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THE BIRTH OF A POLICY.

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MILITARY CIVIC ACTION AND COUNTERINSURGENCY:
THE BIRTH OF A POLICY

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MILITARY CIVIC ACTION AND COUNTERINSURGENCY:

THE BIRTH OF A POLICY

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MILITARY CIVIC ACTION AND COUNTERINSURGENCY:

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CHAPTER I

EXPLANATION OF METHOD

Before 1954 most scholars in the field of international relations considered such elements as power, history and geo-politics to be the determining factors behind the patterns of interactions among nations. Since this objective approach reified the state and neglected the human element Richard Snyder, in 1954, proposed a method of analysing international relations from a subjective viewpoint. Instead of the State he would place the nation's decision-makers at the center of his analysis, and explore the circumstances which led them to particular decisions.¹ In this manner he believed he could better determine why nations exhibited their distinctive patterns of interaction.² "The State's

¹James N. Rosenau, "The Premises and Promises of Decision-Making Analysis," 194-98 in James C. Charlesworth, ed., Contemporary Political Analysis (New York: The Free Press, 1967).

²Richard Snyder, H. W. Bruck, Burton Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision-Making (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), 60-62. Hereafter the authors are referred to collectively as Snyder.

action [then became] the action taken by those who were acting in the name of the State."³

Snyder assumed that decision-makers planned their actions in order to gain optimal conditions and in order to prevent other nations from interfering with those conditions.⁴ He believed that an observer could follow the course of those actions or decisions through an identification of the four basic components of action: situation, actors, goals and means.⁵ It is therefore the purpose of this chapter to analyze these four components in order to portray the format around which the following chapters will be oriented.

Situation and Actors

The situation is the independent variable which conditions goals and means, and it is defined by the actors or decision-makers. Therefore if the analyst intends to determine why a particular decision occurred he must view the situation as the actors viewed it. This involves defining the situation in terms of how the actors relate to each other; to goals and means; and in terms of how they formulate goals and means into strategies of action subject to relevant factors in the situation.⁶

³Ibid., 65.

⁴Ibid., 60.

⁵Ibid., 64.

⁶Ibid.

Snyder encompasses a set of potentially relevant factors in the situation under the rubric of setting, which has two major aspects, internal and external. Each of these possesses several subdivisions. The internal setting is composed of an organizational unit within which the actors decide, the structure and character of the society within which the unit is placed and the geographic unit in which all are placed. The external setting is composed of similar factors, with the exception that they are situated in other countries; the organizational unit, society and geographic position of other areas may influence the actor under analysis. The degree of influence which these factors in the setting exert upon the decision-makers and hence upon the decision under analysis, constitutes the research problem for the analyst.

These factors may directly influence decision-makers as in direct communication between governments. On the other hand, the influence may be indirect: events in a foreign society may influence public opinion in the decision-maker's country from which he, in turn, receives impulses. Snyder adds that the decision-makers themselves may be a source of influence on their further decisions, and hence a relevant factor in the situation. This occurs through the process of feedback.⁷

Since it is difficult to determine which of these

⁷Ibid., 66-73, 132.

factors holds the most relevance for particular decision-makers, Snyder has interjected three variables around which the search for relevancy may be oriented: spheres of competence, communication and information, and motivation.⁸ The first of these, spheres of competence, deals generally with the totality of those activities of the decision-maker relative and necessary to the achievement of the organizational goal.⁹ Among the problems which the analyst faces concerning this variable is a determination of the relative importance of rules and/or conventions. Conventional procedure may place the actor in a more important position vis á vis the organizational goal than he would obtain according to formal rules. Another problem involves the exploration of authority and subordination relationships in order to determine the particular actor's place in the organization. Still further questions include categorizing the actor's functions as general or specific; usually the higher the competence the more general the functions and vice-versa. Finally, in relation to spheres of competence, Snyder considers what structure of participation the actor exhibits. It may be representative in character, meaning he is directly involved in the decision-making process or it may be an advisory position which does not include actual policy-making

⁸Ibid., 106-71.

⁹Ibid., 106.

power.¹⁰

The answers to these questions concerning the spheres of competence are sought within the structure of the decision unit: the occupants of those spheres of competence orienting themselves around a particular decision. The decision unit may be composed formally of only cabinet members, for example. On the other hand it may include members who are not formally associated with the usually accepted spheres of competence. Snyder facilitates matters here when he states that only personnel connected with the government in some capacity may be included within the decision unit, for only they possess the authority to carry out a decision.¹¹

Government officials usually have an advantage in the utilization of the second variable for determining relevant factors in the situation, communication and information. Since, in most cases, they occupy high spheres of competence they are in a good position to influence the leaders by communicating to them information on the situation. The higher the competence the more channels of communication are usually available. Therefore it is important to discover who communicates information and how.¹²

Spheres of competence, communication and information are pertinent variables around which to orient research geared

¹⁰Ibid., 106-24.

¹¹Ibid., 92-100.

¹²Ibid., 124-37.

to determining why particular factors in the situation appeared relevant and therefore influenced a particular decision. However the center of this question is not approached until the third variable is considered, motivation. Snyder indicates that, in general, motivation is the intervening variable between the organism and the situation. Over time an organism develops a readiness to respond to given stimuli in the situation in a particular manner. Both the readiness to respond or attitude and the action of responding, frame of reference, may be analysed through motivational analysis.¹³

These changes in motivation which occur over time may be illustrated in concert with Snyder's concept of an event, which is a sequence of activities encompassing a particular decision. Decision-making may now be described as action which occurs incrementally. Each sequence of activities may be isolated and studied individually and in connection with the others in order to arrive at the reasons behind the particular decision. Included in this analysis is the fact that goals and means change over time for various reasons such as differing interpretations of the situation by members of the decision unit. These avenues of conflict are sources of research in order to determine the influence on the decision by occupants of various spheres of competence.¹⁴ It is in regard to researching the sources of these conflicts

¹³Ibid., 137-53.

¹⁴Ibid., 91.

that motivation is important, for the analyst must determine why and how the individual developed a readiness to respond to stimuli in his distinctive manner. This constitutes the observance of attitude formation and its influence on the decision-maker's interpretation of the situation. Snyder indicates that the illustration of attitudes is oriented around two basic types of motives, "because of" and "in order to." The former derives from the personal history of the actor and is demarcated according to the procedures of psychoanalysis. However, Snyder states that this form of analysis does not accord with the function of the political scientist. This frees the observer to concentrate upon "in order to" motives which occur in order to obtain some objective. This type of motive is derived largely from the actor's experience within a particular decision unit and is therefore association with the unit's goal.¹⁵

In preparing the individual to respond in certain ways to stimuli, attitudes establish the background for an analysis of frame of reference or the form of response.¹⁶ Frame of reference contains three elements: perception, valuation and evaluation. The first of these is characterized as omitting, supplementing and structuring incoming information. It is what one sees as relevant in accordance

¹⁵Ibid., 144.

¹⁶Ibid., 148-53.

with his conceptual map.¹⁷

The second element, valuation, strikes at the center of the concept of political legitimacy. In many instances a decision-maker describes his motives for a decision in terms of what he perceives that the public or other actors want to hear. His descriptions of his actions, then are circumscribed by the prevailing norms of his society and the international system in general. For example, today nearly every nation and leader must clothe his pronouncements with some semblance of democratic platitudes. Even though democracy may symbolize different values to different societies the word itself, democracy, is the norm of international society and statesmen subordinate it to their peril, both at home and abroad. Valuation as an aspect of frame of reference determines the normative bounds of the sequence of activities encompassing decision-making.¹⁸

Since the actor's decisions are circumscribed by values, it is necessary that he continue to evaluate the impact of his actions upon the setting. This constitutes Snyder's third element of frame of reference, evaluation, which is perhaps best understood in concert with the concept of feedback. According to whether the feedback is positive or negative, the actor will continue or modify his decision and/or choice of relevant factors in the situation.¹⁹

¹⁷Ibid., 151.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid., 132.

Motivational research, then consists of analysing attitudes and frames of reference in terms of their effects upon the actor's choice of relevant factors in the situation. To aid the researcher Snyder provides six sources of motivational data.²⁰ The first source considers the general nature of a country's foreign policy orientation such as the United States' containment of communism, and its bearing upon the characteristics of an actor's motivation.²¹

The second source is concerned with the influence upon members of the decision unit of that unit's particular goal. The attitudes and frame of reference of an actor's fellow decision-makers are reflected within the confines of the usually small group concerned with a particular goal. Each individual seeks a certain degree of reinforcement of his perceptions from his colleagues. Perhaps this occurs to a large extent unconsciously, but at any rate Snyder states that it is important to determine the characteristics of the group relationship of those connected with particular goals.²²

While the second source of motivational data is oriented around values derived from the group's relationship to its external goal, the third source involves the internal structure of the decision unit. Its members are partly

²⁰Ibid., 153-71.

²¹Ibid., 153-54.

²²Ibid., 154.

motivated to action according to the norms generated by the internal dynamics of the group relationship.²³

A fourth source of motivational data involves a delineation of external values outside of the group's goal which are internalized within the members of the decision unit. Each member possesses a more or less unconscious standard of values which govern his actions. The analyst may discover this standard through observation of the give and take of argument over particular goals and means. What is relevant to one actor may or may not be to the next, and many times neither can explain why. It is in part the task of the observer to proffer an explanation.²⁴

In contrast to the fourth, members of the decision unit are able to explain the fifth source of motivational data as it involves external values which they consciously reflect. Snyder refers here to the influence of pressure groups on decision-makers which tend to circumscribe their action. As will be shown in this dissertation the military is an example of a pressure group which motivates decision-makers to weigh its interests.²⁵

The final source of motivational data which Snyder illustrates falls under the general term of personality, which encompasses intellectual skills and interpretations of

²³Ibid., 155-56.

²⁴Ibid., 156-58.

²⁵Ibid., 160-69.

competence. The former indicates the importance of a member of the decision unit's occupation, whether lawyer, accountant, military man or other upon the way the actor perceives the situation and, hence, upon his motivation to action. Also pertinent in this respect is the amount of continuing relations which the individual maintains with his professional colleagues.²⁶

In regard to interpretation of competence Snyder attempts to determine how the decision-maker views his role in the decision unit since an actor's self-image in relation to his peers delineates his actions in regard to particular decisions. Snyder lists six basic personality types each possessing a specified self-image or interpretation of competence within the decision unit.²⁷ The first of these is the communicator who interprets his role as coordinator of policies and distributor of information. Another type is the innovator whom Snyder describes as a rebel against the existing normative order. He is the one most likely to be a primary source of internally generated demands to redefine situations or to focus the energies of the decisional system. His conservative counterpart is labeled the traditionalist. A repository of precedent, the traditionalist's actions tend to slow up organizational change and induce rigidity in policy problems. A fourth basic personality type is the

²⁶Ibid., 160-69.

²⁷Ibid., 169-71.

realist who perceives only what in his opinion are the major essentials of situations. He is usually more concerned with specifics than with generalities. Opposed to this narrow view is the power-seeker who takes a broad view of his sphere of competence and inflates its functional aspects. He will violate procedural norms with impunity if it serves his special purpose. Diametrically opposed to the power-seeker is the final personality type, the career servant. This individual maintains a carefully correct attitude with respect to his role limitations and has a strong sense of organizational mission.²⁸

Goals

Upon utilizing the motivational data to determine the most important factors in the situation to the decision unit the analyst is prepared to observe the actor's process of goal selection. The importance of this component of action is revealed in Snyder's definition of decision-making: "a process which results in the selection from a socially defined, limited number of problematical, alternative projects of one project intended to bring about the particular future state of affairs envisioned by the decision-makers."²⁹

He subdivided the component of goal into four elements. The first being the target or the specific achievement element, an example of which was the raising of the

²⁸Ibid., 175-77.

²⁹Ibid., 90.

standard of living in France under the Mutual Security Program. Following the target was a generalized directional element which referred to the ultimate state of affairs envisioned through the goal, including its relationship to other objectives and to total strategy. A third division concerned expectations. This indicated projected changes which would not have obtained without the action, such as heightening of the French resistance to internal appeals to communism. Finally, the fourth element of goal referred to the dimension of time; goals were the directional components of action and they would change over time.³⁰

Means

Finally, having observed the components of action of situation, actors and goals the analyst is ready to consider means or policy. In one sense means may be described as action in progress which has occurred, is occurring, and which is projected. In another sense means constitutes rules or guides to action, which include three aspects: The substance of a response to some future situation, for example, to oppose communist invasion anywhere by American arms; the conditions under which a particular response will be made as in the Suez Crisis when the United States indicated that it would take no action on its own, but, if asked by Great Britain for a view it would oppose complete Egyptian control; finally, the third aspect of rules of action is described as

³⁰Ibid., 82-84.

the interpretation of future events and circumstances, for example any move by the Soviet Union to reduce atomic stockpiles will be regarded as an empty gesture. Snyder's component of action of means then, describes a policy of action along with rules to guide that action with respect to a problem, contingency or event which has occurred, is occurring or is expected to occur.³¹

Snyder terminates his book with a succinct discussion on what is involved in the specific instance of choice. He states that choice coincides with one's scale of preferences which are derived from: organizational norms which the actor follows; rules, prescribed and conventional, and precedents; and the decision-maker's personal biography. The remainder of this dissertation will discuss John F. Kennedy's choice of the means or policy of military civic action and counterinsurgency within the framework of Snyder's methodology.

The official definitions, doctrines and orientations of military civic action and counterinsurgency are derived largely from President Kennedy's directives in his May 25, 1961 message to Congress and in National Security Action Memorandum no. 119.³² In the former he elaborated upon the proper purposes of military assistance during his administration:

³¹Ibid., 84-85.

³²Willard Barber and Neale Ronning, Internal Security and Military Power: Counterinsurgency and Civic Action in Latin America (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966), 153-54.

this program like economic assistance, needs a new emphasis. It cannot be extended without regard to the social, political, and military reforms essential to internal respect and stability. The equipment and training provided must be tailored to legitimate local needs and to our own foreign and military policies, not to our supply of military stocks or a local leader's desire for military display. And military assistance can, in addition to its military purposes, make a contribution to economic progress.³³

In National Security Action Memorandum no. 119

Kennedy delineated three situations wherein military civic action would be useful:

1. To strengthen military-civil relationships in countries combating active internal subversion.
2. Local military forces can contribute to economic and social development where neither internal subversion or external attack is imminent.
3. Military civic action projects should not impair the military role of the armed forces in countries threatened by external aggression.³⁴

In accordance with these directives the Department of the Army Field Manual defined military civic action as the "use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation and other areas contributing to economic and social development,

³³"Special Message Read by the President Before a Joint Session of the Congress, May 25, 1961," 28-37 in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents (Washington: Historical Office Bureau of Public Affairs, 1962).

³⁴Barber and Ronning, Internal Security and Military Power, 154.

which could also serve to improve the standing of the indigenous military forces with the population."³⁵ The same manual described counterinsurgency as "those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat subversive insurgency."³⁶

These definitions, along with Kennedy's directives, imply a basic difference between military civic action as a policy in its own right on the one hand, and as a supplement to a primary policy of counterinsurgency on the other. In the former case military civic action would take as its primary goal the prevention of communist insurgency, while in the latter case it would constitute a means toward defeating insurgents through military combat.³⁷ Accordingly, when this study refers to a policy of military civic action it connotes preventive action by the military; when a policy of counterinsurgency is referred to the goal is one of defeating insurgents in military combat.

³⁵Department of the Army Field Manual 31-22 "U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces" (Washington: Headquarters Department of the Army, November 1963), 4.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Barber and Ronning, Internal Security and Military Power, 6-8.

CHAPTER II

KENNEDY'S PERCEPTION OF THE SITUATION DURING THE PRE-DECISIONAL SEQUENCE

It is one purpose of this dissertation to utilize Snyder's decision-making methodology to determine how and why John F. Kennedy arrived at the decision to implement the policy of military civic action as a means of preventing communist aggression in the underdeveloped areas of the world, particularly in Latin America and Southeast Asia. It is a further purpose to determine why in Vietnam that policy changed to a primary emphasis on defeating insurgents through counterinsurgency.

Following Snyder's concept of decision-making as a sequence of activities it will be shown that this strategy of action evolved incrementally over several years.¹ Accordingly pre-decisional and decisional activities will be isolated for analysis with the immediate aftermath of the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961, for reasons which will

¹The length of time involved in the decision under analysis serves to differentiate it from Glenn Paige's definition of a crisis decision, which he derived from his study of Snyder's methodology. Paige defined a crisis decision as "a response to a high threat to values, either immediate or long range, where there is little time for decision under conditions of surprise." Glenn Paige, The Korean Decision: June 24-30, 1950 (New York: The Free Press, 1958), 276.

become apparent, serving as the dividing line between them. In accordance with this procedure the present chapter will focus on Kennedy's changing definition of the situation through the pre-decisional sequence while the following chapters concentrate largely on the decisional sequence.

The following statement succinctly delineates Kennedy's perception of the external setting during the pre-decisional sequence:

I sincerely believe what I said in the State of the Union Message about our position in the world. During the next four years our country will be strongly tested. Anyone who looks at the increasing power of the communist block, the belligerency which marks it, particularly the Chinese communists, would conclude that we are going to be severely tested in the next four years.²

From this quote by Kennedy just after he took office it is obvious that he perceived the most relevant factor in the external setting to be communist aggression. He further clarified his conception of that threat through an analysis of the communist strategy: Since the communists had at least equaled the United States nuclear capacity they were free to concentrate upon "Sputnik diplomacy, limited brush-fire wars, indirect non-overt aggression, intimidation and subversion, internal revolution, increased prestige or influence and blackmail of our allies. Through these methods they could nibble away the periphery of the free world with

²J. F. Kennedy, Kennedy and the Press, annotated by Harold Chass and Allen Lerman (New York: Cromwell Co., 1965), Feb. 8, 1961, 20.

seemingly insignificant conquests."³ He further stated that the United States had allowed the communists to evict it from its rightful estate at the head of the world-wide revolution. The communists had made the United States "portray the defender of the status quo while they epitomized the vanguard force pointing the way to a better world."⁴ Their strategy, then, involved a deft combination of political, military, social and economic tactics, all aimed at capturing the hearts and minds of men.

Kennedy's conception of the communist threat as a battle for the hearts and minds of men received reinforcement on January 6, 1961. On that date Nikita Khrushchev made his famous "wars of liberation speech" in which he pledged support for all revolutionary movements.⁵ It was the opinion of the Russian Premier that communism constituted the inevitable wave of the future. This was so for several reasons. First the Socialist countries, backed by the nuclear power of the Soviet Union, now could effectively counter any "imperialist" drive to initiate a major world war. Furthermore the imperialists realized that by engaging in local aggressive

³"The Missile Gap," speech in the Senate, August 14, 1958, 33-45 in Allen Nevins, ed., The Strategy of Peace (New York: Harper & Row, 1960).

⁴"The Global Challenge," January 1, 1960, 3-8 in Ibid.

⁵"The Communist Doctrine of Wars of Liberation: Address by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. (Khrushchev) Before a Meeting of Party Organizations of the CPSU, Moscow, January 6, 1961," 555-58 in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962.

wars that they would run the risk of escalation into a nuclear holocaust. Therefore Khrushchev reasoned that the wars of the indefinite future would center upon wars of liberation. The "Oppressed" peoples, realizing that they had the backing of the communist block, would increasingly engage in guerrilla activities to overthrow oppressive regimes supported by imperialist powers. To emphasize his point he cited the examples of this phenomena in Algeria, Vietnam and Cuba.⁶

This speech indicated to Kennedy that in his administration the main communist threat would be within rather than between countries and that it would be based more on psychological strategy than on conventional military procedure.⁷ To Kennedy this psychological aspect of Khrushchev's speech indicated affinity with the political philosophy of Mao Tse-tung; however, similarity in communist strategy was not only exhibited between Russia and China. When Kennedy took office there were four major trouble spots in the external setting each portraying a variation of the communist strategy of "wars of liberation." These areas were Vietnam, Laos, the Congo and Cuba.⁸

The Communist movement in South Vietnam was particularly

⁶Ibid.

⁷Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, 87th Congress, 2nd Session (April 9, 1962), 76-77.

⁸Kennedy and the Press, 13; Helen Fuller, Year of Trial: Kennedy's Crucial Decisions (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962), 90.

threatening to Kennedy when viewed within the perspective of the commitments which Dwight Eisenhower had made to President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1954. He felt bound by Eisenhower's pledge to uphold the Geneva Accords by defending South Vietnam from aggression and subversion instigated from above the 17th parallel.⁹

Apparently Kennedy had realized the psychological-political nature of communist subversion in Vietnam since at least 1954. Evidence for this is found in a Senate speech on April 6 of that year in which he described the enemy as being everywhere and nowhere at the same time, and as having the support of the populace. Furthermore he stated that in spite of French assurances to the American people to the contrary they controlled the Indochinese people politically, militarily, economically and culturally. Therefore in order to gain their support against communist aggression these people must receive "a sufficient degree of independence from France to make them feel that the war is being waged in their cause and for their benefit." Even before 1954 he stated that communism in Southeast Asia must be met by building strong native non-communist sentiment within these areas and relying on that as a spear-head of defense rather than upon

⁹"Exchange of Messages with the President of the Republic of Vietnam, December 15, 1961," 505 in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962; Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), 650-51.

the force of the United States arms.¹⁰

The necessity to strengthen non-communist sentiment also was a requirement in Laos as Kennedy stepped into office. Souvanna Phouma, a neutralist leader whom the French supported, temporarily resided in Cambodia, while the Communist-dominated Pathet Lao occupied North East Laos and the Plain of Jars. The fact that the troops of Phoumi Nosavan, who held the support of the United States, were psychologically unprepared to face the impending invasion of the Pathet Lao, along with North Vietnamese troops, became evident in March when they initiated a scared retreat.¹¹

As in Southeast Asia, communists were attempting to capitalize upon disorder in the Congo as Kennedy entered office. The Belgians had left that area to fend for itself, perhaps prematurely, and in the process invited chaos as Katanga, the most important province of the area, seceded from the Union. The real danger to world peace temporarily abated when the United Nations intervened to isolate the crisis from the major cold war antagonists. However in early 1961 it appeared that the United Nations might be forced to retreat. Thus Kennedy weighed the situation.¹²

¹⁰"War in Indochina," 284-94 in John F. Kennedy: A Compendium of Speeches, Statements and Remarks Delivered During his Service in the Congress of the United States (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964).

¹¹Sorenson, Kennedy, 640.

¹²Ibid., 635-39.

Cuba constituted the fourth major area where the communists were utilizing a psychological-military approach to gain political power. This Caribbean country had witnessed a revolution at the hands of Fidel Castro and others in January 1959 and by the time that Kennedy occupied the presidency it was generally agreed that Castro's was a bona fide communist regime. The threat increased when it became clear that Cubans were receiving training in Russia to become the vanguard of a hemisphere-wide communist revolution.¹³

The various facets of the communist threat in the external setting portrayed in the above four cases became even more frightening to the president when he reviewed them within the context of the internal setting and the political doctrine which he had inherited from the previous administration in Washington. In Kennedy's opinion, the Eisenhower administration "substituted platitudes and slogans for the strength and planning on concrete issues which was necessary to meet the increasingly complex communist offensive."¹⁴ The Republican strategy of massive retaliation had limited the United States' options to the minimum of meeting each

¹³Kennedy and the Press, 5; "The Castro Regime in Cuba: Document submitted to the Inter-American Peace Committee by the U.S. Representative on the Council of the OAS (Morrison), December 6, 1961," 324-26 in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962. Although the document was submitted in December it pointed out that the U.S. had been suspicious of the Cuban-communist Alliance since 1959.

¹⁴"Speech in the Senate," August 14, 1958, 705-15 in J.F.K.: A Compendium.

communist foray with either "indignant platitudes or an atomic bomb." The resultant situation presented increasing opportunities for wars due to miscalculation. Kennedy stated that he had seen three major wars in his lifetime caused by miscalculation, and he did not want to be responsible for a fourth.¹⁵ Therefore he advocated a change in political doctrine to replace that of the old regime.

However, change in political doctrine at the chief executive level was not the only one in store. He believed that the occupants of other spheres of competence in the executive decision unit also had to experience a change in perception. It was his belief that the administrators of republican programs were "short-sighted unsympathetic men, opposed to the very programs they are administering, awaiting their return to private industry, and so lacking in compassion for our domestic needs as to be incapable of compassion for the desperate needs of the world's peoples."¹⁶

President Kennedy also perceived a reactionary state of mind in Congress. He believed that that more conservative body would constitute one of his most difficult problems as he attempted to cope with the communist offensive in developing countries. This fear was particularly evidenced in the realm of long-term assistance to those areas.¹⁷ Probably he

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶"A Time of Decision," Senate Speech, June 14, 1960, 926-35 in Ibid.

¹⁷Kennedy and the Press, March 23, 1961, 56.

did not expect more from Congress since it was elected by another conservative element of the internal-setting, the United States public, which he perceived to hold several invalid assumptions concerning foreign policy. Among them were the following:

American arms and science are superior to any others in the world . . . American efforts for world wide disarmament are a selfless sacrifice for peace . . . Our bargaining power at any international conference table is always more vast and flexible than that of our enemy. . . . A free and peace-loving nation has nothing to fear in a world where right and justice inevitably prevail . . . Americans live far behind the lines, protected by time, space, and a host of allies from attack . . . We shall have time to mobilize our superior economic resources after a war begins . . . Our advanced weapons and continental defense systems, established at a tremendous cost and effort, will protect us . . . Victory ultimately goes to the nation with the highest national income, gross national product, and standard of living.¹⁸

His opinion of the public was not all gloomy however. He stated on one occasion that its people constituted America's greatest resource. He believed that if an American were given a cause to believe in that he would find a way to achieve its implementation.¹⁹ This statement alerts the observer to the basic optimism inherent in Kennedy's political style, the basis for which, according to Arthur Schlesinger, may reside in the fact that his political attitudes received crystallization during the era of the Marshall Plan. He

¹⁸"Senate Speech," August 14, 1958, 705-715 in J.F.K.: Compendium.

¹⁹John Kennedy, "The Global Challenge," January 1, 1960, 3-8 in Nevins, ed., Strategy of Peace.

witnessed Europe's use of that policy enable it to gain the necessary confidence to rise from the desolation of total war to become the third leading industrial area of the world in only a decade. It is this unusual experience which probably conditioned his faith in the possibility of a similar response on the part of the Americans of the sixties which would help the developing world meet the flexible communist strategy.²⁰ In terms of Snyder's dictum to concentrate on "in order to" instead of "because of" motives it may be surmized, then, that Kennedy sought to achieve an objective similar to that obtained through the Marshall Plan.

The evidence presented thus far concerning his perception of the situation may be utilized in identifying the four elements of Kennedy's goal in the developing world in accordance with the format advocated by Snyder: trait, generalized directional element, expectation and time.²¹ The trait aspect or specific achievement element comprised the instigation of a vigorous state of mind in the people of the "free world" conducive to the positive implementation of democratic values. Based on this positive commitment to democratic values, the generalized directional element envisioned a world of independent nations. In a world thus constituted it was his expectation to diminish further communist gains.

²⁰ Arthur Schlesinger, A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 789.

²¹ Snyder, Foreign Policy Decision-Making, 82-84.

The time element was most vital to Kennedy for he believed that the survival of the democratic way of life depended upon a vigorous pursuit of his goal during the nineteen sixties.

The means which Kennedy would employ to achieve that goal is evidenced in the debate which raged throughout the Eisenhower administration over the proper technique to stop communist aggression. As a senator John Kennedy constituted an important figure in that debate. He espoused the position that the United States was overemphasizing the role of the Strategic Air Command at the expense of ground forces, as seen in the Lebanon crisis of 1958. "That situation showed our lack of ability to fight a limited war with speed, discrimination and with the versatility needed to keep it limited and not weaken our ultimate retaliatory power."²² In this connection he believed that the United States should reverse the critical cut in its military manpower which it began in 1954 when it attempted to subordinate military security to the budget.²³

He emphasized his belief in the correctness of the strategy of limited war and its emphasis on manpower many times before he occupied the presidency, particularly during the presidential campaign of 1960. In his debates with Richard M. Nixon, among other occasions, he pointed out that

²²"Senate Speech," August 14, 1958, 705-15 in J.F.K.: A Compendium.

²³Ibid.

the United States possessed at best nuclear parity with the Russians and at worst, and most probable, a "missile gap." Thus in an age of nuclear stand-off the proper means appeared to him to rest with some form of limited war, if war must occur.²⁴

Following Snyder, means constitute both action and rules of action, with the combination of the two comprised of three components: substance, conditions and interpretation.²⁵ Utilizing this format the general outline of Kennedy's military policy in the underdeveloped areas during the pre-decisional sequence may now be illustrated. As for substance he would meet the communist military-political offensive in the underdeveloped world with a United States sponsored counter-offensive. The conditions of this United States response would contain an explicit warning to the recipients of United States assistance that they must also help themselves or the long-run effects would be negative. As for the interpretation of future events, he would probably interpret any interference in the United States project as communist inspired.

These appeared to be the basic elements of Kennedy's military policy in the underdeveloped world during his first three months in office. However an event occurred in April

²⁴Sidney Kraus, ed., The Great Debates (U.S.A.: Indiana University Press, 1962), 416; Nevins, ed., Strategy of Peace.

²⁵Snyder, Foreign Policy Decision-Making, 84-85. Also see chapter one.

of that first year which caused him to instigate, in Snyder's terms, a painful re-evaluation of all four components of action: situation, actors, goals and means. This was the abortive invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs, and it served notice to him that enunciating and implementing a policy were two different things.

In terms of the format of this dissertation, the results of the Bay of Pigs caused the sequence of activities concerning counterinsurgency and civic action to move from the pre-decisional into the decisional or implementational sequence as several newly relevant factors emerged which changed Kennedy's definition of the situation.

Following are some of the incidents which, in conformity with Snyder's terminology, indicated to Kennedy a mix-up in the communication of information: He had assumed that the exiles were prepared to fight the limited guerrilla type of warfare which he had sanctioned. However, not only without his knowledge but apparently even without the concurrence of President Eisenhower, the exiles received instruction in conventional warfare rather than in guerrilla tactics. Furthermore, if the invasion had proven unsuccessful, they were to have moved through the Zapata swamp to the Escambray Mountains where they would join other rebels in subversive warfare against Castro. But occupation by Castro's forces of the few passes through the swamp area enabled them to cut off the advance of the exiles into the interior of Cuba.

Also the re-infiltration of Cuban exiles had not been the quiet, clandestine affair that Kennedy had expected. Rather it turned into an overly publicized invasion by the United States which failed when anti-Castro forces inside Cuba did not answer the call to arms against Castro. This illustrated the fact that a meeting of minds failed to occur between the exiles and the United States government over the degree of participation by each in the invasion. Instead of the Revolutionary Council of the exiles deciding to risk their own lives without United States support as Kennedy expected, they assumed that the United States navy would supply them with jets and warships, along with a diversionary force. The administration in Washington learned afterwards that Dr. José Miró Cardona, the leader of the Revolutionary Council, had failed to pass on the message portraying the lack of support from the United States. Further confusion permeated the ranks of the exiles as seen in the lack of coordination between their various groups which occurred largely because of the element of distrust which swept the whole movement. Distrust ensued not only because of conflict over correct policy, but also over the presence, against Kennedy's orders, of many pro-Batista elements in their midst who were only slightly less suspect than supporters of Castro.²⁶

Following these incidents Kennedy realized that in

²⁶Sorenson, Kennedy, 302-04; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 250-59.

order to obtain his goal of initiating in the people of the underdeveloped areas a state of mind conducive to democracy he needed to determine the reason for the communication of faulty information on the true state of affairs surrounding the Bay of Pigs invasion. This would necessitate, as a first step, a serious re-evaluation of the spheres of competence from which he received those communiques. It should be recalled that he had occupied his office for only about three months at the time of the debacle which hardly allowed him sufficient time to set in motion a smooth working decision unit. He was still engaged in the process of discarding Eisenhower's rules and conventions and installing his own. Therefore he did not know the strengths and weaknesses of his advisors vis á vis military security policy at this time.²⁷ In fact he had not even chosen a personal military advisor.²⁸

Due to this lack of crystallization of decision unit and procedure he had to rely largely on the advisors who had set in motion, during the Eisenhower administration, the complicated series of events pertaining to the invasion. This meant the enhanced competence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence Agency at the expense of the lower levels of the bureaucracy, including those at the

²⁷ Fuller, Year of Trial, 52.

²⁸ Ibid., 55.

regional level of expertise.²⁹ To be even more specific, in most important matters the Joint Chiefs yielded to the CIA. Perhaps the most disastrous example of this occurred when the Joint Chiefs of Staff failed to challenge the CIA's insistence upon the Bay of Pigs as the point of invasion even though the former organization privately disagreed with the latter's choice. This left the CIA in more or less complete charge of a full scale invasion, in spite of the fact that it was militarily equipped to handle no more than a small covert affair.³⁰

The questionable ability of the CIA to perform such a task was concealed by the successful precedent it had set in expelling the communist regime from Guatemala in 1954. Ironically its success in that venture led to failure in 1961, for assistant director Richard Bissell, who had guided the Guatemalan operation, became emotionally involved with the attempt to maintain his reputation at the Bay of Pigs. In the process he lost objectivity and ignored clear signs that Castro was indeed prepared for the exile forces.³¹

The president also examined the role of the Department of State in the invasion fiasco. Although many members in its lower echelons had advised against it, the subordinated

²⁹Ibid., 59-62; Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1967), 30-34.

³⁰Sorenson, Kennedy, 306.

³¹Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 30-31.

spheres of competence from which they communicated their information diminished its effect, and accordingly Kennedy was not motivated to act positively upon it.³² Also derogating the role of State was the fact that Dean Rusk, although a member of that department for years, had barely entered the Secretary's office and did not consider himself prepared to recommend a policy.³³

Two other notable occupants of relatively high spheres of competence failed to receive consultation with Kennedy: Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Adlai Stevenson, United States Ambassador to the United Nations. The president consulted the former briefly only after making the decision to intervene, while the latter remained uninformed until the mission was actually in progress. In fact, Stevenson embarrassed not only himself but his country in the eyes of the world when he announced to the United Nations after the attack had begun that the United States had nothing to do with it.³⁴

Stevenson had important company in his disillusionment, however. For Kennedy soon realized that he had made a mistake at the Bay of Pigs as may be gleaned from the following statement: "How could I have been so far off base?"

³²These circumstances probably account for the lack of influence commanded by Roger Hilsman, head of INR, with his appeal to not intervene. Ibid., 31.

³³Ibid., 35; Sorenson, Kennedy, 304.

³⁴Fuller, Year of Trial, 57.

. . . all my life I've known better than to depend on experts. How could I have been so stupid as to let them go ahead?"³⁵

While in this frame of mind reports from his task forces on Indochina portrayed a similar situation which presented him with the opportunity to profit from the Cuban experience. As indicated above, just before the Bay of Pigs, Phoumi Nosavan was on the run from the communists in Laos. Kennedy interpreted the situation as presenting four alternatives: he could abandon Laos but this would lesson the United States credibility in Indo-China, particularly in the eyes of the Chinese who were already calling the United States a paper tiger. A second alternative was the interjection of more military aid. But this would mean shoring up an unpopular regime which, by retreating from the communists, had proven its lack of courage. Also, in relation to military aid, there were other factors to consider, especially if sending more United States personnel were contemplated. These factors included a lack of ports, railroads and other communications. As a third alternative the United States considered a partition of Laos between the communists and the non-communists. However, besides the problem of maintaining sufficient troops there to guard the borders, the non-communists section would have to contend with a psychological problem of the first magnitude: the traditional site of the Royal Capital, Luang Prabang, would remain within the grip of the

³⁵Sorenson, Kennedy, 309.

communists. This left the final alternative, neutralization, as the most practical solution.

It was the choice of this fourth alternative which finally brought Kennedy to the brink of military intervention. The communists' rejection of his demand for a cease-fire before negotiations over neutralization ensued caused him to heed the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CIA to trigger a seventeen-part mobilization plan in March. By May, however, the precedent of the Bay of Pigs alerted him to the dubious quality of the advice which he received from those experts. These were the same personnel whose wisdom he had not questioned during the Cuban situation. In general the Joint Chiefs of Staff followed the "falling domino theory" which meant that if Laos fell so would all of Southeast Asia. This then was an argument for intervention. This time, though, Kennedy required them to present him individual written reports concerning all possible contingencies. In this manner he found that those in direct command of troops were more cautious than those who viewed the situation from the Pentagon. The former pointed out that conditions in Laos presented insurmountable logistical problems besides the everpresent possibility of Chinese intervention. The Joint Chiefs of Staff countered these arguments by extolling the positive effects of the use of tactical nuclear weapons. It was their opinion that these would require less man power and also serve as a definite deterrent to the

Chinese. Besides, they did not believe that the Chinese, and the Soviets for that matter, would intervene.³⁶

President Kennedy was hesitant to place credibility in the position of the JCS at this point. That group and the CIA had just recently advised him in a similar vein that the Cubans would rebel against Castro if the United States would provide the catalyst, advice which proved untrue. Why then should their prognostication on the state of mind of the Chinese and the Soviets prove any more reliable? It is therefore apparent that Kennedy's "in order to" motives had by now become predisposed to disregard communiques from the upper echelons of the JCS and CIA as primary sources of information on how to deal with the situation in the underdeveloped areas. However he still had not sufficiently crystallized his decision unit to the point where he was ready to give occupants of other spheres of competence the same degree of confidence that he had formerly given the CIA and JCS.

For these reasons Kennedy needed first to place his own advisors in the paramount spheres of competence in his decision unit and then weigh their information on the new situation before he determined the exact nature of his military policy. The next chapter will consequently determine why and how he chose those persons and delineate the attitudes and frame of reference from which they defined the situation.

³⁶Ibid., 641-46.

In this manner a more thorough analysis may be derived of why the policy of military civic action which evolved to meet the impending crises in Latin America and Vietnam became subordinated to the concomitant policy of counterinsurgency.

CHAPTER III

KENNEDY'S DECISION UNIT DURING DECISIONAL SEQUENCE

Whereas some individuals such as the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence Agency had lost credibility on the eve of the decisional sequence, others increased their roles in the decision unit at this time. This chapter will indicate why and how the occupants of these positions, Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy and Dean Rusk, along with others such as Maxwell Taylor, Walter W. Rostow and Robert Kennedy came to constitute important components of Kennedy's decision unit during the pre-decisional sequence and its immediate aftermath. How the changing situation during the decisional sequence served to reinforce the importance of these individuals in the formation of national security policy in general and to counterinsurgency and military civic action in particular will be treated in later chapters.

President Kennedy "took great pleasure in considering the theory of government" and had definite ideas about the place decision units would occupy in his administration. Many of these ideas derived from his experience on the Reorganization Subcommittee in the Senate where he assiduously

studied organization in the White House. His sojourn as chairman of that subcommittee enabled him to wind up the Hoover Commissions investigation of the executive branch of government. Out of this experience, one of the strongest opinions he formed was that the president should be closely involved at every stage of decision-making: "The American Presidency was not intended by its creators as primarily a ceremonial or coordinating job, with its most essential responsibility delegated to non-elected officials."¹

This predilection for the primacy of the president came particularly from his analysis of Eisenhower's shortcomings in the executive branch: "We have found it [the executive branch] full of honest and useful public servants but their capacity to act decisively at the exact time action is needed has too often been muffled in the morass of committees, timidities and fictitious theories which have created a growing gap between decision and execution, between planning and reality, in a time of rapidly deteriorating situations at home and abroad; this is bad for the public service and particularly bad for the country. We mean to make a change."²

His determination to infuse new life into the executive branch induced him to dispense with Eisenhower's

¹Helen Fuller, Year of Crisis: Kennedy's Crucial Decisions, 48.

²Ibid., 49.

convention of weekly cabinet meetings; in fact Kennedy held only ten formal meetings in his first eight months in office. He was more interested in how cabinet members functioned as individuals in their own fields than their contribution to group decisions. He wanted closer contact by direct consultation. This emphasis on a close relationship necessitated that he have men on the "same wave length" as himself in his decision unit.³

In practice this meant the primacy of intellectuals. Kennedy's has been termed the most intellectual administration in the history of the United States. "He was the first president to staff a government with men whose primary qualifications were their knowledge of problems, their understanding of theory and their capacity for logical analysis."⁴ One such man was Robert S. McNamara.

McNamara possessed all the best qualities of a professional manager. He had the ability to range over broad areas of interest, he was interested in ideas, had an analytical mind and a capacity for action. He did not worry over details or the possibility of making mistakes. He did not nibble decisions to pieces, and he would not be scared off from a decision by someone else's reservations.⁵

³Ibid., 43-44.

⁴Ibid., 42-43.

⁵Business Week, February 11, 1961.

Former Defense Secretary Robert Lovett recommended him for the position of Secretary of Defense and on the face of it the choice was a conventional one; for, one day after Kennedy's election, McNamara succeeded to the presidency of the Ford Motor Company and thereby reached that pinnacle of big business from which Eisenhower had drawn his three secretaries. McNamara's road to success lay in his specialty, statistical control, which brought him into contact with the Army Air Force in World War II where he helped keep track of its world-wide inventories, determining what it was going to need next and what supplies it could begin to discard. After the war, he and nine associates moved as a package to the Ford Motor Company where he ascended to the top through finance and product planning.⁶

That McNamara intended to be an integral part of the planning process as Secretary of Defense is seen in the following comment: "I see my position as being that of a leader, not a judge. I'm here to originate, to stimulate new ideas and programs and not just to adjudicate arguments."⁷ McNamara's self-image then seems to fit Snyder's innovative personality type.

Kennedy immediately gave him the opportunity to

⁶William Kaufman, The McNamara Strategy (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 44-46.

⁷Lester Tanzer, The Kennedy Circle (New York: Van Rees Press, 1961), 172.

stimulate new ideas as seen in the following directive: "I have instructed the Secretary of Defense to reappraise the entire defense industry--effectiveness, vulnerability and dispersal of our strategic bases, forces, warning systems, efficiency and economy of our operations and organizations, elimination and obsolete bases and installations, and finally the adequacy, modernization and mobility of our conventional and nuclear weapons in the light of the present situation."⁸ Kennedy wanted his secretary's preliminary conclusions by the end of February, 1961, along with a determination of force structure without regard to budget ceiling. In short, his dual directive to McNamara ordered him to assert civilian supremacy over the Department of defense and to logically derive a military strategic concept.⁹ Before assessing McNamara's response to this directive it is instructive to survey the simultaneous and complimentary development of precedents toward augmenting civilian supremacy over a strengthened Department of Defense and the formulation of a strategic concept.

The movement toward a post-World War II strategic concept began before the end of the war. On April 2, 1945, the Secretary of State advised the Secretaries of War and the Navy of serious deterioration on our relations with the

⁸ Kaufman, McNamara Strategy, 47-48.

⁹ Ibid.; Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), 87.

U.S.S.R. Only a few days later Ambassador Averil Harriman warned from his post in Moscow that "we must clearly realize that the Soviet program is the establishment of totalitarianism, ending personal liberty and democracy as we know it and respect it."¹⁰ According to Harriman the Soviets were simultaneously pursuing three lines: collaboration with the United States and Great Britain in establishing a world security system; creation of their own security system by extending their sway over their neighbors; and extension of their influence into other countries through local communist parties and the opportunities offered by economic chaos and democratic freedoms. He perceived the Soviets as opportunists who considered the "generous and considerate attitude of the United States as a sign of weakness." He therefore advocated a hard line, indicating that we should hurt them if they hurt us.¹¹

The Harriman analysis represented the first effort to assess the overall nature of the Soviet threat and to spell out an approach to deal with it. Events conspired to underwrite the validity of his perception as Soviet influence extended westward into Poland, the Balkans, Iran and the Dardanelles. In September, 1945, the United States, for the

¹⁰Samuel P. Huntington, "The Interim Years: World War II to January, 1950," 298-306 in Raymond G. O'Connor, ed., American Defense Policy in Perspective (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965).

¹¹Ibid.

first time, allowed a high-level conference with the Russians to break down without agreement rather than make further concessions to their demand. This abortive meeting of the Council of Ministers marked the beginning of post-war great power rivalry.

The seeds of the United States' perception of Russia as a pragmatic enemy which Harriman's analysis had sown received reinforcement and crystallization through the communique of George Kennan. Kennan reacted precipitously to a speech by Premier Stalin on February 9, 1946 in which the Russian dictator argued that a peaceful international order was impossible under the present capitalistic development of world economy and announced a five-year plan for massive industrial expansion. Kennan declared that the Soviets had inherited the traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity which reinforced their adherence to Marxist dogma and their view of the inevitability of conflict between the capitalist and communist worlds leading to the victory of the latter. He warned that Russia would use every means to fill every available power vacuum, even though at times, for tactical reasons, they would strive to appear friendly and amenable to negotiation. The following quote succinctly delineates Kennan's definition of the Communist threat:

We have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with the United States there can be no permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be

broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. This political force has complete power of disposition over the energies of one of the world's greatest peoples and the resources of the world's richest national territory . . . The problem of how to cope with this force is undoubtedly the greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably the greatest it will ever have to face.¹²

Out of this admonition of Kennan's emerged the policy of containment which was the application of counterforce corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy. The military strategy which evolved to complement containment possessed two basic tenets: on the one hand the necessity of a huge military force; and, on the other hand, one which followed certain specifications. The envisioned force then would evidence both quantitative and qualitative characteristics. On both counts the United States Armed Forces suffered short-comings in 1947. As for quantity, the United States had followed its usual norm of practically total disarmament to almost total armament to disarmament once again.¹³ The figures speak for themselves: In 1938 this country possessed 322,932 men in arms, while in 1945 the total had reached 12,123,455, and in 1947 the figure was approximately 1,600,000 and falling.¹⁴

Also the qualitative aspects of the available forces did not please the author of the containment policy. From

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Kaufman, McNamara Strategy, 3.

the point of view of Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, the three major components of American military strength were exclusive possession of the atomic bomb, the United States' great productive capacity and its predominant sea-power. According to Kennan's perception of the situation these components of power were actually beside the point for they could offer little help in preserving the integrity of Iran, in suppressing guerrillas in Greece, or in deterring an attack in Korea. To meet these types of threats through a policy of containment ground troops were necessary. In July, 1949, Kennan warned the Joint Strategic Survey Committee that the United States was limiting its choice, in the event of Soviet aggression, either to replying with the atomic bomb or to doing nothing. He further clarified his position by declaring the necessity for two or more mobile and mechanized divisions, trained and ready for instant use in "brush-fire" wars.¹⁵

The two principal implications for a strategy of containment were seen from a different perspective by Harry S. Truman. To him the most relevant factor in the setting consisted of the domestic environment and those who kept perhaps the closest watch on its pulse, the United States Congress. Congress was not predisposed in the late forties to appropriate the necessary funds to successfully implement a strategy of containment. Particularly in the election year of 1948

¹⁵Huntington, "The Interim Years."

it was not going to jeopardize its position with the electorate by raising the necessary taxes. Therefore over Truman's veto it lowered taxes.

The effort to strengthen the military forces received a further setback through Truman's determination to maintain a balanced budget. He decreed that in FY 1948 military activities could have one-third of the funds remaining after fixed charges had been met. This "remainder method" left the military budget from 1947 until 1950 with an average of approximately fourteen billion dollars a year.

It is apparent, then, that the main hinderances to a successful policy of containment in the late forties were a lack of finances and disagreement over the proper strategic concept. In relation to the latter it may be instructive to note that the air force favored a doctrine of deterrence through air power while retaining a desire to concentrate upon winning a war if it should occur. On the other hand, the army favored universal military training in preparation for rapid mobilization on the outbreak of hostilities as the best method of meeting the communist threat. It is also important to note that two of the country's most respected military authorities, George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower, espoused this army point of view along with the conviction that rather than engaging in mere containment measures the United States should strive to win any encounter with the Soviets. The third point of view in respect to strategic

concept came from the State Department and it illustrated a major schism in the United States Government. By advocating the primacy of deterrence through both air and ground forces over the idea of actually winning in the World War II sense, this view pointed out the divergence between the diplomatic-civilian perception of correct policy on the one hand and that of the military on the other.¹⁶

An attempt to establish a single strategic concept came with the passage of the National Security Act in 1947. This act placed the capstone on the new governmental structure deriving from the experiences of the Second World War. Subsequent developments were to flow from the lessons of the post-war period. The act represented a basic charter of civil-military relations and of security policy formation. The core of the system was the National Security Council which in theory would receive already analysed information from the Central Intelligence Agency which it would utilize to promulgate policy through its Basic National Security Policy Documents. This policy would enable the State Department to conduct its international negotiations within a deeper perspective. Furthermore the Military Establishment could devise the strategic and logistic plans necessary to support the agreed policy while also assuring that no policies were adopted making demands beyond the available

¹⁶Ibid.

military capabilities. As a further step the National Security Resources Board was charged with all problems of industrial, manpower and raw material mobilization. Its function consisted of preparing mobilization plans to support military strategy and in keeping the strategic planners within the bounds which the national resources could sustain.¹⁷

The military establishment was composed of three departments, each independently administered by its civilian Secretary and each sustaining a military service under the command of its Chief of Staff. These were now linked together by a series of joint agencies. The strictly military officials in this system constituted the Joint Chiefs of Staff who theoretically served as advisers to both the Secretary of Defense and the President, and who possessed authority to transmit Presidential decisions to the affected services.

Military administration, as distinct from military command, was in theory to be coordinated by the Secretary of Defense. His sphere of competence was limited to general direction, authority and control over the departments. Furthermore, he was expressly forbidden to maintain a military staff or to appoint more than three special assistants from civil life. The three secretaries and their corresponding

¹⁷Walter Millis, "The National Security Act," 307-11 in Raymond O'Connor, American Defense Policy in Perspective.

Chiefs of Staff constituted his advisory War Council. Two other agencies accompanied the Secretary of Defense: a Munitions Board to coordinate military procurement and a Research and Development Board to coordinate military research.

Although the Secretary of Defense possessed limited authority as originally constituted, he held one significant power which would eventually place him at the pinnacle of the Military Establishment. This was his power to supervise and coordinate the budget estimates. The new system recognized the budget as the controlling factor over the course and development of military policy. In theory the military and civilian responsibilities for the budget were meshed. The Joint Chiefs would follow the guide lines of the National Security Council in preparing complementary strategic plans and would then assign to the respective services both their strategic and their logistic responsibilities for fulfillment of the plans. The services would then make their own estimates of what they required to enable them to reach the assigned responsibility. The result would be embodied in three departmental budgets which would go back to the JCS for review and consolidation.¹⁸

In 1949 the Secretary of Defense received an important addition to his authority when a Comptroller of the

¹⁸Ibid.

Department of Defense was constituted as his principal advisor.¹⁹ This officer and the Secretary of Defense would review the JCS budget before final presentation to the president and the Budget Bureau.

In theory, then, military appropriations originated in the policy determinations of the NSC and the president from where they were translated into military terms by the JCS and revised by the Secretary of Defense, to return to the White House and its Budget Bureau for final integration into the total national policy. In practice this coordination system did not live up to its potential. For one thing the JCS could not handle the impossible job of determining the correct percentages of the national resources which should be allocated to defense and then accomplish the even more formidable task of determining the correct allocations among the services against the background of competing weapon systems and strategic theories.²⁰ The resultant inefficiency, when coupled with the situation induced by the Korean conflict, served to enhance the potential power of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The Korean Conflict presented many lessons to those with eyes to see; however each perceived the situation according to his particular motivational background. But

¹⁹Burton Sapin, The Making of United States Foreign Policy (New York: Frederick Praeger Co., 1966), 147.

²⁰Millis, "National Security Act."

most agreed that something happened there for which United States strategic doctrine was unprepared.²¹ A cursory glance would indicate that the advocates of increased limited war capability profited the most from the Korean experience. They could point to the fact that atomic weapons were of no use. Among the reasons that they failed were the following: a desire by the United States to save resources since its stock-piles at that time were scarce; the targets there were unsuitable; there was fear of alienation of our allies, particularly in the area of NATO where a counter move by Russia was a distinct possibility; finally there was the fear that the Soviets would retaliate against Pusan and Japan.²² Also relevant from the perspective of the advocates of limited war was the fact that the United States was not able effectively to utilize the tremendous power of its carriers.²³ On the other hand advocates of the primacy of air power and the atomic bomb could with some truth point out that it was only the lack of will on the part of the politicians which prevented our using the bomb.²⁴

Although the results of Korea were viewed from many different perspectives, the one which counted most in relation

²¹O'Connor, American Defense Policy, 313.

²²Morton Halperin, "The Limiting Process in the Korean War," 314-323 in O'Connor, American Defense Policy.

²³Maxwell Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), 15-16.

²⁴Halperin, "Limiting Process in Korea."

to a strategic concept was that of the new president, Dwight David Eisenhower. He had seen the Truman Administration move from under to over response before and after Korea, respectively, in an economic sense. From a defense budget which averaged approximately 14 billion dollars before the war Truman jumped to over 40 billion during the crisis. Furthermore, the president stated his opinion that the defense budget should remain at over that figure during the fifties. It was this cold fact of the influence of the budget that Eisenhower perceived as the most relevant factor concerning the Korean conflict. He believed that the Soviet Union had "hoped to force upon America and the free world an unbearable security burden leading to an economic disaster."²⁵

It was Eisenhower's opinion that the Pentagon budget must be one which this country could bear for a long and indefinite period of time. Among others, Senator Stuart Symington declared for a greater budget but the aura of Eisenhower prevailed, even over the JCS.

This situation presented another opportunity to enhance the authority of the Secretary of Defense, as Eisenhower perceived the need for overcoming the lack of cost consciousness on the part of the military. To this end he created a panel to recommend measures of reorganization which would ensure an "ever-prepared Pentagon" with "clear and unchallenged

²⁵Clark R. Mollenhoff, The Pentagon (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1967), 164-65.

civilian responsibility" and "maximum effectiveness at minimum cost."²⁶ As a result a decentralization of operations in the Department of Defense occurred in order to ensure civilian leadership. Six assistant Secretaries of Defense were added, while the Munitions Board, the Research and Development Board and the Supply Management Agency were abolished because they were regarded as too cumbersome to be effective management tools.

In a further move at civilian control the authority of the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the JCS increased at the expense of the JCS and the Joint Staff. The Secretary received the authority to select and determine the tenure of the Director of the Joint Staff, while the Chairman obtained the privilege of approving the selection and tenure of the members of the Joint Staff. Also the Chairman received the responsibility for managing the Joint Staff.²⁷

In still another move to enhance civilian control over the military Eisenhower initiated a change in personnel in the JCS, including the appointment of Admiral Arthur Radford to succeed General Omar Bradley as Chairman. To ensure that he would retain control of the situation Eisenhower made the new appointments subject to review every two years. With his new civilian and military defense team and a reorganized Department of Defense, he moved to cut the

²⁶Ibid., 166.

²⁷Ibid.

Defense budget below the forty billion dollar level.²⁸

Eisenhower's efforts to curtail defense spending through his control over the administrative branch of government were strengthened due to certain events surrounding the Joseph McCarthy loyalty hearings in 1954. On May 17, Eisenhower refused to allow Army Counsel John Adams to testify before McCarthy's committee on the grounds of executive privilege and thereby reinforced an important precedent in executive-legislative relations. The importance of the case was not realized at the time because of several extenuating circumstances: Brown vs The Board of Education of Topeka was decided on the same day thereby relegating Eisenhower's action to the back-burner of the news; McCarthy's tactics had so alienated him before the public on live television that people were blind to the importance of the incident. Eisenhower's tremendous popular support allowed him to justify his position by the debatable statement that Washington and Jefferson had utilized executive privilege in order to maintain separation of powers.²⁹

The utilization of executive privilege enabled the Department of Defense simultaneously to increase its independence from Congress and to diminish the authority of the Eisenhower-appointed Comptroller General. The fact that

²⁸Ibid., 14.

²⁹Ibid., 168-81.

FY 1958 expenditures for the Air Force ballistic missile program exceeded the limit allotted to the Air Force prompted the Comptroller General, Joseph Campbell, to attempt to audit the program. However his request by letter to Air Force Secretary James H. Douglas on June 13, 1958 was refused on the grounds of executive privilege.³⁰ This prompted Campbell to write to Representative F. Edward Hebert, Chairman of a House Armed Services Subcommittee interested in the ballistic missile program, and to Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy.³¹ Further correspondence on this subject went to John Moss, Chairman of a House Government Operations Subcommittee conducting a study on the availability of information from federal departments and agencies.³²

The Moss Subcommittee issued a report on the affair on January 25, 1960 in which it reached the following conclusions: Eisenhower had violated Article II section three of the constitution which stated that the President should "take care that the laws be faithfully executed;" there was no foundation whatever for the principle of executive privilege to withhold information from Congress or the General Accounting Office; this action was a clear violation of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, section 313; the precedent of non-elected administrative officials using executive

³⁰Ibid., 223-24.

³¹Ibid., 226.

³²Ibid., 226-27.

privilege to withhold information from the representatives of the people is contributing to corruption and inefficiency and is a danger to democratic government.³³

Still another precedent increasing the authority of civilians in the Department of Defense under Eisenhower resulted from his appointment of James R. Killian as his Special Assistant for Science and Technology. Killian was instrumental in persuading Congress to implement the Directorate of Defense Research and Engineering in the Department of Defense. In order to carry out its responsibilities of monitoring and controlling service expenditures on future weapons the Directorate needed personnel trained in business statistical procedures.³⁴ According to Burton Sapin this is now the third most powerful position in the Department of Defense.³⁵

Almost coinciding with this precedent was the reorganization of the Department of Defense in 1958. This action added considerably to the Secretary's role by clarifying his authority vis á vis the three service departments. The Service Secretaries were to "function under the direction, authority, and control" of the Secretary of Defense.³⁶

In summary, Eisenhower's Defense structure possessed four major instruments to enable him to implement his policies:

³³ Ibid., 230.

³⁴ Kaufman, McNamara Strategy, 32.

³⁵ Sapin, Making of U.S. Foreign Policy, 167.

³⁶ Ibid., 148.

The first was the National Security Council which issued an annual Basic National Security Policy Document. This instrument⁺ provided guidelines by which the Joint Chiefs of Staff, through their Joint Strategic Objectives Plans, projected force requirements five years into the future. The second instrument through which Eisenhower achieved his purposes was his utilization of the fixed budget in a manner similar to that of Truman: after other budgetary expenses were met the military would receive one-third of the remaining funds. Between 1955 and 1966 this amounted to approximately nine to ten percent of the budget. Under the New Look, funds for the services were stabilized at the following figures: Air Force 47%, Navy 29%, Army 22%. Thirdly, Eisenhower reorganized the Department of Defense to place greater power in the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff over the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Finally, he established groups of ad hoc citizens committees to review procedures and chart economically feasible courses.³⁷

According to General Maxwell Taylor this structure failed to provide unambiguous military strategic policy. The procedure through which the Basic Strategic National Policy document was formulated necessitated compromise in order to meet the common denominator of its member's positions on various issues. The most incendiary of these issues concerned

³⁷Kaufman, McNamara Strategy, 22-23.

the credibility of the doctrine of massive retaliation.³⁸ The documents were so vague that both the advocates of massive retaliation and its opponents could claim victory for their position.³⁹ Since these debates placed in perspective the influence of Eisenhower's defense structure on the state of military strategy at the time of Robert McNamara's appointment as Secretary of Defense, it will be instructive to review the arguments which raged during the Eisenhower administration over that topic.

One of the high-points in the decline of the doctrine of massive retaliation occurred in 1954 when the forces of Ho Chi Minh besieged the French at Dien Bien Phu in Indo-China. In desperate straits the French appealed to the United States for assistance. Secretary of State John F. Dulles reportedly was in favor of United States involvement; however, when he confronted Eisenhower he was told to first gain the consensus of our European allies, a project which he was unable to accomplish. This was one political reason why the United States failed to assist the French at this time. But there was a strictly military reason: General Matthew Ridgway disagreed with Admiral Radford's assertion that atomic bombs should be utilized to aid them. It was the contention of the former that the bomb would not only annihilate the communists but it would also destroy those

³⁸Mollenhoff, Pentagon, 163.

³⁹Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet, 82-83.

whom we were trying to protect.⁴⁰ This was not the only time that Ridgway criticized the doctrine of massive retaliation: in fact it was his critique of that policy which finally led to his retirement as Chief of Staff of the army in 1955.⁴¹

Military personnel were not the only ones to criticize that doctrine, for civilian critics of national defense policy informed the public of the limitations of overdependence on nuclear strategy in the middle fifties. Among the writings on the subject was George Kennan's 1954 book, The Realities of American Policy, in which he stated that "The day of the total war has passed. . . . from now on limited operations are the only ones which could conceivably serve any coherent purpose." Similar articles by B. H. Liddell Hart, W. W. Coffman, Vannevar Bush and Bernard Brodie pursued the criticism of the policy of massive retaliation.⁴²

Eisenhower had to contend with questioning of the doctrine within his own supposedly impervious administrative branch when the National Security Council made its first comprehensive review of the 1953 statement of the New Look. For the first time in this review, recognition was given to the possibility of a condition of mutual deterrence and the importance in such a period for the United States to have

⁴⁰Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 101-02.

⁴¹Mollenhoff, Pentagon, 167.

⁴²Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet, 26.

versatile, ready forces to cope with limited aggression. Otherwise the country might have to choose between yielding to local aggression or applying the indiscriminating power of nuclear destruction.⁴³

Another landmark in the demise of massive retaliation came as a result of the Russian incursion into Hungary in 1956. This crisis marked a definite shift in the credibility of the Eisenhower administration for it proved its inability to keep its promise to roll back the iron curtain; American intervention into Hungary would have meant the use of military force which was not contemplated in Dulles' and Eisenhower's original statements on "roll-back."⁴⁴

The end of massive retaliation as a viable policy occurred during hearings over the defense budget for FY 1960. According to Maxwell Taylor, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as usual, took no part in its formulation. In his terms, the budget was compiled vertically, with each service isolated from the others. Then the Joint Chiefs were asked to present in writing their acceptance of the new budget before it went to Congress. Following is the memorandum which they presented in response to this request:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the FY 1960 budget proposed expenditure figure of \$40,954,000,000 is adequate to provide for the essential programs

⁴³Ibid., 26-27.

⁴⁴Paul Y. Hammond, The Cold War Years: American Foreign Policy Since 1945 (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1969), 93.

necessary for the defense of the nation for the period under consideration. They find no serious gaps in the key elements of the budget in its present form but all have reservations with respect to the funding of some segments of their respective service programs.

The Secretary of Defense relayed this memorandum to Congress where it boomeranged when Congress called the Joint Chiefs individually to present in person their reservations.⁴⁵

Taylor was asked to present a written statement encompassing his views. He responded by elaborating on the following four points on which he held reservations: army modernization; the Nike/Zeus anti-missile missile; personnel strength of active army and reserve forces; army surface-to-air missile program.

The issues raised through Taylor's open testimony along with testimony released from other hearings had a country-wide impact. It revealed for the first time the magnitude of the schism within the Joint Chiefs of Staff over massive retaliation and related matters of strategy.⁴⁶ Not the least important of these results was the investigation led by John F. Kennedy's future vice-president, Lyndon Baines Johnson.

Johnson and his Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee received some interesting commentary from Taylor on the Eisenhower administration's

⁴⁵Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet, 69-73.

⁴⁶Ibid., 74-78.

defense policy. Among the opinions which the general expressed were the following: The defense of the United States was presently controlled by nonmilitary factors or military factors which had become outmoded; the United States needed a one million man army and a defense budget of fifty to fifty-five billion dollars for five years to close the gap for "there is no living with communism as an inferior;" it was necessary for the United States to maintain a capability to fight brush-fire wars as well as nuclear ones.⁴⁷

Motivated by this testimony the Johnson Committee began an investigation into army modernization, after which it emerged with several conclusions of its own: There existed a definite need for balanced forces including those especially trained for brush-fire wars since we were now at a stand-off in the field of nuclear missiles. In general the United States possessed limited weapons and equipment, however the need was for production and issuance to the men in the field. Another conclusion concerned Eisenhower's budgetary shortcomings: although the budget for FY 1962 contained a request for \$1,524,000,000 in army procurement money the army stressed that this was mostly to replace losses through consumption in training and obsolescence. Therefore the need was for 2.5 billion for modernization. On top of this Johnson indicated the need for \$928 million for procurement of equipment and weapons.

⁴⁷Mollenhoff, Pentagon, 232.

To illustrate the need for increased man-power Johnson compared the Russian and the United States armies. Russia possessed 175 divisions to the United States' 14, or 2.5 million men to 870,000; however he qualified his statement with the information that only 60% of the Russian divisions possessed sufficient man power to operate on short notice. On the other hand if the United States marines were added to the total of this country's forces the total would come to 1,045,000 men for the United States. But this would still mean a ratio of two and one-half to one in favor of Russia. Therefore since the United States had fewer men it needed superior firepower, mobility and strategic planning.⁴⁸

In regard to strategic planning it should be inserted that the Eisenhower administration was not completely impervious to demands for an increase in ground forces. It apparently needed the advice from many sources including the Draper Committee,⁴⁹ to begin making this a priority project. In fact his last Secretary of Defense, Thomas Gates, indicated in his final report to the president that most of the forces in the next years army would be troops trained to fight in a limited war situation.⁵⁰ Thus the republicans laid the

⁴⁸Report of the Preparedness Investigation Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, 1-22.

⁴⁹The President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program, William H. Draper, Jr., Chairman, 708 Jackson Place, N.W., Washington 25, D. C., June 3, 1959.

⁵⁰Kaufman, McNamara Strategy, 34.

foundation for the break with massive retaliation which came to fruition during the Kennedy administration.

At this point an assessment may be made on the position of the Secretary of Defense on the eve of McNamara's appointment in accordance with Snyder's terminology of spheres of competence: The National Security Act of 1947 and its amendments in 1949, 1953 and 1958 had resulted in the Secretary of Defense occupying the top authority relationship in the Department of Defense. However conventions had prevented the various secretaries from converting potential into actual power; civilian leaders were still reluctant to interfere with the military experts to the extent authorized by their elevated position. One particularly important example of the potential consequences for tampering with what the military considered non-civilian business occurred when Louis Johnson, against the advice of his military advisers, reduced military spending just before the Korean war, an act which "cost him his political neck."⁵¹ The fact that the civilians were still relatively timid in the face of the military was a major reason that inter-service disputes over strategic concepts continued. It was Kennedy's opinion that McNamara was the type of person who as Secretary of Defense would not feel burdened by these conventions of civilian timidity. Rather he would see that conventions complemented rules to make him master of the Department of Defense in practice as

⁵¹Ibid., 20.

well as theory. Upon McNamara's ability to accomplish this task depended the success of the Kennedy administration's search for a strategic concept with which to replace the doctrine of massive retaliation.

The possibilities which McNamara perceived as providing the elements of that concept were three: "minimum deterrence," "optimum mix" and "flexible response." The first of these de-emphasized numerical superiority in favor of small well protected forces aimed at Soviet cities. It was believed that these would decrease the arms race and likewise diminish the possibilities of a Soviet attack. The second possibility, optimum mix, advocated a knock-out blow. Finally, flexible response provided for a matrix of possibilities: the United States could counter attack the enemy's defense installations and maintain reserves with which to attack his cities and still exert pressure to end the war on United States' terms.⁵²

Flexible response held several basic premises: circumstances would occur under which deterrence might not work; the number of lives lost in a nuclear war would vary with the types of targets attacked; the best defense from great damage lay in destroying enemy installations and in utilizing civil defense at home; avoiding enemy cities and holding forces in reserve would give the enemy incentive to limit damage to the United States' allies by focusing its attacks

⁵²Ibid., 51-52; McNamara, Essence of Security, 71-72.

only on our defense installations; since a nuclear war would not eliminate United States interest in the world it would be necessary to mop up the enemy's residual capability.⁵³

On comparing these three approaches McNamara found they had some similarities. For example they all stressed second strike forces of great survivability and the importance of command control. On the other hand they differed in size and composition of offensive forces, role of active and passive defenses and in targets to be attacked. Of the three, minimum deterrence was the most extreme for it assumed that the Soviets could or would not be able to counter by anti-submarine or anti-missiles. It also ignored our overseas commitments. It was in short, too dependent upon Soviet restraint, and like massive retaliation, it presented limited options if deterrence failed.

Therefore in February, 1961, the United States formally became committed to a strategic concept embodying the doctrine of flexible response. It was assumed that now the United States could survive a surprise attack and still respond coolly and deliberately under control of the constituted authorities. To initiate this strategy McNamara ordered several "quick fixes:" an increase in the Polaris and Minuteman missile system, the development of an unambiguous warning system and the placement of more B-52's on alert.⁵⁴

⁵³Kaufman, McNamara Strategy, 52.

⁵⁴Ibid., 52-54.

It was within the context of flexible response that counter-guerrilla war played its role. Like John Kennedy, McNamara had been influenced greatly by Khrushchev's Speech on January 6, 1961. The new Secretary of Defense alluded to that speech while expounding on flexible response: "The communists are resolute opponents of nuclear war or local wars, thus they like wars of national liberation."⁵⁵ This gave the Secretary a reason for strengthening the position of special forces beside the other conventional forces which would operate under the now passive nuclear shield. These would prevent the recurrence of situations such as Laos and the Bay of Pigs, where the United States lacked sufficient conventional forces to fight more than one war at a time. Therefore McNamara requested an additional \$1.8 billion in military assistance funds to enhance this country's ability to respond at any time to any type of threat, including guerrilla war.

His perception that different countries faced different types of threats led him to divide them into two categories, single threat and double threat countries. The former category included those underdeveloped countries of Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America that were not contiguous to the Sino-Soviet bloc but were targets for indirect aggression such as subversion.⁵⁶ The primary type of

⁵⁵Ibid., 60.

⁵⁶Ibid., 60-62.

assistance needed here was economic and social with the military providing the necessary stability for development.⁵⁷

He added that military assistance should contribute to economic progress in the tradition of the army corps of engineers in village development, sanitation and road building.⁵⁸

Countries facing a double threat occupied territory near the Sino-Soviet border exposing them to a direct threat from without and within. Vietnam was a classic example of how these threats could reinforce each other. To meet this situation more types of forces in terms of arms, equipment and personnel were necessary. Local forces must meet the initial thrust until the advent of free world aid. There was also a need for base facilities and infra-structure on the spot which meant more military assistance than that needed by the single threat areas.⁵⁹

McNamara's strategy enabled him to meet the Soviet threat without being forced to choose between doing nothing or deliberately initiating nuclear war. He also carried this flexibility into his decision-making procedure in the Department of Defense. He stated his intention to follow the precedent of Eisenhower's last Secretary of Defense, Thomas Gates, and attempt to draw the Joint Chiefs more into the

⁵⁷ McNamara, Essence of Security, 149.

⁵⁸ Kaufman, McNamara Strategy, 60-62.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 62-63.

mainstream of decision-making.⁶⁰ He therefore established regular meetings with them in which a dynamic exchange of views occurred, and in his reports to the president he strove for objectivity in summarizing their contrasting opinions. In addition he relied heavily on the four hundred man joint staff for advice.⁶¹

Although he initiated a smooth working relationship with his military advisors he still took advantage of Eisenhower's precedent of executive privilege to keep Congress ignorant of any dissent within the Department of Defense. Evidence for this is seen in the directive of May 31, 1961 in which he stated that Defense officials should avoid discussion of foreign policy matters. Many congressmen viewed this loss of a prime information source with alarm.⁶²

This directive was apparently in retaliation for an incident which came to light through a release of information obtained in a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee in April, 1961. The information pointed out that McNamara favored misinforming the public on the Nike-Zeus program. It was his opinion that if he told the public the truth then the U.S.S.R. would know that things were not going smoothly on this project; to him this was unnecessary.⁶³

⁶⁰Ibid., 237-38.

⁶¹Ibid., 238-40.

⁶²Mollenhoff, Pentagon, 269.

⁶³Ibid., 247.

It was at least partially in order to smooth over these brusque relations with Congress that Roswell Leavitt Gilpatrick became Deputy Secretary of Defense. This Ivy League lawyer possessed experience in dealing with Congress and with the military-industrial complex which made his half of the "Bob and Roz" team indispensable to the compatibility of the Department of Defense and Congress,⁶⁴ a compatibility that was essential to gain the necessary funds to successfully implement counterinsurgency forces and civic action teams.

The rest of the Department of Defense under President Kennedy included the following: Elvis J. Stahr, the Secretary of the Army, was a bright young man in the Kennedy pattern who was a former Rhodes Scholar and president of Purdue University. McNamara managed to influence the appointment of John Connally as Secretary of Navy in spite of the fact that President Kennedy had originally suggested Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr. The Secretary of the Air Force was Eugene Zuckert, a friend of McNamara's from Harvard Business School. The Joint Chiefs included the holdovers General Lyman Lemnitzer, Chief of Staff, and General George Decker, Army Chief of Staff. The new appointees found Admiral George Anderson replacing Admiral Arleigh Burke as Chief of Naval Operations, and General Curtis LeMay succeeding General Thomas White as Air Force

⁶⁴Ibid., 243.

Chief of Staff.⁶⁵ These, then, were the men of the Pentagon who would advise Kennedy.

The Department of Defense, though, was not the only important institution whose leaders communicated information on national security affairs to the president. When President Kennedy accepted the suggestions resulting from a two year study by Senator Henry M. Jackson, the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs came to occupy a high sphere of competence in these matters. Jackson's Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, a subgroup of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, presented to the president the following nine basic suggestions concerning the "humanizing" of the National Security Council process:

1. The Council should meet only to advise the President or receive his decision on specific major items. "Council meetings and the Council agenda should never become ritualistic."
2. The Council should offer a clear expression of alternate courses of action and their implications and "not spare the President the necessity of choice."
3. Council meetings should be "considered gatherings of principals" and restricted to top officials, with staff attendance "tightly controlled." A written record of decisions should be kept.
4. The Planning Board should be replaced by a group "used mainly to criticize and comment upon policy initiatives developed by the departments or negotiate or secure agency concurrences. More use might be made of "informal working groups" or outside consultants.
5. "The President must rely mainly upon the Secretary

⁶⁵Ibid., 244-45; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 153.

of State for the initial synthesis of the political, military, economic, and other elements which go into the making of a coherent national strategy." The Secretary was "crucial to the successful operation of the Council."

6. The OCB [Operations Coordinating Board] should be abolished and "responsibility for implementation of policies cutting across departmental lines should, wherever possible, be assigned to a particular department or . . . action officer, possibly assisted by an informal inter-departmental group."
7. The NSC staff should be reduced and more closely integrated. A small presidential staff, working "outside the system," should closely assist the chief executive by providing information, suggesting "policy initiatives," and "spotting gaps in policy execution."
8. The membership on the Council of the Chairman, NSRB [National Security Resources Board], subsequently replaced by the Director, OCDM [Office of Civil Defense Mobilization], was intended to provide the NSC with perspectives on the domestic economy and resources. Since OCDM was less concerned with these problems than with civil defense, the statutory membership of its director on the NSC might well be dropped.⁶⁶

Immediately upon occupying office Kennedy took steps which eventually resulted in the implementation of these suggestions. To ensure that these reforms were implemented Kennedy wanted as his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs a highly skilled generalist who could channel information from the State and Defense Departments and other security agencies to the president and monitor all security decisions to see that they were fulfilled.⁶⁷ Three weeks

⁶⁶ Stanley Falk, "The National Security Council under Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy," 403-34 in Political Science Quarterly, September, 1964, Vol. LXXIX, No. 3.

⁶⁷ Tanzer, The Kennedy Circle, 37.

before his inauguration Kennedy decided that McGeorge Bundy was suited for this role.⁶⁸

Bundy was another of the intellectuals who fit the Kennedy style. Among other accomplishments he had been a Dean at Harvard at the age of thirty-four. Evidence that he was cognizant of the importance of his affinity for the president's style is seen in a sampling of his statements: "John Kennedy's temper is different from that of Eisenhower. . . . The National Security Council is an instrument of the president. . . . I'm to be the president's staff officer in the National Security Council. . . . My problem is to utilize the council to conform to the president's style."⁶⁹

Bundy conscientiously carried out his task. As overall director of the National Security Council Staff he participated in all council-related activities. He and his assistants suggested areas for consideration and mechanisms for handling problems, followed studies through the planning stage and saw that they were properly coordinated, staffed and responsive to the needs and desires of the president. He also ensured that a written record was made of all decisions reached, whether at the formal NSC meetings or not,

⁶⁸Keith C. Clark and Laurence J. Legere, eds., The President and the Management of National Security: A Report by the Institute for Defense Analysis (New York: Frederick Praeger Co., 1969), 70.

⁶⁹Tanzer, The Kennedy Circle, 38; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), 209.

and he kept tabs on the implementation of whatever policy had been adopted. He and his staff coordinated closely with other parts of the president's staff and the Budget Bureau, performing whatever liason was necessary.⁷⁰

Although the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs was essential as a coordinator of information concerning national security policy, it was the president's belief that the most important coordinator of agencies concerning foreign policy was to be the Secretary of State. Kennedy had come to office determined to make that Department the central point below the presidency itself in the conduct of foreign policy. He wanted no questions to arise concerning "the clear authority and responsibility of the Secretary of State, not only in his own Department, and not only in such large-scale related areas as foreign aid and information policy, but also as the agent of coordination in all our major policies toward other nations."⁷¹

To see that the State Department enacted this role Kennedy wanted an experienced practitioner of international relations who would carry out, not decide, foreign policy; the president himself would make decisions in that realm under his constitutional authority. In addition to these

⁷⁰Faulk, "The National Security Council," 163; Fuller, Year of Crisis, 61.

⁷¹Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "The Reconstruction of Diplomacy," 123-132 in Martin B. Hickman, ed., Problems of American Foreign Policy (Beverly Hills: The Glencoe Press, 1968).

qualifications, Kennedy wanted his secretary to be an individual whose past actions would not foreclose bipartisan support from Congress. He did not want Congress to think his policies were a foregone conclusion. On balance, Dean Rusk seemed to suit his specific needs the best.

Rusk came highly recommended. Such personalities as Dag Hammarskjold, Dean Acheson, Charles Bohlen, Senator Fulbright and Robert Lovett concurred in his appointment. Even though he received these illustrious recommendations he was less known than his principal subordinates such as Adlai Stevenson, Chester Bowles, G. Mennen Williams and Averill Harriman. In fact Rusk and Kennedy met only four days before his appointment.⁷²

Rusk would probably accord with Snyder's personality type of career officer. He considered his role to be that of providing alternatives to his chief rather than solutions, and he would usually not even do that except in private conferences. He preferred to hold information inside of him until it was finally shaped. On the negative side, this meant that it entered the world untested and without public preparation.⁷³ He was an advocate of quiet diplomacy believing that a diplomat should especially note little things such as social arrangement and casual

⁷² Fuller, Year of Crisis, 45.

⁷³ Tanzer, The Kennedy Circle, 119.

conversations.⁷⁴

Although Kennedy was impressed with the potential role of Rusk and of the State Department in general, for several reasons he evinced a mixed attitude toward the professionals in the Department: he probably received his attitude in part from his father, Joseph P. Kennedy. As an ambassador to England, the senior Kennedy "inveighed eloquently against the career boys . . . insisted that the State Department did not know what was going on . . . that nothing got to the President straight unless he sent it to the President direct."⁷⁵ Another precedent which conditioned the president's attitude derived from his visit to Southeast Asia as a young congressman in 1951. He returned with the impression that Foreign Services officers often knew all too little about the nations to which they were accredited, were indifferent to their language and customs, did not represent contemporary America, and spent too much time at tennis and cocktails. In spite of these precedents, however, he looked forward to fruitful collaboration with the State Department's professionals.⁷⁶

To these personal situations in Kennedy's life which

⁷⁴"The Formulation of Foreign Policy: Informal Remarks Made by the Secretary of State (Rusk) Before Policy-making Officers of the Department of State, February 20, 1961," 22-28 in American Foreign Policy Current Documents, 1962.

⁷⁵Schlesinger, "The Reconstruction of Diplomacy."

⁷⁶Ibid.

conditioned his attitude may be added several historical precedents which had placed the State Department in somewhat of a subservient position within the myriad of agencies concerned with foreign policy. The decline of State began during World War II when competition from other institutions such as the military and intelligence agencies increased. This competition caused the Department to re-examine itself, asking three questions: should it be expanded to include all non-military foreign policy related issues and bring them under the same roof? should the emerging aspects of foreign policy be assigned to newly created organizations? or should existing governmental agencies be permitted to expand their functions to include foreign policy related issues?⁷⁷

All three of these occurred in part. But in spite of sharing responsibility with other agencies the State Department suffered growing pains. This was evidenced in several ways. For example layering, the bureaucrat's term for the imposition of one level of administrative responsibility on top of another, created a system of concurrences which required every proposal to run an obstacle course before becoming policy.⁷⁸ Dean Rusk stated that he often would read morning telegrams which stated questions to which he was prepared to give an immediate answer; however each telegram would still have to go "on its appointed course into

⁷⁷Hickman, ed., Problems of American Foreign Policy, 118.

⁷⁸Ibid.

the Bureau, and through the office and down to the desk. If it doesn't go down there, somebody feels that he is being deprived of his participation in a matter of his responsibility. Then it goes from the action officer back up through the Department to me a week or ten days later, and if it isn't the answer that I knew had to be the answer, then I have to change it."⁷⁹

Another problem which the Department had to face as it increased in size and complexity involved the type of personnel which would serve it. Before World War II the role of American diplomacy had been largely ceremonial. However, in the post-war era personnel in more than a hundred countries around the world of necessity needed regional knowledge and technical skill in order to cope with the new situation. This meant, among other things, the enhanced importance of language training. These new ideas conflicted with the conventions of State Department overseas representatives who had been trained in the tradition of political officers. They continued to see themselves as gentlemen rather than as players. In short the premium remained on the generalist over the specialist.

Further stereotyping of State Department personalities occurred during the era of John Foster Dulles because of his cooperation with Joseph McCarthy's hunt for communist sympathizers. These years saw the ostracism of diplomats

⁷⁹Schlesinger, "The Reconstruction of Diplomacy."

such as John Davies and Charles Bohlen. "The McCarthy era, by demonstrating the peril of dangerous thoughts, elevated conformism into a conditioned reflex."⁸⁰ Career diplomats consecrated themselves to the clichés of cold war whether they really believed in their credence or not. Thus many cautious mediocrities rose to the top of the service.

These then were some of the problems facing the Service as Kennedy entered office, but in the opinion of some career officers his personal style tended to make matters worse. This is illustrated in a conversation which Kennedy and Charles Bohlen held in which the president asked Bohlen "What's wrong with that goddamned Department of yours, Chip?" to which he replied, "You are."⁸¹ Bohlen explained that Kennedy did not have sufficient patience with the points of view of the professionals who were not receiving enough time to consider the president's questions rationally from the proper angles. They did not have time to learn languages, master technical fields and fraternize with the people of the countries to which they were assigned as the president desired, and still proficiently transact business with their government. Another important official in the Department called Kennedy's procedure with State "crusading activism touched with naiveté."⁸²

⁸⁰Ibid.

⁸¹Ibid.

⁸²Ibid.

Kennedy's statements to Arthur Schlesinger on one occasion indicate the validity of the concern of these officials: "I have discovered finally that the best way to deal with State is to send over memos. They can forget phone conversations, but a memorandum is something which, by their system, has to be answered. So let's put as many things as possible in memoranda from now on."⁸³

In spite of these circumstances JFK continued to search for ways to ensure State's leadership in the field of coordinating foreign affairs. As will be shown it became progressively more difficult for him to maintain his enthusiasm between the Bay of Pigs invasion and January, 1962.

Since the process of crystallizing John Kennedy's decision unit for national security policy occurred during the latter stages and immediate aftermath of the pre-decisional sequence, it is possible to isolate those who had been discarded as major communicators of information from those who had begun to constitute an inner circle at that time. Ironically many of those who were to progressively find themselves on the outside looking in were the most in accord with Kennedy's personal outlook. In general these "Stevenson Democrats"⁸⁴ claimed that the military threat to Western Europe had diminished, that the American position in the underdeveloped areas of the world was far too dependent upon

⁸³Ibid.

⁸⁴Hammond, The Cold War Years, 156.

military instruments, and that a shift from military to economic and political weapons in foreign policy would open up prospects for a *détente* with the Soviet Union. They saw the ideological conflict with Russia as an impediment to practical understanding and the source of unnecessary rigidities in American policy in the underdeveloped countries.⁸⁵

Two of the most prominent figures in this category were Adlai Stevenson and William Fulbright. As indicated in chapter two, Kennedy purposely overlooked them as a source of advice in relation to the Bay of Pigs situation because he realized in advance that their reaction would be negative. In fact their demise as members of the inner group had begun long before the Bay of Pigs, when Kennedy considered and discarded them as nominees for Secretary of State. Stevenson's handicap in this regard was his notability. As a veteran of politics he had on many occasions expressed his views on national security policy; therefore, from Kennedy's point of view, he was too vulnerable to Republican opposition. The closeness of Kennedy's election probably augmented the importance of this factor. Although Fulbright suffered the same vulnerability as Stevenson because of his long political career, probably the main factor preventing his becoming Secretary of State was his signature on the "Southern Manifesto" indicating his sympathy, probably for political reasons, for

⁸⁵ Ibid.

the "southern way of life" in regard to racial matters.⁸⁶

In addition to the "Stevenson democrats" the hierarchy of the CIA was forced to play a diminished role in regard to national security policy. After the Cuban invasion President Kennedy reconstituted the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities under the new name of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board for the specific purpose of reviewing the functions of the CIA. On May 2, 1961, James R. Killian was appointed chairman. Concurrently, Kennedy summoned former Army Chief of Staff, Maxwell Taylor, to make a special study of the Cuban failure and of the United States' capabilities for paramilitary operations and guerrilla warfare. Taylor was assisted in this study by Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Chief of Naval Operations Arleigh Burke and CIA director Allen Dulles. Due largely to the study, the director and assistant director of the CIA were replaced within a year, and paramilitary operations became centered primarily in a Special Warfare section of the Pentagon.⁸⁷

The CIA was not the only institution concerned with national security policy which found itself out-flanked as an integral part of Kennedy's decision unit at the end of

⁸⁶Tanzer, The Kennedy Circle, 110; Fulbright also filed an amicus curiae brief against the government during the Little Rock crisis of 1957, which would hardly commend him to the new African States. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 140.

⁸⁷Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 78-79.

the pre-decisional sequence. The Bay of Pigs was just the latest in a series of events, as related above, that served also to diminish the authority of the JCS.

With the influence of the JCS, CIA, and Stevenson democrats diminished, an obvious political vacuum existed in their place. As indicated, it was only partially filled by the Department of State, which suffered a similar setback at the Bay of Pigs. The State Department entered the decisional sequence still theoretically the primary coordinating agency in the field of national security policy although in practice it progressively took a backseat to the new insiders.

As this chapter has pointed out, precedents placed Robert McNamara in a good position as Secretary of Defense to pre-empt much of States influence. Furthermore he managed to play a minimal role in the Cuban affair which left him for the most part unscathed after that debacle. In addition he initiated one particular procedure which allowed him to fill an important vacuum created by "bureaucratic layering" in State: the memorandums which he prepared for the president bore his personal imprint as contrasted to the more impersonal State Department memorandums which almost inevitably required supplementary analysis or information.⁸⁸

⁸⁸ Clark and Legere, President and Management of National Security Policy, 76.

McNamara helped prepare the way for another important member of Kennedy's crystallizing decision unit when he developed the doctrine of flexible response largely from the ideas of Maxwell Taylor. Taylor's official involvement in the Kennedy administration began with his appointment to the special committee on paramilitary war capability, as indicated above. Due at least in part to his performance on that committee he received an appointment as the president's personal military advisor in June, 1961, thereby filling a glaring gap in Kennedy's decision unit. Taylor's appointment reflected the substantial diminution of the President's confidence in the Joint Chiefs and the intelligence community. He was given liaison duty between the president and the Joint Chiefs, a position from which he worked to improve relations between them and the Chief Executive.⁸⁹

The man who reportedly recommended Taylor to Kennedy as his choice for special military assistant was the president's brother, Robert Kennedy, who should also be included as a member of the president's inner group on national security policy. He debated whether to take some position as a subordinate bureaucrat within the administration but was persuaded by his brother to become attorney general.⁹⁰ Since the president wanted intellectuals around him who were on his wave length it was logical that he should demand the

⁸⁹Ibid.

⁹⁰Tanzer, The Kennedy Circle, 186.

services of the individual most nearly approaching that prerequisite. As mentioned above, Robert Kennedy was cognizant of national security policy through his membership on the special committee on paramilitary capability. The president gave him additional responsibility in this sphere when he singled him out as his primary coordinator of intelligence information.⁹¹

Another member of the inner group on national security policy on the eve of the decisional sequence was the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy. Although his staff was definitely within the inner circle in 1961 it did not constitute a major influence on the formation of the policy under analysis. However it was, in general, more influential than the State Department. When the State Department did not appear to be responsive, the Bundy staff moved in to do the president's work.⁹²

This assessment of the president's decision unit on the eve of the decisional sequence should not close without some discussion of another relevant figure, Walter W. Rostow. Perhaps Rostow should have been mentioned within the context of Bundy's National Security Staff since he was originally appointed as Bundy's deputy. However, Rostow's appointment

⁹¹Faulk, "The National Security Council."

⁹²Clark and Legere, President and Management of National Security Policy, 81.

was made to appease Dean Rusk who wanted George McGhee in the State Department as head of the policy planning staff instead of Rostow.⁹³ Although Rostow's official position in the administration was somewhat tenuous, he was a highly instrumental factor in Kennedy's military policy.

Rostow had been influential with John Kennedy since before the presidential campaign. In fact he contributed the main motif of that campaign: "Let's get the country moving again."⁹⁴ He also is credited with suggesting the "New Frontier" as the name of Kennedy's program.⁹⁵ Rostow met Kennedy in 1957 after the publication of his book, A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy, which highly influenced Kennedy as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations committee. This book, in addition to Rostow's "Cambridge Lectures," was instrumental in reinforcing Kennedy's perception of the importance of the underdeveloped areas to world peace and to the security of the United States. Also, Rostow was a member of the "Cambridge Group" which met at the Harvard Club in Boston on January 2, 1960, in order to advise Kennedy concerning his coming campaign for the presidency. The following quote from Rostow during that

⁹³Tanzer, The Kennedy Circle, 47; Besides his personal friendship for McGhee, Rusk had a temperamental preference for professionals, and he was determined to rebuild the morale of the Foreign Service after the shocks of the Dulles-McCarthy era. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 151.

⁹⁴Tanzer, The Kennedy Circle, 40.

⁹⁵Ibid.

campaign reflected his future importance to Kennedy's decision unit in relation to national security policy: "I did the basic stuff on military policy and threw some other ideas into the pot."⁹⁶

Thus as the summer of 1961 began Kennedy's decision unit on national security policy had begun to crystallize around the nucleus of McNamara, Taylor, Rusk, Bundy, Rostow and Robert Kennedy. This nucleus was to be highly instrumental in determining the nature of the emerging doctrine of counterinsurgency, which was gradually to submerge the policy of military civic action developed mainly in response to relevant factors in the Latin American situation. The rationale for devoting the following chapter to a discussion of the Latin American situation may be seen in a quote from President Kennedy: "I regard Latin America . . . as the most critical area in the world today."⁹⁷

⁹⁶Ibid.

⁹⁷Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 759.

CHAPTER IV

LATIN AMERICA'S SUSCEPTIBILITY TO "WARS OF LIBERATION"

President Kennedy perceived the most relevant factor in the Latin American situation to be its susceptibility to "wars of liberation" under the guidance of Khrushchev's protege, Fidel Castro:

I would not want to characterize Mr. Castro except to say by his own words he has indicated his hostility to democratic rule in this Hemisphere, to democratic liberal leaders in many of the countries of the Hemisphere who are attempting to improve the life of their people, and has associated himself most intimately with the Sino-Soviet bloc, and has indicated his desire to spread the influence of that bloc throughout this Hemisphere.¹

Originally the Castro revolution was supported by the majority of the people. He promised free elections . . . but Castro has not kept that promise. If the people of any country chose to follow a communist system in a free election after a fair number of views had been presented, the U.S. would accept it. We object to a small militant group imposing its way by subversion, infiltration. . . .²

Accordingly this chapter will focus upon those factors in Latin America's socio-economic situation which made that area a prime target for the Castro-communist offensive and upon efforts to change those factors through economic development. In addition, the weaknesses of the hemispheric

¹Kennedy and the Press, April 12, 1961, 60.

²Ibid., November 25, 1961, 133.

security structure in quelling communist subversion will be illustrated, and the necessity for adopting a policy of bilateral military civic action will be shown.

Several factors in Latin America's socio-economic situation made it vulnerable to the communist offensive. Two hundred million people inhabited the southern half of the Western Hemisphere, and at least two-fifths of them were under fifteen years of age. Nearly fifty per cent of the population was illiterate while thirty per cent would die before their fortieth birthday. The population was multiplying faster than in any other area in the world. Two per cent of the people owned fifty per cent of the wealth and seventy per cent lived in abject poverty.³ While these conditions festered during the first decade of the post-war era the United States concentrated on Western Europe and Asia. In fact the United States gave billions of dollars to Europe while allotting Latin America less than two per cent of its world-wide economic and military aid under the mutual security program.⁴ Economic chaos abounded south of the Rio Grande on the eve of Castro's ascent to political power.

One factor in the socio-economic situation which gave cause for optimism was the commitment to commerce and industry by the middle sectors. According to John J. Johnson,

³Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 186.

⁴Edwin Lieuwin, *U.S. Policy in Latin America: A Short History* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), 112.

in 1930 the traditional middle groups, who composed the liberal professions such as the teaching corps, the bureaucracies, the clergy of the Catholic Church and commissioned military officers joined forces with the new middle groups such as scientists, highly trained technicians, managers of business and leading officials of organized labor. The resultant middle sector became the dominant political force in Latin America. Its various components possessed the common characteristics of being mostly urban, subject to wageworker contracts or fixed salaries, and of lacking the capability to take independent political action in isolation. But their most significant common characteristic, and the one which was to give some cause for optimism on the eve of the Kennedy administration, was their commitment to commerce and industry.⁵

This commitment to industry increased during the post-World War II period as the characteristics of the new constellation of world power became evident. The middle sector began to realize that this new situation would leave the weaker countries at an economic disadvantage because of the instability of their exchange resources, their sometimes uncontrollable demand for imports and their relatively modest long-term capital inflow.⁶ Consequently the movement toward the

⁵John J. Johnson, "The Political Role of the Middle Sectors," 104-12 in John Martz, ed., The Dynamics of Change in Latin American Politics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1965).

⁶Victor Urquidi, The Challenge of Development in Latin America (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1962), 125.

creation of the Latin American Free Trade Association began in 1956 with the establishment of a Trade Committee under the direction of the Economic Commission for Latin America to study the mechanics of establishing a Latin American common market. In 1957 the Organization of American States held a meeting of Latin American finance ministers at which the basic principles and resolutions of the Latin American Free Trade Association were derived.⁷ Finally in February of 1960 the Montevideo Treaty created the Latin American Free Trade Association. Its objective was to gradually and progressively achieve a Latin American common market and to favor the complementation and integration of the economies of the member countries.⁸ As a further aid to integration the General Treaty of Central American Economic Integration went into force in December 1960. It stipulated a five-year time limit for the creation of a Central American Common Market and bound the contracting parties to set up a customs union with a single external tariff.⁹

Although the Latin American middle sectors commanded the initiative in improving Latin America's socio-economic conditions through economic development, during the post-war era the United States had not been completely inactive in

⁷John Mathis, Economic Integration in Latin America (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1969), 22-23.

⁸Urquidi, Challenge of Development, 129.

⁹Ibid., 130.

this sphere. After a faltering start in the early fifties, on the eve of the Kennedy administration the United States had initiated many important measures.

The work of reassessment began in the lower levels of the Eisenhower administration. John Moors Cabot, as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, fought for a hemisphere program of economic assistance and social reform in 1953. When George Humphrey, the Secretary of the Treasury, thwarted this effort Cabot resigned. His successor, Henry Holland, resumed the policy of making Latin America a safe place for conservative businessmen to invest.¹⁰

Although Cabot's effort in 1953 unfortunately failed, another event occurred in that year which was to have important repercussions before the end of the fifties: Milton Eisenhower made a trip south upon the request of his brother, the president. This marked the beginning of a re-evaluation of the Latin American scene by someone near the center of United States power. The Republican administration became dimly aware at this time of the need for structural changes including national control of economic development. This awareness increased dramatically when Vice-President Richard Nixon was spat upon and in general molested on a Latin American trip in 1958.¹¹

¹⁰Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 189.

¹¹Ibid.

Another important official in the Eisenhower regime who contributed to the renaissance of interest in Latin America was Douglas Dillon who became Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs in 1957. Although Dillon knew little about Latin Americans, he was struck by the anxiety which they exhibited at the Hemispheric Conference of Finance Ministers in Buenos Aires in 1957. Three weeks at this meeting convinced him that Washington's diagnosis that Latin America was too prosperous to require external assistance was in need of re-evaluation. Dillon was largely responsible for the creation of the Inter-American Development Bank in 1959 as well as for the establishment of several study groups to examine the question of stabilizing commodity prices.¹²

Dillon was not the only individual with access to high counsel who preached the need for a new Latin American economic policy. Adolf Berle, former Assistant Secretary of State under the Roosevelt administration, had continued to press for social and economic reform in Latin America. Probably his most important contribution during the fifties to eventual socio-economic reform lay in cultivating his friendship with Lu s Mu oz Mar n, the governor of Puerto Rico. Together these two statesmen developed a network of unofficial relationships with popular parties of Latin America to which John Kennedy fell heir on a trip to Puerto

¹²Ibid., 189-90.

Rico in 1958.¹³

During the course of that trip on December 15, 1958, Kennedy delivered a speech encompassing the following points which he believed to be indispensable elements of a revised Latin American Policy:

1. An inter-American agreement for stabilizing commodity prices and markets.
2. Pursuing the same objective, a re-evaluation of our tariff duties and quotas, of our programs for stockpiling strategic and nonperishable commodities, and of the possibilities for inter-American common markets and currency convertibility agreements.
3. An inter-American capital development bank, to which all Western Hemisphere nations contribute and in which all participate, with a majority of the capital being supplied by American dollars.
4. Concurrent with such a bank, the allocation to Latin-American projects of a larger proportion and total of the capital funds available from the Development Loan Fund.
5. The negotiation of individual tax treaties which would encourage the flow of private investment to underdeveloped lands whose tax forgiveness programs are now without effect in our own tax structure.
6. An increase in the exchange of students, and inclusion of undergraduates as well as graduates--not only to raise the educational standards and technical training in these nations, but also to foster the spread of good will and a better understanding of both continents--in both continents.
7. A series of inter-American fellowships in medicine and public health, supported by all members of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau, offering opportunities to study medicine and public

¹³Ibid., 192.

health in the United States and elsewhere--including the excellent schools of medicine and public health which have raised the standards so greatly in Puerto Rico.

8. The judicious use of our agricultural surpluses to relieve critical food shortages without displacing the markets of other Latin-American nations.
9. Finally, a new program of loans to encourage the establishment within other countries of a program similar to our own Farmers Home Administration, which through loans and guarantees enables small tenant farmers to buy their own farms.¹⁴

Kennedy's perception of the feasibility of these points was reinforced during his first months in office by reports from various sources. One of these communicators of information was Authur Schlesinger, Jr., who summarized his report as follows:

1. Because population has been growing faster than output in recent years, Latin America has begun to lose ground in the struggle for development. . . .
2. The Soviet Union, in association with Cuba, is exploiting the situation and providing the U.S. with unprecedentedly serious competition. . . .
3. Time is running out for the parties of the middle class revolution. . . . The democratic parties . . . have thus far failed to deliver the goods to the satisfaction of the younger and more impatient members of the middle and working classes.
4. Latin America is waiting expectantly for new initiatives in Washington. . . . The Inaugural Address evoked particular admiration. People are looking on J.F.K. as a reincarnation of F.D.R. To a surprising degree, the slate has been wiped clean of past neglect and error. The atmosphere is set for miracles. There is

¹⁴Nevins, Strategy of Peace, 135-36.

consequently real danger that the intensity of present expectations may lead to future disappointment.¹⁵

Analysing this and similar information from sources such as Adlai Stevenson and Adolf Berle, Kennedy decided to supplement the positive actions in Latin America which the republicans had begun during the latter stages of their administration. In 1960 President Eisenhower had sent an urgent recommendation to Congress saying that we must "help our Latin American neighbors accelerate their efforts to strengthen the social and economic structures of their nations and to improve the status of their individual citizens."¹⁶ To emphasize the change in United States policy Eisenhower made a trip to Latin America the same year to show them that this country was serious in its new departure. Furthermore at the Inter-American Economic Conference held at Bogota in July 1960 the United States offered to loan the Latin American countries \$500 million immediately and more later for social projects.¹⁷

Acting upon these precedents Kennedy announced in March 1961 an Alliance for Progress. This project stood for "a sustained and cooperative effort to accelerate growth and social progress throughout Latin America, working through

¹⁵Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 188.

¹⁶John Hopkins, The Alliance for Progress (New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1962), 13.

¹⁷Lieuwin, U.S. Policy, 113.

democratic institutions based on respect for the individual."¹⁸ The program was formally launched in August 1961 at Punta del Este, Uruguay where Douglas Dillon pledged \$20 billion for the program over the next ten years. Approximately 55 per cent of this support was to come from United States public funds to be supplied at very low rates of interest; 15 per cent would derive from United States private interests; international lending agencies such as the Inter-American Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development would contribute 15 per cent; while the remaining 15 per cent was to come from public and private sources in Europe and Japan.¹⁹

This more than quadrupled the previous United States commitment to Latin America. It was immediately the largest single foreign aid commitment of the United States. However the aid was conditional. The Latin American governments had to set up programs of social reform and to redistribute the land and wealth of the nations. Also over the ten year period they were to contribute over \$80 billion to the program.²⁰

The Alliance for Progress represented the affirmative side of Kennedy's response to Latin America's socio-economic situation as he perceived it. The other side was his absolute

¹⁸Lincoln Gordon, A New Deal for Latin America: The Alliance for Progress (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963); Sorenson, Kennedy, 533.

¹⁹Lieuwin, U.S. Policy, 115.

²⁰Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 773.

determination to prevent the Soviet Union from exploiting that situation and gaining a second communist bridgehead in the hemisphere.²¹

The basis for such a bridgehead was evident as communist parties had existed in Latin America since shortly after the Bolshevik Revolution.²² Since that time Latin Americans had regularly been summoned to Moscow where they learned everything from paramilitary warfare to political doctrine, and carried their lessons back to their homelands.²³ This statement is borne out by the records of a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee conducted in 1959. One of its participants was a Mr. Kornfeder, an Austro-Hungarian who had studied at Lenin College in Moscow, and had been one of the principal founders of the communist parties of Colombia and Venezuela before he broke with communism in 1934. Kornfeder indicated that potential agents were given a three-week intensive briefing by army officers in Russia who specialized in guerilla warfare. He added that South America was considered to have the proper topographical and political terrain for this type of warfare.²⁴ Evidence that the

²¹Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 773.

²²Edwin Martin, "Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere," section VIII-C-1-26 in Readings in Psychological Operations, ST 33-151, U.S. Army Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg.

²³Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 774.

²⁴U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee to investigate the administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws: Testimony of Joseph Zack Kornfeder, 86th Congress, 1st Session, 1959, 36.

U.S.S.R. still believed Latin America to be ripe for exploitation appeared in a Khrushchev statement in 1960: Latin America reminds one of an active volcano."²⁵

During the decisional sequence it appeared to Kennedy that communist efforts toward activating that volcano were bearing fruit. In September, 1961, Cheddi Jagan, an avowed marxist, became the elected leader of British Guiana,²⁶ and during the following October he made his Washington debut. After conferring with him Kennedy indicated his perception of the nature of that regime:

Parliamentary democracy is going to be damn difficult in a country at this stage of development. With all the political jockeying and all the racial tensions, it's going to be almost impossible for Jagan to concentrate the energies of this country on development through a parliamentary system. . . . I have a feeling that in a couple of years he will find ways to suspend his constitutional provisions and will cut his opposition off at the knees.²⁷

Kennedy had made clear to Jagan during their discussion that his domestic policy per se was not the main concern of the United States:

I want to make one thing perfectly clear. We are not engaged in a crusade to force private enterprise on parts of the world where it is not relevant. If we are engaged in a crusade for anything, it is national independence. That is the primary concern of our aid. The secondary purpose is to encourage individual freedom and political freedom. But we can't always get that; and we have often helped countries which have little personal freedom, like Yugoslavia,

²⁵Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 774.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid., 777.

if they maintain their national independence. This is the basic thing. So long as you do that we don't care whether you are socialist, capitalist, pragmatist or whatever. We regard ourselves as pragmatist.²⁸

These statements of Kennedy's serve to reiterate his belief that communism per se did not constitute a threat to his efforts to encourage the development of viable democracy. Only when a communist government attempted to subvert another people did its business also become that of the United States.

Accordingly although he considered Jagan only a potential communist threat, Kennedy considered the danger from Castro's Cuba to be real. Cuba's main political philosopher, "Che" Guevara, indicated in 1961 the nature of that danger. It was his belief that Cuba's contribution to communist ideology lay in its example of how to gain political power by capitalizing upon Latin America's chaotic socio-economic situation. To Guevara this situation composed the objective conditions of revolution. In convincing the masses that they were being exploited through the maintenance of these conditions and in instilling in them the will to instigate change through violence, the Cuban revolutionaries had created the "subjective conditions" of revolution. Furthermore Guevara believed the Cuban Revolution had identified the correct procedure for the resultant revolutionary struggle. It was his opinion that the struggle against imperialism should center

²⁸Ibid., 775-76.

in the rural areas.²⁹ In this he reinforced the threat inherent in Khrushchev's admonition of "wars of liberation."

It was this threat of communist-induced guerrilla warfare which Kennedy needed to meet if the Alliance for Progress were to obtain success. However weaknesses in the hemispheric security structure which he had inherited would cause him frustration in his dealings with Castro. In order to assess these weaknesses it is necessary to ascertain the nature of United States military-strategic policy in Latin America since World War II. It will be shown that an emphasis upon multilateral defense measures during and after that war frustrated Kennedy's efforts toward meeting the threat of communism.

Serious efforts toward formalizing hemispheric multilateral defense measures began as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks conference of August 21 to October 7, 1944. At that meeting the United States managed to impress its view upon its fellow great powers, the U.S.S.R., Britain and China, that regional security organizations should be subordinate to the United Nations. It was the desire of the Latin Americans to counter this universalism with a strengthened Inter-American system which prompted them to convene an Inter-American conference at Mexico City from February 21 to March 8, 1945. If there had to be a showdown between regionalism and universalism

²⁹Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1961), 1-2.

at the impending San Fransico Conference they wanted to be prepared with their arguments for the former.

As it turned out they received help at San Francisco from an unexpected quarter, the United States, when Senator Arthur Vandenburg, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, argued their case. It was his contention that the United Nations should allow regional security organizations the right of individual and collective self-defense against armed attack.³⁰ Articles 52 and 53 supplemented this. The former gave regional organizations the primary responsibility for pacific settlement of local disputes before they were referred to the Security Council. The latter, however, apparently subordinated regional organizations in its directive that they must refrain from enforcement action until they received the authorization of the Security Council.

These articles were very much on the minds of the Latin Americans as well as the United States delegates as they convened at Rio de Janeiro in September of 1947 to write the Rio Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. Article 3 of that document maintained consistency with article 51 of the U.N. Charter in that it authorized collective resistance to armed attack. However the Rio Treaty over-stepped article 53 of the Charter when it promulgated article 6, for this provision allowed the regional group to immediately determine collective

³⁰J. Lloyd Meham, United States Latin American Relations (Dallas: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), 157-63.

measures against other than an armed attack.³¹

With the loopholes thus established in the Rio Treaty for the Latin Americans to exert some influence over the U.N. they set about to establish an organization to coordinate collective measures. The result was the meeting at Bogota, Colombia in 1948 to establish the Organization of American States.* According to this treaty the Conference of Foreign Ministers was to be the major organ concerned with security. However the OAS Council soon usurped this role through convenient loopholes in the Rio Treaty. One was article 6 which had taken a flexible position on what constitutes aggression: "any fact or situation that affects the inviolability or integrity of the territory or sovereignty of any American State." This meant that aggression was, in effect, what two-thirds of the American States decided upon at any given time. The other loophole, found in article 12, made the Council the provisional organ of consultation.³²

The completion of the Rio Treaty, along with an OAS to implement it, set the stage for the next issue in the Inter-American system: what policy would the OAS utilize to keep the peace? In the early post-war period several nations, including the United States, chose a policy of intervention in

³¹Jerome Slatter, The OAS and United States Foreign Policy (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1967), 30-31.

³²Ibid., 41-43.

*Hereafter referred to as the OAS.

order to overthrow dictatorial regimes.³³ However the setback which the United States suffered at the hands of Juan Perón when it attempted to equate him with fascism and totalitarianism caused a re-evaluation of this policy. Perón turned this potential misfortune into a defeat for the United States when he labeled that country's efforts at propaganda through Spruille Braden's Blue Book as Yankee imperialism.³⁴ After this incident the United States moved from promoting a policy of anti-dictatorial alliance within the OAS to one of collective security. The latter policy better fit the interest of the United States as Truman, and particularly Eisenhower were primarily concerned with providing a stable climate in Latin America for business investments.³⁵

The United States successfully utilized collective security in many of the disputes which raged in the Caribbean area from 1948 until 1960. The first of these concerned an armed invasion by Costa Rican exiles of their homeland from a base in Nicaragua. Since Latin American opinion in general favored democracy it was unwilling to allow the liberal leader, José Figueres, of Costa Rica to be subverted by the dictator of Nicaragua, Anastasio Somoza. Therefore collective security worked and stability was quickly restored. In the

³³ Mecham, U.S. Latin American Relations, 172-73.

³⁴ George I. Blanksten, Peron's Argentina (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 59.

³⁵ Slatter, The OAS and U.S. Policy, 183.

process a number of precedents were established: exile movements were to be considered a threat to hemispheric stability rather than an internal matter and hence to be subject to OAS intervention under article 6 of the Rio Treaty; the Council was to outflank the Foreign Minister's Conference as the primary organ of consultation in security matters; the OAS would act mainly through investigating committees, and it would present the threat of sanctions. In 1955 under similar circumstances conservative Costa Rican exiles were again thwarted in an attempt to invade Costa Rica as the United States again obtained its objective of stability through collective security.³⁶

The United States experienced little difficulty in gaining consensus in the OAS for these two ventures as they both pitted democracies against an aggressive dictatorship; however, difficulty and criticism did ensue when the policy of collective security protected dictators. In response to this criticism Washington replied that democracy cannot be imposed by force but must come from within. Furthermore it added that collective security actually contributed to democracy by allowing each country to develop its political life free from outside interference.³⁷

A case exemplifying this dilemma surrounding collective

³⁶Ibid., 67-76.

³⁷Ibid., 78.

security occurred in 1950 in relation to a dispute between the Dominican Republic and Haiti in which the latter charged the former with aiding an exile plot to overthrow the Estimé regime. The dictator of the Dominican Republic, Rafael Trujillo, denied these allegations and countered with some of his own. It was his contention that the Caribbean Legion, a force comprising various liberal elements from throughout the Caribbean region, was attempting to overthrow his government. After it substantiated both claims the OAS investigating committee experienced much criticism in stating that the pursuit of democracy by the Caribbean Legion did not justify its violating the norms of non-intervention. Criticism increased when for all practical purposes this incident caused the disbanding of that liberal group.³⁸

The United States' pursuit of stability through a policy of collective security connected the issue of dictatorship versus democracy to that of Castroist subversion in the spring and summer of 1959.³⁹ The first case involving these issues occurred in April when an exile force from Cuba attempted to invade Panama and overthrow its government. The OAS, with little dissension among its members, quelled the rebellion in short order when an investigation revealed that the basis for the invasion lay in the disgruntlement of the ousted Roberto Arias of Panama. Arias had attempted to

³⁸Ibid., 81-83.

³⁹Ibid., 83.

gain the cooperation of some enthusiastic supporters of Castro in his endeavor to return to power. The investigating committee further revealed that Castro himself had nothing to do with this invasion. For the record the United States praised Castro at the time for his restraint.⁴⁰

Due mainly to a paucity of ideological issues in the Panamanian affair, there was little difficulty in gaining a consensus in the OAS to carry out collective security through the threat of sanctions. This was not the case though when a group of exiles from Nicaragua, with the aid of Costa Rica's government, attempted to overthrow the Somoza regime. Here was a case of potentially labeling a liberally composed invasion force the aggressor, and this most of the Latin Americans were unwilling to do. They had a good argument too, for Somoza had carefully refrained from labeling Costa Rica the aggressor. He merely indicated that he was experiencing a rebellion and requested aid in repelling it. In spite of this chance to favor the liberal cause the United States decided to stick to its policy of collective security and stability first. Since nationality had not been considered in any of the previous exile invasions the United States held that it should not be a factor in this case. As a result the exile force suffered defeat and the Somoza regime received a new lease on political life. As in the Panamanian

⁴⁰Ibid., 84-86.

affair Castro was absolved of any complicity.⁴¹

Apparently encouraged by the OAS action in repelling invasions in Panama and Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic requested the assistance of that organization in meeting the threat of invasion from leftists in Cuba and Venezuela. The United States was willing to abide by collective security and honor the Dominican request, but the majority of the Latin Americans were not so disposed. They had acquiesced in the Somoza case, but now in the case of Trujillo this was going too far. Realizing the nature of the imbroglio the United States temporarily eluded the Trujillo issue and called for a consultative conference to deal with the general situation in the Caribbean and the question of democracy.

The strategy of the United States at the resultant Santiago Conference was to minimize the issue of dictatorship and attempt to link the disturbance in the Caribbean to communism in the hope of obtaining a Latin American consensus for meeting that threat. The United States suffered disillusionment with this strategy on two counts. One was that the Latin Americans exhibited little apprehension of communism. About the only concession they were willing to make on this issue was to increase the powers of the Inter-American Peace Committee to enable it to consider problems before they erupted into violence and hence to act as a monitor on the political climate of the area. The other count on which the

⁴¹Ibid., 86-90.

United States suffered disillusionment concerned the fact that anti-communist measures required a violation of the norms of non-intervention. Venezuela and Cuba were prepared to engage in intervention practices. However, since the avowed purpose of these two countries was to suppress dictators and protect democracy and human rights rather than to combat communism the United States was uninterested in their arguments at this time.⁴² Washington was willing to drop the policy of collective security and hence of non-intervention only if it could obtain a Latin American consensus for intervention against communism, i.e. against Castro; however on the few occasions that it had attempted to force the OAS into an anti-communist alliance it had been unable to obtain that consensus. This statement may be borne out by a survey of the basic elements involved in those occasions.

The first instance in which Latin Americans were called upon to align against communism was at the Bogotá Conference of 1948. After much debate consensus emerged around a declaration which stated that the Inter-American system was incompatible with international communism. The strength of the document was somewhat dissipated by the addition: "and all totalitarian doctrines."⁴³

Another opportunity for Latin Americans to align against communism came in the Korean crisis of 1950. At that

⁴² Ibid., 90-97.

⁴³ Meham, U.S. Latin American Relations, 211.

time a consultative conference convened at Washington in order to determine the part to be played by the Americas in quelling that communist threat. Its recommendations included strengthening and increasing the availability of the armed forces of the Latin American region, strengthening the Inter-American Defense Board as coordinator of hemisphere defense and increasing the effort on the part of Latin Americans to control communist subversion. These objectives were not carried out to any great extent. Only Colombia contributed armed forces to Korea, and this was mainly to alleviate a domestic crisis. The Inter-American Defense Board remained relatively insignificant except in the realm of the symbolic, and little effort went into eradicating communist subversion. In short, then, the precedent set during the Korean crisis was that operational hemispheric solidarity did not include a meaningful alliance in support of United States policies and actions aimed at the eradication of international communism overseas.⁴⁴

In Guatemala in 1954 the United States learned that the Latin Americans were not really disposed toward the eradication of communism within the hemisphere either. The basis for that crisis occurred during the regime of José Arévalo, a proponent of social reform who took over Guatemala after a revolution ended the regime of the dictator Jorge Ubico in 1944. Instead of supporting Arévalo's reform

⁴⁴Slatter, The OAS and U.S. Policy, 110-15.

measures the United States adhered to its usual policy of maintaining the status quo through collective security.

Arévalo ruled Guatemala for six years. During this time the communists made significant gains through filling the political vacuum which resulted from an insufficient number of trained administrators of liberal bent.

The communists clandestinely organized as a political party in 1949, and by the time Jacobo Arbenz took office in 1950 they were the strongest party in the country. Since Arbenz's political tastes were further left than those of Arévalo he allowed them to operate openly. Capitalizing upon this opportunity the communists infiltrated labor, agrarian agencies, the bureaucracy and the National Democratic Front which was a coalition of leftist groups. Under Arbenz communism came to be viewed in Guatemala as only an idea and not as a threat.

After the communist party exhibited ties with Moscow and Guatemala expropriated properties of the United Fruit Company the United States became increasingly concerned. Concern turned into frustration when no legal remedy under the Rio Treaty could be found. For this reason the United States, through the insistence of John Foster Dulles, convened the Caracas conference in March, 1954, for the purpose of gaining multilateral legitimacy for action against Guatemalan communism.⁴⁵ Although Dulles claimed otherwise, the

⁴⁵Mecham, U.S. Latin American Relations, 213-16.

United States did not gain complete Latin American disapproval of Guatemalan communism. The Caracas Declaration indicated that communist governments in this hemisphere constituted a threat if they were controlled by international communism, however it did not impair the right of states to freely choose their own form of government. From the point of view of the Latin Americans, communism per se was not considered a threat. In effect they were repeating the position which they had held during the Korean crisis.

In May the Guatemalans lent credibility to the United States charges of international communist influence when they accepted armaments shipped from the Soviet bloc. However there was another side to the story: the United States had been arming Honduras and Nicaragua for several months to meet the impending threat of communism, therefore there is a possibility that Guatemala was arming for self-defense. At any rate the shipment of Soviet bloc arms gave the United States the opportunity it was looking for. Its strategy then became two-fold. On the one hand it would supply the non-communist Guatemalan exiles training in Honduras and Nicaragua with armaments. On the other hand it would use the OAS as a smoke-screen to prevent the U.N. from entering the scene.⁴⁶

Carlos Castillo Armas led the exiles into Guatemala on June 18, 1954, and on June 19 Guatemala simultaneously called upon the OAS and the U.N. for assistance. By this

⁴⁶Slatter, The OAS and U.S. Policy, 121-22.

act Guatemala again inadvertently aided the United States, for that country constituted the dominant power on the OAS investigating committee besides the fact that it possessed a veto power in the Security Council. Therefore the United States could block any effective action by either the U.N. or the OAS. Arbenz immediately realized his mistake and attempted to call off the OAS, only to see Honduras and Nicaragua reconvene it. Meanwhile, in addition to the obvious threat from its veto power, the United States utilized another weapon to prevent action by the U.N. Henry Cabot Lodge was the president of the Security Council and as such he initiated effective delaying tactics. He charged that the rebellion was only a civil war and that Guatemala was a tool of the Soviet Union because it was attempting to by-pass the OAS. He also threatened the U.N. with disintegration if it tried to preempt the OAS, for this would enjoin the issue of universalism versus regionalism and the former would surely lose. On June 26, the U.S. formally called a meeting of the OAS and on June 27, Arbenz surrendered to Castillo Armas.⁴⁷

The Guatemalan and the Korean cases showed that the OAS was not an effective collective defense mechanism against communism, for in both cases communism was met not through multilateral organization but through unilateral United States action. As in 1950 and 1954, there was not a consensus in

⁴⁷Ibid., 122-26.

Latin America that communism was a threat in 1960. Now the dilemma which the United States faced in that year may be brought into perspective: On the one hand it was committed to a policy of collective security which by its nature was wedded to non-intervention, while on the other hand it wished to legitimize intervention in order to quell Castro and communist subversion. Unless the United States was willing to outrage Latin America and intervene unilaterally as in Guatemala it was going to have to find some way to legitimize multilateral intervention. Such an opportunity presented itself in the Dominican Republic where the regime of Rafael Trujillo was on the verge of collapse in 1960.

For thirty years Trujillo had ruled the Dominican people. During that time he obtained control of more than 50 per cent of the national wealth and monopolized most major enterprises by forcing or frightening competitors out of business. His family eventually owned 65 per cent of the country's sugar production, 12 per cent of its sixteen sugar mills, and 60 per cent of its best land. In fact the Trujillos procured a share of every business except drugs. At least 80 per cent of the nation's workers labored for them, about half on company payrolls and the other half on military and government payrolls.⁴⁸

While these investments brought him prosperity,

⁴⁸Dan Kurzman, Revolt of the Damned (New York: Putnam's Sons, 1965), 46.

Trujillo was sowing the seeds of his destruction through his brutal domestic methods. Literally thousands of his political enemies died in secret dungeons, many of them after suffering tortures inflicted with electrical devices, fingernail extractors, decapitation collars, and leather-thonged whips. A visit to his dungeons was like viewing a medieval torture chamber. These executions and tortures were almost always justified on the grounds that the victims were communists.⁴⁹

The OAS tolerated these atrocities until Trujillo attempted to assassinate President Betancourt of Venezuela. At that point the OAS scheduled the sixth meeting of consultation of Foreign Ministers at San José, Costa Rica for August 1960.⁵⁰ At this meeting Venezuela asked for sanctions against the Dominican government, including intervention. This time the United States was disposed to take a different view toward Venezuela's proposal than it had at Santiago the year before. Now it was in agreement with Venezuela concerning the merits of intervention.

The main reason for the great change in the attitude of the United States was the increasing threat which it perceived from Fidel Castro. This threat when coupled with the concurrent decline of Trujillo led the United States to the

⁴⁹Juan Bosch, The Unfinished Experiment (New York: Praeger Co., 1965), 10.

⁵⁰Ibid.

formula: as Batista was to Castro so Trujillo will be to _____.⁵¹ The Dominican situation presented an opportunity for the United States to obtain its two currently imperative objectives: set a precedent and create the machinery for intervention against dictatorships which could later be used against Castro, and induce a liberalization in the internal Dominican political climate which could forestall a Castro-type revolution.⁵²

The increase in investigative powers which the Inter-American Peace Committee received at Santiago in 1959 now was to help the United States prepare the Latin American climate for a favorable view toward intervention. One aspect of that committee's report blamed the international chaos resulting from the various exile invasions on the regime creating the exiles instead of on the exiles themselves and the regime aiding them. Another supplementary report condemned internal repression by dictators and implied that intervention to restore stability was now a legitimate function of the OAS. These developments created the opportunity for the United States to rationalize itself out of the strait-jacket it created when it indicated that democracy can come only from within. Now the United States could state: "Whenever a flagrant and notorious situation develops . . . intervention may be justified." Within the context of this

⁵¹Slatter, The OAS and U.S. Policy, 190-91.

⁵²Ibid., 186.

situation the OAS decided at San José to break diplomatic and economic relations with the Dominican Republic.⁵³ In pursuit of this directive Eisenhower "imposed a fee of two cents per pound on Dominican sugar, thereby depriving the Trujillo regime of the usual United States margin above world prices."⁵⁴

These efforts by the OAS to gradually bring the dictatorship to an end were abetted by the Dominicans themselves when a group of them assassinated Trujillo on May 30, 1961. Following this event the Dominican Republic lapsed into chaos. The nominal ruler was Joaquin Balaguer, who had been president during Trujillo's regime. However he failed to lead any political movement of note. In the meantime Trujillo's son, Rámfis Trujillo, who had been in Paris at the time of the assassination, flew home to take control of the armed forces.⁵⁵ Under his direction eighteen of the twenty plotters were captured and killed. As he began to assert his authority, he was confronted by OAS pressure to relinquish power to President Balaguer. At this point the effect of the OAS boycott began to be felt, for it was in an effort to loosen these constraints that the Trujillos agreed to relinquish power to Balaguer.

Only a month after the assassination Kennedy put

⁵³Ibid., 186-89.

⁵⁴Ibid., 193.

⁵⁵New York Times, June 1, 1961.

pressure on the Trujillos and Balaguer to moderate their actions.⁵⁶ The United States was beginning to be looked on as the savior of the country by the Dominicans, and Kennedy planned to capitalize upon this feeling. It was the belief of the United States President that in order to prevent communism the Dominicans required both order and democracy. Order was necessary immediately after Trujillo's death to prevent chaos, while democracy was necessary soon to provide an alternative to communism. He decided that Balaguer and the army were the best bet for achieving these goals, at least in the short-run: "Balaguer is our only tool, we must use our influence to take Balaguer along the road to democracy."⁵⁷ It was for this purpose that the Dominican army was converted into an anti-guerrilla organization.

The Balaguer-army coalition would be successful, then if it provided order long enough for an effective opposition to develop which could lead to democracy in the long-run. This opposition did not take long to materialize. Conservative anti-Trujillo leaders organized the National Civic Union (UCN) and protested openly against the government's policies. On the same day that this organization conducted its first rally Manuel Tavares Justo received his freedom from prison. The event was important because he led the 14th of June movement

⁵⁶ John B. Martin, Overtaken by Events (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1966), 82.

⁵⁷ Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 770.

which was named after the date of an abortive coup attempt against Trujillo. Feeling that the situation had indeed changed, the students demonstrated on October 17, touching off a general strike which closed most of the shops and businesses of Santo Domingo. The objects of this demonstration were Héctor Trujillo, and José Arismendi Trujillo, Rámfis' uncles, who had tried to impose a new terrorist regime on the country. The rioting was quelled only after Rámfis had exiled these two from the country. Meanwhile, still another threat to the regime became manifest in the Dominican Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano). The PRD received its leadership from Dominican exiles who had previously organized with the objective of driving Rafael Trujillo from power. Among these leaders was Juan Bosch.

Less than a month after the return of Bosch and the PRD and the violent demonstrations, Rámfis Trujillo decided that he had had enough of the pressure. He telephoned his uncles in Bermuda, telling them of his plans to leave the country for Europe. With their nephew out of the way the uncles planned to return on November 15 and prepare to overthrow Balaguer. These plans placed the United States in an untenable position. Only the preceding Tuesday, November 14, it had proposed to the OAS that that organization lift diplomatic and economic sanctions.⁵⁸ On Thursday the

⁵⁸Kurzman, Revolt of the Damned, 52.

proposal was withdrawn, and on Friday President Kennedy sent a fleet of fourteen warships, including two aircraft carriers, to Dominican waters "to ensure a democratic solution."⁵⁹ The next day, Secretary of State Rusk announced that the marines were available if Balaguer should need them.⁶⁰

With this power at his disposal Balaguer found the courage to oppose the Trujillos openly. Confronting them in his office Balaguer told that if he were killed the United States marines would come ashore under previously given authority, and asked them to leave the country. On Sunday night Balaguer announced to the nation that the Trujillos had agreed, in a "generous, patriotic gesture" to leave for the United States.⁶¹

Finally free of Trujillo terrorism, the Dominicans tore down signs bearing the name of Trujillo and changed the name of the capital from Ciudad Trujillo back to its original name of Santo Domingo. Many people who had been exiled under Trujillo returned, and political life, the expression of ideas and views, so long stifled, began to return.

No sooner had the Trujillos left than the United States mediators began pushing for the establishment of a temporary government and free elections. When the Unión Cívica Nacional called a strike for the purpose of deposing Balaguer, the

⁵⁹Kennedy and the Press, November 29, 1961, 140.

⁶⁰New York Times, November 19, 1961.

⁶¹Kurzman, Revolt of the Damned, 53.

beleaguered president agreed to the formation of a Council of State dominated by the U.C.N. which would consist of seven members.⁶² Thus encumbered, Balaguer remained as president when the new organization assumed control on January 1, 1962.⁶³

In assessing the Dominican situation as it developed during the decisional sequence from May 1961 until January, 1962 it is evident that the United States and the OAS successfully extricated themselves from the strait-jacket of non-intervention. However during this time it was becoming evident that interventionism was only a temporary expedient in response to special circumstances: The Dominicans understood and supported the U.S. policies; opposition groups were available to ensure a non-communist alternative; the Trujillos were vulnerable to the sugar embargo; the Trujillos were considered tyrants by a majority of the Latin American community and United States actions were supported and complimented by those of the OAS.⁶⁴ The most important factor that illustrated the temporary nature of the current mood of intervention was the response during this period with which United States initiatives for OAS intervention in Cuba were received.

Perhaps the most relevant factor determining that Kennedy would experience difficulty in his attempts to secure multilateral legitimacy for OAS intervention in Cuba lay in

⁶²New York Times, December 18, 1961.

⁶³New York Times, January 2, 1962.

⁶⁴Slatter, The OAS and U.S. Policy, 205.

the history of United States-Cuban relations. It was in Cuba that much of the Latin American bitterness against United States interventionism was nurtured even before Cuba became a nation-state. For example there were those who claimed that the sinking of the Maine in Havana harbor was planned and executed by Wall Street business executives who favored the acquisition of Cuba. The United States, according to this view, transformed the Cuban War of Independence into the Spanish-American War for the economic domination of Cuba.⁶⁵ From shortly after Cuba's independence from Spain in 1898 until the rise to power of Castro, the United States controlled the policy-making apparatus of Cuba's governments, first through the Platt Amendment and then through control of Cuba's economy.

It was within the context of this United States imperialism that in 1953 Fidel Castro, then a young lawyer, attempted to have Fulgencio Batista, the pro-U.S. president-dictator, declared unqualified to hold office by virtue of his illegal seizure of power. Foiled in this attempt he tried by means of strikes and work slowdowns to accomplish this task. Partially as a result of poor organization and a lack of communication with the public, these measures also proved unsuccessful. Therefore he tried, again unsuccessfully, to seize a military arsenal at the Moncada barracks in hopes of

⁶⁵ Robert F. Smith, Background to Revolution: The Development of Modern Cuba (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), 15.

triggering a popular uprising against Batista and of winning the backing of the army at the same time. Following this fiasco, he was given a trial and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. During the course of the trial Castro received much publicity from the world press. This gave him a large following and eventually induced Batista to offer a general amnesty to all political prisoners. Martin Ebon states that this was the "greatest mistake of his [Batista's] life."⁶⁶

Capitalizing upon his popularity, Castro left Cuba with a few supporters in 1955 to train his "army" on a ranch near Mexico City for an invasion of Cuba. In December, 1956 the yacht, "Granma," landed on a beach in Oriente Province near the Sierra Maestra Mountains with Castro and eighty-two soldiers aboard.⁶⁷ Since most of the force did not survive an ambush by Batista's forces the dictator made the mistake of assuming that the remainder of the group would not pose a major threat to his regime. However, they set up headquarters in the mountains where they received shelter from the local inhabitants. With the aid of an underground radio station Castro's propaganda campaign swelled his force to over a hundred men. They began to wage hit-and-run attacks on the government outposts which led to Batista's suspension of civil rights in order to prevent future attacks. Through

⁶⁶"On the Way to Castro," 33 in "Che: The Making of a Legend (New York: Universe Books, 1969).

⁶⁷Robert Taber, M-26: Biography of a Revolution (New York: Lyle Stuart, 1961), 52-54.

this war of attrition Castro managed to link up with similar underground groups around the island until, aided by the apathy of Batista's army, he was able to gain control of Cuba on January 1, 1959.⁶⁸

According to Arthur Schlesinger, several events indicate that 1959 saw the clear commitment of Cuba to marxism and the service of Soviet foreign policy.⁶⁹ In January of that year José Figueres received an invitation to visit Castro, however he was unable to attend until March when he was scorned by many of Castro's aids as a tool of Wall Street. In July Manuel Urrutia, Castro's puppet president, resigned under pressure for criticizing communism in a television speech. In October, Major Hubert Matos warned against communist penetration and received a twenty year prison sentence. In November, Manuel Ray, Minister of Public Works, and Felipe Pazos, head of the National Bank, resigned. In April, Castro and his finance ministers visited the United States. Castro's refusal to allow them to accept aid led Schlesinger to surmise that this experience was contrived in order to give him the excuse to tighten political controls; since Cuba was not to receive economic assistance it was necessary for the state to ration its scarce resources.* Finally,

⁶⁸ Ibid., 291.

⁶⁹ Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 220.

*It should be pointed out that this is a highly controversial interpretation. For example John Swomley, among others, believes that the United States blatantly refused Castro aid at this time. John W. Swomley, Jr., American Empire: The Political Ethics of Twentieth Century Conquest (New York: Macmillan Co., 1970), 171-72.

the United States Ambassador, Phillip Bonsal, requested an interview with Castro on May 8, which was not granted until June 13. That summer he was left waiting even longer as he made the request for an interview on July 23, and it was not granted until September 5.⁷⁰

Although the United States was suspicious of Castro's political intentions during his first year in power its policy toward him from 1959 until mid-1960 could be characterized as one of "watchful waiting."⁷¹ Washington was paying the price for its history of interventionism in Cuba and the rest of Latin America by witnessing a pro-Castro foreign policy by at least ten important Latin American countries. Another reason for caution, though, lay in the State Department's opinion that the Soviets were seeking to press the United States into unilateral action in order to take world opinion off its forays into Hungary and Poland. Within this context the role of the OAS was to do just enough to justify Eisenhower's inaction or unwillingness to take strong unilateral measures.⁷²

Several events occurred during 1960 which caused United States-Cuban relations to cool beyond the point of reconciliation, however. In February of that year Castro signed a treaty with the U.S.S.R. according to which he would trade five million tons of sugar for oil, iron, and steel machinery

⁷⁰Ibid., 218-21.

⁷¹Slatter, The OAS and U.S. Policy, 136.

⁷²Ibid.

plus one hundred million dollars in credit. Between this time and August 1960, United States and British oil refineries refused to refine Soviet crude oil, Castro expropriated major United States oil companies, the United States cut seven hundred thousand tons off the 1960 Cuban sugar quota, Khrushchev offered Soviet rockets to protect Cuba from the United States and Cuba appeared before the U.N. to blast United States imperialism.

Toward the latter part of the summer of 1960, the United States was in the mood to risk a hemispheric split in order to secure OAS approval for intervention in Cuba. The United States' objectives in the impending Hemispheric conference were to invoke article 39 of the OAS Charter instead of article 6 of the Rio Treaty in order to keep the issue of aggression low-key, to keep the U.N. where the U.S.S.R. held great influence, out of the affair, to lay the foundation for later and greater action and to pacify domestic critics of Eisenhower's do-nothing policy. In addition it wanted at least verbal condemnation from Latin America of Castro's aggression. To this end it presented a memorandum to the OAS Peace Committee depicting what it considered were those acts of aggression: as an instrument of the "Sino-Soviet powers" Castro was "undermining hemispheric solidarity" through supporting subversive movements in Latin America.⁷³

The seventh conference of foreign ministers finally

⁷³Ibid., 142-43.

convened at San José, Costa Rica, on August 22, 1960. At that time Khrushchev's threat to unleash Soviet rockets had not frightened Latin America to the point that the United States could gain support for attacking international communism per se through evoking the Caracas Declaration. Therefore it concentrated its attack on Castro's threat to the hemisphere.

The Cuban strategy at the conference was to identify with Arbenz's Guatemala of 1954. It indicated that in that crisis the OAS had yielded to "Yankee Imperialism" and thereby forced Guatemala to turn in desperation to the communist bloc.

Cuba's non-intervention plea touched a responsive chord in the nations south of the Rio Grande as may be gleaned from an analysis of the Declaration of San José. That document stated in part that the Americas were against the infiltration of extra-continental powers and that Inter-American norms were compatible only with democracy. These statements taken in isolation would seem to condemn Castro, however the third point showed his influence in that it reaffirmed the sacrosanct nature of non-intervention. Neither Cuba nor communism was singled out for reprimand, nor were sanctions threatened. Even then the Latin Americans signed the declaration reluctantly.

The tepidness which the OAS exhibited at San José increased the domestic pressure on first Eisenhower and then Kennedy until an invasion of Cuba was almost inevitable. The result was the disaster at the Bay of Pigs, which has been

related previously. Following that episode Kennedy's incendiary speech pointing out the United States' determination to do what it considered necessary to defend its interests with or without OAS support helped restore a climate somewhat more propitious for the United States. Shortly after his statement, Costa Rica, Honduras, Venezuela, and Colombia joined the anti-Castro forces. However this still left six hold-outs including the largest countries in the region.

In spite of the restraining influence which those countries exerted, there were still several factors pushing Kennedy toward a hard-line against Castro during the decisional sequence following the Bay of Pigs. Probably the most important was the attitude of Congress, for without its support the Alliance for Progress would never get off the ground for lack of funds. Kennedy did not have long to wait before Congress made its mood perfectly clear. On May 14, 1961, a resolution passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 404 to 2 which demanded that the OAS initiate steps to impose sanctions on Cuba. Other advocates of a hard-line were the Central American and Caribbean countries, with the major exception of Mexico, and important elements of the United States public.

With the situation characterized by such divisiveness Kennedy was not anxious to convene the OAS. He feared the harmful effects which public airing of these divisions might have. For this reason he was chagrined by Peru's unilateral invocation of the Rio Treaty in October, 1961, to propose an

OAS conference. To make matters worse, Peru called for a review of not only external but also internal Cuban policy which struck at the center of the explosive non-intervention issue. Fortunately the United States was able to postpone a meeting under these circumstances.

In November, Colombia unilaterally called a meeting of the OAS to consider only external issues which the United States felt it could not afford to postpone.⁷⁴ Colombia thought the failure of the Cuban invasion should be repaired by collective OAS action.⁷⁵ That country and Venezuela both had militant communist minorities, a fact which caused Venezuela to suffer the loss of thirty-two lives during the ensuing conference.⁷⁶ Therefore they were anxious to extirpate the source of this friction. When several more countries also advocated a harder line on Cuba, it appeared that a display of hemispheric unity might be within reach after all. In fact Kennedy publicly stated his confidence that the negotiators would make their hostility to communism very clear.⁷⁷

The conference met at Punta del Este, Uruguay, on January 22, 1962, and on January 31, twenty of them approved a resolution condemning Cuba as a Marxist-Leninist state tied

⁷⁴Ibid., 144-51.

⁷⁵Carlos Stoetzer, The Organization of American States (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), 21.

⁷⁶"Split on Castro," Time, LXXIX (February 2, 1962), 28-29.

⁷⁷Kennedy and the Press, January 24, 1961, 165.

to the Sino-Soviet block.⁷⁸ They also labeled the Castro dictatorship as incompatible with the inter-American system. On this crucial vote, Haiti abstained until the last but finally cast the ballot that gave the measure the fourteen votes necessary for passage.⁷⁹ This action meant that while the meeting could not legally expel Cuba as a member state, it could suspend her from the OAS so long as she maintained her present incompatibility with the inter-American system. However, no majority could be obtained to totally exclude Cuba from hemisphere affairs.⁸⁰

The meaning of this division may be gleaned from the fact alluded to earlier that the six nations who most vehemently opposed excluding Cuba were the largest nations in Latin America. This meant that countries accounting for nearly three-fourths of the population of Latin America were in opposition to the United States on this issue. The communists capitalized upon this opportunity by trying to deepen the cleavage. Leftist newspapers hailed the courage of the six countries in defying the United States, while labeling the other republics Yankee satellites.⁸¹

⁷⁸ Mecham, U.S. Latin American Relations, 228-19.

⁷⁹ "Split on Castro," 28-19.

⁸⁰ "Full Circle at Punta del Este," Time, LXXIX (February 9, 1962), 33-34.

⁸¹ David B. Richardson, "Where the U.S. Stands now in Latin America," U.S. News and World Report, LII (February 12, 1962), 49-50.

At this point an analysis of the reasons behind the defection of these large nations is in order. It will be shown that the delegates were more preoccupied with problems at home than with establishing hemispheric unity at that time.

In Brazil's case, economic factors were important in the refusal to back a hard line against Cuba. It was the old story of jealousy and misunderstanding of the United States intentions toward her. The Brazilians felt that the United States was more interested in Europe and Asia than in Latin America. The price of coffee, her mainstay, was low and it was felt in the largest Latin American nation that the United States, the biggest consumer of her coffee, was interested in keeping prices low to satisfy American consumers. As if this were not reason enough, her government was weak and divided. Communist strength was substantial. Brazil's presidential candidate, Jânio Quadros, felt it necessary to call on Castro in Havana rather than visit Washington in order to gain the support of Brazilian Castroites.⁸² Therefore, for political reasons also Brazil pushed for a plan of peaceful coexistence with Castro.

Argentina's problem was also both economic and political. The former derived from a United States embargo on Argentine beef and from a flooding of American farm products on world markets. These policies adversely affected

⁸²Sidney Kraus, ed., The Great Debates, 414.

Argentina as a traditional cattle and wheat producing country. Politically, Argentina, like Brazil, voiced concern about the United States apparent neglect of her problems. President Arturo Frondizi felt that the United States should concentrate more on the problems of southern South America and less on the Caribbean area. To draw Washington's attention to this area, Frondizi advocated the establishment of an ABC block comprising Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. It was largely for this reason that he did not antagonize the latter two countries by voting for sanctions against Cuba when they had abstained.

Mexico's position was a paradox. By abstaining on the Cuban issue she alienated foreign private investors who feared that this would encourage communist agitation from the active leftist segment of the nation. At the same time it was suffering a loss of foreign private investment. The answer seemed to be that Mexico thought it was large enough to fend for itself in the world; it was declaring its economic independence from the United States.

Chile's conservative government was struggling under the strains of leftist agitation brought on by a biting inflation. A prolonged strike in its copper mines deprived the country of much of its dollar earnings, and additional taxes were necessary to cover pay increases for hordes of government workers.

In Ecuador, Carlos Julio Arosemena had just become president. The fact that many communists rode Arosemena's

coattails into office prompted Castro to allude to the political upheaval as an impressive victory over Yankee imperialism. To further clarify Ecuador's stand the new president, in his first speech after taking office, promised friendly relations with Cuba.

Bolivia's trouble stemmed from a faltering economy. Nationalization of the country's most important industry, tin mines, only increased left-wing agitation for better conditions. This agitation led to rioting during the Punta del Este meeting.

The countries that voted for a hard line on Castro were also having trouble at home, but in their cases, the Cuba-based threat of international communism was the greater issue.⁸³

The obstinacy of the major Latin American countries in refusing to enact collective intervention measures against Cuba was exhibited by most nations of the area in relation to the issue of collective anti-subversion tactics. This is seen in their position on the proposal at Punta del Este to establish a Special Consultative Committee on Subversion whose duties would be to investigate and offer suggestions as to how to cope with the problem of communist-induced subversion. A major obstacle before a successful S.C.C.S. was the precedent of the Emergency Committee for Political Defense which had wielded great power in extirpating axis sympathizers

⁸³Richardson, "Where the U.S. Stands Now."

during World War II. To many Latin Americans this organization had reeked of super-statism and hence interventionism.⁸⁴

Latin America, then, was not disposed in 1961, during the decisional sequence, to meet the threat of communism through international organization largely because of obedience to the norm of non-intervention. Therefore in order for Kennedy to counter communist "wars of liberation" he would have to operate on a bilateral basis.

⁸⁴Slatter, The OAS and U.S. Policy, 166.

CHAPTER V

RISE AND FALL OF MILITARY CIVIC ACTION: FROM LATIN AMERICA AND VIETNAM TO BERLIN

Since the United States could not count upon the OAS to intervene in Latin American nations threatened by subversion, the Kennedy Administration implemented a new military policy in that area. For this policy to be waged successfully military tactics needed to be coordinated with political, social, economic and psychological factors. One of the means through which the military could work with these non-military aspects would be civic action. This would help to discourage popular support for insurgent movements and encourage local populations to assist the military in operations against such movements. In other words, civic action was to be the integrating factor between the military and the Alliance for Progress.¹

The relevant assumptions contained within the military civic action doctrine are summarized below:

1. It can be a subtle means of having troops in a strategic location. In an area where there is a threat of insurgency, it might be wiser to

¹Willard Barber and Neale Ronning, Internal Security and Military Power: Counter-Insurgency and Civic Action in Latin America (Columbus: Ohio State University, 1966), 179-217.

send in a battalion that devotes at least a part of its time to construction or other useful labor. It can secure valuable intelligence, and its presence might discourage potential insurgents without antagonizing the uncommitted.

2. It can serve to alleviate some of the intolerable conditions of rural inhabitants and thus make them less inclined to join or assist insurgent movements.
3. It is a means of improving the image of the military, the central government, or both, thus enlisting the cooperation of local inhabitants when the army is in pursuit of rural insurgents.
4. By contributing to the general economic development of the country, it will reduce the danger of insurgency.
5. It is a means of educating the armed forces and the civilians by bringing the military into contact with rural problems, inducing communities to work together and by teaching the officers and enlisted men useful civilian skills.²

The objectives of military civic action parallel those of the Caribbean interventions of the early twentieth century: internal security, economic development and the advance of stable government. Other similarities include the promotion of a responsible and non-military establishment; the extension of the central government's authority into remote provinces and the diversion of military resources into socially constructive uses, especially where the civilian community lacks such resources. The differences between the two eras lay in the Kennedy emphasis upon institutionalizing a state of mind which would be conducive to long-run democracy.³

²Ibid., 182.

³Ibid., 61.

Toward this end President Kennedy pointed out the importance of the United States Corps of Engineers as a model for Latin America: "Military assistance can, in addition to its military purposes, make a contribution to economic progress. The domestic works of our own Army Engineers are an example of the role which military forces in the emerging countries can play in village development, sanitation, and road building."⁴

Secretary of State Rusk added that the "United States Government would like to see Latin American armed forces increase their part in modernizing the basic facilities of all the American Republics. We believe they could borrow profitably from the long and honorable record of our own United States Corps of Engineers, in strengthening the civilian economy."⁵

This highly favorable view of the military engineering function received reiteration by the well known Spanish-Mexican author, Victor Alba:

Latin America ought to put the thousands of military technicians to work. What they learn in schools--the capacity to undertake enterprises, to plan public works and direct their execution--covers many of the technical problems that still remain unresolved not only for want of money, but also for the lack of professional skills. The army that Latin America needs--and this is not a demagogic phrase--is an army of engineers, of overseers, of constructors.⁶

⁴"Special Message Read by the President Before a Joint Session of the Congress, May 25, 1961," 28-37 in American Foreign Policy Current Documents, 1962.

⁵Barber and Ronning, Internal Security, 74.

⁶Ibid.

Several other scholars of the Latin American military have emphasized the "new" Latin American military, pointing out that it is no longer an ad hoc caudillo-dominated group, but rather that it is steadily increasing in professionalization.⁷

This increase in professionalization was derived, in part, from the inter-American cooperation during and after World War II. For example, the Inter-American Defense Board, alluded to earlier, became a permanent part of the inter-American system in 1945. Less than a year later it recommended for adoption by the member states a policy long advocated by the United States: the standardization of organization, equipment and training. Another example came in the passage of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 as a result of the communist attack on South Korea. By July, 1959, the United States had training missions in nearly all Latin American countries and had provided \$317 million in grants for military aid and equipment going to twelve countries. Seven other countries were receiving equipment under the reimbursement provisions of the act.⁸

The movement to implement the policy of military civic action in Latin America coincided with a similar effort in

⁷For example: Edwin Lieuwin, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York: Praeger, 1961); and John Johnson, Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).

⁸Barber and Ronning, Internal Security, 63-64.

Vietnam.⁹ The United States had been involved in that area since 1941 when Franklin D. Roosevelt attempted to prevent the Japanese from inhibiting American access to rubber.¹⁰ In the immediate post-war era the United States, through its policy of supporting China's Chiang Kai-Shek, consequently supported Chiang's allies, the Vietminh in their war against the French. However upon Chiang's defeat at the hands of a communist-controlled rebellion the United States became actively engaged in supporting the French.¹¹

Although the official United States line thereafter gave uncritical support to France, its Saigon legation was "bitterly split about the wisdom of this policy."¹² The political section, backed by the economic aid people and the CIA, argued that the French could not organize successful resistance on the basis either of military plans calling for conventional assault or of political plans retaining Indochina as a part of France.¹³

Within the context of this situation in 1951 Kennedy made a trip to French Indochina. In Saigon he made friends with the counselor of the American Legation, Edmund Gullion, who later recalled that Kennedy "bridaled under the routine

⁹Chester L. Cooper, The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1970), 169.

¹⁰Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 537.

¹¹Hammonds, The Cold War Years, 183.

¹²Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 320-21.

¹³Ibid., 321.

embassy briefing and asked sharply why the Vietnamese should be expected to fight to keep their country a part of France."¹⁴ This viewpoint angered the French Commander, General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, who issued a formal complaint to the American Minister.¹⁵

Kennedy said upon his return to Washington that "in Indochina we have allied ourselves to the remnants of empire. . . . To check the southern drive of communism makes sense but not only through reliance on the force of arms."¹⁶ He continued by identifying the task as one of relying on non-communist sentiment as a spearhead of defense rather than upon the legions of General de Lattre. Kennedy believed that to deny innately nationalistic aims spelled foredoomed failure. He gained new perspective on the strength of nationalism in Southeast Asia, for without it "there is no hope of success."¹⁷

Kennedy stated on April 6, 1951, in the Senate that "no amount of American military assistance in Indochina can conquer . . . an enemy of the people. . . . For the United States to intervene unilaterally and to send troops into the most difficult terrain in the world, with the Chinese able to pour in unlimited man-power, would mean that we would face a situation more difficult than even that which we encountered

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid., 320-21.

¹⁶Ibid., 321.

¹⁷Ibid.

in Korea."¹⁸

Further evidence of the strong feelings which Kennedy held about Indochina as a Senator may be gleaned from a Senate speech in 1956 in which he stated that Vietnam is the "keystone to the arch: militarily, politically and economically in Southeast Asia."¹⁹ He indicated the influence of China was increasing in the area while that of our ally, Japan, was declining. He then indicated the importance of this fact: "the fundamental tenets of this nation's foreign policy, in short, depend in considerable measure upon a strong and free Vietnamese nation."²⁰

The Eisenhower Administration shared Kennedy's concern about Vietnam as seen in its 1954 pledge to help resist any "aggression or subversion threatening the political independence of the Republic of Vietnam."²¹ The United States pledged itself to defend a country which had suffered one hundred years of colonial rule, a Japanese occupation and an eight year war with France. South Vietnam possessed few qualified administrators, a population which was four-fifths rural and a million refugees from the north.²² In addition, the government had to

¹⁸Kennedy, "War in Indochina," 284-94 in John Kennedy, Compendium of Speeches, Statements and Remarks in Congress.

¹⁹Cooper, The Lost Crusade, 168.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Sorenson, Kennedy, 651.

²²Ibid., 650.

contend with various independent sects such as the Hoa Hao and the Cao Dai.²³

Senator Mike Mansfield described the scene in Vietnam in 1954 as follows:

The political crisis in South Viet-Nam stems from the same causes that were evident at the time of my previous visit, except that these causes have now become more acute. There is still the same shortsighted struggle for immediate gain among factions. Each of these elements possesses some aspects of power in its organization, armaments or heritage of authority. None, however, is broadly based in the people. The urgent need to develop such a base through the formation of a national government by popular participation continues to be ignored. In their anxiety to preserve and enhance their individual positions the petty power groups in South Viet-Nam appear completely oblivious to the overhanging shadow of the Vietminh which before long may envelop them all unless they put aside their factionalism.

Saigon is the hub of the political crisis. Since the Geneva agreement that capital city has seethed with intrigue and counter-intrigue, with rumors and counter-rumors. The political plotting goes on in army circles, government circles, foreign circles, in party headquarters, in police headquarters, and even in the demimonde of ill-disguised gangsters, pirates, and extortionists.²⁴

In spite of these conditions the leader of South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, managed to maintain a modicum of stability during his first three years in power.

However, events in China portended further instability in Southeast Asia. The success of the Russian sputnik in 1957 motivated Mao Tse-Tung to observe that the "Eastwind

²³Hilsman, To Move A Nation, 416-17.

²⁴Maxwell D. Taylor, Responsibility and Response (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 54.

prevails over the Westwind" and therefore to initiate an aggressive foreign policy. In response to this new development the United States felt constrained to reassure South Vietnam of its backing; therefore in 1957, John Foster Dulles, with moralistic overtones, reiterated the United States commitment.²⁵ This commitment was of a unilateral nature in order to avoid identification with European colonialism in Southeast Asia.²⁶ However the type of military training which the United States employed was to become an increasing area of controversy, as will be shown.²⁷

As the decade of the fifties closed the United States commitment to South Vietnam increased as President Diem steadily lost his grip on the situation. His resultant authoritarian practices such as stopping village elections and practicing nepotism through progressively extending more power to his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, cost him more popular support. The situation almost came to a head when an elite parachutist section, which constituted the core of South Vietnam's anti-guerrilla cadre, attempted a coup in November 1960.²⁸

In spite of these conditions the Chief of the American Military Mission could state before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in April 1959 that the guerrillas in South Vietnam

²⁵Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 285-89.

²⁶Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 537.

²⁷Ibid., 539.

²⁸Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 418.

had been "gradually nibbled away until they ceased to be a major menace to the government." But not all military personnel were so optimistic. General Edward Lansdale had been sent on a secret mission to Vietnam in liason with the Central Intelligence Agency. Although assigned under Eisenhower he did not present his report until February 1961 after Kennedy had entered office. The report shocked the president who was favorably impressed with Lansdale's recommendation to concentrate on the strategy of military civic action in order to regain the support of the population.²⁹

Kennedy's strategy during the pre-decisional sequence, then, was to honor Eisenhower's commitment in Vietnam through a policy of military civic action. Through this policy he attempted to avoid choices limited to escalation or retreat and to buy time for the attitude of the populace to turn in favor of Diem. A report to the president by Lyndon Johnson in in May 1961, reinforced Kennedy's opinion that this was the correct policy to pursue. The vice-president had gone to South Vietnam at the request of the president to gain first-hand knowledge of the situation, and it was his opinion that a commitment by the United States to military civic action in support of Diem was definitely a necessity at that time.³⁰

Kennedy's commitment to military civic action was further clarified in his address to Congress on May 25, 1961 in

²⁹Ibid., 418-19.

³⁰Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 543.

which he spelled out the specific amounts of material he wanted in order to implement his policy.³¹

However, lacking a democratic tradition, subjected to continuous war for two generations, and steeped in the tactics of conventional war for at least six years under the guidance of the United States military advisors, it was to become increasingly evident that the Vietnamese military was incapable in the short-run of building democracy through civic action. The situation became progressively more tenuous in the face of steadily mounting pressure from communist guerrillas.

In order to understand the debates within the Kennedy administration over the proper strategy with which to counter these guerrillas, it is instructive to survey the precepts of the philosophy of guerrilla warfare through the writings of Mao Tse-Tung, Vo Nguyen Giap and "Che" Guevara. This is in line with Kennedy's directive to all the members of his decision-unit to study their writings.

These writers sought, through theory and practice, to prove that through guerrilla warfare the armies of technologically superior countries could be brought to defeat. This basic premise is made explicit in the following statements: Mao in 1937 stated that the "guerrilla campaigns being waged in China today are a page in history that has no precedent. Their influence will be confined not solely to China in her

³¹"Special Message to Congress," in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962.

present struggle against the Japanese, but will be world wide."³²

In November 1949 China's number two communist, Liu Shao-Chi, prophesied that there would be other Asian revolutions that would follow the Chinese pattern. Furthermore, in December 1960, delegates of eighty-one communist and worker's parties resolved that the tempo of "wars of liberation" should be stepped up.³³

Giap, in commenting upon the Vietminh war against the French stated that "from the military point of view the war proved that an inadequately equipped army, fighting for a just cause, can with appropriate strategy and tactics, conquer a modern army of aggressive imperialism."³⁴ Guevara, in discussing Latin America, stated: "given suitable operating terrain, land hunger, . . . a hard core of thirty to fifty men is, in my opinion, enough to initiate armed revolution in any Latin American country."³⁵ He added that:

a new world is dawning. The pillars of colonialism are crumbling in the face of national and popular struggles in Asia and Africa. The people are united, not by religion, race, custom, or hunger, but desire to improve their lot. Asia and Africa joined in Bandung. Now Cuba is uniting Asia and Africa with

³²Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, trans., Samuel Griffith (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1961), 3.

³³Liu Shao-Chi, Inaugural Address to the Asian-Australian Trade Union Conference, November 16, 1949, 2.

³⁴Vo Nguyen Giap, "Inside the Vietminh," 147-77 in T. N. Greene, ed., The Guerrilla And How To Fight Him (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1962).

³⁵"Che" Guevara, On Guerrilla Warfare, 67-68.

colonial America.³⁶

Furthermore, he said that Cuba was the symbol of a new concept of nationalism and that Fidel Castro was the symbol of liberation.³⁷

The basis of the communist theory of guerrilla warfare is oriented around Karl Von Clausewitz's thesis that war is merely a continuation of political relations.³⁸ Guerrilla war is kept limited by a political elite which provides its strategy and direction. Mao states that "there is no reason to consider guerrilla war separately from national policy." He adds that the political goal of the leaders must coincide with the aspirations of the people.³⁹ This need for a clear conception of political goals and a political organization to obtain them suggests the necessity to indoctrinate military officers so that they may inculcate political goals to the inhabitants of guerrilla zones.⁴⁰ Those "simple minded militarists" who "are not interested in politics but only in the profession of arms" must be made to realize the relationship between politics and military affairs. Military action is a means to a political end. It is impossible to separate one from the other.⁴¹

³⁶ Ibid., 75.

³⁷ Ibid., 74.

³⁸ John Pustay, Counterinsurgency Warfare, (New York: The Free Press, 1965), 25.

³⁹ Mao, Guerrilla Warfare, 43-44.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 88.

⁴¹ Ibid., 89-90.

In relation to the politicization of the army there are three political imperatives according to Mao: spiritual unification of officers and men within the army, spiritual unification of the army and people and destruction of the unity of the enemy.⁴² In order to carry out the first task it is necessary to base discipline on the individual conscience. This is the primary characteristic of a democratic army.⁴³ External discipline leads to indifference between officers and men. It is a feudal concept which will destroy unity and fighting strength. Within the political army political liberty and propaganda must be tolerated and encouraged, and the officers should live under the same conditions as the men.⁴⁴

Concerning the second political imperative, unity between army and populace, Mao describes "three rules and eight remarks." Under rules he indicates that all actions are subject to command, that stealing is forbidden and selfishness and unjustness are to be avoided. His eight remarks include the admonishment to replace the door of houses after the customary summer practice of sleeping on them, to roll up bedding on which one has slept, to be courteous, be honest, return what one borrowed, replace what has been broken, not to bathe in the presence of women and to refrain from searching the

⁴²Ibid., 90.

⁴³Ibid., 91.

⁴⁴Ibid., 92.

pockets of those arrested without their authority. At this point he gets off the famous phrase that Kennedy liked to quote: The people "may be likened to water and the [troops] to the fish who inhabit it. How may it be said that these two cannot exist together? It is only undisciplined troops who make the people their enemies and who, like the fish out of its native element, cannot live."⁴⁵

Finally Mao's third political imperative exhorts the troops to destroy the enemy. His emphasis on the primacy of the political is seen in his directive that the enemy is to be destroyed mainly through propagandizing his troops, treating captured soldiers with consideration and in caring for his wounded. Mao adds that in failing this the solidarity of the enemy is increased.⁴⁶

The political nature of guerrilla war is also indicated by Giap who states that the revolution is to be controlled by the communist party acting through the National United Front. This combines all social classes and sets its major goal as keeping the revolutionary ardor of the people at optimum levels. Toward this end Giap's army, like that of Mao is a politically oriented force. From 35 per cent to 40 per cent of the enlisted men are party members while in the officer ranks the percentage reaches 90 per cent.⁴⁷

⁴⁵Ibid., 93.

⁴⁶Ibid., 93.

⁴⁷Giap, "Inside the Vietminh."

Also similar to Mao is the fact that Giap's army strives for equality between officers and enlisted men. "The officer likes his men. He must not only guide them in their work and studies, but must take an interest in their desires and initiatives." The soldier must respect his superiors and correctly fulfill all their orders. "The army practices a strict discipline, allied to a wide internal democracy." This discipline though does not contravene internal democracy in the troops, for in cells, in executive meetings of the party at various levels and in plenary meetings of fighting units, the principle of democratic centralism is the rule. Giap believes that the more democracy is respected within the army the more unity is strengthened.

Giap states that during the resistance war democracy was exercised in three ways and brought about good results: the first way was through a grass-roots level democracy. Democratic congresses were held regularly so that men as well as officers had the opportunity to speak their views on fighting, work, study and living conditions. In the revolutionary army the men have the right to criticize the officers as well as vice-versa. The second way in which democracy was practiced was through meetings which occurred during the fighting whenever circumstances permitted. Finally economic democracy was exhibited. Officers and soldiers possessed the right to take part in the management and improvement of material life. In this manner the talent of the men was utilized in solving the

complex problems of fighting a difficult type of war and internal unity increased.

Giap followed the Mao doctrine of propagandizing the people in order to increase the unity between them and the army. He quoted Mao's dictum that the people are to the army as water is to fish. He stated that the army always worked to educate the people and helped them to the best of its ability. The Vietnamese fighter always took care to observe Point 9 of his Oath of Honor: "In contacts with the people, to follow these three recommendations: to respect the people; to help the people; to defend the people . . . in order to win their confidence and affection and achieve a perfect understanding between the people and the army."⁴⁸

The third important theorist and practitioner of guerrilla war, "Che" Guevara, also espoused the political leadership of a vanguard. He believed only one or two persons should be familiar with the plans of the revolution, especially in the beginning stages. This was to correct the deficiency which most early aborted revolutionary attempts had exhibited: a lack of preparation.⁴⁹ In further describing his elite concept he noted the necessity for two well organized staffs, one for the nation as a whole and the other for local guerrilla areas. The purpose of these staffs was to ensure that the army and the people understood the political nature of the

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, 66.

struggle. Hence the staffs were organized to disseminate propaganda. In relation to propaganda he exhorted them to stick to the truth for "a small truth well-presented is far better than the most glittering lie."⁵⁰

Guevara elaborated on the potential of women as tools of propaganda. He indicated that in colonial areas they were especially discriminated against and underestimated. He disagreed with those who contended that women increased opportunity for sexual conflict within guerrilla units. Instead he accentuated their positive contribution to the attainment of the revolutions' political goal. For example they were especially important in communication of messages and in obtaining enemy information. Besides if they were captured they would invariably be accorded better treatment than men. They could also be indispensable in indoctrinating the troops, population and children. Parenthetically, he added that many successful marriages were contracted within guerrilla camps.

Another innovation which Guevara made in relation to propaganda lay in the role of the medical doctor. He could contribute immeasurably to the on-going of the cause through giving moral as well as physical support to his patients.⁵¹

Guevara followed the procedure of Giap and Mao in respect to the method of obtaining unity within the troops. He believed that rank should not be conferred on anyone who

⁵⁰ Ibid., 60-61.

⁵¹ Ibid., 58.

had not stood the test of battle. He also sanctioned the democratic notion of discipline in stating that it must be based on reason and personal conviction.⁵²

The importance of reason and discipline are seen in the strategy with which the guerrillas are indoctrinated. Mao's strategy is based on the philosophical concept of Yin Yang which is oriented around the concept of the unity of opposites. In isolation opposites possess weaknesses as well as strengths which complement each other. "In strength there is weakness, in weakness strength."⁵³ The influence of this philosophy may be observed in Mao's theory of the phases of guerrilla warfare. For example within the context of the first phase--strategic defense--he exhorts his followers to continually instigate tactical offensive maneuvers which will lead to the second stage of stalemate. In this latter stage, while concentrating on deliberate protracted war, the guerrilla should initiate tactical forays with speed and quickness.⁵⁴

The unity of opposites is also seen in his dictum to exploit the weaknesses within the ostensibly stronger enemy. Although the enemy possesses greater technological power, and hence greater weapons, weaknesses are in evidence. Among them is usually insufficient manpower and barbarism. Against this Mao balances an abundant quantity of forces and a good rapport

⁵²Ibid., 63-64.

⁵³Pustay, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 30.

⁵⁴Mao, Guerrilla Warfare, 96.

with the people. The impatience and underestimation of the guerrilla which the enemy portrays is countered by Mao's axiom to trade space for time in order to alternately destroy the enemy's will and augment that of the guerrilla. The impatience of the enemy will lead him to strive quickly to occupy space. Since the guerrilla fights a protracted war characterized by speedy tactical retreats this loss of space does not hinder his effort. In fact it is an asset to the guerrilla, as the enemy's limited number of troops are tied down holding territory. Meanwhile as time elapses the enemy's impatient nature meets frustration and his will power dwindles. Concomitantly the will power of the guerrilla is strengthened.⁵⁵ In this manner the guerrilla "conserves strength and destroys the enemy."⁵⁶ "Tai Shan is a great mountain because it does not scorn the merest handful of dirt . . . the rivers and seas are deep because they absorb the waters of small streams."⁵⁷

As originally implemented, the policy of military civic action resembled the strategy of Mao, Giap and Guevara in its attempt to synchronize military and political aspects of policy. However, as the decisional sequence unfolded, new factors in the situation became relevant to the members of the decision unit who consequently reformulated their goals

⁵⁵E. L. Katzenbach, "Time, Space, and Will: The Politico-Military Views of Mao Tse-Tung," 11-21 in Greene, The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him.

⁵⁶Mao, Guerrilla Warfare, 95.

⁵⁷Ibid., 76.

and means into new strategies of action. One of these factors concerned the Vienna Conference between Khrushchev and Kennedy and the resultant Berlin crisis.

On the eve of the Vienna meeting, Kennedy believed that Khrushchev was still the master in the Kremlin even though hard-line military advisors were crowding him. For this reason the Russian leader's perception of the world political scene was important to the president. On an occasion when reporters asked him to view the world from Khrushchev's eyes, Kennedy responded that if he were Khrushchev he would see the West as divided on the one hand, with journalists and officials disagreeing with their leaders, and draw the conclusion that the tide of history was on the side of the Soviets.

On the other hand though, if Khrushchev had spent time in the west Kennedy believed that he would take a different view of the tide of history. He would then see where prophets of European collapse in 1947-48 were wrong. He would recognize that dissent and controversy brings a kind of vitality that protects individual liberty. He would consider that perhaps Russian society could be improved, and that the tide of history might not be running necessarily with the Russians. He would see the impending conflict within the communist bloc also. In short, he would see that although the United States was divided on many issues it was still determined to fulfill its commitments and play the role in history which it had created.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ Kennedy and the Press, June 2, 1961, 85.

In order to instill this perception of the West in Khrushchev, Kennedy perceived several aspects of the domestic setting for which he must compensate. One of these lay in the difficulty which a free society experienced in competing with the discipline of a communist state. Kennedy believed that the total mobilization of man and things for the service of the state which the Soviets were able to accomplish constituted a danger and a hazard to the West which would continue through the remainder of the century.⁵⁹

Kennedy believed that democracy was more durable in the long-run, though, for it best suited the qualities and aspirations of people who desire to be their own masters. Democracy's job then was to maintain its strength until its great qualities could be brought to bear more effectively. This would require a united and determined effort.⁶⁰ The people must be asked to spend a good deal of money on mutual security and foreign assistance which was not a popular program but which was essential.⁶¹

Kennedy, then, was very conscious of his role as manipulator of public morale. This probably accounts for his extreme sensitivity with regard to the content of newspapers. He was known to spend a whole evening with a writer who presented what he believed to be the wrong view or who misrepresented

⁵⁹Ibid., May 5, 1961, 73.

⁶⁰Ibid., April 12, 1961, 61.

⁶¹Ibid., May 5, 1961, 73.

the facts as he perceived them.⁶² This motivation to arouse the public may also be seen in his method and timing in implementing the space program. On the eve of the meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna, he officially launched the United States into the space race on May 25, 1961, by declaring America's goal to put a man on the moon before the end of the decade. The commitment to space then was probably as much for symbolic as for scientific purposes. Also at least partially within the realm of the symbolic, was his implementation of the Peace Corps and food for peace program which helped build public morale through commitment to a great cause.⁶³

The initiation of these measures to arouse the American people before Vienna enhanced Kennedy's assurance on the eve of that conference that the world balance of power was not moving in favor of Khrushchev. But there was another aspect of the internal setting which bothered Kennedy at this time and which he would have to contend with before the end of the summer. This was the fact that he did not trust Congress in foreign affairs. He believed for example that Congress failed to look at the stage of development of a country before determining the type of foreign aid to distribute. He also believed that, as a group, it adhered to several myths such as: "the existence of inherently good or bad nations . . . our diplomatic recognition could impair another nations' military power . . .

⁶²Sorenson, Kennedy, 311.

⁶³Ibid., 531.

the democratic way of life will inevitably be victorious in any struggle with an alien power . . . allies owe perpetual homage to the United States."⁶⁴

At Vienna Kennedy hoped to convince Khrushchev of the wisdom of reaching an agreement on the status quo.⁶⁵ He believed the necessary conditions for this move had existed since at least 1959. On a visit to the United States in that year Khrushchev made a speech to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of which Kennedy was a member. From the speech Kennedy gleaned five elements the United States and the Soviet Union possessed in common which should augment their mutual quest for peaceful coexistence: both wanted freedom from the arms race; neither wanted a nuclear war; neither wanted nuclear weapons to pass into the hands of other nations; neither wanted to pollute the air with nuclear tests and both wanted to expand their economies and scientific achievements.⁶⁶

Kennedy's idea of defining the status quo consisted first of a delineation of those underdeveloped areas in which neither power held a paramount interest and which consequently constituted a political vacuum. He then proposed an agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the United States not to agitate these areas and make them a battleground for the cold war.⁶⁷ Upon

⁶⁴ Ibid., 510.

⁶⁵ Hammond, The Cold War Years, 159.

⁶⁶ Nevins, Strategy of Peace, 12.

⁶⁷ Hammond, The Cold War Years, 159.

presenting these proposals to Khrushchev, Kennedy realized the breadth of the existing communication gap between the two powers. Kennedy stated that they gave different meanings to the same words such as war, peace, democracy and popular will. "We have wholly different views of right and wrong, of what is an internal affair and what is aggression." He added that above all they had a "different conception of where the world is and where it is going."⁶⁸ Another example of the communication crisis concerned the fact that Khrushchev was expecting a showdown at the communist party congress in October in relation to the coexistence doctrine which he espoused. Since Russia held a superiority in conventional weapons and manpower and since it was competitive in nuclear power, Khrushchev expected Kennedy to exhibit the chess player's logic and realize that obstinance would cause everyone to suffer needlessly. Kennedy's refusal to recognize the obvious led Khrushchev to attempt to scare him into capitulation by ranting and raving.⁶⁹ When he threatened to grab Berlin before December ended, Kennedy retorted that "it will be a cold winter." Hypertension produced hypertension causing Kennedy to stir the emotions of his nation to fever-pitch during a speech on July 25. On that date he announced the necessity to build bomb shelters in preparation for the impending debacle between the two super powers. The hysteria which Kennedy's reaction induced seeped into Europe

⁶⁸Sorenson, Kennedy, 550.

⁶⁹Fuller, Year of Crisis, 226-35.

from where it further reinforced Kennedy's hard-line stance through the process of feedback.⁷⁰ Particularly obstinant in their hard-line stance were General de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer.⁷¹ In precipitating the Berlin crisis the communication gap exhibited at Vienna had an important bearing upon the eventual nature of the U.S. brand of counterinsurgency.

The Berlin crisis focused on the issue of whether the United States possessed the right to occupy Berlin. Kennedy expressed his opinion on this issue in a press conference on June 28, in which he stated that the crisis was Soviet-manufactured.⁷² That country had illegally blockaded the city from 1948 until the spring of 1949. From then until 1958 the situation was relatively peaceful with the people of West Berlin developing a healthy and thriving city. During this period, the United States carried out its responsibilities and exercised its rights of access to the city without serious incident. In November 1958, however the Soviets began a new campaign to force the allied powers out of Berlin, a process which led up to the abortive summit conference in Paris in May, 1959.

Kennedy continued by pointing out that in 1961 the Soviets revived that drive by calling upon the United States to sign "what they call a peace treaty" with the regime that

⁷⁰Ibid., 242.

⁷¹Ibid., 245.

⁷²Kennedy and the Press, June 28, 1961, 89-90.

they created in East Germany. They further stated that if we refused this demand that they themselves would sign such a treaty. Kennedy believed that the obvious purpose here was not to have peace but to make permanent the partition of Germany. The Soviet's peace treaty would bring an end to allied rights in West Berlin and to free access to that city.

At this point Kennedy interjected his opinion on the legality of the Soviet actions: "It is clear that such unilateral action cannot effect these [allied] rights, which stem from the surrender of Nazi Germany." He believed that such action would mean a repudiation by the Soviets of multilateral commitments to which they solemnly subscribed and had repeatedly reaffirmed.

It was Kennedy's opinion that if the Soviets withdrew from their obligations it was a matter for the other three allies France, England and the United States to decide how they would exercise their rights and meet their responsibilities. But the Soviets declared that if this happened the allies would be subject to the designs of the East Germans.

Therefore it was plain to the president that the kind of "Free City" which the Soviets had in mind was one in which the rights of the citizens of West Berlin were gradually but relentlessly extinguished. This did not connote to Kennedy a Soviet Union that desired peaceful coexistence.

Kennedy then summed up his definition of the threat:
This is not a question of technical legal rights. It

involves the peace and the security of the peoples of West Berlin. It involves the direct responsibilities and commitments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France. It involves the peace and security of the Western World.⁷³

At least one writer believes that Kennedy's actions in inducing hypertension in the public due to the Berlin threat was actually an exercise in calculated caution: he sought to stabilize the status quo as he had defined it at Vienna.⁷⁴ Kennedy realized that the status quo which he was describing would be overwhelmingly in his favor. West Berlin and West Germany had by outclassed the communist puppet regime of East Germany both in political stability and in productivity. Therefore he was asking Khrushchev to agree to a status quo in which the premier would continue indefinitely to witness the flight of thousands of refugees from East Germany to the brighter future evident in the West. Only by convincing the public that nuclear war was imminent could Kennedy legitimize allowing Khrushchev to force the East Germans to remain behind the "iron curtain." Therefore, when Khrushchev built the Berlin Wall, Kennedy ostensibly was horrified and placed troops in position on the west side; however he did not attempt to make Khrushchev back down. In the process he received a modicum of agreement on the maintenance of a status quo which both sides could accept.⁷⁵ In August, the establishment of the Berlin Wall

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Hammond, The Cold War Years, 160-64.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

ironically ensured the agreement on the status quo which Kennedy had asked for at Vienna. A further point which indicates that Kennedy was more calculating than emotional is seen in his statement that "Khrushchev's national inferiority complex makes him appear tough at times."⁷⁶

Besides convincing Khrushchev of the necessity to delineate the status quo, Kennedy's emotional response to the Berlin ultimatum was also geared to impress the neutral nations. In order to maintain their confidence he had to prove at Berlin that he was willing to go to the limit for the principle of self-determination.⁷⁷

In relation to his policy to uncommitted nations he also sought by his actions to influence Congress. As indicated earlier Congress had been slow to provide him the necessary funds to properly implement his policy of civic action; therefore, within the context of the Berlin situation he emphasized the military imperatives inherent in his requests to Congress for foreign aid.⁷⁸

This emphasis on the purely military point of view in relation to appropriations differentiates the pre-decisional from the decisional sequence. A pattern emerges during the latter period which portrays the gradual submersion of the

⁷⁶Sorenson, Kennedy, 555.

⁷⁷"Address and Replies made by the Under Secretary of State at the National Press Club," August 15, 1961, 623-25 in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962.

⁷⁸Fuller, Year of Crisis, 225.

political or preventive aspect of military civic action in favor of the military aspect of counterinsurgency. This is due largely to the enhanced spheres of competence which Rostow, Taylor, and McNamara obtained during the Berlin crisis. Particularly important was their role in reinforcing Kennedy's opinion that more ground troops were needed in order to successfully implement the policy of flexible response.⁷⁹ Consequently, contrary to Khrushchev's expectations, the United States made a credible showing of military force. In spite of this strong showing, Kennedy received much criticism for allowing Khrushchev to retain the wall. This criticism, in turn, constituted still another factor driving Kennedy to a harder line encompassing an emphasis on military over political factors.⁸⁰ It is within this context that the strategic concept for counterinsurgency which was promulgated in Vietnam during the decisional sequence should be viewed.

⁷⁹Sorenson, Kennedy, 590-91, 95.

⁸⁰Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 548.

CHAPTER VI

VIETNAM AND THE ASCENT OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

The debate over the proper strategy to invoke in response to guerrilla war constituted the most divisive issue in the Kennedy administration and Vietnam comprised the primary matrix within which it evolved.¹ Accordingly this chapter will focus upon the main ingredients of that strategy as derived during the decisional sequence. It will be shown how and why the trend toward a military dominant response, evident throughout this dissertation, received fruition in the jungles of Southeast Asia.

During the height of the Berlin crisis Roger Hilsman, the head of the Intelligence Research Division of the State Department, presented the composite of his division's views on that strategy. In developing his argument he first presented the two most likely situations in which a guerrilla war might occur. One of these he compared to the situation in France during the World War II occupation by Germany. Before the Germans became distracted in repelling the allied invasion they were adept at breaking up any move by French guerrillas to weaken their position. However after the Normandy invasion the guerrillas became increasingly successful. In this

¹Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 413.

example Hilsman pointed out that the whole populace arose in support of the guerrillas.

The vulnerable underdeveloped areas comprised the other situations likely to produce guerrilla war. Hilsman elaborated upon the multitude of political problems which the governments of these regions must encounter. For example there were externally induced problems such as antagonism between states in regard to territorial claims generated by the sudden political vacuum which the withdrawal of the colonial masters created. There were also indigenous causes of chaos. Regionalism, tribalism and separatism were rife as was antagonism between social classes.² Not only was inter-class rivalry evident but intra-class competition also occurred through the tendency of modernizing elites to attempt to garner for themselves the benefits of the modernization process.³ Supplementing social class rivalries were those between different races or ethnic groups. Even the presence of bandit gangs constituted a common denominator of undeveloped areas. Finally, and probably most important, was the phenomena of ubiquitous constitutional crises as ostensibly representative governments inadvertantly violated the local norms of political legitimacy. These then were some of the problems of nation building.⁴

To alleviate these conditions Hilsman announced that

²Hilsman, "Internal War: The New Communist Tactic," 22-36 in Greene, ed., The Guerrilla.

³Pustay, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 18.

⁴Hilsman, "Internal War."

the United States must become deeply involved in a systematic way to modernize these countries. Included in his suggestions toward this end were the following: encourage reformers to organize mass parties; create citizens militias; increase the capacity of friendly governments to augment social and political reforms as a basis for modernization; look for ways to ease the access of beleaguered states to outside assistance. Hilsman believed that the addition of these modernization measures would paradoxically induce more chaos in the short run due to the psychological effects of removing people from their traditional folk-ways. For example when modernization began many rural dwellers would migrate to the big cities for the promised better life. However the city's capabilities for coping with large quantities of people was limited; hence many of these people joined the increasing numbers of discontented in the city slums. This connection between rural and urban discontent constituted fertile soil for guerrilla exploitation. In order to stabilize the modernization process in the face of communist aggression Hilsman suggested training local police and military forces in the art of counterinsurgency warfare.

Before illustrating his operational concept Hilsman elaborated upon reasons why regular conventional forces were dysfunctional in guerrilla warfare. He stated that in field formation conventional forces with their heavy equipment tended to cluster together centralizing their power on terrain

that allows rapid movement. They rely on roads and consider such targets as cities to be vital. Concentration keeps units at unwieldy battalion strength with stress on holding land rather than destroying enemy forces.⁵

Hilsman maintained that it was ironic for Americans to have to learn this lesson again in the twentieth century when they had taught the British regulars Indian fighting on several occasions. Also Americans had fought one of the most successful guerrilla campaigns in history in the Philippines at the turn of the century. After Aguinaldo's army lost the conventional war it took to the hills where it joined forces with several bands of guerrillas who had sojourned there for three centuries while jabbing at the Spanish.

The regular army's attempts to fight these guerrillas led to frustration as the latter continually faded into the jungle. The regulars were too burdened with equipment to initiate rapid pursuit. Also impeding their progress was the necessity to maintain supply lines since they could not live off the country or function without ammunition trains or hospital corps. Augmenting these problems was their practice of establishing fixed bases which enabled the guerrillas to always know their location, including the details of the procedure of their guards. Thus the stage was set for the guerrillas to implement surprise attacks.

Through bitter trial and error the United States

⁵Ibid.

arrived at the proper strategy to quell the guerrillas. This lay in the recruitment of native Filipinos who were wise to jungle ways. These were divided into small groups of ten, fifteen, twenty or fifty men with each placed under the command of an American officer. The resultant Philippine Constabulary patrolled every trail until they extirpated the guerrillas.

To Hilsman the lesson of the Philippine experience was to adopt the tactics and weapons of the guerrilla in order to defeat him. Reinforcement for this conclusion came from his own experience in Burma during World War II when he operated an OSS guerrilla battalion behind the Japanese lines. The Japanese mistakenly operated in large unwieldy units which were easy to ambush, and their movements were simple to follow through the mountains and jungles. Hilsman related that at one stage his outfit, consisting of four Americans and about two hundred Burmese, kept a whole Japanese regiment of three thousand men marching and countermarching over the mountains and far away from the front lines. He added that his group held a greater fear of smaller patrols, especially cavalry, than of large masses of troops. The sweeps of the regular troops were cumbersome and also led to antagonism between themselves and the local population.

Drawing upon these and other experiences Hilsman formulated his operational concept for counterinsurgency as follows: A guerrilla-infested part of the country is marked off and

divided into sections. Each section is patrolled by small units who are in contact with a central headquarters which, in turn, has a reserve force at its disposal. Upon contacting guerrillas, a patrol alerts headquarters and adjacent patrols. As the latter converge, headquarters dispatches paratroops or helicopter transports behind the enemy who is surrounded and destroyed. Once an area is pacified the government consolidates its control and moves on to the next section of land to be cleared. The main ingredients then are constant patrols, good communication facilities, rapid mobility and a capacity for rapid concentration.⁶

This then was Hilsman's contribution in August 1961 to the emerging strategic concept of counterinsurgency. However he noted one basic flaw in his scheme: in fighting this was of attrition in which guerrillas would surely be killed or captured there was no guarantee that they would not just recruit more to take their place. Robert Thompson, a British advisor in Vietnam whom Hilsman met on a trip there in January, 1962, offered a suggestion to correct that flaw.⁷

Thompson perceived that the Americans were prone to make the same mistakes in Vietnam as the British in Malaya and the French in Vietnam. In fighting primarily a conventional war they had played into the hands of the guerrillas. For example the French had formed what they called an "Iron

⁶Ibid.

⁷Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 429.

Triangle" of forts along which they defeated every conventional assault by the Viet Minh. However within this triangle the guerrillas were controlling the populace by whatever means were necessary, from kindness to assassination. In short, the French controlled the open battlefield while the Vietminh controlled the people. Similarly the British in Malaya fought a conventional style of war for the first two years of their decade-long encounter with communist guerrillas. Finally, in contrast to the French, they learned their lesson and began to fight with the guerrilla's tactics. In addition they built progressively more garrisons to protect pockets of people from the guerrillas until slowly they brought a majority of the people under their authority and control. In the process the guerrillas lost their major source of supply.⁸

This opinion on the location of the guerrilla's source of supply in Vietnam served to differentiate Thompson sharply from the point of view of the typical conventional military analyst. Whereas the latter believed that the main source lay in the trails leading into North Vietnam and Laos, Thompson thought it lay in the thousands of trails leading from the many hamlets in South Vietnam. To further differentiate Thompson from the conventional military analyst the former believed that the main body of the enemy was not the

⁸Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (New York: Praeger, 1966), chapter 11, 121-40.

concentrated battalions of Viet Cong which the army periodically faced on the battlefield. Rather he believed that the main body of the enemy, at least potentially, was the people of South Vietnam; the guerrillas depended upon the people for their food and other necessities.

Following this line of thought Thompson's goal consisted of three parts: he would cut through these enemy supply lines as he defined them; he would counter the potential strength to the guerrillas from the population by winning the allegiance of the latter; and he would cause the guerrillas to fight on the government's terms rather than on his own terms.⁹

His procedure for achieving these goals was to utilize strategic hamlets. This was essentially the same procedure indicated above which the British used in Malaya to impede the rebels there. The strategic hamlet program involved two components, one military and the other political. The former task consisted of protection for the people. To this end the military was expected to perform five different but inter-related roles: the first was termed static defense and consisted of guarding such sensitive installations as bridges, factories and hospitals. Second there was the "clear and hold" function of forming a protective ring around the villages while the political function occurred within. Thirdly, the military provided strategic reserves who could reinforce

⁹Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 433-34.

the civic action corps within the villages when necessary and also set up ambushes of the guerrillas who ventured too close. These three roles were to be primary in the early stages of the program. As progress ensued the fourth and fifth roles became more important. They were, respectively, to keep the enemy off balance through search and destroy operations and to seal off infiltration routes from the north by ambushing trails.¹⁰

The general aim of the political component of the strategic action program was to gain the political allegiance of the population. The demands of the people were to be injected upwards to the government while goods and services flowed down. This, as Hilsman said, was a revolutionary concept to which the people would be very receptive.¹¹ It included such services by the government as education, sanitation, and medical facilities as well as indoctrination in democracy and instruction in self defense. Each village was equipped with a radio with which to alert the government when the hamlet needed reinforcements.¹²

In combination the political and military components of the strategic hamlet program would instill the proper amount of civil, military, social and political measures to

¹⁰Ibid., 435-36.

¹¹"Address by the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, Chicago, September 18, 1962," 1109-1117 in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962.

¹²Ibid.

allow the government to cut off the main source of supply from the guerrillas. To this end the "ink blot" principle was to be followed: beginning on the coast a few hamlets in strategic locations were to be made safe. Then gradually more were to be added until a hedgehog of villages covered the majority of the country. Faced with this formidable sea of allied and protected villages sweeping across the land the guerrillas would be forced to starvation or obliteration if they remained in the area.¹³

The Hilsman-Thompson plan was one alternative of the State Department which Kennedy considered in regard to formulating a strategic concept for counterinsurgency. There was also another viewpoint which a prominent member of that Department presented for his consideration. Under-Secretary of State Chester Bowles interjected the idea of enlarging the concept of a "neutral and independent Laos" to include Burma, Thailand, South Vietnam, Cambodia and Malaya. Bowles believed that such a neutral belt would eventually be guaranteed by the Soviet Union, China, India, Japan and the SEATO powers. In this manner international support to counter communist aggression would be more readily forthcoming, and the United States would not have to suffer the accusation of being imperialist. Although this was an imaginative proposal its opponents contended that it would be taken as a deliberate abandonment of regimes which depended on the United States

¹³Ibid.

in exchange for empty promises from China and Moscow. Other critics maintained that it was fine but that it was either too early or too late.¹⁴

Although reasons against the utilization of Bowles' idea appeared immediately and were readily apparent, the fate of the Hilsman-Thompson plan was more complex. It must be viewed within the framework of the other alternatives which Kennedy received during the decisional sequence.

In April, 1961, the results of two task forces on Vietnam reached the President. Since the Joint Chiefs of Staff composed one of these while the Central Intelligence Agency heavily influenced the other, Kennedy was skeptical of their advice, especially when their solution to the Vietnam situation reeked of militarism. Kennedy was still under the influence of the Bay of Pigs disaster at that time; consequently he was prone to distrust both the CIA and the JCS. Besides he believed that their alternative unrealistically depended too heavily on supplies from Laos and reforms by Diem.¹⁵

Although Kennedy was not completely satisfied with these reports he apparently followed some of their advice. For example, on May 11th he approved deployment of four hundred Special Forces troops along with programs for covert action in North Vietnam. Among these actions were: dispatch

¹⁴Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 545.

¹⁵Sorenson, Kennedy, 652-53.

of agents into North Vietnam; aerial resupply of agents in North Vietnam through the use of civilian mercenary air crews; infiltration of special South Vietnamese forces in Southeast Laos to locate and attack communist bases and lines of communication; formulation of networks of resistance, covert bases and teams for sabotage and light harassment inside North Vietnam and conduct of overflights of North Vietnam for the purpose of dropping leaflets.¹⁶

As noted earlier in May 1961 Lyndon Johnson recommended an emphasis on the preventive aspect of military civic action rather than attempting a military defeat of the insurgents through a policy of counterinsurgency.

In July, Kennedy sent still another mission to Vietnam, this time under the leadership of Professor Eugene Staley of Stanford Research Institute. After a stay of six weeks in Saigon, he and the Vietnamese economist, Vu Quoc Thuc, worked out a war doctrine and an action plan.¹⁷ The Staley Plan contained a military and a social-economic aspect. The former placed emphasis on the village militias that would be supplied with modern weapons and on the National Guard. It also recommended that the 170,000 man regular army be trained in jungle fighting. Also, since the bad behavior of the soldiers

¹⁶"Pentagon Papers," New York Times, quoted in The Houston Chronicle, July 2, 1971.

¹⁷Jean Lacouture, Vietnam Between Two Truces, trans. Konrad Kellen and Joel Carmichael (New York: Random House, 1965), 64.

had been one of the principle reasons for the villagers' grievances against the government, the Vietnamese soldiers were to receive training in psychological warfare.

On the social-economic plane the Staley Plan called for an "agro-city" experiment. There were to be twenty-six such cities in all originally with the number to reach one hundred in a year. It was around these agro-cities that strategic hamlets were to be set up. They were to have bamboo hedges surrounding them and to have guard towers providing protection. In this fashion the peasants could work during the day in the agro-city and find protection in the strategic hamlets at night.¹⁸

There is an obvious similarity between Staley's agro-city and Thompson's strategic hamlet. However the basic difference exemplifies the theme of this chapter: the trend toward a military dominant strategy. The Staley mission did not give "much evidence of being alert to the realities of the South Vietnamese situation."¹⁹ In contrast to Thompson's "ink blot" principle it was designed to "wipe out the Viet Cong in eighteen months."²⁰ In addition the Staley mission, "though essentially of a civilian character, came forth with few recommendations that were not of a military nature."

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Bernard Fall, The Two Viet-Nams (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1967), 373.

²⁰ George McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis, The United States in Vietnam (New York: Dial Press, 1967), 282.

None involved the necessary political changes.²¹

On September 18, 1961, the political aspect became further submerged as the need for military protection increased in South Vietnam. On that date the Viet Cong seized a Province Chief within 55 miles of Saigon and decapitated him. Adding to the September chaos was the occurrence of torrential floods which caused 500,000 South Vietnamese to go hungry.²² With the communists capitalizing upon the resulting frustration Kennedy clothed his remarks on the situation to the United Nations on September 25 with such phrases as the "smoldering coals of war."²³

A month later, on October 24, President Kennedy apparently had become apprehensive about the Vietnamese situation as is indicated in his letter on that date to President Diem:

Mr. President . . . We have seen and marked well the anguish--and glory--of a nation that refuses to submit to Communist terror. From the people that twice defeated the hordes of Kublai Khan, we could expect no less. . . . America is well aware of the increased intensity which in recent months has marked the war against your people, and of the expanding scale and frequency of the Communist attacks. . . . And I have taken note of the stream of threats and vituperation, directed at your government and mine, that flows day and night from Hanoi. Let me assure you again that the United States is determined to help Viet-Nam preserve its independence, protect its people against Communist assassins, and build a better life through

²¹Fall, Two Viet-Nams, 278.

²²Cooper, The Lost Crusade, 178.

²³"Department of State White Paper, 1961," 123-24 in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965.

economic growth.²⁴

Kennedy added that he was "awaiting with great interest the report of General Maxwell Taylor based on his recent talks and observations in Viet-Nam, supplementing reports which I have received from our Embassy over many months."²⁵ Accompanying Taylor on that mission was W. W. Rostow. Kennedy had directed them to find out whether the United States was better off at that time than the French had been in the early fifties. Specifically he wanted to know if "Vietnamese nationalism had turned against us."²⁶

The composition of the mission was significant. Headed by a general and a White House aide with no figure of comparable rank from the State Department, it expressed a conscious decision by Rusk to turn the Vietnam problem over to the Secretary of Defense. Schlesinger believes that "Rusk doubtless decided to do this because the military aspects seemed to him the most urgent, and Kennedy doubtless acquiesced because he had more confidence in McNamara and Taylor than in State."²⁷

The trouble as Taylor and Rostow defined it, was a

²⁴"Letter from the President of the United States to the President of Vietnam, October 24, 1961," 1049-50 in Current Documents, 1962.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 545.

²⁷Ibid.

"double crisis of confidence:"²⁸ On the one hand doubt existed in Vietnam as to whether the United States was really determined to save Southeast Asia, while on the other hand there was doubt that Diem's methods could really defeat the Viet Cong. To halt the decline Taylor and Rostow recommended increased American intervention to the point of a limited partnership.

In spelling out the means to accomplish their task "the report concentrated on military matters."²⁹ Rostow believed that the essence of the problem lay in a crisis of the modernization process, not unlike the Hilsman analysis. However he differed from Hilsman in the emphasis he placed on military security as the means to alleviate the chaos. He described the communists as "the scavengers of the modernization process" and felt that in order to overcome their debilitating effect elements of reform "must be measured in terms of their contribution to physical security."³⁰ He revealed further emphasis on a military solution when he stated the necessity to block off the infiltration routes in the north by which the Viet Cong received their supplies. On this point also his divergence from Hilsman and Thompson

²⁸Ibid., 546.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰W. W. Rostow, "Guerrilla Warfare in Underdeveloped Areas," 54-62 in Greene, ed., The Guerrilla.

is obvious.³¹ In fact, Rostow was so obstinate in his demand for an attack on the north that "Rostow Plan 6 became jocularly established in the contingency planning somewhere after SEATO Plan 5."³²

Rostow's analysis not only conflicted with the Hilsman-Thompson perception of the situation but it also did not coincide with the view of General Lansdale. Lansdale, who had been involved in Vietnam since the Eisenhower administration, was also a member of the Taylor-Rostow mission. "His experience with the political undercurrents in Vietnam was probably greater than any other American's, as were his sources of information. But much to his disgust, he was put to work estimating the costs and number of men required to "seal off" the 250 mile borders of jungle and mountains through which the infiltrators came--a question that he thought itself revealed a misunderstanding of guerrilla warfare."³³

Lansdale's position reflected his association with Ramon Magsaysay's successful effort to quell the communist uprising in the Philippines--the Huk rebellion.³⁴ In approaching that problem Magsaysay had decided that popular support for Philippine communism existed for the following reasons: the new Philippine government had drifted toward the traditional

³¹Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 422.

³²Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 547.

³³Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 421.

³⁴Ibid., 417.

Asian acceptance of inefficiency, graft and corruption as the prerogatives of those in power; the people had received abusive treatment from some of the military; a lack of national socio-economic reforms compounded by universal poverty.³⁵ Magsaysay's solution to the crisis lay in an emphasis on political over military means. For example, on one occasion he stated that the Huks were "fighting the Government because they want a house and land of their own . . . all right, they can stop fighting, because I will give it to them."³⁶ As a result the Huks began to come in, eventually by the hundreds.³⁷

In essence Lansdale's position coincided with the first two recommendations of the Taylor-Rostow report. The first of these encompassed a series of demands for political, governmental and administrative reforms by the Diem government.³⁸ The second set of recommendations covered a list of items of technical aid which the United States should provide to Vietnam. Included were arms and equipment for self defense corps and specialized equipment such as helicopters to free the Vietnamese military from static defense. Along with these items the United States would send highly trained

³⁵Major Boyd Bashore, "Dual Strategy for Limited War," 184-202 in F. M. Osanka, ed., Modern Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Free Press, 1962).

³⁶Major K. M. Hammer, "Huks in the Philippines," 177-83 in Osanka, Modern Guerrilla Warfare.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 422.

technicians who would operate the equipment while training the Vietnamese to take over. In addition special air force squadrons code named "Farmgate" and including slow-flying propeller-driven B-26s and T-28s would be sent to aid in the counterinsurgency operations.³⁹

The first two recommendations of the Taylor-Rostow report, then, were basically in accordance with the views of Lansdale and Hilsman. The third recommendation, however, reflected a divergence from the precept of military civic action of preventing insurgency toward that of defeating the insurgents in a military sense. This is seen in its advocacy to close infiltration routes from the north through the use of 10,000 regular American troops.⁴⁰ Although Taylor stated that instead of being primarily combat troops they were to boost the morale of the South Vietnamese, he admitted the possibility of combat: "However the United States troops may be called upon to engage in combat to protect themselves, their working parties, and the area in which they live."⁴¹

Secretary of Defense McNamara's opinion of the Taylor report is seen in his statement to Kennedy in November in which he stated that it should be adopted with the "understanding that it will be followed up with more troops as needed

³⁹Ibid., 422.

⁴⁰Ibid., 422-23.

⁴¹"The Pentagon Papers," New York Times (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1971), 142.

and with a willingness to attack Vietnam."⁴²

The President read the report with interest. He was impressed by its description of the situation as serious but not hopeless and attracted by the idea of stiffening the Diem regime through an infusion of American advisors. However he was not impressed with the recommendation of a direct American commitment:

They want a force of American troops . . . they say it's necessary in order to restore confidence and maintain morale. But it will be just like Berlin. The troops will march in; the bands will play; the crowds will cheer; and in four days everyone will have forgotten. Then we will be told we have to send in more troops. It's like taking a drink. The effect wears off, and you have to take another.⁴³

He added that the war in Vietnam was the Vietnamese's war, and that if it were converted into a white man's war, the United States would lose as the French had lost a decade earlier.⁴⁴

In addition to Hilsman, Thompson, Bowles and Lansdale, Kennedy had other support for his view that the crisis was not primarily of a military nature. J. K. Galbraith and Averell Harriman were sure that the crisis of confidence was political in its origins and had resulted from Diem's repressive and reactionary policies in the face of a communist-managed peasant insurrection.⁴⁵ Even more important from

⁴²Peter Arnet, Associated Press, quoted in the Sunday Oklahoman, July 4, 1971.

⁴³Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 547.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Ibid.

Kennedy's point of view were the opinions in 1961 of Charles de Gualle and General Douglas MacArthur. Both these men warned him that the Asian mainland was no place to be fighting a non-nuclear land war. They pointed out that there was no end to Asiatic manpower and that even if we poured a million American infantry soldiers into that continent we would still find ourselves outnumbered on every side. MacArthur added that the domino theory was ridiculous in the nuclear age, and he was critical of the military advice which the President had been receiving from the Pentagon. He indicated that over the last ten years the military leaders had advanced the wrong young officers.⁴⁶

Kennedy seemingly reflected this advice in an address at the University of Washington on November 16, 1961:

We possess weapons of tremendous power but they are least effective in combatting freedom's foes: subversion, infiltration, guerrilla warfare, and civil disorder. We send arms to other peoples . . . just as we can send them the ideals of democracy in which we believe . . . but we cannot send them the will to use those arms or to abide by those ideals.⁴⁷

During the same speech he also reflected frustration over the divergence in his sources of advice: "We must face problems which do not lend themselves to easy or quick solutions." He then implied that advocates of two extreme views were pressing upon him and proceeded to define those views:

⁴⁶Kenneth O'Donnell, "LBJ and the Kennedys," 44-56 in LIFE, August 7, 1970.

⁴⁷"Address by the President at the University of Washington, Seattle, November 16, 1961," 53-56 in Current Documents, 1962.

"Each believes that we have only two choices: appeasement or war, suicide or surrender, humiliation or holocaust, to be either red or dead. Each side sees only 'hard' and 'soft' nations, hard and soft policies, hard and soft men." He summed up his views by stating that both professed to be the true realist of our time but that neither could be more unrealistic. Both failed to grasp the essential fact that diplomacy and defense were not substitutes for one another. "Either alone would fail."⁴⁸

In this mood of frustration the President promulgated the so-called "Thanksgiving Day Massacre" in which he placed into key positions in the State Department personnel whom he understood and in whom he had confidence. He told Hilsman that he was moving toward a more direct and personal supervision of foreign affairs. It is significant at this point to recall Dean Rusk's definition of his role as that of judge rather than of initiating and defending positions, for Kennedy apparently sought security from his frustration in placing men in key positions whose views he knew and understood. It is also significant to recall that the key positions, especially after the Bay of Pigs invasion, were to be at the level of assistant secretary.⁴⁹

⁴⁸Ibid. It should be noted that he apparently referred here to advice from outside his decision unit, as its members did not proffer such extreme views.

⁴⁹Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 53.

Into perhaps the most influential assistant secretary position he placed Rostow. This was the position of Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning or the Chairmanship of the Policy Planning Council.⁵⁰ Established in 1947, it was important for several reasons. One was its location within the Office of the Secretary of State. Another lay in its size, comprising only approximately twelve persons allowed an intimacy for rapport and frank discussion. Still another reason for its importance was its official functions: it was to advise the Secretary of State and to engage in long-range consideration and analysis of policy problems, thus giving continuity to policy.⁵¹

In order to carry out these functions the Policy Planning Council had to be informed of and coordinate its directives with, other divisions of the Department. One of the most sensitive and important of these divisions was created in May 1961. This was the Politico-Military Affairs Staff headed by a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs(G/PM). Both the PPC and the Politico-Military Affairs Staff fell under the supervision of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.⁵²

Rusk characterized the function of the Political

⁵⁰Ibid., 50.

⁵¹Burton Sapin, The Making of United States Foreign Policy (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1966), 112-13.

⁵²Ibid., 393.

Military Affairs Staff in August 1961:

[it is to] assist the supervisory level of the State Department in the management and conduct of all the Department's relations with the Department of Defense, including the Military Establishment. It is intended to provide leadership on such matters within the State Department, and thereby enable it to fulfill more effectively its role of providing timely political guidance to other governmental agencies on politico-military matters.⁵³

"The Planning Council continues to be actively engaged in politico-military problems as an aspect of its long-term planning in the foreign policy field, and its members work with G/PM political military officers on the politico-military facets of their planning tasks."⁵⁴ This quote from Burton Sapin indicates the influence which the Planning Council had in coordinating political policy with military policy. Further specification of the influence which Rostow probably wielded comes from Sapin's statement that the interdepartmental group that drafted the United States policy doctrine of counterinsurgency was chaired by a political-military officer.⁵⁵ As Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning Rostow apparently constituted the connecting link between this group and the President.

In assessing the importance of Rostow's new position it should also be recalled that McNamara had capitalized upon

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴Ibid., 395.

⁵⁵Ibid., 397.

precedents and his strong personality to become the primary spokesman for the Department of Defense and that Kennedy recognized the situation as such. Also germane is the fact that Kennedy recognized Taylor as his primary expositor for counterinsurgency doctrine. Thus paramount spheres of competence in his decision unit for military strategic policy as of November, 1961, were occupied by Rostow, McNamara and Taylor. Since these individuals were apparently prepared to accept the consequences of an increase in counterinsurgency operations, the reasons for the movement in that direction become obvious.*

Further reduction of Kennedy's available alternatives vis à vis counterinsurgency doctrine on the eve of 1962 is evident in the circumstances surrounding his appointment of a new commander in Vietnam. Kennedy had the choice of appointing a younger officer who appreciated the interrelationship between the political, social and economic as well as the military factors involved there or of choosing one of the older officers more steeped in conventional warfare tactics as practiced in Korea. In appointing General Harkins he chose the latter.⁵⁶ Still further reduction of Kennedy's alternatives appear in a revelation by General Lemnitzer. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff he expressed the general consensus

⁵⁶Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 427.

*See "Pentagon Papers," New York Times, particularly Chapter 3.

of that group's views in April, 1961, that the problem in Vietnam was definitely military instead of political. Furthermore he expressed his opinion that even an emphasis on military counterinsurgency was out of order; he would opt for the purely conventional solution.⁵⁷

Besides being surrounded by military oriented personnel who advocated military solutions, Kennedy occupied the untenable position of having civilian personnel in high spheres of competence who believed in the importance of the political but who failed to push for their alternative. The reticence of Rusk has already been discussed. In addition McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, never became a serious factor in the deliberations over Vietnam during 1961. Also pertinent is the fact that Kennedy removed Bowles, the advocate of neutralism, from his position as Under Secretary of State during the Thanksgiving Day Massacre.⁵⁸ Within this context Kennedy made a major commitment to Vietnam in December which marked the final break between a policy emphasizing military civic action to one of counterinsurgency.⁵⁹

The next month saw the influence of the military axis become even more entrenched. In January of 1962 the

⁵⁷ Ibid., 416.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 50.

⁵⁹ "Message from the President of the United States to the President of Vietnam," December 14, 1961, 1056-57 in Current Documents, 1962.

Special Group Counterinsurgency came into existence. Its duties consisted of coordinating all aspects of counterinsurgency policy including contingency plans of various countries so that they coincided with the objectives of the United States. It also had the responsibility of conducting research into plausible doctrines of counterinsurgency. The significance of this group in relation to the theme of this chapter lies in its composition, especially in its chairman, Maxwell Taylor.⁶⁰ From this position he could ensure the implementation of his views. Another important member was the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, U. Alexis Johnson, who in October had proposed to Kennedy that "our real and ultimate objective in Vietnam should be the defeat of the Viet Cong."⁶¹ Still another important member was General Lemnitzer, whose views have been mentioned. Also present on the SGC was the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell Gilpatrick, who on April 27 had recommended "the dropping of earlier conditions that Diem undertake political and social reforms in return" for American military assistance.⁶² Another member was CIA director, John McCone, also a hard-liner. Besides these hard-line advocates there was one member who presumably possessed little influence in counterinsurgency

⁶⁰ Barber and Ronning, Internal Security, 97.

⁶¹ "Pentagon Papers," New York Times, quoted in The Houston Chronicle, July 2, 1971.

⁶² Ibid.

policy at that time; as mentioned earlier, McGeorge Bundy.⁶³

The final member, Robert Kennedy, merits special mention. "His distinctive contribution was to fight unremittingly for his brother's understanding that foreign policy was not a technical exercise off in a vacuum but the expression of a nation's internal policy and purpose."⁶⁴ Various quotes establish him as an advocate of the primacy of the political over the military. He stated that he was impressed by the fact that America could make contact with the youth and intellectuals in Asia only as a progressive country: "I kept asking myself what a conservative could possibly say to these people. I can talk all the time about social welfare and trade unions and reform; but what could some say who didn't believe in these things?"⁶⁵

Although the Kennedy brothers both advocated the primacy of the political, apparently the situation within which the strategic concept for counterinsurgency emerged engulfed them.

⁶³ Barber and Ronning, Internal Security, 97.

⁶⁴ Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 702.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

This chapter will redefine the problem, restate the method utilized to solve it, and present the primary conclusions of the study. Then it will indicate the importance of these conclusions to the discipline of International Relations.

This dissertation has sought to determine why John F. Kennedy decided to implement the policy of military civic action as a means of preventing insurgency in the underdeveloped areas, particularly in Latin America and Southeast Asia. It has also sought to determine why in Vietnam the nature of that policy changed to a primary emphasis on the defeat of insurgents through counterinsurgency.

To answer these questions the study has utilized the methodology formulated by Richard Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin in an attempt to perceive the then contemporary setting from the point of view of the decision unit most immediately involved in the decision. Accordingly those factors which appeared to hold relevance to the members of that decision unit have been isolated. In this manner it has been shown that the frame of reference within which those individuals occupying the highest spheres of competence have considered these factors has constituted the paramount

influence on the decision under analysis.

In the external setting the members of the decision unit perceived the most relevant factor as a more or less monolithic world communist movement menacing the free world. Anchored in Moscow this threat extended from Southeast Asia through Africa and right into the United States' backyard in Latin America.

As Kennedy occupied the presidency, internal factors limited his alternatives of response to this external threat. Primary among these factors was the bureaucratic inertia which precedents of more than a decade of utilizing variations of the containment policy had ordained. Shortly after World War II America's leaders had drawn an imaginary line around the iron curtain and dared the communists to cross it, and the norms of international relations had become accustomed to this policy. Continuing this hard-line approach was the Eisenhower policy of massive retaliation, which not only allowed the United States to "blast the villain that opposed it" but enabled it to do so with a balanced budget.

Therefore as Kennedy entered office economics and strategic concept were two internal factors occupying the same side of the coin. They, in turn, were connected to a third factor, Congress. In order to obtain financial backing for a strategic concept of flexible response with which to replace massive retaliation Kennedy needed the support of what he termed "that more conservative body." To be able

to influence Congress though, the president would have to first influence the electorate. But Kennedy's options vis à vis the public were limited by the closeness of his election.

To receive the desired support within this internal setting, as he perceived it, Kennedy had to govern his actions according to its norms of legitimacy. Hence he appealed to America's values by building a "reputation for action." He would present a picture of perpetual motion toward great under-takings in order to mold public support. Some of the results of these actions were the Alliance for Progress, the Peace Corps and the food for peace program.

Setbacks at the Bay of Pigs, Laos and Vienna caused the president to strengthen these efforts toward public arousal, as exemplified in the commitment to space and the admonition to build bomb shelters. In the process he over-played his hand and paradoxically augmented the very trends which he condemned: a reactionary public and Congress, and a belligerent communist bloc.

Within this emotion-charged setting the influence of Kennedy's decision unit upon his military policy in the underdeveloped areas becomes important. Although he repeatedly stated his affinity for the political aims of military civic action, he sought the counsel of advisors who advocated the primacy of military means embodied in the policy of counter-insurgency.

Although utilization of the Snyder method has led to conclusions concerning why the decisions under analysis were made, the primary question involved in the test of behavioral political theory remains: On the basis of the conclusions what predictions are in order? In other words what contribution does the study make to the discipline of international relations?

The answer must be sought within the present structure of international relations. The most significant characteristic of that structure is the balance of power between the United States and the U.S.S.R. in regard to nuclear capability. Neither nation has sufficient power to prevent its adversary from retaliating from a first strike with sufficient force to inflict serious damage. This situation has led to an emphasis upon conventional limited war as a more sane alternative. However there is still the ever-present danger that this type of war will escalate into a nuclear holocaust. Besides, as with nuclear parity, both countries also possess a near equal capability to fight this type of war. The resultant nuclear and conventional stand-off has set the stage for the proliferation of "wars of liberation." As Kennedy noted, these wars do not transpire across national boundaries. Rather subversion of the legal government occurs from within. This technique has enabled the enemies of the West to outmaneuver it. Not only are the West's nuclear and conventional weapons unable to cope with "wars of liberation," but

anti-communist alliances are incapable of containing an enemy that operates from within a nation.

The setting which will face the members of the United States decision unit on military policy for the indefinite future then is characterized by the primacy of the threat of guerrilla war. Consequently the major contribution of this study to the discipline of international relations is to present some guidelines on how to meet that threat.

A review of the data leads to the conclusion that the decision unit must above all recognize the political nature of the threat. Within this context it should examine three factors in its domestic setting which have caused the United States to underestimate this aspect of the problem in order to project the proper goals and means to cope with it. The examination would show that geopolitics has been instrumental in determining the characteristics of the United States foreign policy. A position between two oceans far away from potential aggressors has enabled the United States to become the dominant power in its neighborhood. The decision unit would also find the time period in which it became an important nation to be relevant. The nineteenth century which witnessed the rise to maturity of the United States also witnessed the dominance of Europe first by England and then by Germany. Under the hegemony of these nations Europe remained locked in a balance of power from which it could not extricate itself without major conflict. Hence America

remained isolated and secure. The third factor that the decision unit should consider is the method by which the United States developed its political traits. Claiming to speak for a world of which it comprised a "melting pot" the United States came to believe its policies reflected the composite good of that world.

The examination of these three facets of the past suggests several conclusions in relation to today's situation. One is the reason for the United States culture trait of complete separation between the military and politics. Traditionally the United States has felt little need to maintain a large standing army, and has tended to view with disdain those European nations that do. On the other hand proximity between European nations has necessitated large armies in constant readiness to defend or expand their country's frontiers. This has caused them to synchronize political and military goals. The decision unit should recognize that technology has now created a similar proximity between the United States and its enemies and initiate steps toward diminishing the dichotomy between military and political goals and means. This is especially imperative in view of the ubiquitousness of military personnel occupying high spheres of competence in political decision units.

Another conclusion which may be reached from the survey of America's past is the basis for the "football stadium psychology" which Kennedy perceived as prevalent in American

diplomacy. Maxwell Taylor commented on the same phenomenon when he blamed the adherents of massive retaliation for exhibiting the "frontier mentality." The reason behind this trait is that Americans were able to journey uninhibited across a vast continent. Since, in their opinion, they represented the best traits of all the world they could with impunity strike down any villain who dared oppose them and then move on to the next one. As each obstacle appeared the main thing was to overcome it immediately and with a vengeance. This suggests the reasons for the American penchant for "holy wars" and for the impatience with which they view conflict of any sort. From football games to war the same principle applies, fight to win without regard to political consequences, then immediately disengage. In relation to meeting the threat of wars of liberation this presents the need to inculcate patience, not only in the military but in society as well. The alternative is to play into the hands of the advocates of Mao's principle to trade space for time in order to destroy will power.

Another conclusion which the examination of the domestic setting indicates concerns the issue of the public's right to know versus secrecy in government. Having pragmatically formed a government which they felt reflected the world culture, Americans fell heir to the prevailing trends of that culture. Western norms were progressively favoring the dissemination of political rights and hence information

to more people. Concurrent to these trends was the paradoxical situation which existed at the source of that culture in Europe: the Europeans proximity to their neighbors necessitated closer political and military coordination and, concomitantly engendered the necessity for governmental secrecy. If these facts are correlated with the tactic of the political vanguard of communist guerrillas to engineer the political-military situation in such a manner as to keep the enemy off balance, the conclusion arises that in order for the United States government to counter this tactic it must maintain a balance between governmental secrecy and the peoples right to know. The important consideration is to educate the people to the necessity for a certain amount of secrecy.

Connected to the historical necessity to adhere to the demands of the people is another lesson concerning the threat of wars of liberation. The communists claim to occupy the forefront of the developing world norm of equality as shown by their emphasis on individual military discipline. Therefore the procedure with which the United States soldier is indoctrinated as to political goals must be geared to recognize his worth as a person, emphasizing his right to assimilate political views according to his own conscience. Mao warned that an army based on negative discipline from above is feudalistic and he believes that he has the time, patience and manpower to prove it.

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