

EDDY, James Howard, 1933-
THE NEUTRALIZATION OF LAOS, 1959-62: A CASE
STUDY IN THE APPLICATION OF A THEORY OF
EQUILIBRIUM.

The University of Oklahoma, Ph.D., 1971
Political Science, international law and
relations

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan

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1971

THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA
GRADUATE COLLEGE

THE NEUTRALIZATION OF LAOS, 1959-62:
A CASE STUDY IN THE APPLICATION OF
A THEORY OF EQUILIBRIUM

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY
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Norman, Oklahoma

1971

THE NEUTRALIZATION OF LAOS, 1959-62:
A CASE STUDY IN THE APPLICATION OF
A THEORY OF EQUILIBRIUM

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The research undertaken in this paper was conducted with the assistance of a large number of people. The writer is indebted to Dr. Rufus G. Hall for his invaluable assistance during the researching and writing of this paper. Dr. Hall, who served as the major advisor for the paper, spent many long hours beyond the call of duty with the present writer. The preliminary and final draft of this paper was typed by Mrs. Paul Rivers. To her the writer owes a note of thanks.

No amount of thanks would be sufficient for my wife and son who spent many hours without my company, and who offered all possible assistance to make this research possible. And to my mother who has given me her moral support throughout my life, my thanks would not suffice.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

International politics in 1959 and 1969 has in common certain changes in the world affecting the formulation of foreign policy of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China. These changes are the basis for equilibrium among nation-states, and for the satisfaction of a balance of power reflecting the realities of political power among the nation-states. The writer believes the United States has not accepted, thus not reflected, an understanding of these changes in the formulation, administration, and execution of the containment policy of the United States.

The United States foreign policy of containment does not allow this nation-state to initiate an active and consistent participation in international politics. Instead, the policy is formulated to react to events. It allows the United States to pursue a de facto problem-solving methodology in international politics, which is inconsistent with the very necessary equilibrium of international politics among nation-states.

United States foreign policy can only gain flexibility when it recognizes the fallacy of applying topical solutions to long range organic problems. This is no less true in relation

to Southeast Asia, than to other areas commanding attention of United States foreign policy. In fact it is more true, for in the under-developed third world it becomes apparent to the conscientious observer that the fate of the world may be well that of Asia; for in this growing, increasingly interdependent world it seems likely there may be a common destiny for mankind.

Charles E. Merriam noted this, when he stated:

Politics cannot be extirpated because wherever there is interaction there is interdependence; and whenever there is interdependence there are adjustments to be made that implicate and affect all or many of those who are constitutive of the context.¹

At this time the writer would like to introduce those attributes present in the international politics of 1959 through 1962 that remain structurally strong today. These attributes are the predominate changes that serve as assumptions which were inputted into the case study of the United Nations presence in Laos during 1959 and the neutralization of Laos in 1962. These attributes are the predominate changes misinterpreted as crisis factors in 1959 and 1969.

The basic characteristic of international politics from 1959 forward was that of change. There was change as evidenced in a lessening in the ideological conflict between the bi-polar powers, the reduction in violence among the developed nation-states, and the fragmentation of power in the world among the

¹Charles E. Merriam Political Power (New York: Collier-MacMillan, 1964), p. 9.

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developed nation-states and between the developed and under-developed nation-states.

Since the Soviet Union detonated a hydrogen device in 1951, ideology of all shapes, except nationalism, became less important in the inter-state relations among nation-states. The writer suggests this was the result of the following changes in international politics.

First, communism became unable to lead and control a militant revolutionary world movement. Instead, the communist movement has been broken apart by the disengagement process starting in 1948 with Tito leading Yugoslavia in an independent manner, and climaxing with Mao Tse-tung breaking with the Soviet Union in August, 1960.

Of course, fragmentation has not negated the presence of Communist nation-states, Communist movements, and Communist subversion. What is significant and sometimes forgotten by the formulators of United States foreign policy is that Communism has become more limited; it represents a method to implement change in the new nation-states. That is, change as it is related to the quest for national identification and stability in a newly created nation-state. Communism provides the methodology for organizing the society for the protracted effort towards nationhood, and the vision of utopia to keep the populace disciplined to the protracted quest for stability.

Second, ideology has lost the ability to satisfy the aims of nation-states interested in social change. Ideological formulas like the dialectic unfolding to show the historical

development of a classless society achieve little in the way of rectifying problems of health, housing, and welfare. This is all too obvious to decision-makers in developed and under-developed nation-states. Most governmental leaders have adopted a problem-solving approach characterized by the utilization of a number of approaches to satisfy the multiple nature of the problems in under-developed nation-states.

Third, and most important, there is the power of the nuclear balance of terror. The destructive power of nuclear devices is known to men only in terms of their potential capabilities. Hiroshima and Nagasaki introduced nuclear weapons to men, and the general reaction to their use in 1945 was that such devices could never be used again. Since 1945, the development of hydrogen devices along with awesome delivery systems has cemented a very strong impression in the minds of all human beings that it is beyond what is rationally acceptable to conduct warfare in a nuclear manner. The restraint reflecting this attitude towards nuclear weapons has introduced a new factor into international politics, that is; force defined in terms of violence has a scale of limitation. Charles E. Merriam noted this limitation, when he said:¹

¹Charles E. Merriam, loc. cit., p. 35.

It may also prove true that the profession of general interest and responsibility is merely a verbalism to cover selfish exploitation. In any case, deference to the "common interest" is a tribute to the basis of authority. It will be paid by the tyrant as well as by the demagogue, by the patrimonial ruler who must care for his people as for his cattle as well as by the popular courtier who flatters and fawns as a part of a play for prestige and domination. The tyrant will not admit that he is a tyrant, at least not an experienced one, or that he is arbitrary or irresponsible, for he is always the vicar of someone or something, God or the nation or the class or the mass or the customs of his folk. And, indeed, however arrogant he may be, he finds it difficult to escape from the world of law which he himself and his system have invoked. The most arrant imposter may thus find himself irrevocably committed to a system which no longer allows him that untrammelled liberty of choice and action, which he may dearly love but which by virtue of his very power escapes him. His sense of power is once more reduced to the dream world from which it came, and its earthly shape eludes him. So it may be said the price of power is limitation. The ruler is ruled by his own rules.¹

With the decline in importance of ideology as the factor pre-emanate in conflict among nation-states there has been a lessening of violence among at least the developed nation-states of the world. This is a break from what has been the mainstream of political interaction between nation-states; especially European nation-states. Today, violence is confined to those

¹ Ibid.

continental areas of residence for emerging nation-states. This statement is qualified by the confrontation between the bi-polar powers. Yet, the Cold War has reached a level of diplomacy where both great powers search out roads to a detente. This is especially true, since 1956 and the adoption of peaceful co-existence by the Soviet Union. The Kingdom of Laos in 1959 represents and reflects a transitional phase in East-West relations.

Laos in 1959 is representative of the movement of international politics from being a confrontation of force between advanced nation-states to a conflict in terms of a political power display in the dimensions of scaled limitation. At the same time, Laos reflects something new in bi-polar relations: detente. This was most evidenced in the late fall of 1959 and spring of 1961, when a bi-polar understanding was reached to allow intervention by the United Nations in 1959 with an armada of its specialized agencies to "help Laos meet basic development needs,"¹ and the restoration of the International Control Commission in 1961.²

A fifth element of change in international politics has to do with the fragmentation in the relations of the developed

¹United Nations, Secretariat. Tuomoja Report on Laos Recommends Co-Ordinated Action by United Nations for Kingdom's Development (Bangkok, Thailand. April 28, 1969), p. 3. A report received as an enclosure to the writer from Prayoon Manakon, Officer-in-Charge United Nations Information Service, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.

²See text Chapter IX pp.155-196 and Chapter X pp.197-237.

with the under-developed nation-states due to their different levels of development. The new restraint and resulting search for detente discussed previously as pertaining to the bi-polar powers is not present in Asia or in Africa. This is due to the fact that nationalist passions and basic freedoms of want and fear have not run their course or received satisfaction. With such a state of development, the tendency is to react totally in terms of a commitment that hasn't been met by the establishment in decision-making roles or towards the nation-state assisting in economic development.

This total reaction against a developed nation-state by under-developed nation-states takes on an unprecedented magnitude in relation to their attitude towards the United States. In addition to the orientation of the American mind, another liability of our involvement in foreign policy pertains to the level of our economic development. We are a post-industrial nation-state. At present this characteristic sets the United States, Japan and Western Europe apart in a unique fashion from most of the world. The specific problem created for these affluent societies in dealing with under-developed societies is that their pursuit of humanistic goals of universal liberty, equality, and fraternity are compromised by the different levels of economic development and the requirement for their own existence to maintain a level of development that is satisfying to a citizenry demanding more leisure and economic well-being.

There is one final element of change important to the development of equilibrium. This is the twilight of the nation-

state in international politics. The process has a long way to go, but the direction is irreversible. It has come about, because of security interdependence and something more: people. People are today identifying more than ever with their regions. The process started with the requirements of economic development and the technological revolution in communication.

Up to now the attention has been upon the problems of change, and the presence of crisis emanating from these changes. The writer believes the inability to recognize these changes stems from the fact that United States foreign policy formulators have not discriminated between the types of political power involved. These decision-makers have categorically assumed that in the external foreign policies the principle of operation is power politics in which a nation-state negotiated from a position of strength defined as military might. Now this simplifies the interaction.

In addition to military might, political power takes the form of force. Force is characterized as being made up of a value system subject to reason. In this form, political power utilizes military might for a higher purpose: a threat, deterrent. Here the end sought is to achieve influence defined as the ability to control another nation-states behavior. When this is accomplished, a nation-state has authority over another nation-state's foreign policy. When competing nation-states have acquired a sufficient amount of political power defined as authority, then a state of equilibrium has been attained in

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international politics. This is never realized, but the state of development in nuclear weaponry assures that nation-states will be satisfied with an approximate amount of authority as long as the self-preservation of the nation-state is maintained.¹

Political power doesn't grow out of the barrel of a gun.² Political power is fashioned in the life of human beings acting through social units like the family, the church, and the nation-state. It is these institutions that possess authority. It is these institutions through which man in decision-making roles goes about the business of maintaining and enhancing the authority of the particular institutions by exerting influence in the social fabric.³ Authority and influence characterize political power in the fully defined sense in the domestic environment of the political system.⁴ Charles E. Merriam described this, when he said:

Power does not lie in the guns, or the ships,

¹The proof that political power is psychological and symbolic as well as real is no better illustrated than here. Most implicitly political power has become a recognition of symbolic strength. It qualifies the efficiency, the validity, and the legitimacy of a nation-state. If it does not have it, it does not function. The nuclear weapon only represents a more dramatic psychological symbol of political power. "The last resort" is a symbolized premise which fear of the unknown protects. Political power is primarily symbolic. Weaponry is secondary, existing only as a qualification of power.


²Mao Tse-tung, "Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung," (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1966), p. 61.

³See p. 171 discussion of decision-making model and application with regard to Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld.

⁴See p. 116 discussion of the model of the political system and its application to the Kingdom of Laos.

or the walls of stone, or the lines of steel. Important as these are, the real political power lies in a definite common pattern of impulse. If the soldiers choose to disobey or even shoot their officers, if the guns are turned against the government, if the citizenry connives at disobedience of the law, and makes of it even a virtue, then authority is impotent and may drag its bearer down to doom.¹

Though Merriam is speaking about political power in relation to the internal domestic environment (authority and influence), one cannot help to feel this also applies to international politics as might and force utilized by nation-states in an international political system. This international political system is illustrated as follows:



For the United States the application of political power in international politics has taken the primary form of power

¹Charles E. Merriam, op. cit., p. 21.

confined to the application of military might.¹ For this reason the United States has lacked the capability to politically influence other nation-states. We have been structured in the orientation of political power to military might by the attempt to integrate instrumentalism with the military orientation of containment.²

In the Cold War, so far, technology has given the United States a military parity with the Soviet Union and superiority with the People's Republic of China, but this has not granted the United States the ability to meet the psychological and covert qualities of Communism.³ The United States has been frustrated by its inability to free itself from a time orientation emanating from the determinism of a Christian foundation and instrumentalism and deal with Communism on a protracted basis in terms of a flexible methodology to meet covert as well as overt contingencies.

Therefore, since the period 1954 through 1959 in which the development of covert protracted war methodology took place, the United States has been weakened in its many attempts to project its traditional emphasis on a deterministic overt foreign policy characterized by treaties and the utilization of military might.

¹Other forms of power, such as the economic element, have been confined as a backdrop to a military presence in the United States efforts to exert political power in international politics.

²See pp. 27-29 for discussion of instrumentalism and containment.

³See p.258 of appendix for comparison of military capabilities.

With the experience against the Japanese and French behind them, Communist guerrilla tacticians began the exportation of covert protracted war methodology to nation-states characterized as being under-developed.¹ This development in methodology for protracted war gave the Communists a flexibility in the means utilized to acquire, maintain, and enhance political power in the era of nuclear weapons.

While the Communist bloc utilized covert protracted war methodology, the United States maintained containment to implement instrumentalism. Containment is somewhat non-competitive with protracted war as implemented, since 1954, because containment depends on the acceptance by competing power blocs of a status quo situation. Thus, containment relies on mutual acceptance of spheres of interest, which requires only the presence of military forces to maintain the accepted zones of jurisdiction. Thus, containment relies on political power defined as military might without leaving an area of flexibility for influence over those nation-states using the present methodology of protracted war. Where these power blocs agree to conduct an active foreign policy, containment many times resorts to military might or disengagement. On the other hand, the covert methodology of the Communists gives the ability to disassociate from any one single aspect of political power. Once the cadre's influence has been acknowledged by the people, the cadre have the authority and then the legitimacy to

¹See Chapter III for discussion of covert protracted war methodology.

use force to maintain or enhance their political power. But this is only done with the implementation of the first fifteen stages of the covert methodology.¹ With this methodology, the Communist tacticians fulfill the cardinal rule of political power. This rule is:

The functional situation out of which the political arises is not the demand for force as such, but the need for some form of equilibrium.²

The covert nature of Communist methodology generally gives that power bloc the ability to exert political power in this era of nuclear deterrence. Containment's reliance on political power defined as only being military might is not sufficiently flexible to act or respond to covert efforts of the Communists. The United States finds itself reacting to change, and to only the overt manifestations of change. In conclusion, the United States loses international political power, but in a greater sense the United States has, since 1954, jeopardized the equilibrium in international politics. This is the case, because the American formulators of foreign policy rely on political power confined many times to military might and the technology present to improve our nuclear weaponry. This is


¹See p. 50 for model of covert protracted war methodology.

²Charles E. Merriam, op. cit., p. 36.

political suicide for the United States, and the rest of the world.

To solve the dilemma of containment, the writer proposes a model of equilibrium for the formulation of United States foreign policy. To accomplish the development of a theory and model of equilibrium requires two things:

First, to conceptualize a theory and model of equilibrium there must be answered the challenges presented in the below described equation of reality:



Second, to justify equilibrium in both negative and positive terms by exploring in depth the components of the equation of reality from 1954 through 1959 to illustrate

¹The challenge on the intentions side of the equation of reality is to have the constant elements flexible though to deal with the real and facts on the execution side of the equation.

²The overall challenge is to identify the components of the equation.

the curtailment of United States influence and authority in international politics, and the mediating role of the great powers to uphold the intentions (trinity of beliefs and political power) the United States ought to be pursuing to assure equilibrium in the international political system.

Equilibrium assumes a state of stability can exist among nation-states, if nation-states possessing nuclear weapons believe their nuclear development and resulting weaponry are viable vis-a-vis their nuclear competitors. The writer makes a second assumption.

Today, and since 1952, the parity does not have to be completely equal given the fact that they are chiefly symbolic. This seems an acceptable judgment given the destructive capability of hydrogen bombs and the delivery systems present for these bombs as of 1959. Thus, since 1959 nuclear development has been prohibitive. This means "over-kill" is present. The result is a fixed state of equilibrium, where political power defined as only being military might does not assure influence and authority in international politics. But it does assure equilibrium, since nuclear war would mean the virtual loss of human life in a civilized world. This is unacceptable as input in formulation of policy for any decision-maker in the East or West.

Third, equilibrium assumes man's development unfolds in a social situation. The social situation involves an exchange between participants in this environment. Basic to the exchange

taking place is man acting. Man acting in giving up something for a mutually acceptable object implies that equilibrium requires a man that is more than social. Man must be rational in so far as being capable of grasping concepts and forming them into a judgment. Man acting out his rational capacity does so in terms of power defined as the desire to influence the attitudes and behavior of others. This attention with power in man's orientation is not power for the sake of power, but rather to achieve goals to satisfy values defined by his individual personality as conditioned by his environment.

Power is natural to man, both in terms of directing man towards fulfillment individually and as a social being. Thus, man cannot exist without power. But to have power, man must be willing to grant a relative amount of power to his fellow inhabitants. This is a state of equilibrium. Equilibrium is thus as natural to man as power, if man wants to be.

Since the nation-state is an expression of man acting out his existence to define himself in a group relationship, equilibrium and power are to the nation-state in its development what they are to man. Thus, they are as natural to the nation-state as to man. But there is a slight difference.

Equilibrium and power can be viewed by man to be a means to a higher goal than mere existence. If existence was for all men the end desired, then equilibrium would be satisfactory as a goal. Man being capable of rationality sometimes sets goals beyond mere existence. With this orientation towards a definition of life, equilibrium would not be sufficiently satisfying.

The nation-state differentiates itself from a man, who places existence in a secondary position to a higher goal. The nation-state is the expression of a man in a political sense. This political sense is the political system defined as:¹

that system of interactions to be found in all independent societies which performs the functions of integration and adaptation (both internally and vis-a-vis other societies) by means of the employment, or threat of employment, of more or less legitimate physical compulsion.²

The political system assures interaction for man in so far as man having a means to attain demand satisfaction. Finally, the political system attains an orderly development of demand, interaction of constituents in groups with decision-makers, and the authoritative allocation of satisfied needs by the decision-makers to those constituents making demands. This is a political system, because a state of equilibrium has been reached.

Equilibrium in the political system is a concept expressing the fact that the collective called society has reached a structural state of political development where men exchange for each other's demands without resorting to force. Instead, the exchange is confined to the utilization of political power defined as using influence to attain, to maintain, and to

¹Almond, Gabriel and James S. Coleman, The Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 40.

²See p. 116 for model of political system and its application to the Kingdom of Laos.

enhance one's ability to affect the will of decision-makers with authority in the political system.

In conclusion, what is to be sought in the formulation of a nation-state's foreign policy is a state of equilibrium much like that in a nation-state, where nation-states exchange demands without resort to military might. Rather, the nation-states confine their interaction to gaining influence and achieving authority by means of diplomacy confined to non-violent means. With this accomplished, the nation-state is operating in the international political system, because the nation-state is exchanging something with another nation-state in order for a demand being satisfied. At this point influence has been exerted by the nation-state. With this influence the nation-state attains control, and with control authority is achieved. Like man in his political system, equilibrium is accomplished in the international political system when an exchange has been made without resorting to military might.

PART I

Causes Behind Our Inability to Achieve Orderly Change

Maturity: among other things - not to hide one's strength out of fear and consequently, live below one's best.¹

Part I concentrates on the elements necessary for the achievement of an equilibrium in the international political system. This means the basis of the nation-state's demand for political power and the satisfaction of self-preservation.² Our concern is with the equation of reality as far as values inputed as intentions into the realities of the international political system.³

The values inputed as intentions into the equation of reality are the American and Asian outlook. These outlooks structure and direct a third outlook present in the international political system, namely; the protracted outlook. The protracted outlook is the methodology utilized by Asian nation-states, because it reflects a lack of determinism present in the

¹Dag Hammarskjöld, Markings (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), p. 89.

²See p. 10 for model of international political system.

³See p. 14 for model of equation of reality.

Asian outlook. The United States policy of containment is a reaction to the protracted outlook, and a reflection of the determinism present in the American outlook.

In Chapter I (The American Outlook) will be described as being based on a trinity of beliefs, structured by a success story of political and economic achievement, and frustrated by the inability to make the world safe for democracy. The writer suggests that these three areas develop the determinism in the American outlook.

Chapter II (The Asian Outlook) delves into the lack of determinism present in the Asian outlook. This discussion will be orientated by the cycle theory of time concept basic to all Asian thinking. The writer concludes that the lack of a time orientation present in the Asian mind is due to the cycle theory of time.

Chapter III (The Protracted Outlook) concentrates on the methodology presented by East and West to satisfy the demand for political power in the international political system. The protracted outlook described in Chapter III is a reflection of the Asian orientation against a time basis for progress. This outlook is very important in 1959 and 1969, because our competitors for political power in the international political system utilize it as their methodology, and the response of the West led by the United States has been a deterministic methodology called containment. Thus, Chapter III will bring into the equation of reality the ideology of East and West, and the methodology (protracted war and containment) utilized by the

power blocs to meet the demands of self-preservation and political power.

CHAPTER I

THE AMERICAN OUTLOOK

Humanity with all its fears,
With all the hopes of future years,
Is hanging breathless on thy fate.¹

The American Outlook was based on the trinity of beliefs. The principles of the American Outlook expressed in the trinity of beliefs were the acceptance of a fundamental moral order in life that constrains life by law, the acknowledgment in society of the primary importance of free and responsible individuals, and the mission of the United States to bring to fruition democracy, liberty, and freedom within the law.

What did these precepts mean, and what were their implications for United States foreign policy?

First, the acceptance of a fundamental moral order in life. At the essence of the American outlook has been a belief in a fundamental law or an eternal moral order underlying the flux of custom and habit. Since this belief reflected an acceptance of supernatural revelation and natural law emanating from God, Americans submitted themselves to an objective standard of

¹Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, "The Building of the Ship," quoted in The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), p. 316.

right and wrong by which human conduct was to be measured.

This was the fountain of justice from which our love of freedom grew out of a sense of moral responsibility in politics.

This was the foundation for social order. Human beings could no more violate this objective morality than the law of gravity.

Second, a belief in the free and responsible individual. This belief had its foundation in the religious heritage expressed in Puritanism, which held that all men are earthly citizens of the divine kingdom and are subjects immediately responsible to its King. Here, each person was to consider himself a significant, if sinful unit, to whom God had given a particular place and duty. Of this Puritan influence, Samuel Eliot Morison stated:

Puritanism was essentially and primarily a religious movement; attempts to prove it to have been a mask for politics or money-making are false as well as unhistorical. In the broadest sense Puritanism was a passion for righteousness; the desire to know and do God's will. Similar movements have occurred in every branch of Christianity, as well as in Judaism. Puritanism was responsible for the settlement of New England; and as the Congregational, Presbyterian, Methodist, Baptist, Unitarian, Quaker, and other Protestant sects of the United States are offshoots of seventeenth-century English and Scottish Puritanism, it is not surprising that Puritan ways of thinking and doing have had a vast effect on the American mind and character, precursors of what is commonly called the Protestant Ethic.¹

But this was accepted without acknowledging the Calvinist

¹Samuel Eliot Morison, The Oxford History of The American People (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 61.

doctrine of an avenging God who commits multitudes of His creatures to eternal damnation. Instead, the American people substituted the Protestant idea that salvation was a matter of free choice, not a matter of predestination.¹

Thus religion, insisting on the ultimate worth of each soul, helped support the political doctrine of the free individual. This political doctrine, in emphasizing individualism, taught that ultimate political authority rested with the sum of individuals. It thus resulted in political democracy. Economically, belief in the free and responsible individual rested on the classical notion of the eighteenth century. This taught that the total social harmony and social effectiveness of the national community resulted from each individual pursuing his own economic interest.² Man was to "lead the New Testament life, yet make a living."³

Third, a belief in the national mission of the United States. This involved the conviction that the United States was chosen by God as the place in which democracy, liberty, and responsible freedom were to come to fruition and then move out to prevail among the nation-states in the international political system. In essence, this belief considered it a duty of the United States to hold before the world the ideal of a

¹Alpheus T. Mason Free Government in the Making (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 52-54 and pp. 57-60.

²Frederick M. Watkins The Age of Ideology (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 18.

³Samuel Eliot Morison, op. cit., p. 65.

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free and self-governing individual.

The foregoing trinity of beliefs were principles governing the way America related power, prosperity, and freedom to each other in the first century of development as a political system. This was the century, Edmund S. Morgan states, in which "America's leading intellectuals were clergymen and thought about theology."¹

In an essay titled "America Presents the Confused Image,"² Max Ways notes that the continuing thread in our history has been a peculiar way of relating the idea of order to the idea of freedom. This way was the first two precepts of the trinity of beliefs. Max Ways states:

Men are bound, in a sense, by the order established by their Creator, the laws of Nature and of Nature's God. But men are also free to search for meaning and applications of those laws and are even free to disregard them - at their peril. Out of this paradox of bound and free comes an idea of morality that applies to government as well as to individuals.³

At the end of World War II the United States stood alone in terms of economic power, and political stability. With United States Allies stripped of economic viability, and subject to the political and military pressures of totalitarian

¹Edmund S. Morgan, "The American Revolution Considered as an Intellectual Movement," quoted in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. and Morton White (ed.) Paths of American Thought (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1963), p. 11.

²Max Ways, "America Presents the Confused Image," Life, XXXVII (October 5, 1959), p. 157.

³Ibid.

communism, the United States concluded that more must be done than to hold before the world the ideal of a free and self-governing individual. The United States activated the belief of a "mission" to further the cause of democratic liberty throughout the world. The United States foreign policy was going to try to build, throughout the world, situations of order and freedom around the idea that government should be constrained by morality and limited by law.

President Harry S. Truman activated the missionary belief central to the American outlook, when he stated to the Congress of the United States:

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure.¹

We went forth in 1947 to export the trinity of beliefs through the vehicle of an economic and military assistance program.² This was our role; this was our missionary duty. We were going to rebuild nation-states to reflect the United States political system. With the poet Henry Wadsworth Longfellow the American people assumed that the people of the world agreed:

Humanity with all its fears,
With all the hopes of future years,
Is hanging breathless on thy fate!³

¹President Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope: Memoirs II (New York: Doubleday Co., 1955), p. 111.

²See appendix p. 258 for breakdown of the United States economic and military assistance programs for the years 1947-1968.

³Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, op. cit., p. 316.

While the trinity of beliefs supplied this nation-state with the means of relating power, prosperity and freedom to each other, the United States was unprepared. The trinity of beliefs had been lost. They were replaced by instrumentalism after the Civil War.

Instrumentalism is the doctrine "that ideas are instruments of response and adaptation, and that their truth is to be judged in terms of their effectiveness."¹ John Dewey believed man "must be faithful to the earth."²

The modern era will begin when the naturalist point of view shall be adopted in every field. This does not mean that mind is reduced to matter, but only that mind and life are to be understood not in theological but in biological terms, as an organ or an organism in an environment, acted upon and reacting, moulded and moulding. We must study not states of consciousness but modes of response. The brain is primarily an organ of a certain kind of behavior, not of knowing the world.³

Instrumentalism negated the trinity of beliefs as far as framing and directing the activity of the American political system in the formulation of domestic and foreign policy in this century. Instrumentalism advocated expediency like

¹Will Durant The Story of Philosophy (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1926), p. 496.

²John Dewey The Influence of Darwin in Philosophy (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1910), p. 8.

³John Dewey Creative Intelligence (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1917), p. 36.

pragmatism with the added fact of the emphasis on workability.

Henry Steele Commager described instrumentalism as follows:

It was as practical as the patent office - or the Declaration of Independence. Its expediency was individual; it came, increasingly to be social, to require that men work together to establish the truth of their hopes.¹

.....

Whatever promised to increase wealth was automatically regarded as good, and the American was tolerant, therefore, of speculation, advertising, deforestation, and the exploitation of natural resources, and bore patiently with the worst manifestations of industrialism.²

.....

All this tended to give a quantitative cast to his thinking and inclined him to place a quantitative valuation upon almost everything. When he asked what was a man worth, he meant material worth, and he was impatient of any but the normal yardstick. His solution for most problems was therefore quantitative - and education, democracy, and war all yielded to the sovereign remedy of numbers.³

Instrumentalism unchained America from the shackles of a traditional national conscience; the trinity of beliefs. And with this accomplishment, America lacked a public philosophy with which to relate power, prosperity and freedom with each other. All that was present in terms of direction was expediency and the workable as evidenced in American technology and management. As a result, the United States entered upon international

¹Henry Steele Commager The American Mind (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 95.

²Ibid., p. 7.

³Ibid.

responsibilities with an advanced technology to be implemented by the specialized experts in computers, who deal with means and know the most about everything involving systems - except what a society ought to do.

Without a link to relate the elements of power, prosperity and freedom to each other, the United States does not comprehend how to build, throughout the world, situations of order and freedom around the idea that government should be constrained by morality and limited by law. The United States has fumbled and stumbled! The political power of the United States has been wasted in so far as political power defined as influence. The United States has gone on a month by month basis in the conduct of foreign policy moving from crisis to crisis.

Yalta, Potsdam, Czechoslovakia, the Berlin blockade, and the fall of China, and today, Vietnam, China, Berlin, and Czechoslovakia. All the same! All because each crisis has been viewed as a total effort to carry out the methodology of containment, but without an approach to direct the method. In 1959 and 1969, the American people view international politics as a stranger within our gate! With Rudyard Kipling, they exclaim:

The Stranger within my gate
 He may be true or kind,
 But he does not talk my talk-
 I cannot feel his mind.
 I see the face and the eyes and the mouth,
 But not the soul behind.

The men of my own stock
 They may do ill or well,
 But they tell the lies I am wanted to,
 They are used to the lies I tell;

And we do not need interpreters
When we go to buy and sell.

The Stranger within my gates,
He may be evil or good,
But I cannot tell what powers control --
What reasons sway his mood;
Nor when the Gods of his far-off land
May repossess his blood.¹

United States foreign policy not only suffers from a vacuum emanating from a lack of basic direction, but from the fact that this nation-state is a post-industrial country. This affects outlook in terms of emphasis in public policy. Computers and communications have brought forth new perspectives and attitudes. With this electronic revolution has also come new social dilemmas such as leisure, automation, and an awareness of the immediate nature of domestic and foreign problems.

This post-industrial status of the United States is a success story, when measured in terms of quantity produced by American industry. But instrumentalism has not prepared this country with the means to relate the idea of freedom to the idea of order. Second, the new state of the society has left this country without a basis of communication with a world suffering through industrial development or coping with the problems of the industrial process. Third, the United States suffers in a state of frustration by being the most powerful nation-state since nineteenth-century England. For this, we are unpopular. Jacques Barzun noted:

¹Rudyard Kipling, "The Stranger," Letters of Travel and Song V (Toronto: The MacMillan Company, 1908), p. 30.

As a nation whose citizens seek popularity more than any other kind of success, it is galling that we, the United States, are so extensively unpopular. We periodically send out envoys of various plumage to find the cause of this failure, and the little doves come back with a surprised look and no olive branch, even when they have been personally well-received.¹

In a speech to the Minneapolis Rotary Club, John Cowles, the publisher of the Minneapolis Star and Tribune, asked the question: "Will America Survive in Freedom in Coming New World Order?"² Mr. Cowles answered his question with an illustration pinpointing why the United States cannot communicate clearly with the world, and finds itself unpopular. Mr. Cowles stated,³

I recently studied some estimates of world income broken down by nations, with the population of each. If one assumes that \$100 a year per person is required for food, clothing and shelter - about 27 cents per day for sustenance and all living expenses of every kind - and if one then computes the amount of excess annual income above \$100 a year per person that each country has, the figures are staggering.

The United States alone has 47 per cent, or almost half, of the total excess world income above \$100 per person.

If one adds together the excess income, that is the amount above \$100 per inhabitant, of Canada, Great Britain, Japan, Australia and

¹Jacques Barzun, "The Man in The American Mask," Foreign Affairs XXXXIII (April, 1965), p. 25.

²John Cowles, "Will America Survive in Freedom in Coming New World Order?" The Minneapolis Star, November 30, 1959, p. 10.

³Ibid.

the European countries including Russia, that total is only slightly greater than that of the United States alone.

These countries that I have mentioned, including the United States, therefore have between them more than 95 per cent of the world's total income above \$100 per person.

In other words, the rest of the world - Asia, Africa, Central America and South America combined - has less than 5 per cent of the world's total income above \$100 per person.¹

Finally, the determinism present in the American outlook is frustrated by an inability to make the world safe for democracy. This frustration is a manifestation of an inability to rekindle the trinity of beliefs as the standard for judging the acceptability of United States involvement. This country has progressed so far economically guided by instrumentalism that the call in 1955 by Walter Lippmann for a return to the public philosophy was not accepted.² We will compete in the world with numbers; that is, quantity produced by our vast technologically sophisticated industrial establishment. Joseph Kraft caught this emphasis in our outlook in an editorial titled "Richness and Bigness Purchased at the High Cost of Empty Lives."³

¹John Cowles, Ibid.

²Walter Lippmann Essays in The Public Philosophy (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1955).

³Joseph Kraft, "Richness and Bigness Purchased at the High Cost of Empty Lives," The Minneapolis Tribune, July 3, 1967, p. 4.

He said:

The speech made by the President (Johnson) the other day to the Junior Chamber of Commerce in Baltimore was full of those qualities in the national character which assure that this country will attain the Great Society. It was also pregnant with national characteristics apt to put beyond reach something still more precious - a modest society.

The President spoke in the old Independence Day tradition, and as grandfathers will to young men on the make. He celebrated American progress and scorned doubters and critics. He piled number on top of number in a dizzying structure of achievement.

The United States had an educational system "second to none;" prosperity "second to none;" a "standard of living second to none;" "a third of the world's railroad track;" "two-thirds of the world's automobiles," "half of the trucks;" "half of all the radios;" "a third of all the electricity;" "a fourth of all the steel."

The trouble with all this, of course, is not that it is false. The United States is the richest and most powerful country in the world. Visible preeminence is a fact central to much of our national experience.

But richness and bigness purchased at the high cost of empty lives.¹

¹Joseph Kraft, Ibid., p. 4.

CHAPTER II

THE ASIAN OUTLOOK

One is in the muck of the world, but not of it.¹

The Asian outlook is defined by his physical environment. Life has meaning to the Asian when he yields to the unfolding of his environment. The nature of his physical environment is to unfold in a cyclical fashion. Man, as a product of his environment, retains only the right in life to the cyclical way in which his life unfolds. This is harmony for man. To do less would make man's gift to his physical environment nothing and in vain.

Nature is basic to the Asian outlook. This is consistent with the peasant base in Asia. The Asian's life has always been challenged by the task of satisfying his diet of rice. Producing rice has required water to assure a level of production satisfying more than a subsistence living.² Water is expressed to the

¹"The Bhagavad Gita," quoted by F.S.C. Northrop Meeting of East and West (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1947), p. 368.

²Reference to rice production is to wet rice. In Asia, peasants living in the highlands carry on what is called dry rice or slash-and-burn rice production. In this form, land is cleared, rice is planted, and the production depends primarily on the fertility of the soil.

peasant through the monsoon. The monsoon is the most basic evidence of control by nature over the peasant. Through the cyclical manner in which the monsoon season takes place the Asian is made aware that Asia is a land with a people, rather than a people with a land.

Nature directs man. By what nature is to man, it discloses the direction in which man can find meaning to life. And this is the cyclical theory of time concept. In nature, the cycle is evidenced in the sequence of a day. The day begins in an all-embracing darkness and ends in the brightness of a day. Endless moves the cycle of a day! So too does man experience with his senses the fact of a cycle from childhood to death. Cycles, he concludes, are everywhere.

This evidence of cycles in what man experiences directly has left the Asian with two conclusions. First, he must live in nature. Second, there is a harmony in nature. This is the determinism in the Asian outlook.

Whereas the determinism of the American outlook emanated from what he rationally concluded, namely; the trinity of beliefs and instrumentalism; the Asian emphasizes flexibility in all matters beyond harmony with nature. This harmony with nature is something the Asian has experienced with his senses.

Nature expressed by the monsoons governs the good earth. Life here hinges on a sufficient rainfall, but no more. Such a life is precarious, yet it must be lived. An Asian lives by yielding in a dignified manner to nature. In doing this,

man wins. Man has created a balance with nature. The determinism is in living with nature, but there is flexibility. It is in man yielding to the demands of everyday life. This is expressed by the symbol of water. The Chinese pacifist Lao Tze expressed this flexibility, when he said:

The best of men is like water;
 Water benefits all things
 And does not compete with them.
 It dwells in (the lowly) places that all disdain -
 Wherein it comes near to the Tao.

In his dwelling (the Sage) loves the (lowly) earth;
 In his heart, he loves what is profound;
 In his relations with others, he loves kindness;
 In his words, he loves sincerity;
 In government, he loves peace;
 In business affairs, he loves ability;
 In his actions, he loves choosing the right time.
 It is because he does not contend
 That he is without reproach.¹

Water illustrates the graceful yielding man must dedicate his life to in order to live with nature. To achieve this yielding is to be strong, because man attains a balance with nature. This is different from the Western orientation, where the end sought is to control nature and conquer outer-space. While an American finds harmony in himself when he seeks betterment of his environment, the Asian yields to the dictates of nature.

This Asian emphasis on yielding to nature has a basic effect on human relations. Since nature is the standard for judging good and bad or right and wrong, there is no objective

¹Lin Yutang (ed.) The Wisdom of Lao Tze (New York: Random House, 1948), p. 76.

morality conceived by man for his perfection. Harmony demands pacific relations between human beings. These human relations should be free of alienation, competition, and friction. Face saving is the end, and courtesy is the medium by which face saving is accomplished, and thus nature is satisfied. F.S.C. Northrop digested the Asian's concern for harmony, and the resulting willingness to yield to whatever is present in the human and earthly conditions of life, when he said:

Now we can understand how it is that in the very heart of Hindu India's most sacred temples at Benares the sacred cows and priests, both indifferently cleaned, walk, squat and meditate unperturbed amidst the muck and filth of this very earthworld. The Hindu blandly accepts the ugliness of the world around him and airs merely to attain spiritual equanimity within it. If the nature of things is such that everything runs in a cycle, coming back at some later date to precisely where it is now, what is the point in trying to change the present state of affairs? One rarely hastens, if this be possible, the time when tomorrow becomes today.¹

What the Asian's devotion to living within the dictates of nature means in the conduct of foreign policy is explained in the classical epic poem of Hindu culture, the Bhagavad Gita.² Arjuna is faced on the field of battle with the task of killing off members of his clan, who have fought with the enemy. Arjuna is depressed. His Hindu religion denies him the right to kill all forms of animal life. The God Krishna appears

¹F.S.C. Northrop, op. cit., p. 377.

²The Bhagavad Gita is a story in the great epic poem of Hindu culture, the Mahabharata.

before Arjuna.¹ Krishna advised Arjuna that what is good requires of Arjuna to dedicate himself to the indeterminate, all-embracing immediacy which is Brahman and to forgo determinate desires and actions, viewing them as worldly and transitory things which they are. Krishna continues:

But man is in part transitory and determinate as well as in part the indeterminate, unlimited formlessness which is his true self or Brahman. Thus man on earth must acquiesce in the transitory, determinate earthly state of affairs as well as the timeless, divine formlessness.²

Thus, Krishna advises Arjuna to kill. But when killing, Arjuna must act on the following basis. He must act:

So as to accept the world, cherishing the victory of battle or regretting the defeat which it may bring, is evil. This is to turn the relative and the transitory into the absolute and the timeless.³

Arjuna's action is justified, Krishna suggests, only if he kills with nonattachment. In other words, Arjuna must accept the determinate, earthly deeds and facts of life for whatever they may be, ugly or beautiful, with indifference or nonattachment.

One is in the muck of the world, but not of it.⁴

¹Krishna is Brahman the supreme soul of the universe. Hindus of both high and low degree do not believe that God, or the Supreme Source of Life, has made only one appearance among men. It is therefore held possible for Hindu deities - all reflections of Brahman in one way or another - to assume different names and forms to meet various challenges and crisis in the world of men and gods.

²F.S.C. Northrop, op. cit., p. 368.

³Ibid., p. 369.

⁴Ibid.

This expresses the confidence basic to the non-attachment with which the Asian views life. In terms of morality, the Asian views any law structured from the deterministic foundation of a commitment to be transitory. It has implications only to the present defined in terms of persons and circumstances involved in a treaty or settlement. As a result, any regulation reflecting determinate meanings, whether a law for society or church, isn't binding for all times on all men under different conditions. F.S.C. Northrop concludes:

The Far Eastern Asian concludes, therefore, that to use determinate rules to settle disputes between men regardless of time, place, person or circumstance is to act immorally. What is moral for tomorrow depends on tomorrow's facts and circumstances and these we will not know until tomorrow comes. . . . Determinate rules are relative to persons, circumstances and occasions. Moreover they are built out of meanings derived from determinate facts which are transitory. Hence they are things to be compromised through mediation between the disputants.¹

What are the implications of the Asian outlook in the East and West competition for political power in the international political system?

First, the Asian accepts timelessness as integral to whatever he might do in life. Life without a time orientation relieves man from frustrations he might exhibit when a day or a year hasn't been successful. Success means to accept the muck of life, because one is not of it. A man is an expression of the cyclical release of nature.

¹Ibid.

Second, man has a responsibility to follow out the cyclical sequence in which nature around him and his own life unfolds. This determinism to abide by the dictates of nature inculcates the Asian with the importance of equilibrium. Equilibrium meaning to create a balance with nature and to identify even with nature's terrible aspects. A Time essay noted;

India's mother goddess, giver of life, is also black and bloody Kali, the bringer of death and destruction. The West divides good and evil, and thinks evil can be destroyed - St. George killing the dragon, the Virgin crushing the serpent beneath her heel. The Hindus revere the serpent as the symbol of all nature, good and vile together. Asians generally are capable of believing that something is simultaneously good and bad, right and wrong, black and white - in a manner that drives the Western Aristotelian, either-or-mentality to distraction.¹

Third, the cyclical theory of time attached to the Asian views of life impresses him not only with the balance he must attain with nature, but also the protracted manner in which life is maintained. He senses life prolonged through a great deal of muck, which he does not understand, but accepts without judgment. To put it simply, this is the way it is! Some scholars have concluded the Asian is fatalistic in his acceptance of life and its inevitable outcome.² This is not the case.

To be fatalistic implies a negative acceptance of an eventual outcome. The Asian is an optimist! He believes in

¹"On Understanding Asia," Time, July 1, 1966, p. 35.

²Nancy Wilson Ross Three Ways of Asian Wisdom (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966), p. 55.

reward. It is Brahman, Nirvana, the Tao, or jen: the supreme soul of the universe. We can think of it as the ocean of being in which the transitory part of man is a wave. The wave comes and goes, but the ocean which is the immortal part of man never ceases to be. A man lives and dies, but the supreme soul of the universe, his true self, is formless and timeless. The Bhagavad-Gita describes the supreme soul,¹

Who sees his Lord
Within every creature
Deathlessly dwelling
Amidst the mortal:
That man sees truly.

Who sees the separate
Lives of all creatures
United in Brahman
Brought forth from Brahman,
Himself finds Brahman.

Fourth, the Asian has acquired patience with nature and his environment. There is little man can do about the unyielding way nature moves in a cyclical fashion. Nature passes through shades of dark and light or wet and dry, but so also does man. Thus, there is little use in Asia for losing oneself in human relations requiring commitments that will pass as man passes on his way to the supreme soul of the universe. What is lasting is the equilibrium in the balance with nature that Brahman requires of man. This is deterministic, yet the man with patience will find the way along the protracted existence of life to the life beyond the muck of this world. To put it simply, this is the way it is!

¹"The Bhagavad-Gita," quoted in Nancy Wilson Ross Ibid., p. 12.

CHAPTER III

THE PROTRACTED OUTLOOK

Enemy advances, we retreat; enemy halts,
we harass; enemy tires, we attack; enemy
retreats, we pursue.¹

The protracted outlook is the expression of an ideology, which is understood through a technique of conflict dedicated to the revolutionary overthrow of political systems unwilling to accept the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, and the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the Soviet Union. Containment is the methodology utilized by the United States to respond to Communist movements led by Communist China and the Soviet Union.

Basic to the protracted outlook is the acceptance of war as the prevailing state of relations among nation-states in the international political system. War is a historical fact having its foundation with the establishment of the social unit called society. "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles."² Marx was speaking in 1848 of a

¹Mao Tse-tung, "On Protracted War," Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung II (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1954), p. 188.

²Karl Marx, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," Great Books of the Western World (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1952), I, p. 419.

spectre haunting Europe. Liberalism had failed to bring an immediate and universal improvement in the material condition of life through the free market. Instead, free competition resulted in economic inequality. Liberty, equality, and fraternity were restricted to the new industrial rich and enterprising bankers and market speculators. In a poem titled "Man with a Hoe," Edwin Markham expressed both society's fear and responsibility in 1899 with the twelve-hour day and seven-day week life of the urban worker.¹ Markham wrote:

Through this dread shape humanity betrayed,
Plundered, profaned and disinherited,
Cries protest to the Judges of the World,
A Protest that is also prophecy. . . .

How will the Future reckon with this Man?
How answer his brute question in that hour
When whirlwinds and rebellion shake the world?
How will it be with the kingdoms and the kings-
With those who shaped him to the thing he is-
When this dumb terror shall reply to God
After the silence of the centuries?²

The reply of the proletariat to his disinheritance from liberalism had already come in the form of an ideology, when Karl Marx wrote the Manifesto of the Communist Party in 1848.³ Marx wrote: "A spectre is haunting Europe - the spectre of

¹Edwin Markham, "Man with the Hoe," quoted in Barbara W. Tuchman's The Proud Tower (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1966), p. 408.

Edwin Markham took the title of his poem from Millet's painting "Man with the Hoe."

²Ibid.

³Karl Marx wrote the Manifesto with Friedrich Engels.

Communism."¹ Communism was the ideology suggested by Marx to give hope to a working class characterized as being a factory hand, a property-less, destitute member of society, dependent for his livelihood on the capitalist who owned the means of production. The class struggle, wrote Barbara W. Tuchman, comes about when:

Through the capitalist's accumulation of profits derived from the surplus value of the worker's product, the exploiters were becoming richer and the exploited poorer. The process could only end in the violent collapse of the existing order. Trained in class consciousness and prepared for this event, the working class would, at the moment of ripeness, rise in revolution to usher in the new order.

This Marxian doctrine of Veralendung (pauperization, or increasing misery) and Zusammenbruch (collapse) was the religious formula of Socialism, equivalent to "God is One" of another religion.²

Marx supplied the ideology for the revolutionary outlook. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin and Mao Tse-tung made the revolutionary outlook protracted with a technique of organization and conflict.³ Lenin's totalitarian party and Mao Tse-tung's protracted conflict cannot be separated from the Marxian ideology in structuring the protracted outlook.

Lenin's views on party contributed to the outlook by supplying the very necessary cadre element to train the

¹Karl Marx, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," op. cit., p. 419.

²Barbara W. Tuchman The Proud Tower op. cit., p. 410.

³Reference here is to Lenin's What Is to be Done and Mao Tse-tung's "On Protracted War," cited on p. 42.

proletariat in class consciousness. Frederick M. Watkins noted the significance of Lenin's advancement of Marxism, when he said:

Instead of trying to include all and sundry, the Communist party should be rigorously exclusive. It should consist of a hard core of professional revolutionaries, undeviating in their loyalty to the party program, and prepared, like a well-trained army, to render unquestioning obedience to the commands of their superior officers. The function of this well-disciplined elite would be to infiltrate and gain positions of leadership in more popular organizations, using them as "transmission belts" for the exercise of power. In this way a small nucleus of party members would be able to control the activities of a vastly large number of outsiders, and use them for revolutionary purposes.¹

From the caves of Yen-an to the hills of Laos, Mao Tse-tung's People Liberation Army of Communist China and the Pathet Lao of Laos have depended on the cadre as a yeast in the leavening of purpose.² The cadre is responsible not only for morale, political indoctrination, and propaganda, but he must also arrange for assistance to soldier's families, since the preservation of the family - including care of the parents in their old age - is of paramount importance."³

¹Frederick M. Watkins, op. cit., p. 86.

²The Pathet Lao refers to the Communist movement in Laos. See Chapters VI and VII.

³Richard C. Kriegel, "Vietnamese Attitudes and Behavior," Marine Corps Gazette LIII (August, 1969), p. 26.

ItCol Kriegel's article is based on his experience in several USAID billets in Vietnam, including that of Assistant Regional Director for military coordination in II Corps. Recently awarded the AID Meritorious Honor Award Medal, he holds five Vietnamese decorations.

In an article titled, "The Guerrilla and His World," Howard R. Simpson noted: "In Vietnam, the political officer has been the backbone of the revolution."¹ Simpson recalls that the French in the Indo-China War recognized the cadre's importance. He states:

The famous "Commando Vandenberghe" that spread fear and insecurity deep into Vietminh territory during the Indochina war made it a practice of seeking out these open air exhortation meetings of the enemy. This elite group would then hold their fire until the political officer rose and exposed his identity by going into his harangue. The first burst of fire was designed to silence him forever.^{2 3}

Lenin developed the foundation for direction and control of the Communist movement based on the leadership of a highly motivated and competent Communist cadre. This would seem to assure that the ideology would not be left to the self-motivation of the workers of the world to understand, interpret, and direct the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. But

¹Howard R. Simpson, "The Guerrilla and His World," United States Naval Proceedings LXXXV (August, 1969), p. 47.
Mr. Simpson is currently faculty advisor and consultant (USIA) at the Naval War College.

²Ibid., p. 49.

³Mr. Simpson's conclusion regarding the importance of the cadre has been acknowledged by many students of guerrilla warfare in the West. See, for example, the writings on this topic by: Evans F. Carlson The Chinese Army: Its Organization and Military Efficiency (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1939), p. 26. "Each unit of the army (8th Route Army) has a political commissar whose authority is equal to that of the military commander. The commander and the commissar keep themselves informed of each other's professional activities, and they consult with each other before major decisions are made." (Evans F. Carlson was a major in the United States Marine Corps at the time he wrote this book. He was attached to the United States Embassy in China, and observed Mao Tse-tung's forces in Northern China.)

ideology and cadre required an additional ingredient to bring decisive direction and control to a Communist movement, namely; a technique of conflict. This is Mao Tse-tung's major contribution to the revolutionary movement of Communism. This technique of conflict provided the ideology with a protracted outlook.

Mao Tse-tung suggests the revolutionary movement is without a rudder, if it is left to human capacity to be motivated by self, disciplined by an ideology, and directed by a cadre structured only by their interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. Mao Tse-tung was sceptical of relying on Communist ideology, because it was confronting the status quo of a nation-state with change through revolutionary ideology and methodology. The status quo in any society had an acceptance or at least the appearance of stability in the presence of social institutions, cultural mores, and an elite willing to uphold the institutions and culture.¹ In addition, the elite might have the economic and military assistance of the imperialistic forces of capitalism. Mao Tse-tung advocates protracted conflict. Protracted conflict is a strategy of warfare, where the final decisive battle is postponed until the balance of power has shifted in favor of the revolutionary forces of Communism.² Protracted conflict is characterized as:

¹Mao Tse-tung, "On Protracted War," op. cit., p. 188.

²Mao Tse-tung, op. cit., p. 180.

The total objective, the carefully controlled methods and the constant shifting of the battleground, weapons systems and operational tactics for the purpose of confusing the opponent, keeping him off balance and wearing him down. The doctrine of protracted conflict prescribes a strategy for annihilating the opponent over a period of time by limited operations, by feints and maneuvers, psychological manipulations and diverse forms of violence. But the strategy should not be mistaken for one of limited war in the style of European warfare in the eighteenth century. It does not rule out the final and total knockout punch. In Communist theory, various techniques of political warfare and graduated violence are so co-ordinated as to form a spectrum that reaches all the way from the clandestine distribution of subversive literature to the annihilating blow delivered with every weapon available.¹

Mao Tse-tung suggests protracted conflict is the technique to accomplish the following goals toward building a protracted outlook.

First, protracted conflict achieves an identification of the revolutionary with the ideology by providing a systematic way of attaining the establishment of a socialistic society without divorcing the revolutionary from his conception of nationalism. In fact, Mao Tse-tung concludes a common identification of the people with an agreed upon cause is basic to a revolutionary movement and the establishment of a socialistic nation-state. Without the presence of a people's base expressing frustration with the society's way of handling economic and


¹Robert Strasz-Hupe et al. Protracted Conflict (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 2.

political affairs, a revolutionary movement is impossible.¹

See illustration on following page of steps and stages in building a revolutionary movement.²

¹The Vice Chairman of the People's Republic of China, Lin Piao, emphasized the importance of a nationalistic people's base in order to achieve victory in revolutionary war, when he quoted Mao Tse-tung: "We hope for foreign aid but cannot be dependent on it; we depend on our own efforts, on the creative power of the whole army and the entire people." Lin Piao Long Live The Victory of People's War (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1968), p. 87.

²Illustration is the result of the writer's own efforts.

Building a Revolutionary Movement

Second, protracted conflict provides the revolutionary with the mental discipline to project his thinking in a protracted fashion. The cadre and revolutionary follower's training provides a protracted orientation from studying the classics of Communist ideology, where the historical record of man as interpreted by Marx and others leaves no doubt of the progress the proletariat has made in class identification, but requires of the workers a great deal of faith in the eventual establishment of a classless Communist society.

Third, the revolutionary views things in a protracted manner through the steps and stages required to reach a socialist nation-state. He knows each step must be fulfilled, before going on to the next step, but he accepts this fact of life for many reasons. One reason being the very success of this technique of conflict in the Chinese Revolution (1921-1949). A second factor that is important for its acceptance has to do with its nationalistic base. Third, the movement is grounded on social, economic, and political problems, which are immediate and thus understandable to the frustrated worker or peasant willing to join the revolutionary movement.

Fourth, protracted conflict assures the revolutionary that what he is involved in is a total society's commitment to social, economic, and political change. Protracted conflict is not merely the expression of the enlightened intellectuals. It is an involvement of a total people defined in terms of all groups performing the functions of political socialization, interest

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aggregation, and decision-making.¹

Fifth, protracted conflict satisfies the necessity of a revolutionary movement to curtail the showdown with the capitalist nation-states until there has come about a decisive shift in balance of power in favor of the revolutionary movement of Communism. This curtailment of a showdown is attained by the necessity to pass through a covert stage of sixteen steps before proceeding to carry on overt warfare with the imperialistic forces of capitalism. The overt stage of conflict is not acceptable, until the revolutionary forces can operate like fish in the sea of a people's base. In other words, the overt stage can be undertaken when the cadre and leadership of the revolutionary movement are satisfied that the political power has been denied the status quo government and the main line forces of the movement have the mobility to move throughout the countryside.² In one famous passage of sixteen words Mao Tse-tung stated the essence of the flexibility present in the protracted outlook, when he said:

Enemy advances, we retreat; enemy halts, we harass; enemy tires, we attack; enemy retreats, we pursue.³

¹Reference here is to the functions found in every political system. See p. 116 of text for a description of the political system and its application to the Kingdom of Laos.

²Main line forces refers to the conventional military forces utilized in the overt stage of the revolutionary movement.

³Mao Tse-tung, op. cit., p. 164.

PART II

United States Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia 1945-1960

Somebody placed the shuttle in your hands; somebody who had already arranged the threads.¹

Part II continues to concentrate on the inputs to the equation of reality described on page 14 of the introduction. Whereas Part I was concerned with the values important in the formulation of a foreign policy, Part II will concentrate on the components of political power and the variables in the equation of reality. This will be done through a historical approach supplemented by a legal and philosophical approach.

In Part II the overall emphasis will be to describe the United States foreign policy in Southeast Asia 1945-1960. This review of United States foreign policy is undertaken with the following objectives in mind. First, to acquire sufficient data in order to understand containment as a methodology for implementing the American outlook discussed in Chapter I. Second, to measure the extent of political power the United States had in Southeast Asia in a period of United States presence. Third, to understand the extent to which the United States presence in Southeast Asia

¹Dag Hammarskjold, op. cit., p. 141.

reflected the variables present in the international politics between 1945 and 1960. Fourth, to answer the following question. To what extent did United States foreign policy in Southeast Asia enhance international equilibrium and grant the United States political power in terms of authority vis-a-vis its competition in the international political system? Fifth, what was there about the United States foreign policy in Southeast Asia that required a United Nations presence in the fall of 1959 and a neutralization by the Great Powers in 1962 in order to assure the maintenance of international equilibrium.

Chapter IV (Cause Behind the Effect) deals with the 1945-1954 period of United States foreign policy in Southeast Asia, when the identification of the United States with the European colonial powers was cemented. Up to May, 1950 the revolutionary forces in Southeast Asia were reluctant to step away from being friends with the United States, but the willingness of the Truman Administration to aid the French in May, 1950 broke any possible tie of the revolutionary forces with the United States.

In Chapter V (Looking Backward) attention is on the diplomatic efforts of the United States to legalize the political involvement in Southeast Asia. Primary emphasis will be on the Geneva Accord of 1954, the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization of 1954, and the Geneva Agreement of 1956. This period of United States foreign policy brought to conclusion the view that we supported those elements within these societies wishing to maintain the status quo, and thus against change. This view held by the

revolutionary forces had its foundation in a memorandum and petition from Nguyen Ai Quac (Ho Chi Minh) and the Annamese people to the American Secretary of State Robert Lansing at the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference.

Nguyen Ai Quac stated the Annamite people "count on your great kindness to honor our appeal" for self-determination.¹ The Petition stated:

Claims of the Annamite People. Since the victory of the Allies, all the subject peoples are frantic with hope at the prospect of an era of right and justice which should begin for them by virtue of the formal and solemn engagements, made before the whole world by the various powers of the Entente (Allies) in the struggle of civilization against barbarism.

While waiting for the principle of national self determination to pass from ideal to reality through the effective recognition of the sacred right of all peoples to decide their own destiny, the inhabitants of the ancient Empire of Annam, at the present time French Indochina, present to the noble Governments of the Entente in general and in particular to the honorable French Government the following humble claims:

- 1) General Amnesty for all the native people who have been condemned for political activity.
- 2) Reform of Indochinese justice by granting to the native population the same judicial guarantees as the Europeans have, and the total suppression of the special courts which are the instruments of terrorization and oppression against the most responsible elements of the Annamite people.
- 3) Freedom of press and speech.
- 4) Freedom of association and assembly.
- 5) Freedom to emigrate and to travel abroad.
- 6) Freedom of education, and creation in every province of technical and professional schools for the native population.
- 7) Replacement of the regime of arbitrary decrees by a regime of law.

¹Ho Chi Minh quoted by Chalmers N. Roberts, "Archives Shows Ho's Note," The Washington Post (September 14, 1969), p. A25.

- 8) A permanent delegation of native people elected to attend the French parliament in order to keep the latter informed of their needs.

The Annamite people, in presenting these claims, count on the world-wide justice of all the Powers, and rely in particular on the good will of the noble French people who hold our destiny in their hands and who, as France is a republic, have taken us under their protection. In requesting the protection of the French people, the people of Annam, far from feeling humiliated, on the contrary consider themselves honored, because they know that the French people stand for liberty and justice and will never renounce their sublime ideal of universal brotherhood. Consequently, in giving heed to the voice of the oppressed, the French people will be doing their duty to France and to humanity. In the name of the Group of Annamite Patriots: Nguyen Ai Quac.¹

The memorandum and petition were ignored. Nguyen Ai Quac turned to international Communism for support. Nguyen Ai Quac became Ho Chi Minh, the enlightened one.

¹The memorandum and petition were received by the writer from the Smithsonian Institute.

CHAPTER IV

CAUSE BEHIND THE EFFECT

We are not permitted to choose
the Frame for our destiny. But
what we put into it is ours.¹

United States national strategy in Asia is controlled by the national goal of preventing an overt attack upon the United States.² This national strategy means the United States assumes a preference to initiate a defense of this nation-state as close as possible to an enemy's mainland, and thus as far away as possible from the United States. This is the essential meaning of containment. George F. Kennan described this method of implementing the national strategy, when he said:

A policy of firm containment, defined to
confront the Russians with unalterable
counter-force at every point where they

¹Dag Hammarskjold, op. cit., p. 55.

²National strategy is the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation-state, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national goals.

National goal is an expression, normally in qualitative terms, of highly desirable conditions toward which the nation-state should direct its efforts.

"Curricular Theme," The Development of a U.S. National Strategy and A Supporting Military Program (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1968), p. 19.

show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world.¹

The "intellectual framework for the new American (and Western) foreign policy"² has remained as the basic method for implementing the national strategy of the United States. Kennan's thesis is evident in the State of the Union address by President Eisenhower dated January 9, 1959. The President stated: "to achieve peace we seek to prevent war at any place and in any dimension."³ President Richard M. Nixon concurred with the method in a speech to the Nation November 4, 1969:

Let us understand that the question before us is not whether some Americans are for peace and some against it.

.....

The question is: How can we win America's peace?⁴

President Nixon believed America's peace could be won by the continuation of the national strategy conceptualized in the methodology developed in 1947. The President said:

Fifteen years ago North Vietnam, with the logistical support of Communist China and the Soviet Union, launched a campaign to impose a Communist government on South Vietnam

¹George F. Kennan (Mr. X), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs XXV (July, 1947), p. 581.

²David Rees The Age of Containment (London: St. Martin's Press, 1968), p. 23.

³President Dwight David Eisenhower, "The State of the Union Message January 9, 1959," Department of State Publication 6763 (January, 1959), p. 4.

⁴President Richard M. Nixon, "Vietnam," quoted in "Nixon on Vietnam: I Want Peace," The Washington Post (November 4, 1969), p. A8.

by instigating and supporting a revolution. In response to the request of the government of South Vietnam, President Eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the people of South Vietnam in their efforts to prevent a Communist takeover. Seven years ago, President Kennedy sent 16,000 military personnel to Vietnam as combat advisors. Four years ago, President Johnson sent American combat forces to South Vietnam.

.....

In January I could only conclude that the precipitate withdrawal of all American forces from Vietnam would be a disaster not only for South Vietnam but for the United States and for the cause of peace.

.....

Let historians not record that when America was the most powerful nation in the world we passed on the other side of the road and allowed the last hopes for peace and freedom of millions of people on earth to be suffocated by the forces of totalitarianism.¹

Besides a preference to initiate defense of this nation-state as close as possible to an enemy's mainland, the United States national strategy moves away from a defensive posture by accepting defense only for that period of time necessary to blunt aggression. Thus, the best strategic defense of the United States is to be achieved by the presence of a military capacity to assume the strategic offense soon after the initial attack by an enemy upon United States or Allied installations near the aggressor's mainland.

This national goal of national strategy did not have its foundation in the Cold War, which began in 1947. Instead, it was in the events climaxing with Pearl Harbor that national security

¹Ibid., p. A8.

became the primary element of consideration in defining national interest. It was in the time period preceding Pearl Harbor that American military planners, such as Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, Commander W.S. Pye, and General John A. LeJeune, evolved a national strategy which emphasized the national security aspect of national interest.¹ And it was in the period prior to Pearl Harbor that the first concepts and organization were formulated to have the national goal achieved via a national military strategy that was basically offensive in nature.²

United States foreign policy prior to Pearl Harbor can be safely viewed in terms of national interest somewhat free of considerations of the national security question.³ This conclusion seems acceptable to the writer for the following reasons.

¹Captain (later Admiral) Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914), President of the Naval War College, Commander of the Atlantic Fleet, and author of several books and articles on sea power such as The Interest of America in Sea Power (1897).

Commander W.S. Pye was the outspoken member of the Plans Division of the Office of Naval Operations in 1920, who developed the carrier task force strategy based on Mahan's offensive strategy. (See Ray L. Bowers article "The Twentieth Century Penchant for the Offensive," United States Naval Proceedings (September, 1967), pp. 58-69. Excellent discussion of Mahan's offensive strategy utilized by the United States in World War II).

General John A. LeJeune was Commandant of the Marine Corps during the 1920's, when the techniques of amphibious warfare were developed to implement Mahan's strategy.

²Reference here is to the development of a strong navy beginning in 1890, when the battleships Oregon, Indiana, and Massachusetts were authorized by Congress, and to the development of the concepts and organization related to amphibious warfare, the carrier task force, strategic bombing, long-range submarine warfare, and tank (armored) warfare.

³The writer used the phrase "somewhat free of consideration

First, the splendid geographical isolation of the United States from the turmoil of Europe during this country's development. "Few nations in modern history - and no great power except perhaps Russia - have been so favorably situated," H. Bradford Westerfield noted, 'as the United States to effectuate the inclination to live apart from alien influences."¹ It was on the foundation of this geographical isolation that President George Washington laid the foundation of United States national strategy for one hundred and fifty years. President Washington stated:

Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain one people, under an efficient government,

of the national security question," because of the reasons stated. Nevertheless, national security was of some importance to the Founding Fathers (Federalist III), and the initial Administrations of the Republic, but it was more a question of removing the Indians and allowing the problems of Europe to dictate that the British and French would have to forget about an empire in America.

For example, John Jay writes in Federalist III that "among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their safety seems to be the first." John Jay, "Federalist III," appearing in Great Books of the Western World XXXVIII (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1952), p. 33.

¹H. Bradford Westerfield The Instruments of America's Foreign Policy (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1963), p. 13.

the period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoyance. . . . why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation?¹

This isolation did not mean a complete rupture from European life. Washington suggested the maintenance of suitable establishments to assure the defense of the shores and merchant fleet, and commercial relations with any country. Finally, Washington believed our greatest contribution to mankind would be an example of free government. Washington stated:

It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and at no distant period a great nation to give mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence.²

Second, the main problem confronting America involved the consolidation of the national government's authority throughout the continental limits of the United States. This was accomplished constitutionally, when Arizona was admitted to the Union

¹President George Washington, "Farewell Address," appearing in Ruhl J. Bartlett (ed.) The Record of American Diplomacy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), p. 86.

²Ibid.

³As to when the consolidation process was completed is open to dispute. The writer has used 1912, since it was then that the continental limits of this country were solidified under one government, and it is the year marking the assumption by the United States of an international role through dollar diplomacy and a naval fleet to implement the sea power thesis of Mahan. Other dates that could be used would be 1789 (United States under one constitution supreme throughout the land), 1865 (Civil War ends), or 1890 (The last armed conflict between Indians and whites took place at Wounded Knee Creek).

February 14, 1912.¹

Third, United States national security was underwritten by the British Grand Fleet through World War I. With the Northern victory in the Civil War, the British accepted the viability of the United States. From 1865 forward, British sea power was the primary force implementing the Monroe Doctrine, and guaranteed United States' commercial trade with the Far East.

World War I marks a watershed in United States foreign policy. In the events leading up to the War, the United States began to see the necessity for giving primary consideration to national security as the most important component of national interest.² The primary event in the American awakening involved the removal of the British fleet from the Pacific theater to the waters surrounding Germany. This occurred when Great Britain renewed a 1902 alliance with Japan in 1905. Of this event, Peter Lyon notes:

By 1905 the Pax Britiannica was contracting: the new terms of the Anglo-Japanese alliance involved the withdrawal of the British Far Eastern naval squadron from Hong Kong, and an agreement by Japan either 'to hold the

¹As states, Hawaii and Alaska came much later as part of the extension of United States commercial interests and sea power in the Pacific. Thus, the writer suggests these states are but the reflection of an already existing United States presence in Asia.

²The events alone did not dictate a change in the American attitude. Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan's writings and the acquirement of Hawaii and the Philippines turned America outward and interested in national security.

ring' or to intervene on Britain's side in the event of an attack on India. Japan thus underpinned what was left of the Pax Britannica in the Orient.¹

The United States viewed the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1905 with great alarm, since the Japanese were frustrating American attempts to achieve an economic sphere of influence in China.² In addition, Japan had shown its viability in defeating a European power, Imperial Russia. Finally, the 1919 Versailles Treaty transferred to the Japanese control of the Marshall, Marianas, and Caroline Islands. This decision threatened the United States ability to defend the Philippines and protect the commercial interests of the United States in China.³

From Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan through the Pye's and Lejeune's of the inter-war period (1920-1941), the request was made for the United States to protect its territorial integrity against the coming confrontation with Japan. The Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover Administrations bought time through a

¹Peter Lyon War and Peace in South-East Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 19.

²Reference here is to the attempts by Wall Street financiers (Harriman, Loeb etc.) to utilize the United States government in the period 1904-1913 to establish an American dominance over the loans granted China and a railroad and mining interest in Manchuria (The Chinchow-Aigun railroad). See A. Whitney Griswold The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1938), Chapter IV. "Dollar Diplomacy." pp. 133-175.

³Julius W. Pratt A History of United States Foreign Policy (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1955), p. 542.

series of treaties designed to limit Japanese naval power in the Pacific, and thus maintain an open door for United States commercial interests in Asia.¹ Time was bought by these Administrations, but at a price. The cost involved several things. These were:

First, the creditability of the United States in the Asian world. Walter LaFeber summarizes this problem with reference to the very first evidence of a gap in the Lansing-Ishii notes dated November 2, 1917.

The Lansing-Ishii Notes heralded a 15 year period of United States-Japanese cooperation on the problem of handling China. Differences did appear, particularly when the Japanese insisted at the Paris Peace Conference that they must retain the former German possessions in Shantung, which the Chinese claimed as part of their own ancient empire. The Japanese position particularly compromised President Wilson's widely publicized policy of self-determination, and the President's failure to force Japan to return Shantung in 1919 was one reason why the United States Senate then rejected the Wilsonian settlement.^{2 3}

¹The treaties referred to are: The Washington Naval Conference 1921-1922; the Five-Power Treaty dated February 6, 1922; the Nine-Power Treaty dated February 6, 1928; the Four-Power Treaty dated December 13, 1922; the London Naval Conference of 1930.

²Walter LaFeber, "Before Pearl Harbor," Current History LVIII (August, 1969), p. 68.

³The Lansing-Ishii Notes dated November 2, 1917 signed by Secretary of State Robert Lansing and Viscount Kikujiro Ishii, a special envoy of the Japanese government. Julius W. Pratt concludes: The Notes gave Japan "a reasonably free hand in China." Pratt believes this is a reasonable view in that the notes state: "The Governments of the United States and Japan recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and consequently the Governments of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous." Julius W. Pratt, op. cit., p. 541.

The Lansing-Ishii Notes were not the decisive element in creating a creditability gap in Asia for the United States. This would come in the contradiction between the promises of the Fourteen Points and the stipulations of the Versailles Treaty.

On January 8, 1918 President Woodrow Wilson addressed a joint session of Congress. Sun Yat-sen, Nguyen Ai Quac, and the other revolutionary leaders in Asia could forget the implications of the Lansing-Ishii Notes, when President Wilson included among his Fourteen Points:

A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.¹

President Woodrow Wilson arrived in Paris December 13, 1918. The Paris Peace Conference began January 12, 1919 with the Republic of China represented as an associated power of the Allies. Nguyen Ai Quac appeared at the Conference with a memorandum addressed to the American Secretary of State Robert Lansing. Nguyen Ai Quac's memorandum stated the Annamite people "count on your great kindness to honor our appeal"² for self-determination. The memorandum was ignored.³ France remained in

¹President Woodrow Wilson, "The Fourteen Points," appearing in Ruhl J. Bartlett, op. cit., p. 460.

²Nguyen Ai Quac (Ho Chi Minh) quoted by Chalmers M. Roberts, op. cit., p. A25.

³Ibid.

Indochina, and Japan was granted a sphere of interest over Shantung Province by the Treaty of Versailles. Ray Stannard Baker saw President Wilson soon after the Allies granted a political interest in China to Japan. Baker writes:

Anything he might do was wrong. He said the settlement was the best that could be had out of a dirty past. . . . The only hope was to keep the world together, get the League of Nations with Japan in it and then try to secure justice for the Chinese not only as regarding Japan, but England, France, Russia, all of whom had concessions in China. He knew his decision would be unpopular in America, that the Chinese would be bitterly disappointed, that the Japanese would feel triumphant, that he would be accused of violating his own principles, but, nevertheless, he must work for world order and organization against anarchy and a return to the old militarism.¹

The Treaty of Versailles, states Franklin W. Houn, produced "profound disillusionment"² in China, and was the event which made "several leading intellectuals, including Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-Lai . . . increasingly interested in the revolutionary experience of the Bolsheviks in Russia."³ It is safe to assume that Nguyen Ai Quac agreed with the Chinese revolutionary leaders, because the Annamese leader joined with the Chinese in the 1920's to develop their Republic and Communist Party.⁴

¹Ray S. Baker Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement II (Garden City, New York: Harper, 1922), p. 266.

²Franklin W. Houn A Short History of Chinese Communism (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 32.

³Ibid.

⁴Bernard B. Fall wrote in the preface to Ho Chi Minh on

While the revolutionary leaders in China and Indo-China were turning to Russia for concepts, organization, and aid, the United States "revived the old habit - possibly to ease a guilty conscience - of signing arbitration treaties qualified by conditions that made them worthless, and concluded a new series of cooling off treaties"¹ climaxing with the Kellogg-Briand Treaty dated August 27, 1928. This treaty to end war as a means to satisfy the national interest demands of nation-states was signed by most nation-states including Japan and China. Article

Revolution: "Certain great political figures in history are remembered for their talents both as writers and as leaders of men. The names of Julius Caesar, Napoleon I, Winston Churchill, and Charles de Gaulle come readily to mind. There are others whose impact on history is likely to be no less great and, for ill or for good, may be even longer lasting than that of the men in the first category. These are men who have the ability to organize, to work with a wide variety of people, and to achieve results through personal contact rather than through the persuasiveness of their writings and their thinking. Louis XIV, Marshall Tito, and of course Lyndon B. Johnson fall into this category of men whose deeds will endure but whose writings are unlikely material for literary anthologies. Ho Chi Minh falls into the latter group." Bernard B. Fall Ho Chi Minh on Revolution (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 5.

Ho Chi Minh (Nguyen Ai Quoc-Nguyen "Loves His Country") was born May 18, 1890 in Central Viet Nam. At thirteen, Ho was expelled from the French school for anti-French nationalist activities. Ho left France for work as a mess boy aboard a French liner and in London. After his failure to persuade Secretary of State Lansing to consider self-determination for the Annamese people at the Paris Conference ending World War I, Ho Chi Minh became a member of the Communist Party. He served as a comintern agent in France and China. After the establishment of the Wampoa Academy in China (May, 1924) Ho Chi Minh served as a lecturer under Chou En-lai. (M. Herzog, "The Whampoa Academy," United States Naval Proceedings April, 1968, pp. 47-53). With Chinese Communist assistance, Ho Chi Minh began the development of a Vietnamese revolutionary force in Yunnan. This effort climaxed in the presence in Vietnam of a nationalist movement as of 1941.

¹Julius W. Pratt, op. cit., p. 534.

I of the Treaty stated:

The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with each other.¹

The United States Senate ratified the Treaty January 15, 1929. On the same day, Julius W. Pratt notes, "the Senate turned to the next item of business - the appropriation of \$270,000,000 for fifteen 10,000 ton cruisers for the United States Navy."² On September 18, 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria. The Chinese Government requested that the United States "take such steps as will insure the preservation of peace in the Far East."³ Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson responded to the Chinese request by informing the Chinese that the League of Nations has "formulated conclusions and outlined a course of action."⁴

A second problem related to United States national strategy that developed in the inter-war period (1920-1941) concerned what Mahan's disciples were saying. Pye, Mitchell, LeJuene and other military planners presented the same theme; namely, the United States must begin to look outward to Asia and protect the United States from Japanese imperialism. But the warnings of these military planners was lost in the perverted form of isolationism practiced by the administrations of Harding,

¹"The Kellogg-Briand Pact," Ruhl J. Bartlett, op. cit., p. 520.

²Julius W. Pratt, p. 539.

³"The Invasion of Manchuria," Ruhl J. Bartlett, p. 528.

⁴Ibid., p. 530.

Coolidge, and Hoover. All the military planners could accomplish in this period of non-existing defense budgets was to develop new concepts of warfare and organization to implement these concepts.

The concepts and organization were not sufficient to stop Pearl Harbor. But a very dramatic change took place in the orientation of the American people and its political leaders regarding national goals and national strategy.

December 7, 1941 taught the American people the following lessons regarding national goals and national strategy. First, there is no more basic national goal than national interest defined in terms of the national security of the United States. What is important here is that the American people started to think about self-preservation (national security) as the battle-ship navy came to rest at the bottom of Pearl Harbor.

Second, the formulators of United States foreign policy reflected the American people's concern for national security by listening to the military planners of the 1920's. These formulators didn't actually listen. Reflecting the instrumentalism in the American outlook, the President and Congress witnessed the results of the technology implementing the concepts and organization developed in the 1920's. By August, 1942, six months after Pearl Harbor, the United States was bombing German installations in Europe and making their first amphibious landing in the Pacific. The results were coming in; the concepts and organization developed in the 1920's which found realization in the form of aircraft carriers, amphibious craft, and bombers could

not be disputed. World War II was won by a new strategic doctrine that structured the weaponry developed by American technology and industrial management.

Third, the national strategy of defending the United States by maintaining an American military presence near the enemy's mainland achieved acceptance. This would assure no Pearl Harbor again!

To accomplish the goal of preventing another overt attack on the United States, the national strategy that evolved included the development of concepts, organization, and weaponry which was to be offensive in nature. Thus, what Pye, Lejuene and others had suggested in the 1920's was to continue. The United States would defend this nation-state with an offensive capability near the enemy's mainland. When the enemy attacked a United States or Allied installation, United States military forces would initiate defense followed almost simultaneously by the utilization of the offensive component of the national strategy.

The concepts, organization, and weaponry that won World War II formed the nucleus of the national policy in the Cold War. Another Pearl Harbor would be prevented by assuring that there would be no repetition of the events surrounding December 7, 1941.¹

¹Reference here is to the continued emphasis on offensive weaponry such as mobile forces with the capacity to carry the attack via helicopter envelopment or an amphibious landing. The tactical thinking behind this kind of methodology is extremely hard to apply in a limited protracted war such as Korea and Vietnam.

The justification for the United States presence in Asia suggested by Pearl Harbor, was not evident to the United States in the period 1945-1954. This post-war period of United States foreign policy is best characterized by a policy of liquidating political and military involvement in Asia. Containment was generally confined to Europe.

The liquidation of the United States presence in Asia began soon after the Japanese Emperor informed his people that Japan was surrendering August 14, 1945. This did not mean the immediate liquidation of United States involvement. What it did mean is that the occupation of Japan and South Korea by military forces of the United States would be maintained only for the period necessary for these nation-states to go it alone. In addition, the United States presence in China at this time was to mediate the political crisis between the Nationalist and Communist leaders. But at no time did the Truman Administration consider military intervention into Chinese political affairs. William C. Johnstone notes:

Our traditional policy of no intervention without invitation dictated a disengagement from any direct embroilment in the Chinese civil war. Our efforts were primarily mediatory.¹

Why did the United States attempt to conduct a foreign policy of liquidation in Asia from 1945 to 1953, when it was quite obvious China was going Communist by the summer of

¹William C. Johnstone, "United States Policy in Southern Asia," Current History XXXXVI (February, 1964), p. 66.

1947?¹ The answer is quite simple. In the priorities of the United States, the American people desired normalcy characterized by reliance on the United Nations in international politics and a quest for the personal and material life which they had been deprived in the War. Samuel Eliot Morison describes the period very well, when he said:

No sooner was the war over than a popular clamor arose to send the boys home. The army planned to discharge 5.5 million by July 1, 1946, but this was too slow to suit the voters, and congressional pressure forced the army to speed it up. By the spring of 1950 it was down to 600,000 men and there were only ten divisions even partially ready for action - fewer than in Belgium and Holland.

To offset this impression of weakness, America confounded all the Marxist prophets by remaining prosperous. There was an enormous unsatisfied demand for consumer goods, which did not want purchasers, as almost every class in the community had money to spend. The new cars were attractive, although double the prices of 1941 models. Television, now nation-wide, dishwashing machines, and electric stoves absorbed millions of dollars. Prices went up, too, especially after Congress in 1946 removed most of the restrictions, but incomes went up even more. Even the farmers continued to benefit from higher war prices for their cattle, grains, and cotton because of the demand in Europe, and the federal government's willingness to extend credit so that Europeans could buy them.²

President Harry S. Truman did not have a mandate from the American people or the Congress to compromise their quest for

¹By the summer of 1947, attempts of George Marshall to affect a coalition government between the Communists and nationalists all failed. Marshall had returned to Washington, and the Communists were on the offensive.

²Samuel Eliot Morison, op. cit., 1076.

normalcy during the period April 12, 1945 to November, 1948.

The policy of liquidation was the only course to follow, until the people or events gave President Truman a different mandate.

The mandate for change in United States foreign policy came in the form of events. "An iron curtain descended across the Continent"¹ of Europe starting with Poland in 1945 and climaxing with Czechoslovakia in February, 1948. Churchill's description of history in the making, which was spoken so eloquently at Fulton, Missouri on March 5, 1946, reminded the American people and their Congress of the national goal of national security. When the protracted conflict of the Soviet Union against Turkey and Greece brought from President Truman a request for economic and military assistance, the American people began to renew their awareness of national security. President Truman climaxed the process of bringing the American people out of normalcy into the realities of post-world War II international politics with an address before a joint session of Congress March 12, 1947. The President stated:

The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my appearance before a joint session of the Congress. The foreign policy and the national security of this country are involved.

.....

The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorists activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists,

¹Winston Churchill quoted in David Rees, op. cit., p. 19.

who defy the Government's authority at a number of points, particularly along the northern border.

.....

Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy. The United States must supply that assistance.

.....

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure.

.....

Great responsibilities have been placed upon us by the swift movement of events. I am confident that the Congress will face these responsibilities squarely.¹

Congress did.² The educational process begun by the events in Europe removed the unreality of normalcy prevailing among the American people.

President Truman's request for United States assistance to Greece and Turkey commenced the activation of the containment policy of the United States in Europe. This policy reached a point of climatic conclusion, when the United States entered into the first peacetime military alliance on April 4, 1949. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is significant not only for the departure of the United States from the traditional policy of no entangling alliances in peacetime, but also for the

¹"The Truman Doctrine," Ruhl J. Bartlett, op. cit., pp. 725-729.

²See appendix p.258 for breakdown of economic and military assistance provided by the United States 1945-1960.

nature of the United States military commitment in Europe.

Article 5 of the NATO Treaty stated:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.¹

The North Atlantic Treaty brought the United States back to an emphasis upon national security in foreign policy. The Treaty was an expression of the conclusion George F. Kennan articulated on behalf of the Truman Administration, namely, "in these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy towards the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies."^{2 3}

But NATO, the Truman Doctrine, and Kennan's containment thesis were conceived to assure the viability of Western Europe,

¹"The North Atlantic Treaty," Ruhl J. Bartlett, op. cit., p. 738.

²George F. Kennan, op. cit., p. 581.

³During the course of the Vietnam hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February, 1966, George F. Kennan applied the same assumption for containment with regard to China that he applied to the Soviet Union, when he said: "I don't doubt that the Chinese Communists would love to unleash the bloodiest sort of revolutions in every country that they can think of that is not Communist." George F. Kennan quoted in Akira Iriye (ed.) U.S. Policy Toward China (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968), p. 17.

and not Asia. In the Pacific theater of United States foreign policy, the liquidation of United States involvement left China to Communism and Japan a viable nation-state. The Philippine Islands achieved independence in 1948, and Indochina was left to French colonialism.

February 8, 1950 marks a dramatic change in United States foreign policy in Asia. In a press conference, Secretary of State Dean Acheson divorced the United States from its policy of liquidation and began to apply a world view of containment to the Asian landscape. Secretary of State Acheson stated:

What we have observed over the last few years is that the Soviet government is highly realistic and we have seen time after time that it can adjust itself to facts when facts exist. We have also seen that agreements reached with the Soviet government are useful when these agreements recognize facts or a situation which exists, and that they are not useful when they are merely agreements which do not register existing facts. . . . So it has been our basic policy to build situations which will extend the area of possible agreement; that is to create strength instead of weakness which exists in many quarters. . . . These are ways in which in various parts of the world we are trying to extend the area of possible agreement with the Soviet Union by creating situations so strong they can be recognized, and out of them can grow agreement. . . I don't need to go over with you again the fact that, growing out of the last war, and other conditions before the war and between the wars, there have been created all over the world those positions of weakness. Every time one of those situations exists, and they exist in Asia and they exist in Europe, it is not only an invitation but an irresistible invitation to the Soviet government to fish in these troubled waters. To ask them not to fish, and to say we will have an agreement that you won't fish is like trying to deal with a force of nature. You can't argue with a river, it is going to flow. You can dam it up, you can put it to useful

purposes, you can deflect it, but you can't argue with it. Therefore we go to work . . . to change those situations of weakness so that they won't create opportunities for fishing and opportunities for trouble.¹

During the course of his testimony with regard to the Senate hearings involving the firing of General Douglas MacArthur, Secretary of State Dean Acheson concluded:

What we must do is to create situations of strength. . . With that change there comes a difference in the negotiating position of the various parties, and out of that I should hope that there would be a willingness on the side of the Kremlin to recognize the facts.²

Secretary of State Dean Acheson revised the methodology of containment formulated and executed by the Truman Administration. Now, there was interjected into the policy a willingness to negotiate with the Soviet Union based upon situations of strength created by a multilateral military capability and alliance system in addition to an economic and military assistance program. In other words, Acheson was trying to break the United States from a passive posture in containing the Soviet military presence in Europe. But Acheson failed to see the revitalization of containment during the Truman Administration.

The Korean War would seem to have been the catalyst for Acheson's thesis to become the reality around which to utilize American resources. Such was not the case. Instead of

¹Secretary of State Dean Acheson, "Press Conference February 8, 1950," Department of State Bulletin XXII (February 20, 1950), p. 213.

²Secretary of State Dean Acheson quoted in David Rees, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

sanctifying the Truman Administration's quest for flexibility in methodology in administering and executing United States foreign policy, Truman and Acheson came to the close of their public service cast as being soft on Communism. The Korean War had left the impression that the United States was unwilling to achieve victory in war and containment was the primary intellectual concept limiting the United States in attaining peace with justice under law.

This negative impression about the Korean War in particular and the Truman Administration in general was developed by the Republican Party in the 1952 presidential political campaign. The issue of being "soft on Communism" had been supplied by Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin. As Samuel Eliot Morison noted: "McCarthy supplied the issue, but who would lead the procession?"¹ Morison continues:

General MacArthur might have ridden the elephant. Willing enough, he was invited to give the keynote address to the Republican nominating convention at Chicago in July. It was received with slight enthusiasm, since the politicians knew that the General had no grass-roots support; he had failed as a avowed candidate in 1948 - eleven votes on the first ballot, none of the third - and veterans did not like him. Thus the most logical candidate was Senator Taft - "Mr. Republican" as he was often called. None more deserved to be President, for Taft had integrity, a deep knowledge of the governmental structure, and political courage. As in the case of Henry Clay, courage lost Taft the nomination; he had made too many enemies, notably the labor union leaders, owing to the Taft-Hartley

¹Samuel Eliot Morison, op. cit., p. 1076.

Act. Tom Dewey, twice defeated, did not care to try again, but he marshaled delegates to win the nomination for a really glamorous candidate - General Eisenhower. "Ike" had no more political experience than MacArthur, but he was well liked by the G.I.s; and his achievements in Europe, which included running two international coalitions, suggested that he had a flair for politics. He received 845 votes for the nomination. . . Senator Richard Nixon of California received second place on the ticket as a reward for having uncovered the former communist connections of Alger Hiss, when a member of the Un-American Activities Committee. He had no other qualifications; it was a case similar to Coolidge's winning the vice presidential nomination for a few strong words about the Boston police strike.¹

The election of Dwight David Eisenhower as President of the United States in November, 1952 brought to a close the implementation of the forward strategy conceptualized by the Truman Administration in 1950 through 1952. This is most evident in the death of National Security Council paper No. 68.² The United States formulated, administered, and executed foreign policy from 1953 through 1959 within the framework of containment conceived by President Truman and George F. Kennan in the period 1947 through the implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in August, 1949. This meant that United States foreign policy would have the following characteristics:

First, the assumption of the existence of a monolithic world

¹Samuel Eliot Morison, p. 1076.

²During the early months of 1950, the National Security Council issued a paper recommending the development of a multi-lateral conventional capability for the United States in addition to our already developing nuclear weaponry. This is what Secretary of State Dean Acheson was referring to in his press conference dated February 8, 1950.

wide conspiracy identified with the foreign policy of Communist Russia and China.

Second, "a policy of firm containment"¹ meant a continuation of our identification with the European community of nation-states under the collective defense arrangement of NATO.

Third, the United States would premise its role in the world on an identification with its European Allies. This was the hub of stability from which United States political power could best generate stability in the world and contain the expansion of the Soviet Union and Communist China.

Fourth, since the threats to world peace emanate from the Soviet Union and Communist China reliance on an overt capability to meet expansion would be the decisive instruments of United States national security policy. This would not only satisfy meeting the threat, but also would assure no future Pearl Harbors. With this in mind, the Eisenhower Administration expanded our offensive nuclear capability.²

Fifth, the nuclear capability of the United States and the Soviet Union created a balance of terror, which required caution in foreign policy, and thus the foreign policy of the United States must do what it thought necessary to keep the status quo and limit initiatives in foreign policy beyond the Western sphere of interest to the exportation of the "spiritual vitality of the

¹George F. Kennan, op. cit., p. 581.

²See appendix p. 258 for breakdown of the military budget of the United States 1945-1960.

United States."¹

Sixth, and finally, the Eisenhower Administration began its eight years by blaming the entire instability in the international political system on a Communist conspiracy and ended the 1950's by noting "we, on our part, know that we seek only a just peace for all, with aggressive designs against no one."² Communism had placed the shuttle in our hands to bring peace with justice to the world: "somebody who had already arranged the threads."³

What the Eisenhower Administration accomplished was to free the American conscience from the "no victory" policy of two Democratic Administrations, which was reflected in the Yalta Agreements and the Korean War. With the Eisenhower Administration the United States was going to restore its traditional role of voicing an image of a nation-state against Communism, and relying on alliances that would not bind us like NATO does to immediate military action. In Europe alone, the Eisenhower Administration would show a willingness to serve the national interests of Great Britain and the Continent by a willingness to go to the brink with massive retaliation.

In conclusion, the Eisenhower years established once again the natural tendency of the American people to have no part in

¹George F. Kennan, op. cit., p. 581.

²President Dwight D. Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 2.

³Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, op. cit., p. 32.

international politics. The image of an outer world of international politics was created in the first few years of the Eisenhower Administration by the nuclear capability of the United States. When the Soviet Union placed a satellite in orbit in October, 1957, the image of normalcy was maintained by the internal problems of Communism between the Soviet Union and Communist China, and the instability within Eastern Europe.

Finally, the Eisenhower Administration's greatest achievement was in securing within the American mind an impression that a period of normalcy was present. Of course, this impression received little competition from either the Soviet Union and Communist China, since massive retaliation or any conventional retaliation was limited to an overt attack upon Western Europe, Formosa, Japan, and etc. Thus, what we had from 1953 to 1960 was a period of looking backward to the bygone days of normalcy enjoyed by the United States during the 1920's and 1930's, and for two years after World War II. Containment meant the preservation of the United States and Western Europe through the collective security arrangement of NATO, and the application of United States political power elsewhere only within the limitations of what the NATO partners would accept in so far as direct economic and military assistance to the nation-states of the third world.

CHAPTER V

LOOKING BACKWARD

Between experiences and having experienced - the moment when the experience yields its last secrets. A moment we only discover is already past when cracks and stains appear, the gilding flakes off, and we wonder what it was that once so attracted us.¹

Two general themes dominate the international politics between 1953 and 1960. On the one hand, the United States foreign policy was controlled by an inflexible attitude toward Communism, the experience of the Korean War, and a quest for normalcy on the part of the American people. In other words, the United States policy in this period was looking backward to what had happened, and judging international politics between 1953 and 1960 by this experience.

At the same time that United States foreign policy was looking backward, another major theme of the 1953-1960 period was a relaxation of tension. This relief from the Cold War was due to the following factors. First, the death of Joseph Stalin on March 5, 1953, resulted in an internal power struggle among the Soviet Communist Party elite. Second, the achievement of nuclear parity by the bi-polar powers permitted the Soviet Union to turn

¹Dag Hammarskjold, op. cit., p. 47.

to different tactics in the protracted conflict with the West; namely, peaceful co-existence with the United States and its Allies. Third, the presence of several well-defined factors in the international politics of the 1950's and 1960's that began exposing themselves in the immediate post-war period. These factors were:

First, a reduction occurred in the role played by ideology in the competition among nation-states. Ideology tended to diminish in importance as evidence mounted that there existed fragmentation within the Communist community of nation-states. Communist nation-states, Communist subversion, and Communist movements were present throughout the 1950's and today. But tension was evident among the European Communist nation-states starting with Tito being expelled from the Cominform in June, 1948, and the East German uprising in June, 1953. This tension was replaced by an open rupture in the Communist movement following Premier Nikita Khrushchev's 'secret speech' condemning Stalin on February 25, 1956. The Polish and Hungarian revolutions in the summer and fall of 1956, and the evident displeasure of the Chinese Communists with the negation of Stalin left little doubt that the Communist movement was without a center of power.¹

Another factor in the diminishing role played by ideology had to do with the achievement of nuclear parity by the United States and the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union exploded a

¹Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict (New York: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 343.

hydrogen bomb in August, 1953, the necessity for restraint became an obvious thing to discuss. And when Sputnik was placed in orbit on October 4, 1957, there was for man no alternative but restraint! Now there was little possibility to calculate the cost and potential advantage of war.

Second, there was the departure of violence from the relationships of developed nation-states to the third world of emerging nation-states. Throughout the 1950's and today, conflicts have taken the form of a confrontation between a developed nation-state and an emerging nation-state, or the very instability within the new nation-states is of itself an element causing tension within the international political system.

This new stage in the format of violence was due to the inability of the bi-polar powers in particular to pursue the satisfaction for political power by means of overt all-out war. This nuclear balance of terror called for new tactical strategy as well as a new method to meet national security and other national interest requirements. What this strategy and method would be began to emerge in the immediate post-war period as evidenced in the "people's wars" conducted in the Philippines, Malaya, Greece, and Indo-China, and the policy of peaceful co-existence adopted by the Soviet Union in 1956.

Third, the third world emerged from the status of being colonial possessions. This process began prior to World War II as we shall see regarding the Lao Issara movement in Laos.¹

¹See p.108 for discussion of the Lao Issara movement.

And the process continued to gain momentum during World War II as the Japanese caused a loss of face to the French and the other colonial powers. Yet, while this was happening, the development of a new power bloc was not realized by the Western and Eastern nation-states, until the emerging nation-states expressed their self-sufficiency within the confines of the United Nations.

At the time of the foundation of the United Nations, the membership was fifty in number. Norman L. Hill noted: "By the end of 1950, a total of nine states had been admitted, but many others had been rejected either by a Russian-applied veto in the Security Council or enough negative votes by the noncommunist states to prevent the affirmative vote of seven required. The deadlock persisted despite every effort to dissolve it until 1955, when sixteen states, four communist and twelve noncommunist, were voted on in one package and admitted."¹ Since 1955 the membership has increased so that by 1960 there was a growing concern among the bi-polar powers for the third worlds vote.²

¹Norman L. Hill International Politics (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 367.

²Russia has declared at the U.N. its objective of putting the organization into a shape and in a direction which will better reflect the Communist view. The West - led by President Eisenhower and the United States - is fighting to retain the present character of the U.N., seeing the Russian proposal as a clear threat to the free world.

Whether or not Russia succeeds in this will depend to a big extent upon what the new nations do. Theirs is a growing and increasingly influential group, with one vote in the assembly on a par with the big powers.

The last previous time the General Assembly met there were 29 nations in the traditional neutralist grouping, 20 Asian

Of all the elements of change involved in the post-war period that contributed to the relaxation of tension there was none more important than the change in Soviet leadership. From the death of Stalin, until Sputnik on October 4, 1957, the Communist world moved with hesitation in international politics.¹ First, there was the game of internal power politics among Malenkov, Molotov, and others with Nikita Khrushchev. This competition ended in June, 1957, when the 'anti-Party group' of Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich and Shepilov were eliminated from

and nine African. Today there are 23 African members alone - extending the bloc's voting strength well into the 40s.

In one day at this assembly session the role was swelled by Cameroon (formerly the French Cameroons), Togo (formerly French Togoland), Malagasy (formerly French Madagascar), Somalia (formerly Italian and British Somaliland), the Congo (formerly the Belgian Congo), Dahomey (formerly French), Niger (formerly French), Republic of the Upper Volta (formerly French), Republic of the Ivory Coast (formerly French), Congo Republic (formerly French Equatorial Africa), Republic of Chad (formerly French), Central African Republic (formerly French) and Cyprus, formerly British.

Sixteen nations have come into being since last January; today there are 27 sovereign African states where 10 years ago there were only four. And the tide of freedom still is rolling. Nigeria, Africa's biggest territory with 35 million people in a continent of 240 million is the latest to join the ranks of new nations. "UN Grows--Which Direction?" The Minneapolis Star April 2, 1960, p. 1b.

¹A comparison of the Stalin period of foreign policy with Soviet action from 1953 to 1957 leaves the impression that the detente sought with the West as evidenced in the Austrian Treaty of 1955, the overtures to Yugoslavia, and the 'summit' Conference at Geneva were gestures resulting from expediency than a desire for peace. The same is true of the action by the Soviet Union under Khrushchev climaxing in the Cuban crisis of 1962.

See Coral Bell Negotiation from Strength (London: Chatto & Windus, 1962), Chapters I-III, and Cyril Black Communism and Revolution: The Strategic uses of Political Violence (New York: Princeton University Press, 1964).

Soviet leadership.¹ Second, the Sino-Soviet conflict began soon after Nikita Khrushchev's famous 'secret speech' in February, 1956, in which Stalin was erased from the history of international communism.²

October 4, 1957 brought forth a strange sound from space. The "bleep-bleep-bleep" of Sputnik settled for the time being the leadership in the missile competition. More important, Sputnik concluded the period of relaxation of tensions in the Cold War. The Soviet Union was now to undertake the diplomatic, political, and military offensive in competition with the United States. The methodology would be that of peaceful co-existence, diplomatic threats regarding the status of Berlin, supporting wars of liberation, and climaxing with the Cuban missile deployment in the fall of 1962. The significance of this period was outlined by Zbigniew Brzezinski, while he was a member of the Department of State's Policy Planning Council. Brzezinski stated:³

The first postwar era-1945-50- was essentially a polycentric era. The United States was largely disarmed. It had a nuclear monopoly, to be sure, but its nuclear power was essentially apocalyptic; it was not applicable - it was only

¹Some students have suggested that it wasn't so much the succession struggle as the necessity to undo the control of the State Security Service after Beria was removed in June, 1953 and later executed.

²Klaus Fehnert Peking and Moscow (New York: G. P. Putnam and Sons, 1963), p. 349. Chapter XIII titled "After Stalin's Second Death," is excellent on the effects of Khrushchev's speech.

³Zbigniew Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 3.

beginning to be involved in Europe, hardly involved in Asia - and there were still two major empires on the scene, the French and British. The Russians were asserting their regional control over Central Europe, but they weren't yet involved in Asia. Asia itself was in turmoil. This truly was the polycentric era.

It gave way to the era of bipolarity, of dichotomic confrontation, if you will, between two alliances - one led by the Soviet Union, one led by the United States. The Soviet Union during this time acquired nuclear capacity, and under Khrushchev it misjudged its nuclear power and attempted to pursue between 1958 and 1962 a policy designed to assert Soviet global supremacy. These years were dominated by the Soviet effort to throw the West out of Berlin, to put missiles in Cuba and to force a showdown. However, Khrushchev discovered in 1962 that the Soviet Union still had only apocalyptic power. Its nuclear power was not relevant when faced with U.S. power, which by then had become much more complex and more usable in a far greater diversity of situations.¹

What was true by 1962 as far as United States capabilities of flexible response in national security policy did not begin during the Eisenhower Administration. With Sputnik on October 4, 1957, the United States was placed in the position of re-evaluating its reliance upon a European orientated collective defense arrangement and massive retaliation. This was the case, since the United States was now in the position of catching up to Soviet technology. The United States Strategic Air Command had maintained the image of dominance and a viable deterrent system through the explosion of a Soviet atomic bomb (1949) and thermonuclear device (1953), but Sputnik changed everything. To the American people

¹Zbigniew Brzezinski, *ibid.*, p. 3.

and our Western Allies, SAC was not a reliable deterrent system now and American technology had to prove itself the leader in the world. In other words, the United States was on the defensive psychologically and in terms of being a reliable counter-force to Soviet threats.

Finally, Sputnik brought about a temporary lull in the Sino-Soviet conflict. At the conference of the Communist leaders in Moscow in November, 1957, with Mao Tse-tung in attendance, the Chinese were subdued. Harry Gelman noted: "Whereas in 1956 Peking had stressed autonomy and inveighed against "great power chauvinism," its representatives now urged unity and deference to the leading role of the Soviet Union."¹ Peking agreed with eleven other Communist nation-states to conduct an offensive strategy against the West through the third world of under-developed nation-states under the banner of peaceful coexistence. In the China Youth February 16, 1960, Sung Tu replied to questions of readers under the title "Answers to Readers' Queries on War and Peace."³ In this statement, the Chinese point out the respect they held for Soviet technology and its relationship to Soviet leadership in the international communist movement.

¹Harry Gelman, "The Sino-Soviet Conflict: A Survey," quoted in Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell's (ed.) The China Reader: Communist China (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 267.

²Dan N. Jacobs and Hans H. Baerwald (ed.) Chinese Communism (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 7.

³Sung Tu, "Answers to Readers' Queries on War and Peace," quoted in Dan N. Jacobs and Hans H. Baerwald, *ibid.*, pp. 158-167.

Sung Tu said:

Question: At the present time, the force of socialism is unprecedentedly strong and the international situation has eased to a certain extent. Could we say that the imperialists would find it still more difficult to start a world war?

Answer: Yes, it is unquestionably so. The current international situation is characterized by the ever more solidification and expansion of the socialist camp. In Asia, Africa, and Latin America the tide of nationalist, democratic movement is on the flow whereas the imperialist camp is splitting into many factions and facing myriads of difficulties. The East wind prevails over the West wind, and the forces of peace with the socialist camp as their nucleus have far surpassed the forces of war of the imperialists. As all the people yearn for peace, even the imperialists cannot but use peace as their signboard. We have every reason to believe that the imperialists would find it more and more difficult to start a world war.

Question: When you say that the forces of peace with the socialist camp as their nucleus have far surpassed the forces of war of the imperialists, do you chiefly mean that the Soviet Union is far superior to the United States in the technique of rockets and guided missiles?

Answer: When I say this I mean the comparison of total strength, militarily, economically, as well as politically. As to the decisive factor, I would rather say political force than military strength. For what decides a war is, after all, the will of the people.

Judged from the current situation, that the imperialists dare not start a war is of course true, to a very large extent, because the Soviet Union is overwhelmingly superior in the field of rockets and guided missiles.¹

While the international communist movement suffered through a period of internal conflict, until October 4, 1957, the United States proceeded to construct a state of normalcy by way of projecting an image of effective security through more collective

¹Sung Tu, *ibid.*, pp. 159-160.

security arrangements and reliance upon massive retaliation and brinkmanship.¹ This direction of United States national security policy was a reflection, and also a reaction to several realities.

First, the presidential campaign of the Republican Party had been orientated towards a political victory through a negation of the entire containment policy of the Truman Administration. While this general orientation in the 1952 campaign was an important factor in Eisenhower's victory, it also gave him a Congress dominated by the right-wing of the Republican Party from 1953 to 1955.² The Congress would have nothing to do with the implementation of the Acheson thesis contained in the National Security Council paper No. 68.^{3 4} Of course, it must be noted the Republican Congress wasn't completely at fault in this matter. President Eisenhower stressed the necessity of a balanced budget as primary to the national security of the United States in his appeals to the Congress. "Under the leadership of the President, Secretary Humphrey, Secretary of Defense Wilson,

¹Reference here is to Southeast Asian Treaty Organization, the United States-Korea Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States-China Mutual Defense Treaty, and the continued United States efforts to maintain a viable North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

²Samuel Eliot Morison, op. cit., p. 1077.

³Seymour Harris, "Military Security or a Balanced Budget," Current History XXXVIII (April, 1960), p. 201. This Current History issue titled "U.S. Military Policy and World Security," was utilized throughout this chapter.

⁴Refer to p. 80 of text for reference to National Security Council paper No. 68.

and Budget Director Dodge large cuts were made in the military budget in 1953 to 1955."^{1 2} "Even in 1959 when asked by a reporter at a press conference whether it was not true that the Administration "put a balanced budget ahead of national security," the President replied:"³

But I do not - I'm just tired even of talking about the idea of a balanced budget against national security - I don't see where this thing ever comes into it.

I say that a balanced budget in the long run is a vital part of national security.^{4 5}

The stress on economics in structuring the United States national security policy from 1953 to 1960 left the Secretary of State with few choices in contesting the Communists throughout the world. What the Eisenhower Administration did have as a

¹Seymour Harris, *ibid.*, p. 201.

²See appendix p. 258 for breakdown of military budget 1945 to 1960.

³Seymour Harris, *ibid.*

⁴*Ibid.*

⁵In the article by Seymour Harris, the author stated: "One of the most surprising aspects of the large cuts in 1953 was that the chiefs of staff were not even consulted. Defense Secretary Wilson on May 20, 1953, spoke as follows: When I came back (from a NATO Conference) I found some figures (on a proposed defense cut) I went over them quickly - after we got the things together we added them up. Much to (my) surprise . . . most of the cuts somehow seemed to show up in the Air Force Program." Seymour Harris, *ibid.*

James Shepley in an article "How Dulles Averted War," quoted the Secretary of State: "After taking a look at the defense budget," the Secretary announced, "in a speech January 14, 1954 that as the defense burden of guarding the free-world perimeter was so great, in future U.S. strategy would depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate instantly, by means and places of our own choosing." James Shepley, "How Dulles Averted War," Life XXXX January 16, 1956, p. 71.

national security policy was a nuclear threat tied to brinkmanship and collective security arrangements.¹

In an interview with James Shepley of Life magazine, Secretary of State Dulles was quoted as saying on January 16, 1956 that the nuclear threat of the United States "had been used to end the Korean War in July 1953, to underwrite the partition of Indo-China agreed upon at the 1954 Geneva Conference, and to prevent a Chinese Communist invasion of the offshore islands of Quemoy-Matsu in the winter of 1954-1955."² Dulles continued:

The ability to get to the verge without getting into the war is the necessary art. If you cannot master it, you inevitably get into war. If you try to run away from it, if you are scared to go to the brink, you are lost.³

With massive retaliation and brinkmanship, the Eisenhower Administration returned to the pre-Korean national security policy of the Truman Administration. It had taken the limited war in Korea to convince President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson of the necessity to have a flexible response. But to the Eisenhower Administration, the Korean War had been communicated to the American people as the wrong war.⁴ In an article titled "The Eisenhower Era in Asia," Alvin J. Contrell notes:

Any discussion of the administration's

¹John Foster Dulles, "Challenge and Response in United States Policy," Foreign Affairs XXXVI (October, 1957), p. 29.

²James Shepley, op. cit., p. 22.

³Ibid.

⁴Samuel Eliot Morison, op. cit., p. 1077.

military commitments in Asia should logically begin with the Korean War. Popular support for that war had dwindled as the conflict dragged on. Dwight D. Eisenhower had campaigned for the presidency while the United States was still heavily involved in Korea. He had made this commitment a major issue of his campaign, promised that if elected he 'would go to Korea.' In office, he exploited his overwhelming electoral victory to settle the increasingly unpopular conflict at the 38th parallel.¹

Second, while the Eisenhower Administration was limited in the scope of its national security policy by economics and 'that war,' international politics dictated a United States presence in Europe and Asia. The European role was accepted without hesitation in terms of containing Soviet imperialism, but Asia wasn't for there was the unacceptable fact of a colonial presence in Indo-China, and the unforgiveable experience of a lost China and limited war without victory.

Southeast Asia became a part of the American life out of a tragedy. The foundation for the tragedy began with the return of the French to Indo-China at the end of World War II. Tragedy continued to characterize Southeast Asia as the French were maintained militarily and economically by the United States, until the tragedy of Dien Bien Phu in May, 1954.² This United States support for French colonialism in Southeast Asia was described by

¹Alvin J. Contrell, "The Eisenhower Era in Asia," Current History CVII (August, 1969), p. 84.

²See appendix p. 258 for breakdown of United States military and economic assistance to France and the nation-states of Southeast Asia from 1950 to 1960.

Senator James William Fulbright as the "first mistake"¹ of United States foreign policy in Southeast Asia. Of this period in United States national security policy, William P. Bundy notes:²

When the French had returned, we stood aside. In the critical year 1946; and over the next 3 or 4 years, the French first made the Fontainebleau agreement and then broke it, so that major conflict started. It has often been argued by Shaplen among others, that we could have exerted greater pressure, perhaps even effective pressure, on the French to go through with the Fontainebleau agreement and to set Viet-Nam on the path to early independence. The failure to exert such pressure may thus be construed as a negative policy decision on our part.³

The former Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs continued:

I myself am skeptical that we could conceivably have affected the unfortunate course that the French followed in this period. If it is argued that our overwhelming Marshall Plan aid to France should have given us leverage, then it must be pointed out at the same time that the Marshall Plan became operative only early in 1948 and that by then the die was largely cast. Moreover, I doubt very much if the proud and bruised French nation would have responded even if we had tried to act to end the colonial era, as we did to a major extent with the Dutch in Indonesia.

In a very real sense, the tragedy of Viet-Nam derives from the fall of France in 1940 and all the understandable emotions aroused by that event among French leaders, including

¹Senator James William Fulbright quoted in Eric Sevareid, "Why Our Foreign Policy is Failing: An Exclusive Interview With Senator Fulbright," Look XXX (May 3, 1966), p. 25.

²William P. Bundy, "The Path To Viet-Nam," Department of State Publication 8295 (September, 1967), pp. 1-2.

³Reference is to Robert Shaplen's The Lost Revolution.

notably De Gaulle himself. Restored control in Indochina was a badge, however mistaken, for a France that meant to be once again a world power. Although it may be argued that we should at least have tried, I doubt if this deep French attitude could have been shaken by anything we did or said and least of all by anything said or done in connection with the wise and right policy of helping France to get back on her feet.¹

The issue in Indo-China during the post-war period presents another example of one of the major problems of United States foreign policy: the frequent conflict of national security between our major military alliance - the North Atlantic Treaty Organization - and our general policy in favor of independence and self-determination for colonial peoples. The conflict arose, primarily, because three of the major NATO powers - Britain, France, and Belgium - were also colonial powers.

This conflict becomes particularly embarrassing when the Soviet Union or the Peoples Republic of China take advantage of it and attempt either to weaken the alliance or to discredit the United States in the eyes of the newly emerging Asian and African nation-states, or to do both. And this they did from the time the French signed and broke the Fontainebleau agreement in 1946 to today.²

Today, as well as in 1960 or 1950, the United States foreign

¹William P. Bundy, op. cit., p. 2.

²Charles Bailey, "Abstaining on Colonialism Vote Hurt U.S. Prestige," The Minneapolis Star, (December 25, 1960), p. 2. United States refusal to support a United Nations resolution calling for 'immediate steps' toward complete independence for colonial areas continues to be a source of controversy here.

The state department has refused to confirm or deny

policy in Southeast Asia has been a tragedy. This tragedy began during the Truman Administration, when in the context of the Korean War, we saw the "French stand in Indochina as part of a global attempt to repel Communist military adventures."¹ While the Eisenhower Administration tried to disengage from Asia in 1953, France could not be sacrificed as a partner within NATO.

persistent reports that the United States abstained from voting on the resolution - which passed, 89 to 0 - because of a personal appeal from British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to President Eisenhower. State department spokesman Lincoln White would not go beyond saying that the reasons for the U.S. action were spelled out by our U.N. ambassador, James Wadsworth.

The only other nations that did not vote for the resolution were Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal, Australia, Spain, the Dominican Republic and South Africa.

Passage of the measure produced dramatic evidence of a split in the U.S. delegation. When the vote adopting the resolution was announced, Mrs. Zelma Watson George, lone Negro on the U.S. delegation, stood and applauded. 'I wanted to crawl under the table when we abstained, but I decided to just stand and applaud instead,' she said.

In addition, by its abstention the United States wound up on what in effect was the short end of an 89 to 9 vote. Russia, of course, was on the 'winning' side, the same side as the Afro-Asian nations.

This point is raised by some critics here who recall the argument, advanced during the election campaign debate on American 'prestige' that a good way to measure our prestige in the world was to look at the consistent majority we have received in U.N. voting.

"Before the resolution came up for a vote in its final form, the U.N. general assembly three times knocked down Soviet resolutions that would have so sharpened the wording of the resolution as to make it all but impossible for us to support it. By a 47 to 29 vote, with 22 abstentions, the assembly defeated a Soviet proposal to write a 1961 deadline for independence of all colonial and trust territories into the measure. Then, on a 35 to 32 vote, with 30 abstentions, the assembly knocked out another Soviet proposal calling for independence 'forthwith.' Finally, by a 43 to 25 vote, with 29 abstentions, the assembly killed the rest of the Soviet draft resolution, which generally followed the line of Premier Khrushchev's bitter U.N. speech on colonialism last September."

¹William P. Bundy, op. cit., p. 2.

In this context, the military and economic assistance program to the French as of 1950 was continued through the disaster of Dien Bien Phu in May, 1954.

Dien Bien Phu was a defeat for France in terms of ending forever a colonial presence in Asia. Dien Bien Phu was also the second tragic mistake in our Asian policy, because the United States not only lost France in terms of NATO, but the acceptability of the United States among the revolutionary forces of Southeast Asia. This conclusion seems valid for the following reasons:

First, Ho Chi Minh was reminded once again in the Indo-China War 1950-1954 that the United States could not accept change in the international political system, where such change affected the international politics between the European powers and the United States. In other words, the United States was a European orientated power, and viewed international politics from the perspective of maintaining a power ratio in the world through the interests of the North Atlantic Treaty partner being satisfied.

Second, the Southeast Asian Treaty organization was a reflection of the United States emphasis upon a status quo in which Europe has the predominate influence in maintaining Western political power in Asia.¹

On September 8, 1954, the United States joined with its NATO allies Great Britain and France in sponsoring a collective

¹See Chapter VII (Laos and Containment vs. Protracted War) for detailed discussion of SEATO as it applied to the Laotian crisis of 1959.

security arrangement to cover the loss of face suffered in the French defeat. Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines became Treaty partners reflecting their relationship to the NATO powers. Pakistan and Thailand added their names to the Treaty to give SEATO an Asian presence. But India and the other newly independent Asian nation-states stayed clear of what seemed to be a return to colonialism.

Third, the United States began to activate the containment policy in late 1954 that President Truman sponsored in March, 1947; namely, United States support for any people trying to resist "attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure."¹ President Eisenhower's decision to support Truman's containment thesis by backing non-Communist leaders like Diem of South Vietnam can be viewed in terms of a United States willingness to make the containment of Communism work in Asia, and at the same time allow the possibility of working with the revolutionary forces in Southeast Asia die. With President Eisenhower's letter to President Diem in October, 1954, the direction of United States national security policy in Asia was set: the United States was going to stop the further penetration of Communism into the underbelly of Asia. And the United States was going to do with or without the activation of the SEATO Treaty. This was a dramatic change from what the Eisenhower Administration accepted as the United States role in the international political system in January, 1953. From the fall of

¹President Harry S. Truman, op. cit.

1954 we were going forward to a full overt military presence in the fall of 1965 by looking backward to the stalemate in Korea and tragedy at Dien Bien Phu.

Southeast Asia was going to teach the United States a lesson in international politics although the French experience and the revolutionary forces for change after World War II should have yielded sufficient data to enable this great nation-state to be above and ahead of the lesson contained in the words of the late Secretary-General of the United Nations Dag Hammarskjold:

Between experiences and having experienced - the moment when the experience yields its last secrets. A moment we only discover is already past when cracks and stains appear, the gilding flakes off, and we wonder what it was that once so attracted us.¹

The Laotian crisis of 1959 is a case study of the application of containment to Southeast Asia. In the Laotian conflict, the cracks and strains in the nature of the United States commitment, SEATO, and the containment policy from 1953 to 1960 are well established. By 1959, when the United Nations substituted its presence for containment, we did wonder what it was that once so attracted us to Southeast Asia. But by 1960, Communism led by the Soviet Union was on the offensive, and preparing the way for the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. In this context, containment seemed necessary, so another six years of tragedy had to be witnessed in Southeast Asia, before it came time once again to reflect on what Hammarskjold had said in Markings.

¹Dag Hammarskjold, op. cit., p. 47.

PART III

THE KINGDOM OF LAOS AND POWER POLITICS

The crack in the jug? Then you
have let it get cold!¹

Part III brings together the constants and variables in the equation of reality discussed in Part I and II. This will be accomplished in a case study of the Kingdom of Laos from its initial independence in 1949 through the turmoil leading to a United Nations presence in Laos in the fall of 1959.

Among the more specific goals to be accomplished in Part III is a specific application of the equation of reality in an environment reflecting the variables present in international politics from 1953 through 1959. These variables were the competition between the advocates of containment and protracted conflict against a background of an international political system dominated by change; that is, the change in the importance of ideology, and the effects of nuclear weapons upon the methods utilized in international politics.

Chapter VI (The Laotian Political System) provides the necessary background of a "crack in the jug" of viable nation-states through which there was presented an environment conducive

¹Dag Hammarskjold, op. cit., p. 99.

to the application of political power by the contending alliance systems in the Cold War. This chapter will be primarily concerned with measuring the viability of Laos in accordance with the model of the political system. In the development of the equilibrium approach, this model of the political system provides the political analyst with a means to decide whether or not Laos or any other society is more than a cultural unit; namely, a political system where political demands are being satisfied to such an extent that there is going on political socialization, political recruitment, interest articulation, and interest aggregation.

In Chapter VII (Laos and Containment vs. Protracted War) the equation of reality is applied to the Laotian political system. In this case study of the Kingdom of Laos in the Cold War, the writer will attempt to illustrate by the application of the equilibrium approach the ineffectiveness of containment in competition with the methodology of protracted conflict. The conclusions of the writer will be developed in summary form in Chapter VIII : (A Political Power Vacuum.).

CHAPTER VI

THE LAOTIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

The water drops, the ants
eat the fish. The water
rises, the fish eat the
ants. So it is better to
love than to hate.¹

"The Kingdom of Laos: Land of Enchantment in Southeast Asia"² is the title of a brochure issued by the Royal Embassy of Laos in Washington, D.C. The brochure goes on to quote from the Lao national anthem:

Our Lao race had once known in Asia a great
reputation.

Lao people were united and loved each other
then.³

The Kingdom of Laos was once a united Kingdom and was called Lan Xang. But this was from the mid-fourteenth until the end of the seventeenth century, when the Lan Xang empire was left alone by her more aggressive neighbors, Thailand and Vietnam.

¹An ancient Laotian adage quoted in Thomas E. Ennis, "Laos: Pawn in Power Politics," Current History XXXVII (February, 1960), p. 74.

²"The Kingdom of Laos: Land of Enchantment in Southeast Asia," edited by the Royal Embassy of Laos, Washington, D.C., May, 1961.

³Ibid., p. 2.

Beginning in the eighteenth century Lan Xang was subjected to periodic invasions and external attempts at domination, particularly from Thailand and Vietnam. It is from the eighteenth century that Laos started to establish "a long tradition of fighting against the imperialists."¹

In the eighteenth century, however, Laos was divided into three rival kingdoms of Luang Prabang, Vientiane and Champasak. While there were efforts on the part of Luang Prabang to bring Vientiane away from Thailand's political dominance, and Champasak back from Vietnam's political control, these attempts by what remained of the Lan Xang empire were unsuccessful.² Until 1949, Laos was subjected to foreign dominance.

The Kingdom of Laos was granted independence by France within the French Union in 1949.³ This event brought to a climax the development of an independent Laos by a combination of French mistakes and Japanese decisions.

France entered Laos by way of a power struggle with Thailand from her political base in Vietnam. This conflict ended in 1893 when the Thai abandoned their claims to Laos due to a French naval threat from the Gulf of Siam.⁴ The Franco-Siamese Treaty

¹"La Revolution Lao A 20 Ans," edited by the Neo Lao Hak Sat Party (1965), p. 10. This periodical was received by the writer as an enclosure to a letter from Huot Sambata, Permanent Representative of Cambodia at the United Nations, dated June 15, 1966.

²Joel M. Halpern Government, Politics, and Social Structure in Laos (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 2.

³Ibid., p. 3.

⁴John F. Cady Southeast Asia: Its Historical Development (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), p. 426.

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opportunity as a nation-state obviously created a situation where France was discredited in terms of its future acceptability as a protector and as a competitor against an Asian power. At the same time that France was discredited, the political vacuum present in Laos allowed for the establishment of forces for change. In Laos, these revolutionary forces took the name of the Lao Issara movement.¹

The Lao Issara (Free Lao) movement was a reflection of the forces of change in the twentieth century. More specifically, the Lao Issara was created out of the inability to keep the "Land of Enchantment" free from foreign rule, and the mistakes made by the French during their indirect rule for some sixty or more years. Arthur J. Dommen writes:

It became clear to them (Prince Phetsarath, Souvanna Phouma, Souphanouvong) that the French presence in Laos was not necessarily a permanent one, and they acquired the hope, faint at first but encouraged by the democracies' enunciation of lofty aims, that after the way they might govern their country in independence instead of under foreign domination.

The prestige of France suffered a major blow when it proved incapable of protecting Laos from exploitation by Japan, an Asian power. In Indochina, as in Malaya, Indonesia, and Burma, the Japanese occupation broke the myth of the white man's invincibility.

French power had been shattered by the Japanese coup de main. The surrender of Japan and the ending of World War II less than six months later removed at one fell stroke the single remaining cohesive force in Laos and Vietnam.²

¹See p.118 for further discussion of the Lao Issara movement.

²Arthur J. Dommen, Conflict in Laos (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 21-22.

Arthur J. Dommen suggests the Lao Issara leaders saw in the Japanese presence during World War II "that the French presence in Laos was not necessarily a permanent one."¹ This is true! But more important, France had failed to create a viable political system in Laos under its protectorate over Luang Prabang and Vientiane, or colony in Champasak. The "live-and-let-live" policy of the French left Laos without political direction. A direction that had been missing since Thailand and Vietnam began the foreign aggression against the Xan Lang empire in the late seventeenth century.

In Laos, like Cambodia, the French followed the practice of dealing with change through "an indigenous elite, with the result that it was more gradual, more evenly balanced between the realms of the formal authoritative structure of government and the societies at large, and both government and people have been less intensely committed to achieving a modern way of life."² France was successful in Cambodia, where the population was united behind a common civilization, ethnic ties, and religion.³ The basic French mistake in Laos was the lack of interest beyond placating the indigenous elite of Laos.

In the brochure on Laos put out by the Royal Embassy of Laos, there is constant reference to the Lao when describing the

¹Arthur J. Dommen, *ibid.*, p. 21.

²Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

³Cambodia's population has been united throughout its history as the seat of the Khmer civilization, and strong center of Buddhism.

national flag, national anthem, royal emblem, and government.

Laos suffers from many problems related to being a viable nation-state, but most basic has been the lack of social, economic, and political integration of the ethnic groups in Laos.¹ In an article titled "Poverty-Pressed Laos Is Headache to West,"

Robert W. Smith wrote:

It is an unnatural political creation . . . Its population-smaller than Minnesota's please note - includes about 20 different and often incompatible ethnic elements. It is estimated that no more than half of Laos' people are ethnic Laotians, and these have demonstrated something far less than a live and let live attitude toward native minority groups.²

The United States Embassy in Laos agrees:³

The population, which lacks homogeneity being composed of many ethnic groups, is estimated to number about 2,500,000. . . About 49% are Lao. . . Mountain tribes, also of Thai stock, are found in upper Laos, while a number of other mountain tribes of Indonesian or proto-Malay background inhabit central Laos. The lack of common origin, customs, traditions and beliefs among the various minorities poses a serious problem to the political unification of the kingdom.⁴

¹Gerald Cannon Hickey and Adrienne Suddard, "Laos: Pawn in Power Politics," Current History XXXXI (December, 1961), p. 352.

²Robert W. Smith, "Poverty-Pressed Laos Is Headache to West," The Minneapolis Star, December 25, 1960, p. 2.

³United States Embassy in Laos, "Laos," p. 1. The writer received this statement about Laos upon request for information regarding United States policy in Laos.


⁴United States Embassy in Laos, "Laos," *ibid.*, p. 1.

This population problem is illustrated as follows:

Ethnic Group Breakdown

1. Map of Ethnic groups. See p. 112.¹

¹Map is the result of the writer's efforts.



2. Pattern of Ethnic Distribution:¹Characteristic: Vertical Pattern of Distribution

Topic	Lao	Kha	Tai	Meo	Man and others
% of Population	51%	27%	15%	2.5%	3.5%
Religion	Hinayana Buddhism with animism among rural Lao.	Animism Some Buddhism	Animism Taoism Confucian	Animism Buddhism	Animism
Language	Lao Tai-Branch of Siamese Tai French	Mon Khmer-in Burma and Cambod.	Tai-Br. of Sino-Tib.	Sino-Tib. Yunnan.	Sino-Tib. Yunnan.
Culture	India, Chinese, Siam French, American.	Chinese	Like Lao	Chinese	Chinese
Live	Lowlands. Cities-Main group along Mekong R.	Mountain slopes above Lao.	Live in Mt. Valley's-No. Laos.	Altitudes of not less 3,000	Live in valleys in interior.
Occupation	Government, Trade & Commerce, Wet Rice Farming.	Slash & Burn (Dry Rice) Farm	Wet Rice Farming	Slash & Burn (Dry Rice) Farm	Slash & Burn (Dry Rice) Farming.
Village Social Structure	Village 2-38 households; collective effort in rice prod. Headman	No Headman Nomadic. Extended Family Groups	Same as Lao	Same as Kha.	Same as Kha.
Relation with Lao		Lao consid. Kha slaves. Dislike Lao	Dislike Lao but integ.	Trade, but dislike.	Same as Meo.

Other Ethnic Groups of note: Chinese (30,000), Vietnamese (12,000), Pakistani and Indians (1,000), Europeans (6,000), Filipinos (500); Outside of Lao, these groups dominate the economic life of Laos - banking, rice milling, traders and business

¹"Pattern of Ethnic Distribution" is the result of the writer's efforts.

This lack of an integrated population and the dominance of the Lao elite has had grave repercussions for Laos in the Cold War. Gerald C. Hickey and Adrienne Suddard noted this in an article titled: "Laos: Pawn in Power Politics?" They said:

It is difficult to say how far Laos might have proceeded, given peace, toward the solution of such fundamental problems as the establishment of national political unity, the creation of conditions for national economic development, and the extension of educational opportunity. Within Lao society itself, the traditional feudal-like social organization has persisted until the present. As a result, the effective leadership in Laos has been in the hands of a dozen or so families who trace their ancestry to the ancient royal line of Luang Prabang. Even during the French rule this small Lao elite, though stripped of actual control, filled most important administrative positions. By contrast the majority of the Lao population is made up of villagers - illiterate, isolated, and many instances of politically apathetic.

This political, cultural and economic gap represents a fundamental weakness in the Laos polity. It unfortunately is compounded by another chasmal social situation - between the Lao and the ethnic minorities, most of whom are upland-dwelling people. The Lao all too often approach the minorities with an air of superiority and there have been recent attempts to "Laoize" highland people by bringing them down to the lowlands to learn the Lao way of life. These attitudes and actions have stirred resentment among the minority groups; as one disgruntled elderly Kha put it, 'All the Lao are bosses.' The Pathet Lao have not ignored the opportunity to exploit this situation, ominously, recent reports indicate that better than half the Pathet Lao troops are non-Lao.¹

In conclusion, the United States representatives noted that "Laos has never been a national entity in the real meaning of the

¹Gerald Cannon Hickey and Adrienne Suddard, op. cit., p. 352.

term, i.e., governed by a stable, effective authority. . . The gulf between the central government and the people in the countryside persists today."¹ The State Department's reference to "today" was 1962. In essence, what the State Department was referring to has been the historical "exploitation and oppression"² by the Lao of the other ethnic groups, who represent approximately half of Laos's population.³ If it had not been the Pathet Lao, then these groups would have found some other vehicle for the achievement of political integration into the Laotian political system.

Whether the time period referred to is 1893 or 1969, the Kingdom of Laos does not fulfill the requirements of a political system. That is, "that system of interactions to be found in all independent societies which performs the functions of integration and adaptation (both internally and vis-a-vis other societies) by means of the employment, or threat of employment, of more or less legitimate physical compulsion."⁴

What is missing in the Kingdom of Laos is "that system of interactions to be found in all independent societies,"⁵ and because these interactions are not present the government of

¹United States Embassy in Laos, "Laos," pp. 6-7.

²"La Revolution Lao A 20 Ans," op.cit., p. 9.

³See p. 130 for breakdown of Laotian ethnic groups.

⁴Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, op. cit.
p. 7.

⁵Gabriel A. Almond and James G. Coleman, ibid.

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*****
*      (Pre-Political Stage)
* Political Socialization → Recruitment → Articulation → Aggregation
*          ↔                ↔                ↔
*
* Input
* [The Political System]
* Output
*
* Rule Making → Rule Execution ← Rule Adjudication
*   ↔               ↔               ↔
*****

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In summary, the functions of the model as applied to the Laotian political system do not exist within the confines of the Laotian's identification with a government. Since independence in 1949, Laos is still at the stage of political development described as political socialization. A nationally identified

¹ Ibid.

2The model illustrates a political process (_____) that takes place in any nation-state. A political system not only includes a political process, but interactions (==) involving seven functions performed by an institutional fabric that may involve only a dictator and his army, a political party, or a confrontation of brothers and their movements as in Laos. Finally, a fully democratic political system would have a breakdown that included input from political pressure and interest groups (interest articulation) to a political party system (interest aggregation) to a legislative branch etc., on the output side.

political socialization process has suffered, because the Lao Issara movement and Communist Pathet Lao have been the only vehicles present in Laos for the formulation of attitudes, values, and beliefs of a political nature among all the ethnic groups. More specifically, political socialization has been inhibited due to the limitations of:

- a. Geography. Most of the terrain of Laos, particularly in the north, is covered by dense jungles and rugged mountains, many of which are over 9,000 feet high. The Mekong River running the length of Laos has not been a factor bringing about political integration, because of the many rapids present. The jungle, mountains, and rugged river have been very important in the lack of a developed internal transportation system. Without such an internal transportation system, communications are limited, and thus political socialization becomes a challenge from the start of the establishment of a nation-state.
- b. Climate. Laos has a climate that is monsoonally rather well defined. There are five months of very heavy rainfall from May to September, with the rains tapering off by November, when there are five months of drought. As of 1959, there existed no all-weather roads, nor does Laos have a railroad. This situation limits the development of government sponsored political socialization to approximately five months of the year.¹
- c. Population. The population lacks homogeneity in any sense. See p. 113 for breakdown of ethnic groups.
- d. Language. Lao is the official language, but

¹See p. 119 as far as the governments' interest in political socialization.

French is the language of the Lao elite both culturally and politically. The United States Embassy in Laos noted:

It is estimated that not over 15% of the population is literate. Furthermore, the numerous ethnic groups possess their own languages or dialects posing one of the principal impediments to the development of national unity.¹

See p. 113 for breakdown of the language factor among the Laotians.

- e. Religion. The predominant and state religion of the Kingdom is Buddhism of the southern of 'Hinayana' type. But Buddhism is in most cases overlayed with animist or spirit worship.² See p. 113 for breakdown of the religious factor.
- f. Economics. Less than 10% of the Laos population is not engaged in agriculture. The extended family unit reflects the common effort required in either wet or dry rice farming.³ This emphasis upon subsistence agriculture is of primary importance in influencing most of the Laotian population to live out their lives in accordance to the basic tenet of the Asian Outlook: the cyclical theory of time.⁴
- g. Government. The constitutional parliamentary monarchy in Laos is dedicated to maintaining the Lao in power. This can be seen in the wording of the Lao national anthem, and the experience of the non-Lao Pathet Lao's political party (Neo Lao Hak Sat) in the 1958 elections to the National Assembly.

¹United States Embassy in Laos, op. cit., p. 2.

²Hinayana (Theravada) Buddhism is the teacher sect of Buddhism, where the emphasis is upon an institutional worship of one teacher.

³Dry rice-slash and burn-is a form of rice production carried on in which land is cleared, rice raised for two or three years, and then when land becomes incapable of production, the dry rice farmers move on and repeat the same process.

⁴See Chapter II for a discussion of the Asian Outlook.

The Lao national anthem states: "All together they would know how to restore the past glory of the Lao blood and help each other in crucial days."¹

In the 1958 elections to the National Assembly, the Neo Lao Hak Sat won 40% of the vote, and gained control of the National Assembly. After this experience, the Government outlawed the Neo Lao Hak Sat, until the neutralization of Laos in 1962.²

Political socialization has been hindered by both physical and human barriers. If the Lao elite would show some form of symbolic or other means of accepting the fifty-one or so percent of the Laotian population, then Laos wouldn't suffer from such a bad press in the United States. Laos has been called "an unnatural political creation,"³ and an "implausible little kingdom"⁴ because the Lao elite have not seen fit to respond to

¹The Lao National Anthem Is:

Our Lao race had once known in Asia a great reputation.

Lao people were united and loved each other then.

Still nowadays they know how to love their race and their country and gather themselves behind their chiefs.

They have conserved the religion of their forefathers and they know how to defend the territory of their ancestors.

They will not allow any nation to create unrest or to occupy their soil.

Whoever wants to invade their country would find them determined to fight till death.

All together they would know how to restore the past glory of the Lao blood and help each other in crucial days.

From the Embassy of Laos, op. cit., p. 2.

²See p. 136 for further discussion of the 1958 National Assembly election.

³Robert W. Smith, op. cit.

⁴"Laos," Time June 26, 1964, p. 25.

the non-Communist ties of the other ethnic groups within the Pathet Lao. Political socialization's lack of development is the main reason for foreign journalists and scholars typing Laos as a "mess."¹

"Laos is a mess,"² but Laos can't escape the fact that it is a part of an area of the world where the Cold War has moved as of the development of nuclear weapons by the East and West. For the Communist nation-states, the fact that Laos has not become a viable political system makes this Kingdom an ideal arena to utilize protracted conflict. On the other hand, the West can maintain a presence in Indochina only if the Kingdom of Laos can move to bring about political socialization among all of its people, and from this pre-political stage develop an input and output institutional fabric to fulfill the seven functions of a model political system.

While the functions of a viable political system have not been fulfilled in the Kingdom of Laos by means of the initiative of Laos's elite, this does not mean that political socialization or any of the other functions in the model are not present. What is missing up to the present is an effective government over the entire population and country. Instead, Laos has been the scene of factional politics between the Pathet Lao led by Prince Souphanouvong, the neutralist forces led by his half-brother Prince Souvanna Phouma, and a more conservative element led by a half-

¹Robert W. Smith, *ibid.*

²*Ibid.*

brother Phetsarath and later Katay Don Sasorith. Within these groups, the processes of political integration are present. What degree of political integration Laos has achieved can not be concluded to the present, because Laos has been designated as a battleground for the Cold War. This has been Laos' state of affairs since it received an independent status in 1949.

CHAPTER VII

LAOS AND CONTAINMENT VS. PROTRACTED WAR

Only he who at every moment is all
he is capable of being can hope for
a furlough from the frontier before
he disappears into the darkness.
The sentinels of the Enemy do not sleep.¹

The Cold War came to the Kingdom of Laos in two different periods. From the Geneva Accord in July, 1954 through Sputnik in October, 1957 Laos wasn't directly involved in any significant overt manifestation of containment versus protracted war. In this period of the Cold War, the dominant theme was transition reflecting the effects of change in Soviet leadership, and the military capacities of East and West. Within this environment of dramatic change, transition resulted in a period of "relaxation of tension",² and the development of new strategy to contest the Cold War.

October 4, 1957 marks the end of transition and the resulting relaxation of tension. Sputnik illustrated to the world that the Soviet Union had a nuclear capability equal to, if not

¹Dag Hammarskjold, op. cit., p. 96.

²Premier N.A. Bulganin's statement of December 29, 1955 in which the Soviet Premier stated that 1955 "will go down in history as a definite turning in the relaxation of world tensions." Hollis W. Barber The United States in World Affairs 1955 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), p. 1.

better, than the United States. This technological achievement was a great psychological defeat for the United States, because the general consensus was that the United States technological supremacy didn't exist any more. In addition, there was generated by sputnik the belief among the members in NATO that the United States deterrent system wasn't to be relied upon now that the Soviet Union had apparently reached a parity in the nuclear capacity to make war. France, Great Britain, and West Germany began to think in terms of their own strategic and tactical defense systems. In other words, sputnik was an important factor in starting the process of reducing the effectiveness of the NATO alliance system that reached a climax during the Administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson.

Within the Communist sphere of nation-states, sputnik restored the prestige of the Soviet Union after the revolutions in Eastern Europe during 1956. The Soviet Union's position was strengthened and Nikita Khrushchev's political power was enhanced, especially vis-a-vis China's Mao Tse-tung. Sputnik, more than anything else, brought to a close the growing differences between Communist China and the Soviet Union. This situation lasted through 1959.¹

Finally, in this second period of the Cold War, the confrontation between the United States and Communist nation-states moved to the third world of underdeveloped nation-states.

¹In 1960, the Sino-Soviet conflict was renewed with a great deal of vigor as evidenced in the removal of Soviet economic assistance to Communist China in July and August.

From 1957 to today, the Kingdom of Laos has been a most obvious battlefield in the application of containment and the new Communist strategy: protracted war with a guerrilla methodology.¹ In Laos, a "war of national liberation"² has been conducted in its guerrilla form without let-up, except for the United Nations presence in Laos in the fall of 1959, and spring of 1960.³

¹Yes, the confrontation in Laos is present today. In fact, the conflict there might have moved to a new level as described in Time under an article titled: "The Chinese Highwaymen." The article stated: "In the shadowy war between Laotian government forces and Communist Pathet Lao guerrillas, China has so far stayed clear of the actual fighting. Peking, however, has launched a different sort of invasion against its diminutive neighbor to the south - one that may prove to be every bit as troublesome. Last year some 3,000 Chinese road builders moved across the border of China's Yunnan province into northern Laos. By the time the monsoon rains began last spring, the Chinese had pushed a gravel-topped all-weather road 55 miles south as far as Muong Sai. . . . Then last September, as the rains ended, the coolies moved on - this time southwestward through the Beng Valley toward the Mekong River and the border of Thailand. The presence of the Chinese highwaymen along with two infantry battalions equipped with anti-aircraft guns who came along to protect the work crews has alarmed Laotian Premier Prince Souvanna Phouma, who has always treated his northern neighbor cautiously. Fearful of a violent reaction from Peking should he protest, the Prince at first ignored the road builders, rationalizing a route as far as Muong Sai after all. But the new spur into the Beng Valley, he told Time, was 'another affair.' When the government asked the Chinese to explain, Peking flatly denied that it was involved in Laos at all. Another sort of reply came recently when Souvanna Phouma's commander in chief flew over the Beng Valley road in a Royal Laotian plane - and was chased away by a burst of Chinese anti-aircraft fire." "The Chinese Highwaymen," Time XCIIII (December 5, 1969), p. 63.

²Premier Nikita Khrushchev, quoted in Richard P. Stebbins United States in World Affairs 1956 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), p. 48.

³See pp. 47-52 text for discussion of protracted war with its guerrilla methodology.

Before the United Nations began to manifest an interest in Laos during the spring of 1959, the Kingdom was dealt with in two ways reflecting the two periods of the Cold War discussed earlier. From 1950 through 1956, Laos was like a pawn in a chess game, and then as the Cold War moved to a new level of tension in 1958, the Kingdom became a very important "domino" to the West led by the United States. This "pawn" and "domino" description of Laos's status reflect not only the over-all developments of the Cold War, but the specific development of SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) in September, 1954.

Prior to SEATO, Laos was a pawn in an undeclared covert war involving the French against a combination of Lao nationalists and the Communist Pathet Lao. In this period, the United States was aiding the French with the limited view that "the French stand in Indochina" was 'part of a global attempt to repel Communist military adventures."¹

With SEATO, Laos remained a "pawn" for the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese for a period of four years, until Ho Chi Minh established the Viet Minh throughout North Vietnam, and the Soviet and Chinese Communists moved from a possible open rupture to a temporary alliance in 1957. On the other hand, the United States confined its presence in Indochina to an assistance program, since there didn't seem to be a great deal of overt military activity going on in Indochina. Massive retaliation implemented by brinkmanship seemed sufficient to the Eisenhower Administration.

¹William P. Bundy, op. cit., p. 2.

The year 1958 ends for four years a basic relaxation of tension between East and West. In Laos, there was a series of direct confrontations between the Western orientated Royal Laotian government forces, and the Pathet Lao. In Laos, the trails leading southward into South Vietnam started to become famous in providing transportation routes to a new organization called the Viet Cong.¹ In Laos, the Communist became so strong that the Pathet Lao won a majority to the National Assembly. It is in the context of these circumstances that Laos became a "domino" instead of a "pawn" for the United States. It is in the time period, since 1957, that Laos has become a central battleground in the new Cold War tactics of the East and West.

Laos, as a central battleground in the Cold War, began in the seemingly unrelated event of the government of Laos at Luang Prabang declaring the Kingdom independent of the French in September, 1945. On October 12, 1945 the King was dethroned by a provisional government formed by the Lao Issara on the grounds of his basic loyalty to France.² "But the French imperialists were not ready to abandon their conquered lands."³ In May, 1946 the French troops reoccupied all of Laos driving the Lao Issara into exile in Thailand.⁴ By October, 1953 the French were finding

¹See p. 139 of text for a discussion of the role of Laos in the Communist effort in South Vietnam.

²Lao Issara (Free Lao) movement began in World War II under leadership of Prince Phetsarath, his half-brother Souvanna Phouma, and Phoui Sananikone. Lao Issara dissolved in 1949.

³"La Revolution Lao A 20 Ans," op. cit., p. 11.

⁴"Laos," United States Embassy in Laos op. cit., p. 4.

the guerrilla war against the revolutionary forces of Ho Chi Minh to be more than they could handle, so the French suggested to the Lao Issara the idea of an independent Laos within the French Union.¹ This did not satisfy Prince Phetsarath and the Lao Issara. They wanted independence. This was achieved at the climatic battle at Dien Bien Phu in May, 1954. Fred Greene notes:

Indochina, a land that bears the name of two great Asian states, was a center of violence for almost a decade after 1945. Here intense nationalism came under communist domination as the French imperial rulers waged a desperate war to retain their power.²

With the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, the end was at hand for a French presence in Southeast Asia. This was important. But even more significant, the United States found itself in 1954 tied to the forces of reaction and the status quo. In the relationship of the United States to the French cause, the possibility was remote for the United States to break the thread binding the nationalism displayed by the Lao Issara to the Communist Pathet Lao and Viet Minh. This togetherness was displayed at Dien Bien Phu. In a periodical titled "La Revolution Lao A 20 Ans," the Pathet Lao political party (Neo Lao Hak Sat) noted the relationship of communism to nationalism in describing the role of Laos in the battle of Dien Bien Phu.³ The Neo Lao Hak Sat stated:

¹Ibid.

²Fred Greene, op. cit., p. 441.

³See p. 126 of text regarding the National Assembly election of 1958 in which the Pathet Lao party (Neo Lao Hak Sat) won the majority of seats.

During the battle of Dien Bien Phu, Laos was an important base for supply and regroupment of the colonial forces. But many of the colonial reinforcements, were intercepted by the armies of the Pathet Lao and their guerrillas.¹

Dien Bien Phu brought to an end the first Indochina War. Within the context of the French defeat, hostilities ended in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. On July 21, 1954, a final declaration was issued at the Geneva Conference by which Indochina was formally removed from the Cold War. According to the Declaration, no more foreign aid or foreign troops were to enter Indochina.² Finally, the Geneva Accord established the independence of the Indochinese nation-states. The Accord stated:

In their relations with Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, each member of the Geneva Conference undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the independence, the unity and the territorial integrity of the above-mentioned States, and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs.³

Because France was militarily and politically defeated in Indochina, the United States played at most a backstage role at Geneva. William P. Bundy notes:

We maintained the possibility of military intervention, which many observers at the time believe played a crucial part in inducing the Soviets and the Communist Chinese alike to urge Hanoi to settle for a temporary division of Vietnam at the 17th parallel and for an independent Cambodia and Laos. And we began to lay the groundwork for SEATO, as part

¹"La Revolution Lao A 20 Ans," op. cit., p. 12.

²Arthur J. Dommen, op. cit., p. 308.

³Ibid.

of the effort to show strength and to convince Communist China that it would not have a free hand in Southeast Asia.

Yet we were unwilling to participate fully in the framing in the Geneva accords. . . . because our policymakers did not wish to associate themselves in any way with a loss of territory to Communist control. So the Geneva accords were framed largely between Hanoi, Communist China, and the Soviet Union on the one side and the French, who were under the urgent pressure of their domestic politics, on the other. In the end we confined ourselves to saying two things,

(a) That we would view any aggression in violation of the accords with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security.

(b) That we took the same position on the reunification of Vietnam that we took in other "nations now divided against their will" - meaning, then and now, Germany and Korea - and that we would continue to seek unity through free elections supervised by the United Nations. In effect, we thus interpreted the election provision as providing for a free determination by the people of Vietnam as to whether they wished reunification and in that sense endorsed it consistent with the similar positions we had taken in Germany and Korea.¹

Former Ambassador to Thailand, Edwin P. Stanton, finds the granting of independence to Laos and the other Indochina nation-states in 1954 as coming at "the eleventh hour,"² because Ho Chi Minh was well-established throughout the area. This was most certainly true in Laos, especially when the French troops departed in November, 1954.

Within Laos itself, there was and still is the Lao elite

¹William P. Bundy, op. cit., pp. 2-3.

²Edwin F. Stanton Brief Authority (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), p. 236.

which was nurtured under French rule and without strong political, cultural, and economic ties with the majority of peasant Lao and the other ethnic groups.¹ A second internal problem in Laos was the chasmal social situation of Lao against the other minority groups as illustrated by the fact that over "half of the Pathet Lao troops are non-Lao."² A third factor in 1954 and today was the presence of corruption among the ruling elite as best evidenced in the use of United States commodity imports.³

Of all the divisive factors in Laos of immediate importance in the period following the Geneva Accord, the most important in creating a vacuum for stable progress was of course the chaotic haste with which the French Army departed. What they left to defend the Kingdom against the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese was but a native militia.⁴ This resemblance of an Army was trained by the few French military personnel allowed under the Geneva agreement with United States "direct"⁵ financial assistance under

¹See p. 114 of text.

²Gerald C. Hickey and Adrienne Suddard, op. cit., p. 351.

³See former employee of International Cooperation Administration Haynes Miller's account "A Bulwark Built on Sand," The Reporter XVIV (November 13, 1958), pp. 11-16.

⁴Bernard B. Fall, "Reappraisal in Laos," Current History II (January, 1962), p. 9.

⁵Ibid.

the "able" direction of Howell and Company.^{1 2}

With the loss of French leadership in the Laotian Army, the weaknesses of the Geneva Agreement of July 21, 1954 became more apparent. In the rosy terms of this agreement signed by the Commander in Chief of the French Union troops and his peer in the Pathet Lao and Republic of North Vietnam's People Army, the following provisions pertain to Laos:³

1. The Pathet Lao Army was to become a part of the Royal Laotian Army.
2. All Vietminh military forces were to withdraw from Laos in one hundred and twenty days.
3. The provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly were to be returned to the political control of the Royal Laotian government.

¹American aid to Laos was guided by a Washington firm Howell and Co., which advised the State Department that the country could absorb a maximum of 24 million dollars a year. Since January 1, 1955 this aid had totaled 225 million through 1960. Five-sixths of this total had gone to equipping, training, and supporting the 25,000 man Laotian Army. For example, of the \$34.2 million spent by the United States in 1960, only \$590,750 went to agriculture. In the years 1959 and 1960, the cost to the United States was \$2,200,000 per month. As of 1959 there were 71 military aids to supervise the use of weapons and logistical support. Also present were 100 technicians to instruct in the use and maintenance of weapons and equipment. Thomas E. Ennis, "Operation Survival in Laos," Current History XXXX (March, 1961), p. 153.

²French aid since the Geneva agreement consisted of a force of 1500 officers and non-commissioned officers, plus a garrison of 3500 men at the Seno airport. With the Algerian war, France reduced the force at Seno to a property guard and withdrew all officers from the training command. This left a total force of 600 French military personnel in Laos. French financial aid, through the year 1959, amounted to approximately eight million dollars. Thomas E. Ennis, *ibid*.

³"Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Laos," Documents of American Foreign Relations 1954 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955), pp. 303, 307.

4. With the exception of 1500 officers and non-commissioned officers to train the Royal Army and a contingent of 3500 at two posts, all other French troops were to be withdrawn.
5. No nation, under the Agreement, was to introduce any new military staffs, arms, troops or munitions.
6. Until a political settlement could be completed between the Pathet Lao leaders and their peers in the Royal government at Vientiane, the Pathet Lao forces were to be withdrawn to Phong Saly and Sam Neua.
7. An interim commission (Canada, India, Poland) under the leadership of India was to control and supervise the implementation of this agreement.

In general, the motivation for the Agreement and the International Control Commission was the wish of the big powers to remove the bi-polar conflict from this region. The United States was especially enthusiastic, because Washington saw in the vacuum created by the French withdrawal an impossible environment upon which to construct a viable economic and political structure in Indochina. Sisouk Na Champassak took a different view of the Agreement. It was:

USSR and Great Britain saw in the Control Commission a means of finally having their say in the affairs of Indochina, from which they had always been isolated but which were beginning to interest them more and more. China and the DRV on one side, and France and the United States on the other, all tended to consider Indochina as a safe place in which to exist their influence.¹

Whatever view is correct regarding the interests of the bi-polar powers in Indochina, the United States took the initiative

¹Sisouk Na Champassak Storm Over Laos (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 35.

in filling the vacuum created by the departure of the French forces. Reference has already been made to the United States military and economic assistance program to Laos. In addition, there was the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization.¹

Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs William P. Bundy noted that SEATO was "part of the effort to show strength and to convince Communist China that it would not have a free hand in Southeast Asia."² In other words, SEATO assumed at least the aggressive tendencies of Communist China in an environment that had experienced in modern times only the fact of a colonial presence by France. China may have been an aggressor in the recent Korean War, but that is even open to dispute today given the proximity of Korea to the heartland of China's industrial base in Manchuria. What SEATO did represent in the minds of the Southeast Asian is the maintenance of a colonial domination. John F. Cady suggests: the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization "did not fully meet the requirements" of relieving the Asian from the thought "of revival of imperialist control."³ Important here is the fact that SEATO did not provide an answer to the basic question confronting the leaders of Southeast Asia as of 1954; namely, what is the political future of Southeast Asia?

¹The Southeast Asian Treaty was signed on September 8, 1954 at Manila by the United States, Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan. It became fully operative in February, 1955.

²William P. Bundy, op. cit., p. 2.

³John F. Cady, op. cit., p. 602.

John F. Cady summarizes very well the values uppermost in importance to the leaders like Phetsarath of the Lao Issara, and why the United States had an emerging problem in 1954¹ that has vexed our presence there even today. Cady states,¹

Whether democratic government can take root and survive in Southeast Asia is a moot question. A helpful carry-over from the colonial period was the idea that progress toward self-government and independence was to be measured in terms of increased popular participation and representation in elective assemblies. But nationalism, once in control, was more likely to express itself in traditional than in alien patterns of government. Because no popular demand for democratic liberties existed. . . constitutions and elections provided little more than an empty facade, a pretense for modernization.

In many areas where the traditional basis of rule by hereditary chiefs and divine rulers had worn thin, single-party rule and dictatorship became likely alternatives to a democracy which commanded little popular confidence. In situations where the Western elite were largely absorbed into the bureaucracy, the gap between the governors and the governed was likely to remain unbridged. Until a politically active middle class should appear, possessed of articulate ideas as to what could and ought to be done, the cause of political liberty and freedom of speech, press, and religion would hardly survive to constitute an urgent objective of political aspirations.

Faced with the postwar threat of Communist intrusion into Southeast Asia, Western governments tended to follow the negative tactics of supporting the traditionalist enemies of the Communist system. Such a policy often ignored the need for constructive adjustments between the old order and the new through the selective appropriation of useful elements of Western culture. If such essential adjustments were blocked by traditionalist barriers, the proponents of a radical version of modernization would inevitably undertake to sweep such hindrances aside.

¹Ibid., p. 601.

Marxism commended itself to many progressively minded persons in Southeast Asia as an ultramodern short cut to industrialization. The centuries-old liberal British, American, and French systems seemed old-fashioned by comparison. The U.S.S.R. accomplished an impressive economic transformation within a generation; democracy and private capitalism, by contrast, seemed to lack positive direction and also left traditionalism undisturbed. The more rapid Communist techniques of economic and political regimentation could presumably avoid the compromises inherent in the more gradual processes of democratic adjustment.¹

An effective regional pattern of integration covering both economic and security needs might conceivably provide a framework for utilizing much-needed outside assistance free of the dangers of revival of imperialist control. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), which was sponsored by Western governments and included only two countries of Southeast Asia, did not fully meet this requirement.²

While the SEATO alliance system did not generate any stability in Indochina, the International Control Commission established by the Geneva Agreement did establish a presence to attempt implementation of the Geneva Accord. This presence began in August, 1954.

Through the International Control Commission the Royal Laotian government concluded an agreement with the Pathet Lao, on August 10, 1956, whereby both agreed to strive for a lasting peace built on the foundations of a foreign policy of neutrality for Laos.³ The end result of these negotiations was the formation of

¹John F. Cady, *ibid.*, p. 601.

²John F. Cady, *ibid.*, p. 602.

³Frank M. LeBar and Adrienne Suddard, Laos (New Haven, Connecticut: Hraf Press, 1960), p. 140.

a coalition government called the National Union in which the Pathet Lao would participate under the title of the National Political Front (Neo Lao Hak Sat). The Pathet Lao leader, Prince Souphanouvong, was to be the Minister of Finance and Planning in the coalition government.¹

On November 2, 1957 Prince Souphanouvong assumed the position of Minister of Finance and Planning in the coalition government. By November 18, 1957 the two Pathet Lao held provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua were symbolically returned to the central government. According to Laos' United Nations' representative Khamphon Panya:

The Vietiane Agreements unquestionably brought about a relaxation of tension. The ICC, a body established by the Geneva Conference of 1954, saw that it no longer served any purpose and considering its task had been completed left Laos July 19, 1958.²

Before the International Control Commission left Laos, the coalition government was falling apart. In the May, 1958 election to seat twenty-one legislators in the National Assembly, the Pathet Lao (Neo Lao Hak Sat) won thirteen seats.^{3 4}

Some of the Communist success can be attributed to the usual tactics of terror etc., but there was much more. There is first

¹Ibid., p. 147.

²Khamphon Panya, "General Debate," The United Nations Review VI (November, 1959), p. 63.

³Joel M. Halpern, op. cit., p. 13.

⁴Neo Lao Hak Sat's margin was 280,000 to 712,000 for the non-Communist parties.

of all the background of the Communist identification with the nationalistic endeavors of the Lao Issara. Also important was the identification of the Pathet Lao with the non-Lao ethnic groups, which made up approximately half of the population. Finally, there was the blatant fact of "corruption present among the pro-Western candidates."¹

In order to offset the Communist expansion in the National Assembly, the three government factions formed the Laotian People's Rally (RPL), under the leadership of Prince Souvanna Phouma.^{2 3} The RPL was a step in the direction for a unified effort against the Pathet Lao, but to the Army this government coalition did not contain a sufficient amount of aggressiveness. In the context of this type of thinking there was formed the

¹Haynes Miller, "A Bulwark Built on Sand," op. cit., p. 11.

Haynes Miller's account of corruption was accepted by Prince Sisouk Na Champassak: "Corruption and extortion in the customs, banking, foreign trade, police, and other administrative departments. Black market deals in American aid dollars reached such proportions that the Pathet Lao needed no propaganda to turn the rural population against the townspeople. The Chinese of Hongkong and Bangkok and a few Lao officials profited from the American aid, while the poor Lao for whom it was intended stood by helplessly." Sisouk Na Champassak, op. cit., p. 64.

In an interview given to the Lao Presse in 1957, Viceory Tiao Phetsarath stated: "Our greatest danger of Communist subversion arises from the bad use of foreign aid we receive. . . . It enriches a minority outrageously while the mass of the population remains as poor as ever." Haynes Miller, Ibid.

²Frank M. LeBar and Adrienne Suddard, op. cit., pp. 110-111.

³The three government factions included Foreign Minister Phoui Sanaikone's Independents, Minister of Interior Katay Don Sasorith's Nationalists, and the followers of Souvanna Phouma.

Committee for the Defense of the National Interest.¹ Here again the basic ingredient for dissension from backing the Lao elite was the "corruption and glaring mistakes of the government, and the sudden fortunes dubiously acquired by particular ministers and high officials."² The Committee for the Defense of the National Interest saw that as long as certain families:

continued to divide titles and prerogatives among themselves, as long as ministerial posts either cloaked the most disgraceful trafficking or were traded about like currency, as long as the wealthy in Vientiane flaunted their luxuries before the eyes of an astounded populace, any anti-communist campaign would be pointless. These public scandals were better Communist propaganda than tons of newspapers and pamphlets.³

What we then have in the CDNI is not a break with the RPL political program of taking the initiative against the Communists, but rather a group of "young Turks" desiring to disassociate themselves with the past. As evidence of this disassociation, the CDNI felt it necessary to break off their ties with those who had been directly spoiled by two generations of French rule. The common purpose of the CDNI was:

to bring a fresh look to a nation governed from its inception by remnants of the defunct colonial administration. Their love of comfort, their taste for profit, and their indifference had degraded this young democracy until it was virtually meaningless. One of the first resolutions adopted by the CDNI declared

¹Among the members of the CDNI were not only Army officers, but also diplomats like Khamphan Panya and Champassak.

²Sisouk Na Champassak, op. cit., p. 63.

³Ibid.

war on corruption through a general government cleanup and vowed a fight against Communist subversion within the Kingdom.¹

In August, 1958 the CDNI leader Phoui Sananikone assumed the Prime Ministry replacing Souvanna Phouma. As a measure of its pro-American status, diplomatic relations were established with the Nationalist Chinese government on Taiwan, and all Communist sympathizers and fellow travelers were dismissed from the Government and replaced by anti-neutralists.²

Communist reaction to the CDNI government in Vientiane took the form of a Viet Minh invasion of southern Laos in January, 1959, while the President of North Vietnam Ho Chi Minh was vacationing in Moscow and Peking.³ This invasion, Prime Minister Phoui Sananikone announced February 11, 1959, called for action by the world community in the form of United Nation's assistance. On March 9, 1959 Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold visited Laos. At this time he did not find any need for further United Nation's concern, since the Government was in control and there was no obvious breach of the Geneva Accord of 1954.

The swiftness of the Secretary-General's visit was matched only by the speed with which the Communists restored fighting. Basic to the renewed fighting on the Plaine de Jarres was the

¹Sisouk Na Champassak, *ibid.*

²Frank M. LeBar and Adrienne Suddard, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

³"The Ordeal of Laos," The United States in World Affairs 1959, ed. Richard P. Stebbins (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 308.

attempted demobilization of the Pathet Lao forces. Since the 1957 ICC agreement for a coalition government, all the Pathet Lao forces had been demobilized, except two battalions totaling fifteen hundred troops.¹

In order to integrate these two battalions of Pathet Lao, the Royal Laotian government promoted one of the Pathet Lao officers, Singkapo. But Singkapo did not agree to accept a commission as colonel in the Royal Army without the other Pathet Lao officers being given the same treatment. During the negotiations to integrate the Pathet Lao forces, a battalion of Pathet Lao under Cham Nien left camp on May 19, 1959.² According to the Royal Laotian delegate to the United Nations, Khamphan Panya, the stable situation in Laos created by the 1957 ICC agreement ended in May, 1959 "when the second Pathet Lao battalion, instead of becoming integrated into the national army as agreed, deliberately chose the cause of rebellion and flight."³

The flight of the Pathet Lao battalion under the command of Cham Nien became a cancer to Laos during the summer of 1959.⁴

¹Sisouk Na Champassak, op. cit., p. 79.

²Ibid., p. 80.

³Khamphan Panya, op. cit., p. 63.

⁴Of note is the fact that the Pathet Lao leader, Souphanouvong, was under house confinement in Vientiane, since May 15th.

Souphanouvong played an interesting side role during his house confinement. Sisouk Na Champassak states that the confined Pathet Lao leader requested permission to "personally intercede with the rebels to induce them to come back." This offer was turned down by Nam Chien. Champassak believes Souphanouvong had lost control of the Pathet Lao to Nam Chien. See Sisouk Na Champassak, op. cit., p. 84.

With reinforcements from North Vietnam, Cham Nien recaptured 1,000 square miles of Sam Neua province by August 1, 1959.¹ On August 4, 1959 the Government appealed to the United Nations. The Laotian government believed the very survival of the nation-state was involved. In other words, Laos was not "capable of being,"² because the "sentinels of the Enemy" in 1959 were 'not sleeping.'³

¹Thomas E. Ennis, op. cit., p. 72.

²Dag Hammarskjold, op. cit., p. 96.

³Ibid.

CHAPTER VIII

A POLITICAL POWER VACUUM

The crack in the jug?
Then you have let it get cold!¹

A political power vacuum existed in the Kingdom of Laos by the fall of 1959. This power vacuum was due to several inter-related internal factors and the containment policy of the United States. The internal factors had to do with the inability of the Lao elite to broaden their political base due to an established Pathet Lao among the non-Lao ethnic groups, and the liabilities to political socialization emanating from geography and ethnic conflicts.

The containment policy of the United States added to the dimensions of the political power vacuum by applying to the Kingdom of Laos certain assumptions and methodology that did not pertain to the realities of international politics in the 1950's or to Laos. In other words, the containment policy of the United States created an arbitrary stratification of political power that did not reflect the constants and variables present in Laos from 1950 through 1959. One evidence of this arbitrary stratification of political power was the backing of a pro-western

¹Dag Hammarskjold, op. cit., p. 98.

government in June, 1958 that did not have a national political base as evidenced in the National Assembly election in May, 1958.

Containment is a methodology for the conduct of foreign policy. It is a methodology reflecting a view of Communism, which became outdated with the advent of the Communist technique of peaceful co-existence, and the bi-polar nuclear balance of terror. For the Eisenhower Administration, containment meant the continuation of the assumption that there was required a constant force in order to hold back the assumed aggression of the Soviet Union, Communist China, or the Pathet Lao. John Foster Dulles suggested this orientation to the direction of containment, when he stated the following summary of the Cold War before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on January 29, 1959. The Secretary of State said;

But what hasn't changed is the policy of international communism.

.....

International Communism believes that there will not be peace or maximum productivity unless human beings are forced into a pattern of conformity - conformity of action, thinking, and belief - established by the party. It believes that to achieve this result on a worldwide basis is so essential to peace and well-being that any means are justified to produce this end, whether those means be propaganda, violent subversion, frauds, breaches of international agreements, or the threat of war itself. Therein lies the cold war.¹

According to the Secretary of State, the Cold War was due to the international nature of the Communist movement. Remember,

¹Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. A statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee dated January 28, 1959 published by the Public Services Division, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, No. 78, Washington, D.C. 1960, p. 1.

this was stated in 1959 after a series of events starting with Tito's break in 1948 and climaxing with Stalin's political death in February, 1956. What Dulles believed two months before his death in March, 1959 was shared by his President. "We have no confidence in any treaty to which Communists are a party"¹ concluded President Eisenhower in the State of the Union message delivered January 9, 1959.

Eisenhower agreed with his Secretary of State that the Communist threat was such a force that he continued the advocacy of massive retaliation by advocating the "maintenance of forces of great power".² For the United States, massive retaliation as implemented through brinkmanship was acceptable, because "we, on our part, know that we seek only a just peace for all, with aggressive designs against no one."³

What President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles suggested regarding Communism was certainly true with regard to the persistence of Communist subversion, Communist movements, and the presence of Communist nation-states. But what was open to question then and even today has to do with the results of conducting foreign policy on the basis of a purely anti-Communist outlook, which is implemented through a methodology like containment that

¹President Dwight David Eisenhower, "The State of the Union Message January 9, 1959," published by the Department of State, Department of State Publication 6763, Series 135, January, 1959, p. 3.

²Ibid., p. 4.

³Ibid., p. 2.

is reactive in nature.

In 1959 and today, the United States assumes for itself the posture of standing for what is good, while the Communists are bad, in an international political system that is still made up of nation-states with varying national interests that need satisfying.¹ This posture interjected into the containment policy an inflexible attitude toward all Communist nation-states without any consideration of objective evidence that would lead to such a conclusion as Communist nation-states have a diversity of national interests that demand satisfaction. Arthur J. Dommen excused the Eisenhower Administration for its position regarding Communism with a historical truth that was relevant in 1953, before Stalin's death. Dommen states:

The Administration of which Dulles was a key figure had been voted into office barely two years before (speaking in 1955) on a foreign-policy platform that condemned the Democratic party for its handling of the China issue - specifically accusing it of having 'denied the military aid that had been authorized by Congress and which was crucially needed if China were to be saved.'

Now, if the Administration had denied military aid to the French in Indochina, it would stand accused of letting another Asian country fall, by default, to the Communists. Moreover, there was McCarthyism, with its imputations of 'softness' on the issue of the Communist threat to American security. Its favorite target was, of course, the State Department. These imputations served to reduce further the already narrow field of maneuver on which the state department normally operates in dealing with foreign countries.²

¹Reference to "today" might have stopped as of President Johnson's March 31, 1968 address to the nation.

²Arthur J. Dommen, op. cit., p. 46.

While the Eisenhower Administration could be excused for utilizing a hard line against Communism in the political campaign of 1952, the year 1953 brought about certain dramatic changes in international politics that should have brought about an investigation of the assumption with which the United States conducted its foreign policy. In terms of change in 1953, reference has to be made once again to Stalin's death and the East German revolution to dramatize the fact of change within the Communist movement. These events coupled to the fact that the Korean War was settled by the Eisenhower Administration should have left the Administration with sufficient flexibility to adjust its policy to the realities of international politics in the 1950's. This wasn't done!

Thus, the containment policy of the Eisenhower Administration was executed at a time, when the forces of change dominated the international political system. Among these forces of change present at the time Eisenhower assumed the Presidency were the emergence of a third world of underdeveloped nation-states, the clear presence of a Soviet nuclear capacity, and the fraction-alization of the Communist movement. Reference has already been made to the break-up of the Communist world system. More immediate to the situation under discussion were the changes with regard to the third world and nuclear weapons.

Massive retaliation implemented through brinkmanship left the Eisenhower Administration with only two alternatives in the

¹Arthur J. Dommen, op. cit., p. 46.

application of direct force by the United States: either totally remove the enemy or do nothing. Bernard Brodie suggests:

One notices . . . that this speech on massive retaliation, presented only a half-year after the armistice which ended the Korean War, was a rejection, on tactical and strategic grounds, of our entire strategy in that war. The war had been limited with respect to weapons and geography and, as a limited war, it had to be waged at a place determined by the enemy and peripheral to the sources of his power.¹

In other words, Secretary Dulles was suggesting that from January 12, 1954 forward, if the enemy - the Chinese Communists for example - attacked some point on the periphery of Asia, the United States might respond not by meeting them on a battlefield favoring them but, instead, by invoking its massive retaliatory power. Brodie concluded:

Thus the Secretary fairly explicitly condemned the scope and methods of Korea as intolerably wasteful and unsatisfactory . . . In fact, the speech makes no sense, except as a rejection of Korea, because otherwise its timing - four years after the first Soviet Union atomic bomb and some months after the Soviet Union had already exploded a thermonuclear weapon - is a little bizarre.²

Bernard Brodie's suggestion that the Administration was limiting itself by negating the limited war thesis of Korea is most evident in Dulles's interpretation of the United States role in SEATO. Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the Secretary of State stated:

¹ Bernard Brodie Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 250.

² Ibid., p. 251.

It is not the policy of the United States to attempt to deter attack in this area by building up a local force capable itself of defense against an all-out attack by the Communists, if it should occur. We do not expect to duplicate in this area the pattern of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its significant standing forces. That would require a diversion and commitment of strength which we do not think is either practical or desirable or necessary from the standpoint of the United States.

We believe that our posture in that area should be one of having mobile striking power, and the ability to use that against the sources of aggression if it occurs. We believe that is more effective than if we tried to pin down American forces at the many points around the circumference of the Communist world in that area.

It may be that other countries of the area will want to dedicate particular forces for the protection of the area under this treaty. But we made clear at Manila that it was not the intention of the United States to build up a large local force including, for example, United States ground troops for that area, but that we rely upon the deterrent power of our mobile striking force.¹

Containment implemented by means of a readiness to threaten with nuclear warfare created a most obvious power vacuum for the Eisenhower Administration's foreign policy. Hiroshima and Nagasaki introduced nuclear weapons to man, and the general reaction of most people to their use in 1945 was that atomic weapons should never be used again. The restraint reflected in the attitude of most people towards these weapons introduced a new factor into international politics that was not heeded by the Eisenhower

¹Secretary of State John Foster Dulles quoted in the "Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations on Executive K," U.S. Senate, 83rd Congress, 2d session (Washington: Government Printing Press, 1954), p. 13.

Administration; that is, military might has a scale of limitation.

Charles E. Merriam noted this limitation, when he said,¹

It may also prove true that the profession of general interest and responsibility is merely a verbalism to cover selfish exploitation. In any case, deference to the "common interest" is a tribute to the basis of authority. It will be paid by the tyrant as well as by the demagogue, by the patrimonial ruler who must care for his people as for his cattle as well as by the popular courtier who flatters and fawns as a part of a play for prestige and domination. The tyrant will not admit that he is a tyrant, at least not an experienced one, or that he is arbitrary or irresponsible, for he is always the vicar of someone or something, God or the nation or the class or the mass or the customs of his folk. And, indeed, however arrogant he may be, he finds it difficult to escape from that world of law which he himself and his system have invoked. The most important may thus find himself irrevocably committed to a system which no longer allows him that untrammelled liberty of choice and action, which he may dearly love but which by virtue of his very power escapes him. His sense of power is once more reduced to the dream world from which it came, and its earthly shape eludes him. So it may be said the price of power is limitation. The ruler is ruled by his own rules.²

With the decline in importance of all-out war as a factor dominating conflict among nation-states there has been a scale of limitation introduced into the violence possible among the developed nation-states of the world. This is a break from what has been the mainstream of political interaction between nation-states; especially the United States, the Soviet Union and

¹Charles E. Merriam, op. cit., p. 35.

²Charles E. Merriam, ibid., p. 35.

Communist China.

In 1953 and today, violence is confined to those continental areas of residence for emerging nation-states. The confrontation of the East and West in Laos is an example of the application of containment vs. protracted war within the scale of limitation introduced by the nuclear balance of terror.

Massive retaliation implemented through brinkmanship was one important factor in creating a political power vacuum in the application of the containment policy. A second factor limiting containment concerns the continued backing of the French presence in Indochina during 1953 by the Eisenhower Administration. This decision assured that the Lao Issara leadership would have to find another channel than the United States in order to establish an independent Laos. The Viet Minh victory over the French at Dien Bien Phu was a declaration of independence for Vietnam and Laos. This was bound to give the Communist Pathet Lao a decisive political presence in Laos. And it did as evidenced in the 1958 election.

The 1958 National Assembly election was an expression of the fact that among the non-Lao backing the Pathet Lao, and many Lao like Prince Souphanouvong, Communism was an acceptable methodology for effecting change in Laos. But this was never recognized or accepted by the Eisenhower Administration. As John F. Cady pointed out regarding SEATO; it was an expression of former colonial powers to "revive imperialist control."¹ To the

¹John F. Cady, op. cit., p. 602.

Asians, containment as expressed in SEATO left their environment with a continuation of colonialism, rather than being a guarantee of self-determination for these new nation-states. In other words, containment assured the status quo with the United States fulfilling the decisive role of maintaining an indirect colonial presence in Asia, through economic and military assistance to governments trying to keep an elite establishment in power such as the Lao elite under Phoui Sananikone in August, 1958.

A third factor in the political power vacuum that can be attributed to the containment policy of the United States has to do with a creditability gap. This is the most important result of the Eisenhower Administration's containment policy, and its affects are with us even today. The creditability gap begins with the way the United States approached foreign policy in the 1950's and today. In the State of the Union address, President Eisenhower excused the thesis of massive retaliation with "we, on our part, know that we seek only a just peace for all, with aggressive designs against no one."¹

Peace as an end means what in terms of international politics? If peace is measured by the conduct of the United States in foreign policy during the 1950's, then the United States failed the test as evidenced in the over-all emphasis upon massive retaliation at a time in history when the Soviet Union was trying

¹President Dwight David Eisenhower, "The State of the Union Message January 9, 1959," op. cit., p. 3.

to solidify its political leadership and relationship with other Communist nation-states. Also, it should be added the acceptance of brinkmanship made little sense in a time period where there had been reached a bi-polar capacity to conduct nuclear war.

Peace as a goal desired by the United States was not accepted by the newly emerging nation-states, especially in Asia during the 1950's. For example, if SEATO was such a good way to maintain stability in Southeast Asia, then why didn't India, Burma, and the other Asian nation-states join Thailand in the multilateral mutual security treaty. SEATO represented a return to the political situation present in Southeast Asia prior to Dien Bien Phu; namely, colonial domination in most of the societies in the area.

Finally, peace as a quest by the Eisenhower Administration pinpoints the basic problem in United States foreign policy, then and now. That is, the United States assumes too much regarding the international environment. In particular, the United States assumes that other nation-states, which have not achieved the status of a post-industrial nation-state, desire to see a state of harmony or tranquility among nation-states that is of a lasting duration. This is impossible!

First, most of the nation-states in the world do not even approach the United States in the level of economic and social well-being nor do we find in the world the degree of political integration present in the United States. Here, reference is to the degree of interest articulation and mass participation present in the United States.

Second, and more basic, international politics is dominated by the interaction among nation-states trying to satisfy the demands of their peoples' interpretation of what is the national interest. Here, of course, the national interest required to be satisfied first is that of national security. Since the quest for a state of national security assuring the preservation of the nation-state can never be achieved in the competitive environment of the political interactions among nation-states, there is a natural tendency of a nation-state to remain concerned with having a better situation in terms of security vis-a-vis a defined competitor. This means the state of international politics is always characterized as being in what might be called the flux of change. What this suggests is that change is the one constant factor in international politics, and a nation-state that is to remain competitive in terms of political power and providing for its national security must have the available means to measure that change, which is present in a given time period of international politics. The alternative to this suggestion is to have a presence of military might beyond the reach of competing nation-states, such as the United States had, until the fall of 1957.

The other alternative is to participate in international politics like the United States has done throughout most of its history. That is, as a non-participating nation-state following out a foreign policy of isolationism. But this is impossible, because the British Grand Fleet is no more, and since 1947 the United States has married itself to an orientation towards international politics that will not allow a divorcement from the

thesis of protecting the United States by maintaining a presence of political power close to a competitor's national territory. Pearl Harbor was a watershed in United States national security policy. Isolationism was put to rest along with the battleship navy on December 7, 1941.

The containment policy of the United States has failed to deal with the constants and variables present in international politics. In particular, containment has not met the requirements of a national security policy that will assure a high level of political power for the United States in a time period where war has a scale of limitation emanating from the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons. This constant factor in international politics was not acknowledged in the massive retaliation thesis accepted by the Eisenhower Administration. In addition, there are the variables present in international politics, such as the presence of violence in the third world of underdeveloped nation-states.

To find an alternative to the containment policy of the United States, the writer turned to the United Nations. In the United Nations presence in Laos, an example will be presented of the world organization stabilizing the Cold War in Laos stripped of any political power element, except the influence and authority acquired by the Secretary-General from the Security Council to inquire into the nature of the conflict. On this basis, a United Nations presence was established. This presence was accepted, because the bi-polar powers were willing to allow a state of equilibrium between the Pathet Lao and the Royal Laotian government.

CHAPTER IX

THE UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE

The devils enter uninvited when the house stands empty. For other kinds of guests, you have first to open the door.¹

In the September 27, 1959 issue of The New York Times Magazine Lester B. Pearson asked:

Is the world organization doomed to the fate of frustration, dissension and disappearance that befell its Geneva predecessor, the League of Nations? . . . Will the United Nations deteriorate in the same way without the bang?²

To answer his own question, the Canadian Prime Minister admitted that "in so far as substantial actions to keep the peace are concerned, 'the United Nations has been' frozen in futility and divided by dissension."³ Yet, the Canadian Prime Minister had hope for the United Nations. "Can, 'asks Pearson,' the United Nations by its diplomatic activities, be the instrument of, can it at least facilitate, an easing of tension in the

¹Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, "Role and Place of the UN Executive Body," Vital Speeches XXVII (November 1, 1960), p. 49.

²Lester B. Pearson, "What Future for the United Nations," The New York Times Magazine (September 27, 1959), p. 14.

³Ibid.

international politics between the Communist and non-Communist blocs?"¹ "Yes,"² concluded Pearson.

The United Nations presence in Laos during the fall of 1959 and through the spring of 1960 is an example of the world organization performing its peace-keeping role by easing tensions. This role began on September 5, 1959, when the Kingdom of Laos called upon the United Nations to ease the tension between the Communist and non-Communist military forces. The Note stated: "Since July 16, 1959, foreign troops have been crossing the frontier and engaging in military action against garrison units of the Royal Army stationed along the northeastern frontier of Laos."³ The Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Laos to the United Nations, Khamphan Panya, continued:

In the face of this flagrant aggression, full responsibility for which rests with the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, Laos requests

¹Lester B. Pearson, *ibid.*, p. 62.

²A fellow subject of the British Empire, Sir Anthony Wedgewood-Benn concluded the United Nations "must be empowered to decide the destiny of the world." His conclusion is based on the fact that "I don't believe the younger generation has any sense of national sovereignty. This generation didn't grow up with the idea that this is ours, and it's better." With mass communication "forming a world court of opinion" Benn believed it is difficult for the diplomats and professors to keep the people's destiny in their own 'exclusive' garden. Sir Anthony Wedgewood-Benn quoted in a speech delivered at the University of Minnesota January 27, 1960 entitled "Is There A World Opinion," appearing in The Minnesota Daily IX (January 27, 1960), p. 1 and 12. See also Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Implications of Change for the United States Foreign Policy," Department of State Publication 8261 (July, 1967).

³"Note of September 4, 1959 to the Secretary-General from the Permanent Mission of Laos," United Nations Security Council S.4212 dated September 5, 1959.

the assistance of the United Nations, of which it is a Member. . . . In Particular, the Royal Government requests that an emergency force should be dispatched at a very early date in order to halt the aggression and prevent the spread of aggression.¹

This appeal from the Kingdom of Laos to the Secretary-General of the United Nations started the dispatch of a United Nations presence in Laos. The World Organization was being called upon to diminish an already expanding conventional war in Indochina by dispatching a United Nations emergency force to Laos. In an editorial titled "The U.N. - Vital Force in the Quest for Peace," The Minneapolis Star noted:

Nations continue to conduct much of their relations with other nations directly, but increasingly, where this business has to do with world peace, the United Nations becomes a participant.

Thus the U.N. finds itself dealing with the crisis in Laos, tiny kingdom in Southeast Asia, Laos, reporting it was threatened from Communist North Viet Nam, appealed to the U.N. for military help.

The plea put the U.N. on the spot. It raised the possibility of a widening conflict in Laos, if U.N. troops were sent. At the same time, it presented the risk of serious damage to U.N. prestige and usefulness if a legitimate call for help from a small nation were ignored.²

On September 5, 1959, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold dispatched a letter to the President of the Security Council, Mr. Egidio Ortona of Italy. The Secretary-General recommended

¹"Note of September 4, 1959 to the Secretary-General from the Permanent Mission of Laos," Ibid.

²"The U.N. - Vital Force in the Quest for Peace," The Minneapolis Star, (October 5, 1959), p. 1a.

that the Security Council be convened "for the consideration of an item entitled 'Report by the Secretary-General on the letter received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Royal Government of Laos, transmitted on September 4, 1959 by a note from the Permanent Mission of Laos to the United Nations.'"¹

The 847th session of the Security Council began September 7, 1959 in an atmosphere of a pending visit of Soviet Premier Khrushchev to the United States on September 15th.² The President of the Security Council, Mr. Egidio Ortona, began the session by detailing the reason for the meeting. "He, 'Ortona said, 'had convened the meeting under the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council which enables the President to undertake such a step at any time he deems necessary."³

Mr. Ortona believed the following facts warranted such a meeting:

There was first a communication addressed to him, on behalf of the Secretary-General, containing the suggestion to initiate consultations with Council members on a message dated September 4, addressed to the Secretary-General by the Foreign Minister of

¹"Letter dated September 5, 1959 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council," United Nations Security Council S/4213 dated September 6, 1959.

²Soviet Premier Khrushchev visited the United States from September 15th through the 27th. This visit was a climax to a series of diplomatic moves by the Premier to relax tensions through a summit conference of the great powers to discuss Berlin, disarmament, etc. See text p.192 for further discussion of the international environment in which the UN presence was developed.

³President Egidio Ortona quoted in "The Procedural Debate on Laos," United Nations Review VI (October, 1959), p. 54.

Laos, regarding developments in that country and calling for prompt action by the United Nations.^{1 2}

After consultations with the other members of the Security Council, President Ortona concluded, an "overwhelming majority" were for such a meeting. With this explanation, the President gave the floor to the Secretary-General for a statement of an "explanatory nature."³

A presentation of the facts in a dispute by the Secretary-General is certainly most revealing about the operations of the United Nations in the peacekeeping field. By his very presentation the Secretary-General may structure the direction of security policy by the Security Council. This is significant when it is understood that the United Nations was designed to operate in the peacekeeping field within the framework of agreement to act on the part of the permanent members.

Here three factors were very important: first, the political atmosphere of the international political system in

¹President Egidio Ortona, *ibid.*

²On September 6, 1959 President Ortona received a letter from the Prime Minister of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, Pham Van Dong. Mr. Van Dong requested: "In the interests of peace and security in the countries of Southeast Asia and throughout the world, in the name of the noble purposes of the United Nations Charter, and in view of the need to respect international agreements, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam considers that the United Nations should purely and simply reject the slanderous and fabricated statements and the senseless request made by the Phoui Sananikone Government." Message dated September 6, 1959 from the Prime Minister of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam addressed to the President of the Security Council" United Nations Security Council Annex II S/4236 dated November 5, 1959.

³"The Procedural Debate on Laos," *op. cit.*, p. 54.

1959; second, the personal characteristics of Dag Hammarskjold as a decision-maker; third, the development of a United Nations presence on the basis of a Security Council majority and the utilization by the world organization of a procedural device to implement its presence.

First, the political atmosphere of the international political system in 1959. Whereas the year 1959 began on the theme of a threat by the Soviet Union towards Berlin, the year ended on a note of hope generated by an agreement between President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev to hold a summit conference in the spring of 1960.¹ This dramatic change in the political atmosphere, which was induced by the "spirit of Camp David,"² was the effect of the Soviet Union and the United States revising or modifying their priorities in domestic and foreign policy in light of a general fragmentation of political power

¹On November 27, 1958, the Soviet Union notified the United States, France, and Great Britain that negotiations must begin within six months on the Berlin problem, or the Soviet Union would settle the matter in a unilateral fashion with the Government of East Germany. "Soviet Note, November 27, 1958," Department of State Bulletin XXXX (January 19, 1958), pp. 181-189.

²Reference is to the discussions held between President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev from September 25th through the 27th at the President's retreat in Maryland called Camp David. Here, Khrushchev agreed that no time limit could be set in the negotiated settlement of the Berlin problem, and thus there was removed the only major limitation to a summit conference desired by Khrushchev. In addition to the Berlin "settlement," Khrushchev agreed to the resumption of negotiations on the settlement of the Soviet Union's lend-lease debt. With this done, President Eisenhower agreed to begin negotiations for the expansion of American-Soviet trade, and the further development of cultural and technical exchanges; specifically, the medical and atoms-for-peace programs. Richard P. Stebbins The United States in World Affairs 1959 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), p. 32.

into several power blocs, the aggressive tendencies of Communist China, and concern for the domestic well-being by Eisenhower and Khrushchev.

Ever since the Soviet Union's space achievement in October, 1957, Khrushchev was at a diplomatic advantage with Eisenhower. This continued to be the case under the administration of President John F. Kennedy, until the neutralization of Laos in July, 1962, and the climatic missile crisis in October, 1962. In part, this was a reflection of a transition of leadership within the United States during 1959 as far as foreign policy is concerned, and the recluse role performed by the United States in foreign policy during the Eisenhower Administration.

The year 1959 began with the spotlight of world attention on the Twenty-First Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Eighteen days prior to the Congress, the State of the Union address was delivered by President Eisenhower.

President Eisenhower's State of the Union message reflected his concern with the domestic problems of recovering from a recession, and the apparent aggressiveness of the Soviet Union exemplified in Soviet space technology and the threat regarding Berlin. While Anastas I. Mikoyan was in the fifth day of a visit to the United States stressing the diplomatic settlement of the differences between the United States and the Soviet Union, President Eisenhower was suggesting that the most important problem facing the United States in 1959 was to "promote strength

and security side by side with liberty and opportunity."¹

While Mikoyan spoke about the need for disarmament in the United States, the President suggested that the most important question confronting the United States was:

Can Government based upon liberty and the God-given rights of men, permanently endure when ceaselessly challenged by a dictatorship, hostile to our mode of life, and controlling an economic and military strength of great and growing power?²

The President's speech was delivered January 9, 1959. On January 27th, Soviet Premier Khrushchev opened the Twenty-First Congress of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's thesis regarding foreign policy took the form of a question addressed to the United States and its European allies. Khrushchev asked:

Would it not be better for the heads of states with different social systems to conclude, and to do so as soon as possible, that, since we share one planet, and not too large a planet by today's technological standards, it is better to live on it without elbowing one another and not to threaten one another constantly by shaking fists in the form of atomic or hydrogen bombs?³

And then Khrushchev added: "we must learn to settle disputes by peaceful negotiations."⁴

¹"Message of the President on the State of the Union, January 9, 1959," House Document I, 86th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1. Anastas I. Mikoyan, a first Deputy Premier of the Soviet Union, visited the United States from January 4 through 26.

²Loc. cit.

³Premier Nikita Khrushchev "Address by the First Secretary before the Twenty-First Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, January 21, 1959," The Current Digest of the Soviet Press XI (March 11, 1959), p. 24.

⁴Ibid.

Premier Khrushchev's quest for a relaxation of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union might have been viewed with hesitation in light of the November, 1958 Soviet note to settle the Berlin question within six months. But this can be viewed as mere speculation in light of the conduct of Soviet diplomacy in 1959.¹ The year 1959 began with the Soviet Union illustrating its achievements in technology and at the same time building a basis for relaxing tensions between the great powers.

On January 2, 1959 the cosmic rocket Lunik began the first interplanetary flight only to fail in orbiting the moon.² This scientific achievement was viewed by Khrushchev as an example of the technological skill of the Soviet people. To Khrushchev, the significance of such achievements should be understood in terms of the realization of a seven-year plan of economic development. For Khrushchev, this economic development was both a challenge and an opportunity. "The fundamental problem of the coming seven years is to make the utmost time gain in socialism's peaceful

¹While the general tone of United States policy in 1959 was to move with reluctance to the conference table with the Soviet Union, Khrushchev's call for negotiated settlement to the problems between East and West did leave the impression within the State Department that the Berlin threat was not to be taken too seriously. For example, Deputy Under-Secretary of State Robert Murphy stated on April 13, 1959: "I start from the premise that the Soviet leadership does not want war, and we know that we do not want it. I just don't believe that an all-out nuclear war is going to happen by sheer accident. Therefore, we do not approach these negotiations (on Berlin) weighed down by fear and apprehension of mutual destruction." Department of State Bulletin XXXXI (May 4, 1959), p. 631.

²Lunik was the first of a series of Soviet successes in space during 1959. In September, a Soviet satellite made direct contact with the moon, and in October, the Soviet Union put the first rocket into lunar orbit.

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economic competition with capitalism."¹

Khrushchev's prescription for the time period 1959 through 1965 was emphasized in several ways. In the background to Khrushchev's speech was the visit of Mikoyan to the United States. It is significant for the tone Khrushchev desired to set for the international politics in 1959 that Mikoyan visited the United States and his return to the Soviet Union coincided with Khrushchev's speech on January 27th.

In the address to the Congress, Khrushchev established a moderate tone to the Soviet foreign policy by opening his comments on international politics with a reference to the necessity of the Soviet Union completing the seven-year plan. This seven-year plan could not be completed, Khrushchev believed, unless there was "a break to the impasse on the disarmament issue." Khrushchev concluded this was "the task of tasks today."²

In addition, Khrushchev stressed the economic success of the Soviet Union compared with prerevolutionary days.³ His attention to a set of statistics that would seem to be strictly an internal matter was designed to inform the world and the international

¹Premier Nikita Khrushchev, op. cit.

²Khrushchev stated; "The seven-year plan is a fresh expression of the Leninist peaceful policy of the Soviet Union. Fulfillment of this plan will play a tremendous role in solving the fundamental problem of our time - the preservation of world peace." Ibid.

³Examples of this comparison of the past with 1959 were; "We now produce more steel and oil in a single month than in the whole of 1913. And as much electric power is generated in three days as was generated in pre-revolutionary Russia in a year." Premier Nikita Khrushchev, ibid.

Communist movement that the Soviet Union was not going to sacrifice the possibility of being the great economic power in the world, when this form of success was so near and the real basis for all other forms of political power.¹ A statement of this nature at this time was very significant. On the one hand, the propaganda affect was immediate.

While the Soviet Union was stressing success by word and deed, the United States was recovering from a recession, and attempting to achieve economic viability by confining military expenditures and searching for ways to restore the balance of payments in favor of the United States. In the State of the Union message, President Eisenhower emphasized the need to "promote strength" of this country in matters of economics, since this was the basis of "security and opportunity" for the United States.²

Communist China shared with the United States a basic concern for internal problems during 1959. The Great Leap Forward

¹Khrushchev stated: "There is not the slightest doubt that the 8.6% average annual growth of industrial output designated in the seven-year plan will not only be reached, but exceeded. Evidently the capitalist countries, too, will not stand still. It may be presumed that in the next few years U.S. industrial output will grow about 2% annually. That has been the rate of development in American industry in recent years." He continued: "The population in the USSR evidently will be about 15% to 20% larger than in the U.S.A. Hence, in per capita reckoning, it will probably take us another five years after completing the seven-year plan to overtake and surpass the United States in industrial output." Ibid.

²President Dwight D. Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 1.

was failing.¹ On August 26, 1959, the Central Committee of the Communist Party publicly admitted the production figures announced for 1958 had been exaggerated and there was a need to reduce the economic goals for 1959.² Before August, there was evidence China's stability was open to question. There is little doubt that Khrushchev enjoyed the inability of China to pass by the Soviet Union and attain the communist state with its commune system.³ He might have had this in mind in his speech, when he stated: "when the U.S.S.R. becomes the world's leading industrial power," and "when the Chinese People's Republic becomes a mighty industrial power."⁴ Premier Chou En-lai led the Chinese delegation to the Congress. Khrushchev's reference to the second place position of China in the future must have been very hard for Chou En-lai to accept. Yet, he did. Not only did the Chinese Premier endorse Khrushchev's address to the Congress, but Chou En-lai

¹The Great Leap Forward was an economic program conceived by Mao Tse-tung "to further accelerate China's economic development on the heels of the Soviet Union's orbiting of Sputnik in October, 1957." The program began in March, 1958 with the first commune established called Sputnik in Honan Province. Franklin W. Houn, op. cit., p. 165.

²Premier Chou En-lai, "Great Leap Forward," Peking Review III September 1, 1959, pp. 5-19. Of all the factors bringing about the failure of the Great Leap Forward, the consensus seems to be that the commune movement and the emphasis upon heavy industry were the primary factors. See Franklin W. Houn, loc. cit., pp. 181-183.

³Ever since the announcement of the commune system in March, 1958, Khrushchev had taken the opportunity to belittle the system. In his visit to the United States, Mikoyan had stated "the U.S.S.R. had already tried out the idea and dropped it as impractical." New York Times January 25, 1959.

⁴Premier Nikita Khrushchev, op. cit., p. 20.

remained in the Soviet Union after the Congress and negotiated an agreement for industrial assistance.¹ This was very significant in suggesting that China's economic program wasn't working for it had been no one less than Mao Tse-tung, who concluded: "China can never win genuine independence and equality by relying upon foreign aid."²

Chou En-lai's assistance agreement with Khrushchev disclosed the inability of China to go its own way in an economic development program. It did something else for China. During 1959 there were signs of problems within the leadership ranks of China. On April 27th, the National People's Congress elected Liu Shao-chi to a four year term as Chairman of the Chinese People's Republic, succeeding Mao Tse-tung, who continued as Chairman of the Communist Party.³ This signified the triumph for the moment of Liu Shao-chi's more pragmatic approach to economic development and international politics.⁴ At the same Congress, Peng Teh-huai was re-elected as Defense Minister. This decision reflected the strength of Liu Shao-chi's more pragmatic

¹Richard P. Stebbins, op. cit., p. 324.

²Mao Tse-tung, "We Must Learn To Do Economic Work," Selected Works III, op. cit., p. 307.

³Franklin W. Houn, op. cit., p. 95.

⁴Liu Shao-chi had never taken a position against foreign aid, and had been known to favor a certain amount of capitalism in China. At the Chengtu conference of party leaders in March, 1958, where the great leap forward was formalized, Liu Shao-chi had led the opposition to the program of the commune. "Fight for the Thorough Criticism and Repudiation of the Top Party Person in Authority Taking the Capitalist Road," Liberation Army Daily XVI (April 14, 1967), p. 8.

approach to policy. But this would all end of September 17th, when Mao Tse-tung began a series of political moves against Liu Shao-chi. In this case, Peng Teh-huai was replaced by Marshall Lin Piaio as Minister of Defense.¹ It is from this date forward that the basis for the Cultural Revolution started. Thus, the Revolution was a very important part of the differences between Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi.²

Communist China was experiencing an internal turmoil regarding leadership and policy from March, 1958 through the elevation of Lin Piaio as Mao Tse-tung's successor on April 14, 1969.³ But this was not all China was suffering from in the 1960's. In foreign policy, Communist China began to lose an effective voice in her relations with the underdeveloped nation-states.

On August 28, 1959, India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru disclosed that Communist China had conducted a series of offensive military operations from Tibet into Indian territory.⁴ Nehru noted that the aggressive pattern of the Chinese began in January, when Peking had sent a formal diplomatic note to Nehru in which the Chinese denied the acceptability of the boundary line between

¹Franklin W. Houn, op. cit., p. 95.

²A. Doak Barnett, "The Changing Course of Revolution in Communist China," An Address delivered at Gustavus Adolphus College, St. Peter, Minnesota on January 22, 1968.

³"Constitution of Communist Party of China," Current History L (September, 1969), p. 176.

⁴Richard P. Stebbins, op. cit., p. 299.

Tibet and India. Throughout 1959 Peking threatened the boundary between Tibet and India with not only words, but deeds. In 1959, Communist China carried out three military operations in the Ladakh region. This action coupled with the suppression of a nationalistic movement in Tibet left Peking with little reserve of friendship from her neighbors or peers in the third world bloc.

While Communist China was pursuing a very militant aggressive stance in international politics, the Soviet Union pursued a relaxation of tension between the bi-polar powers and at the same time established herself as a friend of India and the rest of the third world. This posture for the Soviet Union became clear in Khrushchev's address to the Twenty-First Congress. Instead of threatening India and the rest of the third world, Khrushchev appealed "that the economy is the chief field in which the peaceful competition between socialism and capitalism is unfolding."¹ This had great appeal in the underdeveloped world. On the one hand, its appeal emanated from their quest for economic development. At the same time, this emphasis in the direction of Soviet policy was received in a most positive manner, because of the United States inward looking orientation to policy and the evidence of aggression on the part of Communist China toward India and Tibet.

In summary, the year 1959 was the pragmatic evidence of what Premier Khrushchev had meant by the policy of peaceful

¹Premier Nikita Khrushchev, op. cit., p. 17.

coexistence in his address to the Twentieth Party Congress in February, 1956. In 1959, Khrushchev wanted a summit conference in order to achieve a detente with the United States on the problems of Berlin and disarmament. This was in part a tactical move by Khrushchev to give the Soviet Union the necessary time to deal with Communist bloc problems that were temporarily submerged under the economic and technological achievements of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev could understandably conclude that 1959 was the time to consolidate the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the government in Peking, and the United States.

The second factor that was important in the development of the United Nations presence was the personal characteristics of Dag Hammarskjold as a decision-maker.

On September 23, 1960, Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev, heading the Soviet delegation to the opening of the fifteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, addressed the member nation-states. Among the recommendations put forth by the Soviet Premier was the suggestion that the Secretary-General be replaced by a triumvirate.¹ Khrushchev believed this change was needed, because:

Today only one man is the interpreter and the executor of all the decisions of the Assembly and the Security Council.²

¹Triumvirate meant the "executive body should represent the states parties to the military blocs of the Western powers, the socialist states, and the neutralist states." Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev quoted in "Khrushchev Speaks At The United Nations, September, 1960," Current History XXXIX (November, 1960), p. 304.

²Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev, "Role and Place of the UN Executive Body," Vital Speeches XXVII (November 1, 1960), p. 49.

Political power for the United Nations had its beginning with a recognition of the constants controlling the implementation of the provisions in the Charter related to peacekeeping. The key constant was the recognition that the United Nations was a creation of the nation-states, and thus must reflect what these nation-states would allow in terms of influence and authority for the world organization to settle a dispute.

With this key constant element, in mind, decision-making for the Secretary-General began with a recognition that his competence to influence disputing nation-states started with his neutral position during the formulation of a mandate by the nation-states for the United Nations to act.¹ He can report, as Hammarskjold did, the request of a nation-state like Laos for United Nations's assistance. After the reporting step, it is the nation-state's decision in the Security Council that will dictate what type of initial United Nations's presence will be established.

Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold was an ideal decision-maker for the United Nations, because he understood the necessity of seeking out an equilibrium among the nation-states, before the peaceful pressure of the United Nations could be applied.²

¹The decision-making approach utilized in the analysis of Dag Hammarskjold was obtained from Robert E. Cecile's study "A Frame of Reference for the Study of American Foreign Policy-Making," appearing in the Minnesota Academy of Science XXXIV (1967), pp. 131-137.

²The writer's conclusions regarding Dag Hammarskjold were obtained from Dag Hammarskjold Markings (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965); Emery Kelen Hammarskjold (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1966), John Lindberg, "The Secret Life of Dag Hammarskjold," Look (June 30, 1964), pp. 66-71., and several other articles.

He was trained to be neutral in the formulation of policy during the twenty years of experience in the Swedish government. As a finance and foreign minister, Hammarskjold became acquainted with the necessity to "transform himself into a tool of the powers that be"¹ without compromising individual convictions.

This direction to Hammarskjold's competence as an administrator was maintained in the Secretariat of the United Nations. Hammarskjold articulated this dimension to his decision-making skills stating,²

From generations of soldiers and government officials on my father's side I inherited a belief that no life was more satisfactory than one of selfless service to your country-or humanity. This service required a sacrifice of all personal interests, but likewise the courage to stand up unflinchingly for your convictions.

From scholars and clergymen on my mother's side I inherited a belief that, in the very radical sense of the Gospels, all men were equals as children of God, and should be met and treated by us as our masters.

Faith is a state of the mind and soul. . . . The language of religion is a set of formulas which register a basic spiritual experience. It must not be regarded as describing in terms to be defined by philosophy, the reality which is accessible to our senses and which we can analyze with the tools of logic. I was late in understanding what this meant. When I finally reached that point, the beliefs in which I was once brought up and which, in fact, had given my life direction even while my intellect still challenged their validity, were recognized by me as mine in their own right and by my free

¹John Lindberg, "The Secret Life of Dag Hammarskjold," Look (June 6, 1964), p. 67.

²Dag Hammarskjold, op. cit., vii and viii.

choice . . . the explanation of how man should live a life of active social service in full harmony with himself as a member of the community of the spirit, I found in the writings of those great medieval mystics for whom "self-surrender" had been the way to self-realization, and who in "singleness of mind" and "inwardness" had found strength to say yes to every demand which the needs of their neighbors made them face, and to say yes also to every fate life had in store for them . . . Love -- that much misused and misinterpreted word -- for them meant simply an overflowing of the strength with which they felt themselves filled when living in true self-oblivion. And this love found natural expression in an unhesitant fulfillment of duty and an unreserved acceptance of life, whatever it brought them personally of toil, suffering -- or happiness.¹

Dag Hammarskjold's "self-surrender" as the way to "self-realization"² was in part acted out based upon childhood experiences. Two experiences dominated Hammarskjold's life. The first had to do with the fact that he was the youngest of four boys in a family with a mother wishing to have a girl. Agnes Hammarskjold did not try to turn Dag into a girl as some authors have suggested, but there was a very intimate relationship. Emery Kelen notes:

But nothing has a more lasting effect upon the personality than the place a child occupies in the family hierarchy. Throughout his life, no matter how high he rose, Hammarskjold remained something of a baby brother, and his friends and colleagues did not fail to note in him "the playful lad."³

¹Dag Hammarskjold, *ibid.*, viii.

²*Ibid.*

³Emery Kelen Hammarskjold (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1966), p. 37.

His tender attachment to his mother never weakened, and even as Undersecretary he continued to live with his family at their Stockholm house; he never omitted to bringing flowers to her when he went home for lunch; nor did Agnes Hammarskjold ever forget to advise him to dress warmly when he went on a ski-tour, or ever cease to implore his colleagues in the Treasury Department not to let him work so hard.

The Stockholm house was only fifteen minutes' walk away from the Treasury Department, but if Dag was delayed in the evening, he took a taxi rather than keep his mother waiting. And once, the story goes, he was a quarter of an hour late for a rendezvous with a young lady, his only excuse being that he had not liked to interrupt a conversation with his mother.

Many of the Hammarskjold mysteries have their roots in this deep rapport with his mother: his celebrity, his ardent desire to be wanted and needed, to "belong"; his willingness to submit to loving care -- and also his knack for getting his own way.

. . . .

Agnes Hammarskjold died in 1940. In her Bible was found the following inscription:

The day you were born, everybody was happy--
you cried alone.
Make your life such that in your last hour,
all others weep
And you alone are without a tear to shed.
Then you shall calmly face death whenever
it comes.¹

A second childhood experience dominating Dag Hammarskjold's life was concerned with the public treatment of his father Hjalmer Hammarskjold. Like Dag's close relationship with his mother, his father's condemnation by the Swedish people orientated the future Secretary-General towards a vocation free from direct contact with the public. Hammarskjold's colleague

¹Emery Kelen, *ibid.*, pp. 37-38.

at the University of Stockholm, John Lindberg relates this tragedy:

Hjalmar Hammarskjold's policy of neutrality led to the Allied blockade of Swedish commerce, semi-starvation in the cities and the inflammation of the tense political situation. The usually stolid and patient populace rioted, and the fear of revolution spread, until, in March, 1917, King Gustaf V suddenly capitulated before the democratic onslaught, leaving the old Hammarskjold stranded as governor in the province of Uppsala. He was popularly known as "Hungerskjold," and remained for years a well-hated figure among the liberals of the nation.¹

These two experiences did not make Dag Hammarskjold a recluse to the extent of being a hermit, but Hammarskjold sought to shelter himself from very personal relationships such as the love of a woman, or the friendship of his colleagues. While his mother was alive, the personal attention Agnes Hammarskjold showered upon her youngest son was sufficient to offset what he suffered as a child in school. In Markings dated 1956, Hammarskjold relates:

Into empty space my home sent me.
Few seek me. Few hear me.

Cuffs taught me that fellows
hated my father's name.

Unwanted came I to play with them,
but watched others play.²

With Agnes Hammarskjold's death in 1940, a very important human outlet for Dag Hammarskjold's feelings was strangled. At the age of thirty-five, Dag Hammarskjold was certainly in a position

¹John Lindberg, op. cit., p. 66.

²Emery Kelen, op. cit., p. 39.

to find a more normal existence with another woman. But he didn't. Emery Kelen, who was a colleague of Hammarskjold's at the United Nations, noted how dedicated the Secretary-General was to his work. This was not something new. When he was Sweden's Undersecretary of the Treasury, Hammarskjold thought nothing of working all day, and then after dinner "about nine o'clock, he would return to his office to work for a long stretch until five or six in the morning, relieved only by a visit to the local keller for tea or coffee."¹ This level of physical performance continued in the United Nations. Kelen relates: "Leave it to Dag"² had become Dag's tag in the Swedish Treasury, and continued

now (Suez and Hungary crisis 1956), we in the Secretariat got our first spectacular display of the Secretary-General's formidable staying powers. Day after day the meetings (Security Council) lasted until four or five in the morning, and they started again at three in the afternoon. Regiments of people grew faint weary, but Hammarskjold throve.³

Dag Hammarskjold throve to establish creditability for the Hammarskjold name that had been blemished by the Swedish people's condemnation of his father's policy of neutrality in World War I. He was the Hammarskjold knight fighting for respect and the good name of Hammarskjold. But it was people, who condemned Hjalmar Hammarskjold. And it was people that isolated young Dag from the normal interaction of children. While one may

¹Emery Kelen, op. cit., p. 39.

²Ibid., p. 41.

³Dag Hammarskjold, ibid., p. 79.

not be able to appreciate in an emotional sense the scar left in Dag's personality by his father's experience, Dag must be commended for trying to rectify the Hammarskjold name through public service instead of removing himself from all contact with life and responsibility.

In conclusion, Dag Hammarskjold was an effective Secretary-General. In part, Hammarskjold's success was due to two impressions based upon his personal experience. First, the family name must be cleared through action on his part that is of such a noble nature as to be above condemnation. In other words, Hammarskjold sought out a vocation in life that would be public, but of such a nature that the competition involved would remove him from a very personal human situation. In Sweden, Hammarskjold found satisfaction in carrying out the public policy within the Ministry of Finance and Foreign Affairs. In the United Nations, he attained fulfillment carrying out the acceptable exchange established by the permanent representatives of nation-states. It was they alone who gave him a mandate, and it was within this right to act that Hammarskjold developed not only political power for the United Nations, but a creditability for the Hammarskjold name.

Second, his personal experiences involving human beings left an impression that human relations might not bring a great deal of lasting comfort to him. Like the medieval mystics, Hammarskjold sought refuge in "self-surrender" to a faith characterized by a "marriage of God and the Soul."¹ What he searched for

¹Dag Hammarskjold, *ibid.*, p. 97.

was a cross to bear. Hammarskjold concluded:

At least he knew this much about himself-
I know what man is-his vulgarity, lust,
pride, envy-and longing. Longing-among
other things, for the Cross.¹

On April 9, 1953, Dag Hammarskjold descended from his plane in New York. The scars from his personal experience, which had been a heavy cross to bear, became not only bearable, but Hammarskjold found in the outlet of the United Nations a means to establish the family name and acquire stature at a level generally free of human criticism directed against a Hammarskjold. Hammarskjold noted this aspect of being Secretary-General, when he wrote in his private journal Markings:

Isn't the void which surrounds you
when the noise ceases your just reward
for a day devoted to preventing others
from neglecting you?²

Third, and least in importance, in the development of the United Nations' presence, was the Security Council majority and the utilization by the world organization of a procedural device to implement its presence. This began with the Secretary-General presenting the Laotian crisis for consideration by the Security Council.

Secretary-General Hammarskjold began his statement before the 847th session of the Security Council by noting the justification for his presence. He said:

¹Ibid., p. 55.

²Dag Hammarskjold, *ibid.*, p. 12.

Just as the Secretary-General can ask for, and is granted the floor in the Council, I feel that he is entitled to request an opportunity to address the Council publicly on a matter which he considers necessary personally to put before the Council. In doing so within the framework to which I have just referred, the Secretary-General does not introduce formally on the agenda of the Council anything beyond his own wish to report to the Council. Naturally the Council retains the same rights in relation to such an initiative of the Secretary-General as it has regarding any request of his to address the Council.¹

The Secretary-General continued to build his argument by pointing out "that the request was not based on the explicit rights granted the Secretary-General under Article 99 of the Charter."² To make the request under Article 99, Hammarskjöld stated would have placed the Council in the position of "refusing the Secretary-General permission to address it"³ according to rule 3 of the provisional rules of procedure.⁴ Since Article 99 is not invoked here, the Security Council can grant the

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. Article 99 "Charter of the United Nations," Ruhl J. Bartlett, op. cit., p. 693.

³Ibid.

⁴Rule 3: "The President shall call a meeting of the Security Council if a dispute or situation is brought to the attention of the Council under Article 35 or under Article 11 of the Charter, or if the General Assembly makes recommendations or refers any question to the Council under Article 11, or if the Secretary-General brings to the attention of the Council any matter under Article 99." Ibid.

Secretary-General the opportunity to address the Council without the "inscription of or by the Secretary-General of a substantive issue on the agenda."¹ And to have introduced a substantive issue on the agenda, concluded Hammarskjold, would have required "a judgment as to facts for which, in the present situation, I have not a sufficient basis."²

Secretary-General Hammarskjold's answer satisfied all the Security Council members, except the Soviet Union's Arkady A. Sobolev. The Soviet delegate stated that he wished to question the consistency of the procedure being used in this session of the Security Council.³

Sobolev stated that according to rule number 7 of the Security Council's procedure "only items which have been brought to the attention of representatives on the Security Council in accordance with rule 6, items covered by rule 10, or matters which the Security Council has previously decided to defer may be included in the provisional agenda."⁴ In the case of Laos, Sobolev continued, these provisions cannot apply, since:

¹"The Procedural Debate on Laos," *ibid.*

²*Ibid.*

³*Ibid.*

⁴*Ibid.* Rule 6: "The Secretary-General shall immediately bring to the attention of all representatives on the Security Council all communications from states, organs of the United Nations, or the Secretary-General concerning any matter for the consideration of the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of the Charter." Rule 10: "Any item of the agenda of a meeting of the Security Council, consideration of which has not been completed at that meeting, shall unless the Security Council otherwise decided, automatically be included in the agenda of the next meeting."
Ibid.

it was not the government of Laos which had brought up the matter of requesting the United Nations assistance against the invaders of its northeastern borders before the Security Council, and the Secretary-General, who brought it up, had explicitly not done so under the powers granted him by Article 99 of the Charter.¹

What the Soviet delegate was contending in this case is that the Secretary-General in not utilizing Article 99 gave up all his rights to bring a matter before the Council. Under these circumstances, the request from Laos cannot be put on the agenda of the Council for consideration. All the Secretary-General can do is present his opinion in oral or written form "concerning any question under consideration by it."²

In order to clarify his position, the Secretary-General pointed out that he fulfilled rule 6 by "requesting that he apply to the request of the Government of Laos the appropriate procedure. That request, together with his own letter requesting the convening of the meeting"³ covered rule 6. Hammarskjold added; "he did not request any right to make any statement until after the Security Council had decided to take up the matter for consideration."⁴

Following the Secretary-General was the President of the Council to explain his procedure in this matter. Mr. Ortona believed there existed two responsibilities for him to fulfill;

¹"The Procedural Debate on Laos," *ibid.*

²*Ibid.*

³*Ibid.*

⁴"The Procedural Debate on Laos," *ibid.*

"First to call the meeting, and then to approve the provisional agenda in consultation with the Secretary-General."¹ Ortona continued:

Rule 6 clearly applied to communications from states and not to formal requests by states for the convening of the Security Council. Thus the provisions of rule 6 had been strictly observed in the present case.²

Before the Security Council could vote on whether to include the Laotian matter on the Security Council agenda, the Soviet delegate requested permission to refute what the Secretary-General and President had stated. But instead of basing his argument on the interpretation of the rules of the Security Council, Sobolev accused the United States, the United Kingdom, and France of being behind the Secretary-General's attempt to introduce the Laotian matter as one which is procedural and thus subject to the procedural rules of voting.³

Sobolev then turned to the Geneva Agreement of 1954, which he considered to be the first means the Kingdom of Laos should utilize to settle their problem with North Vietnam.⁴ The Soviet delegate's request was answered by a 10 to 1 vote for the inclusion of the Laotian matter as a procedural question on the Security Council agenda.

With the agenda adopted to include the Laotian request,

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴"The Procedural Debate on Laos," *ibid.*

President Ortona called upon the Secretary-General to detail for the Council members the background and request of the Kingdom of Laos. The Secretary-General informed the Council that this request of the Kingdom dated September 4th was the last of a long series of communications addressed to the Secretary-General by Laos.¹

According to the Secretary-General, a new phase in the crisis was reached, when in August, the Laotian government requested the Secretary-General for advice as to how a peaceful solution could be reached.² This, when added to the September 4th request for "an emergency force to halt aggression,"³ was sufficient grounds for the Secretary-General to appear in person before the Security Council in order to give the Council a clear understanding of the extent of the problem.⁴

¹Ibid. It should be noted that the Secretary-General was waiting for the opportunity to present the Laotian matter to the Security Council. This conclusion seems valid in light of what the Secretary-General stated in his review of the United Nations delivered August 28, 1959. He said: "Although the United Nations has not been formally seized of this situation (Laos), communications on the matter have been addressed to the Organization. The developments have been found to call for informal studies and consultations regarding the possibilities open to the Organization to be of assistance, obviously without impairing the Geneva agreements or interfering with the arrangements which are based on them." "The Developing Role of the United Nations," op. cit., p. 12.

²"Procedural Debate on Laos," op. cit., p. 55.

Reference here is to an August 30th letter addressed to the Secretary-General. S/4211.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

While the Secretary-General was informing the Council it should be noted that the United Nations was being informed by Laos only through this channel (SG). Only after the United Nations sub-committee on Laos was set up on September 7th did Laos turn to other United Nations channels; namely, the President of the Council. In a message dated September 8th, a Special Envoy of the Government of Laos, Ngon Sananikone, informed Ortona of the Laotian crisis. Sananikone stated: "The messages sent by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Secretary-General indicate clearly the gravity of the situation and the deep concern felt by the Government of Laos at the present time. The situation seems likely to become even worse and is a direct threat to peace in this part of the world. . . . Here is a brief account of the origin of the events leading up to the present disorders in one of the regions of Laos." And then Sananikone concluded: "I am therefore instructed by my governments to bring to your notice its serious concern as already explained in the messages from our Minister of Foreign Affairs, and to ask you to consider the possibility of inviting the Sub-Committee set up to conduct inquiries into events in Laos to visit the country as soon as possible with a view to verifying the particulars given."¹

Following the Secretary-General's analysis of the Laotian problem, the President of the Council turned the matter over to the

¹"Message dated September 8, 1959 to the President of the Security Council from the Special Envoy of the Government of Laos." United Nations Security Council Annex I S/4236 dated November 5, 1959.

the Council members for discussion. The United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, opened the discussion by submitting a resolution to the Council.¹ Lodge's proposal called for the Council to appoint a procedural sub-committee, rather than an investigation group which would be substantive and thus subject to the veto. Lodge suggested Argentina, Italy, Japan, and Tunisia be represented on the sub-committee. Lodge suggested that the sub-committee:

examine the statements made before the Security Council to receive further statements and documents and to conduct such inquiries as it might determine necessary, and to report to the Council as soon as possible.²

Ambassador Lodge argued that while the question of whether or not aggression had been committed is open to debate, the fact that a member of the United Nations submitted such to be a fact should be sufficient grounds for the Council to examine whether or not the alleged aggression took place. This, Lodge stated, is in accordance with Article 29 of the Charter. Article 29 states:

The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs, as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.³

Finally, the American representative pointed out that the draft resolution proposed "had the great advantage in that it enabled the Security Council to react without undue delay to this

¹"Procedural Debate on Laos," op. cit., p. 55.

²"Request from Laos for Assistance," International Organization XIII (Autumn, 1959), p. 566.

³"Charter of the United Nations," op. cit., p. 682.

appeal." All members should be able to agree to this proposal, Lodge suggested, since "it did not close doors and did not put anybody against a wall."¹

At the 848th meeting of the Security Council, the Soviet delegate Sobolev was the first Council member recognized by President Ortona. Again, the Soviet delegate returned to the importance of the Geneva agreements. "Those agreements," Sobolev stated, "had been an important contribution to the cause of peace."² It was on the foundation of those agreements that the Government at Vientiane was able to bring about a settlement with the Pathet Lao. Sobolev continued:

The responsibility for the present situation, with its threat of civil war, rested squarely with the present Government of Laos. The latter had declared that it did not consider itself bound by the Geneva agreements, although those agreements expressly stipulated that the international commission must continue to function until it proclaimed its own dissolution.

Thus . . . the obligations undertaken under the Geneva agreements were still valid and their observance was of great importance for the maintenance of peace and security in the area.³

Following Sobolev were the representatives of Panama and the President of the Council speaking in behalf of Italy. Both favored the draft resolution of Lodge. When the President of the Council moved for a vote on the resolution, the Soviet

¹"Security Council Meets on Laos," United Nations Review VI (October, 1959), p. 24.

²Ibid., p. 26.

³Ibid., p. 27.

delegate again requested permission of the chair for the floor.

Sobolev contested that the sub-committee could not be considered procedural, since it was doing more than simply looking and listening. Sobolev reminded the Security Council that the past history of proposing subsidiary bodies had found the Council consistently holding "that such proposals were substantive in character."¹

With Sobolev's statement completed, the President of the Security Council decided that the resolution be considered procedural and thus must be voted as such under Article 27 paragraph 3 "as a question that was not subject to the veto."² Before a vote was taken several of the Security Council members

¹"The Procedural Debate on Laos," op. cit., p. 55.

At this point the Soviet representative referred to the Secretariat study, Repertoire of the Practices of the Security Council 1946-1951. Sobolev suggested that the past practices of the United Nations left the impression that fact-finding committees are matters of a substantive nature. As examples, Sobolev pointed to the Security Council's inability to appoint a fact-finding committee in the Indonesian question of 1947 and the Ukrainian complaint against Greece in 1946, because of the veto of a permanent member. As further evidence of the present proposals break with precedent, Sobolev reiterated the statement on voting by the Big Powers at San Francisco June 7, 1945: "Decisions and actions by the Security Council may well have major political consequences and may even initiate a chain of events begins when the Council decides to make an investigation." Within the context of the conclusions reached at San Francisco, Sobolev believed that in matters of peace and security all the permanent members must be beyond even a fact-finding committee. Lastly, the Soviet representative reminded the Council that the San Francisco statement was very clear on the matter of what is and what is not procedural. He said: "the decisions regarding the preliminary question as to whether or not such a matter is procedural must be taken by a vote of seven members of the Security Council, including the concurring votes of the permanent members." "The Procedural Debate on Laos," Ibid., p. 55.

²"Request from Laos for Assistance," op. cit., p. 567.

requested the floor to reply to the Soviet delegate's charges.

Noteworthy here was the statement by the United Kingdom's

Sir Pierson Dixon. Dixon stated;¹

The suggestion has been made . . . that the proper instrument for dealing with the present situation in Laos was the international commission (International Control Commission set up under Geneva Accord of 1954). The United Kingdom Government considered that the commission had performed a useful task in supervising the application of the ceasefire agreement, but it was necessary to take account of the changes which had occurred since the ceasefire was achieved.

It should be recalled, Dixon noted:

That the international commission had adjourned sine die in July 1958. The Geneva agreements were still in force, and in the opinion of his government, Laos had fully complied, and continued to comply, with provisions of those agreements. But . . . Laos maintained that once the political settlement with the Pathet Lao had been achieved, Laos was no longer obliged to submit to the supervision of the international commission, and the United Kingdom Government believed that Laos was entitled to take that view.

The real point at issue . . . was that Laos was a sovereign state and a member of the United Nations entitled under the Charter to have recourse to the Organization. It would surely be quite wrong for the Council to deny Laos the right of recourse to the United Nations and to insist that she submit herself again to supervision of an organization established before she became a member of the United Nations and whose presence on her soil she evidently considers incompatible with her newly gained sovereignty.²

At this point the British representative turned to the task of refreshing his colleagues as to the contents of the final

¹"Security Council Meets on Laos," op. cit., pp. 25-26.

²"Security Council Meets on Laos," Ibid., p. 26.

declaration of the Geneva Conference of July 21, 1954. Dixon noted that it was in this Declaration that every member of the conference "undertook to respect the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, and to refrain from interference in their internal affairs."¹

With the debate completed, President Ortona moved for a vote on the draft resolution which was approved 10 to 1. The resolution adopted by the Security Council at its 848th meeting on September 7, 1959 stated as follows:

The Security Council decides to appoint a sub-committee consisting of Argentina, Italy, Japan and Tunisia, and instructs this sub-committee to examine the statements made before the Security Council concerning Laos, to receive further statements and documents and to conduct such inquiries as it may determine necessary, and to report to the Council as soon as possible.²

This was the foundation for the legal presence of the United Nations in Laos during the fall of 1959 and spring of 1960. The sub-committee was sanctioned by the Security Council, but the

¹In the discussion, the French representative Armand Berard noted: "The Geneva agreements . . . sanctioned the independence and territorial integrity of Laos. They had in no way established permanent trusteeship over Laos. The international commission had had the task of verifying the application of the clauses of the armistice. There had never been in the mind of the Geneva negotiators or in the letter of the agreements any intention of conferring on the commission an exclusive monopoly of jurisdiction. Moreover, Laos had become a member of the United Nations and as such had the right to appeal to the United Nations when it deemed it necessary." Ibid.

²"Resolution adopted by the Security Council at its 848th meeting on September 7, 1959 concerning the question of Laos," United Nations Security Council S/4216 dated September 8, 1959.

political foundation for the United Nations presence, and the sub-committee's diplomatic service was under the Secretary-General of the United Nations. This became obvious in the way President Ortona and the majority in the Security Council treated the Laotian request. And soon after the adoption of the draft resolution, the Secretary-General became the central figure. To quote from the "Report of the Security Council Sub-Committee,"¹ the Secretary-General's presence started on September 8th and continued, until the United Nations sub-committee departed for Laos September 12, 1959. "In the course of its first five meetings, which were held in New York. . . , the Sub-Committee considered the nature and scope of its duties and the relevant documents. It held meetings with the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General, who informed it of the background of the situation."²

On September 15, 1959, the date of Premier Khrushchev's visit to the U.S., the United Nations sub-committee arrived at Vientiane.³ The Kingdom of Laos had established a Liaison Committee to aid the United Nations in fulfilling the Security Council

¹"Report of the Security Council Sub-Committee established under resolution of September 7, 1959," United Nations Security Council S/4236 dated November 5, 1959.

²"Report of the Security Council Sub-Committee established under resolution of September 7, 1959," *ibid.*

³Members of the United Nations Sub-Committee were: Argentina: Brigadier-General Ahrens; Italy: Minister Plenipotentiary Baratteri; Japan: Ambassador Shibushawa (Chairman of Sub-Committee); Tunisia: Ambassador Habib Bourguiba, Jr.

resolution.¹ With the cooperation of the Laotian Government, the Sub-Committee held consultations with Government officials, and visited Sam Neua province, where the basic area of armed conflict had been taking place. On October 10th, "the Sub-Committee, being of the opinion that it had received the essential basic information for its fact-finding mission, decided . . . to return to New York to prepare a report to the Security Council."² In order to maintain a United Nations presence in Laos, the Sub-Committee left behind two representatives and a secretariat. This was done with the idea that they "would answer any request for clarification and supply any additional information which might be required by the Sub-Committee in the writing of the report. Furthermore, they would give information of material change in the situation if occasion arose."³

The significance of the United Nations presence in Laos became obvious two days after the Security Council passed the draft resolution of the United States. On September 9th, the Pathet Lao offense in Sam Neua province stopped, and radio Hanoi began a peace offensive.⁴ Laotian Premier Phoui Sananikone reported in an

¹Members of the Laotian Liaison Committee were: Inpeng Surysdhay, Oudone Sananikone, Noupbat Chounramany, Bouany, Koupasith Abhay, Tianethone Chantharasy.

²"Report of the Security Council Sub-Committee established under resolution of September 7, 1959," *ibid.*, p. 12.

³*Ibid.*

⁴"United States White Paper on Laos," Current History XXXX (March, 1961), p. 179.

interview with Time correspondent Paul Hurlburt: "It has been a week since our Army has made contact with the Viet Minh, and our commanders in the north say that they have withdrawn to North Vietnam."¹ This situation continued, while the United Nations presence was maintained.

On October 13, 1959 the Sub-Committee departed from Laos, and returned to New York arriving October 21st. On November 3rd, the Sub-Committee approved their report and submitted it to the Security Council. In summary, the report did not establish aggression on the part of North Vietnam against the Kingdom of Laos. In their report, the Sub-Committee concluded:

After examination of documents and statements, interviews with witnesses and visits . . . to Laos's north and northeast provinces, the fact-finding Sub-Committee of the Security Council has found that, generally speaking, although there were military actions of different scope and magnitude, all of them throughout four periods between July 16 and October 11 were of a guerrilla character.

From the statements of the Laotian authorities and from those of some witnesses, it appeared . . . that certain hostile operations must have had centralized coordination. Hostile elements . . . seemed centered on former members of the Pathet Lao combat units previously integrated in 1957: the 2nd Battalion of Pathet Lao, which deserted from the Plaine des Jerres on May 11, 1959, and sections of the frontier minorities consisting of Thais, Mao, and a few Khan.

The ensemble of the information submitted to the Sub-Committee did not clearly establish whether there were crossings of the frontier by regular troops of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.²

¹"Laos," Time LXXXIV (September 20, 1959), p. 24.

²"Report of the Security Council Sub-Committee established under resolution of September 7, 1959," op. cit., p. 34.

Although the evidence wasn't considered conclusive regarding aggression by North Vietnam, the Sub-Committee left two members of the committee with a secretariat behind to provide further information to the Sub-Committee in New York. In addition, the Secretary-General sought another way to keep the United Nations presence, when the Sub-Committee report showed a lack of North Vietnamese presence in Laos. On November 9th, Jorge Illuecs of Panama, President of the Security Council for November, announced that the Secretary-General was going to visit Laos, and that this visit had "no link with the Sub-Committee report. It is based on the general responsibility of the Secretary-General under the Charter."¹

Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold arrived in Vientiane November 10, 1959. After consultations with Phoui Sananikone and Khamphan Penay for five days, the Secretary-General requested the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission in Europe, Sakari Severi Tuomioja, to join him in Laos.² Tuomioja arrived on November 15th. He was there:

to review the economic situation of Laos and in particular the role of economic and technical assistance rendered by the United Nations for the furtherance of economic growth and stability.³

¹"Secretary-General's Trip," United Nations Review VI (December, 1959), p. 2.

²A former Premier and Finance Minister of Finland.

³Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold quoted in "Tuomioja Report on Laos Recommends Co-Ordinated Action by United Nations for Kingdom's Development" which was received by the writer from the United Nations Information Agency, Bangkok, Thailand as an enclosure to a letter from the UNIES officer in Charge, Prayoon Nanakon, dated April 28, 1969. See appendix p. 260 for letter and text of the report.

Tuomioja's arrival was the signal for the departure of the Secretary-General on November 16th. With the Secretary-General went the remaining members of the Sub-Committee of the Security Council. But most important, a United Nations presence was maintained.

During Tuomioja's stay in Laos there was continued a lull in the fighting along the North Vietnamese frontier of Laos. Within the context of this situation, Tuomioja and his staff developed a non-political image of the United Nations presence by delving into the social and economic problems of Laos. The results of this endeavor took the form of a report submitted by Tuomioja to the Secretary-General December 17, 1959.¹ Tuomioja could submit his findings in this manner, since he was in Laos as the personal representative of the Secretary-General.

With a non-political cover in the form of an economic mission in Laos, Tuomioja and his successor in March, 1960 Zellweger, were able to keep both the Secretary-General informed about the small scale engagements between the Royal Army and Pathet Lao.² During this time, Tuomioja and Zellweger performed in a political role.

When an Army coup d'etat took place December 30, 1959, Tuomioja informed the Secretary-General of the conflict between Premier Phoui Sananikone and the Committee in Defense of the

¹"Tuomioja Report on Laos Recommends Co-Ordinated Action by United Nations for Kingdom's Development," *ibid.*

See appendix p. 260 for text of the report.

²Zellweger was a noted Swiss jurist and diplomat.

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National Interest. While it is true the Royal Army did conduct themselves in a manner that is above criticism, the Army may have remained in power and thus a necessary lever for the Soviet Union to intervene had not Hammarskjold insisted on the restoration of civilian rule.

In a letter dated January 4, 1960, the Secretary-General reminded King Sri Savan Vathana of his promise to him in November that "no change will take place which could raise doubt with regard to the basic foundation of the policies of the country and the confidence they have created."¹ Hammarskjold added that "a propitious beginning had been made to give effect to the United Nations interest in the country and that to date a favorable result seemed to have been achieved by the United Nations presence in Laos,"² in granting the Kingdom "independent neutrality and democratic progress."³ The King formed a new government with Kou Abhay as Premier.⁴

With the formation of a coalition government we close the chapter of a United Nations presence in Laos. While it is true the United Nations continued in name to be present, its value was lessened by Washington's decision in the spring of 1960 to back a right wing government represented by the Committee in Defense of the

¹Dag Hammarskjold quoted in Edwin F. Stanton, op. cit., p. 340.

²Ibid.

³Dag Hammarskjold quoted in Thomas E. Ennis, "Operation Survival in Laos," op. cit., p. 154.

⁴A member of the King's Council.

National Interest.¹ This effort reached a climax on August 8th, when Captain Kong Le led his paratroopers in a revolt that resulted in the CDNI gaining a temporary hold on Laos. With the return of the right-wing government, political confusion resulted in Laos. This would diminish somewhat when Souvanna Phouma announced the formation of a new government on August 14th. Souvanna Phouma stated the government would be committed to a policy of "true and wise neutrality."² With this accomplished, Souvanna Phouma invited the Pathet Lao to enter into discussions to begin in October, but they were inhibited by the action of the United States.³

¹Arthur J. Dommen, op. cit., p. 136.

²Souvanna Phouma quoted in Arthur J. Dommen, op. cit., p. 148.

³"The Crisis in Laos," The Department of State Bulletin XXXXII, September 26, 1960, p. 499.

CHAPTER X

TO THE BRINK IN LAOS

It is safer as well as more constructive to be involved in the attempt to settle disputes than to find ourselves involved in the consequences of their not being settled.¹

On May 16, 1961 a Fourteen-Nation International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question convened in Geneva. Once again a protracted search began to extract the Kingdom of Laos from the Cold War. After 87 meetings and 14 months of negotiations, the Conference representatives agreed on a Declaration and Protocol.² These Agreements were signed July 23, 1962.

These Agreements were significant for several reasons. First, the basis for the Agreements included a combination of

¹Hamilton F. Armstrong, "Then and Now," Foreign Affairs XXXXI (October, 1962), p. 5.

²"Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos," and "Protocol to the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos," Great Britain; Office of Foreign Affairs, International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question: Geneva (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1962). The nation-states with representatives at the Conference were Burma, Cambodia, Canada, China, France, India, Laos, North Vietnam, Poland, South Vietnam, Thailand, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

international pressure and the Laotian quest to terminate conflict. Second, the Agreements were achieved in spite of the bitter hostility between North Vietnam and the United States, and the rivalry of Communist China with the Soviet Union. Third, the Declaration and Protocol are significant for they are the only international agreements signed by the United States and Communist China.¹

Prior to these 14 months of protracted negotiations there is a history of inconsistent concern to maintain the Kingdom of Laos in a neutralized status. For the United States, the inconsistent concern for Laos emanated from a general distaste for Asian politics and an inflexible attitude towards communist nation-states. In part, the reasons were historical and because of the post-World War II experience in Europe, China, and then Korea. Also, as Bernard B. Fall remarked in answer to the question: "How did the United States get interested in Laos in the first place?"² Fall replied: "A simple and not inaccurate answer is: France asked the United States to step in."³ And finally, there was the general reluctance to underwrite the development of modern nation-states in an environment without the competitive political experience present in the West.⁴

¹Arthur Lall, How Communist China Negotiates (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. v.

²Bernard B. Fall, "Reappraisal in Laos," Current History XXXXII (January, 1962), p. 9.

³Ibid.

⁴William C. Johnstone, "United States Policy in Southern Asia," op. cit., p. 66.

For the Communist-bloc nation-states led by the Soviet Union, Indochina was sufficiently underdeveloped and anti-colonial to present the basis for Communist insurgency and subversion. But the opportunity was compromised by the rivalry between Communist China and the Soviet Union. Second, the general fragmentation within Eastern Europe prevented the undivided attention of the Soviet Union upon Asian politics. Third, Communist China was suffering through the stresses of economic and political breakdown due to the failure of the Great Leap Forward and the questioning of Mao Tse-tung's leadership by a faction led by Liu Shao-chi.¹

Finally, an important factor in the inconsistent concern for Laos was related to the dramatic changes taking place within the international political system. Reference here is to such changes as the relative unimportance of ideology in the 1960's, the scale of limitation present in the utilization of war as a means for effecting political power, and the fragmentation within the industrialized world between the United States, Japan, and Western Europe, and the rest of the industrialized world. This breakdown in the international political system was also very apparent in the relationship of the third world of underdeveloped nation-states and the industrialized nation-states.²

Whatever the reasons presented to identify the causes behind

¹Yuan-li Wu, "Farm Crisis in Red China," Current History XXXXIII (September, 1962), pp. 162-167, 182.

Shen-Yu, "Party Rule in Communist China," Current History XXXXIII (September, 1962), pp. 168-173, 182-183.

²See text pp. 3-6 for discussion of these variables.

the inconsistent concern for the neutrality of Laos, the theme present in the period 1954 through 1961 was a nation-state on the verge of collapse and confinement within the East or West alliance system. Yet, when the situation in Laos moved to the level of overt confrontation and possible defeat for one of the power blocs, a reduction in the degree of tension was achieved through an exchange by the Communist and non-Communist power blocs.

This exchange involved the neutralization of Laos at a particular time in the Cold War, when the advantage seemed to favor one of the power blocs. In other words, neutralization was exchanged for the limited advantage of equilibrium in Indochina and the effects of this regional equilibrium upon the international balance of power between the power blocs. This was most obvious in the United Nations' presence. Khrushchev had the advantage vis-a-vis Communist China in 1959, and to the Soviet leader detente was the correct posture to take in order to have economic development and competition with the United States. Thus, the Communist bloc did not place any real major barriers before the United Nations' presence in Laos.

When the United Nations' presence was removed in the spring of 1960, the reasons for the removal had to do with the Cold War. This new phase of the Laotian crisis began in December, 1959, when a coup d'etat resulted in the eventual return of pro-United States Phoui Sananikone to power.¹ With the right-wing faction back in power, the Pathet Lao began to escalate their insurgency against

¹Arthur J. Dommen, op. cit., p. 124.

the government in Vientiane. From January, 1960 through July, 1960, the military situation in Laos was confused. Then, on August 9 Captain Kong Le overthrew the government of Phoui Sananikone. Leadership passed to the neutralist faction headed by Souvanna Phouma. On August 14, Souvanna Phouma declared that his government was "pledged to national reconciliation and to neutrality in foreign policy."¹

Prince Souvanna Phouma began negotiations with the Pathet Lao in October, 1960, in order to bring the Pathet Lao and their leader Prince Souphanouvong back into the government. The discussions between Souvanna Phouma and his half-brother Souphanouvong were fragmented by the decision of Prince Boun Oum to establish a pro-United States government.²

According to the State Department "the United States has no desire to intervene in the internal affairs of Laos."³ This is subject to question, if the United States Embassy in Laos or the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress can be accepted as authoritative sources regarding United States foreign policy.⁴ Both agencies agree that the United States desired

¹"International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question," op. cit., p. 3.

²Clyde R. Mark, "The Geneva Conference on Laos, 1961-1962," The Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service DS-552/F-293 Washington, D.C. p. 5.

³"The Crisis in Laos," Department of State Bulletin XLIII (September 26, 1960), p. 499.

⁴"Laos," United States Embassy in Laos, op. cit., p. 7.
Clyde R. Mark, loc. cit.

to see a coalition government. But it was to include only the neutralist faction headed by Souvanna Phouma and the right-wing leader Boun Oum.¹ With this policy in mind, the United States curtailed further assistance to the government of Souvanna Phouma and "Thailand established a blockade on all shipments to the areas under Souvanna Phouma's control."² Now, Souvanna Phouma accepted "a Soviet offer of an airlift from Hanoi."³ This airlift began to land in Vientiane on December 11.⁴

When Souvanna Phouma turned to the Soviet Union for assistance, the initial United States reaction was to provide unlimited assistance to right-wing General Phoumi Nosavan.⁵ This was sufficient to bring about a temporary military victory against the Communist forces, and the establishment of Boun Oum as Prime Minister. Souvanna Phouma was forced to leave Laos for Cambodia between December 9 and 15.⁶ The State Department White Paper

¹Ibid.

²"Laos," loc. cit., p. 7.

³Ibid.

⁴Arthur J. Dommen remarked: "On the runway at the Vientiane airport by the afternoon of December 11 (1960), in full view of American observers, olive-drab Ilyushins were unloading six 105-mm howitzers complete with ammunition and North Vietnamese gun crews to man them (neither Kong Le nor the Pathet Lao had any cannoneers). Arthur J. Dommen, op. cit., p. 167.

⁵"Laos," United States Embassy in Laos, op. cit., p. 7.
General Phoumi Nosavan is the nephew of Premier Sarit Thanarat of Thailand and the former Laotian Defense Minister under Phoui Sananikone.

⁶"United States White Paper on Laos," op. cit., p. 180.

concluded that Souvanna Phouma's departure was evidence of the fact that he and his Cabinet "thus abandoned any realistic pretense of fulfilling their responsibility as a Government."¹

On December 12, the Laotian National Assembly voted the censure of and no confidence in the Souvanna Phouma government, "which was thereupon dismissed by the King's royal ordinance."² A second royal ordinance appointed as the provisional government, the government presided over by Prince Boun Oum. On January 4, 1961 the Laotian National Assembly endorsed the government of Boun Oum. The United States recognized this government. "At the same time, Prince Souvanna Phouma and his administration returned to Laos, and, supported by the Pathet Lao, claimed to be continuing as the lawful government, from their seat in the Plain of Jars."³ "This latter authority was recognized as the government of Laos' by the Soviet Union' and certain other Powers."⁴

Thirteen days before John F. Kennedy became President of the United States, the Eisenhower Administration issued a "White Paper"⁵ on Laos. With the issuance of the White Paper, the Administration brought to a climax the steps taken, since August, to align the Kingdom of Laos with the United States.

¹Ibid., p. 179.

²Ibid.

³International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question op. cit., p. 3.

⁴Ibid.

⁵"United States White Paper on Laos," op. cit., pp. 179-181.

The White Paper disclosed that the Eisenhower Administration had never intended to recognize or assist a neutralized Laos that included the Pathet Lao within the government. "The history of its struggles to date reveals the incontrovertible fact that there never has been any threat to the security of Laos but that which has come from its Communist neighbors. These efforts to undermine its national integrity have been insidious and constant."¹ For Laos to remain independent, "non-Communist nations of the world' must 'render the assistance it has requested."² This is most necessary, according to the State Department, because "if Laos should be seized by the Communists, the effects could be far-reaching and the implications for other small and vulnerable states all too evident."³

The Soviet Union's decision to provide direct logistical support to Kong Le and the Pathet Lao was structured as an action by a co-chairman and member of the 1954 Geneva group responsible for the adherence of every nation-state to the neutralization of Indochina. This conclusion regarding the Soviet Union's involvement is attained from the Soviet note to the United States dated December 13, 1960. The Note stated:

Being one of the participants and chairmen
of the Geneva Conference on Indochina,
the Soviet Government decisively protests the

¹Ibid., p. 181.

²Ibid., p. 180.

³"United States White Paper on Laos," Ibid., p. 181.

United States intervention in the internal affairs of Laos and condemns this intervention.¹

This intervention by the United States, according to the Soviet note, "undermines the Geneva agreements and is directed against the freedom and independence of the Laotian people, against its inalienable right to conduct a policy of peace, neutrality, and friendship with all peoples."²

On December 17th, the United States responded to the Soviet note. This Note expressed a "categorical rejection"³ of all the accusations made by the Soviet Union. The Note came within the time frame of the Laotian crisis, when Souvanna Phouma had fled Laos for Cambodia and Captain Kong Le joined his paratroopers with the Pathet Lao forces in northeastern Laos. According to the United States Embassy in Laos "shortly thereafter, the National Assembly passed a vote of no confidence in the Souvanna Phouma government and a new cabinet under Prince Boun Oum was legally invested."⁴

As the Laotian crisis was escalating into the first frontal confrontation of the bi-polar powers in Indochina, an international dialogue began to reconstitute a neutralized Laos. On December 15, 1960 Prime Minister Nehru of India sent notes to the

¹"Soviet Note to the United States, December 13, 1960," Department of State Bulletin XLIV (January 2, 1961), p. 17.

²Ibid.

³"United States Note to the U.S.S.R., December 17, 1960," Department of State Bulletin XLIV (January 2, 1961), p. 15.

⁴"Laos," United States Embassy in Laos, op. cit., p. 7.

co-chairmen (Soviet Union and Great Britain) of the 1954 Conference.¹ Nehru requested that the International Control Commission be reconvened and another conference be held. Lord Home of Great Britain referred to Nehru's note in remarks to the House of Lords. Home agreed with Nehru's suggestion, but noted "that the Commission could only function with the co-operation of the Laotian government and rebels."² "H.M. Ambassador in Moscow was instructed to express to the Soviet Government the serious concern of Her Majesty's Government at the situation developing in Laos, and to express the hope that the Soviet Government would share the view that foreign assistance to the rebels in Laos should stop."³

The Soviet Union replied to Nehru's suggestion on December 22. Moscow agreed that the Geneva Conference should be reconvened with the same membership.⁴ The Soviet Note agreed the International Control Commission should be reconstituted to supervise a ceasefire. But here a difference arose. The Soviet Union desired to see the ICC "contact"⁵ the government of Souvanna Phouma. This would be unacceptable, since Souvanna Phouma's government was recognized only by the Communist bloc of nation-states. "Her Majesty's Government and many other governments

¹"International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question," op. cit., p. 3.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., p. 4.

⁵Ibid., p. 4.

continued to recognize the government of Prince Boun Oum which on January 5, 1961 finally completed the formalities required by the Constitution. They therefore did not accept the Soviet proposal."¹

On December 31st, Arthur J. Dommen interviewed the deposed Prince Souvanna Phouma. Dommen states:

"The Prince immediately declared that the National Assembly's censure of him, on December 12, was not valid because it had been voted during an extraordinary session held in neither the royal capital nor the administrative capital, but in Savannakhet. He regarded the King's dealing with the Revolutionary Committee as *maladroit* and beyond the royal authority. An underlying factor here was the long-standing personal rivalry between the vice-regal branch of the royal family and the royal family itself, which had lain barely beneath the surface since formation of the *Lao Issara* in 1945.

The Prince said that he had not submitted his resignation to the King and made no mention of sending to Luang Prabang a telegram indicating his willingness to resign. He contended that he was still Prime Minister. The 1947 Constitution offered no guideposts. It did not indicate how soon a Prime Minister must resign after losing the confidence of the National Assembly, but merely stated, in Article 22, that the 'vote of a motion of censure involves the resignation of the entire Government.'"²

¹Ibid., p. 4.

²Arthur J. Dommen, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

Communist China began to show an interest in a diplomatic settlement to the Laotian crisis in December, 1960. Chinese Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi addressed letters to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and British Foreign Minister Home dated December 26.¹ In these letters, Ch'en Yi called upon the co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference of 1954 "to stop the actions of the U.S. government and its vassal the Thailand government, in violation of international law and the Geneva agreements."² Ch'en Yi continued:

The Chinese government fully endorses the proposal put forward by the government of the U.S.S.R. in its note to the British government dated December 22, 1960 and by Pham Van Dong, minister of foreign affairs of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, in his letter to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference dated December 24, 1960, namely to convene a conference of the participants of the 1954 Geneva conference and resume the activities of the international commission for supervision and control in Laos so as promptly to stop the U.S. government's intervention and aggression in Laos and restore peace there.³

This was a very dramatic turn of events in the eventual reconvening of the Geneva Conference. Communist China was in the midst of a confrontation with the Soviet Union. At the Party Congress of the C.P.S.U. in October, 1961, the obvious differences

¹"Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi's letters to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and British Foreign Minister Home dated December 28, 1960" appeared in Peking Review IV (January 6, 1961), p. 19.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

regarding the path to communism became clear to the rest of the world.¹

In spite of the Sino-Soviet conflict, which was in part based on the means for achieving Communism, Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi suggested a peaceful settlement to the Laotian crisis. Here, China was not acting out the role of a doctrinaire Communist nation-state, but rather as a typical nation-state. This can be seen in Ch'en Yi's request for a conference based upon China's concern "to safeguard its own security."² This security would be achieved, according to Ch'en Yi, by having a neighboring Laos free of foreigners from both power blocs. To Ch'en Yi this could be attained only by a neutralized Laos. And a conference was the means most acceptable to the Chinese for the achievement of a neutralized Laos.³

Ch'en Yi's letter was significant not only for the fact that

¹At the Congresses and Conference discussed, Peking denied Khrushchev's thesis of peaceful roads to communism; instead, the Chinese insisted that wars are inevitable as long as capitalism persists. Charles B. McLane notes: As the result of this conflict the general policy of Peking from 1960 forward was "to obstruct Moscow's implementation of peaceful coexistence." Charles B. McLane, "China's Role in the Communist Bloc," Current History XXXXIII (September, 1962), p. 133.

The only real difference in the Sino-Soviet conflict in 1960, and 1961 was that in 1960 the exchanges were veiled, but in 1961 the conflict became very obvious to the world. This was very clear, after Khrushchev attacked China's ally, Albania, at the Twenty-second Congress. Khrushchev's action causes Chou En-lai to leave the Congress. Ibid.

²"Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi's letter to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and British Foreign Minister Home dated December 28, 1960," op. cit.

³Ibid.

China was willing to see the reconvening of a Geneva Conference that included the Soviet Union and several capitalist nation-states, but because China wanted to see a neutralized Laos guaranteed by the International Control Commission under the chairmanship of a recent enemy; namely, India.¹ Ch'en Yi stated:

The Chinese government fully endorses the proposal put forward by the government of U.S.S.R. in its note to the British government dated December 22, 1960 and by Pham Van Dong, minister of foreign affairs of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, in his letter to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference dated December 24, 1960, namely to convene a conference of the participants of the 1954 Geneva conference and resume the activities of the international commission for supervision and control in Laos so as promptly to stop the U.S. government's intervention and aggression in Laos and restore peace there.²

Finally, while Ch'en Yi blamed the crisis in Laos upon the United States, he refrained from using the crisis as a purely

¹Since September 10, 1956 the political relations between China and India had been deteriorating. In the time period under consideration, the Sino-Indian conflict came to a climax in May, 1962, when the China concluded with Pakistan an agreement regarding the border in northwestern Kashmir.

On September 10, 1956 a Chinese Army patrol "threw stones at an Indian Border Security Force unit and threatened to throw hand grenades." . . . "On October 18, 1958, India complained to China about the Ladakh highway completed by the Chinese." . . . "When a unit of 50 Chinese, led by an officer, crossed the easternmost corner of the North-East Frontier Agency in the direction of Burma on September 28, 1958, all of India's boundary became insecure." The Tibetan rebellion in March, 1959 caused further escalation of the conflict. On August 26, 1959, severe fighting broke out at Longju (NEFA) in the course of which C.P.R. troops overran the border and caused numerous casualties to the Indian garrison." "And finally, there was the Pakistan-Chinese settlement of the Kashmir border in May, 1962. Bernard B. Fall, "Red China's Aims in South Asia," Current History XXXXIII (September, 1962), pp. 138-139.

²"Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi's letter to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and British Foreign Minister Home dated December 28, 1960," op. cit.

propaganda vehicle. Mention was made previously that China emphasized her concern in terms of China's security and the viability of neighboring Laos. This theme of China's interest as a nation-state, rather than a member of a Communist alliance system, was evident in that Ch'en Yi made no plea on behalf of the Pathet Lao. Instead, Ch'en Yi advised that the co-chairmen initiate action for a conference by communicating with the "legal government of Laos headed by Prince Souvanna Phouma."¹ Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia added to the diplomatic dialogue regarding Laos by addressing letters to several governments on January 1, 1961. In the letter to Prime Minister Macmillan of Great Britain, Sihanouk recommended "that a Conference on Laos should be held consisting of the signatories of the Geneva Agreement of 1954, plus the members of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos (India, Canada and Poland), and also Thailand and Burma, which border on Laos, and the United States of America."²

Soviet Premier Khrushchev and Chinese Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi agreed to Sihanouk's suggestions.³ Ch'en Yi replied to Sihanouk's letter, and then addressed a second letter to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and British Foreign Minister Home on January 14. Ch'en Yi stated: "China agrees to the positive proposal

¹Ibid., p. 235.

²"His Royal Highness Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia letter addressed to British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, January 1, 1961." Appearing in International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question. Op. cit., p. 4.

³Arthur Lall, op. cit., p. 4.

of His Royal Highness Prince Sihanouk and believes that such a conference, if it could be convened, will certainly help to seek ways to safeguard the Geneva Agreements and restore peace in Laos."¹

British Prime Minister Macmillan answered Prince Sihanouk's letter on January 13. Prime Minister Macmillan agreed that a conference was the best way to achieve neutralization and a relative degree of peace for Laos. But Macmillan advised that a conference was impossible without first having the fighting curtailed, "and that therefore the International Commission for Supervision and Control should return there immediately, in order to bring about a cease-fire."²

On March 23, 1961, the United Kingdom followed up a previous note to Prince Sihanouk by repeating a suggestion that the ICC be reactivated in a note addressed to the Soviet Union.³ In addition, the British called upon the Soviet Union to join them as co-chairmen of the 1954 Conference and call for a cease-fire to be implemented by the ICC. With the cease-fire an accomplished fact, the United Kingdom advised the Soviet Union to join the British in calling for a Geneva Conference.⁴ The Soviet Union's reply to the

¹"Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi's letters to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and British Foreign Minister Home, January 14, 1961," Peking Review IV (January 20, 1961), p. 7.

²"Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's letter to Prince Norodom Sihanouk of January 13, 1961" referred to in International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian question, op. cit.

³"British Aide-Memoire Addressed to Soviet Union, March 23, 1961," Documents of American Foreign Relations 1961 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1962), p. 307.

⁴Ibid.

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British note was dated April 1, 1961. Overall the Soviet Union agreed to the methods suggested by the British for achieving a cease-fire and conference to neutralize Laos.¹

The United States remained on the side lines, while the diplomatic offices of the co-chairmen were preparing the way for the three messages of April 24, which laid the groundwork for the Conference. In part, a reason for this position can be found in the State Department White Paper on Laos issued January 7, 1961.² A second factor of importance had to do with the transition that was taking place in Washington from the presidency of Dwight David Eisenhower to John F. Kennedy.

The White Paper on Laos contributed nothing to the world-wide diplomatic effort being made to neutralize Laos. Rather, the State Department Paper was an effort to turn back the clock of time to an unfragmented Communist movement, and to maintain the United States as the primary benefactor of those nation-states willing to stop Communism. The State Department recommended that the only way Laos could remain independent was for "non-Communist nations of the world to render the assistance it has requested."³ According to the State Department to do less would mean Laos going Communist. "If Laos should be seized by the Communists, the effects could be far-reaching and the implications for other small and

¹"The Soviet Note to Great Britain, April 1, 1961," Department of State Bulletin XLIV (April 17, 1961), p. 544.

²See text p. 203 for reference to the "United States White Paper on Laos," op. cit.

³*Ibid.*, p. 181.

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vulnerable states all too evident."¹

Thirteen days after the Eisenhower Administration published the White Paper on Laos, John F. Kennedy became President of the United States. At first, the new President maintained the policy enunciated by the Eisenhower Administration in the White Paper. This is evident in the State of the Union message delivered by President Kennedy, January 30, 1961.²

In the State of the Union message delivered January 30, President Kennedy maintained the thesis of the State Department White Paper on Laos dated January 7. President Kennedy noted that the major problem in Laos and in the rest of Asia was Communism. He even went one step further than the White Paper exclaiming that it is "the relentless pressure of the Chinese Communist menace' that jeopardizes' the security of the entire area - from the borders of India and South Viet Nam to the jungles of Laos, struggling to protect its newly won independence."³ Kennedy continued:

We seek in Laos what we seek in all Asia, and, indeed, in all of the world-freedom for the people and independence for the government.

¹Ibid.

²"The State of the union: Message of President Kennedy Delivered to the Congress, January 30, 1961," Documents on American Foreign Relations 1961 (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 16-26.

³"The State of the Union: Message of President Kennedy Delivered to the Congress, January 30, 1961," *ibid.*, p. 19.

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And this Nation shall persevere in our pursuit
of these objectives.¹

President Kennedy's initial direction to United States foreign policy as expressed in the State of the Union message was based upon the following facts. In the first place, this was a period of transition in which the quest for the "New Frontier" was important, but also was the need for a sense of continuity with the previous Administration in those areas of basic agreement. And Kennedy seemed to be in agreement with the Eisenhower Administration about the situation in Indochina. As the President stated in his statement of March 23, "in my last conversation with General Eisenhower, the day before inauguration, we spent more time on this hard matter than on any other one thing."²

A second factor in the orientation to the foreign policy of President Kennedy had to do with the realities of international politics. The contemporary scene upon which Kennedy assumed the Presidency, was directed by two primary and two secondary sets of realities.

Since the United Nations presence was removed in Laos, the Cold War in Laos was not cold any more. This obvious primary reality was also a reflection of another basic fact of the new decade; that is, a government's policy founded upon the threat of strategic deterrence (i.e. massive retaliation) would not be sufficient to confront a real threat to the security of a particular

¹Loc. cit.

²President John F. Kennedy, "President's Statement of March 23," Department of State Bulletin XLIV (April 17, 1961), p. 543.

region of the world.

The secondary set of realities, which reflect the primary realities, included the very obvious fact that "neither in the form of a commitment to the Panch Shila, the Nehru-Chou En-Lai Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, nor Seatoism have contained Communist China. India and the area on the rim of the Himalayas - Tibet, Ladakh, Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal - have not been protected by neutralist policies' and now 'Laos . . . and, to a lesser extent, the Republic of Vietnam have suffered erosions of security despite their inclusion under the protective umbrella of SEATO."¹

At a news conference on March 23, President Kennedy indicated a shift in the direction of the technique to be utilized in United States foreign policy. Reading from a prepared statement on the situation in Laos, the President said:

We strongly and unreservedly support the goal of a neutral and independent Laos, tied to no outside power or group of powers, threatening no one, and free from any domination.²

President Kennedy indicated that the United States' assistance to the Boun Oum government is aimed at only one goal, and that is "a truly neutral Laos."³ To underline United States interest in a Laos that is "not a cold-war pawn"⁴ the President

¹Frank N. Trager, "A U.S. Program For Southern Asia," Current History XXXX (March, 1961), p. 129.

²"President's Statement of March 23," op. cit.

³Ibid., p. 544.

⁴Ibid.

offered the following evidence:

First, Kennedy acknowledged that the Laotian crisis was the "most immediate of the problems we found on taking office." Because of its importance, the President felt it necessary "for all Americans to understand this difficult and potentially dangerous problem."¹ Second, the President emphasized the duration with which the United States has dealt with the problem in Laos. Third, in discussing the Laotian crisis going back to 1954 Kennedy noted "real progress was made toward a unified and neutral status" under the direction of an agreement by a large group of nation-states to neutralize Laos. Fourth, in the course of detailing the position of the Administration, President Kennedy stated that first and foremost "we strongly and unreservedly support the goal of a neutral and independent Laos, tied to no outside power or group of powers, threatening no one, and free from any domination." Fifth, President Kennedy stipulated two possible "responses" to the "new dimension" of a Soviet presence in the Laotian crisis.²

What is very interesting about the responses suggested by President Kennedy is that there was no specific mention of a unilateral United States response.³ Instead, the President suggested

¹Ibid., p. 543.

²"President's Statement of March 23," *ibid.*

³President Kennedy made reference to the United States' responsibilities toward Laos in terms of "our response will be in close cooperation with our allies" and "if these attacks do not stop, those who support a genuinely neutral Laos will have to consider their response." Here, the emphasis was upon the multi-lateral, and the kinds of action open to those nation-states interested in Laos. *Ibid.*, pp. 543-544.

two possible multilateral responses: that is, a Geneva Conference or SEATO.

Of the two multilateral responses mentioned by the President, the Administration's preference was for the reconvening of the Geneva Conference. This was the case, because in the President's statement the emphasis was upon the Conference idea.

With reference to the multilateral diplomatic effort under-way among several nation-states, President Kennedy emphasized his preference by stating "we are earnestly in favor of constructive negotiation."¹ Also, the President ended his written statement by making reference once again to the multilateral diplomatic efforts being made to restore Laos to a neutralized status.² Finally, throughout his statement the emphasis was upon a negotiated solution to the Laotian crisis. As he said in closing the March 23 statement:

Careful negotiations are being conducted with many countries in order to see that we take every possible course to insure a peaceful solution.³

In the White Paper of January 7, the primary emphasis was upon the justification for the present unilateral support of the Boun Oum government by the United States. First, there was a description of the unfolding of the Communist threat, which was followed by a statement to the effect that non-Communist nation-states have a moral obligation to assure Laos independence. No mention was made of a multilateral approach in the form of SEATO or the restoration of the Geneva Conference. See partial text of White Paper in appendix p.

¹"President's Statement on March 23," *ibid.*, p. 544.

²*Ibid.*

³*Ibid.*

On the other hand, the context in which President Kennedy referred to SEATO was in the form of a description of the Communist threat. This required "a necessary response." Whereas the Conference idea was viewed as a "way to help Laos back to the pathway of independence and genuine neutrality,"¹ SEATO was mentioned in terms of what it was designed to do: namely, stop aggression. Kennedy said:

SEATO - the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization - was organized in 1954 with strong leadership from our last administration, and all members of SEATO have undertaken special treaty responsibilities toward an aggression against Laos.²

All the President was really emphasizing about SEATO is that it was an alternative. But the President noted that SEATO was an option acceptable to the United States only within the framework of "all members" working together in fulfilling their "special treaty responsibilities toward an aggression in Laos."³ This was never achieved at the March 27 SEATO conference, because Great Britain, the United States, and the other members of SEATO were already in the preparatory phase of realizing a conference to deal with the neutralization of Laos.

On March 26, a White House release noted that President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan had agreed with the contents of the British note to the Soviet Union dated March 23.⁴ This agreement

¹Ibid., p. 544.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴"Joint Communique of March 26," Department of State Bulletin XLIV (April 17, 1961), p. 544. See text p. 220 for a reference to the Soviet note.

set the stage for the next step. In the March 26 release, the Anglo-American leaders requested "the Soviet Union . . . make a positive and constructive reply to these proposals."¹ The Soviet Union's reply to the British note came on April 1.² This reply brought the President to remark on the same day that "the Soviet reply appears to be a useful next step toward a peaceful settlement of a potentially dangerous situation."³ The President continued:

Negotiations for a settlement of the Laotian question will not be simple and may take some time, but the United States will do everything it can to reach a result which will permit the Laotian people to live in peace and take care of their own people.⁴

Negotiations regarding Laos achieved a basis for starting with the issuance of three messages by the co-chairmen of the Geneva Agreement of 1954.⁵ These messages were as follows: First, a message requesting a cease fire on the part of the Laotian factions involved in the military conflict. The co-chairmen agreed a cease fire was very necessary as a preliminary step to a conference. As an added note, the Soviet Union and Great Britain called upon all the Laotian people to cooperate with the International Control Commission in order to implement a cease fire. Second, the

¹Ibid.

²"The Soviet Note to Great Britain," Department of State Bulletin XLIV (April 17, 1961), p. 544.

³"President's Statement of April 1," Department of State Bulletin XLIV (April 17, 1961), p. 644.

⁴Ibid.

⁵"International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question," op. cit., pp. 677.

co-chairmen invited all the nation-states suggested by Prince Sihanouk to an International Conference at Geneva that would begin on May 12. Third, Prime Minister Nehru was asked by the co-chairmen to reconvene the International Control Commission in New Delhi.¹

Two very significant things had been accomplished when the co-chairmen of the 1954 Conference agreed to the means to be utilized in order to achieve a cease fire, and the nation-states affected by the Laotian crisis consented to a diplomatic conference to establish neutralization. First, the positions of the various governments concerned about Laos had been publically reported. This assured a certain amount of structure to the Conference, and also it gave an excellent start to the chances of success for the Conference. Second, the diplomatic exchanges and public pronouncements of the governments involved indicated differences in the reasons for the crisis. But at the same time a common agreement was evident as to the need for an exchange by the power blocs to achieve an equilibrium in Laos, which would leave the Kingdom of Laos in a neutralized political position in the Cold War.

The three messages issued by the co-chairmen brought to a climax a level of agreement among the fourteen interested nation-states to have a Conference. In addition to the co-chairmen's preliminary efforts in April, the other participating nation-states

¹"Message from the Co-Chairmen dated April 24, 1961, appealing for a cease-fire."

"Message from the Co-Chairmen dated April 24, 1961, inviting participants to an International Conference."

"Message from the Co-Chairmen dated April 24, 1961 requesting the Recall of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos," International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question, pp. 6-7, Ibid.

made several significant compromises. For example, the United States agreed to have included in the Laotian faction, the government of Souvanna Phouma. This was accepted by the United States even though there did not exist such a government at the time that was accredited with the United States.¹ The same thing was true of Communist China. Peking recognized Souvanna Phouma, yet the Chinese consented to meet with the Boun Oum government.² Finally, the Pathet Lao were invited to participate, although they did not have a government.³

May 12, 1961 was the day established by the co-chairmen for beginning the Conference. The day passed without a Conference. A problem arose concerning the implementation of the cease fire in Laos.⁴ Communist China demanded that part of the cease fire include the curtailment of all United States assistance to the Boun Oum government.⁵ The United States insisted that there should be a cease fire verified as completed.⁶ Neither nation-state's

¹Arthur J. Dommen, op. cit., p. 150.

²Arthur Lall, op. cit., p. 46.

³George Modelski International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question, 1961-62 (Canberra: The Australian National University, 1962), p. 9.

As a further concession to the 14 nation-states, the co-chairmen agreed to the participation of any Laotian group that had one of the 14 nation-states involved in the Conference as a sponsor. Ibid.

⁴On May 6, 1961 the co-chairmen sent their instructions to the ICC, which had been meeting in New Delhi, since April 28. "Message from the Co-Chairmen dated May 6, 1961, to the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos," International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question, op. cit., p.8.

⁵Clyde R. Mark, op. cit., p. 7.

⁶Arthur Lall, op. cit., p. 47.

demands were met, but a conference was convened on May 16. This came about, because of a report received by the co-chairmen and delegates at Geneva from the ICC on May 12.

The International Control Commission reported "the commission is satisfied that a general de facto cease-fire exists."¹

Arthur Iall reported that the reference to breaches of the cease fire "raised doubts for the United States and the conference was not able to convene on May 12."² It was not until a further message was received from the commission and "backstage persuasions convinced various governments that genuine efforts were being made to stabilize the cease-fire, that the conference opened."³

The Geneva Conference opened on May 16, 1961. In the first and second sessions of the Conference, the participating nation-states continued to maintain general agreement that the final

¹ "First Report of the International Control Commission dated May, 1961," quoted in Arthur Iall, p. 47.

² ³ Arthur Iall, op. cit., p. 47.

Arthur Iall represented India at the 1962 Conference. He was formerly Ambassador to the United Nations and is now Adjunct Professor of Government at the School of International Affairs, Columbia University.

According to the United States Ambassador at the Conference, W. Averell Harriman, the ICC's limited de facto cease fire meant "Such breaches as have been informally complained of are either due to misunderstandings or to such factors as the terrain, the nature and disposition of forces, both regular and irregular, of all parties." Harriman concluded: "The clear inference is that despite the conclusion that "a general de facto cease-fire exists" all was not quiet in Laos. Indeed, even at the time of its first report, the Commission felt it necessary to suggest to the parties that 'pending formal cease-fire agreement, there should be renewed orders on all troops of all commands to observe the cease-fire except when provoked.'"

Ambassador W. Averell Harriman, "Delegation at Geneva Repeats Call for Effective Cease-Fire in Laos," Department of State Bulletin XLIV (June 26, 1961), p. 1024.

solution involved the neutralization of Laos. The main focus of attention and basis for conflict at these sessions had to do with the United States and Communist Chinese positions regarding the cease fire, the role of the ICC in the cease fire, and the future neutralization of Laos.

What the Chinese wanted from the Conference was a guarantee by the participants that Laos would be maintained in a state of neutrality. In other words, the Chinese saw the ICC as an important instrument in the implementation of a cease fire prior to the Conference, but as a body with no acceptable role once the neutrality was guaranteed by the Conference participants.¹ "It was known" among the Conference representatives that "the Chinese government is highly suspicious in general of the concept of control and supervision by foreign powers."²

The United States concern was with the effectiveness of the cease fire, and the role to be played by the ICC during the Conference and in the future as far as implementing the neutrality of Laos. After Ch'en Yi had stated the Chinese position, Secretary of State Dean Rusk followed concentrating his remarks on these three topics: the importance of an effective cease fire, the presence of all Laotian factions at the Conference to assure compliance with the neutrality, and how to include the ICC as an instrument to implement neutrality without compromising the

¹Ibid., pp. 52-55.

²Arthur Lall, *ibid.*, p. 53.

sovereignty of Laos.¹

After complimenting the Chinese on their desire to "make contributions to the peaceful settlement of the Laotian question,"² Secretary Rusk turned immediately to what the United States considered primary in order to guarantee an independent Laos and to assure that the Conference will have some lasting effect on Indochina. Mr. Rusk stated:

An effective cease-fire is a pre-requisite to any constructive result from our proceedings. A failure of a cease-fire would result in a highly dangerous situation, which it is the purpose of the Conference to prevent. I would urge that the Co-Chairmen take this up immediately in order that the situation be clarified, and the ICC given the necessary authorizations and instructions.³

To achieve this effective cease fire, Mr. Rusk suggested that the Laotian factions involved in the conflict must be present at the Conference and the ICC must be given an independent mandate to supervise the cease fire and neutrality throughout Laos. Rusk's reference to the need to have all Laotian factions present had to do with the fact that the Boun Oum government was not represented at Geneva. This problem remained to plague the Conference, until June 22, 1961, when Prince Boun Oum, Prince Souvanna Phouma, and Prince Souphannouvong issued a joint communique. The communique dealt with the political program of the provisional government of

¹Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "International Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian Question: Statement by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, May 17, 1961," Documents on American Foreign Relations 1961 (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), pp. 311-320.

²Ibid., p. 313.

³Ibid., p. 316.

National Union.¹ This joint communique was the key factor in bringing about the presence of the three Laotian factions at the Conference, and for the formation of a coalition government in July, 1962.

Secretary Rusk's main thrust in his opening address to the Conference was concerned with "insuring a genuinely neutral Laos."² Rusk began his argument for a guaranteed neutrality by noting that all nation-states to the Conference agreed to the need for a neutral Laos. This direction to his eventual argument for a viable ICC gave Secretary Rusk a positive thrust tying the United States to a general consensus and allowing the United States representative a degree of flexibility in specifying a major difference with the Chinese.

Having noted the consensus behind neutrality for Laos, Rusk concentrated on broadening the accepted definition of neutrality. Whereas neutrality in the traditional sense referred to a policy of nonalignment, Rusk argued neutrality "must include positive assurance of the integrity of national life."³ Here again, Rusk showed his diplomatic skill, because Ch'en Yi had emphasized that what was being compromised in Laos had to do with its vitality as a cultural and political entity. Arthur Lall noted: "There appeared

¹"Joint Communique of the Three Princes on the Problem of Achieving a National Concord by the Formation of a Government of National Union," International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question, op. cit., pp. 13-14. See text p.234 for discussion of text.

²Secretary of State Dean Rusk, op. cit.

³Ibid., p. 314.

to be enough overlap in the thinking of the Foreign Ministers of Washington and Peking on a concept of neutrality for Laos to make agreement a probability."¹

To fulfill the challenge of insuring a neutral Laos, Secretary Rusk called upon the Conference representatives to provide the means by which Laos can be assured that all foreign assistance has been withdrawn. Mr. Rusk advised this could only be done by the presence of "control machinery" having "full access to all parts of the country without the need for the consent of any civil or military officials, national or local."² Secretary Rusk suggested this element is most necessary, and it is consistent with sovereignty. Mr. Rusk stated:

Neutrality must be consistent with sovereignty. It involves safeguards against subversion of the elements of the state, which is organized, directed, or assisted from beyond its borders. In the end, we must find a way to let the people of Laos live their own lives under conditions of free choice, and under conditions which permit the continuing exercise of choice to adapt institutions, policies, and objectives to the teachings of experience.³

Communist China's representative Ch'en Yi had agreed with the United States Secretary of State in so far as wanting a neutral Laos, the withdrawal of foreign troops, nonalignment for Laos, and the right of the Laotians to decide their own future. The challenge facing the Conference had to do with the very narrow problem of the

¹Arthur Lall, op. cit., p. 56.

²Secretary of State Dean Rusk, op. cit., p. 316.

³ibid., p. 315.

role to be played by the ICC in Laos. Mr. Rusk's discussion of the ICC role "had no parallel in Marshal Ch'en Yi's discourse."¹

Secretary Rusk's recommendation for a control commission to have access and mobility throughout Laos without a check by the Laotian government became a major point of contention with the Chinese throughout the second and third sessions of the Conference. On May 24, Ch'en Yi made his second address to the Conference. Again, like the first session, Ch'en Yi was the first of the major participants to address the Conference. Ch'en Yi showed a willingness to negotiate with the United States on the control commission problem. He said:

For the present there is a great divergence between us and the U.S. Delegates on the definition of neutrality and the question of international machinery. However, we are after all sitting at the same conference table. Provided that there is sincerity for a peaceful settlement of the Laotian question and earnest discussion conducted by seeking for facts and reasoning, it is still possible to reach unanimous agreement.²

Ch'en Yi's flexibility on the control commission problem illustrates how important two factors were in bringing about the eventual neutralization of Laos. There was first of all the basic agreement of the participants that Laos's neutrality was important for reasons of national security, and self-determination. A most obvious evidence of the dedication to neutrality by the Conference representatives can be seen in the attitude and manner presented by all the other delegates towards the United States and Chinese

¹Arthur Iall, op. cit., p. 57.

²Ch'en Yi quoted in Ibid., p. 64.

confrontation. Arthur Lall reports that "most of the major delegations virtually ignored it."¹ More particular, nation-states like France and Cambodia did not mention the differences of the major powers in their statements before the Conference. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko confined his opening address to offering a Soviet proposal on neutrality, withdrawal of foreign troops, and the role played by the ICC in implementing the cease fire.² Gromyko's only castigation was in reference to Ch'en Yi's insistence to speak first on the opening day of the Conference.³ Lord Home remained aloof to the conflict, and confined his public role to presiding over the proceedings with Gromyko.

The third session of the Conference began on June 12. In this session, a number of compromises were achieved including the Chinese acceptance of a coalition government that contained the Boun Oum faction, and the United States agreed to discuss the neutralization of Laos without a complete cease fire being in effect. In this trend towards concession that moved the Conference discussion on to the issue of neutrality, a significant event occurred; that is, the acceptance of neutrality by Soviet Premier

¹Arthur Lall, op. cit., p. 58.

²Ibid.

³Gromyko stated: "The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Comrade Ch'en Yi, quite rightly mentioned in his very colorful intervention that Laos can no longer be in the sphere of activity of SEATO." Ibid.

Reference to Ch'en Yi's colorful intervention has to do with the insistence of the Chinese delegate to speak on the first day, when the Conference was to confine itself to establishing procedure and developing comradee.

Khrushchev and President Kennedy in their conference in Vienna on June 4.¹

What is significant about the Vienna meeting of June 3 and 4 between President Kennedy and Soviet Premier Khrushchev cannot be confined to only what was stated. That was important too, but more significant was the immediate effect on the Conference's third session beginning on June 12 and in the attainment of a neutralized Laos in July, 1962.

President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev agreed to "support" the efforts being made at the Conference to attain "a neutral and independent Laos, under a government chosen by the Laotians themselves, and of international agreements for insuring that neutrality and independence."² In this connection, the bi-polar leaders "recognized the importance of an effective cease-fire."³

In the Joint Statement, Kennedy and Khrushchev brought together the political power of the great powers behind an effective cease fire. This was the position of the United States throughout the Conference meetings.⁴ To the Chinese, an effective cease fire was important as long as the independence of Laos wasn't compromised. Ch'en Yi made a distinction in his second address on May 24 concerning

¹"Joint Statement, Vienna, June 4, 1961," Documents of American Foreign Relations 1961 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1962) pp. 136-137.

²Ibid., p. 136.

³Ibid.

⁴See text pp.226-227 for Secretary of State Rusk's statement on the utilization of the ICC.

the implementation of the cease fire that brought the Chinese in conflict with the Soviet Union and the United States as expressed by the bi-polar leaders on June 4. Ch'en Yi stated:

The Chinese Delegation is in favor of necessary international supervision and control. We deem that it is not necessary to reorganize the present International Commission. As for the terms of reference of the Commission, they should be, of course properly readjusted in accordance with the new conditions. In readjusting the terms of reference of the Commission, a sharp distinction must be drawn between the internal and international aspects of the Laotian question, and interference in the internal affairs of Laos is absolutely impermissible, since Laos is a sovereign state.¹

Ch'en Yi agreed to the need for international control. What bothered the Chinese had to do with the manner with which the ICC would be utilized in Laos. The Chinese representative left the matter of effectiveness open for further discussion, when he stated in the May 24 address that "it is still possible to reach unanimous agreement."² What the Chinese did not do at the Conference in the meeting on June 12 left no doubt that the Chinese were affected by the Kennedy-Khrushchev summit meeting.

Arthur Lall reports "for the meeting of June 12, the Chinese Foreign Minister had inscribed his name as the first speaker."³ This was consistent with the Chinese practice in the two previous sessions to gain respect as a great power vis-a-vis the United States and the Soviet Union. What was inconsistent with Chinese behavior

¹Ch'en Yi quoted in Arthur Lall, op. cit., p. 64.

²Ibid.

³Arthur Lall, ibid., p. 71.

followed the opening statement by United Kingdom's Lord Home.

Lord Home informed the delegates of a communication sent to the ICC by the co-chairmen in which the ICC was asked to make the cease fire more effective.¹ Home asked for comments. Ambassador W. Averell Harriman commented.² This initiative by Home brought a protest from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. Gromyko challenged Home on the grounds that no discussion had taken place between the co-chairmen regarding Home's statement to the Conference, and Harriman's comments that followed.³

For over an hour and a half the Chinese delegation of fifty members sat in silence. When Ch'en Yi was given the floor, the Chinese delegate emphasized in his remarks the progress being made towards the main topic of neutrality.⁴ Arthur Lall remarked: "Though he interspersed his plea that the conference should address itself in a business-like way to the precise task entrusted to it with accusations of United States interference in the affairs of Laos, his language, tone, and general presentation were on the whole mild."⁵ Ch'en Yi emphasized:

¹Clyde R. Mark, op. cit., p. 8.

²Clyde R. Mark commented: Home's "note appeared to be an effort to concede to the United States that the cease-fire approach the effectiveness envisioned by the Americans while still allowing the Chinese room to discount the note as nothing more than a thank you to the ICC." Ibid.

³Arthur Lall, loc. cit., p. 70.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

We are in favor of necessary supervision and control in Laos by the International Commission, but in all its activities the International Commission should respect and not violate the independence and sovereignty of Laos.¹

What stalemated the Conference at this point was the actual situation in Laos. W. Averell Harriman reported on June 26 that "no cooperation has been forthcoming from the Pathet Lao"² for the ICC. Harriman hinted that part of the problem must rest on the shoulders of the Conference members. He said: "The question is whether the conference is to send instructions which by its own words, the Commission desires, or whether we are to sit by while the mission of the ICC in Laos is frustrated and that unhappy country is further overrun by military action."³

A temporary stalemate in the Conference proceedings was overcome on July 3, when the ICC reported that the cease fire was working in an effective manner.⁴ Basic to the cease fire's effectiveness was the agreement among the three Princes on June 22, whereby they agreed to a complete cease fire, an absolute neutrality, and the formation of a coalition government.⁵

Among the provisions of the joint communique by the three

¹Ch'en Yi quoted in Arthur Iall, op. cit., p. 74.

²Ambassador W. Averell Harriman, op. cit., p. 1025.

³Ibid., p. 1023.

⁴Clyde R. Mark, op. cit., p. 10.

⁵"Joint Communique of the Three Princes on the Problem of Achieving National Concord by the Formation of a Government of National Union," International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question, op. cit., pp. 13-14.

Laotian princes for the establishment of the government of National Union were the following elements:

In domestic matters, the Princes agreed:

- (1) "To implement the cease-fire agreement concluded between the three parties concerned in Laos and to see that peace is restored in the country.
- (2) . . .To preserve the unity, neutrality, independence and sovereignty of the nation.
- (3) To ensure justice and peace for all citizens of the Kingdom with a view to appeasement and national concord without discrimination as to origin or political allegiance.
- (4) To bring about the unification of the armed forces of the three parties in a single National Army in accordance with a programme agreed between the parties.¹

On foreign policy matters, they agreed:

- (1) "Resolutely to apply the five principles of peaceful co-existence in foreign relations, to establish friendly relations and to develop diplomatic relations with all countries, the neighboring countries first and foremost, on the basis of equality and sovereignty of Laos.
- (2) Not to join in any alliance or military coalition and not to allow the establishment of any foreign military bases on Laotian territory, it being understood that a special study will be made of what is provided in the Geneva Agreement of 1954; not to allow any country to use Laotian territory for military purposes; and not to recognize the protection of any alliance or military coalition.
- (3) Not to allow any foreign interference in the internal affairs of Laos in any form whatsoever; to require the withdrawal from Laos of all foreign troops and military personnel,

¹"Joint Communique of the Three Princes on the Problem of Achieving National Concord by the Formation of a Government of National Union," op. cit., pp. 13-14.

and not to allow any foreign troops or military personnel to be introduced into Laos.

(4) To accept direct and unconditioned aid from all countries that wish to help Laos build up an independent and autonomous national economy on the basis of respect for Laotian sovereignty.

(5) To respect the treaties and agreements signed in conformity with the interests of the Laotian people and of the policy of peace and neutrality of the Kingdom, in particular the Geneva Agreement of 1954, and to abrogate all treaties and agreements which are contrary to those principles.¹

Among the "immediate tasks" accepted jointly by Princes Boun Oum, Souphanouvong, and Souvanna Phouma were:

(1) Formation of a Government delegation to take part in the International Conference on the settlement of the Laotian question.

(2) Implementation of the cease-fire and restoration of peace throughout the country.

(3) Fulfillment of the undertakings entered into on behalf of Laos at the International Conference on the settlement of the Laotian question and faithful execution of the agreements concluded between the three parties concerned in Laos.

(4) Release of all political prisoners and detainees.

(5) Holding of general elections to the National Assembly for the formation of the definitive Government to include representatives from all three Laotian parties.

(6) During the transitional period, the administrative organs set up during the hostilities will be provisionally left in being.²

The "Joint Communiqué" by the three Laotian Princes did not bring to an end the Conference at Geneva. Instead, the agreement

¹Ibid., p. 14.

²Ibid., p. 14.

by the Princes represented the start of the Laotian phase of the Conference. Now, the three Laotian factions participated in the Conference.

With the three Laotian factions represented at the Conference, the Conference delegates were broken down into committees and there began restricted sessions regarding the contents in the Declaration and the Protocol. This phase continued from July 26 to December 18, 1961. The main basis for discussion by the Conference committees was the "Joint Communiqué" of the Laotian Princes on an Indian proposal dated July 14 and a French proposal dated July 27, 1961. All three proposed drafts for the Declaration and Protocol stipulated:

- (1) To acknowledge the independence and sovereignty of Laos.
- (2) Signatories should refrain from direct or indirect interference in the internal affairs of Laos.
- (3) Laos should not be involved in the international politics of other nation-states.
- (4) To the need of restricting further military assistance to Laos by other nation-states.
- (5) The International Control Commission should supervise the withdrawal of all foreign military forces and equipment.

On December 18, 1961, the delegates from the fourteen nation-states approved the drafts of a Declaration of Neutrality and its attached Protocol. From January to July, 1962, the three Laotian factions organized the coalition government. On July 23, 1962, the final Declaration and Protocol were signed at Geneva, and thus the Conference came to an end after 87 formal and informal meetings over a time span of 14 months. President

John F. Kennedy noted:

It is a heartening indication that difficult, and at times seemingly insoluble, international problems can in fact be solved by patient diplomacy.¹

¹President John F. Kennedy, "Statement by President John F. Kennedy, July 23, 1962," Department of State Bulletin XLV (August 13, 1962), p. 259.

CHAPTER XI

A STEP FORWARD

"the parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall first of all, seek a solution by negotiations, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice."¹

The Neutralization of Laos 1959-1962: A Case Study in the Application of a Theory of Equilibrium is an attempt to orientate the formulation of United States foreign policy with a different approach to international politics. This is an equilibrium approach. Its purpose is to aid in the development of methods consistent with the constants and variables as evidenced in the realities of change in the international political system, and the quest for political power by the nation-states in that system.²

An equilibrium approach begins with the assumption that equilibrium is the necessary basis for the functioning of the international political system. Equilibrium has been suggested as the central reality of international politics today in East Asia.

¹Article 33 of the United Nations Charter quoted by Dag Hammarskjöld in "The Developing Role of the United Nations" United Nations Review VI (September, 1959), p. 8.

²See text pp. 13-14 for description and diagram of the constants and variables in the equation of reality.

In an article titled, "An Equilibrium In East Asia," William P. Bundy writes:

"It is just becoming fashionable among American experts on East Asia to discern a new array of major powers in the area and to describe it as a 'four-power balance.' This theme was developed at length last week in a speech by A. Doak Barnett of the Brookings Institution. It deserves a hard look.

But what sort of 'balance' can there be? It would take a very sophisticated computer indeed to define the common and opposed national interests of the four. For example, the United States and Japan have very close to a common view and can act in parallel on a wide variety of matters. Yet the differences in what each can or will do in Southeast Asia or in its relations with Peking are obvious.

On the other hand, though the Soviet Union and China are the most opposed pair in terms of national and ideological interest, they are bound to act together to support North Vietnam. The real question is whether the complex of relationships will work in the direction of peace over the next decade. As Barnett has said, what the new equilibrium does, in essence, is to impose on each of the four powers 'new and complicated limitations and restraints.'¹

This is assumed, because the international political system consists of nation-states, or organizations representing and reflecting the nation-states. In this international political system of nation-states, the direction to the system is ordered by the national interest demands of the participating nation-states. And among the national interests of these nation-states, national security is the most basic concern of governments in these nation-states. But since a government can never accept a static situation as far as the national security requirement being

¹William P. Bundy, "An Equilibrium In East Asia," The Washington Post, April 26, 1970, p. B5.

fulfilled, peace as a hope of lasting stability does not apply in the international political system. Thus, equilibrium is the goal sought among contesting nation-states.

Equilibrium assumes a settlement among nation-states. This settlement takes the form of a balance of relative power between competing nation-states. Such a settlement is achieved through an acceptable exchange that does not compromise the national security of the nation-states. This equilibrium orientation to international politics is assumed, because:

Politics cannot be extirpated because wherever there is interaction there is interdependence; and whenever there is interdependence there are adjustments to be made that implicate and affect all or many of those who are constitutive of the context.¹

What is implied in equilibrium is that there is no lasting static state of harmony or tranquility, which might be called peace. Rather, there can only be adjustments to a relative power ratio among competing nation-states. Thus, the politics among nation-states, which are constantly searching for better ways to remove doubts about national security, is fluid and subject to change in the balance of national interests among the competing nation-states. Charles E. Merriam stated the case very well for equilibrium, when he said:

The functional situation out of which the political arises is not the demand for force as such, but the need for some form of equilibrium.²

¹Charles E. Merriam, op. cit., p. 9.

²Charles E. Merriam, ibid., p. 2.

Finally, the challenge facing a nation-state interacting with other nation-states in the international political system is that of having the means for the achievement of equilibrium. Here, the basic means is an attitude by government decision-makers, which allows them the flexibility of mind to input into the formulation the factors relevant to the equation of reality. With this attitude, they shall have the basis of measuring what is an acceptable exchange to the nation-state initiating a change in the balance of political power with another nation-state, and the nation-state affected by the change in its political power. George F. Kennan understood the importance of this attitude factor for diplomacy, when he suggested:

The Russian leaders are keen judges of human psychology, and as such they are highly conscious that loss of temper and self-control is never a source of strength in political affairs. They are quick to exploit such evidences of weakness. For these reasons, it is a sine quo non of successfully dealing with Russia that the foreign government in question should remain at all times cool and collected and that its demands on Russian policy should be put forward in such a manner as to leave the way open for a compliance not too detrimental to Russian prestige.¹

A foreign policy with an equilibrium approach would begin with a very different conceptual framework about international politics, then the present containment policy of the United States. With equilibrium as the goal, the United States would begin the formulation phase with the idea of achieving a relative balance of national interests vis-a-vis a competitor, rather than a static

¹George F. Kennan, op. cit., pp. 575-576.

situation of power that is to be maintained by treaty, a collective security arrangement or a preponderance of military might. This balance of national interests would be achieved through an acceptable exchange by the governments involved in a dispute such as that over the status of a nation-state like Laos in the international political system.¹

The containment policy of the United States is the national security policy of this country. It has failed to fulfill the national security requirements of this nation-state, because the policy has not been able to adapt to the changing situation confronting the United States, since 1953. Since the Korean War the United States has accepted four main pillars to be the foundation of international politics. These pillars are:

- (1) a state of political and military deadlock between the Communist and Western groups, reflecting a rough equality or comparability in their military power.
- (2) the fundamental unity of the Communist bloc, whose ingrained hostility to the existing world order was assumed to take precedence over any ideological or strategic differences among its members.
- (3) an at least equal solidarity among the Western nations composing the NATO, who had their own differences on strategy and policy, but were accustomed to submerge them when faced with an immediate threat to their common existence.
- (4) the privileged position of the neutral or nonaligned countries in Asia and Africa, whose

¹Hans J. Morganthau describes equilibrium within the context of a balance of power, which is too viewed "as a universal instrument of foreign policy used at all times by all nations who wanted to preserve their independence, 'and as' a natural and inevitable outgrowth of the struggle of a power." Hans J. Morganthau Politics Among Nations (N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959), p. 187.

supposed immunity from attack by either side had seemed to guarantee them a growing influence in world affairs as well as an opportunity to obtain favors from both competing groups.

To put the containment policy within the context of equilibrium, the policy does not give the United States the means of measuring an acceptable exchange with its competitors, nor the necessary flexibility to deal with change. This failure of containment emanates from the fact that it is a methodology, rather than an approach, for the conduct of foreign policy. As a methodology of foreign policy, containment assumes a confrontation with an ideology, when the Communist ideology has been dead in terms of directing a world-wide Communist conspiracy led by the Soviet Union. What was true as far as a monolithic Communist endeavor in the post-war period of the 1940's began to show signs of fragmentation in 1949, and reached a climatic conclusion in the period between Stalin's death in 1953 and the Eastern European revolutions of 1956.

If the fragmentation within the Communist movement wasn't a sufficient basis for a change in the national security policy of the United States, then the bi-polar capacity to conduct nuclear war should have been an inducement to move away from a policy of reactive confrontation. As of 1953, the Soviet Union's nuclear capability introduced a scale of limitation to the utilization of military might. The United States did not have an approach by which to judge the viability of the methodology of containment. As a result, the United States response was a continuation of containment, but at a higher level of confrontation. Massive retaliation

implemented through brinkmanship reduced the flexibility of the national security policy to two alternatives: an all-out nuclear war or nothing. Some writers have suggested that there was more to our national security in this period; namely, the development of regional collective security arrangements. But as the Counselor of the Embassy of the Republic of South Vietnam, Nguyen Nhan stated to the writer: "SEATO is not a true collective security arrangement in terms of binding the treaty members to a commitment to use force, and it cannot deal with clandestine warfare."¹

What SEATO represents raises another question about the containment policy as a national security policy for the United States. Whereas NATO was constructed as a reaction to the overt aggression by the Soviet Union against Western Europe, SEATO was developed in a time period, where the manifestations of aggression were complicated by a vacuum in Soviet leadership and a China reduced to following a foreign policy of peaceful co-existence with its Asian neighbors. The aggression evidenced in Indochina was that of nationalistic movements utilizing an aspect of Communist methodology developed by Mao Tse-tung in order to circumvent the overt military power of a colonial nation-state. The United States assistance to France might be understandable up through the time period of the Korean War, but with Stalin's death followed by the Korean cease-fire in July, 1953, France's interest in maintaining herself in Southeast Asia had little

¹Counselor Nguyen Nhan of the Embassy of the Republic of South Vietnam interviewed at the embassy in Washington, D.C. on August 8, 1967.

See appendix p. 256 for text of interview with Counselor Nguyen Nhan.

to do with the national security of the United States. At this time, France should have been pressured into granting self-determination to the Iao Issara and the Communist Pathet Iao and Viet Minh. But France wasn't, because the Administration believed NATO would be weakened, and we are today suffering from the image of being a neo-colonial power in Asia.

SEATO was constructed to maintain a static situation in Southeast Asia. Not only is this evidenced in the membership within the Treaty, but the Treaty was aimed at preventing further penetration of Communism into the underbelly of Asia in a time period, when Communism was dead as a unified ideologically led movement.

This emphasis in SEATO upon maintaining the status quo is another basic characteristic of containment. The collective security aspect of the containment policy was designed to perpetuate a ratio of political power between East and West in the 1950's, when there was no monolithic Communist movement nor a preponderance of military might in the hands of the United States. Instead, the 1950's began to bring to full development the fragmentation of military might in the world, and the growing role of the third world of underdeveloped nation-states in acting out political roles in the confrontation between the industrialized nation-states of the West and the emerging world power of the Soviet Union and Communist China.

Finally, the containment policy tends to limit United States foreign policy to only one aspect of political power: military might. This limitation upon the orientation of United States

national security policy is a reflection of several factors. These are:

First, a natural tendency of the American people to withdraw from the political aspect of involvement in the world. Historically, this has been a reflection of our own economic well-being, and a distrust of foreigners. Thus, the American people have shared with Rudyard Kipling an attitude of superiority towards the outside world and a natural reluctance to interact with other nation-states in international politics. With Rudyard Kipling, they exclaimed in 1789 and 1969:

The Stranger within my gate
 He may be true or kind.
 But He does not talk my talk-
 I cannot feel his mind.
 I see the face and the eyes and the mouth,
 But not the soul behind.

The men of my own stock
 They may do ill or well,
 But they tell the lies I am wanted to,
 They are used to the lies I tell;
 And we do not need interpreters
 When we go to buy and sell.

The Stranger within my gates,
 He may be evil or good,
 But I cannot tell what powers control-
 What reasons sway his mood;
 Nor when the Gods of his far off land
 May repossess his blood.¹

Second, the success of the economic experiment in this country reduced the importance of the trinity of beliefs down to what was expedient and workable as evidenced in American technology and management. As a result, the United States entered upon a regional

¹Rudyard Kipling, op. cit., p. 30.

role in the Pacific theater of international politics at the time of the Spanish-American War with an advanced technology, but without a public philosophy to relate power, prosperity, and freedom to each other.

Third, Pearl Harbor represented a watershed in the national security policy of the United States. The defeat suffered on December 7, 1941 was a lesson for the reluctant American about the importance of national security vis-a-vis other national interest demands. If the United States had been a consistent participant in international politics after becoming a Pacific power in 1899, the effects of Pearl Harbor on the American people might have been different. What happened as the result of the vacuum of participation on the part of the United States was an identification of political power in international politics with military might. In other words, the United States entered international politics with a direction to its foreign policy that was security orientated, rather than trying to achieve equilibrium with its competitors through an exchange leading to influence and authority for the United States. This was the beginning of containment in so far as the emphasis upon the negative aspect of political power - military might - and the domination of security in the allocation of human and material resources in foreign policy.

While the United States had the technological lead in weaponry, there didn't seem to be any need to question the containment policy. As stated previously, this all changed in 1953, and most certainly sputnik in 1957 left the United States with a vacuum of political power vis-a-vis its competitors in the international

political system. Military might and collective security, which were manifestations of the level of military might, were not competitive with peaceful co-existence and protracted war in developing influence and authority for the United States. By 1958, the United States had reached a stalemate in political power, because the containment policy had been confining this country to the most base kind of political power.

To find an alternative to the present means for formulating United States national security policy, a study was made of the neutralization of Laos by the United Nations in 1959 and the Geneva great power group in 1962. Here, evidence was found of political power achieved by the interested nation-states without resort to military might. In both instances international politics as applied in Laos called for an exchange by which equilibrium could be maintained. In part, this was the case, because Laos was representative of the movement of international politics from being a confrontation of military might between advanced nation-states to a conflict in terms of a political power display in the dimensions of scaled limitation as dictated by the presence of nuclear weapons. More important, the nation-states involved in the neutralization of Laos were willing to exchange neutrality for a competitive power play by bloc forces. Finally, there was the impressive fact that the United States temporarily breached the wall of the containment policy in favor of equilibrium in the case of the neutralization of Laos 1959-1962.

Based upon a study of the containment policy and the two case studies, the writer concluded political power doesn't grow out

of the barrel of a gun.¹ Political power is fashioned in the life of human beings acting through social units like the family, the church, and the nation-state. It is these institutions that possess authority. It is these institutions through which man in decision-making roles go about the business of maintaining and enhancing the authority of the particular institutions by exerting influence in the social fabric.² Authority and influence characterize political power in the fully defined sense in the domestic environment of the political system.³ Charles E. Merriam described this, when he said:

Power does not lie in the guns, or the ships, or the walls of stone, or the lines of steel. Important as these are, the real political power lies in a definite common pattern of impulse. If the soldiers choose to disobey or even shoot their officers, if the guns are turned against the government, if the citizenry connives at disobedience of the law, and makes of it even a virtue, then authority is impotent and may drag its bearer down to doom.⁴

Though Merriam is speaking about political power in relation to the internal domestic environment (authority and influence), one cannot help to feel this also applies to international politics as might and force utilized by nation-states in an international

¹Mao Tse-tung, "Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung," Selected Works II (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1966), p. 61.

²See pp. 171-177 discussion of decision-making with regard to Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld.

³See p. 116 discussion of the model of the political system and its application to the Kingdom of Laos.

⁴Charles E. Merriam, op. cit., p. 21.

political system.

In the Cold War, so far, technology has given the United States a military parity with the Soviet Union and superiority with the People's Republic of China, but this has not granted the United States the ability to meet the psychological and covert qualities of Communism. This nation-state has been frustrated by its inability to be consistent with a time orientation emanating from the determinism of instrumentalism, and deal with Communism on a protracted basis in terms of a flexible methodology to meet covert as well as overt contingencies.

Therefore, since the period 1954 through 1959 in which the development of covert protracted war methodology took place, the United States has greatly suffered in its many attempts to project its traditional emphasis on a deterministic overt foreign policy characterized by treaties and the utilization of military might. With the experience against the Japanese and French behind them, Communist guerrilla tacticians began the exportation of covert protracted war methodology to nation-states characterized as being underdeveloped. This development in methodology for protracted war gave the Communists a flexibility in the means utilized to acquire, maintain, and enhance political power in the era of nuclear weapons. Secondly, the covert methodology of the Communists gives them the ability to disassociate from any one single aspect of political power. Once the cadre's influence has been acknowledged by the people, the cadre have the authority and then the legitimacy to use force to maintain or enhance their political power. But this is only done with the implementation of the first fifteen stages of

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the covert methodology.¹ With this methodology, the Communist tacticians fulfill a cardinal rule of political power. This rule is:

The functional situation out of which the political arises is not the demand for force as such, but the need for some form of equilibrium.²

The covert nature of Communist methodology gives that power bloc the ability to exert political power in this era of nuclear deterrence. Containment's reliance on political power defined as only being military might is not sufficiently flexible to act or respond to covert efforts of the Communists. The United States finds itself reacting to change, and to only the overt manifestations of change. In conclusion, the United States loses international political power, but in a greater sense the United States has, since 1954, jeopardized the equilibrium in international politics. This is the case, because this nation-state's formulators of foreign policy rely on political power confined to military might and the technology present to improve our nuclear weaponry. This is political suicide for this nation-state, and the rest of the world.

To solve the dilemma of containment, the writer proposes the United States utilize an equilibrium approach for the formulation of foreign policy.

Equilibrium assumes a state of relative stability can exist among nation-states, if nation-states possessing nuclear weapons believe their nuclear development and resulting weaponry are viable vis-a-vis their nuclear competitors. The writer makes a second

¹See p. 50 for model of covert protracted war methodology.

²Charles E. Merriam, op. cit., p. 36.

assumption.

Today, and since 1952, the parity does not have to be completely equal given the fact that they are chiefly symbolic. This seems an acceptable judgment given the destructive capability of hydrogen bombs and the delivery systems present for these bombs as of 1959. Thus, since 1959 nuclear development has been prohibitive. This means "over-kill" is present. The result is a relatively fixed state of equilibrium, where political power defined as only being military might does not assure influence and authority in international politics. But it does assure equilibrium, since nuclear war would mean the virtual loss of human life in a civilized world. This is unacceptable as input in formulation of policy for any decision-maker in the East or West.

Third, equilibrium assumes man's development unfolds in a social situation. The social situation involves an exchange between participants in this environment. Basic to the exchange taking place is man acting. Man acting in giving up something for a mutually acceptable object implies that equilibrium requires a man that is more than social. Man must be rational in so far as being capable of grasping concepts and forming them into a judgment. Man acting out his rational capacity does so in terms of power defined as the desire to influence the attitudes and behavior of others. This attention with power in man's orientation is not power for the sake of power, but rather to achieve goals to satisfy values defined by his individual personality as conditioned by his environment.

Power is natural to man, both in terms of directing man

towards fulfillment individually and as a social being. Thus, man cannot exist without power. But to have power, man must be in a state of equilibrium with his fellow inhabitants.

Since the nation-state is an expression of man acting out his existence to define himself in a group relationship, equilibrium and power are to the nation-state in its development what they are to man. Thus, they are as natural to the nation-state as to man. But there is a slight difference.

Equilibrium and power can be viewed by man to be means to a higher goal than mere existence. If existence was for all men the end desired, then equilibrium would be satisfactory as a goal. Man being capable of rationality sometimes sets goals beyond mere existence. With this orientation towards a definition of life, equilibrium would not be sufficiently satisfying. The nation-state differentiates itself from a man, who places existence in a secondary position to a higher goal.

The nation-state is the expression of man in a political sense; that is, man acting to achieve demand satisfaction through political processes. This political sense is the political system defined as:

that system of interactions to be found in all independent societies which performs the functions of integration and adaptation (both internally and vis-a-vis other societies) by means of the employment, or threat of employment, of more or less legitimate physical compulsion."¹

¹Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, op. cit., p. 37.

The political system assures interaction for man in so far as man having a means to attain demand satisfaction. Finally, the political system attains an orderly development of demand, interaction of constituents, interaction of constituents in groups with decision-makers, and the authoritative allocation of satisfied needs by the decision-makers to those constituents making demands. This is a political system, because a state of equilibrium has been reached.¹

Equilibrium in the political system is a concept expressing the fact that the collective called society has reached a structural state of political development where men exchange for each other's demands without resorting to force. Instead, the exchange is confined to the utilization of political power defined as using influence to attain, to maintain, and to enhance one's ability to affect the will of decision-makers with authority in the political system.

In conclusion, what is to be sought in the formulation of a nation-state's foreign policy is a state of equilibrium much like that in a nation-state, where nation-states exchange demands without resort to military might and force. Rather, the nation-states confine their interaction to gaining influence and achieving authority. With this accomplished, the nation-state is operating in the international political system, because the nation-state is exchanging something for a demand being satisfied. At this point influence has been exerted by the nation-state. With this influence the nation-states attain control, and with control authority is achieved.

¹See p. 116 for model of political system and its application to the Kingdom of Laos.

Like man in his political system, equilibrium is accomplished when an exchange has been made without resorting to military might and force alone. This is, because international, like national politics, is governed by the basic assumption of this study:

The functional situation out of which the political arises is not the demand for force as such, but the need for some form of equilibrium.¹

¹Charles E. Merriam, op. cit., p. 2.

APPENDIX I

INTERVIEW

AN INTERVIEW with Nguyen Nhan, the Counselor of the Republic of South Vietnam at the Embassy of the Republic of South Vietnam. Interview took place at the Embassy in Washington, D.C., on August 8, 1967.

Summary of Interview

Question: What is the greatest cause of instability in the world today?

Answer: The main cause of instability in the world is international communism.

Question: Is Ho Chi Minh a Communist, nationalist, or a nationalist utilizing some aspects of Communist ideology such as protracted war with guerrilla methodology?

Answer: Ho Chi Minh is a Communist first, and Vietnamese second. Ho Chi Minh is a Russian orientated Communist in terms of his training and views with regard to the world. The best evidence of his lack of nationalism was his March, 1944 sell-out of national groups to the French, so he could assume the leadership of the Vietnamese nationalist movement.

"Mistake to stress hatred of Vietnamese for Chinese" as a reason why 'Ho Chi Minh wouldn't go over to the Communists. Instead, more in common amongst Communist parties."

"Ho Chi Minh no Tito, because he is a Communist. Geography wouldn't allow it; Chinese more militant than Russians."

Question: How effective has the International Control Commission been in confining the infiltration etc?

Answer: "It hasn't!" "The Polish member prevents its effectiveness." "Also infiltration, rather than open aggression."

Question: What role has the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization played in the conflict in Indochina?

Answer: "SEATO is not a true collective security arrangement in terms of binding the treaty members to a commitment to use force, and it cannot deal with clandestine warfare."

"SEATO as individual members is actively involved in Vietnam."

Question: If SEATO cannot perform satisfactorily in providing for the security of Indochina, why not turn to the United Nations?

Answer: "The United Nations was only effective in Korea. The UN was there, and the aggression was open, rather than being clandestine."

APPENDIX II

FOREIGN AID PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES¹

I. Net Foreign Aid (Grants and Credits) - (in millions of dollars):

1945	1947	1950	1952	1955	1958	1960	1965	1968
1,979	5,658	4,056	5,041	3,958	4,791	3,966	5,035	4,755

II. Net Foreign Aid by Area (G-C) - (in millions of dollars):

W. Europe:	2,676	498	-20	148
Far East and Pacific	606	621	769	1,043
Amer. Republics	38	72	184	800

(- Denotes less than \$500,000.)

III. Net Foreign Aid by Countries (G-C) - (in millions of dollars):

France and Possessions	464	307	-48	-----
Indochina	1	1954 - 69	-----	-----
Philippines	201	12	23	40
Thailand	*(-Less than \$500,000)		13	41
*In Thailand less than \$500,000 from 1945 through 1950. In 1951 (5 million); 1953 (5 million); 1954 (4 million).				54
Laos		37	33	44
Vietnam		200	185	434

IV. Military Assistance Program - (in millions of dollars):

Worldwide; 1950-1960: 23,577 (28,678,558)* 1,724.3 (1,719)*

Area:

W. Europe	329	1,362	682
Near East	118	305	336
Far East	63	500	759
Amer. Republics	0	29	68

Far East

Countries; 1950-1960:	5,438	(2,774,312)*	557.2	(585,872)*
Australia:	"	29	None	4.6
Cambodia	"	59	(193,973)*	2.9 (23.)*
Laos	"	58	(231,736)*	13.4 (43.)*
Thailand	"	278	(239,161)*	19.2 (24.)*
Vietnam	"	442	(1,302,042)*	69.6 (158.)*

*Figures in () denote Mutual Security Aid - in thousands of dollars)

¹These statistics taken from the Statistical Abstract of the United States for the years 1945 through 1968. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Press, 1945 through 1969).

APPENDIX III

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR ASIA AND THE FAR EAST
SALA SANTITHAM
BANGKOK, THAILAND.

TELEPHONE: 22050
CABLE: ECAFE BANGKOK

INF.133/2-163

28 April 1969

Dear Mr. Eddy,

Thank you for your letter of 1 April.

...

Enclosed you will find our press release No. L/29 of 17 December 1959, the only paper available, which we hope will serve the purpose of your request as mentioned in the above letter.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Prayoon".

Prayoon Nanakon
Officer-in-Charge
UN Information Service

Mr. James H. Eddy
Winona State College
Winona, Minnesota 55987
U. S. A.

V/

TUOMIOJA REPORT ON LAOS RECOMMENDS CO-ORDINATED
ACTION BY UNITED NATIONS FOR KINGDOM'S DEVELOPMENT

A proposal has been made for co-ordinated action by the United Nations and the specialized agencies concerned to assist the Kingdom of Laos in its economic and social development.

The proposal was made by Mr. Sakari Tuomioja, Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), in a special report to Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld.

Mr. Tuomioja had been sent to Laos by the Secretary-General "to review the economic situation of Laos and in particular the role of economic and technical assistance rendered by the United Nations for the furtherance of economic growth and stability." Mr. Tuomioja remained in Laos from 17 November and drafted the special report on the Laos situation.

The report, after reviewing the problems and shortcomings of the Lao economy, recommends that co-ordinated action be undertaken by the United Nations and the specialized agencies to assist Laos in the following main fields: the development of the natural resources of the country; the creation of a comprehensive transport and communications network and the improvement of communications between Laos and the outside world; the improvement of health conditions; the development of an educational system suited to the needs of the country; the development of rural communities paying special attention to the hill population and their problems; and improvement of the entire public administration system.

Specifically, the report on Laos calls for the following:

1. Surveys of natural and human resources and the development of basic information. In this field, mineral prospection, soil surveys, manpower surveys and the development of statistical services should have high priority.
2. Agricultural development, particularly with a view to increased productivity and to promote diversification and marketing.
3. Basic education and vocational and technical training.
4. Organization of a comprehensive public health system, emphasizing preventive medicine and the qualitative improvement of nutritional levels.
5. Community development in order to improve the utilization of latent local resources, with particular attention to be paid to ethnic minority groups and the population of mountainous regions.

6. The setting up of a country-wide system of transport and communications. The work of the United Nations and the specialized agencies should be particularly geared to the problems of using the most economical means of developing inland waterways, secondary and feeder roads, the use of cheap transport facilities and economical methods.

7. The public administration should be helped by placing trained and experienced administrators at the disposal of Laos to work both at the central and the provincial level and to assist in the training of Lao administrative personnel.

The Tuomioja report says that besides these long-term programmes, aimed at general development, a series of short-term projects should be undertaken in Laos in order to obtain quick results and produce a favorable local climate for further development efforts. It declares that in addition, current requests made by Laos for technical assistance by the United Nations and the specialised agencies should be favourably considered. In particular, the implementation of the commitments of the Special Fund under the Mekong development scheme should be speeded up.

Mr. Tuomioja recommends the appointment of a high-level official to co-ordinate the various development programmes, and the activities of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies in the implementation of the projects. He suggests that the personnel recruited to assist the Lao administration should, if possible, come from Asian or other underdeveloped countries.

The document declares that Laos faces peculiar problems as a small, landlocked country which attained independence only five years ago and that there can be little doubt that the two million Lao people will require considerable foreign assistance for many years to come. Laos had set out to build a new state under the most unpropitious conditions and contingencies, and was now appealing to the United Nations for assistance.

With inadequate human and material resources at its disposal, the Lao administration had been facing the extremely difficult task of integrating a heterogeneous population, setting up a state machinery, organizing the economy and raising the living standards of people.

Indeed, Laos has had to rely heavily on foreign aid which, however, according to the report, had not so far achieved significant results nor strengthened the productive capacity of the country.

What was now needed, says the special report to the Secretary-General, was to help Laos meet basic development needs . Among the basic problems were to raise the level of education, to create new educational systems; to develop public health and improve health conditions; to develop the villages and resettle the nomadic population.

The document says that if Laos is to raise its economy to a level conducive to health and self-sustained growth, an intensive and co-ordinated effort will be required. The authorities, for example, should improve public administration, train more efficient personnel and eliminate the causes of waste. The private sector should turn to more productive activity and away from speculation.

International technical assistance from the United Nations and the agencies to Laos could develop through advisory services, training facilities, surveys, fellowships and the provision of essential equipment and supplies.

Some of the projects envisaged in the special report are:

- The development of irrigation to stimulate agricultural production, such as the development of the Vientiane plain within the framework of the Mekong scheme.
- The development of local, small-scale irrigation works, the creation of local channels of food distribution and the development of a livestock industry.
- The continuation and improvement of current surveys of the natural resources of Laos, particularly of minerals, oil and forest wealth.
- The development of the Mekong tributaries in Laos according to the programme recommended by the four-country Committee for the Development of the Lower Mekong Basin.
- The establishment of small-scale industries to meet internal demand in such fields as matches, candles, soap, salt, beverages, tanning, canning, sugar, sawmills, bricks and tiles, earthenware and ceramics and textiles.
- The construction of a comprehensive and efficient system of transport and communications in Laos.
- The development of Lao education, along the lines of the current UNESCO educational programme there.

- The establishment of a national community development scheme, closely co-ordinated with other village development projects such as irrigation, agricultural extension, fundamental education and health.
- The creation of a new fiscal policy and the strengthening of Laos public administration.
- The formulation of a statistical plan for the country, the training of personnel and the organization of demographic and agricultural censuses.

(UNIS)

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