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THE ATM APPROACH ("ASK 'EM, TELL "EM, MAKE 'EM"):

COMPLIANCE-SEEKING AT THE SECURITY CHECKPOINTS OF

A FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SITE

A Dissertation

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

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by

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A Dissertation APPROVED FOR THE

DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATION

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
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
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
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Abstract

Recent terrorist attacks in the United States have increased public concern with

security screeners, yet research does not exist of communication at security

checkpoints. The goals of this study are: (1) to initiate social science study of

private police communication; (2) to add to the sparse naturalistic studies of

policing from the communication perspective; (3) to examine compliance-seeking

at the security check; and (4) conduct a discursive analysis of the everyday

activities of officers during the security check at a federal government multi-

building site in the Northeast U.S. The first four chapters are: (1) a short history

of public and private policing; (2) instances of compliance-like exchanges

extracted from 1960s/1970s policing ethnographies, one private police account,

and news stories of security and SAS encounters at airports; (3) method of several

months' observation, audio-taping, recording detailed field notes, and interviews

of officers; (4) narrative account of typical work days at Government Buildings

for both a public and private police officer. I follow Goffman's (1961)

conceptualization of encounters; Hymes' (1974) ethnography of communication;

Searle's (1969) speech act theory; Etizioni's (1961) concepts of normative, and

social power; and Philipsen's (1975) concept of counter incidents all inform my

analysis of preferred communication modes: politeness and acknowledgement,

face needs and verbal immediacy after directives and reproaches; politeness as the

normative power use through respectful address; speech acts and repetition;

officer local knowledge and tacit knowledge. In sum the officer who subscribes

to "being the bigger person" at Government Buildings employs language that is generally polite (acknowledgements), treats others with respect (politeness) when possible and teaches (reproaches) when necessary, is warm but professionally distant (immediacy), and completes the job with efficiency (directives). I found a range of compliance (derived from on-site interactions or as-told-to examples): compliance that is complete, limited, limited with objection, passive-resistant, eventual with protest, non-compliance or avoidance, over- or distracted. Future research should be based in actual interaction, consider specific relationships within the larger organizational and cultural contexts, examine emotion management of self and others, look at the whole picture of nonverbal/verbal social influence, and study humor in compliance-seeking.

Chapter 1

Policing, Communication, and Compliance: A Review of Literature

Policing has been of interest to the public, the police, and researchers

alike[1]. Literary fiction demonstrates this fascination with detectives who are both

inside (connected to police) and outside (private investigators) the law. Since the

time of constables in the United States, the public has eagerly consumed such

detective stories as Arthur Conan Doyle's Sherlock Holmes. In this century,

Dashiell Hammett's detective Sam Spade was popular in both print and on screen.

The escapades of the marshals of the American frontier, like Wyatt Earp, and the

more recent fiction of Joseph Wambaugh, and others have continued this tradition

of fascination with policing. In television, the success of reality "cop" shows,

"NYPD Blue," and "Law and Order" demonstrate the public's continuing interest,

and movies like "The French Connection," "Dirty Harry," and "Traffic" remain

captivating to the public imagination.

Within the research community, there also exists a tradition of attention to

aspects of policing. In anthropology (Gaffney, 1981), criminology (Mastrofski,

1981), law (Tyler, 1990), political science (Horton, 1995), management (J. Van

Maanen, 1978), psychology (Parker, Meier, & Monahan, 1989), and especially

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[1] Fiction shows this fascination with detectives who are both inside and outside the law. Since the time of constables in the U.S., the public has eagerly consumed such detective stories as Arthur Conan Doyle's Sherlock Holmes, Dashiell Hammett's detective Sam Spade, the marshal's of the American frontier, like Wyatt Earp, and the more recent fiction of Joseph Wambaugh and others have continued this tradition of fascination with policing. In television, the success of reality "cop" shows, NYPD Blue, and Law and Order demonstrate the public's continuing interest, and movies like The French Connection, Dirty Harry, and Traffic remain captivating to the public imagination.

sociology (Bittner, 1970; R. Lundman, 1980; Skolnick, 1975), the police have been and are today an heuristic area of study. Communication scholars also have turned their attention to policing as an area of interest. Communication researchers have turned to such issues as police story telling (Trujillo & Dionisopoulos, 1987), police humor (Lennox, 1992), police organization (Meehan, 1992), and police perceptions (G. E. Miller, 1997) as areas of focus. However, one area which has received little attention from a communication perspective is policing and compliance seeking (King, 1995).

While communication scholars are beginning to examine communication in policing, most of the research on law enforcement is within a criminology, law, or political science framework. Communication-based studies of law enforcement are sparse (King, 1995; Meehan, 1992; G. E. Miller, 1997; Trujillo & Dionisopoulos, 1987), and observational studies of police-citizen encounters, either in public or private policing, based in communication are rare. Additionally, there appear to be no microanalytical studies from a communication perspective which look at security officers and their everyday activities.

To understand the nature of private policing, the persuasive challenges therein, and the important functional differences from the public police, a short history of the development of policing as it relates to private policing is necessary. It is clear from this history that the private police have enjoyed changing levels of public support. In early times, the private police were viewed, at times understandably, as thugs for hire.

Private Policing History

Law enforcement officers have been concerned with convincing people to do their bidding at least since the early days of constabularies in Britain. Forst and Manning (1999) describe the policing of this period: "Policing, like most functions of modern government, was once exclusively in the domain of private enterprise. The policing of homicides in ancient Athens, unlike that of later times and places, was primarily a family matter; entry into the security market was restricted, and individuals without families were not well protected (Posner 1981, 223-24)" (p. 4). The origin of the modern policing system began in England about 1066, with the men in villages raising a "hue and cry" to signal criminals were at work (see Appendix A for more complete history).

In Sklansky's (1999) comprehensive history of private policing, he describes the constabulary system of Britain with the position of constable (unpaid) which by the thirteenth century denoted "a local man with a touch of regal authority about him" (p. 1196) and who denoted the only law around. "Privately established night watches and patrols were often the citizens' only protection against direct assault" (R. J. Fischer & Green, 1998, p. 4), with the presence of this "watch" often a sufficient deterrent to those wanting to do harm. With increasing criminal activity, however, the constable's eyes proved insufficient. Communities required communal responsibility for law enforcement, with "every man between the ages of fifteen and sixty to maintain specified weaponry, which varied according to his wealth" and police duties

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considered "the duties of every man" (Sklansky, 1999, p. 1197). Consequently, since all male citizens were required to be a "watch," the level of experience and expertise of law enforcement was mercurial.

Due in part to this system, the quality of the watch rapidly deteriorated. "Those with sufficient funds hired deputies to serve their stints as constable or watchman, the deputies in turn often hired their own deputies, and in this manner the constabulary and watch gradually were relegated to those who could find no other employment. The predictable results were constables and watchmen of notorious incompetence" (Sklansky, 1999, p. 1198). " . . . by the seventeenth century the office of constable was commonly regarded as appropriate only to the old, idiotic, or infirm" (Sklansky, 1999, p. 1198, note 158). Thus, the deputies had little experience and less motivation to do a good job.

In Britain, during the Industrial Revolution, when thousands of people moved from farms to cities to work in factories, the watch system became insufficient to respond to these increased policing demands. Sir Robert Peel "created the forerunner to the modern urban police department by constructing a force of peace officers (who later became known as 'bobbies,' in tribute to Peel) to prevent crime" (Forst & Manning, 1999, p. 4). Although some corruption remained, these officers were outfitted in "quasi-military navy blue uniforms" (p.5), were carefully chosen, were taught restraint, and served the public twenty-four hours a day.

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The United States followed the British system by instituting the system of constables who performed their civic duty (and were not paid). As in Britain, "those with sufficient resources hired additional protection, and the boundary between private guards and public watchmen often was indistinct" (Sklansky, 1999, p. 1206). Because private citizens were designated to identify criminal behavior, the system of rewards and fines paid to informers produced "widespread collusion between officers and thieves" (p. 1206). The United States was slower than Britain to adopt an effective public policing service, paying sheriffs of the colonial West "per criminal caught, subpoena served, and tax dollar collected" (Forst & Manning, 1999, p. 5).

During the 1800s, fearing excessive government attention to private matters, Americans resisted the movement toward a centrally organized, professional police force (Sklansky, 1999). Yet crime increased sufficiently that public outcry could not halt the growth of public police. The focus of these forces was crime control, but developed into tasks with less focus on crime and more on social control (for example, getting "paupers" and "tramps" off the streets). When economics dictated, the public police turned to private forces for their assistance.

One of the first private policing agencies in the United States was founded by Allan Pinkerton, a Scottish immigrant and son of a Glasgow police sergeant, began his career in security by accident. A barrelmaker by trade, he was searching an island for old barrel staves. The local sheriff used his help to capture

a band of counterfeiters. After other similar events, Mr. Pinkerton was elected deputy sheriff of his county. He moved to the Chicago area in 1850 and five years later, due to a series of train robberies, Pinkerton won a $10,000 contract to start a private railroad police agency (Vila & Morris, 1999).

As public police attention turned less often to crime control and more to social control, vigilantism in the South and the West became common with wealthy landowners and others providing law enforcement "the government could not or would not provide" (Sklansky, 1999, p. 1210). Thus, "the line between public and private policing was frequently hazy" (Sklansky, 1999, p. 1210). Today the divisions are blurring even more with the federalization of airport security.

The private police agencies of today developed from the agencies in the Eastern United States and the Midwest: policing for hire usually run by former police officers. By the 1930s, however, public need of policing had begun to move away from peace keeping (the job of private policing) and toward fighting crime (the focus of public policing).

The mainstays of private policing in the late 1800s and early 1900s had grown far less profitable: breaking strikes and infiltrating labor unions were too controversial, and professional robbers and thieves were no longer beyond the reach of public law enforcement. The golden age was over, and by the late 1930s the industry appeared to be in retreat" (Sklansky, 1999, p. 1219).

However, a new golden age for private security has emerged. In the 1950s the security industry formed the American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS), began to push for security guard certification, and started college programs. Modern private security plays a large role in policing. Hallcrest II (W. C. Cunningham, Strauchs, & Van Meter, 1990), the most recent major study of security in the United States (produced under the auspices of the Department of Justice), reports that in 1990 expenditures for its products and services are estimated at $52 billion, while "police protection expenditures for federal, state, and local governments" (p. 298) were only $32 billion. "Projections for the year 2000 indicate that expenditures from the private sector will be twice as much as that spent by the government" (W. C. Cunningham et al., 1990, p. 234). Today much of current private policing lacks adequate training, job privileges, and consistent regulation standards, although the growth of private security has continued unabated.

This development of private policing has not only been rapid and remarkable, but also private police have assumed some of the functions thought to belong to the public police. "The private security industry already employs more guards, patrol personnel, and detectives than the federal, state, and local governments combined, and the disparity is growing; to a striking extent, private firms now perform many of the beat-patrol tasks once thought central to the mission of the public police" (Sklansky, 1999, p. 1165). However, the state of private policing today is in flux. Due to the federalization of airport security and

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penalties levied on one of the largest private security companies in the United

States, Argenbright, the future of private policing is uncertain.

Thus, the above brief history of the evolution of policing—of the

dominance of private policing to the focus of public police forces, to the

burgeoning importance of private policing today—demonstrates the importance of

private security forces through time. This increasing reliance presents challenges

to the private police; one of which is the creation of new security forms and

functions after the September 11 terrorist attacks.

In the past, fear of domestic terrorism was often cited as the reason for

increased security. Recent terrorist acts in the United States, including "the

bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, the 1993 bombing of the

World Trade Center in New York, the capture of the Unabomber, and the

bombing at the Olympics in Atlanta, have increased the public's concern" (R. J.

Fischer & Green, 1998, p. 465). Additionally, with the Soviet Union's collapse,

the potential for nuclear terrorism has increased. The reality of possible nuclear

losses becomes clearer from the number of thefts reported by the Russian Interior

Ministry officials. "In 1993 they reported 27 thefts of nuclear materials" (R. J.

Fischer & Green, 1998, p. 465) and in 1994 they reported the same number of

incidents.

Despite increasing reliance on private security, the stereotype of the

security officer appears to have remained fairly constant In an informal survey of

my own classes, when asked about their perception of security officers, students

described them as "fat and lazy," "rude," and "sleeping on the job." In 1971, the

Rand Corporation study described the "typical private guard" as "underscreened,

undertrained, undersupervised, and underpaid" (Kakalik & Wildhorn, 1971, p.

106). Yet this characterization was based on limited information, as available data

is inadequate (W. C. Cunningham et al., 1990). The most recent study conducted

by Hallcrest II (Cunningham, 1990) (a security consultancy firm located in

McLean, Virginia) reports that the "long-standing rather negative stereotype of

the private security guard is being replaced. The positive demographic trends

indicate that the contemporary private security guard is better educated and

younger" (p. 140-141).

Due to the lack of even the most basic information about security work

and security officers' communication and the changing nature of security since

the September 11 events, I propose an exploratory study of security work, with a

focus on the security check. The most potentially fruitful manner of gaining rich

data for this preliminary examination is to go on-site to ethnographically examine

the security check. Next I turn to an examination of current research in private

policing.

Private Policing Today

As social scientists (Banton, 1964; Bittner, 1970; Black, 1968; Douglas,

1970; Manning & Van Maanen, 1978; Muir, 1977; Rubinstein, 1973; Skolnick,

1975; Van Maanen, 1974; J. Q. Wilson, 1968) focused on the study of the public

police in the 1960s and 1970s, the private policing "industry entered a period of

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rapid expansion from which it has yet to emerge, and during which growth in public law enforcement has remained slack" (Sklansky, 1999, p. 1221). This rapid growth of private police went largely unnoticed at the time and remains a relatively hidden issue today, although "at this point, security guards in the United States actually outnumber law enforcement personnel; there are roughly three private guards for every two sworn officers" (Sklansky, 1999, p. 1174). Other estimates of the ratio of private police to public police are even higher.

In the last decade, social scientists' interest in private policing has increased somewhat, due in part to the above outlined numerical dominance of private policing over public policing. Another reason for this interest is the increasing visibility of the private police in public places (shopping malls, schools, government buildings, and airports) and the resultant problems in public administration problems. Additionally, media focus on private police misjudgments (Cherry, 2001; Shooting each other, security officers die, 1997; Teen nearly shot when security guards mistake toy for semiautomatic rifle, 1994) has brought heretofore hidden problems into public awareness. After the Oklahoma City bombing, Wackenhut Corporation (America's third largest security-officer provider) stock jumped 20 percent due to the search for ways to protect public buildings from terrorism (*The Economist*, 1995). With the

burgeoning interest in community policing,[2] attention has refocused on private

policing as a part of the interest in the community policing movement.

Policing and Communication

During the 1960s and 1970s, it became clear to policymakers and police

administrators that many of the police-citizen tension and altercations were due, at

least in part, to the lack of communication skills of police (Womack & Finley,

1986). Consequently, training programs for police and public awareness

campaigns aimed at educating citizens about policing burgeoned in police

departments. Because of this increased education, both within the police force

and of the public, the relationship of police-citizen began to slowly change to one

of "partnership" (Skolnick & Bayley, 1986).

As the public perception of the public police has evolved, it appears that

perception of private police may also be changing. The 1971 Rand Report stated

that the typical private officer was "an aging white male, poorly educated, usually

untrained, and very poorly paid" (Kakalik & Wildhorn, 1971, p. 30). Sklansky

(1999, p. 1223) describes the security officer as "a cheap pair of eyes" (p. 1223),

pointing to an image the public has long-held of security as the lazy, warm body

sleeping at the security post.

However, requirements and regulation of private police vary widely from

state to state (R. J. Fischer & Green, 1998) and depend on type of security work

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[2] A precise definition of community policing is impossible. S. Miller (1996) finds three types of definitions: (1) practices that would make the police more accessible to and familiar with the local community, such as foot patrols and community liaison officers; (2) forms of police department public relations and media campaigns; and (3) the use of private security guards.

involved. In some states, security officers are required to have at least a high school education, pre-job and on-the-job training; in other states, pre-job training is not required, but only on-the-job training; some states have no security officer regulations on the books. Contract officers vary in terms of a wide variety of demographic characteristics. Some are highly educated, some have not finished high school. Some have full-time, professional, high paying jobs, but want to earn extra income or "learn the ropes" to start their own security company.[3]

Security officers are required in some states to have extensive annual training, but earn salaries that average 50 percent of a police officer's average income of $24,000 (W. C. Cunningham et al., 1990). As of 1990, only 50 percent of the states required any officer training standards (R. J. Fischer & Green, 1998) and, when training is required it rarely includes communication training. The Certified Protection Officer (CPO) program founded in 1986 by the International Foundation for Protection Officers (IFPO) is offered in several colleges and includes training called "human relations" (R. J. Fischer & Green, 1998, p. 54). Fischer and Green (1998) suggest "communication procedures" and "professional standards, including attitudes toward employees" (p. 51) be included in security officer training, although the definitions of these labels are not outlined and in-class training content is unclear.

Security officers would benefit from improved communication. Owen (1988) finds that "it is the individual security officers who will win or lose a

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[3] An officer I trained had been the agricultural minister to his home country in Africa, but could not come

security contract. The others on the security company team are ancillary, even though they may outrank the individual officer. . . . In addition, better training and scheduled time for personal interaction should be included in a security officer's schedule" (p. 111). Another author calls for complete training programs "to ensure that [companies'] employees obtain the skill and expertise to provide superior security service. Such training does not only improve the skill of these security men [sic], but also gives them more self-confidence and pride" (Savage, 1994).

Social Influence and the Police

Thus, what kind of communication can we expect to dominate police-citizen interactions? Much of what police try to do is to influence citizens to comply with the police officers' wishes. Mastrofski, Snipes, and Supina (1996) agree that "much of policing consists of getting people to do things they might not otherwise do" (p. 269). Communication scholars have proposed for some time that most spoken interactions are attempts to influence others. Berlo (1960) emphasizes control as basic to human communication: "we communicate to influence – to affect with intent" (p. 12). Barnlund (1968) expands this idea: "communication is initiated, consciously or unconsciously, to change the other person. If difference is the raw material of conversation, influence is its intent." Therefore, the assumption herein is that the desire to influence others is at the center of police communication

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close to comparable work in the United States.

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If we accept the proposition that persuasion is an essential skill for police due to the need to try to resolve conflicts with minimal arrests, public harm, or public attention, then we can turn to the compliance-gaining, compliance-resistance literature as a possibly fruitful area of communication study. Mastrofski, Snipes, and Supina (1996) studied the public's perception of police compliance-gaining attempts from a criminological perspective, and of more relevance King (1995) has examined police and compliance-gaining from a communication perspective, finding that police use compliance-gaining strategies which "reflect an escalation of force, are based largely in the resistive behaviors of civilians but may be tempered by a number of perceived contextual cues" (p.1).

Across disciplines the conceptualization of compliance differs. Compliance in law has a rather narrow definition, as Reiss-Ianni (1984) shows, compliance is "conforming behavior to a standard of conduct that is set by normative or political means" (p. 92). According to a legal view, compliance depends upon the measure of risk of harm as well as upon its standard. Legal tests of compliance vary in their precision, from breathalyzers to the use of urine tests for drunk driving to an officer's judgment of speed or the use of a radar gun. Within these definitions is the assumption that "compliance" is dictated by the authority of the compliance-seeker.

One study (Young, 1979) which crosses disciplines provides a history of research on compliance (although it does not include communication studies it provides a clearer picture of the nature of compliance than we would otherwise

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have if examining only communication studies). Young (1979) defines

compliance as "all behavior by subjects or actors that conforms to the

requirements of behavioral prescriptions or compliance systems" (p. 4). His

conceptualization includes the idea of compliance as a system, as dependent upon

the interactants, rather than only the agent only trying to influence the target.

Young views compliance as a matter of choice.

Young (1979) discusses issues of relevance to communication, citing a

lack of attention by some research to the communication aspects of compliance:

(1) political theorists focus primarily on "legislative processes and the problems

of translating laws into practice" and "seldom focus[ing] on the interactions

between subjects and public authorities regarding compliance" (p. 149); (2) law

and legal philosophers look at compliance primarily based on "prescriptions in the

form of laws and on enforcement as a basis of compliance" (cited in Young, p.

149; Hart, 1958; Fuller, 1958, Hart, 1961); (3) decision theory encompasses many

disciplines; of most relevance here is work on human choices under conditions of

conflict (cited in Young, 1979); Rapoport & Chammah, 1965; Tversky &

Kahneman, 1974); (4) anthropological studies include an "awareness of cultural

variations in attitudes and orientations toward compliance" (p. 152); (5)

microsociologists who examine the behavior of the individual (March & Simon,

1958) and Goffman's work on "arational elements in human behavior" (p. 152);

and (6) in psychology and social psychology the theme of conformity, the norm of

reciprocity, and studies of socialization. Because Young wrote this work before

1979, he predates the bulk of the compliance research of communication scholars, yet this important work has been largely ignored by communication scholars.

Compliance-Gaining

The literature on compliance-gaining is so vast and varied that, as Charles Berger (1994) so aptly wrote, "It is difficult to be an effective docent in the Museum of Compliance-Gaining Research because its contents are so diffuse" (p. 492). Boster (1990) counts over 100 articles on compliance-gaining for the 15-year period from 1975 to 1990. Within the last 10 years, interest has remained steady. Communication researchers have examined compliance-gaining in many communication contexts: education (Kearney, Plax, Richmond, & McCroskey, 1984, 1985; Roach, 1991); health care (Ben-Sira, 1980, 1976; Lane, 1983; D. E. Schneider & Beaubien, 1996); marriage/couples (Dillard & Fitzpatrick, 1984; Sillars, 1980; Witteman & Fitzpatrick, 1986); and organizations (Ansari & Kapoor, 1987; Harper & Hirokawa, 1988). Next I will briefly discuss compliance-gaining research, and situate this research in law enforcement, to focus on research of most relevance to this study.

Researchers of all disciplines most often cite sociologists Marwell and Schmitt's (1967) research in compliance-gaining strategies as the turning point in compliance-gaining research. "Marwell and Schmitt (1967a, b) were developing a language-choice model of compliance gaining strategy selections that would alter the research agenda of the social psychology of language and communication" (Burgoon, 1994, p. 82). The researchers examined compliance-

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gaining strategies. This study led to many, many others which used the Marwell

and Schmidt typology as a framework.

Compliance-Gaining Strategies. Perhaps the most studied aspect of

compliance-gaining is in the area of strategic use of compliance gaining tactics, or

ways people try to influence others to behave as they would like (Infante, Rancer,

& Womack, 1997). "Since the publication of the Marwell and Schmitt article in

1977, compliance-gaining strategy selection research has dominated the interest

of social influence researchers in communication" (Burgoon, 1994, p. 83).

Marwell and Schmitt (1967) found 16 types of compliance-gaining techniques in

four hypothetical situations, which they clustered into five techniques: a

rewarding activity, punishing activity, expertise and activation of impersonal

commitments, and activation of personal commitments. Yet recent research has

criticized this focus on the study of compliance-gaining strategies.

Kellermann and Cole (1994), in their impressive review and analysis of 74

compliance-gaining message classification systems, find the compliance-gaining

research has concentrated primarily on two questions: "(1) What compliance-

gaining strategies are available? (2) When are these compliance gaining strategies

used?" (p. 3). The researchers feel the focus of future research should be on

"*explaining observed differences in compliance gaining messages* rather than on

describing possible differences in compliance gaining strategies, situations and

goals" (their italics, p. 46); in other words, rather than focusing on the number of

ways behavior might vary, to focus on "*why* and *how* observed regularities in

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behavior come about" (p. 46). Thus, the context of the compliance-gaining event is of import.

Compliance-Gaining Situations. Scholars have suggested looking beyond strategy selection to include situational differences (Infante et al., 1997); Miller, Boster, Roloff, & Seibold, 1977). Seibold, Cantrill, & Meyers' (1994) review chapter "focuses on situations in which actors' communication is strategically directed toward achieving instrumental objectives . . . ways in which (adult) actors' strategies for managing identities and relationships in influence contexts facilitate the achievement of more prominent instrumental goals" (p. 543). One such situation in which instrumental goals are obvious is the security check: At a minimum, the security officer would like to protect his/her employer from harm to property or persons, and the person who is waiting to enter security check would like to be allowed to access the area on the other side.

An inherent assumption in compliance-gaining research has been that humans are strategic, using compliance-gaining in ways that were effective for them in the past. Another assumption within this research is that the communication is controlled by an agent and the target has little influence over the outcome. Yet Garko (1990) describes compliance-gaining as "a dialectical process of development that ebbs and flows, cycles and recycles, and generates contradictions and inconsistencies in social influence relationships" (p. 141). Compliance-gaining is conceptualized here as being carried out within a relational

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pattern (Palazzoli et al, 1978), either of which might be security officer or customer, depending upon when the interaction is viewed by the observer.

Compliance-Resistance. Compliance-resistance has received little attention in comparison to compliance-gaining (McQuillen & Higginbothan, 1986), although some communication studies do exist (Ifert, 2000; McLaughlin, Cody, & Robey, 1980; O'Hair, 1991). As Garko (1990) points out, "the target is rarely studied in terms of making strategic choices resisting the agent's attempt or supporting it" (p. 153). Ifert's (2000) chapter examines existing research on interpersonal influence by focusing on opposing tensions between compliance with and resistance to interpersonal requests. Due to the nature of security work, it appears that compliance-resistance would be an important concept of relevance to the security check. Citizens do not always want to expose their personal belongings, or their "person," to others.

Compliance-Gaining and Private Security

Although it is intuitively obvious that security checks would include compliance-gaining and compliance-resisting situations, research has not been conducted to support this supposition. In reality, little is known about what private security forces actually do (W. C. Cunningham et al., 1990; Forst & Manning, 1999; Shearing & Stenning, 1981). "About the actual activities of private security personnel there is little reliable information. Plainly, though, they often do a good deal more than observe and report" (Sklansky, 1999, p. 1179). Security officers check people and their belongings through security checkpoints,

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study closed-circuit monitors for unusual behavior, check area perimeters for unlocked doors and suspicious activity, confront suspected thieves, and even chase suspects putting their own lives in peril (Cowen, 1995). "To a striking extent, private firms now perform many of the beat-patrol tasks once thought central to the mission of the public police, although the manner in which private patrols operate has been largely hidden from view" (Sklansky, 1999, p. 1169). Today security issues (especially, airport security) are plainly visible and widely discussed.

Security officers are called upon to use their persuasive skills perhaps in ways the public police do not have to.[4] Public police are armed, while fewer than 10 percent of security officers carry firearms (W. C. Cunningham et al., 1990) and firearms possess their own persuasive power. Additionally, the state backs the public police more forcefully than security officers. As discussed at the beginning of this paper, although at least one study finds the negative public security officer image is changing (W. C. Cunningham et al., 1990), the general public maintains certain stereotypes and biases about security officers, referring to security officers as "rent-a-cops" and "wanna' be's [police officers]." These security-officer labels

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[4] A personal experience highlights the difficulty security officers face when attempting to get the SASs to comply. While traveling with my family to visit my sister, I tried to check through my nephew's gift, a Star Wars "Light Saber," which resembles a weapon when viewed through the magnetometer. The security officers checking me through took me to a side table and asked me what was in the package. I told him. He asked if he could unwrap the gift to check it. It had taken me some time and trouble to wrap such a oddly shaped package and I resisted. He suggested that we check the package through as if it were luggage (putting it in a "cage" to protect it); it would go to the airplane's hold. His demeanor was at all times respectful; and at times he used humor to lighten his request. This relaxed and light approach gained my agreement, when a heavier or more demanding tactic would most likely have encouraged me to resist more.

and their image appear to relate to the public perception of the officers' lack of power.

Power and Compliance-Gaining

Power is intrinsic to the concept of compliance-gaining. Wheeless, Barraclough, and Stewart (Wheeless, Barraclough, & Stewart, 1983) outline the genesis of the power construct as it relates to compliance-gaining. Of most importance here is their discussion of the relationship of people's perceptions and power.

> The reality of a situation might be interesting, but it is functionally irrelevant and potentially misleading; people act not on the basis of the situation but on the basis of their perceptions about the situation. It is misleading to focus on how real someone's power is independent of those over whom the power is being exercised. This idea is particularly salient from the perspective of the persuasion.
>
> Within the context of persuasion, it makes no difference, for example, whether an agent making a threat has the ability to carry out that threat. If the target being threatened perceives such an ability, the agent has power (p. 127)

Specifically, within the security check context, if the individual *believes* the security officer can bar their entry into the desired area, does that convince them to comply? Or, does the public perception of security officers' inability to sanction noncompliance affect their willingness to comply? Thus, of interest here

is: how exactly (what do they say and do) do security officers gain the compliance of their customers, especially ones who believe the officers cannot, themselves, enact punitive measures against them?

At least one research study finds that security officers have power equal to the average citizen. McGregor (1995) (in his study using an abbreviated MMPI to assess security officers personalities) notes that, though private security officers have basically the same power as private citizens, private security officers are not constrained as are police -- private security officers

> . . . do not have to advise individuals of their constitutional rights . . . and have the *privilege, but not the obligation* to arrest and detain in the event of a violation – security officers have the power of intimidation by virtue of their uniforms, but not the responsibility to uphold the rights of citizen[s] as police officers do" (p. 10)

Consequently, security officers can violate a citizens' rights and expect less, or no, legal sanctions.

In the only academic study found of security officers (though not contract security, but maximum security prison officers) and compliance-gaining, Belote (1989) studied the relationship between an authority's orientation toward power and the compliance-gaining strategies used by nurses and prison security officers. He also assessed if "differences in types of organizations are related to power orientations and compliance-gaining strategy use." The security officers had four significant relationships: "power as instinctive drive, power as political, and

power as control and autonomy. " A bit surprisingly, the nurses scored

significantly higher on control and autonomy than did security officers.

The influence of context on patterns of power use has been shown to be

important (Hirokawa & Miyahara, 1986; Roach, 1991). Because "the

communication of power is a perceptual phenomenon, it is possible for

discrepancies to exist between perceptions of power use in a single context"

(Roach, 1991) . Thus, what one customer may see as a security officer's threat or

warning, another may view as a statement.

For argument's sake, I assume that, in general, security officers are lower

in power than public police, and at times lower in power than their customers. [5]

Tjosvold's (1978) (as cited in Berger, 1994) reports on low-power/high-power

individuals and attraction. Tjosvold found that

> When low power individuals strongly affirmed the personal
>
> effectiveness of those with higher power levels, the high power
>
> individuals were more attracted to those with low power; however, this
>
> increased liking did not raise the likelihood that the high power
>
> individuals would yield to the demands of those with low power. When
>
> low power persons ingratiate themselves to high power individuals by
>
> affirming their superiority, they are not likely to increase the probability

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[5] In some cities, it happens frequently that security officers are checking through high-level
government officials. For example, the December 18 Washington Post (This Just In, 2001) cites a
recent incident at Reagan National Airport: "Washington legal investigator Jim Rowe was in the
Delta Shuttle terminal at Reagan National Airport early Friday, having his bags searched. At the
next table, with his suitcase opened wide and every single item getting a thorough going-over,

that they will actually influence those with high power, even though the

high power individuals increase their liking for them. (p. 484)

Namely, high-level (and perhaps self-important) individuals may not be more

likely to cooperate fully with the security officers, even if the low-power officer is

ingratiating and complimentary. However, something else may be at work here –

for example, that high-level person feels that the public is watching, or perceives

that he/she has no choice.

Garko (1990) advocates a return to placing communication in the

foreground of compliance-gaining and power research. In his review of the

compliance and compliance-gaining theoretical literature, Garko finds that

scholars develop their conceptualizations of compliance and compliance-gaining

from a social exchange or power perspective, which he says "push(es)

communication into the background" (p. 138). Garko contends that it is possible

to "adopt a power perspective and not undercut the role of communication in the

gaining of compliance" (p. 138). Communication is "not just assumed to play a

role in compliance-gaining nor is it conceived as being simply a vehicle to present

strategically the resources associated with various bases of power. Instead,

communication is viewed as being ultimately responsible for any outcome

stemming from a compliance-gaining attempt because power requires

communication" (p. 153).

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stood Dan Quayle. 'Only in America, Mr. Vice President,' Rowe quipped to his fellow sufferer. Quayle, trying to make an America West flight to Phoenix, laughed good-naturedly" (p. C3).

I am interested here not in how the security officer (agent) *controls* the customer (target), but in how the security officer and his/her customer *together* negotiate the completion of the security check. Borrowing from the McCroskey and Richmond (1983) studies of power and communication in the classroom, I view communication between the security officer and customer as a constant, ongoing process, whereby the security officer at the security checkpoint would be "powerless" without the customer. Though it is true the security officers may possess certain power (e.g., access to the airline gate area), customer compliance is not necessarily automatic.

This chapter has given a brief history of private security; examined relevant compliance-gaining and compliance-resistance literature; reviewed research in compliance-gaining and compliance-resistance which appears to be relevant to the security check.

Chapter 2

Police-Citizen Encounters: Mutual Compliance-Seeking

The public police are charged with the safety and security of persons and

property of the public. That charge has been forcefully magnified during the

September 2001 terrorist events in New York and Washington, D.C., with the loss

of public police lives in the line of duty. Notwithstanding the importance and

necessity of the public police, security officers (i.e., the private police) also were

on duty and lost their lives in the downing of the World Trade Center and the

airplane crash into the Pentagon (Harowitz, 2001). There are similarities between

public and private police in goals (Shearing, 1993), organizational structure

(Bayley & Shearing, 2001; Rigakos, 1999), functions (Dart, 1981), values (Walsh,

1989), and personality type (Murrell, Lester, & Arcuri, 1978); thus, there are

potential similarities between the interactions of public police with citizens and

private police with citizens.

Sociologists began their interest in police-citizen interactions in the 1960s

(Banton, 1964; Bittner, 1970; R. Lundman, 1980; Reiss, 1980b; Rubinstein, 1973;

Skolnick, 1975; Skolnick & Bayley, 1986; Waddington, 1999; J. Q. Wilson,

1968). Throughout this period, police brutality during protests of United States

involvement in the Vietnam war and the Civil Rights movement brought policing

into the public eye. As a result, many police departments were submitted to a

kind of scrutiny that might not otherwise have occurred.

As a starting point in the research, sociologists were interested in demystifying and describing the work police actually do on a day-to-day, hour-by-hour basis (Rubinstein, 1973). "Like every other kind of work, police work generates demands on the people who do it and encourages them to develop skills and techniques for making the job easier. It may be good or bad work, but it is work, and before any judgments of its moral character or suggestions for reforming it can be made, the work itself must be described. This has not been done" (Rubinstein, 1973, p. x). It is also true that of the few studies that examine security officers, most are interested in an examination of the organization and administration of security – little is known of security officers' daily activities. Perhaps an examination of the security check – the activity which takes up most of a security officers' day--will help illuminate the nature of security work.

Public and private patrol officers ("public patrol officers": of concern here are so-called "beat" officers – officers who patrol a certain sector; the term "private police" is herein intended to mean security officers assigned to guard certain checkpoints or client sites) spend most of their time in interactions with citizens. These encounters are made up of citizen requests for help and police need for citizen cooperation. One researcher (Mastrofski, Snipes, & Supina, 1996) points out that, from the police view, "Much of policing consists of getting people to do things they might not otherwise do" (p. 269). From the citizen viewpoint, policing can involve at one extreme helpful assistance, to the

dispreferred interference, and at the other extreme coercion or physical force, or death.

Police-citizen encounters range from helpful assistance to police use-of-force encounters. Somewhere in the middle are compliance-seeking episodes; thus, an important distinction should be made between coercion/use of force and compliance-seeking. Infante, Rancer, and Womack (1997) define and describes coercion as "the use of physical aggression and verbal aggression (for example, threats, insults, ridicule, and profanity) as substitutes for appropriate attitudinal influence. If coercion is used, no choice is perceived: 'The person is holding a gun to my head, so I must sign this petition'" (p. 144). The issue of coercion *per se* will not be dealt with here in a direct manner, although coercion is inherent in the police-citizen encounter since police have powers which go beyond the average citizen – to detain, to handcuff, to use deadly force (even the private police can arrest when deemed necessary) (Cowen, 1995).

In compliance-seeking situations, the citizen perceives he/she does have a choice – to "comply, resist, or ignore" (Mastrofski et al., 1996, p. 272). These encounters consist of patrol officer requests or directives of citizens, and citizen request of patrol officers. Coercion and compliance-seeking are part of the officers' communicative repertoire. "Compliance involves more subtle forms of psychological pressure: 'I (and/or others) will like you if you comply'; or 'I (and/or others) will dislike you if you do not comply' (Infante et al., 1997, p. 144). In the case of the police, the message is "you may be sanctioned (hand-

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cuffed, physically restrained, and/or arrested) if you do not cooperate." Thus, police need the cooperation of citizens and citizens need the cooperation of police.

As mentioned in the first chapter, the concept of compliance as examined in criminology and law connects to "obeying the law." Much has been written in this area (Mastrofski, Parks, & Worden, 1999; Reiss, 1984; Shearing & Stenning, 1981; Tyler, 1990). However, the notion of compliance herein follows Sanders and Fitch's (Sanders & Fitch, 2001) notion of "compliance-seeking." Compliance-seeking herein is "concerned with the methods persons use in one-on-one situations to get another to do something. We regard compliance seeking as a genre of social influence that falls between simple directives at one extreme and persuasion at the other" (p. 263). Thus, compliance-seeking includes not only officers seeking compliance from citizens, but also citizens seeking compliance from officers. Additionally, I take the view that interactions are co-constructed – a view of compliance-seeking as being mutually managed.

As a recent concept, compliance-seeking has received little attention in policing research (Mastrofski et al., 1996) and is rarely examined from communication perspectives (King, 1995). Examples exist which illuminate police attitudes toward the public that they are charged to serve and protect, and examples of citizen attitudes toward the police can be gleaned from a close examination of ethnographies of the public police. This chapter will extract and examine these examples from the ethnographic literature of policing within the

context of police-citizen interactions. This examination is undertaken to set the framework for the current study of compliance-seeking in public and private policing.

The following section contains summaries of police ethnographies which illuminate communication issues of relevance to the public and private officer-citizen encounter. Entries are organized chronologically, beginning with the earliest and ending with the most recent. Each entry begins with an brief overview of the study, describes prototypic police-citizen interactions, and connects these interactions to the notion of compliance-seeking. After summarizing public police encounters, I outline a private police compliance-seeking instance and provide other possible instances of compliance-seeking situations in security officer work. The final section of the chapter will compare compliance-seeking situations in public policing to instances in private policing.

The Policeman in the Community

Banton (1964) conducted occupational sociological studies of the police role in the British Isles (Scotland) and the United States (Massachusetts, South Carolina, and Georgia). He studied successful police departments to see why they were successful. He felt more systematic research was needed in order to understand what "the ordinary policeman" (p. x) did and how he did it. Banton conducted observations by accompanying patrol officers in ride alongs.

Example 1 (p. 57). Banton gives accounts of police-citizen encounters he observed during his ride-alongs. He describes a "Negro pedestrian [who] was

seen crossing the road in a shaky fashion against the traffic light (a jay-walking ordinance enforced closely in the city centre requires pedestrians also to wait for a green light)". The pedestrian slurred his speech and his breath smelled of alcohol so he was arrested. They encounter another man who appears drunk. They asked what he had been drinking and the man said, "'A couple of beers,' which was so obviously untrue that it only irritated the officer and made him the more inclined to make an arrest. He commented to me afterwards that he had once stopped a man who agreed that he was drunk, and he had been so surprised by this unusual honesty that he had let the man go" (p. 57).

The drunk citizen's agreement with the officer's opinion of the man's sobriety state fits the Mastrofski et al. (1996) "comply" reaction to a police request/question. In this example, the officer was disarmed by the citizen's honesty and he let the citizen go home – in a manner complying with the citizen's unstated wish. This is an example of both receiving compliance.

Example 2 (p. 59). Parents did not want their son taken to jail for the night (the son had not attended a driver improvement school as the court had required). They wanted the officers who were serving the order on their soon to ignore it and said they would bring him to court the next day. The officers said they could not ignore the order and told the parents to try to reach the judge to request this favor. The parents did reach the judge and succeeded in canceling the order with a promise to bring the son into court the next morning. Thus, the parents gained the compliance of the officers in the manner the officers themselves suggested -- to

circumvent the usual channels – and were allowed to bring their son in themselves.

Example 3 (p. 63). In another instance an officer became irritated when a citizen denied being in violation of the law, although he was obviously in violation. "[The citizen] was arrested by the traffic patrol because he did not have his registration certificate (and so might be driving without the insurance required by the laws), and who refused to recognize any liability to produce this document." The citizen's compliance-resistance did not help his case and he did not avoid jail.

Thus, Banton's research supports an idea of compliance-seeking that includes both the interactants as equally seeking compliance and as collaborating in the compliance that is achieved. Officers appear to be communicatively disarmed when citizens admit to wrong-doing and, conversely, officers appear to be more inclined to follow the letter of the law when a citizen denies committing any violation of the law.

The Functions of Police in Modern Society

Bittner's (1970) classic monograph integrates and interprets police studies of the period, as well as documenting the author's own experience. It is during the interactions which require discretionary decisions that public police must employ persuasive skills.

Example 1 (p. 95-96). The neighbor of a dog owner asks the police to confiscate the dog and arrest the dog owner because, as the neighbor claims, the

dog bit him. The animal pound van arrives and the dog owner becomes adamant that he will not give up his dog (who, he says, has done no harm). Directly after the van arrives, more police and Bittner (who is participating in ride-alongs with the police) arrive. One of these officers is skilled at small-talk, saying that the dog "is a clean and healthy looking animal" and he and the owner begin to discuss pets. The officer strokes the dog, saying "it would be a lot cheaper to have the dog checked at the city pound than by a private veterinarian" and the owner does not object when the dog is handed over to the pound attendant.

The officer gains the dog-owner's compliance by establishing common ground – their shared appreciation of the dog – and appealing to the dog-owner's need to save money. Although the officer has the legal right to take the dog, his persuasive skills in convincing the owner to allow him to remove the dog without objection makes his job easier, and makes the possibility of a citizen complaint (by the dog owner) less likely.

City Police

Jonathan Rubinstein's (1973) wrote what is perhaps the first detailed depiction of the working world of police patrol officers. Rubinstein's study uses an ethnographic approach and thus is a complete picture of the activities of uniformed patrolmen. Interestingly, in addition to accounts of compliance attempts between police and citizens, Rubinstein also gives accounts of compliance/noncompliance between police and their supervisors and peer

officers. The following examples are illustrations of compliance situations between police patrol officer-citizens.

Example 1 (p. 144-145). Two officers are called by a woman who believes there are males breaking into the "beautiful " house of her neighbor. The officers listen "attentively" to her because they can see that, although her house is "poorly furnished," it is "immaculate. Her care and concern were evident everywhere." The officers check out the house, finding much damage, they return to the woman and call the utility companies to turn off the electricity and water. But they label the house "abandoned" (and making the call an "unfounded" call, or a call in which they officers had not "found" what the caller had reported – the male vandals) after they ask the woman for nails and a hammer, neither of which she has, to board up the house from entry. The woman received help that night, the utilities were turned off to help prevent fire, and flooding, but the vandals would be back. Thus, the compliance was to little effect.

Example 2 (p. 157-158). A woman calls about trucks parked near her house. She tells the officer "He [a neighbor] knows I keep this space for my son's car. If we don't park it in front of the house, someone will steal it." The officer explains that she cannot reserve space on a public street, so she points to a sign which designates no-parking beyond the end of her house. The officer writes a ticket for each of the two trucks. The trucks' owner arrives and begins a lively discussion with the officer. It is apparent that they know each other well and are on friendly terms. The man says the woman is a "nut" and "Does she think I'm

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gonna leave my trucks on the street overnight? The protection I get from guys like

you, they won't be here in the morning." They both laugh, and the officer says,

"What are you yellin' about, you ain't gonna pay those tickets anyway." They

laugh again. The man apparently sells tires and the patrolman asks about "some

new tires he needed for his car and they agreed on a price. The officer tells the

researcher, "Naw, he ain't gonna pay. He ain't paying me but he's got someone in

traffic court. So what the hell. The old lady is happy and she's got her point. He

don't give a shit and I got my snow tires." The officer appears to make the man

comply (the woman can see the tickets under the windshield wipers)., and the

officer appears to comply with the woman's request.

Justice without Trial

  Skolnick's (1975) study of the day-to-day behavior of police is primarily

based on his research at the "Westville" police department in California.

Skolnick's study is broad in scope, examining not only police encounters with

citizens, but also looking at the law enforcement system as a whole. Several

chapters focus on police-citizen encounters. Skolnick gives complete accounts of

compliance-seeking by both the police and the citizens. I will outline one long

example which is a more complex example of mutual compliance-seeking.

  Skolnick describes a compliance-seeking situation of which he had been

an observer. Several officers needed entry into a hotel room within which they

expected to find a well-known drug addict, Archie, who might be able to give

them information concerning the location of a large cache of drugs stolen from an

pharmaceutical warehouse. Rather than "kick in the door" the officers gained entry by deceptive means: One of them pretended the occupant, Dominick, had a phone call by calling "phone" just outside his door, imitating the Spanish accent of the desk clerk. Dominick opened the door a bit and the officers pushed their way into his room. One officer calmly said everyone should "relax." The occupants, Dominick and Archie, objected that they had done nothing wrong. Thus, the officer was able to quickly examine Archie's arm for "track marks" since Archie's protest implied he would not mind having his arms examined. "By denying his guilt, the suspect gives the policeman an opening wedge. He can say, as Sergeant Harris did, 'Okay, Archie, you know it's my job to check you out,' simultaneously grabbing Archie's arm and pulling up the shirtsleeve. Before Archie had an opportunity to emit the words suggested by the look of protest on his face, the Sergeant had his fingers on a pair of tiny red 'marks' in the crook of the elbow" (p. 145-146).

Archie had previous relations with the police and could expect to have future relations with the police. Consequently, "if he acted like a 'wise-guy' this time (by ordering the police to leave), he could have 'the book thrown at him' the next" (p. 146). The ultimate goal of the police was to get Archie to attempt to buy drugs from the drug thief, Bill, so they could catch Bill in the act of selling. Within 10 minutes Archie had agreed to cooperate with the police – they would overlook his syringe marks (thus, saving Archie 90 days in jail), if he would call Bill that night and "make a connection" (p. 148) to buy drugs.

Thus, both the police and the addicts were compliant to a degree. The police got the addict's help in setting up the connection to buy drugs so they could nab the dealer. The addict was able to avoid jail.

Police Brutality

Reiss (1980b) and 36 others observed police-citizen encounters in Boston, Chicago, and Washington, D.C., every day for seven weeks in the summer of 1966. Though the title of this research contains the word "brutality," Reiss defines brutality quite broadly, to include such non-contact activities as "profane and abusive language" and "commands to move on or get home" (p. 276). Reiss's work is useful to this study as it includes cases of actual encounters between police and citizens during which citizens are quite non-compliant (though largely as the result of police use of extreme physical coercion -- e.g., beatings and the like). Several examples follow.

Example 1 (p. 278). One evening while cruising the "busy street of a white slum" one police officer saw three youths on a corner – two "white" boys and a girl. When they were told to "move on," they mumbled under their breath, which angered the police. The teens moved rather slowly as the officers "pushed them along the street. Suddenly one of the white patrolmen took a lighted cigarette from a 15-year-old boy and stuck it in his face, pushing him forward as he did so." Reiss comments that these police actions inevitably increase citizen resentment toward the police. Yet the teens did, indeed, "move on."

Example 2 (p. 281-282). This neighborhood (Examples 2 and 3) is a checkerboard of squares of rich, poor, "old Americans and new," middle/upper income whites, "'hillbillies' (migrants from Kentucky and Tennessee) and 'pork chops' (Puerto Ricans)," and of Germans and Swedes. During one randomly chosen ride-along, one observer rode with two white police officers. The police stopped a woman who had made an illegal left turn. "She was treated very politely, and the younger policeman, who wrote the ticket, later commented to the observer, 'Nice lady.'" Unfortunately, Reiss does not describe how "treated very politely" played out communicatively. The woman may have wished not to receive a ticket (we are not told).

Example 3 (p. 282). The officers were summoned to a "slum walkup" where they encounter an inebriated man who said he had been burglarized of his food and liquor. The man insists that his food and liquor has been taken and that he was forced to borrow money to buy beer. As the younger policeman takes the report he continually harasses the drunk man, saying "You say your name is Half-A-Wit [for Hathaway]? Do you sleep with niggers? . . . Are you sure that's all that's missing?" The man responds to this harassment "with the seeming vagueness and joviality of the intoxicated, expressing gratitude for the policemen's help as they left." The drunk man needs the officers' assistance and to gain it he maintains a calm and even grateful demeanor, although he is being verbally harassed by the policeman.

The New Blue Line: Police Innovation in Six American Cities

The authors (Skolnick & Bayley, 1986) conducted field research, or

"mini-ethnographic studies" (p. 6), in six urban police departments in Santa Ana

and Oakland (California) Detroit, Houston, Denver, and Newark (New Jersey).

The researchers set out to document "how contemporary police agencies are

coping with the crime problem" (p. 1). The authors are more interested in

examining the systems and organizations of these police departments than in

looking at individual interactions between police and citizens. However, in the

course of their research Skolnick and Bayley characterize instances of what look

like compliance-gaining sequences. Especially in the West and Detroit, the

authors point to cultural differences that clearly affect police-citizen encounters

and citizens' willingness to comply with officers' requests. In Santa Ana, Officer

Jose Vargas discusses cultural differences in interactions with the police: "When

a person is speaking his native language, he is thinking in terms of the way law

enforcement operates in his native country. That's how come our Mexicans get to

seem so peculiar to American police – the Mexicans think they are dealing with

Mexican police, and you know what they are like." In other words, Officer

Vargas points to the power structures inherent in Mexican police-citizen

encounters – the police have nearly unlimited power over citizens.

"Sugar" is a prostitute who "knows the rules. She is allowed to work on

the street if she [doesn't] work the street loaded (under the influence of drugs or

alcohol)" (p. 43). Thus, if she complies with the police rules, she is allowed to

continue her work. A prostitute who is "loaded" needs to stay clean, or she gets arrested.

The above studies are examined for examples of police-citizen compliance-seeking-like situations. The following is a description of the work of one security officer. Within this description, the author identifies compliance-seeking situations.

Saga of a Security Guard

The Saga of a Security Guard is a security officer's (Cowen, 1995) account of his working world -- it is the only book of its kind to give a detailed account of the day-to-day experiences of a security officer, and thus is of interest here. Cowan (who holds a Ph.D. in management) outlines his experience as a security officer, security officer company owner, security officer trainer, and security officer award earner. Though at times self-aggrandizing, the author gives a fascinating account of the range and scope of job responsibilities of a long-term security officer. In addition to the customary security jobs of guarding shopping malls, hospitals, churches, apartments, and schools, he has been hired for such varied duties to include protecting a college president, transporting a mentally ill inmate, overseeing potentially violent wedding receptions, guarding film sets, protecting an international leader on a visit to the U.S., guarding a jumbo jet before take-off (scheduled to travel to Israel after the Israeli athletes were killed during the Olympics), shielding a school during a teachers' strike, ousting gang members who were intent on mischief during a high school basketball game,

controlling traffic at a very crowded fast-food restaurant, protecting construction sites, controlling crowds at music concerts, and protecting Girl Scouts on a camp-out.

The primary form of compliance-gaining Cowan and his colleagues used was "threat" of arrest. There had been several classroom arson fires at a high school. While officering this high school with another security officer, Cowan and his colleague saw two teenagers climbing over a fence to gain access to the school yard. They observed that the teenagers were unarmed. They asked the teens for their identification cards, and said they would arrest the teens and call the police unless they cooperated with the officers. The officers recorded the I.D. names and numbers and then returned the cards to the teens. The teens were told, "we [were] going to turn their names in to the principle's office and the next time we caught them on the school grounds after the campus was closed, we were going to arrest them for trespassing" (p. 94). Then Cowan convinced the teens to climb back over the fence.

> Teens: "Ah, man, why can't we go out the gate?"
>
> Cowan: "Because the gate is locked and you did not come in that way."
>
> One of the teens: "But you have the key."
>
> Cowan: "I do have the key, but you must go back the way you came in or
>
> go to jail for trespassing."
>
> Teens: "All right," and began the twelve-foot climb over the fence.

Cowan: "Remember, if you enter this school yard again after hours, you

will go to jail. Good night, fellows" (p. 94).

In this instance, the security officer gained the compliance of the citizens by using

arrest as a current and future deterrent for their activity.

Recent Airport Security Checks

In a quick analysis of security officer-citizen interactions documented in

recent *Washington Post* articles (Booth & Goo, 2001; Ginsberg & Santana, 2001;

Harowitz, 2001; Merida, 2001; O'Hanlon, 2001; G. Schneider, O'Harrow, &

Kehaulani Goo, 2001) on changes in airport security across the U.S. after the

September terror attacks, I found only one instance of objections to the new rules

which have been imposed on travelers (no doubt these objections will increase as

citizens again become more comfortable and distanced from these attacks). I

have outlined below some examples which relate to the issue of compliance-

seeking.

Example 1 (G. Schneider et al., 2001, p. A16): At New York's

LaGuardia's airport, one businesswoman had lost her driver's license (picture

I.D.s are now required) and she was prevented from access through the security

checkpoint. She was allowed to pass through the checkpoint only after she

appealed "to an airline supervisor, who confirmed her identity as a US Airways

frequent flier and obtained a special clearance for her. She avoided problems on

her return flight by having her husband send her passport to Chicago by overnight

delivery. 'I'm glad that the security measures are in place, but you have to be able

to deal with the occasional traveler who forgets' she said." This passenger gained

compliance from the supervisor for her outbound flight, and the airline gained this

passenger's compliance (to have a picture I.D.) for her return flight. This was the

only instance I found in which a traveler seems to have little patience for the new

security measures.

Example 2 (Merida, 2001, p. C1): A security officer/supervisor discusses

travelers and his job with a reporter. "Travelers reach the security checkpoint five

minutes before their flight is scheduled to take off and they get testy. 'Then it's

the ill-fated security guard 'who made me late.' Well, I didn't make you late,' the

security officer/supervisor says. 'You were late when you left the house.'" This is

an example of security officer attitude. Although it is not an example of

compliance-seeking, it does reveal the nature of the sometimes adversarial

relationship between airport security officers and the public.

Example 3 (Merida, 2001, p. C1): Six days after the September 2001

terrorist attacks, a couple has been waiting in line at the Baltimore-Washington

International Airport for two and a half hours. The husband says, "It's going to

take these guys a while to figure things out. Taking away plastic knives for my

bagel is kind of ridiculous. But if I have to dip my bagel in the cream cheese, it's

no big deal." This man both supports and objects to the rule of "no plastic

knives."

Example 4 (Booth & Goo, 2001): "'Nobody is rude anymore, and that's

one good thing,' said Julia Carrol, 55, an attorney flying into Los Angeles from

Atlanta. 'Not passengers, not the agents. At the check-in, everybody was just as friendly as they could be and everybody in line was more patient, too, because I think they understand what is at stake'"(p. A1). This woman idealizes and projects the future of passenger-airline employee interactions (at just under two weeks' after the terrorist attacks).

Thus, the foregoing examples demonstrate that in police-citizen encounters there is much more going on than police choosing and enacting a compliance-seeking strategy. Although it may be comforting to believe individuals consciously choose their influence strategies (Dillard, 1990), a preliminary analysis of the above situations demonstrates that one person's "strategy" is dependent upon another's "strategy," especially, when that other person is a police officer. Also, since much of the research has relied on subjects' self-reports of how they would respond in hypothetical situations, what happens in live compliance-seeking episodes as we see them here, play out differently. As each of the above episodes unfolds, both the officer and the citizen switch strategies and approaches depending upon the specific situation, the relationship of the officer and the citizen, and the additional interactants who are present.

Citizens seem to have more control over their fate than the compliance-gaining literature has indicated. Some criminology researchers have found that citizens appear more likely to cooperate when the officer is respectful, than when the officer is somewhat verbally abusive (R. J. Lundman, 1974). A recent observational study examining public police officer reactions to citizens found

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that officers were not more forceful toward disrespectful citizens, that they gave citizens a second chance to comply, and in three to every four encounters with a resistant citizen, the officer restrained from applying increased levels of force (Terrill, 2000). Other researchers have found that citizens "obey" almost blindly (Lichtenberg, 1999), believing that the officer will conduct an auto check whether or not the citizen gives them permission. Thus, the findings are still out on which "strategy" to use with an officer or a citizen. It would seem that a more useful approach to studying compliance-seeking is to view each event as mutually created, enacted, and negotiated.

From the police-citizen episode summaries, it appears that compliance-seeking includes both the interactants as equally seeking compliance; officers are communicatively disarmed when citizens admit to wrong-doing and, conversely, officers appear to be more inclined to follow the letter of the law when a citizen denies wrongdoing (Banton, 1964). Additionally, compliance may be gained by establishing common ground through the use of small-talk (Bittner, 1970). The officer who placed tickets on the windshields (which he knew would not be paid) used a clever method of demonstrating compliance; the officer appeared to comply but deceives the compliance-seeker to satisfy his own needs (Rubinstein, 1973). And, when both the police and citizens need each other to meet their own goals, the compliance-seeking game can become quite complex (Skolnick, 1975). Even in light of police verbal abuse, a citizen who needs their help ignores the abuse and "plays along," or the police capitalize on their cultural knowledge of

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the citizens' home country norms of total police power to gain the citizens' cooperation; or a citizen is allowed to break the law as long as s/he complies with the informal rules of the police (Reiss, 1980a).

The examples from recent airport check interactions demonstrate that, as long as cooperation and compliance are in the best interests of both the public and the security officers, cooperation at these check sites will proceed apace. Time will tell, however, just how long the public will remain patient.

Public Police-Citizen and Private-Police Citizen

Compliance Situations Compared

The following is a preliminary analysis of police-citizen situations as they may relate to security officer-citizen interactions. From the descriptions of police/citizen encounters, it appears that the public police and the private police have essential differences and similarities in their interactions with the public. Like the public police, private police have frequent contact with citizens, interact in face-to-face communication, and require mutual compliance-seeking. Unlike public police, the private police (who monitor security checkpoints) may have almost non-stop contact during busy times, are ill-trained to handle belligerent citizens, and have limited rights to punish customers who refuse compliance. Both groups seek to have citizens comply with their demands. On the other side, citizens also seek compliance from public and private officers. Both police groups work largely within the range of the public eye, although private police are

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visible more often to more people (there are many more private police than public police).

Demographics, occupational duties, and legal responsibilities of security officers are largely unknown to the public. Although security has again become a focus in the wake of the September terrorist attacks (as it was after the Oklahoma City bombing and the U.S. embassy bombings in Africa), it is likely the public will return to ignoring security until some event brings them back into focus (e.g., a traveler is asked to hand over a treasured item due to airport safety concerns, or another terrorist attack). Security officers have been variously called "rent-a-cops" or "police wannabes" and given little respect (Josar, 1997). Thus, many customers may resist security officers' requests during the security check.

Compliance-seeking during the security check. In the case of security officers, the public will not gain access to the desired area if they do not cooperate with the security officer. Citizens have at least the following options in compliance-seeking situations: (1) to comply and systematically cooperate with everything the security officer asks; (2) to comply with only the requests necessary to gain access to the desired area; (3) to comply eventually but to resist complying by passive aggressive means (e.g., at an airport check, I saw a man walk through the metal detection door several times, then, when the security officer asked him to step to the side for a physical check using the xray wand, the man twirled around faster than the officer could check him); (4) to comply but to be quite verbally and nonverbally resistant to the requests; (5) to resist the

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security check citing physical reasons (e.g., heart monitor, metal plates in body, etc.); (6) to resist the security check and ask for a supervisor; (7) to resist the security check by walking away; and (8) to resist by circumventing the security checkpoint altogether (i.e., sneaking past the security checkpoint). The above are only a few of the possibilities for compliance-seeking interactions. There are undoubtedly more. Options for a security officer's response to compliance-resistance are also varied. For an egregious security breach, security officers have a range of response possibilities: Depending upon the state, security officers possess the sanction of arresting the perpetrator then calling the police to the scene for transport to the station, or, if armed and threatened by the citizen with deadly harm, shooting the suspect.

On the other hand, the private police have few punitive options at their disposal. They can refuse access through their port into the building or the airport gate. The one hammer that private police possess is that they will summon the public police if necessary. Only recently have researchers turned their attention to the security field (Bernstein, 1980; Crouch & Alpert, 1982; Hertz & Charlton, 1989; Leeds, 1997), and few to the contract security industry (Borofsky & Watson, 1994; Dalton, 1994). The focus of these studies is on: How can we make contract security do what we want them to do? rather than on, How are they able to learn their jobs and their roles?

Because of the dearth of information on private security communication, I embarked on this combination exploratory ethnography and a microanalysis of the

language of security work. An exploration of the system of security work and an examination of the daily activities of the security officer will be of use in increasing our understanding of the actual work of contract security officers. Additionally, an examination of what security officers say during the course of a security check will help us understand how officers are able to gain the cooperation of citizens.

Chapter 3

Compliance-Seeking and the Security Check: Methodological Issues

Great change often comes from the trauma and tragedy of human affairs. The September 11 terrorist events galvanized the United States to examine and alter the structure and functions of security (Booth & Goo, 2001). Due to increased terrorist activities at home and abroad, communication demands on security officers have increased in public contexts, such as airports and government buildings. The potential for future terrorist attacks lends a particular urgency to the examination of communication at sensitive security checkpoints. Security and police officers at security checkpoints are the first line of defense against terrorists and those seeking to do others harm. Yet, though the communication of security and police officers is in the public eye, a research gap exists in these areas. Private police and public police are long overdue for communication ethnographies.

Although I do not examine the security officers in this study, the police of Government Buildings by and large are a security-like force in their duties and public expectations, and thus the following explanation applies equally to this police force.

There are two reasons for the lack and depth of research in private policing. First, the field of private policing has not allowed widespread research and existing research is primarily focused on supporting or changing existing public policy (W. C. Cunningham et al., 1990; Kakalik & Wildhorn, 1971), rather

than an intensive examination of the day-to-day communicative activities of
security officers.

Private policing until recently has not been receptive to systematic
social research. Much of what has been done concerns general policy
issues. Published material are pragmatic, utilitarian, ahistorical,
atheoretical, and anti-intellectual. Much of what passes for research
consists of slick and successful case studies, although the *Security Journal*
and the American Association of Industrial Security (ASIS) encourage
careful empirical studies by economists, criminologists, practitioners, and
students of business administration (Forst & Manning, 1999, p. 53).
Consequently, little is known about the day-to-day aspects of private policing
work.

It is accurate to say that private contract security forces were resistant to
my systematic outside examination. I spent over eight months in my search for a
contract security site to observe. Twice I was given preliminary permission by
the security head at each of the sites. Once my request was forwarded to their
legal departments, however, I was told "no" once and strategically ignored by the
other site's legal department. Eventually I received permission from the head of
security at a major federal government site largely due, I believe, to a family
connection of mine. Additionally, the head of security at this government site is
not a "typical" security or police type, as one officer described him to me: " He's
a nice guy. He has no police background. 'Police' is different than physical

security. Police is police." Thus, he was almost welcoming in his permission for me to interview and observe. However, the contract security firm responsible for internal room-to-room police would not allow me to audio-tape record at their security checks. The firm did allow me to take notes at their security checkpoints and to interview their security officers off-site, though.

Another problem with extant research is that most of it is of the traditional quantitative variety. There is little empirical research on the security officers (Matthews, 1989; South, 1988). Forst and Manning (1999) connect the vast research conducted in the 1960s on the public police to the need for research on the security officers of today: "Certainly, private security should be scrutinized to the same extent that researchers have examined public policing beginning in the sixties" (p. 51).

A problem with private policing research is that it is primarily of the large-scale, federal-government sponsored type and aimed at policy justification or policy change (W. C. Cunningham et al., 1990; Forst & Manning, 1999; Kakalik & Wildhorn, 1971; Nalla & Newman, 1991; Van Meter, 1976). Also, research is applied to security texts which "guide the development and implementation of security programs (e.g., Timm and Christian 1992). They tend to be proscriptive and hortatory, and to avoid the abiding issues, tensions, and paradoxes of private security work" (Forst & Manning, 1999, p. 121 note 4).

Microanalytic studies of interactions between security officers and the public are quite sparse. Forst and Manning (1999) find that "private policing has

few ethnographies (Goodhall, 1989) and no ethnographic classics to compare with Westley's Violence and the Police (1977), Rubinstein's brilliant City Police (1972) or James Q. Wilson's pioneering organizational analysis, Varieties of Police Behavior (1968)" (note 3 p. 120).

In actuality, I found no ethnographies which focused on the security officers or policing as defined in this study. Research either looked at security forces in other contexts, such as prison guards (Belote, 1989; Crouch & Alpert, 1982) and marine officers (D. H. Wilson, 1982) and/or used quantitative methods (Belote, 1989; Murrell et al., 1978). Thus, this ethnography provides a more in-depth understanding of the nature of security work and initiates starts ethnographic study of federal government security and policing forces.

Policymakers have cited the need to improve security forces – to raise the standards for hiring security, to increase pay, and to improve the professionalism of security (W. C. Cunningham et al., 1990; Josar, 1997; Sklansky, 1999) – without seeming to know precisely which changes were most necessary and how to implement these improvements. In the 1980s and 1990s, the federal government held hearings designed to uncover the current security problems (e.g., helping professionalize the image of security by changing the "guard" label to a title which is more professional), such as the lack of officer training and licensing standards (Astor, 1975; Ighabon, 1983). In 1971, the Rand Report (Kakalik & Wildhorn, 1971) described the typical private officer as "an aging white male, poorly educated, usually untrained, and very poorly paid" (p. 30). Today the

average security officer is 31 to 35 years old, 25 percent female, and over 50 percent have had some college education (W. C. Cunningham et al., 1990). The above research, which has cited these demographics, however, reveals nothing about security's actual communication practices.

Impetus For Study: Security Officer Training

My interest in security developed from my experience as a contract security officer trainer of the General Services Administration (GSA) security officers. My training team was hired by GSA because, as a contract officer told us, one officer treated the head of GSA rudely when he attempted to enter a GSA building. Thus, this policymaker saw the need for interpersonal communication training for security officers, and decided to obtain contract training in interpersonal communication for all GSA security officers in a major metropolitan area of the northeastern United States. This year-long training demonstrated to me a wide variety in the effectiveness of communication skills among officers. A brief description of this training follows to demonstrate what I learned about these security officers frustrations within the communicative context of security work..

We began the first day of training by asking the officers to list their experiences with their contract company, the government agency or agencies occupying their building, their peer officers and supervisors (most immediately ranking officer who is responsible for a particular security officer), and *security-access-seekers* (anyone attempting to enter a secure area: employees, delivery persons, family and friends of employees, meeting attendees, visitors to the

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building; *abbreviated hereafter as SAS*). Of most relevance to this study are the officers' comments about encounters with SASs. Many security officers related the wide-spread disrespect they encountered from the employees, delivery people, and visitors at their sites. We collected comments in a focus group setting from the officers which demonstrated the difficulty of convincing their SASs to comply with well-known, well-documented rules for each federal government building. Employees and visitors told them: "You know me! You see me every day. Why do I have to show you my I.D.?" or "This is my purse/briefcase and you aren't going to look through my private things." These sorts of comments led me to examine the phenomenon of compliance-seeking.

As described in Chapters 1 and 2, compliance-seeking has been largely ignored in policing research. One exception is Mastrofski, Snipes, and Supina's (1996) study of citizen compliance with specific police requests. These researchers found that "familiarity appears to breed contempt. It may be that citizens familiar with officers tend to feel a certain license not to comply with their requests. SASs dealing with officers unknown to them may feel more uncertain about the officers' thresholds of intolerance and are therefore less inclined to risk arrest or some other sanction" (p. 296). At Government Buildings security checks, some of the SASs need access to checkpoints over and over each day and, thus, checkpoint officers may be susceptible to "contemptuous" SASs, which provided examples of rich, compliance-seeking situations.

Some officers appear to understand the need for different communicative tactics with each SAS and are quick to explain their strategies for gaining compliance: "Humor goes a long way toward keeping things light"; "I treat them with respect"; "I establish a relationship early on with each of them so they'd feel guilty if they didn't do as I ask"; and "They have to get through me day after day and I have the potential for making their lives hell."

This training experience piqued my interest in precisely how officers are able to convince SASs to do as they requested, and how SASs are able to avoid or resist compliance during the security check. These focus-group type discussions and the private, informal discussions I had with participants convinced me that the rich descriptions I would obtain by using qualitative research methods would be the most fruitful way to conduct an exploratory examination of the nature of "the security check" and compliance-seeking.

Theoretical Assumptions: Following the conceptualization of encounters presented by Goffman (1961), I have assumed that both security officers and SASs determine the nature of the interaction; in other words, each has some control over the development of the compliance-seeking episode. Additionally, the Sanders and Fitch (Sanders & Fitch, 2001) *influential meanings postulate* applies here. This postulate is based on Mead's (1934) and Goffman's (1959, 1967) work on the social construction of the self. Their postulate is: "Person P's likelihood of saying or doing X depends on what P projects the social meaning of his/her doing or saying X would be for relevant others (i.e., what they could infer

about P's identity, character, or relationship with others). This is because the way others treat P depends on their beliefs about P's identity, character, and relationship with others." In other words, both the target and the compliance-seeker will have "heightened vigilance about [what their conduct would mean to others] whenever something might be inferred from one's current actions that would put one's interests at risk" (p. 266). In the security site context, this may be especially true for SASs who are employees of the site, repeat visitors to the site, or visitors who have traveled far to visit this site.

As is typical with ethnographic research, I did not set out with precise and limiting research questions and pre-chosen theoretical frameworks. The questions that began to emerge from my preliminary observations and during initial interviews of officers over the course of the first month are (see Appendix B):

(1) What do officers think are the most important communication methods for getting SASs to do as they ask with minimal resistance?

(2) What kinds of SAS resistance do officers encounter?

(3) Do officers' actual encounters match what they say they do?

I had originally planned to ask SASs as they left the security checkpoint their opinions about that officer and why they had either complied or resisted compliance with this officer. However, I found I could not both observe security check encounters and rush away to interview SASs as they left. I hope that my future research (with a colleague) will allow for this type of check.

The goals of this study are fourfold: (1) to add to the sparse social science literature on private policing; (2) to narrow the research gap of naturalistic studies of policing from the communication perspective; (3) to examine compliance-seeking at the security check; and (4) conduct a discursive analysis of the everyday activities of officers during the security check

Methodological Framework

I have used ethnography because this approach is most appropriate to my research questions. LeCompte and Schensul (1999) point out that ethnographic research methods are appropriate to "document a process" and "answer questions that cannot be addressed with other methods or approaches" (p. 29-30). My research questions suggest an exploratory examination of the security check; thus, an ethnographic methodological framework is in order.

Ethnographic research on the public police has an illustrious history. Ethnographers began to study police at least as early as 1966, the year in which Jerome H. Skolnick's seminal study of police in California was published. Two of the most well-known ethnographic researchers who have studied police from a communication perspective are Peter Manning and John Van Maanen (Forst & Manning, 1999; Manning & Van Maanen, 1978). "Van Maanen (1982) spent three months as a full participant member of an urban police academy recruit class" (cited in Anthony-Davis, 1993, p. 23). Van Maanen "was interested in 'making some sense out of the police life, its consequences upon the people who live it and upon those subject to it." However, there appear to be no

ethnographies policing which is of a security officer type. An interpretive,

naturalistic, ethnographic approach to this research is of most use here. B. A.

Fischer (1978) suggests that "knowledge of any reality depends on one's

observing/interpreting it" (p. 58). Thus, whatever we learn or can learn of a

phenomenon depends on our interpretation of that phenomenon. As suggested by

policing and compliance-seeking researchers, a qualitative approach is desirable.

Ethnographic research requires a dedication from the researcher which

makes the justification of such focus essential. Because we know so little about

security work at any level, research of an inductive nature would provide the most

appropriate starting point.

Compliance-Seeking, Policing and Method

Though it has always been important to get the public to comply with

police requests, after September 11, security forces walk a narrower line between

ensuring the safety of property and people at their sites and effective

communication necessary for maintaining good relations with the public. The

notion of convincing the co-interactant to comply is inherent in these police-SAS

encounters.

Compliance-seeking researchers have also built a strong case for viewing

compliance-gaining from an interpretive stance, rather than the traditional view.

"The predominance of experimental studies over more naturalistic, situated

investigations has been noted as a further weakness of work in [in compliance-

gaining]" (Fitch, 1994, p. 187). Fitch argues that previous research using

"checklist approaches has been challenged as being heavily influenced by social desirability" bias, or subjects' need to conform to behavior they perceive as socially approved (Burleson et al., 1988, p. 438). Paulson and Roloff (1997) suggest that "a naturalistic setting might allow for the observation of the entire interaction sequence and may yield information regarding sequential strategies, the willingness to persist, and the veracity of the reasons presented" (p. 283). Past compliance-gaining research emphasized matching strategy types with either situational or personality variables (Seibold et al., 1994) rather than the "discursive enactments of those strategies" (Fitch, 1994). "Folger and Poole (1982) and Berger (1983) have raised questions concerning the ability of a perspective that focuses solely upon message exchanges, and does not consider the interpretations that social actors have of these messages, to adequately explain control patterns in ongoing interactions" (1994, p.463). Kellermann and Cole (1994) suggest the focus of future compliance-gaining research should be on "*explaining observed differences in compliance gaining messages* rather than on *describing possible differences in compliance gaining strategies, situations and goals*" (p. 46).

Researchers in policing also advocate naturalistic, observational studies (King, 1995; Mastrofski et al., 1996). "Interpretive studies of policing not only provide rich descriptions of the manner in which officers communicate with civilians but also lend valuable insight into the meaning behind officers' communicative behaviors" (King, 1995, p. 10). Perhaps Van Maanen (1978) says

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it best, "While observation of the police in naturally occurring situations is difficult, lengthy, and often threatening, it is imperative"(p. 293). Thus, I have used observational, naturalistic research methods.

Conceptualization of Compliance-Seeking

I borrow the Sanders and Fitch (2001) conceptualization of compliance-seeking. These authors broadly define compliance seeking as "the methods persons use in one-on-one situations to get another to do something" (p. 263). I regard compliance seeking within security contexts as an attempt to influence the other either (1) "to comply by merely informing them of what is wanted because they are obligated or predisposed to comply" (p. 263), or compliance seeking as "a means of influence when there is resistance. However, influence is achieved by offering inducements that make it expedient or self-interested in the moment for that particular target person to do what is being asked, given his or her existing convictions and dispositions" (p. 263).

In this area, SASs have been more compliant with regard to the police since the terrorist attacks. As is shown in Chapter 2, in airport security venues, travelers were more patient than in the past when asked to wait in lines, to allow officers to search their private belongings, and to give up banned items (e.g., nail clippers and Swiss Army knives). More recent reports, however, show that public patience is wearing thin (O'Hanlon, 2001):

> Trouble was brewing at Dulles International Airport. A passenger
> who considered himself a VIP refused when security screeners asked

whether they could inspect his carry-on luggage. Profanities flew out of his mouth. "He had 7 million [frequent flier] miles. He knew everybody. He was God, basically," said Scott Mack, a police officer with the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority.

The profanities continued. "I said, 'Sir, I need to see your ID," Mack said. More profanity. Suddenly flanking Mack were two guys in camouflage, M-16 rifles strapped to their backs and Berettas on their belts. The Virginia National Guard had arrived" (p. B4)

Additionally, employees at the buildings of security sites have become weary of the constant scrutiny. The following is an example of compliant-resistant airport employee.

There have been funny moments for the team at Dulles, the kind that provide a good laugh when the guys go back to the armory at the end of the shift. Like when an airport employee, quite tired of the brave new world in which he, too, was forced to be checked, prodded and scanned every time he went to the concourse, staged a protest one Friday after midnight. "He stripped down to his underwear, threw all his clothes on the belt and all but streaked through the scanner. "I don't think he works there anymore," DePoy said" (p. B4)

The post-9/11 climate and the effects on security checkpoints is only now becoming obvious

Compliance-seeking research is often conceptualized as an intentional, strategic choice made by the interactants. These conclusions have been drawn as the result of mostly self-report data, rather than observation of compliance-seeking episodes as they unfold. D. E. Schneider and Beaubien (1996) point to the reliance on self-report measures in compliance-seeking research. "Paper and pencil surveys have been a popular method in compliance-seeking research inside and outside of the health communication field." This "attitude-behavior discrepancy" (p. 333) is a disconnect between what interactants claim they do to gain compliance and what they actually do (Dillard, 1988). Consequently, the present study relies on observation as one of the procedures.

Additionally, compliance-seeking research has been criticized (Garko, 1990) for ignoring communication. Thus, this study examines the interaction of the communicators by looking at "the entire sequence of interaction constituting a compliance-gaining [and compliance-resisting] episode" (Garko, 1990, p. 154) rather than focusing on the persuasive strategies of the agent or target. The unit of analysis is the "security check," which includes the complete event from the time the SAS attempts to gain access through the site, until the current interaction with the officer is complete.

Gaining Access to a Research Site

Gaining access to security sites is often difficult because it is the job of security and police to be suspicious (McGregor, 1995; Murrell et al., 1978). The nature of policing organizations is one of insularity. Bittner (1970) describes "the

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quasi-military character of the police is evident in the *esprit de corps* that pervades the institution . . . policing is a dangerous occupation and the availability of unquestioned support and loyalty is not something officers could readily do without" and "to the extent that the fraternal spirit binds members of the police it also segregates them from the rest of society" (p. 63). Thus, for the researcher, gaining access to the policing institution can be problematic.

I was originally interested in restricting my study to security officers due to the lack of research on them, and my training experiences. Perhaps because my search for a research site took place a few months after the terrorist attacks of 9/11/01, I found that my preferred site – an airport – would not be available to me due to a lack of response on the part of the new agency, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) which took over control of the airports at that time. Thus, I was forced to take whatever site was willing to have me. Government Buildings had a willing security director and there was both a police force and contract security officers at Government Buildings. I believed having two groups would be a boon and could provide me the opportunity to compare them.

Unfortunately, I found management of the contracting company to be less cooperative than Government Buildings management. The contractor who supplies internal security, SecurityCompany, was understandably resistant to having their employees' interactions with SASs audio tape-recorded. The president did not want SecurityCompany employees distracted from their primary

mission of security which the success of their contract depends on.

SecurityCompany did not allow me to tape record interviews while on-site. (For

each interview the officer and I had to find a place outdoors or away from the

buildings somewhere before I could tape.) I was, however, given full access to

any officer who was willing to be interviewed off post (and could tape them), and

I spent time with officers at their posts observing their security checks.

Description of Setting and Participants

I have studied police officers[6] at security checkpoints at a federal

government building site in the Northeast United States. The rationale for use of

a government building rests on the assumption that the security officers and the

building employees are fairly familiar with each other. As a result of this

familiarity, I expected the employees would demonstrate more instances of

compliance-resistance (Mastrofski et al., 1996). Additionally, some visitors to the

Government Buildings are VIPs, and thus prone to expecting preferential

treatment, which gave richer, in-depth interactions of resistance.

However, it is my sense that, as a group, security officers are from

disparate private companies, tend to change companies often, and appear not to

exhibit a "fraternal spirit" so evident in public police which could prevent access.

As a past trainer of private security officers, I have established relationships

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[6]   Because I was initially interested in security officer work, I also interviewed and
observed security officers. However, I have used little of that data here and will reserve it for
future analysis.

within the profession which might have made access more likely. I also have

contacts at government buildings which did prove useful.

I spent much of my time with two officers, but also interviewed and

observed about 15 police officers in total. I interviewed and audio-tape recorded

all officers, save two, in addition to the field observations.

Data Collection Procedure

I employed multiple methods in this study. Furlong, Lovelace, and

Lovelace (2000) say "using multiple research methods to examine the same

questions of interest" (p. 543) enhances the validity of the research. I began the

project first by preliminary observations at security checkpoints and becoming

acquainted with the officers, asking questions and allowing them to "teach" me.

After some time, I found an officer, Officer Vail,[7] who was willing to wear a

microphone and to be tape-recorded as he worked.[8] In all, I tape-recorded six

police officers as they worked, collecting 12 hours of audio recordings.

The method for uncovering "what they actually do" is to observe the site

where the communication occurs. Participant observation "refers to a process of

learning through exposure to or involvement in the day-to-day routine activities of

participants in the research setting" (Schensul & LeCompte, 1999) Often I took

surreptitious notes during my observations, then went to a private area to flesh out

the notes. At times I simply observed and quickly recorded my observations as

soon as possible. The site management gave me a desk and any help I needed to

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[7] All place and individual names are pseudonyms.

aid in the administrative aspects of this work.[9] If immediate fieldnote work was not possible, I completed fieldnotes that night or the next day.

I began to transcribe the stream taping early on. This stream taping proved unsuccessful until I acquired an expensive and sophisticated law enforcement microphone which I attached to the officer's lapel, with a tape recorder in a pack attached to his – they were all men -- belt. This microphone picked up SAS comments and filtered out the majority of echoing noise.

Interviews have been found to be particularly helpful in providing personal accounts that yield an enriched, elaborated understanding of the phenomena of interest (Greene, Caracelli, & Graham, 1989). After the initial observation and fieldnotes stage, I conducted semi-structured, reflexive interviews of officers to check their perceptions (against my own perceptions) of the observed security check. Lofland and Lofland (1984) describe intensive interviewing as "a guided conversation whose goal is to elicit from the interviewee rich, detailed materials that can be used in qualitative analysis" (p. 12). Hammersley and Atkinson's (1995) "reflexive interviewing" is a contrast to "standardized interviewing" (p. 152). In reflexive interviewing, the ethnographer usually interviews from a list of specific issues he or she wishes to cover and adopts "a more flexible approach, allowing the discussion to flow in a way that seems natural" (p. 152). Thus, as an ethnographer I did not ask each interviewee the same questions and did not follow any fixed order of topics. In all, I

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[8] In a previous policing job, he was always miked, and so he was comfortable with the procedure.

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conducted 12 interviews of police officers, 10 interviews of security officers, and 2 management interviews. As the interviews progressed, I used my interview guide less and less as topics of interest began to emerge. I began to use semi-structured, reflexive interviews of the officers.

As Lofland and Lofland (1984) state:

> [Intensive] interviews of this kind tend to produce a rather large amount of rich material. Before long, you have assembled a significant data log that needs somehow to be managed. Indeed, the management problem is such that researchers who conduct studies utilizing qualitative interviewing tend to employ rather few interviews. It is our impression that such studies are typically based on only about 20-50 interviews. Given the material management problem, numbers in that range seem quite reasonable. The researcher legitimately sacrifices breadth for depth (p. 62).

Thus, amount of data collected in intensive interviews tends to be significant and, thus, 20-50 interviews are sufficient. I was fortunate to be given unfettered access to those police officers who were willing to talk to me, to have me audio-tape our interviews, and to allow me to observe and audio-tape them at work. Once officers began to get to know me, and saw me working with other officers, I was able to find more who were willing to allow me to tape them. They also wished me to interview them while on-the-job, at the checkpoints. Although I was

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[9] See Chapter 6 for concerns about accepting management's help.

reluctant to do so, I found that officers' abilities to do their jobs while talking with me demonstrated their ability to multitask. Also, by allowing this type of interviewing, I was able to interview more officers than would have agreed to interviews on their non-work time.[10]

In sum, I employed multiple methods of data collection – formal interviews (tape-recorded and transcribed) and informal or off-the-cuff interviews while observing; detailed field notes, formal audio-taped observations and informal observations (observing without notetaking), and audio-taping of actual encounters. Thus, due to the amount and variety of data I collected through the use of multiple methods, I feel comfortable with the 12 interviews I use in my analysis.

Data Analysis

I began my analysis with the Lofland and Lofland (1984) domain analysis. As this analysis progressed, I was able to narrow the topics in a systematic way. (I describe my analysis in detail in Chapter 5.)

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[10] I had set up several off-site interviews with officers all of which had been repeatedly cancelled.

Chapter 4

An Account of the Security Check: A Narrative Account

The shooting of a Council member in the City Council chambers of New York City Hall on July 23, 2003, again spotlights the importance of security in government buildings. Although New York City Hall is reputed to have tight security, the gunman was able to slip through security with a weapon, due to his relationship with the council member he later shot (those accompanying the mayor and council members were allowed to by-pass the metal detectors). This incident points to a central dilemma for government security forces – how to protect lives and property while treating security access seekers with professionalism and respect?

My goal is to construct narratively accounts of the day-to-day activities of officers I observed at Government Buildings. This day-in-the-life description is not intended to be a *verbatim* account of each officer's day – officers relate to me that every day at Government Buildings has unexpected events, and new twists and turns – but is intended to paint a picture of a realistically possible working day for a police officer and a security officer.

I agreed to protect the identity of the research site and the security company. Thus, I use this account to protect these identities, while giving the representative essence of life for security forces at Government Buildings. Each of the examples is based on an actual interaction or event I observed. My intention is to protect officers from punishment or retaliation, or notice of any

kind, should their activities be of the sort that would attract such attention from their supervisors or management.

The purpose of this chapter is threefold: (1) to place this security site in the larger U.S. security context, give an overview of the officers' day, (2) provide a flavor of the more usual security checks and describe a less-usual occurrence, and (3) preview speech acts I will discuss in more detail in Chapter 5.

Setting the Stage

A history of this security site would be illuminating, but I am bound to privacy. However, where possible, I have inserted the more mundane and informative facts which may apply to many federal government security sites in the North Eastern United States which give the flavor and tone of this working environment.

This site has two security groups: the police department and the security officers. Police are stationed at external entrances (see Appendix C for MB's main entrance post) and patrol the perimeter of the three buildings that comprise this site. The security force is stationed at internal security posts although security officers also patrol the parking lot and building perimeters when requested. The internal security is contracted out to SecurityCompany (a pseudonym), a medium-sized security contractor in business for over 30 years.

I noticed early in my observations a tension between these two forces (which I will not handle specifically in this dissertation). Officers of both forces

mentioned this stress to me. One possible reason for the police insistence on keeping their distance from the security force is that the police force was a security force until 1995. When wide-scale theft of the Government Buildings property was uncovered, it was decided to increase the visibility of security by changing them to a police force.

The similarities in the duties of security officers in general and this police force in particular are quite comparable. In fact, one police officer said he sought out this job because it was safer than street police work, and "like security work" but paid much higher than security work.

There are two main differences between police and security at this site. Government Buildings police are armed but security officers are not; and Government Buildings police are not required to go through security checks to enter or reenter the buildings, but security officers must enter through security checkpoints each time they attempt to enter the site.

I found the majority of both the security and police officers at Government Buildings to be professional in demeanor and appearance. Police officers typically have military bearing and the pressed uniform and spit-shined shoes of a paramilitary group (John Van Maanen, 1978). Some of the police are former military officers or former enlisted..

On the other hand, security officers have the public reputation for laziness, sloppy dress, and poor attitude (Cherry, 2001; W. Cunningham & Taylor, 1985; W. C. Cunningham et al., 1990; Kanne, 1994). This security force is especially

well-dressed and pressed. SecurityCompany is a well-respected, highly professional firm which treats their officers as professionals, with fair pay, monetary and recognition incentives, and opportunities for officer attention from management. This company recruits and hires from former military, and trains them rigorously in CPR, first aid, pepper spray use, as well as training them through a video and lecture on the use of force. They have an orientation by the program manager, observation on post, on-the-job monitoring and training by a current senior officer the first day, are started at an "easier" post, and receive a 90- to 120-day evaluation. In addition, there is a mentoring program for officers – a senior officer or supervisor is assigned to mentor new or young officers. Also, officers are moved to new posts every few days to avoid boredom and the possibility of officers becoming too close to the SASs and the temptation to allow the SAS to break any rules (e.g., allowing an SAS to access the security checkpoint who says "I don't have my I.D. today . . .").

Security officers, especially those who have worked with other contract security companies, are complimentary of their company president. The president provides the rewards and incentives mentioned above, has the quarterly recognition breakfast catered, and sits and talks with the officers, and they say, seems genuinely interested in their lives.

Government Buildings police officers are trained along with other police forces at the regional police academy. Their days appear to be fairly routinized regarding roll call, post assignments, rotation from post to post every few hours,

break time, lunch time, and end-of-shift. They are trained in reading the magnetometer monitors and the metal detection doors, use of the metal detection wands, site rules and procedures, and the law as it regards their and the security access seekers' rights and responsibilities.

The bulk of the police and security forces' days are spent at a security check-post. The police teams of about four officers at each post work together – stationed at the monitor, the metal detector door, wielding the metal detection wand, and – the modified (one-half height) metal detection door at the exit. Because they are rotated from one post to another so often, over time the police are teamed with many different officers.

On the other hand, security officers staff posts alone, although some areas are near other security posts. Because police have already checked SASs at external entrances, the task of security is primarily to protect Government Buildings property from vandalism or theft. At most posts, security officers check I.D. cards, and at some, SASs are required to sign in and out.

Early on I found informants in one security officer, Officer Edwards, and one police officer, Officer Vail (pseudonyms). Officer Edwards was stationed at the first post a supervisor showed me and he welcomed me, giving me a good basis of information on duties, equipment, and post operations. Officer Vail seemed curious about my presence and he too was posted at the first post I attempted to observe.

A Narrative of a Government Buildings Police and Security Officer's Day

The alarm awoke Andrew Johnson at 4:15 a.m. He knows he has to rush because he needs to be downtown by 5:50 a.m. for roll call. Officers were put on 12-hour shifts after 9/11; they were told it would be temporary. (They did not return to 8-hour shifts until September 22, 2002.) Officer Johnson accepted this change at the time, but over a year after 9/11, they are still on 12-hour shifts and he is tired: tired of not seeing his family (his mother comments on it) and friends, of having little time for recreation, of experiencing a job that is the entirety of his life. He is not alone, of course. The other men and women of the force are exhausted, too, and morale is low.

He has about a 45-minute commute by car and then a half-mile walk from his parking lot. Traffic is light this morning so he is happily on time. At roll call there are announcements concerning important people who will be visiting today, security alerts, and daily schedules are handed out. The meeting takes about 10 minutes and then Officer Johnson is headed to his first post. He checks the complicated schedule for the day. Officers here are moved from post-to-post every few hours to avoid potential problems. Lethargy, inappropriate attachments to employees and the public, and a kind of hypnosis can develop which is detrimental to security. Switching officers often also allows them to be prepared to work all posts and to work with a variety of their colleagues.

Officer Johnson is in his early thirties, of stocky build, African-American, with closely cropped hair. His blue uniform is spotless, shoes shined, his badge

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which is pinned over his heart, gleams. On his thick belt he carries his holstered gun, two-way radio, night stick, and knife. Officer Johnson was a street police officer for nine years in another state before coming here and, as a result, he is very experienced . Even though he came in to the force as a well-trained, experienced police officer, he was required to attend more training.

Government Buildings is a large complex of three buildings open to both the public and employees. Since each building has many floors, walking from post to post is very time consuming. The officers have only a few minutes to switch posts. Supervisors radio to be sure each officer has made his or her post. Each post at the external entrances has a magnetometer conveyor belt machine with monitor(s), metal detection door, and metal detection hand wand. The number of officers varies from post-to-post, but there is at least one officer at the magnetometer, one on the metal detector door, and one using the wand. All posts allow sitting for the monitor officer. Some posts do not allow sitting at the other stations, the metal detection doors and the wanding area. Despite the permission some officers elect not to sit. They do not want to be "surprised" and standing gives them maximum speedy movement possibilities. Also, especially with former military personnel, looking professional is in their training, and standing appears more professional when protecting than sitting.

Officer Johnson heads to his first post of the day, the main entrance and greets his fellow officers. He puts his bottled water and hat on the nearby counter and takes his place at the metal-detection door. The main entrance of

Government Buildings is the busiest post, with hundreds of SASs passing into and out of the building each day.

Employees are starting to trickle in which they usually do from about 6:00 to 8:30 a.m.. Officer Johnson's job is to get them through the security check and to their desks as efficiently as possible. For Officer Johnson, efficiency includes pleasant, albeit brief, small talk and an attention to aiding each SAS to access the security check quickly without giving up security. This means minimal conversation and an interaction script which Officer Johnson has perfected over time.

During any lunchtime, a high-volume time period, officers check through hundreds of SASs at the main security area. Other-than-employee SASs are limited to one entrance before the 8:30 a.m. hour. This rule allows employees to enter the building as quickly as possible through the other entrances so they can start their work day. The following gives a flavor of the range of employees and visitors seeking access into these buildings on any day.

Officer Johnson believes most of the SASs are cooperative, friendly, and helpful. They are interested in being allowed to enter the building and want to cause as little disruption as possible. Officers say that since 9/11, most SASs appear to want to please or obey the officers, but do not always understand what the officers want them to do. SASs new to Government Buildings often neither read nor correctly read signs, and often they do not listen to officer instructions. Some may try to disobey purposely, and some even look uncertain or frightened

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when asked to complete any action. Most security check-throughs, though, are very routine. Over time officers create check through scripts which work for them. They vary what they say according to whether they know the SAS, the nature of their relationship, the dictates of the post (how busy is it, etc.), and their mood.

Because they must access and re-access the security site several times each day, unlike other SASs, employees are skilled at check-throughs. They, too, each have their personal behavioral scripts and follow them. Some employees speak to the officers, some employees treat officers as in-the-way pieces of furniture, and some employees completely ignore the officers.

One of the employees, Mrs. Brown, comes to work quite early in the morning. She is in her sixties, pleasant and no-nonsense, and has been at Government Buildings for 27 years. She says "Good Morning, Officer Johnson." and he greets her by name, "Mrs. Brown, how're you doing today?". "If I was any better, they'd have to lock me up. You stay safe out there, you hear?" She moves quickly through the metal detection door, picks up her purse and briefcase, and heads upstairs.

Since 9/11, many of the employees have told the officers how much they are appreciated which was very uncommon before the attacks. Officer Johnson said he felt the employees now relate to him very differently – they seem to actually care about his safety. Several employees have come to him to tell him about potential security risks and he is grateful for the heads-up. However, as time

has passed, Officer Johnson has noticed that the employees' gratitude and attitudes are returning to pre-9/11 levels.

The next two employees Officer Johnson does not know by name and they do not greet him. In fact, he appears to be invisible to them. His usual "How're you doin' today" hangs in the air, unanswered. They walk through the metal detection door and retrieve their items from the belt. Debbie, in her early-thirties, has been an employee at Government Buildings since graduating from college seven years ago. She seems to be lost in thought as she heads dreamily through the metal detection door, forgetting her briefcase on the belt. Officer Johnson has to say "Miss, you forgot . . ." twice before she hears him. She sheepishly turns around and collects her things, saying "thanks" vaguely in the direction of Officer Johnson. He says, "You take it easy today."

Mohammed, who appears to be in his late twenties, has been an engineer at Government Buildings for 2 years. Mohammed tosses his keys and change into the tray from a bit further than necessary, and abruptly stops to retrieve them on the other side of the metal detection door. He does not meet the eyes of any officer and walks quickly away from the security area. Officer Johnson watches him walk away for a moment.

The next employee going through the security check is Adam who has been a security officer at Government Buildings for three months. He works for the contracting company which provides security at Government Buildings. Adam is young and new at being a both a security officer and an employee. This

morning he sets off the alarm lights and alarm on the metal detection door.

Confused, he pivots and walks back through the door, then tries again. This

action sets off the alarm again, Officer Johnson, a bit impatiently, tells him to go

over to the wand officer. Adam's face flushes. He has forgotten to put his metal

badge in the tray, a rookie mistake.

Tyrone, in early 20's, who has worked in the mailroom at Government

Buildings for less than a year, looks sleepy. He knows Officer Johnson well, as

an observer can tell by the following exchange.

Tyrone: "Jay, what's cookin'?"
Officer J: "The usual?"
Tyrone: "Same. Same. We still on for today?"
Officer J: "Yep. Meet you here at 6."
Tyrone: "See ya'."

Tyron and Officer Johnson have plans to go to the firing range for practice

later. Tyrone wants to become a police officer one day and Officer Johnson is his

unofficial mentor. Both single, they have gone to nightclubs together. They have

also gone to the batting cages for practice (Government Buildings has a softball

team). Tyrone is grateful to have a police officer to help him with his goal and

Officer Johnson is glad he can socialize with someone outside the force.

A teenaged visitor, John, is here to visit his uncle. This is his first time

coming to Government Buildings. He is running a bit late and is trying to hurry

so his uncle will not be mad at him. He ignores the rule sign, so he leaves his cell

phone in his coat pocket. He walks through the metal detection door and the

lights flash and the alarm sounds. John looks up at the wand officer in confusion.

The wand officer gestures "come here." John walks over to him and stands

very close to him, about18 inches way. The wand officer asks, "please step back

so I can work." John does not understand and so he moves several steps back, too

far for the wand officer to check him comfortably. "No, no, over here" he says,

pointing to a spot on the tile. John moves to the indicated spot. The officer asks,

"do you have any metal in your pockets?" John says, "no" and the officer begins

to sweep John's body with the wand. The monitor officer and Officer Johnson

ask the SASs who are in line to wait and they both stand and watch as the wand

officer completes this check.

The officer clears the wand by passing it first over his own metal badge,

and then he starts with John's head, moves to his right arm, across the chest, to his

left arm and then under each arm, to the belt area. As the wand passes over

John's right coat pocket the wand alarms. The officer says, "Please remove

everything from your pocket." Looking surprised, John pulls out his cell phone.

The officer chides him, "the sign says, 'put the cell phone on the conveyor belt'."

The officer places the cell phone carefully on the counter and continues his check.

He continues the wand down John's legs, and between his legs, to his

shoes. He asks John to turn around, and after John does so, he sweeps the back of

John's arms, down his back and buttocks, then finally down the legs. He takes

special care to wand the shoes. When the officer is satisfied that the alarm was

caused by the cell phone, he tells John, "pick up your change," and Officer

Johnson hands John the tray with his coins to empty out into his hand. "You take

it easy today. OK?" Officer Johnson says to John as he walks toward the

elevators.

The next SAS, Megan, is a youngish, white female newspaper reporter

from the main city paper. She has been covering Government Buildings for some

years and knows many of the officers. However, Officer Johnson does not feel

that gives Megan any special-treatment rights. Today she has brought her

photographer's gear (metal cases for the cameras, tripods, etc) on a large flat cart.

Her photographer has been delayed and so she must unhook each piece and put

each through the conveyor belt. Some of these cases are quite heavy. Officer

Johnson, at the metal detection door, and the wand officer, both watch Megan

struggle with the equipment. On the other side of the conveyor belt, the monitor

officer, a male Hispanic, helps Megan return each piece of equipment to the cart

and even helps her re-bungee cord each piece back together. By this time Megan

is sweating and her breathing is labored. But she says cheerfully to all of the

officers (even those who did not help her), "Thanks, gentlemen. Have a good

day." Megan throws all of her 110 pounds of weight behind her cart as she

pushes it toward the elevators.

The city in which Government Buildings is located is a metropolitan city

with a wide diversity of ethnicities. The ranks of the officers by and large do not

reflect this city's range of cultures. Most officers are African-American males.

The next visitor, Yoko, is a writer who has come to Government Buildings to attend an arts event. She is new to the United States, but speaks passable, even admirable, American English. However, some officers have difficulty understanding the multitude of accents they encounter, and the Japanese accent can be tough to understand.

Yoko passes through the security check successfully and then approaches the wand officer to ask for directions to the room where her event is being held (while there is an information desk at this post, the desk is rarely staffed). There is a long line at the door of other visitors wishing to enter Government Buildings, and the wand officer is distracted by his need to keep an eye on the group and his fellow officers. Yoko asks him, "Pardon, where is lecture on mic'obes?" The wand officer says, "Wait a minute here," because his attention is needed by the metal detection door officer. Yoko looks uncertainly at both officers, afraid she is in trouble. She does not quite understand his command. She stands back a bit, and watches him take care of another visitor. When he returns, he says 'what did you need?" She repeats her request and the officer looks at his Sheet of Events. This helps him interpret which event she will be attending and he gives her clear directions, with a comforting smile.

A special tour is scheduled today for 30 college students. They all arrive together at about 9 a.m. The line at the door now continues out the door and into the outside. The officers know they need to clear this area so the door can be closed and they work methodically and cooperatively. This group, as is true for

so many visitor SASs, has never been to Government Buildings before, and it takes the skill and patience of a teacher saint, to repeat the same instructions over and over – because these instructions are plainly posted on the sign next to the conveyor belt where visitors enter.

> Officer Johnson: (to the group) "Take out your cell phones and place them on the belt; no need to take off your coats; put the contents of your pockets in these trays and walk through the door, down the middle."

It takes the students about 15 minutes to come through security, with some of them unnecessarily taking off their coats to put them on the conveyor, or leaving their cell phones or change in their pockets.

During lunchtime, the police officers' jobs become even more complicated, as employees head to lunch and return with their bags of food. All are in a hurry to eat and some are anxious to return to work. At the same busy period, visitors and VIPs join employees in their need to enter Government Buildings. VIPs can be especially short-tempered and curt with the officers. Office Johnson likes to tease the employees he knows by pretending to "steal" their lunch bags, or to ask "What did you bring me today?"

Late morning brings a sixtyish, prominent politician to their post. Mr. George is an infrequent visitor to Government Buildings but the officers know his face because it is displayed on television and in the papers. Susan, Mr. George's wife, has a less-well-known face and she arrives 10 minutes after Mr. George.

She's wearing neat but very casual attire, jeans and a flannel shirt. She's

obviously late and in a huge hurry. She throws her purse on the conveyor and

rushes through the metal detection door before Officer Johnson has motioned her

through. Thus, she has "crowded" a gentleman who was in front of her as he is

walking through the door. Officer Johnson asks her to please wait. She frowns,

but says nothing and steps back. The gentleman walks through uneventfully.

Mrs. George walks through and the alarm sounds. She says, "oh, I'm sure it's my

belt buckle," but Officer George asks her, "Would you please step over to this

officer and he will check it out?" She is clearly irritated and she stomps over to

the wand officer.

Mrs. George glares at the wand officer and says under her breath "My

husband is waiting for me!" He says that the rules say that he must check

everyone out before they can enter the building – even the President of the United

States would have to walk through the metal detector. After he has finished wand

sweeping her (it appears to indeed have been her belt buckle), she asks Officer

Johnson for his name and badge number, and writes this information down.

Officer Johnson seems only mildly concerned. "Some folks think they're above

the rules!" he thinks and he shakes his head as he turns to the next SAS and says,

"How're you today?"

When there is a lull, he walks over to the counter phone and calls his

supervisor to tell him about the encounter with Mrs. George. If his supervisor

knows about the situation, this may help Officer Johnson avoid problems later.

Officer Johnson has now been on the job for four hours, one-third of his day is nearly over by 10 a.m.. His relief arrives and Officer Johnson heads to the break room to eat his lunch. As he enters, Officer Johnson sees a fellow officer dozing, his cheek resting on his hand, in a sitting position on the couch; an officer next to him is watching CNN news on the television, and another officer is on the telephone talking to her daughter. Officer Johnson quickly checks his email on the computer and then retrieves his lunch bag from the refrigerator. He sighs as he plops down at one of the two tables. He only has 30 minutes to walk to the break room, eat lunch, do anything else he needs to do, and move on to his next post. Thus, he must eat very quickly.

His next post is an entrance primarily used by the employees. He is glad to find that the two officers who will be working the post with him are friends. He finds that the long hours of post duty can pass more quickly and pleasantly if he can chat with his friends. But he has to be careful not to become distracted. He has become adept at the small talk, interspersed with checking folks through. Before finishing his lunch, the fire alarm sounds. The officers look at each other, pack up their bags, and head to the main exit.

By the time 6 p.m. finally arrives, Officer Johnson is very tired, both in mind and body. He is wishing he had not made plans for the evening as he heads downstairs to the locker room to change his clothes. But he knows the range practice will provide release from the stress of being on duty, and he will feel

good about helping Tyrone achieve his goal. Officer Johnson slams his locker

shut and walks with purpose toward the main entrance.

The foregoing described a police officer's day. A security officer's day

follows.

Officer Kingston, who rides the subway, needs to be out the door by 7

a.m. or he will be late for the 7:45 a.m. Guard Mount. (He always listens to the

news to be sure his subway line is on time -- if not, he rushes to leave earlier.)

Officer Kingston arrives at Government Buildings and makes his way to

SecurityCompany's office. He greets his colleagues, some of whom look very

tired. Many of these officers are also in college, working another job, raising

children, and/or have a second security officer (or other) job to help them make

ends meet in this geographic area (which is very expensive to live in). He

receives his two-day post assignment, listens to the daily special instructions –

who of importance will be visiting, which groups will be visiting, etc. There are a

few announcements, and Officer Kingston checks his mail then heads to his post.

He will be at one of the more active posts for the next two days.

Before the current program manager came, the security officers were

assigned to a post for six weeks. Many became bored with the same assignment

week after week, and became a bit too friendly with those who needed access to

that post. Now with the frequent shift in posts, Officer Kingston finds he is not

only more interested and alert, but also knows every post well and can fill in at

any post when needed.

These security officers are the cream of the crop, the elite of the contract security officer world. Many previously worked as mall, airport, or school security, were treated like flunkies, and made about 50 percent of what they make with SecurityCompany. Officer Kingston appreciates that the president of the security company believes not only in paying a living wage, but also in giving incentives and rewards for good work – a fairly rare practice in private security contracting companies.

SecurityCompany has responsibility for internal security. This means that they check all those entering and leaving the separate areas of each building. At each internal post there is a modified metal detection door, and bags have to be checked.

Officer Kingston is a twenty-something, African American male with a solid build and is nearly 6 feet tall. His uniform is pressed and clean, his shoes are shiny (they are patent leather; the contractor pays officers for one pair of shoes per year; another unusual practice which employees tell me they appreciate). The standard SecurityCompany uniform consists of a white cotton, short-sleeved dress shirt, with colored tie, gray mixed-blend slacks, and navy blue jacket with SecurityCompany logo. These officers are unarmed.

Security officers are allowed to sit at most posts, but most officers rise when questioned or when they need to ask an SAS a question. The Post Orders binder contains all of the information that officers need to follow: outline of appropriate procedures, current security threats (groups and individuals), record

keeping sheets (e.g., time on post, time on breaks, signed), pictures of badges and identification cards. Eating, reading, and writing, are not allowed by SecurityCompany at this site at any of the posts. Officer Kingston knows that many of his colleagues are not completely familiar with the information in this binder. He decided early on to read it cover to cover (after all, it is the only allowed reading and he was bored) and commit it to memory. These orders need updating frequently, but security officers do not always receive as-needed revisions, which irritates Officer Kingston. As he tells his wife, "How am I supposed to follow the rules when I am not told what they are?"

Post 3 has a security monitor (as most of Government Buildings security officer posts do) which displays views of areas hidden from his in-person view. The monitors can show several areas at once, split screen, or a large screen of one area. This monitor is essential to his job because he cannot leave his post to check these areas on foot. There is a telephone on the desk which is used for calling the SecurityCompany office and other posts. Some officers use the phone for private calls, but they have to be careful since company policy forbids personal calls.

His first two hours pass quickly. The post is very busy with employees entering the area and pick-ups and deliveries. He notices a woman get off the elevator and stop to look at a piece of paper. She frowns as she looks up. Officer Kingston rises to his feet and asks

Officer Kingston:	Can I help you find something?
Woman:	Is this where the visitor's room is?
Officer Kingston:	Yes. It's right over here. Can I see your I.D.?
Woman:	Oh. Yea. *(She fumbles in her purse for the card).*
Officer Kingston:	Thank you, Ma'am. Have a good day.

He sits down again, sighs and studies the monitor

An employee approaches with an I.D. card hanging from a chain around

his neck.

Officer Kingston:	How're you doin' today, sir?
Man:	Just great! How about you?
Officer Kingston:	Doin' well, doin' well. Thank you.
	(The man grasps his I.D. and lifts it closer for Officer Kingston to see)
	Thank you, sir. Have yourself a good day.
Man:	I plan to!

The officer appreciates it when employees are so friendly and enthusiastic. It

helps him to feel valued, he tells me.

When I am observing in this area, I stand. I am told to pull a chair over

and sit down, but I will be in the way if I do this. Additionally, I want the

experience that the police officers have of standing for hours at a time. Floor pads

are provided for the areas where officers stand. The pads are supposed to help,

but by the end of a day of standing, even on a pad, my feet are sore and swollen

(and I am wearing sensible, rubber-soled flats).

Now it is time for Officer Kingston's morning break. He is relieved by

the Roving Officer for a 15-minute break. Rovers spend their entire day walking

from post-to-post to relieve stationary security officers for breaks and lunches. (The rover job is sought-after by some officers because of the freedom, the more interesting activity, and the lofty view of the job. Rovers are often also supervisors or potential supervisors.) There is some preferential treatment – if you are friends with the Rover you might be able to ask for "emergency breaks" or even a bit longer time for lunch (although Rovers must report to the SecurityCompany office by walkie-talkie radio of their whereabouts.)

Officers use their breaks to go to the restroom, get a drink, stretch their legs, make personal phone calls, etc. They are not allowed to leave their posts for in-between breaks unless they can get a Rover to spell them for a moment, and thus some officers do not drink much fluid during the day to avoid the need for too many restroom breaks. Some of the women officers find that two hours is too long between restroom breaks.

Officer Kingston decides to take his break outside; it is a warm and sunny day. He walks to an entrance where another SecurityCompany officer is posted, they talk for a minute and then he walks outside to breathe in the air, and write down some thoughts (although it is against the rules to write, he keeps a note card in his pocket for just such an activity). The time passes quickly and he must hurry back to his post. It takes him five minutes to get outside the building each way so he only has about five minutes time to write. He also must make a quick restroom stop.

While Officer Kingston is on break, I decide to go to the ATM (in the main building) and then run to the cafeteria to get a quick snack. The rest of his morning is taken up giving directions and asking SASs to see their identification badges. Some employees resist showing their badge. Officer Kingston is irritated when an employee yet again places his fingers over the very information the officer needs to read. Officer Kingston asks the employee to move his fingers and he does so, reluctantly. But most of the other employees are pretty friendly.

His lunch relief arrives. Officer Kingston is very hungry so he walks quickly to the Government Buildings cafeteria for an early snack. The cafeteria food is not too bad; some of it is fresh, like the salad bar, although the hot food is heavy on fried and starchy dishes, and the cold food is mostly pre-prepared items. If he wanted to bring his lunch, he would have to travel several floors and a long hallway to retrieve it from his locker in SecurityCompany offices, so he rarely brings it. He selects a Saran wrapped sandwich and an apple. Since it has taken him five minutes to reach the cafeteria, he only has five minutes to eat his snack then use the final five minutes to return to his post. He sees a friend from the employee group and they stand at a tall table and talk while he inhales his food. Officer Kingston realizes he also needs to make a quick stop at the restroom so he says goodbye and leaves quickly.

The afternoon stretches out before him; he wishes he could read or watch television -- do something, anything to help pass the time. His afternoon break is taken with running an errand (he has asked for permission for the relief officer to

stay longer than usual), and by the time he returns from his errand he only has a couple of hours left of his day.

He sees a delivery man get off the elevator and walk toward him. The man has a package in his hands which would have been required to be put through had to be put through the police magnetometer before he could reach this internal floor.

Delivery Man: Where do I take this?

Officer Kingston: *(Looking at the delivery order.)* This should be

                     delivered here but do you have the access form?

Delivery Man: What access form?

(Officer Kingston explains what he should have in hand to give him access

to this room.)

Delivery Man: No one told me nothin' about this form!

Officer Kingston: That's OK. It'll just take you a minute to get one.

                     (He directs the man to the proper office.) See you

                     in a minute.

The man rushes off and is back very quickly. He shows Officer Kingston the form and is allowed entry. He exits the room and stands next to Officer Kingston's desk.

Delivery Man: Thanks, man. Those guys never know what's goin' on.

Officer Kingston: I know, I know. If they did, they'd be dangerous!

Delivery Man: You got that right!

The day is finally over. Officer Kingston is now waiting for his relief

officer. He is very glad to see who it will be because she is usually on time,

unlike some officers. When she arrives he briefs her on the people who are inside

and how the day at this post has been. Then he walks to the SecurityCompany

office to check out and head home.

Conclusion

The above narrative gives a flavor of the kind of communication which

occurs between SASs and officers at Government Buildings. Officers use a

variety of types of language, such as humor, phatic language, firmness, etc. A

clearer picture of the working world of police and security officers at Government

Buildings should have become evident, as well as the notion that officers are very

direct in their requests, but also polite and respectful. They speak familiarly with

their friends, or those who have shown in the past that they are agreeable to fun or

familiarity, only. Some officers I observed, however, were less than friendly, did

not joke, and were a bit imperious in their commands to SASs.

The following excerpt from a radio program, "What D'Ya Know?"

illustrates, in a humorous way, the opinion of one law enforcement officer

concerning how the public should communicate with him. The show's host,

Michael Feldman, is escorting a man up to the stage to sit down at the table to

participate in The Quiz. Feldman describes the man as "big." The man answers,

"I'm 250 pounds" and says that he's a sheriff. They begin to discuss his job

which the sheriff describes as "all presence and dialog". Feldman wants an

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example. The sheriff says to Feldman, who has picked up his chair in preparation to sit down at the table.

Sheriff: "It's in your best interests to put that chair down."

Feldman: That sounds more like a monologue to me.

Sheriff: "Yes, Sir" is their part of the dialogue. (Feldman, 2003)

The foregoing example, though tongue-in-cheek, represents an opinion some law enforcement officers hold about having dialogue with citizens: a citizens-should-be-seen-but-not-heard approach. At Government Buildings, officers vary in their communication approach during the security check, as will be observed in the next chapter.

In the current chapter, I have narratively described a federal government building, given an overview of the officers' day by outlining a few security checks, and described an alarm event. The actual conversations of officers with SASs will be analyzed in the next chapter.

Chapter 5

See, the conquering hero comes!
Sound the trumpet, beat the drums![11]

"A rule's a rule!": The security check at a federal government site.

Police and security officers are expected to be above the need to defend

themselves when verbally attacked -- to be unemotional, yet pleasant in attitude

and demeanor. They experience weeks or months of mundane, everyday security

checks, only to find they are in the middle of a crisis, with others looking to them

for calm words when everyone around them are in a panic. In some ways the

working life of a police or security officer might be viewed as a vocation, rather

than limiting the view to a profession. Some officers describe their work as more

than work, but more a "calling." The current analysis examines the discourse of

police and security officers at one federal government building, and how that

discourse shapes a phenomenon I call "Being the Bigger Person."

In the following pages, I build a picture of the working world of police

and security at Government Buildings, describing large events and small.

Through officers' own words, I uncover why officers choose law enforcement and

how they feel they discursively negotiate security check encounters. From my

field observations I use taped interactions to support some perceptions of the

officers and others which belie what officers believe.

First, however, I will draw a picture of a unique working world.

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[11] From Thomas Morell, *Bartlett's Quotations* (1980) (15th Ed.)

Police and security at Government Buildings have quite a long hike between buildings when they change posts. Government Buildings consists of a complex of three large buildings that above-ground inhabit several square miles, and are connected underground by a maze of tunnels. The main building, which I will call the Mueller Building, is cavernous, with echoing sound that brings to mind a metropolitan train station. The security checkpoint at the main entrance is the trunk of the tree, the limbs of which lead to rooms nested within rooms. Suspended above this checkpoint is an open mezzanine which adds to the din (see Appendix C). This checkpoint entrance and exit is usually staffed by four police officers.

Next, I will describe the three main checkpoints of my observations in order to gain a full picture of the officers' working environment,.[12] These descriptions will also allow readers to call up an image of the encounters between officers and SASs at each checkpoint.

Access to the Checkpoints: The Step-by-Step Process

Access to the main Mueller Building checkpoint is through one of three looming glass doors. On the other side of the doors is a sign which gives potential entrants (Security Access Seekers, or SASs) directions to follow during the security check. On the far right an officer sits or stands at the magnetometer monitor, ready to see the innards of your briefcase, purse, paper bag, etc. On the

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[12] A fourth, more isolated checkpoint, where I conducted interviews and did some observations consists of a table, chair, and modified xray door in a long hallway, which leads to another building not considered part of this research site. Access to this building is highly restricted.

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near right, is the magnetometer xray conveyor belt machine with its opening pointed toward the door. In the middle is the metal detection door, and on the immediate left stands a police officer ready to give SASs instructions. After the officer gives permission to place personal items on the magnetometer belt, an SAS is to wait "behind the line" for the go-ahead to walk through the metal detection door. Once through the door, an SAS can clearly see the officer with the metal detection wand a few feet ahead, next to the Information Booth. If no alarm sounds, the SAS is expected to quickly pick-up his/her items from the conveyor belt and walk swiftly out of the immediate area.

The employee entrance, on the opposite side of the Mueller Building, is much smaller than the main entrance (see Appendix D) yet it echoes, too, due to the marble walls and floor. Near the far right door is the exit checkpoint. As the SAS walks up the steps outside, he/she can see to the right a sign which gives directions for accessing the security checkpoint. Upon entering this site through the left-hand doors, the magnetometer is sharply to the left. The magnetometer officer on the left side of the machine cannot be readily seen due to a column blocking the SAS's view. The metal detection door is to the right of the magnetometer. An officer is stationed straight ahead on the other side of the detection door. After walking through the metal detector, an SAS must make an "S" to walk through the heavy doors into hallway.

The Jacobs Building is primarily a museum. As a consequence, Jacobs Building has more visitors attempting access. After walking through doors which

lead into the building, the SAS turns right to another set of doors which lead to the security checkpoint (see Appendix E). There is an access door for visitors and two bypass doors for employees and others of official or professional capacity to avoid the, at times, long visitor line. The magnetometer machine is to the left. An officer is stationed on the entrance-door side of the metal detector here. Presumably, the need to post an officer there has been identified because new SASs, or visitors, are not as practiced at these security checks and need more direction. Just past the end of the magnetometer conveyor belt on the left, there is a counter which houses the monitor officer (there is no room for an officer post on the side of this magnetometer). The wanding officer is stationed straight ahead from the metal detector door. The exit door into the building is just past the monitor counter. Although there is no sign to this effect, officers require SASs to leave the area adjacent to the magnetometer and walk through the door to wait for their companions.

The foregoing description of these three posts provides a framework for the interaction between officers and SASs. Although these three areas are each fairly large, officers are often forced to work in small quarters with SASs; for example, when wanding the SAS, or examining the contents of their bags. Police are concerned, in these close encounters, about the possibility of citizens grabbing their weapons or otherwise breaching security; thus, police and security focus on getting the public to comply with minimum effort or disturbance, while maintaining their own self-respect and showing respect to others.

Compliance seeking, power and police

Police who work the streets often find themselves in compliance-seeking

situations. At times, police would rather do anything but arrest someone; they

want instead to find ways to accomplish peaceful solutions to societal

disturbances, to convince: the drunk to go home and sleep it off, the stereo music

to be turned down, the domestic fighting to cease, or the confronted robbery

suspect to drop his weapon. If police must arrest, then they need ways to induce

the suspect to cause as little trouble as possible, both for the police and others. In

the Government Buildings settings, officers also must convince the hundreds of

SASs they check through daily, some of whom access officer posts several times

each day, to do as they ask. This task is challenging in its variety as some SASs

are close friends, some officers see daily but only have a "greeting/leaving

taking" relationship with, and some are completely unknown.

Before I begin to analyze the security check, a review of the research on

policing, power, and compliance-seeking is in order. Social science researchers

have begun to examine how officers and citizens think compliance gaining is

accomplished (King, 1995; Lichtenberg, 1999; Mastrofski et al., 1996; Reiss,

1984). One researcher (G. E. Miller, 1997) studied police culture and citizen

compliance. His ethnography uncovered four variables which the officers feel are

the main influences on a citizen's choice to be cooperative or uncooperative with

a patrol officer: if a citizen is "impaired by alcohol and/or drugs, the emotional

level of the citizen, the citizen's knowledge of the system, and the officer's style."

(p. iii). He further found that citizens may comply one moment and then not comply the next in the stream of the encounter. Officers say they make choices to arrest or not to arrest based on whether the citizen cooperates, is disrespectful, lies, argues, does not follow directions, avoids by being passive resistant, etc. The officer will then decide whether to be lenient or makes allowances

Mastrofski, a criminology researcher, has been studying the police/citizen encounters for over two decades (Mastrofski, 1981; Mastrofski, 1998; Mastrofski & Parks, 1990; Mastrofski et al., 1999; Mastrofski, Reisig, & McCluskey, 2002; Mastrofski, Snipes, Parks, & Maxwell, 2000; Mastrofski et al., 1996; Mastrofski, 1999). Part of his research program has included direct observational studies of routine interactions between police and citizens, and he is one of the few criminology researchers who focuses on communicative practices, such as compliance-gaining. Of relevance here are his discoveries that citizens who know officers are less inclined to comply and others who do not know officers are more inclined to comply (because they do not know the officer's tolerance level). "Although the deterrence game always requires punishment or threat, the compliance game may involve a broader range involving both voluntary and coerced compliance" (Mastrofski et al., 1996, p. 270)

Compliance Issues between Government Buildings

Police/Security and SASs

The police and security at Government Buildings are highly concerned about influencing, or controlling, SAS behavior during the security check.

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Officers complained that they must say the same phrases over and over because people do not read the signs and do not listen carefully to instructions. What do officers wish SASs would do? Officer Dutch is a newly trained officer, who has a strong military background. His self-presentation is so professional that, when he was active duty, he was the bodyguard to a series of important federal government officials. In the following excerpt Officer Dutch describes the three-step ATM philosophy which officers discussed concerning how they control the actions of SASs: First, officers *ask* SASs to carry out some action, second, officers *tell* SASs to do as officers have asked, and finally, officers *make* SASs take the action they have been asked and told to carry out (else, the non-compliant SAS will be arrested).

> Officer Dutch: [laughing] READ THE SIGNS! [We laugh.] Read
> the signs and do what it says. When it says empty your pockets, it
> means empty your pockets, it doesn't mean leave five pounds of
> change in your pocket. What it means is put everything on the belt
> for the x-ray and do it, you know. . . . pretty much do what we ask
> for . . . you apply that ATM philosophy to working as a cop. You
> ask them, if they don't want to do it you tell them, if they still don't
> want to do it, you make 'em. [I laugh] Ask 'em, tell 'em, make
> 'em. It's a whole three-strike thing. . . . you give him the benefit of
> the doubt and maybe they're not up to par on how things need to be
> and so you tell them, you ask 'em, "Sir, do you mind opening this

up? This is the [building's] policy" and they're like, "Naw, I don't

want to" and you tell them "Sir, if you want to come in, you have

to open up" and, if they don't want to do it, well "Sir, I'm going to

make you have to leave" so that's how; if you take that approach to

pretty much everything. Three strikes to me is ample opportunity

to adhere to what's being requested, if you don't then, you know,

SOL [shit-out-of-luck]. [He laughs]

Most SASs' objections and tricks are fairly predictable. Officers cite protests to putting food through the xray conveyor belt, a resistance to showing their I.D. cards, and attempts (usually from non-employee SASs) to bring in contraband, such as knives.

Some employees resist putting food through the magnetometer because of the "nuclear waves goin' through" their food. Officer Dutch related a story about a female employee who would neither put the food in the magnetometer nor would she allow him to look at her food. "I don't want microwave radiation going through my food and I don't want you touchin' on it or lookin' at it." He told me, "Nine times out of ten it's always an employee that does that."

A security officer described an incident with a non-employee SAS who refused to show his I.D. which was required for access each time he attempts to enter an important room in the building.

ON: "I need to see your card EACH time you come here." He say,

"You KNOW me already." I say, "That do not work that way. I

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know too many people." [I laugh.] Yeah. "I know too many people to signify that this is who you are now." I say, "Your card is what I need to see and that's all. And if you cannot present your card to me, that will create us a problem." I told him the first day, the second day; the third day I decided to take an action.

The officer talked to the supervisor of the room to which the SAS wanted access. She advised him to get the [I.D.] from the SAS so they could talk to him. And then he told his supervisor what he planned to do. The SAS came in and Officer Nawando made sure he took everyone's card so the SAS would not be singled out. Then he called the security officer in charge of the room. She came and warned the SAS; they talked outside for over 30 minutes, and she told him "if it happens again [you] will be terminated from coming to the [building]." Officer Nawando told me

From that day [the SAS] changed. I said, "Look, listen, Man. I'm not doing this to you because I want to signify [single you out] you. . . . But this is the post I've been assigned to. These are the rules and regulations which the [building] has in force. We have that (inaudible) because if you cannot abide to what I'm telling you here, then I don't think you want to be in this place!" . . . After that, ... each time he comes through, he says hello to me.

Officers told me that if someone tries to bring in a weapon of any kind, they just tell them to "take it outside" What the SAS does with it is "not their

business." A local reporter (who told me he should have known better) had a knife in his pocket:

> SAS: If I could get a tray (had many items stuffed into his jacket
>
> pockets)
>
> OF: "Can't bring that [knife] in here . . . ."
>
> (SAS left to dispose of the knife)

At times officers feel they are simply enforcing rules they did not create and with which they do not necessarily agree. Consequently, they feel, if SASs would just accept that and follow the rules, everyone's working lives would be easier.

Officers would like to be viewed as competent and serious about their work. One security officer relates interactions when folks treat him like a "Rent-A-Cop": "Yeah, as a matter of fact, an employee in the [Government Buildings], you know, it's a running joke. You get off the elevator. They say, 'Hey, you guys got a new job, you're watching the elevators today.' They think that's funny. Or, 'since you don't have a weapon, here' and they hand me a handful of pepper [to simulate pepper spray]. It's all in good fun, I guess. But at the end of the day, as long as I can call my account in, 'You have a checking deposit of – '"

Security officers feel they lack power – the power a sidearm would support, the power a police uniform represents, the power to convince SASs that, if they do not comply, they will receive punitive action. On the other hand, though they wear this uniform, police officers do not always feel they are

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supported by management in their discretionary decisions; for example, to be punitive when they feel it is necessary.

It is, in part, this perceived lack of power which can sabotage a security check encounter. According to compliance-gaining researchers, compliance and power are irrevocably interrelated (Belote, 1989; Berger, 1994; Burroughs, Kearney, & Plax, 1989; Hepburn, 1985; Hirokawa, Kodama, & Harper, 1990; Scudder, 1985; Wheeless et al., 1983; Witteman & Fitzpatrick, 1986). Wheeless, Baraclough, and Stewart (1983) assert that power and compliance-gaining are directly connected: "the power literature constitutes the hereditary roots of compliance gaining research and conceptualization" (p. 110). They posit that while it is interesting to look at the reality of a situation, that reality has little to do with whether a target complies or not. What matters is what the person perceives the situation to be. "Within the context of persuasion, it makes no difference, for example, whether an agent making a threat has the ability to carry out that threat. If the target being threatened perceives such an ability, the agent has power" (p. 127). They define power as "the perceived bases of control that a person has over another person's behavior that would not have otherwise occurred" (p. 127).

The power scheme most appropriate to this study is Etzioni's (1965) which Wheeless et al. (1983) clearly describe. Etzioni suggests that "power differs according to the means employed to make the subjects comply" (cited in Wheeless et al., 1983, p. 122). In Etzioni's structure, *coercive power* is accomplished through threats of physical consequences. At Government

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Buildings, arrest is the only physical consequence. *Remunerative power* is accomplished through "control of symbolic rewards and deprivations." Government Buildings' police officers' ability to enter without going through the checkpoint, and security officers' requirement to go through the checkpoint each time they enter the building is an example of the police's remunerative power. *Normative power* consists of two types: pure normative ("controlling esteem reputation, and ritualistic symbols," p. 122) and social power ("based on the allocation and manipulation of acceptance and positive response," p. 122). Pure normative power can be affected by officers at the security check through what they say to SASs that others hear, and of course their uniform is a visible symbol of their power; and social power is seen at the check points where both officers and SASs can choose to demonstrate respect or disrespect.

Etzioni (1961, as cited in Wheeless, 1983, p. 122) suggests the orientation of the target is also an important factor in compliance and is of three types: alienative (strongly negative), moral (strongly supportive or positive), and calculative, roughly neutral. The power types and target orientations can be viewed together in a 3x3 matrix which yield nine compliance modes (see Appendix F). He argues that certain people in organizations respond to different power types depending on their orientation. In mode 1 "the alienatively oriented subordinate responds only to coercive power", in mode 5 "the calculative subordinate responds negatively to coercion, but positively to remunerative power," and in mode 6 "the morally oriented subordinate responds best to

normative influences" are the congruent types and the preferred modes (Etzioni, 1961, as quoted in Wheeless et al., p. 122). Officers' discourse must be flexible to allow them to respond successfully to all of these target types; at times threatening (coercive), offering rewards (remunerative), complimenting and acting cheerful (normative).

Complimenting and a cheerful demeanor is evident in some officers' approach to their SAS encounters. Two researchers have studied power strategies of managers between the Japanese and U.S. American cultures (Hirokawa & Miyahara, 1986). They found that Japanese managers tended to rely more often on *altruism-based* strategies, while American managers tend to rely more often on reward- or punishment-based strategies. Officers I observed tended to use remunerative and normative messages most often. When using their social power, officers use phrases which appeal to SASs' desire to please the officer (e.g., asking the SAS to take an action "for me"). Within the examples (which appear later in this chapter), I call these types of encounters altruistic in orientation.

The following are two examples of activities which run counter to the everydayness of police/security at Government Buildings and which belied the expectations I had formed during early observations. These counter incidents will provide an overview of police/security work in this setting and begin to make a connection with the power and compliance-seeking research. Philipsen (1975) found that by examining "out of role" behavior he could see the patterns of

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communicative practice more clearly. Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw (1995) support

his view, and advocate examining something closely that "surprises or runs

counter to" the researcher's expectations. Thus, what follows are two speech

events which allow analysis through contrast.

In the first counter incident, the speech event (see Appendix F), which I

label The Fire Alarm, demonstrates that extraordinary events may occur at any

time and these men and women will be asked to direct us through these crises.

The incongruity here is that, while officers' actions are usually discursively

competent, in this case they were definitively not. That is to say, contrary to their

usual language, they were impolite and gave unclear or nonexistent instructions.

Counter Incident #1: The Fire Alarm

One day early in my observations I was interviewing a security officer.

We were sitting on a bench in the hallway between the main floor's elevators. A

siren sounded. I turned in apprehension to Officer Bentley (all names are

pseudonyms). He told me what we needed to do. We got up and walked toward

the main entrance which was only one hundred yards or so away. When we

neared the main security post, we heard the exit police officer saying loudly, "Go!

Go!" while waving his arms, "Evacuate!." Non-employees, unsure what was

happening and remembering the rules, tried to have the exit officer examine their

bags. He shouted "No! No! Go!"

I delayed going outside as long as possible so I could observe the

evacuation more closely. Many people seemed to know they needed to head

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outside; others appeared confused, looking around the area, trying to ask officers questions (this building has many visitors). When someone asked the exit officer a question, he just said, "This is an evacuation! " and pointed to the door.

It was a hot and sunny day in September. We were told to "go across the street." From my vantage point on the front steps of Government Buildings, I watched people step out onto a very busy street to do the officers' bidding. Luckily, the traffic lights were red on both sides, because none of the officers stopped the traffic to make it safe to cross. I waited until there were enough people in the roadway to convince cars to wait for us before I crossed the street.

Several hundred of us stood on the opposite sidewalk, or sat on the wall or lawn and watched the scene unfolding in front of MB. I asked Bentley what was happening. He made some guesses but was unsure. "Could be a fire drill, could be that something set off a smoke alarm, could be a fire. . . there was nothing planned that I know of."

I noticed a woman who was talking on her cell phone as she walked down the sidewalk toward the front door of MB, unaware of the alarm. One police officer was stationed at the door to stop people from entering and another was walking up and down the sidewalk and checking doors. Then she noticed the officer and startled as he shook his finger at her and said, "No!" and gestured her across the street with a jerky motion of his arm. She said "WHAT?" in response to his rudeness, and then shook her head ruefully as she crossed the street.

After five to ten minutes or so of standing in the heat, we heard a fire

truck. The truck passed by us and turned the corner to head down the street to the other side of MB. After a minute or two the same officer who directed the cell-phone woman motioned for all of us to come back across the street and to reenter the building. Because I was anxious to return to the building ahead of the others so I could observe reentry, I stepped off the curb almost directly in the path of a bicyclist, who swore at me. Looking left, I realized that no one had halted the cars on a very busy major street. Others who had started across realized the same thing, as some of us danced back and forth to avoid an SUV. One officer took control and stopped the traffic on the eastbound side of the street, which helped, but the westbound lanes kept coming. Fortunately, no one was hit.

Now hundreds of us were trying to return to the building through the main entrance. The exit doors had been propped open. Many of the people were entering the exit doors quickly, so I chose those doors to enter. Once I was further in, though, I heard "Have your badges out!" and saw that they were only allowing employees to enter without going through the security check point. Officers joked, "Bet you thought you'd go home early!" I exited and got in line with the visitors. We had to wait in a very long line and walk through the metal detector to reenter which took quite some time, although the officers avoided their usual thoroughness in favor of expediency.

The foregoing speech event, The Fire Alarm, is instructive for several reasons. The first surprise is that all pretense of polite speech, which they used consistently during the security check, was dropped. Officers seemed genuinely

surprised and unaware of how to handle the fire alarm situation, and reacted accordingly. Second, they seemed not to have a script for what to say during The Fire Alarm, which was contrary to my observations of their repetitive speech during security checks.

The second counter incident reveals an aspect of some officers' view of other protective forces as part of the "brotherhood.," or police culture. Here an officer gives military men special treatment as they attempt to access the MB. There also may have been some admiration which affected his choice – adulation of his own, because these were high-ranking officers.

Counter Incident #2: Violating "What Every Officer Knows"

I was observing and audio taping my primary informant at the main entrance of Government Buildings. As usual, this check point was very busy and Officer Vail was working efficiently. Two military officers approached the officer and told him they would set off the detector as they were wearing lots of metal (awards, ribbons, and medals). Saying "Go on through. You're fine," he let them walk around the detector. After they were gone, there was a low-key, but argumentative discussion between Officer Vail and the other officers about the foolhardiness of his action. Officer Vail defended his decision by explaining that it would have taken too much time to remove all of the metal because it would have slowed up the check-through process. And, he said privately to me, he refuses to punish "our brave men and women" by forcing them to take

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extraordinary measures to enter this site. This conflict was not settled between these officers in my presence.

By violating a quite common rule, "everyone except Government Buildings police officers and the 'president' of this site go through the security check," the officer demonstrated that he was exercising his discretionary power and being supportive of other "heroes" whom he considered to be part of the culture of protectors.

Of Heroes and Police

Stories about police as heroes, in literature, in film, or oral storytelling have been quite popular through the ages. Carl Jung described the hero archetype as "exist[ing] from time immemorial" (1964, p. 61). While some police enjoy admiration, it is clear that most security officers do not experience public adoration. Some might say that police forces enjoy more legitimacy and approval, although they also find detractors at all levels of society. We are more aware of police or security officer when we are doing something we should not do, or when we need an officer. Officer Giroux agrees. "People only want police really when it's something for *them*. It's a job you only get called when there's a problem. You learn that from the word 'go.'"

Most humans want to be supported by other humans, to receive their approval and presence. Police also enjoy a kind word now and then. Bayley (1985) discusses the history of policing in this regard.

Until very recently neither historians nor social scientists

appeared to recognize that police existed, let alone that they played

an important role in social life. Writing about the police almost

everywhere was left to policemen themselves, who either told

stories or addressed nuts-and-bolts issues. The indexes of standard

histories of most countries show no entries at all related to the

police (p. 3).

Historically, Bayley contends, police were only noticed when dramatic events

(political repression, counterrevolutions) took place. Spies and political police

received the attention. This state of affairs has changed within the last decade,

with historical studies of police attaining almost faddish status. However, Bayley

laments the lack, especially before the 1960s, of social scientific research on

police. He attributes this inattention to four factors: police are not usually at the

fore of important historical happenings (no epic battles, no exciting retreats);

policing is not a "glamorous, high-status undertaking" (mundane tasks, few

educated upper class in the senior officers, unlike in the professional military) (p.

6); policing may have gone unnoticed because it is morally abhorrent (controlling

and constraining, without the heroic deeds of the battlefield); and finally, great

barriers to conducting research on the police exist ("an unusual amount of

legwork is required to study the police" p. 6). Bayley finds that what is missing

today from policing research are examinations of the usual, day-to-day duties of

police, although these are a much more important part of the daily life of ordinary citizens than political upheavals.

I am talking here about a distinct lack, not only of hero-worship, but also a lack of recognition that what officers do on a daily basis is important. The hero as "brave, daring, or noble"[13] (Ehrlich, Flexner, Carruth, & Hawkins, 1980, p. 410) is absent here. However, immediately after the 9/11 attacks the public appeared to awaken from a long sleep to open their eyes to the dangers that officers face daily (and to thank them for it). The moniker "hero" was used often for emergency service personnel, firefighters, police officers, and EMTs

When I asked police Officer Fischer if he noticed SASs treating him differently since 9/11, he said, "Yeah. They showed their appreciation.. Well, they stepped right out and said it. They showed me appreciation verbally by saying, you know, 'thank you very much for protecting us' and everything . . . ." Another police officer expressed his feelings:

> Officer Giroux: As far as the tourists go, what's helpful to me,
>
> whether it's a tourist OR a staffer, is when people . . . they did it a
>
> lot around 9/11, [say] "Thanks a lot. We appreciate you all being
>
> here." The reason the people did that to the police is what
>
> happened in New York. And everybody was scared and they see
>
> all the police down on the corners blockin' streets. . . So. But

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[13] *Oxford American dictionary.*

that's helpful. When people say "we appreciate you officers doin' a good job."

But officers are no longer often praised. Officer Giroux: "You know, we're the first line of defense, even though we had jets flyin' and we got troops overseas. But you know that's all worn off now because the American public forgets things so quick, you know." Thus, I will next discuss a theme that permeates officer perception of themselves, of the profession, and guides their daily encounters with the public.

Being the "Bigger Person"

In line with their own thinking about the profession, when 9/11 hit and the public began to call them heroes, police felt validated. Police said that they did not have to hear the public saying "thanks," but it was nice nevertheless. Families and friends compliment them and support their work, but officers sort of expect that.

Officers say they go into police or security work for multiple reasons: for convenience, because policing has been in the family, because it is something they can do with minimal education, etc. It was striking that several officers used the same words as their reason for entering both security and policing (after the obvious answer, one needs a job and a salary) was "to help others."

Officer Edwards: I can definitely answer that one. I was, even growing up, I always wanted to help people, community, kids, it doesn't matter and when I first went out to the mall and saw these people that I thought were

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police and they were actually security so I started asking questions about it and I thought I would apply. Once I got on I just love the job, I mean I got to help more people than ... It felt good when people say, hey, thank you, you know, they don't have to because its my job but it feels good to be able to help somebody and that's why I think I just stayed into the field.

While officers do express the need to help, they and their families are also concerned about the danger of street policing. Some officers admit to seeking out a Government Buildings police job for safety reasons. One officer formerly was a prison guard. When the prison closed, he started applying to be a police officer in several police departments in the area. When he was accepted at the major metropolitan police force, his wife decided she did not like that idea because it was so dangerous.

> Officer Jordan: They called me for in interview and I came in. During that time I talked to some of the officers that were here. I didn't know them. I asked them how they liked it. They told me it was fine. The one I specifically talked to was Officer Woods. He was telling me that he had been here a while and he liked it and, well, there wasn't a lot of police work where you are actually out on the streets that made the job dangerous.

I began this work interested in the work of officers, and especially in how their words convinced SASs to comply during the security check. Some officers, though, thought I might be disappointed. Early on as I was fitting Officer Woods

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with the microphone pack (which was not always working properly), he cautioned

me: "Well, the people not going to say much." He was correct. SASs did not say

much. But police and security say plenty and say it in an interesting way.

Consequently, I began to notice the officers' words and to uncover the practice of

policing and security at Government Buildings. Thus, I decided to focus on the

officers' words and how they use their power to do their jobs.

Because this is an exploratory ethnography, I use a broad framework for

analysis: ethnography of communication. Additionally, as this research is

conducted on the working world of officers, it is grounded in applied discourse

analysis.

Theoretical Framework: Ethnography of Communication

I have selected Dell Hymes' model for speaking (which he later developed

as a structure for the study of culture), ethnography of communication (EC) as my

analytical structure (Searle, 1969; Gumperz, 1972; Hymes, 1964, 1972, 1974;

Schiffrin, 1994; Wieder, 1999). Hymes (1974) outlines his philosophy of this

approach:

> The ethnographer is likely to look at communication from the
>
> standpoint and interests of a community itself, and to see its
>
> members as sources of shared knowledge and insight. I believe
>
> that the only worthwhile future for the sciences of man lies in the
>
> realization of such an approach" (p. 8)

Wieder (1999) describes this framework clearly: "EC asks how communication, as a set of *specific activities* [my italics], is practiced . . . how is communication conceived by the members of some society or sub-group – what do they recognize some act or activity to be" (p. 1). EC starts by looking at culture as a system of symbols and meanings then focuses on how "the object of study . . . is situated discourse: how speaking is organized and conceptualized within a given community. Thus, this vein of ethnography is concerned with describing ways of speaking as they construct and reflect social life within particular speech communities" (Fitch, 1998, p. 15). In this case, the set of specific activities occur during the security check.

The focus of the EC approach is on how communication is performed communicatively. This performance occurs through speech acts, speech activities, speech events, and speech situations. Speech acts, the primary focus here, are "the social meaning of a short segment of talk" (Tracy, 2002, p. 64). In the case of Government Building police officers, speech acts can fulfill more than one function (e.g., reproaching is an expressive which also is a directive – "Don't place that drink on the magnetometer"); speech activities (e.g., a cluster of acts, such as greeting the SAS, asking them to walk through the metal detection door, handing them their metal items from the tray while saying goodbye); speech events (e.g., restricted by rules or norms for using speech, such as an officer should use polite forms of address, like "sir" and 'maam'); and speech situations (e.g., several speech events, like roll call, Guard Mount, the awards banquet, etc.)

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EC was developed into a approach called cultural communication by

Philipsen (1987). Philipsen asserts that examining cultural communication helps

us to understand the role of discourse (such as talk and silence, native terms,

speech events, stories, and speech rituals) in relationship to the larger cultural

conceptions of personal/social identity and community membership. The CC

model attempts to answer the following questions: "How does communication

reflect and create group membership identity? How is group membership being

reinforced via interpersonal discourse? How does communication deal with

issues of personal and communal identity in particular situations?" Van Dijk,

Ting-Toomey, Smithermann, and Troutman (1997) describe the cultural

communication (CC) model as a "natural development from the ethnography of

speaking perspective with a stronger emphasis on the term 'communication' from

an individual-community dialectical perspective" (p. 159). The CC model is

particularly appropriate to use for policing research because police culture has

been shown to be a powerful force in the communicative lives of police.

I have chosen the EC/CC framework because it is specifically created for

ethnographic research and EC/CC allows me to paint a broader picture of this

communicative setting than a microanalysis (such as conversation analysis) would

have allowed. Consequently, I am able to illuminate not only the patterns of

communicative practices during the security check, but also, through their

discourse, to outline the mundane activities of police and security at Government

Buildings.

The culture of the Government Buildings police began to emerge as a concept as I spent more time observing and interviewing. I was able to observe the police's sense of groupness, how the officers' power functions within the discourse of the security setting, and how face needs are managed through politeness, directives softened with tags, immediacy, repetition, and the sparing use of reproaches.

Police Identity, Culture, and Institutional Discourse

Within the Government Buildings police and security culture, officer identity is created, maintained and sustained through discourse. In other words, the dialogue of this local community not only demonstrates community membership but also renews and supports the police culture. The following section examines what every officer knows through analysis of officer conventions, or unstated rules, for speaking during security checks.

What Every Officer Knows

Officers have strong opinions about how to act and what to say during security checks. Polanyi's (1958/1974) concept of tacit knowledge (e.g., that knowledge which is based on an unarticulated and implicitly accepted background of social practices) helps to illuminate "what every officer knows." For officers, tacit knowledge consists of the presuppositions or stances to which their actions commit them; in other words, officers' beliefs that certain things are the case. For example, many officers believe that, if they are respectful to SASs, they will be more likely to receive return respect back from SASs.

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Officers at Government Buildings have narrower definitions of "what they know." Geertz (1983) called this local knowledge, or commonsense knowledge, something that individuals consider obvious, "what anyone in his right mind knows" (p. 75). Commonsense knowledge is highly valued in police culture. McNulty (1994) examined the commonsense knowledge of police and how that knowledge is shared collectively through police culture. She found that commonsense knowledge was "generated within the context of everyday life routines" (p. 281). In other words, during security checks, these officers are showing and telling one another what it means to be a Government Buildings police or security officer.

My interest here is in examining police discourse as it applies to "various areas of real life, where discourse is essential to the outcome of interaction between individuals" (Gunnarrson, 1997, p. 285); more specifically, I am interested in institutional discourse: the study of "how people use language to manage those practical tasks, and to perform the particular activities associated with their participation in institutional contexts" (Drew & Sorjonen, 1997).

Conventions of Officers' Working Days

Several practical rules-for-speaking have developed at Government Buildings. In our informal conversations and interviews, officers repeated themes which illuminated their feelings about what is right and wrong to say during security checks. Some officers told me that coercion was part of their job.

One researcher found that threats, or coercion might in fact have positive effects on compliance-gaining (Scudder, 1985). Scudder discovered that officers reported using threats (coercion) as methods of gaining compliance. She examined whether overt threats are rarely used in daily interaction but instead, more understated forms of threats are commonly used. She also tested the impact of power on the negotiation because, at the time of her research, much of the previous compliance-gaining research had neglected the power structure involved in the interactions. Somewhat surprisingly, her results indicated three aspects to power and compliance-gaining: equal power may make bargaining more difficult than asymmetrical power structures, power structures are important aspects to the development of agreements, and power structures also had a significant impact upon the frequency with which threats were used   Within the Government Buildings security check context, officers use a minimized form of coercion, which is more efficient with moving the line along quickly, and most SASs do not question gentle orders (e.g., an officer's request of "please do not place that on the belt").

Be courteous, if you can: Politeness and acknowledgement. Power is one of the determinants of the level of politeness used in managing 'face' when a face threatening act (FTA) occurs in dyadic interaction (Brown & Levinson, 1978). A FTA is the reverse of politeness; order, command, threats, warning, dare, and reminders; actions that serve to constrain the target's independence of action. Officers are well-aware of their authority (or power) and how that could affect

their relationships with SAS in a negative manner. Though they have power, officers understand the importance of avoiding embarrassing an SAS unnecessarily. Engaging in polite language is one of their methods.

Attending to positive and negative face needs is a powerful means of maintaining relationships. Brown and Levinson (P. Brown & Levinson, 1978) borrowed the concept of 'face' from Erving Goffman (1961) for their research on politeness. Positive face is every person's desire to have his or her public self-image valued, accepted, and validated by others. In other words, positive face is any effort to meet positive face needs, such as showing liking, claiming commonalities, showing empathy/sympathy, claiming reciprocity. Positive politeness is any effort to meet positive face needs, by pleasant greeting behavior, discussing common areas of agreement (the weather) showing concern for other, using common forms of slang, dialect, address to support group identity.

Baxter (1984) has also studied politeness, but in relation to power. She explored the three situational factors posited as significant by Brown and Levinson: relationship distance, relationship power, and the magnitude of the request. She found that females and persons in close relationships use more polite tactics than males and persons in more distant relationships. She also found that persons with power use less politeness than less powerful persons" (p. 427). The present research belies Baxter's findings. Relationships between these officers and SASs by and large are non-intimate, thus according to Baxter should be less polite than intimate relationships, which as we shall see, is not evidenced.

Additionally, officers in this setting hold the power, legitimate power (i.e., the target believes the agent has the right to influence them, or most SAS understand that in order to reach their desk, or go to a Government Buildings function, they must successfully complete the security check) over the SAS, but are quite polite to SASs.

Negative politeness is defined as "any effort to meet negative face wants" (R. Brown, 1990, p. 444). Negative face is threatened when the person is asked to submit to an imposition on freedom of action, or a challenge to rights or territory. Negative politeness is intended to repair the FTA in the situation. The most common speech act requiring negative politeness is a request that is an imposition. To reduce the level of imposition, by assuring its non-recurrence and to point out any pleasant aspects, many officers are adept at the use of positive and negative politeness.

Acknowledgements are a type of expressive speech act that are expressions of some state (perhaps a psychological one) but that does not appear to have any propositional (statement or assertive) content. Acknowledgements recognize the presence, departure, or conversational actions of another. The speech acts of greeting a person and acknowledging a participant's utterance (by saying 'uh huh' or something similar) are cases in point. Most officers acknowledge SASs presence repeatedly, one SAS after the other, during the busiest hours. The following are examples of how officers demonstrate their

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attention to being polite. (Where appropriate, I have bolded the word or phrases in each encounter quote to highlight an example of the particular concept.)

POLITENESS: OFFICER'S ASSESSMENT

1   Officer Jordan: [one SAS tried to come through a check with closed packages] Yeah, I could have opened the one [letter], but we can use our discretion. If I thought for a minute she was trying to take some [MB material] -- Or if I thought there was something else in the big envelopes, then I probably would have looked in the other one, too. I didn't see any need, but now some officers do that deliberately, would have just gone all through her stuff, which they have a right to. But, you know, you kind of use some discretion about it. You know, **I didn't want to humiliate her** any more by opening her letter, you know [negative politeness]

2   Officer Vail: And we'll put up with so much vulgarity as long as it's not disturbing . . . as a police officer, you learn . . . and they tell you, that's the importance upheld . . . **they expect you in all reality to put up with *some abuse*, because of the authority.** And we do as long as they don't get disorderly . . . I mean, they start off . . now somebody would say "I don't want them using vulgarity around me" and all that, now [after 9/11] it's a different story.

#3   Officer Vail: **We don't belittle people.** You'll get more . . . you

see what I'm saying? You can draw more flies to honey than you

can to vinegar.

POLITENESS: OBSERVATIONS

#1   Officer Fischer: **Please.** Once you get your items, step into the

hallway.

SAS: The hall?

Officer Fischer: Yes, ma'am.

#2   Officer Fischer: [to a European or Scandinavian] Sir, would you

wait in the hall?

SAS: I'm waiting for my wife.

Officer Fischer: If you'd step into the hall, **I'd appreciate it.** [the

SAS looks confused but obeys]

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

#1   Officer Woods: [Greeting another employee] **HOW THERE!**

SAS: [can't hear]

Officer Woods: Fine and yourself? Good to see ya'.

SAS: Good to see you too. Stay safe.

Officer Woods: I sure will. You do the same.

#2   OB: **What's up, Big Maun** [he tries a Jamaican accent]?

Alright!

We Give Them a Choice, But This Isn't A Democracy: Directives and

Reproaches. Directives, one of Searle's (1969) types of speech acts are evident

in these officers' checkpoint interactions. Directives are acts that have the intent

of getting the hearer to do something; for example, giving orders, making

requests, giving instructions, and so on. Obviously, in the work of these officers,

they use many directives.

Officers also use both obvious and subtle forms of reproach. A reproach

(Tracy, 2002) is a type of speech act in which one person raises a questions about

the goodness or rationality of another person's actions by criticizing,

reprimanding, finding fault, accusing, questioning someone's judgment or

decision, asking for an account, and confronting. Officers use reproaches

sparingly.

DIRECTIVES: OFFICERS' ASSESSMENT

#1   Officer Vail: You're taught to **give orders**, it's authority, just like

law enforcement. This isn't a democracy. That's why I wear a

uniform. I'm different from you. I'm given the authority, the law

backs me. As long as I'm within the law I have a legal right to tell

you that I'm where I'm supposed to be, I'm allowed to be there

and I have the authority to tell you to do something, you're

expected to do it . . . **you're expected to comply**, and if it comes

to arrest, let's say you're under arrest, even if it's not a valid arrest,

you're expected to comply under the law for the simple fact we don't want you blowin' off law enforcement.

#2   Officer Allen: Even though I would empathize with [SASs], I would always have to kind of stick to maintain my ground. No matter how far they went [supervisors] always told us we had to . .

. **somebody had to play the adult in the end**. That's the way they always explained it to us. Be empathic with them but, you know, don't give in – say 'I understand your problem' but don't give in.

#5   Officer Jordan: We give them an opening. You have three choices: **Put it through the machine, we open it or you open it or you leave.** It's as simple as that.

#6   Officer Vail: It's your demeanor. You find that, I know you've been out there with me, see we *always* have to show the utmost respect. We *always* do that. I don't treat anybody different . . . or not. They're *guests* here . . . This gentleman [referring to an SAS who had tried to sneak in a knife] has . . . I don't have a problem with . . . it's [MB's] policy that you can't bring a knife in here . . . I let *them* be the one to decide on how I'm goin' to react. . . I'll say "you have to remove that item from here," you'll see my demeanor changes, my body language and the tone of my voice, "I'm tellin' you now, **I'm telling you, I'm not askin' you, I'm giving you a**

command, "you're goin to leave here with that." We tailor the

appropriate action, [sometimes] the arrest is what we do. But just

an officer's demeanor, the way he flexes his [authority] all these

things are . . . as far as behavior, stances, officer stances, they call

it a "interview stance" Keep your weapon away from them . . . My

demeanor is, I'll let you know that you're not going to toy with

me; I'm telling you now . . . not ASKIN' you, telling them you

need to do this, you need to comply.

DIRECTIVES: OBSERVATIONS

#1   Officer Markman: [alarm sounds] **Step back through, Miss.**

Walk straight down the middle. Thank you!

#2   SAS: [woman shouts to him from the conveyor belt]. Is this safe

for the camera?

Officer Giroux: Yes. Fine, Ma'am. It won't bother it. **Put it**

right up there. It's low level. **Right in the bag on through.**

#3   SAS: If I could get a tray [has many items stuffed into his jacket

pockets]

Officer Vail: **Can't bring that in here** [the SAS had pulled a knife

out of his pocket; SAS was very apologetic, saying he knew he

should have noticed it on his way over. SAS left to dispose of the

knife.]

Examples #1 and #2 are directives which are aimed at instructing someone in how

to do something. Officers appear to use this type often. Example #3 is an order: there is no doubt what the officer expects in the mind of the hearer, as can be seen by the SAS's immediate departure to dispose of the knife.

<div align="center">REPROACH: OBSERVATIONS</div>

#1   Officer Markman: You have all your items, Ma'am? Do you have all your items? **You have all your ITEMS**? [for one of the few times, he sound a little bit irritated] I need you to step over here.

SAS: Yeah. OK!!! Good morning!

Officer Markman: Thank you. Alright!

#2   Officer Markman: [lots of alarms sound]. You have a lot of metal in your pockets, so take it . . in your pockets. **Take all the metals out. That's metal. Take all of that out**.

Other officer: Stand on the other side.

Officer Markman: On the other side.

Male SAS: Where?

Officer Markman: **Put that down**. [alarm sounds again] Do you have any other metals? Yep! OK!

In Reproach #1, the reproach is subtly accomplished through repetition and speed of delivery (his tone of voice was irritated but one would have to know him to tell this). However, the officer recovers quickly when he says "thank you" to create positive face.

Nothing Routine About It: Verbal Immediacy. Immediacy is created by some officers during their interactions. Ford (1998) examined customer service interactions. She uses Mehrabian's (1967) definition of immediacy: 'the degree of directness and intensity of interaction between two entities" (p. 325). Ford (1998) found that phatic speech, commonly known as small talk, creates a warm climate, establishes good will, and can leave strong lasting impressions on the customer. Some officers work to provide security, while at the same time trying to create a warm interpersonal climate. In Example #1 below an officer's first concern is safety.

<div align="center">IMMEDIACY: OFFICER ASSESSMENT</div>

#1   [This officer has been joking with this church group about waiting until the exact time to let them in. Several of the women SASs have participated in this exchange.]

SAS: A rule's a rule!

SAS: We wouldn't want you to get fired!

Officer Bales: Ready? ALRIGHT! 10 O'CLOCK.

SAS: OK.

Officer Bales: Ready to go [to other officers].

#2   Officer Vail: [In answer to my question, "Can you describe a usual security check?" the officer explains that security is more important than creating an immediate interpersonal climate] Absolutely nothing routine about it. You may have one person

come up very compliant . . . like I said 99% of 'em are, but you

always have that one percent . . . and that one percent, when they

have bags and all, refusing to do certain things, wouldn't take but a

split second for 'em to reach in, grab somethin' they shouldn't be

grabbin', and you could have an accident. So there's nothing

routine about it. What they do, is they, we keep our eyes and ears

open. We notice . . . we keep separation . . . we bring one person

at a time to the marker, it says "stop". We stop 'em there. Such as

him, we sent this gentlemen out [can't hear]. [alarm sounds]. We

have people around us. We have no idea whether this is a

diversion or what, so the officer controls the [cant' hear] but, no,

there's nothing routine about [can't hear]. It's *very* dangerous.

Cause even within people . . . we have no idea who they are, where

they come from, what they're background is, nothin'.

IMMEDIACY: OBSERVATIONS

#1   Officer Woods: What say, Mike?

SAS: What's up, Man?

Officer Woods: Oh, everything's . . . a whole lot of things.

SAS: Like getting' off early now?

Officer Woods: Oh, I LOVE it. I LOVE it!

SAS: You don't miss the money?

Officer Woods: We can still get the money, but you, yeah, when

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YOU want.

SAS: Then they FIGHT ya . . .

Officer Woods: Yeah . . . GOT ya.

#2   Officer Woods: How you doin', buddy?

SAS: Not too, bad. How you doin'?

Officer Woods: Oh, REAL good, real good.

Some officers attempt to soften orders and commands with tags which consist of warm, immediate modes of address, asking the SAS to be helpful to the officer. For instance, In the second example below, the officer gives a series of directives then lessens it with "for me" and thanks the SAS.

DIRECTIVE WITH TAG: OBSERVATION[14]

#1   Officer Markman: How're you doin', **Lady?**

SAS: Alright!

#2   Officer Woods: How you doin'?

SAS: Have a nice day.

Officer Woods: All right, **buddy.**

#3   Officer Markman: [to SAS] Hey, **Be-bop!**

#4   Officer Vail: Have anything else in your pocket, **my friend?**

#5   Officer Markman: Hey, what's happenin, **Baby Love?** Hey,

Love. What's happenin? Alright!

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[14] Humor could certainly be included in this convention as a softening technique; also humor has a long history in instructional communication research on teacher immediacy. An examination of officer humor use would be a potentially fruitful future study.

SAS: [can't hear]

Officer Markman: It's all good! Be cool now.

Examples #1-5 above are also examples of positive politeness. Example #2

shows liking; all are examples of pleasant greeting behavior; Examples #1, #3, #5

use a common forms of slang.

Us versus Them. Much has been written about the insularity of police

forces. There is a solid literature which addresses issues surrounding police

culture. (Anthony-Davis, 1993; Simonsen, 1975; Smith, 1999; Sykes & Brent,

1980; J. Van Maanen, 1978). Several studies have examined this police culture

from discourse, social construction, and communication overview perspectives

which inform this analysis (Frewin & Tuffin, 1998; McNulty, 1994; G. E. Miller,

1997; Trujillo & Dionisopoulos, 1987; Womack & Finley, 1986) .

Trujillo and Dionisopoulos (1987), in their study of police stories and the

social construction of policing, examine how police label the public, which aids in

building police culture. They assert this labeling practice creates organizational

drama in the form of (1) "expressed anger, uncertainty, and anticipation" (p. 203);

(2) disassociation between the public who have been negatively tagged and the

police officers who deal with them; and (3) creates a powerful connection among

the police officers who constitute the 'us.' Although I did not hear an officer use

name-calling to describe SASs (*a la* Van Maanen 's *The Asshole* (J. Van Maanen,

1978)), officers did display an 'us' and 'them' mentality, through the use of

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pronouns and stories about 'them' and their attitudes. These shared stories develop and maintain the police culture.

Researchers (Frewin & Tuffin, 1998) have found that "three linguistic resources preserve[e] the police culture: police status, conformity, and internal pressure." The authors argue that these resources "maintain the reputation of the officers through the primary concern of rigid conformity and reproduce themselves in the social practices and larger culture of the police." Officers who fail to conform are submitted to strong internal pressure. "Counter Incident #2" above, when Officer Vail violated "the rules," is one example of this type of internal pressure

In perhaps the only communication classroom text aimed at a police audience, Womack and Finley (1986) describe police as "(1) defensive and protective of their profession; (2) are "highly trained and strongly disciplined," (p. 11) thus they respect authority and dislike anyone who disrespects the law; (3) because police spend so much time with people who either violate the law regularly or are at their worst, "policemen [sic] tend to see the worst side of people," and (4) "a policeman's primary contact with most people is in a negative context (p. 11)."

How police negotiate and manage their identities is important to how they feel about their work and themselves. The police and security have been trained and have learned ways of speaking that demonstrate their competence at Government Buildings. Now I turn to an examination of how these encounters

are interactionally produced and how the situation creates social identity for the police (Drew & Sorjonen, 1997; Mastrofski et al., 1996).

In the next scenario a security officer is working crowd control during a particularly busy time on the steps of the main entrance of MB. He discusses how the us *versus* them gets renewed.

GROUP IDENTITY: OFFICER ASSESSMENTS

#1   Officer Allen: Because of the uniform that we wear, you know, we are security persons and we wear this little badge. Anybody who doesn't know, we can just like, you know, we are a very important Presidential type. I was on the corner, you know, doing my little security job, and I had my badge on. There was some guys who were waiting at the store. They looked at me. I saw them looking at me in the rear view mirror. One of the guys rolled the window down and called me "asshole" and the other guys said, "It's the fuzz." I guess I looked like I'm [official] security, you know. That's just the mentality that people have toward me when I'm standing outside the building unprotected, you know.

THIS Isn't Busy, You Should See It When It IS Busy: Multiple Speech Acts and Repetition. Government Buildings officers' discourse tasks are complex. At any one moment, they might be talking to one person, while checking through another and keeping their eye on a third who is an SAS waiting to access the checkpoint.

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#1 Officer Woods: [to researcher discussing golf, sitting at the

monitor at MB—main entrance] We was down in this little gulley,

though. The winds was funny. The ball would shoot off, then it

would . . I need a break. My hand's sore. [To an SAS who's going

through the checkpoint] I'm takin it easy, I'm takin it easy, man.

[SAS asks a question can't hear]. Yeah, man. I got my heart

monitor set up. I need you. Go get the defibrillator.

To New SAS: How you doin?

Officer Woods: Go get the defibrillator! You ain't goin to leave

me hangin? [Turns to researcher] They got jokes all the time [he

laughs], but that makes the job fun, don't it?

REPETITION

Police officers at Government Buildings use the same messages, stated

consistently in the same way, to carry out the security check. When confronted

with a usual security check situation, each police officer uses his or her preferred

phrases. In the example below, this officer greeted four different SASs in a

matter of seconds but builds good will despite the time limitations:

#1 Officer Woods: Good morning. Alrighty! Thank you.

[a new SAS]

Officer Woods: How you doin', sir? Alright. Thank you, sir.

[new SAS]

Officer Woods: [to SASs] How you doin'? Alright!

[new SAS]

Officer Woods: What's goin' on?

[new SAS]

Officer Woods: How you doin'? Alrigh-, alright! [sound of stuff in tray, door alarm] Uh-oh. Step back for me. Alright! Should be good now. Alright, buddy.

SAS: Have a nice day!

Officer Woods: You too, partner!

Officers have "scripts" (i.e., Ford (1998) defines scripts as mental schemas that specify sequences of behavior or routines to be performed in given situations) for interactions with SASs. Officers use the same phatic language over and over. In fact, often I could identity whose quote I was reading by the repetitive phrasings even without the examples being labeled.

#1   SAS: Good morning.

Officer Markman: Have a good one.

#2   SAS: What's up?

Officer Markman: Have a good one. Alright.

As we have seen, police identity and culture is reinforced through institutional dialogue. The shaping forces for security site discourse are power and face needs. Officers attempt to protect self-face and other face wants through speech acts which communicate politeness.

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The officer who subscribes to "being the bigger person" at Government Buildings employs language that is generally polite (acknowledgements), treats others with respect (politeness) when possible and teaches (reproaches) when necessary, is warm but professionally distant (immediacy), and completes the job with efficiency (directives).

Thus, we see that through the above speech acts these officers create and maintain police identity and police culture, and they conduct efficient yet warm security checks through use of directives, expressives, acknowledgements, altruism and immediacy. Ethnography of communication, institutional discourse, compliance seeking, power, and politeness theory have informed this analysis.

Officer Local Knowledge and Cooperation

The police and security at Government Buildings are aware there are acts that are smart and acts that "will get them killed." Similarly, officers know there are ways of speaking which will give them the reputation of expertise to their supervisors, colleagues, and repeat SASs, and ways of speaking which will at best give them an uncomfortable work environment and, at worst get them fired.

Although officers discuss compliance, whether SASs will or will not comply is not much really at issue here. If they do not comply, which at a security check means abide by the security check rules, they simply will not gain access to their destination. Period.

Police and security would simply like to have a job which is as pleasant as possible. By and large, these are not officers who are hooked to the adrenaline of

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the streets – if they were they would be policing at a department that worked the streets. These officers feel that they are in a necessary profession, and they mostly like what they do. Some would like SASs to smile and be pleasant, others do not much care about SAS attitudes, they are concerned with behaviors: Listen to me carefully and just do as I tell you. "Compliance" here resembles "cooperation," which means "working in a helpful way with another or others." Included in this phenomenon is the knowledge that this teamwork is equal. Police officers, after all, carry guns and can arrest you. As for security, at this site, as we saw in the "show your I.D." scenario with Officer Nawanda, officers can actually have you banished from the building if you are a visitor, and an employee SAS could, it is reasonable to say, lose his/her job. Although I cannot say exactly why this would be so onerous for some without the risk of revealing the identity of the research site, I will say that for some visitor SASs this banishment would also affect their livelihood.

Conclusion of Findings

This research has given a broad overview of policing at one federal government building site and uncovered the discursive practices at the security check. Through the use of comparing counter incidents with ordinary communication activities of Government Buildings police, the metaphor of Government Buildings police-as-hero, and an examination of speech acts categorized into themes for Government Buildings policing, it is possible to draw some conclusions about this type of policing, preferred communication modes of

Government Buildings police, and the place of compliance research at security checkpoints.

I have gained admiration for the men and women police and security at Government Buildings. Many times they experience the worst of policing. They cannot win the accolades that a well-handled apprehension of a burglar could provide but if a terrorist does target Government Buildings, these officers will be first in line to risk their lives. On the other hand, their work has more meaning for them and others than some jobs might, and they make a very good salary doing what they do.

On the flip side, I have also gained a better understanding for the routine communication challenges the Government Buildings police face daily – challenges that some officers handle quite skillfully, and others carry out very poorly.

Often officers need to ask SASs to follow their instructions, or to follow Government Buildings rules with which employees are already familiar. Miller's (1997) research outlined above discussed officers' opinions about what characteristics within the citizen affect their poor compliance choices. One of the routine happenings patrol officers encounter is the drunk or drugged citizen. It is less likely that SASs at Government Buildings are impaired by alcohol or drugs while on the job than street officers might encounter, but the emotions of that day, their knowledge of the security system at Government Buildings , and the officer's style would all three likely affect the interactions. Since I was not able

to ask many SAS what affected their compliance decision, I cannot comment on SAS perception of these reasons, or uncover other reason they may have.

I can, however, discuss the officers' opinions as to how they decide what to do with non-compliant SASs – how strongly punitive to be. G. E. Miller's (1997) reasons which were cited by officers include whether the SAS was cooperative, disrespectful, perceived to be lying, argumentative, not following directions, and exhibiting avoidant behavior. Forms of punishment at Government Buildings include forcing an SAS to physically remove personal items, such as knifes or nail files, and food they refuse to have x-rayed or examined. For new visitors, one-time barring of access is the hammer officers can wield. For repeat visitors who need the materials at this site, banning them from access for a long period of time, or forever, is a huge mallet which can directly affect their livelihood. Employees of the site have the threat of "being written up" for being uncooperative hanging over them. Depending on their supervisor, this threat could be more or less serious, but if enough instances of refusal to comply are documented, the employee could conceivably lose his or her job.

My observations at Government Buildings align with Mastrofski, Snipes, and Supina's (1996) findings that the relationship between the officer and the citizen directly affects citizen compliance. I observed instances where even a non-intimate but teasing relationship convinced an SAS who appeared to be considering resisting (e.g., being asked to remove their belt) did as they were

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asked anyway. However, generally encounters between officers and SASs at Government Buildings are dissimilar from patrol officers' experiences. Officers at Government Buildings find that SASs who know them will try to be as obedient as possible to avoid getting the officer in trouble. SASs who are friends may try to stretch the rules a bit, and will ask for favors privately, but they do not want to risk their friend's job. This finding differs from Mastrofski's et al.: when a citizen knows an officer he or she is less likely to comply. However, employees who are not friends with officers do fit the less-obedient scenario Mastrofski et al. describe. Some employees resist showing their I.D.s at all or display them so officers cannot see them clearly and SASs can be vocal in their reluctance to put their food through the xray machines. Officers told me that the employees were "the worst" about complying, especially in these two areas presumably because they know just how far they can go, but visitors to the building do not have a gauge for how far they can go.

Government Buildings-Type Policing

The practice of policing, as the public knows the occupation, consists of patrolling, answering citizen calls for help, apprehending suspects, attending court, and filling out paperwork. Although most of the work is mundane, in urban policing at least ordinary activities have enough excitement to keep many police officers in generally low-paying, though dangerous jobs.

Power. The ways these police officers use power is, of necessity, different from the methods patrol officers use. Because these officers will see employee

SASs repeatedly, they need to take care with their approach. Though there are surveillance cameras everywhere to record the nonverbal communication, officers do not wear microphones. Consequently, when an altercation does occur, it is that officer's, and his or her colleagues', words which are placed against the SAS's word. There are nearly always more than one SAS at the checkpoint line who can corroborate or deny the SAS's story. Many officers take pride in being able to handle these altercations without involving their supervisors.

Coercion within this setting appears to include instances other than "physical threat" of arrest and being held for arrest. Officers attempt to control SAS with verbal threats of being banned from Government Buildings, for some SASs the fact that police officers are armed, and back up security officers, who are not armed represents coercion. The case of the cell-phone woman during Counter Incident #1, The Fire Alarm, demonstrates that even rude, preemptive officer requests might be obeyed. Remunerative power can be seen by officers allowing certain SASs (i.e., other police, government VIPs) to "cut" the line. Government VIPs are also allowed to bring in as many companions as they like to show them the buildings along with off-limits areas.

Some officers also try to avoid unnecessarily punishing SASs. When SASs have closed packages, officers can require that they be opened for inspection (see Politeness, Officer's Assessment, #1). They could exercise their remunerative power and symbolically show their force by rigidly following rules, which is their right.

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Purely normative power is evidenced by the fact that the police officer break room is convenient to many posts, while the security company office is located in the nether regions of Government Buildings. The very labels which describe the two groups are instructive – police say not to call them "security" and I was warned early on by the SecurityCompany president to call their employees security "officers" rather than security "guards."[15]

Officers' social power is evident verbally in the ways they address SASs, using generic terms like Ma'am or Sir, more formal terms of address, for people they don't know, and less formal and more intimate forms of address like Be-bop and Baby with SASs they know well

Two of my informant officers had been street officers before they came to work for Government Buildings. I noticed a difference in how they related to SASs compared with officers who started policing at Government Buildings. The former patrol officers were quicker to use controlling language (e.g., saying "that doesn't come in here" without tags or softeners) and less inclined to joke with the SASs while Government Buildings-only officers appeared more relaxed about their jobs, teasing and being more playful with SASs. Perhaps this more relaxed attitude attracts SASs to do as these more playful and relaxed officers ask. This discovery could inform other policing settings,

Identity. The policing at Government Buildings presents an alternative to the usual duties of police. Government Buildings day-shift police spend their

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[15] The label "guard" has been banned by SecurityCompany's state due to its negative connotation.

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days mostly in security officer-type duties: examining packages, directing people through metal detectors, having them put their items through the magnetometer, conducting individual wanding, keeping an eye out for suspicious behavior, and carrying out public relations functions (e.g., giving directions). Though some police officers would object to the above characterization, several officers agreed that their duties did, indeed, resemble those of security officers. There is a tension, perhaps a competition, between the security and police forces at Government Buildings which may be one of the sources for these objections. Additionally, policing has more status than security work.

There is a disconnect between Government Buildings officers' avowed identities (how they view themselves) and altercast identities (how others' view them). Policing culture strongly supports an "us against them" approach. How these officers view themselves and their profession helps structure their communication preferences. Officers also may deny their public relations, or customer service, duties, while at the same time, using customer service strategies.

Clearly, Government Buildings officers separate themselves from SASs. Language such as "Bet you thought *you'd* go home early!" said by an officer during The Fire Alarm reconfirmed that when there are emergencies, officers must stay and SASs are allowed, even requested, to leave.

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Counter Incident #2, violating "what every officer knows," demonstrates

the fellowship some officers feel with the military[16] Officers are strong about

SASs following rules, but seem willing to bend rules when they make decisions.

Officers call this practice "exercising discretion." The SAS military officers from

Counter Incident #2 are examples of Eizioni's (1961, as cited in Wheeless et al.,

1983) moral mode (recall that is the strongly supportive or positive mode). These

officers that Officer Vail allowed through the security check point without metal

detection began to start taking off their medals, etc., almost before he had the

chance to ask them. These officers clearly respected and were willing to respond

to Officer Vail's social power in this setting.

Compliance-Seeking Skills. During my observation of The Fire Alarm

several aspects of officer communication and compliance-seeking emerged. At

the time when clear communication was most needed, it was least evident. Rather

than keeping us calm with their words and nonverbal proficiency, officers were

visibly rattled. They lost their ability to follow the preferred communication

modes I observed while at security posts. Politeness, immediacy, and directives

with tags, were missing with the officers I observed. It is understandable that

officers wish to be efficient and evacuate the building as quickly and safely as

possible. However, they do not seem to understand that the means for completing

the evacuation optimally would be achieved through their communication with

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[16] Some of the Government Buildings officers are former military. It is common for police departments and security forces to recruit former military because the ability to take orders, and the training in dress and demeanor are valued in policing and security positions.

those they serve. Instituting drills designed to give officers emergency-event communication practice should help improve their communication during these events. Officer compliance-seeking could be adapted for an emergency event which allow for swift execution of their duties, as well as giving Government Buildings occupants confidence in them.

Preferred Communication Modes

In mundane, daily activities, the nature of Government Buildings policing creates and sustains the preferred modes of communication during police and SAS encounters. Because officers know many of the employees of the site and handle repeat SASs who either work at or use the benefits of the sites consistently, officers display the following techniques during the security check.

Politeness and acknowledgement are simply good customer service practices. When you know you will see the SAS/citizen over and over, it is important to positively maintain that relationship, if possible, even though your first concern is safety. Also, when you work at a site that includes very important government officials (and you cannot possibly keep abreast of who everyone is in the ever-changing cast of the federal government) as SASs accessing your site, then it is prudent to treat everyone with respect, or face professional censure or job loss.

SASs are asked to perform many activities that are impositions. Attending to their negative face needs can smooth officer-SAS encounters. Many officers seem to know this fact as demonstrated in their use of polite forms of address,

directives with tags, and reproaches. Even after reproaching an SAS, that encounter (Reproach, Observations, #1) was softened through the officer's friendly closing speech.

Officers wield and yield their power depending upon who is the current SAS. Obviously, if the person is an important political figure, or someone at the site who is in the top echelon, officers must take care in how rigidly they follow rules. While many officers limit face-threatening events, with politeness being the normative power use through respectful address, they also have an environment of such complexity, that they do not always have the luxury of attending to SASs' face needs. If the SAS is a friend, or at least a friendly acquaintance of the site, officers have more flexibility in their compliance-seeking methods.

Police Culture. Officers at this site do not display the strongest police culture. The environment is less "us versus them" than patrol officers experience. I did neither heard any officer use derogatory names for SASs, nor horror stories of what "they" did to "us." Many officers have friends, some close friends, who work at Government Buildings. Those alliances may dilute the occupation-related groupness. However, officers did exhibit a kind of culture through the use of pronouns and in descriptions of "what every officer know," like "the employees are the worst" at compliance.

Though much of their work is public relations, officers' primary mission is the safety of persons and property at Government Buildings. It is due to the very

real dangers of their job that officers can turn from being friendly and open, to stern and closed, using strong directives and reproaches when they feel they are warranted. Yet, even during strong directives and reproaches the officers do employ verbal immediacy tactics to soften the message. Further, officers seem to understand that this lack of appreciation is part of the job. They dislike being taken for granted when there is "nothing routine about" the task of stopping a terrorist attack. Police and security forces were catapulted into public view with the events of 9/11/01. Perhaps being ignored now is more difficult after all of the positive attention police and security enjoyed immediately after those events.

Chapter 6

Conclusion: Compliance-Seeking at

Security Checkpoints of A Federal Government Site

Police and security communication is of great, sometimes grave,

importance. During the period after the airliner hit one of the Twin Towers until

it collapsed, people's lives rested on how competently their security force could

communicate evacuation procedures and the calmness these forces displayed.

From the time the spotlight hit policing in the 1960s to today's focus on

security, social science researchers have studied law enforcement discursive

practices. Attention has been primarily paid to patrol officer forces and, in recent

time, to community policing. Security officers, also known as the private police,

have been largely ignored. Some of the responsibility for this lack of research

rests with the security companies themselves, as these forces are not receptive to

micro-examination; after all, their livelihood depends upon satisfying their clients

and any distraction could take away from what they consider their prime mission.

In order to examine past research in compliance-gaining in law

enforcement contexts I began by culling examples of compliance-gaining

situations from the sociologist literature on policing from the 1960s-1980s.

Additionally, I used the only extant micro-study of security officer work to help

set the stage for this research. Further, using news stories since 9/11, I have

looked at airport security. This is a setting known to many people and has been

widely discussed since 9/11/01. Thus, I have examined security/citizen

encounters documented in the news to further situate this study.

The current research was predicated on the knowledge that there are

several gaps in existing policing and security research in multiple disciplines.

Much of the policing research in criminology has been quantitative survey

research which has been requested by policy makers, rather than instigated as an

outgrowth of scholarly curiosity. Sociology has conducted qualitative research;

however, the focus within this discipline is often on groups, with little attention

given to individual interactions. Most importantly, to my knowledge, there is not

even one study of federal government policing security practices. The

sociological studies cited in Chapter 2 are qualitative research, focused on

individual interactions which help close the gap in policing and security research.

While communication scholars are beginning to examine communication

in policing, most of the research on law enforcement is within a criminology, law,

or political science framework. Communication-based studies of law

enforcement are sparse (King, 1995; Meehan, 1992; G. E. Miller, 1997; Trujillo

& Dionisopoulos, 1987), and observational studies of police-citizen encounters,

either in public or private policing, based in communication are rare (Mastrofski,

1999). This study is a start at increasing observational communication research in

policing settings.

This study is a first attempt to uncover the working world and compliance-

seeking discourse of a federal government police force. Although these officers

are "evaluated"[17] consistently, they have not experienced an outside researcher

who is interested in what they do. During the unfolding of this study, I found

that many officers were anxious to talk to me and to let me in on their working

lives. Officers at times seemed to vie for my attention (other officers were

definite in their unwillingness to talk to me). Many had things to say. One

officer, who at first struck me as distant, was visibly excited when I asked if I

could talk with him. We had our interview outdoors during his lunchtime and

then, when he was back on post, he said we could finish the interview there. I

asked if I could tape him while he worked and he said, "sure," and then turned to

his colleagues and said "she wants to tape me!" Some officers are anxious to

share their working world and interested in making their stories become public.[18]

Within this study I have primarily examined how Government Buildings

police officers communicate skillfully. It is the nature of ethnography that

researchers are forced to talk with those who are willing to talk with them. Of the

officers I either interviewed or audio-taped while observing, most were quite

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[17] During an observation early in the study period, an officer asked me what I was doing:
       Officer Ferme: You're evaluating us?
       Me: No . . . *(I explain why I'm there)*
       Ferme: He *(her colleague)* said you were evaluating us.
       Me: No, I'm not evaluating you. Spread the word . . . NO, evaluation! (She taps my
       hand and laughs, then walks back to her post; they've been evaluated before and that's
       the category I fit into: an evaluator)

[18]   For this project I was originally most interested in examining the occupational
world of security officers. At this site I was able to interview and observe security
officers, but not allowed to tape-record them while they worked. Additionally, I
uncovered the richest data from the police officers. Thus, I have elected to delay
discussing the security officer data until a later study.

proficient communicators.[19] Important future work would include an attempt to direct and help officers who are lacking in the preferred communication modes. With their agreement, coaching them behind the scenes on their approach to compliance could provide great benefits to the officer and the site. The officer would gain confidence and perhaps enjoy the job more, and the site could enjoy improved public relations.

The Government Buildings police force, while designated as a police force, with those attendant powers, carry out many of the duties associated with security officers. The main duties of the Government Buildings police day-shift staffing checkpoints. They check SASs through the magnetometer machines, metal detection doors, examine bags when necessary, and wand those who have set off alarms. Thus, this group primarily carries out security-like duties and was an appropriate force to study.

By and large, there is a tendency for the public and, perhaps, researchers, to lump police into a category of type-of-policing. This research supports the view that officers need to change their communication approaches based on the type of policing they are doing: security-like policing, on-campus policing, special-events policing, community policing, small-town policing, etc.

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[19]   Although one of the officers did display communication problems of concern (e.g., lack of nonverbal communication skills, a terseness and testiness in verbal delivery, these issues remained out of the scope of this study.

Compliance-Seeking in Communication Research

Beginning with the seminal Marwell and Schmitt (1967) study, scholarly interest in compliance-seeking has been strong in the last two decades, notably in instructional, health-care, family, intercultural, and organizational settings. Yet, research on compliance-seeking has been concerned mostly with identifying strategy classification lists with the assumption that the more inclusive the list, the better the classification. Compliance-seeking research, however, has need to focus on observational studies which uncover compliance-seeking as it naturally occurs which this study does.

This research has begun to look at the features of compliance-seeking: politeness and acknowledgement, face-needs, and the speech acts as they relate to the power of officers. O'Keefe (1994) has suggested using a feature-based approach to research which would shift from identifying lists of compliance-gaining schemes to "explaining observed and theoretically important differences in compliance-gaining behavior" (p. 61-62). In a feature-based approach, many characteristics of messages may be examined, such as "different power bases invoked in compliance-gaining messages, or with whether the compliance-gaining attempt is reward oriented or punishment oriented, or with the degree or sort of politeness exhibited" (p. 62). Also, the research herein views compliance-seeking situations as cyclical, dialectical processes which is a benefit of feature-based research.

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In addition to features of compliance-seeking, researchers (Infante et al.,

1997; Miller, Boster, Roloff, & Seibold, 1977) have called for an examination of

situational differences which this study addresses. Only one other researcher is

examining policing and compliance-seeking (Mastrofski, 1996) and that

researcher is based in criminology rather than communication.

Police and Compliance-Seeking at Government Buildings

In law enforcement contexts, the foremost activity of police is to try to

convince citizens to carry out activities they may resist. For example, police need

citizens to get out of their automobiles, to show their registration and driver's

licenses, to give police a wide variety of information, etc. At Government

Buildings, police need to examine SASs food, have items placed on the conveyor

belt, empty their pockets of metal items, open their purses for examination,

cooperate during the metal detection wanding, etc. However, researchers have

largely ignored law enforcement settings and compliance-seeking as an area of

interest. Regrettably, these researchers have been largely out of the

communication realm.

The theoretical framework which fit this research best was ethnography of

communication and politeness theory. EC enabled viewing Government

Buildings policing from a broad, inclusive framework, while focusing on

discursive practices during one speech event: the security check. Police identity,

police culture, and kinds of institutional discourse were uncovered through a

series of officer conventions: (1) *Be courteous if you can: Politeness and*

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acknowledgement. Many officers work very hard at keeping face-threatening acts to a minimum and managing positive and negative face needs through messages of politeness and acknowledgement; (2) T*his isn't a democracy: Directives and reproaches*. It is a part of policing to ask people to take actions they do not want to take. While officers must give commands at times, Government Buildings officers sometimes try to lessen the effect of their directives through the use of altruistic tags. Reproaches are used as a last resort and are also softened; (3) *Nothing routine about it: Officer immediacy*. Although officers know that they need to be alert for unexpected behaviors, they also work on creating a friendly, but professional climate; (4) *Us versus them: Police culture*. Police identity and culture is less evident at Government Buildings due to the unusual nature of policing there, yet officers do share stories of SASs; (5) *Multiple speech acts and repetition*. Officers at Government Buildings' jobs are complex; they deal with several SASs at once, while keeping an eye to entrances and exits. Also, officers must give the same directions over and over all day, every day.

Officer local knowledge and cooperation. As we have seen, police identity and culture is reinforced through institutional dialogue. The shaping forces for security site discourse are power and face needs. Officers attempt to protect self-face and other face wants through speech acts which communicate politeness.

The officer who subscribes to "being the bigger person" at Government Buildings employs language that is generally polite (acknowledgements), treats

others with respect (politeness) when possible and teaches (reproaches) when necessary, is warm but professionally distant (immediacy), and completes the job with efficiency (directives).

Thus, we see that through these speech acts, officers create and maintain police identity and police culture. Additionally, they conduct efficient yet warm security checks through use of directives, expressives, acknowledgements, altruism and immediacy. The ethnography of communication, institutional discourse, compliance seeking, power, and politeness theory have informed this analysis.

Compliance-Seeking at Government Buildings: Questions which arose from this study are: Do SASs actually comply with officers or what does the type of doing-what-officers-ask consist of in this setting? In other words, what is the range of compliance and how might it differ at Government Buildings from other settings? Within an organizational setting like Government Buildings, how much or how little compliance will get SASs what they want? I have constructed a description of a *range of compliance* kinds which I observed during these encounters which I have derived from interactions I observed or examples officers related to me:

1) *complete compliance*: the SAS follows the rules, does as asked. (I observed an SAS who was a local reporter. He emptied his pockets of everything and placed them in the tray. The officer saw there was a knife in the tray and said "You can't bring that in here" and told him to

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put everything back in his pockets and leave the building. The SAS

was very apologetic and left the building to get rid of the knife. He

returned without the knife, still apologizing to the officer that, he

"knew better.")

2) *limited compliance*: the SAS follows the rules, but ignores something.

(My observation at the employee exit: the officer asked an employee

to open her bags so he could examine them. She opened her briefcase

but did not open her purse. The officer either neglected to notice she

had not opened her purse or chose to let her go – there was a very long

line of employees behind her in line impatient to go home for the day -

- and she left.)

3) *limited compliance with objections*:

   a. verbal: directly objecting to the request, order, command, etc.

      (I observed one officer say to a European or Scandinavian,

      "Sir, would you wait in the hall?" SAS: "I'm waiting for my

      wife." Officer: "If you'd step into the hall, I'd appreciate it."

      [the SAS looked confused but obeys]).

   b. nonverbal: physically resisting complying with the request,

      order, command, etc. (An officer described how one SAS

      nonverbally resisted. When he asked the SAS to show her I.D.,

      she said, "'Oh, it's here' and then showed where she had

      pinned the I.D. on her hip."

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4) *passive-resistant compliance:* resisting compliance in an indirect way.

(One officer told me: "A prime example [of resistance], there was a

guy who came here who had a picture of his dog on his ID. For a long

time he got away with it. It was an embarrassment to the police. Then

this one day the officer decided to take it and look at it and it was a

picture of his dog.")

5) *eventual compliance with protest:* shouting, blocking the line while

arguing, etc. (My first day of informal observing, an SAS who was

attempting to leave Government Buildings at the Main Exit objected to

having his book bag searched. He complained to the exit officer

loudly enough for those at the entrance to hear him. He left the exit

line and stalked around complaining to the room in general. He finally

came back to the Main Exit and allowed his bag to be searched; then

he left the building complaining loudly as he went.)

6) *non-compliance or avoidance:* leaving after refusing to do as asked

(An officer related an incident: An SAS at the Jacobs Building

entrance was told to open his food containers to they could be

examined. He refused. The officer repeated the request. The SAS

refused again and the officer told him if he did not open the containers

that he would need to take his food and leave the building. The SAS

walked back to a trash can and jammed his food angrily into the can

and stalked out of the building.)

7) *over-compliance or distracted compliance*: carrying out unasked-for

actions. (At the employee entrance just after the morning rush, a non-

employee SAS was asked by the officer, after she put her purse

through the magnetometer, if she had a nail file in her purse – he

thought he had seen something on the monitor – she unloaded

everything from her purse onto the bottom of the magnetometer slide,

effectively blocking others' entrance into the building.)

In this organization, officers have relationships with SASs which vary in

intimacy, officers and SASs see each other over and over, and SASs can watch

how officers handle others to see how far they can push the rules.

Future Compliance-Seeking Research in Policing

Steve Wilson (2002) provides a useful overview of three challenges to

social influence researchers, to which I will add three additional suggestions.

Wilson suggests that (1) future compliance-seeking researchers base their

research in interaction, (2) consider the specific relationships as they are

"embedded within larger institutional and culture contexts," and (3) consider

emotion within message production. I add to his list, (4) employ heretofore little

used methods, such as ethnomethodology and conversation analysis to uncover

local knowledge and repeatable observations of policing interactions, (5) examine

nonverbal social influence in tandem with verbal influence interactions (which is

especially important in policing interactions; officers discussed with me the

effectiveness of "showing" citizens what they want them to do, or the need to put

"hands on" to keep themselves and others safe), and (6) study humor and compliance-seeking.

(1) Base research in interaction. Past researchers have primarily examined the agent's strategy for influencing the target. Also, rather than asking study participants to tell researchers what they would do in certain circumstances, actually observing and recording what they do gives a more complete, and more accurate picture. Belote (1989) says that "clearly the next step in compliance research is to observe actors gaining compliance from targets" (p. 261) and suggests designing studies "to be observational, to take an interaction perspective" (p. 263). Another suggestion within this category would be to focus on citizens and their perceptions of why they complied with THIS officer. I have begun this research in a police setting.[20]

(2) Consider specific relationships within the larger organizational and cultural contexts. Kristine Fitch (1994) has begun to examine cultural contexts and compliance-seeking, examining directive sequences as they relate to discourse in the United States and Colombia, South America. Within research in communication on police-citizen encounters, the effects of culture on social influence has been mostly ignored. Yet cultural differences are quite evident at security check points. Some security officers' displayed fear of the National Guard who were stationed at airports after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

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[20] I have some data on SAS perceptions which will be used in future analyses.

And the airport security screeners themselves, many of them foreign-born, were visibly rattled by the presence of the National Guard at first. "The first day we were there, some of them were shaking," DePoy said. "Some of them come from places where people who carry machine guns mean to do harm" (O'Hanlon, 2001, p. B4).

At Government Buildings, one exchange I observed was with a visiting Japanese man and woman. They appeared to be very anxious about what they needed to do during the security check. After they had successfully negotiated the metal detector, they stood indecisively (precisely where the officers hate for SASs to stand), blocking SASs who are following them through the security check, and causing officer concern about why SASs are stationary. The wanding officer asked them to move along and gestured toward the elevators. Everything stopped as the man asked the officer for directions. The officer's answer appeared to be incomprehensible to the man, so it had to be repeated while the SASs in line waited. The officer handled the exchange adequately but the visitors were embarrassed and once they had left the security area, I saw they still had no idea where they were to go, as they stood and studied the building index

(3) Emotion within social influence interactions. Emotions, as with power, may be inseparable from compliance-seeking situations. Within the policing context, emotions can be a strong tool for police to use and to experience (consider 9/11/01, the day that officers were required to put their own feelings about family aside and do their job). Emotion management concerns how one

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controls one's *own* emotions (Fiebig & Kramer, 1998; Hochschild, 1979; Mann, 1999; Masterbroek, 1999) and how one controls the emotions of *others* (Cahill & Eggleson, 1994; Thoits, 1996). Both concepts relate to the work of police and security forces, and would present a fruitful area of study.

Controlling one's own emotions can be defined as "the act of trying to change in degree or quality an emotion or feeling" (Hochschild, 1979, p. 561). Government Buildings officers told me that they must stay calm in order to diffuse a potentially volatile situation. One officer related a story about an SAS who called him an "asshole" and how that officer managed his own and the SAS's emotions:

> Officer Woolf: I said, "Yes, sir, I AM an asshole." And, he kind of got quiet and . . . grabbed his stuff and walked off. . . .Well, in my personal philosophy, he's not necessarily lying, he's telling the truth. I'm sure I'm an asshole to HIM. . . . I might as well agree with him, I AM an asshole. That way, I don't escalate it, I kill the situation. I kinda nip it in the bud. Just go ahead and just defuse it. . . cause, to me, if you get upset about it then, . . .he's won. He's controlled you and he's got your ego. That's why most people snap back, cause they get offended by it, and ME, I've been an asshole at least once or twice in my life, I'm sure, so . . there's nothing wrong, there's nothing wrong with saying, "Ok, yeah, well I AM an asshole," or "I'm a jerk," cause that way most people aren't going to say anything after you admit to it . . cause they won't know what to say. He

was tight-lipped and then he just took off. He was out of there quickly. I think it was like you say, he was just in shock, like "he just ADMITTED to that" like he couldn't believe it. But that's always worked, even at the [former job site] I used to work at . . . I've learned that from working at the [former job site], don't get into an altercation with 'em. They're not mad at ME. They're mad at the system, or they're mad at whatever happened.

In addition to managing one's own emotions, managing the emotions of others is an important activity of police (Thoits, 1996). Under potentially stressful conditions (e.g., when an SAS's bag needs to be examined, when several groups are trying to access the entrance all at once, when an article has been discovered which cannot be removed from the building), Government Buildings police and security must carry out their duties swiftly and efficiently while attempting to maintain the calm of those they serve. The officers at Government Buildings routinely use a variety of methods to keep the situation in control.

(5) Study the whole picture, nonverbal/verbal social influence. Officers at Government Buildings use their bodies in particular ways to allow them to influence (some used the word "control") what SASs do. Officer Vail's habit is to hand the SAS their personal belongings from the tray; this action helps him because if SASs take their things with them, then Officer Vail will not have to walk them down to the lost and found; additionally, he appears helpful to the SAS with these actions. He also used sweeping gestures to show SASs what actions to

do next. This reduces the amount of talk necessary and expedites SASs through the checkpoint.

(6) Humor and Compliance-Seeking. Officers must balance between both very serious duties and the "game" of policing at Government Buildings. Goffman's (1961) "world-building activities" (p. 25) in his discussion on actual games and "serious activities" points up aspects of police/SAS encounters:

> Games, then, are world-building activities. I want to suggest that serious activities have this quality too. We are ready to see that there is no world outside the various playings of a game that quite corresponds to the game-generated reality, but we have been less willing to see that the various instances of a serious encounter generate a world of meanings that is exclusive to it. It is only around a small table that one can show coolness in poker or the capacity to be bluffed out of a pair of aces; but, similarly, it is only on the road that the roles of motorist and pedestrian take on full meaning, and it is only among persons avowedly joined in a state of talk that we can learn something of the meaning of half-concealed inattentiveness or relative frequency of times each individual talks (p. 26).

The game of the officer-SAS encounter is usually a routine, repetitive event. However, officers have to also be ready for that one moment when the game becomes deadly. Many officers assume that their use of humor is important to getting folks to do what officers want them to do. Yet this assumption has not been supported by any research of which I am aware. Additionally, while some

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officers enjoy using humor, many officers do not appreciate the use of humor by SASs.

Limitations of this study. Qualitative research does have limitations. While my intensive interviews and audio-taped observations provide a depth and richness to this data, the scope of this study is limited. I interviewed and observed a limited number of officers. Additionally, this research was collected at one research site (though at multiple security checkpoints) only. I encourage future researchers to attempt mixed-methods studies of police and security compliance-seeking communication at security checkpoints which could increase the reliability of the conclusion that are drawn.

Policing and compliance-seeking has proven to be a productive area of study. With the recent increasing public attention to police and security, more naturalistic research is needed. Additionally, it is hoped that other compliance-seeking researchers in communication will become interested in turning to other settings for comparative examinations of compliance-seeking.

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Appendix A

The Early History of Private Policing

Forst and Manning (1999) describe the policing of this period: "Policing, like most functions of modern government, was once exclusively in the domain of private enterprise. The policing of homicides in ancient Athens, unlike that of later times and places, was primarily a family matter; entry into the security market was restricted, and individuals without families were not well protected" (p. 4). The origin of the modern policing system began in England about 1066, with the men in villages raising a "hue and cry" to signal criminals were at work.

Sklansky's (1999) comprehensive history of private policing describes the constabulary system of Britain with the position of constable (unpaid) which by the thirteenth century denoted "a local man with a touch of regal authority about him" (p. 1196) and who denoted the only law around. "Privately established night watches and patrols were often the citizens' only protection against direct assault" (Fischer & Green, 1998, p. 4), with the presence of this "watch" often a sufficient deterrent to those wanting to do harm. With increasing criminal activity, however, the constable's eyes proved insufficient. Communities required communal responsibility for law enforcement, with "every man between the ages of fifteen and sixty to maintain specified weaponry, which varied according to his wealth" and police duties considered "the duties of every man" (Sklansky, 1999, p. 1197). Consequently, since all male citizens were required to be a "watch," the level of experience and expertise of law enforcement was mercurial.

Due in part to this system, the quality of the watch rapidly deteriorated (Sklansky, 1999). "Those with sufficient funds hired deputies to serve their stints as constable or watchman, the deputies in turn often hired their own deputies, and in this manner the constabulary and watch gradually were relegated to those who could find no other employment. The predictable results were constables and watchmen of notorious incompetence" (Sklansky, 1999, p. 1198). ". . . by the seventeenth century the office of constable was commonly regarded as appropriate only to the old, idiotic, or infirm" (p. 1198, note 158). Thus, the deputies had little experience and less motivation to do a good job.

In Britain, during the Industrial Revolution, when thousands of people moved from farms to cities to work in factories, the watch system became insufficient to respond to these increased policing demands. Sir Robert Peel "created the forerunner to the modern urban police department by constructing a force of peace officers (who later became known as 'bobbies,' in tribute to Peel) to prevent crime" (Forst & Manning, 1999, p. 4). Although some corruption remained, these officers were outfitted in "quasi-military navy blue uniforms" (p.5), were carefully chosen, were taught restraint, and served the public twenty-four hours a day.

The United States followed the British system by instituting the system of constables who performed their civic duty (and were not paid). As in Britain, "those with sufficient resources hired additional protection, and the boundary between private guards and public watchmen often was indistinct" (Sklansky, 1999, p. 1206). Because private

citizens were designated to identify criminal behavior, the system of rewards and fines paid to informers produced "widespread collusion between officers and thieves" (p. 1206). The United States was slower than Britain to adopt an effective public policing service, paying sheriffs of the colonial West "per criminal caught, subpoena served, and tax dollar collected" (Forst & Manning, 1999, p. 5).

During the 1800s, fearing excessive government attention to private matters, Americans resisted the movement toward a centrally organized, professional police force (Sklansky, 1999). Yet crime increased sufficiently that public outcry could not halt the growth of public police. The focus of these forces was crime control, but developed into tasks with less focus on crime and more on social control (for example, getting "paupers" and "tramps" off the streets). When economics dictated, the public police turned to private forces for their assistance.

One of the first private policing agencies in the United States was founded by Allan Pinkerton, a Scottish immigrant and son of a Glasgow police sergeant, began his career in security by accident. A barrelmaker by trade, he was searching an island for old barrel staves. The local sheriff used his help to capture a band of counterfeiters. After other similar events, Mr. Pinkerton was elected deputy sheriff of his county. He moved to the Chicago area in 1850 and five years later, due to a series of train robberies, Pinkerton won a $10,000 contract to start a private railroad police agency (Vila & Morris, 1999).

As public police attention turned less often to crime control and more to social control, vigilantism in the South and the West became common with wealthy landowners and others providing law enforcement "the government could not or would not provide" (Sklansky, 1999, p. 1210). Thus, "the line between public and private policing was frequently hazy" (Sklansky, 1999, p. 1210). Today the divisions are blurring even more with the federalization of airport security.

APPENDIX B

Interview Guide

INTRO

1. I'm interested in the work of security and communication between security and those they screen.

2. Your identity (and your company or the Library's) will be protected in written reports.

3. I will keep the strictest confidence in what you tell me.

4. The questions I ask may seem silly or hard to answer

    a. Questions appropriate for one person may not be for others

    b. I am interested in your opinions and experiences

5. Please interrupt, ask for clarification, criticize . . . etc.

6. My background:

    a. BA in theatre, UMKC (1977)

    b. MA in communication, Cal State, Los Angeles (1990)

    c. Doctoral work in communication, U. of Oklahoma

7. May I record this interview? Can pay close attention to you and let the recorder do the work.

8. My University requires that I have your permission in writing to include you in my study. Would you read and sign this Informed Consent form?

FACESHEET: Police or Security Officers

Today's Date: _____

Place: _____

Time: _____

Interviewer's Name: Terri Kelley Wray

Interviewee's Designation:

Please fill in the following questions. This information will be used to better understand the nature of security work as it is experienced by each security officer. **This information will be kept strictly confidential.** (Please do not answer any questions you may object to.)

1. Age: _____

2. Gender: Male   Female

3. Highest education obtained (in years): 1 2   3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12   13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

                                                                                      (h. s.)   (bachelor's) (grad. degree)

4. Degree(s) earned: __ high school ___ B.A. or B.S. __ M.A. or M.S. ___ Doctorate _____ other

5. Living Status: ____ Single _____ Separated ___ Married ___ Significant Other ___ Roommate(s)

6. Children (describe relationship, ages, total number)

7. Do you hold any other jobs at the current time?   Yes   No   Describe:

POLICE/SECURITY WORK: *May I tape your answers to these questions?*

8. How long have you been in police/security work?   _____ months _____ years

9. How did you get into police/security work?

10. Other family members in police/security work? Yes   NoRelationship _____

11. Do you have any goals for your future in police/security work (like supervising, owning a security company, etc.)

12. Describe the recent security check with _____ (the visitor/staff who . . .) _____.
    [He/she will describe a security check the researcher has taped and observed.] Probe: What did you say, do? What did the visitor/staff say, do?

13. Describe a typical security check. How does the above security check instance compare with other, typical security checks?

14. Describe some of the most argumentative, most difficult encounters you have had during your time conducting security checks.

15. Probe: What do you say to convince some citizens to do what you ask? Do you have anything special that you do?

16. Describe what to your mind would be the "ideal security check" encounter? Probe: Why is this citizen "ideal", what does he/she say or do to make your job easier?

FACESHEET: Security Access Seeker

Today's Date:

Place:

Time:

Interviewer's Name: Terri Kelley Wray

Interviewee:

This information will be used to better understand the nature of security work as it is experienced by each security officer. **This information will be kept strictly confidential.** (Please do not answer any questions you object to.)

1. Age: _____

2. Gender: Male   Female

3. Highest education obtained (in years): 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

   (h. s.)   (bachelor's)   (grad. degree)

4. Degree(s) earned: __ high school __ B.A. or B.S. __ M.A. or M.S. __ Doctorate _____other

   (fill in)

5. Living Status: ___ Single ___ Separated ___ Married ___ Significant Other ____ Roommate(s)

6. Children (describe relationship, ages, total number)

7. Profession:

8. Where would you place this security officer as he/she compared to your other experiences at security checks?

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
a)	Competent	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Incompetent
b)	Friendly	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Unfriendly
c)	Humble	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Arrogant
d)	Stupid	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Intelligent
e)	Instructions clear	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Instructions
	vague								
f)	Talks just	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Talks too little
	enough								
g)	Touches just	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Touches more
	enough								than necessary
									to do job well

SECURITY ACCESS SEEKER: *May I tape your answers to these questions?*

9. Describe the recent security check with _____ (the police or security officer who . . .)
   _____. [The subject will briefly describe a security check the researcher has taped and observed.]

10. Why did you agree so readily to what the police/security officer asked you to do? OR, Why did you object to the security check? Probe: Did the security officer say or do something you liked/disliked?

9/11 Questions for Police or Security Officers: Date _____

____ LOC Police ____ Security Officer   Name

_____

1. Were you on-site last year on 9/11?   Yes   No

2. Where were you posted?

3. Describe how you found out about the crashes.

4. What happened next?

5. Do you think that management handled the crisis well?   Yes   No

    a. If yes, what did they do well?

    b. If no, what would you have them do differently?

6. What strategies did you use to keep the crowd calm during evacuation?

7. Have you noticed any changes in visitor or employee attitudes since 9/11?

8. On 9/11, how did you manage to do your job and your feelings about the safety of family and friends?

Appendix C

Mueller Building – Main Entrance

Entrance Doors   Exit Door

Appendix D

Mueller Building -- Employee Entrance

Appendix E

Jacobs Building

Door to Building

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┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  ○    ╲    ╲      ┌──────────────┐      ╲    ╲            │
│                    │    Table     │                       │
│                    └──────────────┘                       │
│  ┌──────────┐       ┌──────────┐                          │
│  │          │       │   Pad    │                          │
│ ○│  Moni-   │       └──────────┘                          │
│  │  itor    │                                             │
│  │          │                                             │
│  └──────────┘                                             │
│  ┌────┐ ┌──────┐ ┌───────────┐ ┌───────┐ ┌───────┐ ┌───────────┐ ┌──────┐ │
│  │    │ │ Xray │ │   Metal   │ │ Table │ │ Table │ │   Metal   │ │ Xray │ │
│  │Wall│ │ Con- │ │ Detection │ └───────┘ └───────┘ │ Detection │ │ Conv-│○│
│  │    │ │ veyor│ │   Door    │   ┌──────┐           │   Door    │ │ eyor │ │
│  │    │ │ Belt │ └───────────┘   │ Pad  │           └───────────┘ │ Belt │ │
│  └────┘ └──────┘                 └──────┘                         └──────┘ │
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
Appendix F

Modes of Power*

	Alientative	Calculative	Moral
Coercive	1	2	3
Remunerative	4	5	6
Normative	7	8	9

from (Wheeless, Barraclough, & Stewart, 1983)

1, 5, 9 = Gray area represents the preferred modes.

Appendix G

Speech acts: ((Crane, Yeager, & Whitmen, 1981, p. 150)

1) "locutionary act is the actual uttering of a sentence with a particular meaning"
2)" illocutionary act is the intent that the speaker has in uttering the sentence"
3) "perlocutionary act is the result achieved in uttering the sentence"

The authors example: "Close the door"
       locutionary: its particular meaning
       illocutionary: the request or order to close the door
       perlocutionary: the result of someone's actually closing the door

Searle (1975) divided speech acts into five parts:

1.   Representatives -- acts that represent a particular state of affairs; for example, statements, descriptions, assertions, and so on.

2.   Directives -- acts that have the intent of getting the hearer to do something; for example, orders, requests, instructions, and so on

3.   Commissives -- acts that commit the speaker to some future actions; for example, promises, threats, offers and so on.

4.   Expressives -- acts that express an attitude of the speaker about some state of affairs; for example, thanks, apologies, welcomes and so on.

5.   Declaratives -- acts that bring about some performance that corresponds to what is being said; for example, declaring war, pronouncing a couple husband and wife, firing an employee, and so on. (Crane et al., 1981)

Hymes ((Hymes, 1974) defined the speech event as "restricted to activities, or aspects of activities, that are directly governed by rules or norms for the use of speech. An event may consist of a single speech act, but will often comprise several" (p. 52). For example, a speech act (an officer teasing that he's "going to take your sandwich!") is usually part of the speech event (the officer using the metal detection wand on you)