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RETRIEVING LOST IDEALS: UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
TOWARD BRAZIL, 1960-1968

The University of Oklahoma

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RETRIEVING LOST IDEALS: UNITED STATES FOREIGN
POLICY TOWARD BRAZIL 1960-1968

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JOYCE C. TOWNSEND

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1980

RETRIEVING LOST IDEALS: UNITED STATES FOREIGN
POLICY TOWARD BRAZIL 1960-1968

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The Alliance for Progress is a glaring example of the failure of American foreign policy during the 1960's. This has made it the subject for numerous works. However, most of these works are based on the rational actor approach. Unfortunately, bureaucratic analyses of United States foreign policy in the 1960's are very rare and a bureaucratic politics analysis of United States foreign policy toward Brazil during that era appears to be nonexistent. This dissertation is offered as a contribution to fill that gap.

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INTRODUCTION

RETRIEVING LOST IDEALS: UNITED STATES FOREIGN
POLICY TOWARD BRAZIL 1960-1968

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Throughout the twentieth century American foreign policy has been characterized by decisions that are made in contradistinction to policy proclamations. This trend presented a paradox which heightened during the post World War II era and climaxed in the American foreign policy of the 1960's.¹ This trend of duplicity has eroded the credibility of American diplomacy, has caused other nations to view American foreign policy with suspicion, and has cast doubts on the validity of American policy proclamations.

In 1961 President John Fitzgerald Kennedy proclaimed the Alliance for Progress, a product of democratic idealism and a statement of United States policy toward Latin America:

¹Hans J. Morgenthau, The Impasse of American Foreign Policy (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 7.

For our unfulfilled task is to demonstrate to the entire world that man's unsatisfied aspiration for economic progress and social justice can best be achieved by free men working within a framework of democratic institutions ... If we are to meet a problem so staggering in its dimensions, our approach must be equally bold, an approach consistent with the majestic concept of Operation Pan America. Therefore, I have called on all people of the Hemisphere to join in a new Alliance for Progress—a vast cooperative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people.¹

The Alliance for Progress, the massive United States program for Latin America during the 1960's, represents a glaring example of this failure in American foreign policy. The Alliance for Progress was the embodiment of United States policy toward Latin America during the 1960's. The decisions of the United States officials during the 1960's conflicted with the Alliance for Progress. These conflicts constitute evidence of both the trend and the resulting failure to make the means conform to the ends in policy-making. Through an analysis of the Alliance for Progress and the United States activities in Latin America, one would readily conclude the validity of Hans J. Morgenthau's statement:

Official pronouncements and practice moved farther and farther apart until today the former tend to have hardly any relevance for the latter... Practice has become uninformed by any general principle and reacts without discrimination to the pressures of the hour.²

¹Agency for International Development-U.S. Department of State, President Kennedy Speaks on the Alliance for Progress: Addresses and Remarks-The First Year (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 4-5.

²Morgenthau, Op. Cit., p. 7.

Within the scope of its total history, the general theme of American foreign policy toward Latin America can be expressed in terms of the broad concept of national security.

J. Lloyd Mecham, accordingly, states:

The basic objectives of United States policy-making toward Latin America have been relatively consistent over the years. From the era of Latin American emancipation to the present day, they have reflected constantly the vital necessities of national security... In contrast to the pronounced consistency in the fundamental objectives of United States policy toward Latin America, the means to attain these ends have not always conformed to a uniform pattern.¹

The original proclamation of United States policy toward Latin America was the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine of 1823, a unilateral statement of policy, was originally intended to protect the Western Hemisphere from Western Europe's incursions in order to enhance the security of the United States.² It constituted guidelines for policy which the Washington policy-makers would persistently refer to as constituting the basis for all United States actions within Latin America. The interpretations of the national

¹J. Lloyd Mecham, A Survey of United States-Latin American Relations (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), p. 459.

²Ibid., pp. 38-52. The Monroe Doctrine focused on the geopolitical concerns of United States proximity to Latin America. Accordingly, the view was that the welfare and safety of the United States was based on the maintenance of the independence of all American Republics. The Monroe Doctrine was based on the view that the New World was separated from the Old World by economic, social, and political factors, as well as by geographical factors.

security content in the Monroe Doctrine have been both strategic and economic.¹

The dawning of the twentieth century found American officials making decisions toward Latin America that were distinctly detached from the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine. Yet, the policy-makers referred to the Monroe Doctrine to sanctify their actions. These initial expressions of the national security content within the Monroe Doctrine were economic.² However, the economic expressions of a vigorous trade and investment drive in Latin America were accompanied by United States intervention in Latin American countries. The assertion of the right to intervene in Latin America was based on the rationale of the "right to protect American lives and property in foreign countries", and was rationalized by elaborations of the Monroe Doctrine. The expansionism and the correlative elaborations of the Monroe Doctrine included the Platt Amendment, the Roosevelt Corollary, the Wilsonian adherence to a policy of withholding recognition until regimes have been legitimized through democratic processes, and the Olney Extension. These elaborations of the Monroe Doctrine, coupled with the interventions in Latin America, constituted

¹Edwin Lieuwen, *The United States Policy in Latin America* (New York: Praeger, 1965).

²Ibid. Mecham, Op. Cit., p. 1.

an unfortunate series of actions that greatly distorted the policy proclaimed in the Monroe Doctrine. This imperialism, which characterized early twentieth century policy toward Latin America, caused a rise in the Latin Americans' hostility toward the United States that persisted until the administration of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt ushered in the Good Neighbor era.¹

The 1930's marked the commencement of the Good Neighbor era (non-intervention), a period characterized by: (1) considerable cooperation between the United States and Latin American nations; (2) a decline of American economic protection relative to the products of Latin American countries; and (3) cooperation in the World War II effort against the Axis.² Highly significant to the developments of this era was the restoration of the original meaning of the Monroe Doctrine in Washington policy-making circles. The Clark Memorandum of 1933 was emphatic in its announcement that the Monroe Doctrine did not justify the Roosevelt Corollary. The United States, adhering to the Clark Memorandum, thus, renounced the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of the Latin American nations, and initiated the Pan American-

¹Ibid., pp. 110-130.

²Ibid., pp. 136-155.

ized Monroe Doctrine. This, in essence, was an attempt to establish an inter-American security system, as opposed to the unilateral character of the original announcement in 1823.¹

The emergence of European fascism during the late 1930's constituted a serious external threat which altered the nature of inter-American cooperation. At the Buenos Aires Conference in 1936, President Roosevelt requested the establishment of the inter-American security system. President Roosevelt's request was fulfilled by continuation of hemispheric cooperation during World War II, intensive collaboration in the area of strategic supplies, and overt Latin American activities in support of the Allies.² From this point on, the inter-American System would focus on security.

The American desire to establish an inter-American security system was extended into the post World War II era, and seemed to be fulfilled by the postwar hemispheric cooperation which the Act of Chapultepec, the Rio Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, and the Organization of American States Chart-

¹Ibid., pp. 110-130. (Hereafter referred to as Mecham, U.S.-Latin America Relations); According to Mecham, the key factor in the development of the inter-American system of the Good Neighbor era was the "principle of nonintervention". Secretary of State Hughes took the initial steps in this direction.

²Ibid., pp. 134-155; See also Federico Gil, Latin America-United States Relations (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Janovich, 1971).

er wrought.¹ Just as the appearance of the fascistic external threat during the late thirties caused the establishment of the inter-American security effort, the external threat of international communism sustained the effort during the post World War II era. However, it was during the years that followed World War II that considerable controversy between the United States and the Latin American nations would stem from this prime concern of United States policy-makers.

¹Ibid., pp. 199-208. These actions underscored the effort to maintain an inter-American security system and hemispheric cooperation on strategic matters. The Act of Chapultepec, a defensive military alliance which was proposed at the Chapultepec Conference in 1945, later became a permanent act after World War II. The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, otherwise called the Rio Treaty, was the outcome of the meeting of the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace and Security in 1947. Through this treaty, which created a permanent defense alliance among Latin American nations, the inter-American system was greatly strengthened. The treaty provided for reciprocal assistance in the event of any form of aggression against a member of the alliance. A Governing Board was established to act as a provisional consulting arm in cases of emergencies. The Organization of American States Charter, adopted at the Bogota Conference of 1948, formalized the Latin American association of states and served as its legal basis. Aside from the general machinery of the Organization of American States which provided collective security through the Inter-American Defense Board, the OAS Charter provided for a specialized conference to deal with technical matters and formally expanded the political powers of the Council. The Council serves as the permanent executive body of the OAS; See also Mecham, United States-Latin American Relations, pp. 80-81; Also Julius Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1968), pp. 529-530; Also Milton Eisenhower, "The Historical Roots of the Alliance for Progress", ed. John Dreier, The Alliance for Progress: Problems and Perspectives (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), pp. 6-7.

The postwar era of American foreign policy toward Latin American can be divided into two periods, in which contrasting approaches were designated by the key administrators. The two approaches were: (1) the traditional foreign policy, which spanned the administrations of Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower; and (2) the New Frontier foreign policy, an effort of the Kennedy Administration to change the traditional policy.¹

In September of 1949 Secretary of State Dean Acheson announced the traditional foreign policy toward Latin America. This enunciation was in response to the following demands of Latin American nations: (1) large-scale grants or loans on easy terms; (2) public loans; and (3) assistance in stabilizing the prices of their coffee, metals, and petroleum at profitable levels. The policy stated by Acheson as the foreign policy of the Truman Administration was a mere continuation of the policy which the United States had pursued under President Franklin D. Roosevelt during World War II. The policy was also the same policy that the Eisenhower Administration would later pursue.²

¹J. Lloyd Meham, The United States and the Inter-American Security System, 1889-1960 (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1963); The "New Frontier" policy was not a total abandonment of the traditional policy objectives, but it was a revision, an attempt to consider the significance of emerging revolutionary forces. While the approaches that were announced had nuances of differences, those that were utilized did not.

²Ibid., p. 359; The criticisms that were aimed at Eisenhower and Dulles were similar to those which Truman and Acheson had received.

The United States objectives toward Latin America, under the traditional policy position were:

1. security of the United States and the Hemisphere;
2. the encouragement of democratic representative institutions;
3. positive cooperation in the field of economics;
4. the extension of public loans for projects, only if private capital was not available, and the utilization of public funds merely as a supplement to private capital;
5. the encouragement of increased investment in Latin America, through the negotiation of treaties with Latin American countries providing for the guaranty of investments;
6. the protection of American domestic production by the continued device of tariffs on selected imports; and
7. opposition to the development of a common market in Latin America.¹

At the time of Acheson's announcement of the policy toward Latin America, the Truman Administration appeared oblivious to the realities of Latin America's conditions. The countries of Latin America, like other Third World countries, were experiencing the "revolution of rising aspiration" in the midst of their "end of the war crisis". Typical of Latin American societies were wide economic disparities in which tiny elites prevailed over small middle-classes and the masses

¹Ibid., pp. 359-360; Lieuwen, Op. Cit.

of illiterate have-nots. The Truman Administration tended to ignore this situation, and concentrated on those regions of the world that it considered key targets of communist subversion.¹

President Truman's inaugural address in 1949 included a proposal for a small-scale program of economic development for the less-developed countries, as a part of his broad line of policy. This proposal, later called the Point Four Program, was intended to make the Third World countries bulwarks against the communist threat. The initial program was not intended or declared to be a large-scale capital assistance program. Latin American nations, during this era, complained of American neglect. And even as the United States perspective of the conditions in Latin America changed, the nature of the American foreign assistance program reflected a continuing ignorance or misperception of the needs of Latin American societies.²

As the United States began to consider the threat of communist subversion as existing in Latin America during the 1950's, the following developments occurred:

1. the Mutual Security Act of 1951 was passed;
2. bilateral agreements, pertinent to the Mutual Security Act of 1951, were negotiated for twelve Latin American nations.

¹Ibid.; Milton Eisenhower, "The Historic Roots of the Alliance for Progress", ed. Dreier, Op. Cit., pp. 7-10.

²Mecham, United States and Latin America Relations, p. 190.

The Mutual Security Act of 1951 stressed that "military assistance be furnished to the other American republics... to participate in missions important to the defense of the Hemisphere". Under this act, the prevailing view was that support to the professional military in Latin America was the most effective approach to preventing communist take-overs.¹

United States economic assistance to Latin America increased as a result of these initiatives; yet the economic assistance allocated to the Latin American countries was still small in proportion to the total assistance program of the United States. Furthermore, the bulk of the assistance was in military aid, which bolstered harsh military governments.² An additional factor that reinforced the build up of military governments was the overriding emphasis on short-range security concerns focused on the requisite of a constant supply of strategic raw materials. The Washington policy hierarchy considered the military in Latin America as the vital force for maintaining the stability necessary for assuring continued access to these supplies from Latin America.³

Thus, the perceived threat of a communist take-over

¹Ibid., p. 180; See also Lieuwen, Op. Cit.; The bilateral agreements were military in nature.

²Gil., Op. Cit.

³Lieuwen, Op. Cit.

caused the United States, during the 1950's, to revert to its former position under Franklin D. Roosevelt, "freezing in power any incumbent government", regardless of the regime.¹ The failure of the United States to distinguish between military dictatorships and civilian democracies in the administration of its economic assistance program gave impetus to the already rising Latin American animosity.

The Eisenhower Administration's approach was characterized by continued adherence to the traditional policy toward Latin America that had persisted during the Truman Administration. When John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, announced a "New Look", Walter Lippman was quick to point out that the "New Look" was, in reality, the traditional policy as espoused by Acheson.²

Simultaneously, the American foreign assistance program failed to address the conditions of gross inequities in the Latin American economies. The failure to address this problem and the American tendency to support military regimes caused persistent Latin American resentment of the United States. In the face of the "revolution of rising aspirations",

¹Ibid.

²Norman Graebner, An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961); See also Thurston B. Morton (Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations) "Our Foreign Policy in Today's World", U.S. Department of State Bulletin v. 30, February 8, 1954, p. 361.

a new force of Latin American intellectuals began to lead the discontented masses. They focused their criticisms on the American private capital investments, which they claimed helped to strengthen the oppressive systems and helped to perpetuate the injustices in Latin America.¹

According to John Dreier, the awareness of inequality and injustices appeared as a new phenomenon in Latin America. It converged with and accelerated the multiple array of forces that demanded change and would lead to the Alliance for Progress proclamation.²

The United States was concerned with the stability of Latin American regimes and intent on ensuring that the communist movement should not gain a foothold in the inter-American system. The states of Latin America were concerned with their own economic growth and could not see why the United States, as it set up programs of economic assistance elsewhere in the world to check communism, should not meet the needs for economic improvement in Latin America. Policy, negotiations, agreements, program, and action gravitated between these poles of interests.³

The priority of Latin Americans was cooperation in socio-economic and health areas. Latin Americans tended to view the communist threat as an internal threat that might

¹Milton Eisenhower, "The Historic Roots of the Alliance for Progress, ed. Dreier, Op. Cit., p. 11.

²Ibid.

³Morton A. Kaplan et al., United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1955 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1956).

easily be eliminated by changing those conditions that cause a population to be discontented.¹ The events in Guatamala² had alerted the Eisenhower Administration to the existence of tremendous Latin American resentment of the United States in 1954. As early as 1953, the Eisenhower Report had stressed the need for a reappraisal of United States policy toward Latin America. Yet, the first indications of a possible reappraisal would await the anti-Nixon demonstrations in Latin America in 1958.³

The hostile reception of Vice-President Nixon, which followed the failure to reach agreement at the Buenos Aires Conference of 1957, called President Eisenhower's attention to the dimensions of the problems. His reaction to these demonstrations was slow. Even following the anti-Nixon demonstrations, the Eisenhower Administration received the 1958 Operation Pan America proposal of Brazil's President Kubitschek with considerable skepticism.⁴ Ultimately, the

¹Pratt, Op. Cit.

²Gil, Op. Cit.; The United States made efforts to unseat the leftist government of Col. Arbenz and supported the corrupt government of Castillo Armas in Guatamala. The Castillo Armas government, despite the U.S. economic assistance, proved unstable, and the U.S. efforts there caused considerable resentment toward the United States.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

full awareness of the enormous dimensions of Latin American resentment of the United States, which dawned upon the Eisenhower Administration near its termination, was brought about by the threat of Castro to export the Cuban Revolution to other Latin American countries. The effort to reappraise United States foreign policy toward Latin America, aside from the establishment of the Inter-American Development Bank and the Inter-American Social Development Fund in 1960, remained the major responsibility of the incoming administration of John Fitzgerald Kennedy.¹

In 1961 John Fitzgerald Kennedy became the President of the United States. The Kennedy Administration immediately undertook the appraisal of the United States foreign policy from the perspective of the "New Frontier" policy stance. The "New Frontier" policy stance, which was the revision of the traditional policy approach, incorporated the following tenets in the United States relationship with Latin America:

1. the extension of public loans;
2. movement toward free trade; and
3. stabilization of prices of the chief exports of Latin American countries.²

¹Dreier, Op. Cit.; Lieuwen, Op. Cit.; Mecham, United States and Latin American Relations; The establishment of the Inter-American Development Bank reflected a change in U.S. policy. Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onis, The Alliance That Lost Its Way: A Critical Report on the Alliance for Progress (Chicago, Illinois: Quadrangle Books, 1970); Greater changes in foreign policy style came with John F. Kennedy.

²Mecham, Ibid.; Lieuwen, Op. Cit.; Victor Alba, Alliance Without Allies (New York: Praeger, 1965).

The reappraisal took the form of the Alliance for Progress program. The Alliance for Progress was an effort to place the international environment of the 1960's within the spectrum of liberal analysis and to treat the causes of Latin American discontent. The tendency to capsule all existing international forces under communism was temporarily replaced by a tendency to recognize that the forces of nationalism, populism, neutralism, and the "revolution of rising aspirations" were a part of a general desire for a social revolution within the indigenous societies. Under the Alliance, the view was that the social revolution had already been set in motion and that the United States might channel the revolution toward peaceful change.¹

The broad objectives of the Alliance for Progress are stated in Title I of the Charter of Punta del Este. They clarify the United States commitment to assist in the cooperative effort of the Latin American peoples to achieve economic, social, and political development.

It is the purpose of the Alliance for Progress to enlist the full energies of the peoples and governments of the American republics in a great cooperative effort to accelerate the economic and social development of the participating countries of Latin America, so that they may achieve maximum levels of

¹Simon Hansen, Five Years of the Alliance for Progress (Washington D.C.: Inter-American Affairs Press, 1967); Morgenthau, Op. Cit.; Levinson and de Onis, Op. Cit.; Under the Alliance for Progress, the U.S. hoped to protect the process of peaceful revolution from Castro inspired disruption.

well-being, with equal opportunities for all, in democratic societies adapted to their own needs and desires.¹

Considerable controversy would follow attempts to implement the democratic idealism so characteristically included in this enormous program. The initiative to move toward this democratic idealism was evident in the proclamation and the financial commitment. But unfortunately, the Kennedy men almost immediately saw their efforts in shambles.² Shortly after the Alliance for Progress was proclaimed, its promise to support democratic regimes was mocked by the build up of authoritarian military regimes and the lack of financial aid supplied to the more democratic regimes of Latin America. The promise to support social development and reform seemed to be revealed as mere rhetoric as Washington policy-makers supported the downfall of reformist regimes.³ The promise to support economic development was flayed by a commitment to techno-military and political-security concerns and the neglect of socio-economic priorities of Latin American peoples.

Scholars of American foreign policy agree on the failure of the Alliance for Progress, despite their recognition

¹Organization of American States Official Records OEA/Ser. H/X.I ES-RE-Document 105 (Washington D.C.: Pan American Union, 1962).

²Christopher Mitchell, "Dominance and Fragmentation", in Julio Cotler and Richard Fagen, eds., Latin American and the United States (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1974).

³See Chapter IV for discussion of the United States support of unconstitutional regimes.

of its sporadic achievements.¹ While many scholars and officials have decried the idealistic basis of the Alliance for Progress, this dissertation is based on the view that the ideals contained in the objectives were rationally deliberated, laudable, and were conceived by the Kennedy men as a sincere effort to solve Latin American problems. Covey T. Oliver has stated:

We of this Hemisphere who work with optimism and energy to achieve the goals of the Alliance for Progress should never be ashamed of being idealistic, for idealism is essential to the attainment of great goals. The objectives of the Alliance do indeed represent a shining ideal worthy of dedication of governments and millions of individuals who can both contribute and benefit ... Thus, these objectives are the ideal, the genuine desire giving direction to our foreign policy... We have but to believe that it can be done and to keep our ideals clearly in focus, as we set about doing what we can with determination, step by step, day by day.²

The failure of American officials to make decisions that would implement these stated commitments, and the taking of overt actions that impede the achievement of these ideals caused a general erosion of confidence in the United States proclamations (as we have noted). This is a detriment to the United States interests. The decisions made by Washington policy-makers in contradistinction to the Alliance for Progress

¹Mecham, United States and Latin American Relations, Op. Cit.

²Covey T. Oliver, "The Alliance for Progress Moves On", ed. Richard Gray, Latin America and the United States in the 1970's (Itasca, Illinois: Peacock Publishers, 1971).

may be seen as points of erosion which led to its ultimate demise. The contradictory decisions were prevalent in American policy toward all participating Latin American countries. However, this analysis will focus on the decisions toward Brazil during the period 1960 through 1968, which constituted the major initiative under the Alliance for Progress. Brazil, the largest and most populous country in Latin America, had for sometime considered itself as potentially the most powerful entity in the continent.¹ The United States officials tended to view Brazil as having the power potential to control the continent, either to the benefit or to the detriment of the United States. Consequently, Brazil received the greatest portion of the United States financial commitment under the Alliance for Progress. Yet, ironically, subsequent developments in Brazil identified Brazil as one of the most flagrant cases in which the United States, during the 1960's,

¹Donald Worcester, Brazil, From Colony to World Power (New York: Scribner, 1973); See also Charles Wagley, An Introduction to Brazil (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963); Adolf A. Berle, Latin America-Diplomacy and Reality (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 19; According to Berle Brazil would "go forth". Berle described the Brazilian economy as not unlike that of the United States in 1900. He foresaw a Brazilian boom for the 1970's. The boom, which he based on preconditions of government stability, fiscal responsibility, and socially conscious administration, would propel the Brazilian economy to the economic level of the Western European countries; Lincoln Gordon, A New Deal for Latin America: The Alliance for Progress (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963); Ambassador Gordon considered Brazil a potential power in the Western Hemisphere.

bolstered the development of a political system and societal basis that contrasted with the ideal model depicted in the Alliance for Progress.¹

In April of 1964, immediately following the military coup d'etat in Brazil which removed the constitutional government of Joao Goulart, President Lyndon B. Johnson sent a message to acting President Raneiri Mazzilli which expressed his "admiration for the resolute will of the Brazilian community to resolve their difficulties through constitutional government".² Also in April of 1964, Secretary of State Rusk praised the Brazilian coup d'etat of 1964 as "an expression of support for constitutional government".³ These statements constituted more than a tacit recognition of the Brazilian military regime. As subsequent events in the political milieu of Brazil revealed, the United States sancti-

¹Ronald M. Schneider, The Political System of Brazil: The Emergence of a Modernizing Authoritarian Regime (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971); Schneider describes Brazil as a highly authoritarian regime; See also Joao Quartim, Dictatorship and Armed Struggle in Brazil (London, England: N.L.B., 1971).

²Peter Bell, "Brazilian-American Relations", ed. Riordan Roett, Brazil in the Sixties (Nashville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press, 1972); See also "Message from President of the United States (Johnson) To Acting President of Brazil (Mazzilli)", American Foreign Policy: Current Documents 1964, April 2, 1964, p. 378.

³"U.S. Views on the Coup d'Etat in Brazil: Replies Made by Secretary of State (Rusk) to Questions Asked at a News Conference on April 3, 1964", American Foreign Policy: Current Documents 1964, April 3, 1964, p. 378.

fication of the military government in Brazil demonstrated the continuing trend of duplicity in American foreign policy. Although the Alliance for Progress was hypothetically intended to end the military interventions and military incursions that were so characteristic of Latin American politics during the 1950's, the Brazilian military (which became increasingly repressive and persistent in retaining the reins of government) was greatly encouraged by the Washington policy-makers.¹

Under the military government which was established in 1964, Brazil has made tremendous progress in her industrialization drive. Despite continuing problems of inflation and the effects of the energy crisis, the economy is now highly developed in selected sectors.² For almost two decades, Brazil had focused upon the problem of promoting its exports of manufactures. Once the military had replaced the elected democratic government in 1964, these efforts were successful.³ Unfortunately, the success in the drive for industrialization

¹Schneider, Op. Cit.; Schneider discussed the immediate authoritarian trend of the Brazilian military government; See also Thomas Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964: An Experiment in Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967); In Chapter IV of this dissertation, the author discusses the nature of the military regime and the United States strategic actors' encouragement of the military regime. By extending recognition to the Brazilian military government, President Lyndon B. Johnson encouraged it.

²Steven M. Arnold, "Export Promotion in an Authoritarian Regime: The Politics of the Brazilian Miracle," ed. S. Raichur et al. The Politics of Aid, Trade, and Investment (New York: Sage Publications, 1971).

³Ibid.

and export promotion has not been accompanied by success in social and political development.¹ On the contrary, the military government of Brazil is now among the most oppressive forces in Latin America.² This reflects modernization as a main thrust, and the virtual ignoring of political, social, and economic development.³

Recognizing that, due to inherent obstacles and limitations, perfect rationality is impossible, this inquiry is not intended to condemn those men whose judgments appear less than rational, in the light of more recent knowledge, data, and insights. By recognizing and analyzing variables that have thwarted rational judgments, we can provide the basis for a more enlightened and rational decision-making process for the future.

This inquiry into the causes of the failure to implement the Alliance for Progress goals must begin with the selection of an appropriate theoretical tool. Currently, four distinct approaches to the analysis of foreign policy

¹See Chapter IV of this dissertation for a detailed discussion of the successful industrialization of Brazil and the continuous problems of authoritarian and repressive government and economic and social dualism; See also H. Jon Rosenbaum and William Tyler, Contemporary Brazil: Issues in Economic and Political Development (New York: Praeger, 1972).

²Quartim, *Op. Cit.*; Also see Alfred Stepan, ed., Authoritarian Brazil (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1972).

³Brady Tyson, "The Emerging Role of the Military as National Modernizers in Latin America", ed. David Pollock and

decision-making are recognized (aside from the Richard Snyder model): (1) the rational actor approach; (2) the organization process model; (3) the bureaucratic politics model; and (4) the group dynamics approach.¹

The rational actor approach of Hans J. Morgenthau, Arnold Wolfers, and Raymond Aron, assumes that government is the rational and unitary actor. This approach visualizes the actor as goal-oriented.² The organization process model of Herbert Simon and James March assumes that government action is an organizational output, that the actions of government are those of the semi-autonomous organizations that make up the government, and emphasizes the factors that limit rationality in decision-making.³ The bureaucratic politics model of Graham T. Allison, Charles Lindblom, and

Arch R. Ritter, Latin American Prospects for the 1970's: What Kinds of Revolutions? (New York: Praeger, 1973); See also Helio Jaguaribe, Economic and Political Development: A Theoretical Approach and a Brazilian Case Study (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968); Celso Furtado, Diagnosis of the Brazilian Crisis (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1965); H. Jon Rosenbaum and William Tyler, Op. Cit.

¹Graham T. Allison, The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown, and Co., 1971).

²Ibid.; See Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Knopf, 1973); Arnold Wolfers, "The Actors in International Politics," ed. William Fox, Theoretical Aspects of International Relations (Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame, 1959).

³Allison, Op. Cit.; See James March and Herbert Simon, Organizations (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958); James March ed., Handbook of Organizations (Chicago, Illinois: Rand

Richard D. Neustadt rejects the notion of a unitary actor and focuses on the "intrusions of the game of domestic politics into the competitive game of international relations".¹ The group dynamics approach of Irving Janis assumes that members of policy-making groups are subjected to pressures widely observed in groups of ordinary citizens, that individuals in the group tend to develop informal goals to preserve cordial intra-group relations, and that this is a part of the hidden agenda to their meeting.²

Abraham Lowenthal has suggested that Graham T. Allison's bureaucratic politics model is useful for analyzing United States policy toward Latin American countries during

McNally, 1965); Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision-making (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1962); Snyder incorporates some aspects of organization theory in his decision-making approach; Roberts Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: War and Decision (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1962); Wohlstetter also incorporates aspects of organizational theory in her work.

¹Allison, Op. Cit.; See David Braybrooke and Charles Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1963); Charles E. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy (New York: Free Press, 1965); Richard D. Neustadt, Alliance Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).

²Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1972).

the era of the Alliance for Progress.¹ According to the bureaucratic politics model, decision-making is a game of politics in which bargaining takes place along regularized circuits among players within the government. The significant components in the decision-making process are:

1. diverse goals and values that demand reconciliation as a prerequisite for reaching decisions;
2. the competitive groups that exist within the key concentric circle and identify with alternative goals and policies.²

The fundamental assumptions of this model are:

1. multiple actors, as opposed to the unitary actor;
2. the tendency for actors to focus on many diverse intra-

¹Abraham Lowenthal, "Liberal, Radical, and Bureaucratic Perspectives on United States Latin American Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Retrospect", ed. Cotler and Fagen, Op. Cit.; Most analyses of U.S. policy toward Latin America are based on the rational actor approach (viz. Riordan Roett's The Politics of Foreign Aid in the Brazilian Northeast and Joseph Page's The Revolution That Never Was; According to Lowenthal, analyses of the U.S. policy toward Latin America during the 1960's that are based on the rational actor approach have the underlying erroneous assumption that the Alliance for Progress constituted a coherent group of policies which a central apparatus had generated. Other critiques of the rational actor approach include that of Raymond Aron and James Rosenau; James Rosenau ed. International Politics and Foreign Policy (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1961); Rosenau's critiques focused on the overly simplistic and organismic nature of the rational actor approach; Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (New York: Doubleday, 1966); Aron's critique of the rational actor approach focused on the assumption of a single goal. He argued that it is more realistic to assume the governments pursue many goals.

²Allison, Op. Cit.

national problems, as opposed to one single strategic issue;

3. the tendency for actors to act in accordance with various conceptions of national, organizational, and personal goals, as opposed to a consistent set of strategic objectives;
4. the tendency for actors to make decisions on the basis of politics, as opposed to rational choice; and
5. the tendency for the decisions and actions to contrast with or differ from the intentions of the strategic actors.¹

Roger Hilsman, concurring with the basic assumptions of the bureaucratic politics model, has indicated that the very nature of American foreign policy-making is political, a characteristic which ultimately leads to distortion.

These are some of the facets of policy-making and the decisions that move nations--separate institutions sharing power, the press, experts, and others who influence policy without holding formal power, selfish and unselfish interest groups that exert a different kind of power, the difficulties and complexities of analysis, prediction, and judgment... Policy faces inward as much as outward, seeking to reconcile conflicting goals, to adjust aspirations to available means, and to accommodate the different advocates of these competing goals and aspirations to one another. It is here that the essence of policy-making seems to lie in a process that is in its deepest sense political.²

¹Ibid.

²Roger Hilsman, The Politics of Policy-making in Defense and Foreign Affairs (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).

The very nature of the foreign policy-making process in the United States is political, and the politics surrounding it operates in a society of multiple and competing elites, with individuals placed in strategic positions. Decisions are, then, the end result of this bargaining process.¹

The bureaucratic politics paradigm is the fundamental model that is utilized in this dissertation. The assumption that "government is neither a unitary actor nor an aggregation of organizations, but an arena of competition among individuals that are strategically placed and possess their respective individual perceptions and interests" is fundamental to this analysis. Accordingly, the Alliance for Progress, as the embodiment of genuine commitments, represents the consensus of the hand-picked authors. The authors of the Alliance for Progress were the Kennedy men, individuals who had personal stakes in promoting democracy and social reform.²

The decisions and actions of the strategic actors that are considered within the framework of this paradigm are:

1. the United States decision to prepare to intervene, if necessary, in support of the Brazilian military in the

¹Ibid.

²Allison, Op. Cit.; Lowenthal, Op.Cit.; Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onis, The Alliance That Lost Its Way: A Critical Report on the Alliance for Progress (Chicago, Illinois: Quadrangle Books, 1970).

- 1964 coup d'etat;
2. the United States immediate recognition of the Brazilian military government in 1964;
 3. the Mann Doctrine; and
 4. the decision to greatly increase the United States foreign assistance (economic) to Brazil under the military regime, as opposed to the reformist regime of the Goulart era.

Brazil's alignment with the United States was the ultimate goal for all participants. In pursuit of this goal, the cast was dichotomized. Kennedy men opposed career men in the struggle to see their policy alternative, the Alliance for Progress, adopted as the means of achieving the ultimate goal. In essence, while the recognized goal of both groups of actors was to retain Brazil's alignment with the United States, the preferred approaches were in opposition. Kennedy men vied against the career men in order to preserve Brazil's alignment through the approach of extending assistance for the socio-economic development of the poverty-stricken regions of Brazil. Career men vied against the Kennedy men in order to preserve Brazil's alignment with the United States through the containment of radical forces in order to preserve a political environment that was favorable toward United States private investments.¹ Definitions and

¹Interview with Jerome I. Levinson, September, 1979. Jerome I. Levinson, Chief of Capital Development in Brazil

identifications of these groups of strategic actors, along with their designated prerogatives and stakes, will be pinpointed in more detail within the following paradigm.

First of all, the arena in which the strategic actors bargained for their policy options must be depicted. The broader arena in which actors bargained for their policy options (which related to the Alliance for Progress) lacked a formal organization. According to Jerome I. Levinson, there was no formal organization charged with the responsibility of implementing the goals of the Alliance for Progress. Rather, several agencies and institutions combined to form the instrument through which the Alliance for Progress program

during the 1960's, designated the dichotomy of strategic actors relative to the Alliance for Progress proclamation. According to Levinson, the dichotomy existed between Kennedy men, who were the authors and supporters of the Alliance for Progress, and the career men, who opposed the Alliance for Progress's idealistic goals.

Interview with Niles Bond, December 30, 1976. Niles Bond, Charge d'Affaires at the United States Embassy in Brazil at the beginning of the Kennedy Administration and Consul General in Sao Paulo from 1964 to 1969, verified this categorization of the strategic actors, but failed to give an extensive account of the varied approaches.

Interview with Robert Ballantyne, April 30, 1976. Robert Ballantyne, Deputy Director of Brazilian Affairs during the 1960's, also verified the dichotomy between the Kennedy men and the career men.

Interview with Joseph Page, June 21, 1979. Joseph Page, Professor of Law at Georgetown Law Center and author of The Revolution that Never Was, also discussed the dichotomy, but failed to give an extensive account of the varied approaches.

Levinson and de Onis, Op. Cit.

would be administered.¹ This instrument included:

1. the Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress;
2. the Latin American Bureau of the Agency for International Development; and
3. the Latin American Bureau of the United States Department of State.²

The Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress was a hybrid, neither fully a part of the Agency of International Development nor fully a part of the State Department. The question is what were the lines of authority between the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and the Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress? The lines of authority were not clear. There was conflict because of this gray area. Teodoro Moscoso, as coordinator, had more of a White House connection than did the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.³

According to Levinson, the Committee of Nine, a group of experts whose duty was to evaluate long-term development programs for Latin American countries and make recommendations, met for only about a year and a half. The Committee of Nine never really worked, because the United States dealt bilaterally with Latin American countries.⁴ In addition to

¹Interview with Jerome Levinson, September 1979; Levinson and Juan de Onis, *Ibid.*

²Interview with Jerome I. Levinson, September 1979; See Levinson and de Onis, *Op. Cit.*; Harvey S. Perloff, The Alliance for Progress: A Social Invention in the Making (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969).

³*Ibid.*, Levinson and de Onis, *Op. Cit.*

⁴Interview with Jerome I. Levinson, September, 1979; Perloff, *Op. Cit.*; Levinson and de Onis, *Op. Cit.*

the Committee of Nine, which later became CIAP, there was the Developmental Loan Committee. This Committee, otherwise called the Capital Assistance Executive Committee, was the vehicle within the United States government through which loans were reviewed and conditions for loans were considered, and through which United States policy toward Latin American countries was really coordinated. The duration of this committee was also very brief.¹

Secondly, the players must be identified and associated with their respective positions. The players considered in this dissertation are strategic actors (individuals) within governmental organizations who had an interest in Brazil, but were subject to various institutional perspectives.² The key players were:

1. John Fitzgerald Kennedy, President of the United States;
2. Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States;
3. William T. Dentzer, Jr., Special Assistant, Agency for International Development;
4. Ralph Anthony Dungan, Special Assistant to the President of the United States;
5. Jerome I. Levinson, Financial Officer, The Agency for

¹Interview with Jerome I. Levinson, September, 1979; Levinson and de Onis, Op. Cit.; Perloff, Op. Cit.

²Allison, Op. Cit.; Lowenthal, Op. Cit.

- International Development, and Director of Capital Development in Brazil, The Agency for International Development;
6. Lincoln Gordon, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Brazil;
 7. Teodoro Moscoso, Assistant Administrator for the Latin American Regional Bureau, Agency for International Development, and United States Coordinator, Alliance for Progress;
 8. William D. Rogers, Special Counsel for the Alliance for Progress;
 9. Jack B. Kubisch, Director, Agency for International Development Office in Rio de Janeiro, with personal rank of minister;
 10. Donor Lion, Director of Agency for International Development Mission in Recife;
 11. Thomas C. Mann, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs;
 12. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State;
 13. George McGovern, Food for Peace; and
 14. Col. Vernon Walters, United States Military Attache.¹

¹Other strategic actors served on Kennedy's Latin American Task Force. They are listed in the footnotes on page 34 as Kennedy men, and are characterized in Chapter III.

Interview with Jerome Levinson; Levinson and de Onis, Op. Cit.; United States Department of State, Biographic Register (1960-1968) (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office) United States Department of State, Foreign Service List (1960-1968) (Washington, D.C.: United States Government

All players perceived the United States as having a stake in Brazil. The consensus was that Brazil was important because of its size, location, resources, and its ability to influence other Latin American nations.¹

Thirdly, the various players' assumptions about the nature of Northeast Brazil's problem must be pinpointed. While the consensus of the players (in all government organizations) was that Brazil was an influential and important country in Latin America and should be the prime target under the Alliance for Progress, there was never a consensus about the nature of the Northeast problem or how the United States' interests should be pursued in Brazil.²

The players, as noted previously, were dichotomized over approaches to achieving the goal of Brazilian alignment with the United States. One group of players followed the outline of the New Frontier approach that was written into the Alliance for Progress. This group of players consisted largely of political appointees under John Fitzgerald Kennedy.

Printing Office); Peter Bell, "Brazilian-American Relations", in Riordan Roett, ed., Brazil in the Sixties (Nashville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press, 1972).

¹Interview with Jerome Levinson, September, 1979.

²Lowenthal, Op. Cit.; Allison, Op. Cit.
Interview with Jerome Levinson, September, 1979.
Interview with Donor Lion, July, 1977.

They focused their attention on the poverty stricken Northeastern region of Brazil. These players, called Kennedy men, were interested in pursuing their goal of ensuring Brazil's alignment with the United States by focusing on efforts to assist in socio-economic development of the Northeast through the extension of public capital flows into the Northeast and by encouraging land reform. Specifically, these players included William T. Dentzer, Jerome I. Levinson, Lincoln Gordon, William D. Rogers, and Donor Lion.¹

On the other hand, an opposition group of players existed in the State Department. Among this group of players were Dean Rusk and Thomas C. Mann. These men (in conjunction with the Department of Treasury) preferred the traditional political approach. They assumed that it was not in our interest to pursue the radical economic and social reforms envisioned in the Alliance for Progress. These men, called career men, pursued their interests by trying to create a stable political climate that would be friendly toward United

¹Kennedy men also included Adolf Berle, Robert Alexander, Theodore Sorenson, Richard Goodwin, Arthur Whitaker, Robert Kennedy, Teodoro Moscoso, and David Bronheim; See Levinson and de Onis, Op. Cit.

Interview with Niles Bond, December 30, 1976.

Interview with Robert Ballantyne, April 30, 1976.

Biographic Register, Op. Cit.; Foreign Service List, Op. Cit.

States investments. As traditionalists, they were skeptical of the goal of socio-economic and political development along democratic lines, and they preferred the use of private American capital investment in the development of Brazil.¹

The fourth task in developing the framework for this dissertation is to associate the players with the government agencies involved. The assumptions of the Kennedy men that the United States interests lay in the pursuit of the socio-economic development of the Northeast coincided with the Agency for International Development's mission to assist the Latin American countries in socio-economic and political development along democratic lines. The assumptions of the career men that the United States interest in Brazil was mainly political coincided with the State Department's mission of ensuring stability.²

The fifth task, in developing the paradigm for this dissertation, is to indicate the mechanism that existed to ensure that the perspective of the President and the White House Staff would be shared by State Department and the Agency for International Development officials in Rio and Recife.

¹Interview with Jerome I. Levinson, September, 1979.
Interview with Robert Ballantyne, April 30, 1976.
Interview with Niles Bond, December 30, 1976.

²Allison, Op. Cit.; Lowenthal, Op. Cit.;
Interview with Jerome Levinson, September, 1979.

The primary mechanism by which the President ensured that the State Department and Agency for International Development officials in Rio and Recife would share his perspective was by appointing key officials who were interested in Brazil, and who appeared favorable toward the approach of pursuing the goals of socio-economic development and political development along democratic lines.¹

The sixth task in developing the framework for this dissertation is to designate, roughly, the period of time that the varying interests were pursued. In designating the period of time that the varying interests were pursued, the groups of players, their positions, and their approaches must, again be categorized, and power changes and political pressures must be pinpointed.²

Allison, in considering the styles of play, indicates that changes in administration are significant as determinants of the behavior of bureaucratic careerists.³ Under the bureaucratic politics model, the assumptions are that bureaucratic careerists adopt codes of conformity to survive the

¹Interview with Levinson, September, 1979; Allison, Op. Cit.; Lowenthal, Op. Cit.

²Ibid.; Allison, Op. Cit.

³Allison, Op. Cit.

inevitable changes of administration and personnel, and that the president is a super power among actors.¹ These assumptions are significant in describing the time frames of power plays under the administrations involved in the game.

The Kennedy men gained entrance into the pockets of power through the election of President Kennedy in 1960. They were Kennedy's handpicked advisors and foreign officers whom Kennedy chose because they seemed interested in his resolve to assist in the socio-economic and political development of the Latin American countries.² They were usually appointed by Kennedy to positions in the newly established Agency for International Development. The period of time in which they were able to pursue their goals was from the initiation of the Alliance for Progress up to the Kennedy assassination and the Lyndon B. Johnson presidency in late 1963.³

¹Ibid.

²Levinson and de Onis, Op. Cit.

Interview with Jerome I. Levinson, September, 1979. According to Levinson, since the Kennedy Administration assigned high priority to the Alliance, the Latin American Bureau began to attract highly motivated FSO's and outside talent who had shunned Latin American affairs during the Eisenhower Administration. Donor Lion represented this category, and because of his emphasis on socio-economic development, we label him a Kennedy man.

Interview with Donor Lion, April 30, 1976 and July 21, 1977. Donor Lion stressed that his views on development in Brazil were similar to those of Lincoln Gordon.

³Levinson and de Onis, Op. Cit.;

Interview with Jerome Levinson, September, 1979; Christopher Mitchell, Op. Cit.

During the period which preceded the Kennedy assassination, there were instances in which the Kennedy initiative and the Kennedy men seemed to wane and waver in their efforts. One case in point is the decision to use impact aid in the Northeast as opposed to developmental aid.¹ But in most instances, Kennedy tried to maintain good relations with the reformist regime by pursuing socio-economic and political development along democratic lines.² The Kennedy men lost their power when Lyndon B. Johnson came to power and reorganized the power hierarchy for Latin American affairs.

As indicated previously, the career men were traditionalists in their positions on United States policy toward Latin America. Theirs was the position of utilizing private American investment in the effort to assist in the development of Brazil and of ensuring a secure political and economic environment for United States investments.³ While the

¹Riordan Roett describes this as the direct result of political pressures to see quick results in the Alliance for Progress Program. See Riordan Roett, The Politics of Foreign Aid in the Brazilian Northeast (Nashville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press, 1972).

²Kennedy's actions and decisions were not always positive in the pursuit of Alliance goals. However, aside from gross errors in Cuba and Guyana, he tended to be self-correcting. Especially in Brazil, Kennedy tried to maintain good relations with the reformist government (Goulart regime), while being confronted with xenophobic nationalism.

³Interview with Jerome Levinson, September, 1979.

first years of the Alliance for Progress saw the career men considerably weakened by the Kennedy thrust, four factors afforded the career men the opportunity to regain power. They were:

1. the Brazilian structural crisis and the appearance of radical elements in positions of power;
2. the assassination of John Fitzgerald Kennedy;
3. the rise of Lyndon B. Johnson to the presidency;
4. the appointment of Thomas C. Mann to the post of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs;
and
5. the elevation, by Lyndon B. Johnson, of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs to the most powerful post in the hierarchy for considering United States policy toward Latin American countries.¹

Once the Brazilian structural crisis appeared, exposing the apparent degree of radicalization that was occurring in the Brazilian government, the career men were joined by businessmen who sought the protection of their investments and by congressmen who sought likewise to protect United States private investments. Both groups also saw the radicalization in Brazil as a trend toward communism, and there-

¹Mitchell, Op. Cit.; Phyllis Parker, Brazil and the Quiet Intervention (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1979).

fore, a threat to national security. Hence, the career men's desire to protect private investments converged with the desire to prevent radicalization and thereby defend the nation's security. The convergence of these two ideals occurred simultaneously with the rise of Lyndon B. Johnson to power as President. Lyndon B. Johnson, seeking to attain a favorable investment and political environment in Brazil, appointed Thomas C. Mann, a career diplomat, as the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and elevated the position to the most powerful post in inter-American affairs, within the United States.

Thomas C. Mann, a noted cold warrior, brought, through the Mann Doctrine, the renewed concept of containment of radical forces in Latin America. His doctrine stressed the utility of the military in preventing the trend toward communism.¹ This was the logical conclusion of the career men's alternative. Its ramifications were seen through the United States decision to prepare to intervene in the Brazilian military coup d'etat of 1964, if necessary, and in the United States decision to immediately recognize the Brazilian military government.

The Brazilian military government began to serve the interests of the career men and their coalition of interests.

¹Levinson and de Onis, Op. Cit.;
Interview with Jerome Levinson, September, 1979;
Mitchell, Op. Cit.

In essence, the career men had taken the reins of power in the American foreign policy-making amalgam, and were successful in implementing their own approach, which conflicted with the Alliance for Progress. The military government in Brazil took on the task that the State Department had long desired for some organizational entity, that of preserving a favorable climate for United States investments and the containment of radical forces in Brazil.

The determination of factors that were causal in the failure to implement the Alliance for Progress goals requires knowledge of the environment. Although the fundamental instrument for this dissertation is the bureaucratic politics model, the epistemology becomes somewhat eclectic in that the decision-making theories of Richard Snyder and Joseph Frankel are utilized. Also the ideas of Morgenthau come into play. Frankel and Snyder differ in their viewpoints as to how the environment must be treated in a decision-making inquiry. Snyder has indicated a preference for considering only the perceived environment. On the other hand, Frankel argues that the objective environment must be taken into account.¹

¹Richard C. Snyder, "Decision-making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics", eds. Richard C. Snyder, Burton Sapin, and H.W. Bruck, Foreign Policy Decision-making (New York: The Free Press, 1963), p. 65; Joseph Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision-making (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963); Harold and Margaret Sprout, Foundations of International Behavior (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1962); Frankel's decision to consider both the perceived environment and the objective environment is an acceptance of the Sprouts thesis that a

I have included, as facets of this inquiry, both the objective and the perceived environment. Allison indicates that games are not played under conditions of perfect information, and that considerable misperception is a standard part of the functioning of each government.¹ Hans J. Morgenthau has designated the misperception of the international system in the 1960's as a leading cause of the failure in American foreign policy. In characterizing this misperception, he utilizes the concomitant of a description of the objective environment.²

Morgenthau, thus, characterizes the objective environment of the international system as far more complex than that of the tight bipolar system of the late 1940's, in which the major phenomenon appeared to be the international communist force in Europe. Accordingly, he describes the international environment of the late 1950's as the composite of

distinction must be drawn between the psychological environment and the operational environment since the two might be quite different; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 312-333.

¹Allison, *Op. Cit.*

²Morgenthau, The Impasse of American Foreign Policy; See also John G. Stoessinger, Nations in Darkness: China, Russia, and America (New York: Random House, 1978), pp. 3-5; Stoessinger alludes to the fact that under certain conditions the strategic actors in international politics respond to the fictions that they themselves have created rather than responding to realities. Yet, according to Stoessinger, the tendency to ignore the relevance of objective reality can be disastrous.

many international social forces and indigenous forces. He proceeds to enumerate these multiple forces, "the revolution of rising aspirations", nationalism, and the changing force of communism. (His thesis on misperception is discussed, along with the application of remedies, in more detail, at the end of the designation of this model).¹

Problems of misperception cannot be clarified if the objective picture is missing. Thus, concurring with Frankel and Morgenthau, I have designated as the seventh task, the explanation of the operative situation or the objective environment, which the American strategic actors perceived and to which they responded. The following aspects of the Brazilian environment are put forth as relevant phenomena during the early 1960's:

1. the Brazilian economy, society, and political scene;
2. the Brazilian political ethos and prominent social forces (nationalism, populism, and communism); and
3. the foreign policy of the reformist government.

Aside from the arena of American foreign policy-making that has already been described within this paradigm, the American situation is described briefly, in terms of economic

¹Ibid.; See also Stoessinger, Op. Cit., p. 154; Stoessinger notes that by 1949 the cold war had become a tug of war between two competing theologies. Within this competition, the role of perception was central. These perceptions persisted long after the communist monolithic arrangement had become polycentric.

situations and political conditions.

The eighth task is to designate the constraints of the game. Dual factors act as constraints on the types of decisions that are made by the strategic actors. These factors are:

1. the parameters of the game; and
2. the action-channels of the game.¹

The parameters of the game are the shared values and images of the participants of the game.² As a whole, the strategic actors share definite values and images which make them tend to conform in their decision-making, despite their political opposition.

The American ideology is the fundamental composite of the shared values and partial-determinants of the images of the participants of the game, and is therefore, examined in this inquiry.³ Dominant themes in the American ideology constitute these shared values and images, and may be referred to as parameters, since they determine the boundaries within

¹Allison, Op. Cit.; Lowenthal, Op. Cit.

²Ibid.

³William C. Vocke, American Foreign Policy: An Analytical Approach (New York: Free Press, 1976); Vocke discusses cultural factors as partial-determinants of foreign policy; See also Robert A. Packenham, Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966); Packenham discusses the American ideology relative to United States policy toward developing areas.

which decisions must be made.¹

The constant factors of the game, which are couched in the American ideology, consist of

1. aversion to radicalism;
2. aversion to communism;
3. belief in the sanctity of private enterprise; and
4. belief in the overwhelming importance of national security, relegated in the final analysis to national defense.²

These parameters weighed heavily on the side of the career men, and helped to push them into pockets of power. Furthermore, these factors were variables that afforded the career men the opportunity to form effective coalitions with performance entities in Brazil and with special interests and officials in the United States.

The second consideration of constraints in this game focuses on the action-channels. According to Allison, action-channels are regularized means of taking governmental action on specific kinds of issues.³ Since action channels structure the game, they are crucial to this inquiry. Action-channels are viewed as the variables that structure the game, because

¹Allison, Op. Cit.

²Packenham, Op. Cit.; Steven Ambrose and James Barber, eds., The Military and American Society (New York: Free Press, 1972).

³Allison, Op. Cit.

they pre-select the major players and determine the major players' usual points of entry into the game.¹ Moreover, action-channels distribute the advantages and disadvantages to the strategic actors.² In as much as the action-channels distribute the advantages and disadvantages to the strategic actors, they invariably act as major determinants of "who has the game" or "which department's men actually do what is decided upon".³

The action-channels for the game under scrutiny included:

1. the manner in which appropriations for extending United States economic assistance to Latin America were initiated; and
2. the autonomous nature of the Rio Office relative to the mission at Recife.⁴

In as much as the appropriations for extending United States economic assistance to Latin American countries were initiated through the congressional system, the United States Congress was, itself, a highly significant action-channel.

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Riordan Roett, The Politics of Foreign Aid in the Brazilian Northeast.

Congressional pressures on the presidential efforts to gain appropriations and congressional attitudes toward the policy-officials who administered the economic assistance programs had an enormous impact on the Alliance for Progress.

The autonomous nature of the Rio Office relative to the Recife Mission may be visualized as another important action-channel. The mission of the Alliance for Progress was to assist in development of the poverty stricken regions of Brazil.¹ The Recife Mission was established to serve the poverty stricken Northeast region, rather than the more affluent regions. In this respect, the role of the Recife Mission was to fulfill the objectives of the Alliance for Progress.² Despite this convergence, the Rio office, which served the more prosperous regions of Brazil, had the greater capacity for influencing the developments in the Alliance for Progress in Brazil.³

By utilizing the following variables, I can begin to examine the strategic actors' perceptions of the relevant phenomena and the operative situation, and relate them to the decisions and actions that were taken. These variables,

¹Ibid.

²Interview with Donor Lion.

³Ibid.; Roett, The Politics of Foreign Aid in the Brazilian Northeast.

many of which have been pinpointed previously within this chapter, are:

1. the designated game;
2. the identified strategic actors;
3. the two competing categories of actors with their relative government agencies;
4. the designated relationship between the strategic actors and agencies;
5. the defined situation;
6. the identified parameters of the game;
7. the identified action-channels of the game; and
8. the relevant events, actions, and decisions.

The designated variables, the perceptions of the strategic actors, and the actions and decisions that were taken in United States policy-making toward Brazil are analyzed against the background of the operative situation in order to test the relative hypotheses of this dissertation. The following hypotheses combine to form the thesis of this dissertation:

1. The mission of the Agency for International Development was positively related to the idealistic goals of the Alliance for Progress.
2. The mission of the U.S. Department of State was negatively related to the goals of the Alliance for Progress.
3. The organization of the Agency for International Development Mission at Recife was positively related to the Al-

liance for Progress.

4. The parameters of the game were negatively related to the Alliance for Progress.
5. The action-channels of the game were negatively related to the implementation of the Alliance for Progress.
6. The prominent forces in Brazil were positively related to stated goals of the Alliance for Progress.
7. The prominent forces in Brazil were negatively related to the implementation of the Alliance for Progress.

I know of no other work in which the bureaucratic politics approach is utilized to analyze United States policy toward Brazil during the 1960's. The most recent works on United States policy toward Brazil during that era are Jan Knippers Black's United States Penetration of Brazil (1977) and Phyllis Parker's Brazil and the Quiet Intervention (1979). Neither of these works show evidence of utilizing the bureaucratic politics paradigm in their analyses. Jan Knippers Black utilizes linkage theory in her analysis, and Phyllis Parker gives an historical account of the events of the era.

In the effort to test the hypotheses that I have stated in this introduction, I have utilized the following sources:

1. interviews with strategic actors, other officials, and observers of the given situation;
2. relevant documents of the United States government;

3. relevant data and general sources from international organizations;
4. files of the Agency for International Development-State Department;
5. interviews with leading scholars who have focused their research on United States-Brazilian relations;
6. leading newspapers and periodicals; and
7. books and articles from scholarly journals.

Interviews with the strategic actors, officials, and observers include: Jerome I. Levinson, General Counsel, Inter-American Development Bank, former Director of Capital Development in Brazil and former General Counsel for the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations; Donor Lion, Director of Agency for International Development in Jamaica, former Director of the AID Mission in Recife; Niles Bond, Charge d'Affaires of United States Embassy in Brazil in 1961 and Consul General in Sao Paulo from 1964-1968; Archie Lang, Administrative Officer in United States Embassy in Rio from 1962-1965, and Field Support Officer of Brazilian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 1965-1966; Robert Ballantyne, Deputy Director of Brazilian Affairs, AID-State Department, 1966-1972, and Brazilian Desk Officer, AID, 1976; Frank Haendler, former American Consulate General for Political Affairs in Sao Paulo and former Secretary and Political Officer at the American Embassy (1967-1969); David Mein, Deputy Director of Office of Management, Technical Assistance Program, AID-

State Department; Lewis H. Duiquid, Foreign Affairs Office of the Washington Post; Robert Miller, Foreign Service Officer at Recife Mission in Brazil; and Virginia Moye, Reports Officer, Capital Development, Latin American Bureau, AID-State Department during the Alliance for Progress.

The United States government documents that are utilized in this inquiry are: copies of declassified memorandums from the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Northeast Survey Team Report, The Congressional Record, special reports from the United States Department of State, Report of the United States Department of Commerce Trade Mission to Brazil. Congressional Hearings, the United States Agency for International Development's Annual Proposed Mutual Defense and Development Program: Summary Presentation to the Congress, The U.S. Department of State Historical Office's American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, special monographs and papers from the files of the Agency for International Development-State Department, the Council on Foreign Relations's Documents on American Foreign Policy, the United States Department of State's Biographic Register, and the U.S. Department of State's Foreign Service List.

United Nations publications that are utilized in this study are the United Nations' Economic Commission for Latin America's Economic Survey of Latin America and other publications on the economies of Latin America. In addition, the Organization of American States's documents were examined.

Scholars of Brazilian politics and government, along with their pertinent works, have been consulted on problems of data and to clarify and elaborate their own interpretations of the operative situation. These scholars include: Keith Larry Storrs, former missionary to Brazil, Professor of Latin American Studies at George Washington University, Latin American Analyst in the Foreign Affairs Office of Congressional Reference Service, Library of Congress, and author of Brazil's Independent Foreign Policy; Riordan Roett, Professor of Latin American Studies at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, and author of many key works on Brazil (viz. Brazil in the Sixties, Brazil in the Seventies, The Politics of Foreign Aid in the Brazilian Northeast, and Brazil Politics in a Patrimonial Society); Brady Tyson, former missionary to Brazil, Professor of Latin American Studies at American University, Foreign Affairs Officer, U.S. Mission to the United Nations and author of "The Emerging Role of the Military as Modernizer"; Joseph Page, Professor at the Georgetown Law Center and author of The Revolution That Never Was; and H. Jon Rosenbaum, Special Assistant to Senator Jacob Javitz, Professor of Political Science at the City University of New York, former Professor in the Brazilian School of Public Administration at the Getulio Vargas Foundation in Rio de Janeiro, author of "A Emenda Hickenlooper: Analise dos Resultados", and co-editor of Contemporary Brazil: Issues in Economic and Political

Development.

The periodicals and journals, as well as newspapers, that I have examined include: America, American Universities Field Staff Reports, Business Week, American Political Science Review, Latin American Research Review, Orbis, Christian Science Monitor, Current History, Foreign Affairs, Fortune Magazine, Harvard Business Review, Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, National Review, New York Times, New Statesman, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, The World Today, Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, International Affairs, The Christian Century, and Commonweal, Journal of International Affairs, The Western Political Quarterly, Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies, Journal of Politics, Wilson Quarterly, Headline Series, International Legal Materials, and The Economist.

Latin American sources have been utilized to a much lesser degree. They include: documents from the Presidency of the Republic, Three Year Plan for Economic and Social Development; Conjuntura Economia; Revista de Direito Publico e Ciencias Politica, Brazilian Bulletin, A Economia Brasileira e Suas Perspectivas, Politica Externa Independente, Estrategia, and Jornal do Brasil.

The dissertation format includes:

1. the design of the paradigm for analyzing United States policy toward Brazil and a review of major themes in

- American policy toward Latin America, matters which have been accomplished within this introductory chapter;
2. the description of the operative situation in Brazil, which is included in Chapter Two;
 3. the analysis of the Kennedy men's perceptions, actions, and decisions, as well as thorough discussion of the parameters and action-channels of the game, which is included in Chapter Three;
 4. the analysis of the career men's perceptions, actions, and decisions, as well as discussion of the Brazilian coup d'etat, which is included in Chapter Four; and
 5. an indepth analysis of United States policy toward Brazil during the 1960's, which is included in the concluding chapter. Within the chapter, major hypotheses are tested by applying the designated variables of the game, and conclusions are drawn, based on the supporting evidence (which we have already detailed).

PART ONE

THE OPERATIVE SITUATION

CHAPTER II

BRAZIL IN PERSPECTIVE: 1960-1961 THE POLITICS,
THE ECONOMY, THE SOCIETY, AND THE POLITICAL ETHOS

In 1960 Janio Quadros was elected as President of Brazil. The election of Quadros ushered in a new era in Brazil's foreign policy, which contrasted greatly with that of his predecessor in the late 1950's. Under Juscelino Kubitschek, the president who preceded Quadros, the Brazilian Monetary Authority had instituted SUMOC¹ Instruction 113, which allowed foreign private investment in high priority sectors favorable conditions for their investments. Official attitudes, at that time, also created a secure political climate for foreign companies in Brazil. Considerable opposition to the 1955 initiative was evident in the domestic industrial sector and in the realm of the nationalist ideologists. Although radical nationalists opposed Kubitschek's policies during the early stages of his administration, the success of his economic policies tended to forestall excessive conflict until the turn of the decade.²

¹Superintendency of Money and Credit.

²Nathaniel Leff, Economic Policy-making and Development in Brazil, 1947-1964 (New York: John Wiley and Sons,

During the latter part of his administration, Kubitschek began to lean more toward a xenophobic nationalistic position. However, this shift was very slight, and resulted from his fear that the fiscal and monetary measures imposed by the International Monetary Fund authorities and the United States might jeopardize his development goals. The two presidents that would follow Kubitschek, Quadros and Joao "Jango" Goulart, would take an increasingly nationalistic line.¹

By 1960 Brazil had reached the peak of what E. Bradford Burns has labeled "twentieth century offensive nationalism". Twentieth century offensive nationalism had its ramifications in the emergency of the "new Brazilian", nurtured by progress and prosperity and projecting self-confidence, rising aspirations, and the desire to improve the nation. At its 1960 peak, the thrust of this nationalism and its new Brazilians became "the liberation of Brazil from foreign control" and the "development of a modern, industrialized,

1968); Instruction 113 was instituted in 1955, pp. 59, 66; Thomas Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964: An Experiment in Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967); Skidmore notes that the domestic industrialists feared the competition of foreign trade and allied with the nationalists, who had become numerous by the last of the Kubitschek term.

¹Ibid. Xenophobia is a term to describe the nationalist's rejection of the foreigner. In this sense, the early 1960's represented an era of xenophobic nationalism.

indigenous society".¹

At the onset of the Quadros Administration, Thomas Lynn Smith portrayed Brazil as an "awakening giant." Brazil's vast territory, which encompassed over three million square miles and included approximately fifty percent of all South America, was an area of considerable diversity. This diversity was reflected in geography, in the broad spectrum of races, and in the regional variations. Uneven development was an obvious feature of the Brazilian economic and social conditions. The contrast between the drought stricken and impoverished Northeast and the prosperous Southeast indicates that the economic progress which Brazil experienced during the Kubitschek era had not been beneficial to all of Brazil. In 1960 the vast and diverse territory of Brazil was populated by more than sixty million people of European, African, and Asiatic descent, as well as the American Indians. Significant proportions of this population suffered from poverty and its concomitant despair.²

Brazil, the "awakening giant" had made its ascent into the industrialized world and was standing on the threshold of

¹E. Bradford Burns, Nationalism in Brazil: A Historical Survey (New York: Praeger, 1968); Burns uses the term "offensive nationalism" to discuss the rise of xenophobic nationalism in the early 1960's. A thorough discussion of the rise of nationalism is given in the latter part of this chapter under the subtopic, Prominent Forces.

²Thomas Lynn Smith, "The Giant Awakens: Brazil", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, March, 1961, pp. 95-102.

a new era, in which it hoped to emerge as a great power. A new middle class was emerging, with the rise of white collar workers and professionals as the pace of industrialization quickened. This expanding new middle class had aspirations for a higher standard of living, and therefore, they placed additional demands on the fragile political system. Aside from the emerging middle class, there was also a changing new upper class. In as much as the patron system had declined considerably during the first half of the twentieth century, the descendants of the traditional upper class experienced a dual process of transformation and diversification. At the roots of this process was the factor of industrialization, which acted as an impetus for many changes during this era.¹

Charles Wagley describes the manner in which this transformation affected the upper class by noting three variants of the old elite. They include: (1) that segment whose relationship with metropolitan centers was severed, but continued as great seigneurial figures in the backlands; (2) a segment which constituted the urban bureaucracy and

¹Thomas Lynn Smith. Brazil: People and Institutions. Revised Edition. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1968; Charles Wagley. An Introduction to Brazil (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), pp. 106-128; Wagley discusses the patron system as the means through which the landed aristocracy attempted to pacify the peasants, and was therefore, able to forestal the politicization.

professional groups, and began to merge with the expanding middle class; and (3) an additional segment that managed to preserve their influence and power on the national scene through industrializing and by diversifying their investments. At the lower strata of Brazilian society were the rural proletariat, dispossessed of its patron system, and the urban lower class, composed of the slum dwellers.¹

The traditional Brazilian social system encompassed a two class system (upper and lower), which was intimately associated with a two way racial division in Brazil. This division consisted of the white landed gentry or traditional upper class, on the one hand, and the Black, American Indian or mixed slaves, peasants, and manual workers, on the other hand. By 1960 middle class Black society did not exist separately from White middle class society. Basic to the understanding of class and race is the fact that the "non-white populations have not improved their status because the socio-economic system of Brazil has offered them few opportunities for vertical mobility". Western industrialized nations have traditionally been condescending in their perceptions of Africans. Brazilian culture is imbued with African themes. Before World War I Brazilians tended to be skeptical of projecting these African themes on the global scene. However,

¹Ibid.; The decline of the patron system left the masses alienated.

with the rise of the intelligentsia, Brazilians developed a sense of pride which changed such attitudes during the post World War II era. By 1960 Brazilian pride and new economic strength combined to strengthen the existing nationalism, a factor which began to influence Brazil's foreign relations.¹

The Brazilian Economy At The Turn Of The Decade

Brazilian aspirations for great power status was the logical consequence of two features: (1) the Brazilians very early concerted and disciplined efforts to industrialize; and (2) the developmental revolution which Brazil shared with other Third World countries. The economic well-being that Brazil had attained by 1960 showed that industrial progress was the major phenomenon of the Brazilian economy. The economic progress which Brazil had experienced under Kubitschek was an extension of the earlier efforts to industrialize. Brazil made its ascent from its nineteenth century position as a traditional supplier of primary goods and an economy that was reflexive and monocultural, to a nation-state that had reached a relatively high stage of industrial-

¹Ibid. Thomas E. Skidmore describes the racial characteristics of the Brazilian culture and the concept of "racial democracy" in Black Into White: Race and Nationality in Brazilian Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974); For a discussion of the existing Brazilian nationalism and its effects on Brazil's foreign policy see pp. 96-107 of Chapter II under Quadros's Independent Foreign Policy. His foreign policy was controversial in both Brazil and the U.S. since it was based on neutralism.

ization during the twentieth century. Brazil's industrialization was the result of three factors, in general:

- (1) the import substitution process of industrialization;
- (2) the entrepreneurial ability of the private sector; and
- (3) the Brazilian government's economic policy.¹

The entrepreneurial capability of the private sector had been set in motion by the process of import substitution.² Joel Bergsman has noted that the tendency for the demand for imports (in developing countries) to grow at a more rapid rate than the per capita income in developing countries aggravates the usual balance-of-payments problems. Due to the reflexive nature of their economies, developing countries are usually forced to rely on the foreign exchange that they can obtain from exports. Unfortunately, the exports of the developing countries are typically primary products. Primary products, except for strategic minerals and fuels, have a low demand on the international market. Thus, the developing nations' desire to obtain foreign exchange as a supplement to generally low levels of income remains unfulfilled. On the contrary, the demand for imports is not met by the process of exporting primary products (which invariably command only low

¹United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. The Economic Bulletin for Latin America, Vol. 9, No. 1, March, 1964, pp. 1-60.

²Import substitution means substituting domestic production for goods that were previously imported.

prices), but by increasing balance-of-payments deficits.¹

In opting for a solution for the problem, developing countries have two alternative strategies:

- (1) that of reducing the demand for imports by placing duties on imports; or
- (2) that of substituting domestic production for goods that were previously imported.

The second alternative is, of course, import substitution. Most developing countries choose import substitution since it requires industrialization and the decision-makers are unaware of its hazards.²

The Brazilian government, unaware of the hazards, chose the second alternative, and thus, began a process of industrialization with import substitution, among other policies. The government's economic policy included two features: (1) a foreign trade policy, which discriminated against non-strategic imports and consumer goods; (2) an investment policy, which stressed the elimination of key bottlenecks in in-

¹Joel Bergsman. "Foreign Trade Policy and Development", eds. H. Jon Rosenbaum and William Tyler, Contemporary Brazil: Issues in Economic and Political Development (New York: Praeger, 1972).

²Ibid. The hazards include forestalling the production of non-durable consumer goods and some durable consumer goods; David Mein, Deputy Director of Office for Management Assistance Bureau, AID-State Department, who was in Brazil during the Kubitschek-Quadros-Goulart era as the son of a Foreign Service Officer, noted the scarcity of consumer goods in Brazil.

Interview with David Mein, April 28, 1976.

frastructure sectors and the financing of other basic investments through Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Economico.¹

In considering the history of Brazil's process of import substitution, several periods must be viewed. The initial period followed the great depression of the 1930's. It was a period of rapid recovery of domestic activity, and it occurred as a result of the Brazilian government's policy which stressed protection against the imports of other countries. Following this period, the era of World War II set a stage in which the government actually entered the steel industry, organizing a plant at Volta Redonda. The third period was the post World War II era, and it was largely characterized by the continuous process of expansion and structural changes in the Brazilian industries. During this period, three distinct stages can be distinguished. They include:

- (1) Stage I, which began in 1945 and lasted until 1948;
- (2) Stage II, which began in 1948 and ended in 1954; and
- (3) Stage III, which began in 1955 and extended into the early 1960's.²

Stages I and II witnessed considerable improvement in the conditions of the external sector; a rise in the Brazilian economy's capacity to import on a par with pre-depression

¹U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America, Op. Cit.

²Ibid.

levels; considerable economic growth, which was directed more toward the expansion of the export sector and less toward the process of import substitution. Stage II was largely characterized by rapid industrial development, with an increase in the capacity to import. This coincided with a large increase in the purchasing power of the export sector. A considerable increase in national income occurred. Consequently, domestic import substitution industries flourished.¹

Stage III, the last recorded stage of import substitution which began in 1955 and extended into the early 1960's, was characterized by: (1) a substantial increase in the direct and indirect participation of the Brazilian government in basic investment; (2) a considerable inflow of foreign private capital in the form of direct investment and also public capital; (3) the intensive installation of dynamic industries (including motor vehicles and heavy electrical equipment); and (4) the expansion of steel, petroleum, and heavy chemical industries. This was a stage of intensive industrialization.²

The process of import substitution in Brazil changed the composition of the Brazilian imports. There was a decline in the share of goods destined for consumption (10 percent decline) between 1949 and 1959. The major portion of the decline, registered during the period, was in the category

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

of durable consumer goods and building materials. The importation of nonmetallic intermediate products and fuels increased substantially. Capital goods remained at the previous level.¹ The greatest changes occurred as a result of the Kubitschek industrial development program during the late 1950's.

The Brazilian Economy: Kubitschek's Initiatives

Kubitschek, anxious to see the postwar dynamism of the Brazilian economy continue, abandoned the economic stability program of the previous administration and embarked upon a policy of industrial expansion and diversification. During the Kubitschek era there was a continued reliance on foreign supplies of capital goods. However, this continuing trend of minor reflexive conditions in the Brazilian economy was offset by the excellent conditions of market growth which provided considerable opportunities for securing external investment and credit. The Kubitschek program for industrial expansion and diversification was embodied in the Target Plan.²

¹United Nations Economic Commission of Latin America. Economic Survey of Latin America 1964. New York: United Nations, 1966; Economic Development of Latin America in the Post-War Period. New York: United Nations, 1964, pp. 115-117.

²United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. Economic Bulletin for Latin America, 1964, p. 209; United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. Economic Survey of Latin America 1964, p. 290.

The theoretical bases of the Target Plan had been established by the Technical Advisory Council of Vargas' second administration, the Joint Brazil-United States Commission, and the Joint Economic Commission of Latin America/BNDE Group. Four general objectives were put forth by the Target Plan:

- (1) the removal or drastic reduction of the main bottlenecks affecting the infrastructure;
- (2) the remedying of the most serious maladjustments or inadequacies in the intermediate industries;
- (3) diversification of the structure of industry; and
- (4) the construction of the new capital city, Brasilia.¹

The Kubitschek Administration sought to achieve these objectives by obtaining a given level of investment and by allocating investment to selected activities. In as much as the attainment of a required volume of investment was needed to achieve the objectives of the industrialization program, the government adopted a very liberal policy toward the importation of foreign capital. The Banco do Brasil was granted the power of extending additional benefits to sectors that were deemed "particularly important for the development of the economy". From 1957 through 1961, the growth of the Brazilian industrial sector accelerated. During this brief period

¹Ibid.; BNDE refers to Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Economico.

the industrial product increased substantially, and the industrial sector's share of the gross domestic product rose to 31.6 percent in 1959-1961, up from 19.4 percent in 1947-49.¹

Under the Target Plan, Kubitschek's main endeavor was to achieve an expansion of electric generating capacity. The postwar industrial development of Brazil had made the rapid development of Brazil's electric power mandatory. The rate of investment in electric power had failed to keep pace with the demand during the immediate postwar years. By the early 1950's an insufficient allocation of capital investment had been provided for electric power. This exacerbated the original scarcity of power. Under the Kubitschek industrial drive, the critical shortage in electric power was overcome. (for details see Table 1.)²

Table 1. Brazil: Data on the Evolution of the Electric Power Sector, 1955-1960

Year	Electricity: Installed Capacity (thousands of kw)
1955 ...	3,149
1956 ...	3,550
1957 ...	3,767
1958 ...	3,993
1959 ...	4,115
1960 ...	4,800

Source: U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America

¹Ibid., p. 295.

²Ibid.

The Kubitschek Administration also worked toward the remodeling of the structure of transportation. The program for remodeling the transportation structure entailed four major aspects: (1) re-equipping the railway network; (2) modernizing the merchant marine; (3) extending and paving the highways; and (4) improving port facilities. At the time of Kubitschek's ascent to the presidency, inadequate transportation constituted the major bottleneck in the Brazilian economy.¹

The railroads and highways ... had their beginnings in the heavier concentrations of population. They originally extended only to the hinterland served by each coastal settlement. For many years coastal shipping was the only link between the settlements. Highway construction was stimulated immediately prior to and following World War II. This construction followed the deterioration of the railroads and the coastal shipping fleet.²

Almost thirty percent of Brazil's total railway track was in the Sao Paulo-Rio de Janeiro area, the industrial center.³ Thus, extending the railway network was a serious problem. To alleviate the disequilibrium in the railway network, heavy investment was needed. Between 1955 and 1961, the length of the railway network in Bra-

¹Ibid.

²U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign Commerce. Report of the United States Department of Commerce Trade Mission to Brazil, September 5, 1960. (Mimeographed copy 1)

³Ibid.

zil was extended slightly from 37,092 kilometers to 38,185 kilometers. (For details of the increase in network and the increased investment in railroads in Brazil see Table 2 and 3.)¹

Table 2. Brazil: Railway Network, 1955 & 1961

Year	Length of Railway Network (kilometers)
1955 ...	37,092
1961 ...	38,185

Source: U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America

Table 3. Brazil: Gross Investment in Railways as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product

Period	Railways
1950-54	0.82
1957-59	1.04

Source: U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America

Under the Target Plan, the objective for intermediate industries was to ensure that a sufficient supply of steel would be produced for the requirements of economic growth and, at the same time, not exert undue pressure on the balance

¹U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America, Op. Cit., p. 297.

of payments situation. Given the tremendous production of ingots and rolled products, the Kubitschek Administration was highly successful in this endeavor. (For details see Table 4.)¹

Table 4. Brazil: Steel making, 1956-61
(Thousands of tons)

Year	Steel Ingots		Rolled Products	
	Domestic Production	Imports	Domestic Production	Imports
1956 ...	1,365	339	1,074	242
1957 ...	1,470	509	1,130	383
1958 ...	1,659	279	1,304	205
1959 ...	1,866	651	1,492	499
1960 ...	2,279	558	1,707	434
1961 ...	2,485	433	1,928	331

Source: U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America

The Economic Development of Brazil: An Analysis and An
Assessment

In this dissertation economic development is viewed from a broad perspective, and therefore, includes the structural changes that are necessary to bring about social and political development. In this respect, our definition of economic development would coincide with the Celso Furtado concept of socio-economic development. In essence, it includes:

- (1) the vital changes that must occur within the economy

¹Ibid., p. 298.

- (eg. increasing rates of gross national product, increasing rates of per capita income, abundance of natural resources) in order to achieve sustained growth;
- (2) the vital changes that must occur within the societal bases (eg. social mobility, decline of dualism, rising standards of living for the population as a whole; and
- (3) the vital changes that must occur within the polity to ensure accessibility of the entire population to the power structures and give them their share of the increasing gross national product, social justice, and human dignity.¹

Economic development as socio-economic development in which structural change occurs differs from economic modernization. Economic modernization is synonymous with techno-economic development. Its focus is on "the big push", the economic dynamo that is based on industry as the lead sector. Its stress on the economic dynamo aggravates the already

¹Charles P. Kindleberger. Economic Development (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966); Kindleberger notes that economic growth focuses on gross product, while economic development implies both more output and changes in the structure of the distribution. Also economic development implies that a country has achieved a measure of growth and is continuing to grow (sustained growth); Celso Furtado. The Economic Growth of Brazil: A Survey from Colonial to Modern Times (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1963); Irma Adelman and Cynthia Morris. Society, Politics and Economic Development: A Quantitative Approach (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967); Brady Tyson, "The Emerging Role of the Military as Modernizers in Latin America", eds. David Pollock and Arch R. Ritter, Latin American Prospects for the 1970's: What Kinds of Revolutions? (New York: Praeger, 1973); Helio Jaguaribe, Economic and Political Development: A

existing problems of dualism that are so characteristic of developing societies. While the proponents of economic modernization promise that humanization of the regime and the quest for social justice will be vigorously pursued following that stage in which the nation-state emerges as a prosperous nation, the contrary usually occurs. Rather than pursue a course of humanization and the quest for social justice, those nations that have first pursued a course of techno-economic development geared to the goal of a prosperous and dynamic sectoral development, at the neglect of humanization and social justice, tend to grow more authoritarian and oppressive once the goal of prosperity has been attained. The promise of humanization becomes an eternal procrastination.¹

In an effort to focus on the more humanistic aspects of the developmental process, Adelman and Morris have included social and political aspects as correlative with the process of economic development. Jaguaribe's discussion of political development relates to the socio-economic theme presented by Celso Furtado and the structuralists. While the key variables in this analysis have been taken from the

Theoretical Approach and a Brazilian Case Study (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968); Octavio Ianni, Crisis in Brazil (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).

¹Ibid., Tyson, Op. Cit.

Adelman-Morris model of economic development; Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr.'s structural-functional model is utilized for the political analysis, in conjunction with the micro-variables of the Adelman-Morris model.¹

From a standpoint of sectoral development the economic indicators of 1960 attest to the success of the Kubitschek industrialization drive. Traditionally, agriculture has been the principal occupation in Brazil. In 1950, the agricultural sector was, by far the greatest contributor to the gross domestic product. Table 5 on Page 75 shows the sectoral proportions of the gross domestic product during the period 1950 to 1960. (For details see Table 5.) More than 31 percent of the gross domestic product came from the agricultural sector in 1950. The industrial sector was the

¹The structuralists, a school of economists in Latin America, were of the Prebisch viewpoint that transformation of the institutions would lead to economic development, and that the route to development could not be fiscal and monetary operations. Celso Furtado, a proponent of socio-economic development, was a leading economist in Brazil. As head of the SUDENE, he stressed extensive reform and the development of infrastructure. See Furtado, *Op. Cit.*; Jaguaribe, *Op. Cit.*; Adelman and Morris, *Op. Cit.*; Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown and Company, 1966); See also Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: System, Process, and Policy (Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown, and Co., 1978).

Table 5. Brazil: Changes in Structure of Gross Domestic Product

Sector	Percentage of Total Gross Domestic Product		
	1950	1955	1960
Agriculture	31.3	31.0	28.3
Mining	0.3	0.3	0.5
Industry	16.5	18.9	23.4
Construction	1.1	1.1	1.2
Public Utili- ties	0.7	0.6	0.8
Transporta- tion and Communica- tions	6.4	7.0	7.6
Trade and Finance	13.8	14.8	15.3
Housing	4.7	4.3	3.9
Public Admini- stration	10.0	8.7	7.4
Other	15.2	13.3	11.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America

second largest contributor to the gross domestic product. Its secondary status had been attained largely through the import substitution process of industrialization that began after World War II. Although the industrial sector had become the second largest contributor, its contribution was only 16.5 percent, about 50 percent less than that of the agricultural sector. The trade and finance sector followed the industrial sector closely with almost 14 percent, reflecting a continuing trend of reflexiveness in the Brazilian economy.¹

¹The Economic Development of Latin America in the Post-war Period. New York: United Nations, 1966, p. 74.

As the decade progressed the industrial sector grew considerably. By 1955 its share of the gross domestic product reached almost 19 percent, a rise of nearly 3 percent over the 1950 level. Agriculture's contribution declined minutely, remaining at the 31 percent level. However, its lead had declined considerably relative to the surging industrial sector. The industrial sector's contribution was almost two-thirds of the sum which the agricultural sector presented. The trade and finance sector remained about the same, rising only one percent (from 13.8 percent in 1950 to 14.8 percent in 1955).¹

By 1960, the trend of industrial progress was obvious. Industry's contribution to the gross domestic product constituted more than 23 percent. Agriculture, while still remaining the leading sector, had declined. Its drop of about 3 percent from the 1955 level brought it down to a little over 28 percent. At this level, its lead over the industrial sector was sustained by as little as 5 percent, roughly.²

Thus, at the onset of the Quadros Administration, Brazilian industry comprised modern industrial plants that had been financed and built by the United States and European countries. These industrial plants were producing a variety of goods, including machinery, automobiles, and rubber goods.

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

Brazil's production of steel had increased substantially and its petroleum resources were being developed by PETROBRAS. This emphasis on steel and petroleum had resulted in Brazil's reduced dependence on petroleum and steel imports. By 1960 Brazil also possessed one of the world's greatest hydro-electric power potentials. Aside from the hydro-electric potential, Brazil also had large reserves of high grade iron ore deposits.¹

Despite the tremendous progress of Brazil's industrial sector throughout the Kubitschek era, Brazil had been unsuccessful in terms of developmental goals. The Target Plan, which embodied the Kubitschek industrial drive, was not an over-all development plan. It was not based on a general diagnosis of the existing economic situation and its problems. In as much as it was not based on an understanding of the Brazilian economy as a whole, it failed to consider some key sectors. H. Jon Rosenbaum and William Tyler have stressed that the rapid economic growth during the 1950's left a legacy of persisting problems. Among these problems were listed:

- (1) the intensification of economic and social dualism;
- (2) the concentration of growth exclusively in the industrial sector and import substituting industrialization, which had left the agricultural sector largely intact; and
- (3) the capital intensive development of the Brazilian in-

¹U.S. Department of Commerce, Op. Cit.

dustry, extremely low educational levels and high population growth, which have aggravated the problem of unemployment.¹

In order to check the validity of the Rosenbaum-Tyler thesis on the Kubitschek industrial drive, the micro-variables of the Adelman and Morris model will be used. The variables utilized in the model are:

- (1) the size of the traditional agricultural sector;
- (2) dualism;
- (3) rate of growth of gross product (the sum of all goods produced in the country for a year); and
- (4) rate of growth of per capita product (the sum of all goods produced in the country for a year divided by the population.)²

The size of the traditional agricultural sector in 1960 substantiates the Rosenbaum and Tyler contention that despite Kubitschek's industrialization drive the agricultural sector was left largely intact. Brazil's population was still largely agrarian by 1960. In 1957 and 1958 agriculture constituted over 85 percent of the total exports from Brazil and only 15 percent of total imports. Coffee constituted 58 per-

¹U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America. Economic Survey of Latin America, 1964. New York: United Nations, 1966; H. Jon Rosenbaum and William Tyler, eds. Contemporary Brazil: Issues in Economic and Political Development (New York: Praeger, 1972).

²Ibid., Adelman and Morris, Op. Cit.

cent of all foreign exchange earnings.¹

Dualism was the most apparent result of the Kubitschek era. By 1960 the contrasts that existed in the Brazilian society during the late 1940's had been compounded to include:

- (1) rural as opposed to urban society;
- (2) agricultural as opposed to industrial society;
- (3) North and Northeast regions as opposed to Central-South;
- (4) traditional as opposed to modern society; and
- (5) poor as opposed to rich.²

The regional disparities were largely reflected in the continuing problems of the poverty stricken Northeast. The nature of the distribution of transportation facilities within Brazil coincide with the general disparities. Almost 30 percent of Brazil's total railway trackage, as mentioned previously, was in the Sao-Paulo-Rio de Janeiro area, the industrial center. Minas Gerais, the mining region, possessed almost 25 percent of the trackage. The Northeast's only link to the Central-South was through coastal shipping.³

¹U.S. Department of Commerce, Op. Cit.; U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America.

²Rosenbaum and Tyler, Op. Cit.

³Department of Commerce, Op. Cit.

To assess the macro-performance of the Brazilian economy, gross product rates of growth over time are considered along with the rates of growth of per capita product over time. The brief period of Kubitschek's industrial drive, 1955-1960, encompassed some instability in the macro-performance of the Brazilian economy. The rate of growth in the gross product fell almost 1 percent during the period 1955-1959 (from 6.9 percent to 5.6 percent), but resurged considerably within 1960 (to 9.7 percent). As for per capita product, the period 1956-1959 was also one of slight decline. Per capita product declined more than 1 percent (from 3.8 percent to 2.5 percent), but it also resurged considerably in 1960. The hint of instability revealed through these economic indicators, suggests that the Brazilian economy had not overcome the tendency toward economic growth (short spurts of rising income) and thus had not been able to move toward economic development (sustained growth periods). For details see Table 6 below.

Table 6. Macro Performances of the Brazilian Economy, 1955-1960

Year	Growth Rate				Rate of Inflation (percent)
	GDP (percent)	GDP per Capita (percent)	Exports (\$1,000)	Imports (\$1,000)	
1955	6.9	3.8	1,423	1,307	16.8
1956	3.2	0.2	1,482	1,234	23.2
1957	8.1	5.0	1,392	1,489	13.2
1958	7.7	4.6	1,243	1,353	11.1
1959	5.6	2.5	1,282	1,374	29.2
1960	9.7	6.5	1,269	1,462	26.3

Source: Rosenbaum and Tyler, Op. Cit.; U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America.

Other economic problems in Brazil included a continuing problem of inflation (which was aggravated by Kubitschek's extravagance), a scarcity of consumer goods, and extremely low wages. Telephone communications were problematic since they were in the initial stage.¹

The Brazilian Political System At The Turn Of The Decade

The Brazilian political system has traditionally been elitist and patrimonial. Throughout the history of Brazil, the ruling group was composed of the landed aristocracy and potential power contenders that, from time to time, aligned themselves with the aristocracy and dominated the Brazilian political system. This oligarchy has been sustained by the following features of the Brazilian society:

- (1) the patrimonial character of society;
- (2) the masses' acceptance of the hierarchical theme in the Brazilian political ethos;
- (3) the tendency for emerging social groups (potential power contenders) to emulate the behavior of the existing elites;
- (4) the failure of emerging social groups to counter the political conduct of the elite; and
- (5) a high degree of elite consensus on political ideas.²

¹Department of Commerce, Op. Cit.

²Riordan Roett, Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial Society (Boston, Massachusetts: Allyn and Bacon, 1972); Hereafter referred to as Patrimonial Society; See also Riordan

The "patrimonial regime" designates the existence of a paternalistic, but very flexible, public order. It has as its underlying motivation self-maintenance and continuity and the preservation of the nation-state. In Brazil the patrimonial state is a bureaucratic state. The administrative structure of the central government maintains the public order. The bureaucracy is dichotomized so that one segment, the civil service, performs the technical duties such as economic planning and another segment, the "spoils" bureaucracy, has become the ruling elite's instrument of political patronage. This clientelistic nature of the Brazilian bureaucracy has been conceptualized by Helio Jaguaribe as the cartorial state (a system in which public employment serves as a means of co-optation and political control).¹

The consequences of elite rule and the patrimonial state have been:

- (1) a relatively static society in which the levels of social mobility were very low over time;
- (2) ineffective interest aggregation among the masses; and

Roett, Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial Society, Revised Edition (Boston, Massachusetts: Allyn and Bacon, 1978).

¹Ibid., Ronald M. Schneider. The Political System of Brazil: Emergence of a Modern Authoritarian Brazil (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972); The civil service is composed of tecnicos, largely highly competent economists who are responsible for the key economic policies. Clientelistic refers to the system of decision-making that is characterized by an exchange of substantive favors, legal privileges or protection from punishment among political actors.

- (3) a consensus among the elites to limit popular participation.¹

Although the Republic ushered in an era of incipient social mobilization after 1946, the mobilization was circumscribed and did not sufficiently challenge the entrenched elite domination. The perpetuation of elite rule through the patrimonial character of society has hindered the development of democratic institutions in Brazil.²

Adelman and Morris, within their model of development, have introduced the following micro-variables as necessary for political development:

- (1) character and orientation of political administration and leadership, entailing efficiency and political strength of key groups as well as the commitment to economic development;
- (2) stable, but sensitive, political mechanisms for relating the interests and demands of the society to political power, entailing the strength of democratic institutions, the existence of competitive political parties, and the degree of freedom of political opposition; and
- (3) political stability, including the extent of internal security, the extent of continuity in the form of govern-

¹Roett, Patrimonial Society.

²Ibid.

ment, and consensus about the prevailing form of government.¹

The character and orientation of Brazil's political administration and leadership (on the basis of efficiency, capabilities, and commitment to economic development) in 1960-1961 was characterized by:

- (1) the pervasiveness of elite rule (maintained through the patrimonial character of the society) which extended into the 1960's;
- (2) a Brazilian national elite which could be permeated, but in which recruitment of new members was based on the aspirants' willingness to accept and defend the basic rules and prerogatives of the patrimonial state;
- (3) a set of basic rules and prerogatives that the aspirants were required to abide by. They are:
 - (a) to avoid the political mobilization of the masses;
 - (b) to prohibit illiterates from voting;
 - (c) to subordinate overall economic development programs to the needs of national security;
 - (d) to stress industrialization through import substitution; and
 - (e) to oppose land reform.²

Unlike the previous administrations of the Republic,

¹Adelman and Morris, Op. Cit.

²Roett, Patrimonial Society.

Janio Quadros and Joao Goulart headed a reformist regime. They embarked upon programs that would politicize and enfranchise the masses and bring extensive reform. Rather than stress industrialization and the needs of national security, they opted for socio-economic development. In this sense, the Quadros-Goulart regime was "outside of the Brazilian elite". For the first time since the beginning of the Republic, the Brazilian political administration was not emulating the elite and was not supporting the patrimonial state. Rather, the Quadros-Goulart regime opted for a change from the clientelistic politics and was committed to economic, political, and social development. In taking this position, the new regime had designated itself as the power contender, ready to challenge a system that had prevailed since the Empire. The logical consequences of the Quadros-Goulart prerogatives were formidable opposition and excessive constraints.¹

In addition to the confrontations that resulted from its reformist nature, the Quadros-Goulart regime had the misfortune of coming to office at the climax of Kubitschek's extravagant industrial drive. The galloping inflation, which had been aggravated by the Kubitschek Administration, was an

¹Ibid.; Thomas E. Skidmore. Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964: An Experiment in Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967); As a power contender, the Quadros-Goulart regime presented a real threat to the patrimonial order. Their genuine effort to reform the economic and social system was feared by the elites and their powerful allies.

initial hindrance to Quadros. The tendency of conservatives to link the proponents of socio-economic development (and their involvement with the forces of nationalism, neutralism, and populism) to an international communist conspiracy, compounded the problems of the reformist regime. The military and the conservative elites of the international community (United States elites) used the cold war theme to counter efforts toward social reform. Moreover, the military, although settling the disputed Goulart succession in a constitutional manner, had been suspicious of Goulart from the beginning due to allegations of his leftist activities in the Getulio Vargas regime. The United States had also watched Goulart cautiously.¹

In essence, the Quadros-Goulart regime was efficient and capable and was committed to economic development. The state had an exceptional reserve of expertise upon which to draw for understanding economic conditions and policy postures. However, even the most capable of men are-within the parameters of legitimate and constitutional power-unable to sur-

¹Ibid.; Skidmore discusses the controversy over the Goulart succession and the problems of the Quadros regime with inflation. Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971); Stepan points to the anti-communist theme in the National Security Doctrine of the National War College as an indicator of the military's skepticism of the new social forces and the reformist regime; Bell, Op. Cit.; U.S. skepticism toward Goulart is described in the work. Bell, in Roett's volume, indicates that the U.S. Embassy decided, after careful deliberation, to treat Goulart cordially.

mount an encirclement of oppositional forces that inhere in the character of the society itself and are perpetuated by the powerful external forces. Given such adverse circumstances any productive schemes that were devised by Quadros and Goulart would ultimately fail.¹

The rapid industrialization of the late 1950's, and the subsequent urbanization, did not result in the development of a national industrial elite. A national industrial elite might have served as a powerful bourgeoisie, capable of mobilizing and organizing significant and necessary challenges to the elitist power structure. However, the emergent urban middle class, held to the traditional tendency to emulate the landed aristocracy, and merely joined forces with them in the contemporary patrimonial society. The military, traditionally the power wielding institution in the Brazilian polity, was obviously the dominant institution in the Brazilian society. However, the military claimed that it was incapable of directing the political affairs of the country and would prefer to remain the "poder moderado". As the "poder moderado", its role was negative in the early 1960's. It flayed the efforts for reform and served as the great sup-

¹No constitutional regime regardless of its capabilities, can survive if the strongest and most effectively organized institutions seek its demise. It will either fall or change into a highly repressive regime.

porter of the patrimonial order.¹

Thus, the Brazilian polity, by virtue of the decline of the traditional patronage relationship that existed between the indigents and the landed aristocracy and the rise of an urban middle class that failed to relate to the needs of the peasants and the urban proletariat, was left a very deep void, which has not yet been filled. In the wake of these circumstances, the Brazilian society was ill-equipped for the task of political development. And political development was a crucial factor during this era of rising aspirations and tension. In the face of this failure of the middle class to relate to the problems of the peasants and the proletariat, the question for political development was to whom might the indigents look for organization, for mobilization, and for politicization?²

The initial efforts to politicize the masses had begun in 1946, but the politicization of the masses had never really been achieved. Their organization was characteristically weak and ad hoc. Almost 50 percent of the adult population was disenfranchised due to illiteracy. In as much as the majority

¹Roett, Patrimonial Society; Adelman and Morris, Op. Cit.; Adleman and Morris refer to the bourgeoisie as a potential force for mobilization of the masses; Donnel Kirchner, "Brazil Eight Years After", America. June 3, 1972, p. 589. Kirchner cites Gen. Humberto Castelo Branco's statement that the military did not possess the capacity or the legitimacy to rule.

²Wagley, Op. Cit.; Roett, Patrimonial Society.

of the illiterates were rural lower class, the urban electorate had a disproportionately large share in the conduct of the affairs of Brazil. Thus, the masses, as a whole, were denied access to the usual democratic channels through which they might have expressed their grievances.¹

Given the conditions of gross inequality and dualism in the Brazilian society, the development of political mechanisms that possessed the "capacity and will" to relate the demands of the alienated masses to political power was the optimum solution to the Brazilian crisis. Adelman and Morris have posited the existence of stable, but sensitive, political mechanisms as a major indicator of political development. Did there exist within the Brazilian polity of the early 1960's any institution that was capable, stable, and sufficiently committed to challenge the patrimonial society to move toward democracy?²

Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr. have described the political system as a process encompassing interacting roles, structures, and subsystems. The process entails: inputs from the environment or from the political system itself; the

¹Rosenbaum & Tyler, Op. Cit.

²Robert Packenham, Liberal America and the Third World (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973)
Adelman and Morris, Op. Cit.

conversion of these inputs within the system; and the production of outputs into the environment. The inputs into the political system are transformed through the conversion process of rule-making, rule application, and rule adjudication. The structures of the political system which have been designated as the performance entities for these conversion processes are the executive branch (including the leadership of the Presidency), the judiciary, and the legislature. Janio Quadros, as Chief Executive of Brazil in 1961, was responsible for the conversion process, and rule application. As mentioned previously, by his words and his deeds, Quadros demonstrated that the executive branch of the Brazilian government was a political mechanism that was sensitive to the needs of the masses, but incapable of meeting these needs with viable programs.¹

Among the interest articulating structures of Brazil, the support for popular demands was extremely limited in 1960. The political parties, leading institutional groups in most democratic societies, were nonprogrammatic and populist. The Brazilian party system of 1960-61 can be characterized by four features:

- (1) the tendency for most of the parties to possess the same program in general;

¹Almond and Powell, Op. Cit.

- (2) the multiplicity of parties;
- (3) the tendency for most of the parties to appeal to all segments of the population (electorate); and
- (4) the extreme factionalization of the party system and the parties themselves, which led to a constant resort to inter-party coalitions and thus rendered platforms meaningless.¹

As Ronald Schneider noted:

The established parties, suffering from a lack of coherence and inadequate organization, as well as from their conservative orientation, were most unsuitable vehicles for the socialization of the new urban masses entering the electorate. Along side the still relatively effective clientelistic politics, new types of populist leaders and movements emerged, particularly filling the vacuum resulting from the elimination of the one ideological party of the left, the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), outlawed in 1947.²

Among the major parties were the National Democratic Union (UDN), the Social Democratic Party (PSD), and the Brazilian Workers Party (PTB). The National Democratic Union had been founded by Getulio Vargas' opposition in the 1940's, with the intention of supporting conservative doctrines and of supporting the interests of the traditional oligarchy.

¹Roett, Patrimonial Society; David D. Burks and Karl M. Schmitt. Evolution or Chaos: Dynamics of Latin American Government and Politics (New York: Praeger, 1963).

²Schneider, Op. Cit.

In 1960 it was largely composed of landowners and industrialists, and was tied most closely to the urban middle class. The National Democratic Union, resting on twin principles of laissez faire and pro-Americanism, had, in 1945, stressed the need for foreign capital in the Brazilian effort to industrialize. Consequently, the rising nationalism of the era found a very strong adversary in the National Democratic Union party. Ironically, the party supported Quadros for the Presidency.¹

The Social Democratic Party was controlled by those who hoped to continue the Vargas policies. The Brazilian Workers Party possessed some elite leadership, but was largely composed of organized labor, lower income groups, and Getulistas during the 1940's. However, in order to achieve the decisive victory of Vargas in 1950, the class character of the Brazilian Workers Party was weakened. Together with the Social Democratic Party, the Brazilian Workers Party, formed a coalition that opposed the National Democratic Union, on most issues.²

The military, as the key institutional group, appeared on the scene in 1960-61 as the opposition to the Quadros re-

¹Burks and Schmitt, Op. Cit.; Schneider, Op. Cit.

²Ibid.

form program of promoting social and political progress (through an expansion of the electorate and broadening of participation). It formed an extremely conservative coalition with the civilian bureaucracy and the urban middle class, in general. As a conservative force, this coalition opposed the weak and poorly organized efforts of the new populists, the radical nationalists, and the Quadros regime to politicize and incorporate the masses into the Brazilian political system. (The military as a member of the elite has been discussed briefly on page 109 of this dissertation.)¹

This conservative coalition, dominated by the military, succeeded in eroding the very limited power of the Peasants Leagues under the leadership of Francisco Juliao, the new populist regime of Miguel Arraes, and the democratic thinkers of the Catholic clergy, by discrediting them as the instruments of international communism and an internal security threat. Hence, the Brazilian political system, upon the initiation of a "democratic revolution", found itself unable to embark upon a viable path toward political development, for it lacked political mechanisms capable of acting as the "engines of change" in the face of an adverse political ethos and the powerful opposition of domestic forces. The opposition was able to rally a powerful force (the United States) to its cause by rationalizing their position in the context

¹Skidmore, Politics in Brazil.

of the cold war. Under these conditions of constant tension and overwhelming opposition, the Quadros-Goulart option for socio-economic development was doomed to failure. The regime was easily labeled unstable by its opposition, who from the very beginning had worked for its demise.¹

The Brazilian Political Ethos And Prominent Social Forces

Brazilians have been described as a nation of pragmatic people who possess considerable talent for conciliation and accommodation. The conception that reality is harsh and unpredictable and yields to clever manipulation rather than hard work constitutes the nucleus of the Brazilian political ethos. Dual consequences result from this central theme in

¹Joseph Page. The Revolution That Never Was: Northeast Brazil, 1955-1964 (New York: Grossman, 1972); Page discusses the struggle of the Peasants Leagues in the Northeast; Schneider, Op. Cit.; Rosenbaum and Tyler, Op. Cit., p. 4. They refer to the efforts the reformist regime made to initiate a "democratic revolution" (the emergence of a stable democracy). The military prevented the development of political mechanisms that were potentially capable of mobilizing the masses. In this way, they also prevented the integration of the masses into the Brazilian society (polity). In as much as the integration of the masses into the society is a necessary condition for the emergence of a stable democracy, the military had prevented political development by preventing integration of the masses; George C. Lodge. Engines of Change: United States Interests and Revolution in Latin America (New York: Knopf, 1970); John J. Johnson. "Brazil in Quandary". Current History. January, 1965, p. 9. Upon the resignation of Quadros, a large-scale movement was led by the armed forces to prevent Goulart from taking the office of the presidency (through legal succession). The armed forces, from that point forward, worked for the fall of the Goulart regime; James W. Rowe. "Revolution or Counter revolution in Brazil?." American Universities Field Staff Report (Nos. 4 and 5, June, 1964, p. 655. As Labor Minister under Vargas (1951-54), Goulart was forced to resign when the military accused him of flirting

the Brazilian political ethos: (1) Brazilians' pragmatic and compromising nature; and (2) Brazilians' tendency to avoid rational calculation and analysis, to disregard basic dogmas or tenets, and to rely on improvisation. The pragmatism of the Brazilian population is revealed through three key sources: (1) Brazil's peaceful evolution; (2) Brazil's *jeito* (ingenuity in blending law, regulations or principles to the moment's needs); and (3) Brazilians' tendency to achieve major social and political transformations without ideological guides and without the mobilization of mass opinion.¹

During the early 1960's Brazil was an arena for the interplay of a multiplicity of forces. Prominent among these multiple forces were nationalism, populism, neutralism, communism, and militarism. Nationalism and populism were very pronounced and were indigenous forces, but were often mistaken for the force of international communism. Neutralism, necessary in the design of Quadros' independent foreign policy, was also deemed as an affront to the capitalistic nations. Communism as a force was weak, institutionalized only in the outlawed Brazilian Communist Party (which had continued its

with communism. Goulart was, thus controversial from the very beginning. He had been re-elected as Quadros' vice-president by a very narrow margin.

¹Frank Bonilla. "A National Ideology for Development: Brazil," ed. K.H. Silvert, Expectant Peoples: Nationalism and Development (New York: Random House, 1963).

activities on an underground basis and placed its candidates on the tickets of other parties), but was the most controversial force in Brazil. The existence of communist elements in Brazil seemed to overwhelm the minds of the National Democratic Union leaders and the minds of the powerful anti-communist military, and therefore, obscure the existence of all other key forces.¹

Prominent Social Forces: Nationalism

E. Bradford Burns has noted that Brazilian nationalism appeared to reach its apogee during the early 1960's. This stage of nationalism was the last of three variants of nationalism that Brazil had passed through since the early sixteenth century. The earlier variants were: (1) colonial nativism, a nationalism which embraced the colonists' pride in the land and precluded antagonism toward Portugal; (2) nineteenth century defensive nationalism, the continuation of devotion to the fatherland, the beginning of mistrust of the foreigners, and a rising consciousness of Brazil's isolation from the Spanish speaking Latin American countries; and (3) twentieth century offensive nationalism.²

¹Rosenbaum and Tyler, Op. Cit.; Although militarism was among the forces of the early 1960's, it was represented in a well-organized and effective organization. It was not in search of a constituency or group to which to appeal. Thus, it was unlike the other forces, which are discussed in this section. In as much as militarism was an entirely different force, it will not be discussed in this section. Rather, an extensive discussion of militarism is included in Chapter II of this dissertation.

²Burns, Nationalism in Brazil.

During the era of twentieth century nationalism, the Brazilian intellectuals began to be critical in their judgment of the nation. They sought to improve the conditions in the nation. They recommended changes that would, hopefully, create a more viable Brazil. Under the guidance of the intellectuals, the nationalists concentrated on the destruction of feudal institutions, liberating Brazil from foreign control, and developing a modern, industrialized society. In addition to these features, the focus of the nationalists was the continuation of the promotion of the national culture. Efforts were made to define and to insulate the Brazilian national culture, as a means of awakening the national consciousness. By the middle of the twentieth century, Brazilian nationalism shifted its focus to economic problems. Contemporary nationalist scholars, in the midst of the developmental revolution, tended to stress change as the route to development. In keeping with this theme, Helio Jaguaribe and Candido Mendes de Almeida often referred to nationalism as "an instrument for change and a key to development".¹

The national character of the Brazilian population has been described as including such characteristics as a tendency to disregard basic dogmas or tenets, to improvise, and ignore ideological considerations. Despite the tendency to disregard

¹Ibid.

basic dogmas and to ignore ideological considerations, Brazil possessed a well elaborated nationalist ideology by 1960. However, nationalism was not a powerful nor well-organized movement. Although every leading political party portrayed itself as the chief defender of the national interest, there was not a single party that was firmly committed to a coherent "nationalist program". Politicians tended to operate on the premise that the Brazilian masses would respond to nationalistic appeals. In the presidential election of 1960, however, those parties that had depended on nationalistic appeals were defeated. Despite the dearth of men who possessed the capacity and the political formulas to mobilize a viable nationalistic movement in Brazil, the well-elaborated nationalist ideologies had considerable potential and the nationalists possessed substantial influence.¹

Nationalists of varying persuasions in Brazil agreed on: (1) planned action toward a highly productive economy of self-sustained growth under control of Brazilians; (2) higher standards of living for all; (3) an independent foreign policy; and (4) an end to the alienation and discontent which plagued Brazil. Also nationalists of every segment of the population viewed Brazil as potentially capable of hemispheric and world leadership. The nationalism of Brazil, during the

¹Bonilla, Op. Cit.; Roger W. Fontaine. Brazil and the United States: Toward a Maturing Relationship (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1974).

Quadros Administration, had as its intellectual bases: (1) the Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros (ISEB), founded in 1955 as an independent unit for study and research at the graduate level within the Ministry of Education, and possessing a rightist nationalist stance; and (2) the Revista Brasiliense, also organized in 1955, but possessing a leftist nationalist stance which stressed that (in opposition to ISEB's view) the Brazilian bourgeoisie was incapable of leading in the process of national development, and opposed foreign participation in the exploitation of Brazil's oil resources. The two groups split on these issues in 1958, when the ISEB produced a publication that gave credence to the idea of bourgeoisie leadership in the process of national development and took a rather conciliatory attitude with respect to external participation in the exploitation of Brazil's oil resources. The publication, in addition to revealing the ideological gulf between ISEB and the Revista Brasiliense, served to set in motion a division within the ranks of ISEB itself. Despite the factional disputes, the ISEB provided a valuable intellectual service for the nationalists.¹

The principal objective of nationalism in Brazil, during this period, was economic development. The aim of the nationalists was the achievement of a well-operated, highly productive, industrial process, controlled by Brazilians, and

¹Bonilla, Op. Cit.

the achievement of an economy that would facilitate a more equitable distribution of the production. Brazil, significantly lacking the status of a truly underdeveloped nation, possessed a nationalism that tended to lack a revolutionary basis, in most instances. While the foundations of nationalist doctrine were the central planning and direction of development by the state, the legal and administrative apparatus through which this state activity would operate was not designated, in most instances. Nationalists of various schools emphasized that: (1) the state must repossess the political functions which the powerful private corporations have come to claim; (2) foreign private enterprise is incapable of devising and financing a well-coordinated plan for development; and (3) political and legal direction of the economy is an imperative for preventing internal dislocations and for making possible a firm and coherent foreign policy.¹

Thomas Skidmore puts forth two operative variants of nationalism as significant forces in Brazil during the era under scrutiny. The two operative variants of nationalism to which he refers are: (1) developmentalist-nationalism; and (2) radical nationalism. Developmentalist-nationalism, embraced by Kubitschek, stemmed from the tenentes and the later state directed industrialization thrusts of the Estado Novo.²

¹Ibid.

²Skidmore, Politics in Brazil; Roett, Patrimonial Society; Rosenbaum and Tyler, Op. Cit.

The underlying premises of radical nationalism were:

- (1) Brazil has an imperative to industrialize;
- (2) The spontaneous forces through which the United States and Europe have achieved industrialization are inadequate for industrialization in Brazil;
- (3) Free operation of the price mechanism and the continued free mobility of factors will hinder Brazil's efforts to industrialize; and
- (4) Brazil needs a new strategy of a mixed economy.¹

Developmentalist-nationalism was significantly lacking in the anti-Americanism and attacks on imperialism which are traditionally associated with xenophobic nationalism, and it pursued an anti-communist stance. These were ideas which a large number of military officers could support. The proponents of developmentalist-nationalism comprised: (1) army officers who insisted that Brazil's national security would be endangered by allowing foreign investors and capitalists to exploit certain natural resources; and (2) younger technocrats and intellectuals who abhorred Brazil's traditional role as supplier of tropical exports for the United States and viewed industrialization as the only means of improving the standard of living for Brazilians.²

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

The Brazilian foreign policy toward the United States, under the Kubitschek Administration, found its basis in the tenets of developmentalist-nationalism. Fundamental to Kubitschek's policy toward the United States was the view that the success of Brazil's industrialization drive required the close cooperation of the United States government and of United States private investors. Pursuing this theme, Kubitschek made special efforts to:

- (1) give foreign firms special incentives to invest in Brazilian industry;
- (2) encourage foreign firms to bring industrial equipment into Brazil through extensive use of SUMOC Directive No. 113;
- (3) offer liberal credit policies for Brazil's businessmen with the promise of a higher level of demand; and
- (4) initiate an increased program of public investment in order to overcome structural bottlenecks in transportation and power production.¹

Under Kubitschek, developmentalist-nationalism reached its apogee, but declined as nationalism became slightly xenophobic. Kubitschek's turn toward a more xenophobic stance was the result of his collision with the International Monetary Fund authorities and the United States over inflation and of

¹Ibid.; SUMOC Directive No. 113 is discussed on the first page of this chapter.

the perfunctory reception which President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles gave to his Operation Pan America.¹

In contrast to developmentalist-nationalism, radical nationalism was based on the following assumptions:

- (1) The existing economic and social structures tend to be exploitative and require radical change.
- (2) Private investors are aligned with capitalist governments in the industrialized world in an effort to limit Brazil's role to that of exporter of low-priced primary products.
- (3) Industrialized countries will not cooperate in the industrialization of Brazil.
- (4) Fundamental to Brazil's underdeveloped conditions are those domestic sectors that are tied to export-import trade and Brazilians who work for foreign firms.²

Radical-nationalists made an effort to discredit the political elite in the ordering of the social structure. Janio Quadros, as president of Brazil, would, during his last days in office, lean strongly toward radical-nationalism. But radical-nationalism would not reach its apogee in Brazil until

¹Skidmore, Politica in Brazil - See also, Storrs, Op. Cit.

²Skidmore, Politica in Brazil

Joao "Jango" Goulart received the mandate for leadership under a full-presidential system.¹

Prominent Social Forces: Populism

In addition to nationalism, several varieties of populism appeared on the Brazilian scene in the early 1960's.

Ronald Schneider defines populism as:

... a non-traditional direct relationship between the masses and a leader in which the leader possesses the allegiance and the active support of the masses.²

The leadership of the populist movements in Latin America possessed the following characteristics:

- (1) lack of a sufficiently clear political philosophy;
- (2) a tactical propensity to appeal to many diverse sectors;
- (3) charismatic capabilities;
- (4) an inclination for state planning and state intervention in the economic sphere;
- (5) a belief in developing through private initiative; and
- (6) possession of an ambiguous view of precisely what should be the role of the state and the role of the private

¹Ibid.; A full discussion of the Goulart struggle for the presidency and the initial parliamentary system that was set up as a compromise for his succession is given in Chapter III of this dissertation. Under the parliamentary system Goulart's powers were circumscribed. The problem of gaining full powers under a presidential system occupied the bulk of his activities and strength. It is little wonder that he had insufficient strength to fight the forces that were also at work to defeat his reformist program.

²Schneider, Op. Cit.

firms.¹

The ambiguous nature of the political philosophy of the populist leadership is the direct result of the attempt to appeal to many diverse sectors of the society. This tendency has had the unfortunate result of preventing the leaders from defining their economic policies. Rather than devise a clear cut economic policy and promulgate a precise political philosophy, populist leaders merely support the general principles announced within the general framework of economic development. In this area, the populists have a nationalist theme. They recognize the necessity of industrialization in the developmental effort and stress social redistribution of wealth and opportunities.²

Helio Jaguaribe has noted that the ambiguity of the populists' conceptions caused a distorted image of the populist governments. The powerful and well-organized conservative elites accepted the radical image that the populists had tactically projected as a genuine characterization of the populist position. Consequently, they tended to fear the rise of populist governments and sought to discredit and weaken them as a political force. On the other hand, the tactical projection of a radical image drew some limited sup-

¹Helio Jaguaribe, Political Development: A General Theory and a Latin American Case Study (New York: Harper and Row, 1973).

²Ibid.

port from the masses, who believed that populists were supportive of their interests.¹

In Brazil, populism appeared as the vanguard of the indigents. Populism filled the political vacuum which had existed in Brazil since 1947, the year in which the Brazilian Communist Party was outlawed. The Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) was the only ideological party on the left. By the 1960's populism was the vehicle used to mobilize the burgeoning urban population and its demands for wider participation and higher standard of living. The new populist parties of the early 1960's were nationalistic and of the left. According to Ronald Schneider they included:

- (1) Janio Quadros's moralistic ideas; and
- (2) Miguel Arraes's tenets for improving the plight of the forgotten masses of the Northeast.²

In as much as the conservative elites feared the rise of populist governments, the conservative elites had traditionally tried to discredit the populists.

¹Ibid.; The case of Goulart in Brazil indicates just how limited the support of the masses was for even the populists. The tendency for the masses to remain unpoliticized and their failure to mobilize, despite efforts on the part of the enlightened potential power contenders, was obvious when Goulart failed to gain any support from the masses or indigents during the 1964 military coup d'etat.

²Schneider, Op. Cit.; Schneider also mentioned Leonel Brizola. However, I hesitate to consider Brizola among the populists, as Jaguaribe has defined populism in Latin America. This hesitation is the result of Brizola's self-avowed communism; Archie Lang (Administrative Officer for the American Embassy in Brazil during the Quadros-Goulart era) in an inter-

The rise of new populist parties in the 1960's similarly, caused considerable concern among the more conservative populists such as Carlos Lacerda and the military leaders. The reaction within the military and within Lacerda's Democratic National Union Party (UDN) would lead to a confrontation in which populists would be labeled as communists during the period.¹

Prominent Social Forces: Communism

Communism as a force within Brazil was significantly lacking in strength. Bedeviled by the paradox of whether to base its organization on the peasant rural masses or upon the urban proletariat, the Brazilian Communist Party was considerably fragmented. The draft programs of the Brazilian Communist Party stressed forming a democratic front with the working class as the vanguard. However, Luis Carlos Prestes and his Soviet-style Communist Party continued to be plagued, in their efforts, by the failure of the working class to move in a communist direction. In an effort to achieve a democratic front, Prestes and his party appealed to the middle sectors to display their support of the people. While Prestes view stated that Brizola was a self-avowed communist.

¹Interview with H. Jon Rosenbaum, May, 1977. All of the new populists in Brazil were not communistic. Only Brizola was communistic. However, the tendency for the populists to converge on many issues with the community gave the cold warriors of Brazil and the United States an excuse to identify them as one and the same; Schneider, Op. Cit.

called for a democratic front with the working class as vanguard, in contrast, the left socialist leadership had embraced those theories oriented toward the inclusion of the urban workers and rural peasants in a common front. Francisco Juliao sought a peasant solution, and excluded the industrial workers from his program. During the Vargas Administration, Prestes and his Communist Party obtained the support of a conservative constituency to oppose the Labor Party. This collaboration with the conservative elements caused many of the Brazilian proletariat and intellectuals to consider the Brazilian Communist Party conservative.¹

During the early 1960's Brazilian socialists and Brazilian communists continued to clash on basic issues. The communists began to stress tolerance of all classes while the socialists were trying to institute restrictions on the Brazilian capitalists. Brazilian industrial labor forces were wedded to the nation, rather than class. They stressed nationalism, rather than internationalism. These postures helped to render the Brazilian Communist Party ineffective and helped to erode its status to that of a minority. While the Brazilian Communist Party was of minority status, it was at the same time accepted within the Brazilian power structure. There was no effort made to prosecute

¹Roett, Patrimonial Society; Irving Louis Horowitz, Revolution in Brazil: Politics and Society in a Developing Nation (New York: E.P. Dutton and Co., 1964).

the communists and there was a general lack of persecution, despite the illegal status of the party.¹

Brazilian Militarism: A Counter Force During the
Reformist Regime

L.I. Radway has defined militarism by designating the following features:

- (1) a doctrine or system that accords primacy in state and society to the armed forces;
- (2) a doctrine or system that exalts an institutional structure for the armed forces; and
- (3) a doctrine or system that implies a military policy and power orientation.²

Militarism had been a traditional feature of the Brazilian society since the Empire. By the early 1960's militarism was a major force in Brazil. The military was gaining considerable power and increasingly institutionalizing its structure. Brazil, like other South American nations, had become a "source of providential solutions and set of rules to be broken" by the military at its discretion. The military had traditionally designated itself as the performance entity

¹Horowitz, Op. Cit.

²Laurence I. Radway. "Militarism" in International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences. X. (ed.) David L. Sills (New York: Free Press, 1968); Also see John J. Johnson, The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962); Brazil's militarism became quite visible during the late 1950's and early 1960's.

(institutional structure) responsible for and capable of usurping the power of the existing inefficient and incapable government at a time of grave crisis.¹

The "power grab" of the military had been accepted as a legitimate function on the rationale of the doctrine of "dignified illegality", a sanctification of the use of limited violence to remove a regime that has gone wrong. The doctrine, an accepted custom among the Latin American nations and Brazil, thus legitimized the military as the institutional remedy for the political instability which results from open conflict between power contenders and the existing government. Political instability was often the direct result of the crisis of rising popular demands and the dearth of capable political institutions to gratify or supply popular aspirations. This situation of excessive demands and weak political apparatus appeared in Brazil as the process of urbanization occurred, and the dominant elites resisted the impetus for corresponding changes in the polity.²

Brazilian militarism, as a tradition, dates back to 1889 and the unification of the empire. The Brazilian military overturned the monarchy in 1889 and assumed the role of

¹Jorge Tallet, "Understanding Latin America", eds. Francisco Jose Moreno and Barbara Mitrani, Conflict and Violence in Latin America (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1971).

²Ibid.; Charles Anderson. Politics and Economic Change in Latin America. (Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand, 1967); Stepan, The Military in Politics.

the poder moderador (moderating power). From that point in history until 1964 the Brazilian military has retained the role as the poder moderador. Although some scholars refer to the period following the military domination of Deodoro and Floriano as the era of civilian rule, the military brought pressure to bear on the civilian rulers of that era. Military incursions into politics reappeared in 1918, after a brief period of inactivity during World War I. The inception of military uprisings during this era ultimately crystallized in the successful revolution that placed Getulio Vargas in the role of Chief Executive. The military also demonstrated its role as poder moderador in 1945 by removing Vargas.¹

Traditionally, the Brazilian military was not politically ambitious. However, the rising professionalization of Latin American armies and the rise of the cold war in the post war era caused considerable change. The rise in professionalization was accompanied by the development of a military complex which was powerful and highly bureaucratized. With the Revolution of 1930 the armed forces gradually gained influence as a political force, and began determining which power contenders should rule and how.² John J. Johnson contends

¹Claudio Veliz, The Handbook of Latin America (New York: Praeger, 1968); Schneider, Op. Cit.

²Stepan, The Military in Politics; Schneider, Op. Cit.; John J. Johnson, "The Military in Society", ed. Robert D. Tomasek, Latin American Politics: Studies of the Contemporary Scene (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1970).

that the 1930 Revolution placed the armed forces in "center of politics and the locus of power has resided in them ever since".¹

Since 1945, when the dictatorship was terminated, the president has tried to have his "dispositivo militar", a group of officers who guarantee him in office. The recurring theme of military incursions to restrain or overthrow the president in order to save the country was exemplified in 1955, when a military coup d'etat brought Kubitschek's democratic and stable rule to the Brazilian nation.²

By the beginning of the Quadros Administration, the armed forces possessed tremendous power potential and were experiencing a broadening scope of concern and activity. A changing political environment, nationally and internationally heightened the role of the military in Brazil. The international environment changed as Castro rose in Cuba, making internal security a higher priority than hemisphere security within military policy.³

In order to stop the "communists' internal warfare and subversion", the United States stressed that the Latin

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.; Schneider, Op. Cit.

³Stepan, The Military in Politics.

American military should move toward counter-insurgency and civic action. According to Alfred Stepan, United States policy urging the Latin American military to "become more deeply involved in all phases of society in order to wage an effective campaign against internal warfare encouraged a deeper involvement of the military in politics. Thus, by 1964, given the rising capabilities of the military and the new rationale to broaden its scope, militarism was an obvious feature that was growing in Brazil.¹

The orientation of the Brazilian military was pro-United States. This orientation stemmed from the period of World War II, in which the Brazilian military established a special relationship with the United States. Brazil's FEB (Brazilian Expeditionary Force) had fought on an integrated basis with a United States army corps in Italy during World War II. Following the war, upon Brazil's request, a United States advisory mission to aid in the formation of a special school which would formulate a new doctrine of development and national security was established in Brazil.² The Bra-

¹Ibid.; An anti-communist theme existed before U.S. influence during the late 1950's and early 1960's. However, U.S. influence heightened this trend toward militarism; Edwin Martin, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs stated U.S. policy toward the Latin American Military on October 6, 1963. In his statement he encouraged the military to become more involved in civic action programs. U.S. Department of State Historical Office, American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 323-325.

²Stepan, The Military in Politics.

zilian military, thus, countered the efforts of the reformist regime and the nationalists to initiate change. The resistance to change included countering the drastic revision of Brazil's traditional foreign policy and countering extensive social and political reforms.¹

Towards a New Foreign Policy For Brazil: Agonizing Reappraisal

During the early 1960's, the traditional foreign policy of Brazil was subjected to rigorous analysis and agonizing reappraisal. The traditional policy, which included close cooperation with the United States as a major goal, had prevailed as the guidepost of Brazil's relationship with the United States throughout the twentieth century. The effort to revise the prevailing foreign policy was divisive within Brazil, itself, and had far reaching implications for

¹Roger W. Fontaine, Brazil and the United States: Toward a Maturing Relationship (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy, Research, 1974), pp. 72-93; The Brazilian military was not monolithic. There were three major factions within the Brazilian military. They were: the nationalists led by Gen. Estillac Leal, Gen. Nelson Werneck Sodre, and Marshal Osvaldo Alves; the Sorbonne group, a moderate faction, led by Gen. Golbery Couto e Silva, Gen. Carlos de Meira Mattos and Marshal Castelo Branco; and the Linha Dura (hard liners), a conservative faction, led by Generals Costa e Silva, Emilio Garrastazu Medici, Odilio Denys, and Admiral Silvino Heck. Although the Brazilian military was factionalized, it was capable of serving as a countervailing force. Its success in countering the drastic revision of Brazil's traditional foreign policy and in countering extensive social and political reforms was largely the result of the dominant position which the linha dura and the Sorbonne groups held among the military factions.

future relations between Brazil and the United States.¹

Although the traditional foreign policy had served Brazil for more than a century, the Brazilian populace had not always been entirely satisfied with it.² Brazilian nationalists had expressed their dissatisfaction with the policy as early as the 1930's.³ The nationalistic expressions of dissatisfaction with the traditional foreign policy were minor aberrations in the line of continuous Brazilian support of close relations with the United States. The accommodation

¹Thomas E. Weil and Jan Black, Area Handbook for Brazil (Washington, D.C.: American University, 1971); Fontaine, Op. Cit.; E. Bradford Burns, "Tradition and Variation in Brazil's Foreign Policy", Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, v. 9, April, 1967, pp. 195-207; At the beginning of the twentieth century the second Baron Rio Branco, the Brazilian diplomat, proclaimed close cooperation with the United States as one of the leading foreign policy goals of Brazil. Other policy goals were: to emphasize hemispheric cooperation; to expand diplomatic relations on a global scale; to establish diplomatic relations with other Latin American countries; and to increase Brazil's prestige in the world community of nations. This goal of close cooperation with the United States contrasted with the general ill-will toward the United States that prevailed in other Latin American countries at the turn of the century; See Pratt, Op. Cit., p. 98; See also Mecham, United States-Latin American Relations, Secretary of State Elinu Root's efforts to temper Latin American suspicions of the growing United States imperialism at the Third International Conference of American States in Rio de Janeiro in 1906 had been successful only in Brazil.

²E. Bradford Burns, "Tradition and Variation in Brazil's Foreign Policy", Op. Cit., pp. 200-201; Acrimony over the traditional foreign policy began after the second Baron Rio Branco's death and heightened in the 1930's. During the 1930's the nationalists were joined in their critique of the traditional foreign policy by the traditional left.

³Jose Honorio Rodrigues et. al., "A Crise do Pan Americanismo", Politica Externa Independente (Rio De Janeiro,

that prevailed between the two countries was originally based on commercial interests, but later the accommodation extended to cooperation in security matters as well.¹

The appearance of nationalist opposition to the Brazilian foreign policy in the 1930's appears to be ironical, for Latin American nations and the United States were in the midst of the Good Neighbor era. However, amid the general goodwill between the United States and Latin American countries, a series of economic and political factors had caused relations between Brazil and the United States to become strained.² In the midst of the disharmony between the two nations the controversial issue that surfaced was, to what extent was Brazil to cooperate with the United States. This controversy of the 1930's dictated the need to reappraise Brazil's foreign policy. Brazilian nationalists, who opposed the continued close cooperation with the United States, chal-

Brazil, S.A.: Editora Civilizacao Brasileira, 1965), pp. 3-5. The nationalists and traditional left stressed that political and cultural loyalty to the western democratic systems must be rejected since it was a counter theme to Brazil's policy imperative, socio-economic development.

¹Pratt, Op. Cit., pp. 199-200; The commercial interests of the two nations, which were based on mutual trade benefits originally, was extended to security matters during World War I.

²Mecham, United States-Latin American Relations, Op. Cit., pp. 110-130, 448-449; Factors that caused relations between Brazil to be strained included: the United States failure to join the League of Nations; the United States failure to purchase Brazilian goods at what Brazilians con-

lenged the fundamental tenets of the prevailing foreign policy. They identified these fundamental tenets as:

- (1) Brazil's identification with Western political systems; and
- (2) the needs and demands of Western political system which served as the basic factor in defining Brazil's national interest.¹

The identification of Brazil with Western political systems, and the consequential definition of the Brazilian national interest on the basis of the needs of Western political systems was perceived by nationalists as an extension of the Brazilians failure to recognize the realities of their own conditions and needs. This failure was viewed as crucial, since the needs and conditions of Brazilians were very different from those of Western nations and often conflicted with them.²

Western nations were generally economically advanced and industrialized. Their economies were usually neither monocultural nor reflexive. Western nations were primarily

sidered to be a fair price; Getulio Vargas's establishment of O Estado Novo (the New State); and the rise of fascism in Brazil; See also Pratt, Op. Cit.

¹Jose Honorio Rodrigues et al., "A Crise do Pan Americanismo", Op. Cit., pp. 3-5.

²E. Bradford Burns, "Tradition and Variation in Brazil's Foreign Policy", Op. Cit., pp. 3-5.

populated with the descendants of Europeans, and did not exude a culture that was based on African themes. Brazil has a history of dependence on primary exports, and was not economically advanced nor industrialized. The economy of Brazil was monocultural and reflexive. The population of Brazil was ethnically diverse, and while Brazil was populated by inhabitants of European descent, the descendants of Africa had dominant themes in the Brazilian culture.¹ In as much as Brazil was an exporter of primary products, it was self destructive to identify with the interests of the industrialized nations, who sought the purchase of inexpensive primary goods. In as much as Brazil was underdeveloped, her mandatory imperative was that of economic development, an imperative that was meaningless to the Western industrial powers. If Brazil were to attain her desired status and development, it must use these designated realities as the underpinnings of a more viable definition of its national interest and as the key factor dictating its foreign policy. According to these nationalistic arguments, the Brazilian interests could not be protected within the context of close relations and

¹Jose Honorio Rodrigues, Brazil and Africa (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1965), pp. 207-208; Janio Quadros, "Brazil's New Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs, v. 40, No. 1, October, 1961, p. 25; Quadros emphasized the African themes in Brazil's culture.

alignment with the United States.¹

Despite the conflict between the United States and Brazil and the rising efforts of Brazilian nationalists to change the theme of close cooperation with the United States in the 1930's, a series of actions forestalled serious efforts to discontinue close alignment and cooperation with the United States as a part of Brazil's foreign policy. Among these actions were Export-Import Bank loans for Brazil and the United States-Brazilian Trade Agreement of 1936. These modes of accommodation were enhanced by cooperation in security matters. Brazil's cooperative effort during World War II was bold and effective, encompassing military collaboration and economic collaboration for defense. These activities entailed: (1) the supply of essential materials to the United States; (2) the establishment of a base in Brazil; (3) the organization of the joint Brazil-United States Defense Commission; (4) the supply of strategic materials; (5) the Brazilian navy's patrol of the South Atlantic; and (6) the development of a Brazilian army, trained and equipped by the United States, which fought in Italy.²

¹Jose Honorio Rodrigues et. al, "A Crise do Pan Americanismo", Op. Cit., pp. 3-5, 6-15.

²Mecham, United States-Latin American Relations, Op. Cit., pp. 450-452; In addition to these factors Foreign Ministers Oswaldo Aranha used his influence to moderate the controversial issues. He engaged the Vargas regime's cooperation in the United States and Allies war effort during World War II, thus moderating the controversy.

The postwar economic crisis in Brazil affected the ~~country in two important ways: (1) it revealed the weakness~~ and dependence of Brazil on the international financial scene, and thus, motivated Brazilians to seek self-sufficiency through industrialization and diversification of production; and (2) it caused increasing resentment of the United States. This resentment of the United States was based on the feeling that it had neglected Brazil.¹ The Joint United States-Brazilian Technical Commission, in the Abbink Report of 1949, reiterated Brazil's concerns by stressing "the need for balanced development of the Brazilian economy and the need for American capital for development", and called for the establishment of the Joint Commission for Economic Development. When the Joint Commission for Economic Development was established in 1950, it pointed out the capital needs of Brazil.² The resulting series of loans that were granted to Brazil through the Export-Import Bank and the World Bank were deemed inadequate by Brazilians.³ In 1953 the United States reacted to accusations of neglect by negotiating an additional loan of 300 million dollars, a loan that induced Brazil to comply

¹Ibid., pp. 455-456.

²Ibid., p. 455.

³Ibid., p. 456.

with the United States wishes by ratifying the Military Assistance Agreement.¹

Despite the growing hostilities in Brazil toward the United States, which stemmed from a feeling that the United States had neglected Brazil for more strategic arenas in the cold war, the nationalists could not initiate a revision of Brazil's foreign policy. Brazilian nationalists, in the 1930's had opted for a foreign policy which would promote national development goals and allow Brazil to pursue its interests without the alleged obstacle of considering the national interest of the United States. The efforts of Brazilian nationalists to change the basic orientation of Brazil's foreign policy had been continuous throughout the 1930's and the 1940's. Even during the late 1950's, Kubitschek was reluctant to support nationalist revision of Brazil's foreign policy.² Although he promoted a highly nationalistic development program, criticized the United States for neglect, and established trade contact with the communist countries, his developmental program was bolstered by private United States capital investments.³

¹Ibid.

²Rodrigues, "A Crise do Pan Americanismo, Op. Cit.

³Burns, Nationalism in Brazil; Mecham, United States-Latin American Relations.

The rise of the reformist regime provided the nationalists their long sought opportunity to effect change in the Brazilian foreign policy. By the turn of the decade a substantial proportion of the Brazilian population, including the new chief executive Quadros and the Foreign Minister Afonso Arinos, sought the transformation of the traditional foreign policy.¹

The efforts to revise the foreign policy resulted in a controversy that dichotomized the Brazilians. The salient issue in the controversy was:

Is a policy of close alignment with
the United States in the national
interest of Brazil?

In order to answer the above question, Brazilians tended to draw upon their perceptions of two related features:

- (1) To what extent is a policy of close alignment with the United States beneficial or detrimental to the economic interests of Brazil?
- (2) To what extent is a policy of close alignment with the United States beneficial or detrimental to the national security of Brazil?

Among Brazilians there was a recognized necessity for economic development. If we assume that all Brazilians were committed to economic development, as they claimed to be,

¹Rodrigues, "A Crise do Pan Americanism", Op. Cit.

we can in turn assume that the conflict that existed was rooted in contrasting conceptions of economic development, and consequential contrasting approaches to economic development.

The opposing factions on the issue of foreign policy and economic development were as follows:

- (1) the radical revisionists, the antecedents of the earlier nationalists and the proponents of Janio Quadros's independent foreign policy; and
- (2) the pragmatic revisionists, who stressed a geopolitical basis for Brazil's foreign policy and sought continued close alignment with the United States.¹

Radical revisionists tended to stress socio-economic development along with their preference for Quadros's independent foreign policy and their skepticism of private foreign capital. Pragmatic revisionists tended to focus on techno-economic development along with their geopolitical strategy and included national security as a definite part of any strategy for economic development and foreign policy.²

Quadros's independent foreign policy, announced during his inaugural address, rallied the radical revisionists and nationalists to the cause. He reiterated his nationalism and

¹Roger Fontaine, Brazil and the United States: Toward a Maturing Relationship (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1974).

²Ibid.

signaled a reversal from the earlier Kubitschek era.¹ Although Kubitschek had proposed Operation Pan America, his proposal had stopped short of suggesting a genuine revision of Brazil's foreign policy and was restricted to the Western Hemisphere.²

The independent foreign policy included the following themes:

- (1) socio-economic development as the imperative for Brazil;
- (2) the broadening of Brazil's relations with other nations, including socialistic countries of Eastern Europe, the Western bloc countries, and the Afro-Asian bloc countries;
- (3) the quest for world-wide commercial relations and the acquisition of new markets;
- (4) the elimination of colonialism and the support for independence for all people; and
- (5) the quest for increased prestige and a leadership role for Brazil in the Western Hemisphere and in the world as a whole.³

Quadros expressed his desire to see colonialism eliminated. He admonished Portugal as a colonial power and de-

¹Skidmore, Politics in Brazil; John W.F. Dulles, Unrest in Brazil: Political Military Crises, 1955-1968 (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1970).

²Mario Victor, Cinco Anos que Abalaram O Brasil: de Janio Quadros ao Marechal Castelo Branco (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilizacao Brasileira, 1965).

³Janio Quadros, "Brazil's New Foreign Policy", Op. Cit., p. 19.

scribed colonialism as a self-destructive and dying institution. He prescribed the appropriate Brazilian responses to colonialism. His prescription entailed the recognition of the excesses of colonialism, the assistance in its demise, and giving support to the emerging nations. This perspective of the Brazilian role in the demise of colonialism signaled the beginning of a new policy of establishing diplomatic relations with the countries of Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe of every political persuasion.¹

Aside from Janio Quadros and Afonso Arinos, authors of the independent foreign policy, radical revisionists included J. Salgado Freire, Mario Neto, Dagoberto Salles, Generals Estillac Leal and Nelson Werneck Sodre, and Marshal Osvino Alves. Their opposition to the continuation of the traditional policy was based on the following arguments:

¹Victor, Op. Cit., pp. 83-95; The article in Foreign Affairs was a sequel to Quadros's inaugural address of January 31, 1961. In his inaugural address, he indicated his desire to develop commercial relations with all nations and to secure a position of genuine sovereignty relative to the concert of nations. He condemned colonialism, but expressed his desire for continued friendly relations with Western nations. Foreign Minister Afonso Arinos reaffirmed the policy of trade with all nations on January 2, 1961, and Quadros indicated that diplomatic relations were being established with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania. The Brazilian delegate to the United Nations had been advised to vote to affirm the admission of the Peoples Republic of China to the United Nations. Quadros also indicated that Brazil would support the Algerian independence movement; See also Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco, Evolucao da Crise Brasileira (Rio de Janeiro, Brasil: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1966), pp. 246-247; J. Hickey, "The Day Mr. Berle Talked to Mr. Quadros", Inter-American Economic Affairs, v. 15, Summer, 1961, pp. 58-72; Quadros also indi-

1. The United States is using the cold war to gain economic advantages from the Third World.
2. The United States effort to include Brazil in its conflict with the Soviet Union could mean the annihilation of Brazil if a nuclear war broke out.
3. Brazil's collaboration will ultimately lead to the satellization of Brazil.
4. United States private investment in Brazil results in highly exploitative profit remittances.
5. By accepting extensive economic assistance from the United States, Brazil risks the probability of becoming the United States "chief agent" in charge of preventing radical regimes in Latin America.
6. Brazil must guard against foreign exploitation of oil resources.¹

cated that he would oppose any efforts to intervene in Cuba and stressed the cultural links between Brazil and Africa. Adolf Berle, Kennedy's special envoy to Brazil, had enraged Quadros by trying to engage his assistance in the American conflict with Cuba; See also Dulles, Op. Cit., pp. 120-123.

¹Fontaine, Op. Cit., pp. 45-50, 75-79; See also Keith Larry Storrs, Brazil's Independent Foreign Policy (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1973); Storrs refers to those who supported the independent foreign policy as independents. According to Storrs, the independents proposed autonomous development and were structuralists. As structuralists, they sought industrialization (based on natural resources) as a means of ensuring the growth of Brazil's international power and national autonomy. According to the independent's view, foreign capital had a colonizing effect on Brazil and exacerbated the balance of payments difficulties.

The nationalistic officers had not been a part of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force that was attached to the American Fifth Army in Italy during World War II. Nor had they attended foreign military schools. Rather, their training had been limited to the basic course which the Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros offered. Their complaints focused on foreign exploitation of oil resources and they supported Quadros's independent foreign policy.¹

The predominant alternative to the independent foreign policy was the geopolitical strategy, which emphasized continued close alignment with the United States and associated development. Its major proponents were members of the Sorbonne military faction. However, the intellectuals who had supported selective alignment with the United States also ultimately threw their support behind the geopolitical school and its policy postures. This school of geopolitical thinkers and conservative economists (monetarists) comprised the pragmatic revisionists.²

¹Fontaine, Op. Cit.

²Ibid., pp. 33-45; See also Storrs, Op. Cit., pp. 205-212; Storrs refers to the policy which the pragmatic revisionists pursued as the Americanist policy and to the school of economic thought which embraced this policy as the monetarists. The pragmatic revisionists included such intellectuals as Roberto Campos, Henrique Valle, Adolpho Menezes, Eugenio Gudin, and Carlos Lacerda; See also Leff, Op. Cit.

Andreas Dorpalen has defined geopolitics as the science of the earth relationships of political processes, the theory that the space and structure of nations is the foundation of their relationships and politics. Early geopolitical thought included the ideas of Frederick Ratzel, Sir Halford Mackinder, and Admiral Alfred T. Mahan. Frederick Ratzel's bio-geography gave birth to the concept of the "organismic state". Sir Halford J. Mackinder emphasized buffer zones and huge land masses. His thesis concerning these geographic features led to the development of "heartland and world island" concepts. From Admiral Mahan, the geopolitical school developed theories about seapower.¹ The ideas of Nicholas Spykman, however, relate more specifically to the Brazilian geopolitical theories.²

Spykman defined power as the ability to wage successful war and considered military and political strategy to be directly related to geography. According to his theory, geography is the key factor to be considered in analyzing the

¹James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: J.P. Lippincott, 1971), pp. 50-63; Andreas Dorpalen, The World of General Haushoffer (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1942), pp. xi-xii; Frederick Ratzel, "The Sea as a Source of National Greatness", ed. Dorpalen, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 50-56; Halford J. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History", ed. Dorpalen, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 185-201; Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown, and Co., 1890), pp. 7-9.

²Nicholas Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1942).

power positions of nation states. Although he stipulated that Brazil's power position was enhanced by its vast domain and its abundant resources, he did not fail to designate its limitations. Brazil's major problems, according to his thesis, were the continuing quarrel with Argentina over the La Plata River, the inadequate infrastructure, the inadequate communication facilities, and the vast underdeveloped interior. With respect to the defense of Brazil, Spykman considered the military strength of Brazil to be inadequate for the protection of its vast domain. Accordingly, he concluded that the United States must inevitably be charged with the defense of the "buffer zone", and that to defend the Western Hemisphere the United States must be given access to the bases in Brazil's "bulge".¹

¹Carlos Meira Mattos, Brasil-Geopolitica and Destino (Rio de Janeiro, Brasil: Olympio, 1975), p. 61; Gen. Carlos Meira Mattos, contemporary geopolitical military man in Brazil, reflects the ideas of Spykman in his appeal to Brazil to permit the United States to utilize the strategic Northeast; Golbery do Couto e Silva, another contemporary and influential Brazilian geopolitical thinker, also reflected the ideas of Spykman by assigning an associative role to Brazil with respect to the United States; See also Carlos P. Mastroilli, "An Updating of the Golbery Doctrine: The Geopolitics and Destiny of Brazil", Estrategia, March-April, 1976, p. 38. The previous generation of Brazilian geopolitical theoreticians included Everardo Backheuser and Mario Travasso. Everardo Backheuser stressed the theory of "living frontiers"; See Edverardo Beckheuser, A Geopolitica Geral do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exercicio, 19520; See also Estrategia, Op. Cit., p. 38; See Mario Travassos, Projecao Continental do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, Brasil: Editorial Brasiliane, 1938); See also Spykman, Op. Cit.; The "bulge" of Brazil, the closest point to Africa, was considered by Spykman to be the strategic point, since it was an important point of control of both air and sea communications.

Gen. Golbery do Couto e Silva, drawing from the ideas of leading geopolitical theorists, put forth tenets that would ensure Brazil's success in attaining her goal of international prestige and national security. His tenets were published during the Kubitschek era.¹ During that era the geopolitical theory of Gen. Golbery became a highly significant force in Brazilian politics. Gen. Golbery had served in the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB), and had been greatly influenced by the United States military officials. Gen. Golbery and the participants in the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB) formed the Sorbonne faction of the Brazilian military. Golbery and his Sorbonne members served on the faculty of the Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG). The Escola Superior de Guerra, a repository of an all-embracing system of military education, had been founded by the officials of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB) with the assistance of a United States advisory mission. Through Golbery and the Sorbonne group, who served on the faculty of the Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG), a direct relationship was developed between geopolitical thought and military education in Brazil.²

¹Golbery do Couto e Silva, Aspectos Geopolíticas do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Brasil: Biblioteca do Exército, 1957), pp. 63-64; The major tenets, which Golbery listed are: participation in the defense of Western civilization; cooperation with the developing nations; containment along the frontier; and national strategy; See also Fontaine, Op. Cit.

²Ibid.

Aside from serving as the key to the formulation of a doctrine of national security for the Superior War College, the Golbery theory of geopolitics served as the basis for selecting strategies for national development. Through Golbery's theory, national development strategies were linked to national security. Fundamental to this doctrine of national security through economic development was the assumption that Brazil was defenseless as long as it remained underdeveloped.¹

The solution to Brazil's underdeveloped and vulnerable state was presumed to be two-fold; (1) development of a strong centralized nation state; and (2) maintenance of close alliance with the United States. According to Golbery, Brazil's close collaboration with the United States was mutually beneficial to the West and Brazil.² The benefits that accrued to the West included: (1) Brazil's resources; (2) Brazil's human resources potential; and (3) Brazil's geographic position in the South Atlantic. Brazil, in turn, needed United States assistance. Golbery further states that it is in the interest of the United States to give assistance to Brazil since a "communist Brazil" would be a geopolitical disaster.³

¹Golbery, Op. Cit.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.; Fontaine, Op. Cit.

During the Quadros-Goulart era, these tenets, and the school of thought that embraced them, served as a formidable opposition to the Quadros independent foreign policy alternative and to the administration that supported it. The idea of close alignment with the United States for security reasons coincided with the idea of close alignment to receive the benefits of United States capital in developmental efforts. Hence, the geopolitical school of thought converged with the developmental-nationalists, and supported the traditional theme of techno-economic development, as opposed to socio-economic development. Roberto Campos, the technico who preferred continued close alignment with the United States, and Gen. Golbery set up this basic theme for economic development through national security schemes.¹ This was the force that emerged victoriously through the Brazilian coup d'etat of 1964 and dominated the Brazilian political and economic scene throughout the 1960's and the 1970's.²

¹
Ibid.

²Ibid., Carlos P. Mastrorilli, Op. Cit., p. 32; According to Mastrorilli, Golbery's theory of geopolitics, announced in the 1950's, "systemized the concept of the associative role assigned to Brazil" with respect to the United States. The Brazilian model, initiated with the military coup d'etat of 1964, was a direct result of that systemized concept. Mastrorilli also noted Gen. Carlos Meira Mattos's argument for close alignment of Brazil with the United States. Carlos Meira Mattos's argument influenced developments from 1964 throughout the 1970's in Brazil, as did Golbery's theory. Mattos maintained that in order to fulfill Brazil's destiny as a continental and a global power, Brazil must carry out designated

In essence, the geopolitical foreign policy adherents sought continued close relations with the United States for defense purposes. The tendency for the geopolitical school to stress national security and containment came into conflict with the goal of social, economic, and political development. In contrast, the aims of Quadros, Goulart, and the radical nationalists were to guide Brazil in achieving independence from Europe and the United States, and increase its trade opportunities as an adjunct to socio-economic development.¹

The reformist regime of Quadros-Goulart, which spans the period from January of 1961 through March of 1964, was an era of intense political conflict. This conflict existed on two levels: (1) the domestic level; and (2) the international level. The domestic conflict followed logically from the existence of a regime that promised reform and thus alienated established elites. The reformist regime also initiated a revision of Brazil's foreign policy. The domestic conflict was extended to the international level as a result of this revision. Brazil's foreign policy had traditionally favored close alignment with the United States, and American

responsibilities. These responsibilities included: integrating the Brazilian heartland; assisting in the defense of the Western Hemisphere; making the strategic Northeast available to the United States; and assisting in the endeavor to maintain the security of the South Atlantic and West Africa. See Mattos, Op. Cit. pp. 74, Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns.

¹Quadros, Op. Cit.

strategic actors became apprehensive over a threat to their favored position. America valued the continued alignment of Brazil, and sought to reinforce Brazil's traditional foreign policy by initiating the vast economic assistance program in Brazil (the Alliance for Progress). The program, however, was hypothetically intended to reinforce the aspirations of the reformers and the have nots of Brazil.¹

The prominent social forces sought reform, but they were countered by the conservative forces, which tended to be stronger. The conservative forces in Brazil, led by the military, were ushered into a coalition with American interests that feared a drastic revision in Brazil's foreign policy. This Brazilian scenario of the early 1960's can roughly be divided into three stages:

- (1) The first stage began with the inauguration of Quadros in January of 1961 and ended with his resignation in August of the same year.
- (2) The second stage began with the controversial succession of Goulart to the presidency, and included the brief

¹Skidmore, Politics in Brazil; Included in the reform effort was the revision (drastic) of Brazil's foreign policy. While it was not necessarily considered to be a vital factor for most Third World countries, the revision of the foreign policy had broad implications for indigenous developmental schemes and conflicting ideologies. In this respect, the revision of Brazil's foreign policy constituted the basis for considerable acrimony in Brazil and in the United States.

period in which Goulart's powers as president were extremely circumscribed through the conversion of the Brazilian political system to a parliamentary system.

- (3) The third stage began when the plebiscite re-established a presidential system in Brazil in January of 1963. The coup d'etat of 1964 ended this stage. In the following chapters, we shall see how American strategic actors responded to the prominent social forces and the conflict that resulted from the impetus to social change and reform.

PART TWO

THE GAME: KENNEDY'S IDEALISM
ENCOUNTERS BOLD CHALLENGES

CHAPTER III

WAVERING IDEALISM: THE KENNEDY PHASE

The election of John Fitzgerald Kennedy to the American presidency in 1960 meant the possible fulfillment of a seven year old promise. The promise was a reappraisal of the traditional United States policy toward Latin America, a necessity first designated by the Eisenhower Report of 1953.¹ Despite the admonitions of the Eisenhower Report, the Latin American demonstrations against Vice President Nixon, and the Cuban Revolution, a genuine effort to reappraise United States policy toward Latin America had been forestalled throughout the Eisenhower Administration. Near the conclusion of the Eisenhower Administration in 1959, the United States decision to support the establishment of the Inter-American Develop-

¹Dreier, The Alliance for Progress; Milton S. Eisenhower, "United States-Latin American Relations (1953-1958): Report to the President, December 27, 1958" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1959); Milton S. Eisenhower, The Wine is Bitter: The United States and Latin America (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1963); Meham, United States and Latin American Relations; Federico Gil, Latin American-United States Relations (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Janovich, 1971).

ment Bank and the Inter-American Social Development Fund signaled a modest change in the United States policy toward Latin America.¹ However, the proposals for broader change would await the election of John Fitzgerald Kennedy.

The Launching of the Alliance for Progress

In 1961 the Mayobre Memorandum, the initial document devising the Alliance for Progress, had warned the Kennedy men that the Alliance for Progress was doomed if Latin America perceived it as "an entering wedge for American private investments". Kennedy heeded the warning by excluding business interests from his inner-circle that planned the Alliance for Progress. With the exception of Douglas Dillon, who would later become Secretary of Treasury, the inclusion of those usually associated with the interests of big business and corporations was nil. Within the realm of economics, Kennedy relied heavily on the advice of Paul Samuelson, the MIT economist who headed the Kennedy task force on economics.

¹Lieuwen, Op. Cit.; Dreier, The Alliance for Progress; Mecham, The United States and Latin American Relations; Levinson and de Onis, Op. Cit.; "Request for Authorization of U.S. Membership in the Inter-American Development Bank: Message From the President (Eisenhower) to the Congress"; American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, May 11, 1959, pp. 470-472; "The Inter-American Development Bank Act: Public Law 86-147", American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, August 7, 1959, pp. 481-484; "Agreement Establishing the Inter-American Development Bank Signed at Washington", American Foreign Policy: Current Documents 1959, April 8, 1959, p. 469; "Recommendation of Congressional Approval of U.S. Participation in the Inter-American Development Bank: Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations", American

Paul Samuelson placed heavy emphasis on public investment and public interests, as opposed to the traditionalists of the Eisenhower Administration who relied on private investment. This emphasis on public investment would become a pillar of the Alliance for Progress approach.¹

Despite the exclusion of business interests from the Kennedy inner-circle that designed the Alliance for Progress program and the Samuelson emphasis on public investment, the Alliance for Progress would reflect the influence from the business community due to the balance of payments constraints. The balance of payments deficit had been extremely high during the Eisenhower Administration, a matter of great concern to key groups in the United States. Many Americans blamed foreign

Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, July 8, 1959, pp. 476-480; American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, June 22, 1959, p. 928; American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, June 8, 1959; American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, February 15, 1960, p. 263; American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, February 22, 1960, pp. 285-290; R.R. Rubottom Jr., Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs discussed progress through cooperation in Latin America and indicated that the Inter-American Development Bank is an example of multilateral cooperation. The bank was to officially go into business in February after the first meeting of the Board of Governors to be held in March; "Department Supports U.S. Membership in International Development Association", U.S. Department of State Bulletin, April 4, 1960, p. 529.

¹U.S. Congress, Senate. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Foreign Assistance Act of 1962: To Amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 87 Congress, 2d Session, 1962; Also see W. Carl Bivens, Economics and Public Policy (Columbus, Ohio: Charles Merrill Books, Inc., 1966); Levinson and de Onis, Op. Cit.

economic assistance for the heightening deficit. In November of 1960, during the last days of his administration, President Eisenhower reacted to national concern by issuing a directive which stated that primary emphasis in the United States foreign assistance program should be placed on the tying of aid funds to the purchase of goods and services from the United States. Thus, when the Agency for International Development was established and the Alliance for Progress was launched, tying arrangements were already in effect.¹

The nature of the American policy making process has been depicted as political. The ramifications of the political nature of the policy making process are compromise, sabotage, and inaction. Roger Hilsman describes the esoteric nature of the foreign policy decision-making process in the United States as "congeries of separate or only vaguely related actions".

Rather than through grand decisions on grand alternatives, policy changes seem to come through a series of slight modifications of existing policy, with the new policy emerging slowly and hauntingly by small and usually tentative steps, a process of trial and error in which policy zigs and zags, reverses itself, and then moves forward in a series of incremental steps.²

¹Levinson and de Onis, Op. Cit.; W. Carl Bivens, Economics and Public Policy (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Books, Inc., 1966); Bivens, Op. Cit.

²Hilsman, Op. Cit.

The politicization that encompassed the foreign policy amalgam and caused a failure to implement the Alliance for Progress was centered in the struggle between Kennedy and the Kennedy men against Johnson and the career men. While Kennedy and the Kennedy men had initiated a revision of the traditional United States policy toward Latin America and put forth the Alliance for Progress as the alternative approach, the career men preferred the traditional approach and countered the Kennedy men's efforts to implement the Alliance for Progress.¹

Jerome Levinson, General Counsel for the Inter-American Development Bank, and Robert Ballantyne, Deputy Director for South American Affairs, both stress that there was a discernible dichotomy between the Kennedy men and the career men.² Niles Bond, former Charge d'affaires of the American Embassy in Brazil, verified the division.³ According to Levinson, the Kennedy men were idealistic, optimistic, reform-minded, and

¹Interview with Jerome I. Levinson, September, 1979.
Interview with Niles Bond, December 30, 1976; Levinson and de Onis, Op. Cit.

²Interview with Jerome I. Levinson, September, 1979.
Interview with Robert Ballantyne, April 30, 1976.

³Interview with Niles Bond, December 30, 1976.
Interview with Joseph Page, June, 1979. Joseph Page also verified the dichotomy between the two groups.
Interview with Donor Lion, April, 1976. Donor Lion also verified the dichotomy.

impatient with the seemingly intransigence of the entrenched elite groups in Latin America. The Kennedy men stressed public investment or public capital transfers for financial assistance in Latin America, and capital development rather than technical assistance. These strategic actors, who were involved in the Alliance for Progress program, focused their attention on the poverty stricken Northeast region of Brazil. They sought to ensure Brazil's alignment with the United States by focusing on efforts to assist in the socio-economic development of the Northeast and by encouraging land reform. They were usually appointed to positions in the newly established Agency for International Development.¹

In contrast, Levinson identified the career men as those skeptical of the Alliance for Progress goals and as those who doubted that Latin American elites would be willing to undertake the reforms that were essential for the attainment of the goals. The career men were opposed to public capital transfers, as the form of capital assistance, and preferred American private investment. In this respect, the views of the career men converged with those of the business groups and corporate interests.²

The career men, who were opposed to the nascent ideal-

¹Interview with Jerome I. Levinson, September, 1979; Bivens, Op. Cit.

²Interview with Jerome I. Levinson, September, 1979; Levinson and de Onis, Op. Cit.

ism of the Kennedy era, were primarily employed in the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency. During the 1950's Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Senator Joseph McCarthy had imbued the Department of State with a legacy of conservatism. Senator McCarthy's communist witch hunt had forced a substantial proportion of the most astute career diplomats to resign. Those career diplomats who remained in the State Department tended to adopt a neo-Wilsonian perspective of the global scene and were impervious to the "New Frontier" philosophy.¹

Amid the general conflict that ensued between the Kennedy men and the career men, several variables existed as determinants of power that accrued to either side. Among the variables (as mentioned before) were:

- (1) the nature and missions of the key agencies involved in implementing the Alliance for Progress;
- (2) the action channels of the game;
- (3) the parameters of the game; and
- (4) the change of administration.

The American foreign policy making amalgam has been characterized as a series of concentric circles. The innermost circle consists of the President and the president's men, the presidential appointees who represent the administra-

¹John Franklin Campbell, The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory (New York: Basic Books, 1971), p. 61.
Kegley, Op. Cit.

tion and are expected to shape the bureaucracy according to the President's wishes. Among the president's men are the secretaries of State and other participating departments, the undersecretaries of these departments, assistant secretaries of the departments, the directors of the Agency for International Development, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, and the President's National Security Advisor. The president's men are labelled as Kennedy men in this inquiry. They have been enumerated previously. As strategic actors, they were lodged in official positions, which granted them extensive power.¹

Adolf Berle headed the Kennedy Task Force on Latin America, the group that authored the Alliance for Progress. Berle, lawyer and former Professor of International Law at Columbia University, had been Ambassador to Brazil. During the early part of the Kennedy Administration he was a Special Envoy to Brazil. His mission was to build a common inter-American front against Cuba. Quadros's response to his suggestion was negative.²

Academicians Robert Alexander and Arthur Whitaker also served on the Kennedy Latin American Task Force. Robert

¹Hilsman, Op. Cit.; Ronald J. Stupak, American Foreign Policy: Assumptions, Processes, and Projections (New York: Harper and Row, 1976).

²Levinson and de Onis, Op. Cit.

Alexander, Professor of Economics at Rutgers University, was a Brazilian expert. Arthur Whitaker, Professor of History at the University of Pennsylvania, was a specialist in United States diplomatic relations with Latin American nations. Other members of the Kennedy Latin American Task Force were Richard Goodwin, Theodore Sorensen, Robert Kennedy, and Teodoro Moscoso. Richard Goodwin was John Fitzgerald Kennedy's speech writer. His positions in the Kennedy Administration included Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Special Assistant in the White House, and Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. Theodore Sorensen was the President's Special Assistant at the White House. Robert Kennedy was the United States Attorney General. Teodoro Moscoso was Assistant Administrator for the Latin American Regional Bureau of the Agency for International Development and the United States Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress.¹

Ambassador Lincoln Gordon, a key figure in the Kennedy Administration, was recruited from his position as William Ziegler Professor of International Economic Relations at the Harvard University School of Business. As a professor at Harvard, he had stressed the virtues of public investment in a series of articles in the Harvard Business Review. He had

¹Ibid.

Interview with Jerome Levinson, September, 1979.

Interview with Niles Bond, December 30, 1976.

also served as an official of the Marshall Plan, and had experience and interest in Brazil which antedated the Alliance for Progress. Ambassador Gordon, having been a member of Kennedy's Latin American Task Force, was involved in the Alliance for Progress from its inception. He perceived a significant stake in the success of the Kennedy program. Fundamental to his acceptance of the Ambassadorship to Brazil was his view that the success of the Alliance was dependent upon the Brazilian experience.¹

Jerome I. Levinson, Harvard Law graduate who was Deputy Director for the Office of Capital Development of the Agency for International Development, entered the agency as a Financial Officer and later served as Capital Development Officer in Rio de Janeiro. Donor Lion, a Harvard graduate and Ph.D. economist, was recruited from his position in the Trade Payments Office by Lincoln Gordon. Under Lincoln Gordon, he held the position Assistant Director of Planning and Evaluation in Rio. He was also Associate Director of the United States Agency for International Development in Recife. William T. Dentzer, Jr. was Special Assistant for the Agency for International Development. Ralph Anthony Dungan was Special Assistant to President Kennedy.²

¹Interview with Jerome Levinson, September, 1979; Also Biographic Register; Lincoln Gordon, "Private Enterprise and International Development", Harvard Business Review, v. 38, No. 4, July/August, 1960, p. 134.

²Biographic Register.

Prominent among the career men were Dean Rusk and Thomas C. Mann. Rusk, Secretary of State, had been President of the Rockefeller Foundation. Before his presidency at the Rockefeller Foundation, he held key positions at the Department of State. Among them were: Director of the Department of State's Office of Special Political Affairs; Deputy Under Secretary of State; and Director of the Far Eastern Affairs Division. The record of Rusk indicates he was a hard liner. It was Rusk that announced the United States policy for recognizing the Chiang Kai-Shek government as the legitimate government of China.¹ Thomas C. Mann was also a hard liner. He had become a foreign service officer during the late 1940's, and had made his stand against communism and the rise of leftist forces in Cuba.²

In so far as the institutional apparatus that was devised to administer the Alliance for Progress program was concerned, two key agencies were involved, the United States Department of State and the Agency for International Development. At the apex of this institutional apparatus were the positions, Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress and Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs. The Coordina-

¹Congress and the Nation, v. II, 1965-1968, Op. Cit., US. Department of State, Biographic Register, 1960-1968.

²Current Biography 1964, U.S. Department of State, Biographic Register, 1960-1968, p. 273.

tor was connected with both the Department of State and the Agency for International Development. Since the lines of authority between the Coordinator and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs were blurred, some confusion arose over these positions.¹

In addition to these key positions and the Agency for International Development and the United States Department of State (their Latin American Bureaus), a Committee of Nine served as a multilateral agency through which the Alliance for Progress was to be coordinated. The Committee of Nine, weak and inept, failed, since the United States chose to deal bilaterally with Latin American countries. Loans from the United States government were initially reviewed through the Developmental Loan Committee, which coordinated United States Latin American policy for a brief duration. This committee was soon dissolved. According to Levinson the strategic actors in the Latin American Bureau of the Agency for International Development and the Latin American Bureau of the Department of State, maneuvered to implement decisions in line with or contrary to the Alliance for Progress proclamation.²

¹Levinson and de Onis, Op. Cit.

Interview with Jerome I. Levinson, September, 1979; Harvey S. Perloff, The Alliance for Progress: A Social Invention in the Making (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969).

²Levinson and de Onis, Ibid.

Interview with Jerome Levinson, September, 1979; Perloff, Op. Cit.

The major responsibility for administering the Alliance for Progress was shared by two agencies, the Department of State and the Agency for International Development. Jerome Levinson describes the situation that resulted from this arrangement by referring to the Alliance for Progress as a "mere pawn in the interdepartmental competition for power and favor within the United States".

The United States government (under the Alliance for Progress) divided among bureaucratic and political fiefdoms, each pursuing its own special interests. Congress was at war with the executive... Kennedy was under pressure at home and abroad to show speedy results. This pressure inevitably led to shortcuts.¹

The Agency for International Development was created by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which replaced the Mutual Security Act and revised the United States foreign assistance program. The mission of the Agency for International Development was to provide assistance for designated developing countries in their developmental efforts. The establishment of the Agency for International Development coincided, in time parameters, with the launching of the Alliance for Progress program. The quest for socio-economic development was germane to both the Agency for International Development and the Alliance for Progress goals, a convergence that would seem to enhance the possibilities for a successful program.²

¹Levinson and de Onis, Ibid.

²Milton Friedman, "Foreign Economic Aid: Means and Objectives", ed. Gustav Ranis, The United States and the

The Department of State, a mainstay of conservatism, is the agency that has traditionally been charged with the responsibility of conducting America's foreign relations. During the early 1960's the agency was imbued with a neo-Wilsonian perspective, that had persisted since the late 1940's. The neo-Wilsonian perspective considers the struggle against the ideological force of communism as the major issue for American foreign policy, as opposed to competition with the Soviet Union as a powerful nation state. The neo-Wilsonian perspective has been promoted by military-ideological theorists and has led to a prime focus on stability in Third World countries and the preservation of the status quo.¹

Given the conflicting missions of the two agencies that were charged with the responsibility of implementing the Alliance for Progress, a clash in interdepartmental competition was inevitable. In as much as the Agency for International Development's mission coincided with the goals of the Alliance for Progress, the strategic actors within the hierarchy of the newly established Agency for International Development tended to be Kennedy men. According to Levinson the career

Developing Economies (New York: W.W. Norton Inc., 1964), pp. 24-38; Joan Nelson, Aid, Influence and Foreign Policy (New York: Macmillan Co., 1968).

¹John Franklin Campbell, The Foreign Affair Fudge Factory (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1971), pp. 23-25.

men who were strategic actors within the State Department reflected the traditional tenets of protection of the status quo and the ensuring of stability and, therefore, conflicted with the goals of the Alliance for Progress.¹

The American ideology, the composite of capitalism, liberalism, and pragmatism, provides the ideological underpinnings for the traditional United States foreign policy toward Latin America. Selected tenets from these philosophical bases have combined with the American democratic tradition and the concept of manifest destiny to provide the formula for economic assistance programs and the justification for these formulas and their accompanying activities.²

The Lockean philosophy, an integral part of liberalism, promoted natural law, individualism, property rights, competition, and the concept of the limited state as the essential principles for providing society with the good life. Through the concept of the limited state, John Locke specified that the main purpose of government is to protect private property. The ramifications of the Lockean theory of individualism and property rights were dualistic. The attributes of his political philosophy can be seen through his arguments for the

¹Levinson and de Onis, Op. Cit.
Interview with Jerome Levinson, September, 1979.

²Kenneth M. Dolbeare and Patricia Dolbeare, The American Ideologies: The Competing Political Beliefs of the 1970's (Chicago, Illinois: Markham Publishing Company, 1971), p. 13.

rights of individuals against arbitrary acts of government, equality among men, the sanctification of the legislature as a democratic institution, and his opposition to absolute monarchy. On the other hand, Locke's glorification of the individual and emphasis on the protection of the entrepreneur from repressive government gave credence to the arguments of the classical economists. The classical economists, Adam Smith and John McVicker, proponents of capitalism, argued for the freedom of market forces as a means of regulating the economy and promoted the institution of private enterprise. The Lockean philosophy came to be used to justify the excesses of capitalism, to bolster the rich against the demands of the poor, and to fortify the rising bourgeoisie.¹

Herbert Spencer, in line with the liberalism of John Locke, stressed individualism, natural law, and the limited state. Spencer's self-adjusting principle, through which the weak would be eliminated to resolve the problems of society, was intended to replace the possibility of state action on behalf of the have nots. State intervention on behalf of the poor was opposed on the grounds that it would distort the operation of social laws. This Spencerian prohibition against

¹William Ebenstein, Great Political Thinkers: Plato to the Present (Hinsdale, Illinois: Dryden Press, 1969), pp. 390-427; Robert A. Packenham, Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973); George Cabot Lodge, The New American Ideology (New York: Knopf, 1975).

state interference included the instituting of social reforms and the welfare state.¹

As the American nation grew, the corporation became the prominent and preferred symbol of private enterprise, and it became the responsibility of the state to protect and promote it. The quest for lands and markets through continental and international expansion was an American phenomenon which accompanied the rise of corporations and big business. The original justification for this physical and commercial expansion, which displaced some people and destroyed social institutions, was manifest destiny, the white man's burden which entailed the mission of civilizing the non-Europeans. However, as the scope of commercial expansion broadened to include other nations, the philosophy of manifest destiny was broadened to include the mission of keeping the world safe for democracy and the self-assigned role of the United States was that of the international policeman.²

During the interim between the World Wars, the economic theories of John Maynard Keynes combined with democratic themes in the American tradition to counter the theories of Spencer and Darwin and to encourage the state to relieve the

¹Ebenstein, Op. Cit.; Lodge, Op. Cit.

²Pratt, Op. Cit.; Thomas Bailey, A Diplomatic History of American People (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1980).

suffering of the poor through social and economic reforms. This stemmed the rise of the new liberalism, an era in which government intervention was sought due to the failure of the market forces, "the invisible hand", and the self-adjusting principle. American conservatism emerged as the embodiment of orthodox liberalism, that force that had originally enshrined the individual, private enterprise, and the limited state. The conservatives used this combination of ideas to justify the excesses of American capitalism.¹

As the twentieth century progressed, fascism, then communism became a prominent contender for adherence on the international scene. As America, the mainstay of capitalism, clashed with the proponents of communism in the global arena and conservatives took on the battle of protecting private enterprise, the prescribed mission of the United States was utilized on an increasing scale to justify United States intervention in other countries. The interventions were justified as actions necessary for the maintenance of stable political entities in the face of the threat of international communism. Endemic to the interventions, however, was the fact that, in many instances, American corporate interests desired the expansion or protection of their markets, their properties, and their investments. American economic motivations were cloaked under the guise of exporting democracy and

¹Ebenstein, Op. Cit.

ensuring stability and world peace.¹

Through the organization of economic assistance programs for developing nations, the American foreign policy often combined the more altruistic motivations of the prescribed mission with those of economic motivations. Moreover, pragmatism combined with capitalism and American conservatism to promote an American ethos that was technologically oriented. Pragmatism, promoted by John Dewey, had specified the desirability of justifying actions on the basis of expediency and had taught the American public to circumvent the traditional quests for valid philosophical solutions by accepting specific answers for immediate application. The technological orientation of the American ethos is revealed in the tendency for Americans to stress the application of technology to human and social problems.²

The traditional approach to United States policy toward Latin America was imbued with the conservatism that glorified private enterprise, pragmatism, and the resulting technological orientation of the American ethos. The progenitor of this traditional approach was the special relationship which had existed between the United States business interests and

¹Frank Coffin, Witness for AID (Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964); Nelson, op. cit.

²Alan Westin et. al., Politics and Government in the United States (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968).

Latin America since the earlier part of the twentieth century. The historical origins of this special relationship emanated from Secretary of State Elihu Root's address in Kansas City, Missouri following his return from Brazil in 1906. Secretary Root indicated that the prospects for United States investment were very good in Latin American countries and that Latin Americans could also serve as a profitable market for United States goods. This policy theme has been a most persistent and significant political and economic factor in our relations with Latin American nations.¹

The basic permanent objectives of the United States toward Latin America include:

- (1) political stability in order to ensure equal treatment of foreigners and nationals, protection of rights of property and respect for international agreements; and
- (2) economic growth, leading to expanded commercial relations and attractive investment opportunities for United States capital, primarily in natural resources of strategic value such as petroleum and non-ferrous metals, but with increasing emphasis of manufactures.²

Throughout the twentieth century this special relationship persisted. When the United States established programs to assist the Latin American countries in their develop-

¹Levinson and de Onis, Op. Cit.

²Ibid.

mental efforts, the promotion of private enterprise was included. American private investment was utilized as the means of providing the necessary capital for development. The technological orientation of the American ethos was also included in the American foreign assistance programs. This technological orientation was written into the Mutual Security Act and was institutionalized in the International Development Cooperation. Latin Americans objected to this techno-economic approach to development and expressed preference for socio-economic development. The major rationale for change in the traditional American approach to Latin American policy hinged around this prime focus on private investment as the form of American assistance and the failure to apply social and humanistic solutions to the problems that bedeviled Latin American countries. Hopefully, under the new approach, the concept of economic development would mean more than the application of technical expertise and the building of physical infrastructure through the hydraulic method.¹

The traditional approach to United States policy toward Latin America was preferred by career men, as aforementioned. As proponents of the traditional approach, they were supported by the complex of ideas in the American ideology which we

¹Stefan Robock, Brazil's Developing Northeast: A Study in Regional Planning and Foreign Aid (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1963); Robock notes the earlier method of approaching the problems of the Northeast was the hydraulic method.

have alluded to as orthodox liberalism and contemporary American conservatism. The traditional approach promoted the interests of the corporate world in Latin America and utilized these compelling forces in the American ideology as justification.

Although the struggle over approaches to foreign policy toward the Latin American countries had the underpinnings of conflicting values, the Kennedy men and the career men shared certain values and images. These shared values caused the Kennedy men and the career men to conform in many decisions and actions, despite their fundamental opposition on foreign policy approaches. These shared values and images determined the boundaries within which all strategic actors were forced to make decisions. They are, therefore, called the parameters in this study. The parameters of the game, as aforementioned, were derived from the American ideology. They included:

- (1) belief in the sanctity of private enterprise;
- (2) aversion to radicalism and revolution;
- (3) aversion to communism;
- (4) belief in the overwhelming importance of national security, relegated in the final analysis to national defense.¹

¹Packenham, Op. Cit.; Lodge, Op. Cit.; Ebenstein, Op. Cit.; Dolbeare, Op. Cit.

The sanctity of private enterprise pervades American society and serves as the foundation for a complex network of American institutions. The American corporation, the leading economic institution in this network, is supported by related political and social institutions. During the early post World War II era, international communism appeared on the global scene. As a global force it sought the destruction of capitalism, the mainstay of American society and the progenitor of many American institutions. The method of destruction was to be violent revolution. The American response to this threat was logically to hate and fear communism, and to be suspicious of all forces that resemble it. Nationalism and populism were progenitors of change and were therefore held in contempt. The American aversion to radicalism dispelled any distinction between the nature of change which communists sought and which other forces proposed. All proposals for change were perceived as radical and revolutionary. All forces for social change were associated with communism and a threat to American institutions.

The tendency to associate world stability with the preservation of American institutions and the tendency to associate change with the destruction of those institutions led to the demand for national security to defend American institutions (private enterprise) against the radical and revolutionary forces. In essence, the growing network of United States investments and security interests, which con-

verged during the cold war gave rise to the view that revolution, specifically the overthrow of a government adhering to the United States rules for amity by political forces committed to radical social change, was inherently dangerous to United States interests and challenged the United States leadership of the inter-American system".¹

Through the prescribed mission of keeping the world stable, Americans have demanded a military establishment and justified it. The rhetoric that results from such justification has been utilized to effectively mobilize popular support for the military establishment. The rhetoric embraces the concept of national security, which it associates with monolithic communist conspiracy. The result has been the rise of "the hyperlegitimacy of security", which means a capacity to justify most decisions and actions in the name of defense. The hyperlegitimacy of security has resulted in an expansion of military functions that generate a narrower set of interests that are engulfed in the ideology. These narrow interests become legitimized as parts of the national interest.² Douglas Rosenberg contends that a series of interests can be served through the neo-Wilsonian perspective.

¹Levinson and de Onis, Op. Cit.

²Douglas Rosenberg, "Arms and the American Way", eds. Stephen Ambrose and James Barber, The Military and American Society, (New York: Free Press, 1972).

Anti-communism might serve the economic interests of an overseas investor, the career interests of a military officer, and the very survival of the elite. It integrates class interests into a more generalized pattern of ethical beliefs and social norms, which is why it is so hard to pin down the motivation behind the so-called military-industrial complex. If a dominant social myth favors high spending, on what basis can we separate out the narrow interest of the weapons contractor, the military officer, or the international businessman. The myth could also favor the interests of the nonelite and the masses.¹

Those who oppose the establishment are ultimately considered as the enemy. The creation of the enemy is illusory and deceptive, for the enemy is distorted in the vision of the establishment. The distortion of the enemy's image allows the establishment to utilize him as a tool. By the early 1960's the monolithic spirit and the neo-Wilsonian perspective persisted, despite the fact that the belief in the monolithic structure had become less tenable. The cold warriors refused to recognize that communism was polycentric in nature.²

The United States pursued her ideological imperative of keeping the world under control through the means of the military (inclusive of counter guerilla warfare, military training, advice and aid) and through economic and technical assistance. In this manner the United States opposed any revolution or movement that had probable effects of upsetting the balance of economic arrangement of the world order, or

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

posed economic threats against the United States. The security function is all-pervasive, reaching beyond the pure military realm into the economic realm.

The security function was broadened to include the responsibility of protecting the lives and property of Americans abroad. The responsibility of protecting the lives and property of Americans abroad is the rationale through which security becomes linked with the economic interests of Americans. This all-encompassing concept of the national security becomes an acceptable and pervasive feature within the public mind.¹

Senator Edward M. Kennedy noted that the identity of the threat to national security always takes the form of political left movements.

An important first step is to put the communist manace into its proper perspective. A legislator can win headlines by pointing to an active, radical left-wing movement in most South American nations. In this way, all movements of social change may be labeled pro-communist... But an example of left-wing movements in Latin America will reveal that most of them have no interest in advancing the aims of Soviet or Chinese policy, and that those that do are not doing very well.²

Kennedy's perception of the global scene was multi-dimensional, as opposed to the traditional perception of a monolithic communist conspiracy that permeated all restless

¹Ibid.

²Edward M. Kennedy, Decisions for a Decade: Policies and Programs for the 1970's (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1968).

developing countries. The consequence of this multi-dimensional perception was a foreign policy characterized as liberal anti-communism, a tendency to recognize the forces of diversity and neutralism and to be cautious about labeling indigenous movements as communist movements.¹ In January of 1962 President Kennedy underscored this perception in his Second Annual State of the Union Message:

Some may choose forms and ways that we would not choose for ourselves but it is not for us that they are choosing. We can welcome diversity.²

This multidimensional perception of the global scene led Kennedy to recognize that nationalism was a stronger force than communism in shaping the destinies of developing countries. Kennedy was thus capable of understanding that all forces that proposed social reform were not communist; all forces that proposed change were not the enemy; social change was essential for development; and social change and development were not antithetical to American interests. Rather, social reform and development could be used as positive forces to head off the threat of a violent revolution.³

Kennedy's perceptions of the international social

¹Martin C. Needler, The United States and the Latin American Revolution (Boston, Massachusetts: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1972).

²Fred Israel, ed., State of the Union Messages of the Presidents, 1960-1966, v. III, (New York: Chelsea House, 1966).

³Ronald J. Stupak, American Foreign Policy: Assumptions, Processes and Projections (New York: Harper and Row, 1976).

forces and the forces of Brazil conflicted with the perspective that the parameters of the game dictated. The parameters dictated the wisdom of promoting American private investment through the exigencies of the foreign assistance program and the wisdom of protecting these investments from destabilizing forces, which were presumed to be the products of international communism. This perspective, which followed from the parameters of the game, would result in technoeconomic development or modernization, as opposed to socioeconomic development.

Within the context of the bureaucratic politics model, the president is viewed as the super power among the strategic actors in the foreign policy-making amalgam. His pre-eminence is derived from formal legal authority established by the Constitution, from judicial interpretations, and from customs and tradition. These formal and informal powers may be considered the president's bargaining tools.¹

Although the president is the super power among the strategic actors, his power is relative and potential. The real power of the president depends upon his capacity to utilize his bargaining tools to influence the other strategic actors within the foreign policy-making amalgam.² A major

¹Allison, Op. Cit.; Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), pp. 237-241.

²Ibid.; Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York: Wiley, 1976).

requisite for the successful initiation and conduct of the Alliance for Progress program was John Fitzgerald Kennedy's capacity to influence or control the action channels of the game. The Kennedy effort to influence the appropriations process, an action channel within the congressional system, was significantly difficult, given the parameters of the game and the composition and the mood of the Congress during the early 1960's.

Congressional influence in the process of foreign policy decision-making can be largely seen through the appropriations process, a field in which the House of Representatives has traditionally been considered as being substantially more powerful than the Senate. Congressional influence, with respect to appropriations, is characteristically applied with the intention of reducing foreign aid. In as much as the power of Congress is crucial in the foreign assistance program, the relationship between President Kennedy (who sought extensive appropriations to finance the Alliance for Progress) and the Congress was highly significant to the implementation and making of Latin American policy.¹

President Kennedy was by no means a novice on the Washington scene. He had served in the Congress for almost fifteen years, as a representative for six years and as a

¹James Robinson, Congress and Foreign Policy-making (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1967).

senator for eight years. The extent of John Fitzgerald Kennedy's experience in Congress, however, was not indicative of positive rapport in his relationship with the law-making institution. By the time of the Kennedy Administration, leadership in both houses of Congress had changed and was accompanied by a Congressional apprehensiveness toward the use of political power by the new president.¹

The tendency to guard against the rise in executive power joined with the force of a continuing conservative coalition between Southern Democrats and Republicans served to deadlock important aspects of the Kennedy program. Legislative hostility toward foreign aid caused Kennedy to approach the Alliance for Progress program's implementation with pragmatism, seeking short-cuts and putting forth justifications for foreign aid that would seem to contradict its purposes as stated in the original proclamation.²

David A. Baldwin, recognizing the reality of legislative hostility to foreign aid, specified several strategies that recent presidents have used to overcome the Congressional obstacle in seeking foreign aid appropriations. They included:

¹Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964: A Review of Government and Politics in the Postwar Years, v. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1965), p. 41.

²Ibid.

- (1) discovering forms of aid that would benefit domestic groups in very obvious ways;
- (2) presenting the annual aid request as a minimum request;
- (3) requiring studies of the problem and appointing as members of the commission persons who would usually not be considered as friends of aid;
- (4) militarizing aid;
- (5) emphasizing the temporary aspects of aid;
- (6) requesting multiyear appropriations; and
- (7) sharing the burden with other nations.¹

During the administration of Kennedy, several of these methods of "getting-by" Congress were tried and only one appears to have been successful. The device of finding forms of aid that would benefit domestic groups in obvious ways had already crystallized in the form of tying aid to American exports, and by the requirement that goods financed by aid be shipped in American bottoms. In an effort to use the device of a commission's study as a basis for the foreign aid request, the Kennedy Administration failed, for the Clay Report of 1963 served to lessen the significance of increased foreign aid, which was at cross purposes with the Kennedy thrust. With respect to the device of making multiyear appropriations requests, the Kennedy Administration also failed.²

¹David A. Baldwin, Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1966).

²Ibid.

The direct militarization of aid was a device not sought by Kennedy, for Kennedy, in line with the J. William Fulbright forces, sought successfully to separate military from economic aid. Yet, indirectly linking security with aid was used as a device. The indirect means through which aid was sought on this basis, during the Kennedy Administration, was to emphasize that national security depended on foreign aid. The Kennedy Administration constantly justified its requests for foreign aid on the basis of the threat of communism.¹

The planning aspect of the Alliance for Progress program came into conflict with the procedure through which the Congress makes its appropriations on an annual basis. The Alliance for Progress's long-range planning effort would require that the Latin American governments know in advance the extent of external resources that might be anticipated. Consequently, in order to coordinate the demands of planning with Congressional approval, Kennedy requested a three year authorization of three billion dollars for the initial stage of the Alliance for Progress program.²

¹Congress and the Nation, Op. Cit.; Levinson, Op. Cit.; May, 1977 Interview with Riordan Roett. Roett indicated that the Kennedy Administration justified its requests for foreign aid on the basis of the threat of communism.

²Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964: A Review of Government and Politics in the Postwar Years, v. I (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1965); See also Levinson, Ibid.

Congress cut the request by six million dollars with the stipulation that the administration would have to make annual requests for appropriations. Consequently, the Latin American countries were unable to design long-range programs based on the promise of specific amounts of external resources from the United States. In addition, there was constant pressure for the administrators of the program to have completely utilized the appropriations by the end of the fiscal year.¹

Given the president's power to appoint policy officials to executive agencies, Kennedy's capacity to influence the action channels within the Agency for International Development was substantially greater than his capacity to influence the action channels within the congressional system. The Agency for International Development, organized during the Kennedy Administration, was composed of a larger ratio of presidential appointees than the Department of State.² This

¹Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, v. I.

²John Franklin Campbell, The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory (New York: Basic Books, 1971), p. 61; Some of the personnel in the Agency for International Development had held positions within the International Cooperation Administration, the forerunner of the Agency for International Development which had preceded the Kennedy Administration. As career officers they were prone to disregard the New Frontier philosophy and to impede the efforts to apply it to the economic assistance program in Brazil. However, Kennedy men prevailed in the Agency for International Development during its early years; See also Joseph Page, Op. Cit. Page refers to these career men as the old technicians of the International Cooperation Administration and chronicles the problems in the

meant that Kennedy had the opportunity to staff the Agency for International Development missions with Kennedy men, men of his persuasion. Although Kennedy men prevailed in the Agency for International Development, Kennedy's power to staff the missions with his men was not absolute.¹

In Brazil, the mainstay of the Alliance for Progress program, Kennedy's liberal anti-communism and multidimensional perspective met with an immediate and impending challenge. His claim to recognize nationalism as a distinct force was tested by the convergence of nationalism with populism and communism in the demand for social change. These social forces coincided with the idealistic goals of the Alliance for Progress in their quest for social change for socioeconomic development and the development of democratic political processes and reform. While the pursuit of the Alliance for Progress goals required extensive change in Brazil and while the social forces sought extensive change in pursuit of these goals, extensive change was deemed a counter theme in the context of the American ideology and the derived para-

¹Kegley, Op. Cit., Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power. (New York: Wiley, 1960).

meters.

John Franklin Campbell describes the dilemma that decision makers faced in their attempt to pursue the idealistic goals of the Alliance for Progress in Brazil and maintain political stability.

To preach a doctrine of minimum conflict and constant political stability on the one hand and fast economic growth and social change on the other is to insist on the most jumbled self-contradiction... The doctrine was very dangerous since it assumed that American effort is the key to Latino-Afro-Asian progress, and that failure of such programs or political instability in achieving it constitutes a grave rebuff and even a security threat to the United States.¹

Brazilian nationalists, populists, and communists, imbued with an impetus to effect change, engaged in activities that annoyed Americans in Brazil and in the United States. Americans tended to be outraged by their actions, since these acts conflicted with the American ideology (parameters of the game), and undermined the economic motives of special interests. Included among these activities were: (1) the mini-mobilization of the have nots under Francisco Juliao, Marxist leader of the Peasant Leagues and Miguel Arraes, the populist governor of Pernambuco; (2) Quadros's independent foreign policy; (3) the Profit Remittance Law; (4) the expropriation of the ITT subsidiary by Leonel Brizola,

¹John Franklin Campbell, The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory (New York: Basic Books, 1971), p. 183.

the self-avowed communist governor of Rio Grande do Sul; and (5) Celso Furtado's determination to utilize the essential expertise of Brazilians of every persuasion, even communist talent, in the SUDENE drive to develop the Northeast.

In as much as these activities clashed with the American ideology and the parameters of the game, Americans tended to see the complex of actions and forces in terms of the neo-Wilsonian perspective. In that context, the network of actions and forces were perceived, by the Congress and by some strategic actors as radicalization, revolution, and a communist threat. Donor Lion, Administrator of the United States Assistant Program in Brazil during the 1960's, describes the reality of the network of Brazil's social forces and their quest for social reform and justice below. His description rejects the prevailing neo-Wilsonian perception as erroneous in the case of Brazil.

Radicalization in Brazil did not occur. Only 30,000 of the Brazilians were radicalized out of the entire Brazilian population. There was a minor marriage between Pernambuco peasants and the urban proletariat. But, there was no organized radicalization.¹

The Congress and the American businessmen, guided by the parameters that assist in molding public opinion, focused upon the expropriation as radicalism, revolution, and communism,

¹Interview with Donor Lion, July, 1977.

Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics, Stepan discusses the alleged radicalization and concludes that no radicalization occurred.

as well as a threat to private enterprise. The Hickenlooper Amendment¹ was the product of Congressional support for American corporate interests.

Given the impending parameters of aversion to radicalism, revolution, and communism and the existence of these forces for social change in Brazil, the degree to which Kennedy and Kennedy men gave support to the goals of social reform, economic development, and democratic processes varied. The Brazilian forces for social change tended to clash with these parameters. The tendency to clash was sometimes tempered by the multidimensional perception of the Kennedy personality. However, the congressional system, as an action channel, tended to reinforce the parameters. Ultimately the congressional system and the parameters, which dictated the wisdom of fear of social change, were transformed into a network of opposition to the Alliance for Progress goals of socio-economic development. The result was the failure of Kennedy and Kennedy men to make decisions that consistently conformed to their designated ends.

Although the extent to which Kennedy and Kennedy men made decisions that supported the desired ends varied, the Kennedy multidimensional perception did reinforce the resolve

¹The provisions of the Hickenlooper Amendment are given on page 182 of this chapter.

to use American public capital transfers as the dynamo for improved conditions in Brazil. The initial support for the Quadros-Goulart reformist government, the mission to the Northeast, the signing of the Northeast Agreement, the establishment of the two Agency for International Development missions in Brazil, and the resistance to the Hickenlooper proposals are evidence of the positive actions taken in support of social change and development.¹

John Fitzgerald Kennedy's tendency to recognize diversity in developing countries was evident in his relations with Brazil. Although Janio Quadros had announced his independent foreign policy and had been viewed as a threat by John Moors Cabot, the American Ambassador to Brazil during the Eisenhower Administration, Kennedy did not hesitate to enter into negotiations with him. Upon the resignation of Quadros, acrimony and apprehensiveness surrounded the possible succession of Joao Goulart to the presidency in both the United States and Brazil. The United States Embassy staff was skeptical of the trend in Brazil. By the time of Goulart's inauguration on September 7, 1961, John Moors Cabot had been recalled from his post and Lincoln Gordon, the newly appointed Ambassador had not yet arrived. Considerable pressure was placed on the Charge d'affaires to intervene in the contro-

¹Peter Bell, "United States and Brazilian Relations", ed. Riordan Roett, Brazil in the Sixties (Nashville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press, 1972).

versy over the Goulart succession. Niles Bond, Charge d'affaires, reported that both the proponents of the succession and the opponents of Goulart attempted to obtain American support. The American Embassy was initially indecisive and cautious. Ultimately, their decision was to maintain cordial relations with the Goulart regime.¹

During the initial phase of Goulart's Administration, the Kennedy Administration was successful in maintaining a relationship of close cooperation with Brazil. This cooperation was maintained, despite the acts of Brazilian nationalists that symbolized hostilities toward Americans. Ambassador Gordon enjoyed considerable access to the President of Brazil. The American Ambassador was often called on to assist in evaluating the capabilities of key Brazilian officials. Goulart was invited to address a joint session of the United States Congress in April of 1962. There he complied with the basic concerns of the American decision-makers by announcing that Brazil was "an independent but not neutral nation" and that Brazil was opposed to Castro.²

Although the alleged threat of revolution in the Northeast and the issue of foreign capital threatened the continuation of cooperation between the two countries, the Kennedy

¹Ibid.

Interview with Niles Bond, December 30, 1976.

Interview with Archie Lang, December, 1976.

Skidmore, Politics in Brazil.

²Bell, Op. Cit.; Skidmore, Op. Cit.

personality and the Kennedy men sought to support the reformist regime. With respect to the allegation of incipient revolution in the Northeast, the Kennedy Administration displayed its liberal anti-communism and welcomed an opportunity to apply its new formula to the developmental efforts in the region. Kennedy hoped to use the Northeast to demonstrate the utility of the new approach. This perspective was unlike that of his predecessor who viewed Celso Furtado, Superintendent of SUDENE, and Juliao Francisco, leader of the Peasant Leagues, as dangerous Marxists.¹

Tad Szulc, the New York Times columnist, had warned his readers that the conditions of poverty and social injustices in the Northeast had sparked a rising political consciousness in the masses. According to Szulc, this rising political consciousness signaled the possibility of a violent revolution (communist). He emphasized the strategic value of Recife to the United States. Szulc's articles generated considerable American interest in the Northeast. George McGovern, Director of Food for Peace, was one of several officials that responded to Szulc's expose by visiting the Northeast. McGovern's observations from his visit in February of 1961 were as follows:

(1) The Brazilian Northeast is an ideal area for social

¹Bell, Op. Cit., "U.S. to Help Develop Economy of the Northeast Area", United States Department of State Bulletin, July 31, 1961.

change in Latin America.

- (2) Celso Furtado and Juliao Francisco are positive forces for initiating social change.
- (3) Furtado and Juliao Francisco offer an alternative to violent revolution.¹

President Kennedy followed the lead of the McGovern observation and began to initiate steps to investigate the situation in the Northeast for possible developmental programs. In the view of President Kennedy, the Northeast might serve as a bulwark against communism, if developed properly. In July of 1961, shortly after Quadros had come into office and SUDENE had begun operations in the Northeast, the United States initiated talks which related to the possibility of American participation in the developmental efforts there. When Kennedy met Celso Furtado, he demonstrated his willingness to work with Furtado for the goal of socio-economic development, affirmed the American interest in the plight of the Northeast, and promised to send a mission to analyze the area for the development of an aid program.²

The Kennedy promise to send a mission to survey the Northeast was fulfilled in October of 1961 when Ambassador

¹Bell, Op. Cit.; Joseph Page, The Revolution That Never Was: Northeast Brazil, 1955-1964 (New York: Grossman, 1964).

²Bell, Op. Cit.

Merwin Bohan and his colleagues arrived in Brazil. The study that Bohan conducted was an analysis for the Agency for International Development. The Bohan Report, completed by February of 1962, constituted the basis for the proposed United States assistance to Northeast Brazil under the Alliance for Progress. Fundamental to the proposed program was the team's view that the problems of the Northeast are basically relevant for the economic progress and social well-being of Brazil and the Western Hemisphere.¹

The program which the team proposed comprised two major parts:

- (1) a short-term program intended to further the economic and social development of the region, including immediate implementation to make possible prompt results. Hopefully these results could be reported as evidence of the viability of the program; and
- (2) a five-year program that was intended to provide considerable assistance in the efforts of the Brazilian government to improve the capacity of the Northeast to provide a better standard of living for its population.²

The short-term program (immediate impact program) was intended to quickly affect those sectors of the population

¹Merwin Bohan et. al., "Northeast Survey Team Report", February, 1962 (Mimeographed copy in possession of the author).

²"Northeast Brazil Survey Team Report", Ibid.

that were most in urgent need of assistance, and was also intended to greatly improve the day-to-day conditions under which the people in the Northeast lived. In reality, it was also intended to fight the "drift toward communism".¹

In describing the conditions of the Northeast and their implications for the United States, Kennedy stated:

No area in this hemisphere is in greater or more urgent need of attention than Brazil's vast Northeast.... This area, with its poverty, hunger, and consequent discontent is a crucible of social economic, and political problems-problems which have unmistakable implications for the future development of Brazil and the security of the entire hemisphere.... And the United States intends to play a continuing role in helping our sister Republic of Brazil meet this urgent challenge.²

On April 13, 1962 the Northeast Agreement was signed. The Northeast Agreement, through which the United States and Brazil agreed to work jointly for the development of the

¹Ibid.; Impact aid was for immediate political concerns to demonstrate the utility of democratic governments utilizing U.S. aid in order to thwart the drift toward communism. Developmental aid was aid applied to long-range projects with considerable planning. For further discussion see Riordan Roett, The Politics of Foreign Aid in the Brazilian Northeast (Nashville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press, 1972).

²"U.S. to Help Develop the Economy of the Northeast Area", U.S. Department of State Bulletin, July 31, 1961; See also Alex J. Goldman, John Fitzgerald Kennedy-The World Remembers (New York: Fleet Press Corporation, 1976). The Northeast was to become a major thrust of the United States efforts to extend economic assistance under the Alliance for Progress during the administration of John Fitzgerald Kennedy.

poverty stricken Northeast region, was one of the initial undertakings under the Alliance for Progress. The Northeast Agreement provided:

- (1) that under the Alliance for Progress, 131 million dollars would be allocated for the Northeast region of Brazil over a period of two years; and
- (2) that the United States Agency for International Development and SUDENE would jointly administer the application of these funds in the Northeast.¹

The Northeast foreign assistance program was of highest priority under the Alliance for Progress. A United States Agency for International Development mission was established in Recife to administer the program in the Northeast. In as much as the United States had established a mission in Rio de Janeiro, the organization of the mission at Recife was unusual. There was no precedent for the establishment of a regional mission in Recife, and in most countries the United States had adhered to the single mission principle. However, the high priority status that was attached to the developmental

¹"Brazil-U.S. Joint Program for the Development of Northeast Brazil: Letter from President Kennedy to President Goulart", American Foreign Policy: Current Documents 1962, April 13, 1962; "President Kennedy Hails Agreement for Northeast Brazil Development", U.S. Department of State Bulletin, May 7, 1962; "The History of the United States Aid Program in Brazil Since World War II", Unpublished Paper of the Agency for International Development (Mimeographed Copy); Page, Op. Cit.

program in the Northeast made the mission in Recife the exception.¹

Aside from the specified Quadros independent foreign policy and the allegations of incipient revolution in the Northeast, overt acts of Brazilian nationalists against the existence of American corporations in Brazil were also treated with caution by the Kennedy Administration. The expropriation of the IT and T subsidiary in Rio Grande do Sul by Leonel Brizola constitutes a notable example of the overt actions which Brazilian nationalists took against American investments. Leonel Brizola expropriated the subsidiary during Goulart's visit to the United States. Given the general attitudes that Goulart displayed during his visit and his pronouncements against Castro, it was obvious that Goulart was opposed to this type of activity. Nevertheless, a flurry of activity within the United States Congress attended the expropriation. This reaction is the logical consequence of the belief in the sanctity of private enterprise and aversion to radicalism, which permeate society and are, therefore, key issues among congressmen.²

¹Ibid.; Riordan Roett, The Politics of Foreign Aid in the Brazilian Northeast (Nashville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press, 1972), pp. 105-107, (Hereafter referred to as The Brazilian Northeast).

²Bell, Op. Cit.; Page, Op. Cit.; U.S. Congress, Senate Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Foreign Assistance Act of 1962. To Amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. 87th Congress 2d Session, 1962; Council on Foreign

Upon Brizola's expropriation, Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper (urged by Harold Geneen, President of IT and T) introduced an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962. The amendment, labeled the Hickenlooper Amendment, included the following provisions:

- (1) required the President of the United States to suspend all economic assistance to those countries that expropriate the property of a U.S. company, or those countries that make a U.S. company subject to discriminatory taxation or administration;
- (2) included in the economic assistance to be suspended, foreign aid and laws that allotted sugar quotas to favored nations;
- (3) allowed a country six months to take effective steps to provide compensation for expropriated property in "convertible foreign exchange"; and
- (4) provided that after the six months the President would have to enforce the amendment.¹

Relations, Documents on American Foreign Policy, 1962, p. 513; "Brizola Scores United States Stand on Alliance and Expropriation Issues", New York Times, February 27, 1962; Levinson, Op. Cit.

¹U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations. Foreign Assistance Act of 1962: To Amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 87th Congress. 2d Session, 1962; Council on Foreign Relations, Documents on American Foreign Policy, 1962, p. 513; Levinson and de Onis, Op. Cit.; "Brizola Scores United States Stand on Alliance and Expropriation Issues", New York Times, February 27, 1962.

President Kennedy objected to the amendment, claiming that it tied the assistance program to protection of United States overseas investments. He also found the amendment objectionable on the following points:

- (1) It was an invasion of his right to make foreign policy.
- (2) It embroiled the United States government in quarrels between the United States companies and foreign governments.¹

Francis Tully, speaking for the Department of State, assailed the expropriation as a blow to Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. Tully stated:

We acknowledge the right of a government to expropriate property belonging to nationals of other countries for public purposes if provision is made for the payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. However, when a government expropriates existing resources and uses its own funds to buy out existing operations rather than using those funds to create new wealth, new jobs, and new taxpayers, and to increase productivity, this action appears to be a step backward in the mobilization of available resources for the success of the Alliance for Progress--the amount offered (as compensation) obviously is so far below book value that the evaluation appears to have been made unilaterally.²

Even though the spokesman for the State Department assailed the expropriation, the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk,

¹Levinson and de Onis, *Ibid.*; "Kennedy Opposes Any Cut in United States Aid to Retaliate Expropriation of United States Property and Congress Moves for Such Cuts", *New York Times*, March 8, 1962; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, Op. Cit.

²Jack Raymond, "United States Scores Expropriation of

a career man, gave support to the Kennedy forces against the proposed Hickenlooper Amendment. When Congress began to consider the Hickenlooper proposal, Senator Frank Lanusche, Democrat from Ohio and member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated his preference for cutting off aid to those nations which "violate the rights of our citizens".¹ Secretary of State Rusk indicated that he was not in favor of linking aid to investments. He further stated that it is the right of a sovereign nation to expropriate property with adequate compensation and he noted that in Brazil there was a special case. In Brazil, a state has taken action without the approval of the Brazilian federal government. The Brazilian government was seeking to resolve the problem. According to Rusk, the problem could be dealt with in ways other than cutting aid. One suggested alternative was "working out guarantees against expropriation without compensation". Also Rusk stressed that the problem of utilities is special. The following statement summarizes his views on the issue:

If we are going to tie American policy by law to the private investor overseas to the extent that is suggested, we must reassure ourselves as to the operations, the conduct, the financial structures and other aspects of those private investors.²

Phone Companies in Brazil", New York Times, February 18, 1962.

¹ U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations Hearings Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, Op. Cit.

²Ibid.

Throughout the Kennedy Administration Brazil experienced tremendous political ferment. The political ferment was a product of pressures for social change and reform. Kennedy and his men had resolved to support the demands for social change and reform as a part of the larger package of socio-economic development. During the first two stages of the Goulart regime (which correspond to the Kennedy phase), Kennedy and his men appeared capable of resisting the parameters which came into play. We have noted that the impetus to social change was symbolized by the mini-mobilization in the Northeast and by the expropriation of the ITT subsidiary. These demands for change clashed with the parameters.

The symbol of mini-mobilization in the Northeast clashed with the American fear of radicalism, revolution, and communism. The symbol of expropriation collided with the American belief in the sanctity of private enterprise and the American belief in the right of private enterprise to protection by the state. The Kennedy Administration, we have noted, resisted these parameters. Evidence of their resistance includes the intense struggle against the Hickenlooper Amendment proposal and the Northeast Agreement.

As the Kennedy phase continued, however, the challenge to the Kennedy resolve became more forceful. Although the Goulart Administration had a relatively positive beginning under the parliamentary system, it soon became an era of increasing social and political unrest. This political and

social unrest was accompanied by an economic decline. The hope of the Prazilian populace was that the plebiscite, which restored the presidential system in January of 1963, would bring some stability to the Brazilian political and economic system. Unfortunately, the situation became even more critical during the third stage of the reformist rule (the presidential phase of Goulart's era).¹

In mid-1962, the political elite, of which the Brazilian military was a significant and powerful component, viewed the following conditions as evidence of an incipient structural crisis in Brazil:

- (1) the increasing rate of political and economic demands made on the government;
- (2) the decreasing political capacity to convert demands into concrete policy because of the fragmentation of support; and
- (3) the increasing withdrawal of commitment to the political regime.²

Skidmore depicts the middle of 1962 through the plebiscite and the end of 1963 as the point of definite decline

¹"The Question of Foreign Capital", A Economia Brasileira e Suas Perspectivas, v. III; Maio, 1964; Skidmore, Op. Cit.

²Stepan, Op. Cit.; "The Question of Foreign Capital", A Economia Brasileira e Suas Perspectivas, Op. Cit.

in the Brazilian polity and economy. He refers to this stage as the negative phase of the parliamentary era, in contrast to the positive phase of the first six months in 1962, during the parliamentary phase.¹ By the end of 1962 an economic decline was apparent. The rate of growth of the gross product had fallen from 10.3 percent in 1961 to 5.3 percent by the conclusion of the parliamentary stage. The production of the industrial sector's rate of growth declined from 10.6 percent in 1961 to 7.8 percent by the end of 1962.²

Washington officials, in general, looked upon the Brazilian decline with disgust and pessimism. Lincoln Gordon and the strategic actors in the State Department, however, resisted the parameters and continued to cooperate with the reformist regime. In March of 1963, San Tiago Dantas, Brazil's Foreign Minister, journeyed to Washington, hoping to gain additional economic assistance from the United States. Dantas's request for American capital assistance was based on the Three Year Plan, a comprehensive economic development plan which he had written in collaboration with Celso Furtado,

¹Skidmore, Op. Cit.

²"Retrospectus," Conjuntura Economica, February, 1963; "Retrospectus", Conjuntura Economica, February, 1964, p. 3; See also Rosenblum and Tyler, Op. Cit.; See also A Economia Brasileira e Suas Perspectivas, Op. Cit.

the Minister of Planning and Director of SUDENE. The plan, a statement of government policy, combined the programs of Kubitschek and Quadros and put forth the following initiatives:

- (1) increased foreign investment;
- (2) stabilization of the Brazilian economy and austerity measures;
- (3) administrative reforms;
- (4) banking reforms;
- (5) tax reforms; and
- (6) agrarian reforms.¹

Lincoln Gordon and the strategic actors in the State Department met Dantas and his Three Year Plan with considerable agreement and enthusiasm. They considered it to be a sound foundation for joint cooperation, provided that Goulart would support the Dantas initiative. Based on these negotiations, the Bell-Dantas Agreement was signed. The Bell-Dantas Agreement had the following provisions:

- (1) The United States agreed to extend immediate capital assistance to Brazil in the amount of 84 million dollars;
- (2) The United States agreed to extend the capital assistance

¹Phyllis Parker, Brazil and the Quiet Intervention (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1979), p. 36; Plano Trienal Do Desenolvimento Economico e Social, 1963-1965, (1962), Mimeographed copy (translated).

to an additional 314.5 million for the 1964 fiscal year, provided that Brazil could meet the condition of successfully negotiating with international financial agencies (IMF, World Bank) and other nations for long term financial assistance.¹

Also in the agreement, San Tiago Dantas committed Brazil to the purchase of ten subsidiaries of the American and Foreign Power Company (which Brazil had seized earlier) for 135 million dollars. Twenty-five percent of the purchase was to be submitted in cash and the balance was to be invested in various local enterprises.²

For those who had considered the Bell-Dantas Agreement as the beginning of even greater cooperation between the two nations; subsequent events dissipated the agreement as a mere mirage. The purchase of the American and Foreign Power Company was assailed by both conservatives and leftists. Their reaction to the AMFORP arrangement changed the scene of good rapport with the United States to one of strained relations.³

¹"Brazil-U.S. Understanding Concerning Economic and Financial Collaboration: Letter from Administrator of AID (Bell) to the Minister of Finance of Brazil (Dantas", American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, March 25, 1963; See also "Brazil-U.S. Understanding Concerning Economic and Financial Collaboration", United States Department of State Bulletin, April 15, 1963, pp. 560-561; skidmore, Op. Cit.; Parker, Op.Cit., pp.38-42; George A. Fiechter, Brazil Since 1964: Modernization Under a Military Regime (London, England: Macmillan Co., 1975).

²Ibid, (all sources); The American and Foreign Power Company had been seized before the expropriation of the IT&T subsidiary.

³Parker, Ibid., p.46.

When Lincoln Gordon met with Goulart, he was highly critical of the political and economic trends in Brazil. He registered complaints about the rising left wing and communist groups in Brazil, Brizola's agitation, Almino Afonso's (Labor Minister) failure to cooperate in the field of wage policy, and the legalization of the pro-communist General Workers Command (CGT). He called upon Goulart to control the leftist drift and to support the Three Year Plan.

Even before the AMFORP negotiations, there had been increasing political unrest in Brazil. As propertyless masses demanded land, higher wages, and better health facilities, the powerful elites were able to use the constitution as a means of denying social justice. Center and rightist factions controlled the legislature. They utilized the Constitution to block tax reform, land reform, and social welfare programs that were designed to alleviate the miseries of the lower income groups. Their inclusion of a law that prohibited illiterates from voting was an exceptionally effective device for maintaining the status quo, and through it more than half of the population was disenfranchised.¹

Goulart's efforts to seek reform tended to coincide with the proposals of the populist governors, Miguel Arraes

¹Edwin Lieuwen, Generals Vs. Presidents (New York: Praeger, 1964); See Skidmore, Op. Cit.; See Stepan, Op. Cit.; The amendment that he demanded was intended to change the provision that required the owners of expropriated land must be paid in cash; Marta Cehelsky, "Redistribution Policy and Agrarian Reform", eds. Rosenbaum and Tyler, Op. Cit.

of Pernambuco, Cid Sampaio of Goias, and Leonel Brizola of Rio Grande do Sul. In as much as these governors were considered leftist, the Goulart effort to seek reforms which these governors supported was viewed by the conservatives as a symbol of Goulart's own leftist leanings.¹ Goulart's reform program included the following basic proposals:

- (1) expropriation of all lands within six miles of important communication arteries and highways;
- (2) government enforcement of price controls on business;
- (3) legalization of the Communist Party; and
- (4) neutralism in the cold war.²

Aside from the political unrest that attended Goulart's efforts to initiate reform and the AMFORP settlement, Goulart reshuffled his cabinet. Additional reports of dissident activity reached Washington. These reports of growth in communism among student groups, of communist victories in Sao Paulo, and of radical nationalists among the military caused Lincoln Gordon to have second thoughts about the Bell-Dantas Agreement. In August of 1963, Gordon met with his staff to assess Brazil's compliance with the Bell-Dantas Agreement. They decided that Brazil had failed to comply with the terms of the agreement,

¹Cehelsky, Op. Cit.

²Lieuwen, *Generals Vs. Presidents*, Op. Cit.; Vladimir Reisky de Dubnic, Political Trends in Brazil (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1968).

and that the agreement should be dissolved. With that decision Lincoln Gordon shifted his approach and his policy.¹

The "Islands of Sanity" policy, established in August of 1963, was the end product of Lincoln Gordon's revision. Through this policy the following approaches were pursued:

- (1) the Brazilian government (federal) was to be bypassed;
- (2) the emphasis of American economic assistance was to be placed on project loans, as opposed to program loans;
- (3) economic assistance was to be extended to individual states in Brazil, as opposed to the usual federal administration of economic assistance;
- (4) the economic assistance was to be extended to those governors that were friendly to the United States.²

The Isles of Sanity policy, initiated by Gordon, was an affront to the Alliance for Progress. It was based on the utilization of impact aid, a form of aid which the Kennedy Administration had supposedly ruled out. Rather than encourage political development along democratic lines and the development of viable political institutions, it was to weaken Brazil as a national entity. Impact aid was applied to prevent the election of governors who were perceived as leftists and radi-

¹Parker, Op. Cit.

²Ibid.; Roett, The Brazilian Northeast; Page, Op. Cit.

cals by the American officials. The policy was applied in Pernambuco, in order to bolster Cleofas (UDN landowner) as a candidate for governor against Miguel Arraes. It was also used to support Alusio Aives of Rio Grande do Sul. The Kennedy men, in this instance, had been unsuccessful in resisting the parameters of the game. In the face of growing efforts for social reform and political mobilization of the masses, Lincoln Gordon reverted to the neo-Wilsonian perspective of the traditional policy approach-perceiving the efforts to improve conditions as radicalism, revolution, anti-America, and the acts of irresponsible people.¹

The Isles of Sanity policy was the exception in the long line of activities that were initiated by Kennedy and his men to support the Alliance for Progress. Kennedy men's reactions to Congressional efforts to associate the problems of expropriation and foreign capital with a security threat exemplify resistance and pragmatism. When a congressman assailed the expropriation in the following statement, Kennedy men retorted.

It is the policy of the United States to strengthen friendly foreign countries by minimizing or eliminating barriers to the flow of private investment

¹Parker, *Ibid.*; Roett, *The Brazilian Northeast*, Op. Cit.; Page, Op. Cit.; Campbell, Op. Cit.; According to Roett impact aid is used to contain political unrest and social change. The proponents of impact aid consider the United States main responsibility to be that of assisting in the global battle against a monolithic communist movement. Impact aid is used to support the status quo against social forces that are demanding social reform and political change toward democracy.

capital... Can anyone believe that Castroism can be a spur to private investment in Latin America? ...It is the communists who work to bring about the seizure of American owned property.¹

The Kennedy men, although resisting the parameters in their general perspectives of the Brazilian scene, used the argument of neo-Wilsonian Congressmen to press for additional appropriations. They stressed the need for aid to protect the security interest (the battle against communism). In this respect, Teodoro Moscoso noted:

The United States is confronted with powerful enemies in the hemisphere--enemies who still constitute a threat to the national security of our country. The campaigns led--by well organized communist groups--are clear and present dangers. The goals of the Alliance are to eliminate danger, disease--in achieving these significant goals, we are furthering the security and the economic growth of the United States--I am convinced that the Alliance for Progress in Latin America will have a positive impact on our balance of payments.²

Rusk, a career man in the Kennedy Administration, stressed using aid as a tool to prevent the security threat.

We don't minimize the burden. We don't minimize the stakes. And I am one of those who think that we must not abandon the field to the enemy. We must continue this effort in many ways. Aid is one of them. And the burdens to us are burdens which we not only can afford, but burdens which we cannot dare not bear.³

¹U.S. Congress, House, "On the Expropriation of American Property in Brazil", Congressional Record, v. 108, Part 3, 87th Congress 2d Session, March 5, 1962.

²U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings to Amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 87th Congress, 1962.

³U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee

The Kennedy Administration, in most instances, was insistent.

Nothing could be worse than a series of anti-Brazilian resolutions at a time when the dialogue is more important than ever.¹

The reference here was toward the rise of leftist forces. It was deemed necessary to grant impact aid to quickly head off the forces of communism and revolution.

In essence, there was increasing tension between the United States and Brazil due to issues of foreign capital and the alleged radicalization of the Northeast. Aside from the application of impact aid through the Islands of Sanity policy, the Kennedy Administration insisted on the continued support of the reformist regime. Although extension of economic assistance was justified on the basis of a politico-security motive (the threat of communism), the Kennedy Administration focused its attention on the Northeast. The development of the Northeast was crucial to the attempt to alleviate the social and economic dualism that characterized the coun-

on Appropriations. Foreign Operations Appropriations for 1963, 87th Congress, July, 1962.

¹Irving Horowitz, Op. Cit.; "Kennedy Opposes Any Cut in U.S. Aid to Retaliate for Expropriation of U.S. Property", New York Times, February 18, 1962.

try of Brazil.¹

¹Interview with Donor Lion, July, 1977. Lion discussed the significance of the Northeast Agreement and the Northeast to the development of Brazil; Riordan Roett, in interview. Roett discussed the politico-security justification of United States assistance to the Northeast. Lion stressed that during the Kennedy Administration, while the Northeast Agreement was in effect, some progress was being made in the Northeast, the region which needed the assistance most.

CHAPTER IV

ACQUIESCENT IDEALISM AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS: THE JOHNSON PHASE

During the Johnson Administration, domestic social programs appeared to flourish, while the Alliance for Progress program collapsed. Johnson's performance in the domestic and international arenas has been assessed by John Spanier.

President Johnson's fate tragically symbolized the plight of a President whose principal experience was domestic and whose fundamental wish to enact a social reform program to rival that of his mentor, Franklin Roosevelt. Unfortunately, the world would not go away. Thus, Johnson, upon succeeding President Kennedy... pushed more liberal social legislation through Congress than any President in the twentieth century, including Franklin Roosevelt. But foreign policy proved his undoing.¹

The collapse of the Alliance for Progress, during the Johnson Administration, was a function of the following factors:

- (1) a President who possessed a neo-Wilsonian and unidimensional perspective of the global scene;
- (2) action channels that were staffed by neo-Wilsonian and military-industrial ideologues or by career men who had

¹Spanier, Op. Cit.

- no interest in the specific development of the Northeast;
- (3) career men, who had been released from the Kennedy personality, and were given considerable leverage in the new administration;
 - (4) the collision of Brazilian social forces with the parameters of the game;
 - (5) the collision of Brazilian social forces with Brazilian militarism;
 - (6) the convergence of Brazilian militarism with the American parameters and with the men who occupied the action-channels.

During the Johnson Administration there was a decisive shift in the American policy of supporting the reformist government of Brazil in its effort to attain socio-economic development. This shift can be seen by reviewing three decisions:

- (1) the official pronouncement of the "Islands of Sanity" policy;
- (2) the announcement of the Mann Doctrine in March of 1964; and
- (3) the United States recognition of the Brazilian military government in April of 1964.

Martin C. Needler has described the foreign policy of President Lyndon B. Johnson as conservative anti-communism.

Under Johnson, the range of Latin Americans who could sympathize with the policies of the United States was reduced to those on the right and extreme right... The Kennedy limited and reluctant anti-communism became (under Johnson) a generalized counter-revolutionary tendency that operated against moderates as much as the extreme left.¹

As a senator, Johnson's main concerns had been military preparedness and appropriations. With regard to appropriations, his view was generally that foreign aid costs too much money. Geyelin specifies that Johnson was not entirely against foreign aid. What he objected to was the extending of foreign aid "without a clear-cut return, either in terms of demonstrable economic improvement or political factors."²

The Johnson Administration kept several officials from the Kennedy Administration, and retained two of them in strategic posts. These men were Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, and Thomas C. Mann, Ambassador to Mexico. Both were career men, rather than Kennedy men who were originally committed to the idealistic goals of the Alliance for Progress. Rusk, although serving under Kennedy, was more inclined to view any kind of uprising as more dangerous to the American national interest than Kennedy. Also Rusk viewed "national wars of liberation" as more capable of immediate communist domination than did Kennedy.³ Rusk's concern over the problem of commu-

¹Needler, Op. Cit.

²Philip Geyelin, Lyndon B. Johnson and the World (New York: Praeger, 1966).

³Ronald J. Stupak, American Foreign Policy: Assumptions,

nism in Latin America was expressed in his statement at Barnard College in January of 1964.

Habana continues to encourage and engage in subversive activities in the Western Hemisphere...A few weeks ago the government of Venezuela uncovered a cache of arms from Cuba intended for terrorists whose objective is the destruction of the democratic government of Venezuela. The recent unfortunate disturbances in Panama were immediately exploited by terrorists trained in Cuba. In several other Latin American countries, Castro-trained agents are actively promoting violence and terrorism.¹

Kennedy had originally approached Thomas C. Mann with the Alliance for Progress idea, and Mann failed to comment. Obviously, he was not enthusiastic about it. Thomas C. Mann was actually a carry-over from the Eisenhower Administration, having held the position of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.²

Under Johnson's Administration, the attitudes of the two career men which differed from Kennedy's began to prevail. As Ronald Stupak notes:

The rhetoric of anti-communism and the fear of ideological wars of national liberation began to dominate the personalized policy framework of Lyndon Johnson.³

Processes, and Projections (New York: Harper and Row, 1976).

¹"The First Purpose of Our Foreign Policy... Is to Defend Freedom". Address by Secretary of State Rusk at the Barnard College 75th Anniversary Dinner, New York, American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, (January 22, 1964).

²Stupak, Op. Cit.

³Ibid.

Philip Geyelin notes that the general view within the Hemisphere by 1965 was:

The Alliance for Progress... had died with John Fitzgerald Kennedy; Lyndon Johnson didn't really care; there was no incentive for the Latin Americans to do the hard things that were absolutely vital if the Alliance for Progress was to make progress.¹

Along with the views of the career men who became Johnson's key decision-makers, Congress reinforced the ideas of intransigent opposition to social reform and reformist governments. In December of 1963, President Lyndon B. Johnson announced that he intended to appoint Thomas C. Mann to the post of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. Mann was to become the key voice on United States policy toward Latin America. Johnson's announcement was met with considerable acclaim in Congress by the cold warrior legislators.²

Representative Carl Albert from Oklahoma, commenting on President Johnson's announcement, stated that by appointing Mann to the post, Johnson had placed the question of United States relations with Latin America among his highest priorities. He stressed that the President intended to place under Mann's jurisdiction "all policies and programs of the United States government, economic, social, and cultural",

¹Geyelin, Op. Cit.

²U.S., Congressional Record, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1963, v. 109, 24761.

which relate to Latin America. Albert continued:

No better man could have been found to assume the responsibility. Under Presidents of both parties, Thomas Mann has demonstrated the qualities that are vital to succeed in this field. His is an attitude of firmness toward communism in every form... For the programs and policies, what is needed is not so much a change in direction as a shift in emphasis.¹

Senator Ralph Yarborough also commented favorably on the appointment of Thomas C. Mann. In his commentary he stressed the necessity of strengthening the anti-communist trade unions in Latin America as bulwarks of democracy.

The New York Times, reporting on the possible appointment of Mann, stated:

Thomas C. Mann is probably the best equipped State Department career officer in the Latin American field. No one will be able to accuse him of being soft on communism, for his sentiments on the subject are fierce. As Assistant Secretary under Eisenhower, he showed flexibility combined with firmness.²

During the Johnson Administration, the precarious position of the Goulart regime continued without relief despite the sincere efforts to enforce the stabilization plan during the early months of 1964. In general, the decline from 1961 to 1964 was reflected through:

- (1) a decline in the growth rate of the industrial sector from 10.6 percent to 5.2 percent; and
- (2) a rise in the rate of inflation from 33.3 percent in

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

1961 to 87.8 percent in 1964.¹

The prominent social forces continued to clash with the parameters of the game and with the growing force of Brazilian militarism.² Brazilian militarism converged with and supported the parameters of the American game.³ The parameters of the game coincided with the perspective of the career men, who now held the reins of power.⁴ Therefore, the career men and the Brazilian military constituted a cross-national categoric group.⁵ The underlying interest of this cross-national categoric group was a product of the Brazilian military's desire to preserve unity within the organization and preserve the geopolitical strategy for national economic

¹Centro de Contrás Nacionais, Fundacao Getulio Vargas, "Retrospectus", Conjuntura Economia, 1961-1964, Rosenbaum, Op.Cit.

²Brazilian militarism opposed the rapid changes that were occurring on two rationales: (1) Goulart's efforts to include the military in his radical reform movement was divisive for the military; and (2) the drastic changes that were proposed signified radicalism and a drift toward communism which was a target for FEB opposition and for the Sorbonne group's opposition.

³The Brazilian military's hostility toward the force of communism and apprehensiveness toward left wing and radical movements coincided with the aversion to communism (parameter in the American game).

⁴The career men were guided by their neo-Wilsonian perspective of the global scene, which accepted the concept of a monolithic communist conspiracy and feared the rise of radicalism, revolution, and communism, and stressed the sanctity of private investment.

⁵Categoric group is used here because there is no evidence to clarify the organization of these forces of conservatism.

development and national security.¹ These motivations coincided with the motives of the career men, which were supported by the parameters of the American game. American corporate interests were a part of this categoric group also.²

The increasing intensity of the social forces that pursued social reform was displayed by increasing hostility toward foreign capital, the threat of radical reforms, and the outbreak of strikes.³ There was a heightening of labor unrest. Rio de Janeiro was helplessly paralyzed by the numerous strikes that occurred. Goulart, as a last resort, attempted to appease labor, by invoking an executive decree that increased minimum wage levels by as much as 100 percent. Goulart further alienated the more conservative forces by stating that Brazil should establish diplomatic relations with Communist China.⁴

The Brazilian military was becoming increasingly polarized due to: (1) the economic decline; and (2) the attempt of Goulart to include the military hierarchy in his mission of reform. General Osmino Alves and Jair Dantas Ribeiro became Goulart's chief advisors, while Generals Nelson de

¹Fontaine, Op. Cit.

²Interview with Niles Bond, December 1976

³A Economia Brasileira e Suas Perspectivas, Op. Cit.

⁴Hispanic American Report, April, 1964.

Melo, Odilio Denys and Admiral Silvio Heck began to plot against Goulart. These polarized positions and the structural crisis caused the military to become more insecure and authoritarian in its approach. The great majority of the military hierarchy sought to maintain the constitutional government as long as it remained nonradical and stable. However, the reformist movement grew increasingly radical and unstable.¹

The following features indicated the growing radicalism in the reformist regime of Goulart:

- (1) the aforementioned proposed reforms;
- (2) Goulart's public signing of two radical decrees at a May 13 rally in Rio de Janeiro;
- (3) Goulart's dismissal of the Navy Minister who sought to discipline a sailor for actively organizing a labor union of enlisted men in March of 1964 and inciting rebellion; and
- (4) Goulart's bellicose address to the dissident sergeants in Rio de Janeiro on March 30, 1964.²

The two decrees which Goulart signed at the public

¹Roett, Patrimonial Society, Op. Cit.; Although Jair Dantas Ribeiro was appointed as Goulart's War Minister, he failed to support Goulart in the final analysis.

²Stepan, Op. Cit.; The decrees specifically nationalized all private oil refineries and declared subject to expropriation all underutilized properties of over 1200 acres within 6 miles of federal highways, railways, or dams; Economist Intelligence Unit. Three Monthly Economic Review No.45 February, 1963, pp. 4-5.

rally in Rio nationalized all private oil refineries.¹ These acts accentuated the radical trend of the reformist government. Riordan Roett reiterates:

The radicals had won control of presidential policy-making. The themes of the May 13 rally were repeated in Goulart's annual presidential message to Congress on March 15. While the left had won the president's ear, it was a divided left, ranging from the fiery Leonel Brizola..., the negative left, to San Tiago Dantas, the positive left's leader.²

On March 20, 1964 General Castello Branco distributed to the Military a memorandum which confirmed the historic role of the military as the defender of the constitution. The military officers were now convinced that the political system was incapable of meeting the rising demands, and that the legitimacy of the constitutional regime was now being undermined by the reformist government of Goulart. Goulart's threat to legalize the communist party and the infiltration of communists and leftists into Goulart's Administration seemed to substantiate these claims. Given these conditions and the Castello Branco memorandum, the military claimed that they had no alternative but to depose Goulart.³

As Johnson took office, rampant militarism had begun to become a rising threat to progressive economic and social development. Goulart's efforts to step-up social reform in

¹Ibid.; See also Riordan Roett, *Patrimonial Society*, Op. Cit.

²Ibid.; Roett.

³Ibid.

Brazil and the decree of December 1963 (which concerned the mining interests and the Profit Remittance Law) were met with tremendous resistance by the Brazilian military, the United States business community, and the American Embassy.¹

Ambassador Gordon, a Kennedy man, had begun to perceive a security threat in the Brazilian structural crisis. Lincoln Gordon, during the month that Johnson took office, made his "islands of sanity policy" official. The "islands of sanity policy", which had been adopted in mid-1963, was a strategy of United States cooperation with some individual state governments, thus by-passing SUDENE. It was an effort to identify entities where ability and stability presented sufficient possibilities for the utilization of United States economic assistance. As a strategy, the "islands of sanity policy" prevailed by the Summer of 1963, following the failure of the stabilization experiment and the resignation of Dantas. SUDENE officials considered this policy, which was announced officially in November of 1963, an attempt to undermine the authority of the Superintendency.²

Just as the American Embassy became concerned over a security threat in the Brazilian situation, the American business men in Brazil also began to express their concern. The

¹Ibid.

²Agency for International Development Paper. "The History of United States Aid Program in Brazil Since World War II", August, 1972; See also Bell's article in Roett, Brazil in the Sixties, Op. Cit.

Institute of Economic and Social Studies (IPES), founded by businessmen from Rio and Sao Paulo in conjunction with the geopolitical military hierarchy, lent support to the anti-communist workers and student groups. Under the direction of Golbery, the Institute of Economic and Social Studies (IPES) was joined by the urban middle class of Brazil and United States businessmen. Such organizations as the Women's Campaign for Democracy (CAMDE) and the Feminine Civic Union (UCF) gave financial assistance. American businessmen were with the conservative Brazilians in the "Family March With God for Liberty", which had been organized by the Feminine Civic Union with the assistance of Sao Paulo Governor Adhemar de Barros. It was organized to express the views (of the participants) that Brazil had moved too far to the left.¹

In the March of 1964 Thomas C. Mann spoke to United States ambassadors and the chiefs of Agency for International Development missions in Latin America. His speech signaled a major change in policy, and signaled Johnson's return to a fragmented and conservative policy. The following objectives were set forth in the speech and comprised the Mann Doctrine:

- (1) to foster economic growth and be neutral on internal social reform;

¹Interview with Niles Bond, December 1976. Niles Bond discussed the pressures that American businessmen were placing on the Embassy and Consulate and the participation of American businessmen in the "Family March with God for Liberty". Also see Schneider, Op.Cit. See also interview with Donor Lion, July 1977.

- (2) to protect United States private investments in the hemisphere;
- (3) to show no preference, through aid or otherwise, for representative democratic institutions; and
- (4) to oppose communism.¹

The day following Mann's speech, the United States Department of State issued the following statement:

The United States devotion to the principles of democracy is historic fact... On the other hand, the United States policy toward unconstitutional governments will be guided by the national interest and the circumstances peculiar to each situation as it arises.²

On March 31, 1964 the reformist government of Joao Goulart was deposed in a coup d'etat, and a military government came to power in Brazil. The military government that

¹Tad Szulc's article in the New York Times, March 19, 1964; Also see Packenham, Op. Cit. and Levinson, Op. Cit. Levinson states that although the statement was off-the-record and there is no transcript of it, some of the participants in the meeting corroborated Szulc's report.

²American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, March 19, 1964. Alfred Stepan, Op. Cit.; Stepan indicates that the coup d'etat of 1964 ushered in the second of two models for the Brazilian military. The two models are the moderator model, (the traditional model), and the director model (the current model which the coup d'etat of 1964 brought into existence. In the moderator model (which persisted from 1946 to 1964), the military was not isolated from the political system. Instead, the military was inextricably "bound up" with politics and was sensitive to civilian opinion. The significant element of this moderator model was the understanding between the civilians and the military that a permanent restriction was placed on the extent of military incursions into politics. This restriction established a constraint for military intervention upon the removal of a president, by specifying that the military officers involved in the coup d'etat would not

came to power following the coup d'etat was unique, for Brazilian military had never, during the twentieth century, assumed the highest office of the nation.

With reference to the military's rationale for intervening in 1964, Riordan Roett reiterates:

In the opinion of a majority of the officer corps, Joao Goulart no longer exercised legitimate authority in 1964. He had begun to act extraconstitutionally, to threaten reform without congressional participation, to erode military discipline without adequate explanation, and to mobilize students and laborers for direct action political action. All of this threatened to undermine the fragile institutional structure of the 1946 Republic.¹

Thus, the military coup which deposed Goulart on March 31, 1964 was considered as an act that was necessary to preserve the patrimonial state society and the cartorial state in Brazil.²

The Mann Doctrine and the State Department's supporting statement apparently gave direction to the American official responses to the overthrow of constitutional government of Goulart in Brazil, for on April 2, 1964 (as previously noted) President Lyndon B. Johnson sent the following message to

assume governmental power. The director model of the Brazilian military has extended from 1964 to today. Under the director model, the Brazilian military usurped the power of the president in 1964 and have been the effective rulers of Brazil since that time. The military, with its basic geopolitical orientation, has had as its major objectives economic development and a general higher level of power in the international community.

¹Ibid.

²Ibid. The cartorial and the patrimonial society are described in Chapter II.

Raneiri Mazzilli:

The American people have watched with anxiety the political and economic difficulties through which your great nation has been passing, and have admired the resolute will of the Brazilian community to resolve their difficulties within the framework of constitutional democracy and without civil strife.¹

At a news conference on April 3, 1964, Secretary Rusk gave the following responses to questions concerning the United States views on the Brazilian military coup d'etat of 1964:

It has been demonstrated over the last several years that the Armed Forces of Brazil basically are committed to constitutional government... and this action did not occur until there were many signs that President Goulart seemed to be moving to change the constitutional arrangements and to move toward some sort of authoritarian regime...²

In contrast with the rationale with which the American officials recognized the new Brazilian government, it was obvious that the new government was not a constitutional government. It was a military government, which from its very beginning was itself authoritarian and suppressive. It ended all pretension of social reform, socio-economic development, and constitutional democracy in Brazil. Its trend was immediately visible to both Brazilians and Americans.³

¹"Message from the President of the United States (Johnson) to Acting President of Brazil", American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, April 2, 1964.

¹"U.S. Views on the Brazilian Coup", Secretary of State Rusk, *Ibid.*

³Roett, Brazil: Patrimonial Society, Op. Cit.; Schneider,

The Authoritarian Trend of the Brazilian Military Government

At the time of the United States recognition of the new Brazilian government, Raneiri Mazzilli was president, having succeeded to the office from his post as President of the Chamber of Deputies. Although Rareiri Mazzilli was the provisional President of Brazil, his position was nominal. The military ruled, in fact, through the Revolutionary Supreme Command.¹

The Revolutionary Supreme Command was a committee of the military hierarchy which Costa e Silva had organized. It consisted of Costa e Silva, Navy Admiral Rademaker Grunewald, and Airforce Chief of Staff Brigadier Francisco de Assis Correia de Melo. Before Mazzilli's succession to the presidency, Costa e Silva informed him that the Supreme Command would be the chief decision-maker. Mazzilli then, accepted the nominal role, and appointed the three military men as his service ministers.²

Almost immediately the Revolutionary Supreme Command demonstrated the suppressive and undemocratic nature of the new military regime by initiating a series of purges. In as
Op. Cit.

¹Schneider, Ibid.

²J.F.W. Dulles, Unrest in Brazil: Political-Military Crises, 1955-1964, Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1970, pp. 341-54; See also Schneider, Op. Cit.

much as Costa e Silva, Commander-in-chief of the revolutionary forces, was determined to carry out purges before elections were to be held, a committee composed of the leadership of all major parties (except the Brazilian Labor Party) drafted a constitutional act which delegated to the Revolutionary Supreme Command the power to purge.¹

Jurists Francisco Campos and Medeiros de Silva were recruited by the military to write an Institutional Act. Thus, on April 9, 1964, the First Institutional Act was decreed. It clarified the military's disdain for Congress by putting forth the tenet that Congress received its legitimacy from the Institutional Act which the revolutionary government decreed. In this way, the military held that it possessed the legitimate authority to decree a new constitutional order.²

The First Institutional Act greatly modified the 1946 Constitution and enhanced the powers of the chief executive. According to Schneider the act stated that:

- (1) Congress was required to elect a president and a vice-president within two days after the publication of the act, and the provision that military chiefs-of-staff and other officials were ineligible for election to the presidency was to be suspended;

¹Victor, Op. Cit; Schneider, Op.Cit

²George W. Bemis, From Crisis to Revolution, Los Angeles, California: University of Southern California Press, 1964; Also see Victor, Ibid; and Schneider, Op. Cit.

- (2) the president was authorized to initiate constitutional amendments and Congress was required to act on them within thirty days, and the amendments could be passed only by absolute majority rather than by two-thirds vote;
- (3) the Supreme Command was given the right to suspend political rights of citizens for ten years, and to cancel the mandates of Congressmen, state assemblymen, and municipal counselors, and the president was to possess the same power for sixty days after taking office;
- (4) Congress was required to act within thirty days on ordinary bills;
- (5) the president possessed exclusive authority to initiate financial bills and Congress was forbidden to appropriate more funds than the president requested;
- (6) the president was given increased power to declare a state of seige;
- (7) the constitutional and legal rights of job tenure were suspended for six months, thus allowing the president and governors to dismiss public employees for threatening national security, "the democratic regime", or public order; and
- (8) a day in October of 1965 was designated for the election of a president and vice-president.¹

¹ Ibid.; Victor, Op.Cit.

General Humberto Castello Branco became President of Brazil on April 15, 1964. By that time, Brazilian "democracy" had already become severely restricted. Castello Branco's cabinet was centrist-conservative and technocratic. At the inception of his administration, he appealed to the nonsubversive left to support a reformist program. He declared his intentions to install a new order that would have as its mission structural reform, the modernization of Brazil, and the elimination of communism. Despite this declaration, the only goals which Castello Branco actually pursued were:

- (1) the elimination of communism; and
- (2) the modernization of Brazil.¹

Under Castello Branco, rule was **authoritarian** and there was no effort made to decree essential reforms. The initial period of his rule was characterized by a continuation of the purges which had begun under the Revolutionary Supreme Command. As the military hard-liners renewed their attacks on the left in August of 1964, Castello Branco began to be acquiescent to their demands. The Military-Police Inquires (IPM's), which began as quasi-judicial proceedings by the military in order to deal harshly with leftist and ultra-nationalist officers during the early 1950's, were again launched during the brief rule of the Supreme Command. They

¹See Schneider's discussion of PAEG and Roberto Campos' economic plan; Op. Cit.

extended their activities to encompass thousands of people during Castello Branco's rule.¹

In addition to these maneuverings, Castello Branco decreed federal control of the state government of Goias. This action was taken due to Governor Mauro Borges Teixeira's protests against the Military Police Inquiries in Goias, his state. Due to his protests, the governor was labeled as subversive. The military government also demonstrated its authoritarian nature by announcing the following new laws, which were intended to prevent the rise of populist leaders in Sao Paulo:

- (1) the Ineligibilities Act;
- (2) the Electoral Code; and
- (3) the Party Statute.²

The Ineligibilities Act was unilaterally passed by the president, as provided by the First Institutional Act. It was issued in 1965 due to the pressure of the anti-communist military hierarchy. The act extended the range of officials who were required to resign six months before presidential elections in order to be eligible to run. Through this act most of the officials who had served in Goulart's cabinet

¹Ibid., Schneider.

²Revista de Direito Publico e Ciencias Politicas, VIII No. 1, January-April, 1965, pp. 91-124 and 125-145; Also see Schneider, Op. Cit.; Also Revista de Direito Publico e Ciencias Politicas, VIII, No. 3, September-December, 1965, pp. 217-226; Also see Schneider, Ibid.

were declared ineligible for election. The act also barred from eligibility "those who had compromised, for themselves or others, the adequacy and normalcy of an election through abuse of economic power, act of corruption, or improper use of the powers of public office".¹

The Electoral Code of July 1965:

- (1) reduced the number of political parties;
- (2) required that candidates reside in the area they seek to represent;
- (3) required that voters choose legislators from the same party; and
- (4) designated that the running mates of successful gubernatorial and presidential candidates were automatically elected.²

In order to limit the establishment of new political parties, the Political Party Statute instituted new procedures. The statute prohibited individuals from running for more than one office in any election, and specified residence and party membership requirements for candidates.³ The Armed Force hard-liners, fearful of the resurgence of populist elements, warned Castello Branco against holding open, competitive gubernatorial elections in October of 1965. Castello Branco

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

defied the hard-liners. When two candidates that the regime considered as adversaries were victorious in Minas Gerais and Buanbara, the military hard-liners began to press for the annulment of the elections. In the midst of the controversy which surrounded the October 1965 elections, Castello Branco and his moderate supporters began to choose the unity of the military as their priority item for the future development of Brazil in contradistinction to the constitutional principle of direct elections. Evidence of this choice of the unity of the military as the priority item was the promulgation of the Second Institutional Act (on October 27, 1965).¹

The Second Institutional Act provided:

- (1) that the president had the sole right to create new positions in the civil service;
- (2) for further restrictions on the time allowed for Congress to consider legislation before the legislation would automatically become law;
- (3) for an increase in the number of members of the Supreme Court;
- (4) for reserving the right of nomination of all federal judges to the president of the Republic;
- (5) for civilians accused of crimes against national security to be submitted to military justice;

¹Revista de Direito Publico e Ciencias Politicas, IX, No. 2 (April-June, 1966, pp. 168-179); Also see Schneider, Op. Cit.

- (6) reorganization of the Supreme Military Tribunal;
- (7) a decree for the indirect election of the president and the vice-president by an absolute majority of the federal Congress; and
- (8) empowered the President with the right to suspend Congress and govern by decree.¹

Additional provisions of the Second Institutional Act were: the permission for the president to declare a state of siege for 180 days to prevent "the subversion of internal order"; the extension of the power of the revolutionary government; the establishment of restrictions on the activities of those whose political rights were removed; and the extension of the right of intervention in states for the president, in order to assure the execution of a federal law and to prevent or punish the subversion of order. It also abolished the existing political parties. The provisions of the Second Institutional Act were to continue until March 15, 1967, the date on which the successor of Castello Branco was to be inaugurated.²

On November 20, 1965, the party system went through further modifications under Complementary Act No. 4, which provided for the provisional registration of political organ-

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

izations sponsored by at least 120 federal deputies and twenty senators. As a replacement of the fourteen party system of the 1946 Republic, two political parties were established. The political parties established were:

- (1) the National Renovating Alliance (ARENA), a government-sponsored party which was basically composed of former members of the National Democratic Union (UDN) and some members of the Social Democratic Party (PSD); and
- (2) the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB), the oppositional party which was composed of the additional elements from the PSD and the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB).¹

In early 1966 an additional act, the Third Institutional Act, accentuated the trend toward authoritarian government. Through the Third Institutional Act, Castello Branco launched the development of a system which would assure victory for the revolutionary candidates for president and governors. Specifically the act provided for:

- (1) the annulment of direct election of governors and their replacement by selection by state legislators;
- (2) elections for federal senators and deputies to be held on November 15, 1966; and
- (3) the abolition of the election of mayors of chief capital cities.

¹Revista de Direito Publico e Ciencias Politicas IX, No. 2, April-June, 1966, pp. 180-199; See also Schneider, Op. Cit.

The mayors of chief capital cities were to be selected by the governors of the states.¹

Between 1965 and 1966 the Brazilian government announced a series of Complementary Acts which were intended to implement the Institutional Acts. They included:

- (1) Complementary Act No. 23 of October 20, 1965, which confirmed the increasing centralization of power within the military and made the government more adamant in its efforts to restrict organized opposition; and
- (2) Complementary Act No. 20 of July 19, 1966, which allowed legislators of the ARENA party to vote for the Brazilian Democratic Movement's candidates in gubernatorial or presidential elections. In this way, the series of Complementary Acts also increased the government's position of power with respect to political parties.²

A Fourth Institutional Act, which was issued in December of 1966 summoned Congress to meet in special session in order to discuss, vote on, and promulgate the draft Constitution which Castello Branco had decided on in April. The Constitution of 1967 provided a very broad basis for future na-

¹Revista de Direito Publico e Ciencias Politicas, IX, No. 2 (April-June, 1966, pp. 180-199; See also Schneider, *Ibid.*

²*Ibid.*

tional security legislation.¹

During the Castello Branco Administration there had been a voluminous record of purges. The majority of purges had occurred under the first Institutional Act of 1964. Under it and the earlier rule of the Supreme Command, 116 elected mandates were cancelled, and in over 370 cases political rights were suspended. There were 1,528 firings, 555 forced military retirements, 544 compulsory retirements for political reasons, and 165 involuntary transfers to the reserves. By the time his administration was ending, the Armed Forces had become entrenched in the direct and indirect exercise of power.²

With respect to the problems of socio-economic and political development and reform in the poverty stricken Northeast, the record of the military government was extremely poor. In 1964, SUDENE lost its autonomy and became a part of the planning effort of the federal government.³ There was no longer any special concern registered for the region that needed economic development most.⁴ Rather, the economic development of the country, now entrusted to the military, became focused on country programs as opposed to regional de-

¹Schneider, Op. Cit.

²Ibid.

³Roett, Patrimonial Society, Op. Cit.

⁴Ibid.; Interview with Donor Lion, July 1977.

velopment.¹

Military rule served to eliminate the political left that had served as the protector of the interests of the poverty stricken population in the Northeast during the early 1960's. Political power in Pernambuco was returned to the families that controlled the state before the rise of Miguel Arraes, as he found asylum in Algeria. And Francisco Juliao was imprisoned. Aside from the university students, who were violently suppressed, Dom Helder Camara, Recife's Archbishop, constituted the single voice of dissent in the Northeast.²

Dom Helder Camara stressed the development of a new mentality as a lever that could elevate urban and rural workers and nonviolent principles. By protesting the plight of the sugar workers, he became known as a subversive personality. Some conservatives labeled him as a communist.³

Thus, Castello Branco had instituted an authoritarian regime by 1967. However, considerable progress had been made in certain economic areas. By the time his administration was ending, inflation was coming under control and the process of accelerating growth had been set in motion. This had occurred under the economic rationality of Roberto Campos, the

¹Ibid.

²Page, Op. Cit.

³Ibid.

Minister of Planning and Economic Coordination. Under Roberto Campos, however, no progress was made in socio-economic development.¹

In March of 1967, Marshal Arthur da Costa e Silva became president of Brazil. Although Costa e Silva had promised to "humanize the Revolution", the military dictatorship which Castello Branco had installed during the period 1964 to 1967 intensified under his regime. The resurgence of the hard-liners, the heightening of unrest in Brazil, and the 1968 political crisis joined forces to motivate the Costa e Silva government to reach an all time high in suppressive government during the period of the 1960's. Also the lack of Congressional power added to the intensification of the military dictatorship.²

Immediately, the Costa e Silva government began to crack down on any semblance of dissent. In March of 1967 General Mainz de Aragao's anti-communist speech, which was published in O Globo, attacked the Church for assisting subversives, and thus ushered in a new era of the war against communism. With these attacks, communist forces began to reorganize, and the military government began to launch an attack on the Church opposition.³

¹Schneider, Op. Cit.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

As student uprisings, organized under the National Union of Students (UNE), were quelled and Cardinal Archbishop Rossi began to protest the government's brutality against students, the friction between the regime and the Catholic Church and dissension within the Church itself began to escalate. Events pertinent to this conflict that would occur during the Costa e Silva government contrasted greatly with the Castello Branco government. The Castello Branco government had been unwilling to accept the unquestioned leadership of the conservative Cardinal Archbishop of Rio de Janeiro, Dom Jaime de Barros Camara. In 1966 the Workers Catholic Action, Rural Catholic Action, and Catholic Agrarian Youth, under the leadership of Dom Helder Camara, spoke out against the injustices toward labor. In 1967 the National Conference of Bishops of Brazil called for redistribution of landholdings, and the Catholic Workers Action initiated its critique against established institutions.¹

The renewed unrest caused an intensification of the authoritarian trend. Specifically the Fifth Institutional Act was decreed. Under its provision:

- (1) the President was granted the power to recess the National Congress, legislative assemblies, and municipal councils by Complementary Acts;

¹Ibid.

- (2) the President was given the sole power to reconvene such bodies;
- (3) the President was granted power to decree intervention in the states when in the national interest, disregarding the constitutional restrictions on intervention;
- (4) the President was empowered to suspend the political rights of any citizen for a period of ten years and to cancel elected mandates, disregarding constitutional limitations;
- (5) personal goods could be confiscated that were gained illegally;
- (6) the right of habeas corpus could be suspended in instances of crimes against national security, against the social and economic order, and in cases of political crimes; and
- (7) the restrictions on those who had lost their political rights were increased.¹

Complementary Act No. 38 was decreed on December 13, 1968. Through the decreeing of this act Congress was recessed, clamping on a period of "outright military rule without the facade of elective offices". The prospects for humanizing the Revolution had been relinquished for the requisite of internal security, and the leadership of the president within the military regime had been secured.²

¹Schneider, Op. Cit.; Also see Roett, Patrimonial Society, Op. Cit.

²Ibid.

In essence, the military, supported by the United States, headed a highly suppressive regime. Aside from the continuation of dualism, there was an all out effort to erode and eliminate institutions that could relate the demands of the masses to political power. Through the Institutional Acts, the Congressional power was seriously restricted. And following the Fifth Institutional Act, which gave the President the power to recess Congress, Congress was recessed.

The United States and the Brazilian Coup D'Etat of 1964

We have noted that the authoritarian trend which crystallized in the military regime had already been set into motion at the time that the United States extended recognition to the Brazilian government in April of 1964 as a Constitutional democracy. This paradox signaled a continuing duplicity in American foreign policy. Considerable acrimony was evoked within the United States Department of State regarding the propriety of recognizing the new regime so quickly. However, the recognition was extended upon the advice of Lincoln Gordon's country team. The team based its decision for immediate recognition upon the premise that immediate recognition would reinforce the strength of the moderates against those who desired a military dictatorship, thus preserving at least the appearance of a constitutional order. The effect of immediate recognition might have been to strengthen the determination of the military to retain power. However, in the midst of charges that the

United States had a direct role in the Brazilian military coup d'etat of 1964, both ambassador Gordon and Secretary of State Rusk stressed that "the Brazilian Revolution of 1964 was a purely 100 percent Brazilian product, not a hidden United States product". Thomas Skidmore investigated allegations that there was direct United States complicity in the coup, and reported that there was no direct complicity.¹

While direct complicity of the United States in the coup d'etat is denied by most scholars, indirect United States involvement is implied by several factors. The factors which imply indirect United States involvement consist of:

- (1) evidence that the United States was aware of the coup d'etat preparations;
- (2) evidence of personal ties linking Military Attache Gen. Vernon A. Walters with key Brazilian military officers (especially, Castello Branco); and
- (3) a similarity of United States and Brazilian views on anti-communist counter-insurgency doctrine and a special relationship between the United States military and the Brazilian military which stems from their collaboration

¹U.S. Congress, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations (Senate), Nomination of Lincoln Gordon to be Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, 89th Congress, 2d Session, 1966, pp. 34, 41-44; Also see Helio Jaguaribe, Economic and Political Development, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968; Keith Larry Storrs, Brazil's Independent Foreign Policy, Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press, 1973; Stepan, The Military in Politics, Op. Cit.; Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, Op. Cit.

during World War II. These factors are depicted by Alfred Stepan, who concluded that the United States policy played a supportive role in the coup d'etat, but one that was successful because it was congruent with domestic trends.¹

In addition to the above factors which imply that the United States had, at least, an indirect role in the Brazilian military coup d'etat of 1964, there is the more recently divulged fact that the United States forces stood ready to aid in the coup d'etat. Lewis H. Diuguid, Washington Post Staff Writer, reported on December 29, 1976, that the United States was prepared, if needed, to support militarily in the ouster of Brazil's "last civilian government". He based his statement on United States official documents that were recently declassified.²

According to Diuguid, the documents show that a United States naval task force complete with an airforce carrier, a helicopter carrier, six destroyers and oil tankers had orders to take positions off the coast of Brazil during the 1964 coup d'etat against the government of Joa Goulart. Reportedly, the ships were to await the orders of Ambassador Lincoln Gordon. Diuguid reported that in a telephone inter-

¹Stepan, Ibid.; Storrs, Ibid.; Bell's Article in Roett, Brazil in the Sixties discusses the extent to which both Walters and Gordon were informed of the coup d'etat; Interview with Archie Lang, October 1976. Interview discussed the relationship of Castello Branco and Vernon Walters as being like that of father and son.

²Lewis H. Diuguid, "United States Forces Ready to Aid

view Gordon again denied that the United States played any role in the coup. Gordon stated:

It was a contingency plan, never put into effect. We feared the possibility of a civil war... and one side might need some outside help.¹

Based on this rationale, Gordon stated that he had recommended creation of the logistical force which was called "Operation Brother Sam" in the declassified military cables.²

According to the declassified documents, on March 27, 1964, Gordon had cabled Secretary of State Rusk that Gen. Humberto Castello Branco would probably be the leader of the military taking power. This communique was conveyed five days before the culmination of the coup. Diuguid also reports that the morning after the coup d'etat Gen. Vernon A. Walters, military attache and close friend of Castello Branco was breakfasting with Castello Branco in an effort to urge him to assume the presidency. In the declassified documents Gordon mentions that Walters was very well-informed.³

United States-Brazil Relations Following the Coup D'Etat of 1964

While the American strategic actors and special interests had found the Goulart constitutional government objectionable,

'64 Coup", Washington Post, December 29, 1976; Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Ammunition for USCINSCO Contingency Plan 2-61", March 31, 1964. Xeroxed Copy of Document from Lyndon B. Johnson Library, declassified June 17, 1975.

¹Ibid.; Diuguid and Document.

²Ibid.; ³Ibid.

the policies that Castello Branco and the military regime initiated were found to be favorable with the strategic actors and the special interests. Upon its ascent to a position of power, the Castello Branco Administration instituted an economic policy that was liberal toward U.S. investments and was decidedly pro-American. A close complementary relation evolved between those goals which the dominant coalition's internal forces sought and the interests of the United States. Commitments included the Brazilian government's unquestioned acceptance of United States hegemony in the political and economic spheres. Within this context the Brazilian government adopted an economic policy that was capable of creating a safe and healthy climate for the expansion of United States investments in the Brazilian economy.¹

The Revolution encouraged and abetted a view of international relations that was in line with the doctrine of the Higher War College, a doctrine which identified Brazilian potential development with the ideology and technology which they believed characterized the power of the United States. The collaboration of the United States military had been sought for the development of the Superior War College, and the doctrines of the United States military (which had been inculcated in the higher military and civilians trained in the Superior

¹Carlos Estevan Martin's Article in Cotler and Fagen, Op. Cit.; Bell's Article in Roett, Brazil in the Sixties, Op. Cit.

War College) were permeated by the cold war views. Thus, Brazilians who came to power after the Revolution of 1964 believed an external alignment with the United States in the cold war was a requisite in the internal struggle against communist subversion. This group, which we have previously referred to as the pragmatic revisionists, were decidedly against the radical revisionists and the radical nationalists who had aligned with Goulart.¹

Under Castello Branco (as previously noted), an austerity program was launched in order to contain the inflation. The credit restrictions and wage ceilings, that were a part of the austerity package, proved to be unpopular with labor. However, the predominant theme of implementing technically sound solutions for Brazil's problems dictated a course for the regime of ignoring public opinion. Thus, the economic policies of the new regime were reinforced by the authoritarian trend in governing. The priority given to economic productivity meant that "democracy would have to wait".

If the rate of development is rapid, inequality can be tolerated and corrected with time. If the rate of development falls because of inadequate incentives, the practice of distributive justice becomes a sharing of poverty.²

In line with its policy of close association with the United States, the military regime of Castello Branco moved

¹Bell's Article in Roett, Brazil in the Sixties, Op. Cit.

²Carlos Estevan Martin's Article in Cotler and Fagen, Op. Cit.; Storrs, Op. Cit.

immediately to severe diplomatic relations with Cuba and reiterated its concern over the communistic nature of the Cuban regime. On July 31, 1964, Castello Branco addressed the new diplomats of Brazil, formally repudiating the independent policy and affirming solidarity with the United States. In decrying autonomous development as false nationalism, he announced that Brazil would attempt to attract foreign investment and financing in order to strengthen the national economy. In September of 1964 he spoke at the Foreign Service and declared that "Brazil seeks to follow a policy of free enterprise and orderly receipt of foreign capital".¹

August of 1964 saw two events reinforcing the trend toward close association with the United States. First, Vasco Leitaó da Cunha, upon his appointment as Foreign Minister, publicly announced that Brazil's position vis-a-vis the Southeast Asia conflict was identical with that of the United States, and indicated that Brazil would be prepared to go to war if the conflict escalated. This announcement was reinforced with actual shipments of medical supplies to South Vietnam. Secondly, the government repealed the Profit Remittance Law of 1962 and made new concessions to foreign companies.²

With respect to the repeal of the controversial features

¹Bell, Op. Cit.; Martin's Article, Cotler and Fagen, Op.Cit.

²Martin, Op. Cit.; Also see Bell, Op. Cit.

in the Profit Remittance Law the following provisions were made:

- (1) remittances would be restricted to ten percent per year only in the case of balance of payments difficulties; and
- (2) reinvestments were permitted to be considered as part of the capital base.¹

In October of 1964 an additional event demonstrated the new Brazilian hierarchy's increasing receptiveness to United States capital. This event saw the Brazilian government's purchase of the ten subsidiaries of American and Foreign Power. As mentioned previously, an earlier agreement made on April 22, 1963 had provided that:

- (1) purchase was to be made at \$135 million; and
- (2) three-fourths of the proceeds were to be reinvested in Brazil.

The final formalities of Congressional approval had been delayed for one year due to considerable nationalistic opposition. The purchase of 1964 was made under terms which were more generous than the memorandum of 1963. This time it passed despite the opposition of Carlos Lacerda, Governor of Guanabara and leader of the National Democratic Union, and the Congressional Leftists.²

¹Ibid.; Bell's Article in Roett, Brazil in the Sixties, Op. Cit.

²Bell's Article in Roett, Brazil in the Sixties, Op. Cit.; Martin, Op. Cit.; Storrs, Op. Cit.

In his 1965 message to the National Congress, Castello Branco focused on the achievements of the Revolution of 1964. Among the achievements, he listed the elimination of points of friction between the United States and Brazil and the general improvement of Brazilian-American relations, which had earlier been on the brink of a crisis. During the same year the United States and Brazil signed an investment Guarantee agreement which renewed nationalist opposition.¹ An additional feature, related to United States-Brazilian relations during 1965 was the presidential decree which opened Brazil's iron reserves to private development. This decree of February 23 was a reversal of the monopolistic policy which the decree of December 1963 had established. Also in 1965, the Minister of Foreign Affairs reiterated the official Brazilian position toward United States capital by announcing that:

From the operational standpoint of foreign policy, independence and nationalism must give way to international interdependence... Political isolation and economic autarkies have been buried.²

The foregoing developments contrasted greatly with those which preceded the Revolution of 1964, and may be viewed as evidence that the post 1964 Brazilian military regime con-

¹Agency for International Development Paper, Op. Cit.

²Martin, Op. Cit.; Bell, Op. Cit.; Storrs, Op. Cit.

stituted a government in which the American national interest defined in terms of the American ideology could and did find protection. The Quadros-Goulart era, in contrast, encompassed a government in which the American national interest (defined in the context of the American ideology) could not and did not find protection.¹

Not only did this constitute a reversal of policy that was inimical to the United States interests as defined in the American ideology. It contradicted the very basis of the Alliance for Progress social revolution concept, thus demonstrating the continuing duplicity in the American foreign policy. Specifically, the new Brazilian regime and the American strategic actors had looked with suspicion upon the pre-1964 developments which included:

- (1) a general unfavorable climate for foreign investments;
- (2) Brazil's criticism of the Bay of Pigs invasion;
- (3) Brazil's abstention on the vote to expel Cuba from the OAS;
- (4) the passage of the Profit Remittance Law of 1962;
- (5) the effort to mediate the Cuban Missile Crisis;
- (6) the failure to complete the AMFORP deal;
- (7) efforts at social reform, perceived by the United States press as a communist threat; and

(8) galloping inflation.¹

Thus, the choice was between social reform and economic nationalism, on the one hand, and economic modernization and authoritarianism, on the other hand. American officials and the Brazilian military chose to support authoritarianism. The rationale on which the United States officials made this choice was that of a security threat that had been associated with social reform and economic nationalism.²

Despite the growing authoritarianism and the suppressive trend of the military government, the American officials were steadfast in their support of the new regime. In August of 1964 President Lyndon B. Johnson wrote to Brazilian President Castello Branco:

Brazil and the United States, I believe, have entered a new era of understanding and comprehension... You spoke of Brazil's commitment to the Western democratic system, its support of free enterprise and the orderly encouragement of private capital.³

This statement followed the First Institutional Act and a series of purges.

In June of 1964 Thomas C. Mann stated:

In each case where a government is overthrown by force there should be a careful dispassionate

¹Ibid.

²Interview with Archie Lang, October, 1976.

³"Letter from President of the U.S. (Johnson) to President of Brazil (Castello Branco)", American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, April 2, 1964.

assessment of each situation in the light of all the surrounding facts and circumstances so that decisions concerning recognition, trade, aid... can be made which are consistent with our ideals and with our overall national interests.¹

Thomas C. Mann gave impetus to the increasing authoritarianism by sanctifying the military movements in Latin America as protectors of American investments and a bulwark against communism.

Although the Assistant Secretary ordered the suspension of negotiations for a new loan program after the Second Institutional Act was decreed in October of 1965, Lincoln Gordon argued successfully the necessity of continuing to support the Castello Branco regime in its struggle against the hard liners who overtly sought to install a more authoritarian military dictatorship. Lincoln Gordon had justified his immediate recognition of the military government to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate in February by describing the military regime of Castello Branco as a transitional regime which was moving rapidly in the direction of full constitutional normality.²

An additional upsurge of political repression occurred in 1966 in connection with the Third Institutional Act. This

¹Thomas C. Mann, Address by Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, June 7, 1964, p. 388; Pakenham, Op. Cit.

²U.S. Congress, Hearings for Nomination for Lincoln Gordon to be Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Op. Cit.; See also Simon G. Hanson, Op. Cit.

upsurge of political repression caused Lincoln Gordon (then Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs) to review the situation. His review of conditions in Brazil rendered the conclusion that social programs and political development toward a democratic order would follow once inflation had been contained.¹

The amount of economic assistance in program loans, accorded by the United States to Brazil, increased enormously during the post-1964 era. Whereas Brazil had received a maximum of \$100 million in AID program loans during the period May 1961 to April 1964, the post revolutionary era was characterized by the following features:

- (1) the signing and release of a 50 million dollar program loan on June 24, 1964;
- (2) the signing and release of a 150 million dollar program loan on December 14, 1964;
- (3) the signing and release of a 150 million dollar program loan on February 10, 1966; and
- (4) another for 100 million dollars on March 11, 1967.²

Also during the post 1964 coup d'etat era, Brazil received almost fifty percent of the funds disbursed to Latin America in contrast with 18.3 percent in 1962 through 1963.³ In addi-

¹Bell, Op. Cit.

²U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee of Foreign Relations, U.S. Policies and Programs in Brazil, Hearings Before the Committee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, 92nd Congress, May 1971.

³Ibid.

tion to these developments the Northeast Agreement was terminated in 1964.¹

This trend of placating the Brazilian military dictatorship continued until Costa e Silva's inauguration as President in March of 1967. Upon the inauguration of Costa e Silva, John C. Tuthill (then Ambassador to Brazil) reviewed the situation and decided that the United States had become overcommitted in Brazil as a result of United States discomfort with the deteriorating political situation and of Brazil's resentment of United States intervention. The tightening of the military dictatorship, with its political coercion, served to motivate liberals in the United States Congress and in the State Department to criticize the United States identification with the 1964 Revolution.²

An additional factor which demonstrates the failure of the United States officials to pursue the idealistic goals of the Alliance for Progress after the coup d'etat of 1964 is the termination of the Northeast Agreement. By 1964 the specified duration of the Northeast Agreement had ended. No effort was made to extend the agreement beyond the specified period. An immediate result of the coup d'etat was the cessation of political and social unrest in the Northeast. The

¹Bell's Article in Roett, Brazil in the Sixties, Op. Cit.; Ibid. Aid to the Northeast was crucial for socio-economic development.

²Ibid., (Bell); Niles Bond in an interview indicated Tuthill's decision. Interview with Niles Bond, December 1976.

decline in the United States effort in the Northeast accompanied the cessation of political and social unrest and the termination of the Northeast Agreement. With the military government in charge, American strategic actors were no longer apprehensive about the possible radicalization of the Northeast. The prerogatives of the State Department and the career men now took precedence in the form of Brazilian-United States cooperation in ensuring the political stabilization of Brazil under military rule.

Donor Lion has referred to the termination of the Northeast Agreement as a definite downturn in United States support of development in Brazil. Riordan Roett concurs with the following statement.

From 1964 forward, there was a marginalization of the USAID effort in the Northeast once the apparent threat of social and political disorder disappeared with the March 31, 1964 military take over. Little new money appeared. The political commitment for 1962-64 had been fulfilled and the money promised had been obligated, if not released. Now the focus shifted to the central-south region and to the efforts of the federal government to control inflation. Few new funds were obligated by USAID. Funds previously committed were released, and projects were pushed to completion. The keynote of Brazilian-United States relations in this era was cooperation in the effort to stabilize and solidify the regime that began with the military coup.¹

There was originally considerable controversy concerning the relationship of the two USAID Missions in Brazil. Wash-

¹Riordan Roett, The Brazilian Northeast, Op. Cit., pp. 162-163.

Interview with Donor Lion, July, 1977. According to Lion, the termination of the Northeast Agreement meant the end of the Alliance for Progress.

ington officials, however, in time, indicated that the Rio Mission was to have the greater role in administering the foreign assistance program. After the coup d'etat in 1964, there was a general reduction of power in the Recife Mission, which meant that the Northeast development program was prone to become the low priority item in the Brazilian development effort. The post coup of 1964 trend was toward national concern. This emphasis on the Brazilian nation, rather than the Northeast region, became the great focus for the United States Department of State and for the federal government of Brazil. While the Agency for International Development had originally adhered to its mission of development and to the Alliance for Progress prerogatives, it began to follow the lead of the Department of State.¹ In 1967 and 1968, there were only a few grants extended for the Northeast and there were no new loans.² The United States effort to assist in the socio-economic development of Brazil, inclusive of eliminating economic and social dualism, had obviously ended.³

Thus, dualism, socio-economic stagnation, and the lack of social mobility persisted in the Northeast region. There

¹Interview with Jerome Levinson, September 1979.
Interview with Donor Lion, July, 1977.
Roett, *The Brazilian Northeast*, Op. Cit.

²Roett, *Ibid.*

³Roett, *Ibid.*;
Interview with Jerome Levinson, September, 1979.
Interview with Donor Lion, July, 1977.

was a dearth of representation for the poor of the Northeast. Harold T. Jorgenson, an economist who had worked as a Rural Affairs Advisor to AID in the Northeast region reported that:

The Decade of Development once promised for the 1960's under the Alliance for Progress has become a Decade for Disaster for most peasants in the Northeast.¹

Jorgenson reported, in 1968, that the struggle for a decent standard of living was greater than before the coup d'etat because the peasants were caught in the effort for economic stabilization. According to Jorgenson the Northeast had remained underdeveloped and traditional. The Northeast was composed largely of poor small peasant cultivators and salaried workers. Although some progress had been made in the coastal cities, slums still prevailed there. The intensification of poverty in the Northeast was caused by unemployment, which had increased since 1964 within the rural sector, and underemployment, which had become widespread. Landowners and landlords that suffered decline through diversification, had dispossessed many tenants and sharecroppers of their small holdings. There had been a temporary shutdown of large mismanaged sugar plantations. In the Northeast region's sugar industry, minimum wages were not being paid. The Alliance for Progress had made no visible positive impact on the con-

¹Harold T. Jorgenson, "Impending Disaster in Northeast Brazil", Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol. No. 2, Summer, 1968, p. 2.

ditions of the Northeast, and appeared to have had some negative ramifications.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

During the 1960's American foreign policy toward Latin America reflected a continuing trend of duplicity. The Alliance for Progress, which was intended to intercept a social revolution that had been set in motion and enable the United States to channel the revolution toward peaceful change, promoted authoritarian and suppressive regimes instead. The idealistic goals of the Alliance for Progress were to assist the Latin American nations in achieving economic development, social reform, and political development along democratic lines. In essence, these goals were to assist Latin American countries in achieving socio-economic development.

This dissertation has focused on United States policy toward Brazil during the 1960's, a country and an era in which the goals of the Alliance for Progress were flagrantly thwarted. The actions and decisions of American actors which conflicted with the goals of the Alliance for Progress were:

1. the decision to apply impact aid in the Northeast, as opposed to developmental aid;
2. the decision to initiate the Isles of Sanity policy;
3. the decision to develop a military contingency plan to

- intervene, if necessary, in the Brazilian military coup d'etat against the reformist government;
4. the decision to grant immediate recognition to the Brazilian military government;
 5. the announcement of the Mann Doctrine; and
 6. the decision to increase American economic assistance to Brazil, after the military government had been installed.

The crucial question for this inquiry has been what has caused this marked variance between the idealistic goals of the Alliance for Progress and the decisions that were made toward Brazil in the 1960's. The bureaucratic politics paradigm has been utilized to analyze the United States policy toward Brazil during the era under scrutiny. The utilization of the bureaucratic politics paradigm in this analysis revealed the following variables as casual, directly or indirectly, in the failure of the Alliance for Progress:

1. the political nature of the policy-making process in America, which allowed a game of competition to thwart the Kennedy men's efforts to win their preferred approach for maintaining Brazil's alignment with the United States;
2. the career men, strategic actors who opposed the Alliance for Progress;
3. the parameters of the game;
4. the action-channels of the game; and
5. a coalescence of variables that were negatively related to the efforts to achieve the idealistic goals of the

Alliance for Progress.

Throughout this inquiry our fundamental assumption has been that strategic actors in American foreign policy possess diverse and often opposing goals and values. The prerequisites for reaching decisions in the American foreign policy-making process is the reconciliation of these diverse goals and values that exist within the policy-making amalgam. The Kennedy men (John Fitzgerald Kennedy, William T. Dentzer, Jr., Jerome Levinson, Lincoln Gordon, and Donor Lion) possessed goals, values, and prerogatives that conflicted with those of the career men (Lyndon B. Johnson, Dean Rusk, and Thomas C. Mann). Within the framework of this dichotomy, a political struggle ensued. In the struggle that ensued, the diverse goals and values of the competing groups were indeed reconciled for decision-making. However, in the reconciliation process, the positions of the Kennedy men were compromised.

The parameters have been identified as variables that caused the marked variance between the Alliance for Progress goals in Brazil and the decisions and actions that were taken. The parameters, couched in the American ideology, were the aversion to communism, aversion to radicalism, belief in the sanctity of private enterprise, and belief in the overwhelming importance of national security. The action-channels of the game have also been identified as factors that caused the variance. The action-channels were the congressional system of the United States and the autonomous nature of the United

States Agency for International Development Mission in Rio de Janeiro over the United States Agency for International Development Mission at Recife.

Although the bureaucratic politics model has been the fundamental methodological tool for this dissertation, Joseph Frankel's theory which holds that a characterization of the operative situation is necessary in a decision-making study was an important premise of this inquiry. Hence, our initial task, aside from the incipient paradigm building and conceptualization, was to depict the objective environment at the inception of the Alliance for Progress. The characterization of the operative situation clarified the motivations of the strategic actors, magnified the misperceptions of the strategic actors, and indicated the premises which underlined their actions.

The objective environment of Brazil has been described in terms of economic, political, and social conditions. In our examination of the Brazilian economy we assessed the economic development of Brazil. Economic development was viewed as encompassing structural changes that are required to bring about social and political development. These structural changes include increasing rates of gross national product, increasing rates of per capita income, abundance of natural resources, extent of social mobility, declining dualism, rising standards of living for the population as a whole, and increasing accessibility of the entire population to the power

structure. In this sense, we made the distinction between economic development and economic modernization, which focuses more on industry as the lead sector.

Based on this distinction, an analysis was made of sectoral development in the Brazilian economy, with the benchmark years of 1950 and 1960. Agriculture, mining, industry, construction, public utilities, transportation and communications were the key sectors included. This analysis, in Chapter II, revealed a definite trend toward industrialization in Brazil, for by 1960 industry's contribution to Brazil's gross domestic product constituted more than 23 percent as compared with a contribution of 16.5 percent in 1950. Agriculture had remained the leading growth sector but the margin was decreasing between it and industry. We noted that this stage of industrialization was attained through the import substitution process, through an increase in the Brazilian government's participation in basic investment, and through a considerable inflow of foreign capital (in the form of direct investment).

A further assessment of the Brazilian economy, in which the micro-variables of Adelman and Morris were utilized, revealed the intensification of economic and social dualism, extremely low educational levels and high population growth, which had aggravated the problem of unemployment. The intensification of economic and social dualism was exemplified by regional disparities between the Northeast and the Central-

South. In assessing the macro-performance of the Brazilian economy, we discovered instability and a lack of sustained growth. Thus, the Brazilian economy was characterized as becoming increasingly industrialized, as experiencing unsustainable growth and continued dualism and regional disparities. Such factors indicated a lack of economic development and a trend toward economic modernization.

An examination was made of the Brazilian political system. Through our examination we came to understand that elite rule was pervasive in Brazil and that elite rule was maintained through the patrimonial character of the society. Aspirants for membership in the elite circles were required to defend the basic rules and prerogatives of the patrimonial state. These rules include the avoidance of political mobilization of the masses; forbidding the illiterates from voting; subordinating overall economic development programs to the needs of national security; stressing industrialization through import substitution; and opposing land reform.

We then related the Quadros-Goulart regime to this tradition of elite rule and the patrimonial society. Their regime was a reformist regime, "outside of the Brazilian elite", neither emulating the elite nor supporting the patrimonial state. They sought to politicize the masses, to enfranchise the illiterates, to initiate land reform, to achieve socio-economic development (as opposed to stressing industrialization), and to change the foreign policy of Brazil. In as

much as these prerogatives of the reformist regime conflicted with those of the traditional ruling elite and the patrimonial character of Brazilian society, the constraints on the Quadros-Goulart regime were excessive and formidable.

Adelman and Morris have posited political aspects as correlative with the process of economic development. Their micro-variables, which are deemed as essential for political development along democratic lines, were utilized in conjunction with the Almond and Powell model to analyze the political system. The Adelman and Morris micro-variables (character and orientation of political administration and leadership, stable and sensitive political mechanisms for relating the interests and demands of society to political power, and political stability) were used to determine that the Quadros-Goulart regime was efficient and capable and was committed to economic development, but was beset with constraints of legitimate and constitutional power.

With Quadros as Chief Executive of Brazil, the executive branch as a political mechanism was sensitive to the needs of the masses, but was incapable of translating these needs into viable programs. Moreover, the support for popular demands was extremely limited among the interest articulating structures in Brazil. The political parties were nonprogrammatic and populist. The military, the key institutional group in 1960-61, was opposed to the Quadros reform program. The military joined the civilian bureaucracy and the urban middle

class in forming a conservative coalition. The military dominated the coalition.

An examination of the cultural and social milieu of Brazil during the early 1960's showed that Brazil was an arena for the interplay of multiple forces. The prominent social forces included nationalism, populism, and communism. Brazilian nationalism was in its third stage, "twentieth century nationalism", an era in which intellectuals became critical of the nation. They concentrated on liberating Brazil from foreign control, insulating the Brazilian national culture, and eliminating economic problems. Leading intellectuals viewed nationalism as a means of change and development. While nationalists were of varying persuasions, they had agreed on the necessity for changing Brazil's foreign policy and on planned action toward a highly productive economy of sustained growth, under the control of Brazilians. Nationalists of different persuasions argued that: the state must repossess the political functions which the powerful private corporations claimed; and foreign private enterprise is incapable of devising and financing a well coordinated plan for development.

Radical nationalism, the prevailing variant within the reformist regime, was based on the assumptions that the existing economic and social structures were exploitative and required radical change, and that private investors and capitalist governments are aligned in the attempt to limit Brazil to exporting low priced primary products. Radical nationalists

and radical revisionists were proponents of an independent foreign policy, in line with Quadros's prerogatives. They claimed that close alignment with the United States would ultimately lead to the satellization of Brazil, and stressed that profit remittances should be restricted. Developmental nationalists and pragmatic revisionists, on the other hand, were proponents of moderate change. Pragmatic revisionists, led by Roberto Campos and General Golbery Couto e Silva, stressed that Brazil must reject neutrality for a policy of nonalignment on selective issues; that Brazil needs foreign capital; and that profit remittances were not highly exploitative. Their strategy was geopolitics and continued alignment with the United States, a strategic position espoused by the Sorbonne military faction.

Populism, a prominent social force in Brazil, appeared as the vanguard of the indigents, and was the vehicle used to mobilize the urban population for demanding wider participation. The new populist groups, led by Janio Quadros and Miguel Arraes, were nationalistic and of the left. Communism in Brazil was national, as opposed to international, and fragmented. Many of the communists' demands converged with those of the nationalists.

An examination was made of the American political scene. We noted that John Fitzgerald Kennedy, liberal anti-communist, was elected as president of the United States in 1960. Although he recognized that the developing nations were involved in the

struggle against communism, he tended to support reformist regimes. He acted upon the assumption that nationalism was a stronger force than communism in shaping the destinies of the developing nations. In line with the assumption, Kennedy, through the Alliance for Progress, proclaimed that the United States would support the idealistic goals of development in Latin American countries, and recognized the need for a social revolution. This proclamation called for a change in United States policy toward Latin American nations, a change which many leading officials opposed.

We observed that a balance of payments deficit was running extremely high during the Eisenhower Administration. The reduction of the balance of payments deficit was a priority for many American groups. Many people in the United States had blamed foreign assistance and military expenditures for the heightening deficit. President Eisenhower, in November of 1960, issued a directive which officially tied the United States foreign assistance to the purchase of goods and services from the United States. Tying arrangements were, therefore, already in force when the Alliance for Progress was initiated.

The Mayobre Memorandum of 1961 warned the Kennedy men not to link foreign assistance, under the Alliance for Progress, to American private capital in Latin America. This memorandum was in direct conflict with the Eisenhower directive. Kennedy, however, heeded the warning by excluding business interests from his inner circle that planned the Alliance for Progress.

Brazil was selected for the major initiatives under the Alliance for Progress, and the Northeast was to have prior consideration.

A set of hypotheses was initially postulated as a means of integrating the causal variables, and as a means of structuring this analysis. The hypotheses relate the variables to the conflict that ensued, and demonstrate the manner in which the variables enhanced the power of the opposing groups in the dichotomized cast. The hypotheses are now related directly to the historical evidence that has been included in the text of this dissertation.

Hypothesis I.

The mission of the United States Agency for International Development was positively related to the idealistic goals of the Alliance for Progress.

The Agency for International Development was established in 1961. The mission of the newly established Agency for International Development was to assist recipient countries in economic development. Hopefully, through the United States economic assistance, the development programs that were manned by the Agency for International Development would cause the recipient countries to experience increasing economic and social progress. This mission coincided with the Alliance for Progress idealistic goals.

Hypothesis II.

The mission of the United States Department of State was negatively related to the goals of the Alliance for Progress.

The State Department's mission of ensuring stability was in line with the career men's political interests and assumptions, but conflicted with the concept of social change which was germane to the Alliance for Progress proclamation.

Hypothesis III.

The Organization of the Agency for International Development Mission at Recife was positively related to the Alliance for Progress.

The Brazilian Northeast was an area that urgently needed economic assistance, and was, therefore, the high priority area for the application of American aid to Latin America under the Kennedy Administration. This high priority status for the Northeast was in line with the Alliance for Progress proclamation, which had as its basic goal, economic development. The alleviation of dualism was a prerequisite for the achievement of economic development. The program was intended to further the economic and social development of the region, and to assist the Brazilian government in improving the capacity of the Northeast to provide economic and social benefits for its people.

To assist in administering this program, a United States Agency for International Development Mission was established at Recife. The establishment of the Recife Mission was unique, since a United States Agency for International Development Mission already existed in Rio de Janeiro, and there was only one mission established in countries involved in the United States economic assistance program. However, the establishment of the Recife Mission could be justified on the basis of the high priority status awarded to the Northeast Development program. The establishment of the Mission at Recife was positively related to the Alliance for Progress's emphasis on economic development.

Hypothesis IV.

The parameters of the game were negatively related to the Alliance for Progress.

The parameters were fundamental tenets in the American political ethos and ideology. As fundamental tenets, they permeated American society. They served as the basis for the traditional American foreign policy, and continued to dictate the choices among alternatives in American foreign policy for Kennedy men as well as career men.

The Alliance for Progress was a major affront to these pervasive tenets of the American ideology. The pursuit of Alliance for Progress goals required the application of public capital inflows from the United States, as opposed to American

private investment. Yet, the American ideology dictated the sanctity of American private investment as a tool in American foreign policy. The pursuit of Alliance for Progress goals required extensive change in Brazil. But, extensive change was perceived as radicalism, a phenomenon that was deemed antagonistic to the American ideology and enimical to American interests. The Alliance for Progress required an understanding of nationalism as a discrete and acceptable force for change in Brazil. Yet, the American strategic actors deemed nationalism as radicalism and associated the two with communism. Thus, the American aversion to radicalism and communism dispelled nationalism as antagonistic to the American ideology.

We have indicated that the Alliance for Progress required the application of American public inflows, as opposed to the traditional investment of private American capital in Latin American countries. The Mayobre Memorandum of 1961, which initiated the Alliance for Progress concept, repudiated the use of private investment in the foreign assistance program. This requirement of American public capital inflows and repudiation of the use of private investment was in direct conflict with the traditional tenet of the sanctity of private enterprise.

Although the Kennedy reappraisal sought to eject American private investment from the policy initiatives in Latin America, the issue of private capital was an institutionalized

feature in the foreign assistance program. The American balance of payments deficit in the late 1950's had dictated the necessity of promoting United States exports abroad. President Eisenhower had responded by issuing a directive that tied American foreign assistance to the purchase of American goods. When the Alliance for Progress was initiated, the tying arrangements were already in effect. Hence, the parameter of the sanctity of private enterprise came into conflict with the implementation of the Alliance for Progress.

Upon the expropriation of the International Telephone and Telegraph subsidiary at Rio Grande do Sul, Ambassador Lincoln Gordon threatened to invoke the Hickenlooper Amendment. His threat to invoke the Hickenlooper Amendment, as well as the congressional passage of the Hickenlooper Amendment, reaffirmed the sanctity of private enterprise as a fundamental tenet dictating American foreign policy.

We have indicated that the Alliance for Progress was also an affront to the American tenet of aversion to radicalism. The goal of development required fundamental transformation of the Brazilian economy, society, and political system. The Kennedy men, while promoting the goal of development, reflected their own predilection to the parameter of aversion to radicalism. The first reflection was not as intense as later reflections. When early allegations of radicalization in the Northeast reached President John Fitzgerald Kennedy, he sought to apply impact aid in the Northeast, as opposed to developmental aid. Aside from

this deviation from the resolve to opt for economic development, President Kennedy was steadfast in his support for Alliance for Progress initiatives in Brazil and for the reformist regime under which these initiatives were instituted.

The second reflection of the Kennedy men's predilection to the factor of aversion to radicalism was maximum. Ambassador Lincoln Gordon, in response to the alleged radicalization in the Northeast, initiated the Isles of Sanity policy. Through the Isles of Sanity policy, the United States economic assistance went directly to selected states, bypassing the federal government. This was in direct conflict with the goal of development, particularly the goal of political development. The decision to deal directly with the states undermined the authority of the federal government, which traditionally is responsible for foreign policy and adjunct activities.

The third reflection was also maximum. After the assassination of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy, the rate of change in Brazil appeared to quicken. The reformist regime, in line with the Alliance for Progress goals, pushed structural reforms. Such reforms included the redistribution of property and tax reform. American strategic actors perceived these changes as radical. Ambassador Gordon and Col. Vernon Walters Military Attache, responded to this radicalization by initiating a military contingency plan by which the United States military installations would stand ready to assist the Brazilian military

in the overthrow of the reformist regime.

Radicalism became associated with communism because the demands of the radical nationalists converged with the populists and the communists. Radical nationalists and populists were often perceived as communists by the strategic actors. Both radicalism and communism were decidedly antagonistic to American tenets. Communism, however, constituted the greater threat. Due to the perceptions of radicalism and a communist threat, fear of a security threat entered into the struggle. Hence the parameter of the overwhelming importance of security prevailed and guided the actions of American strategic actors. The immediate recognition of the Brazilian military regime in 1964 and the announcement and application of the Mann Doctrine attest to this.

Hypothesis V.

The action-channels of the game were negatively related to the implementation of the Alliance for Progress.

The congressional system, an action-channel in the game, was negatively related to the implementation of the Alliance for Progress. The congressional role in appropriating funds for the foreign assistance program was a negative feature in the implementation of the Alliance for Progress. Since the House of Representatives had traditionally had the role of appropriating funds, it is substantially more powerful than

the Senate in the process of policy-making toward Latin American countries. As we noted, in Chapter III the congressional influence through the appropriation role is usually applied with the intention of reducing foreign aid.

The relationship of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy and Congress was of utmost importance in the implementation and making of United States Latin American policy during the early 1960's, because President Kennedy sought extensive appropriations to finance the Alliance for Progress. We have noted that Kennedy was bedeviled with considerable opposition, since the Congress was largely composed of southern Democrats and northern Republicans, and since there was a general congressional apprehensiveness toward the use of political power by the president. Kennedy, in order to gain congressional appropriations for the Alliance for Progress, indirectly linked security with foreign aid. As we indicated in Chapter III he constantly justified his requests for foreign aid on the basis of the threat of communism. By linking security with foreign aid, Kennedy deviated from the pursuit of socio-economic development and pursued politico-security goals with American foreign aid. He did so through the application of impact aid in Northeast Brazil, rather than developmental aid.

Congressional influence was also negatively related to the implementation of the Alliance for Progress through its passage of the Hickenlooper Amendment. Although the Hickenlooper Amendment was never applied to Brazil, it was a state-

ment of congressional policy toward all Latin American nations. By passing the amendment, Congress embroiled the United States government in quarrels between United States companies and Latin American nations (including Brazil), and tied the foreign assistance program in Latin America to the protection of United States investments.

This tendency to link foreign assistance to the protection of United States investments was in direct conflict with the Mayobre Memorandum of 1961, the initial document that devised the Alliance for Progress. The Mayobre Memorandum had included a warning that the Alliance for Progress would be doomed to failure if Latin Americans perceived it as an "entering wedge for United States private capital investments."

Under the Johnson Administration, congressional influence became an increasingly negative feature relative to the implementation of the Alliance for Progress. Congressional skepticism of the reformist government in Brazil and other Latin American countries (where nationalism was on the rise), reinforced President Johnson and the career men's intransigent opposition to social reform. The Congress met President Johnson's announcement of Thomas C. Mann's appointment to the post of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs with considerable acclaim. As we noted in Chapter IV, this appointment was acclaimed by cold warrior congressmen largely due to Mann's record of "firmness toward communism in every

form". Congress perceived nationalists as communists. This congressional approval of Mann's appointment was a premature acceptance of the policies that Mann pursued, i.e. promotion of military regimes to ensure stability in Latin American countries, and containment of the prominent forces of nationalism and populism which pushed for social change and social reform. Such policies were in direct conflict with the Alliance for Progress.

The autonomous nature of the Agency for International Development Mission at Rio de Janeiro relative to the Mission at Recife has also been considered as an action-channel for the game. As an action-channel, it too was negatively related to the implementation of the goals of the Alliance for Progress. When the Northeast Agreement was signed, it was understood that the United States Agency for International Development and SUDENE would jointly administer the application of the 131 million dollars in the Northeast. We have noted that a United States Agency for International Development Mission was organized in Recife to administer the Northeast foreign assistance program. This meant that two United States Agency for International Development missions were operating in Brazil, an arrangement which would lead to confusion.

The Rio Mission began to find the routine administrative responsibilities and control over the Recife Mission very difficult. The Recife Mission tried to assume complete independence from the Rio Mission, and began to try bypassing the Rio

Mission by consulting directly with the Washington office. The officials in the Washington office verified the autonomous position of the Rio Mission relative to the Recife Mission.

The establishment of the Recife Mission, as we previously noted, had originally demonstrated the United States commitment to assist in the development of the Northeast, a region in dire need of assistance. However, after the autonomous nature of the Rio Mission had been designated and the military had come to power in 1964, the trend was toward concentration on Brazil's development in general with a declining focus on the Northeast. During the earlier period of the military government's rule (post 1964 phase), the officials of the Recife Mission became resigned to the trend of declining funds for the Northeast program. As the decade drew to an end, the officials of the Recife Mission began to realize that a new policy position had been adopted toward the Northeast region and its developmental problems. Following the adoption of this new policy position, the budgets of the two missions were merged. The predominance of the Rio Mission proved to be more convenient. The officials could justify the assistance program for Brazil, in general, to the Congress easier than it could justify allocations for the regional program.

Although the autonomous status of the Rio Mission was convenient, the declining significance of the Recife Mission

and the Northeast foreign assistance program meant a gradual erosion of initiatives for the development of the Northeast. The termination of initiatives to develop the Northeast meant the end of the Alliance for Progress in Brazil, for the main target of the initial developmental program in Brazil was the Northeast. The main purpose was to alleviate conditions of poverty and extensive dualism.

Hypothesis VI.

The prominent social forces were positively related to the stated goals of the Alliance for Progress.

The idealistic goals of the Alliance for Progress were to assist Latin American countries in achieving socio-economic and political development along democratic lines. These goals required extensive change in the Brazilian social, political, and economic system. The prominent social forces were rooted in popular aspirations for change that would promote the desired development. Nationalism was considered as the "key to development", and economic development was its main objective. The prevailing beliefs among nationalists were that the existing economic and social structures were exploitative and that transformation was essential to make the institutions viable.

The new populist leaders of the era were nationalistic. They supported the general theme of pursuing economic development, and stressed redistribution of wealth and equal opportunity. Populism, the vanguard of the poor, was the force that

mobilized the urban masses to demand increased participation and higher standards of living. Under populism, the masses also demanded land, higher wages, better health facilities, tax reform, and social welfare programs. These demands, which were included to alleviate the miseries of the indigents, were support themes for the Alliance for Progress goals of development and reform.

The reformist regime (Quadros-Goulart) was both nationalistic and populist, and was positively related to the goals of the Alliance for Progress in that it was committed to the idealistic goals. Initially Goulart met the more radical demands of immediate redistribution and arbitrary occupation and division of land with resistance. He preferred to pursue more moderate reforms. Later, he increased efforts to push structural reforms, demanded the enfranchisement of illiterates, and demanded that the minimum wage levels be increased by 100 percent. In addition to these initiatives, Goulart signed decrees which nationalized all private oil refineries and made all underutilized properties of over 1,200 acres that were located within six miles of federal highways subject to expropriation.

Hypothesis VII.

The prominent social forces were negatively related to the implementation of the Alliance for Progress.

We have indicated that the prominent social forces were

positively related to the goals of the Alliance for Progress. Although they were positively related to the goals of the Alliance for Progress, they were negatively related to the parameters of the game. The parameters, fundamental tenets in the American ideology, are utilized in defining the American national interest and in dictating American foreign policy. Hence, the American ideology dictated the sanctity of American private investment as a tool in American foreign policy. The American ideology rejected extensive change as enimical to the American tenet of preserving the status quo in the world order or guarding against radicalism. The American ideology rejected collaboration with communism and the existence of any form of communism as a threat to the national security of the United States and to international stability. Within the context of the American ideology, national security is the overwhelming factor dictating American foreign policy.

We have noted that the forces of nationalism and populism were, during the early 1960's, predominantly radical and xenophobic. Since the 1930's, the fundamental theme of radical change and xenophobia had existed in Brazilian nationalism, and was manifested in the nationalistic critiques of the traditional Brazilian foreign policy. Such critiques stressed that it was impossible to protect the interests of Brazil within the context of close alignment with the United States. Although Kubitschek had relied upon American private capital in his industrialization drive of the late 1950's, his position

became that of the xenophobic nationalist near the end of his term.

When the reformist regime took the reins of government in the 1960's, the mainstay of Brazilian nationalism was decidedly radical. The overwhelming population of Brazilian nationalist sought extensive revision in Brazil's foreign policy. They expressed, against the protests of the pragmatic revisionists, their views that Brazil's private investors were aligned with capitalist governments in a plot to limit Brazil to the exportation of primary products. They accused Brazilian exporters and Brazilians who worked for foreign firms of being the cause of Brazil's underdeveloped state. They considered private American investment in Brazil exploitative, and claimed that profit remittances were merely a new form of colonial exploitation. They condemned close alignment with the United States as a factor which would lead to the satellization of Brazil, and viewed the cold war as a United States strategy to gain economic advantages from the developing countries of the world.

The key officials of the reformist regime desired extensive change. Hence, the radical nationalists were able to transform their far reaching demands into authoritative decisions, actions, and policies. Among these were the expropriation of the International Telephone and Telegraph subsidiary at Rio Grande do Sul and the passage of the Profit Remittance Law. Other demands of the radical nationalists were the im-

mediate redistribution and arbitrary occupation and division of land, the enfranchisement of illiterates, a 100 percent increase in the minimum wage, the nationalization of all private oil refineries, and the expropriation of certain underutilized properties.

The American strategic actors abhorred these radical acts and demands of the nationalists and populists, and misperceived the significance of their convergence with the Brazilian communists. The convergence of the demands of the radical nationalists and populists, on the one hand, with the Brazilian communists, on the other hand, tended to interweave all three forces in the perceptions of the strategic actors. Thus, all three forces were condemned as communistic as well as radical. The expropriation of the ITT subsidiary, the announcement of Quadros's independent foreign policy, and the passage of the Profit Remittance Law were perceived as acts against Americans and America and as being communist-inspired. American congressmen and American businessmen in Brazil reinforced these perceptions of the prominent forces.

Since these forces were xenophobic, were converging with one another, and were negatively related to the fundamental tenets in the American ideology, they were perceived by American strategic actors as a threat to American national security. In as much as the American strategic actors perceived these forces as threats to the national security, the American actors met these forces with strong resistance. Since

the initiatives which the social forces promoted were often positively related to the goals of the Alliance for Progress, the resistance with which the American actors met the social forces was also resistance to initiatives that would assist in the implementation of the Alliance for Progress. Such resistance included the Isles of Sanity policy, the immediate recognition of the Brazilian military government, the announcement of the Mann Doctrine, and the increased appropriations extended to support the military government.

In essence, the Alliance for Progress, the Kennedy initiative, failed. In the American foreign policy-making process of reconciling diverse goals and values of a dichotomized cast, the Kennedy men lost the game. Their prerogatives were compromised in the reconciliation process. The career men, strategic actors who preferred the traditional foreign policy approach, were victorious.

The gains of the career men were miniscule during the Kennedy Administration, for during the Kennedy phase of the Alliance for Progress, some preponderant variables accrued to Kennedy men and to the support of the Alliance for Progress idealistic goals. John Fitzgerald Kennedy was president. As president he possessed the power to choose some of the strategic actors in the cast. He did so by appointing men who were sympathetic to the goals of the Alliance for Progress. And although the mission of the United States Department of State was negatively related to the goals of the Alliance for

Progress and the Secretary of State was a career man, Kennedy was able to influence the decisions that were made.

President Kennedy and the Kennedy men had given credence to the incipient social revolution in Brazil. The prominent social forces which combined to form the social revolution were positively related to the goals of the Alliance for Progress. Nationalism was at the crux of the ongoing developmental revolution. Populism combined with nationalism to demand changes in the economy, society, and political system that were crucial for the realization of the goal of economic development. Communism, indigenous and fragmented, converged with nationalism and populism in their demands for essential changes.

The United States Agency for International Development, whose mission coincided with and supported the goals of the Alliance for Progress, was established in 1961, just as Kennedy was launching the Alliance for Progress. The Agency for International Development had a major responsibility for the administration of the foreign assistance program under the Alliance for Progress. The United States Agency for International Development, whose mission was to assist developing countries in administering their developmental programs, established a second mission in Recife. The Recife Mission, established in addition to the Rio Mission, was responsible for the administration of the American assistance program in the Northeast. The establishment of this Recife Mission and the sign-

ing of the Northeast Agreement affirmed the United States interest in the conditions of the poverty stricken Northeast region. The development of the Northeast was crucial to the attempt to end the social and economic dualism which characterized Brazil. The termination of social and economic dualism was a prerequisite for achieving the goal of economic development in Brazil. Thus, the establishment of the United States Agency for International Development Mission in Recife was positively related to the Alliance for Progress.

Hence, during the Kennedy phase, the decisions tended to conform to the ends of the Alliance for Progress. President Kennedy and his men gave support to the Alliance for Progress goals in Brazil and were able to evince similar decisions from career men, despite the divergence of their basic prerogatives. We have noted that regardless of the skepticism with which some Americans viewed Celso Furtado and the Northeast, President Kennedy was interested in the development of the Northeast. He sent a mission to the Northeast, and presided over the establishment of the Northeast Development program. When the Hickenlooper Amendment was introduced after the expropriation of the IT&T subsidiary, President Kennedy and Dean Rusk assailed the amendment. President Kennedy insisted on cooperating with and assisting the reformist government of Goulart. Donor Lion stressed that radicalization did not occur in the Northeast.

However, the decisions and actions that conformed to the

ends of the Alliance for Progress during the Kennedy phase represented a tendency, not an absolute phenomenon. Despite the existence of some variables that accrued to support Kennedy and Kennedy men in the pursuit of the Alliance for Progress goals, there were variables that constrained their efforts. These constraints caused the Kennedy resolve to wane and waver, even during the Kennedy phase. Notable examples of this wavering are the decision to use impact aid in the Northeast and the initiation of the Isles of Sanity Policy.

This failure of decision and actions to conform to the ends of the Alliance for Progress during the Kennedy phase was caused by a coalescence of variables. Prominent among them were the parameters of the game. We have noted that the parameters, the shared values and images of the participants of the game, caused the strategic actors to conform in their decision-making, despite their political opposition. Dominant themes in the American ideology served as the parameters in the game. Although Kennedy and the Kennedy men had given credence to the incipient social revolution in Brazil as in line with the Alliance for Progress goals, they were unable to always make decisions that supported this resolve. The parameters were negatively related to the Alliance for Progress. As negative variables they determined the boundaries within which the decisions of Kennedy men were made. In as much as the game was political, the Kennedy men were forced to respond

to the American perceptions of radicalization in the Northeast or risk being labelled as radicals themselves. The Kennedy men were forced to respond to the American perceptions of a communist threat in Brazil or risk being labelled as "soft on communism". The Kennedy men were forced to respond to the American business community's plea for the protection of American investments or risk being accused of not believing in the sanctity of private enterprise and not protecting American interests.

During the Kennedy phase, Lincoln Gordon, a Kennedy man, succumbed to the parameter of belief in the sanctity of private enterprise by threatening to invoke the Hickenlooper Amendment against Brazil when Brizola expropriated the IT&T subsidiary. He succumbed to the parameter of aversion to radicalism by initiating the Isles of Sanity Policy. Kennedy, himself, succumbed to the parameter of aversion and fear of communism and the overwhelming importance of national security by linking security with aid and by applying impact aid in the Northeast.

The United States Congress, an action-channel in the game, reinforced the parameters of aversion to communism and the overwhelming importance of national security as a cause for Kennedy's deviation from the developmental goal. In order to get appropriations for the Alliance for Progress, Kennedy utilized the communist threat. He justified his requests from Congress for economic assistance to Brazil on the basis of a

threat of communism and a national security threat. The prominent social forces in Brazil were negatively related to the implementation of the Alliance for Progress during the Kennedy phase. Nationalism, populism, and communism caused American strategic actors to perceive the reformist government in Brazil as anti-American. As negative features, they reinforced the effects of the parameters and the action-channel, the Congressional system.

During the Johnson phase, the conflicts between the decisions and actions that were taken in Brazil and the Alliance for Progress goals were blatant. The failure to implement the Alliance for Progress during the Johnson phase stemmed from a coalescence of many variables. One preponderant factor was that Johnson, who was negatively disposed toward the Alliance for Progress goals and preferred the traditional policy, now had the power to select many of the strategic actors. The career men, who had served during the Kennedy Administration and remained during the Johnson Administration, were no longer prohibited from initiating policies in line with their preferred approach. Thomas C. Mann had been approached with the Alliance for Progress idea and failed to respond during the Kennedy Administration. Dean Rusk also seemed to acquiesce to the Kennedy prerogatives during the Kennedy phase. Lyndon B. Johnson, the new president, gave support to Dean Rusk's inclinations toward the traditional policy and increased the decision-making power of Thomas C.

Mann, a career man. President Johnson appointed Mann to the position of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and increased the power that accrued to that position.

The parameters of the game coincided with the prerogatives of the career men and the traditional policy, and the career men were now the most powerful. The parameters were negatively related to the Alliance for Progress and weighed heavily on the side of the career men who sought to pursue the traditional policy. Both action-channels, which were negatively related to the Alliance for Progress, weighed heavily on the side of the career men.

Although the prominent social forces, the embodiment of the social revolution in Brazil, were positively related to the idealistic goals of the Alliance for Progress, they were negatively related to the implementation of the Alliance for Progress. The social forces were negatively related to the parameters of the game. The parameters caused a convergence in perceptions, decisions, and actions of American strategic actors (both career men and Kennedy men).

The social forces were abhorred by the career men, who perceived them as radical, communistic, and therefore a threat to the national security. Since the social forces clashed with the parameters of the game, Kennedy men, who were now separated from the power and position of the Kennedy personality (such as Lincoln Gordon), also perceived them as a threat. The perceptions of the Kennedy men and the career men were influenced

and reinforced by the American business community and the cold warrior congressmen. Hence an alliance of career men, Kennedy men, American businessmen, and congressmen was formed to contain the social revolution in Brazil (which was a part of the thrust toward socio-economic development).

In the effort to contain these social forces, American businessmen, cold warrior congressmen, and American strategic actors, found an ally in the Brazilian military. The Brazilian military was highly opposed to the prominent social forces in Brazil, decidedly pro-American (geopolitical oriented), and was the strongest institution in Brazil. Hence, the career men won, as the Kennedy men acquiesced, and together they threw their support behind the Brazilian military. The Mann Doctrine sanctified the role of the military to ensure the political stability of Latin American regimes. The United States strategic actors designed a contingency plan to overtly intervene in the Brazilian military coup d'etat which overthrew the reformist regime. The American strategic actors extended recognition to the Brazilian military government immediately after the coup d'etat.

The Brazilian military, once in power and reinforced by the United States strategic actors, began to contain the prominent social forces that were the concomitants in the social revolution. The United States Department of State's mission of ensuring stability was being fulfilled. The social revolution, which was now being contained, had been a part of the

thrust toward socio-economic development. The containment of the social forces meant the containment of the movement toward socio-economic development.

As the United States Department of State's mission was being fulfilled by the installation of a harsh and suppressive military regime in Brazil, the United States Agency for International Development seemed to retreat from its own mission of assisting in the economic development of the recipient countries. Instead, it supported the United States Department of State in fulfilling its mission. Following the military coup d'etat of 1964, the amount of economic assistance in program loans, accorded to Brazil by the United States, increased tremendously. The Northeast Agreement, however, was terminated in 1964, and as an action-channel the United States Agency for International Development's Rio Mission was designated as autonomous relative to the Recife Mission. With the termination of the Northeast Agreement and the decline of the Recife Mission, the upsurge in funds for development in Brazil was channeled through the Rio Mission to the more prosperous regions of Brazil. This meant a decline of funds that were to be utilized in the Northeast region, the chief target under the Alliance for Progress proclamation.

The consequences of these American decisions and actions in Brazil were manifested in the heightening of techno-economic development or economic modernization and a lack of socio-economic development with a decline of democratic institutions

and processes. The Brazilian military regime was highly efficient in techno-economic matters. The approach of the government was technocratic. Between 1967 and 1968, the growth rate of the gross product rose from five percent to 6.8 percent, a high point that had not nearly been attained since 1957-61. Between 1964 and 1968, the growth rate of the per capita income rose from less than one percent to five percent. The rate of growth of the industrial sector rose from 5.2 percent in 1964 to 13.2 percent in 1968.

Despite the economic attainment of the Brazilian military regime, there was no progress in social and political areas, and the dualism and problems of regional disparity increased. Between 1964 and 1968, the military regime grew increasingly suppressive. Roberto Campos, the Planning Minister under Castello Branco, was determined not to allow technically sound plans and austerity measures to be diluted and compromised because of public criticism. Although the goals of his Program of Economic Action of the Government (PAEG) included the amelioration of regional, sectoral, and social imbalances, the amelioration of imbalances was a goal that was not pursued. The lower echelons of society suffered due to extremely low real wages. The continued dualism and the plight of the workers attest to Campos insensitivity to the needs of the masses. The Military Police Inquiries, the purges, the cancellation of the political rights of the opposition, and the cancellation of elected mandates attest to the sup-

pressive nature of the military government.

There was no stable and sensitive political mechanism that could relate the interests and demands of society to political power during this era. There was an all-out effort to erode and eliminate institutions that could relate the demands of the masses to political power. The president was given the power to suspend the political rights of citizens for ten years and to cancel elected mandates. Through the Institutional Acts, congressional power was gradually eroded. With the Fifth Institutional Act, the president was given the power to recess Congress. Through Complementary Act No. 38 in December of 1968, Congress was recessed. This spelled an end to representation and an overwhelming preponderance of power was placed in the hands of the executive.

In addition to the erosion of congressional power, popular organizations that would have related the demands of the masses to political power were eliminated after the coup d'etat of 1964. Among the organizations were Popular Action, the Catholic University Youth, the National Union of Students, the Basic Educational Movement, and the General Workers Command. Leaders of oppositional groups were either exiled or imprisoned. Their programs were deemed subversive. The multiparty system was abolished, and with it the Brazilian Workers Party was eliminated. Evidence of the suppressive nature of the new regime, the erosion and elimination of democratic institutions, and the preponderance of military executive

power is discussed in Chapter IV. With respect to the dualism in Brazil, we note Jorgenson's report that in 1968 life for the peasants of the Northeast was harder than before the coup d'etat of 1964. The termination of the Northeast Agreement and the installation of the military regime represented a definite turn away from United States support of development in Brazil. By 1968 it was clear that the Alliance for Progress was dead.

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