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Elite Influence and Social Cohesion in Northern Ireland: An Individual Level Theory

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ELITE INFLUENCE AND SOCIAL COHESION IN NORTHERN IRELAND:
AN INDIVIDUAL LEVEL THEORY

by

ELIZABETH A. O'CALLAGHAN

Under the Direction of Ryan Carlin, PhD

ABSTRACT

Social cohesion is an assessment of the functional nature of a polity, particularly how a society perceives, assesses, and interacts with the political system and others in society. This dissertation sets out to clarify our understanding of social cohesion within the field of political science. As a discipline we have diverging definitions and conceptualizations of the term. By laying out a comprehensive individual level theory of social cohesion this dissertation aims to open up the black box of social cohesion, moving beyond the aggregate level analyses that largely occupy the academic and policy literature. I set out a new theory of how three components of social cohesion interact and influence the way that a society produces and maintains or degrades social cohesion. The three attitudinal and behavioral areas discussed and scrutinized include political

legitimacy, social capital, and political participation. To assess the relationships between these individual level attitudes and behaviors I examine original data collected from student sample from Queen's University Belfast from 2014-2015. An online survey including a trust game and priming experiment were conducted to test several hypotheses about the relationship between elite behaviors and the three areas of social cohesion. Evidence and findings in this study should be taken as preliminary and a jumping off point for future research. I find preliminary evidence in support of behaviors of elected officials influencing attitudes about certain institutions. Attitudes about actors and institutions are associated with social trust and reciprocity as well as preferences of interacting with the outgroup. Lastly, I argue that legitimacy and social capital will have an interactive effect on when and how individuals participate in politics. I find limited evidence of this relationship. Ultimately there is mixed initial evidence for my individual level theory with the given data. I provide several prescriptions for how research in this area and further tests of social cohesion at the individual level should move forward.

INDEX WORDS: Social cohesion, Northern Ireland, Consociationalism, Elite influence, Social capital, Legitimacy, Political participation, Experiment, Social trust game, Political attitudes, Political behaviors, Social identity theory, Sectarian

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ELIZABETH A. O'CALLAGHAN

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DEDICATION

To Imogen and Connor

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AP	Alliance Party
CFA	Confirmatory Factor Analysis
DETI	Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment
DK	Don't Know (Survey Response)
DUP	Democratic Unionist Party
EVS	European Values Survey
FPTP	First Past the Post
GFA	Good Friday Agreement
IRA	Irish Republican Army
MLA	Member of the Legislative Assembly
NILT	Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares
P1	Player 1 (in trust game interaction)
P2	Player 2 (in trust game interaction)
PCA	Principal Component Analysis
PIRA	Provisional Irish Republican Army
PR-STV	Proportional Representation Single Transferable Vote
QUB	Queen's University Belfast
RHI	Renewable Heat Incentive
RIRA	Real Irish Republican Army
SDLP	Social Democratic Labor Party
SF	Sinn Féin
UUP	Ulster Unionist Party

1 INTRODUCTION

Often we see societies breaking down along social or cultural fault lines. These divisions can manifest into violent conflict and political upheaval. In the most severe cases domestic and international actors try to manage peace in societies through institutions of inclusion (i.e. power sharing mechanisms), and through programs and policies that aim to foster positive interactions and cohesiveness within a society. Unfortunately, studies attempting to measure the success of efforts at managed peace focus disproportionately on aggregate data -- namely, macro-level economic indicators, distribution of attitudes and behaviors at the country level, and even number of years that a relative level of peace has been sustained. These macro-indicators can mask important variation and explanatory power of citizen groups' and individuals' progress, or lack of progress, towards social cohesiveness. There are three central questions that this dissertation takes on. First, what is social cohesion? Second, how does social cohesion operate at the individual level? Third, in societies with embedded cleavages and histories of violent conflict, how might elite behaviors affect social cohesion? This dissertation sets out a comprehensive definition of polity social cohesions, describes an individual level theory, and details a preliminary plausibility test of the theory with original data from Northern Ireland.

Many scholars have constrained the definition of social cohesion by equating it to social capital (e.g. Hollenbaugh & Ferris 2014; Chowdhrey 2018; Meer & Tolsma 2014; Easterly & Woolcock 2006). This limited conceptualization is inconsistent with large scale empirical tests that validate aggregate level measures of social cohesion (e.g. Dickes et al. 2010; Acket et al. 2011). I argue that social cohesion encompasses a broader conceptual framework than social capital alone. Definitions must incorporate attitudes and behaviors that capture the context of the political system as well as social group structures. Understanding social cohesion is relevant in

any society, and even more crucial in post conflict societies due to the fragile state of political and social stability.

I define social cohesion as *a stable environment of positive horizontal and vertical interaction between individuals producing positive ideas about groups and individuals within one's society, and actions that are productive in maintaining social and political norms.* This is not to say that stable environments do not experience political conflict, but the political conflict in a cohesive society is successfully limited so that it does not threaten the stability of that polity. Social Cohesion is produced through an iterative process where individuals process information about political leaders, institutions, and events, then interpret the information within the context of existing socio-political divisions (identity structures), and form attitudes about other individuals and the political system. An individual's attitudes then inform behavioral decisions about interacting with others, and engaging with the political system.

At the aggregate level social cohesion is a conglomeration of individual level attitudes and behaviors. At the highest levels of social cohesion we see attitudes and behaviors supporting the current political system through support of institutions, high levels of trust in elected officials and in others in society, and high levels of conventional political participation. Participation in a highly cohesive society supports the current system even when we see alternation in individual representatives or political parties themselves. At the individual level, social cohesion operates as an iterative decision making process. Essentially social cohesion can be broken down into three areas of socio-political attitudes and behaviors: 1) attitudes about actors and institutions, 2) attitudes about others in society, and 3) political behaviors. The breakdown and importance of these three components of social cohesion is discussed in greater detail when I unpack the theory of social cohesion in Chapter 2.

Societies that have experienced civil wars and other violent conflicts are particularly susceptible to erosions or a full corruption of social cohesion. During violent conflict the perception of threat between groups within a society grows with duration and severity of a conflict. Threat, perceived or real, promotes group isolation that again feeds the perception of threat. Once resolutions to violence and agreements are set legacies of conflict and threat create obstacles to the buildup of social cohesion. Uncivil and intolerant attitudes can linger for decades after official ceasefires and political agreements are struck.¹ Individual defections from social cohesion can range from small flare-ups of violent protests by those dissatisfied with the new status-quo to large-scale attempts at destabilizing institutions and reversing those post-conflict policies meant to ease integration. These defections can affect day-to-day relations and sustain a long- term buildup of tensions along cleavage lines. Undetected by conventional macro-level indicators, they nevertheless harbor the cumulative potential to slow, halt or even reverse post-conflict social reconciliation.

Consociational institutions, while debated in their viability for producing long term stability in post conflict societies, have been used to create the political systems in several post conflict polities.² There is a great deal of evidence supporting the use of these institutions in divided societies where groups have not been able to come together naturally, or one group has dominated the political and societal institutions and refuses admittance to another group. The main tenants of consociational institutions lay the ground work for required inclusion of a minority group(s) within the political system.³

¹ See Anna Jarstad's (2008) explanation of "legacies of war"

² e.g. "Northern Ireland (1998), Bosnia (1995), and Cyprus (1960)" (Horowitz 2007, 1237). See Horowitz (2007) for discussion of these agreements and criticisms of consociationalism.

³ There are four main requirements of consociationalism: 1) a parliamentary executive that includes all relevant and identified groups within that society (in Northern Ireland this is Unionists and Nationalists, in Bosnia the two groups identified are Bosniac, Croat, and "other groups" (Kaspović 2005), 2) proportional representation within the parliamentary body to ensure representation of all identified groups, 3) a level of group autonomy, and 4) vetoes for

There is also an assumption of a top down nature to consociationalism. Leaders from each community come together and make decisions and form working institutions and ultimately deliver their followers, the general population, to the peace process. Where there is limited to no social cohesion these institutions can facilitate a functional and inclusive political system and develop the space for future social reconciliation.

In a consociational system political parties and individual representatives identify along the salient divide(s) (e.g language, ethnicity, or religion) within the newly structured parliament. The overt group designation along cleavage lines is used to ensure inclusion in the government. The idea being that one must clearly identify the excluded group(s) to include the group(s) in the political process. Critics argue, however, that the necessity of identification along ethnic lines reinforces group differences and propagates the division long into the future.⁴ Despite this problem, many believe that while the divisions dominate in the political discourse and political violence has made it impossible for a stable and inclusive government to exist, consociational agreements and governments are necessary to mitigating violence and building a working governance structure. A question that remains is if consociational institutions, in post conflict societies, provide sufficient stability to grow and maintain social cohesion.

Political elites, comprised of parties and individuals who negotiate peace deals and hold offices in the new government, can have an important influence on these individual level attitudes and behaviors. The political will exhibited by actors to cooperate by building peace and within a consociational political system provides cues to citizens about relationships across

the minority group in the legislature (see McGarry and O'Leary (2004) for indepth discussion of consociational mechanism and defense of consociationalist institutions and power sharing mechanisms in post-conflict societies, particularly Northern Ireland).

⁴ See works by Donald Horowitz (e.g. 1985, 2014) for detailed criticisms of consociationalism. Horowitz highlights the problems of powersharing throughout his work because of the many problems he finds with the top down consociational approach for being sustainable and for propagating social transformation.

community groups and the health of the political system itself. Indeed consociationalism is a top-down theory of peace building, meaning there is an expectation that elites are leading the way by creating an initial peace and building institutions and a structure of political space of operation. When elites continue to cooperate with each other within the consociational institutions these group leaders are facilitating stability that will be echoed by the population and generate a durable peace.

Northern Ireland illustrates notable examples of the destructive potential of a post conflict society, including political conflict and stagnant assembly proceedings, sectarian marches turning into street violence against others and police, and protests which turned violent over the decision to limit the number of days that the Unionist flag will fly over the capital.⁵ Clearly, in societies with embedded cleavages and histories of violent conflict, it is imperative that we better understand the mechanisms by which elite interactions can bias and inform individual citizen attitudes and behaviors as they adapt to new institutional realities.

Discerning how specific individual attitudes and behaviors are formed and changed will shed light on how social cohesion manifests within a polity. I argue that three attitudinal and behavioral areas comprise social cohesion: legitimacy, social capital, and political capital. Other studies look at one of the three areas, but scholars rarely examine the interactions between and among these core components. The extant literature has, moreover, focused too restrictively on aggregate country-level analyses and too frequently overlooked vertical elite-mass linkages. I investigate the complex nature of social cohesion at the individual level and the influence that political elites have on individual-level components of social cohesion.

This dissertation advances an original theoretical framework that connects the disparate components of social cohesion within a single dynamic model. The model generates a set of

⁵ See McDonald 2013, and BBC News 2013.

testable hypotheses to explain how attitudes and behaviors manifest and how elite interactions shape these individual-level attitudes and behaviors in predictable ways. In particular, this dissertation argues that political elite interactions across established cleavage lines, through cooperation or conflict, will increase or decrease, respectively, individuals' feelings of legitimacy, levels of social capital, and frequency and form of participation. Beyond advancing an original theoretical framework, this dissertation makes important new contributions to the literature through its use of experimental methods and its application to the case of Northern Ireland. Although tested within the confines of a single case, the arguments advanced and tested here provide the basis for subsequent comparative analysis in other societal contexts.

1.1 Road Map

The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 details the ways different academic disciplines and policy studies have utilized social cohesion to date. Exploring how social cohesion has been used in the past, I clarify a definition of social cohesion for this project and explain its three distinct components: legitimacy, social capital, and political participation. I then set out a theoretical model of how political elite behaviors influence the components, and how each area interacts with the others. Next, in Chapter 3, I introduce the Northern Ireland case used to test the theory at hand, and detail the methods of research used. I detail the historical political context of the Northern Ireland case and the current structure of regional government that makes it optimal for testing this theory of social cohesion. I will then discuss the two primary sources of original data for this project; an online survey that includes an elite prime and social trust game, and interviews with elected members of the Northern Ireland Assembly.

The following three chapters include empirical studies using one of the three components of social cohesion as the dependent variable of interest. Chapter 4 deals with the first component,

legitimacy, and looks at an experiment that tests the influence of political conflict between the most successful political parties in the Northern Ireland Assembly on individuals' attitudes. Chapter 5 unpacks how elite behaviors and legitimacy attitudes indirectly and directly impact social capital. Elite actor behavior has the potential to impact social capital directly and indirectly impact social capital when it is filtered through attitudes about actors and institutions, while legitimacy attitudes have direct impacts on social capital. I utilize a social trust game and revisit the elite conflict experiment to better understand trust and reciprocity between community members and preferences for interaction across community lines. I focus on the importance of contextualizing social capital indicators according to ingroup and outgroup relationships. Chapter 6 moves on to the third component of social cohesion: political participation. Using original survey data I investigate how individuals make decisions about voicing political preferences through voting and other modes of participation. I test the interactive effect of attitudes about institutions and political actors, and social capital. Chapter 7 concludes this dissertation, summarizing findings from the empirical chapters, discussing implications, and outlining future research that this study lays the ground work for.

2 SOCIAL COHESION AN INDIVIDUAL LEVEL THEORY

Social cohesion is identified as an important factor for supporting democratic regimes (e.g. Mann 1970; Forrest and Kearns 2001; Labonte 2004; Frayha 2003; Heyneman 2003; Manole 2012). Social cohesion has been discussed and studied broadly across many disciplines but with little consistency in conceptualization; therefore this dissertation aims to consolidate a workable definition and working theory of social cohesion. Social cohesion is usually measured at the aggregate societal level. Social cohesion is therefore utilized as an indicator variable but is little

understood in its internal workings. This study will go beyond existing methods to extend our understanding of social cohesion by unpacking the concept at the individual level.

Investigating social cohesion at the individual level allows for exploration of a greater level of nuance into what might drive or deter the building of social cohesion within a society. Focusing only on macro level or aggregated society level neglects understanding the individual level causal factors discussed in social psychology, communication, and political behavior literatures. Obviously how social cohesion is defined and especially how it is measured will impact the outcome of our assessments within the discipline of political science and of the expected influence of social cohesion on a polity. Therefore determining a suitable scope of the term, appropriately measuring the component parts at the individual level, and testing the relationships between the individual level components are the aims of this dissertation. This chapter will outline a broad theoretical framework for defining and assessing social cohesion at the individual level, propose theoretical expectations for the role of elite behavior in influencing social cohesion, and propose expectations for how the component parts may interact at the individual level.

2.1 Defining Social Cohesion

Social cohesion is defined various ways depending on the field of study and if the work is written for policy purposes or academic ones. Many times, however, the term is used without any sort of definition attached. Hence writers expect readers to understand social cohesion, perhaps based on some preexisting, approximately unified or consistent idea about what a “society” that is “cohesive” looks like. This implicitly assumes readers can imagine a “society” that lacks “cohesiveness”. However, the assumption that we are all picturing the same conditions and outcomes is a false one. The importance of clarifying and consolidating what is meant by social

cohesion within the field of political science and preferably across policy and in a multi-disciplinary context would serve well for conducting research and determining policy processes. I define social cohesion as *a stable environment of positive horizontal and vertical interaction between individuals that generate 1) positive ideas about groups and individuals within one's society, and 2) actions that maintain social and political inclusivity, and policy productivity.* Social cohesion is thus, at the individual level, *comprised of legitimacy, social capital, and political participation.* This definition and conceptualization is an improvement on other definitions of social cohesion because it encompasses the full range of the concept. Social cohesion as I define the term captures the horizontal and vertical nature of social and political cohesion of a polity. Rather than narrowing the term to social capital alone, as is the most common practice. Some may argue still that social capital is the dominant area or measure of social cohesion and that legitimacy attitudes and participation are lesser parts of the cohesion picture. It is possible that these areas of social cohesion could be weighted differently when measuring at the aggregate level. While this question is outside of the scope of this project the iterative nature of social cohesion should be remembered when making determinations about weighting the three components more heavily or lightly.

Social cohesion is an attitudinal and behavioral element of societies. Societies have high levels of social cohesion when individuals hold positive preferences and attitudes about others in society and those who have political power, and when individuals behave positively towards the political system and towards others through interactions. Low levels of social cohesion, therefore, exist when these positive preferences are absent, eroding, or replaced with negative

attitudes and behaviors.⁶ These attitudinal and behavioral orientations exist horizontally, towards fellow citizens, and vertically with relation to the government.

Social cohesion has many moving parts and is the conglomeration of three interrelated dimensions for the individual: legitimacy, social capital, and political participation. Legitimacy exists when citizens view the current political institutions and those who have power within the system as right and proper (Lipset, 1959; Easton 1975). A sufficient level of support for the government, institutions, and actors is critical to sustaining a stable socio-political environment in a polity. Social capital is the second component accounting for attitudinal and behavioral patterns of trust and reciprocity of individuals within the context of the existing socio-political structures (e.g. Putnam 1993, 1995). A society with a great deal of social capital, especially bridging social capital is the foundation for social stability and can undercut the viability of political discord shoring up the endurance of a polity. Finally, political participation allows individuals to reaffirm or reject the political system and social structures supported by the politics of the day by taking some action. The actions or behaviors that individuals choose to engage in, or not, are incredibly important to the stability of a polity, as voting and violent protest have very different implications for a society.

In the next sections I will discuss other conceptualizations and measurement schemas that have been used and why I argue that these three component concepts are the most appropriate way to define, measure, and analyze social cohesion.

⁶ This definition of social cohesion and social capital is the reason tolerance is not included within the conceptualization or operationalization here. Tolerance is not positive preference or attitude toward a group or other. To the contrary tolerance is negative association or preference with allowance for inclusion in the political or social system (see Sullivan et al. 1982 for discussion of the definition and measurement of tolerance). While tolerance might provide some sort of system stability in a liberal democracy it is not full stop social cohesion to have tolerance. Social cohesion requires a more genuine positive preference by individuals. Tolerance is not a good measure of the societal aspect of social cohesion and therefore is not included in my conceptualization or measures. Arguably, where there is tolerance versus no tolerance this could be an indicator of acceptance of political norms of inclusion more than social capital as it pertains to social cohesion.

2.2 Other Definitions

Scholars have employed a variety of definitions for social cohesion, most of which locate the unit of analysis at the societal level rather than the individual level. Modern attempts have been made to consolidate a definition and measurement of social cohesion. I build off of definitions and measurements used by Bernard (1999) and Chan, To, and Chan (2006) to conceptualize social cohesion for this study. Both works advanced the consolidation of the concept of social cohesion by defining specific domains and measures that encompass the term. Bernard (1999) and Chan et al. (2006) propose similar conceptualizations of social cohesion with a focus on social and political attitudes and behaviors. The two differ where Bernard includes economic indicators which focus on economic inclusion, equality of opportunity and equality of condition. Chan et al. alternatively argue that the economic factors (i.e. inclusion or exclusion of individuals or groups in the labor market, and other conditions for economic equality and opportunity) are predictors of social cohesion but not measurement component of the concept.⁷ Bernard's argument focuses largely on the role of economic equality in producing social order and social cohesion. Bernard in some ways conflates social order and cohesion, which are not equivalent terms. Beauvis and Jenson (2002) use social order as a component of social cohesion as an update to Jenson's (1998) five dimension conceptualization of social cohesion, discussed below.

Bernard states that social cohesion is a "quasi" concept that remains ambiguous. He does not state a clear definition but instead makes an argument for six dimensions of social cohesion specifying two axes "character of the relation" (Formal and Substantial), and "sphere of activity" (Economic, Political, and Sociocultural). Bernard generates the two axes in an effort to create a typology of Jenson's (1998) five dimensions of social cohesion. Jenson's (1998) five dimensions

⁷ See Table 2.3, also Bernard (1999, 19-20), and Chan et al. (2006, Table III p.294).

of social cohesion in sum are: 1) A feeling of belonging or shared values, 2) Inclusion or exclusion from the labor market via employment, 3) Participation in or abstention from Politics, 4) Tolerating or rejecting differences in others, and 5) the Recognition or Rejection of Institutions. Through these overlapping typologies Bernard argues that he discovers a “sixth type”, 6) social justice and equality. Table 2.1 a recreation of a Bernard’s typology table (1999, 19) shows how his two axes overlap with Jenson’s five dimensions of social cohesion.

Table 2.1 “Typology of the Dimensions of Social Cohesion”

		<u>Character of the Relation</u>	
		<i>Formal</i>	<i>Substantial</i>
<u>Sphere of Activity</u>	<i>Economic</i>	(2) Insertion/Exclusion	(6) Equality/Inequality
	<i>Political</i>	(5) Legitimacy/Illegitimacy	(3) Participation/Passivity
	<i>Sociocultural</i>	(4) Recognition/Rejection	(1) Belonging/Isolation

Table recreated from Bernard (1999, 19)

Chan et al. have a more deliberate definition for social cohesion. They state that “Social cohesion is a state of affairs concerning both the vertical and the horizontal interactions among members of society as characterized by a set of attitudes and norms that includes trust, a sense of belonging and the willingness to participate and help, as well as their behavioral manifestations” (290; bolded in original). Chan et al. argue for a concise and sensible definition; they create a two by two framework rather than the three by two organization of Bernard by excluding the economic factors. The two by two includes Vertical dimensions and Horizontal dimensions on

one side, and subjective and objective on the other. Table 2.2, a recreation from Chan et al. depicts how the subjective, objective, horizontal, and vertical overlap in their conceptualization.

Table 2.2 Measuring Social Cohesion: a two-by-two framework

		<i>Subjective component (People's state of mind)</i>	<i>Objective component (Behavioral manifestations)</i>
<i>Sphere of Activity</i>	<i>Horizontal dimension (Cohesion within civil society)</i>	General trust with fellow citizens Willingness to cooperate and help fellow citizens, including those from "other" social groups Sense of belonging or identity	Social participation and vibrancy of civil society Voluntarism and donations Presence or absence of major inter-group alliances or cleavages
	<i>Vertical dimension (State-citizen cohesion)</i>	Trust in public figures Confidence in political and other major social institutions	Political participation (e.g. voting, political parties etc.)

Table recreated from Chan et al. 2006, 294 Table III)

Dickes et al. (2010) and Acket et al. (2011) test the empirical validity of a range of social cohesion dimensions for which Bernard and Chan et al. argue. Dickes et al. use individual level data from 33 countries in the European Values Survey (EVS) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to validate that the expected survey questions are relevant component measures. Acket et al. use first use individual level measures from 47 EVS countries to construct a two dimensional metric, the *VALCOS Index*, for measuring social cohesion along attitudinal/formal and behavioral/substantial dimensions as conceptualized by Chan et al. and Bernard.

Table 2.3 Dimensions of Social Cohesion

Dickes et al.		Formal (Bernard) / Attitudinal (Chan et al.)	
CASE			
	A	Formal/Economic	Insertion/Exclusion in Economy (particularly in the labor market)
		<i>not included as part of social cohesion</i>	<i>n/a</i>
Legitimacy	B	Formal /Political	Legitimacy/Illegitimacy of public and private institutions
		<i>Subjective Vertical</i>	<i>Trust in public Figures. Confidence in institutions</i>
Social Capital	C	Formal/Sociocultural	Acceptance/Rejection of pluralism; Tolerance of Other groups
		<i>Subjective Horizontal</i>	<i>“General trust in others, Willingness to cooperate intra and inter group, Feelings of belonging shared identity”</i>
		Substantial (Bernard) / Behavioral (Chan et al.)	
	D	Substantial/Economic	Equality/Inequality of Economic conditions and opportunity
		<i>none</i>	<i>n/a</i>
Political Participation	E	Substantial/Political	Participation/passivity in the Political System
		<i>Objective/Vertical</i>	<i>Political Participation (e.g. voting, political parties...)</i>
Social Capital	F	Substantial/Sociocultural	Affiliation/Isolation in/from the community, feeling of belonging, Shared values
		<i>Objective/Horizontal</i>	<i>Social Participation, i.e. Voluntarism/donations, Presence of intergroup cleavage</i>

Source: Chan et al. 2006; Dickes et al. 2010, Bernard 1999. This table is a derivation of Table 1, Dickes et al., p.455, showing dimensions of social cohesion and groups the areas within 6 Case areas classified by Dickes et al. Chan et al. dimensions italicized as in Dickes et al. Column 1 is added to specify the three dominant concepts that underlie the meta-concept of social cohesion.

While Acket et al. and Dickes et al. use individual level, Acket et al. go on to using macro comparisons at the country level and Dickes et al. do not go beyond validating the measures. Both studies find support for the components of social cohesion except for Bernard's economic sphere which is not verified due to insufficient existing data to measure economic indicators. Neither of these studies delves into theorizing or testing predictive or causal models at the individual level. This study aims to understand the individual level factors that may promote or restrict social cohesion.

The conceptualization of social cohesion laid out by the various works discussed above overlap greatly with concepts that are already prevalent in political science literature. I argue that the array of social cohesion components tested by Dickes et al. and Acket et al. align with the political concepts of legitimacy, social capital, and political participation (electoral and non-electoral). These concepts measured and understood at the individual level will contribute to the overall understanding of why we see variation in social cohesion. Table 2.3 shows how the component parts outlined by Bernard, and Chan et al. overlap with each other and cases identified by Dikes et al. Table 2.3 also depicts how the political science concepts of legitimacy, social capital, and political participation align with existing domains. The next section will take a deeper look at these three terms, how they overlap with existing spheres of social cohesion, and why they are important components of social cohesion.

2.3 Social Cohesion's Three Dimensions

I conceptualize social cohesion in this dissertation as a socio-political phenomenon comprised of three attitudinal and behavioral areas: legitimacy, social capital, and political participation. Before turning to my theory that will discuss how these components are associated and might work in supporting overall social cohesion, I will define and discuss the three components with

an eye to prior research in each area as well as to my research question. Then I will elaborate my top-down theory of social cohesion.

2.3.1 Legitimacy

Legitimacy deals with how citizens and individuals perceive the institutions, individuals, groups, and ideals that construct a government. Legitimacy is a critical component of social cohesion because the political environment and contexts shape the way that individuals interact with each other. Legitimacy of the government captures the political and vertical components of a society. Exclusion of these factors would prevent a full understanding of how individuals and groups feel and behave within a society. The political environment and actions taken by various political actors filters through what political scientists call legitimacy, which are the perceptions about the governmental structures that exist and operate the day to day politics and business of the state. Political scientists often measure legitimacy by gauging confidence or trust in specific actors, specific institutions such as the parliament, the president, the judiciary, and of specific regime norms such as democracy. High levels of legitimacy exist when citizens are confident in and have high levels of trust in the government, its actors, and its institutions.

Many scholars have grappled with how to define political legitimacy and argue about the role of legitimacy on “system stability” (Booth and Seligson 2009). Booth and Seligson (2009) deliberate over the concept of legitimacy in great depth, empirically validating a variety of individual survey measures. Booth and Seligson define six areas of support for measuring the structure of legitimacy: 1) “existence of political community”, 2) “support for core regime principles”, 3) “support for regime institutions” , 4) “evaluation of regime performance”,⁸ 5) “support for local government”, and 6) “support for political actors or authorities” (49-55).

⁸ In Booth and Seligson’s study and others, economic evaluations are the basis of measurement for regime performance.

Mishler and Rose emphasize the role of political trust as being an especially important part of legitimacy. They find support for institutional theories for trust which underscore the ability to nurture and grow trust in newly developed democratic institutions (2001, 33). Norris (2011) makes the argument that voter turnout is an insufficient measure for legitimacy and a deeper understanding of the attitudes and behaviors is necessary and now possible with growing individual level survey data.

Additionally, I argue that voter turnout falls under the scope of political participation rather than a direct measure of legitimacy. Legitimacy in my conceptualization is only an attitudinal measure, not behavioral. The attitudes about a government eventually lead to actions taken by individuals, but these are conceptually different aspects of social cohesion. Looking at the social cohesion literature legitimacy overlaps with Dickes et al. “Case B”, Bernard’s “Formal/Political” cell, and Chan et al.’s “Subjective Horizontal” area (see Table 2.3). Bernard’s and Chan et al.’s (2006) “spheres of social cohesion,” the component of legitimacy includes trust in public figures, and confidence in or feelings of legitimacy towards political institutions. I constrain the measures of legitimacy to the attitudes framed by Bernard and Chan et al. including, support of public institutions, trust in elected officials, and confidence in institutions. These three areas are particularly relevant to the political legitimacy which focuses on the vertical attitudes of an individual’s support of governmental institutions and representatives, the first of three components that comprise the overarching concept of social cohesion.

2.3.2 Social Capital

Political science and sociology scholars have long studied social capital. Social capital links the role of individual and group relationships and actions to economic success and social and political functionality. Largely, social capital deals with the existence of trust and reciprocity

between individuals or other actors (Coleman 1988; Putnam 2000). In its original conception, social capital was defined in relation to other forms of capital, economic or “physical capital” and human capital (Coleman 1988). Social capital was considered to be the third important form of capital that could, through its presence within a society, produce positive conditions for growing economic capital. I define social capital in the tradition of Coleman (1988) and Putnam (1993, 2000). *Social capital exists when actors believe that commitments by other actors will be upheld.* The accumulation of trust and reciprocity⁹ between actors within a social structure, establishment of norms to constrain behaviors, and formation of viable networks of actors can create and reinforce this belief in the credibility of commitments (Putnam 1993, 164-67).¹⁰

Putnam (2000) further tested the viability of social capital in its relation to the success of democracy and extended the conceptualization to include two sub-categories: bonding social capital and bridging social capital. Bonding and bridging social capital were argued to be important distinctions in type and in outcome. Bonding social capital occurs within an existing group structure while bridging social capital occurs between individuals or group actors outside of the group or of two separate groups. Levi (1996) discusses the dynamic roles bridging and bonding social capital play. Levi disagrees with Putnam that both bonding and bridging social capital will contribute to generalized trust, and states that neighborhood associations in West Belfast, Northern Ireland, “...promote trust of those you know and distrust of those you do not, those not in the neighborhood or outside the networks” (50). Bonding social capital thus strengthening social ties and trust within existing groups but perhaps prevents the growth of

⁹ Trust and reciprocity here fall within this transactional definition of social capital. One trusts when they believe that another person is committed to a transaction and that the other will return favor. A trustor believes that a trustee is trustworthy. Reciprocity is an act of returning the favor by upholding the commitment themselves once trust has been put in them by a trustor. A trustor forms an attitude (a belief) and then takes action based on that attitude. A trustee receives some action, this action is moderated by preexisting attitudes (knowledge and beliefs), the trustee then takes action based on this information (the trustor’s action and preexisting attitudes).

¹⁰ Putnam uses the term “credible commitments” in his explanation of social capital and linking the concept of collective action to the concept of social capital (1993, 164).

these ties and trust outside of the bounds of that group and thusly limiting broader bridging social capital.¹¹

Social capital captures the horizontal relationships that exist within a socio-political system, when individuals believe that other individuals will hold up their end of any given agreement. The horizontal social trust and reciprocity that exists (or is absent) within a society between individuals can play a part in how political participation manifests. Social capital can be reinforcing to higher levels of cohesion or divisions that exist depending on if we see bridging or bonding social capital, respectively.

Newton (1999) argues that interpersonal trust is a distinct concept from political trust, and therefore always must be distinguished between when discussing trust. Political trust refers to a vertical trust and reciprocity relationship between citizens and their representatives and in some cases other community leaders. Interpersonal trust at the societal level encompasses the horizontal relationships captured in the concept of social capital. Additionally, Newton speaks to the likely causal direction of influence between the two forms of trust. He states that political factors rather than social ones influence political trust, and that political capital likely influences social capital in a top-down manner (186). Sønderskov & Dinesen (2016) also find support for institutional trust having a causal effect on social trust.¹² This is important to my theory of social cohesion in terms of how legitimacy is likely to influence social capital. Social capital is widely discussed in its importance for, and role within, democracies (Putnam 1993, 2001; Fukuyama 2001; Levi 1996; Brehm and Rahn 1997). Areas that fall under social capital within the social

¹¹ Social psychology literature also contributes heartily to our understanding of how group identities and interactions shape attitudinal outcomes with three dominant areas of research: intergroup contact theory (see Allport 1954), extended contact hypothesis (Wright et al 1997; Turner et al. 2007), and social identity theory (Tajfel generally e.g. 1974; Tajfel and Turner 1979).

¹² Sønderskov & Dinesen (2016) use panel studies from Denmark that track individual attitudes for up to 18 years in their study.

cohesion conceptualizations as discussed earlier include: general trust, out-group trust, tolerance, norms of reciprocity, cooperation, feeling of belonging, and participation in social organizations (see Table 2.3). Each of these areas of social capital, when we see high levels, contribute to the belief that commitments by others are being upheld. Additional contextualization between bonding and bridging social capital must be taken into consideration. High levels of bonding social capital have been found to reinforce in-group trust and reciprocity while high levels of bridging social capital have been found to grow outgroup trust, tolerance and so on. Of the indicators that comprise social capital, interpersonal trust is considered to be the most formidable and informative to the likelihood of increased social participation and positive social opinions.¹³

2.3.3 Political Participation

Political participation is the final constituent part of social cohesion. Political participation is a set of bottom up vertical of actions that an individual might take to voice their preferences about the state of the socio-political system and their support or rejection of the current government. Bernard, Chan et al., Dickes et al., and Acket et al. all include political participation in their measures of social cohesion. Electoral participation and various forms of non-electoral participation are of concern for social cohesion. Electoral participation refers to the act of an individual voting in representative election, arguably the most formal form of political voice. Non-electoral participation includes acts of political voice outside of or beyond voting. Voting is an important indicator of engagement with politics, however protesting and signing a petition are other methods of engagement and voicing political preferences. Additionally, non-electoral participation may feel like a more viable and vocal option for some individuals and groups,

¹³ While interpersonal trust can exist at various levels depending on the context, for the purposes of this study, interpersonal trust is constrained to the salient socio-political cleavage. Operationalization and measures are discussed in more detail within the empirical chapters of this dissertation.

either when discontent with the electoral options or when groups are disenfranchised in some way. It is important to include both electoral and non-electoral participation because the motivations for using one over another or both will likely vary. Political participation is relevant and important to social cohesion because it closes the loop between the political and the societal spheres of a polity. Citizen voice, either through formal or informal channels is important to the full picture of representative governance.

Now that I have briefly defined the component parts of social cohesion; legitimacy, social capital, and political participation, I will explain in greater detail the expected relationships between these three spheres. I will also discuss the role of elected representatives on social cohesion. Following from Newton's argument that political trust impacts interpersonal trust I expect a top-down relationship to exist between political actor behaviors and individual level citizen behavior. The next section makes the argument for why political actions matter for social cohesion and how the component parts of social cohesion matter to each other at the individual level.

2.4 A Top-Down Theory of Social Cohesion

The actions and policy decisions of political elites have the potential to influence individual perceptions and behaviors in political and social spheres (cf. Zaller 1992). Therefore, I argue, the role of political elites is incredibly important when trying to understand the individual attitudes and behaviors that foster social cohesion. This is particularly true where consociational institutions exist and have been established to mitigate group conflict. This study focuses on political elites within a society, because the absence or presence of cooperation at the elite level has the potential to drive divisions or unify the political as well as the social sphere. Namely, inclusive (or divisive) elite behavior may encourage (or discourage) an array of attitudes, forms

of political participation, and interpersonal behaviors that stabilize a cohesive regime-citizen equilibrium in society. As explained below, this question of political elite influence is particularly important in, but not limited to, societies that have strongly defined reinforcing ethno-political cleavages, such as Northern Ireland.

While I argue that elites are vital to propagating social cohesion, we first need to understand how identity at the individual level may impact interpretations of elites, as well as attitudes about and actions towards others. The structure of society and where an individual finds themselves within that structure can impact their perceptions and actions. Social identity is important to understanding the full scope of social cohesion in any given polity. Social identity theories (e.g. Tajfel & Turner 1979; Levin & Sidanius 1999; Abrams 1984; Kelly 1988; Hinkle & Brown 1990), social distance (Bogardus 1959), and group threat and conflict theories (e.g. Tajfel 1974; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Levin and Sidanius 1999; Crighton and McIver 1991; Bobo 1999) posit that societies are broken into groups, individuals identifying with one or more social groups affects how an individual understands the world and interacts with others in this social structure. That is, when individuals identify with a subgroup of a society, whether it is political, ethnic, class, linguistic, or otherwise, the individual's identity will moderate perceptions and behaviors. The embedded cleavage structure and categorization of cleavage will vary across different societies. The degree to which these cleavages polarize a citizenry will also vary. The context of socio-political structure must be taken into account to fully understand how social cohesion functions.

General political trust and social trust is usually measured to gauge aspects of social cohesion, but salient cleavages are an important context that must be accounted for. General trust values likely have use in assessing social cohesion, however including the additional context of

embedded cleavages can help researchers to understand how individuals' perceptions and decision making is informed. At both the social and political level the context of salient socio-political or ethno-political cleavage context must be included in the trust calculus. Transue (2007) uses a survey experiment to determine the varying effects of superordinate and subgroup (racial) identities on support for particularized educational (to a particular race group) and general educational funding in the United States. Transue (2007) found that the "salient identity of the respondents" matters for their preferences (88). This and other studies (e.g. Carlin and Love 2018) highlight the importance of the identity context within the larger question of social cohesion and political processes generally. Additionally, recent studies dealing with polarization are highlighting the importance of identifying relevant partisan cleavages beyond the traditional left-right divide to better understand the ways division arise and become entrenched within different societal and polity contexts (e.g. Somer and McCoy 2018; Lauka et al. 2018). This study focuses on these the role of subgroup identity by investigating the impact of elite behaviors across socio-political cleavages on the three areas of social cohesion.

2.4.1 Elite Conflict and Legitimacy Attitudes

Reik et al. (2008) lay the groundwork for elite influence on public social preferences (e.g. trust towards members of a social outgroups). Reik et al. building on extended contact hypothesis/theory (see Wilner et al. 1952; Wright et al. 1997; Turner et al. 2007) that establishes the idea that an individual knowing another ingroup member has had contact with an outgroup member increases favorable attitudes towards that outgroup. Essentially you do not need direct contact with an outgroup member, rather a friend that is part of your ingroup having outgroup contact can affect your attitudes and behaviors about the outgroup. Like direct contact, extended contact works best under certain conditions (e.g. self-disclosure which establishes intimacy; see

Pettigrew & Tropp 2006, and Turner et al. 2007), but we still see reductions of bias even when these most favorable conditions are not present. Extended contact hypothesis was originated at the horizontal or mass level, where individuals interacting making friends with outgroup members.

Riek et al. expand the idea to a vertical or top down exchange whereby witnessing cross-national elite interaction might influence citizen adoption of positive attitudes towards foreign countries. Here the country identity is isolated as the salient ingroup and the elites (e.g. Prime Ministers, Presidents, notable diplomats) interacting work as an ingroup member in contact with an outgroup member, the other countries elite. Reik et al. find that when state leaders interact in cooperative ways with other state leaders, citizens from those countries are more trusting of the other country (State A Leader and State B Leader cooperate → State A citizens are more trusting of State B, and State B citizens are more trusting of State A). The elite behavior acts as a signal to individuals that the other state is trustworthy.

I argue that this extended contact theory, or top-down elite behavioral influence on the general public can be adapted to a fully domestic context. Societies that have experienced violent conflict based on an ethno-political cleavage and have political systems that remain divided along these lines will also have political elites that can be easily identifiable as attached to a specific group. Cooperation or conflict between elites of different groups can therefore be easily interpreted by the public as such and ultimately influence societal level attitudes. If this is the case, divided societies should benefit from increases in overall social cohesion following elite cooperation.

Therefore fully understanding how domestic political elites can inform the attitudes and behaviors that comprise social cohesion is an important socio-political question to address.

Looking at the three spheres of social cohesion individually, links between elite behavior and the three areas (legitimacy,¹⁴ social capital,¹⁵ and political participation¹⁶) have been made in the past, but clarity about the relationship and influence of cross-community interactions at the elite level have not been investigated. Elite-to-citizen influence is often referred to as a top-down relationship, this emphasizes the connection between elite behaviors and individual perceptions of government and institutions. Booth and Seligson (2009) and Mishler and Rose (2001) both discuss this direction of influence. The top-down flow of information about elite behaviors has the potential to greatly influence attitudes and behaviors within and across existing socio-political cleavages.

This new model of social cohesion at the individual level takes into account the social cleavages that are present within a society. Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationship between elite behaviors and the three components of social cohesion. A brief description follows and a more exact and detailed explanation of the mechanisms behind these expected relationships is discussed in the next section and tested in the following empirical chapters. I will also state specific expectations that will inform hypotheses stated and tested in later chapters of this dissertation (see Chapters 4, 5, and 6).


Elite interaction across community lines, either through cooperation or conflict, is the starting place in this model. Elites behave in ways that signal conflict (not working together for common goals), or cooperation (working together successfully through compromise or agreement). Citizens become aware of this cross-community elite behavior through the news

¹⁴ e.g. Seligson's (2006) study on corruption and government legitimacy, and Svobik (2013) who points to "good performance" of individual politicians as important to support for democracy and the consolidation of new democracies.

¹⁵ e.g. Fox (1996) uses a "political construction" approach for investigating how social capital is built in Mexico where he argues elite political conflict may affect the developing social capital.

¹⁶ e.g. Eisinger (1973) linking government responsiveness to likelihood of political activity.

media or other sources. Cross-community trust or mistrust is signaled to individuals in society. These signals should directly impact individuals' feelings about the government and those political leaders and political parties that are interacting. Hence, I expect elite behavior to influence individual attitudes about the government (*legitimacy component*).



Note: Dotted line indicates expected interaction between social capital measures and legitimacy measures.

Figure 2.1 Cross-Community Elite Behavior and Social Cohesion

Legitimacy, in this model, then impacts the formation of social capital and political participation. Social capital is encouraged (or stifled) by support for (or rejection of) the actors and institutions that comprise the government. The social identity context is overlaid here, where trusting ingroup and outgroup political elites impacts social level (horizontal) attitudes and behaviors. There is, therefore, an expectation of some direct effect from elite behavior on social

capital. Legitimacy attitudes are also likely to impact decisions about participating or not participating politically and the form of participation utilized by an individual. Social capital will also influence the form of political participation individuals use to voice their support or opposition to political events and elites. Again it is likely that there is some direct effect from elite behavior to political participation indicated by the line connecting the two.

2.4.2 Moving from Elite Behavior to Individual Attitudes

Citizens observe and interpret public behaviors and policy decisions made by political elites (e.g. elected members of the Legislative Assembly¹⁷). Many factors might influence how individuals interpret actions. The way that individuals receive cues from elites is affected by the media's coverage or lack of coverage of events and issues through agenda setting (McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Brewer, Graf and Willnat, 2003), and framing of the issue (Nelson, Clawson and Oxley, 1997; Scheufele 1999). Depending on what the media decides is salient, and the way information is portrayed can influence the public's perceptions of an issue or event. The way individuals are affected by media also varies because of an individual's predispositions (see Scheufele 1999).

Other works have begun to question the magnitude of influence that the media has on the public given shifts in media formats and reduced attention to news media (see Davis 2003 for discussion). Davis (2003) argues that the role of the media may be shifting to an elite-elite model rather than an elite-mass model, meaning that elites communicate with each other through the media. Davis also emphasizes that elites use the media to communicate what they find to be

¹⁷ In the Northern Ireland context, the consociational institutions are specific to the Northern Ireland Assembly. In other country contexts the parliamentary leaders would be the elected officials working within the powersharing structure. While there are many other groupings of individuals that can be considered "elites" these elected officials are actors within the post-conflict consociational institutions. This study limits the scope of "elites" to these individuals. While other actors may influence citizen attitudes and behaviors I am particularly interested in those individuals that are a part of the power sharing governing structure.

important (agenda setting). Increased easy access to communication technologies has modified the modes of communications available to political figures. Beyond mainstream media, internet websites, and online social networks such as Facebook and Twitter have entered into the arena of political communication. Aragón et al. (2013) discusses the role of Twitter in campaign communication. Aragón et al. track Twitter posts, or Tweets, that political parties and political candidates post, re-tweets, and comments made by other politicians or citizens in the Spanish 2011 campaign cycle. Aragón et al. find support that these communications are largely one directional, meaning there is little citizen to elite dialogue. Instead, political elites communicate with citizens and other elites through Twitter (internet social media).¹⁸

Additionally, Aragón et al. argue and find, similarly to Lawrence et al. (2010) and Bennett and Iyengar (2008; 2010) that individuals seek out media information from sources, media and individuals that reinforce what that individual already believes. This relationship between media seeking behaviors and new ability of elites to communicate directly to constituents has particular bearing on societies with ethno-political cleavages. Individuals are more likely to seek information from ingroup elites and therefore elites have a particular potential for influence of ingroup citizens through behaviors and targeted communications.

Beyond media influence theories, extended contact theory argues that the knowledge of others from one's in-group interacting with a member of an out-group can increase positive attitudes about the out-group (Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, and Ropp 1997, 73). Reik et al. use extended contact theory to explain leaders interacting with international counterpart in a "friendly way" as influential in "altering attitudes of the general population" about a country (2008, 268). I argue that this will apply within country as well. Following the logic of extended

¹⁸ Aragón et al. also found that smaller and newer parties with less access to main stream, traditional media outlets engaged with other individuals more frequently.

contact theory, positive cross-community elite interactions should increase trust in out-group elites. Additionally, Catterberg and Moreno (2006) find a positive association between government performance and political trust. Therefore, if elected members of an assembly are able to make good governing choices, which would require compromise and working together political trust will likely rise. However, if the government is not getting their job done trust is likely to decline. Within any democracy, but especially one with consociational institutions, cooperation can be seen as the government performing well while conflict is seen as a failure.

In a sectarian divided society contextualizing political trust along existent cleavage lines should, therefore, clarify the relationship between government and political trust and confidence in institutions. In sum, good performance and interactive behaviors will lead to increased cross-community trust because the interactions act as an exemplar of extended contact and successful governance. This will increase legitimacy, namely trust in government and confidence in institutions. Alternatively, when conflict exists between groups and policy making is stagnant trust and confidence are likely to decline. I expect that elite public behaviors and policy decisions will influence trust in cross-community elites and confidence in institutions.

Expectation 1: Cross-community elite conflict (cooperation) will increase the likelihood than an individual will mistrust (trust) cross community political elites.

Expectation 2: Cross-community elite conflict (cooperation) will decrease (increase) an individual's level of confidence in political institutions.

2.4.3 Social Identity and Social Capital

The next concept in the dynamic individual relationship of social cohesion is social capital. Determining how social capital and social identity interact to produce different outcomes within politics and society are an important aspect for understanding how social cohesion operates at the

individual level. Social capital and social identity theories inform the expectations about trust and reciprocity within the context of ingroup and outgroup identifications, which are particularly important to informing attitudinal and behavioral outcomes amongst and between societal subgroups.

Social capital studies draw attention to the difference between bridging and bonding social capital, which contextualizes interactions between people according to group identities. *Bridging social capital* exists when inter-group trust and interactions occur. *Bonding social capital* exists when ingroup trust and interactions are present. Strong bonding or bridging social capitals are not necessarily mutually exclusive. They each have implications for how the political system and society as a whole function. Bridging social capital has positive implications for an enduring and high functioning democracy while high levels of bonding social capital can weaken and divide a society (e.g. Putnam 2000). Trust and Reciprocity are attitudes or actions that undergird interactions between individuals. Kenneth Newton argues that trust and reciprocity as a part of social capital are “crucial for social and political stability and cooperation. Treated in this way, social capital focuses on those cultural values and attitudes that predispose citizens to cooperate, trust, understand, and empathize with each other – to treat each other as fellow citizens, rather than as strangers, competitors, or potential enemies.” (1997, 575-76). Trust and reciprocity are, thus, key to social capital’s contribution to the functioning of society and democracies.

Given social capital and social identity theories, I argue that there are a few likely outcomes of individual level attitudes and behavior: 1) identity informs attitudes, 2) individuals generate positive feelings about members of their own group, and 3) negative feelings about

individuals and groups that are on the outside of one's own group will exist.¹⁹ Thus there are three primary ways that identity will inform feelings about trust and reciprocity. There are a few broad expectations that follow from these three assertions:

Expectation 3: Individuals will demonstrate *outgroup mistrust*. Individuals will be less trusting and show less reciprocity for trusting behaviors to a political outgroup member than they will trust or show reciprocity to members of a political ingroup or individuals that cannot be identified as members of the political outgroup or ingroup.

Social and political hierarchies also inform identity formation. Social identity theory argues that social identities, how people identify themselves as a member of a group within a larger social structure of many groups, can produce a zero-sum mentality (Tajfel 1974). The idea that one's own group is pitted against another group, this *us* versus *them* mentality develops because individuals use these groups to structure the meaning of their own identity. The perceived clash of social identities can become entrenched creating stronger, reinforced ingroup attachments. In the social capital terminology, it builds bonding social capital within group lines and minimizes bridging social capital as divides grow stronger.

Sidanius and Pratto (2001; 2011) further argue that when groups interact one group will be dominant and assert their dominance in a variety of ways including discrimination, bias, and hostility (*social dominance theory*). Social dominance leads to inequality, discrimination, and conflict in many societies. In a polity, one group may rise as the dominant political or social group, either because they are the numerical majority or leverage power to gain the political

¹⁹ Because this expectation is within the context of a consociational agreement, I am assuming that there is a level of salience of identity with those who identify with the groups identified within the agreement. In Northern Ireland those who identify as Unionist and Nationalists, this is a salient identity and relevant to the social and political environments. Thusly, I assume that there is at least a base level of "us versus them" mentality that Reik et al. and others discuss as essential to intergroup conflict, for individuals who identify as one group or the other. The distinction between groups is likely more difficult to isolate and determine if the "us" vs. "them" mentality is present and producing perceptions of zero-sum between groups. (See Reik et al. 2008, 2576 for three essential elements of intergroup conflict: "us v. them", zero sum terms, and support of ingroup norms, rejection or "distain" of outgroup norms).

majority. In democracies we often see numerical and political majorities aligning, however, this is not always the case. South Africa, for example, during colonization and apartheid saw the white Dutch and their descendants as the numerical minority but the political majority. Therefore in the political context of South Africa whites would be considered the historically dominant socio-political group maintaining political dominance until apartheid ended in the early 1990s.

Dominant group structures can exist outside and inside of liberal democracies, and can threaten the stability of working liberal democracies. Identification with any group has the potential to produce ingroup bias, but scholars find that this association between identity and ingroup bias can be stronger for dominant groups because of fears of losing dominant status (see Levin and Sidanius 1999, Hinkle and Brown 1990, Abrams 1984, Kelly 1988, O’Callaghan 2010).

Expectation 4: Individuals who are members of a historically dominant group will show stronger *ingroup bias* than others. Individuals who are members of a dominant group will have higher trust levels and show more reciprocity to the ingroup than they show to unidentified individuals or outgroup members.

The next expectation deals with how trusting behavior impacts reciprocity. There is a vast literature on the value of intergroup contact in mitigating biases (see Pettigrew 1998; 2006; Pettigrew et al. 2011).²⁰ Contact, broadly, has been found to reduce prejudice, and positive contact magnifies prejudice reduction. Additionally, many studies specifically on trust and reciprocity find that receiving trust from another person, whether it be from an ingroup or an outgroup member increases an individual’s likelihood of reciprocating trusting behaviors.

²⁰ Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) and Pettigrew et al. (2011) analyzing hundreds of contact theory studies find that contact overwhelmingly produces positive outcomes in terms of reducing outgroup bias. They argue that contact works in outgroup relationships beyond those ethnic and racial groupings alone. Additionally, they argue that “Allport’s optimal contact conditions” are not requisite in reducing prejudice, although they magnify prejudice reduction between groups (see Pettigrew and Tropp 2006, 2011)

Once trust has been established there is a need to fulfill the contract and uphold the social commitment and return in kind. Scholars including Carlin and Love (2013) and Johnson and Mislin (2011) have found that being shown trust by another person increases reciprocity. Cross community interactions or being the recipient of trusting behaviors should reduce some of the group bias motivation for individuals. Therefore, contact or positive trusting behaviors are expected to reduce group biases.

Expectation 5: *Trust will moderate group biases* for showing reciprocity. Individuals who receive trust (approached with trusting behavior), including an outgroup member, will be more willing reciprocate trusting behaviors.

The role of elite behaviors is also expected to impact the levels of trust and reciprocity for individuals in society. Extended contact theory (e.g. Reik et al. 2008) argues that there is a link between elite behavior, political trust, and attitudes about the out-group at the international level of elite interactions. This theory explains that when individuals witness positive interactions between leaders of their own country and another country they are more likely to have positive feelings about the other country. The elite interactions thus act as a proxy interaction for individuals in a society and should, therefore, hold at the domestic level.

I argue that cross-community elite trust will lead to increases in social trust and willingness of individuals to interact with individuals outside of their own subgroup. Feelings of trust towards out-group elites will act as a cue for attitudes and preferences about other individuals in the out-group community.

Expectation 6: *Elite interactions* will influence individuals' attitudes and behaviors. Individuals who observe cross-community elite conflict will have greater ingroup bias and outgroup mistrust than those who do not observe elite conflict. Alternatively, Individuals who observe cross-community cooperation

will have less ingroup bias and outgroup mistrust than those who do not observe elite cooperation.²¹

Expectation 7: *Vertical to Horizontal* - Trust in ingroup and/or outgroup political elites or parties will affect attitudes and behaviors towards the social ingroup and outgroup. E.g. Individuals who trust outgroup party members will be more willing to interact with the outgroup in the social contexts.

These five broad expectations about how social capital, particularly trust, reciprocity, and preferences for interaction are likely to be associated with or changed by elite behaviors and elite (vertical) trust. Additionally, socio-political identity is important context for how elite behaviors and trust in elites are associated with shifts in social capital.

2.4.4 On Political Participation: An Argument for an Integrated Model of Legitimacy and Social Capital

There is a wealth of literature dealing with the conditions that impact political participation (e.g. Verba and Nie 1972, Verba, Scholzman and Brady 1995, Barnes and Kaase 1979, Kaase 1999, Mutz 2002, Jones-Correa and Leal 2001). There are many forms of political participation, conventional and unconventional methods, as well as abstention from political activity. Verba and Nie (1972) look at what factors impact conventional political participation including voting, participating in a campaign, and donating money. Verba and Nie classify protesting and parades as a form of efficacy. Barnes and Kaase et al. (1979) extended their definition of participation beyond measuring conventional participation alone and include unconventional forms of participation which they term “protest potential”.²²

²¹ The cooperation portion of this expectation is unfortunately not tested in this study, but hopefully future studies will be able to test the cooperation side of this theory.

²² Barnes and Kaase et al. forms of unconventional participation included: 1) “writing to a newspaper”, 2) “refusing to pay rent, rates or taxes”, 3) “boycotts (eg. avoid buying South African goods, or avoid taking a holiday in a Communist country)”, 4) “personal violence (fighting with police, rival demonstrators, etc.)” 5) “obstructing traffic”, 6) “occupying buildings (sit-ins, squatting), 7) “signing a petition”, 8) “Damaging property (removing

A range of studies theorize and test the role of legitimacy and the role of social capital on informing voter turnout (legitimacy: Booth and Seligson 2005; Easton 1975; Norris 1999; Kornberg and Clarke 1992, social capital: Putnam 1995, Putnam and Leonardi 1993), but few to none have looked at the interaction of legitimacy and social capital on the form of participation. Booth and Seligson's (2009) work in particular advances our understanding of how legitimacy might produce varying levels of conventional and unconventional political participation.²³ Moving away from linear theories of legitimacy and participation they argue for and provide empirical evidence in support of a U-shaped relationship. They posit that the extremes of the legitimacy spectrum (very high and very low levels of support for the government and regime) will lead to different outcomes than moderate positions. This theory countered the argument that legitimacy has a continuous linear relationship with likelihood to participation.

Building on Booth and Seligson's work U-shaped theory linking legitimacy extremes to participation, I theorize that social capital interacts as follows. The extent to which individuals holding extreme legitimacy opinions, i.e. those with high levels of support or high levels of disapproval, participate in politics further depends on whether they hold bridging and bonding social capital. That is, an individual's propensity for legitimacy extremes to influence participation varies with his or her trust and preferences for ingroup/outgroup interaction.

Particularly in societies with cleavages and reinforcing political divides, as is the case in Northern Ireland, this dynamic of outgroup or ingroup trust can impact decisions about the viability of voicing discontent inside or outside of the electoral institutions.²⁴ It is important to

roadsigns, breaking windows, etc.)" 9) "Unofficial Strikes", 10) "Use of guns or explosives", 11) "Non-violent demonstrations" (1979; 66).

²³ In fact Booth and Seligson explicitly argue for the disaggregation of participation, arguing that to measure political participation correctly one must include "participation's diversity" rather than dichotomizing it.

²⁴ Verba and Nie (1972) focusing on conventional participation find some evidence that indicates that individuals who have an activated group identity are more likely to participate than others, this is found for both political party

account for these social conditions and individual identity salencies when testing for participation outcomes. Confining ourselves to the broad social capital term and measures ignores the potential for interactions and trust between people in divided societies to impact political participation. Interactions and trust with an outgroup member might reduce the impact of low legitimacy feelings towards a stagnant or conflicted legislature. Bonding social capital indicated by a strong identification with an ingroup is likely to isolate a population and could magnify the impact of divisive messages and change the stakes of political action. Thus my theory explains how these key factors – legitimacy and social capital – interact to influence political participation. Thereby I expound on previous theory to include *both* vertical *and* horizontal factors (not just one or the other) and, in turn, change a two dimensional theory into a three dimensional one. In short, I expect the specific forms of participation that an individual chooses to engage in to vary depending on an individual's legitimacy attitudes and social capital (see Table 2.4).

The basis for the three dimensional expectation is of course rooted in extant studies which I will expound upon in the following section. Booth and Seligson (2009) theorized and found a U-shaped relationship between legitimacy and participation. Individuals who are accepting of the status quo, those who are not adamantly opposed to or in support of a government and regime norms are less likely to participate than those who have more extreme positions. I combine this U-shaped expectation about legitimacy predictors with expectations about bridging and bonding social capital.

Each form of social capital, bridging and bonding, is theorized to have a differing effect on participation within or outside of the political system. Individuals with more extreme attitudes

attachment and race (blacks during the civil-rights era – racial identity here has political saliency at the time). This is an example of how ingroup attachment, identity salience, and bonding social capital might affect participation.

about political actors and institutions should be more likely to participate but I argue that depending on levels and form of social capital (low or high, bridging or bonding), the form of participation will also vary. Individuals who have high levels of bonding social capital are more likely to discount the voice of the outgroup both at the societal level and the political level. Their political positions will be more polarized than those of individuals who have had interactions with the outgroup and have high levels of bridging social capital. Individuals with high bonding social capital will, therefore, be more willing to engage in more radical forms of voice outside of the political institutions. Those with high bridging social capital will be less likely to engage in extreme outside forms of participation and more likely to stick to traditional forms of voice. Table 5.1 depicts expectations about how forms of participation may vary based on this interaction. Individuals with low legitimacy attitudes and low social capital levels (neither high levels of bonding or bridging social capital) will be less likely to participate than their counterparts with high bridging or bonding social capital. I also expect that those with high levels of bonding social capital and low legitimacy attitudes will be more likely to resort to violent conflict than those who have low levels of legitimacy but high bridging social capital.

There are a few expectations that come from these expectations about legitimacy and social capital on political participation. First I expect, as Booth and Seligson find, a U-shaped relationship between legitimacy and political participation.

Expectation 8: Individuals with extreme legitimacy positions are more likely to participate by voting than individuals with moderate positions.

I also expect that individual attitudes about system legitimacy will be moderated by the individual's level of social capital to determine the form of political participation.

Expectation 9: Individuals with high bonding social capital and low legitimacy will be more likely to engage in violent protest.

Expectation 10: Individuals with high bridging social capital and low levels of legitimacy will be more likely to participate by voting and in non-electoral forms of participation, but less likely to participate in violent protest.

Expectation 11: Individuals with low levels of social capital and low levels of legitimacy will be less likely to participate in politics than individuals with high levels of bridging or bonding social capital.




Figure 2.2 The Interaction of Legitimacy and Social Capital on Participation²⁵

²⁵ Inside participation refers to conventional non-electoral participation methods. Outside Participation refers to the participation used to voice preferences that are less conventional forms of participation.

In this chapter I have illustrated in detail the relationships between the components of social cohesion and elite behavior in broad context, introduced a top-down individual level theory of social cohesion, and discussed the Northern Ireland case that will be used to test the stated expectations derived from my theory of social cohesion. Eleven expectations have been stated and will be tested in the following empirical chapters (Chapter 4, 5, and 6). The empirical chapters will include discussion of methodology and measures for the legitimacy, social capital, political participation, and elite behavior. In the next chapter I will discuss and justify the Northern Ireland case for testing my theory on social cohesion at the individual level and provide an overview of the methodology used in the elite prime experiment, trust game, and survey used to test the expectations laid out in this chapter as well as the MLA interviews conducted in Northern Ireland.

3 THE NORTHERN IRELAND CASE AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 Northern Ireland Background and Justification

Twenty years after the Good Friday Agreement, a power sharing agreement struck between Unionists and Nationalists the regional assembly struggles to come to agreements on the most important policy and political issues. Political conflict and sectarian unrest remain in Northern Ireland, elected officials butt heads and, in some cases refuse to communicate with each other or share an elevator.²⁶ Policy decisions are often hindered by the sectarian political divide, making stagnation within the Northern Ireland Legislative Assembly the norm. Citizens are frustrated with the lack of consensus, and occasional low-level ethnonational violence breaks out.

Northern Ireland is an appropriate test case for mapping the individual level components of social cohesion across subgroup cleavages because of its historical religious and socio-

²⁶ Personal Interview (Unionist Assembly Member) October 2014.

political divisions that still remain salient within the political system. The persistent cleavage within Northern Ireland exists along Unionist/Protestant/Loyalist and Nationalist/Catholic/Republican lines. These are reinforcing divides along social, religious, and political lines.

Northern Ireland has a long history of conflict and suppression of the Catholic/Nationalist segments of the population within society and politics. The “Troubles” (1968-1998) were a large scale modern manifestation of an ongoing struggle between the Catholic/Nationalist/Republican minority and the Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist majorities who supported and were supported by the British Government. Historically there were many clashes between Catholics and Protestants supported by the British Government. The Battle of the Boyne is a glaring example. Loyalist Protestants still celebrate the victory every July with raging bonfires and parades by the Orange order and supporters. These parades meandered through cities and often purposely through Catholic neighborhoods to revel in their dominance. These parades often lead to violent outbreaks and were specifically addressed during peace talks in the late 1990s leading to a parades commission that evaluates the routes and merits of parades in Northern Ireland.

The electoral system for the regional assemblies has taken on many forms including, proportional representation single transferable vote (PR-STV), first past the post (FPTP), and PR-STV party list. FPTP instituted in 1929, reduced the representation of the Catholic minority in the regional assemblies by creating over representation of the Protestant/Unionist majority.²⁷ The “Troubles”, a period of violent conflict were spurred on by frustrations within the population regarding representation, social and economic inequality, and bias by the British Government. Protests, both non-violent and violent, inspired in part by a feeling of solidarity with the civil

²⁷ See <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/election/electoralsystem.htm> for detail on electoral system evolution.

rights movement in the United States, propelled the voice of the Catholic minority. Paramilitary activity by both Loyalists and Republican factions and reaction by the Westminster Government with military deployment entrenched communities and the society as a whole in an ongoing conflict for nearly thirty years (1968-1998). The Good Friday Agreement (GFA) struck in 1998 was an accord between the population of Northern Ireland, the UK Government, and the Republic of Ireland's Government. The construction of the accord was supported and at certain points mediated by the United States. Support from the European Union also buttressed the sustainability of the agreement over time.

The GFA sought, in part, to rectify the electoral system and increase the representation of the Catholics and Nationalists within the formal institutions of representation. The GFA instituted a more inclusive system for representation in Government with a consociational structure that was meant to reduce and ultimately eradicate the need to violently voice discontent. Of course during peace negotiations there are always factions that feel ignored or unrepresented. Fractions in various paramilitary organizations were a clear indication of this in Northern Ireland.²⁸

Minority group inclusion in the political process is important for democratic representation. The absence of this inclusion and methods for propagating inclusion is the focus of many studies (e.g. Norris 1997, Dryzek 1996, Reynal-Querol 2002, Chandra 2005). In Northern Ireland the hurdle of inclusion was largely addressed through consociational measures including PR-STV, and an inclusive government that requires Unionists and Nationalist parties to run the government institutions together. After the Good Friday Agreement eighteen, six

²⁸ The Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) splintered during this time as they felt any negotiations that did not lead to the immediate inclusion into the Republic of Ireland were insufficient.

member districts elected the 108 Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs).²⁹ In 2017 the number of MLAs reduced to 90 seats, each district losing a seat. The reduction of seats was originally planned to take place in 2021 but a snap election in March 2017 incited due to fallout from a heating scheme scandal led to the dissolution of the Assembly (BBC News 2017). The legacies of public protest and activism, violent protest, paramilitary activity, and sectarian parades remain and inform choices about how to participate in politics.

Identity continues to play a role in politics. The GFA requires parties and individuals to identify along sectarian political designations, Unionist or Nationalist. Some parties and representatives choose to remain “undesigned”, but this minimizes their role in certain types of policy and petitions of concern that require cross-community votes. . Critics of this type of institutionalized identity politics (e.g. Horowitz 1985, 2014; Roeder and Rothchild 2005) argue that identification along sectarian divides (e.g. ethnic, religious, linguistic) entrenches division and does not work in the long term.

The consociational system set up under the Good Friday Agreement required political parties in the regional assembly to designate as Unionist, Nationalist, or Un-designated for voting purposes on certain issues. Two of the four largest electorally successful parties are Unionist (Democratic Unionist Party and Ulster Unionist Party) and the other two are Nationalist (Sinn Féin and Social Democratic Labor Party).The Alliance Party, an undesigned party, is the fifth party with enough electoral success to gain seats in the executive.. The designation system sets up a clear delineation for citizens to observe and assess cooperation and conflict along the traditional cleavages at the political level. Conflict between Unionists and Nationalist parties and party members varies but there is gross policy stagnation and occasional tension flare ups. Some Unionist Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) still oppose the inclusion of Sinn Fein,

²⁹ <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/election/electoralsystem.htm>

the more extreme Nationalist party that has historical ties to the Provisional Irish Republican Army.³⁰ More recently in 2016 and 2017 political scandal over a renewable heating incentive program flared and blame was cast on the First Minister of the DUP, Arlene Foster who was the Minister of the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment (DETI) under which the flawed scheme was run. The RHI led to the loss of £490 million for the government (BBC News 2017). Many called for Foster's resignation and when she did not resign the Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness (SF party) resigned. When Sinn Fein did not replace the position the government was dissolved and new elections were called in January 2017 and held in March, 2017.

Ultimately this is a good test case for my theory on the role of cross community elite behavior on social cohesion because consociational agreements, like the GFA, are largely considered to be top down agreements. Clear delineation along socio-political cleavage lines will be helpful in identifying and testing the social identity aspects of my theory. Assessing if the cooperation, or continued political conflict that exists is trickling down to the societal level is important politically to the Northern Ireland context and to the wider context of consociational agreements and representative democracies. I will now discuss the methods original data collection utilized to study social cohesion in Northern Ireland.

3.2 Methodology

Several methods were incorporated into research undertaken in this study in Northern Ireland to test the probability of the individual level theory of social cohesion. The primary method of utilized was an online survey that included an elite prime, a trust game, and a posttest questionnaire. A secondary data collection of interviews with Members of the Legislative

³⁰ The PIRA was the most active Republican Paramilitary organization during the height of violent conflict in Northern Ireland.

Assembly (MLAs) was also collected. Specific variables and measures used in analysis will be discussed in appropriate chapters. In this chapter, I give details on the methodology for sampling and collecting data.

3.2.1 Online Survey

The primary data that is used in this investigation of social cohesion comes from original data collected from October 2014 through early 2015. A non-representative student sample was recruited online through a Queen's University Belfast School of Psychology program. Each student that completed the survey received course credit. 218 students entered the study with 161 fully completing surveys. The median age of the sample is 19. Eighty percent of those reporting gender in the sample are Female. Much of the analysis in the following chapters looks at Unionists and Nationalist identifying individuals within the sample and therefore the sample size is often much smaller in quantitative analyses. 40 respondents (25.2 percent) identified as Unionists, 36 as Nationalists (22.6 percent), and 83 (52.2 percent) respondents stated that they were other, neither, or didn't know their political attachment. The sample is not representative and therefore all findings in this dissertation should be taken as preliminary and inferences about the full population of Northern Ireland cannot and should not be made. The value of this study, while it does not shed light on the full population's attitudes and behaviors in Northern Ireland is still valuable for understanding and testing the individual level theory at hand.

The online survey has several sections I discuss them briefly here and provide more detail in the empirical chapters (4 - 6). First, an experiment that primes an elite conflict interaction between the five largest parties in the assembly breaks the sample into four randomized groups. Two of these groups received a short story pulled from a news story. And the other two, the control groups, did not read a story. Assignment to the treatment or control is used to determine

if conflict between governing parties impacts attitudes and behaviors of individuals. Second, a trust game where participants play three iterations of a raffle ticket exchange game. Individuals were randomly assigned as a first or second mover in the game and played an unidentified individual, an individual identified as a Unionist, and an individual identified as a Nationalist. The data from this game play are used to measure trust and reciprocity, an important aspect of the social capital area of social cohesion. The third and last section of the survey is a posttest section measuring various attitudes and behaviors as well as demographic information about respondents. Areas of questions include political attachments, trust and confidence in actors and institutions, religious upbringing, preferences for interactions with Protestants and Catholics, political participation, and demographic information such as age and income. The second set of data collected comes from a series of interviews with the regional assembly members working within the consociational institutions.

3.2.2 MLA Interviews

The original data collection included interviews with several Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) during October 2014. Within this study I am particularly concerned with the elected officials that work within the consociational institutions established with the GFA. Therefore, I focus on the Northern Ireland Assembly, the regional assembly that operates within the consociational framework of proportional representation and policy making rules. I contacted all 108 MLAs first with an email and then by calling to get in contact for scheduling interviews.³¹ I interviewed eleven members who responded during the timeframe of the study.³² Of the MLAs I interviewed six designated as Unionist, four as Nationalists, and one Undesignated representative. Interviews were conducted face to face when possible at Stormont or

³¹ The MLAs interviewed were elected in the 2011 Northern Ireland Assembly elections or replaced empty seats that opened between 2011 and 2014. In the 2017 election the number of seats was reduced from 108 to 90.

³² Notes were hand written and later transcribed. Interviews were not recorded.

local district offices, and via phone if requested by the representative. Interviews were conducted using a semi-structured format allowing for open-ended responses and follow-up discussion. Topics of discussion included: representation, role as an MLA, communication with constituents, the effectiveness of the media, institutional legitimacy, legitimacy of consociationalism, and how MLAs might influence social cohesion.

This chapter has set out the background information for Northern Ireland and explained why Northern Ireland is a particularly good case for studying social cohesion. I have also given a brief explanation of the methodology used for original data collection to orient the reader for the empirical chapters that follow. In the next chapter I examine how cross community elite behaviors impacts individuals' assessments of support of the government's actors and institutions.

4 LEGITIMACY

Legitimacy is the first component of social cohesion. The actions of elites are syphoned through individual perceptions and have the potential to impact attitudes about the government and others in society, and participation behaviors. Legitimacy consists of attitudes and behaviors regarding government structures and government agents, particularly trust and confidence in players and institutions. This dissertation broadly asks how elites impact the components of social cohesion and how the three components of social cohesion (legitimacy, social capital, and participation) work to impact each other.

Legitimacy is the most direct measure for how individuals internalize the actions of elected officials, the actors of government, and the institutions that the government is built upon and operate within. There are many measures of legitimacy that have been developed and

utilized to measure the state of support for an operating polity. This chapter focuses on trust in elected officials in the Assembly, and confidence in several institutions. My theory, discussed in Chapter 2 more thoroughly, argues that elected officials/party members behaviors impact attitudes and behaviors including attitudes about the government and its leader's cohesion and gives detailed discussion of definitions and measures of legitimacy.

In this chapter I focus on the expectations to be tested in relation to how elite behaviors impact legitimacy to highlight how elite behaviors impact trust and confidence in Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) and various political institutions. What do individuals feel about the government in Northern Ireland? Can elite behavior impact feelings about the institutions and actors? Do elites think their actions have impact on social interactions? I utilize several methodologies in this chapter including interviews with MLAs and an elite priming experiment with a Queen's University Belfast student sample to find answers to these questions.

In the following sections I discuss two important characteristics of the power-sharing system in Northern Ireland and how MLAs themselves perceive and interact within the Assembly. Next, I revisit the theoretical expectations about how interactions between MLAs might impact individual's attitudes about the government. Third, I present measures of legitimacy and the experimental treatment used to test elite conflict between the main parties in Northern Ireland. Fourth, I analyze experimental and survey findings about legitimacy measures. Last, I discuss implications of the various findings regarding legitimacy.

4.1 Assembly Member Perceptions of Institutional Inclusion

One cannot understand the legitimacy elite's accord to democratic institutions in Northern Ireland without appreciating the mechanisms of conflict resolution adopted to end its long history of violent political conflict. The height of the most recent violent conflict in Northern

Ireland's history lasted from the late 1960s to the late 1990s and is most commonly known as "the Troubles". The Good Friday Agreement (GFA) established a devolved regional government with a power sharing assembly executive in Northern Ireland. At times the Assembly has been very successful and at other times close to failure. The success of the Assembly and support of the institution is important to the stability of politics and arguably a linchpin in maintaining a level of peace.

Political parties identify along sectarian lines as Unionist or Nationalist. Parties and independent members can select an undesignated or "other" designation, but there are consequences on voting outcomes for issues that require cross community support. Cross community support requires support from a majority of those voting and 50 percent of both Unionist and Nationalist members or 60 percent of those voting and 40 percent of members from both sects. Petitions of concern may be used to require cross community support on issues. The intent is to protect the minority, but many within the assembly and outside of it argue that members over use and improperly use the petitions as a stalling mechanism.

Between 1998 and 2013 a petition of concern has been used 56 times. Twice the measure was used jointly with Unionist and Nationalist support, 29 times by Unionists only, and 25 by Nationalists only. During the 2010-11 sessions Unionists used petitions of concern 17 times, the most used on issues during this period. In the 2012-13 sessions 8 were successfully submitted by Nationalists, the most by that group during this period (McCaffrey 2013).³³ During the 2011-2016 mandate it was found that the petition of concern had been used 115 times, 60 times in 2015 alone. This uptick is attributed largely to highly contested welfare reform legislation.

³³See the following link for more details about petitions of concern in Northern Ireland.
<http://niassembly.gov.uk/globalassets/documents/assembly-and-executive-review-2011---2016/reviews/petitions-of-concern/additional-info-on-petitions-of-concern.pdf>

Members and Parties that designate as “other” are obviously not counted in the cross community portion of the vote.

The power sharing executive was also a major point of frustration for some MLAs. The executive is determined by the d’Hondt method to ensure both Unionists and Nationalists both have a hand in the Government. The method by which power is shared and who is included in the Assembly and executive is a problem for some MLAs. Legacies of violent conflict are still relevant and palpable. Many MLAs lived through the troubles and lost family or friends during the conflict. One Unionist MLA argued that including Sinn Féin’s inclusion was absurd given their ties to violent activity and compared the proposition of including Sinn Féin in the government as the equivalent of the United States Congress allowing terrorists as a represented party after 9/11.³⁴

The executive issue came to a head in August of 2015 after Kevin McGuigan, a former IRA member, was murdered on August 11th. McGuigan’s murder was alleged to be retaliation by “ex-Provisional IRA veterans taking revenge for the killing back in May of former Belfast IRA commander Gerard ‘Jock’ Davison in the Market district of central Belfast” (McDonald 2015a). This activity by former PIRA members set off a series of political reactions by Unionists in the Assembly. Unionists argued that Sinn Féin had been aware of continued military action by the PIRA, placing Sinn Féin in clear violation of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA). Although on August 22nd the Chief Constable of the PSNI George Hamilton released information indicating that the PIRA still existed, and members of the PIRA were involved in the murder of McGuigan, but added that the PIRA leadership did not order the murder. “Hamilton

³⁴ Personal Interview (Unionist Assembly Member) October 2014. Quote from interview representative was discussing the loss that many experienced during the Troubles and the difficulty that exists in a post-conflict power sharing arrangement. “After 9/11 Americans weren’t expected to have terrorists sit in their government, but they expect for terrorists to sit in ours”. The MLA also voiced frustration with external powers brokering deals and trying to “fix the government” in Northern Ireland, particularly the United States.

declined to answer questions if any senior PIRA members connected to the McGuigan murder had links to Sinn Féin's leadership. He also refused to discuss if any of individual PIRA members with knowledge of the killing once held senior command positions in the organisation" (McDonald 2015b). Regardless of Hamilton's statements Unionists remained adamant about their displeasure with Sinn Féin's presence in the Assembly. Mike Nesbitt, leader of the UUP at the time, announced on August 26th that his party would be resigning from the Executive and forming an opposition (Bell 2015). Jeffrey Donaldson, the DUP MP for Lagan Valley, spoke out against Sinn Féin on a radio program. Donaldson stated that Sinn Féin should be suspended from the Assembly over continued PIRA activity, "In the end, if the other parties are not prepared to support the exclusion of Sinn Féin, then we will act unilaterally, and if that means that we have a period in Northern Ireland where we don't have a government until we resolve and sort out these issues then so be it." (McDonald 2015d).

Theresa Villiers "admitted she was not surprised that the Provisional IRA (PIRA) still exists" as confirmed by the report on Paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland³⁵ (McDonald 2015c). Villiers stated that "it didn't come as a surprise to me. My understanding, very much in line with that of the chief constable, that a number of the organizational structures of the Provisional IRA still exist but that there is no evidence it's involved in terrorism or paramilitary activity"(McDonald 2015c).³⁶ The question that was of concern to the Unionists was to what degree was Sinn Féin aware of the PIRA activities and while Villiers and the chief constable did not find a link between the leadership, the McGuigan family and others were not convinced.

³⁵ Report on paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland was ordered by Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Theresa Villiers. The report was written by the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and MI5 and released in October 2015.

³⁶ It is important to note that Loyalist Paramilitary structures still exist within Northern Ireland as well. See Nolan (2018) for discussion of post 1998 paramilitary activity. Between 1998 and 2017 71 deaths are attributed to Loyalist paramilitaries, and 74 to republican paramilitaries (including 26 from the 1998 Omagh bombing).

However, if the investigations are right and the existence of PIRA and other organizations is not surprising, Unionist political leaders may have been using events surrounding the McGuigan murder as an opportunity to take actions against Sinn Féin in an attempt to affect the structure of the Executive that had been on Unionists agenda long before August 2015.

Interviews conducted in October 2014 showed that several MLAs disapprove of the structure of the Assembly's inclusive executive. A forced coalition under consociationalism frustrated many of the Unionist MLAs who argued for a more traditional structure of Majority Government and an Opposition party or coalition. Six of the eleven MLAs interviewed mentioned problems with the five party executive. Many of the Unionists see the absence of an official opposition as a serious problem to successful governance in the Assembly and a failing of the GFA. Five of the six Unionists mentioned changing the system and moving away from the mandatory coalition. The Un-designated MLA I spoke with wanted an end to designation so that his vote would count more on all issues. He called for the end to designation while pointing to issues with the two largest parties in the executive: an "end to designation so that my vote would be equal to everyone else. Minorities promote from the right issues not those seen as key by SF and DUP."

Nationalists still largely support the self-admitted imperfect system as the best option given the legacies of the past. One of the Unionist MLAs summed up the debate over the system and preference for change when he said: "We (the party) have always advocated towards the voluntary coalition rather than a mandatory one, but there is apprehension from the Nationalists that we will return to a Majority rule." In the minds of many Nationalists return to Majority rule would mean underrepresentation of the Catholic/Nationalist portion of the population that existed in the past, and which many fought so hard to reverse. While many might argue against

the power sharing institutions, McCrudden, McGarry, O’Leary, and Schwartz (2017) argue that consociational power sharing mechanisms are still necessary to the stability of peace in Northern Ireland. These are two of the ongoing arguments surrounding the structure of the Government.

There are also many contentious sectarian and policy issues that lead to conflict in the Assembly. I argue in my theory that conflict witnessed by citizens may impact their levels of support for the government itself, attitudes about others, and decisions to participate. There are many points of conflict within the Assembly as touched on in this section. In the next section I will begin to unpack legitimacy attitudes at the individual level to understand better how these elite behaviors might be impacting citizen perceptions and attitudes.

4.2 Legitimacy Expectations Revisited

Legitimacy, once again, refers to the attitudes and perceptions about the government institutions and actors. Two expectations are set out in the theory (see Chapter 2) that relate specifically to legitimacy. Expectation 1 and 2 state that interactions between elected officials will influence public perceptions about the elected officials themselves and political institutions. The first expectation pertaining to legitimacy, Expectation 1, argues that when there is conflict or cooperation between cross-community elites this will influence trust in those elites. Individuals who are aware of conflict between elites of two political groups will be less trusting of that group. If my theory is correct we should observe a positive association between cooperation and individual trust in political elites, and a negative association with political conflict and trust in political elites. This chapter will test this relationship and focus on conflict rather than cooperation.

The second expectation for legitimacy, Expectation 2, deals with confidence in institutions. Like the first legitimacy expectation, Expectation 2 pertains to the influence of elite

interactions. Cooperation and conflict leading to increased or reduced levels of confidence in regime institutions, respectively. In Northern Ireland the elites are the Members of the Legislative Assembly, and the regional political parties. The designation system in Northern Ireland established with the GFA in 1998 allows for clear lines of cross-community interaction. Where political parties and ideological scores might be a useful break point in other democracies, the designation system is even clearer in classifying political parties and individual representatives along community group lines. The context of political identity is relevant not only to the interactions at the Assembly level, but is also a salient identity at the individual level.

Expectations 3 and 4³⁷ posit relationships between social identity and positive biases towards the ingroup and mistrust of outgroup individuals. I expect that these biases will influence trust in elite actor trust and social trust. I test the latter of these, social trust, in the next chapter. It is thus expected that an individual's political identity is relevant to the understanding of legitimacy and how the individual will trust parties and individual representatives from their own community and those from the "other" community. In the next section I look at measures of legitimacy and the elite behavior experiment used to test these assertions.

4.3 Individual Level Legitimacy Measures

I use several variables measuring aspects of legitimacy: general trust, party trust, confidence in institutions, and component variables constructed from confirmatory factor analysis. Trust in Politicians and MLA Satisfaction are both measures of generalized elite trust. Trust in Politicians response options ranged from 0 (definitely do not trust) to 4 (definitely trust); however the actual range in the sample is only 0 to 3 (probably trust). None of the study participants trust politicians

³⁷ See Chapter 2

wholly.³⁸ MLA Satisfaction asks how satisfied individuals are with job Members of the Legislative Assembly are doing, response options range from 0 (Very Dissatisfied) to 4 (Very Satisfied). Again, no respondents felt very satisfied with MLAs job performance and therefore the actual range of values in the sample is 0-3, topping out at fairly satisfied.³⁹ I also include trust in specific party members to gauge ingroup and outgroup political trust. Cross-community and intra-community trust is a critical part of the theory about social cohesion, particularly in a society that has a clear and active socio-political divide. Values of trust in specific parties range from 0(definitely distrust) to 4(definitely trust). Trust in members of specific parties was asked for the five largest parties at Stormont, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), the Social Democratic Labor Party (SDLP), Sinn Féin (SF), and the Alliance Party. I only include the four largest parties in analyses because they are the four sectarian designated parties in the Assembly Executive. Confidence variables included measures of the individual's level of confidence in the police, justice system, the government, and political parties generally. Values range from no confidence 0("none at all") to high levels of confidence 3 ("a great deal"). Lastly, I included factor analysis with the general trust (excludes party specific trust variables) and confidence values.⁴⁰ Factor analysis finds two dominant components, *Assembly Legitimacy*,⁴¹ and *Justice Legitimacy*.⁴²

³⁸ This follows from 2009 Northern Ireland Life and Times survey response where only 4 respondents of a 1,228 sample said that they trusted politicians "a great deal", while the majority 83.9 percent trusted politicians "not very much", or "not at all" (ARK 2010).

³⁹ The 2014 NILT survey also found only 1 percent of respondents were "very satisfied", 45 % were "very dissatisfied". (ARK 2015).

⁴⁰ Variables included in factor analysis: Confidence in Police, Confidence in the Justice System, Confidence in Parties (generally), Confidence in the Government, MLA Satisfaction, and Trust Politicians (generally). Cronbach's alpha equals .85.

⁴¹ *Legitimacy Assembly* is the component that loaded most strongly with Confidence in Parties and the Government, MLA Satisfaction, and Trust in Politicians. LA has an Eigenvalue of 3.58.

⁴² *Justice Legitimacy* component loaded strongly with Confidence in the Police and Justice System. The Eigenvalue equals .99.

In addition to dependent variables measuring aspects of legitimacy in this chapter, independent variables included in the following analyses measure the elite treatment prime, the individual's political identification, strength of political attachment, and frequency of church attendance. Elite Treatment is a dichotomous variable where 1 indicates the individual was assigned to the treatment group and received a short paragraph describing conflict between parties and stagnation in making an agreement, 0 values indicate assignment to the control group. Individuals in the treatment group received an excerpt from a news story about stagnation and political conflict between the dominant parties in the executive. The treatment reads:

*The five main political parties in Northern Ireland: the Democratic Unionists, Ulster Unionist party, Sinn Féin, the SDLP and Alliance **have hit deadlock on outstanding issues in the peace process after a marathon** overnight session of talks. The talks covered a range of issues from Northern Ireland's history including unsolved murders from the Troubles, the route of loyalist parades and the flying of national flags.*

(McDondald and Murray, December 31, 2013)

This excerpt was selected to highlight a salient sectarian issues and the parties' inability to make progress or come to a compromise on an important issue. Half of the respondents were randomly selected to read this story, the other half skipped and went directly to the trust game and then the questionnaire. More detail on the treatment and trust game experiment are in Chapter 5 that analyzes findings from the trust game as they pertain to social capital.

Political identification is measured with three dummy variables: *Unionist* (1 = those who identify as Unionist), *Nationalist* (1 = individuals who identify as Nationalist), and *Other* (for those who do not identify with either group). The next section includes a range of models testing hypotheses regarding elite behaviors and socio-political identity on individuals' attitudes about trust, satisfaction, and confidence in the existing government.

4.3.1 *Trust and Satisfaction*

I use trust in politicians and satisfaction with Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) as dependent variables in Table 4.1. Elite Conflict *Treatment* is not a statistically significant predictor of change in the general trust or satisfaction models. Therefore while both coefficients are negative there is not sufficient evidence from the experiment that elite conflict leads to reduced levels of trust in politicians or in satisfaction with the MLAs.

Table 4.1 *Elected Representatives*

	Trust in Politicians	MLA Satisfaction
	II	IV
Elite Conflict Treatment	-.19 (.29)	-.13 (.32)
Cut1	-1.25* (.24)	-1.02* (.26)
Cut2	.36 (.22)	.56* (.24)
Cut3	2.06* (.3)	2.04* (.33)
N	154	129
Pseudo R ²	.001	.001
X ²	.42	.18
Trust in Politicians (0-4), MLA Satisfaction (0-2)		
Ordered Logit , * p<.05		

4.3.2 *Trust in Political Parties*

Next, I argue that cross-community and intra-community elite trust has the potential to drive social trust, this is tested more directly in the next chapter, but here I will test what differences exist in ingroup and outgroup elite trust and how elite conflict might impact these attitudes. Table 4.2 and 4.3 contain models testing trust in specific Northern Ireland political parties with reference to the conflict treatment, and then the individual's sectarian political identity. I analyze levels of trust in four parties, the largest parties in the Northern Ireland Assembly: two Unionist

designated parties (DUP and UUP) and two Nationalist designated parties (SDLP and SF). The treatment is not significant in any of the four models in Table 4.2. Therefore, like with general trust and satisfaction, there is not evidence from this experiment in support of Expectation 1 that cross-community conflict leads to reduced trust in elites.

Table 4.3 provides some evidence for Expectations 3 and 4. Utilizing the control group sample and survey questions patterns are consistent in indicating ingroup favoritism and outgroup mistrust across models for Unionist Parties, and SF. Identity is not statistically significant in the SDLP models. The SDLP, the party of John Hume,⁴³ is arguably the least divisive and overtly sectarian party of the four tested here, thus it is not surprising that there are not large differences in the way that Nationalists, Unionists, and unidentified individuals view the SDLP. There are clear and consistent differences in the ways that political identified individuals feel about sectarian designated parties for the three other political parties.

Table 4.2 Elite Conflict and Trust in Main Parties' Members

	<u>Trust DUP</u>	<u>Trust UUP</u>	<u>Trust SDLP</u>	<u>Trust SF</u>
Treatment	.02 (.29)	-.14 (.3)	-.42 (.30)	-.04 (.29)
Cut1	-.73* (.23)	-1.09* (.24)	-1.89* (.24)	-1.01* (.24)
Cut2	.34 (.23)	-.03 (.22)	-.89* (.24)	.37 (.22)
Cut3	1.36* (.25)	1.25* (.24)	.56* (.23)	1.08* (.24)
Cut4	3.35* (.47)	---	4.78* (1.01)	3.14* (.44)
N	146	147	145	148
Pseudo R ²	.000	.001	.005	.000
X ²	.01	.01	1.9	.01
Ordered Logit, *p<.05				

⁴³ John Hume was integral in the peace talks and received the Nobel Peace Prize with UUP's David Trimble in 1998.

Looking first to models in Table 4.3 Unionist respondents are more likely to trust the two Unionist Parties than Nationalists or Un-Identified individuals. Nationalist individuals are likely to trust the UUP ministers less than Unionists and less than Un-Identified Individuals. Predicted probabilities in Table 4.4 clarify the differences in trust levels for individuals given their political identity.

Predicted probabilities for trust in DUP ministers find that Nationalist individuals are 33.5 percentage points more likely to *definitely NOT trust* DUP ministers than individuals who identify as Unionists.⁴⁴ Unionist identified individuals are 23.5 and 6.3 percentage points more likely than Nationalist identifying individuals to *probably trust* or *definitely trust* a member of the DUP, respectively. Unionist individuals also are more likely to trust the DUP than unidentified individuals at 17.4 percentage points more likely to *probably trust* the DUP. A similar pattern is seen with levels of trust in the UUP. Almost half of Nationalists are likely to *definitely not trust* a UUP minister while more than half of Unionists are likely to *probably trust* a UUP member. Unionist individuals are more trusting than Nationalists and unidentified individuals. Nationalist individuals are 45.1 percentage points more likely to *definitely not trust*, and 48.7 percentage points less likely to *probably trust* the UUP as compared to Unionist individuals. Unionist individuals are also more likely than unidentified individuals to *probably trust* the UUP by 39.8 percentage points. Nationalists are also less likely to trust the UUP than unidentified individuals by 25.6 percentage points. These findings for the two main unionist parties indicate ingroup bias by Unionist individuals and outgroup mistrust by nationalists. Unionist individuals are more trusting of their own party than unidentified individuals and

⁴⁴ This is a student sample. No recent national level surveys that I am aware of ask these trust questions to compare response outcomes. Many of the question wordings for trust that were taken from the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey have not been included since 2008.

nationalist individuals, and nationalist individuals are less trusting of Unionist ministers than Unionist individuals are.

We also see trust patterns of elite outgroup mistrust for Unionists. Unionist individuals are more likely to *definitely distrust* SF than Nationalists by 22.7 percentage points. This is a smaller difference than we see between sectarian identifying individuals for the Unionist parties, but Unionist individuals are just over 70 percent likely to *probably or definitely not trust* SF. Nationalist individuals are just over 30 percent likely to *probably or definitely not trust* SF. Unidentified individuals are less distrusting of SF than Unionist individuals with a 11.3 percentage point difference, but more distrusting of the party than Nationalist individuals with a percentage point difference of 30.2.

Table 4.3 Sectarian Identity and Trust in Main Parties' Members

	<u>Trust DUP</u>	<u>Trust UUP</u>	<u>Trust SDLP</u>	<u>Trust SF</u>
Unionist	1.69* (.66)	3.12** (.74)	-.32 (.64)	-1.29* (.64)
Other	.59 (.54)	1.14* (.55)	-.17 (.54)	-.77 (.54)
Cut1	-.08 (.46)	-.03 (.46)	-2.09* (.54)	-1.86* (.50)
Cut2	1.05* (.48)	1.18 (.49)	-.95* (.48)	-.26 (.47)
Cut3	2.12* (.52)	2.98 (.59)	.36 (.46)	.51 (.46)
Cut4	4.35* (.84)	---	---	2.97* (.78)
N	70	70	70	72
Pseudo R ²	.03	.11	.001	.02
X ²	7.07	20.6	.26	4.24

Ordered Logit Model with Control Group Sample Only; *p<.05, **< .001

Table 4.4 Predicted Probabilities for Table 4.3

	<u>Unionist</u>	<u>Nationalist</u>	<u>No ID</u>	Percentage Point Change		
				<u>Unionist- Nationalist</u>	<u>Unionist- No ID</u>	<u>Nationalist- No ID</u>
Trust the Democratic Unionist Party						
(0)	14.5%	48%	33.9%	-33.5	-19.4	--
(1)	19.9%	26%	27.4%	-6.1	-7.5	--
(2)	26.2%	15.2%	21%	11	5.2	--
(3)	32.9%	9.4%	15.5%	23.5	17.4	--
(4)	6.6%	1.3%	2.3%	6.3	4.3	--
Trust the Ulster Unionist Party						
(0)	4.1%	49.2%	23.6%	-45.1	-19.5	25.6
(1)	8.4%	27.3%	27.3%	-18.9	-18.9	0
(2)	34%	18.7%	35.4%	-15.3	-1.4	-16.7
(3)	53.5%	4.8%	13.7%	48.7	39.8	8.9
(4)	--	--	--			
Trust Sinn Fein						
(0)	36.2%	13.5%	25.2%	22.7	11	-11.7
(1)	37.4%	29.9%	37.1%	7.5	.3	-7.2
(2)	12.2%	18.9%	15.8%	-6.7	-3.6	3.1
(3)	12.9%	32.8%	19.6%	-19.9	-6.7	13.2
(4)	1.4%	4.8%	2.3%	-3.4	-.9	2.5

In models with the DUP, UUP and SF we see evidence of outgroup mistrust. Nationalist individuals are less trusting of Unionist parties, and Unionist individuals are less trusting of Nationalist parties. There is also evidence in support of ingroup bias. When an individual has the same political identity as a party's sectarian designation, that individual is more likely to trust that ingroup party. So while we are uncertain about the role of elite conflict on trust and satisfaction based on this experiment, there is preliminary support for the role of sectarian identity on trust and satisfaction in elected members of the assembly. The ways that this political identity transfers to societal level trust is investigated in Chapter 5. The last variables used to measure aspects of legitimacy are measures of confidence in four specific areas: Confidence in the Police, the Justice system, the Government, and Political Parties generally. I assess confidence in the next section.

4.3.3 Confidence in Institutions

I seek to test how elite conflict (treatment) might impact the way individuals feel about the institutions. Thus far there has not been clear evidence to support my proposition that exposure to elite conflict leads to reduced trust in elites or the government concerning trust in elites (Expectation 1). This section dealing with confidence in institutions and provides support for Expectation 2 that elite conflict impacts confidence in institutions. Table 4.5 contains models for each of the four relevant areas of confidence, Police, Justice System, Government, and Political Parties.

Table 4.5 Confidence in Institutions

	<u>Police</u>	<u>Justice System</u>	<u>Government</u>	<u>Parties</u>
Treatment	-.54† (.30)	-.74* (.31)	-.48 (.31)	.31 (.34)
Cut1	-2.8* (.35)	-2.6* (.33)	-1.67* (.28)	-.96 (.25)
Cut2	-1.04 (.24)	-.67* (.23)	.88* (.24)	2.3 (.33)
Cut3	1.09 (.24)	2.07* (.31)	3.7* (.6)	5.19 (1.02)
N	155	154	155	151
Pseudo R ²	.008	.016	.007	.003
X ²	3.2	5.82	2.35	.86
Ordered logit, †p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.001				

The treatment effects for models with confidence in the Police, and the Justice System as dependent variables are statistically significant and negative. Reading the article excerpt about conflict between parties leads to lower levels of confidence in the police and the justice system. Elite conflict is therefore an important predictor of confidence in the Police, and the Justice System. Information about elite conflict does not statistically or strongly change subjects' confidence in the Government or Parties. It is perhaps somewhat surprising and counterintuitive

that exposure to elite conflict reduces confidence in the police and justice system, but not in the Government or political parties who are directly engaging in conflict. One could argue that as sectarian identified individuals there is an expectation that parties will fight for their ingroup's ideals and therefore they have confidence that the parties are standing their ground. Therefore, it may not be surprising to some that the political actors who are interacting are not being punished with reduced confidence. Instead the police and justice system, two institutions that individuals interact with more than elected officials themselves, are suffering the confidence ramifications of elite conflict. This may pose additional problems within a post conflict society, in that police and the justice system are two dominant institutions that deal with ongoing conflicts and past events on a daily basis. To better understand the relationship between elite conflict and confidence in institutions predicted probabilities are generated and reported in Table 4.6.

Table 4.6 Confidence in Institutions Predicted Probabilities for Table 4.5

		<i>Control</i>	<i>Treatment</i>	<i>Percentage Point Change</i>
<i>Police</i>	<i>None</i>	5.8%	9.5%	3.7
	<i>Not Very Much</i>	20.4%	28.3%	7.9
	<i>Quite A Lot</i>	48.7%	45.9%	-2.8
	<i>A Great Deal</i>	25.2%	16.4%	-8.8
<i>Justice System</i>	<i>None</i>	6.9%	13.5%	6.6
	<i>Not Very Much</i>	26.9%	38.2%	11.3
	<i>Quite A Lot</i>	55%	42.5%	-23.5
	<i>A Great Deal</i>	11.2%	5.7%	-5.5

Exposure to the treatment reduced the likelihood for higher levels of confidence in the police and the justice system. An individual's likelihood of having *a great deal* or *quite a lot* of confidence in the police declines by 11.6 percentage points if they received the treatment. The decline in confidence is even greater for the justice system going down 29 percentage points in the same two categories of confidence. These findings provide evidence in support of

Expectations 2. While we do not see declines in confidence in all institutions, conflict does impact confidence in two very important areas, the police and the justice system.

The last analyses in this chapter utilize dependent variables derived from Principal Component Analysis (PCA): *Justice Legitimacy*,⁴⁵ and *Assembly Legitimacy*.⁴⁶ These variables were generated using the non-sectarian specific legitimacy measures in this chapter: Confidence in the Police, Confidence in the Justice System, Confidence in the Government, Confidence in Parties, Trust in Politicians, and Satisfaction with Members of the Legislative Assembly. Table 4.7 contains OLS models using these two components as dependent variables. The elite conflict treatment is statistically significant and negatively related to *Justice Legitimacy*, but not *Assembly Legitimacy*. This echoes findings from confidence in specific institutions tested in the previous section. Conflict between parties therefore leads to less favorable legitimacy attitudes in areas related to the police and the justice system with a coefficient of -.46. The association between Assembly Legitimacy is uncertain, although we see a similarly negative direction.

The reduction of confidence in police and the justice system could have serious consequences on the ground level of society in terms of the areas of the government that individuals have the potential to interact with on a more frequent and even daily basis. While the same elite level conflict may or may not impact future electoral outcomes, resulting from individuals punishing party members. Looking again at specific areas of confidence (models in Table 4.5), there are negative associations with elite conflict and confidence in the government. The absence of accountability checks by the people may lead to continued stagnation and conflict in the assembly rather than self-correcting towards cooperation through clearing out

⁴⁵ Justice Legitimacy descriptive statistics: Mean is near 0, standard deviation equals .99. Total range of values is – 3.09 to 2.49. Eigenvalue of .99.

⁴⁶ Assembly Legitimacy descriptive statistics: Mean is near 0, standard deviation is 1.89. Total range of values is - 3.7 to 5.41. Eigenvalue of 3.58.

parties or assembly members that are ineffective during elections. Indeed in Northern Ireland we have seen entrenchment of Sinn Féin and the DUP as the dominant parties, while the more moderate sectarian designated parties (SDLP and UUP) have lost seats since 1998.

Table 4.7 Legitimacy Factors

	<i>Justice Legitimacy</i>	<i>Assembly Legitimacy</i>
Treatment	-.46* (.24)	-.29 (.35)
Constant	.24 † (.12)	.15 (.25)
N	120	120
R ²	.053	.006
OLS Regression, †p<.1, *p<.05		

4.4 Discussion

There are a few takeaways from the analyses in this chapter. The two most important findings from this chapter are 1) elite conflict is likely influencing a reduction in confidence in certain institutions, and 2) that political identity is an important predictor for trust in specific political party ministers. Therefore, the empirical evidence supports the elite conflict aspect of Expectation 2, but not Expectation 1. The first finding that supports Expectation 2 related to confidence in institutions might be counter intuitive because only police and the justice system are hit by reduced levels of confidence after witnessing elite conflict, but this definitely has important day to day implications for a post-conflict society. The second set of findings provide support for Expectations 3 and 4 that posit ingroup bias and outgroup mistrust between the salient socio-political groupings, Unionists and Nationalists.

Evidence from this chapter supports Expectation 2 regarding elite interactions and confidence in institutions. Exposure to the treatment, elite conflict between parties, has a

negative association with two areas of institutional confidence. Exposure to elected official's behavior, the inability to resolve salient cross-community issues led to reduced levels of confidence in the police, and the justice system. While this is a student sample this experiment does provide preliminary evidence that elite behavior can directly influence individual level attitudes about institutions. There is no support that interactions between the political parties in the Assembly members is associated with declining confidence in the members themselves, but in other institutions that individuals interact with on a daily basis. While these findings are quite preliminary additional studies with a representative population sample would shed more light on this relationship between elite behaviors and confidence in institutions and trust. Expectation 1 and 2 deal with both cooperation and conflict, but this chapter focused on elite conflict. It would be greatly beneficial in future studies to focus on the role of cooperation. Indeed testing for cooperation in societies that have entrenched partisan or sectarian conflict may prove fruitful in proving the importance of elite behaviors in ensuring legitimacy.

Political identity is found to have a robust relationship with trust in political parties. Individuals who identify as one of the two political designations, Unionist and Nationalist, are more likely to trust the ingroup political party than the outgroup political party. Sectarian identified individuals also are more trusting of their own parties (ingroup parties) than others are. Unionist individuals trust Unionist parties more than Nationalist individuals or Unidentified individuals. Nationalist individuals are the more likely to trust Nationalist designated political parties than Unionists, but not more likely than unidentified individuals. While this is not a novel finding, this dynamic relationship that draws from social identity theory is important for understanding the complex relationship between political parties and individuals in society. This has particular importance in the postconflict society that utilizes consociational institutions to

maintain stability. Sectarian identities are, unsurprisingly, still salient within political contexts in Northern Ireland. These identities influence political trust and there are additional implications for how individuals interpret cues from a more trusted ingroup party versus a less trusted outgroup party and how cues effect on interactions with others in society. I investigate these relationships in the next chapter.

Building from the findings on legitimacy in the next chapter I move to the second component of social cohesion, social capital. I test how social capital is associated with several factors including legitimacy attitudes and elite behavior. I focus on cross community trust and reciprocity levels first by using a social trust game and experiment, and then by using survey data to focus on social distance. I will look at general trust, ingroup and outgroup social trust, and preferences of individuals for interacting with outgroup members as measures of social capital. The next chapter on social capital helps to shed light on if and how elite behaviors influence not only attitudes about the elites and institutions themselves but relationships between individuals in society.

5 SOCIAL CAPITAL

“An empirical task for social capital research is to explore the connections, if any, between government policies and structures, and social capital.”

(Kenneth Newton 1997, 580)

5.1 Introduction

Many have argued that social capital has a pivotal role in working and productive democratic societies. I also argue that social capital is an essential part of understanding social cohesion at the individual level. This chapter addresses a few questions using social capital as the dependent variable to test its relationship with other predictors in my conceptual model: How does social

capital operate within the social cohesion framework? How does political identity to inform trust decisions? What impact does elite behavior have on social capital? As discussed in Chapter 2 social capital is defined as an *actor's belief that commitments by other actors will be upheld*. I operationalize social capital as general social trust, ingroup social trust, outgroup social trust, and willingness to integrate with a political outgroup. These measures take into consideration bonding and bridging social capital, interactions within and across social groups, and generalized social trust. Utilizing all four measures of social capital allows me to test a variety of hypotheses about how elite behaviors and interactions might affect attitudes and behaviors differently across societal contexts. This chapter employs a variety of empirical tests to test how political conflict and stagnation impacts the social capital component of social cohesion, and how legitimacy links them together.

In this chapter I analyze data and discuss findings from an original survey trust game and experiment conducted at Queen's University Belfast (QUB) from October 2014 to March 2015. First, the trust game portion of this study allows us to unpack the cross-community social trust and reciprocity structures that exist within the sectarian political system present in Northern Ireland. Second, I look at treatment effects from the elite prime experiment to see if there are any direct effects on social capital attitudes. Third, additional examination of the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey and posttest questions from the QUB Survey are analyzed to understand the role of cross community elite trust on willingness to integrate with the established outgroup. In short, this chapter focuses on how societal level attitudes and behaviors manifest regarding trust and interactions and how elite behavior influence these components of social capital across Northern Ireland's main ethno-political divide.

5.2 Trust, Reciprocity, and Willingness to Integrate Hypotheses

Chapter 2 expounds on theory and expectations regarding the relationships between elite behaviors and the three components of social cohesion. Expectations 3 through 7 lay out several expectations for societal level attitudes and behaviors as the dependent variables. This chapter lays out testable hypotheses for these expectations about how elite behaviors and social interactions might influence the social capital component of social cohesion.

Expectation 3 states that *outgroup mistrust* will exist between individuals who self-identify with different social groups. Individuals will be less trusting for members of the outgroup as compared to the ingroup. In the Northern Ireland context this expectation will be tested on the trust differences between self-identified Unionists and Nationalists. Individuals are expected to show less trust to a member of one's outgroup. Based on this expectation the hypothesis, that an individual who identifies as Unionist (or Nationalist) will be less trusting of individuals who are not ingroup members as compared to the level of trust shown to an ingroup member, follows. Unionists are expected to trust Nationalists less than they will trust another Unionist, and Nationalists will trust Unionists less than other Nationalists.

Hypothesis 5.1: Individuals will trust a member of their outgroup less than they trust a member of their ingroup.

Ingroup bias is a second expectation about the trust and reciprocity relationships that might exist within a society. Broadly, ingroup bias is the idea that individuals will be supportive of their own group members and less supportive or discriminatory of all others whether that individual is a member of the primary outgroup or another group, even if the "other" is not a member of the salient socio-political cleavage. Expectation 4 in Chapter 2 explains that a historically dominant group member is more likely favor their ingroup more than a historically

subjugated group favors their ingroup members. A historically dominant group member is, therefore, more likely to display greater ingroup bias than the minority group. In Northern Ireland Unionists are the historically dominant group therefore, ingroup bias will exist for both Unionists and Nationalists but Unionists will have greater ingroup bias.

Hypothesis 5.2: Unionist and Nationalist will trust individuals identified as an ingroup member more than will trust an individual identified as an outgroup member OR an unidentified member.

Hypothesis 5.3: The difference between the levels of trust for ingroup members and outgroup member OR ingroup members and unidentified individuals will be greater for Unionists than for Nationalists.

I also test if *elite interactions* are associated with trust and reciprocity. Following Expectation 6 (Chapter 2) I expect that individuals who identify as Unionist or Nationalist and are aware of conflict between the Unionist and Nationalist parties will be less trusting of individuals identified as outgroup members.

Hypothesis 5.4: Individuals who receive the elite conflict treatment will be more trusting of ingroup members and less trusting of outgroup members than their counterparts.

The next hypotheses deal with reciprocity as the dependent variable rather than trust. First, the same expectation regarding trust and *outgroup mistrust*, *ingroup bias*, and *elite interactions* are also expected to exist for reciprocal behaviors:

Hypothesis 5.5: Unionists and Nationalists individual trustees⁴⁷ will reciprocate trust to a lesser degree when interacting with a member of the outgroup than when they interact with member of the ingroup.

Hypothesis 5.6: Unionist and Nationalist individual trustees will reciprocate to individuals identified as ingroup members to a greater extent than they will reciprocate to an outgroup member OR an unidentified individual.

⁴⁷ “trustee” here is the second mover (P2) in the administered trust game.

Hypothesis 5.7: Individuals who witness cross-community conflict reciprocate more to ingroup members and less to outgroup members than their counterparts.

I argue in Expectation 5 (see Chapter 2) that receiving trusting behaviors will increase reciprocating behaviors, or that *trust will moderate group biases*. Another way to think of this is if an individual is expected to fulfill a commitment because another individual has seen them as trustworthy or put trust in them, that individual will be more likely to fulfill that commitment and reciprocate by fulfilling that commitment. Within the Northern Ireland context an example of this is if a Unionist individual puts greater trust in a Nationalists by investing funds, a good, or service, that Nationalist would be more likely to reciprocate by fulfilling the expectation and returning the good or service in kind.

Hypothesis 5.8: There is a positive relationship between receiving trust and reciprocity.

The next two hypotheses follow from *Expectation 7* about the influence of elites on individuals, regarding how cross-community vertical trust might influence cross-community horizontal interactions. In the last section of this chapter I investigate the role of cross community trust in MLAs on the third area of social capital, willingness to interact with the outgroup as the dependent variable and revisit trust to see how cross community trust is affected.

Hypothesis 5.9: Individuals who trust ingroup elites will be less willing to interact with an outgroup member than those who are less trusting of ingroup elites, and individuals who trust outgroup elites will be more willing to interact with outgroup members than those who do not trust outgroup elites.

Hypothesis 5.10: Nationalist and Unionist individuals who trust ingroup elites will be less trusting of outgroup members and more trusting of ingroup members than other Nationalist and Unionist individuals who are less trusting of ingroup elites.

Lastly, I expect that elite conflict has the same effect on willingness to integrate that is expressed in Hypothesis 5.4 for trust and Hypothesis 5.7 for reciprocity. Following Expectation 6 I expect that:

Hypothesis 5.11: Individuals who witness elite conflict will be less willing to interact with the outgroup than individuals who did not.

There are clearly many hypotheses to examine in this chapter. I utilize several different methodologies to appropriately test the above hypotheses. In the section that follows I illustrate the original experiment, trust game, and survey that will be analyzed to test these hypotheses.

5.3 Experimental Procedures and Trust Game

A survey experimental trust game and survey was conducted to collect original data on Northern Ireland to test the social capital component of social cohesion and the role of elite behavior. Participants for this study were recruited from the student population of Queen's University Belfast in Northern Ireland between October 2014 and March 2015. This study combines an elite influence experiment (e.g. Nelson, Sanbonmatsu, & McClerking, 2007) and trust games (e.g. Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe 1995). In the elite influence experiment, subjects are exposed to one of two elite behavior primes: political elite conflict (treatment group) or no information (control group). Participants were assigned to one of four randomized groups. Two groups received the elite conflict prime and two groups did not (see Table 5.1).

Table 5.1 Participant Random Assignment

	Elite Conflict Prime	Trust Game Role
Group A	Treatment - Read Article	Player 1
Group B	Treatment - Read Article	Player 2
Group C	Control - No Article	Player 1
Group D	Control - No Article	Player 2

Subjects in the Elite Conflict treatment group were asked to read the following passage, derived from an article about cross-community elite interactions in *The Guardian* (McDonald and Murray, 2013):⁴⁸

*The five main political parties in Northern Ireland: the Democratic Unionists, Ulster Unionist party, Sinn Féin, the SDLP and Alliance **have hit deadlock on outstanding issues in the peace process after a marathon overnight session of talks.** The talks covered a range of issues from Northern Ireland's history including unsolved murders from the Troubles, the route of loyalist parades and the flying of national flags.*

Participants assigned to the control condition did not read anything but rather skipped to the next phase of the study, the interpersonal trust games. A dichotomous variable is included in various analyses in the next section to indicate if the individual received the elite conflict treatment (treatment received = 1, control group = 0).

The trust game (e.g. Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe 1995) is designed to assess how subjects trust and reciprocate with others. One group from each elite prime condition, discussed above, were assigned the first player role in the trust game, and the other two groups were assigned to the the second player role (Table 5.1). General trust, ingroup trust, and outgroup trust are measured through three raffle ticket exchanges. A raffle ticket represents a valued transaction within the game while facilitating recruitment and online game play (e.g. Fowler and Kam 2007; Carlin and Love 2013). The number of tickets that a participant has at the end of the experiment equals the number of entries into the drawing for one of six £50 prizes. Each ticket earned has an equal chance of winning one of the prizes. All players are aware of the rules of the game before game play starts and understand that an increase in tickets increases the chance of winning one of the six prizes. The trust game instructions explicitly stated that the more tickets they have the more likely they are to win a £50 prize.

⁴⁸ Emphasis added, bolding is included in segment seen by participants.

The trust game is played in the following Player 1 and Player 2 sequence. Each subject is allocated 10 tickets at the outset of each trust game and reads detailed instructions about game play. The first player/mover in the pair selected between 0(none) and 10(all) of his/her tickets to give the second player/mover. The number of tickets given by the first player was tripled before being received by the second player. The second player then has the option to give back any number of tickets in his/her possession (zero to the total number of tickets they have after receiving tickets from the first player which ranged from 10-40 tickets). The greater the number of tickets indicates an increased level of trust or reciprocity, the first mover's actions test trust, and the second mover's behavior tests reciprocity. The maximum number of lottery tickets that a player can win in a game is 40 tickets. The minimum is 0. The amount that the second player received was randomly assigned to the second player and later matched with a first player who sent that amount (Fehr et al.2003; Carlin & Love 2013).

Each player, first mover and second movers, played the game three times parse out variation in general, ingroup, and outgroup trust and reciprocity. In the first game participants played a fully anonymous other player. Second, each subject played another player identified only as a Unionist. Third, each played another player identified only as Nationalist. Ingroup and Outgroup dynamic was determined during analysis based on players self-identified political categorization as Unionist or Nationalist. Therefore, in certain models that follow the sample is constrained to self-identifying Unionists and Nationalists. In sum, the two phase experiment accounts for how legitimacy and social interactions might affect individual level attitudes and behaviors.

5.3.1 *Trust and Reciprocity Measures*

I measure trust and reciprocity in a few ways for the descriptive statistics and hypothesis tests that follow. 1) The raw number of tickets that Player 1 gave in each of the three games measuring trusting behavior, the more tickets given again indicating a larger amount of trust that Player 2 will reciprocate (*Trust*). 2) I calculate the difference in number of tickets given an ingroup member and an outgroup member to measure the differences in trust to each group. The number of tickets that Player 1 gave to the ingroup minus the number of tickets that the same individual Player 1 gave to the outgroup (ingroup trust – outgroup trust = *Sectarian Trust Gap*). A positive value for *Sectarian Trust Gap* indicates an observation of outgroup mistrust and ingroup bias. 3) Similarly, I calculate the ticket difference for the number of tickets that Player 1 gave to the ingroup minus the number of tickets that the same individual Player 1 gave to the unidentified Player 2 (ingroup trust - anonymous trust = *Anonymous Trust Gap*).⁴⁹ This ticket difference, *Anonymous Trust Gap*, indicates ingroup bias for one's socio-political ingroup when this variable is positive (e.g. a Unionist giving more tickets to the Unionist Player 2).

Reciprocity variables are generated similarly but are on a different measurement scale because additional considerations are required because the number of tickets received from Player 1 varies and impacts the number of tickets available to Player 2. I measure reciprocity in the trust game as tickets returned by Player 2. The number of tickets available to give back is dependent on the number of tickets received (e.g. Player 1 gives Player 2 5 tickets. The 5 tickets

⁴⁹ *Trust Gap* variables are comparable to Carlin and Love 2013 Partisan-Co-Partisan Trust Gap generated. Using the *Trust Gap* variables reduces the N available because I can only compare individual players who identify as Unionists or Nationalists to assess their ingroup and outgroup and generate the trust gap based on the number of tickets they give to each. i.e. The values for *Sectarian Trust Gap* for individual who identifies as Unionist is generated as the number of tickets given to the Unionist Player 2 minus the number of tickets given to the Nationalist Player 2. *Anonymous Trust Gap* for Player 1 who identifies as Unionist is generated as the number of tickets given to the Unionist Player 2 minus the number of tickets given the Anonymous Player 2. Both *Trust Gap* and *Anonymous Trust Gap* are limited to players who identify as Unionist or Nationalist in the sample because an ingroup and outgroup must be identified. This restriction of sample included reduces the available number of observations for analysis.

are multiplied by 3 and Player 2 receives 15 tickets. Player 2 had 10 tickets to start with, so Player 2 now has 25 tickets that he can keep some portion of and give back some portion to Player 1). The number of tickets available to Player 2 varies from 10 to 40 tickets. I measure reciprocity in two primary ways in the analysis. 1) The raw number of tickets returned to Player 1, variable *Reciprocity-Tickets*, ranging from 0-40. To account for the number of tickets received (0-30) a control variable is included in models using the raw number of tickets returned as a dependent variable. 2) The second measure of reciprocity captures the number of tickets available in the reciprocity variable.

Reciprocity in this second variable, *Reciprocity-Percent*, is measured as percent of tickets available given back to Player 1. Two players may give 8 tickets each, but one may have had 25 tickets available, and another player may have had 40. The reciprocity is greater for the player who started with 25 tickets because he is giving 32 percent of his available tickets (keeping 17 tickets for himself, and ensuring that Player 1 has 13 tickets at the end of the game). The other Player 2, having 40 tickets available is giving only 20 percent of her available tickets (keeping 32 tickets for herself and ensuring Player 1 only has 8 tickets at the end of the game). This differs from the calculation of Player 1 Trust because each participant that has been assigned with 10 tickets each therefore more tickets given directly indicates more trusting behavior. I calculate the *Reciprocity-Percent* variable as the number of tickets returned divided by the number of tickets available ($[\# \text{ of tickets returned by Player 2} / (\text{number of tickets given by Player 1} * 3)] * 100 = \textit{Reciprocity-Percent}$).

Trust and Reciprocity are the dependent variables for several hypotheses tested in this chapter. I have already stated the general expectations in this chapter, but I will now clearly

identify specific testable hypotheses with the specific trust and reciprocity variables: *Trust*, *Sectarian trust gap*, *Anonymous trust gap*, *Reciprocity-Tickets*, and *Reciprocity-Percent*.

5.3.2 Trust Analysis

In this section I test hypotheses 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 using the number of tickets given by the first mover (Player 1). The mean number of tickets sent by the first mover (Player 1) varies depending on the political identification of Player 2. Without knowing the identity of Player 1 the average number of tickets given to an Anonymous P2 is 4.49 tickets, 4.38 to a Nationalist P2s, and 4.51 to a Unionist P2 (see Figure 5.1).⁵⁰ There is no meaningful difference between these values across political designations for P2 without information of the first mover's identity with a 95 percent confidence interval. When the means are broken down within the context of political identity designation for Player 1 there are greater differences in mean value and t-tests indicate that there are a few significant differences with a 95 percent confidence interval (see Figure 5.3-5.5).

Figure 5.2 shows the mean values for treatment and control group samples expressed separately. The trust game took place after the elite prime, discussed in the previous section; therefore it is relevant to look at the treatment and control samples independently. I will discuss both the full sample differences of means and the treatment and control sample differences of means.

Within the full sample the difference of means for Unionist individuals giving to a Unionist counterpart and Unidentified individuals giving to a Unionist counterpart is 1.31.⁵¹ This also holds in the control only sample. Unionist individuals who did not receive the treatment

⁵⁰ Standard Errors for mean number of tickets sent: to Anonymous (.25), to Nationalist (.27), to Unionist (.26). N = 84.

⁵¹ Standard error of the difference of means is .57, with a 95percent confidence interval of [.17, 2.46].

gave an average of 1.925⁵² more tickets to a Unionist than a politically unidentified individual would give to a Unionist counterpart. This is the only difference across political identities for first movers within the same type of game, but provides support for Hypothesis 5.2 and 5.3 for ingroup bias by Unionists, and greater ingroup bias for Unionists over Nationalists.

If we look at means for individuals who identify as Unionist or Nationalists there are also differences within these groups according to if an identifying individual is playing an ingroup or outgroup member, or an anonymous individual. The mean for Unionists playing other Unionists is statistically different from when Unionists play Nationalists, and when Unionists play an Anonymous counterpart. Unionists give on average 1.44 more tickets to ingroup members than they give to an outgroup member, and .83 more tickets to an ingroup member than they give to an anonymous player.⁵³ Likewise, Nationalists give more tickets on average to other Nationalists than they give to Unionists with a .72⁵⁴ difference of mean tickets given. However there is not a statistically significant difference between the number of tickets given to Nationalist ingroup members and anonymous players.

All other differences in the full sample are statistically indistinct from each other. Only two of these differences of means hold statistical significance in the treatment or control samples. For Unionist individuals who received the treatment they gave on average .91⁵⁵ more tickets to other Unionists than they gave to Anonymous individuals. No other within Player 1 differences are significant for Unionists or Nationalists who received the treatment and none of the differences are significantly different for Unionists or Nationalists who were in the control group.

⁵² Standard error of the difference of means is .93, with a 95 percent confidence interval of [.002, 3.85].

⁵³ Standard errors are .53 and .29 respectfully.

⁵⁴ Standard error .73

⁵⁵ Standard error .31




Figure 5.1 Average amount Player 1 gave to Player 2 across three political identity conditions (with 95% confidence interval, $N=84$)




Figure 5.2 Treatment and Control Groups Number of tickets given (Treatment $N = 37$; 7 Unionists, 11 Nationalists, 19 Neither/Other/Don't Know; Control $N = 45$; 11 Unionists, 7 Nationalists, 27 Neither/Other/Don't Know)




Figure 5.3 Average amount Player 1 gave to Player 2 across three political identity conditioned games by Player 1's political Identity (with 95% Standard Error Confidence Interval; N = 82; 18 Unionists, 18 Nationalists, 46 Neither/Other/Don't Know)

There is evidence in these differences of means of outgroup mistrust (Hypothesis 5.1), since fewer tickets are given to outgroup members by both Nationalists and Unionists. The outgroup mistrust for Unionists is twice as great as the differences for Nationalists providing some evidence for Hypotheses 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3. We see outgroup mistrust for both Nationalists and Unionists, but it is greater for Unionists, the historically dominant political group. In the last category of P1s, those individuals who do not identify as Unionist or Nationalist do not tend to discriminate on the basis of P2's political identity. Unidentified first movers gave an average of 4.13 tickets to Unionists, 4.22 tickets to Nationalists, and 4.24 tickets to other unidentified individuals. These values are not statistically different from each other. These descriptive statistics provide some clarity on the relationships between ingroup and outgroup trust in that we

see higher levels of trust for ingroup members and less trust for outgroup members and unidentified individuals. Utilizing OLS models in the next section I will test my hypotheses further.




Figure 5.4 Average amount Player 1 gave to Player 2 across three political identity conditioned games by Player 1's political Identity (Control Group Sub Sample N = 45; 11 Unionists, 7 Nationalists, 27 Neither/Other/Don't Know)




Figure 5.5 Average amount Player 1 gave to Player 2 across three political identity conditioned games by Player 1's political Identity (Treatment Group Sub Sample N = 37; 7 Unionists, 11 Nationalists, 19 Neither/Other/Don't Know)

Table 5.2 contains the first set of statistical models in this chapter, using two dependent variables to measure trust. I use two variables to account for the differences in ingroup game play, outgroup game play, and anonymous or unidentified game play. The first variable is the *sectarian trust gap*, the difference between tickets given to the ingroup and tickets given to the outgroup. The second dependent variable is *anonymous trust gap*, the number of tickets given to the ingroup minus the number given to the anonymous counterpart. A positive value for either of these variables indicates a positive net level of trust towards the ingroup over the outgroup; individuals trust the ingroup member with whom they are playing more than the outgroup member (*sectarian trust gap*) or the unidentified member (*anonymous trust gap*). OLS models are utilized to test the differences in number of tickets given based on identity controlling for receiving the elite conflict treatment.

Exposure to the elite conflict treatment is positively associated with the number of tickets given. Reading about conflict between parties in Northern Ireland increases the number of tickets given to the ingroup than outgroup or anonymous players. This positive association holds across the two model specifications for both dependent variables. While none of the treatment coefficients are statistically significant the patterns that exist are worth noting. Models I and III, the two bivariate models with the treatment show that the increase in ticket difference is nearly twice that for the sectarian trust gap than the anonymous trust gap. The full shift in ticket gap is .61 in the first model, and .33 in model III. In fact a larger treatment effect for the sectarian trust gap over anonymous trust gap is seen when comparing all model specifications. This difference suggests that reading about elite conflict seemingly widens the trust gap between ingroup and outgroup more than it widens the trust gap between ingroup and unidentified individuals. So while statistical power is limited, arguably due to the small sample size, the substantive patterns

across these OLS models do provide some limited support for expectations about how elite behavior might influence individual level social trust. Elite conflict within the consociational system is increasing outgroup mistrust for sectarian identified individuals, as seen by the larger sectarian trust gap. This evidence while preliminary provides enough support hypothesis 5.4 that witnessing elite conflict (the treatment here) has bearing on social trust between individuals with a salient political identity to warrant further investigation in to the role of vertical extended contact.

Coefficients for P1_Unionist across models (see Models II and IV), are positive ranging between .7 in Model IV and .997 in Model II. This larger ticket gap for Unionists indicates that within the QUB sample there is a larger sectarian gap or ingroup bias for Unionists than for Nationalists (consistent with Hypothesis 5.3) Unionists in the sample are therefore giving, on average, more tickets to other Unionists than they are giving to unidentified or Nationalist participants. However, again this is not statistically significant value.

Table 5.2 Sectarian and Anonymous Trust Gap – Differences in Number of Tickets Given to Ingroup, Outgroup, and Unidentified Trustees

	<i>Sectarian Trust Gap</i>		<i>Anonymous Trust Gap</i>	
	<u><i>I</i></u>	<u><i>II</i></u>	<u><i>III</i></u>	<u><i>IV</i></u>
Treatment	.61 (.63)	.55 (.64)	.33 (.42)	.26 (.43)
P1_Unionist ID		.997 (.68)		.70 (.46)
P1_ID Strength		.71 (.47)		.37 (.31)
Constant	.78 (.45)	-.13 (.66)	.39 (.3)	-.15 (.45)
N	36	36	36	36
R ²	.02	.12	.02	.097

* p<.05, OLS models

Table 5.3 provides two models to assess the role of ingroup bias and outgroup mistrust. I use panel data, where each participant is the unit of analysis or group, and each of the three games is one play in a sequence of plays for that individual (3 sequential observations). Two models are specified to compare individual first mover decisions across all three games. Fixed effect time series modeling is used to account for the relationship between games played and treatment effects that are constant for each player in all three games played. This allows for examination of how a player gives to ingroup members, outgroup members, and unidentified players. To account for the context of player identity dichotomous independent variables are included to identify if Player 1 is giving to an ingroup member (e.g. Nationalist Player 1 is giving to a Nationalist Player 2), outgroup member (e.g. Nationalist Player 1 giving to a Unionist Player 2), or anonymous Player 2. Giving to the outgroup Player 2 is excluded as a right hand side variable and is therefore the reference category for the coefficients. The dependent variable in these models is the number of tickets given in each game, not the gap between tickets given in different contexts. Additionally, a subsample of only the control group is used in the following models to exclude any possible treatment effects from the results.

The fixed effects (Table 5.3) and random effects (Table 5.4) models provide some more evidence for ingroup bias and outgroup mistrust. In the first model (*Trust*), the outgroup game play value, the constant, is 4.1 tickets. Politically identified individuals give on average of about one (.64) ticket more to ingroup members than they give to outgroup members. This difference is statistically significant indicating that we can be confident that this greater trust towards the ingroup is being caused by identity differences. There are similar associations in the second model that only includes Unionist and Nationalist players. We observe a bias in terms of the number of tickets given to the ingroup member (.78) and an anonymous partner (.39 tickets) as

compared to outgroup members. Both of these coefficients indicate that individuals who identify with a sectarian group are more trusting of the ingroup than the outgroup and, in the case of Unionists and Nationalists, less trusting of each other than an unknown individual. These two models of social trust, therefore, provide evidence in support of Hypothesis 5.1 (Outgroup Mistrust) and Hypothesis 5.2 (Ingroup bias). Indicating that politically identified sectarians are likely to trust individuals in their ingroup more than individuals that are unidentified and more than the outgroup. Social identity therefore may inform the levels of trust and the likelihood of future interactions with the outgroup. If mistrust is reinforced through isolation within the ingroup, societal cleavages will be perpetuated and potentially alter the frequency and types of political participation. I test for these possible effects in the next chapter.

Table 5.3 Player 1 Trust Game Panel Analysis of Ingroup, Outgroup, and Anonymous Trust

	<i>Trust</i>	<i>Trust</i> (Unionists and Nationalists only)
Ingroup Partner	.64* (.25)	.78* (.33)
Anonymous Partner	.12 (.18)	.39 (.33)
Constant	4.1** (.11)	4.39** (.23)
N	111	54
Groups	37	18
R ² within	.08	.14
R ² between	.05	.01
R ² overall	.03	.01
F-Test	23.84	23.52

* p<.05, ** p<.001, Fixed effect models
 DV = Number Tickets Given (0-10)
 Control Group Subsample Only

Next, I look at the role of elite conflict again in greater detail. Hypothesis 5.4 argues that cross community elite interactions are associated with societal level trust. I specify two models with the treatment variable and treatment interacted with partner relationship. An interaction is used to capture how players' political identity conditions the effect of elite conflict on trust.

Replicating the analysis above testing Hypotheses 5.1 and 5.2, we see a statistically significant bias against outgroups. Exposure to a news story exhibiting conflict between the executive parties does not, however, on its own produce a substantive or significant difference in number of tickets given in Model I (Table 5.4).

In Model II, there are changes in the treatment coefficients indicating that within the sample the conflict prime is on average moving responses for individuals in the expected directions. Model II includes interactions between game play and the elite treatment effect. The differences between ingroup, outgroup, and anonymous game play and the elite treatment are illustrated in Figure 5.6. I will discuss adjusted outcomes here. Individuals playing ingroup members that received the treatment are giving an average of .16 more tickets, an average of 5.3, compared to their counterparts playing ingroup members who did not receive the treatment (giving an average of 5.17). Individuals playing an anonymous player 2 and receiving the treatment are giving an average of 4.62 tickets, .17 fewer tickets than individuals that did not receive the treatment with 4.79 tickets. Lastly, individuals who received the treatment and who are playing outgroup members are giving an average of 3.95 tickets, this is the smallest number of tickets given in any of the game play contexts at almost half a ticket less than those who play outgroup members and did not read the conflict treatment (4.39 tickets given). In Figure 5.6 it is clear that the treatment has different effects on outgroup trust than it has on ingroup trust or general trust. While the differences for all three types of game play are not statistically

significant at the 95 percent level. The effect that of conflict between elites has on individual attitudes and behaviors with this data is not certain, however, this does provide some preliminary evidence of the way that elite behaviors may be impacting the relationships between individuals and groups in society and the importance of contextualizing trust along the lines of group identity. Reproducing this experiment with a larger and more representative sample would be useful in the future to better test these propositions.

Table 5.4 Elite Behavior Treatment and Trust

	I	II
Ingroup Partner	1.08*** (.26)	.778* (.37)
Anonymous Partner	.528* (.261)	.389 (.37)
Treatment	-.148 (.861)	-.444 (.91)
Ingroup Partner*Treatment		.611 (.53)
Anonymous Partner*Treatment		.278 (.53)
Constant	4.241 (.63)	4.389 (.65)
N	108	108
Groups	36	36
R ² within	.1969	.2126
R ² between	.009	.0009
R ² overall	.0275	.0297
X ²	17.19***	18.39**
Random effects model, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, Standard error in parenthesis.		

There are a few possible reasons that the data and models are producing largely null findings. The treatment article excerpt read by participants in the treatment groups may not have been strong enough to illicit a different perception from the individual. There are two most likely culprits. First, the conflict between parties was not obvious enough to produce a response

by participants, or second, the treatment echoed the status quo political environment to individuals. On the second possible weakness, the elite conflict prime may highlight the already long-standing problems with political stagnation in the Assembly that was ongoing at the time of the study. This preexisting perception of conflict by all participants including those in the control group could mitigate the treatment effect. That is, the treatment might not be “treating” the subjects but, rather, underscoring the status quo. Indeed, during the time of the experiment Northern Irish politics was characterized by ongoing stagnation in political dealings; mentioning it again to the participants may not have been additional information to inform participants’ behaviors for trusting ingroup and outgroup members, but rather reinforcing preexisting notions of how politics works in their society.

Future studies should focus not only on a conflict prime, but also a cooperation prime to better understand how vertical extended contact operates. Perhaps more importantly, priming cooperation would help us better understand how in a society that has experienced division, political conflict, political stagnation and polarization how elite behaviors of cooperation might signal progress towards a more effective and working government and lead to an increase in cooperation and interaction at the societal level. The small-n sample size, and therefore lack of statistical power, is obviously a contributor to the statistically null result. These findings do not give strong support for the relationship between elite behavior and social trust, but this association cannot be ruled out and more studies are needed to provide clearer evidence in the future.




Figure 5.6 Number of Tickets Given by Player 1 and Trust Interaction from Table 5.3 Model II. Adjusted Margin Plots with 95% Confidence Intervals.

This section has tested the trust hypotheses in this chapter. Thus far we have seen some evidence in support of outgroup mistrust (H 5.1), ingroup bias (H5.2), and greater dominant group ingroup bias (H 5.3). Evidence regarding Hypothesis 5.4, the treatment effect of conflict between elites, is inconclusive because of null statistical results, but findings in this study indicate that future studies into vertical extended contact are an important avenue of study. For Unionists and Nationalists trust in the outgroup is weaker than it is for ingroup members. Individuals who identify as Unionist or Nationalists are consistently giving fewer tickets to outgroup members than they are giving to ingroup members. This difference indicates that

Unionists and Nationalists do not believe outgroup members are trustworthy to reciprocate by sending tickets back. Sectarian individuals do not believe that outgroup will uphold their commitments to reciprocate. We see a greater number of tickets given to the ingroup in descriptive statistics and t-tests, as well as statistical models by Unionists. Unionists, the dominant political group, show greater ingroup bias than Nationalists, as expected. Lastly there is not strong evidence supporting a treatment effect on trusting behaviors, but we do see small differences in the sample. Exposure to elite conflict does seem to exacerbate ingroup bias and outgroup mistrust as see in Table 5.2 and Figure 5.6. These findings help us to understand how one social trust functions and the link between political identity, elite behavior, and social capital. In the next section I look at the second movers, the trustees, behaviors from trust game play. I also investigate if trusting behaviors by first movers influences the likelihood that an individual will uphold a commitment to reciprocate.

5.4 Findings on Reciprocity

Individual reciprocity behaviors, the return of trusting behaviors, are also an important part of social capital. Reciprocity behaviors are measured and tested as dependent variables in this section. In a trust game I measure reciprocity as the actions of the second mover (i.e. the trustee), by the number of tickets that Player 2 decides to return to Player 1. The second action in a two person interaction effectively gauges reciprocity. Player 2 has received a number of tickets, perceiving that the more tickets they receive the more Player 1 is trusting them to return those tickets and then some tickets that the researchers have allocated. It is then the choice of Player 2 to honor the trust (number of tickets) Player 1 has placed in them or renege and keep all or most of the tickets received for themselves. In this section I test hypotheses about individual level

reciprocity, the effects of increased trust on reciprocity, and how identity impacts reciprocal behaviors.

Reciprocity is measured with two variables: the number of tickets returned to player one (*Reciprocity-Tickets*), and the percentage of tickets available returned which accounts for the number of tickets received by Player 2 (*Reciprocity-Percent*).⁵⁶ The latter is perhaps the better measure in that it is a standardized measure for all participants accounting for how many tickets they received after they were given additional tickets in the game play. Figure 5.7 shows the mean for *Reciprocity-Percent* by Player 2's political attachment and displays the percent of tickets available returned in trust game with a Unionist, Nationalist, and Anonymous first movers. Unionists and Nationalists both gave the greatest percentage of tickets back to ingroup members, 30.3 percent and 29.7 percent of tickets available, respectively. Tickets available range from 10 to 40 tickets and is dependent on the number of tickets given by P1 [(P1 tickets given * 3) + 10 = P2 available tickets]. Unionist and Nationalist identifying players also gave the lowest percentage of tickets to outgroup members, 24.3 percent and 24.6 percent of tickets available. Next, I use OLS regression modeling to test the association of reciprocity with the ingroup and outgroup identity contexts of player interactions. .

In Table 5.5 both *Reciprocity-Tickets* models show that the number of tickets received affects the number of tickets returned in both ingroup and outgroup game play. During ingroup partner interactions there is an increase of .5 tickets returned for each ticket received. Therefore each ticket given by P1 Player 2 receives 3 tickets and is expected to give an average of 1.5 tickets back. This is a direct split of the tickets received from an ingroup member. Receiving tickets from the outgroup does not generate as high of a return rate with only a .356 ticket increase for each ticket received from an outgroup member, Approximately 1 ticket is returned

⁵⁶ Possible Range of *Reciprocity-Tickets* is 0 to 40. Range of *Reciprocity-Percent* is 0 to 100 percent.

for each ticket given by Player 1 in an outgroup game. This ticket return difference being larger in the ingroup context than it is in the outgroup game provides evidence supporting outgroup mistrust or that a pre-existing ingroup bias exists between outgroup members (Hypotheses 5.2 and 5.5). Individuals have biased reciprocal behaviors toward individuals who are part of their social group and reciprocity is diminished when sectarian identified individuals interact with an individual from the outgroup.




Figure 5.7 Percent of Tickets Returned in each game by Player 2's Political Identity.
 (N= 77; 22 Unionists, 18 Nationalists, and 37 Neither/Other/Don't Know
 * Tickets available range: 10-40)

The last three models in Table 5.5 utilize *Reciprocity-Percent* variables as dependent variables. The first two *Reciprocity-Percent*⁵⁷ models look at game play with ingroup or outgroup gameplay. The third model combines both ingroup and outgroup games with a “gap” variable that measures the differences in percent of tickets given to the ingroup partner as compared with the outgroup partner. (Percent tickets given to the ingroup – Percent tickets available given to outgroup = *Reciprocity Percent Gap*). Within the sample, in both ingroup and outgroup games the percentage of tickets returned increases slightly when subjects received a greater number of tickets. Neither percent changes are statistically significant. In the ingroup games, the percentage returned increases by .56 for every ticket received. The impact is slightly less for the outgroup games with a percentage increase of .397. The number of possible tickets received ranges from 0 to 30. Therefore, an individual playing an ingroup member who received 30 tickets would on average give 16.8 percent more of the available tickets than someone who received 0 tickets. An individual playing an outgroup member receiving 30 tickets would return a little less than 12 percent more of the available tickets than an individual who received 0 tickets. Receiving trusting behavior increases reciprocity but the reciprocity return is magnified during ingroup interactions, while outgroup reciprocity is harder won but still produces reciprocal behaviors.

The last model in Table 5.5 utilizes the percent gap dependent variable, percent available tickets returned to the ingroup minus the percent available tickets returned to the outgroup. This variable much like the trust gap variables used in an earlier section allow us to see how individual players decisions regarding ingroup and outgroup counterparts manifest. The larger the gap value the greater the difference in reciprocity for the ingroup and outgroup. Within the reciprocity gap model when a greater number of tickets are received from an outgroup member

⁵⁷ Range of *Reciprocity-Percent* is 0 to 100 percent.

the gap is greatly reduced. Every additional ticket received by an outgroup game reduces the ingroup-outgroup percent gap by .815. However, tickets received will be in 3 ticket increments because the number of tickets given have been tripled, so for every ticket given, 3 are received, therefore, a one ticket increase given by the outgroup partner reduces the reciprocity gap by 2.4 percent of available tickets. The gap has the potential to be reduced by a percentage of 24 if Player 1 gives all 10 tickets. The number of ingroup tickets given increases the ingroup-outgroup percentage of available tickets returned grows by an average percentage of .164. This is substantively a small increase and it is not statistically different than zero. Therefore we cannot be confident that there is any effect from the number of tickets given by an ingroup member. This may also be an indication of an inherent trust level between ingroup members because of a shared identity. These findings provide some support for Hypothesis 5.7 that receiving trusting behavior from another person impacts reciprocity behaviors for an individual, and that trust can mitigate pre-existing outgroup mistrust. This finding is in line with the contact hypothesis that interactions between outgroup members reduce bias.

Additional models using *Reciprocity-Tickets* and *Reciprocity-Percent* as dependent variables are used in a panel data structured data set to control for other factors including the elite conflict prime.⁵⁸ The first two models in each table use a subsample of the data and only compare the outgroup and ingroup games. The last two, right most, models in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 include comparison of all three games, outgroup, ingroup, and anonymous pairings. In all models (I-IV) in Table 5.6 the number of tickets received is associated with an increase in tickets returned. The increase ranges from .38 to .49 more tickets returned for every ticket received, which reinforces the findings from Table 4.5. To assess the elite conflict prime in these models the Treatment variable is included, and three dichotomous variables are created for the type of

⁵⁸ Data used is the same as utilized in Table 4.4 Analysis.

partner during game play.⁵⁹ The elite conflict prime (*Treatment*) does not have a statistically significant association with the number of tickets given in either Model II or Model IV, and the substantive difference within the sample is very small.

Table 5.5 Reciprocity – Player 2 Tickets Returned

	Reciprocity - Tickets		Reciprocity – Percent		
	# of tickets returned to ingroup	# of tickets returned to outgroup	% returned to ingroup	% returned to outgroup	Difference in % of tickets returned (ingroup – outgroup)
<i>Tickets received from ingroup (0-30 tickets)</i>	.502*** (.116)		.555 (.442)		.164 (.203)
<i>Tickets received from outgroup (0-30 tickets)</i>		.356** (.112)		.397 (.422)	-.815*** (.218)
<i>Constant</i>	.833 (1.869)	1.182 (1.852)	22.76 (7.11)	18.9 (6.96)	14.8 (4.49)
N	40	40	40	40	40
R2	.3294	.2087	.0397	.7707	.2826
Adjusted R2	.3118	.1879	.0144	.7647	.2439
F test	.0001	.0030	.2178	.0000	0.0021
OLS regressions for Player 2 , * p<.05, **p<.01, ***p< .001					

⁵⁹ Ingroup and Anonymous game variables are included making the Outgroup game play the reference category captured in the constant value.

Table 5.6 Reciprocity-Tickets and Elite Behavior

	I	II	III	IV
Tickets received from P1 (0-30)	.490*** (.053)	.477*** (.055)	.389*** (.038)	.375*** (.03)
Elite Treatment	.379 (1.98)	-.332 (2.11)	.136 (1.77)	-.466 (1.98)
P1 Political Ingroup	1.69 (.722)	.789 (1.17)	1.60* (.759)	.276 (1.21)
P1 Anonymous			.484 (.759)	.688 (1.19)
P1 Political Ingroup * Treatment		1.483 (1.52)		2.19 (1.56)
P1 Anonymous * Treatment				-.354 (1.53)
Constant	-.932 (1.717)	-.313 (1.83)	.625 (1.53)	1.18 (1.63)
N	80	80	120	120
Groups	40	40	40	40
χ^2	88.27***	88.94***	107.54***	112.01***

Random Effects GLS model, Dependent variables in each model is the number of tickets Player 2 returned to Player 1 (0-40). Outgroup Player1 is excluded as a third dummy variable and is the reference category. * p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001




Figure 5.8 Number of Tickets Returned by Player 2 and Trust Interaction by Identity Context of Game Play from Table 5.6 Model IV. (Adjusted Margin Plots with 95% Confidence Intervals)

We see similar findings when using *Reciprocity-Percent* as the dependent variable. Models in Table 5.7 (V - VIII) all show a positive association with the percent of tickets returned ranging from .19 percent to .47 percent increase for each ticket received. Models I through II this expected change is statistically significant. Model IV which has additional controls and interactions for treatment effects with partner type included is not statistically significant. Models IV and Model VIII include interactions with type of partner and the treatment. There are differences within the sample for the number of tickets and percent of tickets that are given to an ingroup partner if the elite conflict prime was received. Figure 5.8, and Figure 5.9 are graphical

representations of this change. At a 95 percent confidence interval the differences are not statistically significant. It is interesting to note nonetheless and if this interactive effect is found in future studies with larger and more representative samples it would provide evidence that conflict prime reinforces or magnifies ingroup bias. This is not sufficient evidence to support hypothesis 5.7, but at a minimum it indicates that more research in this area is required.

Thus far in the chapter I examined trust and reciprocity as dependent variables to test the role of elite behaviors on cross-community and intra-community trusting and reciprocity behaviors. Trust and Reciprocity are one aspect of social capital. Analyzing original data from a social trust game that was paired with an elite priming experiment I find some limited evidence that elite behaviors may impact ingroup bias (Hypothesis 5.8). Individuals that identify as Unionist or Nationalist do seem to have ingroup bias and outgroup mistrust on average. It is encouraging however that receiving trusting behavior is associated with greater outgroup reciprocity (Hypothesis 5.7). Future studies will need to greatly expand on the conditions included in such experimental trust games in Northern Ireland and other societies and include larger more representative samples so that we can determine if these relationships are robust at the national level and generalizable beyond the Northern Ireland case.

Beyond behavior in strategic games, social cohesion can be bolstered by positive attitudes towards integration across group lines and preferences for mixing and interacting with outgroup members. The next section of this chapter will look at descriptive data from the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey and test hypotheses, particularly Hypothesis 5.9 and 5.10, about the effects of cross-community and within-community elite trust on preferences for cross-group social interaction and trust using original survey data.

Table 5.7 Reciprocity-Percent and Elite Behavior - Player 2

	V	VI	VII	VIII
Tickets received from P1	.47** (.15)	.43** (.16)	.23* (.12)	.19 (.12)
Elite Treatment	2.8 (7.7)	.99 (7.9)	1.3 (7.1)	.68 (7.6)
P1 Political Ingroup	5.9** (1.97)	3.7 (.03)	5.8* (2.4)	2.5 (3.8)
P1 Anonymous			2.4 (2.4)	4.4 (3.8)
P1 Ingroup* Treatment		3.8 (4.2)		5.4 (4.9)
P1 Anonymous* Treatment				-3.4 (4.9)
Constant	16.2** (6.3)	17.9** (6.6)	20.3*** (5.9)	21.4*** (6.1)
N	80	80	120	120
Groups	40	40	40	40
χ^2	17.93***	18.67***	9.2*	12.57*

Random Effects GLS model. Coefficient is percent (range from 0% to 100% of tickets returned – calculated value from number of tickets returned divided by available tickets. Standard error in parentheses.
* p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001




Figure 5.9 Percent of Available Tickets Returned by Player 2 and Trust Interaction by Identity Context of Game Play from Table 5.7 Model VIII. (Adjusted Margin Plots with 95% Confidence Interval)

5.5 Willingness to Integrate

Preferences for interaction with outgroup members, *willingness to integrate*, is measured using four survey questions that target the preference for mixing with another community based on religious grouping (i.e. if you identify as Catholic how do you feel about interacting with Protestants or the Protestant community). Four areas of integration preference include neighborhoods, work, children's school, and familial marriages. These four questions have been

consistently asked in the Northern Ireland Life and Times (NILT) Survey, with a few exceptions.⁶⁰ I also included these questions in the posttest of the QUB survey administered during 2014 to 2015 that is analyzed later in this section.

The NILT survey responses show a consistent majority preferring mixing in all four areas, however, in the three most recent years displayed there is a decline in the proportion of respondents that prefer mixing and a rise in individuals' preferences for maintaining separate religious communities (see Figure 5.10). An additive variable from these four questions produces a score of 4, while preference for separate community spaces in the four areas produces a score of 0 for the individual. These four questions along with other regarding cross-community elite trust were included in the QUB survey. This section will test Hypotheses 5.9 regarding how cross-community elite trust impacts willingness to integrate.. Trust in ingroup political parties and outgroup political parties are variables determined from questions asking if respondents would trust a minister from the two largest Nationalist parties (SDLP and Sinn Féin) and two largest Unionist parties (DUP and UUP). The possible responses for each question range from 0 (Definitely Distrust) to 5 (Definitely trust) for each political party. Trust in outgroup ministers ranges from 0 to 6 once combined, and trust in the ingroup ministers ranges from 0 to 8. Unsurprisingly the maximum value for ingroup trust is greater than the outgroup trust maximum value, already indicating that participants had lower levels of trust in the outgroup.

Lastly, a gap variable measuring the difference in individual trust in the ingroup and outgroup political parties is generated. The ingroup-ougroup gap variable equals the ingroup trust minus outgroup trust in political parties. Therefore, a score of zero would indicate no difference in the amount that that person trusts the outgroup and the ingroup. Whether the

⁶⁰ The marriage preferences questions were not included in 1999 and 2000 surveys and the 2011 survey responses were not collected due to insufficient funds to conduct the survey in that year.

amount of trust is great or small if they have equal trust or mistrust for political parties of the ingroup and outgroup they will have a score of 0. A positive score indicates that the individual trusts ingroup parties more than outgroup parties and an individual has a negative score if they trust outgroup party members more than ingroup party members. This latter group, those with negative scores, is only present for 3 out of 72 participants in the sample used in this portion of the study. The majority, at 48 participants or two-thirds of the sample, trust ingroup parties more than outgroup parties. This leaves approximately 29 percent trusting ingroup and outgroup parties equally. Per hypothesis 5.9 it is expected that trust in outgroup ministers will increase the probability of an individual's willingness to integrate while trust in ingroup ministers will reduce the propensity for one's preference for mixing.




Figure 5.10 Preference for Mixing in Four Areas for all Respondents
Data Source: Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey (ARK 1999-2015)

I also include the variable *Treatment* to test for Hypothesis 5.11. Again, the *Treatment* variable indicates if a respondent received and read the article contacting conflict between main political parties in the Northern Ireland Executive.⁶¹ Models including only the control group can be found in Appendix A. Additional mechanisms to be tested are income, general trust in politicians, satisfaction with MLAs, individual cross community contact, and confidence in institutions. Future income measures respondents expectation that their household income will fall behind (-1), keep up with (0) or go up more than prices (1). Trust in politicians generally ranges from definitely distrust (0) to probably trust (3), the full range of possible responses goes to “definitely trust” (4) however none of the participants responded with the highest “definitely trust” option. Satisfaction with Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) ranges from “very dissatisfied” (0) to “very satisfied” (4), like trust in politicians no respondents were “very satisfied” so the full range of existing responses is from 0 to 3. Contact in school is a dichotomous variable that indicates if a respondent attended a mixed school prior to college. Lastly, various measures for institutional confidence are included. Each of the institutional confidence variables ranges from 0 to 3, 0 indicating no confidence at all, and 3 indicating a “great deal” of confidence. Models also include index variables used in Chapter 4 for measuring legitimacy: *Justice Legitimacy* and *Assembly Legitimacy*.

5.5.1 Findings on Willingness to Integrate

Models with each of the four component parts of the willingness to integrate show consistent positive relationship between trust in outgroup ministers and preference for mixing, and consistent negative relationships between trust in ingroup ministers and mixing. Logit models for each of the individual components of willingness to integrate are displayed in Table 5.8 and

⁶¹ Models including control group only are included in Appendix A.

5.9. Trust in outgroup ministers increases the probability that an individual will be willing to interact with the outgroup, these values are statistically significant in areas of Neighborhood mixing and mixing in schools. Trust in ingroup ministers on average is associated with a reduction in willingness to interact in all areas. Areas of work, children's school, and familial marriage are statistically different from zero. Predicted probabilities for these models are in Appendix A. Individuals who were exposed to the elite conflict treatment are more likely to prefer interacting with others in three of the four areas (work, school, and family marriage). The difference between control and treatment is statistically significant in the area of sending ones children to a mixed school. This is somewhat counter intuitive to expectations stated in Hypothesis 5.11, where elite conflict predicts a reduction in willingness to integrate. I will look at another model of wiliness to integrate to see if this relationship holds.

Table 5.8 Four Areas of Mixing Comprising Willingness to Integrate with Treatment

	Neighborhood	Work	School	Marriage
Trust in Outgroup Ministers	.43* (.25)	.53 (.48)	.46** (.18)	.36 (.29)
Trust in Ingroup Ministers	-.05 (.17)	-1.38* (.83)	-.33** (.15)	-.56* (.29)
Treatment	-.16 (.76)	2.61 (1.65)	1.01* (.61)	1.29 (.99)
Constant	1.32 (.89)	8.81 (5.18)	.67 (.74)	3.92** (1.7)
χ^2	3.58	11.74**	12.15**	7.38*
N	58	62	62	72

Logit models, * p<.1, **p<.05, ***p< .01 Data from QUB 2014 Survey

A more useful way of looking at these four areas across levels of elite trust is to utilize the gap variable that measures the difference in ingroup minister trust and outgroup minister trust

for each individual.⁶² In all four areas there is a negative association between a greater elite trust gap and preferences for mixing (see Table 5.9). All are statistically significant excluding mixing in Neighborhoods. Three of the four are statistically significant excluding mixing in Neighborhoods. The treatment effect is positive in this model specification as well. Those who were exposed to elite conflict are more likely to prefer interactions in three of the four areas. Predicted probabilities in Table 5.10 show that moving from trusting the outgroup more than the ingroup to trusting both elite groups equally there is minimal substantive change. The greatest change is seen in school mixing where there is an 12.1 percentage point change for those in the control group, and a 6 percentage point change for those who read about elite conflict. The greater differences however, occur as we move from equal trust to trusting the ingroup ministers more than the outgroup ministers. In all areas of mixing there is at least a 20 percentage point decline in preferences for mixing, most notably in school mixing there is 62 percentage point reduction in the probability that the individual would want their child to attend a mixed school when they are more trusting of the ingroup elites for both treatment and control groups.

Similar shifts are seen in the other areas with a 82.9(Control) and 30.3(Treatment) percentage point reduction in preferences for mixing at work, and 56.7 percentage point drop in accepting a member of their family marrying an outgroup member for those in the control group. A smaller dip in areas of mixing in neighborhoods at 21.7(Control) and 23.5 (Treatment) percentage points lower for an individual who has an 8 point gap in elite ingroup-outgroup trust. These consistent associations provides some limited evidence in support of Hypothesis 5.9 that individuals who trust outgroup elites will be more willing to interact with the outgroup while

⁶² The range for the Ingroup-Outgroup Minister variable is -2 to 8 where -2 indicates an individual trusts the outgroup ministers more than the ingroup ministers, 0 indicates that the individual trusts or mistrusts both groups of ministers equally, and 8 indicates a great deal of trust for ingroup ministers and little to none for the outgroup ministers.

those who trust ingroup elites will be less willing to interact with the outgroup. It is unclear why those who read about elite conflict and greatly trust the ingroup elites and not the outgroup elites are more likely to prefer mixing than those who greatly trust their ingroup elites over outgroup elites and did not read the conflict prime.

Table 5.9 Four Areas of Mixing and Elite Trust Gap

	Neighborhood	Work	School	Marriage
Trust in Ingroup – Outgroup Ministers	-.18 (.15)	-.87** (.41)	-.38** (.13)	-.46** (.20)
Treatment	-.14 (.75)	2.44* (1.49)	.99* (.61)	1.33 (.99)
Constant	2.27*** (.68)	5.31** (2.12)	1.02** (.47)	3.29*** (.93)
χ^2	1.71	10.77**	11.78**	7.15**
N	58	62	62	72

Logit models, * p<.1, **p<.05, ***p< .01 Data from QUB 2014 Survey

Table 5.10 Predicted Probabilities for Elite Trust Gap and Treatment Assignment (Table 5.9)

	<i>Area of Mixing</i>							
	Neighborhood		Work		School		Marriage	
	C	T	C	T	C	T	C	T
Minimum Political Trust Gap (Ingroup-Outgroup) (-2)	93.3	92.4	99.9	99.9	85.7	94.2	98.6	99.6
No Political Trust Gap (Ingroup-Outgroup) (0)	90.6	89.4	99.5	99.9	73.6	88.2	96.4	99
Maximum Political Trust Gap (Ingroup-Outgroup) (8)	68.9	65.9	16.6	69.6	11.5	26	39.7	71.4

Values are percentages, C= Control group assignment, and T= Treatment group assignment in the Elite Treatment Experiment

Next, using an additive variable that combines the four areas of mixing as the dependent variable, I specify five models with additional right hand side variables (see Table 5.11).⁶³ Findings on political trust, economic prospects, cross community contact, and trust in police are directionally consistent across models. The likelihood that an individual will be willing to integrate declines as the elite trust gap grows for individuals. This is consistent across all five model specifications in Table 5.11. Perception of economic security in the future also impacts the probability of willingness to integrate. Personal contact with the outgroup community through attending an integrated school greatly increases the preference for mixing in four areas. Additionally, when controlling for confidence in institutions only confidence in the police produces a meaningful difference in the probability of preference for mixing. To understand the magnitude of this change we look to predicted probabilities in Table 5.12. I focus on interpretation of Model 4 in this section, predicted probabilities for the remaining models can be found in Appendix A. All predicted probabilities are specified for the probability that an individual is willing to integrate in all four areas. I set the right hand side variable at the value stated in the table, and all other variables at their means.

As individual trust gap increases from negative two to zero we see a reduction of 4.5 percentage points in the likelihood that an individual would be willing to integrate in all four areas. There is an even greater shift from zero, indicating equal trust in both ingroup and outgroup parties to trusting the ingroup parties completely, and a score of 8, having no trust in the outgroup party. There is a staggering decline in the likelihood that an individual would be willing to integrate in all four areas, moving from 94.6 percent likelihood to 1 percent at the

⁶³ Additional models utilizing separate independent variables for outgroup political trust and ingroup political trust can be found in Appendix A. I focus on using the gap variable in this chapter to be parsimonious in discussion.

greatest ingroup-outgroup trust gap. This provides support for Hypothesis 5.9 that elite trust is impactful on cross community social interactions.

Prospects of future income security increases the probability that an individual will be willing to integrate by 61.6 percentage points moving from expectation of reduced future income to increased future income, and even maintaining ones current income produces an 80.3 percent probability of being willing to integrate in all four areas. Trust in politicians generally has an inverse relationship with willingness to integrate. An individual who probably trusts politicians is 70.4 percentage points less likely to be willing to integrate in all four areas than an individual who definitely distrusts politicians.⁶⁴ This could be indicating that individuals who are dissatisfied with the sectarian and divided political system are more willing to integrate. Personal contact is positively associated with willingness to integrate. Previous interaction with the outgroup increases the probability of preference for mixing in all for areas by 58.1 percentage points. This evidence supports existing contact theory evidence that interaction with the outgroup increases positive sentiment about the outgroup. Lastly, high levels of confidence in police is positively related to the preference for mixing. Individuals who have a great deal of confidence in the police are 74.8 percentage points more likely than individuals have no confidence at all in the police to interact in all four areas of integration. The remainder of the confidence in institutions variables: confidence in the press, the government, the churches, the justice system, and parties generally are not statistically significant. Confidence in the press, the government, and the churches are negatively associated with willingness to integrate while confidence in political parties and the justice system are positively associated. These models on willingness to integrate provide some evidence that elite behaviors may be impacting the attitudes and behaviors of individuals in society, if not directly then indirectly through legitimacy attitudes.

⁶⁴ There was an option for definitely trust politicians on the survey, but none of the participants selected this option.

Table 5.11 Willingness to Integrate

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Trust in Ingroup –	-.45***	-.77***	-.94***	-.94***	-1.03***
Outgroup Ministers	(.13)	(.18)	(.28)	(.28)	(.36)
Increase in Future Income		1.74*	2.3*	2.01*	2.4†
		(.71)	(.96)	(.96)	(1.3)
Trust politicians			-1.26*	-1.18*	-1.07
			(.59)	(.62)	(.84)
Satisfaction with MLAs			.53	-.37	-.53
			(.58)	(.77)	(.98)
Contact in School			3.5	3.61†	4.47†
			(1.93)	(2.02)	(2.72)
Confidence :					
In the Catholic Church					-.4
					(.68)
In the Protestant Church					-.6
					(.71)
In the Police				1.29†	1.7†
				(.68)	(.94)
In the Justice System					.16
					(.94)
In the Government					-.22
					(1.8)
In the Parties					.49
					(1.18)
In the Press					-.26
					(.8)
Treatment	.65	-.29	-.19	-.009	-.26
	(.57)	(.69)	(.84)	(.9)	(.8)
χ^2	15.58***	29.33***	37.26***	40.85***	40.69***
N	56	44	37	36	33

Ordered Logit model, † p< .1, * p<.05, **p<.01, ***p< .001

Table 5.12 Predicted Probabilities for Model 4 Table 5.11

Minimum Political Trust Gap (Ingroup-Outgroup) (-2)	99.1%
No Political Trust Gap (Ingroup-Outgroup) (0)	94.6%
Maximum Political Trust Gap (Ingroup-Outgroup) (8)	1%
Income Future (-1)	35.2%
Income Future (0)	80.3%
Income Future (1)	96.8%
Trust Politicians (0)	82.8%
Trust Politicians (2)	12.4%
Contact (0)	37.6%
Contact (1)	95.7%
Confidence in Police (0)	14.2%
Confidence in Police (3)	89%

Next, I use the PCA generated legitimacy index variables: *assembly legitimacy* and *justice legitimacy*.⁶⁵ In Table 5.13 I use them as independent variables. The relationships found in Table 5.11 models are reaffirmed. The gap in ingroup and outgroup minister trust are negatively associated with willingness to integrate while attitudes about future income and previous contact with the outgroup are positively associated with preferences for mixing. The area of justice regime legitimacy is also positively associated with preferences for mixing while assembly legitimacy is not.

Predicted probabilities for Table 5.13 are in Table 5.14. The predicted likelihoods for ingroup outgroup elite trust gap, contact, and future income are approximately the same as we see in Table 5.11 so I will focus on Justice legitimacy. There is a 93.2 percentage point difference between the lowest levels of justice legitimacy and the highest level. Therefore, having confidence in the justice system, including the police drastically changes the likelihood that an individual will prefer mixing with the outgroup. If we recall from Chapter 4, exposure to elite conflict (treatment) influences justice legitimacy and not assembly legitimacy. Elite conflict

⁶⁵ See Chapter 4 for left hand side analysis of these two variables.

was found to reduce levels of trust in police and the justice system more broadly, so while the treatment does not have a direct effect on willingness to integrate, there is very likely an indirect relationship where willingness to integrate social capital generally are influenced by elite actions. Next I continue investigations around Expectation 7 and test Hypothesis 5.10 regarding cross community elite trust and cross community social trust.

Table 5.13 Willingness to Integrate and Legitimacy Indexes

Trust in Ingroup – Outgroup Ministers	- .92*** (.28)
Increase in Future Income	1.84† (.95)
Contact in School	4.36* (1.9)
Assembly Legitimacy	-.14 (.22)
Justice Legitimacy	1.21** (5.1)
Treatment	.49 (.89)
χ^2	28.29***
N	36
Ordered Logit model, † p< .1, * p<.05, **p<.01, ***p< .001	

Table 5.14 Predicted Probabilities for Table 5.13

Minimum Political Trust Gap (Ingroup-Outgroup) (-2)	99.2%
No Political Trust Gap (Ingroup-Outgroup) (0)	95.5%
Maximum Political Trust Gap (Ingroup-Outgroup) (8)	1.3%
Income Future (-1)	42.7%
Income Future (0)	82.5%
Income Future (1)	96.7%
Contact (0)	38.5%
Contact (1)	98%
Justice Legitimacy (min ~ -3.09)	4.2%
Justice Legitimacy (max ~ 2.49)	97.4%

5.5.2 *Elite Trust and Social Trust – Survey Question Analysis*

Revisiting social trust, I use survey responses rather than trust game outcomes to measure individuals attitudes about social trust. Individuals were asked if they feel that Nationalists are generally trustworthy and if Unionists are generally trustworthy. Responses for sectarian group trust range from “not very trustworthy” (0) to “very trustworthy” (3). Like other measures in this chapter I generate a variable measuring the difference between ingroup and outgroup social trust for Unionists and Nationalists. This *social trust gap* variable could range from -3 to 3 where negative values indicate greater ingroup trust than outgroup trust, and a positive number would indicate greater outgroup trust. The actual range of responses is -2 to 0. This is coded inversely to the elite trust gap variable so that the direction of *social trust gap* moves in the same direction as willingness to integrate, a larger value of the social trust gap indicates greater bridging social capital and a negative value indicates greater bonding social capital. None of the Unionist or Nationalist identifying respondents trust the outgroup more than their own ingroup, however many trust each group equally, and most find both groups “somewhat trustworthy”.

Table 5.15 Elite Cross Community Trust and Cross Community Social Trust

Trust in Ingroup –	-.82*
Outgroup Ministers	(.32)
Increase in Future Income	1.44
Contact in School	(1.03)
Assembly Legitimacy	-1.36
Justice Legitimacy	(1.46)
Treatment	.33
	(.31)
	.05
	(.69)
	-.45
	(1.14)
χ^2	12.85
N	40
Ordered Logit model, † p< .1, * p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001	

Table 5.16 Predicted Probabilities for Table 5.15

	No Social Trust Gap (0)	Bonding Social Trust (-1)	Stronger Bonding Social Trust (-2)
Minimum Political Trust Gap (Ingroup-Outgroup) (-2)	99.9%	.06%	.05%
No Political Trust Gap (Ingroup- Outgroup) (0)	99.3%	.3%	.3%
Maximum Political Trust Gap (Ingroup-Outgroup) (8)	18.4%	13.3%	68.4%

I find the expected negative association between cross community elite trust and cross community social trust. Predicted probabilities show that individuals who have greater trust in the elite ingroup show greater bonding social trust. Individuals who are most trusting of the political ingroup ministers are about 81 percentage points more likely to trust ingroup members in the community more than outgroup members. My theory argues for a clear direction; community elite trust leads to social trust. It is possible that cross community social trust leads to cross community trust. I argue that these findings provide some evidence in support of Hypothesis 5.10 and in combination with evidence on the relationship between elite cross community trust and willingness to integrate, additional support for Expectation 7. In the next section I will discuss some of the implications from analyses in this chapter.

5.6 Discussion

This chapter deals with questions about social capital and the relationship between legitimacy and elite political leader behaviors. Of the ten hypotheses tested in this chapter, we see some evidence supporting all of these propositions. This chapter aimed to illustrate the importance of identity context on social capital, particularly trust and preferences for interacting with outgroup and ingroup members. While there is a vast literature on the role of bonding and bridging social

capital this chapter goes on to highlight the relevance ingroup and outgroup elite trust and the ramifications for social trust and interactions. Additionally, this chapter tests the influence of elite actor behaviors and the relationship between legitimacy attitudes and social capital.

The analyses in this chapter do not provide robust evidence for a direct link between cross-community elite behavior and social capital. However, legitimacy attitudes are associated with social capital variables, and there may be an indirect effect from elite behaviors. In the last chapter we saw that elite conflict reduced *Justice Legitimacy*. In this chapter *Justice Legitimacy* is associated with an increase in preferences for mixing with the outgroup. Political identity plays an unsurprising role in social interaction preferences and willingness to integrate. Individuals who identify as Unionist or Nationalist are likely to take that identity into account when determining behaviors, as the findings from the social trust game indicate.

This study, if nothing else, does indicate that future research is needed to better understand this dynamic relationship between elite behaviors, attitudes about intuitions and actors, and attitudes about others in society. Trust in elite ingroup and outgroup ministers is associated with social trust, as is confidence in justice institutions including the police. The behavior of political leaders and political parties both have the potential to drive societal discord or unity.

There is variation in the degree to which identity plays a role in attitude formation and behaviors, including which political group one belongs to. Cross-community political trust has the potential to grow social interactions, while ingroup political trust can reduce preferences for social interaction. Arguably social interactions and trust can ultimately build political trust. It is clear that accounting for socio-political identity and the context of that identity within the larger societal structure is important for future research.

In the next chapter I look at how legitimacy and social capital factors might impact political participation. I test four Expectations (8-11) from chapter 2 that get at the next step in the relationship between elite behavior and the components of social cohesion. Political participation is unpacked and I make an argument for and test how legitimacy and social capital may interact to inform individual decisions about when and how to participate in the political system.

6 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

“One key way in which democracies can change is in the arena of political participation, which virtually all theories of democracy regard as essential to its functioning. In essence, if there is no participation, there is no democracy.”

(Booth and Seligson 2005, 538)

The final component of social cohesion that my theory contemplates is political participation. The last of three components, following legitimacy and social capital, political participation is integral to the proper functionality of democratic polities. Political participation comes in many different forms from voting and other forms of conventional participation to unconventional participation that includes violent protest against the government. I argue in Chapter 2 that the method or methods of political participation that individuals choose to utilize to interact with the political system is dependent on attitudes about actors and institutions, and attitudes about others in society. The interaction of legitimacy and social capital attitudes inform an individual's decision to abstain from voicing preferences to participating in conventional or nonconventional modes of participation. In societies with historical social cleavages, inclusion or exclusion of groups from the political system can be an important factor in determining one's form of participation. Exclusion in some cases can prevent access to voting or the feeling that a vote is not impactful in determining representation or policy positions of the government. This chapter

focuses on political participation and finding answers for the following questions. What factors influence choices about when to participate and how to participate?

In Chapter 2 I lay out my theory of social cohesion and several expectations about the three components. Adding on to Booth and Seligson's theory of a U-Shaped relationship between legitimacy attitudes, I argue that the role of bridging and bonding social capital impacts political participation decisions. The context of ingroup and outgroup interactions and trust can play an important role in determining what method of participation, if any, will be most effective. Expectations eight through eleven detail outcomes for method and likelihood of political participation and will be addressed in this chapter. I make the argument for an integrated theory with an interactive effect of legitimacy and social capital mechanisms. In this chapter I recap the theory as it pertains to political participation, discuss measures of concepts relevant to analysis, and lay out hypotheses assessed in this chapter. Lastly, I test the four hypotheses about political participation and discuss the implications of my findings.

6.1 Gauging Participation

In this chapter political participation includes electoral and non-electoral forms of participation. Political participation is a vertical interaction between individuals and the government, the last step in the top down cycle I proposed and illustrated in Figure 2.1. The primary focus of this chapter is to understand how legitimacy and social capital might interact to impact individual level political participation. In this section I will look at descriptive statistics for political participation in Northern Ireland from the original survey conducted October 2014 to March 2015. The survey includes a student sample from Queen's University Belfast with a total of 218 respondents. Data from this survey is assessed to determine how social capital and legitimacy might influence political participation..

Questions on political participation asked respondents to indicate if they had participated in the past or would participate in the future in five separate areas of political voice: voting, signing a petition, joining a boycott, attending a peaceful demonstration, and continuing a demonstration that becomes violent. I adapted the questions on political participation from the World Values Survey question about political action.⁶⁶ The political action series of questions asks about signing a petition, joining in boycotts, and attending a peaceful demonstration. Voting and continuing in a protest once it turns violent are added to the participation series of this survey to address a larger scope of potential participation. Violent protest is an important measure to include in many societies but particularly in societies with a legacy of violent conflict and protest. Past participation response options included “Have done” and “Have NOT done”. Possible future participation response options included: “Would do”, “Might do”, “Would Never do”.⁶⁷

Descriptive statistics of responses to the line of political participation show that there are varying methods of participation and many respondents that have not participated in the past are willing to engage in the future in various ways. Figure 6.1 shows the percent of respondents who self-reported past political participation. A little more than 40 percent stated that they had voted. The most frequent form of past participation is signing a petition, with 51.5 percent having signed some petition in the past. Over 10 percent had joined a boycott, and 16.6 percent had participated in a peaceful protest. Less than one percent had continued in a demonstration that had turned violent.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Political Action Questions are variables v96 through v103 in the 2005-2009 wave of the World Values Survey (Inglehart 2014).

⁶⁷ Both Past participation questions and Future Participation response options included “No Answer” and “Don’t Know”. These responses are excluded from descriptive statistic figures and later analyses.

⁶⁸ This number may be under reported because of the nature of the activity asked about. The sample population may have lower levels than we would see in a full population sample.

Figure 6.2 shows the percent of respondents that would or might participate in the five areas of participation. Sixty-eight percent of respondents indicated that they might or would vote in the future an increase of 12 percentage points from past participation.⁶⁹ Sixty-eight percent of respondents also claimed that they might or would participate in a peaceful demonstration, a steep increase from only 16.6 percent who said they had participated in a past demonstration.⁷⁰ There was also a steep increase for individuals joining a future boycott from 10.5 who had, to 53.7 percent who might or would.⁷¹ 40.6 percent of respondents might or would sign a petition.⁷² This is the only category of participation that sees a decline from past to potential future participation dropping from 51.5 percent who said they had signed a petition in the past. Of 102 respondents who stated they had signed a petition in the past 24 of those stated that they would not sign in the future. This could be that they feel that petitions are not effective in voicing political opinion. All 24 who said they would not sign in the future said they would or might vote in the future, and most are likely to participate in other areas, none of the 24 said they would continue in a demonstration if it turned violent even though 21 said they would participate in a peaceful demonstration and the other 3 said they might. Therefore, it does not seem that people who are feeling frustrated with the ineffectiveness of a petition would turn to violence, but continue other conventional and unconventional methods of participation.

The percentage of respondents who said they would continue in a demonstration that turned violent also increased from less than one percent of respondents who had participated in a

⁶⁹ In the 2008 European Values Survey wave for Northern Ireland (n=500) found that 62.6 percent would vote if there was an election tomorrow (EVS 2016). Percent values include missing for QUB and EVS samples, so percent reflected is taken out of 229 respondents (QUB) and 500 respondents (EVS). Approximately 30 percent of those who entered the survey did not answer these participation questions in the QUB study.

⁷⁰ The 2008 EVS found that 14.4 percent say they have attended peaceful demonstrations as compared to 16.6 percent in the sample. The questions in the QUB survey were split into two separate questions of past and future participation and therefore are slightly different than the EVS.

⁷¹ 11.4 percent of the EVS sample said they had boycotted something, 31.2 percent said they might in the future.

⁷² 46.8 percent of the EVS sample said they had signed a petition in the past.

violent protest in the past to over 8 percent that might or would be willing to continue in a violent protest.⁷³ Parametric and non-parametric difference of means tests for each area of participation, except signing a petition, indicates that levels of past and likely future participation are statistically different values.⁷⁴

Unpacking participation by political identity is pertinent to understanding if there is a substantive difference in the amount and methods of participation used by those identifying with a particular political sect or not. Figure 6.3 shows the levels of past participation and Figure 6.4 shows future participation by respondents identifying as Unionist or Nationalist and those who do not identify with either political group. Nationalists are slightly more active in most areas of past participation except for violent demonstrations. The largest differences are in joining a boycott and participating in a demonstration. Nationalists are much more likely to participate in these forms of participation than Unionists or individuals who do not identify with one of the two primary political designations. Nationalists are the political minority, and have been throughout the long and checkered history, this higher rate of unconventional political participation is not surprising, given the tradition of needing to use politically unconventional methods to have their voice heard. Nationalists within this sample are also voting slightly more than Unionists, but that they still choose to participate unconventionally as well may speak to the past, or to ongoing frustration with the level of inclusion in the political system.

⁷³ This question is not asked in EVS or WVS surveys so representative sample responses are not comparable.

⁷⁴ Difference of means t-tests that assume interval level variables with normal distribution, and Wilcoxon signed rank sum tests that assume ordinal variables both produce similar outcomes in terms of statistical difference of the past and future participation.




Figure 6.1 Past Participation – Percent of Respondents that “Have done”




Figure 6.2 Future Participation - Percent of Respondents that “would” or “might” participate in the future.




Figure 6.3 Past Political Participation by Political Attachment




Figure 6.4 Future Political Participation by Political Attachment (respondents who would or might participate)

The number of respondents who stated that they would or might participate in the future is greater than past participation in every area except for signing a petition. When divided by political identification there are moderate differences between groups and levels of likely participation. A larger portion of respondents have the desire to or consider the possibility of participating in politics, through voting, boycotting, demonstrating, and continuing in a demonstration that turns violent, than have participated in such activities in the past. Now that I have discussed the concept of political participation I turn to the specific hypotheses tested, and the variables and specific measures that are utilized to test them.

6.2 The Interaction of Legitimacy and Social Capital

Political participation is the dependent variable of interest within this chapter. In the above section the statistics for both past and future participation are considered. There are four primary hypotheses that will be defined and tested in this chapter. I argue that political participation is influenced by attitudes about the current actors and institutions, and social capital. Chapter 4 and 5 disclose specific measures of legitimacy and social capital in more detail. In this section, I explain how concepts are measured for analysis and posit several hypotheses that I test in this chapter.

Legitimacy, social capital, and political participation are the three components of social cohesion and each is seminal to my theory. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is used to generate index variables for both political participation and legitimacy. Using the responses for an individual's likely future political participation I used PCA to create two variables to measure political participation: *Sign&Boycott*, and *Vote&Demonstrate*. First, *Sign&Boycott*, responses for Boycotting and Signing a Petition loaded together strongly as a component of future

participation.⁷⁵ Responses for being unwilling to continue participation in a demonstration that turns violent, voting, and participation in a demonstration loaded together strongly (generating *Vote&Demonstrate*).⁷⁶

Two principal component variables measure individual attitudes about legitimacy. I ran PCA on responses from several questions targeting attitudes about the government. Four questions on individual perceptions loaded as strongly correlated for the first component, *Assembly Legitimacy*. The four areas of legitimacy included confidence in the government, confidence in parties, satisfaction with Members of the Legislative Assembly, and trust in politicians generally.⁷⁷ The second component, *Justice Legitimacy* strongly loaded on individual confidence in police and confidence in the justice system.⁷⁸ The two legitimacy composite scores created encompass first the legitimacy of representative government, and the second component measures the legitimacy of the justice system.⁷⁹

Last of the three primary components, social capital, is measured with a variety of questions throughout the study. In this chapter, I rely on a measure that gauges an individual's preference for mixing across four areas. Four questions from the QUB survey measure an individual's preference for mixing with their religious outgroup in four contexts: housing, neighborhood, familial marriages, and work. I adopt the question wordings from recurring questions on the Northern Ireland Life and Times survey. These questions ask about religious outgroup and work as a proxy for Unionist and Nationalist outgroup, because the political and religious identities align in the Northern Ireland context. The four areas of mixing include work

⁷⁵ Eigenvalue of 2.34, range of values for component 1 are -3.9 to 3.08.

⁷⁶ Eigenvalue of 1.04, range of values of component 2 are -3.17 to 1.04.

⁷⁷ Eigenvalue 3.58

⁷⁸ Eigenvalue .99.

⁷⁹ Violent participation is not included because only one participant self-reported as having continued participation in a demonstration that turned violent.

environment, neighborhoods, children's school, and inter-faith marriage by someone in the respondent's family.⁸⁰ The additive variable values range from 0 to 4. 0 is no preference for mixing, or preferring to be with one's own religious group in all four areas, and 4 is an individual who prefers to mix with the religious outgroup in all areas.⁸¹ Additional measures of social trust are included: general trust, ingroup trust, and outgroup trust questions. Each of these three variables ranges from 0 to 3 where 0 is the least trusting and 3 is the most trusting of the specified group.⁸² Now that the three primary concepts are operationalized I will move to the discussion of hypotheses.

6.2.1 Participation Hypotheses

There are several propositions on how social capital and legitimacy impact political participation. There is a great deal of literature on each, but these are individual literatures. I make an argument in Chapter 2 for an integrated model of social cohesion at the individual level that includes an interactive effect between social capital and legitimacy on individual political participation. The first proposition for political participation deals with electoral participation. After Booth and Seligson, Expectation 8 predicts that extreme legitimacy positions will increase electoral participation. Therefore, an individual who highly supports or greatly rejects the current political system is more likely to vote than individuals who have moderate positions about the current regime.

Hypothesis 6.1: Individual's with high or low legitimacy positions will vote more than individuals with mid-range legitimacy positions.

⁸⁰ A question asking if a respondent thinks others mind if family members marry outside of their religion but factor analysis indicates this is targeting another base concept. The Cronbach's Alpha for the four variables included in Mixing Preferences is .5837.

⁸¹ See Chapter 5 for more detail about Social Capital variables.

⁸² Please note that while question wording is accurate in the survey the wording of the responses for trust in Nationalist and Unionist individuals did have an error. I do not believe that this impacted the results, but there may be additional error due to this incorrectly saved survey wording.

The next set of expectations laid out in Chapter 2, Expectation 9-11, include additional forms of political participation. While electoral participation is important to the democratic process, it is far from the only form of participation that is used by groups and individuals to voice a political position. The first hypothesis considers only legitimacy as a right side variable, the next set of hypotheses also include social capital as a predictor. Bridging and bonding social capital are both addressed in my theory and can produce divergent forms of political participation. Bridging social capital occurs when there are high levels of trust and preferences for interaction with the outgroup. An example of this in the Northern Ireland case would occur if a Unionist was very trusting of Nationalists or willing to interact with Catholics in different areas of life. Bonding social capital, often considered detrimental to cohesion in societies occurs where individuals have high levels of trust and preferences for interaction amongst their own group. Unionists being more trusting of other Unionists preferring to live with other Protestants instead of Catholics is an example of this in the Northern Ireland context. Expectation 9 argues that individuals who have high levels of bonding (ingroup) social capital, and low legitimacy positions will be more likely to engage in violent protests.

Hypothesis 6.2: Individuals with high levels of trust in the ingroup and/or do not prefer to mix with the outgroup, and have low legitimacy positions will be more likely to engage in violent protest.

Expectation 10 argues that individuals with high levels of bridging social capital and low levels of support for the current institutions and actors will participate more by voting and in peaceful demonstrations.

Hypothesis 6.3: Individuals with high levels of trust for the outgroup and/or preferences for mixing with the outgroup and low level of legitimacy will participate by voting and peaceful demonstration than others.

The last expectation for political participation looks at what might occur if an individual has low levels of social capital indicated by low levels of general trust or low levels of ingroup and outgroup trust. Individual with low levels of social capital and does not support the current institution and actors will participate less in politics in all forms than individuals who have high bridging or bonding social capital.

Hypothesis 6.4: An individual who does not trust ingroup or outgroup and has low levels of legitimacy will participate less electorally and non-electorally.

This subsection has clarified the expectations for political participation given varying legitimacy and social capital conditions at the individual level. There are of course other predictor concepts and variables to consider for analysis; I discuss these in the next section.

6.2.2 Additional Concepts to Consider

In addition to the three main components of social cohesion, other factors may impact an individual's preferences to participate politically and the method of participation chosen. Strength of political identity is likely to impact the willingness of an individual to participate, much like party attachment strength of political attachment is included in many of the models in the next section. *Strength of Attachment* ranges from zero to three. Zero indicates an individual has no political id, they do not consider themselves to be a Unionist or a Nationalist. Values one to three indicate first that the individual identifies as a Unionist or a Nationalist. As the variable value increase the strength of attachment grows, with three indicating the individual is attached "Very Strongly" as a Unionist or Nationalist. *Religious Upbringing* is also important to the divisions that exist in Northern Ireland. The political division and the religious separation of Protestants and Catholics are intertwined. Nearly all Unionists come from a Protestant

background and nearly all Nationalists come from a Catholic upbringing. Dichotomous variables are created to indicate if an individual has a Catholic, Protestant, or Non-Religious background. *Income* is an ordinal variable where 40 categories of income range from less than £519 to more than £52,000. *Male* is a dichotomous indicator for respondent sex where male is equal to one. *Outgroup contact*, lastly, is an important predictor when looking at ingroup and outgroup behaviors. Contact with the outgroup has been found to increase preferences for mixing and bridging social capital. Therefore, it is potentially a contributing factor to increasing outgroup trust. In the next section, I analyze data from the QUB survey to test the relationship between legitimacy and political participation.

6.3 Analysis Political Participation and Legitimacy

In the first set of analyses I plot the relationships between political participation and the legitimacy PCA component variables. Figures 6.5 to 6.8 each contain two prediction lines. The first line is a linear prediction of the relationship between the legitimacy variable and the political participation variable (seen as the dashed line). The second fitted value line is the quadratic prediction, the relationship between the squared legitimacy values and political participation values (seen as the solid line). The quadratic relationship is utilized to account for the curvilinear or U-shaped relationship between legitimacy and participation predicted in Hypothesis 6.1. *Sign&Boycott* and *Assembly Legitimacy* (see Figure 6.5) shows the expected U-shaped relationship. Individuals with very low levels of support and very high levels of support for the government and assembly members are likely to participate more than individuals who have mid-range support for the government. *Sign&Boycott* participation and *Justice Legitimacy* (Figure 6.6) on the other hand produces an inverted U indicating that individuals who have high levels of confidence and low levels of confidence in the justice system will sign petitions and




Figure 6.5 *Petitioning and Boycotting by Assembly Legitimacy*




Figure 6.6: *Petitioning and Boycotting by Justice Legitimacy*




Figure 6.7 Voting and Peacefully Demonstrating by Assembly Legitimacy




Figure 6.8 Voting and Peacefully Demonstrating by Justice Legitimacy

boycott less than individuals who have mid-range support for the police and the justice system. Moving on to the second political participation component, the quadratic relationships between *Vote&Demonstrate* and both Legitimacy components produce a flatter fitted values line.

The quadratic prediction line is closer to the linear relationship predicted than in the other relationships (Figures 6.7 and 6.8). This indicates that as support for the government increases voting and peaceful demonstration increases, but we do not see the curvilinear relationship. These four figures provide bivariate predictions for legitimacy and political participation. These predicted values provide some evidence in favor and in opposition to Hypothesis 6.1, that we should see a U-shaped relationship. Next, I test the other hypotheses stated in this chapter to better understand the role of social capital predictors and other individual level factors that may impact individual decisions to participate in conventional or unconventional ways.

6.3.1 Analysis – Predictors of Political Participation

In this section, I look at multivariate analyses of future political participation. I include different model specifications for comparison of legitimacy, social capital, and other factors. Testing the four hypotheses posited in this chapter requires use of different model specifications. I include both legitimacy variables and social capital variables in the same models. First by interacting two variable sets, and second by constraining the sample in each model to individuals with high bridging social capital, high bonding social capital, or low levels of social capital. The second method produces fully interactive models that allow me to assess the impact of legitimacy and other factors in different social capital contexts.

In the preliminary models, in Appendix B, that included only legitimacy, and not social capital variables, justice system legitimacy is not statistically significant in any of the models. I, therefore, exclude justice legitimacy and focus on the interactive effects of assembly legitimacy

and social capital on political participation. Models II and IV in Table 6.1 include two interaction terms. The first interaction term is between Assembly legitimacy and ingroup trust. The second is between outgroup trust and assembly legitimacy. Neither interaction is statistically significant, however in model II trust in ingroup, general trust, and legitimacy are significantly different from no change.

According to Model II individuals with higher levels of support for the government and the people that run the government have lower scores for signing petitions and boycotting. Individuals with high levels of trust generally, are also scoring lower in this area of likely participation. Lastly, ingroup trust is positively associated with *Sign&Boycott* providing some initial evidence that bonding social capital may motivate certain forms of political action. Ingroup trust and outgroup trust have inverse relationships to the different forms of political participation. Ingroup trust is positively associated with *Sign&Boycott* while outgroup trust is negatively associated. In contrast, ingroup trust is negatively associated with *Vote&Demonstrate* and outgroup trust is positively associated. This again provides some evidence for the context of political identity and the role of bonding and bridging social capital on individual level decisions about how to participate.

Table 6.2 goes further to assess the role of legitimacy and social capital context by utilizing fully interactive models. Utilizing full interaction models by restricting the model to only high bonding, high bridging, and high general trust variables allows to isolate the role of legitimacy on political participation in these social capital contexts. I exclude *Justice legitimacy* and social capital variable preference for mixing from models in Table 6.2. Assembly legitimacy is associated with both *Sign&Boycott* and *Vote&Demonstrate* political participation components. In all *Sign&Boycott* models (Models V-VII) a positive U-shaped relationship is found.

Therefore, for individuals who have high levels of social capital, whether it is bridging, bonding, or general trust, individuals with high levels and low levels of legitimacy are signing petitions and boycotting more than individuals who have mid-range support for the government. This finding provides support for Hypothesis 6.3 high bonding trust and extreme legitimacy positions will result in voting and peaceful demonstration.

The second set of models in Table 6.2 utilize the second political participation component, *Vote&Demonstrate*, in three fully interactive models. The bonding social capital model (Model VIII) there is an inverse U-shape relationship, this provides some evidence for Hypothesis 6.2 that individuals with high levels of bonding social capital will be more willing to continue in a protest once it turns violent, but this support is very limited. Models IX and X, high bridging and high general trust, predict higher levels of support for voting and peaceful demonstration. This provides some additional support for Hypothesis 6.3.

The role of political attachment strength is consistent across all six models, although only statistically significant in the *Sign&Boycott* models. All models indicate that an individual who strongly identifies is going to participate more by signing petitions and boycotting something, than individuals who feel less strongly attached to the Unionist or Nationalist grouping.

Additionally, income plays a role in an individual's willingness to sign and boycott. Both of these impacts are potentially tied to general political efficacy, the belief that the individual can impact politics. Overall there is some evidence to support the hypotheses in this chapter.

However, much more work is needed to determine the robustness of these findings.

Table 6.1 Legitimacy, Social Capital, and Political Participation

	<i>Sign&Boycott</i>		<i>Vote&Demonstrate</i>	
	<i>I</i>	<i>II</i>	<i>III</i>	<i>IV</i>
Legitimacy				
Assembly	-.097 (.131)	-1.404* (.815)	.062 (.095)	.264 (.512)
Assembly Squared	.049 (.046)	-.008 (.054)	.027 (.033)	.05 (.034)
Social Capital				
Preference for Mixing	.344 (.297)	.166 (.342)	-.133 (.214)	-.174 (.215)
General Trust	-.887 (.669)	-1.982** (.872)	.577 (.481)	.663 (.548)
Trust Ingroup	1.29 (.814)	1.714* (.913)	-.910 (.586)	-.918 (.573)
Trust Outgroup	-.924* (.483)	-.515 (.501)	.875** (.384)	.574 (.314)
Legitimacy & Social Trust				
RL*Ingroup Trust	-	.478 (.367)	-	.209 (.230)
RL*Outgroup Trust	-	.116 (.215)	-	-.337 (.135)
Strength of Political Attachment	.358 (.36)	.25 (.398)	-.076 (.259)	-.077 (.25)
Income	.022 (.024)	.033 (.024)	.013 (.017)	.007 (.014)
Contact	-.697 (.901)	-.515 (.702)	-.254 (.648)	.535 (.441)
Constant	.157 (2.38)	-.515 (.702)	-.082 (1.72)	-.318 (1.55)
N	28	28	28	28
R-Squared	.534	.496	.484	.5752

* p<.1, **p<.05 , note there are not "other political group in this model because ingroup/outgroup variables require respondents to identify as Nationalist or Unionist to have an socio-political ingroup or outgroup.

Table 6.2 Legitimacy, and Bridging and Bonding Social Capital on Participation

	<i>Sign&Boycott</i>			<i>Vote&Demonstrate</i>		
	V <i>High Bonding</i>	VI <i>High Bridging</i>	VII <i>High General Trust</i>	VIII <i>High Bonding</i>	IX <i>High Bridging</i>	X <i>High General Trust</i>
Legitimacy						
Assembly	-.177* (.087)	-.168* (.089)	-.197** (.086)	.150** (.06)	.118* (.059)	.116* (.06)
Assembly Squared	.071* (.036)	.063* (.036)	.064* (.034)	-.006 (.024)	.005 (.024)	.009 (.024)
Justice	-	-	-	-	-	-
Justice Squared	-	-	-	-	-	-
Strength of Political Attachment	.497*** (.163)	.461*** (.167)	.564 (.171)	.091 (.111)	.164 (.111)	.067 (.119)
Income	.026* (.014)	.025* (.014)	.029 (.014)	.011 (.009)	.008 (.009)	.009 (.01)
Contact	.088 (.406)	.007 (.408)	.347 (.396)	.341 (.278)	.366 (.271)	.221 (.275)
Religious Upbringing						
Catholic	-.234 (.553)	-.264 (.552)	-.24 (.577)	-.290 (.379)	-.299 (.366)	-.444 (.401)
Protestant	-.65 (.526)	-.748 (.527)	-.538 (.544)	-.199 (.262)	-.148 (.35)	-.338 (.378)
Male	-.171 (.383)	.082 (.401)	-.383 (.401)	-.197 (.262)	-.295 (.266)	-.131 (.279)
Constant	-.764 (.731)	-.650 (.73)	-1.078 (.743)	-.182 (.501)	-.187 (.484)	.008 (.517)
N	87	83	86	87	83	86
R-Squared	.235	.222	.247	.155	.159	.118

* p<.1, **p<.05 , Bonding and Bridging Ranges are from Ingroup and Outgroup Trust variables, individuals with values greater than or equal to 2 are considered to have strong bridging or bonding trust levels.

6.4 Discussion

This study provides some evidence that attitudes about institutions and the government may impact an individual's decisions about participating in the political process. Moreover, there is evidence supporting Expectations 8 through 11 stated in Chapter 2.

The U-shaped relationship between legitimacy and political participation seems to hold in the Northern Ireland sample used in this study. Individuals who have high levels of support or rejection of the current government will participate more than individuals who have mid-range or indifferent opinions. There is evidence supporting hypotheses that bridging social capital impacts the type of political participation that an individual is more willing to engage in. There is initial support that there is an interactive effect between social capital and political participation a larger and more diverse sample to further test the link would be useful. A larger more representative sample that includes larger portions of the population with low social capital values is important to comparing individual behaviors with low social capital and individual behaviors for those with high bridging and bonding social capital.

The measures of social capital could also be expanded to include other forms of social interaction beyond trust. Participation in civic groups was not measured directly in this survey, however, I measured church attendance and there was no evidence that increased church attendance has a role in participation. This study does not test the role of ongoing civic participation on political participation for which there is extant literature providing evidence of that linkage within societies. Studies have focused on the role of bridging and bonding interactions in a social context as having important implications for future social interactions.

With the current data there is not robust support for the interactive effect of social capital and feelings about legitimacy on political participation. Again, a larger representative survey of

the Northern Irish population might provide a clearer picture of the interactive influence of social capital and legitimacy on political participation. The QUB sample is a convenience sample of college students. While there is still value in this evidence a larger representative sample would provide greater variation and allow for inferences about the population to be made. The QUB sample is likely skewing towards higher levels of trust and social interaction than the general population. This increase in sample variation would be valuable particularly in understanding the social capital aspects of this theory. College students are more likely to have cross community contact than the general population of Northern Ireland. The QUB sample is also a younger sample than the population. Generational effects and levels of bridging and bonding social capital may also be relevant in the Northern Ireland case. This original data collection and analysis does point to the importance of including cross-community measures of social capital, distinguishing between bridging and bonding social capital is important to include in future studies that aim to understand how legitimacy and social capital influence decisions about how and when to participate inside of and outside of the political system.

7 CONCLUSIONS

Components of social cohesion are complexly intertwined at the individual level. Understanding the linkages that exist between cross-community elite behavior and social cohesion is important particularly in a society with convocational institutions. Grasping the individual level factors of social cohesion can help us to understand how to mitigate divisions and grow cohesion within a society. While this study has focused on post-conflict societies and Northern Ireland in particular, we have seen a growing level of dissatisfaction with governance, increases in frustrations with political leaders, growing social distance, and reductions of bridging social

capital within societies, and increases in political demonstrations that have turned violent in many polities around the world. The implications of social cohesion for the sustainability of democracy are vastly important.

This dissertation has tackled clarifying a working definition of social cohesion at the individual level. I identify and unpack three constituent components, evaluate how they relate to each other, and how elite interactions affect them. Chapter 2 lays out an integrated individual level theory of social cohesion. The theoretical chapter sets out eleven expectations that I test throughout three empirical chapters. Chapter 3 set up the case of Northern Ireland for study, and detailed my original data collection. Each subsequent chapter tests hypotheses derived from these expectations pertaining to the three components of social cohesion: legitimacy, social capital, and political participation. In this chapter I review the main findings of the three empirical chapters, discuss implications, and directions for future research.

Chapter 4 deals with the first of the three components legitimacy as a dependent variable. The legitimacy chapter focuses on the effects of cross community interactions between elected members of the Northern Ireland Assembly on trust in the main Northern Ireland political parties and politicians generally, and confidence in institutions. Expectations 1 and 2 argue that elite cross community conflict (and cooperation) should directly impact the level of trust in political elites and confidence in political institutions. I tested the first part of both of these propositions with an experiment by priming a treatment group with a news article excerpt expressing an inability of the executive parties to make progress on important cross community issues. There was not any support for the first expectation. There was no treatment effect for non-community specific trust or trust in Unionist and Nationalist political parties. There was, however, some limited evidence in support of Expectation 2.

I found treatment effects for confidence in the police and the justice system, but not the Assembly or the Government. This is a surprising finding in that witnessing behaviors of MLAs was not impactful of trust in the MLAs or confidence in the Assembly that they operate but did reduce confidence in the police and the justice system. Individuals have the potential to interact with the police and the justice system on a daily basis and in ways that they may not interact with Assembly members, therefore, confidence in these institutions is paramount within a society. The breakdown of confidence in these institutions is potentially problematic for the everyday operations. These findings should be taken with a grain of salt in that they are from a student sample.

The findings should be taken as a starting point for future studies to investigate these relationships more fully with representative samples of Northern Ireland and other polities. This study looked at the conflict side of Expectations 1 and 2. The second part of these expectations that deals with cross community elite *cooperation* was not tested empirically in this study. This is definitely an area where future research should focus. Investigating the role of cooperation between elites and the influence on social cohesion would provide a clearer picture of the potential that elected leaders have for growing social cohesion rather than stifling and polarizing a polity. Future examination of elite cooperation and conflict should include a larger representative sample where possible. Cooperation is arguably of particular importance in societies that have preexisting divisions where conflict or stagnation is the status quo. Elite conflict seems to have limited effects on many areas of legitimacy, except the justice system. While the robustness of these findings needs to be tested further it will be important to see if the cooperation has a longer reach in influencing legitimacy attitudes increasing trust and confidence more than conflict reduces them. Using a representative sample and including elite cooperation

in future studies on social cohesion at the individual level will be seminal to understanding the links between cross community elite behaviors and social cohesion.

Chapter 5 moves on to the second component of social cohesion and tests several expectations about social capital. My theory states that social identity and legitimacy attitudes will influence individual values for social capital. I focus on social trust, reciprocity, and willingness to integrate as measures of social capital. The main method for testing the social capital expectations (3 through 7) is a trust game where each participant has the opportunity to trade tickets with an unidentified individual, a Unionist, and a Nationalist. Original survey data is also used to address questions related to willingness to integrate and social trust.

Social identity, belonging to a group, is an important predictor for trust. Unionists and Nationalists were both more trusting of ingroup members than they were of unidentified individuals and outgroup members supporting Expectation 3. There is some preliminary evidence supporting Expectation 4 that groups will show ingroup bias, and that the dominant group (Unionists) will show more ingroup bias than Nationalists. This evidence comes from difference of means tests, but further attempts to test associations with OLS models show positive but insignificant relationships. This indicates that additional tests with larger and representative need to be conducted in the future to determine the nature and robustness of this association. Evidence for Expectation 3 tells us what other studies have shown before, that individuals are more trusting and more likely to reciprocate trust of and to individuals that belong to the same social group and less trusting of those who are not.

Chapter 5 in addition to trust investigates reciprocity. Expectation 5 argues that receiving trusting behaviors will be met with reciprocal action. Evidence from this study greatly supports this. Increases in tickets received were matched with increases in the number of tickets returned.

Indeed when individuals received more tickets, greater trust, from an outgroup member it greatly reduced the difference in reciprocity towards outgroup members, while the number of tickets from an ingroup member did not. This follows assertions of contact theory that interaction with an outgroup member will reduce negative feelings about the outgroup. The implications of this are not novel, but important. Fostering contact between salient ethnic groups can produce positive outcomes for social capital particularly bridging social capital that is important to the overall social cohesion of a society. Producing bridging social capital can buttress the political stability and generate productive political participation that is important in polities after violent conflict.

Critics of consociationalism state that a problem with maintaining the salient identities within the political system can entrench identities that produce conflict, and therefore division and resurgence of conflict and violence may be inevitable. However, individuals who identify as Unionist and Nationalist can interact and produce trust even while social groups and group conflict exists. Eventually, the saliency of these divisions may be reduced, but this process of trust building and contact must be ongoing, beyond initial development of peace accords and new institutions.

Next I look at the connection between elite conflict and social capital. Expectation 6 argues that cross community elite conflict will have a direct effect on social capital. Evidence from the QUB experiment and trust game does not support this expectation. In contrast, there is some evidence indicating that those who witness conflict are more willing to have their children attend a mixed school and work with members of the outgroup. While this evidence is mixed, it is counterintuitive to the theory I posit. The behavior of elites in any polity has the potential to sustain norms, progress them, or destroy them. Interactions between elected representatives, I

argue, can have important consequences for the social cohesion of a polity. In a post conflict society, particularly those with consociational arrangements, the manner in which parties and elected officials interact to produce policy, and discuss issues and problems that the community faces may be linked to legitimacy and social capital.

This study has somewhat surprising findings surrounding the link between cross community elite conflict and legitimacy and social capital. Only confidence attitudes about justice and the police were reduced by elite conflict. Only willingness to integrate in workplace and children's schools were impacted by elite conflict it increased propensity for preferring mixing. It is not entirely clear why seeing conflict might be increasing preferences for mixing in these areas. More research on the association of elite conflict on social trust is needed in the future to clarify the relationship.

Chapter 5 also tests Expectation 7 to determine how legitimacy factors might influence willingness to interact with an outgroup member. Confidence in the police and *Justice Legitimacy* are associated with increased willingness to interact, as is trust in ingroup and outgroup ministers and trust in politicians generally. Political legitimacy is associated with increases in preferences for mixing. So while there is limited or contradicting evidence for a direct relationship between elite behaviors and social capital there are some clearer links between legitimacy and social capital. Therefore, cross community elite behaviors may be indirectly influencing social capital factors. Elite influence, therefore, may still be relevant to social cohesion in ways that this evidence does not clearly show. This study does however set the stage for future research in this area.

Additional findings in chapter 5 include that ingroup and outgroup trust in political elites is important for individual social capital. It is important in studies interested in social capital to

incorporate more specific measures for political trust that tap these identity specific associations. Focusing on political trust broadly or general social trust only misses important nuance in the understanding of the links between legitimacy and social capital that are integral to the individual level account of social cohesion.

The last empirical chapter tackles political participation, the third component of social cohesion. My theory of social cohesion argues for an interactive model of political participation. Legitimacy and social capital values influence the type of political participation and the likelihood that an individual will participate. Bridging and bonding social capital are important to this portion of the theory in that they will lead individuals to peruse different types of political participation. Expectation 8, following from Booth and Seligson, that there will be a U shaped relationship between legitimacy and electoral participation. The next three expectations argue for the interactive effect between social capital and legitimacy. Evidence from the survey portion of the QUB study analyzed in chapter 6 provides mixed support for the U-shaped relationship between legitimacy positions and political participation.

Bridging social capital is associated with the type of political participation an individual used to voice their positions and some support for an interactive effect between legitimacy and social capital. Increases in bonding social capital and extreme levels of assembly legitimacy associated with increased likelihood that an individual would continue in a protest once it turned violent. Increases in bridging social capital and extreme legitimacy attitudes are associated with increased voting and peaceful protests. There was not sufficient evidence to support the likelihood of low levels of social capital because of the distribution of individuals with low social capital in the sample was minimal. While it is limited by a convenience sample and small-

n, this study provides initial backing for an interactive model of legitimacy and social capital on political participation.

There are a few take aways for future research. Moving forward with research on social cohesion it is important to include social capital questions and political questions within the same surveys so that individual level analysis of social cohesion factors is possible. Inclusion of both social and political questions more consistently on nationally representative surveys would be incredibly useful for studying questions of social cohesion. Many surveys have certain questions that I have incorporated into analysis in this study, but it is difficult to find them in surveys together. Social surveys focus on social capital questions, political and electoral surveys ask about political participation and legitimacy. Using these questions in aggregate level analyses is doable, but individual level analysis is not. We need interdisciplinary queries that can provide representative evidence of the links between the three areas of social cohesion, legitimacy, social capital, and political participation.

Next, there are a few questions that should be included in future surveys. First, I recommend that political trust in specific parties and leaders in a given polity are more consistently included. These questions would allow researchers to contextualize and understand trust according to salient political divisions rather than only assessing trust or confidence in the government generally. This distinction may be important in a variety of political contexts, but is definitely relevant in post conflict societies with consociational systems, and other societies where there are reinforcing political cleavages. The Northern Ireland General Election Survey in 2015 and 2017 included feeling thermometers for party leaders, but do not ask about trust specifically (Tonge et al. 2015; 2017). Trust in specific parties and leaders have been asked on

the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey but only in 1998, 2000, 2007, and 2008.⁸³ Second, surveys should include alternative methods of participation beyond voting. Many surveys including the European Values survey and World Values survey include questions about non-electoral participation, but should also include questions about the likelihood of violent protest beyond legally sanctioned or peaceful political protests. In societies with divisions, particularly those with histories of violent conflict, understanding if and when individuals would turn to violent protest to voice political frustrations should not be ignored.

Lastly, additional experiments using a cooperation prime rather than, or in addition to a conflict prime is important for validating the role of cross-community interaction within this theoretical framework. Positive elite contact, while not tested in this study should be the next step in understanding vertical extended contact theory.

In sum, this study provides preliminary evidence for the integrated theory of social cohesion. Additional studies with representative samples in Northern Ireland and other societies is essential for determining if these findings are robust across Northern Ireland and other cases. This theory focuses on understanding social cohesion at the individual level and contributes a dynamic model of social cohesion. I also shed light on the importance of social identity measures related to all three components. While future research is needed to buttress the empirical evidence in this study, the theory posited holds water and deserves further inquiry.

⁸³ ARK 1999, 2001, 2008, and 2009

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Chapter 5 Additional Models and Predicted Probabilities

The predicted values listed are the expected value of the maximum dependent variable value, willingness to interact (1) in the logit models, and willingness to interact in all four areas (4) in the ordered logit models. I generate the expected probability for each independent variable value (e.g. outgroup political trust (0) the predicted value is for if the individual as the least amount of trust in the political outgroup), and set the rest of the variables in the given model at their mean values.

Table A.1: Probabilities for Models Table 5.8

	Area of Mixing			
	Neighborhood	Work	School	Marriage
MIN_Outgroup Political Trust (0) & MIN_Ingroup Political Trust (0)	77.9%	99.95%	74.8%	98.8%
MIN_Outgroup Political Trust (0) & MAX_Ingroup Political Trust (8)	69.8%	42.4%	21..2%	57.8%
MAX_Outgroup Political Trust (6) & MAX_Ingroup Political Trust (8)	96.8%	83.5%	75.0%	87.4%
MAX_Outgroup Political Trust (6) & MIN_Ingroup Political Trust (0)	97.9%	99.9%	97.0%	99.8%

Table A.2 Four Areas of Mixing Comprising Willingness to Integrate - Control Only Sample

	Neighborhood	Work	School	Marriage
Trust in Outgroup Ministers	.63 (.45)	.58 (.80)	.42* (.23)	.16 (.31)
Trust in Ingroup Ministers	-.11 (.24)	---	-.41** (.21)	-.31 (.30)
Constant	1.37 (1.08)	1.18 (1.42)	1.07 (.9)	3.07* (1.62)
χ^2	2.99	.78	6.21**	1.29
N	29	10	32	34

Logit models, * p<.1, **p<.05, ***p< .01 Data from QUB 2014 Survey

Table A.3: Probabilities for Models Table 5.9

	Area of Mixing			
	Neighborhood	Work	School	Marriage
Minimum Political Trust Gap (Ingroup-Outgroup) (-2)	92.98%	99.8%	88.8%	98.9%
No Political Trust Gap (Ingroup-Outgroup) (0)	90.1%	99.4%	79.9%	97.5%
Maximum Political Trust Gap (Ingroup-Outgroup) (8)	66.97%	51.8%	20.4%	60.7%

Table A.4: Four Areas of Mixing and Elite Trust-Gap -- Control Group Only

	Neighborhood	Work	School	Marriage
Trust in Ingroup – Outgroup Ministers	-.25 (.23)	-1.11* (.68)	-.42** (.18)	.24 (.23)
Constant	2.47*** (.9)	6.5* (3.5)	1.09** (.54)	2.58*** (.23)
χ^2	1.25	7.88***	6.21**	1.14
N	29	29	32	34

Logit models, * p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01 Data from QUB 2014 Survey

Table A.5: Additional Table for Willingness to Integrate

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Trust in Outgroup Parties	.394* (.161)	.577** (.222)	.796* (.324)	.803* (.322)	.886* (.388)
Trust in Ingroup Parties	-.476** (.162)	-.977*** (.247)	-1.068** (.341)	-1.068* (.341)	-1.234** (.443)
Increase in Future Income		2.082** (.759)	2.32* (.966)	2.004* (.949)	2.561† (1.36)
Trust politicians			-1.142† (.596)	-1.067† (.625)	-.896 (.855)
Satisfaction with MLAs			.481 (.555)	-.375 (.729)	-.683 (1.001)
Contact in School			3.811* (1.91)	3.793† (1.97)	4.843† (2.85)
Confidence:					
In the Catholic Church					-.569 (.726)
In the Protestant Church					-.539 (.727)
In the Police				1.295† (.677)	1.824† (.976)
In the Justice System					.213 (.961)
In the Government					-.216 (1.84)
In the Parties					.576 (1.22)
In the Press					-3.46 (.829)
χ^2	14.42***	31.34***	37.87***	41.41***	41.55***
N	56	44	37	36	33
Ordered Logit model, † p< .1, * p<.05, **p<.01, ***p< .001					

Table A.6: Predicted Probabilities for Models in Table A5

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)
Outgroup Political Trust (0)	38.5%	34%	43%	33.2%	25%
Outgroup Political Trust (6)	87%	94%	98.9%	98.4%	98.6%
Ingroup Political Trust (0)	91%	98.9%	99.5%	99%	99.5%
Ingroup Political Trust (6)	19.2%	3.6%	26.3%	26%	1.1%
Income Future (-1)		30%	43.4%	37.8%	27.4%
Income Future (0)		77.7%	88.7%	81.8%	83%
Income Future (1)		96.5%	98.7%	97.1%	98.4%
Trust Politicians (0)			88.8%	82.7%	74.8%
Trust Politicians (3)			44.8%	16.4%	16.8%
Contact (0)			50.1%	39%	27.2%
Contact (1)			97.8%	96.60%	97.9%
Confidence in Police (0)				15.60%	5.5%
Confidence in Police (3)				90%	93.2%

Table A.7: Predicted Probabilities for Models in Table 5.11

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)
Minimum Political Trust Gap (Ingroup-Outgroup) (-2)	90%	97.8%	99.4%	99.1%	99.3%
No Political Trust Gap (Ingroup- Outgroup) (0)	79%	90.2%	96.4%	94.6%	94.7%
Maximum Political Trust Gap (Ingroup-Outgroup) (8)	10.3%	1.8%	1.5%	1%	.5%
Income Future (-1)		33.7%	41.1%	35.2%	26.6%
Income Future (0)		74.3%	87.6%	80.3%	79.9%
Income Future (1)		94.28%	98.6%	96.8%	97.8%
Trust Politicians (0)			88.9%	82.8%	75.8%
Trust Politicians (3)			16%	12.4%	11.2%
Contact (0)			48.9%	37.6%	26.7%
Contact (1)			97.2%	95.7%	97%
Confidence in Police (0)				14.2%	5.6%
Confidence in Police (3)				89%	91.7%

Appendix B: Chapter 6 Supplemental Model

Table B.1 Legitimacy and Future Participation

	Sign&Boycott		Vote&Demonstrate	
	I	II	III	IV
Legitimacy				
Assembly	-.185** (.082)	-	.125 (.056)	-
Assembly Squared	.057* (.034)	-	.011 (.023)	-
Justice	-	.050 (.169)	-	.028 (.114)
Justice Squared	-	-.143 (.129)	-	.020 (.088)
Political Attachment				
Unionist	-.494 (.605)	-.532 (.633)	.330 (.413)	.371 (.429)
Nationalist	-.717 (.624)	-.711 (.65)	.617 (.412)	.554 (.441)
Strength of Political Attachment	.785*** (.29)	.828*** (.301)	-.149 (.198)	-.154 (.204)
Income	.029** (.013)	.028** (.014)	.010 (.009)	.008 (.009)
Contact	.025 (.397)	-.009 (.42)	.305 (.271)	.315 (.283)
Religious Upbringing				
Catholic	-.39 (.567)	-.47 (.591)	-.312 (.387)	-.362 (.401)
Protestant	-.714 (.52)	-.805 (.541)	-.237 (.355)	-.19 (.367)
Male	-.316 (.374)	-.407 (.393)	.019 (.255)	.032 (.266)
Constant	-.661 (.724)	-.231 (.718)	-.246 (.494)	-.178 (.487)
N	92	92	92	92
R-Squared	.253	.195	.143	.088

* p<.1, **p<.05