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INCONSISTENT INTERVENTIONS?
THE EFFECT OF OPERATIONAL FEASIBILITY ON U.S. PRESIDENTIAL
MILITARY INTERVENTION DECISIONS

by

Matthew D. Eberhart

A DISSERTATION

Presented to the Faculty of
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INCONSISTENT INTERVENTIONS?
THE EFFECT OF OPERATIONAL FEASIBILITY ON U.S. PRESIDENTIAL
MILITARY INTERVENTION DECISIONS

Matthew D. Eberhart, Ph.D.

University of Nebraska, 2019

Advisor: Ross A. Miller

Why is there apparent inconsistency in U.S. presidential military intervention decisions when cases exhibit similar characteristics that other scholars have argued should be determinant, such as the magnitude of the conflict, economic ties, or domestic political support? For instance, President Clinton committed troops in Haiti (1994) but not in Rwanda (1994); and likewise, President George H.W. Bush intervened in Somalia (1992) but not in Bosnia (1992). Previous studies have held an implicit assumption: if the demand for action is high enough, an intervention will occur. This study moves the operative element of the decision calculus from demand to feasibility, attempting to answer the primary research question: what impact does operational feasibility have on U.S. presidential military intervention decisions?

This research identifies what I call “feasibility factors,” which are based on military planning considerations and provide observable measures for the expectation of intervention success. Successful interventions are those that achieve the intervention mission within a short time horizon at acceptable costs. Using a mixed methods design incorporating both Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and an examination of National Security Council and presidential meeting archives, the study finds that the seemingly inconsistent behavior disappears when feasibility is included. Demand for intervention is necessary, but insufficient; only when there is enough demand *and* the operational feasibility factors are positively aligned do presidents intervene.

This study provides three main contributions. First, it argues for feasibility’s inclusion in future intervention-focused studies. Second, this work elucidates the most prominent feasibility concerns for the policy community: the conflict type, whether there is a regime to intervene on behalf of, the enemy’s organization, and the logistical accessibility of the crisis region. Finally, this work provides an alternative logic for why presidents choose inaction despite overwhelming demand for intervention.

DEDICATION

For Dad

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know. Many are already contributing in significant ways throughout the U.S. military. I am humbled to be counted among them and will do my utmost to ensure the investment made in my education and development is put to good use.

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Above all, I am most eternally grateful to God for this incredible opportunity.

GLOSSARY

<i>Bush 41</i>	President George H.W. Bush, the 41 st president of the United States.
<i>Consistency</i>	Measure in Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) that “gauges the degree to which the cases sharing a given combination of conditions agree in displaying the outcome in question” (Ragin 2008, 44). Similar to “significance” in regression analysis.
<i>Coverage</i>	Measure in QCA that “assesses the degree to which a cause or causal combination accounts for instances of an outcome” (Ragin 2008, 44). Similar to “correlation coefficients and total variance explained” in regression analysis (Bara 2014, 4).
<i>Intervention</i>	“An overt, short-term deployment of at least one thousand combat-ready ground troops across international boundaries to influence an outcome in another state or an interstate dispute; it may or may not interfere in another state’s domestic institutions” Elizabeth Saunders (2011, 21). Interventions occur in response to crises ranging from civil wars to supporting humanitarian goals.
<i>Precision</i>	Measure in QCA that accounts for false positives in predictive analysis and reports the percentage of predictions that are correct.
<i>Sensitivity</i>	Measure in QCA that is the percentage of cases that the solution correctly predicted.

ACRONYMS

CENTCOM: United States Central Command
CIA: Central Intelligence Agency
CJCS: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
EC: European Commission
EU: European Union
ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross
IFOR: Implementation Force (Bosnia)
ISIS: Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham
JCS: Joint Chiefs of Staff
JNA: Yugoslav People's Army
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO: Nongovernmental Organization
NSC: National Security Council
NSC/DC and DC: National Security Council Deputies Committee
PC: Principals Committee
PDD: Presidential Decision Directive
PRD: Presidential Review Directive
QCA: Qualitative Comparative Analysis
QRF: Quick Reaction Force
SIPRI: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SNM: Somali National Movement
SPM: Somali Patriotic Movement
UN: United Nations
UNITAF: United Task Force (Somalia)
UNOSOM: UN Operation in Somalia (I and II)
UNPROFOR: UN Protection Force in former Yugoslavia
UNSCR: UN Security Council Resolution
USC: United Somali Congress
VCJCS: Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
VRS: Army of Republic Srpska

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

This dissertation focuses on recent military intervention decisions made by U.S. presidents. Specifically, why is there apparent inconsistency in decisions to get involved in some foreign crises but not others when they exhibit similar characteristics that scholars have argued should be determinant, such as the magnitude of the conflict, economic ties, or domestic political support? As this work will demonstrate, most studies that attempt to explain intervention behavior hold an implicit assumption in common: if the demand for action is high enough, an intervention will occur. I present a different theory that moves the operative element of the decision calculus from demand to feasibility. Based on military planning considerations, I develop what I call feasibility factors. These factors measure “expectations of success,” or what others have discussed as accomplishing the mission within short time horizons and at acceptable costs (Regan 2002, 5). Using a mixed methods design incorporating both Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and a detailed examination of presidential archival records of National Security Council (NSC) and presidential meetings, this study seeks to answer the primary research question: *what impact does operational feasibility have on U.S. presidential military intervention decisions?* Ultimately, the study finds that when feasibility concerns are included in the analyses, the seemingly inconsistent behavior disappears. Only when there is enough demand and the operational feasibility factors are positively aligned do we see presidents commit troops.

This opening chapter has four parts. First, I frame the research by providing an overview of the research problem and explanation of the key terms. Second is a

description of the methodology used to answer the research question. Third, I present the findings and their implications. Finally, I lay out the organization for the remainder of the dissertation.

Research Overview and Key Terms

Scholars have long sought to understand the selective use of force by U.S. presidents in international crises, or as Rosenau (1967) termed it, “intervention” (p. 168). In this study, I use Elizabeth Saunders’ (2011, 21) definition: “an overt, short-term deployment of at least one thousand combat-ready ground troops across international boundaries to influence an outcome in another state or an interstate dispute; it may or may not interfere in another state’s domestic institutions.” This definition rules out covert operations and missions such as train or assist operations that run a low risk of resulting in combat. This approach adds a level of consistency to the risk being weighed by presidents when undertaking these decisions. Multiple explanations have emerged to explain intervention decisions that call on a wide range of factors, and yet even a cursory examination of cases reveals apparent inconsistencies in how these variables influence whether presidents intervene. For examples, consider a few recent events.

A sarin gas attack on August 21, 2013, outside of Damascus, Syria, claimed the lives of over 1,400 people in one of the most egregious acts in recent memory. The culpability for this event rested upon Syrian President Bashar al-Assad as he prosecuted a campaign to retain power amid intense intrastate unrest. At the time, this occurrence was seen by many to have “crossed a red line” that would trigger an American or multinational response, presumably including a military option (Good 2013). Yet,

Obama did not initiate a punitive attack or forcibly remove al-Assad as some predicted. Contrast this with just over a year later when Obama chose to recommit 1,500 troops to neighboring Iraq to fight ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham) (Collinson 2014).

Did President Obama decide not to intervene in Syria because significant majorities of Americans polled were against involvement in yet another military action in the Middle East (Sullivan 2013)? That is a difficult case to make because U.S. views regarding intervention were low for both – 25% for Syria and 39% for counter-ISIS operations in Iraq during the decision window for each (Pew Research Poll cited in Gewurz 2012; Pew Research 2014). Alternatively, could the inaction in Syria be attributable to confounding geopolitical arrangements within the region, upsetting delicate power arrangements among Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and others? After all, scholars have often viewed international politics and security considerations as determinants of conflict behavior (Moore and Lanoue 2003). Likely not, since the would-be areas of operation are overlapping. Maybe President Obama did not intervene because the United States was still at war in Afghanistan. War weariness has also been determined to be a key indicator for inactivity given intervention opportunities (Levy and Morgan 1986). Yet, both the decision to reinsert troops back into Iraq to counter ISIS and the decision not to intervene to depose al-Assad in Syria occurred while the U.S. was significantly engaged in Afghanistan. President Obama's administration is not an outlier in this apparently inconsistent behavior. Observers could draw similar conclusions for President Clinton, who intervened in Haiti (1994) but not in Rwanda (1994); and for President George H.W. Bush who intervened in Somalia (1992), but not in Bosnia (1992).

Scholars in this field have argued in favor of determinants such as those above, rooted in both domestic or international systemic concerns, with mixed results. Why the apparent inconsistency? I argue that these studies base too much of their analysis on the origins and strength of the demand signal for intervention, and too little on the part of the decision based on expected efficacy. To remedy this, I propose a shift from the demand-based explanation to one that incorporates feasibility through a three-part causal chain: 1) recognize an opportunity to intervene based on significant demand, 2) assess the likelihood of success for the use of force given the constraints of the crisis environment, and finally 3) given the anticipated costs associated with employing that force, determine whether an intervention is still advisable. The question becomes, what are the most important aspects of the situation to help assess part two of the mechanism – the likelihood of success?

Although feasibility appears to be a logical factor to include in *any* study of the use of force, it is surprisingly absent from studies attempting to explain the motivations or dissuasions for U.S. military intervention. Authors have not completely overlooked the tactical and operational levels of military involvement, with authors such as Stephen Biddle (2004) calling attention to the importance of force employment in determining outcomes of armed conflict. Yet, these considerations have not been included in the debate that addresses the decision space preceding the intervention.

This study takes a stride in that direction by operationalizing expectations of success through feasibility factors that indicate whether the use of force can achieve the policy aims within a short time horizon and at acceptable costs. Derived from the planning processes used to develop military options within the U.S. national security

apparatus, feasibility factors pose the key considerations that determine if the intervention is likely to be long and costly, or if a reasonably quick win could be expected.

The four feasibility factors below were the most useful of those considered in this dissertation¹:

1. CONFLICT - What type of conflict is it? If the conflict is based on ethnic or religious divides it is likely more intractable and will contribute to persistent instability.
2. REGIME - Does the U.S. have a clear regime to support or install, or will it intervene as a neutral party between warring factions?
3. ENEMY - How is the enemy/adversary organized? Is the structure hierarchical and susceptible to strike, or diffuse and difficult to target?
4. ACCESS - How accessible is the crisis environment? Are there enough viable ports and transportation networks available to sustain the intervention logistically?

Methodology

This study uses a three phase, explanatory sequential mixed methods research design (Ivankova, Creswell, and Stick 2006; Creswell and Clark 2017). Phase I employs a configurational comparative method – QCA – to analyze 19 intervention opportunities and identify the unique combinations of feasibility factors and demand signals from both

¹ The study considers another feasibility factor associated with the population density of the crisis location: POPULATION. The following chapter discusses the theoretical origins of this consideration and the QCA chapter uses it as part of the analysis. However, it is omitted here and from the broader findings because it did not prove as helpful in explaining intervention decision behavior compared with the other four feasibility factors.

domestic and international systemic sources that are associated with intervention and nonintervention outcomes. From there, I build on the QCA findings in the next two qualitative phases where I use the QCA outputs to guide the inquiry.

Phase II is a comparative historical analysis of two near simultaneous intervention opportunities under the George H.W. Bush (Bush 41) administration: the famine and civil war in Somalia and the breakup of Yugoslavia. Using primary resources from the George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, I evaluate the extent to which the demands for action and the concerns over feasibility were explicitly discussed by those involved in the decision-making process. This involves the detailed analysis of the minutes from NSC Deputies and Principals Committees, as well as presidential small group meetings. The aim is to determine whether feasibility concerns are an observable part of the decisional dialogues, or if they are just implicit, and therefore of lesser analytic concern?

Finally, in Phase III, I conduct another comparative historical analysis of the handling of the same crises by the subsequent William J. Clinton administration. Clinton reverses both Bush 41 intervention decisions, withdrawing from Somalia and committing ground troops to the NATO intervention in Bosnia. This presents an opportunity to extend the application of the theory, looking at what happens when the feasibility factors switch from favoring intervention to nonintervention, and vice versa. Here again, I draw on primary sources from the Clinton Presidential Library to process trace how the Clinton national security team adjusted to changing information and arrived at their decisions.

Findings

The analysis supports the contention that operational feasibility significantly impacts intervention decisions. The QCA solutions in Phase I demonstrate that feasibility figures prominently in both intervention and nonintervention outcomes. A supportable regime and logistically accessible crisis environment were present in 88% of the intervention cases. A hierarchical enemy structure was also present in every intervention and absent in two-thirds of the nonintervention cases, adding weight to its inclusion as a key consideration. Regarding noninterventions, the combination of an ethnically- or religiously-based conflict with no regime to support accounted for 83% of the cases, providing evidence that not only are these factors individually important, but they may also have an additive dissuasive quality when negative attributes are combined.

More traditional determinants for intervention decisions also emerged in the QCA outputs, including presidential approval levels, trade ties, and the magnitude of the conflict. This reinforces the arguments made by previous scholars that both international systemic and domestic factors hold sway. However, none were present on their own in the QCA solutions, requiring the pairing of a positive feasibility factor to produce an intervention. This finding bolsters the argument for the three-part causal chain hinging on feasibility that this work advances.

The paired case comparison of the Bush 41 intervention opportunities for Somalia and Yugoslavia/Bosnia in Phase II strengthens the QCA findings. Bosnia demonstrated a stronger demand signal from the determinants previous scholars have argued in favor of (e.g., media coverage or economic and political ties to allies), yet Bush chose to intervene

in Somalia. The key differences between the cases is in their respective feasibility assessments. Bush's team saw Bosnia as a complex, ethnic civil war where the intervening party would have to remain neutral between multiple warring factions. The anticipated enemy forces were decentralized and likely to oppose entry into a region that was already restricted in its accessibility. Compare this to Somalia where the projected mission was limited to the delivery of aid, with little to no anticipated opposition, and expected completion within 30 days (NSC 0065, 3-5).

The process tracing of the Bush 41 decision regarding Somalia yielded another useful insight that underscores the importance of feasibility. The supposed mission that a U.S. intervention would undertake in Somalia changed over time, going through a series of transitions. Each mission transition carried a corresponding change in its perceived feasibility. Only when the mission was scoped to create a short time horizon with minimal risk did Bush decide to act. This realization fed directly into the final phase of the analysis.

This Clinton administration case study in Phase III also found that the feasibility factors were aligned with the outcomes as theoretically predicted. Here, the primary source materials that supported the NSC deliberations were able to identify how the feasibility factor assessments changed under Clinton as he dealt with the same crises, influencing the decision to withdraw from Somalia and intervene in Bosnia (Clinton Library 1993b and 1993c). The Clinton administration adopted more expansive nation-building aims in Somalia than Bush 41 had proposed, necessitating revised feasibility assessments to account for new mission requirements and their concomitant adversarial responses (Hirsch and Oakley 1995, 81-99; Clinton 1994). Faced with greater than

expected resistance against diffusely organized militias, with no regime to support, and increasing costs over a longer time horizon, Clinton chose withdrawal. Conversely, with the signing of the Dayton Accords, the situation in Bosnia changed substantially. While still intervening in an ethnically-based conflict, the agreed upon cease fire separated the combatants, reduced opposition, and provided access to the airports and road networks. This, too, resulted in a decision reversal, with the U.S. taking part in the NATO Bosnian intervention.

Contributions

This dissertation contributes to improved understanding of intervention decisions for the scholarly community, for the policy realm, as well as for the general public. First and foremost, the theory and the feasibility factors used to test it operationalize the “expectations of success” concept that others have argued is an important consideration, but had not fully developed (e.g., Baum 2004; Regan 1998 and 2002; Seybolt 2007). By providing an alternative theoretical framework that incorporates meaningful measures of feasibility, we can better explain what had previously appeared as inconsistent intervention behavior. Beyond that, the three-part causal chain is a useful way for scholars to think about the decisional process, understanding how demand signals interact with feasibility assessments to arrive at a prudent decision. Therefore, for academia, the findings indicate that feasibility factors should be included and potentially expanded upon in future studies.

For the policy community, the idea that feasibility influences decisions is not novel. Those that develop military options or present them for consideration are aware

of the myriad challenges that pose risks to a potential operation. However, through the systematic analysis of 19 intervention opportunities and two paired comparison case studies covering previously classified discussions, this study elucidates the most prominent feasibility concerns. Knowing that presidents have incorporated these concerns heavily in the past, this study informs those framing decisions by identifying elements of their analysis that may be of greater interest to decision makers. This study also validates the value of their work, demonstrating the decision to intervene or not is much more contingent on the existence of feasible options rather than political whims. More specifically, if the president chooses to intervene in instances where these factors are aligned against success, the policy community should monitor progress carefully and be ready to expose a failing strategy if, in fact, the intervention proves ineffective, as these indicators might suggest.

Lastly, the general public benefits from a more nuanced view of what presidents must consider when making these weighty decisions. Often, presidents are rebuked in the media or on the world stage for failing to act (e.g., Rwanda coverage in *New York Times* 1994). When this happens, the public, much like the scholarly community discussed above, is using a demand-based argument, devoid of any deliberation of whether feasible options exist. By presenting an alternative rationale for why a president might fail to intervene, we open more space in the debate that surrounds these issues, making room for matters that impinge on the potential mission success or failure and what costs they might incur.

Organization

The next five chapters are structured to systematically determine the impact that operational feasibility has on U.S. presidential military intervention decisions. Chapter 2 reviews the literature and proposes a new theory for understanding intervention decisions based on the three-part causal chain. To open, I first explore the intervention literature and identify a gap in operationalizing the idea of an “expectation of success.” In response to this gap, I articulate the theoretical framework upon which the subsequent analyses are built. Extant literature uses a demand-based logic as theoretical underpinning; I propose a shift to a threshold for intervention based on feasibility factors.

Chapter 3 provides the research design and conducts the first empirical tests of the eight hypotheses relating to feasibility using QCA. I explain the rationale for using a mixed methods approach and introduce the various conditions used in the QCA, including both those that other scholars have argued as determinant and the feasibility factors I propose. After providing an overview of the QCA process, I conduct the analysis and identify the unique combinations of conditions that best explain intervention and nonintervention. Using those solutions, I then conduct an out-of-sample test to evaluate the predictive power of the causal recipes.

Chapter 4 is a comparative historical analysis of contemporaneous crises under Bush 41: Bosnia and Somalia in 1992. The analysis builds on the findings from the QCA in the preceding chapter by examining the role that the feasibility concerns identified in Chapter 3 play on Bush’s deliberations. This is accomplished primarily through the analysis of previously classified primary source documents from the George

H.W. Bush Presidential Library, as well as supporting secondary sources. The material includes the minutes from NSC meetings, small group discussions, and communications between senior government officials involved in the decision-making process. The purpose of the chapter is to understand why the Bush 41 administration chose to intervene in Somalia but not in Bosnia and if the feasibility factors identified in the QCA were present in the historical record of the decisional dialogues.

Chapter 5, drawing on primary sources from the Clinton Presidential Library, uses the same method as Chapter 4 but compares the Clinton decisions to withdraw from Somalia and intervene in Bosnia. The previous two chapters emphasized conditions near crisis onset. Looking beyond the initial decision window and process tracing how the Somalia and Bosnia situations change, I expand on the theoretical application of feasibility factor analysis by demonstrating that Clinton's decisions reverse when the feasibility assessments change from positive to negative, and vice versa.

Chapter 6 concludes. In it I provide an overview of the central argument, a summation of the empirical findings, and further expand on the implications. In closing I discuss the limitations of this study outline some recommendations for future research.

Summary

This dissertation explores why U.S. presidents have decided to intervene militarily in some foreign crises but not others in recent decades. By incorporating feasibility into the theory behind intervention decisions where previously only concern for demand existed, this work sheds light on a powerful set of factors that help explain both action and inaction. As the subsequent chapters will demonstrate, a crisis may emit

a strong demand signal with many clamoring that something ought to be done; but without feasible alternatives, U.S. presidents of the modern era have been reluctant to send in ground troops. Therefore, to best understand and evaluate intervention decisions, one must account for the role that feasibility plays in determining the final outcome.

CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY

This chapter serves two purposes. First, it situates this work within the existing body of literature. Second, based on a gap identified within the extant literature in explaining what about the crisis environment makes a military intervention feasible, this chapter articulates the theoretical framework upon which the subsequent analyses are built. Previous intervention scholars had implicitly or explicitly hypothesized a threshold for action, usually based on the accumulation of demand signals from both international and domestic political sources. I reformulate that approach and argue that the demands they describe create an opportunity for action, but that the decision threshold is tied directly to the feasibility of a military intervention being able to achieve the policy goals.

Literature Review

The following literature review looks at how scholars have analyzed military intervention decisions and provides an understanding of where this work contributes to the existing body of knowledge. In particular, it highlights the growth of a nascent consideration often treated in the background as an assumption or precursor issue when evaluating intervention decisions: *the feasibility of military intervention given salient aspects of the crisis environment*. As I demonstrate in the following chapters, this previously underrepresented factor proves useful in explaining the apparent inconsistencies in U.S. presidential decisions regarding the commitment of U.S. forces to resolve foreign crises.

Attempts to understand the selective use of force by presidents, or what was similarly termed "intervention" by Rosenau (1967, 168) have assumed a variety of theoretical approaches. A recent review of research by Aubone (2013), provided a useful typology for the literature, grouping the work into two different categories: research centered on either external or internal determinants for the decision to intervene (pp. 281-298). I follow her lead in this regard for two reasons: first, because I believe her model appropriately portrays the development of the literature in concise fashion; and second, it does so in a way that illuminates the limitations these determinants have in fully understanding decisions to intervene. "External" and "internal" determinants refer to the origin of the demand signal for an intervention. Discussed in greater detail below, external refers for demands generated by forces and concerns rooted in the international arena whereas internal refers to those stemming from domestic matters.² The literature supporting both sets of determinants ascribe to the same logic, that the cumulative weight of the demand is what triggers a decision to intervene.

The graphical depiction below (Figure 2.1) portrays the common cumulative demand explanation for interventions emphasizing the two demand source categories (internal and external determinants) that exert pressure on the presidential decision space. These sources capture everything from demands stemming from economic ties to allies,

² This study acknowledges that there is another body of literature addressing presidential decision-making that is situated on the leader and their personal or chosen organizational attributes. These include significant works such as Horowitz and Stam (2014), Horowitz, McDermott, and Stam (2005), Preston (2001), and Vertzberger (1990), among others. However, because the focus of this research is on the feasibility of military operations for the U.S., it necessarily must be temporally delimited to produce consistency in the challenges faced and the types and capabilities of military tools at the presidents' disposal. This necessarily results in a small N problem, making it impossible to draw significant conclusions from differences in characteristics such as age, military service, or organizational models. Beyond that, my contribution to this body of literature is not in the decision-making model itself, as most of these studies propose, but instead in the content to be considered in the models. Namely, this study recommends the inclusion of feasibility factors in whatever decision-making model is being evaluated.

to geopolitical security interests, to congressional or public pressures at home. In all of these views what matters is the rationale for action and whether there is enough pressure exerted to trigger an intervention. Implied in these theories is that at some point a threshold tied to the amount or type of demand signal is crossed whereby the benefits of the intervention outweigh the costs and risks associated with failure. Where the studies vary is in the types of demand that are said to elicit the greater response. What is not commonly identified is what factors are tied to the placement of that threshold in the decision space. Ostrom and Job (1986) argue that the threshold is tied to an appreciation of the crisis situation as a whole as either conducive to a major use of force or not. I agree. However, no one has adequately operationalized what separates an environment conducive to intervention vice one that is not. I argue that understanding key feasibility factors can help us know where that threshold lies. The omission of what influences the placement of that notional decision threshold is central to understanding the gap in the intervention literature. The following two sections expose this gap by elaborating on the internal and external determinant categories that scholars argue influence intervention decisions.




Figure 2.1 Cumulative Demand Explanation for Intervention Decisions

External Determinants

Of these two categories, the external determinants are the more traditional form, with their roots reaching back to the realist scholars who attribute the actions of state leaders to issues of power, security, and state interests relative to other states within the global system (Waltz 1959 and 1979; Morgenthau 1948; Walt 1987; Mearsheimer 2001). This category also includes those that recognized the interdependencies (e.g., economic and social) among states as exerting pressure on leaders and the formulation of their foreign policy decisions (Keohane and Nye 1977). The externalist position views the president as responsive to an external stimulus, such as a crisis abroad. This approach served as the dominant paradigm throughout the majority of the Cold War, explaining interactions in a bipolar and contested world.

Studies within the external determinants have also included more nuanced approaches to alliance relationships (Smith 1996) and explored the role of global

economic influences on state interaction as well (Fordham 2008). For instance, Fordham demonstrates empirically that alliances are important, but that exports appear to have an indirect effect on intervention decisions. More recently, a more constructivist approach has lent its weight to the externalist position. Numerous scholars, especially those considering the use of force for humanitarian purposes, have assessed the impact of international norms on these decisions and found them to hold sway (Finnemore 2004; Talentino 2005; Choi 2013; Wheeler 2000). Walling (2013) specifically calls out the roles that argumentation and narrative play at the United Nations Security Council in leading to intervention decisions. These works move away from the materialist principles of their externalist forbears and identify the role of intersubjective effects on states through their interaction and involvement within a more cooperative international order. The hallmark of this category, for both the rationalist and the constructivist approaches, is the position that domestic politics do not impinge, at least not to an overriding extent, on decisions within international affairs. Various sources of these determinants can be seen in Figure 2.1 above.

External determinant studies point to a number of relevant factors contributing to decisions to use force within the international environment. However, at the core of this perspective is the assumption that international systemic factors can and should be isolated from the problematic whole, including the domestic influences on that decision (Waltz [1979] 2010). This bifurcation results in these studies tending to look at decisional stimuli as a matter of urgency, whether that urgency traces its roots from state interests or international norms. It could be a threat to an ally, a disruption to international trade, or a call to stop a genocide, but the research focused on external

determinants is primarily concerned with the imperative for intervention – whether an action *should* be pursued. These studies seldom emphasize the part of the decision assessing whether the action *can be* effectively carried out with the means available given the constraints of the situation. An apt example is Yoon (1997) who identifies a number of factors as statistically significant in contributing to U.S. interventions into third world civil wars between 1945 and 1989. These influences include whether the Soviet Union or one of their allies were involved and if the target of the intervention was communist, of strategic importance, and in geographic proximity to the U.S. (Yoon 1997, 582). Note that these considerations are those that make an argument *for* intervention, providing a rationale as to why an intervention may be considered; absent are concerns that would squelch involvement.

Studies from the external determinant group that do attempt to capture some of decisional concerns not associated with the “demand,” but instead with the pragmatics of carrying out the operation, involve the notion of expectations of success. When incorporated, this is frequently done in a relatively limited fashion with proxies designed for the conflicts most prominent in the study. For instance, studies covering interstate wars emphasize relative power between adversaries in dyadic relationships as a predictor for expected outcomes (Bueno de Mesquita 1981, 107; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992, 294-297). These design decisions are often due to efforts to strive for parsimony in formal modelling or statistical inquiry, serving these studies well in many ways. However, calculations such as these are of little help when trying to understand the utility of force in more nuanced applications such as stopping a civil war as a neutral party or attempting to quell an insurgency.

Critiques of overly-simplified analyses of decision-making processes are not new, with many scholars incorporating a variety of considerations into their analytic techniques including a range of considerations from the domestic political sphere as well (George 1980; Ostrom and Job 1986). These studies acknowledged that the decision space was complicated and that more than external factors bore on the decision. As Allison (1971) observed, "[s]pectacles magnify one set of factors rather than another and thus not only lead analysts to produce different explanations of problems that appear, but also...what he takes to be an explanation" (p. 251). In other words, the answers to the questions we ask are limited to the possible answers we consider.

Internal Determinants

Juxtaposed to the externalist perspective is the view that internal determinants, those influences stemming from domestic factors, contribute significantly to presidential decisions to use force. This perspective does not view presidential intervention decisions as solely responsive to stimuli external to the state, but rather responsive to domestically-oriented concerns. Scholarship following this premise has explored the impact of public opinion on decisions to intervene (Baum 2004; Entman 2004), as well as the "diversionary use of force" to manipulate that opinion for political gain (see Levy 1989 for expansive critique on this contention). Other scholars have contrasted the external influences with domestic economic conditions, finding linkages between the state of the economy and decisions to use force (DeRouen 1995). Still others have assessed the role of political institutions and electoral cycles to find explanations for intervention behavior (Feaver and Gelpi 2012; Hildebrandt, Hillebrecht, Holm, and

Pevehouse 2013; Howell and Pevehouse 2007).

As these arguments developed, internal and external determinant advocates have attempted to pair domestic variables against international systemic considerations to determine which holds more explanatory power and in what circumstances. Howell and Pevehouse (2007) investigated the role of internal determinants including congressional composition and the power of the president's party, pitting these factors against traditional external determinants such as power, capabilities, and trade levels with the U.S. for comparison (p. 94). They found that partisan composition does indeed have a significant effect on decisions to use force (Ibid., 222). This subject area, as seen through this sampling, reinforces Aubone's organization (see Figure 2.1) for two main groups of determinants influencing presidential decisions.

The internal determinants scholarship pulls the field in a different direction from the externalist position, finding statistically significant relationships between domestic influences and military intervention. However, by emphasizing internal pressures at the expense of other potential determinants, this approach, like the previous, makes an argument for a singular determinant as the principle arbiter in choices to use force. An example within this category is a study of public opinion's role in shaping foreign policy. Matthew Baum (2004) finds that public opinion can be a constraint on the president's decision to use force based on a study of United States' actions with Somalia over the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations from 1992 to 1994. Baum (2004) hypothesizes that "unless the president is highly confident of success, as public attentiveness increases, the president will be less willing to escalate or use force" (p. 196). He goes on to point out that in Somalia the expectation of success was high and

the strategic stakes were low, and posits that it was the change in public opinion during the conduct of the operations that caused the Clinton administration to withdraw forces (Baum 2004, 199). However, this view again highlights the prominent issue within this literature: attributing greater causality to the determinant of focus, in this case a domestic political factor, while overlooking alternative hypotheses unrelated to intervention demands.

Baum's is one of the few studies within the literature to attempt to integrate the "expectation of success" as part of the research model, attempting to address some of the operational aspects of the problem. However, Baum treats the portion of his hypothesis dealing with the president's expectations of success as static, fixed from the outset; at the same time, he allows for changing public sentiment over the course of the operation to influence his analysis. This creates a noteworthy inconsistency. It is just as plausible that the deteriorating operational situation in Somalia in 1993 altered what President Clinton considered possible.

The availability of evidence supporting competing hypotheses from both camps within the literature makes one wonder whether the incorporation of this consistently underrepresented aspect of these situations – expectations of success – may improve our understanding of presidential behavior.

Expectation of Success

Some scholars have chosen to build off an old idea – the importance of an expectation of success. This factor was one of the chief concerns in Morgenthau's principle of "selectivity," which advocates for a dual focus on the decision to intervene:

one eye aimed at the goal and the other to the feasibility to achieve it (Morgenthau 1967, 436). However, over time, the question of efficacy faded into the backdrop. Scholars such as Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) used probabilities of success as part of their formal models. For the sake of parsimony and due to the dominant characteristics of the international environment at the time, the variables largely reflected relative power comparisons between would-be opponents (Buena de Mesquita and Lalman 1992, 294-295). This treatment, while proving prescient in a number of analyses, is largely limited in its application to interstate wars based on the manner in which likely success is measured. The types of simplification that became common practice because of their utility in the bipolar Cold War served to obscure the feasibility factor, sheltering it within the “security” rubric of the external determinants as the field emerged from the era. Scholars have recently begun to expose feasibility to the analytical light.

An example of this recent shift is Patrick Regan, who laid the conceptual groundwork for addressing this omission in the scholarship through his works discussing interventions in civil wars (Regan 1998 and 2002). He adopts a synthetic approach, factoring in both international and domestic factors, as well as an appreciation of the situation itself. When evaluating the decision maker's use of force, Regan sees a "reasonable expectation of success," a short "projected time horizon," and the necessity for "domestic support" as three conditions necessary to commit to intervention (Regan 1998, 757-758). Although Regan is primarily interested in the efficacy of different strategies, the introduction of these elements begins to bridge the divide in the scholarship and hint at how the inconsistent conclusions drawn between internal and external determinants can be reconciled. This may hold the potential to expose

relationships between variables that heretofore have been unobservable. However, Regan's operationalization of this concept poses some issues in overcoming the type of puzzles referenced earlier. The variables he includes as part of his expectations of success are limited to the following: "contiguity," looking at how close a potential intervener is to the conflict in distance; "conflict intensity," assessing the amount of casualties; and "refugee crisis" and "cold war" as dichotomous variables either occurring or not (Regan 2002, 56). While Regan captured some important aspects that provide greater sensitivity to the problem itself, I believe these have only limited utility in determining whether the use of force is likely to produce the desired outcome, especially when considering uses of force that go outside his civil war intervention focus area.

Gauging potential success as part of the decision-making process has become a more consistent theme in humanitarian literature as well, although like Regan's efforts, operationalizing the concept has varied in emphasis and approach. Taylor Seybolt (2007) identifies a number of principles to aid policy makers in their decisions, one of which is the concern for a "reasonable chance of success" (267-268). Central to Seybolt's point is the impact of inadvertent consequences, which is a significant issue for the use of ground forces because of their concomitant effects on the crisis environment, both intended and unintended. As Seybolt argues, we must face the issue of whether the intervention is likely to cause more harm than good (Ibid, 269). However, like the scholars discussed previously, Seybolt does not operationalize the concept, leaving it as a subjective matter wherein the important consideration is the aim of the intervention. As he states, "the question of how to intervene with a reasonable prospect of success is essentially a question of strategy" (Seybolt 2007, 269). Therefore, according to this

tautological reasoning, as long as the president chooses the correct strategy, success is possible regardless of the crisis environment. This seems to contravene the point made above, that conditions could be such that an effective strategy may not be devisable.

The Impact of Feasibility on Expectations of Success

What types of concerns must we account for when thinking of feasibility and how it influences a president's expectation of success? The subset of literature dealing with civil war interventions again proves lucrative. Aydin (2010), much like Regan before, highlights important features of the conflict itself, specifically the role of uncertainty in the decision to intervene. Of note, Aydin finds that states are more hesitant to intervene the longer a conflict goes on and with the greater resiliency displayed by the potential adversary (Aydin 2010, 47-48). Although his study does not employ variables aimed at the expectation of success, it does illuminate an extraordinarily important aspect: leader behavior in response to a dynamic environment. Aydin exposes this feature by identifying the points when states choose to enter the fray. By revealing the halting trend exhibited by leaders in the face of the previous failures of other actors, the emphasis of the inquiry moves from the cumulative demand signal emitted from particular determinants (e.g., horrible atrocity or ethnic ties to afflicted state), to caution emanating from the problematic characteristics of the crisis (e.g., failure seems likely). Aydin does not provide a clear grasp of what features should comprise a determinant category for generating confidence in achieving the intervention outcome but does demonstrate the meaningful effect that the challenging aspects of a crisis are likely to produce, namely, decreased expectations for success.

Ostrom and Job (1986) employed a "cybernetic decision making" model in their study on presidential uses of force to capture the complexity posed by these situations (pp. 543-544). They recognized the need to reevaluate the way presidents process the information presented to them. However, like most scholars in this field, they emphasized demand over all else when explaining decision outcomes. Unlike others though, Ostrom and Job (1986) explicitly hypothesized the existence of a threshold representing a "composite environmental evaluation," identifying the point at which the environmental context is conducive to major uses of force" (p. 551). If the cumulative demand moves beyond this threshold then the result is a decision to intervene (see Figure 2.1). What they do not account for is what factors of the environment influence the placement of that threshold.

What if the threshold for action was influenced by more than demand? What if it had more to do with the expected ease of the intervention? The characteristics of the crisis environment, if confounding, may be seen to reduce perceptions of the probability of success. Alternatively, absent such characteristics, the situation may present advantageous conditions that heighten perceived feasibility.

The preceding discussion, viewed holistically, indicates that perhaps the best way to explain intervention behavior lies in the nexus between the demand signals for action from the internal and/or external determinants and the feasibility assessment of the operational characteristics of the situation. The next section addresses how these elements interact to produce a presidential decision to either use force or sit on the sidelines.

Theory

One must begin with an assessment of whether intervention is desirable, then address its feasibility, and then return to the question of desirability. Intervening must pass muster both on its own terms and compared to the alternatives.

- Richard Haass, former Special Assistant to President George H.W. Bush (1999, 156)

Previous efforts to explore intervention behavior, as we have seen, have centered on the desirability aspect of the decision-making process. What motivates the decision? This approach does a good job of identifying the various demands for action. But what happens when cases of nonintervention are queried as to why leaders failed to respond? The motivational factors that gave rise to a positive decision are the only ones available to provide an alternative explanation. Consequently, we have trouble understanding why cases like the 1994 Rwandan genocide did not instigate a military intervention to stop such a horrendous tragedy.

What I intend to do is reformulate the assessment of U.S. presidential decisions around an alternative view that incorporates operational feasibility into the decision process, introducing an important element that has either been presumed to be constant across intervention decisions, or – in the case of Regan or others – has not been measured with a very high degree of precision. The aim is to see if this new category of considerations, underrepresented in the extant literature, can explain some of the contradictory findings in U.S. military intervention behavior.

The point made above by former presidential advisor, Richard Haass, is a concise way of stating the underlying premise for the following theory. I maintain that presidents go through a process whereby they respond to the demand signals for action

but temper that response through a judicious appreciation of the potential efficacy of military force given the situational circumstances. *The causal chain for intervention decisions is comprised of three parts: 1) recognizing an opportunity to intervene based on significant demand, 2) assessing the likelihood of success for the use of force given the constraints of the crisis environment, and finally 3) given the anticipated costs associated with employing that force, determining whether an intervention is still advisable.*

This causal chain does not necessarily proceed in such a lock-step fashion in reality; instead, it proceeds through multiple recursive iterations between assessing demands along with the feasibility of potential options. Thus, the mechanism described above is a simplification, but one that is useful for working through the central pieces of the intervention decision process. It is rooted in real-world examples for how presidents have sought and processed the advice of their military and security advisors.

Take the handling of the Syrian Civil War for an exemplar of how the strategic assessment process works. Since the war began in 2011, more than 400,000 have lost their lives, with violence causing over 5 million refugees and 6 million internally displaced persons to flee their homes, creating a significant intervention opportunity (Human Rights Watch 2018). Yet, no U.S. military intervention has been launched to take on the Assad regime and end the crisis by either the Obama or Trump administrations. This reluctance to engage began under Obama's tenure when the supposed "red line" was crossed by Assad when he used chemical weapons on his people, creating the first real impetus for action. Obama directed Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Martin Dempsey to develop military options to deal with the crisis. The Joint Staff developed a range of

options from training opposition fighters, to imposing a no-fly zone, to conducting air strikes (Haber 2013). What the Pentagon did not recommend was a military intervention to end the conflict. This reluctance was met with significant opposition by those, such as Senator John McCain, who believed that something should be done despite Panetta's expressed concerns over identification of an achievable mission at acceptable costs (see Figure 2.2 below) (United States Senate 2012, 15).

<p>Senator MCCAIN. So the President said yesterday he's taken no options off the table, and you said in your opening statement that includes, as I mentioned, potential military options, if necessary. Can you tell us how much longer the killing would have to continue, how many additional civilian lives would have to be lost, in order to convince you that military measures of this kind that we are proposing necessary to end the killing and force to leave power, how many more have to die? 10,000 more? 20,000 more? How many more?</p> <p>Secretary PANETTA. I think the question, as you stated yourself, Senator, is the effort to try to build an international consensus as to what action we do take. That makes the most sense. What doesn't make sense is to take unilateral action at this point.</p> <p>As Secretary of Defense, before I recommend that we put our sons and daughters in uniform in harm's way, I have to make very sure that we know what the mission is. I have to make very sure that we know whether we can achieve that mission, at what price, and whether or not it will make matters better or worse. Those are the considerations that I have to engage in, and obviously the administration believes that every effort ought to be made to deal with those concerns in the international setting to try to build the kind of international consensus that worked in Libya and that can work in Syria if we can develop that.</p>

Figure 2.2 Excerpt from Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing: The Situation in Syria (March 7, 2012)

Through the Syria example we see the causal chain on display: there is a demand signal for action, followed by a feasibility assessment, with a subsequent judgment as to whether what can be gained warrants the anticipated costs. Both Obama and then Trump chose to forego the military intervention option. In addition, Secretary Panetta's commentary in the excerpt above highlights some of the considerations that go into that assessment, strengthening the central contention of this work – that the feasibility factors

advanced in this theory are critical to developing that assessment and sway the intervention decision in significant measure. What we see from examples such as this is that the cost of potential failure often trumps the costs associated with not intervening – e.g., the domestic or international audience costs, or in the potential for greater deterioration of the situation over time.

After identifying the key assumptions upon which the theory rests, the remainder of the theoretical section proceeds in accordance with Haass's characterization of the three-part causal chain. First, we identify whether an intervention is desirable - does it present an "opportunity" for intervention and is there sufficient demand? Second, we determine whether the environment is conducive to intervention using feasibility factors to gain an understanding of what makes a crisis environment more or less complex. Finally, once feasibility has been incorporated, we return to desirability by introducing an expected utility formula as a heuristic to demonstrate the interaction between the demands placed on the president by the internal/external determinants and the feasibility factors assessment.

Assumptions

This theory is predicated on four assumptions. First, I assume that U.S. presidents are the key decider in decisions to intervene militarily (Bueno de Mesquita 1981, 20). While it can be argued that each administration's decision apparatus can significantly influence decision (Allison 1971), the personal nature of the act is highly consistent with U.S. presidential responsibilities as Commander in Chief. As evidenced in the case studies in subsequent chapters, there are many voices that take part in the

national security decision-making process in the United States, but the decision ultimately falls to the president. This maintains the agency for the action or inaction with the president. Others might argue that the adversary may have a role in determining the outcome. For instance, it is possible that a potential enemy may adopt an organizational structure or purposefully cut off logistical accessibility to the conflict region for the purposes of thwarting U.S. interference. However, this study is about understanding why presidents act, given the conditions they face. The possible implications for would-be adversaries will be addressed in the implications of the study.

The second assumption, related directly to the first, is that a decision *not* to intervene is a decision nonetheless, not an example of indecision. Passing on an intervention opportunity in this view is a purposive act. That purpose is derived from some rationale, the contents of which this study seeks, in part, to provide. I maintain that, whether explicitly recognized or stated openly, the president is cognizant of the feasibility factors addressed herein along with their implications. The factors this study uses for analysis are gathered from “open source” resources. The president, with access to the resources of the intelligence community and with planning conducted within the Department of Defense, is at least be aware of the types of considerations noted here. This assumption maintains agency with the president instead of granting it to the situation itself.

A third assumption, common among the literature, is that presidents are "rational, expected-utility maximizers" (Bennett and Stam 1996; Bueno de Mesquita 1981). This assumption holds that presidents undertake a calculative effort, weighing costs and benefits of potential outcomes along with the risk and uncertainty inherent to the task.

The president can therefore be expected to make policy choices that they expect, at the time of decision, to accrue greater political benefits than the costs they expect to incur. Central to the president's calculation is the expectation of success or failure – the value placed on p and q in their notional formula. Where expectations of success have been addressed in the scholarship prior to this it has usually been associated with some variation on relative capabilities between actors, in levels of risk acceptance (Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992), or in the magnitude of the crisis (Regan 2002). This study adopts a different way of determining the odds of success or failure in the decision calculus. I focus on the aspects of the situation that run counter to the expectations of success addressed by previous authors who dealt with civil wars and humanitarian interventions. If success means accomplishing military objectives within a short time horizon without unreasonable exertion, then there are clearly situations whose characteristics run counter to those expectations. The feasibility factors this study presents address some of the key aspects of the operational environment that sow doubt in the president's mind when they are present. The more those problematic factors are present, the less feasible military options appear, significantly altering the expected utility calculation.

The fourth assumption is that presidents seek to retain power. Thus, the reason for the word "political" to be associated with costs and benefits in the previous assumption. This is commonly stated as a leader's preference to "stay in power" (Miller 1995, 764). In this interpretation though, presidential power goals are aimed at retaining or gaining power and not merely staying in office. This stands to reason since a president seeks the ability to govern effectively according to their policy preferences. Losses in

the foreign policy realm (e.g., ill-conceived intervention decisions) can detract from presidential power. Exercising what is seen as poor judgment lessens the persuasive power of the office (Neustadt 1991, chapter 3). This is likely to cost the president's party at the polls and their ability to govern from a preferred agenda due to the contested nature of the U.S. political environment (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992).

Desirability: Identifying Valid Opportunities

The first step in the causal chain is determining whether an intervention is desirable, using Haass's word. This is about identifying valid intervention opportunities for presidential decision. As the review of the literature has demonstrated, there are sound arguments to be made for both types of determinants, internal and external. Since that is demonstrable, it seems that what is considered an opportunity should incorporate both types of drivers in its derivation. This study follows Blechman and Kaplan (1978), Zelikow (1986), Meernik (1994; 2004), and Howell and Pevehouse (2007) in tethering the decisions to the crises themselves and evaluating the unique situations they present. This should enable clearer distinctions to be made between them.

Opportunities are classified here based on the strength of demand they represent to the president, aggregating the overall effect on a single scale. These demands can hold both positive and negative values. In some cases, the external influences may be clamoring for action while the domestic audiences argue for U.S. troops to stay home. This treatment ensures that both are factored in when weighing the overall demand signal. The premise for this formula is drawn from the initial theoretical portion of Ostrom and Job (1986, 551) and may be formalized in the following way:

$$D_o = \sum E_o + \sum I_o + e_o$$

where D_o is the composite demand represented by the intervention opportunity, E_o and I_o are the specific demand signals from external and internal determinants, respectively, and e_o recognizes that there are demands from other sources that unsystematically influence the decision. If the net output of that signal is at least positive, the crisis in question may be viewed as a viable intervention opportunity (see Figure 2.3). It is illogical to believe that the president would choose to intervene in a situation where there is not a positive demand signal emitted. The figure below notes that the crisis can be viewed from either or both of these lenses and that they interact to produce an opportunity when the demands for action outweigh those for inaction.




Figure 2.3 Opportunity Identification

This study, in line with the reviewed literature, expects that if the probability of intervention is linked to the strength of the demand signal, both will increase in parallel, *ceteris paribus*. The next step is to incorporate the potential impact of feasibility into the president's calculation to see how it may potentially influence observed outcomes.

Feasibility: Identifying the Operational Feasibility Factors

The scholarship on intervention may not address the idea of feasibility, but the executive branch and the military assess feasibility regularly, holding a prominent place in the decision calculus. This is evident in the accounts of key advisors that have been involved in the decision process (Haass 1999). Feasibility is one of the five "validity criteria" considered during course of action development within the Joint Operation Planning Process (Joint Staff 2017). This is important to note, since the intervention options presented for decision through the National Security Council often assume a doctrinaire form; this is because the military develops them, typically the headquarters that expects to carry out the mission (Hoar 1993).

Given a crisis, military planners are trained to evaluate the situation as part of their mission analysis using what are called "Operational Variables" (Army Doctrine 2012, 1-7). These variables address everything that could impact the environment where the potential mission could take place ranging from the political or economic conditions of the state in crisis, to the state's geographical characteristics and infrastructure. These considerations are used by military planners to develop proposals used within the U.S. national security apparatus.³ Based on this, I reason that presidents receive strategic options for remedying these problems within a construct that incorporates these considerations. The five feasibility factors used in this study to determine anticipated expectations of success are rooted in the principles of these military processes and are essential components of strategic assessment. These factors "are fundamental to

³ The author took part in developing these military options for numerous crises in Africa and participated in planning forums for those in separate areas of responsibility, for consideration by the National Security Council between 2015 to 2018.

developing a comprehensive understanding of an operational environment” (Army Doctrine 2012, 1-7). I develop observable measure for each of them here to capture important attributes of a crisis that influence notions of feasibility.

The first feasibility factor is the type of conflict; it accounts for the “cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup” within the problem situation (Army Doctrine 2012, 1-7). Is the conflict based on either ethnic or religious differences which are commonly intractable, or on ideological or material concerns? If it is the former, the situation is thought to be less feasible, requiring longer and more costly commitments to resolve, and vice versa if the latter (see Wimmer et al. 2009). Moreover, military interventions aimed at resolving religious or ethnic disputes have a poor record of accomplishment (Regan 2002, 30).

The second feasibility factor concerns the existence of a supportable regime. Does the U.S. have a clear leader or regime to support in the conflict or are they expected to intervene as a neutral party with belligerents on both sides? This concern is consistent with scholarly findings on the success of interventions being associated with support for one side or the other rather than assuming a neutral posture (Regan 2002). A supportable regime would include an agreed upon ceasefire agreement where both/all sides agree not to counter the intervening parties.

The third factor addresses the anticipated enemy’s structure, a departure from previous studies that relied principally on capabilities. Instead, it is an assessment of how the adversary is organized. Diffuse and networked militaries add greater complexity to the situation than do hierarchical ones. Hierarchical organizations are easier to target and to predict the outcome of strikes (King 2014). Alternatively,

decentralized organizations must be countered in a coordinated way on multiple levels of scale, increasing the complexity of the situation and the difficulty in predicting outcomes (Bar-Yam 2004, 100). If the forces opposing the U.S. military are hierarchically organized and tightly networked, this makes them susceptible to strike and opens the possibility for a quick win. On the other hand, if the enemy is diffuse and loosely networked, they are more difficult to target. Here again, the latter enemy type often requires more resources and longer time frames to contend with. This can be demonstrated through the simple comparison of the 1991 Gulf War with Saddam Hussein in power lasting 100 hours versus the Second Persian Gulf War focused on quelling secular civil war among militia groups that went on from 2003 to 2011, with arguably negligible results.

The fourth feasibility factor covers accessibility, capturing the infrastructure and logistics considerations for the operation. How logistically feasible is it to deploy and sustain forces in the crisis environment? Limitations associated with the availability of key nodes, the depth of sea ports, and the length and composition of runways directly impact what U.S. forces can deploy. Logistics challenges have always presented formidable obstacles, particularly as they pertain to interventions that require “opening” overseas theaters of operations, meeting intra-theater transportation needs, and supporting contingency operations where little infrastructure exists initially (Magruder 1994).

Finally, the last feasibility concern has to do with population density.⁴ Here, I address “terrain complexity” (Army Doctrine 2012, 1-8). Will the intervention occur in

⁴ As noted in Chapter 1, this feasibility factor did not prove as useful as the previous four in the study, but it was included in the analyses and is therefore retained here.

a primarily urban or rural setting? The former complicates the situation for ground forces, making discernment of friend and foe difficult and collateral damage more likely when applying force. Highly populated areas therefore pose a greater challenge for an intervener (see Krulak 1999).

The greater the number of these factors trending toward infeasibility, the lower the president's expectation of success in achieving the intervention goals. This means that there is an additive component to an appreciation of the situation. Like the demand signal above, the feasibility factor effect can be formalized in the following way:

$$F_o = C_o + R_o + E_o + A_o + P_o$$

where F_o is the combined value of the negative feasibility factors for the intervention opportunity, and C_o is the conflict type, R_o is the existence of a supportable regime, E_o is the enemy's structure, A_o is the accessibility of the crisis environment, and P_o is the population density for the area of expected force employment.

Now that we know the value of both the demand for intervention as well as the feasibility assessment for successful execution we can locate the feasibility threshold (h) within the decision space. Ostrom and Job (1986) contend that there is a threshold within the environmental factors where a potential intervention situation transitions from unfavorable to favorable conditions (p. 551). Borrowing from their work, I agree that such a threshold exists, but that it is not an unobservable element of the analysis as they contend (Ibid.). Instead, the threshold is best understood as an interaction between the demand signal and the feasibility factors that trend negatively, expressed thus:

$$h = D_o \div F_o$$

The threshold incorporates both demand and feasibility because they are linked.

Demand and feasibility affect one another in two directions. First, and most obviously, infeasible characteristics of the environment undercut the effect of the demand signal on the probability of intervention. When this is the case, it does not matter how strong the demand signal, enough infeasible factors can thwart a response (e.g., Rwanda 1994). Less obvious and working in the other direction, high demand can influence feasibility by causing the president to modify the preferred policy position until the mission associated with fulfilling it can be expected to succeed. In other words, the mission is tailored or timed to increase feasibility. The later chapters covering George H.W. Bush's evolution on how to handle Somalia in 1992 or Clinton's timing of the Bosnian intervention in 1995 are good cases in point. Acknowledging how this threshold affects the intervention decision, we can revise the previous demand-focused intervention graphic to incorporate the impact of feasibility (see Figure 2.4).




Figure 2.4. Feasibility Explanation for Intervention Decisions

Return to Desirability: The Expected Utility of Intervention

Now that we have articulated how feasibility factors influence the expectations of success, the final step in the causal chain is to return to the president's decision calculus. Just as Haass (1999) explained regarding intervention decisions, only after we have addressed both desirability and feasibility can a president then weigh the two given how they anticipate an intervention to unfold. This lends itself to an expected utility consideration in the final step, set up here as a heuristic to explain the process. The expected utility of intervention, weighing costs and benefits based on the likelihood of particular outcomes has been addressed in myriad ways. An excellent theoretical depiction of intervention decisions comes from Regan (2002, pp. 44-45). The two formulas here for intervention and nonintervention are nearly identical to his and can be expressed in the following way:

$$EU_i = p(U_a) + (1-p)(U_x) - \sum C_i$$

$$EU_{ni} = q(U_{ax}) + (1-q)(U_{xo}) - \sum C_{ni}$$

where EU_i is the expected utility of intervening, U_a is the utility gained from a successful action, U_x is the utility gained from acting unsuccessfully, and C_i is the costs, "reflecting human, material, and audience costs." EU_{ni} is the expected utility of nonintervention, with U_{ax} being the utility of their being an acceptable outcome without intervention, U_{xo} being the utility of the crisis continuing without having intervened, and C_{ni} is the costs accrued by nonintervention.

The key difference between this theory and Regan's is that he maintains that it is whichever option, intervention or nonintervention, that holds the greatest utility that

determines the outcome (Ibid.). I maintain that that even if intervention is the preferred option (i.e., $EU_i > EU_{ni}$), the utility for intervention still must clear the feasibility threshold (h) we established in the previous step for the president to intervene. Based on this and recognizing that the president's options are dichotomous, presidential actions for a given opportunity can be represented as $I_o = 1$ for intervention and $I_o = 0$ for nonintervention. Blending Regan's (2004) and Ostrom and Job's (1986) theories, I posit the following as the full expected utility calculation:

$$p(I = 1) = p[(EU_i - EU_{ni}) > h] =$$

$$p[(p(U_a) + (1-p)(U_x) - \sum C_i) - (q(U_{ax}) + (1-q)(U_{xo}) - \sum C_{ni})] > (D_o \div F_o)$$

This formula states that the probability of the president choosing to intervene does indeed rest on a sufficient demand signal, but demand alone is not enough. While the demand must be positive to register a call to action, the strength of the demand signal is not the most important aspect in predicting intervention. Instead, the expected utility of intervention must exceed a threshold (h) that incorporates the dynamic interaction between *both* demand (D_o) and feasibility (F_o), beyond which feasible military options are perceived to be possible (see Figure 2.4 above). This calculation adds a great deal of weight to the feasibility assessment. This is the key difference between this study and previous works: my approach emphasizes the critical role of feasibility in decisions to intervene.

The preceding discussion yields the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1

As operational feasibility decreases, the probability of intervention decreases.

Hypothesis 1 can – in turn – be broken down further into the specific dimensions of feasibility outlined above, and these are represented by Hypotheses 2 through 7.

Hypothesis 2: Conflict Type

- 2a. If the crisis is not the product of ethnic or religious cleavages and there is a positive demand signal from internal and external determinants, the likelihood of intervention increases.*
- 2b. If the crisis stems from ethnic or religious cleavages, the likelihood of intervention decreases regardless of stimuli from internal and external determinants.*

Hypothesis 3: Supportable Regime

- 3a. If the U.S. has a clear leader or regime to support and there is a positive demand signal from internal and external determinants, the likelihood of intervention increases.*
- 3b. If the U.S. does not have a clear leader or regime to support, the likelihood of intervention decreases regardless of stimuli from internal and external determinants.*

Hypothesis 4: Enemy Structure

- 4a. If the potential enemy is organized hierarchically (susceptible to strike) and there is a positive demand signal from internal and external determinants, the likelihood of intervention increases.*
- 4b. If the potential enemy is organized diffusely, the likelihood of intervention decreases regardless of stimuli from internal and external determinants.*

Hypothesis 5: Accessibility

- 5a. If the target location is logistically accessible and there is a positive demand signal from internal and external determinants, the likelihood of intervention increases.*
- 5b. If the target location is logistically inaccessible, the likelihood of intervention decreases regardless of stimuli from internal and external determinants.*

Hypothesis 6: Population Density

6a. If the target location is primarily rural and there is a positive demand signal from internal and external determinants, the likelihood of intervention increases.

6b. If the target location is highly urbanized, the likelihood of intervention decreases regardless of stimuli from internal and external determinants.

Hypothesis 7: Too Complex

The greater the number of feasibility factors that trend toward infeasibility, the lower the likelihood of intervention.

In addition to the hypotheses representing the feasibility factors, we can represent past approaches to intervention with a hypothesis that focuses exclusively on demand signals.

Hypothesis 8: Demand Alone

Positive stimuli from both internal and external determinants combine to increase the probability of intervention, regardless of feasibility factors.

Conclusion

This chapter explored the literature covering military intervention decisions, exposing a gap in adequately addressing the types of considerations for developing expectations of success. Based on an understanding of how military options are generated within the U.S. national security community, I developed a theory for how feasibility impacts the likelihood of intervention. This work is grounded in expected utility theory and extends the scholarship of Regan (2002) to account for crisis environments such as civil wars or humanitarian disasters. This approach offers a more complete measure of an expectation of intervention success using five feasibility factors. It is most important to note that the key theoretic premise of this work is the notion that

feasibility underpins the threshold (*h*) that separates an environment conducive to intervention from one that is not. This unpacks an idea that other scholars identified as a key concern but had dismissed as unidentifiable - “relegated to a grey area of understanding” (Regan 2002, 46). The research design and empirical chapters that follow evaluate the preceding hypotheses in explaining presidential intervention decisions.

CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND HYPOTHESIS TESTING

The preceding chapter provided an overview of the intervention literature and identified a gap in how scholars have addressed the idea of expectations of success in their analyses, a critical component in understanding decisional outcomes. The underpinning factors that make presidents more or less confident in achieving their desired objectives have not been sufficiently addressed in the extant literature. This is particularly true for the types of interventions most common in the post-Cold War era. To help explain these, I advance feasibility factors to operationalize these concerns and in doing so shed light on this heretofore uncharted area of the decision-making process.

This purpose of this chapter is to articulate the research design for the remainder of the study and test the hypotheses I develop to incorporate operational feasibility through qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). The results from the QCA inform the case selection and qualitative analyses in the subsequent chapters.

Rationale for a Mixed Methods Approach

As the literature review exposed, most intervention research has been quantitative. This is not necessarily due to the nature of the research problem. Rather, scholars make methodological choices based on the ontological and epistemological frameworks they find compelling and applicable to their understanding of the subject matter. To accomplish my goals, I employ a methodological approach incorporating quantitative and qualitative components that can contend with the complexity of the presidential decision-making environment (Ragin 2008; Rihoux and Ragin 2009).

The analyses below account for competing and complementary aspects of the intervention opportunities stemming from domestic and international systemic demands as well as force employment considerations. My choice to adopt an approach blending qualitative and quantitative aspects stems from the way I have identified the potential nature of the problem, situated on the presidents' deliberative processes and the meaning they may attach to certain confounding aspects of a crisis.

This is not to say that this study embraces all the principles commonly associated with qualitative research. In fact, because it is building off the extensive work of others in the field, it starts from ontological premises and assumptions that are usually associated with the use of quantitative methods. However, because this research delves into and interprets the dialogues behind the decisions, the epistemological aspects are clearly linked to the qualitative tradition (Guba 1990; Crotty 1998; Creswell 2013).

Research Design

This is a three phase, mixed methods research design. Phase I is contained in this chapter and uses a configurational comparative method – QCA – to identify unique combinations of determinants and feasibility factors that are associated with both intervention and nonintervention outcomes. This phase is critical in identifying the factors that will be the subject of deeper scrutiny in the second and third phases, which are qualitative studies that build off the findings of the QCA.

Phase II (Chapter 4) is a comparative historical analysis of two crises that occurred near simultaneously under the George H.W. Bush administration: the famine and civil war in Somalia and the breakup of Yugoslavia. Here I use presidential library

archives to evaluate the extent to which the demands for action and the concerns over feasibility were explicitly discussed leading up to the final intervention decisions. The goal, through process tracing, is to identify how feasibility concerns weigh on intervention decisions. Is feasibility something implicit to the decisions and thus of little observable concern; or as I theorize above, that these factors are openly discussed and bear critically on presidential decisions?

Similarly, in the Phase III (Chapter 5), I again conduct a paired comparison, this time of the William J. Clinton decisions concerning the same conflicts during his tenure. Here though, Clinton decides to withdraw from Somalia where Bush had intervened and intervene in Bosnia where Bush had decided it too complex of a problem to commit troops. The aim is to extend the application of the theory, looking at what happens when the feasibility factors switch from favoring intervention to nonintervention, and vice versa. Do Clinton's decisions change when the factors reverse? Here again, I rely on presidential archival materials to test the theory.

In the remainder of this chapter I execute Phase I of the research design. First, I explain my analytical framework, operationalizing the theory into observable criteria for analysis and explain why QCA is appropriate for this study. Second, I lay out the method and design for the execution of the QCA. Third, I analyze 19 intervention opportunities for the U.S. between 1980 and 2013 and present the QCA solutions that emerge for interventions and noninterventions. Finally, I conduct an out-of-sample test of the solutions' forecasting capability. The findings support my theoretical contention that feasibility concerns are fundamental to explain both intervention and nonintervention decisions. For cases of intervention, three combinations of conditions account for all

cases of intervention in the sampled period. Of the three combinatorial conditions, feasibility factors were an element of each. Similarly, two combinations of conditions (both including two feasibility factors) explain all nonintervention decisions. In the end, the evidence strongly suggests that operational employment considerations are an important part of the presidential decision-making process and merit further scrutiny by the scholarly community.

Analytical Framework

This analysis is built on the theoretical proposition that intervention decisions are based on an interaction between the stimuli from the internal and external determinants and an expectation of success or failure based on operational feasibility factors. It is not solely the magnitude of the demand for intervention, but instead a combination of those demands and advantageous force employment conditions that leads to military intervention.

Demand Signals - Stimuli from Internal and/or External Determinants

In order to assess the importance of operational feasibility, we must understand what we expect to be a sufficient demand for action, wherein operational feasibility can then combine to either support an intervention decision, or thwart one. Concerning decisions to intervene, we may find that either a key internal determinant or external determinant proves potent and combines with operational feasibility to produce an intervention. For instance, the magnitude of the crisis or the fact that the crisis state is a significant trade partner may provide enough of a stimulus for action. On the other

hand, domestic political concerns such as a high unemployment rate or a low presidential approval rating may be enough of a political reason to consider actions abroad.

Alternatively, it could be that we only see an intervention when both types of determinants combine. The important thing is that we consider the impact of operational feasibility in varied demand environments so that its relative importance, if any, can be revealed. If this approach is well founded, we could potentially see the importance of feasibility with variance in the demands for action from both internal and external determinants.

Intervention decisions are both a rare and complex phenomenon, making their study somewhat challenging. The approach I take is different from the correlational arguments commonly put forward in the literature. While these traditional large-N statistical studies can include interactive terms to attempt to capture some of the interactive qualities that are potentially at play, they are ill-suited to tackle complex problems such as these based on their underpinning assumptions (Rihoux and Ragin 2009, 8). For instance, the traditional statistical models are forced to assume causal symmetry. This may not necessarily be the case. “Causal asymmetry” may be a better epistemological stance, which is simply the idea that different conditional combinations may explain intervention and nonintervention decisions. The theory put forward herein holds this latter position, allowing for an open investigation of the many possible combinations of key concerns that may serve to induce intervention or nonintervention. In addition, the study of modern U.S. foreign interventions suffers from the too many variables and too few cases problem, making it ill-suited for standard regression analysis. For both reasons, I have selected qualitative comparative analysis to help explain and

understand these decisions.

Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)

QCA is appropriate for this analysis because it is designed to deal with the causal complexity we are trying to untangle here. QCA has been widely seen to be appropriate for tackling problems that pose the “small N, many variables” problem (Rihoux and Ragin 2009). That is precisely the case here, where we are limited to an intermediate range of cases (19), and an array of potentially important conditions affecting intervention decisions (12). Unlike correlational models that seek to identify the unique contributions of independent variables, QCA assumes that variables are not independent, but instead have varying influences on the outcome in question based on their synthetic effect through “multiple conjunctural causation” (Braumoeller 2003, 210-213). Crisp-set QCA (csQCA), the form of QCA used in this analysis, is a case-oriented method that employs Boolean logic to identify these combinations of conditions through a set-theoretic approach.

This methodological approach allows me to reformulate the assessment of U.S. presidential decisions around this interactive conception of the decision space. My goal is to find out if there are unique combinations of conditions that exert causal influence on the decision-making process. Uncovering these combinations requires an approach that does not look at the variables in competition to achieve the outcome in question with their own independent influence. Instead, this study holds that causal complexity is at work and those unique combinations, or “causal recipes” of conditions will have demonstrable influence on the investigated outcomes (Ragin 2008, 8-9).

Method

QCA has been employed in a wide array of fields where causal complexity is common, from violent ethnic conflict to public health policy (e.g., Bara 2014; Warren, Wistow, and Bambra 2013). However, its use is not ubiquitous and requires some elaboration. I will briefly describe the conduct of crisp set QCA (csQCA) to explain the process and demonstrate its suitability for the questions addressed here (Ragin 2008; Rihoux and Ragin 2009; Schneider and Wagemann 2012; Thiem and Dusa 2013).

First, QCA begins with case-based research. The researcher identifies the relevant conditions (variables) based on their theoretical and substantive fitness to the problem and then operationalizes these conditions and compiles them in raw data form (see Appendix A). The data used in this study come from existing data sets for some conditions (e.g., trade data or ethnic conflict classification); for others, cases are researched to find meaningful measures based on historical accounts or public records (e.g., enemy structure or target state accessibility).

Second, in crisp-set QCA the researcher dichotomizes the data for analysis (“1” for the condition being present, “0” for absent). Importantly, this part of the process requires that the conditions be “calibrated” based on “external standards or guidelines that have face validity” rather than just trivial or ambiguous criteria (Ragin 2008, 8). I outline the concepts I use for each condition and their coding criteria in the following section where I fully explain the determinant conditions.

Third, the researcher tests for necessity of conditions within the sample to identify those conditions that have such high consistency in their presence as to have no

meaningful part in the analysis (Ragin 2006, 43). If a condition is identified with a high enough consistency (e.g., greater than .95 for quasi-necessary conditions) and coverage, they may be dropped from the analysis (Bara 2014, 6). To accomplish this, I use fsQCA Software Version 2.5 (2014).

Fourth, the researcher runs an analysis (called a “truth table algorithm” in QCA) to identify logically possible combinations of conditions that explain intervention. This is where we begin to account for conjunctural causation. Checking for set-theoretic consistency, the researcher eliminates all sets of combinations that do not have a high consistency; less than .75 is considered highly inconsistent (Ragin 2006, 46). Once I have identified the surviving combinations of conditions, I use standard analyses employing Boolean algebra (Quine-McCluskey algorithm) within the software to minimize the solutions for the outcome in question. The analysis identifies the complex, intermediate, and parsimonious solutions that lead to intervention using Boolean multiplication (logical “and,” meaning a combination of conditions), addition (logical “or,” specifying when either condition or set of conditions is present when intervention/nonintervention occurs) and finally minimization (reduced to the specific combinations that explain intervention/nonintervention once extraneous conditions are removed) (Ragin 2006, 34-35).

I conduct this analysis twice – once for intervention, and once for nonintervention (Rihoux and Ragin 2009, 57). Just because the presence of certain conditions leads to a specific outcome does not mean an absence of those conditions will lead to the opposite outcome in a symmetrical way. Therefore, the two separate analyses are required (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 112).

For each combinatorial solution produced, there are two parameters of fit estimated that can be used to evaluate their significance and explanatory power. The first is *consistency*. Consistency “gauges the degree to which the cases sharing a given combination of conditions agree in displaying the outcome in question” (Ragin 2008, 44). The second parameter is *coverage*. Coverage “assesses the degree to which a cause or causal combination accounts for instances of an outcome” (Ragin 2008, 44). These two parameters - *while different* since we are dealing with set-theoretic rather than correlational arguments - can be thought of as being similar to “significance” (consistency) and “correlation coefficients and total variance explained” (coverage) in regression analysis (Bara 2014, 4). A meaningful analysis will establish set-theoretic consistency by properly selecting the combinations of conditions based on a high enough threshold for consistency (as close to 1.0 as possible) and then establish the empirical importance of that combination based on the coverage within the sample (Ragin 2008, 56).

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable in this analysis is the selective use of force by presidents in external crises, or what was similarly termed “intervention” by Rosenau (1967, 168). The operationalization of this term has assumed different forms in previous literature. For the purposes of this study, I borrow my definition of military intervention from Elizabeth Saunders (2011, 21): “an overt, short-term deployment of at least one thousand combat-ready ground troops across international boundaries to influence an outcome in another state or an interstate dispute; it may or may not interfere in another state’s

domestic institutions.” I have selected this definition purposively to rule out covert operations, those not employing land forces, or deployments that run a very low risk of combat. My aim is to produce consistency in the types of risk the president must consider in the comparative cases. An intervention where the U.S. only provides logistic support from afar via an airlift does not run the same material or political risks for the president as one in which troops are placed in proximity with adversarial forces.

Sample Selection

The unit of analysis for the study is an intervention opportunity. To identify precisely when an intervention opportunity begins or ends is quite difficult. However, following previous studies (e.g., Feste 2003; Seybolt 2007), here the opportunity encompasses the years in which the crisis exhibited violence and personnel displacement beyond the threshold used in the study (see discussion on Magnitude below in the external determinants section). To identify these, I used the Center for Systemic Peace’s Major Episodes of Political Violence data set (MEPV 2014) and selected intervention opportunities that are alike in as many ways as possible (e.g., involving U.S. allies, key trading partners, strong appeals from both international and domestic audiences, etc.), but that also have variance in the dependent variable – intervention.

To select a sample of manageable size, I restricted attention to 1980 to 2013. This focuses the inquiry on the post-Cold War era (almost two-thirds of the period) where the U.S. was largely hegemonic from a security perspective; and includes roughly a decade of the bipolar world, but a period in which the U.S. became resurgent following the Vietnam era. A limited sampling is also required because of the technological

differences that occur that change the capabilities and limitations of military equipment in different time periods. For instance, one of the reasons for selecting the Reagan era forward was in the shift in global airlift capabilities that corresponded to the Reagan administration's military increases. Reagan increased the C-5 Galaxy fleet by more than 60%, significantly altering the power projection capabilities for the U.S. in the years to follow (Leland and Wilcoxson 2003). The same logic holds when considering the advent of precision munitions and the potential for decapitation strikes against hierarchically organized enemies.

According to Grimmett's (2011) report on the "Instances of the use of U.S. Armed Forces Abroad," during this period there were nine U.S. interventions meeting the intervention criteria used here. Using the literature on intervention as a guide, I identified ten other cases from the MEPV (2014) data set that demonstrated sufficient demand from the internal and external determinants. For instance, I selected cases based on the total number of deaths or magnitude of the crisis, reasoning that greater demand from international and domestic audiences would coincide with larger-scale atrocities. This strategy produced 19 cases of intervention opportunities between 1980 and 2013 (see Table 3.1). To get an idea of how this sampling corresponds to the overall opportunities during the time period, the MEPV (2014) data set identifies 41 separate conflicts during the focal period that exhibited "serious political violence," which includes those with deaths ten to 50,000 deaths, and population dislocations in the tens of thousands. Using that as a guide, and assuming that the U.S. would have considered intervening in all of those locations (a liberal assumption), this sampling accounts for roughly 36% of all intervention opportunities during the period.

Table 3.1 Intervention Opportunities Sample: 1980-2013

<i>Case</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>President</i>	<i>Intervention</i>
Nicaragua	Nov-81	Reagan	No
Lebanon	Sep-82	Reagan	Yes
*Grenada	Oct-83	Reagan	Yes
Uganda	Aug-84	Reagan	No
Panama	Dec-89	G.H.W. Bush	Yes
Iraq	Jan-91	G.H.W. Bush	Yes
*Yugoslavia	Dec-91	G.H.W. Bush	No
Somalia	Dec-92	G.H.W. Bush	Yes
Rwanda	Apr-94	Clinton	No
Haiti	Jul-94	Clinton	Yes
*Liberia	Nov-95	Clinton	No
Bosnia	Dec-95	Clinton	Yes
Burundi	Aug-96	Clinton	No
Yugoslavia (Bosnia)	Apr-99	Clinton	Yes
*Dem. Rep. of Congo (Zaire)	Feb-00	Clinton	No
Iraq	Mar-03	G.W. Bush	Yes
Sudan (Darfur)	Aug-06	G.W. Bush	No
*Libya	Mar-11	Obama	No
Syria	Sep-13	Obama	No

* Cases randomly selected for out-of-sample-test

Determinant Conditions: Feasibility Factors

This section explains how I operationalized the different determinant conditions and the coding criteria I used to dichotomize the data for analysis. A table displaying the conceptual to empirical linkages is found in Appendix B (Conditions Analysis Matrix). As discussed in the previous chapter, the first five conditions here are the feasibility factors developed for this study based on the U.S. Army and Joint doctrinal analysis (U.S. Army Doctrine 2012, 1-7). I expect the presence of these conditions to increase the likelihood of intervention. In other words, when present, they increase perceptions of feasibility.

The first condition feasibility condition is CONFLICT. The goal here is to determine if the crisis is the product of ethnic or religious cleavages. Using the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset (Wimmer et al. 2009), I code “1” if the case is *not* an ethnic

conflict and “0” if it is. I hypothesize that the presence of the “ethnic conflict” condition reduces the likelihood of intervention. For conflicts not listed in this data set (e.g., post 2010), I use the Wimmer et al. (2009, 5) definition of ethnic conflict as those that “typically involve conflicts over ethnonational self-determination, the ethnic balance of power in government, ethnoregional autonomy, ethnic and racial discrimination (whether alleged or real), and language and other cultural rights.” All others are considered nonethnic.

The second feasibility condition is REGIME. The concept in question here is whether the U.S. has a clear regime to support or install within the target state prior to intervention. This condition is coded “1” if there is an identifiable leader or regime to support and “0” otherwise. UN authorized multinational peacekeeping forces enforcing agreed upon ceasefires by warring parties are considered “regimes” in this analysis. As displayed in Appendix A (Raw Data Matrix), I used a variety of sources as references to determine whether the U.S. had a supportable regime during the decisional period. Check the appendix for specific sources for each case.

The third feasibility condition is ENEMY. Does the enemy present a hierarchical organization that is vulnerable to defeat through strike (force employment not involving ground troops – e.g., air or missile attacks) that may shorten the conflict? Alternatively, is the adversary organized as a diffuse network that is difficult to identify and discriminately engage? Or, is there no likely enemy to contend with, which is a possibility if the intervention mission is expected to be administrative? These questions lead to three classifications, two of which are coded “1”: hierarchical and no adversary. I identify “hierarchical” organizations as those possessing an organized military typical

of the modern era involving hierarchical chains of command and communications.

These are the common models of forces developed in most advanced countries and those trained and supplied by those countries. I categorize a case as having “no adversary” when combat is possible but not expected, providing a presence and administrative function as a neutral party in support of a peace agreement. The third category within this condition – diffuse – is coded “0” if the structure(s) warrants and if no peace agreement is in place, assuming the U.S. would have to impose peace on one or more parties to quell the violence. Examples of diffuse organizations are terrorist networks or loosely affiliated militias, especially in conflicts where many different adversaries are present. Like REGIME above, I used a variety of sources to code for ENEMY; check Appendix A for specific references for each case. For example, Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi military structure is categorized as hierarchical (see Fontenot et al. 2012), whereas the adversary force in Darfur in 2003 – the Janjaweed – were diffuse based on there being a loosely organized, militia-like, tribal force (United Nations 2019).

The fourth feasibility condition is ACCESS. Are there adequate seaports and airfields to facilitate deployment of units and materiel? To determine this, using the CIA World Factbook for the applicable year, I first identified how many airfields were capable of landing C-5 transport aircraft with full payload (min runway of 5000 ft/ 1524 m with hard surface) in the country during the crisis year (Globalsecurity.org 2015). Second, using the same source, I answer the question: how many major ports were available? Next, I weighted the two types of access points prior to dichotomizing the data. Seaports are weighted twice as much as the airports based on the ability to deliver greater quantities of troops, equipment, and materiel at lesser cost. I then combine these

numbers to arrive at a composite access point score for each crisis. To account for varying sizes of target states, I divide the area of the state by this access score to get an accessibility ratio. This led to states falling on an accessibility ratio range from 44 (highly accessible – Grenada), to 27,642 (highly inaccessible – Sudan). I code the accessibility “1” if less than a 3000 access ratio and “0” if greater than 3000 based on a correspondence between a natural break in the data and knowledge of the cases. Take Syria for example, which has three significant sea ports and 22 airports with modern road networks throughout most of the country (CIA World Factbook 2018). Compare it to Liberia’s four sea ports and only nine airports, with antiquated road network that is among the most underdeveloped in Africa (Logistics Capacity Assessment 2018). The break point used in this study is between these two countries.

The final feasibility condition is POPULATION. Based on the crisis environment, is the conflict likely to be fought among civilians? Urban combat requires the greatest amount of discrimination of violence due to the potential for collateral damage. Urban areas are seen by many military forces as the most restrictive terrain for the application of force (Smith 2007, 409-415). Here, using the CIA World Factbook for the applicable year, I identify the population density of the country, or based on the case, a particular region in question during the given year. For coding, less than 200 people per square kilometer is coded as unrestricted terrain – “1”, whereas greater than 200 is considered restricted – “0”. I base this coding on a natural break in the data and an average population density of 107 people per square kilometer for the sample of intervention opportunities.

Determinant Conditions: Internal Determinants

Next are the internal determinant conditions, starting with UNEMPLOY. What is the unemployment rate in the United States prior to the decision? Literature suggests that presidents may choose to intervene when unemployment levels are high (Fordham 1998). Here I use the monthly unemployment percentage taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The average annual unemployment rate for the period inclusive of these cases is 6.4 percent. Cases are coded “0” if less than 6.4% and “1” if greater than or equal to 6.4%.

APPROVAL is the second internal determinant condition. Does the president have a high or low approval rating? Some literature might expect that the president would choose to intervene if he was experiencing high degrees of popular support (James and Oneal 1991). Others, using diversionary theory, expect to see presidential decisions to intervene at periods of low approval (Morgan and Bickers 1992). These data are from the Gallup Presidential Job Approval Center (2014) and use the rating from the month prior to the intervention opportunity. Based on the two different views on the role of presidential approval, cases are coded “1” if 55% or above *and* when less than 45% (see Appendix A for sourcing for presidential approval ratings for each case). This accounts for both high political capital theories as well as diversionary war views. My coding corresponds to Ostrom and Job’s (1986) empirical findings that presidents are more likely to use force when public support swings from the mean by a standard deviation in either direction (pg. 556). I code the data “0” if between 46-54%, when the president is not incentivized to intervene, where they are unlikely to seek rally effects or have support sufficient enough to withstand a potential foreign policy failure.

The third internal determinant condition is PARTY. Does the president's party control one or both houses of Congress, thereby lessening the amount of political opposition (Howell and Pevehouse 2007)? I code the cases “1” if the president's party is in control of at least one house of Congress and “0” if not using historical records from the U.S. House and Senate (history.house.gov 2018; senate.gov 2018). There are few periods when the full government has been united under a single party and this coding criterion resulted in nearly an even split of the cases having the condition present.

Determinant Conditions: External Determinants

There are four external determinant conditions included in the analysis, beginning with MAGNITUDE (MAG). This condition captures the magnitude of the warfare and its impact on the societal systems. The higher the level of magnitude, the higher the expectation that the U.S. will intervene. This assessment includes the duration of the conflict, population dislocations and their degree, and the level of destruction as represented in the Center for Systemic Peace Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) data set (2014). Crises are coded “1” if the conflicts are categorized as at least “substantial and prolonged warfare,” which includes deaths ranging from 100,000-500,000 with population dislocations exceeding 1 million. They are coded “0” if less than this threshold, which includes “serious warfare” and all remaining forms of “political violence” (MEPV 2014).

The next condition is TRADE. This condition intends to capture the U.S. trade interests with the target state, assuming that economic interests could help spur an intervention (Fordham 2008). This condition is operationalized by summing the inflows

and outflows of trade between the U.S. and the state in question for the year prior to the opportunity using the Correlates of War dyadic trade 3.0 data set (Barbieri 2012). The average trade sum from the US to all countries over the period of the study is 209 million dollars. Based on this, conditions are coded “1” for the state if their trade level is above this threshold and “0” if below.

The third external determinant condition is ALLY. Are there alliances of any kind between the U.S. and the state in question, or with other states that are involved in the conflict/intervention? This includes alliances such as defense, nonaggression, and entente as cataloged in the Correlates of War Alliance Data 4.0 data set (Gibler 2009). Cases are coded “1” if there are alliances with the state or other intervening states, and “0” if no alliances influence the potential intervention. The expectation here is that an existing alliance increases the likelihood that the U.S. would become involved (Walt 1987).

The final external determinant and last condition considered here is UN. This seeks to capture international support for the intervention. Specifically, did the United Nations (UN) produce a mandate for military intervention? The indicator here is a UN resolution authorizing an intervention that specifically calls for military employment as an intervening force, fulfilling a role more than self-defense and monitoring. This aspect is necessary to attain the level of risk involved to make the conditions analyzed here meaningful. I used the UN Security Council Resolution search engine (unscr.com) to research these cases and their specific mandates. Based on recent literature we would expect that presidents would respond to greater international outcries for action with higher frequencies of military response (Wheeler 2000; Finnemore 2004). Cases are

coded “1” if mandated by the UN and “0” otherwise. The dichotomized data set used for the analysis are in Table 3.2 and the summary statistics are in Table 3.3 below.

Table 3.2. Dichotomized Data Set

Case	Year	Conflict	Regime	Enemy	Access	Population	Party	Approval	Unemploy	Magnitude	Trade	Ally	UN	Intervene
Nicaragua	1981	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0
Lebanon	1982	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
Grenada	1983	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1
Uganda	1984	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Panama	1989	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1
Iraq	1991	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1
Yugoslavia	1991	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Somalia	1992	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1
Rwanda	1994	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Haiti	1994	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1
Liberia	1995	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Bosnia	1995	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1
Burundi	1996	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kosovo	1999	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
DRC	2000	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0
Iraq	2003	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1
Sudan (Darfur)	2006	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0
Libya	2011	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0
Syria	2013	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0

Table 3.3. Summary Statistics

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Standard Deviation</i>
REGIME	0.57	0.50
ENEMY	0.63	0.49
CONFLICT	0.37	0.57
ACCESS	0.57	0.50
POPULATION	0.73	0.45
PARTY	0.53	0.51
APPROVAL	0.63	0.49
UNEMPLOY	0.42	0.50
MAGNITUDE	0.47	0.51
TRADE	0.47	0.51
ALLY	0.42	0.50
UN	0.37	0.57
INTERVENE	0.47	0.51

Analysis

This section explains the QCA results for both intervention and nonintervention using all the variables in Table 3.3.⁵ Before proceeding into the detailed outputs from

⁵ I note that all variables were used to arrive at the QCA solutions to point out that if the internal and external determinants prove useful via the Boolean minimization, they will be present in the outcomes.

the QCA, it is important to note up front that four of the five feasibility factors put forward in the theory emerged as important in the analyses. Of those, accessibility and a supportable regime were important factors regardless of whether we are looking at intervention or nonintervention.

The analysis will discuss all three of the different solutions: complex, parsimonious, and intermediate. The complex solution is, as its name portends, the most complex combination since it does not attempt to simplify the results. The parsimonious solution uses the computer algorithm to reduce the solutions via Boolean logic by identifying logical remainders, producing the most simplified solution set. Finally, between these two is an intermediate solution based on “easy counterfactuals” that assesses “the plausibility of simplifying assumptions drawn from the pool of causal combinations lacking empirical cases” (Ragin and Sonnett 2005, 5-6). This approach, common in case-oriented, comparative research with limited diversity, is a useful approach because it allows the researcher to employ theoretical knowledge in the treatment of the logical remainders, aiding in the identification of unique combinations of conditions (Ragin 2008). In addition to these three approaches to the analysis, I take the resultants from both the parsimonious and intermediate solutions and test them for their predictive ability on similar intervention opportunities on a small out-of-sample test. I randomly selected this subset of cases from the full sample, ensuring representation from across the entire period in question. A more detailed description of the analysis

The goal is not just to identify the feasibility factors that survive. That said, for readers rooted in the correlational world, the internal and external determinants can be considered akin to control variables because they are not the primary variables of interest. To a certain extent, they are antecedent. They must be present before feasibility is considered and are therefore necessary but insufficient. As the study demonstrates, the feasibility factors have both independent and interactive effects (with demand) on the probability of intervention.

following each step is found in Appendix C.

Necessary Conditions

The first step in QCA is to check for necessary conditions separately from the question of sufficiency. By examining the question of necessity first, we can identify those conditions whose presence is so common in cases with the outcome in question that they may lack explanatory power when we are looking for unique combinations. That said, just because a condition is “necessary,” does not mean that it is impertinent to the discussion (Ragin 2008, 43). Quite the opposite; it can be considered as a contributing factor to any of the combinations that are ultimately identified as having explanatory or predictive power. The determination of the importance of the condition has more to do with the theoretical examination of the condition based on our understanding of the phenomenon. The necessary conditions check here proves the point.

A condition is “necessary” if it scores a 1.0 on consistency, present in every case where the outcome in question occurs, and is deemed quasi-sufficient if scores a .95 (Bara 2014, 6). The analysis here identifies the condition of ENEMY – an enemy organizational construct that is hierarchical and susceptible to strike – as necessary with a score of 1.0 for intervention decisions. For the purposes of statistical analysis, therefore, the condition/variable is dropped. However, it is important to note the presence of this factor in all cases of intervention and incorporate it into the findings of the study.

For nonintervention decisions, there were no necessary or quasi-necessary conditions identified. Therefore, all conditions are considered in the analysis.

Intervention Decisions

Running the standard analyses with the eleven conditions (minus ENEMY) yields a complex solution with perfect coverage (1.0) and consistency (1.0) but requires eight unique combinatorial conditions to explain cases of intervention. Therefore, this is not particularly useful for subsequent analyses.

However, the parsimonious solution from this initial analysis is quite informative (see Table 3.4 below). The QCA table below is a standard means of conveying the analysis (Bara 2014). The specific formula used is presented following “Model” in the upper left, identifying the conditions analyzed. The asterisk between the conditions means that the analytic outcomes to the right correspond to that combination of conditions, representing a logical “and.” The plus sign between the combinations is a logical “or,” and is used to group the conditional combinations into a group for the solution, all of which when combined present the full causal formula. Restating the parameters of fit used in QCA from above for clarity, “consistency gauges the degree to which the cases sharing a given combination of conditions agree in displaying the outcome in question” (Ragin 2008, 44). Coverage “assesses the degree to which a cause or causal combination accounts for instances of an outcome” (Ragin 2008, 44). The term “raw” refers to the outcomes that display that combination, and “unique” refers to those covered by that combination alone.

Table 3.4 QCA Solution for Military Intervention Decisions (all conditions)

Model: intervene = f(regime, conflict, access, population, party, approval, unemploy, mag, trade, ally, un) (frequency cutoff: 1.00 / consistency cutoff: 1.00)	Raw Coverage [†]	Unique Coverage [†]	Solution Coverage	Solution / Configuration Consistency
			1.00	1.00
regime * access +	0.88	0.13		1.00
population * ~party +	0.63	0.00		1.00
conflict * approval +	0.50	0.00		1.00
unemploy * un	0.25	0.00		1.00

[†] Raw coverage is the proportion of outcome cases having that combination of conditions. Unique coverage is the proportion of outcome cases covered by that combination alone.
* = logical AND ; + = logical OR

The parsimonious solution above identifies four combinations of two conditions that offer some explanatory power in this sample. Foremost among these, the combination of two feasibility factors – having a leader or regime to support and having sufficient accessibility to the target region – is present in 88% of the cases of intervention. The only case of intervention that did not exhibit this combination was Somalia in 1992, a case addressed in subsequent chapters. The second combinatorial condition, a lower population density paired with not having one’s party in power (at least one house of Congress), is also high in its coverage (63% of cases). However, the lack of the PARTY condition’s presence goes against the theoretical argument commonly associated with this internal determinant. With a coverage of 63% of the sample, it could hint at the persuasiveness of a target environment that lacks the complexity concomitant with urban applications of force. The third combination of no ethnic or religious cleavages at the core of the conflict and a sufficiently high or low approval rating for the U.S. president lends some support for the contention that domestic politics

hold sway, particularly when combined with a tractable crisis. The last combination is between an internal and external determinant – high unemployment and international approval of the effort. In total, these combinations demonstrate a number of useful insights. They speak to the importance of the feasibility factors put forward here, as well as to the influence of both internal and external determinants, both in combination with the feasibility factors and with each other. In particular, the combination of conditions represented by Hypothesis 3 (Supportable Regime) and Hypothesis 5 (Accessibility) proved to be extraordinarily powerful.

The parsimonious analysis only yields limited insights, however. To get the full benefit of the analysis on such a small sample, we need to incorporate in the use of “easy counterfactuals” and provide a theoretically consistent accounting of the logical remainders, which are configurations that had no or too few cases. As noted above, this requires the use of the intermediate solution; it considers all theoretical possibilities including those combinations not represented in the sample and simplifies the combinations based on the theoretical assumptions consistent with the theory. However, the intermediate solution for all eleven conditions proved unhelpful, producing eight separate combinations of conditions that are unique to a particular outcome.

To arrive at pathways that are more meaningful to understanding the intervention decision, I test for combinations of conditions that exhibit higher consistencies and coverages when combined using the necessary conditions check within the fsQCA software (2014). The goal is to drop conditions from the analysis that apparently lack explanatory power, while identifying conditions that are more influential when combined with one another. This process initially identified seven conditions that had the greatest

synergistic effects to retain for the analysis: CONFLICT, REGIME, ACCESS, UNEMPLOY, MAG, TRADE, and ALLY. I then proceeded to extract a more parsimonious solution using Boolean minimization, which is displayed in Table 3.5.⁶

By reducing to these seven conditions, we see a significant reduction in the most simplified solution set that still produces perfect consistency and coverage for the sample. Once again, we see the combination of a leader or regime to support with sufficient access to be highly important, present in 88% of the cases of intervention, and now uniquely so in 75% of the cases. This makes an extraordinarily strong case for the determinant power of these two feasibility factors when combined (Hypotheses 3 and 5). The other combination, exemplified by the Somalia 1992 case, pairs a lack of ethnic or religious underpinning to the conflict with a high magnitude of violence and displacement to arrive at an intervention decision. This lends some support to those touting the importance of external factors, especially when paired with operationally feasible conditions.

Table 3.5 QCA Solution for Military Intervention Decisions (parsimonious)

Model: intervene = f(ally, trade, mag, unemploy, access, conflict, regime) (frequency cutoff: 1.00 / consistency cutoff: 1.00)	Raw Coverage [†]	Unique Coverage [†]	Solution Coverage	Solution / Configuration Consistency
			1.00	1.00
regime * access +	0.88	0.75		1.00
conflict * mag	0.25	0.13		1.00

[†] Raw coverage is the proportion of outcome cases having that combination of conditions. Unique coverage is the proportion of outcome cases covered by that combination alone.
* = logical AND ; + = logical OR

⁶ This is not to say that the other conditions do not have a useful role in understanding these cases or those beyond the sample. The conditions selected here just proved more useful in arriving at a clear causal linkage to the intervention decision in a parsimonious manner. The parsimonious solution for intervention in Table 3.5 displays the results of the Boolean minimization.

The parsimonious solution clearly identifies important conditions, but it does not demonstrate the effect of more complicated causal recipes that address the other determinants put forward by scholars. As a reminder, this examination is not intending to identify a superior determinant for intervention, but the intervening conditions that amplify or reduce the effects from the determinants most often posited by the scholarly community. In order to do this, we need to look to the intermediate solution to incorporate the logical remainders based on the theoretical assumptions regarding the effect of the presence or absence of these conditions. As a result, we arrive at a richer understanding of these combinations within this sample (see Table 3.6).

Table 3.6 QCA Solution for Military Intervention Decisions (intermediate)

Model: intervene = f(ally, trade, mag, unemploy, access, conflict, regime) (frequency cutoff: 1.00 / consistency cutoff: 1.00)	Raw Coverage [†]	Unique Coverage [†]	Solution Coverage	Solution / Configuration Consistency
			1.00	1.00
ally * access * regime	0.50	0.50		1.00
+				
trade * mag * access * regime	0.38	0.38		1.00
+				
mag * unemploy * conflict	0.13	0.13		1.00

[†] Raw coverage is the proportion of outcome cases having that combination of conditions. Unique coverage is the proportion of outcome cases covered by that combination alone.
* = logical AND ; + = logical OR

The intermediate solution for military intervention decisions in Table 3.6 explains all of the cases of intervention in the sample (1.00 coverage) without any outliers (1.00 consistency) through only three paths. Just as indicated in the parsimonious solution, the combination of accessibility and a leader/regime to support proves powerful, part of the first two combinatorial paths. In the first path, these two conditions pair with the presence of allied involvement (ally in crisis or allies intervening to resolve the crisis). This path accounts for half of the intervention cases in the sample. Two of these were

interventions in “America’s backyard” occurring in Panama and Haiti, while the other two (Bosnia and Kosovo) were directly affecting European allies (Jones 2000). This is consistent with a recent treatment of allied behavior in the latter two cases, which found that “alliance obligations ultimately played a necessary role in compelling intervention” (Beckley 2015, 40). The second path combines the ACCESS and REGIME conditions with two different external determinants – trade concerns and the magnitude of the conflict. This combination captures three of the interventions: Lebanon and both of the Iraq wars. This is no surprise since many within the national security policy community identify the defense of economic interests to be a key circumstance that justifies the use of military force (Haass 1999, 252). The first two causal paths reinforce the external determinants arguments, highlighting the strategic importance of the crisis.

The third path provides a combination of all three determinant categories; it combines a crisis of significant magnitude (MAG), not based on ethnic or religious cleavages (CONFLICT), with an unfavorable unemployment rate (UNEMPLOY). Interestingly, this combination of all three only captures the Somalian intervention. Upon closer inspection of that case, the first two conditions seem to matter a great deal more than the third. The communications of the G.H.W. Bush administration highlighted the humanitarian motivation behind the intervention, as well as the high expectations of success in a short time horizon (Wines 1992). This seems plausible since Bush was a lame duck at that point within the election cycle with Clinton about to take office. Therefore, in this case, the logic of intervention for the purposes of domestic political gain becomes a stretch.

In total, the three paths that constitute this intervention solution demonstrate the

critical importance of feasibility, especially regarding the conditions in Hypotheses 2 (Conflict Type), 3 (Supportable Regime), and 5 (Accessibility). The solutions also call attention to the external determinants that provide the most pressing demands: ties to trade partners and a high magnitude conflict. While an internal determinant did make it through the analysis (unemployment rate), further scrutiny revealed a weak argument for its inclusion as an important amplifier to the parsimonious solution above.

Nonintervention Decisions

Next, we address the opposite decision and the factors that influence it: When do presidents choose to forego intervention? I follow the same process as above, but instead use a negated-set. Here we are looking for conditions relating to nonintervention with the assumption that the absence of the conditions will lead to a decision *not* to intervene.

As before, using all of the conditions proved futile in identifying lucrative and parsimonious pathways to nonintervention. The analysis produces complex and unique combinations that provide little commonality. Therefore, I again drop conditions for further analysis in order to identify combinations of conditions that can explain more than single instances. This process yielded a new model for nonintervention that used the following conditions to arrive at parsimonious and intermediate solutions: ~REGIME, ~ENEMY, ~CONFLICT, ~ACCESS, ~APPROVAL, ~TRADE (~ denotes the absence of the condition).

The parsimonious solution for nonintervention in Table 3.7 again produces high consistency (1.0) and coverage (1.0) with very few configurations of conditions. Similar

to interventions, the impact of feasibility on these decisions is pronounced. Here, the noninterventions in the sample reduced to three feasibility factors with no surviving representation from the internal or external determinants. Most notably, a lack of hierarchical enemy structure alone (Hypothesis 4) is the reducible factor in two-thirds of the cases. Only Nicaragua (1981) and Syria (2013) were instances where presidents did not intervene when given a hierarchically organized enemy. Interestingly, in both cases, the presidents in question did intervene to a more limited extent – covert action in Nicaragua and supporting the NATO operation in Libya with air and logistical support. The other path is the potent combination of a lack of a leader to support (Hypothesis 3) and a conflict stemming from ethnic or religious friction (Hypothesis 2). This second combination accounts for 83% of the cases, and as with the first, perfect consistency. This analysis may be an even stronger indicator of the importance of feasibility than was evidenced in the decisions *to act*. This is important to note because presidents often boldly proclaim their rationale for taking action in an effort to marshal support. However, the opposite is true for nonintervention, with presidents and their spokespersons remaining silent in the face of calls for action. Acknowledging that, the decision not to intervene may be the one most important to understand.

Table 3.7 QCA Solution for Military Nonintervention Decisions (parsimonious)

Model: \sim intervene = f(regime, enemy, conflict, access, approval, trade) (frequency cutoff: 1.00 / consistency cutoff: 1.00)	Raw Coverage [†]	Unique Coverage [†]	Solution Coverage	Solution / Configuration Consistency
			1.00	1.00
\sim enemy +	0.66	0.17		1.00
\sim regime * \sim conflict	0.83	0.33		1.00

[†] Raw coverage is the proportion of outcome cases having that combination of conditions. Unique coverage is the proportion of outcome cases covered by that combination alone.
* = logical AND ; + = logical OR

As in the analysis of interventions, we can look to the intermediate solution to help provide even greater explanatory power by identifying linkages to other determinants (See Table 3.8). This solution, like the parsimonious, provides perfect coverage and consistency for the sample. Interestingly, it still reduces to just two paths to explain all of the interventions. The first path is the same unappealing blend of an ethnic crisis with no clear regime to support that proved troubling above, again accounting for 66% of the noninterventions. This combination is exemplified by cases across Africa such as Rwanda, Liberia, Burundi, DRC, and the Darfur region of Sudan.

Table 3.8 QCA Solution for Military Nonintervention Decisions (intermediate)

Model: \sim intervene = f(regime, enemy, conflict, access, approval, trade) (frequency cutoff: 1.00 / consistency cutoff: 1.00)	Raw Coverage [†]	Unique Coverage [†]	Solution Coverage	Solution / Configuration Consistency
			1.00	1.00
\sim conflict * \sim regime	0.66	0.33		1.00
+				
\sim trade * \sim approval * \sim access * \sim enemy	0.50	0.16		1.00

[†] Raw coverage is the proportion of outcome cases having that combination of conditions. Unique coverage is the proportion of outcome cases covered by that combination alone.
* = logical AND ; + = logical OR

The second combinatorial path provides an informative combination of feasibility factors with both internal and external determinants. Together with a lack of accessibility and diffuse enemy structure, a lack of sufficient trade interests and average presidential approval (not high enough to provide significant support for action and not low enough to support diversionary interests) are enough to account for half of the noninterventions in the sample. When we look at the cases specifically, we find that the ones this second path captures are Uganda (1984) and Rwanda (1994). If asked to write

a compelling narrative for why the president chose not to act in these cases, it seems these rationales would provide firm ground on which to base an argument.

This intermediate solution for nonintervention demonstrates two things: First, accounting for feasibility is vitally important when understanding action and inaction since it plays a significant role in both combinatorial conditions. Second, it validates the views of both the scholars focused on the role of domestic politics and those prizing the role of international strategic factors. Even when an opportunity for intervention exists, if the political tides are not right (\sim APPROVAL) and there is not a sufficient U.S material interest at stake (\sim TRADE), the decision to act is highly unlikely.

Predicting Intervention Decisions

The results of the initial analysis suggest that the feasibility factors significantly influence the decision-making process. All but one of the feasibility factor hypotheses (Hypothesis 6 concerning population density did not emerge) dominated the causal recipes. Hypothesis 7 (Too Complex) was also supported because combinations of feasibility factors did appear to have an additive effect. However, maybe this is true just for this, admittedly small, sample. To determine if there is greater substance to the claims, I conducted in- and out-of-sample tests to see how many of the cases are predicted using the intervention and nonintervention solutions as appropriate for each case. The process is relatively simple: intervention is predicted if any of the sufficient paths specified in the intervention solution are present. The same is true for the nonintervention combinations of conditions.

When evaluating these models for their predictive power, we are concerned with how many of the cases they predict correctly (true positives), as well as those that they

predict incorrectly (false positives) (Bara 2014, 11). The latter occurs when the solution generates an expected outcome (intervention or nonintervention) and it does not occur. Therefore, the intervention solution may predict a case accurately, but at the same time, that case may also exhibit the requisite conditions for the nonintervention solution. I follow Bara's (2014) approach to account for both of these aspects with two measures: *Sensitivity* and *Precision*. Sensitivity is the percentage of cases that the solution correctly predicted. Precision takes into account the false positives and reports the percentage of predictions that are correct.

I selected the cases for this subset of the sample across the range of years (marked by an asterisk in Table 3.1). This means that I randomly selected five cases but did so by dividing the period up into five segments. The weakness of this test is that it only produced one intervention by the standards used in this paper: Grenada. All other U.S. military interventions during the period were included in the initial analysis. However, within this subsample is a case that may be seen as a partial intervention - Libya 2011 - since the U.S. was actively involved with the NATO air campaign, intelligence, and support operations that facilitated the toppling of the Gaddafi regime. This leads to a breakdown within the sample of three clear noninterventions (Croatia, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo), one intervention (Grenada), and one that blurs the lines (Libya).

The results using the parsimonious solution are positive (see Table 3.9). The solution was perfect for the in-sample analysis, identifying all cases of intervention and nonintervention, as well as not identifying any false positives.

Table 3.9. QCA Model In-sample and Out-of-sample Predictions (parsimonious)

<i>In-sample Prediction (1980-2013)</i>				
N = 14 (8 interventions, 6 noninterventions)				
<i>Model</i>	<i>Sensitivity †</i>	<i>True positive Rate</i>	<i>False positives</i>	<i>Precision ‡</i>
Intervention regime * access + conflict * mag	8/8	1.00	0	1.00
Nonintervention ~enemy + ~regime * ~conflict	6/6	1.00	0	1.00
<i>Out-of-sample Prediction (1980-2013)</i>				
N = 5 (1 intervention, 4 noninterventions)				
<i>Model</i>	<i>Sensitivity †</i>	<i>True positive Rate</i>	<i>False positives</i>	<i>Precision ‡</i>
Intervention regime * access + conflict * mag	1/1	1.00	1 (Croatia)	0.50
Nonintervention ~enemy + ~regime * ~conflict	3/4 (Libya)	0.75	0	1.00
† Sensitivity is the percentage of cases that the solution correctly predicted. ‡ Precision takes into account the false positives and reports the percentage of predictions that are correct. * = logical AND ; + = logical OR				

For the out-of-sample test, the parsimonious solution did quite well in predicting onset for both intervention and nonintervention. The solution predicted Grenada as an intervention based on the conditions of a supportable follow-on regime and operational accessibility. However, it falsely identified Croatia as an intervention based on the presence of these same conditions. Croatia did lack both of the other conditions (CONFLICT * MAG) that were in this solution set, exhibiting nonintervention conditions as well.

The nonintervention solution captured three of the four cases. The deviant case was Libya, which displayed every condition needing to be absent. As expected, based on the initial look at the sample, Libya presents an odd case based on the high level of

involvement that the U.S. had in the NATO operation. In fact, the Center for Systemic Peace data set (2014) codes this case as a U.S. intervention. However, I have chosen to code it as a nonintervention based on the definition for intervention used here, borrowed from Saunders (2011), emphasizing the importance of greater than 1000 ground combat troops. This is important because the concerns of troop employment (as it relates to assumed risk) were essential in the conceptual development of the feasibility factors. If the definition were broadened to include airstrikes, the Libya case would be captured by the new solution but the logic behind the derivation of the feasibility factors would fall apart.

It is important to note that Libya displayed two of the four conditions that were part of the intervention solution above (REGIME and ALLY); they were just not in a combination that Boolean minimization identified to trigger intervention. While a capable and stable government has not followed the downfall of the Gaddafi, at the time of decision President Obama could identify the Transitional National Council (Libya) as the supportable successor, therefore meeting the REGIME condition. The ALLY condition was satisfied by the involvement of NATO partners in the operation. Based on this and considering the case-oriented stance of the qualitative comparative approach, it may be useful to consider Libya a “near-miss” case for intervention rather than a misidentified nonintervention.

How does the intermediate solution fare when we look to its predictive capabilities? It produces mixed results (See Table 3.10). The sensitivity and precision for the in-sample test remains unchanged, capturing both the appropriate interventions and noninterventions and generating no false positives. Again, we might expect a high

degree of fit since this is the data set used to generate the solution.

Table 3.10 QCA Model In-sample and Out-of-sample Predictions (intermediate)

<i>In-sample Prediction (1980-2013)</i>				
N = 14 (8 interventions, 6 noninterventions)				
<i>Model</i>	<i>Sensitivity</i> †	<i>True positive Rate</i>	<i>False positives</i>	<i>Precision</i> ‡
Intervention				
ally * access * regime	8/8	1.00	0	1.00
+ trade * mag * access * regime				
+ mag * unemploy * conflict				
Nonintervention				
~social * ~leader				
+ ~trade * ~approval * ~access * ~enemy	6/6	1.00	0	1.00
<i>Out-of-sample Prediction (1980-2013)</i>				
N = 5 (1 intervention, 4 noninterventions)				
<i>Model</i>	<i>Sensitivity</i> †	<i>True positive Rate</i>	<i>False positives</i>	<i>Precision</i> ‡
Intervention				
ally * access * regime	1/1	1.00	0	1.00
+ trade * mag * access * regime				
+ mag * unemploy * conflict				
Nonintervention				
~social * ~regime	2/4 (Croatia, Libya)	0.50	0	1.00
+ ~trade * ~approval * ~access * ~enemy				
† Sensitivity is the percentage of cases that the solution correctly predicted. ‡ Precision takes into account the false positives and reports the percentage of predictions that are correct. * = logical AND ; + = logical OR				

Looking at the out-of-sample test, the intermediate solution for nonintervention achieved mixed results. The intervention solution improved, capturing Grenada but without any false positives. However, the nonintervention solution still failed to account for Libya, but also narrowly missed Croatia (1991) based on the presence of a supportable follow-on regime.

In total, both the parsimonious and intermediate intervention and nonintervention solutions were able to explain and predict with a notable level of accuracy. Between the two different solutions, the only case they consistently categorized incorrectly was Libya. Both the parsimonious and intermediate solutions failed to capture it as a nonintervention, but also did not claim it as an intervention either. Again, the fact that

the U.S. was significantly involved in the NATO operation but not with significant ground troops is commensurate with the findings here that it is an “in-between” case.

Conclusion

The common approach within the field of IR to understand military intervention decisions has been to assign greater causal weight to *either* domestic factors *or* international systemic conditions. This approach pits independent variables against one another and assumes additive effects on the dependent variable (Braumoller 2003). Both camps have found empirical support for their positions given different samples and methods. Looking through either the internal or the external determinant lens, we see apparent inconsistencies in presidential decision-making. Cases that appear to be very similar produce different decisions regarding the committal of troops.

This study addresses this problem through an alternative approach and makes three significant contributions. First, I operationalized the concerns underpinning expectations of success associated with these decisions – feasibility factors. Feasibility is a real concern for presidents and their advisors as evidenced by the military’s approach to framing these problems and anecdotally in recent narratives of key presidential decisions. However, the scholarly treatment of intervention behavior to date has not incorporated this concept sufficiently into the analyses. Second, this study tests for the impact of the feasibility factors on the decisions through a different methodological assumption. Instead of looking at the decision space as an arena of competing variables, this inquiry rests on the idea of causal complexity or “multiple conjunctural causation” where different combinations of conditions may produce the same outcome (Rihoux and Ragin 2009, 8). Essentially, instead of asking whether one determinant is dominant, I

asked whether there are combinations of determinants, both internally and externally oriented, that have unique causal influences.⁷ This approach is appropriate because of the complexity of these decisions and the myriad influences on the outcome. Finally, I incorporated an out-of-sample test to demonstrate the forecasting ability of these concepts for explaining and understanding intervention behavior in the future.

Both the intervention and nonintervention solutions performed very well for the 19 cases in the complete study. The parsimonious and intermediate formulations for intervention predicted the actual decisions with 100% accuracy. The nonintervention solutions scored 75% for the parsimonious and 50% for the intermediate, but without any false positives. Accordingly, this study finds strong support for the explanatory and predictive power of this approach for understanding presidential decisions to intervene militarily.

The analyses found support for many of the hypotheses relating to feasibility. Regarding intervention decisions, two conditions dominated the parsimonious solution, combining to account for 88% of the decisions to intervene from 1980 to 2013: First, (Hypothesis 3) is there a supportable leader or regime to back? Second, (Hypothesis 5) is the target location logistically accessible? In addition to these, the question of the enemy's structure also figured prominently, present in all of the cases of intervention and absent in two-thirds of the cases where the president chose not to intervene. This condition addresses whether or not the potential adversary's military structure is

⁷ Regarding unique causal influences, some may hold endogeneity concerns. If there is endogeneity between the feasibility factors and the other determinants, the overlap is all between X variables, not between X and Y (intervention or nonintervention). Given endogeneity between X's, we ought to see greater and more consistent combinations between feasibility factors and the determinants than we do; instead, feasibility emerges as an independent factor, or in combination with other feasibility factors. This finding is only reinforced in the qualitative studies that follow.

susceptible to strike (e.g., hierarchical and organized). Finally, the origins of the conflict were also vitally important to the calculus. When the conflict stemmed from ethnic or religious frictions and there was no clear regime to support, this combination accounted for 83% of the cases of nonintervention. This also lends weight to hypothesis seven – “Too Complex” – which argued that there would be an additive quality to infeasible traits. All three of the conditions in the parsimonious nonintervention solution were feasibility factors, and four of the six for the intermediate solution. It is easy to see how these factors would affect the presidential decision space because they address issues such as certainty, shorter time commitments, and costs.

Beyond these, all the feasibility factors carried some weight in the analysis, except for population density (hypothesis six) which did not prove useful. Clearly, the least substantiated hypothesis was number seven, which stated that internal and external determinant combinations would prove impactful *without* concern for feasibility. These findings support the theory put forward here, that feasibility factors are an essential matter of concern when assessing intervention behavior.

The non-feasibility conditions that played the most significant roles here were presidential approval, trade ties to the state in crisis, and a higher magnitude of conflict, reinforcing arguments that favor both domestic politics and international systemic influences on these decisions. However, no combination of these determinants emerged as important without the addition of feasibility factors in the solution, undermining arguments in favor of Hypothesis 8 which posited that demand alone is determinant.

This study produces two key findings. First, we can explain, at least partially, the inconsistency within the literature concerning intervention behavior. From this

analysis, a combination of both internal and external determinants (trade, presidential approval, conflict magnitude) with feasibility factors. The intermediate QCA solutions prove informative here (see Tables 3.6 and 3.8). Second, and more clearly, in both types of decision we see the importance of feasibility. These factors predominate the internal and external determinants, and no combinatorial conditions emerged from the analysis that omitted feasibility as a necessary condition for action/inaction.

Based on this research, scholars should not view operational employment factors as background noise that presidents view as dismissive with the right strategy. Given the prominence of the feasibility factors within the combinations generated by these analyses, they may well be the most important aspect when presidents consider whether to act. This study provides a clear answer for a case such as Syria where there are numerous demand stimuli, yet still no overt intervention. There is not a clear leader and regime to replace Assad; there are numerous and diffuse competing belligerents; and there are religious and ethnic roots to the conflict. These are just a few of the factors that make this an unlikely target for intervention.

In sum, this work supports the theoretical argument that explaining intervention and nonintervention decisions by the strength of demand alone may not be the best approach. Instead, combinations of conditions, especially those incorporating feasibility, can help explain why seemingly less important interventions occur while other calls for action only reach deaf ears within the oval office. Armed with knowledge of which conditions may best explain intervention behavior, the next chapter looks at the George H.W. Bush administration's handling of the Somalian and Yugoslavian crises to ascertain whether the concerns exposed here are evident in the deliberative record.

CHAPTER 4
GEORGE H.W. BUSH INTERVENTION DECISIONS:
YUGOSLAVIA AND SOMALIA

Sometimes the decision not to use force, to stay our hand, I can tell you, it's just as difficult as the decision to send our soldiers into battle. The former Yugoslavia, well, it's been such a situation. There are, we all know, important humanitarian and strategic interests at stake there. But up to now it's not been clear that the application of limited amounts of force by the United States and its traditional friends and allies would have had the desired effect, given the nature and complexity of that situation.

-President George H.W. Bush, Remarks at West Point, January 5, 1993

This chapter builds on the analysis of the last and aims to explicate the role of operational feasibility concerns on the decision to intervene as seen through dialogues among those influencing presidential decisions. To accomplish this, I select two U.S. intervention opportunities for comparison sharing a number of key similarities – Bosnia and Somalia in 1992 – and analyze the minutes from National Security Council (NSC) and Deputies Committee (NSC/DC) meetings along with previously published interview material. These cases represent two of the most-documented instances of simultaneous crises being weighed for intervention by a single administration, and by holding the administration constant I am able to minimize the effect of rival explanations of intervention, the different predispositions of presidents to use military force, or changes in the international environment. The purpose is to gain an appreciation for why the George H.W. Bush administration chose to intervene in Somalia but not in Bosnia and what factors exerted the greatest influence on the actual outcome.

This analysis accomplishes three things. First, it reinforces the work done by previous scholars that international systemic considerations and domestic politics weigh heavily on the decision *to* act. Second, this case comparison demonstrates the key role that feasibility concerns play in the decision-making process when deciding *where* to act. Third, it demonstrates through within case analysis that feasibility factors are paramount in understanding intervention decisions because as they change over time, so too does the president's will to act. This is significant to the body of intervention literature because the scholarship explaining or predicting presidential behavior often pits domestic and international concerns against one another with mixed results.

The mixed results of these studies, I argue, are due to a failure to account for differentiation in difficulty levels posed by the intervention opportunities. While some studies have paid attention to the importance of a mission's expectation of success or whether it is "doable," they have not attempted to factor this into the analysis by operationalizing it into key variables (e.g., Regan 2002; Western 2002). The feasibility discriminators put forward in this study have explanatory power heretofore unrecognized and may serve as a guide to operationalizing feasibility for further scholarship.

The chapter proceeds in five parts. Part I describes the method of analysis and its appropriateness for this study. Part II sets the context, providing a background discussion for these contemporaneous crises. Part III discusses the prevailing theories for why interventions occur within the literature and what predictions they would have made for President George H.W. Bush (Bush 41) decisions given the situation at the time. The principal contribution of this chapter is in Part IV, which explores declassified NSC documents and related materials to uncover feasibility concerns explicitly addressed

in the decision making process – What feasibility considerations predominated? To what extent or impact? Part V compares and concludes.

Part I: Method

This chapter follows in the line of others who have employed the “comparative historical method” to try to better understand phenomena that are both complex and rare, two traits consistent with U.S. intervention decisions (Skocpol 1979; Moore 1993). What follows is a comparison of Bosnia and Somalia intervention opportunities for the George H.W. Bush administration in 1992. I selected these cases based on Mill’s “method of difference,” wherein cases are selected based on their similar characteristics, ideally on key independent variables, but with different outcomes on the dependent variable, in this case the decision to intervene militarily (Mill 1884). Both cases are similar in their independent variables that other scholars argue are important determinants (e.g., strategic import, economic interests, media coverage). The period of analytic focus is the Bush 41 decision space for when these options were being weighed. This corresponds to the timeframe from the fall of 1991, when discussions on these two crises began within the NSC, up to December 4, 1992, the initiation date for Operation Restore Hope (the U.S.-led humanitarian effort in Somalia to enforce UN Security Council Resolution 794).

Once familiarized with the background for these two intervention opportunities in Part II, the comparative analysis occurs over Parts III and IV. Part III is a “disciplined configurative” approach employing the “congruence method” to test what leading theories would predict based on the conditions at the time (George and Bennett 2005,

Van Evera 1997). This analysis is informed both by the literature to determine what conditions are expected to lead to what type of decision (i.e., intervene or not), but also by the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) outputs that yielded combinatorial solutions to the cases in the preceding chapter. Part IV “process traces” discussions framing the decision for the president with emphasis on operational feasibility concerns, serving as a “plausibility probe” for theory development (George and Bennett 2005, 75).

There are a couple of difficulties or limitations associated with this method and the cases selected. First, the reason for highlighting the plausibility probe goal for this chapter is to call out explicitly the limitations of using only two cases, however similar, for controlled comparison to arrive at solid conclusions. There are many elements of these situations that this study will not explore. As a result, there could be any number of intervening factors that are unseen determinants for these decisions. In addition, there is the problem of assuming a multivariate logic which is at the heart of historical comparative analysis (Skocpol 1979, 39). This presumes that the units of comparison are independent of one another. In the tethered crises of Bosnia and Somalia in 1992, this is clearly not the case; these opportunities were viewed in stark contrast and weighed against one another by those directly advising the president (Western 2002, 138).

These methodological concerns are partially mitigated in a number of ways. The unforeseen intervening factors are addressed by relying on the predominant theories from the rich intervention literature to inform the inquiry. Also, as noted at the outset, these two cases are contemporaneous and well-documented, presenting an excellent test bed for research where variance is minimized as much as naturally possible. The multivariate logic problem is addressed by the fact that this chapter builds on the feasibility factor

findings of the last; QCA does not employ multivariate logic, instead assuming that there are combinations of conditions at play. This chapter uses those conditions both consistent with the literature as well as the QCA solutions from the preceding chapter to inform the research (i.e., the conditions found to be useful in the QCA are carried forward for this analysis). Finally, the fact that these cases are not viewed by administration in isolation is actually beneficial to the central research question: why here but not there? This allows the study to get beyond the question of a demand for action and gets to the heart of what it is about a situation that causes an administration to either act or balk.

Part II: Background to Crises

The years of the Bush 41 administration were a period of great tumult on the international stage. This presidency was witness, and participant in many respects, to the end of the Cold War and in the transitions occurring as a result of the crumbling of the bipolar world. Regimes were falling with new strong men vying for position and influence as power vacuums emerged across the periphery of former areas of Soviet influence. As a result, the Bush presidency was rife with opportunities for engagement as the sole remaining superpower tried to make sense of the global landscape and hold together “a new world order” (Bush 1991).

Military engagement during the Bush 41 tenure was significant as one might imagine in a period of geostrategic transitions. Most notable was the decision to eject Iraq from Kuwait in Operation Desert Storm in January 1991, following their invasion in August 1990. This was the largest military action undertaken by the U.S. government since the end of the Vietnam War. At the same time, there were humanitarian demands

for increased use of force and castigation of the administration's military advisors for having a "no-can-do" attitude (New York Times Editorial 1992). In response to these allegations, Bush 41's CJCS, General Colin Powell penned a response that demonstrated that the administration was not bashful about using force but used it selectively where it was likely to have "decisive" results (Powell 1992). Powell noted that in the three preceding years the U.S. military had been used to remove Manuel Noriega from power in Panama, stop a coup attempt in the Philippines, rescue an embassy in Somalia and stranded personnel in Liberia, and assist in humanitarian relief operations in Iraq, Somalia, Bangladesh, Russia, and Bosnia. In short, by the second half of 1992 the Bush administration had a long track record of employing the military toward limited ends, while at the same time it was experiencing significant pressure for even greater use of military means to achieve political ends.

The two most demanding intervention opportunities during the last year of the administration were the collapsing Yugoslavian state and the conflict-induced famine in Somalia. Looking at the NSC/DC meetings starting in May 1992, we find that of the 88 total meetings, 30 meetings were held on the topic of Yugoslavia or its former states, and 28 for Somalia (See Appendix D for NSC and NSC/DC meetings). This means that 66% of the national security decision making staff's energies were fixated on these two topics, roughly in equal expenditure during the last half of 1992 when these intervention opportunities presented themselves. What follows is a brief sketch of each of these crises and some of their key characteristics to paint a picture of what the Bush 41 administration was considering as they discussed their options.

Breakup of Yugoslavia

The former Yugoslavia was a socialist state formed in the aftermath of World War II and a civil war, bringing together six separate republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. Two things contributed to their ultimate fracture. First, the suppressive influence of President Tito, which squelched the tensions among the groups for nearly three decades in various capacities, ended in 1980 with his death, unleashing old animosities. Second, the end of the Cold War brought significant change (BBC 2016). The “Revolutions of 1989” and corresponding retraction of Soviet military presence across their former sphere invited upheaval (Kumar 1992). Beginning in 1990, political protest, and ultimately extraordinary levels of violence overtook the Yugoslav republics. Yugoslavia was always diverse with its six republics divided along ethnic and historical lines. The tensions among the ethnic minorities (Serbs, Croats, and Muslims) created uncertainty about what the geopolitical space would look like moving forward following the end of communism and waning Soviet influence. With the loss of central state control came the opportunity for the republics to go their separate ways along status quo political boundaries; or in the mind of some, such as Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia, an opportunity to reimagine those lines and consolidate power to greater advantage (Magas 1993).

The initial breakdown of Yugoslavia began with secessionist movements in Slovenia and Croatia. Croatia ultimately declared independence on June 25, 1991 while under siege from an internal Serbian minority guerrilla movement. This faction was operating in support of the Serb-dominated Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) who actively

campaigns within Croatia's borders to expand Serbian control. The result of the conflict spanning over four years was more than 20,000 dead and over 250,000 displaced persons (BBC 2003). The magnitude of the conflict as well as its proximity to European powers and key markets ensured that the situation garnered attention. The violence in Croatia resulted in the deployment of the first United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping force (UN Protection Force) to secure safe havens and help enforce a negotiated ceasefire (United Nations Security Council Resolution 743, 1992). With the precedent set for international intervention, additional UN mandates would look to contend with the even more heightened violence occurring in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Table 4.1 Yugoslavia Key Events Timeline

Yugoslavia Key Events Timeline	
4 May 1980	Tito, who had been a key figure in unifying an ethnically diverse country, dies, unleashing resentment among groups that had been suppressed
Sep 1987	Slobodan Milosevic becomes leader of influential Serbian Socialist Party, promising to reclaim Kosovo for Serbs
May 1989	Milosevic named Serbian president
Nov 1989	Berlin Wall falls and notions of independent nationalism rise across the Soviet Union's former sphere of influence
Jan 1990	Milosevic's party split into factions when Slovenia walked out of a party congress, demonstrating a break in the political monopoly on power and an inability to control the splintering across the ethnic groups
12 Oct 1990	National Security Council/ Deputies Committee (NSC/DC) on Yugoslavia
25 Jan 1991	NSC/DC on Yugoslavia
May – Jun 1991	Slovenia and Croatia declare independence, sparking the Ten-Day War and subsequent Serb-sponsored guerrilla movements in the two republics following the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA)'s initial defeat
Sep 1991	JNA renews attacks, beginning the Croatian War of Independence
18 Sep 1991	NSC/DC on Yugoslavia
Oct – Dec 1991	Widespread war across Croatia – Siege of Dubrovnik and capture of Vukovar by the JNA. Hundreds of thousands of refugees are a result of the conflict. Conflict spills over into Bosnia.
13 and 23 Dec 1991	NSC/DCs on Yugoslavia
Jan – Apr 1992	Bosnian Serbs resist calls among Croats and Bosniaks for independence, trying to retain a broader Serbian state with the remnants of the former republic.
Jan 1992	Signing of the Vance Peace Plan creating four UN Protection Agreement zones in Serb-controlled areas
Feb 1992	Formation of United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) for implementation of peacekeeping mission
Apr 1992	Bosnian War begins with declaration of Bosnia and Herzegovina independence. The newly renamed Bosnian Serb Army (formerly JNA) drives Croats and Muslims from homes in widespread ethnic cleansing
27 May 1992	NSC/DC on Bosnia
May 1992	UN recognizes Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina and sanctions the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Summer – Winter 1992	Croats and Muslims are systematically cleansed by the Serbian population producing hundreds of thousands of refugees and a humanitarian crisis unseen in Europe since WW II
4 Jun – 14 Jan 1992	29 separate NSC/DCs or NSC small group meetings on Bosnia or the former Yugoslav republics

Sources: BBC 2016; Washington Post 2018; Bush 41 Library

Serbs were in opposition to independence among the former Yugoslav republics. They envisioned a new Serb state (Republika Srpska) that would consolidate ethnic Serbs under a common flag: the “Plan *Ram*.” Toward this end, the policy included the use of ethnic cleansing and wholesale massacre of villages not submitting to Serbian “terms of allegiance” (Lukic and Lynch 1996, 204). The results were stunning. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) produced casualty estimates for a period closely mirroring this study (April 1992 to July 1993) and found that just in that short time there were approximately 169,100 dead, including civilians and soldiers (Tabeau and Bijak 2003, 6). In addition, SIPRI found that there were over 1,150,000 refugees and internally displaced persons as well (Ibid., 18). In light of these realities and their growing prominence within public discourse, the Bosnian crisis elicited humanitarian calls for action on a scale heretofore unseen.

Somalia Turmoil

During the Cold War, Somalia held significant strategic interests for the United States. This was due not only to Somali proximity to oil transit routes, but also as a counter-balance to Soviet influence in neighboring Ethiopia (Western 2002). Based on this, the United States looked to secure a partner in Somali President Mohammed Siad Barre. President Barre took power via coup in 1969 and had relied heavily on Soviet support during the first decade of his rule. Barre actively worked to consolidate power by deemphasizing the clan-based structures upon which Somali society was built and relied heavily on external support, initially from the Soviets and then the United States. In 1977 Barre initiated a turn to the United States after a failed attempt to regain the

Ogaden region from Ethiopia, with the Soviets siding with the Ethiopians (Hirsch and Oakley 1996). U.S. administrations had overlooked many of the problems associated with Barre's authoritarian rule because of the Horn of Africa's importance in the broader Cold War context.

The failure in the Ogaden campaign prompted a shift in Barre's leadership. In order to retain power he returned to emphasizing the clan structures as the fundamental political entities under the regime (Hirsch and Oakley 1996, 8-12). Barre manipulated these structures and fomented an environment that required personal insulation and wholesale oppression of opposing clans in order to retain control. As a byproduct, these opposed clans turned to Ethiopia for backing and produced significant internal opposition. Unfortunately for Barre, this period of unrest happened to coincide with the precipitous decline of Soviet influence at the end of the 1980's, calling into question rationale for continued U.S. support (Western 2002, 119).

Table 4.2 Somalia Key Events Timeline

Somalia Key Events Timeline	
21 Oct 1969	Bloodless coup by General Mohammed Siad Barre establishing the Republic of Somalia
11 Jul 1974	Barre signs Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Soviet Union
23 Jul 1977	Somali forces attack Ethiopian military outposts in disputed Ogaden territory. Shortly thereafter, US, UK, and FR governments support Somalia
13 Sep 1977	Soviet support to Somalia ends; Soviets back Ethiopia in conflict
9 Mar 1978	Somalia defeated; troops removed from Ogaden; Opposition movements begin to form against Barre led by Army leaders
1984-1989	Siad Barre increases violence against rival clans and oppositional groups, including purging of military of those thought to oppose Siad Barre
20 Jan 1990	Africa Watch reports greater than 50,000 civilians killed in previous 19 months at hands of the Somali government
23 May 1990	Opposition parties to Barre sign a manifesto calling for the formation of a provisional government and reconciliation of conflict among groups
2 Oct 1990	Three Somali opposition movements – the United Somali Congress (USC), the Somali National Movement (SNM), and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) – sign agreement to overthrow government
4 Dec 1990	Siad Barre government abandons constitution and prosecutes arrest, leading to mass violence
5 Dec 1990 – 6 Jan 1991	U.S. State Department conducts ordered departure and ultimately a helicopter evacuation of the American Embassy in Mogadishu
27 Jan 1991	Siad Barre flees Mogadishu to Kismayu, Somalia
29 Jan 1991	USC names Ali Mahdi Mohammed (Hawiye clan) as interim President, and Omar Arteh Ghalib (Isaaq clan) as interim Prime Minister. They invite other oppositional groups to meet in Mogadishu on 28 February. General Aideed, The SPM, and the SNM reject the offer and the naming of Ali Mahdi as president, setting the stage for period of inter-clan conflict producing atrocities and starvation across Somalia
Jan 1992	The ICRC reports hundreds of thousands of refugees in camps dying of starvation. UN Secretary Boutros-Ghali calls on Security Council to take action to end the Somali civil war
Mar 1992	Africa Watch reports fighting in Mogadishu has produced 14,000 deaths and 27,000 wounded in five months
24 Apr 1992	UNSCR 751 requests deployment of 50 UN observers to monitor cease fire and establish a UN security force in Somalia once necessary conditions exist
28 Apr 1992	Siad Barre leave for Kenya, and then onto Nigeria
12 Aug 1992	Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed allows UN to protect its aid and Boutros-Ghali announces deployment of 500 UN soldiers
14 Aug 1992	First National Security Council/ Deputies Committee (NSC/DC) meeting on Somalia crisis – President Bush orders airlift to support famine relief
28 Aug 1992	UNSC authorizes 3500 troops to protect aid convoys
20 Aug – 12 Nov 1992	Increased violence against aid workers and security forces. UN warehouse is looted, Mogadishu airport is closed, and a CARE relief convoy is attacked
21 Nov 1992	NSC/DC considering military intervention options. CJCS Powell supports intervention and directs plan refinement
20 Nov – 3 Dec 1992	Seven NSC/DC and NSC Small Group meetings held on Somalia military intervention options with input from CENTCOM military planners
3 Dec 1992	NSC0065 meeting conducted by President Bush and his principal advisors where decision is made to conduct the humanitarian intervention
9 Dec 1992	First U.S. military elements arrive in Mogadishu and seize control of airport and the port as forward elements of Operation Provide Relief

Sources: Clarke 1992; Bush 41 Library

Somalia, by the end of 1990, had devolved into chaos and full-scale civil war between rival clans and the Barre regime. The United States chose not to risk its embassy staff in such an environment and pulled its personnel out to Nairobi, Kenya to observe from afar in January 1991 (Fox 2001). Barre, too, was not long to remain; he left Mogadishu on January 27th under duress to relocate to his clan's homeland to the south near the Kenyan border. This movement was forced by the successful revolt against the regime by the rival clan alliances and their associated militias. Most prominent of these was the United Somali Congress (USC) under General Mohammed Farah Aideed who was responsible for ejecting Barre from Mogadishu.

General Aideed initially did not assume a dominating leadership role among the allied clans, allowing each to prosecute their fight against Barre's forces in their respective areas. However, when Barre was able to mount a series of counterstrikes and try to take back Mogadishu in early 1992, it was Aideed who exerted authority and adopted a "scorched earth" that devastated areas to the south, ultimately causing Barre to flee to Kenya and then Nigeria (Hirsch and Oakley 1996, 10-13). In the wake, Aideed saw himself as the great liberator while other clan leaders presumed their own right to the spoils of victory. The result was a competitive environment of competing networks of alliances vying for supremacy along clan lines.

Anarchy reigned in post-Said Barre Somalia. Aideed and his principal rival, Ali Mahdi, were leading their allied clans against one another in an attempt to control the capital city. At the same time, on a lower level, teenage gangs were running rampant, looting the aid supplies coming in and committing violence against the international

workers. The aid materiel itself had become the currency in a collapsed state where violence represented the only authority to which to appeal (Talentino 2005, 103-105). The international aid coming in was principally food, which was necessary to combat the famine which was simultaneously having devastating effects on the population, putting nearly 4.5 million Somalis in danger of starvation by mid-1992. The results were horrendous. There were an estimated 40,000 killed or wounded in an around Mogadishu from November 1991 to February 1992, not including the uncounted deaths associated with starvation occurring in camps holding over 200,000 displaced persons (Human Rights Watch 1992). Between the famine and civil war, it was estimated that 350,000 Somalis had died leading up to Bush 41's period of decision (Hogg 2008). As a result, Somalia had captured the world's attention and was seemingly a test for whether those presumably able would be willing to respond.

Part III: Prevailing Theories and Predictions

There is a wide array of competing theories that aim to explain why leaders choose to intervene or not. As we look at the cases compared here, quite a few of the most prominent theories would have predicted the outcome incorrectly. Some arguments have centered on the determinant role external factors such as geopolitical considerations and state interests play (Aydin 2012; Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Mearsheimer 2001), or the media's coverage of the crisis based on its magnitude (Drury et. al. 2005). Similar to media coverage, others argue for the role of humanitarian norms and pressure exerted by international organizations to address atrocities (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, Herrmann and Shannon 2001). Still others posit that these decisions are

no different than any other political decision and that they are ultimately tied to the domestic politics, regardless of the president's rhetoric (Baum 2004; Fordham 2002; Hildebrandt et. al. 2013; James and Oneal 1991). This short section looks at a few of the most prominent scholarly theories to get an idea of what we might have expected Bush 41 to do based on available knowledge at the time if he had acted in accordance with their assertions. As will be seen, each of the following theories got it wrong. Bush 41, rather than intervene in Yugoslavia – which exhibited extraordinarily strong demand signals – instead chose to wait until after the U.S. presidential election and then intervene in Somalia, a place with minimal strategic importance, weaker ties to key allies, and less media coverage.

Beginning with international systemic factors, Aydin (2012) argued persuasively that intervention decisions are driven by a combination of political and economic objectives; these include economic ties to belligerents or crucial allies, containment of conflicts from regions of concern, supporting international audiences, or supporting other democracies (p. 148). Based on these considerations, we can evaluate the two intervention opportunities. The fledgling states of the former Yugoslavia score on a much higher scale in the concerns listed above when compared to Somalia. Economically, the United States is much more tethered and subject to the market forces associated with European states and the large-scale disruption of their economies. While Somalia once served a significant geopolitical role as a regional counter to Soviet influence in the Horn of Africa, that time had passed concomitantly with waning communist presence in the region (Western 2002, 119). The perceived requirement to support the Barre regime was over. Between these two cases, the geopolitical theory of

action would have predicted incorrectly, finding more utility in backing an intervention in the Yugoslavian republics.

Maybe there is something else at play. Drury, Olson, and Van Belle (2005) found that international as well as domestic political factors were extraordinarily important in most intervention decisions, but strikingly call out the additive “impact of a disaster’s media salience,” noting that “one *New York Times* article being worth more disaster aid dollars than 1,500 casualties” (p. 470). Perhaps there was a media coverage disparity that stoked the will of the masses making Somalia seem a better intervention candidate. Jon Western (2002) compared these same two 1992 cases of possible U.S. military intervention and demonstrated the important role that rising political pressure exerts on the decision to act over time as a crisis persists. Western’s work does an excellent job of process tracing the period of decision through interviews with key players in the Bush 41 administration, supporting his contention that what triggered the decision to act was the shift in public perception, as stoked by advocacy groups and an increasingly informed media as they become familiarized with the situations on the ground.⁸ However, what can we make of the so-called “CNN effect” when comparing the two cases? It is often said that it was the news footage of starving Somalis that brought Bush 41 to intervene, but that does not hold up to scrutiny (Western 2002, 114). Strobel (1997) demonstrated that the media’s coverage of Somalia was virtually

⁸ Western’s (2002) study brings up two notable points in his findings that directly relate to this study and may explain the inconsistency: how “doable” is the mission and the importance of military assessment to the decision making process (pp. 140-141). Western (2002) notes that this aspect of analysis for the decision making process is “highly subjective” and therefore leaves it as a consideration, but not necessarily a point of analysis (p. 140).

nonexistent until *after* Bush announced the decision to intervene. The same was not true for Bosnia. Coverage of the Yugoslavian break up and the onset of violence came early and was sustained. The comparative coverage between the intervention opportunities was actually discussed publicly at the time, asking why the tragedies in the former Yugoslavia should warrant so much more media attention to similar calamities in Somalia (Richburg 1992). The imbalance in coverage was chalked up to everything from the disparity in economic ramifications to notions of racism (Ibid.). Regardless of why, the coverage was clearly weighted in favor of the crisis in Europe. So, as for the impact of media pressure, it again seems as though Bosnia would have been the more likely intervention choice.

The magnitude of the atrocity is also thought to impact organizations such as the UN who figure prominently in organizing a response. Are there disparities in how the UN dealt with these concurrent crises that may indicate which was the more likely choice for the U.S. to intervene? Since the United Nations Security Council arguably serves as the bellwether for leading action in cases such as these, we can look to it to assess the relative demand of each crisis on the international stage. During 1992, the UN Security Council adopted 73 resolutions. Of these, six addressed Somalia while 24 dealt with the former Yugoslavia and its republics. In addition, the UN established a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in February 1992, designed to be a multinational peacekeeping force to stop the violence in the Yugoslav wars; the U.S. could have contributed troops to this established effort. Alternatively, in Somalia the UN initially stood up the United Nations Operation in Somali I (UNOSOM I) in April 1992, consisting of only a small monitoring element; it was not until the end of 1992 when the

U.S. volunteered to lead the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), a more robust ground force to facilitate humanitarian aid delivery. Therefore, with four times more resolutions than Somalia and 33% of the total resolutions, and a more strongly supported response capability, it can be argued that Bosnia elicited a stronger demand for U.S. action. But the U.S. chose to intervene in Somalia instead of Bosnia.

What happens when we look to domestic politics? A common argument in this camp is that presidents choose to act to produce a “rally around the flag” effect to sway public opinion towards them at key moments (Baker and Oneal 2001; Heatherington and Nelson 2003). Since 1992 was an election year, we might expect President Bush to choose to entertain a foreign venture for such purposes, especially considering the positive marks he gained at the beginning of his presidency with Desert Storm. Bush 41’s approval rating soared to 89% in March, 1991 following the conclusion of combat operations in Iraq (Kagay 1991). Democratic Congressional members argued at the time that Bush’s support aid to Somalia was plain old election year politics since the initial announcement to provide an airlift for humanitarian relief came just three days before the Republican National Convention (Lofland 1992, 57). Yet, there was a lack of public awareness of the crisis at that point, so such a ploy, if it were one, would not likely have resonated with the electorate. Media coverage did not begin in earnest until after President Bush’s announcement of the impending airlift operation and scholars have shown the argument for a news-driven intervention to be exaggerated (Livingston and Eachus 1995; Robinson 2001). Yet, if the administration had wished to act in accordance with this theory, the obvious choice would have been in the former

Yugoslavia where there was already an approved UN Security Council resolution in place and the establishment of a multinational peacekeeping force.

The question, then, is why did Bush 41 intervene in Somalia rather than in the former Yugoslavia if so many of the prevailing theories point in that direction?

Operational feasibility can provide some answers.

Part IV: Operational Feasibility Considerations

This portion of the chapter exposes key points of differentiation between these seemingly similar cases. Once these differences are factored in, we see that Somalia, from the perspective of Bush 41 at the time, presented a lower cost, less complex, quick win, when compared to the opportunity in Bosnia. Not only that, in the Somalia case we see how the changing feasibility perceptions over time transformed the decision from a clear nonintervention to an intervention.

To review, “operational feasibility” addresses the challenges of force employment to a crisis location and that military force’s potential efficacy given the situation and policy aims. This definition and the search for criteria that influence it are an elaboration on what scholars have attributed to the vague notion of “expectations of success” (Regan 2002, 40). In the previous chapter, I analyzed a subset of the intervention opportunities presented to U.S. presidents over the last three decades using QCA. This method produces combinations of conditions that, when present, are highly likely to lead to certain outcomes – in this case, either intervention or nonintervention decisions.

In the QCA outputs for intervention and nonintervention, there were four feasibility factors that emerged as meaningful elements to these causal recipes. The first accounts for whether there is a clear leader or regime to support. If there is a leader or an established regime to intervene on behalf of (including situations where there has already been a brokered ceasefire), then feasibility increases. Alternatively, feasibility decreases if the intervention is between two or more antagonists where maintaining neutrality becomes problematic. The second factor addresses the roots of conflict. This factor looks at whether ethnic or religious cleavages are driving the violence. If so, these are often intractable problems given the preference for short time commitments. The third factor addresses the structure of the enemy or adversary with which the U.S. military force would contend. Is the enemy hierarchical and therefore susceptible to strike, leading to short time estimates until conflict termination? Or, alternatively, is the enemy diffuse in its organization or consisting of multiple organizations? If it is the latter, longer operational time horizons should be expected because of the need to develop useful intelligence, ascertain vulnerabilities, and arrive at useful approaches to defeat the enemy. Finally, there is accessibility: how logistically difficult will force employment and sustainment be given where the crisis is located? While possibly considered mundane, accessibility problems such as those posed by austere or distant operating locales can make the difference between the possible and the improbable.

The following section probes the historical record of these two decisions and identifies two things: the explicit demands for the intervention and whether or not the operational feasibility considerations above, as well as the previously discussed determinants from the prevailing theories, were considered in the decision-making

process. This research relies principally on two groups of material. First, I place greatest emphasis on primary resources such as NSC records and the public papers from the George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, as well as the public statements made by the president himself or his key advisors. The presidential library documents, most of which were previously classified, were released under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and expose the dialogues behind the scenes of these decisions.⁹ Second, I augment these materials with secondary sources containing interviews with individuals involved in shaping Bush 41's decisions based on their duty positions at the time.¹⁰ The goal is to confirm or deny the existence of these feasibility concerns, along with any of the previously discussed determinants, to assess their influence on the decision to intervene in Somalia vice Bosnia.

⁹ All available archival material for these two cases was used in this study. In conducting the analysis, I searched for not only feasibility factors referenced in the conversations, but for the other demand signal determinants as well. The fact that feasibility is more prominent in the findings and excerpts below is indicative of the evidence more broadly. External determinants such as the role of the UN and the magnitude of the conflict and its effects were also replete in the dialogues. Internal determinants were not as openly discussed, as might be expected. That said, the research must rely on the historical record, and the fact that we find discussions concerning feasibility highlight that it plays a role.

¹⁰ There are four key resources that fall into this category:

1) Fox, John G. "Approaching Humanitarian Intervention Strategically: The Case of Somalia." SAIS Review 21, no. 1 (2001): 147–158. (Winter-Spring 2001). John Fox served as the key Foreign Service Officer working the crisis, first in Somalia, and then based out of the Nairobi U.S. Embassy.

2) Hoar, Joseph P. "A CINC's Perspective." National Defense University, Washington DC Center for Counterproliferation Research, (January 1993). General Hoar was the commander for Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and the principal commander in the development of the operational plan.

3) Lofland, Valerie J. "Somalia: US Intervention and Operation Restore Hope." Case Studies in Policy-Making and Implementation 6 (2002). Lofland's research is based on interviews of members of the NSC Staff and participants from the Department of State working the Somalia case during the crisis.

4) Oberdorfer, Don. "The Path to Intervention: A Massive Tragedy We Could Do Something About." Washington Post 6 (1992). Oberdorfer conducted interviews with key members of the NSC staff and cabinet following the Deputies Committee meetings in November, 1992, offering insights into the deliberation process prior to the declassification of the notes from the Somalia Deputies Committee meetings and the NSC 0065 meeting.

4) Western, Jon. "Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information, and Advocacy in the U.S. Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia." International Security 26, no. 4 (April 1, 2002): 112–42. Western conducts extensive interviews with individuals involved in the management of the crisis, including key advisors such as Brent Scowcroft.

Yugoslavia – Intervention Demands and Feasibility Assessment

The Yugoslavian collapse and the violence that followed it presented significant pressures from both international and domestic audiences for something to be done. Yet, Bush 41 chose not to weigh in militarily. This can be argued to stem from the concerns expressed below regarding the feasibility of any intervention. The dialogues within the administration are replete with concerns over the complex nature of the conflict, the challenge of maintaining neutrality between opposing armies in absence of a cease-fire, limited accessibility, and concerns over countering Serbian opposition forces waiting in the surrounds of the Sarajevo airport. As the following analysis shows, these concerns were both evident and too much to warrant military intervention under Bush 41. The section below identifies the most significant demands for an intervention in Yugoslavia and the feasibility concerns expressed for the presumed mission.

Intervention Demands

Initial NSC staff meetings on Yugoslavian fragmentation focused on identifying the strategic implications and developing planning guidance for how to implement approaches to counter the fallout. To address this, the NSC staff developed a proposed strategy paper on Yugoslavia for consideration at the September 18, 1991 Deputies Committee meeting. The impetus for this paper was the Croatian request for state recognition. The paper, which provided a recommendation based on analysis of two possible options – a recognition strategy and an isolation strategy – highlights a number of key concerns within the decision calculus for the Yugoslavian situation more broadly.

First, the strategy paper addresses what was seen at the time as the impulse for action: “With the collapse of the latest EC (European Commission)-brokered cease-fire, European, Yugoslav, and Congressional attention will turn to us to see what we are prepared to do. This will come at the same time that the level of violence may become too much for the U.S. and European publics to act passively” (NSC/DC 1991a, 7). What can we take from this? There are political pressures -international as well as domestic - working in combination. In this case, the principal concern expressed in the strategy paper and in the supporting documents is the spread of violence across the Balkans leading to broader destabilizing effect on Europe as a whole (NSC/DC 1991b, 13). Absent in the analysis are the merits of supporting the Croats or opposing the Serbs generally speaking, detached from the anticipated outcomes. Instead, the emphasis is on what actions – diplomatic, economic, and military – are likely to be required to assist in stabilizing the situation if it worsens. In fact, the strategy paper’s recommendation was to adopt a policy of “not recognizing Slovenian or Croatian independence” and to “actively discourage others from doing so” (NSC/DC 1991a, 26). The reason for this is because the staff believed recognition would contribute greater instability by fostering downstream effects, regardless of its normative appeal (NSC/DC 1991b, 14).

Understanding what characteristics of a crisis exhibits that place it on the NSC’s agenda is important because it speaks to what generates the perceived “intervention opportunities” that are the subject of this literature. In this case, the way the intelligence community and the NSC characterized the crisis lends support to those who argue in favor of the power of international systemic factors such as concern over the impact on allies and whether the magnitude of the conflict will be enough to cause significant

repercussions. The Yugoslavian collapse and the ethnic violence that followed created significant demands on both counts. Yet, Bush decided to stay out of what his administration understood to be a complex, civil war. Looking beyond the call for action and into questions of feasibility, we can see the aspects of the situation that gave the administration pause.

Feasibility Assessment

The most prominent theme in the NSC meeting notes is the concern over the drivers of the conflict and, in this case, their intractable nature. The crisis in Yugoslavia centered on ethnic and religious cleavages, precisely the type posited here to appear as more infeasible for producing timely desired outcomes. The NSC/DC notes are replete with references to the “historical and ethnic complexities of the region” and their propensity to lead to the “worst case outcome – an intensification and widening of the conflict” where the “peacekeeping force becomes embroiled in hostilities in its efforts to separate Yugoslav combatants” (NSC/DC 1991b, 16). The staff knew that these situational characteristics lent themselves to a “prolonged crisis,” and as a result, they stated that “our approach toward Yugoslavia has shown that neither our Government nor our public is predisposed to involvement in ethnic-based local conflicts in Europe” (NSC/DC 1991c, 6). This recognition over the challenges posed by ethnic conflict, expressed early in the situational analysis, framed the thinking for the decision makers throughout the crisis and persisted until the end of the Bush 41 administration. General Colin Powell, the CJCS, argued in the New York Times in favor of selective inaction because, “the crisis in Bosnia is especially complex, ...one with deep ethnic and religious

roots that go back a thousand years” (Powell 1992). Similarly, President Bush (1992a) used this same rationale to explain the administration’s perceived impotence in dealing with the crisis in August 1992:

Now, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia is *a complex, convoluted conflict* that grows out of age-old animosities. The blood of innocents is being spilled over century-old feuds. The lines between enemies and even friends are jumbled and fragmented. Let no one think there is an easy or a simple solution to this tragedy. The violence will not end overnight, whatever pressure and means the international community brings to bear. Blood feuds are very difficult to resolve. Any lasting solution will only be found with the active cooperation and participation of the parties themselves. *Those who understand the nature of this conflict understand that an enduring solution cannot be imposed by force from outside on unwilling participants* (Emphasis added.).

A second emergent theme from the early NSC meetings pertains to peacekeeping forces. What role would peacekeeping forces play, when would they be employed, and what would their composition be (NSC/DC 1991a, 8)? Perhaps most interesting is that the staff only saw a role for peace *keeping* and not peace *enforcement*. The Deputies Committee strategy paper’s articulation of what conditions would warrant emplacement of a peacekeeping force is telling: “ceasefire and JNA consent” (Ibid.). The thought of putting troops in an intervening position between combatants was not even considered. This is consistent with this paper’s operational feasibility factor regarding the preference for a leader or supportable regime to be in place at the outset. Only when an approved regime is present (in this case a ceasefire agreement and a permissive posture from the would-be adversary) would the administration entertain the introduction of a peacekeeping force.

The NSC/DC meeting on Yugoslavia that occurred on January 16, 1992 looked specifically at the challenges of supporting a potential peacekeeping operation. Prominent in the discussion was the recognition that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had not received answers to the “operational questions posed at the last DC” and that these were needed in order to ascertain the United States’ preparedness in playing “a major supportive role in the planning and execution of a UN Peacekeeping operation” (NSC/DC 1991c, 14). The discussion that followed in this meeting demonstrated two things: one, there were many details missing to support a thorough analysis of the requirements; and two, the concerns over the possible trajectory of the violence led them to desire a visible but small footprint for U.S. forces if they were to be employed. On the latter point, the staff remarks that “American presence would have considerable value, possibly through a visible role in logistical teams or in observer units in bordering states. Presentation is key: we should shape a U.S. role that gets the U.S. prominently involved on the ground but short of troop presence” (Ibid. 68). Candidly conveyed thinking such as this lays bare how significant the risk to troops figured into the analysis and possible U.S. contributions to a peacekeeping operation.

Between January and June, two things happened in direct opposition to one another. On one hand, the demand to respond to the crisis increased from both Congress and international leaders; on the other, the military was working to fill the knowledge gaps associated with the operational questions noted by the JCS above (Gellman 1992). The two most challenging aspects of the situation that defense planners noted were accessibility to the crisis environment and the structural composition and functionality of the JNA opposition.

Accessibility was a key concern for any potential peacekeeping mission because of the limited availability of nodes to support troop and materiel throughput with the closure of the Sarajevo airport. Those concerns tempered the thinking of the administration leadership. Even while the Senate had passed a non-binding resolution directing President Bush to call on the UN to develop a military intervention plan, then Secretary of State, James Baker III, was downplaying any notion of a forcible military entry. Why was this? Because “senior Pentagon officers and defense planners said that seizing the airport and distributing relief supplies would be far more complex and costly than is generally understood” (Ibid.). Barton Gellman, conducting interviews with defense planners at the time for the *Washington Post*, writes that key situational characteristics were causing the administration to drag their feet: The Sarajevo airport has only a single runway, sits in a bowl, is over a mile and a half from the city center, and is surrounded by dominating hills holding significant amounts of opposition artillery and mortars, much “like Dien Bien Phu” (Gellman 1992).

Beyond accessibility, the planners expressed concern over the Serb forces themselves. They noted that the Serbs “do not operate under centralized control but rather in a loose alliance of roughly 40,000 former federal army troops and up to 50,000 irregular in Bosnia” (Ibid.). What does this mean to military estimates for the situation? According to General McCaffrey, a spokesman for the JCS at the time, he estimated that it would take 60,000 to 120,000 troops to “clear a 20-mile strip around the airport to prevent it from being hit by artillery and mortar fire and to deploy troops to guard the 200-mile land corridor from the Croatian port of Split to Sarajevo” (Gordon 1992). Feasibility factors such as these - accessibility and the structure of enemy forces – are

precisely the considerations that I argue are most important in ascertaining whether a force can be employed efficiently, at acceptable risk, and produce results in a timely manner.

It is one thing to note that these matters are discussed and part of the record among those framing the decisions for the president and his advisors. But the question then becomes, do these considerations make their way from the analysts in the Pentagon up through the NSC staff structures to those that make the decisions? The public record says, “yes.” Just two months later in August 1992, when President Bush (1992b) was pressed on why the U.S. was not readying the military for the use of force, he responded with remarks that clearly display linkages between the NSC analysis and his public position. Table 4.3 provides a few select remarks that demonstrate the point.

Table 4.3 George H.W. Bush Bosnia Remarks

George H.W. Bush Select Remarks on Bosnia – August 8, 1992

- It is highly complex. The American people must not be misled into thinking that there is some quick and easy military answer to this highly complex question.
- We are not going to get bogged down in some guerrilla warfare. I owe it to the military not to make some rash decision based on politics...I don't care what the pressures are. If the Senate's going to pass a resolution, fine; let them pass it. But I have the responsibility not just to try to help solve this humanitarian problem but for the lives of young Americans. I take that responsibility very, very seriously.
- I'm not certain that the air strikes themselves would solve the problem, nor am I certain that putting ground forces into this situation, as it stands now, would solve the problem. Therein lies its complexity.
- The terrain is difficult. The finding of the opposition is difficult. You have a history in that area -- you don't have to go very far back -- go back to World War II and see a history of successful guerrilla fighting in the area. You have a terrain problem at Sarajevo that's similar, at the G - 7 meeting, people were telling me Dien Bien Phu.
- It makes me want to do whatever we have to do to stop the killing. I would only suggest that this is a very complicated military question, very, very complicated, indeed. We have probably -- well, I know we have the best intelligence in the world on this, and it is not an easy military problem even for our fantastic Air Force.

Despite the administration's appraisal of the situation as overly complex and holding the potential to become a quagmire, this did not lead them to ignore it. Rather, it impacted the desire to contribute substantively to any military intervention directly, limiting the array of options considered.

Bush (1992a) laid six steps the administration was willing to take to respond to these calls for action at a press briefing on August 6, 1992. These steps ranged from diplomatic recognition of the governments of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, to strengthening economic sanctions on Serbia, to placing civilian monitors in adjacent states to help prevent spillover effects. Notably absent in these "six initiatives," as the NSC referred to them, was a clear commitment of U.S. service members into the cross fire (NSC Small Group 1992a).

Bush's first initiative of the six *did* call for the passage of a UN Security Council resolution authorizing the "international community" to use of force if necessary to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian relief (Bush 1992a). However, Bush was balancing between calling for action and making it clear that it should not be a principally U.S. undertaking. How do we know this? The administration's reluctance to commit forces to Yugoslavia but strong desire for a role for the UN and coalitions involving the post-Cold War application of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were explicit in NSC meetings leading up to these statements (NSC/DC 1992a). Key in those discussions was the important but supporting role that the U.S. was anticipated to play in any multinational efforts. An NSC Small Group discussion (1992b) on the subject made this point clear: "We need to consider every possible means of American support and

contribution – short of committing ground combat troops to Bosnia – to make this operation successful” (p. 13). Viewing Bush’s public statements within the context of the meetings that supported the decision-making process illuminates a more hesitant stance for the administration instead of the active leadership posture they conveyed publicly. Beyond that, Bush’s rationale to explain any perceived hesitancy in U.S. action is directly in line with the analysis expressed by the military planners and in the NSC/DC meetings.

Upon review, Yugoslavia’s dissolution presented strong demand signals for U.S. action based on the impact the crisis had on European allies and from nascent norms calling for the alleviation of human suffering in high magnitude conflicts. However, these demand signals were muffled by competing concerns over what would be required to actually achieve the humanitarian effects given the complex nature of the situation. In fact, all four feasibility factors were aligned in opposition to intervention (see Table 4.4 below). The crisis was characterized as complex “blood feud” in which no quick solution was likely (Bush 1992a). In addition, any intervention would be placed in between the three antagonists without an agreed upon ceasefire. Finally, the Serb opposition was decentralized and numerous, requiring significant amounts of ground troops and thwarting access to the limited ports and logistics nodes required to support the operation.

Table 4.4 Bush 41 Yugoslavia Intervention Opportunity Feasibility Assessment

<i>Bush 41 Yugoslavia Intervention Opportunity Feasibility Assessment</i>			
<i>Conflict Type</i>	<i>Supportable Regime</i>	<i>Enemy Structure</i>	<i>Accessible Environment</i>
- "Complex, convoluted, blood feud"	- No recognized ceasefire	- Up to 90K army/irregulars in decentralized, loose alliances	- Limited ports & roads / Sarajevo airport "like Dien Bien Phu"
+ Denotes positive affect		- Denotes negative affect	

Bush not only received these assessments, he put them on the public record in his statements on the matter. The bottom line is that the anticipated costs were too high, and a viable military option just was not feasible. Maybe the strongest indicator in support of this contention is the fact that President Bush did not hold an actual NSC principals meeting to consider supporting an intervention (See Annex B for NSC meetings). The same is not true of Somalia.

Somalia – Intervention Demands and Feasibility Assessment

The Somalian civil war and famine and Yugoslavia's violent breakup presented similar humanitarian demands when considering the magnitude of human suffering. Where Somalia differed sharply is in the fact that it was a collapsed state in the Horn of Africa, not having immediate impacts on allies, key markets, or geo-political competitors. So with arguably less demand, how is it that Somalia becomes an intervention opportunity seized upon by Bush 41 in his waning days in office? The answer to that question is rooted in how the mission was framed, and from that, feasibility determined.

The discussions within the NSC and military planning staffs demonstrate that the administration's appreciation of the situation in Somalia changes over time. They initially treat the mission as a "quagmire" in the waiting, but a shift occurs in the thinking of both the NSC staffers as well as the Joint Staff, treating Somalia as a much more reasonable mission accomplishable within a shorter time horizon (Lofland 1992, 57). While the demand signal for action plays an important role – the notion in these cases that the U.S. should act somewhere (i.e., either Bosnia or Somalia) – it is the difference in perceived feasibility that weighs most heavily on where that intervention occurs.

Initially, planners assumed that if the military ground forces were used, their purpose would be to end a civil war and restore order throughout the country (Hirsch and Oakley 1996, 37). However, once a potential intervention has the backing of the President and the CJCS as evidenced by the directive to conduct such planning, the mission is redefined in a more limited fashion, focusing on the safeguarding of supplies to the famine belt (Hirsch and Oakley 1996, 41). This, more restricted appraisal of what was being asked from a policy perspective, influenced how the United States viewed the conflict broadly, what mission was required, and finally what the opposition to such a mission might look like. As the subsequent analysis demonstrates, the end result is that Bush 41 seized the opportunity to use overwhelming military force in a mission that he saw as low risk and consistent with his view of the U.S. in a "new world order" (Bush 1993). The following section details the decision-making process for Somalia, starting with identification of the most operative demands for intervention, then the changes in anticipated mission over time, and finally addresses the feasibility concerns associated with the settled-upon mission.

Intervention Demands

What was the driving force behind the intervention in Somalia? Strong sentiments tied to the suffering in this crisis seem to be the most compelling demand signal for action. It is clear from the deliberations among the NSC in the months preceding the decision that there was very little geopolitics at play, or motivations that expressed any U.S. interest at stake other than reputational (NSC/DC 1992). There was a clear sense that something ought to be done and this had everything to do with the magnitude of the tragedy.

The reports coming out of Somalia seemed to produce real anguish for Bush, who expressed as much both in public and behind closed doors (Bush 1992b; NSC0065 1992). For the President, the Somali crisis resonated on two levels. First, Bush 41 appeared to internalize the crisis, receiving pressure from those in his State Department, from Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), and ultimately criticism for failing to alleviate the suffering from UN General Secretary Boutros-Ghali (Western 2002, 135). These pressures coupled with his personal experience in Sudan with his wife in 1985 where they witnessed the Sahelian famine firsthand, an episode that he later professed to have influenced the decision (Lofland 1992, 60). Second, with limited time left in his tenure, the Bush 41 legacy was in question and the President was outspoken about the leadership role he envisaged for the United States in the post-Cold War era (Bush 1993). Based on this, the strongest demands for intervention come from the severe magnitude of the conflict and the emerging international norms for alleviating human suffering in such crises. But these factors are consistent with the Bosnian case where Bush 41 chose to sit

out. What was different here? Much of the difference lies in the manner in which the anticipated mission was conceived.

Presumed Mission – End Civil War

Unlike the public in early to mid-1991, the Bush 41 administration was not as in the dark regarding the situation on the ground in Somalia. By the time President Bush made the final decision in December 1992 to initiate Operation Restore Hope, the NSC had held 12 Deputies Committee meetings on Somalia (NSC/DC 1992). It was during this process of NSC staff meetings supported by concurrent operational military analysis that the situation was framed and understood.

Initially, when the unrest in Somalia first surfaced to NSC attention in the Spring and early Summer of 1992, the Joint Chiefs painted the picture as bleak, convoluted, and argued against any sort of military intervention. This was based on the assumption that the military's principal mission would be quelling the civil war and restoring order – the drivers of the instability that resulted in the famine and violence. Their arguments for nonintervention were based largely on the type of feasibility factors mentioned above (e.g. intractable animosities between warring factions, difficulty in distinguishing combatants from civilians, and complicating terrain) (Western 2002, 116). The result was a unified Pentagon position that an intervention would be ill-advised given the unenviable mission of ending a civil war.

Mission Change – Airlift

However, the situation continued to deteriorate over the course of the summer, increasing the demand for action. The interagency community deliberated on what to recommend in response to pleas for assistance – at this point mostly emanating from the State Department and NGOs involved in relief efforts – but they did not arrive at a consensus (Hirsch and Oakley 1996, 38-39). The breakthrough came with a similar concern for the use of force in support of a humanitarian mission elsewhere: Operation Provide Comfort, initiated to provide support to the Kurds in Northern Iraq and sanctioned by the UN Security Council. With this recent case providing precedent, Bush ordered a similar level of limited support (i.e., airlift) to the Somalia famine on August 14 with the decision to begin Operation Provide Relief (Ibid.). This mission was clearly more feasible, only requiring the use of logistics assets without the risk of combat.

Once on board with the humanitarian mission, even in the limited role undertaken with Operation Provide Relief, the challenges posed by warring clans for the NGOs and the airlift campaign supporting them took on greater importance. The United States was committed to some semblance of success on the ground at that point. Unfortunately, growing violence and starvation began to demonstrate that the indirect approach was likely untenable. This, along with media attention and congressional pressure, increased the call for action. As a result, CJCS Colin Powell requested that the Department of Defense develop options for a more robust military intervention, if one were to be required to achieve the policy goals (Hirsch and Oakley 1996, 42). From Central Command (CENTCOM)'s perspective, the military combatant command conducting the

planning, this directive served to provide an opportunity to re-scope the mission yet again. No longer were they framing their mission as a full-scale civil-war intervention, nor was it a limited airlift operation; instead, it was the more refined problem of securing aid delivery (Hoar 1993).

Mission Change – Secure Humanitarian Aid Delivery

Military planning along these lines facilitated the higher-level analysis at the NSC/DC meetings leading up to the decision. There were nine such meetings held between November 20 and December 3, 1992. Don Oberdorfer (1992), reporting for the Washington Post at the time and citing sources at the meeting, said the November 21, Deputies Committee meeting “was the turning point in the deliberations that led to President Bush's order...to send thousands of American troops to Somalia.” In that meeting, Admiral David E. Jeremiah, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) announced to stunned attendees that the “deployment of U.S. ground troops could end the violence in Somalia and see that its people were fed within a short period” (Ibid.). The military had scoped the mission to such a degree that it was focused on securing key distribution sites to stop the famine and held the assumption that a follow-on UN force would be able to relieve them in short order (Hoar 1993, 62).

Even with this limited mission and its accompanying newfound optimism, there was growing concern among those influencing the decision (Powell and Cheney in particular) that the operation may hold more dangers than were being conveyed (Oberdorfer 1992). The subsequent NSC/DC meetings (November 23 and 24) addressed this concern and teased out the various options available to follow through on the

Admiral Jeremiah's assertion that the military could do the job. Ultimately, Bush 41 was presented with three options: "1) U.S. air-power and sea-power in support of a strengthened UN force; 2) limited U.S. military intervention as a prelude to an expanded UN force; and 3) insertion of a U.S. division, plus allies, under UN auspices. To the surprise of the committee, which had formed a consensus around the second option, Bush selected the third, most aggressive approach" (Fox 2001, 149). This was in keeping with the so-called "Weinberger-Powell Doctrine," deploying overwhelming force in an attempt to achieve clearly defined objectives (here, the securing of aid workers and delivery of relief supplies) as rapidly as possible (Campbell 1998).

In short, from the position of the administration evaluating the crisis, over the course of just a few months, the famine in Somalia went from presenting a hopeless case to a very "doable" mission. The increasing intensity of the crisis, along with a precedent set in Iraq for supporting a humanitarian mission without ground troops, led to a small U.S. commitment to assist in the delivery of aid. However, the situation on the ground proved too much for that same approach to work and if success were to be secured, it would require boots on the ground. The commitment of those troops had everything to do with the reframing of the mission they would be conducting. As a result of the more limited mission, the perceived feasibility of the operation was significantly altered.

Seeing the progression of the decision calculus and how it concluded, it is now easier to see how Bush 41 viewed the feasibility factors for Operation Restore Hope. The remainder of this section analyzes the records of this decision-making process to

determine the degree to which feasibility factors were considered in the intervention decision. As demonstrated below, feasibility was very much at the forefront.

Feasibility Assessment – Secure Humanitarian Aid Delivery

In the final NSC meeting before the decision (December 3, 1992), the president and his NSC principals met immediately following Bush 41's military briefing where he had selected the third option. The thrust of the President's concerns at this meeting, the only one on record of the Bush 41 discussing Somalia with his NSC principals, are on the possible intervention's legality and funding. These two issues are subsequent to the determination of whether the mission can be done; he had already committed to the mission in concept following the military briefing, of which there are no notes. However, the minutes from the NSC meeting provide a clear impression of how Bush 41 and his team had conceived of the intervention and how they anticipated it to unfold.

In the December 3, 1992 NSC meeting, Bush 41 demonstrated how he viewed the conflict and what the U.S. was prepared to do. First, in Figure 4.1 below, Bush 41 notes that "there could be 28-30,000 troops involved for an unknown period of time, although I expect that within 40 days troops can start coming out" (NSC 0065 1992, 1).




Figure 4.1 NSC 0065 Minutes Excerpt Page 1

In a later exchange (see Figure 4.2 below) Bush 41 asks Secretary of State Eagleburger, “If the operation, goes smoothly, why will we need many peacekeepers” (NSC 0065 1992, 4)? These comments make plain that Bush 41 viewed this as a very limited mission focused on relief delivery, rather than on restoring order to a country suffering a civil war. Even if history were to prove this as misconceived or naïve, the president saw this U.S.-led, multinational action with a limited mandate, both in scope as well as time. This means that Bush 41 saw the type of conflict as largely irrelevant, and therefore advantageous, because they did not intend to weigh into it themselves. In addition, while at the point of decision the UNSCR 794 had not passed, Bush 41’s team worked to get it passed prior to announcing the mission publicly (Bush 1992).




Figure 4.2 NSC 0065 Minutes Excerpt Page 4

Next, how had Bush 41 anticipated the enemy likely to oppose the U.S. forces? Under a standard military planning model, enemy actions are anticipated and planned against for both the most anticipated and worst-case scenarios (Joint Staff 2017). In this case, it seems as though the most likely scenario was allowed to dominate the thinking. As General Hoar, the CENTCOM commander at the time noted, “Great care was taken to develop an approved, well-defined mission with attainable, measurable objectives prior to the operation commencing. Disarmament was excluded from the mission because it was neither realistically achievable nor a prerequisite for the core mission of providing a secure environment for relief operations” (Hoar 1993, 58). Why was the requirement for disarmament omitted or significant combat unexpected? Because they assumed that rapid, overwhelming force would quell the violence and there would be little resistance. After all, they were not dealing with an actual “enemy;” instead the warring clansmen were viewed merely as “brigands” (NSC0065 1992). This is a sentiment echoed up to the highest levels. Bush 41 captures the thinking quite succinctly in the NSC meeting where he stated that the mission would “provide relief in a benign setting. We may have to kill some people, but I do not expect any major resistance. Right Colin [Powell]” (NSC0065 1992)? From the President’s perspective, the feasibility consideration for

enemy composition was clear: the enemy was largely nonexistent and unlikely to interfere with delivery of aid given the arrival of prodigious U.S. forces.

Lastly, I address the question of accessibility. Here too we see a shift in how the facts of the situation are interpreted over time. Initially, Somalia was seen to present significant challenges, operationally as well as logistically. General Hoar remarked that “deploying to Somalia was like going to the moon” (Hoar 1993, 60). In the CENTCOM commander’s retelling of the operation’s planning and execution, he was careful to note all of the challenges that had to be overcome, ranging from the extensive air-bridge that had to be established, the limitations of the harbor at Mogadishu, and the generally austere conditions that required enormous efforts on the part of engineers (Ibid.). Yet, just because the problem presents difficulties or great expense does not make it infeasible. Every decision is contextual.

In this case, competing crises played a key role. There was a sense that an action was going to take place, either in support of the humanitarian mission in Bosnia or in Somalia. The Pentagon began to compare the two situations and look at them as an either-or proposition (Western 2002, 138). With that, the Somalia problem appeared in a different light. As Lofland (1992) notes from her interviews with staff members, “The brass began to believe Somalia was ‘doable’ on the ground and much less risky than Bosnia. The terrain in Somalia was relatively flat, unlike Bosnia, where thick woods and mountains would cause new challenges” (p. 59). In addition, the military could explore other options to support operations in Somalia that were sea-based, increasing accessibility without procuring additional infrastructure on the ground (Ohls 2009).

When compared to the Bosnia problem set, Somalia, for all its challenges, was clearly the simpler of the two (see Table 4.5 below). In every feasibility factor category Somalia scored more positively, to include the supportable regime. Even though neither crisis had a ceasefire or government to support, active opposition was not anticipated in Somalia, making even that category more favorable. Given this, Bush 41, if compelled to intervene and demonstrate U.S. leadership in meeting humanitarian challenges, would clearly have viewed Somalia's accessibility in a fairer light than Bosnia.

Table 4.5 Bush 41 Intervention Opportunities Feasibility Assessment Comparison

<i>Bush 41 Intervention Opportunities Feasibility Assessment Comparison</i>				
	<i>Conflict Type</i>	<i>Supportable Regime</i>	<i>Enemy Structure</i>	<i>Accessible Environment</i>
<i>Yugoslavia</i>	- "Complex, convoluted, blood feud"	- No recognized ceasefire	- Up to 90K army/irregulars in decentralized, loose alliances	- Limited ports & roads / Sarajevo airport "like Dien Bien Phu"
<i>Somalia</i>	+ Not attempting to resolve conflict	- No government / unexpected opposition	+ "Brigand" and "Juvenile delinquents"	+ Costly but for short duration
		+ Denotes positive affect		- Denotes negative affect

Part V: Comparison and Conclusion – Why Somalia and not Bosnia?

The comparison of these two cases accomplishes a number of useful outcomes. First, the findings reinforce the previous chapter's results where specific combinations of conditions are tied to respective intervention and nonintervention decisions. Here, again, we see that demand signals for action need to be combined with advantageous feasibility factors for an intervention to occur. This might seem overly obvious, but it is clearly an

underappreciated attribute of these situations based on a body of literature puzzled by inconsistent intervention outcomes.

Second, we gain a better understanding of how the types of demand signal can influence the decisions. These two cases were similar on their calls for action. Both crises were of significant magnitude regarding deaths, refugees, and internally displaced persons. Both were championed by international bodies as calamities warranting intervention citing the application of international norms. The differences between the two were in favor of the Bosnian side of the ledger, with increased incentives from both media coverage and ties to significant allies and markets. In this respect, the comparison adds some weight to those who argue on behalf of those determinants in common. That said, it clearly shows that demand alone, no matter how strong, is not enough.

Third, the comparison demonstrates how powerful differences in feasibility interpretations influence the decision. These two cases varied greatly in how the administration viewed the type of conflict where the interventions would occur, whether there was an established regime to support, the composition and organization of the enemy, and the operating environment's accessibility. Not only did they differ on these counts, more importantly, these factors were candidly discussed among those influencing the decision. The explication of how and at what point in the process these feasibility considerations were taken into account helps us better understand the "subjective" realm of expectations of success and the military's role in shaping that notion that scholars like Western (2002) have labored to understand.

Finally, the Somalia case's shifting conceptions of mission requirements provided a valuable opportunity to assess how changing key aspects of the situation affect the

intervention outcome. In this case, certainly there are those that can argue that media coverage of the atrocities increased over the months, along with associated political pressure from domestic and international audiences. However, when we look at the discourse within the national security community, we see a much more important shift – the anticipated mission being used to assess operational feasibility. As the mission changed, so did the feasibility, making Bush 41 more confident in a lower risk deployment of troops with a higher probability of success.

The next chapter expands on the implication of changes in perceived feasibility over time. Will cases that seemed too complex at the outset become ripe for intervention, or will interventions once undertaken become withdrawals once the appreciation of the situation shifts, and along with it, these same feasibility factors? If so, greater weight will be added to the explanatory power of operational feasibility in explaining intervention decisions.

CHAPTER 5
WILLIAM J. CLINTON INTERVENTION DECISIONS:
SOMALIA AND BOSNIA

This chapter expands on the theoretical application of feasibility factor analysis in understanding intervention decisions. The previous chapters emphasized conditions at crisis onset, or near to it, and how they may have influenced the decision to intervene or not. This analysis explores how presidential intervention decisions are affected by changes in the crisis environment over time, specifically focusing on the feasibility factors illuminated in the work heretofore.

The Somalia case from Chapter 4 demonstrated that intervention may appear to be infeasible at one point, but subsequently changes based on different assessments of the situation. In the George H.W. Bush (Bush 41) Somalia case, this stemmed from changes in how the mission was conceived based on different policy expectations, which themselves were tied to different sorts of demands (e.g., growing magnitude of the conflict and increased media coverage). Ultimately, Bush 41 chose not to undertake the mission until the military provided realistic options based on policy goals that were amended to become more tenable. What once was a likely quagmire becomes a probable success. The same did not hold true for Bosnia, which like Somalia had increased pressure from both international and domestic audiences, emitting significant demands for action. However, no reasonable policy goal with a feasible military option emerged, and therefore no intervention occurred.

This chapter looks at whether decisional shifts like we saw in Somalia under Bush 41 hold true in other cases based on the same changes in feasibility factors. Specifically,

does it go the other way? Does a case where a president decided not to intervene later become an intervention, and if so, what factors changed? Alternatively, does a case where a president intervened become a withdrawal when those same factors shift in the opposite direction? If they do, this adds explanatory weight to the notion that feasibility factor analysis is a central component to understanding presidential intervention behavior.

In answering these questions, this chapter focuses on the same two crises from the previous chapter, Somalia and Bosnia, but in the period immediately following: the William (Bill) Clinton presidential decision space. As depicted above, the Bush 41 administration determined previously that one crisis was overly complex and unlikely to be improved by the introduction of military force (Bosnia), while the other was limited in scope, low in risk, and capable of rapidly achieving the mission goals (Somalia). Clinton reverses positions on both of these crises, precipitously withdrawing from Somalia before mission objectives were accomplished, and committing ground troops as part of a United Nations (UN) force in Bosnia.

This analysis finds that as the operational feasibility factors change, so too does the intervention decision. In Somalia, the mission becomes more complex over time and draws more capable armed resistance than originally anticipated. The cost of success and timeline to achieve it for Clinton becomes untenable. Likewise, the Bosnian Civil War emits extraordinary demands for U.S. support through domestic politics, the UN, and later NATO, but Clinton balks...until the Dayton Accords provide a regime to support and lower the risks and expected duration for a U.S. troop deployment. In both

cases the evidence strongly supports the contention that operational feasibility factors are a powerful tool in helping to understand presidential decision making.

The chapter is broken into five parts. Part I describes the theory and method behind the analysis. Part II provides a background to these crises from the perspective of the Clinton administration. Parts III and IV address the Somalia and Bosnia crises respectively, covering two sections for each case: first, I provide a chronological overview of the crisis to illuminate key events that influence the president's decisions space over time; and second, based on that changing environment, I explore how the presidents' feasibility assessments change as a result. Part V compares the cases and concludes.

Part I: Theory and Method

Theory

The theory in this chapter remains unchanged from the previous: operational feasibility affects military intervention decisions. The last two chapters tested and illustrated this point. This chapter pushes the causal illustration further by exploring if these same feasibility factors are useful in understanding reversal decisions: withdrawals or later interventions under different circumstances. Think of feasibility factors as switches that are either "on" in favor of an intervention, or "off" for nonintervention. This chapter looks at what happens once those switches are flipped in the opposite direction as a crisis unfolds.

The insight behind this application of the theory is rooted in the epistemological observation regarding the causes of conflict and peace by the renowned author, Geoffrey Blainey; as he noted in *Causes of War* (1988, 293),

War and peace are more than opposites. They have so much in common that neither can be understood without the other. War and peace appear to share the same framework of causes. The same set of factors should appear in explanations of the outbreak of war...and the ending of peace.

Blainey argued that the elements of the decisional context that lead one to be confident of success and therefore increase commitment when they are present are the same ones that give pause when found in absence. Blainey's insights can easily be extend to military interventions and the theory I propose, since this analysis is addressing these very same considerations, namely the risks associated with being unable to achieve a desired outcome by using force. The differences are in degree rather than kind when considering limited military intervention instead of full-scale war. Here, we are looking at the same *type* of factors – those increasing the probability of success within a given time horizon at acceptable risk – but suited to interventions that likely have lesser thresholds for risk and time commitment based on limited policy goals.

That being the case, we expect the following logic to hold true: factors that help explain why presidents commit forces to the fray should also cause them to withdraw those forces when those conditions change in ways that are no longer supportive of intervention. Likewise, when factors that arguably dissuade an intervention change, they should then persuade action. This, of course, assumes a certain consistency in demand signal. With that, case selection to minimize variance on these scores is essential.

Method

This chapter, like the last, uses the “comparative historical method” to compare two interventions that occur in similar time periods under the same administration (Skocpol 1979; Moore 1993). In this comparison, I again look at Somalia and Bosnia, but in the Clinton presidency. As National Security Advisor at the time, Tony Lake explained in an interview with PBS in 2001, these were the two most important intervention considerations during President Clinton’s first term: the Somalia intervention already underway upon Clinton’s arrival in the White House and growing in importance as things trended downward; and Bosnia as a forefront issue based on Clinton making it an election issue during the campaign.

Selecting these two cases for comparison has a couple of benefits. First, by viewing this chapter as a continuation of the last, it is a longitudinal comparison since it compares the same crisis environments. As a result, I hold certain things somewhat constant over the two administrations, such as the strategic importance of the crisis state, economic ties, and ally interests. Second, in this chapter as in the last, by examining two crises that are occurring concurrently for a single administration, many other unintentionally omitted or unobserved factors are able to be held constant.

However, what is gained in maximizing consistency through this case selection (e.g., minimizing effects from geostrategic shifts over time or crisis state characteristics) also serves to limit the broader applicability of the findings. To mitigate these concerns, I employ a combination of “process tracing” and “congruence method” focusing primarily on the operational feasibility factors identified in the Qualitative Comparative

Analysis (QCA) and in the Bush 41 comparative case study (Van Evera 1997; Bennett and George 2005). The coupling of process tracing with the congruence method allows for a deeper dive to ensure that the presence or absence of a feasibility factor is more than just a coincidence, that it is actually part of the considerations among those shaping the decision for the president. The aim is to demonstrate how variance in feasibility factors over the course of each crisis contributes to the policy reversal decisions to withdraw from Somalia and commit ground forces to Bosnia.

The operational feasibility factors referenced above refer to the elements of the crisis situation that pose challenges to the military force's potential efficacy. These factors elucidate the types of concerns that are at the heart of what other authors have hinted at with "expectations of success" or short expected time commitments (e.g., Regan 2002, 40). The previous chapters have lent support for the theoretical proposition put forward here that the presence of some conditions have a high degree of consistency with intervention outcomes, while their opposite holds true for nonintervention outcomes. In this study, I explore what happens as they shift over time within an administration. Does the policy change to match the shift in feasibility, or not?

There are four feasibility factors this study will use based on their explanatory power in the previous chapters. First, what type of conflict is it? Is it ethnic or religiously based, and therefore likely intractable? Or, is it based on material or political desires where middle ground may be found? The former is infeasible while the latter is less so. Second, is there a clear leader or regime to support (including situations where there has already been a brokered ceasefire)? If so, then feasibility increases. If not,

and the intervention requires the separation of multiple factions, some of whom oppose the intervention, then feasibility decreases. Third, what is the structure of the enemy or adversary for the U.S. force? Is it hierarchical and susceptible to strike, opening up the potential for quick conflict termination? Or, is the enemy diffuse and nebulous? If the latter, quick strike options prove difficult and more time and boots on the ground are likely required. Finally, how accessible is the crisis environment? Does it pose significant logistical challenges such as limited port infrastructure or vulnerable road networks? Considerations such as these can make force deployment and sustainment much costlier, or in cases where infrastructure does not exist, near impossible. These are the four feasibility factors that will be contrasted between Bush 41's initial decision and Clinton's final decision in Part's III and IV.

The time period for the analyses are not identical but are overlapping. The Somalia decision space goes from the Clinton inauguration in January 1993 until his decision to withdraw troops in his address to the nation on October 7th of the same year. The Bosnian decision space begins with the inauguration but goes until November 27, 1995 when Clinton announces the pending deployment of U.S. troops. The next part provides a broad overview of these crises leading up to the Clinton presidency.

Part II: Background to Crises

Bill Clinton assumed the presidency in 1993 at an inflection point in American foreign policy. The Cold War had just ended with the fall of the Soviet Union and the previous administration had only scratched the surface on articulating the role the United States would play on the global stage moving forward. Clinton did not campaign as an international adventurer, instead focusing on domestic politics and the economy.

However, his foreign policy advisors had differing designs and promoted the idea of “Assertive Multilateralism” in which the U.S. would assume a leadership role in interventions taken on by multilateral institutions aimed at alleviating suffering and injustice, often against the rules of the old order based on independent sovereignty (Boys 2012).

As Clinton took the leadership reins, two crises were prominent. First, Somalia, an intervention already underway, was endorsed by Clinton via consultation with Bush 41 prior to assuming office (Wines 1992). In this sense, while it was inherited, Clinton was part of the decision-making process that led to Bush 41’s decision to go into Somalia and the Clinton foreign policy team supported the mission. By the time the administration had formed, the Somalia mission, Operation Restore Hope, was in mid-stride and seemingly going well. The mission sought to enforce UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 794 (3 December 1992), charged with providing “a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.” This multinational, UN-sanctioned mission was in response to the international outcry to alleviate the suffering due to famine and violence that emerged in Somalia as a byproduct of the overthrow of President Siad Barre. In the warlord-centric struggle for power that ensued, suffering increased greatly for the Somali public. Reports coming out of Somalia indicated that there were potentially 4.5 million Somalis in danger of starvation in the months leading up to the intervention, with over 40,000 killed in the capital of Mogadishu, and over 200,000 displaced persons (Human Rights Watch 1992). Somalia was to be the test case for whether the international community could mobilize under its most esteemed institution at its own behest to end an atrocity.

Second, Bosnia was the administration's primary concern. While Clinton had tacitly supported Somalia, he openly campaigned on a stronger stance regarding Bosnia and doing more to deal with the ongoing atrocities in the former Yugoslavian states (Lake 2001). What began as secessionist movements on the part of Croatia and Slovenia in 1991 in the wake of waning Soviet influence, had become full scale civil war by the early days of the Clinton administration. The former Yugoslavia was comprised of six separate republics, primarily split along historical and ethnic lines. Serbs, Croats, and Muslims were interspersed among these states and in the vacuum that formed following the collapse of the Yugoslav state, and competing goals among them emerged. Croats and Muslims envisaged independent states and moved to consolidate along status quo lines; while Serbs sought to retain a Serbian state that redrew the lines to consolidate ethnic Serbs. These political disagreements transformed into full scale atrocity as the Serbs set out to impose their will and were met with resistance.

Bosnia voted for independence as well in March 1992, a vote boycotted by the Serb population. Following recognition by the European Union in April, the Serbs moved to take the country by force under Radovan Karadzic. War broke out among all parties, first between the Muslims and Croats aligned against the Serbs, and later between the Muslims and Croats themselves. The scale of suffering was startling. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimated casualties from April 1992 to July 1993 at approximately 169,100 dead, including civilians and soldiers, and over 1,150,000 refugees and internally displaced persons (Tabeau and Bijak 2003, 6-18). Here too, the UN organized to respond, deploying the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to secure safe havens, first in Croatia, and then expanded into Bosnia in

Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde (Reuters 2008). It was this chaotic landscape that the Bush 41 administration observed as too complex and riddled with age-old animosities to warrant a commitment of U.S. forces to stop the killing (Bush 1992).

This was the backdrop for these two crises as the Clinton White House assumed leadership in January 1993. Parts III and IV that follow provide a chronological overview and feasibility factor assessment for each situation during the Clinton decision space, starting with Somalia.

Part III: Somalia

Chronological Overview

The UN-sanctioned mission to Somalia beginning in 1992 aspired to alleviate the suffering of millions of people in a country ruptured by civil war and drought. This mission fulfilled the desire of a nascent international conscience that sought to rewrite the rules on when, where, and by whom force should be applied to pursue humanitarian goals. The United States, starting with the Bush 41 administration and carrying on into the Clinton presidency, was eager to lead this charge. This mission, a test bed for such action for the international community, proved to be much more challenging than it was originally conceived. Ultimately what was intended to set a precedent for UN-led humanitarian causes became a cautionary tale for this type of mission, at least from a U.S. perspective. In many respects the shadow of Somalia cast a shadow over subsequent humanitarian missions in the same way that the Vietnam experience in the 1960s and 1970s suppressed military adventurism more broadly in the decades that followed.

This section details the evolution of the mission in Somalia, explaining how a mission that was universally supported in the beginning became a vastly different problem, one from which the Clinton administration desperately tried to extricate itself less than a year later. The mission in Somalia underwent five different transformations, shifting from (1) ending a civil war, to (2) limited humanitarian aid delivery, to (3) nation-building, to (4) offensive targeting, and finally back a focus on (5) aid delivery and withdrawal. Appreciating the mission's evolution, and along with it notions of operational feasibility, are key to understanding the president's decision to withdraw from Somalia before all of the UN-directed goals were achieved.

Mission 1: End Civil War

As originally conceived, the intervention would be expected to squelch a civil war, and consequently no U.S. mission was implemented (Western 2002, 116). The Joint Staff framed the mission in the extreme, not based on policy guidance from the White House, but on an understanding of the Somalian environment following Barre's departure. They assumed that if order were to be restored it would require not only a significant military intervention, but also a political solution to arrest the disintegration of the country (Ibid., 117). This anticipated mission would change with a desire to do something, albeit with lower risk tolerance, as reports of starvation increased over the course of 1992.

Mission 2: Humanitarian Aid Delivery

Months of deliberation between early 1991 to the fall of 1992 on the part of the NSC and Joint Staffs, supported by military planning conducted by U.S. Central

Command (CENTCOM), redefined what success looked like, and thereby what was required to achieve it (Hoar 1993). Reimagining the mission became a necessity as pressures grew for humanitarian action from both domestic and international audiences with the twin crises of Somalia and Bosnia (Lofland 1992). Ultimately, the Bush administration was able to influence the UNSCR to restrict its mandate to providing a secure environment for the purposes of delivering humanitarian aid relief (UNSCR 794 1992). It was this narrowly focused mission that George H.W. Bush agreed to execute on December 3, 1992 (NSC 0065 1992). In his small group NSC meeting, Bush 41 anticipated little, if any resistance, minimal violence, and to have the mission completed within 40 days (Ibid., 1). This is the mission as envisioned when launched in the waning days of the Bush 41 administration.

This limited mission is the problem set that Admiral David E. Jeremiah, the Vice VCJCS said could be accomplished with the deployment of U.S. ground troops at the November 21, 1992 NSC Deputies Committee Meeting (Oberdorfer 1992). This is important, because it was a complete reframing of the problem by the Pentagon.

Mission 3: Nation-Building

President Clinton inherited the humanitarian aid mission with its more than 25,000 deployed troops upon assuming office in January 1993. The limitations on the mission as conceived by Bush 41 were not to last, however. Clinton named Madeleine Albright as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, who proposed a new policy - what she called "Assertive Multilateralism." Although a tactic more than a goal, Assertive Multilateralism focused on the U.S. leading coalitions in curing global ills (Boys 2012,

2). Albright's designs on broadening the mission in Somalia beyond securing the delivery of aid were echoed by key members of Clinton's national security advisory team, including Anthony Lake and Sandy Berger. The ideological predisposition within the administration for more expansive humanitarian goals found like minds in the UN as well. As a result, the mission expanded, as evidenced by UNSCR 814 (26 March 1993).

Table 5.1 UNSCR 814 Mission Excerpt

UN Security Council Resolution 814 – March 26, 1993

Requests the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative, and with assistance, as appropriate, from all relevant United Nations entities, offices and specialized agencies, *to provide humanitarian and other assistance to the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy and promoting political settlement and national reconciliation*, in accordance with the recommendations contained in his report of 3 March 1993, including in particular:

- (a) To assist in the provision of relief and in the *economic rehabilitation* of Somalia, based on an assessment of clear, prioritized needs, and taking into account, as appropriate, the 1993 Relief and Rehabilitation Programme for Somalia prepared by the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs;
- (b) To assist in the *repatriation of refugees and displaced persons* within Somalia;
- (c) To assist the people of Somalia to promote and advance *political reconciliation*, through broad participation by all sectors of Somali society, and the *re-establishment of national and regional institutions and civil administration in the entire country*;
- (d) To assist in the *re-establishment of Somali police*, as appropriate at the local, regional or national level, to *restoration and maintenance of peace, stability and law and order; including* assist in the in the investigation and facilitating the prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law;
- (e) To assist the people of Somalia in the *development of a coherent and integrated programme for the removal of mines* throughout Somalia;
- (f) To *develop appropriate public information activities* in support of the United Nations activities in Somalia;
- (g) To *create conditions under which Somali civil society may have a role, at every level, in the process of political reconciliation* and in the formulation and realization of rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes.

(Emphasis added.)

The aims expressed in blue italics in Table 5.1 above altered the mission significantly. The shift occurred in a period after the initial mission was met with relative success in terms of immediate relief of suffering. But with success, came expanded goals. It was clear that the root causes of the suffering were not going to be addressed simply by delivering aid. The challenges for Somalia were institutional and systemic, requiring a full “nation-building” effort (UNSCR 865 1993).

The Clinton administration was fully behind this shift in the UN mission. This is clear through the words of Ambassador Albright’s characterization of the change: ““With this resolution [UNSCR 814], we will embark on an unprecedented enterprise aimed at nothing less than the restoration of an entire country as a proud, functioning and viable member of the community of nations” (as quoted in Preston 1993). With these changes came the broad recognition that the mission was not going to be accomplished within the same time horizon. What was not accounted for was the increased difficulty in pursuing such goals.

Trying to orchestrate the efforts of over 28 troop contributing countries and staff members from over 70 nations in a single command structure proved extraordinarily difficult to manage (Clinton Library 1993a). The administration openly acknowledged these challenges throughout the summer of 1993, being forced to account for longer than expected deployments and little progress as domestic political grumblings began to mount (Clinton Library 1993b). These challenges were not anticipated by the administration and as a result, they appeared to be always reacting and underperforming. Clinton’s political opponents turned the handling of Somalia into a key issue, remarking

that, “under Clinton, U.S. foreign policy [was] marked by inconsistency, incoherence, lack of purpose, and a reluctance to lead” (Boys 2012, 10). Criticism was not limited to Republicans. Even members of the Clinton’s own party were reluctant to get on board with the expanded mission, calling into question presidential authorities under the War Powers Act (Clinton Library 1993b). The mission was becoming unwieldy on the ground from an organizational standpoint, and a political liability on the home front with pushback from both sides of the political aisle.

Mission 4: Offensive Targeting

Pushback on the mission not only occurred at home in the U.S. as time wore on, in Somalia the warlords and their militias more aggressively opposed UN forces on the ground. On June 5, 1993, Somali militiamen under General Mohammed Farah Aideed attacked Pakistani UN peacekeepers, killing 23. This incident led directly to the UN again modifying the mandate, this time targeting Aideed and those responsible for the attack (Bolton 1994, 63). UNSCR 837 (6 June 1993) authorized UNOSOM II (the force charged with this second phase of the Somalia intervention) to investigate, arrest, and to detain those conducting attacks against the UN forces for subsequent prosecution, trial, and punishment.

The expansion of the mission under UNOSOM II was supposed to coincide with a reduction of U.S. forces, shifting to a more multinational face but with the U.S. providing logistic and enabling support (Hoar 1993, 63). However, with the need to actively target Aideed and other militia opposing UN efforts, the residual U.S. forces would continue to play key roles, even if reduced in number. These residual forces included the types of

capabilities required to identify and pursue targets in accordance with the new policy: intelligence, air mobility, quick reaction infantry, and special forces. What marks these as unique when compared to the other elements is their propensity for combat. Their mission set within the broader nation-building effort was much more focused on offensive action. With that came greater risk.

Aideed and his militia proved more problematic to target and dangerous than the U.S. had imagined. On September 25, 1993 three U.S. soldiers were killed when a Black Hawk helicopter was shot down. Immediately following this incident, political pressures increased with Congress passing a nonbinding resolution for the President to seek approval for U.S. forces to stay in Somalia by November 15 (Hirsch and Oakley 1995, 127). Clinton made his case for the continuance of the mission, not to Congress, but to the UN on September 27 to the General Assembly, attempting to outline more clearly what the actual peacekeeping policies were (Bolton 1994, 65). However, the resolve would not last long.

On October 3, 1993 the U.S. Rangers led a raid to capture Aideed at the Olympia Hotel in downtown Mogadishu. Resistance was greater than expected and the mission went awry when another Black Hawk was shot down and the Rangers became pinned down in the city. This necessitated the launch of the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and additional UNOSOM forces into the bloody fight that became known as the Battle of Mogadishu. The result was 18 dead, 78 and wounded and one hostage among U.S. soldiers; and between 500 and 1,000 Somali casualties (Hirsch and Oakley 1995, 127). Media coverage amplified the effects of the devastation by broadcasting the dragging of

an American soldier's desecrated body through cheering throngs along the Mogadishu streets.

Mission 5: Back to Humanitarian Aid Delivery

How did Clinton react? National Security Advisor Tony Lake (2001) recounted that Clinton did not make an immediate decision but was instead interested in the views of Congress and his advisors. Senior members of the Senate were pushing to get out within a week or two while those close to the president were urging not to back out, worried that it would set a precedent that said, "you kill Americans, America withdraws from that situation," effectively "putting a bullseye on every American around the world" (Ibid.). Clinton chose to do the former while appearing to do the latter.

On October 6, just three days after the initial attack, Clinton convened a meeting with key officials to select a withdrawal date and ordered General Hoar to halt attempts to pursue Aideed or other Somalis and to only act in self-defense (Hirsch and Oakley 1995, 128). The next day, October 7, Clinton (1993) formerly addressed the nation, but cast the withdrawal in a way that appeared to be a doubling down – sending over additional forces (quick response forces with additional armor protection) – but in pursuit of a more narrowly defined mission.

President Clinton (1993) reversed the administration's previous position and now held that it was "not our job to rebuild Somalia's society or even to create a political process that can allow Somalia's clans to live and work in peace. Somalis must do that for themselves." Acknowledging this, Clinton reframed the mission in terms very close to the original mandate, as can be seen in Table 5.2 below.

Table 5.2 President Clinton Address to the Nation on Somalia Excerpt

President Clinton Address to the Nation on Somalia – October 7, 1993
<p>Their mission, what I am asking these young Americans to do, is the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • First, they are there to <i>protect our troops and our bases. We did not go to Somalia with a military purpose.</i> We never wanted to kill anyone. But those who attack our soldiers must know they will pay a very heavy price. • Second, they are there to <i>keep open and secure the roads, the port, and the lines of communication</i> that are essential for the United Nations and the relief workers to keep the flow of food and supplies and people moving freely throughout the country so that starvation and anarchy do not return. • Third, they are there to <i>keep the pressure on those who cut off relief supplies and attacked our people, not to personalize the conflict</i> but to prevent a return to anarchy. • Fourth, through their <i>pressure and their presence</i>, our troops will help to make it possible for the Somali people, working with others, to reach agreements among themselves so that they can solve their problems and survive when we leave. That is our mission. <p style="text-align: right;"><i>(Emphasis added.)</i></p>

The humanitarian relief mission that took a turn toward nation-building as Clinton’s team took charge, and then took on a more offensive tone in light of increased resistance, had now returned to its original form.

Both in the presidential address, and subsequently in correspondence to Congress, President Clinton recommitted the U.S. to a limited and short duration mission undertaken with the addition of 1,700 Army personnel and 104 armored vehicles, along with 3,600 Marines stationed offshore (Clinton 1993; Clinton Library 1994). The addition of combat capability in the short term created the impression of doing more, but clearly the newly arriving forces were more focused on facilitating the safe withdrawal of U.S. troops than on supporting the mission more broadly. Clinton (1993) made his main point clear: “All American troops will be out of Somalia no later than March the 31st, except for a few hundred support personnel in noncombat roles.”

In total, once committed to the intervention, the U.S. role in Somalia took on four different missions over the course of nine months: securing the delivery of aid; nation-building; and targeting of militia leaders; and finally, a return to restricted humanitarian relief. The last conception of the U.S. role was quickly deemed a success and paired with a precipitous withdrawal. What was it that caused the change? Was it political pressures? No, both Republicans and Democrats had been openly questioning the continued presence in Somalia since March (Clinton Library 1993b; Boys 2012). Was it the so-called “CNN effect” associated with a humiliating loss to a militia and unexpected U.S. casualties? If that was the case, Clinton would have not attempted to make the case for perseverance at the UN General Assembly in light of the September 25, 1993 loss of three soldiers in the helicopter ambush. As established in the preceding chapters, we can look to differences in operational feasibility factors to see how changes in the situation alter the decision calculus. Here the analysis demonstrates that changes in feasibility can work in the opposite direction as well, changing an intervention into a withdrawal once the situation proves too problematic.

Feasibility Factors

This section provides two feasibility assessments for the Somalia intervention. The first is the initial assessment associated with the time of Bush 41’s decision and the conclusion that the mission was achievable within a short time horizon. The subsequent assessment pertains to Clinton’s decision window and his choice to withdraw. As discussed previously, the four feasibility factors addressed here are the type of conflict (e.g., ethnic, religious, or social), whether or not there is a leader or regime to support, the

structure of the enemy or enemies (e.g. diffuse or hierarchical), and the accessibility of the crisis environment.

Initial Assessment (Bush 41)

First, what was the type of conflict in which Bush 41 anticipated U.S. forces to be involved? The administration's appreciation of this factor is based on the tightly circumscribed view of the mission that emerged: facilitate delivery of humanitarian aid for a limited time – "40 days" or less (NSC 0065, 1). While certainly true that initial assessments earlier in the spring of 1992 had a clear-eyed view of Somalia as an ongoing civil war, those assessments faded under executive pressure to find a way to arrive at a mission that was within the bounds of the possible (Western 2002). As a result, the military and the NSC reframed the problem around the very specific mission of securing aid delivery. Instead of saddling themselves with dealing with the drivers of the conflict (e.g., inter-clan rivalry, weak governance, limited resources) that could quickly turn into a quagmire, the administration chose to focus on the minimum actions required to alleviate immediate suffering. The residual challenges would be left for whatever capability the UN could muster as a follow-on operation. As a result, what was originally recognized as a civil war came to be seen as a route and logistics node security problem. As discussed by the President in his NSC Small Group Meeting on October 3, 1992, there was no intention of attempting to solve the crisis at its core (see Figure 5.1 below.). U.S. forces would be protecting lives of relief workers by setting up enclaves in a "benign setting" (NSC 0065, 1). Based on this, the feasibility factor for type of

conflict would be viewed as favorable since the administration had no intention of grappling directly with the myriad challenges posed by the Somalian crisis.




Figure 5.1 NSC 0065 Minutes Excerpt Page 1

Second, there was no supportable regime. A ceasefire was initially brokered on January 31, 1992, including key warlords, Al Mahdi and Aideed; but enforcement for this regime was lacking and therefore largely ignored (United Nations 2018). By the time Bush 41 was at the decision point at the end of the year, it was obvious that no meaningful ceasefire was acknowledged by the powers on the ground. However, the importance of this fact as a feasibility concern was lessened in this case based on mission expectations. The administration anticipated UNSCR 794 to be forthcoming within days based on their significant involvement in its crafting at the UNSC. Confidence in this eventuality is demonstrated by Attorney General Ball in Figure 5.2 as he speaks of the resolution during deliberations with the President as if it already had passed. This resolution would have added legitimacy and clarity on the role of the various troop contributing countries, easing some of the concerns over having a supportable regime and ensuring the U.S. forces could hand over responsibility in short order.




Figure 5.2 NSC 0065 Minutes Excerpt Page 2

However, the situation with the UN was not yet firm. There was subsequent consternation about the composition of the peacekeeping force and which countries would be providing what capabilities, all of which still needed to be worked out (NSC 0065, 4-5). In addition, Vice President Quayle's remark that the President should brief Congress even if the UN has not passed the resolution (see Figure 5.3 below) indicates a desire on the part of the administration to conduct the mission regardless of a UN mandate at the outset. With or without the resolution, Bush 41 was confident that there would be "pretty broad support when the people see the picture" and was preparing to move forward (NSC 0065, 5). Therefore, at the initial decision, Bush 41 did not have a regime to intervene on behalf of but did anticipate a mandate from the UN that would ultimately provide the follow-on peacekeepers to relieve the U.S. forces. Perhaps more important, Bush 41 had restricted the mission for the American initial entry forces to the point that it almost precluded conflict. Any concerns over how the force would be perceived by antagonists over time would largely be the problem for the follow-on peacekeeping element, not the limited intervention to which Bush 41 was committing.




Figure 5.3 NSC 0065 Minutes Excerpt Page 5

Third, as noted in Figure 5.1 above, Bush 41 did not expect significant opposition, especially since they would be arriving with overwhelming military force and be focused on aid delivery at isolated “enclaves,” not inflicting violence against the warlords or their militias. The U.S. forces would not be a third party intervening in between warring factions, attempting to be neutral but in essence fighting against all; instead they saw themselves as a security force on the periphery. In addition, the limited opposing forces that were envisioned by Bush 41’s advisors were not viewed as professional, competent military elements that would pose a significant martial challenge. The national security team referred to the warlord’s militias as “brigands” and “juvenile delinquents” (NSC 0065, 3). Therefore, the feasibility factor for anticipated enemy’s structure would have been viewed positively because Bush 41 did not anticipate a significant enemy at all.

Fourth, accessibility for the Somalia crisis environment was first seen as problematic, with limited port facilities, road networks, and infrastructure (Hoar 1993). However, this improved as the military conducted further analysis that explored more sea-based options that mitigated some of the traditional shortcomings (e.g., lack of

airfields and port space) (Ohls 2009). Therefore, while certainly not easy logistically, the mission was supportable, albeit with extraordinary and unconventional measures that were more costly than conventional approaches (Hoar 1993). However, costs would be minimized based on a short, expected deployment.

The administration based the limited expected deployment duration on their anticipation that the UN would be able to rapidly build a peacekeeping force to replace the U.S. ground troops, eliminating the need for U.S. boots on the ground past the first 30 days (see Figure 5.4 below.). This reinforced the positive feasibility factor attributes above because Bush 41 and his team expected to rapidly get in and out. Therefore, the team paid little concern to complications that could emerge over the longer-term mission.




Figure 5.4 NSC 0065 Minutes Excerpt Page 4

Finally, on December 3, 1992 at the point of initial decision, the feasibility factors were aligned largely in support of intervention. While there was no brokered ceasefire with the warlords, the administration believed a U.S. force could secure the aid distribution network with little resistance and the administration was confident a UN peacekeeping force would form in short order to facilitate a rapid redeployment.

Subsequent Assessment (Clinton)

This section characterizes the four operational feasibility factors in October 1993 when Clinton arrived at his decision to withdraw forces, closely following on the heels of the Battle of Mogadishu and its fallout. The type of conflict, existence of a supportable regime, enemy structure, and logistical accessibility all change in significant ways in the infeasible direction, calling mission success at acceptable costs into question.

Concern over the type of conflict changed significantly between the Bush 41 and Clinton administrations. As detailed above, the roots of the conflict were of only limited concern for Bush 41 because they saw their role as restricted in both time and scope, anticipating a rapid handover to a follow-on UN peacekeeping force. However, Clinton's team treated the problem more extensively, recasting Somalia not as a limited application of force but instead as a wholesale nation-building effort. This included everything from refugee resettlement, to establishing a Somali police force, to efforts to rebuild civil society (Hirsch and Oakley 1995, 81-99; Clinton 1994). As a result, this led to a completely different assessment of what would be required, for how long, and at what risk. In effect, the Clinton administration had returned to arrive at the initial assessment from the spring of 1992 where Somalia was properly understood as an

anarchic collapsed state in the midst of a civil war with societal fissures rooted in ancient clan rivalries (Fox 2001, 155). Expanding the mission to engage with the drivers of conflict began in collaboration with others on the UNSC, leading to additional resolutions (UNSCRs 815, 837, 865) over the course of 1993 that added more requirements to the mission. The shifts in focus, or mission creep, acknowledged the challenges on the ground that the warlords' incentives were at odds with the goals of the UN and the peacekeeping forces were going to have to adopt more offensive roles. In the end, the type of conflict adapted from an anticipated non-conflict under Bush 41 to an attempt to change social, political, and security conditions in Somalia as a neutral party in the midst of a civil war with competing militias opposed to the UN's presence.

A second feasibility factor that influenced the Clinton administration was the existence of a supportable regime. Here again, we are looking at either if there is a clear side that the U.S. is backing in a conflict, or if there is a ceasefire agreement in place that the U.S. intervention would support. In this case the focus was on the latter with the UN attempting to maintain neutrality. Like the first attempt at establishing a ceasefire under Bush 41, subsequent attempts during the Clinton administration also failed. Starting early in 1993 when the UN attempted a multi-prong approach to reestablish a supportable ceasefire agreement, acknowledging the urge to place intervenors in a position accepted by the warring parties. First, the UN attempted a negotiated ceasefire and disarmament at the Addis Ababa Accords in January, a conference attended by both Aideed and Ali Mahdi (Hirsch and Oakley 1995, 93-95). This effort was paired with a subsequent Humanitarian and National Reconciliation Conferences, aimed at solving infrastructure, economic, and political challenges. While there was general agreement reached at these

events in theory, challenges came in implementation. Warlords feared that by ceding power or position they would ultimately be left in a vulnerable position when these measures failed or if the peacekeepers were to depart (Ibid., 99). Therefore, no supportable regime ever came to pass. The U.S. role as part of the UN force remained as an intervening force throughout, unable to back any leader or enforce an agreed upon ceasefire agreement.

The characterization of the enemy forces is perhaps the most notable change in the four feasibility factors. Initially discounted as “juvenile delinquents” and not expected to mount significant opposition by Bush 41’s team, events on the ground indicated otherwise as the U.S. presence continued through the spring (NSC 0065, 3). The most notable was the June 5 ambush of the Pakistani peacekeepers that resulted in 23 killed and many more wounded (Bolton 1994). Perceptions were shifting. Warlords, and in particular Aideed, posed significant challenges to UN military forces in 1993 that led the U.S. Intelligence Community to reevaluate their capabilities and overall strategy. The Central Intelligence Agency assessed that Aideed posed a significant threat even though his forces and capability were relatively small (see Figure 5.5 below). This conclusion was based on the supposition that Aideed’s diffuse militia (approximately 300-500 fighters) would continue to be difficult to target and that through “hit-and-run tactics” they would be able to wear down the UN resolve, ultimately leading to a withdrawal and the elevation of him as the dominant warlord (Clinton Library 1993c, 1-5). These traits of Aideed’s militia are precisely those that, according to the theory put forward here, should dissuade intervention. The enemy is difficult to locate and target

because of its small, nebulous structure, and their success is based on the ability to inflict minimal but persistent losses on those that did not anticipate them.




Figure 5.5 CIA Intelligence Memorandum Excerpt on Aideed

Finally, the accessibility of the crisis environment also became a point of concern. Initially seen as presenting challenges that could be overcome through ingenuity in off-shore basing and unprecedented strategic lift networks, these modes became costly. Near the end of 1993 the administration was exploring more traditional options, trying to find ports (e.g., Chisimayu and Boosaaso) that presented lower cost options for the continuation of a mission that was not originally thought to last that long (Clinton Library 1993c, 8-9). While not viewed as a matter that contributed greatly to the decision to withdraw, the economic strain of the mission was a bone of contention between Congress

and the administration going back to as early as March 1992 (Clinton Library 1993b). This continued up until after the Battle of Mogadishu (October 3-4), when legislators opposed to the continuation of the mission used threats to cut the funding as a lever to influence Clinton's decision (see Figure 5.6 below).




Figure 5.6 Email from White House Military Office Director (Maldon) to Liaison to Congress (Paster)

Therefore, on October 7, 1993, when President Clinton announced the forthcoming departure of the U.S. military from the Somalia intervention, feasibility concerns had moved markedly in a negative direction. The conflict was largely viewed as intractable and requiring systemic gains in political, economic, and social institutions than in security, greatly extending the anticipated time horizon. After a year of laboring

to achieve a ceasefire, none materialized, leaving the intervention force in the unenviable position of trying to maintain neutrality among competing factions. As the situation deteriorated in the summer, the intelligence community had the opportunity to reassess the enemy forces that were thwarting UN efforts. They came to the two-part conclusion that the militias were both difficult to target because of their small numbers and nebulous organization, and that the warlords could achieve their aims with minimal effort because of the limited will among intervening countries to sustain casualties. Lastly, the growing costs of the intervention, tied in large measure to logistics funding requirements, increased the sense of burden and became a political liability.

Somalia Summary

Bush 41 foresaw a limited intervention that would have the majority of U.S. forces successfully redeployed within a month with whatever problems that would emerge to be dealt with by a UN peacekeeping force. Clinton's team reimagined this role, seeing Somalia as a testbed for Assertive Multilateralism, acknowledging that the problems undergirding the crisis would not be alleviated by delivery of aid alone. Not only that, they envisioned the U.S. as a leading agent to facilitate the needed change. As a result, the Clinton administration, along with the rest of the UN troop contributing countries, actively contributed to the morphing of the crisis over the course of 1993. The mission focus shifted from delivering aid, to nation-building, to offensive targeting, and following tactical failure and unexpected losses, a quick pivot to claim victory on the initial goal before departing.

Previous scholarship on the Somalian intervention points to the power of the media (e.g. Baum 2004) as the key determinant influencing Clinton’s decision to withdraw. However, the research presented demonstrates that alternative explanations deserve consideration. While certainly true that the media coverage of the Battle of Mogadishu’s aftermath was powerful and shocking, it would be a mistake to look at the media as the solitary agent eliciting a decision to withdraw. The media after all is reacting to a change in the situation in the same way that the president is. With this in mind, and as demonstrated here, more than just media coverage and public opinion changed from the beginning of the crisis to its conclusion. Notably, the expectations of success for the operation had changed significantly, particularly when achieved at the costs the American public had implicitly supported when Bush 41 articulated the intervention’s scope in 1992.

Table 5.3 Somalia Intervention Feasibility Assessment Comparison

<i>Somalia Intervention Feasibility Assessment Comparison</i>				
	<i>Conflict Type</i>	<i>Supportable Regime</i>	<i>Enemy Structure</i>	<i>Accessible Environment</i>
<i>Bush 41 (1992)</i>	+ Not attempting to resolve conflict	- No government / unexpected opposition	+ “Brigand” and “Juvenile delinquents”	+ Costly but for short duration
<i>Clinton (1993)</i>	- Civil War	- ↓ No government / active opposition	- Multiple diffuse militias	- Costly and longer term to success

Ultimately all of the feasibility factors for the Somalia intervention shifted in a downward direction (See Table 5.3 above). When Bush 41 evaluated the decision to intervene he viewed the type of conflict, enemy structure, and the accessibility of the

environment all favorably. Only the absence of a supportable regime worked in the opposite direction, and then only slightly so since Bush 41 was not expecting opposition to such a limited intervention. When Clinton evaluated the situation in 1993 it was a different story. Along with the administration's expanded goals to achieve the nation-building outcomes came a far different assessment of the four feasibility factors. The intervention, if it were to achieve the stated aims, would have to contend with a civil war against diffusely organized militias over a longer time horizon, increasing sustainment costs. In addition, there was still no supportable regime, but the situation worsened due to the recognition that the intervention was opposed. Therefore, at least in this case, the contention that feasibility factor changes in the direction of infeasibility should produce a withdrawal is borne out in the historical record.

Part IV: Bosnia

All I can tell you is that, at this point, I would not rule out any option except the option that I have never ruled in, which was the question of American ground troops.

- President Clinton (April 16, 1993)

Chronological Overview

The breakup of the former Yugoslavia resulted in violence and atrocities not seen since World War II. The Serb "ethnic cleansing" campaign dislocated Muslims and Croats and employed systemic rape, concentration camps, and unrelenting sieges of major cities, resulting in tens of thousands killed and over a million refugees (Daalder 2000). Like Somalia at the time, there was significant international outcry for a response. The UN generated a peacekeeping force to secure safe zones (UNPROFOR), but it

largely proved futile because its mandate was for peacekeeping, not peacemaking. UNPROFOR were ill-equipped to deal with the aggression posed by the Bosnian Serb Army (Army of Republika Srpska (VRS)) and the associated counterviolence in an ethnically fractured state comprised of 44 percent Bosniak Muslims, 31 percent Orthodox Serbs, and 17 percent Catholic Croats (Reimann 2017). If an international intervention was to succeed it would require a more significant presence with a different mandate.

From 1993 to 1995 the Clinton administration wrestled with this thorny problem, moving from being firmly resolved to refrain from putting troops on the ground to finally providing leadership (both diplomatically as well as militarily) that brought about a stable peace. To assist in understanding how Clinton's decision to intervene changed over time, the evolution of the Bosnian crisis and the political landscape during the decision space can be divided into three periods. First, from the end of 1992 through 1994 was a period of *expanding crisis and failed peace*. Second, significant change came with the *Bosnian Serb offensive* of 1995 and its aftermath, altering the willingness of the Clinton administration to respond. And finally, the period *leading to the Dayton Accords*, where a combination of political pressures, diplomatic maneuvers, and military victories proved to change the conditions to support a U.S.-led intervention. The following section details these three periods.

Expanding Crisis and Failed Peace

Upon assuming office, Clinton was poised to take a more active role in the Bosnian crisis based on campaign criticism of Bush 41's ineffectiveness (Kempster 1992). That does not mean that Clinton came into office with a complete reversal in

mind, wanting to put U.S. troops in UNPROFOR and assume leadership on the ground. To the contrary, the administration had clearly thought through what they were prepared to do and under what circumstances.

Clinton immediately had his staff conduct analyses of key issues, producing Presidential Review Directives (PRDs). The first of these was PRD 1 covering the situation in Bosnia (Lake 1993). At the end of the interagency process that framed the issue, Clinton held a Principal's Committee (PC) meeting on February 5, 1993 that recommended a range of different policy positions, including enforcement of the no-fly zone, increased sanctions on Serbia, and supporting political discourse with both allies and Russia. What was also made plainly clear by Secretary of State Christopher (1993) following that review was that the U.S. would not commit ground troops until there was a "viable agreement containing enforcement provisions" agreed to by all parties. Clinton's team thought that peace could be achieved by manipulating some of the key factors of the situation from a distance: increasing the defensive capability of the Muslims and Croats and reducing the offensive capability of the Serbs.

In May 1993 Clinton and his team offered a new strategy that they thought could relieve the pressure being applied to the Bosniaks and Croats by the Serbs. It hinged on air power. Called "lift and strike," the strategy proposed ending the 1991 UN arms embargo on the former Yugoslav states because it limited the U.S.'s ability to supply Bosnian Muslims with arms, putting them at a disadvantage compared to the Bosnian Serbs being supplied directly from Serbia (Brune 1999, 99). As Clinton's National Security Advisor Tony Lake (2001) explained, the "strike" aspect of the strategy was in

relation to the Serbs, whom the proposal called for striking if they “tried to take advantage of the situation before we [the U.S.] could build up the Muslims.” The intent was to try to produce military parity, thereby giving leverage to the Muslims and incentivizing the Serbs to negotiate a peace.

The administration tried to persuade allies to employ the “lift and strike” strategy in various forms for the first year and a half, but to no avail. This approach failed for a variety of reasons. First, the French and British opposed the strategy because they believed the addition of more military capability to the crisis would prolong the war, not shorten it, and that the air strikes would put their forces on the ground at risk (Barthe and David 2004, 6). There was also no consensus among Clinton’s own staff. Vice President Gore, Lake, and Albright argued for air strikes, while Secretary of State Christopher and Secretary of Defense Aspin wanted to strictly pursue diplomatic options; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (first General Powell and subsequently General Shalikashvili) argued that the air strikes would be ineffective without a ground offensive (NSC Principals Committee 1993; Daalder 1998). Important to note, there were strong voices inside the principals who openly advocated for action early in the administration (see discussion from NSC Principals meeting in Figure 5.7 below). The demand for action was ever-present; it was not something that sprang up in the final days before the decision to intervene.

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PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA, FEBRUARY 5 1993

Tony Lake began by introducing the issue of the "end game": i.e., if we started down the road envisioned in the draft Presidential Decision Document, were we comfortable knowing that at the end of the road we would be under great pressure to help implement a settlement including with forces on the ground.

Madeleine Albright: Before we do that, I want to raise a more basic question. I am troubled by the conclusion we have reached. We are treating this area as of peripheral interest. History suggests it is more central. This policy (comment: the one in the draft PDD) legitimizes ethnic cleansing. It signals to the Central and east Europeans and to Russia that we will do nothing about it. The pieces in the draft PDD are "pretty pallid". I understand that deciding to use American forces in Bosnia would be crossing the Rubicon. But we should think about whether sweeping the problem under the rug creates more problems. The draft PDD is contrary to what Governor Clinton said and not commensurate with the importance of the issue.

Jim Woolsey: I agree with Madeleine.

Lake: (to Madeleine): You mean we should use force to enforce a settlement, not impose one?

Albright: If we say we would never impose a settlement we are blessing ethnic cleansing.

Figure 5.7 Excerpt from NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, FEB 5, 1993

Finally, domestic politics were also at play, thwarting any support that Clinton might have been able to muster. Republicans characterized the president's handling of the situation as ineffectual and indicative of the overall foreign policy, using Bosnia as an angle of attack approaching the next election cycle (Lake 2001). As a result, the splintering of positions among key advisors, and a dearth of support from Congress and key allies who resented the fact that the U.S. was unwilling to put troops on the ground, ensured that Clinton's strategy would not be tried.

Throughout this period Clinton continued to cede leadership to the UN and European Union (EU) while fostering peace-seeking efforts through U.S. diplomatic support. But without any change in the dynamics between the opposing sides on the ground, and without a viable deterrent force, no change came. Two peace proposals faltered, first the Vance-Owen plan and then one devised by Norway's Thorvald

Stoltenberg (Brune 1999, 100). All the while, the VRS laid siege to Sarajevo, starving thousands, and carried out ethnic cleansing throughout the countryside. As the crisis expanded throughout 1993 and 1994, the demand for action increased both internationally and domestically without meaningful change in the U.S. response, which at this point supported the defense of the six UN-designated “safe areas” serving as Muslim enclaves.

The Clinton administration struggled to make positive impacts on the ground during this period, yet two diplomatic initiatives were vitally important to the longer-term success. First in February 1994, the Washington Framework Agreement established the Bosnian Federation of Muslims and Croats. The framework began from the recognition that fighting between the two parties benefitted the Serbs, an idea proposed by U.S. State Department negotiators following yet another violent disaster in Sarajevo (Daalder 2000, 26-27). Ultimately this effort led to a cease-fire agreement between the Bosniaks and Croats in March 1994, allying the Republic of Croatia and the newly Federated Bosnia and Herzegovina in common cause against the Serbs. This development led directly to military cooperation among the two groups, significantly altering the dynamics of the crisis.

Second, the “Contact Group” formed in April 1994 consisting of the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and Germany. The impetus behind the formation of the group was a Serb artillery shell that exploded in Sarajevo killing 68 and wounding more than 100, increasing recognition of the escalating nature of the problem (Brune 1999, 101). This brought the main states with vested interests to a small group setting,

removed from the perceived ineffectiveness of both the UN and EU systems. Most notably, it brought in the Russians who were important because of the leverage and influence they had over Serbia. The Contact Group devised a plan that proposed a geographic breakdown that split Bosnia-Herzegovina between a Muslim-Croat federation and the Bosnian Serbs, providing a foundation for the peace talks to follow in the next year.

Bosnian Serb Offensive and Aftermath

The first two stagnant years of the crisis under Clinton's watch were far different than 1995. This was the year in which everything shifted. Extraordinary levels of violence, faltering allies losing their resolve, and rising criticism among political opponents heading into an election year increased the demand for action and for the U.S. to assume a greater leadership role.

During the five-month ceasefire brokered by former President Jimmy Carter in December 1994, the Bosnian Serb leadership decided to adopt a much bolder strategy in 1995, making it the final year of the war. Following the cessation of the ceasefire in April, they planned to swiftly attack three lightly protected safe areas in the east – Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde; then shift to take Bihac in the northwest before finally taking Sarajevo to force final capitulation (Daalder 1998). However, they overstepped in the execution of their plan.

The Serb attack on Srebrenica on July 11, 1995 significantly altered all that followed. The UNPROFOR element under Dutch command requested air attacks to fend off the assault but was denied for the sake of maintaining neutrality, leaving the UN

force ill-equipped and unsupported in any attempt to stop the Serbs. As a result, General Mladic's unopposed Bosnian Serb force gathered over 23,000 Muslim women and children from the surrounding areas and subjected them to torture and rape. The men and boys, totaling almost 8,000 were summarily executed (Rohde 2012). The magnitude of the conflict escalated significantly in light of this attack, not only in sheer numbers, but in its impact on the psyche of world leaders who believed they were uniquely situated to prevent occurrences like this in the modern world. This is evident in reversals made by Britain and France regarding the use of air power that result from growing awareness of the Serbian atrocities.

Another concerning part of the fallout over Srebrenica was the glaring recognition of the ineffectiveness of UNPROFOR. The offensive had exposed the reality that the peacekeeping force was positioned where there was no peace to keep. Based on that recognition, Clinton was forced to deal with the real possibility that UNPROFOR would be withdrawn, or worse, require extraction. Either way, the U.S. would be an essential provider of the needed troops and logistics to facilitate that withdrawal, putting Americans into danger (Lake 1995). This led to a reconsideration on the part of the administration for what ought to be done. Previous thinking had supported maintaining the status quo and the European position of working through UNPROFOR, but now the U.S. was potentially committed to facilitating a withdrawal or coming up with an alternative course on their own terms that would employ U.S. troops under more favorable circumstances. This was yet more pressure to assume greater leadership.

Finally, the international crisis scene is not divorced from domestic politics. Republicans had been critical of the Clinton administration's handling of Bosnia since the inauguration. One of the key points of contention was the arms embargo. Republicans wanted to end it and provide military aid the Bosnian Muslims, but the British and French opposed this, not wanting to exacerbate the violence. Clinton was not keen to act unilaterally in opposition to those he was attempting to leverage. However, the Republicans retook both houses of Congress in 1994 and prepared the "Dole bill," named after would-be 1996 presidential challenger, Senator Bob Dole, preparing to force the president's hand. While Congress had initially agreed to sit on the legislation over the winter with the ceasefire in place, the 1995 Serb offensive pushed the Republicans off the fence. The Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995 (Dole, 1995), approved by Congress on August 1 with numbers capable of overriding presidential veto, authorized the termination of the 1991 arms embargo in conjunction with the withdrawal of UNPROFOR. It was clear the approach of the last two years was about to change, and the U.S. would be assuming much more responsibility in either the success or failure that followed.

Leading to the Dayton Accords

In the fall of 1995, building off of the tremors of the Serb offensive, three things transpired to bring about a supportable solution, as agreed to in December at the Dayton Accords. Military victories by the Bosnian Federation of Muslims and Croats and a more assertive NATO bombing campaign changed the situation on the ground. Diplomatic maneuvers brought Serbian President Milosevic to the bargaining table on

behalf of the Bosnian Serbs, altering the incentive structure and space for agreement. And finally, the political pressures at home were realigned with the agreements specified in the Dayton Accords, bringing bipartisan consensus in support of a limited mission.



Figure 5.8 Bosnian Map following the Dayton Accords (CIA World Factbook)

Part of the reason the Bosnian Serbs had not earnestly negotiated a peace prior to the fall of 1995 was because *they* had made all of the gains (approximately 70% of the Bosnian territory was controlled by Serb forces) and therefore were not willing to make concessions (Daalder 2000). That changed in August 1995 with a three-prong offensive against Serb forces in Krajina (the area surrounding Banja Luka above in Figure 5.8.) The offensive was first initiated by the Croatian Army, then the Bosnian Army attacked out of the Bihac pocket in the northwest, and then their forces united to recapture approximately 51% of the country (Ibid.). This turned the tide on the ground, making it

such that the area held on the ground much more closely resembled the proposition put forward earlier from the Contact Group Plan. That same plan would serve as the foundation for the negotiations at the Dayton Accords.

At the same time, NATO's air power was finally unleashed to much broader effect. Within just a few weeks, Britain and France finally pledged with the United States to undertake an air campaign if the Bosnian Serbs press their attack east to Gorazde, the next "safe area" slated for cleansing. As Secretary of State Christopher warned, "The Bosnian Serb leaders are now on notice... There will be no more pinprick strikes" (Darnton 1995). This marked a change in the allies' willingness to support significant air strikes. UN troop contributing countries had been in opposition to NATO air strikes previously because of the Serb tactic of taking hostages, as had occurred in May when almost 400 peacekeepers were captured. However, Srebrenica changed that concern. The result was NATO's Operation Deliberate Force that went from August 30 through September 14, totaling 3,515 aircraft sorties that attacked 338 aim points and 48 Bosnian Serb targets with 1,026 strikes (Daalder 2000, 131). This combination of the ground forces from the Croat-Muslim Federation and the NATO airstrikes was enough to bring the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiation table.

That seat at the table would not be taken by the Bosnian Serbs, but instead by Serbian President Milosevic. This shift moved Bosnian Serb "president" Karadzic and their military's commander, Mladic to the periphery. This was achieved through both the pressure of sanctions over time on Milosevic as he grew more and more isolated, but also through political maneuverings. Clinton had made outreach to Russia a key part of

his negotiations with the Croatians and Bosniaks, ensuring that they included President Yeltsin in the process, even if at a cursory level (Clinton Library 1993d). This diplomatic maneuver increased the room for agreement with a negotiating partner that was more than willing to concede territory that was not going to be part of his state in the end.

Finally, before committing to an agreement, Clinton looked for bipartisan support because public polling was far from supportive for risking American lives in the Balkans at the end of November – only 37% support (Sobel 1998, 275). Clinton stated early on in a conversation with the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina that he had two preconditions before he would consider using Americans to enforce an agreement: that NATO rather than the UN execute the mission, and that Congress would approve the mission and fund it (see Figure 5.9 below) (Transcript of conversation between President Clinton and President Izetbegovic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Clinton Library 1993d). NATO, already expanding the bombing campaign was preparing to take over for UNPROFOR in the event an agreement could be reached had taken care of the first part. But Republicans had been using Bosnia's mishandling as a wedge heading into the 1996 election, preventing action. That changed when Senator Dole reversed his position on December 1, seeing that an agreement was likely and that the U.S. would need to support NATO in this endeavor. Dole thought that division on this issue would cut into troop morale and work at counter-purposes with the national interests, ultimately throwing his support to the president (Sciolino 1995).




Figure 5.9 Excerpt of President Clinton conversation with President Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia-Herzegovina

The combination of these factors paved the way for a peace agreement – the Dayton Accords – signed on December 14, 1995 in Paris. The Accords were in basic agreement with the Contact Group Plan developed in September. Bosnia-Herzegovina would continue within existing boundaries and consist of two entities, the Muslim-Croat Federation and Republika Srpska, occupying 51% and 49% of the country respectively (Daalder 2000, 138). The UNPROFOR would be replaced by an Implementation Force (IFOR) that had a very specific mandate and limited mission that, as the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs explained in a joint hearing before the Senate (1995), would “not include reconstruction, resettlement, humanitarian relief, election monitoring, and other non-security efforts.” This was the limited mission required to enforce the Dayton accords that Clinton used to arrive at a decision of whether the U.S. should take part in the intervention. Obviously the more tightly scoped mission significantly altered the expectations (what required, how long, at what risk) for the

intervention. More foundationally, that agreement provided an enforceable ceasefire that all parties agreed to, producing an environment with less anticipated hostility. This is the most notable change in conditions from what had existed over the previous three years. While Clinton called out NATO and Congressional support in his discussion with the Bosnian president, these were not Clinton's most important preconditions; it was the "if you reach an agreement" comment in the previous sentence (see Figure 5.9 above). An agreement, as I will demonstrate in the next section, changes the feasibility factors and explains why ground troops "were never ruled in" prior to its existence.

Feasibility Factors

As with the prior Somalia case, this section provides a feasibility assessment comparison of two periods. Here though, the initial assessment corresponds to the beginning of the Clinton administration in early 1993 rather than the period of the Bush 41 decision not to intervene. President Clinton could have easily chosen to intervene in Bosnia upon assuming the office, especially since he had campaigned on tackling the issues there in a way that his predecessor had not (Lake 2001). The second feasibility assessment corresponds to the period around the decision to send U.S. ground troops in December 1995. Again, the four feasibility factors addressed here are the type of conflict, whether the U.S. has a regime to support, the structure of the enemy, and the crisis environment's accessibility.

Initial Assessment (Clinton 1993)

First, did the Clinton team view the conflict in Bosnia as an ethnic civil war in same way the Bush 41 administration did? The evidence clearly supports that they did.

The ethnic tensions at the root of the conflict were obvious in the ethnic cleansing stories regularly published in the New York Times at the time (Sudetic 1992). Not only that, the broader complexity of the situation was also apparent to the Clinton team as evidenced by the specific questions resident in PRD 1 that the NSC was using to develop their policy (Clinton Library 1993e) (see excerpt below in Figure 5.10). The conflict region's ethnic and historical ties to the surrounding states and key international actors such as Russia and prominent Islamic countries all figured into the assessment of the situation. Facts such as these are at the heart of the logic behind concerns over the type of war. The more complex the crisis, the more intractable it appears and the greater the uncertainty regarding how an intervention might unfold. Therefore, for Clinton in 1993 just as it was for his predecessor, the type of conflict was dissuading for a potential intervention.




Figure 5.10 Excerpt from Presidential Review Directive/NSC-1: U.S. Policy Regarding the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia

Regarding whether there was a supportable regime in 1993, there was not. In the early stages of the war there were three distinct groups in conflict: the Bosnian Serbs (supported by Serbia) against the Bosniak Muslims and Croats independently, and the Muslims and Croats against one another to a more limited extent (Brune 1999). An intervenor would have been placed in the unenviable position of attempting to be neutral protector of relief supplies amid these conflicts. This is precisely the position in which UNPROFOR found itself that contributed to its inability to stop the massacres as the violence increased (Daalder 1998). Here too then, the feasibility factor for a supportable regime was not favorable.

Next, what type of enemy formations would a U.S. intervention face? There is a clear answer to this question from the National Intelligence Council's (NIC) response to the Clinton Transition Team's questions regarding the Balkans. The Transition Team posed questions to the NIC to prepare the incoming president and his team for the decisions they would face in the administration's opening days and months. The NIC's December 28, 1992 report provides a thorough record of the assessment the Clinton national security team received as they prepared to take the reins of power (Clinton Library 1992). The excerpt below (Figure 5.11) paints a vivid picture of what threat they anticipated in the event of a "large-scale international military intervention," the type of operation they believed would be required to end the crisis. The report specifically calls out that the "Bosnian Serb forces are doctrinally disposed to protracted, decentralized defense" and that they would be "widely deployed in rough terrain with good concealment that favors defense" (Clinton Library 1992, 38). The estimate is that guerrilla warfare would predominate and result in a lengthy occupation, precisely the

concern this feasibility factor is meant to address. Clearly the Clinton team would not have viewed the enemy structure in a positive light.




Figure 5.11 Excerpt from Response to Clinton Transition Team Questions on the Balkans

Lastly, the Clinton administration, like Bush 41, viewed the region as inaccessible in 1993. This is predominantly because of the necessity of using the Sarajevo airport to employ forces and protect the humanitarian supplies (Gellman 1992). In the early months of the Clinton presidency more and more graphic images poured illuminating the horror of the tragedy in Bosnia. Ivo Daalder (2000), who conducted interviews with administration officials on the subject and subsequently served on the NSC from 2005

and 2006 working the Bosnia issue, notes that this caused Clinton to ask National Security Advisor Tony Lake to revisit the options, including deploying American troops (19). The Pentagon conducted their analysis and the CJCS Admiral Jeremiah assessed that it would take 70,000 troops to halt the siege of Sarajevo, primarily “due to the fact that the airport’s closure meant that the troops would have to traverse hostile territory to get to the city” (Ibid., 20). Therefore, the inaccessibility of the Sarajevo airport and the high costs in troops and equipment to secure long and hostile alternative routes proved prohibitive. These limitations and restrictions put this feasibility factor firmly in the negative as well.

These four feasibility factors in early 1993 were not conducive to intervention. Clearly the demand for action was already there. As noted before, members of the national security team, most notably Albright and Lake were openly advocating for intervention options that included the deployment of the U.S. military as early as February (NSC Principals Committee 5 February 1993). In addition, President Clinton himself was swayed by the reports coming in on CNN while on his Group of Seven (G-7) trip to Tokyo, causing him to have his staff relook at what could be done, including the possibility of using troops (Daalder 2000, 19). Yet still, there was no decision to change course on the question of U.S. boots on the ground until the end of 1995.

Subsequent Assessment (Clinton 1995)

This section assesses the four operational feasibility factors in December 1995 when Clinton decides to deploy troops to Bosnia as part of IFOR. Here we see a significant change in all four factors stemming from one key event – the signing of the

Dayton Accords. The expectations for the military intervention change significantly with all sides agreeing to the ceasefire and its concomitant conditions. Everything from the appreciation of the conflict type, to there being a supportable regime, to the anticipated enemy the intervention would face, and even the logistical accessibility is altered with the agreement in place. It is important to note that the ceasefire agreement was always the lynchpin for President Clinton, making it the principal condition that would warrant U.S. involvement in the peacekeeping effort (Clinton Library 1993d, 11). This was blatantly clear in Clinton's conversations from the beginning of his handling of the crisis to the very end (See Figures 5.9 above and 5.12 below from his conversations with the presidents of Bosnia and Croatia). Seeing how that agreement changes the following feasibility factor assessments, it is easy to understand why.

We have seen things in the last few years that we never expected to see: Israel and the PLO sitting down after 30 years of fighting; the IRA laying down its arms, at least for a year, after 25 years of guerrilla warfare and terrorism. But what the world wants more than anything else is for a resolution of the war in Bosnia. Only you can provide it, and President Milosevic has responsibilities as well. If an agreement is made, I will ensure that a strong, disciplined and coordinated force is there to implement it. The United States will play a major role, and we will also work aggressively to rebuild war-torn areas and to open up economic opportunities for both your countries. The Europeans will take the lead on the economic side, but we will do our share and then some. So we are at a hopeful, positive moment, yet we are also aware of the dire consequences if we fail. (e)

Figure 5.12 Excerpt from President Clinton Meeting with Presidents Izetgebovic (Bosnia-Herzegovian) and Tudjman (Croatia), October 24, 1995

Beginning with the appreciation of the type of conflict, Clinton still recognized that it was an ethnically-divided civil war. However, the war itself ended with the signing of the Dayton Accords. Clear provisions to avoid conflict between the ethnic groups were emplaced and IFOR was given authority over the forces of the previously

warring factions, reducing the risk of significant combat (Brune 1999, 110). In addition, the IFOR mission was restricted to prevent “mission creep,” something the administration might have learned from the Somalia experience. Here, as noted before, senior Pentagon officials made it clear that the Bosnian intervention would not be about nation-building (Daalder 2000, 142-143). IFOR would monitor and enforce a zone of separation between the newly established territories. Therefore, the type of conflict moved from an ethnically-based civil war to a tenuous peace. The situation was still not certain to remain stable, but at least provisions limited contact among the groups through agreed upon lines of demarcation.

Next, the factor addressing a supportable regime changed over time. Initially, the conflict was waged among all three parties – Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. The first intervening force, UNPROFOR, had to maintain neutrality while trying to separate the parties and facilitate the delivery of aid. However, a key shift occurred in February 1994 when the Washington Framework Agreement established the Bosnian Federation of Muslims and Croats. As Clinton conveyed to both Bosnian and Croatian leaders in 1995, the cooperation between them marked a significant shift in the conflict, providing a level of parity between the opposing forces that could help induce negotiation (Clinton Library 1993d, 38) (See statement by President Clinton in Figure 5.13 below).

The only other statement that I wanted to make is that you did a great thing when you created the Federation. It has changed the military situation. The significant strengthening of the Croatian and Bosnian armies has helped make a decent peace possible. Without that I am not sure that the NATO bombing or Dick Holbrooke's diplomacy would have worked; the differences might have still been too great. I have nothing but admiration, but you both must work hard to make the Federation a reality on the ground. There are still many tensions and problems, and we should not let the Serbs or any other adversaries exploit your differences. Only you can help. You need to strengthen the Federation in the lives, minds and hearts of your people. They are the ones who need to make it work. ~~(C)~~

Figure 5.13 Statement by President Clinton in meeting with President Izetgebovic (Bosnia-Herzegovina) and President Tudjman (Croatia), October 24, 1995

Even though the partnership between the Croats and Muslims altered the balance of power positively, it did not provide a supportable regime in 1994. This is because the mandate authorizing an intervention, one that the U.S. supported, was UNSCR 743, which created UNPROFOR (United Nations Security Council 1992). If the U.S. had advocated intervention at this point it would have been blatantly taking one side over the other, in direct opposition to the neutral peacekeeping character outlined in Resolution 743. Therefore, the advent of the Washington Agreement was well received and paved the way for a sustainable peace, but it still did not provide a supportable regime given the nature of the conflict and the fact that the U.S. had committed to a multinational response. That would not come until all parties agreed at Dayton and subsequently signed in Paris.

The “General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” or simply the Dayton Accords, ultimately served as the “supportable regime” in and of itself. IFOR, as agreed to in the accords, was not intervening on behalf of one of the parties as I have maintained is preferable to neutrality; instead it had the most preferred situation. The regime was a clearly articulated set of rules that all the belligerents agreed to abide by, including ceasing hostilities, relocating and restricting the movement of their

forces, and most importantly the empowering of IFOR to use force against them if found in violation (United Nations 1995). Beyond that, the U.S. forces were limited in their scope to enforcing the military aspects of the agreement, providing separation between the parties and monitoring compliance (Daalder 2000, 145). Like the change it induced for the type of conflict, the Dayton Accords provided a clear side on which to act, one that was agreed to by those being acted upon.

The last two feasibility factors, enemy structure and accessibility, are closely linked in this case because the latter is primarily influenced by the change in the former. First, with the Dayton Accords in place, the concern over the decentralized Bosnian Serb forces and their potential to wage a long-term guerrilla war is significantly reduced. In fact, the President was most concerned about forces beyond the control of either the Serbs, Croats, or Bosniaks once the peace agreement was in place. Clinton conveyed this point in conversation with Bosnian President Izetbegovic, expressing concern that Iranian-backed Mujahedin forces that had come into fight against the Serbs could potentially fight on in opposition against U.S. forces (see Figure 5.14 below). This passage also demonstrates that Clinton did not anticipate losses to enemy fire as a result of the agreement being in place since losing “a couple of soldiers to forces connected to Iran...could wreck this whole thing” (Clinton Library 1993d, 56).

or else there will not be a lasting peace. I am strongly committed to this. But if we were to lose a couple of soldiers to forces connected to Iran, it could wreck the whole thing. So I want to do what I promised to do, but this is the one area that could undermine my commitment. ~~(c)~~

President Izetbegovic: As I told you earlier, your troops will be completely safe. The units of the Mujahedin have been dismantled. In the days to come, we will give you more details. The majority of these forces have already left. But there are small numbers that do not have any place to go. They are political opponents in their home countries, and many have families in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But as military units, they have ceased to exist. I understand your concern on this. There will be individuals who stay, but it will be as civilians and in parts of the country in which they will be under complete control. We don't know what to do with them as persons, but they are not soldiers anymore, and they have given a solemn promise that they will not deal with anything military. We will watch them. It is in our interest not to create any problems in this regard. If you provide us with evidence that people are terrorists, we will take action. But the Mujahedin units do not exist. ~~(c)~~

The President: I understand why they came. You needed help wherever you could find it. Those were desperate times. But we are your friends. We want to help -- to make the Federation work, to make Bosnia a unified state in every respect. But this problem could destroy the public base of support in the U.S. for IFOR. We will work with you and tell you what we know, but this is still a potentially serious problem. We are doing what we can to guard against this danger. We will take you at your word. ~~(c)~~

Figure 5.14 Conversation between President Clinton and President Izetgebovic (Bosnia-Herzegovina), December 14, 1995

With the concern over armed opposition largely gone, the accessibility challenges of using the Sarajevo airport or the long routes for logistic support changed as well. Access limitations were always a great concern. Following the bombing campaign in the fall of 1995, General Mladic came to bargain with NATO over what he was willing to concede if the attacks halted. NATO rejected Mladic's proposal and made three specific demands, one of which was "complete freedom of movement for UN forces and personnel and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and unrestricted use of Sarajevo airport (Daalder 2000, 132). With the Dayton Accords these concerns were finally alleviated. The main airport and all road networks became accessible and their use unopposed.

Bosnia Summary

The Clinton administration's appraisal of the Bosnia situation in 1993 was not that different from the Bush 41 perspective (See Table 4 below). All four of the feasibility factors dissuaded Clinton from committing troops. In line with this assessment, the incoming administration saw the prospects of a military intervention being able to solve the crisis without a peace agreement as remote, at least not within acceptable timelines and costs. Clinton maintained from his earliest days in office that an agreement would be a precondition for U.S. troop contributions to the effort. Fortunately, the series of advantageous developments in 1995 made an agreement possible (i.e. Bosniak and Croat ground offensive, NATO bombing campaign, Milosevic negotiating on behalf of Bosnian Serbs).

Table 5.4 Bosnia Intervention Feasibility Assessment Comparison

<i>Bosnia Intervention Feasibility Assessment Comparison</i>				
	<i>Conflict Type</i>	<i>Supportable Regime</i>	<i>Enemy Structure</i>	<i>Accessible Environment</i>
<i>Clinton (1993)</i>	- Ethnic civil war	- Noncompliance with ceasefire	- Decentralized guerrilla force	- Access too costly (e.g. 70k troops)
<i>Clinton (1995)</i>	- ↑ Ethnic but no longer at war	+ Dayton Accords agreed to by all	+ Limited opposition	+ Unopposed key nodes (Sarajevo)

When the Dayton Accords were signed in December, all of the feasibility factors shifted significantly in a positive direction (See Table 5.4 above). The conflict, while still ethnically-based, was a more positive environment for intervention due to the separation of the opposing forces and willing halt to the hostilities. Next, there was a

regime to support, namely the Dayton Accords and its provisions. Third, the expectation of enemy opposition was significantly reduced based on the ceasefire agreement. And finally, the accessibility to the region was vastly improved because of the agreement to allow unfettered access to the Sarajevo airport and all main routes. In short, the mission, once scoped to limit expected conflict and anticipated time commitments for IFOR, displayed the characteristics supporting intervention.

Part V: Comparison and Conclusion

The Somalian and Bosnian interventions provide useful cases to test the utility of operational feasibility factors in understanding more than just an initial decision to intervene or not. In theory, if an appreciation of an intervention's feasibility factors changes from positive to negative, this should be accompanied by a decision to withdraw forces. Likewise, if conditions initially stifle demands to intervene but later are conducive to intervention, we ought to expect a decision reversal. The Bush 41 and Clinton White House's perceptions of the Somalian and Bosnian crises provided a unique opportunity to assess this notion.

The four feasibility factors considered in this study – the type of conflict, whether there is a supportable regime, the structure and capability of the enemy, and the accessibility of the crisis environment – all trended from favoring intervention in some degree under Bush 41 to supporting withdrawal under Clinton in the Somalian case. Therefore, the decision to withdraw given the change in these conditions supports the theory posited here that operational feasibility affects intervention decisions. Similarly, while both Bush 41 and Clinton agreed that putting boots on the ground in 1992/1993

was ill-advised, the signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995 changed the feasibility factors in the direction to promote intervention.

One might argue that these cases exhibit a great deal of covariance between the feasibility factors and the internal or external determinants, harkening back to the idea that the media drove the U.S. out of Somalia or the increased magnitude of the conflict of Bosnia finally warranted U.S. involvement. Covariance can most certainly take place, as the process tracing of these cases identifies. Just as in the last chapter, as conditions shift, so to do the options generated for presidential consideration. However, the question at the heart of the study focuses on explaining both action and inaction in the face of similar demand signals. What this research has shown is that it is not until the options presented for decision are considered feasible do we see intervention. And, likewise, when the feasibility assessments become increasingly negative, we see withdrawal. It is certainly important to note the demands that sway and tailor the types of options being considered, but the operative element of the decision calculus is feasibility.

More than that, building upon the findings of the previous chapters and the explicit reference to operational feasibility considerations in the historical record, the results are striking. There is remarkable consistency of these factors with their corresponding theoretical prediction in outcome. This is true whether supporting intervention outcomes, or in this case, nonintervention/withdrawal.

CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION

This work focused on answering why U.S. presidents choose to intervene militarily in some foreign crises but not in others. Specifically, why do we find seemingly inconsistent intervention decisions when the situations in question exhibit similar qualities, particularly with respect to those variables argued by other scholars as being determinant? Throughout, I have argued that there was an important element missing from these analyses: a way of operationalizing the concepts surrounding “expectations of success,” an element often cited as an important part of the decision-making process (Baum 2004; Regan 1998 and 2002; Seybolt 2007). Toward this end I have provided operational feasibility factors as a way of identifying observable and measurable aspects of situations that presidents use to arrive at their expectation of success. Using a mixed methods approach and primary sources that included the minutes from presidential and NSC dialogues, this study was able to explore the degree to which these feasibility factors influenced the decisions. When these feasibility factors align favorably, the prospects of intervention increase given that there is enough demand for action. Alternatively, when the factors exhibit unfavorable qualities, the president is unlikely to commit ground forces regardless of the demand signal’s strength.

Answering this question is important. Presidential policy positions are the subject of much debate, especially when those decisions involve the expenditure of America’s blood and treasure. The results of these analyses not only help us explain perplexing outcomes, they pass knowledge from the realm of practice to the world of political analysis, filling in gaps that offer more consistent and, in some cases, more

parsimonious answers to perennial questions. This study has sought to do just that. By employing the analytic concepts used by military planners to develop assessments and options as part of the national security apparatus, this work identified factors that explain intervention and nonintervention decisions with a high degree of consistency.

This concluding chapter proceeds in four parts. First, I revisit the theoretical argument upon which the analysis is built. Second, I summarize the empirical findings from the previous three chapters. Third, I explore the implications for the research and policy communities, as well as for the public more generally. Finally, I acknowledge the limitations of this study and recommend future research opportunities to test and improve upon this theoretical framework.

Argument

The main contention is that operational feasibility plays a significant role in determining whether U.S. presidents are willing to intervene with boots on the ground in foreign crises. It does not matter what the impetus is for the intervention – humanitarian, security, or economic interests. Feasibility factors can explain why instances that seem to be very compelling are still not acted upon; and at the same time, why opportunities that were once deemed unsupportable can shift to become interventions.

The scholarly community has largely overlooked these concerns to date, instead focusing on the relative importance of the source of the demand signals that create an intervention opportunity to explain why or why not presidents choose to intervene. The debate has been between those arguing in favor of external determinants such as geopolitical pressures and alliances (Smith 1996), global economics (Fordham 2008), or

international norms (Walling 2013), and those arguing on behalf of internal determinants such as public opinion (Baum 2004), domestic economic conditions (DeRouen 1995), or congressional support and ideology (Hildebrandt et al. 2013). In this work I charted a third course that opens up a new range of considerations to help explain presidential decision-making.

This approach is based on a three-part causal chain. First, presidents respond to the demand signals discussed by previous scholars, identifying an opportunity for potential military intervention. Then, with the assistance of their national security team, they assess the likelihood of success for the use of force given the unique characteristics of the crisis environment. Finally, taking into account the potential efficacy of the mission, they determine whether to go forward with the intervention. This theoretical proposition places a great deal of importance on the estimation of a successful outcome.

Other authors have understood the importance of the expectations of success, using measures such as relative power comparisons in order to account for this factor (e.g., Buena de Mesquita and Lalman 1992). This technique was most useful in the bipolar Cold War era where interventions were often associated with proxy wars between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. However, more recent works have not adequately operationalized this concept to account for the changing strategic landscape following the fall of the Soviet Union. Over the last few decades multilateral institutions such as the UN have more frequently taken a leading role in initiating interventions, morphing traditional views of sovereignty and state responsibilities with concepts such as the “right to protect” (Bellamy 2008). Also, nongovernmental institutions have been instrumental, calling

attention to humanitarian crises and generating demand for intervention (Chandler 2001). Finally, civil conflicts and irregular warfare have continued apace absent the proxy wars commonly associated with the Cold War, seeing new players such as diasporas and smaller external state sponsors play more significant roles in starting or supporting guerrilla and civil wars (Byman et al., 2001). These changes influence not only the prevalence of intervention opportunities, but the rationales that either support or argue against a potential military intervention. In light of these changes, the expectation of success must account for something beyond relative power differentials between would-be adversaries. The question is what types of considerations make sense?

This issue – clearly articulating under what circumstances the U.S. should commit to a military intervention – has been a concern for administrations dating back to Reagan. The famous “Weinberger Doctrine,” presented by then Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in response to concern of growing commitments in the Middle East on the heels of the killing of 241 Americans in Lebanon, laid out six tests that should be met before the U.S. would commit ground troops (Weinberger 1984; Record 2007; LaFeber 2009):

1. First, the United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies....
2. Second, if we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning. If we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all....
3. Third, if we do decide to commit to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives. And we should know precisely how our forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives. And we should have and send the forces needed to do just that....

4. Fourth, the relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed---their size, composition and disposition---must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary. Conditions and objectives invariably change during the course of a conflict. When they do change, so must our combat requirements....
5. Fifth, before the US commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance that we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress....
6. Finally, the commitment of US forces to combat should be a last resort.

Five of the six tests above relate in some way to whether an action should be taken. These concerns are based on what an intervention would accomplish (1); how it should be undertaken (2 and 4); and under what political and diplomatic circumstances (5 and 6). Of note for this study is number three, which addresses clearly defined and achievable military objectives. This is the criterion that deals with whether military force *can* be applied to achieve the desired effect. To answer that concern requires the articulation of the aims of the intervention and the subsequent development of military options that could achieve them. In other words, in order to determine the answer to number three, a feasibility assessment must be undertaken to develop an understanding of what could be done and at what cost. Only then can the president determine whether a reasonable option is even available.

This same doctrine was reinforced by then CJCS Colin Powell (1992) during deliberations over a potential Bosnian intervention during the George H.W. Bush administration, stressing the importance of assessing key factors before assuming the risks involved with sending in combat troops. Similarly, Clinton also struggled to circumscribe the instances where it is appropriate to intervene with ground forces,

something he found necessary early in his administration following the Somalia withdrawal and as he deliberated over the ongoing challenges in the former Yugoslavia. Like Bush 41 before him, he sought to add clarity for those in the national security establishment when developing recommendations in a period of increased pressure for U.S. involvement. Toward that end, Clinton developed Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) / NSC-25 (Clinton 1994). In it, Clinton calls for the same clearly defined objectives and an expectation of being able to achieve them decisively (read quickly) that Powell had conveyed in the previous administration (see Figure 6.1).




Figure 6.1 Clinton PDD-25 Excerpt on Considerations for Significant U.S. Involvement in Peace Enforcement Operations

Based on the above, this study looked to identify what elements of these crises might either lead to more achievable military aims in short order, or alternatively make them more difficult and protracted. By looking to how the presidents' national security teams conduct their assessment of these crises and develop their military options in the

modern era, I have developed a useful set of conditions to indicate whether a crisis environment is conducive to intervention or if it is likely to dissuade involvement: feasibility factors.

There were four feasibility factors that proved most useful in this analysis:

1. CONFLICT - What type of conflict is it? If it is based on ethnic or religious fault lines, then the violence is unlikely to be quelled quickly and will contribute to persistent instability.
2. REGIME - Does the U.S. have a clear regime to support or install within the state where the intervention would occur?
3. ENEMY - How is the enemy/adversary organized? Is the structure hierarchical and susceptible to strike, or diffuse and difficult to target?
4. ACCESS - How accessible is the crisis environment? This addresses the logistic concerns of supporting an intervention through existing port and transportation networks, elements that are often lacking in the underdeveloped locales where intervention opportunities arise.

These four feasibility factors are meant to tease out the most important aspects that determine whether military options that have clear objectives, attainable within a short amount of time, are even possible.

Empirical Findings

Study Design

This study employed an explanatory sequential mixed methods research design to assess the ability of feasibility factors to explain intervention decisions, while at the same time comparing their explanatory power against, as well in combination with, the extant scholarship's more common determinants (Creswell 2013). First, I employ Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to test for unique combinations of feasibility factors with the internal and external determinants that are most associated with intervention and nonintervention decisions. This methodological choice is based on the theory above that the internal and external determinant conditions expressed by other authors emit a demand signal that results in an opportunity, but that opportunity is only acted upon when the feasibility factors are advantageously aligned. QCA was able to identify the combinations of conditions that yielded the most consistent results. Building on those findings, I then conducted two paired comparison case studies, each within a single administration to attempt to control for unobserved variables. The first looked at the George H.W. Bush administration's intervention decisions regarding Somalia and Bosnia – the former resulting in an intervention and the latter nonintervention. By using the QCA findings to guide the research into the presidential dialogues and NSC deliberations, I was able to demonstrate the degree to which feasibility factors were explicitly evident in the decision-making process. In the second paired comparison, the same two crises were explored under the Clinton administration. The aim here was to extend the theory, looking at whether changes in decisions (intervention to withdrawal in

Somalia and nonintervention to intervention in Bosnia) were associated with concomitant changes in feasibility factors, bolstering the argument for their inclusion in intervention analyses. I discuss each of these research contributions – QCA and the cases studies – in turn.

Qualitative Comparative Analysis

The QCA portion of the study used 19 intervention opportunities to identify unique combinatorial condition solutions – causal recipes of the feasibility factors mixed with the internal and external determinants – associated with both intervention and nonintervention and used those solutions for a predictive analysis with an out-of-sample test. The parsimonious and intermediate solutions for intervention predicted the actual decisions with 100% accuracy and the nonintervention solutions at 75%.

Specifically, the analysis looked at eight different hypotheses built around the theoretical expectations associated with the feasibility factors above, and one for the null hypothesis where the factors would be expected to have no effect. Only the null hypothesis had no support.

Feasibility factors performed very well in the analyses. Of them, two were most significant for intervention decisions: 1) Is there a supportable regime? and 2) Is the crisis environment logistically accessible? In the parsimonious QCA solution these two conditions account for 88% of the decisions to intervene from 1980 to 2013. The enemy's structure was also important. A hierarchical enemy structure was present in every case of intervention and absent in two-thirds of the nonintervention cases. Lastly, the conflict type also proved useful. The combination of an ethnically- or religiously-

based conflict with no regime to support accounted for 83% of the cases of nonintervention. This solution also supported the “Too Complex” hypothesis which argued that there would be an additive quality to infeasible traits that would cause presidents to balk.

The non-feasibility conditions that emerged to help explain the decisions were presidential approval, trade ties, and conflict magnitude. The inclusion of these conditions reinforces the position that both domestic and international systemic concerns influence intervention decisions. Yet, alone they did not produce the outcomes in question; they always required the addition of at least one feasibility factor in the solution. This finding reinforces the theory put forward that the internal and external determinants emit a demand signal, but that there is a feasibility threshold that must also be crossed before troops are deployed. Demand alone is not enough.

Case Studies

The paired comparison of the Bush 41 intervention decisions in Chapter 4 for the Somalia and the Yugoslavia/Bosnia crises reinforced the QCA findings. The two cases were similar in that the conflicts had significant magnitude regarding deaths, refugees, and internally displaced persons. Both garnered the support of multinational institutions like the UN that cited international norms as a rationale to intervene. However, the among the factors unrelated to feasibility, Bosnia clearly had a stronger case for intervention. The crisis in the Balkans had drawn much more media coverage and could tout much more important economic and political ties to allies. Yet, Bush 41 went in the opposite direction and intervened in Somalia instead.

As demonstrated, the key difference between the cases was in the feasibility assessment. Yugoslavia was characterized by the Bush 41 administration as overly complex; there was no established ceasefire in place that the intervention could enforce; the opposing forces were primarily irregulars and decentralized; and logistical access to the region was very limited. Compare this to the anticipated mission in Somalia which did not seek to resolve the conflict, but instead only safeguard delivery of aid from the administration thought were “juvenile delinquents” and “brigands” (NSC 0065, 3). In addition, while Somalia was expected to be costly based on the need to support the mission via sea and air, Bush 41 did not anticipate the mission lasting longer than 30 days, therefore making accessibility a minor concern (NSC 0065, 5).

This chapter also discovered an additional phenomenon that underscores the importance of feasibility. Under Bush 41 the assessment of the Somalian intervention opportunity underwent a series of transitions, highlighting how intervention decisions may shift given changes in the mission requirements, and therefore the feasibility of executing that mission. This fed directly into the next chapter which sought to address this principle head on, looking at whether feasibility factor assessments changed under the Clinton administration as they dealt with the same crises, and whether perhaps this led to the reversal of decisions – getting out of Somalia and supporting intervention in Bosnia.

In Chapter 5, when the feasibility factors changed from positive to negative, that resulted in Clinton’s decision to withdraw. Likewise, when the initial conditions were not supportive of intervention but then changed to promote a feasible mission, Clinton

chose to accept the risk and put boots on the ground in Bosnia. In effect, what this chapter accomplished was to extend the application of the theory. The results also add greater weight to the argument put forward here because they demonstrated that changes to the feasibility factors were in accordance with the theoretically anticipated outcomes.

Concerning Somalia, all four of the feasibility factors addressed in this study went from favoring intervention under Bush 41 to supporting withdrawal under Clinton. While Clinton's initial assessment was basically the same as Bush 41's above, that changed over time as the mission grew in scope and was met with greater resistance. Clinton's team then recognized they were embroiled in a civil war with no regime to support, facing multiple diffusely organized militias, with a much longer time horizon for success, thereby greatly increasing the costs associated with logistically supporting the operation. This, in turn, led to withdrawal.

The assessment for Bosnia under Clinton likewise changed, most fundamentally with the signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995. This significantly altered the parameters of the mission and resulted in meaningful shifts in the feasibility factors. The conflict was still ethnically-based, but now there was an agreed upon cease fire and a separation of combatants. In addition, there was then no expected opposition, either preventing the use of the Sarajevo airport or limiting the access across the region. As a result, the change in feasibility led to intervention.

In total, the two previous chapters furthered the understanding of how important feasibility factors are to the decision-making process. The primary sources were able to expose the deliberations occurring within the NSC and its supporting subcommittees,

shedding further light on what it is that truly tilts the scales in one direction or the other. This included the notes of meetings with the presidents and their most trusted advisors, holding conversations that they knew would not be available for immediate public consumption. At least in the cases explored here, concerns over operational feasibility were quite evident and linked in a theoretically consistent way to ultimate decisions.

Implications

Research

This study demonstrates that we can explain, at least partially, the inconsistencies within the literature concerning intervention behavior. The variables that the previous scholarship suggests are determinants, whether internally or externally oriented, really serve as the demand signals that create an intervention opportunity. Those demands must be paired with a combination of positively aligned feasibility factors in order to cross the threshold that results in an intervention decision.

What this research does is operationalize the concept of “expectations of success” that other authors have identified as an important element to be considered, but not adequately accounted for in empirical analysis, particularly in the modern era (e.g., Baum 2004; Regan 1998 and 2002; Seybolt 2007). Therefore, this work builds on the contributions of these authors by taking the factors that the military planning community actually uses to develop options for consideration and translates these into concepts for use in academia.

Moving forward, scholars should view operational feasibility as a portion of the decisional calculus that can be operationalized and included in future analyses. Based on the findings here, these considerations may be much more appropriate for explaining intervention decisions than any previous alternative, and therefore should be included and expanded upon.

Beyond intervention-focused scholarship, the findings also reinforce work done in studies focused on conflict and leader behavior more broadly. For instance, those that have argued strongly that leaders will not go to war unless they are likely to win find common ground here (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Morrow, and Siverson 2005). This has been especially important for democratic leaders, who place a high value on the probability of success, causing them to carefully pick their conflicts.

Policy

The theoretical premise that this study proposes is based on an understanding of how decisions are made in the current national security apparatus. As such, the notion that feasibility affects decisions is not novel; what is, is the elucidation of what factors carry the most weight. Therefore, for the policy community, the primary contribution of this study is in its shedding light on the most prominent feasibility concerns as demonstrated through the systematic analysis of 19 cases. Beyond that, the additional qualitative research of the paired case comparisons illuminates to an even greater degree how decisions are made and the importance that feasibility assessments play.

Often the people that participate in the formulation of military options – military planners, civilian employees within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and on the

Joint Staff, and on the various layers of the NSC and its supporting staffs – are unaware of what specific concerns are addressed in the small group sessions when the presidents meet with their key advisors. This study, through material released via the Freedom of Information Act, was able to shed light on those discussions. Through those records we can see that the decisions are indeed complex, factoring in a number of concerns that all bear on potential risk, repercussions of both action and inaction, and most importantly for this study, a clear explication that feasibility concerns actually matter. Based on that, it is important that those developing potential intervention options in the future ensure that they clearly address these feasibility factors since they will likely be seminal to discussions at the highest levels.

Lastly, for those in the policy realm, this study exhibits that intervention decisions rest firmly in the practical concerns of the possible, not as popularly conceived to be at the whims of political fancy. This should be somewhat vindicating for those who work behind the scenes to support these missions, either in the conceptualization or in the conduct of the missions themselves.

Public Awareness

More generally, this dissertation militates in a certain sense against unwarranted blame. Often, we see presidents chastised for their inaction in the face of horrific atrocities, such as the Rwandan genocide (e.g., New York Times 1994; Reuters 1998). When charges that presidents are insensitive to the plight of those suffering in conflicts around the world are levied, it is most commonly assumed that something *can* and *should* be done.

Most studies have emphasized the driving forces behind the *should* in their analysis of why presidents choose to get involved. In other words, we as a scholarly community constructed our assessment of why a president has intervened or not based on whether the demand for action was enough. This study explored whether the intervention *can* have the desired effect. By doing so, it opens more space in the debate and criticism that surround these decisions in the public sphere.

Potential Adversaries

Knowledge of the importance of these factors will also prove informative for regimes that would seek to deter U.S. involvement in their regional conflicts. If a perpetrator wishes to dissuade U.S. intervention into their affairs, they could take actions early that limit the logistic access to their region such as making air or sea ports unusable. Or, they might purposefully organize their command and control structure in ways that make it difficult to target or pursue more guerrilla tactics from the outset that make targeting of larger formations challenging. Clearly, these concerns might be prudent for an adversary of the U.S. regardless of the situation, but the study lays bare how important these concerns are for the U.S. and the intervention decision-making process.

Limitations and Future Research Recommendations

Although this research has succeeded in providing an answer to why we have witnessed apparently inconsistent intervention behavior by presidents in recent decades, it is nonetheless limited. This is based primarily on the methodological choices I made in the development of the research design. Those choices have a defensible logic that

supports their use, but at the same time they present challenges to the validity of the study, begging further examination.

The universe of potential cases that could be considered in this study was relatively small for three main reasons. First, intervention decisions are complex in that they are made in an environment where a number of contributing factors are in interplay, constantly shifting up until the point of decision. This realization that the combination of certain conditions may hold greater explanations than individual variables led to the choice to use QCA rather than more traditional statistical methods. This decision required in-depth analysis of cases to gain knowledge of all the pertinent conditions used in the analysis, much of which did not exist in current databases. The second reason is tied to the first. Intervention decisions are rooted in the realities of an external world that is constantly shifting, in its power relations, its economic interdependencies, and its cultural norms. This presents problems in making comparisons across extensive time periods. For this reason, I chose to limit the time frame to the previous three decades, capturing the post-Cold War era plus the period of Soviet decline; this produced enough instances of intervention to have a meaningful analysis using QCA. In addition, the case studies were selected with the goal of minimizing unaccounted for variance in key variables. Based on that, I chose to conduct two paired comparisons within single administrations, which the second building upon the first. By using this design I was able to demonstrate substantively through primary source material that the findings of the QCA portion of the design had merit, and then extend the application of the theory to include conditional shifts that generate decisional reversals.

However, the case selection for the qualitative analyses using this approach could be seen by some as problematic because of the dominant influence of the “Weinberger Doctrine” discussed above on the administrations in question (Campbell 1998). As noted previously, this doctrine emphasized the importance of clearly achievable goals and exit strategies, obviously prizing feasibility concerns in the analysis. However, if these concerns were peculiar to the Weinberger and Powell era, why do we see the same feasibility concerns present in the broader systematic analysis when other leaders with different advisors were at the helm? Still, future research should tackle this concern and seek to validate or challenge the findings here as new materials become declassified for the most recent administrations.

Even with the mitigating measures discussed above, this study carries some validity challenges. First, concerning external validity, or the extent to which these findings can be generalized to a broader universe, the few cases poses a problem. QCA, like other forms of statistical analyses, is just as susceptible to the problems associated with small sample sizes. Therefore, future research should look to expand on the application of this design to larger sample sizes. However, as noted above, caution should be taken in operationalizing the feasibility factors generally across time. Temporal shifts can change the makeup of meaningful alliances or technological advancements can overcome access challenges. Therefore, I recommend that studies undertaken in this vein moving forward maintain the case-based research orientation used here and purposively scope the studies to ensure there is logical consistency with the time period in question and the factors being evaluated. In addition, research should extend

beyond the U.S. to see if feasibility considerations are present elsewhere, particularly if the same logic holds in different regime types.

Regarding internal validity, or the extent to which the study was executed in manner that lends credibility to the findings, I have made every attempt at being transparent in both the research and the analytic process. The raw data for the QCA is found in Appendix A, along with sourcing references. For each data type, I have provided the reasoning behind the dates used or judgements made, as well as maintained consistency with previous scholars where appropriate. In the execution of the QCA I have provided a step-by-step accounting of the analysis in Appendix C. However, regardless of the transparency, it is still individual analysis. Therefore, future research should delve deeper into the coding and validate or refine the choices I made in these analyses, adding to the credibility of the findings.

Closing

This dissertation set out to understand why presidents seemingly made inconsistent intervention decisions when evaluating foreign crises. Evidence has been marshalled to support the contention that international systemic forces and international norms are most persuasive in generating a response; and likewise, others have argued to great effect for the impact of domestic concerns. However, all of these arguments hinged on the role of demand. If the demand is high enough, the logic goes, an intervention should occur. This study uncovered a third way of viewing these situations that looked at the threshold for action as not tied to demand, but to the feasibility that the

intervention could produce the desired effect within acceptable costs and time constraints.

The feasibility factors presented here gave meaning to what is really behind an expectation of success. Demand may be present in the extreme, but without feasible options it is unlikely that the U.S. will get involved. This realization should improve future research of military intervention decisions and generate a richer understanding of the attributes of a crisis that weigh most heavily on the choice to intervene.

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APPENDIX A: RAW DATA MATRIX

Description	Date	Begin	End	US Intervene	President	CONFLICT (1=not Ethnic)	REGIME (1= supportable regime)	ENEMY (1=Hierarchy)	ACCESS P: Major Sea ports A: Airports > 5000 ft, 1524 m	POPULATION Density (ppl per sq/km)	PARTY (1: Partial or full control; 0: No Control)	APPROVAL (% Pres. Approval)	UNEMPLOY	MAG	TRADE	ALLY	UN	General Notes	Source Notes
Nicaragua	Nov-81	1981	1990	0	Reagan	0	0	1	P-1, A-11	27.8	1	53	3	413.46	1	0		<p>Date is NOV 81 since Reagan made decision for covert intervention only. Ref: Appendix A. Box ground on United States map. Data taken from US Funding Dept. of Justice. (http://www.usdoj.gov/oeo/oeo3/19712app3a.htm)</p> <p>REGIME: Conflict based on extended collection of literature and other consulting groups. See Political Science R. (1990). The Conflict, 1980-1990: A Special Kind of Politics. ABC-CLIO. ENEMY: Hierarchical. The Sandinista Army (EPS) was modeled on the Cubans and heavily influenced by them in their conduct and doctrinal employment. The lessons of their seventy years were largely unlearned prior to 1980. TYPE: Type of Power Relations Database ACCESS: Data from 1982. Facebooks: /archive.org/stream/1982CIAWorld52a/bookpage/15/mode/2up/. POPULATION: Population density from World Development Indicators (http://databank.worldbank.org/). APPROVAL: Taken from Gallup Presidential Job Approval Center. REGIONS: (http://Q1023P.html#defn). Job-approval statistics and from the work of the event. UNEMPLOYMENT: from Bureau of Labor Statistics (data by gov job) Survey. Outlets: ewirel: UN, UN Security Council. Resolution records at http://www.un.org/63/peace/ewirel/. OPINION: 1982 CBS News INT. National Survey, question on "how would you describe the importance of El Salvador and other Central American countries-El Salvador, and</p>	
Lebanon	Sep-82	1982	1991	1	Reagan	0	1	1	P-3, A-5	257.3	1	42	5	342.88	0	1		<p>REGIME: Initially in support of Lebanese post and then the new president after the assassination. TYPE: Ethnic Power Relations Database in: Andrew Winster, Jan-Erik Cederstrom and Shari Min, 'Ethnic politics and armed conflict: A configurational analysis of a new global dataset', in American Sociological Review 74(3): 316-337, 2009. ACCESS: Post and Airport data from 1982. Facebook: /archive.org/stream/1982CIAWorld52a/bookpage/15/mode/2up/. POPULATION: Population density from World Development Indicators (http://databank.worldbank.org/). OPINION: http://www.ewirel.com/resources/H/John+Publ+Ch+Opinion.pdf. UN Security Council Resolution 521 (http://www.un.org/63/peace/ewirel/job_2007y/job_0185/RES/521/1982). UNEMPLOYMENT: from Bureau of Labor Statistics (data by gov job) Survey. Outlets: ewirel: UN, UN Security Council. Resolution records at http://www.un.org/63/peace/ewirel/.</p> <p>REGIME: Full Scale as interim leader will next election. ENEMY: Hierarchical. Equipped by the USSR and loaned by the Cubans. See DoD DCS (1983) Preliminary Report on Grenada. TYPE: Not included in Ethnic Power Relations Database - politically incorrect. ACCESS: Post and Airport data from 1982. Facebook: /archive.org/stream/1982CIAWorld52a/bookpage/15/mode/2up/. POPULATION: Population density from World Development Indicators (http://databank.worldbank.org/). OPINION: http://www.ewirel.com/resources/H/John+Publ+Ch+Opinion.pdf. UN Security Council Resolution 521 (http://www.un.org/63/peace/ewirel/job_2007y/job_0185/RES/521/1982). UNEMPLOYMENT: from Bureau of Labor Statistics (data by gov job) Survey. Outlets: ewirel: UN, UN Security Council. Resolution records at http://www.un.org/63/peace/ewirel/.</p>	
Grenada	Oct-83	1983	1983	1	Reagan	1	1	1	P-1, A-1	282.3	1	47	1	10.21	1	0		<p>Added to CSP dataset - should have been included since greater than 500 deaths. Operation Urgent Fury, dispose military govt in Grenada following REGIME violence. Deans source is Margaret Hill (data).</p> <p>REGIME: Full Scale as interim leader will next election. ENEMY: Hierarchical. Equipped by the USSR and loaned by the Cubans. See DoD DCS (1983) Preliminary Report on Grenada. TYPE: Not included in Ethnic Power Relations Database - politically incorrect. ACCESS: Post and Airport data from 1982. Facebook: /archive.org/stream/1982CIAWorld52a/bookpage/15/mode/2up/. POPULATION: Population density from World Development Indicators (http://databank.worldbank.org/). OPINION: http://www.ewirel.com/resources/H/John+Publ+Ch+Opinion.pdf. UN Security Council Resolution 521 (http://www.un.org/63/peace/ewirel/job_2007y/job_0185/RES/521/1982). UNEMPLOYMENT: from Bureau of Labor Statistics (data by gov job) Survey. Outlets: ewirel: UN, UN Security Council. Resolution records at http://www.un.org/63/peace/ewirel/.</p>	

Description	Date	Begin	End	US Intervene	President	CONFLICT (1=not Ethnic)	REGIME (1= supportable regime)	ENEMY (1=Hierarchy)	ACCESS P: Major Sea Ports A: Airports > 5000 ft, 1524 m	POPULATION Density (ppi per sq/km)	PARTY (1: Partial or full control; 0: No Control)	APPROVAL (% Pres. Approval)	UNEMPLOY	MAG	TRADE	ALLY	UN	General Notes	Source Notes
Lebanon	Sep-52	1982	1991	1	Reagan	0	1	1	P, 3, A, 5	2573	1	42	10.1 (SEP 82)	5	34C88	0	1	Begin date for US is September 1982.	REGIME: Initially in support of Lebanese govt. and then the new president after the assassination. TYPE: Ethnic Power Relations Dataset in: Andrew Wimmer, Lars-Erik Cederman and Brian Lin, "Ethnic politics and armed conflict: A configurational analysis of new wars data," <i>Journal of Peace Research</i> , vol. 49, no. 3, pp. 343-357, 2008. ACCESS: For and Report data from 1982 Facebook. https://books.google.com/books?id=1982UNW0dFz00k&pg=PA1982 Identify from World Development Indicators http://data.worldbank.org/ OPINION: http://www.enr.com/resources/HFJohnHPJult +Opinion.pdf; UN Security Council Resolution 321 http://www.un.org/refid/search/view_doc.asp?ym=1982/RES/321(1982) ; UNEMPLOYMENT: from Bureau of Labor Statistics (data.bls.gov/pdq/survey); OubaiSevier; UN Security Council Resolution records.un.org/SecurityCouncil/resolutions/ .
Kenya	Oct-83	1983	1983	1	Reagan	1	1	1	P, 1, A, 1	282.3	1	47	8.8 (OCT 83)	1	10.21	1	0	Added to CSP dataset - should have been included since greater than 300 deaths. Operation Urgent Fury; impose military govt in Grenada following REGIME violence; Dictator's score is 10 (largest ill/dad).	REGIME: Paul Scoon as interim leader until next election; ENEMY: Hierarchical. Equipped by the US and trained by the CIA. See also 1983 (1983) and 1984 (1984) for more information. Included in Ethnic Power Relations Dataset - politically motivated. ACCESS: For and Report data from 1982 Facebook. https://books.google.com/books?id=1982UNW0dFz00k&pg=PA1982 Identify from World Development Indicators http://data.worldbank.org/ OPINION: http://www.enr.com/resources/HFJohnHPJult +Opinion.pdf; UN Security Council Resolution 321 http://www.un.org/refid/search/view_doc.asp?ym=1982/RES/321(1982) ; UNEMPLOYMENT: from Bureau of Labor Statistics (data.bls.gov/pdq/survey); OubaiSevier; UN Security Council Resolution records.un.org/SecurityCouncil/resolutions/ .
Uganda	Aug-84	1986	1986	0	Reagan	1	1	0	P, 0, A, 15	71	1	47	9 (MAR 82)	4	115.88	0	0	Date is March 1982 since Baker says that the CIA was aware of Idi Amin's plans to overthrow the govt. and that the CIA provided military training support to the Obote govt. http://ica.edi/collections/ob-amin-1982-1985-1986-1987 (see also www.uganda.gov.ug)	DR TE: USAID report to Embassy on "The Anguish of Ugandan Refugees" (see also www.uganda.gov.ug) and www.uganda.gov.ug for additional info. PM: CCMS.pdf (05/17/82) 250,000 estimated casualties in Region (Second Uganda War in Info-State War Database COW). REGIME: Support would have been to President Obote since British Commonwealth partners were supporting the regime, despite being responsible for much of the violence. ENEMY: Difuse. US role would have been in support of Uganda ENEMY and countering attacks by the National Resistance Army which was a guerilla army. (see www.uganda.gov.ug) Ethnic Power Relations Dataset. ACCESS: For and Report data from 1984 Facebook; POPULATION: Population density from World Development Indicators http://data.worldbank.org/ ; APPROVAL: State President's Approval http://www.uganda.gov.ug (1982/2008); UNEMPLOYMENT: from Bureau of Labor Statistics (data.bls.gov/pdq/survey); OubaiSevier; UN Security Council Resolution records.un.org/SecurityCouncil/resolutions/ .

Description	Date Begin	End	US Intervene	President	CONFLICT (+not Ethnic)	REGIME (1= supportable regime)	ENEMY (+hierarchy)	ACCESS P: Major Sea Ports A: Airports > 5000 ft. 152.4 m	POPULATION Density (ppi per sq/km)	PARTY (1: Partial or full control; 0: No Control)	APPROVAL (% Pres. Approval)	UNEMPLOY	MAG	TRADE	ALLY	UN	General Notes	Source Notes
Parana	Dec-89	1990	1	G.H.W. Bush	1	1	1	P. 3, A. 18	32.8	0	70	54 (DEC 89)	1	694.63	1	0	Coordinates. Last Cause to capture Al Qaeda. Nonch.	REGIME: Yes, President Endo; OPINION: http://www.enr.com/resources/14/Parana.html ; Opinion of: ENEMY: Hierarchical. See Cole (1993, JI). TYPE: Ethnic Power/transition. Database: POSES: Pot and Airport data from 1989 Facebook. Development: Population density from World Development Indicators. UNEMPLOYMENT: from Bureau of Labor Statistics. UN: UN Security Council Resolution records. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1990/19900120.unsecresol.html .
Iraq	Jan-91	1991	1	G.H.W. Bush	1	1	1	P. 7, A. 76	41.2	0	63	6.4 (JAN 91)	5	1873.83	0	1	Trade value is for Kuwait who was included by Iraq.	REGIME: Yes - Kuwaiti Regime. OPINION: http://www.enr.com/resources/14/Iraq.html ; Opinion of: ENEMY: Hierarchical. See Fekete and Johnson II (1991). ACCESS: Pot and Airport data from 1991 Facebook. (Also pots are from Saudi Arabia based on actual usage). POPULATION: Population density from World Development Indicators. http://databank.worldbank.org/ . TYPE: Not included in the EPR database. Conflict does not have ethnic issues because war aims were expulsion from Kuwait only. UNEMPLOYMENT: from Bureau of Labor Statistics. http://data.bls.gov/pds/survey/OutputEmp.html ; UNSECRES: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1990/19900120.unsecresol.html .
Cocoda	Dec-91	1995	0	G.H.W. Bush	0	1	0	P. 3, 12	80.7	0	59	7.3 (DEC 91)	3	0	0	0	0	When the US did not promote, Cocoda would be regional. US Secretary Baker made a clear statement. Pump Baghdad but US did not support. UNSECRES: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1991/19910120.unsecresol.html . See Johnson II (1991). TYPE: Ethnic Power/transition. Database: POSES: Pot and Airport data from 1991 Facebook. (Also pots are from Saudi Arabia based on actual usage). POPULATION: Population density from World Development Indicators. http://databank.worldbank.org/ . TYPE: Not included in the EPR database. Conflict does not have ethnic issues because war aims were expulsion from Kuwait only. UNEMPLOYMENT: from Bureau of Labor Statistics. http://data.bls.gov/pds/survey/OutputEmp.html ; UNSECRES: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1991/19910120.unsecresol.html .
Somalia	Dec-92	201+	1	G.H.W. Bush	1	0	0	P. 4, A. 32	10	0	43	7.4 (DEC 92)	5	25.49	0	1	REGIME: no based on discussion of multiple warring factions (see Western (2005)). ENEMY: Diffuse. See discussion on Somalia in Sundberg et al. (2012, 367-388) and Western (2005, 118). TYPE: Ethnic Power/transition. Database: ACCESS: Pot and Airport data from 1995 Facebook. Find detailed data. POPULATION: Population density from World Development Indicators. http://databank.worldbank.org/ . APPROVAL: taken from Gallup NOV 2022. 1992 pro-B decisions to send troops on DEC 4 1992. OPINION: http://www.enr.com/resources/14/Somalia.html ; Opinion of: ENEMY: Hierarchical. See Fekete and Johnson II (1991). TYPE: Ethnic Power/transition. Database: POSES: Pot and Airport data from 1995 Facebook. (Also pots are from Saudi Arabia based on actual usage). POPULATION: Population density from World Development Indicators. http://databank.worldbank.org/ . TYPE: Not included in the EPR database. Conflict does not have ethnic issues because war aims were expulsion from Kuwait only. UNEMPLOYMENT: from Bureau of Labor Statistics. http://data.bls.gov/pds/survey/OutputEmp.html ; UNSECRES: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1992/19920120.unsecresol.html .	

Description	Date	Begin	End	US Intervene	President	CONFLICT (1=not Ethnic)	REGIME (1=supportable regime)	EENEMY (1=Hierarchy)	ACCESS P. Major Sea ports A. Airports > 5000 ft. 1524 m	POPULATION Density (pop per sq/km)	PARTY (1: Partial control; 0: No Control)	APPROVAL (% Pres. Approval)	UNEMPLOY	MAG	TRADE	ALLY	UN	General Notes	Source Notes
Rwanda	Apr-94	1994	*	0	Cirion	0	0	0	P. 0, A. 3	232.2	1	51	7	38.88	0	0	0	Rwandan genocide	REGIME UN: provider no favorable states to either side, including refusal to admit people from the Hutu. ENEMY: Diffuse. No peace plan to enforce and no declared enemy - neutral position would have created vulnerabilities to all bidders; TYPE: Ethnic Power Relations Dataset; ACCESS: For and Airport data from 1992 Facebook to get detailed information; POPULATION: Population density from World Development Indicators (http://databank.worldbank.org/); CFNON: (http://www.cfr.org/pressroom/pressroom.cfm?id=1067); UNEMPLOYMENT: from Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://data.bls.gov/pds/survey/outbreaks/1992); Outbreaks: UNSCR 912, does not call for ENEMY action (http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1992/9206.html).
Haiti	Jul-94	1994		1	Cirion	1	1	1	P. 2, A. 4	279.1	1	44	1	405.23	1	1	1	Operation Uphold Democracy	REGIME US: restored democratic rule of Aristide. ENEMY: Hierarchical. See discussion in France et al (1994). TYPE: Ethnic Power Relations Dataset; ACCESS: For and Airport data from 1995 Facebook to get detailed data; POPULATION: Population density from World Development Indicators (http://databank.worldbank.org/); UNEMPLOYMENT: from Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://data.bls.gov/pds/survey/outbreaks/1995); Outbreaks: UNSCR 940 (http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1995/9507.html).
Libya	Nov-95	1997		0	Cirion	0	0	0	P. 4, A. 5	21.6	0	49	4	101.54	1	0	0	See US discussion in Human Rights Watch website: http://www.hrw.org/press/1993/03/bahrain17	REGIME US: restored democratic rule of Arafat. ENEMY: Hierarchical. See discussion in France et al (1994). TYPE: Ethnic Power Relations Dataset; ACCESS: For and Airport data from 1995 Facebook to get detailed data; POPULATION: Population density from World Development Indicators (http://databank.worldbank.org/); UNEMPLOYMENT: from Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://data.bls.gov/pds/survey/outbreaks/1995); Outbreaks: UNSCR 940 (http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1995/9507.html).
Somalia	Dec-95	1995		1	Cirion	0	1	1	P. 0, A. 9	69	0	53	6	34.73	1	1	1	Operation Deliverance Force followed by Joint Endeavor (1995) - NATO Actions support of Dayton Peace Accords (see http://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/boaco)	REGIME US: restored democratic rule of Arafat. ENEMY: Hierarchical. See discussion in France et al (1994). TYPE: Ethnic Power Relations Dataset; ACCESS: For and Airport data from 1995 Facebook to get detailed data; POPULATION: Population density from World Development Indicators (http://databank.worldbank.org/); UNEMPLOYMENT: from Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://data.bls.gov/pds/survey/outbreaks/1995); Outbreaks: UNSCR 1031 (http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1995/9512.html).

Description	Date	Begin	End	US Intervene	President	CONFLICT (1=not Ethnic)	REGIME (1=supportable regime)	ENEMY (1=Hierarchy)	ACCESS P: Major Sea Ports A: Airports > 5,000 ft. 1524 m	POPULATION Density (ppl per sq/km)	PARTY (1: Partial or full control; 0: No Control)	APPROVAL (% Pres. Approval)	UNEMPLOY	MAG	TRADE	ALLY	UN	General Notes	Source Notes
Burundi	Aug-96	1993	2005	0	Cirion	0	0	0	P: 0, A: 3	245.1	0	57	51 (AUG 96)	4	5.9	0	0	1996 Congressional discussion in Conflict Research folder, discussion at http://forlongburund_and_the_21st_cslp_journal_2003	Access: No report on regime changing and no report on regime. ENEMY: Difuse. No report on surface and no declared enemy - neutral position would have created vulnerabilities to all factions. TYPE: Ethnic Power Relations Dataset. ACCESS: Port and Airport data from 1996 Facebook. POPULATION: Population density from World Development Indicators (http://databank.worldbank.org/). UNEMPLOYMENT: from Bureau of Labor Statistics (stats.bls.gov/pdq/SurveyOutputServlet). UNSCR 1072 in AUG 1996 5985 not call for ENEMY action
Kosovo	Apr-99	1998	1999	1	Cirion	0	1	1	P: 9, A: 25	161.6	0	64	43 (APR 99)	4	68.47	1	1	UNSCR 1244, TYPE: Ethnic Power Relations Dataset. ACCESS: Port and Airport data from 1998 ITSD and UN Development Indicators. POPULATION: Population density from World Development Indicators (http://databank.worldbank.org/). OPINION: Gallup poll Latest: April 25-27, 1998 N=1 073 adults nationwide. (Find data from Gallup CONUSA Today Poll). ALLIANCE: 1999 Alliance under NATO (KFOR). 1244 (KFOR) (http://www.pollingreport.com/s465094.htm). UNSCR 1244 (KFOR) (http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/9904/990401.htm). UNEMPLOYMENT: from Bureau of Labor Statistics (stats.bls.gov/pdq/SurveyOutputServlet). UNSCR 1244 directed creation of UN Protectorate in Kosovo and gave authorization "to enforce a ceasefire", "to decide on the responsibilities of the international security presence to be deployed and acting in accordance with the mandate of the Security Council, and where necessary enforcing a ceasefire, and ensuring withdrawal and preventing rearmament of the UN-authorized force". REGIME: Multiple factions and co-located involved in conflict. ENEMY: Difuse. World has been a neutral intervention in support of Lusha's ceasefire agreement, no declared enemy but responsible for supporting and demobilizing armed groups from Angola, DRC, Namibia, Uganda, Rwanda and Zimbabwe (see http://peacekeeper.un.org/doc/lusha-agreement05). TYPE: Ethnic Power Relations Dataset. ACCESS: Port and Airport data from 2000 Facebook. (only 1 sea port, remainder are rivers). POPULATION: Population density from World Development Indicators (http://databank.worldbank.org/). UNEMPLOYMENT: from Bureau of Labor Statistics (stats.bls.gov/pdq/SurveyOutputServlet). UNSCR 1244 authorized United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) mission, a peacekeeping force, to be deployed under Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. The date that MONUC may take the necessary action, in the event of deployment of its priority battalions and as it deems it within its capabilities, to protect United Nations and co-located JMIC personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, and protect	
Dem. Rep. of Congo (Zaire)	Feb-00	1996	2013+	0	Cirion	0	0	0	P: 1, A: 42	20.7	0	64	4.1 (FEB 00)	5	405.64	0	0	Fist and Second Congo Wars	Access: No report on regime changing and no report on regime. ENEMY: Difuse. No report on surface and no declared enemy - neutral position would have created vulnerabilities to all factions. TYPE: Ethnic Power Relations Dataset. ACCESS: Port and Airport data from 1998 ITSD and UN Development Indicators. POPULATION: Population density from World Development Indicators (http://databank.worldbank.org/). UNEMPLOYMENT: from Bureau of Labor Statistics (stats.bls.gov/pdq/SurveyOutputServlet). UNSCR 1244 authorized United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) mission, a peacekeeping force, to be deployed under Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. The date that MONUC may take the necessary action, in the event of deployment of its priority battalions and as it deems it within its capabilities, to protect United Nations and co-located JMIC personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, and protect

APPENDIX B: CONDITIONS ANALYSIS MATRIX

	Conditions	Concept	Indicators	Coding Criteria	Data Sources
Feasibility Factors	REGIME	Does the U.S. have a clear regime to support or install within the target state?	Reports of a specific leader or party that the U.S. was aligned with or behind (reinforce or replace).	Coded "1" if there is a clear leader/regime that the US is likely to support in the intervention, and "0" otherwise. UN authorized multinational peacekeeping forces are considered "regimes" in this analysis if a peace/ceasefire had already been negotiated.	Various scholarly and journalistic articles. See notes in Raw Data Matrix.
	ENEMY	Ascertain the organizational structure of the enemy/adversary which determines, in large part, the counter-approach necessary to defeat them.	Does the enemy present a hierarchical organization that is vulnerable to defeat through strike that may shorten the conflict? Or, is there no likely enemy to contend with since the mission is expected to be administrative in accordance with a peace agreement? Or, is the adversary organized as a diffuse network that is difficult to identify and engage?	There are three classifications, two of which are coded "1": Hierarchical and No Adversary. No adversary is used when combat is possible but not expected, providing a presence and administrative function as a neutral party in support of a peace agreement. Diffuse is coded "0" if the structure's warrants and if no peace agreement is in place, making the assumption that the US would have to impose peace on one or more parties to quell the violence.	Various government, scholarly, and journalistic articles. See notes in Raw Data Matrix.
	CONFLICT	Identify the existence of violent cleavages based on ethnic structures. These types of contented environments based on rooted identities can be robust predictors for civil wars (Wimmer et al. 2009). During and following an intervention these cleavages can be mobilized to foment instability.	Are ethnic identities used to motivate the conflict?	Use Ethnic Power Relations Dataset and code "0" if the case is coded as a type of ethnic conflict and "1" otherwise. The presence of the "ethnic conflict" condition is hypothesized to reduce the likelihood of intervention – therefore coded "0". For conflicts not listed (e.g. post 2010), use definition of Ethnic conflict as provided in the online appendix p. 5: Ethnic/nonethnic conflicts are distinguished by the aims of the armed organizations and their recruitment and alliance structures, in line with other ongoing coding projects (Sambanis 2009). Their definition is: "Ethnic wars typically involve conflicts over ethnonational self-determination, the ethnic balance of power in government, ethno-regional autonomy, ethnic and racial discrimination (whether alleged or real), and language and other cultural rights." We define all other war aims as nonethnic" (Appendix, p. 5).	Ethnic Power Relations Dataset in: Andrew Wimmer, Lars-Erik Cederman and Brian Min. "Ethnic politics and armed conflict. A configurational analysis of a new global dataset", in American Sociological Review 74(2):316-337, 2009
	ACCESS	Identify challenges for force deployment.	Are there adequate sea ports and airfields to facilitate throughput of units and materiel? How many airfields are capable of landing C-5 transport aircraft with full payload (min runway of 5000 ft/ 1524 m with hard surface) (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/gso/152088.pdf) How many major ports are available?	Seaports are weighted twice as much as the airports based on the ability to deliver greater quantities of troops, equipment, and materiel. These numbers were then combined to arrive at a composite access point score for each crisis. To account for varying sizes of target states, the area of the state is then divided by this access score to get an accessibility ratio. This ratio is coded as "1" if less than a 3000 access ratio and "0" if greater than 3000 based on a natural break in the data and knowledge of the cases. The break point is between Syria with 28 points of access (accessible) and Liberia with 13 and only 5 airports (non-accessible).	The World Factbook (using closest year available to the intervention opportunity unless another year is specified with the purpose in the raw data matrix. (see http://www.geographic.org/wrby)
	POPULATION	Is the conflict likely to be fought among the people? Urban combat requires the greatest amount of discrimination of violence due to the potential for collateral damage. This may be seen as the most restrictive terms for a political application of force (Smith 2007, 408-415).	What is the population density of the country, or in specific cases, a particular region in question?	Less than 200 people per square km is coded as unrestricted terrain - "1", whereas greater than 200 is considered restricted - "0". This is based on a natural break in the data and an average population density of 107 for the sample of intervention opportunities.	World Development Indicators (http://databank.worldbank.org/)
Internal Determinants	UNEMPLOY	What is the unemployment rate prior to the decision. Literature suggests that presidents may choose to intervene when unemployment levels are high (Ferdinand 1998).	The monthly unemployment percentage taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.	The average annual unemployment rate for the time period inclusive of these cases is 6.4 percent (1981 - 2013). Cases are coded "0" if < 6.4% and "1" if >= 6.4%. (Discretionary Theory approach)	Bureau of Labor Statistics (data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000)
	APPROVAL	Does the president have a high or low approval rating. Some literature might expect that the president would choose to intervene if he was experiencing high degrees of popular support (James and Osoff 1991). Others, using diversionary theory, expect to see presidential decisions to intervene at periods of low approval (Morgan and Bickers 1992).	Presidential approval rating from the Gallup Presidential Job Approval Center, taken from the month prior to the intervention opportunity.	Based on the two different views on the role of presidential approval, cases are coded "1" if 55% or above and when less than 45%. I code the data "0" if between 46-54%, when the president is in a more ambiguous position of support.	Gallup Presidential Job Approval Center (http://www.gallup.com/poll/124922/Presidential-Job-Approval-Center.aspx)
	PARTY	Does the president's party control one or both houses of Congress, thereby lessening the amount of political opposition?	Congressional composition record.	Cases are fuzzy coded "1" if the president's party is in control of both houses; ".5" if in control of one house of Congress; "0" if opposing party controls both houses. For Crisp Set coding, cases are coded "1" if the president's party is in control of at least one house of Congress and "0" if not.	L. David Roper, Composition of Congress Since 1867 at http://arts.bev.net/operdavid/politics/congress.htm .
External Determinants	MAGNITUDE (MAG)	Identify the magnitude of the warfare and its impact on the societal systems. The higher the level of magnitude, the higher the expectation that the US will intervene.	This assessment includes the duration of the conflict, population displacements and their degree, and the level of destruction and how much it is localized.	Cases are coded "1" if the conflicts are categorized as at least "substantial and prolonged warfare" which includes deaths ranging from 100,000-500,000 with population displacements exceeding 1 million. They are coded "0" if less than this which includes "serious warfare" and all remaining forms of "political violence."	Center for Systemic Peace, Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946-2013 "The number listed represents a scaled indicator of the destructive impact, or magnitude, of the violent episode on the directly-affected society or societies on a scale of 1 (smallest) to 10 (greatest). Magnitude scores reflect multiple factors including state capabilities, interactive intensity (means and goals), area and scope of death and destruction, population displacement, and episode duration. Scores are considered to be consistently assigned (i.e., comparable) across episode types and for all states directly involved. See the more detailed explanation below" (Codebook: MEPV2013, p. 7). see Center for Systemic Peace (http://www.systemicpeace.org/warcode.htm).
	TRADE	What is the U.S. trade interest with the potential intervention state?	The summation of the inflows and outflows of trade between the U.S. and the state in question.	The average sum of inflows and outflows from the US to all countries over the period of the study is 209 million dollars. Based on this, conditions are coded "1" for the state if their trade level is above this threshold and "0" if below.	COW dyadic trade 3.0 dataset
	ALLY	Are there alliances of any kind between the U.S. and the state in question, or with other states that are involved in the conflict/intervention?	Existence of alliances (e.g. defense, nonaggression, entente)	Cases are coded "1" if there are alliances with the state in question or other intervening states, and "0" if no alliances influence the potential intervention.	COW Alliance Data 4.0
	UN	Was the potential intervention opportunity supported by a UN mandate?	UN resolution authorizing the intervention. Must specifically call for military employment as an intervening force doing more than self-defense and monitoring.	Cases are coded "1" if mandated by the UN and "0" otherwise.	UN Security Council Resolution Search Engine at http://unscr.com/

APPENDIX C: DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF QCA ANALYSIS

The csQCA process begins with identifying the necessary conditions for intervention. If a condition scores a high consistency rate here (greater than .95 for “quasi-necessity”) it can be dropped from the analysis since it is too common to be of substantive interest (Bara 2014, 6). The analysis identified STRUCTURE, the hierarchical organization of the adversary, as a necessary condition for intervention, but not its absence for noninterventions. Therefore, I drop it from the analysis for interventions, but retain it for noninterventions. This does not mean that the structure of the enemy is unimportant to consider as a feasibility factor. To the contrary, it provides substantive support for its consideration is perhaps the most important data point when analyzing these intervention opportunities since it has such a high degree of consistency with actual uses of force. Further discussion of this is in the main body of the chapter.

The left screenshot shows the 'Analysis of Necessary Conditions' for the outcome variable 'intervene'. The table below is a transcription of the data shown in the screenshot.

Conditions tested:	Consistency	Coverage
leader	0.875000	0.875000
structure	1.000000	0.800000
social	0.500000	0.800000
access	0.875000	0.777778
rural	0.750000	0.600000
party	0.375000	0.375000
approval	0.875000	0.700000
unemploy	0.250000	0.400000
mag	0.625000	0.625000
trade	0.625000	0.714286
ally	0.500000	0.800000
un	0.750000	0.857143

The right screenshot shows the 'Analysis of Necessary Conditions' for the outcome variable '~intervene'. The table below is a transcription of the data shown in the screenshot.

Conditions tested:	Consistency	Coverage
~leader	0.833333	0.833333
~structure	0.666667	1.000000
~social	0.833333	0.555556
~access	0.666667	0.800000
~rural	0.333333	0.500000
~party	0.166667	0.166667
~approval	0.500000	0.750000
~unemploy	0.500000	0.333333
~mag	0.500000	0.500000
~trade	0.666667	0.571429
~ally	0.833333	0.555556
~un	0.833333	0.714286

From here, we turn attention to combinations of conditions that are sufficient for intervention decisions. The first step is creating a spreadsheet for the analysis using a truth table algorithm. The software generates all logical combinations of the conditions and displays each of them in their own row with the number of cases exhibiting that specific combination (Ragin and Davey, 2014). In addition, it also identifies the proportion of the cases in that row that are part of the set displaying the outcome in question - intervention. From this spreadsheet, the analyst must select those cases that are relevant for further analysis. Since I have a small sample, I set the threshold for selection to one case exhibiting that combination and a consistency score of greater than .75 (Ragin 2008, 46).

File Edit Sort Edit Truth Table

leader	social	access	rural	party	approval	unemploy	mag	trade	ally	un	number	intervene	raw consist.	PRI consist.	SYM consist.
1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1 (7%)		1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1 (14%)		1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1 (21%)		1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1 (28%)		0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1 (35%)		1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1 (42%)		1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1 (50%)		1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1 (57%)		1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1 (64%)		1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1 (71%)		0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1 (78%)		0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1 (85%)		0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1 (92%)		0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1 (100%)		0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0 (100%)				
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0 (100%)				
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0 (100%)				
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0 (100%)				
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0 (100%)				
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0 (100%)				
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0 (100%)				
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0 (100%)				
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0 (100%)				
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0 (100%)				
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0 (100%)				
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0 (100%)				
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0 (100%)				
1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0 (100%)				
1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0 (100%)				
1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0 (100%)				
1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0 (100%)				
1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0 (100%)				
1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0 (100%)				
1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0 (100%)				
1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0 (100%)				
1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0 (100%)				
1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0 (100%)				
1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0 (100%)				
1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0 (100%)				
1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0 (100%)				

Specify Analysis Cancel Standard Analyses

File Edit Sort Edit Truth Table

leader	social	access	rural	party	approval	unemploy	mag	trade	ally	un	number	intervene	raw consist.	PRI consist.	SYM consist.
1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000

Next, I ran the standard analyses. This yielded the following complex and parsimonious solutions.
 Complex solution:

```

fs/QCA
File Analyze Graphs Window
*****
TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
*****
file: C:/Users/Matthew/Desktop/Matt's Files/PhD Program UNL/Dissertation/Data Set Sources/QCA Data Files/QCA Data_23 JAN 16_CSV_crispset_corrected for Somalia.csv
model: intervene = f(leader, social, access, rural, party, approval, unemploy, mag, trade, ally, un)

Rows:      14

Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
          True: 1

-- COMPLEX SOLUTION --
frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 1.000000

          raw      unique
          coverage coverage consistency
-----
leader*social*~access*rural*~party*approval*unemploy*mag*~trade*~ally*un  0.125000  0.125000  1.000000
leader*~social*access*rural*~party*approval*~unemploy*~mag*~trade*ally*un  0.125000  0.125000  1.000000
leader*~social*access*rural*~party*~approval*~unemploy*mag*~trade*ally*un  0.125000  0.125000  1.000000
leader*~social*access*rural*party*approval*~unemploy*mag*trade*~ally*~un  0.125000  0.125000  1.000000
leader*social*access*rural*~party*approval*~unemploy*~mag*trade*ally*~un  0.125000  0.125000  1.000000
leader*social*access*rural*party*approval*~unemploy*mag*trade*~ally*un  0.125000  0.125000  1.000000
leader*~social*access*~rural*party*approval*unemploy*mag*trade*~ally*un  0.125000  0.125000  1.000000
leader*social*access*~rural*party*approval*~unemploy*~mag*trade*ally*un  0.125000  0.125000  1.000000
solution coverage: 1.000000
solution consistency: 1.000000

cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~leader*social*~access*rural*~party*approval*unemploy*mag*~trade*~ally*un: SCM (1,1)
cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term leader*~social*access*rural*~party*approval*~unemploy*~mag*~trade*ally*un: KDS (1,1)
cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term leader*~social*access*rural*~party*~approval*~unemploy*mag*~trade*ally*un: BOS (1,1)
cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term leader*social*access*rural*party*approval*~unemploy*mag*trade*~ally*~un: IR2 (1,1)
cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term leader*social*access*rural*~party*approval*~unemploy*mag*trade*ally*~un: PAN (1,1)
cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term leader*social*access*rural*party*approval*~unemploy*mag*trade*~ally*un: IR1 (1,1)
cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term leader*~social*access*~rural*party*approval*unemploy*mag*trade*~ally*un: LEB (1,1)
cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term leader*social*access*~rural*party*approval*~unemploy*~mag*trade*ally*un: HAI (1,1)

```

Parsimonious solution:

```

74 fs/QCA
File Analyze Graphs Window
*****
TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
*****
File: C:/Users/Matthew/Desktop/Matt's Files/PhD Program UNL/Dissertation/Data Set Sources/QCA Data Files/QCA Data_23 JAN 16_CSV_crispset_corrected for Somalia.csv
Model: intervene = f(leader, social, access, rural, party, approval, unemploy, mag, trade, ally, un)

Rows:      14

Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
          True: 1-L

--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ---
frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 1.000000

          raw      unique
          coverage coverage consistency
-----
leader*access  0.875000  0.125000  1.000000
rural*~party  0.625000  0.000000  1.000000
social*approval  0.500000  0.000000  1.000000
unemploy*un  0.250000  0.000000  1.000000
solution coverage: 1.000000
solution consistency: 1.000000

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term leader*access: LEB (1,1),
PAN (1,1), IR1 (1,1), HAI (1,1),
BOS (1,1), KDS (1,1), IR2 (1,1)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term rural*~party: PAN (1,1),
IR1 (1,1), SCM (1,1), BOS (1,1),
KDS (1,1)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term social*approval: PAN (1,1),
IR1 (1,1), SCM (1,1), HAI (1,1)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term unemploy*un: LEB (1,1),
SCM (1,1)

```

The analysis of these outputs is in the main body of the chapter. Of note, using the intermediate solution, I identified the UN condition as problematic based on its ubiquity

across the solution set. The concern is that a security council approval for action already accounts for the issues of feasibility addressed here. Therefore, I omit it from the further analyses.

In an effort to arrive at pathways that are more meaningful to understanding the intervention/nonintervention decisions, I test each for combinations of conditions that exhibit higher consistencies and coverages when combined. The goal is to drop conditions from the analysis that apparently lack explanatory power, while identifying conditions that have synergistic effects with one another. The selection criteria I used were a consistency $> .75$ and coverage $> .70$ (select simplest form to achieve that among and between types of determinants)



Analysis of Necessary Conditions

Outcome variable: intervene

Conditions tested:

	Consistency	Coverage
leader+social	1.000000	0.888889
leader+access	0.875000	0.700000
leader+rural	1.000000	0.666667
social+access	1.000000	0.727273
social+rural	0.875000	0.636364
access+rural	1.000000	0.666667
party+approval	0.875000	0.538462
party+unemploy	0.500000	0.444444
approval+unemploy	0.875000	0.583333
mag+trade	0.875000	0.636364
mag+ally	1.000000	0.666667
mag+un	0.875000	0.700000
trade+ally	0.875000	0.777778
trade+un	1.000000	0.727273
ally+un	0.875000	0.777778
leader+party	0.875000	0.583333
leader+approval	1.000000	0.666667
leader+unemploy	1.000000	0.727273
leader+mag	1.000000	0.666667
leader+trade	0.875000	0.700000
leader+ally	0.875000	0.777778
leader+un	1.000000	0.800000
social+party	0.750000	0.545455
social+approval	0.875000	0.636364
social+unemploy	0.625000	0.625000
social+mag	0.875000	0.636364
social+trade	0.750000	0.666667
social+ally	0.750000	0.750000
social+un	0.875000	0.777778
access+party	0.875000	0.583333
access+approval	1.000000	0.666667
access+unemploy	1.000000	0.727273
access+mag	1.000000	0.666667
access+trade	0.875000	0.777778
access+ally	0.875000	0.777778
access+un	1.000000	0.727273
rural+party	1.000000	0.615385
rural+approval	1.000000	0.615385
rural+unemploy	0.875000	0.636364
rural+mag	0.875000	0.583333
rural+trade	1.000000	0.666667
rural+ally	0.875000	0.636364
rural+un	1.000000	0.666667

.....
 Dropping structure and the UN condition, the new analysis of necessary conditions identified seven conditions to retain for the analysis: ally, trade, mag, unemploy, access, social, leader. The truth table reduces thus:

Edit Truth Table											
leader	social	access	unemploy	mag	trade	ally	number	intervene	raw consist.	PRI consist.	SYM consist
1	1	1	0	0	1	1	2	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000

This produced the following analyses.

Parsimonious solution:

76															
File	Analyze	Graphs	Window												
<p>Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey True: 1-L</p> <p>--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION --- frequency cutoff: 1.000000 consistency cutoff: 1.000000</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>raw coverage</th> <th>unique coverage</th> <th>consistency</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>leader*access</td> <td>0.875000</td> <td>0.750000</td> <td>1.000000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>social*mag</td> <td>0.250000</td> <td>0.125000</td> <td>1.000000</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>solution coverage: 1.000000 solution consistency: 1.000000</p> <p>Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term leader*access: LEB (1,1), PAN (1,1), IR1 (1,1), HAI (1,1), BOS (1,1), KDS (1,1), IR2 (1,1) Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term social*mag: IR1 (1,1), SOM (1,1)</p>					raw coverage	unique coverage	consistency	leader*access	0.875000	0.750000	1.000000	social*mag	0.250000	0.125000	1.000000
	raw coverage	unique coverage	consistency												
leader*access	0.875000	0.750000	1.000000												
social*mag	0.250000	0.125000	1.000000												

Intermediate Solution:

```

Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
  True: 1
  0 Matrix: 0L
Don't Care: -

```

```

--- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION ---
frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 1.000000
Assumptions:
ally (present)
trade (present)
mag (present)
unemploy (present)
access (present)
social (present)
leader (present)

```

	raw coverage	unique coverage	consistency
	-----	-----	-----
mag*unemploy*social	0.125000	0.125000	1.000000
ally*access*leader	0.500000	0.500000	1.000000
trade*mag*access*leader	0.375000	0.375000	1.000000
solution coverage:	1.000000		
solution consistency:	1.000000		

```

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term mag*unemploy*social: SOM (1,1)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ally*access*leader: PAN (1,1),
  HAI (1,1), BOS (1,1), KDS (1,1)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term trade*mag*access*leader: LEB (1,1),
  IR1 (1,1), IR2 (1,1)

```

I then did the same process for the nonintervention set. The analysis of necessary conditions did not result in any to eliminate from further analysis, although I did choose to omit the UN based on the concern of multicollinearity. Using all of the conditions proved futile in identifying lucrative and parsimonious pathways to nonintervention. The analysis produces complex and unique combinations that provided little commonality. Therefore, I again need to drop conditions for further analysis in order to identify combinations of conditions that can explain more than single instances. To do this, I again run a necessity test on combinations of conditions to find those most likely to yield explanatory power.

76		
File Analyze Graphs Window		
Conditions tested:		
	Consistency	Coverage
~leader+~structure	1.000000	0.857143
~leader+~social	0.833333	0.500000
~leader+~access	1.000000	0.857143
~leader+~rural	0.833333	0.625000
~party+~approval	0.666667	0.444444
~party+~unemploy	0.500000	0.300000
~approval+~unemploy	0.833333	0.454545
~mag+~trade	0.833333	0.500000
~trade+~ally	0.833333	0.454545
~mag+~ally	1.000000	0.461538
~mag+~un	0.833333	0.555556
~trade+~un	1.000000	0.545455
~ally+~un	1.000000	0.545455
~leader+~party	0.833333	0.500000
~leader+~approval	1.000000	0.750000
~leader+~unemploy	0.833333	0.416667
~structure+~party	0.666667	0.444444
~structure+~approval	0.833333	0.833333
~structure+~unemploy	0.666667	0.400000
~social+~party	0.833333	0.416667
~social+~approval	1.000000	0.600000
~social+~unemploy	0.833333	0.416667
~social+~mag	1.000000	0.500000
~social+~trade	1.000000	0.545455
~social+~ally	1.000000	0.500000
~social+~un	1.000000	0.545455
~access+~party	0.666667	0.444444
~access+~approval	0.833333	0.714286
~access+~unemploy	0.666667	0.363636
~access+~unemploy	0.666667	0.363636
~access+~mag	0.833333	0.555556
~access+~trade	0.666667	0.571429
~access+~ally	0.833333	0.555556
~access+~un	1.000000	0.666667
~rural+~party	0.333333	0.222222
~rural+~approval	0.666667	0.571429
~rural+~unemploy	0.500000	0.300000
~rural+~mag	0.666667	0.500000
~rural+~trade	0.666667	0.444444
~rural+~ally	0.833333	0.500000
~rural+~un	0.833333	0.555556
~party+~approval	0.666667	0.444444
~party+~unemploy	0.500000	0.300000
~party+~mag	0.500000	0.333333
~party+~trade	0.666667	0.444444
~party+~ally	0.833333	0.416667
~party+~un	0.833333	0.454545
~approval+~unemploy	0.833333	0.454545
~approval+~mag	0.666667	0.500000
~approval+~trade	0.833333	0.625000
~approval+~ally	1.000000	0.545455
~approval+~un	0.833333	0.625000
~unemploy+~mag	0.833333	0.454545
~unemploy+~trade	0.666667	0.363636
~unemploy+~ally	0.833333	0.384615
~unemploy+~un	1.000000	0.500000

This process yielded a new model for nonintervention that included the following conditions based on a .75 consistency threshold and a .70 coverage: ~leader, ~structure, ~social, ~access, ~approval, ~trade (~ denotes the absence of the condition). This produced the following truth table:

leader	structure	social	access	approval	trade	number	~intervene	raw consist.	PRI consist.	SYM consist
1	1	1	1	1	1	3	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
1	1	0	1	1	1	2	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
0	0	0	0	1	0	2	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000

This produced the following parsimonious solution:

```

7%
File Analyze Graphs Window

Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
True: 1-L

--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ---
frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 1.000000

           raw      unique
           coverage coverage consistency
-----
~structure      0.666667  0.166667  1.000000
~leader*~social  0.833333  0.333333  1.000000
solution coverage: 1.000000
solution consistency: 1.000000

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~structure: UGA (1,1),
RWA (1,1), BUR (1,1), SUD (1,1)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~leader*~social: NIC (1,1),
RWA (1,1), BUR (1,1), SUD (1,1),
SYR (1,1)

```

This is the intermediate solution:

```
--- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION ---
```

```
frequency cutoff: 1.000000
```

```
consistency cutoff: 1.000000
```

```
Assumptions:
```

```
~trade (absent)
```

```
~approval (absent)
```

```
~access (absent)
```

```
~social (absent)
```

```
~structure (absent)
```

```
~leader (absent)
```

	raw coverage	unique coverage	consistency
	-----	-----	-----
~social*~leader	0.833333	0.666667	1.000000
~trade*~approval*~access*~structure	0.333333	0.166667	1.000000
solution coverage: 1.000000			
solution consistency: 1.000000			

```
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~social*~leader: NIC (1,1),
```

```
RWA (1,1), BUR (1,1), SUD (1,1),
```

```
SYR (1,1)
```

```
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~trade*~approval*~access*~structure: UGA (1,1),
```

```
RWA (1,1)
```

While I conducted other analyses using these conditions, these were the two sets that I used for the arguments put forward in the main body. This concludes the detailed analysis. The output files for these analyses are available upon request.

APPENDIX D: NSC/DC MEETINGS (AUG 1990-DEC 1992) – BUSH 41 LIBRARY

NSC/DC MEETINGS—GEORGE H.W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION (1989–1993)

Available?	Meeting #	Meeting Date	Brief Meeting Subject
Yes	NSC/DC 206	October 02, 1990	NSC/DC Meeting on Liberia via SVTS, Keywords: Liberia
Yes	NSC/DC 207	October 05, 1990	NSC/DC Meeting on Afghanistan, Keywords: Afghanistan
Yes	NSC/DC 208	October 05, 1990	NSC/DC Meeting on Pakistan via SVTS, Keywords: Pakistan
Yes	NSC/DC 209	October 09, 1990	NSC/DC Meeting on Philippine Policy, Keywords: Philippines
Yes	NSC/DC 210	October 09, 1990	NSC/DC Meeting on Computer Exports, Keywords: Export Controls
Yes	NSC/DC 211	October 09, 1990	NSC/DC Meeting on Iraq via SVTS, Keywords: Iraq
Yes	NSC/DC 211A	October 12, 1990	NSC/DC Meeting on Philippines, Keywords: Philippines
Yes	NSC/DC 212	October 12, 1990	NSC/DC Meeting on Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia
Yes	NSC/DC 213	October 18, 1990	NSC/DC Meeting on Public Diplomacy on Persian Gulf via SVTS, Keywords: Persian Gulf, Public Diplomacy
Yes	NSC/DC 214	October 19, 1990	NSC/DC Meeting on Israeli Machine Tools, Keywords: Israel Technology Transfers
Yes	NSC/DC 215	October 19, 1990	NSC/DC Meeting on Gulf Crisis via SVTS, Keywords: Iraq Kuwait Persian Gulf
Yes	NSC/DC 216	October 24, 1990	NSC/DC Meeting on Computers, Keywords: COCOM, Export Controls
Yes	NSC/DC 217	October 25, 1990	NSC/DC Meeting on Biological Weapons, Keywords: CBW
Yes	NSC/DC 218	November 07, 1990	NSC/DC Meeting on Computers, Keywords: CPU
Yes	NSC/DC 219	November 07, 1990	NSC/DC Meeting on Counternarcotics, Keywords: Counternarcotics, Latin America
Yes	NSC/DC 220	November 08, 1990	NSC/DC Meeting on Computers, Keywords: Computers, COCOM, Technology Transfers
Yes	NSC/DC 221	November 13, 1990	NSC/DC Meeting on Korea, Keywords: Korea, Korea South, Korea North, Nuclear Weapons
Yes	NSC/DC 222	November 13, 1990	NSC/DC Meeting on Computers, Keywords: Korea, Korea South, Korea North

NSC/DC MEETINGS—GEORGE H.W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION (1989–1993)

Available?	Meeting #	Meeting Date	Brief Meeting Subject
Yes	NSC/DC 222A	November 17, 1990	NSC/DC Meeting on Crisis Contingencies-Soviet Union, Keywords: USSR
Yes	NSC/DC 223	November 23, 1990	NSC/DC Meeting on Persian Gulf via SVTS, Keywords: Persian Gulf, Iraq, Kuwait
Yes	NSC/DC 224	November 30, 1990	NSC/DC Meeting on Intelligence Authorization Bill, Keywords: Intelligence, Authorization Congressional
Yes	NSC/DC 225	November 27, 1990	NSC/DC Meeting on Persian Gulf via SVTS, Keywords: Persian Gulf, Iraq, Kuwait
Yes	NSC/DC 226	November 29, 1990	NSC/DC Meeting on Shipboarding and Standoff Policy in Caribbean via SVTS, Keywords: Caribbean, Drugs
Yes	NSC/DC 227	December 07, 1990	NSC/DC Meeting on Intelligence Authorization Act, Keywords: Intelligence, Authorization Congressional
Yes	NSC/DC 228	December 10, 1990	NSC/DC Meeting on Persian Gulf via SVTS, Keywords: Iraq, Kuwait, Persian Gulf
Yes	NSC/DC 229	December 14, 1990	NSC/DC Meeting on Korea, Keywords: Korea
Yes	NSC/DC 230	December 14, 1990	[...], Keywords:
Yes	NSC/DC 231	December 18, 1990	NSC/DC Meeting on CFE and Soviet Data, Keywords: CFE, USSR
Yes	NSC/DC 232	December 18, 1990	NSC/DC Meeting on Persian Gulf via SVTS, Keywords: Persian Gulf, Iraq, Kuwait
Yes	NSC/DC 233	December 20, 1990	NSC/DC Meeting on Export Administration Act and CBW, Keywords: Export, Administration Act, CBW
Yes	NSC/DC 234	January 02, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Somalia via SVTS, Keywords: Somalia
Yes	NSC/DC 235	January 03, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Counterterrorism, Keywords: Counterterrorism
Yes	NSC/DC 236	January 08, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Strategic Nuclear Forces / SNF, Keywords: Arms Control, SNF
Yes	NSC/DC 237	January 08, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on War Risk Insurance, Keywords: Middle East
Yes	NSC/DC 238	January 08, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Counterterrorism, Keywords: Counterterrorism

NSC/DC MEETINGS—GEORGE H.W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION (1989–1993)

Available?	Meeting #	Meeting Date	Brief Meeting Subject
Yes	NSC/DC 239	January 09, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on War Risk Insurance, Keywords: Middle East
Yes	NSC/DC 239A	January 10, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Gulf Crisis via SVTS, Keywords: Iraq, Kuwait, Persian Gulf
Yes	NSC/DC 239B	January 11, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Baltics via SVTS, Keywords: Baltics
Yes	NSC/DC 240	January 13, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Counterterrorism, Keywords: Counterterrorism
Yes	NSC/DC 240A	January 13, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Persian Gulf via SVTS, Keywords: Persian Gulf
Yes	NSC/DC 241	January 13, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Baltic States via SVTS, Keywords: USSR
Yes	NSC/DC 242	January 14, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Baltic States via SVTS, Keywords: USSR
Yes	NSC/DC 243	January 14, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Counterterrorism, Keywords: Counterterrorism
Yes	NSC/DC 244	January 14, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on War Risk Insurance, Keywords: Middle East Terrorism
Yes	NSC/DC 245	January 16, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on CFE and Soviet Data, Keywords: CFE Arms Control
Yes	NSC/DC 246	January 17, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on SNF, Keywords: Arms Control, SNF
Yes	NSC/DC 247	January 17, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Gulf Crisis via SVTS, Keywords: Persian Gulf, Iraq, Kuwait
Yes	NSC/DC 248	January 22, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Gulf Crisis via SVTS, Keywords: Persian Gulf, Iraq, Kuwait
Yes	NSC/DC 248A	January 24, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Persian Gulf via SVTS, Keywords: Persian Gulf
Yes	NSC/DC 248B	January 24, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Persian Gulf via SVTS, Keywords: Turkey, Iraq, NATO
Yes	NSC/DC 249	January 25, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Counterterrorism, Keywords: Counterterrorism
Yes	NSC/DC 250	January 25, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Yugoslavia via SVTS, Keywords: Yugoslavia
Yes	NSC/DC 251	January 25, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Counterterrorism, Keywords: Counterterrorism
Yes	NSC/DC 252	January 29, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Gulf Crisis via SVTS, Keywords: Persian Gulf, Kuwait, Iraq

NSC/DC MEETINGS—GEORGE H.W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION (1989–1993)

Available?	Meeting #	Meeting Date	Brief Meeting Subject
Yes	NSC/DC 253	February 01, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Gulf Crisis via SVTS, Keywords: Persian Gulf, Kuwait, Iraq
Yes	NSC/DC 254	February 05, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Gulf Crisis via SVTS, Keywords: Persian Gulf Kuwait Iraq
Yes	NSC/DC 255	February 06, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on CFE Follow-Up, Keywords: CFE
Yes	NSC/DC 255A	February 07, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Persian Gulf via SVTS, Keywords: Persian Gulf
Yes	NSC/DC 255B	February 13, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Persian Gulf via SVTS, Keywords: Persian Gulf
Yes	NSC/DC 256	February 14, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Cambodia, Keywords: Cambodia
Yes	NSC/DC 257	February 14, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Computers / Export Control, Keywords: Computers, Export Controls
Yes	NSC/DC 258	February 19, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Export Control Issues, Keywords: Export Controls, Computers
Yes	NSC/DC 258A	February 19, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Persian Gulf via SVTS, Keywords: Persian Gulf
Yes	NSC/DC 259	March, 05, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Cambodia, Keywords: Cambodia
Yes	NSC/DC 260	March 05, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Afghanistan, Keywords: Afghanistan
Yes	NSC/DC 260A	March 05, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Persian Gulf via SVTS, Keywords: Persian Gulf
Yes	NSC/DC 261	March 22, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Iraq, Keywords: Iraq
Yes	NSC/DC 262	March 26, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Strategic Cooperation Program with France, Keywords: France
Yes	NSC/DC 263	March 28, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Counterterrorism, Keywords: Counterterrorism
Yes	NSC/DC 264	April 04, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Philippine-American Cooperation Treaty, Keywords: Philippines, Economic Assistance
Yes	NSC/DC 265	April 05, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Iraqi Refugees, Keywords: Iraq

NSC/DC MEETINGS—GEORGE H.W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION (1989–1993)

Available?	Meeting #	Meeting Date	Brief Meeting Subject
Yes	NSC/DC 265A	April 06, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting re: Persian Gulf Humanitarian Assistance via SVTS, Keywords: Persian Gulf Iraq
Yes	NSC/DC 266	April 30, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Kurdish Refugees, Keywords: Iraq, Refugees
Yes	NSC/DC 267	April 08, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Iraqi Refugees and Implementation of UNSCR 687 via SVTS, Keywords: Iraq, Refugees, UN
Yes	NSC/DC 268	April 08, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Iraqi Refugees via SVTS, Keywords: Iraq, Refugees
Yes	NSC/DC 269	April 09, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Iraqi Refugees via SVTS, Keywords: Iraq, Refugees
Yes	NSC/DC 270	April 10, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Weapons of Mass Destruction in Middle East, Keywords: Middle East, Arms Control, CBW, Nuclear Weapons
Yes	NSC/DC 271	April 12, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Afghanistan, Keywords: Afghanistan
Yes	NSC/DC 272	April 15, 1991	NON, Keywords: NON
Yes	NSC/DC 273	April 17, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on sensitive subject, Keywords: NON
Yes	NSC/DC 273A	April 18, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Iraqi Refugees via SVTS, Keywords: Iraq, Refugees
Yes	NSC/DC 274	May 02, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Iraqi Refugees via SVTS, Keywords: Iraq, Refugees
Yes	NSC/DC 275	April 23, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Iraqi Refugees via SVTS, Keywords: Iraq, Refugees
Yes	NSC/DC 276	May 02, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Gulf Security Cooperation, Keywords: Persian Gulf, Security Assistance
Yes	NSC/DC 277	May 08, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Iraqi Refugees, Keywords: Iraq
Yes	NSC/DC 278	May 08, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Strategic Petroleum Reserve / SPR, Keywords: Oil, Energy
Yes	NSC/DC 279	May 13, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Iraqi Refugees, Keywords: Iraq, Refugees

NSC/DC MEETINGS—GEORGE H.W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION (1989–1993)

Available?	Meeting #	Meeting Date	Brief Meeting Subject
Yes	NSC/DC 280	May 17, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Libya, Keywords: Libya
Yes	NSC/DC 281	May 17, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Low Intensity Conflict / LIC, Keywords: Low Intensity Conflict
Yes	NSC/DC 282	May 17, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Angola and Afghanistan, Keywords: Angola, Afghanistan
Yes	NSC/DC 283	May 22, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Iraqi Refugees via SVTS, Keywords: Iraq, Refugees
Yes	NSC/DC 284	May 31, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, Keywords: Middle East, Export Controls
Yes	NSC/DC 285	May 31, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Iraqi Refugees via SVTS, Keywords: Iraq, Refugees
Yes	NSC/DC 286	June 04, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Iraq, Keywords: Iraq
Yes	NSC/DC 287	June 12, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Korean Policy Strategy Review, Keywords: Korea South, Korea North, Nuclear Weapons
Yes	NSC/DC 288	June 24, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Counternarcotics in Latin America, Keywords: Counternarcotics, Latin America
Yes	NSC/DC 289	June 26, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on [...], Keywords: Proliferation, CBW
Yes	NSC/DC 290	June 27, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Pan Am 103 Investigation, Keywords: Pan Am 103, Terrorism, Libya
Yes	NSC/DC 291	June 27, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Korean Contribution to USA for Gulf War and Korean Nuclear Issues, Keywords: Korea South, Persian Gulf
Yes	NSC/DC 293	July 05, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Middle East Arms Control, Keywords: Arms Control, Middle East
Yes	NSC/DC 294	July 12, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Iraq via SVTS, Keywords: Iraq
Yes	NSC/DC 295	July 18, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Korean Nuclear Issues, Keywords: Korea South, Nuclear Weapons, Arms Control
Yes	NSC/DC 296	July 18, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on International Broadcasting, Keywords: Broadcasting

NSC/DC MEETINGS—GEORGE H.W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION (1989–1993)

Available?	Meeting #	Meeting Date	Brief Meeting Subject
Yes	NSC/DC 297	July 19, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Iraq via SVTS, Keywords: Iraq
Yes	NSC/DC 298	June 27, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Pan Am 103 Investigation, Keywords: Pan Am 103
Yes	NSC/DC 299	August 06, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Special Programs, Keywords: None
Yes	NSC/DC 300	August 19, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting re: Soviet Union, Keywords: USSR
Yes	NSC/DC 301	August 19, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting re: Soviet Union, Keywords: USSR
Yes	NSC/DC 302	August 20, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting re: Soviet Union, Keywords: USSR
Yes	NSC/DC 303	August 21, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting re: Soviet Union, Keywords: USSR
Yes	NSC/DC 304	August 21, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting re: Contingency plan on Cuba, Keywords: Cuba
Yes	NSC/DC 305	August 21, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting re: Special Access Subject, Keywords: [...]
Yes	NSC/DC 306	August 22, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting re: Soviet Union, Keywords: USSR
Yes	NSC/DC 307	August 26, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting re: International Economic Cooperation with USSR, Keywords: USSR, Economic Assistance
Yes	NSC/DC 308	August 28, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting re: Humanitarian Assistance to USSR, Keywords: USSR, Economic Assistance
Yes	NSC/DC 309	September 06, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting re: Counternarcotics, Keywords: Counternarcotics
Yes	NSC/DC 310	September 13, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Persian Gulf, Keywords: Persian Gulf
Yes	NSC/DC 311	September 16, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Persian Gulf, Keywords: Iraq
Yes	NSC/DC 312	September 18, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting re: Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia
Yes	NSC/DC 312B	September 23, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting re: Iraq, Keywords: Iraq
Yes	NSC/DC 313	September 27, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting re: Separate Satellite Policy, Keywords: Telecommunications

NSC/DC MEETINGS—GEORGE H.W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION (1989–1993)

Available?	Meeting #	Meeting Date	Brief Meeting Subject
Yes	NSC/DC 313A	September 27, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting re: International Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to USSR, Keywords: USSR, Economic Assistance
Yes	NSC/DC 314	October 09, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting re: Zaire, Keywords: Zaire
Yes	NSC/DC 315	October 23, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting re: Pan Am 103, Keywords: Pan Am 103, Terrorism, Great Britain, France
Yes	NSC/DC 316	October 25, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Haiti, Keywords: Haiti
Yes	NSC/DC 317	October 29, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting re: Intra COCOM Trade in MTCR Annex Items, Keywords: COCOM, MTCR, Non-Proliferation, Arms Control
Yes	NSC/DC 318	November 13, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Haiti, Keywords: Haiti
Yes	NSC/DC 319	November 18, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Haiti, Keywords: Haiti
Yes	NSC/DC 320	November 25, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Haiti, Keywords: Haiti
Yes	NSC/DC 321	November 26, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting re: Intelligence Requirements, Keywords: Intelligence
Yes	NSC/DC 322	November 26, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Haiti, Keywords: Haiti
Yes	NSC/DC 323	December 02, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting re: Libyan-Sanctions for Pan Am 103, Keywords: Libya, Pan Am 103, Sanctions
Yes	NSC/DC 324	December 05, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting re: Machine Tool Voluntary Restraint Agreements, Keywords: International Trade
Yes	NSC/DC 325	December 13, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting re: Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia
Yes	NSC/DC 326	December 16, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting re: Intelligence Requirements, Keywords: Intelligence
Yes	NSC/DC 327	December 17, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on North Korean Nuclear Program, Keywords: Korea North, Nuclear Weapons
Yes	NSC/DC 328	December 19, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Haiti, Keywords: Haiti

NSC/DC MEETINGS—GEORGE H.W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION (1989–1993)

Available?	Meeting #	Meeting Date	Brief Meeting Subject
Yes	NSC/DC 329	December 19, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting re: Pan Am 103, Keywords: Pan Am 103
Yes	NSC/DC 330	December 23, 1991	NSC/DC Meeting on Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia
Yes	NSC/DC 331	January 03, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting re: Afghanistan, Keywords: Afghanistan
Yes	NSC/DC 332	January 17, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Combating Spread of Militarily Useful Technology FM Former Soviet Union, Keywords: Technology Transfers, USSR, Non-Proliferation
Yes	NSC/DC 333	January 31, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting re: Iran and Export Controls, Keywords: Iran Export Controls
Yes	NSC/DC 334	February 03, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting re: Israeli Relay Station for USA International Broadcasting, Keywords: Israel, Broadcasting
Yes	NSC/DC 335	February 10, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting re: Intelligence Capabilities / 1992-2005 NSR 29, Keywords: Intelligence
Yes	NSC/DC 336	February 13, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Export Controls, Keywords: Export Controls
Yes	NSC/DC 337	February 14, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Counternarcotics / San Antonio Summit, Keywords: Drugs, Latin America
Yes	NSC/DC 338	February 24, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Haiti, Keywords: Haiti
Yes	NSC/DC 339	March 11, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Iraq, Keywords: Iraq
Yes	NSC/DC 340	March 17, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Combating Spread of Militarily Useful Technology FM Former Soviet Union, Keywords: Technology Transfers, USSR
Yes	NSC/DC 341	March 20, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Korean Nuclear Program, Keywords: Korea North, Nuclear Matters
Yes	NSC/DC 342	March 25, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Non-Proliferation Initiative, Keywords: Non-Proliferation
Yes	NSC/DC 343	March 26, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Machine Tool Voluntary Restraint Arrangements / VRA, Keywords: International Trade, Japan
Yes	NSC/DC 344	April 01, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Iraq, Keywords: Iraq

NSC/DC MEETINGS—GEORGE H.W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION (1989–1993)

Available?	Meeting #	Meeting Date	Brief Meeting Subject
Yes	NSC/DC 345	April 09, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Export Control Regulatory Reform, Keywords: Export Controls
Yes	NSC/DC 346	April 15, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Counternarcotics, Keywords: Counternarcotics
Yes	NSC/DC 347	April 22, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Export Control Regulatory Review, Keywords: Export Controls
Yes	NSC/DC 348	April 23, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Iraq, Keywords: Iraq
Yes	NSC/DC 349	May 04, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Counternarcotics, Keywords: Counternarcotics
Yes	NSC/DC 350	May 05, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Non-Proliferation Policy, Keywords: Non-Proliferation
Yes	NSC/DC 351	May 13, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Safety of Soviet Designed Nuclear Reactors, Keywords: Nuclear Safeguards, Nuclear Energy, USSR
Yes	NSC/DC 352	May 14, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Haiti, Keywords: Haiti
Yes	NSC/DC 352A	May 18, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Strategic Cooperation with France, Keywords: France
Yes	NSC/DC 353	May 19, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Haitian Boat People, Keywords: Haiti, Refugees
Yes	NSC/DC 354	May 27, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, Keywords: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia
Yes	NSC/DC 355	June 01, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Non-Proliferation, Keywords: Non-Proliferation
Yes	NSC/DC 356	June 03, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Russian Bid to Launch Inmarsat Satellite, Keywords: Space Policy, Russia
Yes	NSC/DC 357	June 04, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia
Yes	NSC/DC 357A	June 11, 1992	Small Group Meeting on Bosnia-Herzegovina, Keywords: Bosnia-Herzegovina
Yes	NSC/DC 358	June 15, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Counternarcotics, Keywords: Counternarcotics
Yes	NSC/DC 359	June 17, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Bosnia-Herzegovina, Keywords: Bosnia-Herzegovina

NSC/DC MEETINGS—GEORGE H.W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION (1989–1993)

Available?	Meeting #	Meeting Date	Brief Meeting Subject
Yes	NSC/DC 360	June 24, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance to Bosnia, Keywords: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Yugoslavia
Yes	NSC/DC 361	July 01, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Iraq, Keywords: Iraq
Yes	NSC/DC 362	July 09, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Counternarcotics, Keywords: Counternarcotics
Yes	NSC/DC 363	July 10, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on NATO Role in Assistance to Bosnia, Keywords: Bosnia-Herzegovina, NATO
Yes	NSC/DC 364	July 10, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Iraq, Keywords: Iraq
Yes	NSC/DC 365	July 16, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Colombia Counternarcotics Programs, Keywords: Counternarcotics, Colombia
Yes	NSC/DC 366	July 17, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Humanitarian Aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Keywords: Bosnia-Herzegovina
Yes	NSC/DC 366A	July 27, 1992	Small Group Meeting on Iraq, Keywords: Iraq
Yes	NSC/DC 366B	July 28, 1992	Small Group Meeting on Iraq, Keywords: Iraq
Yes	NSC/DC 367	July 29, 1992	Small Group Meeting on Bosnia-Herzegovina, Keywords: Bosnia-Herzegovina
Yes	NSC/DC 367A	August 04, 1992	Small Group Meeting on Iraq, Keywords: Iraq
Yes	NSC/DC 368	August 08, 1992	Small Group Meeting on Iraq, Keywords: Iraq
Yes	NSC/DC 368A	August 10, 1992	Small Group Meeting on Bosnia-Herzegovina, Keywords: Bosnia-Herzegovina
Yes	NSC/DC 369	August 12, 1992	Small Group Meeting on Iraq, Keywords: Iraq
Yes	NSC/DC 369A	August 13, 1992	Small Group Meeting on Bosnia-Herzegovina, Keywords: Bosnia-Herzegovina
Yes	NSC/DC 370	August 14, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia
Yes	NSC/DC 371	August 20, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia

NSC/DC MEETINGS—GEORGE H.W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION (1989–1993)

Available?	Meeting #	Meeting Date	Brief Meeting Subject
Yes	NSC/DC 371A	August 21, 1992	Small Group Meeting on Bosnia-Herzegovina, Keywords: Bosnia-Herzegovina
Yes	NSC/DC 372	August 24, 1992	Small Group Meeting on Iraq, Keywords: Iraq
Yes	NSC/DC 373	August 28, 1992	Small Group Meeting on Iraq, Keywords: Iraq
Yes	NSC/DC 374	September 04, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia
Yes	NSC/DC 375	September 09, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia
Yes	NSC/DC 376	September 11, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia
Yes	NSC/DC 377	September 17, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia
Yes	NSC/DC 378	September 23, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia
Yes	NSC/DC 379	September 28, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia
Yes	NSC/DC 380	October 01, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia
Yes	NSC/DC 381	October 07, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia
Yes	NSC/DC 382	October 15, 1992	Small Group Meeting on Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia
Yes	NSC/DC 383	October 18, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Croatia / Kosovo and Yugoslavia, Keywords: Croatia, Yugoslavia
Yes	NSC/DC 384	October 20, 1992	Small Group Meeting on Tajikistan, Keywords: Tajikistan
Yes	NSC/DC 385	October 21, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia
Yes	NSC/DC 386	November 01, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Angola, Keywords: Angola
Yes	NSC/DC 387	November 03, 1992	Small Group Meeting on Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia
Yes	NSC/DC 388	November 05, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Iran and COCOM Cooperative Forum, Keywords: Iran, COCOM

NSC/DC MEETINGS—GEORGE H.W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION (1989–1993)

Available?	Meeting #	Meeting Date	Brief Meeting Subject
Yes	NSC/DC 389	November 06, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on U.S. Policy toward Russia, Keywords: Russia, Economic Assistance, IMF
Yes	NSC/DC 390	November 09, 1992	Small Group Meeting on Angola and Liberia, Keywords: Liberia, Angola
Yes	NSC/DC 391	November 10, 1992	Small Group Meeting on Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia Bosnia-Herzegovina
Yes	NSC/DC 392	November 13, 1992	Small Group Meeting on Kosovo, Keywords: Yugoslavia Bosnia-Herzegovina
Yes	NSC/DC 393	November 16, 1992	Small Group Meeting on Kosovo, Keywords: Yugoslavia Bosnia-Herzegovina
Yes	NSC/DC 394	November 18, 1992	Small Group Meeting on Bosnian Humanitarian Relief, Keywords: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Yugoslavia
Yes	NSC/DC 395	November 20, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia
Yes	NSC/DC 396	November 23, 1992	Small Group Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia
Yes	NSC/DC 397	November 24, 1992	Small Group Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia
Yes	NSC/DC 398	November 25, 1992	Small Group Meeting on Former Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina
Yes	NSC/DC 399	November 27, 1992	Small Group Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia
Yes	NSC/DC 400	November 28, 1992	Small Group Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia
Yes	NSC/DC 401	November 30, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia
Yes	NSC/DC 402	December 01, 1992	Small Group Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia
Yes	NSC/DC 403	December 02, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia
Yes	NSC/DC 403A	December 03, 1992	Small Group Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia
Yes	NSC/DC 404	December 04, 1992	Small Group Meeting on Former Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina
Yes	NSC/DC 405	December 07, 1992	Small Group Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia

NSC/DC MEETINGS—GEORGE H.W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION (1989–1993)

Available?	Meeting #	Meeting Date	Brief Meeting Subject
Yes	NSC/DC 406	December 07, 1992	Small Group Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia
Yes	NSC/DC 407	December 08, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia
Yes	NSC/DC 407A	December 09, 1992	Small Group Meeting on Former Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina
Yes	NSC/DC 408	December 09, 1992	Small Group Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia
Yes	NSC/DC 409	December 10, 1992	Small Group Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia
Yes	NSC/DC 410	December 11, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia
Yes	NSC/DC 411	December 14, 1992	Small Group Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia
Yes	NSC/DC 412	December 15, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia
Yes	NSC/DC 413	December 16, 1992	Small Group Meeting on Iraq, Keywords: Iraq
Yes	NSC/DC 414	December 17, 1992	Small Group Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia
Yes	NSC/DC 415	December 18, 1992	Small Group Meeting on Iraq, Keywords: Iraq
Yes	NSC/DC 416	December 19, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia
Yes	NSC/DC 417	December 21, 1992	Small Group Meeting on Former Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina
Yes	NSC/DC 418	December 22, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Korea, Keywords: Korea South
Yes	NSC/DC 419	December 23, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia
Yes	NSC/DC 420	December 29, 1992	DC on Broadcasting, Keywords: Broadcasting, Middle East, Asia, Africa
Yes	NSC/DC 421	December 30, 1992	NSC/DC Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia
Yes	NSC/DC 422	January 05, 1993	NSC/DC Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia
Yes	NSC/DC 423	January 05, 1993	NSC/DC Meeting on Former Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

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 NSC/DC Meeting List, 1989–1993
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NSC/DC MEETINGS—GEORGE H.W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION (1989–1993)

Available?	Meeting #	Meeting Date	Brief Meeting Subject
Yes	NSC/DC 424	January 06, 1993	NSC/DC Meeting on SLV, Keywords: Non-Proliferation
Yes	NSC/DC 425	January 12, 1993	NSC/DC Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia
Yes	NSC/DC 426	January 14, 1993	NSC/DC Meeting on Former Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Annex B: NSC Meetings (AUG 1990-DEC 1992) – George H.W. Bush Library

NSC MEETINGS—GEORGE H.W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION (1989–1993)

Available?	Meeting #	Meeting Date	Brief Meeting Subject
Yes	NSC0051	August 05, 1990	Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, Persian Gulf
Yes	NSC0052	August 06, 1990	Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, Persian Gulf
Yes	NSC0053	August 15, 1990	Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, Persian Gulf
Yes	NSC0054	August 29, 1990	Persian Gulf Crisis, Economic Action Plan, Iraq [1]
Yes	NSC0054	August 29, 1990	Persian Gulf Crisis, Economic Action Plan, Iraq [2]
Yes	NSC0055	September 20, 1990	Oil Supply, Energy, Persian Gulf [1]
Yes	NSC0055	September 20, 1990	Oil Supply, Energy, Persian Gulf [2]
Yes	NSC0056	October 09, 1990	Nuclear Matters, Middle East and Gulf, Proliferation [1]
Yes	NSC0056	October 09, 1990	Nuclear Matters, Middle East and Gulf, Proliferation [2]
Yes	NSC0057	December 17, 1990	Annual Review of Covert Action Programs
No	[None Assigned]	April 30, 1991	Persian Gulf
Yes	NSC0058	June 06, 1991	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
Yes	NSC0059	October 18, 1991	Pan Am 103, Terrorism
Yes	NSC0060	November 19, 1991	Pan Am 103, Terrorism, Libya, Great Britain
Yes	NSC0061	December 20, 1991	Covert Action Programs, Intelligence
Yes	NSC0062	March 25, 1992	Intelligence Capabilities/1992–2005
Yes	NSC0063	May 28, 1992	Haiti
Yes	NSC0064	June 10, 1992	Nuclear Testing
Yes	NSC0065	December 03, 1992	Somalia