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RYSZARD STEMPOWSKI

Introduction

What is the actual condition of the state in Latin America? Each contributor to this volume has been invited to answer this question by writing an interpretative essay from a specifically suggested angle: the origins of the state; government and society; economic growth; society and economy; nation-building; the indigenous population; political culture; international relations etc. It was the contributors' decision which particular states to focus on in order to best illuminate the issues involved.

Our main focus in the volume is on outlining some of the processes concerning the state now, two hundred years since the first declarations of independence. Along the way, we tackle both theoretical and normative issues. All the contributors to this volume share a long-cultivated multidisciplinary research interest in Latin America but the volume also reflects our disagreement on what we take the state to be as well as on the prevailing situation in Latin America.

Each chapter reflects the views of its author all the way down to his choice of British or American English. As a result all chapters reflect the authors' views on the contemporary state of the State in Latin America, as well as – why not say it – the authors' identities.

The book is aimed primarily at academics and students of the humanities and social sciences. The opening essay by Horst Pietschmann, “**On the Origins of the Latin American States**”, begins by examining the validity of the notion of “Latin America”, an issue that each and every author in this book had to face. Pietschmann delves deep into the core of the matter by pointing out that the usage of the term in the traditional historiography was based upon several premises: (1) The nineteenth-century concept of the nation and a vision of a common history treating “colonization” as a self-contained whole or an analytical unit, followed by the common struggle for independence, thus resulting in a parallel concept of the nation embedded in the sharing of the revolutionary-liberal ideals of the independence period. (2) The rejection of

the colonial past linked up in the most simple way possible with the experience of the “heroic” period of aspirations for independence, one confined to the period of Carlos III since 1759, identifying it as the epoch of the allegedly first manifestations of the opposition to the Spanish-Portuguese regime. Accepting these premises meant forgetting the corporative – statist – ethnic traditions of the colonial past which survived and continued for a long time after independence. It also allowed the local elites to largely disregard the tensions and conflicts between the ancient traditions and the new ideals of the revolutionary period that grounded the new constitutions in Spanish America. It took numerous constitutional amendments, from 1811 onwards, to introduce changes in legislation to resolve some of these tensions and conflicts in public policies, both with respect to external relations (e.g. in accepting the principle of *uti possidetis* or interdict for the purpose of retaining possession of a territory, granted to one who, at the time of contesting suit, was in possession of a territory in order that he might be declared the legal possessor) and home regulation (e.g. with regard to individual rights, private property, the state monopoly of law-implementation). The establishment and delineation of international borders (as resulting from *uti possidetis*) were in general based upon colonial antecedents, and had been achieved much earlier than the “colonization” and “civilization” of the interior by the new states, the other way round than in Europe. And so, within the old borders of the new “nations” it was still possible to speak about the non-integrated population as “barbarians”, as the ancient criteria of legally-fixed social differentiation became social-economic criteria, with the antagonism between the city and the country built into the system.

This state of affairs became increasingly challenged since the second half of the nineteenth century both at home and from abroad. New concepts of ethnic minorities (the science of anthropology), as well as environmental protection concerning transnational areas (e.g. the rainforest), came from abroad and gained gradual acceptance at home. At the same time internal colonization was inducing migrations and other phenomena that were spreading across international borders and creating tensions over the control of resources, etc. These processes were in effect undermining the solidarity of Latin American states while intensifying communication among them. Also, a re-ethnification of some minorities was gradually emerging, which, in turn, led to attempts at redefining the nation in terms of its own ancient traditions and/or re-adapting to the ‘national’ traditions of the past with the help of traditional concepts of the Left. In the face of these tendencies, the big states of the region have intensified

their efforts at modernization, spilling their presence over their international borders (Brazil vis-à-vis some of its neighbouring countries, Mexico vis-à-vis Central America).

Pietschmann makes it clear that this approach results from a reinterpretation of the Iberian colonial expansion. It focuses on the historic significance of three centres of colonial control: Mexico (city), Lima and Bahia (the last centre later relocating itself to Rio de Janeiro). The centres converted themselves into sub-metropolises or sub-empires under a loose European supervision. Each of them was a seat of the institutional power and maintained control over local resources, and, in the case of Mexico and Lima, also over cultural activities (universities, printing houses, secondary education). These colonial systems of Central and Southern America, as existing at the end of the sixteenth century, resemble, argues Pietschmann, the system of domination of the Roman Empire of the late epoch with its various capitals and methods of extracting a surplus. This kind of imperial system was characterised by contradictions and conflicts among the centres, peripheries and the frontier zones, the phenomenon of intermittent conflict and exchange displacing itself more and more towards the interior. At the same time the indigenous peoples in Mexico and Peru, who in the pre-colonial times were highly culturally and politically developed, quickly redefined their identity along catholic-statist lines, thus obtaining a legal status within the new system of domination.

At the beginning of the eighteenth century the European metropolises began to introduce mercantilism and this required a new system of direct territorial governance. What we call now the "second conquest" by Spain and Portugal was started by introducing privileged metropolitan companies and radical fiscal and administrative reforms. In the process the sub-empire of Lima was dismantled, and the Mexican one was considerably reduced in its competences. In Brazil, a new centre emerged in the shape of Rio de Janeiro owing to the gold discoveries in the South, and it is to this centre that even the Portuguese Court moved from Europe (1818). More and more, the ancient legitimacy established in the colonial type relationship between the Europeans and the Americans appeared wrecked, and the political idiom in use on the two shores of the Atlantic was becoming different. Conflicts emerged between those born in Europe, and the Americans (where the division between the Conservatives and the Liberals emerged as a new sign and premise of change). In the end Napoleon Bonaparte destroyed what remained of monarchic legitimacy in Spanish America thus inducing not just the independence of the already more or less solidly formed state entities but also giving rise to even wider issues concerning

the legitimacy of the (new) state and nation. Things were different in Brazil since independence was granted by a monarchical executive act thus assuring a long period of stability and internal expansion and creating some of the conditions for establishing Brazil as a regional power.

Lawrence S. Graham writes about “**Government and Society in the Latin American States**”, and provides an overview of consecutive governments together with his assessment of prevailing trends. We learn from his essay that in order to understand the distinctiveness of the Latin American state system in a global setting, one always needs to keep in mind that government and society in Latin America are inseparably linked to two factors: (1) the choices made by governing elites at the time of independence, as well as (2) the institutional framework that evolved in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries at differential rates throughout the region. The author takes Brazil and the Southern Cone countries as the point of departure for his analysis. This is because, as he argues, the further south one goes the easier it is to discern these two significant factors: (1) the importance of the different decisions made by governing elites in the regions where movements emerged to create independent national states in Latin America, and (2) the different degrees to which governing elites in these countries were able to consolidate both the state and the nation on the basis of their relative autonomy from external interventions and influence. The southern regions of the Western Hemisphere had to contend much less with external actors, namely the European Powers and the United States, as primary factors affecting nation-state formation. As one proceeds northward in South America and into the circum-Caribbean basin, the role of external agents becomes more important in determining the outcomes of nation-state formation. From this base, then, one is in a better position to explain comparatively the diversity to be found among these states, all of which have adopted presidential forms of rule rather than parliamentary options.

Graham examines seven country cases, beginning with Brazil as the largest and the most unique Latin American state and ending with Uruguay, a very small country, which has done the greatest amount of experimentation in correcting for the weaknesses of presidential rule in consolidating its democratic system. The other cases are introduced to call attention to a peculiar set of properties of Latin American politics in the twentieth – twenty-first centuries: the failure to incorporate effectively the masses into democratic rule and the outcomes produced by populist politics (Argentina); the importance of democratic values and the skillful use of national resources, both physical and human, by governing elites and their diffusion into mass politics (Chile); the problem of

incorporating indigenous peoples into national societies shaped by Western concepts of democratic practices, the state and the nation (Peru); the reappearance of populism in new forms and the breakdown of middle and upper-class democracy (Venezuela); the consolidation of limited democracy in the face of elite dissensus and enormous geographical disparities in a single country which makes consolidation of a mass-based democracy difficult (Colombia); and the difficulties of consolidating both the state and nation and making democratic presidentialism work when a country borders a Great Power, such as the United States, or falls within its sphere of influence (Mexico).

Colin M. Lewis writes about **“The State and Economic Growth in Latin America”**. Reviewing the experience of the last century or so, he addresses several key issues. These include: the relationship between economic growth and nation-state formation; the nature of connections between particular patterns of economic growth and state configurations; the ideology and policies associated with specific periods of economic and social change. The author explores these themes by addressing individual phases or cycles, and seeks to challenge a number of conventional assumptions. Lewis argues that state legitimacy has been determined by the provision of public goods, the supply of which underpinned economic growth as well as political order. The main findings of the paper are that since the late nineteenth century successive state ‘models’ have sought to embed the market. In the latter part of the nineteenth and early twentieth century this was done through external economic opening and pragmatic government intervention in domestic markets. Insertion in the world economy during the first age of globalisation made the state and partially formed the market. Between the 1910s and 1930s, state formations changed, driven as much by internal forces as external events. State structures, though often subject to profound challenges, proved to be fairly resilient, partly due to a growth in the outreach of the state represented by an increasing emphasis on the provision of social services as economic infrastructure. Public goods of various forms thereby became more widely available. Although, after the 1940s, the state became ‘larger’ and governments virtually everywhere intervened in the economy, the argument here is that the emphasis remained that of embedding enterprise. The extent to which such efforts succeeded in creating national capitalism, when states ‘retreated’ and economies ‘opened’ after the 1980s, remains a subject of sharp controversy. Yet the ideologies and strategies associated with the neo-populist-business alliance regimes of the 1990s and the market-friendly governments of the democratic left of the early twenty-first century have, as their principal policy objective, the

facilitation of market-capitalism. Hence Lewis maintains that from the oligarchic states of the late nineteenth century, to the post-Washington Consensus regimes of the early twenty-first, an enduring feature of the political economy of Latin America has been the quest to form and facilitate markets, a process intrinsic to state legitimacy.

Patricio Valdivieso writes about **“The State and the National Economy”**. He inclines towards the view that the present situation in Latin America may be best seen as resulting from a combination of the following two factors: the legacy of development that took place between independence and the 1970s (hence the restricted autonomy, instability, poverty, inequalities, marginalization and social exclusion) and neoliberal policies (which resulted in the opening of markets, a strengthening of the private sector and a remaking of the relation between the state and the national economy through deregulation). Owing to the neoliberal spur, Latin America inserted itself more securely into the world economy, but at a high social cost, and while preserving unfavourable conditions of development. This situation, argues the author, needs to be overcome. There is a broad consensus regarding how to do this among political actors, governments, international organizations (the United Nations, specially ECLAC, PNUD, and programmes such as the UN Millenium Development Goals, or global governance as promoted by the World Bank, etc.) and the participants of conferences such as UNCTAD, and scholars in general. At the same time, different countries may face different priorities. Valdivieso zealously argues that to improve the situation or overcome mistakes requires integrating the economic and the social, and setting up as the key goals of policy making human development and institutional stability. The main task of the state in Latin America should be to stimulate economic growth under conditions of globalization, and to develop a social and institutional order according to generally accepted principles of justice (commutative, legalistic, and distributive). The author stimulates the debate on how to convert the stated goals into goals achieved.

Tadeusz Paleczny writes on **“The State and Nation-forming Processes in Latin America”**, against the background of what he calls a general theory of social development in Latin America. Specifically, he examines the main theoretical models of nation-building processes with reference to their political, economic, and cultural distinctiveness. The most important phases of development in Latin American nation-building processes are listed and discussed. Paleczny believes that successive historical periods, which he lists as the colonial, postcolonial, republican, modernist and post modernist, ensured unique

conditions for social integration and national assimilation; conditions that were present only in the countries of Latin America. One section of his article focuses on the role and significance of civic ties and the state in the shaping of the national consciousness of Latin American societies. Besides language, religion, and cultural heritage (all resulting from colonial and migratory tradition), the state has been the most important factor in the growth of national integration. Nation-building processes in Latin America lead towards syncretism, hybridisation, transcultural reality, and the emergence of a Latin American civilisational area. The author provides a description of the Brazilian nation-building processes, turning his attention to the roles played by religion, race, and ethnicity in the context of a multicultural, pluralistic civil society. He concludes that Brazil – much like Mexico – is a complex, multicultural civic society with traits that are characteristic of both a nation and a civilisation.

Aleksander Posern-Zieliński writes about **“The State and the Indigenous Peoples in Latin America”**, and more specifically, countries with a large share of indigenous (“Indian”) people (the Mesoamerican and Andean regions). These relationships – between the state and the indigenous peoples – are situated in specific economic, social, racial and cultural circumstances. In turn these circumstances should be analysed from two perspectives: the ethnopolitics of the state towards the indigenous citizens and the Indians’ ethnostrategy towards the state.

The relationships in question were from the very beginning antagonistic, and they continue to be so perceived by the autochthonous population. The contemporary state – shaped by the Creole, Mestizo, and immigrant elites (from Europe and Asia) – has until recently ignored the actual needs of the autochthonous population. It did not represent the interests of the indigenous population, even though at times it would disguise this fact by calling to life a variety of institutions formally charged with taking care of these peoples. In fact, the attitude towards the indigenous people of both the dominant sections of society and the apparatus of the state was (and still is) strongly permeated with racial prejudice, a sense of cultural superiority, and civilisational and missionary paternalism, i.e. the ideas that have legitimised the social and economic domination of the Creole-Mestizo sector over the indigenous groups. These features categorically point to the postcolonial character of ethical and social relations. They also explain, to some extent, the contemporary postulates of the indigenous groups and individuals in defence of their rights and for the improvement of their lives, all aimed at the liquidation of the continuing structures of endocolonialist domination visible in the economic (exploitation), so-

cial (exclusion), civic (lack of subjectivity), and cultural (acculturation) realms. These relationships between the state and indigenous peoples became increasingly questioned thanks to the progress of democratisation. The newly established indigenous organisations and their leaders, as well as “friends of Indians” gathered in NGOs, formulated a position critical towards the earlier relations. This is how the phenomenon of indigenous activism came to be. Its manifestation is a network of organisations from the local self-government level up to national and international federations, ranging also from ethnic parties to the indigenous peoples’ representatives in parliaments and governments. Posern-Zieliński argues that the contemporary indigenous movement in Latin America owes much to the economic development that triggered the modernisation of the life of the indigenous population by breaking their former isolation. On the grounds of these changes, the idea of ethnodevelopment (*etnodesarrollo*) took shape. It highlights strongly the need for the advancement of the indigenous population, while preserving their separate identity. A view was also becoming widespread, outside of the indigenous population, that the state should also serve the interests of the population in question, and do this by ensuring its active participation as citizens. This is how a new idea of a pluralist state in the ethnic sense began to take shape in Latin America. It is obvious that this new model of the state should lay the foundations for a new type of national and political community. It would incorporate the indigenous population – with full rights – into the main current of the country’s life. The consequences of the complex processes described by Posern-Zieliński are enormous, and the current Bolivian experiment may turn out to be even more important than the Cuban one.

In my own chapter on “**States and Political Cultures in Latin America**”, I use some considerations on political culture as a method for throwing some light on the state. Therefore I begin by defining the notion of the political culture of a society in a given state and time as a set of widespread and relatively stable and respected beliefs (a) related to the identity of the society as a political nation that is the constitutionally defined sovereign, (b) expressed in public discourse, and (c) referring to the state as the institutional correlate of that identity, and especially to the constitutional system of policy-making. It helps me to provide a concise review of the literature on the concept of political culture, thus identifying various perspectives of looking at the state. I focus on such aspects of the connection between the state and political culture as public discourse, policy-making, democratisation, and collective (national) identity in the state. The results are tentative at best. The lingering uncertainties about the

state as such are not much weakened by the rather dispiriting vagueness of all of the conceptualizations of political culture, and even more so by the variety, scarcity and inconclusiveness of the actual empirical data and findings. The connection between the state and political culture naturally exists, yet the results of seeking a specific cause-and-effect connection allow us to speak of no more than a probability. This is all the more so since the dearth of studies by Latin Americanists of the state and political culture combines here with a shortage of such research in Latin America. On top of that, the parallelism between thinking about “the cultural” and “the political” is manifested – on the one hand – in the inconsistently controlled Eurocentrism of many works, which in turn is accompanied on the other hand by the eagerness to accentuate the non-European uniqueness and supposition that, if the European observer does not understand something in Latin America, it is because this “something” carries within itself *ex definitione* a deepness of meaning. Despite all of these problems, discussion of these ties helps us in thinking about the state – both as an institution and as the specific type of organisation of a society, functioning thanks to the systemic connection of norms (the building material for institutions) with a population living in a natural environment within a specific territory, that is about the nation state. Yet before one will be able to say something more revealing about a state from the point of view of political culture, accounting both for continuity and social change, before one will actually be able to clarify the issues and the questions about the state through the discussion of political culture, there is a huge amount of research to be done.

Carlos Escudé writes in Spanish about the **Iberoamerican civilization and its international relations**, rather than just the international relations of the Latin American states. His essay starts with the premise that the main actor in so-called inter-“national” relations is not the state, but what has been dubbed the “state/society complex”. This concept reminds us that, rather than the product of grand geopolitical objectives, foreign policy, in medium and long-term, tends to be conditioned heavily by domestic economic, social and cultural factors. Escudé’s position can be read as supporting the thesis that policy-making is a domain in which foreign policy-making is whatever concerns foreign subjects. That is, foreign policy-making is understood more broadly than it often has been in the literature.

Rather than cataloguing events and treaties, Escudé’s chapter elucidates the causes that explain the peculiar place occupied by Latin American countries in the international relations of today’s world. He digs into the historical processes that led to their emergence as nation-states, in order to find clues for the

understanding of present-day phenomena. The author points to the peculiarities which differentiate Latin America as a region from the rest of the world. Among these are: (1) the unique commonality among this family of nations which, in the case of the Spanish-speaking countries, ranks by far as the world's most extensive contiguous land mass sharing a single language; (2) the uniquely low levels of massive violence, both at the interstate and intrastate levels, which Iberian America has been blessed with during its two centuries of independent life; (3) the inapplicability, in the region, of the bellicose model of state formation; (4) the notably weak states with which the region has been cursed, incapable both of progressive taxation and of mass mobilization for war; (5) the trend toward the capture of these weak states by crony bourgeoisies, both local and foreign, generating the world's greatest inequality of income, engendering poverty, and making populism almost inevitable in most countries once electoral democracy was consolidated, and 6) the trend toward the establishment of zero-sum domestic political games, in which the politician that proposes short-term sacrifices for long-term societal gains almost inevitably is the loser in the competition for an impoverished and poorly-educated electorate.

In this context, the use of the Gramsci-inspired "state/society complex" concept leads to unconventional formulations. The issue of narcotics in Mexico or Colombia, for example, is not dealt with by Escudé so much as an issue of law and order that impinges on state-to-state relations, but is treated instead as a phenomenon involving conflicting stimuli: (a) the demand for narcotics, say, in the United States; (b) the supply, say, in Mexico, which is largely generated by foreign demand; (c) the American state that has declared a "war on drugs", but which emphasizes the repression of the supply side of the trade in order to limit the quantum of violence at home; (d) the Mexican state that sometimes cooperates as fully as it can with the American state, i.e. the United States, in which case it engages in violent conflict with the segment of its own economy that responds to the United States' demand for narcotics, while it sometimes drags its feet as much as it can (in which case it engages in a confrontation with the American state). In other words, the international side of the Mexican narcotics issue is not dealt with as a problem involving simply the two states, but as one in which a segment of the (US) American and Mexican societies are partners, while the relations between the two states fluctuate between conflict and cooperation.

In conclusion to this introduction, I think that having read through the book the reader will discover that the states in Latin America have evolved into

organizations that are similar to the highly developed and democratic states in Europe and North America. But the fact that they are similar – just similar – to those states means that they are also explicitly different. Quite a lot of the similarities and differences can be explained in terms of the prevailing global system. A good deal of the issues can be understood in terms of the sociology of government and/or of political culture. Furthermore, the deliberations on the status of the descendants of the original population, and of the African slaves, help to reveal nation-building as a societal process of identity construction. More difficult to understand is the feed-back between the state and the collective identity as expressed by the nation as a social group which is politically organized. Here we have as many points of views as there are contributors to the volume. All in all, the state as an organization (including the notion of the state as an institution or a set of rules) is developing. However, in most countries of Latin America, the democratic state ruled by law, and universally accepted and treated as a common good by the citizens, seems to be still a constitutional ideal to be pursued, rather than an accomplished fact of life.

If we look at democracy in a wider context we can see that perhaps it is not so much democratic procedures or the possibility of making choice as such that is the most important object of the pretty much universal desire for democracy. Rather, it is what the state delivers in terms of meeting the needs of its people that matters first of all. Above a certain threshold of satisfaction people do not risk a conflict for fear of losing what they already have. Below this threshold, however, even a relatively minor reason may spark off a major confrontation since people do not have much to lose. The exorbitant inequalities in Latin America are a fertile ground for confrontation. But it is not clear how to change this situation and to avoid a catastrophe; even eradicating the most extreme poverty is difficult. If the degree of identification of the population, including the power elite and the lowest classes, with the nation-state is high, it is easier to harmonize conflicting interest in a peaceful way. How can such an identification be increased without recourse to inventing a foreign foe, stimulating chauvinistic nationalism and the like? In other words, neither in the strictly material sphere of life nor in the realm of political culture do we find simple and direct incentives for a social compromise strong enough to prevail. And in the countries with a strong indigenous component, the ideal of mutual acceptance in a bi-cultural society of equals is merely a concept, a design, even if a constitutional one.

Nevertheless, had we dealt with the state in Latin America forty or even thirty years ago, the tone would have been less encouraging. Democratization

in Latin America has become a visible phenomenon and it bodes well. When democracy in the Latin American states strikes deeper roots, as we may hope one day it will, the next classical problem will have arisen: disillusionment with democracy. May the Latin Americans face this problem as soon as possible. One side-effect will be a better understanding of the dynamic relationship between the cultural and the political dimensions of a democratic society.

The approaching Bicentenary offers itself as one more reason to think about the state in Latin America. That is why I was unable to resist the temptation when Dr. Klemens Budzowski, Chancellor of the new and rapidly developing Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow University, invited me to "write or edit for us a book on Latin America". Not everything is that bad in the realm of publishing in Latin American studies in these days of the Second World Depression, not even in publishing edited volumes.

Thanks are due to the people who were involved in publishing this first book of this University Press in a foreign language. Director Tomasz Dalowski of the **Kraków Society for Education – AFM Publishing House** worked incessantly to see the project through. Piotr Krasnowolski has translated the three essays from Polish, and waded through the texts in English as a copy-editor, together with Benjamin Koschalka and Christopher Reeves, while the essay by H. Pietschmann was translated from German in a record time by Piotr Krasnowolski and Lesław Michalus. The Publishers' external reviewer Professor Michał Chmara (The Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań) gave his comments on the earlier version of the manuscript. Halina Baszak-Jaroń, Deputy Editor-in-Chief at the **Kraków Society for Education – AFM Publishing House**, oversaw the lay-out editing of the book.

Kraków, 25th May 2009 –
on the 200th Anniversary of the primer grito libertario de América





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HORST PIETSCHMANN

On the Origins of the Latin American States

Writing about the state and the development of statehood at a time of general crisis is in itself quite an extraordinary project for a historian. First, the notion of the “crisis” is universally agreed upon by philosophers dealing with the contemporary period, and carries a near-religious meaning (Sloterdijk 2009). The subject range of the “state” and the “form of statehood” was, in this way, almost monopolized by the constitutionalists and sociologists who devote themselves to it in, as a rule, the larger international organisations, like “think tanks”. Academics who research politics, on the other hand, in most cases limit themselves to watching and commenting upon politics from a shorter perspective, or from the perspective of examining the processes that took place in the recent past. Besides these, in all the cases referring to non-Western states, this subject range is also the field of research of various branches of anthropology. Historical research concerning the state and statehood, the establishment and development of the state – which was so important in earlier periods – has for a variety of reasons lost significance in this subject area and now focuses on specialist detailed research of various types: beginning with the history of economy and society, through gender history, history of mentality, religion and church, up to historical discourse, the symbolism of governing, everyday history, historical vividness and so forth.

It was only the historians’ rediscovery of historical geography in the last decade, and dramatic historical events – like, for example, the 11th September – that the interest in the history of powerful empires – from ancient times to the present – increased. They are researched, or at times only begin to be analysed along chronological lines, and frequently also in a comparative perspective in the context of oceanic regions, primarily the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, and the Indian Ocean – if we account only for the various “trading and maritime empires” – and currently also “financial or industrial empires”, without even mentioning “economic imperialism” and other similar concepts.

Faced with the detailed historical research mentioned earlier, these newer attempts at generalisation not only often fall into the trap of semi-knowledge and the extreme trivialising of the problem, but also into the classical trap of the traditional, one-way “history of the expansion” of writing – if not the compulsion to write – history from the “top down”, so as not to ground place on the book market. Making generalisations on the basis of “history from below” accounts for the extremely diverse results of the specialist research mentioned above that has been classified in the last few decades. This, by its very nature, is far more difficult and requires multiple intermediary steps which are based on short-range generalisations, primarily because the set of tools inherited from previous periods – and which are typical for purposes of conceptualisation – that are used for this kind of research has become questionable for a variety of reasons. This to a great extent characterises the subject of the development of statehood in Latin America, which shall be demonstrated in the examples below.

On this basis, the case of “Latin America” comes to the fore primarily because that part of the continent had been – until the 1970s – considered to a large extent to be European, or at least being strongly under the influence of Europe. The Portuguese and the Spanish languages – complemented by smaller enclaves of French – that were defined from Paris (as the intellectual capital) as “The Latin” had exerted (better: excersised) a powerful influence, and even awarded the region with its all-encompassing name. Catholicism and Roman Law were part of the process. These were considered to be important common features of the subcontinent that were disseminated by the colonialism of the mother countries. They were already based on a truncated explanation of history, and for that reason they were relativised or were questioned both by the specific contemporary processes of development and by new historical myths.

Originating in the nineteenth century, these characteristics of “Latin America” were questioned especially as a result of the development of the situation after the second world war and also by the increased intensity of the historical and ethno-historical research, and also the role of historical myths that developed immediately afterwards. One should only mention the “Big Brother” in the North, together with the institutional framework of the OAS, the former colonial powers – as poor but functioning members of the European Union offering political, cultural, and economic contacts – and occasionally symbolic alternative events that accompanied the summits of the G8 Group, which served to strengthen to a large extent the coherence of this group of states, and which

is in various ways prompted by the media. With reference to the fundamental parameters of the national economies, members of this group differ, however, to such a large degree that within the geographic framework of the subcontinent, not only extreme differences are present between individual states in the region, but also – even in their mutual relations – there are suitably varied interests, which are hardly covered by the rhetorical appeals and symbolic policymaking. These differences are also apparent even within the continent's states, particularly the largest ones. It is enough to mention here the continent's major power, Brazil, opening not only the interior of the country together with its natural resources – and in so doing, defying global opinion – or the debates about the rainforests of Amazonia and their importance for the world's climate. Yet at the same time, this continental power disseminates its culture and language far beyond its borders, to all the neighbouring countries, and tries to ensure its access and use of the neighbouring countries' resources.

The historian is fascinated at the same time by the phenomenon of the "simultaneity of the unsimultaneous" in Brazil, which internationally shows the face of its most modern coastal cities, yet is a country that beyond them consists of – to quite a different degree – areas of varied historical development within the regions, which when compared to Europe can be described by features ranging from the time of the great migrations of peoples through the various phases of the Middle Ages and the later centuries up to the nineteenth century. This phenomenon may be observed in less developed forms, in other states of the region. It is present even in relatively small states, like, for example, Guatemala; it always has a specific historical shape, and there is always an antithetical relationship between the city and country, and the rural ethnic and cultural components. This phenomenon to a great extent takes root in the fact that soon after regaining independence, and at least since the end of the nineteenth century, the majority of the states in the region had reasonably well-defined state borders that were constructed along the lines of relations from the colonial era and the *uti possidetis* principle. At the same time, however, the areas of the states defined by such borders had not been entirely taken over, and internal colonisation had not fully taken place, the conditions in the interior becoming a significant explanation of the twentieth century guerrilla tradition in Latin America thus adding to the heritage of the "little war" – of medieval origin – in Spain and Portugal. Even though this may not be sufficiently perceived in the historical and political perspective, it is an important difference in comparison to the processes in Europe, where the definition of borders always followed the processes of colonisation, even when the controversial factors

that underpinned the implementation of these processes led to stable clearly-defined borders only as a result of military conflict. It should not be forgotten that the development of the territorial state with permanent borders is quite a recent historical phenomenon, which in Europe continued to cause a variety of conflicts even into the twentieth century, and that it was only relatively recently that these were ended by concluding international treaties.

The process of establishing state borders, which, as already has been mentioned, was completed in Latin America – with a few exceptions – much earlier on the basis of the continent's colonial past, and was supported with the application of the *uti possidetis* rule. The importance of this process is visible, for example, in Mexico, in the fact that the loss of “over half of the state territory” in the war against the United States in 1846–1848, is to this day viewed as a national trauma. What this means is the loss of an area that, even though large, was poorly populated and fell to Mexico as a result of the process of northwards expansion conducted under the Spanish banner which were accompanied by autonomous territorial division. The *Reconquista* of these lands, which began with the migration processes from Mexico and Central America – a region, which in colonial times was also partially controlled by Mexico – brought about processes of Hispanisation in the United States as early as the beginning of the twentieth century, which through electoral and other processes influences the entire state policy even more. The importance of staking out the borders towards the neighbouring countries also brings up quite naturally the question of the extent to which the phenomenon of defining the borders had an impact on the national discourse in the individual states. There are plenty of arguments suggesting that the central events of the “Iberian seizure” and independence from the European colonial powers are viewed in the region from the perspective of historical solidarity, and also from a superior point of view: namely, of the stabilisation of the state system; they were all without exception conquered by Spain and Portugal and allied natives (Matthew, Oudijk 2007) and all gained their independence from the colonial powers. The specific differences of the individual colonial administrative entities along which these processes were conducted have, however, not been considered for a long time. “The History of Latin America” as a discipline of university research and science did not appear in the region until after the second world war; it emerged together with the aggravating economic rivalry between the USA and Europe.

The political role of this somewhat schematic historical vision in the countries of Latin America acquired importance in the context of the 500th anniversary of the voyage of Columbus in 1992. The Mexican national commis-

sion dealing with the preparations for the jubilee worked within the framework of the OAS, falling back upon inter-American consultations, a document that, briefly speaking, put forth a claim that the native American cultures played an extremely active historical role during the European expansion, and that for this reason the quite widespread notion of the “discovery and conquest of America” – its early Spanish nationalist connotations have been proved meanwhile – should be rejected as being Eurocentric and replaced with the notion of *encuentro de culturas*. The OAS commission approved the resolution and introduced this notion immediately into its texts, making sure that this notion became widely held in individual countries. The radical left rejected it decisively, believing it to be euphemistic, and discrediting the sacrifices made by the indigenous population, and consequently its propaganda seized on the fact that persons less familiar with the intricacies of the Spanish language would not be able to discern philologically the double meaning of the central notion. This is contained in the word *encuentro*, which in the Spanish language means both “a joyful meeting of old friends” – this is the denotation that dominates today – and “a military conflict”, a “skirmish, fray”, a violent encounter of adversaries who are not at war with each other. To verify this, one should reach for the Dictionary of the Spanish Language, published by the Spanish Real Academia de la Lengua, which – Ibero-Americans still accept this – to this day remains the central point of reference in the Spanish language. To ensure that this language monopoly (not devoid of significance after all) continues in the successive updates of the Dictionary, the Academia consults to an ever greater degree with philologists from all the relevant countries of Latin America. While the historical solidarity of the states of Latin America was still clearly evident during the Jubilee of 1992, and particularly in the 1980s (the role that the process of democratisation played, which began in the region in 1985, requires further research), such a situation did not take place in relation to the approaching jubilees of the acquisition of independence by the states of Latin America. Organised in 2008 in Mexico, the consultative meeting of the participating Ibero-American states was unable to work out a joint position, for which reason the establishment of an appropriate joint commission was rejected. On the other hand, all the interested parties clearly accepted the invitation of the King of Spain to the meeting commemorating this occasion, as one can learn from numerous websites concerning the *Bicentenario* (e.g. www.grupobicentenario.org, and successive links to other websites).

Over time, several processes interpenetrated with one another: these included the powerful criticism of all types of colonisation, and the increasing

importance and revindications of ethnic minorities that had been occurring since the 1960s, promoted by the United Nations, churches, anthropologists, and the democratic parties in the developed countries, so that during the last five decades the processes of increasing ethnic awareness and the ethnicisation of the assimilated parts of the population at a slightly lower social level took place. They increasingly led to changes in the cultural self-awareness of entire states, or at least helped politically to introduce such changes in their identity, even in those states that from outside seemed to be culturally homogenous. Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela can be identified as states in which these processes are already highly advanced. One can consider the general acceptance of the statement that the Bolivian president, Evo Morales, is the first Latin American president who is of fully indigenous origin a historical fallacy, as the example of President Benito Juárez, who enjoys a great deal of respect in Mexico, attests. He was of indigenous origin, which he, however did not make a show of, and presented himself – as a sop to liberalism – as the president of all Mexicans. Similar processes are taking place in today's Mexico, especially if we notice that in the eastern part of the Mexico City megalopolis, entire districts of the city today mainly use the Nahuatl language, and that every year on the days of the solstices tens of thousands of Mexicans and foreign tourists climb the pre-Columbian pyramids to draw the energy of the sun and/or space. Even the powerful drug cartels, which are dominant in rural areas, and against whom the current president of the country has formally declared war, seem to make reference to the pre-Columbian rituals of human sacrifice.

The processes mentioned above have led to numerous – partially hidden and partially open – internal and at times even transborder conflicts in many countries of the region, that were stirred up – frequently in a conscious, and partially unconscious manner – by foreign guests, “ethnographers”, churches, and even organisations supporting development with civic–romantic and/or ecological goals. From the point of view of the numerous governments in Latin America, even those that are democratically elected, they represent a threat to the domestic policy of the integration of such ethnically conscious minorities. Even with national culture and social orders, however they be defined, these new ideas, implanted, mostly from outside, mainly in those countries that have lively, indigenous traditions and which frequently refer to false or simplified explanations of their history, led individual states to suffer from the pressure of having to deal intensely with their own history, while new ideas questioned the older, simplified historic rationalisations of the “nation”, “identity”, and a variety of their symbolic stylisations.

It is not for nothing that we may look at this from the perspective of the 1970s, when the intense process of the institutionalisation of history was taking place, at least in the major countries of Latin America: new research centres were developed, archives were rediscovered, dusted off and organised, if not digitalised; museums were modernised and reorganised, educational and didactic activities acquired government support often in the face of violent debates on meanings, values, and goals. History and historical policy, which acquired major internal political significance, were strongly present in the media, and involved parliaments. It should be emphasised here that it was primarily the two largest states of Latin America, Brazil and Mexico, which simultaneously very intensively and efficiently modernised their research and educational institutions (and still do) in the area of the natural sciences.

In the meantime, these processes acquired a far more general significance both in the areas of external and internal policy. In terms of their external dimensions, they extend to the mutual relations between the presidents of South America who define themselves as “left-wing”. It is enough to mention, for example, the conflict concerning the management of energy resources in the eastern lowlands of Bolivia, and the fact that it is rooted in culture, essentially reflecting the former opposition between the highlands and the lowlands. The question of energy has acquired in the meantime a global significance; the government of Bolivia has therefore managed to work out a position of solidarity with two other producers of energy – Ecuador and Venezuela – on the grounds of their developing new identity. All the three states show a tendency towards political solidarity, calling upon self-evidently incompatible historical traditions. In Bolivia and Ecuador these are the indigenous traditions which do not greatly strengthen the broader solidarity. There is a slightly older example of indigenisation than that of the early twentieth century, as both the countries were captured and integrated by force in pre-Columbian times by the Incas coming from Peru and speaking a different language. Even the period of Spanish colonisation resulted in major problems that were related to administrative superiority and subordination, and – in the postcolonial period – led to military conflict. This, in effect, had Bolivia cut off from the Pacific, which is an obstacle for the left-wing president of Chile when it comes to strengthening the solidarity of other countries ruled by the left. In Venezuela, in turn, the lack of major pre-Columbian traditions, and the large share of Afro-Americans in the population, the historically falsified liberator, Simón Bolívar, had to become the scapegoat for the justification of such a tradition in *Bolivarismo* promoted by President Chávez. With all the recognition for the historical role of Bolívar, one

cannot avoid arguing that, as an owner of slaves, he does not actually stand out as a pioneer when it comes to the liberation of black slaves. Moreover, he himself brought about the political instrumentalisation of old antagonisms towards today's Colombia, and intervened in a strongly unilateral manner in the independence process in Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. Thus the three stand united in the face of an anonymous, distant, and – for the critics of globalisation – obvious enemies, including the USA, and the multinational concerns of the power industry. It is so even though all three countries cannot – due to the lack of appropriate technological resources – make use of and sell their energy resources. When examining, however, which companies are active in the east of Bolivia, one very quickly realises that Petrobras, the national petrochemical company of Brazil, is the largest investor when it comes to the exploitation of natural gas resources on the eastern lowland of Bolivia. Yet, Lula, the president of Brazil with his left-wing sympathies, does not place in the dock three other countries which are disponents of energy resources; and the similarly leftist presidents of Uruguay, Paraguay, and Argentina are extremely reserved when it comes to dealing with their great neighbours. This example sufficiently explains that, in comparison to the 1960s and 1970s, the joint policy and rivalry in Latin America acquired far greater importance, taking the place of the general models of dependency and heteronomy of the region which were developed and promoted in the past by CEPAL/ECLA, i.e. the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. The processes of internal colonisation leads also to more powerful tensions in the internal relations within this group of states, which was exacerbated also by the debates – originating from outside – about the policy of climate protection, resource consumption, individual shares of the continental shelf, protection of environmental resources, etc., as they drew the region into the realm of the more general problems of globalisation.

All these bring to mind former historical debates on the processes of European expansion in early modern times. It seems that what now becomes lively again are the discussions – continuing since the 1950s – about the form of the Iberian occupation, the treatment and cultural alienation of individual groups of the indigenous population by the missionaries, the political and administrative organisation of the colonial period, the “environmental imperialism” of Europe, etc. The question about the potential existence of a common identity of the region in the face of the mentioned conflicts, that cannot be attributed to external perpetrators as directly as the “discovery and capture” and “struggle for independence” immediately after the second world war is asked in an en-

tirely new light. The internal conflicts within individual states and between them came too strongly to the fore. When faced with doubts concerning the inherited notion of “Latin America” and its content, an additional question about alternatives crops up. Towards the end of the twentieth century, historical research tried to overcome this dilemma by placing it, to an even greater extent, into a broader Atlantic context (Bailyn 2005). Historians speak about “Atlantic history”, perceiving it as an initial step in the latest globalisation schemes. Besides these, there are attempts to revive the classical concept of the Western Hemisphere, which started to lose its importance as a consequence of the conflicts between the North and the South since the 1960s. (Fernández-Armesto 2003). Additionally, we discover the renaissance of the classical notion of empire, especially for the early modern period, most often in connection to the Atlantic (Elliott 2006). Thus the North – South concepts and East – West perspectives compete as they used to for the assignment or appropriation of what we classically define as “Latin America”. All these concepts are loaded with the dilemma mentioned in the introduction of being between historical specialist research and a generalisation that frequently falls back onto semi-knowledge. This is especially true about the highly suggestive attempt at the interpretation of the history of mankind since the last ice age, undertaken by an outsider paleobiologist, Jared Diamond (Diamond 1997). The research, which examines the questions of historic development in a broader extent and in a systematic manner, often respect the rules of “political correctness”, especially in a form that is binding in the ethnographic sciences. Emphasising the use and/or development of resources, with consideration of the technological and geographical conditions – their presence on the interconnection or mutually permeating climatic zones – the author undertakes a global analysis of former civilisations. For that reason, the German translation of the work, which has already been published six times, received a changed title: *Arm und Reich. Die Schicksale menschlicher Gesellschaften*, meaning literally “The poor and the rich. Histories of human communities”. In general terms, this work goes beyond the area of traditional, moralising observations of long-term historical processes, and provides a rationally transparent system of categories that can also be used for a concise outlook on the history of Latin America. Looking at the subject of the state and state development, one can in this way follow how that process was taking place over the last 500 years, accounting for the latest research and emphasising the significant developmental changes in time and space. Although, for those doing research on the pre-Columbian times, knowledge of both empires – the Incas in the Andes and the Aztecs in Mesoamerica

– is no longer a novelty, ethnographic research has greatly expanded our knowledge about their state of being and their antecedents. Parallel to this, these disciplines of science have helped us to realise that also in other areas of Central and Southern America, present in different periods, were historical, indigenous peoples with more or less developed cultures, who, however, in terms of their state of development, had developed quite different forms of organisation, ranging from city-states via larger ethnic alliances to small nomad communities accustomed to warfare, as Diamond points out. As an aside, these his categories draw upon many aspects of the classification devised by a Spanish Jesuit, José de Acosta (“*Historia Natural y Moral de las Indias*”) from the sixteenth century, who in this way wanted to justify the different ways that the Christian missions conducted themselves. At the same time, Acosta was the first to explain the origin of the indigenous inhabitants of America, who came here from Asia through the Bering Straight. The number of state-forming high cultures is agreed to include the Aztecs and the Incas, and – with certain reservations – also the Mayas with their city-states. The two areas, however, differ as the Aztecs and Mayas belonged to Mesoamerica, and were the only cultures of America that developed writing, and whose writings have been successfully deciphered. Moreover, all the three cultures had a highly developed system of numbers and calendars closely connected to religious notions and governmental practices.

The document concerning the understanding of “*encuentro de culturas*” was introduced into the dispute by Mexico in 1985, and being the subject of a violent argument at that time proved, however indirectly, a dramatic mistake in the historiography of the history of colonialism. It did not sufficiently acknowledge the conditions of the indigenous cultures, and instead depicted history according to the chronological progress of the European seizure of the continent. Everything began with Columbus, the events in Haiti / La Española were examined, Europeans were followed to Cuba, to the Panama isthmus, and then to Mexico, Peru, etc. The research of economic, religious, social, and institutional development followed in the same vein. In the face of circumstances, the focus was mostly on the documents kept in Portugal and Spain, as American archives were harder to access. This was coupled with unacceptable generalisations, such as that with the capture of Tenochtitlán in August 1521, the Aztec state collapsed and Mexico was captured, or that the same thing happened to the Inca state in the Andes in 1532–1534, and so forth. Matthew Restall names seven such myths concerning the period of the Spanish conquest. Their number also includes a range of other mistaken opinions and

conclusions that, although they have not acquired the status of myth, lead to this very false interpretation of those processes, and the conclusions that were drawn from them (Restall 2003).

One should, however, mention first that almost from the beginning, Spanish and Portuguese colonisation differed from one another greatly. Already in 1502, Queen Isabella stated that the 'trade colonisation' that Columbus had initially planned should be replaced by the model of 'settler colonisation' in the tradition of the Spanish *Reconquista*, whose characteristic feature was the founding of cities. That model was later reinforced by Charles V to suit his imperial concept of the universal monarchy. When Portugal began the colonisation of Brazil – which initially was not greatly esteemed and was considered to be the supplier of dye-wood – due to the foreign and especially French threat in 1532, it fell back on the model that was already being applied while settling the islands in the Atlantic. Its base was the endowment of estates to colonising entrepreneurs hailing from the feudal tradition, who were to organise the settlement and economic exploitation of the land they had been awarded, ensuring the superior functions at the same time. Apart from the acquisition of wood to dye textiles, that model turned out to be barely effective in Brazil, due to the failure to mobilise sufficient numbers of Portuguese settlers. The indigenous population, inhabiting the coastal areas, could be used only as a workforce, and only to a very limited degree due to their cultural traditions. The economic activity that turned out to be the only one that promised success as the economic base was to produce sugar, as wood was quickly losing its commercial standing. This is why African slaves were imported in ever greater numbers, because through the use of them large-scale sugar production could be organised. This led to a situation where – apart from a few cities – the central place of sugar production – the *engenho* – together with its ethnically mixed population became the core of Portuguese settlements. The embryonic administrative organisation established since the mid-sixteenth century was limited to a great extent to the coastal areas until the large-scale expeditions into the centre of the continent – which were sent to seek precious metals and to acquire slaves – brought about the slow shift of settlement-frontier into the mainland in the seventeenth century. They led to extensive cattle breeding and the slow settlement and establishment of new towns. This quickly resulted in conflicts with the Jesuit Order, who were running missions among the indigenous and black population, and who tried to defend them against the *Bandeirantes*. The poor civil and church organisation very quickly led to the establishment of mixed, Christian–African–Indian cults, whose followers tried

frequently to liberate themselves from the Portuguese colonial system by escaping into the hinterland and developing autonomous settlement centres. This situation was to change only in the eighteenth century as a result of the discovery of rich gold deposits in the hinterland, when the state system was expanded beyond the coastal towns and gained more authority. Yet the decisive difference, when compared to Spain, lay in the fact that no universities were established in Brazil, and – with the exception of the Jesuit Order – printing presses were introduced very late, only in the eighteenth century. As even the members of the elites had to travel for university studies to Coimbra in Portugal, Brazil for a long time lacked a cultural life comparable to that which was present in the metropolises of colonial Spanish-America.

To expand further, the way the state organisation of colonial Spanish-America was presented should be counted among the mistaken judgements listed above. As a rule, it begins with the presentation of the titles and offices of Columbus, progresses to the colonisation guidelines for the Caribbean issued in 1502, and lays an emphasis on the establishment of *Audiencia*, being the Royal Appellate court at Santo Domingo in 1511, and develops further. It does not note, however, that the year 1514 already marked the disappearance of the indigenous inhabitants of Haiti, that only after 1512, some Spanish settlers moved from Haiti to the Panama isthmus, and that – after the conquest of Mexico – a large share of Spaniards who settled in the Caribbean moved to the continent. What they left behind them were cities without residents and institutions, and regents without subjects. The establishment of the state organisation of colonial Spanish-America actually took place on the bases of the two high cultures, together with the use of their resources and with the decisive support of the indigenous elites and specialists. Moreover, after the establishment of an administration controlled by Spain, both viceroy metropolises of Spanish-America, namely the cities of Mexico and Lima, took over the management of further expansion around 1590. Taking Mexico as an example, one can present the following chronological order when depicting the process of capturing the lands of today's Mexico:

1. 1521: the capture of Tenochtitlán;
2. by c. 1530: the capture of all the areas of the former Aztec state and the annexation of the Tarascan (P'urhépecha) State within today's state of Michoacán;
3. by c. 1580: the gradual conquest of today's states of Jalisco, Zacatecas, Durango and San Luis Potosí or parts of them, and some of the land occu-

pied by the Mayas: Campeche, the shores of the Yucatan peninsula, and central Chiapas;

4. by 1600: the capture of the central areas of northern Mexico with Nuevo León, beyond today's US border, into New Mexico;
5. in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: the colonisation of parts of today's states of Sinaloa, Sonora and Baja California, the eastern mountain regions of Querétaro and San Luis Potosí, Tamaulipas, and the area of today's Texas (USA);
6. in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: the colonisation of the northern borderland with the USA, unless they had been captured earlier;
7. in the twentieth century: colonisation of Quintana Roo and the tropical lowland regions of Chiapas.

In most of these phases, indigenous troops played a decisive role. In 1521, less than 2000 Spaniards and over 150,000 indigenous warriors laid siege to approximately 300,000 defenders of the Aztec capital, who were weakened from the lack of water and a smallpox epidemic. In all the later expeditions, auxiliary troops from the former Aztec state also participated, which after the successful missions were frequently settled in the newly established cities in the captured areas as occupational forces, receiving special privileges. In many of these cities, far beyond the former Aztec state, these traditions are cherished to this day, which can be seen today in the names of numerous urban districts.

The penetration of these areas by the state was a top-down process conducted through the viceroys who appeared in 1536, whose rule, although in fact regulated by the standards and acts issued in Spain, had to be exercised locally through the gradually developing interaction with local elites. Assuming the office of the Viceroy in 1536, Mendoza succeeded during his term to establish his administrative authority only within the area of the valley of Mexico City. His successor, Velasco, who stayed in office until 1565, governed in fact three areas – the valleys of Mexico, Toluca and Puebla – relying generally on indigenous experts in writing, who worked with both the local ideograms, and the Spanish language. In a general form, the Spanish reign was recognised within a far larger area through the payment of tributes, yet these were the areas where the government was exercised by the Christianised members of indigenous elites. In those areas, missionaries from mendicant orders spread Christianity, recorded indigenous languages, and brought up the sons and daughters of the indigenous nobility in the schools that they ran. This was possible as a result of the recognition of the indigenous nobility and their privileges, which

made them equal to the Spanish *Hidalgos*; they had the right to use weapons, ride horses, and to collect further tributes. In parallel to that, Spanish cities were founded, and indigenous ones received Spanish charters and privileges of self-government. Besides these, the indigenous communes were integrated into ordered villages and subjected to the municipal laws taken from the Spanish tradition that guaranteed them self-government and a simple judiciary in the hands of selected authorities, under the control of the Spanish district officer. This was all based on written sources in individual native languages. In parallel to the above, churches were built mostly with the support of indigenous expert forces, and their decoration was the work of indigenous artists and painters who worked to European standards, while the mendicant orders were at the same time developing church organisation and would, for example, work on the Indian festivities calendars, replacing them with Christian content. It is important here to see that this process had taken place in Mexico before the end of the Council of Trident, as the Christianity of the Renaissance was theologically more open and varied.

Achieved around 1560, this persistent administrative organisation was far more similar to the ancient methods of colonisation of the Roman Empire than the practices of modern colonialism. In 1560, Mexico already had its university, numerous colleges of secondary education open to Indians, and plenty of printing presses. There was already, by that time, an independent cultural life to speak of, in which the indigenous elites participated in various ways. To an ever greater extent they reinterpreted their own history and culture in the Christian way. This process was reinforced in successive periods, by the Marian revelations and other supernatural occurrences. The Mexican Virgin of Guadalupe meanwhile became by papal appointment the religious protector of the entire continent. Although numerous internal political and church conflicts occurred, these were nonetheless resolved peacefully. Three provincial church councils standardised the religious manner of treating the indigenous population before the lay clergy began to remove the mendicant orders from their dominant positions in the church organisation around 1570. That process ran parallel to the progressive Hispanisation of the administration and the implementation of the state patronage of the church. Besides the indigenous nobility, nobility of European origin also formed, yet court decisions remained, with rare exceptions, under the control of royal institutions. Simplifying, one could say that only Indian nobility maintained some feudal rights over Indian subjects, meanwhile the European elites took over large land holdings without jurisdiction and with a limited supply of labour.

A similar process took place in Peru, yet due to conflicts among the conquerors it was delayed until around 1570, and the resulting differences – compared to Mexico – were great. The fact that the newly established coastal city of Lima was elevated to the status of capital, and not the indigenous capital of Cusco, marked an important difference when compared to Mexico. The construction of the capital of Mexico on the ruins of the Aztec capital of Tenochtitlán in the centre of the country was an obvious difference – whose historical significance is underestimated – when compared to Peru. Today, it is assumed that it was an important factor in explaining the far greater degree of biological and cultural Mesticization in Mexico. Because the Council of Trident had finished in the meantime, the Christianisation of Peru was conducted along stricter theological assumptions, and under the ever growing influence of the Jesuit Order. In Peru, the viceroy's court prerogatives for disputes among the indigenous population did not receive such strong institutional foundations as in Mexico. Independent from the comparable privileges of the indigenous nobility, no indigenous cities originated here, unlike in Mexico, even though the indigenous population received a similar municipal constitution as was the case in Mexico. In both cases, the discovery and control of rich deposits of precious metals was the decisive factor for the development and quickly growing imperial significance of Lima and Mexico.

This was further reinforced by the fact that since Philip II, the state on which “the sun never set” was managed in an increasingly decentralised manner, to which a new quality of the Spanish empire, the “monarchy of courts”, strove for. The regions' viceroys or governors of royal or aristocratic blood established by the King in Aragon, Barcelona, Valencia, Palermo, Naples, Milan, Brussels, Besançon, and the authorities in Mexico and Lima enjoyed a high level of autonomy and presided over the highest judicial authorities, which disposed of the royal seal and could issue documents in the name of the King. The symbolical ceremonies acted as a substitute for the presence of the king among his various subjects. Even the fleets, sailing every year together with military protection between the American metropolises and the motherland, transporting people, messages, goods for trading that were of an economic and cultural nature from all the European countries, were a form of the visible presence of the royal authority. As a result of this tradition, the cities of Mexico and Lima became populous metropolises with an imperial significance, controlling faraway administrative areas directly and indirectly, and managing the system of subordinate centres which were of lesser importance. Only the territorial rule of the two viceroys was appropriately divided by law: the Panama

isthmus was subordinate to Lima and provided the border between the zones of influence of the two royal representatives. In the days of Philip II, there were plans made in the court of Spain to transfer the central Indian Council to Panama, but this did not happen, for reasons that remain unknown. The city of Mexico controlled the Caribbean and the Spanish dominions in North America, as well as the Philippines, together with individual sea connections. Lima controlled the Panama isthmus and the whole of Spanish South America, slowly entering in conflict with Portuguese claims. The role of both the capitals as centres of Spanish sub-empires becomes clear only when they are compared to the centres of other regions that later became capitals of Independent States. To the extent that Santo Domingo and Guatemala or Puebla and Guadalajara in Mexico were – in their architecture and institutions – near copies of the Mexican metropolis, the same was no longer true of, for example, Caracas, Havana, Manila, and other cities of the northern part of Spanish America. The printing presses and the institutions of higher education only had been introduced much later. A similar situation pertained to the Spanish South America, where Quito, Cusco, Charcas, and Potosí were allowed to acknowledge the importance of Lima, which was, however, not then true of Asunción, Buenos Aires, Santiago de Chile, and other cities whose development took place only in the eighteenth century. Despite the greatly increased attacks of pirates, corsairs, and fleets of competing European naval powers in the seventeenth century, the Spanish reign in America was not seriously threatened, and required no more than the stationing of troops to prevent external attacks in a few reinforced spots on the coast. Disregarding local rebellions, which could be subdued with the forces of the militia, the Spanish rule also remained unthreatened in the hinterland. It was only at the end of the seventeenth century, when – due to the problems of the succession of the throne after the death of the childless and sick King Charles II – that these relations were to be changed radically.

Together with the change of the dynasty from the Habsburgs to the Bourbons in 1700, sanctioned after the Spanish war of succession and the peace of Utrecht and Rastatt in 1714, the eighteenth century is defined in historiography by the notion of “the epoch of Bourbon reforms”. Due to the limited power of expression, this notion is complemented with modifiers from the most varied European definitions of the period including “absolutism” or “despotism”, “reason”, “Enlightenment”, “modernisation”, “nation”, etc – depending on the approach of the individual schools of historiography or the ideological positions of individual authors. What was more or less directly emphasised was the relativised French example of such a policy. Individual references to Italy,

England, and states that belonged to the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation have begun to appear only recently, in order to emphasise the difference in the response to this policy also within Spain. Other broader and newer attempts at interpretation place Spain in the context of an Atlantic history that has a West European – American character, while the German speaking historiographers emphasise the further slowing down of development between northern and southern Europe which was visible from the seventeenth/eighteenth centuries onwards. The historiography that deals with Spanish-America interpreted this period more or less clearly as “the beginnings of the history of the independence of Latin America” or as “the end of the Spanish empire” in the context of the Napoleonic period. The researchers only very recently reached beyond the period of Charles III, and even later for reasons extended further back to the times of Philip V.

While initially the processes of the historical development of institutions and constitutions in that century was the domain of not only legal historians, following different methodological and theoretical innovations of the last two decades, these questions, moved to a second plane or were no more than the subject of discussion in the history of law and were pushed to the margins due to their legal positivism. Thus for a long time, the significant changes in the states of the crown of Aragon after the conclusion of the Spanish war of succession were interpreted as a penalty for the uprising against Philip V, and the actions as a tendency towards centralisation that was inspired by France. After the second world war, the Spanish historiography of the Franco era referred to the times of Charles III as “enlightened despotism” and “bourgeoisie revolution”. Early in the 1970s, in his already classical study of Mexican silver mining, an English historian, David Brading, postulated a “Revolution in government” referring to the changes in the mother country at least in reference to the late colonial Mexico. Somewhat later, this author was trying to prove connections with attempts at reformation in the seventeenth century under the reign of the Habsburgs, and explain reforms in a manner more complex than just the top-to-bottom attempt at modernisation and rationalisation of the rule and government. The history of law later took over the notion of a “complex monarchy” and tried to explain reforms as a unification within the framework of Castile Law. What came to the fore in the general historiography was the unclear notion of empire, into which a variety of reformative actions were forced, in an attempt at modernisation or efforts serving to make safe the rule over America. Recently, a biased explanation has been given for the repeated expansion of influence over Italy under Philip V, which views this more as

a restoration of the area that fell under his reign, similar to that of the preceding dynasty, rather than a purely dynastic tendency to provide children from the second marriage of Philip V with Elisabeth of Parma. Speaking of Spanish-America, there were even voices referring to the “second conquest” (König 2006) of the overseas territories that had gained autonomy in the context of the previous political regime of the country.

This brief article acknowledges not only the changed interpretations of historical processes, but emphasises that such interpretations depend very strongly on the earlier evaluations of the period that preceded the Habsburg reign, and the role and significance of Spanish-America in the context of Bourbon policymaking. In both areas, in the last 15 years there have appeared very significant, new premises in research as a result of the opening of new and abundant sources thanks to the nearing of the two-hundredth anniversaries of the independence of the Latin American states, the 400th anniversary of the death of Philip II, and the 500th anniversary of the death of Charles V. In all these cases, we deal with huge state investments into appropriate research and major exhibitions; the Spanish government even established a permanent institution known as *Sociedad Estatal de los Centenarios de...* The commemoration of the years that Philip II and Charles V gave birth, as well as, among others, to the concept of the Spanish monarchy as “the monarchy of courts”, in whose name, Philip II awarded a certain degree of autonomy to the individual parts of the territories he reigned over. Indirectly, this thesis was confirmed independently of the Spanish historiography by the research that focuses on Spanish-America, which worked out the dominant position of both the viceroy metropolises, Lima and Mexico, a characteristic for which there was already an example of their special role in the independence process after the year 1808, which nevertheless could be explained only through large-scale research of the interconnections present in the various areas.

These results revived the discussion about the character of the *Monarchia Hispanica*: whether it was an empire or not. After the works by Anthony Pagden, James Muldoon and others, this question has seemed since the 1990s, to some degree at least, to have been answered. There are, however, symptoms to be found under the reign of Philip II: the assumption of the imperial title was actually considered for a time, and some time later the court entertained imperial symbolism, even though it was never echoed in the official titles used by the then monarch, acts, and treaty policy. An interesting question that is related to this – at least with regard to the overseas territories – is that for some time, the notion of “province” came to the fore also in reference to the metropolitan

regions that defined themselves as *Reinos*, i.e. kingdoms, and were also described in this way by the Crown. Besides them, for example, in New Spain from the seventeenth century, the Creole elites cherished the notion of the Mexican empire – *Imperio mexicano* – even in official ceremonies, like, for example, the reception of the new viceroy. The history of law did not actually consider that too seriously, which may, however, be connected to the rather unsatisfactory explanation of the problem that has remained open since the reign of Philip II, who was very much engaged in codifying the law in his Spanish kingdoms. In Castile, he introduced a collection (and system) of laws entitled *Recopilación de las Leyes de Castilla*, for the Castilian legal order; in Aragon it was *Fori Aragonum*, which was – appropriately for the language used locally for legal purposes – the Latin counterpart of the Castilian *Recopilación*. A similar collection was also ordered for overseas territories. It had been completed by the end of the reign of Philip and published anonymously in 1596, though not publicised. The work was renewed in the seventeenth century, and thus the *Recopilación de las Indias* had been completed by 1638, yet it neither came into effect nor was published. Does such a doubtful status of these texts correspond to the problem of the status of overseas territories?

In 1680, Charles II finally put the *Recopilación de Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias...* into practice, which was distributed in Ibero-America a year later. For the historian, the very title of the work proves that it was different from the two previous ones, as here the Spanish-American territories of the Crown are defined as *Reinos* – kingdoms, just like in the collection of laws, which were defined as *Leyes*, comparable to those that had already been introduced by King Philip II in Castile. In this collection of fundamental laws – in the tradition of Roman law, the *leges* had greater importance than the individual royal instructions in whatever form they took – the character of the kingdoms was recognised for the first time by codified laws, and the territories in America, at least those that enjoyed such a status, were placed on an equal footing to the Spanish kingdoms. In the history of law, which in its scope never dealt with the problem of the Empire, it was asked why this collection of laws was, independently of its predecessors, published so late and at the time when Charles II was considered weak and in poor health. There is much to suggest that there were serious political reasons that triggered these actions, e.g. the first secret plans to divide the Spanish monarchy between Paris and Vienna negotiated around that time, which – though secret – must have been known in Madrid.

Madrid considered maintaining Spanish-American dominions a priority also because – even in the case of a dynastic change in Europe – Spain could still

play a certain political role. Besides, the abundance of precious metals ensured that European powers were greatly interested in these territories. For that reason, everything had to be done so as to maintain the connection between Spanish-America and the mother country, even running into the danger of encumbering the successor of Charles II with difficult political baggage connected to the status of the overseas dominions. Following the Habsburg tradition of reigning, the collection of laws was based on the principle of the legally established state, i.e. the reign over a hierarchy of vassals who define by their properties the territory under the sovereignty of the monarch (*Personenverbandsstaat*). In accordance with the above, authority was exercised over vassals or corporations who lived or existed in a given territory by settling or being established there and through ownership of land. What had to be defined earlier, were only the borders with France, or treaty regulations of dominion over individual islands in America. The Bourbon dynasty was to change that hierarchy in so far as they strove to reign over a territory inhabited by vassals of varied ethnic and legal statuses. This concept of reign was at the same time inseparably connected to the mercantilism that hailed from Colbert, and was even a previous condition for mercantilist economic policy and at the same time an important step towards a modern nation state.

As early as the war of succession – and to a greater extent after its conclusion with the peace treaties of 1714/1715 – Philip V undertook far-reaching means to change drastically the constitutional order of Spain. Already during the war, *intendencias* (departments) known as provinces, with assigned regional jurisdiction, were introduced in the theatres of operation or where troops were stationed; this activity quickly spread across the whole of Spain with the exception of Navarra and the Basque provinces. After the conclusion of the treaty, significant changes took place also at the highest reaches of the monarchy. Together with the so-called *Decretos de Nueva Planta*, the kingdoms of the crown of Aragon, were made equal, i.e. their traditional administrative order was made null and void and subjected to the administrative law of Castile. The viceroys who had at the time governed in Saragossa, Barcelona, and Valencia were recalled and replaced by general captains and governors i.e. officers of military character who started what was called the militarisation of the entire monarchy. With the lowering of the rank of the regions, the departments of the Castilian tax system were introduced, and tax borders between the individual parts of what was now designed to be “Spain” were removed. The capitals of the three parts received their place and right to vote in the Castilian *Cortes*:

these gatherings, however, were summoned only when the order of succession to the throne was changed by the Crown.

In parallel to the above, the Crown reorganised in 1715 the central administration of the monarchy by the establishment of *Secretarías de Estado y del Despacho Universal de...* (followed by the name of the scope of activity), the predecessor of the contemporary ministries. Their number changed, yet soon the secretariat that dealt with foreign relations was developed under the name of *Primera Secretaría de Estado* and fulfilled the executive functions of the Prime Minister of the government; there were also the secretary of justice, for matters of finance and war, and the marine, joint with American affairs. These secretariats, soon furnished with different departments, arranged matters directly with the King, while the former authority of the Council of the Indies was limited ever more to the function of an advisory body and the highest judicial authority. An important element of these actions was primarily the fact that, with their initiation, not only the old authority of the council, when it came to the manner in which it focussed on individual cases, was gradually limited and its importance was being lost, but also that the examination and decision-making in matters other than court procedures were being conducted through these ministries. Executive authority lay with the King and was delegated to the subordinate official units on the order of the King (*real orden*). Thus the old sacred function of the king as the supreme judge who exercised government by deciding what was just in every single affair brought before him, became partially bureaucratic and tended to be more normative. By this process the king lost much of his sacred character especially among the faraway vassals. The former casuistic procedures were increasingly replaced by government through normative general ordinances. Parallel to the above, the Crown tried to introduce gradually administrative routines. Within the Habsburg system, every person or institution – at least theoretically – had the right to turn directly to the king – even if they had to wait a decade for an answer; now such cases were directed either through the regular court procedures, or the decision was made after appropriate information had been gathered directly within the administrative hierarchy. In the same manner, the distance to the monarchy, when it came to being a source of law, was increasing. Together with the geographic distance of the person making the complaint, the path of appeals was lengthening. For politically conscious institutions and individuals in overseas countries, the subordination of American territories to the Ministry of the Navy could be considered to be degrading in terms of their relationship to the mother country.

The actions towards the former kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon soon turned out – on the basis of successive steps – to anticipate the new perspective on policymaking that was conducted by the new dynasty, which served the new administrative and much more centralised structure of the Spanish monarchy. These activities were soon followed by complementary reforms, such as the state administration taking over the entire financial administration and tax collection, and their subjugation to the new provincial and military intendant, who were embarking on the construction of a system of provincial militia based on the drafting and recruitment of men that did not belong to the gentry in order to build military reserves. As well as the reorganisation of the Spanish navy and related to that, the registration of men in coastal areas in order to allow them to be drafted if war broke out has to be seen as a step towards territorialisation. Since these measures preceded the reforms in America, Americans could start preventive measures based on the fundamental laws of the *Recopilación* of 1680 that remained valid, as the new dynasty did not dare to abolish it entirely. Conflicts of legitimacy thus were unavoidable.

The reforms in the army and navy were accompanied also by the policy of recruiting sons of the nobility to serve as officers, and through the discipline and uniformity of the army – subordinating its members to the military courts, and the establishment of professional training centres – introduced incentives for becoming officers who would serve in the Army and Navy. The graduates of secondary and higher officer schools were entrusted to an ever greater degree with various governmental functions in Spain and in America, so that throughout the eighteenth century, not only the militarisation of the administration but also of public life was commented upon. Soon after his accession to the throne, King Charles III ordered that throughout the kingdom mourning be observed early in November for all the military personnel who had died in the wars for Spain. Many of the sermons preached on this occasion were later printed. In parallel to that the “Orden de Carlos III” was established; it was an order for civilian merit that was awarded to, apart from the military who had distinguished themselves in public life, lawyers, scientists, merchants, and the clergy – in other words, to all the subjects whose involvement in different fields of life was outstanding.

Soon after he had inherited the throne, and still during the war of succession, Philip V opened a new front along with his government, by entering into a conflict with the Roman Curia and the high clergy of Spain. In 1707, the King summoned the clergy in the territories he controlled and demanded that they pay subsidies. They rejected that claim, arguing that a concession from

the Pope was required. Not eager to become entangled in the war for the throne, Pope Clement XI confirmed the position of the Spanish clergy. Against the Council of Louis XIV, Philip escalated the conflict by nominating Melchor Rafael de Macanaz for the office of *Juez de Confiscaciones* – which was responsible for collecting subsidies and was created *ad hoc* in Valencia. In December of the same year, he published the decree requesting that the clergy declare their belongings. Later on in the conflict, in 1709, King Philip V broke relations with the papacy and closed the office of the Nuncio in Madrid. Preparing for the negotiations in Paris, which the Pope and Louis XIV were striving for, in 1713, Philip ordered Macanaz, who already possessed the position of the Royal Attorney of the Castilian Council, to prepare a report on the use of the influence of the Curia in Spain. In the report, Macanaz charged Rome with such basic abuses as: the accumulation of church estates; too many monasteries, church institutions and clergy; the immunity of church institutions; the excessive outflow of church funds to Rome, etc, which in the later periods of the eighteenth century was to become increasingly significant. At the same time, the report noted that the Spanish felt equally exploited by Rome as the *Indios* in America were by the local elites. In this way, the idea that the *Indios* were exploited by American Spaniards, which had appeared at least subliminally for an entire century among the Spanish, now for the first time made its way into official texts; this time in connection with the notion that the Spanish themselves were being exploited. It found a reflection in the anti-Creole policy of the Crown towards America, and was independent of the conflict with Rome; the heads of the Spanish state maintained a lack of trust towards church institutions and the clergy. In wider public opinion, an attitude of hostility towards France and the French was beginning to harden. Visible in the Spain of the early eighteenth century was a deep, internal rift: this was between the dynasty closely linked to France and the political elites who supported it, and the population whose attitude was becoming increasingly anti-French, which in many ways presaged the situation after 1808.

The year 1717 finally saw another depolarisation between Philip V and the Curia, and the restoration of diplomatic relations on the basis of the *status quo ante*. Macanaz was removed from his office and imprisoned. The context for this new attitude was the marriage of Philip V to Elisabeth of Parma, which soon brought Italian policy to the fore, and the confrontation with the church and Pope was replaced by the wish to regain the Crown's influence in Italy. The sons of Philip and Elisabeth of Parma were the dynastic vehicle to reach that objective. This situation later facilitated the eldest son of the couple, Charles,

becoming the King of Naples (after 1730), and helped his elder brother, King Ferdinand VI, resolve the open problems in the relations between the State and Church via the Concordat with the Apostolic See in 1753.

Although it was already evident in 1717 that the Crown was beginning the expansion of reforming activities in America and enforced the abolition of purchasing offices, a new interim viceroyship was established in New Granada, today's Colombia. Already, however, in 1721, the reforming policy ceased to be extended onto America, only to undertake it anew, in a more decisive manner, at the end of the reign of Philip V; that is, from c. 1740. Despite the marriage to Elisabeth of Parma and conflict with the Curia, the eastern flank of the monarchy was strengthened for other political reasons, namely the recapturing of the Balearic Islands and the annexation of Gibraltar by the English, and combining this with accommodating elites of Catalonia and Valencia and even Aragon, interested predominantly in the western areas of the Mediterranean. After the defeat in the war of succession, and as a result devoid of their due privileges, and with the policy of suppression of the Catalan language in administration, the elites of these kingdoms had to resign themselves to the new dynasty as quickly as possible, considering themselves defeated. Besides these factors, there was a need for a policy of balancing these actions in the remaining part of Spain, as the reforms and the conflict with the Roman Curia and clergy, as well as domination by foreigners – initially, the French and later, Italians and Spaniards from the North – in policy-making led to problems when it came to the acceptance of other parts of the state.

Besides the intensive policy-making in the western area of the Mediterranean, which was used to strengthen the European policy, since 1720s, the policy concerning the Atlantic fleet continued to acquire increasing importance. The inflexible system of both the fleets moving every year between Spain and America was loosened, and the marginal provinces, like Buenos Aires, Venezuela, and Cuba, were gradually awarded the development of direct maritime connections to the mother country. This was to prevent the increasingly active smuggling on the one hand, but also at the same time was intended to weaken the direct or indirect control of the two American metropolises. Since the 1730s, there had been a policy of establishing privileged companies that had a monopoly on trade that – from the headquarters in Spain – controlled trade and goods exchanged with various marginal provinces, especially in the Caribbean. For a long time, research overlooked the fact that these companies were the expression of not only a mercantilist trade policy favourable for the mother country, but also that at the same time they were also used to break –

besides the foreign trafficking – the economic control, and connected to it, also the political control of these areas by the viceroy metropolises. These companies were a significant part of the already mentioned “second conquest”, after which – in a few years or decades – the companies were dissolved and financial and military intendants directly subordinated to the metropolis were introduced. Such a policy meant the gradual limitation of the scope of authority and competence of the viceroys both in Lima and Mexico.

The situation that – independent from the liquidation of the offices of the viceroys in Aragon – the Crown continued to nominate viceroys in America has not been sufficiently examined. It could be, on the one hand, an expression of the indirect recognition of the legal situation that developed as a result of the *Recopilación de las leyes de Indias*, yet on the other – it can be explained by the awareness of the threats of the vast changes in legal relations in America. Already the first viceroy nominated by Philip V in Mexico, the Count of Alburquerque, opposed the actions of the Crown. It was so as the viceroys sent to America were confronted in their capitals with a complex and influential structure of interests and not with a colonial community. Ten years earlier, under the last of the Habsburg dynasty, the crowd – incited by the elitist interest groups stormed the royal palace. Besides that, viceroys that came from aristocracy pursued their own, most often material interests, at the same time caring for their image as the royal *alter ego*, which they needed in order to perform their tasks. Due to the politics of the Crown aiming to limit the influence of both the Viceroy capitals, many post holders resorted to defence strategies towards the policy of the Crown, which, among other things, included the tactics of using the strategy of bureaucratisation and centralisation of the Crown to develop an administrative apparatus in the viceroy capitals that was under their own control. For that reason in both the capitals – Lima and Mexico – throughout the eighteenth century there continually developed a concentration of administrative bodies that were formally subordinated to the viceroys, yet in fact claiming their share of the execution of power. The attitudes of the viceroy court developed in communities parallel to the court in Madrid, where conflicts were often resolved by symbolic politics.

In 1746, the new viceroy arrived in Mexico, in the person of the First Count von Revillagigedo. He came from a family that had served in the military under the new dynasty. He sent an order – *orden* – to the city council – *Cabildo* – in a matter of wholly secondary importance. The council was infuriated with the manner of the Viceroy's conduct and decided to send two of its members to the Viceroy to explain that, following the tradition, viceroys –

being representatives of the community – do not give written orders to city councils but send a note – *billete* – in a manner similar to sending their wishes to the Archbishop as a request and instruction – *ruego y encargo*. Looking at the frontispiece of the *Gaceta de México*, published monthly, from the mid-1720s under licence from the viceroy and archbishop, we discover that nearly every edition of the gazette was published with a graphic symbol and textual explanations of the culture of the Aztec country. The periodical was also quite naturally sent to Madrid; therefore, the attitude of the Creole elites was very well-known in the capital of the Monarchy. The mentioned Viceroys also began the first profound reforms in New Spain at a time when the Crown undertook the first “frontal attack” towards Lima, and in 1748 established definitively the new Viceroyship of New Granada with the capital in Bogota, whose territory had previously mainly fallen under the jurisdiction of Lima. At the same time, the trade in posts was also done away with – an action pertaining primarily to the offices of the district, where offices were purchased frequently by the members of the merchant elite, to protect themselves against the reluctant alien command, and also to control – through a certain outwork system – trade and production. When at the same time, the Crown ordered that restrictions be placed on the trade in goods by the district’s officers, Viceroy Revillagigedo ordered spacious files with data on the trade to be submitted to individual jurisdictions. When the time to inform Madrid about that action came, the files disappeared; such a situation continued for many years, as long as the danger existed. The files were later returned under the seal of the secret of confession. Although in fact these restrictions began in Peru, it turned out to be largely useless. When in 1749 Madrid asked the Viceroy Revillagigedo whether he would recommend the introduction of the system of intendants in New Spain, he argued them earnestly against such a solution, as different circumstances required a different system of government. Nevertheless, in the following years, he successfully took over the collection of indirect taxation for the state administration, which formerly had been in different hands, and which contributed to the establishment of numerous positions in the administration and reinforced the political standing of the capital of Mexico in relation to Madrid.

The growing political role of viceregal capitals was, on the other hand, widening the differences between the provinces that they ruled, as these were becoming increasingly more dependent. It so happened that the envoys to the Viceroy of the cities lying in the hinterland were accompanied in audiences by two members of the municipal council of México. The Council of the capital city made use of this right on the grounds of having been elevated to the rank

of “the first city of New Spain”, which had already been expressed by Charles V. Looking back, the independence movements validated the opposition of the viceregal metropolises to their nearer and further environment, be they the more distant internal provinces, in Northern New Spain, or the Ibero-American border provinces as Venezuela and Buenos Aires, where the independence movements appeared. In 1808, after the abdication of Charles V and his son Ferdinand VII, which Napoleon had demanded, animated movements of the junta character could be observed in the Ibero-American metropolises. These movements wanted to ensure for themselves swift legitimisation, and found numerous other ways of expressing opposition towards the Spanish metropolis, as only they – as a result of the fact that they transmitted the collected taxes – held the means to apply pressure, even against the will of the viceroys.

Much like in the mother country, where as a result of the political reforms, the differences between the court and its environment were aggravated, in Ibero-America, the rift between the metropolises of the viceroys and the provinces that were subordinate to them was deepening. This required the involvement of high-ranking and politically experienced royal representatives who were able to govern the distant territories in a peaceful manner and eliminate obstacles, which might have been the reason why the judicious followers of Viceroy Revillagigedo warned against the introduction of the system of intendants, as American territories could be governed politically and not through the bureaucracy of administration operating in a more executive manner. In Spain itself, resistance was also developing against the policy of reforms on behalf of local nobility and on the part of the clergy. This was true, even among the lawyers that came from the elitist university *Colegios Mayores* who often played the dominant role both in the councils of the central authorities and the higher courts – *Audiencias y Chancillerías*, on both sides of the Atlantic and were often educated by the Jesuits, who dominated the system of education. The lawyer elites were mostly biased against the more executive attitudes in the governance practised by the new dynasty, and they frequently improved the success of complaints against the practices of the government, calling upon the ancient legal tradition. Governmental positions, besides the new military type, were increasingly held by the legal newcomers who graduated from the same universities, but not as members of the elitist colleges. Similarly, among the clergy there was a marked division into the more traditional fraction, and the progressive regalists, which was frequently defined as being the Jansenist current. For a long time, attempts were made to use in the description of these factions the division line of the Enlightenment, yet this interpretation does not

stand up to criticism, as for example, the Jesuit order *in puncto* of natural philosophy assumed a decidedly modern and progressive attitude, even though it defended the idea of representation in its traditional form and regional tendencies towards autonomy. Nevertheless, the Enlightenment in Spain was a spiritual movement supported by a part of the clergy, which began to spread towards the end of the 1730s, and was promoted by a Benedictine monk, Benito Feijóo. That movement did not become of critical significance until the mid-eighteenth century. The beginning of the political reforms of the Bourbons, and their political vision of their reign's territorialisation were, however, connected far more strongly to the rationalism of the late seventeenth century and mercantilism in Colbert's style.

This tendency is also visible in the political discourses of the first half of the century, which was marked by a mercantilism that focussed the Atlantic trade and relations with the overseas territories. Published in 1724 was the book on the theory and practice of the Spanish trade by a clerk Gerónimo de Uztáriz, which was succeeded in the first half of the century by numerous other works on the subject: some printed and some not. In late 1730s and early 1740s, these authors pointed to a colonial complementarity between Spain and Ibero-America; they were joined by the minister of finance, war and the navy, José del Campillo y Cossío. He believed that Spain should develop industry and production plants fed from Ibero-America with the necessary raw materials, in order to later receive the finished products from the mother country. Following these Spanish discourses, the American territories were openly defined as *Colonias* in the modern understanding. It remains unknown to what level these publications were controlled by the Crown in order to protect its policy of industrialisation and the establishment of production plants, yet such an option remains quite probable. Together with the establishment of academies and new educational institutions, the press was used by the reformers who controlled these institutions to promote their policies to an ever greater degree. It must be stated here that this new language was not welcome in the overseas territories: more or less covert messages can be found in the journalism of the Ibero-American metropolises.

Ferdinand VI, the successor of Philip V, initially continued the reform policy. The minister of war and finance, the Marquis Ensenada, who supported a close relationship with France, conducted his broad project of introducing the *contribución única*, which was a sort of uniform income tax, on the grounds of defining all the subjects' individual property situation. To achieve that, spacious cadastre counts were conducted. The project failed, however, when King

Ferdinand, when faced with the seven years war, opted for a consistent policy of neutrality; he recalled Ensenada and had him imprisoned. After the mental illness of Ferdinand, the reign of the childless monarch ended in 1759 without further crucial reforms. In the same year, he was succeeded to the throne by Charles III, his stepbrother, who had already reigned for many years in Naples. His involvement on the French side in the seven years war led to the defeat of Spain. The loss of Cuba, the Philippines, and other territories was painful, even though in the peace of Paris, Cuba and the Philippines were given back by England, and the loss of Florida was partially compensated by the purchase of Louisiana. These failures at the beginning of his reign induced Charles to embark energetically on a reform policy. The ambitious programme of modernising the capital – Madrid – and expanding the reform activities over the Viceroyalty of New Spain was met with the resistance of the colonies and provoked a popular uprising in Madrid in 1766, which forced the king to flee from his capital.

Viva el Rey, muera el mal gobierno – long live the king, death to bad governments – was the battle cry of the rabble-rousers, as was often the case during times of rebellions and uprisings in the Spanish monarchy on both sides of the Atlantic. The riots, however, did not limit themselves to the capital, yet in the provinces they could be quickly subdued. Once the negotiations had ended, order in Madrid was successfully restored at the price of the reorganisation of the Cabinet. After the appropriate examination of cases, the council of the state discussed the necessary consequences in secret sessions. It was decided that the institution that stood behind the riots was the Jesuit Order, and its banishment was decided upon – much like in Portugal ten years earlier – from all the territories of the monarchy. During the action – which was kept secret and organised by the general command – they were simultaneously jettisoned from the European and American territories in 1767. Members of the order were deported to the Church State and for the rest of their lives were to receive modest pensions. In America, especially in the New Spain, the exiling of the Jesuits, so deeply rooted in the society, resulted in unrest among the indigenous population in the flatlands, yet these were successfully contained. The expropriation of the order's opulent possessions and the sales that resulted from them to interested parties in the regions, and the transfer of the cultural goods to other local institutions of education, helped somewhat to dampen the dissatisfaction with the original action. The reforming activities conducted at the same time with regard to the administration and in the church of New Spain aggravated the existing antagonisms. In 1772, the city council of Mexico sent a long letter to King Charles III, in which it claimed – in the spirit of the

terminology of the *Recopilación* of 1680 – self-government (*Reino*) and the resulting right for the government to be conducted by a person coming from New Spain, and limiting relations with Spain to the maintenance of fraternal relations, while demanding at the same time a separate subordination solely to the King. This without doubt was a reaction to the Crown's policy of appointing European Spaniards to significant posts in the administration. Two years later, mine owners expressed their claims even more clearly, demanding the establishment of a privileged organisation. In a long text, they pointed to the fact that New Spain could not cope with paying for imports from the mother country without mining and its revenues, otherwise they could see no other option but to develop swiftly their own system of manufacturing industry. It was a barely hidden threat towards the European colonial power that also indicated a change in relations. The Crown reacted immediately and acceded to their demands.

At the same time, the council of state finally approved an extensive political programme in 1766. It envisaged undertaking all the possible steps that would integrate America and Spain into a uniform national state, *Cuerpo unido de Nación*. To involve people more strongly in the reform programmes, the Crown promoted the establishment of local or regional patriotic societies – *Sociedades Económicas de Amigos del País*. They were to care “on the spot” for the improvement of the economy, the protection of the poor, improved education, and similar supporting actions, and – through their joint reading and discussion of contemporary literature – develop and carry out appropriate projects. To increase the efficiency of the fossilised structures in city councils on both sides of the Atlantic, the introduction of honorary councillors and annual elections of *procurador síndico del común* – a legal representative of the public good – was ordered. This policy was extremely efficient in Spain. Appropriate societies sprouted up everywhere, and began their work, even though some were successful only for a few years. Others, as for example the *Sociedad Vascongada* of the Basque provinces, exist even to this day. That particular society managed to acquire numerous members also in America. Only in New Spain, was the organisation joined by more than 500 representatives of the economic elite of Basque origin. In other parts of America, the response was much poorer, possibly because in the years following 1776 which marked the outbreak of the American war of independence, the Crown clearly refrained from establishing such societies. Moreover, the national rhetoric enjoyed greater popularity in Spain. The arrival of the notion of “la nación española” which was present as early as the 1780s in many documents – years before the French

Revolution – became a popular slogan in the absolutely modern understanding. Similarly, the municipal reforms seemed to be successful, gradually helping to drive away the elites from the city councils on both sides of the Atlantic, and to have them at least partially replaced with new groupings. From around 1780, there was serious anxiety in Madrid about the development of the situation in America, and independence tendencies were feared. The question of which social groups should dominate politics to prevent that would increasingly come to the fore thereafter. After the French Revolution and the assumption to the throne of King Charles IV, the ruling house discredited itself, therefore, it was only the Crown – a symbol that had been quoted for centuries but which did not exist materially – that connected the various parts of the kingdom.

Attempts were made to characterise the constitutional development of the Spanish monarchy with the aid of numerous general notions, prominent among which were all the possible variants of absolutism and/or despotism, the Bourbon reformism, the Enlightenment, etc. Yet as was stated earlier, the research on the eighteenth century in the post-Franco period drew primarily from the countless sources that that policy produced regarding the administration, army, finance, navy, production, etc. The contents of source materials available made the reform policy perceived as highly impressive, and even effective. Yet the old structures that were hidden below it which concerned justice, senatorial and church rule, influence and possession manifested themselves only much later, primarily when the many aspects of the first desamortisation – as the Spanish language defines secularisation – at the end of the eighteenth century under Charles IV (which, after all, suited the nation's value system) were more precisely researched. The dynasty administratively reorganised, if not modernised, the monarchy. This took place, however, not without the participation of the estates, and was dictated from the top, and for that reason was located on the edge of the inherited legal justification. This is why, after the exile of Jesuits, the dynasty encountered problems with legitimisation that were far stronger in America than in Spain itself. As early as the 1770s, the need for a new legal code for this very reason emerged also on behalf of the ruled. Charles III had appropriated the works that had been initiated. They lasted for nearly three decades. When the *Novísima Recopilación* was finally published in 1804, it turned out to be of such little interest, that even the latest literature concerning Spanish constitutional history during the Napoleonic period either does not mention it or refers to it only while listing sources and literature.

Looking at the political relations in Ibero-America on the eve of independence, we see a highly varied picture. Four Viceroyalties originated from the

formerly dominant two – with capitals in Lima and Mexico. The new ones – New Granada with the capital in Bogota, and Río de la Plata with the capital in Buenos Aires differed radically from the two old ones in terms of population, cultural and political organisation, and economic potential. Mexico, which territorially was politically reduced to more or less to today's Mexico and the northern lands that were seized by the US in the nineteenth century, possessed approximately 200 Spanish cities, highly differentiated in their size and importance. They were governed by municipal councils composed of city councillors, who owned their positions, and a certain number of additional, annually elected honorary councillors, subordinate to the intendants of 11 or 12 intendencias (departments) or their delegates nominated from among the local inhabitants. Together with the intendant or delegate presiding over the council, the *Alcaldes* were elected every year by the members of the council and held executive and the judicial power at the first instance and regulated other municipal matters. The cities were strictly controlled by one of the powers operating in the capital. Besides these, there were around a dozen indigenous cities under the control of a Spanish officer of the appropriate intendant of the province. Independent of the population mix of those cities, aldermen of the councils were always recruited here from the indigenous elite. Besides these, there were approximately 4000 *Indio*-Municipalities that were also subject to the intendants or the delegates, whose council members and persons holding offices were nevertheless elected annually in direct elections from among all the adult males. These elections did not meet today's customs, as they were held in the form of a gathering of all the males, who in a specific "dispute" decided who should take a given post. Thus, a traditional type of direct democracy was in operation here, which could be observed still in nineteenth century military pronunciamientos, when military chiefs wrote down their objectives and made the draft circulate among the villages in order to have them discussed, expanded or amended by the plenary assembly of adults male citizens, who were supposed to back – and finance – the uprising. The intendants and military governors of the fortified cities were subordinate to the Viceroy and his strongly developed central bureaucracy in the matters of finance and government, but in judicial matters answered to both the central courts of appeal in the cities of Mexico and Guadalajara. Besides these, there were two corporate organisations of merchants and mining entrepreneurs with their own judiciary, who enjoyed a high social status. Universities operated in the cities of Mexico and Guadalajara. Dioceses in Yucatan, Oaxaca, Puebla, Valladolid de Michoacán, Guadalajara, and Durango were subordinate to the Archbishop of the City of Mexico. Acapulco

and Veracruz were the two central ports through which nearly all maritime traffic was passed. Like earlier, besides the payments that were transferred to the metropolis, Mexico had to pay high annual subsidies for the benefit of, among others, Puerto Rico, Santo Domingo, Florida, Cuba, and Venezuela, which – under the influence of the policy of Madrid – increasingly refrained from buying the necessary goods in Mexico. This contributed to the alienation towards the mother country.

Of all its zones of influence, Peru kept only Chile, which was subjected to the viceroy in Lima. Its internal organisation was comparable to that of Mexico, yet it had a far smaller number of Spanish cities and self-governing Indio-communes. Moreover, the oppositions between Lima and the plateau around Cusco intensified. The uprising by the cacique Túpac Amaru in 1780, covering a large share of the plateau, was smothered only with difficulty, and with the support of other highland caciques.

Ecuador with its capital in Quito was subjected to New Granada. Venezuela, which used to belong to it earlier, became liberated from under Colombian control and constituted itself as an autonomous province. The territory was decidedly sparsely populated, held only a small number of Indio-communes and Spanish cities, and was inhabited much like Venezuela primarily by free people living in coastal regions of black African origin, and black slaves, that is groups without political rights. Due to the uprising of the indigenous American people of 1780 against the taxation and politics of reforms introduced by the Crown, New Granada, poorly integrated politically and communicatively, managed to prevent the introduction of the system of intendants. In today's Ecuador, clearly visible are the differences between the plateau with its indigenous features and capital in Quito, and the areas of plantations with Guayaquil inhabited by African Blacks. While, besides a few Spanish cities, there were plenty of Indo-communes of municipal character in the plateau, the coastal city of Guayaquil dominated the surrounding settlements and areas of plantations. In Venezuela, people in municipal organisations, much like the economically dominant plantations, were also concentrated in the coastal zones while the base remained an open frontier region, administratively and religiously unorganised.

The Río de la Plata Viceroyalty was also poorly integrated. The quickly growing port and capital city of Buenos Aires was joined by the Pampa: its base, though inhabited, yet poorly organised politically; while nearly the entire south of today's Argentina was the borderland with nomadic Indian tribes integrated neither politically nor culturally. There were a few Spanish cities of local central functions in the Argentinean Mesopotamia, yet they were sparsely popu-

lated by people who were only superficially organised, and hailing from the disbanded Jesuit organisations (after the exile of the Jesuits in 1767–1768). The subordinate province of Paraguay was nearly entirely autonomous and economically dependent on Maté exports controlled by Buenos Aires. Montevideo, which developed only in the eighteenth century as a bulwark against the Portuguese invasion of Río de la Plata and depended on grants from Buenos Aires, at the same time drawing profits from its port, situated far more favourably than the one in Buenos Aires. It was only far to the west of the viceroyalty, that the provinces established earlier were situated; their number included Mendoza, belonging to Chile, and Córdoba with its ancient university – established once as Peru, and now subjected to the viceroy in Buenos Aires, Tucumán, and others that were fully dependent economically on the Upper Peru (today's Bolivia), which belonged also to Buenos Aires. These highland regions with rich silver mines and relatively dense population focusing partially in few Spanish cities, yet mostly in the indigenous municipalities, were the economic centre of the Viceroyalty, which – much like the cities of Córdoba and Tucumán – rejected subordination to Buenos Aires. The very composition of the two new viceroyalties permits the statement that their foundation was the result of the Bourbon policy of regaining control over Ibero-America, which additionally aggravated the already existing Ibero-American conflicts. This is why it is not surprising that the independence movement in many aspects embraced the results of former antagonisms leading to the fact that – depending on the development and the status quo – not only was the question “whether or not to stay with Spain” asked, but also political projects – reaching from an empire via monarchy up to a centralist or federative republic – were born.

The whole Caribbean region provided an entirely different picture, irrespective of whether it was controlled by Spain or by other foreign powers. The Spanish Caribbean was for a long time controlled more indirectly than directly from Mexico. Until the end of the seventeenth century it was a poorly developed region, whose quick development began only after the formal recognition of the foreign holdings by Spain around 1660. Since that time, the foreign powers took decisive action against the pirates and corsairs, who had previously been supported directly or indirectly, and provided an important factor in colonial competition. The Caribbean was first included into the European international legal system, which had not taken place earlier due to the Spanish monopolist claims. This was still based on the papal bulls of 1493 and the resultant Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494 between Portugal and Castile, in line with

which Spain refrained from drawing America into its European treaty policy until the end of the Thirty Years' War. It often remains unnoticed that it was only around 1660 that European treaty law was gradually expanded into America (Kahle 1993). In the eighteenth century, faced with the economic importance of American deposits of precious metals under Spanish control, peace treaties concluded by European powers after major pan-European military conflicts would first decide about colonial interests and only thereafter deal with regulations of internal European matters. As Hans-Otto Kleinmann correctly remarked, Europe at that time became more "Western" or "Atlantic" (Kleinmann 2001). The consequences of that process for Latin America, however, still remain scarcely examined. Nevertheless, they formed the potential background for the statement that the international recognition and protection of external borders was the central political matter of the states gaining independence in Latin America, as was mentioned at the beginning. This was so as the European military conflicts began to spread quickly on to America, and primarily onto the Caribbean. From Spain, this required intensification of military efforts also in America, which in turn had its reflection in the reform effort leading to the increased revenue of the Treasury. As the old Spanish colonial metropolises – on the one hand for geographic reasons, on the other also as producers of precious metals that were so eagerly sought – felt less threatened by war, the interests of Spain and Ibero-America were becoming increasingly divergent.

Due to the quick growth of the transatlantic slave trade and the rapidly increasing significance of the plantation economy (sugar, tobacco, cocoa), this area quickly became internationalised. The English (Jamaica, Guyana, some of the Lesser Antilles, Central America), the French (the western half of Haiti, Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique), the Dutch (Guyana, Curaçao, Lesser Antilles), Danes (St. Thomas, Lesser Antilles), and through Denmark also northern Germans (the Hamburg suburb of Altona belonged, much like Schleswig-Holstein, to Denmark), and even Swedes (St. Barthélemy) had their dominions in the region, and their ships ever more often travelled to the Caribbean as if in "the gold rush". Even small islands were becoming *entrepôts* for slave trade and major smuggling to Spanish America. What was mistakenly defined as "the Atlantic triangular trade" – as, in fact there were far more complex trade networks and roads – was conducted besides European powers listed above even by Portuguese ships; there was also the trade of the Anglo-American colonies with the Caribbean, which – on the way through Mexico – allowed the shortest connections to Asia. It was only the construction of the Suez

Canal that contributed to the region losing its importance in communication with Asia. After Philip V introduced his sons from the second marriage to Parma/Piacenza and Naples in 1730, which – due to the attitude to the Roman Curia – could be of significance to the major Italian interests of Spain, the king focused more strongly on American problems. As has been mentioned, the Caribbean holdings of Spain were – thanks to the aid of privileged trading companies – more strongly connected with the mother country, and their development was based on the import of African slaves. Spain was seeking a way into the lucrative plantation economy. At the same time, Buenos Aires tried to sustain itself with an increased import of slaves. Even though the African slaves reached Spanish America through foreign intermediaries (as Spain had no direct access to the African coast as a result of the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494), even in the days of Spanish Habsburgs, they were not a quantitatively significant population in the old metropolises. Nevertheless, on the little developed borders of the Spanish colonial empire a dynamic “Black Spanish America” developed economically (Meissner, Mücke, Weber 2008). Especially Cuba, Venezuela, Puerto Rico, and Buenos Aires were gaining from this development directed against the old colonial metropolises, which for that reason articulated more strongly their own political interests, partially against the old colonial dependencies and also – increasingly strongly – against the mother country. When the slaves rebelled in the French Haiti and massacred the white planters in 1803, and the news of that spread quickly through a variety of means, printed word included, in Spanish America, the results were long-lasting. Even though a biased assumption is made for the Spanish area namely that slavery in this area was less rigorous, and the opportunity slaves had there to become liberated was greater than anywhere else, the event increased the distrust between the ethnic elements of the population.

We should mention, finally, the further consequences of the Bourbon policy of reforms for Latin America, which must be defined as purely Spanish. Soon after the end of the Spanish war of succession, by reforming central administration, Philip V strengthened fiscal and military administration, and general governmental tasks by the inherited procedures of conduct based on the Roman law, which was focused on examination of individual cases by legally trained officers, and organised these along the procedures based on execution and authority. Governmental posts were increasingly often manned by military trained personnel according to the new principles, whose actions were result-oriented and whose training encompassed the new technical and empirical knowledge. As far as the high military rank in the earlier days was rather a mark of nobility,

now a successful military career became a condition for ennoblement. The new military organisation introduced by the Bourbons ensured – besides ornate uniforms – military careers through provincial militias also to reserve officers working in civil areas, and protection through special military courts. This led ever more strongly to the militarisation of administration and further fields of public life, which in the second half of the century permeated also to America. The old elites were defiant due to their different perception of government, which helped, however, its gradual marginalisation in administration and the army. Prospects of such careers opened for Americans in Spain. Despite numerous examples of such transcontinental carriers in both directions, this phenomenon has not yet been sufficiently studied. As the traditional scheme of opposition between Creoles and European Spaniards was at the same time questioned, no conclusions of general nature may be made here.

Traditionally dominant in the administration during the Habsburg period, the lawyers who captured the central authorities in the councils of the metropolises gradually lost influence over the course of the eighteenth century and were pushed back to the margins that encompassed the judiciary and court administration. The new sites of education that were connected to the new practical and empirical sciences were for a long time limited only to the mother country, and had not appeared in Spanish America until the last decades of the eighteenth century. For that reason, special opportunities to acquire education – especially after the Jesuits were exiled – appeared for the youth aspiring to become clergy, and the future lawyers and the physicians who were traditionally educated in the universities of Ibero-America; yet employment opportunities were limited. Similarly, the professions of a clerk or a notary – available without university education – were strongly reduced in the new administrative order. This development may be perceived as the primary cause of the situation in which the Spanish American claim to reserve the public offices and posts in administration only for people born in America was becoming stronger. The sons of rich parents increasingly chose to travel for a few years to Europe in order to acquire an education, where they embarked on a variety of careers, like, for example, Francisco de Miranda from Venezuela, who first served first in the Spanish army, then in the French revolutionary army and who would later fight for Venezuelan independence, but who would eventually be defeated. Simón Bolívar, a son of rich planters, who after Miranda would also fight for independence, had his Grand Tour of Europe in order to acquire knowledge and experience. There are plenty of other examples of this kind. On the other hand, it is also important to note the cases of innumerable represen-

tatives of lower clergy and lawyers who did not succeed, and who for that reason became increasingly disgruntled. Against this background, it is of little wonder that the number of harbingers of independence, and the fathers of the Latin-American constitution drafts, included lawyers and clergy from that social stratum that – besides officers of the militia who acquired military experience and developed leadership skills during the battles – had a decisive influence on the course of events.

Somewhat different were relations in Brazil, where the entire Portuguese court was transported as early as 1808 by the English fleet. Besides the Royal family, approx. 16,000 Portuguese connected to the court reached the capital of Rio de Janeiro. Internal developments in Brazil had been delayed when compared to Spanish America, and occurred from around 1710, when rich deposits of gold were discovered in the interior of the country and they began to be exploited. This process was a new opportunity for many people from the cities situated close to the shore, which helped to alleviate social tensions. As the press arrived quite late in Brazil, and there was no university education, cultural life was rather weaker, and there was no excess of graduates seeking employment. Moreover, only small movements and caucuses turned up in Brazil during the period of revolution, and struggled to achieve any changes in political relations. The arrival of a huge group of Portuguese, with their anti-French and anti-Napoleonic attitude, who were the source of the educated elite in the country, also prevented movements comparable to those that emerged in Spanish America in the last decade of the eighteenth century. Independence and the establishment of the Brazilian empire took place only as a result of the decisions taken within the Royal family, long after the conclusion of the Congress of Vienna, in the period of the restoration, when the general assembly in the mother country demanded the restoration of the *status quo ante* and threatened to remove the King if he did not return to Lisbon. At the time, the Brazilian elite applied pressure on the new Emperor Pedro I to devise a constitution, or at least prevent authoritarian rule.

Independent of the events of 1808 that presaged the future developments mentioned above, Spanish America was entirely surprised by developments in Europe. The abdication of Charles IV and his son Ferdinand VII, which Napoleon had forced, and the later appointment of Joseph Bonaparte as King of Spain, whose entry into Spain at the head of the French troops and the radical change in the form of government through the constitution of Bayonne in Spain produced a problem of legitimacy. Similarly, popular uprisings that broke out everywhere, and the establishment of the *Juntas* who took power in the

name of Ferdinand VII to begin the struggle against the hated French, led to a situation in which news that required the authorities to react reached the Ibero-American capitals literally every month. Together with the imprisonment and the abdication of the kings, being the source of legitimisation, legitimisation was exhausted, whatever the assessment of the processes preceding them. The messengers of the new King Joseph and a variety of *Juntas* were received – sent one after another – and demanded obedience and subordination, not least because of their interest in the rich financial resources of Spanish America. With the abdication of the kings, did the viceroys and officers nominated by Charles IV also lose their legitimacy? Should people take their future into their hands, which – on the grounds of binding law – seemed fully justified? As the scandals that surrounded the family of Charles IV discredited him completely, one could quickly agree to recognise Ferdinand VII did the Spanish regency. As far, however, as the question of whether an independent administrative unit could take over the regency in the name of Ferdinand – and if so, in what form – or whether it would become subordinated to the Spanish *Junta*, opinions were divided, with those interest groups who were the best organised and who operated in the most decisive manner coming to the fore. With the consent of the highest court, the *Audiencia*, and a group of rich Euro-Spanish, a putsch broke out in the City of Mexico, where the governing viceroy wanted to establish a *Junta* whose rule would cover the entire country. Other places were subordinated to the *Junta Central*, which was quickly formed in the mother country, while other territories established their own *juntas*. Compared to the example of the USA, which in this period had gained independence, and the individual plots of Euro Spaniards suspected of independence tendencies, who – most often thanks to the policy of the Bourbon kings – obtained important posts in America, one can interpret the penchant for establishing *juntas* as being the first step towards independence. The quick succession of events intensified the political climate and rendered a matter-of-fact assessment impossible. When the Spanish *Junta Central* announced the election of a parliamentary assembly which would have representatives of all the parts of the empire, the move resulted in first declarations of independence in some areas of Spanish America, and in other places led to a temporary calming of the situation. The *Cortes de Cádiz*, prepared by the general assembly under the protection of English troops, otherwise occupied by the French, and elaborated the Constitution of Cádiz of 1812 that operated only in the two old viceroyalties, and even then only for a short time, as King Ferdinand VII rendered it null and void immediately on his return to Spain in 1814, returning to absolute government.

Even at the time, the text of this constitution was greeted with a great interest in Europe and America; and has since then stimulated a great deal of discussion, also in relation to its significance for Germany (Wohlfeil 1965; Timmermann 2007). In the face of the jubilees of 200th anniversaries of the independence of Spanish America, the text of the constitution is discussed in Spain and in the Latin American states, where it was the binding document. Those countries of South America that were the first to announce independence, object to today's rather biased attempts to instrumentalise the understanding of Spanish – American similarities. Nevertheless, to understand its great significance, it seems proper to provide at least a general sketch of the processes during the period of 1808–1825, i.e. until independence was achieved.

According to dependency theory, independence has been perceived since the 1960s as a revolutionary liberation movement from colonial exploitation and subjugation. David Brading described the process of modernisation, which had earlier taken place in Spain itself, in terms of “Revolution in Government” as the central reason behind the events that followed 1808 (Brading 1972). In 2006, Hans-Joachim König described the same process with an almost unchanged chronology as “the second conquest” of Ibero-America (König 2006); before that the Mexican historian Luis Jáuregui called the very same process “modernisation”, at the same time characterising, however, the Viceroy's government of that period as weak (Jáuregui 2004). The first example suggests that the reaction to such a “revolution” has been somewhat conservative (Mücke 2008). The “second conquest” raises the suspicion that the colonial status was not that strong, as the Empire's own colonies had to be captured a second time, while the description provided by Luis Jáuregui allows for the conclusion that the autonomy of colonial Mexico, and even the government of the Viceroy in the capacity of a representative of the Crown, was not only to a large extent weak, but did not even have a central role in the processes that were taking place. What fits the last opinion are also the statements of Mexican historians, like, for example, “la conquista la hicieron los indios y la independencia los españoles”, which, when they were delivered, encountered no opposition during a seminar on independence at El Colegio de México in November 2007. Although it is a fact that these cases refer mostly to Mexico, similar tendencies can also be observed with regard to other countries of Spanish America. It is interesting that this concerns mostly the states that possessed metropolitan functions before gaining independence.

Analysing more precisely the way the historiography developed, one can distinguish a few central parameters in the historiography of the Spanish world

that for a long time, up until today, differed partially on some important matters from the European discourses. These include primarily:

1. The notion of “constitution” was and is applied solely to the constitutional orders that the individual fathers of constitution referred to as *Constitución*, which is legitimised through a type of representative consent. For that reason, the first constitution of the Spanish world was the constitution of Bayonne, which Napoleon ordered and which allowed his brother Joseph to be appointed the King of Spain. In many respects, it was reminiscent of the constitution that had been established by Napoleon for the kingdom of Westphalia, where the French emperor placed his younger brother Jérôme in the position of King; yet both constitutions play a rather insignificant role in the historiography of Spain and Germany. While the German constitutional history focuses more on the phenomena of earlier periods, while also examining the revolutionary period of 1776–1848 defined more or less appropriately as *Sattelzeit*; this did not happen in the Iberian world. Even the *Novísima Recopilación de las Leyes de España* from 1804 does not play any role in the literature on constitutional history, independent of its character as the fundamental law. Beginning with the fact that the constitution of Bayonne was actually the first, although widely disliked, constitution for the Spanish world, outside this cultural realm there is hardly anyone eager to claim in earnest that e.g. there was no constitutional order before Napoleon in the German states, and one should also bear in mind that England does not have a written constitution to this day. One should note that the Spanish colonial kingdoms had – much like the mother country – a legal order regulated by the fundamental statute of the supremacy of the constitution, and that the fathers of all the Spanish and Latin American constitutional orders of the period following the attainment of independence naturally knew them, as they were educated in them. This concerns only Spanish America, and not Brazil or the USA, whose colonial territories claimed a variety of royal or other charters that had no common legal basis of the status of fundamental law. Speaking of Spanish America, one should also account for the fact that, due to the lack of codification adjusted to the new constitutional orders following the independence, courts had to pass sentences along the lines of colonial legal norms until very late nineteenth century. The reasons for not accounting for the colonial history of law in the newer constitutional histories are complex. Significant grounds for the view claiming that the history of constitution – at least in Latin America – began in 1808, leads to the second central group of problems, namely:

2. The colonial status of Ibero-America. Even at the beginning of the 1950s, an Argentinian historian of law, Ricardo Levene, published – citing colonial legal orders – a work entitled “Las Indias no eran colonias”. This resulted in violent opposition against the European historiography of Latin America which was emerging at that time, which referring to the Conquista and the Charter of the United Nations insisted on using the term “colony” in its modern definition. Since then the modern notion of colonies has been applied to Ibero-America without differentiation, at least until the period of the independence movements, and to some degree even much more after, qualifying the new states as only formally independent. Yet, in reference to many parallel phenomena between Portugal and Spain on the one hand, and the Ibero-America of the eighteenth century on the other, the question arises whether that colonial status did not change from the sixteenth to the end of the eighteenth century, and was it not at the least perceived differently in Ibero-America. The colonial legal order did not give any opportunity to many representatives that came from the elites to feel “colonialised”, to use this modern, tautological notion. After all, Ibero-America exerted control over the deposits of precious metals coveted by everyone. Another factor that plays a role here is that a certain “Latin American solidarity” made it difficult for the historiography of those countries to admit that Spanish overseas territories were strongly hierarchical. In contrast to the old colonial metropolises, like Lima and Mexico, were in the peripheral areas, whose elites felt partially more colonialised by these centres than by Spain itself. For that reason, the independence movements were born in those very territories; it is enough to mention Venezuela, Buenos Aires, and Paraguay. This thought leads to another specific feature of the historiography of the history of Latin American law and constitutions, in comparison to Europe, namely:
3. The temporal perspective of the depth of the historical sciences in the research of far-going transformations resulting from the American War of Independence and the French revolution, briefly speaking – the research for the reasons behind the period of revolutions from 1776 to 1848. While what is treated as the very genesis of those changes in Europe is – more or less concisely – the entire eighteenth century, and in certain periods an even deeper history is achieved: the late seventeenth century with its rationalism, European system of powers, absolutism, and state development, in the context of the Iberian states and their overseas territories, the research has been limited to a great extent to the times following 1740 in

Portugal (the Minister Pombal) and 1759 in Spain (the assumption of the throne by Charles III, participation in the Seven Years War). The reasons for this emphasis on this relatively short time period can possibly be found in the fact that at least since the eighteenth century the European South was perceived as lagging behind northern Europe, and was, moreover, suffering from stagnation: a view that was even shared by numerous Iberian men of that period, while the overseas territories were perceived as dependent colonies, even less developed than the mother countries. For that reason, the research was limited to the periods that had visible tendencies for reform and modernisation, even though in Europe Ibero-America was again received – since the time of Rousseau, and also partially even in the period of Renaissance humanism and Romanticism – as more akin to nature and less burdened by deleterious civilisation influences, as Antonello Gerbi proves in his old monumental works “La natura delle Indie Nove” and “La disputa del Nuevo Mundo” (Gerbi 1982). What results from this is another significant difference in the historiographical treatment of Ibero-America early in the nineteenth century, both in relation to Europe and the USA, namely:

4. geography. It is known that it did not play a major role in historical research, primarily because it had been abused by the Nazi machine, not only in the German historiography of the latter half of the twentieth century. Since the mid-1980s, French historians following Fernand Braudel (Braudel 1966) and American ones put again in their research more emphasis on geography, which resulted in a new interest and new definition of historical areas, as for example, the concept of Atlantic history from the mid-1980s which subordinated all the adjacent seas and the continental river systems emptying into the Atlantic to the Atlantic area; instead of the classical perspective of metropolises – colonies, it focused on the spatial interactions of lands bordering this area. The role of the colonial powers goes to a further plane, and was reduced to the potential influence on the system and the benefits drawn from those, while colonial territories were indirectly awarded a historically more independent and active role. Whilst this premise focuses primarily on the economic and financial aspects, to an ever greater extent, it also accounts for the questions of migration, cultural development, and even the independent “colonial” internal policy. What results from this, for Spain and Portugal in the historiography of the period and at the threshold of independence, is a change of perspective that treats the mother countries more as an addition to the colonies, and later as political actors of the past.

With reference to the above generally drawn outline of development, the theses stated below may be formed and their significance for the central subject of the constitution briefly explained.

1st Thesis:

In opposition to Portuguese Brazil, in 1680 colonial Spanish America acquired with the *Recopilación de las Leyes de Indias* the basic legal order that corresponded to the categories of European constitutional history of that time, which bestowed equality in the legal sphere to the overseas states, as kingdoms – but not to the provinces that were subordinate to them – with the kingdoms, being parts of Spain. Even though this order was imposed from above, the laws nonetheless included and took as their source the practice of government preceding the process of law, and “listened” individually to the interested parties. In their attempts to make Spain a territorially uniform modern state, the Bourbon dynasty continued to dismantle gradually that order from 1700 onwards, unwittingly distorting in this way the legal order recognised in America as being the most legitimate. This was achieved through transition to a new practice of government, in which it was not the process of law but the directives issued from the top down, which is corroborated by the way that the modern ministries that were established in 1714 operated. At the same time, the colonial discourse was beginning to develop in Spain, comprising mercantilist representations, which resulted in ever greater disparities between the mother country and the colonies. Together with the claim to subject the overseas territories to the Spanish Regency, which resulted in the peoples’ movements that developed after 1808, the legitimisation of the Spanish power based on the *Recopilación* was definitely nullified, as Spanish Americans states felt themselves to have equal rights.

2nd Thesis:

Having roots that went back to 1680 and the times of Philip II, the *Recopilación* consolidated the legal relations that were developing in Spanish America, which could be viewed as a feudatory state of estates and corporations, due to which the authority (reign), was executed primarily over people, and only secondarily over the territory they inhabited and owned. Briefly speaking, that was a system based on feudalism, similar in many aspects to pre-Colombian relations, divided into the same hierarchy as Castile into kingdoms (*Reinos*) and provinces (*Provincias*) that were dependent upon them. Its result was that the elites, at least those who defined themselves as Spanish, did not feel in any way subordinate to Castile or Spain, but only to the King. In this legal order, the

decisive fact was that the *Reinos* were composed of two parts, the (*repúblicas*) of the *Indios* and the Spaniards, neither of them giving any consideration to those persons of Black African origin. In both, municipalities operated as representatives of the common people in an order based on different social strata. In both, the nobility was privileged, while the clergy was counted as being among the Spanish parts. The *senoríos* (*Grundherrschaft*) in Spanish hands were very few (for the inheritors of Columbus, the domains of Cortés and Moctezuma, the last being in the hands of the Spanish nobility), yet they were numerous in the parts that belonged to the indigenous *cazicazgos*, where apart from the indigenous municipalities, they were acquiring the character of manorial estates as many of the large Spanish landholdings may be classified. In the distant *provincias* in Spanish America, there was no such division as there the *Indios* classified as barbarians and were assigned to reservations or *reducciones*, or relations with them might be regulated in the form of treaties. It is enough to mention, even in this context, the “Indian parliament”, established by José de San Martín (who also described it in vivid detail) in Mendoza, before he crossed the Andes.

3rd Thesis:

From the point of view of constitutional law, the policy-making of the Bourbon dynasty was the same in Spain and later also in the American territories, yet the Bourbons connected it to various political discourses. Just like with the end of the war of succession, the kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon lost their legal order and were incorporated as provinces into what was at least formerly uniform Spain, the dynasty attempted to do the same gradually from the 1730s in Ibero-America, even though using somewhat different means. The reason behind that was the change in the concept of governance. The place of the chain of government down the pyramid of the vassals with its corporate structure which defined the given territory through their area of inhabitation based on liege law represented by the Habsburgs, was taken over by the concept of reign over the territory and – in the second order – over the people of any rank who inhabited it. Due to that concept, attempts were made in Spanish America to limit the authority of the old metropolises by establishing new viceroalties (primarily in the area of the viceroyalty of Peru) and trading companies in the regions subordinate to Mexico (Venezuela, Cuba, Philippines, and others) and which were directed from Madrid. This process was justly defined by König as “the second conquest”. At the same time, the breaking of the direct recourse (abolition of the direct path of appeal) of overseas vassals to the Crown – and the weakening of the old overseas bureaucracy that was related

to this – by the development of a formalised structure of administrative hierarchy (ministries, governorships, departments, etc), through which everything was to be directed to the centre, the overseas hierarchies were dispensed with and the focus shifted to the centre in Madrid. At the same time, as has been mentioned, there was a particular militarisation of administration and society through the system of provincial militias and the new officer elite. These actions encroached on numerous interests and the constitutional order (that had been in force) since 1680, yet in the metropolises they triggered defence mechanisms against the politics of the Crown. For example, the Spanish kings were defined in official, printed texts as “emperors of the Indians”. After the exile of the Jesuits in 1767, which was considered in America as planned and unlawful, the crisis of legitimisation was aggravated. The Crown tried to cope with it through a new discourse, postulating the establishment of “cuerpo unido de nación” from Euro- and Amero-Spaniards. The central representative organs, like, for example, the City Council of Mexico, claimed in turn the continuation of autonomy guaranteed by the *Recopilación*, yet indirectly they assumed a privileged position within the American structure of the state. Similarly, since the 1770s, the old centres in Spanish America codified their own legal acts through their appellate courts, and issued them in print, while the Crown ordered the codification of a part of the law (mining law, trade, slaves, etc) ordering at the same time the development of a new legal code of the *Novísima Recopilación de Leyes de España* of 1804, mentioned above. Because of the historiographical lacunae mentioned in the introduction, it is not clear to this day to what extent these attempts at codification on both sides of the Atlantic were complementary or were secretly antagonistic actions. Premises for both the assumptions exist.

4th Thesis:

The outbreak of the American War of Independence in 1776, and later the French revolution aggravated these problems, because they pointed out political alternatives in the solution of the crisis of legitimisation. No later than 1780, we also find documents by Spanish governmental officers denouncing the threat that independence movements also posed in Ibero-America, and promoted them as an opportunity to solve the question of elevating viceroyships to the rank of independent kingdoms in the hands of the princes of the ruling dynasty. At the same time, the King of Spain would take over the imperial title and play the role of the “Suzerain” towards Spanish America. In the 1790s there was an on-going discussion about this project in Spain in the form of

secret consultation. Yet in 1780 with disturbances breaking out in Peru and today's Colombia, in the context of the crisis of legitimacy confirmed by the slogan "Viva el Rey, muera el mal gobierno". The old order, considered legitimate at least by the broad elites, was nevertheless demolished when the regency council was formed in Spain after the events of 1808, as a result of the popular uprising against the new king, Joseph I (appointed by Napoleon) and declared subordination to "Ferdinand VII, who was unable to execute authority" and claimed own authority, which *de jure* meant subordination to Spain but no longer to the king. The year 1808 meant the breakdown of the laboriously balanced, old legitimisation based on the one hand on *Recopilación*, and on the other hand on the Bourbon modernisation policy. In accordance with the old law, referring to constitutional mediaeval legislation, after the abdication of the King, the mandate of the officers he nominated ended, and the representatives of the people (that is, the cities), were envisaged as now organising the execution of power in the name of the King, and to guarantee order in the state. Following the order which the Bourbons aspired to, the execution of authority in the name of the king was to be placed in the hands of the Regency that was to be established in Spain, to whom the overseas authorities subordinated themselves until another decision, considering a further course of action was made by the Regency. This process, which was in the tradition of absolutism, divided the public not only in Spanish America, but also in Spain itself, where, as a result of dissatisfaction towards the old dynasty, even some organisations of the central government supported the new ruler, Joseph Bonaparte.

The conclusion that should be drawn from the above is that the crisis of legitimacy of the Spanish reign in America, which was slowly aggravated in the eighteenth century, led in 1808 to the fundamental breakdown of the order based on constitutional legitimacy, as the new order that was introduced gradually by the Bourbons under the principle of absolutism and which was still imperfect did not offer legal options for a solution that would provide for equal rank. Faced with the vacuum of legitimacy, the broad consensus now offered plenty of political exit strategies in the light of the current circumstances. Only now could one consider, and even try out, political alternatives in a more or less open manner, depending on the relations that were predominant in individual regions. What resulted from this was the right to base political solutions, be it on the legal order that was inherited from the Habsburg period or on different political models from the recent past, as Republican solutions in the USA or the model of empire that had been produced by the French Revolution

and Napoleon, or constitutional monarchy. That was offered from 1812 by the liberal constitution from Cádiz, on which, after all, the first American representatives who had been elected cooperated for the first time. It turned out then that independence movements began to be successful wherever the old order – which was far away from the old metropolises – had a far weaker rooting and institutional cohesion, and where circumstances – like, for example, close external contacts that reached across the ocean – had a beneficial influence. This was the case in Venezuela, and Buenos Aires, while the uprisings of Father Hidalgo and his successors in the depths of Mexico, could be very quickly contained by professional troops, capital elites and institutions. The hierarchical order of the Spanish colonial empire often led to that kind of the independence strife degenerated into civil wars. Some independence declarations, as for example the one in Paraguay, were primarily directed against the dominant colonial metropolis, instead of the distant mother country. It was not for nothing that both Bolívar in Venezuela and San Martín in Argentina understood that without the exclusion of the old, royalist metropolis in Lima, one would not be able to maintain lasting independence even in their home countries; this forced them to undertake the risky crossing of the Andes, which resulted in major losses. Lima was liberated, but Peru preserved the centralist system. Mexico was liberated in the transitory phase by the Empire of Agustín de Iturbide, yet in the first federalist constitution of the state of 1824 the City of Mexico was heavily punished as the largest city of the country. It was administered by a governor appointed by the president and did not have its own representational organ until the early 1990s. Cuba in turn liberated from ties with Mexico only in the eighteenth century, at first preferred weak Spanish authority to independence, when it viewed the events that led to the gaining of independence by Haiti.

All the new Ibero-American states declared themselves to be republics, yet on closer inspection, it became obvious that the first constitutions of all the new republics followed in their central point the Constitution of Cádiz of 1812; that is, the text of the constitution for a constitutional monarchy. The unifying element in each case was the “nation” on which that concept was based. This took place according to the following order: the definition of the nation, definition of those who belong or do not belong to it, definition of Catholicism as the only recognised religion – a statement that could not be avoided due to the position of the church and its role as the loan provider – then duties towards the nation, and somewhat further also the listing of a few individual rights. The individual catalogue of fundamental rights, similar to the catalogue in the first

republican constitution of France, is found – curiously enough – only at the end of the constitution of the Brazilian empire, which, however, is legitimised in its introduction with the Grace of God. The Spanish American fathers of the constitutions knew only too well that the national concept in each of the newly established states did not correspond to the reality for many reasons, yet in all the instances it described a futuristic project, to which one could agree, not least for its potential of maintaining power, and which needed at the same time historic legitimisation, which explains the many references to the pre-Colombian past that sometimes seem absurd. Besides that, the lawyers at least among the fathers of the constitution had to know that in the daily judicial practice one would still have to rely on colonial legislation for a long time to come. Following the Constitution of Cádiz, a basic division of powers was envisaged, yet the judiciary as the third power was strongly handicapped. Nor was there any justification provided for the rulings of the court. If this was a federalist constitution that was agreed, the more complex questions would be passed into the constitutional legislation of the new federal states, and in the case of passing a centralist constitution, the problem-solving questions would be moved to the later acts given by the parliament. What all these constitutions actually sought was only the regulation of the question of the manner of how the state was to be constituted and how sovereignty should be distributed internally. A decisive role here was played by the size and richness of the city; namely, whether or not it would succeed in becoming the capital of a federal state; and in a state with a centralist system, at least the capital of a “department”. Despite numerous borrowings from the constitution of the USA, there was, however, no consent to the solution that was implemented in North America, due to which Washington – at that time devoid of any significance – became the capital and the seat of the institutions of central government. In Spanish America, each city that to varying degrees had any importance thanks to its colonial past, claimed capital functions, at least in one of the federal states. As the federal government in a way embodied the nation and was perceived as a somewhat general binding element, there was no possibility of jettisoning it in its entirety. Sovereignty related to the above required a visible municipal symbol of power, although later there was joint action to limit its political and legal aspects. In individual countries this process was so varied and problematic that a new factor had to be taken into consideration: the inheritance of Bourbon politics, namely the more or less strong, legally privileged role of the armies, whose commands reserved the right, derived from the Bourbon tradition, to be something akin to the “nation’s school and guarantor”. Yet as a symbol of opposition

against the Spanish colonial regime, any direct taxation was deemed to be socially discriminating and was swiftly dispensed with; a move that deprived the state, and especially the army, of an important source of finance. Against this background, the texts of the constitutions were in later periods adjusted to reflect political changes, without the introduction of specific changes towards the nation in ill fortune – stylised to the “sacred cow” – and the general way of operation of the state.

With the process thus outlined, the claim has to be made that the nation as a futuristic project was characteristic of all the constitutions of independent states, yet their development differed from the very beginning in terms of such central functions of the state as centralism and federalism, parliamentarianism, the judiciary, sovereignty, financial system, etc. The frequent changes of constitution in later times and highly differentiated periods of elaboration of adequate legal codifications, frequently making reference to non-Spanish legal traditions, aggravated these differences. This was also the case because the progressing internal colonisation, approach to the church and its landed properties and income from testamentary legacies, economic development, and highly dissimilar internal relations posed new challenges for the states. Although in fact, in all the countries of Spanish-America the legal substratum and corporate legal figures and traditions took root in the Spanish tradition, with time legal and political changes produced a highly differentiated order in individual states. Even though the differences between Brazil and Spanish-America were present much earlier, the situation developing after independence also led Spanish-American states in various directions. While the liberal governments of the nineteenth century initially tried to continue the Bourbon policy of reforms quite persistently, conservative regimes chose an entirely different political direction. Of exemplary significance here is the frustration of Bolívar in his late life, resulting from the development of events, as well as the voluntary, long-term emigration of José de San Martín to France – these were two of the most important strategic protagonists of the independence process, responsible for its success.

Tracing the problem shared by the new Latin American states related to the taking control and organisation of regions situated in the distant corners of the country and imposing state monopoly in exercising power, one encounters similar or comparable consequences in specific areas of statehood, for example the financial system. What showed here for instance in Argentina were long-term problems, related among other things to the implementation of state control of the monetary, financial, and tax policies, as the north-western provinces

colonised by Peru remained dependent on Bolivian mining for a long period after gaining independence, and the Bolivian currency was in use in their territory, despite of their inclusion in 1776 into the new viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata. It was only in the last three decades of the nineteenth century that the central government managed to bind these territories more strongly in financial terms to the seat of central government in Buenos Aires, even though to this day they enjoy a certain autonomy in this scope. These problems look different in such states as Mexico, where the control of resources by individual federal states was much more significant for the financial system from the outset, while the central state had to limit itself to import and export duties, and quickly found itself in financial dire straits. It was only towards the end of the nineteenth century that this situation underwent a change. Independent of the federal system of Mexico, the financial situation of individual federal states is still today extremely unequal, thanks to which the central state may use it as a mechanism for policy-making. The area of financial systems has not been examined in detail in many other states of Latin America, even though state constitutions of numerous countries follow highly divergent assumptions in this scope. From the point of view of the history of constitutions, we should note that this question in the constitutions of the individual federal states within a central state i.e. the constitutions of the subjects of the federation has hardly been researched in the historical aspect. For example, the terms describing the subdivisions of individual federal states in Mexico were very diverse as late as the nineteenth century. Similarly, the elections statutes defined for individual states depending on density of population provided a very misleading picture for a long time, since for example winning 1000 votes was sufficient to win a seat in the national parliament for one state, while in another, their number had to be five or ten times as high. It turned out that territorial divisions originating in colonial times no longer corresponded to later developments, yet for political reasons of national unity, changes were shunned. Similarly, constitutions of individual parts of states seem to operate differently in states with a large concentration of settlements from pre-Colombian times than in states without such a tradition, a difference which produced different forms of exercising the right to vote. We should note here that colonial legislation not only awarded indigenous municipalities with considerable autonomy, but also that those communes – unlike Spanish cities – enjoyed a powerful system of representation throughout the entire colonial period, according to which elections to municipal authorities were held every year, which after gaining independence led to conflicts between the traditional and the modern system of elec-

tions. It is here that the tradition of the communal (municipal) resistance against the decisions of the central state took root: it is present even in the most recent history, as demonstrated by the violent rejection of the new central airport for Mexico City by Mexico's Atenco municipality, which resulted in the federal government abandoning the project.

One should also mention here the different results of the latest historical studies concerning the history of the nineteenth century and conducted under the aegis of methodologically renewed political history. Besides the surprisingly high importance of election processes in the nineteenth century, we should point out that the creation of political parties in the second half of the nineteenth century proves significant similarities to comparable processes in Europe. Thus, parties showing far-going continuation and parallelism to Europe can be found, even though they moved away from the European patterns during further development. The development and role of the public space, much like that of the beginnings of social organisation in the scope of establishing associations and representation of interests, were examined in greater detail by the school of François-Xavier Guerra, a prematurely deceased French academic who persistently applied the theoretical assumptions of Habermas. As a part of far-reaching historical research, based on the unveiling of new sources considering the problems of the nineteenth century, many generalisations and generalising typologies of Latin American histories and political systems were revised or at the least strongly relativised. One cannot fail to refer here to the great amount of recent and latest research on the complex of "nation building", as this has become practically its own field of research on Latin American history. Parliamentarianism and elections also comprise a new, separate area in which new, astonishing discoveries are made in different countries. This also concerns the classical topos of *caciques* and *caudillos*, which are today interpreted as factors of national cohesion. Currently, even the topos of Latin America as a region characterised by specific structural social inequalities – from the time of European invasion to this day – is questioned for lack of historical evidence. Latin American intellectuals claimed even that for Europeans the region plays the role of a "negative utopia" (Villoro 1999).

In the last decades, many new discoveries have been made on the grounds of new source materials, after historiography in Latin America and concerning Latin America adjusted its scope of interest and methods to appropriate interests or historiography in Anglo-America and Europe. The old ideological divides were to a great extent eliminated, and replaced by methodological and theoretical schools and international historiographic networks, describing pre-

dominantly post-modern and postcolonial questions, and dealing with historical, social and historical, structural and historical, and other forms of discourse, while the classical subjects for example the history of international relations, the history of constitutions, and others rather lead their own lives on the margins of the discipline. What is still lacking, as has been mentioned previously, is comparative research. This results from shortages in content, expert and language knowledge encompassing the entire continent. Studies of global, Atlantic, or continental importance – rather scattered and skimming only the surface of the problem – are helpful only in reference to specific problems and in a highly limited way. Facing the problem of the diversified development of Latin American states, after gaining independence, outlined in the introduction, there appears on the other hand a visible trend in line with which the history of Latin America does not differ so significantly from the histories of Europe and Anglo-America, as was postulated in the 1960s and 1970s. In the meantime, the old models of the centre and the periphery, on the one hand, diversified to such a degree that they can no longer be used for the region as a whole in comparison to state organisation in other parts of the world. On the other hand the centre – periphery – model became a problem more within individual states or within the entire region (Scheuzger, Fleer 2009). Earlier, corruption was considered a specifically Latin American phenomenon, and today it is dealt with both in Europe and in the United States. Everyone is talking about the international financial crisis, with which Brazil seems to have no problems.

Speaking of state development in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, one can use the historical experience of the colonial period and process of gaining independence, and of the differences concerning on the one hand Brazil, and on the other – Spanish-American – states, to conclude that since gaining independence, Spanish-America did not suffer from a deficit of democracy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but rather from the deficit of inwardly directed state legitimisation. Establishing the state on the basis of a national model by bringing together competing cities of a corporate type and – to a lesser or greater degree – directly controlling the territories surrounding them with highly differentiated structures and settlement, proved to be complicated in developing the model of legitimisation of the nation based on historical foundation and adjusted to cultural, social, and economic conditions. Obstacles were on the one hand the old colonial past – negatively perceived and incapable of consensus because of the immanent hierarchy and rivalry, and on the other, breaking away from monarchist legitimisation. This necessitated reach-

ing for different, alien standards – in most cases they were European – which sooner or later lost their acceptance due to the development of the processes of internal colonisation, communication and development, together with the integration of new groups in society that accompanied those. In Brazil, on the other hand, the passage to statehood took place thanks to the maintenance of the domestic legitimisation. Not entirely without problems, but also thanks to the fact that the imperial regime provided the country with such a long period of adjustment to changed conditions, that the process of internal colonisation and consolidation of the state and the nation were allowed to develop simultaneously for a long time (Haußer 2009). Thus even the problem of new definitions of national identity and policy could be solved more easily than in Spanish-America, by a variety of cultural and ethnic means.

Did the states of Latin America for that reason become ordinary members of the international community of states ever more strongly connected with one another due to globalisation? A prospective attempt, serving the development of appropriate forms of cooperation in the region, undertaken in vain as soon as 1826 by Simón Bolívar at the Congress of Panama, brought in its day general respect and declarations of intent that were to lead to peaceful conflict-solving, yet it also brought about the increasingly various forms of development of these states, which could not be prevented, either by the application of different systems of pan-American cooperation, or by the OAS/OEA established later. Brazil exploited this development, acquiring to an ever greater degree the character of a power with borders with all the states of South America except Chile, and already at the time influencing the neighbouring countries in many ways. Thus, to an ever greater degree, geography and the use of available resources enforced a more powerful cooperation, whose conditions were influenced increasingly by Brazil, as a hegemon state. In opposition to these, the development of the distant Caribbean is far more complex not only due to the differences between Cuba and the United States, but also to the definition of borders concerning the rights to exploit the seabed – which are still the question of handling maps – not to mention the role of the modernised and developed Panama Canal. Here – sooner or later yet definitely – OAS will play a role more important than other, superior political talks forums at a global level. Migration problems and the policy of the fight against drugs and drug-related guerrillas – in the nineteenth century assigned rather to the realm of folklore, under the influence of colonisation processes – are among further problems on the north-south line, already threatening the destabilisation of states in the region; problems whose solution may only be brought closer through

joint negotiations with the new US administration. The fast pace of growth of the Latin American population in the USA, a population which plays a significant role in many fields, for example in the army, allows the assumption that in the medium-range perspective, the enlivening of the “Western Hemisphere Idea” seems probable, as only in this way can at least the radicalisation of the process of re-ethnicisation be prevented.

Translated from German by Lesław Michalus and Piotr Krasnowolski



LAWRENCE S. GRAHAM

Government and Society in the Latin American States

Government and society in Latin America are inseparably linked to the choices made by governing elites at the time of independence and the institutional framework, which evolved in the nineteenth and early twentieth century at differential rates throughout the region. The national states that emerged are today a hybrid of nation-state constructs derived from Western European governmental experience and ideas linked to U.S. constitutionalism and presidentialism. However, rather than survey these developments from a North-South perspective, it is best to begin with South America, especially Brazil and the Southern Cone countries of Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Paraguay. This is because it is easier to understand the importance of the European antecedents of the Latin American state system and the context within which politics and society have evolved, without dealing first with U.S. hegemony in the areas closest and adjacent to the United States. From this base, we will then proceed northward, in order to understand the dynamics of politics and society in this region and the wide range of governmental experience and outcomes in responding to political and economic issues, over the roughly 200 years spanning independence and the consolidation of a unique group of national states in the contemporary world.

South America

First, most importantly, and least well understood is the difference between Portuguese and Spanish America. Much more common is to speak of the Latin American region within the context of 20 national states with a very similar past and present in the evolution of their governments and national societies.

Why this shift in emphasis? If we turn the map upside down, we have a very different visual image of the region. From this perspective what stands out is the size and diversity of South America. This is a distinct world from the national states which took formation to the north in the mid-nineteenth century. There, issues of state and nation were resolved well before viable national states emerged in Mexico (actually a part of North America, in its physical, human, and political geography), Central America (the land bridge tying together North and South America), and the Caribbean (with its extension into northeastern South America – an area largely separate from the rest of the Continent, historically and presently).

A key factor in the evolution of this state system is the fact that, once these countries achieved independence, governing elites in South America were relatively isolated from external world events and able to focus on their own internal development, without frequent intervention of external powers. As a consequence, by the end of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth, issues related to the definition of state and nation had already been decided largely within the framework of Western European constructs transferred to the Americas, into which U.S. ideas linked to constitutionalism and presidentialism were incorporated.

How this institutional framework for governance evolved differentially can best be captured by contrasting the experience of Brazil and the Southern Cone countries with the rest of Latin America – Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. Whereas the former were far removed from events in Western Europe and freer from direct intervention of foreign powers in domestic affairs, the latter were much more exposed to direct external intervention from independence onward. If in the nineteenth century Great Britain was hegemonic in the circum-Caribbean (Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, and northeastern South America), in the twentieth it was the United States which assumed that role. Furthermore, it is in that region that continuing ties of the smaller island dependencies, Puerto Rico, and French Guiana with external powers have endured until today.

Seen from this perspective, centered in South America, what stands out is the difference between Spanish and Portuguese America: the fragmentation of the Spanish Empire in the Americas at independence versus the cohesiveness of the new world the Portuguese created in the Americas. Despite the fact that Portugal was a weak European colonial power and without the resources which permitted Spain to control its American dominions much more effectively, Bra-

zil embarked on a very different path at independence in 1822 from the rest of the continent. Whereas Spanish America fragmented along lines roughly contiguous with the administrative divisions present in the Spanish Empire in the Americas at the end of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Brazil evolved in the direction of sustained union and consolidation of a framework for governance that allowed it to maintain its regional diversity without rupturing the unity of what is today the largest independent state in Latin America. In the twenty-first century Brazil appears to be destined to become as hegemonic (without wishing to be so) in South America as the United States has been in North America since the 1890s. As a consequence of this trajectory focused on consolidating its own national state, Brazil today is the 5th largest country in the world in geographic area (one which is actually larger than the continental United States, if its non-contiguous appendages in Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico are excluded); it has the 4th largest population, the 9th largest economy; and, next to the United States, it has the largest internal market in the Americas.

In explaining why this occurred, there are two different factors: cultural identity and the choices made by governing elites. Overriding the distinctive character of each of the regional entities scattered along its Atlantic coast, defined first as provinces and later as states, is a cultural cohesiveness that has precluded the division of Portuguese dominions in South America into a series of independent republics, matching Spanish American experience. The forging of this distinctive cultural identity, which is the basis of Brazilian nationalism, has received much attention by Brazilian scholars, viz. Manuel Dieguês Júnior, as well as the U.S. anthropologist Charles Wagley and is usually referred to as Luso-Brazilian. This cultural identity, based on the commonality of the Portuguese language and its acceptance as the medium for communication throughout its national territory, however, needs to be tied more clearly to the legitimacy of the Portuguese monarchy in the Americas in the early nineteenth century. This institutional factor stands in marked contrast to the legitimacy vacuum which evolved in Spanish America at independence and the formation of a distinct group of successor nation-states.

The most important institutional factor shaping Brazil's formation as a national state is a consequence of the decision of the Portuguese Monarchy to move the entire Court from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro in 1808, with the assistance of the British navy, rather than submit to French rule under Napoleon, as was the case in Spain. From 1808 to 1822, Rio became the center of the

Portuguese Empire. Once Napoleon's hegemony on the Continent was broken by the British, the pressures on the Monarchy to return to Lisbon were enormous. Faced with the dilemma of what to do and the reality that a dual monarchy linking Brazil and Portugal was unsustainable, the reigning monarch, Dom João VI, left his son as regent in Brazil. Subsequently, Dom Pedro joined forces with the landed elite in Brazil to declare their independence on September 7, 1822. The outcome of this was the only viable constitutional monarchy in the Americas, one in which he as Dom Pedro I and, more importantly, his son Dom Pedro II governed Brazil until 1889.

When the monarchy was overthrown by a military coup in 1889, what emerged in the aftermath was a presidential federal republic. Consolidated under the Constitution of 1891, this document drew upon U.S. constitutional experience, but more importantly it established the basis for what has been a functioning three-tiered federal system ever since, in which as much autonomy has been granted to the major municipalities as it was to the states. The impact of this governing experience, extending across the nineteenth century into the first two decades of the twentieth, was the construction of a federal state in which local interests were guaranteed sufficient autonomy to ensure their remaining within the union. Thus, what began at the outset as a weak set of national institutions, executive and parliamentary/congressional, evolved in time into a more coherent national government. In this regard, the formative period for modern Brazil were the years 1930 to 1945, during which Getúlio Vargas dominated national politics and power shifted from subnational units of governance to a stronger central government under his leadership. Today, two hundred years later, as a consequence of this convergence of more cohesive cultural and governing forces, more people speak Portuguese and identify themselves as citizens of Brazil than speak Spanish in all the other South American states combined – Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela.

The Regionalization of Latin America

In continuing with this trajectory, setting aside Brazil for now, and in moving from south to north, it is helpful to identify 6 different regions and groupings of states and national societies, each with a different set of governing experiences. There are three in South America (the Southern Cone countries – Ar-

gentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay; the Andean region – Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador; the Northern Tier republics – Colombia, Venezuela) and three in the circum-Caribbean (Mexico; Central America – Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama; and the Caribbean – Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti).

Southern Cone South America

This area is the most embedded in the construction of national states in which issues related to the definition of state and nation were resolved the earliest and governing elites sought more frequently to replicate a European state system. While European points of reference are most visible in the urban spaces occupied by Buenos Aires, Santiago, and Montevideo, a distinct cultural milieu also emerged in the countryside, one which while very different from European experience produced strong national identities. This is reflected in how the Spanish language has come to be spoken in each of the four countries and how the indigenous population was either assimilated or decimated. While massive European immigration from the 1890s onward overwhelmed rural society in Argentina and Uruguay, and to a lesser extent in Chile, Paraguay retained its rural focus. The consequence of this has been a unique bilingual society, one where both Guaraní and Spanish are spoken. But here there is as strong and distinct national identity as has been the case in Argentina and Uruguay, countries where European immigration totally transformed both state and nation.

From the 1890s into the 1950s Argentina was hegemonic in South America. The most dynamic, the most prosperous, the most creative in building a new society in the Americas derivative from European experience, Argentina seemed destined to emerge in those years on the world scene as the most successful instance in Latin America of the ability to transform state and society through massive European immigration and the maximization of a country's resources in land and agriculture that, once commercialized, laid the foundation for a productive national economy. To this day, Buenos Aires remains one of the great urban centers in Latin America. But Argentina's comparatively earlier development, despite its successful economic take-off, became a source of enormous political problems later in building a New Argentina, when this massive immigration, most of which came from Italy, was assimilated into the Argentine ethos. Once mobilized, what emerged was a citizenry that wanted its share of the political power and economic resources held by a conservative, Hispanic ruling elite. This rupture in politics led to political and economic upheavals in

the 1930s and frequent military intervention in government, the outcome of which was the presidency of Juan Perón, 1946–1955. This era of mass mobilization under populism constituted both the highpoint in Argentina's power and influence throughout South America and its collapse. Once the country's economic resources were exhausted and the rupture in Argentine politics between the Old and the New Argentina had created an unbridgeable chasm, bitter recriminations dominated national politics over the next 35 years (1955–1989), until finally in 1989, the military exhausted its power and a democratic transition began which has at long last produced the possibility of sustained democratic rule.

Chile, in contrast, departed on a very different path in its national development on West Coast South America. Even more isolated from European centers of power, Chile's governing elites were able to consolidate a small national state along the backbone of the Andes, extending over 2,000 miles from south to north, along the Pacific Coast. Like Argentina, the model followed was European, both in terms of building state and nation through the assimilation of European immigrants into a new world setting, but without the massive influx of people that characterized early twentieth-century Argentina and its ruptures in politics. The consequence was a longer, uninterrupted process of state and nation building, with greater cohesiveness among its governing elites and more accommodation of new groups, permitting them to enter national politics more easily as the political basis for participation expanded, but with the understanding that they would not set aside the previous rulers. What makes the development of Chile's national state so different from the rest of the Continent was skilled use of its resources, physical and human, to achieve a relatively prosperous and viable society. In this case, the country's leaders not only had a clear-cut idea of how they intended to govern, through civilian institutions based initially on limited participation, but also later on were open to participation in politics and governance by new groups, as they entered a political arena which became more and more democratic over time, through the construction of a parliamentary republic under presidential leadership. Coupled with relatively successful internal economic and political development, without major governmental ruptures until the 1970s, was awareness of the need to develop an external capability which would make it possible for Chile to sustain its hegemony over West Coast South America, as other national states evolved in their area of the world – Argentina to the east, Peru and Bolivia to the north.

From 1860 to 1905 Chile was hegemonic throughout West Coast South America. As Chile pushed northward, into the Atacama Desert where nitrates

were to be found, it came into conflict first with Bolivia, whose access to the sea was through Antofagasta, and then with Peru, whose southern two provinces contained more of the nitrates it sought. The outcome of this three-way competition for territorial control was the War of the Pacific, 1879–1883, in which Chile was the victor. As a small state, with a more homogenous population, leadership which was better educated and more skilled, a greater military capability – the core of which was a navy that could more easily deploy its ships up and down the Pacific Coast, Chile won the crucial engagements on sea and land. Neither Peru nor Bolivia, with their unincorporated Indian masses in the Andean highlands for whom neither state nor nation were meaningful constructs, could match Chilean military power. The outcome was that Chile as the victor annexed both land providing Bolivia with access to the sea through Antofagasta and Peru's southern two provinces. While mediation, through the offices of the United States, eventually settled the conflict, to this day both Bolivia and Peru have unsatisfied irredentist claims on their lost territories, for without access to the Pacific Bolivia remains a landlocked highland nation and Peru has never fully accepted the incorporation of its southern provinces into Chilean territory.

The Andean Countries

The War of the Pacific highlights the contrasts between Southern Cone and Andean South America. During the colonial era, Lima was the hub of Spain's empire in South America, as a vice-regal capital which suddenly lost its relevance with the collapse of Spain's presence continentally throughout the Americas. For the first several decades after independence, Peruvian elites sustained the hope of reestablishing at least the union of adjacent coastal and Andean regions, with Lima as the capital. But both Chile's interest in seeing two smaller nations emerge to its north and centrifugal regional forces in Peru's northern coast and inland in the Andean highlands, where communication north-south faced formidable obstacles, made movement toward three separate states – Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia – irreversible.

Herein is centered the origin of two small states in South America, as buffers in the new South American state system in the making. An independent Uruguay (the *República Oriental del Uruguay* / the Eastern Republic of Uruguay) became a useful buffer between Brazil and Argentina, where control of the eastern bank of the River Platte was seen as key to which would dominate nineteenth-century East Coast South America. And, Ecuador fulfilled equally

well the need for a buffer between Peru and Colombia on the West Coast. There, despite serious internal divisions over who should govern and what to do with its indigenous majority in the highlands, governing elites struggled to define an Ecuadorian state in the space between what was generally recognized as Peru's northern tier and Colombia's southern frontier. This was joined by Chile's interest in confirming the emergence of a smaller Peruvian state to its north, at the end of the nineteenth century, and supporting Ecuador's claim to disputed Amazonian territory under Peruvian control in the twentieth.

The Northern Tier

The geopolitical position of Colombia and Venezuela, with one foot in South America and the other in the Caribbean, has made the dynamics of their national development very different and delayed their consolidation, as each struggled internally with competing regional elites. Once the Bolivarian ideal of a unified Spanish South America collapsed, Simón Bolívar, the Liberator of northern South America, hoped to keep alive his vision of a greater union after independence in the creation of a Gran Colombia in 1819. But even that hope soon ended, with the declaration of independence in Caracas in 1830, out of which eventually came the formation of a Venezuelan state and nation in the early twentieth century, as a country which also had to contend with aggressive external actors.

Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean

The struggle to define new independent national states in the Caribbean basin has followed a very different trajectory. Whereas the majority of the states emerging in South America were relatively free from Great Power intervention in the nineteenth century and remained isolated, for the most part, from the extension of U.S. power into the Caribbean until 1945, none of these states had the option of being able to focus attention on its own internal development. Thus, whereas nationalism was confirmed in South America largely in terms of competition among new states and nations in the making within the same region, in the circum-Caribbean nationalism was defined largely in terms of opposition to external influence, both that of the United States and the European countries. This contrast can best be captured by looking at how national heroes are defined in the two regions. For example, Arturo Prat in Chile, Miguel Grau in Peru, Francisco Solano López in Paraguay are all hon-

ored for how they defended the homeland against the actions of other South American states. In contrast, Augusto César Sandino in Nicaragua is remembered for his stand against the invasion of U.S. Marines in the 1920s. The Heroic Children in Mexico – *Los Niños Héroes de Chapultepec* – are honored for the sacrifice of their lives in resisting the invasion of French troops intended to shore up the rule of the Hapsburg Prince Maximilian and his wife Carlotta. And, to cite a more recent case, Fidel Castro was able to galvanize his control over Cuba by mobilizing those who had remained in Cuba against the action of the *Yanquís* and their Cuban counterparts in the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961.

Mexico and Central America

The century which extends from 1810 – the declaration of independence by a parish priest in Dolores Hidalgo, Guanajuato, – to 1910 – when the upheaval against the dictator Porfirio Díaz evolved quickly into a full-fledge revolution – marks an enormous struggle to build a viable national state in the face of the loss of huge blocs of national territory. While 1821 commemorates the independence of Mexico and the end to the wars for independence from Spain, the succession of Central America from Mexico in 1822 initiated an extended process of redefinition of national territory to the south, out of which emerged a distinct group of very small, independent countries – Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. This process of defining a small, regional system with its own dynamic was not completed until 1903 with Panama's independence from Colombia, which was encouraged by the U.S. in its push to get a canal constructed across the isthmus, in another of its frequent interventions in the Caribbean. To this fragmentation and redefinition of what portion of North America would be consolidated under a Mexican national state must be added the loss of Mexico's northern territories. This occurred, first, through the independence of Texas in 1836 and its admission as a state to the Union in 1845. A year later, as a consequence of Mexico's determination to go to war with U.S. over the loss of this territory to the North Americans, the Mexican-American War of 1846–1848 resulted in an even greater loss of territory. The outcome of that conflict was the invasion of Mexico by U.S. troops, its defeat and the cession of the remainder of Mexico's northern territories to the U.S. under the Treaty of Hidalgo. When this process ended in 1848 Mexico had lost to the United States not just Texas and eastern New Mexico but also California, Nevada, Utah, portions of Colorado, Arizona, and Wyoming, and the remainder of New Mexico – its whole northern tier.

The Caribbean

This is the most heterogeneous region in Latin America. There three very different small island republics complete the region we define today as Latin America: Haiti and the Dominican Republic, on the island of Hispaniola, and Cuba. Their independence dates reflect the complicated history of the island republics: Haiti's independence from France in 1804 as a consequence of a successful slave revolt; the Dominican Republic's independence in 1844 from Haiti, and Cuba's independence from the United States in 1901, in the aftermath of the Spanish-America War of 1898. But, whereas a new state system with definable borders had taken shape in South America by the early twentieth century, Puerto Rico's retention as a U.S. territory under that island's Commonwealth arrangement signals the fluidity of relationships in the Caribbean. This is a region with 13 sovereign states, 2 overseas departments and 12 dependent territories, the majority of which are tied to the European Union. Linguistically it is equally varied: Spanish speaking (Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Dominican Republic), Creole (Haiti), English in the former British islands and the U.S. Virgin Islands; French in the French dependencies, and Dutch in areas now independent, formerly affiliated with the Netherlands.

Puerto Rico is a case in point illustrating the fluidity of boundaries in this region. Under current governing arrangement, the island is semi-autonomous, but subject to U.S. jurisdiction and sovereignty, with its powers of self-governance being derivative from the authority delegated by the U.S. Congress permitting Puerto Ricans, as U.S. citizens but who do not pay taxes to the U.S., to form and maintain their own government. In this case, the society is Latin American, but the government is a replica of U.S. constitutional arrangements in the division of powers among the Executive, the Legislature and the Courts. To this mix must be added numerous islands outside what is defined today as Latin America. The most important are those identified with the Commonwealth Caribbean, in which the United Kingdom's former colonies are now self-governing under parliamentary rather than presidential rule – for example, the Bahamas, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. Adding further diversity to this region are the French possessions, viz. Guadeloupe, Martinique, and French Guiana which are considered to be part of Metropolitan France, as well as those belonging originally to the Netherlands but now self-governing, as is the case with Suriname and Curacao.

State and Society in Latin America: The Continuing Struggle for Democracy

Yet another reason for beginning with Brazil and the Southern Cone countries in South America is to clarify that the difficulties in consolidating democratic rule and in building and sustaining successful market economies are less a function of a very different colonial past (when contrasted with Canada and the United States), lack of experience in self-government, and economic underdevelopment and more a consequence of the choices made by governing elites at crucial junctures in their development of national states and how they have made use of the resources available to them. From this perspective governmentally, the most important issue in all these countries is how each has responded to mass mobilization, when the basis for participation in politics could no longer be restricted to a small ruling elite and citizens at large from all sectors of society pressed for incorporation into the political process. As Robert Dahl has suggested in his book *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, there are two critical variables in making democracy work and key to understanding political outcomes in Latin America: liberalization (the freedom to contest issues publicly) and inclusiveness (the range of participation). To illustrate this point, a series of 7 contrasting case studies will better serve our purposes here, rather than generalizations about the region as a whole, since it is the diversity of this experience with governance in each of these 20 countries that provides greater insight into the dynamics within government and society throughout Latin America. To these country-based discussions will be added an eighth outlying case, Uruguay, a small state like those in Central America, but with a political system of its own unique in Latin America.

Argentina

As already noted in the discussion of national state formation at independence, pre-World War II Argentina reflected a rapid rise to prominence on the world scene as Latin America's most successful economy, with sustained economic growth 1880–1914, based on its agricultural strengths in beef, wheat and wool, followed by a major drive towards industrialization and the creation of a more diversified economy, 1914–1940. Complementing early economic success was progress in consolidating a national state, 1810–1853, marked by the centralization of power under the Juan Manuel de Rosas dictatorship 1829–

1853, followed by mobilization of large numbers of people in opposition to Rosas. Out of this conflict emerged strong political leadership, within which Juan Bautista Alberdi, Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, and Esteban Echeverría stand out in their commitment to institutionalizing more democratic practices, enshrined in the Constitution of 1853. To this base was later added the Sáenz Peña Act of 1912 which removed property requirements for voting. As a consequence of this enshrinement of universal male suffrage into law the urban middle classes entered politics as a dominant force in the election of 1916.

Under the leadership of the Radical Party – a party patterned after the Radical Party in France, voters drawn from newly enfranchised middle class citizens, people with immigrant backgrounds, and their political representatives largely replaced the Conservatives in government, the core of which was a Hispanic elite identified with highly productive, large landed estates. Once in power with an expanded political base and a limited democracy in place 1916–1930, the Radicals failed to deliver on their promises to open up politics to all new Argentine nationals. They proved to be far more interested in consolidating their power and status as a new power contender, rather than respond to increasingly aggressive working class demands, for greater equity in pay and rights, as those groups also pressed for incorporation into the country's political life. Political conflict, centered around the rise of the Socialist Party as a major actor in Congress and its militant working class supporters, eventually triggered reaction by the Conservatives who had been displaced from power in 1916.

Political discontent coupled with the economic impact of the Great Depression in 1929 on all sectors of Argentine society led Conservatives to success in their appeal to the military to intervene to reestablish order. Out of this new alliance came the formation of a military-Conservative governing coalition in the 1930s; the fragmentation of the opposition, as manifested in the 37 parties participating in 1935 congressional elections; and a succession of first two generals, then two civilians as president. In 1943 this coalition broke down and the military decided to pursue its own course of action, the consequence of which was the fragmentation of the military, with a conservative wing favoring sustaining civilian Conservative rule with military support and more radical younger officers favoring the creation of a new mass movement empowering the urban working classes.

In 1946 Col. Juan Perón took power and with his wife Evita forged a much more radical populist government, reflecting the wishes of their urban working

class base and their desire to penalize affluent Argentines identified with the old order. This movement whose formal name remains the Partido Justicialista (the Justice Party) more commonly bears the name of the Peróns. Initially successful in mobilizing and enfranchising workers, by the early 1950s the Peróns had exhausted public coffers in their reallocation of the nation's wealth. As their ruling coalition disintegrated and opposition to their populist regime grew, conservative military officers finally responded to the protests of the opposition against the excesses of the regime and economic chaos, and intervened in 1955.

The *peronista* phenomenon, however, has had an impact on Latin American politics transcending the Argentine case which warrants further discussion in flagging a style of politics known as "populism," one that has returned time and time again in different parts of Latin America when economic, social, and political conditions have led to mass upheaval and the breakdown of established political institutions. Populism in the Latin American world, as first defined by the Peróns, has had four ingredients whose content has varied greatly according to the national context and the epoch within which it has emerged: charisma, mass movement, nationalism, and social justice. Political charisma in populist politics refers to the attachment of large numbers of people to the individual who becomes enshrined in the public memory for his or her identification with the masses and that person's responsiveness to their needs and aspirations. No one to this day has surpassed the imagery, style, and political performance created by Evita Perón, one that has long outlived her demise. Attached to the populist leader is a mass movement which transcends the divisions and competing interests of working class and marginalized citizens who perceive their social condition to be one of exclusion from the economic, social, and political benefits enjoyed by the privileged. Nationalism, the third component, carries with it the identification of the masses with a common political culture beyond the cleavages dividing society into competing groups and interests, with mass aspirations for a better life transcending all that has been defined as the source of their oppression. This phenomenon is closely linked with a fourth characteristic: social justice, the desire for correction of the economic inequities and the social ills affecting workers and the poor by taking back control of the country in the name of the people, the *pueblo*.

From 1955 to 1966, in an effort to transcend the chasm created by *peronismo*, middle-class civilian politicians resumed their leadership, under the Radical Party, with military support based on the agreement that the Peronistas would be excluded from power. But, by 1966 the courting of disaffected

Peronistas by more liberal members of the Radical Party not only produced a split of the party into two factions, but also convinced the military that politicians seeking to build a more solid base from which to govern was tantamount to collaboration with the enemy. From the military's standpoint this necessitated their taking power to root out all corrupt civilian party politicians.

A succession of three military governments followed, 1966–1973, which ultimately failed. Convinced that there was no way to govern the country effectively without reincorporating the Peronistas, General Alejandro Lanusse negotiated an agreement with the Peronistas that civilian government would be reestablished, with the understanding that Juan Perón could return to Argentina but would remain in the wings, only to discover that once in power, the ruling Peronistas reversed their position and invited Perón to reassume the presidency. Acquiescing to a presidential election in which Perón received a mandate to take power in 1973, the result was a new political disaster. By that point, Perón was too old to govern effectively and, with his death shortly thereafter in 1974, politics returned to their old divisive patterns – the consequence of which was the disastrous presidency of Perón's second wife, Isabel (1974–1976). At this point, the military split into opposed wings, one committed to constitutional rule and new accommodation with the civilians – this was the group which had had the upper hand in seeking to work with civilian politicians before – and the other favoring a more decisive and radical intervention to clean up the system and set the country back on course.

The takeover of this latter group, the hardline military, with three Army generals as presidents, 1976–1982 (Gen. Jorge Videla [1976–Mar. 1981], Gen. Roberto Viola [Mar.–Dec. 1981] and Gen. Leopoldo Galtieri [Dec. 1981–June 1982]), ended in the disastrous Falklands War, 1981–1982 – but not before a dirty, internal war against their own people, in which thousands of people identified with opposition to the new order simply disappeared. With the military thoroughly discredited, and a fourth general in office to ease the transition, Argentina returned to civilian rule, this time with a wider base in terms of popular support and with greater consensus for the first time, that in the face of having all the other options fail, a democratic solution was the least worst alternative.

For the first time, since 1930, civilian rule under a democratic regime with open competitive politics, returned to the forefront in 1984. In the election of 1984, the Radicals received majority support and took power under Raúl Alfonsín. In subsequent elections, after the failure of the Radicals to deal effectively with the country's economic problems, the Peronistas reasserted them-

selves as the majority party. As a consequence, a succession of Peronista leaders as president has followed: Carlos Menem (1989–1999), Fernando de la Rúa (1999–2001), Eduardo Duhalde (2002–2003), Néstor Kirchner (2003–2007), and most recently his wife Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in 2007.

Brazil

Aside from the factors already discussed regarding the formation of modern Brazil, when authoritarian and populist responses to mobilization politics in Brazil are compared and contrasted with Argentina, what stands out is the preeminence of a conciliatory political style – that is to say, the use of governing tactics of conciliation and reform as opposed to the confrontation and radical change so prevalent in Argentina and elsewhere in Spanish-speaking Latin America in responding to the mobilization and entry of new groups into the political process. Complementing this political style is a key institutional factor: the formation and evolution over time of a functional federal system of government in Brazil, which permits multiple political arenas to develop at the federal, state, and local level. While federalism has also been a part of government in Argentina, *de facto* that system has functioned primarily within the framework of a unitary state, within which the powers of the national government in governance and finance override those of the provinces. The political antecedents of Brazil's present system of government are twofold: the creation of a federal system in 1891 from above rather than below, characterized by cycles of centralization and decentralization, and considerable internal variance in the autonomy of the individual states.

Just as Juan Perón has had a major role in shaping political outcomes in modern Argentina, so too Getúlio Vargas has exercised a major role in the formation of modern Brazil, first as an authoritarian leader (1937–1945) and later as an elected president (1951–1954). Whereas mass mobilization in Argentina is linked to the Peronista movement and the way the Peróns took power in 1946, so too Vargas' rule and how he responded to the imperatives of economic and political modernization are very important in understanding today's Brazil.

What distinguishes the Brazilian case is that Vargas undertook economic modernization and the creation of a strong national government in the 1930s through the politics of expanding presidential power, until he was able to establish an authoritarian state known as the *Estado Novo* in 1937, one which drew upon corporatist ideas and practices prevalent in Southern Europe. Accompa-

nying this shift in the balance of power from the states to the federal government was Vargas' use of the tactics of cooptation through the establishment of government-controlled unions, designed to anticipate worker demands linked to pay and rights before an independent labor movement could get underway. Prior to the 1930s Brazil experienced weak party development and widespread use of clientelism, based on state and regional coalitions, under the country's Republican Party, which functioned as a confederation of state party organizations. After working within this framework in the years before the Depression of 1929, Vargas undertook major reforms in the economy through the organization of state enterprises, and in government through extensive administrative reform. Among the changes instituted were a new Ministry of Labor and the establishment of an elaborate system of corporate relations establishing close ties between government and state-centered unions, through industry-specific social security arrangements.

What brought an end to Brazil's New State era were external events: the Allied victory ending World War II. With Brazilian troops returning from the Italian campaign with the Americans, military leaders joined hands with Vargas' democratic opposition, the National Democratic Union (UDN), to force Vargas to resign. The outcome was a new democratic charter, the Constitution of 1946, and an interim president chosen from the constitutionalist military. But in the election of 1950, the first open election in more than a generation, Vargas reinvented himself and returned to office as a populist politician with enormous mass appeal. For a brief moment *Varguismo* matched the mass mobilization of the workers, the poor, and the lower middle classes characteristic of *Peronismo* with its cult of the leader. However, Vargas was unable to convert this popular enthusiasm for his election into a governing coalition which could sustain him as president under the new constitution, with an independently minded Congress. In 1954, shortly before his term ended, he committed suicide, leaving a letter behind attributing to unnamed foreign interests the causes of his failed presidency and appealing to his followers to keep alive his spirit.

In death, Vargas had far greater impact on Brazil's new democracy than he had in life. For, his legacy of populist politics lived on in the two parties he had created in 1945: the one, a coalition of conservative followers in the states who had supported his New State (the PSD, the Social Democratic Party); the other, a labor-oriented, lower middle class urban movement (the PTB, the Brazilian Labor Party). The opposition UDN, however, weighed in heavily in the transition, in the selection of an agreed-upon interim civilian. But, in the 1955 presidential election, Juscelino Kubitschek galvanized the union Vargas had

hoped to realize into a coalition linking the PSD with the PTB. His presidency, 1956–1960, was the most successful during this democratic interlude, for he understood how to make the Vargas coalition work and to govern with Congress. When the Kubitschek presidency ended in 1960, the UDN was able to rally sufficient support to elect its own candidate, Jânio Quadros, as president. But Quadros as an anti-party candidate with his own quixotic expectations entered office attempting to bypass the new party system. Chaos soon ensued with his attempts to govern without Congress and, when he resigned in August 1961, expecting a huge upsurge in populist support, he found himself out of power. Crisis in Brazilian politics returned to the forefront, because immediately conservative PSD politicians and their allies in the UDN schemed in Congress to keep João Goulart, Quadros' PTB Vice President, from assuming office. Ultimately, maneuvering in Congress failed, an election was held the end of 1961 in which Goulart consolidated his new leadership with a solid electoral mandate. As a left-oriented populist, he embarked on changes in national politics, designed to enfranchise more fully his labor and lower-class civilian supporters and to subvert the military establishment by organizing support in the Armed Forces from among younger non-commissioned officers. Mass demonstrations proliferated; inflation, already severe, got out of hand; mobilization of the rural poor in their demand for land upset established land owners in the Northeast with a rhetoric increasingly pro-Cuban in content – all this combined to convince the military that conservative civilian appeals to intervene were essential to save the country from radical populism.

Taking power in a March 15, 1964 coup with enthusiastic civilian support from the middle and upper classes, the military began to govern (with Gen. Castello Branco as president), expecting to work with the civilian opposition to Goulart to reform the system and return power to more responsible civilian leaders, housed primarily in the UDN. But, one by one as the initial reforms unraveled, the new regime with its committed military leadership embarked on a policy of exterminating the excesses of populism embodied in the PTB. In the process they became convinced that the whole party system had been corrupted by populism and that a more radical solution was required: abolition of the existing party system and the creation of a new government-controlled two party system. At this point the military split into two camps: the constitutionalists and the hardline military, much along the same lines present in the Argentine military in the aftermath of Juan Perón's rule.

But once again, the established political style of conciliation, conflict avoidance, compromise, and the desire to avoid the excesses of the reactions against

Peronismo moved the country in the direction of avoiding open conflict and outright repression. The label used to characterize this more conservative style of politics became known as *democratic formalism*, the gutting of the content of the 1946 Constitution without abolishing it. In 1967, faced with still uncontrollable inflation and insufficient political control to set the country on a new course, the hardline military took over in a coup within the coup, amending the Constitution so fundamentally that they altered its content. In so doing they avoided the issue of writing a new constitution, and were able to continue to emphasize their caretaker role in setting the nation on the right course. That phase lasted a scant two years, 1967–1968. Taking advantage of the illness of the acting president (Gen. Costa e Silva), a military-civilian coalition took over. The agreement was that the military would name the president (in this case Gen. Garrástazu Medici), while civilian economists and planners would guide the country by assuming key ministerial posts, incorporating key representatives of the business community, in economic reform designed to curtail inflation and to get the economy back on a steady growth rate. This successful strategy became known as the Brazilian miracle, with a growth rate of 10 percent per year, 1968–1973. But it came to an abrupt end in 1974 with the escalating costs of imported oil, which was essential to sustain Brazilian industry; the return of inflation, and economic slowdown in what was state-centered economic growth. The worsening economic situation coupled with growing civilian unrest against military rule, with its hardline policies in dealing with protestors, convinced the military of the need to gradually withdraw from politics.

From 1974 to 1984, under the leadership of two more moderate generals (first, Ernesto Geisel, then João Baptista Figueiredo), the regime began to negotiate with the “responsible” opposition, those who would cooperate with the government in negotiating an exit strategy. The Brazilian transition took a decade as the two sides sparred back and forth on how to open up the system and at the same time avoid recriminations against the military in power. Centrist civilians played a key role in keeping the negotiations on track, but also the inability of the Government to find a solution to the return of inflation and economic slowdown made it impossible for it to renege. Agreement was finally reached on who the civilian president would be (Tancredo Neves), in 1984, and he was confirmed by an indirect election in Congress with a Vice President identified with the regime in power (José Sarney). The tragedy was that candidate, Tancredo Neves, died on the eve of assuming power and the conservative, pro-regime vice president, José Sarney took over as president (1985–1989).

Brazil's return to democratic rule was not an easy one, not only because of the difficulties in negotiating an exit strategy for the military and its civilian supporters, but also because of the intractability of the country's economic problems and spiraling inflation. On the political front, old-style populism returned under the Fernando Collor de Mello presidency, 1990–1992. But there was crucial difference in the 1990s from populism in the 1960s: an independent press and media, in radio and television, with a strong investigatory bent. Since petty and large-scale corruption was the fuel on which populism ran, when documentation of the President's involvement in a huge scheme of privileges and kickbacks became public knowledge, impeachment proceedings were brought against him in Congress. Rather than undergo indictment by the Senate, Collor de Mello resigned and his vice president took over.

At the point when inflation had reached its worst and the economic outlook was the blackest, Acting President Itamar Franco asked a leading opposition figure, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, to assume the role of Finance Minister. To the surprise of everyone, Cardoso devised a recovery plan that worked. So successful was this economic recovery that Cardoso became a candidate for president, was elected to office (1995–1998), and was equally successful in engineering not just continued economic reforms designed to dismantle a state-dominated economy and install a market economy, but also in instigating governmental reform. With these accomplishments behind him, he was reelected for a second term of office (1999–2002). When Cardoso left office at the end of 2002, Brazil had emerged from its long and painful economic and political transition into sustained economic growth and sufficient governmental reforms to insure the continuation of a market economy and sustained democratic rule.

The last phase of this economic and political transition and the consolidation of Brazilian markets and democratic rule has been the election of the leader of the new Brazilian Labor Party, the PT, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, not just for one, but for two presidential terms (2003–2006, 2007–2010). Its significance lies in the acceptance by the opposition of Lula's victory not just in one election but in a second one as well, making it possible for a leader of a political party on the left to take power legitimately by winning at the ballot box. In power, the fact that Lula has been able to hold two terms in succession, as permitted by the Brazilian constitution, is a consequence also of his decision not to reverse the commitment to a market economy, but rather to affirm markets as president of the republic and to move ahead with his left-centered coalition in Congress to enact the social and educational policies his political base demanded.

Chile

In terms of political mobilization – how new groups and individuals are brought into the political process as the base for political participation expands – what is distinctive about Chile, when contrasted to Argentina and Brazil, is its long and successful experience with the development of continuous party organizations and the formation of party governments across time. Earlier than either Argentina or Brazil, one can identify the emergence of a distinct center, right, and left in Chilean politics within an institutional framework that has sustained an evolving and expanding democratic regime. Political historians in Chile account for this within the context first of an aristocratic republic, 1829–1861, in which voting was restricted to those owning property; a liberal republic, 1861–1891, in which property restrictions were abolished and middle class voters were added to the electoral roles; and the parliamentary republic, in which Congress became the dominant institution and where by 1920 all significant social sectors had been incorporated into a multiparty framework. More importantly, all the major parties had two primary characteristics, matching party development in Europe: the ability to develop and sustain party organizations across time and to provide cohesive party leadership in which individuals could be rotated through party organizations, without becoming identified with a single dominant personality.

Why then the breakdown of Chilean democracy in 1970? Despite the openness of the political system in Chile (liberalization) and the incorporation of a wide variety of groups spanning the political spectrum from left to right (inclusiveness), there was one unwritten rule: the political left could obtain majorities in elections and in Congress, as long as coalition politics would not produce a presidential leader from the left who could control the presidency. For many years, the practice of determining who would be elected to public office in the Congress and the presidency depended on pluralities rather than majorities, where multi-member congressional districts allowed greater flexibility in representing a variety of viewpoints, as opposed to single member districts in which there could be but one victor. For years, the election of a president from the left was simply not viable given the broad-based coalitions in the center and on the right, which precluded sufficient votes to elect a left candidate. The other factor, from the mid-1960s onward, was the increasing polarization of politics in Chile, the introduction of marked ideological differences, and the difficulty in building legislative coalitions transcending ideological differences, 1965 to 1973. Here, the politics of the cold war combined

with the rise of Fidel Castro to power in Cuba and the exporting of the Cuban Revolution as a model for reform and revolution throughout Latin America had a major role to play. The priorities in economic and social reform increasingly became issues related to the internationalization of the conflict over priorities in economic and social reform. As the polarization between the right and the left increased, the center in politics became less and less relevant in Chilean politics. The crisis peaked in the years 1970–1973, the outcome of which was military intervention through an attack against civilian institutions centered on the presidential palace, the assassination of President Salvador Allende (the first president from the left to take office), and the imposition of Gen. August Pinochet as acting president.

From 1970 through 1989, Chile was subjected to authoritarian rule. The centerpiece and justification for the existence of this regime was the necessity of radical economic reform, in order to put in place a market economy, the privatization of public enterprises, and the internationalization of the domestic economy, following the economic principles of the Chicago economist John Friedman. While the initial success was great, the vulnerability of Chile to fluctuations in international markets produced an internal crisis in banking and near collapse of the domestic economy, 1982–1984, in which 16 banks and nearly 60 percent of the system's financial assets were liquidated at an estimated cost of 30 to 40 percent of the GDP. At this point, Chilean economists proposed a solution to the crisis by bringing the state back in to sustain domestic markets through the development of a regulatory state that would intercede between the domestic economy and international markets. This shift in economic policy making has generally been referred to as the movement from the primacy of a core group of technocrats known as the Chicago Boys to a new group labeled the Santiago Boys, innovators in free market economics who focused on the role of a regulatory state, protecting internal markets from fluctuations in international markets which might have pernicious effects on the domestic economy. By 1988, the impact of economic restructuring was such that a lively, competitive domestic economy was in place with an international capability to situate Chile effectively in international markets, primarily through its ability to produce high quality copper and fruits, vegetables, and wines.

So confident were Pinochet and his supporters of their economic successes as a vehicle for transforming national politics that, when it became apparent that civilian opposition to the regime had not disappeared but was becoming increasingly vocal, the regime agreed to an October 1988 plebiscite. Having agreed to abide by the outcome of this vote, either a *sí* or *no*, the regime was

caught without a way to avoid opening up the system once there was resounding support for the “no” option, to bring an end to the Pinochet regime. Attempting to take control of the situation, the regime focused attention on writing a new constitution, with Opposition participation, which would defend the principles of a free-market economy and write into that basic document a political arrangement whereby the voice of the right would be guaranteed permanent representation in Congress, especially in the Senate, and Pinochet and the military, protected from recriminations. Once that document was in place, a second plebiscite was held in August 1989 on the new constitution, one which accepted that document as the vehicle for returning to democratic rule. In accord with the time table agreed to, presidential and congressional elections were held in December 1989 in which a coalition of center-left parties won the elections and the country returned peacefully to democracy in early 1990.

Generally, the success of this transition back to democratic practices is attributed to two factors: first, recognition that the economic restructuring which had taken place under Pinochet was working and producing notable results, benefiting most Chileans when compared to the inflation and economic instability of the past, and, second, the success of the protracted negotiations between a coalition of the major parties in the center and left and the Government, in which both sides agreed upon a common framework for governing the country. This “pacted” democracy” produced initially a “constrained” politics in which the conditions designed to protect Pinochet, the Right and the military were seen by many as excessive, but over the years these have all been mitigated by the passage of time (for example, the death of Pinochet) and adjustments (viz., the curtailment of military autonomy), and the greater benefits achieved with the new strength accorded to legislative institutions and the courts, reestablishing the rule of law and respect for electoral outcomes in presidential and congressional elections as decisive. In reestablishing civilian supremacy, the coalition of parties on the center-left has consistently won the last four elections, moving elected government from centrist leaders (Patricio Aylwin in 1990 and Eduardo Frei in 1994) to the democratic left (Ricardo Lagos in 2000 and Michelle Bachelet in 2006). The coalition on the right has continued to compete in national election and, while unable to obtain sufficient support to elect a president, it has had sufficient weight to be able to continue to represent its interests in Congress. More importantly, the left has been folded back into mainstream politics with the election of the last two presidents (Lagos and Bachelet) accepted as legitimate and their legislative programs able to be passed and implemented.

Looking back over the last 200 years, what stands out in Chilean governmental experience comparatively is how Congress has evolved and been sustained over the years, despite many challenges (the most important of which were during the Pinochet years). For, today it is clearly the most important governing institution. This is something to which not even the United States can lay claim, despite the hopes and intent of its founding fathers in designing a constitution which they hoped would endure.

Peru

In moving to West Coast South America and the Northern Tier Republics, we enter a very different political world. In contrast to the success stories of re-democratization and the consolidation of democratic regimes in the ABC countries (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile), Peru, Venezuela, and Colombia have a very different track record in the struggle to sustain democratic practices, through liberalization and inclusiveness. There the outcomes have been much less felicitous. Peru continues to struggle to incorporate its indigenous peoples, concentrated in the highlands, and mass mobilization through political party organizations has remained fluid, except for the survival of the Aprista Party. Oil-rich Venezuela has never been able to resolve the dichotomy between those who have benefited from the country's oil wealth and a party system embracing upper and middle income groups and the poor who have revolted under the leadership of Hugo Chávez to destroy what seemed to most outsiders a very successful party democracy. This resurgence of the sort of populism first harnessed by the Peróns has gained dominance in today's Venezuela with a vengeance. In contrast Colombia, with one foot in the Andean world and another in coastal communities facing the Pacific and the Caribbean, seems to have become locked into an unending pattern of guerrilla violence and struggling middle-class party politics that is very old and at the same time very contemporary, in an archipelago of regional capitals scattered throughout the country that have always defied centralization.

What characterized Peruvian politics for much of the twentieth century was delayed modernization and the prolongation of a traditional order. These developments, coupled with the difficulties of transcending the divisions between coast, *sierra* (a highland plateau with non-contiguous mountain valleys), and *montaña* (the eastern slopes of the Andes that descend into the Amazonian jungle), have always made it difficult to build both a state and a nation. Extended elite rule (1820–1929), the long recovery required to transcend the

devastation left by the War of the Pacific, and the failure of revolutionary politics to restructure state and society (1929–1939), meant that Peru entered the post-World War II era with none of the advantages secured in Brazil and the Southern Cone. In fact, the intellectual foundations of modern Peru, both conservative and revolutionary, and the attempt to explain this delayed modernization in economics and politics led to wide acceptance of an oligarchic thesis: the myth that a unified power structure had long dominated Peruvian society versus the reality of a divided elite at odds with each other as much as with other groups challenging their power and privilege.

The unique outcome of this extended debate was a major role for intellectuals in shaping modern Peru, rather than pragmatic politicians, by advancing revolutionary thought: González Prada (the originator of the oligarchic thesis in the 1890s), José Carlos Mariátegui (in his restatement of Marxist thought to fit Peruvian reality in the 1920s), and Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre (in advancing the concept of *Indo-América* as the authentic Latin America in its fusion of Hispanic and indigenous cultures and peoples). Carried into the world of politics these ideas fueled the entrance of the middle sectors into politics via a revolutionary counter-elite movement: the Popular Revolutionary American Alliance (APRA, the adjective for which is “Aprista”). APRA’s initial quest for power in the 15 years preceding World War II generated violence and repression by force, first with the military negating the Aprista victory in 1931 presidential elections; then the July 1932 Aprista revolt in Trujillo on the northern coast, followed by military reaction in which party leaders and followers were massacred in the ruins of Chan-Chan outside Trujillo; and lastly the Aprista revenge in the April 1933 assassination of President Sánchez Cerro.

Following the stand-off between the military-backed government of Oscar Benavides (1933–1939) and the Apristas, a major effort was made during the government of Manuel Prado to reconcile differences between the coastal elite and Aprista leaders (1939–1945). The outcome was agreement that in the next round of elections the Apristas would be free to compete for seats in Congress, but would not field a presidential candidate. Subsequently, José Luis Bustamante y Rivero was elected president in 1945 and governed until 1948, with APRA controlling Congress. This initial attempt at reconciling their differences at the ballot box and by sharing power, with one side controlling the presidency and the other, Congress, ended in a naval revolt in 1948 triggered by Aprista partisans. At this point the Army intervened once again and General Odría was installed as president, with the mandate to destroy the Apristas by repression, 1948–1956. An asylum case ensued, with Haya de la Torre taking

refuge in the Colombian Embassy, and the Colombian government refusing to hand him over to Peruvian authorities.

In 1956 a new effort was made to resolve the differences between the two sides by negotiating a return to democratic rule, but with the understanding once again that, while the Apristas would be free to compete in Congressional elections, an Aprista candidate for president would not be tolerated. Manuel Prado was reelected president in 1956 and much more attention was given to putting in place an arrangement in which all could work together, without constraints on who might serve in Congress, and letting the majority principle determine legislative outcomes. This era of *convivencia* (living together through a politics of accommodation and accord) worked well, even in relations between Congress and the Presidency. New actors appeared on the scene, with an expanded number of parties now in place spanning the political spectrum, from the Odristas on the right to the Apristas on the left, with new Christian Democrats and Acción Popular (AP) at the center.

When new presidential and congressional elections appeared on the horizon in 1962, great hope was expressed that there would be a peaceful transition from one administration to the next. Elections took place on schedule, but were indecisive and needed to be resolved in Congress. The military discovered at the last minute that in behind the scenes negotiations the Apristas and the Odristas had struck a deal, with the principals Haya de la Torre and Manuel Odría meeting behind closed doors to agree that as a majority bloc they would vote together for a common candidate (Odría) in exchange for a coalition in the new congress which would give the Apristas a solid majority. Not being happy with the prospects of this outcome, the military re-intervened and imposed a moratorium, 1962–1963. A new round of presidential elections then took place, with the block against an Aprista presidential candidate continuing. By then Acción Popular (AP) had picked up much larger support in the center and advanced their candidate as the one capable of breaking the stalemate. Cementing their coalition with the Christian Democrats, they were able to elect the AP candidate, Fernando Belaúnde Terry, president for the 1963–1968 term of office. However, the Aprista-Odrista accord held firm for Congress with that alignment continuing to have a majority and the AP and the Christian-Democrats in the minority. The great hope in these years was that with the erosion of support for the Apristas and the rise of the AP as the party of the center, a new more democratic alignment could be produced in which, while the Apristas would have a plurality in Congress, they would no longer present the threat of an electoral majority, with the capacity to elect a president.

Crisis politics, however, returned in 1968. With Congress and the Presidency stalemated, without the ability to get reform-oriented legislation passed and signed into law, except for a weak agrarian reform law, the sensitive issue of national control of the country's petroleum resources by a foreign oil company became headline news (the International Petroleum Company had been granted subsoil rights years earlier). When negotiations with the Government in the Offices of the President broke down and the scandal of a missing page in the contract, crucial to Peru's regaining subsoil rights, hit the news, the military intervened, put Belaúnde Terry on an airplane out of the country, and assumed power – this time with determination to impose radical reforms by fiat. In short, with this action the long-standing attempt to secure governmental reforms and the incorporation of revolutionary expectations into populist political parties, first Aprista-based, and then by moving a more moderate AP party organization to the foreground as an alternative, failed. Younger military officers – imbued with the ideology of reform and revolution, much better trained than their old-line superiors, and confident in their recent victories over revolutionary guerrilla movements in the highlands – took power with the belief that with the support of the people they could carry out long-suppressed revolutionary expectations and build a new Peru.

Under General Velasco Alvarado (1968–1975) the military imposed a radical agenda, beginning with expropriation of the International Petroleum Company, followed by agrarian reform and “Peruvianization” of banking (i.e., nationalization). To this was soon added a new contract with the Southern Peruvian Copper Corporation, giving the Government much more favorable terms; merger and consolidation of the fishing industry in particular and Peruvian industries in general, and “multilateralization” of foreign trade, which meant lessening economic dependency in trade on the United States and increasing trade with the Soviet-bloc countries. From the beginning the new economic model, which drew on Yugoslav experience with state-owned enterprises and a restricted private sector in a market-oriented economy, was a colossal failure, given the fact that Peru simply did not have a state apparatus commensurate with the tasks at hand. Success in eliminating the old economy was one thing; constructing a new one, another. Complementing major changes in the economy was the goal of creating a new society, in which the old party system was to be replaced by mass mobilization through a controlled social movement from above, known as SINAMOS.

Failure to establish a new order under Velasco Alvarado generated a tempering of the “revolution.” Taking advantage of Velasco's illness, a more mod-

erate group of military officers rallied around Gen. Francisco Morales Bermudez, who assumed the presidency (1975–1980). With military unity now at risk and the imperative of finding a new economic and political framework through which to govern, the senior military opened a dialogue with the business community and the Aprista Party. By 1977 a full-fledged transition was underway. First, an accommodation was reached with the Apristas, followed by the convoking of a constitutional assembly in 1978, agreement on a new constitution in 1979, and the scheduling of national elections every five years, beginning in 1980. The death of Haya de la Torre, the Aprista leader, August 2, 1979 changed the expectations considerably. In the elections which followed, on schedule, Belaúnde Terry was re-elected for a second term of office (1980–1985) with a 45.5 percent plurality.

While expectations were high in the return to democratic rule and a market-economy, neither government nor the business community was able to meet expectations. The failure of this second Belaúnde government in economics and politics was followed by the resurgence of the Aprista Party, which with 46 percent of the vote in the first round and 48 percent in the second, saw its candidate Alán García elected to office and able to take office for the first time (1985). Notable changes certainly had taken place in Peru. Whereas in 1963, the last presidential election before extended military rule, voter registration was 19.1 percent of the eligible population, by 1985 it had increased to 43.4 percent. And, in that context, despite all the upheavals in Peruvian politics, the Aprista Party had not only survived, but also had demonstrated its ability to outperform the other parties and political movements. But, performance-wise, its capacity to govern effectively proved to be just as disastrous, for, while García was successful in rebuilding a populist coalition for electoral purposes, he was unable to deal effectively with the problems before him during his term of office, 1985–1990. When he left office, the economic crisis was even greater with inflation running an estimated 3500 percent and a 20 billion dollar foreign debt, of which the Government was in default to the IMF and other international agencies for almost 2 billion dollars.

In the next round of elections, Alberto Fujimori and his movement called Cambio 90, with 80 percent of the electorate voting, took office for the 1990–1995 term. While inflation was up to 7,659 percent by the end of the year, Fujimori initiated a series of economic reforms that began to produce results for the first time in years. More importantly, faced with a security crisis at hand with the guerrilla movement *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path) more active than ever before, and working with the military and police, he was able to

check that guerrilla movement in the highlands and minimize its presence on the coast. Accompanying these actions, however, was an increasingly authoritarian presidency. In April 1992 he dismissed Congress and instituted government by decree. In late 1993 he secured a new constitution, more to his liking, and called for new elections in November 1992 in which Cambio 90 gained control of 40 of the 80 seats. In December that same year the military captured Abimael Guzmán and other Sendero leaders.

Compared with the disastrous records of his predecessors in economics and security, these accomplishments made it possible for him to be elected for a second five year term, 1995–2000. But with these successes went a mandate which he interpreted to be one endorsing his authoritarian actions. Complicating this second term was the fact that not only had he been unable to erase the guerrilla movements in their entirety, as exemplified by the ability of a small guerrilla group, MRTA, to seize control of the Japanese embassy in December 1996, but also public knowledge of his abuses of power increased rapidly, with a series of scandals and dirty tricks linked to surveillance of the opposition and an opposition press and media publicizing them. When tapes regarding these activities were released, it confirmed the public's worst fears. In that context, the opposition, which had been largely stilled during his first term of office, became increasingly vocal. Unable to establish a basis for the legitimacy of his increasingly authoritarian presidency, Fujimori found himself trapped by his authoritarian populist style of operations and censored both at home and abroad, one that included the naming of 80-member Organization of American States observation team which was appointed to monitor his activities as 2000 elections approached. The final *coup de grace* was the release of videotapes, secretly recorded by his security chief, Vladimiro Montesinos, documenting the shady and illicit operations of the President and his allies. Faced with this evidence and an aggressive opposition led by Alejandro Toledo, Fujimori resigned and left the country for Japan, with a respected member of Congress, Valentín Paniagua becoming interim president until a new round of elections could be scheduled and a new president elected.

In the presidential elections which followed in April 2001, Alejandro Toledo was elected and assumed the presidency for the 2001–2006 term. From the beginning Toledo's administration was a troubled one in the context of the enormous problems facing the country. His chief asset, as a son of the poor, was the legitimacy he had as the first person to serve in the office of the presidency as someone who had risen to the top of the political system from below on the basis of his merits, from among the country's poor majority.

Given the alternatives and the enormity of the problems facing Peru, it is no small accomplishment that he, his administration, and his country were able to struggle through his term of office and were able to guarantee another round of democratically-held presidential elections, held on schedule. Out of this context, with the old parties gone and a host of political movements spanning the political spectrum mobilizing the electorate, a resurgent Aprista Party once again return their head, Alán García to office for a second term in 2006, with far more understanding for the difficulties facing their country and the need for an administration with less focus on rhetoric and more on the substance of how to respond to the enormous economic and political problems facing the country.

Venezuela

In contrast to all these developments in Peru and the ABC countries, the resurgence of radical populism in Venezuela, of the ilk first identified with the Peróns in Argentina in the 1940s, calls attention to the fragility of sustaining democratic practices – even in an oil-rich society such as Venezuela – when the problems of a poor majority are neglected for an extended period of time, especially under circumstances coupled with economic turbulence. For, despite all the progress made in Venezuela in sustaining democratic rule from 1959 to 1999, political party competition, based on two dominant competitive parties offering alternative programs and policies, with mass constituencies, was unable to head off a fundamental rupture in the existing political and economic order. Responding to mass demands for major change in the existing political system, immediate attention to the hardships imposed on the poor by the economic crisis of 1994, and the failure of the existing parties to respond to the crisis – Hugo Chávez, formerly a career military officer, founded a mass-based, left political movement, called the Fifth Republic Movement. First jailed for his radical politics in an attempted coup, he subsequently led his movement to electoral victory in December 1998, on a platform advocating writing a new constitution and changing politics and society in Venezuela fundamentally to the benefit of the country's poor majority.

With a new constitution drafted and approved by popular referendum in 1999, Chávez was reelected president in 2000, under a new provision in the constitution, changing presidential terms from 5 to 6 years. Further turbulence ensued when Chávez undertook reform of the country's state owned oil company, *Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA)*. Faced with opposition by 7 of its ex-

ecutives, Chávez fired them. Management retaliated with a lockout, bringing oil production to a standstill. This was followed by a military coup removing Chávez, April 11, 2002. Demonstrations in favor of Chávez led to a reversal of this action in 48 hours, his return to office, and agreement to submit this controversy over his radical leadership to a recall referendum, as provided for in the new constitution, in 2002. This recall failed to remove him from office. In 2006 he won his bid for reelection with overwhelming support. But at this point, with opposition increasing against his authoritarian actions, when he proposed a new referendum with major changes in the constitution, including his bid to eliminate limits to his two terms of office, his actions to consolidate his rule failed, 51 to 49 percent.

With this immediate situation in mind, and with an eye to the collapse of the established parties, their replacement by political movements spanning the political spectrum, and the realignment carried out by Chávez in enfranchising the poor and bringing them into the political arena through mobilization-oriented politics, there are three points of reference drawn from the past, which have relevance to the current situation. First, there is the demise of personalist rule in Venezuela in 1935, with the ending of the dictatorship of Juan Vicente Gómez; mass mobilization 1935–1945, and the rise to power of Acción Democrática 1945–1948, as a center-left political movement. Second, there was strong reaction from the right against the imposition of a center-left reform agenda in 1948, the overthrow of that government, and the installation of the Gen. Marcos Pérez Jiménez dictatorship, 1950–1958. Third, the outcome of that stand-off and the replacement of Pérez Jiménez was a “pacted” democracy, which provided 34 years of stable democratic rule, coupled with economic progress, based on oil, until a burgeoning economic crisis in 1989, culminating in the economic crisis of 1994, brought down the accomplishments of those years.

Despite Venezuela’s oil wealth, what is now clear in hindsight is the economic and political decline which began in the 1980s and it undermined democratic rule. This was centered not only in the failure of economic policies designed to establish a more diversified and productive industrial and agricultural base for the country, but also in the banking industry in how to build a more effective interfacing between public and private financing of development activities. Coupled with this were problems at the heart of the country’s economy: the oil and gas business, in opening new fields, updating outdated equipment, and improving overall production and refining of the country’s oil. Complementing this was ossification of the country’s competitive, dominant two-party

system. This was centered in the “pacted” democracy agreed upon in 1958, after the overthrow of the dictatorship of Pérez Jiménez (1950–1958), in which center-left Acción Democrática (AD) and center-right COPEI dominated the political arena and rotated in and out of office across the years until 1999.

At the outset the agreements reached among the various groups contending for power were all seen as healthy signs of Venezuela’s nascent democracy, especially in the way in which revolutionary groups engaged in guerrilla activities to upset the new state were defeated and eventually folded into a competitive party system, by agreeing to compete for power at the ballot box and participate in congress in debates over appropriate legislation for dealing with the country’s needs and priorities. Using once again the two key variables first identified by Dahl in assessing democratization, liberalization and inclusiveness, alluded to in the preface to these country case studies, democratic practices in Venezuela can be and were frequently judged successful. This was true especially during the era in Latin America marked by resurgence of military rule in the 1960, ‘70s, and early ‘80s. But, decisions and compromises made along the way, as to what the priorities would be and what would be set aside as non-negotiable issues, also eventually corrupted the process. The two biggest issues were the failure to come up with an effective way to deal with corruption in the state apparatus, in undoing the negatives of party-based political appointments and the use of public funds for partisan purposes, as well as how to use effectively the country’s revenues from oil and gas to close the gap between the well-to-do and the poor. Fundamental reform and attention to social inequities simply became side-lined over time by more pedestrian party politics.

When a full-fledged banking crisis hit the country in 1994, in the context of an inflationary spiral which was out of control, the country’s liquidity became a huge issue. At the time Carlos Andrés Pérez (AD) was in power, for a second term (1989–1994). Electorally, he had been hugely successful in putting together a winning political coalition that could be characterized as “Neoliberal Neopopulism.” “Neoliberal” had become the catch-phrase for the market-friendly economic development strategies centered on deregulation of the economy and privatization of the state-owned enterprises which had dominated the economy, not just in Venezuela but all over Latin America during these years, primarily under pressure from the United States, to stimulate new economic growth. “Neopopulism” was, in turn, the jargon used to capture new-style populism, the strategy of using nationalistic rhetoric and socio-economic issues designed to capture the vote of the poor as well more affluent

members of society to produce winning majorities in competitive elections. CAP, the nickname for the president, was especially adept in using this rhetoric to convince a majority of the Venezuelan people that he had a program and a set of policies for dealing effectively with the country's needs. But, as had been the case elsewhere and before in using populism to produce majorities through rhetoric and political charisma, centered around personalist political movements eschewing formal party organization (viz. the original model created by the Peróns in 1940s Argentina and resurrected by Fujimori in the early 1990s in Peru), the crisis of the moment coupled with the arrogance of power and political corruption generated political disaster for the incumbent and the country. Pérez's economic and political problems escalated without control, leading to his impeachment, the first in the nation's history.

Pérez's impeachment and the subsequent collapse of Acción Democrática made the return to power of Rafael Caldera (for his second term, 1994–1999) and COPEI, a certainty. But, as an old man facing a horrific economic and political situation he had neither the ability nor the stamina to change the course of either politics or the economy. Overwhelmed by his political problems in building and sustaining a ruling coalition and inconsistent economic policies, he struggled to find a way out of the country's economic conundrum, but the best he could do was muddle through his term of office.

It was in this setting with the ossification of this "pacted" democracy and an unresolved economic crisis that was producing enormous economic dislocations and hardships for all sectors of society, but especially for the poor, that Hugo Chávez – with a political charisma in his country not seen since the heydays of the Peróns – assumed power. His defeat of the established "political class" and marginalization of the economic elite, coupled with his capacity for galvanizing mass support behind him (especially the poor and the forgotten ones), has become both as legendary and as divisive as what the Peróns accomplished in Argentina, but with the difference that Venezuela's wealth in oil and surging international petroleum prices has given him an economic basis with sustained revenues never enjoyed by Perón. While Chávez's economic record has been weak in terms of substance, and his political position has weakened as he has remained in power, the longevity of his rule as an elected president sustaining a huge core of support stands in contrast with Perón's relatively brief rule. For, despite all the problems encountered in consolidating his rule, Chávez has completed one full six-year term of office under the new constitution that he and supporters produced (2000–2006) and is now well into his second term (2007–2012), despite increasing dissatisfaction with his rule.

This populist breakthrough and rupture of the prevailing democratic order carries with it all the potential for locking Venezuela into a pattern of divisive politics paralleling Argentine experience in the chasm which exists to this day between Peronista and anti-Peronista partisans. Whereas in today's Argentina politics is dominated by two contending political forces, the Peronista Party (which has sustained its majority now for nearly two decades) and the Radical Party, Venezuela is likely to be faced with a three-way split: Chávez's Socialist Party (the name most frequently used today to refer to his political movement) which still has majority support versus the center-left (the core of which is the old Acción Democrática alignment) and the center-right (concentrated around the country's Christian Democrats, known as COPEI).

Colombia

Compared and contrasted with the other South American cases selected here for brief country profiles, Colombia is as different from the others as any might lay claim to be. What stands out in this instance is Colombia's status as a consolidated limited democracy. The basis of this status is threefold: a political system reflecting and built upon a country that is as diverse geographically as it is politically; the long-standing dominance of two major parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, dating back to the formation of an independent Colombia; and the prevalence of a regionalism and factionalism throughout its political history that have always presented difficulties in implementing fundamental change.

The challenges to Colombia's limited democracy and the difficulties in expanding democratic practices to embrace less advantaged groups economically and those at odds with the system have always centered on institutionalized violence and the politics of protest. Political elites and mobilized middle sectors in Colombia have for most of their country's political history been willing to live with a higher degree of institutionalized violence than their counterparts in most other countries. While upper and middle sectors of society have been unwilling to alter the basis of power by admitting lower sector politicians and activists to fuller participation in reshaping state and society, they have made major accommodations in the political order at crucial intervals, when faced with institutional breakdown and the possibility of guerrilla insurgency getting out of hand. To understand this political option comparatively, it might be helpful to keep in mind another instance of institutionalized violence in a limited democracy: Northern Ireland where its institutionalized violence contin-

ued for roughly 75 years, before achieving a peace agreement with the prospects of transforming social and political relationships, versus the Colombian case where institutionalized violence has continued as a problem for now well over a century. The longest periods of high level conflict in Colombia are those dating back to the War of a Thousand Days (1899–1902), one that has been enshrined in literature in Gabriel García Márquez's *One Hundred Years of Solitude*, and the post-World War II conflict known simply as *La Violencia*, 1946–1958. The *La Violencia* era was characterized by two, related major events which triggered a crisis pointing to breakdown. The first was the pressure for change accumulated through demonstrations (1946–1953) that terminated in uncontrolled rioting in the capital Bogotá, referred to as the *bogotazo*. This occurred while a meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of American States was going on in the nation's capital in 1946, and was triggered by the assassination of the Liberal reformist leader Jorge Gaitán. The second was the intervention of the military on one of its rare incursions into politics when the country bordered on collapse: the Rojas Pinilla *coup d'état* and the establishment of a populist authoritarian regime under his rule, 1953–1957. The outcome in this case was a pact among the principals permitting the country to return to democratic rule in which for a designated period of time the two major parties would rotate in office. The legacy of this past can best be summed up in today's limited sovereignty in the midst of institutionalized violence and uncontrollable drug trafficking – the down side of globalization – in which every time the guerrilla insurgency threatens to inundate the prevailing political and social order the military raises its visibility and negotiations with the guerrillas are re-opened.

Matching these cycles when institutionalized violence reach a crisis point, such as is the case at present, are eras of relative peace under political accords. The most successful of these, in providing relative peace, was the National Front experience, 1958–1974. This was the result of a “pacted” democracy under a political accord involving the principals known as the Pacto de Punto Fijo (1958). During this era, well-developed mechanisms were developed for interest group representation, both through business organizations, for example coffee growers and industrialists, as well as political representation within the established parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives. Yet, at no time, was the countryside effectively folded into the established order; hence, the continued recourse to violence by those outside the system.

Recent politics have reflected this on-going tension in Colombia, between the institutionalization of elite accommodation and responsiveness to new middle

sector groups entering politics, and the failure to guarantee effective mass participation which would require a major adjustment in the internal balance of power. Illustrating this pattern more recently are the César Gaviria presidency (1990–1994), which was marked by reform, openness to new groups entering politics, and negotiation with guerrilla movements, followed by the Ernesto Samper presidency (1994–1998), in which there was a return to political stalemate and increased guerrilla activity.

During the Gaviria presidency initiatives such as broadening the political leadership, increasing political participation and controlling the drug lords and violence were priorities. As a consequence, Gaviria was successful in getting a new constitution approved, one which entered into effect in July 1991. Added to this was follow-through in cracking down on the drug lords and their cartels, the primary accomplishment being the capture and death of Pablo Escobar, the leading drug lord at the time. Gaviria and his governing team were also equally successful in designing policies leading to strong economic performance. But, with Samper's assumption of power, a new cycle of system decline and disintegration set in, with political stalemate once again being at the forefront, accompanied by an escalation of violence. While election of Andrés Pastrana (Conservative) in June 1998, was intended to inaugurate a new era of peace and cooperation, the reverse occurred; by the end of his term, FARC (the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and the smaller National Liberation Army had control of 60 percent of national territory. Yet, in the next presidential election, in 2002 Alvaro Uribe was elected in the first round of voting with 52.9 percent of the vote. This was a leader who presented himself as a hardliner and outsider, as head of a new political movement outside the two established parties, known as the *Primero Colombia* movement.

Today these cycles in Colombian politics continue – eras in which there is sufficient recovery in politics and economics to avoid extended crisis and breakdown, followed by new stasis, with resurgence of rural violence and increased activity by the drug lords in marketing cocaine, only to be followed by a new cycle of reform and adjustment in the country's political economy.

Mexico

More so than any other country in the circum-Caribbean region, Mexico offers insight into a very different set of political dynamics in that portion of Latin America most affected by the continuing presence of external actors influencing internal affairs. The largest country by far within this region, it is the only

Latin American state with a common border with the United States. The problems Mexico has faced throughout its history in defining state and nation are at the same time shared with all the other countries in the region. This group of nation states, in contrast to Mexico, consists of very small countries, be they located in Central America or the Caribbean. Because Mexico is a large state, second only to Brazil in size and population in Latin America, it is simultaneously a major actor within the Caribbean basin, offsetting the United States and providing an alternative regional actor in interstate relations throughout this region that frequently helps these countries limit the influence of the U.S.

For Mexico the nineteenth century was caught up in internal and external struggles to define both state and nation. As a consequence, independence in 1822 did not generate the same dynamic in establishing its own distinctive national identity as was the case with the South America countries. The loss of territory to the south and to the north, coupled with a succession of weak national governments in Mexico City, unable to establish effective jurisdiction over the provinces/states in what emerged as the core of modern Mexico, generated a two-way struggle for control. On the one hand, there was an ongoing debate between the advocates of strong central government versus those favoring federal arrangements which would respect the distinct regional entities that today comprise the Mexican federal system. On the other, there was an overlapping struggle among those favoring conservative rule, either some version of monarchy or dictatorship, versus liberal concepts of governance, identified with republican forms of government and more democratic practices. To this mix must be added the problem of *mestizaje*, the mixing of Spanish and indigenous people, for despite a majority of the population blending together the two, there was until the Revolution of 1910 a small elite proud of their Spanish heritage (*gachupines*) and approximately one million residents, members of at least thirty distinct indigenous groups who to this day have not been integrated into the country's political life nor even speak the same language as the dominant groups.

As already noted, building a national state required confronting the loss first of modern-day Central America in the 1820s, followed only a few decades later by Texas and parts of today's southwestern U.S. In addition, during this same period, Guadalajara, Yucatán, and Zacatecas, all were considered serious risks for secession. These two aspects should help clarify why there was a constant struggle between those defending the autonomy of the Mexican states and those wanting centralized control. The governing compromise reached in the Constitution of 1824 merged these concerns, providing for a division of

federal power into executive, legislative, and judicial branches, the creation of states with a similar separation of powers, and provisions for representative government and political independence for each province.

However, the tensions between monarchists and republicans continued to be manifested. The secession of Texas in 1836 made clear that the form of centralization advocated in the 1824 Constitution was ineffective for defending national territory. To this must be added the loss two decades later of more than half its territory to the United States in the Treaty of Guadalupe. Mexico bordered on collapse throughout this period, as a series of governments rose and fell, including a second attempt at Monarchy, under Maximilian (1864–1867). Finally, in 1867, liberal forces regained the upper hand and established the federal Constitution of 1857 and elected Benito Juárez as president. For the next fifty years, at least on paper, a federal system remained in effect.

With the rise to power of Porfirio Díaz, a strong national state was established for the first time, in the years 1876 to 1910. While this was accomplished at the cost of suppressing regional elites, centralized administrative organization was finally put in place. This was also a period in which there was a good deal of economic progress, through attracting foreign investment. But this was a dictatorship which also increased the inequities in society, in the contrasts between a centralizing elite supporting Díaz who benefited from economic take-off and the rest of society saddled with crushing poverty.

While Díaz and his supporters were easily displaced in 1910, the difficulties began with the attempts to form a new government. In the Revolution which followed from 1910 to 1930 various regional groups came into conflict with each other. Each faction had its own philosophies and interests, the consequence of which was more than a decade of disorder, coups, and counter-coups, coupled with rural violence. The regional alliances that emerged, in which each had little confidence in the others, explain why when they met to write a new constitution in 1917 there was virtually unanimous agreement on a revival of federal arrangements. This new constitution respected the bicameral design of a national congress, and the structure of sovereign states and free municipalities as the basis for more decentralized government. However, as the political movements identified with the Revolution converged in the creation of a single hegemonic party, the PRI (the Institutional Revolutionary Party), a new national government emerged, centered on the principle of six-year presidential terms, with no reelection. The process of centralization was relatively quick, with the presidency of the republic gaining direct control not only over the legislative and juridical branches, but also over the states and municipi-

palties, through its dual leadership of state and party. By 1940, under the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–1940), this process was largely complete. In nationalizing the petroleum and electricity industries, the central government assumed responsibility for planning, organizing, and implementing programs to administer use of the nation's scarce resources. Backing up these initiatives were the government's two most important unions: the Confederation of Mexican Workers and the National Confederation of Peasants.

From 1940 to 2000 the PRI regime was hegemonic, rotating its presidents as heads of state and party every six years, while maintaining the imagery of democracy. Through regularly scheduled federal, state, and local elections and a controlled opposition, the top leadership from President of the Republic to governors to municipal presidents directed political and economic affairs. For 40 years this governmental arrangement created a framework within which sustained economic growth and rotation in public office occurred, but not without challenges and changes as time went by. Its legitimacy stemmed from its identification with the Constitution of 1917 and the goals of the Mexican Revolution as well as its ability to sustain the support of its mass constituencies, embodied in the three wings of its revolutionary party: the peasantry, the workers, and the middle sectors of Mexican society (school teachers, bureaucrats, and small trades people). For most of this period flexibility in the system was attained by balancing progressive initiatives, identified with such themes as Mexican nationalism, improved social conditions for the majority, and flexible wage policies, against more conservative ones, designed to maintain order, stability, and a favorable climate for economic development and investment. For example, Lázaro Cárdenas (1930–1940), Adolfo López Mateos (1958–1964) and Luis Echeverría (1970–1976) can be identified with the former, while Plutarco Elías Calles (1929–1933, founder of the PRI), Miguel Alemán (1946–1952), and Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964–1970) belong to the latter. Matching them are centrist administrations which were mixed in their policies and preferences: Manuel Ávila Camacho (1940–1946), Adolfo Ruiz Cortines (1952–1958), and José López Portillo (1976–1982). Still other patterns can be seen in the administrations of Miguel de la Madrid (1982–1988) and Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988–1994) – the former, being a case of centrist policies, used to bring about major administrative changes internally in order to redirect priorities in economic development and the latter, consisting of significant privatization initiatives, opening up the economy to foreign investors, and making an accommodation with the Church.

In bringing PRI hegemony to end, in recognition that times and circumstances had changed dramatically, again the Mexican presidency played a key role in the peaceful transition to a more open, democratic society. Yet another president and his administration must be recognized for their initiatives taken from the center: Ernesto Zedillo (1994–2000). None of this is intended to minimize the role of the opposition, for the first changes in the system did come about because of widespread opposition in the face of the political crisis of the late 1960s, especially in the rapidly growing cities that necessitated a response by government. Nor should one minimize the economic crises which required reform, as was the case in the debt crisis of 1984 that marked the end of rapid economic growth and which in turn contributed to widespread disillusionment with the existing political system. Likewise, enormous political change took place within Mexico during the 1990s in which a viable opposition emerged for the first time, accompanying the country's economic transformation into a more open economy. Accompanying the move away from a state-dominated economy to a market-based system more compatible with worldwide trends was political liberalization, in which electoral controls were relaxed at the municipal and state levels, generating more competitive local elections and greater pluralism in Congress.

Culminating this transition was the presidential election of 2000, in which all constraints on electoral participation and competition were removed. This in turn created the conditions under which the victory of the PAN opposition candidate, Vicente Fox (2000–2006), occurred and generated subsequently a competitive environment in which the election of a second PAN president Felipe Calderón (2006–2012) occurred. Not only have Mexican elections become truly competitive over the last eight years (2000–2008) in a three-way split (PAN/PRI/PRD), but for the first time the Mexican Congress has become a free-standing institution, no longer dominated by the Presidency, as a really separate and independent branch of government with its own voice, able to challenge, limit, and require the president to respond to its demands and control of the legislative process.

Uruguay

In this survey of the diversity of political experience in Latin America, through the use of case studies illustrating major patterns, Uruguay stands out in the uniqueness of its political system. A very small country similar to the Central American republics in size, yet more akin historically to city-states elsewhere in

the dominance exercised by its capital city Montevideo – between Brazil and Argentina – it is an integral part of “European South America,” those southernmost regions of the continent where massive European immigration overwhelmed the native peoples found there in colonial times, extending northward across country borders into southern Brazil, upwards to the state and city of São Paulo. What sets Uruguay apart from this region as well as the rest of Latin America are the innovative political reforms its leaders have undertaken in the search for a more sustainable and responsive democratic regime, in the midst of periodic crises. In seeking to undercut the weaknesses of presidentialism as it has evolved elsewhere in Latin America, these leaders have over time placed institutional limits on presidential power (including experimentation with a plural executive, only to return to a single office holder accountable to the legislature), sustained the primacy of their National Assembly as the dominant political institution, and developed a double, simultaneous ballot to allow full representation of alternative candidates and political preferences in national elections.

Like Colombia, for most of its history Uruguay has had a dominant two-party system reaching back to the early years of its republic under the labels of the Blancos, now known as the National Party (a center-right party whose origins lie in an older upper class in place before the waves of massive immigration), and the Colorados (a more centerist party, embracing European immigrants concentrated in urban areas). But, unlike Colombia, it has evolved politically over the last decade in such a way that the historic parties have been challenged to sustain their relevance as dominant forces in politics by the emergence of a reformist bloc on the left known as the Broad Front (Frente Amplio).

While the Front’s origins date back to the polarization of politics in the 1971 elections and the fragmentation of the existing party system, which preceded Uruguay’s decline into military rule, 1973–1985, its endeavors to pull together left-wing groups into a broad coalition that would transform national politics did not produce major results until the late 1990s. Its appearance as a major force in Uruguayan politics dates from the 1999 presidential election. While that election was won by Jorge Battle (the candidate of the governing Colorado Party who put together a winning coalition by forming an alliance with the National Party), the Frente Amplio emerged with the largest bloc of votes in the Uruguayan Congress in the first round of balloting in October of that year. That particular coalition government lasted a scant two years, until the National Party withdrew its support, but the Battle presidency survived for the remainder of its term of office under the rules governing presidential politics. In the October 2004 elections, however, the Frente Amplio won a major-

ity with 51.7 percent of the vote and its leader, Tabaré Vázquez, assumed power for the 2005–2010 term as president, thereby transforming politics in Uruguay into a dominant three-party system and setting the country on a course emphasizing political renewal, economic recovery, and a reexamination of the human rights abuses committed when the country was under military rule.

Like Chile, Argentina, and Brazil and despite strong democratic traditions paralleling those of Chile, however, Uruguay fell under the influence of the military during the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, in the face of economic and political upheavals that threatened the basis of the country's economic prosperity and its reputation as a stable democracy. This collapse of democratic rule and its restoration warrants particular attention because it is an important part of the reason why and how Uruguay can today be classified as a consolidated democracy.

Paralleling patterns in Argentina and Brazil whereby the military took a more active role in politics and faced with a growing economic and social crisis in the mid-1960s, in the 1966 elections Colorados elected retired General Oscar Gestido as president. Assuming power in early 1967, under a new constitution, the Constitution of 1967 which replaced the Constitution of 1830, when Gestido died in December that same year, his vice president Jorge Pacheco Areco succeeded him for the remainder of that five year term. Regardless of the government's endeavors to suppress the revolutionary Tupamaros, violence spiraled upward and peaked in August 1970 with the assassination of a U.S. security official and then a year later with the kidnapping of the British ambassador. But, then as elections approached in late 1971, the Tupamaros declared a truce which permitted national elections to be held in a brief but relatively tranquil environment. In that setting three candidates emerged: General Mario Aguerrondo, a hardliner, supported by a faction within the Colorados; Senator Wilson Ferreira Aldunate, with a reformist agenda, appealing to more moderate Blancos, and Juan María Bordaberry Arocena, as the candidate of the majority of the Colorados. Despite controversial election results centered on who had a plurality, Bordaberry was declared the victor and took office for the 1972–1976 term. In that setting; politics degenerated into bitter divisions over political, social, economic and ideological issues, and the economic situation worsened. As the crisis grew more severe, Bordaberry declared a state of internal war and the military stepped in aggressively, the consequence of which was the defeat of the Tupamaros by the end of 1973. Disillusioned with civilian rule, much in the same way as was the experience of the military in Argentina and Brazil, the military assumed an increasingly aggressive role within govern-

ment, following in particular Brazilian concepts of national security, which ended up with their forcing Bordaberry to resign in June 1976 and their assumption of power.

But, when the military sought to consolidate their control of the government through a new constitution, submitted for popular approval by plebiscite in 1980, the civilian leadership from right to left rose up and banded together in opposition to this violation of the country's democratic traditions, the consequence of which was the defeat of the proposed document 57 to 43 percent. From 1980 to 1984, with a new retired military officer as president, a dialogue ensued between the coup leaders and their civilian opposition, the consequence of which was, after protracted debate and continuous protests, a negotiated agreement that the military would return to the barracks, national elections would be held the end of 1984, and a civilian would take office March 1, 1985. In those elections, Colorado leader Mario Sanguinetti emerged as the victor.

Under Sanguinetti (1985–1990) democratic rule was reestablished and the process of national reconciliation was begun, one which proved to be no easy task. In the next round of presidential elections in late 1989, National Party leader Luis Alberto Lacalle defeated the Colorados and took office, 1990–1995, until a new round of national elections in which Sanguinetti was returned to power, 1995–2000. At that point, since no party had a majority in the bicameral National Assembly, the National Party joined the Colorados in a coalition government. These were the years of political and economic recovery for Uruguay, in which democratic reforms and attention to human rights issues, coupled with economic policies designed to revitalize the economy through regional integration (*vis-à-vis* Mercosur, a trade accord centered on Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay), provided relief from the tensions, dislocations, and conflict of the previous decades.

From this point forward, with full participation of all political groups without constraints and a broad based consensus that all would respect democratic rules and practices, the Frente Amplio gained increasing popular support. The 1999 national elections were conducted under a constitutional amendment requiring primaries in April for the selection of presidential candidates for each party and a general election October 31 for the National Assembly in which none of the presidential candidates received a majority. In the November runoff, the primary competition was between Jorge Battle, the governing Colorado Party's leader, and Tabaré Vázquez, as head of the Frente Amplio, which was decided in Battle's favor through support from the National Party. But, as

noted above, two years into Batlle's presidency the National Party withdrew from the governing coalition and in the next round of national elections, October 2004, the Frente Amplio was finally able to achieve majority power and place its leader Vázquez in the presidency. With majorities in both chambers of the National Assembly and widespread consensus that, with the military back in the barracks and the Constitution of 1967 in place as the country's basic charter, a framework for guaranteeing full participation and open contestation of all significant public issues had finally been achieved and a democratic regime, consolidated.

Trends in the Governments and Societies of Latin America

Through the foregoing 8 country case studies what should stand out for the reader is the diversity of the Latin American experience in building national states struggling to make democracy work and to create productive economies that can attend to their societies' needs. While there is an enormous range of variation in country size, natural resources, economic performance, governmental experience, and geopolitical location, there are region-wide trends worth noting.

First, issues related to defining state and nation have been resolved. This sets Latin America as a whole apart from the rest of the developing world in which in so many cases issues in building state and nation continue to be a problem. As an older group of developing national states, whose independence dates back to the nineteenth century, their attention since independence has focused on building viable governments and economies able to respond to the political, economic and social needs of their peoples. All began with a similar set of concerns at independence: the desire to build national states patterned after Western experience which would embrace the ideas of order and progress. There is an essay by the Argentine writer Jorge Luis Borges called "The Garden of Forking Paths", whose title calls attention to the overall integrity of Latin America as a distinctive world region in its particular mix of peoples and cultures – this is the garden – in which political leaders and the choices they have made have led their evolving states in very different directions. At independence all began with the same trilogy of actors: large landholders, the Church, and caudillos, who in time gave way to the institutional military.

Second, for all the difficulties they have encountered in making democracy work, the democratic ideal has remained a constant. These are ideas derivative from Western experience, be it European or North American, shaped in large part by the French and the American revolutions and writers exploring ideas of liberty, equality, justice, and human rights. In South America in particular, as Robert Burr has noted in his book *By Reason or Force: Chile and the Balance of Power in South America, 1830–1905*, the model often became recreating the European state system in the Americas. To this governmental model, especially influenced by the Napoleonic state in the reforms introduced in France after the Revolution and spread throughout the Continent, have been added concepts derived from the United States in how to build and structure democratic institutions. While there was some experimentation with constitutional monarchy at the outset (viz., the Brazilian case under Dom Pedro I and II) and willingness later to consider incorporating parliamentary experience to make accountability work more effectively (for example, Peruvian constitutional innovations over the years), the overwhelming preference has been for building presidential republics centered around the separation of powers in executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. To this day all the Latin American states remain presidential republics, although they vary enormously in how they have handled executive power.

Third, all (with the exception of Cuba under Castro and revolutionary attempts to alter dependency relationships in Central America during the 1980s) share in common prolonged experience in the twentieth century with political and economic modernization, without attaining easily a breakthrough into the consolidation of democratic systems of government and market economies. As a consequence of these initiatives, one can identify six patterns in government and society: 1) a common Western institutional model emphasizing the centrality of the state, 2) marked elite “dissensus”, 3) fragmented mass political cultures, 4) the vitality of pre-industrial urban values despite innovative entrepreneurial initiatives, 5) marked heterogeneity in social institutions and the superimposition of historic epochs within national society, and 6) cyclical patterns in politics in the alternation between authoritarian and democratic rule, derived from unresolved problems leading to regime breakdown in crisis situations and how to rebuild civil society in the aftermath. Depending on where these states are situated geopolitically, there is a seventh factor: the presence of the United States and how political and economic elites work with or against their counterparts in the U.S.

Centrality of the State

In contrast to the United States, where there is general skepticism regarding the capacity of government to resolve the public's needs, throughout Latin America citizens look to government to resolve the issues, the problems, the needs that confront them. This attitude was originally the foundation of the preference for state-centered economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s and the prevalence of public enterprises in critical economic sectors, as a way to offset the power and influence of foreign corporations. While market-friendly strategies have dominated economic discourse since the 1980s, most citizens in this region of the world still look to government first to resolve their needs. A major part of the collapse of democratic practices in Venezuela and the rise of Hugo Chávez's radical populism stems from the expectations of the poor that government do something about their problems and respond to their needs. This expectation was also a huge part of the support which the Peróns elicited from working class Argentines – the “shirtless ones” (*los descamisados*) in the 1940s and early 1950s – and the continuation of the Peronista Party as a major force in Argentine politics ever since. There is, however, one dimension in the centrality of the state which constitutes a new departure from the politics of the last half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth: the rise of well-institutionalized public bureaucracies throughout Latin America which mediate and serve to provide continuity between order-maintaining regimes and periodic breakthroughs of revolutionary mass movements, designed to readjust socioeconomic and political relations. Whether authoritarian or representative forms of government predominate, the state apparatus in all these countries today possesses a similar bureaucratic core, in which decision-making powers are concentrated in a host of governmental agencies, in which there is a fusion of bureaucratic and political roles, and in which the central ministries follow a uniform set of organizational principles, expressed in codified laws, marked centralism, and a similar nomenclature.

Elite “Dissensus”

This awkward word “dissensus” is intended to call attention to a pattern in human relations which is the opposite of elite consensus or consensual elites. The latter has often received attention in what is frequently identified as one of the requirements of consolidated democracies. This viewpoint is exemplified by the work of John Higley and Richard Gunther (eds.) *Elites and Democratic Con-*

solidation in Latin American and Southern Europe. The core of the shared values which this perspective emphasizes in consolidated democracies is concurrence that political conflicts will be resolved by two primary mechanisms: the use of the ballot box in regularly scheduled elections to determine how competition for power will be handled and the use of the majority principle for determining legislative outcomes in legislative bodies. Throughout Latin American political history, while democratic ideals have more often than not been a constant and authoritarian practices have consistently been troubled with problems of legitimacy, there has been real difficulty in sustaining agreement to resolve political conflict through the use of the vote to determine who will govern and to use the majority principle to determine legislative outcomes. The breakdown of democracy in Chile in the September 1973 military coup against the Government of Salvador Allende and the imposition of authoritarian rule under General Pinochet reminded everyone of the fragility of democracy in that country, in which it was assumed prior to this event that this was one of the most democratic countries in Latin America. Less dramatic, but equally important, has been the breakdown of democratic governance in Venezuela and the collapse of that country's dominant two party system and the radical populist breakthrough carried out by Hugo Chávez in 1999. The only exception to date to this repeated problem of democratic breakdowns in Latin American political experience is Costa Rica in Central America, a country which has sustained democratic rule since 1948, with an unbroken series of honest elections since 1953.

Fragmented Political Cultures

Fundamental disagreement over the rules to apply in processing conflict and change in government, which divide political elites, is matched by the prevalence at the mass level of fragmented political cultures – the sub-communities within society from whom political elites draw their supports. This fragmentation within the social fabric is reflected throughout the region in the mosaic of divergent life styles, contrasting institutions of a political, social, economic, and religious nature that operate in countries with marked regional disparities. Cases in point would be the chasm created in Argentina by the marked differences between those who support the Peronista Party (historically, a working class and lower-middle class political culture) and those who oppose it (linked with the more established upper-middle classes and elite life styles) and the Bolivarian Revolution, as Hugo Chávez would characterize his political movement based

on the poor and those historically dis-enfranchised, in Venezuela. The latter is a movement which has swept away nearly all preexisting political parties and alignments.

Preindustrial Urban Values and Life Styles

While metropolitan centers in each of these states reflect a life style similar to that of other metropolitan areas in North America and Western Europe, in provincial towns and cities throughout Latin America one encounters an upper sector life style and set of conservative values identified with the pre-industrial urban cultures of the Mediterranean world, transferred into the Americas through immigration from Southern Europe both before and since independence. This is a very old urban culture, preceding the Industrial Revolution, present in small towns and provincial centers throughout Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal and which immigrants have brought with them into the Americas. This urban culture dominates similar small towns throughout Mexico; extends southward through Central America in the provincial towns present in all these countries; into small towns in interior Colombia and Venezuela; across the Andean highlands in Peru and Bolivia and into provincial centers in the pampas of Argentina, to communities in the lake district of southern Chile, and the Argentine Patagonia. This pre-industrial urban culture has demonstrated the same tenacity and vitality as it has throughout southern Europe and underlies conservative options in politics.

Heterogeneity in Social Institutions and Superimposition of Political Styles

Within these countries, political, social, economic, administrative, and religious organizations exhibit tremendous diversity, spanning the developmental continuum, from traditional to modern organizational forms. As a consequence, previous political structures identified with earlier historical experience continue to exist side by side with those institutions identified with modern industrial societies. Euclides da Cunha, author of the Brazilian classic *Rebellion in the Backlands (Os Sertões)*, captures this especially well in the confrontation between the new republic identified with European modernizing influences at the end of the nineteenth century and early twentieth with the culture, religion, and politics of the interior that has long rejected changes imposed from the outside. This juxtaposition of divergent life styles is readily apparent as one

travels within these countries from capital cities into the interior or from one region to another at the subnational level. To cite an example again from a single country, one encounters tremendous diversity in Brazil, in travels inland from the Atlantic coast as well as from north to south, into the regions which today are set apart as states within the Brazilian federation. In northeastern Brazil the sugar cane culture of coastal Bahia stands in marked contrast with the semi-arid backlands called the *sertão*. Farther to the north, in the Amazon basin, Belém near the mouth of the Amazon and Manáus farther inland on the river are a world apart from the small towns and villages scattered throughout the jungle, many of which are inhabited by indigenous peoples with only relatively recent contact with the rest of the country. Traveling southward to Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo one encounters two very different metropolitan areas – the former identified with the building of modern Brazil in spanning the centuries from its imperial era to the bustling 1960s when Rio was both the nation's capital and the preferred place of residence for the well-to-do with its relaxed, distinctive life style. São Paulo in contrast has been and remains the economic center of Brazil in its banks, industries, factories, and urban conglomerations that make it one of the world's largest metropolitan areas. Immediately to the interior of that city is the state with the same name, with its miles and miles of productive agricultural land, in which coffee, soy, and grain production stretch throughout a rolling countryside. Yet, another region is the Brazilian far west, with its ranches and recently established cities and towns centered around the cattle industry. Matching each of these regions and sub-regions are different styles of politics and activists: Urban political leaders, working-class politicians, political bosses, large-scale landowners, middle-class farmers, military officers, enlisted men, peasant leaders, and organizers of rural workers.

Cyclical Patterns and Politics

As a consequence of the intermingling of these diverse life styles and marked regional differences, responding to political and economic modernization, one needs to contrast the values of continuity, reform, and adjustment with those of rupture, revolution, and confrontation. The issue to be faced here is whether or not the last wave of authoritarianism (with the military frequently in charge, beginning with the mid-1960s, during the 1970s, and into the 1980s) and the resurgence of democratic practices and democratic regimes (throughout the 1980s and 1990s and into the first decades of the twenty-first century) constitute a fundamental breakthrough and reversal of earlier cyclical patterns

of politics. One view is that the frequency of democratic breakdowns reflects the alternation between eras of authoritarian rule, in which power is concentrated in the executive branch of government with public policy issues more likely to be resolved or repressed in the bureaucratic arena, and periods of democratic rule with more open government and debate of issues in public spaces. An alternative way of looking at politics across time is to emphasize the distinct political paths pursued in the various republics in response to internal political, social, and economic dynamics. For example, the contrasts between Chile and Mexico are enormous. For most of its political history, Chile has evolved in the direction of more open governance through the mediation of a representative multiparty system and strong legislative institutions, despite the hiatus of the Pinochet years in which the military dominated politics and political party activities were suppressed. In the Mexican case, the Revolution of 1910 followed 30 years of dictatorship and became a profound political and social upheaval transforming state and society, out of which came 60 years of single-party rule, from the 1940s to the end of 1990s, which – despite all its democratic trappings – was authoritarian. What followed has been a transition to democratic rule as we moved from the twentieth into the twenty-first century. Against these cases, the experience of Venezuela must be juxtaposed, in which there was the breakdown of party democracy after 40 years of a competitive, dominant two party system. The emergence of Hugo Chávez with his Bolivarian Revolution constitutes the first major instance of radical populism in the twenty-first century, and it is now matched by the Evo Morales government in Bolivia and the upheaval currently going on in Ecuador, which while less well defined in terms of a single dominant personality, is more likely to evolve in the direction of an ill-defined mass movement, reflecting the same tensions and frustrations seen earlier in that country among those long excluded from effective participation in national politics.

Conclusions

If we return to the image of Latin America as a garden of forking paths in which national leaders have led their countries in a variety of different directions, there is one fundamental alteration in the balance of power, if we look back at where we stood at the inception of independence from Spain and Portugal. Two of the traditional power contenders are gone and the remaining one has been dramatically changed by the course of post-independence national politics.

The military in all the Latin American republics have emerged after their last experiment with authoritarian rule (1960s–1980s) greatly reduced in their power and their ability to intervene in national politics. In the past, one of the problems in democratic consolidation was centered in the recourse to military caudillos and later the institutional military by disaffected conservatives, in calling on them individually or collectively to save the country from radical changes in the internal balance of power when the Left threatened to take over. The most dramatic failure of military rule is the extended attempt by the Argentine military to govern, having become convinced of the incapacity of civilian leaders to rule. After 18 years of domination (1966–1984) and a disastrous military defeat in the Falklands War (1982), the conclusion reached was that the military was neither capable of governing nor, having seen politicization destroy its internal cohesion, of conducting a war, and that the best option of all was to return to the barracks.

The land-owning elite in contrast have disappeared as a major stakeholder. Both the Mexican Revolution of 1910 and the 1968 military intervention in Peru are the clearest examples of the imposition of land reform, the ending of large-landed estates as the dominant form of land tenure in rural areas, and the curtailment of the economic power held by large landowners for so many years. Where the landed elite survived the longest was in Argentina, but there the economic transition over the years from a state-based economy to a market-friendly one has changed the internal dynamics in the twenty-first century, to one where the commercialization of agriculture has produced a business structure in which the producers of beef and wheat are today much more likely to be business enterprises rather than the properties of a small, privileged elite of family-run estates.

While the Church is still a major institutional actor, it is no longer at the forefront of politics nor is it an actor shoring up traditional society and conservative politics. Two examples suffice: the Church in Mexico and El Salvador. During the Mexican Revolution, the Church was the most important element in rallying civilian forces opposed to the Revolution in the *cristero* movements so prevalent in the Bajío (the rich highland valleys of southwest Mexico centered in the state of Guanajuato). Once the Revolution was over and the PRI regime was consolidated as a secular state, the Church for decades remained on the sidelines. Once the transition to democracy occurred in 1999, and the PAN replaced the PRI as the party controlling the Presidency, one of the first things accomplished was to lay to rest the standoff between Church and state, in recognizing the important role the Church has to play in Mexican society as

a religious institution and as the social conscience of the country; but, no longer is the issue of its direct political influence relevant. In El Salvador, today (2008) 15 years after the Peace Accords and the assassination of Archbishop Romero while celebrating mass at the highpoint of the internal civil wars so prevalent in El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, the Church continues to play a vital role as an advocate acting on behalf of the poor and the victims of the death squads, all of which have been incorporated into the new focus on national reconciliation and rebuilding state and nation in a democratic context throughout Central America.

The radical alternatives to the traditional stakeholders, the revolutionary movements of the 1960s in South America and the 1980s in Central America likewise have been tempered as the years have passed. In neither case, after major upheavals have revolutions come about. But rather in the most recent waves of re-democratization which began in the late 1970s and came to dominate the 1980s and 1990s, both the Right and the Left have been folded into competitive democratic processes. The last of these democratic transitions has been the victory of the opposition in the April 2008 elections in Paraguay, in which the dominance of the Colorado Party finally ended after more than 60 years, and the first president not affiliated with the Colorados took office, Fernando Lugo, a Bishop in his country's Roman Catholic Church who presents real problems for the Church's Papacy. There the political changes which began in 1989 in the ousting of General Stroessner have finally come to a close.

Elsewhere in the rest of South America, social democratic parties with majority support dominate the governments of Brazil and Chile. In the former, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva is now well into his second four-year term (2007–2010) after a successful first term (2003–2006), and Michelle Bachelet, representing the Socialist Party in the center-left coalition known as the *Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia*, is president of Chile (2006–2010). Yet, this picture which suggests democratic consolidations throughout the region is far from complete. The resurgence of radical populism, using socialist rhetoric and mobilizing the poor and forgotten ones against the rest of society, has captured the headlines first in Venezuela, under Chávez, and since in Bolivia under Evo Morales and in Ecuador, under a faction-ridden movement somewhat like the others that have always troubled that country. The social democratic success stories in Brazil and Chile as opposed to the resurgence of radical populism in northwest South America in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador share a common ingredient: the issue of how one should respond to the un-

pleasant reality of poor majorities. Neglected as they were in Venezuela, they have the explosive capacity if the right sort of leader emerges of dealing their countries enormous setbacks in politics and the economy. On the other hand, if another kind of leadership emerges, no matter how unpleasant it may be for well-to-do conservatives, programs can be established and procedures adopted to embrace them in the fabric of national society and politics. This is the example set by how left-center politicians have played their options in Brazil and Chile.

In short, at this writing, democracy and reliance on markets are on the upswing throughout Latin America, with the possibility that these countries at last will be fully embraced within the framework of Western political, social and economic policies and practices, as long hoped for within this region. The most recent and last political and economic transition, that of Cuba, is now fully underway. In the imperfect world in which we live, hope is alive and well, but enormous unresolved political, social, and economic issues remain. And, the struggle for democracy and social justice and economic well-being for all continues unabated.

COLIN M. LEWIS

The State and Economic Growth in Latin America

The state is conceptually distinct from both economy and society, with inherent interests in expanding its scope for autonomous action, asserting control over economic and social interactions, and structuring economic and social relations. These interests derive primarily from the state's concern to establish and maintain internal and external security, to generate revenue, and to achieve hegemony over alternative forms of social organization. [...] States assume empirical reality through regimes that attempt to establish political order, set terms for political interaction, allocate leadership positions and power resources, and determine the representation of interests within decision-making contexts. Regimes attempt to negotiate and impose formal and informal rules about how the state will relate to the economy and to the society; durable and legitimate regimes have greater capacity to achieve these goals than do those that are less institutionalized (Grindle 1996: 3–4).

The polity makes and puts in place the economic rules of the game. [...] However, we do not know how to create polities that work. We have a lot of practice in a lot of countries around the world trying to restructure polities, but we have very, very limited ability to do so. [...] To illustrate [...] When Latin American countries became independent in the early nineteenth century, most of them borrowed from the United States Constitution because it was a set of formal rules that looked as though they worked quite well. They worked all right for the United States; but they certainly did not work well for Latin America (North 2003: 4–5, 8).

Discussion about the stance of the state dominates much of the social science and history literatures on Latin America. Reviewing the experience of the last century or so, several questions head the discussion agenda: was the state active or passive; did the state inhibit or promote growth; what factors conditioned state action and to what extent was it prone to “capture”; was the state capable and autonomous or did government intervention trigger rent-seeking

and macroeconomic inefficiency? This issue subsumes – and extends – earlier accounts in the economic history and development literature which tended to periodise the Latin American experience since the mid-nineteenth century in terms of alternative phases of growth and development or of growth and crisis. First, the phase of state construction and largely passive government associated with export-led growth, c. 1870s–1920s. Second, of the economically and socially active state from the 1930s to the 1960s, a period of interventionism, welfarism and “forced” development associated with the so-called import-substitution industrialisation model. Third, the phase of dynamic international reinsertion (and crisis) of the 1970s and beyond, associated with increasing external indebtedness, a growing presence of transnational corporations in “national” economies and culminating in the hegemony of the new economic model (variously described as neo-liberal or neo-conservative). Specific “state” and “market” configurations are attributed to each of these periods. The oligarchic state of the decades immediately before and after the turn of the nineteenth century was responsible for the formation of markets. The populist state of the middle third of the twentieth century presided over “directed development” (or stabilising growth) and “set” or indicated prices – of factors, commodities and products. The “privatising state” (or neo-populist state) of the late twentieth century which, based on a popular-business alliance, was depicted as either restoring market mechanism or, for the first time in Latin American history, creating conditions in which unfettered markets function.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the struggles for Independence weakened (and in the case of large parts of Spanish America virtually destroyed) the existing administrative apparatus. Although challenged by other European powers in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries and subject to increasing tensions from within, the panoply of Imperial government and much of the substance of mercantilist commercial monopoly had remained intact. Indeed, administrative reorganisation in the late eighteenth century reinvigorated imperial administration and defence while efficacious programmes of “development” (*fomento*) and liberalised intra-empire trade (*comercio libre*) promoted economic revival in many parts of the continent after decades of stagnation and decline (Bakewell 1997; Burkholder & Johnson 1998; Lynch 1986; McFarlane 1998; Prados de la Escosura 2006). Administrative reorganisation and economic growth, driven by metropolitan security and fiscal requirements, succeeded in the immediate objective of promoting a flow of treasure to Europe. But at the cost of triggering political antagonism and social tensions which would ultimately contribute to the collapse of the “colonial compact”.

In promoting a mercantilism revival, the Bourbon Reforms in Spanish America and the Pombaline Reforms in Brazil represented a “second conquest” of Latin America, to use the term coined by Lynch (Lynch 1986), and conflicted with liberal ideas being transmitted to the continent during the Enlightenment. At the same time, these measures demonstrated the apparent utility of state intervention (Coatsworth 2006; Burkholder & Johnson 1998; Lynch 1986). This paradox would influence later government action. Nevertheless, the immediate consequences of the end of empire were state shrinkage, administrative weakness and a legitimacy gap. With only a few exceptions, economic dislocation, incipient social revolution and intra-elite rivalry coupled with a loss of bureaucratic competence seriously weakened the capacity of emergent states. The reach of independent states was constrained by a loss of the monopoly of violence, foreign intervention and a retreat into subsistence.

Yet with very few exceptions, by the early decades of the twentieth century, the central state was much stronger than its regional counterparts. Economic and political decision-making had become more centralised and national governments appeared secure from internal challenge. Arguably, some of the most novel features of statehood were to be found in the economy and the field of economic policy-making. New banking institutions, commodity boards, and regulatory agencies seemed to be firmly under bureaucratic control. A Gerschenkronian-style project of “national” development enshrined in the analyses, prescriptions and policies of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America was rapidly disseminated after the 1940s. (The English acronym for the Commission is ECLA: the Spanish and Portuguese, CEPAL – hence *cepalista* and *cepalismo*.)

If ECLA strategy subsequently became narrowly associated with programmes of forced industrialisation (in part deriving from Hirschman’s concept of unbalanced growth), the original intention had been to upgrade domestic enterprise by means of demand management and societal modernisation. *Cepalismo* explicitly addressed the needs of the (industrial) entrepreneurial but echoed many earlier pre-occupations. ECLA statism was not anti-business, nor was it anti-foreign or anti-export. *Cepalista* ideology and strategy was, however, informed by export pessimism, an assumption that after the second world war global commercial and financial growth would be sluggish and skewed in favour of trade in manufactures. Consequently, government action was required to modernise and restructure the Latin American economies: markets were insufficient; only the state was capable of delivering the incentive structures necessary to induce change (Pazos 1982; Kay 1989; French-Davis, Palma & Muñoz

1994; FitzGerald 1994; Evans 1995; Thorp 1998). Government intervention would facilitate a “renegotiation” of the continent’s relationship with the international economy: forced industrialisation would re-order both domestic economy and society, and the nature of global insertion.

Nevertheless, growing perceptions that *cepalismo* was anti-market and that government-sponsored programmes of import-substituting industrialisation had resulted in structural inefficiency and macroeconomic volatility fuelled debates about the role of the state that gathered momentum in Latin America during the 1970s and underwrote the “sea change” in the state-market equation that occurred in and after the 1980s, when the so-called Washington Consensus became the hegemonic model (Bates & Krueger 1993; Sunkel 1993; Grindle 1996; Smith & Korzeniewicz 1997; Thorp 1998; Barton 1999; Weyland 2002). Whether triggered by the debt/loan crisis or increasingly negative assessments of the costs (and limited benefits) of “hot-house” industrialisation, there was a growing rejection of economic interventionism and increasing support from many sectors of society for greater transparency in politics and economics – for democracy and the market. Hence, during the 1990s, the market was projected as the source of legitimacy: the state was legitimised through delivery of growth with macroeconomic stability, a condition that could only be guaranteed by the market.

Despite these apparent shifts and ruptures, this paper will argue that since the late nineteenth century Latin American states attempted to “embed enterprise”. In the latter part of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries this was done through external economic opening and pragmatic intervention in domestic markets. After the 1930s, and more especially the 1940s, there was a greater correspondence in domestic and external policies as government intervention became more explicit and the state sector increased in size. Nevertheless, the quest to foster business was sustained throughout this period, even if the policy rhetoric became more nationalistic and statist. To what extent this succeeded in creating “national” enterprise capable of competing in a global environment when Latin American states “retreated”, and “closed” economies, opened in the 1980s remains a subject of debate. Certainly, strategies associated with “neo-populist-business alliance” regimes of the 1990s and the “market-friendly” governments of the democratic left of the early 21st century seemed designed to foster enterprise. (By c. 2005, there was a tendency to categorise radical administrations as either “democratic left of centre” or “neo-populist”: governments in Brazil and Chile epitomise the former, those of Bolivian and Venezuela, the latter.)

Forming the Oligarchic State: economics and politics

The oligarchic state, largely in place by the 1870s, remained the main expression of political organisation until the 1910s or, possibly, the inter-war decades. This period saw the establishment of institutions formally modelled on those of Western Europe and the United States of America, principally drawing on ideas of constitutionalism and republicanism promoted during the French Revolution and wars of American independence (Abel & Lewis 1993; Bakewell 1997; Bushnell 1993; Bushnell & Macaulay 1994; Halperín Donghi 1993). Economic policies and models were nominally based on concepts of *laissez faire* and *laissez passer* developed in late eighteenth-century Britain, supposedly responsible for the English Industrial Revolution and the rapid pace of US economic expansion in the nineteenth century.

Institutional building in the early national period (c. 1810–1850s) was messy, involving contending ideologies and no little violence. Dignified by references to the competing political ideologies of conservatism and liberalism, or of centralism versus federalism, for emerging “national” agro-commercial elites of the second quarter of the nineteenth century, politics was essentially a crude, personalist struggle amongst regional factions. These contested to occupy space vacated by Iberian authority, and were also anxious to pre-empt the threat of social revolution or ethnic violence from below, namely by liberated slaves, Indian communities politicised by the struggles of the revolutionary period, and those of mixed race mobilised by the promise of greater social and economic freedom by insurgents and royalists alike (Bushnell & Macauley 1994; Halperín Donghi 1993). Issues of economic reconstruction and state-building were secondary to elites bent on survival and establishing a monopoly of power. Legitimacy was hardly a consideration.

By the third quarter of the nineteenth century, more institutional political structures were displacing regimes associated with regional bosses (*caudillos* or *caciques*), save in Chile and Brazil, where modern institutions were already in place, and in Central America, where the process took longer. A mix of domestic and external factors helped secure the oligarchic state and shaped its policy agenda. Factional success, or exhaustion, in local and regional conflicts that had characterised the post-Independence decades facilitated a reconstitution of elite solidarity. The rapid growth of the world economy after the 1840s provided new power resources for state-building and, possibly, a broader spread

of elite factions. Above all, producers and merchants benefited from a privatisation of economic assets. During the middle third of the century there was a massive transfer of factors of production from public and corporate to private hands. Nominally implemented in accordance with liberal precepts, this involved the disposal of public land, the secularisation and distribution of assets of the Roman Catholic Church, the break-up of communal Indian estates and the seizure of territory occupied by nomadic Indians (Bushnell & Macaulay 1994; Halperín Donghi 1993). Increasingly, land, labour and capital were monopolised by producers supplying primary commodities to overseas markets. In parallel there were attempts to configure domestic practices with international norms in areas such as fiscal, monetary and banking policy: Civil, Commercial and Mining Codes were enacted, designed to secure property rights and foment investment – at least for those with the power to invoke and upheld formal legal provisions (Salvatore 1999; Haber, Razo & Maurer 2004; Dye 2006). The assumption was that a correspondence with economic policies being applied in the USA or Western Europe was appropriate for Latin America and would secure for the countries of the continent a process of economic expansion similar to that of the North Atlantic world.

The history of state-formation in the half-century following Independence demonstrates that institution building proved most problematic in those areas where the revolutionary wars lasted longest (for example northern South America), where there were large indigenous populations (such as the Andes and Mexico), and where silver mining had been an important element in the colonial economy (Halperín Donghi 1993; Bushnell & Macaulay 1994; Earle 2000). Latin America paid a high price for Independence in terms of growth lost: the development gap between Latin America and the rest of the world (as well as within the Americas) widened considerably during the first half of the nineteenth century (Coatsworth 2006; Prados de la Escosura 2006). In Brazil, where the struggle for independence was short and occurred “late”, and in Chile, where military conflict was short-lived, national administrations were fairly rapidly and successfully established. National consolidation was also sustained by economic growth. Although the relatively smooth nature of the transition from colony to co-Kingdom, when Rio de Janeiro became the capital of the Portuguese world, and independent empire should not be exaggerated, the early development of coffee exports, which rapidly out-performed the “colonial” staple, sugar, generated the new opportunities and resources that forged the state (Uricoechea 1980; Murill de Carvalho 1980). Chile benefited from its strategic location as a West Coast entrepôt, producing and shipping grain to

neighbouring republics (and, after the 1840s, to California) and copper to mainland Asia and Great Britain (Bauer 1975).

This raises the question of whether domestic institutional order conditioned the ability to seize economic opportunities resulting from international economic growth or whether external commercial openings – and the resulting increase in resources – fostered regime consolidation. Many of those who promoted Independence assumed that it was the former. The reality, however, may have been different, namely that it was the growth of the international economy after the 1840s that ultimately fostered domestic institutional building and state modernisation: the market made the state, rather than the state the market. This remains a matter of controversy. Writing about mid-nineteenth century Peru, Gootenberg maintains that trade may have made the state but the state was thwarted in its efforts to embed the market (Gootenberg 1988: 88). For Salvatore, also writing about free trade (ideology and practice), international insertion facilitated state-formation but market societies only followed after a considerable lag (Salvatore 1999: 30–35). What is beyond doubt is that those societies most able to realise a flow of exports – particularly “new” commodities such as wool, wheat, non-precious metals and coffee – were amongst the first to enjoy domestic sovereignty and, possibly, pre-empt or reverse the process of territorial disintegration.

With few exceptions, nation-states hardly existed in Latin America in 1850. Boundaries were ill-defined, administrative units separated from each other by distance rather than precisely demarcated frontiers. Few in the continent would have understood the concept of nationality or citizenship – political rights were narrowly circumscribed, slaves were neither citizens nor subjects but property and, in many regions, Indian communities still existed as societies apart, subject to distinct legal and fiscal arrangements. For most people living in Latin America at mid-century, the landed estate, rather than the nation-state, constituted the “political universe” (Halperín Donghi 1993; Miller 2006). Linguistic and ethnic divisions, as well as form of economic activity, isolated groups one from another. By 1900 this had changed. The incidence of domestic political instability declined during the third quarter of the nineteenth century and there was greater security of international frontiers. Symbols of “stateness” proliferated. Constitutions were enacted, legal codes passed into law, national armies created (substituting for provincial militias or irregular forces commanded by rural strongmen), national postal and telegraphic services were set up and “national” currencies were issued. There were, too, attempts to inaugurate national systems of primary education and, in some capital cities, newspapers

began to aspire to a national status if not to national circulation. In those areas that had experienced mass immigration, military conscription and "national" education were viewed as mechanisms to "make" the good citizen and forge national patriotism. An image of the nation-state was created and diffused (Miller 2006).

It was at this point that the struggle to conform Latin American political and economic norms to perceived practice in the North Atlantic world began to bear fruit, in contrast to failed attempts at modernisation in the River Plate and further north in the 1820s and 1840s. The emergence of greater opportunities for Latin America in the world economy was illustrated by the buoyancy of primary product prices throughout the middle third of the nineteenth century (W.A. Lewis 1978). Some countries, like the Argentine, were even able to skew the terms of trade in their favour beyond the turn of the century by diversifying export schedules (Cortés Conde 1973). Export growth valorised local assets and generated additional resources, notably for the central state or groups strategically placed to capture a disproportionate share of additional resource flows. Arguably the most critical economic organisations in late-nineteenth century Latin America were railways and banks, sectors where the national state assumed an increasingly important role as promoter or operator or both. This implied greater state access to resources. It also implied the provision of legitimacy-enhancing public goods.

The production of new commodities and the diversification of export schedules either promoted regime consolidation or, by modifying existing regional power relations, regime change. Either way, the net result was regime modernisation. Much, of course, depended on the sectors to whom these new resources accrued and how they were spent. Nevertheless, it is instructive that in cases as distinct as the Peruvian and the Argentinian, the export of new commodities generated a massive increase in state resources and investment in infrastructure. Taking British investment data as a proxy for larger changes, between 1865 and 1887 the nominal value of Peruvian bonds placed on the London money market increased nine-fold: the British holding of Argentinian public bond increased by a slightly smaller factor. During the same period direct British investment in railways in Peru increased more than twelve-fold and in the Argentine by a factor of 10 (Cortés Conde 1973; Oszlak 1982; Hunt 1985). (It should be remembered that a proportion of portfolio debt was also applied to railway building.) As well as promoting domestic market integration and export production, improved internal communications strengthened the hand of central government. Along with the Remington rifle, the

railway and the telegraph became symbols of “order and progress” and of “peace and administration”. In this respect, the state had to “reinforce” the market. State nurturing was necessary to embed the market which, well beyond the mid-nineteenth century, was a “weak” institution in many regions of the continent, as indicated above.

With export expansion, came imports and the prospect of enhancing state revenue. Imports, financed by export earnings, appeared to promise a secure source of revenue – and one that could be mortgaged to underwrite foreign borrowing. Capacity to borrow and a “commitment” to repay also implied greater state competence and, possibly, greater market coherence. Thus states were able to expand the supply of public goods – political order and economic and social “consumables” such as transport and education facilities. If the growth in the foreign trade sector did not broaden the fiscal base, at least it deepened the purse into which government could dip. Inflows of foreign funds reduced the cost of state borrowing and may have weaned some administrations away from dependence on inflation as a means of financing the state (Marichal 1989). The ability of a government to borrow implies a capacity to tax, in this instance, to capture a share of rents generated by commodity exports. Taxation and borrowing also involve credibility and commitment – an ability on the part of the government to repay and a willingness on the part of tax payers to contribute to the fiscal burden. Hence, the shift from inflationary financing, “discovered” during the early national period (see Amaral 1998), to borrowing (coupled with a credible capacity to tax) points to the embedding of the state and market relationships (see Bordo & Vegh 1998, 33–34). External borrowing, however, was not costless. It carried implications for domestic monetary policy and the threat – and sometimes the reality – of supervision by foreign banks as regimes in Buenos Aires, Lima, Rio de Janeiro and beyond discovered in the 1890s, and even earlier (Aceña, Reis 2000).

It is no coincidence that around the third quarter of the nineteenth century there were further efforts at “market-embedding”. Perhaps the most notable were attempts to impose capitalist norms on land and labour “markets” (Bushnell 1983). Overtly driven by liberal precepts of property, mechanisms such as the *Lei da terra* (1850) in Brazil, the *Ley Lerdo* (1856) in Mexico and similar projects in the Andes, were designed to promote freehold and prohibit corporate/collective land-holding (Gootenberg 1988; Dye 2006). As indicated, the result was a massive transfer of assets into private hands, usually existing *latifundistas*. In the Argentine and Chile, the so-called “desert campaign” against nomadic Indians had a similar effect. Despite the liberal rhetoric, land-holding

became increasingly less “democratic” between the 1860s and 1880s. In various parts of Latin America, progressive land projects had been debated around the middle of the nineteenth century. Often these were connected with schemes to attract immigrants, influenced by policy and practice in the USA. Little came of these projects. One-off disposals, resulting from the alienation of formerly communally held and ecclesiastical property and the seizure of fertile frontier zones from nomadic populations, were commandeered by agro-export elites through the application of market and non-market mechanisms.

Legislation relating to “labour” was more piecemeal, often subject to repeated revision, though no less controversial in its impact. In plantation economies such as Cuba and Brazil, the massive surge in export production undoubtedly strengthened archaic institutions such as slavery. Yet even in these cases there were subtle changes in labour relations. The trans-Atlantic slave trade came to an end in the 1850s – around the time that the institution effectively died in other parts of Latin America. From the 1860s to the late 1880s (when slavery was finally abolished), immigration, the freeing of different categories of slaves, the use of Asian contract labour (in Cuba) and the recruitment of domestic non-slave labour made for greater complexity in labour relations in the São Paulo countryside and the sugar sector in Cuba. During the last decades before abolition, and despite the concentration of slaves on *paulista* coffee *fazendas* and Cuban sugar estates, the majority of rural workers in these regions were technically free (Moreno Fraginals 1984; Lamounier 1993, 2000). And, slaves were capable of resistance. Similar controversy surrounds other mechanisms – debt peonage, share-cropping and contract labour (*enganche*), prominent everywhere but especially associated with the Andean and Central American countries and with Mexico (Blanchard 1980). Were these devices the means of extending slavery or did they constitute a phased transition to a “free” labour market? Relatively new research tends to challenge earlier negative constructions placed on these mechanisms and depicts them as contributing to the emergence of wage-labour and, possibly, the fitful consolidation of a labour market: at local level labour markets functioned and there were institutions – formal and informal – capable of imposing sanctions in the case of contract violation by either party. This is the construction placed upon a re-examination of histories of resistance and coercion.

Mass immigration effected a more obvious and a more thorough-going change in the labour market and to labour relations. Between the mid-nineteenth and the mid-twentieth century, the Argentine received around seven and a half million immigrants, Brazil something less than five million. They

were, respectively, the second and third most favoured destinations of European emigrants after the USA. Other countries, notably Uruguay and Cuba, also received substantial numbers of immigrants. In addition, Europeans settled temperate regions of Chile and, to a lesser degree, Colombia. Indeed, virtually every country attracted immigrants but mass inter-continental free migration flowed overwhelmingly to the grasslands of southern South America. Given that these countries were “competing” with the USA and other areas of recent settlement, the mass movement of people implies economic opportunity and a semblance of political order. Immigration of this magnitude had a significant demographic, social and political impact. Again, controversy surrounds the long-term consequences of mass immigration. Did subsidised and contract labour depress wages or did subsidies represent a “savings” advance to would-be settlers, thereby contributing to individual/family welfare as well as to macroeconomic efficiency by increasing factor availability? Did immigrants provoke socio-political change, and was mass immigration a demographic “gift” or “burden”? Almost 70 percent of all immigrants entering Brazil remained there, only a little over 50 percent did so in the Argentinian case. These were substantial “gifts” of, often literate and socially mobile, human capital. International migrants hardly sought to locate in subsistence activities. Rather, they contributed to the formation of labour and land markets, and of the market economy.

Monetary reform was another area where institutional change can be observed. The early monetary history of independent Latin America was largely one of inflation and turmoil. The cost and method of funding revolutionary and post-independence conflict, coupled with a decline in silver production, undermined the currency in many areas. Additional pressure was placed upon money supply and the exchange by the adverse balance of trade: bullion and specie drained abroad prompting recourse to paper. After the mid-century there were renewed efforts to stabilise the exchange: imported doctrines and export earnings – along with foreign investment – facilitated greater order (Drake 1994; Aceña & Reis 2000). Nevertheless, it was not until the latter part of the nineteenth century that monetary stability appeared to be secured. By this stage, the Gold Standard was internationally dominant and many policy-makers peddled the orthodoxies of fiscal discipline and state creditworthiness. In the struggle to retire paper and remove the legal tender status (actual or informal) of foreign money, “national” coinage was vaunted as a symbol of statehood and a device to advertise the paramountcy of the central state. The route to monetary order – particularly the Gold Standard – was painful, not least for regimes incorrigibly wedded to the “developmentalism” of unbacked

paper currencies or mining regions that favoured silver as a “national” metal. In addition to fiscal rectitude, securing convertibility involved monetary and banking debates about a state monopoly (or otherwise) of the right of issue and the establishment of a monetary authority to supervise both banks and the money supply. These were sensitive matters of domestic political economy for regimes balancing sectional and regional interests. Governments of small, “open” Latin American economies with shallow domestic capital markets faced huge problems in accumulating (and conserving) reserves. There was a trade-off between “openness” and “developmentalism” in fiscal and monetary policy. States faced a trilemma – fixed exchange rates, open capital accounts and interventionism: they could have recourse to any two of these instruments, but not all three. There were limits to the quest for virtue: the benefits had to be seen to outweigh the costs. Domestic critics of the Gold Standard sustained a vociferous opposition from the side-lines. Opponents were always ready with an alternative project should the price of fiscal discipline, particularly at times of generalised instability and credit contraction in the world economy, provoke discontent (Gootenberg 1988; Marichal 1996). The political costs of monetary virtue could prove greater than the supposed economic advantages. Nevertheless, the provision of monetary order can be presented as an indicator of state competence – an ability to tax (rather to inflate). Did this also signal a new “contract” between state and citizen – the provision of public goods in exchange for fiscal exactions? Whatever, the impetus to market consolidation provided by monetary stability should not be under-estimated.

Economic liberalism, however, was tempered with pragmatism and subject to sectionalist special pleading. Was this economic realism, a mercantilism hangover or a response to Listian and Hamiltonian ideas? For example, after the 1880s industrialists in Brazil, Chile and Mexico could count on a significant degree of protection even if the tariff was still primarily regarded as a fiscal device (Birchal 1999; Haber 1989; Kirsch 1977; Suzigan 1986). Duties were becoming increasingly discriminatory and manufacturers could benefit from a softening of the exchange rate. Less consistent tariff protection was also available to manufacturers in Peru and Colombia (Ospina Vásquez 1955; Thorp 1998; Thorp & Bertram 1978). Unsurprisingly, the ability of industrialists to influence what might be described as macroeconomic policy depended on connexions with the dominant export oligarchy and a capacity to press conjunctural or strategic advantage – governments were invariably more responsive to the clamour for protection when short of cash. “Emergency” tariff hikes were rarely rescinded when fiscal crises passed but the incidence of pro-

tection could be eroded by currency appreciation or import price falls (Kirsch 1977; Suzigan 1986; Haber 1989). In addition, politically influential sectors, like hard-pressed Argentinian and Brazilian sugar producers, could always rely on special assistance (Villela & Suzigan 1973; Cerutti & Marichal 1997; Dávila & Miller 1999).

Yet only after the turn of the century was the export-led growth model associated with the oligarchic state seriously challenged. The process and programme was questioned by those segments of the elite who had not benefited from policies of the period or who were particularly adversely affected by increased instability in world commodity markets and by intellectuals who questioned the economic efficiency and social implications of a system based largely on the production and processing of a limited range of commodities for external markets. Others were exercised by societal change triggered by export-led growth, notably mass immigration and urbanisation (in Southern Cone countries) and by the prominent role assumed by foreign companies in strategic sectors. Nationalist and radical criticisms were also articulated by aspiring middle class groups and some segments of organised labour clamouring for greater access to politics and a welfarist stance in state policy. From these criticisms and concerns, a populist challenge would emerge by the end of the 1930s, with a new project and a different view of integration in the world economy. By the second world war developmentalism – welfarism, industrialisation and greater political openness – were firmly established on the agenda.

Between the Oligarchic and the Populist State

In a number of countries, the oligarchic state was under pressure by the early decades of the twentieth century. Were demands for change triggered by societal modernisation associated with the production of linkage-rich “democratic” commodities? Or was the re-ordering of political institutions a reaction to those demands? Alternately, did increased external sector volatility undermine political arrangements created, or long-sustained, by resource flows resulting from early insertion into the world economy? Undeniably, the international economy was changing. Commodity prices were softening, the rate of growth of the volume of exports was slowing and capital flows becoming more erratic (Pérez Brignoli & Cardoso 1979; Sheaham 1987; Halperín Donghi 1993; Thorp 1998).

Even without the first world war, price instability, changes in global polarity, and new institutional and ideological developments within the continent would have led to demands for greater economic and political accommodation. At this point, most Latin American societies were quite different in size and complexity from those that had existed in the middle of the nineteenth century or even 1900. The old order collapsed first, and most dramatically, in Mexico in 1910–1911. That said, nowhere else in Latin America was there a social upheaval of a similar magnitude – at least not until the Cuban Revolution of 1959. The overthrow of the Porfirian system has been variously explained by regime sclerosis, bureaucratic inertia and miscalculation in the face of mounting opposition, the consolidation of a counter-elite and multi-class nationalism. There was, too, peasant land hunger, social discontent and poverty triggered by decades of increasing inequity (Weiner 1999). Other regimes confronted similar difficulties but there were differences of degree and no other government encountered organised opposition in the countryside to the same extent as the *porfiriato* in the late 1900s.

Arguably, the most potent forces working for change in many countries were nationalism and demands emanating for the largely urban middle classes for greater access to power, processes triggered by macroeconomic instability (Sinkink 1991; Halperín Donghi 1993; Weaver 2000; Miller 2006). At this stage, nationalism and populism were to become especially pronounced in the Southern Cone and Brazil, most precisely – and precociously – epitomised by the administration of Batlle Ordóñez in Uruguay, the Radical ascendancy in the Argentine and the Alessandri presidencies in Chile. Later expressions were *varguismo* and Peronism in Brazil and the Argentine, respectively. Perhaps because they were articulated earlier, these demands seemed to have been most easily accommodated in Uruguay (Finch 1981). In the Argentine and Chile, export sector crisis made for messier political adjustments (Peralta Ramos 1992; Weaver 2000). Urban groups were demanding accommodation in the political market place at precisely the moment when the rate and rhythm of economic expansion were becoming more erratic. Hence politics appeared as a zero-sum game. Additional groups could not be accommodated by re-distributing the proceeds of future growth: accommodation implied re-allocating existing resources, a more delicate operation that challenged the very existence of a regime and, perhaps, even of the state itself.

Nationalism, though not necessarily xenophobia and autarchy, became an increasingly potent force throughout Latin America in the inter-war decades, associated in some countries with *indigenismo* and *hispanidad*. Nationalism

heightened concerns about statecraft, yielding more nuanced attitudes to foreign interests, and challenged previous concepts about the role of the state (Sinkkink 1991; Weaver 2000; Miller 2006). Nationalism also served as a cement for proto-populist alliances in some countries and assumed a more overtly anti-liberal and anti-internationalist tone by the 1930s. Nationalist and developmentalist regimes of the 1930s were framed by economic dislocation provoked by the first world war and, more especially, by the inter-war depression. In addition, they were conditioned by criticism of the economics and politics of export-led growth voiced earlier by commentators like Bunge and Encina and by radical thinkers such as Mariátegui and Prado (Abel & Lewis 1991). These ideas were seized upon by sectors such as the military, bureaucrats and industrialists, as well as nationalists (Sinkkink 1991; Weaver 2000). All argued for a more pro-active role by government to ensure greater local consumption of commodities for which overseas demand had contracted, domestic production of items that could no longer be imported and, possibly, the application of *ad hoc* welfare measures to pre-empt further social discontent. This implied a greater role for the state in factor markets, and as a producer and a regulator. During the inter-war period central banks were created (or existing agencies transformed into central banks) in all the major and middle-sized economies. Other financial bodies – credit agencies, reinsurance corporations and commercial banks – also proliferated. In the 1930s exchange control became the norm, commodity boards multiplied and overseas trade and financial transactions were highly regulated. Virtually everywhere, the state “grew” (Evans 1995; Vellinga 1998; Thorp 1998; Bulmer-Thomas 2003).

Policy debates and institutional developments of this period had an influence on post-second world war strategies of import-substituting industrialisation. The relatively speedy recovery of most Latin American economies from the worst effects of the depression by the early/mid-1930s similarly influenced later thinking by creating the impression of bureaucratic competence and macroeconomic management efficiency. Yet it would be a mistake to project back into this period expectations and programmes of the post-second world war decades. During the 1930s economic policy was piecemeal and directed towards export substitution – “economic internalisation” – rather than industrialisation *per se*. Increased domestic industrial production was an important element in this process but it was a part rather than the whole. Moreover, particularly in the early 1930s, Latin American policy-makers were by no means convinced that overseas demand for exports would not recover nor foreign capital markets not re-open. Hence, the predominance of orthodoxy in many

spheres of domestic economic policy, attempts to service the foreign debt, and efforts to protect exporters. How could it be otherwise when export interests remained politically powerful and fiscal resources were overwhelmingly derived from taxing overseas trade and borrowing. Only after c. 1936 did domestic economic strategies and international economic policy become more adventurous and unorthodox – and displayed a willingness to take advantage of great power rivalry (Abel & Lewis 1991; Di Tella & Cameron Watt 1990). Debate continues. For Brazil, positions are particularly polarised: Hilton argues that there was a major policy change in 1930 (Hilton 1975); exploring the political economy of industrialisation, others point to a conscious, coherent application of a new development model only in the late 1930s (Draibe 1985; Suzigan 1986; Villela & Suzigan 1973; Wirth 1970, 1985). In the Mexican case, Cárdenas sees pragmatism as policy-makers responded to demands for reconstruction and stability following the Revolution while coping with a succession of shocks imported from the USA during the late 1920s and the early 1930s (Cárdenas 1994). However, for Chile there is more consensus: there was a trend towards industrialisation throughout the inter-war period, either as a result of early instability in the external sector or due to conscious efforts by government to promote manufacturing (Muñoz G. 1968; Thorp and Whitehead 1987; Palma 1991).

Many contemporaries viewed these developments as signalling a heightened degree of “economic” sovereignty, and greater state competence. If the oligarchic state had been exercised by internal challenges to sovereignty emanating from recalcitrant provinces and the real threat of ethnic violence, the populist state was more concerned about class relations (Malloy 1977; Bergquist, 1986). Hence an emphasis on diffusing “social representation” within the state (Oszlak 1982). Paradoxically, and running counter to contemporary assumption, increased internal sovereignty may have been countered by a decline in “external” sovereignty. Volatility in world commodity and financial markets provoked attempts by foreign business interests, aided by their governments, to defend assets in Latin America in the face of nationalist demands, economic contraction and increased international rivalry (Abel & Lewis 1991; G. Di Tella & Cameron Watt 1990; Gravil & Rooth 1978; Hilton 1975). This interplay of domestic forces and external pressures posed problems for a number of regimes. Responses to these challenges varied across the continent. From these responses, three categories of states may be identified. First, those that adopted a Gerschenkronian position, employing “ideology” or “national project” in order to upgrade state competence and in so doing came to project an image of

efficacious management of domestic and external relations. These states obtained greater legitimacy. Second, regimes which, due to a perceived lack of need (or an inability to do more), implemented only limited modifications to the institutional *status quo*. Finally, states that surrendered a substantial degree of sovereignty in order to survive in the colder climate of global recession and rising internal and international tensions.

Countries such as Brazil, Chile and Mexico were representative of the first group. In Chile and Brazil a national project based upon industrial growth and regional economic regeneration gave the central state enhanced domestic authority and, apparently, greater competence in the management of relations with domestic actors and external agents (Abreu 1990; Hewlett & Weinert 1982; Muñoz G. 1968). In the Mexican case, these objectives were subsumed in the “ideology” – and the iconography – of the Revolution and, ultimately, encapsulated in the strategy of “stabilising development”. Internal economic regeneration from the destructive phase of the Revolution and the impact of the inter-war depression culminated in the radicalism of the Cárdenas *sexenio* that witnessed massive state action in the rural and urban sectors (Cárdenas 1994). In all three countries – though to a much greater degree in Mexico – domestic sovereignty appeared to have slipped in the 1920s. National and regional politics had become more violent in Brazil and Chile during the decade as challenges to the central administration proliferated. This instability was not unconnected with weakness in key export sectors. Possibly this made the task of re-establishing central authority more urgent and, ultimately, more successful. It is instructive that, although starting from very different positions, the central state in Brazil, Chile and Mexico became highly interventionist. Welfare programmes – education reforms, an extension in social insurance provision and labour legislation – were stressed in all three. Mexico and Chile were the first in Latin America to establish official organisations that would become national development agencies, namely, Nacional Financiera (NAFINSA) and the Corporación de Fomento (CORFO) respectively. There was too a proliferation of price-support or state buying agencies for a range of domestic and export staples, all firmly under the control of the central government and, in Brazil and Mexico, exhibiting distinctly corporatist tendencies, often entailing the “representation” of workers and employers, producers and consumers, as well as the state (Gordon-Ashworth, 1984). Government intervention in the commercialisation of commodities displaced private, often foreign, agents. Greater state action in the banking sector also facilitated more adventurous monetary, exchange and external debt management strategies. Hence, these governments

were depicted as “re-capturing” control over monetary policy and adopting a nationalist stance in negotiations with foreign interests – and their domestic clients.

The Argentine and Colombia best typify the second group of countries (Alhadeff 1991; Kalmanovitz 1983; Palacios 1980; Peralta Ramos 1992). Here, despite similar developments in the banking sector and commodity marketing – and much innovation in economic strategy, there was less “ideology” and less “project”. In the 1930s, the commitment to economic liberalism and the prevailing pattern of economic activities was more entrenched or, possibly, less challenged. There may have been less pressure for a radical re-definition of the reach and composition of the state. Perhaps domestic politics was too riven – or rival blocs too evenly balanced – to permit the emergence of an opening for change at this point. This may be the lesson of the upsurge in political violence in Colombia in the 1940s and the rupture in Argentinian politics represented by Peronism after 1946. The third group of states is probably best represented by Nicaragua and Cuba (Pérez 1988). These states might have acquired international recognition by the twentieth century and a degree of domestic sovereignty but they had hardly secured the exclusion of external authority. Now, in the inter-war period, elements of statehood were ceded (or re-ceded) to US pro-consular officials and/or business as overt external assistance was vital to sustain the regime and/or the state.

“Populist” Developmentalism

As suggested above, in many countries during the inter-war decades the economic position of the state shifted from minimalist regulation (based loosely on liberal tenets conditioned by the experience of crisis management) to more explicit attempts to influence the availability of key goods and services. Later, several regimes attempted to combine entrepreneurial and macroeconomic management functions, processes that were associated with a re-structuring of state and economy during phases of “forced” economic development. Government policy initiatives, which had been *ad hoc* and pragmatic, became increasingly pro-active and focused in response to changing perceptions of both the role of the state and the efficiency of the market (Thorp 1998; Weaver 2000). As the state grew, bureaucracies mushroomed and state corporations proliferated – and came to exercise a tighter control over resources. Did official economic policy become more coherent and effective, or did it merely appear to

be so? To what extent did a growth in the role of the state promote social and sectional conflict rather than integrating modernisation?

Economic policy – specific programmes and the ideas underpinning them – was clearly shaped by many groups and organisations, the influence and weight of which changed over time. Some of these originated within the state itself, others emanated from traditional producer bodies, relatively recently constituted segments of the business sector, the military and more diffuse social constellations including politically vocal urban middle and working class groups. Arguably, the diversity of lobbies acting upon the state at different moments (as well as particular national characteristics and a shifting external environment) explains both a re-scheduling of policy priorities and the ideological eclecticism (or inconsistency) of strategy during the period. The diversity of these configurations also touches upon the debate about the autonomy of the state and its ability to devise and select policy options and to command resources.

From the 1930s to the 1960s there was a tendency for a widening spectrum of prices – of factors, services, commodities and products – to be “administered” or “indicated” by the state (French-Davis, Muñoz G. & Palma 1994). These features were not peculiar to Latin America but only in the non-market economies of Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia was the size of the state sector larger (Bates 1989; Gereffi & Wyman 1990; Naya, Urrutia, Mark & Fuentes 1989). In many countries, politics also became increasingly “administered”, whether by civilian or military regimes. There were political parties (and trade unions) *of* the state and political organisations that behaved as if they *were* the state. Economics and politics became statist and nationalist: boundaries between the public and the private blurred – perhaps even more so than in the early nineteenth century. While there were exceptions, these tendencies assumed a near continental dimension. In larger and more pluralistic societies the trends were institutionalised and formalised: in the case of Central American and Caribbean kleptocratic regimes, they were personalised. Underpinned by the research and theorising of ECLA, forced industrialisation became *the* policy goal of many administrations for several decades after the second world war, a goal that justified interventionism. However, Latin American statism, entailed a partnership between government and the private sector. Initially, confined to domestic private business, the alliance subsequently included transnational corporations. The balance of power between state and business varied across the continent and changed over time. The private sector had greater influence in Colombia and Mexico, while government assumed a stronger directive role in Brazil, certainly in the 1970s (Draibe 1985; Evans

1979, 1994; Hewlett & Weinert 1982; Jenkins 1977; Prebisch 1970, 1981; Thorp 1998; Weaver 2000).

Cepalista analyses and prescriptions fell on fertile ground after 1948 when the Commission was established in Santiago. Negative views about the terms of trade likely to be encountered by commodity exporting economies – that price differentials between primary products and manufactures were locked into a downward trend rather than following a cyclical pattern – seemed to be validated by the recent historical experience of Latin America. As Prebisch's examination of data on Britain's terms of trade for the late nineteenth and early twentieth century appeared to prove, once the temporary upsurge provoked by war was spent, primary product prices would continue inexorably along a downward path. The second world war also confirmed structural changes in the global economy which exacerbated the problems of primary producers. The world economy was now centred on the USA, a mature economy with a huge productivity advantage and a rising propensity to export coupled with limited import requirements reinforced by strong protectionist tendencies.

The congruence of experience and theory was a winning combination that contributed to the rapid diffusion of ECLA developmentalism amongst policy-making elites in Latin America (FitzGerald 1994; Love 1994; Pazos 1982; Sunkel 1993). If assessments of the external environment were negative, there were grounds for domestic optimism. Following a process of learning-by-doing during the second world war, and a sense that many countries in Latin America had coped with the problems of the depression rather more effectively than governments in Europe, several administrations were prepared to embrace interventionism. ECLA provided both the justification and the design to do so. Several processes and events contributed to growing confidence in state competence and the new development ethos. The most telling were: the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves during the second world war; a rapid growth of manufacturing output in several economies from the early/mid-1930s to the early 1940s; a modest surge in intra-regional trade during the war (particularly in the Southern Cone); the apparent effectiveness of official agencies (particularly commodity boards and development "banks") in coping with crisis – confirming a process of learning by doing (Thorp 1998; Weaver 2000). These outcomes and mechanisms point to the capacity of (successful) states to manage conflict and capture power-resources. Accumulated reserves, sustained by (temporary) high export prices and the assumption in some countries (notably Mexico and Brazil) of continuing US aid in the immediate post-war period offered to ease the transition from one pattern of growth to another. Post-

depression recovery, growth in manufactured output, and economic and political institution building were also interpreted as signalling state outreach. A renegotiation of the external connexion was both essential and feasible if the Latin American economies were to maximise the limited advantages to be derived from continuing global insertion after the 1940s.

The main policy instruments of developmentalism are well-known: exchange control (often manifest in multiple exchange rates that gave preference to manufacturing); protectionism (non-tariff barriers to trade and exchange regulations were employed in conjunction with, sometime in preference to, discriminatory duties – again discriminating in favour of preferred segments of industry); forced saving; and market expansion/deepening (Dornbusch & Edwards 1991; Fajnzylber 1983; French-Davis, Muñoz & Palma 1994). Overvalued, but not necessarily stable, exchange rates prevailed for much of the period and were consistently applied to the advantage of the industrial sector. While only Mexico managed to defend a stable exchange rate throughout the classic period of ISI (Cárdenas 1996; Reynolds 1970), the repeated devaluations that characterised other economies hardly benefited commodity producers as devaluations were accompanied by windfall taxes on exporters. This was consistent with *cepalista* trade theory which argued that markets for exports were not price responsive. Devaluation taxation of exports was also consistent with the regime of exchange and export profit “nationalisation” and the distortion of the domestic terms of trade in favour of the urban sector. As the principal source of foreign exchange, but not necessarily accumulation, the export sector was consistently squeezed by state agencies. Inflation was the main, but not the exclusive, mechanism of forced savings. Having looted social insurance funds (*caixas*) to finance the construction of the Volta Redonda iron and steel complex, regimes in Brazil learnt to milk – politically as well as economically – the social security system. While funds remained in surplus, they were an important source of forced saving. By 1960 virtually the whole of the Uruguayan workforce was enrolled in social insurance schemes. In Chile the figure was over 70 percent of the economically active population, 55 percent in the Argentine, around 25 percent in Peru and Costa Rica and 23 percent and 16 percent in Brazil and Mexico, respectively.

Periodic extension of the insurance systems, in the 1940s and 1960s, increased the scope of forced accumulation but when out-payments exceeded fund income, the real cost of pension and benefit payments was reduced by inflation. The most sophisticated system of forced savings was devised in Brazil during the miracle years. As this was a period of relatively low inflation, alter-

native mechanisms were constructed to capture resources. These mechanisms included: a general strengthening of market signals (for example, indexation); tax reform (a fairly rigorous application of federal tax law coupled with generous allowances/exemptions for investment in targeted sectors and areas); and institutionalised saving – all formal sector workers were compelled to contribute to social insurance funds, the national housing bank (its resources were used to finance road building in Amazonia) and indexed individual savings accounts (Abreu 1990; Malloy 1979). Subsidies that targeted producers and preferred borrowers sustained business confidence while select consumer subsidies and an extension of hire purchase served to activate demand. This was an alliance of government, segments of the “national” bourgeoisie, and foreign corporations with a pronounced urban bias. From time to time, organised/co-opted urban labour was also brought within the scope of this state-protected “development alliance”. Applied with some consistency and increasing sophistication, this package of measures explain the Brazilian miracle, “miraculous” because high rates of growth were sustained for several years with “historically” low rates of inflation. Yet, for the continent as a whole, it still remains to be explained whether this was a state-business, or a business-state, alliance (Evans 1979, 1994; Sinkink 1991; Schneider 2004).

Few would deny the success of the state in capturing economic resources during the phase of hot-house industrialisation. As suggested, this took various forms. Financial markets were effectively “nationalised” from the 1940s in most countries, even where private banks and credit providers remained visible or even prominent. Central banks controlled the allocation of formal-sector credit through loan and discount operations and the manipulation of reserve requirements. During periods of inflation, interest rates (and rate differentials) were set by state agencies and credit rationed by them. At a time of financial repression, access to credit mattered much more than nominal rates of interest. Formal credit was channelled through the banking system to preferred sectors and agents – not least loss-making state utility corporations and industrial enterprises (ECLA 1971; Kelly de Escobar 1985; Garrido 1988). And, in addition to credit generated via the printing press and allocated through the banking system, there were the mechanisms listed earlier, notably the ever-widening social insurance net and Brazilian-style refinements (Mesa-Lago 1991). At issue, then, was not the ability of the state to cream-off financial resources, rather it was about the efficiency of credit allocation and the capacity to promote indigenous, state-assisted “national” capitalism (Anglade & Fortin 1985, 1990). By the 1980s, the language of the debate had shifted from positive

expectations of credit creation and national entrepreneurial capacity to negative assessments of financial repression – capital markets were not working and forced savings had resulted in rent-seeking.

Nevertheless, mechanisms like inflation/credit creation and social insurance expansion ensured that, notwithstanding substantial direct investment by TNCs in the 1960s and massive state borrowing overseas in the 1970s, by far the greater part of investment was domestically financed. This does not mean that the welfarist element of ECLA developmentalism should be underestimated, as the improvement in social indicators confirms. Welfare expenditure (including food and fuel subsidies and expenditure on education) was an integral part of the strategy of “stabilising development”. Investment in the social infrastructure even more than in the economic infrastructure was critical to the sustainability of the pro-industry urban alliance as well as serving narrower Keynesian functions. There were substantial improvements in standard welfare indicators – literacy rates, life expectancy and birth – during the classic age of import-substituting industrialisation, yet relative inequality rose, and there was absolute decline in welfare in many areas during the 1980s (Urrutía 1991; Maddison 1991, 1992; Abel & Lewis 1993; Thorp 1998; Astorga, Bergés & FitzGerald 2004).

As already stated, *cepalismo* may have been interventionist and statist: it was neither anti-market nor anti-business. The role of the state was to insulate and nurture domestic entrepreneurial talent. The state was to serve as an intermediary between new businesses and an unfavourable external environment, sheltering firms from unfair competition and providing access to essential inputs, not least capital and technology, and serve as a conduit for aid from external sources (Prebisch 1950). There may also have been presumption that some countries might emerge as exporters of basic wage goods. Drawing on the W.A. Lewis thesis of a modern, capitalist sector developing on the basis of unlimited supplies of labour siphoned from the “traditional” and on the evidence of installed manufacturing capacity and intra-regional trade in manufactures during the war, the development of industrial exports seemed to be on the agenda. Popularised in the 1950s, the Lewis concept of growth assumed a “closed-economy”: unlimited supplies of labour facilitated accumulation in the “modern” sector (W.A. Lewis 1949, 1954). These ideas dovetailed with ECLA pessimistic thinking about limited external inflows of capital, evidence of an incipient “demographic explosion”, and the experience of a growth in trade in locally produced manufactures in the 1940s. For some policy-makers and analysts, prefiguring what would later be depicted as the East Asian path, this

combination of circumstances suggested the possibility of industrial expansion based on the export of basic wage goods.

Theoretically coherent, these expectations acknowledged that restructuring the Latin American economies would remain import-dependent in the medium-term. Moreover, although they only assumed concrete form subsequently, the market-orientation of ECLA developmentalism was also confirmed by projects such as regional integration and agrarian reform. Regional integration, pressed with some success on amenable Central American republics in the 1950s, was rooted in concepts of efficiency and competitiveness. Economic integration would facilitate the emergence of large-scale, efficient firms exposed to the rigours of competition from producers in neighbouring countries but still protected from unequal competition in the regional market place by overseas conglomerates. Isolated in small, national markets, businesses were unlikely to achieve optimal size or efficiency (Porcile 1995). The emphasis on agrarian reform also reflected, among other concerns, recognition that growth and efficiency were market-size constrained, though in this case the emphasis was as much about qualitative deepening as quantitative expansion. Agrarian reform would bring more producers and consumers into the market and would ease supply side bottlenecks on food staple availability. Reform was also envisaged as slowing the drift from the countryside to the towns. These were growing anxieties by the 1960s when rural-urban migration made millions of former subsistence farmers dependent on the market and sluggish agricultural supply responses were fuelling inflation and eroding income available for expenditure on manufactures (Furtado 1977; Sunkel & Paz 1970; Sunkel 1993; Ffrench-Davis, Muñoz G. & Palma 1994).

From the perspective of the "neo-liberal" 1990s, the results of classic *cepalismo* are easily disparaged. Yet the achievements were substantial. For almost all major economies, the increase in industrial valued added was impressive between 1950 and 1974. Annual average rates of growth in industrial added value were 6.2 percent: for Brazil and Mexico, the rates were 8.7 percent and 7.4 percent, respectively. Indeed, high rates of industrial growth were sustained in these economies throughout the 1980s. Moreover, the macroeconomic performance of the continent compares favourably with that of other areas before and during the "classic" period of forced industrialisation. For example, between 1929 and 1983 Asian GDP per capita increased at annual average rate of 2.24 percent: the Latin American figure was 2.63 percent. The best performing Asian economies were Korea and Taiwan, with rates of 4.89 percent and 3.80 percent *per annum* respectively: Brazil, the best performing

Latin American economy achieved 5.32 percent; Mexico, the second ranking economy registered 3.30 percent. The worst performing Asian and Latin American economies were India (1.43 percent *per annum*) and Cuba (1.25 percent). Latin American growth rates also compared favourably with those of Western Europe and the USA. Between 1913 and 1950, annual average compound rates of growth for Latin America were almost double those of the North Atlantic economies: from 1950 to 1973, the Latin American figure was virtually within half a percentage of the average of these countries and from 1973 to 1980 about 60 percent higher (Maddison 1991: 17).

Dismantling Populist Political Economy

Nevertheless, the process of import-substitution began to encounter problems by the late 1960s. Criticisms of ECLA policy prescriptions and the analysis on which they were based multiplied. *Dependistas* observed that import-substituting strategies had resulted in further distortions and intensifying underdevelopment. Manufacturing – demonstrably the most profitable sector of the economy – was unbalanced and externally rather than domestically integrated. Production was capital-intensive and skewed towards the manufacture of consumer durables – motor-mechanical, electrical and pharmaceutical goods. This necessitated the perpetuation of inequitable patterns of income distribution. Above all, the sector was dominated by an oligopoly of TNCs that, importing technology and components, financed operations on the basis of local accumulation and siphoned profits overseas (Sunkel & Paz 1970; Kay 1989; Sheaham 1987; Sunkel 1993). Nationalists, too, were antagonised by the import-dependence and the low endogenous multiplier associated with foreign dominance of the industrial sector. Like *dependistas*, they lamented the inculcation of inappropriate patterns of consumption. They were also antagonised by crowding out of local businesses and a tendency, increasingly observed in the latter part of the 1960s, for foreign conglomerate to escape from the consumer durables ghetto, to which they had been confined for much of the post-1930s decades, to penetrate the production of wage goods (tobacco products, textiles and domestically consumed foodstuffs), hitherto largely the preserve of locally-owned firms (Kay 1989; Sunkel 1993; Sheaham 1997). Where was the much vaunted capital goods sector, so cherished by strategic planners and military-supported regimes of the 1940s? Liberals (and later neo-liberals) observed rent-seeking, a product of over-zealous regulation, and macroeconomic

instability triggered by demand creation – monetary expansion and easy credit, notoriously reflected in inflation and balance of payments crises. Liberals also pointed to the misplaced pessimism of *cepalismo*: world trade had grown rapidly after the 1940s and international liquidity increased after the 1950s. Furthermore, liberals stressed the competitive failure of forced industrialisation. Although by the 1960s the export sector was no longer the prime generator of savings in most Latin American economies, commodity exports remained the principal earner of foreign exchange (Fajnzylber 1990; Meller 1991).

Criticism of *cepalismo* is telling but may also have been somewhat misplaced (Sunkel 1993). ECLA predictions about the post-second world war global economy were obviously wrong, though the analysis was not entirely illogical given the climate of the time when they evolved. Assumptions about the scale and quality of Latin American entrepreneurship and state competence were certainly optimistic. Yet the development strategy formulated in Santiago de Chile was more cogent than has been recently allowed. Negative criticisms of ECLA developmentalism are over-conditioned by the outcome of import-substituting industrialisation and neglect the larger corpus of strategies within which forced industrialisation was located (Hirschman 1963; Love 1994; Sunkel 1993). The *cepalista* development project involved more than simply import-substitution and autarky. It assumed an enduring – if reduced – connexion with the global economy and was not unconcerned about efficiency and competitiveness. ECLA strategy was flawed more in the application than in the inception. *Cepalismo* was a policy framework that was argued in the right place at the wrong time. Foreign aid was not forthcoming in the post-second world war period, notwithstanding the expectation of “good neighbour” countries like Mexico and Brazil and a widespread clamour for a Marshall Aid programme for Latin America. Things might also have been different had the “third” Bretton Woods agency been established. The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) was but a pale shadow of the International Trade Organisation that was to have stood alongside the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD/World Bank). There would be no World Trade Organisation (WTO) for another fifty years. Had Latin America obtained funding from the USA on a scale commensurate with Western Europe in the early years of the cold war, or received aid and soft agencies loans similar to East Asian economies in the 1950s and 1960s or had the developed economies in the 1940s been prepared to grant to Latin American exporters of manufactures the access to their markets

that they granted the Asian tiger economies in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, circumstances would have been very different for proponents of “authentic *cepalismo*”.

In some respects ECLA was culpable. If the *cepalista* project failed because only elements of it were selectively applied, this was partly due to the political naivety of proponents of the project. To paraphrase Sunkel: the problem lay not with *cepalismo* but the *cepalistas* (Sunkel 1993: 28–33, 45–48). Indeed some *cepalistas* were already expressing anxiety about the outcome of forced industrialisation strategies by the late 1950s (Love 1994). However, it took another twenty years or so before a *neocepalismo* paradigm was formulated. Acknowledging criticism and accepting the need for theoretical refinements, renewed emphasis was placed on efficiency and international competitiveness. Post-1940s regimes, struggling to accommodate the demands of urban sector interests, notably the middle classes and to a lesser extent urban labour, and balance the conflicting claims of pressured export sectors and aspiring domestic businesses were inevitably inclined to apply parts of the developmentalist programme and not others. Keynesian style demand management was applied in contexts that lacked in-built constraints against inflation and at a time when many economies were operating at full capacity. Favouring the production of durables addressed the demands of middle-class consumers starved of imports and won the approval of emergent business lobbies and offered the prospect of immediate political returns in terms of job creation. While it might have been economically logical – in some countries – to concentrate effort on heavy industry, the political pay-off would have been less in the short-to-medium term (Sinkink 1991). Accordingly, in the 1950s and 1960s, import-substituting industrial expansion was easier to sell than other elements of the *cepalista* “package”. Agrarian reform antagonised still powerful rural interests. Effective regional economic integration was opposed by nationalists, the military and vested business interests. These elements were, however, critical to the viability of the *cepalista* project. Indeed, the importance attached by the Brazilian military regime to raising rural production after 1968 (largely through an extension of the rural frontier and the introduction of new crops) and similar emphases on capitalist modernisation in the countryside elsewhere in the 1970s and 1980s (including state aid for agri-businesses producing domestic food staples and export commodities), validate earlier ECLA anxieties about constraints to development imposed by rural backwardness (Foweraker 1981; Goodman & Redclift 1982). The revival of integrationist projects, for example the

MERCOSUR/L and the resuscitation of the Andean Group, in the 1980s and 1990s, equally testifies to the relevance of another “failed” ECLA initiative (Porcile 1995; French-Davis, Muñoz G. & Palma 1994; Thorp 1998).

If, in many instances, national political priorities account for the selective absorption of elements of the developmentalist package, as Prebisch himself recognised in his 1955 report on the Argentine, scope for import-substitution was already limited in some of the larger economies. In several branches of manufacturing in the Argentine, there was little relative change in the composition of output between the 1920s and 1950. Already by the inter-war period, domestic suppliers had captured the greater share of the market in the production of basic commodities such as ceramics, clothing, publishing and printing, paper, and tobacco. The way forward lay in vertical industrial integration or production for export. What occurred, however, was horizontal diversification – the production of more of the same for a highly protected home market. At mid-century, import-substitution beginning with the manufacture of wage goods was only viable for any length of time in economies where the contribution of manufacturing remained low until the 1940s. In some countries, for example Chile in the 1920s, export-led industrial growth or autonomous industrial expansion, had already eroded this option (Díaz-Alejandro 1970; Dorfman 1983; Mamalakis 1976; Muñoz G. 1968).

In addition, as suggested above, *cepalista* analysts initially found it difficult to respond to, or acknowledge the validity of, criticism (Prebisch 1981; Kay 1998). Even while pressing for regional economic integration and agrarian reform, many ECLA ideologues appeared blind to export sector constraints arising from an over-commitment to manufacturing. There was a reluctance to accept that an export policy or an agricultural policy was required alongside an industrial policy. Starved of resources and often subject to “cheap food” price controls, rural producers responded by reducing output. It was illogical, on the one hand, to accept the existence of an agricultural bottleneck and, on the other, to assume that farmers would respond to rising food and raw material demands triggered by industrialisation and urbanisation while starved of investment funds and foreign exchange. Only in Mexico, where substantial investment had been made in the countryside in the 1930s, and where private producers were actively supported by the state in the 1940s, was there positive growth in rural output per capita for much of the middle third of the twentieth century (Reynolds 1970). Later, during the miracle years in Brazil, there was some success in raising rural production and productivity (Abreu 1990). Yet, in most countries, as labour drained to the cities and profits were

creamed off by official buying agencies or through the distortion of domestic terms of trade, output stagnated or fell. Hence, as the easy phase of import-substituting industrialisation began to run out of steam, critics of the *cepalista* project became more vociferous and pervasive.

“Retreat” to the Market

If government economic strategy from the 1940s to the 1960s was apparently influenced by a determination to promote structural change, issues of efficiency and international competitiveness tended to dominate the policy debate thereafter. This often involved a reduction in the rhetoric of nationalism and social reformism (in those countries where these considerations had featured on the policy agenda). By the 1980s, a questioning of state-directed development was giving way to the neo-orthodoxy that became the dominant ideological framework of the 1990s. The pro-active state was being displaced by the “dismantler” state charged with “privatising” economic activity – returning the economy to the market. In the 1990s, the discourse shift from the “minimalist” to the “capable” state. Neoliberals dominated the academic and policy debate in the 1980s (Grindle 2000, 29–30). Responding to the intellectual challenge associate with the writing of North, greater emphasis was placed on the role of institutions (as mechanisms capable of fostering or inhibiting growth): there were “good” sets of institutions and “bad”. Hence the need for “capable” states, which required legal reform, fiscal reform, privatisation and central bank independence, and the language of the debate which emphasised “transparency”, “credible commitment” and “accountability” on the part of the state (North 1990; Grindle 1996).

With hindsight, two distinct responses to the exhaustion of the easy phase of import-substituting industrialisation (and the economic and political instability that resulted) can be distinguished – neo-structuralism and neo-liberalism (Bitar 1988; Sunkel & Zuleta 1990). In some countries there was a firm commitment to one course of action from the outset, in others policy lurched first in one direction and then the other. Nevertheless, for much of the 1970s and 1980s, Latin American economies would be neatly categorised as applying either neo-liberal or neo-structuralist strategies. This classification ignores these early uncertainties (or policy oscillations) and neglects shared characteristics. Initial uncertainties as to the ultimate direction of policy are best illustrated by the Argentinian military regimes of the 1960s and 1970s. Although the term

was not used, the Onganía military government (1966–1969) was committed to industrial deepening. It spoke of the need for structural change and greater efficiency. It also indicated that economic and social “reform” would take precedence over political “reform” and that a return to civilian rule would only be contemplated when the results of economic restructuring would ensure stable, disciplined democracy. The ethos – and much of the language – of the regime prefigured that of the 1976 military *golpe* which removed the discredited administration of Isabel Martínez de Perón (1974–1976). The 1976 military clique instituted the notorious *proceso de reorganización nacional* – another set of rules for the re-ordering of economy and society. However, while the Onganía regime had favoured industrial deepening, partly through the medium of TNCs (in the teeth of opposition from nationalist officers), the *proceso* advocated neo-liberal remedies. The national bourgeoisie had failed to deliver sustained, efficient industrialisation. Firmly committed to the doctrine of national security, the Argentinian armed forces of the 1970s were convinced that industrialisation had simply resulted in a general loss of economic dynamism and the emergence of socially dangerous sectors (P. Lewis 1990; Peralta Ramos 1992).

And, there were substantial similarities between neo-liberalism and neo-structuralism. The first common characteristic, as implied above, was neo-authoritarianism. It was assumed that the shift towards a more accumulationist model could best be accomplished in a closed, highly regulated political environment, thereby depoliticising the economic decision-making process (O'Donnell 1973; Anglade & Fortin 1985, 1990). Virtually from the Southern Cone to Mexico, violence – state terrorism – became an instrument of policy, usually justified as the only means of fighting internal subversion. Defending “western, Christian, democratic values”, the armed forces and the police in a number of countries engaged in kidnappings, “disappearances” and bloody campaigns in town and countryside. Repression served various purposes: opposition was cowed and economic policy formulation isolated from special pleading and compromises that had typified so-called “inclusive populist” regimes of the past. The second characteristic was wage compression. Wage compression assisted accumulation, of critical significance if inflation was no longer to be used as a mechanism of forced savings, and lowered production costs. By reducing domestic production costs and demand, wage contraction made a double contribution to global reinsertion – international competitiveness and export availability. Hence, the third characteristic, international reinsertion – most clearly manifest in massive external indebtedness and, to a lesser extent, export growth. There was a dreadful symmetry in these features.

State violence and economic shock tactics reduced the political effectiveness and influence of those viewed as most able to derail the new project.

The difference between regimes applying neo-liberalism and neo-structuralism are well documented. Neo-structural remedies were applied in slightly less violent political frameworks than the neo-liberal (Smith & Korzeniewicz 1997). Or, possibly, the phase of repression was shorter and less brutal. Moreover, while all neo-authoritarian regimes justified recourse to coercion in order to promote growth with stability, administration applying neo-structural remedies fairly early sought to construct a new political consensus in favour of change. Growth was not the only source of legitimacy, there were explicit references to social policy and promoting “responsible opposition”. These were certainly features of the Brazilian miracle. The Brazilian regime was not alone. In other parts of the continent, “social pacts” sometimes re-appeared on the agenda during the 1970s and 1980s. The most dramatic contractions in wages were observed in Chile and the Argentine during the early-mid 1970s when real wages were virtually halved. Elsewhere cuts were less savage and trends more obscure. Nevertheless, from the mid/late 1960s, there was a general tendency for wages and salaries to fall and the share of national income accruing to wage- and salary-earners to decline (Foxley 1982).

Conceptual and strategy differences between the economics of neo-liberalism and neo-structuralism are similarly well known. While both approaches were designed to remove distortions, neo-liberals extolled the virtues of shock therapy to change structures and expectations: neo-structuralists favoured phased reforms. Neo-liberal measures focused on the micro – the excision of elements that inhibited the impact of real price signals. Neo-structuralists were more concerned about sectoral imbalance and institutional inefficiency. It was argued that markets were far from perfect. On the contrary, there were many examples of market failure in Latin America. The state *could* be an effective generator and allocator of factors. Thus, while neo-structuralists and neo-liberals accepted the need for an efficient state, the former envisaged a continuing, indicative role for government: neo-liberals assumed that government economic action should be minimalist and neutral. By the 1980s, neo-structuralists, not least in Mexico, were arguing that efficiency-raising investment should precede international opening, challenging neo-liberal assumptions that the market would itself foster productivity gains once allowed to function. For neo-structuralist, “social cohesion” remained a policy issue and reducing inequality was a long-term objective, hence the enduring concern with “social pacts”. Neo-liberalism acknowledged that high levels of absolute poverty con-

strained market growth and represented systemic inefficiency but saw social progress resulting from the “trickle down” affects of growth. Above all, neo-structuralists viewed industrialisation as essential for economic development. Neo-liberals were more concerned about maximising comparative advantage and assumed that manufacturing output would grow with the return of macroeconomic stability, in parallel with recovery in other sectors – provided the industrial sector was internationally competitive (Bitar 1988; French-Davis 1973, 1988; Sunkel & Zuleta 1990).

Mexico provides several illustrations of “social pacts”, which took many forms, ranging from formal agreements amongst government, business and workers (for example, the war-time accord during the Ávila Camacho *sexenio* and more structured arrangements of the De La Madrid and Salinas de Gortari presidencies), two specific projects, such as those designed to subsidise the distribution of basic necessities or tailored to the needs of a particular sector or social group. Examples include: the Mexican Food System (SAM/Sistema Alimentario Mexicano); (CONASUPO/Compañía Nacional de Subsistencias Populares); the National Solidarity Programme (PRONASOL/Programa Nacional de Solidaridad); Economic Solidarity Pact (Pacto por Solidaridad Económica); Stability and Economic Growth Pact (PECE/Pacto por la Estabilidad y Crecimiento Económico). Arguably, “stabilising development” may be presented as a “grand social pact”, constructed by government to embrace segments of business and labour. Other examples are the 1973 Three Year Plan in the Argentine and the 1994 Social Pact in Colombia. Social pacts have a vital role to play in processes of economic reactivation with social redistribution within the context of macroeconomic stability, namely of squaring the circle between accumulationist and consumptionist strategies in order to sustain structural modernisation – both economically and politically (Dornbusch & Edwards 1991: 1–2). Other, classic examples of “social pacts” are presented by the heterodox *plan austral* (the Argentine), the *plan de emergencia* (Peru) and *plano cruzado* (Brazil) of the 1980s. For the first time in the history of those countries, a wages and salaries freeze was accompanied by a price freeze, with wages and salaries being set to take account of residual inflation. However, as the experiences of these plans demonstrates, while “entering” a “social pact” may have not been easy, “exiting” was much more problematical.

The connexions between neo-authoritarianism and international liquidity in the 1970s remains a matter of conjecture. Regimes pursuing neo-liberal and neo-structural strategies borrowed abroad and promoted export growth. Deindustrialisation in the Southern Cone republics meant a resurgence of tra-

ditional exports and/or a diversifying mix of new commodities. Further north there was an erratic growth in the participation of manufactures in exports. To what extent this was a direct response to policy measures or a “natural” outcome of macroeconomic change can be questioned. Less open to interpretative debate is the sharp contraction in manufactured output and exports in countries like Chile and the Argentine, following abrupt opening, in contrast to industrial deepening in Mexico and Brazil. It is also clear that, with the debt/loan crisis and the failure of heterodox stabilisation programmes – classically the *plan austral* and *plano cruzado* – in the 1980s, the ground was prepared for the hegemony of the neo-liberal Washington Consensus “remedy” of the 1990s.

Support for heterodoxy in the 1980s can be explained by the domestic political and international economic contexts in which it was applied. Looking back to orthodox stabilisation packages of the 1950s and 1960s, promoted by the IMF, and neo-liberal measures of the 1970s, associated with military governments, proponents of heterodoxy saw clear lessons. Reducing state expenditure (not least by cutting subsidies to consumers and producers) and charging real prices for services, factors and foreign exchange had provoked “corrective” inflation and recession. The result was political protest that compromised the commitment to pursue stabilisation packages to their logical conclusion. Political will collapsed in the face of popular protest or sectional special pleading. These were not attractive propositions for new, democratic governments or authoritarian regimes attempting to open a dialogue with the opposition (Frenkel & O'Donnell 1994; Smith & Korzeniewicz 1997). Consequently, although heterodox policy-makers shared with their orthodox predecessors the received wisdom of the need to stabilise the economy, the task they set themselves was stabilisation with growth rather than stability through recession. Heterodox analysis also viewed inflation somewhat differently from proponents of orthodoxy and structuralism. While their views were closer to those of structuralists, who argued that inflation was occasioned by supply-side bottlenecks, they maintained that orthodox solutions, which envisaged inflation as (almost exclusively) driven by excess demand, were inappropriate by the 1980s because they failed to take account of inflationary expectations. Mechanism such as indexation had institutionalised inertial inflation, which had become built into the system. Inflationary expectations, or inertial inflation, could not be tackled by orthodox remedies such as cutting expenditure, reducing subsidies, and raising taxes and utility charges. Yet, borrowing from neo-liberalism, shock measures were seen as the most effective means of dealing with in-built inflationary pressures.

There were lessons to be learnt from the initial success and ultimate failure of heterodox stabilisation. First, as with successful stabilisation in the 1990s, the return of confidence did not trigger an upsurge in savings, as policy-makers assumed, but a consumption splurge which strained both domestic productive capacity and the reserve position. Neo-liberal reformers of the 1990s were thus made aware of the need to strengthen the reserve position in advance of stabilisation. Substantial reserves facilitated both investment in productive capacity, in the medium-term, and an "import cushion", in the short-term, to dampen inflationary pressure associated with a demand surge. This said, planners in the 1990s found it much easier to accumulate reserves than their predecessors in the 1980s when global recession weakened commodity prices and international capital markets were depressed by debt overhang and manifest a pronounced anti-Latin American bias. The second lesson learnt from the failures of the 1980s by later policy-makers was the need to take prompt action to resolve the fiscal deficit. Regimes applying heterodox policies in the 1980s were more concerned with the political and social deficits than the fiscal position and looked to expand social and economic investment. Perhaps, by the 1990s, earlier failures had induced greater realism or tolerance on the part of electorates. Moreover, the worse of the debt crisis was over by the 1990s. The international financial system had not collapsed – bailed out by first-world tax payers and the poor in the third world. As bank profits rose, inter-governmental agencies and private banks themselves adopted a more relaxed attitude to debt write-down and were anxious become involved in the easy profits to be acquired from debt restructuring and privatisation deals.

From the perspective of the early 21st century, the hegemony of neo-liberal (or neo-conservative) strategies can be confirmed (IDB 1996; Thorp 1998). The "ten commandments" of the Washington Consensus are now well-established: fiscal discipline, reallocation of public expenditure to directly productive activities, tax reform, financial liberalisation, unified and competitive exchange rates, labour market "flexibilisation", trade liberalisation, economic openness, privatisation and deregulation. Yet, the defining characteristic is fiscal discipline. State expenditure must be covered by revenue (or limited borrowing) and not by monetising the public sector deficit. This implies fiscal and budget reform. The tax system has been simplified in many countries and the efficiency of tax gathering improved, not least through a crackdown on evasion. Increasingly, budget reform has involved the devolution of expenditure (and a distribution of revenue) to lower levels of government.

The second major characteristic is deregulation. Internally, this has meant that prices must be determined by the market – progressively legislation has removed from the state the role of fixing (or indicating) prices of factors, goods and services. Externally, it has meant opening the economy: reducing tariffs and simplifying tariff regimes and removing non-tariff barriers to trade; and removing exchange control. Most administrations have sought to peg the rate of exchange though few went as far as the Argentine, anchoring the local currency to the US dollar, and reducing the Central Bank virtually to a currency board. (At the time, the Argentinian government maintained that the Convertibility Plan [1991–2001] introduced a new monetary *system*.) The fall-back position being dollarisation – a solution of last resort that was considered and dismissed in the Argentine around 2000, and remains much disputed in Ecuador.

The third most obvious feature is privatisation. The size of the state sector and its role in the economy has been considerably reduced by the disposal of state corporations. In some countries the role of the central state was curbed by constitutional reform which passed responsibility for social expenditure to the provinces (or, in the case of pension provision, to the market). Privatisation has served a number of objective in addition to state shrinkage and returning economic decision-taking to the market. It removed one of the principal expenditure pressure points – the operating deficits of state corporation that accounted for a substantial portion of the overall fiscal deficit. Privatisation was also used to reduce the debt burden and, where state enterprises had been purchased by foreign consortia, strengthen the process of economic opening. As implied above, economic opening (global reinsertion) was the fourth main feature. This process has been institutionalised not so much by unilateral tariff reform but, as stated, by privatisation and international treaties – including membership of the WTO and adhesion to regional free trade blocs such as the MERCOSUR/L, Andean Group and NAFTA.

A final characteristic was social policy reform – modifying social insurance and healthcare regimes and changes to the labour code (Lewis & Lloyd-Sherlock 2009). Again, these measures were consistent with other “elements of the package”. Changing labour legislation and social insurance regimes implied reducing the role of the state in determining the price (or rather the cost) of labour. With the disposal of state enterprises, financing pensions and healthcare (along with state education) represented the remaining pressure point in the budget. As with the sale of government corporations, “privatising” social serv-

ices was envisaged as a mechanism to return decision-making to the market. It was also projected as a means of depoliticising (or increasing the neutrality of) taxation and expenditure. Social insurance “reform” was also intended to deepen domestic capital markets.

Proponents argued that neo-liberalism were the only alternative for Latin America: applied consistently, the Washington Consensus recipe would facilitate growth with stability and, through sustained growth, greater welfare for the mass of the population. If there is another, defining feature of the 1990s and the continued application of market-friendly policies in the early 21st century, it is that neo-liberal policy were (and continue to be) applied in a democratic or, at least, an electoral framework – even if many emergent democracies remain fragile (Grindle 1996; Weyland 2002). In contrast to other moments of policy change, not least the 1970s or the 1930s, the mass of the population is being periodically provided with an opportunity to comment on policy and, to date, (at least in such countries as Chile, Brazil and Mexico) continues to vote in favour of “market economics”, albeit with a greater emphasis on social programmes that target the poor. Inevitably, the nature of democratic/electoral participation in neo-populist regimes of the 1990s applying neo-liberal programmes, triggered a discussion about the re/construction of civil society, citizenship, civil rights and the forging of a political market place – alongside the economic (Diamond, Linz & Lipset 1989; Smith, Acuña & Gamarra 1993; Weyland 2002). In Northian terms, does this point to the consolidation of an institutional framework endowed with a capacity to demonstrate – and deliver – credible commitment?

There is little doubt that macroeconomic stabilisation, not least policy elements such as privatisation, has radically changed the environment within which business operates. However, the road to stabilisation, sustained growth and, indeed, privatisation was far from smooth and the process hardly linear. There was much back-sliding (ideological and actual). Yet, the history of stabilisation and structural adjustment suggests that macroeconomic stability and the creation of more space for the private sector was welcomed (in principle) by virtually all sectors of the domestic entrepreneuriat. However, the consequences of fiscal discipline (namely reduced state subsidies) and economic opening were not always as warmly embraced. There were challenges and costs as well as gains for the business community. The gains were clear enough: new-found macroeconomic stability reduced market uncertainty, often resulted in fairly rapid growth and promised future wealth gains. However, stability also implied new uncertainties – competition. Prices became real – for consumers (who

became more discriminating) as well as firms. Competition meant that mechanisms previously employed to limit the old uncertainties (for example, price-fixing, and good, old-fashioned corruption or “capture” of the state) no longer work. Echoing Chandler (1990), Kosacoff argues that enterprises have to adjust in scope and organisation to meet the challenges of the market (Kosacoff 2000: 176–177) Do changes in scope and scale signal the emergence of a dynamic industrial capitalism?

And there was the issue of timing and sequence. How much support was government prepared to offer the domestic business community to modernise before liberal financial and trade policies were fully implemented? Moreover, increasingly during the 1990s, the role of the “capable state” in sustaining the new model – through constructive microeconomic policy and social measures designed to ease the pain of adjustment and promote socio-political to buttress change – came to be recognised. After stabilisation and structural reform, is the state becoming involved in social reengagement to “fix” support for the market in a period of continuing global uncertainty? This may be so in such countries as Chile, Brazil and Mexico, though hardly in others like Venezuela and Bolivia where remedies of the 1990s have been rejected, and increasing international volatility, notwithstanding the “China effect”, regarded in much the same light as externally induced shocks in the inter-war period.

Conclusion

Institutionalists present two scenarios in which change may occur. The first assumes a profound shock to the system: either an endogenous shock, for example the Mexican Revolution, or a shock from without, such as the first world war or the inter-war depression. The second scenario occurs when organisations agree that an existing institutional arrangement is no longer working and that change is essential. In the latter case, restructuring may result from a reconstruction – from within – of relationships amongst organisations, possibly involving the inclusion of new groups. The formation of the populist state after 1930 has traditionally been presented as signalling a rupture. The old order was destroyed by the inter-war depression, which undermined oligarchic organisations and allowed new social formations to establish a novel structure. This view may be challenged. The proto-populist state should rather be seen as an internal adjustment of the old order as existing groups accommodated/absorbed elements – notably urban sectors – challenging the system.

There was an *appearance* of change in institutional arrangements but the constellation of players remained much the same, at least initially. How may the neo-authoritarian order (which gave way to the neo-liberal) be viewed? Arguably, the neo-authoritarian order reflected a last-ditch effort by powerful organisations to preserve the substance of the old system while neo-liberalism represents a growing prevalence of the view amongst extant organisations that the old institutional structure could not be sustained and that a new arrangement had to be agreed upon.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, effective integration into the world commercial and financial system transformed Latin America, promoting institutional change on several fronts. Some of these were anticipated and welcomed, or relatively easily accommodated, others were not. For example, foreign immigrants were embraced as workers, settlers and vectors of social and ethnic “modernisation” but not when they introduced ideologies and practices that challenged dominant arrangements or when their consumption patterns and desire to remit funds threatened the external accounts. Similarly, foreign capital was much appreciated, save when clustered in key sectors or when foreign bankers, bondholders or investors voiced adverse opinions about host states or clamoured for home government action.

The first “globalisation” of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and second of the late twentieth, offered opportunities and posed challenges for states in Latin America. The gains from international insertion were not, however, shared equitably by all sectors or by all countries. Was this because some areas were but imperfectly integrated into the world economy, because international markets were inherently unstable and moving against Latin American producers or were the rules of the game rigged against Latin American players? There were certainly considerable differences in the export and general economic performance of the Latin American economies during the period of oligarchic liberalism. It is equally clear that economic “liberalism” as practised in end-of-the-nineteenth-century Latin America was far from orthodox. States intervened in the economy both to promote the formation of markets and to influence them.

The inter-war depression had a profound impact on the Latin American economies. It was inevitable that, as in other areas, the crash would influence the economic policy debate and its ideological underpinning – as well as outcomes. The immediate consequence was not a policy revolution nor a quest for novel solutions. By the end of the decade, social and economic policies may be depicted as innovative, were largely internally coherent and tended to be ap-

plied with a degree of consistency. In the main, however, it would be erroneous to depict measures of this period as proto-import-substituting industrialisation. In many cases, policy regimes were increasingly counter-cyclical (though deficit spending was not a continental phenomenon), designed to promote aggregate domestic demand growth – to reactivate economies so as to prevent market collapse. Regulatory agencies and mechanism of interventionism multiplied. Economic internalisation – endogenising growth mechanisms – was successfully accomplished and facilitated recovery, largely to the benefit of existing companies. These interventionist measures were welcomed by most business groups, notably those producing tangible goods and services for domestic markets.

Between the late 1940s and the 1970s, industrialisation was the principal objective of government policy throughout the region. During this period all economies embraced import-substitution. In some cases, such as Brazil, Mexico and the Southern Cone republics, industrialisation may already have been underway before the process was dignified with the intellectual imprimatur of *cepalismo*. Other countries, like Colombia and Cuba were late-comers, only fully absorbing the ideology in the 1960s, precisely at the moment when the paradigm was being challenged. The main policy instruments of Latin American developmentalism were distortion of the domestic terms of trade in favour of manufacturing, an overvalued (unstable) exchange rate, negative or low real rates of interest and protectionism. The main features of the period were, for most economies, fairly rapid growth, absolute welfare gains and inflation. The language of policy was nationalist and statist but economic policy was not anti-capitalism nor autarchic. Increasingly, the exchange rate was allowed to take the strain of development strategy. Opportunities for rent-seeking multiplied, to the benefit of preferred sectors of the business community – at least in the medium term.

Volatility in the external and fiscal accounts underwrote the lurch towards neo-structuralism and neo-liberalism in the late 1960s and early 1970s. By this stage, “stabilising development” was perceived to be giving way to socially destabilising political protest, the most obvious manifestations of which were urban terrorism in the Argentine and Uruguay, rural discontent in many regions, the fear of civil war in Chile in 1973 and the onset of conflict in Central America as discredited traditional authoritarian regimes found it impossible to stem protest by the politically excluded. It had proved impossible to move from “unbalanced growth” to “stabilising development”.


The emergent appeal of neo-liberalism after the mid-1980s was also associated with violence, not least economic violence triggered by failed hetero-

doxy. Hyperinflation, even more than the institutionalised terrorism of the late 1960s and 1970s, destroyed the alliances that had administered the post-second world war developmentalist and neo-developmental projects. By the end of the 1980s, the international environment had also changed. The apparent ending (or easing) of the debt crisis and the collapse of communism in Europe and Africa seemed to validate the vitality of the global capitalist system. Certainly, the influence of the “Washington agencies” increased.

Whether the new economic model can be sustained remains a matter of debate. Neo-liberal economy, tempered by social redistributionism, has demonstrably survived in Chile and Brazil, in the face of a transition from centre-right to centre-left governments, and notwithstanding patterns of income distribution that remain highly inequitable. In Mexico, too, and equally in the face of historic levels of income inequality, the basics of the economic project of the 1990s broadly continues – perhaps unsurprisingly as the “party of developmentalism” (the PRI) has been substituted by the “party of business (the PAN). Nevertheless, as Latin America moves decidedly into the post-Washington Consensus era, and as recent events in Venezuela and Bolivia demonstrates, powerful forces can be marshalled against the remedies of the 1990s that promised growth with stability and equality, but tended to deliver growth with volatility and increasing inequality – even when overall levels of absolute welfare improved. The dominance of the neo-liberal (or neo-conservative) economic model in the 1990s derived from the failure of heterodoxy – the last attempt at neo-structural solutions to the loss of dynamism exhibited by strategies of “easy” forced industrialisation – and the debt/loan crisis that consolidated international reinsertion. As the global environment becomes more uncertain in the early 21st century, it remains to be seen which of the new “leftist” models will gain ascendancy in Latin America: a resurgent *cepalismo auténtico* that deploys the rhetoric of doctrinaire statism, or “democratic social market economics” founded on economic internationalism.

During the last seventy years there have also been substantial welfare gains, notwithstanding increasing inequity. Growth from the 1930s to the 1970s disproportionately benefited the upper and middle classes and organised labour, the urban sector and manufacturing interests. Whether countries applying post-Washington Consensus market economics will observe gains for a wider spectrum of the population, and result in greater equality remains a matter of debate – though indicators for Brazil and Chile since c. 2005 have been positive. Proponents of the new economic model, and its post-Washington Consensus variant, maintained that inflation was the principal cause of

poverty and inequality. If so, it follows that ending inflation has prevented conditions deteriorating further. Echoing early nineteenth-century liberals, the current market orthodoxy presents the market as a force for social peace, political harmony and material abundance. Hence, the shift from “supporting business” to “supporting the market” and facilitating the social and economic incorporation of the poor into the market. In this sense, similarities between some of the rhetoric of late nineteenth-century and late twentieth-century liberalism mask a fundamental difference. The market is now conceived in terms that are much “larger”, relatively and absolutely, and engagement with it more inter-active or participatory. If the mass of nineteenth-century rural workers produced for the market but did not consume from it, their early 21st-century counterparts are envisaged as in and of the market. If nineteenth-century liberalism was pragmatic and (largely) concerned with the economic, at least in terms of the language of the discourse, since the 1990s considerably greater emphasis has been placed on the economics and the politics of participation. In short there is an emphasis on the necessary proximation of engagement in the economic and political market places.



PATRICIO VALDIVIESO

The State and National Economy in Latin America

Presentation

The state in Latin America is a political unit with sovereignty over a territory. It represents a population, and consists of a set of institutions with authority to make the rules that govern the society. The national economy as a social system of production and distribution of goods and services is one important dimension of the society and its culture. For example, regarding free market mechanisms, the institutions of the state have the responsibility to establish satisfactory conditions for the national economy, such as fair competition, low inflation, guarantees of rights (not only property, but also economic and social rights), and social welfare. In Latin America the role of the state includes the provision of conditions and incentives for economic growth, better distribution of wealth and opportunities for human development, as well as strengthening the ability to progress in a very complex and dynamic international order amid increased internationalisation and globalisation. The state should seek reasonable ways to integrate the economic dimensions into a social system, where the principal goals are human development and social welfare (Valdivieso 2002).

In spite of the macroeconomic performance and economic growth in Latin America in the last two decades (Noriega 2009), some characteristic features of underdevelopment, such as inequality, poverty, and insecurity, continue to be the main obstacles to a better future in the region.

According to the information and evaluation of scholars and specialised international agencies, Latin America remains one of the most iniquitous regions in the world (Dion 2007; socioeconomic indicators in Comisión Económica para América Latina 2008). The gap between rich and poor continues to increase and nearly 25% of the population lives on less than USD 5 per day. One dimension of poverty is unequal access to basic goods and services, e. g.

sanitary conditions and education (Vidal 2008; Yoshioka 2009). The quality of many private and public services remains low, and social violence is increasing. Nevertheless, the majority of countries have a normative framework that provides rational economic policies and welfare. However, the practical conditions for development and human security are very low; poverty, social exclusion and inequalities are formidable obstacles. Furthermore, the participation of important social sectors in the social and political system is decreasing, and there are many places where the political and institutional conditions are dangerous and the governments do not have enough capability to exercise the sovereignty needed in their territories (Morrison et al. 2003; Kirby 2003, 108–122; Valdivieso 2006). In several places, the public institutions do not work regularly, the expanding corruption affects the trust of the population and violence is dominant. For instance, political practices inspired by market theories and democracy are not possible. Therefore, there is a high degree of uncertainty and insecurity with respect to the future. In consequence, the main task of the state in Latin America is to search for ways to overcome these features, and integrate domestic economic growth and globalisation in a social and institutional order with justice sustainable for future generations.

This study argues that the current contradictions and tensions in Latin America are a consequence of legacies of certain specific patterns and experiences of development since the time of colonisation in the sixteenth century. Marginalisation and social exclusion, restricted autonomy, lack of stability, and lack of consolidated democracies are some of the current conditions in Latin America that are a result of long historical precedents. Historical tradition, especially the conquest and colonisation of Latin America by the Spanish and Portuguese, helps to explain how some of these factors came to exist and persist; the historical legacy of colonisation has had many consequences for Latin America: the transfer of European institutions, which influence everything from urbanisation to religion and culture, measures which separated the natives from the colonists, and a conservative social structure that is very difficult to change. Authoritarian traditions and economic dependence on commodities are further legacies and practices from the colonial period. In the nineteenth century, the application of liberal economic principles produced a radical transformation of living conditions in Latin America. Liberalism's positive legacies included foreign trade and external investments. On the other hand, liberalism reinforced the status of Latin America as a peripheral region in the international order – very dependent on foreign capital and technologies. In

Table 1. Socioeconomic indicators in Latin America, 2005–2009

Country	Population in millions (2009)	Gross domestic product per capita in USD (2007)	Poverty in % (2005, 2006, 2007)
Argentina	40 134	9 396.3	
Bolivia	10 227	1 090.2	54
Brazil	197 592	4 216.5	30.3
Chile	16 933	6 126.5	13.7
Colombia	47 282	2 843.1	46.8
Costa Rica	4 623	5 085.1	18.6
Dominican Republic	10 030	3 464.1	44.5
Ecuador	14 001	1 624.2	42.6
El Salvador	7 339	2 252.4	47.5
Guatemala	14 017	1 665.5	54.8
Honduras	7 468	1 420.4	68.9
Mexico	108 896	7 093.7	31.7
Nicaragua	5 751	884.9	61.9
Panama	3 444	5 205.6	29
Paraguay	6 341	1 466.5	60.5
Peru	28 536	2 750.9	44.5
Uruguay	3 352	7 255.1	
Venezuela	28 362	5 788.6	28.5
América Latina y el Caribe	586 590	4 732.3	34.1

Sources: CELADE: Centro Latinoamericano y Caribeño de Demografía, División de Población de la CEPAL: Revisión 2006. Base de datos de población; D. POB. N.U.: División de Población de las Naciones Unidas; CEPAL: Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe: División de Estadística y Proyecciones Económicas. Unidad de Estadísticas Sociales (www.cepal.cl).

modern Latin America, socialist ideology and Catholic social teachings were incorporated into many of the policies of Latin American governments. The major achievements of Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) were higher GDP growth rates in Latin America during the periods 1945–1972 and 1972–1981 than had been achieved before or since, and faster growth of GDP per capita. However, ISI reinforced structural problems for development (protective barriers, lack of effectiveness, high-cost production, more dependence). Neoliberalism opened the markets, strengthened the private sector and reformulated the relationship between state and national economy. Through neoliberal policies, Latin America may have inserted itself better into the world economy

through globalisation, but with high social costs. Currently, Latin America needs stronger states with capabilities of providing essential functions, and there are four important related tasks: economic growth, social equality, redesign of public institutions, and democratisation of democracy. The goals of the new reforms are: an increase in state regulations, a decrease in poverty and social development, and decentralisation of government leading to more local government for more input from citizens. In present-day Latin America, there is a new approach to the connection between the state and the national economy through reforms: reforms should aspire to respect and promote human beings and their rights; public institutions should adapt their structures to social and economic needs through greater participation and decentralisation; a consensus between public actors and civil society is essential; the follow-up function of citizens and their organisations is crucial for implementation and efficiency.

In the first part of this study, we present the main consensus on the requirement to lead the national economy to support human development in contemporary Latin America. We then continue by presenting the historical models of development and their legacies for the region: colonial and Enlightenment, liberalism, socialism, social-Catholicism, industrialisation, neo-liberalism, and the influence of US policies. In our conclusion, we summarise the positive and negative legacies of the past models, and present and conceptualise the current state policies for reform and modernisation in Latin America as a serious effort to structure the economy in a socio-political order centred on human development and social welfare.

This study summarises the results of a long period of research on the state and the national economy in Latin America. I first want to acknowledge the financial support that made the research possible: National Fund for the Development of Science and Technology in Chile (Fondecyt), number 1071073; the Catholic University of Chile, Committee on Research of Public Policies Program and FONDEDUC supported me with various grants throughout the early stages of my research. I presented portions of this study at many conferences, seminars and courses, where I received comments. Three seminars in particular – the semester-long Internet Seminar “Neoliberalismus versus Neostukturalismus” at Catholic University and Universität Tübingen (1997), led by Harald Barrios and Patricio Valdivieso (see <http://tiss.zdv.uni-tuebingen.de/webroot/sp/barrios/index.html>), the week-long International Seminar at the universities Santa Cruz, Federal do Rio Grande do Sul and Luterana do Brasil (December 2001), and a seminar-workshop at the Polish Institute for International Affairs (December 2007), were particularly helpful to me in revising and

improving manuscripts related to the topics of this study. I also wish to thank those students who took my course about models of development in Latin America at Duke University (spring 2008).

Human development as the principal task for the state and the national economy

The state and the national economy make sense if their goal is the promotion of the human being in both an individual and a collective dimension. The main motive of its economic policies and development programs should be the progress and welfare of the majority of the people, for the people and by the people. The task includes providing adequate economic, socio-political, institutional, and cultural conditions for the development of the human being. A growing consensus about human development and the tasks of the public sector has developed worldwide in recent decades. Regarding this idea, there are diverse local, national, and international initiatives to improve domestic and international conditions in the area of human development and security. The concept of human development brings together several efforts in the academic world and in the United Nations. The conceptualisation includes all conditions that promote human capacities, so that every person can be an architect of their own development in their collective and individual dimensions, including “human life”, “liberty”, and “competencies” for progress and a better future. The concept of human development and its characteristics are sustainable for the following reasons: first, they synthesise political, philosophical, and religious principles with a broad consensus in our time; second, they express essential principles for the stability of constitutions and institutions in the modern world; third, they find clear support in the international community of states and nations (see for example Carta Democrática Interamericana at <http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/Basicos15.htm>, 20.03.2009). The meaning of human development and its characteristics suggest that all conditions that promote life, liberty, social well-being, and development of and by the people, will enrich societies and the international system. Consequently, the promotion of human development is not only a matter of socio-economic and individual conditions, it is also related to social structures, political life, institutions, and political culture, and should be the main goal of the state.

In the contemporary world, since the end of the cold war (the 1990s), international forces have worked energetically to promote the economic poli-

cies of countries, development, democracy and social participation. The most powerful and influential international actors in the world, such as governments of industrialised countries, and international organisations dealing with issues including security, finance, and international cooperation, have supported initiatives that promote economic and social development and exercise of rights of peoples as agencies in different countries (Hastedt 2005: 285–290). As a result of these efforts, there are several policies and programs that promote human development.

Everything mentioned so far constitutes an important frame of reference in the discussion of the task of the state in relation to the national economy in Latin America and its strategies. In this region, living conditions for the majority are precarious (low income and education level, etc.). In synthesis, we can argue that the policies of states and national economies should focus on human development.

Legacies of European discovery, conquest and Enlightenment in the contemporary situation in Latin America

Conquest

Latin America has had an important place in global discussion on development and international cooperation. This fact is a consequence of extended poverty, marginalisation, social exclusion and racial discrimination, lack of opportunities, restricted autonomy by the intervention of external powers, and poorly consolidated democracies. Numerous intellectuals, politicians, and critics of Latin America believe that the region is composed of pre-modern societies which do not have the capacity to begin a process of sustainable development. It has been noted that the political culture is extremely authoritarian, centralist, and not inclusive, and that the society is segmented and not integrated (Wiarda et al. 1996). When asked about the causes that explain such perspectives and evaluations, scholars have pointed the finger at the legacies of colonisation from Spain and Portugal. Since the nineteenth century, many people have admired the progress achieved in other regions of the world, especially Western Europe and the United States of America. They have blamed the Spanish and Portuguese, though, for the poor results in Latin America. Two examples from

the first half of the nineteenth century were the Argentinean publicist Domingo Faustino Sarmiento (1861) and the Chilean publicist José Victorino Lastarria (1844). Consequently, the conquest and colonisation of Latin America by the Spanish and the Portuguese were the first cause of underdevelopment by these people.

The first legacy of these European countries is the basic economic structure, social order, and culture that were transferred to Latin America. Spain and Portugal transferred a socio-economic feudal order and authoritarian political culture that were difficult to change (Barros Arana 1865). Although the Iberian world had marked feudal characteristics, they were different from other places in Europe because of their long war for the recovery of territories occupied by the Arabs. In the territories that fell under control of the Christian kingdoms, the feudal social structure was reinforced by the practices of placing the captive Arabic population among the conquerors. The Arabs were legally under the control of the Crown, and at the same time were servants of the representatives of the Crown. In the economic dimension, they brought economic institutions and forms of production, such as highly regulated agriculture, cattle, mining, handcrafts, and commerce. In this feudal society, aspirations for social mobility did not exist because people were born and remained with the same social status for their whole lives. In these times, Latin America's feudal society reflected the pattern of the authoritarian state that had emerged in the Iberian Peninsula: a hereditary state, an absolute monarchy that governed with the nobility of military origin, together with the hierarchy of the church. Culturally, there were notable aspects that reinforced the feudal social order in Iberian and Latin America, among them parochial culture, intolerance, and discrimination (Bataillon 1978; Paz 1982). After centuries of cultural coexistence, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries Christian Iberian culture became intolerant, and everything that appeared to be a threat for unity was considered suspicious and destroyed. Second, the Iberians' perception of the world was focused only on Europe and parts of Asia and Africa, and they assumed that the civilised world was divided between Christians and Pagans (barbaric); Christianity was identified as a model of civilisation. Therefore, in times of geographical discoveries and colonisation overseas, the Iberian societies had a strong prejudice against other cultures, and thought their own culture superior.

The type of state colonisation used by the Iberian monarchies explains a social and cultural heritage which was difficult to change (Valdivieso 1994). Castile and Portugal were the first states that conquered territories outside of

Europe and colonised the native population. At the beginning, both states, Castile and Portugal, had the experience of colonisation in the Atlantic Ocean islands and on the coast of Africa, where their actions were limited to the formation of commercial factories, without colonising the native population. Slavery was practised in order to provide labour. The first experience in the Americas was the colonisation of the Canary Islands in the Atlantic (1470). In these islands, the new Iberian state created by the monarchs Isabel of Castile and Fernando of Aragon made the decision to colonise territories and not European populations, deciding to establish direct state control on the Canarian land and on their inhabitants. It was the first experience of colonisation outside the Iberian territories. At that time, the rulers organised a new state in their European territories. For this reason, they looked favourably on the fact that the Christian perspective became dominant and intolerant of other beliefs and cultures (Muslim, Jewish, etc.). The monarchy wanted cultural and political unity of their population in their empire, so minorities were not tolerated and were forced to be assimilated, to become Christian or leave the Iberian territories. The monarchy desired consolidation of their state and power in both places, inside the Iberian territories and outside in the new colonised territories. During this era, the University of Salamanca was an academic centre with enormous influence inside and outside of the Iberian Peninsula. Scholars at Salamanca wrote about arguments to support the modern absolute state, and to work for an international order of nations. Their analysis reflected their interest in understanding the many changes that were occurring at the time. One well-known author was the Dominican Francisco de Vitoria, whose lectures on theology were very influential. In the Canary Islands and in Latin America, the monarchy were in favour of the evangelisation and assimilation (Christianisation and acculturation) of the native population, that is, their conversion into loyal Christians, like the farmers in Iberia. Because the monarchy prohibited the practice of slavery from the beginning, the goal of the native populations was the conversion of their beliefs to those of Christianity. The desire of the monarchy to have unity and control in the new territories made the use of tools for control necessary to consolidate the state. For this reason, the monarchy was very interested in the development of official colonial policies, and during this stage began a process of regulation in the territories of the monarchy. Numerous activities and rights regarding the use of land quickly became regulated, and this became another legacy in society and culture. After the conquest of the American territories, the monarchy operated through capitulations (*capitulaciones*). These agreements were stipulations for discovery

and conquest, where the rights and the obligations of the conquerors were described. Through this instrument, the monarchy was always considered as the proprietary of the countries and populations of the conquests. The groups of conquerors (*huestes de conquista*), who organised the voyages of discovery and colonised territories and people, were not private entrepreneurs. The conquerors did not make plans to build factories. The *huestes* did not have absolute freedom because of the regulations of the monarchy. Their activities were based on territorial rights and rights over the native populations under the control of the monarchy. According to the *capitulaciones* as agreements to colonise the conquerors had to colonize territories with Europeans, create cities according to the urban model of the Iberian Peninsula, and practice the same kind of agriculture as in Europe. In time, the *capitulaciones* and *ordenanzas* became more detailed, and strictly regulated several aspects of life in the colonies (König 1998). Hernán Cortés, the conqueror of the territories of the would-be state of Mexico, received a set of ordinances in 1523, with instructions on the names that should be given to geographical places, with the criteria to establish cities, the architectural form, and instructions on the treatment and protection of the native populations. Pedro de Valdivia, who conquered (1541) the territories of the would-be state of Chile, without having received a prior “capitulation”, tried to legalise his occupation of the territory. He requested that Emperor Charles V recognise every territory belonging to the monarchy. In the letters of the conquest of the would-be Chile that Valdivia sent to the emperor, he tried to convince the monarch of the advantages of controlling the territory and population, the creation of cities, the promotion of European agriculture, and the evangelisation of the native population. Hernán Cortés used the *repartimientos* and *encomiendas* – systems for the labour done by the natives – not only to abuse the natives, but also as a mechanism to improve the situation of the governed territory. The natives of the labour force under the conquerors had to work in agriculture, mining, public services, etc. The forced labour system benefited the territories of the monarchy.

What were the consequences of the colonisation and Europeanisation models in America? First, the transfer of institutions and the European lifestyle to the American territories; second, the formation of a legacy of more than 500 years on the continent that would influence everything: urbanisation, bureaucratic-state organisation, legalism, lack of clear distinction between public and private interests, social structure, productive systems, culture, and religion. The colonisation had some positive effects for the future development of Latin America: the regulations of the monarchy on the colonisation and the eco-

conomic interests of the conquerors promoted the diffusion of European products, especially vegetables and animals. These had a multiplier effect on the development of transactions and productive activities. For example, the entire population of the American territories enriched its diet with new products (see facts and data in Bulmer-Thomas 2006; Bauer 2008). The ordinances and instructions of the monarchy stimulated the mining industry, systems of transportation and communications, and commerce. The same ordinances clearly indicated how the Europeans should live, in cities, for couples and families, and how they should manage education (schools and universities). With the goal of implementing and monitoring their political decisions, the monarchy created a bureaucratic-administrative apparatus like those in other kingdoms of Europe. The monarchy did not have any other option to control the territories and reinforce their development program in the American regions. It was the one and only possibility to consolidate political control in America because of the distance between the Iberian Peninsula and the American territories. Therefore, the bureaucratic apparatus took control of the American territories by removing the conquerors through force or persuasion. For this reason a second conquest is often referred to: the first one was the conquest of the conquerors, the second was the conquest of the state over the conquerors and territories. The facts lead us to the conclusion that the monarchy – through the framework of the process of formation of the state in the Iberian Peninsula – practised a genuine program for colonisation whose objectives were more than exploitation (Pietschmann 1980). The state wanted control of the conquered regions, first through regulations and norms, and afterwards through direct control over the territories and control of all important human relations in their societies.

Christianisation in the new territories to be civilised was a way to achieve control in the long run. The monarchy formulated policies to control the native population with serious consequences for social conditions in Latin America. In the period of discovery and the first colonisations, until the end of the fifteenth century, the monarchy authorised the work of the natives in the mines and in agriculture, and labour institutions (*repartimientos* and “commissions”) were created in America. The conversion to Christianity, the imposition of a lifestyle as vassals, and the labour which benefited the conquerors represented a radical change in their living conditions. In the following Instructions of the year 1503 for the administration of Española Island, the monarchy declared: “For the salvation of the Indian, it was necessary that the Indians be distributed into towns, that they live together, that they should not walk in the mountains, and

that they should have their houses inhabited with their women and children, and that they should have agriculture to work" (König 1998: 25). What did the monarchy intend by these instructions? That the native people should live like European peasants (married, with children, in towns, working in agriculture). This goal was possible only through a European re-education process. From the perspective of the native inhabitants of America these obligations were absurd because they were forced to live like aliens in regard to their own lifestyle and traditions. Of course it was not usual to live in towns, with individual houses, with nuclear families, doing agricultural work and stockbreeding like in Europe.

One of the main instruments of civilisation was urbanisation; through their ordinances and official supervision, the monarchy ordered the creation of towns and cities with authorities, representatives of the state and Church, who had the task to control, re-educate, and Christianise. At the same time, officials were to control abuses against the natives (König 2006). In the beginning, the monarchy thought that joining the life of the natives to that of the colonists would be positive, because the natives would benefit from the lifestyle of the colonists and embrace it. However, in time, and as a result of a debate regarding atrocities in the American territories, the monarchy became aware that joining these two different lifestyles was not working out. To protect the native population, the official policy became division of races (New Laws of 1542), and the mission of re-education of the natives remained in the hands of the missionaries and officials. From this native population, the monarchy wanted to see cultural assimilation and education of good vassals. Measures were taken to weaken the control by the conquerors over the natives; their education was assigned to the missionaries, the labour system was regulated, native towns (communities) were formed. All of these measures separated the natives from the colonists. Thanks to these policies, in many regions of the continent the Indian communities maintained similar structures to those of the pre-Hispanic period (family and community with a central role), and languages and native traditions survived (Trojan 2008). On the other hand, these policies led to a limited autonomy which corresponded to the image that the Europeans had of them: under age, in need of protection, represented by Spanish officials or missionaries, and able to reach the status of other subjects only by means of re-education. From the time of independence, when protection by the monarchy came to an end, the Indian population became very vulnerable, not well-integrated, and poor (Menjívar 2008).

Enlightenment and independence

In the eighteenth century, the Enlightenment became one of the most influential intellectual movements in Latin America. Politically, the Enlightenment had two manifestations: liberal and absolutist Enlightenment. In the liberal Enlightenment, the society and state were conceived as a result of a contract, an agreement among individuals with previous rights to any associate-political institution, who do not renounce those rights (from John Locke). Consequently, the main goal of the state was to protect those rights, and as a result they needed a constitution and institutions to guarantee the rights and the work of the state. On the other hand, the absolutist Enlightenment defended the principle of the divine origin of political authority, namely the monarchy. At the same time, the absolutist Enlightenment justified the absolute power of the monarchy because of the actions in favour of the people: sound management of the economy, modernisation of the state and its functions (political-administrative rationalisation), incentive for sciences and general progress of the country. These ideas motivated practical actions by rulers in the eighteenth century: state reforms to enlarge the degree of centralisation and to increase their efficiency (specialised bureaucracy, administrative system, armies, public finances, etc.), incentives for manufactures and urbanisation, among others. Economically there were two variants of the Enlightenment, free trade and mercantilism (protectionism).

The Enlightenment arrived in Latin America in the eighteenth century through the absolutism of the Spanish and Portuguese monarchy (the Bourbons). They initiated a period of profound economic and political reforms focused on a rationalisation of administration of their territories, with significant implications for the later development of the region. The Enlightenment was also present in the intellectual movement of natives, who carried out their independence and practised the first development strategies in the new national states (Lynch 1989).

The Spanish and Portuguese monarchies wanted to rationalise and modernise the administration of their territories through a division of labour of the different regions of the Empire for more efficient exploitation. In so doing, Latin America became the "colony" and "periphery" of the empire. Latin America was to have a productive function for supplies and commodities, and be a market for the manufactured products of the Metropolis. In 1778, the Spanish Empire, like Portugal, dictated regulations for free trade, with the aim of ending the contraband of foreigners in their American territories. Furthermore

they wanted to stimulate internal trade and increase taxes through a larger commercial flow. The mining industry, the main area of Latin-American export, received incentives through the elimination of taxes on production, technical missions, and abolition of monopolies to induce the investment of the natives. Agriculture also received incentives, especially the production of agricultural goods to export (tobacco, cocoa, wheat, animal products, etc.). The policies of the monarchy, especially free trade, produced economic diversification, and increased production and exports, but also in the long run produced a dependence on commodities. Some regions were favoured over others, and manufacturers did not receive incentives from official policies because the Europeans only wanted the expansion of their own manufactured products (Villalobos 1990). Geographically, the trade expansion favoured regions that during the previous period had been completely insignificant, such as Cuba in the Caribbean, the Oriental Band on the Atlantic South American coast (Argentina and Uruguay), Chile, and the Caribbean sector of Venezuela. Those regions now had the advantage of being specialised in products that were in demand internationally (sugar, dairy and meat products, cocoa and other tropical products). Many handmade products were seriously affected due to the trade liberalisation because they were in no state to compete with the European manufactures (better quality and prices).

The administrative and political reforms aimed to change traditional relations which became dominated by the local interests of Latin America. During the eighteenth century, the metropolitan authorities began to send specified officials, loyal to the monarchy, to protect their interests against local groups, to collect taxes efficiently and guarantee defence. The monarchy created new viceroalties (*virreinos*) and general headquarters (*capitanías generales*) to improve the system of defence and stop the contraband carried out by foreigners (especially in the zones of Sacramento, the Caribbean, South of Chile, etc.). The Bourbon Monarchy eliminated a series of special privileges of the Church, especially the secular and religious corporations. Their final goal was to weaken the influence of the powerful American elite groups and consolidate their own power.

One can identify clear legacies in Latin America from the period of absolutism: for instance, the inclusion of Latin America in international markets solely as commodity producers and consumers of manufactured goods and technologies. Politically, absolutism created an ideal order for progress in Latin America with direct influence on future authoritarian governments (governments of the people, but without participation from them). In absolutism it is possible to

identify the origin of Latin American political practices to carry out modernisations from the head of the political system, without significant participation from the people.

The pattern of Enlightenment in the first development strategies of the new Latin American states and consequences, 1810–1830

The ideas of the Enlightenment supported a program whose goals were to reach a similar level of development as those of the European models (France and England) and the USA. The plan consisted of an application of a program with political, economical, and social reforms. The political reform included the introduction of modern institutions, representative institutions based on the principle of popular sovereignty, republics as associations of equal citizens, written constitutions with prescriptions on the separation of powers to guarantee fundamental rights. The economic reforms provided measures for the improvement of free trade, elimination of the restrictions for free markets and stimuli to facilitate the use of natural resources with modern technologies. The social reforms aimed to eliminate the institutions which neglected the idea of human dignity and equality, for example slavery, special taxes on the native population, protection of particular interests of religious corporations, titles, etc. These policies were consistent with the belief in equality of the citizens before the law. The first independent governments implemented a program of free trade reforms, allowing external trade for new ports, elimination of taxes on production, introduced constitutions that declared their countries republics, based on the principle of popular sovereignty, division of powers to guarantee individual rights and equality before the law, elimination of institutions that were against the principle of equality (slavery, special taxes, noble titles, unjustified primogenitures, etc.); new educational institutions, societies, libraries and a press to diffuse knowledge (Tobler et al. 1994).

Unfortunately, the expected prosperity after independence did not occur because the new states were drained by the enormous efforts to finance the wars of emancipation. As a result, the new states had many debts, and the recovery of exports was very slow. Because of this, free trade reforms were not successful. On the contrary, the new states began to receive a great quantity of good quality imports, which affected local producers, especially the traditional manufactures. The majority of the new states did not have common interests, and the political and social elites were divided. There were groups that com-

peted in imposing their ideas regarding political order, thus producing civil wars and authoritarian regimes. In summary, the period immediately after independence was characterised by economic stagnation, political instability, chaos, and authoritarian leaders. The Enlightenment was not successful, and most of the new states did not experience a real revolution, and continued colonial era practices or fell into long periods of chaos. This situation had high costs for Latin American countries, producing stagnation, and the loss of opportunities for progress by the economies and societies. In comparison to other countries, which were modernising, in Europe and North America, Latin American societies remained poor and underdeveloped.

Liberalism, socialism, and Catholicism

Liberalism

Liberalism, a middle-class movement for liberalisation that developed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, competed with other political and intellectual actors, such as socialism, social Catholic teaching, anarchism, conservatism and fascism, for a place leading development. In the economic sphere, liberalism claims to guarantee free initiatives by people, free activities, free enterprises, and freedom of work without restrictions. All artificial tax burdens on economic activities should be eliminated (for example, union and corporate privileges). The state should not intervene in economic activity. The natural laws of supply and demand should act in its place. Liberalism required an open society for the free development of the people. It therefore promoted the elimination of barriers that did not permit social mobility and limited individual development (barriers such as rigid social classes, diverse forms of unjustified control, dictatorship of particular interests, etc.). According to liberalism, the society should grant equal opportunities to all of its people. As a result, the society, just like the economy, should be regulated through the principle of equality of opportunities and free competition, the only factors needed to produce social harmony. Liberalism inherits the Enlightenment's belief in the rational and communicative human being. In other words, free and autonomous human beings should be the one and only natural and legitimate basis for the economy and its policies.

The formative phase of liberalism in Latin America began in the period of 1750–1850, as in many other countries in the Western world. Many liberal

principles were present in the Enlightenment from the eighteenth century, but political movements only started in the second half of the nineteenth century. In those times, Liberalism inspired models and goals of development as well as cooperation in the new American states. During the first period of the Latin American emancipation or Independence movement (1776–1825), liberal ideas were diffused and practised. One may recall: the representative political desire to have institutions was based on the principle of popular sovereignty; the idea of the republic was understood as an association of equal citizens; the aspiration to have a constitutional system that guaranteed individual rights; free trade, the elimination of obstacles to free initiative and production (taxes, state and corporate monopolies, etc.); the change of institutions, which were previously against the idea of social equality (slavery, taxes on native Indians, noble titles, corporate privileges, etc.); the desire to undertake educational reforms to incentivise the use of modern competences and capacities, like the introduction of applied sciences. However, the first strategies failed because there were unfavourable conditions in many of the new states during the period immediately after Independence (1825–1850/1870). In numerous cases, the situation became difficult because of the political instability and economic stagnation. There were only a few states that had early stability, and in both cases there was a marked continuity with the colonial period (strong, authoritarian regime, paternalism, centralisation, interventionism; formal concessions for the new principles of popular sovereignty and equality before the law, etc.). The first case was the conservative government in Chile from the 1830s; the second was the monarchical system in Brazil from the 1820s. The other states were governed by authoritarians like Gaspar Francia in Paraguay and Juan Manuel de Rosas in Argentina.

Between 1830 and 1840 a climate of self-criticism and insecurity dominated in almost the entire region (Del Pino 1954). Various scholars and politicians criticised their society and were disappointed with the results of the first development strategies after Independence. One of the more influential thinkers of this time was Simón Bolívar, who modified the belief of the natural capacities of the Latin Americans to have their own government, and adopted the perspective of the authoritarian Enlightenment. In these times, the majority of intellectuals identified the Iberian past inherited from colonisation as a result of the mistakes made in the region. In this context a new generation of future politicians were born, who took an extremely pessimistic position with regard to the reality of Latin America. They became the receptors and vehicles of Western liberalism. The diffusion of liberalism in this generation was possible

thanks to the regular contacts between the societies of Latin America and Western Europe, through the arrival of newspapers and books, the emigration of Europeans and trips of Latin Americans to the United States and Europe (Valdivieso 2006). They observed in Europe liberal, socialist and other movements that mobilised against traditional structures, and the majority of these groups tried to move from authoritarian political orders to democratic societies. In addition, the people of Latin America observed with interest the prosperity of the countries that were experiencing the first phase of their industrial revolution. Numerous Latin Americans assumed that there were consolidated liberal principles of the financial and industrial bourgeoisie in Western Europe, and that as irreversible economic liberty and democratisation expanded, it would produce enormous possibilities for the development of Latin American societies.

The British government followed certain beliefs of Adam Smith in the 1840s, especially the policies of free trade with less restrictions. England needed commodities and new markets to be able to sell its manufactured products. The Latin American liberals wanted to open the Latin American markets for European and North American trade. Meanwhile, Latin American production should have been reoriented for export. Logically, a strong and real change in the use of productive factors to fulfill the beliefs in progress through free trade was necessary.

All previous tendencies led to the emergence of a new liberal elite in Latin America. There were young people with intellectual motivations who really believed that Liberalism could help the progress of their societies (Zea 1963). Therefore they were willing to actively participate in the modernisation processes in their countries. They created different political parties which translated their ideas into political programs and concrete development strategies to transform their countries. The new liberal elites had some common characteristics, such as the conviction of the need to practice the superior model of liberal development that originated in Western Europe and North America. They argued for the position of superiority of the European culture in comparison with the inherited culture of Latin America. They had a strong desire to transform Latin America according to the cultural model of Europe (political systems, economic structures, cultural values). The liberal elites of Latin America considered that international cooperation would only be possible through a greater presence of Latin American economies in international markets, as exporters of commodities and food, and as importers of consumer goods, capital and technology. They wanted foreign investment and technology to improve the productive activities for exports. Furthermore, they hoped for the arrival of Euro-

pean immigrants who would settle in their countries and cooperate through the transfer of knowledge and capital.

Regarding the political order, there were differences in each case. In some cases there were genuine libertarian movements, like the Western European political movements against the absolute monarchies. In others, the principles of liberty were understood only in terms of an advantage in economic relations (Tobler 1994).

Liberal strategies of development

In contrast to the experiences in other regions of the world, the introduction of liberal political institutions in Latin American societies did not signify the enlargement of political participation. The new Latin American states were governed by small socio-economic elites, who occupied the most important positions inside the social and political hierarchies. They controlled the most important economic activities. The ideological differences and conflicts among elite groups in the new states were the result of conflicting interests or lack of experience of self-government. During the colonial period, institutions were always controlled by the monarchy. The forms of government varied according to the scenario: there were centralised governments and dictatorships. Latin American governments adopted constitutions and some rules introduced from liberalism, such as the existence of legislatures, electoral systems, and the written recognition of individual rights. In practice, however, the style of government was centralised, paternalist, and authoritarian.

Several conditions in the industrialising countries of Western Europe stimulated the production and export of primary products and the import of manufactured goods (Bulmer-Thomas 1994; Valdivieso 1994; Kirby 2003): first, the demand of different goods that could be supplied by Latin American economies, raw materials for industry (tin, copper, cotton), foodstuffs (coffee, beef, wheat, bananas and sugar); second, new technologies – especially the railway and steamships – dramatically cut the costs and time of getting these products to the European markets; third, growing European and US investment in Latin America – spurred both the production of export commodities and the infrastructure (machines and railways), the import and export businesses, and the banking and insurance sector that offered credit to Latin American governments; by the end of the first world war, the US was the largest investor in Latin America (Bulmer-Thomas 1994); fourth, the civil and political unrest which marked the first half-century of post-independence, began to resolve and al-

lowed the Latin America countries to play a more significant role in world trade up until the Great Depression.

The Latin American governments promoted foreign trade and focused their economies on promoting the export of commodities to the world market (Valdivieso 1994, 1996, 2006). The public and private sectors were interested in investments in transportation infrastructure, modern communications and the financial sector. In addition to these policies, diverse legal reforms facilitated the production of exports, for example legal reforms for the privatisation and individualisation of the agricultural property of Indians and the Church. All of this was influenced by foreign trade; the most dynamic forces were the demand for Latin American commodities, foreign investment in the finance infrastructure to stimulate export systems (ports, transportation, banking, etc.) and facilitate the import of technology and goods. The leading sectors of economic growth were agriculture and mining production. During this period a fast modernisation process took place: means of transportation improved with the introduction of steam navigation and railroads, and urbanisation increased. The markets became better connected and more efficient because of improved transportation technologies, greater volume of merchandise, and lower export costs.

The increased presence of Latin American economies in the international markets produced profound alterations in the countries. These changes profoundly affected the living conditions of the population, productive systems in fields and cities, labour conditions, property systems, demography, etc. Overall, modernisation mostly affected regions with a production potential for the markets. Foreign trade stimulated economic activity through, for example, the processing of raw materials, making inputs for the dynamic sectors (machinery, tools), and increasing incomes. Yet, many other areas remained traditional, without any change in institutions or social organisations. Some economic sectors where liberal strategies had a greater impact included agriculture, mining, services and the public sector. The international demand stimulated the incorporation and extensive exploitation of land, and by means of legal reforms, fiscal and communal properties were privatised, and the native Indian communities and Catholic Church were dramatically affected. Agriculture produced goods to export and satisfy the demand generated by areas of development in large cities and in mining centres. Through economic international relations, the mining industry was favoured by technological progress, the reduction in transportation costs, and the introduction of new technologies for production

(machinery, steam energy, procedures to process minerals, electricity, etc.). The export activities and modernisation of economies in urban areas generated a demand for diverse services. The growth of the public sector was made possible thanks to the resources generated by foreign trade and access to international loans. Taxes on trade were the main source of financing for the public treasury, and permitted public sector investments (see data in Bulmer 2006).

Some relevant social changes took place in Latin America in the period 1870–1930. New social forces emerged, such as the growth of a middle class and a small, but in places militant, working class – both of which were able to impulse new social dynamics and change.

Liberal policies improved economic growth, which was stimulated by foreign trade and by external investments throughout the 1930s. Commodity exports offered Latin America a dynamic role in the world economy for about six decades, allowing the region to achieve significant growth in exports and in GDP over the period. During this time, there was notable progress in transportation (railroads, steam navigation, etc.), communications, financial and monetary systems. All of these positive effects generated a basis for the subsequent development of Latin American countries and their strengthened presence in a more global economy (Valdivieso 1994).

The issue of the negative effects of liberal strategies on the international markets started to be discussed as early as the beginning of the twentieth century when liberalism was in crisis. In Latin American societies, there was criticism about the region's weak position in the international order. There was a feeling of dissatisfaction with the dependence of Latin American countries on commodities, foreign capital, and foreign technologies.

Latin American countries transformed themselves into "monocrop" economies, dependent on the export of one or two products for most of their export earnings. The countries became more vulnerable to fluctuations in the prices these commodities fetched on the world market, and markets simply disappeared for some products (for example Peruvian guano or Amazonian rubber). Economies that depended for their economic growth on the export of primary commodities reinforced obstacles to industrialisation (Bauer 1975; Valdivieso 1994, 1996, 2006; Kirby 2003): since the production of export commodities was often in the hands of landlords or foreign companies, there was little incentive to reinvest profits in industry; industrial development served the needs of the export economy and limited to goods for which there was a large consumer market in the modernising regions, like breweries, flour, clothing or

shoes. The Latin American economies were highly dependent on importing many of the goods needed both for consumption and as economic input, and industry retained a tiny sector. The taxes on these imports constituted the state's principal source of revenue.

This critical appraisal led to the dependency theory created in the early 1950s, which rejected the integration of Latin American peripheral economies to the capitalist world. This theory blamed the industrialised countries for dependence and underdevelopment in Latin America.

Socialism and Latin America

The socialist movement started in Western Europe in the nineteenth century and represented a response to a series of problems stemming from structural transformations in the economy, society and politics. The principal concerns of socialism were: How can living conditions for the common man improve without having property or means of production? The socialist answer to this question came from theoreticians and union representatives, and has formed the basis of socialist teachings since the middle of the nineteenth century. The socialists rejected the liberal economic order, because they felt that it did not improve the living conditions of workers and people without property; the absolute right to private property was considered a source of exploitation and discrimination. For socialism, the ideal economic order included central planning in which the state performed an important function, and where the key productive sectors of the economy were managed by the state; socialists believed that this was only possible with the egalitarian co-participation of the workers in business management (Valdivieso 2006). The state could intervene in the flow of income to achieve better redistribution. Through these mechanisms, social policies could improve the social conditions of different classes, especially by means of income and property taxes. The socialist state was conceived as an instrument to attain social justice, equality and social support. For this reason, the state should have many roles in the economy. The political system should be represented by the majority, and the political system should be participatory so that the disadvantaged social sectors could have an influence in politics. As a result, socialism struggled in many countries for more electoral and universal rights without restrictions. Finally, socialism favoured a general education which provided the people with skills to actively participate in the construction of socialism, to practice solidarity, and to direct individual

interests to benefit common interests. All values and competencies should be transmitted through the educational system; for this reason a system of public education was essential.

The first socialist ideas in Latin America were spread during the middle of the nineteenth century (Di Tella 1993). This diffusion was produced through means of publications from foreign countries and trips of Latin American scholars to Western Europe. None of the Latin American countries were influenced by those ideas in their practical development in the nineteenth century, since the representatives of socialism failed to reach relevant positions in the political systems. In some countries, such as Chile and Colombia, there were opposition movements against established governments, and the socialist ideas were parallel to liberalism. In both countries, the liberal movement was born in alliance with a socialist movement that incorporated a sector of urban workers and handcrafts. Both movements were defeated, though, and only liberalism survived as a political movement with consequences for the development of the countries. A second movement, in which anarchist and socialist ideas were mixed, began in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. It was the case in some countries that a greater degree of modernisation was experienced due to their presence in international markets. Modernisation was expressed in three important phenomena: rapid urbanisation; the birth of modern labour sectors, particularly in the mining industry, manufactures and transportation; and the arrival of many immigrants from Europe. The modern labour sectors created labour organisations and leftist movements (socialist, anarchist and communist), which were encouraged by the ideologies of the immigrants (anarchism and socialism). These organisations and new political parties pressured the society and the liberal state through strikes and mobilisations. They wanted to achieve a democratisation of the political systems, greater participation and social reforms. The period between 1910 and 1930 saw a rise of socialist movements. Some of the movements were similar to the Western European movements during the nineteenth century, although there were also other movements that were more original. In the 1920s, a very prominent ideology arose in Peru, named the *Aprismo*. The founder was Raúl Haya de la Torre, who had witnessed the Mexican Revolution in the previous decade, and continued to study in Europe. In Mexico, he observed reforms such as agrarian reform and diverse redistributive measures. He had the perception that Mexico had an original government for the first time in its history. He imagined that the revolutionary government was an authentic representative of the people and no longer a foreign model. As a result, his ideas to create an indigenous politi-

cal movement in the entire continent were formed, and he founded the *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance, APRA). The main goal was to create a party with multiple classes, including the support of labourers, the rural population and minimum wage workers. The Russian model of revolution was ruled out, because Latin America did not have a large working class and the labourers were not representative. He was convinced that the only way to change capitalism and end the liberal system was by a new, indigenous political movement. In order to obtain a representation of the majority, an alliance of social sectors directed by the middle class was needed. In his ideology, the movement would reform the state, creating state administrators in the economy, to plan, introduce social reforms like agrarian reform, and increase social services. In the theories of Haya de la Torre there were also corporate elements among ideologies of different parties (from right to left). The corporate spirit focused on the idea that the social sectors should have direct representation like organised corporations, which was the contrary of democracy. Another important intellectual was José Carlos Mariátegui, a Peruvian, who emphasised the problem of the native Americans and the need to redistribute land (agrarian reform). In his book *Siete Ensayos de Interpretación de la Realidad Peruana* (1928), he described the possibility of a revolutionary change by means of an ideological elite pursuing socialist values such as equality, solidarity, etc. According to Mariátegui, the native population would enthusiastically participate in the movement because of their tradition of social cooperation from pre-Colombian cultures. By the end of the 1950s, socialist movements had acquired great force in Latin America. This was the result of a situation that existed throughout the continent, and will now be described.

Latin America had very little participation in international trade at that time; their products were not in great demand, they lacked foreign investment, and their development was mostly ignored by the industrialised countries. Most of the Latin American countries experienced problems of underdevelopment such as low economic growth, rapid urbanisation, and extreme economic polarisation. The policies of development that stressed the need for greater investments in the countries and economic growth, without considering the need for structural social reforms, were criticised because these strategies seemed insufficient.

The Cuban Revolution was revealing step by step to anyone who cared to see the true nature of what they called socialism there.

Nevertheless, the underdeveloped countries began to demand justice. At this time, the socialist ideology discovered the *Teoría de la Dependencia* (dependency theory), which had a great impact on the thinking of leftist intellec-

tuals and politicians. Dependency theory attempted to explain underdevelopment from the point of view of Marxists, some of them focused on the quantitative indicators of underdevelopment, and blamed the exploitation of Latin American countries by the industrial countries as the cause of underdevelopment. In their mind, the exploitation had its historic origins in the imperialism of the world powers since the discovery and conquest of America. The deformation of Latin American internal structures was condemned as the result of foreign control and exploitation. The supporters of dependency theory all agreed with the following statements: the external conditions of underdevelopment are the most important factors; the unjust social structures in the marginal countries were not the result of an autonomous historic development, but of the control of external hegemonic powers; the stages of underdevelopment and development do not move towards more development; the development of some countries is a result of the underdevelopment of other countries, and in the long term, the real cause of underdevelopment is the development of the world capitalist system; external dependence is the structural condition of the underdeveloped countries; dependence and underdevelopment are produced in every situation in the world, core and marginal countries, metropolitan and provincial regions, urban and rural, large and small properties, business owners and workers. Therefore, exploitation is a general phenomenon, and signified misappropriation of the surplus produced by labourers. The diagnosis of dependency theory on the causes of underdevelopment of Latin American countries led to the idea of solving this problem by means of a revolution. This was the beginning of changes, first using the term "bad capitalist system" within every country, through redistribution of resources, greater representation, and finally the end of dependent relations between countries (Dos Santos 1973).

Generally opposed to liberalism, socialism was not implemented as a development strategy by Latin American countries. Cuba was the only country that experienced a socialist revolution with long-range projections. Thus, only the Cuban Revolution gave rise to a socialist strategy, consisting of the transformation of political, social, and economic conditions. There were revolutions in other countries; however, these socialist experiments were usually short-term and generally abandoned.

The model of Cuban socialism

Before the revolution, Cuba was a country that depended economically on the sugar production of North American markets as well as tourism. The invest-

ments of American businesses in Cuba were substantial, the majority in land and the sugar industry, along with other productive areas. However, there were groups of Cuban businessmen who participated in these investments. In the 1950s the Cuban economy encountered serious problems. The fall in the external demand for sugar caused an economic depression and increased unemployment. Politically, Cuba was governed by Fulgencio Batista, who came to power at the beginning of the 1950s and was supported by Cuban businessmen, by the union movement controlled by the state, and also by members of the communist party. Batista's government gradually became an authoritarian dictatorship, centralised and less and less representative of the population. Batista suspended constitutional rights, closed the Congress, and continued a policy linked to US security. In the 1930s, Cuban political parties were formed. In the 1950s, the parties opposed Batista. In this context, Fidel Castro began his political career, and followed the beliefs of José Martí, who at the end of nineteenth century had fought for national independence. The opposition contained educated young groups from the University of Havana. Opposition groups favoured a radical nationalism and demanded a change in the political system. After various failed attempts to end the government of Batista, the opposition movement succeeded in 1959 (Annino 1996: 504–522). Originally, the movement wanted the re-establishment of the democratic Constitution of 1940. Furthermore, they wanted to give property to the small farmers, and to legally guarantee the right of the workers so that they could receive 30% of the business profits. In addition they wanted to increase the salaries of agricultural leaseholders, and returned properties that had been expropriated by the government of Batista. Lastly, it strove to guarantee land, education, and health for all Cubans.

In March 1959, Fidel Castro became prime minister of Cuba, and introduced the first law of agrarian reform that limited the maximum size of property to 400 hectares. With the aim of gaining the support of the workers' unions, he promulgated a new union statute so that union members could be directly represented. Thus, the young workers who identified with Castro could obtain control of the union. In 1960, Castro radicalised agrarian reform and created a system of agricultural credits to support small and medium-sized farmers. In addition, the government organised a system of agricultural cooperatives with the same objective. The government confiscated property from rich Cubans and Americans. This produced an open confrontation with the United States, which severed relations between the two countries. United States put international pressure on Cuba, cut it off from the inter-American security

system, boycotted its economy, and finally supported an invasion against Castro (1961), that failed and ultimately strengthened the solidarity of the Cuban government. Furthermore, Cuba joined political and economical forces with the Soviet Union to guarantee security (against the United States, sugar markets, cooperation for development). Moreover, the Cuban Revolution's survival was assured by means of an institutionalisation of social organisations that guaranteed the control of the population (Domínguez 2008). The first institutionalised organisation was the *milicia armada* (armed militia), founded at the end of 1959, composed of workers and university students. In 1960 the Association of Cuban Women and the Committee of Defence of the Revolution were formed, organisations that opposed the internal counter-revolutionary enemy. As a result, committees of defence of a revolutionary function were installed in each neighbourhood and business. At the same time other prominent organisations were established to assure the control of the population in fields and cities. As an apparatus of coordination of all organisations, Revolutionary Organisations Integrated was installed (1961). It became the basis for the Cuban Revolutionary Party. Everybody who believed in the Party was to recognise and defend the principles and programs of the Revolution. Thus, they should obey the rules of the Party, be an example at the workplace, and participate actively in the militia. In each work unit, the bosses were selected to become new members of the Party. Lastly, a state bureaucracy was recruited by the Party.

The search for adequate economic policies for the country was very difficult, and many ways to organise the economy were planned. Cuba was accepted in the community of socialist republics, from which it received much support. However, the production of sugar and other primary products could not be industrialised. Economically, the productivity of Cuban markets and consumption by the average Cuban was low. Yet some important social goals were reached: a huge increase in educational establishments, the lowering of illiteracy, progressive health systems, a decrease in infant mortality rates, and the elimination of extreme poverty. Internationally, Cuba always had to face American pressure. For this reason it wanted to become an ally of the Soviet Union in the early 1960s. Yet Cuba continued with its own international policies and relative independence. In the 1960s and 1970s, Cuba supported revolutionary movements all over the world and was the role model for the underdeveloped countries that were against capitalism. At present it has an alliance with the Chávez administration in Venezuela. Today, Cuba is experiencing the worst crisis in its entire history, with the fading away of communist countries, the

decrease in the demand for sugar affecting its export market, and the possibility of receiving subsidised products such as petroleum from the former Soviet Union. Cuba faces international isolation and persistent pressure by the US government.

Catholic social teaching

Religion, and churches, have always had a great influence in the Western world, especially in Latin America. This topic is essential in our study for the following reasons: the Catholic Church is an international organisation that operates everywhere in the world, and has had an enormous impact in economic, social, and political development, especially in Latin America; remember the impact of Pope John Paul II with his Vatican Diplomacy and his impact on the end of the cold war in Europe, or the actions and interventions of Catholic foundations (endowments, universities, research, etc.) and Christian movements (volunteers for example). Catholicism has had a long history with models and policies for governments based on principles called “Natural Law” and “Social teaching of Catholicism.” From the times of colonisation, Catholicism has had a great influence in the Western world, especially the Iberian Peninsula and Latin America. Catholic social doctrines became especially relevant starting in the nineteenth century, because of a greater awareness of social injustices in the world.

For a long time, the principal concern in Catholicism was peace and security, and Natural Law justified riots and wars. After the second world war, it became clear that these doctrines were not sufficient to ensure justice among the nations, and for countries to have peace and development. Pope Pius XII changed the question about justice in time of injustice or war, emphasising what can be done to have peace, to produce peace in the world (under which conditions the world can have stable peace). At the time of the creation and first stages of the United Nations (1945–1960), John XXIII demanded to create a world order of peace that guaranteed respect for human rights, democracy and development. The subsequent popes and the Second Vatican Council (1960–1965) followed this direction (Second Vatican Concilium, *Gaudium et Spes*). The last two centuries have seen some special developments that must be considered in order to understand the transition of Catholic beliefs. In the nineteenth century, similarly to alternative intellectual and political movements, Catholicism formulated a diagnosis, proposals and policies for the solution of the increased socioeconomic and political problems in the world

(poverty, exclusion, disparities in human and social development, etc.). This occurred first in Western Europe, and afterwards in other regions of the world. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Catholicism had a conflictive relation with the modern world, which was becoming more secularised. In the Catholic countries, relations with the state were particularly difficult, especially in the 1870s and 1880s. In Europe, the French Revolution was the starting point of a secularisation process that debilitated the traditional position of Catholicism in the society and state. In many countries, the Catholic Church lost its material base (educational institutions, foundations, charity, etc.). The Church lost its position in public institutions. In addition, alternative movements emerged (liberalism, socialism, anarchism, communism), and Catholicism developed a very negative vision with respect to the modern world and especially liberalism. The first practical answer to these challenges to lead in the area of modern social problems and social influence were through charitable activities such as the conferences of San Vicente de Paul, a foundation of patronage for young working people, and organisations to support craftsmen. The basic idea of these initiatives was to support and win over the most vulnerable population.

In Catholicism two positions emerged regarding the solutions to modern social problems: societal re-foundation and social reform. Both positions began to compete with each other to become the official position of the Catholic Church. The re-foundation position favoured the renewal of the corporate society, and had a very strong influence in modern "corporatism". It denied the legitimacy of the modern society, post-revolutionary society, and individualistic modern values, regarded modern society as a mistake, false and distant from the essential nature of humanity (Natural Law). The reason for this position can be explained in the following way: in the corporate society of other past periods (the Middle Ages), each person had a place in the social hierarchy determined by birth (social order). This order was destroyed by the new individualistic and rationalist ideas of modern times (modern thinkers, modern capitalist economy, etc.). These new ideas would have given origin to revolutions and economic reforms that imposed a strong individualism and the rules of the controlling elites. The reform included the following: agrarian reforms to promote individualism, liberalisation of the labour market to benefit capitalists, deregulation of economic activities to favour the strongest people, and the elimination of corporations. According to the concept of Catholicism, the places that were modernised and industrialised had a capitalist order for market production. The motor of the society became the principles of individual interest and competence. The liberal order and capitalism were rejected by Catholicism

because it was considered that their foundations were erroneous and their consequences unjust for the social order and peace, because of socioeconomic and political asymmetries. From the point of view of Catholics, the new political, economic and social liberal systems were spread all over the world, giving rise to anarchical relations, and imposition of more powerful people. Poverty, misery, social exclusion and insecurity were the consequences. In this regard, the only way to act against those tendencies consisted of a political and social reform, reconstruction of the corporate order that preceded liberalism, introduction of new regulations, corporate representation in public decisions and an improved distribution of products for equality. From these beginnings, diverse corporate models and development strategies were derived and the notion of "social justice" became popular. The problem with these proposals was that the society had already changed and was no longer a corporate society (the people did not feel any more that they were part of a corporation). The more division of work in the society, economy and culture, the greater the amount of pluralism, and corporate reorganisation will not be possible. The imposition of the corporate order of society is artificial and limits individual freedom and social mobility. Besides, there are no examples regarding the positive relationship between corporate order and equality.

Unlike the re-foundation position, the reform position accepted the capitalist order, and recognised its contribution to development: economic growth, increase in jobs and improvement of living conditions in general. But it criticised the social consequences for the majority, especially insecurity in several dimensions (low income, bad working conditions, nonexistence of social insurance for the majority, etc.). It proposed two solutions: first, social politics; second, practice of solidarity in form of associations and unions to improve living conditions. The reform position had resonance in the teachings of Catholicism and practices in different countries. Catholicism formed a program to achieve economic development with growth and solidarity. The program consisted of a social policy, action of associations, action of institutions, political activity of the Christian people, etc. From the end of the nineteenth century, in several countries, political parties introduced social legislation in order to improve the social security of workers (disease, accidents, old age, etc.), working regulations (no work on the Sabbath, working regulations for women and children, state inspections of working conditions, the right to create unions, etc.). Together with other movements, Catholicism offered its model to achieve justice and peace in the world. Catholicism was internationally diffused and had an enormous impact on international cooperation and strategies of develop-

ment. The following initiatives had special importance: organisations related directly to the Church (Conference of San Vicente de Paul, nongovernmental organisations, universities, among others), *Concilios* (meetings of bishops; for example the First Vatican Council in 1870–1872, the Second Vatican Council in the 1960s); activities by Catholic orders (for example, the Jesuits). There were certain ideas from the Catholic doctrines that represented a patrimony of reflection and these were an essential part of the Christian message: first, the truth that the human being can be understood through rationality and faith; second, this truth can be expressed through certain principles and social values, which stems from the encounter between the evangelical messages and social life problems; third, the principles and values with social consequences are: charity, dignity of the human being and associated human rights, communal property, and solidarity. The values that should dominate in the society are truth, freedom, and justice. These principles are the fundamental criteria for the interpretation and evaluation of social phenomena, and from these principles all social action and economic policies should evolve. These aforementioned ideas are the arguments to support the social function of private property. The universal destiny of goods introduces the principle of subsidiary (*subsidiariedad*). Every human being or society with power and capabilities should have the attitude to aid others (“*subsidium*”) through means of support, promotion or development. Therefore, this principle declares that powerful people or societies should not abuse the population, but support them. This principle does not exclude the idea that the state should have a very active function. Also, subsidiary demands active participation from communities and institutional organisations in daily social life. Another related principle is solidarity. All rules and structures in society should express solidarity as a common good (*bonum commune*). However, solidarity is a virtue because it represents the decision to be responsible for the wellbeing of every person and common good. The practice of solidarity uses the consciousness of debt that everyone has in society and before God. In the social thought of Catholicism there are clearly stated goals: every person must try to achieve the truth and act in conformity with its demands; the recognition of the individuality of everybody to realise their personal aims; justice is a constant desire and action to form social relations with an equilibrium; of course, there are several forms of justice in several situations and under diverse conditions (commutative, legal, distributive).

Catholic social thought in Latin America

Starting from the second half of the nineteenth century, Catholic thought has served as an inspiration for political movements with models of justice and economic development in Latin America (Valdivieso 2006). The Catholic Church, which had been part of the state since the period of discovery, enjoyed a privileged position in the state and society. In the eighteenth century there were state attempts to gain control over the Church, but its privileged position was never questioned. In addition, the Church managed the educational system, charitable institutions, civil registration of births, marriages and deaths, etc. During the independence period, the Church maintained its position, and was sanctioned constitutionally. In Latin America, the constitution of the nineteenth century declared the Catholic religion the official religion of the state and prohibited the practice of other beliefs. Starting in the 1840s, intellectual and new political movements arose that questioned the privileged position of the Catholic Church and demanded the secularisation of the state and society (to be more liberal or more socialist). During the 1860s and 1870s, the liberal movement obtained control of the state and introduced reforms to debilitate the position of the Church: public education, freedom of other religions, public services for registration, loss of corporate privileges. In some countries, Catholicism reacted by means of the creation of the Conservative Party to defend the interests of the Church in the country. Meanwhile, the Catholic Church began to create private schools and educational centres of higher learning to assure religious education (for example the Catholic University in Santiago, 1889). The Catholic Church saw its loss of influence on the state and its privileges in society as a serious crisis. In its opinion, the causes of the crisis were the new intellectual and political movements: liberalism, socialism, etc. At the beginning, the Catholic Church reacted defensively, but at the same time a period of renovation began.

At the end of the nineteenth century a social process of modernisation began in Latin America, the transition from a corporate social order to a class society, causing an increase in social problems. These problems began with the social economic transformations that took place as a result of modernisation (liberal legislation and capitalism, changes in the demographic structure and migrations, inflation, lack of regulations, abuses, etc.). In this context the anarchists and socialists began to spread, and a labour movement was born, acting through means of strikes. Catholics perceived that the social problems were a consequence of mistakes of liberalism in the state and society and criticised

those tendencies. Meanwhile, Catholicism was losing its influence in the poorer sectors of the society. Consequently, there was great interest in social problems and social solutions. The contribution of Catholicism to the solution of social problems was supposed to help to improve its own position in the state and society.

Latin American Catholics began to look for answers to social questions from the Western European experience because the European Catholic Church faced similar problems. They observed that Western European Catholics were active and mobilised. Catholic social movements worked with patronages (*patronatos*), cooperatives, popular organisations of self-support and social legislation. They began to develop similar initiatives in their countries. In Chile, one of the most important activities was the "Patronato Santa Filomena" (Valdivieso 1998, 2006). This organisation was created to attract and support the youth during their life. This experience helped the social elites to be aware of the real social situation in popular sectors. A progressive elite was born and struggled to improve the social conditions of the country. This sector produced many politicians and important priests. The new social Catholic movement grew quickly and included labour associations, patronages, study circles, student associations, etc. There were also other similar Catholic movements in other Latin American countries. In 1955, the general session of Latin American bishops created a Latin American Episcopal Conference. This Conference made a great effort to find solutions to the social problems of the continent. The desire of many Catholics was to transform the unjust social economic structures. For instance, in the 1960s, the Latin American Church had an important trajectory in social matters: organisational experience, tools for mobilisation of Catholics, social institutions, Catholic media, etc. The Catholic Church recovered an important role in national life, regaining power and influence. The Church was a legitimate institution that appealed to the social consciousness of Chile in order to improve national solidarity and social action.

In the 1960s, important events took place. At the international level, the Cuban Revolution demonstrated a possible alternative for other Latin American countries to solve their social problems without capitalism, through socialism. The answer of the government of the United States was the strategy "Alliance for Progress", an aid program focused on moderate Latin American governments. The goal consisted of structural reforms for economic growth and an increase in democracy and development. Urban growth accelerated, increasing popular expectations of greater citizen participation. Moreover, the strategy of ISI did not bring success, and poverty continued to spread. Conse-

quently, scholars and politicians were convinced that structural reforms were necessary to triumph over underdevelopment: modernisation reforms (agrarian, education, housing, health, etc.), nationalisation of resources, programs to improve living conditions.

In the Catholic world, the Second Vatican Council (1960–1965) had huge repercussions. The bishops put an emphasis on reforms, looking for solutions to economic and social problems. In Latin America, the bishops met in Medellín (1968), Colombia, in order to discuss the consequences of the Council in the region. The bishops stated that the Church favoured a transformation to another consciousness. Several sectors with a privileged socio-economic position had to be responsible for the human needs of poor and marginalised people. The bishops wanted the social elites to practice their solidarity, to encourage the exercise of fundamental rights in their countries and contribute to surpass the problems that maintained underdevelopment in society. The Latin American churches called upon Catholics to participate actively in the transformation to a fair society and declared their preferential option for the vulnerable population. Their specific concerns were centred on the misery of the rural population, housing deficit, low income, desertion of schools and infant undernourishment. According to their thinking, the causes of all these problems were slow economic growth and lack of justice. The bishops demanded structural reforms to change the situation and reach the goal of effective participation in the state and institutions.

In the political world, Christian Democratic parties (DC) were formed at the end of the 1950s. The DC was inspired by the principles of the Catholic Church and support by the US Government and the German CDU Party. In Chile, for example, the DC won the presidential election in 1964 with Eduardo Frei Montalva as president and obtained a parliamentary majority in 1965. With this great support the DC embarked on a “Revolution in Liberty” that consisted of structural reform programs to reach the goals of growth with social justice. The program’s priority was to increase economic growth, infrastructure, institutional and social reforms. The Christian Democrat government (1964–1970) carried out agrarian reform and stimulated work associations in farms and factories, changes in the educational system, the development of a massive housing program, and reform of labour legislation. The reform measures combined two central principles of Catholic thought: state functions and promotion of associations. The economic policy of the government tried to increase industrialisation through means of an integration strategy with neighbouring countries. Consequently, Chile became a part of the *Pacto Andino* (Andean

Pact) in 1969. Moreover, to finance social programs, the government made tax reforms and legislated a patrimony tax. Another way that it acquired resources was the nationalisation of the copper industry, which was in the hands of USA corporations. In order to curb inflation, the government reduced the fiscal deficit and made moderate use of monetary emission (mechanism of public financing). The Chilean government was the recipient of international loans and resources from international cooperation. The United States offered support through its Alliance for Progress. The achievements of this government were mixed. The public educational system was expanded, agrarian reform accelerated, work associations increased, copper produced resources for the country, and inflation stopped until 1967. Later, the inflationary goals were not reached due to the persistent pressure by several groups to increase their economic benefits (social spending, income, etc.). But all political actors eventually became radicalised; the leftist parties wanted a revolution while the conservative parties wanted a counter-revolution.

Catholicism had profound consequences for the development of Latin America. From the principles of Natural Law and Catholic social teaching as well as some popular social science ideas to criticise an unjust social order, Catholicism emphasised the necessity of growth with social justice and emancipation from controlling relationships, but did not agree with revolutionary movements to overthrow unfair economic, social and political institutions. A popular version of political theology in Latin America was theology of liberation. It was created in the 1960s and 1970s, in the context of increased underdevelopment and poverty. It placed special emphasis on the focus that Catholics should have regarding poverty, and related the liberation of poor populations to biblical passages.

Structuralism and industrialisation

Structuralism is a school of thought on economic development that influenced Latin America from the end of the 1940s to the end of the 1970s, and began to again in the 1990s. The main organisation that spread the ideas of structuralism in Latin America was the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC, www.eclac.cl). Latin American structuralism had a solution for the causes of underdevelopment in Latin-American and proposed a strategy that was accepted in Latin American countries and became official policy. During the general economic crisis of the 1980s this strategy was dis-

credited, and lost its influence in many countries. Consequently, structuralism began to decline. The ideas of structuralism were reformulated as neo-structuralism in the 1990s.

International economic context

Some transformations in the international economic system are important in order to understand the structural proposals. During the nineteenth century, the industrialised economies experienced an extraordinary boom, and an interdependent international economy was born. However, by the end of the nineteenth century, the United States and Germany had surpassed the United Kingdom as economic powers and thus ended a long period of the rule of free trade under British dominance. Furthermore, the first world war caused distortions in the international economy affecting many regions that depended on free trade. The European economies lost influence, while the US economy acquired a more important role as a world power. The Great Depression (1929–1933) and the second world war reinforced these new tendencies. In the period of the Great Depression, the governments of the industrialised countries tried to protect their societies from unemployment through protectionist policies; these measures included the control of exchange rates to avoid more imports, the control of capital, and intervention to achieve full employment. These and other policies favoured the recovery of the local economy, but affected international markets and economic relations. The displacement of Europe and the increased importance of the United States of America in the world economy had enormous consequences for development. In contrast to the complementary economic relations between Western Europe and Latin America, the United States was competitive in many areas with the Latin American countries because it had a lot of natural resources and was, for example, an important exporter of commodities (foods, minerals, etc.). Besides, the European countries substituted the importation of commodities through their own production and protected trade; some countries with colonies or former colonies in Africa and Asia began to substitute the imports of other areas through preferential agreements. In addition, there were some technological developments which allowed the industrialised countries to become more efficient in the use of commodities. All these changes had strong repercussions in the Latin America economies; the demand for their products diminished, and access to the markets became very difficult. The foreign trade of Latin American countries became unstable and its economic position and status fell dramatically.

The economic crisis of 1929–1933 hit at the heart of the primary commodity-exporting model of development, had deep consequences and generated a pessimistic perception of the future. Most Latin American countries faced a sudden and sharp decline in the prices for their products, and faced debt repayments that did not decline; as a result, spending on imports had to be drastically cut back. As governments depended on customs duties for most of their revenues, the effect was particularly severe. At the height of the crisis, an estimated half of Latin America's workforce was unemployed. Latin American governments abandoned free trade policies, the crisis forced governments to take a much more active role in the economies of their countries – initially through immediate efforts to manage the crisis. Through interventionist measures, every government started to manipulate its currency and commercial taxes and stimulated productive sectors in the domestic market. Governments instituted public works programs and other forms of spending to generate demand within their economies, and used import quotas and tariffs as a way of stimulating industrial production by protecting the domestic market from competitive imports. In 1932, the crisis began to ease, exports recovered, but governments took steps to consolidate these early moves toward industrialisation and several interventionist policies did not stop. This was the case in the countries that included conditions for the growth of industrial sectors (previous industrial development and domestic markets). In other countries, such as those of the Caribbean and Central America, small and slow development continued by exporting without much economic success. In conclusion, the Great Depression influenced the transformation of economic policies in Latin America; the main change consisted of a transition in the economic system and increased regulations with new state instruments.

In the 1930s and 1940s, these efforts developed into a new model of development based on manufacturing at home goods which had previously been imported: ISI and the welfare state. During these years, the industrial sectors of some countries experienced substantial development (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Chile and Uruguay) and the main branches of the industrial sector became food and durable goods. Latin American states changed their functions and incremented their intervention in economic and social life; in comparison with the liberal states of the previous period, the new state became more dynamic and a central actor for development. From the middle of the nineteenth century until 1930, the majority of countries practiced only limited intervention policies, such as monetary, financial, and tariff. Later, the

governments created a complex tax system, introduced income distribution, and became a business state.

The second world war stimulated the industrial development of Latin American countries. Imports decreased because the industrialised countries had all their resources focused on the war. Yet, the demand for Latin American products increased and Latin American countries received resources to invest in internal production. A very important factor for the industrial development of Latin America became the foreign policy of the United States. After the war, the United States became the world's primary economic power, and its importance for the foreign trade of Latin America increased, but the region lost importance for the globalised US economy. The US concentrated all its efforts on the reconstruction of the countries that had been directly affected by the war. This situation was very unfavourable for Latin America because the demand for and prices of its products decreased, while all imports experienced an increase in prices.

After the war, as a response to the economic isolation of Latin America, the ECLAC was created, which formulated a strategy for industrialisation through import substitution. The executive secretary of the ECLAC, Raúl Prebisch, developed a theory of international relations also known as the theory of peripheral economies. In his theory, the terms "centre" and "periphery" were used to classify the countries according to their level of development and status in the international economic order. This classical theory of economics, where international work division and international trade provide advantages for everyone, was criticised because of its unfavourable consequences for countries exporting commodities. The reasons were: the low prices of commodities, the concentration of productivity progress only in the industrialised countries, the weak position of the underdeveloped countries in facing the international crisis, and the asymmetric structure of international trade. According to the ECLAC, the one and only solution for this problem was industrialisation led by the state. These arguments were spread through Latin American countries by intellectuals and prominent politicians like Celso Furtado in Brazil, Aldo Ferrer in Argentina and Aníbal Pinto in Chile. They all argued in favour of an industrialisation promoted by the state. Consequently, industrialisation through import substitution was implemented as official strategy, and developed as a coherent state-led industrialisation in countries like Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, Chile and Uruguay between 1950 and 1970. In countries whose primary commodities still found easy export markets, or in countries whose markets were too small to facilitate it, ISI did not develop to the same degree.

ISI policies

The state played a key guiding role in the ISI strategy through creating a climate for the development industry. The ISI policies were characterised by economic protectionism, high tariffs, and monetary intervention to favour the domestic industrial sector. Furthermore, the state directly supported the industrial sector by means of credits and privileges, investments in infrastructure, and public demand. The state increased its direct intervention in economic activities through the nationalisation of mining and energy sectors (steel, petroleum, electricity), the creation of public businesses, and many regulations. As a result, the 1950s and 1960s were characterised by enormous growth in the industrial sectors of many Latin American countries (Muñoz 1990).

Growing population and high levels of migration to large cities created ever-growing demands for infrastructure and services. The urban centres became the most prominent markets for the industrial sector because employment increased incomes and the demand for exports, while concentrating investments in infrastructure for transportation, energy, financial markets and trade. The development of industrial activities favoured the diversification of productive systems because of their multiple effects. The state grew substantially, and was involved in new organisations, agencies, and manufacturing activities.

Between 1950 and 1970 some countries entered a new phase: the formation of basic industries and capital goods. Industrialisation generally moved in four stages: non-durable consumer goods, such as foodstuffs, beverages, pharmaceuticals and clothing which were the easiest to manufacture; durable consumer goods such as household electrical goods; intermediate goods such as inputs for cars or machinery; capital goods such as iron and steel production (Sunkel 1970). Without resources or technologies for this transition, countries opened their markets to foreign investment in the industrial sector, largely trying to associate with multinationals. Some multinational companies, for example Japanese car industries, set up subsidiaries to manufacture for worldwide and regional markets, sometimes with conditions that they use inputs manufactured nationally by relatively small domestic firms (Tsunekawa 1989). At the end of the 1950s and during the 1960s, ISI reached its highest point in the most populated countries thanks to the development of steel, chemicals, cars, and electronic industries, and the dynamics of growth gave rise to the exportation of some industrial goods. The industrial exports increased their participation in the intra-regional commerce from 9% to 21% (the exporting countries were Brazil, Mexico and Argentina).

In the smaller countries such as Chile and Uruguay, ISI lost its dynamism. These countries sought to deal with the situation by complementing this strategy with new initiatives: greater investments in the industrial sector, expansion of markets in the region, the stimulus to export other products other than traditional commodities, to obtain and invest resources in the economy. They also practised structural reforms directed by the state as they tried to improve industrial development conditions: agrarian reforms and other redistribution measures in order to strengthen internal markets, educational reforms geared to improving the conditions of the labour markets. Unfortunately these initiatives were not successful.

ISI had positive legacies. First, GDP growth rates in Latin America in the periods 1945–1972 and 1972–1981 were higher than had been achieved before, for instance faster growth of GDP per capita than in the past. Second, by supporting production, manufacturing, new transport and communications infrastructure and energy supplies became dynamic sectors for growth. Third, by regulating the labour markets and providing social services, ISI and the welfare state model brought benefits to workers in the new industries, labour codes and social security benefits.

In general terms, ISI had some problems. First of all, theoretical deficits, the theory of peripheral economics and the ISI model were influenced by certain points of view between 1930 and 1950, and also by economic policies practised by industrialised countries in periods of crisis (depression, wars, etc.). The strategy of the ECLAC for Latin America was based on the false assumption of reaching industrialisation through export substitution and economic intervention. There was great optimism with respect to the economic consequences of political intervention in the economy. The problem of the ECLAC model was that it did not take into account many important factors in the process of industrial development – for example social factors, dynamic relations, and complex interactions between manufacturing and other productive sectors such as agriculture – nor did it consider the importance of foreign trade for industrialisation.

One characteristic inherited from ISI was the strengthening of the public sector, which acquired new functions. By means of tariffs and credits, governments used financial mechanisms to locate resources in the industrial sector. Governments spent a lot of money on mechanisms for redistribution by means of social policies, construction of infrastructure and basic industrial businesses. But the state was in no condition to finance all its activities fundamentally, because taxes and credits were insufficient. The financial needs of the state,

committed to many projects, tended to increase internal taxes at all levels. Internal tax collections became one of the main sources of resources for the state. While tax systems became very complex, they never solved any financial problems, nor did they encourage productivity and efficiency. On the other hand, the state did not have other options, because governments based their legitimacy on the support of the labour sector, middle class and other beneficiaries of ISI. In order to remain solvent, governments should have stimulated the industrial sector, spent more money in social programs, and accepted international loans.

Lack of efficiency – with ISI, the government had a lot of power and, continuing with tradition, used the power for personal interests, rather than public-wide interest (e.g. social security funds were raided to help balance budgets). High levels of tax evasion led to foreign borrowing and printing money (major inflation).

During the era of ISI, nobody paid any attention to the minimum requirements of macroeconomic equilibrium for economic growth such as stable fiscal expenses, a stable monetary system, and the dangers of inflation. As a result of poor monetary and fiscal policies and a disregard for the rural sector, governments lost control over inflation. Typically, many diverse groups participated in the process of economic negotiations, and exerted pressure to attain higher wages (Hirschman 1965).

The supporters of ISI thought that industrialisation would help Latin American countries overcome external dependence. However, Latin American manufacturing sectors were dependent on the imports of industrial supplies, capital goods, and foreign technologies. For the development of basic industries, Latin American governments should have attracted foreign capital and permitted the accesses of multinationals to Latin American markets so that they could develop those industries. Latin American countries were condemned to remain behind in technology because they were consumers of foreign technologies. In addition, the dependence on exports persisted; thanks to the revenues of exports the governments had access to financial resources for the manufacturing sector. But the small size of the exporting sector limited the plans of the governments, and also the possibilities of growth of the manufacturing sector.

In addition to the aforementioned problems, ISI was fundamentally conceived to produce finished products for domestic markets. These industries had difficulty managing the conditions to compete in international markets because they had protected markets. Only a few countries, such as Mexico and Brazil, were able to develop export competitive industrial sectors. Sooner or later,

Latin American industries would face the problem produced by a lack of competitiveness in world markets, thus becoming structurally vulnerable.

During the ISI period, many businesses were created with a large amount of capital, and plants often surpassed the dimensions of the domestic markets, especially in public businesses, where the criteria of efficiency was not focused on profitability. Many industries lacked comparative advantages to produce because the basic supplies to produce did not exist in those Latin American countries. These businesses imported supplies and machinery thanks to state subsidies. On the other hand, industrial development caused the loss of traditional manufacturing activities. ISI supported the production of many end products containing more advanced technologies than the traditional manufacturing sectors used. In the past, in economies oriented to free trade and export, groups with high incomes tended to consume expensive imports, the labour sectors with lower incomes demanded the same goods at lower prices, which were produced in their country. As a result, traditional manufactures had more markets and developed (Sunkel 1970).

Greater productivity in agriculture to meet the growing demand in the internal market required new investments, incorporation of new lands into production, new types of cultivation and fertilisers, and irrigation and transportation systems. Likewise, important technological innovations were necessary to increase productivity. However, during the period of ISI, agriculture suffered from bad conditions in many countries, farmers lacked loans, and infrastructure was poor. For example, the agricultural sector was not able to satisfy the new demands of modern sectors (urban, industrial, and services). The lack of agricultural resources increased the price of food and raw materials in the domestic markets, and it affected the demand for manufactured products. In summary, the stagnation of agricultural productivity limited industrial expansion, generated inflationary pressures, reduced the market for manufactured products, and produced debts.

The distribution of the benefits of ISI was extremely limited. A large part of the population remained vulnerable and in a marginalised situation. There was no decrease in social and economic poverty and inequalities, nor a substantial elevation of the standards of living of the majority of the population. Industrial activities offered relatively few jobs because imported capital goods and technologies did not require much labour. At the same time, many countries were becoming quickly urbanised, the agricultural sector was experiencing a crisis, and migration to cities was increasing. As a result, the growing populations did not have much access to social participation, nor to political or economic integration.

Neoliberalism

The principles and recommendations of neoliberalism to manage the Latin American economies have a direct relationship with some of the transformations in the international economy in the last four decades.

In the 1970s a rapid internationalisation of products and services began, thanks to the growing mobility of capital and the progress in transportation and communications (ships, planes, computers, satellites, etc.). For example, through the introduction of hardware advances and technology in the financial markets, the decision of an investor could occur anywhere in the world with complete information and in a short time. Investors could react quickly by responding to economic or political changes. In recent decades, especially since 1980, there has been no limit to the mobility of capital; at present, one may look for opportunities of investment anywhere at any time. All of this influences the transformation in the international division of labour, and increases the economic integration of countries. International competition increased in all world markets and the conditions for investment become fundamental factors in this process (legislation, labour markets, and production expenses). The internationalisation of markets have created international pressures for the adaptation of economies to these new international conditions. Consequently, those countries with structural or domestic problems of production cannot expect to adapt very well, and are the losers.

The oil crisis exercised strong pressures on the markets. During the Yom Kippur War in the Middle East (1973), the members of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), formed in the 1960s, applied pressure on the Western countries that supported Israel and the prices of oil increased. This measure had a great impact on the worldwide economy, producing imbalances and price fluctuations. Between 1973 and 1979, the first increases in oil prices resulted in an increase in the prices of commodities. The second oil crisis, which occurred in 1979–1980 and had a different political origin – the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the first crisis in the Persian Gulf (1978, 1983) – doubled the price of each barrel, and also had enormous repercussions on the world economy. The industrialised countries had a stronger position than in the first crisis, but the developing countries were more affected because the oil prices were increasing while the demand and prices of commodities dramatically decreased.

As a result of the oil crisis, the United Kingdom and United States changed their economic policies. Starting in 1979, the conservative government of

Margaret Thatcher abandoned economic policies geared toward state intervention in the economy. The government drastically reduced state expenses, and reformed the tax system (tax reductions, especially for businesses). These policies were intended to stimulate more investment in the economy, and to improve the market conditions to produce domestically (reduction in costs of production). As a result, many state businesses were privatised despite social protests caused by these policies; Thatcher's government introduced legal reforms to limit the actions of the unions. In the United States, under the administration of President Ronald Reagan (1981), a similar trend began. The government wanted to stimulate competitiveness in the economy and economic growth. If the conditions of production were good (low production costs), then the economic activity would recover, and increase investment, thus creating more employment. To control inflation, a big problem in the American economy since the 1960s, the Reagan administration cut social expenses and decreased taxes to stimulate business production.

Since the 1960s, in South-east Asia, countries like Korea and Singapore have shown the positive effects of economic policies focused on commercial liberalisation and the attraction of external investors. Those countries quickly overcame the problems caused by the oil crisis and since the 1980s have exhibited very high economic growth rates.

The efforts of international economic organisations to overcome the economic crisis of the last decades represent another important factor to explain the changes in Latin America. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), an initiative that from its start (1947) defended the thesis that the liberalisation of international trade led to greater welfare for all participants, had strong repercussions in the liberalisation of international trade. In the negotiations of Tokyo (1973–1979), the member countries agreed to eliminate non-tariff barriers (subsidies, import limitations, complex administrative norms), and liberalise the markets for agricultural products and commodities. In Uruguay (1986–1993), participating governments debated how to overcome the new protectionism of the industrialised countries, the liberalisation market of agricultural products, the liberalisation market of international services, and international protection of intellectual property (computers, software, CDs, etc.). Furthermore, GATT explained to countries in which directions world economic trends should go. Since the end of the 1970s, international monetary and financial institutions – the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank – have had the objective to maintain world stability especially in monetary and financial issues and reduce inflationary tendencies in the world

economy. To reach that goal, the IMF monitors and recommends special policies for countries. The World Bank conditions its financial cooperation to implementing a series of economic policies that will give a guarantee of stability.

Emergence of neoliberalism

In the 1970s, the common perception that an important condition for economic and social progress was state intervention lost popularity when the world economy was shaken by the oil crisis and other related events. In this context, liberal economic ideas reappeared, this time represented by neoliberal scholars.

Neoliberalism believed that the welfare state was responsible for the economic problems in individual countries. It noted that the economies of those countries suffered stagnation when the fiscal incomes decreased. The inefficiency in the economic regulation of the state and distribution of resources was produced because the state did not want to make decisions on the basis of economic criteria, but on the basis of pressure from social sectors that benefited from their interventionist politics. In addition, neoliberalism held that the size of the state tended to grow excessively without any possibility to react rapidly to negative signs in the markets, and this intensified economic problems. Neoliberalism assumed that the one and only way to have a healthy economy and be able to develop was through the market and opportunities for private initiatives, and despite the regulations and artificial taxes of the state.

Neoliberalism wanted to introduce changes in the government system to counteract the tendency toward the inorganic growth of states. The growth of the state had benefited only a part of the population, the part that had a better chance to exercise pressure. The state produced goods and services that were worse than those produced by the private sector. Neoliberalism proposed a free trade policy and globalisation of commerce without protectionist bonds (to open markets, to eliminate distortions and inflexibilities). The state should no longer have the role of distributing the majority of resources in the country.

Neoliberalism advanced the fundamental principle that individual liberty and private initiatives should be guaranteed and stimulated because the individual is the primary motor of progress. As a result of millions of individual decisions, the market should be the principal mechanism for the distribution of resources, and not the state. The role of the state should be reduced to regulating to avoid distortions in the market so that individuals could make use of their abilities and individual rights. What signified liberty to neoliberalism? The central idea was the independence of the individual, and consequently the right

to be free from internal instability and thus able to develop a creative capacity. The market was the natural environment to exercise liberty. In the market, individuals formulated goals, and searched for ways to carry out the goals of other individuals. For neoliberalism there were two ways to coordinate the activities of millions of people: a centralised direction with the constraints of the totalitarian state, and the voluntary cooperation of the people in the market.

Society was organised on the basis of voluntary exchange by the people, which created freedom for the market economy and a wealth of private enterprises. The laws of supply and demand were necessary because they led to a natural equilibrium. Each person should use the available resources to produce and exchange goods, trying to maximise his/her benefits in the market. These facts constituted a stimulus for the increase of productivity, division of labour, specialisation of functions, and related economic progress.

Everybody trading goods and services in the markets had different preferences and resources. But they all should have the same opportunities to participate, and from this perspective equality of rights should prevail for everybody. The state should contribute to increased equality, eliminate distortions, and practice a secondary role. The state had no right to introduce an abusive system of privileges. It should reduce its size, in order to stimulate the activity of the private sector and competitiveness in the economy. The main function of the state should be to create respect for general rules that assure a free and voluntary coexistence (justice in the state, peace in international relations), to monitor the transparency of the market, protect liberty and stimulate competitive private markets.

State intervention was justified if it was necessary for the country; for example if a priority was not assumed by private agents, the state could handle it (social investments such as infrastructure in transportation and communication). Also, the state could intervene if there were monopolies or distortions in the market, even when there were no basic equalities for the general participation in the market. In this case, the action of the state should generate conditions for equality without using the mechanisms of the welfare state. The state should not intervene in the economy to reduce unemployment in the economy because its intervention produced artificial inflation that affected everybody and did not provide an adequate solution to the problem of unemployment. The state should not burden private economic agents with excessive taxes, and should not keep factors that inhibit production.

In neoliberalism, people were naturally different, and consequently the results of their actions were too. Therefore, social justice consisted of recognis-

ing the characteristics of the human being and allowing everyone to achieve their goals with freedom and independence. State intervention to redistribute wealth was considered unjust because it assumed that people with power, that is, those who governed, had the ability to understand the actions and desires of multiple social and economic actors in the society. This led to erroneous decisions that limited individual freedom. Therefore, state intervention fomented the imposition of particular interests by determined social groups. By so doing, this distortion introduced injustice into society, and destroyed the principles that had historically permitted development.

For neoliberalism, the market was: the most efficient system to foster voluntary cooperation by individuals, the most democratic and optimal system for the distribution of productive resources, and the best guarantee of individual freedom. In the markets, prices represented a multiplicity of dispersed information, fulfilling the fundamental function of having access to information. The free market guaranteed the possibility of obtaining the principle of commutative justice, the justice of exchange and reciprocity. Intervention, on the other hand, damaged that principle of justice as well as the efficiency of the distribution of resources. The market was essentially democratic because its mechanisms coordinated the wishes and preferences of the people. The market was a self-regulated system, the result of multiple individual decisions and actions prompted by private interests. If the market functioned according to its own laws, the growth of the economy and a greater degree of social integration would be possible. The real growth of the economy produced an increase in employment, and better conditions for social integration.

Neoliberalism in Latin America

From the 1960s, the ISI strategy began losing its influence throughout the continent. Several Latin American governments wanted to maintain this strategy with complementary policies (e.g. greater investment, diversification of exports) but did not have any success. Consequently, skepticism regarding the capacity to solve the problems of underdevelopment appeared. The first attempts at modifying ISI occurred at the beginning of the 1960s, first under the conservative government of Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez in Chile (1958–1964) and later in Argentina (at the end of the 1960s). During the 1960s other countries such as Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico decided to develop complementary strategies, basically by introducing reforms in commercial policies (oriented to stimulate the exporting sector). These countries remained

highly dependent on earning foreign exchange from their traditional primary commodity exports. Nevertheless, in some countries ISI still seemed to be a viable option until the end of the 1970s, especially in Brazil and Mexico. Before, those countries had had high economic growth rates and access to international credits, which allowed them to finance imports of supplies, technologies, and capital goods.

In Latin America, neoliberalism began to take hold through the belief that the efficacy of the market is the best mechanism to ensure the efficient production of goods and services. Also, it was believed that the role of the state is to ensure the free and effective operation of market forces, imposing these on society by force if necessary. In the 1970s, the military governments of Chile, Argentina and Uruguay abandoned the ISI strategy. After the first oil crisis, the prices of commodities increased so these countries abandoned protectionism and liberalised their foreign trade, convinced that an increase in international competitiveness was the only way to solve the problems of fiscal deficit and underdevelopment. These governments believed that foreign trade should be the motor of economic growth. However, this goal was not reached in the 1970s because of several problems: deficient monetary policies, especially the policy of exchange rates causing an explosion of imports and high consumption while the export possibilities became worse. Later, at the beginning of the 1980s these countries experienced the same problems as other countries (recession, economic contraction, debt crisis).

In the 1980s ISI faced a crisis situation everywhere. The economies of countries were seriously affected by the problems of the international market, especially the second oil shock and increasing indebtedness. All of these factors produced modifications to the development strategies in those countries that were still in the ISI phase. At the start of the 1980s, all Latin American countries were seriously affected by two external factors: lower prices for commodities and higher costs of credit. The fall in commodity prices was due to technological advances and the economic crisis in industrialised countries.

In the 1970s, both the public and private sectors of Latin America had enormous debts. After the first oil crisis, international banking consortiums had a large amount of resources and Latin American countries offered good conditions for investment. In turn, those countries needed external resources because of their chronic lack of capital. Apparently, greater indebtedness was not problematic because the increase in commodity prices would mean an increase in exports and income. Most of the credits were provided by the private banking sector (in previous decades, the credits were only provided from pub-

lic international banks). Instead of investing in productive activities, many resources were wasted in consumption, speculation, and governmental budgets. By 1982, the external debt had risen to such a high level that most Latin American countries were in no condition to pay. Their annual debt payments represented 59% of their exports.

The debt crisis began when Mexico declared its inability to make its debt payment. Immediately there was a loss of confidence by the external sources of financing which intensified the crisis. The consequences of the crisis were so serious (as occurred in the 1930s), that they caused a change in development strategy and an end to the ISI. Dealing with the crisis lasted almost a decade. The actors involved were Latin American governments, private banking consortiums, international financial institutions, and the government of the United States. To avoid a financial collapse, all the aforementioned actors sought a solution together. The main instruments to manage the crisis were the agreements between creditors and debtors, and renegotiations of debts to extend the payment period; between 1983 and 1991, 104 renegotiated agreements were signed. Between 1982 and 1985, the renegotiations of debts translated into higher interest rates. From the middle of the 1980s, more favourable conditions for Latin American countries were proposed: facilities for payment and larger loans by the World Bank. These changes were a consequence of a new strategy to overcome the crisis, the Baker Plan, that basically proposed measures to stimulate economic growth and enable structural changes. However, until 1989 there was no substantial improvement, while the feeling grew that the crisis could only be ended by eliminating the debt. US Treasury Secretary Brady called for creditors to contribute to the solution of the problem by reducing the debt, and these subsequent measures finally contributed to ending the crisis.

The governments of the industrialised countries and international agencies, the IMF and World Bank, held the belief that the debt crisis showed the vulnerability and inability of the Latin American economies to overcome external problems. After decades of high tariffs and state intervention in all areas of economic life, Latin America had a rigid economic structure which was not adequate to react to the changes in international markets. Therefore, the powerful international actors, industrialised countries, the IMF and The World Bank, insisted on structural adjustment programs to achieve higher exports through trade liberalisation, attract foreign investment, and reduce government intervention in the economy through privatisation. In order to maintain their credit flow, Latin American countries had to turn to the IMF and the World Bank.

Consequently, the compliance of the Latin American economies was absolutely necessary because the international environment required it. At this time, there was a lack of loans available, and conditions to receive new loans were very difficult, while the international market was not good because of capital flight.

The gravity of the debt crisis forced Latin American countries to adopt belt-tightening programs demanded by international organisations. Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) were programs designed to introduce neoliberal policies, in order to get them to repay their debt. Latin America had to transfer resources to debtors and industrialised countries, and the only way to accomplish this was by lowering imports, increasing exports and manipulating variables to achieve macroeconomic stability.

The new development strategy required the liberalisation of economies, a commercial opening by means of eliminating protectionist barriers (tariff and non-tariff barriers) and structural adjustments. Commercial liberalisation led to the increase of exports that by the beginning of the 1990s had increased by 80%. The adjustment programs that were requested by international agencies specifically required the reduction of fiscal expenses (fiscal deficit), restrictive monetary policies to control inflation, reforms of tax systems to consolidate treasury, elimination of state subsidises, removal of price controls (prices related to the law of supply and demand, including the prices of state services) and deregulation of markets. In order to achieve economic efficiency, the Latin American governments were to transfer public companies to the private sector. Businesses were supposed to be managed using profit rationality. The speed and change in direction was different in each case. Chile, Mexico, and Bolivia were the first countries that adopted structural reforms, and Chile proved to be a very successful model of neoliberalism in the early 1980s which made other countries follow suit. However, countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Peru continued for a short period with ISI policies based on state intervention in their economies. Their unorthodox plans to stabilise the economy included price controls, salary controls, and exchange rates. Yet the policies were not successful, and as a result these countries adopted programs of structural adjustment that were being applied in other countries.

In the first half of the 1980s most Latin American countries adopted neoliberal politics to generate resources in order to pay off debts. These policies basically consisted of reducing government interference in all sectors and a fiscal write-off, reforming tax systems to increase fiscal income; eliminating state powers over interest rates, credit provision and foreign investment, reducing tax on profits and placing it more on consumption, and establishing the

independence of central banks. Through liberalisation and realistic exchange rates, the governments increased the significance of the market in allocation of resources, and made the private sector the main instrument of economic growth through privatisation of state companies, deregulation, secure property rights and financial liberalisation. Another way was the privatisation of public companies and public utilities. Nevertheless, these measures were not enough to finance the fiscal deficit and debt services. Therefore, the governments authorised the emission of money, contributing to an increase in inflation. In some countries, inflation reached three-figure sums.

The internal markets of Latin American countries experienced a serious recession during this period because of the lack of capital, hyperinflation, capital flight, and a decrease in investments, production, and consumption. The cuts in spending led to a deep recession in the early 1980s, while public social services in health and education deteriorated, causing serious social problems. Slowly, most Latin American countries abandoned emergency measures and applied coherent long-range reforms. This seemed to be necessary in the public sector of the countries to improve their institutions. By the end of the 1980s the majority of countries had achieved sufficient economic stability to attract private investments.

The drastic reduction of foreign trade barriers was one of the most interesting aspects of these reforms. Latin American countries began a quick integration with the rest of the world, notably by improving their commercial relations. In many countries, modern exports grew substantially and created new sources of employment. The liberalisation of trade led to a large increase in productivity and economic growth, especially in the 1990s. The countries' need to compete internationally improved the efficiency of their business community. Another important phenomenon was the greater integration of Latin American markets. This process can be explained by the need of the countries to export their products to external markets, and it created more competitive economies.

During the 1990s most of the countries made large efforts to reduce the size of the state by means of the privatisation of firms and financial institutions. Argentina, Chile, and Mexico were the leading countries in privatisation, followed by Peru and Venezuela. The principle behind their privatisation policies was that the productive sphere of the state is no more efficient than its private counterparts.

In the meantime, a change was emerging in the perception of Latin America. Scholars and politicians of diverse political tendencies began to coincide in the

opinion that the only way to end underdevelopment was the introduction of structural reforms geared to open economies; accepted was the belief that long-range growth could only be achieved through a new, favourable orientation of economic policies to the exporting sector. Many people who had fostered traditional growth in the public sector in the 1980s requested drastic reforms including greater fiscal discipline and more focus on international trade and privatisation programs. Neoliberal reforms during this time became a turning point for Latin America – the point where several countries began to change drastically.

The neoliberal approach had relevant economic consequences in Latin America. The market-led approach replaced state-led development. Through the reforms, growing heterogeneity in all goods produced became an important effect of neoliberal reforms and adapting to market pressures. The capital-intensive subsectors were more successful (had greater demand) than labour-intensive subsectors, whose strengths relied on intensive use of natural resources produced in capital-intensive plants (the Southern Cone, Brazil and the Andean countries); another industrial strength was based on assembling electrical goods, computers and clothes. (Mexico and Central America). Therefore there were deep changes in the relations between the state and the society: from the state having a monopoly on social provision to sharing it with private groups, whether commercial, non-profit or family; from the state being the source of all financing to private-sector financing.

US foreign policy in Latin America

US influence in Latin American countries has been and is a very important constraint for the state and national economy in the region.

Between 1945 and 1960, American policies prioritised military and commercial issues, practised direct interventions, and supported anticommunist governments. In this period, great antagonisms between the USA and Soviet Union characterised world politics. In technologies, the military and politics there was a strong competence and both governments practised interventions in Third World countries and supported opposition movements. During the governments of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, conflictive relations reached a climatic level. After the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1949, the Soviet Union responded with the Warsaw Pact in 1953. In Berlin, both superpowers confronted each other to dispute the control of

Table 2. US foreign policy in Latin America, 1945–2008

Adminis- tration	Years in office	Info on world context	Relationship with Latin America
Truman / Eisen- hower	1945– 1961	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – American politics prioritised military and commercial issues, practised direct inter-ventions and supported anticommunist governments – Great antagonism and competition between the US and Soviet Union – Conflictive relations were high – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) founded in 1949, countered with Warsaw Pact in 1953 – Disputed control of Berlin, Soviet support of communist governments, US attempt to preserve stability in Asia and lead reconstruction process in Western Europe through the 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Diplomacy, signings of treaties, and participation in inter-American organisations allowed US governments to have influence in LA e.g. TIAR treaty for mutual assistance in defence issues and Organisation of American States (OAS) – US supported LA governments through military assistance such as aid, training and weapons – LA governments pleaded for more economic aid from the US and for bilateral relations in meetings of OAS – “North-south conflict” – LA governments denounced unjust structure of economic order and international trade that always favoured northern countries
Kennedy	1961– 1963	Marshall Plan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Different priorities: political approximation of governments and developmental programs – Fear that beliefs of Cuban Revolution would spread – Providing weapons, teams and training to LA armed forces – Did not want to assist authoritarian governments, so ended military aid to Argentina and Guatemala and broke relations with non-democratic governments like Dominican Republic.

			<p>– Thought more emphasis was needed on real problems of region, such as: decades of postponement, scarce social development, poverty, inequalities, social injustice, and lack of democratisation</p> <p>– Alliance for Progress – three main objectives: social development, structural change, and democratisation, with most important points of the program being to:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Develop and strengthen democratic institutions, 2) Accelerate of economic and social development, 3) Avoid analphabetism and improve education in all areas, 4) Improve work conditions and wages 5) Promote health programs, especially, the eradication of epidemics, 6) Reform tax policies, 7) Expand agrarian reforms, 8) Control inflation and restore fiscal discipline, 9) Stimulate private enterprises to generate employment. <p>– Alliance lost its force with Kennedy's assassination</p>
Johnson	1963–1969		<p>– Disregarded Alliance for Progress in order to focus on other priorities in domestic politics and improve the domestic economy</p>
Nixon / Ford	1969–1977	<p>– Feared advances of the Soviet Union</p> <p>– Cuba sent troops to Angola</p> <p>– US lost the Vietnam War</p> <p>– US influence in Middle East threatened by the Israeli-Arab conflict of 1973</p> <p>– Internally US plagued with unemployment, inflation, and political tensions</p>	<p>– In LA, US supported non-democratic governments again e.g. Chilean military government of A. Pinochet</p>

Carter	1977– 1981		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Wanted to improve international image of US, avoid friction with LA countries – Constant approach to democratic governments, with periodic meetings with LA leaders – Torrijos-Carter Treaty returned the sovereignty of the Panama Canal to Panama in 2000 – Focused on diplomatic procedures and diminished use of military force e.g. Providing aid to Nicaragua after Sandinista Revolution of 1979 – Human rights was an important priority – sent emissaries who made regular reports – Cut aid to countries such as Uruguay and Argentina as a result of these reports
Reagan	1981– 1989	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Priorities were: energy crisis, economic recovery, and security – Cuba continued intervention in Angola/Ethiopia – Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan – American embassy in Iran was invaded by Islamic extremists 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Moderately favoured all types of states, so long as they were a guarantee against communism and Soviet influence – Re-established the sale of weapons and delivered high volumes of military aid – Aid in wars against rebels – Played an essential role in overcoming the debt crisis in LA
Bush / Clinton / Bush (1990–2008)	1989– current	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Abandoned the dominant militaristic goals of the past and incorporated more cooperative elements – Enlargement and Engagement policy that included the support and promotion of democracy, free market, and free trade. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – In LA, many countries that had had authoritarian governments became democratic, except Cuba and a few others – Strategy of Security for the Americas (1995) – declared the prosperity and liberty of their citizens as priorities, recognised new threats: drug trafficking and terrorism, trade and proliferation of weapons, weak governments, ethnic conflicts, humanitarian crisis, natural disasters, immigration, tension in the relations between civilians and military.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Main threat of Soviet Union disappeared at the beginning of 1990s, making the US the greatest economic and military power 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – LA increased in importance for US because of proximity and destabilising potential – Cocaine production and trade – Unequal income distribution and lack of adequate regulation caused discontentment and frustrations, and the conditions for crime increased – Immigration to US stimulated by low life conditions/lack of possibilities – USA's solution was that democracy and human rights could help to provide a stable long-term political environment, which could help the middle class to economically grow and prosper – Economy, development, free commerce and privatisation could help consolidate democracy and human rights – Democracy as a guarantee for peace – Free trade was the first prescription for economic growth – In 1991, US suffered from high unemployment rates, so the stimulation of domestic markets through exports was necessary, making LA important markets for US exports.
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the city. The Soviet Union supported many communist movements and governments; for example, the communist government of North Korea in a war against the USA. In Western Europe, the USA government led the reconstruction process through the Marshall Plan and intervened to preserve stability in Asia. Diplomacy, the signing of treaties, and participation in inter-American organisations all had important roles for USA governments during this period. In 1947, the USA government signed a treaty for mutual assistance in defence issues (TIAR), and in 1948 the foundation Charter of the OAS. Thus, the USA governments supported Latin American governments through military assistance such as aid, training and weapons. During this period, the US governments recognised any government able to maintain order. In Latin America, US governments directly supported authoritarian and semi-democratic governments, and intervened in the Caribbean and Central American countries. The Latin

American governments pleaded for more economic aid from the USA through their bilateral relations, multilateral diplomacy, and actions at the meetings of the United Nations and the OAS. In regard to the "North-South Conflict", many Latin American governments denounced the unjust structure of the economic order and international trade that always favoured northern countries, and they demanded greater support from industrialised countries in the development of South America.

During the era of President John F. Kennedy in the first half of the 1960s the US had two priorities: closer political relations with moderate Latin American governments and aid programs for development. The Kennedy administration, fearing that the ideas of the Cuban Revolution would expand to other Latin American countries, created an integral program with economic and military aspects (Schoultz 1998: 356–358). The Kennedy administration was convinced that the foreign policy of the US government in Latin America had not been successful because it did not give enough attention to the real problems which characterised the entire region: decades of neglect, little social development, poverty, inequalities, social injustice and lack of democratisation. For instance, the US believed that a true economic and social revolution in Latin America with US support was necessary, and that it would include a set of deep structural reforms for change and progress. The official policy was titled "Alliance for Progress," and it had three main objectives: social development, structural change, and democratisation. The most important points of the program were to develop and strengthen democratic institutions; accelerate economic and social development; defeat illiteracy and improve education in all areas; improve work conditions and wages; promote health programs, especially the eradication of epidemics; reform tax policies; expand agrarian reforms; control inflation and restore fiscal discipline; and stimulate private enterprises to generate employment. The Kennedy administration promised 20 billion dollars over 10 years, and delivered one billion dollars in 1962. This aid was channelled through the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the programs were implemented through governments and several social organisations. The Program compromised the support of the ECLAC, which provided technical personal and specialised studies. Militarily, the US aid financed programs against radical left organisations and public security, provided weapons, teams and training to Latin-American armed forces. But the Kennedy administration did not want to help authoritarian governments, ended military aid to Argentina and Guatemala, and even broke relations with non-democratic governments such as the Dominican Republic.

After the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963, the Alliance lost its strength. At the end of the 1960s, the administration of President Lyndon Johnson disregarded the Alliance for Progress because there were other priorities at home such as improving the domestic economy and gaining support for the American incursion in Vietnam. Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford feared the advances of the Soviet Union. During their terms in office, Cuba sent troops to Angola, the United States lost the Vietnam War and the US influence in the Middle East was threatened by the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1973. Internally, the USA suffered unemployment, inflation, and political tensions. In Latin America, the US government supported non-democratic governments again. For example, it used resources to finance the forces against leftist forces and governments such as Chile's socialist president, Salvador Allende (Hastedt 2005: 300–301). In the second half of the 1970s, President Jimmy Carter also changed the US foreign policy in Latin America. He was interested in improving the international image of the USA. The Carter administration was consistent in supporting democratic governments. This policy was carried out through periodic meetings with Latin American leaders with whom the president consulted on a series of matters. One of the most prominent cases was the call from President Carter to sugar producers to discuss the subsidies that his nation gave its producers, in Washington D.C. The Carter administration tried to resolve pending topics in order to avoid friction with Latin American countries. Among these topics, the most important one was the negotiation and signing of the Torrijos-Carter Treaty, which returned the sovereignty of the Panama Canal to Panama in 2000. The Carter administration focused on diplomacy in the US foreign policy, decreased the use of military force, and made human rights an important priority. The most popular case was Nicaragua; after the Sandinista revolution of 1979, the first reaction of Carter was to talk with the new leftist government and provide aid. The president sent emissaries to different countries to find out the real facts behind the issue. With this information, the Carter administration cut aid to countries such as Uruguay and Argentina. Likewise, the US government enlarged the budget for the International Commission of Human Rights and got 14 Latin American countries to ratify the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Cuba continued its intervention in Angola and Ethiopia, and the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan (1979). The American embassy in Iran was occupied by Islamic extremists. In Latin America, Nicaragua fell into the hands of a leftist revolutionary government (1979), and leftist extremist groups gained control of the government of El Salvador. In Jamaica, President Michael Manley moved closer to

Fidel Castro, and the small island of Grenada was invaded by Marxist rebels. The dominant view of world policy in the USA was very insecure, and confrontations with the Soviet Union were common. The Reagan administration saw Latin America as one of its main priorities, specifically Central America and the Caribbean. The US government moderately favoured all type of regimes when they were a guarantee against communism and the influence of the Soviet Union. In military relations, the sale of weapons was re-established and high volumes of military aid were delivered, such as 20 million US dollars to El Salvador in 1985. The American government continued aiding Central American governments in wars against rebels. Likewise, the US government intervened militarily in Grenada to remove Marxists groups. In Nicaragua the US financed the "contras" movement and exercised a permanent military pressure in the zone through the presence of aircraft off the coast of Honduras. During the second Reagan administration, the US government proposed that the leftist rebels of El Salvador work for change through elections. At the same time, the Reagan government helped Mexico surmount its recession in 1982, and played an important role in overcoming the debt crisis in Latin America.

In the 1990s, an integrated American foreign policy for Latin America emerged. The US government abandoned its dominant militaristic goals of the past, and incorporated more cooperative elements in inter-American relations. The new policy was called Enlargement and Engagement, adopted from the Republican government of President George Bush (1989–1993) onwards. It was consolidated in the Democratic administration of President Bill Clinton (1993–2001) and followed by the administration of the second President Bush (2001–2009). This policy included the support and promotion of democracy, free markets and trade. At the beginning of the 1990s, the supposed main threat for the security of the United States, the Soviet Union, disappeared. The USA became the greatest economic and military power, and had the added prestige and satisfaction of being the winner of a long ideological battle. The American model of democracy and a free market economy became hegemonic in the world. In Latin America, most countries that had had authoritarian governments between 1960 and 1980 became democratic, except Cuba and a few other countries. The US government designed the Strategy of Security for the Americas in 1995. In State Department documents, the government declared the prosperity and liberty of its citizens as priorities. This would be accomplished by protecting and maintaining world stability, especially in Latin

America. The US government recognised new threats: drug trafficking and terrorism, the trade and proliferation of weapons, weak governments, ethnic conflicts, humanitarian crisis, natural disasters, and immigration. Latin America acquired more importance for the US government, not only because of its proximity (Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean above all), but also because of its destabilising potential for the United States. Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia have been the main producers of cocaine in the world and the United States is probably the main consumer. This situation caused high expenses in health care centres and increased crime in the streets. The Caribbean, Buenos Aires and Mexico were the principal routes for the cocaine trade to the United States. Although democracy was and is the rule, in some countries Latin American governments and institutions were weak. Income distribution and lack of adequate regulations continued to be problems in the region. This causes discontent and frustration, and the conditions for crime and insecurity increase. Thus, poor conditions for important sectors of the population and lack of possibilities to improve living conditions and human development prompted a large flow of immigrants to the United States, causing complex problems for the society. The State Department declared the aforementioned issues as the principal threats for the countries, and urged the need for political answers to stabilise the hemisphere through an increase in prosperity. In the US government's view, democracy and human rights could help to provide a stable long-term political environment, which could economically help the middle class to grow and prosper. Economic development, free trade, and privatisations could help consolidate democracy and human rights. Democracy was regarded as a guarantee for peace. Free trade was the first prescription for economic growth because it promoted the use of comparative advantages, competitiveness, innovation, and greater efficiency.

In 1991, the economy of the USA suffered high unemployment rates, and nearly 10 million people could not find employment. Stimulation of the domestic market through exports was necessary. In this context, Latin America and the Caribbean became the third most important market for American exports between 1987 and 1993. Latin American economies grew between 3 and 4% per year, while the industrialised OECD countries only had a rate of 0.9%. The American investments in Latin America reached 89 billion US dollars. Three of the main oil exporters to the United States were Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, and Mexico. Chile was the main producer and exporter of copper, Brazil of steel and Jamaica, Surinam and Guyana of bauxite.

Since the 1990s, the USA has played an active role in the promotion of democracy and free markets. The US government has promoted presidential summits known as the Summit of the Americas. In these meetings, presidential groups have worked towards common goals. The US foreign policy created the mechanism of meetings and consultations at a high level that began for the first time in December of 1994 in Miami (later came Santiago in 1998, Quebec in 2001, and Mar del Plata in 2005, among others). The principal commitments decided at the summits were: to promote communities, fortify dialogue among social groups and a consensus regarding democracy, lend aid in areas such as judicial and legislative procedures, governmental reforms and other institutional changes, guarantee the respect of constitutional rights, promote instruments for the defence of human rights, provide regular financing of electoral processes, and fortify the role of local governments in each country. In 2001, the fundamental Democratic Chart for strengthening democracy and protection mechanisms was created. The US government cooperated through the Agency of International Development (USAID), regional programs set up to fortify democracy, support regional institutions and networks that served as agents for democratisation processes, promote human rights, ensure transparent elections, civil society, and decentralisation, and help implement judicial system reforms. Part of the American aid was conducted through the Pan-American Institute of Human Rights, the Center for Electoral Promotion and Advice which carried out training, publications and offered technical aid to governments.

Regarding relations between the armed forces and society, the US government supported stronger trust between the two. The first Summit of Defence of the Continent took place in Williamsburg in July 1995. There, 34 governments agreed to preserve democracy, develop measures of mutual confidence, work for the subordination of the armed forces to civilian control, participate in projects of humane relief and peace-keeping missions, and collaborate in the war against drugs. A complete revision of its military contacts with the region was initiated. The controversial School of the Americas was renamed as the "Western Hemisphere Institute for Security and Cooperation". The training that was regularly provided to Latin Americans had a special emphasis in the teaching of human rights. The peaceful resolution of regional conflicts was supported. It offered mediation in the conflict that Peru and Ecuador faced, 2005–2006, supported negotiations for the end of the civil war in El Salvador, assisted in the process of reconciliation in Nicaragua, and offered its services in the territorial disputes between Colombia and Venezuela, and El Salva-

dor and Honduras. In 1993, it led the multinational force of the United Nations that restored the democratic government of Jean Bertrand Aristide in Haiti.

The support and promotion of the free market and economic integration played an important role in helping Latin American countries to achieve more development and prosperity as guarantees of security in the Hemisphere. Through the enlargement of multilateral credit agency capital, the US government helped countries such as Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil to stabilise their economies. These countries were benefited by special support to pay credit services or undertake developmental programs. In exchange, the World Bank, BID and IMF required them to undertake far-reaching economic reforms in order to liberalise capital markets and trade, and facilitate privatisations. The most symbolic case was Mexico, where the US government offered a package of 40 billion dollars to avoid financial collapse in 1994. The free trade integration process was initiated by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); the USA, Mexico, and Canada became an important commercial area in the world with 426 million people and a volume of trade totalling 289.3 billion dollars. The US government justified the argument that NAFTA would create more jobs in the United States. This was thought of as a balance to control the instability that would come from Mexico. Thus, the United States was sure that through trade liberalisation Mexico would start democratisation. Furthermore, it was believed that trade liberation and cooperation would increase the control of drug and human trafficking. In this period, the US government began free trade agreement negotiations with Chile and other countries.

In 2001, President George W. Bush maintained the same political policies as his father and President Bill Clinton: strengthening and promoting democracy, free markets and free trade. However, from September 11, 2001, a new pillar of security reinforcement was created. The terrorist attacks that took place on that day affected American security profoundly. In a short time domestic measures for security were taken such as restructuring intelligence services, greater control of immigration, and creating a special department for the protection of American citizens, the Homeland Security Office, and the Patriot Act to prevent and investigate any source of terrorism. A new Strategy of National Security emerged that emphasised preventive war. Any country threatened by terrorist activities or supporting terrorist groups would face intervention, even when an offensive attack had not been initiated.

US foreign policy formed a coalition for the "war against terrorism". The cooperation involved treaties for coordinated actions against terrorism, detec-

tion measures, detailed lists of dangerous groups that promoted or practised terrorist acts, and offensive actions against Afghanistan and Iraq. Complementary policies to improve security included: an increase in national security, economic prosperity measures, reinforcement of the law, promotion of democracy, and answers to other global issues such as the environment, population growth, and health.

The Framework for Strategic Planning in 2004 followed national interests and focused on peace and security. Sustainable development and global interests were included, such as the promotion of international understanding and strengthening of diplomatic channels. The 14 strategic objectives did not include population or health issues.

The US government continued to support reinforcement programs for democracy, promoting the implementation of second-generation reforms which were discussed at the presidential summits of the Americas. In this context, the USA has supported programs that connect Latin American citizens with their governments, decentralise political power, and promote citizen participation in political procedures, public policies, transparency and government effectiveness.

The Human Aid, Conflict and Democracy Program, financed by USAID since 1996, included an annual budget of 2.4 million US dollars, a figure which had increased to 3.8 million US dollars by 2006. The objectives of the program are: to support policies and anticorruption reforms through networks, training and revising treaties; to protect human rights and achieve equal access to justice which is implemented through training programs at the Pan-American Institute of Human Rights and OAS; to fortify democratic political parties through financial aid; to support democratisation and decentralisation reforms through specific programs for management and citizen participation.

The US government has continued programs that encourage economic growth and free markets. Economic growth is essential to achieving stability and security. The USA has continued with the program "Special Opportunities for Development", which promotes agriculture and trade, and spent 40.6 million dollars in 2005 and 11.6 million dollars in 2006. This initiative aims to stimulate private sector institutions that support small businesses, reinforces civilian society through the promotion of unions (carried out by the Pan-American Center for Labor Solidarity), and improves legal frameworks and justice systems through the Centre of Regional Studies of Justice.

Another program involved in the objective of economic development is the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), whose budget was 1 billion US dollars in 2005 and 5 billion in 2006. The program is a global initiative that rewards

actions that: favour effective social investments, fight corruption, and open markets. At present there are three beneficiaries: Nicaragua, Bolivia and Honduras.

The US government continues to implement its agenda of free trade. There is new interest in continued trade with Latin America because of important trade partners such as the MERCOSUR. Latin America and the Caribbean are the main markets for American exports. NAFTA is another trade partner, and has doubled the trade between countries in ten years. After the free trade agreement with Chile (2003), American exports increased by 33%, and the Chilean and American market together by 27%. American exports increased by 100% during the last decade.

In the USA, there is a very positive perception regarding the agreements signed with Chile, Canada and Mexico. The American foreign policy agenda now includes: negotiating a free trade agreement with Andean countries such as Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador, ratifying the agreements with Central America and the Dominican Republic, and extending free trade agreements to other countries. The USA program of hemispheric cooperation provides 150 million US dollars each year to various countries in order to fortify their commercial capacity.

An important focus in American foreign policy is to change former military programs. There is special interest in the wars against terrorism and drugs. For "Plan Colombia", whose goal is to combat drugs, started in 2000 by the Colombian president, Andrés Pastrana, the US government provided a package of aid of more than 1.3 billion US dollars. Before 9/11 the main objective of this aid was to stop and control the production of drugs, eradicate cultivations, and offer alternative cultivation programs. After 9/11, the program was expanded with more than 500 million US dollars to fight insurgency and prevent traditional violence in Colombia, especially the guerrilla warfare of the FARC – *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), ELN – *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (National Liberation Army), and AUC – *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia*, the paramilitary self-defence forces of Colombia. The US government wanted to avoid the possibility that these guerrilla groups could transform themselves into allies of international terrorist organisations. Since September 2001, the official list of terrorist groups includes the ELN, FARC, and AUC. In 2003, American troops intervened to combat guerrilla groups and organised crime. At the end of 2003, the US government reinforced its cooperation with the launching of the Patriotic Plan, a military offensive to recover territories in the hands of the FARC.

Anti-terrorist aid between 2002 and 2005 provided 30 million US dollars in efforts to prevent ransoms in Colombia. In addition, a total of 3.9 million US

dollars was used for the borders of Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina. In 2004, 20 million dollars was spent by Mexico to increase border security through new technologies such as computer systems and training Mexican immigration officials.

The US government has invested in weapons and military assistance. There was a progressive increase of military assistance between 2002 and 2003, the number of Latin-American troops trained by the United States increasing by 50%, the majority from Colombia, with 12,967 soldiers in 2003, while Bolivia had 245, Panama 914, Peru 680 and Ecuador 662. Peru, Bolivia and Colombia were cocaine producers. Colombia has been the major focus of instability and potential terrorism in Latin America according to the United States. In 2000, military assistance began to decrease, in contrast to economic and social aid. However, military assistance recovered in 2002 after the terrorist attacks. In 1996, military assistance was 161 million US dollars and economic aid was 547 million. In 2000, economic aid totaled more than 950 million dollars. In 2003, military assistance provided 866 million dollars and economic aid totaled 937 million.

Currently, American foreign policy in Latin America focuses on democracy, free markets, and free trade, and represents important progress in the American approach. Changes in the international context explain part of this trend. Between 1990 and 2008, the economic and political stability of Latin American countries was very important for the USA to continue the path of prosperity (Noriega 2009). Therefore, the United States had to safeguard its borders against terrorism and organised crime. Through its support of democracy, economic growth, and security for Latin American countries, the US government has created allies and strong partners for its war against terrorism.

In Latin America there is criticism regarding some priorities of the USA. One criticism is that the USA prioritises the military over other important topics such as economic and social development. There is criticism of immigration policies (approximately four million Aztecs had to wait to normalise their legal situation as immigrants in the USA). Many people of Latin America believed that US policy-makers ignored the financial crisis that struck Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay in 2002. Many people believe in trade and social development, while rejecting terrorism and military security. Nevertheless, the facts and figures clearly show that there have been tremendous advances in cooperation between the United States and Latin America.

Summary

This study began with a discussion about how historical traditions have played a primary role in shaping Latin America's current situation; on the one hand economic growth, on the other hand extensive poverty. Marginalisation and social exclusion, restricted autonomy, lack of stability, and lack of consolidated democracies are some of the current conditions in Latin America that are a result of long historical precedents.

Three factors explain factors such as these (i.e. underdevelopment) in Latin America in the present time: 1. Segregated society that is not integrated, 2. Authoritarian political culture (centralist, non-inclusive), 3. Lack of genuine participation in political institutions. Historic tradition, especially the conquest and colonisation of Latin America by the Spanish and Portuguese, helps to explain how some of these factors came to exist and persist. Iberian societies had strong convictions that their culture was superior, and their religion (Christianity) was seen as the pinnacle of civilisation. From initial colonisation, the monarchies wanted complete political and cultural domination. The colonising monarchies also wanted consolidation, and strengthening of their state for more complete control of the native population. The monarchy's regulations promoted the spread of conservative European social structures, institutions and products (vegetables and animals). At the same time, atrocities were committed against native populations (illness, slavery, abuse, conversion) and a bureaucratic-administrative apparatus (legal and administrative) emerged that held tight control with ordinances that outlined every aspect of colonial life. The historical legacy of colonisation has had many consequences for Latin America: the transfer of European institutions, a 500 year legacy that influences everything from urbanisation to religion and culture, measures which separated the natives from the colonists, and a conservative social structure that was very difficult to change.

Authoritarian traditions and economic dependence on commodities are also legacies and practices from the colonial period. The ideas from the Enlightenment crossed the Atlantic Ocean with the spread of European colonialism and the ruling governments in Latin America became absolutist and modern (Spain and Portugal). These governments took free trade steps to provide incentives for mining and agriculture to develop natural resources. Free trade produced commercial expansion and signified concrete benefits for many sectors. However, measures for the improvement of production – like free trade, elimination

of taxes that impeded production, stimuli to facilitate the use of natural resources with modern technologies, investments to improve transportation, incentives for promoting areas with export advantages like agriculture and mining – generated very vulnerable economic structures in Latin America, dependence on commodities, and foreign trade. The fundamental economic goal was not accomplished, mainly because the economic systems of Spain and Portugal were not in conditions to satisfy the demand of the American territories with manufactured products. Even after the colonial period ended, the rich/poor, developed/less-developed relationship between Western Europe and its former colonies was established. Thus, Europe used its economic power to further influence, control, and profit from Latin America's economy. In most Latin American countries, the economy and politics were still dominated by a small Creole elite, descendents of the colonisers. This hierarchy of power was established through Colonialism.

In the first decades of the nineteenth century, the costly wars for independence and differences in political ideologies among the elites were obstacles to progress. The period immediately after independence was characterised by economic stagnation, political instability, chaos, and authoritarian leaders. The Enlightenment was not successful, and most of the new states did not experience a real revolution and continued colonial era practices, or fell into long periods of chaos.

The application of liberal economic principles produced a radical transformation of living conditions both in Latin America and in the rest of the world, and in the region reinforced open markets, foreign trade as a motor of economic growth, and modernisation. In their new role in the international market, Latin America countries acted as exporters of commodities and importers of consumer goods, capital, and technology. The arrival of European immigrants was welcomed to help industrialise and cooperate through knowledge transfer and capital. Liberalism's positive legacies were foreign trade and external investments, because improved economic growth left Latin America better prepared for the subsequent stages in development and globalisation. On the other hand, liberalism reinforced the status of Latin America as a peripheral region in the international order – very dependent on foreign capital and technologies.

Despite socialist ideology being incorporated into many of the policies of Latin American governments from the 1940s to the 1980s (ISI for one), Cuba has been Latin America's long-term manifestation of socialist revolution/government. There have been other revolutions and socialist governments in several countries, but these have mostly been short-lived.

The Catholic Church has had an extreme impact on economic, political and social development around the world, and especially in Latin America. Like other movements, the Catholic Church designed reform policies to address socio-economic problems in Latin America such as poverty, social exclusion, and inequalities in social development. The Church provided solutions for reforms to solve social problems and improve its status in relation to the state. In the late 1960s, the Latin American Church encouraged agrarian reforms and lower inflation, increased industrialisation, improved education, and supported a program for more housing and changes in labour legislation. Some reforms lasted, others did not, and they had many implications for the role of the state even today. For example, all Latin American countries incorporated into their constitutions the principles of solidarity and social justice as fundamental for the state.

From 1940 until 1980, the state played a key guiding role in the ISI strategy by creating a climate for industrial development. Tariffs on consumer imports, import quotas, multiple exchange rates making state-favoured imports cheaper, and politically determined interest rates to facilitate borrowing and industrial expansion were all used. In certain strategic sectors (steel, petroleum, electricity), the state took a direct role in production, through either nationalising existing industries, or establishing new ones. The attempt to strengthen the industrialisation process led countries to attract multinational companies and foreign investment to set up subsidiaries to manufacture for their domestic markets, sometimes with the condition that they use parts manufactured nationally by relatively small domestic firms. The major ISI achievements were higher GDP growth rates in Latin America during the periods 1945–1972 and 1972–1981 than had been achieved before or since and faster growth of GDP per capita. In some countries manufacturing became an engine for growth, supported by new transport and communications infrastructure, energy supplies, and specialist agencies for the development of the industrial, mining and agricultural sectors. However, ISI had structural problems (1960s onwards): manufacturing with protective barriers for a relatively small home market resulted in inefficient, high-cost industries, often having a monopoly in their own market and lacking the competition that might spur greater efficiency; the bias against industrial exports resulted in countries remaining highly dependent on earning foreign exchange from their traditional primary commodity exports in order to import the materials needed by their manufacturing sector. Yet these traditional sectors were often neglected or discriminated against in the drive to industrialise, giving rise to a growing balance

of payments deficit as countries faced reduced foreign exchange earning but increased costs for imports for the capital investment needed by the growing state industrial sector and for the social investment required by the modernisation process.

Neoliberalism replaced the concept that an important condition for social and economic progress was state intervention to correct the imbalances in markets. Instead, neoliberalism assumed that the one and only way to have a healthy economy and be able to develop was the market and opportunities for private initiatives, avoiding the over-regulation and artificial taxes of the state. Neoliberalism proposed to generate a free trade policy and globalisation of commerce. It would open the markets, eliminate distortions, get rid of protectionist bonds, and take away from the state the control of the distribution of resources. Neoliberalism also proposed to increase transparency and participation in the market. The new view was that neoliberalism was the only way to end underdevelopment, and it should be done through structural reforms focused on open economies, and that long-range growth could only be reached through a new favourable orientation of economic policies to the exporting sector. The new strategy of development required the liberalisation of economies, commercial openings by eliminating protectionist barriers (tariff and non-tariff) and structural adjustments like legislation. The adjustment programs that were requested by international agencies specifically consisted of reduction of fiscal expenses (fiscal deficit), restrictive monetary policies to control inflation, reforms of the tax system to consolidate the treasury, elimination of state subsidies, removal of price controls (prices related to law of supply and demand, including state services), deregulation of markets, efficient distribution of economic resources, increased privatisation of public and state businesses, and profit management.

Through neoliberal policies, Latin America may have inserted itself better into the world economy through globalisation, but that does not mean that everyone has received the benefits from this. With the economic reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, Latin American countries experienced a serious recession. This included lack of capital (because of debt payment), and a decrease in investment, production, and consumption. Public social services like health and education deteriorated and caused serious social problems, and 35% of the population suffered from poor living conditions. The problems caused a large amount of distrust in government.

At present, an alternative point of view to neoliberalism focuses on the structural problems in Latin American countries. Population growth and inter-

nal migration to urban areas gave rise to economic problems such as poverty and the persistence of income inequalities. Latin American countries are dependent on industrialised countries, both technologically and in terms of debt. Everybody agrees that markets needed to be deregulated, liberalised, and partially privatised, but alternative opinions believe that there should have been complementary state action.

Conclusion: State, national economy and reforms

After decades of instability and authoritarian experiences, since 1978 Latin America has become a democratic continent with economic growth and progress. Currently, there are five important related tasks: economic growth, social equality, redesign of public institutions, democratisation of democracy and globalisation.

The signs of globalisation have been contradictory. On the one hand, greater interdependence, transport progress, economic growth to respond to the needs of large global economic players, rather than focus on the development of one's own country, and on the other hand, vulnerability as shown by the current economic crisis (2008–2009), increased poverty, and social fragmentation. Governments have to lead by applying pressure to resolve both domestic and international problems. The most persistent problem in Latin America is the low level of human security, development, and socio-economic rights. Extreme poverty and inequality have disqualified millions of people from becoming "agents". The institutional capacity of Latin American governments does not appear strong enough to manage the national economy toward better living conditions and social welfare for the majority. The region suffers from an institutional delay, preventing it from facing the new challenges raised by globalisation. Institutional delay causes problems of governability in several countries due to a lack of state legitimacy. For example, in the last two decades this crisis of governability has appeared as a recurring theme in many countries (Arce 2009). In Latin America there has been disenchantment and disagreement regarding the economic reforms introduced as a direct consequence of the debt crisis and neoliberalism in the 1980s. The 1990s were poor in socio-economic and human development. On the one hand, the economic indicators presented a good GIP in relation to other regions in the world (annual average Latin America 3.4%, United States 2.2% and European Union 2.0%). Without

any doubt, economic growth and macroeconomic stability demonstrated the success of first generation reforms. On the other hand, alarming information from the World Bank indicated that 36% of the population was considered poor. Moreover, the difference in incomes and living conditions between rich and poor populations has increased dramatically, and opportunities for development have become extremely unequal (Valdivieso 2003).

In Latin America there is growing awareness that free markets and economic growth cannot operate alone, separately from social justice and political democracy (Colloredo-Mansfeld 2009; García-Heras 2009). One can appreciate that first generation reforms, neoliberalism and globalisation did not solve many issues, because their object was to expand markets and support economic stability.

Bad economic policy can erode political stability, but inequality in income distribution and lack of opportunities, liberties and political expression can create an unmanageable country. The improvement in quality of democracy is not a natural consequence of the democratisation of political regimes. This improvement requires, among other things, authentic civic participation. During the last wave of democratisation in Latin America at the end of the 1970s, the experiences of political regimes led to the realisation that the existence of democratic practices such as periodic elections, political parties, and classical liberties are not enough to improve the quality of social integration, national cohesion, democratic life and development. The latter requires authentic participation of citizens, individually and collectively, in all spheres of socio-economic and political life, as agents who can experience the basic promises of democracy. Public opinion would like greater efficiency from states. For example, excessive bureaucracy should be reduced, and social participation should increase. The ways to have a better future are through citizen participation in the administration of public policies, measures promoting transparency, efficiency and nondiscrimination, and modernisation reforms (Valdivieso 2001, 2007).

Traditional contradictions between formal declared rights and the practical use of rights persist in many countries of the world. Certainly, it is recognised that every person has minimal rights that correspond to human rights and a democratic government, but the majority of people have difficulty in exercising their basic economic and social rights. In many regions of Latin American countries, many people do not feel protected from institutional or social violence. With difficult access to state institutions, many are forced to live in poverty, systematic humiliation, and insecurity. The violence can be practised in the

same institutions or services that are designed to serve the people. If the people are materially and legally vulnerable and poor, and systematically humiliated, they cannot be well integrated in society and state, cohesion becomes weak, and development becomes difficult.

Given this background, reforms are necessary to increase socio-economic development, and the quality of life of the people and the democracy. If these reforms are really used for the exercise of citizens' rights in their day to day lives, Latin American countries will achieve a better future. Currently, Latin American reforms focus on redefining the tasks of the state and its institutions, renovating the state apparatus, and fortifying its intervention to integrate the national economy in a sustainable social order. For example, the present reforms aim to strengthen ties between the output of state institutions and input of civil society (citizens' needs). The relationship between state and civil society needs to be redefined.

As in other regions of the world, in Latin America the state is an institutionalised channel for modernisation and development. In some cases, there are numerous circumstances that explain the strength of the states and institutions: historical legacy, state identity, efficient institutions, and an increase in state regulations in the two last centuries. Nevertheless, one cannot overlook the important role of the civil society. At critical moments in historical development, the society's civil organisations have led strategies and projects for development. For example, the Chilean economic model and several related policies were produced in the 1950s and 1960s through initiatives in the social sphere, centre-left groups and extreme right or "gremialistas" and scholars of the Catholic University of Chile. The same thing happened with justice reforms in the 1990s through the efforts of some specific civilian organisations (Valdivieso/Vargas 2003). Consequently, civilian society has gained influence over time, and a case can be made that some of them have made excellent contributions to modernisation and institutional change.

Currently, participation is a main ingredient of development. The concept of participation refers to conventional and non-conventional participation. The former is institutionalised participation – for example voting in elections – while the second corresponds to participation in voluntary associations, protest actions, or collective initiatives, and through confidence and trust in other people or institutions. Latin American democracies have traditionally had conventional participation. Therefore, regarding new reforms, greater participation and quality of democracy should be understood as the creation and operation of consultations and intervention mechanisms of people who are not part

of the government apparatus, between electoral processes at several levels of public policy.

Reforms

The struggle to modernise and develop Latin American countries started to change in the 1980s, when the first steps in this direction were taken through early reforms. “First Generation” reforms focused on opening the markets, achieving macroeconomic stability, and reducing the state’s size and its role in the economy. After years of attempting to implement the measures of the “Washington Consensus” (1990), it became clear that these reforms were not enough to develop Latin American countries. Consequently, an understanding emerged regarding the need for institutional and social reforms.

Reforms to the state, economy, and society in Latin America should express the consensus of legal principles and documents such as the constitution, organic laws, and international agreements, and be related to human rights and development. Civil, political, economic and social rights are interdependent and related with economic, social and institutional reforms. To transform all citizens into agents with full rights, a series of institutions and practices that provide minimal social and economic conditions is necessary. In this way, the reforms should improve health, education, and access to justice as conditions for the use of rights and human development, among others.

One of the main arguments in favour of the necessity and importance of new reforms in Latin America is that the region suffers from an institutional delay, preventing it from facing the new challenges raised by globalisation. New reforms can help to re-legitimate the state through support for the state, citizenship participation, and more equality. The reform agenda can include the modernisation and fortification of state activities (inputs and outputs), health reforms, education, and other public services.

Latin America needs stronger states with capabilities to provide essential functions. This is the only way to be stronger in a period marked by the effects of the mega-trends of globalisation and democratisation. Globalisation provides possibilities for growth, cooperation, integration, and more connections to global markets. As for democracy, Latin America now has four decades of experience. The participation of the citizens in the decision-making process, in planning, implementation, and control of policies and budgets, is essential to gain consensus and social cohesion. These factors will contribute to increased political legitimacy and governability. Besides, scholars see decentralisation and

governability as key concepts from which to develop reforms. Decentralisation signifies strengthening local governments such as municipalities because they can promote efficiency in development and civil participation. Local organisations and institutions have the best chances to promote efficiency in development and civil participation. A good example of decentralisation in reforms is the participative decisions on fiscal budgets. Since the 1990s, several countries have introduced mechanisms for citizen participation at community levels (for example, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Argentina and Chile). Through the discussion about budgets and fiscal expenditures, several citizens' organisations expressed their problems and needs, and took part in important decisions for the future of their communities.

Goals of the new reforms are: to decrease poverty, introduce more regulations, and bring about decentralisation of government to more local government for more input from citizens. The new reforms included different fields such as economic and public administration, more regulations to ensure no monopolies occur (e.g. electricity, telecommunications or water supply) and make sure standards are upheld, social security, education, health, politics to improve citizen participation and reforms in the justice system. In a positive sense, the new reforms are essential to improving participation and involvement by more people in democratic institutions. At the same time, socio-political, institutional and economic reforms are necessary for better economic performance and conditions for democracy. From a more practical point of view, new reforms are necessary in order to improve the living conditions of the people and provide better governance.

Today, reforms are attempting to improve: living conditions, relations between the state and civil society and governability, and state justice. The most important objectives for the reforms are the achievement of poverty reduction and social development; better distribution of justice; better integration of vulnerable and marginalised sectors; a more efficient institutional framework, and improvements in infrastructure. Some very important factors to consider in relation to these reforms are: functional competition or creation of a better atmosphere for free competition (through regulations); decentralisation; tax policies; fight against poverty; cultural stimulus as an element of integration into the society. The effective regulation requires an independent judicial system, efficient legislative oversight of regulatory bodies, high levels of administrative competence, legal protection for producers and consumers, independent and inquisitive, media, and scrutiny by citizens and non-governmental organisations.

In present-day Latin America, there is a new approach to the connection between the state and the national economy through reforms. First, reforms should aspire to respect and promote human beings and their rights. Second, public institutions should be reorganised to adapt their structures to social and economic needs through greater participation and decentralisation. Third, a consensus between public actors and civil society is essential, the only way reforms can function is through gradual improvement because there are diverse interests and points of view in state and society, and changes in customs are never fast. Fourth, the follow-up function of citizens is crucial for implementation and efficiency. Fifth, the re-design of institutions plus citizen participation operate as tools of political education to strengthen social networks. Sixth, civil society organisations can operate as a bridge between citizens and institutions by defending citizens' interests. Seventh, the educational process will engage in a constant fight against disinterested citizens, especially among the youth.

Reforms, participation, and democracy

Democracy can be defined as a regime which offers access to the principal governmental positions by means of elections, which are both clean and institutionalised, and guarantees diverse liberties during and between these elections. As a result, democracy is understood as a regime with basic characteristics such as open, institutionalised elections. Nevertheless, these minimal conditions do not assure democratic quality and the full participation of agents. As already mentioned, political institutions should extend the quality of agents through the exercise of political, economic, social and cultural rights. The integration of knowledge and social interest guarantees more efficiency, effectiveness, and greater control of governmental acts. All of these factors are essential conditions for economic performance, sustainability, and the fight against corruption. It is necessary that citizens and organisations increase their participation and responsibility in the political process. This is the one and only method to achieve representative and legitimate long term democracies. More interaction by citizens in public policies will produce a greater quality of democracy. If people find outlets for their active participation as citizens, they will develop agency capacities. The next question to ask is how participation can expand. The answer is not towards a few specialised social organisations different from governments, but towards a greater amount of citizens.

Citizens' rights were not created by reforms, because they arrived along with human beings. With greater steps toward more equitable access in the world, it would become possible to exercise rights. With concrete possibilities to exercise rights, vulnerable and marginalised people, majorities in Latin America, could identify democracy as a minimal public good, like access to justice and human security conditions. Furthermore, the exercise of these rights contributes to the transition from a passive culture, without the input of citizens, to a more critical and participative culture that allows democracy to flourish.

The objectives of the current reforms are the democratisation of democracy through the increase of access to basic goods, improvements in health systems, and education. The result is referred to as re-legitimate institutions (the executive, legislative, judicial system, etc.). Economic performance is a necessary condition to strengthen the middle class and eradicate poverty, and the experience of the last few decades shows that it is possible to achieve. In addition, improvements in education have been essential to the exercise of human rights and the increase in citizen participation in democracies. A good general education is key for economic growth as well as for learning how political and justice systems function with empowerment.

In the case of Latin America, there is no other way to develop than to redistribute parts of incomes and opportunities. Redistribution is difficult because of opposition by privileged social groups and actors. For this reason, redistribution should be prudently undertaken in order not to provoke an aggressive response (the consequences in the past were not good). After stabilising the economy and restoring democracies with different degrees of quality, Latin American countries must now make changes to increase equality, focus on democratic practices, implement transparent practices, and become a more integrated part of our globalised world.



TADEUSZ PALECZNY

The State and Nation-forming Processes in Latin America

Numerous controversies are associated with the search for a useful – i.e. true in description and efficient in explanation – system for reconstruction of the progress of processes of social, cultural, political and economic integration of the peoples of Latin America. From the beginning they lead to numerous questions of various degrees of generality and significance. Ordering these may allow us to formulate more precisely the problem and define the path leading to a description of it, and also to explain the progress of nation-forming processes in Latin America. Of special importance is the definition of their nature, and also of the role of individual cultural units – family and tribal, ethnic, national, racial, religious and language groups – in the reinforcement of national integration.

First, questions arise about the nature of the integration processes that consolidate the various components, constituent elements, mostly racial, ethnic, regional and denominational, into broader social systems. Are we dealing with the continuation of European models of integration, or with a new cultural, political and economic order? Did Europeans, in this case Iberians, exert a dominant influence on the shaping of Latin American societies? To what degree may we speak in this case about an own, independent path of development being forged in Latin American cultures? To what degree are we looking at a homogeneous culture, and to what degree a multiplicity of cultures? Is it justified to characterise an area of uniform religion, language, colonial tradition, and resulting values and common customs in the name of civilisation? Is there a spirituality, a mentality specific to Latin American cultures whose manifestations are mysticism, irrationalism, and the tendency to formation of communities? How big is the influence of racial amalgamation processes on the Latin American “option” of integrative processes, including nation-forming? For that reason, what is the position assumed by Latin Americans of mixed racial origin, especially Mestizos? What role did the state play in the shaping of

the cultures and civilisations of Latin America? Can one speak about the institution of the nation state, or would it be more proper to use the notion of civic society? Are Christianisation and Europeanisation really the most important processes of shaping of identity for Latin Americans? Is it possible to apply the laws of westernisation, globalisation, and/or the model of Americanisation in reference to the cultures of Latin America? Did the United States impose upon Latin America the concept of "dependent" development? Is this concept being implemented besides the economy and the state also in nation-forming processes? Can the relatively highly integrated socially and cultured civic societies of Latin America be characterised in the categories of nation states or nation cultures?

To order the questions, both asked and unasked, in this paper I distinguish the following areas of analysis:

1. Can the indigenous Latin American cultures, represented by autochthonous peoples, currently develop towards nation societies? Or is this more a case of domination of connections of the pre-national type? Do Latin American societies, with all their complexity, transform into groupings of relatively homogeneous national culture, or rather into heterogeneous pluralistic civilisation? What is taking place in the nation-forming processes with local communities of autochthonous peoples, and also with ethnic groups created by European and Asian immigrants? Do these cultures yield to homogenisation, disappearance, and reduction to the identity of the Brazilian or Mexican national identification type, or are there new areas of connections appearing, characteristic of culturally complex and pluralist societies? Are the categories of Latinos – white and non-white – integrating and nationalising at the same pace and to the same extent?
2. What mechanisms were decisive for the actual development of integration processes in Latin American countries? Can the individual phases of these processes be quantitatively singled out? Have Iberisation and Christianisation been among the most important processes shaping the cultural identity of the Latinos? What role in Latin American nation-shaping processes was played by the phenomena of Mestizoism, indigenism, pan-Indianism, and pan-Americanism?
3. Are Latin American societies a continuation of European models of integration, and do they repeat the principles of nation-forming processes present on the old continent? Do they select and shape their own path of cultural, civic, and civilisational bonds? To what extent can we speak about the existence of original, separate principles governing the processes of assimilation resulting from the nature of Latin American societies?

4. Is it *nations* that we are dealing with in Latin America? If so, in what sense and scope? Does the racial, ethnic and regional variety not form a significant barrier in the transformation of complex, multicultural, highly non-homogeneous, socially disintegrated, economically unstable, structurally stratified civic societies into national cultures? What is the level of ethnocentrism and nationalism in Latino ideologies and identities? Can one speak about the opposition between European monocentrism of conservative political elites and cultural white minorities, and the polymorphism and pluralism of the liberally-oriented racially mixed and “coloured” Latinos?

The areas of analysis defined by the four groups of questions listed above shall allow the ordering of notions and descriptions of the nature and progress of nation-forming processes in Latin America. Nation or civic society, culture or civilisation, multicultural and pluralist character or monocentrism and homogenisation, conservative or liberal model of development, Iberisation and enforced assimilationism or integration and voluntary acculturation, Christianisation or religious syncretism, European, Western or a home-grown – Latin American – path of development?

The actual nation-forming processes in Latin America run between the extremities of these dichotomies, embracing the dependencies of both types, connecting and configuring anew external and internal influences hailing from the cultural heritage of indigenous inhabitants of Latin America and from the traditions of the arriving cultures, settling and colonising the continent.

Outline of analysis of nation-forming processes in Latin America

Culture	Civilisation
the Romantic model	the Enlightenment model
Iberisation	integration
Christianisation	syncretism
language, religious, racial homogenisation	heterogenisation, assimilation, acculturation, amalgamation, Latinisation
nation	civic society
monocentrism	polymorphism
conservatism	liberalism
ethnocentrism	pluralism

The table contains a simplified, general outline of the analysis that I use for the further description and explanation of causes and results, genesis, progress, and mechanisms that govern the development of nation-forming processes in

Latin America. The societies of Latin American countries have been developing according to both European and American – Western – cultural standards, and to the mechanisms of political, economic, and cultural integration that they themselves developed.

1. The state and national culture in Latin American tradition

Two major European traditions have made a visible mark on the processes of social, cultural, and political integration of peoples inhabiting the two American continents. Convergent in some aspects, they are nevertheless prevalently divergent in their assumptions and impact on Latin American nation-forming processes. The two great traditions, namely Enlightenment and Romanticism, are similar in their belief that in the process of development and progress, the peoples – autochthonous cultures of the two Americas – found themselves beyond the mainstream, on the margins of events and phenomena dominated by European national cultures. The partisans of both theoretical traditions preached hegemony of national European cultures in the shaping of social and cultural life in the British as well as the Spanish, Portuguese, French, and Dutch colonies.

The Enlightenment preached the primacy of the state over tradition, language, religion and culture – in its broad sense – as integrative and bonding factors. The highest and the fullest stadium of development of societies in Enlightened thought was the European nation state treated as a system of organisation for civic society. The nation was also perceived in the categories of state and political integration as a community of citizens equal to one another and before the sovereign government. In Enlightened theories, the status of nation was awarded only to those cultural communities that had their own states. To exist and develop, a nation needed its own political organisation. On the power of historical lag behind the romantic concept of Hegel – which made reference to the assumptions of Enlightenment concepts on the primacy of the natural national bond implemented in an own state – “bereaved” non-European cultures – as devoid of a certain “spirit” of the nation, the founding principle that would award the primitive, wild, barbarian peoples with the ability to construct their own sovereign governments – of the right to political national subjectivity. To quote Leopold Zea, “Hegel speaks of the existence of

two Americas, in which the spirit finds implementation; one subjugated by Anglo-Saxon nations, and the precursors of the other – subjugated by Iberian nations. Both still need to conquer what has been left of nature, they must liberate the spirit from the necessities that nature imposes on it” (Zea 1993: 37).

Following this concept, indigenous populations, tribal cultures lagging in development behind European cultures and continuing their existences more “in nature” than “in culture”, should be subjected to the civilisational influence of European cultures, swallowed and incorporated by cultures of the “higher” order. Following the same principle, the champions of protection of the rights of autochthonous Indians, including the initiator of the idea Bartolomé de las Casas, were building the foundations of the enlightened principle that the spirituality of individuals should be protected – not cultural groups sentenced to being swallowed by European civilisation and disappearance or marginalisation. The road to the eradication of autochthonous cultures was to lead through Christianisation but also racial and ethnic amalgamation, which was initially legally permitted.

The romantic cultural model of national integration considered the nation – treated as a cultural community – as the most important factor and centre of social integration. It is culture, and especially the language, religion, and the belief in common ethnogenesis, that determine the division of humankind into distinct nations and ethnic groups. States are only a certain developmental phase of nations and – once they cease to fulfil their integrative functions – they may disappear (Znaniński 1990). In the “cultural” understanding, nations and ethnic groups let the most important type of social integration emerge, and the states only represent large cultural communities that may also create civilisations. The differentiation of ethnic, national and racial groups leads to such a division of the world where the dominant role is played by the fairly homogeneous states. Nations that are better organised politically, more powerful militarily, and larger in the sense of human, economic, and territorial potential, show a tendency to expansion (Znaniński 1990). Nations, according to of the followers of this theoretical orientation, are the largest communities, growing basically from the same foundation as tribal and ethnic groups. National affiliation is based on the fact of being born, and does not result from the choice that is a consequence of origin. The identity of individuals is shaped within a cultural group, within which there exists – apart from the sense of a community bond – a powerful ideological bond shaped both on the grounds of conviction about the existence of a common ethnogenesis and sharing the same values, using the same language, and following the same religious creed.

The state complements the cultural integration of the nation, and the sanctioning of its capacity to independent, sovereign existence. In this sense, the nation becomes an autotelic, autonomous cultural group: the only one to have its own state institutions.

Following the romantic tradition, where the dominant principle of shaping the cultural and national bond is shared origin – biological heritage, the primitive, autochthonous cultures in both the Americas had no opportunity to transform into nations. In the new reality, the image of the social structure of populations of the two Americas, on the grounds of the radical assumptions, assumed the form of dichotomy. On the one hand, there were the “savages”, socially disadvantaged, culturally depreciated, religiously and civilisationally underdeveloped, with the status of conquered people and slaves; on the other there were the dominant “white lords”, Christians, representing higher developed national cultures and European civilisation. In the initial phase, this model dominated the processes of social and cultural integration, excluding from them permanently the clan and tribal cultures of indigenous peoples.

The laws of the colonial model of development, dividing the cultures of peoples inhabiting the two Americas into autochthonous and European – backward, savage and barbarian, and civilised and developed – theoretically dominated the social and cultural development at least to the times when the colonies became independent, and practically – in the sense of changing the legal and political order – to the moment of razing the dichotomous structure based on slavery. To quote Leopold Zea, “Thus the Christian and European project, which justified the first wave of expansion in the sixteenth century in America, led to the establishment of the emancipative project of the Latinos early in the nineteenth century. Incidentally, the emancipative project was the conclusion of another European project, which in turn was the reaction of European modernity to the antiquated project of Christianity. This reaction was visible in the confrontation of Christianity with modernity. Part and parcel of modernity is the European project, which aims at dominating the entire world, failing at the same time to recognise the right of Iberian imperialism to hegemony. This is the project of so-called Western Europe, carried out by the nations of the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands in North America and in some areas of the Antilles, spreading from there into the America that remains under Iberian domination. This project is embodied in the North American Puritan concept” (Zea 1993: 22).

The model of the Enlightenment, which allowed the establishment of independent states within the same, Spanish-speaking, Catholic, Iberian cultural

tradition, became attractive for the new republican political elites of Latin America. It awarded the status of nation state to populations that were tribally, ethnically, racially and linguistically divided. Operating at the same time were the criteria of divisions transferred directly from the Hegelian tradition, where ethnic origin and affiliation to a cultural group determined placement on the scale of power, riches, and prestige. This is how the dimensions of social and cultural stratification, regional and ethnic, and ideological and political divisions developed and consolidated for at least three centuries. Following the disputes about the scope of participation of members of non-European cultures in the establishment of the new social order – also of the political and legal, cultural, and economic nature – and cultural regulations, conservative and liberal concepts arose and developed to defend the hegemony of the white, Christian population, as did those that allowed the participation of members of tribal and racial autochthonous groups. Additional conflicts and disputes conducted against their background were borne from the presence of Africans brought to both Americas as slaves bereft of the right to maintain their cultural tradition. The coloured people had language, religion, and the values of national European cultures enforced, yet the scope of the phenomenon was limited and guarded by social, religious, and legal barriers.

The initial phase of building integrated Latin American societies was conducted in the conditions of colonial territorial, administrative, legal, and structural links and relations, which with few exceptions excluded the possibility of full participation of indigenous Indians and Blacks. The foundations of cultures of the future states developed in the milieu of white colonial elites operating in the administrative centres of Spanish, Portuguese, British, French and Dutch colonies. After routing the French (apart from the Quebec province in Canada and other remnants in the form of diaspora cultures, for examples the Acadians and Cajuns) and the Dutch (apart from small enclaves in the Caribbean and South America) from both the Americas, the Anglo-Saxon and Iberian models competed against each other in both, with the latter being present in the Hispano-American and the Lusitano-American variety in Brazil.

The cultural model found a far lesser area of implementation, as it rendered more difficult the processes of integrating the citizens of the new states hailing from various racial, ethnic or national, linguistic, and religious groups. Latin America became an area of implementation of the Enlightenment principle identifying the nation with the civic society, and finding in the state – in line with the Weberian sociological paradigm – the most important nation-forming factor (Weber 2002). Concepts taken from the Enlightenment allowed the estab-

lishment and development of integrational principles according to which all the citizens of the state could belong to the same cultural space and state space at the same time. People who did not speak Spanish or Portuguese and/or did not belong to a Christian religion were situated on the margin of national civic societies. Such a situation was prevalent at least to the end of the twentieth century. Currently, new concepts of the Latin American society-civilisation are being formulated: universalised cultural domination, the pluralistic "cosmic race"; new, multicultural nations mixed racially and ethnically; religiously syncretic with hybrid, pluralistic types of cultural identities and bonds (Campa 1999; Souto Maior 2003; Vasconcelos 1993).

In both Americas, the state became the most important factor for building bonds of the national and civilisational type. Much like in other multicultural societies of a postcolonial, immigrant pedigree, the processes of reinforcing territorial integration, language homogenisation, civic solidarity, and the shaping of supra-racial and supra-regional bonds occurred thanks to the state, leading to the establishment and development of national identity. The civic societies of Latin America are in different phases of the development of the national bond in the conditions of multicultural, racially, ethnically and denominationally mixed population structure. Some, such as Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Brazil, are situated closer to the nation state, while others – less integrated racially and ethnically, for example Peru, Ecuador and Colombia, maintained territorial, political, economic and cultural unity thanks to the institutions of the state.

2. Models of nation-forming processes in Latin America

Both the American continents became "the New World": an ideological and actual area not as much in a geographic as in a cultural sense, where ideas that stood no chance of fulfilment in the "old" Europe could be implemented and developed on a great scale. Some of them – for example the first attempts to build conditions that would allow for integration and acculturation of Indians with European cultures – Puritan, represented by the first Anglo-Saxon settlers in British colonies in New England (Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Hampshire), Quakers in Pennsylvania, and Catalan and Aragon in Spanish dominions, as well as the Lusitanic population in Brazil – assumed the possibility of

embracing "Indians", the indigenous inhabitants of America, in the new cultural community that the colonists were building. The model of racial and cultural integration formulated by Bartolomé de las Casas in theoretical rather than practical terms proved more utopian than realistic. In the initial colonisation phase, both Spanish and Lusitanic conquistadors united with Indian women, providing religious and legal possibilities for amalgamation. This, however, resulted more from the position of the male colonising contingent than from ethical principles or religious and scientific concepts. The consequence of that fairly long phase of paternalism in relation to Indians has been the phenomenon of racial admixture, whose significance is growing. For Latin American nation-shaping processes, this is a phenomenon that allows combination into a single cultural – and not only social and political – whole the descendants of both European and autochthonous racial, ethnic, and national groups.

From the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, nation-forming processes in Europe gained momentum. At that time Latin America was the arena of attrition between tribal cultures: ancient, primordial, living in a cyclical and closed non-linear time, in a world dominated by magical practices, animistic beliefs, and clan and tribal models of social organisation. European colonisers brought with them not only new technology that was inconceivable for Indians, but also the ideas and models of the new social stability and cultural order. These models were implemented without asking for acceptance from members of the autochthonous cultures, without inviting them to participate or respecting their norms or values; with the exception of elements of Indian heritage, mostly related to plant husbandry, that were actually taken over selectively. The transfer of European cultures to both Americas was in fact a one-way system for a very long time. The dominant national cultures of European colonisers would disregard, marginalise, and displace the cultures of autochthonous peoples, replacing them in an authoritarian, unilateral manner which disallowed any dialogue or mutual integration, with the local cultural and civilisational models. Religion, language, and state institutions became the basic elements of enculturation, and – through the system of education – enforced European models of internalisation of cultural norms and introduced Iberian legal and administrative regulations, and eradication and destruction of organisational systems of the autochthonous cultures.

Among numerous historically extant racial, ethnic, religious, linguistic and regional groups transforming, especially as a result of the collision of cultures at the time of great geographic discoveries and due to colonisation, only a few achieved the status of politically sovereign nation states. The fastest and high-

est level of advancement of nation-forming processes compared to other regions of the world took place in Western Europe – mostly in the realm of Christian and especially Protestant – Germanic, Galician, Iberian, and Anglo-Saxon cultures. Most national civic societies, including those of Spain and Portugal, based not only on the cultural ties, but also – if not primarily – on those of a state and political nature, have a long and complex historical pedigree, complex ethnogenesis, and frequently superimposing different dimensions of racial, ethnic, denominational, and regional structures.

At the one extremity of the scale there are nation states with relatively high cultural homogeneity, in fact mono-ethnic, with one denomination or at most two dominant religious systems, uniform in language, and politically united. The nations with uniform ethnogenesis and uniform state solidarity are mostly old nations with a very long history such as the Jewish, Italian, German, French, Spanish, Russian, and Polish nations. These are nation–cultures whose political sovereignty is guaranteed by their own states. Situated at the other end of the scale in terms of complexity and non-homogeneity are the multi-cultural, post-colonial, and post-immigration civic societies, transforming into nation communities of the new type in the historical process. In the case of nationally homogenous states a great role (earlier than other state institutions) in nation-forming processes was played by culture, including language, art, literature, and religion; in the case of multi-ethnic, complex civic societies it is and has been the state that is the most important factor uniting the non-homogeneous population element. This group of civic national communities or “new nations” (Gellner 1983; Lipset 1967; Kubiak 1975) includes nation states of colonial or migration/immigration (or joint) origin, such as Brazil, Mexico, the United States, Canada and Australia as well as Chile, Argentina and the remaining countries of Latin America. Communities in the individual countries have reached various degrees of social integration and cultural homogenisation in the historical processes of the development of the racially, ethnically (incl. tribal and national), linguistically, regionally and religiously complex human substrate. Thanks to the relatively uniform racial and ethnic mix, certain communities, e.g. the Argentinian, Uruguayan and Chilean, have reached a relatively high level of cultural unity, closer to European nations than to the multi-cultural civic communities of Peru and Bolivia. Mexico and Brazil, the most populous countries, have elaborated their own, original models of national integration based to a great extent on domination resulting from amalgamation of population of mixed racial origin (Freyre 1951). The notion of the “model” refers to a set of ordered statements on reality. The model aims to order and simplify this

phenomenon, thus becoming helpful in the explanation and understanding of its essence.

Looking for the most general dependencies in the processes of shaping of nations with their own states (Anderson 1997; Kubiak 1975; Smith 2003; Wiatr 1969: 250), sociologists distinguish the following models of nation-forming processes:

1. Bourgeoisie and democratic. This is the classical path in the development of European nations, shifting from the feudal phase to capitalism. The historical turning point in the process of developing bourgeois national states is believed to be the end of the eighteenth century, and especially the period of reorientation of political values caused by the French Revolution, United States Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution of 3rd May in Poland. The democratisation of civic relations, liberalisation of economic, political and social links, the system of free-market economy, and individualism elevated by the ethos of Protestant religious and moral values resulted in the development of the new political doctrine of national civic states, where disproportions between the estates were removed. This is the path of national and state development that was followed by the communities with relatively high cultural homogeneity and long earlier traditions of historical unity: France, England, Italy, and initially also Poland and Ireland. It was the nation-forming model to which the nation- and liberty-oriented independence elite of Latin America made reference and from which it drew inspiration. The republican ideologies of political elites became imposed in the first phase of Latin American nation-forming processes on the ideas of democracy. Nevertheless, in the earliest, postcolonial phase the mechanisms for development of democracy in Latin American countries practically "missed" the course of nation-forming processes. Racial and ethnic-national divides were very strongly correlated with social barriers, which led to cultural and political exclusiveness of the white Latin American elites. These elites implemented the particular, social and political interests in specific models of state systems, making reference to democratic and republican ideas, practically assuming the form of autocratic, if not totalitarian, rules of narrow social categories dominated by the descendants of white colonists. Today, Latin American civic communities are undergoing stepped-up democratisation processes. This is the case for at least two groups of reasons. The first is linked to the context of international relations, and transformations in the situation and role of Latin American states in the structures of international organisations. The processes of globalisation, modernisation and cultural universalisation make Latin American states, especially those which are pluralist and multicultural

such as Brazil and Mexico, yield to the external pressure of both the media and legal and political campaigns (Stemplowski 1979). On the other hand, there is a growing level of civic awareness and political subjectivity of Latin Americans hailing from coloured, autochthonous and racially mixed categories of the population. The models of democratisation of civic societies in Latin America assume unique forms, which, however, in consequence lead to the doctrine and ideologies of state nationalism under progressing cultural homogenisation.

2. Bourgeoisie-conservative. As Jerzy Wiatr stated, "the bourgeoisie-conservative evolution of nations is present in two main variations: through the transformation of an existing feudal state, or by the unification of a number of divided feudal states into a single state organism and the building of a new national rapport on the foundation of that organism. The history of the unification of Germany in the latter half of the nineteenth century very well illustrates such a path of national development. As a rule, the bourgeois conservative path of national evolution left many national problems opened." (Wiatr 1969: 263) The so-called Prussian path of national development is most evidently built on the domination of a single privileged social and cultural category, class, or stratum of bourgeoisie with an unquestioned position in the structure of national-civic community. In a sense, fascism was a complement for that part of the evolution of ideological doctrines and state structures of Italy and Germany. The result of choosing this developmental path was cultural, political, and economic expansionism. The turn of the twentieth century brought an intensification of conservative tendencies in Latin America with growing oligarchisation, and social and economic disproportions in the majority of, if not all, Latin American states. The conservatism of political elites was combined with the growing revolutionary tendencies of the poorest social strata recruiting mostly from the autochthonous and racially mixed populations. The phenomenon of growing disproportion not only on the scale of prestige, wealth and power but also in focusing on the ways of achieving the ideologically defined national values, brought about the rule of military and civil juntas in Latin America, which slowed down the nation-forming processes. The governing elites in Latin American states used the idea of the nation and at the same time implemented the policy of racial and social exclusiveness, which led to conflicts and surges of revolutionary mood. These phenomena were especially clearly visible in Mexico and the countries of Central America. In fact, though, none of the Latin American civic societies was free from tensions and conflicts caused by the politics of states dominated by white political elites, who based their social status on the models of Western economic doctrines. In the first

half of the twentieth century the systems of Republican Latin American states assumed the form of conservative-oriented autocratic, centralised governments of white postcolonial elites basing their rule on the doctrine of defence against communism. Conservative governments in Latin American states formed the foundations of their politics on international support from Western states, practically mostly from the US. The internal Latin American dimension of the “Cuban missile” crisis was in the growing tensions and conflicts between pro-US political and economic elites on the one hand, and on the other increasingly radical, left-wing, pro-Marxist milieu, and intellectuals and leaders of social liberation movements who found support among social masses. Within the latter category originated the leaders of the new national and revolutionary movements, which brought about the weakening and breaking of conservative tendencies of the white political elites.

3. Postcolonial. The postcolonial path of formation of civic national communities is characteristic of countries and democracies that formed within the territories dominated by European or Asian (Japanese, Chinese) colonial influences, mostly in Africa, the South Pacific, and both Americas. In the early phase of nation-forming process the United States and Canada as well as Brazil, Mexico, the other countries of Latin America, and Australia were developing according to the rules of the colonial model. Colonial dependence and military, economic and cultural domination led to imposition of the laws of the dominant group upon the autochthonous peoples: of Anglo-Saxon Protestants in North America, and of Iberian (Spanish and Portuguese) Catholics in South America. As far as Latin America was capable of becoming liberated from the political and cultural domination of the Spanish, Portuguese and British, it still remains economically dependent on Western countries. Latin American countries – as the experience of the latter half of the twentieth century has proved – could not function independently in economic terms, and operate according to the principles of the “dependent model of economic development”. This dependency is the result of colonial setbacks in technological, organisational, and economic development. Hegemony in the processes of economic and social changes in Latin America belongs to the United States. Ever more often theories are presented of globalisation of Latin America through Americanisation (Frank 1967; Galeano 1983; Haines 1989; Huntington 2000).

The consequence of Iberian colonialism is not only the displacement of languages and cultures of autochthonous peoples and their gradual disappearance, but also the primacy of religions, traditions and values of white colonists and settlers, that allows hardly any exceptions. This tendency undergoes slow

changes and transformations. Through the phenomena of indigenism and pan-Indianism, the growing importance of intellectuals and politicians coming from outside the genetically European racial and ethnic milieu in nation-forming processes, Latin America entered not only the phase of accelerated national homogenisation but also of cultural universalisation in the Latin American version in the latter half of the twentieth century. The Latin American "model" of nation-forming processes is currently based on near-general racial amalgamation, religious and racial syncretism, and ethnic hybridisation with far-reaching linguistic, national and civic homogenisation.

Latin American states conduct a policy of integration with the world's political and economic system, remaining dependent in organisational, financial and military terms on the most developed states. One of the dimensions of the neo-colonial dependency of Latin American countries, mostly on the United States, is based on the formulation of the concept of so-called "dependent development" by the political and economic leaders of Mexico, Brazil, Chile and Argentina. (Galeano 1983; Stemplowski 1975; Stemplowski 1996).

Nevertheless, it was the decolonisation of Africa that was most spectacular. The establishment of states marked the beginning of nation-forming processes in most countries of that continent, under the conditions of ethnic, tribal and religious fragmentation, and the lack of indigenous intellectual elites. "The state borders of the majority of African, South American and Asian postcolonial republics were drawn up along the dividing lines of colonial influences, which in most cases followed the former divisions among European countries" (Wiatr 1969: 269).

4. Bourgeoisie-settler. This model of increasing national and state unity is characteristic of countries of migrant pedigree, built on the foundations of colonial administration. This is the model that the civic communities of the United States, Brazil, Mexico, Latin American countries, Canada, and Australia followed. In these countries the state was the most important factor in increasing territorial and cultural-national integrity. The common denominator of all the post-migration nation states is the existence of a strong, hegemonic national (racial, religious) group that contributes a set of basic cultural and ideological values to the new community, including the common language (English in the US, Spanish in Mexico, and Portuguese in Brazil), a system of religious beliefs (Protestantism in the US, Catholicism in Brazil and Mexico), an administration dominated by the relatively homogeneous social category (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant in the US and Lusitanic and Creole in South America). Another feature of that model of development was the implementa-

tion of a formula of military conquest and absolute domination over the autochthonous population. The native American tribes were pushed away in the United States, Brazil and Canada into marginalised, subordinate, and culturally and socially degraded ethnic and tribal enclaves. It was only in the last decades of the twentieth century that boosted and intensive processes of indigenisation – that is the growing participation of the autochthonous population in the social, political, economic and cultural lives of civic societies – took place. The phenomenon of their indigenisation means on the one hand increasing cultural variety of Latin American countries, and on the other increased democratisation in social life. The autochthonous population does not as much “blur” into the Peruvian, Bolivian or Mexican culture, but rather builds its own, syncretic, hybrid models and standards of integration and types of cultural identity (Romero 1971; Posern-Zieliński 2005; Paleczny 2001b). Biculturalism, divided, double, multiple identity, syncretic forms of religions, and racially and ethnically mixed communities have been the dominant tendencies of changes in nation-forming processes in Latin America in recent decades.

The bourgeois-settler model is based on the culturally dominant role of the white elites, and is superimposed on their social and economic conservatism. In the earliest phase, nation-forming processes are limited to the narrow categories of white settlers marginalising both the autochthonous population and the descendants of African slaves.

The development of United States as a multi-ethnic, racially complex, religiously pluralist civic community that transformed into a nation in its own state has been described in numerous works (Kubiak 1975; Lipset 1967). The cases of Canada and Australia were similar. The least space has been devoted in sociological literature, at least in Polish, to the history of Latin American nation-forming processes (Łepkowski 1977–1983; Paleczny 2004; Urbański 1981).

5. Socialist. Historically present in central and eastern parts of Europe, though not solely, this model had its origin in Russia after the October Revolution. In the years 1945–1989, it encompassed Poland and other countries of the so-called “communist bloc”. It seems that despite the fact that its consequences are visible in the development of conditions for political and cultural integration to this day (e.g. in Belarus), it is rather a “blind” ramification of nation-forming processes. Despite numerous strenuous efforts, attempts to establish “the socialist East German nation” or “the Soviet nation” failed. Nevertheless, the model played its integrative, and nation and state-forming role in numerous countries of Europe, and in other continents, for example in Vietnam, China, Cuba and Libya. Elements of the socialist model were taken over

by social liberation movements, and movements for the ethnic liberation of local populations in Latin America. They led to the radicalisation of social, racial, and ethnic conflicts, assuming in the most extreme cases the form of military revolutionary and terrorist movements, e.g. the Shining Path (*Sendero Luminoso*) in Peru. One of the main exponents of this variation of the idea of nation-forming processes, assuming the socialist utopia of the existence of a system of social justice, was Ernesto "Che" Guevara. Elements of the socialist developmental path were emphasised and manifested in the ideologies of radical groupings such as the Brazilian Landless Workers' Movement and by Mexican guerrilla leaders. The social phenomenon of the guerrillas features – much like the conflicts between the Brazil oligarchy and coloured categories of the rural population in Brazil – the transformation of postcolonial, racially and culturally dichotomous Mexican society into a national community. To quote Urszula Drzewiecka, "in different moments of history it [*the guerrilla* – T.P.] assumed special features, yet its essence remained unchanged: the rejection of the state mandate in favour of claiming rights by a variety of social groups. The guerrilla of the twentieth century developed in two basic directions in Mexico: the armed rural movement, and the urban movement based among others on the ideology and practical example of the Cuban revolution. [...] Unfortunately, the contemporary political and social stage in Mexico is not free from the phenomenon of guerrillas actively operating in the Chiapas State. The Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) have been fighting for over 12 years for the rights of Native Americans, questioning the successive attempts by the changing authorities to solve the conflict. Enjoying the support of international public opinion, the Zapatista incessantly challenge the stability of Mexican democracy, as – to quote Professor Soledad Loaeza – "the border between lawlessness and democracy is indistinct in Mexico, which means that the implementation of social postulates is attempted through direct pressure" (Drzewiecka, 24).

The disproportions on the scale of social positions – especially where property, richness, affluence, authority and prestige are concerned – made the unprivileged strata resort to the idea of socialist equality. The ideas of "Latin American" socialism assuming the forms of revolutionary and national armed movements became one of the components of nation-forming processes not only in Mexico, Brazil and Cuba, but also in Chile, Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru, Honduras, Nicaragua – in fact in all the countries of Latin America.

The distinctiveness and variety of historical nation-development processes resulted in the variety of their relations towards one another. In the historical

perspective, relations between nations depend on the type and nature of processes that bring them together. The countries of colonial and migration pedigree remained in the realm of the dominant political and cultural influence of the original national communities. Going along their own path of development and civic integration within their own state, the societies of the United States, Mexico, Chile and Brazil took over the values, language, religion, norms and ideologies of the countries of origin of groups colonising and settling their territories. The transmission channels of population, ideas, technologies, and elements of culture have remained open to this day. The political bond characteristic of the relations between Mexico and Spain and between Brazil and Portugal is supported not as much in joint economic or military interests, as in the cultural heritage and natural ties characteristic of relations between the country of origin and settlement, the colonising population and the colonised.

The processes of the development of civic societies and reinforcement of national integration in Latin American countries were dominated by the bourgeois-settler and postcolonial models. The fundamental distinctive features of these overlapping models of nation-forming processes in Latin America include:

1. The presence of a hegemonic, dominant cultural group, imposing upon autochthonous cultures the language, the religion, and most importantly cultural norms and values as well as models of social and economic organisation. Within almost the entire area of Latin America – with the exception of certain regions dominated by the British, the Dutch, and the French – these were predominantly the models of Spanish and Portuguese cultures in the different phases of historical development. The notional equivalent of cultural civilisational space of South America is given by the terms “Hispanic America” and “Latin America” that point to the cultural heritage and ties between the heritage of European colonisers and settlers and the traditions of the local population. Suffice to say that Latin American civilisation is based on Spanish and Portuguese languages, Catholic religion (with the increasing participation of Protestantism of Anglo-Saxon origin, mostly from the United States), values, and standards transferred from Europe and fixed by the Creole and Lusitanic peoples and other descendants of European colonisers and settlers.
2. Treatment of the native population as culturally lower, socially subordinate, and economically dominated. Nation-forming processes were dominated by the ideology of conquest and assimilationism based on absorption and enculturation of autochthonous peoples. One of the dominant strategies was displacement of the native population from their homelands, pushing

them into cultural reservations, situating them on the margin of social life, bereaving them of political rights, eradication from the areas subjected to industrialisation and urbanisation, spatial isolation, and racial segregation. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of eliminating the autochthonous population in the countries of Latin America never achieved – thanks to acceptable amalgamation, the admixture of races – such a scope or scale as in the United States.

3. Domination of Christian values represented by the structures of the Catholic Church. The profound role of the clergy and religious organisations, and especially of Catholic missions in the shaping of Latin American cultural identity. Religion became the most important transmission belt of European values. Christianisation was and still to a great extent remains – besides nationalisation and cultural universalisation leading to the appearance of civilisational identity as well as the phenomenon of globalisation – the most important factor of social, political, and economic integration, as well as cultural homogenisation.
4. The gradual acceptability of racially amalgamated categories of mixed population, mostly Mestizos and Mulattoes as well as syncretic, mixed, hybrid cultural groups such as the Quimbanda, Macumba followers, and universalists to participation in social and cultural life (Bastide 1978; Brown 1986).
5. The increasing syncretism, polymorphism, and hybridism of communities in Latin American countries. The most important and superior role in the shaping of multicultural, pluralistic social structures and cultural identities is played by state institutions. The state bond and civic solidarity provide the fundamental factor in nation-forming process, which differentiates communities that belong to the same cultural area. Connected to the state bond is the sense of territoriality, and cultural objectivisation and internalised identification with the motherland. State identity, the bond with the ideological motherland, and the racial and ethnic structure specific to each civic community are the most important ingredients of national bonds in the countries of Latin America, which merged into a single whole the varied population substrate/element.
6. The pluralistic, complex character of civic societies and new types of Latin American nationalism. The nations of Latin America still taking form in the nation-forming processes in the very nature of things, due to the different ethnogeneity, historical processes of colonisation and migration, presence of autochthonous, African and European populations, participation of numerous tribal groups, heterogeneous, complex civic communities in the

processes of social integration besides the dominant categories of white Iberian colonisers are heterogeneous, complex civic communities. These communities formed the early sense of territorial, religious, and language unity sharing the same traditions, i.e. all the necessary elements that constitute a nation.

3. Main phases of nation-forming processes in Latin America

The notion of “a phase” is not only a chronological definition referring to a temporal sequence. It denotes a qualitatively discrete state of advancement of nation-forming processes present in reference to specific communities in different periods of time.

The following phases may be distinguished in the development processes of Latin American civic societies, nation–cultures, and nation–civilisations:

I. Ethnocentrism, Iberoconformism, domination of Iberian cultural models, assimilationism. Characteristic of this phase, continuing throughout the colonisation period and the beginning of the independence of Latin American countries, that is from the early sixteenth to the late nineteenth century, was the absolute domination of conquistadors–colonisers from Spain (Castilia, Aragón) and Portugal (Lusitanic, Lusitanic-Azorean). Other European powers – France, England, and the Netherlands – competed against the Spanish and Portuguese to influence the two Americas. As far as the North American continent was dominated by British influence with the passage of time, its southern part remained under the sole influence of Iberian cultures. The administrative division of Iberian colonies in South America into viceroyalties in Spanish-speaking dominions and captainships in Portuguese-speaking ones assumed them to be exploitative. With the passage of time, the exploitative attitude began to be balanced by the settlement orientation.

The autochthonous population and the African slaves brought to the colony were subordinated socially and culturally to Iberian cultural models. Two assimilation policies were applied towards the indigenous population and African slaves, namely those of enculturation and exclusion, marginalisation, and driving into the reservations of tribal mono-ethnicity. The instrument of enculturation used by the white settlers to take over the native Indian cultures was on the one hand colonial administration, and on the other the institutions of the Catholic Church, missions, and local parish structures. The tribes that found themselves

in the processes of economic, territorial and cultural expansion in the field of the interest of colonists were subjected to Christianisation and Iberisation, while those who were situated beyond the realm of direct influence were the potential workforce – the conquered and exploited population.

In the first, Iberoconformist, phase of nation-forming processes, where the only hegemonic culture entitled to development was the heritage transferred from Europe by white colonists, two tactics were used towards the autochthonous cultures: paternalist and authoritarian. The supporter and exponent of the first was Bartolomé de las Casas, and that of the latter was Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda. The first allowed the possibility of acculturation, integration of the autochthonous population with colonists on the condition that they assumed the religion, the language, and the values of the dominant culture. The latter focused solely on exploitation, and territorial, cultural and economic expansion pushed the native population into a subordinate role, that of the social culture that was displaced, and sentenced to marginalisation and extinction – redundant from the point of view of further integrative processes in Iberian colonies. To quote Leopold Zea, “at the time of the first wave of expansion, Iberian conquistadors – the Spanish and Portuguese – attempted to impose their ideas on the subjugated Indians; it was mostly about Christianisation. No efforts were undertaken to maintain the cultural identity, as it was believed that a higher form of culture may not mix with lower ones. The spiritual world of the Indians was to such a degree alien to the Christian culture and wrong that it was even believed to be satanic. For that reason, attempts were made to uproot their values and impose the Iberian culture brought by the conquistadors. [...] The goal behind the Iberian conquest was the total absorption of natives, part of the project of expansion. Together with the natives, the local models and beliefs were to be buried. The objective was to avoid contamination of Christian culture. Nevertheless, the uprooting of local traditions and ideas, even though temples were destroyed and gods were removed, turned out to be impossible” (Zea 1993: 48–49).

With the passage of time, Indians would mix with the descendants of white colonists through processes of amalgamation, producing a new category, and later cultural group, of Mestizos, that was important for further processes of nation-forming. Race admixture would gradually produce the “bridge” into the cultural space. That allowed mixing of people of various racial origins within a single civic society and national community. After Mestizos and Mulattoes in Brazil, Indians became equally legitimate members of civic societies, albeit not until the end of the twentieth century.

II. Nationalism, cultural homogenisation, nation-forming ideology and policy. This is the independence phase, of a republican nature, occurring this time in all countries of Latin America including Brazil. It took place in the earlier half of the twentieth century. The largest countries in the continent, Mexico and Brazil, formed the principles for the construction of the new, homogeneous, civic societies transforming towards national culture. The turning point of that phase was the nationalistic policy of Porfirio Díaz and Francisco I. Madero in Mexico, and of Getulio Vargas in Brazil.

The processes of nationalisation, the shaping of new types of cultural identity of the nationalistic type, assumed a conservative or liberal character. Early in the twentieth century, people's revolutions in the countries of Latin America were strongly correlated with socialist ideologies. These led to the expansion of democratic principles into the categories of population that had earlier been excluded from nation-forming processes: the poorest coloured and racially mixed population, mostly Mestizos and Indians. As Leopold Zea claims, "the nations remaining under Iberian colonial role would strive to turn that project into their own one. The revolution in the United States in 1776 and the French Revolution of 1789 provided ideological justifications to the Latin American project of liberation or liberty. Nevertheless, the Spanish metropolis assumed a stalwart position in the question of allowing Hispanic Americans rights equal to those of the Spanish. Spain would struggle to maintain the colonial project, which in the sixteenth century focused the vehement dispute between Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda and Bartolomé de las Casas. The partisans of the project of liberation would support one of the two options: conservative or civilisational. The conservative project, faced with the unyielding position of the metropolis, proposed the maintenance of the cultural and political system inherited after the Iberian colonisation yet already liberated from the metropolis. The Spanish or Lusitanic [Brazilian – T.P.] order, yet without Spain and Portugal. This would be the project of various Latin American conservative groups in numerous places of that America" (Zea 1993: 23).

In this phase of nation-forming processes, the consolidation of civic society around national values related to state ideology, territorial unity, and language, religious and legal equality of citizens took place in Latin American societies. Following the policy of "nationalisation" conducted essentially in most Latin American countries until the 1980s, the following phenomena occurred:

1. Further expansion of the homogeneous realm of national identity and culture in the individual countries of Latin America. The broadening of that identificational and cultural area took place through the construction of

ideological and axiological unity around the interests represented by the civic communities which were monolingual and mostly differentiated by class and ethnicity. Intellectuals, writers, artists and academics on the one hand, and representatives of the ruling elites on the other, became the exponents of the nationalist idea, politically and culturally uniting the socially, racially, and ethnically divided community.

2. Reduction of regionalisms and separatist tendencies of individual lands, states, and provinces of Mexico, Brazil, and all the lesser countries of the continent. In that phase, the continuing and expanding territorial integrationism found its expression in the spreading of the state–civic awareness leading to the emergence of common areas of symbolic and mass culture. For the intellectual elites, state territories were becoming ideological motherlands.
3. Social and cultural consolidation – especially in the ideological and territorial dimension – against group separateness of ethnic and racial minorities. Beginning with the 1980s, that is for nearly 20 years, there has been a trend aiming towards the protection and maintenance of ethnic identity of Indian groups, with a neutral (i.e. lacking) policy towards the cultural exclusiveness of other, including white, ethnic groups.
4. Development of ideological unity of civic society based on an attempt to liquidate the results of a bi-polar, polarised model of class and layer/strata structure. This was and still is the worst obstacle in the construction of full cultural and ideological unity of the Mexican, Brazilian, Chilean, and Argentinian nations – not significant to an extent that could stop the process. Nevertheless, the disproportions on the scale of affluence, prestige, and power divide Latin American society into clear cultural segments. A considerable proportion of Mexicans and Brazilians (with some estimates speaking even of a third of the population) live on the margins of civic societies, producing ties and identity proper for the declassed communities of ethnic ghettos. Further, in some narrowly defined spatial frames of the favelas and clusters of alienated Indian, Mestizos, and Afro-Brazilian minorities, a separatist identity of the hybrid type develops. This is characteristic also of criminal groups and gangs. It is a phenomenon that is common in Latin American countries and visible also in the overlapping of ethnic and tribal structures onto the hierarchies of criminal gangs and religious and cult groups.
5. The establishment of a strong centrist ideological orientation based on the eradication and elimination from social life – and from cultural and ideological circulation – of all the types of social radicalism situated both on the

extreme right and extreme left of the political stage. The development of the foundations for national unity at the expense of the radical, belligerent ideological and cultural minorities of a socialist, feminist, anarchist, environmental or pacifist nature has led and still leads to results opposed to any assumptions. In Latin America it becomes impossible to slow down, not to mention eradicate, a variety of "social liberation" movements (for example in the "liberation theology" version), Landless Workers' Movement, pan-Indian awareness, and emancipation of cultural minorities.

6. Promotion of popular – national and symbolic – elements of mass culture through their participation – increasing in both scope and significance – in the mass media. Today it is television that shapes to the greatest extent the scope of contents and values that are promoted by the national and commercial broadcasters. The share of mass media in the creation of the national dimension of culture is continuously growing. Public television channels, subordinate to governmental centres, are on the one hand the instrument of ideological propaganda, while on the other they are a means that leads to standardisation of language and customs, and homogenisation in terms of values.
7. The technological and industrial developments as well as progress and modernisation have brought new literary and artistic currents. The exemplary futuristic capital of Brazil became a symbol of modernist changes. Modernist tendencies have not always operated in a functional union with the needs and tendencies of the average Latin American, yet they fulfilled the cultural and political aspirations of the governing elites and intellectual creative milieux. Nevertheless, that peculiar modernism and postmodernism, as one of the reactions to the European heritage and North American influence, paved an original – national and continental – Latin American path of cultural development (Urbański 1981; Paleczny 2004).

III. Multiculturalism, pluralism, "open" civic societies. In this phase, it is the phenomena of racial amalgamation, pluralism, linguistic homogeneity, religious syncretism, and hybridism that begin to dominate. The lack of racial, ethnic and national homogeneity as the basic feature of the new national communities in Latin America was the barrier in social integration processes and in cultural homogenisation. Imposed by European colonists, the ideological role models of nation-forming processes in the first phases excluded and pushed beyond the margin of the social and cultural community numerous autochthonous and African groups. Race was the main obstacle on the path to acculturation to Spanish and Portuguese national standards. Before the idea of the new

state–nation appeared, as formed by the “El Libertador” Simon Bolívar, it was narrow, particular, exclusive ideologies of cultural domination of the Creole and Lusitanic people, the offspring of white colonists, that predominated in Latin America. As Leopold Zea believes, “the variety of races, cultures, and people, which did not form obstacles to the establishment of cultures and empires in Europe, became one in America, due to the way that Europe conducted colonisation and conquest in that part of the world. The same diversity that in Europe helped to unify forces and to reinforce national characters would, in America, result only in divisions and in the never-ending civil wars accompanying them” (Zea 1993: 95).

On the other hand racial, ethnic, and national variety with the simultaneous existence of dominant languages and Catholic religion became the reason for searching for own paths of social integration. Following and imitating the European models of nation-forming processes, representatives of political, economic, and cultural elites would seek a method of connecting into a single whole the entire multicultural, social mosaic. The basis for the Latin American path of national development was formed by Simon Bolívar’s utopia based on the promotion of vision and ideology of a single federated Latin American state, thanks to which a single Latin American nation could rise and develop to the like of the United States. That utopia was close to the American concepts of the melting pot and Americanisation through assimilation of various cultural minorities – no longer under Spanish or Portuguese hegemony – but to the pluralistic, multicultural identity of the nation–civilisation type. Simon Bolívar’s utopia became a way of “ploughing the sea”, that is promoting an idea that had no chance of implementation in the context of particular interest of the governing elites, racial, ethnic, political and class divides, social conflicts, and party divides. Nevertheless, it was this utopian model put forth by Bolívar that became useful towards the end of the twentieth and early in the twenty-first centuries in search of a new middle road between Western – European and American – universalism, and racial, ethnic, political and economic particularism.

IV. Globalisation, universalism and Latino-Americanisation. The phenomena of political and economic integration, the functioning of the Organisation of American States, the political and economic as well as cultural role of Mercosur, the development of joint markets within the NAFTA trade bloc, and numerous other institutional initiatives in the field of international relations have led – independent of the language and religious unity of Hispanic America and, to a great extent, also of Brazil – to an increased sense of a civilisational continental bond. To quote Samuel Huntington, Latin America

developed its own, unique configuration of interstate, territorial, and historical ties that finds its main support in language and religion and leads to the operation of civic societies in their particular "civilisational space" (Huntington 2000). Latin America produces its own supra-state, civilisational tradition of cultural unity in the long historical process. This tendency was first expressed by Zea, who wrote "thus on the one hand, we have the European history, the history of internalising and assimilation, and on the other, the Latin American history of different overlapping realities, in this or that way alien to the subject that rejects and adopts them" (Zea 1993: 19).

Late in the nineteenth and early in the twentieth centuries, Latin America entered the path of its own civilisational development, different from the Western, capitalist, rational system of international organisation. Positioning Latin American civilisation in the context of spiritual, ideological, and cultural tendency to encourage anti-Westernisation and anti-Americanisation, Zea claimed long before Huntington that "the civilisational project that rejects the entire heritage of Iberian colonisation in America is the juxtaposition for the other [Western – T.P.] one. Following such an assumption, the need to transform using the models of alien present is postulated parallel to the breakaway from one's own past. This fits perfectly the project of West European expansion initiated in the seventeenth century after the period of Iberian expansion. Springing from the Puritan concept, this project presented its authors as privileged subjects, predestined to conduct actions that would go far beyond what is temporary and what results from circumstances. The eighteenth-century Enlightenment philosophers reshaped that project into a civilisational mission to be fully implemented in the nineteenth century, when the great West European empires would take shape. The United States of Northern America, with the manifested destiny of the country representing the highest form of imperialism, will participate in the new division of the world. At the same time, the Latin Americans supporting the civilisational project will internalise the Western project and focus on its implementation in the America until recently dominated by the anachronous, conservative Iberian project and drowned in Indian barbarism, and therefore finding itself on the margins of civilisation. Moreover, race admixture, being the result of implementation of the Iberian project, helped this marginalisation. The implementation of the civilisational project alien to the experience of those who are trying to internalise it shall be boiled down to its irrational imitation" (Zea 1993: 23).

In other words, after the phase of Iberian conformism, westernisation, modernisation, and rationalisation of Latin American societies, the process of

constructing bonds of a civilisational type is taking place. As Zea argues, “the Latin American civilisational project, ignoring its own experience, will be driven to internalise the experience that has never before been within its reach” (Zea 1993: 23).

Latin Americanisation means primarily racial amalgamation, language homogenisation, ethnic pluralism, religious syncretism, and cultural hybridism with social disproportions in wealth, power, and prestige. The elements of the new “cultural mosaic” of the supra-state intercultural integration system are civic societies acquiring towards the end of the twentieth century the status of nations: Brazilians, Mexicans, Chileans, Argentinians, Paraguayans, and Venezuelans are not only politically and territorially integrated civic communities, composed of different racial, ethnic and religious, and social categories – strata, classes, oligarchies, residents of poverty districts – but they are also communities of national culture (Znaniński 1990).

Latin Americanisation does not simply mean a “jump” from the face of local autochthonous communities of regional racial groups to the civilisational phase with the omission of ties of the national type. The construction of different types of bonds and cultural identity covers a variety of phenomena: both of regionalisation and of maintaining tribal–ethnic and racial distinctiveness, as well as nationalisation and construction of civilisational solidarity beyond national unity. The phenomenon of distinctiveness of local autochthonous communities, regional racial groups belong among those losing their significance, situating themselves on the edge of integration and assimilation processes. Separate local racial and ethnic communities are strongly correlated with the economic and social criteria of stratification. Decisive for the ethnic and racial particularisms in today’s Latin America are not origin, birthplace, or ethnic or racial belonging, but rather position in the local structure and on the paradigm of wealth, power, and prestige.

4. The role of the state

Until the end of the twentieth century, the state was more of an instrument of pressure, an institution “appropriated” by the privileged social categories rather than a means of building national solidarity and identity. The states – Latin American republics – functioned as political institutions, maintaining deep social divides imposed on the racial, ethnic and regional variety. The institutions of nearly all Latin American states served the protection of the interests of

oligarchies, social groups taking root predominantly from the white, postcolonial Lusitanic and Creole elites. The state policy of the republican states bore clearly visible hallmarks of dependency on the United States. Not penetrating the anatomy and systemic principles of operation of republicanism in Latin America, four qualitatively different phases determining the role of the states in the course of nation-forming processes are clearly visible.

A. The colonial phase, with the dominant role of Spanish and Portuguese administration. State administration was focused on the subjugation of the indigenous population to the power of Spanish and Portuguese colonists. The few European settlers who were neither Spanish nor Portuguese served in colonial contingents subordinate to those countries. It was the phase of Iberoconformism and enculturation of the autochthonous population, and later of its marginalisation and displacement beyond the territories settled and administered by the European colonisers. Indians, and later slaves imported from Africa, were becoming an inferior category of population, socially and culturally alienated. The culture of Latin American societies took root in Europe, and was a derivative of Iberian cultures (*derivada*). Within the system of absolutist monarchy, states allowed certain forms of self-government in the colonies, especially when these were justified by the economic interest of the dynasty. In the colonial period, the germs of a civic society and national state formed, covering the prerogatives of the white Christian population.

B. The early republican phase and the Empire of Brazil. This period in fact lasted throughout almost the whole of the nineteenth century. Once Latin American colonies gained independence, Mexico and Brazil became the countries with the largest populations in the southern part of the continent. The two countries formed political systems ranging from the dictatorship of oligarchy, military and civil juntas, to limited systems of republican national states. Emancipation of the autochthonous population was progressing slowly. Towards the end of this phase, Brazil abolished slavery, which did not automatically mean liquidation of racial inequalities and discrimination. The first ideological and doctrinal forms of state nationalism were built. Moreover, a sense of civic and at the same time national identity took shape and developed among Chileans, Argentinians, Mexicans, Brazilians, Uruguayans, Colombians, and in lesser nation states. Towards the end of the phase, some Latin American countries, and especially Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay – initiated and conducted a planned policy of settling European immigrants, mostly Italians, Germans, Poles and Ukrainians. Immigration helped to speed up economic growth, yet at the same time it led to upsetting the traditional social

structure and cultural domination of Creole and Lusitanic political elites. The beginnings of a sense of national unity began, often parallel to formation of a critical attitude to the Spanish tradition and a search for role models in the direction of the United States, France and the United Kingdom. Born in the nineteenth century were the intellectual elites, “national” literatures, trends in art, and formations of worldview. At this time not only were models drawn from the heritage of Europe but also a local cultural tradition was established and models of state organisation from other American countries were imitated. The period of independence of Brazil at the time of the Empire meant qualitative change in developing and maintaining the new political and cultural identity of Brazilians who were no longer subjects of the Portuguese crown. After the period of European cosmopolitanism that was the Enlightenment, Brazil entered the period of romantic discovery of separate identity and cultural sovereignty for Brazilians. Even a certain fascination in the indigenous, Brazilian element of Lusitanic, Indian tribal, and Afro-Brazilian cultures emerged. This was the time of development of national Brazilian literature represented by a range of authors including Antônio Gonçalves Teixeira e Sousa, Joaquim Manuel de Macedo, and Manuel Antônio de Almeida. Poets, especially the most eminent ones such as Domingos José Gonçalves de Magalhães, Antônio Gonçalves Dias and José de Alencar, devoted plenty of space and attention to the Indian element in Brazilian national culture in their poems. They presented American Indians as noble people—warriors, developed morally, intellectually and culturally. At the same time Brazilian painting and historiography flourished. The initial phase of independence provided the grounds for the budding processes of civic integration and national assimilation of Brazilians. The processes of enculturation and transculturation were overlapped to an ever greater degree on the dominant patterns of acculturation, i.e. the mutual mixing of elements of cultures that belong to different racial and ethnic groups. As the result of this process, the area of national Brazilian culture emerged. Following the reorientation of national awareness, including its components – identification of racial and ethnic groups, increased ethnic variety of the white population – a shift in the value systems of social structuralisation took place in Brazil. A transitory phase began in which the Brazilian community was shifting from a feudal–slave economy to a bourgeois–capitalistic one. The path to full democracy was still long; nevertheless, the society – riven with internal class and racial–ethnic divides – was acquiring a new dimension of integration defined by the fact of increased national unity. The changes in agriculture and ways of obtaining profits took place during the independence–modern period, still in

the imperial phase. The turn of the nineteenth century meant domination of sugar cane, coffee, and rubber tree plantations. These forms of agricultural production, still concentrated in huge plantations, were based to a greater degree on capitalist employment of workers rather than the feudal exploitation of slaves. The shift from one means of production to the other was a long-term process, and did not take place in a single leap. Nevertheless, the growing category of agricultural labourers and industrial workers profoundly changed the face of ethnically diverse Brazilian society. Changes were appearing at the same time among the participants and recipients of culture in the new society, whose circle was ever growing. Although it was strongly limited to the white political and economic elites of Brazil in the field of written, symbolical culture, it would at the same time assume a certain peasant-folk version, indigenous–interracial, Afro-Brazilian especially in the elements referring to the patterns of merrymaking, holiday-making, and everyday life. It was during this phase of the Brazilian nation-forming process that the samba and elements of Indian music spread among the lower social strata. Similar processes of building new, national and civic identity and nationalistic ideas – especially in literature – took place even at the end of the nineteenth century in other Latin American states, especially in Argentina and Mexico.

C. The late republican phase, which continued throughout nearly the entire twentieth century. Latin American states were going through a tumultuous and yet clearly manifested evolution from totalitarian institutions governed in the interest of particular, narrow social elites of juntas and dictatorships to the democratic, liberal systems adjusted to the requirements of modern civic societies and national cultures. Competing and clashing during this phase were the concepts of a conservative, oligarchic state subjected to the dominant social category – the oligarchy against the liberal, democratic, revolutionary-and-communist ideologies, and social and national liberation movements. The largest countries, that is Mexico and Brazil, would shape their own policies of national and social integration. European emigrants coming from outside the Iberian peninsula and their descendants began to play an important role in these processes. The movements of social liberty were multiplying and intensifying, taking the shape of radical, revolutionary groupings of the ilk of the Mexican National Liberation Forces (*Fuerzas de Liberación Nacional*, FLN), the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (*Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional*, EZLN), the Brazilian movements of the landless, the Peruvian Shining Path (*Sendero Luminoso*), and other groupings of a military and terrorist character. The local wars against state institutions, known as *guerrillas*, provide

a constant and necessary element for the shaping of the national ideologies of Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Chile. They flourished and assumed a special importance in the 1960s and 1970s. Maturing among them was the ideology and doctrine of the nation state, of the people's democratic republic (Bizberg and Frybes 2000). Besides the ideology of the elites, forms of civic, state nationalism emerged and became reinforced. Latin American nations ceased to be the expressed communities, and became symbolic and at the same time realistic communities of national culture. The civic societies of Latin America built their own models of integration, focused on their own heritage and tradition, and developed the first mature theoretical concepts and ideologies of the nation. This was a phase of advanced nationalism in Mexico, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia. The national cultures became altered, autotelic, free from dependency on the European ideological and intellectual heritage. Latin America "turned towards itself (*ensimismada*), individual countries shaped their own national identities" (Wojcieszak 2000: 8). The process of migration that brought wide groups of European ethnic origin mostly to Argentina and Brazil occurred during this phase of development. Immigration radically changed the proportions between white and coloured populations in these countries, and remained not without influence on further deepening of ethnic differentiation and racial exclusivism on the one hand, and on the mixing and overlapping of components of various cultures on the other. The basic factor putting together the racially, ethnically, and denominationally varied population element was the state. Initially exclusive, oligarchic, and conservative, the state evolved ever more towards the liberal, democratic systems of civic states based on elections.

The republican period – the phase of "new states" in Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, and Chile can be divided into three sub-periods: a) destabilisation and attempts to introduce democratic governments (the first half of the twentieth century), b) the governments of military and civil juntas, and the period of dictatorship of regimes (until the end of 1980s), and c) the period of the "new democracy" that has continued since the end of 1980s to this day.

Plenty of new movements of a revolutionary, democratic, and liberal and socialist character appeared in Latin America in the latter half of the twentieth century. In most cases, they would assume the form of guerrillas, taking after "Che" Guevara's troupers and partisan groupings commanded by Fidel Castro. Liberal, democratic, and national liberation movements engulfed the largest countries of Latin America, including Mexico and Brazil. These movements were as a matter of fact of local scope, yet they received a reaction from the governments of central states. They involved and attracted the attention of

domestic and international public opinion. The oligarchic, elitist state governments would gradually yield to social pressure. Yet the ideological and political reasons for the new liberal and democratic movements in Latin America – frequently of a leftist or socialist bias – were relatively complex and based mostly on the following:

1. The particular and elitist character of state institutions serving the implementation of interests of narrow oligarchic political elites, mostly of a white, European pedigree. The system based on autocratic governments of military or civil juntas would “appropriate” the state, rendering impossible the participation of broad social groups in sharing power and participation in democratic civic procedures. The elitist, conservative, oligarchic character of most Latin American states – if not of all of them – led not only to political tensions, but also to social disproportions based on unequal access to natural resources and on unfair distribution of national revenue.
2. The result of political tensions, being the consequence of social inequalities, was a variety of protests, rebellions of different social groups and communities – ethnic and racial as well as and professional. Participants of all the opposition movements were repressed, persecuted, imprisoned, and tortured. Such phenomena, leading to escalated repressions towards a variety of oppositionists, were especially strongly manifested in the 1960s. Brazil and Argentina did away with members of left-wing political parties, and far-reaching repressions were applied towards the rural population, mostly Indian, in Mexico and countries of Central America; the brunt of persecution by state authorities was aimed against students, physicians, railwaymen going on strike in Mexico, and a range of other social categories.
3. This was the time when the tendency to liberalisation and democratisation of political life appeared. The idea of national and socialist revolution was replaced by a programme of liberal and democratic change, which allowed liberalisation and democratisation of political life. The civic identity spread to all – even the most underprivileged – social strata, leading, besides rare exceptions, to an increased sense of nationalism.

D. The post-national, civilisational phase, when – beside national ones – systems of interstate and international integration took shape. This phase had its roots in Simon Bolívar’s ideology of Latin American federation, aiming at a single state organisation and integration of all the former Spanish colonies. The particular interests of local economic and political elites in colonial administrative units, as well as external influences exerted by other powers, and especially by the United Kingdom, France, and

the United States, made the highly uniform and homogeneous culture of Spanish colonies divide into separate states. The nineteenth century was a period of territorial wars for the political borders of states dominated by elitist, exclusive oligarchic groups. The twentieth century was a tumultuous time when civic nationalism formed and when the democratic idea of nation–states became more common. Parallel to country-based forms of nationalism, designed by political elites, there was the ever persistent and developing sense of broader, civilisational, Latin American identity. The scope of language uniformity, and religious solidarity, growing from the grounds of sharing a common tradition and cultural heritage, is rooted deep in time. It comes from the phase of political unity of colonies, linguistic and religious homogenisation, with ethnic and racial variety. The processes of automation, synchronisation, and hybridisation of Latin American societies are parallel to the phenomena of cultural homogenisation, national integration, and political unification. One of the manifestations of the functioning of this form of integration and identity is the concept of “the cosmic race” (*raza cósmica*) put forth by Jose Vasconcelos. It reaches more a creed than a theory of a tribal, racial, and ethnic identity reshaping into a sense of social and civic identification with disappearing cultural divides. The basic distinctive feature of this new, universalised identity was to be the sense of social solidarism and religious identification (Vasconcelos 1993). For Mexico, this concept became the foundation of a new nationalism and sense of Latin American unity developing towards the North American one. Most countries of Latin America, and especially Mexico and Brazil, found themselves in a phase of reconstruction of their national identity and redefinition of the grounds of political, economic, and cultural integration. As anti-Americanism was being replaced by the concept of pan-American ideology, the civic societies of Latin American countries turned towards the multicultural, pluralist model, following the path marked out by the United States.

The basic tendencies in transformations of national identity among members of civic societies of Latin American countries in the 1990s included:

1. Processes of optimisation and building cultural unity and national identity detached from the Spanish and Portuguese heritage. This process led to awarding Chileans, Mexicans, Brazilians, and Argentinians the character of civic societies, and also of cultural and national communities. At this stage, national identity was characteristic not only of members of political and intellectual elites, as it had been early in the twentieth century, but it spread to all social categories of the population, irrespective of racial and ethnic origin. At the end of the twentieth century, civic communities transformed

to an ever greater degree into culturally separate nations. The nation-forming processes led to the homogenisation of Latin American societies to an uneven degree and at a different pace, shaping not so much the existing sense of territorial and state bond but the awareness of cultural separate-ness based on tradition and national heritage.

2. Changes in production relations. Technological progress and changes in the systems of production and distribution management made Latin America enter the phase of controlled dependent development towards the end of the twentieth century. The notion of “dependent development” denotes on the one hand the entry of Latin American countries, and especially of Chile, Argentina, Mexico, Brazil and Uruguay, to the global economic (and financial) system, and on the other, the founding of national economies in cooperation with highly developed countries, and especially with the United States. Besides subjugating the banking systems and state budgets of South America to international control, this economic model, known as the “Latin American option”, aids dynamic changes and transformations in the realm of economic organisation and social structure. It leads to fast, uncontrolled transfer of the rural population to cities. This phenomenon is the result of changes in agricultural production. For over two decades, small agricultural farms have remained below the threshold of production profitability. Agriculture is based on huge farms, organised by global concerns, managed cultivation and breeding in a way adjusted to contemporary organisation and the world’s economic conditions (Stemplowski 1978). They are very quick to displace owners of small farms from the market. The number of pauperised, landless and jobless residents of large cities is growing in Latin America.
3. The phenomena of industrialisation and urbanisation of the country. As far as the processes of industrialisation are slower and weaker in Latin America than those taking place in agriculture, urbanisation related to the mass exodus of rural population into the cities assumed an unrestrained, spontaneous, and mass character. Another result of urbanisation – not necessarily a positive one – was the rapid numerical growth of “poverty districts” – ethnic and tribal ghettos lying beyond the margin and composed of people bereft of traditional social and cultural heritage. Reconstructing their racial and ethnic identity, the residents of these districts of Indian–African origin, and racially mixed Mulattoes and Mestizos, mark – in a paradoxical manner – the beginnings of a new, proletarian and plebeian version of national awareness. The gatherings of urban population, independent of the class- and ethnic-racial divides among them, develop their particular market for

so-called cultural consumption. In the same way, elements of ethnic cultures – ludic, related to entertainment and fun – have also become the driving force behind homogenisation and cultural integration of the ethnically mixed urban population.

4. The processes of territorial integration and the reduction of the tendency to regionalise and polymorphise, leading to an increased sense of national unity. Historical separatist tendencies of individual regions of Mexico, Brazil and Colombia, especially related to certain types of agricultural mining economies, made the most powerful marks on the most economically developed regions – for example in the Rio Grande do Sul state in Brazil – as well as the most impoverished – such as in Mexico's state of Chiapas.
5. The movement of religious revival and syncretism has become a highly interesting and new phenomenon. Racial and religious syncretism leads to further emergence of transcultural forms of identity, closer to Brazilian national awareness than to other forms of local, particular identification with regional or ethnic groups. One of the important functions of syncretism is the universalisation of identity of coloured and racially mixed categories of population.
6. A specific variant of the processes of building supranational, continental bonds is the phenomenon of pan-Americanism. The construction of trans-continental, pan-American integration takes place mostly in the economic and political dimensions. The states of the northern hemisphere develop an ever better-functioning, organised and coordinated financial and economic market, coordinated by international organisations such as the Organization of American States and NAFTA. The integration of the two Americas: the Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, rationalist, and individualist, and the Ibero-American, Spanish and Portuguese-speaking and Catholic – is a phenomenon perceptible also in the cultural dimension. The borders of Latin American civilisation are moving ever further north. The percentage of Spanish-speaking citizens of the United States is growing now not only in Southern California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas, but also in Nevada, Colorado, and even New York and Illinois. On the other hand, the participation of the United States in the economic development of Latin American countries is expanding and deepening. Political and economic rationalism, economic competition, freedom of the individual, fast technological growth – the phenomena that define integrating trends for the economies of the US, Canada and Mexico – have also become the decisive factors in the context of cultural changes.

The phenomena of Latin Americanisation, pan-Americanism, increased sense of civilisational unity in the globalising world, are accompanied by the tendency to search for own paths to integration, stemming from the indigenous cultural and political tradition. One of the variations of Latin Americanisation is the populist movements – operating on the grounds of anti-Western, anti-American, anti-globalist ideological assumptions – which in certain countries, such as Venezuela, Bolivia and Nicaragua, assume the form of democratic socialism. The President of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, became the leader and symbol of this ideological and political path of international integration. Finding support in the radical social movements represented by the categories of pauperised coloured and racially mixed inhabitants of large cities, Chávez in a sense is building grounds for Latin American solidarity of a new, supranational type falling back on the classic concepts of “Che” Guevara and Fidel Castro, who preached the domination of egalitarian and social revolutionary principles based on the assumptions of social equality. The nativist movements have become a certain alternative in the construction of Latin American identity – other than national – of the socialist, proletarian type, referring at the same time to independence traditions and national civic societies. Radical ideas and left-wing movements have recently become institutionalised in Latin America. Presidents of a number of Latin American states, including Brazil, Venezuela and Bolivia, were elected to their posts to a greater extent thanks to falling back on the principles of social solidarity rather than those of national unity. The social solidarisation correlated with the ideas of nationalism assumes the form of national revolutionary programmes, in which the main role is no longer played by the richest white postcolonial elites but by the coloured and racially mixed categories of the population situated in the lower layers of the social structure.

5. Latin American societies: communities of national culture or civilisational corporation – community?

One of the greatest sociological controversies related to theoretical attempts to define the cultural nature of pluralistic Latin American societies is based on the impossibility of finding a single model for the process of integrating people of various racial, national, and ethnic (including tribal) origin. Due to the type of

bonds, Latin American communities are situated between the models of state–civic, economic, political and ideological uniformity, and of cultural – i.e. racial, ethnic, and religious pluralism. Which of these models – the political or the cultural one – would better, that is more fully and adequately, render the nature of integrative phenomena into a relatively uniform and homogenous civic society? Are Latin American communities closer to the edge of political and economic uniformity, and language homogeneity, allowing interpretation and explanation in the categories of political, civilisational, and economic system, or are they rather similar to a peculiar “multi-headed Leviathan”, that is a certain cultural-national whole? Do Latin Americans feature a fairly uniform type of identity, preach the same standards, respect similar values, or are these rather individual communities characterised by political and cultural uniqueness and national separateness?

The question whether civic societies in Latin America build nations or other post-national civilisations is by definition unanswerable, just like the question whether people hailing from different cultural groups are something of the like of a corporation–grouping: a community of citizens of the state equal in the view of one another and the law, or whether they form a homogeneous community of national culture. The societies of Latin America are both, they build areas of state–civic and cultural–national integration.

The nation is defined in the most general sense as a **historically developed very large community of people of territorial character, with a characteristic relatively uniform culture, especially in the scope of language and religion, conscious of their own separateness and integrity, together with the psychological and ideological consequences of this unity, fulfilling itself in its own state.** In reference to Latin American societies, the definition of the nation thus formulated contains a few highly important components decisive for the essence of every nation. Latin American societies are territorial groupings. On the basis of the territorial bond, functions the notion of the motherland as a politically and culturally shaped element of national identity of civic societies. Thus understood, territorial groupings – native, with characteristic nationalist types of attitudes, base their status not only on their own state and a sense of civic solidarity but also on the language they share, and the system of values and symbols stemming from their uniform religious tradition. In this way, civic societies in Latin American countries are sovereign, autotelic groupings that meet all the criteria along which nations are defined.

The factors constituting Latin American nations include:

1. Population, and its racial, ethnic and demographic characteristic features. The data concerning the sizes of populations of individual Latin American countries and their ethnic, racial, and religious mix are presented below in tables 1 and 2. Latin America is currently inhabited by approximately 550 million people. There are 34 states and 14 dependent territories in Latin America, covering together approximately 20.6 million sq. km. The population of Latin America is a mixture of Europeans, indigenous Indians, Africans, and Asians, which has developed a number of important ethnic and racial categories, especially of mixed type, for example Mestizos, Mulattoes, Zambos and Caboclos. The populations of individual countries of Latin America are strongly varied ethnically and racially, depending on the proportion of participation of the autochthonous population, Europeans, and Africans. In the majority of Latin American countries categories of population of Asian origin are also visible. Dominant among the European population are the descendants of colonists and settlers from Spain and Portugal. The percentage of descendants of French, Italian, German, Polish, Jewish and Ukrainian immigrants is significant. The most populous country of Latin America, Brazil, is currently inhabited by over 119 million people. The population of Mexico reaches 110 million. Every second Latin American citizen lives in one of these two countries. Integrative processes among the population of these two countries provide a model that is to a great extent representative of the entire area. The two largest civic societies are dominated by a population of racially mixed origin. In Mexico, 60% of the population are Mestizos, while in Brazil, even though the percentage of racially mixed population is still second – according to subjective declarations – to the population of white Brazilians, it reaches approximately 45% of all inhabitants. The demographic characteristics of the countries of the Andes are different from those of other states, as it is the Indian population that is dominant here. Closest to racial homogeneity are the racially mixed Chile and Paraguay. In these countries the decided majority of inhabitants are Mestizos, yet Chileans and Paraguayans form populations with a domination of national rather than racial identification. The definition of “a Chilean” does not contain the notion of a “Mestizo”, and calling a Chilean or Paraguayan a Mestizo carries a pejorative, negative undertone. The processes of civic and cultural assimilation have in these countries gone so far that we see here not only the domination of civic–national bonds and identity but its near exclusivity, if the low percentage of the indigenous population is disre-

garded. A similar situation on the grounds of uniform national identity is present in Argentina and Uruguay. In those countries, racial – much like ethnic – identity is reduced to national identification.

2. Territoriality. Characteristic of Latin American societies is a powerful sense of territoriality that finds expression both in state and national ideologies, and in people's psychology and identity. From the very beginning, the idea of territorial integration assumed one of the central places in the processes of integrating colonists and immigrants into a civic society. The sense of a bond with the motherland assumes an exceptionally powerful form with a clear domination of civic, territorial–state solidarity. The principle of territorial integration is comprised in the nation-forming processes of Latin American countries. The most important role in the processes of territorial integration – in fact from the earliest days of Iberian settlement in Latin America – was played by the state. The sense of territoriality is, as Stanisław Ossowski believes, one of the basic distinctive features of national solidarity, and is characteristic also of Latin Americans. Besides a powerful subjective bond with the ideological motherland, the state, the territory treated as home for all irrespective of racial or tribal–ethnic origin, very distinctive types of local–regional identity are present locally. Among the most obvious types of such territorial and cultural identity are the *gaucho* regionalism in the Brazilian–Argentinian–Uruguayan borderland; the “little” Indian homelands in Mexico, south of the Chiapas state; and Caribbean islander enclaves of individuality, as in the case of Haiti and Puerto Rico. The processes of regionalisation are one of the phases at the same time of types of the phenomenon of cultural universalisation in Latin America. Cultural universalisation means the broadening of the borders of the notion of homeland, from the “private” tribal homeland, inheritance, home soil, native territory, and region to the “ideological” homeland of state and national type.

Cultural universalisation takes place through the processes of acculturation, and, in the colonisation phase – dominated by Iberoconformism – was based on the shaping of the regional (territorial and ethnic) identity of the autochthonous type, while in the post-national phase it leads to the emergence of international regions, as around La Plata. The universalisation of the notion of homeland takes place in Latin America through nation-forming processes. Among other things, this means the broadening of the territorial, semantic and semiotic scope of the notion of homeland. The people of the Rio Grande do Sul state in southern Brazil no longer believe their identification with the “private” homeland – the region – to be more important than that with the Brazilian ideological homeland. Nor do they claim secession or political sovereignty. The

Rio Grande identity, much like the *gaucho* and *carioca* in the Rio de Janeiro State, overlap and coexist with a broader notion of territorial bond. This is not only of a state and legal character but also, if not primarily, it is cultural. Brazil, Mexico, Argentina or Chile are homelands for all citizens, irrespective of racial, regional, religious and ethnic differences. The feeling of civic solidarity is not based solely on the sense of territorial and state bond, but also on linguistic and cultural ones. In short, present here are all the components of national identity.

Territorial and demographic characteristics of selected (largest) countries of Latin America (data for 2003)

Country	Area (in sq. km)	Population	Population increase (in 2003)
Argentina	2,766,890	38,740,807	1.05%
Belize	22,966	266,440	2.44%
Bolivia	1,098,580	8,586,443	1.63%
Brazil	8,511,965	182,032,604	1.15%
Chile	756,950	15,665,216	1.05%
Colombia	1,138,910	41,662,073	1.56%
Costa Rica	51,100	3,896,092	1.56%
Cuba	110,860	11,263,429	0.34%
Ecuador	283,560	13,710,234	1.91%
El Salvador	21,040	6,470,379	1.81%
Guatemala	108,890	13,909,384	2.66%
Honduras	112,090	6,669,789	2.32%
Mexico	1,972,550	104,907,991	1.43%
Nicaragua	129,494	5,128,517	2.03%
Panama	78,200	2,960,784	1.36%
Paraguay	406,750	6,036,900	2.54%
Peru	1,285,220	28,409,897	1.61%
Puerto Rico	9,104	3,885,877	0.58%
Dominican Republic	48,730	8,715,602	1.36%
Uruguay	176,220	3,413,329	0.79%
Venezuela	912,050	24,654,694	1.48%

Source: *The World Factbook 2003*, <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/>

The processes of regionalisation are not only phenomena of expansion of the territorial borders of the homeland, but also of increased political consolidation, social unification and economic standardisation of cultural groups in-

habiting territorial units in individual countries of Latin America. More and more widespread is the sense of a supra-state, international regional bond. An example here is the Mercosur region, the borderlands between Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. "Latin Americanness" cannot be reduced only to a certain type of identity, connecting the members of the Mexican or Cuban diaspora in the United States. This is supra-state, international identification of a civilisational type.

3. Historical continuity. Latin American societies have their traditions of colonial and settlement: a historical memory connected with the long process of linguistic, religious and racial integration, and group mythology as well as ideologies related to the process of shaping the territory, development of state organisations, principles of democracy, and civic liberty. In the basic mythical and ideological canon functioning in the collective and individual awareness of Latin Americans are the linguistic bond and a special type of folk religiousness, as well as state and civil solidarity assuming the form of nationalism. A very important role in the shaping of the tradition and common heritage is played by the territorial bond: identification not so much with the state as with the homeland, being the correlate of Latin American nationalisms. Not only territories of states become homelands, but so do the regional areas that function in the awareness of Mexicans, Brazilians and, for example, Colombians not only as geographic areas, but as symbolic zones of economic, political, and cultural unity. The historical continuity of Latin American societies grows on the ground of dominant cultures of Spanish and Portuguese colonisers, but is complemented with elements of heritage.

The relatively short – compared to other nations – collective awareness of Latin Americans is also influenced to a certain extent by the pre-Columbian beliefs and cultural products of Indian tribes, increasingly considered equally important to European civilisational heritage. The phenomena of American Indian pan-ethnicism and indigenism are among the most important elements of the contemporary phase of development in the nation-forming processes of Latin America (Romero 1971; Kearney 1996; Posern-Zieliński 2005). The historical heritage shared by all Latin Americans – irrespective of their cultural identity – also includes state symbols, including the anthem, coat of arms, flag, and the cult of national heroes, especially strongly identified with the slogans of social solidarity and struggle for national liberation, cultivated by political and public authorities. The pantheon of heroes shared by nearly all Latin American societies includes Simon Bolívar and "Che" Guevara. Mexicans have their own national heroes including Emiliano Zapata, and Brazilians have Luis Barbosa.

National heroes are an important part of cultural heritage and an element of national ideologies and identities.

The historical heritage of Latin Americans is as complex and varied as the traditions of cultures that they themselves or their predecessors hailed from. The most important integrative dimension lies primarily in the – common for all Latin Americans – area of state, economic, and increasingly cultural traditions, manifested in the syndrome of supranational ties – the cosmic race – and also among other things in the iconography of products of musical, film and literary pop culture, art, architecture, and numerous other areas of activity including sport, science and economy. Sport, and especially football, plays a particularly important role in the development of national identities. Pelé, a footballer of the Brazilian club Santos, helped to shape patriotic attitudes and nationalism to a greater extent than several generations of politicians. Matches played by national football teams are an important element of national identity and of the sense of separateness within the space of a linguistic and religious community of Latin Americans. Football matches played by national teams not only raise powerful emotions and patriotic attitudes, but they have also led to armed conflicts, as was the case of the war between Honduras and El Salvador, which was, due to the immediate reason for its outbreak referred to as “the football war”. With all the traits of an armed conflict, the football war broke out in 1969. The name was derived from information spread by the press and television that the reason for the war was the World Cup qualifying match that Honduras lost on 15th June 1969. In reality, the relations between the two states had been tense much earlier, but nevertheless the match itself became the factor which allowed the culmination of nationalism in the two communities. The actual and more important reason for conflict were territorial disputes the two countries held around border areas, settled in an uncontrolled manner by the poor smallholders and landless Salvadorean peasants. Approximately 3000 people died in the conflict on both sides of the front.

4. Community character – being an attribute of nations showing a justified belief in common ethnogenesis. In this case, the community character is to a greater extent a component of a racial, ethnic or religious tie, being more narrow than the national one (Weber 2002: 306–313). In the supreme instance in the dimension of civilisational–cultural and state–civic integration, the Latin American society is a “community of communities” of tribal, ethnic, racial, linguistic, local, denominational, traditional, regional and national types. The community component is carried and substituted in the dimension of civil, political ties in the form of a new state nationalism expressed in the possibility

of establishing – as Latin American theoreticians and politicians claim – the new Mexican (Zea 1993), Brazilian (Freyre 1951), Bolivian or Chilean nations. Latin American societies were formed to the greatest extent by the states and a type of identity closer to political and cultural nationalism. To a significant degree they are closer to the type of civil society defined by Florian Znaniecki than that of the “national culture” community. Latin American thinkers were more eager to use the notion of “civilisation” than that of “culture”, which to a great extent rendered the complexity and variety of such societies as the Mexican, Brazilian, and Columbian in their racial and ethnic, and consequently also cultural, origin.

The sense of community: the specific bond based on personal identification with persons not only being citizens of the same state but also representing a similar or identical type of symbolic solidarity is based among Latin American nations to a greater extent on mystical, irrational belief, and subjective and deeply experienced spiritual union, than on the grounds of rational community of interests. The community spirit of Brazilians, Mexicans, Chileans and Bolivians is of a more spiritual, religious and psychological nature that has grown against the background of belief in historical and territorial ties rather than that of an economic or political nature. Social structure and political ideas are the factors that decisively set Latin Americans apart due to the differences in their income levels, social and professional prestige, and standing in the hierarchy of power. These differences are still – even though to a decreasing degree – reinforced by features of a racial and ethnic-tribal nature. The Brazilian or Chilean character are, however, syndromes of national awareness and attitudes, whose elements are common for all those citizens irrespective of racial, ethnic or national origins. The sense of national community is a distinctive feature among Mexican, Brazilians, and representatives of all national societies in Latin America. It is more passionate, spontaneously expressed, and experienced deeper than in European countries. The sense of national community in Latin American countries always kindles more lively emotions than would be justified in the case of linguistic, religious, economic or social unity. The community spirit also means orientation in the shaping of such types of identity and personality that find acceptance of other people in the near and far social environment. The questions of honour, prestige, social recognition, and acceptance of own position are more important for Latin Americans than their situation within the social structure. The sense of belonging and ties with the community lead to a powerful emotional relationship with homeland, nation and tradition. Elements of that tradition are not only the state, the president,

and the national football team, but also a peculiar religious, linguistic, territorial bond. This identity is based on the shared cult of heroes, saints, ancestors, and also on a belief in cultural similarity and common history.

5. Relatively high cultural homogeneity of Latin American societies, especially in the scope of language and religion. The dimension of cultural integration is very strongly correlated with the principle of relatively high denominational homogeneity and language uniformity. The dimension of values, symbols, and products that connect all citizens over racial, religious, and ethnic divides emerges more and more powerfully in the integrative processes of Latin American societies.

One of the most important components of this unity is **language**. The language that all Mexicans – with very rare exceptions – share is Spanish, much as is the case with the Portuguese language for Brazilians. It is true that these languages have by now become quite different from their European precursors, yet this fact reinforces even further the sense of national unity and community, parallel to drifting apart from the colonial tradition. At the same time, the sense of bond with the Creole or Lusitanic cultural milieu is weakening in both language zones, giving way to more general, egalitarian identification with the nation.

Latin American societies are highly uniform in their **denominational** structure. Dominant here are Christian groups, mostly Catholic, with a growing participation of Protestants and a fairly large share of other religions, especially syncretic ones: Afro-Brazilian and Indian -Christian. Independent of the fact that areas of denominational variety continue to exist is the Latin American phenomenon of folk Catholicism: informal and extra-ecclesial. It is based on the successful transfer of this sphere of group integration to the private, personal, and local space. In the countries of Latin America, religion is of a folk, spontaneous, and individual nature rather than of an institutional, formal, and group character. The ethos of Christian values combined with folk tradition, tribal magic and rites, and the belief in the unity of the world of people and nature leads to the evolution of the syndrome of mystical community tied to powerful religious grounds.

The **ethnic structure** leads to the continuing separateness of numerous groupings – differing in their cultural as well as their linguistic and religious assets – both on local, tribal, neighbourhood, community and parish levels, and on a global one too. The fact of maintaining an ethnic bond is to an ever lesser degree an obstacle in the development of a broader civic and cultural bond defined by integrative processes carried on the level of global society.

Racial and religious characteristics of the largest countries in Latin America

Country	Racial mix	Religion
Argentina	97% Whites (Indo-Europeans); 3% Mestizos, Indians and others	92% Catholics (less than 20% practising), 2% Protestants, 2% Jews, 4% others
Belize	48.7% Mestizos, 24.9% Creoles, 10.6% Maya, 6.1% Garifuna, 9.7% others	49.6% Catholics, 27% Protestants, 1.5% Jehovah's Witnesses, other 14%, none 9.4% (2000)
Bolivia	30% Quechua, 25% Aymara, 30% Mestizos, 15% Indians	95% Catholics, Protestants
Brazil	55% Whites, 38% Mulattoes, 6% Blacks, 1% others	80% Catholics
Chile	95% Whites and Whites Indians, 3% Indians, 2% others	89% Catholics, 11% Protestants, less than 1% Jews
Colombia	58% Mestizos, 20% Whites, 14% Mulattoes, 4% Blacks, 3% mixed Blacks and Indians, 1% Indians	90% Catholics
Costa Rica	94% Whites (inc. Mestizos), 3% Blacks, 1% Indians, 1% Chinese, 1% others	76.3% Catholics, 13.7% Protestants, 1.3% Jehovah's Witnesses, 0.7% others Protestants, 4.8% other, 3.2% none
Cuba	51% Mulattoes, 37% Whites, 11% Blacks, 1% Chinese	85% Catholics (before Castro), Protestants, Jehovah's Witnesses, Jews, Santeria
Ecuador	65% Mestizos, 25% Indians, 3% Blacks, 7% Whites	95% Catholics
El Salvador	90% Mestizos, 1% Indians, 9% Whites	83% Catholics
Guatemala	55% Mestizos, 43% Indians, 2% others	Catholics, Protestants, indigenous Maya beliefs
Honduras	90% Mestizos, 7% Indians, 2% Blacks, 1% Whites	97% Catholics, Protestants
Mexico	60% Mestizos, 30% Indians, 9% Whites, 1% others	89% Catholics, 6% Protestants, 5% other
Nicaragua	69% Mestizos, 17% Whites, 9% Blacks, 5% Indians	85% Catholics
Panama	70% Mestizos, 20% Indians, 10% Whites	85% Catholics, 15% Protestants
Paraguay	95% Mestizos, 5% Whites and Indians	90% Catholics

Peru	45% Indians, 37% Mestizos, 15% Whites, 3% Blacks, Oriental and other races	90% Catholics
Puerto Rico	80.5% Whites, 8% Blacks, 0.4% Indians, 0.2% Asians, 10.9% mixed and other races	85% Catholics, 15% Protestants and others
Dominican Republic	16% Whites, 11% Blacks, 73% mixed races	95% Catholics
Uruguay	88% Whites, 8% Mestizos, 4% Blacks, practically no Indians	66% Catholics, 2% Protestants, 1% Jews, 31% other religions and non-believers
Venezuela	Spaniards, Italians, Portuguese, Arabs, Germans, Africans, indigenous population	96% Catholics, 2% Protestants, 2% others

Source: *The World Factbook 2003*, <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>.

The white Catholics of European origin and heritage remain the culturally and economically dominant category, while the proportion of coloured and racially mixed social categories is on the increase. Catholicism, and growing religious and racial syncretism, are decisive for the original and unique qualities of the processes that integrate and form nations in Latin America.

6. National awareness. The decided majority of Latin Americans pride themselves on their civic belonging and shape a sense of state and civilisational nationalism specific to the countries of this cultural realm.

Latin American communities – multicultural in the sense of racial mix – are not nations in the sense that we ascribe to the notions of “the French nation” or “the Polish nation”, while at the same time meeting most definitional requirements that are set for such groupings. Latin American societies are in an advanced phase of the nation-forming process, shaping the bond of the national type among Chileans, Bolivians, Colombians, not to mention Mexicans, Brazilians, and Argentinians. National solidarity is superimposed on a narrower identity of racial and ethnic community type, becoming unified in the dimension of state and civic loyalty. There is also an ever clearer and broader dimension of Latin American civilisation emerging, which is expressed through Catholic heritage, the Spanish language, and a territorial bond that is in fact no longer reducible to the component cultures of individual immigrant groups.

For this reason, one should not ask whether Latin American societies *are* nations, but whether they *perceive* themselves as nations. The subjectivisation

of the criteria of national belonging has in recent years become the dominant tendency. For a Chilean or Paraguayan, the basic type of highly homogeneous, uniform identity does not boil down to identification with the racial category of Mestizos, but with the national culture and state being the determinants of the civic category.

It might also be claimed that Latin American societies feature the characteristics both of nation–cultures and civic societies–states on the one hand, and of pluralistic, international, supra-state civilisations on the other. In this sense, the term “Latin American” also covers a citizen of the United States of America of Mexican or Puerto Rican national origin, considering their American identity as obvious and broader than the racial identification of the Blacks or Mestizos, the religious identification of Catholics and Protestants, the ethnic one of Indians, or – for example – of Brazilians of Polish or Italian origin. As far as citizens of Brazil or Mexico use identifiers in the type of “a Brazilian” or “a Mexican” while defining their own national (cultural) affiliation, a citizen of the US coming from these countries and identifying himself or herself with a broader type of cultural group would be more likely to express his or her identity using the notion of “a Latin American”. The phenomenon of broadening of the borders of cultural identity overlapping the processes of political and economic globalisation is spreading to an ever greater extent onto people coming from various racially uniform or mixed groups. Hence this type of Latin American, or simply Latino, identity is increasingly present next to Afro-American or American Indian (pan-Indian) ones.

The processes of construction of the ties of civilisational, post-national, supra-racial (mixed), interethnic, and multi-denominational Latin American society are far more advanced. Superimposed on the phenomenon of globalisation, “Latin Americanisation” of culture of members of the various racial, religious, and ethnic groups is the phenomenon of language uniformity, while enclaves of bilingualism and bi- and multi-culturality continue. The phenomenon of bicultural reality is present in the identity proper for example for Afro-Brazilians and Indians, and is dominated by linguistic, religious, political, and economic identification aiming towards the national type, similar to Brazilian, Mexican or broader – Latin American of the civilisational type (Paleczny 2005).

6. The case of Brazil: nation-forming process or phenomenon of Latin Americanisation?

The specific and unique features that differentiate the Brazilian nation-forming process from other, similar, pluralist societies of immigration and postcolonial origin include the highly developed phenomenon of racial amalgamation, crowned with the near disappearance of that dimension of structuralisation. As far as the component of racial variety and origin remains among the few rather secondary dimensions of distinctiveness and ethnic identity, it is based not as much on the maintenance or establishment of conflicts and biases but rather on the construction of a complex system of cultural identity of the new Brazilian nation.

The most important features of the Brazilian society that built the unique civic-national mosaic of groups and people of various racial, ethnic and national origins include:

1. Superimposition and simultaneous presence of various models of pluralism: from national and ethnically monism, via monism or hybrid bi-culturality (trans-culturality), to external and internal pluralism, increasingly dominating the shaping of the current system of identity of Brazilians. These mechanisms may be defined by the term "trans-culturality" (Lévi-Strauss 1964; Wade 1997).

Mechanisms that belong to all the models of intercultural relations have played and are still playing – with changing and unequal intensity – a role in the Brazilian nation-forming process. I believe that the most important mechanisms include three forms of influence:

- a) racial mixing and establishment of transnational categories and groupings, racially and ethnically mixed: Mulattoes, Mestizos, Cafuzos.
- b) superimposition of ethnic and racial awareness with the disappearance and reduction of the racial and ethnic dimension defined by the fact of tribal, ethnic or national origin. The result of that process is the relatively early disappearance of racism and discrimination resulting from the fact of racial identity.
- c) parallel presence of double, shared, symmetric national and ethnic identities: Indian-Brazilian, Afro-Brazilian, Polish-Brazilian, Ukrainian-Brazilian, and Italian-Brazilian. As a result, there are still frequent cases of bilingualism and biculturalism at the level of local ethnic groupings. Biculturalism and double, shared Brazilian ethnic and national identity survive not only in the rural areas of the interior, but also in the large, metropolitan communities of "ethnics" in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Santos, Recife, and Salvador.

2. Religious, aesthetic and artistic, and cultural and social syncretism. The Brazilian nation-forming process allowed the mixing and superimposition of elements of magic, religious beliefs, musical motifs, tribal and national symbols, and other cultural elements including dances, foods, architectural styles, patterns of family inheritance, lifestyles, and many others.

3. Polymorphism of ethnic–racial groups and regional tribal communities, autochthonous and cultural (Paleczny 2001a, 2004). The variety of forms of organisation results from the racially, ethnically, and religiously multicultural heritage of the Brazilian population. Hence local groupings of varied racial and ethnic mix are adjacent one to another, for example in Rio de Janeiro the favelas, counted among the lowest categories of social class, neighbour with the enclaves of skyscraper apartment blocks reserved for the ethnically non-homogenous, although predominantly “white” in their self-identification, middle-class. In other places, as in the interior of the Rio Grande do Sul State, local tribal groupings of Guarani Indians coexist side by side with the rural ethnic communities composed, for example, of the descendants of Polish settlers, groupings of gauchos and Caboclos, and the camps of Brazilian peasants gathered in the landless movement and devoid of a sense of ethnic identity.

4. “Glocalism” of the Brazilians’ ethnic and national identity. This is a syndrome of attitudes and identity being a complex, multi-dimensional system of global identity with various types of the narrower, local, regional identification in versions that might be represented by members of the district or city “samba schools” or schools of the flamenco or the botafogo or gauchos in the Dom Feliciano municipal region in Rio Grande do Sul. Global identification of the Brazilian type, national, ideological–civic is based on various elements of the sense of identification with the Brazilian nation, and for all the separate local–and–ethnic and cultural–regional groups. Elements of this identity definitely include the language, yet the case of religion is not that obvious. Going further, the symbols of Brazilian unity visible in global identity include, for example, the Brazilian football team, but in regional and local systems the person of Pelé, for example, is replaced in the capacity of national hero by a player of a local football team.

The peculiarity of the Brazilian cultural pluralism boils down to the overlapping of two basic types of cultural identity:

I. Broad, global, national. The process of national integration runs at a quicker pace, as cultural communities – various in the sense of racial and ethnic origin and intermingled with one another – seek a broader type of

identification that all could share. The Brazilian society – young in the sense of cultural homogeneity – is a natural point of reference that is attractive for members of various racial, ethnic and denominational groups. The hybrid cultural groups, unique in their ethnic and racial characteristics and encompassing more than half of society, urgently need a broader principle for integration to legitimise their identity. And the new type of national identity is where they find it. The globalisation of cultural identity of Brazilians does not wrench them from the original environment – more narrow ethnically and racially; it only awards the group identification with the more universal character accepted by everyone.

II. Narrow, exclusive, particular. This dimension of identification of Brazilians is encompassed in the variety of regional and local racial and ethnic communities. Besides prototypes of mixed cultural categories, including the Mulattoes, Cafuzos, Caboclos and gaucho, there are numerous local tribal groupings of Indians assuming subcultural characteristic features of tribal–racial–neighbourhood communities of the favelas environment; religiously and racially separate groups of Brazilians; and the local ethnic groupings of Brazilians of Polish, Ukrainian, Italian or Japanese origin.

These identities become superimposed and crossed with one another in the complex processes of national assimilation, racial hybridisation, religious syncretisation, and ethnic amalgamation, leading to the reinforcement of the new multicultural society. This multiculturalism meets all the basic assumptions of the theoretical model of pluralism (Zhou 1997).

1. Despite internal racial, ethnic and religious divides, Brazilian society is **internally coherent, culturally integrated, racially and ethnically mixed, and religiously tolerant**. The cohesion of Brazilian society is not tantamount to homogeneity. On the contrary, this cohesion means the crossing of a number of relatively strongly diverse principles of hierarchisation and structuralisation. At that level of global society, race remains a factor that barely differentiates and is in fact disappearing. The scope of racial amalgamation makes the mixed population the dominant category, while locally an unequal valuation of the individual components of identity can be observed. There are no permanent structural tensions in the country that would lead to antagonisms and conflicts despite major disproportions in the situation of Brazilians that have assumed the form of a dichotomy on the scale of richness, prestige and power. There are movements and groupings that question the existing class and social order, yet their very activity has

nothing in common with racial or ethnic belonging. One of the most radical forms of protest is the social activity of the movement of landless peasants. This movement is an expression of the social stratification between the extreme social categories, owners of vast estates and landless peasants, escalating into conflicts, which in a great majority of cases are solved by the use of legal means. Brazilian society contains minorities dissatisfied with their situation, yet they are of a class or social character, and not of cultural, racial or ethnic origin. These minorities do not bring down the basic principle of pluralism based on acceptance of the rights to cultural separateness that are honoured by a majority of Brazilians. It is true on the other hand that the principle of the primacy of "the social good" in Brazil is an ideology that is more clearly and strongly articulated than implemented, yet the federal authorities have not conducted any planned policy towards racial and ethnic communities for the last several decades.

2. Brazilian society is **multi-cultural, and encompasses numerous identities of various uniform and mixed racial, ethnic, and religious characteristics**. The various types of cultural identities are maintained and developed without any political or legal barriers, encountering no more than obstacles of a social and economic nature. Members of various cultural groups have unequal access to education, they participate to various degrees in the division of power and revenue, yet the principle of free development is maintained for every racial, ethnic, and religious group. There is cultural equality in Brazil, which is expressed by the fact that a variety of communities is maintained with full rights to their own separateness. Social equality and cohesion do not stand in contradiction to cultural variety.
3. **The abundance of cultural identities is expressed in a multicultural, racial, ethnic and religious mosaic. Cultural pluralism means the existence of various traditions, lifestyles, and historical traditions of human groups**. Brazilian Multi-culturalism is developing in three dimensions:
 - a) **Cultural stratification**. On the racial plane this means inequality on the scale of fortune, education, power, and prestige. Yet these inequalities are neither common nor dominant, and assume the form of regional class gradation between the black and the white populations in the regions of their concentration. The extremes of the scale are taken by the poorest and the most affluent, yet this dichotomy does not fully overlap with the criterion of

racial divides. Ethnic stratification replaces racial gradation within the white and mixed population of Brazil and becomes an element of positive biculturalism and bilingualism, and not the negative discrimination or inequality. Religious pluralism means a lack of evident correlation of ethnic or racial structure with division into denominational groups, even though such dependence without a doubt exists.

- b) **Cultural regionalisation.** Regionalisation is present in the perspective of global society, in the divisions into “the Black north” and “the White south”, macro-regional and regional areas of domination of the gaucho or the Caboclo cultures; and on a local, ethnic, religious, and racial micro-scale: in religious sects, Polish communes in rural communities in the interior, metropolitan favelas settled by Indian and Afro-Brazilian population of complex racial and ethnic characteristics including tribal.
- c) **Variety of cultural communities and space.** Various types of local identities narrower than the Brazilian are situated beyond spatial borders of both a regional and local type. The presence of racially mixed categories – Mulattoes, Cafuzos, and Mestizos – is common all over Brazil, much like different forms of theology of liberation, ethnic exclusivism of Iberians, and the maintenance of tribal bonds of Indian peoples.

An analysis of the nature of Brazilian society from the point of view of principles of cohesion, equality, and plurality of equal cultural identities supports the assertion that this is a complex, pluralistic community assuming the form of a nation. The notion of the “Brazilian multicultural nation” seems to verge on paradox, as it contains a basic theoretical and practical contradiction. On the basis of the known theories, the conviction operates that a nation must be culturally homogeneous, and internally coherent racially and ethically. Yet Brazil joins the group of those postcolonial and post-migration countries that in a highly efficient manner develop the principle of national integration on the basis of pluralistic ties between various racial, ethnic, and denominational communities.

Brazilians form a highly integrated cultural group that fulfils the qualities of the nation. It is a group of predominantly the same type of cultural integration as the Portuguese or Polish nations. Yet it also differs significantly from the culturally uniform European nations due to its complex racial and ethnic characteristics. The processes of integration in the sense of increased language, symbolic, and ideological factors are present parallel to the processes of pluralisation of that society in the racial and religious dimensions. Independent

of the growth of Brazilian national identity, the processes of “Latin Americanisation” of Brazilians are progressing. A new type of broader civilisational identification is emerging. At the same time, it is a fact that in the Spanish-speaking population of Latin America, the processes of “Latin Americanisation” are more advanced on the grounds of historical tradition, language identification, and racial amalgamation.

Translated by Piotr Krasnowolski

ALEKSANDER POSERN-ZIELIŃSKI

The State and the Indigenous Peoples in Latin America

Introduction

Indians, that is native (*nativos*) or indigenous (*indigenas*) peoples, autochthonous in the ethno-historical sense, are the oldest stratum of population in the New World. For this reason, they are defined as “pueblos originarios”, a term corresponding to the concept of “first peoples” used in North America. They are therefore the heirs of the people who reached the American continent more than 10,000 years before its “European discovery” in the fifteenth century. Following 500 years of conquest, colonisation, extermination, exploitation, marginalisation, exclusion, deprivation of rights, assimilation (*mestizaje*), and extinction resulting mostly from lack of immunity to pandemic illnesses, these peoples became a minority in the world of the new Latin American societies and states. In some regions – the Caribbean, for example – they died out almost entirely, while in others they have survived to this day, albeit only in small, fairly isolated groups (as in Brazil and Paraguay), and in some areas of Mesoamerica and in Andean countries, they are still present in fairly large numbers, both as a percentage of the total population and in absolute terms. Beginning with the 1980s, a range of native organisations, tendencies, and restitution actions – usually defined jointly as movements of indigenous revival – began to appear in autochthonous societies: both small ones, usually inhabiting tropical forests and savannas far away from urban centres, and those living in large gatherings in mountain and highland areas. Their common denominator has been a tendency to reject the postcolonial status assigned to Indians, defence of their land, territories and natural resources, fight for guarantees on deciding their own fate, shaping the strategy of their development (*etnodesarrollo*), and finally the struggle to preserve their own identity, including language, culture, religion, and legal traditions.

What began to take shape at the same time was pan-Indian solidarity, possible mostly thanks to new means of social communication (Internet, cheap and readily available telephone connections) and more intensive contacts between Indian leaders from various countries of the continent (through conferences, workshops, working visits, etc.) First this encompassed socially varied indigenous societies of one country, and then spread into the macroregion, and later throughout the continent. Despite the vast cultural and language differences that divide indigenous groups, its foundation was a common tragic historical experience, a similar current situation based on the status of a minority deprived of the civil and native rights, and a joint effort to change this situation by overcoming the paternalism that brings Indians down to the position of an "object" of state policy and replacing it with indigenous activism allowing *indigenas* to achieve the status of being one of the recognised "subjects" of the country's social and political life.

The pan-Indian solidarity mentioned here has one more, far broader dimension, namely it fits perfectly the global movement of indigenous peoples, developing the ideology of the so-called "fourth world". Its main axis is the struggle to work out generally accepted rights, principles, and standards which take into account the specific characteristics of indigenous peoples on all continents (from Inuits in Greenland to Aborigines in Australia), which on the one hand would be respected by state authorities in the territories where such peoples live, and on the other would allow those groups to maintain their jeopardised identity, its continuation harmonised with development programmes bringing those people out of poverty and marginalisation. The path to reaching these goals leads first of all through a network of international connections linking different indigenous organisations and their leaders, thanks to which new ideas and experiences of the struggle for human and collective rights for autochthonous people quickly spread from one country to another. Secondly, it leads through lobbying at the forums of international organisations, primarily the United Nations and its main agencies (UNESCO, ILO, WHO), including working out legal regulations defining clearly and unambiguously the rights of indigenous peoples, and state authorities' duties towards them. We should note that representatives of the indigenous community – from both North and Latin America – have for years been very active in this global "fourth world" movement. It goes without saying that a number of solutions, proposals and suggestions assumed in the recently passed United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples were borrowed from the Latin American experience,

which is exceedingly rich and inspirational when it comes to the Indians' fight for their rights.

Carrying out the emancipatory postulates of the Indians, a process that has intensified especially since the 1990s, led to the establishment of a new relationship between the native people and the external world, including the Creole–Mestizo majority society, the Latin American and international network of businesses operating in regions inhabited by indigenous peoples, and also the state and its administrative apparatus. In each of these social, and at the same time interethnic relations, conflicts, disputes, confrontations of positions, and finally pursuits of new solutions took place and still do, so that these relations become based no longer on racial prejudices but on partnership and tolerance, and in the course of economic progress ignorance of indigenous vital interests should be replaced by taking into account their right to own territories and land. The final goal is to have the paternalistic ethno-politics of state authorities (*indigenismo*) replaced by such regulations that would allow Indians to exercise their civic rights in all areas of social and political activity, beginning with local government and ending with the central administration of the state (Favre 1998).

In this chapter we shall primarily focus on the relations between the states and indigenous peoples, as this aspect of the “new” interethnic relations in Latin America may be considered fundamental. This does not mean, however, that the importance of economic, social, racial and ethnic, and cultural factors will be ignored, as without referring to them it would be difficult to understand the contemporary position of native peoples. Nevertheless, they shall be examined primarily from the perspective of the highly complex relations shaping the ethnic politics of the state towards its indigenous citizens and the ethnostrategy of Indians towards the state in whose territory they have lived for centuries and its system of power relationship.¹

It is no exaggeration to claim that the relations between the states and Indians were of an antagonistic character since the colonial times. This is how

¹ Majority of the reflections and interpretations included in this chapter have been based on my personal experience of many years of anthropological studies and ethnographical fieldwork carried out since 1993 in Latin America, specially in the Andean countries, where I have observed the indigenous activism and its social, cultural and political context. Some of the results of my studies were published mostly in Spanish as well as in Polish, among other in my book (2005a).

they were and are still, sadly, perceived by the native peoples. It is hard to find this phenomenon astounding if one takes into account the fact that structures of power and administration – in both colonial and republican periods – were built by European colonisers and New World Creoles on the areas captured by power and taken from the control of the native people. In this new situation, the authorities – personified by the state apparatus, usually supported the institutions, groups, and people responsible for exploitation of Indians and expropriation of their land. There is no doubt, that the state was responsible for social and territorial marginalisation of indigenous people, for pushing them into the position of those excluded and deprived of rights. Last but not least, it was perceived as a permanently active factor favouring successive conquests of indigenous territories in the name of economic (exploitation of natural resources) and social (settlement of excess population) interests, and promoting civilisational progress (missions, schools, infrastructure) in line with the visions of development of the state yet in most cases contradictory with the interests of Indians themselves (Maybury-Lewis 1997).

In the colonial period, the authorities of vice-kingdoms, *audiencias*, and *capitanas generales* spread their reign by conquering all the new territories that had earlier been controlled entirely by Indians, and made sure that their indigenous peoples were subjected to exploitation as a cheap labour force. Nevertheless, those new and – for Indians – alien authorities awarded the natives with limited autonomous status, e.g. in the form of the so-called *repúblicas del indio* or of the missionary *reducciones* that awarded the indigenous people with a certain package of rights respecting their local traditions, customs, and legal norms. In the formative and mature republican times (the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century), that is under the reign of the independent state shaped by Creole elites following French and North American political and legal ideas, this special status for Indians was liquidated following lofty slogans of Enlightenment, preaching formal equality (before the law) for all citizens, and therefore also for Indians. As a result, their legal situation in fact deteriorated, while exploitation and expropriation continued with a high intensity despite countless rebellions and uprisings, which were considered the only active strategy of the indigenous people opposing the pitiful situation.

Until quite recently, the contemporary (i.e. latter half of the twentieth century) Latin American state, shaped by Creole, Mestizo, and immigrant (from Europe and Asia) elites, ignored almost entirely the existence and needs of autochthonous people. In fact, this state did not represent the interests of

Indian people, although it would sometimes hide these tendencies away, establishing a variety of institutions (agencies, bureaus, departments, ministries) that were formally to take care of the natives. Their primary real task hiding behind the *indigenismo* ideology was stepped-up integration of Indians, perceived as a process of including them in the main current of the dominant society and depriving them of their ethno-cultural identity on the path of the so-called *mestizaje*, i.e. cultural, ethnic, and racial assimilation. An Indian was perceived as a primarily conservative element, a misfit to the modern, developing society. The Indian pattern of life was considered “primitive”, and therefore unworthy of continuation, indigenous legal norms (including the idea of collective property) were treated as contradictory to the principles of occidental positive rights, while indigenous land and territories were considered an area of potential settlement and economic expansion to allow implementation of development programmes and economic growth of the country. In this way the State–Indian opposition acquired an additional sense. If, from the point of view of the natives, this relationship was seen as a confrontation between the apparatus of power and violence (that is the oppressive state) and its victim (the indigenous people), in the eyes of the dominant society, Indians were perceived as the representatives of backwardness, lagging behind and standing in opposition to progress and development, of which the contemporary state was the natural instigator (Bello 2004).

It goes without saying that, inherited from the time of Spanish and Portuguese rule, the attitude of both the dominant society and the state apparatus towards Indian people was strongly infused with racial prejudice, a sense of cultural superiority, and civilisational and missionary paternalism – that is ideas that legitimise perfectly the social and economic dominance of the Creole and Mestizo population over indigenous world. In this sense, then, Latin American states are without doubt of a postcolonial character, despite the two centuries that have passed from their formal liberation from the control of their overseas metropolises. If one looks closer today at the most significant demands of Indians, formulated in defence of their rights and also with the intention of improving their everyday lives, it is clear that they are primarily directed against the still existing elements of (endo)-colonial relations visible in the economic (exploitation), social (exclusion), civic (lack of subjectivity), and cultural (acculturation) areas (Pueblos 2007).

At the threshold of the twenty-first century, this postcolonial model of relations between the State and Indians began to be questioned ever more often: a phenomenon reinforced by the progressing process of democratisation that

encompassed the whole area of Latin America after the period of the fall of authoritarian rules, civil wars, and guerrilla activities. One of the most visible manifestations of the process is formed by the so-called new social movements encompassing ever new sectors of population, claiming an improvement of lives, respect for their laws, emancipation, and upholding their jeopardised identities. This current includes such social and organisational efforts as the movement of peasants without land standing up to owners of large estates, the movements of the *cocaleros*, i.e. growers of coca plants, claiming legalisation of their family small plantations, the movement of Afro-Latin American people striving for recognition of their cultural heritage and protesting against racism, movements of residents of the poor neighbourhoods in large metropolises protesting against the dehumanising conditions of their existence, and also extremely active emancipatory ethnic movements among the indigenous people.

Numerous newly established indigenous organisations and their leaders, as well as “friends of Indians” from all over the world – usually gathered in numerous NGOs acting for the benefit of Latin American indigenous people – formulated and assumed positions of decisive criticism towards the former and current conditions of the native population. After the great fall in the prestige of left-wing movements (partially caused by the fall of the Soviet Union and its allies supporting the world-wide communist movement) often favouring the indigenous population, a major change took place in the indigenous ideological orientation and the strategy of their struggle. Indian leaders became aware that the indigenous question was frequently used only opportunistically by the political parties for their own goals, and that it had little in common with the actual interests of the native people. This is why, beginning with the 1990s, they began to build their own organisational structures, strongly dissociating themselves from the powerful and direct ties to political and syndicalist organisations of the Creole- Mestizo sector. This is how the phenomenon of institutionalised Indian activism was born, and was manifested in the extremely well developed network of organisations from the local level to that of national and supraregional federations, and also the more or less successful attempts at establishing ethnic political parties, gaining influence at the local level of self-government and also winning indigenous representatives in parliaments, and state central administration. All of these actions brought a new, strong, well-organised, influential actor, namely, indigenous leaders and organisations, aware of their own objectives, arising on today’s political stage in Latin America. Their presence can no longer be in any way ignored, and must increasingly be taken into consideration by the state authorities (Yashar 2005).

Now it is primarily the state and its administration of all levels that has become the main counterpart in disputes, negotiations, conflicts, and pressures aimed at the improvement of the position of Indians. The experience of the past years has proved unequivocally that the former ethnic policy of the authorities – despite the concessions and gestures made on behalf of Indians – was in fact contradictory with the actual interests of the indigenous people. Nevertheless, wherever powerful native gathering Indians sprang up, the situation began to improve gradually, which was mostly based on the construction of new platforms for cooperation and dialogue between the governmental and indigenous parties. Despite that, strong tensions and conflicts along the State–Indians line are still visible. In many countries and regions of Latin America, the new Latin American populism – implemented in Bolivia by Evo Morales, in Venezuela by Hugo Chávez, and in Ecuador by Rafael Correa – strongly emphasises its positive attitude towards the native people, yet this has not in fact broken the strongly established barrier of mistrust among Indians towards the institutions of what (in their eyes) is the oppressive state. For the state is perceived not as an ally of minority ethnic groups, but primarily as a collaborator of major national and international corporations employing neoliberal development programmes that frequently threaten the vital interests of Indians. Such modernising projects are recurrently the hotbed of acute conflicts that provoke Indians to mass protests – frequently of an anarchistic character (blocking roads, occupying buildings, destroying machines) – resulting in repressions on the part of the authorities, and penalisation of indigenous activists.

In spite of everything, democratic tendencies acquire ever greater power, slowly becoming an effective means of conflict solving. That end is served by various commissions, platforms and forums for debates, gathering Indian leaders and representatives of the local and central administration. What is, however, a markedly weak element in these encounters – is the fact that they construct ambitious programmes of agreement and protection of Indian interest in the form of “paper” resolutions that are hardly ever implemented, and even more rarely end in specific actions being undertaken that visibly liquidate malpractices or significantly improve the lives of Indians.

The object of these consultations, debates, mediations, appeals, and protests addressed to state authorities by Indians – independent of local specific conditions – always includes similar postulates. These include claims to establish conditions for preservation of identity, halting the process of degradation of the natural environment inhabited by indigenous peoples, safeguarding their

human rights together with their due rights as citizens, hosts, and owners of land that they have inhabited for centuries, introduction of territorial and cultural autonomy based on the principles of multiculturalism, intensification of the process of restitution of lost lands and/or territories, and finally awarding the indigenous people with full civic subjectivity so that without any formal obstacles they can become responsible for their own lives. Such ideas can easily be found in the action programmes of the Chilean Mapuche from Araucanía and the Bolivian Aymara from Altiplano and in the demands of the Mexican Maya from Chiapas (Warren 1998).

An important factor supporting the phenomenon of contemporary indigenous movements in Latin America is the gradual economic development of the continent, resulting in the modernisation of the lives of Indians by a breakthrough in the isolation they have hitherto experienced, greater professional activation, huge migrations of indigenous peasantry to cities, an improving level of education, an increasing level of self-awareness among the *indigenas* concerning their political, legal, and economic matters, incipient development of the indigenous middle-class, and shaping of the new native elites, both moving freely in the world of own values and knowing well the rules of effective activity in the realm of Western civilisation. Shaped on the grounds of these transformations is the idea of ethnic development (*etnodesarrollo*) strongly accentuated the need for modernisation and civilisational advancement of the indigenous population, yet with the maintenance of a separate ethnic identity based on the values of their own culture and tradition inherited from their ancestors (Jackson, Warren 2005).

One of the significant and objective factors favouring the democratisation of interethnic relations and the development of the indigenous emancipatory movement – that is at the same time independent from the Latin American context – is definitely globalisation, perceived primarily as “mundialisation” (*mundialización*), which is not as much an economic process as one embracing both the social and cultural realm. Quick flow of ideas and easier interpersonal contacts have allowed the spreading of principles of multiculturalism and intercultural education, promoted knowledge of human rights and of international principles for protection of indigenous populations, allowing rapid exchange of information about the situation of Indian people, and launching moral, legal and financial support from international organisations and governments of those states that support the countries of Latin America, and especially their native inhabitants (Posern-Zieliński 2005).

The worldwide debate concerning the rights of indigenous peoples and promotion of political programmes, accounting for the principles of multiculturalism, have without doubt become important factors that favour reforms in the relations between the State and Indians. In this atmosphere of significant shifts of values in the previous “standards” in interethnic relations, the claim that native people may no longer be ignored or live on the margin of the country’s mainstream continued to become an increasingly obvious corollary. On the other hand, there was a conviction spreading that the state in its internal policy should account for the vital interests of Indian people and, moreover, do so with their active participation. At the same time, leaders of indigenous organisations began to articulate ever more strongly postulates aimed at launching such mechanisms which would allow them not only to influence matters concerning their compatriots, but also – as citizens – to have an impact on all the matters significant for the future of the country. In this manner, the new model of a state, pluralistic in the ethnic sense, began very slowly to take shape in Latin America. The states would – accepting the principles of multiculturalism – as a consequence have to begin to walk the path of recognising separate cultural traditions (primarily Indian, but also Afro-American, Asian, immigrant), promoting bilingual education, accepting indigenous languages in the public realm to a greater extent, respecting autochthonous legal norms, and also paying more careful attention to developmental programmes for liquidation of poverty affecting the majority of native people. It goes without saying that this new model of state has only entered the phase of initial formation, which means gradual acceptance of a political philosophy different from the former, introduction of the necessary constitutional changes, establishment of special governmental–indigenous agencies to act for the improvement of the situation of native people, the increasing acceptance of Indian partners in the process of decision-making, and eventually causing mental changes in the entire Creole-Mestizo society based on overcoming the previous ethnic stereotypes and racist prejudices. The direction of these changes seems obvious. Their goal is not only to construct a new model of democratic state respecting the principles of multiculturalism, multiethnicity, and linguistic plurality adequately adjusted to the ethnocultural and ethnoracial structure of the society, but also to lay the foundation under the new type of national and political community, which – by accepting the necessary process of decolonisation – would include Indian people into the mainstream of the country’s life with equal rights (Dávalos 2005).

Indigenous people and their position in the state

When analysing the situation of Indians in Latin America and the attitude of state authorities to that group, it is necessary to consider the character of the definition of an Indian, which is of key importance primarily in the praxis of the assessment of the size of native populations. Let us, therefore, begin with pure terminology: the term "Indio" is considered throughout Latin America as pejorative and derogatory, strongly imbued with the inheritance of colonialism and spite towards "the other" in whom the features of "the savage" are perceived, and who is juxtaposed to the "civilised" majority. This is why the term has been practically eradicated from official discourse. Similarly, in colloquial language its use has been marginalised under the pressure of political correctness. A certain novelty is a revival of this term in the utterances of some Indian leaders who – within the framework of the movement of ethnic revival – are trying to bestow it with a new, this time positive, meaning. Although visible, this reinterpretation is still hardly significant.

The term used to define indigenous people that is neutral and common all over Latin America is "indigenas". This encompasses essentially all categories or groups of Indians, although in some countries – for example in Peru – the native inhabitants of Amazonia are officially defined as *nativos*. Beginning with the 1980s, the term *pueblos originarios* began to spread under the influence of debates and legal solutions approved in Bolivia. It emphasises chiefly the precedence of Indian presence and native character of their culture on the American continent. Semantically, this proposal is therefore close to the term "first peoples", generally used in reference to the Indians of the US and Canada.

The question of using terms that are more or less approved, be it by the indigenous people or by the state, does not, however, solve the most crucial problem, namely the definition of clear-cut criteria of who is definitely an Indian, and who is definitely not. Faced with the increasingly intensifying process of assimilation and acculturation in the form of *mestizaje*, vast migrations from native villages to towns, popularisation of contemporary mass culture, and state education focused on elimination of ethnic identities and indigenous languages, and globalisation processes reaching with large force even to marginal regions, the "traditional" criteria of Indianness have become ambivalent and unreliable. The one that has been used most often for ethnodemographic calculations was the number of speakers of native languages. However, faced with

today's increasing phenomenon of bilingualism, and especially those forms of bilingualism that limit the use of mother tongue to home and family, this criterion ceased to be sufficient. Especially due to the fact that it is one that decidedly narrows, due to the growing number of the "indigenas", who speak only Spanish or Portuguese. On the other hand, there are also reverse situations – such as in Paraguay – where the native language, Guaraní, became simply the colloquial "speech" of Mestizo countryside people who in no way consider themselves representatives of the Indian minority. Similarly, racial (morphological) features may not serve as a useful marker of Indian identity. They were certainly significant in colonial times, when there were sharp divisions between Iberian Creoles, that is "white" Europeans, assuming the position of conquerors, and the "indios" subject to their power. Nevertheless, with the intensifying processes of miscegenation (i.e. the mixing of races) and syncretisation (the mixing of cultures), and, what follows, with the formulation of a new social, racial, and cultural category in the form of Mestizos, this criterion too became fully unreliable. This is all the more the case of many indigenous (genetically and culturally) Indians renouncing their native origin today willing in such a way to accelerate and reinforce their "civilisational" advancement, while on the other there are the new and opposite phenomenon among some Mestizos "discovering" their native roots.

Moreover, reference to culture-related traits as the distinguishing factor of Indianness becomes ever more unreliable. What have until recently been generally considered "typical" indigenous elements prove to be to a great degree a product of an amalgamation, going back several centuries, of the indigenous heritage and Iberian imports. Such a process was in fact noticeable in all areas of culture: rites, popular religion, cosmovision, costume, social relations, etc., and led to a major blurring of the borders between Indian and Mestizo cultures. Should we add today's dynamic cultural changes, affecting even the more "traditionally" oriented societies, we see how ambivalent the notion of "Indian culture" actually is as the distinguishing factor facilitating the identification of indigenous people. Due to the modernisation of the life of inhabitants of rural areas, which includes also Indians, and their migrations to cities, there is an ever-growing number of native inhabitants of Latin America who in their everyday lives do not cultivate the "traditional" patterns that they inherited from the previous generations, although they may refer to them (as a rule, selectively) along entirely new principles (during holidays, visits to home areas, or just to prove their identity). Their lifestyle follows a different rhythm than it would in the "traditional" Indian rural milieu. This is true, for example, of

indigenous miners, craftsmen, and settlers (*colonos*) colonising new areas in tropical forests, as well as about plenty of migrants from villages and towns, who, living on the urban outskirts, form neighbourhoods of poverty there. Some of them are try to forget their ethnic origin, and melt as soon as possible into the Mestizo environment, while others – adjusting to the new conditions of life – continue to maintain strong ties with of their native region, and try to rebuild their Indian identity along new lines. Thus, strong or weak connections to Indian cultural tradition and/or character of lifestyle are, in fact, ever less reliable distinctive factors of belonging or not belonging to indigenous group.

So if neither language, nor race, nor cultural tradition, nor a lifestyle can comprise the criteria decisive for ethnic identification, it is reference to legal status that could be such a powerful parameter, following the principle that an Indian is one who is considered to be a native due to the place assigned to him/her in the state's legal system. Such solutions are used, with certain limitations, in the United States and Canada, where as a consequence we come across so-called "status Indians". That is, those who are legally considered members of the "first nations", and those who are treated as "non-status" natives, and therefore not enjoying the majority of special rights and privileges that the first group have successfully fought to obtain. The situation is similar in numerous countries of Latin America. Wherever the authorities recognise the legal status of native communities, that is "comunidades indígenas" and "comunidades nativas", their members are automatically recognised as indigenous inhabitants of the country. Similar is the situation of indigenous groups that inhabit areas east of the Andes, covered mostly by tropical rainforest, living in the so-called "reservas" – that is areas considered by the state authorities as belonging to indigenous ethnic groups. Legally protected for that reason, those areas are excluded from privatisation, and from development and economic plans. Besides this "accountable" group of recognised Indians (*reconocidos*), enjoying the legal status of indigenous minority, there is, however, another category of native peoples considered an autochthonous population by the state administration. They have by now only just started efforts to have the lands they inhabit considered as areas under their own dominion along similar lines as the *comunidades* and *reservas* operate. As far as identification of an Indian (in the legal sense) seems fairly simple in the case of inhabitants of such special zones, it is much harder to define the ethnic belonging of those natives who have left their homeland and come to live in cities, in mining centres, or who as settlers (the so-called *colonos*) have moved to less populated areas so as to farm land or raise cattle in an alien environment. Contemporary migration processes

have greatly changed the former map of Indian residence, at the same time rendering evaluation of the scale of maintaining indigenous identity outside the native lands harder. The situation of the Mapuche, the largest group of Chilean Indians (approximately 900,000) is a clear example of that phenomenon. It is estimated that two thirds of the Mapuche have left Araucanía, moving primarily to Santiago metropolitan area. In the last two decades a new phenomenon arose, namely migrations of Indians from one country to another on a scale not previously encountered. This includes employment seeking migrations from Bolivia to Chile and Argentina, and refugees escaping from Nicaragua to Mexico at the time of the civil war. There is also the ever increasing settlement of Latin American Indians (from Mexico, Ecuador, Guatemala) in the United States. Thus it can be said that much like in the USA, where Indians may not be associated entirely with reservations, in Latin America too they have ceased to be solely residents of tropical forest villages and peasants communities from the Andes. This situation justifies the question whether these people should still be treated as Indians, together with the questions about their status and the method of defining the size of such populations.

It goes without saying that all the criteria quoted above, used in the process of "objectivised" identification of Indians and definition of the sizes of the individual indigenous groups, are either completely mistaken or have to a great extent lost their cognitive power. In this situation, the only way out from the impasse is not as much a reference to external criteria that have been applied so far, but considering as Indians those who identify themselves so and who for the reasons of cultural, historical, and genealogical ties with the indigenous milieu have a justified right to manifest their identity independent of their current place of residence. Such an inclusive attitude is obviously not the ideal manner of identification of the sizes of ethnic groups, but it meets two conditions resulting from human right namely the right to cultivate one's own culture, language, and religion – that is those factors that result from one's heritage and constitute one's identity. A reference to the subjective sense of group identification presents plenty of trouble in defining the actual sizes of indigenous groups, which is naturally not without significance both for state authorities responsible for the ethnic policy towards minorities and for the leaders representing the vital interests of those groups. In the contemporary practice of Latin American countries, no reference to such declarations was made during censuses, which usually provided information on the ethnic language (different from Spanish or Portuguese), used in childhood, in the family or in the local community. Similarly, survey research carried out on population samples

that included the aspect of subjective ethnicity had so far been conducted only occasionally, and therefore could bring no credible data. In this situation, debates continue only on the bases of estimations and extrapolations, which frequently reflect more the ethnopolitical preferences of their authors, keen to increase or decrease the size of the Indian population, and trying in this way to limit the so-called Indian question to the role of a minority that has to be taken into consideration only to a small extent. On the other hand, there are indigenous organisations which try to increase the size of ethnic groups beyond reason to wield powerful arguments in disputes with state authorities on matters related to the aid to be received, and their potential political role in national society.

The acceptance of ethnicity as a subjective declaration of identity suits the contemporary trend which allows us to become liberated from the social roles that have been assigned by "aliens". Nevertheless, it renders the matter of ethnic relations highly delicate and ambiguous at the same time. There are other problems that we encounter ever more often in Latin America. An Indian ceases to be an "exotic" or "folkloristic" ethnic species that is admired, like an Andean condor, or a savage creature brought out by indigenistic "civilisers" from the "pitiful" primitive world. An Indian is gradually becoming a citizen aware of his rights and opportunity to choose an appropriate strategy of conduct. Hence the frequent and seemingly contradictory ethnic choices made by people of indigenous heritage, that to a great extent result from the current social and political context.

The low prestige of the social position of Indians, the inheritance of colonialism and the neo-feudal economic dependence of the indigenous population in the republican era burdened additionally by racial prejudices, is frequently the reason that people readily renounce Indian roots so as to enter the Mestizo group as quickly as possible erasing the traces of their own origin and start the slow upward climb on the rungs of the local social ladder. During my fieldwork in Peru, I encountered such attitudes a number of times. They are especially visible among the young and middle-aged generations of residents of settlements that in the 1970s must still beyond doubt have been Indian. These people currently dissociated themselves determinedly from the ethnicity of their ancestors, and strongly accentuated only their Peruvian identity. On the other hand, tendencies to the contrary are also visible, namely to the "rediscovery" of Indianness by the people who have quite recently been considered only Mestizos. This phenomenon is observed both in rural and urban environments, and is connected not only to the general atmosphere that favours revi-

talisation of ethnicity, but also to the discovery of opportunities and potential benefits (economic, developmental, political) that indigenous groups may encounter at the time when special legal regulations are set to cover all natives by special protection, and direct towards them the stream of international aid funds.

In this dynamic process of fluctuation of identity, a considerable role is played by the state, whose ethnic policy may once favour the reinforcement of "national unity", and the weakening of ethnocultural pluralism (for instance in Peru), and then again tolerate or accept ethnic variety, together with its openly manifested social and political activity (for example in Bolivia and Ecuador). The example of Peru is especially significant, as this is the country that until the 1970s had been considered as one with the largest population of Indians, and due to a variety of legal and statistical manipulations shifted into an ever more homogeneous state with the ever decreasing number of native people in the successive decades (Posern-Zieliński 2007). This undertaking was possible due to, for instance, the redefinition of indigenous communities (*comunidades indígenas*) as peasant ones (*comunidades campesinas*), thanks to which their inhabitants began to perceive themselves primarily as a Peruvian *campesinos* or *comuneros* and as a result of that change of status they entered gradually to the cultural category of Mestizo population. At the same time, the Indian culture of the sierra regions was deprived of ethnic values and considered to mean regional folklore, indigenous beliefs were treated as a manifestation of popular religiosity, and the ethnic languages began to be viewed as provincial dialects (the vernacular speak of the peasant people).

In this way, suddenly a few million Indians inhabiting the Andean regions disappeared from the ethnic map of Peru. Left on it are primarily the indigenous groups inhabiting the eastern areas of Amazon forests, whose marginal position, territorial dispersal, and small numbers did not cause major trouble – in a potential sense – for the stability of the state and its internal policy. The vast migrations from villages to cities connected with the boosted process of amalgamation of indigenous people into the national mainstream greatly intensified the process of this politically inspired de-Indianisation. As a result, Peru – seen as a country boasting magnificent pre-Columbian indigenous cultural heritage – became a state gradually eliminating the contemporary inheritors of Tawantinsuyu (the Inca state) from its population structure. This attitude of the state authorities was beyond doubt one of the main reasons behind the exceedingly mysterious absence of a powerful and organised movement of ethnic revival in the Peru of the 1990s and early twenty-first century, paralleled by the eruption of social and political activism of Indian people in the neighbour-

ing countries: Bolivia and Ecuador. Currently, the situation in Peru is beginning to undergo marked changes: on the one hand being a manifestation of gradual revitalisation of Indian ethnicity in the country, and on the other a result of the impact of external indigenous influences, showing to the Peruvian *indigenas* the advantages and efficiency of organised activity in the process of combating postcolonial structures and limitations.

It goes without saying that the character of contemporary Latin American Indian ethnicity today is undergoing a decided change. The former identity, of a more primordial nature, rooted in the native culture, lifestyle and traditional world outlook, and strongly connected to an ethnic territory inhabited by the native group for a number of generations, is yielding gradually to ethnicity understood in a constructivist manner. Indianness – although still strongly connected (even though symbolically) with autochthonous culture – is becoming primarily a question of conscious choice, the search for one's own (frequently lost) roots, elimination of minority complexes by building ethnic pride and also a certain strategy of acquiring assistance from the support groups, and a method that allows efficient activity for ethnic development and implementation of principles of democratic multi-ethnic society.

The situation (defining who is and who is not Indian) is doubtlessly complex, with the state authorities not only dealing with ethnic diversity within the traditional indigenous population, but also encountering new categories of *indigenas* that are different in their character. What this means is that ethnic policy addressed to this group of people may not be uniform but should account for the interests and position of each of those categories separately. On the other hand, such a major break-up of the indigenous milieu causes major problems for Indian leaders to coordinate and uniform action strategy, and the develop a joint package of postulates, claims, and reform proposals to the state administration.

One of the basic divisions of the Indian world in South America is the coexistence of two groups: the Indians inhabiting the areas of tropical rainforests and flatlands (savannas, pampas), situated east of the Andes, and the *indigenas* from areas of the Andean sierra. The former are primarily small indigenous communities living far one from another, in relative isolation and distance from the centres of Latin American "civilisation". They have been traditionally self-sufficient economically with their subsistence based on tillage agriculture, gathering of wild plants, hunting, and fishing. The latter category are the rural local communities of indigenous origin that in the pre-Columbian period belonged to the zone of high Andean civilisations, who have lived since

the time of the conquest in the conditions of economic and cultural (post-) colonial dependence on the dominant Creole-Mestizo society, supporting themselves with extensive high-mountain agriculture, shepherding, and crafts (*artesania*). Similar divisions, although not so acute, can be found also in Middle America, between the Mesoamerican indigenous peoples – the offspring of the builders of former pre-Columbian civilisations (including Aztec, Maya, Toltec, and Totonac), who in the colonial period were transformed into a class of dependent peasantry, maintaining a range of the cultural ethnic traits – and small groups of Indians from north-western areas of Mexico (Huichol, Cora, Yaqui, Tarahumara) and the countries of southern part of Central America (Panama, Nicaragua) that for the last centuries were capable of maintaining a far-reaching autonomy and conduct lifestyles that have only to a small extent been subjected to external control.

Today, the basic interests of Indians from both these groups (*indigenas campesinos* and *nativos selváticos*) are in fact highly different, although they include a number of convergent elements. The former group have always acknowledged the priority of recognition and guarantee for collective ownership of agricultural land and pastures, being a part of the *comunidad* – which for centuries has been jeopardised by the expansion of large landholder estates, and today exposed also to deterioration caused by industrial environmental pollution and the increasing exploitation of water resources. Another important postulate of this group is the development of local infrastructure and termination of poverty that reinforces the low status of the Indian, provoking mass migration from homelands. For the Indians from the jungle, on the other hand, the most important question is to obtain legal recognition of the territory that their ethnic group inhabits and exploits, and later receive a guarantee of their autonomy within that area, expressed primarily through the right to control their habitat including its protection from the expansion of industrial companies (mining and wood industries) and the inflow of settlers. They are also keen to maintain their contemporary lifestyle, and to be able to exist further – with the acceptance of selected elements of contemporary technical civilisation (e.g. motorboat engines, solar panels, etc.) – in the local, relatively isolated communities, far from external interventions.

This divergence of social, ethnic, and economic context lends a different character to the relations between the two basic types of indigenous communities with the state authorities. In many countries and regions the *indigenas-campesinos* sector consists of large populations, for which reason they are potentially significant not only on the local political stage. Their organised

force, manifested usually in moments of crisis through strikes, road blockades, and other protest actions, may to a major degree destabilise the situation within the country, and for that reason the state authorities must very seriously approach this new civic actor on the remodelled political stage. The groups of forest Indians, on the other hand, although very small and living seemingly far from the world of "big politics", can sometimes extremely efficiently expose the ever more frequent conflicts with the industrial companies entering their territories, who usually conduct economic expansion with the concession of the state and in the so-called interest of "the civilisational development of the country". As the native inhabitants of the "virgin" regions, they frequently become a power that seriously obstructs the implementation of major investment and development projects in the interior of the country. For that reason, the state must also consider these groups, lost in the forest, important, and reconcile the interests of various parties in a balanced manner.

It is important to note here that the official ethnic policies towards Indians are different in those states which deal with only one category of indigenous people from those in countries inhabited by native peoples representing both the types mentioned above. In the latter, such policy must be more flexible, varied depending on the milieu, and accounting for the specific characteristics of the various lifestyles, needs and claims. Thus, there is a group of countries inhabited nearly solely by an indigenous population who are conventionally termed here as forest Indians (Brazil, Guiana, Surinam, Venezuela), and a number of states where peasant-type Indian communities are dominant (Mexico, Guatemala, Chile, Argentina). The situation in the Andean countries whose territories reach far east beyond the Andes and encompass the lowland areas of tropical rainforests (Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia) looks quite different. Those states feature both major clusters of Indian peasants within the *sierra*, and scattered small ethnic groups of *nativos* in the forests of the east. It goes without saying that in this last case the task of state authorities is made easier by applying the "divide and rule" principle, the more so as also the indigenous groups within the state territory are in most cases antagonised. The natural conflicts of interests are frequently aggravated by disputes between groups of different political affiliations, additionally competing with each other for assistance funds, and divided by the unbridled ambitions of their leaders. Despite the powerful organised Indian movements in those countries, all the factors listed above render them much weaker, and at times lead them astray.

This is what the situation looks like on the macro scale, yet with a certain narrowing of the perspective, it turns out to be even more complex due to

further internal radiation within each category. For example, the core of the “forest” Indians are the local communities, the so-called *etnias* (formerly without any justification defined as “tribes”), who enjoy the legal status of ethnic communities recognised by state authorities, living within the area of native *comunidades* and *reservas*. Today they have their own self-government at the local level, whose representatives enter greater, already inter-ethnic associations and regional federations that allow negotiations with state authorities. Nevertheless, during the last decade a new category of Indians have arrived on the native scene of South America, namely, small indigenous groups that had before lived in almost perfect isolation from the external world, avoiding until recently any contacts, with a hostile attitude towards potential intruders entering their refugial areas. Currently, due to the increasing economic penetration of Amazonian forests, these groups no longer have much room to withdraw into ever greater wilderness, as they used to do before. For that reason, some of them have assumed a new strategy, that is “coming out” from isolation and establishing contacts with the world they find external, mostly with the neighbouring and ethnically related groups of Indians who have for a long time been subjected to the processes of acculturation and treat their “new” brethren as “savages”, “uncivilised” and therefore deprived of any rights. In the official naming conventions, these groups are today defined as “recently contacted” (*recien contactados*), or as communities living in “voluntary isolation” (*en aislamiento voluntario*). They are primarily found on the western borderlands of Brazil as well as in the eastern forested areas of Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia. Their emergence has posed a major challenge for indigenous organisations, NGOs operating within this area, and anthropologists and state administration involved into native matters. The key is primarily to work out as soon as possible mechanisms thanks to which these groups – with no understanding whatsoever of the rules governing the contemporary world – could acquire their subjectivity, protection from appropriation of their territories, and the right to free choice of lifestyle satisfying them within home areas enjoying the status of *reservas*.

Besides the groups of “recognised” Indians (*reconocidos*), and those living far in isolation (*recien contactados*) in forest areas, we increasingly often encounter syncretic ethnic forms, ever more often claiming from the state authorities recognition of their status as indigenous peoples, and therefore granting of similar rights, which are currently highly praised and held in high esteem. These are primarily the so-called “new tribes” that originated from the amalgamation of many usually culturally and linguistically close indigenous groups

that to a great extent have lost their original cultural specificity, while maintaining only a range of elements that originated from indigenous tradition in their lifestyle, worldview, and economy. A specific category of “new tribes” are the groupings that originated from the mixing of indigenous people with Blacks or Mulattos. These are ethno-social communities that we encounter in Venezuela (Paraujano), Brazil (Xukuru), and in Central America (Garifuna). Besides these “new” indigenous communities, in the interior of Brazil there have been jungle people of mixed origin, called Caboclos, at least since the nineteenth century. This is in fact a category of people close in character to the Canadian Metis, being almost an intermediate group between Indians and Brazilians from the eastern provinces. They are perfectly adjusted to life in the Amazon environment, they know and often cultivate some native customs, move freely between the two worlds, and often marry women from neighbouring Indian communities, with whom they maintain close contacts. Moreover, they know well the local, indigenous languages, and themselves use a dialect that is deeply suffused with indigenous borrowings. Until recently the majority of Caboclos simply considered themselves Brazilian Mestizos. The situation, however, is also undergoing change, and much like in the case of “new tribes” there is a growing conviction among the Caboclos that if they are considered indigenous people, they will acquire measurable benefits, privileges, and rights gained in the long process of the Indians’ effort to have their subjectivity recognised, the inviolability of their territories respected, and cultural separateness cherished.

It is within the category of those Indians who until recently formed the native stratum of the rural population that we find today a major distinction that renders the application of sharp criteria of ethnic identification difficult. The inhabitants of rural communities that hail from the pre-Columbian (e.g. the Bolivian *ayllus* and *marcas*), colonial (e.g. Peruvian *comunidad campesina*) and republican (Mexican *ejidos*, Chilean *comuna*) times are in some countries considered Indians (*pueblos originarios* in Bolivia, *comunidad indigena* in Ecuador) without any obstacles, while in others – having lost that status – they are only now regaining it as the result of the process of “rebirth” of autochthonous awareness (Peru). Yet, independent from the degree of maintaining the indigenous culture and the sense of ethnic separateness, these people belong to the peasant stratum – in the sense of profession and class – and for that reason, in many countries and regions, such notions as *campesino*, *comunero* and *indigena* are superimposed on top of and blur into one another. At the same time, it must be remembered that not every peasant must be an Indian, and that not every Indian is in fact a farmer.

A significant group among the indigenous people are also the so-called *artesanos* (craftsmen), who in their home workshops make products defined as *artesanía*, including fabrics, ceramics, decorations, elements of traditional and contemporary clothing, sacred objects, paintings, and also – more and more often – regional souvenirs for tourists. As this field of economic activity is developing dynamically, and its market has long gone beyond the borders of a single region or country, the number of indigenous people involved in this sector continues to grow. Besides small producers who still live in the villages, we increasingly often meet owners of professional workshops and shops, wholesalers and travelling salesmen reaching even distant cities and countries with their “Indian” commodities. In the countries of the Andean and Mesoamerican zone, this phenomenon is visible with special force, and among its consequences is the slow establishment of the indigenous middle-class, settling the formerly little Mestizo towns by Indian peoples, educational advancement of the youth hailing from *artesanos* families, and finally also the reinforcement of a new type of Indian identity (torn from traditional community norms and rural ethos).

In regions abounding with mineral deposits, the majority of miners working in local mines recruit from among the local Indian population. Many of them have maintained family and community ties with their indigenous villages, although by living far away from their native places in typical mining settlements they became a part of the country’s proletariat. In the new environment, some of them quickly yield to the process of *mestizaje*, while the others try to maintain bonds of solidarity with their Indian background, and it is hard to refuse them the right to indigenous identity. Due to poverty, lack of land, overpopulation of villages, and also the crisis in the mining industry, a new phenomenon has appeared of migration from densely populated areas into ones that have so far been hardly colonised. This wave of settlers is visible especially in Andean South America, and covers the so-called *colonos*, to a large extent Indians from the “sierra” lands, who – desperate because of tough living conditions – abandon their present settlements, villages, and communities, and go east into the depths of tropical forests so as to establish small crop-growing and breeding farms (*minifundios*) on “no man’s land”, or be hired to work in oil, gas, and wood industries. Some of these Indian settlers devote themselves to growing of coca plants and as *cocaleros* they oppose the US-inspired campaign of eradication the (illegal) plantations, which are their only source of subsistence in an organised and efficient manner (e.g. in the Bolivian province of Chiapare). Their efforts for the legalisation of coca plantations, as well as endeavour of those *colonos* farming on small plots of land not cultivated by large land own-

ers to secure their future, forming the new Movement of People without Land (*Movimiento sin Tierra*), increasingly support the indigenous emancipation movement. In this manner originally social movement gradually gain an ethnic colour, whose demands and slogans make it easier to support their particular economic arguments. The success of the *cocaleros* movement in Bolivia, which produced the controversial first Indian president of the country – Evo Morales – is evident proof of today's political efficiency of such movement and the good example of effectiveness of utilising references to indigenous interest and origin, identity and rights.

Such tendencies are made use of also in the milieu of the so-called Indo-Mestizos, that is among regional groups that have been formed by people considered Mestizos for decades who today – despite the lack of cultural continuation – openly manifest their genealogical ties with Indian groups that historians have officially considered long dead. This phenomenon recalls to a certain extent similar processes of restitution of the indigeneity carried among the offspring of American Indians from the Atlantic shores of the United States, who are insistently attempting to be inscribed on the roll of tribes recognised by the federal administration, and draw from that title certain benefits that they currently miss. In Latin America, this kind of pursuit of long-gone identity is known, for example, from the Caribbean and from the Pacific shores of Ecuador. The groups living there declare their Indian identity more on the bases of their genealogy than cultural continuity, and try not only to change their status but also to become a part of the great continental pan-Indian movement, and – acting within it – reinforce their local position as a new, distinctive ethno-social subject.

As a result of huge and constantly increasing migrations from rural areas to cities – which pertain to the indigenous people with a particular intensity – we are dealing today with a new category of native populations, namely with urban Indians (*indigenas urbanos*). Some of them maintain ties with their home region, building a sophisticated network of various regional organisations gathering migrants from a single village, department or province, and supporting them in combating the painful results of urban alienation. Others manage to merge immediately into the Mestizo–lumpenproletariat society of marginal poverty neighbourhoods, trying to forget about their indigenous roots. These two opposing phenomena may be observed both in the so-called *pueblos jóvenes* of Lima and in the poor districts of Mexico (city). A special case may be the establishment of the entirely new, indigenous city that the one-million-people El Alto, situated in Bolivian Altiplano just next to La Paz, undoubtedly is. Nearly

all *altenos*, that is inhabitants of the city, are Aymara from around Lake Titicaca, who settled close to the main metropolis of the country hoping to find work and better lives. During the various bursts of protest among the indigenous people, which were quite numerous in recent years in Bolivia, the *altenos* frequently expressed their solidarity with their brethren from rural *ayllus* and *marcas* (traditional communities).

A special transitory category between the indigenous and Mestizo world is the so-called urban Indo-Mestizos (*indo-mestizos urbanos*). This group consists of people of Indian origin who in their daily culture and/or awareness have not fully cut themselves off from their indigenous roots, but who often maintain a highly ambivalent attitude: first manifesting their ties to autochthonous people, and then rejecting such ties. One of these groups are the *cholos*, best visible in Bolivia, and especially in La Paz and Oruro, where they form a colourful (thanks to the women's costumes and holiday traditions) group of residents of lower middle classes successfully involved in petty trade.

A specific situation may be encountered in the former Inca capital, Cusco, a city proud of its pre-colonial heritage, where many residents (both those living there for generations and those hailing from the nearby indigenous settlements) on many occasions (and especially on holidays) without hesitation emphasise their real or mythical ties with the inhabitants of the ancient Tawantinsuyu (Inca empire). It is not a coincidence that the first very important meetings of Indian leaders both from Peru and from the entire Andean region took place nowhere other than Cusco. The city is not only the symbol of the former power of the Indian state, but it also fosters a special atmosphere of acceptance and approval for indigenous cultural heritage (García 2005).

With the ever more visible (although naturally still insufficient) progress of education covering the Indian communities among the urban population, representatives of a new indigenous intelligentsia come into being. Their avant-garde is made up of ever more numerous students from the provinces, who do not disown their ethnic origin and who, having graduated, work as teachers, agronomists, physicians, veterinary doctors, foresters, artists, and lawyers. Ever more often, indigenous scientists are found in universities, while Indian priests are increasingly often found in Catholic Church and other Christian denominations. The most visible group are the many Indian activists and leaders presiding over numerous organisations fighting for the rights of the *indigenas*. Some have become leaders thanks to their professional qualifications and education, while others acquired such a position thanks to self-taught skill and the trove of experience gained during their many years of social activity.

As has already been mentioned, major contemporary migrations connected to social crises, civil wars, and primarily to globalisation are seriously affecting the indigenous peoples of Latin America. Despite participation in internal migrations within a single country, Indians increasingly often opt for ever more daring jaunts in search of a better life, work, and pay, crossing borders and moving to neighbouring countries and frequently even further: to the United States, Canada, and European Union. These migration processes result in the establishment of indigenous diasporas, whose status is usually highly vague. The arriving migrants are in most cases not perceived through their ethnic affiliation, but identified according to the country of origin and citizenship. Despite that, the Indian settlements in countries receiving migrants become more visible: Indians not only maintain ties with their compatriots, but also initiate a variety of organised actions to reinforce their ethnicity in their new places of residence. Following a period of failing to notice that Indians too number among the incoming migrants, the receiving countries gradually began to consider implementation of special assistance programmes addressed to this category of immigrants. The most visible transfers take place in the countries of Central America. Indians from Nicaragua and El Salvador whose native lands were affected by military activity would look for shelter in Guatemala and Mexico during civil wars, while the natives from Guatemala move to the more developed Belize in search of work, gradually changing the ethnic composition of the country. In South America, the largest migrations cover the Andean zone and feature the Bolivian Aymaras moving to Chile and Argentina, Ecuadorian Quechua settling in Colombia, and indigenous Colombians escaping from the areas threatened by violence to Venezuela. At the same time, from year to year, the emigration of indigenous people from Latin American countries to the US intensifies, resulting in a growing number of Latin American Indians in the United States. There, they are usually treated as "Hispanics" or "Latinos", that is without the special rights the native "American Indians" are entitled to.

Thus, having made a definitely incomplete review showing the internal differentiation within the indigenous population of Latin America, one may conclude that today's so-called "Indian problem" is no marginal social question that could be boiled down to actions aimed at the improvement of the life of the indigenous peasants or "civilising" of the native inhabitants of the jungle. Contemporary Indians are a separate ethnic category present in different parts of the population structure of the country. To an ever greater degree, they cease to be an "exotic" and peculiar ethnic category becoming instead an active participant in the current changes. For that reason, wherever they form

a significant percentage of the country's population, they become increasingly visible in public life, and this new position they assume imposes on the state the duty to treat Indians as a significant factor in the formation of civic community based on multicultural and pluri-ethnic principles.

It goes without saying today that the so-called Indian America, that is that part of the Latin American population that originated in the pre-colonial tradition, is showing no signs of decline or of becoming an ever more marginal problem; on the contrary, it is increasing in its dynamism, manifesting its new face, openly claiming respect for due rights and manifesting its presence throughout the continent in a spectacular manner. Naturally, the power of the indigenous voice and vote depends to a great degree on the size of Indian population in every country, on the degree of its organisation, and also on the strategic importance of the areas that this population inhabits. Referring only to demographic data, however, one may claim that the size of indigenous population on the continent is highly uneven, both when analysing the problem in reference to the total number of indigenous people in each of the countries, and looking into the percentage of the Indians as compared to the entire population. From this point of view, four categories of states may be differentiated: first, where the Indian population is especially large, and for that reason begins to play an important – also political – role; second, states with a significant number of Indians often gathered in a few compact regions, where they are majority inhabitants; third, countries with a small percentage of indigenous population, who often inhabit territories that are highly attractive from economic and settlement points of view; and fourth and finally – countries with trace numbers of the *indigenas*, moreover, situated in the refugial regions, and without major economic significance.

The first group, that is the states whose indigenous population exceeds 50% of the entire population, includes Guatemala, inhabited mostly by Mayan groups (with an indigenous population of approx. 50 to 66%, i.e. 6 to 7 million) and Bolivia, with very large Aymara and Quechua communities (its native population approx. 60 to 65%, i.e. approx. 6 million). Both the countries may be considered Indian—Mestizo, and in both of them the tensions between the indigenous population and other segments of national society resulted in numerous crises, expressed in the civil war in Guatemala (1960–1994), which had the hallmarks of a popular uprising, and violent forms of social protests in Bolivia that began in the 1990s. The well-organised movement of indigenous revival operates with specific power in both countries on all possible platforms: beginning with the struggle for local governments, and

ending with presidential campaigns. Symbolic expressions of the contemporary significance of this movement in the two countries may be the Nobel Peace Prize for an activist of the Guatemalan Indians, Rigoberta Menchu Tum, and the election of a representative of the Aymaras, supporter of *cocaleros*, and partisan of "Andean socialism" – Evo Morales – as president of Bolivia.

The second group of countries, those of the Mestizo–Indian character, that is with a major indigenous population yet dominated (not only in percentage) by the rest of the national society, are the states with an autochthonous population within their territories ranging from approx. 10 to 40%. In Central America this means Mexico, with approx. 10 to 14% of Indians, who after all make up a population exceeding 12 million, gathered mostly in the south of the country (Oaxaca, Chiapas, Yucatan), and Belize, with a 10% share held by autochthonous people, primarily the Maya. In South America this category includes Ecuador, with approx. 31 to 43% of Indians (approx. 4.1 million) mostly the Quichua inhabiting central valleys of the Andes, and Peru, with 28 to 46% of *indigenas* (9.3 million), mostly Quechua and Aymara populated predominantly the mountainous areas of the central and southern provinces. The movement for the emancipation of the indigenous peoples assumed special significance and influential forms in two states that belong to this category: firstly, the Zapatista movement from Chiapas fighting for regional and ethnic autonomy, whose repercussions and fame have far exceeded the borders of Mexico, and the unusually active organisations of Ecuadorian Indians, who since the 1990s have played a very significant role in national politics.

Quite a number of Latin American countries are inhabited by indigenous people that account for less than 10% of the entire population. In Central America, this group of states includes Honduras (5% Indians, i.e. approx. 290,000 people), Nicaragua (4% Indians, i.e. approx. 182,000), El Salvador (5% Indians, i.e. approx. 330,000), and Panama (5.5% Indians, i.e. approx. 142,000). All these are states covering quite small areas and size of population, with a dominant Mestizo sector. The indigenous peoples inhabiting them form hardly any major groups (besides the Misquito bordering on 180,000, and the so-called Black Caribs or Garifuna, whose number is estimated at approximately 100,000. The remaining ethnic groups consist of the size between several thousand and a few hundred people. In South America, countries with a similar, fairly small share of indigenous population include Chile (7 to 9% Indians, mostly Mapuches, altogether approx. 1 million; Argentina, with 3.2% Indians (approx. 1.1 million), and Guiana (7% Indians, i.e. approx. 50,000 persons). The *indigenas* of both Chile and Argentina are highly active,

frequently entering acute disputes with the authorities due to the conflict of interests related to defence of indigenous lands threatened by the development of industrial activity.

The last group of countries are those where the indigenous groups are very small, both in absolute numbers and in the percentage share. In Central America, this is Costa Rica with 0.5% Indians, i.e. approx. 16,000 people, and in South America – Colombia, with 1.5 to 2.2% Indians, i.e. approx. 740,000 persons, of which 350,000 are the inhabitants of Amazonia, Argentina, with 3.1% Indians (i.e. approx. 1 million), Venezuela (1.4% Indians, i.e. approx. 300,000 people), Surinam (1.4% Indians, i.e. approx. 6000 persons), Paraguay with 1.6% Indians, i.e. 90,000 people, French Guiana (2% Indians, i.e. approx. 3000 people), and Brazil (0.1% Indians, yet in absolute numbers as many as 260,000 people) (*Political database...*, 20.01.2009).

The majority of these indigenous groups inhabit lands situated far from settlement and industrial centres and main communication routes (tropical rainforest, savannas). They live there in great dispersion, and the average size of the ethnic groups ranges from 30/50 thousand to just several thousand. Encountered in these regions are also many groups that are extremely small, composed of just a few hundred people, whose further existence is evidently threatened. Their often tragic lives are today a true challenge for state authorities who are formally bound to go any lengths to protect these smallest indigenous minorities. Nevertheless, Indians from this group of states – although not too numerous – inhabit very large territories in the countries' interiors. With the dynamic economic development of such states as Brazil, which is increasingly more interested in the integration of its interior with the Atlantic provinces, and the exploitation of natural resources situated within what is now Indian territory, the vital interests of indigenous people are seriously threatened, even despite the defence mechanisms already applied, which include establishment of specially protected areas in the form of reservations called *parques indigenas* (indigenous parks).

Indigenous peoples and their social and economic situation

An element of doubtless significance in its influence of the mutual relations between the state and the indigenous peoples of Latin America is the social and economic position of the latter, which is not without reason defined as highly

marginalised, affected by poverty, excluded from mainstream economic life, and pushed off the path of civilisational development. On the one hand, such a position must undoubtedly influence the moods of Indians, very easily provoked to revolutionary ferment, and the animated protests, which are actions that namely destabilise the previous “order” in the state. On the other hand, meanwhile, the awareness of the pitiful position of the *indigenas* should incline the state authorities to promote ethno-developmental programmes and assistance projects to help gradually towards liquidation of the most drastic reasons that keep the autochthonous people in poverty, and in the manacles of ethnic and racial prejudices.

The current situation of the indigenous peoples has so far been the result of the conquering of the continent, a period of over 500 years of continuing pushing Indians into marginal areas, depriving them of the best lands, and exploitation of the indigenous manpower and today also of natural resources existing within their ethnic territories. While analysing the indigenous poverty, however, we have to refer not only to the indexes and rates characteristic for individual Indian groups, but also consider the problem from the perspective of the entire continent. It goes without saying that Latin America belongs to those areas of the contemporary world that, despite their development, still have a high degree of population engulfed by poverty. For example, in 2004, approximately 22% of population were forced to survive on the equivalent of only two US dollars daily, which – according to approved international standards – defines the poverty line. Should we look at these data from the point of view of dispersion of poverty between urban and rural populations, we see that the people living in extreme poverty (that is surviving on an equivalent of one US dollar daily) in rural areas encompasses 17.5% of the population, which is nearly 3 times as much as in urbanised areas (6.2%). These contrasts become even more visible when data for individual countries are compared. The highest percentage of the poor in rural areas are present in Bolivia (72.6% in 2002), Peru (59.8% in 2003), Nicaragua (59.9% in 2001), El Salvador (56.9% in 2004), Ecuador (47.6% in 2003), Guatemala (44.7% in 2004), and Mexico (36.8% in 2004) (Hall, Patrinos 2006). If on top of that we consider the fact that the countries listed above are those with the highest percentage of Indian population, still inhabiting mostly rural areas, we may assume that the data quoted refer to a great degree to this category of people. We should note here that the majority of Indians belong to the poorest category of Latin American population, and add that poverty in indigenous communities is especially highly concentrated (i.e. 2.4 times greater than for the rest of the population).

This does require, however, a number of terminological remarks. First, the operational concept of poverty is usually based on an arbitrarily determined level of income (usually very low), which does not after all mean that persons with, for example, three US dollars at their daily disposal should be counted among the people with sufficient means of subsistence. Indeed, the same amount has a different market value for inhabitants of cities, and different for the residents of villages, who have at their disposal their own products and houses, and lead more "traditional" lives. It is harder to use these economic factors to measure the "poverty" among those groups of Indians who still live far away from "civilisation" and its "market economy", conducting a symbiotic existence with their natural environment, which is very characteristic for the simple cultures of the Amazon basin. According to the economic criteria, some representatives of this category of Indians would have an income many times lower than that assumed by specialists, yet this does not mean that they live in a social environment that is characterised by "poverty". Besides the income scale, today's poverty is manifested also through high unemployment, low effectiveness of farms, low earnings, lack of professional qualifications, problems with access to education and healthcare, poor infrastructure in the regions, low level of consumption, lack of access to contemporary technologies, and a high level of children's involvement in paid work. In fact, the situation of the majority of Amazonian Indians taken aside, all these characteristic features of poor societies affect the native people of Latin America. Poverty and a lack of prospects are pushing increasing numbers of the *indigenas* out from their villages and communities, and the new indigenous settlements that are formed through this migration as a rule become typical urban neighbourhoods of poverty.

Certain positive changes should, however, be noticed against this background. These include leaving the poverty zone through advance of professional activity, education, implementation of aid programmes, development of petty trade and crafts, and seasonal migrations for work. As the result of this strategy in some areas a new Indian middle class has been formed, with a good example being the Ecuadorian region of Otavalo with its highly active *artesanos*, *hoteleros* and *comerciantes de artesanía*. Nevertheless, such places are still too few to become the harbingers of truly thorough changes in the situation of Indians. For this reason, the remark made by Gillette Hall, an analyst of the World Bank and one of the authors of the report by that institution concerning the situation of the indigenous population in Latin America, seems accurate. She noticed that "although indigenous people in the region have increased their political power and representation during the last decade, this has not

translated into positive results – in terms of poverty reduction” (Hall, Patrinos 2006).

The same report includes information proving that the poverty indicators concerning indigenous communities decrease far more slowly than for other categories of the Latin American population. This proves that Indian communities make use of contemporary changes, major development programmes, and liquidation of social inequalities to a lesser degree. The data on the poverty of indigenous people from individual countries, especially those where those populations are high, are even more alarming. Thus, three quarters of the autochthonous population of Bolivia and Guatemala live in poverty; in Ecuador, as many as 87% of Indians live in poverty (data from 1998); the same condition affects 62.8% of *indigenas* in Peru (as of 2000); while in Mexico this category extends over 89.7% of the indigenous population. In the light of the data above, it goes without saying that it is still the autochthonous population that is touched to the greatest degree by poverty, which in the rural communities is decidedly of a structural character, that is resulting from lasting social and economic inequalities. In the years 1994–2004, that is during the period that the United Nations announced “the decade of the indigenous people”, the economic position of Indians in Latin America did not undergo major changes, despite the propaganda slogans promoting civilisational progress in this sector of the population. Still, a close correlation between Indian ethnicity and poverty is maintained throughout the continent, meaning that this population lives in far poorer conditions also in many important aspects of daily life.

This phenomenon is also visible in the labour market (that is, outside the sector of family or community farming). The earnings of Indian worker in most countries range from 36% (Mexico) to approximately 50% (Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador) or 60% (Guatemala) of salaries received by those who are not of indigenous origin. These inequalities result from the fact that the majority of the autochthonous population work in those sectors of the economy that typically receive lower rates of pay (agriculture, animal husbandry, forestry, non-formalised house services), and are the effect of poorer qualifications of indigenous labour, also partially reflecting the ethno-racial discrimination that allows employers to pay an Indian at a far lower level than is the case with a non-indigenous employee (*Minnesota Population...*, 20.01.2009).

What favours the strengthening of inequalities in Indians’ condition of life is the educational system operating in Latin America, for which the state takes direct responsibility. The rural schools in the regions inhabited by the *indigenas* represent the lower level, are poorly furnished and equipped, and lack compe-

tent teachers. On top of that, educational curricula only to a small degree meet the actual needs of Indian children. Their home environment (lack of education among parents, reading habits, books) does not favour the progress of pupils, who, to make matters worse, often have serious problems with understanding the lessons due to their poor knowledge of Spanish or Portuguese. Because of the problems with finding teachers with appropriate competences, there are few schools with bilingual programs. Thus most schools earmarked for Indian children in fact operate as institutions facilitating assimilation of the indigenous population, and very often for that reason are perceived by Indians as an oppressive necessity, hardly useful for the lives of their children. Another crucial factor that debilitates the effectiveness of teaching is the work of children in their parents' households, which often draws them away from school duties. As a result, the efficiency of education is considerably lower, as proved for example by the situation in Guatemala, where Indian children finish education after 3.5 years at school. The situation is not much better in Mexico (4.5 years) and in many other countries. This phenomenon is still accompanied by a high level of illiteracy, especially affecting women. Thus, in Mexico and Ecuador, nearly a quarter of the Indian population has received no education whatsoever. The situation looks even worse if one looks at secondary education and participation of the indigenous population in it. In Bolivia only 8% of Indian children attend schools after turning 15, a factor that does not differ greatly from other countries (Bello 2001).

All these facts clearly demonstrate the character of the educational barriers that keep the Indian population at the very bottom of the social ladder. Only very few individuals break through the inefficient system of education and obtain secondary or higher education. Luckily, in recent years a gradual process has been observed whereby the number of Indian students and graduates has increased, leading them to form very slowly the milieu of indigenous elites (teachers, priests, physicians, engineers). These are the elites that the Indians need to participate fully in contemporary modernisation processes as actors of changes. Unfortunately, the appearance of the first generation of indigenous "intelligentsia" cannot to a great degree be credited to public education. A far greater role in this process is played by non-state institutions and initiatives: schools and universities for Indians established by Catholic church (for example, the educative activities of the Salesian Order in Ecuador), scholarship and support programmes for indigenous youth (organised by foreign foundations), vocational education courses conducted by NGOs, and finally an entirely new phenomenon: establishment of educational institutions, including also universi-

ties, by Indian organisations that rightly see an opportunity to break away from the state of poverty and exclusion in increasing the level of scholarisation.

Further evidence of the poor situation of Indians is the condition of healthcare in this segment of the population which, much like education, lags behind the – still, on average, low – rates characteristic of the entire Latin American society. The reason for this status quo is the poorly developed public network of healthcare, which in fact hardly reaches the rural, forest, and highland areas, which are the ones usually inhabited by the *indigenas*. Secondly, the availability of those medical centres is highly limited for Indians, due not only to the distances involved and the potential hardships on the road, but also to the prices of medical services and medications that are relatively high for the poor. Thirdly and finally, awareness and knowledge of the principles of hygiene, illness prevention, and treatment of simple ailment conditions is very low among these people. Should we add the conditions of life resulting from hard work in agriculture, improper nutrition, and also the ever more frequently observed contamination of the Indians' natural habitat (e.g. of surface waters and rivers), the fact that the health condition of the indigenous population is far poorer than in the remaining groups becomes understandable (Posern-Zieliński 2007).

We therefore see twice as high mortality of infants, a few years' shorter life expectancy, and far lower immunity to illnesses, which are evidently proved by the data from, for example, Ecuador and Mexico. The awareness of such a status quo mobilises numerous charity (religious, aid, and international) organisations that are trying to assist those in need by opening health centres, distributing medications, and organising training in conscious motherhood and/or elementary principles of hygiene. Naturally, these are activities that only partially supplement the duty of the state administration, whose inefficiency in healthcare is of a systemic character and pertains not only to the sector services for the indigenous population. It is little wonder then that – faced with all this – people try to cope along the lines they have traditionally tested. This is what lies at the root of the exceeding popularity of medicine men and healers (*curanderos*), who have tuned themselves perfectly to contemporary needs, opening their own health care centres, advertising their services on notice boards and the Internet, and also (in Mexico, for instance) legalising their activity by becoming so-called *medicos profesionales* specialising in alternative medicine.

An important factor that makes Indians' daily life harder is the poorly developed infrastructure in the regions they inhabit, even though the situation in this field improved markedly throughout the last 20 years, primarily thanks to

the intervention of administrative authorities trying to integrate the backward provinces with the economic centres of the country and promote modernisation of rural settlement. This type of activity is frequently synchronised either with election campaigns or with plans for exploiting minerals discovered in Indian territories. Yet even in spite of these factors, in the areas densely populated by the *indigenas* the road grid is poor and their condition unsatisfactory, with many settlements having no access to electricity, potable water, wastewater systems, public transportation, and/or a telephone network. Due to the poverty in which most Indians live, also their houses (of a very simple construction) lack the majory or furnishing and utensils that are in common use in the cities.

Superimposed on the “objective” factors listed above and responsible for the poverty among Indians in Latin America are important social aspects that make it harder for the *indigenas* to leave the state of poverty and exclusion. These often include racist prejudices, less visible in the official contacts, yet very strong in daily life, powerful negative ethnic stereotypes, strong paternalism still visible in the policies of state authorities, and also of aid organisations, foundations, and churches. This kind of perspective of Indian people results on the one hand in their discrimination, displaying of contempt towards them, and treating them with frequently manifested superiority. On the other hand, it reinforces the complex of inferiority among the indigenous population, resulting from the low social position devoid of prestige attributed to this ethnic group. As a result, it is small wonder that among Indians there are powerful tendencies to hide away their indigenous identity, and also to deny their native roots so as to enter as quickly as possible the Mestizo world and erase any traces of their autochthonous origin. This process of assimilation, in the Andes known as *cholificación* and in Central America as *ladinización*, is opposed today by Indian activists who try to reconstruct the self-confidence and ethnic pride based on the revived tradition and reinterpreted achievements of their forefathers.

Indigenous people and their legal situation

The Latin American states established early in the nineteenth century based their legal systems on concepts borrowed from Napoleonic ideas, according to which the institution of the state is construed as a powerful and uniform organism forming, together with all its inhabitants, a uniform nation–state (*Estado–Nación*). Formally, in such an entity – today often termed as a political nation –

all citizens were to be equal before the law applied within its territory. In such a system, cultural, ethnic, and racial differences – evidently present – could not provide grounds for any special rights resulting from diversity of individual groups. After all, the key was to launch the mechanisms favouring quick establishment of “new” nations within the Latin American space that had before been controlled by colonial powers.

As a result of that political philosophy, Indian people, although *de iure* becoming citizens of the newly established states, *de facto* lost the special rights they acquired in the colonial period, resulting from the partial autonomy that they were awarded within the marked-off administrative (*repúblicas del indio*) or missionary (*reducciones*) zones. In the new situation, the *indígenas* were actually perceived as “savages” (*salvajes*) inhabiting territories that would become fully integrated with the state only in future, or as part of the basic labour force, allowing exploitation of rich natural resources and finally as potential future citizens, who they would become only once they had recognised the generally accepted norms of the “civilised” society simultaneously rejecting the burden of “primitive” tradition. Gradual changes in this field did not come until the 1940s, together with the spreading ideology and practice of *indigenismo*, according to which the “backward” and “exploited” Indian, deprived of land, and not integrated with the mainstream society, deserved special assistance and treatment, also by agencies of the state.

In this way, in fact, began the process of accepting indigenous people as a special category of citizens – with separate cultural features and different social needs resulting from the (post)colonial situation. This acceptance eventually had to make a major breach in the concept of a unitarian state, and after many years of debates, discussions, and controversies led to the shaping of a new model of plural state, based on the principles of multiculturalism (interculturality). Even though initially one-sided, that is involving primarily the *indigenistas* trying a variety of methods to influence the “passive” indigenous masses, with the passage of time the process was increasingly interactive in its character, triggering the movement of Indian revival, with their leaders putting forth most crucial postulates of the need for thorough reconstruction of the state, so that its political system accounted not only for the existence of ethnic and cultural diversity but would also empower the indigenous people with legal personality, and the right to co-decide not only on their future but also on the shape of social and economic reality in the country they live in.

Launching this debate helped also to redefine the ethnic terminology related to the Indian world. Some words began to have a legal sense attributed,

others were excluded as a part of the language of political correctness, while still others were quickly accepted on the power of claims from the interested parties. Thus finally the pseudo-anthropological notion of calling a specific indigenous group “a tribe” (*tribu*) was dispensed with, as in the eyes of Indians it was a purposeful semantic technique to juxtapose them against the rest of the “civilised” world. This unfortunate term was initially replaced by a more universal notion, namely that of an “ethnic group” (*etnia*), used both for very small communities lost in the Amazon jungle and groupings of hundreds of thousands people or even more found in the Andes and Mesoamerica. Nevertheless, this seemingly neutral concept was not approved by the Indians themselves, who still saw in it a reflection of the unequal dichotomy dividing the world into the “nations” enjoying full rights and the “ethnic groups” living on their verges and subjected to them.

The increase in the ethnic awareness of Indians and their sensitivity to the language of postcolonial dominance that continued to be used by the non-Indian party is an evident contribution of the indigenous leaders to the process of so-called *concientizacion*, which resulted in numerous changes in geographic and ethnic names. As part of this process of “cleansing” the language from colonial influences – present, by the way, also on other continents – a number of Indian ethnic groups rejected the formerly used exoethnonyms and forced the outside world – including, quite naturally, the state authorities – to use the endoethnonyms they approved. This is how the Araucanians from Chile and Argentina became the Mapuche, the Colorado from Ecuador are today known as Tsachila, and the Jivaro from the Ecuadorian–Peruvian borderland defined themselves as Shuar. These are naturally only a handful of examples showing a far broader and constantly visible phenomenon. This “return” to own ethnic names is a form of symbolic manifestation of an identity revival. Even in numerous official documents, manifestoes, and declarations of indigenous organisations, the word “America” is frequently omitted, and replaced by a term borrowed from the Cuna Indians from Panama: “Abya Yala”, meaning more or less “our land”. In this way, the term became a near synonym of “Indian America”: the America of its indigenous inhabitants, that is consciously juxtaposed to Latin America as the continent of Creole and Mestizo population dominated over the Indians.

The indigenous people also do not accept their groups being called ethnic minorities (*minorias etnicas*), for the simple reason that they do not want to be count into the same category as communities of immigrant origin, such as those consisting of the descendants of the Japanese, Chinese, Lebanese, Jews,

Germans, Ukrainians, and Poles. The legal status they enjoy, and which is accepted in both national and international discourse, is the belonging of Indians to the category of indigenous peoples (*pueblos indigenas*), which today – at the time of global struggle for special protection of autochthonous groups (their culture, language, identity, property, and territories) – is decidedly more attractive. The ever broader possibility of acquiring material aid, awarding and restitution of special collective rights facilitates also a process of creation of “new” indigenous groups, whose ties to the culture of their forefathers are very poorly maintained, and who try to formalise their status of indigenous ethnic units.

Both in international law and in the legal discourse conducted in the individual countries of Latin America, acute debates continued concerning the choice of an adequate term to define properly the indigenous inhabitants. Indian leaders and their allies strongly opposed the previous practices of calling this category of citizens “indigenous population” (*poblaciones indigenas*) or “indigenous people” (*pueblo indigena*). Both these terms were treated as contradictory to reality and as expression damaging the vital interests of Indians, as they resulted in treatment of them as an amorphous conglomerate of individuals, deprives of features of ethnic identity, and forming a great collectivity of native residents of the continent, gradually integrating into the national society of the countries they inhabit. This is why these terms, considered pejorative and inadequate, began to be replaced by the term “indigenous peoples” (*pueblos indigenas*) which was introduced into a variety of legal acts (international conventions, constitutions, declarations, agreements, etc.), albeit gradually and against great resistance (Grey, Zamosc 2005).

Seemingly a small semantic difference, the persistent addition of the “-s”, which focuses on the plural form, has in fact significant consequences. First of all, it accounts for the legal recognition of each Indian people (*pueblo*) in the capacity of a unique socially organised ethnic community, with a distinctive identity and characteristic cultural features, enjoying special collective rights (to land, to territory, to protection of its own culture and environment). Secondly, such recognised group – as a separate people (*pueblo*) – becomes also a political subject, which through its representatives should participate in the public life of the country of their residence, and should be able to influence the course of affairs, especially those pertaining to indigenous affairs (*autodeterminacion*). Thirdly, each such indigenous “people” could in fact claim establishment of a certain territorial autonomy that would let it undertake decisions along the lines of traditional legal and property, customary and religious norms.

This specific point was recently the reason for major political and legal controversies, although in fact it corresponds to the multicultural philosophy declaratively accepted in Latin American countries mostly in the form of ideas of multiethnicity (*multiethnicidad*) and cultural pluralism (*pluriculturalidad*) (Velasco Cruz 2003).

It may be claimed that these terminology-related matters do not cover everything, as there are even more revisionistic postulates put forth by the Indian party. On the one hand, this may be a testimony to the ambition of groups marginalised for hundreds of years, while on the other they are a reflection of a certain new way of thinking about the national structure of the state. In numerous speeches, documents, and manifestos of Indian organisations, the word *pueblo* is replaced by the term *nacionalidad*, which emphasises that the indigenous group – although often small in terms of numbers – is in fact an autonomous community, with not only a separate culture and language but also its own territory, and within it social structures that follow its own norms inherited from the ancestors. The assumption of the term *nacionalidad* is in fact a form of strategy reinforcing the position of the indigenous community within the multicultural state and give it not only the right to cultivate its own tradition and promote ethnic development but also ensure its autonomy to allow control of the territory inhabited by the group and – within that framework – establishment of a native society following its own laws.

The most radical Indian leaders go even further, and following some North American “tribes” define their own ethnic communities as nations (*naciones*), believing that the term *nacionalidad* is not adequate to the situation, as by definition it makes such a group subordinate towards the main Creole-Mestizo segment of the society, co-forming the “titular” nation–state (*estado–nación*). Acceptance of the status of *pueblo* or *nacionalidad*, although showing major progress on the path to recognition of Indians’ subjectivity, does not eliminate the subordination of indigenous peoples to the interests of the dominant society. Assumption that individual groups of native population form “nations” – i.e. legal entities that are equal to other “nations”, even the big ones – is to lead to such a reform of the state political system, which would result not only in acceptance of the principles of multiethnicity and multiculturalism, but also in “multinationality”, with all the legal consequences of such a step. Such radical postulates do not, however, find any support in non-Indian society, even among those people who are favourable towards indigenous groups and support their struggle for improvement of their current position. The reason of that attitude is a strong anxiety that this type of ideas may lead to destabilisation of the state,

even greater social divisions, increased separatist tendencies, and – as a consequence – more intensive ethnic conflicts.

It goes without saying that throughout the twentieth century the legal status of Indians (in the sense of their rights as specific ethnic groups of indigenous character), was not clearly defined in the legislation of individual countries of Latin America. Hence both *indigenistas* and Indian activists sought support in legal acts of international character, rightly believing that these may be an efficient weapon in debates on the rights of the indigenous population, and primarily a support in solving conflicts originating between Indians and the state administration. In fact, besides a variety of acts and declarations of the United Nations concerning the condemnation of racial discrimination and the need to respect human and civil rights, it is hard to find high-ranking documents that sets down *expressis verbis* the scope of rights of indigenous people or peoples. The first such act was the “Convenio (num. 107) sobre Poblaciones Indigenas y Tribales” of the International Labour Organisation of 1957. Imperfect though important, the document was replaced in 1989 by “Convenio (num 169) sobre Pueblo Indigenas y Tribales”. Interestingly, the latter document was worked out in a dispute with the participation of numerous indigenous organisations from all over the world, and for the last two decades it has been an extremely important legal instrument both for the Indians – who can now refer to the regulations contained therein – and for the state administration, especially in those countries that ratified Convention No. 169.

The convention leaves no doubt that every indigenous people has the right to maintain its identity and should have the chance to participate in those decisions of state and local authorities that pertain to its existence. At the same time, the document postulates to promote the development of indigenous peoples and eliminate their asymmetric position (social and material) toward the non-native society. The first Latin American state to ratify the Convention was Mexico (1990), which was soon followed by other countries. Although formally recognised, this international document was practically often ignored, not respected or misinterpreted. Nevertheless, its impact on the relations between Indians and the states they inhabit has been great. For the indigenous party, the existence of this convention provided an opportunity to refer to international law in the cases of evident violation of the native rights set out clearly in the document. At the same time, pressure from Indians, frequently supported by the international community (NGOs, solidarity organisations, UN agendas, governments of European states, and eminent religious, artistic and

political authorities) resulted in important changes in the ethnic policy of states towards indigenous people, and consequently also in national law (Stavenhagen 2008).

This convention was not a fully satisfactory document due to some disputable formulas, failure to account for numerous questions crucial for indigenous peoples, and its lack of adjustment to the situation of the native population, which was changing dynamically towards the end of the twentieth century. Nor was it given a sufficiently high rank, as it was among the legal acts worked out by one of the UN bodies and not established by the highest organ of the world's parliament. For that reason, as early as 1995, following the inspiration from the "Grupo de Trabajo sobre Poblaciones Indigenas" established earlier (as soon as 1982) by the United Nations, work on a draft of a UN declaration defining the rights of indigenous peoples and duties of the state towards them began. Negotiations were as a matter of fact very difficult and conducted with the participation of all interested parties, including representatives of indigenous peoples (a large share of them being leaders of Indians' organisations), UN experts, activists of those NGOs that dealt with assistance for native peoples, and also governmental delegates of the countries most interested in the question due to the presence of this category of people within their territories (Anaya 2005).

Following the repeated agreements on almost every sentence and paragraph, a document of unusual weight was finally constructed as the "Declaracion de las Naciones Unidas sobre los Derechos de los Pueblo Indigenas", which was approved by the General Assembly with the votes of 144 states in 2007. In this manner, an extremely important international document was passed, which recognises the collective rights of indigenous peoples. The Declaration passed after the years of debates is today, beside Convention No. 169, an extremely important instrument of international law regulating relations between indigenous peoples (i.e. also Indians) and state authorities. For the indigenous party, this document serves as a point of reference that allows identification of the range of their own rights, while for the state party it should be a certain touchstone binding to such activity in the legislative and administrative area that would not be contradictory to the provisions of the Declaration. Interestingly, the Declaration discussed here is constructed in such a way that most of its articles are divided into two paragraphs, of which the first defines the rights of indigenous peoples in various realms and spheres of their life, while the latter identifies the duties and tasks of the state, related to the implementation and protection of these rights.

Thus the Declaration should be an inspiration for relations between indigenous peoples and state authorities to make it possible to launch a process of elimination of inequalities resulting from colonial conquest and marginalisation of autochthonous populations. It should help to respect collective rights of indigenous groups, prevent actions that bear the traits of forced assimilation, preclude colonisation of indigenous lands and appropriation of natural resources contained therein, and support the struggle of indigenous people for reinforcement of their jeopardised identity by letting them live freely within their own culture. There are two settlements worth noting that are of very special weight, namely the articles where the Declaration states *expressis verbis* that the indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination of their political status and their path of social, economic, and cultural development. The state and its administration, in turn, are obliged to conduct a dialogue with their indigenous peoples in all the matters that may influence their lives and concern the territories they occupy. These norms, in fact, go forth to meet the tendencies manifested in many Latin American countries to institutionalised activity of Indians in the political life of the country, participation of their representatives in local government administration, and to acquisition and broadening of both cultural and territorial autonomy.

It goes without saying that the UN Declaration shall be an important inspiration, not only for Indians and their emancipatory activity, but also becoming an important guideline pointing the direction of the necessary reforms in legislation and ethnic policy in all the countries of Latin America. A number of ideas contained both in Convention No. 169 and now in the Declaration were taken into account in the recently reformulated constitutions of many individual states. To the greatest extent, these changes affected cultural questions, that is the recognition of the national society's cultural pluralism, and hence the Indians' right to cultivation of different customs, languages, and religions. To a lesser degree, the new constitutions reflect the postulates of native leaders to recognise the rights of the indigenous population as new subjects of social, economic, and political life of the country. At most, these documents define that the state has a multi-ethnic (*multiétnico*) character, and the Indians that inhabit it have the right to cherish their identity, have their own forms of social organisation, and possibly the right to decide autonomously about their matters at the local level, due to their specific character resulting from their autochthonous status. Such guarantees are contained in the constitutions of Argentina (1994), Bolivia (1994), Brazil (1988), Columbia (1991), Ecuador (1998 and 2007),

Guatemala (1985), Mexico (1992), Nicaragua (1995), Panama (1994), Paraguay (1992), and Peru (1993) (Anaya 1998).

The recognition of cultural distinctiveness of Indians and their right to maintain separate ethnic identity in fact imposes the duty to support the struggle of indigenous groups to execute these rights in everyday practice on the state. Three factors pose obstacles here. The first is the lack of legal acts to translate constitutional guarantees and norms into the language of administrative practice. Secondly, the lack of will and determination to introduce successful reforms that the indigenous people would find satisfactory, and thirdly, the still profound layers of prejudices and stereotypes against the indigenous population, resulting from postcolonial political philosophy, and associated with the fears for integrity of the state, preservation of social equilibrium, and stability of economic growth.

Although the clauses in the constitutions of Latin America are still not fully satisfactory in the eyes of Indian leaders, they are beyond any doubt a manifestation of distinctive evolutionary tendencies gradually transforming the unitary model of the state with its idea of homogeneous civil nation into a pattern of a pluricultural and multiethnic state, respecting within its borders the existence of various ethnic units characterised by distinctive cultural traits. The main foundations of this new model are:

- recognition of a specific relationship existing between indigenous peoples, and territories they inhabit and lands they farm;
- recognition of indigenous languages as an important element of Indians' cultural heritage, worth supporting through bilingual education;
- respect for cultural identity of indigenous groups, including customs, traditions, and cosmovision;
- recognition of the Indians' right to preserve their own forms of social life and administer their local community in accordance with own norms.

Each of these four principles shapes the relations between the state and Indians in a different field, leading alternatively to confrontation or to a difficult dialogue in search of a solution satisfactory for both parties. Thus Indians find the question of "territory and land" a very important tool to protect their "native fatherlands" against loss, reduction, destruction, industrial infiltration and expansion of settlers' colonisation; while for the state such guarantees are often only a formal (i.e. easy to pass over) barrier standing in the way of the modernisation programmes they promote. The question of bilingual education, meanwhile, is an important factor for Indians, as it supports their identity, but

for the administrative authorities it is only a serious logistic problem due to the lack of expert staff and conviction about the dysfunctionality of native languages in the public life of the country.

Similarly, the ideas of cultural pluralism are not easy to reconcile within a single country, especially when confronting entirely different, and at times even contradictory norms (e.g. religious, medical, social, familial). Yet the greatest number of controversies is raised by the question of the potential acceptance for Indians to use their own common law in their indigenous milieus. This is so because some of its principles concerning inheritance, management of community affairs – even though different from those enshrined in legal codes – can be applied without any hindrances in the form of alternative solutions, while others (for example those referring to punishment of criminals) are hard to accept due to the fundamental contradiction with the binding legal doctrine.

It goes without saying that one of the most important questions for those Indians who still live in the same areas that their ancestors inhabited for centuries is the problem of legal protection of the land (in reference to collective ownership by local communities) and the guarantee of the inviolability of the territory of their ethnic habitat in reference to the ethno-local groups inhabiting tropical forests and savannas. We should note here that beyond the obvious, though in practice hardly respected, protection of the right of ownership, the notions of “land” and “territory” have in fact different meanings in the indigenous system of values. According to it, the land of the forefathers may not be reduced to solely an economic category, as it is treated as the natural space for the existence of the entire community or native group, hence – independently from the changing ways of its use by the community, local group, particular family, or tenants – it may not belong to an individual. It is the entire group – frequently unified on the bases of blood ties, common origin, traditions, and experiences of living together in a given area for a longer spell of time – who are the real owners and managers of the occupied territory. Such a community considers its land/territory extremely important, as its little homeland, the real source of identity, and a native area pervaded with sacral elements and places strongly associated with their worldview (cosmovision). In fact, it can be said that – within this indigenous philosophy – it is not the local group who rules over a territory inherited from their ancestors and can for that reason treat it in any way, but it is the community living within the given area that belongs to (is an integral part of) this “sacral” land considered as a timeless and lasting foundation of the order of the native world. For that reason, all and any designs against the indigenous land/territory are treated by the groups of

native people as an attack on their very foundations of existence (material, social, ethnic), and disregard for the rules binding for centuries.

The entirely different treatment of land by the state and the official law according to which individual property is subject to market operations and by the indigenous population with its tradition of inalienable community ownership, bearing values of sacral object) has been the source of acute controversies and tensions for the last two centuries. Both the state and its non-Indian citizens considered respecting the customary rights of Indians as no more than an obstacle in the acquisition of new lands and areas for economic expansion and “development”. Hence – with methods that were both seemingly legally and illegally resorted to – everything was done to attain the assumed economic goals and bereave the indigenous people of their property. On the other hand, however, the intensifying protests of the autochthonous groups, the *indigenistas* of both left- and right-wing orientation, and also of international organisations, made Latin American states gradually recognise the specific character of Indian property. An example of such a change of position were the activities of national indigenistic institutes (connected into the continental co-operation network, presided over by Instituto Indigenista Interamericano based in Mexico Ciudad, and operating under the auspices of Organizacion de los Estados Americanos), which recommended that governments launch *reconocimientos* procedures, that is the re-acknowledgement (after the colonial era) of indigenous communities through the verification of their territorial boundaries, awarding them with legal personality, and defining their operation in the state as special self-governing units of the local level. Such practices were introduced, for example, by Velasco Alvarado’s government in Peru in the 1970s.

It must also be stated that changes in this direction were introduced in the majority of the new constitutions of Latin American states. Without doubt, these amendments accounted for the statements of Convention No. 169 of the International Labour Organisation, whose ideological impact had been visible in the preceding two decades. Thus such clauses of the highest ranking, being for Indians – naturally, only those who have managed to survive to this day in their traditional areas – a special guarantee of a right to land, made their way into numerous constitutions. In Bolivia, these lands are defined as “tierras comunitarias de origen”, while in Colombia they are known as “tierras comunales de grupos etnicos” and “tierras de resguardo”, and in Nicaragua they are termed “formas comunales de propiedad de las tierras de las comunidades”.

Nevertheless, in the legal discourse that continues today, among on the one hand politicians, lawyers, and “friends of Indians” (*neo-indigenistas* from NGOs),

and on the other indigenous leaders, a decidedly greater importance is assigned not as much to the notion of “community property”, which no longer raises any major controversies, but to the concept of the “indigenous territory” and autonomous rights of their native inhabitants. Such indigenous territories in the areas situated east of the Andes are most often defined as *reserva*: a term strongly criticised by Indians, who believe it to be pejorative, suffused with postcolonial connotations, and bringing to mind the idea of “enclosing” an area. In its traditional meaning, a reserve (*reserva*) is in fact an area excluded from economic and development plans, legally protected as a territory that belongs to the indigenous group, who inhabit it and exploit it in the traditional manner. This kind of concept of the *reserva*, however, though aimed at the protection of small and scattered Indian groups from loss of land, invasion of settlers, decomposition of culture, and destruction of their natural environment, was frequently and strongly criticised also by many anthropologists and human rights activists who believed this type of solution to be an attempt at introducing a certain type of a “human (ethnic) zoo”, aimed at conservation of “primitive societies” through artificial isolation, just like elephants and pandas threatened with extinction. It was believed that the guarantees of the states, safeguarding the rights of Indians to life in dignity in the land of their ancestors, should not be a barrier isolating the local autochthonous groups from the contemporary world, and development opportunities – in short, from the unencumbered choice of lifestyle made by the interested party themselves. Naturally, reconciliation of these two attitudes, each of which refers to a different area of rights – the right to decide about one’s life, and the right to maintain an ethnic territory under special protection – is exceedingly difficult, although the two can definitely be applied partially depending on the local situation (Gómez Parra, Martínez Miguélez 1992).

Despite these reservations, the Indian territories enjoying the status of *reserva* (Peru) or similar (*parque indígena*, *terra indígena* in Brazil) operate in the countries lying within the Amazon basin (i.e. Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, Columbia, Bolivia), and indigenous organisations are trying hard to establish additional areas of that type. This is the only efficient legal way of protecting the indigenous groups inhabiting those territories from aggressive economic colonisation and from the degradation of the natural environment. The process of awarding such rights to indigenous groups, considering the areas they inhabit and exploit as protected territories, and staking out the borders of such areas, leaves much to be desired and is conducted at a highly unsatisfactory pace. In the countries of the Amazon basin, there are still numerous indigenous groups

awaiting such decisions, which means that they have no sufficient guarantees to allow them to oppose the theft of land, exploitation of natural resources, major developmental investments (roads, dams, and oil and gas pipelines) and the new wave of settlement.

Brazil, a state where since 1988 Indians have been awarded a range of important rights that afford them special status, including guarantees pertaining to the territories they inhabit, may provide an interesting case of such delays. The native lands were defined as indigenous, referring to the concept of “primordial rights”, acquired by Indians as a result of inhabiting the territory of Brazil, even before the state was established and before the period of European colonisation. Thus defined, the *terras indígenas* were encompassed by the state’s legal protection, which means a ban on trading this land or removing its traditional inhabitants, albeit with the exception of such cases when an important public interest is at stake. Brazilian Indians therefore on the one hand acquired legal ownership of the “traditional” territories, yet on the other did not acquire property rights to it. Legalisation procedures in Brazil, much like in other countries, are highly complicated, although it is notable that the number of fully or partially recognised indigenous territories reached the level of 71% in 2007, which marks an increase of nearly 8% as compared to 2003.

The contemporary debate on indigenous territories, and especially the postulates of Indian organisations, shifts decisively from the fairly narrowly conceived field of protection of property towards working out a model of functioning of an autonomous area. It is therefore argued that such an area (conceived geographically) should have clearly defined borders, and require legal recognition within them. Such a territory, treated as a habitat, i.e. together with its natural riches (land, forests, animals, water resources and mineral deposits) should be considered an environment that is inalienable and necessary for indigenous group to live. Its biodiversity (*biodiversidad*) and knowledge pertaining to it acquired by Indians during the hundreds of years in this environment should be legally protected along lines similar to intellectual property and environmental protection standards. Understood in this way, the indigenous territory (*etno-territorio*) should be considered an area of special symbolic, historical, social, and cultural meaning for the Indians inhabiting it, who see it as an area that shapes their identity. Finally, this is an Indian territory that, quite naturally, remains a part of the state, yet with a special status, and as such should be covered by the right to autonomy, meaning the possibility of nominating an own local administration (self-government), free determination of own matters, cultivation of ethnic customs and norms appropriate for the given

group, including also the implementation of principles resulting from traditional law.

The debate concerning indigenous autonomy and its various forms became increasingly powerful especially following the so-called San Andrés Accords (*Acuerdos de San Andrés*) signed in 1996 by the Mexican government and leaders of the Zapatista movement (*Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional*). The settlement of the document, which were of great significance for the struggle of Mexican Indians for their rights, resounded with a powerful echo all through the continent, and became a part of the agenda for numerous indigenous emancipatory movements. That is why it is worth quoting significant passage of this agreement, which assumes that *la autonomía es la expresión concreta del ejercicio del derecho a la libre determinación, expresada como un marco que se conforma como parte del Estado nacional. Los Pueblos indígenas podrán, en consecuencia, decidir su forma interna de gobierno y sus maneras de organizarse política, social, económica y culturalmente [...] El ejercicio de la autonomía de los pueblos indígenas contribuirá a la unidad y democratización de la vida nacional y fortalecerá la soberanía del país.* (Sierra, 21). Appropriate changes in the constitutions, which partially (in reference to the recognition of legal autonomy – *autonomía jurisdiccional*) were embodied in the new constitutions of Mexico, Colombia, and Ecuador, were to be a guarantee of autonomy defined in this way. Yet the right of the Indians to refer to their traditional *usos y costumbres* was included only in a limited scope, that is only to the extent they are not contradictory to the basic legal norms defined in codes.

Today, another important aspect pertaining to norms, principles, and practice of autonomy is indigenous political autonomy, which means that Indians should make use of their civic right to have their own local authorities that decide on all matters crucial for the indigenous community. In many countries of Latin America, and especially those where democratisation processes have become highly advanced (Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Mexico), such indigenous local authorities are now a fact. One controversy that – as always – remains is the scope of such an autonomy and its relationship towards the authorities of a higher administrative level (province, state, central government). Mexico can again serve here as an example, as on the one hand it covers hundreds of *municipios* (for example in Oaxaca) run by indigenous authorities appointed in accordance with the principles of traditional rights and recognised by state authorities, while on the other there are Indian initiatives (for example in Chiapas) to establish autonomous regions in spite of lacking the

governmental approval and in no way subjected to any control from the state administration (Assies, Van der Haar, Hoekema 1999).

Actually, that permanent tendency towards an ever broader and more generally accepted Indian autonomy can be observed today, even though in each of the countries it is differently construed and defined, ranging from cultural and territorial to legal and political. The conviction that indigenous autonomy is not a threat to the state and its integrity in a political sense is becoming increasingly popular, even though the question of limitations imposed on such form of autonomy continues to raise serious objections. One of these is limiting or depriving Indians' rights to their natural riches situated within their territory, which is especially true in the case of resources of strategic importance for the state (mineral deposits, gas, oil, and water). In such cases, the law at most provides the requirement (for authorities, firms) to conduct consultations with representatives of local Indians concerning potential compensations for the lost land and damaged environment. Little wonder, therefore, that these questions – difficult to solve in a manner satisfactory for both the parties – are today the most frequent reason for conflicts between Indians, and the state authorities and investors who – with the approval of the state administration – conduct major development projects on indigenous territories. It goes without saying that these conflicts are also an expression of the expansion of a neo-liberal economy that ignores "indigenous rights", and the power of globalisation processes that today reach the furthest regions and encroach without hesitation on the territories that have so been the domains of the *indigenas* (Assies, Gundermann 2007).

Indigenous organisations and their political strategies

The movements of Indian revival, the visible effect of which today are numerous indigenous organisations, were originally of a fairly narrow range and elitist character. It was only with the passage of time that they gradually broadened the scope of their impact, while also acquiring increasing numbers of participants. In this gradual process of consolidation of the movement, frequently simply called Indianism, there are three factors that seem to be of significant importance. These are, in fact, the same elements that played a key role in the establishment of social and religious movements of a millenarian and

messianic character. The first important question that is to be considered is the social and political context – favourable or unfavourable (as until recently in Peru) for the development of indigenous revival movements. It is shaped both by the factors that determine the political, social, and economic reality of the country (for example processes of democratisation after the fall of authoritarian governments, possibilities for organised actions of indigenous people due to their social and spatial situation, the impact of armed conflicts, such as those resulting from the activity of the Shining Path (*Sendero Luminoso*) in Peru, leftist guerrillas and cocaine mafias in Colombia, and civil war in Guatemala), as well as the totality of the international situation in reference to the positions of individual states of Latin America (for example, the general approval of Indians' struggle for their own rights, financial and moral support awarded to such actions, conventions and legal regulations implemented by international organisations favouring changes in the situation of the indigenous population, and the increasingly powerful impact of the new political philosophy referring to the ideology and policy of multiculturalism).

The second significant factor in the process of consolidation of these movements is beyond doubt the ideology that allows formulation of attractive programmes and – with their help – the acquisition of followers among both Indians and non-Indians. Speaking about ideology, two elements are crucial. First – the pace at which the idea of ethnic activism is spread, the increasing tendency to respect the rights of indigenous people, the concept of establishing ethnic autonomy springing up here and there, ever more solidified convictions about the need to build a civic society based on the principles of multiculturalism and multiethnicity. Transformation of the state system towards one respecting its multinational character, and the popularity of slogans advocating the implementation of intercultural and bilingual education, legal pluralism, and improvement of the legal status of indigenous religions are of course very important elements present in the current discourse.

Secondly, this ideology contains elements both of the social programmes inherited from the postulates of the indigenists (improving the civilisational level of Indians' life, of their education and healthcare, and modernisation of regional infrastructure), and of those of left-wing political groups (liquidation of socially unjust relations based on domination and subordination system resulting from the endo-colonial praxis, elimination of the marginalised position of Indians, the fight against expropriation and exploitation of native people, and opposing the relics of racial prejudices).

Finally, the third important element in the process of consolidation of Indian revival movements is the so-called human factor. Besides the internal (social, ethnic, regional, cultural, religious) differentiation) of the Indian people where these movements are active, it encompasses the actions of Indian leaders and the establishment of indigenous elites, including the “intelligentsia” (originating from the education of Indian youth) and middle classes (established as the result of economic advancement), i.e. the social groups that naturally pursue changes. It is the leaders who in a very skilful and successful manner often make use of the crisis situation in the country to conduct revindicative activities; it is the leaders who – knowing perfectly well the needs and mentality of their compatriots – translate universal ethnic ideas into their language (and cognitive system); it is they who more or less successfully connect these ideas with specific programmes of social and legal reforms; it is they who are the initiators of various protest actions; it is also they who shape the public opinion (of the indigenous community, national, and often international), efficiently building lobbyist pressures on the legislative process and the ethnic and social policy of the government.

Beginning in the 1990s, the Indian revival movement in Latin America began to assume an especially powerful dimension, manifested primarily in the earnest struggle of the indigenous people to become subjectivised, i.e. to assume such a position in the gradually democratising states of the area that would let them go beyond the current social and economic marginalisation and be liberated from the political paternalism, at the same time opening to them the path towards co-deciding on their legal, economic, educational, and cultural condition. To achieve this goal, Indians began to organise themselves into local, regional, provincial, and country-wide organisations, that slowly became actual partners of state authorities treated by them as legally recognised representations of the indigenous peoples. As a result, former ethnic, tribal and territorial divisions moved to a far more distant plane, yielding their place to a variety of associations, societies, unions, and even Indian parties, frequently gathering under joint leadership of different ethnic groups (Bengoa 2000).

This is how a new alternative towards the former structure of ethnic divisions developed: a network of new indigenous organisations, trying to become a part of the political reality of the countries. Especially this last aspect has recently assumed significant importance, primarily due to the increasing importance of the Indian population, organisation, and leaders in the political life of Latin American countries. Examples which clearly point to this aspect of

ethno-politics might be on the one hand Ecuador, with its powerful federation of indigenous organisations that is frequently decisive for the fall or election of new central government in the country, and on the other— Bolivia, since 2006 ruled for the first time in its history by an Indian leader, Evo Morales. In other words, today's indigenous organisations in many countries of the American continent are an important political actor, which has to be taken into serious consideration on the local and regional scene, but also in the state and even international space. These organisations have systematically expanded the space of their impact, and on the Indian side have gradually monopolised the relations connecting indigenous people with the state administration. In this way the scattered protests and barely heard voices of Indian people are taken over by increasingly strong indigenous associations, while the state must negotiate with organisations making official statements in the capacity of representatives of the autochthonous milieu and not the amorphous or poorly structured masses of indigenous residents.

These organisations are the ones that organise and manage Indian matters within the indigenous world; they try to gain increased control over the space and resources of the indigenous acumen, it is they who represent the interests of indigenous population in contacts with authorities, administration, NGOs; and it is they, finally (apart from local communes of community character), who have legal personality, and for that reason may be (and are) a legal political partner and the party taking over and distributing financial assets earmarked for assistance and modernisation of Indians' lives. Briefly speaking, Indian organisations decide today on the majority of questions concerning the fate of the indigenous population, and their leaders are treated as a representative section of the society, who should and must be negotiated with.

We can therefore say that today these organisations are led by "the new Indians". They no longer are the chiefs, the medicine men, the caciques, but representatives of new indigenous elites: people experienced in social, political, and organisational work, ever more frequently educated at secondary schools and universities, knowing the rules of contemporary life in the Mestizo world, usually aware of the import of their ethnic mission, and clearly distinguished with their privileged position in their own society. They draw their authority – and often also their charisma – not from tradition and family genealogy, but primarily from the social capital, whose resources let them play the function of efficient mediators between their own indigenous milieu and the (Mestizos–Creole) world that is external towards it. Contemporary indigenous organisations are, in fact, not as much a transformation or adaptation of structures

operating earlier, but an entirely new element of Indian social life. The patterns of such associations were introduced from the outside world, but adjusted to the current needs of the indigenous struggle for rights, now indeed greatly facilitated thanks to their own, legally operating ethnic representation (Posern-Zieliński 2002).

The arrival of Indian organisations on the political, self-government, and ethnic stage was especially evident in the last decade of the twentieth century, and was primarily connected with the discovery of the new democratic space by indigenous leaders. This space let them build from square one associations that represented the vital interests of indigenous people. In such favourable conditions, taking shape in Latin America after the fall of numerous authoritarian regimes and the gradual disappearance of local armed conflicts, an organised Indian movement appeared. Its key was the subjectivisation of Indians who – having discovered their new identity, their unfulfilled rights, and their potential power of protest – turned, through their increasingly well educated leaders, towards self-organisation of their own society. Thanks to this new movement transforming the indigenous marginalised population, deprived of strong leaders, and decentralised to the level of local communities into an increasingly well-organised network of indigenous associations of various levels – the native people began to perceive themselves in a new light: a supra-ethnic community having special rights thanks to the status of “first peoples” on the American continent. They began to discover gradually that despite the major differentiations of cultures, languages, and territories, all Indians share common interests, which on local, regional, ethnic, and state stage should be expressed by indigenous organisations characteristic of the democratic order. In this manner, the “new Indian tribes” appeared on the map of the social life of the numerous countries of Latin America, assuming the form of indigenous associations that are usually recognised through the acronyms of their very long official names (e.g. CONAIE from Ecuador, ONPIA from Argentina CONACAMI from Peru, and CONAMAQ from Bolivia).

The newly developed organisations do not do much displace the traditional organisational structures as rather move them to a further plane of importance, while including them into their own network of associations. In this way, self-governmental organisations managing local indigenous communities (village councils, community councils) ceased to be lonely “islands” wielding rights that applied solely to their own ethnocultural matters. In the new system, they became a part of the ethnoregional or ethnoprovincial associations, as the lowest organisational level within them. In this manner, two systems of organisational

networks for indigenous associations were built: the horizontal one connecting all the basic units (local communities) within a single administrative area, and the vertical system consolidating hierarchically organisations from the lowest level (communities and their regional groups) to ethnoprovincial and ethnonational associations, and even interethnic federations of such organisations operating within a single state, and recently also to confederations coordinating the activity and ambitions of indigenous leaders at the level of groups of states (e.g. the Andean, the Amazon, the South American, and the Latin American zones).

Thanks to such a developed organisational structure, frequently additionally augmented by associations of a specialist character (women's, professional, environmental, religious, etc.) these organisations have become official representations of ethnic groups, in whose name they struggle for the improvement of indigenous lives. The governmental or administrative party (so far most often in Creole–Mestizo hands) now meets on its way a new and very difficult partner, with whom – like it or not – agreements must be signed, compromises negotiated, and – in extreme cases – sharp conflicts entered into (Langer, Muñoz 2003).

These new Indian associations play at least three important functions that give the indigenous population an opportunity to reconstitute the rights lost due to (endo-)colonial rule. First, they have a very important integrative function, uniting the dispersed and uncoordinated emancipative activities, and also reinforcing the barely visible links between individual local Indian communities. Thanks to this function, indigenous associations become “new tribes”, whose existence reinforces the sense of ethnic identity and an Indian solidarity. Secondly, worth emphasising is their participatory function, which turns indigenous associations into important pressure groups, acting in the defence of the interests of native people. This is manifested through organisation of acts of civic disobedience (strikes, occupations, marches, demonstrations, petitions, road blockades, etc.), intervention into the political mechanisms of establishing laws in conformity with Indians' interest, and finally the monitoring and criticism of actions of the state administration and international corporations that enter into conflict with indigenous communities. Being vested with legal personality, these associations may conduct a variety of modernisation undertakings, receive assistance funds from national and foreign sources, and – thanks to their influence in the world of politics – struggle (increasingly efficiently) to place their representatives in state administration, legislative, political, and trade union bodies.

The Indians' discovery of the efficiency of their newly established organisation (new tribes), and the leaders who preside over them (new chiefs) brought about an unusual eruption of various associations, whose network closely covers nearly all the important areas of the lives of the indigenous population. Some of these organisations are exceedingly stable and powerful through their spectacular actions and actual popularity in their own ethnic environment, while others turn out to be ephemeral, have a low impact and hardly any support in the field. Some of them are focused on "work at the grassroots" and concentrate on the implementation of programmes of ethnic development, while others have great political ambitions and struggle to conduct spectacular actions on the national arena. We may describe this as a true hypertrophy of various associations, federations, forums, groupings, factions, etc., who often devote a share of their energy to maintain the life of their own organisational structures, which requires from them primarily concentration on acquiring funds from a variety of non-governmental and international organisations.

Such a great diversity of Indian organisations allows to propose their classification based on criteria that may naturally follow a great variety of lines, including ideological orientation (e.g. left-wing, liberal, conservative), attitude to a mythologised past (e.g. nativist, restitutional, traditional) or the strategy of action practised (revolutionary, reformative, modernisational), and may also be divided according to the organisational form (basic, regional, federational, national level), and finally to the type of leaders (traditional, political, charismatic).

With full awareness of the arbitrary character of the division proposed below, these associations may be divided into at least a number of basic groupings. The first of them consists of organisations gathering Indians who belong to the same ethnocultural or ethnoregional group living within the same state (e.g. the association of the Shuar from Ecuador or the Aymara from Peru). The second category of indigenous organisations unite various ethnic communities living together in the same territory, usually within the area of one of the department. Despite marked cultural and language differences, they decide to act jointly to improve their lives, which are conditioned by the same context that is characteristic for the territory they inhabit. In this manner, they become a major partner for state authorities at the regional level, as in the case of the association of Peruvian Indians of the department of the Madre de Dios. Another group of organisations are the multiethnic federations that unite Indians of a single, clearly defined environmental and cultural area situated within a specific country, as is the case of the organisation of the Indians from Peru-

vian Amazonia and the natives of Bolivian lowlands, and the indigenous peoples of the Pacific shores of Ecuador.

Another type of federative organisations are associations which are monoethnic yet of an international character, representing members of one group that lives within a few neighbouring states (e.g. the associations of the Quechua Indians from Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru, of the Aymara from Peru and Bolivia, and of the Mapuche from Chile and Argentina). An interesting category is made up by those associations whose ambition it is to become the main or the only representative of an entire indigenous population within one country with the aim that all Indians might – through their representatives – speak in one, very powerful voice. Such a situation, although highly desired for strategic reasons, is not often found in South America. In fact, the only example of such an association is CONAIE from Ecuador, which in that country is a true confederation built on the developed hierarchy of various ethnic, regional, and departmental associations. Another important category is pan-Indian organisations, representing the interests of all Indians, independently of their ethnic affiliations but inhabiting a single major cultural and geographic area, covering usually a number of states of the continent, such as the association of Indians of the Amazonia, the Andean countries, or the whole of South America. Recently, even broader organisational structures have come about, whose ambitions encompass the entire American continent. In most cases, these are committees that consist of major representatives (leaders) of main indigenous organisations, which organise continental Indian meetings to debate and work out unified postulates on the threat to indigenous identity, violation of native rights and developmental projects contradictory to the vital interests of indigenous people. One such meeting was organised early in 2007 in Guatemala, namely the 3rd Continental Summit of Indigenous Peoples, with participation of leaders of Indian organisations from Canada to Chile.

Last but not least, a mention is due for a range of specialised organisations that primarily support the interests of specific (e.g. professional) groups, that in fact are composed primarily of Indian people (e.g. indigenous peasants, Andean miners, coca farmers, artisans, shepherds, teachers, members of rural communities affected by mining damages, etc.). Included in this category may be the indigenous associations built on different ties: ethnoreligious (for example organisations uniting only Protestant Indians in Ecuador) or gender (indigenous women's organisations), for instance. Parallel to their increasingly active operation, some of them are adding new issues to this agenda, often becoming an important representation of majority of Indians within the area of their activity.

New indigenous organisations and the state

If, following previous considerations, we assume that Indian organisations are in fact new ethnic groupings – a certain type of “new tribes”, changing the amorphous indigenous masses deprived of subjectivity into civic society composed of indigenous people increasingly aware of their rights, goals, and ambitions – it is worth considering the relations that connect the world of Indians with the internal policy of Latin American states. The pattern that dominated nearly to the end of the twentieth century was definitely the conservative, neo-colonial and national project of Mestizo–Creole elites excluding Indians from the decision-making space, preferring their accelerated assimilation (*mestizaje*), and pushing away those *indigenas* who kept to their identity in the margins of the country’s life. The dominant conviction that native people are in fact a handy object for exploitation, both as cheap labour and in terms of the expropriation of the easily accessible areas they previously occupied, was an inheritance of the colonial period. Indians were also treated as a convenient object of political manipulation, especially when they were by force “activated” for the time of elections so that they voted for the parties and politicians who in fact did not care for the interests, when the so-called “friends of Indians”, known as *indigenistas* made free use of elements of their culture and historical heritage to reinforce the Mestizo–Creole national ideology, when revolutionary ferment was kindled among indigenous people to increase the power of left-wing movements and guerrilla groups, or finally when they were enlisted in the army, where they often accounted for a decided majority of military troops like in Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Guatemala.

The answer of Indians to such treatment was a strategy of going into isolation, limiting contacts with the apparatus of exploitation and violence to a minimum, growing mistrust towards the external world that as a rule they found hostile, and also – at the moment of local crises – starting rebellions that were usually quenched with blood. The psychological consequence of this situation was also rapid assimilation (*mestizaje*), considered the only way that led to social advance through simultaneous obliteration of traces of indigenous cultural heritage. The character of these relations was decidedly based on unequal rights, paternalism, exclusion of the indigenous population from civic space, and on top of that forceful and rapid integration of indigenous people into the main current of the Mestizo–Creole nation.

The long years of marginalisation and non-participation of Indians in the political life of the country, and their treatment by the Mestizo–Creole domi-

nant society from neo-colonial positions, had a profound influence on the current relations that connect indigenous population to the state. This is manifested frequently in mutual mistrust, further aggravated by stereotypes and prejudices that make it impossible to find rational solutions acceptable for both parties. It goes without saying that Indians still treat the state as a force that is decidedly "alien": as the main instrument of their oppression and power attempting to stop or minimise the revindicative ambitions of the indigenous population. This is why, on the one hand, they try to use democratic mechanisms so as to influence the state authorities efficiently, while on the other – dissatisfied with the frequently meagre results of such efforts – they resort to populist, if not anarchistic or even destructive, strategies, introducing chaos and paralysis to the political and economic life of the country by initiating violent forms of protest, an example of which may be found in numerous actions of the type known from Ecuador and Bolivia. Mistrust towards the state administration also results in the fact that Indian organisations frequently prefer to refer their cases directly to international and non-governmental organisations, seeking allies there. In search of profitable strategic alliances with other powers, indigenous organisations also join in the activity of different political groups (for example, anarcho-syndicalist, anti- and alterglobalist, nationalistic, and anti-American), which in fact spread anti-modernisation ideology and form opposition against industrialisation of the country, exploitation of its natural resources, development of free trade and restrictions on commercial coca plantations producing raw material for global illegal drug market.

Against this background, one could try to present basic patterns illustrating the relations between the organised Indian movements and the state. It is obvious that these relations must to a great extent depend on the size of indigenous population and its percentage share in the national society of every state. Wherever this share — is significant, one should naturally expect a greater impact of the indigenous people on the course of current affairs. Nevertheless, it is important also to realise that it is not only ethno-demographic relations that are responsible for the character of relations between the state authorities and native groups. The example of Peru, a country with significant Indian population but characterised for many years by a very low level of native organisation, is evidence which also points to other important factors that may strengthen or weaken the indigenous activism.

It seems that we can present here three basic model situations. The first is that where we deal with a very strong state of centralist character, which moreover pursues a strong "integrational" policy. This in fact hides assimilative strategies

that are to incorporate the Indians into the mainstream of national society without respect for their ethnic identity. Such a situation evidently does not favour the establishment of powerful indigenous organisations, and those that exist there are of ephemeral character and little potential impact. Cases illustrating such a system are Argentina, and primarily Peru, as mentioned earlier, where attempts to activate Indians from mountain areas – officially considered by the authorities as “peasant” population (*campesinado*) living in traditional “rural communities” (*comunidades campesinas*) – have for years found little response.

The second case is a situation where the state and its structures are not too efficient, yet they try to enable the Indian population to take advantage, though in a limited scope, of the approved indigenous rights. The states may afford this type of strategy, as the question of indigenous people is not a priority in those countries, while the most important problem is leaving out of internal crises situations caused by civil war (as in Colombia) or departing from the authoritarian regime (as in Chile). In those countries, Indian organisations acquire a certain influence on the course of things, yet primarily on the local plane and as a part of efforts for the restitution of the lost land, and acquisition of ethnic autonomy (e.g. of a territorial, legal, or cultural nature).

Finally, the third option, concerns the permanently very weak state (both in an economic sense and in its actual potential of implementing civil rights and obligations), which, moreover, is inhabited by very large groups of Indians. In this case (for example in Bolivia and Ecuador), indigenous organisations quickly gain power, and their ambitions reach not only the questions related directly to the fate of Indians, but encompass all the problems significant for the entire country. For this reason, it is small wonder that they enter eagerly into the political struggle and become an important actor on that stage, frequently deciding about the trajectory of development of the entire country and the character of its international relations.

The emergence of new Indian organisations of various levels on the social and political stage of Latin America was, on the one hand, an obvious result of “discovery” of the values of a democratic system by the indigenous population, and on the other it fit well the traditions of self-organisation and self-government of the commune, so typical of local native communities that have managed to survive. In this way, we may interpret the phenomenon of the high level of organisation among the Indian population as a successful result of the adaptation to Occidental models, yet with the preservation of certain elements typi-

cal of indigenous cultures. It seems that Indian organisations oscillate in fact between these two basic models, first coming closer to one role model, and then preferring the other. In one case, they deal with the Western type of democracy based on the representational majority and pluralist system, while in the other they refer to the principles of direct democracy, making reference to Indian solutions respecting the autonomy of decision of individual communes, the principle of regular rotation of positions, and the path of agreeing binding decisions by seeking consensus through very long debates and consultations.

Side by side with this pair of opposing positions in the understanding and practising of democracy, we can point to another module – this time diversifying types of leadership in indigenous organisations. On the one hand, this is the Latin American model of strong authority of the leader (*caudillo*), usually aiming at total subjugation of institutions and representative bodies that are subordinate to him. On the other stand models based on traditional authority in the person of the “chief”, “cacique” or similar, whose position – although strong and respected by the majority – is controlled by a variety of collective bodies, councils, and gatherings. We should point out here that this model of executing power was very important in the Andes until the end of the eighteenth century, as it was incorporated into the system of indirect governance of Spanish colonial administration. Its rudiments – present primarily at the local level – successfully survived to present times, and reached new organisations from the local governments of the communes.

An analysis of the strategies, division of competences, and manner of making key decisions by Indian organisations points in fact to the presence of all the four models listed above. The frequent controversies that originate within these organisations are often the result of clashes between the approaches described above, sometimes referring to Mestizo–Creole models, and sometimes preferring solutions that are more strongly based on the indigenous tradition. It goes without saying, however, that the organisations that to a greater degree refer to the decisions of their basic units in the field (community councils, local self-governments) are likely to prefer patterns of direct democracy. As a result, they reach consistent decisions with great effort that requires consultation in all the “basic” units of the entire association. This feature of their activity is in fact its weak point, and for that reason the effectiveness of decisions made is as a rule fairly low, as most of the members’ energy burns out during all the meetings, gatherings, and internal discussions, not during the activity on the interethnic state arena. In turn, those organisations that are to a greater extent based on Latin American and Western patterns are usually constructed in more central-

ised manner, and consequently the decisions and conclusions binding on members follow usually from top to bottom. Characteristic of these associations is powerful leadership, often of a charismatic character, capable of making quick decisions and establishing more efficient dialogue with the government and its agendas.

Organisations of the first type, that is of the more traditionalist attitude, are keener on the question of maintaining ethnic culture, preserving identity, and bilingual education, at the same time strongly emphasising the benefits that result from the promotion of the idea of Indian autonomy. The other associations – those that are to a greater extent adapted to the Mestizo–Creole patterns, are primarily oriented to the introduction of social reforms, improvement of the economic situation, and achievement of significant political goals, pushing the cultural and ethnic postulates to a further plane.

Should we look at the strategies developed by Indian organisations according to levels of their basic activity, we should also notice certain regularities or dominant tendencies that may refer to Western patterns or to indigenous experiences in self-government. It goes without saying that among the basic organisations, that is mostly among those that operate at the level of local populations, the principles of direct democracy are preferred, with a strong emphasis on achieving consensus, while agreeing positions. In associations of the middle level, coordinating the work of numerous lesser organisations operating in the same region or province, domination of leader attitudes is noticeable, yet it is combined with consultations with representatives (leaders) of units that belong to lower structures.

Organisations of the high level, that is those that for example unite within a single country all Indians association of the Amazon or Andean region, decidedly prefer the Latin American pattern of a powerful leader of the *caudillo* type with the deciding vote, who, moreover, strongly competes for primacy with other leaders presiding over similar associations. Finally at the highest, that is federational, level, usually believed to be the main representation of “all” Indians in the given state, there is a tendency to have a powerful leader, empowered with great authority, who, however, due to the complex structure of the organisation and the high independence of its members, must often resort to consultations with leaders of associations from the lower level of this hierarchical structure.

The observations presented above refer only to the basic tendencies, which nevertheless assume a variety of forms in the reality of today’s Indian movement, depending on the context of their activity and on the power of personali-

ties of the new indigenous leaders. It may be noticed, though, that referring to cultural orientation we are dealing with at least three basic attitudes. The first of them is the “nativist” one manifested in the fact that the associations that represent it try to negate openly the mechanisms and principles of Western democracy, attempting to maintain in their structures at all levels patterns strongly based on indigenous traditions of political and social life. Without doubt, an example of this is CONAMAQ from Bolivia – association of different community councils (*ayllus* and *markas*).

The second position is represented by the “modernists”, who believe that the high efficiency of indigenous activity can only be assured by applying Latin American organisational patterns, including powerful leadership, supported by local members, being the form best “adjusted” to the current political and social situation in the given country. Certainly, a good illustration of this tendency used to be the organisation known as CSUTCB, i.e. *Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia* (Unique Syndicated Confederation of Rural Labourers of Bolivia), presided over by the charismatic Felipe Quispe, as well as the movement of the *cocaleros* competing with it, under Evo Morales, which finally was transformed into a broad interethnic political movement known as MAS (*Movimiento al Socialismo*), and succeeded in 2006 election forming the new Bolivian government with the first indigenous president in the history of the country.

Lastly there is the third attitude, which should be defined as “syncretic” due to the fact that it is trying to combine modernist and nativist elements, sometimes allowing primacy to one and then to the other type of strategy. This category, in fact, harbours the great majority of contemporary Indian organisations, which at the lower levels make use of the traditional mechanisms of executing power, while at the higher – that is operating mostly in a non-Indian environment – they adjust themselves to Mestizo–Creole standards of making politics.

Contemporary Indian organisations try to achieve their goals through the continuous conquest of social and political space, which until recently was entirely inaccessible for them. In states respecting even rudimentary principles of democracy, using these mechanisms for the improvement of Indians’ lives and recognising their representation as an important partner who can no longer be ignored, this becomes a common strategy of conduct. Indigenous associations, depending on the situation and power of their arguments, refer to the existing democratic mechanisms, and only if they believe these to have failed resort to the strategy of so-called street democracy that upsets social order (Posern-Zieliński 2008).

The indigenous organisations in Latin America are extremely diversified when it comes to the programmes and strategies of operation they follow. The orientations identified within this movement can be generally divided into a number of basic currents, although in daily practice some of them intertwine with others and evolve, making the analysed reality quite impenetrable. Thus the typology proposed here is only of a preliminary and ordering character, and serves only to point to the main tendencies present in the indigenous movement.

First, what we are dealing with here – mostly in Bolivia and to a lesser extent in Peru – is an ethno-syndicalist orientation quite strongly instilled with leftist (generally Trotskyist) influence grown from the tradition of Marxist perception of the problem of Indians, being the question of exploitation, enslavement, and marginalisation of the Andean peasant. For this reason, this current strongly emphasises the improvement of living conditions of the *indígenas*, modernisation of the country, development of fairer social and economic relations, and also the reclaiming of the lost land. The questions related to the solution of burning social problems come to the fore, as these are the ones treated as the most basic, while anything referring to the defence of ethnic culture or the need to maintain identity comes on a further plane.

Of a somewhat similar character is the second orientation – the ethno-political one – based on the development of indigenous party groupings. Thanks to this strategy Indians may come onto the national or regional political scene to formulate programmes of major social reforms, conclude favourable but short-lived alliances with greater factions representing non-Indian milieus, introduce own representatives in administration, government, and Parliament, and also operate as one of the opposing powers with an influence on the course of decision-making and legislative processes. In this stream, too, ethnic culture is treated as an element of the further plane, yet in an instrumental manner, which is expressed through frequent use of ethnic symbols to legitimise the Indianness of party activists, and testify to their involvement in the matters of native peoples. This orientation was especially present in Bolivia as of the 1980s and 1990s, and is currently substantial in Ecuador and becoming gradually visible also in Peru.

Of decisively different character is ethno-cultural orientation, which struggles primarily to subjectivise the Indian people, to turn them into citizens of a multiethnic and multicultural state, aware of their rights, who will, however – entering the mainstream of the country's life – maintain their ethnic identity and cherish what they believe to be the most crucial elements of their heritage.

Followers of this current believe that the solution of social problems that affect Indians may be achieved only on the path of social advance of indigenous people, who have to look out for their future themselves, having access to power at all levels. Such an attitude shapes a powerful sense of indigenous – solidarity, and is situated in strong opposition to the previously and currently dominant world of *Blanco-Mestizos*. Attitudes of this type are most present in the movements of Ecuadorian and Chilean Indians.

Another orientation is the ethno-communitarian current that builds both the horizontal and vertical network of organisations representing local communities in the region, province, and country, yet falling back on tested local authorities. This orientation is of a decidedly traditionalist character, as it reaches for mechanisms of the indigenous system of *cargos*, and tries to shift it from the community level to higher organisational rungs. It rejects the principles of Western democracy accepting power of elected representatives and replaces them with a system of multiple consultations, a variety of mechanisms aimed at working out the consensus, and negation of a powerful central leadership, which it replaces with various councils and bodies composed of recognised traditional authorities. Very important in this current is the maintenance of constant communication with the local communities, at the same time fairly coherently, combining programmes of social transformation and modernisation with attention to the preservation of ethnic identity and respect for the jeopardised cultural heritage. This orientation is present in Guatemala and Bolivia, where it competes in its daily life with the far stronger ethno-syndicalist movement.

Of major importance too is the ethno-autonomist tendency that primarily requires that indigenous people be awarded in the regions they densely inhabit the right to local autonomy, thanks to which many elements of social, legal, and religious life resulting from the ancestral tradition can still be followed within an ethnic territory controlled by indigenous local authorities, with the simultaneous possibility of implementing ethno-developmental projects in a manner coherent with the real needs of the local population. The autonomous areas should be legally protected from the expropriation of land, exploitation of natural resources, and invasions of settlers. Such ideas are popular among the indigenous peoples of Amazon regions but also in the south of Mexico, Guatemala, and Panama.

Finally, the last orientation is the ethno-self-government current, which is based on gaining influence and power at local and regional level, wherever – thanks to the rules of democracy – the demographically dominant Indian majority may win seats (through elections) that are crucial in local administration,

and fill the posts of mayors, councillors and other elected officers. It is natural that this current is stronger in the provinces than at the national level. It strongly focuses on social and economic problems, and only to a lesser extent on ethnic issues. Nevertheless, it allows Indians to win new spaces of civic responsibility. It is especially visible in Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Mexico, and Guatemala (Bartolomé, Barabas 1998).

It is also worth having a closer look against this background at the manner in which Indian organisations enter the mechanism of democratic action. First, they try to utilise existing legal instruments in order to negotiate solutions that are advantageous for the indigenous people. The most frequently used mode of such action is the tendency to execute the rights formally acquired by the indigenous people primarily concerning the property titles to the community land, territory inhabited, local water resources, and obtaining compensations for illegal expropriation and/or environmental pollution caused by industrial investments.

A further important strategy of conduct is the effort aimed at defining new legal regulations to replace those that did not take into account the interests of Indians and permitted their unequal treatment. These legislative efforts are aimed primarily at acquiring new guarantees protecting property rights for *indígenas* to the land they use and territory they inhabit, so that the subjectivity of indigenous groups could be legally recognised, and also to accept – as a part of increasingly popular principles of multiculturalism – the Indians' right to regulate their own matters within their autonomous social life according to native and traditional legal norms.

The step that certainly goes furthest on the path to making use of the legal instruments is the attempts of Indian organisations, and especially those of the highest level, to change the state constitution to permit it to reflect the guarantees that are important for indigenous peoples. Hence frequent postulates (which have brought the effects desired by Indians in a few states of the Latin America) to break away finally from the old concept of unitary nation-state and replace it with a clause about the pluralistic character of national society composed not only of the ethnorracial Mestizo–Creole dominant group, but also of internally diversified indigenous peoples and post-slavery Afro-Latin-American communities. These proposals in most cases assume the form of a clause stating that the idea of the postulated pluralistic society should be expressed through constitutional guarantees of principles of multiethnicity and multiculturalism (Almeida, Arrobo Rodes 1998).

Where these positions have been taken into consideration, further postulates of indigenous associations go towards another expansion, namely to rec-

ognising the multinational (*plurinacionalidad*) character of South American states. So far this postulate has not, however, gained approval, primarily as anxiety is expressed that such a clause in the constitution could inspire some indigenous elements to separatist actions threatening the territorial integrity of the continent's states.

It should be mentioned here that an important field of operation of indigenous organisations is law-giving initiatives conducted on the international stage, primarily in the United Nations, and in the Organisation of American States. It is there that the debates have continued for years, conducted with the participation of representatives of those Indian associations and representatives of authorities of individual countries of the continent and striving to work out a uniform and generally binding document defining the rights and principles of protecting the indigenous population. Such a document would be the first to replace the imperfect and dated Convention No. 169 of the International Labour Organisation of 1989 defining the basic principles of treating indigenous groups, which has, moreover, failed to be ratified by all states. In fact, this work led to the successful approval of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 2007.

Undoubtedly the second most important method of operation of Indian organisations is the increasingly popular tendency to make use of democratic elections and delegate their representatives to a variety of decision-making bodies and assemblies. The presence of the new elected Indians – that is those who are aware of their rights, frequently well-educated, and politically experienced – in these bodies is to provide a guarantee that the questions that the indigenous associations finds important will not be solved without the consideration of the indigenous party, even though they were in the decided minority.

This tendency is also visible in the Indians' ambition to have their own representatives in administrative institutions, beginning at the local level and ending, of course, at that of central government. Examples of such a strategy of operation are Bolivia, with its 1994 reform guaranteeing participation in local authorities to Indians (*Ley de participación popular*), and Ecuador, where from year to year an increasing number of mayors (*alcaldes*), and councillors (*consejeros*) are elected from among indigenous candidates, and – interestingly – frequently also by the votes of ethnic competitors: Mestizos and Creoles. Thanks to the slow but systematic changes in the system of political powers, representatives of Indian communities also feature in ministries, holding important posts in central offices of the state, and in parliaments (Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia) (Singh 2002).

At the same time, the last institutions of the indigenistic type (that is agencies for Indian affairs established, and managed by specialists representing the Mestizo–Creole society) were liquidated and replaced by offices of the new type aimed at focusing on the important problems of the indigenous population (beginning with education and ending with the questions of health, infrastructure and law). In some countries, these are separate central offices in the form of ministries, vice-ministries or departments such as the Bolivian “Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos, Pueblos Indígenas y Originarios” (Ministry of Peasant, Indigenous and Native Peoples’ Affairs) operating in the first years of the twenty-first century), while in others (for example in Peru), these can be specialised boards or commissions operating under the patronage of the government to support the ethnodevelopment of Indians, for example the Peruvian INDEPA, i.e. Instituto Nacional de los Pueblos Andinos, Amazonicos y Afroperuanos (National Institute for the Development of Andean, Amazon and Afro-Peruvian Peoples), established in 2005. In both cases, they consist of joint representation of indigenous population and governmental specialists in different fields who are supposed to assist the indigenous population in solving economic, legal, and educational questions they find important. Institutions of this type, however, have not always enjoyed the recognition of Indians. An example here is Ecuador, where there is no such agency, despite the considerable political power of national indigenous organisations. The situation was also similar in Bolivia after the coming to power of MAS and Evo Morales. This was the case because Indians themselves considered that such institutions were a confirmation of the special, exceptional status of the indigenous people, which that population rejects as a relic of the time when the indigenist ideology dominated. In return, they want to be treated on equal terms resulting from their constitutional and civil rights, so they also claim an equal participation of their representatives in all local, regional, and naturally also central authorities, beginning with the ministry of defence (due to the high percentage of Indians in the Armed Forces), and ending with the ministries of agriculture and health (Rosenberger, Pajuelo Teves 2007).

Finally, we must mention an important tendency, defined as ethnopoliticisation of the Indian movement, and expressed primarily in the establishment of ethnic political parties, whose goal it is to support indigenous interests during the electoral struggle, and – through efficient presence on this stage – to introduce their own representatives to local and central authorities. This phenomenon is relatively new, and it is notable for its dynamic development, proving its high efficiency, especially in those countries where such parties may count on

the high support of indigenous masses (related to the demographic power of Indian populations participating in elections along the lines of administrative obligation). In such states as Bolivia and Ecuador, Indian political groupings may (and do) win a large number of votes and try to become in this way an important partner on the political stage, both during the electoral campaign (by building alliances and blocks, usually with groupings of a left-wing and populist character), and also during the post-election division of power.

The third important strategy of use of democratic rules is Indian organisations' appealing to the international community in the hope that its impact – through the various specialised agencies – might help to provide indigenous questions with appropriate publicity. Such a strategy allows a variety of sometimes highly local conflicts to be awarded with an disproportionately high standing, permanently turning the attention of public opinion to the problem of violation of rights of indigenous peoples and the need to defend Indian interests, and finally allowing efficient "omission" of national information barriers, controlled by authorities unfriendly to Indians and exerting influence upon these authorities through foreign or international organisations.

An important goal of such strategies is thus the struggle to obtain increasingly greater recognition on the international stage, as corroborated by the fact that indigenous peoples are considered an actual subject of international law. This is why the activity of Indian associations encompasses primarily impact on the most important international organisations. They also turn to the governments of the countries whose political and economic interests are strongly connected to the countries inhabited by the indigenous groups. Moreover, these organisations maintain lively contacts with international organisations operating for the benefit of environmental protection (e.g. the rainforests of Amazonia), connecting in this way the universal questions of ecology to particular needs of Indians and their claims to control their ethnic territories. They establish contacts with associations and institutions promoting respecting human rights, trying to expand these postulates by recognition of the collective rights of indigenous peoples. Nor do they shy away from contacts with anti-and alterglobalist organisations, seeing in them an ally in their struggle against economic neoliberalism and great international corporations perceived as a threat to the lively interests of the indigenous population. Finally, they also seek assistance and support from international political organisations gathering socialist, social-democratic, and Christian parties. It must be admitted that, in this international space, the new Indian leaders move with high efficiency, achieving in this manner great successes, which – thanks to positive feedback

– are quickly transformed into modernising solutions that satisfy the indigenous population.

Besides international recognition and receiving publicity for their needs and harm to indigenous population, an important form of activity of their representatives is also efforts for the acquisition of assistance funds necessary for those organisations to operate and manage ethnodevelopmental projects conducted in various fields of indigenous life. In this scope, the main partner for Indians is primarily non-governmental organisations (*ONG*), of which most are of an international character or come from abroad. They are in fact countless in Latin America, and – despite heavy criticism directed against them both from the left wing (accusing them of pacification of revolutionary spirit among Indians), and the right (seeing in them a threat to the state monopoly in internal ethnic policy) – they are the main source of support for the new organisations. Besides direct financial aid, they also provide logistical support, organise training of leaders and courses of professional mobilisation, conduct research in applied social engineering, in this way potentially influencing the improvement of life standards and condition of Indian communities, provide legal counselling, organise intervention and lobbying actions for Indians, and finally – to a major extent – shape public opinion (primarily in Europe) feeding it with information concerning the lives of the indigenous population through publications, online news, exhibitions, conferences, and appeals.

The principles of democracy are still poorly grounded in the countries of Latin America, both among the governing elites and in the opposition milieu. From this stems the tendency, for intertwining of democratic principles – which, as a rule, provide a certain smokescreen legitimising power – with brutal contravention of these principles both by the governmental and civic partners. In crisis situations, Indian organisations frequently make use of the “street democracy”, organising rallies and demonstrations, conducting protest marches, occupying important buildings of public administration, and, in extreme cases, blocking roads of strategic importance. It is interesting that, during such acts of protest, violence is as a rule refrained from, which does not mean that it never occurs; it happens most often when the state authorities send security forces to disperse the protesters.

Considering the reasons for the passage from “classical” democracy to forms of “street democracy”, so easy in Latin American reality, a number of basic reasons for this phenomenon can be identified. One of them, certainly, is the observation that normal methods of negotiation cannot ensure the reforms that are important for the Indian population, as the apparatus of power shall

always be an obstruction against them. An important reason for leading people out into the street is the frequent acts of protest against the introduction of arbitrary price rises for basic products or new legal regulations not accepted by the indigenous people. Thus such protest actions are a non-democratic form of reacting to pseudo-democratic steps taken by the authorities and aimed against the interests of the minority. A circumstance that also favours such forms of protest, certainly, is in many cases the "weakness" of Latin American (non-authoritarian) governments that are relatively easily put up against the wall and force to make the concession or even abolish the ruling team. In the process of rallying the society, not without significance are the populist slogans preached by Indian leaders, their strategies of acquiring support among indigenous people, and their ability to build their own authority (Stavenhagen 2005).

Also worthy of note are other forms of activities, alternative to democratic rules, which aim to maintain order within the indigenous society, especially in the situations when the state apparatus cannot cope with the task of protecting its citizens. When it comes to this, Indian peasants take matters into their hands and try to introduce their own justice within their area, falling back on traditional strategies of conduct that have been well tested in the past.

Just to illustrate this, we may cite here two examples that are highly characteristic of contemporary indigenous inhabitants of the Andes. One of them is the so-called *rondas campesinas*, that is units of peasant self-defence, composed of volunteers who protect the settlements and pastures from cattle rustlers. The criminals caught are immediately punished by the authorities of local communities, and sometimes killed on the spot by the *ronderos*. In this way we reach the second example, namely the question of so-called indigenous justice, which in many regions of the Andes begins to replace the institutions of the democratic state of law. Indians increasingly often refer to indigenous rules of conduct, toward the perpetrators of crimes introducing within the territory they inhabit their own system of executing punishment. Such practices frequently result in acute conflict with the administration, as the state as a rule considers such actions a blatant violation of legal norms binding all citizens. Attempts are sometimes made to eliminate these contradictions through debates and endeavours to accept the legal pluralism, that is a system that – considering the real existence of indigenous law – should limit it to a size closely controlled by the state.

Contemporary indigenous leaders as a “new Indians”

An important factor in contemporary ethnic changes, taking place in the area of relations between the indigenous peoples and the organisations representing them and the state administration, is the emerging of new indigenous elites, from among which the leaders and activists hail. Their appearance on the civic stage was of major impact, as to a great extent they replaced the traditional leaders, who have no opportunity to act efficiently under the new conditions, and far beyond the matters of the local community. It is worth mentioning here that following the colonial repressions, the former indigenous elites (in the areas where they were present, as that is in the Andes and Mesoamerica) were eliminated, either physically or through assimilation. As a result, in these regions Indians became the typical ethnoclass, that is the ethno-racial group composed of exploited and marginalised peasants.

A certain role in this rural milieu was also played by the representatives of community authorities, who managed all the matters of daily and holiday life of the *comunidad indigena* and/or *comunidad campesina*, taking care of all the affairs of the local society, from the organisation of public works, via distribution of water in irrigation canals, to the resolution of disputes and organisation of main festivities. An important element of the tradition was the hierarchy of offices (*cargos*) held by the members of the community as a result of elections that were usually conducted every year. This kind of system, however, made it impossible to establish a powerful and permanent leadership, although it made everyone responsible for the good of the community and awarded great social recognition to those persons who played their roles properly. Nevertheless, in the latter half of the twentieth century, the prestige of the traditional *cargos* was greatly debilitated by the introduction of a new system of local offices being a part of the state administration in peasant and indigenous communities. Although the people holding these duties were also elected, their responsibility was not before the community, but rather before their supervising bodies, controlled by Mestizo people usually unwilling to represent Indian interests. Noticeable with the passage of time is a significant shift of the centre of real power in the communities from traditional village authorities towards officers of local administration.

Thus the indigenous community had neither an organisational structure nor leaders capable of playing the role of contemporary representatives of

Indians, both in matters concerning the social and economic improvement of the conditions of their life and in the area of ethnic programmes important for maintaining identity. It is small wonder, therefore, that throughout the majority of the twentieth century it was the *indigenistas* – that is people from outside the indigenous milieu – who spoke about matters related to the condition of the lives of Indians. Frequently noble in intention, they established paternalistic agendas, missions, programmes, and centres focused on giving direct aid, promotion of basic education, modernising activities, and finally the integration of Indian people with the national society. Although this orientation turned the attention of the dominant society to the lives of the indigenous population, *indigenistas* were still a part of the current that primarily perceives Indians as a marginalised category of population, who must be brought out from their backwardness for the good of the harmonious development of the entire “nation–state”. Beyond doubt, however, in many regions it contributed not only to the modernisation of indigenous life but also to a major activation of Indian society, where native leaders of the new type began to emerge slowly, aware not only of their responsibility for the future of the local communities but also of all Indians living in the entire region or country.

We should note, however, that a far more important fact was the process of dilution of the Indian identity, which was favoured by civilisational changes in the life of indigenous peasantry, migrations from villages to cities, obtaining of education, and also by certain limited economic success among better educated Indians. Today, it is observed that assimilation-oriented attitudes are displaced by a growing ethnic self awareness, being a combination of the sense of own identity, ethnic pride in the heritage, and conviction about the necessity to change not only the individual social condition, but also the civilisational position of the entire group by its inclusion in the nascent civic society.

Thanks to the continuously growing level of education, being the result of initiatives of the state, NGOs, different foundations, and religious organisations, the first group of indigenous intellectuals have taken shape: teachers, lawyers, scientists, social and political activists, officers of lower ranks, artists, etc., who provide a natural environment for the new ethnic leadership. Simultaneously, the indigenous middle-class is developing to a limited scale in certain places, wherever artisan production (*artesanía*) and trade and tourism have developed. Thanks to all these, the formation of the “new Indians” – natives discarding their complexes, aware of their heritage, and fairly freely moving in the contemporary world – is also taking shape. There is no doubt, that also many new indigenous leaders belong to this category.

They are people originating from a variety of indigenous and social groups. It would be hard, therefore, to describe their joint characteristics, as of a uniform group with similar experiences and comparable goals. This is why it is best to characterise them by focusing on same basic types of indigenous leaders. At the very bottom, there are the leaders of peasant (indigenous) communities, who are in fact representatives of village self-government elected regularly by members of those settlements (*comuneros*), but representing simultaneously state administration at the lowest level. For that reason, in Peru they were often treated as agents of the regime by guerrilla fighters from the Shining Path, and frequently cruelly persecuted and even killed. There are regions where they displaced nearly altogether the traditional authorities, and where the latter still exist they are dominated and marginalised by these people. While holding their posts, presidents of the communities (*presidentes de las comunidades*) represent their villages externally and deal with the daily matters of their residents, as well as manage modernisation programmes within the area of their jurisdiction. It is on their efficiency, their local social capital, and entrepreneurial spirit that the pace of changes taking place in the life of the village often depends, as they are usually responsible for the obtaining of aid funds and external assistance to direct developmental programmes.

This group of official local authorities increasingly often encounters within its area of operation powerful competition from the “self-proclaimed” leaders, who are in fact generated through the NGOs, which – operating within the area of the communities and implementing their modernisation projects there – must have support in local people. These indigenous collaborators of usually foreign agencies quickly obtain major prestige, mostly thanks to their direct contacts with NGOs agents, the considerable possibility of deciding on the ways of spending assistance funds, and the material benefits they personally enjoy.

In some situations, “neo-traditional” leaders too come to the stage. They still operate within the system of *cargo*, openly opposing attempts at being marginalised. They try to rebuild their threatened authority, on the one hand falling back on the self-governmental indigenous tradition, and on the other presenting themselves as the only truly representatives of the native world capable of introducing modernising changes that do not pose a threat of loss of identity. To reinforce their position externally, they sometimes build regional and supraregional associations (as in the case of the CONAMAQ in Bolivia), gradually developing a new hierarchy of leaders capable of negotiating important questions with the local administration and central government.

A separate category of indigenous leaders is made up of peasant union activists of various levels, who represent the interests of Indian farmers in these organisations. In those regions of the Andes where a decided majority of Indians make a living working in the fields within communities or as owners of small family farms (*minifundios*), peasant unions have quite naturally been of a strictly ethnic character, and combine in their programmes social and economical elements with the ideas of defending native culture, tradition, and preservation of identity. This is a situation we encounter primarily in Bolivia, where such organisations are most powerful, but also in Peru, where the organisations of peasants fight against environmental threats, try to legalise their coca plantations, and organise village self-defence squads (*rondas campesinas*).

An important category of leaders of ever growing importance are those with clearly political ambitions, who struggle to form parties and associations that are to represent the interests of indigenous population at all levels of authority, and primarily in central administration, as well as in the opposition to the government. These people usually come from the former Indian students and university graduates. Having learned very well the mechanisms behind the operation of power, they try to enter the system by establishing their own Indian parties or ethnic organisations of a lobbyist character. These initiatives are as a rule undertaken from top to bottom without any strong support from the indigenous masses, who – due to their lower level of education and poor knowledge of the rules that govern politics – are more likely to follow populist or leftist slogans of Creole-Mestizo demagogues rather than the ambiguous and sometimes utopian ideas of the new Indian leaders, who are frequently perceived as people alienated from their rural support base. The towering ambitions of these leaders frequently make it impossible to introduce a uniform strategy of conduct and finally result in the multiplication of small groups with contradictory interests within the already weak indigenous political milieu. A case illustrating this phenomenon is, for example, the Indianist movement of the *Kataristas* from Bolivia (whose name derives from their historical hero – Tupac Katari – an eighteenth-century leader of a major anti-Spanish uprising in Upper Peru), a representative of which was even the vice-president of the country in the 1990s. Currently, this formation is scattered and yielding to other, far more efficient Indian initiatives (Van Cott 2005).

A highly interesting category of leaders consists of civil, self-governmental, and political activists who come from the newly developing indigenous elites. They are people who, before they became leaders, acquired an education, a good professional position, and an above-average material status – to devote

themselves later to organisational work for the benefit of their own society. They represent, for example, merchants and artisans, who acquired their civic competence as presidents of local professional associations, as well as clerks, teachers, lawyers, and scientists. As people of success, they can operate perfectly well in a world that so far has been alien to Indians, and as people with strong bonds of their native society they are considered good candidates to represent the indigenous people or even more broadly, the regional population in all its multicultural complexity in, municipal, or provincial administration. For this reason, they may ever more often be found holding posts of city mayors (e.g. Otavalo and Cotacachi in Imbabura Province, Ecuador), city councillors, and even chiefs of local police departments (Posern-Zieliński 1999).

Finally, the last group of Indian authorities are usually the young leaders of native groups from Amazonia and other areas situated east of the Andes, who – thanks to the education they have obtained (mostly in Catholic or Protestant missionary schools) and certain experience in the external environment, have become in the areas of their operation something akin to “bigmen” (if this universal anthropological concept borrowed from New Guinea social context may be used here), i.e. people of exceptional influence and importance based on their charisma, experience and achievements. The authority of these leaders is almost solely built on their skilful competence and knowledge of the world they find external, for which reason they quickly become ideal representatives and mediators between the relatively isolated groups inhabiting the interior of the forest and the nation-state society with its administrative centres. Assuming the leadership of ethnolocal, and later interethnic regional indigenous organisations, these people in a natural way became promoters of changes in their villages, supporters of the interests of their compatriots, managers seeking financial support and political allies, and sometimes also organisers of great protest actions (e.g. marches to the capital of the province or the state). People of this type may be found in all the countries lying in the Amazon Basin, and the efficiency of their operation in the local, national and international forum frequently raises true envy among the leaders of far more numerous and in fact politically stronger indigenous organisations from the of the Andean zone.

As this brief review of types of Indian leaders proves, they acquired their privileged position in a great variety of manners. In the majority of cases, they are fairly young people representing the first generation of educated persons and/or with certain experience in organisational work. They situate their ambitions both at the local level – where they still sometimes have to compete against the hierarchy of authorities of the traditional kind – and primarily at the

regional and higher levels, where they have acquired entirely monopolistic positions. The abundance of various indigenous associations and organisations, unions, and federations of various sorts means that the group of new leaders has grown continuously. It is this group of people that is becoming the main power behind the movement of Indian revival and struggle for the improvement of their social and economic position, who attempts to modernise native life and makes efforts aimed at turning the indigenous people into citizens. However this leadership elite does have a weakness, though: namely, the incessant internal strife and backbiting conducted within it, which frequently divide individual organisations, widen splits, and often render any concerted actions impossible, thus contributing to a weakening of the Indian position. Such bickering results from ideological differences between organisations (some are more loyal towards the authorities while others are decidedly of oppositionist or rebellious character; some are tied to left-wing organisations, and others with religious ones; some emphasise political neutrality, while others conclude political alliances; some are class-oriented, while others are very attached to ideas of maintaining and emphasising ethnic identity) and also from belonging among the different competing ethnic and regional groupings (e.g. the Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia, Saraguro, Cotopaxi and Otavalo in Ecuador, and Indians of the Andean sierra vs. the indigenous people from Amazonia), as well as for reasons of pure ambition and benefits (competition for access to prestigious titles, profitable posts, and attractive *cargos* sinecures).

It goes without saying that contemporary indigenous leaders are decidedly different from traditional ones. This is true also of that group which directly hails from the former system of community authorities. Both these groups have made major efforts to adjust to the requirements of the contemporary world, and understood perfectly that isolation and remaining locked within their own environment is a path that leads nowhere. They have discovered a new principle according to which one should actively tune into the current political and social system and skilfully use its principles so as to fight in this way for the civic space due to the Indian people and their right to equal treatment resulting from democratic principles, as well as their rights to follow their civil aspirations and co-decide on the shape of the multicultural national society. It is on this long path of transformation that the new Indian elite took shape, struggling for changes and seeking its own identity without denying its ethnic roots. Of major importance in the forming of this group is education, which has for the first time became accessible too for indigenous youth at higher than primary level. On the other hand, not-for-profit work for the benefit of indigenous organisa-

tions is also an important place of education for Indian activists, who are increasingly more conscious of their roles and responsibility towards the ethnic milieu they represent.

In real life, however, these principles are not always respected. We may note that in many cases leaders of higher-level organisations are clearly disconnected from their members and follow policies that are not always understandable and adequate to the current needs of the indigenous society. Against this background emerges the phenomenon known as *caudillismo*, typical of Latin American tradition, which means the establishment of a leader whose strong authority quickly becomes unchallengeable. These tendencies are nevertheless much obstructed by the traditions of discussion and consultation with leaders of a lower level and members of councils and commissions to acquire a consensus, a factor very strongly rooted in indigenous tradition (Montoya 2008). A major problem in the contemporary indigenous movement is the ambitions of individual leaders, which render understanding and rapport difficult, pose barriers that obstruct uniting of efforts, and provoke fights between factions. Another important feature is the marked tendencies to conduct operations of a spectacular character which are essentially hardly constructive but reinforce the position of the leader. It goes without saying that the eruption of new Indian organisational initiatives is strongly connected to the gradual shaping of the indigenous elites, which – liberated from the bonds of traditional relations of subordination – make conscious use of their competence in the field of knowledge of the rules of civil society. As the result they make a significant qualitative change, in the lives not only of Indian people but of entire Latin American nations.

The road to recognition of multiculturalism

Beginning with the 1990s, changes significant for the promotion of multiculturalism have more and more often been introduced into the legislation of Latin American states. As a result of this process, many constitutions define the character of the state as respecting the principle of cultural pluralism (*pluriculturalidad*). Put very briefly, this means two things: 1) confirmation of the parallel existence of various cultural traditions, and 2) guarantees of rights for every ethnic group to cultivate its own culture, religion, language, and a distinctive lifestyle.

In this context, one should consider what this principle of cultural pluralism means for the current dominant society, that is the Creole-Mestizo mainstream of the national society. Firstly, it results in the obligation to consider all other cultures (native, immigrant, Afro-Latin-American) as equal to the currently hegemonic tradition, treated hitherto as a standard culture pattern to be followed by Indians in this way subjected to acculturation. Secondly, the new ethnic philosophy not only enforces the need to tolerate the multiplicity of cultures, but also postulates developing good conditions for their development. Thirdly, a consequence of this assumption must be permission to follow other cultural patterns in public life. Fourthly, what results from this principle is resigning with acculturation programmes, usually disguised under the vestiges of modernisation and civilisational progress. Fifthly and finally, there is a need for profound reformulation of the Mestizo-Creole own vision of culture, which suddenly – when confronted with other accepted cultures – turned out to be a not-too-attractive cultural hybrid (*cultura híbrida*), composed of syncretically mixed traits, including many elements borrowed also from the indigenous tradition.

The principle of cultural pluralism also introduces significant changes for the indigenous population. First of all, it reinforces tendencies that favour the development and invention of an own ethnic tradition. Secondly, it allows them to revalue and revitalise their own cultural heritage, partially appropriated by the Mestizos who on one side incorporated many of the civilisational achievements of the pre-Columbian time to their own tradition and on the other depreciated contemporary indigenous folk culture, due to its peasant origin and very low status of Indians. Thirdly, it allows for a de-folklorisation of their own tradition, which – frequently has been transformed to the rank of a tourist or regional attraction – should now become a recovered and important value for the Indian people. This process includes, for example, the revalorisation of folk costume and other ethnic symbols, such as the traditional hairstyle (long hair plaited among the men from the Otavalo group). There is also an increasing awareness of the fact that the rebirth of “authentic” Indian folklore may give many local indigenous communities an opportunity for tourist development. Fourthly, it also provides the Indians with an opportunity to restructure their own vision of the past (*recuperación del pasado*) necessary for the ethnic education of the younger generation and for the liquidation of the endocolonial deprivation (that is the elimination of the still strong sense of inferiority and conviction about the low value of own culture and history). Fifthly, it allows them to reinforce the impact of the indigenous vision of the world (*cosmovisi-*

ón) on their own people as a native alternative to the dominant Iberian–Christian worldview, alien to the indigenous tradition. In this current of changes, such phenomena as the formation of a neo-shamanistic movement, revival of indigenous religions, efforts aimed at the development of native theology, and popularity of folk medicine based on the experiences of autochthonous medicine men (*curanderos*) must be mentioned. Sixthly, it makes it possible – and in a much broader scope than currently executed – to promote bilingual and bicultural education, and opening indigenous means of mass communication (newspapers, radio stations, TV channels, and websites) to facilitate and spread ethnic ideas.

The principle of cultural pluralism also has its weak sides in its practical, social and legal implementation. First, this principle is still more visible within the realm of verbal declarations than in implementation in daily life. Secondly, these declarations usually assume the form of discourse keeping to the principles of political correctness, and actually provide a kind of smokescreen for the still maintained domination of the Creole–Mestizo culture. Thirdly, the ideas of cultural pluralism still reverberates weakly among indigenous milieus, primarily due to the fact that indigenous elites are too narrow, especially in the field of culture, as majority of influential Indians are political activists. Fourthly and lastly, these principles are introduced to a greater extent at the local level, especially in areas where the percentage share of indigenous population is high, rather than in national forum.

The philosophy of cultural pluralism preaches a principle that may be boiled down to the claim that a new civil community is to be built in the form of a political nation developing within the one state, but composed of numerous ethnic cultures. In this system, the Mestizo culture, which – being dominant – has so far reserved the right to the status of national culture (together with its regional variations) quite naturally becomes degraded to the position of one of many cultures co-forming the cultural mosaic of the plural society. At the same time, indigenous cultures, until recently marginalised and submitted to inevitable acculturation, or rather to deculturation, have become a significant element in the formation of a new pluralistic reality, giving to it its precious flavour and contribution (because rooted in native tradition).

The second innovative principle, besides cultural pluralism, introduced in a number of Latin American constitutions is the declaration to recognise the multiethnic character of the state. This defines that 1) the nation-state is the homeland of numerous ethnic groups and for that reason is of multiethnic character, and 2) it sanctions this *status quo* by acceptance of the right of every

ethnic group to develop its identity, and recognition of ethnic representation put forth by each of the group (Posern-Zieliński 1992).

Much as we did before, let us now consider what principle of cultural pluralism may in fact mean for either party. For the main stream of the society it means first the need to relinquish their previously held idea of a unitary (that is Mestizo–Creole) nation as one dominant over the marginalised indigenous groups that have no influence on the course of matters in the state. The second question that results is the need to accept the actual and legal existence of other ethnic groups in the state, which together form a new plural civic society within one nation-state. Thirdly, this principle generates the need to synchronise all national or state interests with those of individual ethnic groups, which was previously not necessary and therefore not done. Fourthly, the idea of multiethnicity favours the acceptance of such legal solutions that not only respect the positive law (that is derived from the European legislative tradition with certain Latin American peculiarities) but also account for local traditional (ethnic) norms considered by individual groups as important tool for keeping social order, in a scope that would allow elimination of basic contradictions between both legal systems, with the simultaneous respect of indigenous tradition in solving local disputes and conflicts. Fifthly and finally, this principle for the first time provides an opportunity to look at the Creole–Mestizo group from a somewhat different perspective, namely as an important ethnic segment of the national society – but only one of many – co-forming the qualitatively new, pluralistic nation forced to agree and negotiate with the remaining partners of one and the same state community, and to begin anew the pursuit of its identity.

For Indians, meanwhile, the principle of multiethnicity means the following: 1) Inclusion of indigenous groups into the life of the country and recognition of their civic subjectivity, i.e. abolishing of the status of a marginal group attributed to them, deprived of equal rights and treated paternalistically to this moment. 2) This principle makes it possible for indigenous groups to claim their rights legally and help them to organise protest actions against the continuing inequality and injustice. 3) Indigenous groups through their organisations and leaders may now represent their vital interests at the local, regional, national, and even international level. 4) They acquire *de iure* the right to establish their own self-government (*autogobernación*), including own forms of local administration and legal norms according to the cultural tradition of the group. 5) They are awarded the right to recognition of the collective ownership of community land (*comunidades indígenas*) and – in forest areas – to protected native territories. 6) These groups are also awarded the right to

continue their lifestyle without external intervention into questions of traditions, culture, and customs. 7) It is considered appropriate to award them with assistance supporting ethno-development, through modernisation of life, development of infrastructure, reinforcement of education, and promotion of indigenous economic activities.

Multiethnicity, understood in this way and legally confirmed, is naturally still primarily a collection of postulates which are not very well introduced in practice, yet this set of guidelines can serve as a certain reference for ideal interethnic relations, to which Indians may always refer so as to fulfil their rights step by step. In this manner, the principle of multiethnicity is slowly changing the model of Latin American societies (especially those with a large number of Indians) reshaping them potentially into modern (political) nations composed of numerous smaller and larger ethnic groups. Each of these ethnic segments maintains its ethnic and cultural traits, and all together are connected by the common administrative, political and educational institutions, and the all-national economic system (Warren, Jackson 2002). Thanks to this, this pattern begins to recall slightly the solutions known from the United States, where the level of existence of numerous ethnic groups that manage their own space of expression is subjected to state and federal institutions guarding the territorial cohesion and unity of the country with the simultaneous broad acceptance of the idea of pluralistic nation that is gathered around the supra-ethnic American values that everybody shares.

The third principle – so far only postulated by the indigenous population of Latin America – is the claim to introduce to the constitutions a declaration confirming the multinational character of the state. As far as the two principles discussed earlier (cultural pluralism and multiethnicity) were quite easily accepted by Creole-Mestizo society and legislation, the third postulate put forth by the indigenous leaders encountered the decided opposition of nearly all social milieus of the current mainstream, including politicians, social scientists lawyers, and *indigenistas* and supporters of multiculturalism. As a result of these obstructions, the constitutions of Latin American states only include formulas on the acceptance of cultural pluralism, multiethnicity, and recognition of the existence of numerous ethnic languages. Meanwhile the basic point of the programme of proposed political reforms in the country put forth by indigenous leaders is the postulate to complement those formulas with the principle confirming the multinational character of the state (*plurinacionalidad*), which clearly goes furthest in the legal sense, and for that reason is treated by its opponents as the source of a potential threat to the unity of the state.

Rejecting the third postulate, the Mestizo–Creole sector put forth the argument that its acceptance would lead to the formulation of a federalist state. This would put an end to national unity in the political sense for the benefit of the “one state – many nations or nationalities” formula. Today, the greatest value is to maintain – as the opponents of the concept of multi-nationality claim – the unity of the nation–state, which would be seriously threatened by the introduction of a pattern of *estado plurinacional*. This is why the majority of official (governmental) documents do not refer to indigenous groups with the terms “nation” – (*nación*) or “nationality” – (*nacionalidad*), but define them only as “indigenous peoples” (*pueblos indígenas*), treating them as ethnic groups of a minority type, who form legally sanctioned segments of the multiethnic state.

A different proposal is put forth by Indian activists, who repeatedly resort to the term “Indian nationalities” (*nacionalidades indios*). They believe that the introduction of the principle of cultural pluralism and multiethnicity did not change the situation of Indians much, and that these ideas are something akin to a convenient cover for the dominant Creole–Mestizo sector to continue keeping the indigenous population on the margin of the country’s mainstream. This is why the native leaders propose acceptance of the idea of multinational state, as a *sine qua non* condition for further in-depth reforms. They believe that the elevation of the legal and political status of the “ethnic group” to the category of “nationality” or even “nation” will be of cardinal importance for the improvement of the situation of Indians, and primarily for the better operation of indigenous self-government and organisations within the area they control. In other words, these postulates aim at territorial autonomy, indigenous control of natural resources within these areas, and political self-determination of ethnic units (*autodeterminación política i autogobierno*). At the same time, the Indian leaders disclaim certain fears of the Mestizo–Creole society concerning the potential threat to state integrity, emphasising their eagerness to further coexistence within the republic, and clearly disassociating themselves from the idea of building “a state within the state”. To confirm these arguments, they frequently refer to the Spanish model, in which the autonomy of regions and nations (the cases of Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque Country) fulfils simultaneously the principle of territorial unity of the state.

Finishing these reflections, it is worth devoting some space to reflecting on the evolution of the pattern of the nation-state and interethnic relations in the context of the multicultural projects introduced and postulated in Latin America. Let us first dwell on the current pattern, which may be defined as assimilating

and excluding. Its foundation is the political nation with the social core composed by the Creole–Mestizo population, believing itself to be the emanation of the “republican” nation that maintains its dominant position thanks to its situation in the upper and middle classes. Oscillating around this core are indigenous communities of a peasant character subjected to social marginalisation, native groups from forest areas fairly isolated in territorial sense, and the population of African origin submitted to social, and racial marginalisation. All these groups from the periphery gradually have yielded to absorption by the main stream due to the progressing processes of acculturation and assimilation accelerated with the development of education, migrations, and civilisational advance of the poorest strata. This model is partially a continuation of colonial patterns, in which particular ethno-racial groups assumed clearly defined places in the highly stratified society, whose durability was maintained by the strong racial stereotypes, and social prejudices.

Today, this pattern is slowly being rejected and replaced by a pattern that we may call integralistic and pluralistic. Its main features are the limitation of the dominance of the Creole–Mestizo sector, acquisition of new space in the social, administrative, intellectual, economic, and political life of the country by the marginalised groups, gradual liquidation of asymmetry in interethnic relations, and the struggle for elimination of the long-term impact of minority groups marginalisation. Attempts are made for the ethnoracial divisions to cease to be the markers of social position, according to which an Indian is perceived as a poor and primitive villain or uncivilised savage. The growing struggle against these stereotypes is conducted by showing their one-sidedness and harmfulness. At the same time we see a gradual process of subjectivisation of the groups formerly dominated and legally incapacitated, which now begin to speak in their own voice and in their own name, rejecting the intermediary services of the (neo-)indigenistas. Consequently, attempts are made for the society to become a political nation composed of different ethno-cultural segments enjoying equal rights, whose mutual coexistence would be regulated by the principles of multiculturalism and multiethnicity. Its continued harmonious existence would be possible thanks to each group maintaining and cherishing ethnic identity and cultural distinctiveness being enforced with simultaneous full participation in the life of the country, including programmes of ethno-development promoting modernisation and civilisational advance of each of the ethnic groups. In this way, the pattern of a uniform state–nation – though composed of a number of ethnocultural and ethno-racial groups – would form.

The third pattern to be listed here is a model – postulated by the Indian leaders – of a decided multicultural–autonomous character. It is based on the idea of a state respecting the principle of political pluralism, and expressed in the political and territorial autonomy of individual ethnic groups, elevated to the status of “nations” or “nationalities”. In this case, multiculturalism would directly intertwine with the multinational coexistence of all the groupings enjoying a high level of autonomy in the realm of local government and control of their natural resources, with a major impact on the shape of the policies of the central government, who would need to take care to maintain a balance between the particular aspirations of the individual “nations” and the interests of the state as a whole.

Discussion concerning the place of indigenous people in the structure of the state and civic nation continues, and is frequently subjected to new trials, especially at moments of crises and political turning points. Ever more clearly visible in such situations is the key role of native people and their political representations. In this manner, the dialogue between the state administration and society, which usually deals with economic questions, more often than not intertwines with discourse about the future of the political nation and the place of indigenous people within it. This process is continuously *in statu nascendi*, and its further course is hard to forecast, as attested to by the unexpected developments in Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Guatemala, and Mexico. One thing is certain, though: namely, that the process of emancipation of the indigenous peoples and their politicisation, once initiated, shall not decline soon, and will continue to be increasingly visible.

Final reflections

The processes that were indicated in this chapter are dynamic, changing from year to year the social and political, ethnic and racial configurations in many countries of Latin America. This is why they require permanent monitoring, current interpretation, and critical revision of earlier findings. Each stage of the transformation brings changes that are significant for the situation of the indigenous people. Some of them, as it turns out, were fairly relatively easy to forecast, while others are quite unexpected for the observer. A couple of years ago, hardly anyone would have envisaged a Bolivian government led by an Indian president defending coca plantations. Similarly, it was hard to foresee that the influential Indian federation from Ecuador (CONAIE) would suddenly

wane due to its involvement in unfortunate political alliances, or to predict that Peru – after a long period with hardly any organised Indian movement (in the Andes) – would slowly begin to form and reinforce such forms of indigenous associations.

Today, new indigenous organisations are certainly enjoying their heyday. They are conquering ever new spaces, beginning with local communities and ending with a true pan-Indian movement trying to coordinate activities between individual countries of Latin America or even more broadly, of the entire American continent. The successes of these Indian groups in some countries quickly becomes a model to follow in other states, even where the tendencies to self-organisation of the indigenous people have so far been weak due to the scattering of native groups, their small number, or the nearly total loss of autochthonous culture and, identity. This is why it is hard to be surprised today, even when information comes from the Caribbean that there too – that is in an area that for centuries the existence of Indian people has officially been denied – initiative groups are suddenly arising and claiming their indigenous origin, frequently in spite of their real racial and cultural features, which prove a strong Afro-American contribution.

Former ethnic divisions based on language and cultural differences, usually respected by anthropologists and state authorities, are today clearly giving way to new distinctions that are defined by the structure of Indian organisation networks. In the contemporary legal and political space, of significant importance are primarily the legally operating indigenous associations, and not the fact that a given community or local group belongs to a specific ethnic and language unit. The first dimension is of a practical, legal, and political character – significant in relations with the outside world, while the latter maintains primarily its cultural values and identity orientation that are important for Indians themselves. In this way, two codependent structures took shape in parallel to each other: the cluster of all indigenous communities and groups of a single country as a collective ethno-racial category of population, and a network of Indian associations, federations and confederations, representing an organised avant-garde of indigenous peoples, conscious of their goals. It is these organisations, and not some amorphous ethnic groups, that are a real partner for state authorities, NGOs, and international agencies. Their rising activity on the local, national, and continental stages is on the one hand a result of skilful application of the rules of democracy, and on the other a effective use of the mechanisms of globalisation (cultural, communicational, legal) for the benefit of own people. Comparing the situation of the indigenous population of Latin

America to that of the native communities on other continents, one could conclude with the following observation: whereas in many other parts of the world, where until recently tribal structures were very strong, now they are adjusting to contemporary requirements, frequently hiding away their traditional, tribal character under a variety of new organisational forms, in Latin America – that is in areas with hardly any classical tribal structures – the situation assumed quite the opposite character. The newly established associations, with structures borrowed from Western patterns, both operate as legal representations of indigenous peoples, and function for themselves as “new tribes” deciding on all the most important questions of daily, social, cultural, and political life, and moreover significantly kindling, reinforcing, and strengthening the indigenous identity within the regional and ethnic groups, and moreover increasingly often in the pan-Indian dimension as well.

Translated by Piotr Krasnowolski

RYSZARD STEMPOWSKI

States and Political Cultures in Latin America

In this text I am trying to point at the opportunity opening before the researchers of the state by the possibility of explaining it further through discussions of political culture or, to be more precise: its various concepts and their links to the notion of the state. Thus it is not the political culture; indeed it is the state as an organisation (and simultaneously, an institution) that is the basic subject of my interest. After all, the condition of the state is not only the subject of my essay, but also of the entire volume. And yet, what is discussed here most extensively is the political culture, as I refer to the pertaining literature as if I treated the collection of the works listed below and the concepts discussed in them as a toolbox with measuring instruments and results of such measurements performed on the state. Therefore I begin with my own definition of the notion of political culture, and later use it while making a concise review of literature on that concept to grasp such aspects of the connection between the state and the political culture as public discourse, policy-making, democratisation, and collective (national) identity in the state. Yet as the road to a theory is still long, I prefer to use “states” and “political cultures” in plural to emphasise the diversity of the processes and phenomena involved. Such discussions – not always brought to a definite conclusion – are to provide some more food for thought about the nation-states in Latin America.

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The concept of political culture

Political culture is the union (not a unity) of culture and politics, but it is a special relationship. Its content must be sought in the cultural and the political.

I use the notion of the cultural, to define the capacities of an individual and a collective to build their identities as an individual and as a community. This process begins at the level of a family and goes on up to the level of the community in which a person defines her/his position owing to the individuation of her/his identity. It was so in the earliest history of social mankind, and it is so now. Quite naturally, the individual always defines himself or herself in social relations, that is in interactions with other individuals. Yet not only individuals. Also with other groups i.e. communities. The existence of these communities, on the other hand, is the result of the organisation of individuals. The propensity to such a self-organisation is what I define as the political, if the composition of the group goes beyond the family, even a multigenerational one. Currently, the highest organisational form of the group – of a community or society – is the state. Yet as the state undergoes transformations as well, one has the liberty to consider that, like the cultural is permanently present in the continuous process of shaping and transformation of individual and collective identity, the political is a permanent feature of human social existence.

The collective identity of a society organised within a state assumes various forms as a civic society and political nation. It is, however, especially connected to the political through norms and ideologies. A certain particular set of such norms builds the institution of the state. A certain particular type of ideology is patriotism and nationalism. These norms and ideologies operate in the consciousness of citizens of the state. This means that the notion of the state is to embrace both the institution and also its elements being the population with its collective identity and the territory of the state. For this reason, the state is only partially available to sensory perception. What is available and created intellectually – and includes norms and ideologies – assumes among other forms that of political culture.

Political culture is a set of forms of social consciousness, that is widespread and respected beliefs, operating with relative stability (also as new elements yet equipped with the features of potential stability) in the process of political self-organisation of a society as defined by the cultural. As the institution of the state is a specific result of this self-organisation, and such self-organisation may also mean reforming an existing state, therefore, **the political culture of a society in a given state and time is the set of widespread and relatively stable and respected beliefs (a) related to the identity of the society as a political nation that is the constitutionally defined sovereign, (b) expressed in public discourse, and (c) referring to the state as the institutional correlate of that identity, and espe-**

cially to the constitutional system of policy-making. This refers *mutatis mutandis* to the community, which had the state externally imposed.

If the ethnical structure of the political nation is complex, its political culture is to a degree a function of that structure. Characteristic for the political nation is also the class and layer structure, and that is why the political culture of such a nation is composed to a certain extent of the cultures of individual social groups. A strong nation state exists when the cultural and the political are already such a state of political culture (a set of widespread and relatively stable forms of social consciousness), where the national identity of the whole population of the given state includes also fundamental acceptance of the existing statehood of the nation. Statehood requires an appropriate collective identity, yet in turn such a fundamental acceptance of statehood reinforces the collective identity of the political nation (society in the state). Potential proposals of state reforms lie within this political culture. The revolutionary project assumes a radical change of the political culture, as in itself it is a manifestation of the inconsistencies that came to being at the level of the connections between the identity of the revolutionary group and the identity of the majority of the society.

Such a concept of political culture will be helpful for me in reading literature referring to the various definitions of notions of political culture. Here I am looking for information referring to the components listed in my definition. Yet I primarily want to note down the variety of concepts present in the literature concerned.

The matter is highly complex and there are plenty of definitions of political culture. Before I embark on the diverse contemporary and most widespread varieties of the notion, I want to point at the origin of the very concept of political culture in European literature, where it appeared first. For it may be worthwhile to make references to earlier discussions that are hardly known today.

The term "political culture" itself we owe most probably to Herder. In this way, we use this nineteenth-century term, even though until the end of 1960s, "any mention of its genesis in subject literature" was lacking (Barnard 1969: 392). Possibly because the term had not become widespread until the twentieth century. Those who visit Galleria d'Arte Moderna in the Milanese Villa Reale may see "Il quatro stato", a painting by Giuseppe Pelizza da Volpedo. It presents "the fourth estate": workers on strike. Twenty-five years later, the title of the painting from 1901 became the title of a periodical: "*Il quatro stato. Rivista socialista di cultura politica*". It is immaterial for us how much of the

inspiration of the revolutionaries of the earlier period, representing the third state, there is in the stance of Italian socialists and republicans. It is important that socialists referred the notion of political culture to social consciousness. And to democracy, should we note that they wrote about it already after Mussolini's March on Rome (*Marcia su Roma*). Yet they were politicians. The researchers of political culture are inspired by crises. "Research on political culture is practised predominantly in the periods of rapid social change; they may be termed as a phenomenon accompanying social and political crises" (Bevc 2007: 94–95). The source of the interest in the political culture of Latin America may be similar. It is connected to the politically worrying image of a weak state, not only – and not even predominantly – in Latin America. The key is the cultural studies-related explanation of this state of such a State.

That in the twentieth century Max Weber worked on the application of the notion of culture in a research, is a known fact. Yet, if I am not mistaken, the first extensive concept of political culture in twentieth century literature is found not earlier than in the work of Józef Siemieński dating to 1930 (Siemieński 1932), i.e. it was actually written in a crisis period. Even though the text itself is devoted not to Latin America but to the Polish political culture of the sixteenth century, that is of a society with complex and yet relatively harmonised ethnical and political structure of what at the time was one of the largest European states. Professor of the Jagiellonian University, Siemieński was almost certainly familiar with the writings of Herder and Weber. He could be inspired with them in Kraków, but he never quoted the formal definition of the notion he used. We may, however, construct – or, rather, reconstruct – it to the scope that Siemieński's text allows such a practice by (a) skipping the elements pertaining specifically to sixteenth century society, yet (b) using the language of the author:

Political culture is produced by the nation (entire society or its specific stratum) and its most important and most characteristic expression is the form of government (the system of the state). The system may be endured with submission (passivity or yielding to force) or may be developed (activity in building the state; modernisation) through democracy.

Siemieński uses the following indicators of democratisation:

- (1) political consciousness of the constructor of political culture (awareness of one's own power and understanding of public matters.);
- (2) percentage of population sharing power by participating in the establishment and operation of representative bodies (organs of power), and carrying out direct democracy by participation in local general assemblies

- (Siemieński referred to the *sejmiki szlacheckie*: dietines, or regional parliaments of the nobility in the sixteenth century);
- (3) equality of citizens before law and equal access to offices (positions);
 - (4) political liberalism, that is guaranties of civil freedoms;
 - (5) the degree of exercising civil rights, especially the guarantee of freedom;
 - (6) education in legal matters; using political literature, production of such literature, publication of statute books;
 - (7) discipline that is civil discipline hinging on the ability to achieve political compromise;
 - (8) rule of law in relations between the organs of state authority and citizen, and between citizens;
 - (9) efficiency of the organs of the state (state apparatus);
 - (10) modernisation that is increasing the efficiency of own institutions (as better than the slavish imitation of the foreigners);
 - (11) quality of political law (In Siemieński's Poland, the term was considered more appropriate than the German *Staatsrecht* or the French *droit constitutionnel*);
 - (12) significance of eminent individuals eager to lead in a politically unorganised society, capable of managing the crowd; great significance of talented demagogues;
 - (13) high level of political rhetoric;
 - (14) political culture as the foundation of stability of the state, which may yield only to external violence;
 - (15) research of political culture.

It is easy to notice that some indicators of political culture may be helpful in grasping the characteristic features of our contemporary culture in Latin America. Yet the historiosophic concept of Siemieński seems a category of rather intuitive and descriptive than explanatory and theoretical nature, despite the relatively high level of coherence that emerged in the process of its reconstruction.

Some indicators used by Siemieński were precursors of later concepts. What deserves emphasising is the fact that, even though in the development of his concept Siemieński accounted for the international comparative perspective, he referred the notion of political culture to a specific state, one state, and, moreover, focused on the nobility (identified with a particular understanding of the nation) in the capacity of the producer or constructor of political culture characteristic for the system of the researched state, that is the social group the political (a term unknown to Siemieński) of which is decisive for the state's system. This is why Siemieński comes to identifying the political culture with

“the culture of political life” and “the culture of the state”. What is, however, striking here is Siemieński’s belief that the Polish state was lost towards the end of the eighteenth century (partitioned by the neighbouring powers) mostly – or only – as a result of external force, as the system of the Polish state – according to him – favoured its stability.

We know that Ernst Cassirer, contemporary to the Polish researcher, a bit later pondered over the union or joint interface of culture and politics. Not as a historian but as a philosopher, he tied political culture to freedom, preaching the opinion that freedom is “given as a task” and not just given (*aufgegeben*, *nicht gegeben*). For this reason, culture may develop only in a pluralistic society, and the human being is responsible for building this culture. It is not difficult to notice that a pluralistic society may develop only as a result of democratisation, while the notion of freedom is connected to the notion of the guarantee of freedom. The position taken by Cassirer was close to that of Siemieński’s, yet he most probably did not know the work of the Polish researcher.

I want to notice the position taken by the theoreticians of the Frankfurt School (Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno), being after all a current that originated while Siemieński and Cassirer were active. These theoreticians knew the Germany of the 1930s and the USA of the 1940s from the personal experience, much like Cassirer. They defined the political culture of such a society (both German national socialism and American capitalism) as a system of subjugation that needed abolishing, and preached the idea that a human being may be free, that is live without fear as the “other” (i.e., somebody who is individually defined, living his or her separate life, the alien, someone thinking differently) only in a pluralistic society. Such a society is the expression of the political culture they postulated, while the political culture itself refers to the social and economic system (capitalism) and is not limited to the conditions of the single state. What we deal here with are the requirements for pluralism, i.e. democracy, and with the postulate of freedom, as in the case of the other authors, only that these theoreticians formed their theses on political culture in the context of analysing the capitalist system, which was distinctive for them at the time.

Following Siemieński, Cassirer, and the Frankfurt School, a new attempt to make the theoretical view of political culture by European authors could be expected from the “Dizionario di cultura politica”, edited by Antonio Basso connected with the anti-fascist movement, and published by Autori Associati in Milan in 1946; a book with contributions by approximately 50 authors. Yet the

dictionary does not contain the entry “political culture”, and individual authors treat this category as a synonymous to the category of “politics”.

The Latin American use of the notion of political culture appeared during the second world war in Brazil. Fifty issues of the magazine “Cultura Política – Revista mensal de estudos brasileiros” were edited by Almir de Andrade and published in Rio de Janeiro from March 1941 to May 1945. At that time it was the platform for the Estado Novo financed by the government. In 124 articles by 73 authors of this magazine – cheap and widely available in its days, and easily accessible via Internet today – apologetic analyses of the political ideology of Vargas’s government (1937–1945) were included side by side with an array of materials from the realms of historiography, economy, law, art, information on current activity of the government, Brazil-related bibliographies, etc. The term “political culture” is not used even once in the editorial. Its use in the title of the magazine seems to be a gentle – and, in its concept, attractive, i.e. at least not repulsing the reader – all-encompassing definition of the policies of the head of the government. Yet the content of the magazine is a source for studies of political culture, and so is the article by the editor-in-chief in the last issue, where on the occasion of the birthday of the leader, President Vargas is defined as “ao constructor da mais brilhante época de nossa história” (“Cultura Política”, No. 5, p. 6). The term political culture itself played an important social function, yet its content remained undefined in the magazine. This, however, might be due to my only perfunctory reading, while systematic research may yet lead to the reconstruction of the content of the title notion...

Since the latter half of the 1940s, works heralding the cultural-studies related approach to politics began to emerge, yet they operated with the categories to the like of “style of action”, “operating code”, “national character”, etc. It was only in 1955 that Gabriel Almond announced his concept of political culture in the USA: “Every political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political action. I have found it useful to refer to this as the political culture.” (Almond 1956: 396). Beer and Ulam soon used “political culture” as the central category in their comparative studies of politics (Beer and Ulam 1958), and Lucian W. Pye quoted its following definition: “Political culture is the set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments which give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the political system. It encompasses both the political ideals and the operating norms of polity. Political culture is thus the manifestation in aggregate form of the psychological and subjective dimension of politics” (Pye,

International Encyclopaedia of Social Science, 1961). We shall return to Pye's definition.

Two years later, Almond, together with Sidney Verba, used the concept of "civic culture", defining it as "specifically political orientations – attitudes towards the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system" (Almond, Verba 1963: 17) and listing its three kinds, or rather ideal varieties, whose mix in different proportions the actual political cultures are composed of:

- parochial culture, with a political orientations are not separated from religious and social, and citizen realise the operation of the central power only to a minor degree, and conduct their lives within an enclosed sphere, independent of the decisions undertaken by the state. Example: Ottoman Empire.
- Subject culture, whether citizens are as a rule oriented on the political system, they are aware of the operation of the central power and clearly subjected to its decisions, with little potential for taking a very own (different) stands/position. Example: German Empire.
- Participant culture, which citizens can influence the central authorities, in a number of ways, which in turn has an impact on them (Almond, Verba 1963: 17–19).

Generally, therefore, this culture is manifested in orientations, and more specifically – in civic attitudes, and the research of those is the research of the "civic culture" mentioned above. This is all about civic culture – studying individual citizens and groups of people forming the family or school (considered by the authors the main institutions transferring culture). We are allowed to treat "civic culture" as political culture, yet do the denotational ranges of these notions fully overlap? After all, the authors knew the notion of political culture, and yet preferred "civic culture". Much later, they would treat these notions as synonyms, which may be considered the answer to the question asked above. They turned their attention to the fact that appropriate set of attitudes of the citizens of a given state favours stable democracy in the state. Even if the subjects are citizens of various states, the frame of reference for a specific citizen is his or her specific state. This tripartite division of "civic culture", refers to a specific state at all cases. Almond and Verba's method was based on confronting the technique of individual questionnaires with the cultural macro scale, which entailed the need to juxtapose the value of the individual human with the operation of the state system (the political system) in a cause and effect relationship, which means that it is easier in this case to point at correlations than at cause and effect relationships.

Writing, somewhat earlier (in 1959) about the functional approach to comparative studies of politics, Almond used the notion of political culture only marginally, and did not use the notion of "civic culture" at all, nonetheless putting forth a claim, which he referred also to Latin America, namely, that political culture (much like the entire political system, political structure) is dualist due to the mutual interpenetration of the modern and the pre-modern (earlier, primitive, non-Western).

He continued the application of Kenneth Jovitt's concept of modernisation in the research of the political culture of "Marxist–Leninist systems", putting forth a thesis that the relation present between the political structure and the political culture is similar to the relation between the formal and informal organisation of a production plant. As the system being the object of research made inducing a change in the political culture of the society its objective, this particular modernisation pertains to the informal organisation of the political structure that is the state. "Political culture refers to set of informal, adaptive postures – behavioral and attitudinal – that emerge in response to and interact with the set of formal definitions – ideological, policy, and institutional – that characterize a given level of society" (Jovitt 1974: 173). Such an approach limits the scope of the notion of "political culture" to the area not regulated by law, or possibly even by the customs related to the implementation of law (for example, the regulatory significance of the procedural precedents in the operation of the parliament). This is akin to the representation of the civil society by a collection of non-governmental organisations, thus being a decisively too narrow a perspective.

Embarking on an analysis of these systems (also in reference to Cuba), Almond wrote about the political culture in a manner that allowed treating his statement as the final version of his concept of political culture (Almond 1983: 127–128). What results from this is the fact that Almond not only no longer limited himself to the postulate of researching attitudes and their classification but he also paid specific attention to the degree of rooting of the forms of political culture, that is to the degree of its stability and resistance to the change as such.

Pye, already quoted above, modified his own definition and wrote in 1993: "Involving both the ideals and the operating norms of political system, political culture includes subjective attitudes and sentiments as well as objective symbols and creeds that together govern political behavior and give structure and order to the political process. Nations generally have both elite and mass political cultures, along with further subcultures that are rooted in regional, occupational, class, ethnic, and other differences" (Pye 1993).

There is no entry for “political culture” in *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought* of 1989, revised in 1991 and frequently republished later, edited by Oxford philosophers of politics: David Miller and Janet Coleman, William Connolly, Alan Ryan (Miller 1994).

It is interesting that the second edition of the “Dictionnaire de la science politique et des institutions politiques” (1996), a very important publication as it does not bring up the definition of political culture even though it provides the characteristics of politics and culture. Nevertheless, French sociology has known the view that the political culture “*est constituée d’un ensemble de connaissances et de croyances permettent aux individus de donner sens à l’expérience routinière de leur rapports au pouvoir qui les gouverne et aux groupes qui leur servent de références identitaires. Elle permet donc à chacun de se situer dans l’espace complexe du politique en mobilisant un minimum de repères, conscients ou non, pour leur guider dans ses comportements: ceux de citoyen par exemple ou ceux d’électeur, de contribuable etc.*” (Braud 1998: 212). At the same time the French manual for students and candidates for civil servants approaches political culture most pragmatically, implying by the way a definition of the state that is hard to accept: “*La culture politique vise le phénomène politique dont le centre aujourd’hui est la relation entre l’Etat ou les gouvernants et les gouvernés*” (Lageot, Pavegeau 2008: 8).

In turn, the new (2006) and popular German manual, whose authors declare their acceptance for the concept of Almond and Verba’s, is built on the claim that “Ziel der vergleichenden politischen Kulturforschung war und ist die Erklärung der *Stabilität* oder besser des Ueberlebens von *Demokratien*” (Pickel, Pickel 2006: 144).

I have found a multifaceted discussion of the notion of the ties between politics and culture in the second edition of Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson’s “Culture and Politics: A Comparative Approach” (2005). The authors account for such analytical categories as social structure, ethnicity, historical heritage, religion, civil attitude (including values) and use these categories not only to examine the conscience of a human being, but also – political processes at regional and state levels. Despite such efforts, the authors are not capable of giving the rule governing the link between culture and politics besides stating that culture has a significance, which they however define in reference to individual societies and nation-states. These, however, differ from one another with their cultures, and this is how the circle closes.

In no other language but English so many articles devoted to the concept of political culture have been published. This is mostly thanks to the political

scientists and historians working in the USA. The critical review of positions – as of the year 2000 – is given by Formisano in “The Blackwell Dictionary of Twentieth-Century Thought”, where he defines the study of political culture as a “degenerative research program’ – unproductive, unclear, and tautological” (Formisano 2001: 404). I have found no polemical statement on this claim.

Turning now in the chronological order only towards the works of Latin-Americanists, I shall now for order’s sake note the pioneering article by Daniel H. Levine on “Issues in the Study of Culture and Politics: A View from Latin America” (Levine 1974), yet I would like to turn the attention especially to the Latin American criticism of Almond and Verba’s approach. After all, the two authors included in their book – by now a classic – also the analysis of the civic culture of Mexico, “with a thought”, as Almond would write 20 years later, “that a developing, non-European country with mixed democratic-authoritarian features might furnish some interesting contrasts with the European and American cases” (Almond, Verba 1980: 22).

“The Civic Culture Revisited”, a collection of studies quoted here that Almond and Verba edited includes a work by Ann L. Craig and Wayne A. Cornelius that refers to the political analysis and culture (and not to civic culture) of Mexico mentioned above. Craig and Cornelius carried out a systematic criticism of that analysis (including the opinion survey methodology followed) and formulated a number of guidelines suggesting that the researchers in political culture of Mexico: (1) research the perception of attitudes of individuals and groups by political decision-makers (rather than focus on researching these attitudes), (2) account for subcultures that is the cultures of individual social and cultural groups, with appropriately constructed samples and with special consideration of regional differences, (3) award greater significance to the authoritarian aspect of the political system of Mexico, (4) turn special attention to the conditions and functions of participation in political activity in connection with interests (Craig and Wayne 1980). I believe that the guidelines mentioned above may also apply to studying the remaining countries of Latin America.

Would it yet be Latin America as a whole? The question whether Latin America exists rises again.

The affirmative answer comes in a three-volume synthesis of the history of Latin America from the decline of the colonial period until the contemporary times, published over 25 years ago in Poland. The main author and editor of the work, who I know not to have read Almond and Verba’s works, claimed in the closing essay (“Cywilizacja latynoamerykańska” – lit.: “Latin American civilisation”) that political culture is “public life organising the community: state

and power; law, and political structures and customs; the governing and the governed, their conflicts: the relations between the organised groups and of the state to the external world: cooperation, coexistence, war and making war" (Łepkowski 1980: 599–600). Moreover, the author notices at that "huge convergences in state structures and political culture of Latin America and the USA: republicanism, well-rooted presidential system, parliaments usually operating under the name of Congress, and the federal system that is often binding, yet in the recent decades [written in the latter half of the 1970s, – R.S.] often in retreat. Nevertheless, in practice, the North American standard does not function, or, rather, functions in a limited scope if not as a sheer formality. State tradition and political culture of Anglo-America and Ibero-America are quite different qualities." [...] The army [...] popularised a particular model of political culture: the standard for behaviours that assume with silent approval that it is primarily the pistol that makes decisions in politics, especially that – following the idea of the colonial tradition – "la ley se acata pero no se cumple" (the law is respected, but it is not followed)." Still, the author distinguishes the state and political culture (Łepkowski 1980: 618–619). He also points at European influence, believing that what belongs to the specifically Latin American political culture are "personalism, militarism, populist phraseology" (Łepkowski 1980: 623). Łepkowski refers to Latin America as a whole, and in his understanding political culture is a correlate of Latin American civilisation. It is a concept of Latin American political culture in the singular.

The positive answer to the question about the existence of Latin America is given also by Howard Wiarda, who treats this region as a whole, as a civilization, as a culture area, as he is writing about the philosophically envisaged "soul" of Latin America, justifying it through political sciences rather than historiography, and writing about revolutions, positivism, nationalism, Marxism, and corporatism, that is indirectly about the potential and actual premises of political culture (Wiarda 2003). Wiarda emphasises that while the founding fathers of the USA were the people running away from European absolutism and feudalism, the Ibero-American colonies functioned thanks to the people who were recreating European systems within them. Americans in the North valued freedom and individualism, and together created a new state, while the Americans in the South were breaking away from the centre of power in Europe, but did not question the European social order – initially not even the monarchy. They preferred group privileges, and built separate states, in which they would resort to extremism and violence in internal struggle. Wiarda turns the attention to such features as militarism, religious orthodoxy, and hier-

archical structure built on social inequalities as well – which may be surprising for readers used to thinking in the categories of Latin American individualism – as a particular collectivism (organised groups, corporation style). The author points to the importance of the heritage of social philosophy. Yet if Spain and Portugal themselves changed so strongly in the twentieth century, cultural heritage requires an insight that is absent in Wiarda, which in turn weakens the statement on Latin America as a whole.

Similarly, Harry E. Vanden and Gary Prevost are convinced – much like Łepkowski and Wiarda – that there is the certain specific variety of political culture that is Latin American, ergo common for the entire Latin America, in which they make reference to the first book by Almond and Verba, stating that “political culture is defined as those attitudes and beliefs that affect the way we think about, engage in, and evaluate politics and political events” (Vanden, Prevost 2006: 175).

Of different opinion is Peter H. Smith, who uses Larry Diamond’s definition and says that political culture may be defined as “a people’s predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments and evaluations about the political system of their country and the role of the self in the system” (Smith 2005: 286). Naturally, democracy and values condition each other mutually, yet the notion of political culture refers here to a specific state and not to the entire Latin America.

The author of probably the best manual for studies of politics in Latin America, Gavin O’Toole, defines political culture by referring culture to individuals, and tying it to the specific qualities of the system of a specific state, differing from the system of another state: “Political culture: a unique combination of beliefs, attitudes and values held by individuals in any given society about how political system and economic life should be conducted that together help to shape a political system’s distinctive character” (O’Toole 2007: 518).

An anthropological concept (“model”) of political culture is proposed by Larissa Adler Lomnitz and Ana Melnick, who establish it on the “structure of social networks (1), connected to power and (2), being a system of symbols legitimising, feeding, and supporting this power” (Adler, Melnick 2000: 2). These networks may function as either vertical or horizontal, while the system of symbols may be manifested in discourse, political rituals, language, architecture, myths of political cosmology, insignia, way of treating time and space: factors that often provide a part of the nationalist ideology. The authors applied the concept to the examination of political parties – considered the representa-

tion of the middle classes – using source material in the form of historiographical works, press, and interviews and data from participant observation. They identified the type of network and diverse cultures and subcultures of the parties examined, entered into what they call “the grammar of domination, subjugation, and cooperation relations, that is the grammar of power” (Adler, Melnick 2000: 141).

A highly sophisticated and at the same time complex approach can be perceived in the collection of texts devoted to Mexico, Costa Rica, and Chile edited by Roderic Ai Camp (Camp 2001). The authors founded their reasoning on the results of a study of individuals, and the individuals' evaluation of politics and the type of politics that they postulate. At the same time, they construct the common scope of political culture of the people examined and put forward the question how political culture – assured in this way – influences the behaviours of the people examined and the development of specific institutions, and also how democratic operation of these institutions shapes the attitudes of the persons examined within this political culture that they share. The research proves (a) the need of differentiating political cultures viz. nationality of those examined and at the same time (b) the presence of certain aspects of individual attitude at the supranational (supra-state) level. While the first is not surprising, the latter is unusual, as one should be expecting that the attitude to democracy must depend on the position assumed by the given person in the social structure (status is measured by income, education, and the type of work performed, as well as by the age of the person in question). It is interesting where these differences become manifested. In the group of older citizens, the tendency to be satisfied with electoral democracy predominates, while the people of the younger generation conceptualise democracy in a more sophisticated manner (including into it, for example, the protection of minorities) and they simply expect more. In all the age groups, the understanding of politics is positively correlated to education. Nonetheless, also in the case of this very interesting book, discretion requires that we consider the implications of the method applied (opinion survey), as it is known that the media aspect of the public discourse is not always taken into consideration while interpreting the respondents' answers, a racially-biased person is not always eager to disclose his or her attitude to the pollster, an authoritarian personality does not have to be manifested by the public questioning of democracy, the vast majority of people do not use general categories (“the political system”) and think rather about specific government or political party, and so forth. Should we take into consideration a similar list of the countries – Mexico,

Chile, and Uruguay – we may put forward a hypotheses that the political cultures operating today are connected to the phenomenon of a very high growth of employment in the public sector. It would be extraordinary if such a process did not favour acceptance of the state that developed this employment. This is how a variety of norms became mingled, which helps in the understanding why the military juntas of Uruguay and Chile could resort to torture with fair approval of many employees of public administration. They must have clearly accepted the principle of very broad application of brute force in the process of executing power even earlier.

The line of reasoning presented above is easier to understand, should one know that before 1930 the state employed in Latin America less than 1% of population, which means that at that time there were fewer than 500 000 civil servants. During the three following decades, that share grew only to 1.2%, yet with the parallel increase in population the change meant that the number of employed in the state sector grew by the factor of five (a number that does not account for the state-owned economic entities). The largest increase occurred in education, yet of the three countries listed here, it was only in Mexico that education came first in the ranking by the number of employees. The high rate of employment growth in administration was noted in Uruguay: from 1.6% of the country's population (30 000 civil servants) in 1930 to 2.9% (52 200) within two years, and by 1966 – to as much as 22.5%! Chile also proved a major growth of employment in the administration in 1930–1970, as the numbers rose nearly 5 times. The rate for Mexico was 0.93% in 1930, yet in 1986 – with state corporations left aside – it was already 7.5%, and paralleled by the very high rate of demographic growth mentioned above. While in 1930, two in every three state employees worked in the states' and municipal administration of Mexico, in 1980 it was already only one in four (Whitehead 1998, *passim*). It is the central government that employs people today. The reasons behind the growth of employment in the administration of the countries listed above include anti-crisis policies (absorption of the unemployed from the middle class in Chile and Uruguay), and the development of state functions. The deterioration (1930–1970) of the quality of administration in Chile and Uruguay, with its simultaneous improvement in Mexico, brought the levels of administration in these countries close. Wherever reforms were recorded, it was not public administration that generated their programmes, corruption rendered implementation of law difficult, and clientelism was blossoming. As neither military governments nor the current phase of democracy changed the tendency to increase employment in administration, although the growth is now

minor in absolute numbers, political cultures in these social groups most probably favour retaining the bureaucratic *status quo*, with the unavoidable oscillations of the circumstances related to political orientations of the president, ministers, governors.

Let us, however, draw the attention also to the fact that in the concepts of Peter Smith and many other authors, it is significant that political culture is something that is present among “people”. They do not focus on specific groups: politicians or civil servants. Smith’s notion of political culture refers to the statistically basic, greater part of the society (population). Moreover, he believes that political culture is the result of the impact of politics, and not its source or reason, devoting little attention to the feedback between politics and political culture, which might have been manifested as the result of examining the connection between the increase of employment in public administration and political culture in these social groups.

Authors from the Universidad Nacional de Colombia make reference to various understandings of political culture, beginning with Almond and Verba’s classical concept and ending with Spanish political science. The team working under Oscar Mejía Quintana published (in 2006) a volume of studies edited by Gina Paola Rodríguez, relating the connections between culture and politics to the state, nation, and globalisation in the long process of Colombian modernisation. For all considerations of greatest importance is the closing essay by the editor of the volume, entitled *Los estudios sobre la cultura política en América Latina* (Rodríguez 2006: 269–293). She primarily asks the familiar question whether we deal with the political culture that is common for Latin America as a whole, or, rather, with political culture of the individual countries. In her analysis, Rodríguez refers to several Latin American works. These do not include the results of clearly empirical research. The author makes the reservation that it is impossible to build a comprehensive perspective, because – and here she quotes Jose Joaquin Brunner – “*las culturas de América latina en su desarrollo contemporáneo no expresan un orden – ni de nación, ni de clase, ni religioso, ni estatal, ni de carismas, ni tradicional ni de ningún otro tipo – sino que se reflejan en su organización los procesos contradictorios y heterogéneos de conformación de una modernidad tardía, construida en condiciones de acelerada internacionalización de los mercados simbólicos en el ámbito mundial*” (Rodríguez 2006: 291–292). She goes on to add that “*con esto, el campo de la cultura política latinoamericana se nos presenta como plural e indeterminado, pero además móvil y cambiante, de tal suerte que frente a la ausencia de una historia unificadora, emergen un sinnúmero de relatos*

e identidades fluctuantes que, no obstante su condición, logran dar cuenta de nuestra características en determinados tiempos y espacios. Así, la cultura política latinoamericana puede ser definida como la suma de las matrices culturales que componen el collage de la actividad política de nuestras sociedades en un momento dado. Esto hace que, así como podemos hablar de una cultura política democrática, puede resultar justificado hablar, en otro contexto, de una cultura política autoritaria, cuando predominan ciertos actores, actitudes y formas de acción que bien favorecen la instalación o el mantenimiento de regímenes políticos autocráticos” (Rodríguez, 292). The cognitive pessimism of the author seems to me exaggerated, however, though doing this she points quite appropriately to the limitations of the “demo-liberal” model as the only or basic measure of political culture in Latin America.

An extremely interesting attempt at applying the notion of political culture, I found in “Political Cultures in the Andes, 1750–1950”, a collection of works edited by Nils Jacobsen and Cristóbal Aljovín de Losada (2005). It is extraordinary in the sense that – as far as I would like to use considerations of political culture to reach the lesser-known aspects of the state – the authors of the book apply considerations of the history of the nation-state to portray political culture and the histories of historical polities. As the research of the history of the state in Latin America (in this case: of the Andean states) is more advanced than the research of the political culture of the societies of the Andean region, one is free to believe that the political change known from history will help the authors to point at a change in the scope of political culture that has not been known as yet. In the meantime, such changes are always difficult to be specifically identified. The result is in most cases, a suggestion, if not only an allusion, but not a statement about a change documented in the sources. Moreover, the content of what undergoes change is not always clear either. Yet the authors list here three important features typical in the twentieth century for the political culture of the region of the Andes, and at the same time specific against the background of Latin America.

I perceive these features in the following manner: first and foremost, there are representations of the former local civilisations, representations building the mythological foundation (for state- and nation-forming processes). Second, beginning with the great rebellions of the latter half of the eighteenth century, a phenomenon has been observed in the region, namely, that the local actions are conducted in mutual communication despite the great natural obstacles, while after the fall of such efforts, the local ties – being the ones that oppose the centralist tendency of the state – are reinforced. Third, the stale-

mate between the main political forces is more clearly and lastingly visible here than elsewhere in Latin America. The basic factions of the elite have failed to work out consensual cooperation and are incapable of building a lasting coalition, at the same time, they all apply the principle of excluding everyone from outside the elite (discrimination is a means of control), while other social (and ethnical!) groups efficiently resist the attempts at suppressing the local cultures by centrally imposed ideologies. Although capable of inter-communal communication, they are, on the other hand, unable to develop their joint political strategy.

It goes without saying that the three features—phenomena are the features or manifestations of political culture, even though in his chapter of the book in question, Alan Knight (Knight 2005: 25–57) expresses plenty of justified doubts on the usefulness of the notion of political culture, the editors of the volume, on the other hand, emphasise that there is no political culture of the Andean region even despite the presence of these three features shared. I shall not be able to refer to each book on political culture of Latin America and/or its specific countries. The catalogue of the Library of Congress alone lists 45 titles. I can say however that most authors accept the known concept of civic culture; others offer no definition of the political culture, as Mansilla in his pioneer study of political culture of the authoritarian rule in Bolivia, applying the term “political culture” as a synonym of the state performance (Mansilla 1987).

Political culture and the public discourse

My concept of political culture requires that the set of widespread and relatively stable and respected beliefs connected to the identity of the society as a political nation, that is the constitutionally defined sovereign, were expressed, among others, in the public discourse.

In the public discourse, citizens and institutions of the civic society – in a democratic state – conduct a debate on the *raison d'état* and the socially important goals of policy-making. This is how the public hierarchy of the shaping policy factors is continuously updated, including the ideologies transforming into political doctrines and programmes of political parties. What we deal here with is the formation of a certain “public *raison d'état*” within a pluralist society. With the lack of democracy, the public discourse looks somewhat different, yet also plays an important function.

Going beyond the face-value understanding of the discourse, as a debate in the mass media and through education and publication, I use this notion to define – under the influence of Foucault – the “public debate of operating subjects – actors (also institutional), working out the generally accepted understanding of the given question, resulting from the shared history and culture of social communication, and manifested in a variety of ways, yet, finally, represented in language” (Stemplowski 2007: 325).

Does the criterion of the language not exclude registering forms of consciousness and resultant behaviours if they are not expressed directly in verbalisation? To illustrate the problem let me ask whether the phenomenon of the mass failure to observe the principles of road traffic is a manifestation of political culture. Peter Waldmann described the vehicular traffic over the river in the Bolivian city of Santa Cruz, where one of the bridges has only one lane and requires alternating one-direction traffic. The increased weekend traffic loads (as the route leads to attractive suburban areas) is obstructed by the drivers who – ignoring the queue of the cars that have arrived earlier – attempt to force their way into the head of the column from a side (from outside the only lane), which results in the situation reminding of “shepherding of a flock of rams disturbing one another into a pen” (Waldmann 2006: 204). Neither a pedestrian nor a driver produces any written statements on such an occasion. Even though not every crossing the street by a pedestrian on a red light in a Latin American city will find its description in a work by a learned democrat in the European Rechtsstaat, such behaviours have their correlate not only in the drivers’ mentality but also in the form of police descriptions of the situation that can be considered representative (language) for research in political culture. It is only the public emergence of the description of the attitude (introduction of the results of the research into public domain) that allows using such a secondary source of information: and it is this very information that is a component of the discourse recognizable through language, also – if not predominantly – accounting for the colloquial language, which may “disclose” to the researcher the actual state of consciousness present in large numbers of individuals. Having identified the source of information, we may consider the conceptualisation involving the language in a deeper sense.

Continuing considerations on the language as a manifestation of culture, we notice that the phenomenon of the populist leader communicating with the masses is typical for the Latin American *cultura verbalista*. “Give me a balcony, and I will become the president,” José María Velasco Ibarra, five times the President of Ecuador (winner in the elections of 1933, 1943, 1951, 1959

and 1967), used to say. Similarly known was the *balconazo* practised by the President of Peru, Alan García, during his first presidency: he would leave the place behind his desk, grab the microphone ready for such a circumstance, run out to the balcony and announce his decisions “in dialogue with people”. In this, he might have followed Perón, yet the latter began from using the microphone thrust at him by a journalist by name of Evita, and did so in the street (which, after all, made their joint way to the balcony of Casa Rosada easier). The “living” language is not only the carrier of information about the programmes or resolutions, but also a more broadly conceived component of the political, and of organisation of the political power in a Latin American state. Neither television nor the Internet could fully replace the balcony. Is this connected with the cult of the hero so widespread in Latin America? Possibly only of those, who have earned their special status in their lifetime, and usually on an exposed position (Brunk and Fallaw 2006). The attitude towards the hero is hard to be distinguished from the one towards the caudillo, should one disregard the manner such leadership is created. *Balconazo* could, however, be explained in the categories of symbolism and communication in politics (Dittmer 1977), that is, as one of the manifestations of political culture, moreover: one that is very old and enjoys Independence traditions (*cabildo abierto*).

Quoted above, the criterion of the “generally accepted understanding of the given question”, significant for the evaluation of the public discourse, does not cover – I believe – the totality of citizens in any country of Latin America. It definitely does not encompass those who do not realise that their homeland lies within a territory that others (aliens) believe to be within something that those aliens refer to as the state. From time to time groups of such original inhabitants of South American jungles are found, especially in Brazil and around its north-western borders. These descendants of the original inhabitants who are aware of being subjected to the state’s central power, on the other hand, are not a uniform group. Present here is the dualism of political culture. Besides the norms of traditional organisation – present here are the norms of the imposed state; side by side with the precolonial political culture – there are the norms connected to the new culture of the conquerors, especially among the persons passively or – the more so: actively – accepting the new state. A great portion of the autochthonous population of Latin America does not participate in the construction of the “generally accepted understanding of the given issue” that is to be the result of the “shared history and culture of social communication” in the given state. For this reason, in a country with such an autochthonous population, it is impossible to find such an “understanding of the

issue" that would be produced by all the citizens. Political culture of the autochthonous population mentioned above is related to the political that connects their civic consciousness with precolonial forms of social self-organisation, and with these forms of collective life that originated in the process of these people's adaptation to the colonial and postcolonial order. The twentieth century Indigenism and even Indianism served that adaptation. Only those who had gone through the process of acculturation were capable – to a certain extent – of winning through the dualism, although the question about the content of citizenship in consciousness (political culture) of these people – or, to be more precise, about the scope of acceptance of statehood as a factor co-constituting national identity – still comes up. There is probably the phenomenon of two levels of identity in the local social space, where one can be a member of both the local community and one that is broader, yet in a different manner than the *bien acomodados* politicians from the capital.

Black slaves and their progeny did not participate in the process at all. By paradox, the black was "invisible" (Bryan and Serbin 1996: 40–41), although the Blacks' blood "flows in a majority of Brazilians" (Burns 1970: 356) and in many other inhabitants of Latin America. Yet our knowledge of the political culture of non-European population – also about the political cultures (the plural use intended) originates from the analysis of secondary sources, that is published results of anthropological, archaeological, ethnological, historical, political, and sociological studies.

Social movements, as for example the Zapatista in the Mexican state of Chiapas, favour the development of these forms of political culture that are connected to the political of the local Indian communities and can make use of modern means of communication (Internet). The participation of the leaders of such a movement in public discourse favours the development of our (observers') knowledge about this political culture. They participate in the public discourse also in the forms that attract the attention of the media.

Turning attention to the importance of the criterion of the generally accepted understanding of the given issue, we perceive that the convergence of the condition of the communities listed below with the condition of the communities of the Andean region described in the book edited by Jacobson and Aljovín de Losada referred to above. The inability to produce a national collective identity of the population in such states signals the poorer advancement of the cultural, and – the more so – of the political. Or, in other words, of such widespread and stable forms of social consciousness, where the joint identity of the political nation and acceptance of common statehood exist. I cannot dwell

here upon the historical example of Paraguay from before the Guerra de la Triple Alianza (1864–1870), when most probably the country featured a process of nation-building that was most advanced in the entire Latin America, and a situation to which the statements about identity and statehood made above could possibly not apply.

Reflected in the public discourse, the poor advancement of the cultural and the political is present also in reference to the social inequality in the position of the woman and the man. The extreme demographic imbalance (overwhelming numerical overrepresentation of women) in Paraguay after the mentioned Guerra de la Triple Alianza weakened the state, yet such a problem does not exist in today's Latin America. There is, however, an inequality of a different type. The participation of women in the public discourse is smaller than that of man, yet even the overrepresentation of women over men in the parliament does not naturally have to be a mark of actual democracy (see Rwanda). There are at least three factors that influence the status of the woman measured in her impact in the discourse and especially her impact in elections: (1) the tension between the religious and lay orders connected with the economic conditioning of the status, (2) the level of institutionalisation of the state, (3) mindset or the attitudes within specific party elites – which is at least how I understand the thesis formulated by Fiona Macaulay (Macaulay 2006). There are at least two models of equalising the status, Brazilian and Chilean. The first is based on a huge political party, Partido Trabalhista, being the promoter of women's rights, while the centralised Chilean system developed the Office for Women (Servicio Nacional de la Mujer). Visible clearly in both the countries is the progress in equalising the status of the woman and man. It continues faster in Brazil, possibly due to the starting point being lower, greater differentiation of the country, and flexibility that accompanies it in the realm of social advancement.

The division into urban and non-urban population causes the inequality of participation in the discourse, because the non-urban population is poorly educated and organised, which is especially visible wherever this division as a criterion is superimposed on the criteria of ethnicity and sex. I have been unable to ascertain how much the two sections of the population differ regarding their examination by the social sciences; I suppose only a small share of the population has at all been covered by research. Which is why we have to confine ourselves to making hypotheses through application of deduction and extrapolation of the results contained in secondary sources. Mentioned above, Craig and Cornelius verify the classical work by Almond and Verba and turn the attention to the methodological implication of such a state-of-the-art in the domain.

The urban population participates in the public discourse intensively, yet to the manual labourers of production and services sectors do it mainly through their trade unions, direct actions, union and party manifestations, participation in elections, and organised crime. Information about political culture is to a great extent expressed in the language of trade union activists, politicians and media, police, persecutors and judges, and to a lesser degree in the language of other secondary sources, that is works of social scientists. The research of the connection between identity, work (labour) and forms of protest is now only beginning to discover the political culture of people remaining outside trade unions and other organisations (Peloso 2008) or forming entirely new movements.

A manifestation of civic movement that creates something that is really of an alternative character, were the gatherings that originated in Argentina as a spontaneous answer to the suddenly developed deep atrophy of state power and banking institutions in December 2001. These movements were “not demanding something new, but creating it” (Sitrin 2006: 10). Consensus (and not the method of reaching decisions by majority vote) led these people to organise themselves around the basic functions related to employment and sustenance. It is hard not to notice that this bears a resemblance to some premises for the actions of organisations of autochthonous communities, the Argentinian “*piqueteros*” (Escudé 2005: 67–100), and even the guerrilla movements, corruption cliques, etc.

Similarly, political culture is influenced by religious organisations that at the same time are to a certain extent a manifestation of that culture; a fact that can be attested by the common presence of such institutions among the Latin American migrants in the USA and Europe: it is a presence with no serious institutional competition, should one disregard the ethnical organisations focused on the commercial services for migrants (as e.g. the media). Transfer of religious institutions from the native country to the target country is a manifestation of the cultural (a function of the identity) of the migrants that took shape before the migration. The research of a similar – yet much earlier phenomenon – among immigrants from Europe in Argentina and Brazil proved that émigré religious institutions promoted maintaining contact with the country of origin, i.e., with the country or the institution of the state, with all its implications for the political culture, yet this was true mainly about Catholicism. In the case of Latin America, the most active religious organisations among immigrants are not Roman-Catholic. Besides this, what is visible here is a religious syncretism, a phenomenon known in Latin America (and the Caribbean) yet rather from the colonial period. Local religions that are now born that are theologically

universal and of transnational character. For that reason, their impact on political culture must differ from the one we know from the history of Atlantic migrations from mid-nineteenth century to 1930s.

The importance of religious organisations in Latin America for the public discourse requires a systematic research. Important are the unorthodox elements of religious activity, among whose number I count the liberation theology and the activity of North American evangelising missions. On the other hand, systematic religious practices in the churches and religious associations recognised by the state apply to a tiny share of population, and for that reason the social teaching of the most popular church – the Roman Catholic Church – including the personal impact of priests, monks, and nuns – seems to me something of secondary importance immersed in the syncretism of local cultures. Such an opinion is in no way denied by the fact that some grass-root guerrilla movements opposing the European intervention in Mexico in mid-nineteenth century used the imported Catholic icon of Mother of God, i.e., the image of Our Lady of Guadalupe.

Worth attention is the function of the system of education in the public discourse. The role of primary and secondary education is obvious, especially in those areas where *educación cívica* was persistently promoted, yet its results are visible after the students have left school. The university is of greater importance.

Unlike in the British colonies in the Caribbean, in the colonial America, later referred to as Latin, the establishment of universities preceded the development of general education of the primary and secondary levels. The university reinforced the culture of colonial metropolises, opening in the period since the Independence to the more-broadly-understood European culture yet retaining its elitist character. Where the European presence made its strongest mark due to mass European immigration in the latter half of the nineteenth and in the first decade of the twentieth centuries, this model of university was questioned. The implications of the Argentinian *Reforma Universitaria* (Cordoba, 1918) went beyond the university, influencing the broader political culture in a manner unequalled also outside Latin America.

The reformers put forward three groups of ideas and demands: (1) they defined the university as a republic of the intellectuals, managed like a democratic state, with the participation of citizens i.e. students, claiming the participation of students in managing bodies. (2) They opposed what they defined as dogmatism, demanding discourse showing opposing points of view, wanted to abolish the system of “catedráticos” i.e. lifelong professorships (with fixed number of tenures): they wanted these posts to be staffed through competitions, and

later regularly verified (here, postulates were confined to generalities); they demanded that the prerogatives of the rector and dean in their brief of defining the curriculum be abolished, imposing and entrusting the same to the lecturer (here the postulates varied); demanded abolishing compulsory attendance at the lectures, and improvement of relations between the teaching and the taught. (3) They wanted to develop a new type of a link between the university and the society: (a) Universities were to embark on the most important problems of the country, but they were to be autonomous, and the state authority was not to influence the operation. (b) Universities were to be accessible also for the youth without the financial support of the family, and were also to run certain branches in the form of people's universities. (c) The Manifesto includes the notion of "scientific liberalism". It may be believed that it led its the authors to postulating the university as "a tool of social impact" so as to transform the "high culture" into "scientific disciplines" given into the service of the society. The reformers rejected the "colonial mentality" and the university perceived as a "monastery", demanding "a university being a laboratory".

Implications of these postulates for the considerations on political culture are obvious. Nevertheless, the movement of university reform did not, however, aim at the creation of the alternative university, even if it helped to establish people's universities. Additionally, it must be remembered that thanks to its instigation of establishment of a national student associations (a political culture factor in and of itself), the reform movement helped democratisation by the reinforcement of parties representing the middle class. After many years, the socially radical tradition of the reform reinforced the factors politicising academic milieu in Latin America. One may even consider whether and to what degree the reform of 1918 could be treated a few decades later as the historic legitimisation of the social role of the reformer and even the reformism-despising revolutionary of the 1960s and 1970s (Stemplowski 2008).

The contemporary political discourse encompasses even wider problem ranges that connect the concepts and postulates of justice with those pertaining to the attitude to the natural environment. There are plenty of suggestions that it is the very platform where the people of various ethnicities, nationalities, social classes, sexes, etc may co-operate. The recognition of forms of consciousness in this scope requires a new sensitivity to the questions of the natural environment. Such a recognition runs into elementary difficulties with access to data on the natural environment, especially ones that refer to this environment indirectly, as e.g. the data on the health status. Such data, where they actually exist, are indeed testimony to exposing people to the dangers resulting from

the changes (more precisely: destruction) of the natural environment, that is to environmental hazards.

In some cases, the purpose of seeking the link between the environment and justice – and indirectly, the political culture – will seemingly concern only the autochthonous people, the *indígenas*, *pueblos originarios*. What is most visible is the fact that these people fall victim to the most blatant social inequalities. This, however, pertains also to the descendants of the slaves and – generally – the poor as such. Indeed, some of the poor invade the lands of other poor, albeit belonging to the *indígenas*, in which case the victim is everyone on both sides of the conflict, for which someone else is responsible.

Although passing legislation on natural environment has continued in Latin America for over 20 years, its execution is partial because this is how law operates there and also because the laws are copied from highly industrialised states (the US, EU countries), where these norms operate in a different social context. Let us take a note of what access to water looks like – a case that I treat as an illustration of the problem discussed – and there are few needs as basic for existence as the satisfaction of the human need for drinking and watering the cultivated lands. The more so, as both the notion and the physical substance of water have different significance in some cultures than in the culture of the West. Let us remember that for example the subterranean resources of *Acuífero Guaraní* (covering the hydrographical conditions within a basin around the borders of Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina, and Uruguay) are one of the largest prospected body of fresh water in the world in its type (Schmidt, Vassolo, Assolo 2007).

Even though it is only 5% of the world's potable water that is privately managed, the revenues from this title are nearly twice as large as those produced by the entire global oil industry. Major foreign investors, not to mention Latin American governments, must be interested in local political cultures, not only those that take up huge areas and speak mostly the *Guaraní*. "Sophisticated infrastructure and management regimes for irrigation were developed by communities in the Andes well before the Incas flexed their imperial muscle [...]. In some places in Mexico, communities managed water autonomously and cooperatively. In arid regions, water management was 'heavily dependent on terraces, diversion dams, aqueducts, and canal networks within valley-limited drainages which were knit together by expanding empires' [...]. Mexico City was a marvel of water engineering when Hernán Cortés and his forces arrived to conquer the Aztec empire [...]. Indigenous values and political cultures and the complex systems of rights and responsibilities where they have any status at

all have been reduced [...]. States and market systems of water-resource management 'ignore or deny the existence or importance of common-law normative frameworks regarding local indigenous rights and uses and water resource management' [...]" (Wickstrom 2008: 287–289). Local people fight back not only major foreign investors but also the new settler (*colono*). Moreover, the more local the water management, the more efficient it is, which may be at odds with the culture of a major corporate investor.

The presidency of Evo Morales favours the introduction of new property relations in Bolivia concerning water distribution, a change that the people of the poor urban districts began struggling for earlier. Social organisations in Chile also work hard for a new regulation in this scope. In Mexico, operating within NAFTA "[...] elites have attempted to deconstruct the corporatist political culture of the Mexican Revolution, but have yet to replace it with a new political culture" of free trade in water (Wickstrom, 310).

The language of talks about water may be a problem in itself, if a foreign investor considers it among physical resources or means of labour in the enterprise constructed, while the local community treats water as something that has its identity in the system combining all the elements and including the river, the forest, people, air, mountains, etc, with each of the components being treated in a similar way. Political cultures of the investor and the local people belong to different worlds. Even though all the participants of the communication process may speak one language in the philological sense, there is a need for an interpreter being a cultural broker.

The problem of language is also present when speaking in Latin America about one of the most important questions, namely the redistribution of the domestic product, in the language of the societies of highly developed Europe with its social structure different from Latin American. It is rather the "style of former leftist rhetoric" of social democratic and/or liberal origin – not adequate to today's EU or the US – that is to be used in Latin America: the language of David Lloyd George, Franklin Roosevelt, and William Beveridge treating these issues in the categories of "social patriotism" and aimed at the "average citizen" (Jackson 2009), i.e. according to the principles of class solidarity. Here, political culture is immediately connected with the forms of ideological thinking about the nation and major groups in social structure.

I would also like to point to the significance of the Aesopian language and the public discourse. It is present when the words uttered in an explicit literary and historical context acquire a different meaning with the listener, because he or she refers it to his or her contemporary political reality. We know this phe-

nomenon from the practice of autocratic systems not only in Latin America. Any mention of a "Fall" may be associated with the expected fall of the military junta, the "Spring" is the harbinger of changes, and in Chile the "earthquake" (after the actual earthquake in 1985) was associated quite unambiguously: cases of Chilean and not only theatres operating under censorship that sought for the language of political resistance are quite well known. This is how also objects—signs may speak out, for example, I saw a small electric resistor pinned into the lapel that signalled the attitude of opposition against the dominant system. The political joke is close to such behaviours. In the language of Aesop and in the language of signs, political culture finds its manifestation.

Examining the public discourse, we prefer searching for utterances that are the result of existing convictions and beliefs: widespread and typical in the statistical sense, predominant in the given set. The set may be the entire society, or, at another time – a group singled out along with defined criteria. This, however, does not exclude examining the beliefs of individuals, which is discussed below. Methodology-wise, it is more difficult to decide whether a given belief is respected. One might assume that "the given individual respects the given belief, if in a systematic manner (at an appropriate time) the individual undertakes the appropriate activity regularly as if the individual accepted that belief as a subjective and rational premise of that activity" (Kmita 1985: 25). The individual may in fact accept such a belief in this manner, yet the acceptance itself may nevertheless be gradable. On the other hand, not every regular action must be the result of acceptance, as what we deal with may be a reflex and not an action resulting from acceptance (conscious action).

To the considerations about the participation of individuals and social groups and organisations in the discourse, I would like to add a comment on the media. They participate in the shaping of the discourse, yet it is risky to deduce political culture on the grounds of their message. We have in memory the impressive spread of the printed word in Argentina and Uruguay in the first half of the twentieth century, with the long terms of office of very different governments in these countries. Together with education at the secondary and higher level, the printed word increases the level of orientation in education, yet the radio and especially the television must be even more important. Television seems to be the national carrier of political culture mostly in the sense that it emphasises the central executive power and the national symbols. The European viewer in Latin America is stricken by the name of the state being the most frequently repeated word in the president's speech. This has also lost the semblances of novelty to Latin Americans, and they hardly notice it. They have

been accustomed to frequent references to the state by the school with its everyday ritual of singing the national anthem and raising the flag. It is possible that the term "nacionalismo" has lesser importance in Latin America than in Europe. I mean here especially the immigrant countries. Nevertheless, these were the governments of Latin America that in the 1930s rejected the European concept of national minority as Latin American elites found it conflictogenic. It seems, however, that there is still room for such a form of conscience, where a descendant of European immigrants ideologically finds the indigenous population a minority, even though it may constitute the statistical majority there.

The significance of the elite is obvious, and often these are the family ties that play a decisive role in its formation (Lindhal 1962), yet what is the significance of the so-called authorities or individuals of high standing? Individuals as public or moral authorities in Latin America are a rarity, while authorities built on the position held in the halls of the academy are an extreme rarity. Such a position of the authority may be acquired by a writer, but one must first gain recognition abroad – best in Europe. A musician or a singer should acquire fame in the United States. Naturally, a footballer always remains a highly popular and possibly the best recognised celebrity, a fact that politicians know how to use, yet how is this it connected to the construction of civic society? It definitely may play a socially compensating function, as it shows a specific path of social advancement and makes the acceptance of external world easier. (Yet even in the United States it took 61 years from the moment the first black basketball player was selected for a league team to the election of Barack Obama the President.) Of interest is the fact that Latin Americans are primarily highly successful in team games, which rebuffs the stereotype of their excessive individualism. Does it prove that the ability of closely regulated cooperation – in their culture – comes to them with ease? Such a cooperation is also a form of public discourse with media reinforcement. NB: Neither General Powell nor President Obama would be considered Blacks in Latin America.

With full acceptance of the special significance of the mass media and spoken word, and also of the Internet – especially in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Mexico (Riedinger 2008: 185; Gascó Hernandez 2008) – one may not forget the fact that bodies of state authorities and persons involved in public administration participate in the public discourse, speaking mostly through official acts and the normative acts published. Moreover, these bodies express themselves also in a particular manner by implementing laws and carrying out political directives. They conduct a certain discourse with citizens and the (non-governmental) organisations along the rules of the dominant political culture.

Closing, we need to answer the question whether considering the ties between the widespread and stable forms of social consciousness with the public discourse, we examine beliefs as a manifestation of the consciousness of an individual or an organ of public authority, and in this we deem that having examined a certain (large) number of persons, also members of a collective body, we are allowed to make binding statements on social consciousness, which means that we believe that a social phenomenon is determined by individual phenomena... Or maybe it is otherwise, namely that the individual consciousness (ergo also individual beliefs) are determined by the social consciousness? Answering yes to the last question, we would have to assume that social consciousness is something more than just an averaged collection of individual beliefs; it is a manifestation of social practice, an aspect of the social existence that is a set of beliefs that are both commonly respected in the examined society, and defined by the functioning of that society. Such a statement should reinforce our assumption of the connection between the cultural and the political with the language of political culture. Nevertheless, neither this language nor the language of analysing political culture may be adequate provided a resident of the country, a citizen, a social group or the analyst do not believe themselves to be a part of the whole they belong to together with the subject of the analysis: "the language has its inertia and is used also when it has long ceased to adhere to the world that it is to describe", says Leszek Kołakowski (Kołakowski & Mentzel 2009: 126).

Policy-making and political culture

It results from the definition assumed initially that political culture is a set of widespread and relatively stable beliefs referring among other questions to the constitutional system of policy-making. It would therefore seem that the obvious direction of considerations should be connected with the examination of the content of the legislation and its implementation, and the widespread and reinforced forms of consciousness, opinions, attitudes, and behaviours of citizens to identify the forms carried out in social practice – both formal (law) and informal ones – jointly providing a testimony to the beliefs that together build political culture. I, however, embark on my discussion in this chapter from a point that is removed a step further, immediately borrowing a well-known assertion of the lack of democracy and assuming that the generally binding law was implemented throughout the most of the twentieth century to a degree

insufficient (the actual function, not the assumed one) for the emergence of a lasting operation of this set of systemic (constitutional) functions assumed by a democratic republic. This shortage was quite naturally present to a varying degree and in diverse periods in different countries, and also in various institutional circumstances (e.g. democracy existing in a local community but lacking within a group of similar size in a latifundist *hacienda*), but it did not pass any of the countries, even Costa Rica. (Yet a hundred years ago, the turn-up at the polls in Latin America did not diverge significantly from the European average.)

Beginning from recording the phenomena most broadly known and present throughout entire Latin America, it would be impossible to fail to mention the numerous coup d'état. Of not lesser importance is the fact of widespread failure to execute tax law and other forms of financial law. Added to that must be the inefficiency of the policing services in ensuring safety and security for citizens, especially outside metropolises, and even outside some of its districts. Connected to this is the insufficiency of the judiciary and abuse of the principle of the free discretion of the judge. Imposed on all these is also the disregard of the law by the officers of public administration. Contempt for the law and being unpunished. There is also the fact that the diplomatic and civil staff, with the exception of few executive positions, remains in the ministries independent of systemic changes. This is no Civil Service whatsoever. These are rather obedient conformists. When General Onganía made his coup d'état in Argentina in 1966, only one diplomat resigned. When President Díaz Ordaz brutally suppressed the student demonstrations of 1968, only one ambassador of Mexico handed in his resignation. The prevalent political culture evidently did not suffer from these. At the same time there is no shortage of people among the administration who adjust to the new order, whether authoritarian or democratic, and use the language of the new power, yet award individual terms with contents different from ones assumed in programmes. Demoralisation engulfed also the judiciary. In Argentina, for instance, many of the judges initially accepted the dictatorship, and – after its fall – took to sabotaging the proceedings against torturers and their accomplices by delaying them. “Thus, within a single country we can observe both notable experiences of authentic democratisation of public life as well as the worst authoritarian fictions, both supported by the same language and by the same legal and institutional foundations” (Olvera 2008: 115).

Another characteristic phenomenon is that – while corruption of civil servants, judges and politicians in a state ruled by law is a rarity and entails infringement of law – in Latin America it is frequent and is often connected to

the effort to implement (and adjudicate) law, as this law promises to the citizen more than the state as personified by policeman, judge, ministerial or municipal officer is able or actually wants to provide for him. Corruption is an additional transaction cost in the unfriendly environment of public authorities, and frequently a manifestation of solidarity being a reaction to the unbearable public administration. It is a manifestation of political culture, amending the unaccepted law, a form that sanctions parallel redistribution of the GDP. It may be more enduring than the political circumstances that gave birth to it. Moreover, a bureaucrat usually accumulates as a bribe-taker.

Studies of contemporary political corruption in Brazil, Mexico, Paraguay, and Venezuela show a variety of corruptive phenomena in Latin America and the level to which countering them is becoming the central problem in the consolidation of political reform in Latin America (Little and Posada-Carbó 1996: 13, 195–285).

The government frequently runs a policy of privileging some at the expense of others, as in the case of foreign financial operations of natural persons and private businesses, which receive tax breaks and amnesties to the detriment of public funding in education, healthcare, social aid, and law enforcement. Efficient evasion of taxation can most evidently be reconciled with other forms of political culture, related to the beliefs – and expectations – of other citizen viz. the policies of the government that require budget expenditure.

It is a paradox, yet one may say that even though these states are weak, they are at the same time perversely stable and foreseeable. It is so as their weaknesses are visible. At least it was so until the recent years. A criticism more comprehensive and acute than mine; in fact truly devastating for the Latin American state; was given by Waldmann, who defined it as *el estado anómico* (Waldmann 2006). Nevertheless, now Latin America – entering that stage of its development when it enjoys the highest pace of economic growth in the last three decades, the current economic crisis notwithstanding – is slowly becoming increasingly democratic and changing its vast social inequalities (still high throughout the Latin America, yet with the decreasing Gini coefficient) step-by-step, even though at the same time it is becoming more politically torn. With the passage of time, this will influence the system of policy-making and political culture. To a certain extent, these phenomena represent also the foreign influence as democratisation is the requirement of foreign and international institutions, whose cooperation Latin Americans may want or be forced to use. This, in turn, favours the façade character of administrative actions in support of democratisation.

Embarking on a more systematic analysis of the connection between social consciousness and the systemic way of policy-making, I would like to emphasise that the frame of reference (institutional model) here is a democratic state. The notion of policy-making refers here to policy-making in the comprehensive sense of “policy”, unless the term “foreign policy” is used. Policy-making encompasses everything that may refer to actors (including agents), without limitation of the notion of the actor to the notion of a subject of international public law. Special attention will be paid to the operation of the federal system, executive power, the notion of *raison d'état*, the presidential decision-making process, efficiency of policy-making, existential security, and potential change in policy-making resulting from the existence of autocratic government. Democratic transformation will be discussed in the following chapter.

1. Majority of Latin American states are unitary, and hardly differ one from another. The only federal Latin American states are Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela, but most people in Latin America live in a federal state. There are some 46 federational states in today's world, yet it is difficult to find two that would be the same. The following concepts of federalism, carried out in different states of Latin America in different proportions, are decisive for discussion of political culture:

- a) All three types of power – legislative, executive, and judiciary – must be present at both institutional levels: institutions of the federal state and institutions of the member of the Federation.
- b) The functional division of power is based on the fact that defined functions (tasks, permanent goals) of the state are conducted independently on either level.
- c) The characteristic features of culture, economy, etc. of the individual regions, whose borders usually coincide with the borders of members of the federation, are maintained.
- d) The principle of subsidiarity, in reference to the institutions of public authorities, and to the voluntary civic associations, is respected in the society of the federal state.

Federal character is always manifested in the consciousness of citizens, depending on the legal awareness, yet it may also be so to the extent to which: (1) The colonial “territorialism” (Carmagnani 1984) of the economic interests of local elites was finally overcome, and they were fully included into the supraregional market, with the simultaneous maintenance of the regional specific character, also cultural, and (2) the above is allowed by the centralist presidential system of policy-making and the system of elections – also in the

scope of its abuse. The situation where the problem of territorialism does not refer solely to the elite is not a typical one (Jan Szemiński told me how, on Sunday, in the market square of Cusco first the Peruvian flag is hoisted to the mast to the accompaniment of the Peruvian anthem, but immediately thereafter the Himno al Cusco is heard and the flag of Tawantinsuyu is hoisted).

The so-called *intervenciones*, i.e. the cases of assuming control over a province by the president of the federal republic in the place of the authorities of the province (a member of the federation) are a common phenomenon. Of specific importance is also the system of electing governors (of states, provinces, departments, territories, autonomous regions) in the non-federal states. In some of them, governors are elected in popular election (Nicaragua, Colombia, Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay) just like in the federal states. Moreover, in Paraguay, Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia – that is in unitary states – the departmental/regional/provincial legislative authorities are elected.

2. Policy-making is the operation of the state's executive power, that is carrying out the competencies on the basis and within the scope of law by the policy-making body. The principle of state policy-making by the executive power pertains to all the states, whatever their system, even though there have been systems where the decision-making body was the "party" group, governing under its "secretary", while the organ of state authority, not only of executive character, just rubber-stamped those decisions. The position of the policy-making body within the structure of executive power depends only on the constitutionally defined system of policy-making. In Latin American states, there is only one such organ, and this is the head of the state – the president, and as a rule she/he is elected in popular election. Rooted in the political culture is the authority of the leader (*jefe de Estado*, *jefe político*, *caudillo*, *líder*) that reinforces the legitimisation of the highest organ of executive power. The president holds the key power. This principle is similar for entire Latin America but variations do exist as to the powers accorded to the president and the kind of parties and party system (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997). There is no place here for the conflict between the president and the Cabinet, that is the team of ministers, and it used to be so even in those states where the traditional leading role of the Minister of Home Affairs was for some time replaced by that of the First Minister. In a democratic state in Latin America, however, there emerges the tension between the President and the Parliament. Both these organs or bodies of state power come from popular election, and this is the mandate that they fall back on in their disputes.

The parliamentary scrutiny covers only ministers, and not the president, with the exception of the impeachment procedure meaning accusation of the president before the parliament, considering him guilty and his removal from the post by the parliament. In some countries, the parliamentary majority may not be tantamount to the presidential party, yet in divided parliaments this ensures the president with a relatively broad freedom to act. At the same time, the parliament participates in the process of ratification of treaties concluded by the executive power, and history knows a long list of treaties that have never been ratified. Tolerating such a *status quo* signals the condition of legal awareness that is present in political culture which sanctions such politics of the president, who may refrain from ratifying a treaty, even should it be one his representative previously signed. Worth emphasising is the fact that in most cases it is the president who is the active subject, while the parliament remains the reactive one, which finds reflection in the construction of the legislative agenda (Cox and Morgenstern 2002: 446–468). One is allowed to believe that the functioning of organs of public authority may not continue clearly and for a long time against the political culture of the president, members of the parliament, and the staff involved. To quote Sondrol “*De jure*, but more importantly, *de facto* political arrangements in Latin America reflect a unique, corporatist and centralist tradition dating back to Spain’s Philip V and before. The coexistence of *de jure* republicanism and *de facto* authoritarianism in the region reflects a clash of values [...]. Dictatorship constitutionally disguised reflects the blending of institutions and attitudes inherited from Iberia of the fifteenth century and the United States of the eighteenth century. Cultural and institutional predispositions have fostered authoritarian leanings in the Latin American presidency. At the same time, the aspirational qualities of Latin American constitutions (no reelection provisions, legislative impeachment procedures, judicial review) reflects an equally powerful predilection for some mode of pluralistic politics.” Sondrol suggests that the Latin American presidential system may be “a different breed, mixing the primordial corporatist centrism of the region with the more modern tenets of pluralistic liberalism to produce a facade polyarchy that masks a civilian authoritarian system dominated, as always, by a strong executive. [...] Historically and presently, the influence of tradition and of prevailing conditions combine to expand Latin American presidential authority. The executive provides a rallying, unifying symbol, enhances respect for the autocratic state, and overpowers regional or factional challengers to the developmental goals of the regime. [...] This developmental model

does not correspond to those usually employed by Northern Europeans and North American modernisationists, who seem to view their own developmental process and socio-cultural values as exportable in a condensed version. Through an examination of the writings by Latin American *pensadores* reacting to their own caudillistic, personalistic and elitist cultural heritage, the present study of the Latin American presidency seeks to convey the idea that the institution represents a culturally congruent alternative to the United States prototype, not an aberration" (Sondrol 1990: 431–433). This argumentation may be reinforced by turning the attention to the importance of the machismo as a factor that is as characteristic for Latin American cultures as reinforcing various shades of authoritarianism, both in their predominantly "male" political elite and, more broadly, in the society. Relevant and widespread, the stable and respected beliefs are part and parcel of political culture.

3. Theoretically speaking, making policy, the president uses categories that analysts may see as part of the concept of *raison d'état*. It seems, however, that in the political vocabulary of Latin America, the notion of the "*raison d'état*" has acquired somewhat perverse connotations and it is rather the notion of "the national interest" that is used, even though it is quite rare. It has become a custom to present the goals of politics in a manner as descriptive as obscure, and aligned with nationalistic and populist rhetoric. This is most clearly required by political culture, independent of the differences between the states (Coniff 1999). Yet in the research of policy-making, a concept of the *raison d'état* or of the national interest is worth using. The content of such a concept may be the rationally justified requirement of policy-making based on a certain hierarchy of goals; in a democratic state – on the primacy of goals that are: a) stably connected with (1) the national identity (expressed in political concepts of the common good, fundamental liberties, existential security, justice, peace, and human rights), (2) basic functions of the state in law-making and law-implementation (including law-adjudication), (3) cooperation of organs of state power, and b) combining change with continuation, c) tested in continuous public discourse, d), non negotiable in relations with foreign subjects. (Stempkowski 2007: 207–216). What we discuss here is an ideal criterion. Whoever has analysed the speeches by Latin American presidents knows that reconstruction of the *raison d'état* on such grounds may border on the impossible.

The notion of a political concept of justice, much like of the fundamental liberties and existential security refer solely to the basic institutions of the state, which only partially connects these notions with the stable forms of consciousness, worldviews, ideologies, doctrines, philosophies of morality, religions, etc.

widespread in a pluralistic society; hence – with the political culture of people who are not a part of the broadly perceived composition of the bodies in question. (Yet we distinguish the political culture of individuals, only inasmuch as the political culture of such persons differs from the political culture related to the institutional bodies involved.)

Under military governments and civilian authoritarian presidencies, the rules of functioning of executive power quoted above apply with the following assumptions:

- a) a non-democratic type of presidency implies the concept of the national interest being the reflection of the objectives of the individual involved or group wielding power; present here may be different political cultures, including racist stereotypes and specific beliefs about the relationship between the given nation and other nations, and even nationalistic ideologies accompanying the formation of the concept autonomising “the nation” in the definition of the content of the national interest;
- b) political instability requires a politically exposed citizen to continuously monitor the legal state, including the information related to the implementation of the law being made by the incumbent president (with the limitation or liquidation of the legislative power, and the limitation of the judiciary), especially in the scope of human rights, respect for civil and legal contracts, and the property status; such an updating is performed in relation to the dominant political culture;
- c) the public discourse is controlled directly by the president, a fact also related to political culture;
- d) there is no effective parliamentary scrutiny; present here again is either contradiction or harmony with the political culture;
- e) responsibility of the president is decided along the rules established by the ruling group, which can be characterised in the categories of political culture;
- f) the awareness of the democrats that the values the ruling few are suppressing, are of significance for their opposition is becoming more and more acute; the connection between the policy-making and political culture of these people is obvious.

4. The policy-making: president makes decisions – as a politically rational decision maker – falling back on the identification of resources and frames of reference (even though it were only the position of his group or political party), operating in uncertain circumstances.

The process of policy-making is a set of feedbacks between the objectives of the stated policy with the goals in progress and the goals actually achieved, and

the process of policy-making by the president in a finite (defined) time is the grand total of such feedbacks. Construed in such a way, this process holds the potential of permanent updating of the objective and sequencing of the decision-making acts. Yet the inaccessibility of data on the decision-making process, even worse – the colossal obstacles in accessing the archives, if not the downright lack of documents in the archives – make it difficult to investigate the motivations and consequently the connection between the decisions made with the stable beliefs of decision-makers and other citizens, that is their political culture. Therefore, it will be difficult to use the knowledge of that culture in an examination of the state.

Political rationality is connected primarily to the identity of the president and – to a certain extent – personalities (including emotional profiles) of the president's staff and advisors, and also with their groups of reference, and finally: with the political consensus concerning the national interest. Political rationality allows the president to reinforce his hold on power. The recognised forms of political culture should be obviously useful here, as the president's decisions are to a great extent connected to his tactics. Documentation of the decision-making process conducted rarely bears traces of political rationality, even though such a rationality is obviously present. An insight into such a process could rather be provided in the form of published biographies, diaries or memoirs of its participants, yet such sources are scarce in Latin America.

The internal frame of reference includes the state's unitary or federal character. The president may "intervene" and subjugate the federational subjects (members of the federation), yet a democratically oriented president may strengthen his position towards the federal subjects even without an "intervention", by using instruments related to his unquestioned competences in foreign policy, and command over the Armed Forces. President's social radicalism may lead to the questioning of his position by federal subjects under control of the conservative forces opposing him. See Bolivia under the government of Evo Morales, and compare with what can be said on the federal system and the contemporary society in general (Schulte 1990; Reissert 1995).

The external frame of reference may be less complicated emotionally for the decision maker, yet highly differentiated. It is easier to observe the environment which is composed primarily by: the political situation, the global system, the self-evaluation of the position of the state within the system, international law, and the binding treaties. The assessment of the situation of the state should be performed, among others, with the internationally recognised indices and cri-

teria. Part and parcel of such a practice should be the evaluation of the efficiency of policy-making.

It seems that the political practice is based on the application of a vision of international relations, if not even a few at the same time. For an analyst and other people interested in world politics, the most important element in the frame of reference valid for every state may be the global system construed as the accumulated result of the feedback between subjects and processes, present since the end of the nineteenth century as a universal, procesual, multi-subject, functional, self-regulating system (Stemplowski 2007: 99–102). There are also other, varying concepts of the global system: the world system in Frank's model, and world-systems in Wallerstein's model. The explanation of these concepts lies, however, beyond the frameworks of this text. Worth noting is also the fact that even quite recently the notions of the periphery and the Third World were not familiar to everyone in Latin America, and among those who knew them, there were in some countries quite a few, whose political culture required the rejection of these notions when referring to their country, a fact that was especially true of the notion of "the Third World".

5. Policy-making is strongly efficient if maintaining the stability of the constitutional system of policy-making leads to the improvement of the state's position in the global system. It is the optimum one when maintaining the stability, the state reaches a record improvement. Supportive criteria may include: the efficiency of Mercosur and other regional cooperation agreements in Latin America, and in the future – of the Unasur system. A yardstick of this efficiency may be the political culture of those who operate at this level of consciousness, which though a small group is yet unresearched for its political culture.

6. The respect for the (real) property and the principles of justice belongs to the category of existential security (an ingredient of the notion of *raison d'état*), and the postulate of justice in Latin America must refer primarily to the distribution of wealth. One may risk the statement that the postulate of existential security is rooted – though differently formulated – in the political culture of every society, and the better we get to learn this culture, the more precisely we will understand that postulate. Yet, let us ask to what degree the concepts worked out in the prosperous societies apply to Latin American states? Is it the volume of assets that is the criterion, or is it rather its perception? How strong is the impact of relative deprivation? The scope of existential security entails also personal security. How does a residential district of a metropolis compare

here to the favelas? Going further, what is the position taken by Latin American governments viz. such blatant manifestations of the “inequality and the rule of law” that are found in the “police killings” (Brinks 2008), lawless intimidation and killing suspects and witnesses by the police in cities including Salvador, São Paulo, Buenos Aires, and Córdoba?

7. A specific aspect of the relationship between the state and the political culture results from policy-making defined as counterinsurgency, and being in its essence, state terrorism. This is how the state redefines the constitutionally declared institution of the rule of law, putting the citizen not only before the authority which is autocratic but also applies double legal standards. This is based primarily on the fact that the most repressive actions are concealed and publicly presented as apparent abuse of the apparatus of power, while in fact, they result directly from the policy-making of the government; they are conducted on the basis of governmental decisions and decisions of the bodies, services, and offices dependent on the government. Such a policy was present in the operations of the so-called “death squadrons” and even in the Operation Condor initiated during the cold war by the government of Chile and conducted jointly on the power of an agreement between the governments of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay, and in a certain scope also of Ecuador and Peru, by the special services of those states, with the knowledge and approval of the US government, and with the support of the CIA (McSherry 2007). It is hard to expect that the political culture of people from outside the government machinery or groups supporting it could develop the culture of civic identification with the state under such conditions.

Democratisation and political culture

The stability of certain features of colonial, metropolitan political culture in Latin America went hand in hand with the Latin American constitutional republicanism, that is something systematically – ergo also culturally – different from European (ex-)colonial metropolises throughout the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth century. Hence the idealistically formulated Latin American constitutions include the principles of the sovereignty of the people, division of powers, representational bodies, principles of equality of rights, electoral law, etc. with the simultaneous rejection of slavery, inquisition, aristocratic titles, privileges of catholic clergy, limitations of liberties, limitations of private ownership, etc. Nevertheless, this republican constitutional

order was contradictory not only with the (post)colonial order of the metropolis, but also with the practice of Latin American governments – authoritarian and rather akin to the colonial. Obviously, contemporary political cultures of those societies were related rather to the *ancien regime* and may be said to have posed barriers for the new order. The democratic Latin American republicanism drew on European doctrines and US federalism to excel over European monarchism (which is not contradicted by the fact that for a time Mexico and Brazil were monarchies), yet it never managed to transform into the practice of governing in Latin American states. This is why the economic and political development in the United States and Western Europe made the systems of Latin American states of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries measured with the model of the democratic state ruled by law outside Latin America, in the United States and Western Europe of the latter half of the twentieth century. It is mostly on this model that the typical conceptualisation of democratisation of Latin American states is based, with all the limitations of the Eurocentric approach. Hitherto, any new approach is still *in statu nascendi*.

There are features of political culture that favour democratisation, and yet some features of this culture result from the existence of democracy. In the process of democratisation – being a transformation of the systemic kind – there are processes that to a certain extent depend on the system from which one goes to democracy.

In the case of every state under transformation in Latin America: (a) the social grounds for wielding state power (legitimation) changes, which is followed by the legalisation of the previously existing party system, provided there had been one; (b) the implementation of a democratic constitution is restored, institutions of the democratic state are built by the restitution of the system for law-making and establishment of representative bodies of state power (president, parliament) through democratic elections; (c) the functioning of the judiciary is returned; which, however, does not automatically mean the automatic implementation of all the binding legal norms (with the saying *la ley se acata pero no se cumple*, retaining its validity to an extent). The state undergoing systemic transformation is potentially strong, if the success of transformation is assumed, yet the transformation runs from the level of a weak state under the conditions of weakness. (The transformation itself does not make the state, strong.) What is obviously discussed here is the transformation of autocracy into democracy, and not vice versa.

As I mentioned above, the weakness of a Latin American state is stable, which makes it foreseeable. Now, however, I would like to discard this semi-

ironic use of the notion of stability, for the benefit of the defined concept. I refer the notion of the stability of a constitutional system to human activity and legal institutions. The basic criterion for the stability of a constitutional system is not the change as such or the lack of changes, not even a defined single change; this is the combination of (a) two defined equivalent states of balance, (b) two defined changes, and (c) time, that is the combination of (1) the state of original balance, (2) the disruptions that originated in this state of balance, and (3) the return to the state of balance equivalent to the original state, with (4) the return taking place in a finite time. The "return" used in the definition does not mean only the process of returning, but the process ending up in the return. The constitutional system is strongly stable, if after the cessation of the disruption that originated in an existing state of balance, it returns to a condition that corresponds to the original state of balance. The lower levels of stability are a function of the partial process of returning. The empirical discovery of the equivalents of the state of balance assumes the existence of adequate knowledge, which may require historical research of the original condition.

The problem lies in how we define the disruption. It may be defined narrowly, as a change that renders the working out or carrying out the *raison d'état* or national interest impossible. Or it may be defined broadly, as the rule of authoritarian government. In a strongly instable system, to differentiate between balance and disruption may be impossible even in a longer period.

Let us, however, first consider the problem of the duration of the disruption. If the period when the disruptive circumstances last is very long, the question arises whether something that in its initial phase might be considered a disruption has not later transformed into a stable change in the system? Should the duration of the period of the disruption be immaterial for the application of the definition of stability quoted here, the returning of the electoral democracy in Chile in 1999 removes the disruption initiated with Pinochet's coup in 1973. Would, however, also a potential change of the system in Castro's Cuba end the period of the thus defined disruptions, if it were to return the democratic government from before the Batista dictatorship, introduced after a short lived period of democracy? In this case, it would rather be the democracy that would be a certain disruption in the authoritarian rule. The political culture of Cuba has been shaped under the influence of authoritarian or autocratic government throughout nearly its entire history. This is what happened before the revolution, this is how revolution functioned. "Revolutionary justice is based not on legal precepts, but on moral conviction" – Castro (quoted after Pérez 1995: 316). Yet culture is also shaped by the social welfare policies

initiated in 1959. "Since then the Cuban Revolution under Fidel Castro has scored some notable achievements, especially in the areas of health care, education and race relations" (Smith 2005: 24). Could achievements of this kind remain without influence on beliefs – even under authoritarian rule – and not contribute to the understanding of – for example – egalitarianism or speaking more broadly – of justice – if their impact went even beyond the borders of Cuba, and even Latin America? This, however, must be a selective influence, if one does not hear much about the eagerness to follow the Cuban family code with its prerequisite for the men to participate in the housework with the woman in full-time employment. Possibly because it does not work in Cuba either.

The fact of the repeated character of the disruptions, even should they be present for decades, is not a complication that would be insurmountable in the application of the definition quoted above – Argentina experienced in the twentieth century the following: electoral democracy in 1916–1930, a military coup in 1930, returning of the electoral democracy with limitations in 1932, a military coup in 1943, returning of the electoral democracy in 1958 – yet with the limitation of the operation of the Perón party, a military coup in 1966, returning the electoral democracy in 1973, a military coup in 1976, and returning of the electoral democracy in 1983 – yet during the financial crisis (caused by the servicing of the foreign debt) Argentina had five presidents in two weeks (without any coup d'état) in 2001.

The number of military coups in Latin America in the twentieth century, ranged from 15 in Bolivia to 1 in Uruguay, with the average of 8 per state. The high instability in nearly all the countries of the region influences the political culture, but definitely also partially results from it – both in the realm of the private and of the public. Naturally, one must account for the external conditioning of the period discussed (the Great Depression, the cold war). If the technological and economic development continues parallel to that, and the state is active as the owner of businesses and allows foreign investments, the more do the borders between the mentioned above realms of private and public blur, and so do those between the democratic and the partially democratic, while the political culture acquires a greater significance. Similar discussions may be conducted about the connection between political culture with distributional justice and stability (Uruguay and Costa Rica have the lowest Gini coefficient).

With the narrow definition of the disruption, one might point at stable systems only in the case of Costa Rica, Mexico, and Uruguay, and at the systems stable at the medium-range – in the case of the states that experienced no

more than half of the average number of *coups d'état*. With the application of the broad definition, no state is stable. Due to the high instability of the system measured in this way, and automatically resultant instability of the relationship between the state and political culture, the question arises whether it is not the concept of crisis management that should be used in the analysis of the relationship between the state and political culture? Yet does such a concept of crisis not come from the same political culture as the concepts of balance and disruption?

I have already made reference to the known fact that the research of Latin American states frequently reflects the opinion about superiority of highly industrialised societies of the centre of the global system over the peripheral societies. Some of the complications result from the fact that the analytical categories applied are value-laden. The classification of societies, political cultures, and states in the global system is predominantly based on comparing everything and everyone to the condition of the societies in the centre of the system. The touchstone here is the democratic state functioning in the centre of the global system, any other state is classified depending on the degree of similarity to such a central state. Developed thus is a hierarchy with the democratic state (at its top) and ones defined with notions pointing to the lack of certain qualities of the democratic state. The extreme illustration of that are the notions of "failed state" and "rogue state", and the claim of the lack of civil society, or at least about its underdevelopment, in states outside the centre of the global system. In literature concerning the Latin American state, special attention is drawn to the concepts of: modernisation, dependence, imperialism, authoritarianism, military dictatorship, democratisation (democratic transformation), low intensity democracy, *defekte Demokratie*, and state antinomies (*Estado anómico*).

It is impossible to point at a lastingly democratic state ruled by law (i.e. a liberal democracy) in Latin America, and for that reason a disruption – e.g. caused by a military coup – refers only to such an electoral democracy. For that reason, one may even ask whether the system of electoral democracy should not be treated as a disruption of the system of liberal democracy. Treating liberal democracy as the final criterion leads therefore actually to the openly Eurocentric, or rather corecentric measurement of political culture. At the same time, it remains a fact that the international debate on democratisation makes use primarily of the European model, and partially also of the federalist model of the USA.

Nevertheless, even a positive answer to the question about the legitimacy of applying a European measure (democracy) does not rule out examination of an

alternative solution. It could be the hypotheses that political cultures (including the institution of the state) in the societies of Latin America are not to be treated as reflections of European culture, yet the use of certain categories worked out in the culture could be allowed. Accordingly, one should assume that each Latin American state combines authoritarian institutions with democratic ones; and each state does it in a proportion it believes proper. This Creole republicanism would therefore be characterised by the advantage of one-man executive in the system of power that aligns – through the system of personal loyalties – the interests of groups with the greatest economic power with the interests of those best organised sectors of the state apparatus (at the same time having at their disposal the means of direct physical force). A citizen who is not a part of any of these groups aspires to build for himself beneficial relations with the people who are a part of such a group, accepting the authoritarianism of one-man power, the priority of personal relations, hierarchy, voluntary character, and arbitrariness at each level of political power and administration. Relations of this type are reflected commonly outside the system of relations with the people of power. Such a political culture encompasses everyone and everything. In result, the operation of the society is based on such principles, both within the realms of politics and outside it. Yet the social dynamism is also subject to the impulses of economic globalisation and cultural diffusion of systemic models. This is why the Creole republicanism evolves, although not in a linear manner, towards the systems prevalent in the states remaining in the centre of the global system.

Thus, finally, using the model of European democracy makes sense, yet not because it is “better” but because it is the system of the stronger which influences the weaker, and to a certain extent transforms the weak to its own image. It renders the systems similar – and – to a lesser extent, the scientists who research them.

Thus, political culture in Latin America, including the institution of the state, should not be considered in an Eurocentric or corecentric manner, as a system that is immature because it lacks something (democracy), etc, but as one well rooted in historical social processes, and developing at the same time. This development is to be examined not only or primarily as an imitation of European culture but rather as participation and cultural diffusion – through the globalisation mentioned earlier – covering political cultures in the scale of the global system. At the same time, one must notice the evolution of political culture in the countries of the centre. In these states, we encounter the long-term drop in the consequence of increasing dysfunction of the representative

institutions (the turnout at the polls fluctuates strongly, the capacity of effective parliamentary scrutiny of the government's activities is falling, the EU integration processes require quick action that is unattainable in large parliamentary bodies), increase of the role of private financing and economic organisation (also in producing and communication of information), weakening of the state exclusive functions (see private provision of military services) and reinforcements of the institutions of civic society (also in suprastate relations), instrumentalisation of religion and weakening of the educational function of the school, production of ever more efficient means of killing people, growth of uncontrolled degradation of the natural environment... It was in no other place, but in Europe that Nazism was born and the German State operated under martial law for 12 years, it was in European cities of Russia that the Soviet system was born, and in Central and Eastern Europe there were states with authoritarian governments between the two world wars, and the autocratic governments after the second world war: regimes of the state socialism. Modern colonialism was born in Europe. The indigenous inhabitants of America were subjugated by Europeans. When constitutional republics were established in Latin America, European monarchies were still to reign for another 100 years. Plenty of nondemocratic phenomena in various periods belong to the historical origins of the democratic state ruled by law, treated as the main – if not the only – model in the analysis of any political culture. Currently, political culture undergoes a sped-up globalisation, and even if we want democracy to become ever more encompassing, democratic culture is changing as well and ever more often it functions as the resultant – which does not mean average – of various states of political culture. Even Europe within the EU is not uniform as a democracy.

Turning the attention to the differences between systems and similarities between them can turn out to be useful, while explaining the institutional (legal) and sociological characteristics of the state, should we use one of the comparative studies methodologies: (1) "the most similar systems design" and (2) "the most different systems design", which Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune defined in the following manner: "The most similar systems design is based on a belief that a number of theoretically significant differences will be found among similar systems and that these differences can be used as explanation. The alternative design, which seeks maximal heterogeneity in the sample of systems, is based on a belief that in spite of intersystem differentiation, the populations will differ with regard to only a limited number of variables or relationships" (Przeworski and Teune 1982: 39, quoted after Merkel, Puhle,

Croissant, Thiery 2006: 10). In this methodology, one may account for the perception of the state through political culture, unless one takes the position represented by the author of the most developed application of this methodology to analyse democracy in Latin America (Peru, Mexico, Argentina), Peter Thiery, who finds no significant importance in the category of political culture (Thiery 2006: 54).

Political culture and collective identity

Like state in the political, political culture is rooted in the cultural, i.e. the capacity as well as propensity to build and express individual and collective identity and other forms of social consciousness. Collective identity comes first as the propensity of individuals and families to build a multi-family and multi-generational group (community). Based on the fundamental values shared by all the members of the group and functioning in direct contact. Nationality, in turn, is the propensity to build a community of a specific type, the nation: the largest community based on the belief in joint origin and of the decisive importance of this origin for the identity. Which is how it is allowed to be interpreted in European experience and, to a certain extent, in an analysis of the Latin American state. Of special importance in this community is the shared language, the shared tradition (including religion), and the shared economic space. The institution of the state turns up as the most important institutional correlate of these phenomena and processes. Many European states, with their history uninterrupted since the early Middle Ages, operated in harmony with the processes of cultural development of thus construed national identity; the European states without such a continuity – if the lack of their statehood occurred in the period of the quickest forming of the modern nations, that is from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century (the situation of e.g. Poland) – were reborn in the result of the existence of (a) some external premises and (b) of a modern nation formed for a number of generations without their own state. (In such a country, social consciousness form appear which allows the nation to be juxtaposed to the state as if an autonomous entity.)

Compared to Europe, a different variation is present in Latin America, where the precolonial rule was destroyed but some institutions persisted. In colonies, with the passage of time, collective consciousnesses of dual character began to take shape, connecting what came from Europe, with what was being built already in America. Later, the divorce from the metropolises led to the formu-

lation of collective identities that though autonomous, were yet with immediately notable cultural and economic mechanism that separated the descendants of the indigenous American people and slaves from Africa from the population of European origin. Although *mestizaje* was present, yet not everywhere with the same impact on statistics, though everywhere with similar impact on the social structure. Autonomous towards the metropolises, these collectives assumed key positions in the new states. These were these new states that became the basic institutional material for the construction of the new nationality. The descendants of people of the non-European origin had to wait long for formal civic rights in the acts of law, yet in practice this inequality has not yet been fully eradicated, and its source has been not only ethnical. Both a black and a white inhabitant of the Brazilian Bahia state, both typically poor, see that the black "African tourists" from the USA, frequently met there, live in the five-star Hilton hotel.

Yet both these observers are to consider themselves Brazilians, following the *ius soli* principle (the birthright citizenship: where citizenship depends on the place of birth). In Latin America, citizenship has been identified with nationality. This was made easier by the language, as *nacionalidad* was identified with *cuidanía*, which was reinforced by legal formulas, thus *la nación* is not only the nation but also the state as a specific type of organisation of the society (e.g. "La Constitución de la Nación Argentina" of 1949).

In the 1930s, the ideologists of *Deutschtum* went the opposite way, as they treated all the German speaking individuals, regardless of their origin and nationality, as a community that is extended world-wide and united in their Germanic loyalty also beyond the Latin American nations and borders (Stemplowski 1975: 80–112). Similar was the action of the contemporary Italian fascists, who reinforced the ties and connections of the immigrants and their descendants to the old homeland of the forefathers. A similar direction, although without any aggressive purposes and to much a smaller scale, was followed at that time by the Polish teachers sent to support the Polish "national substance" to Argentinean Misiones and Brazilian Paraná. These activities with quite a moderate result reinforced, however, certain elements of political culture in the milieu of people aware of their national origin: elements of political culture of their countries of origin (Stemplowski 1991: 33–38).

Similar direction was followed by some catholic priests, despite the generally integrative function of the Roman Catholic Church in Latin America (even the relatively recent "liberation theology" did not challenge the idea of the nation, although it accentuated social justice, and rejected nationalism in an

orthodox manner). The integrative function of the church favoured the political culture of accepting every state. Although bishops blessing military dictatorship as the bulwark against – quite imaginary – communism were not few, there were some others who stood openly on the side of the excluded, irrespective of the beliefs of those simple people. “When I give bread to the poor, they call me saint; and when I ask why the poor have no bread, they say I’m a Communist” (Archbishop Helder Câmara, from Olinda-Recife Archbishopric). Despite the fall of the USSR, in the case of a bishop, “communism” cannot be replaced with “Islamism”, yet the use of the term “terrorism” is still not fully ruled out.

The themes of the crisis of identity developed in the twentieth century *belles lettres* and political journalism concern the middle-class and predominantly the immigrant states. It is there that “el hombre está solo y espera” (Leopoldo Lugones). In such circumstances, characteristic for the political culture is the uncertainty of its routine, and this is why the state-building messages that it sends out may be ambiguous.

The comment made above concerns also political parties. Parties of all colour develop their activity in Latin America, being more of election platforms than mass organizations. The radical left has criticised local communist parties at least since the 1960s, dissociated themselves from the practices of East European state socialism, and took to arms in the romantic efforts of young intelligentsia ineffectively seeking allies among the underprivileged classes. Official experts bickered in the USA whether that “communism” was the result of the poverty omnipresent in Latin America, or of Soviet agents. Just in case, the governments of the United States supported, or at least tolerated, Latin American dictatorships, possibly even inspiring some of the coups, as the lesser evil and realistic alternative to the ideals like “alliance for progress” or Allende’s socialism. That built a political culture where a political party seeks an ally in the army and not in the civil society. Officers, in their turn, correctly perceiving the military as the best-organised institution in a weak state, were becoming used to the political culture of modelling missions of armed forces as a quasi-political party, if not a quasi-social class (Stemplowski 1998). Attempts were made to introduce into the society the belief that the border between what is safe and unsafe for the state runs through the consciousness of a citizen, for which reason the military must intervene within the realm of thought, and if the military ideology of national security is insufficient, more radical means must be applied. Inefficiency of the state in ensuring justice and security, with the simultaneous application of the direct measures, and at times even physical

extermination, on behalf of the state – by the military, president, local dignitaries, or even a latifundist invoking “the order” – must reinforce a political culture that believes that sometimes one must take justice into own hands. Illegitimate violence may be condemned, yet violence as such may be a value accepted by the society. This ambivalence is strongly visible in political culture and, as a feedback, debilitates the impact of the principles of the formally binding constitution.

The sense of national identity may impact the question that is currently most important in bilateral Inter-American relations, namely the regulation of migration. Who demands respect for the identity of the incoming immigrants, assumes stability of some scope of their political culture, and at the same time assumes that their political cultures will impact the system of their new country of residence. The “ethnic” media in the United States consist of hundreds of newspapers, and radio and TV stations. Majority of them are in Spanish. There are also such schools. On the other hand, religious institutions in the new places of residence are rather multiethnic. Migrants in Latin America are not organised. They may vote in Latin American elections to local authorities, yet for understandable reasons, integration develops initially mostly through the market. At the lowest levels of skill political culture plays no significant role. Especially in migrations between the countries of Latin America, there are few people with higher education, and still their ability to adapt to different conditions is higher than average.

In reference to Latin American states, a special role is played by migration of people with higher education between Latin America, and the United States and Europe; migrations caused by the repressions of military governments and changed circumstances after their fall. During forced exile in highly developed countries, numerous immigrants acquire new professional qualifications. Moreover, they learn to live in a different political culture, which they later transfer, to a certain extent, to their native countries. They return physically to the community that they never deserted, but onto which they have a direct impact after their return, as people with slightly different set of beliefs, and with somewhat changed political culture. The most important groups among those are economists and lawyers, men of letters and journalists. Many of them are partisans of neoliberalism. These are usually people with anti-military attitude, pro-democratic stance, and pro-statist orientation; they are the partisans of the broadest possible application of human rights. In most cases they hail from outside the traditional “old” elite; an elite that they displace from public life. They are the carriers of professionalised political culture correlated with the group interest of the potentially new machinery of efficient executive branch of

power as the outward manifestation of the national state. This is an idealism of a new kind. These people probably reinforce all major political forces.

Seeking for further factors binding the institution of the state to collective, national consciousness, we should ask about the importance of presidential and parliamentary elections. Political culture is manifested in all its components, beginning with the elections statute and ending with elections behaviours. Pointing at specific connections requires further research.

The specific characteristics of each national identity, the distinctiveness of each nation and each political culture are related also to the differences in the institution of a national state in Latin America. In Latin America, combined effects of the cultural and the political developed forms similar to the European nation-state, and the differences are connected mostly to the scope and level of social integration. High cultural heterogeneity is at the same time diversification in the field of political culture, and discussions of it facilitate examining the state from various perspectives.

Should we follow Whitehead and other authors believing that the states of the Southern Cone were the ones best organised at the end of the twentieth century, and the states of central America (apart from Costa Rica) – worst, then Mexico and Brazil may qualified to the medium level of state organisation. Following Whitehead, Mexico and Brazil, at the beginning of the financial crisis (the previous one, that is, in 1982), “possessed perhaps the most sophisticated and effective, certainly the most ambitious and self-confident, state autocracies of the region. By contrast, at either of the two extremes, we witness far less in the way of positive change, and also much less growth in self-confidence. Since 1982 the impression of relentless advance has been reversed, through the region, by the debt crisis and the consequent near bankruptcy of most states...” (Whitehead 1998: 385). One is allowed to believe that “ambition”, “self-confidence”, and “relentlessness” are connected to political culture. This is how culture keeps influencing the organisation of the state and is undergoing a change as induced by that organisation.

Closing remarks

The deliberations above underpin my presumption that the cultural and the political of Latin American societies have led to the development of political culture, wherein the ancient Creole republicanism connects with autocracy and

democracy in different proportions for different states (and even for the ethnically differentiated groups and regions in individual countries), the states as organisations with significant *pueblos originarios* being still divided along the cultural line. In fact, in Latin America, the state as an organisation is not (yet?) a fully integrated national state, and the cultural and the political have (as yet?) hardly anywhere brought about the establishment of a society organised as a political nation that is functioning with the use of institutions of the state that is actually and generally accepted in the political culture of a given society, and different states feature different levels of such an integration. In the currently operating states, there are visible – although not everywhere the same – cultural variations, also in the sense of political culture. In the light of the existing literature of the subject, including also my own research, the very notion of political culture remains ambiguous for being too general.

The question why the systemic principles of Latin American states for nearly 200 years did not manage to take a permanent, deep and widespread root beyond the text of the constitution, cannot be fully answered by portraying the limitations of Eurocentrism in system models. One should rather point to the importance of the norms reinforced in the period preceding the earliest stages of building independent statehood. It may be worthwhile to consider the hypothesis that where the cultural will not lead to the establishment of a group with collective identity, with characteristic feature being the capability to manage other groups (from outside the realm covered by its collective identity), the political of such a group does not result in the establishment of a state capable of surviving in the original institutional shape. All in all, making use of literature devoted to political culture is walking on quicksand, even if one is aided by a relatively operational definition. The state view from the angle of political culture, discloses many of its aspects, yet its image does not in this way become much clearer, gaining rather depth and shades. The connection between the state and the political culture naturally exists, yet the results of seeking a specific cause-and-effect connection allow speaking of no more than probability. The more so, as the dearth of Latin Americanist studies of state and political culture combines here with shortage of such research in Latin America. Finally, the parallelism between thinking about the cultural and the political is manifested – on the one hand – in their inconsistently controlled Eurocentrism, which in turn is accompanied on the other hand by the eagerness to accentuate the non-European uniqueness and supposition that if the European observer does not understand something in Latin America, it is because this “something” carries within itself *ex definitione* a deepness of meanings. Despite all

these, discussion of these ties helps us in thinking about the state – both as an institution and as the specific type of organisation of the society, functioning thanks to the systemic connection of norms (building material for institutions) with the population living in a natural environment within a specific territory and developing in the cultural and the political, that is about the nation state. Stabilisation of democracy in Latin American states and the increased prosperity of the population will favour the depreciation of the political significance of satisfying basic needs, appreciating the importance of institution- and culture-related problems of the state (Ingelhart 1989; Pye 1993). Yet before one will be able to say something more revealing about such a State from the point of view of political culture, accounting both for continuity and social change, before one will actually be able to clarify the issues and questions of the state through discussion of political culture, there is a huge work to be performed in research.

Translated by Piotr Krasnowolski



CARLOS ESCUDÉ

La civilización iberoamericana y sus relaciones internacionales

Introducción metodológica

Este ensayo parte de la premisa de que el verdadero actor de las relaciones “internacionales” no es el Estado, sino lo que el norteamericano Robert Cox llamó el “complejo Estado/sociedad civil”. Este concepto, inspirado a su vez en el pensamiento de Antonio Gramsci, nos recuerda que desde la perspectiva de un tiempo mediano o largo, la política exterior es menos el producto de la voluntad de gobernantes que de profundas fuerzas económicas, sociales y culturales, muchas de ellas internas, que condicionan a los gobernantes.

Por eso, más que catalogar hechos y tratados, este trabajo procura dilucidar las causas que explican (hipotéticamente) el peculiar lugar que América latina ocupa en las relaciones internacionales del mundo actual. Para ello, y porque el pasado es prólogo, penetrará en algunos procesos históricos, principalmente relacionados con la formación de estos Estados.

Por cierto, la dialéctica propia del “complejo Estado/sociedad civil”, que supone un condicionamiento recíproco y permanente entre ambos términos de esta ecuación, conduce a la premisa complementaria de una fuerte *path dependence*. Partimos del supuesto de que la posición de los países latinoamericanos, en y frente al mundo, no puede comprenderse cabalmente si no nos remitimos a algunas peculiaridades provenientes de su mismo nacimiento y origen.

Por otra parte, este enfoque tiene sus costos y beneficios. Debido a limitaciones de espacio, la mayor profundidad de la explicación causal obliga a reducir el número de asuntos analizados. Lejos estaremos de describir las características específicas de (por caso) cada acuerdo de libre comercio con países ajenos a la región. En su lugar, analizaremos los atributos de las socieda-

des propensas a tales acuerdos, en contraste con los de aquellas que parecen renuentes a los mismos. En otras palabras, privilegiaremos la comprensión del tipo de fenómeno sobre la descripción de los casos individuales.

Finalmente, en este estudio se prioriza el análisis de los fenómenos auténticamente “internacionales” sobre aquellos que son meramente “interestatales”. Por ejemplo: debido a que involucra pulsiones contradictorias entre Estado y sociedad, que cruzan de país a país de manera muy compleja, el fenómeno del narcotráfico interesa más que un bloque comercial como el MERCOSUR, que parece más un ejercicio de retórica de políticos y gobernantes, que un auténtico boceto de integración supranacional.

Similarmente, nos importa más el análisis de las consecuencias transnacionales del incipiente carácter fallido de algunos Estados, que la crónica de proyectos como la Alternativa Bolivariana para las Américas (ALBA), lanzada por Venezuela en La Habana en diciembre de 2004; el Banco del Sur, creado también por dicho país en 2007; el Tratado Constitutivo de la Unión de Naciones Sudamericanas (Unasur), firmado en Brasilia en mayo de 2008, o la aún nonata propuesta brasileña de fundar un Consejo Sudamericano de Defensa.

El mencionado Tratado de Unasur busca emular a la Unión Europea. ALBA pretende ser una alternativa al fracasado ALCA (el Acuerdo de Libre Comercio para las Américas, que propusiera Estados Unidos en 1994). El Consejo Sudamericano de Defensa aspira a reemplazar la estéril Junta Interamericana de Defensa, que funciona en Washington. El Banco del Sur se presenta como alternativa al Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, el Banco Mundial y el Fondo Monetario Internacional.

Es verdad que tales ejercicios no deben ser ignorados por los cronistas de las relaciones interestatales. Sin embargo, son de interés menor para este trabajo porque (en vista de las experiencias previas de la región) por el momento parecen pertenecer más al ámbito de los rituales de la diplomacia (estilo latinoamericano), que al de los procesos que realmente moldean el futuro de las sociedades. Téngase por caso el lanzamiento en 2006, con bombos y platillos, del Gasoducto del Sur, que habría de haber atravesado escollos geográficos colosales para llegar desde Venezuela hasta Argentina, pero ya estaba olvidado en 2008.

Por cierto, aunque “ninguna otra región del mundo tiene tantos tratados, cartas, documentos, convenciones y resoluciones multilaterales y bilaterales”, en la práctica la mayoría de estos acuerdos no se cumple, y el concierto latinoamericano resuelve sus problemas puntuales a través de negociaciones diplomáticas *ad hoc* (Arie Kacowicz, 2005: capítulo 3).

No obstante, detrás de la actual proliferación de propuestas de integración, muchas de ellas inspiradas en sentimientos anti norteamericanos, subyace un hecho muy significativo. Más allá de que tales proyectos fructifiquen o se esfumen, su número y diversidad ilustra el eclipse relativo de Estados Unidos como potencia hegemónica en la región.

Por cierto, el margen de maniobra externo de los Estados latinoamericanos se ha ampliado significativamente debido a:

- la relativa disminución de la capacidad de sanción de los Estados Unidos, cuyos recursos están drenados por los conflictos mundiales en que están comprometidos,
- el desprestigio de su diplomacia debido a los engaños y fracasos que acompañaron a la guerra de Irak; y
- la crisis económica que asoma en la propia economía estadounidense, que parece indicar que Washington tampoco es la mejor consejera en materia económica.

Esta ampliación del margen de maniobra externa es una variable contextual que deberá mantenerse in mente a lo largo de nuestro análisis.

Parte I – El iberoamericano: una paradoja agridulce

Las variables dependientes

Dos epifenómenos especialmente relevantes caracterizan a la región latinoamericana. No sólo distinguen a estos países de manera singularísima, sino que parecen vinculados entre sí por una relación causal, indirecta y paradójica:

1. La relativa ausencia de guerra internacional y genocidio masivo durante toda su historia, aunque más significativamente en el siglo XX, y
2. La concentración del ingreso, que es la más alta entre todas las regiones del mundo.

Si agregamos un elemento valorativo, el primer fenómeno resulta “benigno” y el segundo, “perverso”. Cómo se verá, el vínculo causal indirecto entre ambos proviene, conjeturalmente, de las particularidades de la formación del Estado en las antiguas provincias americanas de los imperios ibéricos.

El primero de los rasgos anotados remite a la hipótesis formulada por Miguel Ángel Centeno, acerca de la excepción representada por América latina frente al “modelo belicista” de formación del Estado, de amplia difusión en la

sociología política. Éste fue formulado, entre otros, por Charles Tilly y Samuel E. Finer, sobre la base de aportes precursores de Max Weber y Otto Hintze. En verdad, el aforismo de Tilly, “la guerra hizo al Estado y el Estado hizo la guerra”, convertido en cliché, es uno de los de mayor circulación de todos los tiempos en las ciencias sociales.

Esta dialéctica funcionó de manera imperfecta en América latina, porque allí casi no hubo guerras totales que obligaran a movilizar las sociedades de una manera absoluta, so pena de sufrir la extinción del propio Estado. Las guerras totales exigen la extracción de ingentes recursos humanos y materiales, y sólo pueden ser libradas por Estados institucionalmente capaces de imponer tales exacciones. La guerra consolida esa capacidad, y superado el conflicto, deja una herencia institucional positiva y duradera:

The building of a successful military machine imposed a heavy burden on the population involved: taxes, conscription, requisition, and more. The very act of building it – when it worked – produced arrangements which could deliver resources to the government for other purposes. (Thus almost all the major European taxes began as ‘extraordinary levies’ earmarked for particular wars, and became routine sources of governmental revenue). It produced the means of enforcing the government’s will over stiff resistance: the army. It tended, indeed, to promote territorial consolidation, centralization, differentiation of the instruments of government and monopolization of the means of coercion, all the fundamental state-making processes. War made the state, and the state made war (Tilly 1975: 42).

Este mecanismo estuvo en gran medida ausente en América latina y este señalamiento es la principal contribución de Centeno en el estudio de esta cuestión. Antes había sido escuetamente anunciado por el mismo Tilly, en palabras que a su vez remiten al concepto de “tiempo mundial” difundido por Immanuel Wallerstein: “*The European state-building experiences will not repeat themselves in new states. The connections of the new states to the rest of the world have changed too much*” (Tilly 1975: 81).

Ciertamente, la experiencia latinoamericana no fue ni podía ser similar a la de Estados del “viejo mundo”. Por el contrario, a diferencia de los europeos, la mayoría de los Estados de América latina nacieron súbitamente, como consecuencia de la crisis generada en la Península Ibérica por las guerras napoleónicas. Los procesos que culminaron con su fundación no se originaron en su interior (como ocurrió con las trece colonias angloamericanas), sino en acontecimientos de ultramar. Su verdadero libertador fue Bonaparte (Cisneros y Escudé 1998; Tomo 1). Muy lejos estaban las ciudades-estado hispanoamericanas,

que adquirieron autonomía gracias a la invasión napoleónica de España, de poder imponer a sus poblaciones la movilización masiva requerida para la guerra total. A partir de entonces, las guerras latinoamericanas fueron casi siempre limitadas. Y paradójicamente, este carácter limitado de la guerra resultó disfuncional para la formación de instituciones estatales verdaderamente fuertes (Centeno 2002: 21–24).

Este razonamiento nos planta ante una bella paradoja. Por una parte, es verdad que no hay mayor bendición que la de no padecer guerras totales. Pero por la otra, hay pocas maldiciones peores que la de ser súbdito de un Estado incapaz de hacerse obedecer. Tal Estado es fácilmente capturado por elites depredadoras (Escudé 2006: 125–147). Carece de la autonomía necesaria para oficiar de mediador en las disputas de la sociedad civil. Al convertirse en el instrumento de una elite, puede llegar a ser despótico, pero sigue siendo institucionalmente débil: no es autónomo. Jamás se convirtió en un movilizador totalitario de recursos, como lo fueron tanto Estados Unidos y Gran Bretaña como Alemania y Rusia en tiempos de guerra total. Y precisamente porque no atravesó esos episodios de totalitarismo (a veces) pasajero, no desarrolló las instituciones necesarias para superar un autoritarismo (frecuentemente) crónico.

La guerra y la paz

No obstante, la afirmación de que la región latinoamericana se caracteriza por la relativa ausencia de guerra internacional no está libre de controversias en la bibliografía académica. En su *Violent Peace*, por ejemplo, David Mares aplica una metodología cuantitativa para sostener que:

In terms of international wars since 1816 (the start date for quantitative studies of war) Latin America is not exceptionally peaceful. Europe (30) is by far the most warlike, followed by Asia (22) and Latin America (20) [...]. Latin America's ranking is not entirely different when we just examine the twentieth century. [...] The frequency of Latin American wars (6) in that century keeps the region in the middle of the group (Mares 2001: 27).

En contraste, otros especialistas como A. Kacowicz (1998) y M. Desch (1998: 245–265) consideran que, en términos comparativos, América latina ha disfrutado de una “larga paz”. Y en *Blood and Debt*, Centeno afirma:

There have been very few international wars involving (Latin American states) in almost two centuries of independence. [...] Even if we include civil wars, Latin America has enjoyed relative peace. [...] Worldwide, Latin America stands out for the general absence of organized slaughter. [...] Nowhere is the

general peace of the continent more clearly seen than on a map. Examine a map of Latin America in 1840 and the general borders [...] look surprisingly like today's. While early units such as Gran Colombia have vanished [...], no politically recognized state has disappeared through conquest. In almost two hundred years of independent history Latin America has yet to lose a Poland, a Burgundy, a Saxony, or a Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (Centeno 2002: 9).

Quizás esta diferencia de percepciones académicas esté condicionada por las divergentes deformaciones profesionales de sociólogos y politólogos. Por lo menos parte del desacuerdo proviene de la metodología cuantitativa de Mares, que equipara las guerras mundiales con la de Malvinas, un episodio que, con menos de mil muertos, ni siquiera alcanza el requisito convencional de la ciencia política para ser considerada "guerra".

En cualquier caso, las cifras y tablas sobre muertos en batalla presentadas en *Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816–1980*, el estudio ya clásico de Small y Singer (1982), le dan ampliamente la razón a Centeno. Y no es menor el dato que éste apunta arriba: nunca ha desaparecido un país iberoamericano debido a su conquista por un vecino. En el concierto europeo, en cambio, ha ocurrido en múltiple ocasiones. Polonia, por ejemplo, fue repartida entre sus vecinos más poderosos en 1772, 1793 y 1795, y no volvió a ser independiente hasta 1918. El Reino de las Dos Sicilias fue anexado a Italia por conquista en 1861, para nunca más volver. Hay cientos de casos similares, perdidos en la amnesia colectiva, cuyo nombre no sería reconocido por el lector medio excepto como provincia del país que lo conquistó. En el concierto latinoamericano, tales desenlaces serían culturalmente inaceptables para pueblos y gobiernos.

En verdad, por más que el escudo de Chile incluya un lema belicoso, "Por la razón o la fuerza", en sus casi dos siglos de independencia jamás libró una guerra contra Argentina. En contraste, en ese período Francia y Alemania libraron tres guerras, en 1870, 1914–1918 y 1939–1945. Las últimas dos fueron las mayores catástrofes bélicas de toda la historia humana registrada.

Algo similar se registra en la historia de las relaciones entre Argentina y Brasil. En toda su vida independiente libraron una sola guerra, muy limitada por cierto, que pueda definirse como auténticamente interestatal: la de 1825–1828. Es la única registrada como tal por la historiografía argentina. La versión brasileña agrega una segunda instancia, la del derrocamiento del dictador Juan Manuel de Rosas en 1852, cuando los mini-estados argentinos de Entre Ríos y Corrientes, en alianza con Brasil, derrotaron al mini-estado argentino de Buenos Aires. En cualquier caso, la situación es bien distinta a la de los grandes

Estados contiguos de Europa: desde bastante antes de la unificación italiana (1870) y alemana (1871), no ha habido conflictos bélicos entre Argentina y Brasil.

También es significativo que, aunque tanto Brasil como Argentina poseen más tecnología nuclear que cualquier país del Medio Oriente excepto Israel, estos vecinos sudamericanos están en las antípodas de la India y Pakistán, en términos de su amistad y cooperación nuclear. Brasil desarrolla un submarino nuclear. Argentina exporta reactores – su cliente más reciente es Australia, un país avanzado. Aunque hasta 1979, año de la firma del Tratado de Corpus-Itaipú, hubo competencia entre ambos en el ámbito del desarrollo atómico, desde entonces rige una cooperación activa en este delicado campo.

Por cierto, abonando la tesis de la propensión latinoamericana a la paz, con el acceso al Tratado de No Proliferación Nuclear de Argentina en 1994 y de Brasil en 1998, América latina se convirtió en la mayor región del planeta libre de amenazas nucleares. Y en febrero de 2008, ambos países firmaron un acuerdo para el establecimiento de una planta binacional para enriquecer uranio con fines comerciales, bajo el sistema de salvaguardias de la Agencia Internacional de Energía Atómica.

A pesar de la controversia, parece claro que la región es la más pacífica del orbe en términos de guerras interestatales. América del Norte la supera en términos intra-regionales, pero exporta violencia masiva. A lo largo de los doscientos años de independencia latinoamericana, los Estados de Europa y América del Norte han tenido casi cuatro veces más hombres alistados y mataron a decenas de millones más que los de América latina. Además, con el tiempo ésta se volvió más pacífica, siendo el siglo XX menos violento que el XIX en términos de guerras, tanto interestatales como civiles (Centeno 2002: 37).

Obviamente, esto no significa que en ella no haya violencia a raudales. Pero incluso en el ámbito del conflicto interno, América latina no ha sido partícipe de ninguno de los holocaustos globales del siglo XX. Sin ánimo apologético, resulta claro que ni Pinochet ni Videla son comparables con Hitler o Pol Pot. Como señala Centeno, ni la religión secular del nacionalismo, ni el odio étnico, ni el fanatismo religioso, ni el fervor ideológico, condujeron en ella a genocidios de la magnitud de los protagonizados por Estados europeos, asiáticos y africanos. No hubo, en los doscientos años de vida independiente de la región, el equivalente de una guerra civil española, una limpieza étnica como la de la ex Yugoslavia, una tragedia análoga al genocidio armenio, o masacres como las protagonizadas en Ruanda entre hutus y tutsis. Incluso los guerrilleros de la región son incomparablemente menos peligrosos que Al Qaeda, Hamas

o Hezbolá, a la vez que hasta ahora no se ha dado en ella un caso de terrorismo secesionista exitoso como el del IRA original, que diera nacimiento a la República de Irlanda en pleno siglo XX.

Por cierto, incluso en este delicado tema del separatismo, América latina registra una historia peculiar. La secesión de Panamá (que era parte de Colombia), único acontecimiento de este tipo en el siglo XX, fue perpetrada en 1903 con la instigación y apoyo de una potencia extraregional, Estados Unidos, que estaba interesada en la construcción y dominio de un canal transoceánico en ese territorio.

Es verdad que resulta difícil realizar una contabilidad de secesiones latinoamericanas en el siglo XIX, porque la región está signada por un común origen ibérico que le legó muchas ambigüedades, en términos de qué territorio corresponde a qué jurisdicción. En el pasado, ese legado se prestó a que lo que desde un país se consideraba secesión, fuera percibido desde otro como un desenlace acorde con la doctrina del *uti possidetis juris* ("poseerás lo que poseías"), convenida en el siglo XIX por el concierto regional.

No obstante, es evidente que la actitud latinoamericana actual hacia el separatismo es marcadamente diferente a la del concierto europeo. Esto se verifica en el momento de entrega de este trabajo al editor, cuando Bolivia corre el peligro de sufrir la secesión de cuatro de sus departamentos. Uno de ellos es Santa Cruz de la Sierra, que produce el 50 por ciento del PBI boliviano y posee el 10 por ciento de sus recursos de hidrocarburos. Otro es Tarija, con el 85 por ciento de las reservas de gas natural de ese país. El primero linda con Brasil y el segundo con Argentina.

Si este escenario se presentara en Europa, Asia o África, las maniobras de los Estados circundantes probablemente estarían enderezadas a competir por estos bocados de cardenal. Pero no en Iberoamérica, cuya civilización rechaza esa rapiña a la vez que condena de plano la conquista. En cambio, Estados Unidos instaló como embajador en Bolivia a un experto en secesiones, Philip Goldberg, cuyo puesto anterior había sido en Kosovo. Alentó el separatismo de Santa Cruz hasta que fue expulsado por el gobierno boliviano, en septiembre de 2008.

El contraste entre este idealismo iberoamericano y la cruel *realpolitik* practicada por europeos y estadounidenses no podría ser más agudo. En la ex Yugoslavia, por ejemplo, violando los Acuerdos Dayton de 1995, la OTAN instigó la separación de la provincia serbia de Kosovo, cuya independencia fue reconocida por la mayoría de sus miembros en febrero de 2008. Como respuesta a este acto que consideró inamistoso, en agosto Rusia reconoció la independencia de Osetia del Sur y Abjasia, provincias pro-rusas de Georgia.

Estas maniobras de inspiración geopolítica se llevaron a cabo a pesar de que sientan precedentes peligrosos, tanto para Rusia como para algunos miembros de la OTAN. Por cierto, en el bloque occidental, España padece el separatismo de los vascos. Y la Federación Rusa es un imperio multiétnico que no sólo enfrenta enemigos secesionistas en Chechenia, Ingushetia y Daguestán. Varias otras repúblicas de mayoría islámica, menos agitadas que éstas, permanecen en la Federación sólo por la permanente presencia militar rusa, a la vez que en Kaliningrado, enclave ruso entre Polonia y Lituania, son muchos los rusos étnicos que preferirían formar parte de la Unión Europea antes que de la Federación.

Por lo tanto, no se puede argüir que esta diferencia entre Europa y América latina surja del temor de países como Argentina y Brasil de sufrir sus propias mutilaciones territoriales, si cayeran en la tentación de instigar el secesionismo de territorios ajenos, como Tarija y Santa Cruz. Argentina y Brasil no enfrentan desafíos separatistas en el presente. En cambio, el hecho de que Rusia y algún país de la OTAN lidien con enemigos secesionistas muy peligrosos y actuales, no impide que tanto Moscú como la Alianza Atlántica agiten esos demonios en otras latitudes. Hay algo en la cultura política y ética del concierto latinoamericano que prohíbe a sus Estados especular con secesiones ventajosas, impidiendo la vigencia, entre ellos, de la cabal *realpolitik* que salvajemente practican europeos y angloamericanos.

En verdad, para la cultura iberoamericana el territorio de un Estado es inmutable, y las disputas emergen de desacuerdos respecto de qué territorio pertenece, casi ontológicamente, a cada una de las partes de un conflicto. Los europeos, en cambio, están mucho más acostumbrados al cambio violento de los límites fronterizos.

Este contraste en términos de la significación del modelo del Estado belicista, que se proyecta también al ámbito de la magnitud de la violencia interna, representa cabalmente lo que Robert King Merton llamó un "dato *serendipity*": un inesperado trozo de realidad, capaz de modificar paradigmas teóricos. Como lo sugirieran anteriormente Juan Carlos Puig, Arie Kacowicz y Mary K. Meyer, en América latina parece haber emergido una singular cultura diplomática, que constituye una vía alternativa, altamente civilizada, para la resolución de conflictos.

Es como si, a lo largo de doscientos años de vida independiente signados por Estados débiles que no tienen el poder interno necesario para librar guerras externas totales, hubiera surgido una cultura política acorde con esa realidad. Una singularidad de origen estructural, común a toda la región, parece

haber engendrado una conciencia colectiva que forja imperativos categóricos relativamente pacifistas. Uno de ellos sería el precepto “no bombardearás ciudades”: obsérvese que las ciudades iberoamericanas jamás sufrieron bombardeos como los que sepultaron a urbes enteras de Europa y Asia, frecuentemente perpetrados por otros europeos y asiáticos.

Quizás en este ámbito acotado, antes de formular la típica pregunta del paternalismo neoimperialista, “*what is wrong with Latin America?*”, debiéramos investigar “*what is right with Latin America*” y “*what is wrong with the rest of the World*”.

La relativa impotencia fiscal del Estado

No obstante, no todas son luces en Iberoamérica. Como señalamos al principio, hay un epifenómeno perverso que no es menos importante que la relativa virtud de la región en el ámbito de la guerra y la paz. Como sabemos, padece la mayor concentración del ingreso de todas las grandes regiones del mundo.

Este segundo rasgo de nuestro modelo también parece haber trascendido su origen estructural, para convertirse en parte de la cultura. En América latina, las grandes desigualdades sociales se toman con naturalidad. En materia social, la región se caracteriza por la ausencia de un imperativo categórico que está muy presente en la cultura de las democracias capitalistas avanzadas, aunque se cumplimente siempre de manera limitada e imperfecta. Ese precepto reza: “no explotarás en demasía a tu propio pueblo”. Muy lejos de ese ideal, en la América latina profunda la pobreza extrema es incluso parte de la pervertida estética local.

Como en el caso de la ausencia de guerra total, este rasgo también parece vinculado causalmente a la debilidad del Estado. Quien no tiene poder interno para movilizar, para la guerra, los recursos humanos y económicos de una sociedad, tampoco puede cobrar los impuestos sin los cuales no hay educación adecuada, buenos niveles de salubridad ni un régimen humanitario de jubilaciones y pensiones. En otras palabras:

- si es verdad, como se dijo al principio, que en Europa y Estados Unidos “la guerra hizo al Estado y el Estado hizo la guerra”;
- si como sugiere la sociología histórica, es cierto que la capacidad de recaudación surgió con las movilizaciones militares;
- si la documentación estudiada por eruditos como Tilly no miente, y los impuestos que permitieron reducir la injusticia social fueron prohijados por mecanismos de recaudación instalados en tiempos en guerra,

entonces viene de suyo que una región que desde su independencia no ha sufrido la guerra total, será también menos capaz de cobrar tributos y más injusta socialmente, que una en la cual sucesivas guerras devastadoras fueron engendrando impuestos que, transformados, sobrevivieron al conflicto mismo para convertirse en el cimiento de la justicia social.

Esta hipótesis, a su vez un corolario del hecho de que el modelo belicista de formación del Estado poco sirve para comprender la gestación de los Estados latinoamericanos, se verifica en forma cabal. Mientras a comienzos del siglo XXI, en promedio, los países del G-7 recaudaban impuestos equivalentes al 37% del PBI, los de América latina llegaban apenas al 13% (Centeno 2002: 6). Si algunos Estados de la región intentaran alcanzar los niveles de imposición de las democracias avanzadas, seguramente enfrentarían una rebelión fiscal generalizada que no podrían reprimir. Esto es particularmente cierto del impuesto al ingreso o a la riqueza. El equilibrio fiscal, cuando se consigue, proviene de mecanismos regresivos y distorsivos, como el impuesto al valor agregado, que profundiza la concentración del ingreso.

La mención de una rebelión fiscal no es mera conjetura. Es lo que ocurrió en Argentina entre marzo y julio de 2008, cuando el gobierno aplicó un sistema de retenciones móviles a las exportaciones de soja. El tributo se cobraba al momento de exportar, porque ese mecanismo es muy difícil de evadir. Los objetivos de la medida no se limitaban a la recaudación, sino que (por lo menos en teoría) apuntaban también a desalentar el avance de la soja, un cultivo que destruye la fertilidad de la tierra pero que está reemplazando a otras producciones debido a su altísimo precio internacional actual.

El aumento del impuesto movilizó a las cuatro principales organizaciones del sector agrícola-ganadero, representativas de los productores grandes y chicos del campo argentino, aunque no sembraran soja. Las organizaciones convocaron a un paro para desabastecer el mercado. Simultáneamente, cortaron las rutas con piquetes, para impedir que productores desobedientes envíen sus mercaderías a las ciudades. Mientras tanto, intermitentemente, el centro de Buenos Aires se vio atiborrado de manifestaciones, algunas en contra y otras a favor del gobierno. Cuando después de meses, el conflicto amenazaba la gobernabilidad, el impuesto fue sometido a consideración del Congreso. La Cámara de Diputados lo aprobó, pero en el Senado se registró un empate. Entonces el vicepresidente desempató, votando en contra de su propio gobierno y cerrando la cuestión.

Más allá de las imputaciones de corrupción en el uso de fondos públicos, y de las discusiones técnicas acerca de la pertinencia y constitucionalidad de

este tipo de impuesto, la rebelión fiscal argentina de 2008 puso de manifiesto que ese Estado no es suficientemente fuerte como para privar a la burguesía de lo que los norteamericanos llaman un “*windfall profit*” (ganancias en vendaval que no son el producto del esfuerzo productivo sino de circunstancias excepcionales del mercado internacional). Sin arriesgar una rebelión que puede derrocar al gobierno, el Estado argentino no puede implantar el tipo de tributo que Jimmy Carter impuso a las empresas petroleras de su país en 1980, y que Ronald Reagan no derogó hasta 1987.

Aunque la coalición de productores rurales acusó al gobierno de Cristina Fernández de Kirchner de despotismo, lo que la historia de los últimos treinta años demuestra es que el Estado argentino sólo puede ser despótico cuando sirve a los intereses de las burguesías prebendarias que frecuentemente lo capturan. Reiteradamente en las últimas décadas, por ejemplo, se estatizaron enormes deudas privadas, usando el poder del Estado para transferir riqueza masiva de los pobres a los ricos (Escudé 2006). Lo que ese Estado no puede hacer sino circunstancialmente es transferir ingresos en el sentido opuesto. No puede implantar una política fiscal progresiva que afecte la renta de aquellas burguesías. No puede ejecutar medidas como la que, en fecha tan temprana como 1794, tomó el presidente norteamericano George Washington, cuando despachó quince mil soldados para reprimir a los granjeros de Pensilvania, que se habían rebelado contra un impuesto al whisky sancionado por el gobierno central.

Por cierto, en cuestiones fiscales los contrastes entre América latina y las democracias avanzadas son notorios. En las grandes crisis norteamericanas, tanto bélicas como económicas, se impusieron tributos a las “ganancias excesivas” que hubieran sido tildados de “comunistas” en Iberoamérica. Como nos recuerda W. Elliot Brownlee en *Federal Taxation in America*, el presidente Franklin D. Roosevelt llegó a decir al Congreso en 1943 que, en una emergencia nacional, “ningún ciudadano debe tener un ingreso anual post-impuestos de más de 25.000 dólares”. El resultado de esa política fue que, hacia 1945, el uno por ciento más rico de los hogares estadounidenses ya aportaba el 35 por ciento de los impuestos a los ingresos personales, a la vez que éstos representaban el 40 por ciento de la recaudación total del fisco, correspondiendo otro 33 por ciento al impuesto a los ingresos corporativos (p. 116). Por cierto, la república norteamericana debe parte de sus éxitos a que, pese a la permanente oposición de fuerzas conservadoras, sus padres fundadores se inclinaron por un principio sentado por Adam Smith en *La Riqueza de las Naciones*, que postula que “no es muy irrazonable que los ricos contribuyan a los gastos

públicos, no sólo en proporción a sus ingresos, sino en una relación algo mayor” (Smith 2004; Libro V, Capítulo II).

Políticas progresistas de este tipo, que explican la vigencia de una equidad relativa en las democracias capitalistas desarrolladas, jamás estuvieron al alcance de los Estados latinoamericanos. Y la diferencia entre ambos no puede justificarse con el argumento de la falta de transparencia en el uso de fondos públicos en América latina, porque las formidables maquinarias de recaudación de Europa y Estados Unidos se instituyeron antes de que se alcanzara la relativa transparencia que conocemos hoy. El poder estatal para imponer tributos vino antes que la virtud republicana.

Por todo esto, puede afirmarse que el reciente episodio argentino no hizo más que poner de relieve, una vez más, el contraste entre la debilidad de estos Estados y la fortaleza de aquéllos. Contribuye a explicar por qué la recaudación fiscal ha sido históricamente insatisfactoria en toda la región. La consecuencia inevitable es que, en América latina, ni las más elementales funciones sociales del Estado moderno sean adecuadamente provistas.

El Estado cautivo

No obstante, la mitología neoliberal da por supuesto que el Estado latinoamericano es un gigante tributariamente opresivo, y las elites que frecuentemente manipulan al mismo adoctrinan a las multitudes con esa noción. Un eslogan típico, ampliamente difundido en algunos de estos países, proclama que “achicar el Estado es agrandar la Nación”.

Por otra parte, el único ámbito en que el Estado latinoamericano ha ocupado un lugar importante en el siglo XX ha sido la economía. Por cierto, hasta muy recientemente, la mayoría de estos Estados producía una sorprendente gama de bienes y servicios, casi siempre caros y de mala calidad. A su vez, esas empresas estatales eran y siguen siendo abastecidas por proveedores privados que se enriquecen con sobrefacturaciones sistemáticas. Con este y otros mecanismos, se benefician las burguesías prebendarias que capturan a ese Estado.

En el caso argentino, investigaciones conducidas desde la Universidad de Harvard han documentado que las privatizaciones de las empresas estatales fueron salvajemente resistidas por los poderosos contratistas privados hasta que, durante la década de 1990, el negocio de participar en la privatización se planteó en términos aún más provechosos, para los intereses privados, que las sobrefacturaciones crónicas con que éstos se habían beneficiado durante las

décadas previas (Corrales 1998: 24–51). Los otrora contratistas privados de las empresas estatales privatizadas pudieron convertirse en copropietarios de las mismas a precios gruesamente subsidiados. Así como en fases previas del ciclo de vaciamiento se estatizó la deuda privada, en esta etapa se regalaron activos públicos (Escudé 2006).

Es el colmo de la paradoja: las empresas del Estado canalizan riquezas hacia la burguesía prebendaria, pero su privatización concentra aún más riqueza en ese sector. No se trata de simple corrupción. Porque el Estado no tiene el poder de abolir las prebendas de las empresas privadas que operan como proveedoras de las empresas públicas, sólo se puede privatizar si el negocio, para aquellas empresas privadas, es aún más lucrativo que el anterior. De lo contrario, el gobierno que intenta privatizar es desestabilizado por estos poderosos intereses.

A través de mecanismos como el descrito, la debilidad institucional ha retroalimentado las desigualdades sociales. En algunos países, a las étnicas también. En toda la región, hizo más ricos a los ricos y más pobres a los pobres (Escudé 2006). Y por lógica, tampoco pudo generarse en América latina la integración étnica y social sin la cual la movilización masiva de la guerra total sólo engendra revueltas (recordemos la Rusia de 1917). Aunque las constituciones formales digan lo contrario, en América latina el sujeto nunca se convirtió en verdadero ciudadano (Centeno 2002: 4).


Por lo tanto, la misma debilidad del Estado que postulamos, que se manifiesta benignamente en la ausencia relativa de guerra internacional, sería la causa eficiente de la singularidad más perversa de la región: su alta concentración del ingreso y sus astronómicos porcentajes de pobres e indigentes, con muy bajos niveles educativos.

Democracia y populismo sistémico

La dinámica postulada por nuestro modelo explicativo de la singularidad de América latina estuvo vigente desde tiempos fundacionales. No obstante, hubo una modificación importante cuando, a partir de las últimas dos décadas del siglo XX, al son de un nuevo consenso interno y externo respecto de la inaceptabilidad de los gobiernos militares en la región, se generalizó la democracia electoral. A partir de entonces, las grandes mayorías pauperizadas adquirieron cierto tipo de poder. Así, aumentó la propensión al populismo, porque al momento de los comicios la satisfacción de algunas necesidades inmediatas de las masas pasó a tener un premio electoral superior al de cualquier otro programa de gobierno.

Inequality by region and decade

Inequality by region and decade



Source: Birdsall; Deininger, K. and Squire, L.

Esto no significa que se haya interrumpido la transferencia de ingresos de abajo hacia arriba, ni que se haya eliminado el poder de veto de la burguesía prebendaria frente a las políticas fiscales progresivas. Lo que se instaló es un ciclo al que he llamado “populismo sistémico”. Mientras los pobres son manipulados con propósitos electoralistas a través de las dádivas típicas del “populismo clásico”, una vez capturado el poder político invariablemente se practica un “populismo de derecha”, transfiriendo riqueza a la burguesía amiga del gobierno. Antes de la democratización, los regímenes militares podían saltar la fase clásica y pasar directamente al populismo de derecha, pero esencialmente tanto los gobiernos democráticos como los militares se dedicaron a concentrar riqueza en segmentos diversos de la burguesía. El funcionamiento de esta dinámica ha sido oscurecido por la comprensible obsesión de los cientistas sociales con las transiciones latinoamericanas a la democracia.

Ambas fases del populismo son parte del mismo todo sistémico. Siguiendo una lógica olsoniana, los intereses y comportamientos de firmas privadas que se benefician de sinacuras del gobierno son análogos a los de los trabajadores y desempleados subsidiados que transitoriamente mejoran su suerte gracias a la demagogia electoral. Las clases subordinadas recompensan a los políticos con

su voto y apoyo en manifestaciones. La burguesía prebendaria los recompensa con fondos electorales y sobornos. Las clases subordinadas castigan a los políticos con huelgas, cortes de ruta, empresas tomadas y edificios ocupados. La burguesía prebendaria, que es más poderosa, ha llegado a despedir operarios innecesariamente, y a financiar huelgas y manifestaciones populares contra el gobierno, para castigar y desestabilizar a políticos no cooperativos encaramados en el poder (Escudé 2006).

Por cierto, en vigencia del sufragio universal, cuanto mayor sea la población por debajo de la línea de pobreza, mayor será la proclividad a esta dinámica populista. La gente sin esperanzas y escasa educación no suele apostar al futuro, especialmente cuando ha sido sistemáticamente traicionada. Razonará que es mejor pan para hoy y hambre para mañana, que hambre para hoy y para mañana también. Por eso, su voto puede ser comprado por modestas dádivas, devolviendo el poder a quienes ejercen el populismo de derecha.

Conclusiones a la Parte I – Disminución de la gobernabilidad y ocaso de la política exterior

Sin embargo, a medida que aumenta la pobreza se deterioran las instituciones y la gobernabilidad. Esto significa que, en el largo plazo, el poder del Estado disminuye aún más. Y junto con esta regresión, emerge una tendencia a adoptar políticas exteriores que, más que la expresión de alguna concepción (aunque fuera elitista) del interés colectivo de largo plazo, son una proyección de necesidades urgentes de política interna, que muchas veces sacrifica el futuro en aras del presente.

Aunque este fenómeno no es común a todos los Estados latinoamericanos, su presencia parece haberse incrementado con el brote populista emergido de la conjunción de la pobreza masiva con la democracia electoral. Además, como se documentará después, en aras de la preservación de su orden interno, incluso países con estrategias geopolíticas consolidadas y de largo plazo, como Brasil, a veces se ven obligados a hacer concesiones sorprendentes frente a organizaciones criminales o subversivas, propias y ajenas.

En verdad, en la próxima sección veremos de qué manera las singulares características del origen e independencia de los países iberoamericanos, hicieron que el vínculo entre lo interno y lo externo fuera más fuerte en ellos que en otras comunidades de naciones. No me refiero al consabido cliché de los efectos del imperialismo, sino por el contrario, al fuerte impacto de las políticas domésticas sobre las externas. Como es lógico, en tiempos fundacionales la construcción del Estado primó sobre cualquier otro objetivo. Esta limitación

inicial nunca se remontó por completo. Y en los tiempos actuales, la imperiosa necesidad de conservar una gobernabilidad amenazada, distrae energías sobre el planeamiento estratégico frente al mundo.

Por lo tanto, como se arguyó al principio, existe un vínculo causal entre los epifenómenos “virtuoso” y “vicioso” de la América ibérica. La debilidad relativa del Estado, nunca totalmente superada, ha contribuido a forjar una civilización que es, simultáneamente, la menos violenta y la más injusta del mundo entero. Como lo demuestra la situación boliviana de septiembre de 2008, sin embargo, esta ecuación es inestable, y un estallido de violencia en gran escala en la región no es descartable.

Parte II – El pasado es prólogo

La contigüidad lingüística de mayor extensión del planeta

Las singularidades de Iberoamérica no se agotan con la relativa ausencia de guerra y genocidio, y la aberrante concentración del ingreso. Un hecho obvio en el que casi nadie repara es que desde la Baja California hasta Tierra del Fuego se habla una misma lengua, y que el portugués está tan emparentado con el castellano que no es necesario un aprendizaje especial para que los hispano y luso-parlantes de la región se comuniquen entre sí.

No sólo eso. Un chileno y un madrileño se entienden casi como si pertenecieran a la misma nación, pero lo mismo no ocurre entre un castellano y un aldeano catalán, que pertenecen a un mismo Estado. Entre Tijuana, en el norte de México, y Ushuaia, en el sur de Argentina, existen 10.776 Km. de territorio contiguo donde se habla castellano. En cambio, los apenas 505 Km. que separan a Madrid de Barcelona han sido suficientes para la erección de una barrera lingüística significativa. Y la distancia entre mundos tan diferentes como los de Moscú y Washington DC es de apenas 7827 Km., cifra bastante inferior a los 10.055 Km. que separan a Ciudad Juárez, en el estado mexicano de Chihuahua, de Punta Arenas, puerto chileno en el Estrecho de Magallanes.

Los orígenes de esta peculiaridad, que distingue a América latina de cualquiera de los “viejos mundos”, no son menos importantes que los de la relativa “paz larga” de la región. Aunque desde el nacimiento de los Estados latinoamericanos hubo una importante diferencia entre el Brasil lusoparlante y las provincias hispanoparlantes del Imperio español, tales distingos son pequeños en comparación a los que separan entre sí a la mayoría de los Estados europeos. En el caso más acotado de los Estados hispanoamericanos, los rasgos

compartidos eran tantos y tan relevantes que, por lo menos en el momento fundacional, el concepto de “nación” no resultaba aplicable para ellos, en el sentido en que lo fue en Europa a partir de la emergencia de las proto-nacionalidades lingüísticas.

Aunque el origen de esta diferencia es de fácil comprensión, vale la pena registrarlo porque ilustra la excepcionalidad de América latina. Como sabemos, al caer el Imperio romano, en la Europa romanizada el latín se transformó en forma acelerada, dando lugar a lenguas vernáculas diferenciadas a lo largo y ancho de ese territorio. La quiebra de las instituciones imperiales y la anarquía propia de la temprana Edad Media produjeron una segmentación cada vez mayor de estos romances, de modo que llegó un momento en que casi en cada valle se hablaba un dialecto diferente.

Esto comenzó a cambiar cuando hacia 1450 Johannes Gutenberg introdujo la imprenta de caracteres móviles en Europa. La emergencia del libro impreso representó una revolución político-cultural. Aunque en un primer momento se imprimió en latín para un mercado paneuropeo, ese negocio pronto se agotó y se comenzó a publicar en lenguas vernáculas, para mercados geográficamente acotados. La contingencia de que en una ciudad emergiera una imprenta importante y en otra no, determinó que un idioma lugareño pasara a dominar su región circundante, en que se empleaban dialectos distintos pero afines entre sí. Unos vernáculos se convirtieron así en lenguas literarias, mientras otros pasaron a ser dialectos vulgares. De este modo comenzó un proceso inverso al que había tenido lugar con la caída de Roma. Las lenguas vernáculas tendieron a aglutinarse. Siguiendo el conocido planteo de Benedict Anderson, así surgieron las identidades lingüísticas modernas en Europa.

En otras palabras, fue porque la imprenta no existía que, cuando cayeron las instituciones políticas romanas, el latín se diversificó en romances diversos. Pero fue precisamente porque la imprenta ya existía que, cuando desaparecieron las instituciones políticas que unían a toda la América española, el castellano no se dividió en dialectos diferentes, sino que se consolidó a pesar de la segmentación política del otrora Imperio español americano (Cisneros y Escudé 1998: 1:56–64). Esta particularidad dio lugar a la contigüidad lingüística más extensa del planeta, vigente al día de hoy.

La protonacionalidad panhispanoamericana originaria

Puede discutirse si los orígenes comunes de los Estados de la región ayudan o no a explicar tanto la abundancia de litigios territoriales como su resolución,

casi siempre pacífica. Después de todo, ni los orígenes germánicos comunes a Alemania e Inglaterra, ni los compartidos orígenes romanos de Francia y España, alcanzaron para prevenir pavorosas guerras entre ellas. Como en otras dimensiones de la vida latinoamericana, la comprensión de estas cuestiones referidas a la guerra y la paz requiere una mirada retrospectiva que nos remonta a tiempos fundacionales.

Las disputas territoriales iberoamericanas, que a entendimientos extranjeros pueden parecer nimias, tienen una considerable proyección sobre el presente. Recuérdese la guerra de Malvinas de 1982, desencadenada por la invasión argentina de un territorio ocupado o usurpado por Gran Bretaña en fecha tan lejana como 1833. O considérese el derrocamiento del presidente boliviano Gonzalo Sánchez de Losada en octubre de 2003, perpetrado por multitudes enardecidas debido a su decisión de exportar gas natural a través de Chile, país que hasta hoy es considerado archienemigo por los bolivianos a raíz de la guerra del Pacífico de 1879–1884. La comprensión de estas cuestiones actuales exige, una vez más, que nos remontemos al pasado con imaginación sociológica.

Como se verá, y en medida no menor que la relativa ausencia de guerra, en Hispanoamérica las disputas territoriales están más vinculadas a lo que sus Estados tienen en común que a lo que los separa. Por cierto, la identidad panhispanoamericana que prevaleciera antes de la crisis de la Independencia representó un factor de debilidad para los Estados incipientes, ya que impuso límites a los hombres y tributos que éstos podían movilizar contra vecinos que competían por territorios, pero que compartían casi todo lo demás.

El Brasil lusitano, en cambio, fue diferente porque en su caso la Independencia no trajo consigo una división del territorio en múltiples Estados de una misma comunidad lingüística. Los Estados hispanoamericanos estaban necesitados de identidades “nacionales” diferenciadas, a pesar del idioma compartido, que por momentos se convirtió en una suerte de maldición, dificultando la separación de las identidades.

No así Brasil. Éste se expandió, pero como Estados Unidos, poseía una identidad clara antes de expandirse. Los litigios territoriales en que se involucró emergieron de luchas convencionales por recursos o posesiones de valor estratégico. No formaron parte del proceso de organización de su Estado, aunque hayan podido contribuir a fortalecerlo. Con la posible excepción de la lucha con Argentina por la perdida Provincia Cisplatina (el actual Uruguay), esos conflictos no estuvieron relacionados con la delicada cuestión de quiénes son los brasileños, que tiende a agravar la típica competencia por recursos.

Fueron todos litigios librados contra Estados pertenecientes a otra comunidad lingüística.

Por cierto, a pesar del largo período en que Portugal y su imperio fueron parte de la Corona española, la diferenciación que emergió a partir de la rebelión del duque de Braganza en 1640 fue sustancial. Llegada la crisis napoleónica, la experiencia histórica de portugueses americanos y españoles americanos era suficientemente diferente como para constituir identidades claramente separadas, incluso más allá de las diferencias lingüísticas. Por motivos varios, la oligarquía brasileña estaba mucho más unida a su metrópoli que en el caso de Hispanoamérica, a la vez que el temor a una rebelión de esclavos en Brasil, mucho más numerosos que en la América española, generó actitudes muy diferentes de parte de las elites (Bethell: vol. 3).

Pero en el caso de la América hispana, la experiencia histórica común potenciaba los vínculos generados por el idioma compartido. Por cierto, más allá de éste, desde tiempos fundacionales hubo allí una multitud de características comunes de orden cultural, económico y social. Ayudaron a cimentar una identidad a través de un contexto social y una experiencia histórica compartidas. Entre esos elementos en común se cuentan:

1. La omnipresencia de la Iglesia, cuyo poder era cultural, político, social y económico.
2. Un ámbito cultural homogéneo en el que durante siglos fue preponderante la influencia de pensadores españoles. La gente instruida leía lo mismo en toda Hispanoamérica. Además, las restricciones a la entrada de libros afectaron a todo el Imperio americano. Desde California hasta Buenos Aires, se compartía no sólo lo que se leía sino también lo que no se podía leer.
3. El carácter y la evolución de los mercados de la región. El monopolio comercial establecía una única vía de entrada, uniformando los productos con que toda Hispanoamérica se abastecía. Sólo por el contrabando se diferenciaban los mercados de las diversas jurisdicciones administrativas del Imperio.
4. La sobreexplotación de la población indígena, que produjo la catástrofe demográfica del siglo XVII, compartida por toda la región.
5. El carácter forzado del trabajo. Aun donde era nominalmente libre, las deudas de los peones anulaban la libertad. El verdadero trabajo asalariado requirió siglos para desarrollarse.
6. La diferenciación social en términos de casta. Hasta la crisis de la Independencia, el acceso a la administración, al ejército y a la Iglesia del estrato urbano más bajo estuvo vedado, a la vez que el ascenso económico conseguido a través de otros medios carecía de relevancia social.

7. El resentimiento de los blancos criollos (“españoles americanos”) hacia los “españoles peninsulares”. Este sentimiento brotó después de las reformas borbónicas de 1778, que tendieron a desplazar a los criollos blancos y a los mestizos de las posiciones más codiciadas. (Halperin Donghi 1969: 11–73; Cisneros y Escudé 1998: 1:27–28).

Sin embargo, más allá de estas similitudes, el territorio en que se asentaba Hispanoamérica padecía una fisura esencial que separaba a los núcleos hispanizados de las inmensas extensiones que aún estaban bajo la hegemonía de alguna cultura indígena. Esta distinción no tiene paralelos en la Europa medieval ni en la moderna. Apelando a una metáfora de Tulio Halperin Donghi, la América española era una suerte de archipiélago de islas hispanizadas, sito en un océano indígena.

A la vez, estas “islas” y su “océano” eran incomparables entre sí por la homogeneidad de las primeras y la diversidad del segundo. La identidad hispanoamericana era la misma en todas las islas: por caso, en Ciudad de México y en Buenos Aires. Pero los indígenas vecinos a Ciudad de México no tenían nada en común con los que eran próximos a Buenos Aires. El océano indígena era un mosaico heterogéneo de numerosas piezas. Por el contrario, las islas hispanizadas (y también las portuguesas) eran muy similares entre sí. Había una identidad hispanoamericana (y otra, lusoamericana). Pero había multitud de identidades indígenas. Y las islas hispanizadas estaban separadas entre sí cual cabales ínsulas del mar: por caso, no había contigüidad entre los territorios (hoy provincias argentinas) de Buenos Aires, Santa Fe y Córdoba. Enormes extensiones de territorio indígena escasamente poblado las separaban.

Por esta razón, son falaces los esfuerzos por separar y distinguir las nacionalidades hispanoamericanas entre sí, al momento de la crisis de la Independencia. Para el hispanizado, el indígena era el otro absoluto, de manera que los lazos entre los primeros eran muy fuertes aunque miles de kilómetros los separaran. Como sugiere R.N. Burr en *By Reason or Force: Chile and the Balancing of Power in South America, 1830–1905*, si no fuera porque el tiempo mundial condicionaba otro desenlace, en Hispanoamérica pudo haber surgido un sistema de encadenamientos de mando al estilo de la Europa feudal. En lugar de ello, emergió un sistema interestatal similar al de la Europa post-Westfalia, no porque fuera el más adecuado para aquellas circunstancias sino porque era el único compatible con la cultura eurocéntrica de las elites locales, que nunca pudieron imaginar otra cosa.

Estos fuertes lazos entre hispanoamericanos muy distantes entre sí hicieron posible que hombres públicos oriundos de un Estado incipiente fueran funcio-

narios importantes en otro. Andrés Bello, nacido en Venezuela, representó primero al grupo revolucionario de Caracas en Londres, luego al gobierno independiente de Venezuela en Inglaterra, más tarde a otros gobiernos hispanoamericanos y finalmente se mudó a Chile. Allí le tocó ser el arquitecto de la primera política exterior estable de ese Estado. Hoy el instituto formador de los diplomáticos chilenos porta su nombre.

Casos análogos (entre muchos) fueron el presidente de la Primera Junta de gobierno en Buenos Aires, Cornelio Saavedra, que era boliviano; el Director Supremo interino de las Provincias Unidas del Río de la Plata, Ignacio Álvarez Thomas, que era un peruano de Arequipa; el primer embajador de Bolivia en Buenos Aires, Deán Gregorio Funes, que era oriundo de la provincia argentina de Córdoba, y el fundador del Colegio Militar boliviano, que no fue sino el futuro presidente argentino Bartolomé Mitre, por los tiempos en que otro futuro presidente de ese país, Domingo F. Sarmiento, era funcionario chileno.

Por cierto, como demostró J.C. Chiaramonte, durante las primeras décadas de independencia, hombres como el caraqueño Andrés Bello o el arequipeño Ignacio Álvarez Thomas podían ser forasteros en Santiago de Chile o Buenos Aires, sus ciudades adoptivas, pero no eran extranjeros en ninguna parte de Hispanoamérica. Las islas hispanizadas, desde México hasta Buenos Aires, tenían en común todo lo que en Europa se hubiera requerido para definir una nacionalidad: lengua, religión, cultura, historia y en medida variable (según el grado de mestización) también raza. Existía una proto-nacionalidad pan-hispanoamericana (Cisneros y Escudé, 1998: 1:19–22).

Las disputas territoriales como antídoto al problema de la protonacionalidad compartida

Pero cuando gracias a Napoleón Bonaparte, la metrópoli sufrió un colapso absoluto, el archipiélago hispanizado debió desmembrarse en soberanías diferenciadas, porque ningún centro hispanoamericano tenía el poder necesario para mantener unido un territorio contiguo tan vasto, con intereses económicos contrapuestos y centrífugos. Esos intereses en conflicto alimentarían numerosas contiendas.

Por otra parte, a medida que la hispanización avanzó, el archipiélago de islas hispanizadas se fue convirtiendo en un océano de cultura hispanoamericana, a la vez que el otrora océano indígena devino en archipiélago de ínsulas nativas muy diferentes entre sí. Al disminuir la amenaza del "otro absoluto" que antaño había representado el aborigen, la cultura hispana compartida por

gentes que habitaban ciudades distantes entre sí perdió, por lo menos en parte, su carácter de cemento identitario.

Este nuevo potencial para el conflicto entre españoles americanos se nutrió, además, por el hecho de que las delimitaciones territoriales entre las diversas jurisdicciones del colapsado Imperio eran ambiguas. Los Estados incipientes rápidamente acordaron que se respetarían los límites fronterizos vigentes en 1810, pero éstos no eran nada claros. El acuerdo, conocido como el *uti possidetis de 1810*, podía funcionar respecto de las tierras que habían sido bien exploradas y en alguna medida ocupadas, pero no respecto de aquellas que jamás habían estado bajo el control efectivo de conquistador alguno.

Tal como argüimos en el primer volumen de Cisneros y Escudé, ello es comprensible. Los reyes españoles tenían el interés de asegurarse contra las pretensiones de otras potencias europeas. Para hacerlo debían alentar a sucesivos conquistadores a explorar vastas regiones. Adjudicaban incentivos territoriales sucesivos a conquistadores sucesivos. Una jurisdicción grande daba al conquistador amplia libertad para moverse y elegir la tierra en que debería establecerse y fundar sus ciudades. Pero los resultados eran siempre parciales: ningún conquistador podía conquistar todo el vasto territorio que estaba autorizado a conquistar y que en teoría le correspondía gobernar. Por eso, las sucesivas concesiones, emitidas a través de capitulaciones y cédulas reales, incluyeron enormes superposiciones y contradicciones.

El monarca buscaba asegurar sus derechos expandiendo la conquista efectiva del territorio a través de una práctica administrativa que jamás pretendió establecer los derechos soberanos de Estados sucesores de la Corona. Colapsado el Imperio, los Estados incipientes competirían por los territorios cuyos títulos eran ambiguos. Eso conduciría a la guerra.

Y en tales circunstancias, la falta de diferenciación entre las poblaciones de los diversos Estados embrionarios representó un grave problema, siendo a la vez una fuente adicional de debilidad. Como ya se sugirió, para movilizar grandes contingentes de hombres a una muerte probable o para cobrar los tributos necesarios para costear tales movilizaciones, cada centro de poder debía intentar generar una legitimidad que otorgara cierto grado de obligatoriedad moral a los sacrificios impuestos por la nueva "patria" local.

Dicha legitimidad requería la generación de una identidad propia y diferenciada para la población bajo la jurisdicción de cada ciudad-estado. Y como existía un exceso de elementos en común entre los elementos hispanizados de estos diversos centros de poder, uno de los principales problemas que debieron enfrentar los Estados incipientes fue el de *construir diferencias*.

A partir del colapso del Imperio y el establecimiento de gobiernos autónomos que competían entre sí, la proto nacionalidad pan-hispanoamericana se convirtió en disfuncional para los intereses de los Estados incipientes. El marco identitario previo, por el cual un caraqueño era forastero pero no extranjero en Santiago de Chile, dejó de ser funcional para Estados incipientes que debían convencer a sus súbditos que los habitantes de los territorios de un Estado incipiente contiguo eran enemigos potenciales, cuando no actuales.

Por eso, la construcción de identidades “nacionales” pasó, en la América española, por esta construcción de diferencias, en un universo cultural donde lo que sobresalía era lo mucho que se compartía. Había que convencer a la gente local de que el habitante de la jurisdicción contigua era diferente. ¿Pero como hacerlo si hablaba la misma lengua, profesaba la misma religión y compartía una misma historia? La única alternativa disponible era adoctrinar sobre el carácter naturalmente codicioso, desleal, violento y expansionista de ese o aquel argentino, chileno, paraguayo o boliviano, en apariencia tan similar a uno, pero moralmente tan abyecto.

Así surgieron los mitos de pérdidas territoriales de los países hispanoparlantes de la América meridional. Por cierto, si emprendemos el estudio de los manuales escolares de geografía de estos países, al llegar a los capítulos de “geografía histórica” comprobamos que casi todos ellos registran enormes pérdidas territoriales a lo largo de su historia. Si nuestra curiosidad nos llevara a comparar y sumar las pérdidas de cada uno, nos enfrentaríamos a un descubrimiento asombroso, digno de una novela de Gabriel García Márquez: que dicha suma es mucho mayor que la masa continental de la América del Sur (Escudé 1992).

Es así como, alimentando la rivalidad territorial que ha caracterizado a la Argentina y Chile durante toda su historia, los mapas de pérdidas territoriales con que se adoctrina a los niños de uno y otro país son el reflejo de versiones opuestas de la historia. Como puede observarse en los mapas que publicamos en el primer volumen de Cisneros y Escudé (a los que también puede accederse por Internet), Chile presume de haber perdido la Patagonia argentina y la Argentina de haber perdido el sur de Chile. Este fenómeno se originó en la necesidad funcional de los Estados incipientes de destruir la protonacionalidad común que había hecho posible, en otros tiempos, que un futuro presidente argentino como Sarmiento fuera funcionario en Chile.

Aquel amplio sentido de identidad correspondiente a los “españoles americanos” no era compatible con las realidades políticas emergidas con la Independencia. Como la competencia por territorios surgió en forma automática, la mutua acusación de expansionismo entre vecinos contiguos se lanzó

espontáneamente. Luego se convirtió en parte de la política educativa. Así comenzó el proceso de construcción de diferencias, que culminaría con la destrucción de la protonacionalidad común y con el lento surgimiento de identidades “nacionales” diferenciadas para cada uno de los Estados que consiguieron consolidarse.

Las guerras hicieron el resto. En la actualidad, queda como testimonio el resentimiento que aún subsiste entre bolivianos, chilenos, peruanos y ecuatorianos. El mapa de las pérdidas territoriales bolivianas usado en las escuelas del Altiplano es esencial para comprender procesos políticos recientes como el derrocamiento civil de Sánchez de Losada. Allí comprobamos que los bolivianos sólo presumen de haber perdido las dos terceras partes de su territorio original, pasando de aproximadamente tres millones de kilómetros cuadrados a un millón, como consecuencia de la presunta iniquidad de todos sus vecinos, cada uno de los cuales habría llevado a cabo una artera y sistemática tarea de despojo.

Entre los Estados contiguos a Bolivia, el país retratado de manera particularmente vil es Chile. Los textos escolares bolivianos prácticamente azuzan a su pueblo a lanzarse al ataque sobre ese país. El siguiente párrafo, extraído de un texto oficial de la enseñanza secundaria que porta el significativo título de *El Mar Boliviano*, ilustra la virulencia de los sentimientos que el Estado intenta sembrar en los ciudadanos:

Este libro está destinado a los estudiantes y busca hacer comprender con facilidad toda la magnitud de nuestra tragedia, los recursos vedados que utilizó Chile para llevar adelante su guerra de despojo, y la incapacidad de nuestros gobernantes para frenar las maniobras del enemigo, la felonía de éste y el uso y abuso que hizo de la fuerza para extender su territorio aprovechándose del vecino, para usufructuar sus riquezas y crecer gracias a ellas (Sanabria G., F., 1988; *El Mar Boliviano*, Proinsa, La Paz, p. 3).

Probablemente no sea coincidencia que el Estado latinoamericano que más odio instila en sus habitantes contra los nacionales de países contiguos, sea uno donde más del sesenta por ciento de la población habla quechua o aymará, y donde aún otro segmento amazónico se comunica en otras lenguas indígenas. Se requiere un cemento muy especial para mantener unido ese mosaico étnico con las poblaciones criollas de Tarija y Santa Cruz, en torno de un mismo Estado cada vez menos hispanizado. Hasta ahora han permanecido unidas no por el amor, sino por temores y resentimientos alimentados por un Estado que, entre otros mecanismos, usa el odio a Chile como aglutinante. Y a la fecha de entrega de este trabajo, no se saben si permanecerán unidos.

Algo similar, aunque de mucha menor gravedad, ocurre en el Perú frente a Chile, y en Ecuador frente al Perú. Los mapas de pérdidas territoriales de Perú y Paraguay son los que registran las "pérdidas" más importantes. En algunos textos paraguayos se dice que el nombre original de su país fue "Provincia Gigante de Indias", apareciendo bañado por el "Mar del Paraguay", nombre sui generis del Atlántico (Cisneros y Escudé 2008: 1:78).

Pero aunque el adoctrinamiento sobre sus pérdidas históricas incluye todo el territorio hoy argentino, el principal blanco del odio que se alienta en los estudiantes peruanos es otra vez Chile. La proyección de este adoctrinamiento sobre la opinión pública está ilustrada por la edición del 4 de enero de 2006 de *El Men* (sic), un tabloide de Lima. El gran titular de tapa informa: "Nuestras Fuerzas Armadas revelan Plan de Defensa. Bombas peruanas más poderosas que chilenas. Soberanía nacional está garantizada". Y en la página 5 se incluye una lista de las bombas peruanas, con el subtítulo: "Conozca las bombas que usan nuestras Fuerzas Armadas. Y las que estamos produciendo meten miedo a Chile".

La gerencia del tabloide, que está dirigido a estratos escasamente educados pero alfabetos, sabe que su público es sensible a estas cuestiones. Se diseña esta tapa porque se sabe que venderá, y al venderse contribuye a consolidar este adoctrinamiento escolar, que se convierte en auto-perpetuante.

Procesos similares se observan en varios países, entre ellos Argentina, a pesar de su nivel educativo relativamente mayor. Como lo señalara Charles E. Merriam en su precursora serie *The Making of Citizens*, que data de la ya lejana década de 1930, en estas cuestiones lo relevante no es tanto el alcance cuantitativo de la educación sino su contenido (en un país nazi, el ciudadano "bien educado" suele ser un "buen" nazi). Cuando (como en el caso claro de Malvinas) los contenidos alimentan conflictos interestatales, el mayor alcance de la educación agrava el problema.

En verdad, el caso de Argentina frente a las Malvinas es uno de los más extremos, en tanto el adoctrinamiento de la población no fue considerado suficiente y se buscó maniatar a los gobiernos. La Constitución actual, vigente desde 1994, posee una "cláusula transitoria" que establece:

"La Nación Argentina ratifica su legítima e imprescriptible soberanía sobre las Islas Malvinas, Georgias del Sur y Sandwich del Sur y los espacios marítimos e insulares correspondientes, por ser parte integrante del territorio nacional. La recuperación de dichos territorios y el ejercicio pleno de la soberanía, respetando el modo de vida de sus habitantes, y conforme a los principios del derecho internacional, constituyen un objetivo permanente e irrenunciable del pueblo argentino."

La cláusula es “transitoria” porque dejará de tener vigencia cuando estos territorios hayan sido recuperados. Mientras tanto, toda negociación con el Reino Unido, por ventajosa que fuere, sería anticonstitucional si renunciara a alguna de esas aguas y tierras.

Obviamente, la transitoriedad de la cláusula es imaginaria. Pero esto no debiera sorprender, ya que a veces estos fenómenos vienen acompañados por un adoctrinamiento acerca de territorios imaginarios. Los detectamos en la enseñanza y en los organismos de difusión ecuatorianos hasta la firma del Acuerdo de Brasilia (con Perú) en 1998, y en la educación argentina y chilena hasta el presente.

Por cierto, en los mapas escolares de ambos países australes se incluyen los territorios antárticos superpuestos que sus diplomacias reclaman. Parte de ese segmento disputado de la Antártica está también reclamado por Londres, que sin embargo no lo incluye como parte del Reino Unido en sus mapas escolares. Además, los reclamos de soberanía están congelados por el Tratado Antártico, que fue firmado por todas las partes interesadas. Más allá de cómo se renegocie el régimen antártico una vez que dicho congelamiento venza en 2009, es sumamente improbable que Argentina o Chile alguna vez consoliden su dominio sobre todo el territorio que reclaman.

No obstante, ambos Estados alientan a sus ciudadanos a vivir en la irrealidad. Mientras las fuentes internacionales adjudican a la Argentina una superficie de 2.792.810 Km², la Presidencia de la Nación Argentina dice en su sitio web que:

En el extremo Sur del continente americano se encuentra la República Argentina [...]. Con una superficie de 3.761.274 Km², (su) territorio posee un paisaje variado [...]. Por su extensión – que corresponde al continente americano, al continente antártico [...] y a las islas australes – ocupa el cuarto lugar entre los países americanos [...] y el séptimo a nivel mundial.

Consecuentemente con esta fantasía, según algunos textos escolares, las sureñas ciudades de Ushuaia (Argentina) y Punta Arenas (Chile) se encuentran en el centro mismo de sus respectivos países, medidos de norte a sur. Es lo que resulta si los confines de Argentina son La Quiaca y el Polo Sur, y si Chile es un “país tricontinental”, tal como afirma un lema oficial.

En verdad, la Presidencia de Chile anuncia en su sitio web oficial que:

Chile, país tricontinental, asienta su territorio en América, Antártica y Oceanía.

Y mientras las fuentes internacionales nos dicen que ese país posee 755.838 Km², desde su sitio web la Presidencia de la República pontifica que:

La superficie de Chile americano, antártico e insular, es de 2.006.096 km², sin considerar su mar territorial, la Zona Económica Exclusiva y la pertenente plataforma continental. [...] Chile limita al norte con el Perú a través de la Línea de la Concordia (y) al [...] al sur con el Polo Sur.

El territorio que su Estado se adjudica más que duplica el territorio que domina y que el mundo reconoce como suyo. Más de la mitad de estos dos millones de kilómetros cuadrados son territorio imaginario. Tanto como cualquiera de sus vecinos, el exitoso país andino demuestra, con sus políticas educativas y de difusión pública, que el realismo mágico no es solamente una escuela literaria. A la vez, gasta sumas gigantescas en el equipamiento de sus fuerzas armadas: según el Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), en 2006 invirtió en ello 4858 millones de dólares. Estos son recursos de los que su pueblo es privado. Es un consumo sustraído a su desarrollo económico y social, que resulta inteligible a la luz de este discurso: un país tricontinental requiere grandes inversiones en armas de guerra.

¿Puede haber indicador más elocuente de su debilidad?

Parte III – Pobreza, populismo y política exterior

La diversidad de las izquierdas gobernantes

Como se dijo en la sección anterior, la debilidad de los Estados latinoamericanos contribuye a explicar la alta concentración del ingreso en la región. Es lo que hace posible que poderosos intereses capturen al Estado y lo pongan a su servicio, incluso a través de mecanismos formalmente legales. Las frecuentes depreciaciones y estatizaciones de deudas privadas llevadas a cabo en Argentina entre 1975 y 2002, ya mencionadas, se instrumentaron desde la legalidad y sirvieron para enriquecer a los más ricos a costa de los más pobres, durante regímenes tanto constitucionales como militares, e independientemente de qué partido gobernara. El uso de las empresas del Estado para transferir recursos a contratistas privados dedicados a la sobrefacturación sistemática, y la limitada capacidad de estos Estados para cobrar impuestos, obedecen a las mismas causas y tienen las mismas consecuencias en toda la región. Y en países relativamente pobres como los latinoamericanos, concentrar el ingreso significa engendrar pobreza.

En efecto, según la Corporación de Desarrollo Andino, en 2005 la proporción de la población que vivía con menos de dos dólares diarios equivalía al 37% en Brasil, el 39% en México, el 45% en Argentina, el 48% en Venezuela, el 50% en Colombia, el 54% en Perú y el 62% en Bolivia. Entre las consecuencias de este cuadro se cuentan la proliferación de la protesta social, la difusión de ideologías contestatarias, y la elección de gobiernos que dicen representar a los desposeídos y se encuadran en algún tipo de "izquierda".

Siguiendo a K. Roberts, podemos definir ampliamente a la izquierda actual como una praxis y un pensamiento caracterizados por:

1. Una disposición a usar el poder del Estado para estimular el crecimiento económico y corregir las distorsiones producidas por el mercado;
2. Una disposición a usar el poder del Estado y/o las organizaciones sociales para reducir las desigualdades sociales y enfrentar los déficit sociales, y
3. Un compromiso con la profundización de la democracia, a través de diversas formas de movilización social y de participación en el proceso político (Arnson, p. 10).

Puesto en estos términos, a principios de 2008 podemos afirmar que sólo México, Colombia y Perú tienen gobiernos electos que no se encuadran en algún tipo de izquierda. Por cierto, aproximadamente el 60% de los 540 millones de habitantes que pueblan América latina han optado por gobiernos de ese signo (Arnson, p. 3).

Sin embargo, en cuanto examinamos las políticas concretas ensayadas por los diversos gobiernos comprendidos dentro de nuestra definición de izquierda, encontramos diferencias importantes. Venezuela, Ecuador, Nicaragua y, en menor medida, Argentina y Bolivia, se encuadran en una izquierda "populista". Este populismo generalmente está caracterizado por una movilización de masas desde arriba hacia abajo. A menudo pero no siempre, es personalista. Suele venir de la mano de un hombre fuerte que desafía a la política tradicional y a las elites económicas. El caso arquetípico de este líder carismático en la izquierda es, en la actualidad, Hugo Chávez.

No obstante, el populismo de izquierda (que se diferencia del de derecha, ejemplificado por el ex presidente peruano Alberto Fujimori) no siempre es encabezado por un hombre fuerte. En la Argentina actual, por ejemplo, no hay un líder carismático sino un gobierno emergente de un partido populista tradicional, el peronismo, que en una etapa previa, la de Carlos Menem (1989–1999), había representado un populismo de derecha, y ahora se regenera con un populismo de izquierda moderada.

También es diferente el caso de Evo Morales en Bolivia, ya que representa una movilización social que fluye en dirección opuesta a la que es habitual en el populismo: de abajo hacia arriba. Además, como sabemos, en el caso boliviano los conflictos étnicos son un componente crucial que condiciona la política interna y externa.

Vemos entonces cuán diversa es la textura del populismo latinoamericano: puede incluir o no un líder carismático; en algunos casos tiene componentes étnicos; a veces emerge de un partido populista histórico. La movilización social casi siempre se alienta de arriba hacia abajo, aunque en algún caso el flujo de energía se produce en sentido inverso. Lo que todas las variantes tienen en común, sin embargo, es la ausencia de énfasis en la institucionalización democrática, que queda eclipsada por el líder carismático o por la estructura partidaria "movimientista" o indigenista.

Es precisamente en este rasgo donde yace la diferencia fundamental entre la izquierda populista latinoamericana y su contraparte socialdemócrata, que en términos generales caracteriza a los gobiernos y opciones electorales de Chile, Uruguay y en medida menor, Brasil. En Chile, cuya centroizquierda es la que más se parece al sector homónimo en Europa, gobierna la Concertación de Partidos para la Democracia. Esta coalición está liderada por el Partido Socialista, una agrupación institucionalizada y neomarxista que sobrevivió a la dictadura de Augusto Pinochet (1973–1990). Los cambios en el mundo, principalmente el colapso de la Unión Soviética, contribuyeron a renovar ideológicamente al partido, a la vez que a moderarlo. Y cómo señala Roberts, esta moderación surge en parte porque compite con rivales en un sistema institucionalizado de partidos (Arnson, p. 13).

Populismo vs. socialdemocracia: comparando Argentina con Chile

Este anclaje del centroizquierda chileno es diametralmente diferente al de la izquierda populista latinoamericana. Tomemos por caso al partido del gobierno en la Argentina, el justicialismo (o peronismo). No sólo no es neomarxista: no representa filosofía política alguna, excepto el pragmatismo descarnado de ser efectivo en la captura del poder.

En efecto, a diferencia de Chile, en Argentina los grandes partidos han sido movimientistas. En el caso del peronismo, los presidentes engendrados fueron:

- Juan Domingo Perón (1946–1955 y 1973–1974), un militar carismático que manipuló al movimiento obrero desde la cúpula de una dictadura militar y luego fue elegido democráticamente en tres ocasiones;

- Héctor J. Cámpora (1973), que fue una suerte de bisagra entre el líder carismático exiliado y una juventud peronista revolucionaria que desafiaba al ala derechista del partido;
- María Estela (Isabel) Martínez de Perón (1974–1976), una bailarina que llegó a la presidencia a través de la alcoba y fue cómplice de intereses de ultra derecha, a su vez afines a la dictadura militar que le derrocó;
- Carlos S. Menem (1989–1999), un populista de derecha neoliberal que se dedicó principalmente a construir su poder, sirviendo a los intereses de una burguesía prebendaria y concentrando el ingreso nacional;
- Eduardo Duhalde (2002–2003), cuya devaluación de principios de su gestión redujo en un 70% las deudas de las grandes empresas, contribuyendo a concentrar aún más el ingreso y a engendrar la consiguiente pobreza; y
- Néstor Kirchner (2003–2007), un populista de centro-izquierda que, en medida modesta, consiguió revertir este proceso de concentración del ingreso.
- Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2008–presente), ex legisladora y populista de centro-izquierda sin carisma alguno, más moderada que su cónyuge, que le precedió en la presidencia.

En otras palabras, la filosofía política del peronismo no existe. El suyo es un aparato para conquistar el poder. Sus afiliados frecuentemente reconocen que su partido es un “proyecto de poder”. Y es por eso que en él han convivido siempre un ala de derecha y otra de izquierda. En alguna medida, lo mismo se puede decir de la alicaída Unión Cívica Radical, el otro gran partido tradicional argentino. Siempre tuvo una rama conservadora y otra de centroizquierda.

Aunque legalmente estas organizaciones “movimientistas” son partidos políticos, en realidad son mecanismos que permiten sortear el sistema político constitucional, cual un cabal “*by pass*”. La verdadera competencia política se produce en su interior, y no es democrática. Disfrazados de partidos, en el fondo son clubes cuyos dirigentes se alternan en la presidencia del país. Su longevo poder proviene de una red subterránea de facilitadores, conocida como el “aparato”.

En el caso del peronismo, el aparato es una trama de punteros que incluso pudo sobrevivir dieciocho años de proscripción de su partido. Sus vínculos con el crimen organizado de barrio le permiten obtener fondos modestos provenientes del juego clandestino, la prostitución y el narcotráfico pequeño. Su longeva supervivencia es el fruto de su duradera inserción en los estamentos inferiores de las burocracias estatales, de nivel nacional, provincial y municipal. Durante décadas este aparato ha seducido a vecinos humildes en numerosas

localidades y vecindarios, facilitando trámites difíciles, desde entierros hasta la habilitación de pequeños negocios, a la vez que ha contado con los fondos necesarios para costear movilizaciones populares. Tiene el poder de repartir favores incluso cuando sus dirigentes no están en el poder. Por eso, engendra lealtades duraderas entre las masas pauperizadas. Es una de las “instituciones subterráneas” emergidas del fracaso de las instituciones formales.

En contraste, los partidos políticos chilenos de izquierda y de derecha tienen una filosofía política identitaria, y ese rasgo de la política chilena sobrevivió a la dictadura. Con o sin aparato, no han degenerado en estructuras movimientistas. En esta dimensión, aunque no en otras, Chile es constitutivamente diferente de la mayor parte de los países de América latina y tiene fuertes rasgos en común sólo con Uruguay. Como veremos más adelante – y esta es una nueva paradoja – la ausencia de un crudo pragmatismo en los partidos políticos de Chile contribuye a que el Estado chileno se comporte pragmáticamente frente al mundo, velando por los intereses chilenos, mientras los “proyectos de poder” de los partidos políticos argentinos han tendido a anularse recíprocamente, impidiendo la defensa pragmática de los intereses nacionales en el largo plazo.

Por cierto, el pragmatismo de los “partidos” argentinos deviene en, a lo sumo, partido-céntrico. Una vez instalado el juego de suma cero, todo político que privilegie el interés colectivo sobre el de su facción particular pierde frente a los demagogos. Como se verá en sucesivos acápite, este intrínquilis de difícil solución es especialmente visible en el análisis de las políticas exteriores.

La política exterior del populismo vs. la de la socialdemocracia: comparando a Venezuela con Chile

Las divergentes políticas exteriores producidas por la matriz socialdemócrata y la de la izquierda populista son particularmente visibles cuando se comparan casos extremos como el chileno y el venezolano. Ambos países se han beneficiado enormemente de los precios favorables de las *commodities* que exportan: Chile, con el cobre, y Venezuela con el petróleo. Pero mientras Ricardo Lagos (2000–2006) ha sido frecuentemente señalado como el estadista latinoamericano que más hizo por combatir la pobreza en la historia reciente, acreditándosele el buen uso de esos importantes recursos, muy otro es el caso de Hugo Chávez. Además, mientras la infraestructura chilena se ha desarrollado con paso sostenido, la venezolana se ha deteriorado fuertemente en años re-

cientes. Y mientras Chile se ha abierto al mundo, inteligentemente aprovechando oportunidades comerciales, Venezuela ha caído en un dirigismo estatal extremo, adoptando un rígido control de cambios. Asimismo, mientras Venezuela desafía permanentemente a Estados Unidos, Chile mantiene una relación buena pero no servil con esa potencia.

Si estudiamos a Chile, comprobaremos que no es por amor a los Estados Unidos sino por un cálculo de conveniencia que su gobierno socialista adhiere a principios de libre comercio. Por cierto, según la consultora Latinobarómetro, los países latinoamericanos donde el presidente George W. Bush goza de menor aprobación son Chile, Uruguay y Argentina. Pero ocurre también que los países donde Fidel Castro tiene menor aprobación son Chile y Costa Rica, y aquel en que Hugo Chávez tiene menor aprobación es Chile. En otras palabras, la animadversión chilena por Bush y la propensión de su gente al centroizquierda, no alcanzan para neutralizar el rechazo hacia caudillos personalistas y dictadores de izquierda, que son enemigos de Bush. La actitud parece europea y permite al Estado chileno mantener relaciones satisfactorias con los tres, Bush, Chávez y Castro, a pesar de que sus ciudadanos no simpatizan con ninguno de ellos.

Las políticas chilenas son el producto de esta disposición pragmática de parte de pueblo y gobierno, y eso se ve sobre todo en su apertura comercial. Hasta la fecha Chile ha firmado tratados de libre comercio con 37 gobiernos y bloques, entre ellos Estados Unidos, Canadá, la Unión Europea, la Asociación Europea de Libre Comercio, China, México, Japón, Corea del Sur y América Central. Junto con México e Israel, es uno de los tres países con mayor cantidad de acuerdos de libre comercio del mundo entero.

Esta política le ha deparado resultados extraordinarios. Para poner un ejemplo, en los cuatro primeros años de vigencia del Acuerdo de Asociación, el intercambio comercial chileno con los países de la Unión Europea aumentó de 7.426,7 millones de dólares en 2002, a 21.128,3 millones en 2006, es decir, 2,8 veces. Similarmente, desde que entró en efecto a comienzos de 2004, el tratado de libre comercio entre Chile y Estados Unidos produjo un aumento del 154% en el comercio bilateral entre ambos. Chile prospera, y no sólo por el aumento del precio internacional del cobre.

En cambio, Venezuela se nos presenta como un violento contraste. Los petrodólares de ese país, incomparablemente más abundantes que las divisas del Estado chileno, han sido usados principalmente para comprar protagonismo internacional para su caudillo, Hugo Chávez. Y si bien es verdad que tanto Chile como Venezuela gastan mucho dinero en armamentos, las adquisiciones

de Santiago se realizan sin ostentación, como discreta política de Estado, mientras las de Caracas vienen junto a cotidianos alardes y amenazas.

Las aventuras geopolíticas venezolanas

La Venezuela de Chávez usa sus gigantescos recursos para subsidiar las economías de varios países de la región, sobre los que aspira a ejercer influencia. A Nicaragua le suministra petróleo barato a la vez que la coopta para su alianza con Irán, mientras en Argentina financia organizaciones de protesta que le son afines. Desde hace varios años se ha convertido en el principal sostén del régimen comunista de Cuba. Azuza al mandatario boliviano Evo Morales para que acelere procesos de nacionalización, ofreciendo financiar bases militares en las provincias petroleras de ese país. En su fallido intento de 2007 por conseguir un asiento no permanente en el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU, y con la esperanza de captar el voto africano, Chávez prometió comprar todo el excedente exportable de las cosechas de algodón de Benin y Malí. Llevó su amistad con Irán al punto de apoyar los intentos de penetración chiíta en la región, e incluso concurrió a la conversión al islam de indígenas de la Guajira, en su propio país. También se plegó a la retórica anti-israelí del régimen de Teherán.

Gracias a los coqueteos geopolíticos de Chávez, la milicia libanesa Hezbolá tiene en Venezuela una importante puerta de entrada a América latina. Se trata de una trama doble por la que se contribuye a financiar operaciones del Hezbolá en Medio Oriente, a la vez que se avanza en la penetración chiíta de organizaciones populares latinoamericanas. Esta penetración es efectiva porque Hezbolá brinda servicios sociales a los miembros de las organizaciones populares en que asienta su presencia, duplicando el modelo de su operatoria en el Líbano.

En este contexto, Ghazi Nasr al Din, diplomático venezolano de origen libanés, ha sido acusado por el Departamento de Estado de los Estados Unidos de usar las embajadas de su país para proveer de fondos al Hezbolá y facilitar "cursos de entrenamiento", en Irán, de miembros venezolanos de dicha organización terrorista. Estas operaciones se realizan en connivencia con agencias de viajes de Caracas, manejadas también por libaneses. A su vez, el consulado de Venezuela en Maicao, Colombia, ha sido denunciado como proveedor de cédulas y pasaportes venezolanos a radicales islámicos. Un punto neurálgico del vínculo entre Venezuela y el Hezbolá se encuentra en la Isla Margarita, donde opera un banco que financia actividades en el Medio Oriente de la

milicia chiíta, facilitando flujos de dinero provenientes del tráfico de drogas, la venta de armas, el contrabando de personas y otras actividades.

Es por medio de estos y otros mecanismos que prosperan las actividades de "Hezbollah Venezuela", una organización de filiación política chavista que se auto-publicita en Internet y que opera principalmente en la zona de la Guajira y la sierra del Perija, con indígenas de las etnias guajira y wayuu. Según informes norteamericanos, estas actividades cuentan con el apoyo de la Dirección de los Servicios de Inteligencia y Prevención (DSIP) del gobierno venezolano.

Pero Chávez no sólo flirtea con los islámicos. La proximidad de maniobras ruso-venezolanas en noviembre, con la anunciada presencia del moderno crucero Pedro el Grande, y el reciente aterrizaje de dos poderosos bombarderos Tu-160 en Caracas, han advertido a los analistas y a la comunidad de inteligencia acerca del advenimiento de una nueva fase en la competencia geopolítica ruso-norteamericana, complementaria de la inaugurada con los sucesos de Georgia de 2008. Y esta nueva era viene a caballo de la oportunidad que tanto Chávez como el presidente nicaragüense Daniel Ortega le dan a los rusos. Nicaragua, digno es de destacarse, es el único país aparte de Rusia que ha reconocido la independencia de Osetia del Sur y de Abjazia. Cuba, en cambio, deseosa de alentar una política norteamericana menos dañina para sus intereses, ha adoptado una actitud más ambigua.

Mirando al futuro, también existe la posibilidad de que Rusia use su influencia política en Venezuela para anclar submarinos en sus aguas. Durante toda la Guerra Fría (aún después de la crisis de los misiles) hubo presencia de submarinos rusos en Cuba, y ese escenario puede recrearse ahora en el país de Chávez. Moscú está muy activa produciendo nuevos y más modernos sumergibles, y en pocos años tendrá la disponibilidad necesaria para ubicar algunos en esas latitudes en forma permanente. Eso obligará a Washington a invertir aún más en defensa, para mantener su amplia superioridad, o a trasladar recursos del ejército a la marina, lo que implicaría reducir aún más su capacidad para librar guerras terrestres en frentes como el afgano o el iraquí.

Pero la mayor amenaza radica en la posibilidad de que Rusia, con su recuperada liquidez financiera, reanude su táctica de guerra fría de armar organizaciones insurgentes enemigas de los Estados Unidos en América latina. El móvil ya no sería ideológico sino crudamente geopolítico. Las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) colombianas podrían ser beneficiarias. También los cárteles mexicanos. Y en el caso de las FARC, la connivencia de Venezuela sería el mejor canal de acceso.

Aunque es improbable que Moscú acuda a estos extremos en lo inmediato, el mensaje que envía a Estados Unidos es que esas opciones están abiertas. Y entregando a Venezuela, llave en mano, una fábrica de fusiles Kalashnikov, diluye su responsabilidad directa en cualquier aumento de la capacidad de combate de los enemigos de los intereses norteamericanos.

Téngase en cuenta que el mandatario "bolivariano" es amigo cercano de la guerrilla narcotraficante de Colombia. Entre muchas evidencias de larga data, puede mencionarse que en 2004 ofreció ciudadanía venezolana a dirigentes de las FARC como Rodrigo Granda Escobar, un representante para-diplomático de los insurgentes, para protegerles de la persecución del gobierno colombiano. Cuando en enero de 2005 Granda fue secuestrado por mercenarios colombianos cerca de su casa en Caracas, Chávez acusó a Bogotá de violar soberanía venezolana.

Más grave es el hecho de que la localidad venezolana de El Nula, sita en las inmediaciones de la frontera con Colombia, esté en manos de las FARC, según informaran *El Herald* de Miami el 3 de octubre de 2008, y *La Nación* de Buenos Aires siete días más tarde. Allí la guerrilla colombiana, incluido también el Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), ejerce acciones de gobierno y de justicia, supervisa obra pública y asesora a los consejos comunales creados por el gobierno de Chávez. Esta presencia en esa y otras localidades fronterizas se remonta al año 2000, demostrando que a pesar de sus reveses recientes, las FARC retienen una cuota significativa de poder y gozan del apoyo de algunos gobiernos extranjeros.

Según la crónica de Casto Ocando para *El Herald*, en El Nula las guerrillas resuelven disputas familiares; deciden la separación de bienes en casos de divorcio; dan la palabra final en casos de querellas por robo de ganado o por el establecimiento de límites entre fincas; organizan reuniones con directores y maestros de escuelas públicas; y obligan a las empresas contratadas por el Estado para construir obra pública, a emplear guerrilleros como obreros y a tributar entre el 15 y el 30 por ciento de su recaudación. La justicia guerrillera opera en 24 horas, mientras que la Defensoría del Pueblo demora meses. Es una justicia salomónica que la gente acepta, frente a la virtual ausencia del Estado venezolano. Además, la guerrilla combate el crimen. Ladrones y violadores aparecen muertos. Según Ocando, el párroco del pueblo declara que: "Hay mucha seguridad. Es como el pago de ellos. Y la gente lo reconoce".

A pesar de estas pruebas de complicidad o connivencia entre Chávez y las FARC, en agosto de 2007 el presidente colombiano Álvaro Uribe aceptó que el venezolano intermediara entre Bogotá y los rebeldes por la liberación huma-

nitaria de rehenes. Quizá quiso neutralizar la mala impresión causada en la opinión pública internacional porque, en junio de 2007, negociaciones anteriores entre su gobierno y los insurgentes habían culminado en la muerte, por fuego cruzado, de once congresistas secuestrados que las FARC habían ofrecido liberar. Con el apoyo locuaz del presidente de Francia, Nicolas Sarkozy, la intermediación se puso en marcha, pero a fines de noviembre Uribe retiró su apoyo a la mediación de Chávez, en parte porque éste daba a los negociadores de la guerrilla el tratamiento propio de diplomáticos de Estados soberanos, a la vez que sostenía conversaciones personales con generales colombianos, como si respondieran a su mando.

El caudillo venezolano reaccionó airadamente y las FARC decidieron “desagraviarlo”, entregando rehenes a Caracas para su liberación desde Venezuela. Esta operación, en la que los gobiernos de Argentina y Francia tuvieron participación, se concretó exitosamente el 10 de enero de 2008 con la liberación de Consuelo González (una congresista colombiana secuestrada en 2001) y Clara Rojas (asesora de la candidata presidencial Ingrid Betancourt, secuestrada junto a ésta en 2002). Posteriormente, el 27 de febrero, otros cuatro rehenes de alto perfil fueron entregados para su liberación por las FARC a Chávez. Entre ellos, uno era senador cuando fue secuestrado y otro era esposa de un senador.

Pero antes de esta postrera liberación de rehenes, con todos los ánimos crispados por la crisis diplomática, el 20 de enero Chávez escaló su confrontación con Uribe, amenazando militarizar la frontera entre su país y Colombia. Seis días más tarde acusó a su vecino de “fraguar una provocación bélica contra Venezuela”. Y el 3 de febrero volvió a proferir advertencias. No obstante estas actitudes, el 28 de febrero Sarkozy recurrió otra vez a Chávez para que intermediara por la liberación de Betancourt, que tiene doble nacionalidad colombiana-francesa. El interlocutor del presidente francés era Raúl Reyes, segundo en comando de las FARC y a veces considerado su “canciller” (ministro de relaciones exteriores).

Cuando el 15 de marzo, quizá con la intención de interrumpir negociaciones que daban a las FARC un excesivo estatus internacional, fuerzas colombianas mataron a Reyes y a otros dieciséis combatientes en territorio ecuatoriano, muchos pensaron que comenzaría la guerra. Venezuela, Nicaragua y el propio Ecuador acusaron a Colombia de violar la soberanía ecuatoriana. Chávez escaló nuevamente la disputa anunciando el envío de tropas a la frontera. Lo mismo hizo Ecuador. Y el 6 de marzo, Nicaragua rompió relaciones diplomáticas con Colombia.

No obstante, en la ocasión se puso de manifiesto una vez más que América latina tiene escasa vocación guerrera. El 7 de marzo, los presidentes de la región se reunieron en Santo Domingo para una cumbre previamente agendada del Grupo de Río. La sospecha persistentemente enunciada por diplomáticos y analistas de varios países es que a quien verdaderamente le convenía una guerra era al gobierno de los Estados Unidos, ya que su resultado probable hubiera sido el derrocamiento de Chávez, el cese del subsidio venezolano a Cuba y Bolivia, y quizás incluso una eventual crisis del régimen de La Habana.

En Santo Domingo, luego de feroces acusaciones e insultos entre las partes en conflicto, los mandatarios de Brasil, Chile y Argentina pusieron paños fríos y consiguieron un pedido de disculpas formal por parte de Colombia por haber violado la soberanía ecuatoriana. Estas disculpas fueron premiadas, ya que Cristina Kirchner habló del "terrorismo de las FARC", alejándose levemente de la posición histórica del gobierno argentino, que supone que éstas son solamente un grupo insurgente. Antes del feliz desenlace, el mandatario colombiano Álvaro Uribe había denunciado a su par ecuatoriano Rafael Correa de haber recibido contribuciones importantes de los guerrilleros para su campaña presidencial. También circularon informaciones de que en territorio ecuatoriano hay establecidas once bases de los insurgentes. No obstante, al rato hubo fotos y apretones de mano, declarándose superada a la crisis. Inmediatamente, Nicaragua reestableció relaciones diplomáticas con Colombia, y Venezuela desmilitarizó su frontera.

Algunos días más tarde, durante la reunión de cancilleres de la Organización de los Estados Americanos (OEA) del 18 de marzo, se puso más claramente de manifiesto que el país del hemisferio menos interesado en la paz era Estados Unidos. En esa reunión, el bloque latinoamericano se enfrentó a ese país y a Colombia, quienes argüían que el ataque colombiano en territorio ecuatoriano era "justificable". Después de largas discusiones, Colombia cedió, dejando a Estados Unidos aislado. Finalmente, el país del norte también cedió, y la OEA aprobó un documento donde se rechaza "la incursión de fuerzas militares y policiales de Colombia en territorio de Ecuador". Además, se acordó "combatir las amenazas de seguridad provenientes de la acción de grupos irregulares o de organizaciones criminales, en particular de aquellas vinculadas a actividades del narcotráfico". Pero no se declaró a las FARC una organización terrorista.

Pero el juego geopolítico tiene sus riesgos. Chávez acusa airadamente a Estados Unidos de estar detrás de la llama separatista que se ha avivado en la provincia venezolana de Zulia y en la ecuatoriana de Guayas. Ambas son petroleras y pertenecen a Estados cuyos gobiernos, aliados entre sí, que son

antagónicos al norteamericano. Además, suscitando la ira de Caracas, Washington negocia con Bogotá el establecimiento de una base militar en la Guajira, justo en el límite entre Colombia y la rica provincia de Zulia.

El armamentismo del populismo venezolano

El casino geopolítico exige armas, y era esperable que Chávez las comprara masivamente. Es en ese contexto que se inscribe la retórica militarista que el mandatario venezolano desplegó antes de la resolución de la crisis entre su país y Colombia. Chávez ya dispone de unos cien mil milicianos armados con fusiles automáticos de última generación, de origen ruso. Están divididos en dos organizaciones, el Frente Francisco Miranda (FFM), fundado en 2003, y la Guardia Territorial (GT), establecido en 2005.

Estas tropas irregulares están reclutadas entre los pobres y dependen de los subsidios con que el caudillo doma sus voluntades. Cuando el 20 de enero, Chávez amenazó con "armar al pueblo y a los batallones de reservistas", se refería a esta nueva fuerza, cuya función es alterar dos equilibrios de poder: el sudamericano y el que ordena sus relaciones con la oposición interna a su gobierno. En el fondo, como ha sucedido casi siempre con el armamentismo latinoamericano, esta amenaza hacia afuera es una proyección de la política interna.

Con estas erogaciones, Venezuela malgasta la mejor oportunidad que ha tenido en su historia para desarrollarse. Pero lo más interesante es que, por lo menos hasta la derrota de Chávez en el referéndum realizado en diciembre de 2007 para habilitarlo para reelecciones ilimitadas, la gran masa de venezolanos pareció aprobar este uso de recursos. Es un gasto que les deparó el beneficio emocional de ver a su caudillo disputando protagonismo internacional con el presidente de los Estados Unidos en las noticias de la tarde, como si fueran verdaderos pares. Cuando un país está sumido en la pobreza y el analfabetismo funcional, los beneficios electorales de este tipo de actitud suelen ser mayores que sus costos internos. Los altos costos para el país en términos de desarrollo frustrado son de largo plazo y por ahora no perjudican al caudillo: *après lui le déluge*.

Por otra parte, en el plano doméstico Chávez va por más, y eso tiene consecuencias geopolíticas. Seguirá intentando reformar la Constitución para perpetuarse en el poder. Y a la vez, desde 2005 viene anunciando su aspiración de expandir la fuerza de milicianos a 2,3 millones de hombres armados. De concretarlo, las consecuencias serían graves tanto hacia adentro como hacia fuera.

Armar un ejército popular de ese tamaño parece un proyecto faraónico, pero con los petrodólares de Venezuela no lo es. A 500 dólares por fusil automático ruso, representaría un gasto de 1.150 millones. Esta cifra es muy inferior a los 5.000 millones que cuestan los cazas y helicópteros que Chávez le compró a Rusia. Además, en lo que hace al equipamiento de milicianos propios y ajenos, Venezuela pronto podrá autoabastecerse, ya que también compró en Moscú el equipamiento y tecnología necesarios para una fábrica de fusiles automáticos que, a partir de 2010, será capaz de producir 30.000 por año. Téngase en cuenta que, por ahora, las fuerzas armadas brasileñas son las más poderosas de la región, con una fuerza total de 189.000 hombres. Si a los 2,3 millones de milicianos adicionales, Chávez sumara una flota de cazas rusos más modernos que los mejores de Brasil, el equilibrio militar sudamericano quedaría alterado a favor de una Venezuela aventurera.

Y por cierto, las primeras dos docenas de cazas Sukhoi 30-MK llegaron a destino en septiembre de 2008, revitalizando la alicaída fuerza aérea de Chávez, que había sufrido gravemente desde que, en 2001, los norteamericanos interrumpieron la provisión de repuestos para sus cazas F-16. Los nuevos cazas rusos son los más avanzados que están disponibles en el mercado mundial y representarán un salto cuántico para el poder militar venezolano. Tienen la autonomía necesaria para llegar al Canal de Panamá y a las bases norteamericanas sitas en Guantánamo y en Puerto Rico. Aunque los nuevos cazas no se usarán para atacar tales blancos, obligarán a una modificación en el despliegue de los recursos aéreos estadounidenses en el Caribe.

Y aunque Chávez jamás atacaría a Brasil, el cambio en el equilibrio militar regional le permitiría moverse con soltura frente a Colombia y las FARC. Considérese que el caudillo venezolano da santuario y en ocasiones ha contribuido a armar a éstas. Si los milicianos chavistas crecen y se multiplican, podrán entrar y salir de Colombia a voluntad, potenciando el poder de los hoy alicaídos guerrilleros colombianos.

El caudillo juega a la geopolítica, invirtiendo en ese deporte los recursos del pueblo venezolano. Pero es muy improbable que estalle la guerra con Colombia: su propio pueblo no toleraría un conflicto bélico de alta intensidad. El mandatario sería derrocado con el primer bombardeo de Caracas. Además, Venezuela compra a Colombia el treinta por ciento de sus alimentos y también gas natural. En 2007, el intercambio comercial entre ambos alcanzó los 5500 millones de dólares. En el caso del complejo Estado/sociedad civil de Venezuela, la interdependencia económica es casi un seguro de paz. La brillante trayec-

toria de benignidad de la región, que seguirá pasando desapercibida, probablemente no será mancillada.

El desarme del populismo argentino

En algunos sentidos, el populismo de centroizquierda argentino se encuentra en las antípodas del venezolano, y es sumamente interesante puntualizar el contraste. La fase actual de la democracia argentina nació con el triple fracaso de una dictadura militar de triste memoria. Las fuerzas armadas argentinas masacraron a unos treinta mil ciudadanos sospechosos de connivencia o de participación en la guerrilla de la década de 1970, sufriendo por ello una derrota política que las desmanteló. Esta derrota fue agravada por el fracaso económico del gobierno militar, que comenzó con un proceso de endeudamiento externo que antes el país no padecía, y culminó con la catastrófica guerra de Malvinas, que fue vivida como una humillación nacional sin precedentes.

Por todo ello, muy lejos está el populismo argentino de imitar la política armamentista de Venezuela. Por el contrario, sucesivos gobiernos han conseguido desposeer a los militares. Hacia fines de 2008, sus obsoletos equipos están en mal estado y sus municiones no alcanzarían para una guerra de veinticuatro horas con un país vecino.

Por cierto, durante la década de 1990 se redujo a un mínimo el presupuesto de las fuerzas armadas, se abolió el servicio militar obligatorio y se desmanteló la industria de armas. En este último rubro, se liquidó:

- La fábrica Tanque Argentino Mediano S.E., dedicada a la producción de la familia TAM de vehículos blindados – TAM, VCTP, VCTM, VCA, VCPC;
- El complejo Área Material Córdoba, dedicado al mantenimiento de aviones y a la producción de material aeronáutico;
- La Fábrica Militar de Aviones, dedicada a la producción del avión de entrenamiento IA-63 Pampa, de diseño argentino;
- Los Astilleros Río Santiago, dedicados a la producción de destructores y fragatas misilísticas de la familia MEKO, con licencia de la empresa alemana Blohm & Voss;
- Los Astilleros Domeq García, dedicados a la producción de submarinos clase 1700, bajo licencia de la firma alemana Thyssen Nordseewerke GmbH;
- La Fábrica Militar Domingo Matheu, dedicada a la producción de pistolas y fusiles automáticos;
- La Fábrica Militar Río Tercero, dedicada a la producción de cañones, morteros y municiones;

- La Fábrica Militar Fray Luis Beltrán, dedicada a la producción de municiones para artillería;
- La Fábrica Militar San Francisco, dedicada a la producción de municiones para armas personales, material electrónico y partes para la familia TAM de vehículos blindados, y
- Una multitud de industrias militares menores.

Además, como ya se dijo, durante la década del '90 se adhirió al Tratado de Tlatelolco para la Proscripción de Armas Nucleares en América Latina, al Tratado de No Proliferación Nuclear (NPT) y al Régimen de Control de Tecnologías Misilísticas (MTCR). En el camino, se desmanteló el misil Cóndor II, un vehículo balístico de alcance intermedio comparable al Pershing II norteamericano, con mil kilómetros de alcance y capaz de portar una carga útil de mil libras (el peso promedio de una ojiva nuclear).

Ninguna de estas políticas fue revertida por los gobiernos posteriores. Por el contrario, durante los gobiernos de ambos Kirchner se ha continuado con la política, comenzada en 1984 por el presidente Raúl Alfonsín (1983–1989), de perseguir penalmente a los militares por sus violaciones de derechos humanos. En 2008, esta persecución se extendió a crímenes anteriores a los de la última dictadura militar. Se ha procesado a los responsables de fusilamientos acaecidos en el penal militar de Trelew en el año 1972, y se habla de llegar hasta 1955, año en que Perón fue derrocado.

Paradójicamente, seguramente debido a *path dependences* divergentes, estas políticas anti-militares generan tanto apoyo popular en la Argentina, como parecen suscitar en Venezuela el armamentismo y los alardes belicistas de Chávez. Ambas políticas son populistas y se prestan a la especulación demagógica, aunque están encuadradas en contextos históricos y políticos divergentes.

Argentina: la crisis de gobernabilidad 2001 y la muerte de la política exterior

Este sorprendente contraste entre dos populismos latinoamericanos se explica en parte por la singularidad de caso argentino y su colapso de diciembre de 2001. Por cierto, en poco más que un cuarto de siglo este país sufrió una involución con pocos paralelos en el mundo: el porcentaje de su población bajo la línea de pobreza aumentó permanentemente desde menos del 10% en 1975, al 50% o más en 2002. Este milagro al revés es el dato central del que debe partir cualquier diagnóstico de la crisis argentina, porque es el producto de un proceso que ha tenido lugar bajo regímenes tanto democráticos como autorita-

rios, e independientemente de qué partido gobernara cuando el gobierno era constitucional.

Por cierto, aunque muchos países del Tercer Mundo siempre han albergado una marginalidad de proporciones masivas, únicamente la Argentina ha sufrido tamaña regresión. Se trata de un país que a principios del siglo XX fue tierra de promisión para millones de europeos pobres, pero que en el siglo XXI se convirtió en expulsor de su población de clase media. Su superficie es casi del tamaño de la India pero alberga 28 veces menos población. No obstante, hacia el momento de su colapso de fines de 2001 había acumulado más del doble de deuda externa pública que ese país, y 64 veces más deuda por habitante. A pesar de ello, si sumáramos los activos en el exterior de particulares nativos, la Argentina como sociedad resultaría una acreedora neta. Sin embargo, su Estado aparentemente no podía pagar sus deudas públicas y protagonizó la mayor cesación de pagos de la historia económica mundial hasta entonces.

Cómo era de esperar, el deterioro de su estructura social y del nivel de vida de sus mayorías no vino solo, sino que fue acompañado por una severa erosión de sus instituciones, siendo el colapso político y financiero de diciembre de 2001 la ilustración más dramática del fenómeno. El crecimiento de la pobreza, producido por la voracidad de una burguesía que capturó al Estado y concentró riqueza, engendró poderosas organizaciones de protesta que hacia fines de 2001 adquirieron un visible poder de veto extra-constitucional sobre las acciones de los gobiernos.

Al quintuplicarse el porcentaje de la población por debajo de la línea de pobreza, se redujo el margen de maniobra interno y externo de los gobiernos, en una medida inimaginable en países como Chile, México o Brasil. En diciembre de 2001, las organizaciones populares de la nueva pobreza fueron el principal factor en el derrocamiento civil de dos presidentes constitucionales, Fernando de la Rúa (1999–2001) y Adolfo Rodríguez Saá.

Éste último se alejó de la presidencia a los siete días de haber asumido el cargo, cuando a fines de diciembre, durante una reunión de gobernadores en el sur de la provincia de Buenos Aires, fue rodeado de protestas amenazantes a la vez que privado de su escolta, gas y electricidad. Escondido en un automóvil, huyó del lugar y luego voló a su provincia de San Luis, donde sus aliados controlaban la policía local. Sólo desde allí se atrevió a dar una conferencia de prensa, renunciando a su cargo. El vicepresidente Ramón Puerta, que le seguía en el orden de sucesión, hizo lo mismo desde su provincia, Misiones (Escudé 2006).

Durante 2002, las instituciones virtualmente habían desaparecido. El poder se segmentó territorialmente. El 27 de agosto de 2002 el *New York Times*

anunciaba en su portada: "*Some in Argentina See Secession As the Answer to Economic Peril*". El país conservó su integridad territorial gracias a frecuentes reuniones de gobernadores, que en la práctica reemplazaron a las instituciones nacionales establecidas por la Constitución.

Estas fueron sólo algunas de las consecuencias de la involución en la distribución del ingreso, que destruyó el tejido social, generando a la vez instituciones subterráneas, como el nuevo poder de veto de las organizaciones populares. A partir de entonces, los gobiernos optaron por complacer a estas agrupaciones, independientemente de los costos para el país en el largo plazo. Se privilegió el beneficio de corto plazo de preservar el orden.

Para poner coto a las protestas sociales que amenazaban con sumir al país en la anarquía y que hubieran podido producir la caída del gobierno recién instalado de Eduardo Duhalde, en 2002 se optó por reducir al máximo el inevitable aumento del costo de vida. Significativamente, como veremos, esta política engendró nuevas dependencias frente a otros Estados de la región. Decidida la mega-devaluación con que se sacó al país del modelo de paridad monetaria con el dólar, el gobierno convirtió las tarifas de gas natural al peso argentino y las congeló. En términos de divisas, el precio del gas natural (que representa la mitad de la mezcla energética argentina) cayó un 67%.

Esta intervención en la estructura de precios del sector energético poseyó la virtud de eliminar una fuente posible de disturbios sociales, contribuyendo a la gobernabilidad de un país acosado por una regresión social sin paralelos. Pero a la vez, el precio fijo no competitivo del gas representó un disuasivo a las inversiones en el sector y un incentivo para un mayor consumo. Como el gas fue el más subsidiado de los combustibles, gran cantidad de automóviles que usaban nafta fueron reconvertidos para funcionar con gas natural comprimido. Siempre que la tecnología lo permitió, consumidores e industriales optaron por el combustible de menor precio.

Cuando la economía se recuperó del colapso de 2002, la demanda de gas creció rápidamente mientras la oferta permaneció estancada. Peor aún, hacia 2004 las reservas probadas del país habían disminuido en un 35% frente a su nivel de 2000. Por momentos, la red eléctrica estuvo a punto de colapsar. Como consecuencia, para asegurar el suministro interno, el gobierno recortó entre el 20 y el 50% las exportaciones de gas a Chile, violando acuerdos y generando una crisis en las relaciones bilaterales. Al mismo tiempo, se establecía una dependencia que antes no existía frente al gas natural boliviano y el fuel oil venezolano.

Como se ve, la inserción externa de Argentina dejó de estar bajo el control del gobierno, cuyo margen de maniobra disminuyó debido a la involución interna.

Un fenómeno análogo, de pérdida de capacidad de maniobra del Estado, se observa en las relaciones post-crisis entre Argentina y Uruguay. En este caso no estuvo de por medio una problemática económica sino ecológica. El ex presidente Kirchner debió aceptar, casi con una sonrisa, que organizaciones de ambientalistas de la provincia de Entre Ríos prácticamente destruyeran las relaciones bilaterales entre ambos Estados. El conflicto se produjo por la oposición de los habitantes de la localidad argentina de Gualeguaychú a que se instale, en territorio uruguayo, una fábrica de pasta de papel presuntamente contaminante. La planta se encuentra a la vera del río Uruguay, que comparten los dos países.

Desde marzo de 2003, y con mayor intensidad desde febrero de 2006, los ambientalistas se abocaron a violar las leyes argentinas, la Constitución y el Tratado del MERCOSUR, cortando por la fuerza el tránsito del puente que une a Argentina y Uruguay. A los camiones chilenos con insumos para la instalación de la fábrica se los detenían a veces por una semana, alimentando a sus chóferes, para luego ordenarles que regresen a su país. De esta manera, por decisión de los ambientalistas argentinos, parte del comercio terrestre entre Chile y Uruguay debió convertirse en marítimo.

A pesar de que las fábricas de papel argentinas, que existen desde hace décadas, son mucho más contaminantes y también ensucian aguas compartidas, y a pesar de que ni a la Argentina ni al Uruguay les conviene tener esta disputa que le ha causado un daño grave al MERCOSUR, el gobierno optó por no aplicar la ley para impedir que los ambientalistas violen las leyes. Si lo hubiera hecho, es muy probable que al día siguiente las calles de las ciudades argentinas hubieran quedado sumidas en el caos, inundadas por miembros de otras organizaciones de protesta más poderosas. Como ese fue el camino que condujo en 2001 al derrocamiento civil de Fernando de la Rúa, el gobierno optó por evitarlo, a la vez que la oposición política le conminaba a reprimir, quizás ansiosa de producir precisamente ese desenlace.

Por cierto, la crisis de gobernabilidad argentina de 2001–2002 ilustra los límites de la política exterior. Antes de ese punto de inflexión, los presidentes estaban dispuestos a sacrificar apoyo político interno en aras de objetivos nacionales de largo plazo. Alfonsín aceptó enormes costos políticos para solucionar el litigio territorial con Chile en el Beagle, porque entendió que hay pocas cosas tan importantes para Argentina como tener relaciones de cooperación con ese vecino. Lo mismo ocurrió con Menem, que solucionó el litigio de

Hielos Continentales con ese país. Pero – con permiso del razonamiento contrafáctico – si Menem o Alfonsín hubieran sido presidentes a partir de 2002, es difícil imaginarlos sacrificando capital político en aras de un objetivo de política exterior, beneficioso para el país en el largo plazo pero perjudicial para sus gobiernos en lo inmediato.

Por todo lo dicho, se puede afirmar que hay razones estructurales por las cuales el pragmatismo alcanzado por un país como Chile en su política exterior, no está al alcance de un gobierno argentino. En circunstancias involutivas como las de Argentina, el populismo no es simplemente una opción equivocada, sino un producto de la decadencia del que es difícil escapar. Más que fruto de la voluntad del gobernante, es un desenlace condicionado por fuerzas estructurales.

En verdad, cuando la supervivencia del gobierno está en juego, el largo plazo tiende a sacrificarse, confirmando una vez más que el verdadero actor en las relaciones interestatales no es el Estado sino el complejo Estado/sociedad civil.

Bolivia y el peligro del Estado fallido por segmentación étnica

Los límites impuestos a la política exterior argentina por su crisis de gobernabilidad de 2001–2002 permiten vislumbrar las consecuencias de la captura del Estado, durante un cuarto de siglo, por un segmento de una clase social: la burguesía prebendaria. El fenómeno pudo haber conducido al fracaso radical del Estado.

A su vez, el actual peligro de implosión de Bolivia ilustra un fenómeno afín pero diferente: las consecuencias de la captura del Estado, durante casi toda su historia, por una minoría étnica opulenta. Este caso nos aproxima mucho más al peligro del Estado fallido. No sólo nos encontramos allí con pobreza masiva extrema y con una polarización abismal en la distribución del ingreso. Debido a la profundización de la democracia, la situación se agrava porque la minoría que domina la economía se diferencia étnicamente, de una manera visible, de la mayoría que domina el sistema político.

Como lo diagnosticara Amy Chua, en tales circunstancias tiende a generarse un etno-nacionalismo potencialmente catastrófico, que enfrenta a una minoría étnica opulenta y odiada con una mayoría autóctona iracunda, fácilmente movilizable por políticos que buscan votos (Chua 2003: 6).

En estos casos, la democracia se convierte en el motor de la conflagración étnica. Más allá de América latina, dos casos extremos mencionados por Chua en los que esta combinación condujo al genocidio son la ex Yugoslavia y Ruanda.

En Yugoslavia los croatas eran la minoría dominadora de la economía. Bajo el comunismo de Tito hubo estabilidad, pero con la democratización, la historia se encaminó hacia la tragedia. La mayoría serbia pasó a controlar el sistema político, los croatas optaron por la secesión y los serbios se lanzaron a recuperar la integridad territorial, desencadenando venganzas genocidas contra los croatas, a quienes odiaban, y contra los bosnios, a quienes despreciaban. Eventualmente, todas las partes se volvieron genocidas. Un caso análogo fue el de Ruanda, donde los tutsis representaban el 14 por ciento de la población pero dominaban la economía. En cuanto se estableció la democracia, la mayoría hutu dominó el sistema político. En 1994, civiles hutus masacraron a 800.000 tutsis. En otras ocasiones, la minoría económicamente dominante fue expulsada, como ocurriera con los blancos en Rodesia. A su vez, en la ex Unión Soviética, una minoría judía económicamente privilegiada se sintió obligada a emigrar. En casos más venturosos, como el de Sudáfrica, se pudo evitar el genocidio pero no sin peligrosas turbulencias que pudieron terminar mal (Chua 2003: 11–13).

Cuando se produce este divorcio entre una mayoría que domina el proceso electoral y una minoría que domina la economía, que es étnicamente diferente a simple vista, típicamente se genera un proceso que sobreviene en tres fases. La primera es un impulso hacia la confiscación de la riqueza de la minoría dominante. La segunda es una reacción defensiva de la minoría opulenta contra la democracia electoral. Agotada esa instancia (que suele ser la de las dictaduras militares), la tercera fase se caracteriza por una violencia, a veces genocida, contra la aborrecida minoría (Chua 2003: 10).

El parecido entre los casos mencionados y el incierto drama que se desencadena actualmente en Bolivia es evidente. La mayoría de la población es indígena, pero Evo Morales es el primer presidente en su historia cuya identidad es explícitamente indígena. La mayor parte de los recursos naturales se encuentran en cuatro departamentos cuya población es percibida como criolla y rechaza el indigenismo. En forma permanente, crece la tensión entre los empobrecidos indígenas de las tierras altas y los terratenientes de tez clara de las tierras bajas. Santa Cruz, Tarija, Chuquisaca, Beni y Pando albergan ambiciones autonómicas, si no secesionistas. Se oponen a la nacionalización de los hidrocarburos y a las confiscaciones de tierras del gobierno, exigidas por la mayoría indígena de las sierras. La situación no es demasiado diferente de la de la ex Yugoslavia antes de su guerra civil. Y en menor medida, se viven situaciones similares en Ecuador (un país que en los últimos doce años tuvo nueve presidentes), Perú, Guatemala y algunas regiones mexicanas.

En verdad, a mediados de 2009 Bolivia enfrenta graves desafíos. Cinco de las principales problemáticas, todas vinculadas en mayor o menor grado a esta fragmentación étnica, son:

1. La nacionalización de los hidrocarburos – Cumpliendo con promesas electorales de Morales, un decreto de mayo de 2006 nacionalizó el petróleo y el gas boliviano. La medida genera conflictos con los inversores extranjeros, especialmente brasileños (PETROBRAS), españoles (Repsol YPF) y franceses (Total). También genera conflictos internos con los departamentos (provincias) productores de gas y petróleo. Por otra parte, acercó más a Chávez y Morales. Al anunciar las medidas, el presidente proclamó: “necesitamos trabajadores revolucionarios, ningún reformista ni conservador”. Sin embargo, la capacidad de gestión del Estado boliviano es muy baja, y en la práctica es difícil que pueda instrumentar la nacionalización sin padecer una parálisis. No obstante, la cuestión de quién controla los ingresos provenientes del petróleo y el gas natural llegó a un punto culminante en septiembre de 2008, cuando se produjeron violentas manifestaciones en Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Pando y Tarija, que clamaban por la devolución, a los nueve departamentos bolivianos, de un fuerte impuesto recaudado por el gobierno central. Por momentos, grupos autonómicos de Santa Cruz sabotearon los envíos de gas a Brasil, que obtiene de Bolivia el 45% de su consumo. Los disturbios condujeron a la mencionada expulsión del embajador norteamericano, acusado de promover la secesión.
2. La reforma constitucional – En septiembre de 2008, protestas violentas contra la nueva constitución aprobada por la Asamblea Constituyente en diciembre del año anterior habían convergido, en las provincias autonomistas, con las manifestaciones contra los impuestos a los hidrocarburos. Los autonomistas intentaron entonces bloquear carreteras para desabastecer la capital. A pesar de esta fuerte oposición de los departamentos ricos de las tierras bajas, en enero de 2009 un referendo nacional aprobó por amplio margen la nueva Carta Magna, que fue entonces promulgada. Su artículo 1° define a Bolivia como “Estado unitario social de derecho plurinacional comunitario” y su artículo 5° establece que los idiomas oficiales son el castellano más otras 36 lenguas indígenas. Asimismo, sanciona un principio de “pluralismo jurídico” que pone el derecho positivo del Estado boliviano en un pie de igualdad con los derechos consuetudinarios de los pueblos indígenas, que son numerosos. En materia económica apunta contra los latifundios, estableciendo que toda persona tiene derecho a la propiedad privada, individual o colectiva, siempre que ella tenga una función

social. La expropiación podrá hacerse por causas de necesidad o utilidad pública, o cuando la propiedad no cumpla ninguna función social.

3. El peligro de secesión – Como respuesta a la aprobación del proyecto de reforma constitucional, el 15 de diciembre de 2007 los departamentos de Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Beni, Pando y Tarija concretaron su amenaza de declarar su autonomía. Los primeros tres lindan con Brasil, mientras Tarija (que como se mencionó en la Parte I, posee el 85 por ciento de las reservas de gas natural del país) linda con Argentina. Meses más tarde, en referendos que fueron considerados inconstitucionales por el gobierno central, el 81, 82, 85 y 80 por ciento, respectivamente, de los sufragantes de Beni, Pando, Santa Cruz y Tarija, votaron a favor de una autonomía que les permitiría firmar tratados con Estados extranjeros, constituir un parlamento, crear una fuerza policial propia y decidir sobre todo lo concerniente a la distribución de la tierra. Sobre la base de ese mandato, el 15 de mayo de 2008 se instaló en Santa Cruz una “Asamblea Provisional”, que deberá convalidar sus legisladores en elecciones populares. Dicho departamento, que produce el 50 por ciento del PBI boliviano, tiene el 26 por ciento de la población del país, el 10 por ciento de sus recursos de hidrocarburos y el 90 por ciento de su capacidad industrial. En el evento de que se avanzara hacia la secesión, el ejército ha declarado que se opondrá activamente. No obstante, los aeropuertos de las cuatro provincias autonomistas están controlados por fuerzas que responden a la oposición contra el gobierno central.
4. La posibilidad de intervención de países vecinos frente a un intento secesionista – En octubre de 2006, para proteger al gobierno de Morales de los secesionistas, Venezuela ofreció construir bases militares en las tierras bajas cercanas a la frontera boliviana con Brasil y Paraguay. Luego, en mayo de 2008, poco después del referendo santacruceño y de la embestida del Senado boliviano para plebiscitar la continuación de la presidencia de Morales, Chávez declaró que Caracas “no se quedará de brazos cruzados” si se le hace daño a Bolivia. Sus palabras fueron interpretadas con alarma, como una amenaza de intervención. Sin embargo, el presidente brasileño aportó inmediata tranquilidad, declarando que “Chávez es el mejor presidente venezolano de los últimos cien años”. Con esas palabras, sugirió que ambos estaban del mismo lado y que su país no contribuiría a la desestabilización de Morales. Además, lo sugerido por Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva confirma el conservadorismo de la región a la hora de legitimar cambios en el territorio que se le reconoce a sus Estados.

5. La posibilidad de intervención de Estados Unidos para promover la secesión – En agudo contraste con los países de la región, que se oponen a cambios en el mapa político de la región, los norteamericanos han dado señales de estar más dispuestos a aceptar la secesión de algún departamento, ya sea para facilitar el flujo de hidrocarburos bolivianos o para desestabilizar a un gobierno que colabora poco en el control del narcotráfico. Eso por lo menos es lo que sugiere el nombramiento del ya expulsado embajador Philip Goldberg.

En efecto, la carrera de éste es elocuente. Entre 1994 y 1996 fue el encargado de la oficina para Bosnia del departamento de Estado. Simultáneamente, fue asistente especial del avezado embajador Richard Holbrooke, jefe de la delegación norteamericana que negoció los Acuerdos de Dayton de 1995, en los que su país se comprometió a respetar la integridad territorial de las repúblicas constituyentes de la ex Yugoslavia, promesa que luego fue violada. Entre 2004 y 2006 fue jefe de misión en Kosovo, la provincia separatista de Serbia cuya independencia aún no había sido reconocida por nadie.

Aunque los detalles de su gestión en Pristina serán secretos por muchos años, es fácil seguir su rastro en la prensa internacional. El 15 de diciembre de 2004 Goldberg fue citado por el *Globe and Mail* de Toronto, expresando su apoyo al gobierno autonomista de la provincia rebelde. También manifestó entusiasmo por resolver el status de Kosovo, en una entrevista transmitida por *Radio Free Europe* el 15 de febrero de 2006. Y meses antes, el 20 de abril de 2005, su otrora jefe, el embajador Holbrooke, lo mencionó aprobatoriamente en una nota de opinión del *Washington Post*, informando que Goldberg aconsejaba a su gobierno apurar los tiempos respecto de Kosovo. En ese artículo, Holbrooke asentaba su propia opinión sin tapujos: "Aunque nadie se expresa oficialmente en Washington ni en Europa, me parece difícil encontrar un desenlace para Kosovo que no sea la independencia".

Como sabemos, esa independencia ilegal llegó en febrero de 2008, a pesar del rechazo de Rusia y China, que impedirá su reconocimiento por la ONU. Mientras tanto, Goldberg era enviado como embajador frente a Bolivia, incurriendo repetidamente en la ira de Morales por sus sospechosas actividades en Santa Cruz. Finalmente, en septiembre de 2008 fue declarado persona non grata.

El nombramiento de un diplomático como Goldberg en La Paz no sorprende. Aunque no puede demostrarse, desestabilizar a Morales puede ser un objetivo de Estados Unidos. Considérese que el presidente boliviano es el princi-

pal dirigente de los cocaleros (los campesinos indígenas dedicados al cultivo de la coca). Como es sabido, el consumo de esa planta forma parte de las más antiguas tradiciones andinas, a la vez que es la materia prima para la producción de cocaína. Con la elección de Morales a la presidencia, disminuyeron las restricciones a su cultivo, impuestas por presión de los Estados Unidos. Esto condujo a un importante aumento de la oferta de cocaína de origen boliviano.

Por otra parte, la debilidad de los Estados latinoamericanos, uno de los *leitmotifs* de este trabajo, se vislumbra elocuentemente en muchos de los fenómenos descritos en esta sección. Lo vimos en el caso de la rica Venezuela, que no puede controlar regiones fronterizas con Colombia. Lo vimos también en el caso argentino, cuyo gobierno perdió control de parcelas de su política exterior. Lo vimos elocuentemente en el caso de la colapsada Bolivia. Y está presente, finalmente, en el descontrol del narcotráfico.

Considérese que el 23 de febrero de 2008, el *New York Times* informaba que sólo 200 policías federales brasileños vigilaban la frontera de 3380 kilómetros que ese país comparte con Bolivia – aunque las autoridades aseguraban que pronto llegarían refuerzos. Y en cuanto a Argentina, apenas el 10% del territorio está vigilado por radares, dejando abiertas las fronteras a tráfico ilegal de todo tipo. Mientras tanto, Brasil ya es el segundo consumidor mundial de cocaína, sólo superado por Estados Unidos.

Parte IV – El crimen organizado y la guerrilla insurgente frente al complejo Estado/sociedad civil

Paraguay: presentación en sociedad

Como Bolivia, pero por causas muy diferentes, Paraguay está cerca del síndrome del Estado fallido. Durante 61 años fue gobernado por el Partido Colorado, comparable al PRI mexicano, que preservó su hegemonía durante 71 años y se convirtió en sinónimo del Estado mismo. Alfredo Stroessner, el más famoso de sus dictadores recientes, retuvo el poder durante tres décadas y media. Su derrocamiento fue cuestión de familia: lo perpetró su consuegro, el general Andrés Rodríguez, en 1989. Aquel golpe contó con los auspicios de quien pronto se convertiría en activo protagonista de la política paraguaya, el general Lino Oviedo.

Desde entonces hasta 2008, Paraguay se debatió entre una serie de intentos golpistas protagonizados por éste y elecciones que repetidamente le dieron el triunfo al partido hegemónico. En el ínterin, en 1999, un vicepresidente, Luís María Argaña, rival de Oviedo y del entonces presidente Raúl Cubas, fue asesinado por un comando paramilitar. Cubas renunció, y él y Oviedo huyeron del país.

En 2007 la Corte Suprema dictaminó que el golpista era inocente y éste se postuló entonces a las elecciones presidenciales de abril de 2008. Pero ya estaba desgastado y fue derrotado por un obispo retirado, Fernando Lugo, que asumió la presidencia en agosto. Al frente de una coalición de centroizquierda, el rotundo triunfo electoral del ex religioso puso fin a la longeva hegemonía del Partido Colorado.

El fenómeno de un sacerdote que llega a la presidencia es nuevo en la región, pero vino precedido por el ejemplo del obispo emérito Joaquín Piña, de la contigua provincia argentina de Misiones, cuya enérgica campaña política de 2006 impidió la reelección indefinida del gobernador, un aliado de Néstor Kirchner. En verdad, el impacto de influencias políticas transnacionales en el otrora aislado Paraguay es cada vez más fuerte.

Lugo llegó a la presidencia con un amplio apoyo a su persona, pero sin aparato político. Las organizaciones populares que lo respaldaron presentaron sus propias listas para la legislatura, de manera que no posee un bloque sólido en el Congreso. Su coalición alberga a casi dos docenas de partidos y organizaciones que nada tienen que ver entre sí excepto su oposición al Partido Colorado. Sin apoyo legislativo, le resultará difícil desplazar a los funcionarios colorados de la burocracia del Estado, y éstos tendrán la ocasión de boicotearlo. Según expresiones de un prestigioso periodista paraguayo, reproducidas por *La Nación* de Buenos Aires, "*Sólo con una política muy agresiva va a poder mantenerse en el poder. Si no, lo van a tirar abajo*".

Para comprender el pesimista pronóstico hay que ubicarse en el complejo escenario paraguayo. Entre 1996 y 2000 padeció unos cuarenta conatos de golpe. La pobreza ronda el 40 por ciento de la población, y el desempleo y subempleo, el 30 por ciento. Sus adversarios no sólo han acusado a Lugo de recibir el respaldo del venezolano Hugo Chávez, sino también de la comisión de delitos varios, como propiciar el tráfico ilegal de armas entre Brasil y los países andinos, y permitir que, en 2004, las FARC secuestraran y luego asesinaran a la hija del ex presidente Cubas.

Para colmo, su programa de gobierno sólo puede granjearle más enemigos. Incluye una amplia reforma agraria y la renegociación de los tratados binacionales

de las represas hidroeléctricas de Itaipú y Yacyretá. Lo segundo inquieta a los gobiernos de Argentina y Brasil, ya que, de concretarse, aumentarían los precios de la electricidad que Paraguay vende a ambos vecinos.

Fronteras sin ley

Los ribetes transnacionales de estos acontecimientos ilustran una vez más que las relaciones internacionales no se agotan con los vínculos interestatales. Como sugieren las acusaciones, seguramente infundadas, contra el ex monseñor Lugo, Paraguay está muy involucrado en el tráfico ilegal de armas en Sudamérica. Gran cantidad de armas exportadas desde Brasil diariamente regresan ilegalmente a ese país a través de la frontera paraguaya, donde prácticamente no existen controles. Las armas se pagan con cocaína y ésta con armas. Además, armamento pesado fabricado en otros países ingresa por la misma vía.

Confirmando una vez más la debilidad de los Estados latinoamericanos, incluido el brasileño, reporteros de *O Estado de São Paulo* recorrieron 750 kilómetros de caminos en el sur de Mato Grosso do Sul sin encontrar policías, a pesar de que la región es la ruta principal de traficantes de drogas y armas hacia Brasil. Algunas armas se quedan allí y otras fluyen hacia otros destinos: por ejemplo, Colombia. Hacia el año 2000 había apenas un centenar de policías brasileños cuidando el límite fronterizo entre su país y Paraguay, distribuidos en tres estaciones.

Más allá del Brasil, en 1993 una comisión parlamentaria paraguaya informó que una isla del Caribe perteneciente a Colombia era utilizada como base para militares paraguayos involucrados en el tráfico de armas desde Sudáfrica. Armas norteamericanas y alemanas eran embarcadas desde la isla de San Andrés hacia Colombia y Nicaragua. El ejército paraguayo también fue sospechado de vender armas a Irán hacia finales de los '80, durante el conflicto con Irak.

Hechos como estos abrieron una investigación de la Comisión Bicameral de Investigación del Paraguay, que demostró la participación de militares de alto rango en la habilitación de empresas dedicadas al tráfico ilegal de armas. Éstas operan desde Asunción y también desde la localidad de Pedro Juan Caballero, famosa por las organizaciones delictivas que hospeda.

Por cierto, informes de 2008 indican que allí se encuentran los cuarteles generales de las poderosas bandas mafiosas brasileñas Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) y Comando Vermelho. Ésta última es la organización narcotraficante que el notorio mafioso brasileño Fernandinho Beira-Mar maneja desde su celda en la cárcel de alta seguridad de Campo Grande. Desde Pedro Juan Caballe-

ro se articula el intercambio de cocaína por armas para las FARC, que luego se materializa en pequeños aeródromos del Mato Grosso brasileño. Y según las autoridades paraguayas, también son numerosos los guerrilleros colombianos que circulan entre aquella ciudad y Ponta Porá, en la franja fronteriza paraguayo-brasileña. A la vez, el vacío de poder estatal entre las localidades paraguayas de Pedro Juan Caballero, Capitán Bado y Salto del Guairá, pone en mano de los cárteles el verdadero dominio del territorio.

En verdad, de manera aún más acentuada que en países como Argentina, Brasil y México, la debilidad del Estado paraguayo se conjuga con la demanda transnacional de armas y sustancias ilícitas, engendrando un paraíso delictivo. Con la elección de un presidente idealista que carece de aparato político, esta ingobernabilidad paraguaya probablemente se acentúe.

Porque Paraguay es un nodo de fronteras porosas y en gran medida ficticias, su condición de Estado contrabandista y casi fallido engendra complicidades que corren por todos los niveles del poder en los Estados vecinos. Su presencia genera mayores grados de libertad para las organizaciones delictivas de la región, y esa es su principal función en el sistema latinoamericano.

Por cierto, según estimaciones del gobierno de los Estados Unidos, en la Triple Frontera entre Argentina, Brasil y Paraguay, el Hezbolá, la poderosa organización terrorista libanesa, gana decenas de millones de dólares anuales a través del contrabando de productos electrónicos, discos de música y de video pirateados, y falsificaciones de diversos productos de marca. Sus operaciones están facilitadas por comunidades árabes de largo arraigo en la zona.

Según investigaciones realizadas por servicios de inteligencia argentinos, estadounidenses e israelíes, esta Triple Frontera sin ley fue la base logística desde donde se organizaron los ataques terroristas contra la Embajada de Israel en Buenos Aires y la Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA), perpetrados en 1992 y 1994 por el Hezbolá (con el concurso de la Embajada de Irán en Buenos Aires).

Más aún, también de la Triple Frontera procede la incipiente penetración islamista de la subregión, engendrada por clérigos chiítas que, auxiliados por petrodólares venezolanos, hacen proselitismo en las organizaciones populares de diversos países, incluidos los piqueteros argentinos, que a veces han marchado en la Provincia de Buenos Aires acompañados por la bandera del Hezbolá.

Si a partir de la asunción de Lugo como presidente, la impotencia del ejecutivo fuera a agravar el síndrome de Estado fallido que incipientemente sufre Paraguay, este país podría equiparar a Bolivia, Colombia y Venezuela como fuente de algunos de los principales riesgos de seguridad de la región.

Las FARC como desafío a la integridad territorial de Colombia

Otro de los elocuentes ejemplos de la debilidad del Estado latinoamericano es el de las FARC colombianas, ya mencionadas. Aunque su descabezamiento en marzo de 2008, debido a la caída de Raúl Reyes y la muerte natural de su jefe supremo, el legendario Tirofijo, abre incógnitas sobre la estrategia futura de la organización (que según algunos analistas atraviesa el peor momento de su historia), éstas tienen una presencia activa en un 40% del territorio que teóricamente corresponde a la soberanía del Estado gobernado desde Bogotá. En los hechos Colombia se divide en dos. La que es gobernada desde Bogotá, densamente poblada, es aproximadamente del tamaño de California. La que dominan las FARC, escasamente poblada, se acerca al tamaño de Texas. Complicando las cosas, la insurgencia se financia con el narcotráfico y el secuestro extorsivo.

Como ya se ha visto, y al igual que otras organizaciones importantes de su tipo, las FARC poseen una rudimentaria para-diplomacia que negocia oficialmente con otros países. No sólo desafían el orden colombiano sino que proyectan su actividad más allá de sus fronteras, poseyendo cierta presencia en el sistema interestatal. Aunque algunos Estados las incluyen en su lista de organizaciones terroristas, otros se niegan a hacerlo. París y Brasilia están dispuestos a negociar la liberación de rehenes bajo la coordinación de Caracas, aun a espaldas de Bogotá. Y en la Argentina se ha tolerado la presencia de la diplomacia de las FARC desde el regreso de la democracia, en diciembre de 1983. Durante los gobiernos de Carlos Menem y Fernando de la Rúa, el entonces “embajador” de las FARC, Javier Calderón, se paseó libremente por todo el país, dando conferencias en universidades y entrevistándose con funcionarios del gobierno, legisladores e incluso con el ex presidente Raúl Alfonsín.

Según una investigación reciente del reputado Grupo de Diarios América (GDA), publicada por *La Nación* de Buenos Aires, la guerrilla colombiana tiene una red de contactos con unos cuatrocientos grupos muy diversos, en por lo menos siete países de del hemisferio occidental. Incluso en Estados Unidos hay académicos radicalizados que sirven como nexo (hasta ahora infructuoso) con congresistas.

Entre los grupos de simpatizantes esparcidos por América latina, hay organizaciones legales, clandestinas y semiclandestinas, incluyéndose partidos políticos, movimientos de insurgentes y ONG defensoras de los derechos humanos. El vértice de esta red es la Coordinadora Continental Bolivariana (CCB), cuyo último congreso se realizó en Quito en febrero de 2008.

Uno de los métodos de penetración de las FARC consiste en apoyarse en estas "redes bolivarianas" para obtener el estatus oficial de refugiados políticos para sus cuadros. Estos enlaces crean vínculos de diverso tipo con la sociedad civil. En los últimos cinco años, por ejemplo, ochenta tales refugiados habrían ingresado a la Argentina. Frecuentemente, las organizaciones que participan de la red solidaria están vinculadas a empresas funcionales para el lavado de dinero. A veces también, el apoyo ideológico se vincula al logístico, anclado en el tráfico de armas y drogas.

En Ecuador, pequeñas empresas colaboran obteniendo propiedades y permisos de residencia para miembros de las FARC. En Perú, éstas cuentan con la complicidad del Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA), al que brindan entrenamiento militar. En este entramado, la ciudad amazónica de Iquitos sirve como importante centro para el reclutamiento de milicianos, la atención médica de heridos y el intercambio de drogas por armas.

En Chile, las organizaciones solidarias incluyen a sectores del Partido Comunista. En México, por lo menos dos agrupaciones participan de la red: el Núcleo de Apoyo a las FARC, vinculado a la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM), y el Frente Popular Francisco Villa, afín al Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD), la segunda fuerza política del país, ideológicamente cercana a los insurgentes colombianos. Sus talleres políticos son frecuentados por enviados de las FARC.

La ambigüedad de Brasil frente a las FARC

A pesar de la fortaleza relativa del Estado brasileño, éste exhibe una tolerancia hacia las FARC que es comparable con la que rige en Argentina. Ejemplo de ello es la historia del comandante Francisco Antonio Cadena Collazos, alias Padre Olivério Medina, un guerrillero que residió en Brasil cinco años antes de ser detenido en septiembre de 2000. Durante ese tiempo, se había desempeñado como representante diplomático de las FARC, encontrándose con docenas de legisladores en Brasilia, visitando universidades y cultivando una amistad con el célebre arquitecto Oscar Niemayer, como también con el movimiento brasileño "Sin Tierra".

Como informamos en Escudé y Souto Zabaleta (2001), en el mes y año mencionados el Padre Olivério Medina fue apresado en Foz de Iguazú como un "peligro para la seguridad nacional". Por ese entonces, el gobierno brasileño se había alarmado ante las posibles repercusiones demográficas del Plan Colombia, una ofensiva contra el narcotráfico financiada por Estados Unidos.

Con anterioridad a su arresto el propio Medina había dado “garantías”, en su carácter de representante oficial de las FARC, de que a pesar del embate previsto por parte de las fuerzas gubernamentales, su organización no escaparía hacia territorio brasileño. La alarma brasileña era justificada porque, de hecho, ya había habido incursiones guerrilleras en el propio Brasil y también en Venezuela. Además, frente a ofensivas de las FARC, las mismas tropas regulares colombianas se habían visto forzadas a refugiarse del lado brasileño. Por otra parte, subsistía la cuestión de si, en caso de que el ejército colombiano atacara frontalmente a las FARC en la región fronteriza, no se produciría un flujo hacia Brasil de población civil.

Por cierto, esa amplia franja de territorio no está firmemente bajo el control de ningún Estado (como tampoco lo está la llamada Triple Frontera entre Argentina, Brasil y Paraguay). En los hechos, la guerrilla ingresa pacífica pero ilegalmente al Brasil para abastecerse de productos de todo tipo, desde víveres hasta productos químicos para la elaboración de cocaína. Muchas veces ha ocurrido que cuando se captura un laboratorio de las FARC, se encuentran etiquetas en portugués de productos químicos provenientes de Manaos. Y a la vez que mucha droga colombiana sale por Brasil, de allí entran también armas para las FARC. Brasil es, en más de un sentido, parte de la economía y la logística del narcotráfico, y de la guerra civil misma.

No obstante, la captura del cura-guerrillero en el año 2000 fue todo un escándalo para algunas organizaciones de derechos humanos, que argüían que éste no había cometido delitos en Brasil. Estas presiones condujeron a su liberación tres semanas más tarde, por decisión de un juez federal de Foz de Iguazú que restableció su derecho legal de residir en ese país. En su declaración judicial, el guerrillero-embajador manifestó que “su principal función es buscar el reconocimiento de Brasil a las FARC, porque son un Estado paralelo que gobierna Colombia”. Lo mismo dijo por entonces Calderón, el “embajador” en la Argentina: “Las FARC son un partido en armas en lucha por el poder. Somos un Estado dentro del Estado. Tenemos, de hecho, el reconocimiento como fuerza beligerante y pretendemos que lo sea de derecho.”

La historia no terminó allí, ya que Olivério Medina volvió a estar en el escenario en agosto de 2005. Su reaparición ilustra con elocuencia las proyecciones internas y externas de la debilidad de los Estados latinoamericanos. El “embajador” fue encarcelado una vez más, en esta ocasión porque en marzo de ese año la influyente revista brasileña *Véja* denunció que, por su intermedio, las FARC habían donado en 2002 cinco millones de dólares al Partido de los Trabajadores (PT), que es el del propio presidente Lula.

Pero en cuanto el guerrillero fue detenido, el mismo partido acusado puso el grito en el cielo, demandando su liberación. Lo hizo junto a otros partidos y numerosas organizaciones de izquierda, incluyendo diecinueve diputados federales. Por su parte, la Agencia Brasileña de Inteligencia (ABIN), que fue la fuente citada por *Veja*, negó la veracidad de la acusación. Finalmente, después de un intenso tira y afloja, en julio de 2006 Brasil concedió al guerrillero-diplomático el estatus de refugiado político.

El PCC: otra manifestación de la debilidad del Estado brasileño

Esta muestra de debilidad – que equivale a que Estados Unidos reconociera como refugiado a un narcotraficante mexicano en apuros – no sorprende, pese a que no caben dudas de que Brasil es un país muy importante.

Por cierto, en 2006 ostentó el décimo producto bruto interno del mundo, ubicándose – según datos del Banco Mundial y el FMI – ligeramente por encima de Rusia. Hallazgos recientes de reservas de hidrocarburos, realizados desde fines de 2007, permiten suponer que pronto se ubicará entre Nigeria y Venezuela en materia petrolera. Está cerca de la vanguardia mundial en el desarrollo de combustibles alternativos, siendo renovable el 45% de la energía que consume. Su etanol, producido con los desechos de la caña de azúcar, sirve de combustible barato para más de cuatro millones de automóviles.

Más allá de América latina, en materia de diplomacia económica Brasil es parte de BRIC, un proyecto de bloque que incluye también a Rusia, India y China. Son las cuatro economías emergentes más importantes del globo, aunque nada tienen en común excepto esa circunstancia. Y también participa del foro trilateral IBSA, que incluye a la India y Sud África. Aunque por ahora no tienen solidez institucional ni tampoco protagonismo, estos proyectos alimentan grandes expectativas entre algunos analistas. Por lo menos, documentan cierto reconocimiento internacional del papel de Brasil como potencia regional.

No obstante, cuando se toman en consideración parámetros como la distribución del ingreso, Brasil no deja de ser un país del Tercer Mundo. Según el Banco Mundial, en 2006 su ingreso por habitante se encontraba entre 4730 y 8800 dólares (según se mida por el método Atlas o el de poder de compra), ubicándose en el 91º o 92º lugar en el mundo. Como en otros países latinoamericanos, una de las manifestaciones del subdesarrollo brasileño es el déficit de poder de su Estado. Y ese déficit se refleja de manera dramática en el escaso control del Estado sobre sus propias ciudades.

Por cierto, en años recientes se han producido reiteradas batallas campales entre el Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) y las fuerzas del orden, en pleno centro de la ciudad de São Paulo, la mayor y más rica urbe del país. El PCC fue fundado el 31 de agosto de 1993 en el Anexo de la Casa de Custodia de Taubate, la prisión de máxima seguridad del Estado de São Paulo. En su inicio fue llamado el Partido del Crimen y se estableció sobre la base de un pacto de confianza y protección. La organización se financia principalmente a través de puntos de venta de narcóticos en las ciudades. Está regida por un Estatuto que obliga a sus miembros a contribuir financieramente, so pena de ser ejecutados. Esta suerte de constitución aboga también por la "libertad, justicia y paz" y convoca a la lucha por mejores condiciones en el sistema penitenciario brasileño. En la actualidad la organización se ha internacionalizado. Se sospecha que está siendo manejada desde Paraguay, con ramificaciones en Argentina, Uruguay y Colombia.

En 2001 el PCC coordinó, por teléfono celular, rebeliones simultáneas en veintinueve presidios paulistas. Ese año, después de una crisis de liderazgo, estructuraron una alianza con la banda criminal carioca Comando Vermelho (CV), ya mencionada. A partir de entonces, desde el Complejo Penitenciario de Bangu, coordinaron atentados contra edificios públicos y asesinatos de jueces.

En 2006 la ciudad y el Estado de São Paulo sufrieron la peor ola de violencia de su historia, cuando el PCC tomó varias unidades penitenciarias, entre ellas los centros de detención provisional (CDP) de Mauá, Mogi das Cruzes, Franco da Rocha, Caiuá e Iperó. Las rebeliones se extendieron a la Cadena Pública de Jundiá y a los CDPs de Diadema, Taubaté, Pinos y Osasco. A principios de 2007 volvieron a producirse tumultos, aunque de menor gravedad.

Aunque el caso brasileño es incomparablemente menos grave que el colombiano, confirma la regla de la debilidad relativa de los Estados de la región. Por otra parte, este contraste entre Brasil y Colombia es instructivo, ya que nada similar a lo que sucede en São Paulo ocurre en Bogotá, donde el Estado señorea sobre la ciudad.

¿Será que, en América latina, el precio de imponer un orden local sin fisuras es perder el control sobre vastos territorios nacionales?

Recuerdos del futuro: el origen liberal de las FARC

Tal es la sospecha que inevitablemente emerge al contemplar las escasas recompensas de la admirable seriedad y ausencia de populismo que caracterizan en el presente al Estado colombiano. Colombia es poco más de la mitad del país que

pretende ser. En la práctica (y por ahora) ha cedido el resto a una guerrilla narcotraficante mucho más poderosa y “respetable” que el PCC brasileño.

¿De donde proviene esta fuerza insurgente que conmueve a una parcela significativa del mundo, movilizand o diplomacias y para-diplomacias? Para comprender su origen es preciso recorrer rápidamente los últimos sesenta años de vida política colombiana. La protohistoria de las FARC comienza en 1948, cuando se inauguró el período conocido como “la Violencia”, a raíz del asesinato de Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, un dirigente de la izquierda liberal. Se desató entonces una sangrienta sucesión de revueltas y saqueos bautizado como “el Bogotazo”. Tras batallas campales, los liberales vencidos se retiraron al campo y se aliaron al Partido Comunista, con el que organizaron la resistencia.

Se desencadenó entonces una enconada lucha entre los propietarios rurales y los liberales. Los elementos conservadores más extremos conformaron milicias armadas que confrontaron con las de los campesinos liberales e izquierdistas. Al mismo tiempo, bandidos oportunistas se confundían con unos y otros. Todos cometieron desmanes.

Cuando en 1953 el general Gustavo Rojas Pinilla tomó el poder e impuso cierta paz, algunas guerrillas liberales firmaron un armisticio. Cinco mil guerrilleros de ese signo, vinculados a la línea oficial del partido, renunciaron a la lucha armada. Pero varias organizaciones liberales habían roto con la línea partidaria y siguieron en armas en los territorios donde operaban. Lentamente, esas agrupaciones locales se volvieron autónomas, abandonaron el liberalismo de origen y se acercaron al comunismo agrario. Desde la izquierda, algunos llamaron “territorios liberados” a las zonas dominadas por estas milicias. A su vez, para enfatizar el peligro separatista, desde el gobierno se las llamó “repúblicas independientes”.

Estas organizaciones de anclaje territorial no reconocieron la legitimidad de la dictadura militar de Rojas Pinilla. Entre ellas, la más conocida fue la República de Marquetalia, ubicada en una zona montañosa de difícil acceso, en el sur del departamento del Tolima. En 1964, el gobierno colombiano decidió terminar militarmente con estos reductos autónomos. El ejército cercó a Marquetalia con miles de soldados, mientras la fuerza aérea bombardeaba con napalm. Como consecuencia, familias enteras de campesinos huyeron por la cordillera junto con los guerrilleros.

Estas gentes, sumadas a gran cantidad de pobladores aterrorizados por la violencia, se reagruparon al pie de la cordillera oriental colombiana, al sur de los departamentos del Meta y Caquetá. Entre los resistentes estaba uno de los

líderes campesinos de aquellas milicias originalmente liberales: el recientemente difunto Tirofijo, también conocido como Manuel Marulanda Vélez, cuyo nombre de nacimiento fuera Pedro Antonio Marín. Junto con algunos miembros del Partido Comunista, Tirofijo organizó las FARC a partir de aquellos hechos de 1964. Llegaron a tener entre 15.000 y 17.000 efectivos, aunque después de las deserciones y reveses de 2008 se calcula que retienen sólo unos 8000. Dichos reveses incluyen la liberación de Ingrid Betancourt en el mes de julio, conseguida por el ejército colombiano gracias a la traición de dos oficiales de las FARC.

El fallecimiento de Tirofijo se produjo en marzo de 2008 pero fue dado a conocer recién a fines de mayo. Las FARC lo reconocieron sólo después de que la noticia fue divulgada por el gobierno de Bogotá, lo que indica la vulnerabilidad actual de la organización.

No obstante, cuando eso ocurrió, el presidente de Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega, expresó sus “condolencias” y “solidaridad” por la muerte del dirigente miliciano. En el discurso de clausura del Foro de San Pablo, una organización regional de partidos de izquierda reunida en esa ocasión en Montevideo, Ortega calificó a Tirofijo como “un gran hombre, honesto, sencillo y valiente” que bregaba por la paz. Agregó:

Nuestro hermano fue un luchador extraordinario, que batalló largos años y fue el guerrillero de más larga lucha en la historia de América latina y el Caribe.

Sin llegar a tanto, días más tarde el venezolano Chávez fustigó a quienes se alegraron de su muerte, lamentando no haberse reunido con Tirofijo para hablar sobre la paz y un acuerdo humanitarios para la liberación de “prisioneros de guerra, o secuestrados o rehenes”.

Estas palabras, pronunciadas por dos presidentes en ejercicio, ilustran hasta qué punto las FARC siguen constituyendo un grave desafío para el Estado gobernado desde Bogotá. Por cierto, desde un punto de vista principista, liberal y contractualista, la organización insurgente no tiene menos legitimidad de origen que la dictadura de Rojas Pinilla, que fue el punto de partida de la legitimidad colombiana posterior al asesinato de Gaitán y al colapso del Estado acaecido entonces. Su accionar está hoy enmarañado en una compleja trama en la que son componentes esenciales la oferta colombiana de narcóticos, la demanda norteamericana y europea de sustancias ilícitas, y la represión de su tráfico por parte de la mayoría de los Estados.

La irrupción de la coca y su derivado en las relaciones interestatales

Pocos fenómenos importantes para la vida de los países latinoamericanos son tan auténticamente “internacionales” – en el sentido etimológico del vocablo – como las causas y consecuencias de la producción y tráfico de cocaína. Como se sabe, ésta es un alcaloide cristalino que se obtiene de las hojas de la planta de coca, nativa de los Andes sudamericanos. El alcaloide fue aislado recién en 1855 por el químico alemán Friedrich Gaedcke.

La hoja de coca, a su vez, posee efectos medicinales comprobados. En las culturas indígenas antiguas se le atribuían propiedades mágicas. Como ya se dijo, desde tiempos inmemoriales su uso ha sido tradicional entre los indígenas andinos, desde Colombia hasta el noroeste de Argentina. Después de la Conquista, su uso se generalizó a las poblaciones mestizas de esa amplia zona. Estas gentes mascan la hoja tostada, a veces mezclándola con cal de piedra o de conchas marinas. Además, la coca es consumida por los pueblos de las selvas amazónicas, quienes producen un polvo verde que se llama “mambe”: la hoja se tuesta, se pulveriza y luego se mezcla con cenizas de otras plantas de la zona.

Ya en tiempos más recientes, cundió el hábito de producir infusiones con la hoja. En algunos países, el té de coca se vende fraccionado en saquitos. Más allá de hábitos locales, la receta tradicional de Coca Cola originalmente contenía coca como aditivo de sabor. Y en 2005, los indígenas de la etnia nasa, nativos de la cuenca del Cauca, lanzaron al mercado su propio refresco, la Coca Sek, para competir con la Coca Cola. También producen otros derivados, como las galletas de coca.

La comercialización de la hoja de coca fue prohibida en Colombia en enero de 2007, como parte de la campaña del presidente Álvaro Uribe contra el narcotráfico, inducida a su vez por Estados Unidos. Esta medida, muy criticada por sectores progresistas e indigenistas, es una de las escaladas más recientes vinculadas al Plan Colombia, lanzado en septiembre de 2000 por el entonces presidente colombiano Andrés Pastrana y el norteamericano Bill Clinton.

Colombia y Estados Unidos frente al narcotráfico

Estos esfuerzos fueron el producto previsible del crecimiento, en la década de 1970, del tráfico ilegal de narcóticos colombianos. Tanto el Cártel de Cali como el de Medellín comenzaron sus operaciones modestamente por aquellos años, cuando grupos de traficantes pequeños, que traían base de coca de Perú,

comenzaron a asociarse en estas dos ciudades. Pronto conformaron estas dos organizaciones, que crecerían y se enriquecerían muy rápidamente.

Esos años fueron muy ricos en acontecimientos, entre ellos la formación de la primera agrupación de paramilitares, creada por los mismos cárteles. Por cierto, cuando el ahora disuelto grupo guerrillero M-19 comenzó a secuestrar capos de la mafia, ambos cárteles cooperaron creando el MAS, acrónimo que significaba "Muerte a Secuestradores". Para ello, se contrataron mercenarios extranjeros, el más famoso de los cuales fue el israelí Yair Klein, quien entrenó al legendario Carlos Castaño, fundador quince años más tarde de las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). Los narcotraficantes, los militares regulares y los segmentos más derechistas de la "clase dirigente no mafiosa", tuvieron estrechos contactos a través de estas organizaciones, que protegieron de los secuestros a los poderosos a la vez que lucraron con la droga en forma independiente. Cuando hacia 1981 fue creado el MAS, las drogas ilegales ya se había convertido en una de las principales fuentes de ingresos colombianos, superando por momentos el valor de las exportaciones legales.

Este desenlace era esperable, por lo menos en lo que concierne a la cocaína, ya que no sólo es su materia prima parte central de la cultura nativa, sino que la producción del alcaloide requiere una tecnología que está al alcance de muchos y representa un gigantesco valor agregado. Para la economía colombiana, la producción de cocaína es "natural".

Mientras tanto, el complejo Estado/sociedad civil norteamericano envía pulsiones completamente contradictorias a Colombia. Por un lado, a través del mecanismo de mercado, la sociedad estadounidense (y las europeas) le piden cocaína a Colombia. Esta pulsión transnacional necesariamente incrementa el precio y la oferta. Por otro lado, el Estado norteamericano (y los europeos) prohíben el producto demandado por su propio mercado. Esta contradicción engendra violencia.

En el caso particular de Estados Unidos, estas "órdenes" contradictorias vienen junto con la exigencia, de parte del Estado, de que la oferta se interrumpa en su mismo origen extranjero. En verdad, aunque ese país invierte enormes sumas en la prevención del uso de narcóticos en su propio territorio, la represión violenta se concentra principalmente en el punto de origen de la oferta. Comprensiblemente quizá, las autoridades norteamericanas no quieren convertir sus propias ciudades en el escenario de una guerra sin cuartel entre las fuerzas del orden y las mafias que operan al interior de su país.

Esto significa exportar la violencia hacia las fuentes de la oferta, que se reprimen más duramente que las fuentes de la demanda y las cadenas de

distribución al interior del territorio de Estados Unidos. Este procedimiento, accesible a una superpotencia, intenta curar a la sociedad estadounidense de sus adicciones sin someterla a los costos de una guerra interna.

Este es el origen de la intromisión norteamericana en las actividades narcotraficantes de muchos países latinoamericanos, especialmente después del fin de la Guerra Fría. Antes, cuando el adversario estratégico era la Unión Soviética, el grueso del esfuerzo estadounidense en América latina se había concentrado en la lucha contra la insurgencia comunista en América Central, que durante la década de 1980 insumió miles de millones de dólares. Pero a partir de la década de 1990, la atención se desplazó hacia la lucha contra el narcotráfico. En parte, fue una manera de encontrar ocupación para soldados y agentes de inteligencia que se habían quedado sin un adversario.

Así nació la "Estrategia Andina" del presidente George H. W. Bush (1989–1993), un plan quinquenal presupuestado en 2200 millones de dólares que debía abarcar a varios países de la región. Estados Unidos continuó impartiendo entrenamiento militar, como durante la Guerra Fría, pero el objetivo era ahora el narcotráfico. Como el problema estratégico ya no era la insurgencia, en Colombia los norteamericanos intentaron limitar su participación en la lucha contra las FARC y el ELN, a aquellas situaciones en que resultara claro que éstos eran cómplices del narcotráfico.

Pero la línea divisoria era débil. Las guerrillas habían ingresado a una etapa defensiva, asediadas no sólo por las fuerzas colombianas regulares sino también por los paramilitares de las AUC, que contaron con el apoyo de una extrema derecha vinculada al aparato del Estado. Respondieron robusteciendo sus finanzas a través de la venta de servicios de protección de campos de coca, laboratorios de cocaína y pistas clandestinas de aterrizaje. También aumentó el número de sus secuestros extorsivos.

En ese primer capítulo de su involucramiento latinoamericano posterior a la Guerra Fría, sin embargo, Washington intentó ser discreta. No transfirió batallones enteros de militares colombianos para entrenarlos en bases estadounidenses (como había hecho durante las primeras etapas de la guerra civil salvadoreña, a principios de los '80), sino que envió pequeños equipos de fuerzas especiales para entrenar a los colombianos dentro de su propio país.

No obstante, pronto surgieron acusaciones de violaciones graves de derechos humanos y complicidad con los paramilitares, contra brigadas y batallones colombianos entrenadas por los norteamericanos. Casi de inmediato, el Congreso de los Estados Unidos impuso la interrupción de la ayuda a las unidades militares culpables de tales abusos. Esta intervención, por lo tanto, se

caracterizó por una dinámica dialéctica y compleja, típica de los procesos decisivos de ese país.

La Estrategia Andina pronto fracasó, sin embargo. Alejándose de la vieja y estéril táctica de intentar decapitar las organizaciones latinoamericanas, apuntó contra figuras de nivel intermedio, como los corredores, pilotos e intermediarios de dinero. Bush (padre) dejó momentáneamente de lado el proceso por el que se sancionaba a países que no cooperaban y lo reemplazó por uno de incentivos financieros para aquellos cuya cooperación pareciera más sólida.

Como esta táctica tampoco fue exitosa, en la segunda mitad de la década de los '90 el presidente Bill Clinton (1993–2001) regresó a las sanciones. En marzo de 1996 tomó una medida revolucionaria: descertificó a Colombia. Este es un mecanismo por el cual Estados Unidos califica a los países productores o traficantes de narcóticos según su grado de cooperación con la “guerra” de Washington contra las drogas ilegales. La descertificación implica sacar a un país de la lista de aquellos cuya política se considera aceptable, para ubicarlo en la lista de los que se consideran sospechosos de ser cómplices del negocio.

Cuando se anunció la medida hubo críticas dentro de los mismos Estados Unidos, porque varios congresistas consideraron que la cooperación de México en la lucha contra el narcotráfico no era superior a la de Colombia. Se dijo entonces que la diferencia en el tratamiento de uno y otro estaba relacionada con el estatus especial de México como vecino contiguo de los Estados Unidos, con su posición de socio igualitario en el Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte, y con los 12.500 millones de dólares en préstamos con que Washington había contribuido para paliar la crisis mexicana de 1994.

Fue en parte por esa doble vara, que funciona siempre que el interés nacional de los Estados Unidos aconseja una política hacia un país y otra hacia otro, que México salvó el honor y Colombia fue sancionada. Pero hubo una razón adicional: las acusaciones que se habían lanzado, en la misma Colombia, contra el entonces presidente Ernesto Samper (1994–1998). Supuestamente, éste había recibido una contribución electoral de seis millones de dólares del Cártel de Cali. También se decía que Samper había conspirado con congresistas colombianos corruptos para impedir la sanción de importantes leyes antinarcóticos.

Aunque el Departamento de Estado reconocía algunos progresos colombianos importantes (como el arresto de seis de los siete principales líderes del Cártel de Cali, entre ellos el notorio Miguel Rodríguez Orejuela), el país fue incluido en la lista de peor comportamiento, junto con Afganistán, Birmania, Irán, Nigeria y Siria.

La descertificación significó para Colombia no sólo la interrupción de toda ayuda que no estuviera anclada en la lucha contra el narcotráfico o en razones humanitarias, sino también:

1. La descalificación de las inversiones norteamericanas para créditos del Eximbank y la Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC);
2. El voto negativo de Estados Unidos en cualquier solicitud de crédito colombiano ante bancos multilaterales como el Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI), el Banco Mundial y el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID);
3. La posibilidad de que, por disposición presidencial, se aplicaran sanciones comerciales adicionales que podían llegar a cerrar las importaciones de café, flores y otros productos colombianos.
4. La imposición de trabas a las importaciones colombianas, cosa que de hecho ocurrió pocos días después de la descertificación para el caso de productos químicos usados (entre otras cosas) para la refinación de cocaína. A partir de ese momento, cualquier estadounidense que quisiera exportar alguno de una extensa lista de solventes y otros compuestos, útiles para un sinnúmero de procesos industriales, debía documentar fehacientemente que su destino fuera inobjetable. También se negociaron similares precauciones por parte de los países europeos.

Por ese entonces, se calculaba que el 80 por ciento de la cocaína consumida en los Estados Unidos podía rastrearse a Colombia, como así también el 60 por ciento de la heroína. En el caso de la cocaína, gran parte de la materia prima provenía de Perú y Bolivia. En la medida en que la erradicación de cosechas en estos países andinos había sido exitosa, sin embargo, había aumentado la producción colombiana. No obstante, la puerta de entrada de la mayor parte de esta producción a los Estados Unidos, viniera de donde viniera, era México. En términos generales, este diagnóstico sigue siendo válido en 2008.

En junio de 1996, el Congreso colombiano sobreseyó a Samper de todas las acusaciones lanzadas contra él. No obstante, en marzo de 1997 Colombia fue descertificada por segundo año consecutivo. Entonces, el presidente colombiano tomó una medida audaz que sorprendió a casi todos: suspendió de inmediato los programas de fumigación de cosechas de plantas de coca y amapolas.

La fumigación, una riesgosa operación que requiere helicópteros blindados para escoltar a los aviones que rocían las cosechas, estaba financiada totalmente por Estados Unidos aún en vigencia de la descertificación. Los norteamericanos proveían aviones, helicópteros y entrenamiento de pilotos. Al suspenderse las fumigaciones llovieron críticas, tanto contra Samper como contra Estados

Unidos. A Samper se lo acusó de permitir que el narcotráfico se beneficie de una rencilla entre gobiernos, y a Washington de ser desaprensiva frente a los riesgos corridos sistemáticamente por todos los colombianos (especialmente los pilotos), que contribuían honestamente a combatir el narcotráfico.

Quizás fue por eso que, en febrero de 1998, la superpotencia revisó su política hacia Colombia. Volvió a descertificarla, pero invocando su propio interés nacional, desistió de aplicar las sanciones. De esta manera, Colombia subió de categoría, ubicándose esta vez en la compañía de Pakistán, Paraguay y Camboya, a pesar de que dos meses antes había sancionado una legislación que protegía a los narcotraficantes de la extradición a Estados Unidos.

Con esa revisión, los norteamericanos también se preparaban para el recambio presidencial colombiano. En efecto, a mediados de ese año Samper fue reemplazado por Andrés Pastrana (1998–2002). Y ya en febrero de 1999, Colombia fue restituida a la respetabilidad de la certificación, a pesar de las quejas de muchos en Estados Unidos que insistían que ni ese país ni México merecían tal distinción.

Con Pastrana comenzó una nueva etapa en las relaciones colombiano-norteamericanas. Poco después de su inauguración, él y Clinton lanzaron solemnemente el ya mencionado Plan Colombia, en Bogotá. Supuestamente se trataba de un plan colombiano que habría de desarrollarse a lo largo de tres años y a un costo de 7500 millones de dólares. Su objetivo era erradicar el tráfico ilegal de narcóticos. Estados Unidos contribuiría con ayuda por 1300 millones, para financiar operaciones militares colombianas contra el narcotráfico en áreas controladas por las FARC. Se esperaban también contribuciones de Europa y de Japón.

Desde un primer momento hubo desconfianza de parte de los demás países latinoamericanos. Se sospechó que podría tratarse de una estratagema norteamericana para recuperar una presencia militar en la región, después de la entrega del Canal de Panamá al gobierno de ese país y el consiguiente retiro de los efectivos, acaecido el 31 de diciembre de 1999.

Para compensar, en ese año Estados Unidos había negociado con Ecuador el uso por una década de la base aérea de Manta. El pacto, que vence en 2009 y podría no ser renovado, fue y es duramente objetado en una región cuyo nacionalismo simbólico es muy fuerte, al punto de que dicha base (que según el convenio puede albergar un máximo de 475 efectivos) es la única extranjera en todo el continente sudamericano.

La dimensión militar del Plan Colombia exigía presencia militar, pero una base estadounidense en suelo colombiano era entonces impensable, y con la

ecuatoriana Manta no alcanzaba. Guantánamo (en Cuba), y Fort Buchanan y Roosevelt Roads (en Puerto Rico) no estaban suficientemente cerca. Para suplir este déficit, Washington negoció bases en América Central: Soto Cano en Honduras y Comalapa en El Salvador. Y también acordó con Holanda el uso de instalaciones en Aruba y Curaçao. Así venció las dificultades impuestas por la resistencia latinoamericana a la presencia militar extranjera.

Sin duda, esta escasez de bases norteamericanas en América latina desmiente más de un estereotipo y contrasta con su presencia en Europa desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial, donde hasta la orgullosa Gran Bretaña acepta sin chistar la presencia militar "yanqui". En diversa medida, Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Ecuador, Panamá y Venezuela se opusieron al componente militar del Plan Colombia. Incluso la Unión Europea lo objetó, y en los hechos, la contribución europea fue mucho menor de la esperada. Más aún, entre los países de la región, sólo Argentina y Chile aprobaron explícitamente las dimensiones no militares del Plan.

No obstante, la política de Estados Unidos se endureció a partir de los ataques a las Torres Gemelas y el Pentágono del 11 de septiembre de 2001. El Congreso de ese país dio luz verde para que el componente militar del Plan no se limitara a la lucha contra los cocaleros en las zonas controladas por las FARC, sino que incluyera también la lucha directa contra éstas y el ELN, consideradas organizaciones terroristas. Hacia marzo de 2003, el general James T. Hill, jefe del Comando Sur de los Estados Unidos (con asiento en Miami) declaró que el Plan Colombia debía regionalizarse, expandiéndose por lo menos hasta Ecuador. Todas estas iniciativas fueron duramente resistidas en América latina.

A pesar de ello, en agosto de 2003 el presidente Álvaro Uribe (2002–2010) anunció el lanzamiento de la segunda fase del Plan. Su cruzada, aunque enérgica, no deja de estar mancillada por la complicidad que desde siempre ha existido entre las más altas esferas políticas colombianas y los paramilitares, también narcotraficantes. Consistente con esta pauta es el hecho de que en mayo de 2008 hay treinta y tres legisladores y ex legisladores presos por sus presuntos nexos con escuadrones paramilitares de ultraderecha, acusados de narcotráfico y violaciones de los derechos humanos. La mayoría son aliados del presidente y entre ellos se encuentra su primo, Mario Uribe. A esto se agrega que el propio presidente está acusado de haber planeado, con jefes paramilitares, el asesinato de quince campesinos en 1997, y de haber sobornado a legisladores en 2004 para posibilitar la reforma constitucional que le permitió acceder a su reelección.

Quizás para recuperar respetabilidad y aumentar sus posibilidades de reformar una vez más la Constitución (para competir por un tercer mandato presidencial consecutivo), el 13 de mayo de 2008 Uribe extraditó a Estados Unidos catorce de los más importantes jefes paramilitares, para que respondan por delitos de narcotráfico. Lo actuado – que fue condenado por la oposición y las organizaciones de derechos humanos – es consistente con su promesa de 2003, cuando dijo que el nuevo capítulo del Plan Colombia incluiría la lucha contra todas las organizaciones insurgentes o terroristas del país, incluidos los paramilitares.

Por otra parte, la relevancia presupuestaria del Plan queda reflejada en el hecho de que en aquel momento, la contribución norteamericana total ascendía a 2500 millones de dólares. Hacia agosto de 2006 esta cifra había escalado a 4700 millones, y en febrero de 2008 se situaba en 5500 millones, la ayuda militar norteamericana más importante fuera del Medio Oriente.

El esfuerzo principal para la erradicación del narcotráfico consistió en la fumigación de las cosechas de coca, realizada por aviones y pilotos norteamericanos, con la ocasional participación de pilotos de otras nacionalidades extranjeras. De tiempo en tiempo, la administración de George W. Bush (2001–2009) alegó grandes éxitos. Por ejemplo, adujo que entre 2001 y 2005 se triplicó la cocaína confiscada, se extraditaron 350 traficantes a los Estados Unidos y se multiplicó por seis el número de laboratorios clandestinos destruidos.

Sin embargo, los expertos son prontos a señalar que estos indicadores en sí mismos no implican un éxito. Resulta que la cocaína producida excede tan ampliamente a la demanda, que la disminución de la disponibilidad de la droga no alcanza para hacerla más escasa en el mercado norteamericano, donde ni siquiera se registró un aumento del precio.

Por otra parte, a medida que se destruían sus cosechas, se modificaron las tácticas de los cocaleros, que comenzaron a plantar en extensiones más pequeñas, segmentadas, ocultas bajo grandes plátanos o al borde de bosques donde es difícil fumigar. Hacia 2008, para destruir la misma cantidad de coca que en tiempos del lanzamiento del Plan Colombia es necesario fumigar tres veces más.

Si bien es cierto que la guerra contra los grandes cárteles produjo algunos resultados, como la muerte de Pablo Escobar Gaviria (mandamás del Cártel de Medellín) y el eventual colapso de estas organizaciones, las rutas que éstas manejaban pasaron a otras más pequeñas, e incluso a los paramilitares de AUC, que siempre contaron con el apoyo encubierto de poderosos segmentos de la dirigencia “no mafiosa” de Colombia.

Por cierto, en el lugar de los otrora poderosos cárteles de Calí y de Medellín, hoy operan 300 organizaciones de contrabando de droga en Colombia. A su vez, los paramilitares, hoy aparentemente asediados por el gobierno, también se segmentaron en pequeñas bandas de narcotraficantes. La menor envergadura de las nuevas agrupaciones las hace más flexibles y difíciles de combatir como conjunto. Las unidades operativas en que descansa la producción de cocaína se han segmentado y dispersado. El cultivo, procesamiento y embarque ahora están a cargo de organizaciones separadas y especializadas. Esta novedad generó oportunidades para que otros agentes, como las FARC, participen del negocio, brindando servicios logísticos y de protección, para los cuales su capacidad militar resulta útil.

Por otra parte, esta disminución de la importancia de las organizaciones colombianas individuales ha producido un cambio en el equilibrio de poder entre los cárteles mexicanos y los colombianos. Otrora mandaban los colombianos. Ahora es al revés, porque al hecho de que son los mexicanos quienes poseen la llave geográfica para el gran mercado allende el río Bravo, se suma este trastocamiento en la dimensión relativa de las organizaciones.

La pregunta contrafáctica que se hacen muchos especialistas de Estados Unidos es si la situación de su país en lo que hace al narcotráfico sería peor si la guerra contra la droga nunca se hubiera librado. La producción de cocaína de Colombia, Perú y Bolivia sigue siendo ampliamente superior a la totalidad de la demanda mundial. Cuando hay indicios favorables en Estados Unidos, es por una caída circunstancial de la demanda, no por problemas con la oferta.

Sociedades como las de los países sudamericanos mencionados, a los que debe agregarse México, reciben la permanente pulsión de esta demanda desde las sociedades de los países más ricos, y siempre habrá un sector de sus poblaciones dispuesto a correr el riesgo de producir y traficar para satisfacer la sed de narcóticos. La prohibición de la droga por parte de los Estados y su intervención más allá de sus fronteras para reprimir la oferta, encarece el proceso de satisfacer la demanda y lo torna mucho más violento, pero no lo suficiente como para eliminar la oferta o desalentar la demanda.

En el caso del narcotráfico, Estados y sociedades civiles (los dos términos de la ecuación que, en el largo plazo, dialécticamente conforma al verdadero actor de las relaciones internacionales) se encuentran en conflicto entre sí. El conflicto no es entre Estados Unidos y Colombia, sino entre el Estado norteamericano y su propio mercado (un emergente de su sociedad). En los intervalos en que el gobierno colombiano coopera con Washington, también se libra un conflicto entre el Estado bogotano y un importante segmento de la sociedad

colombiana. Sólo cuando no se registra tal cooperación hay, por añadidura, un conflicto entre ambos Estados.

Lo dicho resulta obvio si se analiza la inmensa popularidad que han tenido, por momentos, los cárteles colombianos en sus zonas de influencia. En el seno de vastos sectores de su país, han sido un símbolo de soberanía nacional. Una organización como “Los Extraditables”, creada por los dirigentes de los cárteles a principios de los '80 con el lema “preferimos una tumba en Colombia antes que una celda en Estados Unidos”, pudo influir en estamentos jurídicos y parlamentarios para demorar la vigencia del tratado de extradición.

El legendario Pablo Escobar Gaviria, todo un *Robin Hood* narcotraficante de Medellín, fue incluso retratado post mortem por artistas como “candidato a presidente”. Cuando en 1991 se entregó a la justicia, durante el gobierno de César Gaviria Trujillo (1990–1994), fue recluso junto con sus cómplices en una cárcel de lujo conocida como “La Catedral”, de donde entraba y salía a capricho. La misma “cárcel” fue construida según sus especificaciones. Cuando en 1992 cundió la voz de que sería trasladado a otra institución, se esfumó con toda naturalidad. Finalmente fue abatido en 1993 por una unidad de elite, con apoyo de inteligencia norteamericano.

Su tumba, cercana a Medellín, es una de las más visitadas en Colombia.

México, Estados Unidos y los cárteles del narcotráfico

Como vimos a propósito de Brasil, las limitaciones en el dominio efectivo del propio territorio es un mal que aqueja no sólo a Estados menores, como Bolivia y Paraguay, y medianos, como Colombia, sino también a los más importantes de la región. El caso mexicano, uno de los más interesantes por su relevancia y complejidad, ratifica este diagnóstico.

Por cierto, México no es solamente el país de economía abierta orientado hacia las exportaciones, cuyo resonante Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte (TLCAN, o NAFTA según sus siglas en inglés) ha sido tan difundido por la prensa mundial. No es solamente el país que tiene acuerdos similares al TLCAN con más de cuarenta países y bloques (entre ellos la Unión Europea, la Asociación Europea de Libre Comercio, Japón, MERCOSUR y Chile) y cuyo comercio con sus dos vecinos hacia el norte representó en 2006 tanto como el 90% de sus exportaciones y el 55% de sus importaciones. Y tampoco es solamente el país que se beneficia con un flujo de remesas de sus emigrados a Estados Unidos, que a fines de 2007 alcanzara unos 24.000 millones de dólares, un ingreso que en 2003 fue aproximadamente equivalente al 80 por

ciento de sus exportaciones petroleras, el 73 por ciento del superávit de la balanza comercial de sus maquiladoras y el 142 por ciento de sus ingresos por turismo extranjero.

Es verdad que el famoso tratado de libre comercio con Estados Unidos y Canadá ha tenido un impacto positivo sobre la economía mexicana. A pesar de la grave crisis de 1994–1995, la pobreza ha disminuido y los salarios reales han aumentado. No obstante, estas mejoras no han alcanzado para generar siquiera una incipiente convergencia con los niveles de desarrollo de sus socios norteamericanos. Los niveles de pobreza siguen siendo muy altos, a la vez que la educación y la infraestructura son insuficientes. Estas falencias ayudan a explicar porqué México no se ha liberado de esa lacra crónica de América latina, la debilidad de sus Estados, ni siquiera en lo que hace a su capacidad para hacerse obedecer en toda la extensión de su territorio.

Más aún, en México este fenómeno no se limita al conocido desafío planteado por la presencia en Chiapas del Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, con sus ribetes de reivindicación nacional maya. Su principal indicio es la incapacidad del Estado para imponer la ley en los territorios donde operan los principales cárteles de la droga y el crimen organizado, a pesar de la firme determinación del presidente Felipe Calderón (2006–2012), y no obstante la fuerte presión norteamericana para que disminuya el flujo de narcóticos hacia el norte. Como en el caso de Colombia y las FARC, se trata de una debilidad del Estado con fuerte impacto sobre las relaciones internacionales mexicanas.

Por otra parte y como es obvio, el narcotráfico es en sí mismo un fenómeno transnacional en el que todos los cárteles importantes tienen significativos vínculos propios que trascienden las fronteras. Como ya se dijo, el negocio existe porque los consumidores, principalmente de países ricos, demandan sus productos, y los cárteles frecuentemente se fortalecen gracias a sus vínculos con organizaciones hermanas en otros países, con quienes configuran verdaderas cadenas de abastecimiento. A diferencia de los Estados, cuyas relaciones más que internacionales son interestatales, el narcotráfico (como el deporte, aunque de manera diferente) vincula entre sí a diversos segmentos de muchas naciones, a la vez que se enfrenta (por lo menos en teoría) a la mayoría de los Estados.

En verdad, los vínculos panamericanos del narcotráfico son muy fuertes, en especial los que existen entre las organizaciones mexicanas y las colombianas. Los viajes a México de representantes de cárteles colombianos para organizar las entregas de cocaína sudamericana son tan frecuentes e importantes como los desplazamientos por negocios de los ejecutivos de grandes corporaciones.

Por otra parte, otra dimensión panamericana de los cárteles mexicanos es la mano de obra especializada emigrada de América Central, de la que ha podido nutrirse. Hasta la fecha, la más notoria proviene de desertores de las fuerzas especiales guatemaltecas, los feroces “kaibiles”, cuyos reclutas están obligados a arrancar cabezas de pollos vivos de un mordisco. Por su experiencia en las luchas civiles de su país, están bien entrenados en el uso de explosivos, lo que no es común entre los narcotraficantes mexicanos, cuya tropa frecuentemente proviene del ejército y la policía locales. Según las autoridades mexicanas, ya en el siglo XXI, desertores kaibiles han entrenado a algunos de los cuadros más aguerridos de los cárteles mexicanos.

En el presente, las organizaciones mafiosas más fuertes de México son la Federación de Cárteles de Sinaloa, y los cárteles del Golfo y de Tijuana. El menos poderoso entre éstos es el de Tijuana, también conocido como Organización Arellano Félix, otrora legendaria. El del Golfo, el más importante, sufre en la actualidad un intenso embate de parte de las fuerzas del gobierno. Y la Federación de Sinaloa, a su vez, es una coalición muy fuerte que nació cuando, a partir de 1997, colapsó el cártel de Juárez al morir Amado Carrillo Fuentes, su caudillo. Debilitada esa hasta entonces poderosa organización, algunas de sus ramas – como las de Zambada García y Esparragoza – se aliaron a cárteles más chicos. Juntos configuraron una poderosa fuerza nueva.

Una mirada a un mapa de México dividido en las zonas de influencia de los cárteles, apabulla. En 2008 se libra una feroz guerra por el control mafioso de territorios en Yucatán, Guerrero, Jalisco y Chihuahua, que incide incluso sobre el control del tráfico en la ciudad estadounidense de El Paso y su zona de influencia. Otras ciudades del Estado de Texas, como Del Río y Laredo, están firmemente bajo la influencia del cártel del Golfo. Douglas, en el sur de Arizona, se encuentra en la zona atendida por la Federación de Sinaloa.

Es quizás por este motivo que, azuzados por los estadounidenses, hacia mayo de 2008 el gobierno mexicano montó un enorme operativo en su lado de la frontera, donde congregó unos seis mil efectivos. Uno de sus objetivos inmediatos era doblegar a Los Zetas, el temible brazo armado del cártel del Golfo. Al momento de entregarse este trabajo al editor, algunos de sus dirigentes podrían estar acorralados por las fuerzas del orden y a punto de caer.

A su vez, el origen de este grupo de mercenarios – algunos de los cuales fueron entrenados por kaibiles guatemaltecos – da la pauta de la dificultad que enfrenta cualquier gobierno mexicano que se proponga derrotar al narcotráfico. “Zeta” es un código de radio para oficiales de alto rango de la policía federal

mexicana, y se sabe que la mayor parte de Los Zetas han pertenecido a fuerzas de elite del Estado. Similar es el origen de Los Pelones, el brazo armado de la Federación de Sinaloa. Estos escuadrones se especializan en intimidar y matar, para posibilitar la plena vigencia de la ley mafiosa sin la cual el narcotráfico se desmoronaría. Son, a los cárteles, lo que las fuerzas armadas y de seguridad son al Estado.

Aunque el gobierno norteamericano quisiera acotar – si no eliminar – toda la industria mexicana de narcóticos, sus esfuerzos son más intensos en el caso del cártel del Golfo debido al control, por parte de éste, de gran parte del tráfico fronterizo. Es por esa presión que, en enero de 2007, las autoridades finalmente efectivizaron la extradición a Estados Unidos de Osiel Cárdenas Guillén, jefe máximo del cártel, que había caído preso cuatro años antes. En ese momento, el gobierno extraditó un total de quince mafiosos, incluyendo los hermanos Ismael y Gilberto Higuera Guerrero, otrora encumbrados oficiales del cártel de Tijuana. Y pocos meses antes, en septiembre de 2006, se había extraditado al propio Francisco Rafael Arellano Félix, hermano menor del clan de su nombre.

Pero es digno de notarse que, hasta esa fecha, el gobierno del ex presidente Vicente Fox (2000–2006) sólo había entregado figuras menores a Estados Unidos. Sin duda que esto no se debía a una complicidad de Fox con los mafiosos, sino a su conocimiento de las vulnerabilidades de su Estado y al temor de las represalias que los cárteles podrían desatar. Por cierto, la lucha contra el narcotráfico mexicano ilustra con elocuencia la permanente dialéctica tejida entre la debilidad del Estado y la naturaleza de sus relaciones internacionales.

Por otra parte, la decadencia del cártel de Tijuana a partir de la eliminación, por muerte o captura, de algunos de sus principales caudillos, corrobora una enseñanza admonitoria. El fenómeno ya se había observado con el previo colapso del cártel de Juárez. Como en Colombia, cuando una organización delictiva sufre un revés, otras tienden a ocupar el vacío de poder. En 2008, la organización asediada por las fuerzas del orden es el cártel del Golfo, cuyo vasto imperio se maneja desde las ciudades fronterizas de Nuevo Laredo, Reynosa, Matamoros y Río Bravo. Si caen algunas de sus principales figuras, el casi seguro resultado no será la eliminación de sus operaciones, sino el desencadenamiento de una violencia furiosa para determinar qué organización ocupa los territorios correspondientes a capitostes caídos y quién domina al interior del cártel herido. Con el afianzamiento de una nueva distribución del poder territorial, emerge un nuevo equilibrio y una nueva época de paz y prosperidad delictiva.

A principios de mayo de 2008, cuando los analistas se preparaban para un zarpazo de la Federación de Sinaloa contra sus rivales del Cártel del Golfo, se vieron sorprendidos porque en vez de aprovechar la coyuntural debilidad de su asediado competidor, aquél asestó un duró golpe contra el gobierno central. Asesinó en Ciudad de México a Edgar Millán Gómez, al más alto funcionario policial del país, responsable directo de toda la lucha contra el narcotráfico. La semana anterior había caído otro importante policía, Roberto Velasco Bravo, también en el Distrito Federal, corazón del poder del Estado. Y hubo varios más en fecha muy reciente. La consecuencia probable es que se relaje la situación en la frontera con Estados Unidos, ya que el gobierno mexicano deberá trasladar recursos de represión a la meseta central.

Comentando el caso, el analista estadounidense George Friedman publicó el 13 de mayo un artículo con un significativo título: "*Mexico: on the Road to a Failed State?*" Su reflexión es que puede estar próximo el momento en que, frente a la opción de enriquecerse con el narcotráfico o morir asesinado por el mismo, los más altos funcionarios nacionales optarán por lo primero. Y esa es su definición de un Estado fallido.

Por cierto, el narcotráfico mexicano continuará floreciente, violento y vigoroso, debido a que el Estado es demasiado débil como para que segmentos de sus estratos medios y altos no sucumban a la influencia de un negocio tan lucrativo, capaz de movilizar a tanta gente que sin su aporte sería paupérrima. Cuando poderosas fuerzas sociales se conjuran para llevar a cabo una actividad catalogada como ilícita, los transitorios éxitos de la acción represiva no suelen culminar con el aumento de la capacidad ordenadora del Estado, sino con un reordenamiento de los conjurados. Los mismos Estados Unidos vivieron procesos similares cuando, entre 1920 y 1933, intentaron prohibir las bebidas alcohólicas en su propio territorio.

Prueba de la vigencia de este fenómeno es lo acaecido en años recientes con la Federación de Sinaloa. Gracias a la complicidad de decenas de guardias, su jefe, Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán, escapó en 2001 de una prisión de máxima seguridad. Según análisis de inteligencia de fuente abierta, hacia marzo de 2008 se escondía en Pachuca, una ciudad que no sólo está lejos de los territorios de su cártel, sino que se encuentra a apenas 98 kilómetros de la capital mexicana. Desde su huida de la cárcel hasta fines de 2007, El Chapo cortejó ostentosamente a una niña de 18 años, a cuyo pueblo se trasladaba en uno de sus helicópteros. Sistemáticamente, cuando la visitaba, sus fuerzas cerraban todos los accesos a la localidad con prolijidad y eficiencia.

Finalmente, en noviembre de ese año, Guzmán y su joven novia contrajeron matrimonio en la localidad de Torreón, Estado de Coahuila, con bombos y platillos. Según todos los informes, el territorio fue "liberado" por órdenes de funcionarios comprados por el cártel. Estas hazañas son recurrentes: de vez en cuando, el caudillo cena en público en el restaurante de algún pueblo cuyos accesos han sido cortados transitoriamente por sus fuerzas, para que pueda disfrutar tranquilo. Tales son los límites del poder del Estado mexicano.

Los límites del accionar estadounidense

No obstante, está claro que el mismo problema no afecta a los Estados Unidos. Objetivamente, éstos poseen el poder requerido para frenar el tráfico de drogas que atraviesa su frontera terrestre. Su Estado domina su propio territorio tanto como puede esperarse de un país no totalitario. La pregunta que cabe es entonces: ¿por qué no lo hace?

La respuesta se ancla en el ABC del comercio internacional. México es el tercer socio más importante de Estados Unidos en el mundo entero. El monto de sus exportaciones a ese país está superado sólo por Canadá, a la vez que sólo los canadienses y los chinos importan más de Estados Unidos. En 2006, las importaciones norteamericanas desde México llegaron a los 198.000 millones de dólares, a la vez que exportaron a ese destino por 134.000 millones.

Este comercio legal, que no es sacrificable para la economía de Estados Unidos, depende del bajo costo del transporte y de una frontera eficiente. Para posibilitar el flujo rápido y permanente de las mercancías, el contenido de los vehículos raramente se verifica con esmero. Sólo así puede administrarse semejante caudal de tráfico. Por consiguiente, es inevitable el ingreso de drogas escondidas entre las importaciones legales – como también el de inmigrantes ilegales. Encarecer el comercio con México con un control férreo, o reemplazarlo con importaciones de países más lejanos, pagando altos fletes, obraría en detrimento de la economía estadounidense y afectaría el nivel de vida de su gente. Para colmo, tampoco falta corrupción en el lado norte de la frontera.

Podrá objetarse que el comercio bilateral es mucho menos sacrificable aún para los mexicanos. Por cierto, los países que le siguen a Estados Unidos en importancia como socios comerciales, China y Japón, compraron en 2006 por apenas 1.700 y 1.600 millones de dólares. En otras palabras, el primero de éstos compró en México por un valor 116 veces inferior al de las compras estadounidenses en ese país. La dependencia mexicana frente a la economía de los Estados Unidos es abismal. Pero el dato resulta irrelevante, porque aunque

estuviera en juego ese mercado gigantesco, el gobierno mexicano no podría intentar la eliminación del narcotráfico sin destruir su propio Estado.

México podrá colaborar “enérgicamente”, poniendo coto a sus cárteles, pero mientras haya una fuerte demanda de narcóticos del otro lado de la frontera, no podrá eliminar a estas mafias colosalmente poderosas. Téngase en cuenta que las pulsiones que motorizan las relaciones auténticamente “internacionales” no se limitan a las exigencias de un Estado sobre otro: la demanda estadounidense de narcóticos es una pulsión aún más poderosa. Lo que el gobierno de Washington le pide a México está en total contradicción con lo que le pide el mercado estadounidense. Las opciones del Estado mexicano son limitadas, porque éste no quiere ni debe ni puede controlar totalitariamente a su sociedad.

Sólo Estados Unidos tiene opciones radicales, y esto sólo en teoría. Es por eso que, mucho antes de que entrara en vigencia el NAFTA, se llegó al *modus vivendi* actual. El costo, para el país del norte, de fortalecer su economía con importaciones legales de bajo costo provenientes de México, es tolerar no sólo el tráfico ilegal de narcóticos e inmigrantes, sino también una medida de criminalidad y violencia en su frontera sur, que de manera limitada se derrama sobre su propio territorio.

En enero de 2008, en una batalla campal en pleno centro de la ciudad fronteriza de Tijuana entre mafiosos y una combinación de fuerzas policiales y militares, se puso de manifiesto una vez más el poder de los cárteles. La batalla duró más de tres horas y requirió el traslado de unos 500 efectivos de refuerzo. Como si se tratara de insurgentes de las calles de Bagdad, los narcotraficantes emplearon cohetes lanzagranadas. Casi no hay armamento militar que no puedan adquirir. A la vez, la violencia no enajena a la gran masa de la población, porque desde siempre, los cárteles mexicanos se han cuidado de reducir a un mínimo el número de víctimas inocentes. Las bajas colaterales son relativamente escasas.

La batalla de Tijuana y otros intensos tiroteos recientes entre organizaciones que combaten entre sí por el dominio de zonas estratégicas en la frontera, alertaron a los servicios de seguridad y de inteligencia estadounidenses, que saben que este tipo de violencia fácilmente puede trasladarse a su país. En los hechos, algunos mafiosos del cártel del Golfo, perseguidos por el gobierno mexicano, ya han huido a refugios en Estados Unidos, donde incluso hay instalados arsenales de los cárteles.

En un pasado ya lejano, cuando la expansión de las actividades ilegales mexicanas sobre el territorio estadounidense superó cierto umbral, se produjo

una intervención armada de ese país. Fue lo ocurrido en 1916, cuando Pancho Villa comenzó a operar dentro de Estados Unidos. Menos lejos en el tiempo están las incursiones punitivas de 1985 de la *Drug Enforcement Agency* (DEA), cuyas fuerzas cruzaron la frontera varias veces para castigar a los responsables de la tortura y asesinato del agente especial Enrique "Kiki" Camarena. Pero la complejidad de las relaciones bilaterales entre los dos países, en el contexto de la actual economía globalizada, torna poco viables esas alternativas.

No obstante, desatada la crisis de octubre de 2008 sobre las finanzas y la economía norteamericanas, el futuro de México es imprevisible. La alta dependencia engendrada por el NAFTA puede resultar en una catástrofe económica, política y social que agudice la agonía de su Estado y potencie el poder de sus cárteles. En ese caso, la reacción norteamericana también sería imprevisible.

Estados Unidos, muy cerca de México y muy lejos de Dios, inevitablemente importa parte de las lacras engendradas por la debilidad crónica del Estado azteca.

Conclusiones

Los casos abordados en este estudio sugieren la validez de lo que Robert Cox postuló para el sistema interestatal en su conjunto: que desde la perspectiva de un mediano o largo plazo, la inserción internacional y la política exterior son más el producto de profundas fuerzas económicas, sociales y culturales, en gran medida endógenas, que de la voluntad de los gobernantes y sus proyectos estratégicos.

Asimismo, se ha verificado que las circunstancias singulares del nacimiento de los Estados latinoamericanos engendraron mitos fundacionales que, doscientos años más tarde, aún se proyectan sobre el presente de la interacción internacional de cada uno de ellos. Esta generalización es más válida para la América española, cuyos diversos Estados debieron engendrar diferencias identitarias para consolidar su individualidad, que para el único Estado lusoamericano, que más fácilmente desarrolló una identidad específica.

Pero la vigorosa proyección del pasado sobre el presente no sólo se verifica en las ficciones de origen. Los diversos casos analizados sugieren una fuerte *path dependence*, diferente para cada uno de ellos, en varias esferas de la vida política. Las crisis argentina y boliviana, los problemas de gobernabilidad brasileños y mexicanos, el populismo venezolano, la porosidad paraguaya, el

desafío a la integridad territorial colombiana y las imágenes de un Chile "tricontinental" propaladas por su misma Presidencia, no pueden comprenderse sin estudiar los caminos divergentes de cada una de estas sociedades desde que se separaron de España y Portugal. A la vez, cada uno de estos síndromes tiene una fuerte gravitación sobre las relaciones internacionales actuales de estos países.

Todos los Estados latinoamericanos son débiles, en el sentido de que tienen dificultades a la hora de hacerse obedecer por su propia gente, especialmente si se trata de exacciones fiscales. Por eso, tienen menos autonomía, tanto interna como externa, para defender los intereses de su colectivo nacional. Parecen especialmente vulnerables a la captura y explotación por parte de burguesías prebendarias, tanto autóctonas como extranjeras.

Porque los Estados latinoamericanos son fácilmente capturados por intereses facciosos que los usan para provecho propio, tiende a concentrarse el ingreso, engendrando pobreza. Y así emerge una tendencia al populismo, que más que vicio político es una resultante estructural de la pobreza masiva y la educación deficiente.

Por cierto, cuando se profundiza la democracia política en países sumidos en la miseria y el analfabetismo funcional, los beneficios electorales de la demagogia suelen ser mayores que sus costos internos. Aunque la demagogia genera altos costos colectivos, éstos son de largo plazo y normalmente no perjudican a los políticos individuales. Por el contrario, una vez instalado el juego de suma cero, el político que privilegie el interés colectivo sobre el de su facción particular perderá frente a la demagogia de sus rivales. Y dada esta estructura de juego, dichos rivales tenderán a acudir a la demagogia.

Hasta el presente, Chile es el país que mayor éxito ha tenido evitando este círculo vicioso, pero corre peligro mientras no mejore la distribución de su ingreso y disminuya la pobreza más allá de los parámetros de la región. Gracias a que sus gobernantes han podido evitar el extremo pragmatismo interno de, por caso, sus contrapartes argentinos, su política externa pudo conservar su pragmatismo, contribuyendo al crecimiento.

Pero aunque su trayectoria señala cuál es el camino del ansiado círculo virtuoso, su receta posiblemente no esté al alcance de los gobernantes de países en los que el juego de suma cero ya está instalado. Universalmente, cuando (bajo la vigencia del sufragio universal) está en juego la supervivencia del gobierno o de los políticos, el largo plazo tiende a sacrificarse, confirmando una vez más que el verdadero actor en las relaciones interestatales no es el Estado sino el complejo Estado/sociedad civil.

De cualquier manera, no todo es estructural. Existen factores aleatorios que pueden tener enormes consecuencias, positivas y negativas, sobre cada uno de estos países y la región en su conjunto. Un ejemplo relevante es el surgimiento de un líder carismático como Chávez, que ha engendrado una gran inestabilidad continental.

Además, hay factores externos a la región que inciden profundamente sobre las fuerzas internas. Por ejemplo, los altos precios del petróleo, sin los cuales Chávez no sería un peligro para otros países, o los altos precios de la soja, sin los cuales los populistas Kirchner no hubieran podido alejar a la Argentina de su crisis.

A la vez, la crisis global desatada en octubre de 2008 puede transformar estos guarismos en un santiamén, cambiando radicalmente las ecuaciones de la política interna y externa de estos Estados. Por cierto, al momento de entregarse este trabajo al editor se abre una enorme incógnita respecto del futuro iberoamericano, en el contexto de lo que parece el comienzo de una grave crisis del capitalismo global.

Aunque no hubiera tal crisis de por medio, el factor extrarregional de mayor relevancia para la región sería siempre Estados Unidos, por su peso tanto político como económico. Dejando de lado a México, con quien ha establecido una alianza estratégica, su proyección es principalmente destructiva. Su mercado demanda narcóticos, a la vez que su Estado declara la "guerra a las drogas" por el lado de la oferta, exportando violencia a América latina. Y si contara con la complicidad de algunos gobernantes de la región, es probable que Washington estuviera dispuesto a desencadenar una guerra local para sacarse de encima al peligroso Chávez, y de paso destruir las FARC colombianas y eliminar los subsidios venezolanos a Cuba, Bolivia y Nicaragua.

Pero curiosamente, estos gobernantes latinoamericanos que con tanta facilidad sacrifican el interés nacional, vendiéndose al voto, no se dejan seducir fácilmente por el encanto americano. Su actitud de 2008, evitando la guerra y frustrando a los Estados Unidos, demuestra una vez más que América latina es más que un capricho clasificatorio.

Tiene identidad y puede llegar a tener entidad.

La civilización iberoamericana

Más allá de todo, nuestra conclusión más importante es la confirmación de la vigencia del modelo enunciado a comienzos de este trabajo. Por razones estructurales vinculadas al proceso de gestación de los Estados iberoamericanos,

la región está caracterizada por dos singularidades sin paralelos en el mundo: ausencia tanto de guerras totales como de violencia interna de magnitud holocáustica (ilustrada por el hecho de que jamás se protagonizaron allí episodios comparables a los genocidios judío, armenio, yugoslavo, camboyano o ruandés), e injusticia social extrema (medida en términos de la concentración del ingreso).

A partir de su nacimiento, los recorridos de los diversos países de la región fueron muy divergentes. No obstante, compartieron una característica que contribuye a explicar estructuralmente tanto la ausencia de violencia extrema como la polarización en la distribución del ingreso: la debilidad de los incipientes Estados latinoamericanos al momento de producirse la crisis de la Independencia.

Esta deficiencia de origen (no compartida por las trece colonias angloamericanas al momento de gestarse su Guerra Revolucionaria) se proyecta hasta el presente. Y tanto la viciosa concentración del ingreso, como la virtuosa ausencia relativa de guerra total y violencia holocáustica, parecen emanaciones de esa persistente debilidad del Estado.

Por otra parte, estudios cuantitativos sobre la guerra y la violencia demuestran que a lo largo de los doscientos años de independencia de estos países, el segundo rasgo se ha acentuado. Quizá por eso, esa singularidad de origen estructural parece haberse convertido en parte de una conciencia colectiva que forja imperativos categóricos. Por ejemplo, el mandamiento "no bombardearás ciudades" mencionado en la primera sección. En verdad, las ciudades latinoamericanas jamás fueron bombardeadas como lo han sido las europeas y asiáticas por otros europeos y asiáticos. Este hallazgo converge con señalamientos previos, de autores ya mencionados, que sugieren que en América latina ha surgido una envidiable y singularmente civilizada cultura diplomática, que facilita la resolución de conflictos.

Por cierto, en Iberoamérica se firman más tratados que en ninguna otra región del mundo, a la vez que éstos se acatan con mucha menor frecuencia. Curiosamente, pocos esperan que se cumplan. Pero esto no significa que sean irrelevantes. Por el contrario, muchos de esos acuerdos no respetados son el trasfondo ritual de un concierto latinoamericano que una y otra vez evita la guerra a través de mecanismos *ad hoc*.

MERCOSUR, por caso, es un bloque comercial cuyos protocolos muchas veces no se cumplen. Cuenta un distinguido ex funcionario argentino que, en el contexto de unas conversaciones con Estados Unidos en que los países del bloque exigieron que éste fuera respetado, los norteamericanos preguntaron

intrigados qué era exactamente lo que ellos debían respetar, dado que la mayor parte de las regulaciones no eran respetadas por los mismos Estados miembros. El funcionario sorprendió a sus interlocutores con esta sentencia: “el MERCOSUR es la paz”.

En verdad, aunque éste se presenta jurídicamente como un bloque comercial, en la práctica es otra cosa. Es un lubricante que afianza la cooperación informal, vacunando contra las escaladas de conflictos. Es un ejemplo de un estilo diplomático *sui generis* pero sofisticado. Por cierto, como ya lo señalara Kacowicz, la diplomacia latinoamericana descansa sobre una cultura casi indescifrable que el extranjero debe decodificar si aspira a vincularse con éxito.

Simultáneamente, el segundo rasgo de nuestro modelo también ha trascendido su origen estructural para convertirse en parte de la cultura. Las grandes desigualdades sociales, vigentes quizás desde tiempos precolombinos, parecen haberse convertido en parte de una conciencia pervertida que las toma con naturalidad. En tal sentido, como ya se dijo, la región se caracteriza por la ausencia de un imperativo categórico, vigente de manera limitada e imperfecta tanto en los países capitalistas desarrollados como en los pocos Estados comunistas supervivientes (Cuba incluida). Este mandato ordena: “no extremarás la explotación de tu propio pueblo”.

Lejos de ese ideal, en la América latina profunda los pobres se han convertido en parte de un color local que enriquece la extraña estética local, sin herir la conciencia moral del buen burgués. Éste, a su vez, parece creer que el acceso al servicio doméstico es un derecho natural de la clase media, lo que exige la existencia de una clase masiva de sirvientes que sólo es compatible con una alta concentración del ingreso.


Por lo tanto, debido a esta combinación de rasgos estructurales que se han convertido en parte constitutiva de la cultura, postulamos que más que región del mundo, América latina es una “civilización”, tan diferenciada de las demás como pueden serlo la europea, la china, la india o la islámica.

Este estatus es poco visible, sin embargo, debido a su filiación europea. Obsérvese que, a diferencia de otras regiones del mundo, los diversos nombres por los que se la conoce refieren todos a su origen mestizo: América latina, Iberoamérica, Hispanoamérica, Lusoamérica. Los términos “latino”, “hispano”, “luso” e “íbero” refieren directamente a Europa. Incluso “América” (también usado por Estados Unidos, pero sin adjetivo identitario) tiene su origen en Amerigo Vespucci, un navegante italiano al servicio de las coronas de España y Portugal.

Esta filiación, por otra parte, condice con la condición de “madre patria” y “mãe pátria” que los manuales escolares latinoamericanos adjudican a sus antiguas metrópolis. A diferencia de la memoria de la Conquista, que produce gran escozor en sectores indigenistas, en la mayoría de estos países este romántico y filial punto de referencia genera pocos resentimientos. Sin jamás habérselo propuesto, los Estados ibéricos prohicieron una nueva civilización allende el Atlántico, de la que – Guerra Civil Española por testigo – no forman parte.

Con sus luces y sombras, esta novísima civilización es un actor relativamente benigno de la comunidad global. Exporta drogas que estadounidenses y europeos se desesperan por consumir. Sus burguesías explotan a sus clases populares como en ninguna otra de las grandes regiones del mundo. Pero no será desde ella que se desencadene la guerra holocáustica que termine con la especie humana.

Oculto detrás de sus numerosas e indisimulables lacras hay una grandeza paradójica.



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