

NATIONAL  
AND INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY  
IN CONTEMPORARY  
CHANGING  
REALITY

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ANDRZEJ FRYCZ MODRZEWSKI KRAKOW UNIVERSITY

“SECURITY AND DEFENCE”

2

NATIONAL  
AND INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY  
IN CONTEMPORARY  
CHANGING  
REALITY

PART 2

ED BY MIECZYŚŁAW BIENIEK, SŁAWOMIR MAZUR

ANDRZEJ FRYCZ MODRZEWSKI  
KRAKOW UNIVERSITY  
SECURITY SCIENCES FACULTY

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2012 – SECURITY AND DEFENCE

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“National and International Security in Contemporary Changing Reality” is a compelling, must-read work for those who study and try to gain a better understanding of today’s national and international security environment.

A collection of diverse views of Polish and international authors on military, security, international relations, new forms of warfare such as cyber-terrorism and challenges they bring about allows the reader not only to see the whole complexity and interdependencies of the current security network, but creates a solid foundation for any further studies, especially for those readers who wish to obtain a better understanding of the Polish and other former Warsaw Pact countries’ perspective on the current and future role of international organizations such as NATO and the EU.

While discussing security and defense from many different angles, authors – whose backgrounds are diverse and who jointly represent a vast and profound experience in defense-related matters – invite the reader to embark on a fascinating journey through the modern world of multifaceted security relations, links among sometime remote areas of defence-related studies, and challenges that not only NATO and its members but all the nations of the modern world must face and live up to.


I found it very rewarding and at the same time refreshing to read articles by so many respected luminaries of international security science.

To have the views of them in one volume is simply a treat for any and everyone who – like myself – endeavours to see and understand the global picture to a maximum possible extent.

The opportunity to learn the views and observations of people of such different background and experience, representing both military and civilian academia, administration and chain of command is indeed rare and worth careful study.

It greatly broadened my horizons, corrected or improved my understanding and I can with all honesty recommend it to all scholars and general readers who are interested in understanding the security environment of today.

Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation

  
General Mieczysław BIENIEK, PhD





# FOREWORD

As the authors mentioned in the first part of the study “National and international security” constitutes one of the principal domains of the undertakings involved as part of the research on educational conditions and specialties available in the Department of Security Studies at Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow University. This issue is also extremely important in the field of international relations existing in the contemporary world. The essence and character of security, both in the national and international dimension are being reflected in all functional aspects of contemporary society. It not only refers to military security, but also to security in various spheres of economic, social, cultural, political and ecological life. As regards the current globalization processes, security applies to any area of the globe, equally to each and every human being and to entire nations. The issue of safety is inseparably connected with threats and related challenges continually emerging in the reality around us. Such threats arise in specific geographical locations and can exhibit diversified dimensions. They can exert considerable impact on the sustainable development of countries, regions and areas. Ensuring a set of forward-thinking measures, which would lead to increasing security in all senses, will significantly contribute to the proper economic development of our country, making the Polish economy more innovative and competitive.

This second part of the study seeks to familiarize the reader with selected problems of conducting security-related research. Expanding this domain of knowledge is now of the utmost importance. Although security has constituted the subject matter of several publications, there are still no concise and well-structured studies concerning this area of human endeavor and activity, so important to our country.

In the forward to the first part, it was stressed that security is generally interpreted as the state of non-threat, peace and confidence. As was stated by Józef Kukuła, it is a state of confidence of the country and people’s existence in the subjective, objective and processual dimension.<sup>1</sup> The National Security Dictionary defines it as “the state which gives a sense of confidence, a guarantee of maintaining this state and the opportunity for its enhancement. The situation in which there is no risk of losing what we cherish most, such as health, work, dignity, feelings and property, is one of the principal needs of every human be-

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<sup>1</sup> J. Kukuła, *Narodziny koncepcji bezpieczeństwa (The origins of the security concept)* [in:] *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe, teoria i praktyka (International security – theory and practice)*, ed. K. Żukrowska, M. Grącik, Warsaw 2006, p. 40

ing. Among different types of security, the following can be distinguished: global, regional and national security; military, political and public security; physical, psychological and social security; and also structural and personal security<sup>2</sup>. The diversity of definitions causes various entities to approach the issue of security selectively. One and the same dictionary proposes a number of different definitions related to security and defense. Referring to the dictionary cited above, the national security is “a state ensured through properly-organized defense and protection against external and internal threats, determined as the relationship of the defense potential to the threats scale”.<sup>3</sup> The essence of national security in the narrow sense concerns the internal state and the international situation of a country, which effectively secure its independence, consistency and interests, at the same time excluding the real risk of internal destabilization and external threats. National security in a broader sense is understood as the whole set of internal and external conditions that guarantee the sustainable development of society and the protection of the national territory against internal and external threats, and that ensure the capability of a country to implement autonomous internal and external policies.

The security-related need was already referred to in the 1930s by Abraham Maslow, the author of the classical theory of human needs. Maslow distinguished five levels of needs where first-level needs must be satisfied before the next level could become dominant. Safety was assigned to the second level, immediately following physiological needs. It manifests itself as the need for security, stability, order and care, combined with the lack of fear, chaos and threat.

All we know that neither security nor favorable conditions for the development of civilization are given once and for all. They require an ongoing effort to project the emerging challenges and to promptly react to them. The 21<sup>st</sup> Century world has turned out more complicated and unforeseeable than it seemed at the end of the previous century. Therefore, we have to set new objectives on a daily basis, bearing in mind our strategic goals.

This study is devoted to the new trends in research, especially in the field of security studies, including national and international security, in the evolving areas of contemporary reality.

The book is addressed especially to national and internal security students, to all students undertaking research work in the widely-understood area of security, and also to the managerial staff of various units and institutions operating within the national security and defense system.

The publication contains a wide range of topics that are relevant to security, and includes the following articles: Piotr Sienkiewicz – Systems analysis of security management, Mariusz Skulimowski – Military support of humanitarian operations in Pakistan, Mieczysław Bieniek – Arab Spring – Dynamic changes in

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<sup>2</sup> Słownik Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego (*National Security Dictionary*), Warsaw 2002, p. 13

<sup>3</sup> Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego (*Dictionary of national security terms*), Warsaw 2002, p. 15

the Middle East, Henryk Ćwięk – Between Germany and Russia. The Problem of Poland's Security in the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> Centuries in View of Europe's Situation. Selected Problems, Michal Pružinský, Peter Varhoľák – Selected Slovak and European security contexts, Janusz Liber – Counterintelligence support to military operations, Marek Zawartka – Security of mass events regarding stadium hooliganism. Of great interest is the article of Professor Czesław Dźwigaj – My 11<sup>th</sup> of September The Paris Retrospection, in which a different perspective on international security is presented.

*Mieczysław Bieniek  
Sławomir M. Mazur*



Piotr Sienkiewicz

# SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF SECURITY MANAGEMENT

*There is no such thing as an isolated person or situation. There is only a relation between a person and their environment. A relation, whose essence is expressed by the word 'threat'.*

A. Magnusson

## INTRODUCTION

A system analysis of security of any objects is sensible when danger exists, that is to say when there are threats that can cause either an interruption of functioning (existence, progress) of those objects, or a loss of certain properties thereof. Security is an ambiguous notion, regarding: (1) lack of danger; (2) a system of institutional and non-institutional guarantees of the elimination or minimization of threats; (3) one of the existing existential values, related to sense of stability, an enduring favorable state of affairs, a sense of the lack of threats, confidence. In terms of political science and studies related to national and international security, both the scope criterion (e.g. regional security, global security) and the subject criterion (military, economic, ecological, technical, cultural security) are applied. On the other hand, on the basis of system analysis, two dominant approaches exist, namely:

- Security understood as an object's property, qualifying its resistance to the emergence of dangerous situations (threats), the major stress being put on the object's security failure, that on its susceptibility to real or potential threats;

- Security of a system understood as its capability to protect its intrinsic values against outside threats.

We need to notice two aspects of security: the objective one, when conditions exist to create real threats, and the subjective one, which expresses the feeling of security or insecurity. In systemic studies, the relation is highlighted, between the security of systems and other system characteristics, such as e.g. stability, balance, reliability, resilience, readiness, etc., especially their effectiveness (in terms of efficiency and/or economy) [2,8].

## MODEL OF THREATS

A threat to the system's security is any occurrence (process, event) that is undesirable in terms of uninterrupted functioning of the system (table 1). Such occurrences or their accumulation in the given time and place, by affecting it destructively, create a threatening situation for the system's existence (development). It should also be noted that there is a possibility of creating situations dangerous to the system, caused internal threats resulting from e.g. system failure (fig. 1).

Table 1. Classification of threats

No.	Classification criterion	Threats
1	Physical properties	Material threats (on the road, in the air, etc.) Energy threats (heat, radioactivity, etc.) Information threats Non-material threats (mental, social, political)
2	Duration time	Short-term, occasional threats, Long-term, increasing, evolving threats, Cyclical, recurrent threats;
3	Range	Local threats, Extensive threats (regional, global);
4	Stability of territorial coverage	Spreading threats, Non-spreading threats.

Source: author's own work.

System's **situation** is taken into consideration [9,12]

$$\Sigma = \langle S, E, R \rangle$$

Where: S – the system, which is the **object** of threats:  $S \subset M.Rw$ , M – a set of elements, Rw – a set of relations between elements;

E – the environment, consisting of elements, which are the **sources** of threats;

$Rz \subset S \times E$  – a set of relations.

The system as an object of threats is characterized by its defensive potential (system security):  $P(S) \geq 0$ .

The source of threats is characterized by its destructive potential:  $P(e) \geq 0$ ,  $e \in E$ .

Set  $R^z$  describes the **threat relation**  $Rz = Rz(e, S)$ , such that  $eR^zS \Leftrightarrow P(e) \geq P(S)$ , which means that the object is threatened by  $e \in E$ . The function  $R^z(t)$  can be a threat relation in real time  $t \in T$ .

The **state of threat** may be interpreted as a point on a complex Gaussian plane, described with the coordinates  $P(e), P(S)$ , which means that  $z = z(e, S) = (P(e), P(S))$ ; suppose that to every  $t \in T$  we can assign a complex number  $Z(t) = P(e, t) + iP(S, t)$  and then the collection of points described with the equation  $z = z(t)$  may be interpreted as a trajectory of the states of threat situation.

The trajectory can go as follows:

- a) If the relation  $Rz(t)$  is true for every  $t \in T$ , which means that  $\text{Im}z(t) \leq \text{Re}z(t)$ , then the trajectory  $z = z(t)$  is a **threat trajectory**.
- b) If the relation  $Rz(t)$  is not true for every  $t \in T$ , then the trajectory  $z = z(t) = b(t)$  is a **security trajectory**.




Figure 1. General typology of threats for the security of systems.

Between trajectory  $z(t)$  and  $t$  axis, a threat plane  $\Pi(z(t))$  can be spread, whereas between trajectory  $b(t)$  and  $t$  axis, a safety plane  $\Pi(b(t))$  can be spread. Both these planes create a whole. An analysis of this model allows us to consider threat situations in terms of R. Thom's catastrophe theory.

A system analysis of threat situations can be "scaled" according to two **criteria**:

- a) Probability criterion (*security*) of the emerging of a state of threat (or other measure of the possibility of threat occurrence, e.g. fuzzy measurement);
- b) Importance criterion (*severity*) of the state of threat (e.g. the risk and the value of the system in question or the value of resources it disposes).

If the system  $S$  has a function of security threats  $z(t)$  assigned to it and the function of reliability is  $\text{Rel}(t)$ , then the function of the systems effectiveness is (fig. 2):

$$E(t) = f(u(t), K(t) = \phi(z(t), \text{Rel}(t))), \text{ where } U(t) - \text{utility function, } K(t) - \text{cost (expenditure) function.}$$




Figure 2. A concept of system analysis of security

Source: author's own work.

#### SYSTEM'S SECURITY MODEL

If the threats have been recognized, then the system's security depends on equipping it with a specified resistance potential (security). In particular, it can be a particular, usually layered security system, protecting against threats.

Let us consider, as before, a given system situation  $\Sigma$  and assume that the data is as follows:

- Outside threats  $A(t)$  coming from the system's (S) environment (E), to which a function of threat potential corresponds;
- System's (S) resistance to outside threats  $B(t)$ , which corresponds to the function of the defense (security) potential.

Above situation characteristics are random functions with known probability distribution:

$$F(a,t)=\Pr\{A(t)<a, a\geq 0\},$$

$$G(b,t)=\Pr\{B(t)<b, b\geq 0\}, t\in T$$

A generalized indicator of the system's security can be expressed by the probability that the threats will not exceed a given critical (permissible) point  $a_0 \geq 0$  and the system's resistance will be greater than a specified limit  $b_0$ , which is  $\beta(t) = \beta(a_0, b_0) = \Pr\{A(t) \leq a_0, B(t) > b_0\}$  which, in terms of statistical independence of the values in question, gives us an indicator of the system's security:  $\beta(t) = F(a_0, t) [1 - G(b_0, t)]$ .

Accepting the desirable level of system's security as  $\beta_0 > 0$ , we may say that the system is safe within time  $T$ , provided that in every moment  $t \in T$  the condition  $\beta(t) \geq \beta_0$  is met.

In the case of technical objects, analyses of the object's security utilize certain simplified procedures, which basically determine the probability of "destruction"

$$P = p(PS \leq Pe), Pe = A(t), PS = B(t),$$



Which means that there is a possibility of generalized resistance (bearing capacity)  $P_s$  is no larger than a generalized threat (encumbrance)  $P_e$ .

Apart from crisis situations, where national or business security is at stake, special attention is paid to crisis situations caused by extensive threats (e.g. chemical and energy disasters, weather anomalies, viral epidemics, etc.) and local threats (e.g. road accidents, building disasters, explosions, etc.). Procedures and standards are made for various types of crisis situations, setting out e.g. threat classes and threat objects' classes, severity of the threats' results, etc.

## SECURITY MANAGEMENT

In the system analysis of security it has been assumed that the following have an impact on the system's effectiveness (fig.3):

- a) The system's reliability, its capability to operate smoothly (with no failure, damage, errors, etc.) in the given time;
- b) System's security, its capability to protect itself efficiently against the effects of outside threats.

System security management is an integral part of system management and is associated with rationalizing the choice of measures (methods, technologies) providing secure (consistent with its purpose) functioning of the system in a dangerous environment (tab.2).

If there are no outside threats, then system security management can be reduced to managing over the system's reliability: we must choose such a reliability strategy, whose criterion value (function of system's reliability) is at maximum, assuming that the cost of the reliability increase (or keeping reliability on the desirable level) does not exceed the permissible limit.

If, however, a threat to the system's security exists, then security management can be reduced to choosing such a security strategy (means for protection against threats) from a set of permissible strategies, whose anticipated value of the effects of threats (losses) is minimal, assuming that the cost of applying this strategy (implementing security measures) does not exceed the permissible limit.

It should be pointed out, that both the problem of reliability management and the problem of system security management, can be reduced to the following: (1) minimizing the risk function, provided the value of effects (utility) obtained due to the functioning of the system are greater than the desirable limit or (2) maximizing the function of the system's effectiveness, provided the function of risk is no greater than the permissible ("safe") limit.




Figure 3. Security system against threats

Source: author's own work.

Table 2. Security management

THREATS	RELIABILITY	
	Low	High
Non-existent	“reliability management”: minimizing the costs for a desired level of reliability (risk, effectiveness)	“reliability management”: sustaining the state of reliability for the permissible level of expenditure for protection against failures
Existent	“security management”: minimizing the costs for a desired level of reliability and security (risk)	“security management”: minimizing the costs for the desired level of risk and sustaining the level of reliability

Source: [9,10].

Let us assume that a system is given as the object of threat (fig.4), characterized by a generalized function of security [9,10,11]

$$\beta = f(P_e, P_s, v)$$

Where  $v$  - system's value,  $0 \leq P_e \leq P_{e_{max}}$ ,  $0 < P_s \leq P_{s_{max}}$ ,  $v > 0$

And the function of cost of security against threats

$$K = \varphi(P_s, v) > 0.$$

It is assumed, that the costs are directly proportional to both the system's value and the security potential.

The problem of optimization of security management can be formulated as determining such a value  $P_s$ , which maximizes the level of security, that is  $\beta \rightarrow \max$ , provided that:  $K \leq K_0$ , where  $K_0$  represents the permissible value of expenditure for system security against possible threats  $P_e$ .




Figure 4. A model of security management.

Source: Sienkiewicz P., Teoria bezpieczeństwa systemów, AON Warszawa 2004.

Let us assume there are  $N$  relatively independent systems, every one of them characterized by the following values (fig.5):

$$\{P_e^i, P_s^i, V^i, \theta, K, i=1,2,\dots,N\}$$

A primary management system, which administers “central” security measures (resources)  $W$ . Depending on the local threat situations, the primary decision-making center may assign a specified  $W$  value to  $i$  system in order to “enhance” its security.

In such a case, security management can be formulated as a problem of duplex optimization, namely:

a) Primary problem

$$\beta = F(\beta_1, \dots, \beta_N) \rightarrow \max$$

where

$$\beta_i = \beta_i(P_s^i, W_i), W_i \geq 0, \sum_{i=1}^N W_i = W$$

Provided that

$$K = \sum_{i=1}^N K_i(P_S^i, W_i) \leq K_O ;$$

b) Local problem:

$$\beta_i = f_i(P_S^i, W_i) \rightarrow \max$$

$$K_i(P_S^i, W_i) \leq K_O^i, \quad i = 1, 2, \dots, N$$

It is assumed that the primary management system – thanks to the processes of monitoring and diagnosis of threats situations – possesses information on the threats, which means that  $\{P_O^i, i=1, 2, \dots, N\}$  for the moment  $t$  (or the period  $T$ ). This information is the basis for optimization of  $W_i$  resources allocation to individual systems. It can also be assumed, that the primary system (center) allocates the measures directly to the  $i$  local system, for internal security purposes, or indirectly, for enhancing the “outside security system” (fig.5).




Figure 5. A model of security management.

Source: Sienkiewicz P., Teoria bezpieczeństwa systemów, AON Warszawa 2004.

## CONCLUSION

Security of technical systems may be considered in two basic aspects, namely (1) as the security of technology in terms of its negative consequences (threats) to the environment (social environment, natural environment); (2) as the security of the technical system, resulting from its functional states (reliability-unreliability, readiness, resilience, etc.).

In the first case, we are dealing with a necessity to analyze the technological risk, which is best shown by the example of “Chernobyl syndrome”, whereas in the latter case, the risk can be expressed by communication security (e.g. in air transport), affected by unreliable technology. Although the disaster at Chernobyl nuclear power plant was caused by technical system breakdown, resulting from human error, the social (health and biological) and ecological effects were the consequence of the specific properties of nuclear technology.

Scientific study over technical systems’ security have a long history. Its beginnings should probably be sought in the ancient and medieval times, when giant structures (e.g. cathedrals, aqueducts) were created that needed to meet safety conditions of building constructions. A method proposed by Ch. Coulomb (1736-1806) was known as allowable stress method and is a deterministic method. In the 1930s it was assumed that a catastrophe, failure or breakdown must be treated as a random event and the reliability (security) must be analyzed with probabilistic methods.

In the late 60s and 70s, at the Military University of Technology, a foundation was made for the original “school of studies on exploitation” in military technology (e.g. the works of S. Ziembra, S. Piasecki, J. Konieczny), including issues of wear and tear (durability, resistance), reliability and control over the processes of exploitation (handling and attendance) of technical equipment. In the late 80s and 90s, the main research centers were developed in: the Systems Research Institute of the Polish Academy of Sciences (systems’ reliability: Piasecki, Hryniewicz), the Warsaw University of Technology (reliability and security in transport: Ważyńska-Fiok, Szopa), the Gdańsk University of Technology (Brandowski) and the Air Force Institute of Technology (Lewitowicz, Jaźwiński). Scientific achievements in this field were summarized during national conferences in Kiekrz under the common title “Systems Security” (1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996), as well as “KONBIN” International Conferences on Security and Reliability (1999, 2001, 2003).

During these conferences, which presented over 1000 lectures, a creation of uniform foundations of “security studies” was repeatedly postulated (S. Ziembra, L. Brandowski, K. Ważyńska-Fiok, J. Jaźwiński, A. Szymanek, J. Lewitowicz, P. Sienkiewicz). There have also been attempts on creating uniform concepts of “security and insecurity, threats and risk” of both technical and social systems (P. Sienkiewicz, A. Szymanek) [3,6,7,12].

Currently, two main research trends can be distinguished: (1) creating theoretical basics of (technical and social) systems security, (2) designing security

systems, including security management and hence risk management methods as well (especially in crisis situations). We can, therefore, speak of security science, which includes the theory and engineering of systems security.

Basic methodological conclusions of widely understood systems research on the security of social and technical objects, may include the following:

- Security is a system category, as it concerns complex objects (technical, biological, socio-technical, social), considered as a structuralized whole, active and operating in an active environment;
- The security of a system is a state and a process, in which the system can develop (realize its development goals);
- System security is a relative concept, always related to the general outside situation, moreover, it can either mean a lack of threats (objective state) or lack of sense of danger (subjective state);
- Every conflict situation, in which the particular system participates, includes potential or real threats to the system's security;
- The system's security depends both on the risk volume (intensiveness and outside influence effectiveness) and on the effectiveness of the security system;
- One of the basic tasks of system analysis is to identify dangerous (critical) situations, including the recognition and evaluation of the sources of threats, their intensity, forms and the risk of their potential effects;
- One of the basic tasks of system security engineering is developing methods of designing efficient security systems, providing a desirable level of security to the systems;
- The issue of systems security is a strictly interdisciplinary problem that will become more and more significant in view of the creation of a new world order (globalization, the information society); the most important issues are likely to include international and national security, transport and communications systems security, energy systems security, information and ecological security, etc.;
- Research methods over systems security should mainly be based on modern methods and system concepts, such as synergetics, nonlinear thermodynamics, catastrophe theory, fuzzy sets theory, probabilistic and possibilistic methods, developing systems theory, conflict theory, crisis management, etc.;
- An urgent need to develop a general systems security theory is observed, as it would be one of modern systems theories and an important branch of systems study, as well as of a development program of system security engineering (security management system engineering).

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Mariusz Skulimowski

# MILITARY SUPPORT OF HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN PAKISTAN

Logistics, its sources and efficiency, in large measure decide on the potential possibilities of conducting operations. The greatest plans of tactical actions will be worthless, if they do not take into account logistic realities. Operation Desert-Storm, whose name was determined by logistics, proves this theory the most.

The entrance of former Warsaw Pact countries to Nato in 1999 had enormous influence on changes in their internal as well as foreign policy. According to the NATO members' regulations, their armed forces (including Poland's) have to be prepared for operating in two fields. The first one relates to operations in the national system, whereas the second one to operations in the allied system.

It should be noticed that current literature regarding the issues of logistic support of sub-units which deal with tasks within NATO operations abroad, mention this problem partially and do not present all irregularities which can appear during the accomplishment of military actions.

## TERM AND ESSENCE OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT

In order to determine the definition of logistic support we should consider the definition of the following terms in the first place: logistics, military logistics, logistic protection and support.

Basing on the historical sources we can assume that first appearance of logistics in the military meaning appeared in the Byzantine Empire during the reign

of Leo VI (886–911). This term was connected with calculating an army's pay, its supplies and arms. A French writer sees an example of military administrator (quartermaster) in the person of camp prefect of Roman legions. It seems that we do not have to delve so far into the past in order to find a definition for the term 'logistics', as some of the dictionaries as well as other works point out an earlier source of this word. The words of Henri de Jomini, the famous theoretician of French military thought, taken from one of his works (from 1835) are worth quoting: "*Logistique* is the art of arranging advances of the armies well, the art of arranging an army in columns well, it is the timing of their departure as well as the means of transport essential for securing their reaching their destination. *Logistique* is the rule of messages and duties of the main staff officers."<sup>1</sup>

Armed operations were always accompanied by logistic ones, although the subject scope of logistics has changed.

Reforms in the political, economic and defensive system meant that towards the end of the eighties the term *logistics* started being used in the Polish Armed Forces both in theory and in practice.

Logistics is a scientific branch related to planning, preparing, using and transferring objects, people, energy, information and services in order to achieve the desired results.<sup>2</sup>

Military logistics is a scientific branch related to planning, preparing and using weaponry and military equipment, material means, benefits and services in order to maintain an army in a state of suitable battle readiness at home and supporting the army logistically abroad. In the most concise meaning, these are the aspects of military activity that concern the following:

- designing and development, acquiring, storing, transferring, distribution, maintaining and exploitation, evacuation and disposal of weaponry and military equipment as well as chemical weapons and materiel;
- transport of people involved;
- acquiring or building, maintaining, using and removing objects;
- acquiring and providing services;
- medical security.<sup>3</sup>

Logistic security is a process of supplying an army and providing services essential for functioning, training and fighting. Supply deliveries include weaponry and military equipment as well as chemical weapons and martial means. However, logistic services are undertakings implemented by units (sub-units) and logistic devices.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> S. Dworecki, *Logistyka w wojsku*, Wojskowa Akademia Techniczna, Warszawa 1997, s. 9

<sup>2</sup> *Zasady funkcjonowania systemu logistycznego SZ RP*, Inspektorat Logistyki SG WP, Szt. Gen. 1429/94, Warszawa 1994, s. 50

<sup>3</sup> *Doktryna logistyczna SZ RP*, Szt. Gen. 1566/2004, Warszawa 2004, s. A – 3

<sup>4</sup> M. Brzeziński, *Zabezpieczenie logistyczne oddziałów i pododdziałów wojsk lądowych w działaniach taktycznych*, Zarząd Planowania Logistyki SG WP, Szt. Gen. 1490/98, Warszawa 1999, s. 9

From the definitions quoted above it emerges that logistics was oriented to material-economic-organizational issues concerning the assurance of the best possible conditions for waging war and army existence although, in the past, logistics was developed with the aim of conquest and defense..

Logistic support is relatively new term used in military. Within the last few years instead of 'logistic security' the term 'logistic support' has started to be used. Using these two terms interchangeably has caused misunderstanding of these issues.

By support in the military point of view, we should understand:

- operations of forces or their units which help, secure, complement or support operations of any other kind of forces.<sup>5</sup>
- operations of armies or their units which are aimed at helping, securing, complementing or maintaining the capabilities of other armies.<sup>6</sup>

In the terminology used by NATO we can find the term *logistic support* which is translated into Polish as 'wsparcie logistyczne'. The term *logistic assistance* is also often used in the same meaning.

Under the circumstances, it seems that we should find the origin of the new term 'logistic support' which is used in our army in the NATO terminology. However, it has no equivalent in our manuals or works regarding army activities.

The usage of terms taken from English literally and using them in everyday official activity has contributed to confusion and misunderstanding.

The latest great popularization of the activity of logistic element such as NSE (National Support Element) could also mislead military environment because of the great interest of our forces in foreign operations.

Regarding the usage of NSE, in the military specialist literature national support often limits to logistic support.

Meanwhile, allies treat NSE as an element of national support responsible for everything that is organized as a part of national responsibility (not necessarily a logistic one) and it is examined separately from the area of common and allied tasks resulting from the mandate of particular missions or operations.

An example which can be used as a tip for correct understanding of such a state of affairs is the statement below.

National Support Element (NSE) – the national organization or activity supporting national forces operating abroad. NSE is under the authority of the Sending Nation (SN) . Its task is to secure the unique, national support for units.<sup>7</sup>

After explaining and defining a number of terms in logistics we can determine what is the fundamental aim of logistic support in a wide sense.

The aim of logistic support is to maintain an army's combat capability by providing it with supplies including their storing, transferring, transport, maintenance

<sup>5</sup> *Wybrane terminy z zakresu dowodzenia i zarządzania*, Instytut Dowodzenia, Wydział Wojsk Lądowych, AON, Warszawa 2002, s. 99

<sup>6</sup> Dictionary military and associated terms, NATO Military Agency for Standardization, AAP – 6 (T)

<sup>7</sup> *Doktryna logistyczna SZ RP*, Szt. Gen... *op. cit.*, s. A-3

as well as repairing weaponry and materiel,, medical care and treating the wounded, providing reinforcements and securing essential services.

Such responsibility is planned to:

- provide an army with everything that is needed in order to carry out the task;
  - relieve an army of everything that prevents it from carrying out its task.<sup>8</sup>
- Regardless of realization of logistic security in the national system or treaty of alliance, a logistic system will demand realization of the following undertakings:
- preparation and maintenance of logistic potential for armed forces conducting an operation;
  - analyzing information about the state of logistic forces as well as logistic means;
  - specifying the aim and concept of logistic security of forces conducting an operation;
  - planning the logistic security of forces;
  - planning logistic tasks and coordination as well as supervising their realization;
  - gathering materiel as well as weaponry and military equipment for the army supported by various sources;
  - cooperation with district authority bodies (if such authority exists) in order to gain and use civil resources;
  - organization of the process of managing and exercising executive posts in the logistic system.

Despite the fact that countries are responsible for the realization of logistic security for their own forces in NATO, duplicating the commonly available logistic functions should be minimized.

It is important to avoid too large and too expensive a distribution of logistic forces during the stage of planning logistic security.

The option of internationalization of logistic security should be chosen only in the event of obtaining lower costs with greater efficiency and cost-effectiveness at the same time. The position of international logistic security will be determined during the assessment of the logistic situation and the planning process. It will depend on the time factor as well as the international bilateral agreements existing between the Sending Nations (SN).

The fundamental options of logistic security are:

- **National logistic security** – a country is fully responsible for supplying and securing logistic support for its forces. Such security can be carried out only by basing it on national possibilities and/or by bi- or multilateral agreements with other NATO countries or any other organizations according to needs.<sup>9</sup>
- **National responsibility** – taking full responsibility for the accomplishment of logistic security for a country's own forces. It should be used during the time of immediate redeployment of forces only if such an option ensures the

<sup>8</sup> *Doktryna logistyczna Wojsk Lądowych NATO, ATP – 35 (B)*

<sup>9</sup> *Doktryna logistyczna SZ RP, Szt. Gen...op. cit., s. A-3*

complete logistic security of the forces – especially during the initial operation stage. In the next stages of the operation, as soon as there is such a possibility, the system should be replaced with a multinational one. Even if the sending country carries out logistic security based only on national responsibility options, the NATO commander is responsible for coordination of the entire logistic security of operation.<sup>10</sup>

- **Lead nation** – in logistics, this term describes a country that takes responsibility for supplying and securing a wide range of logistic support for all or a part of multinational forces or command. Compensation or reimbursement of costs incurred will be a subject of contracts between interested parties. The lead nation can also take responsibility for the coordination of logistics of other countries as a part of their functional and regional area of responsibility.<sup>11</sup>
- **Standardization agreement (STANAG NATO)** – inclusion of a national system of logistic security to a multinational system requires permission for sharing the control of important functions of carrying out logistic security with NATO Commanders. Under these circumstances, there is a need for technical inter-operation in the area of logistic security. Standardization agreements contain resolutions related to politics and standards for members of NATO. They create the environment for security areas describing competences, doctrines, processes and technical requirements. Countries that are not members of NATO but which are taking part in NATO's operations are required to follow the procedures included in such publications.<sup>12</sup>

Such agreements and systems allow the Polish military contingent (PKW) to adapt to ensuing situations and accomplish tasks which are required for dealing with natural disasters. This issue is presented in the following sections.

#### NATIONAL AND MANDATE RESPONSIBILITY OF HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN PAKISTAN

As the result of national responsibility, the NSE (National Support Element) was responsible for running the material–technical economy and sponsoring and logistic security of PKW Pakistan. A similar range of tasks based on material and financial resources was carried out by the lead nation, Spain.

These two areas of logistic responsibility had to be separated at the very beginning of the planned operation (conferences, debriefing, force generation etc.), which enabled its proper preparation.

National responsibility distinguished, in both preparation and during the operation phase, two directions because of the remit division of particular command posts.

<sup>10</sup> *Doktryna logistyczna wojsk lądowych*, Dowództwo Wojsk Lądowych, DWLąd. 33/2007, Warszawa 2007, s. 16

<sup>11</sup> *Doktryna logistyczna SZ RP*, Szt. Gen... *op. cit.*, s. A-4

<sup>12</sup> *Doktryna logistyczna Wojsk Lądowych*, DWLąd... *op. cit.*, s. 19

The first was the responsibility of the Commander of the Economy Unit and in this case it was 10 BLog Commander. The range of duties is detailed in the rules of material and financial economy in Polish Military Contingents which carry out tasks abroad.

The OG Commander chosen by a superior isolates NSE and coordinates its activity in terms of logistic national security. It secures weapons and military equipment and supplies for the PKW via NSE. To fulfill the tasks given it has access to supplies of RP's armed forces. Foreign transportation and the ability to buy the appropriate goods at home or abroad is also possible.<sup>13</sup>

The responsibility of the OG commander was based on both collecting and analysis of the logistic level of PKW security on the basis of data (reports, orders, inquiries etc.) provided by the NSE commander.

An outcome of these analyses was obtaining weapons and military equipment from military resources, in this particular case it rather means enabling the purchase of the required resources via NSE on the local market.

The OG commander kept quantitative – valuable record and quantitative with the division into the PKW warehouses as well as collective account.

The OG commander's task was to organize transport with supplies from the home country to NSE. However, due to the fact that the operation did not last long the transport was limited to a small supply of equipment before the end of the mission.

After returning home, the OG commander settled the contingent with NSE commander within all supply departments.

The OG commander also financed goods and services executed by NSE to the benefit of PKW.

Another 10 BLog commander's task was redeployment of the contingent to the field of operation and then its safe return after accomplishing the mission.

The commander of National Support Element was the second, directly lower rank of command who was responsible for task completion of PKW's national logistic support. Therefore, one can state that the commander was directly responsible for national and logistic responsibility once the contingent reached Pakistan.

The NSE commander is responsible for direct completion of tasks of national support of PKW. That is why (depending on needs) the commander sets up and runs warehouses with logistic supplies, organizes the repair of weapons and military equipment, buys supplies and contracts services in local market. Furthermore, the commander stores and transports supplies to PKW's sub-units. The commander also gives the OG commander orders for supplies for a particular country. In consultation with the OG commander the NSE commander transfers soldiers, redundant weapons and military equipment and supplies home as well as states how much money is needed for goods at home and abroad.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Zasady prowadzenia gospodarki materiałowej i finansowej w Polskich Kontyngentach Wojskowych realizujących zadania poza granicami państwa, Szt. Gen. Warszawa 2008, s. 7

<sup>14</sup> Ibidem, s. 8

NSE ran quantitative records divided into:

- NSE collective account,
- NSE and PJW's warehouses and PKW's collective warehouses,
- PKW collective account.

Warehouses with supplies for headquarters, sub-units that were taking part in the operation and for NSE were organized based on transport containers.

The PKW needs in terms of national logistic security were made in the form of orders to NSE in a monthly system or even immediately if this was needed.

NSE was responsible for organizing USE repairs and first level medical aid.

The constant contact with home regarding orders, supplies and personnel helped PKW logistic support to be carried out smoothly.

The mandate responsibility follows the function of the operation, the headquarters' goals and their capabilities. In this case after the earthquake quick actions needed be undertaken because of the onset of winter and difficulties it could bring to civilians and aid groups.

Redeployment was financed by particular contingents and all actions were controlled by the leading country which was responsible for flights arrival organization, to Islamabad airport for example, and later coordination of convoys into fields of operation. Unfortunately, it was not always organized precisely and it happened that in field of operation destination, for example Arya, after the arrival of first transport the Spanish were establishing working contact with NSE.

As part of the mandate responsibility, from the logistic point of view, one should include supplies of constructional elements and services that were implemented for the aid projects. Starting with the rebuilding of roads, schools and finishing with constructing single temporary buildings for local Pakistani people who were injured in the cataclysm.

From the Polish side the PKW commander was responsible for coordination, managing tasks and supervision over mandate tasks.

The PKW commander planned tasks and aid programs for the engineer sub-unit from headquarters and Spanish sappers taking into account logistic security.

The Spanish side was engaged in financing and logistic security of the mandate tasks and as lead nation and direct representative of NATO was given financial support from North Atlantic Council representatives.

The coordination of logistic security of mandate tasks and the realization of PKW's national logistic support could run smoothly subject to NSE's thorough preparation.

The National Element of Support was prepared by 10 BLog for the humanitarian operation in Pakistan. Since this component was responsible for the security of the NATO Response Force and was of a different structure than the one that was to be secured, it required some structural changes.

A question arose what tasks this sub-unit faced, which could be foreseen at that time with the information available.

To answer the question consultation with Spanish side was to be helpful, which specified what the lead nation could be offered in terms of logistics. On the other hand, sub-units that took part in operation defined their logistic needs.

Within a short period of time NSE was obliged to complete a series of undertakings that prepared the sub-unit for task completion abroad, such as:

- The process of structure reconstruction started and the aim was to achieve the most self-contained actions taking the distance, climate and unique features of the location into consideration.
- The sub-unit was oriented of logistic sufficiency, which in this case was valid, because the supplies from home to PKW were not fulfilled at all, and was based on taking material and support from the lead nation.
- The next step was to prepare a schedule of delivery for PKW and calculate stocks for sub-units and the headquarters' contingent.
- The next step was to enter PKW's material into records from other military units, with autonomous sub-units that took part in the operation.
- Once the properties were taken over, quantitative – valuable records in (OG) were established and quantitative one at NSE level in all support departments.
- Training was organized for the logistics and for the use of the equipment, with the emphasis on specialist training (management of economic–financial activity) which resulted from the sub-unit's purpose.
- Additionally, on account of region's character (a country with many active Islamic fundamentalists) the appropriate use of force was emphasized, medical training and local culture and traditions.
- At the same time the NSE's personnel from the operation area provided with medical examinations and preventive vaccinations.
- The next step was to open PKW Pakistan account in 10 BLog and then accept the entire contingent's material for records (the initial positions – opening balance). In order to achieve this economic units, that sent sub-units, had to prepare and then send quantitative – valuable documentation to 10 BLog.

These actions had to be based on particular and anticipated tasks, which were to be executed by NSE, and on the range of duties that occurred in those circumstances.

The individual equipment that soldiers received was prepared according to the list of responsibilities for PKW Pakistan. In this case, taking into account the proximity to Afghanistan and the similarity in the situation the list of responsibilities for PKW Afghanistan was used as an example. The open account also covered material that the logistic brigade had prepared for the operation directly. In most cases material, before being regrouped into operation field, was in 10 BLog building with the exception of equipment and material which due to the short departure timetable were received from the manufacturer and then directly delivered at the airport.

The supplies were prepared for 30 days of independent action while taking into consideration the preparation of a contract with by the Spanish, as lead nation were obliged to secure contingents with food and petrol immediately after reaching the action area by PKW.

These undertakings led to forming, completing and reaching readiness to action by NSE PKW Pakistan in MSD region.



## REDEPLOYMENT OF PKW PAKISTAN TO OPERATION AREA AND REACHING READINESS OPERATION

Redeployment of forces and supplies to a remote region is quite difficult; it may become even more difficult if the destination is an unknown and remote country with poor communication. That is why at the request of NSE commander several days before departure of forces a group was sent to reconnoiter the situation (local market and area of operation) and help in organizing first flight arrivals.

The reconnaissance group that included several soldiers took two planes C – 295 “CASA” taking two heavy-duty vehicles in order to be mobile.

Meanwhile at home reorganization to Pakistani airport in Islamabad began; this was the responsibility of 10 Blog, due to its experience in organizing such transports (Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq).

After listing the equipment the amount of material was calculated that was to be regrouped. At the early phase of planning two types of transport were taken into consideration: sea and air.

The first, cheaper one, was time-consuming and was not suitable in situations where rapid decisions had to be made, for example in the aftermath of an earthquake.

According to supervisors’ decision the redeployment was to be made with the use of An-124 planes “RUSŁAN” from Strachowica airport in Wrocław. The advantage of this plane was that apart from cargo it could carry 10 people.

The redeployment of equipment was placed in one location, that is in 10 BLog’s barracks so that material could be described, weighed and prepared for departure.

The PKW’s basic equipment in Pakistan included:

- 61 vehicles (including 10 truck trailers),
- 54 residential containers,
- 35 containers of different kind (transport, sanitary, technical).

The transport documentation was prepared by unit of logistic brigade and NSE PKW Pakistan commander.

With this type of transport two pieces of information were important: tonnage and volume of the cargo, on the basis of which it could be stated how many planes would be needed. The calculations showed that 12 planes An – 124 “RUSŁAN” and one C – 295 “CASA” would be needed to transport soldiers. **Zarząd Transportu i Ruchu Wojsk z Centrum Wsparcia Dowództwa Operacyjnego** was responsible for ordering of air transport.

Another task was to load material to containers safely. Easily damaged equipment was given extra protection and then all the boxes, and containers were fastened with transport belts.

All containers had descriptions of what was inside of them. Additionally, on the inner side of container doors there was a very precise description of the cargo carried. From the outside the containers were labeled according to rules and in the local language (Urdu).

Engineering vehicles and machines which were prepared for departure were described in the same way as containers and because of plane redeployment were tanked up in 1/3 tank.

On the basis of NSE specifications the transport unit prepared PKW Pakistan transport documentation (customs declaration C – 302, cargo manifest and others).

According to the redeployment plan the transfer of containers and equipment to 3<sup>rd</sup> air base in Wroclaw Strachowice started.

The transport unit of the air base verified the prepared documentation and the cargo.

The redeployment Wroclaw–Islamabad was done in one or two planes daily. The NSE commander and some soldiers who were involved in organization of transport from Islamabad to the operation area in Arya took the first plane.

The first plane at the Islamabad airport was awaited by the NSE officer who had reconnoitered the area, and who had arrived with rented local transportation to carry containers. The quality of this transportation was poor. However, in Pakistan it was considered to be of high quality.

Since that there was no possibility to gather all the equipment at the airport the first convoy from the first plane that was under the supervision of the NSE commander headed towards the operation area in the city of Arya with a Pakistani military escort.

Arya is 140km away from Islamabad but since the area is mountainous and the roads are very narrow and winding it took 10–12 hours to cover the distance.

After reaching the destination the NSE commander and soldiers from the first flight organized the arrivals of the next columns. The satellite connection with the NSE officer, who enabled other columns to leave Islamabad was essential and helped to prepare the base for the arrival of equipment, vehicles and soldiers. What is more, it also helped to be up to date with situations such as malfunctions of local trucks so a new vehicle with crane and escort was sent to take the cargo.

Well organized redeployment enabled all soldiers to have good sleeping conditions and social facilities.

The engineering sub-unit arrived on the 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> day of operation and after finishing redeployment on the 11<sup>th</sup> day the sub-unit was ready to complete mandate tasks.

The deadline for redeployment was based on the An-124 “RUSŁAN” planes schedule and redeployment was finished on the 12th day from the take-off of the first plane.

The logistic unit was first in the operation area and had time to prepare logistic security for incoming Polish sappers. It can be stated that once the last soldier of the engineering sub-unit arrived NSE was ready to secure them in all areas which were constantly improved in the subsequent days of the mission.

## NSE'S TASKS FOR THE CONTINGENT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF "SWIFT RELIEF" OPERATION

NSE PKW Pakistan was responsible for the planning and organization of the logistic security of the contingent. In this situation the NSE commander was also the chief of container logistics and was responsible for logistic security resulting from national responsibility and coordination of logistic security of mandate tasks.

The first task was the organization of transport equipment and soldiers from the airport in Islamabad to Kashmir (the city of Arya) which was mentioned earlier in the text.

After reaching the destination the development of the camp began and the contact with the Spanish was established in terms of logistic security for the leading country.

The entire logistic system of PKW Pakistan could be divided into three areas. The first one used the lead nation's logistic support under signed bilateral agreements.

The Spanish offered PKW the following logistic supports:

- Using the social center (sanitary container) on the first days of the mission (the redeployment period),
- Full board (3 hot meals) in a canteen and packed food,
- Fuel (ON and petrol) on the basis of a signed agreement with a local contractor.

The second area of PKW logistic system was coordination and support of engineering sub-unit in terms of mandate tasks which can be divided into:

- Transport tasks to the area of performed tasks,
- Organization of field kitchens,
- Organization of field tanking places,
- The purchase of essential, minor equipment.

The most important task was PKW logistic support resulting from national responsibility where the following areas of action can be listed:

- Organization of living quarters on base (appendix 9) with:
  - Accommodation of the entire contingent on the basis of residential containers
  - The social service on the basis of sanitary containers and field baths,
  - Organization of the field laundry room,
  - Preparation of platforms to move around the base (because of mud, rain),
  - Power supply of the camp on the base of collected aggregates (the main and additional ones),
  - Provision of heating and air conditioning,
  - Organization of leisure and recreation facilities for soldiers,
- Preparation of posts for PKW headquarters and sub-units' commanders,
- Organization of warehouses on the basis of transport containers,
- Preparation of field tanking area,

- Medical security of 1st level and operating of outpatient clinic and field pharmacy,
- Organization of repair post,
- Preparation of communication points to maintain contact with home,
- Supply PKW with aqua ammonia,
- Organization of Christmas,
- Purchase of goods at the local market,
- Keeping records of PKW's equipment,
- Security of PKW's secret office,
- Running PKW's financial business and services' settlement in favor of PKW that were carried out by LEAD NATION,
- Hiring translators and janitors to clean sanitary containers,
- And many others that occurred.

Last but not least NSE's task was the preparation of the contingent to finish the mission and return home as presented below.

#### MISSION ENDING AND RETURN HOME OF SOLDIERS FROM PAKISTANI CONTINGENT

The PKW Pakistan superiors decided that after three months its activity ended similarly to other sub-units of 'SWIFT RELIEF' operation.

Because of the fact that, in this case, time was not a decisive factor, attention was focused on the financial aspect of such reorganization.

Financial analysis suggested using sea transport from Karachi harbor. In order to accomplish such an undertaking, material needed to be transported through all of Pakistan (from north to south) over a distance of 1700 km.

Because of the specialist equipment, the possibilities of the local market as well as the time of ship sailing to the harbor, redeployment was accomplished by combined transport (plane, train, road and ship).

Redeployment was divided into stages that included such means of transport which could transport material and people.

The first stage included leading the forces out of Kashmir to the Pakistani military base in Rawalpindi (approximately 20 kilometers to the south of Islamabad) along with Spaniards and other nations.

Multinational convoys with escort, medical and technical security as well as contact with the transport coordination centre were organized.

PKW staff and the engineering sub-unit (in majority) were regrouped by air to Rawalpindi with the use of a German transport helicopter.

In order to organize and accomplish the redeployment, Spaniards used a Spanish civilian shipping company which has long-standing contract for providing any kind of services to the army (including the transport ones).

As lead nation the Spanish offered allies (including PKW) help in organizing wheeled transport from Arya to Rawalpindi, from Rawalpindi to Karachi and sea transport from Karachi to Szczecin.

After investigating the Spanish company offer and making a reconnaissance of the market by NSE officers, it was decided by superiors that a shipping company as well as two Pakistani trains would have been hired separately. Nevertheless, sea transport would have been provided by the Spanish civilian shipping company.

After redeployment of people and equipment to Rawalpindi base, they were divided into parts in order to be regrouped further.

The PKW commander handed over command to the NSE commander and then along with his staff as well as the engineering sub-unit (excluding drivers) went to Istanbul from where he returned home by 'CASA' plane.

The remaining part of people and equipment was divided into two groups by the NSE commander. The first one included containers and equipment which could be transported by rail transport. The second one included bulky vehicles (such as the bulldozer-loader 'St-34', the MAN dump truck, the HIAB crane and others) which were prepared for road transport.

It was required to coordinate rail as well as road transport in such a way to reach Karachi and to be appropriately prepared before the ship sailed into the harbor. According to the calculations rail transport should last three days and road transport four days.

The whole PKW's material was loaded onto two trains and the NSE officer was chosen as the commander of the rail transport. The commander departed two days after the wheeled column.

Such an option enabled the NSE commander, who was the commander of wheeled equipment convoy at the same time, to reach Karachi one day before the train in order to prepare its unloading.

The wheeled column with specialist bulky vehicles that had its own escort and a Pakistani one, its own medical and technical security as well as means of allowing contact between the column and satellite contact with home, went to Karachi.

The route was outlined with Pakistani approval and was divided into four stages (Rawalpindi – Lahore – Multan – Sukkur – Karachi). During these stages accommodation, equipment refueling and the replacement of the Pakistani escort were organized.

After reaching port in Karachi, soldiers were quartered in Pakistani forces barracks. Equipment was left in a guarded area, close to the port.

One day after the wheeled column reached the port, the trains with PKW material came. The material was placed in one spot and was prepared for sea transport.

Disinfecting material before loading it onto the ship as well as disinfecting people at the airport after they landed in Wrocław was unusual.

This operation was accomplished by a Spanish veterinary team with the use of specialist equipment. The team also issued a special certificate related to this operation.

Formalities regarding reporting material and determining its implementation were accomplished along with Spanish soldiers who had reached Karachi by

train. By contrast, their bulky vehicles were transported from Islamabad to Spain by the use of air transport.

Because of the ship delay, it was decided to send soldiers who were not directly involved in loading the ship home by plane immediately.

A few hours before the ship sailed into the harbor, containers and PKW's vehicles were transported and placed in such a way that enabled the efficient loading of equipment in accordance with a plan prepared by the Spanish shipping company.

Loading equipment onto the ship was carried out quickly and without any problems which allowed the whole work to be finished within couple of hours.

It should also be added that from the beginning of the redeployment in Arya to unloading the ship in Szczecin, PKW property was insured by the Spanish company SLI.

After loading the ship, a group of soldiers under NSE commander's command went to Karachi airport from where they flew home by 'CASA' plane.

In the stage of planning accomplishment of such an operation related to redeployment of 140 people, 61 vehicles, 89 containers from distant *Kashmir* in Pakistan to Poland appeared to be really difficult and complex.

Practical accomplishment of this operation shows that such tasks can be carried out based on experience and immense involvement of all people taking part in such an operation.

## CONCLUSION

The participation of Polish forces abroad implies the need for implementation of modern logistic solutions according to NATO standards and based on economic factors. Assumed and mutually coordinated actions that sustain logistic potential in readiness outside the home borders are likely to succeed provided the theoretical knowledge gained is supported by some experience.

At this moment, there are many examples of such experience, for instance: Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Congo, Chad.

Tasks that PKW Pakistan carried out after the earthquake that took place on the 8<sup>th</sup> of October 2005 were, in my opinion, fulfilled properly and it may be demonstrated by the gratitude that the army received from supervisors and allies from NATO. The most important is the gratitude and sincere thanks from the Pakistani people which cannot be replaced by any medals or honors.

Preparation of logistic support for an operation in such a remote and unique country should be preceded by detailed contacts with the leading country. The result of the meetings should be reflected in agreements and common contracts that regulate the logistic support of forces performing tasks abroad.

Due to organizational aspects the financing of some common undertakings should be carried out by the lead nation despite the fact that it belongs to national competence. Such a situation would ease some aspects such as redeployment and armies dislocations so that there was no situation when under one

supervision a decision about time and method of people's dislocation was made individually.

All changes that occur and are to happen in an army cannot cause situations when a soldier going on a mission abroad is deprived of proper logistic support.

Satisfaction of commanders' expectations in terms of effective conditions of operation requires a serious attitude towards army logistic problems. However, the commanders should also seriously approach logistic problems (material, technical, medical, transport, personnel and services). It involves the need of reorganization of current systemic solutions. Although "Each reorganization is surely passing the phase of disorganization" as T. Kotarbiński used to say, one should aim to make the latter phase as short and as little discouraging as possible.





Mieczysław Bieniek

## ARAB SPRING – DYNAMIC CHANGES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Arab Spring began on 18 December 2010.

The protests have shared techniques of mostly civil resistance in sustained campaigns involving strikes, demonstrations, marches, and rallies, as well as the effective use of social media to organize, communicate, and raise awareness in the face of state attempts at repression and Internet censorship.

Many Arab Spring demonstrations have met violent responses from authorities, as well as from pro-government militias and counter-demonstrators. These attacks have been answered with violence from protestors in some cases. A major slogan of the demonstrators in the Arab world has been “the people want to bring down the regime.”

The Arab spring is widely believed to have been instigated by dissatisfaction with the rule of local governments, though some have speculated that wide gaps in income levels may have had a hand as well. Numerous factors have led to the protests, including issues such as dictatorship or absolute monarchy, human rights violations, government corruption, economic decline, unemployment, extreme poverty, and a number of demographic structural factors, such as a large percentage of educated but dissatisfied youth within the population.

The catalysts for the revolts in all Northern African and Persian Gulf countries have been the concentration of wealth in the hands of autocrats in power for decades, insufficient transparency of its redistribution, corruption, and especially the refusal of the youth to accept the status quo. Increasing food prices and global famine rates have also been a significant factor, as they involve threats to food security worldwide and prices that approach levels of the 2007–2008 world food price crisis.

## TUNISIA

Following the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, a series of increasingly violent street demonstrations through December 2010 ultimately led to the ousting of long-time President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali on 14 January 2011. The demonstrations were preceded by high unemployment, food inflation, corruption, lack of freedom of speech and other forms of political freedom, and poor living conditions. The protests constituted the most dramatic wave of social and political unrest in Tunisia in three decades, and resulted in scores of deaths and injuries, most of which were the result of action by police and security forces against demonstrators. Ben Ali fled into exile in Saudi Arabia.

A state of emergency was declared and a caretaker coalition government was created following Ben Ali's departure, which included members of Ben Ali's party, the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD), as well as opposition figures from other ministries. However, the five newly appointed non-RCD ministers resigned almost immediately. As a result of continued protests, on 27 January Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi reshuffled the government, removing all former RCD members other than himself, and on 6 February the former ruling party was suspended and on 9 March - dissolved. Following further public protests, Ghannouchi himself resigned on 27 February.

On 23 October, citizens voted in the first post-revolution election to elect representatives to a 217-member constituent assembly that would be responsible for the new constitution. The leading moderate Islamist party, Ennada, won 37% of the vote, and managed to elect 42 women to the Constituent Assembly.

## EGYPT

Inspired by the uprising in Tunisia and prior to his entry as a central figure in Egyptian politics, potential presidential candidate Mohamed ElBaradei warned of a "Tunisia-style explosion" in Egypt.

Protests in Egypt began on 25 January 2011 and ran for 18 days. Beginning around midnight on 28 January, the Egyptian government attempted, somewhat successfully, to eliminate the nation's Internet access, in order to inhibit the protesters' ability to organize through social media. Later that day, as tens of thousands protested on the streets of Egypt's major cities, President Hosni Mubarak dismissed his government, later appointing a new cabinet. Mubarak also appointed the first Vice President in almost 30 years.

On 10 February, Mubarak ceded all presidential power to Vice President Omar Suleiman, but soon thereafter announced that he would remain as President until the end of his term. However, protests continued the next day, and Suleiman quickly announced that Mubarak had resigned from the presidency and transferred power to the Armed Forces of Egypt. The military immediately dissolved the Egyptian Parliament, suspended the Constitution of Egypt, and promised to

lift the nation's thirty-year "emergency laws". A civilian, Essam Sharaf, was appointed as Prime Minister of Egypt on 4 March to widespread approval among Egyptians in Tahrir Square. Violent protests however, continued through the end of 2011 as many Egyptians expressed concern about the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces' perceived sluggishness in instituting reforms and their grip on power.

Hosni Mubarak and his former interior minister Habib al-Adli were sentenced to life imprisonment on the basis of their failure to stop the killings during the first six days of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. His successor, Mohamed Mursi, was sworn in as Egypt's first democratically elected president before judges at the Supreme Constitutional Court. Fresh protests erupted in Egypt on 22 November 2012.

## LIBYA

Anti-government protests began in Libya on 15 February 2011. By 18 February the opposition controlled most of Benghazi, the country's second-largest city. The government dispatched elite troops and militia in an attempt to recapture it, but they were repelled. By 20 February, protests had spread to the capital Tripoli, leading to a television address by Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, who warned the protestors that their country could descend into civil war. The rising death toll, numbering in the thousands, drew international condemnation and resulted in the resignation of several Libyan diplomats, along with calls for the government's dismantlement.

Amidst ongoing efforts by demonstrators and rebel forces to wrest control of Tripoli from the Jamahiriya, the opposition set up an interim government in Benghazi to oppose Colonel Muammar Gaddafi's rule. However, despite initial opposition success, government forces subsequently took back much of the Mediterranean coast.

On 17 March, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 was adopted, authorizing a no-fly zone over Libya, and "all necessary measures" to protect civilians. Two days later, France, the United States and the United Kingdom intervened in Libya with a bombing campaign against pro-Gaddafi forces. A coalition of 27 states from Europe and the Middle East soon joined the intervention. The forces were driven back from the outskirts of Benghazi, and the rebels mounted an offensive, capturing scores of towns across the coast of Libya. The offensive stalled however, and a counter-offensive by the government retook most of the towns, until a stalemate was formed between Brega and Ajdabiya, the former being held by the government and the latter in the hands of the rebels. Focus then shifted to the west of the country, where bitter fighting continued. After a three-month-long battle, a loyalist siege of rebel-held Misrata, the third largest city in Libya, was broken in large part due to coalition air strikes. The four major fronts of combat were generally considered to be the Nafusa Mountains, the Tripolitanian coast, the Gulf of Sidra, and the southern Libyan Desert.

In late August, anti-Gaddafi fighters captured Tripoli, scattering Gaddafi's government and marking the end of his 42 years of power. Many institutions of the government, including Gaddafi and several top government officials, regrouped in Sirte, which Gaddafi declared to be Libya's new capital. Others fled to Sabha, Bani Walid, and remote reaches of the Libyan Desert, or to surrounding countries. However, Sabha fell in late September, Bani Walid was captured after a grueling siege weeks later, and on 20 October, fighters under the aegis of the National Transitional Council seized Sirte, killing Gaddafi in the process.

## YEMEN

Protests occurred in many towns in both the north and south of Yemen starting in mid-January 2011. Demonstrators initially protested against governmental proposals to modify the constitution of Yemen, unemployment and economic conditions, and corruption, but their demands soon included a call for the resignation of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had been facing internal opposition from his closest advisors since 2009.

A major demonstration of over 16,000 protesters took place in Sana'a on 27 January 2011, and soon thereafter human rights activist and politician Tawakel Karman called for a "Day of Rage" on 3 February. Organizers were calling for a million protesters. In response to the planned protest, Ali Abdullah Saleh stated that he would not seek another presidential term in 2013. On 3 February, 20,000 protesters demonstrated against the government in Sana'a, others participated in a "Day of Rage" in Aden that was called for by Tawakel Karman, while soldiers, armed members of the General People's Congress, and many protestors held a pro-government rally in Sana'a. Concurrent with the resignation of Egyptian president Mubarak, Yemenis again took to the streets protesting President Saleh on 11 February, in what has been dubbed a "Friday of Rage". The protests continued in the days following despite clashes with government advocates. In a "Friday of Rage" held on 18 February, tens of thousands of Yemenis took part in anti-government demonstrations in the major cities of Sana'a, Taiz, and Aden. Protests continued over the following months, especially in the three major cities, and briefly intensified in late May into urban warfare between Hashid tribesmen and army defectors allied with the opposition on one side and security forces and militias loyal to Saleh on the other.

After Saleh pretended to accept a Gulf Cooperation Council-brokered plan allowing him to cede power in exchange for immunity only to back away before signing three separate times, an assassination attempt on 3 June left him and several other high-ranking Yemeni officials injured by a blast in the presidential compound's mosque. Saleh was evacuated to Saudi Arabia for treatment, but he handed over power to Vice-President Abd al-Rab Mansur al-Hadi, who has largely continued his policies and ordered the arrest of several Yemenis in connection with the attack on the presidential compound. While in Saudi Arabia, Saleh kept hinting that he could return any time and continued to be present in the political

sphere through television appearances from Riyadh starting with an address to the Yemeni people on 7 July. On Friday 13 August, a demonstration was announced in Yemen as “Mansouron Friday” in which hundreds of thousands of Yemenis called for Ali Abdullah Saleh to go. The protesters joining the “Mansouron Friday” were calling for establishment of “a new Yemen”. On 12 September, Saleh issued a presidential decree while still receiving treatment in Riyadh authorizing Vice President Abd al-Rab Mansur al-Hadi to negotiate a deal with the opposition and sign the GCC initiative.

On 23 September, three months since the assassination attempt, Saleh returned to Yemen abruptly, defying all earlier expectations. Pressure on Saleh to sign the GCC initiative eventually led to his signing of it in Riyadh on 23 November, in which Saleh agreed to step down and set the stage for the transfer of power to his vice-president. A presidential election was then held on 21 February 2012, in which Hadi (the only candidate) won 99.8 per cent of the vote. Hadi then took the oath of office in Yemen’s parliament on 25 February. By 27 February, Saleh had resigned from the presidency and transferred power to his successor; however he is still wielding political clout as the head of the General People’s Congress party.

## SYRIA

Protests in Syria started on 26 January 2011, when a police officer assaulted a man in public on Al-Hareeka Street in the old town of Damascus. The man was arrested right after the assault. As a result, protesters called for the freedom of the arrested man. Soon a “Day of Rage” was set for 4–5 February, but it was uneventful. On 6 March, the Syrian security forces arrested about 15 children in Daraa, in southern Syria, for writing slogans against the government. Soon protests erupted over the arrest and abuse of the children. Daraa was to be the first city to protest against the Baathist regime, which has been ruling Syria since 1963.

Thousands of protestors gathered in Damascus, Aleppo, al-Hasakah, Daraa, Deir ez-Zor, and Hama on 15 March, with recently released politician Suhair Atassi becoming an unofficial spokesperson for the “Syrian revolution”. The next day there were reports of approximately 3000 arrests and a few martyrs, but there are no official figures on the number of deaths. On 18 April 2011, approximately 100,000 protesters sat in the central Square of Homs calling for the resignation of President Bashar al-Assad. Protests continued throughout July 2011, the government responding with harsh security clampdowns and military operations in several districts, especially in the north.

On 31 July, Syrian army tanks stormed several cities, including Hama, Deir Ez-Zour, Abu Kamal, and Herak near Daraa. At least 136 people were killed in the most violent and bloody day since the uprising started.

On 5 August 2011, an anti-government demonstration took place in Syria called “God is with us”, during which the Syrian security forces shot the protesters from inside ambulances, consequently killing 11 people.

By late November – early December, the Baba Amr district of Homs fell under armed Syrian opposition control. By late December, the battles between the government's security forces and the rebel Free Syrian Army intensified in Idlib Governorate. Cities in Idlib and neighborhoods in Homs and Hama began falling under the control of the opposition, during this time military operations in Homs and Hama ceased and stopped.

By mid-January the FSA gained control over Zabadani and Madaya. By late January, the Free Syrian Army launched a full-scale attack against the government in Rif Dimashq, where they took over Saqba, Hamoreya, Harasta and other cities in Damascus's Eastern suburbs. On 29 January, the fourth regiment of the Syrian Army led by the president's brother Maher al-Assad and the Syrian Army dug in at Damascus, and the fighting continued where the FSA was 8 km away from the Republican palace in Damascus. Fighting broke out near Damascus International Airport, but by the next day the Syrian government deployed the Republican Guards. The military gained the upper hand and regained all land the opposition gained in Rif Dimashq by early February. On 4 February, the Syrian Army launched a massive bombardment on Homs and committed a huge massacre, killing 500 civilians in one night in Homs. By mid-February, the Syrian army regained control over Zabadani and Madaya. In late February, Army forces entered Baba Amro after a big military operation and heavy fighting. Following this, the opposition forces began losing neighborhoods in Homs to the Syrian Army including al-Inshaat, Jobr, Karm el-Zaytoon and only Homs's old neighborhoods, including Al-Khalidiya, Homs, Al-Khalidiya, remained in opposition hands.

By March 2012, the government began military operations against the opposition in Idlib Governorate including the city of Idlib, which fell to the Army by mid-March. During the month, the government also recaptured Saraqib and Sarmin. Still, at this time, the opposition managed to capture al-Qusayr and Rastan. Heavy fighting also continued in several neighborhoods in Homs and in the city of Hama. The FSA also started to conduct hit-and-run attacks in the pro-Assad Aleppo Governorate, which they were not able to do before. Heavy-to-sporadic fighting was also continuing in the Daraa and Deir ez-Zor Governorates.

By late April 2012, despite a cease-fire being declared in the whole country, sporadic fighting continued, with heavy clashes specifically in Al-Qusayr, where rebel forces controlled the northern part of the city, while the military held the southern part. FSA forces were holding onto Al-Qusayr, due to it being the last major transit point toward the Lebanese border. A rebel commander from the Farouq Brigade in the town reported that 2,000 Farouq fighters had been killed in Homs province since August 2011. At this point, there were talks among the rebels in Al-Qusayr, where many of the retreating rebels from Homs city's Baba Amr district had gone, of Homs being abandoned completely. On 12 June 2012, the UN peacekeeping chief in Syria stated that, in his view, Syria has entered a period of civil war.

## BAHRAIN

The protests in Bahrain started on 14 February, and were initially aimed at achieving greater political freedom and respect for human rights; they were not intended to directly threaten the monarchy. Lingering frustration among the Shiite majority with being ruled by the Sunni government was a major root cause, but the protests in Tunisia and Egypt are cited as the inspiration for the demonstrations. The protests were largely peaceful until a pre-dawn raid by police on 17 February to clear protestors from Pearl Roundabout in Manama, in which police killed four protesters. Following the raid, some protesters began to expand their aims to a call for the end of the monarchy. On 18 February, army forces opened fire on protesters when they tried to re-enter the roundabout, fatally wounding one. The following day protesters reoccupied Pearl Roundabout after the government ordered troops and police to withdraw. Subsequent days saw large demonstrations; on 21 February a pro-government Gathering of National Unity drew tens of thousands, whilst on 22 February the number of protestors at the Pearl Roundabout peaked at over 150,000 after more than 100,000 protesters marched there and were coming under fire from the Bahraini Military which killed around 20 and injured over 100 protesters. On 14 March, Saudi-led GCC forces were requested by the government and entered the country, which the opposition called an “occupation”.

King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa declared a three-month state of emergency on 15 March and asked the military to reassert its control as clashes spread across the country. On 16 March, armed soldiers and riot police cleared the protesters’ camp in the Pearl Roundabout, in which 3 policemen and 3 protesters were reportedly killed. Later, on 18 March, the government tore down the Pearl Roundabout monument. After the lifting of emergency law on 1 June, several large rallies were staged by the opposition parties. Smaller-scale protests and clashes outside of the capital have continued to occur almost daily. On 9 March 2012, over 100,000 protested in what the opposition called “the biggest march in our history”.

The police response has been described as a “brutal” crackdown on peaceful and unarmed protestors, including doctors and bloggers. The police carried out midnight house raids in Shia neighborhoods, beatings at checkpoints, and denial of medical care in a “campaign of intimidation”. More than 2,929 people were arrested, and at least five people died due to torture while in police custody. On 23 November 2011, the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry released its report on its investigation of the events, finding that the government had systematically tortured prisoners and committed other human rights violations. It also rejected the government’s claims that the protests were instigated by Iran. Although the report found that systematic torture had stopped, the Bahraini government has refused entry to several international human rights groups and news organizations, and delayed a visit by a UN inspector.

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Henryk Cwięk

BETWEEN GERMANY AND RUSSIA.  
THE PROBLEM  
OF POLAND'S SECURITY  
IN THE 20<sup>TH</sup> AND 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURIES  
IN VIEW OF EUROPE'S SITUATION.  
SELECTED PROBLEMS

The problem of Poland's security is complex and difficult to assess unequivocally. If we inspect it from a historical perspective we must take into consideration various instances of neglect. The sovereignty of the First Republic of Poland was successively limited by the nation's neighbors, and by the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century Poland was crossed out from the political map of Europe. This was the consequence of the country's feebleness, a regime that differed from those of the rest of Europe, the specific political customs of Poland's ruling class as well as economic underdevelopment. The country's neighbors attempted to influence Poland's internal processes and foreign policies, despite the fact that only two hundred years earlier Poland had been among Europe's great powers.

The Duchy of Warsaw, established in 1807, and – following the defeat of Napoleon – the Kingdom of Poland, under the rule of the Russian Tsar, did not allow Poland to regain its nationality and sovereignty. Poland's absence from the international arena was, for some countries, a condition of equilibrium and stability established during the Congress of Vienna. Subsequent uprisings reminded the

world of pro-independence tendencies still thriving within the country's society. However, a shift of power and clashing interests of countries created the conditions for World War I and, as a result, an international political situation arose that made it possible for Poland to regain its independence.<sup>1</sup>

The outcomes of World War I were a shock to the present European system. Three great monarchies fell: Austria-Hungary, Tsarist Russia and the German Empire. The victors, i.e. England, France and the United States, creates a new alignment of political power on the Old Continent. Its legal and political voice was expressed in the Treaty of Versailles; the Covenant of the League of Nations was its integral element. It was interpreted as a new system of common security. In practice, however, it did not fulfill its expectations. The causes for this are not limited to the institutional insufficiencies of the League of Nations.<sup>2</sup>

In November of 1918 Poland regained its longed-for independence. The re-establishment of Poland as a country, after 123 years of bondage, armed battles and conspiracies was an important even in Europe's history. The reborn Republic of Poland had to face many problems, and faced them as a result of military and diplomatic actions. Poland was in a difficult international situation as Germany and Russia did not agree with the Treaty of Versailles and attempted it have it revised.<sup>3</sup> The security of the Second Republic had a special significance. In this situation it was necessary to employ intelligence to discover the intentions of the countries bordering Poland to both the east and the west.<sup>4</sup> The Second Republic's diplomacy conducted its operations in difficult conditions, attempting to protect the very existence of the country.<sup>5</sup> It was a task that must be interpreted in the context of hostile and revisionary tendencies in the foreign policies of the neighboring superpowers. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs attempted to ensure the safety of Poland via pacts with selected countries, utilizing, inter alia, the common security system of the League of Nations.

The "Versailles Dictate" psychosis, from which the Weimar Republic suffered, had an impact on Berlin-Warsaw relations. The Germans considered their eastern border to be the effect of a pact between France and Great Britain<sup>6</sup>. Poland's safety was threatened by both its eastern and western neighbors. This is why the Second Republic's secret services tried to determine the intentions of the

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<sup>1</sup> R. Kuźniar, *Droga do wolności. Polityka zagraniczna III Rzeczypospolitej*, Warszawa 2008, p.11.

<sup>2</sup> A.D. Rotfeld, *Bezpieczeństwo centrum a peryferie: rosyjskie koncepcje polityczne [in:] Modernizacja Centrum Peryferie*. red. W. Borodziej i S. Dębski, Warszawa 2009, pgs. 377–378.

<sup>3</sup> S. Dębski, *Między Berlinem a Moskwą. Stosunki niemiecko-sowieckie 1939–1941*, Warszawa 2003, p. 55–88.

<sup>4</sup> H. Cwiąg, *W tajnej służbie II Rzeczypospolitej. Wywiad polski wobec Niemiec w latach 1918–1939*, Częstochowa 2009, p.11 and following.

<sup>5</sup> R. Kuźniar, *op. cit.*, pgs. 12–15.

<sup>6</sup> P.P. Wiczorkiewicz, *Polityka zagraniczna II Rzeczypospolitej na tle sytuacji europejskiej w latach 1918–1939 [in:] Z dziejów Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej*, Warszawa 1986, pgs. 80–81.

country's potential opponents. The operations of Poland's secret services during the interwar period was focused within one institution and answered to one entity – the *Second Division* of the General Staff of the Polish Army. The Division conveyed information necessary to reach important decisions to the army commanders and government. The Second Division also counteracted espionage. It was a significant aid to the ruling body and influenced the activities of other government institutions. It was composed of several departments, and each department had a fixed number of sections. The Second Division played the most important role – intelligence. The Department included “West” and “East” sections, a radio-intelligence section and technical section. Reconnaissance of bordering countries was conducted via branch offices supervised by the “West” and “East” sections, and located outside of the country. Russia and Germany's hostile attitude towards Poland charted the route for joint ventures.<sup>7</sup>

In July of 1919 General Hans von Seeckt presided over a special committee which was to organize a new army in conditions of peace. The General tried to sidestep the limits of the Versailles conditions, not wanting to draw the attention of the coalition and to enable Germany to endure until the country could regain its freedom and introduce mandatory military service. Von Seeckt organized a professional Reichswehr – the miniature version of a great army. It was to include all the elements of the planned, but at for the time being future, army. Armament was a significant problem. General Seeckt considered modifying manufacturing plants for military production, yet German industry was under the control of the Coalition. A solution was to transfer production outside of the country. Russia turned out to be the most suitable country for that purpose.

Russian leaders were eager for an alliance with Germany due to common enemies, yet their objectives were different. In 1920 Lenin spoke of the problem as follows: “[...] Germany wants revenge, we want a revolution. At this moment we have the same interests. But when our paths diverge Germany will be our greatest enemy. Time will show whether the rubble of Europe will become the foundations for a German hegemony or a communist federation [...]”.<sup>8</sup> The Second Division of the General Staff determined that following the war Germany and Russia cooperated on: political, military and industry-related levels. Undoubtedly military cooperation was most significant and it was the focus of Poland's secret services. The Red Army and Reichswehr began cooperating in 1919/1920. Germany sold military equipment that remained from the period of the First World War.

Poland's war with Bolshevik Russia in the years 1919-1920 animated German-Russian contacts.<sup>9</sup> In July of the same year, during the peak of the Bolshevik

<sup>7</sup> J. Wieliczka, Reichswehra a Armia Czerwona. Nawiązanie kontaktów i pierwsze porozumienia 1919–1923, “Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego”, 1994, z. 112, pgs. 73–74.

<sup>8</sup> Ibidem, p.74.

<sup>9</sup> L. Grosfeld, Polska a stosunki niemiecko-sowieckie 1919–1939, Warszawa 1988, pgs. 5–7.

offense in Poland, the German government and leaders attempted to establish whether Russian armies would stop at the border with Germany or continue onwards. Germany perceived the perspective of returning to its prewar eastern border and a change in the Versailles order. This concept was propagated not only in military circles, especially Hans von Seeckt. Chancellor Joseph Wirth was an advocate of the German-Bolshevik alliance – whose blade was directed towards Poland. In July of 1920 the German government proclaimed neutrality. It avoided direct involvement with the Russians, fearing the reaction of western countries. Neutrality was linked with, *inter alia*, prohibition of the transportation of military resources and materials through Germany. Polish secret services discovered that many German officers and specialists served in the Red Army. Russians were using German weapons, ammunition and aircraft.

After the end of the Polish-Russian war military cooperation between the Reichswehr and the Red Army further developed. In September of 1921 both parties conducted secret negotiations to assist Germany in the development of its arms industry. Generals Otto Hasse and Leonid Krasin participated in the negotiations. The Kruppa Plant constructed Factory No. 8 in Moscow, which was to manufacture artillery guns, while the German Bresol built a poisonous gas plant in Trakai. Both sides also signed an agreement to help Germany manufacture ammunition in Tula, Petrograd as well as other locations. In October of 1921 a conference was held in Berlin, participated by a Russian delegation, as well as General Seeckt. He accepted the necessity for Germany to assign considerable funds to arm the Red Army. Russia turned to Seeckt for military assistance in the attack on Poland. He supported their plans and assured that Germany would remain neutral. The General ordered that the Junkers plants in Dessau commence manufacturing aircraft for the Russian Army, so that it might prepare for its attack on Poland.

At the start of 1922 the German government, thanks to the support of Chancellor J. Wirth, allotted the Reichswehr 150 million marks to be invested in the military industry within the territory of Russia. In order to manage the funds correctly, Germany created an expenditure agency – Sondergruppe “R” (Russland) – which was directed by Major Fischer. He also maintained ongoing relations with the heads of both armies concerning military investments in Russia.<sup>10</sup>

The Treaty of Rapallo, signed on the 16<sup>th</sup> of April 1922, created the framework for the ultimate normalization of Russian-German relations. Articles 1 and 2 of the treaty revoked all Russian claims for compensation arising from Article 166 of the Treaty of Versailles, as well as German claims for compensation for property and rights arisen through the application of Russian laws and measures. Article 3 pertained to reassuming diplomatic relations. Article 4 contained a clause according to which both countries would be perceived as favored. Article 5 obligated

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<sup>10</sup> M. Pirko, *Ręka w rękę z Reichswehrą przeciw Polsce, część I, “Wojsko i Wychowanie”*, Warszawa 1992, nr 2, s.46–49; A. A. Achtamzjan, *Wojennoje sotrudnicestwo ZSRR i Germanii w 1920–1933, (po nowym dokumentam)*, [in:] *Nowaja i nowiejszaja istoria*, 1990, pgs. 3–25.

both countries to treat their mutual economic needs with goodwill. Both parties also exchanged undisclosed annotations.<sup>11</sup>

After the signing of the Treaty of Rapallo cooperation between Germany and Russia (and later the Soviet Union) continued to develop. Many agreements were signed. Germany obtained a few dozen trade and industry concessions in the Soviet Union. The first gave Germany the right to purchase Russian products and sell them abroad. Industry concessions were made to attract foreign capital in order to restore the Russian economy. Germany played the largest role in this process. German plants became the main source of loans for the Soviet Union. The interest of industry circles would not have been as great were it not for the development of military cooperation. During the early 1920s the Association for the Support of Industrial Undertakings (Gefu) was formed, with headquarters in Berlin and Moscow. Germans allotted appropriate funds to cover the investment. The Junkers Company was given the responsibility for the manufacture of 300 fighter aircraft a year in Fili near Moscow, of which 60 were sold to the Russians, and the remaining aircraft were used by the Reichswehr for training purposes. The Kruppa plant erected an artillery manufacturing plant in Moscow, and in Manych, located near Rostov-on-Don, a tank manufacturing plant. German engineers were employed in all plants. Supervision was also conducted by Germans. The equipment was tested in Soviet testing ranges.<sup>12</sup>

Contact between Germany and Russia grew increasingly close. Ambassador Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau maintained close relations with Commissar Georgy Vasilyevich Chicherin, which was interpreted by Moscow's diplomatic corps as an apparent attempt to handle certain matters via the informal route. The fact that Germany applied the principles of the Treaty of Rapallo in other republics in November of 1922 was viewed as the country's approval of the emerging Soviet Union.

Both countries saw the significance of military cooperation. A discussion regarding the Reichswehr's cooperation with the Red Army, conducted in the summer of 1922, brought the two countries closer. Admiral Hintze and Colonel Bauer drove to Moscow, while air force commanders Swieczin and Lazarev, traveled to Berlin to discuss air force cooperation. Russian leaders procured additional funds for armament from the budget. As an example, 35 million rubles in gold were assigned to the air force. In August of the same year Major Fischer arrived in Moscow to discuss important military arrangements. Germany wanted to conduct activities in Russia that they were prohibited to conduct under the Treaty of Versailles. This included the following: acquiring military technical knowledge, conducting tactical tests with the use of various types of weapons as well as educating groups of qualified specialists who could later assist in military operations.

Germany wanted the Red Army to provide its own military bases, suitable for air force, armored vehicle and war gas testing, as well as freedom to conduct

<sup>11</sup> J. Krasuski, *Stosunki polsko-niemieckie 1919–1932*, Poznań 1975, pgs. 29–31.

<sup>12</sup> A. Skrzypek, *Nie spełniony sojusz? Stosunki sowiecko-niemieckie 1917–1941*, Warszawa 1992, pgs. 29–31.

technical trials with the use of various weapons and the possibility of exchanging experience and information. The Russians received payment in exchange for leasing bases, access to technical trial results as well as theoretical and technical information.<sup>13</sup>

Germany strove to strengthen its influence over the Red Army. Frequent military contacts assisted in this aim. German officers trained the Soviet Army's staff; in test ranges, during shared maneuvers and in training facilities. They provided them with professional equipment and weapons. In 1924 a special bureau was formed in Berlin which helped acquire "white officers" for service within the Soviet Union. The Second Division obtained information that the bureau helped in procuring approximately 800 persons – to be employed in the Red Army. This group was mainly comprised of aviation, artillery and technical officers. They were obligated to change their last names and cease all anticommunist propaganda. The leaders of the Soviet Union offered each a salary and a sum of 3 thousand Deutsche Marks in gold, and a promotion of one rank. German military commanders conducted a recruitment process for service in the Soviet Union. They searched for officers and non-commissioned officers who knew Russian. At the beginning of the 1920s instructors were in great demand. Annually, a few hundred persons began work as instructors. Germans held responsible positions as advisors of the Red Army's command. They also participated in organizational changes introduced by their allies. A German military center operated in Moscow – it served as an advisory agency for the Red Army<sup>14</sup>.

Investments in the Junkers plants were of great importance to German-Soviet cooperation in the field of aviation. An aircraft manufacturing plant was erected in Fili near Moscow. German influences encompassed Soviet aviation plants in Samara, Saratov, Taganrog and Oleksandrivsk. The Junkers plant was liquidated in the mid-1920s. Only maintenance facilities owned by the Russian-German Deruluft remained. The aviation plant was liquidated as a result of different approaches by the two countries to production conditions. Germany, due to its considerable deficit, terminated its credit agreement with the Soviets. Personnel and equipment were transported back to Germany. Yet the Soviets commenced their own production.<sup>15</sup> An important joint venture was the German test center and aviation school established in Lipetsk in the mid-1920s,<sup>16</sup> financed by Germany. A large complex of production halls, workshops, hangars, and training and residential buildings was built within the vicinity of two runways, *nota bene* modernized by the Reichswehr. The aviation center and school were created and maintained in great secrecy. Administrative supervision over the structures was carried out by Germans. Approximately 200 Germans were employed there in total, of which almost half was composed of technical personnel and instructors.

<sup>13</sup> J. Wieliczka, *op. cit.* pgs. 80–81; J. Erickson, *The Soviet High Command*, Stanford 1966, p. 155.

<sup>14</sup> CA MSW, sygn. 614, t. 174, *Współpraca niemiecko-sowiecka...*, *op. cit.*, pgs. 37–45.

<sup>15</sup> A. Peptoński, *Wywiad polski na ZSRR 1921–1939*, Warszawa 1996, p. 314.

<sup>16</sup> CA MSW, sygn. 614, t. 174, *Współpraca niemiecko-sowiecka...*, *op. cit.*, pgs. 55–59.

During the summer months approximately 70 persons were trained to become fighter aircraft pilots.

We should also mention cooperation in the area of training and development of higher-ranked commanders. Generals and higher-ranked officers of the Red Army took part in special training and attended military schools in Germany. Special courses were also organized for the officers of the General Staff. Among participants were Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov and Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevsky. High-ranked German officers, including Generals Werner Blomberg and Kurt Hammerstein, participated in the Red Army's operations.<sup>17</sup> In the 1920s the Soviet Union saw the alliance with Germany as a form of security, stability and mutual benefits – not adventure or risk. Funds and technical support were needed in order to industrialize the country. Advisors were needed to form a strong Red Army, and – on the international stage – a counterbalance for English-French pressure. All this could be offered by Germany, and the Soviet Union was prepared to pay the necessary price. In the mid-1930s Germany had a staff of several thousand educated officers. Many well-known air force or armored weapons officers were trained in Soviet schools, including von Blomberg, who later became the Minister of War. We should interpret the close ties that linked Germany and their Russian comrades within this very context – which later had tragic consequences for many officers of the Red Army.<sup>18</sup> In autumn of 1926 the Soviet Union delegated 25 Reichswehr officers to examine officer training methods employed in Russian universities. Some participated in Soviet military operations. Germany invited a few dozen Soviet officers to return the favor. Some participated in the Reichswehr maneuvers, whilst others became acquainted with the organization of the German General Staff.

In the second half of the 1920s a test range was formed east of Kazan, in the Izhevsk over the Kama River. The range was erected by the Reichswehr and called the Kama.<sup>19</sup> Here Germans conducted training, tests with the use of tanks and compared the strength of weapons manufactured in various countries. Training was intended for tank commanders as well as campaign and tank formation leaders – both German and Russian. The Reichswehr's officers, allowed leave from service for the time-being, comprised most of those who attended the training. Training was conducted by German officers and engineers. Training cycles encompassed theoretical and practical courses conducted from the end of April until the beginning of December. During the winter courses were conducted in the Mechanized Army Training Center in Berlin.

Tanks manufactured by various plants (Rheinmetall, Krupp, Daimler and Esslingen) were tested on the Kama test range. The plants also manufactured armor as well as optical and radio equipment. Components were transported to Szczecin, and later via the sea to Leningrad. The assembly plant was located in the

<sup>17</sup> L. Grosfeld, *op. cit.*, pgs. 7–8.

<sup>18</sup> S. Haffner, *Diabelski pakt. Z dziejów stosunków niemiecko-rosyjskich 1917–1941*, Lublin 1994, pgs. 92–98.

<sup>19</sup> CA MSW, sygn. 614, t. 174, *Współpraca niemiecko-sowiecka...*, *op. cit.*, pgs. 49–54.

test range. Polish intelligence had information about the range's users.<sup>20</sup> Apart from Kama, one more test range was operational in the Soviet Union – the Katorg – where experiments were conducted with tanks and armored weapons. Its organization resembled that of the Kama.<sup>21</sup> The Tom test range is also worth noting – as it was here that tests were conducted with the use of military gas. The range was composed of several plants (Tomysłowski Kombinat) that manufactured explosives, poisonous gases as well as artillery missiles. Apart from test ranges, there were also several artillery ranges. Many experiment facilities were formed for the needs of the German military industry. In Professor Konrich's laboratory, located in the Berlin Hygiene Institute, attempts were made, inter alia, to treat mustard gas wounds. Professor Flury conducted biological experiments in Würzburg. Research concerning poisonous gases was conducted in the Institute of Chemistry at the Berlin Institute of Technology, under the supervision of Professor Werner.<sup>22</sup>

As German engineers and mechanics were traveling to the Soviet Union to work, a special training course was organized in Berlin in 1931. They were to assemble aircraft engines purchased in Germany and train Soviet mechanics and workers. The Second Division obtained information about the universal cooperation between both countries, confirmed – inter alia – by German shipments. Krupp Plants sold steel blocks to the Soviet Union, where they were made into steel plates for heavy artillery. Russians also ordered modern equipment from German plants.<sup>23</sup> An important element of cooperation between the Reichswehr and the Red Army was the exchange of information among high-ranking officers concerning the armies of other countries.<sup>24</sup> Materials that interested both parties were prepared by designated military experts. Cooperation of this type commenced in the second half of the 1920s. Guidelines established during this period show that the Soviet Union prepared information concerning military industry, military orders and items manufactured for the military needs of other countries. Germany focused on a reconnaissance of personnel and the mobilization potentials of foreign countries. German-Soviet friendship lasted as long as the Weimar Republic. In 1933, a time of radical political changes in Germany, relations between the two countries were no longer as friendly. An alliance with France was to guarantee Poland safety during the interwar period, despite fluctuating relations between Warsaw and Paris<sup>25</sup>. Of lesser significance were Poland's military and political associations with Romania. Germany's strong position in the West, a consequence of the Locarno conference, was further enhanced by a nonaggression and neutrality pact signed with the Soviet Union in 1926.

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<sup>20</sup> A. Peptoński, *op. cit.*, pgs. 318–319.

<sup>21</sup> CA MSW, sygn. 614, t. 174, Współpraca niemiecko-sowiecka..., *op. cit.*, pgs. 52–55.

<sup>22</sup> CA MSW, sygn. 614, t. 174, Doświadczalny obóz "Tomka", Opracowanie Oddziału II SG, pgs. 1–6.

<sup>23</sup> A. Peptoński, *op. cit.*, pgs. 319–320.

<sup>24</sup> CA MSW, sygn. 614, t. 174, Współpraca niemiecko-sowiecka..., *op. cit.*, pgs. 45–47.

<sup>25</sup> P.P. Wiczorkiewicz, *op. cit.*, p. 80.



In 1922 a period began that lasted 12 years: a period of struggle between Hitler and Stalin. Both dictators had an extremely strong will, political skills, imagination, courage, a great resistance and were capable of being cruel with no scruples. Both held supreme power in their countries.<sup>26</sup> Previously, German policies concerning the East and Russian policies concerning the Weimar Republic were the outcome of political conflicts and considerations. Even Lenin had problems with his own party. In the new reality of Germany, only Hitler's decisions mattered; in the Soviet Union only Stalin had supreme power. In order to comprehend the genesis of the cruelty of this era we must understand the personalities of both dictators. This undoubtedly, on the one hand, simplifies the matter, and on the other – complicates it, as it is easier to assess the mechanisms of one person's behavior than to comprehend the sum of views and interests that impact on a given political regime. Yet what was really on the minds of Hitler and Stalin, what they really wanted to accomplish, has not been fully explained or documented.

Hitler's rise to power in January of 1933 caused a significant deterioration in German-Soviet relations.<sup>27</sup> Reactions of the Soviet press concerning political changes in Germany were restrained. At first *Izvestia* did not comment on the groundbreaking changes in Germany. *Pravda* wrote of the great wall dividing the ideologies of communism and fascism. Soviet newspapers, in accordance with the government's directives, refrained from assessing and portraying Hitler and his foreign politics.

German diplomats operated in accordance with predefined principles. The Ambassador of the Third Reich to Moscow, Herbert von Dirksen, as well as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Konstantin von Neurath, assured Soviet politicians and diplomats that Germany wanted to maintain their current policies concerning the Soviet Union, and attacks on communist ideology were only a fragment of the Reichstag's pre-election campaign.

Many months passed before Russia understood that Hitler was not a typical right-wing politician, and that their friendship with the Germans had come to an end. It was possible that many had read "Mein Kampf" only after Hitler's rise to power. Some assessed it negatively. Despite the friendship ultimately crumbling, some threads remained for a limited period. In May of 1933 a delegation of high-ranked officers, under the command of General von Bockelberg, arrived in Moscow to conduct a meeting with the Red Army's staff. The visit was conducted in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and good will. Events were planned for the guests in a positive atmosphere. All members of the Soviet Union's War Council were present. Voroshilov expressed the desire to maintain relations between the two armies. Before Bockelberg and his associates, who received a warm farewell, managed to arrive in Berlin, Russia had also rejected the proposal to participate in all military training conducted in Germany. The Soviets believed that they had received reliable information concerning von Papen providing information

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<sup>26</sup> S. Haffner, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

<sup>27</sup> A. Skrzypek, *op. cit.*, pgs. 56–57.

on Russian-German cooperation to the French Ambassador to Berlin, André François-Poncet.<sup>28</sup>

Hitler's verbal attacks on the Soviet Union were in unique contradiction to the development of trade relations between the two countries. According to Hans von Herwarth, Germany had no reason to feel anxious knowing that export to Germany was being conducted without complications. Hitler was perfectly aware of this contradiction and was eager to maintain it. In 1935 the Minister of Economy and the Head of the Bank of the Third Reich, Hjalmar Schacht offered Russia a substantial loan. Russia accepted the loan but, to the surprise of the Germans, intended to use it to fund military equipment. Hitler, however, did not agree to such a solution. The discrepancy between the words and the actions of the Chancellor of Germany were explained by the priority of economic development over the purity of Nazi doctrine. Schacht paid a great deal of attention to the development of the arms industry. Hermann Göring, who could not be accused of pro-Soviet sympathies, as the representative for the four-year plan, appreciated the benefits of trade with the Soviet Union. Officials delegated to the Department of Foreign Affairs saw definite benefits of the improvement in German-Russia relations. Göring's cousin, the ministry attorney in the office of the representative of the four year plan, was an ardent advocate of trade with the Soviet Union as the Russians paid part of their dues in gold. Germans were anxious about their balance of payments, burdened by foreign loans.<sup>29</sup>

Growing conflict between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union took the shape of an ideological battle between fascism and communism. The Nazis eradicated all oppositional groups during this time. The conflict was further emphasized by criticism of the Soviet Union's political regime (this criticism went beyond the norms accepted in international relations), as well as the promotion of maxims which were aimed against the integrity of the Soviet Union as a country and were often emphasized in the speeches of many prominent Nazis.<sup>30</sup>

Polish intelligence could determine that Soviet leaders employed restrictions regarding German professionals.<sup>31</sup> In November of 1937 approximately 400 specialists were arrested. Diplomatic interventions brought no results. A few dozen were deported back to Germany following an interrogation which determined that they were guilty of espionage, sabotage and maintained secret contacts with German diplomacy. Among those deported was an official of the German consulate in Kiev. Soviet leaders also demanded that Rudolf Sommer, the General Consul of the Reich in Leningrad, be removed from his position, accusing him of espionage and sabotage. Soviet security agencies employed various methods during proceedings. Those detained were forced into admitting to crimes they had not committed. They were informed that Germany was not interested in their fate.

<sup>28</sup> S. Haffner, *op. cit.*, pgs. 102–104.

<sup>29</sup> H. Herwarth, *Między Hitlerem a Stalinem. Wspomnienia dyplomaty i oficera niemieckiego*, Warszawa 1992, pgs. 168–169.

<sup>30</sup> A Skrzypek, *op. cit.*, pgs. 68–69.

<sup>31</sup> A Peplowski, *op. cit.*, p. 320.

During the investigation all contact with the detained was cut off. If someone had a Russian friend, they would find out that she was arrested, confessed and had given incriminating evidence. At times certain individuals were confronted with the prisoners, allegedly before deportation or execution. Often prisoners were blackmailed by being told that their wives would receive compromising photographs. Prisoners were interrogated for many hours during the day and often also at night. When this gave no results – harsher methods were used. Everyone confessed to the crimes they were accused of – sooner or later. Nazis, as revenge, planned to arrest Soviet citizens residing in Germany, but to treat them quite differently. Diplomatic circles criticized this idea.<sup>32</sup>

Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevsky's trial attracted the interests of Polish secret services, as well as the physical liquidation of the Red Army's officers – of all ranks. Both the party and the economic-administrative apparatus were the subject of waves of ruthlessly conducted repression, which peaked in 1937.<sup>33</sup> In June of that year the people were informed of the alleged treason of the army commanders. The trial was confidential and short. Executions took place the day after the verdict. Those executed included: Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevsky, Ion Jakir, August Kork, Ieronim Petrovich Uborevich, Vitaly Markovich Primakov, Vitovt Kazimirovich Putna and Robert Eideman. Following these executions, tens of thousands of officers of higher and middle rank were executed. This massacre during peacetime was an unprecedented event in the history of the civilized world. As a result of the so-called purges of 1930 approximately 90 percent of higher-ranked officers were replaced, as well as over half of middle-ranked commanding officers. The command of the Soviet Armed Forces was disorganized. Stalin accused his victims of secret contact with the German government.

After rising to power, Adolf Hitler announced preparations for the plan to revise the borders. Even during the beginning of his command Hitler emphasized that in order to regain political power the Third Reich must construct a powerful army that would enable the country to “gain new living space in the East and Germanize it ruthlessly”.<sup>34</sup> The Reich Chancellor undertook actions to quickly prepare the country for war<sup>35</sup>. During one of the first government deliberations Hitler declared that armament would be of absolute priority<sup>36</sup>. Marshal Józef Piłsudski carefully observed the development of political events in the Third Reich. He believed that “[...] Hitler is rather an Austrian, by no means a Prussian. This fact

<sup>32</sup> H. Herwarth, *op. cit.*, p. 173–174.

<sup>33</sup> A. Peplowski, *op. cit.*, p. 301; J. Smaga, *Narodziny i upadek imperium ZSRR 1917–1991*, Kraków 1992, pgs. 106–108; A. Skrzypek, *op. cit.*, p. 84; More on the topic: P. P. Wiczorkiewicz, *łańcuch śmierci. Czystka w Armii Czerwonej 1937–1939*, Warszawa 2001.

<sup>34</sup> W. Kozaczuk, *Wehrmacht 1933–1939*, Warszawa 1978, p. 98.

<sup>35</sup> M. Zgórnjak, *Europa w przededniu wojny. Sytuacja militarna w latach 1938–1939*, Kraków 1993, p. 19.

<sup>36</sup> S. Żerko, *Niemiecka polityka zagraniczna w przededniu II wojny światowej [in:] Kryzys 1939 roku w interpretacjach polskich i rosyjskich historyków*, red. S. Dębski i M. Narin-ski, Warszawa 2009, p. 88.

creates a new situation as old Prussian traditions were greatly permeated with hatred towards Poland[...].<sup>37</sup> Minister of Foreign Affairs Józef Beck, during deliberations of the Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee in mid-February of 1933 emphasized that “[...] our attitude towards Germany and its matters will be exactly the same as Germany’s attitude towards Poland”.<sup>38</sup>

Poland’s policy regarding Germany and the Soviet Union has special significance.<sup>39</sup> It was not until 1926 that Poland managed to sign an agreement with Germany concerning the regulation of border relations. In 1934 a nonaggression declaration was signed by Germany and Poland. It was a limited-term truce. Marshal Piłsudski had no doubts concerning Nazi Germany’s intentions. At the same time, relations with the Soviet Union developed differently. Poland did not acknowledge the country until the end of 1923. A nonaggression pact was signed nine years later. Agreements with the Third Reich and the Soviet Union caused Warsaw’s lack of interest in France’s attempts to extend the Locarno principles to cover Eastern Europe.

Identification of Germany’s intentions was of especial significance for Poland. The activities of the Second Republic’s intelligence in the first part of the 1920s left much to be desired. The situation changed in 1926 when Rittmeister Jerzy Sosnowski organized an intelligence facility in Berlin under the codename “In. 3”. Its agents stole the most important secrets from the German Ministry of War. The commanding staff of the Second Division gained access to information concerning the expansion of German armed forces and the Reichswehr’s cooperation with the Red Army.<sup>40</sup> The seeds of the future German military power were planted in the Soviet Union. An intelligence agency by the codename “I.A.” functioned within the German capital – and played an observation-information role. It facilitated the work of other agencies. It also utilized its own agency. In the years 1929–1930 the agency uncovered: German-Soviet cooperation and armament of the Weimar Republic. Polish intelligence strived to discover the development potential of the Third Reich’s army. In Germany, the West Section conducted deep intelligence with unlimited scope.<sup>41</sup> It was assisted by domestic agencies. The West Section supervised the operations of agencies utilized during peace and war conditions. The Third Reich was divided into regions within which Polish intelligence agencies operated. They were present in all German industry and economy centers. Many agencies were located within the offices of Polish diplomats. An agency was, usually, led by an intelligence officer commissioned and engaged by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<sup>42</sup>

<sup>37</sup> Cyt za: P. P. Wiczorkiewicz, *Polityka zagraniczna...*, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>39</sup> R. Kuźniar, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

<sup>40</sup> More on the topic: H. Cwięk, *Rotmistrz Sosnowski. As wywiadu Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej*, Kraków 2010, *passim*.

<sup>41</sup> CA MSW, sygn. 289, t. 62, *Sprawozdanie prac dokonanych przez Referat “Zachód” w 1932 r. oraz program prac na 1933r.*, z 16 I 1933 r., k. pgs. 35–45.

<sup>42</sup> L. Gondek, *Wywiad polski w Trzeciej Rzeszy 1933–1939*, Warszawa 1982, pgs. 64–72.

In March of 1935 the Third Reich introduced mandatory military service. The Reich had freed itself from the obligations of the Treaty of Versailles and created the foundations for unlimited development of its armed forces.<sup>43</sup> The tempo imposed by the Nazis for armament and preparation for the ultimate war required an effectively functioning system of terror and propaganda in Germany. The nation had to be a submissive and effective tool in the hands of the Nazi party and its commander. Polish intelligence prepared to assess the increasing military potential of the Third Reich. Plans were made to obtain German military documents. During this period Germany was reorganizing its armed forces and quickening the tempo of armament. Poland attempted to discover the directions in which Germany's transformations were heading. To accomplish this, Poland searched for valuable agents – i.e. agents who had access to organizational, training and mobilization information. Resident spies were stationed in Germany who facilitated the operations of agents. Upon the liquidation of the “In. 3” facility Polish intelligence in the Third Reich suffered a crisis, accompanied by the slower operations of the secret services.<sup>44</sup> The Second Division had difficulty in dividing its work between peace operations and war preparations. During the period of peace, intelligence was concerned with forms of battle with the enemy. Information was collected, and its synthesis, elaborated by agencies, provided the basis for the decisions of the Commander in Chief. During the period of greater danger from the Third Reich, inner branch offices intensified their operations.<sup>45</sup>

Germany's Plans concerning Czechoslovakia did not provoke a negative reaction from Minister Beck<sup>46</sup>. Warsaw's policies during the Sudeten crisis and the ultimatum to take over the disputed territory of Śląsk Zaolziański had a negative impact on Poland's image on the international stage and exacerbated the country's situation. Some compared the Republic to a hyena preying on the victim of the Munich Agreement. They believed that Minister Beck was disloyal, deceitful and in league with Hitler. Many prominent individuals of the western world believed that Poland did not deserve any assistance if threatened by German aggression. Even Prime Minister Édouard Daladier, who was active in Munich, assessed Poland's actions with disdain. The Foreign Office also criticized Poland's actions. The German diplomats who were unaware of Hitler's plans suggested that the country utilize the favorable conditions and demand the surrender of Gdansk to the Reich and its joining to East Prussia.. Ernst von Weizsäcker assured the Head of the Abwehr, Wilhelm Franz Canaris, that Great Britain and France would remain neutral in the case of a Poland-Germany conflict.<sup>47</sup> Hitler's plans were

<sup>43</sup> M. Wojciechowski, *Stosunki polsko-niemieckie 1933–1938*, Poznań 1980, s. 164; W. Kozaczuk, *Bitwa o tajemnice. Służby wywiadowcze Polski i Rzeszy niemieckiej 1922–1939*, Warszawa 1978, pgs. 374–375.

<sup>44</sup> L. Gondek, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

<sup>45</sup> CA MSW, sygn. 289, t. 63, *Sprawozdanie z działalności Ekspozytury nr 3, za lata 1935–1936*, z 18 II 1936 r., k. pgs. 27–50.

<sup>46</sup> P.P. Wieczorkiewicz, *op. cit.*, pgs. 94–95.

<sup>47</sup> S. Żerko, *op. cit.*, pgs. 102–103.

carried out by Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop. On the 24<sup>th</sup> of September 1938 von Ribbentrop presented Ambassador Joseph Lipski with a program that was to settle disputes in Polish-German relations. Minister Beck did not accept the propositions and demands issued by the Chancellor of the Third Reich. Hitler's declaration of a nonaggression pact with Poland, issued in the Reichstag in 1939, and Beck's later answer before the Sejm concerning the demands listed therein, led to tension between Warsaw and Berlin.

Important supplements to information gained by the Polish intelligence were the reports and plans elaborated by Lieutenant Colonel Antoni Szymański, a military attaché in Berlin. His work was supervised by the Second Division of the General Staff.<sup>48</sup> In the spring of 1939 Szymański received interesting information from an Estonian military attaché, Lieutenant Colonel Ludwik Jacobsen, who was present in the office of operations of General Franz Halder, the Chief of the Military Staff, on the 28<sup>th</sup> of March 1939. When Halder left for a few moments Jacobsen noticed a map (scale of 1: 300 000) of the area from the Elbe River to the east, beyond the Bug River. It marked three areas of the Wehrmacht's concentration: in East Prussia, in Pomerania and Silesia, as well as marked directions of attack: the Cracow-Lvov axis, from Szczecin through Pomerania to East Prussia, and through the Narew River to the east past the Bug. There could be no doubts concerning the reliability of this information.<sup>49</sup>

The spring of 1939 was a period of feverish preparation of an agency strategic network in Germany.<sup>50</sup> This was linked with the activation of work conducted by Section West, which took place following personnel changes. From March until August of 1939 the Independent West Sector (Samodzielny Referat "Zachód") increased its military staff in Germany twice. In mid-March of 1939 the officers of this section were stationed in: Königsberg, Lyck, Marienwerder, Stettin, Hamburg, Dusseldorf, Berlin, Leipzig, Munich, Breslau and Vienna. In the period before the start of World War II the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces had conducted a relatively good reconnaissance of German armed forces grouped around the Polish border, though the information was superior for some areas.<sup>51</sup> The reconnaissance was conducted particularly well for the East Prussia area. Intelligence had information concerning the deployment of large active units and defensive units.

In April of 1939 a pact was formed concerning British assurances for Poland, altered in August into a pact of mutual assistance between the two countries.

<sup>48</sup> More on the topic: H. Ćwięk, *Polityczno-militarne przygotowania Trzeciej Rzeszy do wojny w raportach attaché wojskowego w Berlinie płk. Antoniego Szymańskiego*, Częstochowa 2007; A. Szamański, *Zły sąsiad. Niemcy 1932–1939 w oświetleniu polskiego attaché wojskowego w Berlinie*, Londyn 1959.

<sup>49</sup> R. Majzner, *Polski wywiad wojskowy wobec polityki III Rzeszy 1933–1939*, Toruń 2006, pgs. 194–195; A. Szymański, *op. cit.*, pgs. 161–162; H. Ćwięk, *Polityczno-militarne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 425.

<sup>50</sup> L. Gondek, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

<sup>51</sup> A. Woźny, *Niemieckie przygotowania do wojny z Polską w ocenach polskich naczelnych władz wojskowych w latach 1933–1939*, Warszawa 2000, pgs. 303–311.

In May of the same year a military protocol was signed, stating that in the event of German aggression France would offer Poland military aid. The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, signed on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of August 1939, concerned the preparations for yet another partition of Poland. On the 1<sup>st</sup> of September 1939 Poland conducted armed resistance in a hopeless, from a military point of view, situation, thus forcing England and France to declare war on Germany. Five years later, Germany signed an act of unconditional surrender.<sup>52</sup> The new international order proposed by Stalin, based on a division into zones of influence, remained intact until the year 1989.<sup>53</sup>

Following the lost campaign of September 1939, Poles fought alongside France, their ally, and later Great Britain. Their input in the victory of the Allies during World War II is underestimated. Poles contributed to the victory against the Third Reich not only by participating in battles.<sup>54</sup> Special mention should be made of their success on the secret front.<sup>55</sup> Facing the threat of war from Hitler's Germany, the heads of the Polish Cipher Bureau, located in Pyry near Warsaw, provided their allies – the French and British – with information concerning the Enigma and replicas of plans of the machine.<sup>56</sup> Poland's victory over the German Enigma cipher had exceptional significance for countries comprising the Anti-Hitler coalition during World War II. Thanks to Polish efforts, the Allies were able to decipher the secret correspondence of the Third Reich.<sup>57</sup> Polish-British-American radio intelligence cooperation had a significant impact on the outcome of the war.

Various concepts of global security were created following the end of World War II. The Charter of the United Nations, signed in 1945, defined the foundations of the global security system. During the Cold War the division of the world into two opposing zones found its expression in the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in 1949, and the Warsaw Pact, formed in 1955. The fall of this bilateral system caused politicians to search for new forms of security. Intermediary forms were created; responsibilities were defined. An example is the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). A different category of security was formed within the structures linked with the North Atlantic Alliance, e.g. the Partnership for Peace, the NATO-Russia Council, the NATO-Ukraine committees, and others.<sup>58</sup>

<sup>52</sup> J. Nowak-Jeziorański, *Kryteria bezpieczeństwa [in:] Kryteria bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego państwa*, red. S. Dębski, B. Górka-Winter, Warszawa 2003, p. 154.

<sup>53</sup> S. Dębski, *Układ monachijski i pakt Ribbentrop–Mołotow siedemdziesiąt lat później – problemy, interpretacje, oddziaływanie [in:] Kryzys 1939 roku w interpretacjach polskich i rosyjskich historyków*, red. S. Dębski, M. Narinski, Warszawa 2009, p. 15.

<sup>54</sup> A. D. Rotfeld, *Polska w niepewnym świecie*, Warszawa 2006, pgs. 329–330.

<sup>55</sup> More on the topic: *Polsko-brytyjska współpraca wywiadowcza podczas II wojny światowej*, t. I *Ustalenia Polsko-Brytyjskiej Komisji Historycznej*, red. T. Dubicki, D. Nałęcz, T. Stirling, Warszawa 2004; A. Peplowski, *Wywiad polskich sił zbrojnych na Zachodzie 1939–1945*, Warszawa 1995.

<sup>56</sup> D. Kahn, *Łamacze kodów. Historia kryptologii*, Warszawa 2004, p. 1150; M. Grajek, *Enigma. Blżej prawdy*, Poznań 2007, pgs. 132–133.

<sup>57</sup> W. Kozaczuk, *Bitwa...*, *op. cit.*, pgs. 202–203.

<sup>58</sup> More on the topic: A.D. Rotfeld, *Bezpieczeństwo...*, *op. cit.*, pgs. 384–399.

Transformations taking place in Poland during the early 1980s led to fundamental changes within Europe. Contrary to popular Western opinion, the beginning of the end of totalitarian rule on the Old Continent was not the destruction of the Berlin Wall in the autumn of 1989, but the activities of the democratic opposition in Poland. The voice of free people in a country under bondage had more power than the greatest armies or the various forces utilized by the Soviet Union or its dependent countries comprising the Warsaw Pact. Political changes commenced on the Vistula River led to the demise of the Yalta order. Central and Eastern European countries had regained their independence. It was the end of the bilateral world.<sup>59</sup>

Regime transformations commenced in Poland in the late 1980s created the opportunity to construct new foundations for the construction of a national security system.<sup>60</sup> The nation's political situation was complex. The dynamics of processes taking place on the international arena during this period resembled a great unknown. A few factors determined Poland's security policy. The most important factor was the existence of the Eastern Block, the Soviet army stationed within Poland's territory and the specific approach exemplified by Western European countries. The security policy was to be managed by Tadeusz Mazowiecki's government – but Mazowiecki did not yet have any experience in the field. The Department of Foreign Affairs was led by Krzysztof Skubiszewski. He faced the challenge of taking command of a completely sovereign foreign policy, in completely new conditions.<sup>61</sup> At the start of the 1990s Poland was searching for answers how to create the foundations for a new form of national security. Political elites were aware that an unique opportunity to solve national security issues had been created – and that the opportunity would allow Poland to free itself from the role of hostage or object of foreign expansion.

Ever since the 1990s Poland's security policy included cooperating or creating a new alliance with the Soviet Union.<sup>62</sup> We can state that support for this concept from the Solidarity movement was a tactical element, resulting from the existing international situation. Among the various political considerations – stemming from various political modes of thought – the concept that Moscow would withdraw from its sphere of influence in Central Europe was not taken under consideration. It was also taken for a fact that some sort of pact with Russia was necessary to ensure the safety of the new geopolitical situation. We must also mention the misgivings that appeared subsequent to Germany's reunification. Members of the far-left strongly supported an alliance with Poland's eastern neighbor. This approach was not accepted by the politicians determining Poland's security policy. At that time Moscow did not attach any especial significance to relations with

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<sup>59</sup> A. D. Rotfeld, *Polska... op. cit.*, pgs. 19–20.

<sup>60</sup> R. Kuźniar, *Droga..., op. cit.*, p. 86.

<sup>61</sup> R. Grodzki, *Polska polityka zagraniczna w XX i XXI wieku. Główne kierunki – Fakty – Ludzie – Wydarzenia*, Zakrzewo 2009, pgs. 151–153.

<sup>62</sup> R. Kuźniar, *Polityka bezpieczeństwa w polskiej polityce zagranicznej [in:] Polska polityka bezpieczeństwa 1989–2000*, red. R. Kuźniar, Warszawa 2001, pgs. 71–77.



Poland. The Kremlin's priority was to stop the disintegration of the Soviet Union and maintain relations with the United States.

During this time Poland had many different concepts concerning the nation's security: not only diverse, but also discordant. Military circles viewed the concept of "armed neutrality" as appealing. It was advocated by Piotr Kołodziejczyk, the present Minister of Defense. He believed that assuming the position of "armed neutrality in the heart of Europe we will be a bridge between the West and the Soviet Union, also from the military perspective".<sup>63</sup> Considering Poland's geopolitical situation, the concept of neutrality was unacceptable. It would have to take into account Poland assuming a defense strategy in all possible directions, which was impossible due to the level of development of the country's technological and economic potential. The concept was not supported by the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A more appealing option was the concept of designating on a geostrategic map of Europe countries from within Poland's region that would serve as a buffer zone between the East and the West. This process was accompanied by a conscious emphasis of Central Europe's identity. The concept was not developed due to unfavorable geopolitical circumstances as well as conflicts – not only due to historical reasons – but mainly lack of enthusiasm for the concept on the part of other European countries. Many controversies were caused by President Lech Walesa's concept of forming a "NATO bis". The idea assumed the creation of a quasi-system of common security under NATO's leadership; its members were to be primarily Central European countries and the Ukraine. This safety zone was to fill in the void in the area and make it possible for further countries to join NATO in the future. The concept proposed by the President of the Second Republic of Poland was not supported by Prime Minister Skubiszewski, and also did not gain the support of other politicians throughout the world.

We must also mention Poland's activity in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe following the year 1989. The institution was to serve as a shield from potential threats in the security zone.<sup>64</sup> As early as the year 1990, Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki presented the directions of Poland's European policies before the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the proposal to create a European Co-operation Council for the states comprising the Final Act of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Yet the Prime Minister did not explain its security functions. These issues were outlined by Minister Skubiszewski in a speech in the Sejm, presented on the 26<sup>th</sup> of April 1990. The Council, as the OSCE's permanent political organ, was to operate via three committees, one of which was to focus on political and security issues. Skubiszewski emphasized that the priority of Poland's foreign policy was to co-create a European security system in which the OSCE would play an important role. In mid-1990 he observed "the development of a new, cooperation-based European security system within the framework of the OSCE", which was

<sup>63</sup> Ibidem, p.74.

<sup>64</sup> R. Kuźniar, *Droga...*, *op. cit.*, pgs.88–92.

to safeguard Europe so that the continent would not become “a grey, neutral or buffer zone”<sup>65</sup>. The activities of Polish diplomacy confirmed the role that the OSCE was to play in the country’s security policy.

The Third Republic’s politicians noted that Mikhail Gorbachev’s decision not to apply the Brezhnev Doctrine allowed them to transfer conflicts regarding Europe’s safety from the political-military level to a purely political one.<sup>66</sup> They believed that during the development of new political and economic forms in Central and Eastern Europe there would be no armed intervention from Russia. Poland was situated between the politically stable West and the weakened East, undergoing a crisis, and thus developed in an atmosphere free from threats, but also in a region of decreased security standards. Polish diplomacy attached great significance to pacts that were to lower Europe’s military potential and limit the use of force.<sup>67</sup> The reform of armed forces was yet another important matter. The issues that needed to be addressed in Poland included the number of soldiers, the army’s organization, equipment, dislocation and defense doctrine.<sup>68</sup>

The fall of the Soviet Union in December of 1991 enabled many political changes to take place throughout Europe. These changes played an important role in the transformation of Poland’s security policy.<sup>69</sup> New countries were being formed on the rubble of the Soviet empire, which encouraged both Poland and the North Atlantic Alliance to determine its roles in the European security system. The Alliance’s politicians and military staff resolved that the most important organization to ensure the region’s stability was the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. Yet it did not ensure the security of the North Atlantic countries; it only made security, arms control and defense industry restructure consultations possible. Poland attempted to determine the role of its new neighbors in its security strategy. Relations with NATO played a focal role in the Third Republic’s foreign policies – as a guarantee of the nation’s security. The concept of evolutionary changes in the configuration of powers was accepted by Poland’s government. The process of adapting the North Atlantic Alliance depended on the evolution of the international situation and changes taking place inside the country. We can state that the process lasted until the year 1990, although it became more realistic two years later. NATO’s members, in accordance with the guidelines of the New Strategic Concept of the Atlantic Alliance passed in 1991, carried out their policies of conducting careful dialog and developing cooperation with its partners and Russia.<sup>70</sup> The prospects of extended security created a new situation

<sup>65</sup> Cyt. za: Ibidem, pgs.88–89.

<sup>66</sup> P. Mickiewicz, *Polska droga do NATO. Implikacje polityczne i wojskowe*, Toruń 2005, pgs. 68–69.

<sup>67</sup> R. Kuźniar, *Droga...*, *op. cit.*, pgs. 89–91.

<sup>68</sup> P. Mickiewicz, *op. cit.*, pgs. 68–69.

<sup>69</sup> Ibidem, pgs. 91–93.

<sup>70</sup> More on the topic: R. Zięba, *Bezpieczeństwo państw zrzeszonych w NATO i Unii Europejskiej* [in:] *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe po zimnej wojnie*, red. R. Zięba, Warszawa 2008, pgs. 269.

in Central and Eastern Europe. It indicated that countries in this region would accept all criteria in force within the Trans-Atlantic community: political pluralism, principles of democracy, respect for human rights and the rights of minorities, respect for political freedom and freedom of the media. Conflicts between countries were resolved during the Alliance and Union expansion process.<sup>71</sup>

Poland joined NATO during a period of significant changes in the international security network. These changes were not due to Poland's membership or the expansion of NATO. Certain unfavorable phenomena and threats had begun appearing. This included terrorism motivated by a fundamentalist version of Islam, danger of the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the consequences of the process of "failing and failed states". These occurrences had an impact on NATO's security strategy and the Alliance as a whole. Since the year 2001, new security threats have served as a type of justification for the US to undertake re-nationalization measures and militarize foreign and security policies, as well as to strengthen influences. Poland, together with other members of the Alliance, has had to make difficult decisions.<sup>72</sup>

Polish-German relations deserve our attention. Even during the preliminary transformation phase in 1989 they were of especial significance for Poland. Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki had elected a special representative, Mieczysław Pszon, for contacts with the West German Chancellery, even before all government positions had been filled. Pszon was an expert on Germany and an advocate of Polish-German reconciliation.<sup>73</sup> Mazowiecki viewed reconciliation with Germany as one of his political priorities. Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Minister of Foreign Affairs, wanted to frame this reconciliation and cooperation in treaties. The obstacles faced by Polish diplomacy were not easy to overcome. We must take into consideration the substantial baggage of the past and the differences in potential and development of both countries.<sup>74</sup>

The visit of West Germany's Chancellor Helmut Kohl in Poland was of especial significance for German-Poland relations. On the 9<sup>th</sup> of November 1989 the German Chancellor and Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki participated in an ecumenical mass in Krzyżowa in Lower Silesia, where a symbolic reconciliation took place. News came from Berlin that East Germany's government had agreed for its citizens to cross the border. The demolition of the Berlin Wall had begun to take place. Chancellor Kohl ended his visit in Poland to participate in the historical event. He returned to Warsaw in two days to continue discussions, in a slightly different mindset. Eleven agreements and pacts were signed by both countries as a result of the meeting.<sup>75</sup>

The reunion of the two German countries posed a serious problem. Tadeusz

<sup>71</sup> A. D. Rotfeld, *Polska...*, *op. cit.*, pgs. 25–32.

<sup>72</sup> R. Kuźniar, *Droga...*, *op. cit.*, pgs. 216–219.

<sup>73</sup> J.A. Majcherek, *Pierwsza dekada III Rzeczypospolitej*, Warszawa 1999, p. 204.

<sup>74</sup> R. Kuźniar, *Droga...*, *op. cit.*, pgs. 54–55.

<sup>75</sup> R. Zięba, *Główne kierunki polityki zagranicznej Polski po zimnej wojnie*, Warszawa 2010, pgs. 39–45.

Mazowiecki's government was the first – among the countries of the Warsaw Pact – to acknowledge the right for Germany to reunite, with the observation that the country would not be a threat to other European nations. Poland did not expect a swift reunification process. Yet by the end of November of 1989 Chancellor Kohl formulated a 10-point plan to reunite Germany and Europe. The plan included the creation of confederation structures by East and West Germany, and, in effect, the establishment of the German nation. The plan did not take into consideration issues concerning the borders on the Odra and Nysa Łużycka Rivers, which was criticized by the Polish government. Many European politicians wondered about Germany's future. Great Britain and France, despite the fact that they supported the reunification process, did not hide their anxiety. Moscow accepted the changes taking place in Germany. The United States also offered its support. The problem of creating one German nation surfaced in January of 1990. It was then that the so-called "2+4 Group" was formed. It encompassed the representatives of two German nations and four superpowers who were to decide the fate of Germany.<sup>76</sup>

The achievements of the Polish-German political reconciliation process were expressed in a treaty during the Europe reunification period of 1989-1991. Contacts and mutual relations, marked with distrust for many years, improved greatly and took on new meaning. In November of 1990, West Germany and Poland's Ministers of Foreign Affairs signed a German-Polish Border Treaty. Poland was interested in the development of bilateral cooperation in various fields. Minister Skubiszewski emphasized the significance of Poland and Germany's common interests. On the 17<sup>th</sup> of June 1991 the Polish-German Treaty of Good Neighborship and Friendly Cooperation was signed in Bonn. It is seen by many as a "constitution" of relations between Poland and United Germany.<sup>77</sup>

Military cooperation played an important role in the establishment of Polish-German partnership.<sup>78</sup> The united Germany greatly supported Poland during the country's accession to the European Union, despite the fact that other countries did not always view this as a favorable event. Germany promoted the interests of the Visegrád Group, especially Poland. We must emphasize that Germany's commitment went beyond obligations outlined in treaties and was acknowledged throughout the difficult accession process. Yet there were some confrontations during the negotiations.<sup>79</sup>

The policies of the Poland-Germany partnership, the background for which were the concepts of reconciliation and common interest, encountered certain obstacles during the period when Poland was preparing to join the European Union.<sup>80</sup> It was the result of growing problems in the field of Polish-German

<sup>76</sup> J. A. Majcherek, *op. cit.*, pgs. 205–206.

<sup>77</sup> W. M. Góralski, *Polska – Niemcy: Trudny proces pojednania* [in:] *Dokąd zmierza świat*, red. A. D. Rotfeld, Warszawa 2008, p. 428.

<sup>78</sup> R. Zięba *Główne kierunki...*, *op. cit.*, pgs. 63–64.

<sup>79</sup> R. Łoś, *Gerhard Schröder. Blaski i cienie władzy*, Łódź 2008, pgs. 278–279.

<sup>80</sup> R. Zięba, *Główne kierunki...*, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

relations. An event that served as a spark was the activity of expelled German groups; after the failure of legal regulations included in treaties that structured relations between the two countries, attempts were made to revise history and recall German-held grievances against Poland<sup>81</sup>. The Federation of Expellees was particularly active in May of 1998. This was subsequent to the inauguration of stipulations concerning Poland's accession to the European Union. Erika Steinbach, the head of the federation, appealed to Poland and the Czech Republic to "compensate expelled Germans for the wrongs done to them". In 1999 a decision was made to create the "Center of the 15 Million" in Berlin, an institution that was to commemorate the fate of the Germans who were expelled following World War II. In September of 2000 the Center Against Expulsions Foundation was formed. Its objective was to create a museum dedicated to Germans expelled from Central and Eastern Europe in Berlin, as well as to those who had been repatriated from East Germany to West Germany. The institution also intended to show that Germans had been unlawfully expelled. The activities of the Federation of Expellees were categorically criticized by Poland.

Diversity in Polish-German relations was the result of opposing views concerning various challenges, leading to antagonism.<sup>82</sup> Poland and Germany's membership of NATO and the European Union has determined the political directions of both countries. An important matter is defining national and European interests. The strategic objectives outlined by Germany do not leave any doubts. Transatlantic partnership is an important area of Germany's foreign politics. Yet strategic similarities of Polish and German diplomacies had a specific dimension.<sup>83</sup> The concept of an ideal European army was analyzed rather in theoretical, and not substantial, categories. Europe's security policy needs to be assessed in a broad perspective, and not in a bilateral context.

Poland's current political situation greatly differs from that of the Second Republic.<sup>84</sup> The Polish nation – for the first time in a thousand years of history – is not experiencing a territorial conflict with any of its seven neighbors and is maintaining good relations with these countries, though not with all of them. Polish-German relations have undergone a great change. Poland's western neighbor, a traditional enemy, has become Poland's ally and most important economic partner. Germany has accepted Poland's boarder along the Odra and Nysa Rivers, and – as a member of European and Atlantic defense structures – has become an ally. In contemporary Europe, Germany's security is integrally linked with Poland's security. A change of moods in the above relationship impacts – to a point – on the quality of cooperation. Yet Poland's relations with Russia have developed quite differently.<sup>85</sup> Russia sees Poland as a NATO neophyte that betrayed its

<sup>81</sup> W.M. Góralski, *op. cit.*, pgs. 418–419.

<sup>82</sup> R. Zięba, *Główne kierunki...*, *op. cit.*, pgs. 76–78.

<sup>83</sup> K. Wóycicki, W. Czachur, *Wyzwania polskiej polityki wobec Niemiec, "Sprawy Międzynarodowe" 2009, nr. 1, pgs. 37–38.*

<sup>84</sup> J. Nowak-Jeziorański, *op. cit.*, pgs. 154.

<sup>85</sup> More on the topic: K. Pełczyńska-Nałęcz, *Stosunki polityczne między Polską a Rosją po 1990 [in:] Białe plamy Czarne plamy. Sprawy trudne w relacjach polsko-rosyjskich*

former ally; while Poland treats Russia as its greatest challenge and a source of dangers. We should add however that the dynamics of Polish-Russian relations within the past two decades indicates that the countries are not condemned to constant conflict.

Terrorism, as well as its derivatives, poses a significant threat to international safety in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.<sup>86</sup> Existing threats to world peace and stability are the legacy of the past decades. The arms race began in a period – which lasted half a century – when the world was divided and the interests of superpowers clashed throughout the globe. Well-armed, well-trained and equipped groups of partisans and soldiers were active during this period. The superpowers are responsible for the armed military forces utilized by countries and organizations which pose a threat to global stability.

#### SUMMARY

The issue of Poland's security in the 20th and 21st centuries is complex and difficult to assess. Poland is a country with a tragic past that has paid a great price for neglecting security as it is broadly understood. In the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the First Republic of Poland had been crossed out from the political map of the Old Continent.

In 1918, following 123 years of bondage, Poland regained its longed-for independence. Yet the safety of the Second Republic was based on unstable foundations. The Weimar Republic and later the Third Reich on the one side and Bolshevik Russia and later the Soviet Union on the other did not accept the Treaty of Versailles and attempted to revise it. Cooperation, especially military cooperation, between the two countries was directed against Poland. In September of 1939 the Second Republic of Poland fell under the occupation of the Third Reich and the Soviet Union. At the end of the Second World War, Poland was under the influence of its eastern neighbor.

Following a regime transformation in 1989, the Third Republic of Poland became a sovereign nation. For the first time in history there are no territorial conflicts with its neighbors, although not all relations are fully satisfactory. Poland is a member of the European Union and NATO. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization guarantees protection from traditional threats, although the regulations of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty give cause for reflection. The EU, on the other hand, protects Poland – to an extent – from the outcomes of globalization processes. Terrorism and its derivatives are a significant threat to international security, causing justified unease throughout the world.

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(1918–2008), red. A. D. Rotfeld i A. W. Torkunow, Warszawa 2010, pgs. 669–688.

<sup>86</sup> More on the topic: R. Borkowski, *Terroryzm ponowoczesny. Studium z antropologii polityki*, Toruń 2006; B. Bolechów, *Terroryzm w świecie podwubiegunowym*, Toruń 2003; M. Sageman, *Sieci terroru*, Kraków 2008; M. Levitt, *Hamas*, Kraków 2008.

Michal Pružinský, Peter Varhol'ák

# SELECTED SLOVAK AND EUROPEAN SECURITY CONTEXTS

## INTRODUCTION

Security is a broad concept. The aspect of security is linked with its opposites: the semantic concept of risk (or threat), accident, dangerous occurrence, victim, loss, damage, level of damage. Related concepts are those of risk, the level of risk, defense, protection from threats, prevention, etc. Both the term 'security' and the term 'threat' have a wide range of meanings. Security is associated with the relevant data, information, knowledge, experience, training, procedures,, and strategies for the prevention and minimization of threats and the losses incurred. Security is linked to measures, costs, and expenditure, which depend on the size and scale of the threat. Security, threat assessment, prevention, the costs have a logical relation. The level, structure, and dynamics of threats in space and time should be adequately responded to by methods of security strategy, and the nature of their applications.

## THE ISSUE OF SECURITY

The individual aspects of security from a structural point of view can be assessed in different ways. The security of mankind but also the individual can be generally subdivided as follows:

- Against threats from space — for example, comets or asteroids. In the period from 16 July to 22 July 1994 the core of the Comet Shoemaker-Levy 9 broke into more than 20 parts and hit the southern hemisphere of Jupiter, which allowed the first direct observation of a collision of two celestial bodies in the solar system.<sup>1</sup> In the following years, astronomers noted the impact of this celestial body on Jupiter, one of the craters was the size of the Earth.<sup>2</sup> Up to 900 asteroids have a diameter greater than 1 km, while a potentially dangerous one is 990 m (data according to the statistics of the Minor Planet Center in Cambridge, MA, USA).<sup>3</sup>

*“In particular, asteroids near the planet are in themselves a big potential for science. But they are not only for science but also for the normal life of people. Although it may seem that they still are the greatest threat to the existence of mankind and all life on Earth. And maybe sometime in the future they will become a rich source of minerals and the launch pad for exploring the universe.”<sup>4</sup>*

- Against threats of natural forces on the planet Earth. The earthquake and tsunami in March 2011 in Japan killed thousands of people and damaged the nuclear reactors in Fukushima, with the result that hydrogen escaped into the atmosphere and dangerous radioactive substances polluted the sea. After the reactor explosion four Japanese prefectures were contaminated by radioactivity. Many people were evacuated. Several countries halted imports of foodstuffs from Northern Japan. Japan, according to the experts of the IAEA, underestimated the threat posed by earthquakes and tsunamis for nuclear installations in the country. In reply, the Government of Japan stressed that it would propose a special independent authority, which would in the future, oversee the crisis measures and prevention, and was not under the control of the Ministry of the Economy, as its predecessor had been, which is not a suitable situation.<sup>5</sup>
- Against human behavior:
  - Against the violence and destruction that can result from the use of nuclear, biological, chemical,<sup>6</sup> seismic and other weapons in possible future conflicts.

<sup>1</sup> ZEM, MARS A JUPITER. [online]. (Cited 31.5.2011). Available on the Internet: [http://www.wesmir.weblahko.sk/ZEM-\\_MARS-A-JUPITER.html](http://www.wesmir.weblahko.sk/ZEM-_MARS-A-JUPITER.html).

<sup>2</sup> ŠKREKA, M. 2009. Zrážka s Jupiterom. [online]. 22.7.2009. (Cited 3.6.2011). Available on the Internet: <http://astrin.planetarium.sk/zobraz.php?id=64>.

<sup>3</sup> HUSÁRIK, M. 2008. *ASTEROIDY*. Astronomický ústav SAV, Tatranská Lomnica. [online]. 2008. (Cited 3.6.2011). Available on the Internet: [http://www.astro.sk/~choc/08\\_casu/zbornik/husarik/husarik.pdf](http://www.astro.sk/~choc/08_casu/zbornik/husarik/husarik.pdf).

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> MAAE: Japonsko podcenilo hrozbu tsunami. In *24hod.sk*. [online]. 1. júna 2011. (Cited 3.6.2011). Available on the Internet: <http://www.24hod.sk/maae-japonsko-podcenilo-hrozbu-tsunami-cl162801.html>.

<sup>6</sup> DURDIK, J. – GÁFRIK, A. – PULIŠ, P. – SUŠKO, M. 2005. *Zbrane hromadného ničenia – aktuálna bezpečnostná hrozba*. MO SR, Inštitút bezpečnostných a obranných štúdií MO SR. Bratislava. 2005. [online]. (Cited 3.6.2011). Available on the Internet: <http://www.mosr.sk/index.php?page=67>.



The nuclear powers are: the USA, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, the People's Republic of China,<sup>7</sup> Israel, India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (it is possible that atomic weapons are owned by the South African Republic and Taiwan). It is known that intercontinental ballistic missiles are owned by the USA, Russia, France and the United Kingdom, and probably by the People's Republic of China. The military atomic programs of other States are unclear. North Korea has an advanced nuclear program as does Iran.

- Against reckless mismanagement of resources, whether human, financial, material, energy, food, water, soil, forests, etc.
- Against unforeseen consequences of human activities. An example of this was an accident involving two submarines. In February the French submarine *Le Triomphant* and the British submarine *Vanguard* collided with each other. They are responsible for the national security of their respective countries. *Le Triomphant* is capable of carrying 16 nuclear missiles, and *Vanguard* may have in its inventory 48 of them.<sup>8</sup> Submarines have sunk. The Russian submarine *Kursk* sank on the bottom of the of Barents sea on 12 August 2000; all sailors of the crew perished.<sup>9</sup> On April 9, 1963, the nuclear submarine *Thresher* sank also. This military submarine crashed to the bottom of the Wilkenson Trench in Atlantic Ocean during its training. All 129 US Navy sailors on board perished.<sup>10</sup>
- Harm to the natural planet, causing an increase in the greenhouse effect, the loss of biodiversity, pollution of the environment, etc.) before the genetic capabilities of man, restrictions, limits, mutations and genetic modification of products, environmental impacts caused by man (chemical, agricultural, energy, industrial production, e.g. processing of waste, etc.).
- Against accidents, whether due to improper or hazardous work practices (falling under the remit of Health and Safety) or accidents at home or while travelling.

According to the results of our survey,<sup>11</sup> respondents assume the biggest threats to be waste (20.5%), industry (20.2%), mining (19.9%), energy supply (15.6%), transport (15.3%) and finally agricultural production (8.5%).

<sup>7</sup> ŠIPEKY, M. 2004. *Definovanie asymetrie*. 2.11.2004. [online]. (Cited 3.6.2011) Available on the Internet: [http://www.valka.cz/clanek\\_10821.html](http://www.valka.cz/clanek_10821.html).

<sup>8</sup> SZALAI, P. 2009. *Francúzi a Briti tajili atómovú nehodu v Atlantiku*. 16.2.2009. [online]. (Cited 3. 6. 2011). The article was published in the newspaper SME daily. Available on the Internet: <http://www.sme.sk/c/4311923/francuzi-a-briti-tajili-atomovu-nehodu-v-atlantiku.html>.

<sup>9</sup> BÉZA, M. 2000. *Ruské ponorky*. K-141 *Kursk*. [online]. (Cited 3.6.2011). Available on the Internet: <http://www.military.cz/russia/navy/submarin/oscarclass/kursk/kursk.htm>.

<sup>10</sup> *Námorné katastrofy*. 9.10.2008. [online]. (Cited 4.6.2011). Available on the Internet: <http://www.priestor.estranky.sk/clanky/tragedie-zeme/namor-ne-katastrofy>.

<sup>11</sup> VARHOLÁK, P. 2010. Vybrané environmentálne hodnotenia pre 21. storočie. In: *Týždeň vedy a umenia na Pedagogickej fakulte Katolíckej univerzity v Ružomberku. Zborník prednášok z týždňa európskej vedy*. Ružomberok 29.11.–3.12. Ružomberok : VERBUM, 2011. pp. 156–166.

From the perspective of the threats caused by human in our survey (the differences are not so great)<sup>12</sup> our respondents viewed the largest: pollution of world drinking water and ozone depletion (9.95%), air pollution (9.83%), the threat of the disappearance of organisms and biocenoses (9.66%), the greenhouse effect (9.53%), radioactive contamination of the natural environment (9.21%), acid rain (9.19%), destruction of natural ecosystems (9.11%), pollution and erosion of the soil (8.83%), over salting (7.53) and wetness, soil, and finally weathering (6.87%). Respondents considered the greatest natural threats to be floods (20%), followed by avalanches (18%), wind (17%), earthquake (16%), tsunami (15%) and finally volcanic activity (14%).<sup>13</sup> It has been asked whether it is possible to ensure the safety of countries and national institutions, by accepting a measure of outsourcing and privatization. The extreme case of privatization is that of national defense, and is a controversial proposal in the light of future developments, threats, turmoil, and the effectiveness of security needed to counteract this. The privatization of security at the level of individual countries and alliances on the one hand, and, on the other hand, organizations with a global scope, for example, terrorist groups, have led to the privatization of wars and military conflicts.

*“The role of private security and military organizations as a tool of intervention in conflict scenarios increased constantly and exponentially after the Cold War, in many cases, a return to order and stability in conflict zones and [a means of carrying out] peacekeeping operations and [distributing] humanitarian aids. Nevertheless, its real contribution to ensuring peace is questionable”.*<sup>14</sup>

The phenomenon of the privatization of war has historic precedents and once again is becoming popular

*“Privatization of war was the objective reality of political developments. Globalization, information technology, democracy and devolution of power were the cause of the privatization of war. The trend towards the privatization of war should be a cause of concern for global, national and personal security”.*<sup>15</sup>

Decentralization of power in the 21<sup>st</sup> century shows the Table 1.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> MACIAS, A. 2011. *Privatization of Security: a Strategy for Peace or War?* [online]. (Cited 4.6.2011) Available on the Internet: <http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/maciaswpaper.pdf>.

<sup>15</sup> YUZH, Zhang – HUIPING, Liu 2010. On the Basic Reasons of Private War. In *Canadian Center of Science and Education. Journal of Politics and Law*, vol. 3, no. 2; September 2010. pp. 134–138. (Cited 4.6.2011) [online]. Available on the Internet: <http://ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/jpl/article/view/7195/5542>

Table 1 Devolution of power in the 21<sup>st</sup> century

	Privacy	Members of the Public	The third sector
Super State	Transnational Corporation	Intergovernmental organizations	Non-governmental organizations
Country	Domestic corporations	The Central Government in 21 <sup>st</sup> century	National organizations
Sub-national organization	Local business	Local Government	Local groups

Source: YUZH, Zhang – HUIPING, Liu 2010. On the Basic Reasons of Private War. In *Canadian Center of Science and Education. Journal of Politics and Law*, vol. 3, no. 2; September 2010. pp. 134 – 138. (Cited 4. 6. 2011) [online]. Available on the Internet: <http://ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/jpl/article/view/7195/5542>.

Possible approaches to the view of the relationship and the focus of safety-related systems in response to a post in aggregate form<sup>16</sup> are illustrated in figure 1.

## EUROPEAN SECURITY

In terms of European security strategy from 2003 threats to European security include: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, environmental degradation, climate change, limited access to energy resources, the threat of European energy crisis, failure or collapse of computer technologies, technological accidents, natural disasters, epidemics, or pandemics and humanitarian crisis, terrorism, regional conflicts, the collapse of state authority, organized crime, an ageing population in the countries of the EU, illegal migration, the threat to the European social model due to the influence of the unforeseen consequences of globalization, the radicalization of society from ethnic and social causes, corruption and money laundering.<sup>17</sup>

Table 2 shows the threat to European security.

<sup>16</sup> VEBER, J. a kol. 2010. *Management kvality, environmentu a bezpečnosti práce. Legislativa, systémy, metody, praxe*. 2. aktualizované vydání. Praha : Management Press, 2010. BALABÁN, M. 2009. Vize evropské bezpečnosti v globálním kontextu (reflexe bezpečnostních analýz a prognóz ve světě, v EU a v ČR 2003 – 2009). In *Bezpečnost a obrana v evropském kontextu. Univerzita obrany. Ústav strategických a obranných studií. Sborník z mezinárodní konference*. Brno : IDET, 6.–7. května 2009. Libor FRANK, Petr HLAVÁČEK (eds.), 2009.

<sup>17</sup> BALABÁN, M. 2009.




Figure 1 Relations, and the focus of safety-related systems

Source: custom processing

Table 2 Threats of European security

Threats <sup>18</sup>	Trends and evaluation <sup>19</sup>	Evaluation by the results of questionnaire survey <sup>20</sup>
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	Slowing their spread, continuation of the persistence of threats from Iran, terrorist organizations and their smuggling	15.4%
Degradation of the environment climate change	Global limits are exceeded, particularly in climate change, harm to the nitrogen cycle and loss of biodiversity, degradation continues,	14.2%
Limited access to energy resources, the threat of European energy crisis	The situation after the shutting-down of nuclear power plants; this is complicated by the possible knock-on effect of German plans to phase out nuclear energy by 2022; this may lead to an increase in prices and higher dependency on Russia	13.6%
The failure or collapse of computer technologies	Cyber-attacks create difficult situations, they are beginning to be seen as an act of war,, the case of Wikileaks; virtual network as a Trojan horse, problems affecting national security.	13.5%
Technological accidents	Extensive projects with aggressive investigation of financial resources from the calculation of damages resulting from accidents.	13.4%
Natural disasters	Nature is more powerful than man	12.5%
The epidemic, or pandemic	The case of E-coli is a warning, showing possible multidimensional threats (terrorism, mutations, hygiene)	10.1%
Humanitarian crisis	The world reacts too late, often ineffectively, and sometimes not at all, there are many victims; sometimes humanitarian crises are man-made.	7.3%

<sup>18</sup> Selected from: BALABÁN, M. 2009.

<sup>19</sup> Own project of authors (see below).

<sup>20</sup> The first eight items are sorted in descending order according to the percentage of respondents of survey of 58 Master degree students in eight teams (see: VARHOĽÁK, P.: Vybrané environmentálne hodnotenia pre 21. storočie. In: Týždeň vedy a umenia na Pedagogickej fakulte Katolíckej univerzity v Ružomberku. Zborník prednášok z týždňa európskej vedy. Ružomberok 29.11.–3. 12. Ružomberok: VERBUM, 2011. S. 156–166).

Terrorism	Despite countermeasures by governments, the problem of terrorism does not lessen, the asymmetries persist	
Regional conflicts	Persist, without any decrease in the intensity of the threat	
The collapse of State authority	The huge deficit results in popular protests in countries such as Greece and wars in African countries	
Organized crime	Dealing with organized crime sometimes may be beyond the capabilities of state bodies.	
An ageing population in the countries of the EU	There is a definite trend, which may be limited by immigration; this, however, can have other negative effects.	
Illegal migration	The trend is increasing, challenging the Schengen principles	
The threat to the European social model (social security)	The trend reinforces social inequality, there no reduction in unemployment but rather a deepening of the problem; competition is intensifying, and the mission of non-governmental organizations is more socially questionable.	
Radicalization of part of society from ethnic and social causes	The Trend is increasing, and the situation is deteriorating; measures to counteract this trend are inadequate and solutions are inefficient.	

Processed according to the: BALABÁN, M. 2009. Vize evropské bezpečnosti v globálním kontextu (reflexe bezpečnostních analýz a prognóz ve světě, v EU a v ČR 2003–2009). In *Bezpečnost a obrana v evropském kontextu. Univerzita obrany. Ústav strategických a obranných studií. Sborník z mezinárodní konference*. Brno : IDET, 6.–7. května 2009. Libor FRANK, Petr HLAVÁČEK (eds.), 2009.

Source of authors: VARHOLÁK, P. 2010. Vybrané environmentálne hodnotenia pre 21. storočie. In: *Týždeň vedy a umenia na Pedagogickej fakulte Katolíckej univerzity v Ružomberku. Zborník prednášok z týždňa európskej vedy*. Ružomberok 29. 11. – 3. 12. Ružomberok : VERBUM, 2011. ISBN 978-80-8084-682-4. pp. 156 – 166.

From the point of view of energy security issues in the security strategies for low energy sources can be considered as a global challenge to mankind this century. The earthquake and tsunami in March 2011 in Japan caused a nuclear disaster in Fukushima, which greatly affected the nuclear energy situation all over the world, but in particular in Japan itself. Germany will close all of its 17 nuclear power plants at the latest by the year 2022, as agreed by the coalition of Chancellor

Angela Merkel.<sup>21</sup> This can cause a knock-on effect, followed by problems in the procurement of energy for existing prices. The industrial sector has reservations regarding this policy. According to the President of the Federal Association of German industry, Hans-Peter Keitela, it risks weakening Germany as an industrial nation; car manufacturer and head of Daimler Dieter Zetsche has evoked the possibility of financial risk; energy group RWE is considering a legal defense. The coalition has also agreed to speed up the construction of new power plants using fossil fuels, energy storage and transmission networks. According to news agency Reuters the country intends to reduce the consumption of electricity by about 10% by 2020, and double the percentage of renewable energy in the energy use of the country from 17 percent (the approximate current figure) to 35 percent.<sup>22</sup> According to Reuters Agency, the Slovak Prime Minister stated that extensive decommissioning of nuclear power stations in Europe on the basis of a possible EU decision would lead to a huge increase in gas prices.<sup>23</sup>

In table 3 are some of the characteristics of possible strategies. Various combinations of privatization are possible. It is emblematic that most countries in war conflicts now have often due to oil and natural gas, but also water and other scarce or valuable raw materials.

Table 3 Matrix of strategic approaches to the source of energy

Combined strategies	Resource strategies	Priority	Shortcomings	Threats To	Opportunities
Slovak Republic, EU ecological trends	Combustion of wood	Availability depends on the quality of the soil	The geographical restriction	Felling forests, erosion	Sustainability, expansion
Slovak Republic, EU, People's Republic of China, replacing kernel	The combustion of coal, etc	A global view of the availability	The geographical restriction	Greenhouse effect, the breakdown in hundreds of years	Use in chemistry

<sup>21</sup> Nemecko končí s jadrom, zatvorí všetky jadrové elektrárne? ČTK. 30. mája 2011. [online]. (Cited 30.5.2011) Available on the Internet: [http://spravy.pravda.sk/nemecko-konci-s-jadrom-zatvori-vsetky-jadrove-elektrarne-pmi-/sk\\_svet.asp?c=A110530\\_083222\\_sk\\_svet\\_p23](http://spravy.pravda.sk/nemecko-konci-s-jadrom-zatvori-vsetky-jadrove-elektrarne-pmi-/sk_svet.asp?c=A110530_083222_sk_svet_p23).

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Grékom miliardové injekcie nepomôžu, tvrdí Radičová. 30.5.2011. [online]. (Cited 30.5.2011) SITA, TASR. Available on the Internet: <http://ekonomika.sme.sk/c/5915446/grekom-miliardove-injekcie-nepomozu-tvrdi-radicova.html>.

States of the EU, in the future People's Republic of China, North America	Combustion of petroleum products, natural gas, shale oil.	High usability, high rate of indispensability (for aviation)	The geographical restriction	Greenhouse effect, limited availability, pollution of surface water, the seas,	Use in chemistry, more efficient combined technologies (cars)
Slovak Republic, France, USA, Russia, Iran, Japan	"Burning" of breakdown products	Availability, declared efficiency	High intensity production	The danger of leakage of radioactivity, pollution, waste disposal, an attractive terrorist target, tsunamis, earthquakes, technological and space requirements	More efficient and safer technologies, solve energy storage
People's Republic Of China, Austria	The combustion of biogas	Availability, geographic distribution	Initial investment	Technology and space requirements	Sustainability, usability
Slovak Republic, Czech Republic, EU, Austria, People's Republic of China	Hydro power	Availability varies with the weather	The geographical restriction, investment	Technology and space requirements	Sustainability, maintenance of water
Austria, Maritime States	Wind energy	Availability is dependent on the wind	The geographical restriction, investment	Technology and space requirements	Sustainability, resolving to save energy
Austria, ecological trends	Solar energy on Earth	Availability is dependent on the weather	Investments	Technology and space requirements	Sustainability, resolving to save energy
Scientific trends and visions, satellites	Solar energy from the cosmos	Universal availability	The geographical restriction, investment	Technology and space requirements	Sustainability, resolving to save energy



Scientific trends and ideas	Thermo-nuclear energy	Energy bomb, potential availability	Dozens of years of investment	Unknown	Unknown
Unknown	Other	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown

Source: custom processing.

### SLOVAK SECURITY IN THE EURO-ATLANTIC FRAMEWORK

The issue of the security of the Slovak Republic is conditional on a historical dimension, experience and knowledge of the elites, public opinion, moral and ethical orientation, the strength of their own State, economy, law, morality, etc. In the State administration and territorial self-government the following general shortcomings were identified:<sup>24</sup>

- the system of state administration and territorial self government is insufficiently effective and transparent,
- the heads of staff are have inadequate managerial ability and other skills that are necessary for executive management,
- the lack of cooperation of the ministries,
- the low level of communication and cooperation between the central authorities of State administration and territorial self-government,
- the misunderstanding of procedural control (procedural control = the focus on the causes that lead to the result; functional management = focus on results),
- lack of financial motivation of human resources,
- Insufficient education and training of human resources.

Problems in improving the quality of institutional capacities can be seen in:

1. lack of financial motivation of human resources,
2. lack of education and training of human resources,
3. lack of optimization of the activities carried out by human resources.

Slovak Prime Minister Iveta Radičová, during her visit to Slovenia pointed to the fact that the economic crisis is far from over, and that the Eurozone and other EU member countries are looking for the appropriate tools and resources to spur economic growth and address its implications. In interviews with the Slovenian

<sup>24</sup> Národný strategický referenčný rámec Slovenskej republiky na roky 2007–2013. Ministerstvo výstavby a regionálneho rozvoja Slovenskej republiky. Bratislava, 29. jún 2007. [online]. (Cited 30. 5. 2011) Available on the Internet: <http://www.bing.com/search?q=N%C3%A1rodn%C3%BD+strategick%C3%BD+referen%C4%8Dn%C3%BD+r%C3%A1mec+Slovenskej+republiky+na+roky+2007+%E2%80%93+2013.+Ministerstvo+v%C3%BDstavby+a+region%C3%A1neho+rozvoja+Slovenskej+republiky.&src=IE-SearchBox&FORM=IE8SRC>. p. 27.

press she indicated that citizens did not realize the gravity of the problems facing the EU and the Eurozone. She further stated:

*"Pushing the expectations, which I'm afraid, in the coming years simply will not be able to be fulfilled."*

It is therefore necessary to consolidate public finances, or implement painful reforms for the citizens

*"If we do, the crisis will have a much more serious impact. It is our duty, despite the misunderstanding and often times the resistance of the public to promote these measures seriously."<sup>25</sup>*

In view of the defense of the State, the concept of Defense (EU, NATO), which alone has the power to defend the sovereignty, the nature of the State Constitution, and the lives and property of people, the situation is not simple, while the importance of security in the current turbulent environment is growing:

*"...under the pressure of current security threats, in the event of future large-scale crises and conflicts, it will be just the armed forces, which, as the military tool of crisis management, in the case of the failure of diplomatic efforts, will represent the most effective means to deal with the external security problems, as well as the prevention and elimination of security crises and conflicts in today's world. And even though the security risks and threats by State or non-State actors can never be removed or at least eliminated completely, the adoption of effective and efficient measures with as much funding as possible reduces the negative effects of possible security crises, including armed conflicts, for the developed States of the world, including the Slovak Republic."<sup>26</sup>*

Questions and problems relating to our defense should be assessed by experts in this domain, taking into account the analysis of domestic and foreign relations.

It is necessary to refuse further "reforms", which basically almost always meant a reduction in military numbers of the area without any concept, only in order to meet political orders<sup>27</sup>:

- Various, diverse, fast and expensive reorganization – Models of the Armed Force 2010, 2015, 2020, as the new minister (12) and three in one parliamentary term, it is faster and better "redeployment", but can be incomplete.<sup>28</sup>
- None of the existing text of the "models" - Model of the Armed Forces 2010, 2015 and 2020 – are realistic from the financial point of view, as their resources allotted were significantly lower than originally planned, creating

<sup>25</sup> Grékom miliardové injekcie nepomôžu, tvrdí Radičová. 30. 5. 2011.

<sup>26</sup> IVANČÍK, R. 2011. *Financovanie obrany v kríze*. [online]. (Cited 2. 6. 2011) Available on the Internet: [http://cena.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Transatlanticke-listy-1\\_2011.pdf](http://cena.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Transatlanticke-listy-1_2011.pdf).

<sup>27</sup> ONDREJCSÁK, R. 2011. *Strategické hodnotenie obrany: Kde sme a kam smerujeme?* [online]. (Cited 2.6.2011) Available on the Internet: [http://cena.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Transatlanticke-listy-1\\_2011.pdf](http://cena.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Transatlanticke-listy-1_2011.pdf)

<sup>28</sup> MIKLUŠ, M. 2011. *Armáda je v ?!* 24.04.2011. [online]. (Cited 2. 6. 2011) Available on the Internet: <http://www.despiteborders.com/clanky/data/upimages/miklus2.pdf>

a huge gap between the resources invested in defense and what had been planned.<sup>29</sup>

- It has been known since 2005 that the army will have problems, only for this fact to be kept 'under the lid'.<sup>30</sup>
- So far, the biggest problems – in addition to the frequent lack of systematization – were just unrealistic financial projections and, consequently, unrealistic planning.<sup>31</sup>
- In addition to the progressive reduction of budgets for the army, there was a very rapid and extremely massive staff release of the most experienced soldiers (often even against their will), and the freezing of resources to the armament of troops, including its modernization.<sup>32</sup>
- It is not the first time that such a process has been implemented by the Slovak Republic (preparation of strategy documents, preparation of Model of the Armed Forces of the SR 2010 and 2015), but is this current model acceptable?<sup>33</sup>
- The Army Joint-Chiefs of Staff lost the competence particularly in the area of actual (not paper) decision-making on financing and procurement of equipment necessary for the performance of its tasks.<sup>34</sup>
- These competencies were taken over by the officials of the Ministry of Defense – transferred to the Minister of Defense, and the head of the Ministry Staff, which means that decisions are often made without the consent of the army.
- It is also necessary to state that defense cuts result in resources for the army being spread too thin.<sup>35</sup>
- The first impression given is of a relaxed and sometimes unprofessional approach on the part of those politicians responsible for national defense, and of lack of understanding on the part of citizens as to the desirability of the existence of a national army and its membership of NATO, the EU and the fulfillment of its commitments.
- As the system does not function, the integrated Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, bears the main responsibility for solving the long-term crisis in the military.
- It is also necessary to ask what responsibility the Security Council (the former Council of Defense of the State), Committee on Defense and the Security

<sup>29</sup> ONDREJCSÁK, R. 2011.

<sup>30</sup> MIKLUŠ, M. 2011.

<sup>31</sup> ONDREJCSÁK, R. 2011.

<sup>32</sup> MIKLUŠ, M. 2011.

<sup>33</sup> BARTKO, F. 2011. *Strategické hodnotenie obrany: prostriedok na vyriešenie problémov OS SR?* [online]. (Cited 2.6.2011) Available on the Internet: [http://cenaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Transatlanticke-listy-1\\_2011.pdf](http://cenaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Transatlanticke-listy-1_2011.pdf).

<sup>34</sup> MIKLUŠ, M. 2011.

<sup>35</sup> MIKLUŠ, M. 2011.

Council of the SR, but also of the Government of the Slovak Republic have in this domain.

- Defense is not only a matter of the Armed Forces (as is often simplified and wrongly understood, and as has also been presented within the objectives and procedures of the SHO (Strategic Defense Review)), but is the responsibility of the State and all its components.<sup>36</sup> Thus, this will be a real means of addressing the SHO (strategic defense review) of the current situation, when not only are the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic in a critical situation, but the question of the security system of the State and the credibility of the Slovak Republic within the framework of NATO and the EU has not yet been answered, and it is this credibility which is rapidly decreasing due to the failure of the commitments undertaken by the State.
- It is perhaps also worth examining the level of preparedness and the ability of the competent representatives of the State (legislative and executive), who bear responsibility for defense and security.<sup>37</sup>
- We agree that the security policy and defense of the Slovak Republic was psychologically perceived as isolated from the rest of the world, and the country was perceived as a "small state".<sup>38</sup>
- It would be of benefit to inform the public of the exact purpose of the armed forces.
- After more than 18 years, we have reached a critical point and that cannot be overcome in the short term and in this and other extreme deficit years.
- Defense (the Army) in the Slovak Republic is not sufficiently important, not even from the perspective of the National Government the Security Council and the Ministry of Defense), despite international commitments and promises made to NATO and the EU.
- A huge issue is crisis communication in the framework of solutions of non-military threats (System of warnings to the population, communication between the stakeholders of the integrated rescue system (IZS), Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic and crisis staffs at all levels, technical equipment), the coordination of the deployment and management of the forces and means of IZS and Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic, the ability of the Government authorities to analyze in particular, threats to the population, to prepare contingency plans, and respond properly to the management of crises after their the emergence.<sup>39</sup>
- The immediate cause was the economic crisis, which forced severe restrictions and drastic cuts in public spending, affecting defense and requiring reforms to the structure of the armed forces.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> BARTKO, F. 2011.

<sup>37</sup> MIKLUŠ, M. 2011.

<sup>38</sup> ONDREJCSÁK, R. 2011.

<sup>39</sup> BARTKO, F. 2011.

<sup>40</sup> VALÁŠEK, T. 2011. *Obranné reformy v NATO*. [online]. (Cited 2.6.2011) Available on the Internet: [http://cena.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Transatlanticke-listy-1\\_2011.pdf](http://cena.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Transatlanticke-listy-1_2011.pdf).

- There is also a lack of coordination between individual member states of NATO. With a few exceptions, each country examines its situation in isolation.
- There is no guarantee that NATO virtually disappear from some important types of experience or technology.
- Over 80% of all military equipment purchased (the allies) from domestic firms, only 13% of the orders is not open to foreign suppliers and 95% of all military equipment is owned by the States, not the common property.
- Even though military operations take place today mostly under the control of NATO, the EU or the United Nations, each country educates soldiers virtually on its own.
- Among 1.6 million troops in the European countries of NATO, only a few thousand serve in integrated international units. The remaining armed forces are formed by the government in a way that has essentially remained unaffected for centuries: the emphasis is on maximum autonomy.
- War is fought today virtually only on the basis of coalitions or alliances.
- After the whole of the successful reforms in the years 2000–2005, since 2006 the Armed Forces have not received support from successive Prime Ministers. For the first time in the history of the independence of the Slovak Republic, not only was there a reduction in defense spending, but also a gradual change in perception of the armed forces on the part of the public. The comment by the then Prime Minister, that the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic are costly and unnecessary, contributed to this.<sup>41</sup>
- Frank Boland – “Status of the Slovak army is especially critical,” NATO membership is not free and therefore the Alliance continues to set aside its request for the defense of the resources to the amount of 2% of GDP.
- Lack of courage of the leaders, and managers, unjustified secrecy, lobbying pressures, and lack of vision. Contributed greatly to the current state.
- Military education been affected by the liquidation of several academies.
- A significant part of research & development, testing and repair was eliminated.

A search for a plan for the development of the security of Slovakia in the Alliance framework is on the agenda. The following issues have been raised:

- An analysis of the current situation and a summit of Nato officials and states would certainly provide a necessary and positive input into the issue of neglected security. Detailed comprehensive professional unbiased and non-political analysis across departments is very necessary. The question is whether it is even feasible. If not, the situation, in principle, cannot be changed for the better. Despite this risk, the analysis must be made.
- On the basis of the analyses, which should not last long, because the Act is to be as soon as possible, it is necessary to adopt clear strategic decisions on the highest level and convince senior management of the State, ministries

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<sup>41</sup> IVANČÍK, R. 2011.

(including the Ministry of Finance), public administration and self-government, and of course the population, because they will pay, that they should pay the cost of this.

- While political marketing thinks about short-term goals, marketing concerning the security of the state and prevention is a recent phenomenon,
- For the above reasons it is necessary to substantially improve the system of communication in all relevant levels and areas.
- Of all changes that need to be made, the most crucial is to introduce transparency regarding the flow of money and information.
- Substantial conclusions deriving from the strategic decisions should be enshrined in the management documents (Constitution, laws, a statement of the Government, etc.). The performance of related tasks should be controllable by citizens on the basis of deductions of relevant structures.
- One of the main components of the solution should be a binding intention of the Executive to commit in justifiable terms a necessary financial budget. The remedy does not only lie in the earmarking of larger funds for security. This is a necessary condition, but is not in itself sufficient.
- How much money should be spent and for what purpose should not depend on dictates, business plans or political marketing but rather on honest analysis and a minimum of consent across the relevant political and professional markets.

*“In the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance funding at the level of 2% of the GDP of the country is regarded as sufficient. This means that the more resources the Government and Parliament set aside in favor of the Ministry of Defense, and thus also for the benefit of the armed forces, thus providing an improved defense, the more State can ensure that its armed forces achieve the highest possible level of capabilities. Of course, this is true if the allocated resources are used economically, efficiently and effectively, in accordance with the set tasks, objectives and priorities of the sector, country, group and in accordance with the applicable legislation”.*<sup>42</sup>

- Yet the state managed to build a professional army, however tiny and weak. The need for sufficient financial security stems from the following argument:

*“In the case of the Slovak Republik the economics of defence are a challenge not only because of the defense of its territory and security assistance to the civilian population in the event of natural disasters or industrial disasters, but also due to the implementation of international commitments and efforts to continue the reconstruction of the armed forces of the Slovak Republic towards relatively small, but professional and modernly equipped armed forces with sufficient combat potential, which are able to meet the requirements for compatibility and interoperability with the armed forces of the allies”.*<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

- It is questionable whether the entire breadth of the issues of security, defense and protection in conditions of modern threats and contexts has been taken into account, namely that this issue combines factors of supranational and national defense. The question is whether the new streamlined and efficient authority, with sufficient competence, connected to the sources of scientific and scientific-technical intelligence information, could be formed, which would with time coordinate the issues comprehensively and ensure adequate, uniform and secure communication between the individual departments, public administration and Government.

*“The white paper, in so far as it is to fulfill its purpose, cannot be “only” a document of the MOD, it must be a document with which go along the whole (or majority) of the political spectrum of the State, and which will have a binding character for shaping and implementing not only the security policy of the State against the outside world, but especially for all the components of the State, which by law (or by common consent) entails obligations and tasks in the field of security and defense of the Slovak Republic. This means the document is approved by the National Council of the Slovak Republic and then it is valid for the entire Slovak Republic. The white paper must be a document also for ordinary citizens, who also have their obligations and responsibilities towards the defense of the State”.*<sup>44</sup>

To respect the status of security and defense and the related financing and funding science and research.

Table 4 illustrates the relationship between GDP (gross domestic product) of Slovakia, and expenditure on defense and expenditure on science and research. In theory and in practice there is a known link between the costs and investments for defense and security, on the one hand, and the costs and investments for science and research in general (and defense and security in particular). The connection is confirmed well in our case.

Chart 1 shows the relations between the GDP, expenditure on defense and security, science and research, as indicated in table 4. It is obvious that GDP has increased but expenditure on defense and security and science and research as a percentage of GDP shows a constantly decreasing trend. Correlation (by Excel function of Corel) between GDP growth for the defense spending shows this decrease. The decline in defense spending as a percentage of GDP for the years 1993 to 2011 represents a value of -0.8658, which is a very high negative value (the maximum should not exceed -1).

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<sup>44</sup> BARTKO, F. 2011.

Table 4 cost of GDP (gross domestic product) of Slovakia, and expenditure on defense and expenditure on science and research

Year	GDP in the Bill. EUR <sup>45</sup>	Defense in% GDP <sup>46</sup>	Science and research in% GDP <sup>47</sup>	Expenditure on defense in the Bill. EUR	Expenditure on Science and research in the Bill. EUR
1993	17.022	2.34	1.45	0.398315	0.246819
1994	18.081	2.31	0.96	0.417671	0.173578
1995	26.11	2.51	0.98	0.655361	0.255878
1996	28.205	2.31	0.97	0.651536	0.273589
1997	29.393	2.13	1.13	0.626071	0.332141
1998	30.698	1.93	0.82	0.592471	0.251724
1999	30.704	1.7	0.68	0.521968	0.208787
2000	31.136	1.62	0.65	0.504403	0.202384
2001	32.191	1.61	0.64	0.518275	0.206022
2002	33.725	1.8	0.57	0.60705	0.192233
2003	35.332	1.77	0.58	0.625376	0.204926
2004	37.173	1.79	0.51	0.665397	0.189582
2005	39.614	1.7	0.51	0.673438	0.202031
2006	47.451	1.62	0.49	0.768706	0.23251
2007	47.451	1.51	0.46	0.71651	0.218275
2008	50.481	1.49	0.47	0.752167	0.237261
2009	48,068	1.49	0.48	0.716213	0.230726
2010	49.19	1.26		0.619794	
2011	51.885	1.08		0.560358	
2012		0.99			
2013		0.91			


Source: Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, Institute of Financial Policy of the Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic, the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. And the sources of the footnotes seen from table 4 and calculated in the last two columns.

<sup>45</sup> Ekonomika Slovenska 2011. REÁLNA EKONOMIKA. Vývoj ukazovateľov reálnej ekonomiky Slovenskej republiky v období od roku 2005 do roku 2011. EuroEkonom.sk ekonomická príručka moderného ekonóma. [online]. (Cited 2.6.2011) Available on the Internet: <http://www.euroekonom.sk/ekonomika/ekonomika-sr/ekonomika-slovenska-2011>; Ekonomické indikátory. Hrubý domáci produkt (HDP) v rokoch 1993–2011 (mil. EUR). [online]. (Cited 2.6.2011) Available on the Internet: <http://openiazoch.zoznam.sk/zivot/makro/ukazovatele.asp?iid=HDP&year=ALL>.

<sup>46</sup> IVANČÍK, R. 2011.

<sup>47</sup> VINCÚR, P. 2009. Základné determinanty sociálno-ekonomického rozvoja v dlhodobom horizonte. Podiel výdavkov na vedu a výskum za HDP v SR za roky 1993. – Zdroj: ŠÚSR 1994–2008. [online]. (Cited 2.6.2011) Available on the Internet: <http://www.prog.sav.sk/subory/konf20/Vincur.pdf>; Národný program reforiem Slovenskej republiky 2011–2014. apríl 2011. PRÍLOHA č. 1 – Národné ciele stratégie Európa 2020. [online]. (Cited 2.6.2011) Available on the Internet: [http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nrp/nrp\\_slovakia\\_sk.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nrp/nrp_slovakia_sk.pdf).





Graph 1 GDP in multiples of 10<sup>11</sup> EUROS, expenditure on defense and security, science and research in % (for the years 2012, 2013, the preliminary plans for the Defense)

Source: Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, Institute of Financial Policy of the Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic, the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. And the sources of the footnotes seen from table 4.

Chart 2 shows the relationship between expenditure on defense and security, science and research, as indicated in table 4. It is clear that the expenditure on defense and security, science and research has demonstrated a constantly decreasing trend. Correlation (Excel function of Corel) as a percentage of GDP on defense and science and research for the years 1993 to 2009 represents the value of 0.860018, which is a very high positive value (the maximum can reach 1).




Chart 2 the comparison of expenditure on defense and science and research as % of GDP,

Source: the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, Institute of Financial Policy the Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic, the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. And the sources of the footnotes seen from table 4.




Chart 3 the comparison of expenditure on defense and security, and science and research in billions of Euros

Source: Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, Institute of Financial Policy of the Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic, the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. And the sources of the footnotes seen from table 4

## CONCLUSION

A high level of security and defense may be a guarantee for the long life of the citizens of the State. The departments are safe when they work properly. However, the realization of this aim requires many things. The level of 2% of GDP in financing defense and security was a reality in the 1997-1998 and the level of 1.5% of GDP in 2007-2008 (table 4). Today it is likely that this will decrease further. Under the influence of the crisis and the lack of financial resources, as well as the dominance of the requirements for funding in the sectors of Slovakia but also in Europe, hopes for an increase in funding are optimistic. Growth of 1.5% in this electoral term would be a positive achievement. The elite should recognize the relationship between defense and security, and science and research in the private sector, because the argument from the period of the formation of the Slovak Republic is true only in so far as available resources and the willingness of the seller to sell military techniques and technologies. And it is not, nor has never been understood.

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Czesław Dzwigaj

## MY 11<sup>TH</sup> OF SEPTEMBER A PARIS RETROSPECTION

This is only a short reflection, an essay about one's own entrusted safety. Only the belief that I yearn to feel safe in the place where I live, where I work and carry out my dreams or create national values. Only the certainty that as a citizen of this country – in which I was born and the burden of which I carry with due responsibility together with a full load of imponderabilia – I am aware of the pride and responsibility for the safety of my loved ones, my colleagues at work, and finally, my nation in all aspects of its trends and directions. This is also an awareness of my own safety and the safety of all of Europe's citizens, a shared feeling of traditions stemming from the history of the Mediterranean World, its Roman Catholic legacy, encompassed in every aspect of our philosophy of life and humanism, which we must pass on to future generations. It is a responsibility for the safety of the world. Every one of us – whether an hermit living in a symbolic cave of the home or an intellectual journeying through the jungle of numerous universities – through contact with various forms of media (not just the Internet or television), is already a global recluse, and must be aware of the fact that, just like a microbe, he impacts the psyche of the entire population, not only his own, and is thus responsible for it – whether he wants to or not.

This is why, regardless of the possibilities, but first and foremost taking into consideration the continuously expanding technical possibilities, we are responsible for the safety of our entire planet. What remains is the safety of the so-called hyperspace, the interplanetary space, which is unimaginably significant, but issues linked with this topic, over which we shall yet bow our heads in thought, let us leave for a slightly later time.

September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001 – Paris. Since noon I had been exploring the Musée d’Orsée, admiring the works of impressionists active in the 1870s. I was already familiar with these works. They had been formerly located in a pavilion in the Tuilleries Gardens, between the Place de la Concorde and the Arc de Triomphe. In my opinion they presented themselves much better in that vicinity than here, on the third floor of a former train station converted into a museum. But on the ground floor a large, nineteenth century French sculpture suits the space perfectly. Individual stands are also nicely arranged – presenting various trends of 19<sup>th</sup> century French art. If you visit the museum with a guide – you will not understand anything. If you are visit it on your own, in your own way – this, by the way, pertains to every museum – you will remember the experience for the rest of your life, although you are sure to overlook many significant works of art. This is because museum curators and art historians are a specific breed; like a scrupulous housekeeper they need to have everything in order, neatly folded, tidied up and vacuumed on the outside. There is no sense in arguing with their views and principles, or – God forbid – presenting new arguments, meaning a different view of a given phenomenon in art.

It is approximately 4 pm, perhaps 5 – European time. My brain, filled to the limits of its possibilities with a rush of artistic visions, has stopped taking in further outside stimuli – this means that if one of my readers manages to perceive works of art for four, five hours, and is capable of discerning where he has been and what he has viewed, what he has contemplated and what conclusions he had drawn, and is furthermore aware of where he is, I can only congratulate him; that he is still alive and that he has managed to arrive at his destination, his base – meaning his hotel or some other nest of respite. As for myself, despite many years of training, I “tune out” after three, four hours of viewing and contemplation. Flabbergasted, brimming with the mist of paintings I have viewed, I end up at my hotel. Water, shower, silence, despite the fact that I have (or rather – we have) a room near a rather busy boulevard. Can you feel, dear reader, that calming hum of warm water flowing into the bathtub, enveloping your body, making your thoughts drift lazily, indifferently, wherever, in whichever place on earth, in whichever hotel, apartment, room you happen to find yourself in? *C’est la vie*. I confess that after this point I usually have great artistic ideas.

But in the meantime, the river of thoughts flows unknowingly, I would even say reminiscently, conceptually. Various questions present themselves; what to do, to be my own time. You fill this time thanks to your potential, but you keep living in what will be, in the future. Dreams? Perhaps so, as well as images of those that have passed on, but have left behind such wonderful works of art, and thus continue to live on with us, and we live on with them. How cunningly they have outsmarted their time.

Somewhere near the open door of the bathroom the television is turned on and droning. A blissful state of traveling, sightseeing, of being a Pole and a European. A blissful state, with the entire world open to exploration. A time of freedom has come.

– *Good Lord, a war! How will we return home? The World Trade Center! A war in New York!*

I see the terrified eyes of my companion running to the bathroom, her horrified voice uttering the abovementioned sentences. I could have reacted only in one way.

– *They're showing some kind of science fiction movie on TV. Give it a rest, we've watched enough nonsense about water dams breaking and flooding entire towns, imagined earthquakes, unforeseeable volcano eruptions and whatnot.*

– *For the love of God, it's a war! Where is Paris, where is Cracow? How will we get back?* – the terror in my interlocutor's voice kept rising.

Submerged in warm water that enveloped me with its delicate velvet not only physically, but also tickled my mind, calling to mind the paintings of old masters, especially the large one depicting a Funeral at Ornans, by Gustav Courbet, before which I had just a few hours ago contemplated the adequacy of the forms of expression utilized by the artist to convey *pompa mortis*, the mood of the given moment. Was the recalled image an adequate representation of what had actually happened in New York, and an adequate expression of a situation when death strikes the bodies of many blue-collar workers entwined forever, as well as pilots, who disappear into the ether of flammable aircraft fuel and suicide torpedoes – was it the cowardice of desperate persons, or the only way out for Icaruses, who – in the given situation – chose the ultimate gravitational flight of death, running from mimetism of pain? And what were to say those who believed in the strength of the fight that went down in flames? And the dust of hope, grey, common as flour, like daily bread, enveloping those who wanted to bring help and those who helped. And this dust and rubble devoured them, as well as those who bravely sought to escape it – caught them and shattered all hope.

I yelled once more:

– *My dear lady, they've finally made a good movie, that's all there is to it. Please stop panicking.*

Back then I was a cigarette smoker. Golden Americans. The warm steam given off by the water, the smoke of a cigarette symbolizing American freedom and safety neutralized the nervous behavior of the person bearing Job's news, being aired by sagging as far as reliability went – even back then – sources of mass information. This dreamlike state, I admit, did not last long. Only as long as the cigarette. Well, maybe as long as it took to thoroughly dry my entire body and all of its limbs with a towel. There was also the disdainful moment, full of irony, that it took to sit in my hotel chair and pitifully, indulgently “have a gander” at the television screen. Sudden consternation: damn, unfortunately, this was not a science fiction movie. It was a direct, maybe indirect by now, censored visual and verbal announcement from New York.

With disbelief, with calmness, but surely – I became aware that there is no longer a safe place on this Earth. This thought began drilling holes in my psyche.

I had been there not long ago. I had walked through those streets. Rockefeller Center. I had been at that very spot, had even kneeled in a church pew – a church located right next to those famous twin towers, so characteristic of the Manhattan skyline. I had personally felt good in the shade cast by the church's interior, and not on the street, overwhelmed by the tall, large-scale, inhuman towers. Often, when the clouds lowered themselves (and I've seen this on several occasions), I had the feeling that the towers were devouring them – that this architectural-engineering concept was striving towards the clouds. I will truthfully admit that I do not "feel" New York, I do not understand the fascination of those who love this organized anthill. As far as human adjustment to this gigantomania is concerned, I prefer the Sears Tower in Chicago, or even Hong Kong – nameless, brimming with bird-human cages.

For the first time in my life, I felt personally threatened. No, I was not afraid. But just as two skyscrapers had shattered, metaphysically returning to Mother Earth in clouds of dust consuming more victims than can be readily counted, I also felt the uncertainty of the cloud of danger. Not physical danger. A danger that lives in the consciousness and paralyzes the thoughts concerning the certainty of personal goodness. Of being a person that aims towards – regardless of circumstances – beauty and good. That moment in the hotel room in Paris on the 11<sup>th</sup> of September 2001, late afternoon European time, gave proof to the evil that lurks on the dark side of every human being. At this moment my mind's eye saw images of Hitler's concentration camps, confirmed a few years later by photographs in Yad Vashem in Jerusalem. At this moment I saw Treblinka, its large grounds with crematoria. Here fleeting images of people jumping from windows on the television screen, there countless eyes looking at life from a thousand photographs. Tormentors with a different concept and ideology. Terrorists and Nazis, cursed idiots, but human in every dimension. Born, fed by their mother's milk, full of childhood, joy, hope, beauty, love. The children of the times, deeply gazing into eyes, charming smile of good. This pertains to both groups. The killers and their victims. Yet the source and beginning of the road was the same. The same for each of us. What happens along the road? The crossover is imperceptible, and we later stand across from each other, without sense, without logic's boundaries. Where does the point begin, beyond the feeling of safety diminishes? After the fact of terrorism? Or maybe earlier, during a perfectly decent conversation, while taking a break from everyday chores, or perhaps when our own imagined aspirations are unsuccessful. Or maybe on a completely different level, in indoctrination that we are subjected to slowly as if it were a dose of poison, which inoculates us day by day, only to later kill the humanity in us. Not only us – but everything that surrounds us.

11<sup>th</sup> of September 2001. New York, Paris, the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, basically a breakthrough, conventional date. The start of the third century. Were the campaigns, wars and battles carried out in past centuries only an illustrated history of toy soldiers clad in various uniforms, a rank ancillary to the entire system, serving the commander. Often a great commander, behind whom marched



an entire logistic front in various types and parades. Very little is written or said about it, though often the entire theatre of war depended on it; Victory depended on it.

There is talk about the number of victims, injured, these are numbers, but first and foremost about the genius attesting to the great strategic concept of the commander or those in command. Let us recall only the defense and failure of ancient Troy, the Greek marches predating Christ, the heroism of the Spartans, the ingenuity of the Jewish nation, the refusal to surrender at Masada, and even the mutual killing of its Zealot defenders, in order not to give Rome the satisfaction of victory in the Judean Desert, the conquests of Ancient Rome, et cetera. Let us recall the logistics, meaning the establishment of the Cracow Merchants' Congregation in 1410, which supplied the knights fighting in Grunwald, which opposed the Teutonic Order. Let us use our artistic imagination and the magic of hearing the boom of the cannons and the clank of snare drums of Napoleon's armies riding on horseback with their entire fleets with supplies, passing not only through Europe – from Spain to Austria, but also Egypt and Moscow. Let us recall the strategies behind national uprisings of our forefathers. The Kosciuszko Uprising, Kosciuszko on the Cracow Square, November of 1830, January of 1863, the strange year 1846, with Jacob Szela, and later World War I. Its stationary war theatre and brother aiming at his own brother's heart, who unknowingly was forced to stand on the opposite side of the barricade. The Soviet War of 1920. The enemy at Warsaw's gates – it is certain that before the concept of Bolshevism all of Europe stands open; the selfsame Europe we travel through today as if it were our home town, familiar since childhood, without the need to explain anything by showing our passports.

And the cataclysm of World War II. The insanity of ideology. People did not count; their feelings did not count. Love, everyday toils, the touch of a hand, family homes. Someone who is a mother, a father, knows what it means to touch the clumsy, tiny fingers of a child. For each of us the small world we remember on a given day, in a given moment, unforgettable, usually in our memory throughout our lives. This is the world of New York and Paris, which was bright and sunny. Full of joy.

On that day I understood the need for higher security measures that have been internationally implemented by societies, responsible persons and decision-makers with regard to the millions of people travelling all over the globe. We do this in order not to limit personal freedoms, equality and respect for personal dignity, but to simultaneously maintain maximum security measures and prevent the unforeseeable consequences of acts of terrorism, which, usually, affect innocent people.

And here we reach the crux of the matter of so-called security; not only national security but also international security. What measures to use, how to prepare the right people, what staff members to call in order not to limit the personal freedoms of the individual, who has to undergo a certain type of invigilation, in various forms, and has to be aware of the obligation to submit to various rigors,

must understand without force that this is not a limitation of personal freedoms. On the other hand, where does the limit to invigilation and prevention lie, both on the physical, psychological and sociological levels, but also – most importantly – on the ideological level. These boundaries are fluid and easily blurred, within not only the timeframe of decades, but also months. What only a few months ago was unacceptable, punishable both in the national and international legal system, becomes an enforceable law. With time a so-called feedback takes place, and what was once a crime becomes a logical action. What can be done to feel safe while attending a lecture, while sitting in a café garden overlooking the Cracow square, or, e.g., at the Place du Tertre in Paris, and not to have the consciousness that something may suddenly happen resting on one's shoulders, or, if you prefer, at the back of your mind. How can one feel safe while carrying out a public function, as a diplomat, MEP or a senator. How can one feel safe at home, on their street, on the crosswalk while crossing the street in the arms of their closest loved one. Each of us surely knows the answer to these questions, depending on actual or imagined circumstances. In my opinion there is no one, unequivocal answer. As they say, circumstances are dynamic and unforeseeable. Thus the answers also cannot be comparable, or unambiguous, or instructional.

Yet this essay should have a moral or end with a generally-accepted conclusion. So this general conclusion is: limited confidence. When we enter the pedestrian crosswalk in front of a car we must have limited confidence that the driver's reflexes will not fail. But perhaps technology will fail – the brakes will not work – and what will happen then? Limited confidence at the airport: someone left behind a briefcase or backpack. Our reflex is to yell and call the person who forgot their luggage. Yet what could happen, if the baggage or briefcase has been left behind on purpose? How many good Samaritans, those who did exactly that, have passed on? But how to have limited confidence in our loved one, the person closest to us? Is it appropriate to formulate such a question at all?

But on memorable 9/11 the four pilots handling the planes were fully reliable employees, entrusted with the fate and lives of a few hundred passengers. These pilots operated planes, inter alia, from Boston to New York. Others hit the Pentagon, others did not make it to the White House, but were destroyed in mid-air. *Nota bene*, two reflections: one concerns the passengers on board the flight that was to hit the White House. The cell phone transcripts of a reporter who was aware of the situation show her sending information to family members and then, a heroic deed – not believing that her life could be saved, which was indeed true – allowed security services to locate the plane and take it down. A great figure; a woman aware of her heroism.

Yet there is the other side of the coin. The reverse. A person, hitherto anonymous, who makes the decision to shoot down the passenger plane, on board of which are a few dozen passengers, including the aforementioned journalist, as well as the terrorist piloting it. A death sentence multiplied by the number of deaths of innocent people. The decision maker's trauma – incalculable. A choice of the lesser of two evils. Let us ponder a question. There is a threat, like the one

in the case being described. Could the person holding the responsible position make the right decision within, let's say, a dozen or so minutes: *yes* or *no*? We have to ask the question: are the regulations and procedures in force capable of logically substantiating the right decision? In my opinion – no. Because it is always the person who matters: his knowledge, state of mind, and – above all – his humanitarianism.

It may seem to us that the higher we are in the hierarchy of a given government service or company, the greater the honor. Unfortunately I believe the opposite to be true: the greater the moral and civil responsibility of our everyday tasks, unnoticeable in the burden of Sisyphean, thankless at times downright absurd duties. Yet in extreme situations the positive awareness of these actions reveals itself, the aptness of these seemingly stupid regulations, and first and foremost, intuition and experience.

I did not understand this until 2002, when treading upon wooden platforms I gazed upon the remains of the World Trade Center. When I read the lists of names of those who had disappeared into the ether and those who had faced the hard concrete of New York's sidewalks. The fence of a nearby church had been covered with signs and photos of those who had given their lives to save others. I entered the church. I kneeled in the same pew as a few months before. I prayed for the dead and said to myself: you cannot live only partially trusting yourself, your friend, the entire world. And yet...! There is something to it, that without this partial trust you can also no longer live.

**Memorials are the message from those who have gone  
for us and for the future generations**



Fig. 1. Krakow, Rakowicki Cemetery – *For Victims of Genocide*. Source: author's collection



Fig. 2. Zawiercie – *Those for which God, Honor and Fatherland*. Source: author's collection



Fig. 3. Krakow, Fr. Peter Skarga. Source: author's collection



Fig. 4. Bochnia, General Leopold Okulicki "Niedźwiadek" (The Little Bear). Source: author's collection



Fig. 5. Augustow, Obelisk. Source: author's own collection



Fig. 6. Tarnobrzeg, King Ladislaus Łokietek (*the Short*). Source: Author's collection





Fig.7. Krakow, *The Monument of Józef Piłsudski, the first Polish Marshal*. Source: author's collection



Janusz Liber

## COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO MILITARY OPERATIONS

US Armed Forces are deployed all over the world. In 2007 there were 737 US Military Bases in the world with more than 2,500,000 U.S. personnel serving across the planet.<sup>1</sup>

Additionally US soldiers have taken part in every kind of military operations such as Korea, Vietnam, Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan. Since the Second World War US military personnel have faced the threat of terrorism for several decades, and examining previous attacks can provide valuable insight into the problem.

The security environment requires that deployed military units, forward-based activities, and forward operating bases protect themselves against threats designed to interrupt, interfere with, or impair the effectiveness of joint operations. Base and lines of communications (LOCs) security must be properly planned, prepared, executed, and assessed to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against US personnel, resources, facilities, equipment, and information.<sup>2</sup> Threat activities can be generally described and categorized in three levels. Each level or any combination of levels may exist in the operational area, independently or simultaneously.<sup>3</sup>

Typical Level I threats<sup>4</sup> include enemy agents and terrorists whose primary missions include espionage, sabotage, and subversion. Enemy activity and individual terrorist attacks may include random or directed killing of military and civilian personnel, kidnapping, and/or guiding special purpose individuals or teams

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.alternet.org/story/47998>.

<sup>2</sup> *Joint Security Operations in Theater*, Joint Publication 3-10, 03 February 2010, p. VII.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.* p. VII.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.* p. VII.

to targets. Level II threats<sup>5</sup> include small-scale, irregular forces conducting unconventional warfare that can pose serious threats to military forces and civilians. These attacks can cause significant disruptions to military operations as well as the orderly conduct of local government and services. Level III threats<sup>6</sup> may be encountered when a threat force has the capability of projecting combat power by air, land, or sea, anywhere into the operational area. Level III threats necessitate a decision to commit a tactical combat force (TCF) or other significant available forces to counter the threat.

Commanders use intelligence to anticipate the battle, visualize and understand the full spectrum of the operational environment, and influence the outcome of operations. Intelligence enables commanders at all levels to focus their combat power and to provide full dimensional force protection across the range of military operations.<sup>7</sup> In war, intelligence focuses on enemy military capabilities, centers of gravity (COGs), and potential courses of action (COAs) to provide operational and tactical commanders the information they need to plan and conduct operations.<sup>8</sup>

The attack against the US Marine Barracks in Beirut, Lebanon serves as a useful starting point for examining Department of Defense intelligence activities.<sup>9</sup> On October 23, 1983 a vehicle packed with the equivalent of 12,000 pounds of TNT penetrated the security perimeter of the US Marine contingent at Beirut International Airport, crashed into the Battalion Landing Team Headquarters Building, and exploded. The explosion destroyed the building and killed 241 Marines.<sup>10</sup> On June 25, 1996 a truck bomb exploded outside the perimeter of Khobar Towers, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The explosion destroyed a building used to house US military personnel, and resulted in the deaths of 19 Air Force members.<sup>11</sup> On October 12, 2000 the USS Cole was attacked while the ship was refueling in the port of Aden, Yemen.

Commanders at all levels depend on timely, accurate information and intelligence on an adversary's dispositions, strategy, tactics, intent, objectives, strengths, weaknesses, values, capabilities, and critical vulnerabilities.<sup>12</sup> The intelligence process is comprised of a wide variety of interrelated intelligence

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<sup>5</sup> Ib. p. VII–VIII.

<sup>6</sup> Ib. p. VIII

<sup>7</sup> *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations*, Joint Publication 2-01, 05 January 2012, p. IX.

<sup>8</sup> Ib. p. X.

<sup>9</sup> *Michel T. Imbus, Identifying Threats, Improving Intelligence and Counterintelligence Support to Force Protection*, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 2002, p. 7.

<sup>10</sup> *US Department of Defense. Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act*, October 23, 1983. Washington D.C.: Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, 20 December 1983, 3,32.

<sup>11</sup> *US Department of Defense. Force Protection Assessment of USCENTCOM AOR and Khobar Towers*. Washington D.C.: Downing Assessment Task Force, 30 August, 1996, VIII.

<sup>12</sup> *Joint and National Intelligence*, *op. cit.* p. XVI.

operations: planning and direction, tasking and collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination and integration, and evaluation and feedback. These intelligence operations must focus on the commander's mission and concept of operations.<sup>13</sup>

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)<sup>14</sup> is a major producer and manager of foreign military intelligence for the Department of Defense and is a principal member of the United States Intelligence Community. Established on October 1, 1961, and designated a combat support agency in 1986, DIA's mission is to provide timely, objective, all-source military intelligence to policymakers, to U.S. armed forces around the world, and to the U.S. acquisition community and force planners to counter a variety of threats and challenges across the spectrum of conflict. It performs all military intelligence and counterintelligence functions to collect, process, retain, or disseminate information.<sup>15</sup> The main aim of these activities is to provide adequate, timely and reliable intelligence and counterintelligence for Military Departments and other agencies as directed by competent authorities.<sup>16</sup>

Intelligence disciplines are well-defined areas of intelligence planning, collection, processing, exploitation, analysis and production, and dissemination using a specific category of technical or human resources.<sup>17</sup> Intelligence sources can be people, documents, equipment, or technical sensors, and are grouped according to one of the seven major intelligence disciplines: geospatial intelligence (GEOINT); human intelligence (HUMINT); signals intelligence (SIGINT); measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT); open-source intelligence (OSINT); technical intelligence (TECHINT); and counterintelligence (CI).<sup>18</sup> Intelligence has two objectives: to reduce uncertainty by providing accurate, timely, and relevant knowledge about the threat and the surrounding environment, and to assist in protecting friendly forces (including Department of Defense personnel, family members, resources, facilities and critical information) through counterintelligence.<sup>19</sup>

The Defense Intelligence Community is headed by the DIA, through its Director (who chairs the Military Intelligence Board), and it coordinates the activities of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force intelligence components.<sup>20</sup> The DIA

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<sup>13</sup> *Ib.* p. XVI.

<sup>14</sup> <http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/gov-orgs/dia>, *An Overview of the United States Intelligence Community for the 111*.

<sup>15</sup> *Department of Defense DIRECTIVE NUMBER5240.01 DoD Intelligence Activities*, August 27, 2007.

<sup>16</sup> *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Publication 1, 02 May 2007 Incorporating Change 1, 20 March 2009, p. III-11.

<sup>17</sup> *Joint Intelligence (Joint Publication 2-0)*, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 22 June 2007, p. I-5.

<sup>18</sup> *Ib.* p. I-5.

<sup>19</sup> *Intelligence Operations MCWP 2-1*, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY Headquarters United States Marine Corps Washington, DC 20380-1775, 10 September 2003.

<sup>20</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defense\\_Intelligence\\_Agency](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defense_Intelligence_Agency).

consists of several centers and directorates,<sup>21</sup> e.g. the Directorate for Analysis, the Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center, and the Directorate for Intelligence but for the purposes of this article the most important is the Defense Counterintelligence and HUMINT Center. It is mandated to manage, develop and execute U.S. Department of Defense counter intelligence and human intelligence activities worldwide;<sup>22</sup> it is also responsible for oversight for training, doctrine, policy, information technology architecture, planning and career management.<sup>23</sup> For example, the Director, Defense Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center, takes part in Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) and in this field shall:<sup>24</sup>

- Deconflict CI activities when multiple CI elements have an interest in the same critical asset.
- Provide program management and deconfliction to Department of Defense components providing Counterintelligence support to the DCIP.
- Coordinate with DoD Counterintelligence elements to develop and implement performance measures for CI support to the DCIP.
- Create and maintain information databases for Department of Defense Counterintelligence support to the DCIP.
- Develop and manage an advanced Department of Defense level training program for Counterintelligence support to the DCIP.

CI activities shall be undertaken to detect, identify, assess, exploit, and counter or neutralize the intelligence collection efforts, other intelligence activities, sabotage, terrorist activities, and assassination efforts of foreign powers, organizations, or persons directed against the Department of Defense, its personnel, information, materiel, facilities and activities.<sup>25</sup> The Department of Defense describes counterintelligence<sup>26</sup> as information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities. CI constitutes active and passive measures intended to deny a threat force valuable information about the friendly situation, to detect and neutralize hostile intelligence collection, and to deceive the enemy as to friendly capabilities and intentions.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> <http://www.dia.mil/about/organization>.

<sup>22</sup> [http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2008/07/defense\\_intel\\_reorg.html](http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2008/07/defense_intel_reorg.html).

<sup>23</sup> <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=50718>.

<sup>24</sup> *Department of Defense INSTRUCTION NUMBER 5240.19, Counterintelligence Support for Defense Critical Infrastructure Program*, August 27, 2007, Incorporating Change 1, December 28, 2010.

<sup>25</sup> *Department of Defense DIRECTIVE NUMBER 5240.2, DoD Counterintelligence (CI)*, May 22, 1997.

<sup>26</sup> *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02, 8 November 2010, p. 79.

<sup>27</sup> *Intelligence Operations, op. cit.* p. A-3.

CI counters or neutralizes foreign intelligence and security services (FISS) and international terrorist organizations (ITO) intelligence collection efforts. It does this through collection, CI investigations, operations, analysis, production, and functional and technical services. CI includes all actions taken to detect, identify, track, exploit, and neutralize the multidiscipline intelligence activities of friends, competitors, opponents, adversaries, and enemies. It is the key intelligence community contributor to the protection of U.S. interests and equities. CI helps identify EEfIs<sup>28</sup> by identifying vulnerabilities to threat collection and actions taken to counter collection and operations against U.S. forces.<sup>29</sup> According to *Joint Intelligence*<sup>30</sup> CI analyzes the threats posed by foreign intelligence and security services and the intelligence activities of non-state actors such as organized crime, terrorist groups, and drug traffickers. CI analysis incorporates all-source information and the results of CI investigations and operations to support a multidiscipline analysis of the force protection threat.

CI is similar to, and often confused with, HUMINT, as CI uses many of the same techniques for information collection. CI obtains information by or through the functions of CI operations, investigations, collection and reporting, analysis, production, dissemination, and functional services.<sup>31</sup> The function of CI is to provide direct support to operational commanders, program managers, and decision makers. This support includes: CI support to force protection during all types and phases of military operations; detection identification and neutralization of espionage; antiterrorism; threat assessments; countering illegal technology transfer; acquisitions systems protection; support to other intelligence activities; information systems protection; and treaty support.<sup>32</sup>

Counterintelligence (CI) in the Combatant Commands and Other Department of Defense Components is strictly described by DoD instruction.<sup>33</sup> According to this regulation:<sup>34</sup>

- Authorized CI activities shall be conducted in the Department of Defense Components as part of an integrated DoD and national effort.
- CI investigations shall only be conducted by the MDCOs<sup>35</sup> and in accordance with DoD regulations.
- All Department of Defense personnel conducting CI activities shall attend formal CI training approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, or their designees.

<sup>28</sup> Essential Elements of Friendly Information – key questions likely to be asked by adversary officials and intelligence systems about specific friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities, so they can obtain answers critical to their operational effectiveness.

<sup>29</sup> *FM 2-0 Intelligence*, Headquarters Department of the Army, March 2010, p. 1-22.

<sup>30</sup> *Joint Intelligence*, *op. cit.* p. 1-19.

<sup>31</sup> *Ib.* p. B-7.

<sup>32</sup> *Ib.* p. B-7.

<sup>33</sup> *Department of Defense INSTRUCTION NUMBER 5240.10 Counterintelligence (CI) in the Combatant Commands and Other DoD Components*, October 5, 2011.

<sup>34</sup> *Ib.* p. 1-2.

<sup>35</sup> MDCO (Military Department Counterintelligence Organization) – Army Counterintelligence, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Air Force Office of Special Investigations.

The Commanders of the Combatant Commands, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall:<sup>36</sup>

Develop a CI capability to conduct authorized CI activities or rely on the supporting MDCO.

- Select Military Department-nominated personnel to serve as the CCICA<sup>37</sup> and conduct and exercise staff coordination authority over CI activities.
- Establish a written agreement with the supporting MDCO that describes the ongoing and continued CI support MDCO shall provide.
- Annually or as directed by emerging operational needs, identify, prioritize, and disseminate resource requirements for the individual Combatant Command headquarters to the Joint Staff with copies provided to the Director, DCHC, and the MDCOs.
- Ensure that effective measures exist to compartmentalize and protect sensitive CI investigative or operations information and techniques which are in support of the Combatant Command.

The CI agencies (Military Department Counterintelligence Organizations) within the four Services have historically demonstrated dramatically different CI areas of emphasis, concepts of operations, and methods of execution.<sup>38</sup> The Naval Criminal Investigative Service and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations have traditionally viewed CI with a strategic focus drawn from their perspectives as, primarily, law enforcement organizations.<sup>39</sup> The NCIS has exclusive responsibility for CI policy development and implementation and execution and management of CI programs, with the exception of those combat and combat related CI responsibilities of the Marine Corps. CI activities of the NCIS are funded from the Foreign Counterintelligence Program (FCIP). The OSI is a field-operating agency of the Air Force. CI activities of the OSI are also funded from the Foreign Counterintelligence Program (FCIP). Like the NCIS, there is no programmatic provision in the OSI for tactical intelligence and related activities (TIARA) funding or resources. The Army and Marine Corps maintain CI as a component of their intelligence staffs. The Marine Corps CI orientation is entirely tactical, with funding exclusively within the DON's budget for TIARA. The Army emphasizes both strategic and tactical CI and is supported by a mixture of FCIP and TIARA resources.<sup>40</sup> Taking into account that the US Marine Corps and the Army conduct the most common operations (ground operations) I am going to focus mainly on the CI activities connected with these Services.

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<sup>36</sup> *Ib.* p.7.

<sup>37</sup> Command Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority (CCICA) – The senior command representative to conduct and exercise staff coordination authority over CI activities. Develops and implements the Combatant Command's CI strategy and plans, serves as the focal point for CI issues impacting the command, identifies command resource requirements, and coordinates CI support to the command.

<sup>38</sup> *Counterintelligence U.S. Marine Corps MCWP 2-14*, Department of the Navy Headquarters United States Marine Corps Washington, D.C. 20380-17755 September 2000, p. 1-3.

<sup>39</sup> *Ib.* p. 1-3.

<sup>40</sup> *Ib.* p. 1-3.



*Department of Defense INSTRUCTION NUMBER 5240.10 Counterintelligence (CI) in the Combatant Commands and Other DoD Components*<sup>41</sup> states that the senior CI advisor and subject matter expert to the Combatant Command, the CCICA, shall be in the military grade of O5 or O6, or civilian equivalent, and have CI experience. The main aims of the CCICA are:<sup>42</sup>

- Develop and implement the Combatant Commands' and Joint Staff's CI strategy and plans; integrate CI into Combatant Command and Joint Staff planning, operations, exercises, and other activities; identify and forward Command resource requirements; coordinate CI support as needed by the Command; and oversee CI activities supporting the Combatant Command headquarters staff and geographically separated elements.
- Provide for staff supervision, awareness, deconfliction, and coordination of CI activities and policies within the Combatant Command AOR.
- Identify and provide Combatant Command resource requirements to the Director, DCHC.

Counterintelligence supports commanders providing them with information and conducting activities in the field of credibility assessment, CI investigations, Technical Surveillance Countermeasure, CI Awareness and Reporting (CIAR), CI Security Classification Guide, Offensive Counterintelligence Operations (OFCO), CI Collection, CI Analysis and Production, CI Inquiries, Force Protection. Research, Development, and Acquisition (RDA) and other.

The Army conducts aggressive, comprehensive, and coordinated counterintelligence activities worldwide, to detect, identify, assess, and counter, neutralize, or exploit the intelligence collection efforts, other intelligence activities, sabotage, subversion, sedition, terrorist activities, and assassination efforts of foreign powers, organizations, or persons directed against Department of the Army or Department of Defense personnel, information, materiel, and activities. This mission will be accomplished during peacetime and all levels of conflict.<sup>43</sup> Army CI has four primary mission areas:<sup>44</sup>

- Counterespionage.
- Support to force protection.
- Support to research and technology protection.
- Cyber CI.

CI core competencies are interrelated, mutually supporting, and can be derived from one another. The CI core competencies include:<sup>45</sup>

- Operations.
- Investigations.
- Collection.

<sup>41</sup> *Department of Defense INSTRUCTION NUMBER 5240.10 Counterintelligence, op. cit.* p. 8.

<sup>42</sup> *Ib.* p. 8.

<sup>43</sup> *Military Intelligence the Army Counterintelligence Program Army Regulation 381-20, Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC, 15 November 1993, p. 1.*

<sup>44</sup> *FM 2-0 Intelligence, op. cit.* p. 6-1.

<sup>45</sup> *Ib.* p. 6-2.

- Technical services and support.
- Analysis and production.

Counterintelligence operations are broadly executed CI activities that support a program or specific mission. CI operations<sup>46</sup> are proactive activities designed to identify, exploit, neutralize, or deter foreign intelligence collection and terrorist activities directed against the United States. Offensive CI operations in the US Marine Corps use of specialized CI techniques and procedures. They are directed against espionage, sabotage, subversion, and the threat of terrorism. These operations are planned, coordinated, and conducted by MAGTF<sup>47</sup> CI personnel and include the following operations:<sup>48</sup>

- Counterespionage Operations.
- Countersubversion Operations.
- Countersabotage Operations.
- Counterterrorism Operations.
- Exploitation and Neutralization Operations.

There are two types of Army CI operations—special operations and general operations.<sup>49</sup> Special operations involve direct or indirect engagement with FIS through human source or technical efforts. General operations are usually defensive in nature and are aimed at supporting force protection programs and formal security programs of Army commanders at all levels. Included in general operations are:<sup>50</sup>

- Advice and assistance programs.
- Technical support activities.
- Support to acquisition and SAP.
- Support to intelligence disciplines.
- Support to treaty verification.
- Support to domestic civil disturbances.
- Support to natural disaster operations.
- Support to HUMINT.

CI techniques are means used to accomplish the mission efficiently and effectively.

Selection of techniques occurs at the lowest level possible by the on-scene CI element to meet the needs of the supported military commander within the constraints of the operation and applicable regulations. Techniques include vulnerability assessments, hostile intelligence simulation (Red Team), and covering agent support.<sup>51</sup>

<sup>46</sup> *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, op. cit. p. 80.

<sup>47</sup> Marine Air-Ground Task Force.

<sup>48</sup> *Counterintelligence U.S. Marine Corps*, op. cit. p. 2-1.

<sup>49</sup> *FM 34-60*, op. cit. p. 3-1.

<sup>50</sup> *Ib.* p. 3-2.

<sup>51</sup> *AR 381-20 Military Intelligence The Army Counterintelligence Program*, Department of the Army Washington, DC 15 November 1993, p. 14.

CI investigations are conducted when national security crimes are allegedly committed by anyone under CI authority. Counterintelligence investigation<sup>52</sup> is an official, systematic search for facts to determine whether a person is engaged in activities that may be injurious to US national security or advantageous to a foreign power. Counterintelligence Investigations are investigations concerning personnel, security matters, espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and subversive activities, including defection.<sup>53</sup>

I am going to show an example of CI investigations in the field of activities carried out by US Army CI. The Army counterintelligence conducts two types of investigations: CI investigations (aka Subversion and Espionage Directed Against US Army and Deliberate Security Violations investigations) and personnel security investigations.<sup>54</sup> CI investigative jurisdiction is derived from national, Department of Defense, and Army policy that defines the types of incidents and personnel who are subject to investigation by Army CI components. Army CI jurisdiction includes the following:<sup>55</sup>

- Treason.
- Espionage and spying.
- Subversion.
- Sedition.
- FIS-directed sabotage.
- CI aspects of terrorist activities directed against the Army.
- CI aspects of assassination or incapacitation of Army personnel by terrorists or by agents of a foreign power.
- Investigation of the circumstances surrounding the defection of military personnel, and DA civilians overseas, and debriefing of the individual upon return to U.S. control. Investigation of the circumstances surrounding the detention of DA personnel by a government or hostile force with interests inimical to those of the United States.
- Investigation of the circumstances surrounding military members, and DA civilians overseas, declared absent without leave (AWOL), missing or deserters, who had access within the last year to TOP SECRET national defense information or sensitive compartmented information (special category absentees) (SCA); who were in a special mission unit (SMU); who had access to one or more special access programs; or were in the DA Cryptographic Access Program (DACAP); and debriefing of these personnel upon return to U.S. control.
- CI aspects of security violations; known or suspected acts of unauthorized disclosure of classified information or material; unauthorized access to DA computer systems; and COMSEC insecurities.

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<sup>52</sup> lb. p. 80.

<sup>53</sup> *Counterintelligence U.S. Marine Corps, op. cit.* p.2-2.

<sup>54</sup> *FM 34-60*, p. 2-1.

<sup>55</sup> *AR 381-20 Military Intelligence, op. cit.* p. 7-8.

- CI aspects of incidents in which DA personnel with a SECRET or higher security clearance, access to a SAP or sensitive compartmented information, or in the DACAP or an SMU, commit or attempt to commit suicide.
- CI aspects of unofficial travel to designated countries, or contacts with foreign diplomatic facilities or official representatives, by military personnel or by DA civilians overseas.
- CI investigations of CI scope polygraph examinations.

Within the United States, Army CI has investigative jurisdiction over the following persons:<sup>56</sup>

- U.S. Army personnel on active duty.
- Retired Army military personnel when the act(s) under investigation took place while the individual was on active duty.
- Active and inactive members of the U.S. Army Reserve Components, when the act(s) under investigation took place while the individual was in military duty status.
- Active, retired, and Reserve Components personnel of other services, where Department of Defense has given Army CI geographic jurisdiction.

Outside the United States, Army CI has investigative jurisdiction over the following persons (unless responsibility is otherwise assigned by U.S. law, executive directive, or agreement with the host government):<sup>57</sup>

- Army personnel on active duty and their family members.
- Current DA civilian employees, including foreign national employees, and their family members.
- Army contractors and their family members, subject to coordination with the FBI, CIA, and host government agencies.
- Retired Army personnel, Reserve Components personnel, and other U.S. persons, subject to coordination with the FBI, CIA, and host government agencies.
- Foreign nationals who are applicants for Army employment, are Army employees, or are former Army employees, no matter whether they have, require, or had access to U.S. classified information, unless responsibility is otherwise assigned by U.S. law, executive directive, or agreement with the host government.
- Foreign nationals not affiliated with the Army, subject to coordination with the CIA and agreements with the FBI, other Department of Defense intelligence components and host nation governments.
- Active, retired, and Reserve Components personnel of other services, DOD civilian employees and family members, and Department of Defense foreign nationals, where DOD has given Army CI geographic jurisdiction.

Army CI elements will conduct personnel security investigations (PSI) overseas. PSI will be conducted under DIS<sup>58</sup> direction and control and all personnel

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<sup>56</sup> *Ib.* p. 8.

<sup>57</sup> *Ib.* p. 8.

<sup>58</sup> Defense Investigative Service.

conducting PSI will be evaluated under the DIS courtesy letter program. I pass over this kind of investigation in this article because of its volume.

Counterintelligence collection<sup>59</sup> is the systematic acquisition of information (through investigations, operations, or liaison) concerning espionage, sabotage, terrorism, other intelligence activities or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons that are directed against or threaten Department of Defense interests. CI collection is conducted by using sources, elicitation, official liaison contacts, debriefings, screenings, and open-source intelligence (OSINT) to obtain information that answers the standing CI collection requirements or other collection needs-based on commanders' requirements.<sup>60</sup>

CI technical services are used to assist in the CI core competencies of investigations, collections, and operations or to provide specialized technical support to a program or activity. This includes:<sup>61</sup>

- Performance of technical surveillance countermeasures (TSCM).
- Performance of cyber CI activities that provide protection to information networks as well as identify vulnerabilities and attempted intrusions into Army and Department of Defense computer networks.
- Performance CI scope polygraph examinations.
- Provision of support to Army information tasks.

Counterintelligence production<sup>62</sup> is the process of analyzing all-source information concerning espionage or other multidiscipline intelligence collection threats, sabotage, terrorism, and other related threats to US military commanders, the Department of Defense, and the US Intelligence Community and developing it into a final product that is disseminated. Counterintelligence production is used in formulating security policy, plans, and operations. CI analysis and production are used to satisfy the supported commander's intelligence requirements and to provide focus and guidance to CI operations. CI analysis and production can be accomplished at any level in which Army CI assets are assigned to counter the FISS and ITO collection threat; support protection of U.S. personnel, property, and operations; protect the research and development (R&D) of critical technologies; and support Army information tasks to protect U.S. forces information systems.<sup>63</sup>

According to the Marine Corps,<sup>64</sup> production is the activity that converts information into intelligence. It involves the evaluation, interpretation, integration, analysis, and synthesis of all information that is relevant to a particular

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<sup>59</sup> lb. p. 79.

<sup>60</sup> *FM 2-0 Intelligence, op. cit.* p. 6-2.

<sup>61</sup> lb. p. 6-3.

<sup>62</sup> *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, op. cit.* p.80.

<sup>63</sup> *FM 2-0 Intelligence, op. cit.* p. 6-3.

<sup>64</sup> *Intelligence Operations, op. cit.* p. 3-10.

Intelligence Requirements to answer the question that has been asked. During the production phase, information is<sup>65</sup>:

- Evaluated to determine pertinence, reliability, and accuracy.
- Analyzed to isolate significant elements.
- Integrated with other relevant information and previously developed intelligence.
- Interpreted to form logical conclusions that reflect on the situation and support the commander's decision-making process.
- Applied to estimate possible outcomes.
- Placed into the product format that will be most useful to its eventual user.

The role of CI is to support the commander's requirements to preserve essential secrecy and to protect the force. To carry out his force protection responsibilities, a commander requires support from several sources, one of which is the intelligence community.<sup>66</sup> CI support to force protection must be tailored to the supported organization and its vulnerability. CI support can be tailored from a combination of activities to include:<sup>67</sup>

- Mobilization security, including ports and major records repositories.
- Combating terrorism.
- Rear operations.
- Civil-military affairs.
- Psychological operations.
- Battlefield deception.
- OPSEC.
- Friendly Communications-Electronics (C-E) (C-SIGINT).
- CI force protection source operations (CFSO).

The Army conducts CI during peacetime and at all levels of conflict to protect the force from foreign exploitation. During peacetime, CI supports the commander's needs. During war, CI operations are much the same as in peacetime, except the adversary state or nation is well-defined.<sup>68</sup> The commander's needs are the top priority information. Operations Other than War are conducted by all Services, e.g. MOOTW<sup>69</sup> (Military Operations Other than War) refers to the conduct of Marine and naval expeditionary operations across the range of military operations short of war. MOOTW encompass a wide variety of activities intended to deter war, resolve conflict, promote peace, and support civil authorities. MOOTW encompass a broad range of 16 possible missions and tasks, each of which has its own unique Intelligence Requirements.

Operations Other Than War may include the direct or indirect support of foreign governments or international organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty

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<sup>65</sup> lb. p. 3-10.

<sup>66</sup> *FM 34-60 Counterintelligence*, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington DC, 3 October 1995, p. 1-6.

<sup>67</sup> lb. p. 1-6.

<sup>68</sup> *FM 34-60 Counterintelligence*, *op. cit.* p. 1-8

<sup>69</sup> *FM 2-0 Intelligence*, *op. cit.* p. 7-1.

Organization. OOTW consist of the following operational categories<sup>70</sup>:

- Noncombatant evacuation operations.
- Arms control.
- Support to domestic civil authorities.
- Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
- Security assistance.
- Nation assistance.
- Support to anti-drug operations.
- Combatting terrorism.
- Peacekeeping operations.
- Peace enforcement.
- Show of force.
- Support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies.
- Attacks and raids.

Other Counterintelligence activity conducted to support military operations is the Threat Awareness and Reporting Program (TARP).<sup>71</sup> The primary focus of this regulation is to ensure that Army personnel understand and report potential threats by foreign intelligence and international terrorists to the Army. Threat awareness and education training is designed to ensure that DA personnel recognize and report incidents and indicators of attempted or actual espionage, subversion, sabotage, terrorism or extremist activities directed against the Army and its personnel, facilities, resources, and activities; indicators of potential terrorist associated insider threats; illegal diversion of military technology; unauthorized intrusions into automated information systems; unauthorized disclosure of classified information; and indicators of other incidents that may indicate foreign intelligence or international terrorism targeting of the Army.<sup>72</sup> All Army personnel have to take part in threat awareness training but there is special threat-awareness training for vulnerable personnel and positions.

Certain Army personnel may be especially vulnerable to exploitation by foreign intelligence or international terrorism. Foreign intelligence services have traditionally targeted personnel with access to sensitive compartmented information, cryptographic, and Special Access Program information. The CI units will coordinate with supported unit security managers to identify potentially vulnerable personnel and provide them with special threat-awareness training, either one-on-one or in small groups. The following personnel should receive special threat awareness training:<sup>73</sup>

- DA personnel scheduled to travel to or through countries with a high intelligence or terrorist threat level as identified by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

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<sup>70</sup> Ib. p. 1-9.

<sup>71</sup> *AR 381-12 Military Intelligence, Threat Awareness and Reporting Program*, Department of the Army Washington, DC 4 October 2010.

<sup>72</sup> Ib. p. 1.

<sup>73</sup> Ib. p. 5.

- DA personnel scheduled to attend scientific, technical, engineering, or other professional meetings or symposia that representatives from foreign countries sponsor or attend, whether in the U.S. or abroad.
- DA personnel participating in training, education, commercial ventures, technical information sharing, or exchange programs with foreign governments or organizations.
- Members of agencies sponsoring or meeting with foreign visitors, foreign exchange personnel, foreign liaison officers, and foreign students.
- DA personnel who have close and continuing relationships with relatives or others residing in, who have foreign business connections or financial interests in, or who have other significant ties to foreign countries.
- System administrators and other key information network personnel who have administrator-level privileges on classified or unclassified Army information systems.
- Personnel whose jobs require interface with foreign governments or businesses regarding RDA activities or critical military technology.
- Persons with access to SAP information and persons assigned to special mission units (SMU).
- Personnel serving as military attachés or serving in U.S. embassies or diplomatic missions abroad.

In Army Regulation 381-12 there are a large number of duties in this case for all level commanders but I am going to focus on this topic only on the level of unit commanders with counterintelligence personnel assigned or attached. These commanders will:<sup>74</sup>

- Support all Army commanders in the unit's area of responsibility with a TARP.
- Ensure that the content of threat awareness training includes correct items and that CI trainers are following these guidelines.
- Ensure that the content of threat awareness training is tailored appropriately to the mission, geographic location, and degree of potential international terrorist or foreign intelligence threat to the organization receiving training.
- Coordinate with supported commands to identify those personnel who require special threat-awareness training and conduct the briefings and debriefings of these personnel, as appropriate.
- Ensure that Army personnel reporting CI incidents are interviewed about the details of the incident as soon as possible.
- Submit CIR<sup>75</sup> within 72 hours of the incident being reported to the CI unit.

During their activities CI personnel use a variety of HUMINT sources to collect information. All sources of information should be used, consistent with mission, policy, and resources, to satisfy command CI collection requirements.<sup>76</sup> Similar CI collection sources of information are exploited by the US Marine Corps.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> *Ib.* p. 3.

<sup>75</sup> CIR – Counterintelligence Incident Report.

<sup>76</sup> *FM 34-60*, p. 4-1, 4-2.

<sup>77</sup> *Counterintelligence U.S. Marine Corps, op. cit.* p. 6-8.



- A casual source is one who, by social or professional position, has access to information of CI interest, usually on a continuing basis. Casual sources usually can be relied on to provide information which is routinely available to them. They are under no obligation to provide information.
- Official sources are liaison contacts. CI personnel conduct liaison with foreign and domestic CI intelligence, security, and law enforcement agencies to exchange information and obtain assistance. CI personnel are interested in investigative, operational, and threat information.
- Recruited sources include those who support CFSO. Such activities are, by design, human source networks dispersed throughout the area, who can provide timely and pertinent force protection information.
- Refugees, civilian detainees, and enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) are other sources of CI information.
- Open source publications of all sorts and radio and television broadcasts are valuable sources of information of CI interest and operational information.
- Documents not openly available, such as adversary plans and reports, are exploited in much the same way as open source publications.

Counter Human Intelligence activities are the core of CI effort. These actions include screening, cordon and search operations used to gain intelligence information. The purpose of CI screening operations is to identify persons of CI interest or verify persons referred by interrogators who are of CI interest, and gather information of immediate CI interest.<sup>78</sup> The purpose for conducting cordon and search operations is to identify and apprehend persons hostile to our efforts and to exploit information gathered.<sup>79</sup> US Marine Corps CI uses two types of cordon and search operations:<sup>80</sup>

- Community Operations.
- Soft or area operations.

Counter Human Intelligence techniques and procedures conducted by the Army and US Marine corps counterintelligence are similar.<sup>81</sup> The effectiveness of CI operations depends largely on the planning that precedes the operation. The most important is to obtain information on the adversary's intelligence, sabotage, terrorism, and subversion capabilities. During the intelligence cycle collected information is processed and analyzed, and from it the CI officer formulates a list of CI targets. These targets are personalities, organizations, and installations of intelligence or CI interest which must be seized, exploited, or protected.

These are persons who are a threat to security, whose intentions are unknown, or who can assist the intelligence and CI efforts of the command. Personalities are grouped into these three categories. For ease in identification, a color code indicates the category. Colors currently in use are black, gray, and white and pertain to the three categories in the order listed above.<sup>82</sup>

<sup>78</sup> *FM 34-60, op. cit.* p. A-IV-1.

<sup>79</sup> *Ib.* p. A-IV-8.

<sup>80</sup> See: *Counterintelligence U.S. Marine Corps, op. cit.*

<sup>81</sup> See: *The Army and US Marine Corps CI Regulations.*

<sup>82</sup> *FM-34-60, op. cit.* p. A-V-1.

The black list is an official CI listing of actual or potential enemy collaborators, sympathizers, intelligence suspects, and other persons whose presence menaces the security of the friendly forces. Black list includes<sup>8384</sup>:

- Known or suspected enemy or hostile espionage agents, saboteurs, terrorists, political figures, and subversive individuals.
- Known or suspected leaders and members of hostile paramilitary, partisan, or guerrilla groups.
- Political leaders known or suspected to be hostile to the military and political objectives of the US or an allied nation.
- Known or suspected officials of enemy governments whose presence in the theater of operations poses a security threat to US Forces.
- Known or suspected enemy collaborators and sympathizers whose presence in the theater of operations poses a security threat to US Forces.
- Known enemy military or civilian personnel who have engaged in intelligence, CI, security, police, or political indoctrination activities among troops or civilians.
- Other personalities indicated by the G2 as automatic arrestees. Included in this category may be local political personalities, police chiefs, and heads of significant municipal and national departments or agencies, and tribal or clan leaders.

The gray list contains the identities and locations of those personalities whose inclinations and attitudes toward the political and military objective to the US are obscure. These people are the “unknowns.” They may be individuals whose political motivations require further exploration before they can be used effectively by US Forces. Examples of individuals who may be included in this category are:<sup>8586</sup>

- Potential or actual defectors from the hostile cause whose *bona fides* have not been established.
- Individuals who have resisted, or are believed to have resisted, the enemy government and who may be willing to cooperate with US Forces, but whose *bona fides* have not been established.
- Scientists and technicians suspected of having been engaged against their will in enemy research projects of high technology programs.

The white list contains the identities and locations of individuals who have been identified as being of intelligence or CI interest and are expected to be able to provide information or assistance in existing or new intelligence allies. They are usually in accordance with, or favorably inclined toward, US policies. Their contributions are based on a voluntary and cooperative attitude. Examples of individuals who may be included in this category are:<sup>8788</sup>

<sup>83</sup> Ib. p. A-V-1.

<sup>84</sup> *Counterintelligence U.S. Marine Corps, op. cit.* p. 6-9, 6-10.

<sup>85</sup> Ib. p. 6-10.

<sup>86</sup> *FM 34-60*, p. A-V-2.

<sup>87</sup> Ib. p. A-V-2.

<sup>88</sup> *Counterintelligence U.S. Marine Corps, op. cit.* p.6-10, 6-11.

- Former political leaders of a hostile state who were deposed by hostile political leaders.
- Intelligence agents employed by US or allied intelligence agencies.
- Key civilians in areas of scientific research, who may include faculty members of universities and staff of industrial or national research facilities, whose *bona fides* have been established.
- Leaders of religious groups and other humanitarian groups.
- Other persons who can materially and significantly aid the political, scientific, and military objectives of the US and whose *bona fides* have been established.

Counterintelligence organizations are also interested in specific installations, which may contain materials or documents of CI interest. They also keen on any group that is a potential threat to the security of the friendly force in the Area of Responsibility.

Military Department Counterintelligence Organizations conduct a huge amount of CI activities but there is not possible to discuss all of them in this article, e.g. we have not mentioned counter-signal intelligence activities and counter-imagery intelligence techniques and procedures as well as CI training and interrogation. I would like to emphasize that to become successful in its activities, CI needs professional overt and covert sources of information, especially human sources. Informant handling is a very sensitive area and such sources have to be controlled and protected from disclosure. It is common knowledge that sources of information are essential for counterintelligence and it is impossible to take any CI action without information from AOR. The most important feature of CI operations is counterintelligence support to military operations. Providing commanders with useful information is crucial for fulfilling their mission. The second element is collaboration between CI organizations and Armed Forces. It is a two-way communication system. Commanders and all military personnel should cooperate with CI components (officers, agents) not only to receive the above-mentioned intelligence for security reasons, such as Force Protection but have to inform CI about threat-related incidents.

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Marek Zawartka

# SECURITY OF MASS EVENTS REGARDING STADIUM HOOLIGANISM

## HOOLIGANISM AS A SUBCULTURE OF VIOLENCE

The progressive transformation of civilization, with economic, social, cultural, political changes taking place in modern democracies – in addition to their obvious positive consequences such as the creation of civil society, or fulfilling the existential needs of the possibility of satisfying “happiness”, nevertheless brought together a number of adverse events involving social loss, fear and suffering of many individuals.<sup>1</sup> Such negative phenomena, contrary to the universal order, among them deviant behavior of children and youth, have been categorized by Piotrowski as part of the subculture<sup>2</sup> of escape characteristic of youth subcultures

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<sup>1</sup> Krzyżak-Szymańska E., Szymański A.: Some selected deviance among children and youth in the province of Silesia. (in:) children youth safety – the risks of civilization in terms of: educational, institutional and legislative. Mysłowice 2005, p.15.

<sup>2</sup> A subculture is an informal group that bases its actions on separate models and rules of conduct. Members of this group generally do not respect the standards of conduct adopted in a given society. The classic definition of subcultures usually includes small social groups marginalized in the dominant cultural system of social trends, which negate or undermine the established and generally accepted patterns of social functioning. A subculture is also said to be a social group rejecting part of the values, norms and patterns of behavior found in their society and creating their own rules, that it is a system of cultural patterns, respectively, selected for specific characteristics, and the particular social environment, and because the characteristics of social roles are unique for this environment.

including : a) ideological assumptions, b) customs, c) creating an image, d) creative activity.<sup>3</sup>

The activity of certain subcultures (such as hippies, punks, skinheads) all contain such characteristics, it can happen, however, that this creates a youth subculture, fascinated by such a kind of music (meatheads), sports (skateboarders) or the possibilities offered by modern technology information (hackers). In these cases, the main element of group identity is the ratio of the "object of worship," and other manifestations of the functioning of a subculture (e.g., symbolism, ideology, customs) are formed on the basis of side effects or not. It should also be noted that members of informal groups of young people differ from one degree of involvement in subcultural activity. In addition to the leaders and ideologists of subcultures, and so people that shape the activity, there are a number of members of the movement, implementing the ideas of leaders, as well as a large group of fans, who identify with the overall message or selected manifestations of the subculture.

Youth subcultures are primarily a kind of culture of spontaneity in the way of living reality. At the same time young people who want to achieve specific social position always have two choices: accept norms and institutions in force in the socio-legal order, or their rejection, together with a value system imposed by the ruling class or party; in recent years, this has become a major social problem.

Representatives of the currently active subcultures distinguish themselves from other youth and adult community many features:

- their lifestyle with a distinct system of values and ideological assumptions;
- different role models representing the objects of imitation, and the specific objects of worship;
- separate standards and procedures, which in many cases are expressed in activities disturbing public opinion, and even evoking fear and panic among people;
- different, flamboyant style of dress;
- different expression of views such as publishing their own newspapers;

Also different are the reasons why contemporary youth choose to belong to youth subcultures. Above all, they are:

- a) critical attitude to the environment;
- b) lack of acceptance by the young generation of the surrounding socio-cultural realities, including the existing norms and values, especially the practices preferred by adults;
- c) attempt by youth to abolish the existing order to change their own life;
- d) the socio-economic and political, which becomes a source of social instability and growing unrest. Not everyone has equal access to life opportunities, resulting in accumulation of frustrations for those who may have less access and are aware of it;

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<sup>3</sup> Piotrowski P, Youth Subcultures. *op. cit.*, p. 14–15.

- e) socio-political events that cause the values of the average person to be marginalized;
- f) the current crisis of values;
- g) the resolution of issues without the participation of young people and treating them marginally.<sup>4</sup>

With the use of the terms “hooligans” and “fan” there is a great deal of confusion. One of the many reasons for this phenomenon may be that general awareness of these terms reaches us through reports in the media of sporting events, which use these terms “fan”, “hooligan” and “bandit” collectively, and almost as synonyms.

Czesław Matuszewski, a fan, recognizes an individual emotionally involved in either side of the fighting (...) “He’s cheering, and not watching, and is engaged in combat sports.” Fans are those stadium goers who are fascinated by the game, respect the players and want to support them, do not believe in hating their opponents, and imagine sporting events without vulgarity and aggression.

Negative connotations are associated with the word “hooligans” (“pseudo-fans”). According to the dictionary of foreign words “pseudo” (gr. pseudo – lie), that “(...) the first part of compound words, meaning: fake, the alleged”.

In the spirit of such an approach hooligans are imitation, fake, fans, pretending to be real fans. Wikipedia sees the phenomenon of hooligans, as an aggressive audience. As stated above, the definition of “hooligans” appears in the term “hooligan”, which has permanently stuck to this category.

The phenomenon of hooliganism and hooligan subculture is variously defined. On the basis of criminology acts of hooliganism are described as a kind of aggressive behavior of an irrational nature.<sup>5</sup> According to Czapów hooligans are people who have taken over patterns of hooligan subculture and identify with the social role of the hooligan. This author also believes that “the word *hooliganism*, understood as a social role, is commonly used to define deeds of aggressive, unselfish and reckless criminal activity committed and viewed as a means of obtaining prestige”<sup>6</sup>.

In his book, *Youth Subcultures*, Piotrowski in a very clear way lists the most important features of hooligan subculture, namely:

- a negative, dismissive attitude to the rules of social coexistence,
- valuing as positive qualities such as courage, physical strength, willingness to take risks, cunning, a contemptuous attitude towards women,
- committing non-economic crimes, often under the influence of alcohol and treating them as a kind of entertainment or sport,
- immaturity, expressing an inability to delay gratification, disregard of the results of their own actions and lack of plans for the future<sup>7</sup>.

<sup>4</sup> Kowalski R., *Descendants of Hooligans. Socio-cultural sources of aggression among sports spectators*. Torun 2000, p. 19–20.

<sup>5</sup> Piotrowski P., *Youth subculture*. Warsaw 2003, p. 66.

<sup>6</sup> Czapów Cz., *Hooliganism as a social role*. “Law and Life” 2/169, p. 2.

<sup>7</sup> Piotrowski P., *Subcultures*, op. Bogan, p. 67.

Among the many factors that determine criminal behavior important are both inadequate educational methods used by parents and teachers, and the normative expectations of the subculture. The phenomenon of hooligan behavior is generated in the family, school and peers. The increase in violence and cruelty among young people is due not only to genetic factors in human nature, but also impaired socialization.<sup>8</sup>

There is one specific term associated with the phenomenon of cheer and a sense of fashion. This term is *szalikowiec*. This name is reserved for those who wear colorful scarves, which are sort of a sign of their belonging and attachment to a sports club and its colors. Other accessories of the *szalikowiec* are huge flags, banners, the emblem of the club, fireworks, painted faces, hair dyed in club colors as well as military jackets, denim pants and military boots, so called *glans*.

Hooligans appeared on Polish stadiums in the early 70's, a fact that essentially all researchers agree on is there are growing uncertainties in determining which group was the first.

Hooligans of ŁKS insist on their primacy. According to *Elkaesiak* they originated when a group of students dressed in scarves, armed with flags gathered, in the same place for every game, singing songs and chanting slogans of ŁKS. The group soon began to grow. In addition to ŁKS hooligans, three other groups of claim that they were the first: Polonia Bytom, Lechia Legia Warsaw and Gdańsk. The fact is that in the early 70's fans ŁKS were the largest, most colorful and most active group. Shortly afterwards in the same decade, supporters of Lech Poznan, Leg Hooligans appeared in Polish stadiums. Shortly afterwards supporters of Lech Poznan, Legia Warsaw, Wisla Krakow and Polonia Bytom appeared on the scene soon joined by supporters of Arka Gdynia, Pogon Szczecin, Wrocław and Silesia GKS Tychy. However, one should also note the particularities of Polish football hooliganism, which in its early days coincided with the dominant period of 'gits'. The account must warrant that, in the cities where the movement of "gits" was the strongest, most were also hooligans.<sup>9</sup> There is no doubt that in the matches among younger fans, most violence was caused by 'gits'. It was evident also that hooligans took over from the gits most of their rules. These were: hatred of the Militia and the prohibition of any contact with it, a strong internal solidarity within the group (one for all and all for one), aversion to and independence from the world of adults, the recognition of the leaders of the brave men and women, strong, good in the fight, but above all "hard" and a strong manifestation of individuality.<sup>10</sup>

Adopting the ideology of 'gits', hooliganism spilled outside the stadiums. Hooliganism existed no longer just for the game, or shortly before it, hooligansism was all the time, and affected the whole a neighborhood. Groups of hooligans marked their territory by the scarves they wore, fighting with other groups of hooligans. On the walls of houses began to appear graffiti with slogans such as: "Legia rules", etc.

<sup>8</sup> Jędrzejewski J., A subculture of violence, Warsaw 2001, p. 53.

<sup>9</sup> Kowalski R., Descendants of hooligans. Socio-cultural sources of aggression among sports spectators. Radom 2000, p. 13.

<sup>10</sup> Sielecki P., Sobiech P., Hooligans. Katowice, 2006, p. 10–11.



In the late 70s, when gits began to rapidly disappear from Polish towns hooligans continued to develop as a movement,

The authorities became aware of such informal groups forming around the teams in all major cities. Since the constitution did not allow the existence of independent power groups, it was decided to take over the movement at the same time subjecting it to strong control. Grzegorz Aleksandrowicz gave the green light for promoting the initiative of "Fan Clubs" engaged in support for their team, introducing a "League Stadium" which scored the behavior of the fans and their cheering.<sup>11</sup>

Hooligans were not well-disposed towards such undertakings, suspecting that the new movement would not be independent. In part, however, they benefited from the events organized by the club fans, especially from club-subsidized travel to matches, meetings with players and programs issued by the fan club at football matches. They also participated in fan club meetings. Make friends working together, were guests on the occasion of the matches. Particularly well placed was the co-operation between Silesia Wroclaw fan clubs, Wisla Krakow, Ruch Chorzow, Polonia Bytom, GKS Tychy and Gdynia ark. But fan clubs rarely became informal leaders of hooligans groups. In their eyes the fan clubs did not fulfill the hopes pinned on them and after the death of Grzegorz Aleksandrowicz began to gradually decline. Nevertheless, it should be noted that clubs began to think of supporters clubs, as an organized group to be reckoned with.

In subsequent years, the movement "szalikowcy" developed rather quickly. Hooligans appeared in ever new and ever-smaller cities. Ideology hooligans firmly established in the late 70s one could already speak of more than 20 groups hooligans.<sup>12</sup> There was already a strong movement but in large part they were still random. On the map of Poland, Lubuskie, Warmia and Mazury, Lublin, and Świętokrzyskie were relatively free from the phenomenon.

After the formation of "Solidarity" (1980) by reducing censorship, news of the "exploits" of hooligans increasingly appeared in the press. Frequent reports of excesses of hooligans led to calls for severe punishment.<sup>13</sup>

During Martial Law hooligans were frequent participants in demonstrations and battles with riot police. Scarves served as a useful method of hiding one's face in order to avoid identification, and of protecting against tear gas. Hooligans fighting with the militia could be seen mainly in Gdansk, Wroclaw, Krakow and Szczecin. Sometimes there were also demonstrations at matches, and for several years: 31 August (anniversary of "Solidarity"), or 3<sup>rd</sup> May there were no organized football matches. All this did not cause too much change in the rules of the Hooligan Code. Perhaps the example of "Solidarity" showed hooligans that the Militia need not always be a source of fear as one could escape from it or fight it. In the late 80s the number of independent groups of hooligans rose to 60, there was now no region free of stadium hooligans.

<sup>11</sup> <http://wildboyszineblog.interia.pl>.

<sup>12</sup> Piotrowski P., Hooligans – the deviant behavior of sports fans. Torun 2000, p. 64–65.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p. 30.

Another youth subculture, which (after gits) had a strong impact on the *szalikowcy* was the ideology of 'skinheads'.

Skinhead ideology is based on love for the Polish and a deep hatred of strangers, especially Gypsies, blacks, Germans, Arabs and Jews. Skinheads believe that Canadians are being manipulated by Jewish nationalists and that the United States, Germany and Israel are taking over our good nation, pushing the Poles to the role of unskilled laborers. Skinheads take care of their physical condition considering that they must be strong, brave, proud, ready to fight. They must also develop a resistance to physical pain, so they cover their bodies with numerous tattoos.

The skinhead appearance is also characteristic: shoes, "Doc Martens" or combat boots, military jackets, military pants. They also often wear shirts with inscriptions like "Skinhead Ol" or Celtic crosses. They have, of course, cropped hair, (not to interfere with fighting). Skinheads had their own bands where they exchange information. In the first period of their activity they began fighting with the more numerous punks. In the struggle they were ruthless. They attacked leather jackets punks by "slicing". Skinheads quite quickly drove the punks off the streets.

Following the footsteps of their predecessors in the west, skinheads soon appeared in groups in the stadiums. At the beginning of this was in Warsaw (FC), Wroclaw (Silesia) and in Gdansk (Lechia). Then they appeared in the other stadiums. Skinheads in no way constituted the majority of hooligans, but they were active. Often they went on trips where they were very appreciated. Because of their "familiarity with the struggle". At the same time they influenced hooligans, more and more, by their habits and 'ideology'.

Hooligans quickly adopted the heavy shoes, and above all the close-cropped hair of skinheads. Hooligans began to visit more often matches played by the Polish National Team, often emphasizing their "Polishness" with expressions of anti-Jewish, anti-German, anti-Ukrainian feeling and to a lesser degree of aversion to blacks (occurring in league matches). Henceforth fans from central Poland were called "Jews", from the south-east "Ukrainians" and from Upper Silesia, "Germany". Hooligans did not tolerate the German flag in the first half of the 90s in the stadiums of the Silesian teams. During this period, almost all were broken with the consent of Silesian clubs. Hooligans began to resemble skinheads in their behaviour and actions. They would 'cut' the scarves of hostile fans on the street. Increasingly, they began to organize "fan meetings", they began to become part of the football environment, making the skinhead movement better known. Also, hooligans began to attach particular attention to their physical condition, often training for combat sports and reducing their consumption of alcohol.<sup>14</sup>

Currently in Poland there are over 200 independent team hooligans. Independent fan clubs of local teams are becoming more and more common.

<sup>14</sup> Zawartka M., Hooligans – young people in the stands of sports stadiums. (in:) The safety of children and adolescents – risk civilizational aspects: pedagogical, institutional and legislative. Mysłowice 2005, p. 54–65.

The behaviour of participants in the hooligan subculture is characterized by mystification of rioting. De Coubertin's ideals are rejected, and the subculture seems to prove George Orwell's statement that "serious sport has nothing to do with *fair play*. It is associated with hatred of jealousy, boastfulness, with contempt for all rules and sadistic pleasure in witnessing violence. In other words, sport is war – minus the shooting". War minus the shooting became the domain of fans gathered every year for a more and more bloody harvest.

Fans of traditionally hostile clubs wage continuous war with each other, with different levels of rage, both on their own, as well as during "guest appearances" of their club.

Trips to matches provide an opportunity to demonstrate "heroism" "courage", and "bravery"; one of the fundamental precepts of hooligan ideology is to "overcome fear."

The so-called "Fanatic's Handbook", compiled by Zielinski<sup>15</sup>, shows a peculiar code of conduct, whereby hooligans emphasize the need for mutual aid and solidarity. "Sometimes it is better to leave the situation bloodied than to escape thanks to fast legs."

As follows from the analysis presented, hooligan subculture represents a serious threat before, during and after matches.

Hooligans perceive their environment in a way that recalls the structure of the social organization of primitive tribes, dividing the world into two parts: 'us' and 'them' (strangers, enemies, all those which must be eliminated).<sup>16</sup> At the same time in this world of savagery and primitivism acts of destruction carried out are particular source of pride and satisfaction for hooligans, and the damage caused is a source of inspiration for the next time. Among them, Przemyslaw Piotrowski<sup>17</sup> identifies five most common forms of negative among hooligans, classifying them as follows:

- physical fighting;
- throwing dangerous objects;
- violent behavior on trains;
- acts of vandalism;
- intimidation of players and officials;

As already mentioned, much of the negative events that we classify as taking place during mass events, takes place immediately after its completion. From the perspective of hooligans this is most reasonable, because on the one hand they do not have to rush to catch the match, which is in fact of little interest to them, and on the other hand, this gives them an irresistible opportunity to give vent to their emotions, hence the meeting.

When they are not separated from each other by a fence, hostile parties try even more different types of attacks. Most confrontations start with supporters

<sup>15</sup> Zieliński R., *League hooligans*. Wrocław 1996, p. 15–16.

<sup>16</sup> Sahaj T., *The fans and hooligans – Analysis of stadium hooliganism*. "Professional sports" 7–8, 2002, p 16.

<sup>17</sup> Piotrowski P., *Subcultures*, *op. cit.*, p. 91–93.

of the opposing team, or insults and stones at police officers. Then there is only a collective direct clash during which injuries occur, ranging from the light to heavy, and in extreme cases, also fatal<sup>18</sup>.

Although the degree of internal organization of groups of hooligans are loose, their strength is a hierarchy founded on a particular structure. At the bottom are ordinary "hooligans newcomers" who do not engage in aggressive actions. For them, the game is "fashionable way of spending their free time and avoiding boredom. Above the "newcomers" are the warriors, who themselves are called hooligans. At the top are "Holses" who are the Iron Guard<sup>19</sup>, an hooligan elite.<sup>20</sup> In this area, however, there is a continuous evolution towards a more mobile structure, where the leaders are the "leaders", then Holses, and finally the soldiers. Holses are – often the oldest and best-paid. They create a budget reserve, so the group can provide financial support in difficult times such as in case of conflict with the law on the part of a member. They are also responsible for providing military equipment to soldiers. In some groups there are even scouts, creating a bank of information about the enemy. Warriors fight "cwels", the enemy team's fans. On the front line fighting the so-called *nawojka* consist of the most seasoned members of the hooligans. These radical factions of hooligans also bear the name "Ultras Hooligans" or "Official Hooligans". They provide militia, which together with the most active hooligans travel to their teams, matches around the country and abroad.

Identification with the city or the club that makes a group of fans express a form of patriotic ideology, and war club colors are a substitute for the old battle flags strengthening unity of the group. But every war requires rules, and hooligans try to establish rules that direct the behavior of the members of their gangs.

As already mentioned, the hooligans are guided by certain principles.

At present a "code of honor", also known as the seven commandments, is widely known among Polish fans. According to the hooligan code:

- 1) A fan is with the club for better or worse, regardless of the performance of the players.
- 2) A fan does not work with the Police, he does not seek Police protection from other fans.
- 3) The struggle between the supporters must be fought with bare knuckles or in special cases, with the consent of both parties, with weapons.
- 4) Hostile fans cannot take cell phones, jackets, shoes and other things not related to rioting.
- 5) When a fan is alone against a larger group, he may, at most, propose a "solo".

<sup>18</sup> Tajak I., The occurrence of criminal events surrounding crowds and the role of the members of youth subcultures (in:) Materials Safety Conference audience of sports and culture. II Regional Narada, Silesian Stadium in Chorzow 22.10.2003, Katowice 2003, p. 10–11.

<sup>19</sup> Kudzia P., Pawełczyk G., Republic of scarves. "On" No. 15, 2003.

<sup>20</sup> Piotrowski P., Subcultures, *op. cit.*, p. 97–100.

- 6) There should be a truce between fans during international matches when the Polish national team is playing.
- 7) Respect their own rules and hierarchies.<sup>21</sup>

The *szalikowcy* ideology itself as can be seen is not overly complicated. It is expressed in the desire to manifest affection and sympathy for the team, beating the supporters of other clubs, battles with the Police and causing as much damage as possible. According to S. Wanat "for hooligans the situation is somewhat similar to that in the case of alternative youth movements occurring in previous years. They protested in the name of political or moral values. For hooligans today rebellion is based on identification with the club. Everything outside of this system is foreign, hostile bad. So [they must] fight it."<sup>22</sup>

Hooligans also created some extreme form of competition, modeled on tournaments. These are meetings of rival groups (traditionally or occasionally opposed to each other) in specific places and times in order to fight. A pre-defined number of participants is involved in a fight, and the participation of outsiders is not permitted. The places of these meetings are meadows, parks and deserted sports stadiums. In this confrontation – "uptake" fans usually arrange to support the Internet posting "invitation" to the pages devoted to football. Battle fought in the brouhaha caused uptake and are reflected in the numerous commentaries published in newspapers hooligans "zines" and 'prestigious' hooligans' leagues created for the occasion.<sup>23</sup>

The League is a compilation of disorderly conduct made by the same hooligans. It is made on an ongoing basis, but about the position in the league decide themselves fans. They do so in specially prepared questionnaires. In these, each group writes its opinion as to who the ten most dangerous groups of supporters are. Completed forms are returned to those who count the votes. 10 points are awarded for first place, nine for the second, eight for third, etc.<sup>24</sup>

Here, a dangerous phenomenon is that fans have embraced fanaticism and hatred, attacking at every opportunity. Among them are smart people with ambitions for personal power and who can provide hooligans with charismatic leadership. This presents an important social problem, as evidenced by the reaction of public opinion, national and international authorities and institutions including the management of sports organizations.

#### CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STUDY POPULATION OF FANS

Seeking answers to the questions: Who are the "stadium Gladiators", and the extent to which they are prone to breaking norms of social intercourse – hooligans who declared that they are active participants in such activities were questioned. Research involved 180 fans of teams from the Province of Silesia and Małopolska

<sup>21</sup> <http://www.kibice.pl.net>.

<sup>22</sup> J. Dudala, Traditional antagonisms. "Sport" of 02.27.1998, p. 9.

<sup>23</sup> Sahaj T., Fans, op. cit, p.17.

<sup>24</sup> Pawłowski T., A Few Good Men. "Politics", 18 November 2000, p. 98th.

Among those surveyed the most numerous and active groups of fans were aged 15–20 years (43.3% of respondents). The second largest segment comprised older fans aged between 21–29 years (41.1% of respondents). The least numerous was the last category, fans over 30 years of age (15.6% of respondents). It seems that the age structure of the fans is a reflection of the existing trend in this regard. Hooligans are relatively young people, not having too many social obligations, who could devote their time and money to be with the club and travel with their team.

An analysis of respondents' education suggests that hooligans are characterized by low levels of education and that the largest segment (39%) of respondents consisted of people with vocational education (see Figure 1).




Figure 1. Supporters Education

However, taking into account the known fact that this group consists of young people, in addition to questions concerning their education respondents were asked about their current activity.

In assessing the indicated variable, it turned out that 88 of those surveyed (48.9%) declared that they were still continuing their education – whether in technical schools 13.3%, or as high schools (2.8%) or basic vocational school (5%) or as students (17.2%). It is worth noting that the remainder of those who are not in education is not entirely passive in life. Indeed, they are either working odd jobs (16.7% of respondents) or have permanent employment (19.4% of respondents). 27 people, representing 15% of the sample group, declared that they had no work.

Respondents were also asked about their possible criminal convictions. The results showed that despite the fact that they operate in a conflict-prone environment relatively few stated that they had any convictions (28 people, 15.6%). This suggests that respondents were either very quiet or street-smart. (FIGURE 2).

Here it should be noted that football hooliganism has rarely resulted in prosecutions.

Matuszewicz wrote in his book "Sports Event" that hooligans are mainly young people with no depth of interest, coming so often from marginalized and pathological families. As it turns, the results obtained contradicted this description and widespread social stereotypes.

It may be surprising, then, that not only hordes of half-wits and unemployed wasters participate in stadium brawls. It should be noted that hooligans often come from so-called 'good homes'; they have no problems with learning or everyday work and are exemplary citizens and "exemplary heads of families", which is also confirmed by further data on the family situation of the respondents.




Figure 2. Judicial penalty fans

I am a fan of my team, and identify with it. My enemies are all those who are doing anything to interfere with my team. Who is not with me is against me! And who is against me, he must be punished. (...) The world is evil and vile, because it is against my club. Those who think otherwise are stupid and abnormal.<sup>25</sup>

Such declarations and perceptions of what it means to be a fan for hooligans in the raise the issue of rioting.

First respondents were asked what it means to be a real fan.

The analysis of the collected material shows that for more than 22% questioned, being a fan is above all cheering their team. Among the more important statements exchanged in this regard, there are statements indicating that being a true fan is wearing scarves and colors of the club (16.1%), this being with the team in good and bad times (10%) and regularly going to sporting events and club away matches (14.4%).

For some respondents to be a supporter of not only associated with spontaneous encouragement, team loyalty, knowledge of the players or going to the

<sup>25</sup> Zieliński R., *Memoirs of the fans. People from the stigma of Heysel*. Wrocław, 1993, p. 47.

stadium and travel for the club, but the destruction of colors and scarves of the opposing team (12.8%) and participation (13.9% .) (Table 1).

Table 1. What does it mean to be a fan?

O.	Response of categories	Responses of Number	
		N	%
1	Cheering the squad	41	22,8
2	Being with the team in situations of good and bad	18	10,0
3	Systematic going to sporting events and participation in meetings away	26	14,4
4	Wearing a scarf and club colors	29	16,1
5	Involvement in fights	25	13,9
6	Destruction of colors, scarves opposing team	23	12,8
7	Being faithful to only one team	9	5,0
8	Knowledge of all party members	9	5,0
Total		180	100,0

B. Karolczyk-Biernacka points out that the behavior of supporters often are close to psychopathological symptoms.<sup>26</sup> This thesis is confirmed by the analysis of another question in which respondents were asked to comment on what they think should accompany each sporting spectacle.

The material gathered shows that for 36.7% of respondents, a sporting event is primarily associated with a fight with the police.

According to respondents, the a sports event is also good where there is a fight with the other team's fans (17.8%) and those where there is a club picking up flags and scarves (15%). A certain proportion (6.7%) of the sample group also believed that the city and stadium should be spectacularly vandalized. Only a small group of people stated that the match is most important (8.3%) and should be supported by spontaneous cheering (6.7%). Some respondents also felt that the fans should paint their faces in the team colors (6.7%). A detailed breakdown of the variable is shown in Table 2.

Table 2. What should accompany each sporting spectacle?

O.	Categories of response	Responses of Number	
		N	%
1	Devastation and vandalization of the city and stadium	12	6,7
2	Disturbing bystanders	4	2,2
3	Fights with police	66	36,7
4	Taking the club scarves	27	15,0
5	Paint color club	12	6,7

<sup>26</sup> Karolczyk-Biernacka B., The problem of aggression in sport. (in:) violence in everyday life. Red. B. Hołyst. Warsaw 1997, p. 128.



6	The fight against the opposing team fans	32	17,8
7	Match fixture	15	8,3
8	Cheering team	12	6,7
Total		180	100,0

Being a supporter is inextricably associated with activity associated with participation in sports events. In the next question the respondents were asked to indicated how often they took part in matches played in their area and away matches of their team.

The results indicate that over 40% of respondents believed that they attended the games very often. 27% surveyed said that their participation was frequent. It is noteworthy that 15% of the study declared that they always went to their team's matches.

Nearly 10% of those responding stated that they were rarely involved in the matches of their team. (Table 3)

Table 3. Frequency of attendance at matches on "home soil"

O.	Categories of response	Responses of Number	
		N	%
1	Always	27	15,0
2	Very often	77	42,8
3	Often	49	27,2
4	Sometimes	10	5,6
5	Rarely	13	7,2
6	Very rarely	4	2,2
Total		180	100,0

Looking at this share of fans in the away meetings it must be stated that over 60% of them believe that they took part in trips very often or often. Add to this almost 9% of the fans who defined their commitment in the 'always' category suggests that whether a team plays at home or away, they can always count on the support of their fans. (Table 4)

Table 4. Frequency of attendance at matches at away

O.	Categories of response	Responses of Number	
		N	%
1	Always	16	8,9
2	Very often	58	32,2
3	Often	55	30,6
4	Sometimes	23	12,8
5	Rarely	14	7,8
6	Very rarely	14	7,8
Total		180	100,0

Respondents supporters also believed that participation in the culture of fans gives them a sense of security (Figure 4) 94 people (52.2%) of 180 respondents are convinced of this.




Figure 4. Participation in the culture of fans and a sense of security

Also, more than half of respondents (56.1%) feel that participation in the group of fans gives them a sense of power (Figure 5).




Figure 5. Participation in the culture of fans and a sense of power

Respondents also believe that a group of fans satisfy their inner need related to separation from the existing reality. 102 respondents are convinced about this aspect of their lives, representing 56% of the sample population (the distribution of variable graph 6).




Figure 6. Participation in culture and meeting fans' needs of detachment from reality

A similar position is accompanied by the fans in terms of their participation in the culture of fans and the possibility of anonymity and a sense of impunity. About this aspect, and “the blessings of divine” belonging to the group, says 70% of the respondents (Figure 7).




Figure 7. Participation in the culture of fans and a sense of anonymity and impunity

It may seem curious that the vast majority (65.6%) of supporters believe that participation in the group of supporters do not raise their self-esteem (the distribution of variables are presented in Table 5).

Table 5. Participation in the culture of self-fans

O.	Categories of response	Responses of Number	
		N	%
1	No increase self-esteem	118	65,6
2	Raised self-esteem	62	34,4
Total		180	100,0

Respondents also believed that the hooliganism subculture did not satisfy their need to demonstrate their abilities to a wider group of people (for the distribution of variables, see Table 6).

Table 6. Participation in the culture of fans and the opportunity to demonstrate to a wider group of people

O.	Categories of response	Responses of Number	
		N	%
1	It does not allow to demonstrate	107	59,4
2	Lets show	73	40,6
Total		180	100,0

Also asked whether participation in the culture of other fans met their needs – the vast majority of the respondents (91.7%) stated that they did not. If the answer was yes, they pointed to such needs as belonging and acceptance.

In discussing the issues, we also need to mention a conflict of roles. Role conflict occurs when the provisions relating to two or more statuses are contradictory because of the presence of many roles, such as student, friend, supporter, member of the group. In many cases, it causes tension in the role when the effort in the accomplishment of actions resulting from the social status causes anxiety, stress and tension. It can therefore be said that if at least two different systems of norms oblige their recipients to alternate their behavior, it encourages a situation of conflicting expectations. Therefore, out of necessity, standards of one of the systems will not be respected.

Because people derive great satisfaction in life from participation in groups, they will have a significant effect on the behavior of group members. Generally, groups are less tolerant of behavior that deviates from their standards than society as a whole. In this line, it was decided to examine whether the group put pressure on the respondents by approval or disapproval.

Respondents believe that the fans (hooligans) in their neighborhood environment met with approval (31%) or with general acquiescence (28%). Almost 20% believe that their neighbors are rather against them and more than 10% are convinced that they are the subject of strong opposition (Table 7).

Table 7. The assessment of the environmental approval by the fans' neighbors

O.	Categories of response	Responses of Number	
		N	%
1	Accept	56	31,1
2	Sometimes accept	50	27,8
3	Rather, they are against	35	19,4
4	Strongly oppose	19	10,6
5	I do not know	20	11,1
Total		180	100,0

Respondents also believed that they did not feel a strong obstruction because of their situation. They believe that being hooligans is not associated directly with any stigma and overt disapproval. Some respondents were aware that in the neighborhood in which they operate part of the population is opposed to them or despise them. A significant proportion are also people (28%), who did not know how to answer.

Table 8. The assessment of the environmental approval by the residents of the estate of fans.

O.	Categories of response	Responses of Number	
		N	%
1	Accept	41	22,8
2	Sometimes accept	23	12,8
3	Rather, they are against	32	17,8
4	We strongly oppose	24	13,3
5	Disregard	10	5,6
6	I do not know	50	27,8
Total		180	100,0

Research also indicates that active supporters do not need to worry about the potential role conflict, and that the vast majority (65%) have friends who accept their love for violent rioting (Table 9).

Table 9. The assessment of the environmental approval by the friends of fans

O.	Categories of response	Responses of Number	
		N	%
1	Accept	118	65,6
2	Sometimes accept	27	15,0
3	Rather, they are against	10	5,6
4	Disregard	15	8,3
5	I do not know	10	5,6
Total		180	100,0

To sum up this part of the discussion, we can say that the group behavior, like all social behavior, depends largely on the standards in force in the immediate social structure. Standards are the result of a gradual process of interaction between members of groups. An individual behaves in his own way, and others confirm the adequacy or inadequacy of this behavior and suggest the desired change. Therefore is not surprising that hooligans do not feel the need to change their behavior when their attitude and conduct, even if apparently inconsistent with general rules, and moral standards, do not meet with social rejection by their closest friends and acquaintances.

Many sociologists emphasize that hooligans present a permanent structural element of football and other sports. At the same time J. Zdebski points out that in Poland football fan subculture is a widely recognized and significant segment of youth. However, an important starting point for the analysis of hooligan subcultures and accepted by them was to check the value of what respondents consider to be a subculture, and whether they themselves as supporters believe that they belong to a subculture.

Of the 180 respondents 18 (10%) could not identify what for them is a subculture, although the three alternative definitions of the term were provided in the survey. Although respondents were given the possibility of providing their own definition of a subculture, none did so.

The most common definition of election enjoyed subculture indicating that it is a relatively stable social group living on the margins of the dominant trends in the system of social life, expressing their individuality through denial or undermining the well-established and widely accepted cultural patterns. A third of the surveyed people chose this definition. The other two definitions of subculture as a range of symbolic and axiological references, indicating the separateness of the group from other groups, and describing subculture as part of a group of people rejecting the values, norms and patterns of behavior accepted in their society and forming its own rules, received, respectively, 31.1% and 25.6% of responses – the overall distribution of variable Table 10.

Table 10. The definition of a subculture

O.	Categories of response	Responses of Number	
		N	%
1	A social group living on the margins of social life.	60	33,3
2	A range of symbolic references distinguishing the group from other groups.	56	31,1
3	Group rejecting the values and norms recognized society.	46	25,6
4	I do not know	18	10,0
5	Other	0	0
Total		180	100,0

As for whether the fans felt that they belong to a subculture, 10% said that they did not belong to a subculture, they were just fans. 14.4% of respondents were inclined to say that that they were unlikely to belong to a subculture. 12.8% of those surveyed could not decide.

One third of respondents were fully convinced that as fans they belonged to a subculture. One in four believed that to be a fan (hooligans) rather meant that one belonged to a subculture.

The distribution of the variable suggests that fans prefer to talk of themselves as hooligans, etc. rather than as members of a subculture. Perhaps the concept

of a subculture is seen by hooligans as unmanly, and prefer a more masculine formulation.

Over the years, the socially accepted model of a football fan underwent continual, albeit systematic changes. In the past, a common example, which appealed to the media was a fan pattern associated with each club. Representative of this pattern were supporters, who not only remained true to their team, regardless of its ups and downs, but were also prepared to make various sacrifices, such as financial support for their team. Today, this “ordinary fan” remains on the margins of interest to both the world of scholarship, and the media. What arouses interest, instead is the stadium “gladiator”, seeking adventure and the opportunity for a fight.

Among hooligans can be found many extreme factions and groups whose activities and intimidating names are reminiscent of the *modus operandi* of various gangs. Particular members of the gangs are particularly aggressive and violent, and in so doing, radical and ruthless. They put into practice what might be called a philosophy of violence.<sup>27</sup> Not afraid to use dangerous weapons they do not fear serious injury.

However, not everyone can become a knight of the stadium and enter the gang. Such a group requires dedication, courage, respect and knowledge of the hooligan ideology. Gang members themselves claim to be the worthy representatives of club team. They have to be representatives of the city region and usually actively and faithfully support their regional favorites.

Around the “real hooligans”, on the fringes of groups gravitate enthusiasts, who can only dream of participating when they demonstrate bravery and courage.

Bearing in mind this aspect the respondents were asked whether they belonged to the gang of his team.

113 respondents answered the question in the affirmative, representing nearly 63% of the sample population. The remainder – 37.2% – said that they are not part of the structure of the gangs operating around their sports club.

Table 11. Membership in the club gangs

O.	Categories of response	Responses of Number	
		N	%
1	No	67	37,2
2	Yes	113	62,8
Total		180	100,0

However, non-membership of the gangs does not imply passivity of action. The data obtained reveal that more than 68% of the subjects took part in such events. Almost a third of respondents denied having taken part in such activities (Table 12).

<sup>27</sup> Zdebski J., *Football and emotions. “Characters”* NR6, 1998, p. 28.

Table 12. The share of respondents

O.	Categories of response	Responses of Number	
		N	%
1	No	57	31,7
2	Yes	123	68,3
Total		180	100,0

One can say that membership in the gangs, is inextricably linked to participation. Hooligans of lower rank are responsible for, cheering, small skirmishes, or initiation of fights.

Those surveyed, indicated, as the reason for his participation in this form of fight, in particular the desire to show the superiority of their club to other fans. For many fans, fights provide the opportunity to test their skills.

Table 13. Theme share

O.	Categories of response	Responses of Number	
		N	%
1	He did not take / a	52	28,9
2	The possibility of discharge of aggression	27	15,0
3	The desire to demonstrate in front of others	15	8,3
4	Raising self-esteem	15	8,3
5	Check your skills in battle	26	14,4
6	Persuasion of other fans	14	7,8
7	The desire to show the superiority of our club to the other supporters	26	14,4
8	Other reasons	5	2,8
Total		180	100,0

Not everyone gets a chance to represent the club in prearranged battles. The rules for this competition include, as a basic element, a confrontation during the melee, and an equal number of "fighters" that may be involved in a skirmish. The best hooligan teams to represent the club are like famous gladiatorial schools in ancient times and so select only the most courageous, strongest and toughest fighters.

The group's effectiveness in fighting provides glory or shame in the hooligan league and the wider community around the club subculture.

It should also be noted that interest in these meetings is becoming increasingly popular among fans and we hear more and more views, that this illegal activity carried out on commons and desolate parking lots is becoming more important than the official sports performance.

Polish football stadiums have suffered a wave of brutal violence over the years. This has resulted in a series of measures including the urgent adoption of the Law on safety of mass events.



Currently, the law is an important instrument to ensure not only the security of public events, but also to protect public safety and order. The Act has a number of sections, which are designed to combat crime in and around the stadium. These include stadium bans, monitoring, or the relatively new obligation to identify participants in certain events.

With such a broad formulation of projects and legal matters, the question still remains what effect these new laws will have on football hooliganism.

It is also clear that further investigation and research are needed on the reasons for the excesses of football hooligans.

First, respondents were asked to evaluate solutions implemented to reduce stadium excesses.

Table 14. The effectiveness of preventing destructive behavior on a scale of 1 to 10

O.	Categories of response	Responses of Number	
		N	%
1	Rating 1	38	21,1
2	Rating 2	36	20,0
3	Rating 3	18	10,0
4	Rating 4	38	21,1
5	Rating 5	18	10,0
6	Rating 6	10	5,6
7	Rating 7	13	7,2
8	Rating 8	9	5,0
Total		180	100,0

The results do not inspire optimism. Although some respondents are tempted to issue an "8" in the adopted ten-scale, but the number of such evaluations was only 5%. Few more percentage points gained "7" and "6", which the indicated 7.2% and 5.6% of those surveyed.

From the data in table 14 it is evident that the legal system adopted against violent behavior is assessed by sports spectators as inefficient, ineffective, and weak. In assessing it, respondents focused on a scale of "1" to "4" which suggests that public authorities and sports clubs need to present new ideas, in order to effectively counteract the threats presented by stadium hooligans.

The main idea introduced in 2007 by specialists in the fight against crime and hooliganism was that of 24-hour courts. The promoters of this solution indicated that the severity of the punishment is not a deterrent, but rather its inevitability, and how quickly it will be applied. This idea was analyzed with interest. Unfortunately, a plurality of respondents gave it the lowest possible rating, 1, indicating a complete lack of effectiveness of the solution. 65% of respondents made this assessment. The second most common score was found to be "2" which was the assessment of almost 20% of respondents. From these data it can be concluded that this aspect of the policy of limiting stadium hooliganism turned out to be

a paper tiger. At the same time it is hardly surprising that assessment of the situation by those concerned, the highest representatives of the Government, led to the conclusion that this law presents more problems than benefits, and requires a deep reform because of its narrow scope of activity mainly involving drunk drivers.

Safety at sports events is an element of public safety. It is regulated by numerous Acts and the Council of Europe conventions, ratified by the Polish Republic.

The basic legal act regulating the safety issues at sports grounds as previously stated is the law on safety of mass events, where the event organizer is chiefly responsible for the safety of persons present at the event and for order during the event..

The research material collected and experience with the operation of the law on safety of mass events show that we do not guarantee a solution to maintain public order and security at events, especially at football matches. The escalation of violence and disorderly behavior of football fans in particular, increasingly require the Police force to restore order.

The proposed legislative measures are only one tool in the fight against violence, xenophobia, and intolerance in sports stadiums. To be effective, it must be properly applied. This requires the cooperation and common strategy of the Police, justice, organizers, the management of club stadiums, stadium staff, fans and non-governmental organizations.

Activities related to the prevention of violence and racism should proceed in an integrated way. Legislative measures should be complemented by educational and social progress. With regard to the problem of aggression and social pathology of groups of supporters, efforts should be made to boost positive behavior and reduce the role of factors that may cause negative behavior. Basically, the aim of such measures is prevention, which in future will result in the absence of social risks.

The most desirable solution, to reduce the pathological behavior of sports fans, from a social point of view and because of the cost of its implementation is primary prevention. Many researchers points out that this type of intervention is characterized by two features: first, it is proactive, in that promotes positive behavior, the second is a warning that there is a problem.

Criminologists suggest that the prevention of crime should include four integrally linked planes.

1. Prevention of crime before it occurs.
2. Legislative prevention, which aims to create standards of criminal law.
3. The practice of criminal law, consisting of a policy of judicial punishment and prosecution of perpetrators.
4. Punishment, including fines and imprisonment.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Hotyst B., *Criminology*. Warsaw 1994, p. 539.

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