

Summer 1960

Foreign Aid to Europe as Viewed by the United States Senators and Representatives from Kansas, 1947-01/01/1959

Darrell Munsell
Fort Hays Kansas State College

Follow this and additional works at: <https://scholars.fhsu.edu/theses>



Part of the [History Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Munsell, Darrell, "Foreign Aid to Europe as Viewed by the United States Senators and Representatives from Kansas, 1947-01/01/1959" (1960). *Master's Theses*. 683.
<https://scholars.fhsu.edu/theses/683>

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at FHSU Scholars Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of FHSU Scholars Repository.

FOREIGN AID TO EUROPE AS VIEWED BY
THE UNITED STATES SENATORS AND
REPRESENTATIVES FROM KANSAS
1947-1959

Being

A Thesis

Presented to the Graduate Faculty
of the Fort Hays Kansas State College in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the Degree of Master of Arts

by

Darrell Munsell, B. A.

Fort Hays Kansas State College

Date July 20, 1960

Approved Eugene P. Craiss
Major Professor

Ralph G. Coder
Chairman Graduate Council

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION	1
Statement of the problem	2
Limitations and sources	3
II. A HISTORY OF THE MARSHALL PLAN	6
Interim Aid	8
Isolationism	9
Harriman Committee	12
Herter Committee	13
Krug Report	14
Nourse Report	15
Republicans in Congress	16
The Democrats in Congress	19
Bipartisan foreign policy	21
Controversies over European Recovery Program	22
Mutual Security Administration	24
III. SENATORS	26
Senator Capper	27
Senator Reed	34
Senator Schoeppel	40
Senator Carlson	47
IV. REPRESENTATIVES	53
Representative Cole	54
Representative Hope	59

CHAPTER	PAGE
Representative Meyer	64
Representative Rees	73
Representative Scrivner	85
Representative Smith	94
Representative Myron V. George	104
Representative Miller	106
Representative Avery	107
Representative Breeding	108
Representative Newell A. George	110
Representative Hargis	111
V. CONCLUSIONS	113
BIBLIOGRAPHY	124
APPENDIX	129

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE	PAGE
I. Recorded Vote in Senate on Foreign Aid Bills . . .	52
II. Recorded Vote in House on Foreign Aid Bills . . .	112

ABSTRACT

Foreign aid has become a traditional part of the foreign policy of the United States, but in the eleven years since the enactment of the Marshall Plan there has been a steady increase of opposition to foreign aid programs. The votes in the Senate in favor of the Marshall Plan were 4.06 times the negative votes. Ten years later, in 1958, the "yea" votes in the Senate on the Mutual Security Administration bill were 3.00 times as many as the "nay" votes. The votes in the House for these same two years show an even greater manifestation of a growing opposition to foreign aid. In 1948 the affirmative votes were 4.48 greater than the negative, while in 1958 the figure drops to 1.93.

While only two out of the eight Kansans in Congress voted against the Marshall Plan in 1948, three voted against the Mutual Security Act in 1958, and Senator Schoeppel, who did not vote, was known to be against the bill. This indicates that the Kansas Senators and Representatives in Washington have roughly followed the national trend of a mounting opposition to foreign aid bills (3.00 more "yea" votes as "nay" votes in 1948 as compared to 2.00 more "yea" votes than "nay" votes in 1958).

Throughout this study the writer has attempted to show why this opposition has increased as far as the Kansans were concerned. Speeches, both in and out of Congress as well

as the public statements of the Kansas Senators and Representatives for the period 1948 to 1959 were checked in an attempt to ascertain why these men voted as they did. A study was also made of the Congressional Record, the Topeka Daily Capital, the Hutchinson News-Herald, the Garden City Daily Telegram, the Emporia Gazette, and the Kansas City Star. Letters of inquiry were also submitted to these men.

It is the considered opinion of the author that the main reason for the Kansans voting in favor of foreign aid was basically due to the agricultural interest of their State. Many of the Senators and Representatives from Kansas have attempted to solve the problem of surpluses in agricultural commodities by foreign aid legislation. The majority of these men who voted in favor of foreign aid hoped that these plans would permit the flow of agricultural commodities to the rest of the world. This would, as they believed, solve the problem of hunger in the world while solving the problem of surpluses in the United States.

That feeding hungry people is a humanitarian purpose cannot be disputed, but to feed the hungry of the world and collect a return for the food is a degree beyond a humanitarian purpose. The Kansans wanted the United States to be the chief source of food for the world, yet they wanted the United States to be justly compensated for their food in the form of foreign currencies, strategic materials or military defense in Europe

Not all the Kansans believed foreign aid would solve the agricultural surplus problem in the United States. Those men who voted "nay" on foreign aid measures argued that a better and a cheaper plan could be legislated to solve the surplus problem. They believed that foreign aid measures were not the best defensive maneuver the United States could utilize for security in the world. They believed the money collected from taxpayers of the United States could be used to gain the real advantages of security for the nation. The key to this security for the United States was a financially sound nation, one that built its military defenses upon its own shores, not the far-off shores of foreign countries.

Although the form of foreign aid has changed considerably, such as in the form of the Point Four Program (assistance to underdeveloped countries), Mutual Security Administration, or the International Loan Fund; the debate in Congress concerning foreign aid has not actually changed. Those arguments that were used in 1948 were used in 1959.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Foreign aid to Europe has long been a controversial topic in the United States. Two points of view have been expressed regarding the beginnings of the United States foreign aid programs. One school of thought is that the program of foreign aid to Europe started with the Lend-lease program of 1940. The second is that the program was initiated in a period of international peace with its actual beginnings made known to the public in the address given at Harvard on June 5, 1947 by Secretary of State George Catlett Marshall. This study recognizes the second school of thought, and since the author is more concerned with presenting the attitudes of the Kansas Senators and Representatives in United States Congresses from 1948 to 1959 relative to the Marshall Plan, little mention will be made of the first two phases of the entire aid to Europe program, which were the Greek-Turkish Loan, commonly known as the Truman Doctrine, and the European Interim Aid Program.

The Marshall Plan legislation was officially known as the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, or as it was known in actual operation, the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA). These names will be used interchangeably in this study. After 1951, foreign aid to Europe no longer was classified as the

Marshall Plan or as the ECA but was known as the Mutual Security Administration. The year 1951 marks the beginning of a shift from purely economic aid to military aid, and this change is distinctly noted by the implications of the title for the aid programs, the Mutual Security Administration (MSA).

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The purpose of this study is to examine the attitudes and the opinions expressed publicly by the Kansas Senators and Representatives in the United States Congress relative to foreign aid to Europe as it was enacted during the years of 1947 to 1959. This study will cover the Marshall Plan (ECA) and the Mutual Security Administration (MSA) to 1959. Other forms of aid programs, such as the 1947 Greek-Turkish Loan, will be mentioned only intermittently as a comparison for the Marshall Plan.

Chapter II is a brief discussion of the Marshall Plan, how it originated and was enacted. This brief discourse is by no means a complete one. It is intended to be only an introduction to the overall legislative problems produced by the Marshall Proposal and some of the basic solutions employed to solve these difficulties. A quick survey of the Congressional attitude toward the Marshall Plan measure is outlined in Chapter II.

In Chapter III, the arguments supporting the voting

records of the United States Senators from Kansas on European aid are presented. This chapter is only a survey of the various positions of these men. No final conclusions are drawn from the surveys. The conclusions of these Senators, drawn as neatly into one basic summarization for each individual man as research would permit, will be found in Chapter V. This conclusive chapter is also applicable to Chapter IV, which describes the voting records of the United States Representatives from Kansas.

LIMITATIONS AND SOURCES

Statements, formal letters, and newsletters released by the Senators and Representatives should be the chief sources used in discovering the true opinions of these men. Due to the difficulty of obtaining such correspondence, heightened by incompleteness of files for newsletters and letters, speeches not recorded or not kept, or the inaccuracies of verbal memory, the author was forced to confine his attention, almost exclusively, to documented statements found in the Congressional Record or the more secondary newspaper comments pertaining to this subject matter. However, informal statements from the men surveyed in this report, who are still living and who were willing to make comments, were obtained by the writer. In most cases, these statements, in letter form, supplemented the declarations already published

in the Congressional Record or in the various newspapers used by the author.

Few secondary source books may be utilized in connection with the survey of Kansas Senators and Representatives. To a large degree, the material from secondary sources reviewed for this study has been used only in Chapter II, the brief history of the Marshall Plan.

No attempt has been made here to exhaust the material available on foreign aid to Europe. Only the material directly concerned with the Kansas Congressmen and the specific problem of foreign aid to Europe was used. Five Kansas newspapers were covered thoroughly with particular attention given to the Congressional election years and the periods of time when foreign aid measures were being debated in the Congress. A study was made of some of the major newspapers in Kansas from the newspaper files at the Kansas State Historical Society Library at Topeka, Kansas. Newspapers used for this study were the Topeka Daily Capital, Hutchinson News-Herald, Garden City Daily Telegram, Emporia Gazette, and the Kansas City Star. The Salina Journal and the Wichita Beacon were also studied. These two newspapers, however, were not as extensively covered as the other five newspapers.

This study is not an attempt to solve the riddle of foreign aid. The author is not advocating any aid program, nor does the author wish to imply any malice toward foreign

CHAPTER II

A HISTORY OF THE MARSHALL PLAN

Immediately following World War II the many political, social, and military, as well as economic problems of Western Europe, the Middle East, and Asia came to be regarded as arising from economic difficulties. The solution to all these problems was therefore felt by the United States Government to be an economic one. It was the rush of events in the winter of 1947 that led the Policy Planning Staff of the United States State Department to seek an expedient capable of solving the troubles of a Greek Civil War, a remedy for the economic quandary causing hunger in Western Europe, and, in general, a policy capable of dealing with the threat of communist expansion over these territories. Past efforts such as the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and earlier American loans which had been utilized, to stimulate the economic heartbeat of the war-wrecked world, were coming to an end, yet recovery had not been attained.¹

This tenebrous scene was at its nadir in Greece, a country where the government had been plunged into rebellion,

¹John C. Campbell et al., The United States in World Affairs, 1947-1948 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 27.

and where economic conditions within the country itself hindered the recovery of that government from its chaotic situation. The instability of Turkey also presented a disturbing situation. When it seemed nothing short of military and economic aid to Greece would save the falling government, Secretary of State George Marshall gave new hope in a speech delivered in Cambridge, Massachusetts on June 5, 1947.² In the body of that speech Marshall inserted the idea of providing aid to European nations who would, through a process of self-help, cooperate with the United States to regain or rebuild their economic strength in an effort to ward off communism. The people of the United States were thus introduced to the idea of peace-time economic aid to Europe, and with the crisis in Europe caused by the two relentless pressures of Soviet expansion and economic poverty, the first of which was simultaneously promoted by the second, the concept rapidly attracted many friends. Few American people disputed the challenge of Soviet ambition,³ and the recent adjournment of the Moscow conference brought little if any hope of accomplishing world peace. The speech was timely in that the opposition to

²Ibid.

³James W. Wiggins and Helmut Schoeck, Foreign Aid Re-examined (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1958), p. 14.

internationalism, composed of the seemingly always present isolationist bloc in the United States, had little material to present to the citizens of the United States that they would accept as counterevidence to the policy of international cooperation because of the European crisis.⁴

The Harvard Speech stressed a broader arrangement than economic aid to Greece and Turkey, later known as the Truman Doctrine, which had been under Congressional discussion during March and April of 1947. This dividing line between the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall plan was the concept of economically aiding all of Europe through the broader Marshall Plan rather than just aiding Greece and Turkey; the wider Marshall Plan, however, stimulated many arguments after the ultimate passage of the Greek-Turkish aid bill. Some Congressmen could accept the Greek-Turkish aid but could not support a more general economic plan: that of aid to all of Europe.

INTERIM AID

President Harry S. Truman summoned the members of Congress to a special session on October 23, 1947, giving two reasons for the necessity of having this session as,

⁴Harry Bayard Price, The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1955), p. 25. Hereinafter cited as Price, Marshall Plan.

first, the crisis in Western Europe and, second, the inflationary conditions within the United States.⁵ The President believed action on emergency relief appropriations could not wait until January inasmuch as France urgently requested \$357,000,000 and Italy \$285,000,000.⁶

On November 17, 1947, one month after the opening of the special session, Public Law 389 was passed sending \$522,000,000 to France, Italy, and Austria in a stopgap measure.⁷

ISOLATIONISM

The Eightieth Congress was Republican in composition and was dedicated to a reduction in taxes and in the amount of government spending. One particular faction of the Republican Party built its Presidential hopes around a traditional American premise, isolationism. This wing coincided with the conservative Midwestern representation, while the internationalist component, the liberal branch of the Party, was a product of the coastal areas. Almost a

⁵Ibid., pp. 47-48. The session was to commence on November 17, 1947.

⁶New York Times, October 4, 1947.

⁷Price, Marshall Plan, p. 48. The interim Aid Program was continued in the Eightieth Congress, First Session (Public Law 393 passed on March 31, 1948) which appropriated an additional \$55,000,000 more. Total Interim Aid was \$577,000,000.

third of the Republican Party in this Congress of 1948 "constituted an irreconcilably isolationist bloc,"⁸ but the Administration counted on the rest of the members of the Republican Party in Congress to follow bipartisan tactics.

Whether isolationism ever existed is a question raised by critics who study American history. Some feel that if isolationists hold that the United States must not engage in international conduct, then isolationism never existed. In their new interpretation of the term, the critics describe isolationism as a political tool used by certain Congressmen, even with the realization that withdrawal from international cooperation was not possible, as an emotional appeal to voters confused over United States foreign policy. These Congressmen were particularly connected with the "America First" school of thought and are by all rights "Disillusionists."⁹ They should have realized the United States could not live apart from the rest of the world. Many of the constituents

⁸Bradford H. Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics: Pearl Harbor to Korea (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), p. 34. Hereinafter cited as Westerfield, Foreign Policy.

⁹Samuel Lubell, Revolt of the Moderates (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), p. 79. According to Lubell a disillusionist is a Congressman who relates the evils of internationalism and attempts to win his Congressional seat on a platform of isolationism. He is called a disillusionist because he quite frequently distorts the actual facts.

who are thus exploited by this political means are people with ethnic prejudices, namely pro-German or anti-British, who are usually found in the Midwest. They are the "Russian-German" farmers in Kansas, Iowa, Nebraska, North and South Dakota who display an opposition to military service as well as certain phases of Americanization.¹⁰ Since the Midwest is in the interior of the nation, the people of this section are likely to feel more secure, more able to live apart from the other countries of the world, than coastal residents.

Remarkable political ramifications of this geographical isolationism are as follows: (1) isolationists used their philosophy as a tool against a President of the opposite party, as for example against New Deal economic appeal; (2) isolationism declines when the Republicans are in power and revives if the Republican Party is defeated; (3) sentiment for "America First" is found to be stronger in rural America than in urban; and (4) Democrats are more likely to vote internationalist than Republicans.¹¹ The term given to those Congressmen who utilize the votes of the disillusioned is "pseudo-conservatives."¹²

¹⁰Lubell, The Future of American Politics, pp. 132-146.

¹¹Lubell, Revolt of the Moderates, pp. 100-101.

¹²Daniel Bell (ed.), The New American Right (New York: Criterion Books, 1955), p. 35. Bell borrows the term pseudo conservative from Theodore W. Adorno's The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950). As Bell

HARRIMAN COMMITTEE

The "Harriman Committee," named after the chairman of the committee, William Averell Harriman, who had been appointed as the Secretary of Commerce in the Truman Administration on October of 1946, had been appointed by Secretary of State Dean Gooderham Acheson on June 22, 1947, as chairman of President Truman's Committee of Foreign Aid on the recommendation of Senator Arthur Hendrick Vandenberg following the Marshall speech on June 5, 1947. The duty of this nonpartisan committee as announced by the Administration was to study the plan proposed by Marshall and the State Department. In the committee report on its conclusions, European Recovery and American Aid, submitted to the President on November 7, 1947,¹³ the committee agreed that Europe

interprets the Adorno writing, the pseudo conservative "is a man who, in the name of upholding traditional American values and institutions and defending them against more or less fictitious dangers, consciously or unconsciously aims at their abolition." He describes the nation as being on the brink of ruin from plots within its own boundaries. He detests communism, but shows little interest in realistic approaches that might destroy it or strengthen his own country against communism. He is content to view only the domestic scene, and has a tendency of portraying his country as weak; being deluded by the democratic nations of Western Europe, which seem to antagonize his concern more than Soviet Communism; and he is against all "give-away programs" directed at strengthening foreign nations. Bell believes that the "new pseudo-conservatism" is nothing more than the old "ultra-conservatism...heightened by the extraordinary pressures of the contemporary world," heavy taxes, dissolution of urban life, and consideration of partisan political expediency.

¹³Price, Marshall Plan, p. 42.

was in dire need of economic aid from the United States.

HERTER COMMITTEE

Another committee was established on July 29, 1947, by the House of Representatives to study the Marshall proposal. The committee was commonly known as the "Herter Committee" because Representative Christian Archibald Herter was in charge of the delegation while it was overseas.¹⁴ Influential in the creation of this committee was Speaker of the House Joseph William Martin, Jr., who named Representative Charles Aubrey Eaton as chairman and Herter as vice-chairman. The objective of this group was self-education. The membership of the committee was truly bipartisan as it was extracted from the Foreign Affairs Committee and from the body of the House according to geographical representation. On August 28, 1947, the assemblage sailed for Europe with questionnaires prepared with State Department assistance. Sub-committees visited every nation in Europe except Russia, Yugoslavia, and Albania.

Many members of this group returned to the United States with a deeper conviction for the necessity of American leadership and aid. The firsthand study gave the members of this committee a chance to view the actual conditions in

¹⁴Ibid., p. 51.

Europe free from the political controversies in the United States. Consequently, upon their return, they proposed a foreign aid recommendation to the Foreign Affairs Committee. This testimony, stressing maximum self-help of the European countries in a program of aid by the United States, influenced the passage of the European Recovery Program in 1948. The influence of the members of the committee was apparent both at home in their own constituencies and in the Halls of Congress. Without a bipartisan approach many feel the program of foreign aid would not have had Congressional approval.¹⁵

Such recommendations as production and production management, utilization of resources, local currency counterpart funds, the relationship of Germany to European recovery, American participation, and acquisition of strategic and other materials by the United States were included in the Committee's 883-page report.¹⁶

KRUG REPORT

On June 22, 1947, President Truman appointed a committee under the chairmanship of Secretary of the Interior Julius Albert Krug to investigate the ability of the United States to conduct a foreign aid program by ascertaining the

¹⁵Price, Marshall Plan, p. 55.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 54.

impact that such a measure would have on the United States economy. Listed in the report, published on October 19, 1947, as the National Resources and Foreign Aid, were three major world shortages: foods and nitrogen fertilizers; coal for industrial plants; and steel, basic to all reconstruction programs and mechanical equipment.¹⁷ The conclusion of this committee was that the economic security of the nation would not be ruined by a foreign aid program.¹⁸ This report was an important compilation of facts and figures which was reviewed in Congress.

NOURSE REPORT

Whereas the Krug Report determined the ability of the United States to engage in a foreign aid program without too severe economic consequences, the Nourse Report, submitted by the second committee activated within the Administration by Truman on June 22, 1947, to participate in a study of the Marshall Plan, related the fact that these commodities mentioned in the Krug Report were scarce materials even in the United States; and if such materials were sent abroad, the United States would be required to use

¹⁷Robert E. Summers, Economic Aid To Europe: The Marshall Plan (New York: The H. W. Wilson Company, 1948), p. 62. Hereinafter cited as Summers, Economic Aid.

¹⁸Price, Marshall Plan, p. 40.

certain measures, both domestically and abroad, to ensure efficient distribution overseas as well as the collection of these goods in the United States. Such extents of regulation of the United States economy, as proposed by this Nourse Committee headed by the Council of Economic Advisers with Edwin Griswold Nourse as the chairman, would require export controls, allocations for domestic use, discouragement of misuse or excessive use, efficient transportation and distribution, and the curbing of speculation and hoarding of goods.¹⁹

REPUBLICANS IN CONGRESS

Unanimity existed in Congress on one general expression of the controversial subject, the threat of communist expansion over the free world. Disagreement arose in formalizing a policy or policies to meet the danger of this peril. There were many different opinions as to what solution should be applied to the existing situation, and with 1948 being an election year, the debate on technicalities seemed incessant. The Democratic party was in power in the White House, but the convening Eightieth Congress was Republican controlled, ostensibly committed to a program of tax reduction. The

¹⁹Summers, Economic Aid, p. 69. The report of the Council of Economic Advisers, The Impact of Foreign Aid upon the Domestic Economy: A Report to the President by the Council of Economic Advisers (Washington, 1947), was submitted on October 28, 1947.

enactment of the Marshall Plan would seemingly be an obstruction to that desired goal, and the people had not had a chance to express their opinions on the Marshall Plan as the events leading to the proposal had occurred since the last election. Therefore, the Congressmen were in a position that called for the use of their own judgment. Characteristically, the Eightieth Congress had viewed European affairs bipartisanly as a traditional carry-over of war time politics, yet partisanly enough to have some degree of debate. It became unmistakably clear that the liberal Republicans were willing to join the Democrats in support of the Marshall Plan legislation. The conservative Republicans, however, maintained a partisan front.²⁰ The liberal Republicans, in relation to foreign affairs, outnumbered the conservative branch of the party, a factor which encouraged an over-all bipartisan approach to a foreign policy.

With the above division in the Republican Party developing early in January, 1948, each facet of the split Republican Party looked for a leader. Senator Arthur Vandenberg, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, labeled by many as a long-standing isolationist, reversed his position, and moved in the direction which made him the likely candidate for the leader of the party section that

²⁰Westerfield, Foreign Policy, p. 33.

would advocate and follow President Truman's foreign aid policy. He promptly took the reins of leadership by having an extended series of discussions with the President and his Secretary of State. Later, he stood before a packed Senate to introduce the proposed legislation in acceptably unqualified temper on March 1, 1948.²¹ He had the absolute backing of his Foreign Relations Committee when he stated that "famine, disease and disaster will stalk a desperate Europe" unless emergency aid was sent immediately to that part of the world.²² There is little doubt that Vandenberg played an important role in holding the Midwest partisan vote to a minimum during 1947 and 1948.

Vandenberg, however, was not unopposed. Senator Robert Alphonso Taft indirectly led the opposition, an opposition not clearly defined. Those who supported the aid plan did so in varying degrees, almost to the point of confusion, which resulted in lengthy debate. Taft was bolstered by the Midwestern bloc at all times and at various moments by those of fluctuating sympathy for aid approval, including the groups partial to cuts in appropriations. Taft's major handicap was his lack of an alternate plan.²³

²¹Price, Marshall Plan, p. 63.

²²Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. (ed.), The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952), p. 373. Hereinafter cited as Vandenberg, Private Papers.

²³Summers, Economic Aid, p. 234.

Because of the perplexities of the situation, Taft resigned himself to domestic matters, rarely associating with the foremost noninterventionist bloc of the economy-minded Republicans. Thus the opposition force was faced with two serious problems: they found the American people generally favoring legislation directed at halting communist expansion, and they found Taft's leadership was not in the realm of international affairs. Both adversities left the advocates of the Marshall Plan better organized, stronger, and more active than their opponents.

Members of both sections maneuvered behind the leadership of Vandenberg or Taft. Republican House members usually affiliated with either of the two sides; however, the lines were not as distinct in the House as they were in the Senate because there were no Republicans of prominence in the House to assume leadership. In the House most of the promotion work for the Marshall Plan was left to the Foreign Affairs Committee, which witnessed little assistance or opposition from pressure groups of either Democratic or Republican Party leadership.

THE DEMOCRATS IN CONGRESS

President Truman had solidarity among his Democratic friends in the Congress in most instances in relation to the Marshall proposal. A left-wing defection had sprouted

in Congress over "New Deal" and "Fair Deal" policies in general under the leadership of Henry Agard Wallace, editor of the New Republic and formally a member of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's cabinet. Wallace, however, did not attract many Democrat adherents either on national affairs or international policies. The main Democratic controversies in Congress over legislative measures stemmed from the North and South sectional differences, but this North-South cleavage was minor in 1948.²⁴ The pressure from the Administration was sufficient in keeping the Democrats from splintering into bickering cliques on foreign affairs, and there were few Midwestern Democrats in Congress at this time to follow the noninterventionist bloc. The Southern Democrats supported the Administration's foreign policies much more than its domestic policies, even with the Midwestern Republicans trying to impose a conservative coalition with the Southerners.

Roll call votes pertaining to foreign aid may be used to emphasize the general solidarity of the South. These records show Democratic support never dropped lower than ninety percent, except for voting records in the Eighty-first Senate.²⁵ Therefore, the Democrats had solvent ground

²⁴Westerfield, Foreign Policy, p. 45.

²⁵Ibid.

on which to promote a foreign aid plan, even within a Republican Congress, especially when eminent members of the Republican party collaborated with them and when the noninterventionist economy-minded bloc failed to convert the Southern Democrats to their side.

BIPARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY

In November of 1948 the citizens of the United States would again go to the polls. The Republicans in control of Congress were confident that there would be a Presidential victory for them and concluded, therefore, that there was no harm in voting bipartisanly. Also, many of them gave credence to the testimonies of members who had been on the various investigational committees, both those studying domestic realities and foreign situations, and judged from these hearings that it would be dangerous to vote against the general issue of the Plan. Thereupon, most of the debate changed from whether legislation should be adopted to how it should be administered.²⁶ Evidence of the bipartisan nature of the measure was shown when "only a fourth of the Republicans in the House voted against the Marshall Plan."²⁷

²⁶Summers, Economic Aid, p. 231.

²⁷Lubell, Revolt of the Moderates, p. 99.

CONTROVERSIES OVER EUROPEAN RECOVERY PROGRAM

Former President of the United States Herbert Hoover warned his countrymen against over expenditure of the economy. This was indirect opposition²⁸ to the Administrative plan which called for immediate aid to Europe, and his cautionary remarks may have had significant repercussions in Congress to the degree of causing some members there to decide that the foreign aid proposal should be altered. Many different forms of this hesitancy were obvious. There was the fear that European business methods differed from those in the United States, rendering comparative standards inefficient. Many Congressmen were not sure that American dollars should be used in a program that would show no dollar for dollar return. Senator Joseph Hurst Ball of Minnesota was the leader of one group of twenty revisionist Senators who played a major part in composing the original draft of the legislation.²⁹ In addition to this, a few United States citizens were suspicious of European diligence

²⁸Summers, Economic Aid, p. 234. Hoover's monitory modifications were not in complete disagreement with the policies of the Truman Administration inasmuch as both men advocated aid to Europe, but Hoover was more concerned with the dangers of the Administrative plan decorously favoring aid without, as he believed, observing the possibility that it might weaken United States economy.

²⁹More discussion on this element will follow in Chapter III.

to "put out...maximum effort at self-help...."³⁰ Then, if the European nations should recover, many believed, their economic machine would compete with the United States industrial plant, which would inflict a danger to the capitalistic system in the United States. Another fear was that the economies of Europe were becoming socialistic or even communistic.

The foremost argument in Congress was the struggle over appropriations. Groups of Senators and Representatives wanted the United States to utilize one or all of the various organizations such as the United Nations, the World Bank, or the International Monetary Fund in promoting world recovery, while others wanted the United States to take complete initiative in sponsoring the program but disagreed in the amount of money to be expended. The primary goal of the critical Congressmen was to cut the amount of money authorized in the passage of a foreign aid bill. Vandenberg realized this fact and planned his attack accordingly. He realized that the lump figure of \$17,000,000,000, which the Administration's proposal would put into effect, would be a stumbling block in ultimate passage.³¹ In order not to let this contention crystallize in Congress, Vandenberg

³⁰Summers, Economic Aid, p. 231.

³¹Vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 385.

divided the total figure into annual segments subject to yearly debate. His leadership for the support of the European recovery measure reached its highest point in the area of appropriations. It was in this area that he met serious opposition from a Congress dedicated to balancing the budget, since foreign commitments antagonized a large section of the Republican party who were on the lookout for dollar-cheap diplomacy without foreign entanglement.

Other arguments concerning the proposal were numerous. Length of time for the program; debate over an administrator; who should control the administration of the program, Congress or State Department; and aid to communist countries were certainly all major conflicts. Other contentions will not be mentioned in this chapter. Minor details of difficulties and elements of the major controversies over foreign aid to Europe as they affected Kansas Congressmen will be discussed in the following chapters.

MUTUAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

In 1951, while the major question in Congress was not whether aid should be continued but rather what form the legislation should take, Congress altered the performance of foreign aid. The Mutual Security Act was passed on October 10, 1951, enlarging the purpose of aid to include military funds for the establishment of military strength in

Europe capable of posing a threat to Russia and, consequently, producing a defense for the United States. The meaning of the Marshall Plan was no longer entirely economic; in fact, that purpose seems to have been lost in favor of European military security. However, it is difficult to separate economic from military aid for the reason that economic aid to a country will likely promote a stronger military machine in that country also, and this writer will make few attempts at this separation.

The Mutual Security Act of 1951 not only shifted the emphasis of aid from peacetime recovery to military defense but also placed the program under the authority of a single agency, the Mutual Security Agency headed by the Director for Mutual Security, largely because of the distrust between Congress and the State Department.³²

³²Many of the disputes evident in The Marshall Plan debate continued in existence during the debates over passage of the Mutual Security Act.

CHAPTER III

SENATORS

Five different men served as Senators from Kansas during the years between 1947 and 1959. All were closely associated with agricultural matters, but only four were active in matters treating with foreign relations.

Senator Harry Darby, a replacement for Senator Clyde Martin Reed, who died on November 8, 1949, was never active in any particular area of Congressional business due to the shortness of his term in office as the appointed member to conclude the term of Reed. Darby's opinions and influence cannot be adequately discussed in this study as his attitude toward foreign aid was not published. It can be noted, however, that amendments reducing the total appropriations for the administration of the 1950 ECA were accepted by Darby even though these amendments were generally rejected in the Senate. He was also alarmed over conditions indicating socialization of European industry and over European countries, who aided through ECA funds, seemed to be discriminating against American business interests. Official business detained Darby on May 5, 1950, the day of the Senate vote on the ECA bill of that year.¹ However, with the limited amount

¹Congressional Record, 81 Cong., 2 Sess. (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 6442. Hereinafter cited as Congressional Record.

of information available, it is concluded by this writer that Darby was in favor of the lowest possible appropriation with regard to foreign aid.

The other four Senators reviewed in this chapter were more active in foreign affairs than was Darby. Senator Arthur Capper, a long-standing member of the Senate, was a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Andrew Frank Schoeppel replaced Capper after the latter's retirement in 1949; the maneuver of retiring Capper supposedly was viewed with approbation by the Kansas Republican organization, if not initiated by them to make room for the younger Schoeppel. Schoeppel was to become a member of the Appropriations Committee, and important committee in conjunction with foreign aid spending.

Frank Carlson became a Kansas Senator in 1951, sitting in the seat which Darby had filled for one year, 1950. Carlson and Schoeppel remained in the Senate up to and beyond 1959.

The following discussion will be a presentation of the individual opinions of Kansas Senators Capper, Reed, Schoeppel, and Carlson. Because of the paucity of information no further statements can be made regarding Darby.

SENATOR CAPPER

Senator Arthur Capper, Republican of Kansas, viewed

the Greek-Turkish aid proposal of 1947 with uncertainty. Aid to Greece and Turkey, he believed, would mean ultimate aid to other countries around the world whose people were threatened by communist infiltration. He wanted to know where the end would be to European aid.² The spread of such commitments over the world, in Capper's viewpoint, would probably not be known by all the citizens of the United States unless each measure was brought to the surface through Congressional debate. Capper seemed to fear that the Department of State would erect a veil of secrecy around the United States foreign policy. Capper also seemed fearful that such a program would bring an unhealthy increase in executive power. On January 5, 1948, Capper made these remarks over radio station WIBW of Topeka, Kansas:

...I cannot see why, just because we won a war, we have to lose the peace by adopting the political and economic philosophies and practices of those whom we defeated in the war.

I decline to accept even the theory that the price we must pay for the Marshall plan...must be the surrender of the freedom of America to the rule of the totalitarian State.

Personally, I do not see that we have to pay that price [Truman asking emergency power on November 17, 1947] in order to contribute [sixteen to twenty] billion dollars worth of food, fuel, fertilizer, and capital goods to Europe in the coming five years. If it should develop that we do have to pay that price--surrender of individual freedom to State controls--then I repeat, the price is too great.³

²Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 1241-42.

³"Capper Says Should Not Give Up American Freedom to Aid Europe," Topeka Daily Capital, January 5, 1948, p. 4.

He commented that he must be shown the necessity for expending billions of dollars on the European recovery program. However, Capper seemed to believe that Congress was bound in its actions by commitments in Europe made by the Democratic Administration. After March, 1948, his stand against foreign aid was replaced by a more positive belief toward economic aid measures, based primarily on the understanding that American money must be spent to reconstruct Europe because of the commitments made to Europe.⁴ He saw no alternative to the Marshall Plan since he viewed the plan as being one of distribution of foodstuffs to the hungry peoples of Europe, rehabilitation of industry and agriculture, and a device to allow European countries to maintain their freedom. Capper still maintained reservations about the potentiality of increased Government control, as he stated:

...the Government will have to supervise, control, allocate and select, what goods are sent out and what goods are allowed in, both as to those financed by government [about \$50,000,000,000 in the next five or six years starting from 1948], and those financed thru trade channels.

The whole foreign trade picture, government-financed exports, privately-financed exports, and all imports, will have to be co-ordinated. If not there will be endless confusion, free competition among both exporters and importers.

So, as you see, one effect of the European Recovery Program will be to force a government-controlled foreign trade.⁵

⁴Topeka Daily Capital, March 8, 1948, p. 1.

⁵"European Recovery Plan to Boost U.S. Exports by Billions, but Costs Must Come From American Taxpayers," Topeka Daily Capital, March 1, 1948, p. 4.

The part of the recovery program which Capper liked best was the provision whereby farm commodities were selected by the Commodity Credit Corporation and sold through regular channels to the European governments thus providing food for the European economic recovery plan. This would establish an outlet for surplus agricultural products by means of adopting fair-price regulatory devices which would benefit the farmers of the United States by keeping prices high and stimulating the production of needed commodities to feed a hungry world.

Senator Capper's position as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the years examined in this study make his opinions of particular interest. Although Capper was senior member serving on the committee, his poor health resulted in Vandenberg's appointment as Chairman. Capper and Vandenberg seemed to work in conjunction with each other during the later years of their careers in Congress. During the Marshall Plan debate in the Foreign Relations Committee as well as in the Senate, Vandenberg played the leading role while Capper followed the main issues outlined by Vandenberg, not only on Marshall Plan legislation but in other areas as well.⁶ Capper made this

⁶Letter from Homer E. Socolofsky to Darrell Munsell dated February 13, 1960. Homer Socolofsky, Professor of History at Kansas State University, has conducted a study on Senator Capper's political career. His conclusions also confirm the closeness of thought between Capper and Vandenberg.

statement in 1948 concerning Vandenberg:

Thanks to the effective leadership of Senator Vandenberg ...I would not be surprised if the Senate passes the bill [European recovery plan] by the middle of February.⁷

Capper and the other members of the Foreign Relations Committee following the advice of Vandenberg, approved the Marshall proposal in the committee, and continued to agitate for its passage in the Senate. Thorny items requiring approval in the committee included such particulars as (1) how much aid should be authorized and (2) who should direct the administration of the program. Capper could see no reason for "pollyfoxing" on the latter question in either the committee or in the Senate debate.⁸

The Senate Committee unanimously agreed on February 12, 1948, that the sixteen countries designated to receive the aid must carry out a program of self-help whereby they would assist in their own recovery. Another unanimous decision by the Foreign Relations Committee authorized \$5,300,000,000 to be spent for the Marshall proposal over the first year beginning April 1, 1948.⁹

⁷"Capper Says Foreign Aid Bill May Be Passed by Middle of February," Topeka Daily Capital, January 12, 1948, p. 4.

⁸"Capper in Senate Fight to Stay--Pleased With Public Response," Topeka Daily Capital, January 26, 1948, p. 4.

⁹"Senate Group To Polish Up New Aid Bill," Topeka Daily Capital, February 15, 1948, p. 1. The Administration had asked for \$6,800,000,000 for the first fifteen months.

In a radio speech over station WIBW on March 7, 1948, Capper commented on the Marshall Plan by saying:

As for myself, I do not see that anything is going to be gained by carrying on the debate in Congress over the Marshall Plan legislation.

The European Recovery Program...as worked out thru the masterly leadership of Senator Vandenberg...in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, came from that committee with unanimous support from the Committee....

Under these circumstances, I can see no object in any prolonged debate.

The House of Representatives also will have to pass the bill. And I think the sooner both branches of Congress act, the better.¹⁰

The Senate voted down the amendment proposed by Senator Glen Hearst Taylor, which designated the administration of the European Recovery Program by means of the United Nations, on March 15, 1948. Both Senators Capper and Reed voted against the amendment; Capper seemed to believe that the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration had been a failure in giving adequate relief to Europe and that the amendment would simply invite another such failure.¹¹

He also believed that economic and military backing for Europe would not be sufficient to remedy the unstable world condition. He added the Middle East and the Far East, including Korea, Manchuria, and China as areas that would be needing aid.

Capper, even with the fear of continuing inflation and

¹⁰"Capper Predicts Senate Will Pass Marshall Plan Bill, Few Changes," Topeka Daily Capital, March 8, 1948, p. 4.

¹¹"Capper Tells of Growing Talk About Possibility of Another World War--and Effects on Congressional Acts," Topeka Daily Capital, March 15, 1948, p. 4.

high taxes, supported the Marshall Plan with what seemed to be wholehearted approval.¹² He had previously voted against amendments limiting appropriations, such as the Taft Amendment, as well as voting against all amendments altering the proposal as passed by the Foreign Relations Committee.

In August of 1948, Capper stated:

Since 1941, as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and in my votes on the floor of the Senate, I have gone along, have supported in the main, the bipartisan foreign policy which we decided held the best prospects for a peaceful postwar world, and for the future prosperity and happiness and security of the people of the United States. I supported the United Nations Charter, the British loan, Bretton Woods, Greek-Turkish aid, the Marshall program, approving the principle in general that we could well afford to take the calculated risks involved in the interest of a better and safer world.

The most of these programs have been based on the United States giving much and taking little--aside from the calculated risks involved. I am not criticizing that at all. As I say, I went along, and am not voicing any regrets that I did so.¹³

Senator Capper ended his long thirty-year career in the Senate in 1948. He remained connected with political life in Washington, however, and offered weekly statements to the Topeka Daily Capital until his death on December 19, 1951. He left the Senate in complete support of foreign aid, but his attitude during his retirement seems to shift to a critical view of the matter. He became suspicious of high governmental spending. After 1948 he seemed to see

¹²Capper's vote may be found in the Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 2793.

¹³Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 9595.

a grandiose Truman plan of prolonged inflation providing a false economy in the United States. The proponents of foreign aid spending, Capper believed, based their case on the idea that the plan provided a continuing market for agricultural products and a continuing market for American industrial products entailing a large working force in the United States; but the proponents did not, in Capper's opinion, mention that the Government collected taxes from the American citizens. To him, the Government collected money from the American people with one hand and gave it away to foreign nations with the other hand. No United States citizen could prosper under such a situation, at least not the average American wage earner.¹⁴

The continuing spiral of a rising inflation seemed to Capper to be a larger threat to the people of the United States than the Russian menace. Inflation would produce a "Welfare State" like England, especially if President Truman's program was given a mandate from the people.¹⁵

SENATOR REED

Twenty Republican Senators met at the apartment house

¹⁴"How Long Can U.S. Supply World With Goods and Dollars to Buy Them," Topeka Daily Capital, February 10, 1949, p. 4.

¹⁵"Seek Aid Harmony," Kansas City Star, February 31, 1948, p. 1.

of Senator Clyde Martin Reed of Kansas in continuous and private meetings throughout the months of January and February to discuss possible revisions applicable to the Marshall proposal. Most of these twenty Senators were from the Mid-West with Senators Joseph Hurst Ball of Minnesota and Kenneth Spicer Wherry of Nebraska being leaders of this group. This powerful group, none of them members of the Foreign Relations Committee, presented a bloc somewhere between the Taft and Vandenberg Senate cleavage. The group of twenty Senators were primarily interested in reducing the proposed figure of \$6,800,000,000 for the Marshall Plan. A conference meeting was arranged between a committee from the twenty Senators and Vandenberg to discuss the proposals offered by the group of twenty. This meeting was held at Reed's apartment on February 7, 1948.¹⁶ The essence of the changes proposed by this group to the Marshall proposal were as follows: (1) compel the sixteen Marshall Plan countries to submit specific recovery projects to the United States Administrator who would either accept or reject them; (2) hold back aid to countries who used the aid money for socialization of their industry; (3) give the power to an Administrator responsible to Congress and not the State Department; (4) condition aid to England on the basis of

¹⁶"Seek Aid Harmony," Kansas City Star, February 31, 1948, p. 1.

British coal exports to the continent; and (5) lower the total appropriations.¹⁷

The revisions to the Marshall proposal placed Vandenberg in a difficult position. Advocating a full authorization of \$6,800,000,000, even though he desired this, might cause a split in the Republican Party.¹⁸ Vandenberg desired to reconcile as many of the party differences as possible on the proposal before the Foreign Relations Committee prepared a draft of the plan. He was thus willing to work out a compromise with the powerful bloc of the twenty Republican Senators. He followed the meetings of this group quite carefully, keeping in mind that an "all-or-nothing" Truman program would encounter severe difficulties in the Senate because it would likely cause alienation of this revisionist bloc.¹⁹

¹⁷"Consider Major Alterations in Foreign Aid Setup," Emporia Gazette, January 31, 1948, p. 1.

¹⁸"Maneuver on Aid," Kansas City Star, February 3, 1948, p. 5. A letter from Senator Reed published in the Topeka Daily Capital on February 11, 1948, to a Wichita, Kansas attorney related the objectives of the group of twenty Senators. Reed stated in this letter: "We have a great responsibility, not only for our own freedom, but for the freedom of all people. I do not think we should fail that responsibility....The group of [twenty] Senators who have been meeting in my home are trying to look with candor at the picture, obtain all the facts that are available; deal intelligently with both the political and economic phases; insist upon better and intelligent administration; more care in determining the amounts of money necessary, and how and where that money should be used. We have made some headway...."

¹⁹Kansas City Star, February 8, 1948, p. 5A.

Some of the members of this group, composing almost one-fifth of the members of the Senate, were out to destroy the program.²⁰ However, the majority of this group only wanted to make special recommendations to Vandenberg and the Foreign Relations Committee, with the chief suggestion being a lower figure in the amount of aid appropriated for the program. Some of the group's revisions that Vandenberg compromised with or accepted were: (1) the authorization for the four and one half years would be granted from year to year, not in one general appropriation of \$17,000,000,000; (2) self-help obligations of European countries would be strengthened by stressing continuity of cooperation among countries involved; and (3) an Administrator would be established.²¹

²⁰Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. (ed.), The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952), pp. 384-85.

²¹Ibid. His vote on March 12, 1948, against the Taft Amendment to cut the appropriations from \$5,300,000,000 to \$4,000,000,000 for the first phase of the Marshall legislation, was supported by his statement in the Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 2720-21: "I voted against the Taft amendment....I do not want it to be understood that that means I am going to vote against the bill. I expect to vote for the bill. I do not want it understood that that fore-closes me as to the amount of money involved. I voted against the Taft amendment because I thought the authorization should be at least a limit which would make for flexibility in the handling of appropriations and the funds to be appropriated from this time on.

"I am a member of the Committee on Appropriations, and

The revisionist bloc wanted to keep harmony within the Republican Party, and the majority of these twenty members realized a dangerous condition was present when the Marshall Plan was too severely attacked. The Republican Party might split into distinct lines whereby one side would follow Vandenberg and the other join Taft in the race for the 1948 Presidential nomination. This could conceivably hurt the Republican chances in the 1948 elections. Reed expressed this fear in a letter to Senator Ball published February 26, 1948. He stated:

I profoundly believe that the U.S. has a tremendous responsibility in the present world situation which it cannot safely ignore. Any serious attempt [sic.] to ignore our responsibility might break the Republican Party in two--at least create a serious break.²²

In the same letter Reed expressed his opinion on how the bill should be written:

I think the bill should be so written as to allow consideration in two parts:

1. The diplomatic move should clearly be under the State Department even tho the State Department has not crowned itself with glory. The President operates in international relations thru the State Department and we probably couldn't change that if we wanted to.

in that committee I shall subject the amount to be appropriated to the closest scrutiny of which I am capable....We have [those who voted against the Taft Amendment] publicly stated that we favor the lowest sum that can be reasonably appropriated to do the job....

"I hope to be able conscientiously and fairly to vote for a smaller sum than \$5,300,000,000, but I want a record before the Appropriations Committee which will justify such a vote."

²²"Reed Outlines Idea To Prevent Split on Marshall Plan," Topeka Daily Capital, January 27, 1948, p. 12.

However, the power and authority of the State Department in the development of the foreign program which we call the Marshall plan, should be severely limited.

2. When it comes to utilizing the money we are asked to appropriate for rehabilitation of their European industrial and agricultural economy, certainly the State Department should be on the sidelines, if around at all. A strong competent organization of industrialists and scientists should be set up. We have the "know how" in this country to a pre-eminent degree. We should apply our "know how" thru competent engineers and scientists.²³

Senator Reed desired to keep the Republican Party intact, and with this desire, he generally voted the Vandenberg line.²⁴ In order to vote as Vandenberg proposed, Reed voted against the Taft Amendment for a lower appropriation. On the other hand he momentarily deserted Vandenberg by voting in favor of the Ball Amendment of 1948 which provided measures to stabilize European currency and establish a valid rate of exchange between countries. Reed joined eleven Senators in proposing an amendment to appoint an Agent General for Economic Cooperation under the control of the Senate as a means of coordinating the activities of the Administration's mission and those of Congress. Later Reed reversed his thinking after Vandenberg attacked the program in the Senate debate and voted against the proposed amendment. This points to the fact that Reed deserted his colleagues whenever Vandenberg strongly protested the proposal

²³Ibid.

²⁴His vote on the Marshall Plan may be found in the Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 2793.

being voted upon.²⁵

His vote in favor of the Marshall Plan was naturally connected with his interest in agriculture. He believed the Commodity Credit Corporation should send surplus commodities to Europe with reimbursement for these commodities to come from the Government's appropriations to the Economic Cooperation Administration.²⁶ Another change in the 1949 bill on European aid which passed the Senate and was supported by Reed was the provision appropriating aid to Spain. Reed continued to support the aid program in 1949 with the additions mentioned above.²⁷ His 1949 vote was his last vote on foreign aid owing to his death on November 8, 1949.

SENATOR SCHOEPEL

When Senator Schoepel took office in 1949 he disagreed with many of the activities promoted by Marshall Plan money. He opposed such things as allowing England to purchase wheat from Canada with Marshall Plan money, which, in the free market, discriminated against American wheat; England

²⁵Ibid., p. 2536. This citation is an example of Reed's vote against an amendment proposed by the list of Senators who invited Reed as a colleague. Reed's vote against this amendment is an indication that Reed supported the main items that Vandenberg favored.

²⁶Congressional Record, 81 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 3857.

²⁷His vote in 1949 may be found in the Congressional Record, 81 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 4147.

sending war materials to Russia; and, in general, as Schoepfel believed, Dean Acheson's policy of pleasing the "Reds" instead of promulgating a policy of strictness against the communist countries. He was in favor of a gradual withdrawal from Asia for the reason that the United States was misunderstood in that area and that no action on the part of the United States would destroy that misunderstanding. The Crises-Government, the Truman Administration, was making sincere internationalists out of many of the citizens in the United States, said Schoepfel, and the internationalists were the group who seemed to lead the nation toward the horrors of war. In Schoepfel's thinking, the United States must withdraw from world affairs into a hard shell of American continental concerns protected by military installations in the United States alone.²⁸

Schoepfel also believed that the amounts paid out by the United States to the United Nations, World Health Organization, and military and economic development overseas were too large when compared to the amounts expended in the United States to feed and rehabilitate the hungry and jobless and to promote projects such as flood-relief. As far as he was concerned, he was going to "chart his course" for a strong America by voting for the military requirements within the

²⁸Congressional Record, 81 Cong., 2 Sess., p. A7553.

United States and only those projects abroad which he considered necessary as a way of strengthening the United States military force in its line of defense for the Western Hemisphere.²⁹

Throughout the Truman administration, Schoeppel voted against foreign aid in the form of the Marshall Plan as well as the Mutual Security Administration. He voted for amendments to lower the appropriations and amendments to curtail aid to countries trading with communist countries. His only favorable thought in connection with foreign aid was concerned with the exchange of United States surplus agricultural commodities. In 1953 he introduced a bill authorizing the Commodity Credit Corporation to transfer certain surplus agricultural commodities to the Director of Mutual Security for sale to countries participating in the mutual security program.³⁰ These surplus agricultural products would be exchanged for foreign currencies, which, in turn, would be used to reinforce the Mutual Security Administration as loans to banking institutions in cooperating countries, or to pay United States obligations for economic development, or for cooperative defense establishments throughout the world. In arguing for such a program, Schoeppel believed that the

²⁹"Truman Message Called 'Pie-In-Sky' Politics,"
Topeka Daily Capital, January 10, 1952, p. 1.

³⁰Congressional Record, 83 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 6425-26.

local currencies would save American dollars while still strengthening the defenses of Western Europe. The United States could also obtain strategic materials from these countries as a result of the above exchange plan. This bill (S. 2127) was never voted on in 1953 because other legislation similar to this bill was passed in the House.

To make his position clear relative to the Mutual Security Administration, Schoepel stated in 1953 that

I have listened to the discussion about this being an authorization measure. Frankly, I want to say my position ...would be one of serious doubt, if I felt that the amount of money authorized by this bill would have to be appropriated....I think it is sound to expect that the Appropriations Committee, when these authorizations come before it, will go over them with a fine-toothed comb, and will cut out many of the expenditures which can justifiably be eliminated. I would not think of voting for this bill as an authorization of the whole amount, if I did not feel that that was the situation.³¹

Schoepel, in the above explanation, concluded that there must be a reduction in the 1953 Mutual Security appropriations before he would vote in favor of it, and he stated in the same message that he would vote for all such reductions as reduction in the amount of appropriations was the desired end. Another example of his regard for lowering the total amount of appropriations may be found in his 1956 voting record which clearly shows that he voted in favor of enacting mutual assistance but voted against the bill which appropriated

³¹Ibid., p. 7793.

money to implement it. The interpretation of his 1956 voting record shows that he was in favor of a mutual assistance agency but was in disagreement with the total figure Congress would authorize for such an agency. In 1957 Schoeppel again voted for the bill which enacted the Mutual Security Administration. In this year, however, his voting record shows a distinct approval for military aid for Europe, which was never certain in the preceding years, but he maintained again that the figure, as originally set in the bill, was too high.³² The amount of aid finally arrived at for military purposes in the 1957 foreign aid bill was satisfactory enough for Schoeppel to give his approving vote for the entire Mutual Security bill. This vote in favor was not necessarily a change-over for Schoeppel. Some political pressure was being put on him to vote for foreign aid measures, especially in 1957 when it was evident that the people of Kansas were highly in favor of the Eisenhower Administration.³³

³²The figure for the Mutual Security bill of 1957 was originally \$1,800,000,000. Schoeppel voted against the amendment proposed by Senator Allen Joseph Ellender to reduce the figure to \$1,300,000,000, but he voted in favor of reducing the figure to \$1,700,000,000, which was offered by Senator Russell Billiu Long in an amendment that was defeated in the Senate. Congressional Record, 85 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 9126-28.

³³Schoeppel had been up for reelection in 1954, a starting date for his growing support of Eisenhower policies. An article by James L. McConaughy, Jr., "While Eisenhower Proposes The Old Guard Disposes," Life, June 21, 1954, p. 133, acknowledges the pressure put upon Schoeppel to support the

His attitude relative to aiding underdeveloped countries remained the same during these years even if his view concerning military aid to Europe shifted. In 1959 Schoeppel made the following statement regarding the economic development of countries:

It amazes me that responsible economists have so completely misread the history of American economic development which should provide a basis for sound progress in other underdeveloped countries today. One hundred and fifty years ago the United States was certainly underdeveloped and our present position in the world was not secured through grants from a multitude of international agencies.³⁴

Later, in the same speech he stated:

...in considering proposals for economic aid we must make sure that recipient countries can benefit from our own experience. Those who in other nations wish to enjoy the amenities which hard work has achieved for Americans must emulate some of the methods we have adopted rather than to expect that the American taxpayer will continue to transfer the wealth he has created to other nations through international agencies.

I have long supported the thesis that military assistance to countries who wish to resist the deadly virus of Communist totalitarianism is in the interests of all our people. On the other hand, I cannot agree to the proposition that we should support any program which guarantees

programs of the President who is popular in Kansas. However, Schoeppel is still considered as an "Old Guard" Republican in that he does not support basic Eisenhower legislation, such as foreign aid or general foreign policy. His non-support of foreign aid measures is more in the area of appropriations than in the actual body of security programs, but his disinclination to vote appropriation approvals, in itself, devoids his vote for mutual security enactments.

³⁴Congressional Record, 86 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 11743.

full employment in New Delhi, Rangoon, Paris, and Rome if it also promises unemployment and bread lines in Topeka and Wichita.³⁵

He disliked the thought that the United States was pouring money into countries that were not allies and who attacked the foreign policy of the United States; or countries that would require billions and billions to turn themselves from "poverty-stricken, disease-ridden, agricultural countries like India into modern industrial nations."³⁶

As an answer to the popular contention that aid from the United States actually was a profit to American industry, Schoeppel stated:

As I view the trends in the American agricultural situation, the textile industry, the lumbering industry, the steel industry, the automobile industry, the mining industry and a host of other vital segments of our economy, I am becoming more and more convinced that unless an end is put to this wasteful mismanaged, scoop-shovel, give-away foreign aid program, we will have serious economic dislocations in this country.³⁷

He believed the United States failed in its foreign aid program because the American people expected this aid to do something that was impossible for it to accomplish; to promote freedom and security throughout the world.

Again in 1958 and in 1959, as in the years prior to 1956, Schoeppel voted "nay" for the continuation of a mutual

³⁵Ibid., p. 11747.

³⁶Congressional Record, 85 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 19426.

³⁷Ibid., p. 19427.

security program. In 1959 he was one of the eight Republicans who joined with eighteen Democrats in voting against the measure.³⁸ The main reasons he listed for voting against the legislation in 1959 were:

Upon examination of the foreign aid program, it was my conclusion that the purposes for which it had been originally established had largely been accomplished. Almost every European country has a "gross national product" several hundred percent higher than pre-World War II levels. That was the primary purpose for establishing this program. That objective was achieved years ago. The United States must assume its obligations to the free world, but in my opinion, the American taxpayer is also entitled to some protection.³⁹

SENATOR CARLSON

Senator Frank Carlson believed the United States could not barricade itself within America away from the world problems nor spread itself too thinly throughout the world by means of unwise foreign-aid spending. In 1951 he wanted to terminate the original form of Marshall Plan spending by replacing ECA spending with a plan whereby the military would receive all the funds formerly granted to the ECA. This would be enacted after an understanding had been reached with military heads that the use of these funds would be for the building of factories and defense installations.⁴⁰ The

³⁸Newsletter from Andrew F. Schoepel dated July, 1959.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Congressional Record, 82 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 10878.

amount of funds sent to Europe should be lowered however, Carlson believed, in that it was necessary to lower governmental expenditures if the Government was ever going to balance its budget. The Government must cut-back on all expenditures, tighten its belt in all areas of spending, make its sacrifices in the United States as well as all over the world. He states this belief as follows:

Further substantial savings, possibly totaling \$1,500,000,000, should be made in foreign aid, both military and economic. I realize the importance of foreign aid to help the free world present a strong and united front to the forces of Communist aggression. Nevertheless, since we are calling for sacrifices and belt-tightening by American citizens and urging our people to get along on less, in all justice we must do the same thing in the countries we are helping. In short, the principles of equal sacrifice for all Americans must be expanded, when it comes to our foreign-aid programs, to equal sacrifice for all those fighting Communism.⁴¹

Nonetheless, even with his agitation for Congress to put a stop to increased budgets and increasing taxes, his first vote as a Senator on foreign aid in 1951 was "yea."

In a speech at Colgate University on July 14, 1954, Carlson numbered the choices which the Government had to settle the farm surpluses. These solutions were: (1) limit production; (2) spend Government funds for storage; (3) give the surplus commodities away; or (4) help foreign countries to earn the needed money to buy these surpluses.⁴² Carlson

⁴¹Ibid., p. 4667.

⁴²"Carlson Backs U.S. Foreign Trade Plan," Topeka Daily Capital, July 16, 1954, p. 6.

advocated that the foreign policy of the United States be based on a realistic approach which would utilize the agricultural surpluses as a tool of foreign policy. A policy of more trade, less economic aid, and some military aid were the points on which Carlson would base a foreign policy of the United States. He foresaw, however, that maintaining and increasing agricultural markets abroad meant clashing with the agricultural productivity of Canada. An answer to this problem, argued Carlson, was a provision proposed by Senator John Little McClellan of Arkansas in his 1953 amendment to the Mutual Security bill of that year. This amendment would use a currency-conversion program whereby the United States would accept foreign currency in indirect payment for surplus agricultural commodities produced in the United States. This would aid the United States in meeting the competition offered by Canada. The foreign currency would be spent by the United States in the country from which it came for military supplies and services.⁴³

The need for a program for disposing of wheat surpluses was stressed in a speech by Carlson before the State Board

⁴³Congressional Record, 83 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 7774. The amendment was agreed to by a vote of forty-nine to thirty-five. Carlson, along with Schoeppel, voted "nay" on the McClellan Amendment apparently because it would grant extended authority to the Mutual Security Administration, not because they disagreed with the general plans of disposing surplus agricultural commodities in the amendment by the means of accepting foreign currency.

of Agriculture at Topeka, Kansas, on January 15, 1953. He stated:

There have been times in the past when a carry-over of that size [550,000,000 bushels of wheat] was one of the hallmarks of a depression among wheat farmers.

Today this surplus wheat and other surplus food commodities enter into the international picture as a part of our defense program. It is as vital for the future peace of the world, and probably more so, than munitions of war.⁴⁴

Carlson was in favor of sending surplus agricultural products to Europe, but he was not in favor of the United States Government giving these food commodities as gifts. His plan would permit private concerns, such as the Christian Rural Overseas Program, to purchase these commodities from the Commodity Credit Corporation. The commodities would then be sent as gifts from these private organizations. All aid to the smaller countries of the world, Carlson believed, should not be terminated in toto. Instead the Executive Department of the United States should stand ready "to heed their pleas if aggression occurs," helping them both economically and militarily whenever acts of aggression threatens them.⁴⁵ Through his evaluation of foreign aid spending by the United States under the Eisenhower Administration in

⁴⁴Ibid., p. A195.

⁴⁵Congressional Record, 85 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 1419. President Eisenhower requested such a plan be enacted by Congress which would allow him this power of assisting small countries faced with immediate aggression.

1956, Carlson concluded:

I do not mean to infer that you should be precluded from making expenditures abroad for real and genuine national defense, but I fail to see, and I cannot condone, this apparently endless demand for foreign spending on projects that have little or no relationship to our national defense.

I do not deny that many countries need military aid and technical assistance in meeting problems of hunger, disease, military defense. But we have segments in our national economy that are also in need of serious consideration at this time.⁴⁶

Senator Carlson became a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1959. He commended Senator James Franklin Fulbright, Chairman of the Committee, for his forbearance in assisting him in the foreign affairs area. Carlson also joined Fulbright in praising the 1959 mutual Security legislation for the main reason that this assistance bill provided for a gradual change from a grant program to a loan program. Believing this 1959 mutual security bill was the best measure brought before the Senate since he had become a member of that body, Carlson acted for its passage. He also supported the Fulbright proposal for a five-year program in connection with the Development Loan Fund as a part of mutual security legislation.⁴⁷

Carlson supported, by vote, mutual security legislation throughout the years of 1952 to 1959, but remained suspicious of large aid programs during this period.

⁴⁶Congressional Record, 84 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 2156.

⁴⁷Congressional Record, 86 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 11179.

TABLE I
RECORDED VOTE IN SENATE ON FOREIGN AID BILLS
1947-1959

Year	Bills	CAPPER	REED	DARBY	SCHOEPPEL	CARLSON	Vote of Senate	
							Yeas	Nays
1947	Greek-Turkish Loan	X	X				67	23
1947	Interim Aid to Europe	X	X				83	6
1948	Marshall Plan	X	X				69	17
1949	Economic Cooperation Act		X		X		70	7
1950	Economic Cooperation Act			#	#		60	8
1951	Mutual Security Act				O	X	61	5
1952	Mutual Security Act				O	#	64	10
1953	Mutual Security Act				#	X	69	10
1954	Mutual Security Act				"	X	67	19
1955	Mutual Security Act				#	X	59	18
1956	Mutual Security Act				*	*	54	25
1957	Mutual Security Act				X	X	57	25
1958	Mutual Security Act				"	X	51	17
1959	Mutual Security Act				O	X	65	26

KEY: X-yea vote
O-nay vote
#-not voting
*-paired in favor
"-paired not in favor

CHAPTER IV

REPRESENTATIVES

The Kansas members of the House of Representatives manifested more conservatism than the two Kansas Senators. Of the six Republican representatives from the state, two voted against the 1948 aid plan while both Senators voted in favor of it. These two men, Representative Wint Smith from the Sixth Congressional District and Representative Edward Herbert Rees from the Fourth Congressional District, were among the "hard core" of the isolationist bloc in the House, although neither were ostensibly active in the movement; both wrote and made brief statements concerning their viewpoints, but their battle in Congress does not compare with the feverish debates of other Representatives dedicated to economy.

Only two of the six members in the House of Representatives from Kansas during 1948 remained in the House throughout this entire period, 1948 to 1959. The four members who did not remain in Congress were replaced by reason of their death, retirement, or by their loss in various elections. Representative Herbert Alton Meyer of the Third Congressional District died on October 2, 1950, and was replaced by Republican Myron V. George on November 7, 1950, who finished out the term and was re-elected until Democrat Denver David Hargis replaced him in 1958; Clifford Ragsdale

Hope, Representative from the Fifth Congressional District, retired after the 1956 session of Congress, and was replaced by Democrat James Floyd Breeding in the election of that same year; Albert McDonald Cole was defeated in 1952 by Democrat Howard S. Miller in the election for the First Congressional seat, and Miller, in turn, after one term, was defeated by Republican William Henry Avery in 1954; and in the Second Congressional District, Errett Power Scrivner was defeated by Democrat Newell A. George in the 1958 election. The discussion in this chapter is a presentation of the attitudes on foreign aid to Europe existing among the Kansas Representatives.

REPRESENTATIVE COLE

Representative Albert McDonald Cole from the First Congressional District in Kansas introduced a bill for debt reduction in the House on March 26, 1947, calling for \$10,000,000,000 payment on the principal and interest of the United States debt each year.¹ In supporting such legislation that year and again in 1948, Cole emphasized the fact that it was the duty of Congress to bring order to the Government; something, he added, the people of the United States

¹Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 1 Sess. (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 2678. Hereinafter cited as Congressional Record.

deserved. The 1948 plan for reduction was modified to the extent that foreign aid, debt reduction, and tax reduction could work together to achieve a common end. Cole believed each aim should be devised in an order and system that each would work together to achieve solvent government; separate functioning would most assuredly cause a failure in each to bring the desired goal of restoring sanity to the Government. The plan would use foreign aid for stimulation of production abroad of goods useful in the United States to replace worthless foreign currency; a properly administered debt reduction of \$5,000,000,000 each year would trim government costs, promote investment by destroying "explosive Government bonds," and safeguard savings; a tax reduction providing a curb on inflation by halting demands for wage increases and encouraging industrial production.²

The above excerpts from a speech by Cole expressed his fundamental thinking relative to foreign aid. The details of foreign aid planning, as he wished to understand it, were expounded before the House on March 25, 1948. To Cole the proposed Marshall plan, if properly administered through tagging where each dollar was going and for what purpose the money was to be spent, was an assurance of the prevention

²Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 2 Sess., p. A133. This material is taken from a radio address given by Cole over the National Broadcasting Company on January 9, 1948.

of another war. Cole wanted a progressive plan creating greater production in Europe than the 1938 standard inasmuch as he believed that returning the world to the pre-war conditions would entail "economic stagnation" ultimately producing an explosive situation, ripe for a third world war. The \$5,000,000,000 contemplated expenditure over the first twelve-month period, as Cole defined it, would equal the difference in United States exports and imports over the same period. Waste in the program could be checked by "the actions and vigilance of the democratic peoples who are to receive the aid."³

The Administration's economic record prior to 1948 had not been remarkable in Cole's estimation. According to Cole, Truman had failed in such economic affairs as post-war price control, converting industry from war-time production to peace-time production, and post-war taxation. Cole could see potential waste in Truman's foreign aid program, but he strongly believed the waste of the program would be checked abroad by a conscientious administrator. In addition to this, Cole believed the foreign aid plan should be passed on the faith that the plan would gain strength by removing the weaknesses from Washington either by replacing the economically inefficient President Truman in the November

³Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 3559.

elections or by replacing all administration and authority of the plan beyond the reach of the administration.

The strengths of the plan were listed by Cole as being the following: (1) a new orientation in world thought and (2) a new orientation in world trade based on post-war trade tendencies, that is, preventing the world from drifting into the no longer applicable pre-war trade channel. This new orientation of world trade would assist the American economy. As an example of this, Cole maintained that Kansas and Alberta would have to replace the Ukraine as the source of wheat for Europe. In a new orientation of world trade Germany would not be restored as a world supplier, Japan would not regain her former markets, nor would the Soviet Union gain new markets. For these two reasons, world thought and world trade orientation, Cole supported the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948.⁴ The price of non-support was much greater in the eyes of Cole than the price for supporting this plan, even with the fact that the expense of the program would not reach its height.

In a speech at the First Congressional District of the Young Republican Club convention at Holton, Kansas, on April 17, 1948, Cole praised the effects that the Economic Cooperation

⁴Ibid.

Act would have on World recovery. However, he gave the credit of the success to the Republicans in Congress who, he said, had passed the original legislation in its present form, and that the plan was being managed by Republican Paul Gray Hoffman. He added that the legislation was "a tremendous effort to stem the tide of despair and war."⁵

Cole continued to support foreign aid legislation in 1949 and 1950. However, in 1951, his views were altered by the progress of Europe in economic recovery. He expressed his change of mind at Topeka, Kansas, on December 29, 1950, while speaking to the Topeka Optimist Club. The postwar aid to Europe, commented Cole, had reached an end and a new phase was commencing. That new phase was military aid instead of economic aid. The spending of funds under the Economic Cooperation Administration should be replaced by concrete military aid. The two reasons for his decision in 1951 were listed by Cole as: (1) the economic recovery of Europe under ECA funds had been successful, but ECA funds did not promote a military build up, and (2) direct military aid to European allies would "eliminate phony dollar friends, save money, and get value received for expenditures."⁶

Cole supported the Mutual Security Act of 1951 because

⁵Ibid., p. A3114.

⁶Congressional Record, 82 Cong., 1 Sess., p. A7943.

it started the gradual change from purely economic aid to military assistance.

REPRESENTATIVE HOPE

Representative Clifford Ragsdale Hope, of the Fifth District in Kansas, declared his support for emergency European aid and for the Marshall Plan while on a trip studying a master farm program with the House Committee on Agriculture.⁷ At Rocky Mount, North Carolina, October 17, 1947, he predicted the passage of the Marshall Plan in the next session of Congress.⁸

His acceptance of the Marshall Plan principles centered around his belief that such a plan was the price the United States would have to pay as a result of food abundance. The policy of feeding the rest of a hungry world necessitated a postponement in food cost reduction for the citizens of the United States. The American surplus would be needed in order to feed the rest of the world, and the Agriculture Department's price-support policy would be needed for protecting the farmers against price collapse. Therefore, the American consumer would have to continue paying high prices for food.⁹

⁷New York Times, October 18, 1947, p. 5.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. A2250-51.

In a speech at Wichita, Kansas, on December 4, 1947, Hope stressed:

This thing of foreign relief must be a balanced thing. It must not deplete our resources while helping needy nations to help themselves....I want....aid to do the job, to take the form of self help.¹⁰

Also, in that same speech, Hope clearly pointed out that, with the events of that day, the State Department activities were intricably linked with these activities of the Agriculture Department.

It was his belief that with a long-peaceful world economy the United States could double its standard of living in twenty or thirty years. Organizations such as the American Farm Bureau Federation and the Counsel for the National Grange agreed with Hope's assumption and supported the European Relief Program as a policy to bring about peace.¹¹

The Committee on Agriculture in the House, Hope as Chairman, studied the farm-machinery situation as it existed in the United States and abroad. Their findings showed the proposed aid legislation quoted a figure for farm machinery shipments that was too large for the size of the farms in participating countries; the shortage of steel and petroleum throughout the world would make the quoted figure too costly;

¹⁰"No More Isolation for U.S., Says Hope," The Hutchinson New Herald, December 5, 1947, p. 8.

¹¹"Farm Group Leaders Back European Aid Plan," Emporia Gazette, January 30, 1948, p. 1.

and increase in European agricultural production could be realized by other means.¹² This was Hope's greatest criticism of the proposed Marshall Plan legislation, the Administration's failure in not conducting an adequate and detailed survey of agricultural equipment needs both in the United States and in Europe in connection with the Marshall Plan.¹³ He did not want to send machinery to Europe that was in short supply in the United States.

Combining a long-range price-support agricultural measure with the needs of European nations for American food, Hope visualized a desired position for the farmers of America. All-out production with necessary incentives to protect the producers would promote stabilized agricultural prices and create a surplus of farm products needed to carry out the commitments of the country's foreign policy. Hope, however, did not want surplus products to be substituted into the aid program in lieu of an appropriation worth \$1,000,000,000. In other words, Hope did not want surplus food appropriated in place of money, but wanted money to be appropriated, surplus agricultural products purchased with this money, and the

¹²Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 7204.

¹³"Hope Asks Survey First of U.S. Farm Machinery Needs," Garden City Daily Telegram, February 11, 1948, p. 1. The Harriman Report set a figure of \$545,000,000 to be used to purchase farm machinery for Europe throughout the four year period.

purchased goods sent to Europe. The provision substituting products was taken from the aid bill in 1950 with Hope leading the attack against it. Such a provision, he said, would go "counter to the agricultural program" in that it operated against ECA principles by not functioning through normal channels.¹⁴ Operation through competitive and normal channels would help keep farm prices up, he declared.

Hope's attitude is plainly marked by this statement made on January 4, 1951:

While I feel a continuation of our present reckless foreign policy, which is being carried out without any apparent consideration of its costs or its results, would be a fatal mistake, I am just as much opposed to a return to a policy of isolationism....Somewhere between globalism and isolationism there is room for a sound, realistic American foreign policy.¹⁵

This equivocal statement is clarified somewhat by the role Hope desired the agricultural program would play in the foreign policy of the United States. He believed food was the all important implement of the United States in conducting foreign policy. In administering this foreign policy, said Hope, the United States would need a large surplus of farm goods in stockpile to make certain domestic needs could be met along with the hungry of Europe.¹⁶

¹⁴"House Chops ECA Funds \$250,000,000," Topeka Daily Capital, March 29, 1950, p. 1.

¹⁵Congressional Record, 82 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. A14-15.

¹⁶Congressional Record, 82 Cong., 2 Sess., p. A105.

By not installing markets in Europe through ECA funds, Hope feared countries like Germany would join the International Wheat Agreement, which would allow them to purchase wheat from either Canada, Australia, or Argentina resulting in the destruction of American markets in Europe. With fewer markets for United States wheat, American farmers would be forced to limit acreage, and as a result, suffer lower incomes.

In a speech made before the 1952 graduating class at Sterling College, Sterling, Kansas, Hope made this comment:

I want to make it clear that I am not criticizing what we have done. While I have not been in accord with all of it and while mistakes have been made, I am convinced that if we had not carried out our policies of economic and military aid, more of the world including much of Western Europe would be under Communist control. Furthermore, under existing conditions I think our present rearmament program is necessary as a holding operation, until more constructive and effective policies can be put into effect.

My criticism is directed to the things we have not done. Had they been done at the proper time, much that we are doing now might not be needed.¹⁷

Hope voted "yea" for Economic Cooperation Administration in the years from 1948 to 1950; he voted in favor of the Mutual Security Administration in 1951, and continued to support this legislation until he retired from Congress in 1956. Other subsequent legislation, such as aid to Pakistan in 1953, also caught his approving nod with stipulations that the wheat was to be given to that country for the government

¹⁷Ibid., pp. A4600-01.

to do with as they wished without putting any attached strings on the gift. He had introduced the bill that supplied wheat as a gift to Pakistan. In doing this he stated:

I am advocating giving away wheat, of which, we have an oversupply, to a friendly nation.¹⁸

As a conclusion to his viewpoint on foreign aid, Hope had stated that:

....some people say we are giving away the taxpayer's money, but the people of this country do not want these surplus agricultural commodities to spoil, they do not want us to let them be wasted, they want us to give them to hungry people....

Let me further state that, in my opinion, the farm program in this country is doomed unless we permit these surpluses that have been piling up under the program [support-program] to be diverted where they are needed to feed people who are hungry.¹⁹

REPRESENTATIVE MEYER

A radio address over three stations in Kansas on May 9, 1947, was the device used by Herbert (Hub) Alton Meyer, Representative from the Third Kansas District, to express his views on Greek-Turkish aid.²⁰ In this speech he related some of the dubious aspects of such a venture. He wondered how much money, how many men, and how much equipment it would take to stop the spread of Communism over these areas as well

¹⁸Congressional Record, 83 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 7023.

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 10400-01.

²⁰Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. A2238-39.

as the rest of Europe and Asia. He told the radio audience that he had serious doubts as to the value of \$400,000,000, the original investment of Greek-Turkish foreign policy, as the device for stopping communism, for aid had not retarded the advance of communism in China, Yugoslavia, Poland, Rumania, or Bulgaria. He believed that communist ideology was misleading the officials of the United States into expanding its foreign policy in a way to include aid programs that would not achieve their proposed purpose of halting communism.

It was inconsistent, he continued, to pour money into Greece and Turkey as combatants of Russian aggression while letting communism spread, without restrictions, in the United States itself.

Another question Meyer raised in that address was whether the United States should, with its national debt being \$273,000,000,000, enter a realm of foreign aid demanding a down payment of \$400,000,000 and a progressive and eternal commitment. More of his arguments were: such a move may destroy United States economy; the officials in Washington are too quick and sensitive to Stalin-made crises; if the United States matched each crisis with great quantities of the taxpayers money, the United States would financially bleed to death; one nation cannot finance the rest of the world and stay solvent; and the best method for the United

States to fight communism is to have the country financially sound.

Meyer submitted his plan for stopping Soviet aggression. He told the people in Kansas that the United Nations organization should be the agent in demanding Russia to cease putting pressure on countries in line of Soviet aggression. The United Nations should have been tried out; the people of the world should be allowed to see what power this organization really has, argued Meyer.²¹

Meyer was in favor of feeding the hungry of the world only if such an act would not destroy the solvency of the United States; however, to Meyer the Interim Aid or stopgap foreign aid measure was a bill which was seemingly devoid of restrictions; which gave relief to France and Italy in the form of \$597,000,000 for coal and \$35,000,000 for petroleum when coal stockpiles in France were lacking due to strikes, and when petroleum for gasoline was scarce in the United States; and which would assist France in paying off interest on the French foreign debt to Belgium (\$17,000,000), to Brazil (\$26,000,000), and to the International Monetary Fund (\$10,000,000). No payment of French debts to the United

²¹Ibid. Meyer used the example of Iran in 1946 in explaining that the United Nations Organization has forcefulness when dealing with aggression. He viewed the situation with praise and credited the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran as due to United Nations action.

States was mentioned including the food taken into Germany by France which should have been credited to the United States. The above, as Meyer related, was not aid to the needy as was suggested in the wording of the bill. Nor could the spending of billions stop the spread of communism when shipments of heavy machinery, petroleum, and other materials were sent to Russia, the mainspring of communism. For these reasons, the legislation, Meyer believed, could not accomplish its intended purpose and would enfeeble the economy of the United States in a way that would cause inflation, whereby vulnerability to attack would be the outcome substituted for the strength needed to match the expanding Russian economy. Meyer could not support this legislation because he felt that voting for stopgap aid would bind him to a vote in favor of the long-range Marshall Plan, which, he considered, would be an eternal and unlimited extension of stopgap aid.²²

The Government of the United States should take care of its aged and needy at home, Meyer believed. And, he maintained, inflation would eventually lead to police state tactics of establishing controls over the daily life of individuals. But he stated:

...while I yield to no one in the desire to feed the

²²Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 4800-01.

hungry and clothe the naked, I cannot in good conscience support this so-called stopgap foreign relief measure.²³

Meyer wanted private charitable organizations to distribute provisions to the needy of the world. If the United States Government distributed these goods, he said, there would be too much waste caused by black market competition and inefficiency.

In 1948, however, Meyer was converted to the ranks of the Marshall Plan supporters. His speech in the House on March 30, 1948, confirmed this. He began:

...I shall vote for this European recovery program. This blunt statement is not to be construed as indicating that this has been an easy decision for me to make. I can think of no question or problem which has given me more concern than that posed by this measure. It is the most momentous and soul-wracking issue ever presented to me in Congress or out....²⁴

He decided to vote for the Marshall Plan for four reasons. The first argument he gave in support of his decision was that the plan was launched in a pool of propaganda, making many men skeptical, but Meyer considered that the communist threat to world peace was increased considerably by the failure of post-war foreign policies of the United States, and that this "Bitter fruit of appeasement" should be replaced with a program not as negative in nature as former post-war policy, even if the Marshall Plan was only to be a

²³Ibid.

²⁴Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 3749.

calculated risk. His second reason was that the plan's intrinsic value outweighed the drain on the economy of the United States. The United States could not, however, continue in the future years to be an "international Santa Claus." Meyer was happy to learn that the program was to be a separate part of the State Department and apart from the Truman administration. He listed this as his third reason for his support of the measure, and his fourth reason was that he believed the majority of the people in his district were in favor of the plan. He had conducted a poll including some 2,000 people in the Third District, and, even with the possibility of the influence of the Administration's propaganda in shaping the opinions of the people in Kansas, Meyer believed the favorable response toward the Marshall Plan shown in this poll was the typical thinking of his district.²⁵

Many Congressmen were persuaded in their thinking by the 1948 coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia. Meyer seemed to be one of these men. His statement admitting that he saw "no alternative now at this late hour but to accept" the risk indicated his concern over world conditions.²⁶ In the light of the four points mentioned above, Meyer voted "yea" on Marshall Plan legislation in 1948. It may be summarized that

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Ibid.

Meyer visualized the plan as the best policy introduced up to then and should be tried as a way of preventing another war. Watching during the first year of application to see whether the Economic Cooperation Administration would actually benefit Europe and conversely help the United States, Meyer again voiced his view in 1949 which was only slightly changed from his 1948 opinion on the ECA program. He admitted the fact that ECA money put European people back to work, helped them earn money in order to purchase goods and commodities, fed them, and put tools in their hands; all the above relieved the pressure of communism.²⁷ Hungry, jobless people are more interested in communism. This was the objective of his view of the plan in 1948. However, in 1949, Meyer believed some of his suspicions concerning the foreign aid program had been confirmed by this one-year trial. He saw no dollar-for-dollar return of the money given by the United States; he saw precious materials being sent to Europe, which prevented inflation from ebbing in the United States;²⁸ he saw fabricated materials of Western Europe slipping into the hands of the Russians, via satellite countries; and he saw

²⁷Congressional Record, 81 Cong., 1 Sess., p. A2106.

²⁸Ibid. Meyer based his opinion, that inflation would be cut in the United States if precious material was not exported as aid items to Europe, on a statement made by Secretary of Commerce, then European head of ECA, Averell Harriman.

that the continuation of the program would mean a rising cost to the taxpayers of the United States. As a result of his observations Meyer formulated one general question covering his criticisms or skepticism: "How much can we really afford to spend internationally and nationally without a back-breaking tax burden?"²⁹ He wanted to be informed as to where and how the money was being spent. He could not accept the opinions of many that ECA funds could not be cut without destroying the whole program, that Europe was still in such a precarious position that it would be impossible to reduce ECA funds ten percent, as he stated was possible without destroying the ECA principle. A bipartisan support of the bill without debate only granted a "blank check" to the Administration, he stated again in 1949. He wanted debate, especially on reducing the amount of aid to England, primarily because England seemed to have economic constancy. At least she had enough to lend money to Russia and expand home plans of nationalizing all British industry. His argument for a slight curtailment of expenditures for ECA was that if the countries of Europe collapse into the arms of Russia as a result of ECA fund reduction, then the United States should buy real security, not false friendship constructed from European aid, in the form of a strong Army, Navy, and Air

²⁹Ibid.

Force at home.

Meyer voted for shaving the appropriations after he had voted in favor of continuing the Economic Cooperation Act in 1949.³⁰

The turning point in his voting record came in 1950. A letter dated January 13, 1950, from a Conservative member of the English Parliament to a taxpayer in the United States was published in the Congressional Record by Meyer. In this letter the Parliamentarian prayed to God that the United States would not renew the aid-giving generosity that year. He blamed the United States for contributing to the growth of socialism in England as a result of the ECA program.³¹

Meyer felt that voting for continuation of foreign aid money to Europe implied subscription to socialism in Europe as well as the United States. He said:

Yes...and fancy the international 'do-gooders' over here still persisting that we continue these 'dollops of dollars' to keep socialism going over there.³²

His last vote on Economic Cooperation legislation was "nay."³³ His voice in the argument was silenced by death on October 2, 1950.

³⁰Congressional Record, 81 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 4422.

³¹Congressional Record, 81 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 1632.

³²Ibid.

³³Ibid., pp. 4552-53

REPRESENTATIVE REES

Edward Herbert Rees, Representative from the Fourth Congressional District in Kansas, voted against the Greek-Turkish loan in 1947.³⁴ Later, that same year, Rees supported Interim Aid to Europe with only a few limitations. The major restriction he formed in qualifying his stand was concerned with the distribution of certain goods to Europe. One system of distribution of the Interim Aid goods that Rees could not agree with was the system whereby the United States would send incentive goods such as tobacco or liquor to European heads of government. In the vote on the Interim Aid bill of 1947 Rees voted to strike out the word "incentives."³⁵ Rees did not wish to think that these incentive goods were necessities. Funds appropriated for the Interim Aid program, Rees felt, for the distribution of tobacco and liquor among the citizens of Europe with the hope that these stimulants would induce the Europeans to produce more goods of necessity, such as food, was a waste of the taxpayer's money. This bribe would not work, Rees believed, and the European people should not receive tobacco or liquor from the United States. The

³⁴Congressional Record, 81 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 4975.

³⁵Ibid., p. 11169. Another amendment offered by Representative John Svinglius Anderson of California was to charge additional surplus material sent to Europe amounting to about \$100,000,000 to the base \$599,000,000 of the original relief bill was supported by Rees. Ibid., p. 11281.

United States instead should supply the various necessities such as food, medical supplies, clothing, fuel, fertilizer, and seed directly to the people of Europe until they were able to produce these supplies themselves.

Rees may not have been a prohibitionist in the strict sense of the word, but in certain of his actions directed against the distilleries it seems evident that he may be classified as a somewhat moderate prohibitionist, at least during 1947 and 1948. He joined Senator Capper in the attack on liquor advertisement in the United States, he joined others in the House in attempting to limit the amount of grain sold to American distilleries, and in order to make the most of the aid from the United States, as he said, Rees offered an amendment prohibiting the shipment of grain abroad for the production of distilled beverages.³⁶ A strictly prohibitionist motive, simple dislike of alcoholic beverages, may or may not have been the driving force behind these actions on the part of Rees. He remarks that the United States and the world are short of grain and cannot afford to use limited supplies of grain for use in making alcoholic beverages. It was his belief that much of the farm land in France used in the growing of grapes for the purpose of making wine should be planted to grains. His argument on this point was that these countries

³⁶Ibid., p. 11272.

needed food--food in the form of grains.

When the debate on Economic Cooperation legislation came to a climax in 1948, Rees was still not in favor of sending tobacco to Europe as a relief item at the expense of the United States taxpayers. He was answered by Representative Virgil Munday Chapman of Kentucky, who stated that the surplus tobacco sent to Europe as a relief item in addition to food would pay \$1,200,000,000 in taxes each year. However, this answer was not sufficient in Rees' mind to justify the need for the Government to buy surplus tobacco and send it to Europe.³⁷ Up to the time and during the debate on appropriations for Economic Cooperation funds, Rees believed certain items could be reduced or deleted from the measure. Such reductions were in the areas of (1) tobacco; (2) coal to Great Britain when Poland and Germany had a surplus; (3) petroleum which was in short supply in the United States; and (4) tractors. Rees believed that the \$90,000,000 allotted for tractors could be cut at least ninety per cent. Since the Europeans did not know how to use tractors and since European farms were small, Rees would keep the \$10,000,000 remaining after the ninety per cent cut in the allotment for tractors to buy horses and horse-drawn machinery, which, in his thinking, would be more practical for the European

³⁷Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 2 Sess., pp. 3762-63.

conditions.³⁸ He also disagreed with appropriating \$2,000,000 for agricultural experiment stations in foreign countries as this item could be eliminated, along with others, without putting the plan into jeopardy.

On March 31, 1948, Rees offered an amendment which he later withdrew in favor of an amendment by Representative Edward James Devitt of Minnesota, providing ocean-free transportation of relief packages to Europe.³⁹ Rees was the chairman of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, and he believed the amendment would serve the purpose of extending friendship from the United States to Europe. The Post Office Department was to be reimbursed from the funds appropriated for foreign relief at a reduced rate, while the Maritime Commission would provide shipping space for these parcels.

Representative Rees was alarmed at the scarcity of information concerning the program. He believed citizens of the United States were entitled to more information regarding

³⁸Ibid., p. 7193.

³⁹Ibid., p. 3849. The amendment by Devitt is as follows: "to provide ocean-free transportation and to defray port charges on relief supplies furnished by voluntary nonprofit relief agencies and on individual relief packages from the U.S. to Europe, and to make mandatory the execution of agreements between the Administrator and the recipient countries by the terms of which moneys in the so-called revolving fund shall be used to pay the transportation charges for such supplies and relief packages from the point of arrival in Europe to the place of residence of the addressee."

foreign policies because, he argued, wise decisions cannot be made on rumors and hints. However, Rees concluded in favor of backing the 1948 program for these reasons: (1) it had the endorsement of many great leaders who had spent a considerable amount of time in direct study of the proposal; (2) it had the approval of many people of the country who considered the program as a way to prevent another world crisis; and (3) it seemed to have the hope of bringing a better understanding among nations in preventing the suffering of people.⁴⁰ He supported, without much enthusiasm, the legislation for these three reasons in the hope that the funds would be properly administered and would accomplish what its sponsors believed it would.

The next year, 1949, Rees again voted "yea" for the extension, amendment, and appropriation of the Economic Cooperation Act. He voted in favor of the 1949 ECA in the spirit that the United States had already committed itself on that policy and that it was only a question of carrying out the promises. The appropriations for all items contained within the measure, Rees stated, should be carefully scrutinized, eliminating any aid not needed, making sure that American products were purchased with the American money, and, in general, making all the savings possible under the bill.⁴¹

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 3823.

⁴¹Congressional Record, 81 Cong., 1 Sess., p. A2290.

Representative James Thomas Patterson of Connecticut introduced an amendment in 1949 intended to permit small businesses to participate in the ECA program; such participation would not only be fairer to the small businesses by allowing them to participate in the measure but it would also stimulate more competition in supplying goods to be used in the program, directly lowering the prices. Rees favored this Patterson proposal along with the amendment offered by Representative Leonard Irving of Missouri to provide for the milling of twenty-five per cent of ECA wheat in the United States. This latter measure was included in the 1948 ECA plan, but it was again debated in 1949 in connection with small-business participation in the 1949 ECA program. It is possible that Rees would support the Irving Amendment because he was concerned with the problem confronting the small milling industries around the country, a problem created by the fact that several thousand small mills were shut down or running at less than capacity. Due to the importance of the milling industry in Kansas, Rees associated this nation-wide problem with Kansas, and to promote business for these industries would mean, in the outcome, more wealth for the state of Kansas.

In 1950 Rees changed his vote relative to foreign aid. In April of 1950, Rees had stated:

Personally, I am deeply concerned with regard to the tremendous expenditure of the taxpayers of this country in its attempt to bring about a better understanding

between the nations of the world.⁴²

It was his opinion that the Government of the United States had no money, was operating at a deficit, had a large national debt, and an unbalanced budget, all of which would contribute to a welfare state.⁴³ The new Congress should, therefore, cut foreign aid appropriations almost in half, from \$4,500,000,000 to \$2,000,000,000, and at the same time balance the budget and reduce taxes.

One criticism by members of Congress during the Truman Administration was that Truman refused to submit cost estimates to Congress and to the public. Representative Joseph Martin, Republican floor leader of the House, appointed a twenty-one member "price-tag" committee in order that Congress might be informed as to the costs of proposed legislation, and Rees was appointed to this committee.⁴⁴ From his observations, both in the United States and abroad, Rees concluded that the responsibility of the United States to rehabilitate the peoples of the world, as the 1948 legislation supposedly attempted to do, no longer was the objective of foreign aid in 1950. By the use of statistics, Rees concluded that the United States was sending \$800 per American

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Topeka Daily Capital, January 6, 1950, p. 21.

⁴⁴Topeka Daily Capital, January 16, 1950, p. 12.

family to underdeveloped areas in an attempt to elevate their standard of living to a point comparable to that of their benefactor. Sending aid to the world as a way of stopping the spread of communism was, to Rees, actually only a guise used by the foreign policy formulators in that the countries accepting the aid were not those threatened by communism.⁴⁵

Rees visited Europe during the fall of 1949. It was his view that the countries of this area were still in need of direct food relief; however, he felt that the United States should give this food directly to the people instead of to the governmental heads who had in the past acted as middle-men. He also emphasized that food production in Europe was, as of the end of 1949, almost as high as the pre-war era.⁴⁶

The \$3,000,000,000 proposed authorization, in addition to about \$10,000,000,000 which was authorized but not expended at that time, was too great an amount in his thinking. He wanted Congress to authorize only the funds absolutely needed to send food or clothing or medical supplies to Europe and not one item more.⁴⁷ Other items, he argued, such as heavy machinery and building plants, would be sent to Europe at

⁴⁵Congressional Record, 81 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 4162.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 7538.

the expense of the United States taxpayers and would be outside the purpose of restoring a pre-war economy in Europe. He maintained that the starving people of the world received little if any assistance from sending heavy industrial goods abroad and, therefore, these goods or the money for these goods should be loaned to the governments of these countries.⁴⁸ He believed that the United States Treasury could not afford any more grants of money for foreign aid expenditures. He made this comment about the Treasury:

I wonder if we realize that our country has a greater debt obligation than all of the other countries in the world combined.⁴⁹

He lauded the 1950 plan of the State Department concerning the disposal of such surplus goods as dried eggs and milk. The Commodity Credit Corporation earmarked 73,000,000 pounds of dried eggs and 170,000,000 pounds of dried milk for disposal as allocations to welfare organizations.⁵⁰ Rees no longer believed the Congress of the United States should pass foreign aid legislation because of previous commitments to countries abroad as he had formerly agreed. He stated:

...I supported legislation providing for billions of dollars for defenses in this country, and because of commitments made with certain European countries, I have also supported a considerable amount of funds to carry

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 1512.

out such commitments. I think, however, there must be a time when we should call a halt in the authorizations and appropriations against the people of this country, especially in consideration of tremendous sums already appropriated.⁵¹

Sending billions of dollars abroad, affirmed Rees, was not the way to solve the problem. Friendship could not be purchased especially when it was bankrupting the Treasury of the United States.

Because of his concern for locking the nation's vault and establishing an agency to determine the efficiency of the Government, Rees introduced a bill to provide a Congressional Commission on Government Efficiency and Economy.⁵² His attitude also made it impossible for him to vote "yea" for Mutual Security in the period 1951 to 1959, for he considered this nonessential aid to underdeveloped countries. He supported amendments designed to reduce appropriations, such as the Kem Amendments proposed by Representative James Preston Kem before the House to reduce the amount of appropriations. Rees introduced amendments before the House to limit the number of employees receiving a \$15,000 per year compensation within the Mutual Security Administration from one hundred employees to sixty; subtract the \$816,000,000 unexpended 1950 appropriations

⁵¹Congressional Record, 82 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 10284.

⁵²Ibid., pp. 190-01. Congress was to be advised at all times by the above mentioned Committee with respect to proper or improper and unnecessary use of Federal funds or nonessential Federal expenditures.

from the 1951 \$7,482,000,000 figure; and reduce the total appropriations for aid to India and Pakistan from \$237,155,866 to \$204,555,866. The latter amendment was rejected by a vote of eighty-seven to one hundred and one. Rees and those in support of limiting appropriations for the \$8,000,000,000 Mutual Security were quite unsuccessful in their mission for that year.

In the last year of the Truman administration Rees used the same arguments against extending Mutual Security legislation. After hearing the President's State of the Union Address on January 10, 1952, Rees had this to say:

The President has handed Congress the biggest peacetime budget submitted by any President. We realize that a great share of the funds requested is for defense purposes....

It seems incredible that this administration and those in charge of administering the affairs of this country would at such a critical time insist that the costs and charges of the departments of Government be increased....

...it is dangerous, yes, appalling, to contemplate billions of dollars of deficit when the tax charges are reaching the point of confiscation.

...It is my judgment that with sound economy, and by elimination of unnecessary expenditures our budget can be balanced, and without the necessity for additional taxes, or going into further debt.⁵³

A startling fact to Rees was the \$6,900,000,000 requested in 1952 for the Mutual Security program in addition to \$12,000,000,000 already appropriated but unexpended from previous allotments. This approximately \$19,000,000,000 was

⁵³Congressional Record, 82 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 508.

more than the proposed 1952 fiscal year expenditures for civilian agencies in the United States. As a way for expressing his views on this matter, Rees quoted John Foster Dulles, then chief adviser on foreign policy for the United States:

With nations, as with men, money is no substitute for character. Our Nation today is spending fabulous sums for security. The largest this year is about \$60,000,000,000. We have given away, in one form or another, about \$40,000,000,000 since 1945. If money could buy security and happiness, we should have them.⁵⁴

It was evident to Rees that the expenditures under this legislation were not as carefully checked as they should be. He attacked the policy of financing expensive improvements abroad such as power dams and flood control when more of these same improvements were needed in the United States.

It seemed to Rees that the \$12,000,000,000 already on hand was a sufficient amount of money to carry on the security program if the money was spent wisely. Therefore, in 1952, Rees voted against extending the Mutual Security program. His attitude remained the same throughout discussions on this matter in the years up to 1959. His arguments remained the same, that you cannot spend more than \$4,000,000,000 a year in carrying out the aid program, and it was senseless to appropriate anything above this amount; unexpended funds should be used first in meeting the \$4,000,000,000 if such a need is present; and that more experienced businessmen

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 5911.

were needed as advisers to the United States Government, replacing the "striped-pants corps" of the State Department as a way to guard against the State Department signing economically weak treaties.⁵⁵ His vote against the Mutual Security Acts as a package vote, voting for all the items on one vote, was a protest vote against waste and inefficiency caused by the surplus of unexpended funds.

REPRESENTATIVE SCRIVNER

The Republican leaders in the Eightieth Congress selected Errett Power Scrivner, Representative from the First Congressional District in Kansas, as a member of the Committee on Appropriations for the reason that he was the Kansas Congressman who knew how to say no, knew "what it takes to say 'no', and... [knew how to]...stick to it."⁵⁶ Aid to European countries was usually a subject in which Scrivner gave the persistent answer of no.

As early as December 18, 1947, Representative Scrivner advised his colleagues that they should ascertain the full meaning of the Harvard speech of June 5, 1947. He entered his remarks dealing with the early debate over the Marshall

⁵⁵Congressional Record, 83 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 5618.

⁵⁶Clif Stratton, "Clif Stratton Writes," Topeka Daily Capital, March 30, 1949, p. 4. Hereinafter cited as Stratton, "Stratton Writes."

Plan in the Congressional Record, including within that speech warnings on Chinese aid and European stopgap aid of that year.⁵⁷ He wrote Secretary Marshall on July 9, 1947, asking for more information on the Marshall Plan. His questions were on plan formulation. Whose idea was it? What was its purpose? When was it actually brought into existence? What foreign policy implications did it have? What approach to European problems? How much will it cost? What measures have been used in Europe to make ready for receipt of such aid? How will it effect United States economy?⁵⁸ Marshall's reply on July 29, 1947, seems only to have added fuel to Scrivner's skepticism. President Truman's call to Congress for Greek-Turkish aid, said Scrivner, was one of economic weight; asking for food, fuel, clothing, medical supplies, and fertilizer. However, Scrivner found that Greece and Turkey received a greater amount of military aid than the purely economic aid listed above upon passage of the Truman Doctrine. Greece and Turkey were not being economically reconstructed, they were being fortified. Marshall's letter in answer to Scrivner's letter confirmed that the so-called Marshall Plan was not a plan nor a doctrine. This answer was not sufficiently explicit, Scrivner believed, to base an

⁵⁷Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 11627.

⁵⁸Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 2 Sess., pp. 582-83.

opinion upon, although his doubt as to the worth of the plan appears strongly in his speech. He considered the possibility that European recovery would include such places as Japan, Korea, and other Asiatic countries, and the possibility that these places would not be helped economically but fortified as Greece and Turkey had been earlier.

Another reflection of weakness, the Representative contended, was the manner in which the Administration presented the proposal, stirring support by painting a gloomy picture of world conditions; the brink of crises, which, Scrivner interpreted Secretary of Defense James Forrestal as predicting, must cost the United States a sizable defense appropriation, intolerable, as well as misidentified, in the real event, unless the \$16,000,000,000 plus foreign aid bill was passed; and War Secretary Kenneth Claiborne Royall prognosticating a return to the draft in one sentence and saying "there is no imminent threat of war" in a later one.⁵⁹

In a newsletter to his constituents, Scrivner blasted the use of loan or aid money for the use of bolstering a socialist program in England. He did not cherish the thought of helping England regain and build up her colonies by sending American dollars to Great Britain. This was not self-help, the aid which Europe needed: food, clothing, shelter.

⁵⁹Stratton, "Stratton Writes," January 29, 1948, p. 4.

Scrivner indicated that the British colonial expansion would be greatly enhanced and that England could grow on a socialistic basis if the United States sent Marshall Plan aid to that country.⁶⁰

These things seem to have been the chief reasons for Scrivner's "nay" vote in the House on March 31, 1948, when the Marshall Plan legislation was passed in the House. Previously, he had voted against European interim aid (December 15, 1947), against Greek-Turkish aid (May 9, 1947), but had voted for a reduction of the amount of funds authorized for relief assistance (April 30, 1947).⁶¹ Scrivner also voted for the amendment introduced by Representative William Meyers Colmer and Senator Karl Earl Mundt that excluded aid to Russian-controlled countries (April 30, 1947).

It was a somewhat different story in 1949. Scrivner's vote on the Economic Cooperation Act of that year changed from a "nay" to a "yea." In a statement made in March, 1949, Scrivner noted a partial success for European recovery as it concerned industrial reconstruction, yet he notices a situation

⁶⁰"Scrivner Opposes European Aid Plan," Topeka Daily Capital, February 19, 1948, p. 3.

⁶¹Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 4292. This was the amendment to House Resolution 153, which reduced amount of funds authorized from \$350,000,000 to \$200,000,000, introduced by Representative Bartel John Jonkman of Michigan. This amendment was agreed to by a vote of 225 to 165. All members from Kansas voted "yea".

that would likely weaken American business. He comments:

European Relief money, materials and machines have so restored some European countries that they are taking over many American export markets. This will mean less work for the American taxpayers whose hard-earned dollars pay for the program. The feeding hand is being bitten. If the teeth marks grow too numerous and go too deep the hand will be crippled.⁶²

With the progress of the ECA in Europe, and with the amount of unexpended funds held over for use in 1949, Scrivner voted for the 1949 legislation in the hope that the authority for carrying out the measures would be removed from the hands of the Administration.

Again in 1950, as in 1948, the Representative from the Second District voted against the Economic Cooperation Act. The 1950 version was a mere extension of the 1949 bill, but the amount of funds proposed to be authorized seemed too high to Scrivner. To him, as to many other Congressmen, the size of the national debt was alarming. The communist announcement that they would force the United States to spend itself into bankruptcy seemed quite logical to him. Still, he pointed out that the United States insisted on spending billions to counter the threat of communism, promoting a situation whereby the nation would grow financially weaker each day. He offered this statement for the purpose of showing the national debt:

On December 30, 1949, the Treasury report shows that

⁶²Stratton, "Stratton Writes," March 30, 1949, p. 4.

Uncle Sam had spent \$3,229,798,921.52 more than had been received since July 1, 1949.

Our national debt as of January 1, 1950, was \$257,-160,110,000.09, an increase of \$4,305,708,539.54 over January 1, 1949.⁶³

These figures were also used by Scrivner to explain the reason why taxes must remain high, unjustly putting a burden on the workers of the United States, inasmuch as the national debt could be lowered. His obstinacy in regard to limiting the amount of foreign aid, if not eliminating the program in its entirety, was maintained in a House debate with Representatives Jacob Koppel Javits, John Kee, and Walter Henry Judd on March 29, 1950. These three men attempted to convince Scrivner that the United States had everything to do with determining how the aid money was to be divided and how it was to be spent. Scrivner continued to believe that the seventeen recipient nations decided how to divide and spend the money. The Economic Cooperation Administration Director had little voice in the matter, Scrivner believed, nor would Scrivner credit the counterpart fund as an effective device since, as he interpreted the system, European nations could determine what they could do with the money that was collected by individual foreign countries as a result of purchases from the Economic Cooperation Administration Director. The money did not go to the ECA Director to be sent

⁶³Congressional Record, 81 Cong., 2 Sess., pp. 574-75.

to the United States but this money spent for commodities in the United States was put into a counterpart fund, which was kept in the country, and which Scrivner objected to, especially when these funds were used for that country's debt reduction or public relief. Judd agreed that countries could reduce their national debts with these counterpart funds, but in doing this they had to have permission from the director of the Economic Cooperation Administration; and when agreement was made, the United States could never receive anything out of the fund as direct currency repayment. The Congressman from Kansas agreed that the United States would never be repaid for the billions sent to Europe.⁶⁴ He refused to agree with the philosophy of the three men, however, and he would not give credence to the benefit of indirect security repayments, which, the three men believed, would be far greater than the original investment of foreign aid because the aid money would be stimulated by counterpart funds, ultimately contributing to the economic stability in Europe. On March 31, 1950, he indicated a negative vote relating to the extension of the Economic Cooperation Act.⁶⁵

A grassroots response in the form of a twelve-point questionnaire was used by Scrivner in 1951 to gain insight

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 4326.

⁶⁵Ibid., pp. 4552-53.

in forming his opinions. Question number ten was: "Should we continue to supply naval, air, and army equipment to Western European nations?" Although this question belongs more to a military appropriations appraisal, it shows a frequent tendency of many Congressmen to disregard information found in questionnaires. Those who favored a continuation of military aid constituted 72.8 percent while 19.4 percent were against. Scrivner commented on this particular question by saying the responses of approval were conditioned. He refused to allow the overwhelming approval by his constituents for mutual security to direct his vote in 1951, for he voted against the Mutual Security Act of that year.

Representative Christian Herter proposed an amendment in 1952 authorizing the Secretary of Defense to transfer \$1,000,000,000 worth of items such as guns, tanks, and planes originally appropriated for defense to the foreign military program without having the Mutual Security Agency reimburse the Secretary of Defense. Scrivner was in complete disagreement with this measure. It meant, to him, adding another \$1,000,000,000 to the Mutual Security appropriations making the total \$7,889,000,000, cutting the general military bill from \$73,000,000,000 to \$72,000,000,000, and giving the Secretary of Defense the excuse of asking for an extra \$1,000,000,000 in appropriations for the military bill to replace what was transferred to Mutual Security when it came time for

military authorization in 1953.⁶⁶ As a way to make sure the military authorization in 1953 would not be raised the \$1,000,000,000 as a compensation for transfer of this amount to the Mutual Security Administration, Scrivner proposed an amendment to the Herter Amendment on May 23, 1952. Scrivner's Amendment stated that the military in the United States would be reimbursed by the MSA in the case of a transfer of \$1,000,000,000 from the military in the United States to the MSA in Europe. The amendment was adopted.

John Martin Vorys, Representative from Ohio, proposed an amendment to the MSA appropriations bill of 1952 which provided for the authorization to continue unexpended funds of the Mutual Security Agency through June 30, 1953, and have them consolidated with the appropriation authorized in 1952. All the Kansas Representatives voted in favor of this plan which passed the House. On the earlier vote on the Mutual Security Act that same day, May 23, 1952, Scrivner had voted no.⁶⁷

Scrivner continued to place a negative vote on Mutual Security legislation up to the time that his seat was filled

⁶⁶Congressional Record, 82 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 5815.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 5917. The amendment to the appropriations bill proposed by Representative John Vorys also was to strike out the \$408,000,000, replacing it with the lower figure of \$208,800,000 for international development. The measure was passed.

by Representative Newell George in 1958. His chief concern remained with the huge national debt; the Government must reduce both appropriations and expenditures in order to reduce taxes, and Congress had the power to do this if it had the will, he implied. The authority, he continued, rests with Congress, and Congress should not pass new legislation when revenue to pay the price is not in the national purse.

REPRESENTATIVE SMITH

Oh! You say we cannot fight communism with bombs-- I agree, but you can fight an idea with a better idea-- if you back up your idea with planning and money.⁶⁸

Thus spoke Representative Wint Smith from the Kansas Sixth Congressional District in a discussion on aid to Greece and Turkey. The consequence of not aiding these two countries seemed much more serious to Smith than the cost of aiding them. His vote in favor of sending aid to Greece and Turkey was based on the premise that by building the strength of these two countries the United States was building the offensive power of the latter against an aggressive force, supported by the communist nations, from the mountains of Greece. This Greek-Turkish aid would break the policy of appeasing Russia.

Actual belligerency between the aggressive forces of communism and the forces of the Royal troops of King George II

⁶⁸Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 4959.

of Greece prompted Smith to vote "yea" on Greek-Turkish aid.⁶⁹ However, in 1948 Smith refused to join the supporters of Marshall Plan aid; voted against any aspect of it, except amendments or clauses reducing or limiting the amount of aid authorized; and affiliated with those legislators who preached the principle of never allowing such legislation to pass in Congress in that year of 1948 or in any future years. He, thus became a member of the "psuedo-conservatives."⁷⁰

The members of the bloc voting against the Marshall Plan were frequently branded as isolationists. Smith, as well as other men who were labled as isolationists, opposed the aid plan, objected to having 400,000 displaced persons coming into the country, and disagreed with those in favor of sending American troops to help partition Palestine.

In a lengthy speech before the House on March 25, 1948, Smith denounced the Marshall Plan proposal. He described the plan as a device of propaganda artists to obtain money (of which only twenty per cent would be used for food while the remainder would be used to purchase short supplies in the United States in order to aid a socialistic Europe), keep inflationary conditions existing in the United States, and keep the taxes beyond the means of the taxpayers of the

⁶⁹Ibid., Smith's vote in favor of the Greek-Turkish loan may be found in the Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 3793.

⁷⁰See Ch. II, p. 12, ftn. 13.

United States. Since the World Bank declared the European countries a poor risk the United States was asked to send money to Europe as a gift, and this money, Smith forecasted, would be used by the European countries to pay reparations to Russia. Ireland was on the list of those countries receiving aid, and yet Ireland had not aided the Allies during the Second World War. In fact, Smith continued, the policy would assist countries defeated by the Allies in the war, which was a complete reversal of historic tradition. This should not be done, and Smith stated his opinion by recalling the United States Government's policy after the Civil War; a policy that left the South the obligation of self-reconstruction.

Mutual Security, he felt, was not good, in that friendship cannot be purchased with money; hence, it is impossible to have a united front consisting of heterogeneous countries grouped to fight communism. The fallacy in stopping communism by aid programs is in the fact that countries receiving the aid are really not threatened by communism. Countries like Ireland, England, Denmark, Holland, and Iceland, countries receiving the majority of the aid, are far from falling into the grip of the hammer and sickle, Smith argued.⁷¹

If the threat of war is as great as evidence seems to

⁷¹Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 3568.

indicate, Smith concluded at this time, he would spend the money authorized in the plan for building American defenses. Moreover, if loans were made to European countries the United States should ask France for bases in Algeria, England for islands in the Caribbean Sea, and minerals from Norway. Smith would ask for something in return from all countries receiving this aid money.⁷²

Probably his greatest criticism of the proposal was that he felt it was bribing Europe into stopping Russia while allowing the United States to remain indirectly concerned with the whole matter. Smith could not believe a bribe of this type would work. It would be too costly an attempt at indirect methods. The only true method would be the direct approach, whereby the United States would draw the line, warn Russia, and inflict punishment by destroying the base of the enemy if the line is crossed.⁷³ The United States should by no means supply material to the potential enemy if war was as close as the State Department claimed it to be.

In concluding his speech, Smith stated:

We should not adopt the Marshall Plan. Let us stick to what we have learned from our own experience. Let us not invest America's free-enterprise earnings in socialistic schemes in Europe. We can be sympathetic and generous but let us do it on an out-and-out charity

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Ibid.

basis--such as Hoover administered relief after World War I with funds donated by the generous people of America....

...I believe the people of America have had enough of our top-flight policy makers looking off at the far-off horizon of foreign shores. Let us start looking about us and build the internal economy of our own country by reducing public spending, cutting taxes, and paying off our debt. In short--we have had enough of foreign star gazing.⁷⁴

These were the main arguments given by Smith for his vote against the Marshall Plan.⁷⁵ He added new angles to these basic views in the years when new discussion on foreign aid opened in the House. He was relatively taciturn during the latter sessions, however.

Smith also feared that the Executive branch would demand more power in order to carry out the functions of the plan. This he did not favor.

As may be expected, Smith rose in support of all amendments lowering appropriations to the aid fund.⁷⁶ Smith improvised a way to show the people of his district just how much the plan would cost each person in that district. One figure released by him placed a \$129.11 burden on each person in the Sixth District.⁷⁷

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 3569.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 3874.

⁷⁶A good example of this can be found in the Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 3818, where he supported the Vursell Amendment that reduced funds.

⁷⁷Topeka Daily Capital, February 19, 1948, p. 16.

Smith also felt that if the Marshall Plan were to be passed, Spain should be included in the program. This desire of his was somewhat paradoxical in that he proposed to aid Spain and no other countries. He explained his position by the following statement:

Why do not these proponents of this 'give-away plan' want to help Spain? Because the leftwingers and pinks would say we cannot help France; he is a Fascist. So, it is not an honest defense program or they would put Spain into the program. Yet, military experts tell us the Russians can overrun Europe in 6 weeks. A first-class army in Spain could make an invasion most costly.⁷⁸

Along with many believers in the "American First" ideology Smith believed communism to be America's greatest danger and he worried about the spread of this "disease" in America. He could not imagine the President of the United States asking for billions of dollars to build up "defenses against world-wide communism" without first checking communism in the United States.

The people back home cannot understand why we spend billions of dollars to stop communism in Europe and apparently take no official action to stop it in the United States.⁷⁹

Wint Smith became a marked man in respect to his stand against foreign aid. He was viewed by some as being an enemy of the United States. "Because of his sentiments ...Congressman Smith has been named one of the country's

⁷⁸Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 3569.

⁷⁹Ibid., p. A1806.

[fourteen] foremost enemies by the New Republic...."⁸⁰ Smith was fearful that the economic policy of the United States consisted of spending itself into bankruptcy. "There is no such thing as security in a bankrupt country."⁸¹

Every taxpayer should know what the country was doing, Smith stated, and foreign aid, as the United States was applying it, was inviting disaster. The Government of the United States was spending money abroad for the improvement of production of such items as wool and other agricultural

⁸⁰ Stratton, "Stratton Writes," January 6, 1950, p. 4. Representative Shafer of Michigan submitted to the Congressional Record an article concerning Wint Smith written by Jack Williams, Washington Correspondent of the Kansas City Star. In this article the author describes Smith as a large, plain man who aggressively battles adherents of foreign aid and labor union leaders. The author classifies Smith as running a close second to Taft as being the most hated man in Congress by the Fair Dealers. He votes "no" more times on Fair Deal proposals than any other Congressman, the author states. "The labels pasted on him do not worry Mr. Smith. He cracks back at taunts of foreign aid advocates with 'Truman's international W.P.A.'" Another speculation offered by the author of this article as to why Smith dislikes New and Fair Dealers is that many of the politicians associated with Truman's Administration or "Brain Trusters" are Harvard men while Smith is a Yale graduate. Williams also states in this article that Smith represented an area which was characterized by "free-enterprise" and anti-Fair Deal thought. Smith is amazed at the large national debt and the practice of deficit spending, which, as Smith believes, leads a country to socialism; and bipartisan politics will continue to map the course for planned economy, "I prefer this ground [constitutional government] to the quicksands of political expediency [always-a-crisis government]....," Smith says. "They still talk about the 'four freedoms' and brotherhood of man, while a gang of deep-freeze experts are stealing some of the 30 freedoms the American people by our Constitution," added Smith.

⁸¹ Ibid.

products that were surplus items in the United States. This would cause more world surpluses, shut off further American overseas markets, and bring more decreases in prices. He did not blame Truman for this condition as he felt the President could not spend money that Congress did not appropriate.⁸²

In 1950, Smith proposed an amendment "to drop from next year's fund the sum of \$150,000,000," the total unexpended amount for the 1950 fiscal year.⁸³ The amendment, however, was defeated in the House by a vote of 154 to 103.

Preaching for a balanced budget, to which he firmly believed the people of the country were entitled to, Smith continued to vote against all aid in any form. He made the following statement in 1951:

The people are demanding an answer to just what is to be our policy in the matter of national defense. They full well know we have had no established policy in foreign affairs except to try to buy with tax dollars a false economy and well-being.⁸⁴

He asserted that foreign aid was illogical since the countries receiving aid had reduced their foreign debts by \$1,202,300,000 as a result of this aid while the United States went \$5,000,000,000 more in debt over the same period of time.⁸⁵

⁸²Stratton, "Stratton Writes," March 22, 1950, p. 4.

⁸³Topeka Daily Capital, March 31, 1950, p. 12.

⁸⁴Congressional Record, 82 Cong., 1 Sess., p. A715.

⁸⁵Stratton, "Stratton Writes," April 2, 1951, p. 4.

During the discussion on continuing aid to England in 1951, Smith formulated the theory that United States aid, the tax dollars of the citizens of the United States, were furthering the nationalization of industry in Great Britain. It was clear to him that the cooperation received in 1951 from Great Britain in not selling precious materials to China came as a result of a British desire to obtain aid for nationalization of the oil industry in Iran within British socialism. Great Britain needed help in Iranian affairs, said Smith, and England wanted this help in the form of aid from the United States.⁸⁶

A published newsletter written by Smith revealed the reasons why he voted against the loan to India in 1951.⁸⁷ The reasons listed were similar to those arguments he had used to attack previous foreign aid plans, but Smith altered them slightly to fit this new situation. He contended that there was a surplus in the Indian Treasury of \$137,000,000 in 1950, while the Treasury of the United States had no surplus to loan India; that starvation of people in India was not an ascertained fact, and many people in the United States were hungry; that it was not a loan, only a gift; that the government of India would never fight the Chinese; that India refused to sell the United States valuable minerals; and that he had pledged himself to vote the taxpayers' money only on

⁸⁶Stratton, "Stratton Writes," April 2, 1951, p. 4.

⁸⁷Stratton, "Stratton Writes," May 31, 1951, p. 4.

projects of direct defensive spending, not on policies distributing money to peoples on the earth without receiving a return for the loans.

Each "State of the Union" speech presented by President Truman was criticized by Smith, especially those remarks made by the President concerning foreign aid policies. These statements of policy were caricatured by Smith as being "Pie-In-Sky Politics."⁸⁸ Whenever the new President, Dwight David Eisenhower, stressed a continuation of high taxes in both individual and corporation taxes, Smith again sharpened his critical axe. As he stated:

If I voted against things when Truman was President, I can't in good conscience change overnight....

....after all, I've got to live with myself and I'm not going to follow along on some issues that I think are detrimental to the country's welfare and the people in my district.⁸⁹

A continuation of foreign aid seemed detrimental to the people of Smith's area. He based his judgment on a premise that European countries were balancing their budgets with American money when they could balance their own budgets by a wise policy of economy,⁹⁰ and a majority of the people of his district seemingly backed his stand. By a poll taken

⁸⁸Topeka Daily Capital, January 10, 1952, p. 1.

⁸⁹"While Eisenhower Proposes The Old Guard Disposes," Life (36:133, June 21), 1954.

⁹⁰Stratton, "Stratton Writes," June 8, 1953, p. 4.

in 1951, Smith found that people in his district did not approve, by a vote of 741 nays to 116 yeas, the proposal of economic as well as military aid to the nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.⁹¹

Wint Smith continued his vote against all foreign aid from the time he voted against the Marshall Plan to the time he retired from Congress in 1960. He voted for all reductions in the appropriations, and was an active member of the economy-minded noninterventionists in Congress.

REPRESENTATIVE MYRON V. GEORGE

Republican Myron V. George, Representative from the Third Congressional District in Kansas, who replaced Representative Meyer on November 7, 1950, as a result of the latter's death, viewed the Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson foreign policy as one of failure. He did not approve of United States foreign policies being conducted on the basis of "fear."⁹² He wrote the people in his district that: "We...

⁹¹Stratton, "Stratton Writes," April 20, 1951, p. 4. Another article in the Salina Journal, reprinted in the article "Clif Stratton Writes," Topeka Daily Capital, July 17, 1954, p. 4, contests the opinion that Smith represents the majority thinking of his district. Smith's die-hard tactics are a slap at President Eisenhower, who is popular in Kansas, and may produce ill feeling among Kansas people. However, Smith has been successful in returning to Washington only because he has had no "vigorous and effective opponent."

⁹²Stratton, "Stratton Writes," January 15, 1951, p. 4.

are being guided by a policy of fear....Because of this fear, we are losing the initiative."⁹³ George wanted a partisan approach to the debate on foreign aid as well as all debate because he believed absolute control by one party or bipartisan politics led the country to war.⁹⁴

His suspicion of foreign aid as devised by the Truman Administration prompted Myron George to vote against the legislation in 1951. However, George voted for the plan in 1952, due to the fact that the Vorys amendment was adopted which cut the international development fund for that year from \$408,000,000 to \$208,800,000. He was also happy with the amendment offered by Representative Fred Lewis Crawford which cut the total for Mutual Security from \$3,273,824,750 to \$3,128,224,750. He voted in favor of the legislation in 1953, but in 1954 George again registered a "nay" vote, primarily for the reason that cuts in the total appropriations were turned down. In 1955 George returned to the favorable side, voting "yea."

George's voting record probably depended upon the amount of deductions or cuts made in the total appropriated each year for Mutual Security legislation. This conclusion is made by examining the inconsistency in his voting pattern

⁹³Ibid.

⁹⁴Congressional Record, 83 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 882.

and in the statement made by him in 1959:

Often I wonder...if it would not be wise for America to withdraw completely from the foreign-aid picture as it now exists, thereby leaving the field to Communist Russia. If this were done, Russia would have to spread her resources so thin that she could accomplish little in any one country. Our aid could then be given upon application by the various countries, and they would most certainly be cognizant of the source of that assistance.⁹⁵

George, however, continued in the late years of his term in Congress to support foreign aid in the hope that this program would change from a gift basis to a long-term loan policy.

REPRESENTATIVE MILLER

Democrat Howard S. Miller from the First Congressional District in Kansas took office as a replacement of Albert Cole after the 1952 election. This Democratic Representative immediately supported the Emergency Famine Relief Authority and aid in the form of wheat to Pakistan for the basic reason that he felt it was the humanitarian thing to do. He stated:

We cannot, even if we would, shirk our responsibility as a Nation without compromising ourselves as individuals. We must not, and we cannot do it. We intend to meet the wants of our fellow men in Pakistan. There is no doubt as to that. It is only a question of the spirit in which we shall do it....let us give this relief, not because they are in a position to return the favor. Let us not give even as a matter of duty. Let us give it

⁹⁵Congressional Record, 86 Cong., 1 Sess., p. A6105.

because they are fellow human beings....⁹⁶

In this spirit Miller, during his short tour of one term in Congress, supported the Mutual Security Acts of 1953 and 1954.

REPRESENTATIVE AVERY

The Eisenhower Administration, in the opinion of Representative William Henry Avery from the First Congressional District in Kansas, based foreign aid spending on national security alone. In 1954, Avery stated to voters in his district that his concepts concerning a foreign policy were based particularly on the following points:

1. To insure a strong free America I favor: a. Economic and political alliances with friendly nations.
- b. Financial and material assistance to friendly nations.⁹⁷

His attitude seems to have become somewhat modified to the extent that funds for foreign aid should be appropriated only when they are necessary for the defense of the United States. He wrote:

Everyone will agree there is great danger in the general world situation today and that the United States must do everything it can, within reason, to contain and limit the spread of communism. As an [a] means to help us achieve this goal, I think generally the mutual

⁹⁶Congressional Record, 83 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 7086.

⁹⁷"Top Kansas Candidates Give Their Views On Main Election Issues To Women Voters," Topeka Daily Capital (October 31, 1954), p. A21.

security program has been successful.⁹⁸

Avery remained friendly in his attitude toward the Mutual Security Program; however, he wanted a thorough review made of the work done in this program and the results of the plan obtained. Some changes, he argued, could be made in the operation of the program to achieve efficiency.

In concluding this discussion of Avery's attitude toward foreign aid, one more point must be included. Avery noted that thirty percent of United States foreign aid or \$16,000,000,000 has been spent for surplus agricultural products, and that eighty percent of the aid "is spent for commodities grown and products manufactured in this country."⁹⁹

From his first session in Congress in 1959 to 1960, Avery voted in favor of the Mutual Security Administration.

REPRESENTATIVE BREEDING

James Floyd Breeding, Democratic Representative from the Fifth Congressional District in Kansas, responded to the Mutual Security Administration legislation in a cautious manner, but always with an affirmative vote. He resented the secrecy surrounding the program and many questions disturbed him. He desired answers to some questions before he cast

⁹⁸Newsletter enclosed in letter, William Avery to Darrell Munsell dated February 25, 1960.

⁹⁹Ibid.

his vote. Some of these uncertainties were: reports by responsible Congressional committees relating tremendous wastes in the program; foreign aid funds spent to finance dams, rural electric lines, and economic development abroad when the above were needed in the United States. All the answers to these questions were not supplied to Breeding, but he voted in favor of the "package" legislation in spite of his disapproval of legislation in "package" form. He preferred to vote on a separate basis, that is, military aid and then economic appropriations. It was against his judgment to vote for \$3,200,000,000 additional to an already unexpended \$6,200,000,000 with \$1,000,000,000 counterpart funds in 1957. Economic aid, he felt, should have been eliminated from the \$3,200,000,000, leaving just funds for military assistance.¹⁰⁰ All economic aid should be limited to just farm surplus products. "Communism," said Breeding, "thrives on the difficulties of other people."¹⁰¹ As far as Breeding was concerned, the difficulties of the world generally were based on hunger.

The ideal way to conduct a world economic promotional

¹⁰⁰Congressional Record, 85 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 12224-25. Breeding was in favor of sending surplus agricultural goods to Europe under the Public Law 480. This law exchanged United States surplus agricultural goods to friendly countries in return for their foreign currency. This currency in turn would be used to expand foreign economics, to maintain United States public officials abroad, or trade strategically necessary materials.

¹⁰¹Congressional Record, 86 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 6140.

plan, Breeding concluded, would be to eliminate the development loan fund, with its low rates and outright gifts, and replace these funds with an extended Export-Import Bank.¹⁰²

In 1959 Breeding told his constituents that:

I voted for every reduction proposed on the floor.... I am convinced that the amount \$400,000,000 could be further reduced without crippling the program....If Congress reduced the amount available, it could well force the administrators to tighten up their procedures so the money will go further.¹⁰³

Breeding, however, voted in favor of continuing the Mutual Security Administration in 1959.

REPRESENTATIVE NEWELL A. GEORGE

Democrat Newell A. George was elected to the House of Representatives in 1958, defeating the incumbent Scrivner. George did not wish to be considered as an opponent of the Mutual Security Program, but he wanted some of the waste and extravagance cut from foreign aid as a means to increase the development loan program or Point Four Program. He stated in April, 1959:

I do agree...that the emphasis [on foreign aid] should be placed on long-term loans and technical assistance...¹⁰⁴

George voted "Yea" on Mutual Security appropriations

¹⁰²Congressional Record, 85 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 12224.

¹⁰³Newsletter from James Floyd Breeding dated June 19, 1959, p. 2.

¹⁰⁴Congressional Record, 86 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 5680.

in 1958 and 1959.

REPRESENTATIVE HARGIS

Democratic Representative Denver David Hargis, Kansas Congressman from the Third District, advocated debt reduction. The Government, he believed, should take steps in the direction of limiting the debt, and foreign aid reduction, he thought, would be an excellent place to begin this step. He expressed this point of view in a letter to the author as follows:

I feel that the government is spending a great deal too much on foreign aid. If the government would discontinue foreign aid, they could not only pay off the National debt, but taxes could be reduced as well. I find that here in Washington the government is more concerned about trying to build up foreign trade, which is detrimental to our own industries and workers, than it is to help American industries. As anyone can see this is an injustice to our men that are laid off because of lack of work.¹⁰⁵

Hargis, for these reasons, could not vote for the continuation of foreign aid to Europe in the 1959 vote in the House of Representatives.

¹⁰⁵Letter from Denver D. Hargis to Darrell Munsell, dated February 11, 1960.

TABLE II
RECORDED VOTE IN HOUSE ON FOREIGN AID BILLS
1947-1959

Year	Bills	COLE	HOPE	MEYER	REES	SCRIVNER	SMITH	M. GEORGE	N. A. GEORGE	AVERY	BREEDING	HARGIS	MILLER	Vote of House	
														Yeas	Nays
1947	Greek-Turkish Loan	X	X	O	O	O	X							287	107
1947	Interim Aid to Europe	X	X	X	X	O	O							333	66
1948	Marshall Plan	X	X	X	X	O	O							329	74
1949	Economic Cooperation Act	X	X	X	X	X	O							355	49
1950	Economic Cooperation Act	X	X	O	O	O	O							287	86
1951	Mutual Security Act	#	X		O	O	#	O						260	99
1952	Mutual Security Act	X	X		O	O	O	X						246	109
1953	Mutual Security Act		X		O	O	O	X				X		280	108
1954	Mutual Security Act		X		O	O	O	O				X		260	126
1955	Mutual Security Act		X		O	O	O	*	X					273	128
1956	Mutual Security Act		X		X	O	O	#	X					275	122
1957	Mutual Security Act				O	O	O	#	X	X				252	130
1958	Mutual Security Act				O	O	O	X	X	X				259	134
1959	Mutual Security Act				O	O	O	X	X	X	O			271	142

KEY: X-yea vote
O-nay vote
#-not voting
*-paired in favor
"-paired not in favor

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

Those years following the Second World War were filled with troublesome problems for the United States in relation to world affairs. The Truman Administration had to subordinate its domestic problems, to a large extent, in order to solve the vexing international problems. Kansas people were not altogether ready for a total abandonment of domestic problems, at least not those problems concerning high taxes, the national debt, high prices, and farm income. Even if the other members in the Congress were willing to discuss measures geared to international policy, the Kansas Senators and Representatives were quick to try and bind thinking on domestic affairs with international policy as a way of instigating solutions for perplexities in the United States while solving international problems. In this way the problem of agricultural surpluses could be conveniently re-shaped to fit into solutions for international measures. As such, Representative Hope suggested the continuance of a price support program for farm products during those years after World War II, which were years when almost everybody wanted lower taxes with lower prices. He could thus stress the importance of farm surpluses, advocating even a larger surplus than that in existence at that time, as being the backbone of any foreign aid program.

Senator Capper could easily see the importance of food to a hungry world, and Cole endorsed a plan designed to trade food for strategic materials in Europe. Carlson believed food was more effective in combatting communism than guns. No matter what form the plan of foreign aid would take, Kansas men conveniently held to an ideology which made food the key to any plan of aiding Europe. That such an ideology benefited their constituents was hardly coincidental, and the semi-isolationism of the State was reflected in their actions. The bluntness of such a policy could be neatly covered by the broad and popular argument that they favored humanitarian aid.

Benefits from foreign aid programs to sections of the United States excluding Kansas were viewed skeptically by the delegation. Who in Kansas would want to pay taxes for the support of the American tobacco growers? Rees did not. He could not agree with the policy of sending tobacco to Europe as a relief product. His interest in foreign aid, as was the interest of most of the Kansas Representatives and Senators voting in favor of aid programs during any one year of this period, was narrowly directed to the problem of the Kansas wheat surplus. All the members in Congress from Kansas had the agricultural surplus problem in the center or near the center of their interests, but they all did not agree that foreign aid programs would answer that problem; and quite

frequently those that might agree one year changed their minds the next year. For an example of this, Hope would stand by foreign aid measures that were wrapped in elements of military aid, counterpart funds, increasing European industrial output, supporting foreign debt reductions, or measures raising taxes in the United States longer than Rees, Scrivner, Meyer, Schoepfel, or Hargis would, mainly because he believed foreign aid a good answer to the agricultural surplus problem. He would not join his contemporaries in Congress in voting against foreign aid measures because they were plans that assisted socialistic countries or were plans inefficiently administered. He saw these dangers and was willing to improve aid measures, but he was not willing to completely defeat these aid programs in Congress because of these criticisms. Hargis saw the advantages of sending food around the world, but, to him, the effort of aid programs as devised by past Congresses entailed sending almost everything overseas, thus raising taxes, prices, and the national debt in the United States. Schoepfel, Rees, and Meyer were in agreement with Hargis. The aid programs of the United States were, to these three men, too expensive a device to rid the country of food surpluses.

Most of the Kansas group in Washington was willing to have bipartisan debate on foreign aid. It was not a Republican view that foreign aid spending was too expensive nor was

it a Democratic assumption that any foreign aid program was the only effective weapon to fight communism short of war to these Kansas men. Over the nation and over the years some Republicans viewed the measures concerning foreign aid as a necessity for the United States while some did not. Democrats were in much the same position. Of the group of eight Kansas Republicans in Congress in 1948, only two voted against the Marshall Plan that had been proposed by a Democratic Administration. This plainly indicated the bipartisan nature which the Kansas men considered necessary for foreign aid debate. Senator Reed was willing to vote for the Marshall Plan, although he did not like the plan as it had been proposed by the Administration, for the reason that a bipartisan approach to this matter was a much safer avenue to take. He feared the defeat of the plan would split the Republican Party immediately before the 1948 Presidential elections. Another Republican, Wint Smith, did not view the Marshall Plan as a threat to Republican solidarity. He did not vote against the Marshall Plan because he considered it as a Democratic invention for, as he stated, the party formulating the plan made little difference to him. He was against any foreign aid program whether it was drawn up by the Democrats or Republicans. After 1952 he still refused to vote for foreign aid measures that the Republican Eisenhower Administration had outlined. Smith was more faithful to his reasoning on

foreign aid measures than Schoeppel, who entered the ranks of partisanship during 1957 when Republican persuasion converted him to the view that military aid was a necessity to the Republican foreign policy of the United States. This partisan pressure had only a small effect of short duration upon Schoeppel, for he was never happy with the figure appropriated for the enactment of the 1957 MSA, and he again slapped the Eisenhower Administration in the face by voting against the 1958 MSA. In 1958 and 1959, Democrats Breeding and Newell George voted for the Eisenhower foreign aid proposal in each of those two years while Republicans Rees and Smith refused to go along with their party on foreign aid legislation. Partisan debate on foreign aid matters was not a factor in the discussion as far as the Kansas Senators and Representatives were concerned.

Quite frequently the Kansans would join colleagues in working for revisions in foreign aid measures. Reed joined nineteen other Republican Senators in the revisionist group in 1948, a group advocating alterations to the Marshall Plan proposal. Some of this group's suggestions for the plan came into direct conflict with Senator Vandenberg, and Reed, desiring to prevent a split in the Republican Party, modified his thinking when Vandenberg directly opposed the revisions advocated by the group of twenty Senators. However, after 1948, Reed again returned to the battle for revisions in the

foreign aid programs. Schoeppel, after he was convinced by Republican pressure in the form of party ethics to vote for the Eisenhower MSA legislation, worked harder than before to obtain revisions in subsequent foreign aid bills. Schoeppel really wanted a bill that would send only military equipment to Europe to fortify the military troops of the United States without sending economic aid to the countries of Europe. This is hardly foreign aid when only American troops benefit from the money sent abroad by the United States, yet Schoeppel did not make this distinction. Rees constantly stressed the need for revision in foreign aid measures. His alterations consisted simply of less money sent abroad. All Kansans in Congress, in 1959, favored a loan program over a direct aid program.

Although the humanitarian purpose of foreign aid was a major factor in the thinking of the members of Congress, it was not the only important factor. Cole's strategic material program whereby food would be traded for European material; Hope's program of sending food to Europe to rid the United States of surplus agricultural products; and Carlson's desire to use food as the chief weapon against communism were plans that were not only partly humanitarian in nature, a policy of which all members of Congress were ostensibly in favor, but were ways of extending or gaining markets overseas while feeding the hungry of the world. Cole, as well as Capper,

Hope, and Carlson, wanted the United States to be the chief supplier of food for the world. The United States was to replace the Ukraine as the European source of food, ensured against Canadian competition by the International Wheat Agreement that produced guaranteed markets by contract for the United States in return for the economic aid sent to Europe.

Europe should be aided, at least nominally, Cole, Hope, Breeding, and Carlson believed, but the United States had to guard itself against Europe as a competitor. The European industrial plant should be re-made in the form of a supplementary part of the greater industrial system of the United States. In short, as Scrivner proscribed, Europe had to be Americanized. The economies should be that system of cooperation where one unit would supply the needs of the other. Cole would not raise the industrial level of Europe much beyond the pre-World War II days; Hope and Capper would allow American dollars to reach Europe as a way to promote a recovered European economy based on an industry in Europe large enough to ensure stability in Europe but not large enough to flood the world with European goods. Europe had to raise its own standard of living with assistance from the United States, and once the stability of Europe was obtained Capper demanded that the United States should terminate all aid.

Rees and Smith criticized the American foreign aid

plans because they believed the United States was trying to raise the standard of living throughout the world by aid money, which, as they maintained, was impossible. They argued that such a policy would force the United States into bankruptcy, and allow socialism to fill the vacuum left by the disintegrated economy of the United States after the national debt, high prices, and high taxes brought about this bankruptcy. In the thinking of Rees, Scrivner, and Meyer the Americanization of Europe was the only way to stop communism, and the only way to Americanize Europe was to take complete control in the administration of aid programs.

While the retired Capper, along with the active Smith, Hargis, Rees, and Schoeppel believed that a continuation of aid to Europe would leave the United States with socialism as the only alternative, a more optimistic opposition was formed by Hope, Myron George, Newell George, and Avery. The latter men stress the point that there would be a dollar for dollar return of the aid sent to Europe in the form of increased productivity in the American economy owing to a stimulation of production created by the demand of more goods to be sent to Europe. This new market would give more employment to people of the United States, as they interpreted it, by calling for increased production of these goods needed in Europe, and, subsequently, these goods, once received in Europe, would put the European people back to work. An increased

level of economy, created by a fuller employment, both in Europe and in the United States, was the strength needed in a defense against Soviet Communism. All the Kansans in Congress were interested in an adequate defense for the United States, but they disagreed with each other on just what was adequate, and in the steps to be taken in establishing this defense. To Meyer, the Marshall Plan was the end of a policy of appeasing the Soviet Union; but continuing aid programs, as they were introduced in the House of Representatives, became, to him, demands on the Treasury of the United States for inefficiently controlled funds reaping insignificant returns. To Smith and Schoepfel, the only effective weapon against communism was actual force. This being impossible short of war, the United States should then, especially in Smith's view, define a line at which communism would have to halt, prepare the offensive force of the United States by appropriating the means for strength within its own boundaries, and strike if that line of definition is fractured as a result of communist aggression. A mitigatory action of this extreme view was the policy of those supporting foreign aid to Europe; to strengthen the position of the United States in Europe as a pose of threat from a solidified Western Europe. Avery, Breeding, and Newell George advocated the latter view when they voted in favor of the MSA in 1958 and 1959.

To vote for foreign aid in Congress would mean a

departure from a program of tax reduction and national debt reduction in the opinion of most people. Smith, Rees, and Hargis believed this to be true; a nation cannot have both a program of tax and debt reduction and a program of foreign aid. Cole did not agree with this as he was inclined to believe that foreign aid would stimulate the economy of the United States in both the areas of production and in the area of trade; and, consequently, as a result of more tax money to be collected from an increased profit in the United States, taxes could be lowered for the average citizen and payments could be made on the national debt with the increased revenue from trade. When Cole advocated his plan of encouraging foreign aid as a way of stimulating United States trade, he chose a plan of political convenience. To him an advocacy of tax reduction in lieu of foreign aid was a policy more dangerous than a plan designed to encourage both tax and debt reduction while granting foreign aid. As such, Capper, Reed, Hope, and Cole could view foreign aid favorably, advocate its acceptance, and, at the same time, vote for a bill to reduce the national income tax. This plan would please a larger number of the constituents than measures designed just to lower taxes or legislation stressing just foreign aid. A broad general plan to cover all those items, as the one above, would be a more desired plan since it was an ideal policy to use for political expediency.

Foreign aid is likely to continue being a controversial topic. There are still those in the United States who believe foreign aid to countries of the world is a necessary part of the United States foreign policy. There are still others who do not believe it is a necessity, and believe that it should be discontinued. To 1959, the "yeas" had it over the "nays."

131

Printed by

Lithographed by

U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20540

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1951, 147: 1000-1001.
- 2. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1951, 147: 1001-1002.
- 3. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1951, 147: 1002-1003.
- 4. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1951, 147: 1003-1004.
- 5. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1951, 147: 1004-1005.
- 6. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1951, 147: 1005-1006.
- 7. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1951, 147: 1006-1007.
- 8. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1951, 147: 1007-1008.
- 9. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1951, 147: 1008-1009.
- 10. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1951, 147: 1009-1010.

3. Newspapers (1951)

- 1. *Washington Post*, October 1, 1951.

4. References

- 1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1951, 147: 1000-1001.
- 2. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1951, 147: 1001-1002.
- 3. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1951, 147: 1002-1003.
- 4. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1951, 147: 1003-1004.
- 5. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1951, 147: 1004-1005.
- 6. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1951, 147: 1005-1006.
- 7. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1951, 147: 1006-1007.
- 8. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1951, 147: 1007-1008.
- 9. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1951, 147: 1008-1009.
- 10. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1951, 147: 1009-1010.

March 20, 1952

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

1. Government Documents

Congressional Record. 80 Congress, 1 Session to 86 Congress, 1 Session. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1947 to 1959.

The Department of State Bulletin. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, Volume 17, October 5, 1947 to Volume 39, December 1, 1958.

United States Statutes at Large. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, Volume 62, 1948 to Volume 73, 1959.

2. Letters

Avery, William H. (Representative), February 25, 1960.

Breeding, J. Floyd (Representative), February 15, 1960.

George, Newell A. (Representative), February 24, 1960.

Hargis, Denver D. (Representative), February 11, 1960.

Rees, Edward H. (Representative), February 19, 1960.

Schoeppel, Andrew F. (Senator), April 27, 1960.

Scrivner, Errett P. (Representative), April 19, 1960.

Socolofsky, Homer E. (Professor), February 13, 1960.

Smith, Wint (Representative), February 4, 1960.

3. Newspapers (Texts of Speeches)

Topeka Daily Capital, October, 1947-July, 1951.

4. Newsletters

Breeding, J. Floyd, February 27, 1959.

_____, March 20, 1959.

_____, June 19, 1959.

Schoeppel, Andrew F., July, 1959.

5. Diaries and Personal Accounts

Millis, Walter (ed.). The Forrestal Diaries. New York: The Viking Press, 1951.

Truman, Harry S. Years of Trial and Hope. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1956.

Vandenberg, Arthur H., Jr. (ed.). The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952.

SECONDARY SOURCES

1. Studies

Bell, Daniel (ed.). The New American Right. New York: Criterion Books, 1955.

Campbell, John C., et. al. The United States in World Affairs, 1947-1948. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948.

Donovan, Robert J. Eisenhower, The Inside Story. New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1956.

Lubell, Samuel. Revolt of the Moderates. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956.

_____, The Future of American Politics. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952.

Price, Harry Bayard. The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1955.

Summers, Robert E. (comp.). Economic Aid To Europe: The Marshall Plan. New York: The H. W. Wilson Company, 1948.

Westerfield, H. Bradford. Foreign Policy and Party Politics: Pearl Harbor to Korea. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955.

White, William S. The Taft Story. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954.

Wiggins, James W. and Schoeck, Helmut. Foreign Aid Re-examined. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1958.

2. Periodical Literature

Bolles, Blair. "Congressional Leaders Reappraise ERP," Foreign Policy Bulletin, 28:3-4, December 17, 1948.

"Congress Debates: Interim Aid For Europe," Forum, 109: 45-64, January, 1948.

"Congress Debates: The Economic Cooperation Act; Senate Debate Taken From Congressional Record," Forum, 109: 236-56, April, 1948.

"Congress Reports: European Recovery," Forum, 111:176-92, March, 1949.

Folliard, E. T. "Washington Scenes: Marshall Plan," Nation's Business, 34:29, August, 1947.

"Harriman's Men: Architects of Recovery," Business Week, 995:105-06, September 4, 1948.

"How Wheat Moves From U. S. To Breadlines of Europe," Business Week, 945:20-1, November 15, 1947.

Lindley, Ernest K. "Two H Reports: Harriman and Herter," Newsweek, 30:32, November 17, 1947.

_____. "What Our Congressmen Found In Europe," Newsweek, 30:32, October 27, 1947.

Strout, Robert. "Marshall Plan Report," The New Statesman and Nation, 35:90, January 31, 1948.

3. Newspapers

Emporia Gazette, January, 1948-July, 1955.

Garden City Daily Telegram, October, 1947-July, 1953.

Hutchinson News-Herald, October, 1947-July, 1959.

Kansas City Star, October, 1947-July, 1959.

Kansas Farmer, January 3, 1948-December 15, 1951.

New York Times, October, 1947.

Topeka Daily Capital, August, 1951-July, 1959.

4. Thesis

Brumm, Jan R. "Congress and the Marshall Plan," M. A.
Unpublished thesis, Kansas State University, 1958.

The 1950 Congressional Districts in Kansas

APPENDIX

The 1959 Congressional Districts in Kansas



