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A Study of the Political Concepts and Theories of Mao Tse-Tung

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A STUDY OF THE POLITICAL CONCEPTS AND THEORIES
OF MAO TSE-TUNG

being

A Thesis Presented to the Graduate Faculty
of the Fort Hays Kansas State College in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Master of Science

by

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THESIS ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is an examination of the policies which were important in Mao Tse-tung's rise to power in China and those policies which have been instrumental in keeping him in power.

Documentary and secondary sources were consulted with secondary sources used only where insufficient documentary evidence existed or when they made a significant contribution to the subject. The study was confined primarily to the four volumes of the English translation of the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung and the three publications of the American Consulate General at Hong Kong entitled, Survey of the China Mainland Press, Current Background and Extracts from China Mainland Magazines.

The formation and foundation of Mao's political concepts consisted of his early education and contact with Communist ideologies, his theory of practice and the development of his materialist-dialectic philosophy.

Mao's use of the peasants in the Communist movement in China and his class analysis of the rural areas were part of the basis for his agrarian program. Major policies aiding his program were land reform, collectivization and the commune system.

Examination of labor's role in the Chinese Communist

movement and the division of the classes of labor show Mao's concept that labor must lead the revolution in China. His policies, such as the use of communes and the Trade Union Law, give examples of his efforts to bring labor to the front in the revolutionary movement. Mao is apparently trying to transform the broad masses of the peasantry into an industrial proletariat in support of his belief that this will make the Communist movement more stable.

Mao Tse-tung has made extensive use of the military forces both in resisting the Japanese and in overthrowing the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek. The communes are designed along military lines to give him more authority in all areas. This would imply that Mao is depending extensively upon the military forces for his control of China.

The early economic policies of Mao and the Chinese Communists were to proceed with all economic construction possible as well as essential and to concentrate on the agricultural and industrial programs in the formation of a sound economy. By the use of the commune system Mao hopes to build a strong economic basis for Communist China.

Mao is attempting to control the education and culture of the Chinese people as closely as possible. His program is aimed at the young people with the New Democratic Youth League and the commune boarding schools designed to obtain the support of the youth. He also maintains that all art

and literature should be adapted to fit the needs of the revolutionary movement.

In the formation of the Chinese Communist government Mao maintains that two stages, new democracy and socialism are necessary to achieve Communism. More recent developments indicates Mao's belief that China is in the latter part of the socialist stage and ready to advance into an early phase of the true Communistic state. His program of consolidation of the masses and the elimination of feudalism is important to the achievement of his goals. The commune system and the Chinese Communists' international relations are also important in the political organization of Mao's government. He reserves the right to interpret Communism to fit the needs of China, or, more correctly, to satisfy his own desires.

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PREFACE

The years, 1918-1959, have been eventful years for the people of China. They have struggled to become a nation respected in international affairs and one with internal harmony among the people. Out of the numerous factions striving to achieve governmental control has arisen a strong Communistic government under the direction of Mao Tse-tung. It is the opinion of the writer that the policies which the Chinese Communists are pursuing are presently and will continue to have significant bearing on international affairs. These policies are designed to dominate completely, the lives of the Chinese people and those in any other areas in which Chinese Communists gain control. It seems to the writer, therefore, that it is necessary to have an understanding and insight into the development of the policies of the Chinese Communist government which has successfully controlled the more than 600 million people on the China mainland for the past ten years (1949-1959), and one that appears to be in command of the situation in China. Since Mao Tse-tung has been a major factor in bringing about Communist domination of the China mainland, it is the purpose of this study to set forth and analyze some of his basic political concepts and theories. This writer has tried to present the major policies which have highlighted Mao's

rise to power and his policies which have been instrumental in keeping him in power since he achieved control of the great portion of the Chinese people.

It is the purpose of this thesis to present the evolution of Mao's political theories and concepts in directing the Communist movement in China. The thesis will not pertain directly to contemporaries or others who have had influence on his thinking. It is the hope of the writer that some of the information contained in this work will be helpful in forming a more vivid picture of the policies and practices of the Chinese Communists and their leader, Mao Tse-tung.

Since the writer does not read Chinese, a fact which places him at a definite disadvantage, research was confined primarily to the four volumes entitled the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung with English translation by the staff of International Publishers of New York City and the three publications of the American Consulate General at Hong Kong, Survey of the China Mainland Press, Current Background and Extracts from China Mainland Magazines which are translated by the New China News Agency, the official Communist press of China, and do not reflect the opinion of the government of the United States. A number of documents obtained through correspondence with Charles E. Lockett, Jr., Chief of the Government Branch for the Division of External Research and

Publications for the State Department of the United States government have been most useful.

To exhaust adequately the materials relative to this subject would require work in Chinese Communist government documents and access to Mao's private papers and library, neither source being available to the writer owing to the non-recognition policy of the government of the United States toward Communist China. The writer has tried, wherever possible, to compare sources of information on different items and for the most part has found the different translations to have basically the same meaning. However, when two or more translations of the same item were available they were usually not found to be verbatim. Secondary sources were used only to bridge the areas where sufficient documentary evidence was not available or when they had important information on the subject.

Special acknowledgement is given to Dr. Eugene R. Craine whose patient proofreading and critical analysis have added immeasurably to the content of this paper. His suggestions and guidance have been beneficial in preparing this paper. Miss Margaret van Ackeren, of the staff of Fort Hays Kansas State College Forsyth Library, extended me innumerable kindnesses. To Miss Jeanette Hillers of the Hastings, Nebraska, Public Library I express sincerest

appreciation for aid in obtaining numerous documentary materials. My wife, Gay Isom, in addition to doing routine things researchers seem to expect of their wives, has always radiated the kind of confidence that counts.

CHAPTER I

BASIS OF MAO TSE-TUNG'S POLITICAL CONCEPTS

Mao Tse-tung was born in Shao San, in the Chinese Province of Hunan, in 1893. After attending primary and middle school at Changsha, he served in the revolutionary army of Sun Yat-sen from 1911 until he resumed his education at the Hunan Normal School in 1912. Mao received his degree from the Normal School in 1916, and later the same year went to Peking where he studied and worked as a librarian at Peking University.¹

While at Peking University, Mao came in contact with Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Head of the Literature Department, and Li Ta-chao, Professor of History, who were to have a considerable amount of influence on the political concepts and theories of Mao. Not only were these men the founders of the Communist Party of China and the sponsors of Marxism-Leninism in China, but they were also among the few undisputed leaders of the entire body of Chinese westernized intelligentsia. Ch'en had a fairly consistent philosophy resting on the twin pillars of democracy and science. On the other hand, Li was definitely a man who

¹"Mao Tse-tung," Encyclopedia Americana (1958 ed.), XVII, 251.

leaned to metaphysical theories. However, because of the depressing milieu in which they found themselves and the impact of external events which occurred during the period from 1918 to 1920, they began to look for other methods of solving the social, political and cultural problems that were present in China at this time. They turned to Marxism-Leninism because they thought this philosophy presented a possibility of developing a China which could stand on its own and bring an end to exploitation by other nations. Mao's contact with Ch'en and Li came during their period of transition in political thought and this transition had some influence on Mao's own political thinking.²

Mao did not accept in its entirety either the philosophies of Ch'en and Li or those of Marx and Lenin. Instead, he developed his own theories which have been named by students of the Chinese Communist revolution as Maoism. In Maoism one sees an adaptation of what Mao considers the best of Marx and Lenin for China and Chinese nationalism.

The Chinese Communist Party was organized at Shanghai on July 1, 1921, under the leadership of Ch'en

²Benjamin I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951), 7-18. Hereinafter cited as Schwartz, Chinese Communism.

Tu-hsiu and Li Ta-chao. Ch'en Tu-hsiu was not present at the organizational meeting because he was in Canton at the time, but Mao Tse-tung was among the twelve men who attended this important meeting.³ Soon after the organizational meeting of the Communist Party, Mao proved himself better able than either Li or Ch'en to understand the principles of Marxism-Leninism as a program of action by adapting it to the needs of the Chinese revolution. Some of the others present soon found themselves in opposition to Marxism-Leninism.⁴

During the period, 1923-1926, the Kuomintang Party and the Communist Party of China worked together to organize a coalition government that would satisfy both factions. The Chinese Communists entered this government because they

³The twelve delegates who attended were Chang Kuo-t'ao, Ch'en Kung-po, Ch'en T'an-ch'iu, Ch'en Wang-tao, Chou Fu-hai, Ho Shu-heng, Li Han-chun, Li Ta, Liu Jen-ching, Pao Hui-seng, Tung Pi-wu and Mao Tse-tung. Officers elected were Ch'en Tu-hsiu (Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party), Chou Fu-hai (Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party), Chang Kuo-t'ao (Chairman of Organization) and Li Ta (Chairman of Propaganda). Also in attendance was Maring (also given as Mahlin) representing the Communist International. Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz and John K. Fairbank, A Documentary History of Chinese Communism (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1952), 30. Hereinafter cited as Brandt, Schwartz and Fairbank, Documentary History.

⁴Schwartz, Chinese Communism, 26.

were instructed to do so by the Comintern which was controlled by Russia. Neither party was strong enough to organize a government of its own so they worked together to get a foothold and then when the opportunity presented itself each would try to destroy the other. By 1926 Chiang Kai-shek seemed to be fairly secure as the leader of the Kuomintang Party and he introduced a program designed to destroy the Communist Party; however, he only succeeded in forcing the Communist movement underground.

Neither were the Communists idle, and, in 1926, Mao Tse-tung was sent to the province of Hunan to organize the peasants of that area into a military force to oppose the Kuomintang army. This order did not authorize the formation of Peasants Associations but authorized only a military force to bring about a peasant uprising. Because this peasant uprising failed Mao was dismissed from the Communist Party early in 1927. In February of 1927, Mao made his, "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan," discussing the progress that had been made to that time. One of the major accomplishments of the "Report" was to win widespread attention for Mao as it was published in three Chinese journals and translated into Russian. Brandt states that the "Report," "cannot be taken as a complete expression of Mao's political outlook since it deals with

specific events and a very limited subject."⁵ This "Report," however, does give tangible evidence of Mao's theories on agrarian reform and will be discussed more fully when Mao's agrarian policies are examined.

Mao's analysis of the classes in Chinese Society was contained in the article, "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society," and was written in 1926, to combat two deviations existing in the Party.⁶ The right wing which was under the leadership of Ch'en Tu-hsiu paid attention only to the Kuomintang Communist cooperation and the left wing under Chang Kuo-tao was interested only in the labor movement; both forgot the peasants. Although both wings were keenly aware of the insufficiency of the revolutionary forces, neither knew where to look for reinforcements and for broad masses of allies. In this article Mao indicated that in the peasantry the Chinese proletariat had its staunchest and most numerous ally, and thus solved the problem concerning the chief ally in the Chinese revolution.⁷

Mao gave evidence that all past revolutions in China

⁵Brandt, Schwartz and Fairbank, Documentary History, 77.

⁶Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, 4 Vols., 1954-1956), Vol. I, 13-20. Hereinafter cited as Mao, Selected Works.

⁷Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 13.

had achieved basically very little, because the revolutionaries were unable to unite their real friends and attack their enemies. Thus, a basic concept in Mao's philosophy is the determination of who are friends and who are enemies. In applying this philosophy to the movement of the Communist Party in China Mao states in his Selected Works that "A revolutionary party is the guide of the masses, and no revolution ever succeeds when the revolutionary party leads it astray."⁸ Mao's purpose of this analysis was to adjudge the value of each of the different classes of Chinese society with reference to the importance of each class to the Chinese Communist Party in its revolutionary movement. The analysis of the classes was made with regard to the economic status of the various classes and of their respective attitudes towards the revolution and was designed to distinguish real friends from real enemies. The basic ideas of the report follow:

- I. The landlord and comprador classes-- In economically backward and semi-colonial China the landlords and compradors are the complete vassals of the international bourgeoisie, depending upon imperialism for their existence and development. Mao feels this class represents the most backward and the most reactionary production group in China and that it is this group which is hindering the development of her productive forces.

⁸Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 13.

- II. Middle class-- According to Mao this class represents China's capitalist production group in town and country. This class favors revolution only when it thinks it will profit from the revolution. Politically this class stands for the establishment of a state under the rule of a single class, the national bourgeoisie.⁹
- III. Petty bourgeoisie-- It is Mao's opinion that on account of its size and class character, this class deserves the greatest attention. The group is composed of owner-peasants, master handicraftsmen and the petty intellectuals. In the petty intellectual faction are found the students, primary and middle school teachers, lower government functionaries, office clerks, small lawyers and petty traders. Although the various strata of this class have the same petty-bourgeois economic status, they nevertheless fall into three different groups.
1. Those who have some surplus grain and money. This group of people by their manual or mental labor, have an annual surplus over and above what they need for their own support. This is considered to be the right wing group of the petty bourgeoisie and is interested in gaining wealth and position.
 2. Those who are economically self-supporting. This is the largest of the three groups, comprising about half of the petty bourgeoisie. While they make enough money to support themselves they are unable to accumulate wealth.

⁹While the landlord and comprador classes are national bourgeoisie, in Mao's opinion the greater crime rests in the fact that they are vessels of the international bourgeoisie. As members of this class, he feels that there is no hope of changing their reactionary thinking and bringing them in line with the Chinese Communist Party. He therefore, uses the term national bourgeoisie to distinguish the middle class group that he feels will accept the thinking and principles of the Chinese Communist Party line.

3. Those whose standard of living is being reduced and who are finding, due to various circumstances, great difficulty in retaining their wealth and social position. This group constitutes the left wing of the petty bourgeoisie.
- IV. The semi-proletariat-- This class is divided into five categories: (1) the overwhelming majority of the semi-tenant peasants, (2) poor peasants, (3) handicraftsmen, (4) shop assistants and (5) pedlars. The economic status of this class plus the fact that it is exploited by the landlords and the middle class easily unites it with the revolution.
- V. The proletariat-- At the time of this analysis this group consisted of only about two million people. It is Mao's opinion that while they should be the backbone of the revolution there must be additional forces gathered to be successful.¹⁰

From this analysis it is Mao's conclusion that the warlords, the bureaucrats, the compradors, the big landlords and the reactionary section of the intelligentsia are enemies of the Chinese Communist Party and the revolution. The industrial proletariat is the leading force and the semi-proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie are the closest friends of the revolution. In regard to the middle class Mao thinks the right wing may become an enemy of the Party and the revolution while the left wing may become a friend of the Party and the revolutionary movement. If the left wing joins the Party it must be watched because it might

¹⁰Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 13-20.

try to create confusion within the Party.

During the period 1931-1934, there developed, within the Chinese Communist Party, two groups who were misusing or not following Party ideas. These two factions were causing many Party members to be misled. One group, the doctrinaires, denied the experience of the Chinese revolution and denied the truth that Marxism-Leninism is not a dogma but a guide to action. The other, the empiricists, clung to their own fragmentary experiences and could neither understand the importance of theory for revolutionary practice nor see the whole revolutionary situation. In order to correct these lines of thought Mao's article, "On Practice," was written to expose from the viewpoint of Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge such subjectivist mistakes in the Party as doctrinairism and empiricism, especially doctrinairism.¹¹

Mao believes that if a man is to do something successfully he must understand the method by which his goal is reached and he must practice to reach this goal. Man, in the process of practice, sees only the phenomena of various things at the beginning, but as practice continues man is able to form perceptions and impressions. If this

¹¹Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 282-297. American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Survey of the China Mainland Press, No. 194, October 13, 1952, 1-8.

process is continued man will be able to form concepts or draw conclusions that conform with logic. According to Mao, the viewpoint of practice is the first viewpoint in the theory of knowledge of dialectical materialism.¹²

It is Mao's contention that the whole process of man's knowledge of a thing, conception, judgment and inference constitutes a more important stage of rational knowledge than the formation of perceptions and impressions. According to Mao, "The real task of knowledge is to arrive at thought through perception, at a gradual understanding of the internal contradictions of objective things, their laws and the internal relations of various processes, that is, at logical knowledge."¹³ Mao maintains that logical knowledge reaches the wholeness and the internal relations of things; where perceptual knowledge concerns only the separate aspects. It discloses the internal contradictions of the surrounding world and makes it possible to grasp the development of the surrounding world in its totality and in the internal relations between all aspects.¹⁴

Mao thinks that the question of knowledge is one of science. If one wishes to gain knowledge one must participate in the practice of changing reality. Mao states

¹²Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 282-285.

¹³Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 285-286.

¹⁴Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 286.

that:

The source of all knowledge lies in the perception through man's physical sense organs of the objective world surrounding him; if a person denies such perception, denies direct experience, and denies personal participation in the practice of changing reality, then he is not a materialist.¹⁵

According to Mao, there can be no knowledge without practice and he calls this theory the dialectical-materialist process of knowledge arguing that it arises from the practice of changing reality. He attributes his basis for this theory to Marxist materialism.¹⁶

Mao's philosophical essay, "On Contradiction," was written as a companion-piece to "On Practice," with the same object, that is, of combating the serious mistakes of doctrinaireism existing in the Chinese Communist Party line at the time.¹⁷

In this essay Mao develops a philosophical theory which he calls materialist dialectics. This theory included some of Vladimir Ulianov's (Nicholas Lenin) ideas from his theory called the law of essence of dialectics, but Mao made

¹⁵Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 288.

¹⁶Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 286-288.

¹⁷Mao, Selected Works, Vol. II, 13-53. American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Current Background, No. 202, August 15, 1952, 4-28. Hereinafter cited as Consulate, Background, No. 202.

a number of changes and additions to the theory.

It is Mao's philosophy that "the law of contradiction in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the most basic law in materialist dialectics."¹⁸ Mao maintains that in order to understand the law of materialist dialectics one must have some comprehension of the six major problems involved. Mao believes these problems to be:

the two world outlooks; the universality of contradiction; the particularity of contradiction; the principal contradiction and the principal aspect of a contradiction; the identity and the struggle of the aspects of a contradiction; the role of antagonism in contradiction.¹⁹

In the development of this theory it is Mao's concept that there have always been two views concerning the laws of the development of the world. The first, the metaphysical world outlook or the world outlook of vulgar evolutionism which consists of looking at the world from an isolated, static and one-sided viewpoint, regards all things in the world as being isolated from one another and forever changeless. The cause of the increase or decrease or transplacement does not lie inside things, but outside them, that is,

¹⁸Mao, Selected Works, Vol. II, 13. Consulate, Background, No. 202, 4.

¹⁹Mao, Selected Works, Vol. II, 13. Consulate, Background, No. 202, 4.

propulsion by external forces. The metaphysical theory holds that all varieties of things in the world have remained unchanged since the moment they came into being. Through this theory, according to Mao, the capitalists trace the causes of social development to conditions external to society, like geography and climate. It is Mao's contention that the metaphysicists could not explain the multiplicity of the qualities of things; nor can they explain the phenomenon of one quality changing into another because they naively seek outside the things themselves for the cause of their development and repudiate the theory advanced by the materialist-dialectics that it is the contradictions inside things that cause their development.²⁰

In opposition to the metaphysical world outlook, the materialist-dialectical world outlook advocates the study of the development of things from inside, from the relationship of a thing to other things. The materialist-dialectical theory holds that the development of things should be regarded as interconnected and interacting upon each other. Mao states that, "the basic cause of development of things does not lie outside but inside them, in their internal

²⁰Mao, Selected Works, Vol. II, 13-15. Consulate, Background, No. 202, 4-5.

contradictions."²¹ Mao feels that purely external causes, such as is put forth by the metaphysical theory, can only lead to the mechanical motion of things. The contradiction which takes place inside a thing is the basic cause of its development. Relationships are secondary causes according to the materialist-dialectical theory. Thus, man should learn how to observe and analyze skilfully the movement of opposites in various things and, on the basis of such analysis, to find out various things and methods of solving contradictions.²²

It is Mao's contention that universality or absolute-ness of contradiction has a two-fold meaning. First, contradiction exists in the process of the development of all things. Second, in the process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from beginning to end. Contradiction is the basis for simple forms of motion, and still more the basis of complex forms of motion. In setting down rules for the Chinese Communists, Mao indicated that they must master the following method of contradiction which was explained by Karl Marx.

²¹Mao, Selected Works, Vol. II, 15. Consulate, Background, No. 202, 5.

²²Mao, Selected Works, Vol. II, 15-18. Consulate, Background, No. 202, 5-6.

In his Capital Marx first analyses the simplest, most ordinary, fundamental, most common and everyday relation of bourgeois (commodity) society, a relation that is encountered billions of times, viz., the exchange of commodities. In this very simple phenomenon (in this 'cell' of bourgeois society) analysis reveals all the contradictions (or the germs of all contradictions) of modern society. The subsequent exposition shows us the development (both growth and movement) of these contradictions and of this society in the sum of its individual parts, from its beginning to its end.²³

Mao contends this method must be mastered by the Chinese Communists so they can correctly identify and analyze the history and condition of the Chinese revolution as well as define its perspectives.

Mao indicates that it is necessary to take into account the particular points of motion of matter, namely the qualitative difference between one form of motion and other forms. Any form of motion contains within itself its own particular contradiction and this contradiction constitutes the particular quality which distinguishes one thing from all other things. All forms depend upon one another as well as differing from one another. A certain quality possessed by a form is determined by its own contradiction. This is true not only of nature, but also of society and of thought.

²³Karl Marx as quoted in; Mao, Selected Works, Vol. II, 22. Consulate, Background, No. 202, 8.

Hence, it would not be possible to develop a common character unless an individual character is developed first, because without individual character there can be no common character. All individual characters exist only temporarily, therefore they are relative.²⁴

The two sides to the particularity of contradiction in Mao's philosophy are the principal contradiction and the principal aspect of a contradiction. In the process of development there are many contradictions which exist. One of these contradictions is the principal contradiction whose existence and development determine or influence the existence and development of other contradictions. According to Mao, it is very important that all Communists understand these two phases because the study of various conditions of unevenness in the contradiction and the non-principal contradictions, of the principal aspect and the non-principal aspects of a contradiction constitutes one of the important methods by which a revolutionary political party determines its political, military, strategic and tactical directives.²⁵

²⁴Mao, Selected Works, Vol. II, 22-35. Consulate, Background, No. 202, 8-13.

²⁵Mao, Selected Works, Vol. II, 35-42. Consulate, Background, No. 202, 13-16.

It is Mao's theory that the identity and struggle of the aspects of a contradiction can not exist unless the aspects in every case or process exclude each other, struggle with each other and are opposed to each other. In carrying the idea further he contends that such contradictory aspects are contained in the process of all things in the world and in human thought, and argues that a complex process contains more than one pair of opposites, while a simple process contains only one pair of opposites. This brings about the fact that various pairs of opposites are opposed to one another. By this method all things in the objective world and human thought are formed and impelled to move. But if this is true, there is an utter lack of identity, or unity and how can Mao speak of identity or unity? "The reason is that a contradictory aspect cannot exist in isolation. Without the other aspect which is opposed to it, each aspect loses the condition of its existence."²⁶

The last thing to be considered in contradiction, according to Mao, is the role of antagonism. To Mao antagonism is, "a form of struggle within a contradiction,

²⁶Mao, Selected Works, Vol. II, 43. Consulate, Background, No. 202, 16.

but not the universal form."²⁷ This type of thing may exist between different classes or it may exist between political groups. Supposedly this antagonistic contradiction will disappear when a Communistic society is realized.

In summary, it may be said that the law of contradiction or the law of unity of opposites is the basic law of nature and society and also the basic law of thought. This is the opposite of the metaphysical world outlook and is Mao's theory called materialist dialectic.

²⁷Mao, Selected Works, Vol. II, 49. Consulate, Background, No. 202, 20.

CHAPTER II

AGRARIAN POLICIES OF MAO TSE-TUNG

Mao Tse-tung first differed from the strict Communist Party line in his concepts regarding agrarian policies. He thought China presented a different situation from those which had been present in previous Communist uprisings throughout the world. Mao created the peasant Soviets or Peasant Associations, with their primitive Communism in Hunan in 1927. The success of the Chinese Communist agrarian program led by Mao must be viewed against the background of a collapsing agrarian economy and a Kuomintang retreat from the reality that the peasants were the major force in China. This retreat from reality was also present, at this time, among many of the leading members of the Communist Party and "Mao's greatest achievement was to secure recognition of the peasant movements as the moving force of the Chinese Revolution rather than as phenomena of merely temporary and tactical utility."¹

Mao, as we have seen, without authority from the Central Committee, organized the Peasant Associations in the

¹Mary C. Wright, "The Chinese Peasant and Communism," Pacific Affairs, XXIV (September, 1951), 262. Hereinafter cited as Wright, "The Chinese Peasant," Pacific Affairs.

Hunanese peasant movement and drew the peasants closer to his ideas. The result was the Autumn Harvest Insurrection which was a revolt of the peasants against their poor standard of living. This was quickly suppressed by the Kuomintang army in 1927, but it convinced Mao that the answer to a successful revolution in China rested with the peasant class.

Even though it was not considered the true Party line nor even sanctioned by the Communist Party, Mao continued his agrarian movement. By 1930, the entire Communist movement had been forced into the interior by the Kuomintang and by 1933, those who followed Mao constituted the only effective peasant or Communist movement in the country. They survived because they found the key to peasant support and control, land reform. They introduced land reform and a host of subordinate policies designed to mobilize the peasantry, improve agricultural production and secure its fruits. Since no other active Communist movement existed in China, the urban revolution having become nihil, Mao assumed the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. His leadership meant a basic shift in Party policy to the support of the peasants and was reflected in the changing composition of the Party membership. In 1926, only five per cent of the Chinese Communist Party members were peasants but by 1930,

the over-whelming majority were peasants and by 1951, more than eighty per cent of the six million Party members were of peasant origin. The importance of the peasant membership can be fully understood when it is realized they hold key posts, from Mao on down.² It had long been argued by Mao that "whoever wins the support of the peasants will win China; whoever solves the land question will win the peasants."³ It appears that at least for the time being Mao has the correct solution.

Mao's "Report of an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan" was written in reply to criticisms made both inside and outside the Party against the peasants' revolutionary struggles in 1926 and 1927.⁴ Through this report Mao attempted to make clear the peasant situation and to justify the position he had taken in supporting them and called upon the Party to do the same.

Mao spent thirty-two days in Hunan conducting his investigation. He said that he found the peasant situation quite different from the information given him by the gentry

²Wright, "The Chinese Peasant," Pacific Affairs, 258.

³Chao Kuo-chun, "Chinese Land Policies," Current History, XXIV (June, 1953), 339.

⁴Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, 4 vols. 1954-1956), Vol. I, 21-59. Hereinafter cited as Mao, Selected Works.

in Hankow and Changsha and believed that all kinds of arguments against the peasant movements must be speedily righted. Many of the erroneous measures which had been taken by the revolutionary authorities concerning the peasant movements should be changed. He believed that the peasant movement was a colossal event and their assistance would be of great value to the revolution. He pointed out that the peasants could not be held in check forever and probably before too long they would break their chains and the resulting movement would be so swift and violent that no power, however great would be able to suppress it. In Mao's thinking the Party had three alternatives in regard to the peasants which were, "To march at their head and lead them. Or to follow at their rear, gesticulating at them and criticising them. Or to face them as opponents."⁵

The peasant movement in Hunan was divided into two periods. The first period, which was a period of organization was divided into two stages. During the first period there was a stage of underground activities and a stage of open activities. During this period the peasant association was not large but their activities were fairly successful.

⁵Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 22.

During the second period of the peasant uprising the revolutionary movement took place. The size of the peasant association was greatly increased. The peasants fought a good battle but because of the lack of arms and supplies, they were unable to defeat the gentry forces sent by the government to suppress the rebellion.

The peasants attacked as their main targets the local bullies, bad gentry and the lawless landlords, hitting in passing the patriarchal ideologies and institutions, corrupt officials in the cities and evil customs in the rural areas. The peasant associations should have all the power necessary to improve the situation, their living standards and social conditions.⁶

For ages the people with the power had tyrannized over the peasants and trampled them underfoot; that was why the peasants rose in such a revolt. It was Mao's theory that the most formidable revolts and the most serious troubles would invariably occur at places where the local bullies, bad gentry and the lawless landlords had been the most ruthless in their evil deeds. These points were made by Mao in his "Report." In discussing the question of whether or not the peasants had gone too far in their revolution Mao said: "a revolution was not the same as inviting

⁶Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 23-26.

people to dinner, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or doing fancy needle work; it could not be anything so refined, so calm and gentle or so mild, kind, courteous, restrained and magnanimous."⁷ To him, a revolution was an act of violence by which one class using all the strength and power it could muster would overthrow or try to overthrow another class. It was absolutely necessary for the peasants to use their maximum amount of power in attempting the revolution.

According to Mao in his "Report" the peasantry had achieved a revolutionary task which had been left unaccomplished for many years. However, he realized that not all of the peasants had taken part in accomplishing the task of the revolution. He pointed out that the peasantry consisted of three sections--the rich peasants, the middle peasants and the poor peasants.⁸ The circumstances of the three sections differ, and so did their reactions to the revolution.

The main force of the revolution in the countryside was the poor peasants. This group accepted very willingly the leadership of the Communist Party according to Mao.

⁷Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 27. The virtues quoted were virtues of Confucious, as described by one of his disciples.

⁸Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 29.

Throughout the period of underground organization and the period of open organization, the poor peasants gave their full support to the cause. The poor peasants were not afraid of losing anything because they had nothing to lose.⁹

During the first period the middle peasants did not as a rule join the associations. They joined during the second period but were not very active in the support of the association. This group took the attitude of wait and see.¹⁰

A part of the rich peasants joined the association but after being admitted never worked for it enthusiastically as they could not see where they could benefit. Up to the time when Mao wrote his "Report" there were still many who had not joined the peasants' association.

It was Mao's theory that the Party should continue to lead the poor peasantry in the revolutionary movement. The Party should educate the middle and rich class showing them that they would benefit just as much as the poor peasants. This was necessary if the revolution was to be successful. As has been pointed out before Mao thought that the peasantry must provide the Communist Party of China with the nucleus of their revolutionary forces. They would be the

⁹Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 31.

¹⁰Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 30-31.

vanguard of the revolution.¹¹

According to Mao's interpretation of the peasant movement in Hunan, fourteen great deeds had been performed by the organization of the peasants.¹² The first great deed was, of course, the organization of the peasants into the peasant association. This bound the peasants together in the common cause of improving their lot and it was by use of this association the peasants were able to dispose of local bullies and bad gentry as well as the corrupt government officials.

The second deed performed by the movement was the dealing of political blows against the landlords. The aim of the association was to overthrow the power of the landlords and to foster the growth of the power of the peasants. Such things as auditing of accounts, fining, contributions, minor protests and major demonstrations were examples which Mao gave for dealing political blows to the landlords.

Another point mentioned by Mao was the dealing of economic blows to the landlords. This was achieved by preventing the shipping of grain out of the area, preventing hoarding and speculation and preventing the price of grain

¹¹Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 29-33.

¹²Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 33-59.

from rising. This was possible only through the cooperation of the peasants and the association. Other methods to reduce the landlords income were also used.

Overthrowing the landlords' armed forces and the building up of the peasants' armed forces was a fourth deed. It is necessary for the peasants to build up a strong army if they hope to succeed in the revolution. It has already been pointed out how Mao felt about revolution. He thought that if it would obtain the goal then it was necessary and just.

The extension of political agitation was another important deed. Mao stated that if ten thousand schools of law and political science had been opened; they could not have achieved so much in such a short time in politically educating the men and women, young and old, all the way into the remote corners of the country, as the peasant associations did.

A point mentioned by Mao in the "Report" laid the basis for his agrarian program for he argued that the peasants needed the cooperative movement. This had not been achieved but Mao contended it was necessary to prevent the merchants and landlords from taking advantage of the peasants when they were marketing their products.

Other deeds mentioned by Mao were the overthrowing of the feudal rule of the local bullies and bad gentry;

overthrowing of the political power of his excellency, the county magistrate and his baliffs; overthrowing the clan authority; the peasants' prohibitions; eliminating banditry; abolishing exorbitant levies; cultural movement, and the building of roads. These completed the fourteen deeds and this also completed Mao's "Report." The "Report," as mentioned, deals with specific events and cannot be taken as a complete expression of Mao's political outlook. It does, however, give some insight into Mao's theories and ideas on the peasantry and the use which should be made of them in the revolution.

A short analysis of three of the classes in the rural areas has been given, but a discussion at this time of a document which Mao wrote in 1933, will show how he analyzed the classes of the rural areas in his effort to find a correct solution to the agrarian problem.¹³ Mao used the five main divisions of Chinese Society in discussing the classes of the rural areas. The first group, the landlords, possess land and do not engage in labor but they exploit the peasants and take part in labor only as a means of supplementing their income. Their exploitations are in the form of the collection of rent; besides that, they lend

¹³Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 138-140.

money, hire labor, or engage in industrial or commercial enterprise. However, land rent from the peasants is their principal form of exploitation.¹⁴

The second group, the rich peasants, normally possess land, but there are some who possess only a part of the land they farm and rent the remainder of their farm land. The rich peasants engage regularly in exploitation and, in many cases, their income from exploitation forms a major portion of their total income.¹⁵

The middle peasants, which make up the third class, hold varying degrees of ownership. The position of the middle peasants ranges from one of complete ownership of land on one hand to the renting of all their land on the other hand. In any case the middle peasants always possess adequate tools and implements of their own. The middle peasants, as a group, do not regularly participate in any form of exploitation.¹⁶

The fourth class, the poor peasants, usually have to rent their land for cultivation; however, in a few cases they do own their land, but these are very rare. The poor peasants are exploited by the other classes and are usually

¹⁴Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 138.

¹⁵Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 139.

¹⁶Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 139.

forced to sell part of their labor in order to make a living. The fact that they have to sell part of their labor is the main criterion for distinguishing the middle peasants from the poor peasants.¹⁷

According to Mao the fifth class is composed of the workers and farm laborers who make their living wholly or principally by selling their labor power. By this analysis Mao hoped that he and the Party could better cope with the agrarian problem.¹⁸ The peasantry provided Mao with the nucleus for his revolutionary army and by the program of land reform he hoped to satisfy the basic grievances of the bulk of the peasantry. The Chinese Communists found they had to teach the peasants how to carry on the class struggle because, according to their explanation, "most peasants lacked class consciousness and did not realize the landlords were their class enemies whom they must hate and fight without mercy."¹⁹

On July 1, 1949, in Commemoration of the Twenty-eighth Anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao

¹⁷Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 140.

¹⁸Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 140.

¹⁹Theodore His-en Chen, Chinese Communism and the Proletarian-Socialist Revolution (Los Angeles: University of Southern California Press, 1955), 6.

delivered his speech, "The People's Democratic Dictatorship."²⁰ According to the speech Mao feels a major problem facing the Chinese Communists is the peasants' scattered economy. Mao's answer to this problem is the socialization of agriculture because without the socialization of agriculture there can be no complete and sound realization of socialism. Socialization of great industry and labor as well as agriculture must be brought about and they must be backed by national enterprise. Mao contends a nation under democratic dictatorship by the people must solve these problems.²¹

To solve these problems of the peasants' economy Mao has brought and is bringing about sweeping reforms in his agrarian policies. These are aimed at increasing the production, efficiency and socialization of agriculture. In 1950, a Land Reform Law was passed by the Central People's Government abolishing the land ownership system of the upper class and calling for rather moderate treatment of rich and middle peasants. Other regulations passed at this time were the Agrarian Reform Law, the Decisions Concerning the

²⁰Mao Tse-tung, "The People's Democratic Dictatorship," Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 95, Part 7, 9345-9348. Hereinafter cited as Mao, "Dictatorship," Congressional Record, Vol. 95.

²¹Mao, "Dictatorship," Congressional Record, Vol. 95, 9347.

Differentiation of Class Status and the Regulations Governing the Organization of Peasants' Association.²²

The Organization of the Peasants' Associations is an important step in Mao's agrarian program of collective agriculture. These associations were organized in the following manner:

Under these regulations a team of three or four trained cadres would enter a village and talk with various peasants, gathering information. Then they would hold a series of mass meetings at which the government's determination to expropriate the land and possessions of the "landlords" was explained to the assembled throng. The peasants were urged to speak out their bitterness. A few selected "landlords" were displayed before the shouting mob, and "witnesses" hastened to relate their "crimes." The People's Tribunal would pass sentence on the victims. Meanwhile, under the direction of the cadres, the village adults would meet to determine the "class status" of each local citizen, determined according to a detailed series of regulations drawn by the government. Landlords lost all of their property, rich peasants part of their property and so forth. Finally the redistribution would begin, including buildings, tools, stored grain, and farm animals. The cadres would utilize the "enlightened elements" to form a Village or Peasant Association, sponsor Women's organizations and recruit potential members for the Youth League. A village militia, responsible to the party and the army, would be organized to carry out the sentences "demanded" by the assembled "Village Congress."²³

²²Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz and John K. Fairbank, A Documentary History of Chinese Communism (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1952), 276.

²³Richard L. Walker, "Collectivization in China: A Story of Betrayal," Problems of Communism, IV (January-February, 1955), 4. Hereinafter cited as Walker, "Collectivization," Problems of Communism.

In the next phase of the collectivization movement "mutual aid teams" were organized based on the Chinese practice of pooling labor during the busy season. After these were under way they were placed under the direction of the cadres. By this method they were converted into permanent mutual aid teams and were organized for the accomplishment of other tasks during the slack season. These were to be used as the stepping stones to higher forms of collectivization in agriculture. The higher forms of collectivization in agriculture are as follows:

- (1) Agricultural producer's cooperatives--The key development from the point of view of collectivization. These are owned by the member peasants.
- (2) Collectivized farms--These are owned by the collective as a unit.
- (3) State farms--These are owned by the state and manned by the peasants working for wages.
- (4) Machine tractor stations--These are state owned units which farm out tractors to collectives.²⁴

The events which led to these policies on the agrarian problem occurred during the period from 1945-1950. After the completion of World War II the Communists found themselves in a favorable position to resume their theory

²⁴Walker, "Collectivization," Problems of Communism, 8.

of class struggle. The Party found the masses were not effectively organized and the goals which they hoped to reach could not be reached if this type of mass confusion was allowed to continue. This made it necessary that a Party line be developed in relation to the agrarian movement so that the force of the peasantry could be mobilized to bring about better discipline in the Party and greater production of products. In the development of this line a number of Party directives to cope with the situation were issued by Mao. Out of these directives grew the collectivization movement.²⁵

According to a survey made by the Human Resources Research Institute of Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, in 1955, this program had contributed nothing to the financial position of the peasants. This report contends that due to the rise in agricultural taxes, the exacting of donations and contributions the peasants of China have not been able to build up any savings. It is the contention of this report that the future development of farm economy in Communist China will depend largely on the adequacy of the help of the government and on the attitudes of the peasants towards the obviously collectivistic tendencies of government

²⁵Shao-er Ong, Agrarian Reform in Communist China to 1952 (Lackland Air Force Base, Texas: Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center, July, 1955), 17-19.

agriculture policies.²⁶

On July 31, 1955, Mao called for the socialization of the agricultural program to be intensified and to be carried to a greater degree. The results of this directive is the commune system which is now being used in Communist China. When Mao gave his speech calling for this movement, he made it plain that the Chinese Communist Party had encountered resistance in their program to put all Chinese peasants into agricultural producer cooperatives.²⁷ According to Mao, these resistances stemmed partly from doubts and uncertainties in the minds of certain cadres concerning the wisdom of the Party's cooperativization program as well as the Party's ability to carry it out, and partly from the fact that some 20 to 30 per cent of the peasants who are comparatively well-to-do are opposed to further socialization of agriculture. It is Mao's contention that the program is meeting with some difficulty because the Party is not supplying the leadership which is necessary to carry through a program

²⁶Shao-er Ong, Chinese Farm Economy After Agrarian Reform (Lackland Air Force Base, Texas: Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center, August, 1955), 7-9.

²⁷American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Current Background, No. 364, October 19, 1955, 1-11. Hereinafter cited as Consulate, Background, No. 364.

such as this.²⁸ Mao told the Party members that this is a large scale Socialist revolutionary movement with more than 500 million of the rural population involved, and it will have great world significance. It is the duty of the Party members to lead this movement, and not resort to various ways to hold it back. There are bound to be deviations in the course of promotion of the movement, but these are understandable and easily corrected. The defects and mistakes among cadres and peasants will be overcome or corrected as long as the Party actively assists them. The cadres and peasants are progressive, and the movement is basically healthy under the correct leadership of the Party. It is Mao's contention that the Party members have confidence in the masses and they must have confidence in the Party's ability to lead. According to Mao, if the Party members doubt these two basic truths they shall achieve nothing.²⁹

Mao does not want cooperatives created just for the sake of making more cooperatives. He is opposed to the tendency to disregard quality but to merely seek figures in the development of cooperatives and households joining them. For this reason he insists that there must be a reorganization

²⁸American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Current Background, No. 367, November 14, 1955, 1.

²⁹Consulate, Background, No. 364, 1-4.

procedure carried on many times a year that will make it possible to let these consolidated cooperatives lead those awaiting consolidation in a movement of gradual collectivization and to do away with the tendency of rushing into a job or a task without first laying basic plans for the completion of the specific project which is being undertaken. Furthermore, the Party must treasure any small bit of socialist enthusiasm on the part of the peasants, and the cadres, and not check it. It, therefore, becomes the duty of a Party member to move simultaneously with members of the cooperatives, cadres of cooperatives, and cadres of the hsien,³⁰ chu³¹ and hsiang³² levels, and they must not snap their positive enthusiasm. As long as any part of a cooperative is functioning well and its members or at least part of its members are working together, it is to be continued.³³

Mao feels that if this program is to succeed the Party must be fully prepared to put all their energy and efforts into the construction of socialized agriculture. He feels that there is a considerable amount of work to be

³⁰Hsien--A province in China.

³¹Chu--A district in China.

³²Hsiang--A village in China

³³Consulate, Background, No. 364, 4-5.

done if a number of new agricultural producer cooperatives are to be built. This consists of:

- (1) The criticism of mistaken ideologies, the summing up of work experiences.
- (2) The systematic and repeated propagation of the principles, policies and measures of our Party on agricultural cooperatives. In carrying out propaganda among the peasants, not only must we explain the benefits of cooperativization, but we must also point out the difficulties to be encountered in the process of cooperativization so that the peasants may be fully prepared spiritually for them.
- (3) On the basis of actual conditions, there must be made overall plans for the development of agricultural cooperativization.
- (4) The training, through short term courses, of cadres for the operation of cooperatives.
- (5) The universal and large scale development of agricultural production mutual aid teams, and where possible, the promotion of federations of mutual aid teams to lay the foundation for their further union in building of cooperatives.³⁴

In the implementation of this program Mao stresses that only those who are active and interested in the program should be organized. It is his opinion that these people will further the cause of his program and the advantages such as, special privileges and use of machinery, which those who have not joined the movement can see and

³⁴Consulate, Background, No. 364, 5.

this will serve to unite them with it without the use of force. In other words, if the people are shown the advantages of the cooperatives in agriculture they would not have to be forced to join but would join of their own free will, and thus there would be no problem. Mao thinks the broad masses are willing, under the leadership of the Party to march gradually on the road of Socialism and the Party is capable of leading the peasants on the road of Socialism. These two points are basic aspects in the carrying out of this program. If the Communist Party of China lacks such confidence it cannot, according to Mao, hope to build up a Socialist China in the period of three Five Year Plans. It is Mao's hope that in the span of three Five Year Plans China can reach some semblance of Socialism in both agriculture and industry. Mao indicates that the Communist Party of China is now engaged in carrying on two revolutions, one in the area of changing the social system from private ownership into public ownership and the other in the carrying out of the technical revolution of changing handicraft production to large scale modern mechanized production. It is Mao's belief that it is very fundamental that all Party members realize that the two revolutions are joined together.³⁵

³⁵Consulate, Background, No. 364, 7-9.

This policy which was adopted by Mao in allowing only those who were active in the support of the cooperatives led to some confusion in the movement. The development of the cooperatives failed to interest many of the peasantry who did not join them and this led to a stricter policy of enforcement. This is the stage which China is presently going through. The Communist Party has organized the cooperatives into a group of larger organs called communes. The Party members under the leadership of Mao came forth with the concept that the socialization stage was not moving rapidly enough and therefore, it was necessary to introduce another idea. This is the concept that Communist China must advance by "leaps" rather than a slower pace towards their goals. While one cooperative had from 100 to 2,000 households represented, the size of the new commune ranges from 5,000 to 10,000 households. It is Mao's intention that the commune not only expands the scope of the original agricultural cooperative, but also changes its nature. By the introduction of the commune Mao hopes to be able to make better use of the tremendous labor which is present in China. This has been a problem because of the deranged population, but by uniting them in large groups in particular areas it is hoped that the labor potential can

be realized.³⁶

The backbone of Mao's revolutionary movement is the peasant. It appears that by the use of the commune in bringing about industrialized society in China, Mao hopes to transform the peasants into an industrial proletariat. He contends that the industrial proletariat is necessary for a Communist revolution to be completely successful. Since the original industrial proletariat in China was small in comparison to its huge population Mao must develop through such measures as the communes a larger industrial proletariat.

³⁶American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Current Background, No. 524, October 21, 1958, 1-5. Hereinafter cited as Consulate, Background, No. 524.

CHAPTER III

LABOR POLICIES OF MAO TSE-TUNG

Although Mao Tse-tung's revolution was spearheaded by the peasantry, he now seeks to inflate the role of the laboring class, or the industrial proletariat as it is known in Communist society, in the achievement of the revolution. This does not mean Mao is deserting the peasantry. Mao is trying to convert the peasantry into the same status as that of the industrial proletariat by the use of communes. At least this appears to be one of the motives behind the introduction of the communes according to reports coming out of Communist China at this time. Mao hopes to achieve a large industrial proletariat which is dependent on the government for its living and at the same time be a supporting factor in any program which the government wants to carry out.¹

It is Mao's theory that democratic dictatorship by the people requires the leadership of the labor class, because, he believes, only the labor class would have the sense of thorough revolution. Mao has advanced the idea of labor as the focal point of the revolution and he is

¹Based upon the publications of the American Consulate General at Hong Kong.

embarking on the road of industrializing China. Because of China's predominantly peasant population and the lack of an important urban working class the Communist Party must lead the Chinese nation through an interim "bourgeois capitalist" period of unknown duration.²

The basis for the labor phase of the Communist revolution, just as with the agrarian phase, starts in the 1920's. In 1928, the condition of China's laboring class was very poor and labor during this period was divided into four main classes. First, the independent workers who worked on a small scale for their own livelihood and sold their finished products directly to the consumer averaging from twelve to fourteen hours a day on the job. Second, the industrial laborers who worked in the factories and was composed of two factions. One faction was employed by the Chinese Government and spent nine to twelve hours a day in the factories. The other was employed in private factories with a work day of ten to sixteen hours. Third, the agricultural laborers of China who constituted a large majority of the labor class in China during this period and worked from twelve to eighteen hours a day. Fourth, the Coolie

²Mao Tse-tung, "The People's Democratic Dictatorship," Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 95, Part 7, 9347. Hereinafter cited as Mao, "Dictatorship," Congressional Record, Vol. 95.

laborers who were of the lowest caste and earned a bare subsistence wage for around eighteen hours work a day. This system presented another area for Communist agitation but the labor population at this time was very small precluding great success with labor groups at this time.³

In a resolution written for the Chinese Communist Party between 1939 and 1941, Mao discusses the role of the industrial proletariat (labor) in the revolutionary movement.⁴ It is Mao's theory that the Chinese proletariat should understand that although it is the class with the highest political sense of organization it cannot win victory by virtue of its own strength. To make victory possible the proletariat must unite, under various conditions, with all possible revolutionary classes and strata and organize a revolutionary united front. To answer the question of why the proletariat should form a united front with other groups, Mao points out that the size of the group compared with the whole of China makes it impossible to carry on the revolution without uniting with other groups.⁵

³S. K. Sheldon Tos, "Present Labor Conditions in China," Monthly Labor Review, XXVI (April, 1928), 742.

⁴Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, 4 Vols., 1954-1956), Vol. III, 93-95. Hereinafter cited as Mao, Selected Works.

⁵Mao, Selected Works, Vol. III, 93-95.

In this resolution Mao maintains the basic good qualities of the proletariat are that it is associated with the most advanced form of economy, it has a strong sense of organization and discipline and it owns no private means of production. In addition to the basic good qualities of the Chinese proletariat, Mao also argues that they have many outstanding qualities. He contends that the proletariat have been subjected to three fold oppression, oppression by imperialism, by the bourgeoisie and by the feudal forces, with a severity and ruthlessness rarely found in most nations of the world. Consequently, the Chinese proletariat is more resolute and more thoroughgoing in the revolutionary struggle than any other class. Since there is no such economic basis for social reformism in colonial and semi-colonial China the proletariat is a very revolutionary group as a whole.

Since its appearance on the scene the Chinese proletariat has been under the leadership of its own revolutionary political party, the Chinese Communist Party, and has become the most politically conscious class in Chinese society. Mao maintains that in spite of unavoidable weaknesses such as size, age and cultural level the Chinese proletariat has nonetheless become the basic motivating force of the Chinese revolution. He contends that the Chinese

revolution cannot succeed without the leadership of the proletariat because earlier examples of revolutionary movement in China have proved this to be true. He cited both the revolution of 1911, and the revolution of 1924 to 1927 as examples to prove this belief. He claims the proletariat did not consciously participate in the 1911 movement and that the movement of the 20's, failed because the big bourgeoisie betrayed its alliance with the proletariat by abandoning the common revolutionary program and also because the Chinese proletariat and its political party still lacked ample revolutionary experience. Since the proletariat was abandoned by the bourgeoisie Mao argues that it is necessary for the proletariat to unite with a class on which it can depend for support, and he maintains that among all the classes in Chinese society, the peasantry is the firm ally of the working class, while the urban petty bourgeoisie is a reliable ally and the national bourgeoisie is an ally in certain periods and to a certain extent. He cites the fact that the Chinese proletariat is largely made up of bankrupt peasants, and since this is true it has natural ties with the vast peasantry, which will facilitate their close alliance.⁶

The adoption of an urban policy by the Chinese

⁶Mao, Selected Works, Vol. III, 93-96.

Communist Party became necessary, in 1948, when the Communist army became an organized group. The Communists needed to keep the cities from being destroyed and the factories running so they could carry on the revolutionary movement against the Nationalists under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. The following policy was outlined by Mao and his associates in order to achieve this goal.

- (1) Troops were especially briefed on the political, military, and ideological necessity for keeping the cities alive, and special disciplinary regulations were formulated and disseminated to inspire troops to observe an exemplary conduct.
- (2) Special proclamations to the citizenry within besieged cities were extensively broadcast to prescribe the course of conduct incumbent upon them, to offer assurances of personal safety for all but "war criminals" and other objective elements, and to promise personal safety and rewards for those who protected installations from destruction or sabotage.
- (3) These special proclamations were standardized in the latter phases of the 1949 campaign by a point proclamation of Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh, broadcasts prior to the capture of cities and widely disseminated by radio, wall-board, newspapers and other media as a statement of basic policy after their occupation.
- (4) Immediately after the Communist forces entered the city, a special "military control commission" was established under military auspices to prepare for the re-establishment of civilian government.
- (5) Finally at an appropriate time, the "people's" or "democratic" government was

proclaimed within each city. It was initially to work hand in hand with the military control commission or its agent in support of military policy, but was eventually to assume complete local authority with the disbandment of the military control commission.⁷

In 1949, Mao established a legal basis for the use of corrective labor which served Mao both as a means of economic exploitation and a weapon for political coercion and also re-education. This was provided in article nine of the Common program, which specified the performance of "public service" as one of the duties of all citizens of the People's Republic.⁸

In June, 1950, the Trade Union Law of the People's Republic was put into force. The object of this law was to define precisely the legal status, functions and obligations of the trade union organizations under the new democratic regime and to enable the working class to become better organized so it can play its due part in the new democratic reconstruction. In order to protect the fundamental interests of the working class, trade unions were specifically directed to:

⁷H. A. Steiner, "Chinese Communist Urban Policy," American Political Science Review, XLIV (March, 1950), 55-56.

⁸Karl A. Wittfogel, "Forced Labor in Communist China," Problems of Communism, V (July-August, 1956), 34.

- (a) organize and educate the masses of workers.
- (b) establish a new attitude towards labour, observe labour discipline and organize output competitions and other production movements.
- (c) protect public property in nationalized and co-operative enterprises and in institutions and schools.
- (d) promote the policy of developing production for the benefit of both labour and capital in private enterprises and oppose violations of Government decrees.⁹

An indication Mao is turning to labor for support to continue his Communistic movement appeared in 1949, when Li Li-san, who was the leader of the urban Communist from 1928-1930, but was dismissed by the Comintern because he failed to achieve urban organization, was brought back into the Party ranks. Li admitted the Mao line of lying low in the cities in the early phase of the Communist movement had been correct and his policy of trying to organize an urban revolt during the early period had been wrong.¹⁰ It is apparent Mao is now (July, 1959) in complete command of Communist Party strategy and tactics. It also seems that Mao is energetically seeking to build up his industrial proletariat.

⁹"Trade Union Law of the People's Republic of China," Industry and Labour, IV (October 15, 1950), 366.

¹⁰New York Times, November 30, 1949, 19.

Mao's concept of labor's role in the revolution is probably best indicated in his speech, given on July 1, 1949, in commemoration of the twenty-eighth anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party entitled, "The People's Democratic Dictatorship,"¹¹ in which he states:

Our experiences focus on one point. It is the democratic dictatorship by the people based on the unity of labor and peasantry and led by labor through the Communist Party. This dictatorship must unite with the international revolutionary forces. In the era of imperialism, no other class in any country can lead any genuine revolution to victory. This is our formula. This is our principal experience. This is our main political point.¹²

The significance of the communes and their relationships to industry and labor can be examined on two levels, the practical level and the theoretical level. In considering the practical level, the commune appears to be intended as an appropriate answer to a number of difficulties which have confronted the Communists in the attempt to carry out socialist construction in China. One of the most formidable of these has been the government's failure to control the movement of labor between the countryside and towns. Of course, the industrialization of China requires that the largest number of workers be drawn from the rural areas

¹¹Mao, "Dictatorship," Congressional Record, Vol. 95, 9345-9348.

¹²Mao, "Dictatorship," Congressional Record, Vol. 95, 9347.

into industry, but owing to the frequent revisions of plans and the difficulties of estimating labor requirements, there has been a tendency for peasants attracted by hopes of better conditions of life than in the villages, to migrate to the towns in numbers far in excess of what is needed, resulting in large-scale urban unemployment. Since, in the average commune, an urban center will be combined with surrounding villages in a single economic unit, it should be easier for the communists to regulate and harness the available force within the commune. The commune also has its advantages for a policy which seeks to combine a decentralized socialist economy with central political control.¹³ The urban people's communes are set up in cities mainly for the purpose of accelerating the pace of socialist construction now and to create suitable conditions for gradually passing over to Communism in the future. It is necessary, therefore, according to recent Party directives, that the central link in the chain of consolidation and elevation of urban people's communes should consist in developing production and building a powerful material base.¹⁴

¹³American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Extracts From China Mainland Magazines, No. 161, March 16, 1959, 38-43. American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 1965, March 4, 1959, 4-5. Hereinafter cited as Consulate, Survey.

¹⁴Consulate, Survey, No. 1965, 4.

The Party has found from their experience in setting up people's communes in many areas that there are many favorable conditions for developing production in the cities. The economic strength of state-owned factories, enterprises and schools are powerful enough to aid the development of commune production. Meanwhile, the commune production consists mainly in socialist commodity production; production is fast, profits are greater, development is rapid and technical conditions are better. The production policy of urban people's communes should be:

to serve state industry, agricultural production and people's livelihood in cities; to suit local conditions, obtain materials locally and rely on the masses; to run communes industriously and thriftily and gradually build the material base for communes with the aid and support of state economy.¹⁵

The industrial production of the communes of the urban area in Communist China at the present time takes the following forms:

- (1) Commune-run factories. The factories organize production of desired articles, taking into account the needs of state industry, obtaining materials locally, utilizing waste products and materials, and maintaining direct contact with state factories and work sites. The products are sold either through commercial departments or by the communes themselves.

¹⁵Consulate, Survey, No. 1965, 4.

- (2) Production to serve large factories and enterprises. The commune-run factories are organized to meet the needs of large factories and enterprises or to do processing jobs for state-owned factories, enterprises and commercial departments under processing contracts.
- (3) Service production. For instance, tailoring, shoe making, dry cleaning, dyeing, etc. are organized to meet the people's daily needs.
- (4) Agricultural and subsidiary production and processing of foods to insure supply of non-staple foods to cities.¹⁶

To develop commune production, a mass movement is being launched for finding production outlets in every possible area and expand multiple production. According to a Party directive, existing facilities and waste materials must be fully utilized. A technical revolution must take place to insure progress by transferring from crude methods to modern methods and from handicraft to mechanization in order to raise production.¹⁷

In order to further develop commune production, the Party is incorporating commune production into state plans so as to avoid a situation in which certain units sometimes cannot carry on normal production because of the lack of raw materials. At the same time, existing small plants

¹⁶Consulate, Survey, No. 1965, 4-5.

¹⁷Consulate, Survey, No. 1933, Jan. 14, 1959, 8.

of the same nature are being merged into larger plants on the principle of facilitating production, leadership, and the gradual transition from collective ownership to ownership by the entire people.¹⁸

It is the Communist Party's desire and goal to see the urban people's communes as unified organizers of production, exchange, distribution and people's living amenities, and as a social organization to combine workers, peasants, traders, students and soldiers and merge government and communes.¹⁹

¹⁸Consulate, Survey, No. 1965, 5-6.

¹⁹Consulate, Survey, No. 1965, 10.

CHAPTER IV

MILITARY STRATEGY AND TACTICS

According to Mao Tse-tung, anyone directing a war must study and solve the problem of the laws of war. Consequently, it becomes necessary for anyone directing a war to understand the conditions of that particular war. Mao contends that everyone knows that, in doing a thing, if one does not understand its circumstances, then one cannot know its laws or how to deal with it. These are some of Mao's basic concepts of war which were adopted as the correct views on war strategy in 1935 by the Chinese Communist Party. He maintains that, "war is the highest form of struggle, existing ever since the emergence of private property and social classes, for settling contradictions between classes, between nations, between states, or between political groups at given stages of their development."¹ Unless there is an understanding of the circumstances of war, its characteristics and its relations to other things, Mao argues that it is not possible to know the laws of war nor is it possible to direct a war to win a victory. According to Mao's theory on the problem of war the difference in the

¹Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, 4 Vols., 1954-1956), Vol. I, 176. Hereinafter cited as Mao, Selected Works.

circumstances of war determines the difference in the guiding laws of war. There is a difference of time, of place and of character. Mao is opposed to the mechanical approach to war because the laws of war in each historical stage have their own individual characteristics. Revolutionary war and counter-revolutionary war have their own characteristics and, in reference to place, each nation or state has its own peculiarities. Therefore, a study of the laws of war of different historical stages, of different characteristics, of different places, is necessary for each war.²

One of Mao's fundamental beliefs in the military area is that wherever there are military operations, there is a whole military situation. This military situation may cover the world, a nation or an independent area, but wherever there are various phases and stages to be taken into consideration there is a whole military operation. Mao indicates the task of strategy is to study the laws for directing operations that may affect a whole military situation and the task of operational or tactical direction is to study the laws for directing military operations which are of a partial character. A comprehension of the whole makes it easier for one to handle a particular part of a

²Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 175-179.

situation. The whole situation consists of all the parts and no part can become independent. The relationship between the whole and the parts holds not only between war strategy and operational strategy, according to Mao, but it also is true between operational direction and tactics. He further argues that the main thing is to center attention on the important links which have a bearing on the whole situation, therefore, a basic task in studying strategic problems is to achieve the aim of solving all the important problems of a war or operation.³

Mao maintains that learning is no easy matter, but to apply the knowledge one has acquired is even more difficult. Mao admits that he cannot ask for an invincible general, but he does ask for a general who is both brave and wise, who usually wins battles in the course of a war and who combines wisdom with courage. He thinks that in order to attain the combination of wisdom and courage, there is a method which must be mastered and this method is to be employed in learning as well as in applying what has been learned. Mao contends that it is necessary to become familiar with the problems which confront the enemy, as well as those which confront his own forces. By the use of the knowledge

³Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 180-183.

of knowing the whole situation one can better formulate military plans. Since most military laws and theories represent knowledge which has been gained from past experience it is necessary to study them, but Mao argues that it is also important to put the conclusions reached to tests of experience. In other words, practice is more important than study in the process of learning war strategy.⁴

It is Mao's contention that the Chinese Communist Party must work hand in hand with the industrial proletariat in order to bring about a complete revolutionary victory in China. He thinks the masses of the Chinese peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie are willing to take an active part in the revolutionary movement and bring it to victory if they have the proper leadership. This leadership, according to Mao, must come from the Chinese Communist Party and the industrial proletariat. To further this point Mao argues that of all the social groups and political groups in semi-colonial China, only the proletariat and the Communist Party are open-minded and politically far-sighted enough to apply what they have learned in carrying on the revolutionary movement. Mao maintains that the Communist revolution of China is not only for its liberation, but

⁴Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 183-187.

also has great significance for world revolution. It is, therefore, necessary that the Party give its fullest support and its most capable leadership to the revolutionary cause. The Party must strive to overcome the harmful tendencies that endanger the revolution and try to establish the correct line so that complete victory will be possible.⁵

In discussing the revolutionary war of China Mao feels it is necessary to understand the character of this struggle. Failure to understand the characteristics of this revolutionary movement means inability to direct it or lead it to victory. According to Mao's interpretation there are four main characteristics of the Chinese revolutionary movement. The basic ideas of these characteristics are summed up by Mao in the following manner:

- (1) The first is that China is a vast semi-colonial country which is unevenly developed both politically and economically, and which has gone through the revolution of 1924-7.
- (2) The second characteristic is the great strength of the enemy.
- (3) The third characteristic is that the Red Army is weak and small.
- (4) The fourth characteristic is the Communist Party's leadership and the agrarian revolution.⁶

⁵Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 188-192.

⁶Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 193-196.

Mao maintains that the first characteristic basically determines both the political strategy and tactics and the military strategy and tactics of the Chinese Communists. At the time of this analysis the Kuomintang Party was in control of key positions in China and, therefore, the strength of the enemy which is the second characteristic should not be underestimated. Mao indicated the Red Army was weak because it was small in numbers and had very few supplies. Thus, the weakness of the Red Army, the third characteristic, must be taken into consideration in planning strategy. The leadership of the Party is a basic idea which must not be overlooked if the Communists hope to achieve victory. Out of these characteristics come the two main aspects of China's revolutionary war. The first and fourth characteristics determine the possibility of the Chinese Red Army growing and defeating its enemy. The second and third characteristics determine the impossibility of the Chinese Red Army growing rapidly or bringing about a quick defeat of the enemy.⁷ This is a fundamental law of the Chinese revolution, according to Mao, and those who cannot see laws of a fundamental nature cannot direct China's revolutionary war.

Under the heading of strategic defensive there are nine different phases which are discussed by Mao. These

⁷Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 193-197.

phases are: (1) active defense and passive defense; (2) preparation for a campaign against "encirclement and annihilation;" (3) strategic retreat; (4) strategic counter-offensive; (5) problems of starting the counter-offensive; (6) problems of troop concentration; (7) mobile warfare; (8) war of quick decision; and (9) war of annihilation.⁸

By the use of this essay Mao is trying to point out the correct methods which must be followed in carrying the Chinese Communist Revolution to a successful termination. A major event in the field of military affairs in the Chinese revolution is the "Long March." This is one of Mao's greatest military achievements and a very good example of his application of his theory of strategic retreat. Almost trapped by the Kuomintang forces Mao decided to move the Communist army into northwestern China. The Communist army covered about 5,000 miles in a little over a year's time (368 days) and had only forty-four days rest during that period.⁹ This movement probably saved Mao's forces from complete destruction and allowed him to continue his revolutionary movement and practice.

The series of lectures delivered by Mao on the

⁸Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 203-206.

⁹Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York: Random House, 1944), 216.

subject, "On the Protracted War," were designed to mobilize the Chinese people in resistance to the Japanese.¹⁰ In these lectures, which were delivered from May 26 to June 3, 1938, at the Association for the Study of the Anti-Japanese War held in Yen-an, Mao listed as some of the major problems to be solved:

What will be the actual course of the war? Can we win it or not? Can we win it quickly or not? Many people are talking about a protracted war, but why will the war be protracted? How to carry on a protracted war? Many people are talking about the final victory, but how can victory be ours? How shall we strive for it?¹¹

Mao maintains that in order to obtain a united front for victory over the Japanese it is necessary to answer these questions for the masses of the Chinese people.

It was his theory that the people must be informed of the situation and they must be united to fight for victory. It would be necessary, according to Mao, to carry on an extensive propaganda campaign among the masses of the people. Mao contended that the Chinese people could win if they received the correct leadership, but this leadership must understand the problems which it was facing.

Mao's reasoning that the war with Japan must be of a protracted nature stemmed from the fact that Japan was a

¹⁰Mao, Selected Works, Vol. II, 157-243.

¹¹Mao, Selected Works, Vol. II, 157.

small nation which was strong and China was a large nation which was weak. Mao argued that the strength which Japan possessed was her only advantage and China's weakness was her only disadvantage. If China would make an effort to reduce the advantages of the Japanese and aggravate their shortcomings and at the same time make an effort to remedy its own shortcomings and enhance its advantages the ultimate victory can belong to the Chinese.¹²

A protracted war is fought in three stages according to Mao. The first stage is one of the enemy's strategic offensive and a strategic defensive by the Chinese. The second stage is one of strategic defensive by the Japanese and of preparation by the Chinese for the counter-offensive. The third stage is one of Chinese strategic counter-offensive and the enemy's strategic retreat. In the first stage the enemy will attempt to penetrate so deep they will encounter immense difficulties, with consequences so disastrous that they cannot possible imagine them. This should, Mao maintains, exhaust the finances and economy of the Japanese and dishearten them. The second stage will be a stage of strategic stalemate. The advances of the Japanese will be stopped and at the same time the Chinese

¹²Mao, Selected Works, Vol. II, 157-183.

will be preparing for the counter-offensive. The third stage will be the carrying out of the counter-offensive to recover lost territory.¹³

Mao asserts three conditions which will be responsible for victory in a protracted war. The first is the achievement of the national united front against the Japanese; the second is the formation of a world anti-Japanese united front; and the third is revolutionary action by the people in Japan and the oppressed peoples at present suffering under Japanese imperialism.¹⁴

It became necessary for the Chinese Communist Party to determine the role the Party should play in a national war. In a report to the Central Committee on this subject Mao outlined his views. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party adopted Mao's policies as the correct Party line. Mao professes that a Communist who is an internationalist should also be a patriot. Mao proposes that it is necessary for the Chinese Communists to combine patriotism with internationalism. He maintains that in fighting in the defense of the motherland against aggressors and defeating their imperialistic motives the Party is achieving national liberation and only by achieving national

¹³Mao, Selected Works, Vol. II, 183-187.

¹⁴Mao, Selected Works, Vol. II, 241.

liberation will it be possible for the proletariat and the toiling masses to achieve their own liberation. Thus patriotism is simply an application of internationalism in the war of national liberation.¹⁵

Mao acknowledges that the united front is necessary to win victory, but he maintains the Communist Party must keep its ideological, political and organizational independence. He admits that independence within the united front can only be relative and not absolute. He further propounds that to regard it as absolute would undermine the general policy of unity against the enemy, but this relative independence must not be denied. Every member of the Communist Party as well as of all the friendly parties should clearly understand this.¹⁶

Mao accentuates that all those members of the Party who are fairly qualified to study must study Communist doctrine, the history of the nation and the circumstances and trends of the present movement. It is also the duty of the Party to organize education for Party members whose cultural level is relatively low. Mao contends that it is impossible for a Party to lead a great revolutionary movement to victory if it has no knowledge of revolutionary

¹⁵Mao, Selected Works, Vol. II, 245-247.

¹⁶Mao, Selected Works, Vol. II, 249-250.

theory, and it is not possible to have a revolutionary theory unless the Party members are educated so that it is possible for them to study the history and develop an understanding of the movement. It is the purpose of the study on the "Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War" to develop a united front and unity within the Communist Party. It is Mao's concept that if this unity is achieved a strong nucleus will be established not only to win the war from the Japanese but also to build a New China.¹⁷

The most important victory in the military field for Mao was, of course, the one over the Nationalists armies in 1949. When leaders of the Kuomintang Party began to ask for peace Mao told them a peace could be made only on his terms which were as follows:

- (1) Punish War Criminals.
- (2) Abrogate the bogus Constitution.
- (3) Abolish the Kuomintang's legitimacy of traditional institutions.
- (4) Reorganize the revolutionary armies in accordance with democratic principles.
- (5) Confiscate bureaucratic capital.
- (6) Reform the Agrarian system.
- (7) Abrogate the treaties of national betrayal.

¹⁷Mao, Selected Works, Vol. II, 258-261.

- (8) Convoke a Political Consultative meeting without the participation of reactionary elements, establish a democratic coalition government and take over all power from the Nanking Kuomintang reactionary government and the lower levels of government.¹⁸

On January 14, 1949, Mao broadcast these terms from North Shensi, China, by radio and in the speech he alleged that the Chinese Communists felt the above mentioned points were a satisfactory explanation of the will of the Chinese people. He also put forth the idea the Communists would accept peace only on the basis of these eight points and only by acceptance of these points could a genuine democratic peace be established.¹⁹ Some members of the Kuomintang accepted these terms while others continued to fight and were finally forced to move their government to Formosa.

While the foregoing terms for peace were dictated to the Kuomintang, Mao's theory of peace is quite different than one might expect. On the subject of war Mao stated, "war, the monster of mutual slaughter among mankind, will finally be eliminated through the progress of human society, and in no distant future."²⁰ However, Mao maintains that

¹⁸New York Times, January 15, 1949, 4.

¹⁹Mao Tse-tung, "Chinese Communist Party Peace Terms," Vital Speeches, XV (May 1, 1949), 432-433.

²⁰Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 179.

there is only one way of eliminating war, namely, to oppose war by means of war, to oppose counter-revolutionary war by means of revolutionary war, and to oppose counter-revolutionary class war by the means of revolutionary class war. To carry his theory further Mao contends that there are only two kinds of war in history, just and unjust. It is the duty of the Communist Party of China to support all just wars and oppose all unjust wars according to Mao. In determining whether a war is just or unjust Mao suggests that all counter-revolutionary wars are unjust and all revolutionary wars are just. Mao professes that the revolutionary war being waged by the Communists in China is against the greatest and most ruthless of all unjust counter-revolutionary wars. According to Mao, the banner of the Communist's revolutionary war is the banner for the salvation of China. This is a just war because it is being waged by the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people. This will undoubtedly be the most honorable undertaking for saving China, and will form a bridge leading world history into a new era. Mao declares that his war is a step in advancing human society to the point where classes and states are eliminated. Thus, when this era is achieved it will bring the ideal Communist society and when all the people of the world are Communists there will be no need for war. Mao claims that the will of the Communists to eliminate war is

the dividing line between them and the exploiting classes.²¹

The introduction of the commune has had definite effects on the military alignment in Communist China. There is a move afoot in Communist China to disperse industry and administrative services throughout the country so as to eliminate the vulnerability of a centralized socialist economy. From the outset Peking has laid emphasis on the military functions of the communes; it has declared that the same organization which will be used to mobilize labor for whatever purpose it is needed can be used also for defense in time of war. It appears, indeed, that the communes are to be run on semi-military lines and that their members will form militia units available for partisan resistance in the event of foreign invasion or for the suppression of local disturbances. The people of Communist China are told that the practice of making everybody a soldier is an important measure of consolidating the national defense and safeguarding the socialist construction. Mao thinks the militia is a good organization and should be promoted. It is a part of Mao's strategical thinking that it is important to make everybody a good soldier either in the army

²¹Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 179.

or those serving in people's communes.²²

²²American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Current Background, No. 520, September 30, 1958, 1-4. This is the basic document cited for the information of military happenings in the communes, however, a number of other publications of the American Consulate General have been consulted.

CHAPTER V

ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION

In the area of economic organization in 1934, a part of Mao Tse-tung's policy was to carry out all the economic construction that was possible as well as essential. He argued that it was necessary for state enterprise to become dominant over private enterprise and the proletariat should be dominant over the peasantry in order to lay the foundation for the future development into socialism. Mao also realized that it would be necessary to concentrate economic strength to provide for the anti-Japanese war and the Communist revolutionary war respectively and at the same time improve living conditions to consolidate the economic alliance of the workers and peasants.¹

The concept of economic construction is based on the development of agricultural and industrial production, trade with Western areas and the co-operatives. In the development of agricultural production Mao believes close attention should be given to the methods of production and he feels it is necessary that the old methods of production be improved and new methods be introduced. The first

¹Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, 4 Vols. 1954-1956), Vol. I, 141. Hereinafter cited as Mao, Selected Works.

step in gaining better methods of production is the distribution of the land among the peasants for only after the land is distributed to the peasants and the peasants' production is promoted and encouraged will the labor enthusiasm of the peasants burst forth and great victories in production be achieved. As for the industrial production Mao maintains that with proper planning the industries can be kept going. Mao agrees that it is impossible to make completely detailed and comprehensive plans, but he does believe that fairly detailed plans of production are absolutely necessary.²

It was necessary in 1934, to conceive some plan to trade with the Western areas and let the state handle the distribution of certain products. The national economy of China for this period was composed of three sectors: state enterprise, co-operative enterprise and private enterprise. While state enterprises had started to grow they were still confined to what was possible and essential. As long as private enterprise did not go beyond the legal limits established by the government, the Communist Party not only refrained from prohibiting private enterprise, but promoted and encouraged it. The development of private

²Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 142-145.

enterprise was necessary at this time in the interests of the state and the people. The co-operative movement, of course, was still in its infancy. When co-operatives have been co-ordinated and have passed through a considerable period of development, co-operatives will become a tremendous force in the economic sphere and will gradually gain preponderance and assume leadership over private enterprise.³

The basic line in Mao's fiscal policy is to increase income through the development of national economy. It is the duty of the economic and financial organizations of the Party to make a serious effort to achieve this policy. Financial expenditure is to be governed by the principle of economy and it should be made clear to all government personnel that corruption and waste are the greatest crimes. One of Mao's principal thoughts in regard to the accounting system is that every single coin should be saved either for the war, the revolution or economic construction.⁴

In his speech, "China's New Democracy," made on January 19, 1940, Mao called for the establishment of a republic that is economically new democratic as well as

³Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 144-145.

⁴Mao, Selected Works, Vol. I, 145.

politically new democratic.⁵ In order to implement this policy Mao contended that big banks and big industry and big commercial enterprise should be owned by the republic. Any enterprises which are monopolistic in character or on too large a scale for private management, such as banks, railways and airlines, whether Chinese-owned or foreign-owned, should be operated by the state so that private capital cannot dominate the livelihood of the people. This is one of the main principles of the control of capital. The state-operated enterprises of the new democratic republic are to be socialist in character and constitute the leading force in the national economy. The state-operated enterprises are to be under the leadership of the proletariat. This does not mean, however, that the republic will take over the forms of capitalist private property which cannot dominate the livelihood of the people, for China's economy is still very backward.⁶

⁵Mao, Selected Works, Vol. III, 106-156. Mao Tse-tung, "China's New Democracy," The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report of Sub-Committee No. 5, Supplement III, 81st Congress, 1st Session, House Document No. 154-Part 3, Appendix B (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1949), 500-513. Hereinafter cited as Mao, "Democracy," Strategy.

⁶Mao, Selected Works, Vol. III, 122. Mao, "Democracy," Strategy, 80.

Mao suggests that it will be necessary to adopt certain measures to confiscate the land of landlords and distribute it to those peasants who have no land or only a little land. It is also necessary for the Communist Party to adopt Sun Yat-sen's slogan of "land to the tillers," abolish the feudal relations in the rural areas and turn the land into the private property of the peasants. Therefore, the policy of equalization of land ownership and control of capital should be used. Mao maintains that China's economy should be developed along these lines and that this line must never be monopolized by a few. He felt that those who dared to run counter to this line should be dealt with harshly. Thus, with these views in mind, it becomes necessary for the new democratic politics to become the concentrated expression of the new democratic economy.⁷

The economic problem which confronts Mao and the Chinese Communists is one of tremendous proportion. In order to build any type of economy in present-day China it is necessary to bring about numerous reforms in all fields concerned in the economic situation of China. China's industrial development has been very limited and most of the industrial construction which has been carried on in China

⁷Mao, Selected Works, Vol. III, 122-123. Mao, "Democracy," Strategy, 80-81.

has been achieved through the use of foreign capital. The economic problem on the agrarian scene is not much brighter. Up to the time of the Chinese Communist Revolution most of the land and wealth of the people of the rural areas was concentrated in the hands of a small ruling class. It is now necessary for the Communists to try to distribute this wealth in furthering production and bringing about much needed reforms. The task of rejuvenating the economy of China is the problem which Mao and the Chinese Communists are trying to solve.

It is apparent that the communes are a definite attempt to pump new life into the sagging economic situation in which the Communists found themselves. The whole idea of gradual economic progress has been abandoned and in its place has appeared the new economic organization of Mao and the Communist Party which contends that China's progress must be achieved by "leaps" instead of a gradual economic program. The Party line which has been introduced by Mao concerning this movement is that nothing is impossible for China's vast population if it has the correct leadership. Officials who are in charge of production are being instructed not to obstruct the idealism and initiative of China's great masses.⁸

⁸These statements are based upon the publications of the American Consulate General, Hong Kong for the years 1958-1959.

The first step in building a finance program in the people's communes is the establishment of a fiscal organization that suits the demand of the communes. In order to accomplish this the original form of financial organization must be changed by transferring the task of finance from the hsiang⁹ to the people's communes, and to co-ordinate the fiscal program according to the objective needs of various enterprises of production and construction. In making this transfer there are two problems which the Communists must solve. On the one hand, the power to control finance must be transferred from hsiang finance to the people's communes and the mutual relations between the hsien¹⁰ finance and the commune finance must be clearly defined. On the other hand, the form in which fiscal payment is made by the people's communes to their superior organs should be improved. To solve the problem of the power to control finance it will be necessary to transfer the control of properties which were under the control of hsiang finance and at the same time, industrial and commercial enterprises, banking office, grain controlling stations, livestock protecting and breeding station, health

⁹Hsiang -- A village in China.

¹⁰Hsien -- A province in China.

centers and schools will all come under the control of the people's communes. All expenditures related to these different areas of control are to be paid by the communes. The Party line is to draw the dividing line on this basis between commune finance and hsien finance. However, on major construction projects which the hsien governments require to be built and which may yield benefit to more than one commune should be jointly undertaken by the hsien government and the commune or communes concerned. The Chinese Communist leaders also want to improve the form of fiscal payment made to the superior organ of government to suit the demand for unified operation and production. These relations determine the relations between the commune finance and the hsien finance and also the form in which the commune will pay revenues to its superior organ.¹¹

According to the Chinese Communist government the commune finance is a new type of basic level finance combining finance with fiscal affairs. It is the purpose of the commune to realize the functions of finance and undertake the task for the state accumulation and distribution of funds. Another duty to be performed by the commune is

¹¹American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Current Background, No. 548, February 2, 1959, 15-16. Hereinafter cited as Consulate, Background, No. 548.

to organize, under the guidance of the state finance, the activities concerning financial affairs within the commune and undertake the task of centralizing and distributing the funds in the commune.¹²

The finance of the people's commune will be a developed form of the hsiang finance. The commune inherits the task of the hsiang finance to mobilize funds for state construction and conducts some principles governing the organization of hsiang finance, such as centralized leadership and management by levels. It is the desire of the Communist Party that commune finance will combine finance with fiscal affairs and bring finance more closely to production. For these reasons it has advantages over the hsiang finance which are as follows:

First, the commune finance integrates finance with production more closely, makes finance serve and support production, and encourages the development of production. Thus it is easier to carry out the principle of "from economy to finance", develop production, open tax sources and guarantee to fulfill and overfulfill the commune task for the accumulation of funds.

Second, more closely, the commune finance integrates the state interest with commune interest, the power to control the commune affairs with the power to control the commune finance, and revenues with expenditures. Thus the party committee for the commune will pay more attention to the fiscal work, improve its leadership over finance,

¹²Consulate, Background, No. 548, 19.

unify plans, and make overall arrangements. All this is the basic guarantee for smooth development of the fiscal work.

Third, the commune finance is more assessable to the masses than the hsiang finance. The budget and final account of the commune must be discussed and approved by the representatives of the commune members and the fiscal affairs and accounts of different units must be published regularly. So the hsiang finance is in a more convenient position to draw the masses into the control of finance. Besides, the commune finance, whether well or badly operated, affects directly the personal interest of each commune member. The commune member may be urged to pay attention to the fiscal work of the commune. For this reason the commune finance becomes the best organizational form in the operation of finance by the whole party and the whole people.¹³

After the financial organization of the communes was changed it became necessary to change the financial-trading system to correspond with the new situation. The People's Bank has sent down to the level of the people's commune its rural basic machineries (business offices), and they are merged with the original credit co-operatives in different localities, as the credit departments of the people's communes, in order to meet the needs of this new situation which has occurred by the creation of the people's commune. This is being done in order to place the work connected with currency and credit in the communes more directly under the unified leadership of the Communist Party and administrative

¹³Consulate, Background, No. 548, 20.

authorities of the people's communes. This is to be closely associated with the departments of industry, agriculture, exchange, culture and military affairs of the people's communes, and to serve to consolidate and develop the people's communes. It is the plan of the Party to use the communes to strengthen the role of currency and credit. The Party maintains, therefore, that credit departments must be run properly, and that a study of the special characteristics and laws of currency and credit under the socialist system be made, so that they can grasp and utilize these laws. After the conclusions are made the findings should be used to serve the "big leap" forward in industrial and agricultural production and serve the consolidation and development of people's communes.¹⁴

According to the information available in the publications of the American Consulate General at Hong Kong, the Chinese people under the leadership of the Communist Party are making important gains in the economic field. They are expanding industry and increasing industrial output as well as showing a large increase in agricultural production. They are developing new methods and improving old methods as well as developing new industries. The

¹⁴American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Survey of the China Mainland Press, No. 1964, March 3, 1959, 9-12. Hereinafter cited as Consulate, Survey, No. 1964.

Communist, of course, claim that the economic status of the broad masses is much improved since the organization of the communes. There are numerous articles found in these publications about different communes setting new production goals for the year 1959. The following is a typical example:

The Siyu People's Commune in Yesien, Shantung Province, led by the nationally known model farmer Hse Chien-chun, plans to produce an average of 22.5 tons of grain per hectare as against only 6 tons last year.¹⁵

It is apparent that the Communists are making full use of this type of propaganda.

¹⁵Consulate, Survey, No. 1964, 13.

CHAPTER VI

EDUCATION AND CULTURE

Mao Tse-tung laid the foundation for his educational policies in his speech, "On Coalition Government," delivered at the opening of the Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party on April 24, 1945.¹ A basic point of this speech was Mao's contention that the elimination of the illiteracy of eighty per cent of the nation's population is an important task in the creation of a new China. He believes that the calamities which foreign and feudal oppression brought to the Chinese people also affects China's national culture. Mao argues that the progressive cultural and educational institutions and progressive cultural workers and educators had particularly suffered from this oppression. The elimination of foreign and feudal oppression is necessary if China is to establish a new democratic educational and cultural system, and the efforts of a large number of people, including teachers, scientists, writers, artists and ordinary cultural workers will be necessary in developing this new democratic educational and cultural system. Mao also feels that proper recognition should be

¹Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, 4 vols., 1954-1956), Vol. IV, 244-315. Hereinafter cited as Mao, Selected Works.

given to all intellectuals who have performed meritorious service for the people. Mao indicated that the Chinese people's revolutionary struggle urgently needs the participation of the intellectuals because the problem of having an educated class becomes particularly important in the revolutionary movement. He mentions that the intellectuals will play even more important roles in forthcoming struggles. The people's government should, therefore, systematically develop among the broad masses various categories of intellectuals to serve as cadres and to unite and re-educate all the useful intellectuals that China now has.²

According to Mao, proper steps should be taken by the people's government to eliminate all slavish, feudal and fascist culture and education. He felt the adoption of positive measures should be taken to prevent and combat epidemics and disease among the people and that the promotion of public sanitation and medical services should be adopted. The Chinese people's culture and education should be new democratic and the Chinese should build up through the leadership of the Communist Party a new culture and education which are national, scientific and popular. Mao maintains that the Chinese must fully absorb progressive

²Mao, Selected Works, Vol. IV, 299-300.

foreign culture as an aid to the development of China's new culture, but it must not indiscriminately import foreign culture into China. The foreign culture which is to be used must meet the actual needs of the Chinese people.³

It is Mao's belief that the new democratic culture must be a national culture. It must oppose imperialist oppression and uphold the dignity and independence of the Chinese nation. If this new democratic culture is achieved it will unite with the socialist and new democratic cultures of all other nations and establish with them relations which will make it possible for the two cultures to absorb ideas from each other and aid each other in development. Mao maintains that China should absorb on a large scale the progressive cultures of foreign countries as ingredients for Chinese; but it can never unite its culture with any reactionary imperialist culture of any nation, for China's culture is a revolutionary culture. In order to determine which cultures and which parts of cultures should be adopted by China, Mao suggests that the foreign material be treated as food is treated. Food, he pointed out, is chewed in the mouth, submitted to the working of the stomach and intestines and then separated into essence to be absorbed and

³Mao, Selected Works, Vol. IV, 300.

waste matter to be discarded. He maintains that only when this procedure is followed will food do the body any good and only when the Chinese are selective and thorough in choosing the cultures or parts of cultures they want to use will the cultures do their culture any good. Out of this should be developed a Chinese culture which should have its own form, namely, a national form. National in form and new democratic in content, such is the goal of the Chinese Communist Party and Mao for the development of a new type of culture in China. Even though some ideas are borrowed from other cultures they must fit into the framework of the Chinese culture and take on the appearance of national in form and new democratic in content.⁴

Mao's educational program is organized basically to indoctrinate the youth of China in the Communist Party line. There are some indoctrination classes for the older people, but the main thought of the educational program is to bring the youth of the country into the Communist fold. "The Communists have always depended on the support of the student

⁴Mao Tse-tung, "China's New Democracy," The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report of Sub-Committee No. 5, Supplement III, 81st Congress, 1st Session, House Document No. 154-Part 3, Appendix B (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1949), 89-90. Hereinafter cited as Mao, "Democracy," Strategy. Mao, Selected Works, Vol. III, 153-154.

class. To the students they have directed a continuous program of propaganda; from the students they have recruited their most enthusiastic propagandists and cadres.⁵

It appears the Communists are having a considerable amount of success in the indoctrination of the youth of China. It is the future in which Mao is interested, and it is the young people of China who hold the key to the future.⁶ In the young mind the focus of loyalty is being shifted from the family to the state. One of the prime objectives of Mao's remolding movement is to cut the roots of obedience and domestic loyalties by transferring the reverence from the head of the family to the head of state. The child is the charge of the state not of its parents.⁷

The first step in the indoctrination process is the education of the teachers and professors to fit the Communist Party line. In order to remold thinking and ideologies in any society it is necessary to re-organize the educational system first. It is apparent that Mao understands this theory because his first aim is to educate the teachers and professors. This program was carried out during 1952.

⁵Theodore His-en Chen, "China: Communism Wins," Current History, XIX (August, 1950), 78.

⁶New York Times, September 9, 1956, 72.

⁷Frank Moraes, Report on Mao's China (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953), 47-48. Hereinafter cited as Moraes, Report.

During the ideological remolding period the teachers and professors were given a chance to repent their capitalistic ideas. There was a period of several months in China, during which classes were stopped, while professors and teachers engaged in orgies of open mutual recrimination and abject self-criticism.⁸

The first step in educational reform as far as ideas were concerned was to eliminate the feudal ideology which dominated the old educational system. Love for the fatherland and for the people of the country, love of labor, science, and taking care of public property were specifically mentioned as the desired traits of national character to be developed by education. The study of science is stressed in the Chinese Communist schools as Mao realizes that in order to build up the nation and to develop her industries China must have good scientists. Science is also important in agriculture and national defense. Another purpose was the application of the scientific historical viewpoint to the study of history, economics, politics, culture and international affairs.⁹

⁸New York Times, September 9, 1956, 72.

⁹Theodore His-en Chen, "New China: New Texts," Current History, XIX (December, 1950), 321-322.

The New Democratic Youth League which was organized in 1949, drew its members from all youthful elements of society, outside as well as within the schools. It was broader than a purely Communist organization, but it was made clear that it would function under the leadership of the Communist Party. In addition to organizing youth, disseminating propaganda in schools, factories and rural districts, and executing government directives, the Youth Corps united the broad masses of youth to study Marxism-Leninism and the Mao Tse-tung Doctrine. Mao is using this organ to the fullest possible extent in indoctrinating the youth of China in his doctrines.¹⁰

Under the leadership and influence of the Russians, Communists everywhere have placed great importance upon the willingness of the Communist Party member to subject himself to the criticism of his comrades and also to engage in self-criticism. The Chinese Communists go one step further in the methods of criticism by comrades and self-criticism. They are extending both these processes to a whole people. The entire population of China is expected, periodically, to analyze their thoughts, deeds and motives in public, and to prove that their minds have been cleared of all

¹⁰S. B. Thomas, "Recent Educational Policies in China," Pacific Affairs, XXIII (March, 1950), 30.

bourgeois influences. This form of public examination of conscience and confession is more far-reaching, its application more universal, than anything ever attempted elsewhere by any Communist regime.¹¹

Mao believes it is necessary to achieve a proper relationship between the revolutionary movement and art and literature. The basis for this relationship was established in Yen-an in 1942, at a conference held to determine the correct relationship of art and literature to the revolutionary movement.¹² It is Mao's contention that the struggle for the liberation of the Chinese people is being waged on various fronts which includes the fields of art and literature. He admits that victory over the Kuomintang depends primarily on an army of soldiers with guns in their hands, nevertheless, he feels a cultural army is equally indispensable for uniting China and defeating its enemy. Mao propounds the theory that the duty of the people in the

¹¹Douglas Hyde, "Mao: New Prophet of World Communism," America, XCII (March 19, 1955), 642.

¹²Mao, Selected Works, Vol. IV, 63-93. Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of Art and Literature," The Communist Conspiracy, Part I: Communism Outside the United States, Section D: Communist Activities Around the World, House Report No. 2243, May 29, 1956, United States Congress, Committee on Un-American Activities, 84th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1956), 513-518. Hereinafter cited as Mao, "Problems," Conspiracy.

artistic and literary fields is that of serving the proletariat and the broad masses of the people by correctly using their talents in their specific fields to further the Communist revolutionary movement. He also professes that it is necessary for the artists and writers to adopt three views concerning the evaluation of material. The artists and writers must develop the views of standpoint, attitude and audience because they will be coming into contact with material of the enemies, the allies and their own people and, therefore, need to be able to determine the correct line.¹³

Mao contends that it is necessary for the artists and writers to understand and know something about the audience for whom their art and literature are intended. This audience will be composed mainly of workers, peasants, soldiers and their cadres. It is necessary that the artists and writers fuse their ideas with those of the broad masses of workers, peasants and soldiers so this group, for whom the work is intended, will receive the benefit of the labors of the artists and writers. If art and literature do not meet the requirement of promoting the revolutionary cause, the artists and writers must undergo a thorough

¹³Mao, Selected Works, Vol. IV, 63-64. Mao, "Problems," Conspiracy, 513-514.

remolding procedure to bring them in line with the Party's revolutionary movement. This makes it necessary for any writer or artist to have a thorough understanding of Marxism-Leninism.¹⁴

Since art and literature are intended for the broad masses Mao suggests it is necessary to understand the problems of inner-Party relations between the art and literature work and the Party work as a whole and the relation of Party writers and artists with the non-Party writers and artists. Mao, in discussing inner-Party relations, maintains that art and literature belong to a class or a party, and therefore, they respond to the political demands of a class or party. Art and literature will also respond to the revolutionary task of a given revolutionary period and when they deviate from this principle, they divorce themselves from the basic needs of the people. Mao argues, therefore, that the literature and art of the proletariat are a part of the revolutionary program of the proletariat and the role of the Party's work in art and literature is determined by the over-all revolutionary program of the Party. This means that the revolutionary struggles on the ideological and artistic fronts must be subordinate to the

¹⁴Mao, Selected Works, Vol. IV, 65-68. Mao, "Problems," Conspiracy, 514.

political struggle because only through politics can the needs of the masses be expressed in a common form. Mao emphasizes that since this is true it is very necessary to obtain the correct relationship between art and literature and the Party.¹⁵

According to Mao, it is necessary to carry on relations between the artists and writers of the Party and the non-Party artists and writers. He feels there are certain groups within the non-Party writers and artists which would be beneficial to the revolutionary movement even though they have many shortcomings in their ideology. He suggests that this group is confined mainly to the petty-bourgeois artists and writers and it is especially important to try to help them overcome their shortcomings and win them over to the Party line.¹⁶

It is Mao's contention that culture is the reflection of a given political and economic system of society, though politics in turn exerts an immense amount of influence upon economics, and politics are the concentrated expression of economy. Therefore, it is the given politics and economy which first determines a given culture. Mao professes that

¹⁵Mao, Selected Works, Vol. IV, 81-82. Mao, "Problems," Conspiracy, 514-515.

¹⁶Mao, Selected Works, Vol. IV, 83-84. Mao, "Problems," Conspiracy, 515-516.

the Chinese Communist revolutionary movement will give China a new culture because it will give it a new economy and new politics.¹⁷

The Chinese Communist government is controlling all phases of personal and group life. It is the purpose of the Communist Party to change every feature of Chinese society including standards, values, institutions, habits and customs. To remold the thinking of the Chinese people the Communists are teaching a double standard of morality. There is one standard for the friends of the revolution and another for the enemies of the revolution. It is the duty of the people to love and cooperate with friends and comrades; at the same time they must learn to hate enemies of the revolution and strive to destroy them without scruples and without compassion. This double standard is also incorporated into the political theory of the Chinese Communist state. This new theory is called the democratic dictatorship. According to Mao, democracy is reserved for the active supporters of the revolution, and dictatorship applies to the reactionaries and counter-revolutionaries, who are being ruthlessly suppressed.¹⁸

¹⁷Mao, Selected Works, Vol. III, 141. Mao, "Democracy," Strategy, 84.

¹⁸Theodore His-en Chen, "The Marxist Remolding of Chinese Society," American Journal of Sociology, LVIII (January, 1953), 341-346.

Mao suggests the content of the new Chinese culture means neither the cultural domination of the bourgeoisie, nor the imposition of the Socialist culture of the proletariat, but means the construction of a people's culture, with an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal content, carried out under the guidance of proletarian thought. It is Mao's desire that the combination of the new democratic politics, new democratic economy and new democratic culture will constitute the edifice of a republic of New Democracy, a republic in name and in fact.¹⁹

The control of the people's education and culture in China is probably best stated by Frank Moraes in his book, Report on Mao's China. Mr. Moraes describes a picnic procession of children in the following manner:

Solemn children marching four abreast, marching to a picnic. Robots on the road. Sunlight and shadow. It was incongruous and absurd. It was also pathetic. But in those school children tramping solemnly to a picnic I think I saw briefly and in a flash the heart and mind of Mao's China.²⁰

It appears that the design of economic life in the communes is aimed at breaking down what the Communists regard as the principal obstacle to the attainment of their

¹⁹Mao, Selected Works, Vol. III, 136. Mao, "Democracy," Strategy, 91.

²⁰Moraes, Report, 41.

ends; this obstacle is the close family ties which are present in Chinese society. The Communists are carrying out the principle of collective work thoroughly. The young children are to be cared for in day nurseries so that women can work on the land or in mines and factories. All meals are to be taken, if possible, in canteens, and household cleaning, sewing and mending will be done by squads going from house to house, so that there will be virtually nothing left to do in the home. It is the apparent hope of the Communist Party that the family will lose all significance as a social unit and that the reverence which the head of the family has been receiving will be transferred to the head of the state. This, of course, is a basic Communist aim in the education and cultural field.²¹

The leaders of the Communist Party in China maintain that in the development of cultural activities in the people's communes, politics must assume command. Since the building of the people's communes, the Party's leadership over cultural work has been strengthened, the Party leaders profess that their policies and tasks have become more clarified, and mass cultural activities are thus being led on a healthier road. It is the contention of many of the

²¹Based upon the publications of the American Consulate at Hong Kong.

Party members that they must always be vigilant over the capitalist trend in cultural work which attaches greater weight to the old and neglects the new, and is divorced from politics and production. Thus, in their opinion, the most important thing is to let politics assume command in the development of cultural activities. If this is to be done the Communists think the leadership of the Party must be strengthened organizationally, and the literary ranks must be purified. The Party has built or is building cultural centers in the majority of people's communes. The administrative committees of these cultural centers are under the unified leadership of the propaganda department of the Party committees. The director of a cultural center is a responsible cadre who is a member of the Party, and elite Party members are selected to lead in the work of cultural work corps, club houses, libraries and exhibition halls. Among the rank and file of the cultural workers, the Party members believe they must achieve the combination of culture and art, politics and propaganda, and labor and production, using Communist thoughts to arm the literary hardcore elements. Those who are politically opposed to socialism, even if they have special talent, must not be allowed to join the ranks of the literary force. The Party leaders feel they must develop a way of launching a resolute struggle against

impure elements who have infiltrated into their ranks, and expel them.²²

Ideologically, the Party committees have organized cultural activities as weapons for the ideological struggle. Cultural work in a people's commune must resolutely implement the policy of serving politics, serving production and serving the workers, peasants and soldiers. It is the contention of the Communists that education in socialism and communism must be actively developed among the broad masses. Whatever the current central task happens to be, the Party leaders maintain that it should provide the theme for plays staged for propaganda conducted and wherever production efforts are extended cultural activities should be extended too. In this way, the Communists think socialist culture will develop with great fanfare in the wake of the socialist construction cause as a whole. The cultural work of the people's communes must be combined with production and physical labor must be combined with mental labor. All cultural organizations must be developed to the state in which they are at the same time shock production corps as well as cultural propaganda corps. It is the contention of the Party that all workers must truly achieve the combination

²²American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Current Background, No. 539, December 15, 1958, 5-6. Hereinafter cited as Consulate, Background, No. 539.

of physical and mental labor. All production organizations must exert great efforts in developing cultural enterprises. It is Mao's belief that these cultural enterprises operated by the people's communes can achieve greater, faster, better and more economical results due to the combination of production with culture. At the same time this combination plays an important role in pushing forward the building of socialism and the consolidation of the people's communes.²³

The Chinese Communists emphasize social education because, first, the children are members of the Communist society which has the responsibility of fostering and educating them. Second, the family institution will be gradually superseded by the collective life of the communes. Third, home education is inferior to social education because it often breeds spoilt children indisposed toward labor, and selfishness. If a student gets a Communist education in school and receives a non-Communist education at home, the results can not be satisfactory. The Communist claim that flaws in home education in this respect are becoming increasingly conspicuous and, therefore, they advocate the boarding school which calls into full play the superiority of social education. First, this type of school

²³Consulate, Background, No. 539, 7-8.

is in a good position to make unified plans for study, labor, cultural and social activities with full regard of ages and other characteristics of the boarding students and to co-ordinate education with labor ingenuity for the training of well-rounded personnel. A second point is that the children will eat, live, labor and study together in big Communist families and develop in the atmosphere of the Communist quality of "one for all and all for one." Third, the school not only teaches but also trains the children in a socialistic manner. Fourth, the further the Communist society develops, the higher the degree of collectivism will be, and consequently, the more important to the Communists will be the education of the Chinese children in collectivism and having them live and eat together. By the use of this method the Communist will be able to completely destroy loyalty to the family and transfer this loyalty to the state.²⁴

Thus, by controlling the education and culture of the Chinese people the Communist Party marches on the road to what they claim is true Communism. How effectively they maintain this control will have a definite bearing on the success of their program.

²⁴American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Current Background, No. 540, December 18, 1958, 3-4.

CHAPTER VII

POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

Mao Tse-tung's basis for the organization of the Chinese Communist government is found in his article, "China's New Democracy," which was written near the end of 1940.¹ The adoption of the Common Program by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Council² is actually the embodiment of Mao's "New Democracy" as the guiding light of the Communist government of China. The Common Program is a sixty-article manifesto which states that it should be jointly observed by all units participating in the CPPCC, the people's government at all levels, and the people of the entire country.³

¹Mao Tse-tung, "China's New Democracy," The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report of Sub-Committee No. 5, Supplement III, 81st Congress, 1st Session, House Document No. 154-Part 3, Appendix B (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1949), 67-91. Hereinafter cited as Mao, "Democracy," Strategy. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, 4 Vols., 1954-1956), Vol. III, 106-156. Hereinafter cited as Mao, Selected Works.

²The Chinese People's Political Consultative Council will be referred to as the CPPCC.

³S. B. Thomas, "Structure and Constitutional Basis of the Chinese People's Republic," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCLXXVII (September, 1951), 51.

In his move to take over the Chinese nation and turn it into a Communist ruled land, Mao argues that there must be two stages in the revolutionary movement which will bring the Communists into power. The first stage of the revolution is the new democracy which is not a regular type of democracy, but a special type of Chinese democracy. The second stage is the Socialist movement which is designed to bring about the socialization of China. According to Mao the Socialist stage will not come for some time because the stage of new democracy, which lays the foundation for the Socialist era, will last for several years.⁴

On July 1, 1949, Mao made a speech, "The People's Democratic Dictatorship," in commemoration of the Twenty-eighth Anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party.⁵ In the speech Mao suggested that the experiences of the past few decades instruct the people of China to enforce a democratic dictatorship by the people, or in other words, the dictatorship of the people. He maintains that if the people choose this type of government they will have control of it. According to Mao, the democratic dictatorship is

⁴Mao, Selected Works, Vol. III, 106. Mao, "Democracy," Strategy, 70.

⁵Mao Tse-tung, "The People's Democratic Dictatorship," Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 95, Part 7, 9345-9348. Hereinafter cited as Mao, "Dictatorship," Congressional Record, Vol. 95.

the only type of government which can lead the Chinese people out of the oppression and confusion which has been caused by other governing factions. If the broad masses of the people of China would accept the democratic dictatorship type of government it would mean, Mao stated, "The democratic system is to be carried out within the ranks of the people, giving them freedom of speech, assembly, and association."⁶ Also, the reactionaries would be deprived of the right to vote because only the masses of the Chinese people have the right to speak.

To bring about necessary reforms Mao thinks the people have to be re-educated in order "to unlearn" the bad habits and ideas which have been acquired from the old society. If this educational process is carried out it will prevent the Chinese people from following the erroneous path which is pointed out by the reactionaries. Mao and other prominent Communists argue that suppression of persons opposed to this new order is necessary and essential for the survival of the democratic dictatorship.⁷

On April 24, 1945, Mao Tse-tung made a political report entitled, "On Coalition Government," to the Seventh

⁶Mao, "Dictatorship," Congressional Record, Vol. 95, 9346.

⁷S. B. Thomas, "Government and Administration in China Today," Pacific Affairs, XXIII (September, 1950), 267-268.

National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.⁸ In this report Mao declares:

The state structure of New Democracy should be based on democratic centralism, with the people's congresses at various levels determining the major policies and electing the government. It is at once democratic and centralised, i.e. centralised on the basis of democracy and democratic under centralised guidance. Only this system can, on the one hand, give full expression to democracy by investing with full powers the people's congresses at all levels and, on the other, guarantee the centralised administration of state affairs by enabling the governments at various levels to effect centralised administration of all affairs entrusted to them by the people's congresses at their corresponding levels and protect all the indispensable democratic activities of the people.⁹

Another point of importance in Mao's political organization is the idea of consolidating the masses and getting the view point of the masses. Mao told Gunther Stein in an interview in 1945, that the "mass viewpoint" is the most fundamental point of the Communist Party of China. Mao thinks the leaders of the Party must work through the broad masses of people and listen to the people to obtain this point of view. One of the processes used to obtain opinions of the people is popular meetings in villages, towns, districts, regions and everywhere in the territory of

⁸Mao, Selected Works, Vol. IV, 244-315.

⁹Mao, Selected Works, Vol. IV, 272-273.

China.¹⁰

The Chinese Communist leaders generally attribute their conquest of power to the faithful pursuit of effective "mass line" tactics. Furthermore, they regard a correct mass line as essential for the full consolidation of power. The policies have to be executed correctly in order to bring about the far-reaching policies to which they are committed. They also hope, and it appears to be coming true, this will ultimately bring about the transition from the "people's democratic dictatorship" to the complete Socialist order. The mass line is designed to effect that relationship between the Party and the masses best calculated to enable the revolutionary leadership to capture mass support for its program. The mass line tactics resembles the classic Marxist-Leninist precept on the "unification theory and practice."¹¹

In the speech, "The People's Democratic Dictatorship," Mao maintains that democratic dictatorship is based on the unity of labor, peasantry and the bourgeoisie of the cities.¹²

¹⁰Gunther Stein, The Challenge of Red China (New York: Whittlesey House, 1945), 116.

¹¹H. Arthur Steiner, "Current 'Mass line' Tactics in Communist China," American Political Science Review, XLV (June, 1951), 422-424.

¹²Mao, "Dictatorship," Congressional Record, Vol. 95, 9345-9348.

The strong point of this unity is between the labor class and the peasantry. These two classes make up between eighty and ninety per cent of the Chinese population. If there is to be a realization of socialism the Communist Party must successfully unite these two groups and maintain close harmony between them in carrying out the Party objectives.¹³

Mao, in a speech made in 1956, to the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party of China, suggests that the Party members should strive not only to bring about unity in the Party, but should also strive to unite the nationalities, democratic classes, democratic parties, and people's organizations, and to consolidate and expand a people's democratic united front.¹⁴

To eliminate feudalism and monopoly capitalism is the object of the new democratic revolution. In other words Mao is aiming at the landlord class and the bureaucratic--the big bourgeoisie--not capitalism in general. In fact, Mao admits that a certain amount of capitalistic enterprise is necessary for the construction of an economically sound New China. Of course, this type of capitalistic enterprise will be allowed only during a transitional period and

¹³Mao, "Dictatorship," Congressional Record, Vol. 95, 9347.

¹⁴New York Times, September 16, 1956, 3.

eventually control of all methods of production must come under the leadership of the state or more explicitly the leadership of the Communist Party. These principles for the democratic dictatorship of the people were proposed by Mao in the speech, "China's New Democracy."¹⁵ According to Mao, the organization of the Chinese Communist government will contain a state system which will be a joint dictatorship of all revolutionary classes and the political structure which is to be democratic centralism. He maintains that only a government of this type can thoroughly express the will of the people and prevent the monopolization of production methods by a few. Also, a government of this type will be able to powerfully oppose the enemies of the revolution and attain a genuinely democratic system which can achieve harmony between the state system and the political structure of democratic centralism which must be combined to form the new democratic government.¹⁶

To protect the people is the purpose of the organization of the people's republic, according to Mao. Only through a people's republic can the people educate and reform themselves by democratic methods. A reason for having

¹⁵Mao, Selected Works, Vol. III, 106-156. Mao, "Democracy," Strategy, 67-91.

¹⁶Mao, Selected Works, Vol. III, 116-123. Mao, "Democracy," Strategy, 70-75.

a people's republic is that it will help the people free themselves from internal and external reactionaries. The purpose of this is to keep the people from turning to the wrong cause as directed by the reactionaries and to continue their march toward the socialist society and toward the Communist society for the accomplishment of their historic mission, the extermination of class distinction and the regulation of cosmopolitanism. Mao argues that the methods employed by the Communists are democratic and it is by persuasion and not by force that the goals of the Party will be attained.¹⁷

Mao's theory of the Chinese Communist revolution-- "Maoism"--is not heresy, but a legitimate development of Marxism-Leninism. His fundamental ideals are firmly based on Marxist dogma of class struggle and his agrarian program and new democracy corresponds basically with Lenin's teachings on the general tactics for semi-colonial areas. These teachings are that before the realization of socialism, there must be an alliance with all forces fighting imperialism and feudalism. The Chinese Communists, under Mao's leadership, have skilfully developed a strategy to meet China's realities. As Chuan Leng Shao stated in writing on Mao's concepts, "a good agriculturalist would not do

¹⁷Mao, "Dictatorship," Congressional Record, Vol. 95, 9348.

everything the same way in China and Russia and neither would a good Communist."¹⁸

It is Mao's concept that democracy must be all sided--political, military, economic and cultural and it must also be democratic in Party scope and internationalism. Mao agrees that political unification is necessary, but he defends the argument that only a government based on a democratic franchise can strengthen the political unification of a country. Mao thinks unity in the military sphere is necessary, but this can not be achieved unless there are democratic relations between the officers and men, between the soldiers and the people and also between the different armies so that it will be possible to unify these armies. Mao hopes to introduce an economic system which will construct new industry and increase the production of goods and promote proper distribution and uniform consumption of goods and products.¹⁹

Mao Tse-tung is the only Communist chieftain--except Tito--ever to be expelled from the Party and still remain

¹⁸Chuan Leng Shao, "The Chance for Titoism in China," Current History, XXI (December, 1951), 337.

¹⁹Mao Tse-tung, "China Needs Democracy and Unity," The Communist Conspiracy, Part I: Communism Outside the United States, Section D: Communist Activities Around the World, House Report No. 2243, May 29, 1956, United States Congress, Committee on Un-American Activities, 84th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1956), 520.

in power. Mao has been expelled several times because he refused to follow the strict Party line, such as he did in the organization of the Peasants' Associations. He has been the only Communist leader--except Tito--to criticize Moscow's agents. Several years ago he led in the arrest and removal of the last Comintern "specialist" sent to assume active direction of the Chinese Politburo and that agent has never been replaced.²⁰

Mao has retained his right to the independence of the interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. He has refused to give Russia the role of high priest of the doctrines and rejects in general to the import of foreign ideas into China. He makes no exception of Marxism-Leninism. Mao thinks Marxism-Leninism can be meaningful only if it can be adapted to the conditions of a particular country. Mao demands the "Sinonization" of Marxism-Leninism to make it useful for China. He attacks what he calls subjective and dogmatic Marxism-Leninism, a Marxism-Leninism which is not flexible and does not fit the objective framework within which it has to work. This concept is apparently directed at Russia and her early attempts in China and against those who try to look at China with Russian eyes. Mao warns that such Marxists and

²⁰Edgar Snow, "Will China Become a Russian Satellite?" Saturday Evening Post, CCXXI (April 9, 1949), 30.

Leninists will not be tolerated in the Chinese Communist Party.²¹

Where is the Chinese Communist Party under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung headed? There may be some light shed on this subject by the four major goals of the Chinese Communist regime, which were announced early in 1957.

Peking aims at the implementation of a broad ideological revolution in the values and attitudes of the Chinese and a thorough going rice roots transformation of the structure of Chinese Society.

Peking aims at employment of advanced technological methods to develop Communist China into a modern industrial nation.

Peking aims at the creation of a unified and closely-knit apparatus of totalitarian control over mainland China.

Peking aims at the organization of the strongest indigenous military force in Asia.²²

These goals would indicate that the Chinese Communists under Mao's leadership are concentrating in the economic and military fields.

Probably one of the biggest steps taken by the Chinese Communists is the introduction of the commune. The Chinese Communists hope the communes will be the answer to

²¹Max Mark, "Chinese Communism," Journal of Politics XIII (May, 1951), 247.

²²Howard L. Boorman, "How has China Changed," The New Republic, CXXXVI (May 13, 1957), 6. These are the goals of the Chinese Communists as seen by Mr. Boorman.

increasing production and at the same time a means of gaining firm control of the educational and cultural lives of the people of China. The commune is to be all-inclusive, whereas, the collective concerns itself only with agricultural production. The commune is designed to supervise all agricultural, economic, cultural, political, social, educational and military activity within its boundaries. The Party claims the commune is the final step toward collective ownership by society. In the commune personal possessions will be a thing of the past and all private property will become the property of the commune. According to most reports the Chinese Communist Party leaders claim the commune is the natural development of the Socialist revolution and socialist construction. The Party hopes that by the creation of the commune they will be better able to control and use the labor power of the Chinese people. This tremendous labor potential must be harnessed if China is to become an industrial nation.²³

The commune is, of course, aimed at complete destruction of the family. The Party leaders realize that they cannot achieve the socialistic goals they want until they destroy the family ties. If this conclusion seems a

²³These statements based upon the publications of the American Consulate General, Hong Kong.

little strong, read from a Party directive of September, 1958:

We must undermine the capitalist type of social living built on the basis of the class exploitation system, and at the same time we must also undermine the family built on the basis of the class exploitation system.

That kind of family which carried out individual production with the family or the household as the unit . . . was nothing but a poor cage for the working people Individual domestic labor is also a remnant of the family under the conditions of individual production. In the socialist society (individuals) will no longer have to worry over their inability to establish or to maintain a most simple family.

In the socialist and communist collective body, everybody takes up labor with joy, and all jointly and reasonable share the fruits of their labor.²⁴

The spiritual aims of the communes are co-existent with the material aims of the communes. The Party maintains the commune resident must be stripped not only of his technical individuality but of his personal identity also. The Communists are carrying on intensive indoctrination sessions during leisure hours idolizing the idea of living, eating, working, studying and playing together. The Party thinks these methods have extremely far-reaching revolutionary policies. Of course, the communes have increased in

²⁴American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Current Background, No. 520, September 30, 1958, 3.

size. The collectives ranged in size from 100 families to 2,000 families, while the communes range between 5,000 to 10,000 families. A serious policy of indoctrination in favor of the communes will be carried on by the Chinese Communist Party because their success is necessary for the building of the Communistic state in China.²⁵

In the realm of international relations, Mao sustains, throughout his writing, the idea that the Chinese Communist Party and a China under Communist leadership must align itself with the international proletariat which is lead by Moscow. He contends that these people are under the same type of leadership and are striving for the same goals as the Chinese Communists hope to attain. Therefore, it will be beneficial for the Communist Party to join hands with all the other revolutionary parties which are striving to gain freedom for the working people of the world. An examination of the agreements and treaties of Communist China made between 1949 and 1957, plainly shows that the Chinese Communist government under Mao's leadership is leaning on the Communist block nations. Russia is the major recipient of most of these treaties.²⁶

²⁵American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 1937, January 20, 1959, 2.

²⁶Consulate, Background, No. 545, January 20, 1959, 1-25.

The counterpart of the permanent and unbreakable friendship between China and Russia is the deep and intense hatred for the United States which has been promoted by the Mao regime at home and abroad. The general internal goals of Peking's campaign against the United States involve much more than the creation of hatred to sustain Chinese Communist military ventures. Apparently the drive is used to distract attention from shortcomings and oppression at home and to direct blame away from the regime, which is always pictured as trying to save the Chinese people from difficulties created by United States imperialism. The Chinese Communists try to promote simultaneously, contempt of Western power and fear of having anything to do with the West, especially with Americans.²⁷

The Chinese dream of copying the West is shattered by the aggression of imperialism. Mao thinks it is very peculiar the way the Western teachers repeatedly humbug their pupils. Out of this contact with the West Mao feels the Chinese have gained two basic experiences. The first experience is the Chinese Communist Party must awaken the

²⁷These statements based upon information found in the Chinese World Outlook and the Chinese Communist Anti-Americanism and the Resist-American Aid-Korea Campaign.

masses in China and bring the peasants, laborers, petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie into a united front. The second experience is to unite in a common struggle with those nations who treat China with equality.²⁸ This will, of course, unite the Chinese Communists with the Communist bloc nations.

Thus, Mao is following a policy of uniting the Chinese Communist Party and its government with the Communist bloc nations. He will trade with the anti-Communist bloc but he asserts they are suppressing the people and carrying out imperialistic tactics against the Communist bloc nations. Mao is definitely a leader of the world Communist movement and seems to be secure in his position in China at the present time.

There has been considerable speculation over the past few months as to the significance of Mao's relinquishment of the governmental position as Chairman of the People's Republic of China. Although Mao has resigned this post, he still retains the position of Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party which is the most influential position in any country under Communist rule because the Central Committee of the Party directs governmental policies. According to reports coming out of

²⁸Mao, "Dictatorship," Congressional Record, Vol. 95, 9346.

Communist China Mao resigned the post in order to have more time to deal with the questions of the direction, policy and line of the Party and the state and to have more time to write about Communist ideologies.²⁹

²⁹American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Current Background, No. 542, December 29, 1958, 6. This issue contains the announcement that Mao had asked the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party that he not be nominated as a candidate for re-election as Chairman of the People's Republic of China. This report and others seem to verify the claims that Mao is simply reducing his work load.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

It is apparent that the policies of Mao Tse-tung are leading China into an extreme type of Socialistic government or, perhaps, more correctly a true form of Communism. Mao seems to be in firm control of the policies being followed by the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese government and his relinquishment of the Chairmanship of the government of the People's Republic of China does not appear to have reduced his power as he is still directing Party policy and line through his post as Chairman of the Party's Central Committee.

It seems that Mao has been successful thus far (July, 1959) in the implementation of his agrarian policies which have been an important part of his program in his rise to power. Although he seeks to inflate the role of the proletariat in the revolutionary movement it is apparent that he is attempting to convert the broad masses of the peasantry into this category by use of the communes. It is probable that as long as the peasants are satisfied with Mao and his Chinese Communist regime they will be able to remain in power in China.

Another major problem that Mao and his associates

must continue to solve is the industrialization of China. If they are to have a successful Communist government they must bring about sweeping improvements in the production methods of the Chinese people as well as introducing new industries and increasing the output of products now produced. If they can solve these problems then it is highly possible that they will be able to continue to control the China mainland and maintain a Communist government.

If Mao's programs in agriculture and industry are successful they will help solve the economic problems faced by the Chinese Communists. The introduction of the commune appears to be at least a part of the solution for increasing the economic basis of the Chinese Communist government. It also seems to be the answer offered by Mao in the educational and cultural area where they are trying hard to completely control the thoughts and actions of the people of China. If the communes are continued in their present status they will definitely give Mao and the Chinese Communist Party ample opportunity to control the education and thoughts of the young people of China. It is also the hope of Mao and his Communist colleagues that the commune system will undermine the Chinese family system and transfer the reverence which is reserved for the head of the

family to the head of the state.

Mao insists on interpreting Communist doctrines to fit the needs of China and more explicitly to suit Mao. To say Mao will fall or remain in power would be absolutely foolish. It is probable that Mao will remain in power as long as he controls the army and gives the people something better than they have received from factions that have ruled China in the past. The key to Mao's control of China rests with the military and police forces. Through these it is possible for him to eliminate the extreme reactionaries which are opposed to his policies and to re-educate the people who show possibilities of understanding Communism, but have been misled by the reactionaries and need to be enlightened by the study and practice of Communist doctrine. Apparently the commune system will aid Mao and his associates in maintaining a firmer control over the people of China and allow them to carry out large scale propaganda programs. By the use of the military and police forces and the propaganda programs Mao is able to introduce and carry out the policies that he feels are necessary to bring about what he claims is true Communism.

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