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The Re-Valuation of William Jennings Bryan In Woodrow Wilson's Administration

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THE RE-VALUATION OF WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN
IN WOODROW WILSON'S ADMINISTRATION

being

A thesis presented to the Graduate Faculty
of the Fort Hays Kansas State College in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the Degree of Master of Science

by

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Date

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Re-evaluation of William Jennings Bryan In Woodrow Wilson's Administration is a study of the relationships of William Jennings Bryan, Secretary of State, Edward M. House, uncommissioned agent of Woodrow Wilson, Walter Hines Page, United States Ambassador to England, and Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States. The author's purpose in writing this thesis is to throw light upon the machinations that were carried on behind the back of William Jennings Bryan, as Secretary of State in Woodrow Wilson's Administration. This investigation gives to Bryan a higher and more reputable position in American history than he is usually accorded. In order to accomplish this task it was necessary to re-evaluate The Intimate Papers of Colonel House which covers the Colonel's early youth up to the end of World War I. The period 1912-1915 was given special attention. The author does not contend that Bryan should have been given the appointment, nor does he contend that there were not others who could have served in the capacity of Secretary of State with more ability than Bryan. The author does contend that with all the handicaps that Bryan faced, the Commoner performed his duty to the American people admirably.

The problem is very important because of the effect these men had on the early policy of the United States in World War I. The basic conflict in early World War I American diplomacy seems to be between such men as Edward M. House and Walter Hines Page, and

Woodrow Wilson and William Jennings Bryan. When House and Page succeeded in bringing Wilson over to their side and in opposition to Bryan's views, American policy changed with marked subsequent effect on the course of the European War. The policy which House, Page, and the English themselves followed was the policy of delay. Bryan vigorously opposed this policy.

The author found it extremely difficult to divide the thesis into chapters. This difficulty arises from the fact that there is no clear-cut line to draw between the events that occurred. Therefore, in order not to interrupt the clarity of the presentation, as few chapter headings as possible were employed. Some preliminary details were included in order to better understand the subject. This material prior to the Baltimore Convention, as well as the Convention itself, and the making up of the cabinet have been included in the second chapter. The third chapter deals with the domestic and foreign issues confronting Bryan and the administration before World War I. The fourth chapter deals with Bryan and the American position during World War I. This chapter ends with the resignation of William Jennings Bryan as Secretary of State. Chapter five is the Conclusion.

The author has tried to get at the basis of the problem by using as sources principally the memoirs and letters of the more important men involved. He has also noted material from the Foreign Relations of the United States. Other material not specifically used or noted in the thesis were speeches on British foreign policies and

a discussion of the German problem in Turkey by Ambassador Henry Morgenthau. Several secondary sources were used by the author at the beginning in order to better understand conditions of the early 1900's.

There are certain limitations in the thesis which must be cited. Several works which might have proved valuable in writing the thesis were not available to the author. The most important of these works not obtained was the War Memoirs of Robert Lansing. No satisfaction was given the author by the National Archives in trying to obtain a step by step procedure of the drafting of the Second Lusitania Note. Since no thorough study has been made and based upon the Bryan papers, the author again wrote the National Archives to obtain information especially on the ratification of the Bryan Treaties. The archivist replied that no information on the ratification of the Bryan treaties existed in their files. Thus the author has had to work with what facts were obtainable and draw as logical conclusions as possible from the data.

CHAPTER II

BRYAN BRINGS VICTORY TO WOODROW WILSON
AND THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

William Jennings Bryan had devoted his life to progressive principles. Among the principles which were followed by progressives of all parties were: that special, minority, and corrupt influence in government be removed; that the machinery of government be changed so that control by the few will pass to control by the many; and, that the functions of government be extended to relieve social and economic distress. The Commoner had been a candidate for the President of the United States in 1896, 1900, and 1908 in order to accomplish these progressive principles, but he had been defeated due principally to his vigorous stand on the silver question. Not only was Bryan discredited by his stand on bimetallism, but also direct legislation, control of corporations, the income tax and many other of his excellent measures all had to be abandoned.

By 1912, Governor Wilson of New Jersey had secured a great deal of the support of the Democratic Party. However, Wilson had many issues to solve. It is not too much to say that Wilson's greatest single problem during his political beginnings was William Jennings Bryan. Bryan was not only the outstanding man of the Democratic Party but also an outstanding progressive in the country. Because of Bryan's position Wilson was confronted with a series of problems that called for adroit management. In order to achieve

a position of leadership in the Democratic Party Wilson had to step into Bryan's place -- with or without his consent. He had to accomplish this feat without agreeing wholly to Bryan's program or his methods. Wilson could not afford to alienate the East which was suspicious of Bryan. Above all Wilson had to strive for a united party.

The Commoner remained aloof from Wilson and was not very interested in the Governor of New Jersey as a candidate, even as late as the Baltimore Convention. The Commoner would not sacrifice progressive principles in order to be elected President himself, and he meant to see that no other candidate should be selected by the Democratic Party who was not progressive. Probably the primary reason Bryan regarded Wilson with so little interest was that he felt Wilson was backed by the "big interests".

Wilson contributed to Bryan's belief that the "big interests" were backing him by apparently associating with Colonel George Harvey, editor of Harper's Weekly, which was a J. P. Morgan firm. The aims of Harvey and the "big interests" were stated to Josephus Daniels, later Secretary of Navy under Wilson, by Harvey in the winter of 1911:

It was an interesting account of how against their inclination he (Harvey) had won the support of James Smith, boss of the Democratic Party, Robert Davis, boss of Jersey City, and James R. Nugent -- the big three who were in control of the Democratic machine in New Jersey . . . Harvey had said, 'Do you (Robert Davis) think Wilson would make a good governor?' Davis answered, 'How in the hell do I know. . . . But I do know he will

be a good meal ticket for hungry Democrats. On his coattail hundreds of Democrats will be elected to small offices and the party will win a victory, something it needs if it is to live.¹

Wilson was not in ignorance of what the "machine" was doing nor of its intentions. It was particularly disturbing to Wilson to find Hearst's New York papers publishing such news as:

Wall St. To Put
Up W. Wilson
For President.²

Wilson was particularly confused as to why the "machine" had gone outside of its ranks of recognized politicians to nominate him. He concluded that the machine had recognized that a new day in American politics had come and that they must act accordingly. Wilson evidently did not understand that the "machine" had been convinced by Harvey that he, Wilson, could be controlled.

Shortly after the Governor of New Jersey openly became a candidate for the Presidency, he was confronted with a serious problem -- a split with Harvey, which occurred on December 18, 1911. Harvey had asked Wilson if there was any talk left concerning his advocating the governor on behalf of the interests. Wilson replied that there was, and that these rumors were having a serious effect,

¹ Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1946), p. 15.

² Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1931), III, 61.

especially in the West.³ Harvey asked Wilson if he had thought of any way to counteract this harmful effect. Wilson replied:

'I have not. In fact, I am greatly perplexed to know how to do it. I have been able to satisfy those I can reach, but there are thousands, of course, who we cannot reach -- I have not yet been able to devise a way to meet the situation.'

Harvey asked: 'Is there anything I can do except, of course, to stop advocating your nomination?'

Governor Wilson answered: 'I think not. At least I can't think of anything.'⁴

Thus, Harvey discontinued his support for Wilson.

The split between Harvey and Wilson at first brought grievous effects to Wilson. It appeared to many that Wilson had deserted a friend who had long supported him. However, due to quick action on the part of Tom Pence, Washington correspondent for the News and Observer, Wilson's dark day indeed turned very bright. Mr. Pence quickly pointed out that Wilson's action was a deliberate and purposeful break with Wall Street. This report brought Wilson's action to the attention of the Progressive Democrats of the West who had considered him a friend of Wall Street.

Thus, it appeared to many of the friends of Wilson that even

³ Daniels had noted in the early fall of 1911 that he feared the backing of Harvey was causing men who had supported Bryan to distrust Wilson as a true progressive. Daniels, op cit., p. 23.

⁴ Wilson considered this question and answer as between friends and answered accordingly. Daniels, op. cit., p. 24.

the support of Bryan might come to the Governor of New Jersey. However, Wilson's troubles were not over, for shortly after the Harvey episode had passed even a greater sensation was created by the publication of the Joline Letter. The full text of the letter appears as follows:

April 29, 1907

My dear Mr. Joline:

Thank you very much for sending me your address at Parsons, Kansas, before the Board of Directors, of the Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railroad Company. I have read it with relish, and am in entire agreement. Would that we could do something, at once, dignified and effective, knock Mr. Bryan, once for all, into a cocked hat.

Cordially and sincerely yours,

Woodrow Wilson.⁵

The letter was published on January 7, 1912, the day before the all-important Jackson Day Dinner. At this dinner all the notables of the Democratic Party were to be present, as were members of the National Committee from all the states. Possibly even more significant -- Bryan and Wilson were to be at the dinner! Bryan had followed Wilson's career as the New Jersey Governor but had never met Wilson. Their relations from this time forward were direct.

The immediate problem that faced the Wilson forces was the forming of a reply. "Mr. McCombs suggested that the governor address

⁵ Baker, op. cit., III, 98.

an open letter to Mr. Bryan, voicing his regret over the publication of this letter and assuring him of his present kindly feelings toward him. . . ."⁶ Mr. Daniels, as an old friend and supporter of Bryan, was sent to observe the reactions of Bryan to the "cocked hat incident". While he was there a New York Sun reporter arrived to show Bryan the letter.

The Commoner read it slowly as if he had heard nothing about it until that minute. 'What have you to say?' the correspondent asked. 'You represent the New York Sun, do you not?' Bryan asked. When he replied, 'Yes', Bryan said, 'In that case, you may just say that if Mr. Wilson wanted to knock me into a cocked hat, he and the Sun are on the same platform. That's what the Sun has been trying to do me since 1896.'⁷

It was finally agreed upon by Wilson's friends that the idea of Tumulty should be followed. This suggestion was for Wilson to pay a tribute to Bryan's unselfish service to the Democratic Party and that the gesture should be made during the Jackson Day Dinner.⁸

⁶ Joseph Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson As I Know Him (New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1921), pp. 96-97. McCombs in this book makes it appear that he had at first suggested a reply such as this but then he considered Daniels the man to see Bryan.

⁷ Daniels, op. cit., p. 32.

⁸ In main Governor Wilson paid a tribute to the great Commoner by saying, as he turned to Mr. Bryan: 'I, for my part, never want to forget this: That while we have differed from Mr. Bryan upon this occasion and upon that in regard to the specific things to be done, he has gone serenely on pointing out to a more and more convinced people what it was that was the matter. He has had the steadfast visions all along of what it was that was the matter and he has, not any more than Andrew Jackson did, not based his career upon calculation, but has based it upon principles.' Baker, op. cit., III, 264.

'When others were faint-hearted, Colonel Bryan carried the Democratic Standard. He kept the 'fires burning' which have heartened and encouraged the democracy of the country.' Tumulty, op. cit., p. 97.

Mr. Tumulty considered Wilson's speech a great triumph, for the Bryan-Joline crisis was safely passed. In the presence of newspapermen Bryan put his arm very affectionately around the shoulder of Wilson. On his return from Washington Wilson confided in Tumulty that Bryan had told him not to worry about the publication of the Joline Letter saying:

I (Bryan), of course, knew that you were not with me in my position on the currency, and Woodrow Wilson replied: 'All I can say, Mr. Bryan, is that you are a great, big man.'⁹

It may be well to pause and consider the relations of Bryan, House, and Page with Wilson before the Baltimore Convention.

The two men -- Wilson and Bryan -- presented interesting contrasts. Wilson was intellectual; Bryan was emotional. Wilson was sensitive and shy and did not enjoy to a great extent speaking before crowds; Bryan was a great lover of crowds. Wilson was careful and exact; Bryan was swift and careless. Wilson was a thorough and a deep reader; Bryan was not. However, the two men did have attitudes in common. Ray Stannard Baker said:

. . . Both were men of faith, deeply religious; both believe profoundly in the people, Bryan instinctively by heritage, because he was one of them, Wilson by reason, by historical understanding, by virtue of his Scotch-Presbyterian conviction that 'all men rank the same with God.' Both men were gifted orators with the power of leading and influencing the masses; and both, underneath, deep down, were sincere in their objectives.

⁹ Ibid., p. 97.

It was this sense of fundamental agreements as to the rights of people, and the iniquity of 'privilege,' that gradually brought the two men together.¹⁰

Wilson was convinced that Bryan was sincere and trying to express the wishes of the people but that he had no direction in which to lead the people.

On the other hand while Bryan had long been an irritant to Wilson, Bryan knew nothing of Wilson until 1910. Bryan began taking notice when a rank outsider appeared in politics and was elected Governor of New Jersey. On the day after the election, Bryan telegraphed to Governor Wilson the first direct communication between them on November 9, 1910: "May your administration be crowned with signal success."¹¹ From this time on both men became keenly interested in each other.¹² Bryan became even more interested when he learned from Thomas B. Love¹³ that the Texas delegation was going to organize in favor of Wilson for President. However, Bryan's support

¹⁰ Baker, op. cit., III, 200-01.

¹¹ Ibid., III, 207.

¹² Bryan particularly noted Wilson's stand in favor of Jim Martine for United States Senator as elected by the people and opposed by Jim Smith, the big interest's candidate.

¹³ One of the earliest supporters of Wilson for President was Thomas B. Love from Texas. The conversation was carried on between Bryan and Love in January, 1911. Love had been active since 1910. It is interesting to note that House takes the credit for the organization of Texas in Wilson's favor. House as of January 21, 1911, was supporting Mayor Gaynor of New York for the presidency. Baker, op. cit., III, 297.

still seems to have been for Champ Clark. Concerning Clark, Bryan records his election to the Speakership of the House in 1911:

I regarded him as an available man for the nomination. Governor Wilson was being talked of more and more, but I felt that Clark was more in sympathy with the policies of the party and, therefore, better suited to lead our forces in the coming presidential campaign.¹⁴

During his own birthday banquet, on March 19, 1911, Bryan first began to doubt Clark as a candidate.

Clark came but I (Bryan) learned from him afterwards that it was with some reluctance. This surprised me and I was surprised still more when, as the campaign proceeded, I found that his friends were tying up with the Harmon forces whenever a combination was necessary to defeat the Wilson forces.¹⁵

Bryan would not declare himself in favor of either candidate. He found Wilson an equally acceptable candidate.

While the relations between Bryan and Wilson before the Baltimore Convention are open and clear, matters between House and Wilson are badly muddled. That House did not trust the masses as did Bryan and Wilson is evidenced by the following:

The trouble with getting a candidate for President is that the man that is best fitted for the place cannot be nominated and, if nominated, could probably not be elected. The people seldom take the man best fitted for the job; therefore it is necessary to work for the best man who can be nominated and elected, and just now Wilson seems to be that man.¹⁶

¹⁴ William Jennings Bryan, The Memoirs of William Jennings Bryan (Chicago: The John C. Winston Company, 1925), p. 159.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1920), I, 43.

It has already been noted that at least as late as January 21, 1911, House had supported Mayor Gaynor of New York.¹⁷ According to the accounts of House, the Colonel had become interested in Wilson as a candidate in November, 1911, as was shown by a letter to Senator Culberson:

The more I see of Governor Wilson the better I like him, and I think he is getting to be a man one can advise with some degree of satisfaction. This, you know, you could never do with Mr. Bryan.¹⁸

House also informed the world in his papers that it was he who had advised Wilson to stress the tariff problem in his speech of January 3, 1912. The Colonel also asked D. F. Houston, Chancellor of Washington University, to talk about the question of the tariff with Wilson. Furthermore:

The Governor agreed to the advisability of this move, and Houston came. I gave a dinner at Gotham (December 7, 1911). The others present besides Governor Wilson were Houston, Walter Page¹⁹ McCombs, and Edward S. Martin.²⁰ . . . This data was afterwards given to Governor Wilson, who based his tariff speeches largely on it.²¹

¹⁷ House had been introduced to Gaynor by Bryan and had at first become an enthusiastic supporter of Gaynor. The split between the two men came when House invited Gaynor to speak before the Texas State Convention and Gaynor refused. House was infuriated over this action.

¹⁸ Seymour, op. cit., I, 46. House was indeed happy over his opinion that Wilson could be advised for this was to be his source of power with Wilson in later years.

¹⁹ Later under Wilson's administration Ambassador to England and an early supporter of Wilson.

²⁰ Editor of Life magazine.

²¹ Seymour, op. cit., I, 47.

William F. McCombs who had attended the dinner given by House notes the following:

Mr. House said, incidentally, that Mr. Houston had made a special study of the tariff, and that the two men (Houston and Wilson) might meet on common ground on that issue, especially since the governor was to make his tariff speech on January 3, 1912.²²

The dinner passed off quite pleasantly. There was general conversation. President Houston intimated a desire to discuss the tariff. Governor Wilson caromed off the issue and there was nothing further heard of that. The conversation was then resumed along conversational lines, Colonel House not participating.

I went later to see Colonel House on the very practical matter of his contribution. He said he could make none, then disappeared.²³

Shortly after this dinner, House, according to his own papers,²⁴ began the quick mobilization and organization of the Texas delegates in order to swing their solid support behind Wilson. He was able, by the beginning of March, 1912, to express the expectation of a solid

²² Note the words "especially since the Governor was to make his tariff speech on January 3, 1912". House as we have seen had gone to Wilson and stressed the point of the tariff in Wilson's forthcoming speech.

²³ William F. McCombs, Making Woodrow Wilson President (New York: Fairview Publishing Company, 1921), pp. 230-31. Probably the best analysis of House's means and methods are described in Baker, op. cit., III, 296. "He (House) shrank from the ordinary hurly-burly contacts. He was 'inspired by the desire to improve political conditions', but he avoided, always, any personal responsibility whether for the influence of his ideas or the results of his acts. If things went wrong some one else must take the punishment: public opinion could not reach him."

²⁴ Seymour, op. cit., I, 57.

wilson delegation from Texas. Actually long before House and Wilson met a vigorous movement had begun in Texas to advance Wilson's candidacy. The principal enthusiasts were: Thomas B. Love, George D. Armistead, Thomas W. Gregory, and Albert Sidney Burluson. Love had been active from the time that Wilson had been elected Governor of New Jersey in 1910.²⁵ McCombs himself readily states that:

I can positively state that Colonel House had nothing to do with carrying the State of Texas in the primaries for Woodrow Wilson except as he told me himself, he had written a few letters. I think no responsible person who took part in that difficult primary would contradict me for an instant.²⁶

House who had taken it upon himself to influence Bryan to join on the side of Wilson, he likewise took some credit for accomplishing this purpose as is shown by the following letter to William F. McCombs on February 10, 1912:

I sent him (Bryan) some clippings favorable to Governor Wilson, which he promises to use and asks for more. If you could think to have sent me things that you would like to have used in the Commoner,²⁷ I am sure that I can arrange it.

I agree with you that Mr. Bryan's support is absolutely essential, not only for nominating, but for the election

²⁵ Baker, op. cit., III, 297-98.

²⁶ McCombs, op. cit., p. 231. Also note Baker, op. cit., III, 322-63. This information is corroborated by Josephus Daniels who said that at the time of the Baltimore Convention, House did not control the Texas delegation and further more was not even present. Daniels, op. cit., p. 41.

²⁷ The newspaper of W. J. Bryan was published in Lincoln, Nebraska.

afterward; and I shall make it my particular province to keep in touch with him and endeavour to influence him along the lines desired.

He has evolved considerably in our direction, for when I first talked to him in October he did not have Governor Wilson much in mind.²⁸

Thus, we have seen that House, contrary to what he might want us to believe in his papers, contributed next to nothing in advancing the candidacy of Woodrow Wilson.

Woodrow Wilson did have a strong advocate in Colonel House's later cohort, Walter Hines Page. Page had known Wilson for some thirty years and had met him at Atlanta when Wilson was a struggling young lawyer. He felt that with the coming of Wilson a new era in politics would also be reached. Page wrote to Henry Wallace,²⁹ editor of Wallace's Farmer and ardent admirer of Theodore Roosevelt, shortly before the campaign of 1912:

I see you are coming around to Wilson . . . and in pretty rapid fashion. I assure you that that is the solution of the problem. I have known him since we were boys, and I have been studying him lately with a great

²⁸ Seymour, op. cit., I, 56. It must also be stated that House's tactics did not prove to be so greatly valuable because Bryan remained a Clark supporter until the release of the Bryan-Parker telegrams, with which House had no connection. House's particular plan to influence Bryan was to lay special weight upon the fact that the reactionary forces in the Democratic Party were fighting both Bryan and Wilson.

²⁹ Henry Wallace was the father of Henry A. Wallace, later Secretary of Agriculture under Franklin D. Roosevelt.

deal of care. I haven't any doubt but that is the way out. The old label 'Democrat' and 'Republican' have ceased to have any meaning, not only in my mind and in yours, but I think in the minds of nearly all people. . . .³⁰

Mr. Hendrick, author of The Life and Letters of Walter Hines Page, suggests that Page was quite valuable in presenting Wilson and House to one another due to the fact that because of House the important state of Texas came over to Wilson's side. Since we have already seen that House's contribution in securing Texas' delegates for Wilson was certainly not large, Page's worth in this connection does not seem to be very great. It must be remembered that Mr. Hendrick studied the letters of Page, of which a great number were from House. Therefore, Mr. Hendrick must have assumed that what House wrote was the truth.

Page did, however, make positive contributions to aid the election of Wilson. Page was not a collector of delegates to the nominating convention, nor a manipulator of assemblies to favour Wilson. His talent lay in exposition. He took upon himself the task of spreading Wilson's fame. He set forth the achievements of Wilson in his magazine, in books published by his firm, in letters to friends, and in personal conferences. Page also aided in helping persuade Wilson to make his famous speechmaking trip through the western states in 1911. This trip aided Wilson greatly for it brought him out into the open before the masses.

³⁰ Burton J. Hendrick, The Life and Letters of Walter Hines Page (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1922), I, 105.

Wilson's attitude toward the enthusiasm of such men as Page and McCombs concerning his candidacy is recorded by Ray Stannard Baker as follows:

All these men are strangely interested in the enterprise of making me President of the United States. I cannot help them in the least. . . . I think every man instinctively likes to play the role of kingmaker. I am at present, apparently, suitable material for their favourite sport, and so the game is on the boards. I do not mean that they are not generously interested in me, personally; but I must, for the working of my own mind, have something in addition to that to explain their enthusiasm. . . .³¹

Possibly the actions of one other man should be studied before entering into the subject of the Baltimore Convention itself. This man is William F. McCombs, Wilson's campaign manager. He sought to modify Wilson's attitude towards "machine politics" and thus secure their support as well as the votes of the New York delegation. McCombs felt that without this delegation's support, Wilson could not win. No other candidate in the past had been able to overcome this deficiency. "He urged Wilson to modify his attitude toward the bosses -- bosses were after all only local leaders -- and he sought to minimize Wilson's growing understanding with Bryan -- though he sought Bryan's help in certain Western states -- because it

³¹ Baker, op. cit., III, 193. Mr. Wilson early seems to have drawn an astute conclusion for William F. McCombs later wrote a book entitled Making Woodrow Wilson President. Page does not seem to take such a great glory in the kingmaker's role as shown in The Life and Letters of Walter Hines Page.

was offensive to some of the powerful Eastern organizations, especially Tammany Hall."³² McCombs and the practical politicians seemed to be right for in the primaries, despite Wilson's tremendous appeal to the people, one state after another went against him.

The old established leadership, based so largely upon personal acquaintance, favours given and received -- the 'vast inertia of organization' -- in most cases prevailed. . . . Wilson's attitude toward 'Jim' Smith's machine in New Jersey, however much as it might please the people, did not help him with the leaders in other states. . . .³³

At the close of the primaries and state conventions, the situation, with regards to the standing of the delegates, stood as follows:

Pledged to Clark	436	
Pledged to Wilson	248	
Pledged to Underwood	84	
Pledged to favourite sons, Harmon, Marshall and others	102	
Uncertain	224	
Total Delegates	1094	34
Majority	548	
Two thirds, necessary for choice	729	35

House wrote to Senator C. A. Culberson May 1, 1912, that Wilson's best chance to win lay in the fact that many people feared that if

³² Baker, op. cit., III, 278.

³³ Ibid., III, 283-84.

³⁴ The total number of delegates after the Credentials Committee made its report was 1088.

³⁵ Baker, op. cit., III, 323.

Bryan were nominated and elected, Hearst would succeed in landing Champ Clark in the administration as the dominating figure.

In early June, 1912, the Democratic National Committee met and selected Judge Alton B. Parker³⁶ from New York to be the temporary chairman for the Baltimore Convention. This was particularly galling to Bryan for Parker was an open conservative. Bryan saw that the Baltimore Convention, since its candidates were progressive as well as its platform, must in all ways be progressive in order to match or better the Republican candidate, Taft, and the Progressive candidate, Roosevelt. Roosevelt had split from the Republican and had formed his Bull Moose party. The Commoner, still a supporter of Clark, had written to Clark to be a leader and to fight for progressive principles or Wilson would beat him. Wilson was a leader as well as a fighter.³⁷ Shortly after the selection of Parker by the National Committee, Bryan drew up a telegram which was to have perhaps more influence on the nomination of Wilson and the rejection of Clark than any other factor. The telegram stated:

In the interest of harmony I suggest to the subcommittee of the Democratic National Committee the advisability of recommending as temporary chairman some progressive acceptable to the leading progressive

³⁶ Parker was the Democratic candidate for President in 1904.

³⁷ Bryan especially hoped Clark would be favorable. After seeing the Republican Party's candidate elected by the influence of big interests, Bryan perhaps feared Clark might also be swayed by Wall Street.

candidates for the presidential nomination. I took it for granted that no committeeman interested in Democratic success would desire to offend the members of a convention overwhelmingly progressive by naming a reactionary to sound the keynote of the campaign. Eight members of the sub-committee, however, have, over the protest of the remaining eight, agreed upon not only a reactionary, but upon the one Democrat, who, among those not candidates for the presidential nomination is, in the eyes of the public, most conspicuously identified with the reactionary element of the party. I shall be pleased to join you and your friends in opposing this selection by the full committee or by the convention. Kindly answer here.³⁸

It was clear from the Bryan-Parker telegram sent to all the candidates, that the Commoner wanted to find out just how the candidates stood. It appeared to Mr. Bryan that the efforts of both the New York delegation, led by the Tammany boss, Charlie Murphy, and the conservative element of the Democratic party in the East, were trying to extend their control over the convention and giving to the convention the most conservative and standpat appearance by controlling the preliminary organization and nominating Alton B. Parker as temporary chairman. It was also rumored that by doing this the New York delegation as well as other conservative elements were striving to dig a political grave for Mr. Bryan and bury him in it for all time. Ironically enough, the conservatives dug their own grave and gave Bryan a chance to regenerate his political popularity and power.

All of the candidates, with the exception of Wilson, replied unfavorably to the telegram of Bryan.³⁹ Although House takes the

³⁸ Bryan, op. cit., p. 164.

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 164-65.

credit for turning Bryan to Wilson,⁴⁰ it appears that the replies received by Bryan concerning the telegram actually caused Bryan to turn to Wilson. The fact that the Wilson delegates voted for the Bryan resolution later in the convention served to strengthen Bryan's shift. The resolution was against supporting any candidate backed by the "big interests".

Wilson, because of the telegram, was placed in a peculiar situation. His campaign manager, McCombs was doing everything in his power to bring Tammany into the camp of Wilson. Certainly his thought on the subject would be influenced by the Eastern environment. On the other side, Tumulty, the Governor's secretary, was trying to impress upon Wilson that an unfavorable reply would be taking the side of the Eastern conservatives as opposed to the Western progressives. Tumulty wanted to answer Bryan's telegram favorably. Wilson would not answer until he had heard the opinion of McCombs. McCombs suggested on June 21, 1912, the following reply:

Hon. William J. Bryan
Lincoln, Nebraska

I quite agree with you that the temporary chairman of the Convention should voice the sentiments of the democracy of the nation which I am convinced is distinctly progressive. However, before receiving your telegram I had given out the following statement for publication in the Baltimore Evening Sun: My friends in Baltimore are on the people's side in everything that affects the organization of the convention. They are certain not to forget their standards as they have already shown. It is not necessary that I should remind

⁴⁰ Seymour, op. cit., I, 67.

them of these standards from New Jersey and I have neither the right nor the desire to direct the organization of a convention of which I am not even a member.

(Signed) McCombs.⁴¹

Tumulty greatly feared the consequences should the McCombs reply be sent. It was clearly a rebuke to Mr. Bryan and a bid for the Eastern delegates in the convention. After long discussion Wilson discarded the McCombs reply and formed the following:

You are right. Before hearing of your message I clearly stated my position in answer to a question from the Baltimore Evening Sun. The Baltimore Convention is to be the convention of progressives -- the men who are progressive in principle and by conviction. It must if it is not to be put in a wrong light before the country, express its convictions in its organization and its choice of the men who are to speak for it. You are entirely within your rights in doing everything within your power to bring that result about. No one will doubt where my sympathies lie, and you will, I am sure, find my friends in the convention acting upon a clear conviction and always in the interest of the people's cause. I am happy in the confidence that they need no suggestion from me.

(signed) Woodrow Wilson.⁴²

Although the statement of Wilson's was not as direct as Bryan would have liked it, the Commoner was satisfied, for at least Wilson opposed Parker's candidacy. "Wilson's telegram to Bryan fixed

⁴¹ Tumulty, op. cit., p. 110.

⁴² Ibid., p. 111. Also note Bryan, op. cit., pp. 164-65.

him in the mind of the country as a militant progressive who was not afraid, and that action was a long step towards his nomination.⁴³

Although the Wilson and Bryan forces had combined to a great extent, Alton Parker still was able to defeat Bryan in a vote of 579-508. Parker had won the right to make the key speech. However, it was noticed by Bryan that the Wilson forces almost to a man had voted for him. The selection of Parker had such a bad effect on public opinion that Clark again⁴⁴ asked Bryan to take the chairmanship but Bryan refused "telling the messengers that those who owned a ship should furnish the crew."⁴⁵

The Wilson forces again wooed Bryan by suggesting for the office of permanent chairman of the convention, Ollie M. James of Kentucky. This action delighted Mr. Bryan very much. Although James was a Clark man, the Wilson forces felt he would be fair towards them. Tumulty states this was also an important contribution for:

From Mr. Bryan's subsequent conversations over the telephone it clearly appeared that he was delighted at the suggestion of his own intimate friend, and it was plain that he was being convinced from moves of this kind by the New Jersey Governor that Woodrow Wilson was willing

⁴³ Daniels, op. cit., p. 52.

⁴⁴ Bryan had been the first to be asked to become temporary chairman.

⁴⁵ Bryan, op. cit., p. 170. Bryan obviously refers to Clark's control over the convention.

to stand or fall with him in attempting to organize the Convention along progressive lines.⁴⁶

Shortly after the convention had passed through the Bryan-Parker episode, another event occurred that was more shocking if not more important -- the Bryan resolution. In Bryan's own words:

. . . I learned of the activity of the same element that had controlled the Republican Convention at Chicago. I found that the representatives of Morgan, Belmont, and Ryan were at work. Belmont and Ryan were themselves delegates, the former from Chicago and the latter from Virginia. Being convinced of the intimate relationship between these financiers and Mr. Murphy, I became increasingly alarmed lest they should be able by the control of the New York delegation to make the nomination. The ninety delegates from New York were bound by the unite rule and Charles P. Murphy, the Tammany leader, had enough delegates to enable him to vote the entire delegation at his will.⁴⁷

In order to combat this force Bryan proposed a solution suggested to him by his brother Charles W. Bryan. The resolution contained two paragraphs, the first adopted substantially by the convention; the second, was withdrawn by Bryan. The complete resolution is as follows:

Resolved, That in this crisis in our party's career and in our country's history this convention sends greeting to the people of the United States, and assures them that the party of Jefferson and of Jackson is still the champion of popular government and equality before the law. As proof of our fidelity to the people, we hereby declare ourselves opposed to the nomination of any candidate for President who is the representative of or under obligation to J. Pierpont Morgan, Thomas F. Ryan, August Belmont, or any other member of the privilege-hunting and favor seeking class.

⁴⁶ Tumulty, op. cit., p. 115.

⁴⁷ Bryan, op. cit., pp. 173-74.

Be It Further Resolved, That we demand the withdrawal from this convention of any delegate or delegates constituting or representing the above-named interests.⁴⁸

The effect of the resolution on the convention was immediate and vehement. The convention was uproarious, many on their feet shouting denunciation. Even old politicians accustomed to surprises were dazed.

One member of the Congress rushed to the platform, and gesticulating violently, denounced me (Bryan) until he frothed at the mouth, and almost hysterical he was carried away by friends.⁴⁹

Another delegate offered a great sum of money for any man that would shoot Bryan. "The uproar went on, and every minute I (Daniels) feared Bryan would be killed. Never have I seen such hate. . . ."⁵⁰ Finally order was restored. Thomas Ryan had gone so far as to try to leave the hall, but the Virginians held him back.

After a heated debate, in which it was argued that the convention had no right to expel delegates chosen by the sovereign states, Bryan withdrew the latter part of his resolution, but he would not withdraw the whole resolution. Although the Commoner perhaps did not secure all that he wanted from the resolution, he did secure his aim for:

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 174-75. It was fortunate for Bryan that Ollie James was permanent chairman or Bryan probably would not have even been recognized. It was fortunate for the Wilson forces because this resolution in effect brought Bryan and his Western progressives on the side of Wilson. Further information on Bryan's change to Wilson is found in Appendix A.

⁴⁹ Bryan, op. cit., p. 177.

⁵⁰ Daniels, op. cit., p. 57.

My (Bryan) aim was to get a roll call, because I felt that whichever way the convention voted it would be difficult to nominate a man who had the support of the New York delegation. If they passed the resolution it excluded anyone who was the representative of Morgan, Belmont, or Ryan or under their influence; if they voted it down, the rebuke from the country would make it impossible for New York to select a candidate.⁵¹

Polls were taken in nearly all the delegations with some of them changing from a solid vote against the resolution to a solid vote in favor of it. As frenzy overtook the delegates, they jumped on the bandwagon with the result that the resolution carried by a vote of about $4\frac{1}{2}$ to 1. Even New York voted for the resolution.

As the vote of New York was recorded for the Bryan resolution, with grim humour Murphy said to Belmont, 'Now Augie, listen to yourself vote yourself out of the convention'.⁵²

Nearly all of the Wilson delegates voted "yes" while many of the Clark delegates voted "no" and in so doing greatly lessened the political chances of their candidate. Bryan feared that a candidate supported by Wall Street would become a target for Theodore Roosevelt. There was the possibility that Roosevelt might step in and claim that both parties had elected Wall Street candidates, thus drawing away progressives from both parties and securing his own nomination. Bryan, convinced that the convention was safe against the nomination of anyone by Wall Street influence, retired from the convention while delegates were being named for candidacy.

⁵¹ Bryan, op. cit., p. 177.

⁵² Daniels, op. cit., p. 57.

On the first day of balloting Clark was decidedly in the lead. The ninety votes of New York went to Governor Harmon. Underwood had the support of the Old South. The tally of the first ballot was as follows:

Clark	440 $\frac{1}{2}$
Wilson	324
Harmon	148
Underwood	117 $\frac{1}{2}$
Marshall	31
Baldwin	22
Sulzer	2
Bryan	1 53

On the fourth day of balloting New York gave her ninety votes to Clark. Up to this time McCombs felt that he could secure the New York block for Wilson. Wilson was very annoyed with McCombs and told Tumulty:

. . . that their principal discussion was the attempt by McCombs and his friends at Baltimore to exact from him a promise that in case of his nomination William Jennings Bryan should not be named for the post of Secretary of State; that a great deal in the way of delegate's votes from the Eastern states depended upon his giving this promise. The Governor then said to me: 'I will not bargain for this office. It would be foolish for me at this time to decide upon a cabinet officer, and it would be outrageous to eliminate anybody from consideration now, particularly Mr. Bryan, who has rendered such fine service to the party in all seasons.'⁵⁴

Wilson had not yet decided upon any one nor had he ruled out any one for the post of Secretary of State in his cabinet.

⁵³ Baker, op. cit., III, 347.

⁵⁴ Tumulty, op. cit., p. 118.

However, after the New York block went to Clark McCombs gave up. McCombs says that Wilson phoned him and begged him to withdraw his name as a candidate to which McCombs replied, "You (Wilson) bet your life I won't."⁵⁵ Both Tumulty and Daniels⁵⁶ agree that McCombs made no such statement:

I (Tumulty) afterward learned that McCombs was about to release the delegates when Roger Sullivan,⁵⁷ who had been informed of McCombs' message to the New Jersey Governor, rushed over to McCombs and said to him, 'Damn you, don't you do that. Sit steady in the boat.'⁵⁹

With the grant of votes to Clark there was still no stampede as was expected, but the result of the ballot showed that Clark had eleven more votes than a majority. However, Wilson's lines held firm and he lost only two votes from the former ballot. The vote on the tenth roll call stood:

Clark	556
Wilson	350 $\frac{1}{2}$
Underwood	117 $\frac{1}{2}$
Marshall	31
Harmon	31
Kern	1
Bryan	1 59

⁵⁵ McCombs, op. cit., p. 144.

⁵⁶ Daniels, op. cit., p. 60.

⁵⁷ Sullivan had discovered that McCombs was ready to withdraw Wilson's name from the convention. McCombs stated the exact opposite in that he was the one who urged Sullivan on. McCombs, op. cit., p. 157.

⁵⁸ Tumulty, op. cit., p. 121. Sullivan had also told Wilson after the Jackson Day Dinner that the Governor could count on his, Sullivan, support.

⁵⁹ Baker, op. cit., III, 349.

This was the last serious effort by Clark. Wilson had been gaining on him all along and finally passed him.

When he (Bryan) threw his tremendous influence to Wilson, the struggle was over. Indiana jumped to Wilson, then Illinois, and the fight was won. Wilson received the necessary two-thirds vote and was proclaimed the candidate.⁶⁰

In retrospect we must keep in mind that House was the man who took major credit in making Woodrow Wilson President. House's activities during the convention are best summed up by Daniels saying:

. . . House went to Texas,⁶¹ and contributed three hundred dollars to the Wilson campaign. He afterwards put himself at Wilson's service and made contacts that he thought would help him. But he did not control a delegate to the Baltimore Convention.

After Wilson lost most of the states in the primaries in the spring of 1912, House gave up, and was in Europe⁶² when the critical fight was on at Baltimore. Before sailing he wrote to Senator Culberson (May 1, 1912): 'It looks to me as if the opposing candidates might again be Bryan and Roosevelt', and wrote Wilson, 'the fight seems to be going against us', adding, 'I shall not abate my efforts', though he was abandoning the ship, leaving the country while the contest called for the presence of all Wilson supporters at Baltimore, where the fight was won over great odds by those on the ground. House came back in time to aid in a behind-the-scene way in the campaign.⁶³

⁶⁰ Tumulty, op. cit., p. 122. Wilson was proclaimed candidate on Tuesday morning, June 28, 1912.

⁶¹ House arrived in Texas shortly before the Baltimore Convention.

⁶² House explained his cause for leaving was due to ill-health.

⁶³ Daniels, op. cit., p. 76.

To refute the convictions of such men as House, Page and McCombs who were so apparently convinced that Bryan was working devious methods in the convention to obtain his own nomination, the Commoner recorded:

'This may be the year for a Democrat to win. The other boys have been making their plans. I would not step in now.' And he went to Baltimore with only the future of 'the other boys' in his mind.⁶⁴

From the day Bryan started his fight against Parker, he had one dominating purpose and that was to make the Democratic Party thoroughly progressive, both in candidates as well as its platform. He would never have swung his support to Wilson if Wilson had listened to McCombs. It was Bryan's conviction that Wilson was truly progressive and courageous that attracted the Commoner and finally made Wilson's nomination possible. Bryan believed that he, himself, could be elected except for his stand on prohibition which could possibly beat him and the party. Daniels concludes: ". . . I did not doubt that Bryan . . . had given up ambition for the presidency and would not permit the use of his name at the Baltimore Convention."⁶⁵

Since the actual election of Woodrow Wilson is not pertinent to this study, for Bryan had little to do with the actual campaigning, let it suffice to say that Wilson won the election by an

⁶⁴ Bryan, op. cit., p. 335.

⁶⁵ Daniels, op. cit., p. 33.

overwhelming majority over Roosevelt and Taft. Wilson got 442 electoral votes out of 531 with Roosevelt receiving 77, and Taft, 12. Wilson's popular plurality was up to that time the greatest in American history. The total vote was 14,720,037. Wilson received a total of 6,292,718 votes, Roosevelt, 4,057,429, and Taft, 3,369,221.⁶⁶

The first problem to face the president-elect was to make up his cabinet. Probably the greatest problem was that of finding a post for Bryan. It was through the powerful support of Bryan that Wilson secured the nomination, and yet, Wilson did not agree in all respects with Bryan. It was through House that Wilson appointed Bryan Secretary of State. House stated that Wilson had accepted his argument that "it would be best to make him (Bryan) Secretary of State, in order to have him at Washington and in harmony with the Administration, rather than outside and possibly in a critical attitude."⁶⁷ House continued to say that Wilson did not want Bryan in his cabinet and did not think him fitted for the Secretaryship of State. However, there was no question but that the new administration could carry through its service, its reform programme more effectively with Bryan in it. House records on December 19, 1912:

⁶⁶ McCombs, op. cit., p. 206.

⁶⁷ Seymour, op. cit., I, 68.

I (House) called up Governor Wilson to talk things over, and he asked if I still held to my advice about Mr. Bryan, and I answered 'yes'. This is the third or fourth time he has asked me this. It shows how distrustful he is of having Mr. Bryan in his cabinet.⁶⁸

There is little question but that House suggested Bryan for Secretary of State for the primary reason of getting him out of the way. House had long mourned over the fact that Bryan could not be advised. Thus, he could not hope to control Bryan. On the other hand if Bryan were on the outside he might stir up opposition which might stop the plans of Wilson as well as House. House had early made his plans to secure power by advising the President. He would be able to work around the Secretary of State!

It also appears that House perhaps was stretching the truth concerning Wilson's convictions on Bryan as Secretary of State. There is no doubt that they were not completely in accord. Tumulty states that Wilson told him he would not keep Bryan out of his cabinet to secure his nomination at Baltimore. Furthermore, Wilson had several good "outs" if he had wanted to take them. Bryan himself did nothing to further his interests. He even advised Wilson through the Commoner to avoid appointments based on past service:

The men selected by Mr. Wilson for the Cabinet should be selected, not because of personal service rendered to him, nor even because of past service rendered to the party. The individual counts for little; the cause counts for much.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 98. Also note Baker, op. cit., III, 437-43.

⁶⁹ Baker, op. cit., III, 441.

Finally, Bryan's acceptance was conditional in that Wilson would make the Bryan treaties an integral part of the foreign policy. After reading a draft of the proposed treaties of Bryan, Wilson found they were in accord with his own views and approved them.

It was a natural thing for Bryan to be asked into the Wilson administration for Wilson hoped to create a situation looking toward peace and progressive domestic policies. Bryan's devotion to peace was known by all. Daniels concludes that:

If he Wilson had not known Bryan was sound and in sympathy with him on foreign policies looking toward world peace, on the tariff, and on currency reform, he would not have made the tender. And Bryan would not have accepted it if he had not felt that his mind and Wilson's ran together on the main policies. . . .⁷⁰

Two other appointments, McAdoo and Daniels, seem to have been determined in Wilson's mind before he left for Bermuda, although he had not decided regarding the posts they should fill. Wilson conferred with Bryan on December 21, 1912, about his intention to bring McAdoo into his cabinet, probably in the treasury. There were several other outstanding candidates for the treasury, notably McCombs and Henry Morgenthau. On the evening of the election McCombs remarked "If I cannot be Secretary of the Treasury I will take nothing."⁷¹ However, Wilson thought McCombs unfit both temperamentally and physically for a cabinet position. Morgenthau was later made Ambassador to Turkey.

⁷⁰ Daniels, *op. cit.*, pp. 113-114.

⁷¹ Baker, *op. cit.*, III, 443-44.

Josephus Daniels was much harder to place. He had made a definite contribution in Wilson's election and had been a God-send in the "cocked-hat incident". Finally on February 23, 1913, he was asked to serve as Secretary of the Navy. When Page learned of Daniels appointment he was astonished.

'Why, don't you think he is cabinet timber?' asked House.

'Timber!' exclaimed Page. 'He isn't a splinter!'⁷²

Walter Hines Page was considered as a possibility for Wilson's Cabinet,⁷³ but did not receive a post. After Wilson was elected President, it was generally thought that Page would be asked to be in the Cabinet. He was, perhaps, best qualified for the post of Secretary of Agriculture. However, he himself, suggested that David Houston would be the man best qualified for the position. Possibly another reason Page suggested Houston was that he, Page,

⁷² Ibid., III, 445-46.

⁷³ The entire Cabinet was as follows:

Secretary of State	William Jennings Bryan
Secretary of Treasury	William Gibbs McAdoo
Secretary of War	Lindley M. Garrison
Attorney General	J. C. McReynolds
Postmaster General	Albert S. Burluson
Secretary of Navy	Josephus Daniels
Secretary of Interior	Franklin K. Lane
Secretary of Agriculture	David F. Houston
Secretary of Commerce	William C. Redfield
Secretary of Labor	William B. Wilson

Note Daniels, op. cit., pp. 115-17; Hendrick, op. cit., I, 114-15; Seymour, op. cit., I, 76; and Baker, op. cit., III, 449.

detested office seekers and did not want to become one himself. Wilson still wanted him in his Cabinet and decided Page should become the Secretary of Interior. Page did not assume this position primarily because he was in North Carolina when the important positions were being filled. In between the time Wilson asked House to contact Page for the position and the arrival of Page, certain opposition arose which possibly convinced Wilson himself that it would be a mistake to give Page the appointment. According to Mr. Hendrick, there were objections against Page.

Page was a Southerner; the Interior Department has supervision over the pension bureau, with its hundreds of thousands of Civil War veterans as pensioners; moreover, Page was an outspoken enemy of the whole pension system and had led several 'campaigns' against it. The appointment would never do! . . . ⁷⁴

Although Page did not receive a cabinet post, he was made Ambassador to England. This was a very important appointment due to the outbreak of war in Europe. ⁷⁵

Comment on Wilson's Cabinet was generally favorable. Frank Cobb pointed out in the New York World on March 4, 1913, the following:

Whether strong or weak in its various elements, this is no cabinet of political trade and barter. It was

⁷⁴ Hendirck, op. cit., I, 119.

⁷⁵ Page's work in England is considered in Chapters III and IV of this thesis.

fashioned by no political boss. It was fashioned to placate neither sordid political interest nor sordid financial interests. Every member stands on his own merits, as Woodrow Wilson sees these merits.⁷⁶

In retrospect it appears that the Cabinet of Woodrow Wilson was ill-chosen, if not in ability, at least by methods. Bryan was not an especially good appointment as Secretary of State. The Commoner probably stood the test on domestic issues, but he was ill-informed on foreign problems. Bryan did not push Wilson for the position, and in fact, as we have seen, urged Wilson not to appoint anyone because he felt he owed the position due to a political favor. McAdoo was given the Treasury Post probably because Wilson knew him best. Houston was probably best fitted for the Treasury Post but instead received the office of Secretary of Agriculture. Daniels had no qualifications for the office of Secretary of Navy and if qualified for any Cabinet position, it would be the post of Secretary of Agriculture. Garrison clearly informed Wilson that he knew nothing about the post of Secretary of War. Although Wilson could not secure some of the men he had wanted due primarily either to the opposition of House or their unavailability, even the Colonel recorded:

The thing that impresses me most is the casual way in which the President-elect is making up his cabinet. I can see no end of trouble for him in the future unless

⁷⁶ Baker, op. cit., III, 457-58. Also note Daniels, op. cit., p. 117.

he proceeds with more care.⁷⁷

Finally, Wilson did little to acquaint himself with his Cabinet before their appointments. Ray Stannard Baker, who knew the President and later after the war accompanied him to Paris, records:

With no member of the new cabinet can it be said that Wilson was truly intimate. He knew McAdoo, perhaps the best personally; Houston was a familiar spirit intellectually. He liked and dreaded Bryan. Daniels was comfortable and devoted. He knew Garrison and McReynolds and Wilson scarcely at all and had never met Lane until Inauguration Day. It was a cabinet largely made up of unknown and untried men. Bryan was the only member with a national reputation: and he was looked upon with doubt by a large part of the country. But Wilson's own prestige was so great, he was so widely trusted, that the comment upon his appointments was not unfavorable. It was felt that in any event he would himself dominate; and the temper of the nation was tolerant. 'Wait and see.'⁷⁸

⁷⁷ Baker, op. cit., III, 455.

⁷⁸ Ibid., pp. 456-57.

CHAPTER III

SECRETARY OF STATE BRYAN BEFORE WORLD WAR I

Although England presented problems to the American foreign policy, the immediate problems that faced Wilson and his Cabinet were those of the disturbed conditions in Mexico and the recognition of Huerta. Houston records that on Friday and Tuesday, March 7th and 11th, 1913, this matter came up before the Cabinet for discussion. The President read a statement¹ which opposed the illegal practice of Huerta's Government. About this statement Houston remarked: "This interested me at the time particularly because it clearly indicated that the President was going to be his own Secretary of State. . . !"²

Again on May 23, 1913, the problem, uglier than ever, loomed up in the Cabinet. Wilson and Bryan were firmly convinced that it would be wrong from every consideration to recognize the usurper. They were confident that the masses of Mexicans were opposed to Huerta. Garrison saw no other way except recognition, and Lane

who had been in Mexico and thought he knew most about it, felt if Huerta were not recognized Wilson should back some other Mexican for President. . . .³

¹ This statement read by Wilson probably formed the back ground of his message to Congress, August 27, 1913. Note Appendix B for the full message.

² David F. Houston, Eight Years with Wilson's Cabinet (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1926), I, 43.

³ Daniels, op. cit., p. 182.

Daniels held a like view. Houston emphatically opposed recognition as immoral. The President after studying the problem stated: "I have to pause and remind myself that I am President of the United States and not of a small group of Americans with vested interests in Mexico."⁴ To those who urged recognition of Huerta, Bryan replied:

'You believe, do you, that Díaz was the kind of man needed to preserve order in Mexico?' They always answered, 'Yes.'

'Do you think that Huerta would imitate the methods and reestablish his regime?'

'Yes.'

'If, after thirty years of experiment with his policy, Díaz, with world-wide prestige and splendid credit, could not maintain himself against Madero, but saw his Government crushed like an eggshell, what reason have you to believe that Huerta, not only without prestige and credit, but guilty of high treason and blamed for the death of Madero, will be able to succeed where Díaz failed?'

No answer was attempted.⁵

Since the majority of the Cabinet was against recognition, it was agreed that Bryan should sound the English and French Ambassadors, to see if their governments were behind a loan to Huerta and to warn them that they could not enforce a loan guaranteed by a pledge of customs duties.⁶ The policy of the United States was set down on March

⁴ Ibid., p. 182. Presumably Wilson meant the control of the oil interests in Mexico. For further evidence on this subject see page 43.

⁵ Bryan, op. cit., p. 358.

⁶ Houston feared that if the United States recognized Huerta, it would make the United States indirectly responsible for a foreign loan which would then fasten the General upon the Mexican people.

12, 1913, in a statement by the President. It was decided in late May to follow this policy. The policy as stated by Wilson in full was as follows:

One of the chief objects of my administration will be to cultivate the friendship and deserve the confidence of our sister republics in Central and South America, and to promote in every proper and honorable way the interests which are common to the peoples of the two continents. I earnestly desire the most cordial understanding and cooperation between the peoples and leaders of America, and therefore, deem it my duty to make this brief statement:

Cooperation is possible only when supported at every turn by the orderly processes of just government based upon law, not upon arbitrary or irregular force. We hold, as I am sure all thoughtful leaders of republican governments everywhere hold, that just government rests always upon the consent of the governed, and that there can be no freedom without order based upon law and upon the public conscience and approval. We shall look to make these principles the bases of mutual intercourse, respect, and helpfulness between our sister republics and ourselves. . . . We can have no sympathy with those who seek to seize the power of government to advance their own personal interests or ambition.⁷

Two forces primarily formulated the President's Mexican policy: one, that all nations have the right to control their internal affairs; two, that Mexico could never become a peaceful nation as well as law abiding until she was permitted to achieve a permanent and basic settlement of her troubles without outside interference.

A new Latin American policy was issued by Wilson before the Southern Commercial Congress at Mobile, Alabama, October 27, 1913.⁸

⁷ Tumulty, op. cit., p. 145.

⁸ This address appears in Appendix C. Also see Woodrow Wilson, The New Democracy (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1926), I, 1-21.

With this speech Bryan heartily agreed as is shown in a letter to Wilson on October 28, 1913:

Your utterance in regard to conquest was timely. We must be relieved of suspicion as to our motives. We must be found in advance not to turn to our own advantage any power we employ. It will be impossible for us to win the confidence of the people of Latin America, unless they know that we do not seek their territory or ourselves desire to exercise political authority over them. If we have occasion to go into any country, it must be as we went into Cuba, at the invitation of the Government, or with assurances that will leave no doubt as to the temporary character of our intervention. Our only object must be to secure to the people an opportunity to vote, that they may themselves select their rulers and establish their government.⁹

The activities of the British as well as Page, the Ambassador to England, round out the picture of the Mexican question even further:

It was clear that, as the United States Government had made up their minds to eliminate Huerta, he would have to go. He could not stand against that influence, as well as against his enemies in Mexico.¹⁰

The Conversations between Grey and Page were not always very sympathetic. Great Britain's policy was to look on passively with acquiescence in whatever policy the United States thought fit to pursue in Mexico.

Page saw an ideal in the Mexican policy of President Wilson. I was ready to sympathize with the ideal, and to believe in the moral purpose of this policy; but I did not believe that

⁹ Bryan, op. cit., pp. 360-361.

¹⁰ Sir Edward Grey, Twenty Five Years, 1892-1916 (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1937), II, 100.

morally there was much to choose between Huerta and his opponents. That was the difference between us.¹¹

The British, according to Grey, had no intention of interfering or attempting to influence the situation in Mexico. They would merely wait for the Mexicans to settle their own government and then make arrangements with that government. Page accepted the assurances of the British Government of having not interfered to support Huerta; but Page believed that British commercial interests were doing so. Grey replied that he had no knowledge of these interests doing so. Furthermore, Grey stated that since the British Government could not interfere with the Mexican problem, it was only fair for these interests to make whatever terms they could with whoever could protect them or might destroy them.

Page also disagreed violently with Wilson, for the President believed the constitutionalists would and could be trusted to handle the Government of Mexico. Page's imperialism can be shown by the following letter to House on April 27, 1914:

. . . And, as for war with Mexico -- I confess I've no confidence in the Mexican leaders -- none of 'em. We shall have to Cuba-ize the country, which means thrashing 'em first. . . . All England believes we've got to fight it out.¹²

The President and Bryan were pretty well persuaded that the oil concessionaries were dictating British-Mexican policy. Page's

¹¹ Ibid., II, 100.

¹² Hendrick, op. cit., I, 230.

letters, such as the following, no doubt contributed greatly to this feeling:

Deep down at the bottom, they (the British) don't know what Democracy means. Their Empire is in the way. Their centuries of landstealing are in the way. Their unsleeping watchfulness of British commerce is in the way.¹³

The appointment of Sir Lionel Carden¹⁴ as British minister seemed to uphold their convictions. The attitude of the Cabinet was very bitter towards Great Britain for it appeared that Great Britain was determined to seat Huerta against the wishes of the United States. Secretary Lane wrote Page, "There is a feeling here . . . that England is playing a game unworthy of her."¹⁵

Although Carden was compelled by the British Government to harmonize himself with American policy, Page still felt that his presence in Mexico was a menace to British-American relations. He therefore set himself to accomplish the Minister's removal, Sir Edward Grey, like Page, would sacrifice much for the cause of Anglo-American relations. Page occasionally expressed to Grey his regret that Carden did not understand the situation between the United States and Mexico.

¹³ Ibid., I, 211.

¹⁴ Page wrote of Carden in November, 1913, "He's a slow-minded, unimaginative, commercial Briton, with as much nimbleness as an elephant. British commerce is his deity, British advantage his duty and mission; and he goes about his work with blunt dullness and ineptitude. That's his mental calibre as I read him -- a dull commercial man." Note Hendrick, op. cit., I, 215.

¹⁵ Ibid., I, 220.

He left the impression that the problem could better be solved if a more congenial person represented British interests in Mexico. This evidently produced results for in early January, 1914, Page learned that Carden was being recalled to London and probably would not return to Mexico.

Secretary of State Bryan was for the most part ignorant of British sentiment as well as the sentiments of Page. The memoranda of Page went through House and then to Wilson. House enlightened many on the method of communication in a letter to Page on December 12, 1913:

Of course you knew that I only read your letters to him (Wilson). Mr. Bryan was my guest on Wednesday and I returned to Washington with him but I made no mention of our correspondence and I never have. The President seems to like our way of doing things and further than that I do not care.¹⁶

Mexican-American relations were further entangled when the "Tampico incident" took place. On April 9, 1914, a paymaster of the United States steamship Dolphin landed at the Iturbide bridge at Tampico with a whaleboat and boat's crew to obtain supplies needed aboard the Dolphin. While loading these supplies the paymaster and his crew were arrested by an officer and squad of the army of General Huerta. Neither the paymaster nor any of the crew were armed. Two of the men were arrested while in the boat and hence were taken from United States "soil". Release was ordered, after the paymaster and the sailors

¹⁶ Ibid., I, 19. The underlining is my own to show that Page and House were linked together. The statement shows no outright and apparent approval of Wilson.

had been detained about an hour, by Admiral Mayo commander of the American fleet in Mexican waters. Furthermore, Mayo sent an ultimatum to General Zaragoya. Before the ultimatum had been sent Zaragoya had said that the Colonel who had ordered the arrest knew nothing of the laws of war and only carried out his orders to allow no boats whatever at the warehouse dock. However, Mayo wanted a more formal apology and a disavowal of the act, together with assurances that the officer in charge would be punished. He also demanded a twenty-one gun salute be given the American flag which would be returned by American guns. Huerta replied that the officer in charge would be punished, if he were found. Huerta also asked that the ultimatum be withdrawn.

Bryan was not satisfied with the reply of Huerta. He insisted the demands be met but extended the time to April 13. However, Huerta would not be moved. Wilson, Bryan, and Daniels all agreed that Mayo must be backed or Huerta's position would be strengthened. To further complicate the situation, it was learned by the United States Government that the German ship, Ypiranga,¹⁷ was on its way to Veracruz with arms for Huerta.

Bryan was the first to recommend to Wilson that the Ypiranga be stopped. Daniels also agreed. A note was prepared and sent to Admiral Fletcher, Commander of the fleet near Vera Cruz, although Admiral Badger was actually sent into Vera Cruz:

¹⁷ The Ypiranga was to arrive on April 21, 1914, with 200 machine guns and 15,000,000 cartridges.

Washington, D.C.
April 21, 1914.

Fletcher,
Vera Cruz, Mexico.

Seize custom house. Do not permit war supplies to be delivered to Huerta government or to any other party.

Daniels.¹⁸

The customs houses were taken while the Ypiranga was stopped from unloading its cargo. The clash that ensued resulted in the death of 126 and the wounding of 195 Mexicans while 19 Americans were killed and 71 wounded. The trouble was not settled among Mexico and themselves for there was still civil war between Carranza, Villa, and Zapata; but Wilson did not want to intervene. To conclude the Mexican incident Tumulty said:

Wilson, Bryan, and Daniels are pacifists no longer,¹⁹ but plain, simple men, bent upon discharging the duty they owe to their country and utterly disregarding their own personal feelings of antagonism to every phase of war.²⁰

¹⁸ Daniels, op. cit., p. 193.

¹⁹ Although Bryan let his nationalist feelings get away with him, he still wanted no bloodshed. Earlier he had declared: ". . . on February 3, 1914, the embargo on arms and munitions was withdrawn in order that Huerta's enemies might be better enabled to put him down. Bryan, it is true, objected to this in a very pointed memorandum, in which he clearly demonstrated that by sending arms into Mexico we invited further bloodshed, increased the risk to Americans residing there, and thus paved the way for our intervention. But he did not insist, and our munitions went to Mexico." Note Curti, op. cit., XVI, 212.

²⁰ Tumulty, op. cit., p. 152.

During the Mexican crises, the administration had to solve the question of the Panama tolls. The issue over the exemption of tolls between the United States and England dates back at least to the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty in 1901. By this treaty all nations were to be treated equally on the basis of tolls. However, the United States announced the interpretation that since it was up to her to build the canal, fortify and protect it, she should be exempted from tolls for coastwise shipping. This exemption would and did, of course, give the American shippers a great advantage. British ships could not engage in coastwise trade. Anything which affected British shipping adversely touched Great Britain in a sensitive spot. Page early in his career as Ambassador noted the British feeling concerning this problem. Page wrote to Wilson in June, 1913: ". . . The English Government and the English people without regard to party -- I hear it and feel it everywhere -- are in one mind about this: they think we have acted dishonorably."²¹ Page went on to state that this problem was one of the reasons why England distrusted American foreign policy. Wilson took little notice of Page's analysis for he was engrossed in the Mexican question. Although Wilson did nothing openly on the Panama Tolls, one thing was certain:

Wilson believed that exemption of tolls was in violation of a treaty we had made and that we were in honor bound

²¹ Daniels, op. cit., p. 209.

to live up to our contract. He felt this so strongly that he declined to be bound by the declaration in the platform of the Convention²² which nominated him. . . .²³

The British had recognized Huerta as a de facto government. Wilson had changed American policy and had refused this type of recognition. Suddenly, the British reversed their policy toward recognition of Huerta. Many people felt that the act taken by Britain was done because it was believed Wilson could not win a fight to repeal the toll provision if Britain continued recognition of Huerta. Daniels believed that Page possibly influenced Grey in that direction. Another possibility was the British influence on Bryan to favor the Canal Tolls Exemption Act, for his influence was bound to be important in the question of its repeal.

Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, the British ambassador in Washington, was not slow to see that Bryan's pet treaty (the cooling-off treaties) might be used as a lever to win his support for the repeal of the Tolls Exemption Act. Speaking of the American secretary of state's profound and haunting desire to get his treaties consummated, the British ambassador counselled his government: 'If you want to gain him (for a time), help them on, and you will have your reward.' On February 17, Spring-Rice went even further in urging London to exploit the connection between the peace treaties and the canal tolls affair. Although he had no great faith in the

²² Houston records that Bryan was opposed to repeal of the tolls provision. Note Houston, op. cit., I, 113. Bryan was a great believer in following what had been promised in the platform. He also felt the big interest who controlled the Panama Railway favored its repeal for financial reasons of their own.

²³ Daniels, op. cit., p. 209.

value of the Bryan treaty, he continued to advise his government to begin negotiations. In London, Page, our ambassador, likewise reminded Grey as frequently as he thought it courteous of Bryan's eagerness to have such a treaty with England.²⁴

By the end of March, 1914, Bryan was thought to have changed his position. On March 28, he was quoted in Congress as favoring repeal. On March 31 the House repealed the act and the Senate of June 11 likewise did so. Bryan's influence in the repeal was felt. Thus the Bryan "cooling-off" treaties for the promotion of world peace might possibly have been used by England as a diplomatic pawn to secure trade advantages.

Wilson possibly did not make a deal with any foreign power during the Panama Tolls controversy. The fact remains that there was a close tie-up, at least on the part of the British, between tolls exemption, the Mexican question, and the Bryan treaties. There is one other possibility that might have occurred to Wilson concerning tolls. Wilson was preparing to send House to Europe in an appeal to get all of the big powers to outlaw war. This plan was not related to the Bryan treaties. Repeal of the canal tolls could have been preliminary action on the part of Wilson. Be that as it may, the British renounced recognition of Huerta in November, 1913, and the canal tolls repeal bill was introduced January 4, 1914. The United States did not vote repeal until Britain had withdrawn support from Huerta. The actual repeal law did not pass until June 11, 1914.

²⁴ Merle Eugene Curti, Bryan and World Peace (Northhampton, Mass.: Smith College, 1913), XVI, 158.

The British were greatly relieved to see the repeal pass. Sir Edward Grey noted:

President Wilson's decision in this matter of the Panama tolls was an independent and unqualified example of putting the sanctity of a treaty above immediate self-interest. As such it was noted at the time and ought still to be remembered.²⁵

Although Bryan had not been in complete accord with Wilson on the tolls controversy, he was in complete accord with Wilson in repudiating "dollar diplomacy". In October, 1913, Wilson made a speech repudiating "dollar diplomacy", and Bryan listened with a smile on his face and nodded approval as the President read. The Commoner quickly acted by sending a representative of an American corporation to Ecuador who was more impartial than the man he replaced. Honduras was also gratified by the administration's refusal to support a loan which would have bound her body and soul. The Commoner also brought to the President's attention the exploitation of our southern neighbors by American bankers. It did not take the Secretary of State long to see through the banker's practice of lending money for large securities and high interest rates, and then demanding that their government eliminate the risk they had assumed by backing them in emergencies. Bryan saw that on the one hand the Latin American states needed our money for internal development, and that, failing to get it from us, they would turn to Europe. That might involve United States' intervention to defend the Monroe Doctrine as had occurred in the past. On the other

²⁶ Grey, op. cit., II, 97.

hand, it did not seem fair for our bankers to charge such high rates.

In the summer of 1913 Bryan hit upon a plan that he thought would meet the problem. He suggested that the United States Government itself step in and lend the money. He conferred with the President about his plan and in July forwarded to him a memorandum as to its chief advantages.

In this he stated:

They (the Latin American republics) are now compelled to pay a high rate of interest and to sell their bonds at a discount. . . . If the United States offers to loan them its credit to the extent that such a loan is safe, the bonds could be made to draw four and a half per cent., which would be an immediate savings to them in the way of interest and the difference of a (per) cent. and a half between their bonds and ours could go into a sinking fund which would, in a reasonable time at compound interest, pay off the debt and leave them free. We could, in this way, relieve them of the debts which ~~embarrass~~ them, and enable them to construct such railroads as are imperatively necessary for the development of their countries.

The second advantage would be that the plan would give our country such an increased influence . . . that we could prevent revolutions, promote education, and advance stable and just government. . . .

. . . we would in the end profit, negatively, by not having to incur expense in guarding our own and other foreign interests there, and, positively, by the increase of trade that would come from development and from the friendship which would follow the conferring of the benefits named.²⁷

Bryan thought by his plan the United States could furnish the modern example of the "Good Samaritan". He proposed to try out the plan in Ecuador, Nicaragua and finally in early 1914, in Panama.

²⁷ Baker, op. cit., IV, 433-34.

Wilson listened, but was very dubious. On March 20, 1914, he wrote Bryan:

Frankly, I am afraid to propose that we directly assist the Panama Government in their loan by giving them the use of the credit of the United States, because so many matters of difficulty and delicacy are pending that I feel that this is not the right time to inject something that would have to be a long time canvassed and would strike the whole country, I am afraid, as a novel and radical proposal. I think that for the present there are enough difficult questions on the carpet, particularly with regard to our foreign relations, but I am heartily in favor of assisting Panama in any way that is possible in the matter of her loan, and I have every confidence because of your past admirable management of these things that we can secure for her much more favorable conditions than she could otherwise secure for herself.²⁸

Something had to be done about the situation in Nicaragua. The country was in a state of crisis both politically and financially. There had been a fierce revolution in 1912 against the conservative President Adolfo Díaz of Nicaragua with whom both the bankers and the United States Government had been working toward economic stabilization. The opposition to Díaz was sharpened by his favorable attitude toward American business and American capital. President Taft had interfered in the revolution by sending eight warships and a considerable body of marines to aid Díaz in keeping his power. The revolution had left the country almost bankrupt and desperately in need of new funds. American bankers expressed their willingness, in the last months of Taft's regime, to supply the money to Nicaragua but on terms that even Díaz regarded as too severe.

²⁸ Ibid., IV, 434.

Thus, Wilson came into office in a situation of distrust. The bankers were suspicious of the new administration, and a strong minority of the Senate was suspicious of the bankers.

Just before Wilson was inaugurated, the American minister in Nicaragua reported that Brown Brothers, one of the two New York banking firms most active in Nicaraguan affairs, would not invest another dollar until they had become certain of the new administration's policy. This was disappointing to Díaz who wanted to reach a definite settlement on the financial question while the old administration was in office.²⁹

The attitude of the Democrats in the Senate was one of opposing the Knox-Castrillo treaty³⁰ because they thought it provided a basis for our interfering in Nicaraguan affairs.

It became plain that mere opposition to the bankers was not enough for the government had already become deeply involved. There had to be a decision on the next step to be taken. Wilson believed that the bankers might be influenced to grant easier terms. Bryan tried it but without success.

The Commoner began considering another way out of the difficulty. As he saw it, Nicaragua could be refinanced, at least partially, and on the other hand, the United States could serve a far-sighted

²⁹ Note Foreign Relations of the United States, 1913, op. cit., p. 1035.

³⁰ The treaty of June, 1911, provided for a new \$15,000,000 loan on terms so severe that the United States Senate had refused to approve it despite Taft's constant urging for its passage.

interest. This was through the purchase of the canal route across Nicaragua. On May 24th, he wrote Wilson:

I am inclined to think that the purchase of the canal option might give sufficient encouragement to the bankers to loan without the conditions which were, at their request, put into the other (Knox-Castrillo) treaty in regard to a loan.³¹

A canal treaty was before the Senate, having been signed on February 8, 1913. This was revised and approved by Wilson:

The proposed Nicaraguan treaty has my entire approval and I sincerely hope that the Senate may approve it, as well as our friends, the Nicaraguan Government. I have read it very carefully.³²

When the treaty was laid before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, a strong minority opposed the clause providing for a protectorate similar in its terms to the Platt amendment in the Cuban treaty. The Senate was against any extension of United States authority over these countries.

Central American states feared this might be another advance upon them by the "Giant of the North". El Salvador even proposed a united action by a league of Central American nations. Wilson agreed with Bryan that steps had to be taken to quiet the fears of these countries that a protectorate was being considered. In a letter of September 25, 1913, he approved of the United States Minister's explanation and added: "They can, I think, convey conclusive

³¹ Baker, op. cit., IV, 436.

³² Ibid., IV, 436.

assurances that no protectorate is contemplated."³³ In any event it became clear that the treaty in the form presented to the Senate would not pass during the special session. Yet something had to be done.

Bryan then went back to his proposal for a government loan to Nicaragua, arguing that the sum could later be applied upon the payment for the canal option and joint naval base which the United States had hopes of obtaining.

Bryan continued in a letter to Wilson on August 16, 1913:

. . . it is pathetic to see Nicaragua struggling in the grip of oppressive financial agreement . . . we see these transactions a perfect picture of dollar diplomacy. The financiers charge excessive rates on the ground that they must be paid for the risk that they take and as soon as they collect their pay for the risk they then proceed to demand of the respective governments that the risk shall be eliminated by governmental coercion. No wonder the people of these little republics are aroused to revolution by what they regard as a sacrifice of their interests.³⁴

Since Bryan was unable to make progress on this plan, he was finally driven back to the bankers. In October, 1913, a loan was arranged, stiff in its terms, and not completely pleasing to Bryan, but acceptable to the government of Nicaragua because of its needs.

President Díaz who, of course, was more or less the creature of the United States government, sent his 'heartfelt thanks' to Bryan for his 'beneficent and efficient cooperation' in the arranging of the new loan. The Assembly also approved of it.³⁵

³³ Ibid., IV, 437.

³⁴ Ibid., IV, 438.

³⁵ Ibid.

It is significant to note the forces existing and determining the foreign policies of states that drove both Bryan and Wilson, although strongly opposing anything that approached dollar diplomacy, into a situation that did not differ greatly, especially in the case of Nicaragua, from actions of Taft and Knox. There were some modifications in the loan arrangement, as a special adviser was to be appointed by the State Department to see that the provisions of the loan were adhered to.

It should be the function of this watcher 'to keep the administration informed of the manner in which the business is conducted so that we would be in a position to advise against anything that would be to the injury of Nicaragua and would also be in a position to advise the government in favour of the American Company whenever its claim was just.'³⁶

It is interesting to note that the salary of the special adviser was to be paid by Brown Brothers!

It appears that Wilson, in the beginning at least, left the conduct of Latin American and Caribbean affairs -- except for Mexico and the Panama Tolls problem -- largely to Bryan. Wilson was consulted but did not give these problems his full consideration. On January 20, 1914, Wilson wrote Bryan:

. . . I would be interested to know how much of the talk in the newspapers recently has been founded in fact. It is true that Nicaragua's neighbors have been showing themselves to be very much upset by these proposals and that they have made anything like a joint

³⁶ Ibid., IV, 438-39.

protest against them? Just now when we are trying to gain a certain moral prestige in Central America, I should like to know how you think the pressing of the Nicaraguan treaty would affect opinion towards us in the rest of that region.³⁷

The new loan arrangements of October served at least temporarily to quiet the situation in Nicaragua although the settlement was not wholly acceptable to that country.

Although the Latin American situation posed a difficult problem for the Wilson Administration, an even greater problem arose between Japan and the United States. In early May, 1913, the Japanese Ambassador, Chinda, delivered a note in which Japan declared the California law³⁸ obnoxious, discriminatory, unfair, unfriendly, and in violation of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation³⁹ ratified on February 21, 1911 between the two countries. The Japanese thought that our Federal Government should overrule the state law. The Japanese further stated:

It has been suggested that the power to deal with the question of alien real estate ownership in the United States belongs exclusively to the several States. Controlling decisions of the courts of the United States might be cited in refutation of that suggestion. But it is sufficient to point out that the United States accepted the first and third clauses of Article I of the existing Japanese-American treaty,

³⁷ Baker, *op. cit.*, IV, 439-40.

³⁸ The California Legislature forbade the Japanese to own or lease land in that state. In short, the Japanese felt they were the ones who were being discriminated against and they were right. National pride played an important part in the protest. For the full text of the California Law see Appendix D.

³⁹ For Articles I and XIV of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation see Appendix E.

as well as Article I of the treaty of 1894, and that she can not have given her consent to those stipulations if the power to regulate the question of ownership of real property by aliens was reserved exclusively to the States.⁴⁰

There was little doubt that the purpose behind the law concerned the Japanese economic ability. There was also little doubt but that California had the power to make land laws affecting natives and aliens.

It was agreed in the Cabinet that Bryan should talk with Ambassador Chinda to find out how serious the note was. He found that the Ambassador was very serious. Bryan had been told by Wilson that the problem might be turned over to the courts.

The President asked Bryan to go to California to see if he could solve the situation. Bryan did not want to go for he saw little hope, but in April, 1913, he left to present the administration's views to the California Legislature. Wilson thought that even if Bryan's trip failed, it would show Japan that the Federal Government was trying to help solve the problem. Bryan made a very favorable impression on the legislators by showing them that he understood the situation and also by not swinging a big club of the Federal Government.

He sought a method of doing what Californians were set on doing, without singling out Japan, which was overwrought and whose people were talking militantly. In the end, while it did not satisfy the Japanese Government, the

⁴⁰ Papers Relating To The Foreign Relation of the United States, 1913 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1922), p. 639.

law that Governor Johnson signed served to keep the dispute in diplomatic channels. The gesture of the Washington Government in trying to adjust matters assuaged the war party in Japan and gave cooling time.⁴¹

Bryan also was very diplomatic in handling China while relations were quite strained:

The Ambassador arose and said, 'I suppose, Mr. Secretary, this decision is final.'

The Secretary advanced, extended his hand, and with his winning smile said, 'There is nothing final between friends.'

The Ambassador was touched, resumed his seat and an agreement was reached.⁴²

The situation, somewhat tempered, flared again when on May 13, 1913, a Joint Commission Board of the Army and Navy reported that it favored building up the Army and Navy and also having ships sent to the Philippines.⁴³ This action was publicized in the New York papers and was taken to counteract the Japanese notes which were becoming more and more insistent. Wilson was very angered at the publicity given the board's action and immediately dissolved the board. Bryan was more indignant if possible than the President at the action of the Joint board and its publication.

⁴¹ Daniels, op. cit., p. 162. " . . . Although the legislature refused to incorporate the most important modifications urged by the federal government, it did, thanks to Bryan, make some minor concessions." The Webb Act did allow a three year lease of land to aliens ineligible for citizenship. Note Curti, op. cit., p. 185.

⁴² Bryan, op. cit., p. 367.

⁴³ General Wood was the instigator of the action of the board. It also included Admiral Fiske and Admiral Dewey.

Coupled with the Joint Board's action came the second Japanese note on June 6, 1913. The note contended that the courts would not satisfactorily settle the land problem in California; that the law violated the treaty and was adverse to good relations; that California could not confiscate property; that the objection did not rest wholly on economic grounds; that Japanese were not naturalizable; and that the situation was mortifying to the Japanese. The Japanese land laws forbade any foreigner owning land in Japan. Wilson again replied that if necessary the matter would be taken to the courts and if the Japanese had suffered damage, the United States might make good the amount.

If the Japanese were mortified over the land question, they were frantic over the United States' possible action as recommended by the Joint Board in the Philippines question. The latter question appears to be the one which Japan would have probably have gone to war. Again Bryan appears to have been the factor that brought about a better understanding for:

(He) acquainted the Japanese Ambassador with the President's feeling about the recommendations of the Joint Board and informed him it had not been approved by the Secretary of the Navy. The Japanese Government was thereby assured that the administration had no thought of war and no intention of moving any of its ships in the Far East while negotiations for peace were pending. This assurance was given so promptly that the Japanese Government was able to quiet superheated demonstrations in their country.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 167-68.

The Wilson Administration had to face another problem in the Far East -- a loan to China. On March 9, 1913, members⁴⁵ of the big Morgan banking house called on Bryan and raised a question of international consequence. They wanted to find out if the new administration would carry out the Taft approval of the Six-Power loan to the new Republic of China. Holdover State Department officials sent a memorandum to Wilson favoring the bankers participation. The money was designed to pay the Chinese army and other indebtedness. The money was to be disbursed by or under the direction of foreign governments. One of the stipulations of those offering to make the loan was that if China wished to borrow more money it could be borrowed only from those making the loan. A group of American bankers wished to join in.

Bryan was against the loan because:

First, . . . it gave the monopoly of this nation's interest in China's finances to a small group of American bankers to the exclusion of all other American financiers. Second, because it gave to the six groups interested in this loan a monopoly of China's financial affairs. Third, the security contemplated might interfere seriously with the political independence of China. Fourth, it linked our country with other countries and deprived it of any independence in dealing with China. The American group, being only one of six groups, could not have a controlling voice in matters connected with the collection of the loan, and this government, being only one of six governments interested through representatives, could not have a controlling voice in determining methods to be employed in enforcing the loan.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Mr. S. P. Davidson and Mr. Willard Straight.

⁴⁶ Bryan, op. cit., pp. 362-63.

McAdoo and Lane both agreed with Bryan, and Daniels feared that the new Republic would be one in name only if it had to begin its existence with obligations to a group of international bankers. Secretary of Commerce Redfield, however, feared that if the United States failed to approve the loan, it would be made by other nations, and America would lose in building up a large trade with China.

Wilson asserted⁴⁷ that the condition of the loan would 'touch very nearly the administrative independence of China itself' and that the governmental responsibility involved 'might conceivably be to the length of forcible interference.' He declared participation in the loan to be 'obnoxious to the principles upon which the government of our people rests.' He concluded by saying that ways would be found to promote trade with China, but that we would continue to stand for the Open Door -- 'the only door we care to enter.' . . .⁴⁸

Thus, Wilson refused to sanction the loan to China in April, 1913. Furthermore, the United States followed the lead of Russia and recognized the new Republic of China in early May, 1913. Both Wilson and Bryan had initiated again a new policy for the United States -- the end of dollar diplomacy, although as will be shown later House and Page strongly resisted this policy. Unfortunately, even Wilson and Bryan were not able to steer a straight course on this point.

⁴⁷ The President gave his Chinese Loan statement to the press, instead of sending it through the State Department to foreign governments. At the meeting on March 25, 1913, he viewed this as a mistake. Note Houston, op. cit., I, 45.

⁴⁸ Daniels, op. cit., pp. 226-27.

The Wilson Administration had to face domestic issues as well as foreign problems. One of the immediate domestic issues facing the Administration was currency reform. Bryan had long been interested in currency reform. The Commoner recorded:

I broke with Cleveland on the money question and for sixteen years our party platform has committed us to the principle that the issue of money is a function of government and should not be surrendered to banks. I am also opposed to that feature of the measure which permits the bankers to name some members of the Federal Reserve Board. They ought all to be appointed by the President and the government have both complete and undisputed authority over the issue of the government notes and the personnel of the board.⁴⁹

Bryan was in a mood to withdraw from the Cabinet if the provisions he opposed were insisted upon. Tumulty, as well as Senators Glass and Owen and Secretary of Treasury McAdoo, were largely responsible in bringing better understanding between Wilson and Bryan. The Commoner freely discussed his differences with the President over the Federal Reserve Act, and then asked Tumulty: "Who from Wall Street has been discussing this bill with the President? I am afraid that some of the President's friends have been emphasizing too much the views of Wall Street in their conferences with the President on this bill."⁵⁰ However, Wilson assented to not allowing bankers choose representatives on the Federal Reserve Board, Bryan said: "Mr.

⁴⁹ Daniels, *op. cit.*, pp. 226-27

⁵⁰ Tumulty, *op. cit.*, p. 179. Tumulty informed Bryan that only McAdoo, Glass and Owen were the President's intimate advisers.

President, we have settled our differences and you may rely upon me to remain with you to the end of the fight."⁵¹

Colonel Edward M. House again steps into the picture during the currency reform. House is quoted by Mr. Seymour as having taken a great interest in the currency bill and was the unseen guardian angel of the bill. However, House evidently favored the Aldrich scheme for a central bank for he wrote to Bryan:

He (Wilson) is also opposed to the Aldrich plan, but I think you are both wrong there. You will have to convert me the next time I see you. I am inclined to think that Aldrich is trying to give the country a more reasonable and stable system.⁵²

Thus, it appears to the author that again Colonel House had interjected himself into a situation of glory while again he contributed nothing. The arguments of such men as Tumulty, Owen, Daniels, and Glass are too much for House and his author, Mr. Seymour, to honestly refute. If House was trying to destroy the confidence between Bryan and Wilson in this instance, he failed, for Bryan, through his letters, influenced a good many of his political followers to vote for the passage of the bill.

Although the problem of currency reform was always dear to the

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 181.

⁵² Baker, op. cit., IV, 142. House was closely associated with Mr. Warburg, a sympathizer of the scheme of Aldrich. Note Seymour, op. cit., I, 165-66. For Glass's account note Carter Glass, An Adventure in Constructive Finance (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1927), pp. 1-57.

heart of Bryan, probably the main reason Bryan entered Wilson's Cabinet was to push through his "cooling-off" treaties. Winston Churchill, First Lord of the British Admiralty, had approached Germany concerning a naval holiday. However, the Germans were not receptive because England would still be twice as strong on the seas. The United States also did not receive the proposal favorably. The United States favored the policy suggested by Josephus Daniels, Secretary of Navy, who thought that the size of navies could not be determined by a council of nations having large navies, and that they should agree not upon a holiday but a permanent policy which would end naval competition.

The suggestion met with popular approval in the Cabinet. Bryan agreed with the suggestion in principle but had even a greater contribution to add. The Commoner had brought forth a draft of his peace treaties⁵³ which appears as follows:

The parties hereto agree that all questions of whatever character and nature, in dispute between them, shall, when diplomatic efforts fail, be submitted for investigation and report to an international commission (the composition to be agreed upon); and the contracting parties agree not to declare war or begin hostilities until such investigation is made and report submitted.

The investigation shall be conducted as a matter of course upon the initiative of the commission, without the formality of a request from either party; the report shall be submitted

⁵³ Note page 50 of this chapter for the relation between Bryan "cooling-off" treaties and the Panama Tolls controversy.

within (time to be agreed upon) from the date of the submission of the dispute, but the parties hereto reserve the right to act independently on the subject matter in dispute after the report is submitted.⁵⁴

The composition of the International Commission was to be agreed upon but Bryan suggested:

1. That the International Commission be of five members, to be composed as follows: one member from each of the contracting countries, to be chosen by the Government; one member to be chosen by each of the contracting countries from some other country, and the fifth member of the commission to be agreed upon by the two governments, the commission to be appointed as soon as convenient after the making of the treaty, vacancies to be filled according to the original appointment.

2. The time also is to be agreed upon, and it is suggested that that time be one year. If a year is considered too long or too short, this Government will consider either a greater or a less period.

3. This Government is prepared to consider the question of maintaining the status quo as to military and naval preparation during this period of investigation, if the contracting nation desires to include this, and this Government suggests tentatively that the parties agree that there shall be no change in the military and naval program during the period of investigation unless danger to one of the contracting parties from a third power compels a change in said program, in which case the party feeling itself menaced by a third power, shall confidently communicate the matter in writing to the other contracting party and it shall thereupon be released from the obligation not to change its military or naval program, and this release will at the same time operate as a release of the other contracting party. . . .

All of these suggestions, however, are presented for consideration, and not with the intention of imposing any fixed conditions. The principle of investigation being accepted, the details are matters for conference and consideration.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1913, op. cit., p. 8.

⁵⁵ Ibid., pp. 10-11.

Bryan argued that nations, as individuals, usually fought when they were angry and did not sit down and reasonably think out the problem. Wilson, as did all of the Cabinet, heartily agreed with Bryan's peace treaties and made them part of the New Freedom program.

As a result of cabinet discussion, certain minor changes were made in the draft which Bryan had drawn up. Determined not to encounter the hostility of the Senate, he went to its committee on foreign affairs and won its approval. . . .⁵⁶

How was Bryan able to secure the ratification of his arbitration treaties from a usually jealous Senate? The reason appears to stem from the fact that many Senators were not interested enough to attend the session in which the treaties were discussed.

Ironically the outbreak of the greatest of wars may have saved these treaties for the preservation of peace. When, on August 13, 1914, the Senate ratified the first group of eighteen Bryan treaties difficulty was experienced in obtaining a quorum. Had more senators been present, as they would have been if the treaties had been considered important, a two-thirds majority might have been impossible. As it was, the voting revealed partisan bias, for on the first and decisive test the forty-four votes to approve the treaty were cast by thirty-two Democrats and twelve Republicans, while all five negative votes came from Republicans. Certainly inconspicuousness saved the treaties from the experienced and skillful opposition of Senator Lodge who was so little interested in them that he stayed away from Washington that summer.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Curti, *op. cit.*, p. 150. The author wrote the Archives in Washington and learned there was no correspondence between Bryan and the Senate Foreign Relation Committee or with the Senate. Note Appendix F. for the entire letter.

⁵⁷ W. Stull Holt, *Treaties Defeated By The Senate* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1933), p. 245. For the roll call vote on the first arbitration treaty, note Appendix G.

Partly owing to the objection of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and partly to fear that foreign powers might be opposed, the provision that the period of investigation should not be used for a change in the naval or military program of the contracting parties, was omitted. The treaties differed in detail, although they were alike in their main features. Bryan dealt with each government separately.

On August 17, 1913, the first treaty was signed, with Salvador; the Netherlands was the first European country to come into the arrangement. Altogether thirty treaties were negotiated, and twenty ratifications exchanged. Bryan showed much greater skill in handling the senate than his predecessors: he submitted a statement in advance to the committee on foreign affairs, setting forth the interpretation that all disputed questions could be submitted directly to international commissions without previous consent of the senate. . . . He took great pride in his achievement, and even after the world war broke out, pursued his course without any less energy or, so far as could be seen, any less optimism. He regarded this as his greatest contribution to world peace.⁵⁸

Many pacifists found little in the Bryan treaties to cause optimism. Some felt the treaties were essentially superficial in that they neglected the idea of international federation, which, they thought, could alone prevent war. Others, as Jacques Dumas, pointed out more practical difficulties.

If all the states made treaties with all other states, he urged, there would be 1806 commissions, and this might be somewhat confusing! In case of a dispute between one government and two or three others, just what commission

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 151. The Senate ratified the treaties with little or no opposition.

would function? Others realized that certain categories of disputes involved far too complex issues, emotions and prejudices for investigation by a commission, disputes which even a year's delay could not prevent from festering into war. Even if the facts could be agreed upon, each disputant might still insist on the correctness of its own interpretation of the facts. With nationalism what it was, could one be at all certain that governments would voluntarily submit a postponement of hostilities during an investigation, or accept the findings of the commission?⁵⁹

Outside the circle of the peace movement, the Bryan treaties were not taken so seriously, partly because Bryan sponsored them, partly because the majority of them were signed after the world war had already defied the sanctity of international agreements. . . .⁶⁰

Although there are many points in the treaties that might be criticized with justification, the author believes that they were definitely a step in the right direction. The treaties were superficial in many respects but one does not state dogmatic rules and regulations in such a momentous step as the treaties defined.

The Commoner received little aid even from his own diplomatic colleagues. Walter Hines Pages stated:

The outstanding feature of the Bryan treaty was the clause which pledged the high contracting parties not to go to war without taking a breathing spell of one year in which to think the matter over. Had Germany adopted this treaty, the United States, in April, 1917, after Germany had presented a casus belli by resuming unrestricted warfare, could not have gone to war. We should have been obliged to wait a year, or until April, 1918, before engaging in hostilities. That is,

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 153.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 153.

an honorable observance of this Bryan treaty by the United States would have meant that Germany would have starved Great Britain into surrender, and crushed Europe and her army. . . .⁶¹

It appears to the author that Page was either trying to confuse the issue or was confused on the issue himself. Several discrepancies might be noted in his analysis of Bryan's peace plan. First, the United States was not pledged to take a breathing spell for one year. This was only a suggestion by Bryan. Bryan said the period may either be extended or lessened as the contracting nations themselves saw fit. Second, Bryan certainly did not mean that if one of the contracting parties refused to abide by the treaty, the other party was to continue abiding by the plan. The peace plan was sent in April, 1913, and the purpose was to get as many to ratify the plan as possible before an outbreak of trouble, or at least at the early outbreak of a war.

Generally the comment in the United States on the Bryan peace plan was favorable. James B. Scott, head of the Carnegie Peace Foundation, wrote:

Only the services of an international nature which he rendered as Secretary of State can properly be considered here, and they will probably be found to be much more important than commonly supposed; so important indeed, that Mr. Bryan is likely to hold a more prominent place among those who have striven for peace among nations, than among political leaders in the United States, who have held

⁶¹ Hendrick, op. cit., I, 294.

the attention of their countrymen, and aspired to the highest offices of State.⁶²

Unfortunately for Bryan's reputation as Secretary of State, the esteem that Mr. Scott thought Bryan would enjoy never came. The submission of all disputes to arbitration, embodied in Article 12⁶³ of the Covenant of the League of Nations, is more closely associated with Woodrow Wilson than with William Jennings Bryan. The wording of Article 12 and Bryan's "cooling-off" treaties are not the same, but the ideas of both are very closely associated.

While Secretary of State Bryan was bearing the heavy responsibility of the Department of State, there arose the curious conditions surrounding Mr. E. M. House's unofficial connection with the President and his voyage abroad on affairs of state. Wilson had the idea that if the United States, England, France, and Germany would agree not to make war on each other, these big nations could compel all other nations to stop wars. It was with this idea in mind, which Bryan heartily

⁶² Bryan, *op. cit.*, pp. 374-75.

⁶³ Article 12 of the Covenant of the League reads as follows: "The members of the League agree that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the report by the Council.

"In any case, under this article the award of the arbitrators shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute." Note Bryan, *op. cit.*, pp. 373-74.

agreed to, that House was sent on his first mission to Europe in May, 1914. House, after reaching Europe, found not opposition to Wilson's plan, but instead met indifference which was much worse. Both England and France feared the intentions of Germany, but neither would do anything constructive about the situation. British statesmen gave the impression that the mission on which Colonel House was engaged was an unnecessary one -- a preparation for a danger that did not exist. Another thing that House had to combat, although he knew nothing about them, were the secret alliances that existed between the Allies as well as the Central Powers. The attempt of House to persuade Sir Edward Grey to visit the Kiel regatta to see the Kaiser came tonight for the English government feared that such a visit would be very disturbing to France and Russia.

The European idea was to distinguish the American people from the American Government. They considered the American Government as one lacking both good manners and good faith.⁶⁴ Thus, it may be assured they would believe there was little good in the Department of State, for example. House fed fuel to the flames when in Germany speaking to Tirpiz he said,

. . . I spoke of the courage and character of the President.
 . . . I drew clearly the distinction between the President and Mr. Bryan. I wanted official Germany to know that if any international complications arose between our two countries, they would have to deal with a man of iron courage and inflexible will.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Hendrick, op. cit., I, 145-46.

⁶⁵ Seymour, op. cit., I, 250.

House spread the word through Europe that Mr. Bryan could not be taken seriously.

It was probably in early July that House thought of his plan to get the big powers of the world to stop spending their money on wars and use the money instead to develop the waste areas of the world. Page sympathized with House's plan but thought it would not work for each power distrusted the other's motives. It is worthwhile to mention that Woodrow Wilson knew nothing of this idea of House's before he went to Europe. In all probability Wilson would have been against it for it would have resulted in nothing more than dollar diplomacy. As we have seen, Wilson, expressed himself as very much against dollar diplomacy in his speech concerning Latin American affairs. On August 28, 1913, Page wrote to House himself on House's plan, the following:

I wonder if we couldn't serve notice that landstealing game is forever ended and that the cleaning up of backward lands is now in order -- for the people that live there; and then invite Europe's help to make the tropics as healthful as the Panama Zone?⁶⁶

Despite the fact that the plan of House and Page was as visionary as almost any yet designed, they continued to view Bryan as lacking prestige. This is shown by the following letter from House to Wilson, August 1, 1914:

Please let me suggest that you do not let Mr. Bryan make any overtures to any of the powers involved. They look upon him as an absolute visionary, and it would lessen the weight

⁶⁶ Hendrick, op. cit., I, 271.

of your influence if you desire to use it yourself
later. . . .⁶⁷

At any rate House failed in his mission. He had not brought the big powers together. Possibly one reason for House's failure ~~if~~ if success were possible -- stemmed from the fact that House did not believe in the mission as is shown in a letter to Wilson May 29, 1914:

The best chance for peace is an understanding between England and Germany in regard to naval armaments, and yet there is some disadvantage to us by these two getting too close.⁶⁸

The only thing House did accomplish was to see and have a chance to study the European situation at first hand.

Bryan had planned to go to Europe shortly before House left for the continent. When Page learned of the proposed trip he wrote House:

Mrs. Page has learned something more about Secretary Bryan's proposed visit here in the spring. He's coming to talk his peace plan which, you know, is a sort of grape juice arbitration -- a distinct step backward from a real arbitration treaty. Well, if he comes with that, when you come to talk about reducing armaments, you'll wish you'd never been born. Get your ingenuity together, then, and prevent that visit.⁶⁹

House did succeed in preventing Bryan from going for it was he who took the place of the man who should have gone. It was Bryan who had taken a large step forward in his cooling-off treaties. It was

⁶⁷ Seymour, op. cit., I, 229.

⁶⁸ Ibid., I, 249.

⁶⁹ Hendrick, op. cit., I, 226.

Bryan who, as Secretary of State, would shoulder the blame to a large extent if American policies did not work. It appears to the author that House again usurped the power due Bryan and, with nothing to lose and everything to gain for himself, proceeded to Europe. If Bryan did not like the idea, he expressed no dissent.

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CHAPTER IV

SECRETARY OF STATE BRYAN DURING WORLD WAR I

It is indeed a strange fact that the man who had worked tirelessly for the cause of peace should have been the Secretary of State at the outbreak of World War I. The Commoner had strongly advocated his "cooling-off" treaties only to find their value nullified by war. However, most analysts of existing conditions of that time agree that no man nor any nation could have stopped the conflict. Among the primary causes of the war were the commercial competition between England and Germany; the historical hatred between the French and the Germans; the Russian interest in the Slavs and in a warm water seaport on the Mediterranean. Above all one must remember that all of the big powers of Europe were pledged to come to one another's aid if attacked.

The United States, as the only great power not directly engaged in the war, found it necessary to define her position with regard to the war. Wilson felt very deeply that the neutrality of the United States must be preserved. On August 5, 1914, House wrote Wilson:

. . . If a statement is made, let me suggest that you make it clear that what you have done was at your own instance. If the public either here or in Europe thought that Mr. Bryan instigated it, they would conclude it was done in an impracticable way and was doomed to failure from the start.¹

¹ Seymour, op. cit., I, 282.

It may be concluded from this letter that the Colonel was trying to shake the President's confidence in Bryan concerning foreign relations as well as domestic issues. This was House's as well as Page's policy throughout the time Bryan served as Secretary of State. In August, House had written to the President that if Germany succeeded it ultimately would mean trouble for the United States. Furthermore, Grey said:

House left me in no doubt from the first that he held German militarism responsible for the war, and that he regarded the struggle as one between democracy and something that was undemocratic and antipathetic to American ideals.²

This was a stranger role for a "peacemaker" for a neutral country to play.

However, House's suggestions were not followed by Wilson. The President made his neutrality speech to the Senate on August 19, 1914.³ The President's attitude was that the United States and its peoples should be neutral in both thought and action. As evidence of Wilson's refusal to be influenced by such men as House and Roosevelt:

(Wilson) said in a Cabinet meeting that he had informed Ambassador Spring-Rice that if Prussian military prowess overcame the Allies, it might be necessary for the United States to 'give up its present ideals and devote all its energies to defense, which would mean the end of its present system of government .' He also related a conversation with others to the effect that if Britain should deny American rights he would be forced to hold it to 'strict accountability.'⁴

² Grey, op. cit., II, 124.

³ For the entire speech see Appendix H.

⁴ Daniels, op. cit., p. 570.

Page cannot be said to have been neutral in any sense of the word. The evidence for this statement resides in Page's own letters to Wilson. Page felt that there was no such word as neutrality; a government either must go in or stay out. It could not maintain a position in the middle. A government could be neutral, but certainly no man could be. Page's letters became more and more outspoken to the President.⁵ Even Colonel House did not maintain such an unneutral position openly. House became so worried over the convictions of Page that he wrote Page on December 4, 1914:

The President wished me to ask you please to be careful not to express any unneutral feeling, either by word of mouth, or by letter, and not even to the State Department. He said that both Mr. Bryan and Mr. Lansing had remarked upon your leanings in that direction, and he thought it would materially lessen your influence.⁶

The neutrality question brought the first break in the relations between Wilson and Bryan. The Commoner took the position that if we were neutral, all belligerents should receive exactly the same treatment. To those people who considered Bryan a complete pacifist may be noted the following statement by Bryan: "If we are to take place with either warring factor, let us do it -- but if we are to pose as being neutral, let us be neutral."⁷ The Commoner found it easy to be absolutely neutral, for he felt that in any struggle of

⁵ Note Hendrick, op. cit., I, 362.

⁶ Seymour, op. cit., I, 373.

⁷ Bryan, op. cit., p. 395.

such intensity no nation was capable of calm reasoning and each of the warring factions would do anything that would promote its own cause. Even as neutral as Bryan was, he was accused of being prejudiced to the Allies for he had a son-in-law in the British Army. Bryan's reply was:

Ties of relationship do not always bind. The Kaiser has a cousin on the throne of England and another on the throne of Russia, but it does not seem to bias him at all.⁸

Efforts for mediation on the part of the United States took place early in the war. On July 28, 1914, Bryan cabled Page asking if the good offices of the United States under Article III of the Hague Convention⁹ would be acceptable. "Page and House, each on his own discouraged the suggestion. Page cabled, 'There is not the slightest chance', and House advised twice: 'Do not let Mr. Bryan make any overtures'."¹⁰ The Cabinet, however, agreed with Wilson and Bryan, and Wilson, ignoring the advice of Page and House, cabled England and Germany tendering his good offices. There were no acceptances of Wilson's offers for mediation. Each side claimed to be fighting in self-defense. The English point of view toward mediation was expressed by Sir Edward Grey on August 7, 1914:

⁸ Ibid., p. 428.

⁹ Article III of the Hague Convention dealt with the methods employed in settling disputes among nations.

¹⁰ Daniels, op. cit., p. 569.

I knew that President Wilson wished to mediate, and whenever there appeared a fair opportunity of stopping the war by mediation, we should, I felt sure, throw our influence on the side of it, and, having taken part in the war, our influence would be stronger than if we had stood outside.¹¹

Probably what Grey more nearly meant was that England had to delay in order to get her war machine running. After she appeared to be on the offensive, then and only then would England turn to mediation. She could then more easily wrangle concessions out of Germany. Thus, the President faced an extremely difficult situation.

The first glimmer of an opportunity for mediation came on September 6, 1914. Bernstorff, German Ambassador to the United States, mentioned that his government would accept an offer of mediation. Bryan received this information through Oscar Straus, former United States Ambassador to Turkey. The President not only approved of Bryan's prompt action in calling on Spring-Rice and Jusserand, the British and French Ambassadors, but also expressed the thought " . . . this war is so horrible from every aspect that no one can afford to take the responsibility for continuing it a single hour."¹² But the Straus proposal was received coldly by both sides. The proposal leaked to the press as did nearly all the so-called secret communications at that time were doing. No government would then, publicly, admit a readiness to discuss peace lest it be

¹¹ Grey, op. cit., II, 165.

¹² Baker, op. cit., V, 275.

construed as a sign of weakness. Neither Page nor Herrick, the American Ambassador to France, formally presented the Straus proposal.

This eager attempt at mediation was entirely the work of Wilson and Bryan. Most of their advisers, particularly Page, but including House and Herrick, were opposed to any such move.¹³ Page thought that it was the hope of the English that neither the American Government nor its people regarded a proposed peace as worth while that stopped short of a final blow to bureaucracy. Since Page supported this belief, he dwelt upon atrocity stories and the Zeppelin raids. Page and Grey appear to have been anxious, after Grey's complete rejection of the Straus proposal, for they feared that both the President and American opinion might think that Great Britain was opposed to peace, as Bernstorff was asserting.

(Thus) on September 19, (1914), Wilson received a defensive explanation from Grey, in which the whole argument turned upon the statement that 'Germany planned the war, and chose her own time for forcing it on Europe.' Grant this, and it naturally followed that the Allies must have reparation and security against the menace of repetitions in the future -- even to the extent of crushing Germany entirely.¹⁴

However, Wilson was not willing, yet, to grant the first premise.

Bryan drew from the Straus incident the lesson that, since none of the belligerents were willing to take the initiative toward

¹³ Seymour, op. cit., I, 333-34.

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 283-84.

peace, it should be taken by the United States.

Both sides seem to entertain the old idea that fear is the only basis upon which peace can rest. . . . And so, the Kaiser sees peace in a victory which will insure the supremacy of Germany, while the Allies see peace only in a success so signal as to crush the German war machine.

It is not likely that either side will win so complete a victory as to be able to dictate terms and if either side does win such a victory, it will probably mean preparation for another war. It would seem better to look for a more rational basis for peace.¹⁵

Bryan's idea of the proper step towards peace was presented to the President on September 19, 1914:

Would it not be worth while for you to address a note to all the combatants reciting the awful horrors of this conflict, and pointing out --

First, that all deny responsibility for the war and that all express a desire for peace;

Second, that responsibility for a continuance of such a war is as undesirable as responsibility for beginning it, and that as such responsibility attaches to this nation as well as to participants, my suggestion is that you earnestly appeal to them to meet together and exchange views as to the terms upon which permanent peace can be insured.

They could be reminded that, while mediation can not be asked or accepted with conditions, the parties are under no compulsion to accept unsatisfactory terms; also that while an armistice during mediation would, on general principles, be desirable, it might operate unequally upon the combatants and is not therefore essential to mediation.¹⁶

Again Bryan had proposed broad, sound ideas on the subject of mediation.

¹⁵ Baker, *op. cit.*, V, 285. This was a sound statesmanlike case based upon ideas which Wilson later used in his message to the belligerent governments on December 18, 1916, when he called for their war aims.

¹⁶ Bryan, *op. cit.*, pp. 390-92. Wilson was to profit later by Bryan's suggestion in that the proposal that 'nations shall enter into an agreement to respect present boundaries', found its way into Article X of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Note Baker, *op. cit.*, V, 286.

In all of Bryan's proposals may be seen the basic principle of good diplomacy -- leaving the door open for further diplomacy. On the subject of Bryan's proposal, Ray Stannard Baker, surely not biased in favor of Bryan, records:

Here was broad, sound thought -- with constructive ideas. . . . If Bryan's proposals had been tried at that time -- before capitulations of October,¹⁷ while yet the United States possessed the mighty power of placing an embargo on munitions and of challenging the British blockade -- something might possibly have been effected.¹⁸

Bryan's work was to come to nought for at the elbow of the President, constantly urging him to do nothing, was Colonel House. Through a conscious or unconscious effort, House played right into the hands of the Allies. Because of his pro-Ally feeling, House fell into the policy of hesitation and delay, which was just what the Allies wanted. House's policy of delay was to be exploited further in the Colonel's second mission to Europe.¹⁹ He had talked with the Ambassadors of both sides and had asked them to explain their bases for settling the War:

The suggestions of both sides were of the vaguest and most general nature. The 'end of militarism' -- what did it mean? 'General disarmament', or 'other effective measures', 'and indemnity for Belgium.' One cannot avoid the impression that the Allied diplomats were playing for

¹⁷ By the capitulations of October, the United States no longer demanded that the Declaration of London be followed.

¹⁸ Baker, op. cit., V, 286.

¹⁹ House's second mission to Europe may be found on page 99 of this chapter.

time, using House to keep Wilson inactive. Delay was at that time the chief article in their policy.²⁰

House definitely feared the influence of Bryan on both the President and American public opinion as is shown in a letter to Page on October 3, 1914:

I have always counselled him (the President) to remain quiet for the moment and let matters unfold themselves further. . . . I do not think there is any danger of anyone on the outside injecting himself into it unless Mr. Bryan does something on his own initiative.²¹

Rank outsider -- the Secretary of State.²²

The President, against the wishes of Bryan, decided to wait for a better opportunity to offer mediation. He was probably greatly influenced in his decision by Page's accidental or designed prophesy concerning the conflict as being a long and drawn out affair.

²⁰ Baker, op. cit., V, 287.

²¹ Ray Stannard Baker states further: "In this letter House went on to indicate some bases for a durable peace, as for example, 'every nation in Europe guaranteeing the territorial integrity of every other nation' which Mr. Hendrick regards as an 'astonishing' example of House's foresight, since this idea, embodied in Article X, became the chief point of controversy in the Covenant of the League of Nations. But it had already been presented to the President in Bryan's letter of September 19th which House had no doubt seen, the phrase there being, 'that nations shall enter into an agreement to respect present boundaries'. Note Baker, op. cit., V, 288. Also note Seymour, op. cit., I, 318-19.

²² Baker, op. cit., V, 288. This letter is certainly indicative of House's regard both for his own position and for the position of Bryan.

After awhile, said Page, neutral nations will rise up and say war must end. The combatants will also be more receptive. Thus ended the first and probably the only really hopeful opportunity for a direct and vigorous effort at mediation.

On October 22, 1914, the United States abandoned the Declaration of London, which dealt with rules of contraband and non-contraband and rights of search, thus taking away its greatest negotiating power. American commercial interests became more and more closely connected with the Allies thus making it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to be considered a neutral nation.

The issue of Latin America relative to neutrality proved very difficult for the Wilson Administration. The immediate problem was that if some of the Latin American countries became involved in the war, the Monroe Doctrine might easily involve the United States. While Bryan and Lansing, Assistant Secretary of State, were struggling with these problems, Colonel House arrived in Washington on December 16, 1914. House proposed a plan to the President which would do away with the Monroe Doctrine and set up a status of equality of states. This plan, the Pan-American Plan, was as follows:

1st. Mutual guaranties of political independence under republican form of government and mutual guaranties of territorial integrity.

2nd. Mutual agreement that the government of each of the contracting parties acquire complete control within its jurisdiction of the manufacture and sale of munitions of war.²³

²³ Seymour, op. cit., I, 209-10.

House further recorded that this plan was his own as formulated on December 16, 1914. The first of these ideas, as we have seen, had originated with Bryan in his letter to Wilson on September 19th. The second idea was Wilson's own,²⁴ and was discussed with Bryan in September.²⁵

House began eagerly talking "his" plan over to the the South American Ambassadors. However, he did not invite Bryan to participate in the negotiations. House became somewhat irritated by Bryan's insistence upon applying the scheme to the immediate and difficult problems of the moment -- "a convention . . . for the purpose of securing the rights of neutrals."²⁶ It seems that House had proposed a meeting of both belligerents and neutrals. Bryan was very much interested in a meeting of this kind, hoping that it might open the way to mediation. Bryan knew that House had the President's ear, so he thought, probably, the President might

²⁴ Note Baker, op. cit., V, 74.

²⁵ The author did not find the discussion on this point but Bryan's reply to Wilson may be found in Bryan, op. cit., pp. 390-92. For Bryan's note of September 19th see p. 97 of this thesis.

²⁶ Baker, op. cit., V, 299-300.

come nearer approving a proposal of House.²⁷

²⁷ The letter Bryan wrote to Wilson on December 17, 1914 is as follows:

Mr. House will call your attention to a suggestion which was made to me by one of the South American representatives and I am inclined to think there is some force in it. You have not failed to notice the increasing urgency with which the neutral nations are presenting the idea of mediation or of some form of protection from the burdens of war. The sentiment is unanimous among the South (and) Central American countries that something ought to be done to protect the neutral nations of Europe. A recent dispatch says that the kinds of Norway, Sweden, and Denmark are to meet for the purpose of considering what can be done to lessen these burdens. The Venezuelan minister yesterday handed me a suggestion to the effect that you call a meeting of all the neutral nations to be held in Washington for the purpose of considering a proposition to be submitted later to a convention in which all the nations, neutral and belligerent, will be represented. I think, however, that the idea of Mr. House, which I have mentioned, is the most feasible one, namely that you invite all the nations, belligerent and neutral, to send representatives to a conference to be held in Washington for the purpose of considering ways and means by which the burdens borne by the neutral nations may be minimized with the consent and agreement of the belligerent nations. The belligerents could not take exception of (sic) it, were it understood that the changes were to be made through agreement with the belligerents, and I am sure it would appeal to all the neutral nations. The one who suggested this plan had in mind the possibility of its opening the way to mediation. He thinks it would give you an opportunity to make an address of welcome which might be helpful in advancing the cause of mediation without directly referring to it. He thinks that the coming together of these representatives, even for consideration of questions growing out of war and yet not involving the subject of mediation, might lay the foundation for some coming together of the belligerent nations. I am very much impressed with the idea and with its possibilities for good. It seemed to commend itself to Mr. House also although he only had time to think of it for a moment. It is at his suggestion that I bring the matter up this evening in order that you may talk with him about it more fully and let me know your impressions.

Baker, op. cit., V, 300.

This letter written by Bryan on December 17, 1914, seems to refute the statements of House concerning Bryan's apparent lack of interest in his plan.²⁸ Nothing came out of House's plan, through no fault of Bryan, but because of a number of other factors. House apparently lost his interest in Latin America and began more and more turning his complete attention to Europe. He also was never able to get all of the South American ministers to agree to his proposal. At this time, House became convinced that real peace would be obtained only when Germany was thoroughly crushed. Naturally, a conference and arbitration would not accomplish this purpose. Finally, House proposed taking another trip to Europe in late January, 1915, and Wilson agreed. From 1915 on, House's entire attention was turned to Europe.

In order to understand the American problem of shipping during the war and the apparent failures of both of House's missions, it is necessary to sum up in a few sentences the allied diplomacy, especially English diplomacy.²⁹

Sir Edward Grey states that there were two chief objects in allied diplomacy: the first, was to preserve solidarity among the Allies. Grey considered this object completely and successfully

²⁸ Seymour, op. cit., I, 210-11.

²⁹ A more intense study of English diplomacy will be presented in connection with each specific problems as American shipping and the Declaration of London.

achieved. The second, was the most important object of allied relations with neutrals, allied relations with the United States.

Likewise, to understand Allied diplomacy, one must realize that a constant policy was impossible. Circumstances were always changing. Thus, a policy that was designed when Allied armies were winning was not suitable when Germany seemed to be winning. Diplomacy had to adapt itself to whatever happened at the battle front, and in these adaptations Allied ministers sometimes got out of step.

Sometimes there was a tendency in one quarter to make diplomacy more active, when the Allies were having military reverses; as if a more copious use of words in the form of threats or promises could compensate for the effect of defeats on the battle field.³⁰

Always the Allies had in mind the policy of delay with regard to the United States. They needed delay to build up their war machine to defeat Germany and best wrangle concessions out of the Hun. They needed delay to tie up the economic forces of the United States and the Allies. Neutrality on the part of the United States made little difference to the Allies, for they intended to carry on trade with America while at the same time blocking off German-American trade. They executed this policy very successfully with the aid of House and Page in keeping Wilson in a stage of inactivity.

Early in the war the United States developed its policies concerning the trade of neutrals along the lines established by

³⁰ Grey, op. cit., II, 158.

the Declaration of London in 1909. On August 7, 1914, Bryan with the approval of the President, asked Germany and the other belligerents to accept the Declaration as a code of law. This proposal sent out by the State Department was met very coldly by the Allies, especially the British. Page explains this coldness in the following manner:

They (the British) had long regarded our government as ignorant of European affairs and amateurish in its cockiness. . . . Mr. Bryan was looked on as a joke. They forgot him -- rather, they never took serious notice of him.³¹

When Mr. Bryan, therefore, blandly asked Great Britain to accept the Declaration as its code of maritime warfare, he was asking that country to accept a document which Great Britain, in peace time, had repudiated and which would, in all probability, have caused that country to lose the war. The substance of this request was bad enough, but the language in which it was phrased made matters much worse. It appears that only the intervention of Colonel House prevented the whole thing from becoming a tragedy.³²

This letter by Page illustrates the fact that he understood neither the British policies, nor the American situation. It is true that Great Britain had never ratified the Declaration of

³¹ Hendrick, op. cit., I, 374.

³² Ibid., pp. 377-78.

London, and its rules played little part in the war.³³ The Declaration had not been the work of the Foreign Office alone for the Admiralty had been present and had approved when it was drawn up. Sir Edward Grey had supported it and was the minister specially responsible for it. The Declaration passed the House of Commons, but its rejection by the House of Lords prevented its ratification. This is about the only truth in Page's letter. Grey stated that if the Declaration had been followed, it would have saved England from her greatest peril during the war-- the submarine. However, he also stated:

The question is not worth pursuing: if the Declaration had been ratified, it would have been broken. The same ruthless spirit that introduced the use of poison-gas, an offence not only against the rules of war but against all humane considerations, would have made short work of the Declaration of London.³⁴

³³ "On August 20, 1914, the British Government announced by proclamation that 'it would act in accordance with the provisions of the Convention known as the Declaration of London, so far as may be practicable', but with modifications which, in the opinion of the State Department at Washington, largely nullified the original Declaration. Very critical questions arose with the United States, and on October 29, 1914, a second order was issued, the principal effect of which was to withdraw the general application of the doctrine of 'continuous voyage' to conditional contraband (mainly food) with the result of permitting some of this to pass through neutral ports into Germany. This was, however, subsequently supplemented and to a considerable extent superseded by the 'Reprisal Order' of March 11, 1915, which gave power to stop all goods of whatever description, destined for Germany, leaving the Declaration of London in being only in so far as it governed the decision whether conditional contraband could be condemned as prize." Grey, op. cit., II, 105-6.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 105.

Bryan had nothing to do with formulating the statement issued to Great Britain concerning the Declaration. It was first thought that Lansing had drawn up the plan, but later it was found that Cone Johnson, Solicitor-General, had been the author.³⁵

Nevertheless, the Declaration of London was not accepted by the British, probably because it left among other things copper and rubber on the non-contraband list and would have permitted the importation of foodstuffs by Germany. Wilson hesitated to push the American stand due to the influence of Page and probably House. On October 20, 1914, Lansing arrived at the conclusion that America must surrender her stand. He sent the following letter to Wilson:

It seems to me that in view of the rigid attitude of the British Government further attempts to obtain an agreement on the Declaration of London would be useless. We must, therefore, stand on the rules of international law which have been generally accepted without regard to the Declaration. In the matter of the transfer of vessels this will be a decided advantage. The great loss is the failure to have a definite code, which will undoubtedly be the source of numerous controversies.

It is to be regretted that in spite of all that has been done, the purpose of the negotiation has failed.³⁶

³⁵ Johnson was from Texas and was particularly perturbed over great stocks of cotton lying on the docks and not being shipped because of British infringements upon the rights of American shippers. Baker, *op. cit.*, V, 199.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 217-18.

The memoranda collected by Lansing resulted in a distinct step backwards in rules and regulations of neutral trade. Wilson approved of Lansing's despatch, based on his letter, of October 22, 1914. This withdrawal, as we have seen, greatly weakened the United States' powerful position as a neutral in mediation. The rules of international law were uncertain and debatable. The purpose of the London Conference in 1908 had been to strengthen these rules. Now all that the United States had were the weak rules of international law.

Both Wilson and the State Department were convinced that the avoidance of future trouble could best be obtained by pointing out clearly to the British at the very beginning that the United States regarded the British Admiralty policy as infringing our neutral rights and material interests.

It was with some irritation that the Ambassador (Page) discovered that in the United States British seizure of ships and prizes was not regarded as a 'smaller question', and he did not conceal his lack of sympathy with the arguments drafted by the legal advisers to the State Department in protection of American rights on the seas.³⁷

Page was very unorthodox in his relations with Grey. This is illustrated by the following:

One incident in particular remains in my (Grey) memory. Page came to see me at the Foreign Office one day and produced a long despatch from Washington

³⁷ Seymour, op. cit., I, 305.

contesting our claims to act as we were doing in stopping contraband going to neutral ports. 'I am instructed', he said, 'to read this dispatch to you.' He read, and I listened. He then said: 'I have now read the dispatch, but I do not agree with it; let us consider how it should be answered!'³⁸

On another occasion when American opinion was particularly set against British interference, Page suggested a French ship be used to stop American trading vessels. Since American regard for France had always been high, Page reasoned that American sentiment would not rise at a French seizure. Page was correct for the issue never even reached the newspapers. For an Ambassador from a supposedly neutral nation, Page's action was disgusting.

The British first issued a small list of contraband articles. The three most important additions were copper, rubber, and cotton. However, it was felt that to include cotton would certainly provoke a challenge from the United States which would then impair the prospect of her agreeing to a list that included copper and rubber. This policy proved to be successful. As time went on orders were issued that entitled the British to seize such things as rubber and copper in any ship on the high seas, if they were destined to go to a German port. However, this order was of little use by itself, for Germany imported goods as easily through Dutch, Danish, or Swedish ports as her own. Thus, it became necessary for Britain and the Allies to seize goods that were going to these neutral ports as well.

³⁸ Grey, op. cit., II, 110.

It was on this point that controversy arose with the United States.

Wilson's policy on neutrality was harshly attacked from both sides. Mr. Munsterbert, Professor at Harvard University in a long letter to the President on November 19, 1914, strongly criticised the administration for discriminating in favour of the Allies. He also added:

The policy of the administration with regard to the holding up, detaining and search of Germans and Austrians from neutral and American vessels is a reversal of the American policy established in 1812. It has excited no end of bitterness. . . . the United States permitted the violation by England of the Hague Convention and international law in connection with conditional and unconditional contraband. The United States, for instance, has not protested against the transference of copper from the conditional to the absolute list, although on former occasions the United States has taken a spirited stand against one-sided interpretation of international agreements. In 1812, in the Russian Japanese war, and in the Boer war, the United States insisted that a neutral nation has the right to send conditional as well as unconditional contraband to neutral nations without permitting an inquiry into its ultimate destination. . . . By permitting this new interpretation the United States practically supports the starving out policy of the Allies. The nation by reversing its own policy thus seriously handicaps Germany and Austria in their fight for existence.³⁹

Lansing replied to the statements of Munsterberg that there was no Hague Convention that dealt with absolute or conditional contraband, and, since the Declaration of London was not in force, only international laws could apply, and on these laws there was no general agreement. Lansing defended his position with the following statement:

³⁹ Baker, op. cit., V, 223-24.

In the enforcement of the laws of neutrality . . . this government cannot take into account the advantage or disadvantage which may result to any of the belligerents through the enforcement of neutral duties. If one belligerent has by good fortune a superiority in the matter of geographical location or of military or naval power, the rules of neutral conduct cannot be varied so as to favor the less fortunate combatant. To change such rules because of the relative strength of the belligerents and in order to equalize their opportunities would be in itself an unneutral act, of which the stronger might justly complain.⁴⁰

Bryan appeared to be even more disturbed over the problem of American rights on the high seas than the President. On April 28, 1915, he wrote a bolder appeal to Wilson than he had yet ventured. He argued that the Germans were not unreasonable in asking (1) why Americans should travel on British ships; (2) how we could complain of accidents to American ships when British ships used our flag; and (3) why the drowning of a few people should provoke more irritation than the starvation of a whole nation.

If we are to prove our neutrality -- and unless we do we are likely to be drawn into the conflict by the growing feeling in Germany -- it seems to me we must prevent the misuse of our flag and warn Americans not to use British vessels in the war zone unless we can bring pressure on Great Britain to withdraw (the) threat about making bread or food contraband.⁴¹

Bryan's analysis seems to be a good statement of the case. Wilson found himself facing a difficult decision -- a decision which he could not make. He had relied heavily upon the information of

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 227-28.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 271.

House, for he thought they were "both of the same mind". To change the rules of international law would be legally unneutral; not to change the rules of international law would be morally or practically unneutral. The position of the fence-sitter was not only uncomfortable, but, in this case, beyond reach.

As for the two other men most concerned with the diplomatic controversies of the time, we find Page, our most important representative on the firing line, actually taking the part of our chief diplomatic opponent, playing the game of the British; and Colonel House, wandering anxiously about Europe seeking peace, being used by the Allies as a pawn in their deliberate and most effective policy of delay.⁴²

The British policy of delay meant an increasing dependence of American industry, at enormous profits, upon the business of supplying arms and other supplies to the Allies. If delay continued long enough, difficulties between the United States and Germany were certain to develop. Delay, then, was the keynote of Grey's diplomacy. This policy, as we have seen, proved to be quite effective with House urging Wilson neither to mediate nor protest to Great Britain for the time was not yet opportune.⁴³ As a result, Wilson answered Bryan's letter of the 19th, on April 28, 1915, as follows:

I wish I could see it as you do. But in view of what House writes me I cannot. It is known to every government concerned that we believe the war should be ended and that we speak for all neutral nations in that wish. It is known to them that we are seeking to help and that anything they want to say to one another which they are too prudent to

⁴² Ibid., p. 261.

⁴³ Seymour, op. cit., I, 373-74, 378-81.

say directly and officially they can say privately through us. They are at present most appreciative and cordial, -- ready to accept help when they can accept it. We know their minds and we know their difficulties. They are dependent upon their own public opinion (even Germany) and we know what that opinion is. To insist now would be futile and would probably be offensive. We would lose such influence as we have for peace.⁴⁴

In early January, 1915, the President again sent House to Europe to negotiate for peace. Here again is shown the fundamental defect of the relationship between Wilson and House. In the whole matter of peace efforts, Wilson trusted House implicitly without clear-cut understanding as to how House proposed to act. He felt that House's mind worked just as his own did and that under similar circumstances he would act just as Wilson himself would wish him to do.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Baker, op. cit., V, 275. Further study of House's activity causing delay will be found in the study of the Lusitania notes and the second mission of House.

⁴⁵ Ray Stannard Baker notes the following concerning the relationship between House and Wilson: "This has recently been demonstrated to be a false supposition. In the address of December 8, 1914, Wilson had taken a stand on preparedness (Wilson was against this policy) quite the opposite to that which House had been urging him to assume. . . ." "House also contributed to this impression by constant and indiscriminate praise of Wilson's doings. . . ." This added to Wilson's feeling that he and House thought alike. Baker, op. cit., V, 306-7.

This was a fatal mistake in Wilson's policy; his trust in House prevented him from seeing things House did not see, but which he might himself have seen if he had looked for himself, without House in the way.⁴⁶

House, himself, quotes the following:

Mr. House is my (Wilson) second personality. He is my independent self. His thoughts and mine are one. If I were in his place I would do just as he suggested. . . . If any one thinks he is reflecting my opinion by whatever action he takes, they are welcome to the conclusion.⁴⁷

Before leaving, House further built up his structure of secrecy by sending the President a list of code words which were to be used between them. Probably any amateur could have solved this. House was to be known as "Beverly", Page as "Yucca", Sir Edward Grey as "White" and the Kaiser as "Dante".⁴⁸ This listing was sent only to the President and not to the State Department. This structure of secrecy set by House was to characterize his entire mission. House records a month after reaching England:

I have succeeded in keeping my name absolutely out of the European press, which is a good beginning, and I remain in as much obscurity as is possible for one having such work in hand. No one, of course, not even Page, knows when I see the different ministers or personages of importance; and my comings and goings are as unchronicled as if I were a crossing-sweeper.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 306-7

⁴⁷ Seymour, op. cit., I, 114.

⁴⁸ For a further listing of the code, note Baker, op. cit., V, 307.

⁴⁹ Seymour, op. cit., I, 387.

On February 15, 1915, Gerard, United States Ambassador to Germany, wrote House that Germany was ready to accept a peace proposal because of a number of factors such as: the German drive to Paris had failed; the attack on Russia had failed; and, Italy had decided to join the Allies. House contacted Grey and

He (Grey) thought after matters had quieted down upon the Eastern front and a deadlock had once more been arrived at, and the Dardanelles had been forced, it would be well for me (House) to go to Germany.⁵⁰

Grey concluded by saying that the Germans were not sincere in wanting peace. On February 18, 1915, House, completely against the purpose of his mission, was undertaking to give Grey some military advice:

I again urged upon him better coordination between the eastern and western fronts. . . . It seems to me perfect folly not to work more in harmony; that is, when the Germans are attacking in the east, they should be severely pressed in the west, and visa versa. . . .⁵¹

This action by House seems to be a strange role for an impartial peacemaker to assume. Thus, House, under Grey's spell wrote the President to let matters develop somewhat further before going to Germany. If Grey's plans worked out, the British would go into peace negotiations with a string of victories behind them. Even Gerard's pleas that they were passing up a chance for peace went unheard by House.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 380.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 379.

Wilson undoubtedly was losing some of his confidence in House's purpose for on February 20, 1915, he sent a cablegram to House warning him not to be influenced by the British policy of delay. Wilson feared it would look to the world that House was a representative of England and not the representative of the President of the United States. On February 23, 1915, House commented on the usual British slowness and added:

The psychological time to have ended this war was around the end of November or the first of December when everything looked as if it had gotten into a permanent deadlock. You will remember we tried to impress this upon Sir Cecil and tried to get quicker action, but without success.⁵²

House had evidently forgotten that in November and December he had equally been urging the President to delay.⁵³

A month later House finally got to Germany. However, by this time it was too late, for the German campaign in the East was underway and the submarine campaign was started. Again House's mission was a failure. However, it did accomplish further delay. It was unfortunate that the President's faith in House prevented him from searching any other avenues of peace, such as those being suggested by his Secretary of State. Probably everything would have failed, but certainly not everything was tried. House arrived in New York on June 13, 1915, and denied that his trip to Europe was in any way

⁵² Baker, op. cit., V, 314.

⁵³ Note Baker, op. cit., V, 276-294.

connected with a mission of peace or even that he was the personal representative of the President: "'I did not talk peace, and that was not my mission abroad', Colonel House declared."⁵⁴ The unfortunate as well as ironic situation concerning Wilson's policy of delay was expressed on May 5, 1915, by Secretary of Interior Lane to Colonel House:

After all, our one greatest asset is the confidence of the people in the President. They do not love him, because he appears to them as a man of cloister. But they respect him as a wise, sane leader who will keep them out of trouble, and whatever fool things are done they are willing to blame on Bryan, which is gravely unjust. I am growing more and more in my admiration for Bryan each day. He is too good a Christian to run a naughty world and he doesn't hate hard enough, but he certainly is a noble and high-minded man, and loyal to the President to the last hair. . . .⁵⁵

Lansing had wanted to break relations with Germany over the sinking of the Cushing. Bryan was still opposed to this type of thinking as the Germans had warned Americans about getting on ships and sailing into the war zone. Wilson took the stand that Americans had the right to travel on any ship they might choose. However, the President kept up the protests to Britain concerning interference with trade in a cablegram to House on May 5, 1915, and even came near threatening to interrupt the munition traffic. Wilson

⁵⁴ House's statement appeared in the New York Times, June 14, 1915. Baker, op. cit., V, 321.

⁵⁵ Seymour, op. cit., I, 459.

still hoped that House might accomplish something when on May 7, 1915, the Lusitania was sunk.⁵⁶ Page immediately wrote the President urging him to join the struggle on the side of the Allies else we could not retain the good opinion of anyone. Bryan was as shocked as anyone over the sinking. He directed Lansing to study its cargo and found that the Lusitania had carried contraband.

Wilson, without consulting the Cabinet, drew up the protest to Germany or the First Lusitania Note. Bryan admitted that the draft was a clear statement of the American position and agreed that it was well to act without delay in order to give direction to public opinion. After making a few minor suggestions, he added:

But, my dear Mr. President, I join in this document with a heavy heart. . . . I cannot bring myself to the belief that it is wise to relinquish the hope of playing the part of a friend to both sides in the role of peace-maker, and I fear this note will result in such a relinquishment.⁵⁷

Bryan held that the note had a one-sided bearing as being so much sharper than the protests directed to Great Britain. He pointed out that the illegal actions we were condemning were taken as a result of illegal British actions which we tolerated. He added on May 12, 1915:

The only way, as I see it . . . to prevent irreparable injury being done by the statement is to issue simultaneously

⁵⁶ It is interesting to note that House talked to King George at Buckingham palace in the morning of May 7th, and King George said, "Suppose they (Germany) should sink the Lusitania with American passengers on board. . . ." Note Seymour, op. cit., I, 432.

⁵⁷ Baker, op. cit., V, 338. For the full text of the Lusitania Note, see Appendix I.

a protest against the objectionable conduct of the Allies which will keep them from rejoicing and show Germany that we are defending our rights from aggression from both sides.⁵⁸

Bryan suggested that some kind of a public statement accompany the note to the effect that "strict accountability" need not mean an immediate accounting until peace was restored. He also suggested that the United States extend to Germany the principle embodied in the "cooling-off" treaties with the Allies. These suggestions were to give rise to the famous supplementary statement, or "postscript".

To these suggestions Wilson replied on May 13, 1915:

After sleeping over your suggestion, I have this to propose: It would be wise, I think, to give out a direct statement; but I think the same purpose would be served by such a 'tip' as the enclosed, accompanying the publication of the note. And it would be best that this tip should be given out from the Executive Office, while the note was given out by the Department of State. What do you think?⁵⁹

Bryan was greatly relieved and prepared to have the "postscript" sent out with the note. In the meantime, Lansing had discovered what was in the wind, and with Garrison, Burleson and Tumulty, called on the President. Whether owing to these remonstrances, or to his own reconsideration of the subject, Wilson wrote Bryan a second letter on May 13, 1915:

⁵⁸ Ibid., V, 339.

⁵⁹ Bryan, op. cit., p. 400.

Since I expressed my approval of the statement you suggested for the press, I have heard something, indirectly, from the German Embassy, which convinces me that we would lose all chance of bringing Germany to reason if we in any way or degree indicated to them, or to our own public, that this note was merely the first word in a prolonged debate. I will tell you what I have in mind when I do not have to write it.

In the meantime, I beg that you will pardon me for changing my mind thus. I am sure that it is the safer course, the one more likely to produce the results we are all praying for. Please withdraw the message (the supplementary statement) altogether. If we say anything of the kind it must be a little later, after the not(e) has had its first effect.⁶⁰

Thus on May 13, 1915, the note, practically as drafted by Wilson, was transmitted to Germany.⁶¹ It was signed by Bryan and went out unaccompanied by the postscript which he had counted on modifying it. Bryan now relied upon a compensatory protest against

⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 401-2. Wilson further explains on October 30, 1916: "No postscript or amendment of the Lusitania note was ever written or contemplated by me except such changes as I myself inserted which strengthened and emphasized the protest. It was suggested, after the note was ready for transmission, that an intimation be conveyed to the German Government that a proposal for arbitration would be acceptable, and one member of the Cabinet spoke to me about it, but it was never discussed in the Cabinet meeting, and no threat of any resignation was ever made, for the very good reason that I rejected the suggestion after giving it such consideration as I thought every proposal deserved which touched so grave a matter. It was inconsistent with the purpose of the note. The public is in possession of everything that was said to the German Government." Baker, op. cit., V, 341.

⁶¹ See Foreign Relations of the United States, Supplementary, 1915, pp. 393-96. Also see Appendix J.

Great Britain's blockade measures and some action to restrain Americans from travelling on British ships. On May 14, 1915, Bryan wrote Wilson:

At my request he (Lansing) prepared a notice such as we discussed, warning passengers against taking these ships pending negotiations. He is doubtful about the wisdom of issuing the notice, fearing that it may raise the question as to why we did not issue an earlier notice. While this question may be asked, I think it is better for us to have the question asked and answered, rather than run the risk of any more attacks. I believe that the issuance of such a notice would not only be likely to protect the lives of some Americans and thus lessen the chances of another calamity, but would have its effect upon the tone of the German reply and might point the way to an understanding. At least it would probably prevent anything like a summary dismissal of our protest. . . .⁶²

Wilson replied the same day:

My feeling is this: the request is unnecessary, if the object is to save lives, because the danger is already fully known and those who do not refrain because of the danger will not, in all probability, refrain because we request them to do so; and this is not the time to make it, not only for the reason Mr. Lansing suggests, but also because, as I urged this morning, it weakens the effect of our saying to Germany that we mean to support our citizens in the exercise of their right to travel both on our ships and on belligerent. If I thought the notice necessary, or effective, to save lives, the second objection might be waived, but since I do not, I think the second objective ought to prevail.⁶³

Thus two of Bryan's cherished plans for modifying American diplomacy had both been rejected -- postponing the accounting with

⁶² Bryan, op. cit., p. 402.

⁶³ Ibid., p. 403.

Germany as we were doing with England, and getting our citizens out of the way of retaliatory processes. However, one chance remained⁶⁴ -- that of trying to exact from England the same strict respect that we were exacting from Germany. To this Wilson had agreed, and to this hope Bryan now clung.

Bryan again wrote Wilson on May 16, 1915, asking if he would not send a protest to Britain. However, Wilson was being persuaded by a letter sent by House on the same day, intimating that Britain might lift the food embargo to Germany. However, by May 18, 1915, when House's letters became more pessimistic, Wilson cabled House showing his determination to go on with the protest to Britain as Bryan urged. It was folly to think that even if Grey had initiated his proposal of lifting the food embargo Germany would have accepted, for Germany had clearly stated that raw materials of manufacture must also be permitted to come in before she would drop her submarine campaign. Wilson must have perceived these difficulties for on the 23rd he wrote House:

In your conversations with Sir Edward, please make it plain that it is not foodstuffs only in which we are interested, but all non-contraband shipments to neutral ports, and that the purchase of our cotton illegally intercepted does not help matters because it is the

⁶⁴ This explains why Bryan signed the first note and remained in the Cabinet. Houston claims that Bryan's signing of the first note and refusal to sign the second note was inconsistent and, thus, Bryan's reasons for signing were little personal reasons.

principal and not the money we insist on.

We feel that the blockade recently proclaimed has not been made in fact effective and the impression prevails here that Sir Edward Grey has not been able to fulfill his assurances given us at the time of the Order in Council that the order would be carried out in such a way as not to affect our essential rights.

There is an accumulating public opinion here upon our matters of which I think the ministers there should know, and the recent explanations do not touch the essence or meet the opinion.⁶⁵

Possibly House was being used by Britain again for the policy of delay. Wilson was undoubtedly annoyed at the inactivity of House. On May 28th came a cablegram from House stating all of Page's hopeful predictions of improvement of British conduct as well as House's advice that no new note be sent until the British Government had answered the last one, and until the German answer to the United States' note of May 13th was in.⁶⁶ Thus the last of Bryan's hopes of a counter-balancing protest was frustrated, for only three days later, May 31st, the German reply to the American note reached Washington. From that time on the break between Wilson and Bryan became inevitable.

When the German reply to the President's note came in on May 31st, Bryan's anxiety greatly increased. It seemed to him that unless drastic changes were made in America's policy, war and possibly immediate war would occur. The note itself was argumentative

⁶⁵ Baker, op. cit., V, 346.

⁶⁶ See Foreign Relations of the United States, Supplement, 1915, p. 407.

and unsatisfactory in that it did not directly meet the American contentions and demands. It implied that the policy of the submarine blockade would be continued and that cases involving neutrals arising under it would be dealt with individually. Finally, it ventured to contest the American assertion that the sinking of the Lusitania was inexcusable and attempted to discuss the matter.⁶⁷

Wilson began at once to draft a reply, working entirely alone. The note seems to have been completed in one evening, May 31st, with possible corrections early in the morning of June 1st. The President's proposed note again insisted upon the principles embodied in acknowledged international law:

Whatever be the other facts regarding the Lusitania, the principal fact is that a great steamer, primarily and chiefly a conveyance for passengers, and carrying more than a thousand souls who had no part or lot in the conduct of the war, was torpedoed and sunk without so much as a challenge or a warning, and that men, women, and children were sent to their death in circumstances unparalleled in modern warfare. The fact that more than one hundred American citizens were among

⁶⁷ There is some conjecture of thought that the Germans answered the note in this manner due to Bryan's talk with the Austrian Ambassador to the United States, Dumba. After their talks, Dumba concluded that the United States did not take the note seriously. Actually Bryan had said nothing of the kind, although it was known that he was against Wilson's policies. Perhaps he betrayed this feeling in not what he said, but rather in how he said it. Nevertheless, Bryan was completely exonerated both by Wilson and the newspapers. Note Bryan, op. cit., pp. 377-82, for the Dumba episode. This incident had nothing directly to do with Bryan's resignation.

those who perished made it the duty of the Government of the United States to speak of these things and once more, with solemn emphasis, to call the attention of the imperial German Government to the grave responsibility which the Government of the United States conceives that it has incurred in this tragic occurrence, and to the indisputable principle upon which that responsibility rests. The Government of the United States is contending for something much greater than mere rights of property or privileges of commerce. It is contending for nothing less high and sacred than the rights of humanity, which every government honors itself in respecting and which no government is justified in resigning on behalf of those under its care and authority.⁶⁸

On June 2, 1915, Bryan wrote Wilson pleading for delay in sending the reply, arguing that ample time should be given for deliberation in the spirit of the cooling-off treaties.

He also favored judicial consideration of the allegations of fact brought by the Germans, arguing that the preliminary requirement of acceptance of principles was contrary to customary procedure. He disagreed with Lansing on the rights of passengers in armed ships, arguing 'the character of the vessel is determined, not by whether she resists or not, but by whether she is armed or not . . . the fact that she is armed raises the presumption that she will use her arms.'⁶⁹

On June 5, 1915, Houston records that the Cabinet thought the note was admirable except for slight modification:

I suggested that it would be useless to demand flatly that Germany give up the use of the submarine, but that it was imperative that he demand that she use it in accordance with the law of nations and the dictates of

⁶⁸ Ibid., V, 353.

⁶⁹ Ibid., V, 354.

humanity, and that she must not imperil or destroy our ships, or endanger the lives of our citizens travelling on ships on which they had a right to travel. I suggested that he lay the emphasis on our own ships and on the safety of our own citizens on whatever ships they were lawfully travelling, and that other neutral nations might be trusted to do their own protesting about their ships and citizens.⁷⁰

Bryan, still opposing opinions such as those of Houston, wrote to Wilson again on June 5th. Although the letter contained no new points, it was a very heartfelt plea and is therefore worth quoting:

The fact that the note to Germany has not yet been completed encourages me to trespass upon your time for a moment to present again three matters which, to my mind, are necessary to insure us against war with Germany.

First, a reference to the plan embodied in our thirty treaties -- the principle of which has been accepted by Germany. Her mention of arbitration opens the way and makes the suggestion easy, if it does not in fact compel the suggestion. It will ensure a peaceful settlement of this controversy. . . .

Second, steps to prevent passenger ships from carrying ammunition. This is referred to by Germany. Action ought, in my judgment, to be taken before the reply is sent.

Third, before we send another note to Germany, I think we should make a renewed protest to Great Britain against interference with our trade with neutrals. These three propositions have been under consideration before. The first was decided upon -- that is the idea was given to the public and communicated to Germany -- but you were dissuaded by something that you heard. The second is thought by the Attorney General to be possible -- and even if it could not be accomplished as a matter of fact, the same end could be reached almost as well by advice such as was given to Americans in Mexico. The third suggestion was

⁷⁰ Houston, op. cit., II, 39, 40.

about to be carried out but you were dissuaded by a message from Mr. House.

If the initiative were with us I would not fear war, for I am sure you do not want it, but when the note is sent it is Germany's next move. . . . If the note causes her to act in an unfriendly way it may cause conditions here that will increase the difficulties of our position. This may be our last chance to speak for peace, for it will be much harder to propose investigation after some unfriendly act than now.⁷¹

Wilson, in a possible compromise attempt, wrote Bryan on June 5, 1915, a letter which was to spell defeat for the Commoner:

I am inclined to think that we ought to take steps as you suggest, to prevent our citizens from travelling on ships carrying munitions of war, and I shall seek to find the legal way to do it. I fear that, whatever it may be best to do about that, it is clearly impossible to act before the new note goes to Germany.

I am sorry to say that, study as I may the way to do it without hopelessly weakening our protest, I cannot find a way to embody in our note the principle of long discussion of a very simple state of facts; and I think that our object with England can be gained better by not sending it; and, after all, it is our object and the relief of our trade that we wish to accomplish.

I recast the note last night. I hope you will think a little better of it.

I would be very much obliged if you would go over it for substance, making any suggestion that may occur to you.⁷²

Thus, Bryan had seen all his hopes dashed on the rocks. He could not get a counter-balancing protest to England; he could not get the President to agree on Americans travelling on the high seas;

⁷¹ Curti, op. cit., p. 212.

⁷² Baker, op. cit., V, 355.

and finally he was unable to get the principle of long discussion or his cooling off treaty principle, embodied in the second note. He felt that as phrased, and particularly with no protest having been sent to England the note left Germany no chance to do anything but refuse to discontinue her submarine warfare. That could only mean war. Bryan felt that his only recourse was to resign, which he did on June 8, 1915.

On June 8, 1915, Wilson received the following letter of resignation from Bryan:

My dear Mr. President:

It is with sincere regret that I have reached the conclusion that I should return to you the commission of Secretary of State with which you honored me at the beginning of your administration.

Obedient to your sense of duty and actuated by the highest motives, you have prepared for transmission to the German Government a note in which I cannot join without violating what I deem to be an obligation to my country, and the issue involved is of such moment that to remain a member of the Cabinet would be as unfair to you as it would be to the cause which is nearest my heart, namely, the prevention of war.

I, therefore, respectfully tender my resignation, to take effect when the note is sent, unless you prefer an earlier hour. (Alike) desirous of reaching a peaceful solution of the problems arising out of the use of the submarines against merchantmen, we find ourselves differing irreconcilably as to the methods which should be employed.

It falls to your lot to speak officially for the nation; I consider it to be none the less my duty to endeavor as a private citizen to promote the end which you have in view by means which you do not feel at liberty to use.

In severing the intimate and pleasant relations which have existed between us during the past two years, permit me to

acknowledge the profound satisfaction which it has given me to be associated with you in the important work which has come before the State Department, and to thank you for the courtesies extended.

With the heartiest good wishes for your personal welfare and for the success of your administration, I am, my dear Mr. President,

Very truly yours,

W. J. Bryan.⁷³

On the same day Wilson replied to Bryan's resignation:

My dear Mr. Bryan:

I accept your resignation only because you insist upon its acceptance; and I accept it with much more than deep regret, with a feeling of personal sorrow. Our two years of close association have been very delightful to me. Our judgments have accorded in practically every matter of official duty and of public policy until now; your support of the work and purposes of the administration has been generous and loyal beyond praise; your devotion to the duties of your great office and your eagerness to take advantage of every great opportunity for service it offered has been an example to the rest of us; you have earned our affectionate admiration and friendship. Even now we are not separated in the object we seek but only in the method by which we seek it.

It is for these reasons my feeling about your retirement from the Secretaryship of State goes so much deeper than regret. I sincerely deplore it. Our objects are the same and we ought to pursue them together. I yield to your desire only because I must and wish to bid you Godspeed in the parting. We shall continue to work for the same causes even when we do not work in the same way.

With affectionate regard, sincerely yours,

Woodrow Wilson.⁷⁴

⁷³ Bryan, op. cit., pp. 406-7.

⁷⁴ Ibid., pp. 407-8.

Many people, as did Secretary Houston, held the opinion that Bryan had resigned to promote an active campaign on the outside against the policies of Wilson and, furthermore that he had quit under fire.⁷⁵ Houston held that Bryan could not logically sign the first note and not sign the second note. We have already seen why Bryan signed the first note and not the second. Bryan had drawn the conclusion from Wilson's letter accepting his resignation that both he and Wilson were working for the same ends, but that Wilson because he had the high office of presidency could not actively campaign for the method of peace as suggested by Bryan. The Commoner also thought the people wanted what he stood for; that is, the consideration of every possible opportunity for arbitration. Thus Bryan did not resign for petty reasons, although he had many, nor did he quit under fire. Daniels records a meeting between McAdoo and Bryan:

McAdoo told Bryan, 'This will destroy you', (the resignation of Bryan) to which Bryan replied, 'I believe you are right; I think this will destroy me; but whether it does or not, I must do my duty according to my conscience, and if I am destroyed it is, after all, merely the sacrifice that one must make to serve God and his country.'⁷⁶

Both House and Page were greatly relieved at Bryan's resignation. They both felt that Wilson could now be more sure that his Cabinet would support unanimously any measures that might be necessary to

⁷⁵ Houston, op. cit., II, 146-47.

⁷⁶ Daniels, op. cit., p. 430.

carry out his policies.⁷⁷ House also recorded that Bryan told Gregory after he had resigned that there had been inserted in the second note a sentence which Bryan had written. The Commoner claimed the insertion had been eliminated before his resignation, and was again placed in the note after his resignation. "Mr. Bryan evidently wished it to appear that he resigned because the President refused to include a certain sentence modifying the note, and, after he resigned, the sentence was used."

Thus, the question arises, did Bryan know of the sentence placed in the note before or after he resigned? The insertion placed in the note was as follows:

If the Imperial German Government should deem itself to be in possession of convincing evidence that the officials of the Government of the United States did not perform these duties with thoroughness the Government of the United States sincerely hopes that it will submit that evidence for consideration.⁷⁸

In other words this addition left the door open between the United States and Germany for further diplomatic negotiations. Without this addition, the door was closed. As we have seen, Bryan throughout the years he served as Secretary of State stood for the principle of mediation. If there was the slightest bit of hope for mediation, Bryan was in favor. Bryan resigned because he thought the note would lead to war with Germany. He would not

⁷⁷ Seymour, op. cit., II, 8

⁷⁸ Bryan, op. cit., pp. 408-9.

have thought this in all probability if the principle of mediation had been contained in the note.

We have also seen that in the letter of Wilson to Bryan on June 5th, the President would not consider Bryan's suggestion with regard to American rights on the sea until after the note was sent. The President also stated he knew of no way to insert the principle of "long discussion" without destroying the object of the note to Germany. The recasting of the note was done before the President's letter to Bryan. In other words the President stated on June 5th that he could not embody the principle of "long discussion" contained in the cooling-off treaties in his note to Germany. Recasting was done on June 5th and the principle of mediation was not in the note, but it did appear in the final drafting of the note on June 9th. Bryan must not have known of the insertion for his resignation was tendered on June 8th and he had not seen the note since June 5th.⁷⁹

Bryan refused to discuss the change in the note after he had left office. The public failed to find in the altered note an ultimatum to Germany and the Commoner was lashed both by the press and the people for leaving his post and for claiming the note was harsher than, in its final form, it proved to be. Bryan calmly

⁷⁹ The investigator has checked with the Archives in Washington for the steps in the drafting of the note but received no satisfaction. However, it is still logical to assume Bryan had no knowledge of the change at the time his resignation was tendered and accepted.

made speeches urging the people to support more strongly the President in offers of mediation. However, when war was declared nearly two years later he offered his services to the country. Daniels recorded that Bryan in his support of the war declared:

There is one choice we cannot make, we are incapable of making; we will not choose the path of submission and suffer the most sacred rights of our nation and our people to be ignored or violated. The wrongs against which we now array ourselves are no common wrongs: they cut to the very roots of human life.⁸⁰

Josephus Daniels quoted the following words, from Oliver Wendell Holmes, which best described the nature of the services of Bryan for his country:

What if another sit beneath the shade
Of the broad elm I planted by the way --
What if another heed the beacon light
I set upon the rock that wrecked my keel, --
Have I not done my task and served my kind?⁸¹

⁸⁰ Daniels, op. cit., p. 433.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 115.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

As we have seen William Jennings Bryan was the man most responsible in securing for Wilson the nomination for President at the Baltimore Convention. Bryan, had he so desired, had many chances to defeat Wilson. The Commoner had first been offered the job as temporary chairman of the Convention, but had refused. By the time of the Convention Bryan was nearly convinced that Champ Clark was controlled by the big interests; thus, he did not want to accept the offer, made by Clark, of the position of temporary chairman. The Bryan-Parker telegram episode more clearly crystallized the thinking of Bryan, for Wilson was the only candidate who had answered favorably to Bryan. The Bryan resolution was the death blow to the hopes of Clark and resulted in a Wilson victory for the nomination. Even against the instructions of the Nebraska delegation, the Commoner voted for Wilson. Bryan's choice, in turn, influenced a great many other delegations. Bryan threw his great political influence to Wilson because Wilson was an outstanding progressive. The Commoner knew that an out-and-out progressive was needed in order that the Democratic Party might gain the victory in November. There was little to fear from the Republican Party if a progressive candidate were elected. The Republican Party had split its loyalties between Taft and Roosevelt with the latter being the

only one to fear. If the Democrats put up a strong progressive candidate, even Roosevelt had little chance of winning. Thus, the Commoner was more than indirectly responsible for Woodrow Wilson's becoming President of the United States.

The part that Colonel Edward M. House played in the convention is not definitely known. The Colonel, although 3,000 miles away, claimed to control the Texas delegation and a few other delegates which were enough to keep Clark from getting a two-thirds majority. Thereby, House claims a great share in Wilson's securing the nomination. Actual proof is missing. No scholar seems to have checked any of the delegates from Texas to prove one way or another the claim of House. However, both the accounts of Daniels and Ray Stannard Baker take the view that House controlled no delegates whatsoever. Neither does Tumulty make any mention of House's influence in the Convention and McCombs completely refutes the idea. In conjunction with other claims of House which appear also to be false, the author believes that House only wanted to take share in the glory. The Colonel did not want to serve in a responsible position, as in the cabinet. Actually, not enough study has been done on the subject to make a positive statement.

House's part in securing the confidence of Wilson and the powers he derived from Wilson's trust have not been clearly explained. It is known that House early gave up the notion to enter politics in the open. He saw that only a few men in the House and Senate practically ruled the country along with the President. House wanted to be the power behind the throne. Probably through his many letters showing

himself to be completely in accord with the President, he secured the President's confidence. The President became more and more convinced that House and he were of the same mind. This was a fatal mistake by the President, for House disagreed with many things the President believed in: confidence in the people, military preparation, dollar diplomacy, and the banking system. Although House disagreed with Wilson, he still sent Wilson letters expressing his accord, thus preserving the idea that he and Wilson were of the same mind.

Bryan was appointed Secretary of State largely by the insistence of House. One of the greatest faults that House found with Bryan was that he could not be advised. Thus, House did not urge Bryan's appointment in order to advise him. Bryan was not particularly fitted, as no doubt others were, for filling the Secretaryship of State. Although Bryan understood domestic issues rather well, he was ill-informed at the time of his appointment on foreign affairs. Thus, House did not urge him for the position because of his ability to serve in this capacity. The only reasonable explanation is that House urged the appointment of Bryan as Secretary of State in order to get him out of the way. Bryan carried, and had long enjoyed a large public following which could easily defeat the plans of not only House and Page, but even Wilson himself. House's plan, undoubtedly, was to get Bryan into the office and then work around him. On the outside of the Administration Bryan might have proved to be too difficult to handle.

Hardly more than a month after the inauguration the newspapers were full of articles to the effect that the President was ignoring Bryan and his office. The Commoner reassured the country that he and the President were in sympathetic unity on all matters of importance in foreign policy. Yet Wilson constantly wrote important instructions which ordinarily the Secretary of State would draft; and, he kept in close touch with foreign countries, and with our Ambassadors abroad, through Colonel House, with the result that Bryan often did not know what was going on, or what the President's real position was. In spite of this, as well as many efforts made to break up the relations of Wilson and Bryan, Wilson had both confidence in, and admiration for Bryan. It was this attitude which made Bryan's position tolerable by giving him some opportunity to influence the administration. It is therefore important to judge Bryan's consistency to his peace principles in situations in which he had reasonable freedom. Yet it is also important not to forget that in major policies Bryan had to follow rather than lead. Many who have criticized his inconsistencies have forgotten that. Such examples of Bryan's inconsistencies are: his approval of force in the Huerta crisis; and, his seemingly apparent approval of the use of dollar diplomacy in the Caribbean area. These inconsistencies show that Bryan was not a pacifist to the point of peace at any price.

The Commoner, like Wilson, was convinced that force was necessary in Mexico. However, in this case, he followed the ideas of Wilson. Wilson believed that no moral, stable government could

exist if it obtained its power through force and not through the expressed wishes of the people. Bryan deeply believed in Wilson's policy and felt that the intervention of the United States was for the benefit of the Mexican people. Bryan did not take the position that the United States had no right to interfere into the affairs of other governments whether for their benefit or not.

It was an ironic fact indeed that both Bryan and Wilson abhorred dollar diplomacy, and yet found themselves using this policy, if anything even to a great extent, in the Caribbean area. Yet there was probably little either of the men could do. Because of past administration, the government was committed to its businessmen. Bryan had proposed a plan by which the government itself should lend the necessary capital, but Wilson was not yet ready to flaunt big business. Bryan then proposed a type of protectorate over the Caribbean nations, for they were desperately in need of financial aid and something had to be done at once. The Commoner felt that in this case, the American government would still be the controlling factor and could protect these nations from being exploited by big business. He also saw that if the United States did not do something at once, these nations might turn to Europe for help. This might in turn lead to the United States invoking the Monroe Doctrine and if this occurred, war might result. However, the Senate refused to confirm Bryan's plan and the Commoner had no other course but to allow the businessmen to continue their practise of dollar diplomacy.

The last inconsistency to keep in mind is that although Bryan was a pacifist, he did not allow his pacifism to extend so far as to be inconsistent with his principles of nationalism. Although Count Leo Tolstoy influenced his life, the Commoner did not believe in the Spanish-American War; he had authorized the use of force in Mexico as well as in the Caribbean states; and, when the United States entered World War I, he again volunteered his services immediately. While serving in the capacity of Secretary of State, his position had always been that if we were to enter on one side or the other, let us do it, but, if we were to remain neutral, then let us do that.

Bryan believed the greatest contribution he had made to world peace was embodied in his "cooling off" treaties. Although treaties of arbitration, they were intended "to provide means for the peaceful solution of all questions of difference which it shall be found impossible in the future to settle by diplomacy." This was a recognition of one of the essential ideas that Bryan had continuously worked for. The second article in the text provided for the creation of joint high commissions of inquiry, instituted for each difference, and committing the parties to abstain from hostilities during the year in which the commission made its investigation. Recommendations of the commission were not to be binding.

A month after Bryan took office as Secretary of State, he began taking carefully planned steps for the negotiation of his arbitration treaties. He had already secured Wilson's approval before taking

office. As a result of Cabinet discussion, certain minor changes were made in the draft which Bryan had drawn up. The Commoner then went to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and won its approval. Partly due to the committee's objection and partly to fear that the larger foreign Powers might be opposed, a provision that the period of investigation would not be used for a change in the naval or military program of the contracting parties, was omitted. Ironically the outbreak of World War I may have saved these treaties for the preservation of peace, for only a bare quorum voted on the treaties. The rest of the Senators did not take interest in the treaties.

Bryan was not given a clear opportunity to learn the European situation. He did not receive the confidential despatches of Page, but House did. The Colonel kept himself on intimate relations with the Ambassadors Page, Herrick, and Gerard. Bryan received little information from the President, for Wilson seemed to be more worried over domestic issues. Wilson was content for some time to let House have an almost free rein in the European situation. Bryan had decided to make a trip several times to Europe to study the situation at first hand, but due to House's dissuading the President, the Commoner was not able to realize the trip. House had contributed nothing to peace but he had gone to Europe both in 1914 and 1915 to study and report to the President what he saw in Europe. Although Wilson had decided to become his own Secretary of State, it is

difficult to understand why he could let a man not even commissioned go to Europe and at the same time let his own Secretary of State who was bearing the heavy responsibilities of that position, remain at home not knowing what was happening -- but that was House's plan and thanks also to Page, it succeeded.

When House got to Europe in 1914, he seems to have started on a deliberate attempt to ruin the reputation as well as the powers of the Secretary of State. Europe as a whole seems to have trusted the American people but not the American Government. When House spread the words that unlike the Secretary of State, the President was strong, courageous and iron-willed, this only added to their beliefs. They were told many times not to take the Secretary seriously, and perhaps this as much as anything else explains why the Germans did not take the First Lusitania Note seriously.

In both of his missions, which House termed "The Great Adventure", he succeeded in doing nothing for the United States, but on the other hand, became a pawn of the Allies. Both House and Page have this dubious distinction. Early Allied diplomacy was based on delay, delay in order to build their war machine and delay in order to tie their own economic policies with those of the United States. To these policies House contributed a great deal for he constantly urged Wilson to delay time and time again when Wilson planned to send a note of protest to England concerning infringements upon American rights on the high seas.

The American policy of neutrality, as laid down by Wilson, was defeated in House's policies of delay. Bryan was constantly urging policies of arbitration which were very statesmanlike, but they were all blocked. House had become convinced that America's only policy should be the complete devastation of German militarism. This certainly was a strange position for a peacemaker to take! Although Wilson had sent House on a peace mission, House in 1915 completely denied this as the purpose of his mission. He had succeeded in helping the Allies delay the President's notes of protest; he had succeeded in keeping Wilson from proclaiming an ammunition embargo; he had succeeded in keeping Bryan from going to Europe; and, he had succeeded in keeping Bryan's mediation proposals from being used.

Ambassador Page was even more pro-British, if possible, than House. He constantly urged Wilson that the British were engaged in a struggle that America itself should be fighting. Page even went so far as to help Sir Edward Grey form replies to protests sent by the United States. It was Page who added to Wilson's hesitancy by his drawn-line formula. He informed Wilson that the war would soon be a drawn line stalemate and that after a period of time both sides would be more agreeable to mediation. This policy was in accord with the British policy of delay.

Bryan, after seeing his last hope crushed, decided he could do nothing else but resign. He had seen his mediation efforts go thwarted. He had stated that if we were to choose sides, then we should do it; but, if we were to become neutral, than we should

be absolutely neutral. Bryan was unable to get the President to send a protest to England at the same time he sent the first and second Lusitania Notes. He had promised the people that while he was in office there would be no war, and he could see nothing left but war if the Second Note were sent to Germany. It is probable that he knew nothing of the addition which toned down the note, but even this would probably not have kept him in office. Again there has not been enough study on the actual drafting of the note to prove whether Bryan knew of the addition to the note or not. The author believes it likely that he had no knowledge of this insertion.

Finally, the author would like to discuss the value of the Intimate Papers of Colonel House. It is understood by this author that this book is the generally accepted work of the period. The author believes that although the book is valuable in the sense that it shows the works of House in respect to Wilson, Bryan, and Page, that it is not historically true in so many places, that if used at all it must be used with extreme reservations. There are too many inaccuracies in the book, such as: House's advising Wilson on the tariff which was not true; House's claiming to draw up the Glass-Owen currency reform bill, which was not true; House's attempts to show his being in complete accord with Wilson, which was not true; House's claim that he controlled the Texas delegation thus making Wilson's nomination possible which appears to be false; and House's claim that his missions to Europe were not for the

purpose of making peace overtures when they were supposed to be.

Thus it appears that House tried to claim most of the glory that should have been given to William Jennings Bryan. Bryan, himself, seems not to have noticed House's intrigue, or at least to have made no mention of it. The Commoner probably would not have gone out of his way to claim any credit and never did so in his career except when confronted with false information. The Commoner had a record of service to the cause of democracy that could speak for itself. In 1890, he had stood practically alone for the popular election of United States' Senators; he had constantly urged the passing of an income tax since 1891. Although the bill failed to pass, it was in every platform on which he ran for President, and shortly before he became Secretary of State, the bill was made law. He was one of the foremost workers in the issues of woman suffrage and prohibition; and, he was to a great deal responsible for securing the passage of the Federal Reserve Act. There are many more policies that he stood for and aided in securing as law, but none stand out more than his cooling-off treaties. Thus, the Commoner took undeserved abuse from the public in resigning. He was denounced as a coward and accused of having had to resign under pressure. None of these statements were true, but the Commoner did little in defending himself, for he feared that Wilson might have had to take abuse from the public. He resigned not because he felt antagonism towards

anyone, although he had plenty of reasons, but merely on a difference of principle. He believed that he was serving both his God and the American people -- nothing more or nothing less.

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Seymour, Charles, American Diplomacy During the World War. Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1942.

The work is valuable for source references and gives discussion on Allied interference with neutral trade and efforts to negotiate peace.

_____, American Neutrality, 1914-1917. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1935.

This work is similar to the preceding book except that it is a more intensive study.

Tansill, Charles Callan, America Goes to War. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1942.

This work is a comprehensive and intensive study of Bryan as Secretary of State. Its purpose is to find why American went to war, but the period covered in the early part of the book is important to this thesis. It is well documented.

Van Alstyne, Richard W., American Diplomacy in Action. Stanford University, California: Stanford University Press, 1944.

The book covers the period 1783-1918. It gives information on Bryan and the Nicaraguan Treaties.

Periodicals

Adler, Selig, "Bryan and Wilsonian Caribbean Penetration," Hispanic American Historical Review, 20:198, February, 1940.

This work is a good study on the subject of Bryan and the Caribbean. It was especially important on the Nicaraguan question and Bryan's policies.

WHY BRYAN CHANGED FROM CLAVE TO WILSON

(From the Official Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention, 1912, page 113.)

Mr. Bryan, of Nebraska, known as a progressive State. Only twice has she given her vote to a Democratic candidate for President, in 1896 and in 1900, and on both occasions her vote was cast for a progressive ticket, running upon a progressive platform. Between these two elections, in the election of 1904, she gave a Republican plurality of 35,000 against a Democratic reactionary. In the recent primaries the total vote cast for the Republican State was over 50,000, and the vote cast for Wilson amounting over 12,000, showing that the party is now more than three-fourths progressive. The Republican party of Nebraska is progressive in about the same proportion. The situation in Nebraska is not materially different from the situation throughout the country west of the Alleghenies. In the recent Republican primaries, fully two-thirds of the Republican vote was cast for candidates representing progressive policies.

APPENDIX A

In this campaign the progressive sentiment is overwhelming. Every candidate has proclaimed himself a progressive. No candidate would have any considerable following in this convention if he admitted himself out of harmony with progressive ideas.

By your resolution, adopted eight weeks last, you, by a vote of more than four to one, pledged the country that you would nominate for the Presidency no man who represented or was obligated to farmers, Ryan, Belmont, or any other member of the privilege-seeking, money-hunting class. This pledge, if kept, will have more influence on the

WHY BRYAN CHANGED FROM CLARK TO WILSON

(From the Official Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention, 1912, page 233.)

Mr. Bryan, of Nebraska: Nebraska is a progressive State. Only twice has she given her vote to a Democratic candidate for President, in 1898 and in 1908, and on both occasions her vote was cast for a progressive ticket, running upon a progressive platform. Between these two elections, in the election of 1904, she gave a Republican plurality of 85,000 against a Democratic reactionary. In the recent primaries the total vote cast for Clark and Wilson was over 34,000, and the vote cast for Harmon something over 12,000, showing that the party is now more than three-fourths progressive. The Republican party of Nebraska is progressive in about the same proportion. The situation in Nebraska is not materially different from the situation throughout the country west of the Alleghenies. In the recent Republican primaries, fully two-thirds of the Republican vote was cast for candidates representing progressive policies.

In this convention the progressive sentiment is overwhelming. Every candidate has proclaimed himself a progressive. No candidate would have any considerable following in this convention if he admitted himself out of harmony with progressive ideas.

By your resolution, adopted night before last, you, by a vote of more than four to one, pledged the country that you would nominate for the Presidency no man who represented or was obligated to Morgan, Ryan, Belmont, or any other member of the privilege-seeking, favor-hunting class. This pledge, if kept, will have more influence on the

result of the election than the platform or the name of the candidate. How can that pledge be made effective? There is but one way; namely, to nominate a candidate who is under no obligation to those whom these influences directly or indirectly control. The vote of the State of New York in this convention, as cast under the unit rule, does not represent the intelligence, the virtue, the Democracy or the patriotism of the ninety men who are here. It represents the will of one man -- Charles F. Murphy -- and he represents the influences that dominated the Republican convention at Chicago and are trying to dominate this convention. (Applause.) If we nominate a candidate under conditions that enable these influences to say to our candidate, "Remember now thy creator," we cannot hope to appeal to the confidence of the progressive Democrats and Republicans of the nation. Nebraska, or that portion of the delegation for which I am authorized to speak, is not willing to violate the resolution adopted by this convention, and to accept the high honor of the Presidential nomination at the hands of Mr. Murphy. (Applause.)

When we were instructed for Mr. Clark, the Democratic voters who instructed us did so with the distinct understanding that Mr. Clark stood for progressive Democracy. (Applause.) Mr. Clark's representatives appealed for support on no other ground. They contended that Mr. Clark was more progressive than Mr. Wilson, and indignantly denied that there was any cooperation between Mr. Clark and the reactionary element of the party. Upon no other condition could Mr. Clark have

received a plurality of the Democratic vote of Nebraska. The thirteen delegates for whom I speak stand ready to carry out the instructions given in the spirit in which they were given, and upon the conditions under which they were given (applause); but some of these delegates -- I can not say for how many I can speak, because we have not had a chance to take a poll -- will not participate in the nomination of any man whose nomination depends upon the fate of the New York delegation. (Applause.)

Speaking for myself and for any of the delegation who may decide to join me, I shall withhold my vote from Mr. Clark as long as New York's vote is recorded for him. (Applause.) And the position that I take in regard to Mr. Clark, I will take in regard to any other candidate whose name is now or may be before the convention. I shall not be a party to the nomination of any man, no matter who he may be, or from what section of the country he comes, who will not, when elected, be absolutely free to carry out the anti-Morgan-Ryan-Belmont resolution and make his administration reflect the wishes and the hopes of those who believe in a government of the people, by the people and for the people. (Applause.)

If we nominate a candidate who is under no obligation to these interests which speak through Mr. Murphy, I shall offer a resolution authorizing and directing the presidential candidate to select a campaign committee to manage the campaign, in order that he may not be compelled to suffer the humiliation and act under the embarrassment

that I have, in having men participate in the management of his campaign who have no sympathy with the party's aims, and in whose Democracy the general public has no confidence.

Having explained the position taken by myself and those in the delegation who view the subjects from the same standpoint, I will now announce my vote -- Mr. Bryan was here interrupted. Continuing, he said: Now I am prepared to announce my vote, unless again interrupted. With the understanding that I shall stand ready to withdraw my vote from the one for whom I am going to cast it whenever New York casts her vote for him, I cast my vote for Nebraska's second choice, Governor Wilson. (Applause.)

Note. -- The Nebraska State Democratic Convention held soon after the Baltimore Convention endorsed Mr. Bryan's action. If Mr. Bryan's constituents approved his course, who else has the right to complain?

The Memoirs of William Jennings Bryan
William Jennings and Mary Baird Bryan
pp. 522-24.

CENTRAL MESSAGE OF INTERNATIONAL YEAR

Addressed to the people, United Nations, 1955, and the
General Assembly, 1955, and the

INTERNATIONAL
YEAR 1955

Summary of the document

It is desirable to make the document, which was adopted and approved
unanimously, the most authoritative and practical instrument of the Year

APPENDIX B

of the Year. The main purpose of the document is to provide a
framework for the work of the Year. It is intended to be a guide
for the work of the Year. It is intended to be a guide for the work
of the Year. It is intended to be a guide for the work of the Year.

There are four main parts to this document. The first part
deals with the general principles of the Year. The second part
deals with the specific objectives of the Year. The third part
deals with the methods of work. The fourth part deals with the
organization of the Year. It is intended to be a guide for the work
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SPECIAL MESSAGE ON MEXICAN RELATIONS

(Address to Congress, August 27, 1913. From the "Congressional Record" 63D Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 50, pp. 3803-3804.)

Gentlemen of the Congress:

It is clearly my duty to lay before you, very fully and without reservation, the facts concerning our present relations with the Republic of Mexico. The deplorable posture of affairs in Mexico I need not describe, but I deem it my duty to speak very frankly of what this Government has done and should seek to do in fulfillment of its obligation to Mexico herself, as a friend and neighbor, and to American citizens whose lives and vital interests are daily affected by the distressing conditions which now obtain beyond our southern border.

Those conditions touch us very nearly. Not merely because they lie at our very doors. That, of course, makes us more vividly and more constantly conscious of them, and every instinct of neighborly interest and sympathy is aroused and quickened by them; but that is only one element in the determination of our duty. We are glad to call ourselves the friend of Mexico, and we shall I hope, have many an occasion, in happier times as well as in these days of trouble and confusion, to show that our friendship is genuine and disinterested, capable of sacrifice and every generous manifestation. The peace, prosperity, and contentment of Mexico mean more, much more to us than merely an enlarged field for our commerce and enterprise. They mean an enlargement of the field of self-government and the realization of the hopes and rights of

of a nation with whose best aspirations, so long suppressed and disappointed, we deeply sympathize. We shall yet prove to the Mexican people that we know how to serve them without first thinking how we shall serve ourselves.

But we are not the only friends of Mexico. The whole world desires her peace and progress; and the whole world is interested as never before. Mexico lies at last where all the world looks on. Central America is about to be touched by the great routes of the world's trade and intercourse running free from ocean to ocean at the Isthmus. The future has much in store for Mexico as for all the States of Central America, but the best gifts can come to her only if she be ready and free to receive them and to enjoy them honorably. America, in particular America north and south and upon both continents -- waits upon the development of Mexico; and that development can be sound and lasting only if it be the product of a genuine freedom, a just and ordered government founded upon law. Only so can it be peaceful or fruitful of the benefits of peace. Mexico has a great and enviable future, before her, if only she choose and attain the paths of honest constitutional government.

The present circumstances of the Republic, I deeply regret to say, do not seem to promise even the foundation of such a peace. We have waited many months, months full of peril and anxiety, for the conditions there to improve, and they have not improved. They have grown worse, rather. The territory in some sort controlled by the provisional authorities at Mexico City has grown smaller, not larger.

The prospect of the pacification of the country, even by arms, has seemed to grow more and more remote; and its pacification by the authorities at the capitol is evidently impossible by any other means than force. Difficulties more and more entangle those who claim to constitute the legitimate government of the Republic. They have not made good their claim in fact. Their successes in the field have proved only temporary. War and disorder, devastation and confusion, seem to threaten to become the settled fortune of the distracted country. As friends we could wait no longer for a solution which every week seemed further away. It was our duty at least to volunteer our good offices -- to offer to assist, if we might, in effecting some arrangement which would bring relief and peace and set up a universally acknowledged political authority there.

Accordingly, I took the liberty of sending the Hon. John Lind, formerly governor of Minnesota, as my personal spokesman and representative, to the City of Mexico, with the following instructions:

Press very earnestly up on the attention of those who are now exercising authority or wielding influence in Mexico the following considerations and advice:

The Government of the United States does not feel at liberty any longer to stand inactively by while it becomes daily more and more evident that no real progress is being made towards the establishment of a government at the City of Mexico which the country will obey and respect.

The Government of the United States does not stand in the same case with the other great Governments of the world in respect of what is happening or what is likely to happen in Mexico. We offer our good offices, not only because of our genuine desire to play the part of a friend, but also because we are expected by the powers of the world to act as Mexico's nearest friend.

We wish to act in these circumstances in the spirit of the most earnest and close interested friendship. It is our purpose in whatever we do or propose in this perplexing bad distressing situation not only to pay the most scrupulous regard to the sovereignty and independence of Mexico -- that we take as a matter of course to which we are bound by every obligation of right and honor -- but also to give every possible evidence that we act in the interest of Mexico alone, and not in the interest of any person or body of persons who may have personal or property claims in Mexico which they may feel that they have the right to press. We are seeking to counsel Mexico for her own good, and in the interest of her own peace, and not for any other purpose whatever. The Government of the United States would deem itself discredited if it had any selfish or ulterior purpose in transactions where the peace, happiness, and prosperity of a whole people are involved. It is acting as its friendship for Mexico, not as any selfish interest dictates.

The present situation in Mexico is incompatible with the fulfillment of international obligations on the part of Mexico, with the civilized development of Mexico herself, and with the maintenance of tolerable political and economic conditions in Central America. It is upon no common occasion, therefore, that the United States offers her counsel and assistance. All America cries out for a settlement.

A satisfactory settlement seems to us to be conditioned on --

(a) An immediate cessation of fighting throughout Mexico, a definite armistice solemnly entered into and scrupulously observed;

(b) Security given for an early and free election in which all will agree to take part;

(c) The consent of Gen. Huerta to bind himself not to be a candidate for election as President of the Republic at this election; and

(d) The agreement of all parties to abide by the results of the election and co-operate in the most loyal way in organizing and supporting the new administration.

The Government of the United States will be glad to play any part in this settlement or in its carrying out which it can play honorably and consistently with international right. It pledges itself to recognize and in every way possible and proper to assist the administration chosen and set up in Mexico in the way and on the conditions suggested.

Taking all the existing conditions into consideration, the Government of the United States can conceive of no reasons sufficient to justify those who are now attempting to shape the policy or

exercise the authority of Mexico in declining the offices of friendship thus offered. Can Mexico suggest any better way in which to show our friendship, and can Mexico give the civilized world a satisfactory reason for rejecting our good offices? If Mexico can suggest any better way in which to show our friendship, serve the people of Mexico, and meet our international obligations, we are more than willing to consider the suggestion.

Mr. Lind executed his delicate and difficult mission with singular tact, firmness, and good judgment, and made clear to the authorities at the City of Mexico not only the purpose of his visit but also the spirit in which it had been undertaken. But the proposals he submitted were rejected, in a note the full text of which I take the liberty of laying before you.

I am led to believe that they were rejected partly because the authorities at Mexico City had been grossly misinformed and misled upon two points. They did not realize the spirit of the American people in this matter, their earnest friendliness and yet sober determination that some just solution be found for the Mexican difficulties, and they did not believe that the present administration spoke through Mr. Lind, for the people of the United States. The effect of this unfortunate misunderstanding on their part is to leave them singularly isolated and without friends who can effectually aid them. So long as the misunderstanding continues we can only await the time of their awakening to a realization of the actual facts. We can not thrust our good offices upon them. The situation must be given a little more time to work itself out in the new circumstances; and I believe that only a little while will be necessary. For the circumstances are new. The

rejection of our friendship makes them new and will inevitably bring its own alterations in the whole aspect of affairs. The actual situation of the authorities at Mexico City will presently be revealed.

Meanwhile, what is it our duty to do? Clearly, everything that we do must be rooted in patience and done with calm and disinterested deliberation. Impatience on our part would be childish, and would be fraught with every risk of wrong and folly. We can afford to exercise the self-restraint of a really great nation which realizes its own strength and scorns to misuse it. It was our duty to offer our active assistance. It is now our duty to show what true neutrality will do to enable the people of Mexico to set their affairs in order again and wait for a further opportunity to offer our friendly counsels. The door is not closed against the resumption, either upon the initiative of Mexico or upon our own, of the effort to bring order out of the confusion by friendly co-operative action, should fortunate occasion offer.

While we wait, the contest of the rival forces will undoubtedly for a little while be sharper than ever, just because it will be plain that an end must be made of the existing situation, and that very promptly; and with the increased activity of the contending factions will come, it is to be feared, increased danger to the noncombatants in Mexico as well as to those actually in the field of battle. The position of outsiders is always particularly trying and full of hazard where there is civil strife and a whole country is upset. We should

earnestly urge all Americans to leave Mexico at once, and should assist them to get away in every way possible -- not because we would mean to slacken in the least our efforts to safeguard their lives and their interests, but because it is imperative that they should take no unnecessary risks when it is physically possible for them to leave the country. We should let every one who assumes to exercise authority in any part of Mexico know in the most unequivocal way that we shall vigilantly watch the fortunes of those Americans who can not get away, and shall hold those responsible for their sufferings and losses to a definite reckoning. That can be and will be made plain beyond the possibility of a misunderstanding.

For the rest, I deem it my duty to exercise the authority conferred upon me by the law of March 14, 1912, to see to it that neither side to the struggle now going on in Mexico receive any assistance from this side of the border. I shall follow the best practice of nations in the matter of neutrality by forbidding the exportation of arms or munitions of war of any kind from the United States to any part of the Republic of Mexico -- a policy suggested by several interesting precedents and certainly dictated by many manifest considerations of practical expediency. We can not in the circumstances be the partisans of either party to the contest that now distracts Mexico, or constitute ourselves the virtual empire between them.

I am happy to say that several of the great Governments of the world have given this Government their generous moral support in

urging upon the provisional authorities at the City of Mexico the acceptance of our proffered good offices in the spirit in which they were made. We have not acted in this matter under the ordinary principles of international obligation. All the world expects us in such circumstances to set as Mexico's nearest friend and intimate adviser. This is our immemorial relation towards her. There is nowhere any serious question that we have the moral right in the case or that we are acting in the interest of a fair settlement and of good government, not for the promotion of some selfish interest of our own. If further motive were necessary than our own good will towards a sister Republic and our own deep concern to see peace and order prevail in Central America, this consent of mankind to what we are attempting, this attitude of the great nations of the world towards what we may attempt in dealing with this distressed people at our doors, should make us feel the more solemnly bound to go to the utmost length of patience and forbearance in this painful and anxious business. The steady pressure of moral force will before many days break the barriers of pride and prejudice down, and we shall triumph as Mexico's friends sooner than we could triumph as her enemies -- and how much more handsomely, with how much higher and finer satisfactions of conscience and of honor!

The New Democracy
Ray Stannard Baker and
William E. Dodd, pp. 45-51.

A NEW LATIN-AMERICAN POLICY ADDRESS

Delivered before The Commercial Congress of Mobile,
Ala., October 27, 1913. From Official Publication
in Mr. Wilson's Files.)

It is with unaffected pleasure that I find myself here to-day. I have before had the pleasure, in another southern city, of addressing the Southern Commercial Congress. I then spoke of what the future seemed to hold in store for this region, which so many of us love and love the future of which we all look forward with so much confidence and hope. But another hour directed me here this time. I do not need to speak of the Senate, the next, perhaps, acquired the gift of speaking for myself. I came because I want to speak of our present and prospective relations with our neighbors to the south. I deemed it a public duty, as well as a personal pleasure, to be here to express for myself and for the Government I represent the welcome we all feel to those who represent the Latin American States.

The future, ladies and gentlemen, is going to be very different from this neighborhood from the past. These States lying to the south of us, which have always been our neighbors will now be drawn closer to us by immeasurable ties, and, I hope, chief of all, by the tie of a common understanding of each other. Interest does not tie nations together; it sometimes separates them. But sympathy and understanding does unite them, and I believe that by the new route that is just about to be opened, while we physically are too distant to meet, we spiritually unite them. It is a spiritual union which we seek.

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The future, ladies and gentlemen, is going to be very different from this hemisphere from the past. These States lying to the south of us, which have always been our neighbors will now be drawn closer to us by innumerable ties, and, I hope, chief of all, by the tie of a common understanding of each other. Interest does not tie nations together; it sometimes separates them. But sympathy and understanding does unite them, and I believe that by the new route that is just about to be opened, while we physically cut two continents asunder, we spiritually unite them. It is a spiritual union which we seek.

I wonder if you realize, I wonder if your imaginations have been filled with the significance of the tides of commerce. Your governor alluded in very fit and striking terms to the voyage of Columbus, but Columbus took his voyage under compulsion of circumstances. Constantinople had been captured by the Turks and all the routes of trade with the East had been suddenly closed. If there was not a way across the Atlantic to open those routes again, they were closed forever, and Columbus set out not to discover America, for he did not know that it existed, but to discover the eastern shores of Asia. He set sail for Cathay and stumbled upon America. With that change in the outlook of the world what happened? England, that had been at the back of Europe with an unknown sea behind her, found that all things had turned as if upon a pivot and she was at the front of Europe; and since then all the tides of energy and enterprise that have issued out of Europe have seemed to be turned westward across the Atlantic. But you will notice that they have turned westward chiefly north of the Equator and that is the northern half of the globe that has seemed to be filled with the media of intercourse and of sympathy and of common understanding.

Do you not see now what is about to happen? These great tides which have been running along parallels of latitude will now swing southward athwart parallels of latitude, and that opening gate at the Isthmus of Panama will open the world to a commerce that she has not known before. A commerce of intelligence, of thought and sympathy between North and

South. The Latin American States, which, to their disadvantage, have been off the main lines, will now be on the main lines. I feel that these gentlemen honoring us with their presence to-day will presently find that some part, at any rate, of the center of gravity of the world has shifted. Do you realize that New York, for example, will be nearer the western coast of South America than she is now to the eastern coast of South America? Do you realize that a line drawn northward parallel with the greater part of the western coast of South America will run only about 150 miles west of New York? The great bulk of South America, if you will look at your globes (not at your Mercator's projection), lies eastward of the continent of North America. You will realize that when you realize that the canal will run southeast, not southwest, and that when you get into the Pacific you will be farther east than you were when you left the Gulf of Mexico. These things are significant, therefore, of this, that we are closing one chapter in the history of the world and are opening another, of great, unimaginable significance.

There is one peculiarity about the history of the Latin American States which I am sure they are keenly aware of. You hear of "concessions" to foreign capitalists in Latin America. You do not hear of concessions to foreign capitalists in the United States. They are not granted concessions. They are invited to make investments. The work is ours, though they are welcome to invest in it. We do not ask them to supply the capital and do the work. It is an invitation, not a privilege;

and states that are obliged, because their territory does not lie within the main field of modern enterprise and action, to grant concessions are in this condition, that foreign interests are apt to dominate their domestic affairs, a condition of affairs always dangerous and apt to become intolerable. What these States are going to see, therefore, is an emancipation from the subordination, which has been inevitable, to foreign enterprise and an assertion of the splendid character which, in spite of these difficulties, they have again and again been able to demonstrate. The dignity, the courage, the self-possession, the self-respect of the Latin American States, their achievements in the face of all these adverse circumstances, deserve nothing but the admiration and applause of the world. They have had harder bargains driven with them in the matter of loans than any other peoples in the world. Interest has been exacted of them that was not exacted of anybody else because the risk was said to be greater; and then securities were taken that destroyed the risk -- an admirable arrangement for those who were forcing the terms! I rejoice in nothing so much as in the prospect that they will now be emancipated from these conditions, and we ought to be the first to take part in assisting in that emancipation. I think some of these gentlemen have already had occasion to bear witness that the Department of State in recent months has tried to serve them in that wise. In the future they will draw closer and closer to us because of circumstances of which I wish to speak with moderation and, I hope, without indiscretion.

We must prove ourselves their friends, and champions upon terms of equality and honor. You cannot be friends upon any other terms of equality. You cannot be friends at all except upon the terms of honor. We must show ourselves friends by comprehending their interest whether it squares with our own interest or not. It is a very perilous thing to determine the foreign policy of a nation in the terms of material interest. It not only is unfair to those with whom you are dealing, but it is degrading as regards your own actions.

Comprehension must be the soil in which shall grow all the fruits of friendship, and there is a reason and a compulsion lying behind all this which is dearer than anything else to the thoughtful men of America. I mean the development of constitutional liberty in the world. Human rights, national integrity, and opportunity as against material interests -- that, ladies and gentlemen, is the issue. I want to take this occasion to say that the United States will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest. She will devote herself to showing that she knows how to make honorable and fruitful use of the territory she has, and she must regard it as one of the duties of friendship to see that from no quarter are material interests made superior to human liberty and national opportunity. I say this, not with a single thought that anyone will daresay it, but merely to fix in our consciousness what our real relationship with the rest of America is. It is the relationship

of a family of mankind devoted to the development of true constitutional liberty. We know that that is the soil out of which the best enterprise springs. We know that this is a cause which we are making in common with our neighbors, because we have had to make it for ourselves.

Reference has been made here to-day to some of the national problems which confront us as a Nation. What is at the heart of all our national problems? It is that we have seen the hand of material interest sometimes about to close upon our dearest rights and possessions. We have seen material interests threaten constitutional freedom in the United States. Therefore we will now know how to sympathize with those in the rest of America who have to contend with such powers, not only within their borders but from outside their borders also.

I know what the response of the thought and heart of America will be to the program I have outlined, because America was created to realize a program like that. This is not America because it has set up for a great population great opportunities of material prosperity. America is a name which sounds in the ears of men everywhere as a synonym with individual liberty. I would rather belong to a poor nation that was free than to a rich nation that had ceased to be in love with liberty. But we shall not be poor if we love liberty, because the nation that loves liberty truly sets every man free to do his best and be his best, and that means the release of all the splendid energies of a great people who think for themselves. A nation of employees cannot be free any more than a nation of employers can be.

In emphasizing the points which must unite us in sympathy and in spiritual interest with the Latin American peoples we are only emphasizing the points of our own life, and we should prove ourselves untrue to our own traditions if we proved ourselves untrue friends to them.

Do not think, therefore, gentlemen, that the questions of the day are mere questions of policy and diplomacy. They are shot through with the principles of life. We dare not turn from the principle that morality and not expediency is the thing that must guide us and that we will never condone iniquity because it is most convenient to do so. It seems to me that this is a day of infinite hope, of confidence in a future greater than the past has been, for I am fain to believe that in spite of all the things that we wish to correct the nineteenth century that now lies behind us has brought us a long stage toward the time when, slowly ascending the tedious climb that leads to the final uplands, we shall get our ultimate view of the duties of mankind. We have breasted a considerable part of the climb and shall presently -- it may be in a generation or two -- come out upon those great heights where there shines unobstructed the light of the justice of God.

The New Democracy
Ray Stannard Baker and
William F. Dodd, pp. 64-69.

THE CALIFORNIA LAW -- MAY 18, 1913

The people of the State of California do enact as follows:

Section 1. All alien citizens of citizenship under the laws of the United States may acquire, possess, enjoy, transmit, and inherit real property, or any interest therein, in this State, in the same manner and to the same extent as citizens of the United States, except as otherwise provided by the laws of this State.

APPENDIX D

Section 2. All alien stock raisers whose positions in sections one of this act may acquire, possess, enjoy and transmit real property or any interest therein, in this State, in the same manner and to the same extent as for the purposes contemplated by any treaty now existing between the Government of the United States and the nation or country of which such alien is a citizen or subject and was established, and may in addition lease lands in this State for agricultural purposes for a term not exceeding three years.

Section 3. Any company, partnership, or corporation organized under the laws of this or any other State or nation, of which a majority of the members are aliens other than those specified in section one of this act, or in which a majority of the issued capital stock is owned by such aliens, may acquire, possess, enjoy and transmit real property, or any interest therein in this State, in the same manner and to the extent and for the purposes prescribed by any treaty now existing between the Government of the United States and the nation or country of which such members or citizens are

THE CALIFORNIA LAW -- MAY 19, 1913

The People of the State of California do enact as follows:

Section 1. All aliens eligible to citizenship under the laws of the United States may acquire, possess, enjoy, transmit, and inherit real property, or any interest therein, in this state, in the same manner and to the same extent as citizens of the United States, except as otherwise provided by the laws of this state.

Section 2. All aliens other than those mentioned in section one of this act may acquire, possess, enjoy and transfer real property, or any interest therein, in this state, in the manner and to the extent and for the purposes prescribed by any treaty now existing between the Government of the United States and the nation or country of which such alien is a citizen or subject and not otherwise, and may in addition there to lease lands in this state for agricultural purposes for a term exceeding three years.

Section 3. Any company, association, or corporation organized under the laws of this or any other state or nation, of which a majority of the members are aliens other than those specified in section one of this act, or in which a majority of the issued capital stock is owned by such aliens, may acquire, possess, enjoy and convey real property, or any interest therein in this state, in the manner and to the extent and for the purposes prescribed by any treaty now existing between the Government of the United States and the nation or country of which such members or stockholders are

citizens or subjects; and not otherwise, and may in addition thereto lease lands in this state for agricultural purposes for a term not exceeding three years.

Section 4. Whenever it appears to the court in any probate proceedings that by reason of the provisions of this act any heir or devisee can not take real property in this state which, but for said provisions, said heir or devisee would take as such, the court, instead of ordering a distribution of such real property to such heir or devisee, shall order a sale of said real property to be made in the manner provided by law for probate sales of real property, and the proceeds of such sale shall be distributed to such heir or devisee in lieu of such real property.

Section 5. Any real property hereafter acquired in fee in violation of the provisions of this act by any alien mentioned in section two of this act, or by any company, association or corporation mentioned in section three of this act, shall escheat to, and become and remain the property of the State of California. The attorney general shall institute proceedings to have the escheat of such real property adjudged and enforced in the manner provided by section 474 of the Political Code and title eight, part three of the Code of Civil Procedure. Upon the entry of final judgment in such proceedings, the title to such real property shall pass to the State of California. The provisions of this section and of sections two and three of this act shall not apply to any real property hereafter

acquired in the enforcement or in satisfaction of any lien now existing upon, or interest in such property so long as such real property so acquired shall remain the property of the alien, company, association or corporation acquiring the same in such manner.

Section 6. Any leasehold or other interest in real property less than the fee, hereafter acquired in violation of the provisions of this act by any alien mentioned in section two of this act, or by any company, association or corporation mentioned in section three of this act, shall escheat to the State of California. The attorney general shall institute proceedings to have such escheat adjudged and enforced as provided in section five of this act. In such proceedings, the court shall determine and adjudge the value of such leasehold, or other interest in such real property, and enter judgment for the state for the amount thereof together with costs. Thereupon the court shall order a sale of the real property covered by such leasehold, or other interest in the manner provided by section 1271 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Out of the proceeds arising from such sale, the amount of the judgment rendered for the state shall be paid into the state treasury and the balance shall be deposited with and distributed by the court in accordance with the interest of the parties therein.

Section 7. Nothing in this act shall be construed as a limitation upon the power of the state to enact laws with respect to the acquisition, holding or disposal by aliens of real property in this state.

Section 8. All acts and parts of acts inconsistent, or in conflict with the provisions of this act, are hereby repealed.

ARTICLES I AND XIV OF THE TREATY OF COMMERCE
AND NAVIGATION BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES. JANUARY
21, 1911

Article I

"The citizens or subjects of each of the High Contracting Parties shall have liberty to enter, travel and reside in the territories of the other to carry on trade, wholesale and retail, to own or lease and occupy houses, manufactories, warehouses, and shops, to employ agents of their choice, to lease land for residential and commercial purposes, and generally to do anything incident to or necessary for trade upon the same terms as native citizens or subjects, submitting themselves to the laws and regulations there established.

"They shall not be compelled, under any pretext whatever, to pay any charges or taxes other or higher than those that are or may be paid by native citizens or subjects.

"The citizens or subjects of each of the High Contracting Parties shall receive, in the territories of the other, the most constant protection and security for their persons and property, and shall enjoy in this respect the same rights and privileges as are or may be granted to native citizens or subjects, on their submitting themselves to the conditions imposed upon native citizens or subjects.

"They shall, however, be exempt in the territories of the other from compulsory military service either on land or sea, in the regular forces, or in the national guard, or in the militia; from all contributions imposed in lieu of personnel service, and from forced loans or military exactions or contributions.

Article XIV

"Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Treaty, the High Contracting Parties agree that, in all that concerns commerce and navigation, any privilege, favor or immunity which either Contracting Party has actually granted, or may hereafter grant, to the citizens or subjects of the Contracting Party gratuitously, if the concession in favor of that other State shall have been gratuitous, and on the same or equivalent conditions if the concession shall have been conditional."

APPENDIX F

June 24, 1953

Dear Mr. Mathers:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter, postmarked June 18, 1953, in which you request to be furnished with microfilms of the papers of William Jennings Bryan while Secretary of State, 1913-1915, specifically covering the period from March 4, 1913, to April 30, 1913.

As we previously advised you in our letter of March 9, 1953, we cannot undertake the selection of documents for private investigators. The arrangement of the correspondence of the Department of State for this period precludes an estimate for microfilm of all Bryan's correspondence as Secretary of State. It is not segregated but is classified under many headings and countries. The published volumes of the Papers Relation to the Foreign Relations of the United States for the years 1913-1915, as well as the supplements for 1914 and 1915 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920-1924, 1928) contain much of Bryan's correspondence. This publication should be available in the larger libraries in your vicinity.

Among the records of the Department of State in the National Archives is a series of correspondence between President Wilson and Secretary Bryan covering the period 1913-1915. This correspondence is contained in four binder type volumes, consisting of approximately 385 pages to a volume. There are but four letters in this series between the specific period cited by your, that is, March 4 - April 30, 1913, three of which are rather routine and the fourth pertaining to a letter written by the President of the American Jewish Committee, Louis Marchall, to President Taft in January 1913 pertaining to Jews in the Balkan peninsula and conditions in the Near East. These four letters consist of a total of 12 pages. Negative microfilms are furnished at the rate of \$3.60 per 100 pages estimated to the nearest 100, the minimum charge for any order under 100 pages being \$3.60.

The records of the Department of State referred to can be made available for examination by you or your legal representative in the search rooms of the National Archives. For your information there is enclosed herewith a copy of "Regulations For The Public Use of Records In The Nation Archives".

Very truly yours,

Carl L. Lokke, Acting Chief Archivist
Diplomatic & Judicial Records Branch

APPENDIX G

The following information was obtained from the Congressional Record, 66 Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 59, p. 3219-4316. The following resolution was submitted by Mr. Swanson on August 13, 1914.

'Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), that the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of the treaty between the United States and Norway, looking to the advancement of the cause of general peace, signed at Washington June 24, 1914.'

'Mr. Jones submitted the following amendment:

'Add at the end of the resolution the following:

'Provided, that the Senate advises and consents to the ratification of said treaty with the understanding, to be made part of such ratification, that the treaty does not authorize the submission to or investigation by said international commission of any question which affects the admission of aliens into the United States, or the admission of aliens to the educational institutions of the several States, or the territorial integrity of the several States or of the United States, or concerning the question of the alleged indebtedness or moneyed obligation of any State of the United States, or any question which depends upon or involves the maintenance of the traditional attitude of the United States concerning American questions, commonly described as the Monroe Doctrine, or other purely governmental policy.'

The amendment failed.

Call of roll resulted in 44 in favor of resolution and 5 against.

Those who voted in affirmative were:

'Messrs. Ashurst, Bankhead, Brady, Bryan, Burton, Camden, Clarke of Arkansas, Gallinger, Gronna, Hitchcock, Hughes, Johnson Kern, Lea of Tennessee, Lee of Maryland, Lewis, Lippitt, McCumber, Martine of New Jersey, Nelson, O'Gorman, Overman, Page, Perkins, Pittman, Pomerene, Ransdell, Saulsbury, Shafroth, Sheppard, Shields, Simmons, Smith of Maryland, Smoot, Sterling, Stone, Swanson, Thompson, Thornton, Vardaman, Walsh, West, White, and Williams -- 44.'

'Those who voted in the negative are:

'Messrs. Borah, Bristow, Fall, Jones, and Poindexter -- 5.

Seventeen other treaties followed:

The Senate then:

'Ordered, that the injunction of secrecy be removed from the treaties for the advancement of the cause of general peace with Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland, Denmark, Italy, Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Persia, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, together with the resolutions of ratification of and the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations on the same, and

'That the said treaties be printed, with amendments.'

APPENDIX H

[The following text is extremely faint and largely illegible. It appears to be a list or a series of entries, possibly related to a survey or a collection of items. The text is organized into several paragraphs, with some lines appearing to be numbered or bulleted. The content is too light to transcribe accurately.]

AMERICAN NEUTRALITY - AN APPEAL BY
THE PRESIDENT

Presented in the Senate, August 19, 1914. From Original Copy in Mr. Wilson's Files.

My Fellow Countrymen: I suppose that every thoughtful man in America has asked himself, during these last troubled weeks, what influence the European War may exert upon the United States, and I take the liberty of addressing a few words to you in order to point out that it is entirely within our own choice what its effects upon us will be and to urge very earnestly upon you the sort of speech and conduct which will best safeguard the Nation against distress and disaster.

The effect of the war upon the United States will depend upon what American citizens say and do. Every man who really loves America will act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality, which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness to all concerned. The spirit of the Nation in this critical matter will be determined largely by what individuals and society and those gathered in public meetings do and say, upon what newspapers and magazines contain, upon what ministers utter in their pulpits, and men proclaim as their opinions on the street.

The people of the United States are drawn from many nations, and chiefly from the nations now at war. It is natural and inevitable that there should be the utmost variety of sympathy and desire among them

with regard to the issues and circumstances of the conflict. Some will wish one nation, others another, to succeed in the momentous struggle. It will be easy to excite passion and difficult to allay it. These responsible for exciting it will assume a heavy responsibility, responsibility for no less a thing than that the people of the United States, whose love of their country and whose loyalty to its Government should unite them as Americans all, bound in honor and affection to think first of her and her interests, may be divided in camps of hostile opinion, hot against each other, involved in the war itself in impulse and opinion if not in action.

Such divisions amongst us would be fatal to our peace of mind and might seriously stand in the way of the proper performance of our duty as the one great nation at peace, the one people holding itself ready to play a part of impartial mediation and speak the counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend.

I venture, therefore, my fellow country-men, to speak a solemn word of warning to you against that deepest, most subtle, most essential breach of neutrality which may spring out of partisanship out of passionately taking sides. The United States must be neutral in fact as well as in name during these days that are to try men's souls. We must be impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a curb upon our sentiments as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as a preference of one

party to the struggle before another.

My thought is of America. I am speaking, I feel sure, the earnest wish and purpose of every thoughtful American that this great country of ours, which is, of course, the first in our thoughts and in our hearts, should show herself in this time of peculiar trial a Nation fit beyond others to exhibit the fine poise of undisturbed judgment, the dignity of self-control, the efficiency of dispassionate action; a Nation that neither sets in judgment upon others nor is disturbed in her own counsels and which keeps herself fit and free to do what is honest and disinterested and truly serviceable for the peace of the world.

Shall we not resolve to put upon ourselves the restraints which will bring to our people the happiness and the great and lasting influence for peace we covet for them?

The New Democracy
Ray Stannard Baker and
William E. Dodd, pp. 157-159.

THE FIRST "LUSITANIA" NOTE

Telegram from Secretary W. J. Bryan to Ambassador James W. Gerard, May 13, 1915. From Official Publication in Mr. Wilson's Files.

APPENDIX I Department of State,
Washington, May 13, 1915.

Please call on the Minister of Foreign Affairs and after reading to him this communication leave with him a copy.

In view of recent acts of the German authorities in violation of American rights on the high seas which culminated in the torpedoing and sinking of the British steamship Lusitania on May 7, 1915, by which over 100 American citizens lost their lives, it is clearly wise and desirable that the Government of the United States and the Imperial German Government should come to a clear and full understanding as to the grave situation which has resulted.

The sinking of the British passenger steamer Ralston by a German submarine on March 26, through which Leon C. Thrasher, an American citizen was drowned; the attack on April 25 on the American vessel Cushing by a German aeroplane; the torpedoing on May 1 of the American vessel Gullflight by a German submarine, as a result of which two or more American citizens met their death; and, finally, the torpedoing and sinking of the steamship Lusitania, constitute a series of events which the Government of the United States has observed with growing concern, distress, and amazement.

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The sinking of the British passenger steamer Falaba by a German submarine on March 28, through which Leon C. Thrasher, an American citizen was drowned; the attack on April 28 on the American vessel Cushing by a German aeroplane; the torpedoing on May 1 of the American vessel Gulflight by a German submarine, as a result of which two or more American citizens met their death; and, finally, the torpedoing and sinking of the steamship Lusitania, constitute a series of events which the Government of the United States has observed with growing concern, distress, and amazement.

Recalling the humane and enlightened hitherto assumes by the Imperial German Government in matters of international right and particularly with regard to the freedom of the seas; having learned to recognize the German views and the German influence in the field of international obligation as always engaged upon the side of justice and humanity; and having understood the instructions of the Imperial German Government to its naval commanders to be upon the same plane of humane action prescribed by the naval codes of other nations, the Government of the United States was loath to believe -- it can not now bring itself to believe -- that these acts, so absolutely contrary to the rules, the practices, and the spirit of modern warfare, could have the countenance or sanction of that great Government. It feels it to be its duty, therefore, to address the Imperial German Government concerning them with the utmost frankness and in the earnest hope that it is not mistaken in expecting action on the part of the Imperial German Government which will correct the unfortunate impressions which have been created and vindicate once more the position of that Government with regard to the sacred freedom of the seas.

The Government of the United States has been apprised that the Imperial German Government considered themselves to be obliged by the extraordinary circumstances of the present war and the measures adopted by their adversaries in seeking to cut Germany off from all commerce, to adopt methods of retaliation which go much beyond the ordinary methods of warfare at sea, in the proclamation of a war

zone from which they have warned neutral ships to keep away. This Government has already taken occasion to inform the Imperial German Government that it cannot admit the adoption of such measures or such a warning of danger to operate as in any degree an abbreviation of the rights of American shipmasters or of American citizens bound on lawful errands as passengers on merchant ships of belligerent nationality; and that it must hold the Imperial German Government to a strict accountability for any infringement of those rights, intentional or incidental. It does not understand the Imperial German Government to question those rights. It assumes, on the contrary, that the Imperial German Government accept, as of course, the rule that the lives of noncombatants, whether they be of neutral citizenship or citizens of one of the nations at war, can not lawfully or rightfully be put in jeopardy by the capture or destruction of an unarmed merchantman, and recognize also, as all other nations do, the obligation to take the usual precaution of visit and search to ascertain whether a suspected merchantman is in fact of belligerent nationality or is in fact carrying contraband of war under a neutral flag.

The Government of the United States, therefore, desires to call the attention of the Imperial German Government with the utmost earnestness to the fact that the objection to their present method of attack against the trade of their enemies lies in the destruction of commerce without disregarding those rules of fairness, reason, justice, and humanity which all modern opinion regards as imperative. It is

practically impossible for the officers of a submarine to visit a merchantman of sea and examine her papers and cargo. It is practically impossible for them to make a prize of her; and, if they can not put a prize crew on board of her, they can not sink her without leaving her crew and all on board of her to the mercy of the sea in her small boats. These facts it is understood the Imperial German Government frankly admit. We are informed that in the instances of which we have spoken time enough for even that poor measure of safety was not given, and in at least two of the cases cited not so much as a warning was received. Manifestly submarines can not be used against merchantmen, as the last few weeks have shown, without an inevitable violation of many sacred principles of justice and humanity.

American citizens act within their indisputable right in taking their ships and in traveling wherever their legitimate business calls them upon the high seas, and exercise those rights in what should be the well-justified confidence that their lives will not be endangered by acts done in clear violation of universally acknowledged international obligations and certainly in the confidence that their own Government will sustain them in the exercise of their rights.

There was recently published in the newspapers of the United States, I regret to inform the Imperial German Government, a formal warning, purporting to come from the Imperial German Embassy at Washington addressed to the people of the United States, and stating, in effect, that any citizen of the United States who exercised his right of free travel upon the seas would do so at his peril if his

journey should take him within the zone of waters within which the Imperial German Navy was using submarines against the commerce of Great Britain and France, notwithstanding the respectful but very earnest protest of his Government, the Government of the United States. I do not refer to this for the purpose of calling the attention of the Imperial German Government at this time to the surprising irregularity of a communication from the Imperial German Embassy at Washington addressed to the people of the United States through the newspapers, but only for the purpose of pointing out that no warning that an unlawful and inhumane act will be committed can possibly be accepted as an excuse or palliation for that act or as an abatement of the responsibility for its commission.

Long acquainted as this Government has been with the character of the Imperial German Government and with the high principles of equity by which they have in the past been actuated and guided, the Government of the United States can not believe that the commanders of the vessels which committed these acts of lawlessness did so except under a misapprehension of the orders issued by the Imperial German naval authorities. It takes it for granted that, at least within the practical possibilities of every such case, the commanders even of submarines were expected to do nothing that would involve the lives of noncombatants or the safety of neutral ships, even at the cost of failing of their object of capture or destruction. It confidently expects, therefore, that the Imperial German Government will disavow

the acts of which the Government of the United States complains, that they will make reparation so far as reparation is possible for injuries which are without measure, and that they will take immediate steps to prevent the recurrence of anything so obviously subversive of the principles of warfare for which the Imperial German Government have in the past so wisely and so firmly contended.

The Government and people of the United States looks to the Imperial German Government for just, prompt, and enlightened action in this vital matter with the greater confidence because the United States and Germany are bound together not only by special ties of friendship but also by the explicit stipulations of the treaty of 1828 between the United States and the Kingdom of Prussia.

Expressions of regret and offers of reparation in case of the destruction of neutral ships sunk by mistake, while they may satisfy international obligations, if no loss of life results can not justify or excuse a practice, the natural and necessary effect of which is to subject neutral nations and neutral persons to new and immeasurable risks.

The Imperial German Government will not expect the Government of the United States to omit any word or any act necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens and of safeguarding their free exercise and enjoyment.

Bryan

The New Democracy, Vol. I
Ray Stannard Baker and
William E. Dodd, pp. 323-328.

APPENDIX J

THE SECOND LUSITANIA NOTE, June 9, 1915

The following information was obtained from Foreign Relations of United States, 1915, Supplement:

Your excellency's note, in discussing the loss of American lives resulting from the sinking of steamship Lusitania, adverts at some length to certain information which the Imperial German Government has received with regard to the character and outfit of that vessel, and your excellency expresses the fear that this information may not have been brought to the attention of the Government of the United States. It is stated in the note that the Lusitania was undoubtedly equipped with masked guns, supplied with trained gunners and special ammunition, transporting troops from Canada, carrying a cargo not permitted under the laws of the United States to a vessel also carrying passengers, and serving, in virtual effect, as an auxiliary to the naval forces of Great Britain. Fortunately, these are matters concerning which the Government of the United States is in a position to give the Imperial German Government official information. Of the facts alleged in your excellency's note, if true, the Government of the United States would have been bound to take official cognizance in performing its recognized duty as a neutral power and in enforcing its national laws. It was its duty to see to it that the Lusitania was not armed for offensive action, that she was not serving as a transport, that she did not carry a cargo prohibited by the statutes of the United States, and that, if in fact she was a naval vessel of Great Britain, she should not receive clearance as a merchantman; and it performed that duty and enforced its statutes with scrupulous vigilance through its regularly constituted officials. It is able, therefore, to assure the Imperial German Government that it has been misinformed. If the Imperial German Government should deem itself to be in possession of convincing evidence that the officials of the Government of the United States did not perform these duties with thoroughness, the Government of the United States sincerely hopes that it will submit that evidence for consideration.

Whatever may be the contentions of the Imperial German Government regarding the carriage of contraband of war on board the Lusitania or regarding the explosion of that material by the torpedo, it need only be said that in the view of this Government these contentions are irrelevant to the question of the legality of the methods used by the German naval authorities in sinking the vessel.

But the sinking of passenger ships involves principles of humanity which throw into the background any special circumstances of detail that may be thought to affect the cases, principles which lift it, as the Imperial German Government will no doubt be quick to recognize and acknowledge, out of the class of ordinary subjects of diplomatic discussion or of international controversy. Whatever be the facts regarding the Lusitania, the principal fact is that a great steamer, primarily and chiefly a conveyance for passengers, and carrying more than a thousand souls who had no part or lot in the conduct of the war, was torpedoed and sunk without so much as a challenge or a warning, and that men, women, and children were sent to their death in circumstances unparallel in modern warfare. The fact that more than one hundred American citizens were among those who perished made it the duty of the Government of the United States to speak of these things and once more, with solemn emphasis, to call the attention of the Imperial German Government to the grave responsibility which the Government of the United States conceives that it has incurred in this tragic occurrence, and to the indisputable principle upon which that responsibility rests. The Government of the United States is contending for something much greater than mere rights of property or privileges of commerce. It is contending for nothing less high and sacred than the rights of humanity, which every Government honors itself in respecting and which no Government is justified in resigning on behalf of those under its care and authority. Only her actual resistance to capture or refusal to stop when ordered to do so for the purpose of visit could have afforded the commander of the submarine any justification for so much as putting the lives of those on board the ship in jeopardy. This principle the Government of the United States understands the explicit instructions issued on August 3, 1914, by the Imperial German Admiralty to its commanders at sea to have recognized and embodied, as do the naval codes of all other nations, and upon it every traveler and seaman had a right to depend. It is upon this principle of humanity as well as upon the law founded upon this principle that the United States must stand.

The Government of the United States is happy to observe that your excellency's note closes with the intimation that the Imperial German Government is willing, now as before, to accept the good offices of the United States in an attempt to come to an understanding with the Government of Great Britain by which the character and conditions of the war upon the sea may be changed. The Government of the United States would consider it a privilege thus to serve its friends and the world. It stands ready at any time to convey to either Government any intimation or suggestion

the other may be willing to have it convey and cordially invites the Imperial German Government to make use of its service in this way at its convenience. The whole world is concerned in anything that may bring about even a partial accommodation of interests or in any way mitigate the terrors of the present distressing conflict.

In the meantime, whatever arrangement may happily be made between the parties to the war, and whatever may in the opinion of the Imperial German Government have been the provocation or the circumstantial justification for the past acts of its commanders at sea, the Government of the United States confidently looks to see the justice and humanity of the Government of Germany vindicated in all cases where Americans have been wronged or their rights as neutrals invaded.

The Government of the United States therefore very earnestly and very solemnly renews the representations of its note transmitted to the Imperial German Government on the 15th of May, and relies in these representations upon the principles of humanity, the universally recognized understandings of international law, and the ancient friendship of the German nation.

The Government of the United States can not admit that the proclamation of a war zone from which neutral ships have been warned to keep away may be made to operate as in any degree an abbreviation of the rights either of American shipmasters or of American citizens bound on lawful errands as passengers on merchant ships of belligerent nationality. It does not understand the Imperial German Government to question those rights. It understands it, also, to accept as established beyond question the principle that the lives of non-combatants can not lawfully or rightfully be put in jeopardy by the capture or destruction of an unresisting merchantman, and to recognize the obligation to take sufficient precaution to ascertain whether a suspected merchantman is in fact of belligerent nationality or is in fact carrying contraband of war under a neutral flag. The Government of the United States therefore deems it reasonable to expect that the Imperial German Government will adopt the measures necessary to put these principles into practice in respect of the safe-guarding of American lives and American ships, and asks for assurances that this will be done.

Lansing.