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Katie Zoglin

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PARAGUAY'S ARCHIVE OF TERROR: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND OPERATION CONDOR^{*}

KATIE ZOGLIN¹

I. INTRODUCTION	58
II. POLITICAL CONTEXT	59
III. OVERVIEW OF PARAGUAY'S ARCHIVE OF TERROR	61
A. <i>Discovery Of The Archive Of Terror</i>	61
B. <i>Overview Of The Archive's Contents</i>	63
IV. EVIDENCE OF OPERATION CONDOR IN THE ARCHIVE OF TERROR	64
A. <i>International Intelligence Conferences And Meetings</i>	65
1. Multilateral Meetings	65
2. Bilateral Conferences	68
3. Advanced Intelligence Courses	70
B. <i>Operation Condor's Extra-Legal Exchange Of Political Prisoners</i>	71

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1. Katie Zoglin (J.D., Harvard Law School) spent over four months reviewing documents in Paraguay's Archive of Terror through a Fulbright grant provided by the Council of International Exchange of Scholars.

1. The Detention, Transfer, And Disappearance Of Nell, Insaurrealde, Santana, Logoluso, And Landi.....	71
2. Detention And Clandestine Transfer Of Three Paraguayans.....	73
C. <i>Potential Involvement Of INTERPOL In Operation Condor</i>	75
D. <i>Sharing Information Regarding International Subversive Activities</i>	77
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS.....	81

I. INTRODUCTION

Paraguay's Archive of Terror not only records General Alfredo Stroessner's fear of political opponents, but it also confirms accounts that Southern Cone countries such as Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay engaged in the clandestine exchange of intelligence and prisoners from the mid-1970s through the early 1980s. This secret scheme was known as "Operation Condor." Certainly, the exchange of intelligence is not *per se* inappropriate or illegal. However, Operation Condor must be viewed in the larger context in which these military governments ignored the due process rights of individuals and targeted those who voiced opposition to them.

Evidence of Operation Condor has gradually come to light. In 1999, Operation Condor received attention in the United States when the Clinton Administration's Chile Declassification Project released documents revealing that as early as 1976 the United States government was aware of and expressed concerns regarding at least one aspect of Operation Condor.² The work of Spanish Judge Baltasar Garzón in the cases against Chile's General Augusto Pinochet has also increased knowledge of this scheme.

While previous accounts of evidence contained in the Archive of Terror regarding Operation Condor have not always portrayed documents accurately, cited specific records, or relied on a

2. September 1976 telex on file with the National Security Archive at <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/ch23-01.htm>.

systematic review of the Archive, this article provides a comprehensive review of the records in Paraguay's Archive of Terror that demonstrate the secret exchange of intelligence and prisoners. In doing so, this article provides additional evidence to the developing picture of Operation Condor.

II. POLITICAL CONTEXT

From 1954 through 1989, General Alfredo Stroessner ("Stroessner") ruled Paraguay with an iron fist.³ Cold War politics played a significant role during his authoritarian regime. In the 1950s and 1960s, the United States gave considerable financial aid to Paraguay. Paraguay was seen as a U.S. ally, particularly in its opposition to communism.⁴ Stroessner used the national security doctrine⁵ and the threat of communism as a unifying theme.⁶ He freely labeled unsanctioned political activity as communist.⁷ Stroessner relied upon the alleged communist menace as a pretext for imposing many of his government's repressive measures.⁸

Throughout his tenure, Stroessner imposed a state of siege almost continuously without legal justification.⁹ Hundreds of so-called "subversives" were arrested pursuant to laws entitled "In Defense of Democracy" and "In Defense of Public Peace and Liberty of Persons."¹⁰

3. See VIRGINIA M. BOUVIER, *DECLINE OF THE DICTATOR: PARAGUAY AT A CROSSROADS* 4 (1988); INT'L HUM. RTS. L. GROUP & COMITÉ DE IGLESIAS PARA AYUDAS DE EMERGENCIA, *PARAGUAY: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE TRANSITION TOWARDS THE RULE OF LAW I* (1996) [hereinafter *PARAGUAY: HUMAN RIGHTS*].

4. See BOUVIER, *supra* note 3, at 7-9; RIORDAN ROETT & RICHARD SCOTT SACKS, *PARAGUAY: THE PERSONALIST LEGACY* 147-148 (1991); Andrew Nickson, *The Overthrow of the Stroessner Regime*, 8 (no. 2) BULL. LATIN AM. RES. 185, 195 (1989).

5. See Paul C. Sondrol, *The Emerging New Politics of Liberalizing Paraguay: Sustained Civil-Military Control without Democracy*, J. INTERAM. STUD. & WORLD AFF., 127, 131 (1992).

6. See Marcial Antonio Riquelme, *Desde el stronismo hacia la transición a la democracia: el papel del actor militar*, in *PARAGUAY EN TRANSICIÓN* 193-95 (Diego Abente Brun ed., 1993); FATIMA YORE, *LA DOMINACIÓN STRONISTA: ORIGENES Y CONSOLIDACIÓN* 174-78, 188-90 (1992).

7. See CARLOS R. MIRANDA, *THE STROESSNER ERA: AUTHORITARIAN RULE IN PARAGUAY* 70 (1990).

8. See *id.*

9. See OAS REPORT, *REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN PARAGUAY*, OEA/ser. L/VII.71, Doc. 19 rev. 1, at 21-22, 111 (Sept. 28, 1987) [hereinafter 1987 OAS REPORT].

10. See generally MIRANDA, *supra* note 7, at 7-9.

Real and perceived opponents of the Stroessner government were detained without warrant, imprisoned without formal charges lodged against them, never brought before a magistrate, held without trial, tortured, "disappeared," and killed extrajudicially.¹¹ Many of those tortured were forced to sign statements about their purported involvement in subversive activities. Still others were compelled to leave the country or placed in internal exile.¹² Many opposition parties were banned.¹³ The judiciary lacked independence; judges were appointed and could be dismissed by the executive branch.¹⁴ Political, student, union, and religious groups were closely monitored and repressed.¹⁵ The government shut down a newspaper and a radio station.¹⁶ Elections were held but in name only.¹⁷ Corruption was widespread.¹⁸

Paraguay was not the only Latin American country that justified the suppression of political opponents based on the purported "Marxist" or "communist" threat. During the 1970s, military regimes in many Latin American countries, including in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, responded to the perceived communist menace by detaining, torturing, and "disappearing" political opponents.¹⁹ These countries created Operation Condor to combat what they viewed as a pervasive and imminent threat to their national interests.

11. See OAS REPORT, REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN PARAGUAY, OEA/ser.L/V/II.43, Doc. 13 corr. 1, 86-87 (Jan. 31, 1978) [hereinafter 1978 OAS REPORT].

12. See BOUVIER, *supra* note 3, at 23.

13. See JOSÉ LUIS SIMÓN G., LA DICTADURA DE STROESSNER Y LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS 222, 240 (2d ed. 1992).

14. See DR. DAVID M. HELFELD & DR. WILLIAM L. WIPFLER, MBARATÉ: THE HIGHER LAW OF PARAGUAY 86, 208, 211 (1980).

15. See BOUVIER, *supra* note 3, at 23; 1978 OAS REPORT, *supra* note 11, at 87.

16. See 1987 OAS REPORT, *supra* note 9, at 113.

17. See BOUVIER, *supra* note 3, at 15-16.

18. See Dionisio Borda, *Empresariado y transición a la democracia en Paraguay*, in PARAGUAY EN TRANSICIÓN 88 (Diego Abente Brun ed., 1993); VICTOR-JACINTO FLECHA & CARLOS MARTINI, HISTORIA DE LA TRANSICIÓN: PASADO Y FUTURO DE LA DEMOCRACIA EN EL PARAGUAY 27 (1994).

19. See generally ARGENTINA COMISIÓN NACIONAL SOBRE LA DESAPARICIÓN DE PERSONAS, NUNCA MÁS: THE REPORT OF THE ARGENTINE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE DISAPPEARED (1986)(accounts of the political contexts and human rights abuses committed during this period)[hereinafter NUNCA MÁS]; 1 REPORT OF THE CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION (Phillip E. Berryman trans., 1993); SERVICIO PAZ Y JUSTICIA URUGUAY, URUGUAY NUNCA MÁS (1989); TORTURE IN BRAZIL: A REPORT BY THE ARCHDIOCESE OF SAO PAULO (Jaime Wright trans., Joan Dassin ed., 1986).

III. OVERVIEW OF PARAGUAY'S ARCHIVE OF TERROR

A. *Discovery Of The Archive Of Terror*

In 1989, Stroessner was overthrown in a military coup engineered by his brother-in-law, General Andrés Rodríguez.²⁰ While this change in government and the introduction of democratic rule represent significant developments in Paraguay, Stroessner's Colorado Party continues to retain power. Indeed, Paraguay's transition toward democratic rule has been an unsteady one.

Unlike neighboring Chile or Argentina, Paraguay has not set up a truth commission or other fact-finding task force to examine the human rights abuses committed during the decades of dictatorship. It has not prosecuted human rights abuses; rather, that role has been left to human rights groups and individual victims or their families. The government has made little attempt to redress the human rights abuses perpetrated under Stroessner.²¹ Nor was it the government that released records from the Stroessner regime to the public.

Instead, it was the efforts of some courageous individuals that brought Paraguay's Archive of Terror to light. In 1992, Paraguayan attorney and educator Martín Almada filed a petition for habeas data,²² pursuant to Article 135 of the 1992 Constitution, requesting information regarding his detention during Stroessner's rule.²³ On December 22, 1992, Almada and Judge José Agustín Fernández proceeded to the police station in Lambaré (located just outside of Paraguay's capital in Asunción) to request the habeas data.²⁴ Initially, the police denied the existence of such information.²⁵ Ultimately, however, "the police

20. See PARAGUAY: HUMAN RIGHTS, *supra* note 3, at 3.

21. See *id.* at 23-24, 52.

22. See R. Andrew Nickson, *Paraguay's Archivo del Terror*, LATIN AM. RES. REV. 125, 125-27.

23. "Everyone may have access to information and data available on himself or his assets in official or private registries of a public nature. . . . He may request a competent judge to order the updating, rectification, or destruction of these entries if they are wrong or if they are illegitimately affecting his rights." Para. Const. art. 135 (1992).

24. See Rosa Palau, De "Archivo del Horror" a Centro de Documentación para Defensa de los Derechos Humanos, at 5-6 (Dec. 1993), (unpublished article, on file with author); See Nickson, *supra* note 22, at 125-27.

25. See PARAGUAY: HUMAN RIGHTS, *supra* note 3, at 10; Palau, *supra* note 24, at 6.

allowed Almada and Judge Fernández to enter the station where thousands of documents were stored.²⁶ Some of the records were actually being buried.²⁷ Most of these documents were from the political branch of the police department in the capital, known as the Investigations Department.²⁸ Judge Fernández and his colleague Judge Luis María Benítez Riera understood the significance of this discovery, as well as the potential danger posed to the records.²⁹ They ordered the documents to be transferred to the courthouse in Asunción.³⁰ These two judges, reporters, and human rights activists formed a human chain to move the documents from the police station to the courthouse.³¹

Additional confidential police records existed. Again, the government did not voluntarily release them. On December 24, 1992, Judge Benítez learned of documents from the Dirección Nacional de Asuntos Técnicos of the Ministry of the Interior ("La Técnica").³² La Técnica was established during the second half of the 1950s to combat communism, and was responsible for political intelligence.³³ The majority of the items recovered from La Técnica were so-called "subversive" books (approximately 700 volumes) confiscated from individuals, including Bibles and writings of Lenin and Marx.³⁴ Documents from the police department's legal division, known as the Judicial Department, were also recovered on January 21, 1993.³⁵ All of these documents were removed from police custody and are stored in the courthouse in Asunción. They are collectively known as the Archive of Terror or the Archive of Horror ("the Archive").³⁶

26. PARAGUAY: HUMAN RIGHTS, *supra* note 3, at 10.

27. See Palau, *supra* note 24, at 6.

28. See PARAGUAY: HUMAN RIGHTS, *supra* note 3, at 10.

29. See *id.*

30. See *id.*

31. See *id.*

32. See Palau, *supra* note 24, at 6.

33. See *id.* at 6-7.

34. See *id.* at 7.

35. See PARAGUAY: HUMAN RIGHTS, *supra* note 3, at 11.

36. In 1993, additional police documents were identified in the town of Coronel Oviedo, located in central Paraguay, as the result of a habeas data request. Approximately ten to twelve files regarding the Agrarian League (a "campesino" group which was subject to severe repression during the 1970s) consequently were released. However, thousands of additional documents were reportedly being held by local Colorado Party authorities.

B. Overview Of The Archive's Contents

The Archive is comprised of more than half a million documents created, collected, and maintained by various divisions of the police and armed forces in Paraguay. The large number of records and their detail demonstrate the degree of control and oversight maintained by the Stroessner regime. The Archive provides a unique opportunity to help understand the methods of operation and mindset of the Stroessner regime. Because police and military files from other Southern Cone countries remain largely unavailable to the public, Paraguay's Archive of Terror has become increasingly important.

For example, the Archive contains over 9,000 "fichas," or cards, on which police recorded basic information about suspected government opponents, such as a photograph, name, address, date of birth, fingerprints, profession, supposed political affiliation, and dates of detention. The fichas are the general equivalent of police booking cards in the United States, but the fichas also include information concerning the detainee's alleged political activities.

The Archive has provided documentation of "disappeared" individuals about whom the Stroessner government originally denied having detained, including Rodolfo and Benjamín Ramírez Villalba. These brothers were accused of having participated in a plot to kill Stroessner.³⁷ They were held in the Investigations Department of the police.³⁸ After Stroessner left power, Julio Ramírez Villalba filed a criminal complaint on behalf of his brothers.³⁹ Officials initially denied knowledge of the detention, torture, and murder of the Ramírez brothers.⁴⁰ However, documents in the Archive and testimony from fellow prisoners undermined their positions.⁴¹ Other prisoners testified that the Ramírez brothers were repeatedly tortured during a six-month period.⁴² Luis Alberto Wagner, a former political prisoner

37. See PARAGUAY: HUMAN RIGHTS, *supra* note 3, at 30.

38. See *id.* See also INT'L HUM. RTS. L. GROUP & COMITÉ DE IGLESIAS PARA AYUDAS DE EMERGENCIA, TORTURA EN EL PARAGUAY: PASADO Y PRESENTE at 81(1993) [hereinafter TORTURA].

39. See PARAGUAY: HUMAN RIGHTS, *supra* note 3, at 31; See TORTURA, *supra* note 38.

40. See PARAGUAY: HUMAN RIGHTS, *supra* note 3, at 31; See TORTURA, *supra* note 38, at 20.

41. See PARAGUAY: HUMAN RIGHTS, *supra* note 3, at 31.

42. See *id.* at 30.

who served as a National Deputy after Stroessner left power, testified that Stroessner himself told the Ramírez brothers that they would be killed if they refused to admit that they were plotting to assassinate Stroessner.⁴³ Wagner also witnessed the brothers being removed from their cells at about midnight and never saw them again.⁴⁴

The Archive also includes approximately 500 bound notebooks compiled by the police. These volumes contain thousands of pages of surveillance reports on known or suspected communists and political opponents, reports from named and unnamed civilian spies, signed and unsigned declarations from detainees (many of which were reportedly obtained under torture), and lists of political detainees. Surveillance reports record the activities and whereabouts of suspected political opponents who lived in Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil. ANTELCO, the state run telephone company, provided the police with time, duration, and recipient of telephone calls. The police saved communist and "subversive" literature, books, political pamphlets, and newsletters confiscated from Paraguayan citizens. The Archive also contains lists of political party leaders and their addresses.

IV. EVIDENCE OF OPERATION CONDOR IN THE ARCHIVE OF TERROR

Documents in the Archive demonstrate that by approximately 1974, Paraguay, Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and Uruguay had agreed to coordinate their efforts to exchange information with one another in response to the communist menace that they perceived had reached an international scale. "Operation Condor" was the code name for this clandestine scheme in which Southern Cone military governments exchanged intelligence and prisoners during the mid-1970s through the early 1980s.

Archive documents establish that in Paraguay, Operation Condor was coordinated through the Second Division of the Armed Forces ("ESMAGENFA"), which was headed by Benito Guanes Serrano ("Guanes"). Guanes exchanged the intelligence

43. *See id.* at 30-31.

44. *See id.* at 31.

he received with Pastor M. Coronel ("Coronel"), the Chief of the Investigations Department, as well as with Francisco Brítez Borges ("Britez"), the Chief of Asunción's Police. After Stroessner left power, Guanes, Coronel, and Brítez were convicted of having committed a range of human rights violations during this period.⁴⁵ In addition, many intelligence reports were signed by or addressed to Alejandro Fretes Davalos, who commanded Paraguay's Armed Forces.

The following discussion is based on records contained in the Archive. This information comes from police and military intelligence sources. Thus, the Archive presents an interesting, albeit one-sided, view of the political climate.

A. International Intelligence Conferences And Meetings

It is clear from the Archive that the military governments in the Southern Cone coordinated their efforts in the so-called war against subversion and communism. Discussion of international coordination appears to have begun as early as 1973 or 1974 during intelligence conferences held among police and military officials. These intelligence conferences were directed at fighting subversion and reflect a pervasive fear of the perceived communist threat. The intelligence services concluded that because the communist threat had reached an international scale, the governments had to coordinate their activities and responses on a national, as well as an international level. The bulk of the Archive's documents involving international intelligence meetings span a ten-year period from approximately 1973 through 1982.

1. Multilateral Meetings

One of the earliest records in the Archive relating to international cooperation is a report authored by Antonio Campos Alúm, the Director of Paraguay's La Técnica, and appears to summarize what occurred at an international conference in approximately 1973.⁴⁶ According to this report by

45. See *id.* at 24-40.

46. Dirección Nacional de Asuntos Técnicos, Carpeta 73 (undated)[hereinafter DNAT]. The first page of the three-page document was missing. It referred to an

Campos, Paraguay accepted Brazil's offer to exchange information through bilateral meetings and other methods with members of the Latin American Anti-Communist Confederation ("CAL").⁴⁷ Paraguay and Brazil agreed to coordinate methods of security and protection.⁴⁸ The Brazilian delegation privately offered to provide Paraguay with comprehensive collaboration, information, materials, and technical support.⁴⁹ According to the document, Campos discussed the political situation in each country and methods to combat subversion.⁵⁰ At the close of this conference, all the delegates affirmed that the time had come to take offensive action against communism.⁵¹ Campos reported that he had established valuable contacts for the direct exchange of information and methods with the other delegations.⁵²

In 1974, a number of international anti-communist conferences were convened, including the Congress of CAL in Rio de Janeiro and the Seventh Congress of the World Anti-Communist League ("WACL") in Washington, DC.⁵³ The most significant of the conferences held that year was a meeting of the Coordinating Council of the Anti-Communist Confederation.⁵⁴ The purpose of the meeting was to receive information and to exchange experiences concerning Communists and pro-Communists in order to adopt methods that could be applied throughout the continent.⁵⁵ It was important because one of its main resolutions sought to establish a system to exchange confidential information among member nations.⁵⁶ Thus, this meeting marked a more widespread exchange of information

upcoming World Anti-Communist League conference scheduled to begin at the end of August 1973.

47. *See id.* at 2.

48. *See id.*

49. *See id.* at 3.

50. *See id.*

51. *See id.*

52. *See id.*

53. *See* Memorandum from la Policía Federal de Argentina, DPA 8 1973-77 W, No. 00013F 0298-99 (July 22, 1977)[hereinafter DPA 8]; Memorandum, Bibliorata 221 (1976)[hereinafter Bib. 221].

54. Many of the documents in the Archive were found in bound, labeled volumes. After they were "discovered," many of the records were bates stamped. Here, the citations to records from the Archive include both cites, if they exist. In these notes, the first reference is to the volume and the second is to the bates stamp number. *See* DPA 8, *supra* note 53.

55. *See id.*; Bib. 221, *supra* note 53.

56. *See id.*

than had previously taken place. The Coordinating Council was comprised of representatives from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Cuban exiles.⁵⁷

In 1975, the number of high-level meetings among the intelligence services appears to have increased. One of the initial planning meetings of what apparently was to become Operation Condor was held from May 30 through June 4, 1975.⁵⁸ Guanes traveled to Chile to help with the meeting of the chiefs of the national intelligence services and the chiefs of communication in the national intelligence services from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay.⁵⁹

From November 25 through December 1, 1975, a key meeting was convened in Santiago, Chile.⁶⁰ During this meeting, many of the mechanisms through which Operation Condor might operate were discussed.⁶¹ A planning document for this First Working Meeting of National Intelligence explained that "subversion . . . recognizes no Borders or Countries, and the infiltration penetrates all levels of National life."⁶² It discussed how subversion had developed in the continent during the preceding years and how subversion was contrary to the history, philosophy, and religion of the continent.⁶³ It continued that:

It is to confront this Psycho-political War we have determined that we must count on the International realm not with a Command centralized in its internal action, but with efficient Coordination that permits an opportune exchange of information and experiences as well as a certain level of personal knowledge between the Chiefs responsible for Security.⁶⁴

As a result of this meeting, a proposal was made to

57. *See id.*

58. *See* Informe No. 65 from El Comando en Jefe de la Nacion de Paraguay, Bibliorata 245, No. 00021F 1558-59 (Oct. 22, 1975)[hereinafter Bib. 245]; GS CV.

59. *See id.* In October 1975, the Eighth Intelligence Conference of the American Armies was held in Montevideo. *See id.*

60. *See Primera Reunion de Trabajo de Inteligencia Nacional*, Bibliorata 47, No. 00022F 0155-65 (Oct. 29, 1975)[hereinafter Bib. 47].

61. *See id.*

62. *Id.* at 00022F 0157.

63. *See id.*

64. *Id.*

coordinate the exchange of information through an Office of Coordination and Security. Further, a data bank, a centralized archive with the backgrounds of individuals, organizations, and activities "connected directly or indirectly with subversion," would be located in one country.⁶⁵ It would generally be like INTERPOL, but instead it would be dedicated to combating subversion.⁶⁶ A modern information center would allow access to the data bank.⁶⁷ Working groups would evaluate and address specific problems.⁶⁸ Under this proposal, all non-Marxist countries would be allowed to join.⁶⁹ Chile's National Intelligence Directorate ("DINA") offered to house the data bank.⁷⁰

The Archive contains formal invitations to this meeting sent by Colonel Manuel Contreras, the Director of DINA. Officials from Paraguay's police department and armed forces, including Coronel, Britez, and Guanes, were invited to attend.⁷¹

2. Bilateral Conferences

The Archive reveals that Southern Cone countries frequently held bilateral conferences between military intelligence services in the 1970s through the early 1980s. Participants discussed the status and activities of "subversive groups" as well as methods to coordinate efforts against them.

For example, from 1974 through 1977, Paraguay and Argentina held annual bilateral conferences.⁷² At the 1975 Bilateral Intelligence Conference between Paraguay and Argentina, the Paraguayan Army presented its views of

65. *Id.* at 00022F 0158.

66. *See id.*

67. *See id.*

68. *See id.*

69. *See id.* at 00022F 0159.

70. *See id.* The telephone and telex numbers of "Luis Gutierrez" were provided as contact numbers. *See id.* at 00022F 0162. According to a conversation the author had with Manuel Garretón in Asunción in 1995, "Luis Gutierrez" was not a person but rather was the code name for the Director of the Department of the Exterior of DINA.

71. *See id.* at 00022F 0152-53.

72. *See generally Conferencia Bilateral de Inteligencia: Paraguay-Argentina*, Bibliorata 1008, No. 00046F 1344-1377 (1975)[hereinafter Bib. 1008]; Letter from Guillermo Clebsch, Sub-jefe del Estado Mayor General (Asunción), to Francisco A. Britez Borges, Jefe de la Policía de la Capital (Asunción), Bibliorata 246, No. 00021F 1692 (Sept. 5, 1997)[hereinafter Bib. 246].

subversion in South America.⁷³ The Army concluded that for many years subversion in Paraguay and other Latin American countries had been considered merely an internal problem but that was no longer the case.⁷⁴ Paraguay therefore recommended the direct exchange of information; the exchange of doctrine, organization, and instruction; and the possibility of broadening the bilateral nature of the Intelligence Conference to include other countries.⁷⁵ It explained that the efficient coordination of intelligence activities among the Paraguayan and Argentine armed forces and national police was needed to deal with subversives.⁷⁶ Paraguay noted that there were connections among subversive groups in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, and other countries.⁷⁷ The Army was particularly interested in the Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria ("JCR"), which was comprised of members of the National Liberation Movement ("MLN," Tupamaros from Uruguay), Revolutionary Left Movement ("MIR," from Chile), and the People's Revolutionary Army ("ERP," from Argentina).⁷⁸ It understood that the purpose of the JCR was to make the American continent socialist.⁷⁹

Beginning in the early 1970s through at least 1982, Paraguay and Brazil convened annual bilateral conferences.⁸⁰ For the 1976 conference, Paraguay's police intelligence division was asked to develop a presentation on internal subversive activities and their connection with the exterior for the previous year or so. In addition, the Paraguayan and Chilean armies held bilateral conferences beginning in approximately 1975.⁸¹ According to the program for the 1982 conference, topics included

73. See Bib. 1008, *supra* note 72, at 00046F 1376-77.

74. See *id.* at 00046F 1376.

75. See *id.* at 00046F 1377. At the September 1977 Argentine-Paraguayan Bilateral Intelligence Conference held in Paraguay, Coronel was asked to discuss subversive activities in Paraguay. See Bib. 246, *supra* note 72, at 00021F 1692. In 1980, Guanes participated in working meeting with the Argentine Army.

76. See Bib. 1008, *supra* note 72, at 00046F 1347.

77. See *id.*

78. See *id.* at 00046F 1347-55.

79. See *id.* at 00046F 1348.

80. See Bib. 246, *supra* note 72, at 00021F 1650; Bib. 245, *supra* note 35, at 00021F 1553; Document from el Departamento de Investigaciones de la Policía de la Capital (Asunción), Bibliorata 147, 1-13 (1975)[hereinafter Bib. 147].

81. See generally Program from the Conferencia Bilateral de Inteligencia entre los Ejercitos de Paraguay y Chile a Desarrollarse, DPA 6 D, No. 00019F 0855-0857 (July 25-31, 1982)[hereinafter DPA 6 D].

the evolution of the subversive situation in Latin America overall as well as in Paraguay and Chile.⁸²

3. Advanced Intelligence Courses

From at least 1979 through 1982, Argentina's State Intelligence Agency ("SIDE") held annual advanced intelligence courses for high-level officials from "friendly countries."⁸³ Although the names of these so-called "friendly countries" were not identified, Paraguay was certainly one of them given the numerous letters of invitation and course descriptions existing in the Archive.⁸⁴ These training courses were designed to address issues of intelligence and counter-intelligence, subversion and terrorism, and methods of social communication.⁸⁵

These courses also discussed the underlying ideologies of subversives and sought to provide a comprehensive overview of the situation.⁸⁶ They emphasized the importance of national intelligence given the current climate of international terrorism.⁸⁷ They cited the extent of the insidious ideological penetration.⁸⁸ Argentine authorities believed that it was indispensable for the security of the nations to develop this intelligence.⁸⁹ They noted

82. *See id.*

83. *See* DPA 10 1979-80 E, 00010F 0535.

84. *See e.g.* Series of letters from Francisco Alcibiades Brítez B., Jefe de la Policía de la Capital (Asunción), to Pastor Milciades Coronel, Jefe del Departamento de Investigaciones de la Policía (Asunción), Bibliorata 81 No. 706, 963, 1771 (May-Dec. 1979)[hereinafter Bib. 81]; DPA 10 1979-80 E, No. 00010F 0533; Letter from the Secretaria de Inteligencia de Argentina to D. Benito Guanes Serrano, Jefe del II Departamento del Estado Mayoral General de Paraguay, Bibliorata 173 (Sept. 18, 1979)[hereinafter Bib. 173]; Letter from el Ministro del Interior (Asunción) to Francisco A. Brítez, Jefe de la Policía de la Capital (Asunción), PQ 53 (Oct. 10, 1981)[hereinafter PQ 53]; Letter from Carlos Martínez to Guenes, Bibliorata 595, No. 00053F 0617 (May 19, 1981) [hereinafter Bib. 595]; Letter from Alejandro Fretes Davalos to Pastor M. Coronel, Bib. 246, *supra* note 72, at 00021F 1658; Letter from Pastor M. Coronel, Jefe del Departamento de Investigaciones de la Policía de la Capital (Asunción), to Francisco A. Brítez Borges, Jefe de la Policía de la Capital (Asunción) (Dec. 15, 1981), Informes from Pastor M. Coronel to Francisco A. Brítez Borges, 1981 1984 F (Oct. 3, 1980)[hereinafter Informes]; DPA 10 1979-80 E, 00010F 0532. *See also* J. Patrice McSherry, Analyzing Operation Condor: A Covert Interamerican Structure, (March 16-19, 2000)(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). McSherry contends that high-ranking Spanish officials also attending these intelligence courses sponsored by the Argentines.

85. *See* Bib. 595, *supra* note 84, at 00053F 0617; Bib. 173, *supra* note 84.

86. *See generally* DPA 10 1979-80 E, *supra* note 84, at 00010F 0535.

87. *See id.* at 00010F 0533.

88. *See id.*

89. *See id.* at 00010F 0533, 0535; Bib. 173, *supra* note 84.

that it would be beneficial to exchange intelligence and to have some personnel with knowledge of the regional, continental, and worldwide situation.⁹⁰ Paraguay's representatives to the advanced courses were ordered to report to the Second Division of the Armed Forces to receive instructions before attending.⁹¹ Scholarships were made available to some attendees.⁹²

B. Operation Condor's Extra-Legal Exchange Of Political Prisoners

The Archive reveals several examples of suspected subversives who were detained in one country and then secretly transferred to the custody of another government's military or police authority. These individuals were detained without warrant, based on their political affiliations and activities. They were transferred extra-judicially: without being brought before a court of law, without legal representation, and without attention to extradition treaties.

1. The Detention, Transfer, And Disappearance Of Nell, Insaurralde, Santana, Logoluso, And Landi

The Archive's most clearly documented example of Operation Condor's extra-judicial exchange of political prisoners is illustrated by the fate of five individuals from Argentina and Uruguay: José Nell ("Nell"), Jose Antonio Logoluso ("Logoluso"), Dora Marta Landi Gil ("Landi"), Nelson Rodolfo Santana Scotto ("Santana"), and Gustavo Edison Insaurralde (or Inzauralde) Meliar ("Insaurralde"). These individuals were detained by Paraguayan officials without warrant; interrogated by Paraguayan, Argentine, and Uruguayan military authorities; never presented with formal charges; and then disappeared by Argentine authorities.

Nell was a 69-year-old Argentine affiliated with the Montoneros.⁹³ Both Insaurralde and Santana were Uruguayans

90. See Bib. 595, *supra* note 84, at 00053F 0617.

91. See DPA 10 1979-80 E, *supra* note 84, at 00010F 0532, 0534; Informes, *supra* note 58; PQ 53, *supra* note 84.

92. See Bib. 246, *supra* note 72, at 00021F 1658; Bib. 81, *supra* note 84.

93. Booking record No. 3845 from la Policía de la Capital (Asunción), No. 00017F 1308-11 (Mar. 29, 1977) [hereinafter 00017F].

who belonged to the Student Workers Resistance ("ROE").⁹⁴ Insaurrealde purportedly was involved in other "subversive organizations" and presumably served as a leader for the Party for the Victory of the People ("PVP").⁹⁵ Logoluso, an Argentine, was described as an active member of the Peronist Youth ("Juventud Peronista").⁹⁶ Landi, also from Argentina, was affiliated with the Peronist Youth.⁹⁷ All five arrived in Paraguay in early 1977 on various dates.⁹⁸

Records in the Archive indicate that Paraguayan authorities believed that Nell, Insaurrealde, Santana, and Logoluso were involved in a plan to arrange for political dissidents from Argentina to obtain Paraguayan documents so that they could leave the country and seek political asylum in the United Nations' office in Brazil.⁹⁹ The political dissidents would then travel on to Europe.¹⁰⁰ On March 29, 1977, Nell, Insaurrealde, Santana, Logoluso, and Landi were detained by Paraguayan authorities.¹⁰¹ All were held pursuant to what the documents in the Archive refer to as a "superior order."¹⁰² In a rare document addressed directly to President Stroessner, Coronel reported that these five individuals had been detained and described their "scheme."¹⁰³

The following week, from April 5-7, 1977, a working team comprised of military intelligence officers from Paraguay, Uruguay, and Argentina met in the Política and Afines division

94. See Document from el Departamento de Investigaciones de la Policía de la Capital (Asunción), DPA 63 MOPOCO P, No. 00008F 1371-74, at 1374 (undated)[hereinafter DPA 63].

95. Letter from Alberto B. Cantero, Director de Policía y Afines, to Pastor M. Coronel, Sr. Jefe del III Departamento de Investigaciones de la Policía de la Capital (Asunción), DPA 2 ENE MAY 1977 A (Apr. 9, 1977)[hereinafter DPA 2].

96. See Booking record No. 3851 from la Policía de la Capital (Asunción), 00017F, *supra* note 93, at 1320-22.

97. See Booking record No. 8850 from la Policía de la Capital (Asunción), 00017F, *supra* note 93, at 1317-19.

98. See *id.* at 1309-10, 1317-18, 1320; Documents from el Departamento de Investigaciones de la Policía de la Capital (Asunción), DPA 48 W, No. 00008F 1742-80, at 1744, 1746 (Mar. 29, 1977)[hereinafter DPA 48 W].

99. See DPA 48 W, *supra* note 98, at 00008F 1743-44; 00017F, *supra* note 93, at 1311.

100. See DPA 48 W, *supra* note 98, at 00008F 1743.

101. See 00017F, *supra* note 93, at 1309, 1318, 1321.

102. See *id.*

103. DPA 48 W, *supra* note 98, at 00008F 1742-45.

("DPA") of the Investigations Department in Asunción.¹⁰⁴ This division was responsible for overseeing internal security and investigating subversion within Paraguay. Alberto Cantero served as the director of the DPA. This working group was comprised of high ranking military officials, including Guanes and Galo Escobar, both of the Second Division of Paraguay's Armed Forces; Jose Montenegro and Alejandro Stada from SIDE; Carlos Calcagno of Uruguay's Army Intelligence Service; and others.¹⁰⁵ Each of the five detainees was meticulously interrogated, but, according to Cantero, none provided any major new revelations.¹⁰⁶

On May 16, 1977, Nell, Insaurralde, Santana, Logoluso, and Landi were transferred to the custody of Argentine authorities, again pursuant to what the records identify only as a "superior order."¹⁰⁷ Guanes and Captain Lazaro Sosa of Paraguay was present when these five individuals were delivered to the custody of two members of SIDE: José Montenegro and Juan Manuel Berret.¹⁰⁸ At 4:34 in the afternoon, an Argentine Naval airplane piloted by Captain Jose Abdala left for Buenos Aires.¹⁰⁹ Abdala was an official from the Naval Mechanics School ("ESMA"), an infamous clandestine torture center near Buenos Aires.¹¹⁰ Nell, Insaurralde, Santana, Logoluso, and Landi have not been heard of since, and are presumed "disappeared."¹¹¹

2. Detention And Clandestine Transfer Of Three Paraguayans

The case of three Paraguayans – Nercio Anastacio Stumps ("Stumps"), Sotelo Franco Benegas ("Franco"), and Lidia Ester Cabrera ("Cabrera") – illustrates the clandestine detention and transfer of political prisoners from Argentina to Paraguay. According to a report by Francisco Ortiz Tellez ("Ortiz"), the

104. See DPA 2, *supra* note 95.

105. See *id.*

106. See *id.* See also DPA 63, *supra* note 94, at 00008F 1371-73.

107. Informe from Alberto Cantero to Pastor M. Coronel, DPA 1 1976-77 A (May 16, 1977)[hereinafter DPA 1]; 00017F, *supra* note 69, at 1311, 1318-19.

108. See DPA 1.

109. See *id.*

110. See NUNCA MÁS, *supra* note 19, at 130-31.

111. See generally, GLADYS MEILINGER DE SANNEMANN, PARAGUAY EN EL OPERATIVO CONDOR, at 22.

Paraguayan Consul stationed in Posadas, Argentina, to Sabino Montanaro (Paraguay's Minister of the Interior), Stumps was detained in Iguazú, Argentina, by Argentine authorities.¹¹² During the night of January 18, 1977, Stumps, Franco, and Cabrera were detained in a joint operation by the Argentine National Gendarmerie and Argentine police in Misiones.¹¹³ At the same time, the Argentine officials confiscated Paraguayan Communist Party ("PCP") propaganda from the detainees' homes.¹¹⁴ Ortiz reported that he spoke with the Assistant Chief of Police of the Province, who indicated that the Headquarters of the Military Area in Posadas (Argentina) would presumably arrange for the "subversives" to be held pursuant to Argentina's Executive Power.¹¹⁵

The next day, Ortiz again reported to Montanaro. He confirmed that Stumps, Franco, and Cabrera had been detained in Iguazú.¹¹⁶ They were held in the Military Unit in Posadas, Argentina.¹¹⁷ Ortiz asked the Chief of the Military Intelligence Service if an official from the Paraguayan Armed or Security Forces could participate in the interrogations of these detainees.¹¹⁸ On May 5, 1978, Alberto Cantero wrote that Stumps, Franco, and Cabrera were in custody and were sent from the Political Division of Paraguay's Police to Emboscada.¹¹⁹ Emboscada was a detention center for political prisoners located outside of Asunción. These individuals were never brought before a judge and charges were never filed against them.

112. See Three letters from Francisco Ortiz Teller, Consul del Paraguay en Posadas, Argentina, to el Ministro del Consulado del Paraguay en Posadas, Argentina, Bibliorata 600, No. 00053F 1527-29 (Jan. 20-21, 1977)[hereinafter Bib. 600].

113. See *id.*

114. See *id.*

115. *Id.* The Organization of American States (and others) concluded that Argentina violated the rights of many by indiscriminately detaining individuals pursuant to the National Executive Power. See INTER-AM. C.H.R., EL INFORME PROHIBIDO: INFORME SOBRE LA SITU[A]CIÓN DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS EN ARGENTINA (1984) at 289-90.

116. See Bib. 600, *supra* note 112, at 0053F 1528.

117. See *id.*

118. See *id.*

119. See Letter from Alberto Cantero to Jose Felix Grau, DPA 15 1978-80 W, 00013F 0380 (May 5, 1978).

C. Potential Involvement Of INTERPOL In Operation Condor

Records in the Archive further indicate that Operation Condor may have subverted the purpose of the International Criminal Police Commission, more commonly known as INTERPOL.¹²⁰ Notwithstanding the prohibition in INTERPOL's Constitution against involvement in political crimes, INTERPOL seems to have participated in the trading of intelligence regarding political opponents of some governments on at least a few occasions. A handful of INTERPOL documents in the Archive seek and respond to requests for information regarding the background of various individuals perceived to be political opponents.

This exchange of information regarding the political affiliation and backgrounds of certain individuals through INTERPOL appears to have violated INTERPOL's Constitution. According to the INTERPOL Constitution, its purpose is "(a) To ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance between the criminal police authorities within the limits of the laws existing in different countries and in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; [and] (b) To establish and develop all institutions likely to contribute effectively to the prevention and suppression of ordinary law crimes."¹²¹ In addition, Article 3 of the INTERPOL Constitution specifies: "It is strictly forbidden for the organization to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character."¹²²

Moreover, the exchange of information regarding political opponents of military regimes certainly was not "in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." Freedom of expression and association are clearly protected under the Universal Declaration.¹²³ More specifically, Article 19 of the

120. INTERPOL is an international police force created in 1923 by police chiefs from twenty different countries.

121. INTERPOL Constitution, Article 2.

122. In 1984, INTERPOL adopted a resolution allowing it to address issues of terrorism. However, all incidents discussed in this article took place when INTERPOL's Constitution prohibited involvement in politically motivated crimes, before that resolution was adopted.

123. See G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).

Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression, including the right to hold these opinions without interference and to impart information without regard to frontiers.¹²⁴ Under Article 2, individuals are entitled to rights without regard to political opinion.¹²⁵ Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that freedom of association shall be respected.¹²⁶ Nevertheless, a few INTERPOL radiograms in the Archive relate not to "ordinary law crimes" committed by individuals, as was the proper domain of INTERPOL, but rather to the political activities, views, and affiliations of certain individuals.

For example, in February 1979, Asunción's police chief indicated in a confidential report that INTERPOL Buenos Aires had been asked to provide background information regarding José Tomas Salinas Pintos ("Salinas"), who had returned to Paraguay to complete his military service.¹²⁷ Salinas purportedly wanted to join the Cavalry's Presidential Escort Regiment for better access to national dignitaries.¹²⁸ Paraguayan authorities expressed concern that Salinas may belong to unidentified "subversive" Argentine groups.¹²⁹ There is no indication that Salinas was suspected of being involved in any "common crime."

Two radiograms to INTERPOL Asunción responded to its prior requests for information.¹³⁰ In the first, dated March 10, 1980, INTERPOL Buenos Aires replied to a communication from INTERPOL Asunción.¹³¹ INTERPOL Asunción had forwarded fingerprints and identification cards of several individuals to INTERPOL Buenos Aires.¹³² In its response, INTERPOL Buenos Aires provided INTERPOL Asunción with the political affiliation

124. *See id.*

125. *See id.*

126. *See id.*

127. *See Letter from el Jefe de Policía de la Capital (Asunción), DPA 47 W, No. 248 (Feb. 19, 1979)[hereinafter DPA 47 W].*

128. *See id.*

129. *See id.*

130. *See Radiogram from Domingo Galeano, Inspector General, Jefe del Departamento INTERPOL, DPA 14 1977-82 W, No. 00048F 0683 (Oct. 3, 1980)[hereinafter DPA 14]; Radiogram from Ysax Ruíz Diaz, Sub-Comisionario OP., Sub-Jefe, Departamento INTERPOL, DPA 14 1977-82 W, No. 00048F 0669 (Jul. 13, 1981)[hereinafter DPA 14 0069].*

131. *See id.*

132. *See id.*

of two individuals.¹³³ It explained that according to the police, Jorge Omar Lewinger was a member of the subversive Bolivian National Liberation Army (ELN) and presumably had received training in Cuba.¹³⁴ INTERPOL Buenos Aires also reported that Jorge Alberto Ruiz was a member of the "subversive" ERP.¹³⁵

Next, in a radiogram dated July 13, 1981, INTERPOL Montevideo responded to another inquiry from INTERPOL Asunción.¹³⁶ INTERPOL Montevideo stated that Julio Cesar Suarez Formolli was identified as a member of the MLN (an Uruguayan guerilla group) and had been detained by the Military Justice on July 22, 1972 for his "subversive activities."¹³⁷

D. Sharing Information Regarding International Subversive Activities

The exchange of information among the Southern Cone countries regarding alleged subversives is further substantiated by numerous reports to and from Paraguay's Second Division of the Armed Forces, particularly during the period of 1974 through 1980. In many of the reports, instead of naming a particular country, the distribution lists or sources of intelligence often refer only to a "friendly country," "intelligence service of a friendly country," or "security agency of a friendly country."¹³⁸

The Archive also contains a confidential distribution list that identified some of the codes used in these confidential intelligence reports, although this key does not directly clarify which states were the "friendly countries."¹³⁹ That these codes and veiled references were used rather than the actual names of the countries involved invites speculation. Perhaps these codes were used because the authorities sought to avoid public scrutiny or accountability for their activities.

133. *See id.*

134. *See id.*

135. *See id.*

136. *See* DPA 14, *supra* note 130.

137. *Id.*

138. *See* DPA 7 1973-83 W; DPA 8 1973-77 W, 00013F 0340; DPA 5 Personal de ABC, Hoy, Ultima Hora y de Radio Emisoras 1980-3 Q; Informe No. 025/78 from Alejandro Fretes Davalos, DPA 6 D, *supra* note 55, at 00019F 1061 (May 23, 1978); DPA 47 W, *supra* note 127; Archivador 109, 00040F 1245 (Feb. 10, 1978).

139. For example, this "key" shows that a "G" on a distribution list refers to specific foreign military, aeronautic, and naval attachés. Bib. 595, *supra* note 84, at 00053F 0719.

Paraguayan authorities requested and received information from Argentine, Bolivian, Brazilian, Chilean, and Uruguayan authorities regarding suspected subversive groups and individuals who had been detained; they also sought to verify intelligence they already possessed.¹⁴⁰ Officials offered to support and cooperate with other countries. They also exchanged documents they seized.¹⁴¹ Military attachés of these countries, especially Argentina, are frequently identified (by their designated codes) as sources of information and on the distribution lists for these confidential reports.

As an example, on November 22, 1974, Guanes circulated a report to the junta of other governments discussing two guerilla training camps located in Argentina and requested additional intelligence regarding them.¹⁴² In a report dated March 14, 1975, distributed to the military attachés of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela, Guanes noted that "extremist" Latin Americans were meeting in Argentina.¹⁴³ He sought further details about the meeting.¹⁴⁴ Later that month, Guanes circulated a confidential report to Argentine military authorities explaining that Paraguayan authorities had been unable to verify whether Paraguayan dissidents, including Epifanio Méndez Fleitas and Waldino Lovera, had met in Clorinda, Argentina.¹⁴⁵

140. See Letter from Guanes to Coronel, DPA 12 1976-83 WP, 00050F 1855 (Mar. 26, 1976); Letter from Alberto Cantero, DPA 29 ENE FEB 1981 A (Jan. 12, 1981).

141. In January 1977, the Argentine intelligence service intercepted a card from Dr. Telmo Carrillo and turned it over to Paraguay's EMAGENFA. Letter from the Ministerio de Interior to Fransisco Britez, DPA 1 DE (Oct. 21, 1976). In July 1978, ESMAGENFA received information from Argentina's Armed Forces regarding the plans of various Argentine subversive organizations based on documents confiscated from the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP), Partido Revolucionario de Trabajo (PRT), and Banda de Delinquent Terrorists (BDT). See Letter from el Jefe de la Policía de la Capital (Asunción), to Pastor M. Coronel, Jefe del Departamento de Investigaciones de la Policía de la Capital (Asunción), Archivador 207, No. 00040F 1353-54 (July 15, 1978). In July 1979, Fretes reported on intelligence received from Uruguay's Defense Intelligence Service (SID) regarding two individuals who had held a clandestine meeting of Paraguayan Confederation of Workers (CPT) in Buenos Aires. According to SID, these individuals were in touch with leftists in Uruguay and were going to participate in international campaigns against "our countries." Uruguayan authorities wanted them located. SID provided Paraguayan authorities with materials seized in Buenos Aires. See Bib. 246, *supra* note 72, at 00021F 1675.

142. See Bib. 595, *supra* note 56, at 00053F 0707.

143. Bib. 245, *supra* note 58, at 00021F 1435.

144. See *id.*

145. See *id.* Informe No. 16 at 00021F 1644 (Mar. 24, 1975).

The Archive contains a series of reports written in October 1975, approximately one month before the meeting of the First Working Meeting of National Intelligence held in Santiago that is described above. A secret report dated October 20, 1975, based on information from Brazilian and Argentine military sources discussed the operations, organization, and plans of dissident political groups.¹⁴⁶ Guanes concluded that these organizations represented a threat.¹⁴⁷ He emphasized the importance of coordinating all the national intelligence resources through meetings and the exchange of intelligence.¹⁴⁸ Guanes recommended that a commission evaluate intelligence for the Commander-in-Chief.¹⁴⁹ He advocated devoting economic resources for trips abroad to verify the intelligence held by agencies of other countries.¹⁵⁰ In another memo, sources from Bolivia and the United States informed Paraguayan officials about a "subversive" coordination center in Santa Cruz, Bolivia.¹⁵¹ This information was analyzed with Colonel Padilla of the Bolivian Army during the 1975 Bilateral Intelligence meeting held in Asunción.¹⁵²

A report dated July 6, 1976, from Guanes is significant in that its distribution list cites "Condor 1," the apparent code name for Chile.¹⁵³ Paraguayan authorities, Argentine authorities, and Argentina's Army Intelligence Service ("SIE") are also identified on the circulation list.¹⁵⁴ Guanes asked for confirmation that a military motorized patrol was searching for a guerrilla camp and indicated that he wanted to coordinate efforts with the chief of the military unit responsible for investigating the guerrilla camp.¹⁵⁵

Moreover, the Archive establishes that military officials visited one another. On February 26, 1979, two officials from the Argentine Intelligence Service, who oversaw the investigation of

146. *See id.* Informe No. 64 at 00021F 1578-81 (Oct. 20, 1975).

147. *See id.* 00021F 1580-81

148. *See id.* at 00021F 1581.

149. *See id.*

150. *See id.*

151. *See id.* Informe No. 65 at 00021F 1558-59 (Oct. 22, 1975).

152. *See id.* at 00021F 1558.

153. *Id.* Pedidio de Busqueda No. 23/76 at 00021F 1522. (Jul. 6, 1976). *See* Peter Kornbluh, *Chile Declassified*, THE NATION 21, 23 (August 9/16, 1999).

154. *See* Bib. 245, *supra* note 58, at 00021F 1522.

155. *See id.*

Montonero activities, visited the Political Division of Paraguay's Police Department.¹⁵⁶ On July 10, 1980, Fretes and Guanes reported on intelligence obtained during a visit from several Argentine officials, including Orlando Ruiz of the Intelligence Unit of the Naval Mechanics School, and two other intelligence officers from Argentina's Chaco and Formosa provinces.¹⁵⁷ Fretes indicated that he had previously exchanged information with the Argentine Intelligence Unit.¹⁵⁸ Fretes requested authorization to coordinate efforts with Argentina to identify and to follow two Montoneros detained by Argentine officials.¹⁵⁹

On November 6, 1978, Camilo Almada Saprizza and Lucilo Benítez, from Paraguay's Investigations Department, reported on their mission to Buenos Aires.¹⁶⁰ They stated that they were well received by Argentine authorities, especially the commanders of the military attachment division and members of SIDE.¹⁶¹ Almada and Benítez were allowed to interrogate members of the Political Military Organization (OPM, a Paraguayan political opposition group) who had been detained in Buenos Aires.¹⁶² It should be noted that after Stroessner was deposed, Almada and Benítez were convicted of having committed a range of human rights abuses.¹⁶³

Brazil and Uruguay participated in the exchange of information with Paraguay as well. The Archive contains a 1977 report discussing the background of certain Brazilian citizens.¹⁶⁴ The information contained in this report originated from Brazil's National Information Service, ("SNI").¹⁶⁵ A confidential map with the stamp from the military attaché of the Brazilian Embassy in Paraguay shows the locations of various Brazilian, Paraguayan,

156. See Letter from Alberto Cantero to Pastor Milciades Coronel, DPA 12 Feb. Abr 1979 A. (Feb. 27, 1979).

157. See DPA 6 D, *supra* note 81, at 00019F 0876.

158. See *id.*

159. See *id.*

160. See Letter from Almada and Benítez to Coronel, DPA 5 1978-81 B (Nov. 6, 1978).

161. See *id.*

162. See *id.*

163. See PARAGUAY: HUMAN RIGHTS, *supra* note 3, at 24-40. In 1992, these two individuals were sentenced to 25 years in prison for the murder of Mario Schaerer Prono. See *id.* at 25. In 1994, Benítez was sentenced for his involvement in the detention and torture of Amílcar María Oviedo. See *id.* at 35. In 1995, Lucilo Benítez was convicted of having tortured Alberto Alegre Portillo. See *id.* at 26.

164. See Informe No. 004/77, DPA 12 1976-83 WP, No. 00050F 1839 (Jan. 5, 1977).

165. See *id.*

and Argentine dissidents living in Paraguay.¹⁶⁶ As demonstrated by several reports from 1981, Uruguay's intelligence service provided Paraguayan authorities information regarding the political affiliations of Uruguayans detained in Paraguay.¹⁶⁷ A lengthy report from Uruguay's National Army (Dept. II) discusses the history and operations of political opposition groups in Uruguay.¹⁶⁸

The Archive contains numerous lists of "subversives" from Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil, including organizational charts of these groups. Some of these lists are extensive. For example, the Archive holds lists of: Brazilian subversives living in Argentina;¹⁶⁹ Argentine terrorists, including one with more than one thousand names;¹⁷⁰ Chileans, Brazilians, and Bolivians exiled in missions;¹⁷¹ the Peronist Montonero Movement from Argentina's SIDE;¹⁷² Paraguayans detained and disappeared in Argentina (including Augustín Goiburú and Federico Tatter, who are believed to be victims of Operation Condor);¹⁷³ terrorist Argentine criminals;¹⁷⁴ and Uruguayan "subversives" and political opponents of the Uruguayan government, including more than six hundred alleged Tupamaros wanted by the Montevideo police.¹⁷⁵

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

More research is required to completely understand the true extent and nature of Operation Condor in the Southern Cone

166. See Map of Paraguay, 1051 Caso Goiburú, No. 00050F 2474.

167. See DPA 10 1974-83 WV, 00048F 1706 (Jan. 2, 1981); Informe No. 004/85, DPA 6 D, *supra* note 81, at 0019F 0994 (Jan. 9, 1981); Bib. 595, *supra* note 84; Letter from Cantero and Coronel, DPA 29 (Jan. 12, 1981); Informe (E.M.G.), DPA 11 1981-3 E (Aug. 10, 1981); Nota No. B/247, Bib. 246, *supra* note 72, at 00021F 1672.

168. See DPA 48 W, *supra* note 98, at 00008F 1761. These groups included the Anarchist Federation of Uruguay (FAU), the Student Worker Resistance (ROE), and Popular Revolutionary Organization 33 (OPR 33, which allegedly had connections with the Montoneros). See *id.*

169. See Nota No. B/650, Bib. 246, *supra* note 72, at 00021F 1653 (Aug. 6, 1976).

170. See Nomina de Terroristas Argentinos, DPA 1 1962-83 EW, No. 00051F 0382-83 (undated)(hereinafter DPA 1 1962-83 EW); DPA 36.

171. See Documents from la Embajada del Uruguay en Paraguay—Agregatura Militar, Bibliorata 7 INTERPOL, No. 00046F 0341-49 [hereinafter Bib. 7 INTERPOL].

172. See DPA 6 D, *supra* note 81, at 00019F 1015.

173. See DNAT, *supra* note 46, at Carpeta 30.

174. See *id.* at Carpeta 3.

175. See Bib. 7 INTERPOL, *supra* note 171, at 00046F 0341.

countries, as well as the level of awareness and involvement of the United States. Additional investigation of INTERPOL's role in Operation Condor may also provide insight as to whether INTERPOL routinely exceeded its mandate by exchanging information regarding political crimes. In any case, it is evident from Paraguay's Archive of Terror that the Southern Cone military governments coordinated their efforts against the perceived communist threat. The Archive provides concrete evidence of the clandestine exchange of intelligence and prisoners among the Southern Cone countries. Unfortunately, compromising documents were likely removed from the Archive of Terror before they were "discovered." The Archive of Terror adds to the small but growing number of publicly available records confirming the existence of Operation Condor.