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## The Many Ways of Justice

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
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


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# STUDIES

IN  
THE SPIRITUALITY OF JESUITS

The Many Ways of Justice

SÉAMUS MURPHY, S.J.

MAR 13 1996

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26/2 · MARCH 1994

## THE SEMINAR ON JESUIT SPIRITUALITY

A group of Jesuits appointed from their provinces in the United States.

The Seminar studies topics pertaining to the spiritual doctrine and practice of Jesuits, especially American Jesuits, and communicates the results to the members of the provinces. This is done in the spirit of Vatican II's recommendation to religious institutes to recapture the original inspiration of their founders and to adapt it to the circumstances of modern times. The Seminar welcomes reactions or comments in regard to the material which it publishes.

The Seminar focuses its direct attention on the life and work of the Jesuits of the United States. The issues treated may be common also to Jesuits of other regions, to other priests, religious, and laity, to both men and women. Hence the Studies, while meant especially for American Jesuits, are not exclusively for them. Others who may find them helpful are cordially welcome to read them.

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THE MANY WAYS OF JUSTICE

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*Séamus Murphy, S.J.*

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STUDIES IN THE SPIRITUALITY OF JESUITS

26/2: March 1994

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*For your information . . .*

"Here we go again!" Some may be tempted thus to expostulate as they look at the title of this present STUDIES, "The Many Ways of Justice." But the issue simply won't go away, and so for several reasons this essay is well worth reading.

First, it gets us out of the rut of thinking and acting as if nothing had developed on this question since 1974-75. Secondly, it frees us from certain presuppositions. Next, it holds us to certain commitments. Fourth, it points out with admirable clarity the characteristics of and the differences among several contemporary ethical theories that give us a variety of options with which to develop differing and appropriate notions of justice for different Jesuit ministries. Lastly, it does all this with the clarity and precision of a philosopher and the practical experience of a hands-on worker in the field, both of which designations characterize the author.

In addition, one need only look at the actions of the provincial congregations that recently took place in the United States. When they held their meetings a few months ago, seven of the ten congregations adopted a *postulatum* or request to next year's general congregation that in its work on the revision of our law it make clear "the central, permeating, and integrative function of the promotion of justice in all the ministries of the Jesuits." We, and the whole Society, would do well to attain as much clarity as possible on what this really means and what it implies.

Not only this present essay, but also a book soon to be published by the Institute of Jesuit Sources can help toward this clarity. In the late spring the Institute will publish a work, tentatively entitled *At Issue with Faith and Justice: Is There a Better Way?* by Martin R. Tripole, S.J., who teaches theology at St. Joseph's University in Philadelphia. Among its interesting features, but by no means the only one, are the results of a series of questions asked in interviews with fifteen Jesuits who come originally from nine different countries, eleven of whom were members of the Thirty-Second General Congregation. The interviews focused on their understanding at the time and their present understanding of "justice" and of "the poor," their judgment on the significance of Decree 4, "Our Mission Today," their understanding of the meaning and position of "faith" in the decree, the promotion of justice in the tradition of the Society, their response to critiques of the decree, and their views as to what the coming general congregation perhaps ought to do about the service and faith and the promotion of justice.

As a result of the two together, this present essay and the forthcoming book, "Here we go again!" describes an encouraging journey of critical reflection and practical insight.

*John W. Padberg, S.J.*  
*Editor*



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## Preface

**M**uch of my background lies in social ministry, but after ordination the provincial decreed that I was to work in philosophy also. It seemed an odd mix at the time: philosophers tend to be squeamish about the rough-and-tumble of social action, while some social activists give the impression that garlic should be worn to ward off the anemia-inducing influence of philosophers. The combination has given a certain Janus-like quality to my life; but it has worked, and I have felt no need to look back.

Justice is the theme of my essay. Many of those in ministries such as education argue, rightly, that we need a wider notion of justice. People in social ministry worry about the notion of justice being made so wide that it means little more than doing good, and about “the poor” being taken to mean anyone in need; they too are right. A more careful analysis of the claim that justice-promotion is integral to faith-service is the key to resolving the problem.

For instance, consider the following chain of propositions: (1) Integral to the service of faith is the promotion of justice; (2) the promotion of justice and the option for the poor mean the same thing; (3) the option for the poor is aimed at the materially poor. Nonsocial ministries are forced into reductionism about faith if they hold all three. Dropping (1) means rejecting GC 32 and the Church’s social teaching; dropping (3) and taking “the poor” to mean anybody in need (that is, anybody) guts the option for the poor of its force. I recommend abandoning (2), implicitly assumed since GC 32. The work of justice and the option for the poor overlap but are not identical; only the former is integral to faith-service. We can now modify the notion of justice in whatever ways are necessary to keep it in integral lockstep with faith so as to avoid reductionism, while at the same time holding to a strict notion of who the poor are.

I assure my social-ministry comrades that people are not being let off the hook: they’re just being transferred to a better fitting hook. My treatment of the option for the poor is strict enough to satisfy the most Jacobin of Jesuits.

In discussing justice, I employ philosophical categories; this too may cause unease. Yet, since most of our discussions of justice treat it scripturally, I need not rehearse the work of others. “Integral” and “constitutive” are philosophical terms, so clarity requires a philosophical treatment. While a

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scriptural approach to the notion of justice is far more important for the Society's purposes than any philosophical notion, it can be enriched by the technical precision, the capacity for distinction and nuance, and the fine-grainedness that philosophy offers.

Finally, I urge the reader not to lose sight of the forest because of the trees: the essay is not about issues of justice, but about the ways and methods of justice, and above all about the large-scale theoretical framework within which we comprehend justice. Issues are used to illustrate theoretical problems in our understanding of justice: whether a particular issue is cited or not bears no relationship to its importance as an issue or to the practical problems we may experience in tackling it.

I thank Peter Bernardi, Jim Corkery, Danny Huang, Bill McKenna, Leonard Moloney, Des O'Grady, Pat Riordan, Jim Smyth, Joe Veale, and the members of the Seminar on Jesuit Spirituality for advice and encouragement. My chief debt is to my brothers of the Irish Province for example and fellowship: "More is [their] due than more than all can pay."



*The old order changeth, yielding place to new,  
And God fulfils himself in many ways,  
Lest one good custom should corrupt the world.*

—Tennyson

# THE MANY WAYS OF JUSTICE

## Introduction

### The Issue

About 1989 Father General asked each province to reflect on its experience of living our mission to faith and justice. I was involved in conducting the Irish Province's reflection. On the basis of the reports from the various houses and ministries, there seemed to be evidence that the call to promote justice as part of the service of faith was associated for some with consolation and for others with desolation. This difference had some correlation with each one's apostolic sector: people in social and youth ministries tended to experience consolation, people in education and spirituality often experienced desolation.

This finding is my starting point. It suggests that our intuitive, working notion of justice since GC 32 fits some ministries well and other ministries badly. In Part I, I shall look at the background and text of Decree 4, note its general principle that justice is integrally linked to faith, consider a case history, and then explore Decree 4's examples of justice. I shall argue that it is possible to have a wider notion of justice, and then offer reasons, based on our experience and recent Catholic social teaching, why we need to employ a wider notion. Part II will show how it can be differentiated for different kinds of ministry.

### What the Paper Will Not Cover

I aim to clarify our concept of justice, so a number of related but distinct issues must be put aside.

► I will discuss notions of justice linkable to faith, but not the link itself. It is sometimes said that faith and justice cannot be separated or separately understood. In a Christian's *life*, faith and justice ought not be separate. But in the realm of *concepts*, separate treatment (initially) is necessary if we are to avoid reductionisms.

Besides, "justice" is a term which the people of our time (many of whom have no faith) also use, and we, as children of our time, are influenced by our culture. A concept of justice that excludes faith is unusable for developing a concept of an integrated faith and justice: not every notion of justice is



acceptable for our purposes. On the other hand, we want to learn from different cultures, as well as work with people of goodwill for a better world: a notion of justice that is indistinguishable from our notion of faith is defective because it blocks such dialogue and cooperation. In any case, unlike faith, justice touches on matters of universal moral obligation. Thus, we must not blur the distinction between the concepts of faith and justice.

► I will not discuss the following important topics: (a) the benefit to religious from contact with the poor, (b) the vow of poverty and its link to the option for the poor, (c) the spirituality of the promotion of justice, (d) the biblical roots of the Church's commitment to the poor and justice.<sup>1</sup> On (d), I note that it is necessary to take account of contemporary notions of justice and poverty: we should, for example, use the term "poor" to mean the materially poor, not the biblical poor of Yahweh.

## What Points the Paper Will Make

Aware of the danger that someone will stop at the following summary of the central points of this paper and not read it through, I will nonetheless give here those main points at which the paper arrives. They are the following:

1. Decree 4 reflects Catholic social teaching's pre-1975 level of development; subsequent development is normative for interpreting Decree 4 today.

2. "Justice" in GC 32 has two senses: a wide scripturally based sense meaning Christian liberation and a narrow sense meaning social justice oriented to the poor. Only in the wide sense can we speak of it as integral to the service of faith for all ministries. As regards the narrow sense, all ministries are clearly directed by GC 32 to develop a social-justice dimension, and the fact that it might not be "integral" to faith-service in some ministries makes no difference at all to the rightness of the directive.

3. The notions of the work of justice and the option for the poor must not be conflated; doing so leads to reductionism about faith or inflating the notion of the poor to mean any in need. Social justice and the option for the poor should be distinguished, since the former will often be directed to people who are not poor.

4. Making justice integral to the service of faith at a practical level requires different operative notions of justice for different kinds of service of faith.

5. In a particular ministry, what makes an operative notion of justice appropriate is that it is easily and obviously connectable to the core elements in the work of that ministry and to the more general, abstract notion of liberation.

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<sup>1</sup> See John R. Donahue, "What Does the Lord Require? A Bibliographical Essay on the Bible and Social Justice," *Studies in the Spirituality of Jesuits* 25/2 (1993).

6. Contemporary ethical theories offer a variety of options for developing notions of justice for different ministries.

7. To determine the most appropriate notion of justice for a particular ministry, the question to ask is, What is it that is to be made just? One must identify whether the direct and immediate goal of its work is to change society and its structures, or behavior, or personal attitudes and values.

But it would be too easy to stop here and to agree or disagree with these statements without understanding how and why I have arrived at them. The steps by which I have come to the positions summarized above are themselves both important and illuminating. So I invite the reader to accompany me on this exploration of the many ways of justice.

## Part I. Synthetic: From Social Justice to Liberation

### Justice in GC 32: Background and General Principle

Part of Decree 4's background was Catholic social teaching's development in the 1961–71 period. Although, on the level of propositional content, the continuities with previous doctrine were strong, there was an unmistakable change of style and emphasis. In *Pacem in terris* (1963), John XXIII shifted the discourse from an intra-Catholic dialogue where the relevance of faith was assumed, to a Church-world dialogue where Christian faith was offered as part of the solution to the needs of the time. Vatican II's *Gaudium et spes* (1965) expressed the Church's newfound openness to the world and its problems. From a relatively sharp bipolarity of Church and world, Vatican II moved to bridge the gap and fully commit the Church to the struggle for a better world. Paul VI's social encyclicals sharpened our sense of the urgency of world problems, reinforcing a feeling that the test of the authenticity of Christians' faith lay in the degree to which they worked for justice and peace.

The culmination of this development was the 1971 Synod of Bishops' statement that "action on behalf of justice and participation in the transformation of the world fully appear to us as a constitutive dimension of the preaching of the gospel or . . . of the Church's mission for the redemption of the human race and its liberation from every oppressive situation."<sup>2</sup> This bound faith and justice together in a way that suggested that there could be no real faith without effective commitment to justice. It was a significant moment in the history of Catholic social thought.

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<sup>2</sup> Synod of Bishops, Second General Assembly, "Justice in the World" (1971), in *Justice in the Marketplace*, ed. David M. Byers (Washington: United States Catholic Conference, 1985), introduction, ¶6.

In 1975, GC 32 used similar language: “[T]o be a companion of Jesus today . . . is to engage . . . in the crucial struggle of our time: the struggle for faith and that struggle for justice which it includes.” In the service of faith, promotion of justice is “an absolute requirement” and “an integral part” (¶48, ¶79). Nor is the promotion of justice “one ministry among others” or “one apostolic area, . . . the social apostolate”: it must be “the integrating factor of all ministries,” “the concern of our whole life and a dimension of all our apostolic endeavors” (¶19, ¶96).<sup>4</sup>

Those were GC 32’s general principles concerning the faith-justice link, representing our attempt to follow the lead given by Catholic social teaching.<sup>5</sup> A service of faith, to be truly such, had to have a justice dimension; and since the Society has many ways of serving faith, it must also have (or develop) many ways of promoting justice.

Before we continue, we must deal with a technical problem. To state that promoting justice is “constitutive” of or “integral” to the service of faith is to make a claim with important semantic and ontological implications; it goes beyond the ethical claim that justice is an “absolute requirement” of faith service.<sup>6</sup>

“Constitutive” usually means that which makes something what is, for example, its form or essence: to say that justice-promotion is constitutive of faith-service is to imply that without justice-promotion, an activity could not be faith-service in any sense. In a word, without justice there can be no faith. It comes close to reducing faith-service to justice-promotion. It is noteworthy that the term has not been used since in Church documents.

“Integral” has a weaker meaning: to say that justice-promotion is integral to faith-service implies that it is an intrinsic part (or *one* of several constitutive parts) of faith-service, such that its absence would gravely impair (but not destroy) the nature and effectiveness of that faith-service. In short, without justice faith is seriously diminished, yet not necessarily absent.<sup>7</sup> At the

<sup>3</sup> John W. Padberg, S.J., ed., *Documents of the 31st and 32nd General Congregations of the Society of Jesus* (St. Louis: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1977), p. 401, ¶12.

<sup>4</sup> See also *Documents of the 33rd General Congregation of the Society of Jesus*, ed. Donald R. Campion, S.J., and Albert C. Louapre, S.J. (St. Louis: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1984), ¶35.

<sup>5</sup> See ¶69, ¶71; also John W. Padberg, S.J., “Continuity and Change in GC XXXII,” *Studies in the Spirituality of Jesuits* 7/5 (1975): 204.

<sup>6</sup> See Charles M. Murphy, “Action for Justice as Constitutive of the Preaching of the Gospel: What Did the 1971 Synod Mean?” *Theological Studies* 44 (1983).

<sup>7</sup> The Council of Trent noted: “Justification is lost not only by unbelief which causes the loss of faith, but also by any other mortal sin, even though faith itself is not lost.” “If anyone says that with the loss of grace through sin faith is also always lost, or that the faith which remains is not true faith, granted that it is not a living faith, or that the man who

same time, “integral” has a much stronger meaning than does “morally imperative.” I intend to explore that meaning.

## A Case Study

To focus on the claim that justice-promotion is integral to faith-service, I offer the following case, based on an actual event. We have assumed that justice being a dimension of all ministries meant that doing justice in any ministry would be similar to doing justice in social ministry. The assumption appears to be false.

A religious goes on an eight-day “faith-justice” retreat, involving exposure to the life of the poor and the unemployed.<sup>8</sup> He is concerned about justice and the plight of the poor and wants to discern what he should do to respond. His director, however, decides early in the retreat that he should not go on the exposure experience, but rather stay with his own issues. When he expresses anxiety about discerning what to do for justice when he returns home, the director waves it aside, saying that the matter “will take care of itself” once the interior issues have been resolved.

Question: On the basis of the story so far, has the director done justice? Or has he sabotaged the “justice thrust” of the retreat? Many of us in social ministry would grade the director negatively: he appears to see justice and the option for the poor as marginal to the retreatant’s spiritual development. He seems in need of conversion to justice, away from a privatized spirituality.

If I add that the retreatant for the first time in his life began to think that he was important, valuable in himself, and that the retreat led to much greater personal happiness, many of us would allow that what the director did was “good.” However, we would be less sure that it would count as a “work of justice.”

On returning home the retreatant found that, without having given it consideration during the retreat, what he should do for the poor was now very clear. He went on to do great good for the poor in that city, to the degree of being widely acknowledged for his effectiveness in serving them. Over the years he consistently attributed the initiating impulse of his work to the effect of the retreat. What would we say now about the director’s ministry?

Many of us would now say that the director’s action was indeed an example of the faith that does justice, since it led to the retreatant doing justice

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has faith without charity is not a Christian, anathema sit” (Henricus Denzinger and Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.J., eds., *Enchiridion symbolorum, definitionum, et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum* [Rome, New York: Herder, 1963], ¶1544 and ¶1578). The translations are my own.

<sup>8</sup> The “exposure” element emphasizes, but is not essential to, the point of the story. The point applies to any kind of retreat.

for the poor: what more could possibly be asked in order for retreat work to count as a work of justice? This brings us to the crucial point of the case. If one's previous answer was that the director was not "doing justice," then one cannot change the answer now without closing one's eyes to what retreat directors do. First, he could not possibly have foreseen that the retreatant would subsequently do great good for the poor; he cannot be credited for achieving something he was not intending. Second, even if he could have foreseen it, he could not have directed the retreatant with a view to achieving it, on peril of undermining that indifference which is a prerequisite for the free action of God upon the soul. Had he attempted to do so, he would have been sabotaging the retreat, using the retreatant as a means.

Between God's clear general will that justice be done to the poor and God's often mysterious particular will for a person at a certain moment, no retreat director should ever act so that his or her knowledge of the former should influence a retreatant's discernment of the latter.<sup>9</sup> One may not argue that the retreat director did justice by virtue of the fact that the retreat helped the person change **so that** the cause of social justice was advanced.

The conflicting intuitions to which the story gives rise illustrate our lack of clarity on what it means to do justice in ministries that are not directly social. The director might properly present material from GC 32 or Catholic social teaching to a retreatant for meditation, but ultimately the dynamics of retreat giving are such that the nature of the readings matters little. Presentation of material from Catholic social teaching (or data about local social injustice) is acceptable; but it cannot be described as making justice "integral" to that ministry, since it is external or preparatory to (that is, dispensable from) what goes on in a retreat, as the story illustrates. If one can take away certain justice-oriented elements from a particular ministry and it remains clearly a genuine service of faith, then those elements, however suited and appropriate to that ministry, cannot be said to be "integral" to the service of faith involved.

Similarly, the justice dimension of retreat work could be a matter of choosing the poor as retreatants. Doing so would be a genuine option for the poor. But it is a choice of where and with whom to work, so it is external (hence not integral) to the work.

For justice to be integral to the service of faith in retreat work, we need an appropriate notion of what it means to do justice in such work. The notion of justice employed in social ministry will not do, because it looks to social effects (did the retreatants become agents of change, companions of the poor?) to decide the question of whether a retreat director is doing justice. But since what the retreatant does subsequent to the retreat is beyond the director's

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<sup>9</sup> See *Spiritual Exercises*, ¶2, ¶¶14–16.

control, the integral justice dimension of retreat work cannot be taken to be a matter of social justice.

## Justice in GC 32: The Examples

Let's return to GC 32. After the enunciation of the general principle concerning justice (integrally linked to faith in all ministries), the first article to give content to the notion of justice focuses on the challenge of an interdependent world, divided by injustice: "injustice not only personal but institutionalized: built into economic, social, and political structures that dominate the life of nations and the international community" (§52). Tackling injustice is said to require social, economic, and political analysis (§93). In §70, there is reference to the "personal and spiritual" dimensions of human problems; it is clear that the problems in question are social.

The most concrete illustration is the following: "millions . . . suffering from poverty and hunger, from the unjust distribution of wealth and resources and from the consequences of racial, social, and political discrimination" (§69). The decree contrasts sharing versus greed, openness to all versus caste and class distinction, service versus exploitation (§65). Talk about "making the world more just" is exemplified by "distributing the resources of the planet more equitably" (§76). Decree 4 moves without pause into talk about solidarity with the poor (§§96-99). References to poverty and inequality, social analysis, and solidarity with the poor include §§52, 65, 67, 69, 76, 78, 81, 84, 89, and 91-93.

Despite the principle about justice being a dimension of all our ministries, the examples made us think of social ministry, since they connote a justice that is social, structural, and oriented to the poor. Many have seen Decree 4 as a call to work for social justice.<sup>10</sup> "Justice" meant social justice and "social justice" suggested social work: it seemed intuitively obvious, and in any case social justice was what Catholic social teaching was about.<sup>11</sup> Decree 4 lent

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<sup>10</sup> See *Promotio justitiæ* (Rome); the "justitia" is clearly social. See also Edward Sheridan, S.J., "The Jesuit and Justice," and Peter J. Henriot, S.J., "Justice: Challenge for an International Society," *Studies in the International Apostolate of Jesuits* 7, no. 2 (December 1978):1-36.

<sup>11</sup> "Father Janssens . . . had given a new thrust to the social apostolate in the Society, expressing the strong desire that all Jesuits should work with a clear social mentality. Father Janssens introduced the ideal of justice. By the time Father Arrupe succeeded him, there was a great increase in awareness of injustice, and the coining of the expression "promotion of justice" kept actual injustice on the horizon, urging us on to a concrete and effective response. These recent years have clearly shown the risks and the possible consequences of such a concentration on the social, political and economic reality" (Father Peter-Hans Kolvenbach, "Our Mission Today and Tomorrow," Detroit Conference 1991, p. 49).

itself to that interpretation, seeming to treat the work of justice, the social ministry, and the option for the poor as indistinguishable.<sup>12</sup>

In the mid seventies my impression was that GC 32 had called us to work for social justice, more or less in the sense that our experience in the social apostolate suggested. Although Decree 4 had explicitly widened the notion of the work for justice beyond the social apostolate, yet the “preunderstanding,” the intuitive apprehension of what was involved, suggested that the social apostolate’s agenda was to be taken on board by other ministries. When one heard that justice was to be a dimension of all apostolates, one thought of schools and retreat work; one did not think of the social apostolate, since justice could hardly be a mere “dimension” of that—it could be nothing less than the whole thing.

GC 32 clearly held that there was more to the faith-justice mission than working for social justice: much of Decree 4 deals with contemporary hunger for God. But the justice part of the mission seemed to be about social justice. Yet it was not clear how people’s need for God was always integrally linked to promoting social justice. One could think of numerous instances where people were helped to come closer to God and social justice had nothing to do with it, for example, the case study’s retreatant. To accommodate the latter and so make sense of the claim that justice is integral to evangelizing, we need a wider notion of justice.

## The Social and the Structural in GC 32

Before we search for a wider notion of justice, it is important that we see how significant GC 32’s social-structural notion of justice was. It developed our understanding of justice in ways that were creative and theoretically necessary. Talk about social structures was introduced because social injustice on the large scale appeared to be the result of more than individual or group behavior and attitudes: a third moral category was needed, which I will discuss in Part II. Appreciating the distinctiveness of structural justice makes it easier to accept that there are other kinds of justice.

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<sup>12</sup> See previous quotation, first two sentences. In *Studies in the Spirituality of Jesuits* 9/4 (1977): 233, “Can the social be a dimension of all apostolates?” is equated with “Can the doing of justice be a dimension of all our ministries?” Also: “Every Jesuit’s lifestyle witnesses or fails to witness to justice. It identifies him with or distances him from the poor.”

*a. What Are Structures?*

GC 32 offered no definition or list of structures: it presumably had in mind such things as international trading relations and multinational corporations. The following count as social structures:

- **Institutional entities:** states, the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF); corporations, banks, stock exchanges; churches, political parties, colleges, the Mafia, the police
- **Institutional relations:** international treaties, statutory laws, constitutions; formal rules of any institutional entity

A structure is formal: it is distinct from the people who belong to it or are governed by it and distinct in its working from their habits and attitudes. Customs are behavioral and/or attitudinal, rather than structural. Racial prejudice should not be considered structural unless formal structures are established that embody or engender it. Laws, attitudes, and behavior reinforce each other, but we have lost sight of the reason talk about structures was introduced if we call all of them “structures.” Inflationary use of the concept devalues its explanatory power.

Regrettably, Decree 4 at one point uses the terms “structures” and “mindsets” interchangeably (§74); but elsewhere justice on the “social and structural” level is kept distinct from justice on the level of “attitudes” and “habits” (§81). The distinction is also implied when Decree 4 wavers between structural and social justice, having their “roots” in the “human heart” (§81) and their shaping people’s “intimate desires and aspirations” (§89).

*b. Structures and Analysis*

GC 32 notes that “the power of . . . social . . . structures is now appreciated and the mechanisms and laws governing them are now understood” (§80). That structures exist and are powerful is unquestionable; the mechanisms and laws governing them are another matter.

The formal powers and legal rights of any structure taken on its own are easily determined. But to explain how structures interact with each other and with individuals and groups to constitute our social world and its history is much more difficult: it requires a theory, or perhaps many theories, with no guarantee that such theories will harmonize with each other.<sup>13</sup>

Some cases were easy enough: it did not take much theory to explain how the apartheid system caused injustice. Some structures may be unjust in

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<sup>13</sup> For parallels from physics see Nancy Cartwright, *How the Laws of Physics Lie* (Oxford University Press, 1983).



themselves, where the intentions of those establishing them were unjust. However, the structures we are often most interested in are typically such that it is not the structures themselves that are unjust, but the way they operate under certain conditions; whether farm subsidies in rich nations hurt the poor, whether GATT or NAFTA will hinder social justice, whether minimum-wage laws are a good idea, whether being politically independent makes a central bank (like the U.S. Federal Reserve or Germany's Bundesbank) less just.<sup>14</sup>

For such issues we have theories (for example, the famous “dependency theory” which once influenced so many of us), which may posit or employ “(causal) mechanisms and laws” within a model of the real world. A theory enfolds empirical data within a model, to interpret it; another theory might employ a different model, interpreting the data differently.<sup>15</sup> New data may lead to the abandonment of the theory. A model is not a picture of reality, so it is usually not true in the sense of mirroring the way the world is: the best we can hope for is that the theory will be true in the sense of adequate to the phenomena and data, and that it will be explanatory, even predictive. Certain social phenomena (for instance, social classes) count as structures only within a theory.

The tone of ¶80 is that of the naive realist, as though one could, with a little sociology, actually see the IMF hurting a Third World village, much as one might see one person rob another. Its talk about mechanisms and laws, as though these could be apparent without the aid of an enfolding theory, is revealing. It would have been better to have said, We have some promising theories to explain the social phenomena; these involve positing certain social mechanisms and laws. Identifying how social structures are causally involved in suffering and injustice requires continuing work in the human sciences.

### *c. The Relation between the Social and the Structural*

The social situations or states of affairs with which social justice is concerned do not always involve structures. We can classify the types of social-structural links as follows:

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<sup>14</sup> “GATT” stands for the (periodically renewed) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade between the world’s market economies, aimed at liberalizing trade. “NAFTA” stands for the North American Free Trade Agreement between Canada, the United States, and Mexico.

<sup>15</sup> See Fred Suppe, *The Semantic Conception of Theories and Scientific Realism* (University of Illinois, 1989); Arthur McGovern, *Liberation Theology and Its Critics* (Orbis, 1989), 156–59. Dependency theory argued that patterns of transnational capital formation and associated political structures kept underdeveloped countries in a peripheral role, exploiting them as suppliers of raw materials and cheap labor.

- i. Social ministry that involves employing the existing structures for the well-being of people, for example, working with poor people to help them secure their entitlements;
- ii. Social ministry that is unconnected to structures or that attempts to supply the lack of appropriate structures;
- iii. Social ministry where the structures are the primary causal factor in oppression or injustice, and where those involved in this ministry may be doing research to influence public policy so as to reform those structures, or working in advocacy roles, mobilizing the oppressed and seeking to empower them against the structures in question, lobbying public representatives, attracting media attention. Decree 4 applies most directly to this category.
- iv. Social ministry in cases of ethnic or intercommunal tension, as in Northern Ireland, Croatia, Lithuania, and Slovakia. Here social structures tend to be a relevant but minor factor in conflict: they may provoke or exacerbate it, but their removal does not suffice to eliminate it. At the same time the conflicts are social, since people do not kill or discriminate out of personal enmity, but out of inherited antagonism and collective fear: nationalism/tribalism is a powerful social force. Those of us working where there is intercommunal conflict need the critical support of our fellow Jesuits elsewhere to keep us honest, so that we do not mistake nationalist partisanship for inculturation or (where our tribe is poorer) justify partisanship by dressing it as an option for the poor. Our resistance to the Idols of the Market may be growing; our resistance to the Idols of the Tribe is weak.

## The Necessity of a Wider Notion

I now come to the central argument of Part I, concerning the need for a wider notion of justice. Many of us thought that GC 32 warranted a wider notion based on simple extension of Decree 4's examples, generalizing from the case of social, structural justice for the poor. This assumes that GC 32's examples of justice are not just examples, but *representative* examples. Yet the previous sections show how very specific GC 32's examples are, so it is clear that we can list various kinds of justice:

1. Social, structural justice for the poor, just discussed
2. Social, structural justice oriented to the nonpoor, such as women, ethnic minorities, the unborn (GC 33, ¶48)
3. Social justice, oriented to any group or issue, but not involving structures, thus needing little social analysis
4. Justice in behavior, for instance, commutative (one-to-one) justice

## 5. Justice in character: values, motives, desires, attitudes

Adding (2) through (5), particularly (4) and (5), generates a far wider notion of justice than that represented by Decree 4's examples of justice. We need it, because "the promotion of justice" (integral to the service of faith) has turned out *not* to be semantically interchangeable with "the promotion of social justice" or "the option for the poor," since many ministries serve the faith in ways that have no direct connection to social justice or the poor.<sup>16</sup> To say something is "integral" to a ministry is no mere metaphor but a claim that it is a central, necessary part of that ministry. That the synod used similar language and that GC 32 was consciously following suit are also reason for giving "integral" full weight. That a ministry has a social-justice dimension is no guarantee that it is *integral* to that ministry.

What is problematic is not the claim that faith and justice are linked but that they are linked so strongly that a particular service of faith would largely cease to be such if its integral justice dimension were absent. Where justice is understood as social justice, it is impossible to vindicate the claim. To sustain the claim of integral linkage, we must take the "promotion of justice" to refer to any of (1) through (5) above.

Nor can we get out of the dilemma by suggesting that work for justice is meant to be a dimension of each Jesuit's *life*, as distinct from his apostolate: he might continue to work in a school or retreat house while tithing time to work among the poor, and thus count as having integrated the faith-justice mission into his apostolic life.<sup>17</sup> Decree 4 is explicit that promoting justice has to be a dimension of all our ministries (§78, §96).

To people in the social ministry, the foregoing may seem academic: it certainly would have seemed so to me until the mid eighties. But on the basis of my experience in collecting information in my province, the problem is real enough for many in other ministries. Today, the implicit, operative notion of justice predominantly used in the Society is one that can be intrinsically integrated into the social ministry, yet not much more than extrinsically added, tacked on *ab extra*, to other ministries.

I draw the following conclusions. The assumption that the examples of social justice oriented to the poor are representative of the justice that is integral to faith must be abandoned, because there are many services of faith with no intrinsic connection to *social* justice. The notion of the justice integral to faith is better expressed when Decree 4 remarks that "there is no genuine conversion to the love of God without conversion to the love of neighbor and, therefore, to

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<sup>16</sup> It may be replied that they have an indirect connection. But since our world is one, everything is indirectly connected to everything else. Indirect connections come cheap.

<sup>17</sup> In no way do I intend to belittle time tithing to the poor. It seems particularly appropriate for those whose ministry is remote from the poor, for instance, philosophers.

the demands of justice” (§77). The love of neighbor includes far more than what we include under the heading “social justice.” The authors of Decree 4 seem unclear on this point; otherwise they would surely have indicated that “justice” was being used in two senses: a wide one in the general principle about the faith-justice link and a narrow one in the examples of justice. We cannot identify an integral justice dimension in what the retreat director did in the case study unless we have a notion of justice that is wider than the notion of social justice and involves elements not found in the notion of social justice.

The distinction is reinforced by the statements of Fathers Arrupe and Kolvenbach that the call to promote justice must not be interpreted to mean that all ministries except those involving direct work with the poor are now of doubtful value.<sup>18</sup> However, holding *that* the proper concept of justice goes beyond the socioeconomic does not tell us *how* it goes beyond it; and experience suggests that we will not really believe that it does until we know how it does. To fill in the content of a notion of justice integral to the service of faith, we need a wide, multifaceted notion of justice, embracing (1) through (5) listed above.

## Evangelization and Liberation

A wider notion of justice is available in post-1975 Catholic social teaching. After the 1971 Synod, questions were raised as to the meaning of the synod’s proposition about action for justice being constitutive of preaching (as distinct from living) the Gospel. That could be interpreted to mean that Scripture scholarship or giving retreats had no evangelical value of themselves unless those activities were directly involved in the struggle for social justice. However, such an understanding would have to be ruled out unless one were to regard a wide range of ministries as not serving the faith because they are not fighting for social justice.

But saying what the synod did not mean or could not have meant is not enough to make clear what it did mean.<sup>19</sup> The narrower notion of justice, as

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<sup>18</sup> Father Peter-Hans Kolvenbach, *The Changing Face of Justice* (CAFOD, 1991): “The risk was to interpret [Decree 4’s] call to promotion of justice as implying: (a) abandon all other works and concentrate on social work alone; (b) give up evangelisation in favour of development work to eliminate poverty; (c) give up religious life and join the secular forces of promoting justice; (d) give up the preoccupation with Church unity and take up the radical stand of struggle in a class society; (e) write off preaching and sacramental ministry and be politically involved; (f) discard the ‘universal’ approach of trying to convert the oppressors and dare to opt for the poor.”

<sup>19</sup> The Ptolemaic paradigm of the geocentric cosmos continued to hold sway until the sixteenth century, not because the medievals could see no flaws in it, but because no new paradigm had emerged.

social action to combat poverty and the structures that perpetuate it, was clear, and therefore powerful; appeals to the necessity for having a wider notion were largely idle in the absence of such a wider notion with hard content.

GC 32 ended in April 1975, and Paul VI's *Evangelii nuntiandi* appeared in December. Its context is partly given by the coupling of faith and justice in the 1971 Synod, which had made faith (rather than justice) problematic. Confusing justice with social justice had not mattered much in the sixties: the synod's proposition made it matter a lot. Hence it was logical that *Evangelii nuntiandi* should reexamine the nature of evangelization, given that justice must be included in it. It noted the danger of reducing the Church's message of salvation to a social program (§32). The synod's commitment was to be reaffirmed, but expressed differently.

The 1971 Synod had also used the term "liberation"; now, in *Evangelii nuntiandi*, "liberation" took pride of place.

The Church, as the bishops repeated, has the duty to proclaim the liberation of millions of human beings . . . the duty of assisting the birth of this liberation, of giving witness to it, of ensuring that it is complete. This is not foreign to evangelization.

Between evangelization and human advancement—development and liberation—there are in fact profound links [anthropological, theological, and evangelical]. . . .

. . . With regard to the liberation which evangelization proclaims . . . it cannot be contained in the simple and restricted dimension of economics, politics, social or cultural life; it must envisage the whole man, in all his aspects, right up to and including his openness to the absolute. . . .<sup>20</sup>

Significantly, the term "justice" is not used. The synod's proposition was to be interpreted in the sense of an all-embracing liberation, going decisively beyond the scope of social justice.

According to *Evangelii nuntiandi*, evangelization had to touch every aspect of life. For justice to be integral to evangelization, it would have to be pursued also on psychological, cultural, spiritual, and interpersonal (that is, nonsocial) levels. The scriptural and theological roots of the Church's concept of justice indicated that to work for justice was to respond to God's liberating action in history, which involved not just the overcoming of oppression and poverty but a total redemption overcoming all sin, all privation of moral being.

The integration of faith and justice is recast as follows: Evangelizing is the proclamation of "salvation . . . which is liberation from everything that

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<sup>20</sup> Pope Paul VI, *Evangelii nuntiandi*, On Evangelization in the Modern World (December 8, 1975), in *Justice in the Marketplace*, ed. David M. Byers (Washington: United States Catholic Conference, 1985), 271-73, ¶30-¶33.

oppresses man . . . above all liberation from sin” (§7, §9). “Liberation” could include the redemption Christ brought and the transformation his Church sought. “Liberation” carries cultural connotations more easily than does “justice,” thus serving as the catch-all term for the transformation that a holistic evangelization involves.<sup>21</sup> *Libertatis nuntius*, dealing with concerns about the integrity of faith and the danger of reductionism, repeated the message of *Evangelii nuntiandi*: “The Gospel . . . is a force for liberation . . . from the radical slavery of sin . . . slavery in the cultural, economic, social and political spheres, all of which derive ultimately from sin.”<sup>22</sup> Throughout, the focus is on liberation, with justice mentioned rarely.

The semantic content of the concept of liberation does not appear to mean anything more determinate than the search for and attainment of the human good. But on the level of pragmatics, the term is powerful and evocative.<sup>23</sup> Also, the evangelization-liberation pair has a linguistic advantage over the faith-justice pair, since it is less conducive to reductionism: “faith” and “justice” suggest theoretical content, conceptual propositions, a *terminus a quo* from which to start, while “evangelization” and “liberation” suggest process, ongoing transformation of people and the world, a *terminus ad quem* towards which to strive.

GC 32 came at the end of a phase that began around 1960 and focused on issues of justice. *Evangelii nuntiandi* inaugurated a new phase (involving the CDF documents on liberation theology, the Puebla documents, and John Paul II’s letters) focusing on Christian anthropology and the relationship between evangelization and liberation. Today, we need to reinterpret Decree 4 through the prism of post-1975 Catholic social teaching. It is one thing to explain what Decree 4’s authors had in mind in 1975; quite other is the task of understanding or interpreting their text now.<sup>24</sup> To give content to the concept of justice integral to faith, Catholic social teaching’s notion of liberation is most appropriate.

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<sup>21</sup> John Paul II, *Sollicitudo rei socialis* (1987), §46, notes that liberation has become “the fundamental category and the first principle of action” in much of the world.

<sup>22</sup> Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, *Libertatis nuntius* (1984), introduction; see also §64.

<sup>23</sup> Gustavo Gutiérrez, *A Theology of Liberation* (Orbis, 1971), 24f., employs it pragmatically as expressing the aspirations of the oppressed, the struggle of humankind to become the subject of history, and the salvation brought by Christ.

<sup>24</sup> See Paul Ricoeur, “What Is a Text? Explanation and Understanding,” in *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, ed. John B. Thompson (Cambridge University Press, 1981) for the importance of the distinction between textual meaning and authorial meaning.

## Interlude: Why a Wider Notion Is Not Enough

The theme of holistic liberation was a synthesis of the great diversity found in the ways the moral sense and passion for justice of Christians can be expressed. It can be enormously inspiring, particularly appropriate in a spirituality that embraces justice. It is also useful as a negative criterion: If an activity cannot pass as a work of evangelization for human liberation, it is definitely not a work of justice. But because it is so all-embracing, it is indiscriminating: visions of liberation are of little use as guides to action within a ministry. We also need narrower notions of justice, closer to the actuality of ministry.

## Part II. Analytic: From Liberation to Ministerially Differentiated Notions of Justice

In Part I the goal was to synthesize, transcending differences to develop a notion of justice capable of being integral to the service of faith; this led to a wide concept of justice, equivalent to the Catholic concept of liberation. In Part II the goal is to analyze, exploring differences in order to come closer to the diverse contexts of our ministries. To make talk about liberation or “wide” justice relevant to our work, guiding us in discernment and apostolic choices, we need notions of justice differentiated by the nature of each ministry and its direct goals. The first distinction is between the work of justice and the option for the poor; the second is between different kinds of justice.

### The Work of Justice and the Option for the Poor

The inclusion of peace, ecology, women, and ethnic minorities as issues under the heading of justice requires this distinction. Of course there is overlap; but attempting to treat the work of justice and the option for the poor as identical causes problems.

Narrowing the work of justice to being essentially a matter of combatting poverty creates a risk that other serious injustices, such as the annual worldwide toll of abortions and rapes, will be viewed as not included under the heading “the work of justice,” or included *only to the extent that they are connected to poverty*. Some priests and religious in Ireland and Sicily have treated the murderous terrorism of the IRA and the Mafia respectively as merely symptomatic injustice compared to poverty; public commitment to the bizarre notion that structural poverty is always the fundamental injustice can mask a semiconscious complicity.

Widening the category of “the poor” to cover any injustice or any need causes us to sink into a linguistic and conceptual morass. Refugees and prisoners may reasonably be included, because the majority are poor and their material poverty is directly relevant to their plight. But if anybody who suffers injustice is to count as poor, to whom will the term refer in the case of the rape of a middle-class person by a poor person? Surely it is quite adequate to say that the person raped suffers a serious injustice. Matters become even worse when anybody in need counts as poor, for there is nobody in the world who is not in some need, whether material, spiritual, or cultural. It is a pity that some Church documents have used the term “poor” in such ways, since it deprives the concept of its force. Letting “the poor” refer very widely leads to conceptual contortions, undermines the claim of the world’s poor to our special attention, and makes us look silly if not dishonest to those of goodwill and no faith with whom we work.

The problem is linguistic, and the solution is to avoid equating the meaning of the terms “injustice” and “poverty.” The works that should count under the option for the poor are a (proper) subset of the works of justice. There are important works of social justice with which Jesuits around the world are involved, for example, work for peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland or work against the Mafia in southern Italy; these are only partly, and certainly not intrinsically, about the struggle against poverty.

A further distinction, noted earlier, is that while the work of justice is about what Jesuits do in their ministries, the option for the poor is about for whom it is done. Anybody, rich or poor, male or female, black or white, can be the object of the work of justice; only those who are materially poor can be the object of the option for the poor. We should treat the work of justice and the option for the poor as two separate criteria, the former more important and to be applied first. We should prioritize the different injustices in our society, and then decide how resources can best be used to respond. This may leave some Jesuits working primarily against poverty and other Jesuits countering injustices involved in abortion or ethnic conflict. For the former, their option for the poor automatically accompanies their work for justice. For the latter, theirs may be added by giving special attention to poverty-related factors pushing people towards abortion or ethnic conflict, or working more with poor people affected by that injustice; where this is not possible, their option has to be made via time tithing to a different work. To avoid partisanship, the justice criterion must have priority and be understood independently of particular groups.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Thus marginalization will not do as a criterion: racists and child abusers are marginalized—deservedly. Amending it to unjust marginalization admits the priority of the justice criterion. If one treats the option for the poor as a hermeneutical principle (for example, sees the world through the eyes of the poor), it becomes even more important to give priority to the justice criterion.



## A New Moral Category

In the traditional sense, everybody was expected to be just, through being honest, fair, and so forth, towards others; it was immoral or sinful not to be just in this sense. Catholic moral thought, like other types, dealt with issues of moral action, of rights and duties. The focus was on actions (as well as their avoidance or omission): commutative justice dealt with one-to-one moral relations, and distributive justice dealt with one-to-many (typically, state-toward-citizens) moral relations. Justice was about who owed what to whom. Unlike other types, Catholic moral thought also dealt with character, emphasizing the formation of good habits and attitudes. Here, justice was a virtue, a quality of character developed in habits. GC 32 said little about moral action or character because it was really talking about *social* justice.

In the sixties the mass media generated a strong sense of the “global village” dimension of human existence, as well as a sense of the growing economic and social interdependence of our world. Thus, for example, a rising unease about world poverty and the risk of global war directed attention to the international trading system as paradigmatic of the unjust social structure. The writings of Marx and others taught us about the reality and power of social structures. Traditionally, social ethics had evaluated the actions of political and business leaders; but observing that the powerful who attempted radical change often lost power as a result forced us to realize that it took more than morally good leaders to make the world just, since social structures could not easily be manipulated. The novel response was to treat the structures themselves as subjects for moral evaluation; by extension, society as whole, (social) states of affairs, were also to be treated as morally evaluable entities. The categories of moral action and character were still relevant, but they needed to be supplemented. A new moral category had arrived: social situations or states of affairs and their social structures. The situation could be general and global or local and particular; usually, but not always, it would include causally related structures.

That category is reflected in the connotation of the term “justice” in GC 32; for, in general, Decree 4 takes society (rather than behavior or attitudes) as that which is to be made just (¶69; see also ¶63 and ¶75). It had some connection to Catholic social teaching’s notion of the common good.<sup>26</sup> It was not uncommon to hear older Jesuits wondering if Decree 4 was about distributive justice. The social-structural notion of justice resembled the notion of distributive justice in its concern that the goods of this world should be fairly distributed, but the resemblance ended there; it was not primarily concerned

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<sup>26</sup> See Charles Curran, “The Common Good and Catholic Social Teaching,” in Oliver Williams and John Houck, eds., *The Common Good and US Capitalism* (University Press of America, 1987).

with what the state owed its citizens, but with how the needs of the poor were to be met and what society (to count as humane or Christian) ought to give them.

Decree 4's notion of social justice has similarities to the notion of justice in consequentialist ethics, as distinct from deontological ethics and virtue ethics, since Decree 4's focus was on how to bring about a better world, not on what actions were just or on what the virtuously just person looked like.<sup>27</sup> However, a consequentialist ethic is not the only ethic, and perhaps not the most suitable ethic for some ministries. In interpreting what is meant by the justice integral to faith, we need not confine ourselves to thinking in terms of just societies, along the lines of a consequentialist ethic. We can also talk about just actions in terms of a deontological ethic or about just persons via a virtue ethic: all fall within the Catholic notion of liberation.

### **Ethical Theories: Different Notions of Justice**

First, from the theoretical end, the concept of justice can be elaborated in different ways, in order to fit the experience of different ministries and to show how justice is integral to the service of faith in a particular ministry and easily linkable to the wider, overarching concept of liberation. The more general a concept, the more abstract it is; to be of any use to busy Jesuits, a concept of justice needs to be made easily applicable.

Second, from the practical end, the typical tried-and-tested form of Jesuit ministry usually involves an implicit, operative notion of justice.<sup>28</sup> An operative notion is deduced from what can be made out about people's beliefs from their behavior, even though the notion they explicitly hold is different. To the extent that there are such implicit notions of justice, they will usually vary with the nature of the ministry.

Taking the two together, it should be possible to make appropriate connections between a long-tested ministry, still experienced as "right for us to be in it," and some explicit concept of justice.<sup>29</sup> It makes sense to speak of different operative notions of justice, because ethical theories use various concepts of justice. The following pages will show that it is legitimate to have different notions of justice for different ministries.

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<sup>27</sup> Consequentialism evaluates actions, attitudes, and the like in terms of their results, deontologism in terms of their intrinsic nature.

<sup>28</sup> "In one form or another, [faith and justice] has always been the mission of the Society" (GC 32, ¶49).

<sup>29</sup> That our main ministries do (or have the potential to do) justice does not imply that each institute or Jesuit in that ministry is doing justice: the status quo is not being endorsed.

There are three major types of ethical theory: (a) an ethic of *outcome* (consequentialism/proportionalism), (b) an ethic of *right/duty* (deontologism), and (c) an ethic of *virtue*. Each is concerned with social outcomes or situations, individual duties and rights, and personal virtue and growth; consequences, action, and character are all important categories in any ethical theory. What distinguishes a theory is which category it treats as central: the resulting differences between theories can be very substantial.

### a. *Ethic of Outcome*

The first emphasizes consequences, and declares justice to be a matter of creating a society where human well-being is ensured and people are given what they need. The focus is on society, involving the network of (formal) social structures and (more general) social situations that make up the web or matrix within which people move, rather than on the individuals (their actions, habits or attitudes) at the nodes of the web.<sup>30</sup> Thus, social ministry typically involves working with identifiable classes or groups (for example, the unemployed, rape victims, the homeless, prisoners) and countering situations of deprivation or structural injustice. Its notion of justice is similar to distributive justice insofar as the recipients are concerned.

Its primary question is not, What ought I do (with my life)? but, What needs to be done (to make our world better)? Thus, its viewpoint is impersonal, universal, or divine: there is a parallel between Ignatius's picture of the Trinity considering what to do about our world with its evil, injustice, and sinfulness, and the utilitarian trying to work out what engineering is necessary to fix society. Its key question is, In what way should human resources be employed so as to have maximum effectiveness in bringing about a better world? Its center of gravity is in the notion of the good society, whether that is explicated in terms of the common good or the greatest good for the greatest number.

As regards the moral agent (individual or group), the ethics of outcome has little to say. Becoming a just person is a by-product of one's commitment to bringing about a better world by means of working to meet human need and through standing in solidarity with the poor and the oppressed. But it remains in a state of "becoming" as long as there is injustice anywhere in the world: one may not presume to call oneself just, since one is part of a sinful world. However, to mix metaphors from different ages, one is "accounted" just through being "on the side of justice."

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<sup>30</sup> See Samuel Scheffler, *The Rejection of Consequentialism* (Clarendon Press, 1982); David Braybrooke, *Meeting Needs* (Princeton University Press, 1987); and James Griffin, *Well-Being* (Clarendon Press, 1988).

Part of its appeal in the heady days of the sixties was its offer of a larger moral task than that of developing personal virtue or observing the list of moral precepts. It was based on a generous self-forgetfulness plus a belief in the possibility of radically changing society. For many of us, then and now, it offers an exhilarating, exciting vision of the Kingdom, providing a cause that brings meaning to life and value to sacrifice. In a certain sense (not necessarily bad), this ethic evaluates individuals and their behavior as means to the end of a just society.

With its emphasis on meeting needs, increasing human welfare and changing social structures, this ethic is particularly appropriate to the social ministry. It appears in fact to be the (implicit) notion of justice primarily in use in Jesuit social ministries, and one can see why that should be so. It is also directly relevant to any ministry concerned with public policy.

### *b. Ethic of Duty*

Deontological ethics starts from the question, What does it mean to act justly?<sup>31</sup> Here the perspective is personal or involves a small group. It reflects an awareness of human limitations, a sense of the fact that one is not a messiah who can set the world to rights. Global injustice is not my fault: my moral responsibility is mainly for the evil I have done and the good I am obligated to do.<sup>32</sup>

Central to this understanding of justice are notions of rights and duties. The focus is not on society but on the individual, because society, lacking a mind and a will, cannot be a moral agent in the strict sense. If the ethic of outcome highlights original, cosmic, and social sin, this ethic of duty or action highlights individual sin and notes the fact that at the end of the day global sin is built up from individual sin. Accordingly, a moral agent may not treat the task of becoming just in his own behavior as subsumed under the task of creating a more just society, nor even assume that the degree of one's commitment to working for a just society will be a reliable gauge of the morality of one's behavior. This ethic notes that the world will probably continue to be unjust during and after one's lifetime, and proposes that one develop the clarity and strength to live morally in it despite that fact.

While the ethic of outcome tends to see justice to oneself as something that follows on one's working to make the world a better place, the ethic of

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<sup>31</sup> See Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*; John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Oxford University Press, 1971); Ronald Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously* (Duckworth, 1977); John Finnis, *Natural Law and Natural Rights* (Clarendon Press, 1980) and *Moral Absolutes* (Catholic University of America Press, 1991).

<sup>32</sup> This does not imply that the ethic of action ignores the social dimensions of personal sin or cannot accommodate the reality of social sin.

duty or action is not so impersonal. It places the well-being of others and one's own moral perfection on a level as two nonnegotiable moral goals: one cannot work at one and hope the other will arrive as a by-product. In fact, one cannot achieve one without also working to achieve the other. Love and care for others is not enough, since without personal moral development and a sense of the boundaries between persons, one's love for others may lack respect and be tinged with codependency or paternalism.

This ethic is strong on treating persons as ends, and sees justice as a matter of giving others what they are owed. Its notion of justice includes the commutative (one on one). Its question is, How ought I behave in my relations to others? It is related to distributive justice insofar as it refers to the agent.

It plays some role in every ministry, notably in preaching, confession, and much pastoral work. Sunday homilies about global, structural injustice cannot be regular fare, since the person in the pew wants to hear about how he or she should live, and that means drawing on the resources of the ethic of action. Likewise, the sacrament of penance is about confessing one's own sins—not those of the system. Except in contexts where the local community is severely oppressed and is in need of having that oppression named, the notion of justice involved in preaching and parish work is likely to be deontological. It is the primary notion of justice in catechisms, where the focus is not on the state of the world but on the morality of behavior. It was the notion of justice most common in the Church prior to the sixties.

### *c. Ethic of Virtue*

The third ethic focuses on personal growth: physical, emotional, moral, intellectual, interpersonal, and so on. Key words are excellence and virtue, where virtue is not understood in a narrowly moral sense, as it has sometimes been in the Church's history. The question here is not about what's wrong with our society or about what is morally obligatory, but about how to identify and develop human excellence, of which moral goodness and moral character are part.<sup>33</sup>

The guiding star of this ethic of virtue or of the person is not the happy society or the fulfilled moral law, but precisely the integrated, cultured, and socially involved person. Excellence includes being attentive, rational, reasonable, and prudent. The virtuous person knows that graciousness, artistic sensibility, intellectual development, and academic rigor have ethical value. One's virtue can be gauged by the degree to which one can say, "Homo sum:

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<sup>33</sup> See Aristotle and Aquinas; J. Crossin, *What Are They Saying about Virtue?* (Paulist Press, 1985); Jean Porter, *The Recovery of Virtue* (Westminster/John Knox Press, 1990); and Michael Slote, *From Morality to Virtue* (Oxford University Press, 1992).

humani nil a me alienum puto,” through the capacity for empathy with human misery, appreciation of human excellence and cultural achievement, and solidarity with all.

Here justice in action is understood as what the just person would do, and the just person is one who is well developed in the ways listed, naturally doing what helps oneself and others become better persons. The inability to form friendships is a character deficiency, and a person incapable of friendship will probably not be a just person. The just person is merciful; here, justice and mercy meet to a degree not found in other ethical theories.<sup>34</sup> As well as instructing us on the cognitive and moral virtues we are all familiar with from Aquinas and Aristotle, the sixties taught us that to be socially conscious was also a virtue. By “socially conscious” I mean (a) being sensitive to social injustice in one’s community and the wider world, and (b) being aware of one’s social groundedness in a particular nation, culture, ethnic group, class or social stratum, and so forth. In the case of (b), the related moral requirement is a loyalty to one’s community, balanced by a critical freedom with respect to it, so that nationalism, racism, middle-class complacency, consumerism, homophobia, and other factors making for injustice can be counteracted where they grow, namely, in the human heart.

If the first theory is consequence-centered and the second action centered, this one is person centered. It argues that well-integrated persons lead to just societies and suggests that without just persons a just society is a mirage in the desert. Its question is, How can I become a better person? Its motto could be “The glory of God is the human person fully alive.” It seems to describe best what Jesuits have experienced as right in what I shall call “growth ministries,” such as, education, spirituality, psychological care. Here doing justice can be interpreted as a matter of “e-ducating” and empowering persons.

There are important elements of Catholic social teaching that are not about society as such and that were not noticed in the era when we read social encyclicals with a view to locating them on a capitalism-socialism spectrum. Much of what is said about the evangelization of culture can seem irrelevant to the work of justice when an adequate concept of the just person is lacking.

In this ethic, justice to oneself is sometimes prior to justice to others. In the ethic of outcome, society conceived as a whole is primary, and the individual moral agent is secondary. What matters is that the good society should be created; who creates it is unimportant. In the ethic of duty or action, there is a balance between pursuing the happiness of others and seeking one’s own moral perfection. In the ethic of virtue or person, the agent must (initially, at least) give an importance to one’s own happiness that is not given to that of other individuals.

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<sup>34</sup> See John Paul II, *Dives in misericordia* (1980), ¶12.

This may make the ethic of virtue sound self-centered. But if one moves away from the more consequentialist image of the selfless, heroic cadre building the just society, towards the image of the person who is to be a model, a teacher, and a guide for others, it may seem less so. The just society may be imaged by a plan and a strategy, and just action by a moral code or a charter of human rights; but communicating the image of the admirable, just person, requires a model. If it is to be enough that the disciple should be like the master, then the master had better be worth imitating: someone truly admirable, an embodiment of human excellence. But one cannot attain to that unless it is pursued for its own sake. The most influential Jesuit teachers and spiritual masters were those whose own lives and inner richness and depth were the primary lesson. The Jesuit or the evangelizer cannot develop character and become cultured *as a means* to making a better world: he must do it for its own sake, or for his own sake. He must see it as valuable in itself, even if he influences not a single person thereby. The appropriate notion of justice for evangelizing culture is that found in virtue ethics, not that of outcome ethics.

Arguing the relative merits of ethical theories can be left to philosophers: it is not my concern here. My goal is to point out that each type offers fruitful insights for identifying and naming what is of core value in some of our important ministries, and explaining how justice is done there. We have a natural but mistaken tendency to expect that the effects of doing justice will look much alike from one ministry to another. To correct this tendency, we must identify that notion of justice most appropriate to our own ministry, while at the same time keeping an eye on the implications the other notions might have for our own work.

### Schematic Outline

The following is a schematic outline of the different ethical theories and their relevance to our ministries. The distinctions are a little artificial at times, and there is less sharp division and more overlap than is indicated.

	OUTCOME	DUTY	VIRTUE
<i>Philosophical influences:</i>	Utilitarianism, Marx	Kant, the Rights of Man	Aristotle, personalism
<i>Key concept:</i>	The Good (society)	The Right (action)	The Virtuous (person)

	OUTCOME	DUTY	VIRTUE
<i>Focus on</i>	Consequences	Duties/rights, actions	Personal qualities, excellence
<i>Justice is about</i>	Giving people what they need; increasing well-being	Giving others what they are owed, thus doing one's duty, treating others as ends	Creating better persons, empowering each person
<i>Attitude to others:</i>	Concerned	Responsible	Seeing them as unique and other
<i>Attitude to self:</i>	Person for others; lose oneself	Subject to inner law	Cultured person, create oneself
<i>Significant emotion:</i>	Sympathy; compassion	Indignation; respect	Admiration; wonder
<i>Goal</i>	Happy society	(A society of) free, responsible persons	Fulfilled (good, happy) persons
<i>Means:</i>	Transform structures, redistribute	Rights/duties, moral code	Holistic education of persons
<i>Psychological theme:</i>	Care	Freedom	Growth
<i>Social image:</i>	Caring society	Free agents, as ends, not means	Organic, dialogic community
<i>Distinctive values:</i>	Welfare, solidarity, redistribution, equality (of outcome)	Honesty, rights, integrity, equality (of opportunity)	Personal integration, friendship
<i>Option for the poor is a response to</i>	Unmet needs	Unfairness	Dehumanization



	OUTCOME	DUTY	VIRTUE
<i>Theological image:</i>	Kingdon (of peace, justice)	Covenant (call of God)	Divinization (becoming like Christ)
<i>Image of Christ:</i>	Good Shepherd: healer	Son of Man: suffering servant, eschatological judge	The Vine: master/model
<i>Particular error:</i>	Utility is the sole measure	Worship of autonomy	Belief in human perfectibility
<i>Denying:</i>	Intrinsic value	Solidarity	Original sin

To identify the most appropriate notion of justice for a particular ministry, examine which of the following is most directly targeted by that ministry: (a) society and its structures, (b) behavior and actions, (c) persons and their attitudes. The distinction between direct and indirect goals is important when one seeks the justice dimension integral to the service of faith in a particular ministry. It is appropriate that the evangelizing impulse tackles each via different ministries, since moral theory distinguishes between (a) through (c), with different evaluative criteria for each.

All our ministries hope to affect all of these in some way: those working in social ministry hope that their work will also facilitate interior conversion, and those working in education hope that it will lead to social change. All ministries intend total human liberation. But this is an ultimate goal, and a particular ministry aims at it through some intermediate, more work-a-day goal. By nature, education and retreat work aim at personal growth and conversion and social ministry (usually) at social change.<sup>35</sup>

## The Option for the Poor

### *a. Outcome Option for the Poor: Redistribution*

In the ethic of outcome, the option is about redistribution to favor the poor and to ensure that their needs are met, because, as a consequence of their being poor, their need is greater and their power to obtain what they need is correspondingly slight. The greatest contemporary force of the option for the

<sup>35</sup> Communicators, *formatores*, administrative and technical staff, superiors, and so forth count as promoting justice by reason of their indispensability for our major ministries.

poor lies under this conception of justice, and it is at the heart of what GC 32 had in mind. It expresses the sense that the unequal and inequitable distribution of the world's wealth is not just the state's problem but one that concerns all of us if solidarity is to have any meaning. It reflects a heightened sense that today's social world is the outcome of all our previous choices and that we are somehow morally obliged to change it. It reflects an awareness that the outcome of apparently rational choices by the enlightened, the educated, and the influential of this world can lead to structured situations whereby the powerful continue to exploit the poor.

### *b. Duty Option for the Poor: Rectification*

Here rectification is the goal, based upon the recognition that fairness is denied in our world; it is unreal to pretend that injustice is the irrational exception and just dealing the norm. Reflection on what the option means in the context of deontological ethics raises the question of its status. Taking the word "option" to mean a choice, it would seem that the option for the poor is not morally mandatory in the full, strong sense; so while one ought to do it, one is not evil or immoral if one doesn't. But while the "option for the poor" may be optional, acting justly is not. Paying one's employees a just wage cannot be described as "making an option for the poor," since it is immoral not to pay them fairly, and it is to let oneself off too lightly by half to claim that because one pays a decent wage to employees one is thereby living out an option for the poor.

In this type of ethic, the option for the poor is about going out of one's way to ensure that justice is done to the poor by others. The commutative relations between person and person or group and group, other than myself, are, strictly speaking, not my business; but where one side is much the weaker and unlikely to succeed in vindicating its rights, intervention may be warranted. Under this view, the option for the poor is about taking it upon ourselves to ensure "fair play" by adding our weight to the lighter scale. Though it is an option, we have signed on for it and are morally bound to keep our promise.

### *c. Virtue Option for the Poor: Affirming Broken Humanity*

Poverty is an evil that dehumanizes and diminishes people. While it is true that the poor have much to teach us, it is also true that poverty and economic marginalization affect not just their pockets and their opportunities but also their inner selves. Those who are in greatest need of interior enrichment or who are most entitled to available resources for self-development are the poor. The option for the poor points us towards giving priority to educating the poor. Besides, knowledge is power, so to educate the poor is to

empower them. A virtue option for the poor directs our efforts to counteracting the personal and interpersonal (rather than social or class) effects of the evil of poverty.

## Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Who Is the “Justest” of Us All?

What are core issues for one ministry are often side issues for another: this should be accepted in good faith. Besides, there is no notion of justice so theoretically complete that it has no shortcomings, and no experience of injustice so fundamental that the experiences of others have nothing to teach. This point is so important, it would be hard to overemphasize it.

### Social Ministries’ Ethic

#### *a. Strengths*

First, the outcome ethic grasps that building a better society takes more than fulfilled persons and dutiful citizens: the nature of our complex global metropolis requires an ethic that gives full weight to society and its structures. Second, this ethic reflects the fact that a society cannot escape its history, as the Pilgrim Fathers hoped, nor can one escape society by “lighting out,” like Huck Finn, for the frontier. Its ability to evaluate states of affairs or situations makes it able to deal with the moral aspects of our being products of our history and social environment. But third, by the same token, the outcome ethic (particularly when reinforced by a Christian anthropology) also offers possibilities of evaluating and changing our society: it is an ethic that empowers with respect to social structures. While we cannot divorce ourselves from our society, we can work towards a less oppressive, more participatory matrix of social structures. Since it focuses on structures and society in general, it is particularly relevant for social ministry directed to structural or public-policy issues.

Fourth, an outcome ethic goes beyond the limitations of rights-based ethics in the area of economic rights. For instance, it is difficult to prove that there is a right to work, since for somebody to have a right, somebody else must have a corresponding duty.<sup>36</sup> Governments, private businesses, and others have duties towards the unemployed, but these duties are indirect and partial. The ethics of outcome can treat that problem as academic, since its vision is not of a world of fulfilled rights, but of a world of happiness and need-satisfaction: like the virtue ethic, it does not interpret the human good in terms of entitlements or rights.

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<sup>36</sup> I mean here a positive right or claim right (claim to assistance), not just a negative right or liberty (that is, a right not to be prevented from working).

Fifth, a consequentialist ethic has the flexibility to relate moral requirements to the availability of material resources. While equality (at subsistence level) could be cheap, meeting needs costs money: only an outcome ethic adequately expresses the moral imperative of wealth creation to meet human need. For those involved in distributional issues of public policy, moral reasoning must look to outcomes, trading off certain human goods against each other in proportionalist fashion (so much for health care, so much for law enforcement, so much for job training, and so forth) and accepting that, with limited resources, some needs will be insufficiently met. Rights are too absolute to fit easily with cost-benefit analysis, limited goods, and compromises: hence the relevance of an ethic of outcome, rather than a rights/duties ethic.

### *b. Problems*

There are a number of blind spots in this ethic that have affected the attitudes and practice of religious in social ministry.

▶ Transforming structures is not enough, since just structures are easily circumvented without just persons. For example, structured forms of discrimination against the U.S. Afro-American community and Northern Ireland's Catholic community have been greatly reduced. But this does not prevent persons from continuing to act in discriminatory ways that are often seriously unjust. Social structures and psychological attitudes are different things, and changing one will not guarantee the change of the other.<sup>37</sup>

▶ There is the risk of paternalism. The ethic of outcome, in its emphasis on the good society and deemphasis on the moral agent, can forget that freedom must always be respected and that individuals are accountable. One should not place too much weight on the claim that "society is to blame for the wrongdoing of underprivileged group X." The ethic of duty corrects by pointing out that rights and duties are claims that hold *now*: they cannot be treated as though in abeyance until the coming of the just society.

▶ The ethic of outcome focuses on tackling unjust situations, and is only indirectly concerned with the actions that brought those situations about. For example, it sees justice for the unemployed as a matter of trying to get them retrained appropriately and employed in work that respects their dignity: how they became unemployed (while not unimportant) is secondary, since it often has little relevance to the task of overcoming unemployment. Besides, the person unemployed through nobody's direct fault suffers just as much as the person fired by an unscrupulous employer. The question, Who is to blame? is

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<sup>37</sup> They are linked, of course, but not in a deterministic way, which is what counts for my argument.

less important than the question, How is the suffering to be removed and the need met?

Most religious acknowledge that abortion and political terrorism also involve unjust states of affairs, but they sometimes feel that the hierarchical Church gives undue emphasis to these by contrast with poverty issues. All are bad states of affairs, all involve suffering: why pay special attention to abortion?

Part of the answer comes from the ethic of duty. In this framework, abortion (like other forms of violence) stands out from unemployment and poverty because of the nature of the *actions* leading to the evil state of affairs. Unemployment often results from such lesser failings as inefficiency or lack of foresight, or from product obsolescence, or from the raising of interest rates to combat inflation. So while unemployment is an evil state of affairs, that does not always mean that particular agents bring it about by proportionately immoral action. Unemployment is not usually the result of action or policies aimed at hurting people. But in the case of abortion, the outcome of millions of slaughtered fetuses is the directly intended result of wilful action by particular people. Unlike the ethic of outcome, the ethic of duty grasps the fact that in situations like the gas chamber or the abortion mill, we have not only the evil outcome of numerous human beings dying horribly but the greater moral evil of the direct, deliberate action of other human beings in killing them.

► Following the point just treated, depending on whose actions brought about the unjust situation, degree of responsibility for tackling that injustice may vary. Take political terrorism. For the Irish Catholic it is an equally evil state of affairs in Northern Ireland that Catholics are murdered as that Protestants are murdered: so says the ethic of outcome. But the actions that lead to such murders cannot be of equal moral significance for the Catholic; he must take the action of murder by Catholics (the IRA) more seriously, since those actions originate from his community and kinsfolk. There is a moral obligation to first tackle the evils that originate from one's own national or ethnic group.<sup>38</sup>

One can almost always run a plausible sociopolitical analysis to show how one must "understand" some immoral behavior as the almost inevitable result of a context of past oppression. But the more closely one is connected by bonds of blood or kinship to those who behave so, the less acceptable it is to adopt that detached line *as a determinant or ingredient in one's basic moral stance* with respect to that behavior. It is all right for a Swede to speak thus of the Mafia; it is not all right for an Italian, because it will sound as though he is excusing it. An Irish Catholic may view terrorism originating from Islamic fundamentalists thus; but to do so in the case of IRA violence is to be in danger

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<sup>38</sup> In the eighties many U.S. religious understood that their being U.S. citizens added to their responsibility to act on the issues of war and human rights in Central America since U.S. governments had much to do with creating the evil.

of being (or appearing—it comes to the same thing) morally complicit in it. One needs the ethic of duty to see that there are certain social evils which one has a greater responsibility to tackle, because of who one is. One cannot behold wrongdoing by one's own solely from a Trinitarian or scientific perspective.

► As noted earlier, ministry directed towards changing social structures must not lose sight of the empirical nature of the theories we use to describe the social world. It is crucial that we continue to work at social analysis; but we need more rigor and pragmatic self-abnegation in testing and being ready to jettison our theories, and more clarity about the nature of their claims to truth. In some cases, we have treated the oft misunderstood claim that “there is no such thing as value-free analysis” as a methodological dispensation to canonize whatever theory we pleased.<sup>39</sup>

First, it is necessary to be open to alternative theories, and sit lightly, pragmatically, to one's current theories. Second, one's notions of what justice demands, relative to particular situations, had better not depend entirely on the conclusions of one's social analysis, given the empirical and pragmatic nature of such analysis.<sup>40</sup> Third, sometimes social analysis reveals nothing very useful about how to counteract a certain social injustice (for instance, intercommunal conflict). Here, moral norms for individual/group behavior and attitudes can still be usefully applied.

► Finally, there is the issue of culture. On occasion, some religious in social ministry have lived lives of such selflessness that there appeared to be nothing in those lives other than what they did for others. In extreme cases it resembles a new Puritanism. What has Athens to do with Jerusalem? What has Mozart to do with the plight of the homeless and the unemployed, other than divert, distract, and blunt one's sense of urgency? The ethic of outcome has little theoretical capacity to express the suspicion that an (extreme) “person for others” is an alienated person. Unease then tends to be expressed in functional terms: This is not a good way to live, because he'll drop and the work will lose him. The very different issue as to whether it is good *for him* to live thus requires handling by a virtue ethic.

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<sup>39</sup> One misunderstanding: that all values are moral.

<sup>40</sup> See Francisco Ivern, S.J., “The Future of Faith and Justice: A Critical Review of Decree Four,” *Studies in the Spirituality of Jesuits* 14/5 (1982): 20f., on the risks to both theology and the human sciences of casually mixing the two.

## Growth Ministries

### *a. Owning Strengths*

Many Jesuits in education, spirituality, and therapy have felt vulnerable to criticism that they were merely cossetting the middle-class and their neuroses. It is still true that many of our institutes primarily benefit the better-off. However, much of what those in social ministry had to say about justice in ministries such as education was wide of the mark because it focused on what education should cause the young people to do for social justice in the wider world, rather than on what education should do to the young people themselves. Thus one article listed the following elements in justice education: raising critical consciousness of the pupils through exposure programs, studying global injustices, and educating the pupils towards political action aimed at social change. While there is no doubt that Catholic education can be enriched by these elements, it cannot be the most important part of the story about the justice dimension of education.

The personal-growth apostolates (education, spirituality, and psychotherapy) are about changing persons, not about changing society. Of course one hopes that the products of our schools will be motivated to change unjust structures, and it is undeniable that a school will be judged by its products. But that cannot be the core of what justice in education is about, for several reasons. First, it would reduce education to functional training: like horse trainers at the races, religious in education would not know whether they had succeeded, “done justice” in our sense, until they saw which of the school’s products subsequently got into work for social justice. Second, it would mean training people for somebody else’s purposes, which is a subversion of education, even though those purposes might be good. Education ought to be more than conditioning or indoctrination. Third, there is something fallacious about the idea that one can make an option for the poor by trying to influence others to do so. Fourth, while a Jesuit school should try to realize that option in its admission policies, it is impossible to see how its internal activities (teaching calculus or carpentry, going on field trips or to art galleries) could be directly aimed at changing society.<sup>41</sup>

What has motivated and fired so many religious in education has been the sight of young persons blossoming out, and knowing that they had a hand therein; many a teacher knows the joy of that experience and knows how

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<sup>41</sup> By “education” I mean secondary education. The virtue notion of justice can also apply to undergraduate, third-level education. But in technical or specialist training (for example, law or medical school), the outcome notion of justice is more important: Jesuit law and medical schools are not doing justice unless their alumni are noticeably committed to social justice and the poor.

“right” it feels. And the ethics of virtue says that this is how good educators knows that they are “doing right” by the pupil, in other words doing justice. It bears reiterating: the educator, the retreat director, and the therapist do justice first and foremost to the pupil, retreatant, or client—not to something called “society.”

Thus, the notion of justice as virtue, as a quality of character, is at the core of education (and other growth ministries) in a way that the notion of social justice can never be. The core element in justice in education and other personal-growth apostolates is enabling persons to develop their potential and acquire maturity on physical, emotional, moral, intellectual, religious, and aesthetic levels, thereby enabling them to become happy and virtuous persons. If the sign of injustice in the social apostolate is the homeless person or the welfare line, the sign of injustice in education is the stunted, ignorant human being.

It may be argued that distinguishing persons from society denies the social dimension of personal existence; but this assumes that society is merely the sum of individuals in their social dimensions. Socially just persons and a just society are not the same thing; the former, but not the latter as such, is part of the direct goal of growth ministries.

For religious in growth ministries, it is important to distinguish between (a) doing justice in their own work and (b) teaching others to be just. Failure to distinguish leads to collapsing the first into the second. While both are necessary, it should be clear why (a) has to be more important.

The correlative of this point is that the claim the poor have on us in justice cannot be met by our educating the rich and middle class to do justice to them. When we educate a child from a wealthy or middle-class background, the integral justice dimension of that work is that it does justice to that child: it is unjust to off-load onto that child our responsibility to the poor. To the degree possible, we are required by the Church to educate the poor, and the nature of education is such that this cannot be done at a remove, indirectly, through others. Jesuits who educate well are doing justice: but they are not doing enough justice unless there is some effective option for the poor in admission policies.

### *b. Learning from Other Perspectives*

Some educators might like the idea of an “alternative education,” radically breaking with our contemporary culture in its consumerism, competitiveness, grades orientation, and so forth. But there is a risk of doing the pupils an injustice (as those in social ministry could tell them) by failing to prepare them for the world as it actually is. Pupils must also have grades and marketable skills: they must be prepared for the real as well as for the ideal world.



Sometimes there can be an excessive emphasis on humanities, with some hostility to applied science, industry, and business studies. C. P. Snow's point about the two cultures is still relevant for Jesuit educators. There is a risk of cultural (or countercultural) elitism accompanying a virtue-ethics approach: the objectionable element in such elitism is not the enjoying of a painting by Matisse, but a countercultural pious horror at science and skills training as technocratic, at commercial studies as consumerist, at encouraging entrepreneurial talents as worship of Mammon.

Those working in growth apostolates also need to remember that, while all injustices are humanly caused, not all can be directly affected at any point in time by interior conversion. In addition, they need to listen to the social-apostolate people when it comes to choosing persons or groups to serve. Neither education nor spirituality ought be the preserve of an elite.

Some schools of psychotherapy and spirituality influential in the Society of Jesus in Europe give the impression (unintentionally) that they regard the social dimensions of personal existence primarily as factors inhibiting inner freedom. One can sympathize with the goal of reinforcing personal and vocational identity and of undermining facile claims to impotence arising from conditioning. But, to use philosophical jargon, this ought not be pursued on the basis of an ontological assumption that, while properties are real, relations are accidental or phenomenal. The full force of the claim that justice is integral to faith is lost where one's relations to society (including not just other persons, but cultural, historical, and socioeconomic groundings also) are treated as ephemeral compared to one's inner characteristics and nonrelational properties. On the ethical level, it leads to viewing freedom essentially as minimization of social connectedness and maximization of psychological space, not as power to give oneself to the task of evangelizing liberation and readiness to commit oneself to involvement with particular social groups.<sup>42</sup> The perspectives of an outcome ethic are relevant here.

Some Catholic educators might argue that enabling the pupils to "become themselves" will automatically ensure that they acquire moral backbone and a social conscience. This is debatable.<sup>43</sup> Sometimes doing the right thing brings loss of job, status, popularity—even martyrdom. It is probably a mistake to educate young people to think that one will recognize what is right by the fact that so acting will help one "become oneself," given the relative inability of our Western culture to challenge a personal growth that has turned

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<sup>42</sup> Too much weight is sometimes put on the claim that social activists are merely working out their own anger, as though there were nothing "out there" to be angry about.

<sup>43</sup> See William K. Kilpatrick, *Why Johnny Can't Tell Right from Wrong* (Simon and Schuster, 1992) on the flaws of decision-making models (feeling-based values clarification and reasoning heavily focused on moral dilemmas) of moral education.

introverted and self-indulgent. The ethics of duty would argue that educators must also teach pupils a moral code. The point applies also to spirituality and psychology.

## Rights and Culture

Earlier, I noted that the rights/duties ethic plays some role in all ministries. It is important to see its limitations. It is related to a liberal ideology of freedom and human rights, increasingly influential in the evaluation of individual and institutional behavior and on some points incompatible with Catholic anthropology. The internal collapse of socialism has obliged us to accept that, for now, capitalism (libertarian or social-democratic) is the only viable economic option. This development is reinforcing the power of liberal ideology, particularly outside the United States.

The concept of natural/human (as distinct from social/political) rights emerges from social-contract philosophies where the “unencumbered self” is ontologically prior to society.<sup>44</sup> After the concept of the “Rights of Man” became a revolutionary force in 1776 and 1789, it began to come under fire. It subverts the solidarity needed for the good and utility of humanity as a whole (Bentham); it devalues organic communal tradition and ignores social rootedness (Edmund Burke then, Alasdair MacIntyre today); it legitimizes egoism and inequality and “leads man to see in other men not the realization but the limitation of his own freedom” (Marx).<sup>45</sup>

The nineteenth-century Church also had reservations about the ideology of natural rights and the liberal notion of freedom. As with the other critics, the objection was not to rights as such, but to regarding them as the fundamental fact about humans as rational and moral beings and to treating freedom as the core value. Thus, Newman defended Gregory XVI’s *Mirari vos* and Pius IX’s *Quanta cura* by distinguishing between liberty of conscience, where conscience stands under the law of God and “has rights because it has duties,” and the liberty which is the “right of self-will,” taking precedence over divine and moral law.<sup>46</sup> As recent encyclicals indicate, there are still reasons for rejecting the proposition that “the Roman Pontiff can and ought to reconcile and harmonize himself with progress, liberalism and modern civilization.”<sup>47</sup> One

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<sup>44</sup> See Michael Sandel, “The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self,” *Political Theory* 12/1 (1984).

<sup>45</sup> Jeremy Waldron, *Nonsense upon Stilts: Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man* (Methuen, 1987).

<sup>46</sup> Newman, “Letter to the Duke of Norfolk” (1875), in Alvan S. Ryan, introd., *Newman and Gladstone: the Vatican Decrees* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1962), 130, 148.

<sup>47</sup> See *Centesimus annus* (1991), ¶¶4, 17, 25, 36, especially 46.

is that the common good and the poor's need override property rights. The Church's position here is part of its general critique of a liberalism that involves an understanding of rights and liberty as limited only by a minimalist state, normative pluralism (one set of values is as good as the next), endorsement of an unlimited right to choose with respect to one's property, one's unborn, and one's values, and a tendency to regard any choice as morally validated by virtue of its being free.

Respect for human rights and acceptance of cultural diversity (descriptive pluralism) are so valuable that there can be no question of blanket rejection of the underpinning ideology. As with nationalism and Marxism, the two other great sociopolitical challenges the Church has had to face, confronting the ideology of liberal pluralism is difficult precisely because of the good in it.

As with the best responses to Marxism in bygone days, there must be an openness to learning from liberal culture, as well as an honesty about the degree to which it has seduced us. Many of us have recognized ourselves in Robert Bellah's *Habits of the Heart*. Besides the individualism Bellah describes, liberalism has edged some of us into cultural relativism, arising from a well-intentioned desire to be respectful of different cultures and shaped by our instinctive use of the rights paradigm: Cultures have rights, so all cultures should be treated equally (with affirmative action for some), and criticism of deeply rooted elements of other cultures is oppressive and "dominating."<sup>48</sup> Discomfort with talk about truth, uncertainty about normative models of the good life, an inchoate relativism about culture, and emphasis on present feelings as behavioral norm under the rubric of "authenticity" are in the culture we Western Jesuits inhabit, making us less-than-clear or fully convinced proponents of a different dispensation.

The degree to which so many of us have become dependent on therapy (treating freedom as paramount), particularly as a formation device, may reflect the severity of the loss sustained when talk of virtues lost persuasive power after Vatican II. For both ourselves and our society, a virtue ethic must be part of the response to the solipsistic, anomic error of seeing liberty, rights, and pluralism as constituting the good life. It must have a material, not just a formal, notion of the good life, which means that it will run counter to certain forms of multiculturalism.

A society that emphasizes freedom as the core value may have difficulty in tackling poverty and inequality seriously, since doing so means expanding

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<sup>48</sup> "Evangelization and Culture," GC 34 working paper (*National Jesuit News*, May 1993) gives grounds for concern on this point in treating pluralism without any reference to truth. In the identification of an "authentic" cultural trait, it is often ambiguous whether "authentic" means "deeply rooted" (descriptive meaning) or "good" (normative meaning). Confusing them leads to relativism.

entitlements and claim rights, thereby reducing the freedom of others, which will seem wrong. In the area of economic justice, an outcome ethic can be used to counteract the shortcomings of a rights ethic. Beyond that, a sociopolitical vision for the public good life still eludes us. In the Anglo-American world, even the whiff of integralism is so unacceptable that alternative, faith-based visions of society labor under a heavy handicap. For many of us in Europe and Latin America, the internal collapse of socialism has induced a temporary despondency about viable alternative social models. Some countercultural critiques have been penned, but they depend so heavily on theological or normative concepts (for example, consumerism, domination) that they have no clear social referent or correlative: such critique lacks bite.

## Conclusion

I have dealt, not with the issues of justice, but with the ways, concepts and methods of justice. The experience of the last twenty years shows that arriving at clarity about the justice integral to faith requires navigating between the Scylla of a reductionism implying that nothing is a service of faith that is not directly aimed at social justice for the poor, and the Charybdis of Orwellian semantics where the rich are the (spiritually) poor, a social structure is any human relational entity, and indirect connections will do anything, for example, prove that research on black holes is an option for the poor.

An important navigational tool is a grasp of the logic and syntax of the proposition that promoting justice is integral to serving faith. We have taken it to be simply an emphatic way of saying that we should work for social justice. Yet it is not an “ought” statement, but rather an “is” statement. It is not a moral prescription about what people should do, but a semantic description of the content of certain concepts. The fact that GC 32 rightly prescribes work for social justice does not necessarily make the description (justice-promotion is integral to faith-service) true under all interpretations. My goal was to show what the content of the concept of justice had to be in order for the proposition to be true, while protecting the commitment to social justice by excluding Orwellian semantics.

The following summarizes the main points.

1. Decree 4 reflects Catholic social teaching’s pre-1975 level of development; subsequent development is normative for interpreting Decree 4 today.
2. “Justice” in GC 32 has two senses: a wide scripturally based sense meaning Christian liberation and a narrow sense meaning social justice oriented to the poor. Only in the wide sense can we speak of it as integral to the service of faith for all ministries. As regards the narrow sense, all ministries are clearly

directed by GC 32 to develop a social-justice dimension, and the fact that it might not be “integral” to faith-service in some ministries makes no difference at all to the rightness of the directive.

3. The notions of the work of justice and the option for the poor must not be conflated; doing so leads to reductionism about faith or inflating the notion of the poor to mean any in need. Social justice and the option for the poor should be distinguished, since the former will often be directed to people who are not poor.

4. Making justice integral to the service of faith at a practical level requires different operative notions of justice for different kinds of service of faith.

5. In a particular ministry, what makes an operative notion of justice appropriate is that it is easily and obviously connectable to the core elements in the work of that ministry and to the more general, abstract notion of liberation.

6. Contemporary ethical theories offer a variety of options for developing notions of justice for different ministries.

7. To determine the most appropriate notion of justice for a particular ministry, the question to ask is, What is it that is to be made just? One must identify whether the direct and immediate goal of its work is to change society and its structures, or behavior, or personal attitudes and values.

## Appendix: The Love of Learning . . .

**A**cademic research only partly passes the faith-justice criterion. It can pass in the following ways. (1) Like any Jesuit institute, Jesuit *academies* can be socially committed, actively serving the poor, and critically oriented to contemporary society. (2) Jesuit *academics* can tithe time to work with the poor; perhaps these men are in greater need of it than other Jesuits. (3) Personal *formation* in any academic discipline passes the justice criterion since it is indispensable for our corporate ministry: the intellectual life is for all Jesuits.<sup>49</sup> (4) *Functional* academic research (in theology, ethics, and human sciences) intended to provide expertise to a clearly evangelical ministry also passes, since it shares the justice dimension of the ministry to which it is functional. (5) Scientific researchers should be alert to the *ethical implications*, if any, of their work.

Attempts to show how academic work promotes justice have focused on the above, but academic work for its own sake in arts and sciences is not covered, since (1) and (2) deal with context and agents, (3) and (4) are functionally oriented, and (5) deals with something important but tangential to the core of the academic.

To see why (1) through (5) do not go to the heart of the matter, look at the lives of people like Roger Bacon, a Franciscan; Christoph Klau (Clavius) and Rudjer Josip Bošković, Jesuits; or Gregor Mendel, an Augustinian. Their research was not primarily intended to educate, nor could they have been motivated by the thought of consequences that were unforeseeable. Their motives could only have been the love of learning and the desire for God's glory. Truth was their direct goal, the good only an indirect goal. Similarly with artists: their work intends the beautiful. One cannot force "justice" to refer to the true and the beautiful. Noam Chomsky's writings on U.S. foreign policy are intended to promote justice, whether one agrees with him or not; but it would be absurd to argue that his books on transformational grammar serve justice, any more than did Klau's astronomy or Hopkins's poetry. It might, though it seems unlikely, be possible to widen the notion of liberation to include the pursuit of the true and the beautiful.<sup>50</sup>

Yet such work is important to the service of faith.<sup>51</sup> The problem here is not with our concept of justice, but with our concept of faith. In 1987 the

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<sup>49</sup> See John A. Coleman, "A Company of Critics: Jesuits and the Intellectual Life," *Studies in the Spirituality of Jesuits* 22/5 (1990).

<sup>50</sup> See John Paul II, *Redemptor hominis* (1979), ¶14.

<sup>51</sup> See John Paul II, "Lessons of the Galileo Case" (address to the Pontifical Academy, 1992), and numerous other addresses.

Vatican sponsored a major conference to mark the tercentenary of Newton's *Philosophiæ naturalis principia mathematica*.<sup>52</sup> A similar conference took place in April 1993 at Notre Dame on "Knowing God, Christ and Nature in the Post-Positivist Era."<sup>53</sup> In both, the papers clearly reflected a *fides quærens intellectum*, but not a faith to which justice was "integral." Here, the notion of faith has to be illuminative or contemplative, rather than liberative.<sup>54</sup> Since exploring this would take me beyond my theme of justice, I shall stop. At any rate, it is clear that the issue is serious for the morale of those in such work and that it has not yet been adequately addressed.<sup>55</sup>



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<sup>52</sup> Robert John Russell, William R. Stoeger, S.J., and George V. Coyne, S.J., eds., *Physics, Philosophy and Theology: A Common Quest for Understanding* (Vatican Observatory, 1988).

<sup>53</sup> Organized by Fred Suppe; the proceedings are to be published.

<sup>54</sup> Avery Dulles has remarked that intellectualist, fiducial, and performative notions of faith may all be needed; see "The Meaning of Faith Considered in Relationship to Justice," in John C. Haughey, ed., *The Faith That Does Justice* (Paulist Press, 1977), 39.

<sup>55</sup> See Avery Dulles, S.J., "Faith, Justice and the Jesuit Mission" (address at Jesuit Assembly, Georgetown University, 1989).

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