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
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The Dialogical Approach to Interpersonal Communication: A Critique



by Charles Veenstra

In recent years various scholars have recognized that increasingly people need effective interpersonal relationships. Frequently when these scholars discuss interpersonal needs they use the term "dialogue."¹ In common parlance the term refers loosely to nearly any open conversation between people, but in scholarly work it has come to represent a particular approach to communication—especially *interpersonal* communication. Approaching communication as dialogue is growing in popularity. Furthermore, some scholars suggest that dialogue appears to be a Christian approach to

communication. For example, Fulkerson claims that it grows out of Judeo-Christian heritage.² Kale draws on Buber's work on dialogue in an attempt to devise a Christian ethic for interpersonal communication.³ Griffin merges dialogical ideas with the ethical responsibilities of love and justice to develop a Christian ethic for influence in groups.⁴ In essence, this approach is a way of determining *ethical* communication.

The first part of this paper describes briefly dialogical perspectives on communication and examines their foundations. The second part indicates problems in this approach and difficulties inherent in attempts to integrate it with a Christian perspective on communication. The final section provides suggestions how to handle the contributions of dialogue.

Dialogical Perspectives and Foundations

The dialogical view of communication is largely rooted in the I-Thou notions of Martin Buber;⁵ yet, a second significant strand comes from the work of Carl Rogers.⁶ In his book, which advocates a dialogical perspective as a normative standard for judging the ethics of communication, Johannesen writes: "Dialogical perspectives for evaluating communication ethics focus on the *attitudes toward each other* held by the participants in a communication transaction. Participant attitudes are viewed as an index of the ethical level of that communication."⁷ Attitudes conducive to dialogical communication, and consequently ethical communication, include authenticity, inclusion, confirmation, presentness, spirit of mutual equality, and support-

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tive psychological climate.⁸ Sometimes the term dialogue is contrasted with monologue, a term suggesting a lack of concern by the speaker for the listener. Characteristics of monologue include "self-centeredness, deception, pretense, display, appearance, artifice, using, profit, unapproachableness, seduction, domination, exploitation, and manipulation."⁹ Monological attitudes usually cause people to treat others as objects. Dialogue carries positive connotations; monologue—at least if it shuts out dialogue—is negative.

Stewart finds four common foci which characterize the work of communication teachers and scholars who adopt a dialogical perspective.¹⁰ First, "the primary object of their study is not the communication 'message,' 'effect,' . . . but the dynamic, complex, context-dependent communicative 'transaction,' 'reciprocal bond,' 'between,' or 'relationship.'" The second characteristic is experientialism. Students must be involved in activities, exercises, and other experiences in order to understand dialogue. The third common feature is a focus on the self and subjectivity. A fourth characteristic is holism, "the conviction that speech communication research and teaching which is based on a unidimensional perspective should be replaced by a point of view which embraces a multitude of interdependent cognitive, affective, behavioral, and contextual variables."¹¹

The dialogical view is also maintained by Keller and Brown, who argue that communication which enhances the ability of the other for self-determination is more ethical than that which does not.¹¹ Harral expands on Keller and Brown's dialogical view by arguing that choice is the essence of ethics: "Acceptance of the range of choices another person may make is an essential ingredient for ethical communication. In other words, as a fundamental ethical standard for interpersonal communication, the attitudes toward each other of the people in the communication are more significant than content elements of the message."¹²

Kale mixes three things in describing his dialogical view of ethical interpersonal communication: 1) Buber's I-Thou concept (which he says Buber bases on people being created in the image of God); 2) Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson's concept of communication having report and command aspects; and 3) the concept of speaking the truth in

love as drawn from the Bible.¹³ His integrating of these three items is not sufficiently clear.

Several scholars who are not first of all concerned with ethics also advocate "dialogue" as a broad approach to the understanding and practicing of communication.¹⁴ Textbooks suggest what students can do to develop their skills in interpersonal relationships by using this approach. For example, Thomlison provides guidelines for using language as a means to achieve dialogue, suggestions for dealing with feelings, and additional recommendations which aid students in their effort to practice dialogue.¹⁵ Bolton recommends three key qualities that improve communication: genuineness, non-possessive love, and empathy—qualities which he draws from Rogers.¹⁶ Beatty's approach to communication in dating and marriage distinguishes dialogue from monologue and then prescribes implementation of dialogue.¹⁷

Trying to discuss dialogue non-prescriptively, Stewart describes the foundations of dialogue, which he ties to the characteristics indicated above. First, he finds the concept of "relationship," which is central in dialogue, to be rooted in phenomenology: "The insight which is phenomenology's most important and most basic contribution to communication research and teaching is its relational perspective, that is, its emphasis on the metaphysical and epistemological primacy of the *relationship*."¹⁸ The second contribution of phenomenology to this approach is its emphasis on intuition: "The phenomenological notion of intuition can be seen to ground dialogic communication's experiential focus."¹⁹ According to Stewart, the third common feature, a focus on self and subjectivity, that characterizes dialogical approaches to communication, arises from existentialism: "A central contribution of existentialism is to shift the focus from a scientific, transcendental philosophy of intentional consciousness to a subjective philosophy concerned with the impact of intentional consciousness on the subject or person's concrete world."²⁰ Students are encouraged to develop "awareness of their own idiosyncratic communication values and behavior" as they learn how to communicate.²¹ The fourth distinguishing characteristic of dialogue, holism, Stewart finds fundamentally tied to the philosophical anthropology of Buber: "In Buber's view, then, humanness is ontologically an interpersonal phenomenon. The whole

human person can be understood neither as a monad in an alien world nor simply as a part of a collective whole. The humanness of the person 'is not to be grasped on the basis of the ontic of personal existence, or of that of two personal existences, but that which has its being between them and transcends both That essence of man which is special to him can be directly known only in a living relation.'"²²

Arnett clarifies the two separate perspectives that are often placed under the term dialogue, and which are sometimes confused: "(1) the 'humanistic' psychological dialogue of Abraham Maslow and Carl Rogers, and (2) the phenomenological dialogue of Martin Buber and Maurice Friedman."²³ The difference, he claims, lies in the source of "meaning" in communication. Rogers emphasizes the psyche and therefore the "meaning of communication remains *inside* the person, not 'between' persons" as is evident in Buber.²⁴ Anderson challenges Arnett's description: "To Rogers, the 'person' is an emergent process in which the 'between,' the relational, is inherent."²⁵ Both Buber and Rogers have had significant influence on the concept of dialogue as it is currently understood and taught in the communication discipline today.²⁶

Plumbing the Dialogical Line

Much in the dialogical approach appeals to the Christian scholar: genuineness, treating people as persons rather than objects, confirmation, and so forth. The contrast between dialogue and monologue offers clear advice for the practitioner. Consequently, these characteristics appear, at first glance, as very possibly Christian attitudes toward others in communication. Furthermore, this approach goes far beyond some traditional narrow views, which see communication as a tool to be used. It clarifies that the nature of the communication process integrally involves the whole person.

On the other hand, the dialogical approach to communication must be carefully examined by the Christian scholar who desires a perspective on communication that is thoroughly consistent with his or her own faith. This section details several problems in integrating this approach with a Christian perspective.

The first major problem in the dialogical approach centers on its grounding. Arnett claims that "Buber

and Rogers share the pursuit of genuineness and truth in human communication. However, they do so from different world-views Rogers' psychological dialogue is a world-view and so is the existential-phenomenological dialogue of Buber; to ignore this is to fail to take a world-view seriously."²⁷ Even though Buber seems to use communication with God as a model, his view when taken as a whole appears based on a strictly humanistic conception of people. Persons are viewed as having worth in their own right, not primarily due to their creation in the image of God. For Buber, the future of mankind depends on a rebirth of dialogue.²⁸ According to Buber,

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"The fundamental fact of human existence is neither the individual as such nor the aggregate as such The individual is a fact of existence in so far as he steps into a living relation with other individuals. . . . The fundamental fact of human existence is man with man."²⁹ The only way life can be meaningful lies in the "between" when two people interact. Construction of the self occurs in this mystical "between."

Clearly Rogers' view of dialogue is grounded in a secular conception of human beings, in spite of the fact that he was raised in a Christian home.³⁰ His faith lies in the innate goodness of persons if they follow organismic impulses.³¹ His "client-centered" therapy flows from this belief.

Neither the approach of Buber nor Rogers is grounded in a Christian worldview. Since these two men were the primary proponents of dialogue, we can safely conclude that dialogue does not have its historical roots in a Christian view of the nature of a person. A Christian perspective of communication would begin with the belief that people are created in the image of God and in need of redemption through Christ.

Redemption in the dialogical approach can supposedly come only from dialogue itself. Buber's view that the future of humanity depends on a rebirth of dialogue is perhaps the clearest statement that only people can save themselves from their condition. The purpose of dialogue then becomes redemption of the self from the ills that plague the human race. Friedman explains Buber's position: "Redemption is not dependent upon Messianic calculations or any apocalyptic event, but on the unpremeditated turning of our whole world-life to God. This turning is open to the whole of mankind and to all ages, for all are face to face with redemption and all action for God's sake is Messianic action."³² He explains further that this "is a faith in the power of the spirit to penetrate and transform all impulses and desires, to uplift and sanctify everything material."³³

Even if we were to follow proponents of dialogue, such as Buber and Rogers, on their own ground and grant, for the sake of argument, that perhaps dialogue could be a means to save people from their condition, we would finally end in a frustrating impasse because pure dialogue can never be achieved. Even its proponents realize that dialogue can never be achieved fully. In discussing Buber's view, Johannesen writes: "But he realizes that dialogue is an ideal only capable of approximation."³⁴ Its advocates speak of a journey or a movement toward dialogue. Indeed, the title of Thomlison's book, *Toward Interpersonal Dialogue*, is most apt. Thus, the means of salvation in this approach can never be reached. It is intellectually unsatisfying for one to advocate that dialogue is the only way to save people from their condition and yet to admit that this means of salvation can never be achieved! This belief system is inherently flawed.

Another criticism lies in using the dialogical approach to determine what is ethical communication. A major difficulty for the ethicist is how to evaluate the attitudes of another communicator. Since the dialogical approach indicates that attitudes are primary; it regards communication as ethical if the speaker had correct attitudes toward the listener. One assumes that behavior would flow from correct attitudes and that one could judge attitudes as they are embedded in behavior. Just how that behavior would be manifested, however, is not specified. If one can say that content flows from attitudes or that content demonstrates particular at-

titudes, one should be able to assess the ethics of communication from the content of the particular communication event. But a critic cannot justify evaluating content because the proponent of dialogue wants to focus on attitudes. If a communicator claims these attitudes while communicating, the evaluator would be hard pressed to deny this. Since the judgment rests on individual assessment of attitudes, the critic must be able and willing to thoroughly understand the other's perspective or phenomenological field. This is virtually impossible. Furthermore, one who holds the dialogical position can hardly engage in ethical criticism of the communication of another person who practices monologue because the dialogical perspective encourages attitudes that "avoid value judgments that stifle."³⁵ The critic is immediately open to the charge of not being "supportive" or "accepting" or demonstrating "unconditional positive regard" for the other person. The critic runs the risk of being called unethical from this dialogical position. In essence, the dialogical critic is trapped by his or her own position.

Another problem inherent in the dialogical perspective toward communication is that it also comes close to the point of seeing a relationship as an end in itself. The purpose of communication is solely in building the relationship—particularly between two people. Just how that relationship should develop and to what end is not completely clear. Discussion of building community through dialogue is common, yet this community is based on the individual relationships that are then broadened to include others—the purpose of which is ultimately to preserve relationships.³⁶ If only we continue to communicate to maintain our relationship, we will survive, in this view. The focus is only on the horizontal relationship between two persons without regard to any effort to help the other live obediently before God. Certainly this is a myopic view compared to the Christian position, which sees all communication between human beings as integrally involved in their response to God.

A significant critique of the dialogical perspective focuses on the basic assumption of this view: that people determine themselves and their society through correct interaction with others, as indicated, for example, by Buber's assertion that the future depends on the rebirth of dialogue.³⁷ We need to ask about the underlying reason for dialogue. But

this may not be easily seen. However, Stewart's claim that one of the common features which characterize the work of communication scholars and teachers who adopt a dialogical perspective "is a focus on the self and subjectivity."³⁸ Fisher reports that "the key to dialogue is the elevation of the individual self to a position of prominence."³⁹ The purpose for engaging in dialogue seems to be maintaining one's self. That is, in this view, a person cannot be defined as a person aside from interaction with others. The self only emerges "between" two persons interacting together. In order for the self to exist, one must interact with another. The existence of the self seems to be the prime reason for communicating. Hence, this position, which claims to be other-directed, appears, at its roots, to be other-directed so that the self will be maintained, albeit open to change from the other. One practices dialogue *so that* another will do the same and the process will, thereby, confirm one's existence. Even when the proponents of dialogue argue that participants serve goals higher than their own, the reason for those goals—in the long run—seems to be that the selves involved must be preserved. For example, even when Buber argued for dialogue between Jew and Arab, the highest principle was "that for each of the two partners the full national autonomy is preserved; neither one should be allowed to injure in any point the national existence of the other."⁴⁰ Again, Arnett writes: "Dialogically, maybe a pragmatic narrative voicing concern for others *in order to assure our own survival* is a better alternative than forced community that destroys the bonds of communicative freedom between persons in groups and in organizational life."⁴¹ This view is egoistic, even though on the surface it appears otherwise. Van Belle indicates that the dialogical perspective is characterized by "selfism" and "meism."⁴² In the end, it does not do what it claims to do. It is self-defeating.

Handling Dialogical Insights

Truth is relative in dialogue. In the perspective rooted in Buber's assumptions, truth only develops from the mystical "between." "Answers emerge in the relationship, not from one party or the other."⁴³ "One can not embrace an absolute without being willing to hold it open for discussion and debate. . . . For Buber's 'great character' taking

the risk of violating the norm is not only necessary but is the very standard by which the person of 'great character' must be measured."⁴⁴ Followers of Rogers would suggest that truth develops within the person who follows his or her own organismic impulses. As Bellah puts it, "In the absence of any objectifiable criteria of right and wrong, good or evil, the self and its feelings become our only moral guide."⁴⁵ Thus the perspective is left with only relativism, and that relativism derives from the individual, usually in relationship with another. A question of objective truth would be a breakdown in communication. No external source of truth is deemed acceptable in this view. While proponents

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of dialogue would be comfortable with that, the Christian would not because truth, in the ultimate sense, resides in the Word of God. This is not to deny, however, that correct insight can emerge from discussion.

To minimize the contributions of dialogue to our understanding and practice of interpersonal communication would be foolish. But to adopt this approach as totally compatible with a distinctively Christian perspective toward communication would be equally foolish. What, then, should one do with the contributions of the proponents of dialogue? Only a few suggestions will be outlined here.

The Christian scholar approaches the study of creation directed by the Scriptures. He or she must be busy both in the Word of God and in creation—moving from one to the other and back again.

A Christian approach to communication, of necessity, goes back to creation. All persons are created in the image of God and thus must be given full respect. Essential to that nature is the fundamental fact that human existence is religious in character. Our created nature entails response to God, and that is seen in all we do. We are directional creatures. Either our communication helps

others in a proper direction toward God or in a wrong direction, which leads away from him. There is no neutral ground. Communication, as a central part of that created nature, must be viewed in the context of one's response to God. To treat communication only as a tool to promote the self would be to ignore its essential character. Space does not permit extensive treatment here of these fundamental principles of a Christian view of communication.

When someone operating outside of a Christian perspective for communication discovers something that appears correct, the Christian scholar needs to do two things: 1) examine carefully the *structure* of the discovery to see how well it fits with the created nature of human beings, and 2) determine the *direction* of the discovery, that is, the extent to which it serves the Creator or turns people away from Him.⁴⁶ Thus, one must be knowledgeable about the academic discipline of which he or she is a part and must also know the Scriptures.

Moving back now to the dialogical view of communication, we can begin to apply the two criteria identified above—to the extent, of course, that it can survive an internal critique on its own grounds. Some inherent flaws in the system of dialogue have been noted above. Now we should briefly look at those elements which apparently have survived such a critique. The attitudes of authenticity, presentness, and supportive climate, for example, appear to be helpful in the interpersonal communication process. That is, these *structural* elements seem to be correct. They facilitate growth in relationships. But the underlying drive or motive needs to be challenged on a *directional* basis: are these elements practiced so that people are given full respect and helped to respond more obediently to their Creator or are they done to help each individual achieve his or her own fulfillment apart from God? The analysis given above suggests that the direction of much of the dialogical perspective is incorrect.

A few other comparisons need to be made between a Christian perspective on communication and the dialogical. A Christian communication scholar would not hesitate to make an ethical evaluation because to do so, in this view, would fail to demonstrate full respect for the other person. Pointing out an error in another's communication, and thus helping the other person to correct those actions in the future, indicates care for the other person—particularly caring for the direction of that

person's life. Respecting one another requires that we evaluate each other's communication carefully and fully; this evaluation might even include persuasion that urges the other to change. This is in contrast to the dialogical perspective which, although it allows evaluation, suggests that the critic may be trapped by the possible charge of not being supportive to the other's position.

Both the dialogical and a Christian view stress the importance of attitudes. Essentially the dialogical view stresses that attitudes of love are necessary in order for people to exist and, therefore, they are taught to love others so that the person himself or herself can survive, that is, it appears egoistic—even though its proponents would deny this. In contrast to this view, a Christian position maintains that a person must love others because they have been created in the image of God. Thus, in both, attitudes are important, but those same attitudes are fundamentally different in a Christian view. According to this position, a person is called to love, respect, honor, and help neighbors, beyond the self, and beyond one's own world. A Christian view is a transcendent one. A person demonstrates love for God by respecting the person next to him or her as also created by God. A person is responsible to God rather than solely to the other person or to the self. This is not an egoistic view. The Christian position stresses that attitudes, which on their face may appear to be similar to those advocated by the dialogical perspective, are very important to ethical communication, but it does not define attitude as the crucial determinant of what a human being is or should be. Nor does it limit the realm of ethics to attitudes, or even attitudes as they are manifested in communication, because some techniques—even if they arise out of a proper attitude—may be hurtful. The Christian position involves a broader view of communication.

Much in the dialogical perspective on communication is alluring to anyone interested in a view of communication that respects other human beings. However, the humanistic roots of this perspective present significant problems for the Christian scholar. Probing of this position indicates that respect for human beings in communication may not be as complete as it appears. The dialogical view cannot simply be merged with a Christian view without encountering serious problems. While learning from those who have developed important

principles and practices for communication, we need to redirect what we have learned and move beyond dialogue toward a more complete view of communication that, by its obedience to the Creator, gives greater respect to persons and gives God all the glory.

NOTES

- 1 Ronald C. Arnett, *Communication and Community: Implications of Martin Buber's Dialogue* (Southern Ill. University Press, 1986); Charles T. Brown and Paul W. Keller, *Monologue to Dialogue: An Exploration of Interpersonal Communication*. 2nd ed., (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1979); Martin Buber, *Between Man and Man*, Trans. Ronald G. Smith (New York: Macmillan, 1965); Martin Buber, "Dialogue between Martin Buber and Carl R. Rogers," in *The Knowledge of Man*, ed. Maurice Friedman (New York: Harper & Row, 1965) 166-84; Richard L. Johannesen, *Ethics in Human Communication*. 2nd ed., (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1983); Richard L. Johannesen, "The Emerging Concept of Communication as Dialogue," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 57 (December 1971) 373-81; Alexander S. Kohanski, *Martin Buber's Philosophy of Interhuman Relation: A Response to the Human Problematic of Our Time* (Rutherford, NJ: Dickenson Univ. Press, 1981); Floyd W. Matson and Ashley Montagu, eds., *The Human Dialogue: Perspectives on Communication* (New York: The Free Press, 1967); Carl R. Rogers, *On Becoming a Person* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961); John R. Stewart, ed., *Bridges Not Walls: A Book about Interpersonal Communication*, 5th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990); John Stewart, "Foundations of Dialogic Communication," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 64 (April 1978) 183-201; and Dean T. Thomlison, *Toward Interpersonal Dialogue* (New York: Longman, 1982).
- 2 Gerald Fulkerson, "The Ethics of Interpersonal Influence: A Critique of the Rhetorical Sensitivity Construct," *Journal of Communication and Religion*, 13 (September 1990) 1-14.
- 3 David Kale, "An Ethic for Interpersonal Communication," *Religious Communication Today*, 2 (September 1979) 16-20.
- 4 Em Griffin, *Getting Together: A Guide for Good Groups* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1982) Ch. 8.
- 5 Works frequently cited by communication scholars for an understanding of Buber's view include Martin Buber, *I and Thou*, 2nd ed., trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958); Martin Buber, *Between Man and Man*, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (New York: Macmillan, 1965); and Maurice S. Friedman, *Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue* (1955; rpt. New York: Harper & Row 1960). Bormann finds earlier roots of the dialogical view in the writings of Adam Muller. See Dennis R. Bormann, "Adam Muller on the Dialogic Nature of Rhetoric," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 66 (April 1980) 169-81. See also Stewart, "Foundations of Dialogic Communication."
- 6 Works frequently cited by communication scholars for an understanding of Rogers' view include Carl R. Rogers, *Client-Centered Therapy: Its Current Practice, Implications, and Theory* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961); and Carl R. Rogers and Barry Stevens, *Person to Person: The Problem of Being Human* (Lafayette, CA: Real People Press, 1967).
- 7 Johannesen, *Ethics*, 46.
- 8 Johannesen, *Ethics*, 50-51. In the first edition of this book he used the terms of genuineness, accurate empathic understanding, unconditional positive regard in place of authenticity, inclusion, and confirmation, respectively.
- 9 Johannesen, *Ethics*, 52.
- 10 Stewart, "Foundations," 184-85.
- 11 Paul Keller and Charles T. Brown, "An Interpersonal Ethic for Communication," *Journal of Communication*, 18 (March 1968) 73-81.
- 12 Harriet Briscoe Harral, "An Interpersonal Ethic: Basis for Behavior," *Religious Communication Today*, 2 (September 1979) 42-45.
- 13 David Kale, "An Ethic for Interpersonal Communication," *Religious Communication Today*, 2 (September 1979) 16-20. However, since his mixture is drawn from what seem to me radically different bases and he is unable to mesh them together comfortably, his contribution is minimal in presenting a unified system of thought.
- 14 See, for example, Arnett, Keller and Brown, and Thomlison.
- 15 Thomlison, Ch. 7.
- 16 Robert Bolton, *People Skills* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1979) Ch. 15.
- 17 Michael J. Beatty, *Romantic Dialogue: Communication in Dating and Marriage* (Englewood, CO: Morton Publishing, 1986).
- 18 Stewart, "Foundations," 186.
- 19 Stewart, "Foundations," 191.
- 20 Stewart, "Foundations," 192.
- 21 Stewart, "Foundations," 194.
- 22 Stewart, "Foundations," 197.
- 23 Ronald C. Arnett, "Toward Phenomenological Dialogue," *Western Journal of Speech Communication*, 45 (Summer 1981) 201-12.
- 24 Arnett, "Toward Phenomenological Dialogue," 204.
- 25 Rob Anderson, "Phenomenological Dialogue, Humanistic Psychology, and Pseudo-Walls: A Response and Extension," *Western Journal of Speech Communication*, 46 (Fall 1982) 344-57.
- 26 Ronald C. Arnett, "Rogers and Buber: Similarities, Yet Fundamental Differences," *Western Journal of Speech Communication*, (Fall 1982) 358-72.
- 27 Arnett, "Rogers and Buber," 362.
- 28 Friedman, *Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue*, 146-47.
- 29 Buber, *Between Man and Man*, 203.
- 30 Harry A. Van Belle, *Basic Intent and Therapeutic Approach of Carl R. Rogers* (Toronto: Wedge, 1980).
- 31 Rogers, *On Becoming a Person*, 118-23.
- 32 Friedman, 141-42.
- 33 Friedman, 141-42.
- 34 Johannesen, "Emerging," 380.
- 35 Johannesen, *Ethics*, 51. Rogers, particularly, stresses non-judgmental attitudes.
- 36 See, for example, Arnett, "The Community of Dialogue," in *Communication and Community*.
- 37 Friedman, 146-47.
- 38 Stewart, "Foundations," 185.
- 39 B. Aubrey Fisher, *Perspectives in Human Communication* (New York: Macmillan, 1978) 179.

40 Quoted in Arnett, *Communication*, 163.

41 Arnett, *Communication*, 172.

42 Harry Van Belle, "What is Communication?" unpublished manuscript.

43 Arnett, *Communication*, 164.

44 Arnett, *Communication*; 156-57.

45 Robert N. Bellah, Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven M. Tipton, *Habits of the Heart: In-*

dividualism and Commitment in American Life (New York: Harper & Row, 1985) 76.

46 The concepts of structure and direction are treated extensively in Albert M. Wolters, *Creation Regained: Biblical Basics for a Reformational Worldview* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985). This excellent little book clearly lays out the basics of a Christian reformational worldview.