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## **CIDA CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPE BRANCH**

### **CANADIAN MINE ACTION PROGRAMME IN THE BALKANS 1998 – 2003**



## **EVALUATION REPORT**

June 2003

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# **CIDA CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPE BRANCH**

## **CANADIAN MINE ACTION PROGRAMME IN THE BALKANS**

1998 – 2003

### **EVALUATION REPORT**

#### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The evaluation of the Canadian Mine Action Programme in the Balkans (Balkans CMAP) was focused on the key results achieved and lessons learned, with particular emphasis on validating the design, implementation and effectiveness of the numerous projects that comprised the programme. The lessons derived from the evaluation are intended to improve programme development, and project selection, design and implementation. To this end, the evaluation has defined a number of principles that can be used as the basis for the development of a formal programming framework. The purpose of this framework would be to provide strategic orientation and design guidance for future CIDA MAP initiatives in the Balkans or in other mine affected regions of the world.

Overall, the evaluation has shown that the CIDA Balkans CMAP must be viewed as a significant success. The programme began in response to a push of funding furnished by the Canadian Landmine Fund (CLF) in 1998. It was initially confined to Bosnia and Herzegovina and was designed to support or complement ongoing CIDA development assistance initiatives in the country. From a few initial projects, the programme was quickly expanded a year later in response to the cessation of hostilities in Kosovo and again in 2000 with the change of regime in Croatia. It therefore evolved over a very short period into a significant regional programme, totaling some \$20m (CAD) and included a large number and variety of projects covering all of the key areas of mine action.

While it was a difficult programme to manage, it did represent successful collaboration between CIDA and DFAIT in all its stages. As well, it involved beneficial support by the Canadian Forces and included innovative use of Canadian expertise and capabilities in institutional support, mine clearance, victim assistance and MDD training. The programme was responsive to political and local developments, and was consistent with the Canadian foreign policy goal in the Balkans to promote regional stability after years of strife. The CMAP raised Canada's profile and credibility in Europe, promoted Canadian values and reinforced the Ottawa Convention to Ban Landmines by linkage to Canada's aggressive support of mine action in the Balkans.

The CMAP was also supportive of CIDA's development assistance strategy to secure peace and prosperity in the region, as well as its related development priorities and crosscutting

themes. The mine action initiatives were undertaken to protect vulnerable populations and communities, and to facilitate humanitarian action, peace building, reconstruction and socio-economic development. The programme achieved particular success in the area of institution building and in the development of sustainable, indigenous mine/UXO clearance capacity. The CMAP mine awareness and victim assistance projects achieved varied results although these projects stand out for their ultimate success in the areas of reach and sustainability. The programme's innovative attempts to employ Canadian demining and MDD training capabilities also received mixed reviews. Nonetheless, the Balkans CMAP was widely applauded for its focus, reliability and achievements. The review of the programme results and key success factors was also very favourable and a number of important lessons have been derived from this evaluation that will greatly assist in the design of future programmes of its type.

The design of future CMAPs must first and foremost be informed by a clear understanding of Canadian foreign policy goals and development assistance strategy in the region concerned. The value-added dimension is also an important consideration and in most cases this will lead to a focus on institution building. The creation of an effective mine action coordination centre is vital to the development and coordination of a successful and sustainable national mine action programme. This is an area where Canada has achieved a particular impact and has much to offer. Next in importance is the building of sustainable indigenous mine/UXO clearance capacity. The use of international NGOs or contractors should not subordinate the goal of sustainability unless there are emergency requirements for which they are best suited. Mine awareness and victim assistance initiatives should normally be considered but should always be coordinated with lead agencies such as UNICEF and the ICRC, and must be consistent with MAC priorities, themes and standards as applicable.

There are many lessons learned from this evaluation that bear repeating. Mine action programming in general benefits from close collaboration and sharing of programme information between CIDA, DFAIT and DND. Any new CIDA programme initiatives must include input from DFAIT (foreign policy) and DND/MIC (mine situation assessments) as well as key international organizations such as UNMAS, UNDP, UNICEF, ICRC, engaged NGOs such as NPA, and UN or national MACs. Project selection, design and implementation must include reliable local partners, and programmes must be regionalized to the extent possible to reduce the span of control and ease the task of programme management. Project design and contracts/donor agreements must include precise milestones, deliverables (outputs) and reporting requirements with tied funding in the form of progress payments and holdbacks. As well, every project must have a well-defined exit strategy. Finally, programmes with the magnitude and impact of the Balkans CMAP must include a clearly defined communication strategy, with a plan that provides guidance for both reactive and proactive communication. This would greatly assist managers in responding to incidents or queries, and facilitate international and domestic awareness of Canada's contribution in this highly topical area.

*Note to Reader: This report was prepared in accordance with the "CIDA Evaluation Guide, January 2000". As a result, it includes a project-level review for each of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo, as well as a regional programme-level review. Unfortunately, project similarities lead to unavoidable repetition in the presentation of results. To avoid this repetition, the reader may wish to focus attention at the outset on the individual country/province or mine action area of particular interest using the index for Part II as a guide.*

# CIDA CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPE BRANCH

## CANADIAN MINE ACTION PROGRAMME IN THE BALKANS 1998 - 2003

### EVALUATION REPORT

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# **CIDA CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPE BRANCH**

## **CANADIAN MINE ACTION PROGRAMME IN THE BALKANS 1998 - 2003**

### **EVALUATION REPORT**

We envision a world free of the threat of land mines and unexploded ordnance, where individuals and communities live in a safe environment conducive to development, and where mine survivors are fully integrated into their societies.<sup>1</sup>

## **PART I - EVALUATION OVERVIEW**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **GENERAL**

The Central and Eastern Europe Branch (CEEB) of CIDA is responsible for Canada's Official Development Assistance (ODA) programme in Central and Eastern Europe. A key element within this area of responsibility has been CIDA's Canadian Mine Action Programme (CMAP) in the Balkans. The 1997 Ottawa Landmine Treaty and the resultant government created \$100m Landmine Fund to address mine contamination in affected countries throughout the world, precipitated this unique five-year programme. The five-year Balkans CMAP (1998-03) comprised 37 individual projects plus nine sub projects, with a level of investment totaling some \$20m (CAD). The projects were located primarily in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo with some residual programming support undertaken in Slovenia. The Balkans CMAP was principally focused on: the provision of direct humanitarian assistance; the enhancement of peace, security and stability; the building of institutional mine action capacity; and the creation of indigenous mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) clearance capabilities. Accordingly, the programme covered the key mine action areas including: mine/UXO survey, marking and clearance; mine awareness/mine risk education (MRE); institutional capacity building; and mine victim assistance.

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<sup>1</sup> A/56/448/Add.1 United Nations Mine Action: A Strategy for 2001-2005 Report of the Secretary-General.



## **LINKAGES – CIDA MANDATE AND PRIORITIES**

As outlined in the Balkans Memorandum to Cabinet approved 15 March 2001, Canadian development programming is to be conducted along three strategic axes: peace building and security; economic cooperation and reconstruction; and social sustainability. The overall focus of CIDA's CMAP in the Balkans was to reduce the threat of injury and death posed by mines and UXO in order to: permit the return of refugees and displaced persons, enable rebuilding and economic recovery to take place, and result in the development of sustainable indigenous institutions and capacity. By virtue of this approach, the CMAP contributed to all three Balkans programme priorities (see figure 14). Indeed, the broad objectives of the Balkans MAP were in keeping with CIDA's mandate to support sustainable development in order to reduce poverty and contribute to a more secure, equitable and prosperous world. The primary aim of the programme was focused on improving the safety and security of vulnerable populations. This was accomplished by projects designed to identify and mark dangerous areas, create awareness of the threat and directly clear critical areas of mines and UXO. CIDA's corporate priorities were adhered to in the development of the Balkans MAP and were addressed to the extent possible in all of the individual projects. To this end, the objectives of the programme were identified as:

- a. Enhance the physical security of vulnerable populations and aid workers by reducing the threat posed by mines and UXO (survey, mark, educate, clear);
- b. Address basic human needs and well-being by ensuring that shelter areas, utilities and social infrastructure are safe and cleared of mines/UXO;
- c. Contribute to sustainable development and growth by ensuring that transportation, systems, utilities, private sector and public infrastructure, and agricultural and forestry land are safe and cleared of mines/UXO;
- d. Enable the protection of the environment by addressing the issue of mine/UXO contamination;
- e. Provide assistance to the victims of landmines/UXO by the direct support of physical and socio-economic rehabilitation and reintegration projects; and
- f. Contribute to sustainable mine action capacity by supporting MAP institution building and the development of indigenous mine action/clearance capacity in both the public and private sectors.

These objectives included numerous supporting or enabling objectives such as: the enhancement of Canadian private sector capacity in the area of mine action; increasing public awareness of Canada's international profile in the area of humanitarian mine action, the Ottawa treaty and the Canadian Landmine Fund; and the development of Canadian industrial capability in the area of mine/UXO detection and clearance technology.

## **STAKEHOLDERS**

The Balkans MAP involved numerous stakeholders and partnership organizations. These organizations include:

- a. International organizations such as NATO, the UNDP, UNICEF, UNMAS, the World Bank and UN Mine Action Coordination offices in the affected countries;
- b. Local and international NGOs such as CARE Canada, Norwegian Peoples' Aid (NPA), Handicap International (HI) and Akcija Protiv Mina (APM);

- c. Other Government of Canada Departments such as DFAIT and DND;
- d. Canadian partners such as Queen's University, International Centre for the Advancement of Community-Based Rehabilitation (ICACBR), International Children's Institute (ICI), Canadian International Demining Centre (CIDC), the International Demining Alliance of Canada (IDAC), NOTRA Environmental Inc. and Wolf's Flat Ordnance Disposal Corp; and
- e. Local government institutions such as the Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC), the Bosnian Demining Commission and the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMAL).

## **REACH AND EXPECTED RESULTS**

The participation of these stakeholder organizations covered the full spectrum of involvement from advisory and coordination status to full project implementation, and responsibility for results/outputs and reporting. The reach of the Balkans CMAP has been equally diverse, ranging from involvement in the area of institution building to hands on mine/UXO clearance and victim assistance with the resultant ability to identify immediate beneficiaries in the target population. Consequently, the expected results of the Balkans CMAP in terms of impact, outcomes and outputs also vary considerably. In the case of institution building, the results are difficult to quantify and must be viewed in terms of increased organizational effectiveness. Actual mine/UXO clearance projects, on the other hand, are quite easy to quantify in terms of lethal devices found and destroyed or area cleared. These statistics, however, must be evaluated with caution, as there are numerous factors that impinge on demining operations that can render normal comparative analysis invalid. These factors include; weather, topography, soil conditions, vegetation, type of equipment, and proximity to worksite, as well as the length and type of conflict, sophistication and lethality of ordnance and the prevailing political/security situation. Nonetheless, outputs can be quantified and the impact of these results can be assessed in terms of basic human needs and sustainable development.

## **INVESTMENT PROFILE**

### **THE DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT**

Transition and conflict are the two main forces that have characterized the development environment in the Balkans. With the decline of the Soviet Union, countries throughout Eastern Europe faced the challenge of updating corrupt and inefficient state institutions and faltering economies. In the Balkans, these economic processes were complicated and disrupted by a number of conflicts revolving around the break-up of the area's largest state, the former Yugoslavia. The tumultuous events during this period have had a significant impact on the economic, political and social contexts, all of which influenced Canadian mine action interventions in the region.

### *Recent Balkan Conflicts*

The former Yugoslavia, which existed as a federation of six republics from 1945 to 1990, largely disintegrated into its constituent parts in 1991. The non-aligned Socialist government, sometimes through the use of force, suppressed minorities within Yugoslavia's republics. After free parliamentary elections held throughout the federation in 1990, nationalism flared and wars erupted along ethnic and religious lines throughout the 1990s. The most significant of wars occurred in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo, a province of Serbia. However, the war also spilled over the borders into Montenegro, Slovenia and Macedonia, and NATO conducted bombing on Serbia to stop its role in the Kosovo war.

Croatia was the first country to suffer through significant military conflicts. In 1990, a parliamentary election in the republic resulted in a large number of Croat nationalists entering parliament, perhaps as a response to the hard-line tactics being promoted by the Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic. They pushed nationalist policies that angered the Serb minority. As a response, the Serbs declared autonomy from Croatia around the same time that Croatia was declaring independence from Yugoslavia. The result was confrontation between Croat forces and Croatian Serb rebels.

The sympathetic Serbian government took political and then military actions to aid the Serb fighters in Croatia. The conflicts resulted in 20,000 deaths. By 1992, approximately one third of the country lay outside of the Croatian government's control. At the beginning of that year, a UN brokered ceasefire resulted in the deployment of an international force on the borders of Serb-controlled areas, the withdrawal of Serbian troops and the beginning of a fragile peace. This peace was broken in 1995 when the Croatian government launched assaults on the Croatian Serb controlled areas of western Slavonia and Krajina. The assaults led to the displacement of most of the 200,000 Croatian Serbs, amongst allegations that Croat forces committed widespread atrocities. The country has been fully under the Croatian government's control since 1998.

The first Croatian conflict was shortly followed by conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Like Croatia, Bosnia's 1990 parliamentary elections were won by ethnically based parties representing the Muslims, Serbs and Croats. Bosnian Serbs declared they would remain with Yugoslavia in response to the Croatian and Slovenian independence motions passed in 1991. They formed autonomous areas to distance themselves from the Bosnian government and boycotted a 1992 referendum on independence. A declaration of independence made by the Bosnian Croatian and Muslim parties in 1992 was followed directly by war.

The war lasted for four years, from 1992 to 1995. Armies from Croatia and Serbia attempted to annex parts of BiH. Bosnian Serbs and Croats, attempting to secede from a greater Bosnian state, changed the nature of the conflict from a war of aggression to a civil war. Muslims and Croats fought together against Serbs until 1993, when Bosnian Croats proclaimed an independent state. This resulted in Muslims and Croat forces turning against each other until a 1994 US-brokered peace agreement. This peace resulted in Muslims and Croats again joining forces to fight the Serbs. In total, more than a million people were displaced across borders and 845,000 were internally displaced. There are allegations that all sides committed atrocities. In 1995, the three sides agreed to the Dayton Accord, a peace agreement implemented with the military and institutional support of the international community. The presence of a NATO-led stabilization force (SFOR) has prevented any resumption of conflict.

Kosovo broke into war in 1998. Serbian nationalism had been growing in Yugoslavia since the middle of the 1980s, and manifested itself in the election of a nationalistic leader, Slobodan Milosevic. Milosevic prompted nationalist policies such as resuming Serbian control of Kosovo, a province that had been relatively autonomous since 1945 and whose majority population were ethnic Albanians. A Serbian crackdown of Albanian protest forced Kosovo to concede loss of its autonomy in 1989.

The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) emerged in 1996 and was determined to gain independence for Kosovo through war. Serbia refused to agree to an internationally brokered peace plan, which provided for NATO forces entering Kosovo and Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia intensified its activities in Kosovo and around the same time, NATO conducted bombing strikes on Serbia. Up to 900,000 Albanians were displaced from Kosovo, hundreds of civilians died from the bombing and thousands of Serbs and Albanians died in Kosovo. The bombing ended after 78 days with the acceptance of a G8 plan that included the withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo and the introduction of the NATO Kosovo force (KFOR). Kosovo is currently under the administration of the UN (UNMIK) although from a legal standpoint, it is still a province of Yugoslavia (recently renamed as Serbia-Montenegro).

### *Transition in the Region*

Even before the Balkan wars of the 1990s, Yugoslavia's government and economy were facing serious troubles. The country went into a difficult recession during the 1980s. While Yugoslavia was more economically open and liberalized than the soviet-aligned eastern European states, it failed to approach the economic development of most of its western neighbours. Also, the country's national and federal leaders avoided democratic and governance reforms, with the first multi-party elections not occurring until 1990.

Political and economic transition from centrally planned economies and socialism to democracy and liberal economies has proven costly throughout Eastern Europe. In the Balkans, elections have often resulted in ethnic and nationalist parties gaining power, which usually exacerbated inter-ethnic tensions. The closure of inefficient industries has increased unemployment and poverty, at least temporarily. The nationalization of state-run industries has often led to punitive rents that are not economically sustainable. Transition and conflict have provoked rapid economic, political and social changes with all of the associated challenges.

Due to the costs of transition and their participation in wars, Balkan governments were often reluctant or unable to implement the necessary elements of transition during the 1990s. As a result, the former Yugoslav states are in various stages of transition.

### *Economy of the Region*

Transition and conflict have extracted a high cost in the Balkans. This is illustrated by the fact that economies in the region are significantly weaker than they were in 1990. Gross Domestic Products are a fraction of what they were in the late 1980's. For example, in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the most severely affected

states, it is estimated that 2000 Gross Domestic Products were only 47 percent of their 1990 level.<sup>2</sup> All statistics fail to include activity in the grey economy, which may be significant.

Kosovo is one of the poorest regions of Europe. Its infrastructure, and economic and political institutions are severely underdeveloped. These problems were exacerbated by the 1999 conflict that destroyed much of what infrastructure the province did have. The province is now highly aid dependent. While its GDP has grown at a rate of 16 percent a year, much of this is dependent on international aid. The large number of refugees and displaced people also provides a large economic drain.

BiH is also dependent on aid, but to a lesser extent than Kosovo. The result of compromises made to end the BiH conflicts was a complicated, disjointed political system. The wars also damaged the country's physical infrastructure. Both of these factors create significant economic challenges. Basic government financing functions, such as taxation, are weak and the lack of infrastructure impedes economic development. Unemployment in 2001 was approximately 38 percent.<sup>3</sup>

Croatia, in contrast, is second only to Slovenia among the former Yugoslav states in terms of its economic progress. The country has had a coherent political centre since 1998. Since the 2000 election, a moderate political party has been in power, and has shown the will to accelerate transition. Elections at the end of 2002 resulted in more nationalistic parties being re-elected, however, they do not have the same hard-line character as the parties of the 1990s. Development in the country is uneven. Lack of physical infrastructure, partially due to damage caused in the country's military conflicts, remains a problem. Continued insistence on the part of the government to take a strong role in the economy, has prompted members of the international community to insist that it speed up the process of privatization.<sup>4</sup> Unemployment at the beginning of 2002 was 23.7 percent.<sup>5</sup>

### *Politics*

Transition and conflict have resulted in different political and institutional frameworks throughout the former Yugoslav states. Each country's unique situation created different development needs.

In the case of Croatia, the 1995 offensive against Serbs resulted in a strong, coherent central state. This state played an activist role in the economy and remained highly nationalistic until 1999. The death of the country's president during that year precipitated elections in 2000. As a result of those elections, a more moderate coalition came into power that pursued international, especially EU, norms of good governance and economic management. The new government has made significant progress towards those goals.

The Dayton Peace agreement, which hallmarked the end of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, involved a number of compromises that led to a complicated political structure. The country is comprised of two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republica Srpska, and direct international involvement in the administration of the country in

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<sup>2</sup> Interview with David Mueller, CEE Mine Action Programme Officer 1996-99.

<sup>3</sup> BiH IPRSP

<sup>4</sup> Economist 2001

<sup>5</sup> Economist, 2002

the form of the Office of the High Representative (OHR). Further complicating this political structure, the Federation contains eleven regional governments. The division of responsibilities among these governments results in institutions that remain weak and in need of reform.

Indigenous institutions in Kosovo are even weaker than they are in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the case of Kosovo, no such institutions existed prior to the 1999 conflict. Their development was stymied by the fact that the province had never been an independent state, was not a republic within the former Yugoslav federation and was integrated into Serbia through most of the 1990s. As a result of the lack of indigenous institutions, the international community has taken a significant role in the operation of Kosovo and is represented by two primary institutions, UNMIK and the OSCE, plus the military presence of NATO in the form of the KFOR.

### *Social Issues*

The economic, political and military turmoil of the 1990s left behind significant social problems in Kosovo, BiH and Croatia. Unemployment and displacement have contributed to poverty, growth in social dislocation and other social problems. However, the extent and nature of these problems is different in each area.

Kosovo is one of the poorest regions in Europe with some of the lowest indicators of human development, including a 50% poverty rate, low attendance of women in schools and high levels of corruption. Kosovo's most immediate problem following the war was resolving the needs of a massive displaced population. According to the Norwegian Refugee Council, approximately 288,000 people displaced from Kosovo during the war still live in Serbia and Montenegro. The majority of these are Serbs that are blocked from returning by ethnic tensions between them and the Kosovo Albanians. In order for Kosovo's social infrastructure to recover and improve, it also needs rebuilt physical infrastructure and developed institutions.<sup>6</sup>

Bosnia and Herzegovina suffered through the longest war in the 1990s. Consequently, its infrastructure was significantly damaged and a large portion of its population was internally and externally displaced. The BiH PRSP estimates 281,652 internally displaced persons and 624,250 BiH refugees still living abroad, almost half of whom have no permanent solution to their status. The Poverty Paper concludes that this displaced population is particularly vulnerable to poverty and low standards of living. In BiH, nineteen percent of the total population lives below the poverty line, while 30 percent live just above it.

During the 1990's, Croatia's social development reflected large disparity between the capital, Zagreb, and the countryside. Zagreb enjoys a developed infrastructure and government institutions while the country is less developed. In terms of basic human development, the country is doing significantly better than the other former Yugoslav states except, Slovenia. In April of 2002, the Croatian government reported that only 22,000 people from a high of 220,000 remain internally displaced. The majority of the returnees are Croats, while much of the Croatian Serb population remains outside of Croatia's borders.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>[www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/idpProjectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/wCountries/Yugoslavia+\[Federal+Republic+of\]](http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/idpProjectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/wCountries/Yugoslavia+[Federal+Republic+of])

<sup>7</sup>[www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/idpSurvey.nsf/wViewSingleEnv/CroatiaProfile+Summary](http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/idpSurvey.nsf/wViewSingleEnv/CroatiaProfile+Summary)

## **INVESTMENT OVERVIEW**

As outlined in the introduction to this evaluation, the CMAP can be viewed as complementary and enabling in terms of CIDA's development priorities in the region. The expected results for the programme vary based on the differing situations in each country. Within Kosovo, the primary goal was to remove the threat of mine contamination completely. In BiH, mine contamination is significant and may take decades to clear. Therefore, the priority was to clear the highest priority areas for refugee returns and local populations, while building a sustainable capacity to manage and conduct a long-term mine clearance programme. Although more advanced, there was a similar need for the building of a sustainable national institution to manage mine action in Croatia.

## **ACHIEVEMENTS AND MILESTONES**

Balkan countries each have a unique mine contamination and development context. As a result, the activities undertaken by the CMAP have taken a different character in each country. Also, many of these activities have been collaborative in nature and the CMAP has contributed a portion of the mine action efforts of the international community. Therefore, the milestones of the Balkan CMAP are area specific and often cannot be separated from the achievements of the entire community. The following are the noteworthy achievements/milestones that the Balkans CMAP has contributed to:

### **Kosovo:**

- 1999 - The UNMACC was established.
- 1999 - Rapid clearance of priority areas for returning refugees.
- 2001 - Effective removal of the mine threat.

### **Croatia:**

- 2000 – 2001 - Development of the legal background, technical knowledge and physical infrastructure for the CROMAC to operate as a fully indigenous organization.
- 2000 – 2001 - Accurate mine surveys significantly reduced the suspected mine contaminated areas.
- 2001 – A completed mine awareness needs report provided coherent priorities and implementation strategies.
- 2002 - Law on Demining.

### **Bosnia and Herzegovina:**

- 1998 – 2001 - Establish and consolidated the legal, technical and physical infrastructure for a BHMAC. The BHMAC replaced the UN and entity MACs to become the sole body responsible for mine action coordination.
- 2002 - Establishment of a State of Law on Demining.
- 2002 – Transfer of the responsibility for payment of MAC staff to the Bosnian government, reflecting an increased level of indigenous ownership over mine action.
- 1998 – 2002 – Increase in the indigenous mine clearance capacity.
- 1998 – 2002 – Clearance of many priority areas for the return of refugees

## **PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT INFORMATION**

Monitoring and evaluations have played a key part in the Balkan CMAP. CIDA project officers and management have provided the resources to conduct initial needs assessments and to undertake periodic evaluations to test the progress, draw lessons learned and incorporate those lessons into future programming. Field visits have been conducted at almost every phase of the CMAP and in every area. The CIDA programme officer responsible carried out these visits for the CMAP along with contracted technical experts.

The process of incorporating the lessons learned into ongoing programme decisions may have been partially hindered by staff turnover among the CIDA programme officers. During the five-year course of the programme to date, three individuals have been responsible for managing the programme, two of which only did so for one year. However, the staff turnover rate at CIDA was balanced by continuity in senior CIDA management and by technical experts taking a long-term role in the programme. There have been two such experts, Roger St. John, the primary author of this evaluation, and George Focsaneanu. Mr. St. John has played a role in evaluation and monitoring of the CMAP since 2000, while Mr. Focsaneanu conducted an evaluation of the demining projects undertaken during the emergency phase in Kosovo in 1999.

Monitoring, needs assessment and evaluation missions were:

- March 1998 - Feasibility Mission to BiH by Stephen Wallace, Director General.
- June 1998 - Needs Assessment and Project Design Mission to BiH by David Mueller, Programme Officer.
- May 1999 - Monitoring Mission to BiH by David Mueller.
- November 1999 - Evaluation of Mine and UXO Clearance Projects in Kosovo by George Focsaneanu, Technical Advisor.
- July 2000 - Monitoring and Needs Assessment Mission to Kosovo, BiH and Croatia by Lianne Garceau-Bednar, Senior Programme Officer, and Roger St. John, Technical Advisor.
- November 2000 - Evaluation of IDAC Demining Project in Kosovo by Roger St. John, Technical Advisor.
- September 2001 - Monitoring mission by Roger St. John, Technical Advisor and Darcy Demarsico, Programme Officer.
- November 2002 - Field Mission for the CIDA/ CEE Balkans CMAP 1998-2003 - Evaluation by Lianne Garceau-Bednar, Senior Programme Officer and Roger St. John, Technical Advisor.

In addition to these official monitoring, needs assessment and evaluation missions, CEE Branch senior management conducted numerous visits to evaluate progress, identify concerns and convey information back to Branch Staff. Hélène Corneau, Director, Stephen Wallace, Director General and Gilles Rivard, Director General, all conducted such missions.

## **INVESTMENT RESOURCES**

As stated in the introduction to this evaluation, approximately \$20m (CAD) was spent on the CMAP over its first five years of operation. Approximately half of this was spent in Bosnia



and Herzegovina, 8 million in Kosovo and 2 million in Croatia. A brief break down of the areas of spending by country is illustrated below in Table 1 and the allocation of spending is detailed in Part II - Evaluation Findings.

**Table 1. Canadian Mine Action Program Disbursements 1998/99 – 2002/03 (CAD)**

	<b>MACs</b>	<b>MINE AWARENESS</b>	<b>VICTIM ASSISTANCE</b>	<b>MINE/UXO CLEARANCE</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
BiH	\$ 2.63 m	\$ 0.61 m	\$ 1.22 m	\$ 6.57 m	<b><u>\$ 11.03 m</u></b>
Kosovo	\$ 0.76 m	\$ 0.20 m	\$ 0.50 m	\$ 6.00 m	<b><u>\$ 7.46 m</u></b>
Croatia	\$ 0.97 m	\$ 0.06 m	\$ 0.17 m	\$ 0.80 m	<b><u>\$ 2.00 m</u></b>
<b>Total</b>	<b><u>\$ 4.36 m</u></b>	<b><u>\$ 0.87 m</u></b>	<b><u>\$ 1.89 m</u></b>	<b><u>\$ 13.37 m</u></b>	<b><u>\$ 20.49 m</u></b>
%	21.3%	4.2%	9.2%	65.3%	<b><u>100.0%</u></b>

## EVALUATION PROFILE


### OVERVIEW

As noted above, the Ottawa Convention and the creation of the CLF precipitated the Balkans CMAP. This unique and multi-faceted programme consolidated ongoing CEE MAP initiatives in the Balkans in response to significant additional funding from the CLF and the emergence of compelling needs in the region as the political and security situations stabilized. As a consequence, the development of the programme was largely responsive in nature, particularly in Kosovo, and many valuable lessons have been learned.

These lessons resulted in the gradual refinement of the programme and concomitant increases in effectiveness. Clearly these were hard-won lessons that should be captured from a corporate perspective. This is particularly important with the recently announced extension of the CLF beginning in 2003 and in terms of Canada's current ODA policy focus on Africa, with its many mine-affected countries. Accordingly, the evaluation of the Balkans CMAP focused on the key results achieved. The emphasis was on validating the design, implementation and effectiveness of the numerous projects that comprised the programme. The lessons derived from the evaluation have been focused on improving programme development, and project selection and design for similar MAP initiatives in the future. The aim was to produce programming principles that will provide strategic orientation for future mine action decisions, including the definition of preferred areas for Canadian intervention, i.e. Canada's mine action 'niche'. Refining project design parameters, monitoring requirements, reporting protocols and the type of results that should be expected will further

enhance programme effectiveness. A flow chart depicting the key activities included in the evaluation process is shown at Figure 1.

**Figure 1. Balkans CMAP Evaluation Project Flowchart**



## METHODOLOGY

The objectives of the evaluation were to assess the performance of the CMAP in the Balkans (both in terms of development and operations) and to identify lessons learned challenges and opportunities for future programming. The work focused on the assessment of the programme as a whole. A review of the 37 individual projects that comprise the Balkans CMAP was a relevant part of the work, as they represent the building blocks of the programme. However, a detailed review of each project at this stage would have been counter productive, time consuming and expensive. The evaluation was conducted using CIDA's Evaluation Guide, 2000, and the Framework of Results and Key Success Factors, as tools for the assessment of the results. The work was structured to include two distinct but interrelated parts.

The first was a review of the projects and their progress towards results consisting of a brief analysis of the 37 projects, grouped by country and type of programme (including MAC's, mine awareness, victim assistance and demining). Their results were then assessed, taking into consideration the following:

- a. consistency with CEE's programme objectives and with crosscutting themes;
- b. consistency with CIDA's priorities of individual security, economic and social development, and sustainability; and
- c. what worked and what didn't work in terms of project design, planning, implementation and reporting (management factors and design factors), along with an assessment of the capacity of the executing agencies, the synergies and partnerships.

The findings in each country are presented separately, as each country presents different issues to be addressed and a different context for programme and project design, management and implementation.

An assessment of the overall programme performance was also conducted consisting of a review of the programme implemented in each country with comparisons among the types of programmes across the target countries. The programme review focused on:

- a. development results (focusing on the achievement of results, cost-effectiveness, relevance and the degree of sustainability achieved) and the success factors (including appropriateness of design, resource utilization, and informed and timely action);
- b. strengths and weaknesses, focusing on what worked and what didn't work in terms of programme design, planning, implementation, management and reporting; and,
- c. challenges and lessons learned, focusing on programme-level development and implementation with a view to recommending a framework for future programming.

The background and context, in which the CMAP has been developed, along with key aspects of demining operations, were also taken into consideration as these had implications in terms of the design and implementation of a responsive programme. Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia have significant differences in the nature and extent of mine/UXO contamination, political and legal structures, military/security situations, MAP structures and international involvement.

Due to the nature of the projects in the programme, non-statistical analysis was used to assess the projects' progress towards results. This involved subjective assessments based on both qualitative and quantitative information, and the use of informed judgment and expert opinion where available. Also, because the CMAP focused on results achieved at the outcome and impact level, the analyses and comparisons will take into consideration the various stages of project implementation.

To simplify information presentation requirements, evaluation results matrixes were prepared, based on information contained in the Annual Project Performance Reviews (APPRs) (complemented with other reports such as end-of-project-reports, annual progress reports and work plans, project evaluations, etc.). These result matrixes provide summarized information regarding the expected results performance indicators, actual results and a performance assessment for each project. These are included in Part II and are intended to provide a simple and effective illustration of project results.

The sources of information, method of collection and basis of analysis remained relatively consistent throughout. The sources of information principally included a detailed review of corporate and related external documentation, as well as site observations and interviews during a field visit to the programme area. Brief consultations were undertaken with CIDA personnel, DFAIT, UNDP and UNMAS while more detailed consultations were undertaken during the field visit with post personnel, beneficiaries, local authorities, project partners and executing agencies. Information collection methods include: literature searches and file reviews, consultation, site observations and expert opinion, as well as a survey questionnaire that was completed by executing agencies and beneficiaries.

## **THE EVALUATION TEAM**

The evaluation team was comprised of the Evaluation Manager, Lianne Garceau-Bednar, Senior Programme Officer, Peace and Security, Eastern Adriatic Division, Central and Eastern Europe Branch; Evaluator/Technical Advisor, Roger St. John from St. John & Associates Projects Inc; Performance Review Advisor, Claudia Marcondes; plus a Research Assistant, Jeff Naylor. The evaluation included a thorough review of CIDA project documentation as well as direct consultation with CIDA HQ and post personnel, beneficiaries, local authorities, executing agency personnel and other stakeholders. The detailed responsibilities of the team members were as follows:

- a. Lianne Garceau-Bednar, CIDA Evaluation Manager, has overall responsibility and accountability for the evaluation. She was responsible for overseeing and controlling the evaluation process, providing guidance and direction throughout all phases of its execution and approving all deliverables. She conducted an evaluation visit to the Balkans to collect information (Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina).

- b. Roger St. John, CIDA Demining Technical Advisor, was responsible for conducting the evaluation, including the day-to-day management of operations, review of programme documentation, development of the work plan, regular progress reporting to CIDA's evaluation manager, and the preparation of the evaluation report. As well, he participated in the evaluation site visit to the Balkans to collect information and provide evaluation technical support (Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo). The work plan elaborated on the broad parameters initially set out in the evaluation, by adding precision, scope and refinements to the operational planning.
- c. Claudia Marcondes, Performance Review Advisor, was responsible for providing expert programme evaluation advice to the team in the areas of results measurement and professional evaluation methodologies. She reviewed relevant programme documentation to extract key elements such as expectations, results, issues and lessons learned. She also provided input to the evaluation work plan and was responsible for the development of a comprehensive evaluation questionnaire for key project partners in the Balkans, in order to confirm project results and obtain critical follow up information regarding the impact of the programme on the defined beneficiary population (See Annexes F).
- d. Jeff Naylor, Research Assistant, was responsible for assisting in the review of all documentation related to projects that comprised the Balkans CMAP, with a view to providing a comprehensive summary including key project parameters, results achieved, issues and lessons learned. This review has been reflected in a set of key results tables that provide a comprehensive summary of results by country and mine action programme area (see Annex E).

## PART II - EVALUATION FINDINGS

### BALKANS CMAP OVERVIEW

#### GENERAL

The purpose of this section of the report is to relate the evaluation findings regarding the performance of the CMAP in the Balkans through a review of its 37 projects. The findings have been derived from an assessment of the achievements, challenges, opportunities and lessons learned from a detailed review of the information contained in CIDA files and related correspondence. Corporate memory was tapped through a series of interviews with key personnel. As well, external sources such as post personnel, partner organizations and implementing agencies were surveyed by direct interviews during the evaluation field mission and, where necessary, by an electronic questionnaire.

The file review consisted of an analysis of the Annual Project Progress Reports (APPR's) for each of the 37 projects involved in the programme. End-of-project reports and the most recent annual report prepared by the executing agencies were consulted in specific cases where it was necessary to collect more in-depth information. This was augmented by a review of all programme/project monitoring and assessment reports as well as a review of reports prepared by related external agencies. Following this research phase, a series of information matrixes were developed to assemble project information and key results into a manageable framework for analysis and presentation. Ultimately, results matrixes were designed for each of the Balkans CMAP countries and these were further broken down by the key areas of mine action (Annex E). A survey questionnaire was then developed to guide the interview process with key CIDA personnel and those visited during the field mission. As noted above, this questionnaire was also used in electronic format to access important respondents who could not be interviewed in person (Annex F). Finally, the information from all sources was synthesized to complete the results matrixes, and form the basis of the following discussion and findings.

The bulk of the work focused on:

- a. assessing the performance of CMAP in the Balkans as a whole (both in terms of development and operations);
- b. identification of the lessons learned, challenges and underlying principles that should guide future programming; and
- c. CIDA's Framework of Results and Key Success Factors was employed as a tool for the assessment of results.

The background and context in which the CMAP has been developed along with key aspects of demining operations are important to consider as they have significant implications in terms of the design and implementation of a responsive programme. Things to consider include: the nature and extent of mine/UXO contamination; political and legal structures; the military/security situation; existing MAP structures; and other international involvement. Accordingly, a brief historical perspective has been provided in the Investment Profile, Part I that describes the development context in terms of the origin of the various conflicts and the resulting political, economic and social conditions that defined the investment profile of the

Balkans region. From the standpoint of the CMAP, it is also necessary to understand the mine action context that existed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo. This information is provided in the following background discussion.

## **BACKGROUND**

In order to evaluate the Balkans CMAP, it is essential to understand the nature and extent of the mine contamination problem. Indeed, the various Balkan regions exhibit great diversity in terms of ethnicity, culture, religion and geography as well as in the areas of political, economic and social development. The conflicts that resulted in the widespread and severe landmine and UXO contamination of the CMAP countries within the region were also extremely different in terms of their origins, intensity and duration, as well as the source, extent and the very nature of the contamination. Accordingly, considerable care was required in the design and development of the individual CMAP projects. In this context, it is important to remember that a template approach to project design and implementation is not at all appropriate in this or other mine affected regions.

While there is reported to be residual landmine contamination in Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), Macedonia and Albania, the 1998-2003 Balkans CMAP focused on those countries that emerged from conflict in the 1990s with extensive contamination problems; Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. Prior to 1998, the UN established mine action coordination offices in Croatia and in Bosnia. The development of these organizations was supported by DFAIT, CIDA and DND, particularly in the area of institution building by the provision of technical expertise, hardware and database development. The five-year Balkans CMAP originated with the establishment of the CLF in 1998 and began as a modest package of projects designed to address pressing needs in Bosnia. Bosnia was identified as the most critical mine affected country and the most suitable for Canadian development investment given the intransigence of the regime in Croatia at the time. A feasibility mission was undertaken in March 1998 and this was followed in June 1998 by a needs assessment and project design mission. This process resulted in the funding and implementation of several projects covering the full spectrum of mine action with particular focus on demining, and institution and capacity building. The Balkans CMAP was rapidly expanded at the end of the Kosovo crisis in 1999 and further expanded in 2000 to include several projects in Croatia in response to the 2000 elections and the installation of a more moderate government.

## **THE MINE/UXO CONTAMINATION PROBLEM**

As noted above, the mine/UXO contamination in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo varied dramatically. Table 2 provides comparative information related to the nature and extent of the problem. In terms of land area, Croatia and Bosnia are comparable with over 50,000 square kilometres each, while Kosovo is just over 10,000 square kilometres. Compared to Croatia, the terrain of both Bosnia and Kosovo is extremely rugged with corresponding extremes of climate, particularly in the higher elevations and mountainous areas. The conflicts that produced the mine/UXO contamination were also very different in nature:

**Croatia.** The fighting in Croatia broke out in July 1991 and ended at the beginning of 1992 with an UN-brokered ceasefire. The fighting was concentrated in and around four Serb-dominated areas in the southern and eastern border regions of Croatia and consequently, most of the resulting contamination was concentrated in these areas.

UN protection areas were established and while some clearance took place, another brief round of fighting occurred in 1995 when the Croats conducted offensive military operations to restore their borders. During the initial conflict, the Croat forces consisted mostly of irregulars called into service with a small cadre of ex-JNA professionals. The Serbs also consisted of irregulars but were backed by professional military units of the JNA. Extensive mine laying was undertaken by each side in the conflict, however, a great number of mines were laid in haste by untrained personnel and record keeping was erratic at best. Some 14,000 records were initially retrieved reflecting a modest 132,000 AP and 79,408 AT mines, and an initial suspected mined area of roughly 4000 square kilometres. A large number of the records were discounted as unreliable and CROMAC now has 8,300 records on file. Obviously there are still many more mines than reflected in the records and this is complicated by concentrations of UXO, particularly in siege areas such as Vukovar. The current suspected mined area in Croatia is approximately 1,700 square kilometres and with an estimated 500,000 mines and an unknown amount of UXO.



Figure 2. Outskirts of Sarajevo (CIDA file photo)

**Bosnia and Herzegovina.** The fighting in Bosnia lasted much longer, 1992-95, and took on the nature of an all-out civil war with three ethnic groups, shifting alliances and extensive outside involvement by both Yugoslavia and Croatia as well as a number of Islamic factions. The fighting raged along a front that snaked some 1,600 kilometres through central Bosnia dividing Serb from Muslim and Croat areas of the country. The front divided the capital of Sarajevo that was under siege and surged back and forth with various offensives leaving extensive mine/UXO contamination in their wake. Minefields were laid, lifted, re-laid and sometimes overlaid. Nuisance or random

mining was widespread and mines were also used to support ethnic cleansing, for intimidation or to prevent refugee returns. This extensive minefield contamination was exacerbated by heavy concentrations of UXO resulting from heavy bombardments, particularly in locations such as Sarajevo and Goradze. The war ended in December 1995 with the implementation of the Dayton Accord and the deployment of a large NATO-led stabilization force (SFOR). Some 17,500-minefield records were retrieved and initial estimates indicated approximately 4,000 square kilometres of suspected mined area containing over one million landmines. More recent estimates indicate about 10,000 contaminated sites totaling about 2,100 square kilometres involving some 670,000 mines and 650,000 UXOs.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Mine Action Plan of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the Year 2003. Note: The reduction in suspected mined area in both Croatia and Bosnia reflects ongoing analyses and the discounting of suspected areas by the review of documents for duplication, field investigation and technical survey. It is estimated that the current suspected area could be reduced by as much as an additional 50-75% by the use of methodical technical surveys thereby greatly increasing the efficiency of clearance operations and reducing the overall cost.



**Kosovo.** The conflict in Kosovo initially consisted of insurgency operations undertaken by the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) beginning in 1996. In response, the Serbian forces laid mines on border infiltration routes, lines of communication, critical infrastructure, military installations and domestic infrastructure for the purposes of denial and intimidation. For the most part, they used a doctrinaire approach and the majority of these minefields were well recorded. Some random or nuisance mining was carried out by both sides, thereby increasing the threat and complicating subsequent clearance operations. The refusal of Serbia to agree to an internationally brokered peace plan in 1998 resulted in an intensive 78-day NATO bombing campaign intended to force Serbia to withdraw from Kosovo. This resulted in widespread strike area UXO contamination throughout Kosovo from Cluster Bomb Units (CBUs). The UNMACC that was established in mid-1999 obtained a total of 620 Serb minefield records and recorded some 333 NATO CBU strike areas. In all, approximately 4,000 reported dangerous areas were investigated and either discounted by survey or cleared accordingly. All known minefields and strike areas, totaling 32 square kilometres, were cleared during the period July/August 1999 to December 2001. The total ordnance found and destroyed included 8,485 CBU bomblets (an additional 7,455 were cleared by KFOR troops in the same period), 19,457 AP mines 5,515 AT mines and 13,896 items of other UXO.<sup>9</sup>

Clearly, Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo varied dramatically in the nature and extent of their mine contamination problem. Kosovo presented a unique and manageable situation that was largely addressed in a mere 2.5 years by amassing significant international and local resources under a very effective UNMACC. Without local government institutions, the clearance programme was able to proceed under the auspices of the UN (UNMIK) and KFOR. This was a significant and highly successful operation, however, the number of mines/UXO, the nature of contamination and the size of the area amounted to only a fraction of that faced in Croatia and Bosnia. There are significant differences as well between Croatia and Bosnia. The contamination in Croatia affects approximately one-third of the country but is largely concentrated in defined border areas permitting relative freedom of movement in large areas including the capital, Zagreb, and along the Dalmatian coast thereby allowing revitalization of the lucrative tourist trade. On the other hand, the contamination in Bosnia is widespread and affects a very large proportion of the population including those living in the capital, Sarajevo. Unlike Croatia, infrastructure throughout the country was heavily damaged or destroyed because of the protracted and intensive nature of the conflict, and many developed areas were mined to facilitate ethnic cleansing. As well, the effectiveness of the entire mine action programme in Bosnia has been badly hampered by the complexity of government and public institutions trying to function in an ethnically divided country. These dramatic differences must be taken into account when reading the findings, lessons learned and recommendations contained in this evaluation as well as in the application of lessons learned or 'principles' in the design of future programmes.

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<sup>9</sup> Willing to Listen – An Evaluation of UN MAP in Kosovo 1999 – 2001, The Praxis Group, Riverside, Geneva, 12 February 2002.

**Table 2. Comparative Landmine Contamination - Balkans Region (2002)**

	<b>BiH</b>	<b>Croatia</b>	<b>Kosovo*</b>
<b>Land Area</b>	56,610,000 km <sup>2</sup>	51,129,000 km <sup>2</sup>	10,080 km <sup>2</sup>
<b>Population</b>	4,381,000	4,400,000	2,100,000
<b>Minefield Records/ Dangerous Areas</b>	10,000	8,300	Mine fields: 620 CBU Strikes: 333
<b>Estimated Number of Mines</b>	670,000	500,000	Mines found and destroyed: 5,515 Anti-Tank 19,457 Anti-Personnel
<b>Estimated Number of UXOs</b>	650,000	(No Estimate)	15,940 CBU (bomblets) 13,845 Other UXOs
<b>Initial Suspected Mined Area (at end of conflict)</b>	4,000 km <sup>2</sup>	4,000 km <sup>2</sup>	361 km <sup>2</sup>
<b>Current Suspected Mined Area (end 2002)</b>	2,100 km <sup>2</sup>	1,700 km <sup>2</sup>	32 km <sup>2</sup> were cleared (only residual contamination remains)
<b>Mine/ UXO Incidents (total to 2001)</b>	4,764	1,360	456
<b>Mine/ UXO Victims Killed and Injured</b>	1,385	~1,818**	95

\*Kosovo data is from end of the conflict (1999) to the completion of the UNMACC mine action program in December 2001. Some residual mine/UXO contamination remains and there were a few incidents in 2003 resulting in 10 casualties mostly from M75 grenades but including one death from a CBU bomblet.

\*\* Total since 1991. The figures prior to 1995 are unreliable.

## CONTENTS

The rest of Part II is structured as follows:

- a. Balkans CMAP Project Reviews. A detailed review is provided for projects in each of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Croatia. In each case, the CMAP projects are reviewed by area of mine action (MAC/institutional support, mine awareness, victim assistance and demining) including a general description of the project, an assessment of progress towards results and a check of consistency with established goals. This is followed by a discussion of findings and lessons learned based on a brief review of the key aspects of project design, implementation and reporting, focusing on what worked and what didn't work.
- b. Balkans CMAP Programme Review. A brief review of the Balkans CMAP is provided at the programme level. The discussion includes an assessment of the programme's consistency with its stated goals, adherence to CIDA/CEE's objectives and priorities, and its consistency with the crosscutting themes of gender and the environment. This includes findings and lessons learned based on a brief review of the key aspects of programme design, implementation and reporting,

again focusing on what worked and what didn't work. Finally, a review of the CMAP is provided based in the Framework of Results and Key Success Factors.

The assessment of the 37 projects (see CMAP Project List, Table 3) was conducted taking into consideration that the projects are in different stages of implementation. The discussion also takes into consideration the methodologies used in project implementation, including:

- a. expertise transfer and training,
- b. demining operations,
- c. provision of equipment, and
- d. core contributions.

**Table 3. List of all Balkans CMAP Projects**

<b>Bosnia – Herzegovina</b>			
	<b>Project No.</b>	<b>Project Title</b>	
MACs	Z-011297	1. Institutional Support to MACs I	
	Z-011303	2. Institutional Support to MACs II	
	Z-020160	3. UNDP Task Manager for Demining	
	Z-020216	4. Institutional Support to MACs III	
	Z-020353	5. Institutional Support to MACs IV	
	Z-020519	6. Institutional Support to MACs V	
Mine Awareness	Z-010437	7. Mine Awareness	
Victim Assistance	Z-011414-001	8. ITF Landmine Victim Assistance	
	Z-011464	9. Support to Children Victims of Landmines	
	M-010054	10. Emergency Assistance to Disabled population/Landmine Victims Peer Group	
	Z-020336	11. Landmine Victims Peer Counselling Group II	
Demining	Z-011295	12. Mine Detection Dog Training I	
	Z-020339-001	13. Mine Detection Dog Training II	
	Z-020520	14. Mine Detection Dog Training III	
	Z-011296	15. Akcija Protiv Mina (APM) Demining I	
	Z-020217	16. Akcija Protiv Mina (APM) Demining II	
	Z-020340	17. Akcija Protiv Mina (APM) Demining III	
	Z-011298	18. Sarajevo Canton Mine Clearance I	
	Z-020341	19. Sarajevo Canton Mine Clearance II	
	Z-011299	20. Entity Armed forces Demining I	
	Z-020342	21. Entity Armed Forces Demining II	
	Z-020521	22. Entity Armed Forces Demining III	
	Other: Int'l Donor Coop/ Leveraging of Funds	Z-011414-002	23. International Trust Fund for Demining (ITF) – Channelling of Funds II
		Z-020232	24. International Trust Fund for Demining (ITF) – Channelling of Funds III
		Z-020351	25. International Trust Fund for Demining (ITF) – Channelling of Funds IV
Z-020518		26. International Trust Fund for Demining (ITF) – Channelling of Funds V	
<b>Croatia</b>			
	<b>Project No.</b>	<b>Project Title</b>	
MACs	Z-020337-001	27. Cdn Mine Action Progr/Support to UN-CROMAC Transition Program	
	Z-020337-002	28. Cdn Mine Action Progr / CROMAC National Managers & Middle Managers Training & Development	
	Z-020337-003	29. Cdn Mine Action Progr / CROMAC Communications, Database & Management Coordination	
	Z-020337-004	30. Cdn Mine Action Progr / Support to CROMAC Survey & QA Depts .	
Mine Awareness	Z-020337-005	31. Cdn-Mine Action Progr / Mine Awareness Program	
Victim Assistance	Z-020337-006	32. CMAP-CMAV Mine Victim Assistance Program	
Demining	Z-020337-007	33. Cdn Mine Action Progr / Modest CROMAC Survey & Verification Projects	
	Z-020337-008	34. Cdn Mine Action Progr/ Support to NPA's Demining Program	
	Z-020339-002	35. Mine Detection Dog Training II (HR)	

<b>Kosovo</b>		
	<b>Project No.</b>	<b>Project Title</b>
		36. Canada / Belgium / UNMAS Assessment Mission
MACC	Z-020066	37. Support to MACC in Kosovo- Data Entry Clerks
	Z-020091	38. Institutional Support to MACC in Kosovo
Mine Awareness	M-0	39. UNICEF Balkans Regional Program
Victim Assistance	M-010054	40. Emergency Assistance to Disabled Population/Landmine Victims Peer Group
Demining	Z-020013	41. Rapid Response Demining in Kosovo Y1999
	Z-020027	42. Rapid Response Demining in Kosovo Y1999
	M-0	43. Emergency Shelter & Related Demining Y1999
	Z-020200	44. Canadian Mine/UXO Clearance Project in Kosovo Y2000
	Z-020350	45. Canadian Support to the Mine Action Program in Kosovo Y2001
Other: Int'l. Donor Coop/ Leveraging of Funds	Z-020233	46. Int'l Trust Fund for Demining (ITF) – Channelling of Funds II

## THE CMAP PROJECTS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

### OVERVIEW OF BIH PROJECTS AND RESULTS

#### *General Description of Programme*

Bosnia and Herzegovina is described as one of the most heavily mined countries in Europe. According to the Landmine Monitor Report 2002, the BHMAL has described the situation as a threat which is generally low density and random in nature. The total area potentially affected is in the order of 2,100 square kilometres and the bulk of it still requires survey in order to determine the finite extent of the problem. Current estimates indicate there are approximately 10,000 dangerous (mined) areas containing about 670,000 mines and 650,000 items of UXO<sup>10</sup>. Casualties from mine/UXO incidents have leveled-off since 2000 at some 50 to 60 per year.

The UNDP and the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victim Assistance (ITF) are the institutions that receive most contributions directed to the overall funding of mine action in BiH<sup>11</sup>. Most of these contributions are geared towards mine action operations such as demining but there is also considerable support provided for mine action centre capacity development by the UNDP. Table 4 below provides an illustration of the amount of overall funding for mine action in BiH.

<sup>10</sup> BHMAL Demining Strategy for Bosnia and Herzegovina by the year of 2010 (Draft).

<sup>11</sup> Landmine Monitor Report 2002. International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL).

**Table 4. CIDA Canadian Mine Action Program Contributions in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1998/99 – 2002/03 (CAD)**

FY	1998/99	1999/00	2000/01	2001/02	2002/03	Total
Canadian Landmine Fund	2,470,000	3,120,000	1,786,750	1,708,643	1,064,607	10,150,000
Other Funding Sources (CIDA, CEE Branch)	580,000	300,000	0	0	0	880,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,050,000</b>	<b>3,420,000</b>	<b>1,786,750</b>	<b>1,708,643</b>	<b>1,064,607</b>	<b>11,030,000</b>

The CMAP in BiH is a peace building and security initiative that provides support to the four areas of mine action in the country<sup>12</sup>. This five-year, \$11m (CAD) programme, initiated in 1998 constitutes a significant contribution<sup>13</sup> and places Canada as one of the key donor countries in this field (see Table 4). In 2002, “the UNDP estimated that approximately \$23m (USD) per year was needed for demining activities in BiH and an additional \$3m (USD) to maintain the Mine Action Centres”<sup>14</sup>. Interestingly however, the latest BHMIC estimates call for approximately \$60m (USD) per year to tackle the mine contamination problem by the year 2010<sup>15</sup>. Table 4 provides the total funding provided by the CMAP in BiH for each year of the programme since 1998. The CMAP in BiH has been a very balanced programme covering all four areas of mine action with emphasis on demining and institutional support (see CMAP – BiH Project List, Table 5).

**Table 5. CIDA Canadian Mine Action Program Contributions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Project**

	Project No.	Project Title	Budget (CAD dollars)	Executing Agency	Start Date	End Date
		<b><u>Institutional Support to MACs</u></b>				
1	Z-011297	Institutional Support to MACs I	\$ 650,000	UNDP		
2	Z-011303	Institutional Support to MACs II	\$ 720,100	UNDP	98.12.15	01.12.31
3	Z-020160	UNDP Task Manager for Demining	\$ 75,000	UNDP	00.01.11	01.01.31
4	Z-020216	Institutional Support to MACs III	\$ 500,000	UNDP	00.03.31	01.06.29
5	Z-020353	Institutional Support to MACs IV	\$ 400,000	UNDP	01.04.02	02.03.28
6	Z-020519	Institutional Support to MACs V	\$ 290,000	UNDP	02.11.28	04.02.28
		<b><u>Sub-Total “Institutional Support to MACs”</u></b>	<b><u>\$2,635,100</u></b>			

<sup>12</sup> Canada’s assistance to Bosnia-Herzegovina is broader and concentrates on economic and institutional transition with several areas of emphasis including health, policing, human rights, government administration and the development of non-governmental organizations.

<sup>13</sup> The Canadian Mine Action Programme in Bosnia-Herzegovina is one component of the \$100m (CAD) CLF.

<sup>14</sup> Landmine Monitor Report 2002. International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL).

<sup>15</sup> BHMIC Mine Action Plan for the Year 2003, and BHMIC Strategy to the Year 2010.

		<b>Mine Awareness</b>				
7	Z-010437	Mine Awareness (\$580,000 non CLF)	\$ 0	IBRD	96.04.05	98.09.30
		Adjustment (CIDA Multilateral Branch)	\$ 26,020			
		<b>Sub-Total "Mine Awareness"</b>	<b>\$ 26,020</b>			
		<b>Victim Assistance</b>				
8	Z-011414-001	ITF Landmine Victim Assistance	\$ 70,000	ITF	99.04.23	00.03.31
9	Z-011464	Support to Children Victims of Landmines	\$ 450,000	ICI	01.05.25	03.04.15
10	M-010054	Emergency Assistance to Disabled Population/ Landmine Victims Peer Group (\$300,000 non CLF)	\$ 0	Queens U.	99.07.01	99.12.31
11	Z-020336	Landmine Victims Peer Counselling Group II	\$ 270,000	Queens U.	01.03.07	02.07.31
		<b>Sub-Total "Victim Assistance"</b>	<b>\$ 790,000</b>			
		<b>Demining</b>				
12	Z-011295	Mine Detection Dog Training I	\$ 540,000	CIDC		
13	Z-020339-001	Mine Detection Dog Training II	\$ 700,000	CIDC	01.03.01	02.05.31
14	Z-020520	Mine Detection Dog Training III	\$ 402,000	CIDC	02.08.01	03.05.31
15	Z-011296	Akcija Protiv Mina Demining I	\$ 840,000	HI		
16	Z-020217	Akcija Protiv Mina Demining II	\$ 400,000	HI	00.03.31	01.06.30
17	Z-020340	Akcija Protiv Mina Demining III	\$ 422,000	HI	00.11.06	02.03.28
18	Z-011298	Sarajevo Canton Mine Clearance I	\$ 710,000	NPA		
19	Z-020341	Sarajevo Canton Mine Clearance II	\$ 500,000	NPA	01.02.16	02.02.15
20	Z-011299	Entity Armed Forces Demining I	\$ 1,430,000	SFOR		
21	Z-020342	Entity Armed Forces Demining II	\$ 450,000	SFOR	01.03.29	02.12.31
22	Z-020521	Entity Armed Forces Demining III	\$ 172,500	SFOR	02.07.19	03.12.31
		<b>Sub-Total "Demining"</b>	<b>\$ 6,566,500</b>			
		<b>Other: Int'l. Donor Cooperation / Leveraging of Funds</b>				
23	Z-011414-002	Int'l Trust Fund for Deming (ITF) – Channelling of Funds I	\$ 0	ITF	99.04.23	
24	Z-020232	Int'l Trust Fund for Deming (ITF) – Channelling of Funds II	\$ 19,500	ITF	00.03.31	
25	Z-020351	Int'l Trust Fund for Deming (ITF) – Channelling of Funds IV	\$ 91,410	ITF	01.03.31	
26	Z-020518	Int'l Trust Fund for Deming (ITF) – Channelling of Funds V	\$ 21,470	ITF	02.07.19	
		<b>Sub-Total "Int'l. Donor Cooperation / Leveraging of Funds"</b>	<b>\$ 132,380</b>			
		<b>GRAND TOTAL - Canadian Landmine Fund</b>	<b>\$10,150,000</b>			
		<b>OTHER FUNDING SOURCES (CIDA, CEE Branch, Balkans Program)</b>				
7	Z-010437	Mine Awareness (\$580,000 non CLF)	\$ 580,000	IBRD	96.04.05	98.09.30
10	M-010054	Emergency Assistance to Disabled Population/ Landmine Victims Peer Group (\$300,000 non CLF)	\$ 300,000	Queens U.	99.07.01	00.03.31
		<b>Sub-Total "Other Funding Sources within CIDA"</b>	<b>\$ 880,000</b>			
		<b>GRAND TOTAL CIDA Canadian Mine Action Program</b>	<b>\$11,030,000</b>			



**Figure 3. BHMIC Headquarters – Sarajevo (DFAIT/ILX file photo)**

### *Institutional/MAC Support Projects*

The BHMIC was instituted at the national level in 1998 and has been the central policy-making and coordinating body for all mine action in the country along with so-called Entity Mine Action Centres (EMACs) located in each of the Republica Srpska (RSMAC) and the Federation (FMAC). This mine action coordination structure functioned under the direction of a Demining Commission consisting of senior entity representatives and proved exceedingly cumbersome. Allegations of corruption and fraud in

the BiH mine action programme at large erupted in the autumn of 2000 followed by a one-year inquiry conducted by the Office of the High Representative (OHR). The most disturbing finding of the inquiry was that the three demining commissioners were directly implicated in the fraudulent activity. It is important to note that Canadian funding contributions were not involved. As a result of the inquiry, however, Canada and several other donor countries suspended funding support for almost a year pending the results that were finally published in the spring/summer 2001. This action and increasing dissatisfaction with the MAC structure led to a new law on demining in Bosnia and Herzegovina<sup>16</sup> published in February 2002. The former demining commissioners were removed, a new Demining Commission was created, and the MAC structure was rationalized to include regional instead of entity MACs with key mine action authority vested in the BHMIC. This restructured organization includes new demining commissioners as well as a new manager for the BHMIC, and it is already showing dramatic signs of improvement over the previous organization. Of the \$11m (CAD) contributed to mine action in Bosnia-Herzegovina, \$2.64m (CAD) was spent to improve the capacity of the MACs through six institutional support projects managed by the UNDP. The first project was a contribution of \$650,000 (CAD) in 1998 which included \$500,000 (CAD) to pay for UNDP expenses and \$150,000 (CAD) earmarked to cover incremental costs of deploying five Canadian Forces<sup>17</sup> (CF) technical experts for a 12-month period.

Following that project, the largest single contribution was made through MAC II - a three-year, \$720,000 (CAD) project initiated in December 1998 which provided a \$400,000 (CAD) contribution to the BHMIC Information Department and \$150,000 (CAD) to cover the deployment costs of the Canadian technical experts. The contribution was used to maintain and upgrade the national mine information database and minefield mapping systems. The Canadians provided technical advice and training of local nationals within the BiH and entity MACs in areas such as management, database development and maintenance, prioritization of tasks, quality control, certification of cleared sites, development of standard operating procedures and accreditation of demining organizations. MAC III, MAC IV and MAC V were subsequently approved, providing UNDP with 1 to 1.5 year contributions at decreasing levels from \$500,000 to \$290,000 (CAD)<sup>18</sup>.

<sup>16</sup> Law on Demining in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, February 2002.

<sup>17</sup> These were Canadian Forces (CF) Military Engineers from the Department of National Defence (DND) whose salaries were covered by DND

<sup>18</sup> MAC III's contribution of \$500,000 (CAD) was split into the BHMIC Department of Coordination (\$390,000) and the Information Department (\$110,000), the latter being used for the purchase of additional hardware to resolve serious problems of the network systems. MAC IV's contribution (\$400 000) to BHMIC and the two entity MACs was channelled through the (ITF).

In addition to the contributions to build the capacity of the MACs, there was also a contribution of \$150,000 (CAD) to pay for the salary of a demining Task Manager, Mirgo Saltmiras, for one year who played a key role in establishing a good working relationship between the UN and the BiH government (governmental interrelations experience, consensus building) and was instrumental in bringing about the reform of the Demining Commission. CIDA also funded a UNDP Chief Technical Advisor (CTA), Mr David Rowe who was instrumental in the creation of the new Law on Demining that included the rationalization of the MAC structure. He was also heavily involved in the development of the comprehensive 'BiH Mine Action Plan for 2003' and a 'Demining Strategy to the Year 2010', as well as the promotion of a comprehensive socio-economic impact survey planned and funded (USA/Italy) for 2003.

### *Institutional Support Results - Consistency with Goals*

The results achieved by the projects in institutional support have been consistent with the goal of "improving indigenous demining and institutional capacity". Indeed, taken together the projects resulted in significant and progressive improvements in capacity that have been described as vital in terms of creating the competent national structure that exists today. To assess the magnitude of the results achieved, it is important to have some contextual information. In the first couple of years after the conflict ended, there was no functioning state in Bosnia and UNMACC was set up to coordinate demining operations in the country. As noted above, in 1998 a decentralized national model was created with a BHMAL and two entity MACs. Besides the challenges of creating institutions from scratch, there were many other difficulties and issues to be dealt with. These included; the difficulty of operating between the entities, the testing and accreditation of the organizations performing demining operations, as well as the certification and quality assurance of the clearance work being performed. The lack of regulations and the absence of a framework for quality assurance were central to many problems (including corruption/conflict of interest) and contributed to overall poor quality of services provided by the MAC structure in this critical development area and time frame.

Canadian support was key for the development of the MACs as local institutions to coordinate the national mine action programme. The placement of Canadian technical experts provided not only for necessary technical advice but also for on-job training and building local capacity in key areas. Canadian support in the area of database development, mapping and the provision of hardware was also crucial. The ongoing support provided by CMAP has been widely applauded for its consistency and reliability throughout the period, permitting a degree of confidence and stability vital to such organizations. With the continuous support provided by the CMAP in Bosnia, the capacity of the BHMAL has been greatly enhanced and it has matured into a sound and effective national structure. Indeed, Canadian pressure related to ongoing funding contributed in a significant way to the reform of the Demining Commission, the new Demining Law and the rationalization of the MAC structure. The Demining Law, which passed in February 2002, mandated centralization of responsibility for mine action with the BHMAL thereby ending the competition for areas of responsibility between the BHMAL and the entity MACs.

The capacity of the BHMAL has significantly improved in two key areas: the planning and coordination of mine action, and the development of a regulatory framework. The improvements made in coordination range from the development and implementation of key



information tools (such as plans, detailed maps, task dossiers, survey reports, incident data reports, data collection, existing minefield data updates, clearance completion reports, task threat assessments, etc.)<sup>19</sup>, and the creation of operational systems and procedures necessary to identify, prioritize, execute and monitor action in the sector. Some examples of the latter include: higher efficiency of communication and network systems allowing for an increased level of operations; a management system to simplify accounting and reporting processes; and the consolidation of a system of priority setting based on identified needs and broad national objectives that are endorsed by cantonal, regional and entity governments.

In terms of the development of a regulatory framework, BiH national mine action standards were developed based on an examination of recognized international standards and the experience of various practitioners in the field. These are being used as the basis for standard operating procedures, quality control and certification of cleared areas to guide the work of all NGO/commercial demining organizations operating in the country.

The level of improvement is such that the BHMIC is now fully recognized and has been able to establish good levels of contact with appropriate government bodies, and interested national and international organizations. As noted above, the new Demining Law vested responsibility for all demining operations (including UXO clearance) in the BHMIC and the salaries of the BHMIC personnel are now to be paid by the BiH government as employees of the Ministry of Civil Affairs and Communication. This is a major milestone in terms of ownership and the building of long-term sustainability. The BHMIC is also “responsible for formulating and proposing the national mine action plan, which must be approved by the Council of Ministers” and “will accredit deminers, who must be trained in accordance with BiH standards”<sup>20</sup>. As noted above, this plan, which is now in place for 2003, is being supplemented by a strategic demining strategy to the year 2010. This is an important development and reflects a substantial improvement in the management, planning and operations capacity of the MAC, and will serve to reinforce its importance as a vital government institution in the ongoing process of national reconstruction.

Another key result of the institutional support projects is in the important area of achieving long-term sustainability. The structure is now almost entirely comprised of local staff. Initially the BHMIC had 40 foreign advisers and by the end of 2001 there were only six. Locals who were trained by the Canadians and other donors gradually replaced the international advisors. They are now highly competent and have produced professional and comprehensive planning documents with hopes of realizing an ambitious strategy for largely removing the effects of mines in BiH by 2010. This dramatic reduction in the number of foreign advisers and the acceptance of responsibility for the pay and allowances of BHMIC personnel by the government are strong indicators of long-term sustainability for the institution. These are also good indicators of the cost-effectiveness and the relevance of the improvements made by the CMAP through its consistent support of MAC institution building projects in Bosnia, in spite of a difficult development investment environment. Indeed, the UNDP Resident Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina cited Canada’s long-standing support as key to the successful evolution of this country’s mine action work. This was considered instrumental both in leveraging contributions from other donors and in bringing the demining institutions to the point whereby UNDP has a plan in place to transfer control and funding support for the BHMIC and

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<sup>19</sup> The number and quality of plans and reports produced by the MACs is a good indicator of the improvements made in their planning, management and coordination capacity.

<sup>20</sup> Landmine Monitor Report 2002. ICBL.

the Demining Commission to the Bosnian government.<sup>21</sup> Notwithstanding the foregoing, it should be noted that at the time of writing this report, the BiH government was unable to meet its salary obligations for the BHMAL and had to be assisted by Canada and other donors. This situation is a result of difficult macro-economic issues and is not a reflection on the BHMAL or indeed on the motivation or commitment of the government.

### *Mine Clearance Projects*

Since 1998, the CMAP in Bosnia has included funding support for the implementation of mine/UXO clearance projects. The goals were to “bring stability and normalcy to peoples’ daily lives, permit safe development, encourage the safe return of refugees and facilitate the development of a sustainable indigenous mine clearance capacity”. The total Canadian contribution in this area to date has been \$6.57m (CAD), disbursed through 11 projects that were managed by four different partners and executing agencies, including Handicap International (HI)/Akciija Protiv Mina (APM), Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), the SFOR Engineer Branch/Entity Armed Forces (EAF) and the Canadian International Demining Corps (CIDC). All of the projects involved three phases except for NPA, which only had two.

The contributions varied from a one-year period to 21 months. The largest single contribution was of \$1.43m (CAD) to SFOR. The other contributions were somewhat less, ranging from \$400,000 to \$840,000 (CAD) for the training of mine detection dogs (MDDs), the purchase and operation of mechanical mine clearance equipment, and the provision of specialized equipment for enhancing the capability of demining teams.



**Figure 4. CIDC MDD Team (CIDA file photo).**

### *Mine Clearance Results - Consistency with Goals*

The results achieved by the Bosnian CMAP projects in mine clearance have been consistent with their goals of “increasing security for the people of Bosnia, providing safe conditions for development and the return of refugees, and building sustainable indigenous capacity”. These results are somewhat easier to measure than those related to institutional capacity building, because it is possible to quantify the amount of land area that has been cleared<sup>22</sup>. According to the Landmine Monitor Report (2002), in Bosnia-Herzegovina, during 2000<sup>23</sup> a total of 5,545,005 square metres of land were cleared, and 3,113 mines and 2,675 items of UXO were found and destroyed, and in

2001, a total of 7,111,000 square metres of land was cleared, with 5,797 mines and 3,408 UXO found and destroyed.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>21</sup> DFAIT Report on the Canadian Landmine Fund, “Making a Difference”, 2001-02.

<sup>22</sup> Even though it would be possible to also measure the number of mines/UXO cleared, this is not an accurate measurement of the landmine problem, as even the “perception” of mines still constitutes an impediment/ problem.

<sup>23</sup> Housing accounted for the greatest proportion of land cleared in 2001 (51 percent compared with 47 percent in 2000), agriculture for a smaller proportion (15 percent compared with 20 percent in 2000) and electric power for a lower proportion (7 percent compared with 17 percent in 2000).

<sup>24</sup> According to BHMAL database.

Canadian funding support contributed directly to the amount of area cleared through dedicated contributions to demining organizations such as NPA and APM as well as by the employment of assets made available by Canadian funding support such as MDD teams and mechanical clearance equipment. Indirect contributions include the funding of insurance premiums for EAF deminers operating under the auspices of SFOR and the donation of MDD teams, vehicles and mechanical clearance equipment to the EAF, the BiH Civil Protection Organization, APM and NPA. These contributions enabled demining operations to take place and the funding of insurance for the EAF deminers permitted SFOR to pressure the EAF to also undertake demining operations in accordance with the Dayton Peace Accord. In this project, CIDA contributions support demining operations that are carried out by demining teams from the entity armies of the Federation and the Republika Srpska. The mechanical clearance equipment and MDD teams are important centralized assets for rapid ground preparation, quality assurance and technical survey; however, some problems have been experienced by the EAF in the area of refresher training, maintenance and effective employment of these



**Figure 5. SFOR/EAF Bozena Donated by Canada (CIDA file photo)**

resources. Nonetheless, these assets greatly accelerate the work, and mechanical preparation reduces the danger of manual mine clearance by removing vegetation and tripwires, and by detonating some mines. Solutions currently being investigated include contracting mechanical and MDD services thereby concentrating the EAF effort exclusively in the area of manual demining.

In some projects, the Canadian contribution in terms of area cleared has been quantified.<sup>25</sup> Approximately 106,909 and 110,670 square metres of land have been cleared in 2000 and 2001 respectively by a local NGO, APM (Demining II & III), funded through HI.<sup>26</sup> In addition, the EAF Demining II project<sup>27</sup> reported 896,000 square metres of land cleared in 2000<sup>28</sup>. NPA also contributed with 437,568 and 73,450 square metres of land cleared in two phases of

the Sarajevo Canton mine clearance project. As well, 187,000 square metres were cleared directly by contracted CIDC MDD teams. As can easily be seen, these direct and indirect Canadian contributions comprised a significant proportion of the total area cleared in 2000 and 2001, and the outputs were very comparable to BiH norms.

A more significant measure of impact is the clearance of high-priority land that was not being used because of the risk or perceived risk posed by mines. This is land that is economically

<sup>25</sup> See note 17.

<sup>26</sup> Besides demining, project activities included training of demining teams, community liaison work, mine awareness and administrative capacity building.

<sup>27</sup> The project activities included: (a) mobilization of EAF deminers; (b) a 10-12 month insurance package for all 550 EAF deminers throughout Bosnia; (c) procurement of 3 MDD team vehicles; and, (d) training of an additional six (6) MDD teams for the EAF demining Programme.

<sup>28</sup> This project also contributed to the preparation of 187,226 square metres, which was done by the Bozena fleet donated by Canada.

and/or socially valuable, or essential to the local residents for access.<sup>29</sup> In these terms, the results reported by one of the projects (APM, Demining III) included 6,568 square metres cleared along a road serving a school, 13,425 square metres cleared for agricultural purposes, and 52,746 square metres cleared around 22 houses, power lines and water supply systems in 2001. Another project (NPA, Sarajevo Canton Mine Clearance II) reported land cleared for 35 houses and a local electrical installation. This project alone accounted for 175 direct beneficiaries, and contributed to the return of many more refugees.

The objective of developing a sustainable local capacity for demining has been well served by the CMAP BiH demining projects. The SFOR EAF project is having an increasing impact in terms of the total BiH clearance capacity and in spite of issues such as entity intransigence regarding supplemental (danger) pay, the EAF will no doubt have long-term responsibilities for mine clearance within the state. With the approval of the new demining law, the role of the EAF as BiH's principal long-term demining resource is likely to be consolidated, and should provide for an increase in national ownership and hopefully, a proper funding level by the state and the respective entities. Under SFOR guidance, the EAF demining programme that CIDA has supported since 1999, now represents almost 50 percent of the indigenous BiH mine clearance capacity and last year accounted for a significant part of the clearance output. HI's local partner, APM, is also taking steps to become self-sufficient. After several phases of CMAP funding, it is actively engaged in seeking other donor support and has competed successfully for demining contracts with larger commercial demining firms. Although HI representatives have expressed some concern over management problems and the risks posed by bidding too low for commercial contracts, APM cannot depend indefinitely on Canadian and other donor contributions, and is to be commended for its willingness to become self-sustaining. The HI partnership with APM was terminated in March 2002.

The CIDC project has also made significant progress toward the creation of a sustainable, indigenous MDD training centre. All but one of the training centre's staff are local nationals and the increasing awareness of the value of MDDs has created revenue opportunities that include; contracting-out of MDD team services, the payment of fees by clients for refresher training and re-accreditation, and the lease of facilities for the training and exercising of other canine organizations.<sup>30</sup> The Civil Protection Organization (HELP/EC representative) expressed dissatisfaction with CIDC; however, this was discounted by the BHMAL as the result of a misunderstanding. In all, the CIDC MDD training facility in Trebinje has made significant progress, particularly in recent months, and many of the problems previously reported have largely been overcome. The CIDC MDD teams enjoy one of the best accreditation pass rates in the country. As well, the Trebinje area offers a virtually unbroken training season, the training facilities have been expanded and improved, and the operation enjoys a relatively low overhead. The project addresses gender requirements by the unique inclusion of several women as MDD handlers, and excellent project visibility has been achieved including a National Geographic film segment and project exposure during the Queen's Golden Jubilee visit to Canada. Additionally, the UN and SFOR have recognized the project for breaking new ground by uniting the different ethnicities as students, living and working together on the same course.

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<sup>29</sup> Data from Safe Lane. <http://www.mines.gc.ca/IV-en.asp>

<sup>33</sup> Mine Action Plan of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the year 2003, BHMAL, Sarajevo.

<sup>30</sup> It should be noted that information has recently come to light that CIDC has a significant current operating deficit and this should be taken into account in future MAP programming.

Unfortunately, issues have emerged recently that threaten the long-term viability of the project. SFOR has concerns regarding the willingness and ability of the EAF demining units to maintain and effectively employ their MDD teams, particularly in the Republika Srpska. Part of this problem stems from the reluctance or inability of the entity armies to fund the EAF demining teams to the required level. The impact of the MDD teams has been significant, however, and a suitable solution to the problem is currently being investigated by SFOR and the BHMAL. An even greater issue is a recently announced initiative by the US Department of State in conjunction with the Bosnian Government to build and operate a regional canine training centre (including MDDs) in the area of Konjic in southwest Bosnia.<sup>31</sup> This is apparently planned to be a major initiative costing in the order of \$2m (USD). Construction is planned to begin in early 2003 and the US has committed to fund the first three years of the operation after which responsibility will revert to the BiH Government, Council of Ministers. Interestingly, a Texas-based US company, Global Solutions, is involved as the prime contractor for the Department of State and a suggestion of a collaborative effort with the Canadian CIDC initiative was quickly rebuffed.<sup>32</sup> Clearly this initiative, if it is successful, will seriously threaten the sustainability of the CIDC project. This is unfortunate considering the progress that has been made, the experience that has been gained and the possible benefits of collaboration.

Regarding the future of the CIDC project, MDD training methodologies vary significantly and, in the short term, there will be a continuing need for refresher training and re-accreditation of



**Figure 6. NPA Deminer Clearing Land Near Sarajevo (Credit: NPA/Damir Atikovic)**

the existing teams. The BHMAL strongly supports the CIDC project and indeed have questioned the long-term need and viability of the proposed, US -backed regional MDD training facility. In the short term, it would be prudent to continue residual support for the CIDC project pending an evaluation of the impact of the new regional training centre. In the longer term, CIDC must be encouraged to seek other sources of funding/revenue if they wish to continue their current operation.

An important consideration in measuring the overall success of the above group of demining projects is the excellent safety record they have enjoyed and the low

number of incidents that have occurred. Also very relevant is the degree of difficulty in the projects that have been undertaken. Many of the clearance sites have been in extremely rugged terrain or around badly damaged infrastructure requiring such a labour intensive approach that it becomes unaffordable from the standpoint of commercial companies. This was the case with many of the NPA projects in the Sarajevo Canton and its surrounding villages.

Cost-effectiveness is difficult to assess in these types of projects. Outputs are a function of many factors such as; the degree of difficulty in terms of vegetation, soil type, terrain, debris,

<sup>31</sup> Mine Action Plan of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the year 2003, BHMAL, Sarajevo.

<sup>32</sup> CMAP Evaluation Mission meeting with Mr. John Cohen, US Embassy, Sarajevo, November 21, 2003 and meeting Roger St. John with Mr. Pat Patierno, Director, Office of Humanitarian Demining Programmes, US Department of State, Washington, DC, February 2002.

access, weather and the like, as well as the type of ordnance involved and the mine clearance techniques and equipment being employed. As noted above, NPA working in the Sarajevo Canton encountered very arduous conditions and comparisons from the standpoint of cost-effectiveness would be problematic. In any case, NPA is viewed as a highly effective mine clearance organization that uses an integrated demining approach to increase outputs. Indeed, cost effectiveness can be significantly enhanced by using mechanical systems for ground preparation to ease the task of manual deminers as well as MDDs to complement clearance, survey and quality assurance. The EAF demining units, for example, experienced a 33 percent increase in productivity in 2000 compared to 1999 and similar increases since then due to improved administrative capacity and the use of MDD teams and mechanical clearance equipment. From this, it is obvious that the CMAP-funded provision of MDD teams and mechanical systems to the BiH EAF demining organizations was an effective way to increase mine clearance outputs and provide a concomitant increase in cost effectiveness as well as increasing the safety of individual deminers. While the benefits of these additional resources are well known and have been demonstrated in this project, recent reports from SFOR indicate the EAF are having difficulty maintaining the MDD and mechanical systems due to limited funding, the lack of qualified personnel and the heavy training requirement. Accordingly, full consideration must be given to the high costs of maintenance and ongoing training associated with both MDD teams and mechanical clearance systems, especially for organizations that lack funding and technical expertise. Contracting-in and/or providing these assets from centralized holdings are possible solutions that could be explored.

#### *Mine Awareness Projects*

CIDA's involvement in mine awareness in Bosnia-Herzegovina was through a contribution of \$580,000 (CAD) made to the World Bank mine awareness programme. The contribution was made in 1996, prior to the launching of the CLF and the initiation of the Balkans CMAP. The project funds, however, were not disbursed to UNICEF, the implementing agency, until 1999. The project supported the delivery of 600 mine awareness education sessions and the provision of 6,000 posters, 32,000 booklets, 2,000 notebooks, and 1,000 T-shirts in 100 municipalities throughout all parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina reaching a total population of 40,000 including; 18,000 pupils, 800 teachers and 400 refugees.

#### *Mine Awareness Results - Consistency with Goals*

The mine awareness education sessions along with the distribution of posters and other informative materials reached a sizable population, and no doubt contributed to the saving of lives and the prevention of injury. As well, a formal mechanism was used to obtain valuable participant feedback that assisted in the identification of mine contaminated areas. UNICEF is an acknowledged lead agency in the area of mine awareness and the results are consistent with the goals of "individual security and the provision of safer conditions for returnees". The unresponsiveness of the World Bank as a funding partner, however, is something that must be borne in mind for future programme/project development.

#### *Victim Assistance Projects*

The CMAP contribution in the area of victim assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina was initiated with a contribution of \$70,000 (CAD) to the ITF, for an 18-month project for the

medical rehabilitation of landmine victims initiated in 1998. A subsequent contribution of \$300,000 (CAD) non-CLF money was made to Queen's University for the development of a landmine victims peer-counseling group, including the practical training of technicians in the field. In addition, Queen's University received \$270,000 (CAD) for a subsequent phase of the landmine victims peer counseling for the training of group leaders and local health professionals on issues such as post amputation care, orthotics and prosthetics, psycho-social issues, community and family interaction, job creation (small business training) and the reintegration of landmine victims and other persons with disabilities (PWDs) as productive members of society and the economy. The largest CMAP victim assistance contribution in Bosnia was \$450,000 (CAD) in 2001-2002 to the International Children's Institute (ICI) for its 'Support to Children Victims of Landmines' project. This two-year project aims to identify best practices for improving the physical and psychological care of children who have undergone major medical interventions, such as amputations in the case of landmine victims.

### *Victim Assistance Results - Consistency with Goals*

The results of the victim assistance projects are consistent with their goals of "reintegration of PWDs into the community" and "increasing access for victims to medical and psychological support". The projects also aimed at achieving "greater understanding and support amongst medical staff, family members and/or policy makers regarding disability issues" and increasing "local capacity to deliver psycho-social services to victims".

The ITF project (Z-011414) for the medical rehabilitation of 12 landmine victims was relatively minor at a cost of only \$70,000 (CAD). While the patients received excellent care, the project did not contribute to local capacity development since the patients were treated in Slovenia, not Bosnia. The project did, however, strengthen the collaboration between CIDA and the ITF and had the associated benefit of leveraging additional funding.

Both the Queen's University and ICI projects suffered from growing pains and required careful attention in the early stages to identify and correct some project design problems and other issues such as reporting, management difficulties and insufficient impact. In spite of some resistance by the partners, however, this early intervention by the CIDA team led to significant improvements and ultimately to a very successful outcome for both projects.

The ICI project has gained significant momentum during the past year and appears to have enjoyed remarkable success in recent months. Consultative committees have been established involving representatives from the BiH Ministries of Health and Education. Psychosocial rehabilitation programmes were developed with input from child victims and teachers and health professionals received training in how to deal with children who have been traumatized as victims of landmines or other serious accidents. Some 150 children, who have undergone a major medical intervention, as well as their parents and teachers, have received psychosocial support and relevant training. Facilities have been developed and discussions are underway to provide teachers who can cater to children who are hospitalized for extended periods. This approach has not only helped the children cope but also increased awareness in the community regarding the needs of all children with disabilities. A key measure of the success of this project is its ongoing integration into the existing health care system, and the widespread recognition and support that it is currently receiving in government circles and within the local community as well as from further afield. In this regard, there is now an active interest in initiating similar programmes in Tuzla and Banja Luka, both within the Republica Srpska, and health professionals from Zagreb visited Sarajevo on

November 29<sup>th</sup> to learn more about the programme. This project has taken on a life of it's own and should prosper.

Another good example of relevance and sustainability of results achieved is demonstrated by the peer-counseling programme for victims of landmines undertaken by Queen's University. The programmed trained local group leaders and expanded its capacity to serve all PWDs. Ten groups have been established throughout Bosnia – with an average of 179 people reached per month through more than 100 peer-counseling meetings based on one-to-one contact and some 81 PWDs active in the rehabilitation process. Recent activities have expanded to include women's groups, job workshops, a fashion show to raise funds and a small business project focused on mothers of children with disabilities, to make them more self-sufficient and better able to cope. It is also important to highlight that this project managed to achieve significant results related to changing attitudes towards PWDs. Public figures, health professionals and policy makers have been positively influenced resulting in enhanced understanding of disability issues<sup>33</sup> and support for the equal rights of PWDs including employment and the establishment of a law regarding accessibility. While these latter goals will be very difficult to achieve in the short term, awareness is increasing and progress is being made. In any case, it appears certain that the peer-counseling groups will continue to evolve, facilitating change in society at large and providing support for many more PWDs in Bosnia (estimated at some 10 percent of the population - approximately 250,000 people). Notably, this project involves many PWDs/victims in the areas of leadership, counseling, training and management, including a significant proportion of women.

## **FINDINGS - PROJECT DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION AND REPORTING**

Canadian involvement in mine action activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina predates the Ottawa Mine Ban Convention and the launching of the CLF. In fact, the crisis in Bosnia was one of the key factors that brought the mine contamination issue to centre stage and accelerated Canada's involvement. As noted previously, the advent of the CLF in 1998 precipitated the evolution of the CMAP in the Balkans into a coherent programme, beginning with Bosnia and Herzegovina. See Annex E for a summary of key results presented in matrix form for all of the BiH CMAP projects.

### **Project Design**

The CMAP in Bosnia was established as a responsive programme, based on a balanced approach, that initially emphasized mine clearance operations while still allocating some resources for institutional support, mine awareness and victim assistance. It was a five-year programme with planned disbursement totaling 60 percent of the funds in the first and second year of operations, including immediate support for mine clearance.<sup>34</sup> The programme and project design process was somewhat compressed, due to the need to act quickly because of substantial funding that became available with the announcement of the five-year, \$100 million CLF in early 1998.

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<sup>33</sup> The Deputy Minister of Health and Social Affairs of the Republica Srpska stressed the importance for the ministry to participate in the process of policy change to meet the needs of PWDs. Media coverage through television, newspapers and radio has also enhanced awareness and influenced the attitudes of the public.

<sup>34</sup> Interview conducted with David Mueller, November 2002.



As noted, the initial phase of the Balkans CMAP concentrated exclusively on Bosnia and Herzegovina. The process began in early March 1998, with a CIDA/CEE Branch high-level feasibility mission that assessed needs, identified potential partners and projects, and defined the probable scope of a mine action intervention in BiH. A subsequent project-planning mission, led by the CEE programme officer, was conducted in June and focused on direct liaison with key partners and executing agencies, the definition of likely projects, and the establishment of planning and design parameters including project goals, duration and funding lines. This was followed by a few months of detailed project design, planning and approvals and the results were quite good in spite of the crisis-nature of the compressed planning and programming process.

In order to accommodate the short planning window, the initial CMAP projects in Bosnia and Herzegovina resulted from proposals put forward by organizations active on the ground in 1998. Fortunately, these included partner organizations with extensive experience in the region and a solid background in mine action such as the UNDP, ITF, CARE Canada and SFOR, and executing agencies with a proven capacity in specific areas of mine action such as HI, Queen's University, ICI and NPA<sup>35</sup>. All of these organizations had been operating in the region for some time and possessed a sound understanding of the local environment and the most pressing needs. The design process certainly benefited from the experience of these organizations in establishing realistic project goals and objectives (achievable within the project timeframe) and, particularly, in setting up monitoring mechanisms to identify risks and quickly respond to problems. This early design support no doubt contributed to the success of the individual projects.

The CIDC MDD training initiative was perhaps the only example of a project designed by an organization with limited experience in the field.<sup>36</sup> Despite some significant early problems in getting established, the results achieved by this project indicate growing competence and ultimately the appropriateness of its design. Another anomaly was the mine awareness project funded through the World Bank. As noted in the previous discussion, this project was conceived in 1996 and was later included under the umbrella of the Balkans CMAP. Accordingly, it was not designed as part of the package of projects initially included in the Balkans CMAP but was subsequently implemented by UNICEF and managed as part of the same programme.

The design approach used in the first round of projects was successfully replicated by CIDA and the executing agencies in subsequent phases of the projects, as well as for new projects. This flexibility at the programme level allowed for these agencies to build on their own experience, maintain necessary momentum in their operations on the ground and mature their projects to achieve the intended results.

**Finding 1.** Mine action is a specialized area of expertise and the process of project selection, design and planning, especially on short-notice, would have benefited from guidance in the form of basic planning principles or a framework for mine action programming.

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<sup>35</sup> The NPA is a good example of a world-class organization. It consistently trains well qualified demining personnel, uses an integrated approach for mine clearance (manual, dogs, and mechanical), has a very strong safety record and apart from the management team, is entirely staffed with Bosnians.

<sup>36</sup> CIDC's experience included involvement in a mine survey project in Mozambique.

**Finding 2.** The selection of experienced and competent partners and executing agencies was a major factor in the success of the CMAP in BiH.

**Finding 3.** To be successful in project selection and design, the programme officer must be familiar with the area of operations, understand the local issues and have the opportunity for direct personal contact with the intended partners and executing agencies, i.e., an early field visit is indispensable.

### **Project Implementation**

For the purposes of this discussion, project implementation covers the full spectrum of project execution including planning, day-to-day management, monitoring and accountability. In general terms, the BiH CMAP was very well managed by CIDA, its partners and executing agencies. Canadian efforts have been universally applauded and the vast majority of recipient organizations have praised the consistency, reliability and flexibility associated with CIDA's CMAP funding contributions. Particularly appreciated is the relative lack of strings or caveats that are associated with many donor contributions. This aspect was applauded by several of the organizations that were visited during the evaluation.

Project implementation and management are directly impacted by project selection and design. The selection of experienced, competent and committed partners, and executing agencies as noted above, was a major factor in the largely successful implementation and management of the CMAP projects in Bosnia. With a few exceptions, the projects have progressed smoothly and good results have been achieved.

**Institutional Support.** There were several BiH institutional support projects that benefited from a strong partner relationship and were coordinated on CIDA's behalf by UNDP. On a cumulative basis, these projects had an enormous impact and were virtually problem-free from the standpoint of implementation. The funding of key technical personnel such as the current Chief Technical Advisor (CTA), David Rowe, produces results out of all proportion to the investment. The provision of Canadian Forces technical experts, and hardware for mapping and database development were also particularly useful. This approach takes advantage of a unique Canadian competency, is very cost-effective and quickly builds sustainable indigenous capacity in the critical area of mine action coordination, management and planning. This is an area where Canadian CF and private sector expertise could be tapped by CIDA in terms of in-kind contributions. Indeed, the institutional strengthening of the BHMIC that was supported by CIDA created marked improvements in local staff capacity that has allowed the reduction of foreign technical advisors from initially around 40 to six at the end of 2001 and only one by the end of 2002. The formal and on-the-job training brought local staff to the point whereby they have articulated a realistic strategic plan supported by the government and donor community that aims to rid the country from the effect of mines by 2010

**Finding 4.** In the Balkans, the UNDP is a proven partner in the area of Institutional/MAC support.

**Finding 5.** While not as visible as mine/UXO clearance or victim assistance, institutional support builds local capacity and will probably have a more important and far-reaching impact in ridding the country of mines/UXO. Canada didn't shy away from supporting this area, as other donors did, and its consistent investment is now paying off.

**Finding 6.** Certain development areas such as institution building may require the commitment of consistent funding over a significant period of time to achieve effective and sustainable results. Canada has been applauded for its reliability and consistency of support in this key area and it is widely agreed that this has been a major factor in the emergence of the CROMAC, BHMAC and the UNMACC (Kosovo) as sound institutions.

**Finding 7.** Partnering with the DND/CF is a cost-effective and constructive approach that CIDA used to good effect in the Balkans CMAP to tap vital technical expertise in mine action, including the CF Mine Information Centre. This expertise should be exploited more formally in terms of CIDA and DFAIT development-related mine action programming.

**Finding 8.** Canadian niche expertise in the development and implementation of mine action programmes should be utilized by way of in-kind contributions. This can take the form of CF technical experts or private sector resources that are retained on standing offer agreements for emergency situations or through normal contracting procedures when sufficient time is available.

**Mine Clearance.** In the area of demining, both the NPA and HI/APM projects were relatively problem-free in terms of implementation. Some management problems within APM caused concerns in 2001/02 but these were resolved without significant project disruption. In previous assessments, APM was criticized for being unable/unwilling to become more self-sufficient, however, since its partnership with HI terminated, APM has managed quite well as a self-



**Figure 7. APM Mine Clearance - Sarajevo (CIDA file photo)**

sufficient NGO, having acquired some key contracts and additional international donor funding. This project served Canadian interests by promoting mine clearance in the SFOR/CF contingent area of operations and by the development of local, indigenous mine clearance capacity. NPA has consistently produced good results: it has outstanding management, the Norwegian government funds its overhead, and all but one of its BiH employees are local nationals, including several women. Accordingly, both of these projects made a valuable contribution to BiH mine action sustainability and achieved the goal of providing safer conditions for locals,

returnees and future development.

The SFOR/EAF projects were instrumental in pressing the BiH and entity governments to become more proactive in the development of a significant national mine/UXO clearance capacity within Bosnia and Herzegovina. This effort, however, has not been without difficulties. In fact, at the outset, the EAF participated only under duress. It is noteworthy that the payment by Canada and Norway of the insurance for deminers eliminated their only reason for not complying with the Dayton Agreement. With the CIDA-funded provision of mechanical equipment and MDDs, and the perseverance of SFOR, the outputs have increased dramatically. Problems that have been experienced include: short staff rotations in SFOR (six-month duty tours), non-payment of danger pay by the entities causing low morale, and

difficulties in the maintenance and effective utilization of mechanical and MDD assets. On the plus side, the new law on demining formalized the role of the EAF deminers and the BHMAL views this as an important national resource that will become key to the sustainability of the new strategic demining plan. Furthermore, the EAF demining was viewed as, “among the most successful, as this contributed directly to CIDA and DFAIT goals such as supporting SFOR, providing alternative skills to former combatants, democratization of armed forces, peace building, and confidence and security building. It also contributed to progress in the field of mine action by showing that former militaries can work to the highest (humanitarian) standards and be competitive in the mine clearance business.”<sup>37</sup>

Most problematic in terms of implementation has been the CIDC MDD Training Project. MDD training is a complex business that requires good training facilities, reasonable weather and strong staff, not to mention the need to select good quality dogs and handlers. The project was initially established in northwest Bosnia in the area of Bihac but training site problems and weather dictated a move to the southwest in the area of Trebinje. This move caused considerable disruption and delayed the production of MDDs and handlers. Inadequate management, poor productivity, high staff turnover and poor communications exacerbated this disruption. Recently, however, the organization has stabilized and shown marked improvement in all areas. Locals have virtually taken over the operation in BiH. In fact, there is now only one Canadian in the project, the Chief Instructor, who is running the Croatia project and only visits Trebinje periodically. Although some challenges remain, communications and reporting have improved, and the organization is now generating revenue through MDD (Blue Team) contract work, facility rentals, and refresher training/re-accreditation fees. Also, according to the BHMAL, the CIDC MDD teams currently have the highest MDD accreditation rate in the country and they strongly endorse the CIDC organization. Indeed, the project has resulted in the development of significant local expertise and is close to being self-sufficient. Unfortunately, the USA-BiH regional dog training centre initiative poses a distinct threat to the continued viability of the CIDC project. Notwithstanding this, however, there will be an ongoing need for the CIDC MDD Training Centre to provide services for the refresher training and re-accreditation of the EAF/Civil Protection MDD teams and nominal support should be provided to ensure this capacity continues to exist. In the meantime, CIDC project staff needs to consider all options available to build self-sufficiency; for example, focus on contracted MDD services to the BHMAL, EAF, CROMAL and other mine clearance organizations.

**Finding 9.** Proven partner organizations like NPA should be selected for funding dedicated to mine/UXO clearance. NPA in particular, has vast and proven experience in mine action, a positive policy on gender issues, a strong record of sustainable capacity building and no overhead funding component.

**Finding 10.** Care must be exercised in the selection of projects to develop local mine clearance NGOs. A plan to develop self-sufficiency and well-defined exit strategy must be included at the front end to prevent creating an all-or-nothing funding dependency.

**Finding 11.** Supporting the development of humanitarian demining capacity of national military elements can be tricky from philosophical, security and practical perspectives. It must be considered on a case-by-case basis and not be

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<sup>37</sup> CMAP Evaluation, Questionnaire Response, DFAIT Mine Action Team – Alison Clement, Programme Coordinator, et al Mine Action Team, DFAIT-MAECI.

discounted out-of-hand. With the proper conditions in place, it can constitute a major contribution in capacity building.

**Finding 12.** Canadian-based mine action organizations such as CIDC, will invariably experience difficulties establishing complex projects in remote or far-away locations. Careful project planning, clear output goals, constant monitoring and timely interventions are the keys to successful development of Canadian 'niche' expertise and the related local indigenous capacity. If the development of Canadian capacity is a complementary goal, then the additional investment in project design and management effort may well be worthwhile. It must be remembered, however, that sufficient lead time must be allowed, a clear exit strategy must be defined, risks such as the proposed regional MDD training facility must be thoroughly assessed, and the balance between achieving the most cost-effective results and developing Canadian capacity must be carefully weighed.

**Mine Awareness.** The mine awareness component of the BiH CMAP was a carry-over from a project initiated in 1996 through the World Bank. While reasonable results were ultimately realized through UNICEF, the project was flawed from a design and implementation standpoint. As a CIDA partner, the World Bank was unresponsive and considerable delay was experienced in initiating the funding for UNICEF and the achievement of results. Accountability problems were also experienced in terms of identifying the total disbursements. UNICEF is a recognized leader in mine awareness/MRE, and a direct partnership and funding arrangement would have been more suitable. In terms of mine awareness project selection and design, however, it is advisable to confer directly with UNMAS/UNDP and the responsible MAC, to ensure that any proposed project is valid, coordinated with other initiatives, properly targeted, consistent and conforms with established priorities. Finally, mine awareness is a normal component of demining and should be included as an output goal for reporting purposes for all CIDA – funded mine/UXO clearance projects. This would help to identify the true extent of CIDA's contribution in this important area. It is noted that NPA, CIDC and APM have routinely conducted mine awareness training as part of their demining operations.

**Finding 13.** The selection and design of mine awareness projects should be informed by advice from UNMAS/UNDP, UNICEF and the responsible MAC.

**Finding 14.** Funding for mine awareness should be direct to a major partner such as UNICEF or ICRC for a clearly defined project including identification of the executing agency (e.g. local NGO) and the expected results or output goals.

**Finding 15.** The complementary mine awareness activities undertaken by demining organizations funded by CIDA, should be clearly identified as output goals and included in project reporting.

**Mine Victim Assistance.** The Balkans CMAP victim assistance projects in BiH took considerable perseverance to overcome slow start-ups and other difficulties, but have generated excellent results. A nine-month funding delay in Z-020036, Queens' Peer Counseling project threatened successful implementation. This resulted from key issues identified in an evaluation of the first phase that needed to be addressed prior to moving forward on phase II. In any case, the ICI Support to Child Victims and the Queen's Peer Counseling projects have matured to achieve a high degree of sustainability, excellent reach and quality outputs. They have strongly addressed the crosscutting gender theme, heightened

public awareness of the needs and rights of PWDs, and tapped resident Canadian niche competencies. As noted previously, the ITF project was relatively minor in scope and did not improve local capacity although it did serve to strengthen collaboration with CIDA and the associated leveraging of funds.

**Finding 16.** Victim assistance is an area where it appears Canada can make a valuable contribution. A comprehensive listing of Canadian institutions with niche competencies in psychosocial and physical rehabilitation should be maintained and considered when planning future mine action development initiatives.

**Finding 17.** The benefit of leveraged funding through the ITF must be weighed against project management requirements; however, in most cases process was efficient and resulted in significant matching contributions that often augmented specific CIDA initiatives.

**International Donor Cooperation / Leveraging of Funds.** " Canada has enjoyed close cooperation with the Slovenia-based International Trust Fund (ITF) for Demining and Victim Assistance. The ITF was announced in March 1998 at the "Workshop on Mine Action Coordination" held in Ottawa. While the ITF undertakes its own mine action programming, it also acts as a flow-through mechanism to allow donors to double their contribution through a matching fund. This fund established by the United States totaled \$14M (USD) in FY 2002/03. The matching funds may not often be directed to the project in question, but to other mine action projects that are selected according to ITF criteria.

The ITF has an executive office based in Ljubljana, Slovenia and is run by a Management Board comprised of seven members (three from Slovenia, three from BiH and one from Croatia). It also has a 22 member Board of Advisors made up of 19 donor and 3 SEE states. This Board meets semi-annually and Canada's representative is the DFAIT Ambassador for mine action, presently Mr. Ross Hynes.

The ITF organizes and finances demining activities and the rehabilitation of mine victims in South East Europe. Initially established to support programming in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ITF has since expanded its operations to include Kosovo, Croatia, Albania, Macedonia and Serbia-Montenegro. The ITF's programming activities for 2002 included: demining (76%), mine victim assistance (4%), support to MAC's (7%), regional activities (8%) and landmine impact surveys (2%). In 2002, the key ITF programme country recipients were Bosnia and Herzegovina (39%) and Croatia (40%).

Following the creation of the ITF, Canada and Norway were the lead countries to indicate their support for the ITF by the commitment of important donor contributions. Of the \$20M (CAD) disbursed over the past five years by CIDA's Balkans CMAP, five contributions have been channeled through the ITF totaling \$7.5M (CAD), thereby activating dollar-for-dollar matching contributions. Of that amount, over half of the CMAP Bosnia amount (\$6M) was channeled via the ITF. The ITF charges a three percent administrative fee for donor's flow through contributions.

For Canada, there are three compelling reasons to make a contribution to the ITF: (1) it provides the opportunity to double the size of financial contributions to mine action in South East Europe; (2) it encourages incremental progress in the area of regional cooperation on mine action in the Balkans; and (3) it helps to further integrate Slovenia into the global mine action community.

Canada, along with other donors, has sought to have the matching funds that are released by its flow through contributions earmarked to related Canadian projects. Until recently, this has met with little success; however, this initiative is welcomed by CIDA's key partners in the region such as UNDP and should continue to be pursued as an objective of the programme. Notwithstanding this, Canada has enjoyed a very cooperative relationship with the ITF and recently it was learned that \$2M (CAD) worth of matching funds was utilized in 2001 and 2002 to support mine action projects also supported by the CMAP. As well, efforts are currently underway to formalize this collaboration by including a written clause in future flow through funding agreements with the ITF that will stipulate that a portion of the matched funds will be directed towards projects supported by CIDA's Balkans CMAP.

**Finding 18.** A sizable proportion of the total CMAP contributions in the Balkans have been matched by the ITF resulting in a significant increase in the development assistance benefit for the people of the region. This and other forms of donor assistance collaboration are valuable mechanisms for realizing greater results and cost-effectiveness for projects that support Canadian development objectives and goals.

### **Project Reporting**

Results are important but it is also necessary to have a reliable monitoring and reporting system to capture and document not only the quantity but also the quality of results. The reporting found in the CMAP in Bosnia varies from well established reporting frameworks and high quality reports to an obvious lack of knowledge of Results Based Management (RBM) and cases in which the partners have not been able to set up effective management and reporting systems. Examples of the first include NPA and HI, whose quality of reporting was consistently excellent. The quality of reporting by the UNDP has been variable at times but overall has been good to excellent. The reporting by CIDC, however, was sub-standard, and reflected a general lack of attention and poor administration. This deficiency was brought to the attention of CIDC on several occasions, including during annual monitoring missions and lately CIDC reporting has improved.

In any case, project reporting is the one area where there is room for improvement. It is necessary to fine tune aspects related to establishing appropriate goals and indicators related to those goals. For example, in cases where a project involves training (e.g. training of MDD), it is important to make a distinction between primary and secondary objectives. While training of MDD teams will ultimately have an impact in terms of area cleared of mines, the primary objective is enhancing the capacity of the teams. Therefore, it is more important to collect indicators directly related to the capacity that is to be developed such as recruitment, failure rate, number of dogs trained and certified and the like. Also, in cases where the objective of the project is related to capacity building, measuring the results would also be enhanced if the stages of development (knowledge-systems, policy development, organizational change, local improvement) were captured and translated into a results-chain.

It is also important to acknowledge that some indicators are going to be difficult to obtain and special effort will be required during the project design phase to develop clear and concise output goals with unambiguous reporting indicators. A good example relates to victim assistance programmes and the difficulty of acquiring information disaggregated into victims in general versus mine victims. This further applies if information is required to indicate the

impact broken down by age and gender in terms of all aspects of mine action and the reporting of outputs that include discrete information in these key areas.<sup>38</sup>

Finally, some frustration was expressed by a few BiH CMAP partners with the amount and complexity of reporting required for CIDA-funded projects. While the flexibility of the funding was applauded, organizations such as UNDP, UNMACC and NPA complained about the time required to complete the required reports. Efforts should perhaps be made in the project design phase to streamline MAP project reporting.

**Finding 19.** CIDA MAP project reporting should be simplified and key information requirements need to be clearly indicated. It is important to identify at the outset what information must be reported as well as the required format and frequency. Key information like gender statistics, quantified outputs or impact areas such as refugee returns or restored land use, need to be clearly specified.

## **FINAL CONSIDERATIONS – BiH CMAP**

Overall, the CMAP in BiH must be considered as a qualified success. The programme was developed quickly in response to a key government policy and funding initiative, and succeeded due to the careful selection of partners, deliberate planning and consistent monitoring. Some components of the programme, however, suffered growing pains and other projects have a doubtful future related to issues beyond the control of CIDA.

Setting realistic project goals and development objectives was an important element of success in the projects assessed. The establishment of goals and appropriate implementation mechanisms required a sound understanding of the local environment. The project design used in most cases allowed for flexibility and for accommodating necessary revisions. This was an important factor in responding quickly to emerging needs and changing contexts in Bosnia.

Canada's goal was to develop the capacity of national institutions, to coordinate mine action and to encourage the Bosnian state government to take greater ownership of its mine action programme.<sup>39</sup> To that end, Canada made its assistance conditional on evidence of increased BiH ownership and this approach proved successful, although BiH macro-economic difficulties must be addressed to minimize threats to increased local responsibility for mine action.

The landmine contamination problem remains a challenge. Continuation of mine clearance efforts is crucial in a country with such a high level of contamination. In this context, Canada's priority support of institution building and the clearance of high-risk areas combined with some support of mine awareness and victim assistance was appropriate. At this point, effort needs to shift to the socio-economic impact survey and area reduction through technical survey. This will optimize the clearance effort and allow permanent marking of low-risk areas for clearance in the future, with the concomitant and necessary reduction in risk and increase in

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<sup>38</sup> In terms of the crosscutting themes impact on gender and the environment, very little information was available in the CIDA CMAP files.

<sup>39</sup> CIDA Memorandum to the Minister CEE Garceau-Bednar, May 31, 2002.



effectiveness. Canada has made a significant impact and the CMAP projects accounted for a sizable proportion of the overall mine action funding in BiH.<sup>40</sup>

## THE CMAP PROJECTS IN KOSOVO

### OVERVIEW OF KOSOVO PROJECTS AND RESULTS

#### *General Description of Programme*

The UNMACC was established in Pristina, Kosovo on June 17, 1999, and undertook an ambitious and very successful mine action programme that relied on a combination of bilaterally funded and UN-contracted mine action assets. "On December 15, 2001, the UNMIK mine action programme in Kosovo was completed and the MAC that operated as the focal point for all mine action activities in Kosovo since June 1999 was closed."<sup>41</sup> According to the UNMACC final report, all **known** minefields and Cluster Bomb Unit (CBU) strike areas had been cleared<sup>42</sup> and the overall responsibility for mine action was handed over to the UNMIK - managed Department for Civil Security and Emergency Preparedness (DCSEP), Directorate for Civil Protection (DCP). The DCP is now the coordination body for all mine action activities in cooperation with the Public Health Institute (incident data collection), Ministry of Education (mine awareness in schools), Social Welfare (support to mine victims) and the Cadastral Agency (land status mapping). The task of implementing the clearance of any residual mine/UXO contamination was assigned to the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) utilizing mine action teams that were trained by and continue to operate under the tutelage of HI.

The UNMACC demining operations in Kosovo cost approximately \$85m (USD) for the clearance of "more than 32 million square metres of land and the destruction of more than 50,000 mines, CBU bomblets and other unexploded ordnance". Canada's contribution to address the problem included \$1,571,761 (USD) via the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF) between 1999 and 2001.<sup>43</sup> In addition, Canada contributed \$3,200,000 (USD) in bilateral support.<sup>44</sup> Table 6 provides a breakdown of CMAP funding for the projects in Kosovo from 1999 to 2001.

Canadian mine action support in Kosovo began as an emergency programme designed at the end of the conflict in June 1999. When a UN Resolution called for the help of the international community, "Canada was one of the first nations to respond to the declared need for rapid-response mine clearance in Kosovo."<sup>45</sup> Quick response was required to enable the return of 900,000 Kosovar refugees to their homes. This need for action was made more urgent

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<sup>40</sup> Canada's ranking as a donor in UN reports and the Landmine Monitor is derived from limited sources and doesn't account for related contributions in all mine action programme areas. Consequently, these listings must be viewed with caution. This is a problem that CIDA has attempted to address but has met with little success.

<sup>41</sup> Landmine Monitor Report 2002. International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL).

<sup>42</sup> UNMIK, Mine Action Programme, Final Report 2001

<sup>43</sup> According to the Landmine Monitor Report 2002 "The VTF is described as the MACC's "financial backbone;" funds channeled through the VTF totaled US\$9,967,135. The total for 2001 was \$1.18 million. Over half the VTF funding came from donations by European Union countries and Canada.

<sup>44</sup> Landmine Monitor Report 2002.

<sup>45</sup> [www.acdi-cida.gc.ca](http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca)

because the onset of winter would restrict demining operations and greatly increase the misery of the refugees if they could not safely return.

**Table 6. CIDA – Canadian Mine Action Program Contributions in Kosovo, by Project**

	Project No.	Project Title	Budget (CAD dollars)	Executing Agency	Start Date	End Date
		<b><u>Institutional Support to MACs</u></b>				
1	M-0	Canada-Belgium UNMAS Assessment Mission	\$ 75,000	UNMAS	99.06.07	99.11.30
2	Z-020066	Supp. to UNMACC in Kosovo - Data Entry Clerks	\$ 65,000	DND	99.07.30	00.01.31
3	Z-020091	Institutional Support to UNMACC in Kosovo	\$ 500,000	UNMAS	00.01.04	01.01.04
4	Z-020350-001	Canadian Support to the MAP in Kosovo (Institutional Support)	\$ 120,000	UNMAS/ UNMACC	01.03.30	02.03.31
		<u>Sub-Total "Institutional Support to MACs"</u>	<u>\$ 760,000</u>			
		<b><u>Mine Awareness</u></b>				
5	M-0	UNICEF Balkans Regional Program	\$ 200,000	UNICEF	99.06.16	99.11.30
		<u>Sub-Total "Mine Awareness"</u>	<u>\$ 200,000</u>			
		<b><u>Victim Assistance</u></b>				
6	M-010054	Disabled Pop / Landmine Victims Peer Group	\$ 500,000	Queens U.	99.07.15	00.03.31
		<u>Sub-Total "Victim Assistance"</u>	<u>\$ 500,000</u>			
		<b><u>Demining</u></b>				
7	Z-020013	Rapid Response Demining in Kosovo	\$ 530,000	CIDC/ Wolf's Flats	99.07.22	00.01.31
8	Z-020027	Rapid Response Demining in Kosovo	\$ 1,290,000	IDAC	99.07.30	99.12.10
9	M-0	Emergency Shelter & Related Demining	\$ 300,000	CARE	99.08.06	99.11.30
10	Z-020200	CDN. Mine/UXO Clearance Project in Kosovo	\$ 2,200,000	IDAC/NOTRA	00.06.15	00.12.20
11	Z-020350-002	Canadian Support to the MAP in Kosovo (Mine/UXO Clearance, Survey, QA)	\$ 1,680,000	UNMAS/ UNMACC	01.03.30	02.02.28
		<b><u>Other: Int'l. Donor Cooperation/ Leveraging of Funds</u></b>				
12	Z-020233	Int'l Trust Fund for Demining (ITF) – Channelling of Funds II	\$ 15,230		99-12-09	
		<u>Sub-Total "Demining"</u>	<u>\$ 6,015,230</u>			
		<b><u>GRAND TOTAL</u></b>	<b><u>\$7,475,230</u></b>			

Similar to the CMAP in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Kosovo programme also focused on all four areas of mine action, including institutional support, demining activities, victim assistance and mine awareness. This project initiated in 1999 provided a significant contribution to address the mine/UXO contamination problem in Kosovo. All of the projects of the CMAP in Kosovo are now completed and are discussed below.

#### *Institutional/MAC Support Projects*

As noted above, the UNMACC in Kosovo was established at the end of the crisis in June 1999 as the focal point for all mine action activities in the province. Its responsibilities included the accreditation of all mine clearance and awareness organizations operating in the province, along with the planning and assignment of clearance tasks, and quality assurance over all

operations<sup>46</sup>. The MACC also had responsibilities related to the coordination of mine awareness and victim assistance programmes including the collection of mine incident and victim statistics.

The institutional capacity building projects of the CMAP began in 1999, with a very early contribution (\$75,000) to UNMAS to help underwrite an assessment mission to define the scope of the mine problem in Kosovo, identify priority areas for mine action and initiate the establishment of the UNMACC. This was followed by a project (\$76,000) to support the secondment of a CF Military Engineer LCol to provide a critical liaison function between KFOR and the MACC and another project \$65,000, to support the provision of CF technical experts to assist in the development of a mine action database and to train local staff. In 1999, a two-year contribution of \$500,000 (CAD) was provided to enable the UNMACC to conduct surveys in Kosovo to determine the extent of remaining contamination and to conduct quality assurance to verify that clearance operations were undertaken in accordance with established UN international standards<sup>47</sup>. This contribution was channeled through the ITF.<sup>48</sup> Also, a sum of \$1.8m (CAD) was contributed in 2001 to significantly increase the operational capacity of the UNMACC. This funding permitted the UNMACC to contract important specialized centralized assets (MDD, mechanical, manual and EOD) and support specific clearance projects that required additional funding to achieve success.<sup>49</sup>

#### *Institutional Support Results - Consistency with Goals*

The results achieved by the institutional support projects were consistent with the goal of “enhancing the capacity of the UNMACC.” The contributions in 1999 helped facilitate the early definition of the contamination problem, the development of a plan of action and the actual establishment of the UNMACC. Critical UNMACC liaison with KFOR was catered for and resources were provided to establish an effective database and trained staff. The subsequent Canadian contributions provided key resources for technical survey and quality assurance that were greatly appreciated for their certainty and the stability afforded in these important areas. Finally, the operational capacity of the MACC was greatly enhanced in 2001 by the acquisition of Canadian-funded centralized mine/UXO clearance and survey assets that were instrumental in achieving the target of December 2001 for the completion of the UNMIK mine action programme. These centralized assets were described as critical to the ability of the MACC to accelerate the clearance efforts and contend with a broad range of survey, verification, quality assurance and other support tasks that otherwise would likely have delayed the completion or the thoroughness of the mission.

The Canadian institutional support projects played a significant part in the overall success of the UNMACC. The early contributions helped to develop the capacity of the MAC as a professionally competent organization. With only eight UN internationals, seven in-kind internationals and 33 locals, the UNMACC coordinated 1,000 personnel in 17 mine awareness organizations, and mine clearance activities involving an investment of approximately \$85m (USD) by the donor community over three years. This amounts to excellent value for the

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<sup>46</sup>UNMACC. 2001. Final Report on the Z-020350 CMAP in Kosovo Y 2001.

<sup>47</sup> [www.acdi-cida.gc.ca](http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca)

<sup>48</sup> The ITF, established by the government of Slovenia, acted as a channel for international funding in the region, with the benefit that matching funding from the US effectively doubles most donations.

<sup>49</sup> While classified as institutional support, this project was essentially a mine/UXO clearance activity through the provision of centralized assets to the UNMACC to permit flexibility by reinforcing priority tasks. This was similar to the 1999 project Z-20091 Provision of UNMACC Centralized Assets.

donors and the Canadian contribution was praised for its reliability, lack of caveats and timeliness.

### *Mine Clearance Projects*

The CMAP contribution for mine clearance in Kosovo involved approximately \$6m (CAD) for five projects beginning in 1999, implemented by several different executing agencies. The goal was “to contribute to the removal of a key impediment to the return of refugees and displaced persons by clearing priority areas of landmines and UXO” and “to reduce the threat to life and loss of limb.” The projects began with the rapid contracting and deployment of Canadian companies with expertise in ordnance disposal, mine clearance and surveying to assist in the emergency phase in 1999. This was followed in 2000 with the deliberate contracting of a Canadian company to provide an integrated demining capacity and ultimately in 2001 by the contribution of funding to enable the UNMACC to contract specialized centralized assets and reinforce funding of critical clearance projects.

The projects undertaken in 1999 were developed at very short notice in response to a UN appeal for assistance. Only a few weeks were available to assess the requirement, complete project design and contract the necessary resources. In fact, two projects were undertaken simultaneously: Rapid Response Demining in Kosovo I and II. CIDC and the Wolf’s Flat Ordnance Disposal Corp implemented the Rapid Response I project. This project involved funding contributions from CIDA (\$528,000) and DFAIT (\$200,000), and saw the deployment of a mixed, five-person demining/EOD team. In Rapid Response II, CIDA funded (\$1,290,000) the International Demining Alliance of Canada (IDAC) to provide two EOD teams of two persons each, and three demining teams of three persons each plus locally hired and trained deminers. Both projects involved the provision of support teams in the field as well as the



**Figure 8. CIDC/Wolf’s Flat EOD, Operator - Roger Gumbrell (CIDA file photo)**

acquisition of mine clearance, EOD and other support equipment. While some success was achieved, these projects both encountered numerous problems in the areas of management technical qualifications, partnerships and reporting. These projects were ultimately subject to a detailed evaluation.

Consequently, in 2000 CIDA undertook a deliberate and rigorous Request for Proposal (RFP) process to select and contract a Canadian company to provide a fully integrated, self-sufficient mine/UXO clearance organization to be employed by the UNMACC. This process of project design was very inclusive and Kosovo UNMAC and from senior partner

A consortium led by IDAC won this \$2.2m (CAD) contract.<sup>50</sup> The organization was comprised of a management team, two manual teams, two MDD teams and a mechanical (Bozena) clearance team. The project involved nearly 50 personnel, including nine Canadians and 24 Kosovar deminers.<sup>51</sup> The EOD team operated under direct control of the UNMACC and the

<sup>50</sup> The consortium also included NOTRA Environmental Services, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre and Hyaton.

<sup>51</sup> This project has been the subject of much discussion and the difficulties experienced during the implementation phase provided many lessons for CIDA that will be referred to later in this report.

rest of the organization was employed under the designated UN senior partner, Defence Systems Limited (DSL), in the Multi-National Brigade (MNB) South sector in the area of Prizren. Overall, a reasonable degree of success was achieved in terms of outputs but numerous problems were experienced, once again resulting in a detailed evaluation that led to a modified approach to the funding of mine/UXO clearance in 2001.

The Canadian contribution in 2001 consisted of \$1.8m (CAD) to fund the acquisition by UNMACC of specialized centralized assets to enhance its operational capability. This contribution was supplemented by the donation of mine/UXO clearance equipment (\$536,411) that was procured as a part of the previous CIDA projects in 1999 and 2000. This project involved a wide range of support activities including the provision of MDD teams, level I/II survey, EOD teams, and a joint manual/mechanical team for survey, verification, quality assurance and clearance operations as well as the provision of critical institutional support to the UNMACC.<sup>52</sup>

Finally, it must be noted that mine/UXO clearance and survey/verification capacity was a key component of the Y1999-2000 institutional support project Z-020091 that also provided centralized assets to the UNMACC. Outputs for those projects are detailed at Annex E.

#### *Mine Clearance Results - Consistency with Goals*


The results achieved by the CMAP mine clearance projects in Kosovo were consistent with their defined goals of “increasing cleared land for refugee resettlement” and “reducing the threat to life and loss of limb.” As noted above, however, the earlier projects were not without difficulties.

In the first two projects in 1999, it took the contracted organizations considerable time to fully deploy their personnel and equipment, conduct necessary training and prepare for operations. As a consequence, they only became effective late into the demining season and although they achieved reasonable results in the time available, there were enough problems that a technical consultant was engaged to undertake an evaluation of the projects. The evaluation revealed problems in the areas of management, technical qualifications, improper procedures, inadequate reporting and difficulties in partnership cooperation. No doubt, the crisis environment faced by the donors and programmers caused some of the problems. Indeed, the very short lead time led to an ‘emergency’ contracting process that only included very broad terms of reference and resulted in three companies providing two disparate Canadian mine/UXO clearance organizations without a clear reporting relationship or common command structure. This was exacerbated by the difficulty of assembling and deploying the necessary personnel and equipment on short notice into such a far-off location and the general confusion encountered during the initial stages of the UNMACC operation. It is also worth noting that the CIDA programme officer changed just as the emergency phase in Kosovo was beginning. While ultimately a good deal was achieved, the results were not considered adequate and the numerous problems that were identified led to a detailed evaluation and a more holistic planning approach for the CIDA mine clearance contribution in 2000.

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<sup>52</sup> The donation of Canadian mine/UXO clearance equipment, valued at \$536,411 (CAD) included: a mechanical clearance system (Bozena mini-flail); 8 vehicles; a 10-ton truck w/ trailer; a generator; protective mine/UXO clearance suits; detectors; tools; MDD equipment; as well as office, communications, medical and camping equipment.

The RFP development referred to above began in earnest in January 2000, after detailed consultation with the UNMAS and the Manager of the Kosovo UNMACC. The RFP was aimed at selecting a suitable Canadian company to provide an integrated demining capability to be employed by the UNMACC consisting of manual clearance, MDD and mechanical teams as well as a rapid response EOD capability. The objective was to deploy the organization to begin work at the beginning of the demining season in April; however, delays in the tendering and contracting process (including appeals) delayed the contract award until mid-June. Consequently, the selected organization, IDAC, was not deployed until the end of June. While the EOD team commenced operations almost immediately, the manual teams had to be locally hired, trained and accredited, and did not begin operations until the beginning of August. The mechanical clearance equipment (Bozena) needed even longer for delivery, testing and accreditation, and was not operational until mid-August. The MDD teams experienced similar problems and were not operational until the end of August. Once fully established, however, the organization proved to be very effective. The EOD team worked directly for the MACC, and the mechanical and MDD capacity was employed for the most part by DSL in areas of suitable terrain. In the meantime, the manual teams tackled minefields in some of the most difficult terrain in Kosovo and to increase their effectiveness, they employed field camps to support remote sites in order to reduce the amount of time required for travel each day. In the end, the IDAC organization produced very good output results; however, once again the operation experienced problems.



**Figure 9. IDAC Minefield Sites in Mountainous Area Near Brod, Kosovo (CIDA / IDAC file photo)**

The most serious problems involved leadership, technical standards and safety, and could be traced to one individual, the Deputy Project Manager. His unorthodox approach is cited as a factor in two 'preventable' accidents and the MACC's refusal to certify some of the project's clearance results. Interestingly, the UNMACC stressed that the difficulties created by this individual did not overshadow the excellent achievements and contributions of the project. While this did not make the deficiencies more palatable, it did offer some assurance that the overall project design and execution were sound, and underlined the likelihood that the results could

have been outstanding if the contracting process had not been held up awaiting the results of the formal evaluation of the 1999 projects. Indeed, it has been suggested that the lateness of the deployment may have caused some haste on the part of the organization to 'catch up' with their counterparts. It has also been noted that the results achieved by the technical teams in spite of the situation was a strong endorsement of the leadership, professionalism and technical skills of the individual team leaders, most of whom were Canadian. Other problems were experienced including communications, reporting and finances, but these were dealt with promptly and aggressively by the CIDA programme officer, and brought to timely resolution underlining the effectiveness of the project management that was in place at the time.

The problems experienced and lessons learned in the execution of the CMAP Y2000 Kosovo mine/UXO clearance project led to a different funding strategy for 2001. In consultation with UNMAS and the UNMACC, it was decided that all of the specialized demining equipment, vehicles and other equipment amassed by CIDA in the previous two years would be offered as a donation to the MAP in Kosovo. This was to be accompanied by sufficient funding to facilitate the contracting of established mine clearance organizations to employ the equipment as

UNMACC centralized assets. Ultimately, this permitted the MACC to greatly accelerate the final phase of clearance by supporting various organizations with specialized assets, increasing survey and verification capacity and facilitating innumerable small clearance tasks. This Canadian donation is cited as “the decisive factor in enabling the MACC to complete the objectives in 2001, in that it was the funding source for the majority of MACC centralized assets. In fact, the ability of the MACC to directly control the centralized assets through UNOPS contracts versus the situation that exists when the organizations are bilaterally funded was a significant contributing factor in the success that was achieved.”<sup>53</sup> It is also worth noting that part of the Canadian contribution was channeled through the ITF. Significantly, the matching funds were used to contract additional assets that enabled clearance of an additional 527,394 square metres and destroyed a total of 1,699 mines. This represents 28 percent of



**Figure 10. Bozena Donated by Canada.**  
(CIDA file photo)

the mined area cleared and 22 percent of the mines found and destroyed during 2001.<sup>54</sup> In all, the 2001 project has been hailed as a resounding success and a very important contribution by Canada. While some problems were cited, such as delays in finalizing the donation of the Canadian equipment, these are overshadowed by the good results. Another beneficial result cited on behalf of the Canadian contribution is the fact that the equipment donation was multiplied in effect by its further donation: the mechanical clearance equipment was passed on to the Albanian MAP; some equipment was passed on to the South Lebanon MACC; and the bulk of the assets were passed to the DCP for

subsequent use by the KPC mine action teams throughout Kosovo. This can be viewed as an important contribution in terms of the development of sustainable indigenous capacity as well as improving the capacity in other mine-affected areas.

As noted above, results in mine clearance were also achieved with the 1999-2000 institutional support project Z-020091, contribution provided to the UNMACC that was in turn used to fund a company called Mine Tech. This funding enabled the company to provide MDD teams as a MACC centralized asset to support a number of organizations including NPA, Danish Church Aid (DCA), HI, DSL and the HALO Trust. This resulted in a total of 101 hectares of land cleared of 768 mines and 6 items of UXO. Mine Tech also cleared 61 minefields and conducted survey tasks on a further 76 areas to verify or discredit the presence of mines. The land cleared through this contribution provided access to prime agricultural and grazing land along with access to the main water reservoirs for two towns.

### *Victim Assistance Projects*

The CMAP in Kosovo provided a victim assistance contribution of \$500,000 (CAD) to Queen's University for the implementation of the 'Disabled Population and Landmine Victim Assistance Project'. Similar to the BiH CBR initiative, this project involved expanding the capacity of 10 existing community-based rehabilitation centres operated by the 'Association of Disabled People in Kosovo' (HANDIKOS). Also, a number of activities were conducted to strengthen the

<sup>53</sup> UNMACC Final Report on the Z-020350 CMAP, Y2001, December 12, 2001.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid ....

capacity of existing centres including the provision of several educational sessions<sup>55</sup> in Kosovo and Albania, client assistance and educational sessions in south-western Kosovo<sup>56</sup> along with activities related to health care policy development and advocacy.

### *Victim Assistance Results - Consistency with Goals*

The project results are consistent with the stated goal of “strengthening the quality and scope of existing services for the disabled.” The project contributed to the well being of persons with disabilities at the community level. These people realized an improvement in their mental and physical health as well as a marked improvement in their overall quality of life. This was achieved through improving the skills of rehabilitation workers and increasing the scope of services available. The enhanced capacity of HANDIKOS enabled participation of the disabled in all levels of the development and implementation of activities promoting the rights of disabled persons. The profile of disability issues and public awareness has also been raised with input being provided by Queen’s ICACBR to assist in the drafting of a world Health Organization (WHO), Health Care Policy. The actual impact of this project on the disabled population, however, was very difficult to quantify. The bulk of information available was from project performance reports and previous interviews with project partners. The project has since terminated and no one was available to seek input from during the recent field mission. One should be able to assume, however, based on positive results of the Queen’s ICACBR project in Bosnia that equivalent results were achieved.



**Figure 11. Primary School Mine Awareness Training, Sojeva, Kosovo (Credit: ICRC/Diffidenti)**

### *Mine Awareness*

Canada supported various projects in south eastern Europe that were intended to broaden the awareness of the general population and refugees in target areas including Kosovo, regarding the dangers posed by landmines and UXO. These regional programmes were generally coordinated by UNICEF and involved local NGOs. The aim in Kosovo was to sensitize local populations by supporting information sessions in schools, refugee camps, villages and community centres. In Kosovo, the project produced 400,000 mine/UXO warning posters and leaflets that were distributed through local NGOs and government institutions, and three TV/radio spots. As well, UNICEF conducted a study to better understand the attitudes and behaviour that resulted in mine/UXO accidents.

<sup>55</sup> This included: three 5-week educational Programmes delivered to 50 HANDIKOS personnel; 3 seminars for rehabilitation professionals from Pristina Hospital and various community clinics (50 participants); and 16 classes focusing on care of war and landmine victims taught to 100 physiotherapy students at Pristina Medical Secondary School. It also included activities in Albania; a 3-day education seminar for rehabilitation staff held on CBR principles and clinical physiotherapy techniques.

<sup>56</sup> ICACBR staff worked in southwestern Kosovo with caseworkers from ICRC and other NGOs. Activities included, 15 seminars with NGO CBR workers (241 participants), 62 client site visits and 48 case conferences to review challenging cases (240 participants).



### *Mine Awareness Results - Consistency with Goals*

As this was a multilateral, regional programme, no detailed results were available to the evaluation team. In general terms, however, UNICEF was the lead agency for the mine awareness effort in Kosovo and the overall results were rated as excellent. Mine awareness was a component of all clearance operations and UNICEF assisted the efforts of 17 different organizations operating in support of mine/UXO clearance activities.

UNICEF also supported the Department of Education with the delivery of school programmes, as well as assisting in the implementation of a UNMACC exit strategy programme known as operation 'Normal Life'. This programme was undertaken to ensure that local communities were aware of and satisfied with the clearance work completed in their areas, to advise on residual dangers, reinforce awareness and indicate how to obtain assistance after the departure of the MACC. Notwithstanding the lack of details, Canada's contribution was no doubt instrumental in terms of facilitating the very effective mine awareness programme that was undertaken in Kosovo.

## **FINDINGS - PROJECT DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION AND REPORTING**

Because of the need to respond quickly with a programme in response to the UN Resolution and request for mine action assistance, the CMAP in Kosovo was somewhat unique. The project definition and design phase was quite compressed and consequently was very reactive in nature. See Annex E for a summary of key results presented in matrix form for all the Kosovo CMAP projects.

### **Project Design**

It must be noted that the initial Kosovo CMAP project design was undertaken in a crisis environment. Consequently, it was significantly abbreviated and was further complicated by external requests and the Canadian Government's position regarding the utilization of Canadian resources. UN requests precipitated support for a mission to define mine action requirements that ultimately led to the establishment of the Kosovo UNMACC. Follow-on institutional support was approved in the form of CF technical experts for database development and an in-kind CF contribution to provide for critical UNMACC liaison with KFOR. Emergency demining support was accomplished by the selection of Canadian companies in an abbreviated contracting process that provided only broad terms of reference. Finally, mine awareness was supported through funding of UNICEF on a regional basis and victim assistance was addressed through a Queen's CBR project that was split between BiH and Kosovo, and built on previous success. It is also noteworthy that the CIDA programme officer changed in June 1999 and the new programme officer was faced with a very steep learning curve as a result of the emergency response requirement and had no opportunity to visit the area or meet with potential project partners. However, a humanitarian assistance officer was deployed in 1999 and did work on behalf of the bilateral programme.

Because of numerous problems with the rapid response demining projects in 1999, a more deliberate project design process was adopted to provide an integrated mine clearance capability to support the UNMACC in 2000, and take advantage of CIDA purchased mine clearance equipment, vehicles and supplies from the 1999 projects. A comprehensive RFP was developed in consultation with UNMAS and the UNMACC in Kosovo. As described earlier, however, although considerable success was achieved, the contract was late being

awarded because of unavoidable delays and the project experienced several problems. Consequently, a new design approach was adopted for 2001, which entailed the provision of critical centralized mine clearance assets for the UNMACC. This project included the donation of CIDA-purchased mine clearance vehicles, specialized equipment and supplies. The design of this project was customized to satisfy critical UNMACC requirements and achieved outstanding results<sup>57</sup>.

Institutional support to the UNMACC was also provided in 1999-2000 with a significant project that included a major funding component for the provision of specialized mine clearance assets. The design of this project was driven by the UNMACC and significant success was reported.

- Finding 20.** Institutional support is a niche area where Canada through the use of CF or private sector technical experts and organizations with niche capabilities, can make an important contribution. Mechanisms should be established to monitor these resources, coordinate short-notice availability (e.g. through MOU's or standing offer agreements) and facilitate ongoing mine action liaison between CIDA, DND and DFAIT.
- Finding 21.** Normal Canadian government contracting processes are not suitable for rapid response or emergency mine action situations. As well, CIDA programme officers have limited capacity beyond their normal workload to handle rapid project design, contracting, implementation and the demands of hands-on contract management. For emergency situations, CIDA should focus on institution building and any support of mine/UXO clearance; mine awareness or victim assistance should be through established organizations. As noted above, however, the provision of Canadian resources in niche areas could be facilitated by the use of Standing Offer Agreements to achieve timely, cost-effective and efficient response.
- Finding 22.** While Canadian private sector mine/UXO clearance capabilities do exist, they are somewhat limited and should not be contracted without special care in the definition of the scope, terms of reference and deliverables in the tendering process. It is also important to obtain the input of a mine action technical expert to assist in the development of RFP and contract documentation.
- Finding 23.** Deliberate contracting utilizing a comprehensive RFP requires sufficient lead-time. Experience has shown that at least six months is required from the start of project design/RFP preparation to contract award including the possibility of appeals. It should be noted, however, that the timeliness of contracting certain niche capabilities could be facilitated by the use of Standing Offer Agreements.
- Finding 24.** For larger, more complex projects involving Canadian resources, as was done with the 2000 IDAC demining contract, a careful needs assessment and detailed input into project design is required at the outset from the supported agency– in this case UNMAS and the UNMACC.
- Finding 25.** Direct, untied funding of the UNMACC in Kosovo to acquire critical centralized assets by in-theatre contracts was very effective, however, this approach may not

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<sup>57</sup> UNMIK – Final Report on the Z-020350 CMAP in Kosovo Y2001 dated 12 December 2001.

be transferable to other situations based on the capabilities of the MAC to let and oversee contracts, availability of suitable resources, local laws and the like. Direct funding contributions for national MACs to let contracts for centralized resources or demining activities must be very carefully considered due to often questionable or non-existent contracting regulations, the likelihood of preferential selection and the lack of management control.

**Finding 26.** The extension of existing projects such as UNICEF mine awareness and Queen's Victim Assistance was an effective way to cover these important areas of mine action on short-notice, with experienced and effective partners.

**Finding 27.** Changing of key CIDA management personnel should be avoided during periods of heightened/emergency response. If unavoidable, however, MAP planning principles and technical expertise would be beneficial.

### **Project Implementation**

During the emergency phase, CMAP project implementation in Kosovo was impacted by the general confusion that marked the first six months of the UNMACC mine action efforts. The early institutional support projects were timely and very effective in helping the UNMACC get established, define a mine action plan and coordinate the activities of numerous clearance and awareness agencies in the midst of a tight security situation and a crush of returning refugees. The later institutional support projects in 2000 and 2001 were well-contrived and managed throughout their implementation with UNMACC as the partner and solid executing agencies like Mine Tech and DSL.

The mine awareness project coordinated by UNICEF was regionally based, well-managed and produced reasonable results as far as can be determined. The mine victim assistance project, likewise produced fair results that mirrored its parallel project in BiH and did not present any management or reporting problems to speak of.

The greatest project implementation problems for the Kosovo CMAP were generated by the emergency demining projects in 1999 and the integrated mine/UXO project that was planned and implemented in 2000. The problems are discussed above, however, the two projects in 1999 suffered from short-notice and poorly defined contracts resulting from urgency of the situation and the crisis nature of the programming and project development process. The contracted personnel and equipment were late in arriving, and poor leadership, a flawed organization, poor technical skills and faulty management exacerbated this. The 2000 project was much better designed but suffered from unavoidable contracting delays, late deployment, poor leadership and on-site management, and a poor safety record. Some of the problems such as late contracting and deployment were beyond the control of the executing agency but the overall implementation of these projects was poor.

In the end, reasonable results were achieved<sup>58</sup> and many valuable lessons were learned. Indeed, the 2000 Kosovo mine/UXO clearance project was an ambitious undertaking and despite the problems, the outputs were credible, cost-effective and beneficial. The project paved the way for the UNMACC centralized assets project in 2001, demonstrated the effective

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<sup>58</sup>Willing to Listen: An Evaluation of the UN Mine Action Programme in Kosovo 1999-2001, the Praxis Group Ltd, Riverside, Geneva, 12 Feb 2002.

use of remote support camps and provided a set of environmental guidelines (SOPs) for mine/UXO clearance operations. Also on the positive side, it demonstrated Canadian capabilities in the mine/UXO clearance arena such as, rapid response EOD, MDDs, mechanical mine clearance, and the training of deminers, that should be considered in future programming. Finally, the CIDA management of these projects was diligent including aggressive and timely trouble shooting, and problem resolution. CIDA's project management involved monitoring missions to the field as well as detailed project evaluations by technical experts<sup>59</sup>. CIDA post personnel in Pristina provided invaluable support in the management, coordination and evaluation of these projects.

**Finding 28.** Early familiarity with the area of operations, frequent monitoring, annual field visits and ongoing close scrutiny by CIDA post personnel are indispensable elements of successful project implementation.

**Finding 29.** The Y2000 Kosovo CMAP integrated mine clearance project demonstrated significant Canadian niche mine action capabilities such as rapid response EOD, MDDs, mechanical clearance, QA and the training/supervision of deminers, that should be surveyed by CIDA and considered for future interventions.

**Finding 30.** The RFP format used for the 2000 Kosovo mine clearance project should be considered as a draft model for future niche programming of this type.

**Finding 31.** The mine action 'development' approach currently used by Norway, the United Kingdom and the USA, should be reviewed by CIDA for methodologies that may be suitable to the Canadian context, such as streamlined contracting or government funding through an implementing agency or NGO such as NPA.

**Finding 32.** The 'environmental SOPs' developed for the Y2000 Kosovo CMAP mine clearance project have been adopted by UNMAS as a technical note to the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) to define environmental protection protocols for all mine/UXO clearance operations. This beneficial result follows from Canada's leadership in the area of environmental protection and the need to undertake impact assessments for Canadian overseas development projects.

### **Project Reporting**

As for Bosnia, the Kosovo CMAP projects varied significantly in the quality of reporting. The UNICEF mine awareness project was regionally based and only reported outputs in terms of products produced and distributed. The Queen's victim assistance project, likewise reported on programme services delivered but did not provide statistics on total beneficiaries let alone any disaggregation by gender or other categories.

The projects in direct support of the UNMACC were very well reported on and the MACC also supplemented reporting by the Canadian demining organizations that were generally deficient in this area. Reporting during the emergency phase was difficult but the 2000 project had well defined reporting requirements that were not adhered to.

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<sup>59</sup> CIDA RZE Kosovo Y2000 Mine/UXO Clearance Project – Evaluation, November 5 to 20, 2000.

**Finding 33.** Partners and executing agencies expressed frustration with CIDA's complex and demanding project reporting requirements. Accordingly, CIDA reporting requirements should be reviewed and streamlined in the context of exceptional working conditions.

## **FINAL CONSIDERATIONS – KOSOVO CMAP**

Considering the emergency nature of the project development for the CMAP in Kosovo, the results achieved are very reasonable and the lessons learned are invaluable. CIDA's response to institutional support requests was timely and effective, reflecting a useful partnership with DND that should be maintained. The un-tied funding of the UNMACC permitted strong centralized assets to be acquired that greatly accelerated the overall mine clearance effort, well beyond the outputs that would have been achieved through direct funding of a mine clearance NGO or contractor; indeed, the \$1.8M (CAD) funding in 2001 was viewed as a lifeline that facilitated the successful completion of the mine/UXO clearance in the province. The extension of regional projects to provide specialized mine action support in Kosovo was also an innovative and effective approach to a short-notice requirement. Finally, important lessons were learned from CIDA's foray into contracting Canadian mine/UXO clearance capabilities. CIDA should review the approach to mine action programming used by key allies such as the United Kingdom, USA and Norway with a view to defining a Canadian approach that builds on key areas of expertise and a resource base of niche competencies. Again, these are countries that have innovative approaches that are worth examining such as crisis contracting and a government sponsored NGO such as NPA.

## **THE CMAP PROJECTS IN CROATIA**

### **OVERVIEW OF CROATIA PROJECTS AND RESULTS**

#### *General Description of Programme*

According to the Landmine Monitor Report, 2002 "during the conflict in Croatia, mines were laid mainly to protect defensive positions on the lines of confrontation, which changed frequently, and also in areas of strategic importance, for example, along railway lines, and around utility installations such as power stations, and pipelines".<sup>60</sup> Minefields and areas suspected of being contaminated with mines and UXO are located in 14 of the 21 counties of Croatia", totals an estimated 1,700 square kilometres<sup>61</sup> of suspected mined area in 2001, of which "it is thought that only a percentage is actually contaminated" by some 500,000 mines.<sup>62</sup> The affected area potentially consists of: "infrastructure, 236 square kilometres (14 percent); agricultural areas, 566 square kilometres (33 percent); houses and yards, 87 square

<sup>60</sup> Landmine Monitor Report 2002. International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL).

<sup>61</sup> According to the Landmine Monitor Report 2002, the affected area was estimated at 4,000 square kilometres in 2000. "It has been explained that the reduction resulted from general survey activities, systematic and more precise development of the County Mine Action Plans and multi-criteria analysis.... Technical survey was conducted on 82,078,884 square meters.... The area has been further reduced as a result of continued and intense general survey activities, additional information submitted by the Croatian Armed Forces, Special Police and county administrators."

<sup>62</sup> Landmine Monitor Report 2002. International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL).

kilometres (5 percent); economic infrastructure, 82 square kilometres (5 percent), and pastures, meadows, and forests, 29 square kilometres (3 percent)<sup>63</sup>. When compared to Bosnia, the situation is considerably better because all of the 14 mine affected counties have been provided with precise danger area maps and as noted previously, the worst contamination is confined to the four former Serb enclaves (UNPAs). Approximately \$26.4m (USD) was spent to fund mine action activities in 2001.<sup>64</sup> It is noteworthy that **78 percent came from Croatian State funding** with the bulk of the remaining amount (approximately \$5.8m USD) coming from international donor agencies.<sup>65</sup> Canada is a significant donor with contributions via the UNDP Trust Fund and the ITF.<sup>66</sup> The CMAP in Croatia is also a peace building and security initiative and as with the programme in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it includes projects covering aspects of mine action in the country.<sup>67</sup> This 2.5 year, \$2m (CAD)

**Table 7. CIDA – Canadian Mine Action Program contributions in Croatia, by Project**

	Project No.	Project Title	Budget (CAD dollars)	Executing Agency	Start Date	End Date
		<b>Institutional Support to MACs</b>				
1	Z-020337-001	CMAP/ Support to UN-CROMAC Transition Program	\$ 300,000	UNDP	00.11.06	03.12.31
2	Z-020337-002	CMAP/ CROMAC National Managers & Middle Managers Training & Development	\$ 30,000	UNDP	00.11.06	03.12.31
3	Z-020337-003	CMAP/ CROMAC Communications, Database & Management Coordination	\$ 185,000	UNDP	00.11.06	03.12.31
4	Z-020337-004	CMAP/ Support to CROMAC Survey & QA Depts.	\$ 450,000	UNDP	00.11.06	03.12.31
		<u>Sub-Total "Institutional Support to MACs"</u>	<u>\$ 965,000</u>			
		<b>Mine Awareness</b>				
5	Z-020337-005	CMAP/ Mine Awareness Program	\$ 60,000	UNDP	00.11.06	03.12.31
		<u>Sub-Total "Mine Awareness"</u>	<u>\$ 60,000</u>			
		<b>Victim Assistance</b>				
6	Z-020337-006	CMAP/ Victims Assistance Program	\$ 170,000	UNDP	00.11.06	03.12.31
		<u>Sub-Total "Victim Assistance"</u>	<u>\$ 170,000</u>			
		<b>Demining</b>				
7	Z-020337-007	CMAP/ CROMAC Survey, Verification Pjcts.	\$ 300,000	UNDP	00.11.06	03.12.31
8	Z-020337-008	CMAP/ Support to NPA's Demining Progr.	\$ 148,000	UNDP	00.11.06	03.12.31
9	Z-020339-002	Mine Detection Dog Training II	\$ 350,000	CIDC	01.03.01	02.05.31
		<u>Sub-Total "Demining"</u>	<u>\$ 798,000</u>			
		<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>\$ 1,993,000</b>			

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid

<sup>65</sup> According to the Landmine Monitor Report 2002, these contributions come from the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, and Norway (via the UNDP Trust Fund); the United Nations Associations of the UK and USA, and Adopt-A-Minefield, for demining; the European Commission (via the ITF); Switzerland; and, the USA (via the ITF), among others.

<sup>66</sup> A donor conference "Humanitarian Demining – Support to the National Mine Action Programme in the Republic of Croatia" on 24 September 2001 was co-organized by the government, CROMAC, World Bank and UNDP.<sup>[48]</sup> The main reason for the conference was the closure of the World Bank Loan Programme and the need to find new ways of financing mine action. Present at the conference were 150 people from 34 countries. Donations (USD) were announced by the United Kingdom (\$250,000), Austria (\$80,000), Norway (\$504,000), Japan (\$317,311) and INA oil industry (an office building for CROMAC).

<sup>67</sup> Canada's development assistance to Croatia is also broader and concentrates on economic and institutional transition with several areas of emphasis including; health, policing, human rights, government administration and the development of NGOs.

programme is a significant contribution and places Canada as one of the key donor countries in this area (see Table 7). CMAP's contribution aims at strengthening CROMAC institutional capabilities through funding in the areas of training and development, equipment and the support of technical surveys for area reduction. Mine victim assistance and mine awareness programmes are also supported along with equipment acquisition (mini-flail, protective suits, marking and fencing equipment). In addition, CMAP has also provided support for the establishment of a Croatian MDD training facility implemented by CIDC.

As noted previously, the CMAP in Croatia is a fairly new programme. It was initiated in 2000 as a result of the state elections and the advent of a more moderate and cooperative regime in Zagreb. It is therefore early to assess the progress made in some of the projects, particularly at the outcome and long-term sustainability levels.

### *Institutional/MAC Support Projects*

The Government of Croatia established CROMAC in 1998 to be responsible for managing all mine action programmes in Croatia. Prior to that, mine action coordination was carried out by a UNMACC established in 1996. With the creation of CROMAC, the UNMACC "changed its name to the UN Mine Action Assistance Programme (UNMAAP), and until December 2001 when it was dissolved,<sup>68</sup> it supported the CROMAC in a capacity-building role"<sup>69</sup>.

Of the total CMAP funding in Croatia, \$1.7m (CAD) was allocated to improve the capacity of CROMAC through multi-year institutional support projects managed by the UNDP. The implementation of five projects that began in November 2000 involved contributions ranging from \$30,000 to \$450,000 (CAD) for a two year period including; the UN/CROMAC transition programme (\$300,000); development and delivery of training to managers (\$30,000); automation and office equipment (\$185,000); support to Survey/QA Departments (\$450,000); and survey and verification projects (\$300,000).



**Figure 12. MV-3 Donated to CROMAC by Canada (CIDA file photo)**

### *Institutional Support Results - Consistency with Goals*

The recent CMAP evaluation field mission clearly confirmed that the CROMAC institutional support projects are consistent with the goals of "improving indigenous demining and institutional capacity". While some of the projects are in the early stages and final results are yet to be reported,<sup>70</sup> a great deal of progress has been made in the development of CROMAC. Indeed, a recent evaluation of the UNDP project that supported the development of the

<sup>68</sup> During 2001 its functions included: assistance in interpreting and introducing IMAS into the Croatian mine action system, assistance in planning and prioritization including socio-economic impact factors, and liaising with the international community in raising funds for mine action.

<sup>69</sup> Landmine Monitor Report 2002.

<sup>70</sup> These include Z-020337-001 (\$ 300,000 Support to UN/CROMAC Transition Programme), Z-020337-002 (CROMAC National Managers Training and Development) and Z-020337-007 (\$300,000 CROMAC Survey, Verification Projects).

CROMAC concluded, "CROMAC has now developed into one of the most – and possibly the most – successful national mine action coordination centres anywhere in the world."<sup>71</sup> In this context, the Canadian contributions to the institutional support of CROMAC are significant. In fact, some of the projects have served to directly address some of the institutional shortfalls identified in the above noted evaluation report. For example, the evaluation cited the need for improvements to general assessments and technical surveys with emphasis on area reduction, and this was directly addressed by Z-020337-004 & 007, support to CROMAC survey and verification. Also detailed was the need to develop and apply international standards and improve county, regional and national planning processes. These requirements were addressed by Z-020337-002 & 003, support to the development and training of national mine action managers and improved automation and office equipment, including the provision of equipment for a Decision Support System (DSS) for enhancing communications and database coordination.<sup>72</sup> Also, the support to CROMAC's Survey and QA Department included the purchase of a mini-flail (MV-3), protective equipment for deminers, marking and fencing supplies, and MDDs. These contributions greatly improved the technical survey and area reduction capacity of CROMAC. The mini-flail has proven useful for verification and area reduction work. It has been used extensively to support the construction of a highway to the coast that is important to the tourist industry and commercial traffic from Zagreb to Zadar. As well, tangible results have been achieved through the development of the DSS including the development of sound mine action priorities based on the definition of social, political, economic, safety, legislative and environmental parameters to drive operational planning. This system has also been used to accelerate the reduction of suspected areas thereby greatly increasing transparency and cost-effectiveness of clearance operations.

Overall, the projects have been highly successful in achieving their primary aim of developing a sustainable indigenous mine action capacity and their secondary aim of reducing the threat that mines/UXO pose to the country. Only one project has experienced difficulty and it involved the provision of protective equipment for deminers –embarrassing delays were experienced in the replacement of helmets furnished by Med-Eng of Ottawa. In any case, CROMAC is now at a point where it is mostly self-sufficient and sustainable. In broad terms, the capacity building efforts have: increased the competence of the Croatian staff in the technical aspects of mine action; increased the competence of the Croatian staff in general management and administration; and developed a sustainable national system to address the mine action issue within Croatia.<sup>73</sup>

### *Mine Clearance Projects*

Support for mine clearance has been provided by the CMAP in Croatia through the implementation of a MDD training project. The goal is "enhanced personal safety for deminers, residents and visitors in the area". The MDD project was partly funded by Belgium and Austria and is being undertaken by CIDC by building on their experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The purpose of the project was to assist CROMAC in the establishment of a local MDD training and evaluation facility, and the development of a national programme. The project started in March 2001 and was supposed to be completed in May 2002. Delays have occurred based on a number of factors including the unsuitability of the selected Croatian partner

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<sup>71</sup> Joint Evaluation Mission, Review of the UNDP Project "Support to the Croatian Mine Action Centre" (Projects CRO/00/001 & CRO/00/Q01, Report Dated – 16 October 2001)

<sup>72</sup> This project included training on new database applications.

<sup>73</sup> Joint Evaluation Mission, Review of the UNDP Project "Support to the Croatian Mine Action Centre" (Projects CRO/00/001 & CRO/00/Q01, Report Dated – 16 October 2001)



organization, unusually bad weather and poor candidate selection. While a detailed MOU was signed that defined the partnership responsibilities, the Croatian company (PHD) would not live up to its obligations and CIDC had to make up the shortfall by creating a training facility and recruiting candidates. The project should be completed by early 2003.

### *Mine Clearance Results - Consistency with Goals*

While considerable progress has been made, this project has not, to date, achieved the intended results. A suitable MDD training facility has, however, been established including good kennels, support infrastructure and equipment as well as the necessary training sites (boxes). The facility is in the area of Skabrnja, near the city of Zadar. There are currently 10 MDD with handlers undergoing training and graduation/certification is tentatively scheduled for the end of February 2003. Except for the MDD training and testing facilities, there obviously has been no capacity added to the resources of CROMAC and consequently, no "enhancement to the personal safety of deminers, residents and visitors to the area."

However, the project will deliver up to 10 MDD teams early in 2003 and the training facilities will be available to support the refresher training and accreditation requirements of CROMAC MDD teams.<sup>74</sup> What remains to be seen is whether the Croatian government and CROMAC will honour their commitment to take over the programme and if they are capable of building a sustainable national MDD programme. This must be considered in light of the fact that the project does not, at this point, include a 'train-the-trainer' component due to the termination of the Croatian partner's involvement. Other complicating factors include the forthcoming creation of a regional canine/MDD training facility in Bosnia, variations in training methodology, the question of state or donor funding, and the future of CIDC in the region. In fact, it is too early to tell if the intended objectives will be achieved and whether this project will result in a sustainable indigenous MDD training capacity.

### *Mine Awareness Projects*

A CMAP project was used to fund a needs assessment survey for communities living in mine suspected areas and to prepare a Croatian mine awareness needs assessment report. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) undertook this UNDP project at a modest cost of \$80,000 (CAD). The final report was completed in May 2002 and was subsequently translated and distributed to all key stakeholders in the Croatian mine awareness sector.<sup>75</sup> The project funding also permitted the production of some mine awareness materials as well as the funding of a small mine awareness project in the form of a play that will be performed in schools by a local theatrical group.

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<sup>74</sup> Croatian infrastructure for Mine Detection Dog training include: the initial construction of training facilities and kennels near Novigrad, Croatia, relocated (in Dec. 2001) to Skabrnja-Zadar and Pridraga respectively, with training areas that comprise 81 training and testing boxes occupying 8,100 square metres with an overall area of 11,000 square metres, seeded with 100 AP mines, 12 AT mines and 5 pieces of UXOs; the establishment of a Croatian office with a national administrative assistant, and communications tools; and procurement of project vehicles.

<sup>75</sup> An Assessment of Mine Risk Education Needs in Croatia, GICHD, Geneva, May 2002.

### *Mine Awareness Results - Consistency with Goals*

There is every indication that the results of this mine awareness project will meet or exceed expectations in terms of, “reducing the number of preventable mine incidents and improving long-term donor enrolment.”

In fact, the project is well on its way to achieving its expected results and will no doubt have a significant and lasting impact. The "Mine Awareness Needs Assessment Report" is already being used as a strategic planning tool to coordinate scarce mine awareness resources, for the development of programmes and to guide programme delivery. Improved collaboration has already been realized between the key stakeholders, the Croatian Red Cross<sup>76</sup>, the Ministry of Education and CROMAC. The long-term focus of the report is to encourage and enable a new array of planning, priority setting and implementation strategies. These will in turn contribute to a higher level of programme concentration with a view to maximizing impact and donor cognition. The report will no doubt be used as a strategic planning tool for years to come, which underlines the positive capacity building and sustainability achieved by this project.

This project is a good example of achieving results that are both relevant and cost effective. It was a relatively low-cost undertaking that will have a disproportionate impact and useful complementary projects were achieved with the remaining funds. This needs assessment will enhance the overall performance of mine awareness programmes in Croatia and will no doubt precipitate more donor funding. Obviously, it is an important contribution to saving lives and preventing the loss of limbs in Croatia.

### *Victim Assistance Projects*

The CMAP mine victim assistance project in Croatia funded a comprehensive victims survey



**Figure 13. Mine Victim (Credit: John Rodsted)**

and the completion of a “Mine Victim Needs Assessment Report.” The Centre for Disaster Management and the Croatian Association of Mine Victims (CAMV) undertook these important projects. The survey was also expanded by CROMAC and CAMV into a complete database of mine victims that provides information about the current status of individual. The funding also provided for the conduct of physical and psychosocial workshops for mine victims, one for children and one for adults. These were held at a seaside hospital complex known as the Rovinj Centre where the wing of a building was renovated to accommodate the workshops. The workshop’s curriculum has been refined and plans have been made to conduct four children’s workshops in 2003, each of three-weeks duration and involving 20 candidates.

Madame Plestina, the wife of the Prime Minister and a Special Mine Action Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs is currently the force behind this project. She has apparently

<sup>76</sup>The Croatian Red Cross is the principal implementer of mine awareness in Croatia.

leveraged additional funds (USA) and plans are being made to expand this project into a year-round, regional and perhaps, international, mine victims/PWDs rehabilitation centre.

#### *Victim Assistance Results - Consistency with Goals*

The "Mine Victims Needs Assessment Report" and the victim's database will serve as important strategic planning and decision-making tools for all issues, programming needs and support related to the rehabilitation, care and reintegration of mine victims. It will also assist in raising public and government awareness of the needs and rights of the disabled, particularly in the areas of employment and accessibility. The survey, report and mine victim database are sustainable results, as they will serve the long-term needs of the disabled population and continue to have a positive impact for years to come.

The Rovinj rehabilitation workshops offer many tangible benefits to participating children and adults. Although only twenty-four landmine victims have benefited from these workshops to date, the potential exists to expand this initiative. The participants are furnished an opportunity to overcome trauma, and to gain confidence and self-esteem through music and sports. These results are consistent with the project goals of "advances in mine victim's quality of life and raised expectations of future economic opportunities," and of "increased level and quality of care for Croatian mine victims".

In addition, the project also serves the secondary goals of "long-term management by the Croatian health system and the Union of Institutions for Disabled Persons," "informed decision-making as concerns Croatian mine victims" and "representational advocacy on behalf of Croatian mine victims." This has been facilitated to a large degree by the involvement of Madame Plestina who has embraced the cause and is raising both funds and awareness. Unfortunately, the large-scale expansion of the project into a year-round regional centre for mine victims does not appear to be well thought out or sustainable. While capital funding can likely be secured, no sponsor or implementing agency (government/NGO) has been identified, professional staff requirements have not been addressed, and no source of long-term operations and maintenance funding has been secured. As well, the need has not been quantified nationally, regionally or from further afield. On the other hand, the current workshop initiative would benefit from a limited expansion in order to serve more victims and their families. This would provide relevant and cost-effective results in a sustainable programme framework. The large expansion envisaged, however, seems overly ambitious and is not likely to be sustainable without significant donor support or government intervention.

### **FINDINGS – PROJECT DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION AND REPORTING**

The CMAP in Croatia is modest by comparison with Bosnia or Kosovo. This reflects the relatively late start of the programme for the reasons noted above as well as the fact that the Croatian government has demonstrated an impressive degree of ownership of its mine problem. State funding makes up the majority of mine action spending in Croatia: CMAP funding was focused on addressing deficiencies identified in the UNDP institutional capacity development project, "Support to the Croatian Mine Action Centre."

## **Project Design**

In terms of design, the projects funded by the CMAP in Croatia were consistent with the programme's balanced approach and together they represented a complementary package addressing all areas of mine action. Once again, the UNDP was a valuable partner in the area of institution building, suggesting projects with maximum impact, sustainability and cost-effectiveness. Project design was easily facilitated and the positive results are reflected in the glowing assessment of the CROMAC in the UNDP project evaluation.<sup>77</sup> The capabilities of national managers have been enhanced and a broad range of other tools and equipment has been introduced to significantly improve the planning, management effectiveness and operational capabilities of the CROMAC. The mine awareness and the victim's needs surveys and reports, are valuable strategic tools that will guide policy development, agency coordination and programme delivery for years to come. The victim assistance project generated valuable visibility and coordination through the Croatian mine victims association, and the physical/psycho-social workshops produced good results but the current plans for large-scale expansion are not supportable. Finally, the CROMAC MDD Training Centre project being implemented by CIDC should have been able to simply build on the experience gained in Bosnia. The inability to identify a suitable Croatian partner, output delays and the lack of identified, follow-on funding support raise serious questions about the design and sustainability of this project. As well, the project was undertaken in spite of the ongoing efforts of the mine action community including CROMAC to regionalize activities such as MDD training.

**Finding 34.** Once again, the selection of strong, established partners and executing agencies was a key ingredient in project success. The UNDP has proven to be a valuable and reliable partner in institutional capacity building, particularly in the selection and design of high impact, priority projects.

**Finding 35.** Professional analyses such as a mine awareness needs assessment, the mine victim needs assessment and socio-economic impact surveys and socio-economic impact surveys have great value in guiding policy and programme development, coordinating resources and increasing mine action programme effectiveness. Their value far outweighs their cost and they should be undertaken in the early stages of any mine action programme.

**Finding 36.** Limited expansion of the physical/psycho-social rehabilitation project in Rovinj is justified but the large expansion project outlined during the evaluation field mission by Madame Plestina should be viewed with considerable caution.

**Finding 37.** Due to the intransigence of the Croatian partner, the CIDC project to develop a MDD training programme in Croatia experienced difficulties from the outset. The partner was ultimately deemed unsuitable and while considerable progress has been made, follow-on staffing and funding support have not been identified. As well, the project is threatened by a regional canine training facility that is planned for development in 2003.

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<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

## **Project Implementation**

As for project design, the UNDP has proven to be a reliable and effective partner in guiding the implementation of CMAP-funded institutional capacity building projects in support of CROMAC. These projects all benefited from useful CROMAC input and positive involvement in their execution. The Canadian support was well-acknowledged by CROMAC during the recent field mission and good project visibility has been afforded by Canadian/CIDA flags and logos on donated equipment, in particular, the MV-3 mechanical clearance system. Only one project suffered difficulties and it involved lengthy delays in the supply and delivery of replacement helmets for the deminer protective ensemble (supplied by Med-Eng). The mine victim physical/psycho-social rehabilitation project in Rovinj enjoyed considerable success and a modest expansion of this project planned for 2003 is worthy of support. On the other hand, the proposed major expansion of the programme that includes significant capital costs does not appear to be well thought through or supportable. In addition, it was felt that the Canadian contribution in this area in particular and mine action in general, was not well known or recognized and that better CMAP communication planning and effort are required.

Finally, the CIDC project to develop a CROMAC MDD training programme has suffered significant implementation problems and delays. Key factors in the delay included poor handler and MDD candidate selection and the unsuitability of the proposed Croatian partner organization. Consequently, the programmed 10 MDD teams will not be accredited until the end of February 2003, approximately one-year late. As well, sustainability is in question and a competing regional canine training centre is being developed in Bosnia. On the plus side, the training facility seems to be very good and the MDD teams will add a valuable resource for CROMAC's 2003 demining programme. This project fell short in the key areas of cost-effectiveness, partnerships, appropriate use of resources, and informed and timely action.

- Finding 38.** Close and active collaboration between CIDA, UNDP and CROMAC was the key to the successful selection and implementation of high-impact, well targeted, projects to build the sustainable national institutional mine action capacity needed by CROMAC.
- Finding 39.** The involvement of a high-profile personage such a Madame Plestina had a beneficial impact on the mine victim project in terms of its visibility, impact and obvious success, and her involvement leveraged valuable resources and facilities. On the other hand, her enthusiasm may result in an overly ambitious and unsustainable expansion that must be viewed with caution.
- Finding 40.** CIDC experienced considerable difficulty in terms of achieving established project timelines. Accordingly, CIDA should carefully review the timelines and deliverables of any future CIDC proposals.
- Finding 41.** Major programmes such as the Balkans CMAP must include a communication strategy and plan to better exploit success and respond to any identified media queries resulting from project implementation issues or problems.

## **Project Reporting**

In general terms, UNDP's project monitoring and reporting was viewed as inadequate. This was discussed during the field evaluation mission and it was noted that due to staffing reductions, the UNDP Croatian office lacked the resources to conduct extensive monitoring and reporting. Possibly this situation could be helped to some degree by the use of a more abbreviated reporting format.

CIDC's project reports were consistently of poor quality, lacking in substance, incomplete and often late. Serious problems and project delays were not communicated to the programme officer in a timely fashion and these difficulties were often revealed by other sources. Until recently, similar problems were experienced with the CIDC project in BiH.

**Finding 42.** Abbreviated report formats or additional funding should be considered for organizations lacking the required staff capacity to complete full reports.

**Finding 43.** Funding increments in the form of progress payments or holdbacks may be a suitable approach for organizations that fail to produce satisfactory and timely deliverables such as annual reports. This approach has shown good results in recent dealings with CIDC

**Finding 44.** The delay in the replacement of the Med-Eng protective helmets caused considerable embarrassment.

## **FINAL CONSIDERATIONS - CROATIA CMAP**

The design of the CMAP in Croatia benefited from the experience of the UNDP in orchestrating the CROMAC transition project as well as the active involvement of the CROMAC staff. Of note is the fact that the institutional support projects were selected for their capacity building value prior to the termination of UNMAAP. As a consequence of the UNDP/UNMAAP institutional support project, the CROMAC has matured into an effective national institution with competent and professional staff. It now has the tools such as the DSS, needs assessments and physical assets to coordinate an effective mine action strategy. Area reduction surveys, marking and clearance efforts will be prioritized based on multi-criteria analysis. There is also the likelihood of a socio-economic study to further assist planning and the establishment of priorities. Canada has made a major contribution to this success through the Balkans CMAP and the tailored project funding that was provided. The only questionable project has been the CROMAC MDD training programme undertaken by CIDC. Poor partnership selection, significant delays and sustainability questions indicate poor design and poor implementation, not to mention consistently poor reporting. The victim assistance project produced good results and deserves continued support, however, any large-scale expansion will require a comprehensive plan that includes a Croatian government ministry or equivalent sponsor/implementing organization. In summary, the CMAP in Croatia was well contrived, cost-effective and highly productive from the perspective of sustainable capacity building.

## **BALKANS CMAP – PROGRAMME LEVEL REVIEW**

### **GENERAL OVERVIEW**

From a development perspective, mines/UXO are first and foremost, a humanitarian concern and must be addressed from this perspective. Accordingly, priority in mine action must be afforded to those who are most vulnerable and to reducing the immediate threat to the well being of mine affected communities. Mines/UXO also constitute a major impediment to rehabilitation and sustainable socio-economic development. Therefore, in order to be effective, mine action programmes in countries recovering from violent conflicts should be integrated into comprehensive strategies designed to support humanitarian action, peace building, reconstruction and development.

In countries where the scale of contamination is widespread and severe, and a broad range of support is required, the international community is usually called upon to assist in the development of a national mine action programme. Where mines/UXO present an immediate threat to local populations or an obstacle to socio-economic development, emergency mine surveys, marking and clearance as well as mine awareness should be the principal requirements of the central mine action effort. These are essential to prevent loss of life or injury and allow the beginnings of socio-economic development. An efficient response to the landmine threat also requires government, international organizations, NGOs and civil society to cooperate closely and this dictates the priority development of a strong and technically competent mine action coordination institution. Mine victims also need to be accounted for and supported, and the state of the local health system will define the nature and extent of development assistance required in this area.

### **BALKANS CMAP – CONSISTENCY WITH PROGRAMME GOALS**

Mine action is primarily concerned with assisting people and communities that are exposed to the dangers of mines/UXO. The purpose of mine action is to recreate a safe environment conducive to normal life and development. To this end, the overall objectives of CIDA's Balkans CMAP were to: reduce the threat of injury and death posed by mines/UXO; remove a key impediment to the return of refugees; enable rebuilding to take place; and support the capacity development of indigenous institutions and expertise. To accomplish these goals, the Balkans CMAP was designed to include the key mine action activities geared towards addressing the problems faced by populations as a result of mine/UXO contamination. The programme encompassed four complementary components: mine awareness; mine clearance including survey, mapping and marking; victim assistance; and institution building.

As noted previously, the Balkans CMAP was developed in three distinct phases by country; Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Croatia. This programme development process was in response to local and regional situations/events, however, the overall programme goals remained consistent and were reflected in the selection and design of individual projects. Most of the projects met or exceeded the results expected and in a few areas, CIDA funding produced significant and long-term impacts. This was particularly true in the vital area of institutional support and capacity building. In Bosnia and Croatia, Canada's support was a major factor in the progressive development of self-reliant and competent national mine action

coordination institutions. In Kosovo, CIDA's institutional support projects were described as critical to the success of the UNMACC. CMAP mine awareness and clearance projects protected significant numbers, facilitated returns, and enabled reconstruction and development to take place. And, mine victim assistance projects in all three countries provided vital physical rehabilitation and psychosocial support to victims as well as sustainable capacity in the health and education sectors.

## **BALKANS CMAP – CONSISTENCY WITH CEE OBJECTIVES AND CIDA PRIORITIES**

The Balkans CMAP was designed in the larger context of CIDA/CEE's development assistance strategy which has been constructed along three main axes as a means of securing peace and prosperity in the region: peace building and security (governance); economic cooperation and reconstruction (economic well-being); and social sustainability (social development). As noted above, in seriously mine-affected countries, mine action must be an integral part of humanitarian action, peace building, reconstruction and socio-economic development. In this regard, the Balkans CMAP was designed to support CEEs assistance strategy, and the overall goals of the programme are consistent with CIDA's development priorities and crosscutting themes. This notion is graphically depicted in the diagram at Figure 14. This diagram effectively illustrates how the key components of a mine action plan are related to the components of the development assistance strategy. As discussed above, in countries suffering from severe and widespread contamination, mine action programmes must be undertaken to facilitate humanitarian action, peace building, reconstruction and socio-economic development. The diagram shows how the mine action outputs and their impact results facilitate development assistance and progress in the key areas of the development assistance strategy. The goals and achievements of the Balkans CMAP are reflected in the CMAP activities diagram. The diagram also illustrates how the crosscutting themes of gender and the environment are recognized and served by the CMAP. This is an important dimension and it should be noted that mine/UXO clearance of itself is an important environmental remediation activity. Also, women (and children) make up a significant proportion of mine victims, refugees and displaced populations that are directly targeted by the key areas of mine action, particularly mine awareness, mine clearance and victim assistance. Mine/UXO clearance priorities are also driven by the needs of special groups and moreover, a number of women and PWDs are employed by many of the project organizations funded by the Balkans CMAP.

## **BALKANS CMAP AND CIDA'S "CANADA-IN-THE-WORLD" POLICY**

The CMAP in the Balkans developed in 1998 respects many of the principles and programming approaches outlined in CIDA's new policy statement on strengthening aid effectiveness, "Canada: Making a Difference in the World" (September 2002). Indeed, this consistency may be one of the underlying reasons why the Balkans CMAP has been successful and effective. For example, the Balkans CMAP has consistently focused on the encouragement of *local ownership* and the building of *indigenous capacity* in the four key areas of mine action. The successful development of capable and self-sufficient local national mine action institutions, indigenous demining capacity and local health/support services to victims of landmines have all been hallmarks of the Balkans CMAP. Consistent support in these areas has resulted in substantial progress towards ensuring the local ownership, capacity and sustainability of individual country mine action programmes. In the area of *improved donor coordination*, the Balkans CMAP included significant effort and considerable



success in the coordination of key projects with like-minded donors thereby reducing risk, avoiding duplication and greatly increasing the overall impact of the Canadian programme. *Country focus* is another principle that applies to the Balkans CMAP. Although the programme does not include any of the nine identified CIDA focus countries, the Balkans CMAP has followed the principle of geographic concentration. The programme was concentrated in only three of the seven Balkans countries/provinces, and in future it will have a single country of focus, Bosnia and Herzegovina. From the outset, the programme also adhered to the principle of *untied aid*. During all phases of programme design and implementation, partnering with multilateral, international or foreign organizations was readily undertaken if it was assessed that project effectiveness and results would be improved. In terms of *results based management*, the Balkans CMAP included regular and thorough of monitoring throughout its implementation as well as prompt and detailed evaluations of specific projects when the need was identified. Finally, with respect to CIDA's six priority development sectors (health, HIV/AIDS, education, child protection, agriculture, and private sector development), the Balkans CMAP either directly or indirectly addressed four of these areas. These were: *health*, through its landmine victim assistance projects and overall savings to the health care system through prevention of injury etc; *child protection*, through the provision of a safe and secure post-conflict environment for children; *agriculture*, by restoring agricultural land to production; *private sector development*, through the rehabilitation of public and private sector infrastructure, utilities and services, and some local private sector capacity development in demining.

## **FINDINGS – PROGRAMME DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION AND REPORTING**

As noted previously, Canada and CIDA's involvement in mine action in the Balkans predates the Ottawa Convention and the advent of the CLF. A CIDA contribution was made to a World Bank mine awareness programme in 1996 as part of a regional economic revitalization project. The linkages between development and security issues were becoming more apparent and it was clear that for the region to develop, the landmines issue needed to be addressed.<sup>78</sup>

The Ottawa Convention was signed in 1997 and the resulting CLF apportioned \$10m (CAD) for mine action in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This resulted in a BiH MAP assessment mission followed by a design mission consisting of staff from DFAIT, DND and CIDA in June 1998. After extensive consultations with other donors and with several organizations operating on the ground (including the UNDP, NPA, SFOR, Care Canada, HI and the Mines Advisory Groups/UK)<sup>79</sup>, the Canadian team produced a conceptual design for a programme. The product was a responsive programme based on an integrated approach which emphasized mine clearance operations heavily, while assuring some resources for institutional support, mine awareness and victim assistance, also perceived to be important complementary elements of the programme. It was a front-end loaded, five-year programme with the disbursement of 60% of the funds in the first and second year of operations, and it included immediate support for mine clearance.


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<sup>78</sup> According to Stephen Wallace, former Director of the Balkans Programme in CIDA-CEEB, the creation of the Peace Building Fund was based on the same principles.

<sup>79</sup> Some of these organizations formed the international coalition (6 NGOs) that allied with the Government of Canada to push the Ottawa Convention forward.

**Key Agency Development Result:**  
Economic Well-Being  
 “Equitable economic growth and improved standards of living for the poor”

**Figure 14. CMAP Results Relationship to CIDA Development Objectives and Priorities**



The success of this initial phase of the Balkans CMAP was due in large measure to the strong partner organizations that greatly assisted in project selection and design. The UNDP guided the key institutional/MAC support projects and CARE Canada was instrumental in the selection of good projects and strong partners in the area of victim assistance.<sup>80</sup> The collaborative relationship between Canada and Norway led to mutual cooperation, and the use of NPA as a valuable partner and executing agency in mine/UXO clearance of high-value areas in the Sarajevo Canton.<sup>81</sup> HI was also a strong partner in the development of APM as a local demining NGO. Unfortunately, the CIDC projects did not include a strong and experienced in-country partner. This is believed to be a major factor in terms of the delays and difficulties that were encountered with the MDD training projects. Finally, the SFOR EAF demining project has produced good results over time but has suffered problems due to SFOR military staff turnover. The subsequent phases of CMAP design included the emergency response requirement in Kosovo in 1999 in response to UN appeals and the more deliberate design of a programme for Croatia in 2000.

**Finding 45.** The CMAP in the Balkans was consistent with most of the programming principles defined in CIDA's recent policy statement on strengthening aid effectiveness, "Canada: Making a Difference in the World" (September 2002).

**Finding 46.** The design of the initial phase of the Balkans CMAP (BiH) was greatly assisted by the CEEB project design mission including DFAIT and DND representation, as well as by input from experienced partners such as UNDP.

**Finding 47.** The formal interaction of DFAIT (Mine Action Team), CIDA (Mine Action Unit) and key programme officers, and DND/NDHQ (J-3 Engineer Branch/Mine Information Centre) on a routine basis would be useful for sharing resources, information, contacts and lessons learned that would aid in programme planning.

The design of the Kosovo programme included a deliberate focus on mine/UXO clearance and institutional support. While the institutional support projects were very successful and vital to the success of the UNMACC, the Canadian Government's choice was to contract Canadian companies for the provision of emergency mine action response. Due to the crisis situation, however, there was little or no time available for proper programming or project design. Also, because of the urgency and resulting time constraints, these companies were engaged using an abbreviated process, the contracts were vague and inadequate, and the results were unsatisfactory. This situation was not helped by a coincident change in the programme officer. The mine awareness and victim assistance projects achieved good results and uniquely, they were extensions of projects being undertaken by experienced organizations elsewhere in the region. The follow-on projects in Kosovo built on successes and included an innovative attempt to contract and deploy an integrated Canadian mine/UXO clearance organization that achieved noteworthy success while experiencing some key problems. The UNMACC in Kosovo proved to be a strong and valuable partner that ultimately used the CMAP mine/UXO clearance contribution in 2001 to directly contract vital centralized demining assets that achieved outstanding results. In hindsight, it may have been better to provide the money directly to the United Nations in 1999 as opposed to sending Canadian teams, however, it was a Canadian Government decision to contract and deploy Canadian resources, and the crisis nature of the situation obviated a more deliberate programming and project design process.

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<sup>80</sup> Interview with David Mueller, CEE Mine Action Programme Officer 1996-1999.

<sup>81</sup> The subsequent phases.

**Finding 48.** Rather than dismiss the use of Canadian private sector capabilities, CIDA/DFAIT should, with input from UNMAS, UNDP and other partners, try to define ‘niche’ areas of mine action expertise that could be exploited. It would also be useful to review other national models for development funding in the area of mine action such as; Norway/NPA, the UK/DFID and the US Department of State/Humanitarian Demining Programmes. As well, it must be noted that the Canadian contracting process does not easily lend itself to emergency or short-notice scenarios.

Again, the design of the Croatian component of the CMAP benefited from strong partnerships with experienced organizations. The projects concentrated on institutional support and the development of sustainable capacity in some key areas, including management, QA and survey, database and mapping improvements, and a decision support system. The mine victim and mine awareness projects, while modest, were very successful and will have a lasting impact. Unfortunately, the MDD programme undertaken by CIDC experienced serious difficulties and has questionable sustainability. Additional focus on institution building would have been more beneficial and would have respected the ongoing dialogue at the time, which was supporting the development of a regional MDD training centre in BiH.<sup>82</sup>

**Finding 49.** From a foreign policy perspective, more utility may have been realized by focusing the Balkans CMAP funding on fewer niche areas involving Canadian competencies such as reinforcing institutional capacity and with targeted initiatives in mine clearance aimed at increasing indigenous capacity such as the SFOR/EAF, APM, and NPA projects including key equipment donations.

Overall, the programme design was a significant success and the results achieved are impressive. Some problems occurred as a result of changes in the Programme Officer at critical points in the five-year programme but were minimized by senior staff continuity and the use of a technical expert (consultant). The design of the programme also had to account for significant differences in the three programme countries. Kosovo had a permissive environment for mine action (UNMIK/KFOR control) but Croatia and Bosnia had various constraints that had to be accounted for, such as legislation on demining, restrictions on international companies/NGOs and evolving national institutions. Accordingly, taking advantage of local experience and strong partnerships was essential. In this regard, regionally based organizations such as UNDP, NPA, Care Canada and the like were helpful in expanding the Balkans CMAP to Kosovo and Croatia, and could serve a useful purpose in developing a more regional approach to programme design and implementation.

**Finding 50.** The Balkans CMAP would have benefited from a more regional approach particularly from the standpoint of programme management and span of control. This could be achieved through programming partnerships with strong, regionally based organizations. This would reduce the number of individual projects that would require direct management by the programme officer.

From the standpoint of implementation and reporting, the Balkans CMAP was overall a success. A number of assessment and monitoring missions were conducted as well as two project evaluation missions. These provided direct oversight by the programme officer, who was able to correct problems, engage partners and executing agencies, assess progress and review future programming options. The programme officer made effective use of CIDA post

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<sup>82</sup> Ibid

personnel and senior partners to monitor projects, and aside from a few problems identified in previous sections, was able to manage the programme effectively. Project implementation innovations were also evident in the use of the ITF to leverage matching mine action contributions for the region and the development of partner donor funding to facilitate larger projects such as the MDD programme in Croatia. The focus of Canada's Y2000 Kosovo mine/UXO clearance project to provide centralized assets to the UNMACC was also an innovative approach that was effectively exploited again by the MAC in 2001 using CIDA funding.

**Finding 51.** The high level of monitoring, assessment and detailed project evaluations greatly assisted the programme team to respond effectively, adapt lessons learned and manage the CMAP efficiently. This level of hands-on familiarity is indispensable for effective programme design and implementation.

## **CMAP – FRAMEWORK OF RESULTS AND KEY SUCCESS FACTORS**

### *Achievement of Results*

The “Key Results Tables” provided in the foregoing country reviews provide a concise illustration of results achieved for each of the CMAP projects. These tables resulted from a wide variety of inputs including a file review, APPR's, mission reports, interviews and questionnaires. For the most part, the results achieved are either acceptable or they exceeded expected results based on accepted norms. A few projects failed to achieve expected results but in some of these cases the results were simply achieved later than agreed upon. In the above discussion, the CMAP was related to CIDA's development strategy and priorities indicating the relationship of the results achieved. The CMAP projects have left a powerful legacy of indigenous capacity in all areas of mine action and the results are highly sustainable, particularly in the areas of institution building. The measurement of results in most areas of mine action, however, is difficult. Institution building for example, is an area where the measurement of results is necessarily subjective. Improvements in management, planning, administration, reporting and operational effectiveness can be observed but are difficult to measure. There is no question, however, regarding the dramatic improvements in the CROMAC and BHMAC over the past three years. They have both matured into very professional and effective institutions that are now purely national organizations. The UNMACC in Kosovo proved its worth by completing its mine action programme on time in 2001. Mine awareness can be measured in numbers trained and materials produced, however, it is only one of many factors that contribute to a reduction in victims. Again, mine victim assistance results depend on the programme and what is being measured; number of prosthetics, number counseled, advocacy results etc. Finally, mine clearance is easily quantified but again, one must be careful with regards to what is being measured and compared. Area cleared (m<sup>2</sup>) and unit cost (\$/m<sup>2</sup>) are the most common measurements used, but these also include certain limitations.

### *Cost-Effectiveness of Results*

The CMAP was a large programme with many disparate projects that made cost accounting and detailed monitoring difficult. Nonetheless, very few variances occurred and which largely due to the aggressive monitoring by the programme officer and the partner agencies. In the vast majority of the projects, the relationship between costs and results was favourable. In

fact, in a few cases, the planned projects cost less than anticipated and the surplus money went to funding supplementary projects (e.g. mine awareness needs assessment – Croatia). In the case of the Kosovo 1999 demining projects, the results were definitely unsatisfactory from the standpoint of the late deployment and limited demining outputs in relation to the costs. In most other demining projects, however, the results were quite favourable in comparison with other organizations. Finally, a few organizations, such as CIDC, experienced delays and cost overruns, however, in most cases there was shared responsibility or the executing agency was forced to make up the shortfall from other sources. While the ITF victim assistance project was relatively minor in terms of cost, it was not very effective from the standpoint local sustainability or capacity building.

### *Relevance and Sustainability*

Regardless of the results achieved, every CMAP project must be viewed as relevant since they were based on the key areas of mine action and addressed an identified need. The projects usually focused concentration on threat reduction and the development of capable mine action institutions. As noted above, these CMAP initiatives were tied to CEE Branch objectives and CIDA's development priorities as enabling or complementary activities, and were consistent with the needs and priorities of local stakeholders and partner organizations. As well, one of the key hallmarks of the Balkans CMAP has been its high degree of sustainability. The national mine action institutions that required so much assistance at the start, have emerged as strong, largely self-sustaining indigenous institutions. This is less so in Kosovo, but the KPC/DCP is gradually improving with the help of HI. Substantial indigenous mine/UXO clearance capacity has been nurtured by CIDA's contributions. The SFOR/EAF and APM are two good examples and the CIDC MDD project has enhanced both these organizations as well as the Civil Protection Organization (CPO). Finally, the victim assistance projects in BiH, Kosovo and Croatia have generated substantial physical and psychosocial rehabilitation capacity within the health and education sectors respectively, and the number of direct beneficiaries continues to grow.

In terms of CIDA's cross cutting development themes, all the CMAP mine clearance projects contributed to the welfare of women by providing safe areas for communities to live, manage their households and raise their children. All victim assistance projects contributed to social welfare by promoting the health of the victims, and teaching proper care and rehabilitation to avoid further injury. A significant proportion of the beneficiaries were women and children. And, the SFOR/EAF project built non-combative employment skills for military personnel, which is a major contributor to peace and stability that will directly benefit women, children and the environment.<sup>83</sup> In terms of the environment, it is particularly noteworthy that the guidelines developed from the environmental assessment of the Canadian Y2000 mine/UXO clearance project in Kosovo were adopted by UNMAS and will be included in the IMAS as a technical note (SOP) for all future mine clearance operations conducted under UN auspices.

### *Partnership*

As noted throughout this report, effective partnerships have been the foundation of success for the Balkans CMAP. With a few minor exceptions, those projects that involved a partnership

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<sup>83</sup> CMAP Evaluation Questionnaire Response: DFAIT Mine Action Team, Alison Clement, Programme Coordinator, et al, DFAIT-MAECI.

with a strong and experienced international agency already established in the country achieved the expected results and generated few problems in the areas of implementation and reporting. As well, most of the CMAP projects included the active participation of local partners, recipients, employees and beneficiaries in many areas of the project design and implementation. This is particularly so in the case of institution building where locals, including women, are trained in management and operations, in order to gradually take over completely. The same applies to the victim assistance programmes, demining and mine awareness. The Canadian companies contracted for mine/UXO clearance in Kosovo were exceptions; like most other operators, locals were only involved as deminers, MDD handlers or in a support capacity. CIDC on the other hand, has evolved to an organization comprised fully of locals, except for one Canadian as the Chief Instructor. It is also noteworthy that CIDC trained several women as MDD handlers. Partnership innovations included shared funding of projects with other donors and key agencies such as UNDP, other countries and UNICEF, as well as leveraged funding opportunities through the ITF.

### *Appropriateness of Design and Resource Utilization*

As discussed earlier, the programme design approach used for the Balkans CMAP was based heavily on needs assessments and project selection input from key partners and agencies with extensive experience in the local area. Each project involved a risk assessment and mitigation analysis, and ongoing monitoring was accomplished through field visits, post personnel and regular reporting requirements. The Balkans CMAP evolved through three distinct phases, with different degrees of urgency and only limited opportunity to extend existing successful projects on a regional basis. This is an approach that deserves further consideration in future programme design, however, since the span of control/number of projects could conceivably be greatly reduced. Interesting opportunities were presented during these programme expansions to try innovative approaches to project design and implementation. A case in point was the evolution of the Kosovo mine/UXO clearance projects that involved Canadian companies. As discussed in the Kosovo project section, a consultant carefully evaluated the 1999 emergency contracts and a more deliberate contracting effort was undertaken for 2000 using a comprehensive RFP. The 2000 project was also subject to a detailed evaluation, resulting in a new approach for 2001 that was highly successful. The major lesson from the Kosovo experience is that normal Canadian contracting processes are not well suited to emergency requirements and CIDA is not well equipped for contracting Canadian resources during crisis situations. Mechanisms such as Standing Offer Agreements or a government-supported agency/NGO may be a useful approach to address this requirement.

The CMAP record with regard to resource utilization is also excellent. In the area of prudence and probity, the programme officer demanded accountability through diligent project financial reviews. This approach resulted in a comprehensive audit of the 2000 IDAC demining project and a formal investigation of CIDC's BiH accounts based on a local allegation of fraud that was proven to be unfounded. The CMAP has exploited Canadian capabilities and niche competencies in many areas, most notably: DND/CF partnerships in the provision of technical experts for institution building; ICI and Queen's University in victim assistance; CIDC MDD training; and Med-Eng for mine/UXO clearance equipment. Variable results were achieved by the Kosovo mine clearance contracts but this is an area worthy of more investigation. Indeed, the 1999 demining contracts were flawed due to an imposed abbreviated process and key lessons were learned and applied the following year. Overall, CMAP resource utilization has

been very good and is aptly illustrated by the management, utilization and final disposition of the CIDA mine clearance equipment from the Kosovo projects valued at over \$550,000 (CAD).

### *Informed and Timely Action*

The CMAP was created in the context of a need for timely action and was expanded into Kosovo on an even tighter timeline. Thorough preparation and knowledgeable partners contributed to the success of the programme and minimized any risks involved. Annual monitoring and assessment missions, good project oversight and timely evaluation kept the programme on track. Several examples have been cited of proactive intervention by the programme officer, and CIDA post personnel played a valuable role in day-to-day surveillance and timely response. Notwithstanding this effort, some projects were challenging to manage at a distance and without a strong local partner. CIDC reporting was persistently poor and particularly in the case of the Croatia MDD centre, problems were not reported in a timely fashion. The same was true for the Kosovo demining contracts, which also had to be managed directly by CIDA. The majority of projects within the Balkans CMAP, however, were managed without difficulty, and good mechanisms existed to mitigate risk and ensure timely response to problems, needs or opportunities.



**Figure 15. Mine Awareness – Saving Lives and Limbs**



## PART III – CONCLUSIONS

### LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The following lessons learned and recommendations derive from the list of findings in Part II as well as from experience with the CMAP and other similar programmes (related findings are shown in brackets):

- **Lesson Learned 1. Programme Officers (3, 24, 28, 44)**

Successful programme/project selection, design and implementation demand that the responsible programme officer be thoroughly familiar with the development area, the local issues, and the potential partners and executing agencies. A timely field visit or programme/project design mission is indispensable. Expert technical input is advisable as well as DFAIT and DND involvement as applicable. Programme officers should also maintain an annual contingency amount that can be used to provide flexibility, respond to key opportunities, reinforce success or address problems.

**Recommendation.** Programme officers must be afforded an early opportunity to become familiar with their development area of responsibility and undertake a programme/project design mission for defined CMAP initiatives (with technical/DFAIT/DND support as applicable). The programme officer should retain an annual programme contingency amount, however, it should be committed early enough to achieve effective results.

- **Lesson Learned 2. Programme Design (2, 6, 28, 34, 39, 40 45)**

Strong partners and executing agencies with extensive experience and a functioning organization in the development area can provide valuable assistance in project selection and programme design. This is aptly demonstrated by CIDA's successful CMAP working relationship with UNDP, HI, NPA, SFOR, ITF, HELP, DSL, Mine Tech and the Kosovo UNMACC.

**Recommendation.** CMAP project selection, design and implementation should take full advantage of strong partner relationships to provide advice, local management, project monitoring and roll-up reporting.

- **Lesson Learned 3. Programme Planning Principles (1)**

Mine action is a specialized development area and the process of project selection, design, planning and implementation would no doubt benefit from a detailed programming framework or set of basic planning principles for programme officer guidance. These tools would be particularly useful in short-notice development scenarios such as Kosovo.

**Recommendation.** The mine action programming principles are provided later in this report and should be refined to provide the basis for the development of a framework for mine action programming, in accordance with CIDA's "Guide for Developing Programming Frameworks."

- **Lesson Learned 4. Monitoring (28, 51)**

Regular field visits by the programme officer to monitor and evaluate projects, assess needs, and coordinate with post personnel and partners, was instrumental in the effective management of the Balkans CMAP. This was critical to smoothing the transition for new and replacement (temporary) personnel. Hands-on familiarity and monitoring are indispensable for effective programme design, implementation and day-to-day management.

**Recommendation.** The programme officer must be afforded the opportunity for regular monitoring and assessment field visits.

- **Lessons Learned 5. Stability of Key Personnel (27)**

Changing of key CIDA programme management personnel should be avoided during periods of heightened activity or emergency response. If unavoidable, MAP planning principles/guidelines, technical support and key resource/contact lists are essential.

**Recommendation.** Avoid changing key programme management personnel during critical activity or transition periods, such as the Kosovo emergency phase and ensure guidelines, technical expertise and key resource/contact lists are available.

- **Lessons Learned 6. Interdepartmental Cooperation (7, 45, 46)**

The Balkans CMAP benefited by successful collaboration between CIDA and DFAIT programme officers in all stages of its development, and by the support of DND in assessment missions and the provision of technical experts. This relationship should be formalized to facilitate better mine action coordination, and the sharing of information, resources and lessons learned.

**Recommendation.** An inter-departmental mine action committee should be established to include: DFAIT/ILX (Mine Action Team); CIDA/MAU and branch/geographic mine action programme officers; and DND (NDHQ/J-3 Engineer Branch). This committee should meet semi-annually or as needed to review ongoing mine action programmes, share lessons and learned, facilitate the exchange of information, and share resources and contacts.

- **Lessons Learned 7. DND Mine Information Centre (46, 47)**

A Mine Information Centre (MIC) is located in DND, NDHQ, J-3 Engineer Branch. This is a little known 'local' resource that can provide useful mine situation

summaries, briefings, background information and research on mine contamination and mine action programmes throughout the world.

**Recommendation.** All mine action programme officers should be aware of and make use of this valuable resource. Personnel departing on deployment to mine contaminated areas would also benefit from an up-to-date assessment.

- **Lesson Learned 8. Institutional Support (2, 4, 5, 20, 34, 49)**

The critical first step for any mine action programme is the establishment of an effective mine action coordination institution (MAC) capable of national planning, donor coordination, enforcement of standards, database development and priority setting. The Balkans CMAP has excelled in the area of institutional building utilizing a close, collaborative approach with UNDP (Croatia, BiH) and UNMAS (Kosovo) to select and fund projects critical to the development of national and UN mine action coordination structures. While not as visible as mine/UXO clearance or victim assistance, institutional support builds local capacity and will undoubtedly have a more valuable and far-reaching impact in ridding a county of mines/UXO. This is an area where Canadian management, technical, and mine action expertise and experience can make a real difference.

**Recommendation.** Canadian mine action interventions should focus initially on ensuring the development of strong, capable national or UN mine action coordination institutions. This will greatly enhance the effectiveness of the overall mine action programme and thus the utility of Canadian investments in other areas of mine action. The Balkans CMAP experience also demonstrates the value of institutional support in terms of achieving local sustainability.

- **Lesson Learned 9. Canadian Capacity for Institutional Support (6, 7, 8, 20)**

A wealth of technical expertise, and MAP management skills and experience are available in Canada within the DND/CF and the private sector. CF technical experts have made an extremely valuable and cost-effective contribution to MAC institutional capacity building in the Balkans. Private sector expertise includes individuals possessing extensive experience in UN/international mine action operations as well as companies that specialize in geographic information systems, database development and mapping. These resources should be surveyed and considered for inclusion as in-kind contributions in the area of MAC institutional support and capacity building in future CMAPs.

**Recommendation.** The CIDA/MAU should take the lead for all mine action in CIDA and should be the focal point for liaison with DFAIT and DND, coordination of support for geographic units, consolidation and distribution of lessons learned, and the scheduling of joint coordination meetings. It should maintain an up-to-date list of MAC institutional support and capacity building resources within the DND/CF and the private sector. These resources should be considered during the design and development of future mine action programmes.

- **Lessons Learned 10. Institutional Support – Surveys/Assessments (35)**

Early professional surveys and assessments by recognized professional organizations such as HI, NPA or GICHD have a valuable impact on institutional capacity to focus and coordinate mine action programmes. These include a socio-economic impact survey, mine awareness and mine victim needs assessments and technical surveys for area reduction. Despite their valuable long-term impact and relatively low cost, these surveys and assessments are usually generated quite late in the evolution of country mine action programmes.

**Recommendation.** Canada should focus early support on these valuable mine action institution support tools to generate general efficiency and cost-effectiveness in mine action programme planning, priority setting and clearance operations. Particular attention should be given to an early socio-economic impact analysis and the provision of technical survey for rapid area reduction.

- **Lesson Learned 11. Partnerships (2, 4, 7, 12, 17, 18, 33, 34, 37)**

As noted in Lesson Learned 2, strong partnerships are invaluable for project selection and design. This is also true for project implementation, management, reporting and timely response, and good partnerships can effectively reduce the span of control for programme officers. As a note of caution, however, a strong partner organization in the Balkans, such as the UNDP, may not have the same responsibilities or capacity in other mine-affected areas of the world.

**Recommendation.** Strong partner organizations should be selected to reduce span of control, ensure timely response, and assist project management, monitoring and reporting. CMAP partner selection must be carefully considered in each programme country.

- **Lesson Learned 12. Mine Clearance (8, 9,10, 11, 48)**

For best development assistance value, mine clearance projects should be aimed at building indigenous capacity as well as reducing the threat posed by mines/UXO. The SFOR/EAF, NPA and APM projects are all good examples of direct support providing valuable clearance outputs while increasing vital indigenous mine clearance expertise.

**Recommendation.** For best value in terms of development assistance funding, mine clearance projects should have a strong indigenous capacity building component.

- **Lesson Learned 13. Mine Clearance – Outputs (8, 10, 11, 19, 22, 23, 24)**

Where rapid and effective mine/UXO clearance is a high priority for refugee returns, vulnerable populations or critical rehabilitation/reconstruction, then proven NGO organizations such as HI, HELP and NPA, or capable contractors like DSL and Mine

Tech, produce the most reliable results. CIDA should not attempt to contract Canadian mine/UXO clearance companies for emergency response requirements.

**Recommendation.** Where urgent mine clearance is required, proven organizations with experience and an established base in the region should be selected for funding.

- **Lessons Learned 14. Mine Clearance – MAC’s (9, 11, 25, 49)**

Direct funding of MACs for centralized assets or mine clearance by in-theatre contracts worked well for the UNMACC in Kosovo. This may not be transferable to other operational areas based on the capability of the MAC to let and manage contracts, availability of suitable resources, local laws and the like. This approach should not be used for national MACs such as CROMAC or the BHMAC due to questionable contracting procedures, uncertain reliability and inability to monitor performance and outputs.

**Recommendation.** Direct funding of UNMACC’s for centralized assets or in-theatre mine clearance contracts has great potential benefit but must be weighed on a case-by-case basis. National MACs should not be directly funded for contracting local mine/UXO clearance organizations.

- **Lesson Learned 15. Mine Clearance – National Organizations (11)**

Supporting the humanitarian demining capacity of national military organizations can be tricky from philosophical, security and practical standpoints. There is a traditional international reluctance in this area. Under certain circumstances, however, it can serve foreign policy and development goals such as the democratization of armed forces, providing alternative skills for former combatants, peace building, and confidence and security building. The overriding requirement is the ability to exert some measure of control over the military organizations involved, as is the case with SFOR and the EAF, and KFOR and the KPC.

**Recommendation.** Under the right circumstances, support to national military organizations to develop humanitarian demining capabilities should be pursued.

- **Lesson Learned 16. Mine Clearance – Canadian Capabilities (8, 9, 12, 21, 22, 23, 24, 30, 37, 40, 48)**

Canadian-based mine clearance organizations will invariably experience difficulties establishing complex projects in remote locations. Nonetheless, some unique Canadian private sector mine/UXO clearance and other mine action capabilities do exist and should be exploited. Careful planning, including a well-defined scope, clear outputs/deliverables and detailed reporting requirements are needed. User agency design input is also required (UNMAS, UNDP, UNOPs, MAC) and contracting using the RFP process normally required a minimum of six months. Significant Canadian ‘niche’ capabilities exist in the area of mine action and these should be exploited. The Kosovo Y2000 Cdn mine clearance RFP could be used as a model for larger

projects, or portions of it for smaller contracted undertakings. As well, consideration should be given to the use of 'standing offer agreements' to acquire Canadian 'niche' mine action capabilities particularly in rapid response situations. Finally, any Canadian contracted organization should be tied to a partner organization such as the UNDP or UNMACC for local reporting and oversight.

**Recommendation.** The engagement of Canadian mine action resources/capabilities should be considered as part of mine action programme planning. A minimum of six-months lead-time should be allowed for normal contracting and standing offer agreements should be investigated to facilitate acquiring niche capabilities in emergency situations. This needs to be supported by a comprehensive, countrywide survey of current Canadian private sector and institutional mine action capability.

- **Lesson Learned 17. Mine Clearance – CIDC (12, 37)**

The CIDC MDD project has experienced ongoing problems and the extension of the project to develop a MDD programme for CROMAC encountered difficulties the outset. Also, the pending US Department of State-funded creation of a BiH regional canine/MDD training centre, significantly jeopardizes the viability of the CIDC project. Ironically, the operation in Trebinje is beginning to show definite signs of improvement. Management and reporting are better, outputs have increased, revenues are being realized and the CIDC BHMAD MDD accreditations are amongst the highest of all organizations. On the other hand, the SFOR EAF ability to utilize and maintain their MDD teams has been questioned and CROMAC has no plan for sustaining the 10 MDD teams that it will receive in the near future.

**Recommendation.** While this project has developed significant specialized indigenous mine clearance capacity, its sustainability is in serious doubt. The existing MDD teams will continue to need refresher training and re-accreditation support; however, this may not be a sufficient level of effort to sustain the operation. The impact of the new BiH regional MDD facility should be followed closely, CIDC should seek additional revenue opportunities such as contracting out to the SFOR EAF, and CIDA should carefully evaluate the provision of support beyond the current project.

- **Lesson Learned 18. Mine Awareness (13, 14, 15, 26, 35)**

Mine awareness is a vital component in the early stages of a mine action programme to protect vulnerable populations, mine affected communities and returning refugees. To be effective, however, it must be centrally coordinated, targeted, and consistent and employ the right delivery mechanisms. A mine awareness needs assessment is an invaluable tool if professionally done (e.g. GICHD Croatian assessment) and an organization such as UNICEF is best equipped to help coordinate a national programme. Finally, local mine awareness is an integral component of most demining operations and should be tracked as an output in CMAP funded mine clearance projects.

**Recommendation.** The selection and design of CMAP funded mine awareness interventions should be informed by advice from UNDP/UNMAS, UNICEF and the responsible MAC as appropriate. For local coordination, QA and oversight, mine awareness funding contributions should be through a senior partner such as UNICEF. And, mine awareness undertaken by demining projects should be reported as a separate output, including the number of recipients.

- **Lesson Learned 19. Mine Victim Assistance (16, 26, 35, 39)**

Victim assistance appears to be an area where Canada can make a valuable contribution. The ICI and Queen's ICACBR projects have developed strong local networks; sustainable capability, advocacy and good reach in terms of beneficiaries. The ITF project, on the other hand, had few beneficiaries and achieved no sustainable capacity. The Rovinj mine victim project in Croatia has achieved good visibility for mine victims because of the patron but it likewise has had limited impact in terms of beneficiaries. The current plan for its significant expansion doesn't appear to be sustainable and should be viewed with caution. ICRC is the leading international agency in the area of mine victim assistance and any future CMAP projects in this area should be informed by ICRC advice and partnership, and include local national disabled persons' associations.

**Recommendation.** CIDA should continue to monitor the results of the ICI and Queen's CBR projects with a view to including them as a component in future CMAP planning. ICRC input and/or partnership as well as local national disabled persons' associations should routinely be included in the design and implementation of mine victim assistance projects.

- **Lesson Learned 20. CMAP – Regional Approach (26, 44, 49, 50)**

The Balkans CMAP would have benefited from a more regional approach particularly from the standpoint of programme management and span of control. This could have been achieved through programming partnerships with strong regional organizations. This would serve to reduce the number of individual projects that must than be directly managed by the programme officer (e.g. UNDP sub-projects in support of CROMAC). This would also facilitate any need for a rapid regional expansion of the programme, as in the case of the Kosovo emergency phase. This approach could also work in other areas such as Africa where there are mine-affected countries bordering each other, straddled by the same international agencies and NGOs.

**Recommendation.** Planning for future mine action programmes should include a review of opportunities for employing a regional approach to reduce the span of control and simplify project management. This approach could be extended to contracting mine action resources to provide services on a regional basis.

- **Lesson Learned 21. Reporting (19, 33, 42, 43)**

Inadequate project reporting was a recurring theme from the CIDA perspective and a source of frustration for many of the partners and executing agencies. Some of the reporting needs were also not satisfied in terms of key statistics such as outputs

(number of mines/UXO, area cleared, beneficiaries), which were usually not disaggregated to show gender impact and the like. Some of the Canadian organizations experienced problems with the reporting requirements so it is understandable that local organizations found it difficult.

**Recommendation.** Reporting requirements should be reviewed and simplified where feasible. As well, specific requirements, such as output statistics, must be expressed in precise terms and quantified where possible.

- **Lesson Learned 22. ITF – Leveraged Funding (17, 18)**

The use of the ITF to channel CMAP project funding triggered matching funds that increased the overall mine action effort and in some cases complemented the Canadian initiative. The results for the ITF landmine victim project in Slovenia were less satisfactory but, for the most part, this was a successful partnership approach that accomplished the aim of increasing donor support.

**Recommendation.** Future leveraged funding mechanisms such as the ITF, should be utilized to the extent possible as long as it meshes with or complements CMAP priorities and key partner relationships.

- **Lesson Learned 23. Foreign Policy Perspective (45, 47, 49)**

From a foreign policy perspective, the utility of the CMAP may have been enhanced by concentrating on niche areas of Canadian competency, particularly institutional capacity building. This should have been combined with specific, targeted initiatives in mine /UXO clearance aimed at building indigenous capacity such as the SFOR/EAF projects, support of HI/APM and NPA, and the provision of UNMACC centralized assets and key equipment donations.

**Recommendation.** CMAP planning must be informed by foreign policy goals, as well as CIDA development objectives and priorities. These parameters must guide how the programme is to be tailored and how the outputs will be achieved.

- **Lesson Learned 24. Project Planning – Milestones and Exit Strategy (10, 39, 40, 43, 44, 51)**

CMAP contracts and funding agreements should clearly define key milestones, outputs/deliverables and reporting requirements. Funding contributions should be tied to deliverables in the form of progress payments or holdbacks and a defined exit strategy should be included for all projects. This would have motivated Med-Eng in the replacement of equipment and CIDC in terms of appropriate planning, reporting and achievement of outputs.

**Recommendation.** CMAP funding agreements and contracts should include key milestones, deliverables and reporting requirements as well as a holdback mechanism for payments and a defined exit strategy. The exit strategy should be geared to terminate unsuccessful projects and to the achievement of output



objectives or sustainability in all projects in order to avoid 'all-or-nothing' funding dependencies.

- **Lesson Learned 25. Multi-Year Funding Reliability (5, 6, 31, 38)**

Funding predictability, consistency and the lack of strings or caveats were described as the hallmarks of CMAP funding contributions. In a few cases, however (Queen's CBR II, NPA), delays in the notification of funding jeopardized project implementation. To the extent possible, projects should be designed with funding commitments over a two to three-year period to enable projects to mature and the results to be achieved, including sustainability. This commitment should be tempered by the need to achieve defined deliverables, and satisfy reporting and accountability requirements as outlined above.

**Recommendation.** CMAP project funding should be designated in annual increments in advance to, allow longer-term projects to mature and achieve results subject to the achievement of defined deliverables.

- **Lesson Learned 26. Communication (39, 41)**

Major development initiatives such as the CMAP should include a comprehensive communication strategy and plan. This plan should provide guidance for responding to incidents and other queries, and it should define proactive mechanisms for raising awareness of the programme and CLF.

**Recommendation.** Comprehensive mine action programmes should include a well-defined communication strategy and a plan for reactive and proactive media and public relations communication.

- **Lesson Learned 27. The Mine Action Approach of Canadian Allies (31, 48)**

Canadian allies such as Norway, the USA and the UK have all developed unique mechanisms or approaches to provide support for international mine action needs. These range from Norway with a government sponsored NGO to various funding, contracting and in-kind donations sponsored by the UK (DFID) and the US Department of State, Office of Humanitarian Demining Programmes. It would be instructive to review these different approaches to determine if it would be beneficial to adapt successful mechanisms for Canadian use.

**Recommendation.** CIDA should undertake a review of different national approaches to mine action programming and funding to determine if there are successful mechanisms that can be adapted for Canadian use.

## CONCLUSIONS

The evaluation of the Balkans CMAP was focused on the key results achieved and lessons learned, with particular emphasis on validating the design, implementation and effectiveness of the numerous projects that comprised the programme. The lessons derived from the evaluation are intended to improve programme development, and project selection, design and implementation. To this end, the evaluation has defined a number of principles' that can be used as the basis for the development of a formal programming framework. The purpose of this framework would be to provide strategic orientation and design guidance for future CIDA MAP initiatives in the Balkans or in other mine affected regions of the world.

Overall, the evaluation has shown that the CIDA Balkans CMAP must be viewed as a significant success. The programme began in response to a push of funding furnished by the CLF in 1998. It was initially confined to Bosnia and Herzegovina and was designed to support or complement ongoing CIDA development assistance initiatives in the country. From a few initial projects, the programme was quickly expanded a year later in response to the cessation of hostilities in Kosovo and again in 2000 with the change of regime in Croatia. It therefore evolved over a very short period into a significant regional programme, totaling some \$20m (CAD) and included a large number and variety of projects covering all of the key areas of mine action.

While it was a difficult programme to manage, it did represent successful collaboration between CIDA and DFAIT in all its stages. As well, it involved beneficial support by the DND/CF and included innovative use of Canadian expertise and capabilities in institutional support, mine clearance, victim assistance and MDD training. The programme was responsive to political and local developments, and was consistent with the Canadian foreign policy goal in the Balkans to promote regional stability after years of strife. The CMAP raised Canada's profile and credibility in Europe, promoted Canadian values and reinforced the Ottawa Convention by linkage to Canada's aggressive support of mine action in the Balkans.

The CMAP was also supportive of CIDA's development assistance strategy to secure peace and prosperity in the region, as well as its related development priorities and crosscutting themes. The mine action initiatives were undertaken to protect vulnerable populations and communities, and to facilitate humanitarian action, peace building, reconstruction and socio-economic development. The programme achieved particular success in the area of institution building and in the development of sustainable, indigenous mine/UXO clearance capacity. The CMAP mine awareness and victim assistance projects achieved varied results although the ICI and Queen's CBR projects stand out for their success in terms of reach and sustainability. The programme's innovative attempts to employ Canadian demining and MDD training capabilities also received mixed reviews. Nonetheless, the Balkans CMAP was widely applauded for its focus, reliability and achievements. The review of the programme results and key success factors was also very favourable and a number of important lessons have been derived from this evaluation that will greatly assist in the design of future programmes of its type.

The design of future CMAPs must first and foremost be informed by a clear understanding of Canadian foreign policy goals and development assistance strategy in the region concerned. The value-added dimension is also an important consideration and in most

cases this will lead to a focus on institution building. The creation of an effective mine action coordination centre is vital to the development and coordination of a successful and sustainable national mine action programme. This is an area where Canada has achieved a particular impact and has much to offer. Next in importance is the building of sustainable indigenous mine/UXO clearance capacity. The use of international NGOs or contractors should not subordinate the goal of sustainability unless there are emergency requirements for which are the best suited. Mine awareness and victim assistance initiatives should be considered but should always be coordinated with lead agencies such as UNICEF and the ICRC, and must be consistent with MAC priorities, themes and standards as applicable.

There are many lessons learned from this evaluation that bear repeating. Mine action programming in general benefits from close collaboration and sharing of programme information between CIDA, DFAIT and DND. Any new CIDA programme initiatives must include input from DFAIT (foreign policy) and DND/MIC (mine situation assessments) as well as key international organizations such as UNMAS, UNDP, UNICEF, ICRC, engaged NGOs such as NPA, and UN or national MACs. Project selection, design and implementation must include reliable local partners, and programmes must be regionalized to the extent possible to reduce the span of control and ease the task of programme management. Project design and contracts/donor agreements must include precise milestones, deliverables (outputs) and reporting requirements with tied funding in the form of progress payments and holdbacks. As well, every project must have a well-defined exit strategy. Finally, programmes with the magnitude and impact of the Balkans CMAP must include a clearly defined communication strategy, with a plan that provides guidance for both reactive and proactive communication. This would greatly assist managers in responding to incidents or queries, and facilitate international and domestic awareness of Canada's contribution in this highly topical area.

## **PROGRAMMING PRINCIPLES – MINE ACTION PROGRAMMES**

### **GENERAL**

As discussed in the evaluation, there are many factors that must be considered in designing an effective mine action programme. Most important, it must be remembered that there is no mine action template available that will suit all situations or be easily adapted from one contaminated country to another because the variables are too diverse. This was aptly demonstrated by the differences between individual Balkan states in what amounts to a relatively small regional footprint. These differences are magnified when one looks at other mine-affected countries such as Angola, Ethiopia, Cambodia or Afghanistan. Nonetheless, there are some fundamental considerations that can serve to guide future mine action programme development. A number of these have been derived from the lessons learned and recommendations above and are presented below as proposed 'principles' for the development of Canadian mine action programmes. These principles can also form the basis for the development of a mine action-programming framework. As recommended above, it may be desirable to review the approach some of our allies use (NOR, UK, USA) for developing and implementing development assistance initiatives in the area of humanitarian mine action.

The principles are necessarily general, as they may need to be applied in a broad range of circumstances. Many mine-affected countries in the world have some degree of international and local intervention initiatives already underway. At the same time, mine/UXO contamination continues in areas of strife and some countries have only recently emerged from years of conflict. The maturity of mine action in a given area will greatly influence the focus, urgency and design of Canada's possible mine action assistance.

## **PRINCIPLES**

1. The development of mine action programmes must be: guided by Canada's foreign policy goals, consistent with CIDA's development assistance strategy and objectives, and informed by a realistic mine situation analysis and needs assessment. This implies a collaborative effort between CIDA, DFAIT and DND including use of the CF/MIC and other expert technical support as required.
2. Input and guidance should be obtained from key international organizations and lead agencies including UNMAS, UNDP, UNOPS, UNICEF, GICHD, ICRC, UN or coalition military, and engaged international NGOs.
3. Mine action programme officers must make themselves thoroughly familiar with the proposed programme area, the mine action structure in place, the principal international organizations engaged in mine action, the status of the mine action programme, the key issues and the identified areas of greatest need. A field visit is indispensable and should include DFAIT and DND representation, and technical support as required. When a programme is first initiated, especially in short-notice planning situations, strong consideration should be given, if feasible, to the use of established, experienced and competent in-place partner organizations to assist in project definition, design and implementation. As well, programme officers should not be changed at critical junctures during the design and implementation of significant mine action programmes.
4. In highly technical areas such as mine action, it is highly desirable that the CIDA programme management team be provided with the services of a technical expert/advisor.
5. Experience has shown that strong partner organizations with extensive experience in the area should be engaged to assist in project selection and design as well as implementation and monitoring. Every attempt should be made to reduce the span of control and where applicable, to develop programmes on a regional basis.
6. Canadian mine action programming should always focus on the 'value-added' dimension; the most benefit for the development assistance investment. In most cases, Canada should concentrate on institutional capacity building as a first priority. It is a proven area for Canadian intervention that achieves far reaching, and highly cost-effective results and impact. This support could involve CF and/or Canadian private sector technical experts as in-kind contributions, and should include management and technical expertise, the provision of database and mapping support including training and equipment, technical survey and area reduction support, QA, standards, vital needs assessments and support for a

socio-economic impact survey. Mine/UXO clearance support should be focused on the development of sustainable indigenous capacity and could include the provision of specialized equipment, vehicles and other assets. Mine victim assistance and mine awareness projects must be carefully considered in terms of value and impact, and should be approached through multi-lateral channels such as the ICRC and UNICEF to ensure adequate coordination. The use of Canadian organizations such as ICI and Queen's ICACBR and the proper selection and training of local executing agencies should also be vetted by these lead agencies to ensure coordination and best value.

7. Canadian mine action capabilities should not be dismissed out-of-hand; a successful operation will provide enhanced visibility, develop Canada's unique private sector capabilities and contribute to the economy. To this end, CIDA should develop and maintain a list of related Canadian mine action capabilities including CF technical experts, private sector organizations, public institutions, NGOs and qualified individuals/consultants.
8. Crisis situations require a timely response to unpredictable events. This can be facilitated by the development of mechanisms to quickly fund critical resources to meet the most important needs in response to the inevitable pressures that will be brought to bear. Such mechanisms could include up-to-date inventories of Canadian mine action resources, emergency contracting provisions, Standing Offer Agreements and government supported agencies with standby agreements.
9. Any plan to contract Canadian capabilities will require care in the development of a suitable RFP/Request for Expressions of Interest. Ample time should be allocated for the contract process – a minimum of six months lead-time to the desired contract award date. The use of a standing offer agreement should be investigated to facilitate the timely engagement of Canadian resources/niche capabilities in rapid response situations.
10. The Y2000 Kosovo Mine Clearance RFP or portions of it could be used as a model for future mine action contracting initiatives.
11. Any mine action contract or project contribution agreement should include definite milestones, clearly defined deliverables (outputs), and simplified but precise reporting requirements (with explicit guidance on statistics such as amount and type of area cleared, ordnance destroyed, number of beneficiaries including age and gender information, and environmental impact). Grants should also be considered on a case-by-case basis, particularly for clearly defined requirements with a reliable partner where timeliness and simplicity are paramount considerations.
12. Every mine action project should have a clearly defined exit strategy included as part of the contract or contribution agreement to avoid funding dependency. This demands the definition of an objective output such as the completion of a report, acquisition of equipment, training completion or the attainment of sustainability/self-sufficiently.

13. In addition to an exit strategy, mine action projects should have progress payments and holdback amounts tied to key milestones, deliverables and satisfactory project reporting. This is common practice in industry and would encourage better performance.
14. Projects should be designed to ensure predictable and secure funding commitments of reasonable amounts and duration to permit projects to mature and achieve the expected results without lapses in funding that could jeopardize the initiative as a whole.
15. Projects should be designed with sufficient built-in flexibility to respond to changing circumstances, exploit opportunities in a timely way, reinforce success or 'terminate for cause'.
16. A contingency amount based on the size of the programme should be retained in the budget for discretionary spending (nominally 10 percent). This contingency should be included in the approval process and final commitment decisions should be made within four months of year-end or the funds should be re-allocated. This contingency would offer flexibility to the programme officer to exploit opportunities, reinforce success or address problem areas. A back up list of project with short execution times should be available for easy re-allocation of funds.
17. A significant mine action programme should include a clearly defined communication strategy and detailed plan to guide both reactive and proactive communication requirements. This would encourage and facilitate better exploitation of Canada's mine action successes and allow a controlled, positive and timely response to media inquiries and incidents.
18. A significant CMAP should include sufficient financial resources to permit regular monitoring and assessment missions (minimum of once per year) by the programme officer as well as specific evaluations as required. These are essential to understand the local environment, build a working relationship with post personnel and key partners, monitor progress and facilitate timely interventions should problems arise.

**ITINERARY  
CIDA VISIT  
NOVEMBER 18 – DECEMBER 2002**

<b>OTTAWA</b>	
November 12	Arrive Ottawa from Vancouver
November 13	CIDA <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting with David Rushton</li> <li>- Evaluation Team – Mission preparations</li> </ul>
November 14	CIDA <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Evaluation Team – Mission Preparations</li> </ul>
November 15	CIDA <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting with Alison Clement, Program Coordinator, Mine Action Team, DFAIT/ILX</li> <li>- Meeting with Denise Labelle, CIDA /Mine Action Unit</li> </ul>
<b>CROATIA</b>	
November 17	Arrive Zagreb from Ottawa
November 18	CIDC, MDD Training Facility, Skabrnja <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting and site tour with Sid Murray, CIDC Chief Instructor plus CROMAC Liaison Officer</li> </ul> CROMAC, Project Site, Zadar Highway <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Site tour of CROMAC clearance/verification project using Canadian donated MV-3</li> </ul>
November 19	CROMAC Headquarters, Sisak <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting with Oto Jungwirth, Head of CROMAC; Miltenko Vahtaric, Head of Finance; Nikola Pankovic, A/Director Planning, Analysis and R&amp;D; Mirko Invanusic, A/Director International Relations; Ljiljana Zalic-Amiric, Mine Awareness and Mine Victim Assistance Adviser; and Harald Wie, UNDP Senior Technical Advisor</li> </ul> ITF for Demining and Mine Victim Assistance <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting with Goran Gacnik, Deputy Director; and Eva Veble, Head of international Relations</li> </ul> UNHCR, Zagreb <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting with Gunther Scheske, Chief of Mission and Field Coordinator; Mario Paulovic, Associate Field Officer; and Lada Blagaic, Associate Program Officer</li> </ul>

	<p>Croatian Association of Mine Victims (CAMV) / Rovinj Project</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting with Madame Plestina, Prime Minister's wife and Special Advisor for Mine Action to the Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Martina Belosovic, Assistant</li> </ul>
November 20	<p>Croatian Red Cross, Zagreb</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting with Vijorka Roseg, MD, Program Manager for Mine-Risk Education.</li> </ul> <p>UNDP, Zagreb</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting with Tanja Rzehak, National Program Officer; and Davor Brkic, incoming National Program Officer</li> </ul> <p>Norwegian Embassy, Zagreb</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting with Knut Toraasen, Ambassador; and Henrick Malvaerk, Political Officer</li> </ul> <p>European Commission, Zagreb</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting with Alfons Peeters, Project Manager</li> </ul> <p>Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), Zagreb</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting with Paul Collinson, NPA Program Manager</li> </ul> <p>Canadian Embassy</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting with Dennis Snider, Ambassador; and Vanja Sikirica, Technical Cooperation Consultant</li> </ul>
<b>BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA</b>	
November 20	<p>Arrive Sarajevo from Zagreb</p>
November 21	<p>Canadian Embassy, Sarajevo</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting with Emil Baran, Counselor/ Head of Technical Cooperation; Almir Tanovic, Program Officer; and Elma Sarajlic, Assistant</li> </ul> <p>BiH Demining Commission, Sarajevo</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting with Darko Vidovic, Commissioner; and Dragisa Stankovic, Commissioner</li> </ul> <p>APM Demining Operation, Sarajevo Canton</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Visit to demining project completion ceremony with Mayor of Sarajevo</li> </ul> <p>BHMAC, Sarajevo</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting with Dusan Gauran, Director</li> <li>- Meeting with David Rowe, UNDP Chief Technical Advisor</li> </ul> <p>Embassy of USA, Sarajevo</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting with John Cohen, Political Officer</li> </ul>
November 22	<p>UN Office of the High Representative (OHR)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting with Rear Admiral Hugh Edleston, Military Representative to the High Representative; and Major Robert Strazisar, Staff Officer</li> </ul> <p>SFOR Engineer Branch</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting with Lieutenant Colonel Jim Greaves, Chief of SFOR/EAF Demining Program; and Major James Gladwin, Chief Mines/ Intel; and Dijana Trivakovic –Lucic, Senior Engineer Consultant</li> </ul>



	<p>- UNHCR, Sarajevo</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting with John Farvolden, Assistant Chief of Mission; and Lejla Ridanovic, Assistant Program Officer</li> </ul> <p>Housing Verification and Monitoring Unit</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting with Elizabeth Hughes, Program Manager</li> </ul>
November 23	Travel to Dubrovnik
November 24	Rest
November 25	<p>CIDC MDD Program, Trebinje</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting and site tour with Oliver Mitrevski, Operations Manager</li> </ul>
November 26	<p>CIDC MDD Program, Trebinje</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting with Oliver Mitreuski, Operations Manager</li> </ul> <p>SFOR EAF Demining, Republica Srpska</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Site tour of EAF demining operation west of Trebinje</li> </ul> <p>Travel to Sarajevo</p>
November 27	<p>Queen's University, ICA CBR, Sarajevo</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting with Malcom Peat, Executive Director, ICACBR; Sanela Sadikovic, Education Coordinator and Nazif Bogdanic, Goradze Peer Support Group Leader</li> </ul> <p>Handicap International (HI), Sarajevo</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting with Emmanuel Sauvage, Director; and Almedina kovic, National Operations Coordinator</li> </ul> <p>BiH Government, Ministry of European Integration</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting with Nedeljko Maslesa, Assistant Minister</li> </ul> <p>NPA, Sarajevo</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting and tour of facilities with Stephen Bryant, Regional Mines Action Manager</li> </ul>
November 28	<p>International Children's' Institute (ICI)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting with Dr. Mirsad Muftic, Rehabilitation Specialist/Program Director, Mevlida Ovuka, Prof., Program Coordinator; and Samra Tozo, Program Officer</li> </ul> <p>HELP/EC Civil Protection Organization (CPO)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting with Peter Sutcliffe, Program Manager, CPO Development</li> </ul>
November 29	<p>UNDP, Sarajevo</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting with Henrick Kolstrup, UNDP Resident Representative; and Seid Turkovic, Portfolio Manager Institutional Capacity Building</li> <li>- Meeting with David Rowe, UNDP Chief Technical Advisor to BHMACH</li> </ul> <p>HI/Akcija Protiv Mina (APM), Sarajevo</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting with Senad Nuhic, Program Manager</li> </ul>
November 30	Depart Sarajevo to Vienna

<b>KOSOVO</b>	
December 1	Arrive Pristina from Vienna / Sarajevo
December 2	<p>UNMIK / Directorate for Civil Protection (DCP)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting with Mr. Steve Saunders, UNMIK, EOD Management Operations Officer</li> </ul> <p>HI UNMIK Mine Assistance Team</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting with Aidan Thornton, Program Manager</li> <li>- Site tour of CBU strike area clearance project, Germia Park</li> </ul>
December 3	<p>HI, Pristina</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting with Drito Ukmata, Director of Kosovo operations, HI</li> </ul> <p>Canadian Mission</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting with Tamara Sorger, Head of Technical Cooperation; and Iliriana Gashi, CIDA Program Officer</li> </ul>
December 4	Depart Pristina to London, UK
December 5 – 7	UK personal
December 8	Depart London to Ottawa
<b>OTTAWA</b>	
December 9	<p>CIDA / CEEB</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting with Evaluation Team to develop tasks for report completion and assemble research results</li> </ul>
December 10	<p>CIDA/CEEB</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting with Evaluation Team continued</li> <li>- Debriefing of Gille Rivard, Director General; Helene Corneau, Director; and David Rushton, Program Manager</li> </ul>
December 11	Depart Ottawa to Vancouver

**ANNEX B**

**A D V I S O R**

**Canadian Mine Action Program in the Balkans  
(Bosnia & Herzegovina, Kosovo and Croatia)  
CIDA Southern Europe and Humanitarian Assistance Division (RZE)**

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**1.0 REFERENCE**

The RZE/CEE Branch Mine Action Advisor for the Balkans' overall Terms of Reference for the duration of the contract period are described in full detail in the Advisor's Contract Appendix B - Statement of Services and are valid and in effect (QM/ Z020326).

**2.0 FOURTH MAJOR ASSIGNMENT - EVALUATION of the CANADIAN MINE ACTION PROGRAM in the BALKANS 1998/99 - 2002/03**

The Advisor is asked to conduct an evaluation of the Canadian Mine Action Program (CMAP) in the Balkans 1998/99 - 2002/03, which include integrated country programs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Croatia.

**3.0 PURPOSE OF THE ASSIGNMENT**

The main purpose of the evaluation is to assess the performance of the CMAP in the Balkans (both in terms of development and operations) and to identify lessons learned challenges and opportunities for future programming. The work will focus on the assessment of the program as a whole.

**3.1 Overview**

The evaluation of the CMAP in the Balkans will focus on the key results achieved and lessons learned. The emphasis is on validating the design, implementation and effectiveness of the numerous projects that comprise the program. The lessons derived from the evaluation will be focused on improving program development, and project selection and design for similar MAP initiatives in the future. The aim is to produce programming principles that will provide strategic orientation for future mine action decisions, including the definition of preferred areas for Canadian intervention, i.e. Canada's mine action 'niche'.

**4.0 METHODOLOGY / DESCRIPTION OF SERVICES**

The evaluation is to be conducted using CIDA's Evaluation Guide, 2000, and the Framework of Results and Key Success Factors, as tools for the assessment of the results. The work will be structured to include two distinct parts.

#### **4.1 CMAP Balkans Project Performance Review:**

The first part of this evaluation is to review of the projects and their progress towards results consisting of a brief analysis of the 36 projects (45 sub-projects), grouped by country and thematic area of programming. The evaluation will include review of CIDA documentation as well as direct consultation with CIDA HQ and post personnel, beneficiaries, local authorities, executing agency personnel and other stakeholders. This review will take into consideration the following:

- a. consistency with CEE's program objectives and with cross-cutting themes;
- b. consistency with CIDA's priorities of individual security, economic and social development, and sustainability; and
- c. what worked and what didn't work in terms of project design, planning, implementation and reporting (management factors and design factors), along with an assessment of the capacity of the executing agencies, the synergies and partnerships.

#### **4.2 CMAP Balkans Program Performance Review:**

The second part of this evaluation is to conduct an assessment of the overall program performance consisting of a review of the program implemented in each country with comparisons among the types of programs across the target countries. The program review will focus on:

- a. development results (focusing on the achievement of results, cost-effectiveness, relevance and the degree of sustainability achieved) and the success factors (including appropriateness of design, resource utilization, and informed and timely action);
- b. strengths and weaknesses, focusing on what worked and what didn't work in terms of program design, planning, implementation, management and reporting; and,
- c. challenges and lessons learned, focusing on programme-level development and implementation with a view to recommending a framework for future programming.

### **5.0 EVALUATION TEAM - ROLES & RESPONSIBILITY**

The evaluation team is comprised of the Evaluation Manager, Lisanne Garceau-Bednar, Senior Program Officer, Peace and Security, Eastern Adriatic Division, Central and Eastern Europe Branch; Evaluator/Technical Advisor, Roger St. John from St. John & Associates Projects Inc; Performance Review Advisor, Claudia Marcondes; plus a Research Assistant, Jeff Naylor.

The CEE-RZE Demining Technical Expert-Advisor, Mr. Roger St. John, is the lead evaluator. As such, he has the lead responsibility for the production of the CMAP Balkans Evaluation Report. Detailed responsibilities of each team members are as follows:

- a. Lisanne Garceau-Bednar, CIDA Evaluation Manager, has overall responsibility and accountability for the evaluation. She is responsible for overseeing and controlling the evaluation process, providing guidance and direction throughout all phases of execution and approving all deliverables. She will conduct a field evaluation mission to the Balkans to collect information (Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina).
- b. Roger St. John, CIDA Demining Technical Advisor, is responsible for conducting the evaluation, including the day-to-day management of operations, review of program

documentation, development of the workplan, regular progress reporting to CIDA's evaluation manager, and the preparation of the evaluation report. As well, he will participate in the field evaluation mission to the Balkans to collect information and provide evaluation technical support (Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo). He will elaborate a workplan on the broad parameters initially set out in the evaluation, by adding precision, scope and refinements to the operational planning.

- c. Claudia Marcondes, Performance Review Advisor, is responsible for providing expert program evaluation advice to the team in the areas of results measurement and professional evaluation methodologies. She will review relevant program documentation to extract key elements such as expectations, results, issues and lessons learned. She also will provide input to the evaluation workplan and is responsible for the development of a comprehensive evaluation questionnaire for key project partners in the Balkans, in order to confirm project results and obtain critical follow up information regarding the impact of the program on the defined beneficiary population.
- d. Jeff Naylor, Research Assistant, is responsible for assisting in the review of all documentation related to projects that comprised the Balkans CMAP, with a view to providing a comprehensive summary including key project parameters, results achieved, issues and lessons learned. This review will be reflected in a set of key results tables that will provide a comprehensive summary of results by country and thematic mine action programming area.



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## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AP (mine)	Anti-personnel mine
APM	Akcija Protiv Mina (BiH demining NGO)
APPR	Annual Project Performance Review
AT (mine)	Anti-tank mine
BHMAC	Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
CAMV	Croatian Association of Mine Victims
CBR	Community Based Rehabilitation
CBU	Cluster Bomb Unit
CEE(B)	Central and Eastern Europe (Branch) CIDA
CF	Canadian Forces
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIDC	Canadian International Demining Corporation
CLF	Canadian Landmine Fund
CMAP	Canadian Mine Action Program
CPO	Civil Protection Organization (BiH)
CROMAC	Croatian Mine Action Centre
CTA	Chief Technical Advisor
DCP	Directorate of Civil Protection (Kosovo/UNMIK)
DCSEP	Department for Civil Security and Emergency Protection (Kosovo – UNMIK)
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DND	Department of National Defence
DSL	Defence Systems Limited (UK)

EAF	Entity Armed Forces (BiH)
EC	European Commission
ELS	European Landmine Solutions (commercial mine action company)
EMAC	Entity Mine Action Centre (BiH)
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EU	European Union
FMAC	Federation Mine Action Centre (BiH)
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
GIS	Geographic Information System
GLS	Global Landmine Survey
HALO	Hazardous Area Life-Support Organization
HANDIKOS	Association of Disabled Persons – Kosovo
HELP	Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe e.V..
HQ	Headquarters
ICACBR	International Centre for the Advancement of Community based Rehabilitation (Queen’s University)
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICI	International Children’s Institute
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross (INGO)
IDAC	International Demining Alliance of Canada
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IMAS	International Mine Action Standard(s)
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action
ITF	International Trust Fund for Demining and Victim Assistance (also known as the Slovenia Trust Fund)

JNA	Yugoslav National Army
KFOR	Kosovo Force (NATO)
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
KPC	Kosovo Protection Corps
KVM	Kosovo Verification Mission
MAC	Mine Action Centre
MACC	Mine Action Coordination Centre
MAG	Mines Advisory Group (mine action NGO)
MAP	Mine Action Program
MDD	Mine Detection Dog
MNB	Multi-National Brigade
MRE	Mine Risk Education
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
OA	Official Assistance (Canada)
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PWDs	Persons with Disabilities
RBM	Results Based Management
RSMAC	Republica Srpska Mine Action Centre
SAC	Survey Action Centre
SWG	Survey Working Group
TA	Technical Advisor
UNDP	United Nations Development Program

UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
VJ	Yugoslav Army
VTF	Voluntary Trust Fund (UN)
VVAF	Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organization

## **BALKANS CMAP KEY RESULTS MATRIXES**

**Prepared by: Jeff Naylor, Research Assistant**

The following matrixes organized by country and area of mine action provide a summary of key results achieved for the principal projects undertaken as part of the balks CMAP from 1998 to 2003. The information is necessarily brief and was gleaned from a comprehensive review of the APPRs as well as other file documentation and programme reports.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA DEMINEING RESULTS		Actual Results				
		Z-011295, Z-020339: CIDC Mine Detection Dog I & II	Z-011296, Z-020217, Z-020340 Ackja Protiv Mina (APM) Demining I, II, III		Z-011298, Z-020341 NPA Sarajevo Canton Mine Clear I and II	Z-011299, Z-020342 SFOR/EAF Demining I and II
EXPECTED OUTCOME RESULTS	Performance Indicators					
1. Safer conditions for returnees	1. Changes of mine clearance efficiency rates  2. Number of potential and actual returnees benefiting directly and indirectly from demining actions  3. Number and type of areas cleared	-CIDC trained MDDs cleared 734,141 m2 -33 MDDs in BiH trained by CIDC (of a total of 86)	Year 1997	Area Cleared 5,955 m2	1999- NPA CMAP 91,890 m2 2001- NPA CMAP 73 450 m2, (a slight reduction due to work in harder terrain)	1999 - 593,062 m2 2000 – 896,000 m2 2001 - 800,000 m2 2002 - 1,200,000 m2
			1998	49,362 m2		
			1999	114,172 m2		
			2000	125,105 m2		
			2001	116,216 m2		
			2002	227,500 m2		
		- Many important areas cleared including school access, houses, and water sources. - Most minefields inhibiting refugee returns in northwest Bosnia are cleared.				
2. Indigenous demining capacity	4. Quantitative and qualitative changes in the level of assistance provided for demining/ MAC operations	- In 2001, in-country participation of international personnel was reduced to one Chief instructor	- APM has good technical capacity to conduct mine clearance operations and its managerial and administrative skills to be self-sustainable have improved.		- In 1999, the project manager position was passed to a Bosnian staff member and training for Bosnian staff in language, management and computer skills progressed	- Bozena mini flail units (2 of 5 provided by Canada) increased efficiency - CIDA funding for insurance allowed EAF to operate and increased BiH demining capacity 25%
<b>Projects' Success at Achieving Expected Results:</b>		<b>Z-011295, Z-020339</b>	<b>Z-011296, Z-020217, Z-020340</b>		<b>Z-011298, Z-020341</b>	<b>Z-011299, Z-020342</b>
Failed to Achieve Results:						
Achieved Results:		✓	✓			✓
Exceeded Expected Results:					✓	
<b>General Evaluation of Cost Effectiveness, Partnerships and Appropriateness of Design</b>		-Many past human resource and management problems but situation improved in last year. -USA/BiH regional MDD centre is a definite threat	- APM is competent and has recently shown willingness to become self-sufficient -Some discrepancy in planned and actual activities resulted from BHMACH monopoly on assigning tasks		-Lack of steady funding from the international donor community prevents fully sustainable mine planning -NPA develops well qualified personnel and good planning -Good indigenous capacity building	- Results were met and EAF teams show good gain in productivity -BiH gov't did not provide EAF supplemental pay for demining

<b>BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA MAC PROGRAM RESULTS – Institutional Support (Z-020519 Support to MACs V / Z-020353 Support to MACs IV / Z-020216 Support to MACs III / Z-011303 Institutional Support- MACs II / Z-020160 UNDP Task Manager in Deming / Z-011297 Support to Mine Action Centres)</b>		
<b>EXPECTED OUTCOME RESULTS</b>	<b>Performance Indicators</b>	<b>Actual Results</b>
1. Enhanced and strengthened capacity of BHMAC as indigenous Bosnian institution	1. BHMAC is a central mine action coordinating body  2. Quality of staff knowledge and abilities	-Increased capacity of BHMAC to the point where it was able to manage the mine action activities in BiH - With the 2002 BHMAC restructure the Entity MACs became regional and the BHMAC is now the primary mine coordination institution centre in BiH - Cdn and international pressure precipitated a state of Law on Demining passed in Feb 2002 that regulates mine action activities in BiH. -BiH government took control of paying the salaries of BHMAC staff, indicating increased ownership and control. -Local staff sustainable, the number of foreign advisors has decreased from 40 to 1 and a strategic demining plan to 2010 has been created. -A new committed, transparent Demining Commission was appointed in 2001
2. Mine clearance activities focus on priority areas for return of refugees and displaced persons	3. Coherence of mine clearance operations	-Early in the program (2001), a series of 425 threat assessments, 204 completion reports, 73 survey reports, 13 incident data, 86 minefield data were produced. 900 minefield maps were issued. BH MAC is now sustainable in such operations
<b>Projects' Success at Achieving Expected Results:</b>		
Failed to Achieve Results:		
Achieved Results:		
Exceeded Expected Results:		✓
<b>General Evaluation of Cost Effectiveness, Partnerships and Appropriateness of Design</b>		-Short tenure of international advisors reduced their effectiveness -The original division of responsibilities among three indigenous MACS (BHMAC plus the two entity MACs) reduced efficiency and clarity of responsibilities -Overall, the program was cost effective, encouraged partnerships and was extremely well designed. Great improvements have been realized.



<b>BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA VICTIM ASSISTANCE RESULTS</b>		<b>Z-011464 ICI Support To Children Landmine Victims</b>	<b>Z-011414 ITF Landmine Victim Assistance</b>	<b>Z-020336 Queen's U Landmine Victim Peer Counselling II</b>
<b>EXPECTED OUTCOME RESULTS</b>	<b>Performance Indicators</b>			
<b>1. INCREASED ACCESS FOR VICTIMS TO MEDICAL / PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT</b>	1. Number of people participating in the program	150 children who have undergone a major medical intervention, parents, senior and front-line hospital and education professionals	12 landmine victims medically rehabilitated over 10 months	-10 Peer Counselling (PC) groups reached approximately 1000 PWDs -151 PWDs referred between centers/ PC programs
2. Greater understanding and support among medical staff, family members and / or policy makers of disability issues	2. Number of education and health professionals trained/ using appropriate techniques 3. Evidence of understanding of disability issues through use of language and development of policies sensitive to the needs of PWDs	-39 health professionals, 36 teachers and 11 parents attended focus groups identifying issues and needs relating to psychosocial care of children. -Workshops and meetings held with 30 residents from family medicine centres, 100 health professionals, and 25 school facilitators about psychosocial needs		- Community and public relations initiatives were organized and implemented by PWDs - 12 training sessions held for 91 health professionals to increase knowledge - Marketing workshops led to awareness, 2 brochures (2000 copies), 3 posters (1500 copies), 60 media contacts - Program expanding
3. Increase capacity to deliver psycho-social services to victims	4. Number of education and health professionals trained/ using appropriate techniques	See above	-Professional rehabilitation and socio-economic reintegration of victims aided through donations from other sources	-PC groups identified vulnerable populations
<b>Projects' Success at Achieving Expected Results:</b>		<b>Z-011464</b>	<b>Z-011414</b>	<b>Z-020336</b>
Failed to Achieve Results:				
Achieved Results:			✓	
Exceeded Expected Results:		✓		✓
<b>General Evaluation of Cost Effectiveness, Partnerships and Appropriateness of Design</b>		- The project was slightly behind schedule - Good reach and sustainability - Expansion to RS/Croatia - Good advocacy/awareness results - Gender addressed	- Fully achieved results in a cost-effective manner. - Increased collaboration between CIDA and ITF	- PC groups gathered funding from other sources - A 9 month delay in CIDA funding between this and M-010054 project endangered program - Leadership by PWDs - Good Reach and sustainability - Inter-entity cooperation - Addresses gender - PWDs advocacy

<b>BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA MINE AWARENESS RESULTS</b>		<b>Actual Results</b>
		<b>Z-010437 Mine Awareness</b>
<b>SHARED EXPECTED OUTCOME RESULTS</b>	<b>Performance Indicators</b>	
1. Reduced incidence of mine-related deaths and injuries	1. UNICEF, UNMAC, Red Cross and other agencies dealing with mine accidents report a decrease in mine-related incidents. 2. Subsequent investments in mine awareness in years 1998 and 1999 go ahead based on success of 1997 program. 3. Utilization of PIUs for project implementation continues.	-Delivery of 600 mine awareness education sessions -6000 posters, 32,000 booklets, 2000 notebooks, 1,000 T-shirts distributed in 100 municipalities in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Republica Srpska -Live reports, video and radio broadcasts were also utilized to reach the population -40,000 people including 18,000 pupils, 800 teachers and 400 refugees were reached
<b>Projects' Success at Achieving Expected Results:</b>		<b>Z-010437</b>
Failed to Achieve Results:		
Achieved Results:		✓
Exceeded Expected Results:		
<b>General Evaluation of Cost Effectiveness, Partnerships and Appropriateness of Design</b>		The PIUs performed reasonably well in terms of project management and reporting requirements

<b>CROATIA DEMINING RESULTS</b>		<b>Z-020339- 02 Mine Detection Dog Trng II</b>
<b>SHARED EXPECTED OUTCOME RESULTS</b>	<b>Performance Indicators</b>	<b>Actual Results</b>
1. Strengthened Capacity of CIDC to assist PHD in becoming an autonomous and sustainable local (indigenous) org. in support of CROMAC and Croatian mine-action in general	1. Number of Croatian Employees trained and retrained on staff relative to the number of CIDC's int'l staff employed in Croatia 2. % increase mine clearance efficiency rate, as well as the acceleration rate of manual & mechanical demining compared to teams without mine detection dogs	- MDD teams have increased to 10, with 6 MDD teams separately funded by Austria and Belgium - Croatian handlers selected - Testing facilities constructed and MDD training occurred - CROMAC capacity has not been enhanced to date due to project delays
2. Enhanced personal safety for deminers, residents and visitors in the area	Number of potential and actual returnees that benefit from demining activities Reduction of suspected area/ increase in efficiency	- MDD teams not yet utilized due to project delays
<b>Projects' Success at Achieving Expected Results:</b>		<b>Z-020339-02</b>
Failed to Achieve Results:		✓
Achieved Results:		
Exceeded Expected Results:		
<b>General Evaluation of Cost Effectiveness, Partnerships and Appropriateness of Design</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Serious differences between project partners, due to disagreement over the responsibilities and training methodology delayed the beginning of training. The project's results should be achieved by Feb 2003</li> <li>- The ability of CROMAC to take over the management of the MDD training program has been questioned</li> </ul>	

<b>CROATIA MACC PROGRAM RESULTS</b>		
<b>Z-020337 (001) Suprt UN/ Cromac Transition Program /(002) CROMAC Nat'l Managers Training &amp; Dev't, /(003) Cdn. Mine Action Program CROMAC Automation and Office Equipment, /(004) Cdn Mine Action Program Support to CROMAC Survey, Verific. Projects, /(007) CROMAC Survey, Verific. Projects</b>		
<b>SHARED EXPECTED OUTCOME RESULTS</b>	<b>Performance Indicators</b>	<b>Actual Results</b>
Improving institutional capacity of MACCS.	Number of Croatian Employees trained and retrained on staff relative to the number of int'l staff employed in CROMAC.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Canada provided a mini-flail (mv-3) and protective gear. The mv-3 was used survey and verification work on a future highway route. 161 000 m2 surveyed to June 2002.</li> <li>- Communications, computer, database, management coordination and office equipment was purchased, which will be used to improve database, communication and management.</li> <li>- A Decision Support System was developed and delivered which helped coordinate survey efforts, which reduced suspected areas from 4000 km2 to 1700 km<sup>2</sup>.</li> <li>- A technical survey allowed the release of 200 000m2 of agricultural land.</li> </ul>
<b>Projects' Success at Achieving Expected Results:</b>		
Failed to Achieve Results:		
Achieved Results:		
Exceeded Expected Results:		✓
<b>General Evaluation of Cost Effectiveness, Partnerships and Appropriateness of Design</b>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Projects have achieved goals. A key contributor to success was good project planning done in conjunction with the CROMAC.</li> <li>- UNDP lacked the resources to conduct sufficient monitoring.</li> </ul>

<b>CROATIA VICTIM ASSISTANCE RESULTS</b>		<b>Actual Results</b>
		<b>Z-020337 006 Cdn Mine Action Program Mine Victim Assistance Program</b>
<b>EXPECTED OUTCOME RESULTS</b>	<b>Performance Indicators</b>	
1. Improved attitudes of PWDs, service providers and policy makers		- Mine Victims Needs Assessment Report was produced, which will serve as a tool for decision-making and strategic planning. - Workshops were held for 17 children and 7 adults - Participants reported better attitudes
2. Expanded services	Reduced demands for local treatment	-Reconstruction of a wing of the Rovinj Centre Hospital involved 5 rooms with 20 beds
<b>Expected Result:</b> 3. Increased skills of PWDs	Reintegration monitored and documented	- The adult workshops included computer literacy
<b>Projects' Success at Achieving Expected Results:</b>		<b>Z-020337-006</b>
Failed to Achieve Results:		
Achieved Results:		
Exceeded Expected Results:		✓
<b>General Evaluation of Cost Effectiveness, Partnerships and Appropriateness of Design</b>		- Overall, the project is a great success and achieved above expected results
<b>CROATIA MINE AWARENESS RESULTS</b>		<b>Actual Results</b>
		<b>Z-020337-005 Cdn Mine Action Program Mine Awareness Program</b>
<b>EXPECTED OUTCOME RESULTS</b>	<b>Performance Indicators</b>	
-Reducing the number of preventable mine incidents and of long term donor enrolment	1. Number of mine-related accidents 2. Number of Returnees	- A "Mine Awareness and Needs Assessment Report" and survey was completed in March 2002 and was translated into Croatian in July
<b>Projects' Success at Achieving Expected Results:</b>		<b>Z-020337-005</b>
Failed to Achieve Results:		
Achieved Results:		
Exceeded Expected Results:		✓
<b>General Evaluation of Cost Effectiveness, Partnerships and Appropriateness of Design</b>		- The Mine Awareness Needs Assessment has already, and will continue to, provide an excellent resource for maximizing scarce Mine Awareness resources . It will allow for better coordination and collaboration among various organizations - The project is well on its way to having a lasting impact and achieving its expected results

KOSOVO DEMINING RESULTS		Actual Results			
		Z-020013 Rapid Response Demining	Z-020027 Int'l Demining Alliance	Z-020200 Cdn IDAC Mine / UXO Clearance Project	Z-020350 United Nations Mine Action Service
EXPECTED OUTCOME RESULTS	Performance Indicators				
Significant Impediment to the return of refugees and displaced persons removed in Kosovo	Area cleared or declared safe by surveys	Cleared: 71 schools, 46 homes, 7 medical clinics a few TV/ Radio transmission stations a water pump house 4 power plants	- 37 000 m2 cleared - Over 1 000 000 m2 released by level I and II surveys - Demining focus on schools, water sources, farm complexes, houses, power lines, agricultural land, electrical substations	- VJ Minefields: - 4 Completed - 6 Released by Survey - 6 Issued with no action taken - 6 completed but NOT accepted - 6 Suspended - Focus on the mountainous region along the Macedonian and Albanian borders	CMAP funded UNMACC acquisition of core demining assets. - 204 287 m2 cleared by MDD, manual and mechanical teams - 6,750 m2 released by Level I/II Survey and EOD teams - Use of Land Cleared: 72% agricultural 17% forest 6% school grounds 4% forest tracks
<b>Projects' Success at Achieving Expected Results:</b>		<b>Z-020013</b>	<b>Z-020027</b>	<b>Z-020200</b>	<b>Z-020350</b>
Failed to Achieve Results:		✓	✓		
Achieved Results:				✓	
Exceeded Expected Results:					✓
<b>General Evaluation of Cost Effectiveness, Partnerships and Appropriateness of Design</b>		Numerous difficulties in effective management, partnerships, technical expertise, monitoring and reporting	Numerous difficulties in effective management, partnerships, technical expertise and monitoring and reporting	Delayed by contractual process but well designed and delivered. Management and safety problems.	A resounding success, cost effective, well designed and effective coordination of activities

KOSOVO MACC RESULTS		Actual Results	
		Z-20066 MACC in Kosovo- Data Entry Clerks	Z-020091 Institutional Support to MACC in Kosovo*
EXPECTED OUTCOME RESULTS	Performance Indicators		
Enhanced Capacity of the UN MACC.	UNMACC's reports on the progress and results achieved by the overall mine action program in Kosovo.	- \$ 65,000 provided to cover the incremental costs of technical experts data entry Clerks from the Department of National Defense to the MACC in Kosovo.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Project connected to Z02035 to provide for UNMACC demining core capabilities.</li> <li>- 101 hectares of land cleared of 768 mines and 6 items of UXO.</li> <li>- MINE-TECH cleared 61 minefields and conducted surveys on a further 76 areas.</li> <li>- MDD teams deployed as needed to support MACC operations.</li> <li>- MDD teams conducted training on days not deployed.</li> <li>- Med evacuation exercises conducted monthly.</li> </ul>
<b>Projects' Success at Achieving Expected Results:</b>		<b>Z-020066</b>	<b>Z-020091</b>
Failed to Achieve Results:			
Achieved Results:		✓	
Exceeded Expected Results:			✓
<b>General Evaluation of Cost Effectiveness, Partnerships and Appropriateness of Design</b>		No reporting on results is available.	Well designed and focused. The project resulted in improved access to agricultural land water sources, and a reduction in the loss of human life and livestock.

\* CIDA provided funding to MACC with the provision that it invest in an integrated mine clearance team comprising manual, mechanical and explosive detection dog

<b>KOSOVO VICTIM ASSISTANCE RESULTS</b>		<b>Actual Results</b>
		<b>M-010054 Disabled Population and Landmine Victim Assistance - Queen's</b>
<b>EXPECTED OUTCOME RESULTS</b>	<b>Performance Indicators</b>	
To Improve the health and well-being of disabled persons in Kosovo, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina	No Performance Indicator listed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Three five-week educational programs delivered to the Association of Disabled People in Kosovo (HANDIKOS).</li> <li>- 3 Seminars for rehabilitation professionals from Pristina Hospital were held.</li> <li>- 16 classes taught to 100 physiotherapy students.</li> <li>- 62 client site visits, 15 seminars with NGO CBR workers (241 participants).</li> <li>- 48 case conferences to review challenging cases.</li> <li>- Agreement for including staff members with disabilities in the ten CBR centres was reached.</li> <li>- Meetings and patient home visits with nurses identified needs.</li> <li>- ICACBR raised awareness of disability issues through education programs and meetings with health professionals, and through advocacy at political and private organizations.</li> </ul>
<b>Projects' Success at Achieving Expected Results:</b>		<b>M-010054</b>
Failed to Achieve Results:		
Achieved Results:		✓
Exceeded Expected Results:		
<b>General Evaluation of Cost Effectiveness, Partnerships and Appropriateness of Design</b>		The project achieved its goal, however, the actual impact of the project on the disabled population is difficult to access. Approximate numbers of beneficiaries would be useful and were not provided. Training of locals provided for good sustainability.
<b>KOSOVO MINE AWARENESS RESULTS</b>		<b>Actual Results</b>
		<b>M-010022 Balkan/ UNICEF/ Second Grant Kosovo Crisis</b>
<b>EXPECTED OUTCOME RESULTS</b>	<b>Performance Indicators</b>	
None Listed	No Performance Indicator listed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 400 000 mine/ UXO awareness posters and leaflets distributed through NGOs</li> <li>- 3 locally produced TV spots in Albanian and Serbian which were aired by Radio/ Television Kosovo</li> <li>- UNICEF conducted an assessment of accident victims and group discussions with villagers to better understand behavior causing mine/UXO accidents</li> </ul>
<b>Projects' Success at Achieving Expected Results:</b>		<b>Z-010022</b>
Failed to Achieve Results:		
Achieved Results:		
Exceeded Expected Results:		
<b>General Evaluation of Cost Effectiveness, Partnerships and Appropriateness of Design</b>		- The project is multilateral and no evaluation of the program is available.



## BALKANS CMAP EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE SUMMARY OF RESPONSES

**Prepared By: Jeff Naylor, Research Assistant**

The following tables provide a summary of the responses received from the CMAP Evaluation Questionnaire. Also included for information is a copy of the questionnaire. It should be noted that the questionnaire was sent to all partners and executing agencies and formed the basis of the interviews that were conducted during the evaluation field mission and in most cases, responses were oral. The respondents listed below provided written responses that have been included in the report and are summarized in the following matrixes:

### SURVEY RESPONDENTS

Respondent(s) and Position(s)	Organization	CIDA Projects(s)
Oliver Mitrevski, Operations Manager	CIDC	Z-011295 Z-020339
David Horton, Executive Director	CIDC	Z-011295 Z-020339
Dzevad Hadzic, Program Manager	APM	Z-020217
Stephen Bryant	NPA	Z-020341
Almedina Komic, Emanuel Sauvage, Landmine Impact Survey National Operation Coordinator, Director	Handicap International Mission in BiH	Z-011296 Z-020217 Z-020340
Lt Col Jim Greaves UK Army, Maj James Gladwin UK Army, MsDijan Trivakovic-Lucic, Chief Countermines, EOD, Chief Mines, Intel, Senior Engineer Consultant	SFOR Engineer Branch (EAF Demining)	Z-011299 Z-020343
Malcolm Peat, Project Manager, Executive Director	ICACBR and Queen's University	Z-010280
Dennis Snider, Ambassador	Canadian Embassy, Zagreb	All Croatia Projects
Sid Murray, Training Manager	CIDC	Z-020339 (02)
David Rowe, Program Manager and Strategic Advisor	UNDP	MAC projects in BiH
Alison Clement, Program Coordinator et al	DFAIT/ILX Mine Action Team	Entire CMAP

\*NB: Questionnaire response from DFAIT/ILX, Mine Action Team applied to overall Balkans CMAP and for ease of input was incorporated directly into the Evaluation Report (see footnotes for reference).

## PARAPHRASED RESPONSES OF SURVEYS OF PARTNER AGENCIES FOR CMAP IN CROATIA

RESPONDER ORGANIZATION	CANADIAN EMBASSY, COVERING ALL CMAP PROJECTS IN CROATIA	CIDC MDD PROJECT
<b>Question 2.1</b> Project Effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Projects have achieved their primary goals of institution building.</li> <li>- A key reason for success is good project planning in cooperation with the CROMAC.</li> <li>- UNDP performed satisfactory administration of projects overall but could have invested more in monitoring.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- There were problems in dealing with CROMAC staff.</li> <li>- It is questionable whether CROMAC has the capability of taking over the CIDC MDD program.</li> </ul>
<b>Question 2.2</b> Key Issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Issues with projects success include CROMAC's ability to locate funding for managing MDD teams.</li> <li>- Management training at the CROMAC was focused on technical skills but some higher-level staff may still require management skill.</li> </ul>	
<b>Question 2.3:</b> Examples of key results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- CMAP has provided the greatest level of support for building the capacity of the CROMAC.</li> <li>- CMAP contributions covered approximately 10% of total contributions to Victim Assistance.</li> <li>- A technical survey allowed the release of 200,000 m<sup>2</sup> of agricultural land.</li> </ul>	
<b>Question 2.4:</b> Future needs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Areas of need include general management training.</li> <li>- Mine victims assistance and awareness may require an infusion of funds.</li> </ul>	
<b>Question 3.3:</b> Consistency with local needs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The Needs Assessment conducted with the CROMAC and other mine action agents created a strong foundation for successful programming.</li> </ul>	
<b>Question 3.2:</b> CMAP Effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Programs managed and funds used satisfactorily, with some delays in the payment of suppliers providing a mild problem.</li> </ul>	
<b>Question 3.3:</b> Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Program would have benefited from more involvement from the Canadian Embassy. The UNDP staff is often overextended and it would have allowed for Canada to gain greater visibility.</li> </ul>	

## BiH – CMAP DEMINING PARTNER – SUMMARY OF RESPONSES

RESPONDER (S)	Responses: CIDC	Responses NPA	Responses AM and HI	Responses SFOR/EAF
<b>Question 2.1:</b> Project Effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Project was successful</li> <li>- 33 of 86 MDDs in BiH trained by CIDC in 2002</li> <li>- High accreditation rate</li> <li>- Difficulties of previous 1.5 years gone in last 5 months</li> <li>- Funding of program 59% CIDA, 23% CIDC, 18% other donors. Also, program now generates \$140,000</li> </ul>		<p><b>HI</b> – CIDA funds helped APM approach financial, administrative and technical sustainability</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- SFOR distributes CIDA donation, but NATO contract rules create complications.</li> <li>- CIDA should consider making donations directly to the insurance service provider.</li> </ul>
<b>Question 2.2:</b> Key Issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Staff turnover of international instructors can create problems.</li> <li>- Human resource management and poor candidate selection are key problems. 6 Canadian instructor trainees, 3 local instructors and 9 local dog handlers failed.</li> </ul>	Effective Demining needs steady funding. BiH to conduct good planning.	<p><b>HI</b> – No major difficulties.</p> <p><b>APM</b> – some discrepancy in planned and actual activities resulted from BHMACH having monopoly on assigning tasks.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Time is needed to plan spending. Notification of funding levels is often insufficient.</li> <li>- ‘EAF’s’ work is unrecognized by the government in pay/bonuses.</li> <li>- Number insured now matches equipment available.</li> </ul>
<b>Question 2.3:</b> Examples of key results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Succeeded in training 5 women dog handlers (an extremely good record) and encouraged inter-ethnic cooperation</li> </ul>		<p><b>HI</b> - rationalize and prioritize tasks.</p> <p><b>HI</b> - reinforce mine awareness.</p> <p><b>HI</b> - landmine impact survey will help set needs &amp; priorities</p> <p><b>APM</b> - Few donors.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- CIDA funding is necessary for insurance, without which 20-25% of BiH demining capacity would be lost.</li> </ul>
<b>Question 2.4:</b> Future needs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Maintenance of accredited MDD teams.</li> <li>- Train local instructors.</li> <li>- Renewal of MDDs</li> <li>- Build non-mine related canine uses.</li> <li>- Use MDDs in other countries.</li> </ul>	<b>BiH</b> government needs to provide funding to take ownership of mine action.	<b>APM</b> - CMAP was important for APM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Integrated demining is most effective but CIDA contribution may be best spent on civil companies for mechanical preparation and MDD work.</li> </ul>
<b>Question 3.1:</b> Consistency with local needs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- BiH needs CMAP activities and results are good.</li> <li>- Focus on indigenous capacity building effective.</li> </ul>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Insurance is essential for maintaining BiH demining capacity.</li> </ul>
<b>Question 3.2:</b> CMAP effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- CIDA/CIDC management very satisfactory</li> </ul>		<b>HI</b> – CMAP and other MAPs can strengthen indigenous mine action.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- When SFOR leaves, CIDA will have to do contracting.</li> </ul>
<b>Question 3.3:</b> Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Program results will mostly manifest over the next 2 years.</li> <li>- Canada/CIDA do not gain due recognition</li> </ul>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- EAF strength in manual demining. Also, Bozena flails are too small for the task. Contracting commercial dogs and mechanical demining a good idea?</li> </ul>

## BiH – CMAP MAC and MINE VICTIM ASSISTANCE PARTNERS – SUMMARY OF RESPONSES

RESPONDER	UNDP RESPONSE ON MACC	QUEENS RESPONSE ON VICTIM ASSISTANCE
<b>Question 2.1:</b> Project Effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The project's aim was to increase BiH's indigenous MAC capabilities.</li> <li>- The BiH MAC under UNDP supervision managed it by UNDP, or.</li> <li>- The projects were effective.</li> <li>- They aided the establishment of a unified, indigenous BH MAC.</li> <li>- A state of Law on Demining was passed regulating mine action.</li> <li>- The Bosnian government gained ownership of MAC by taking over the payment of staff.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The Project was the continuation of Queen's ICACBR project from 9-1999 to 3-2000.</li> <li>- Successful at forming 10 Peer Counseling groups.</li> <li>- A gap in funding between two initiatives existed from June 2000 to March 2001.</li> <li>- Each PC group largely managed their organization through consensus/discussion.</li> <li>- A small business development component existed in partnership with SOL WBO and the Economic Institute, the University of Sarajevo.</li> </ul>
<b>Question 2.2:</b> Key Issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The tenure of international advisors was often too short to make an impact.</li> <li>- The original division of responsibilities among three MACs (BHMIC + 2 entity MACs) and lack of donor confidence from delays in adopting the Demining Law placed constraints on management.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Peer Counseling groups identified vulnerable populations, not just mine victims.</li> <li>- The two project coordinators were strong leaders.</li> <li>- The 9-month financing delay caused financial and personal difficulties.</li> <li>- The relationship with SOL WBO was effective professionally but unnecessarily complex.</li> </ul>
<b>Question 2.3:</b> Examples of key results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The project increased indigenous capacity, created the State Law on Demining, and encouraged the Bosnian authorities to fund MAC staff salaries.</li> <li>- Field contributions and training increased MACs capability to coordinate operations.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The 10 PC groups involved approx. 1,000 PWDs.</li> <li>- PWDs organized and implemented community and public relations initiatives.</li> <li>- Federation and RS groups integrated into a single disability initiative and women PWDs were involved in a productive small business.</li> <li>- PC groups gained funding from new sources.</li> <li>- A PC group for mothers of children PWDs formed.</li> <li>- Coalition of Associations of PWDs successfully lobbied for a Law on Building (Accessibility).</li> <li>- Survey on attitudes of school children on PWDs (positive).</li> </ul>
<b>Question 2.4:</b> Future needs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Effective mine action needs to become a highlighted consideration at the highest levels of the government.</li> <li>- The Demining Commission should be able to influence their minister.</li> <li>- The Commission should have a support team for special administrative and communication functions.</li> <li>- BHMIC requires more capable information and operational management systems.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- PC groups are sustainable. They will need legal registration as a national PC organization, which is complicated by F8iH and RS's legal systems.</li> <li>- Enhanced knowledge, attitudes and behaviours of the general population towards PWDs.</li> <li>- International agencies are rarely physically accessible or employ PWDs.</li> <li>- CIDA should take a leadership role by finalizing a disability policy framework.</li> <li>- Canada-Japan Queen's CBR initiative identifies peer support, providing opportunities to incorporate previous PC experience.</li> </ul>
<b>Question 3.1:</b> Consistency with local needs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The Canadian program effectively identified needs, was compatible with local efforts and contributed directly to the work of other organizations.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- CMAP is excellent in that it targets all aspects of mine action, including victim assistance.</li> </ul>
<b>Question 3.2:</b> CMAP effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The CMAPs ability to provide responses tailored to needs is a definite strength.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- CIDA delay in funding was problematic and seemed extreme for the size of funds requested.</li> </ul>
<b>Question 3.3:</b> Recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Canada should encourage BiH government to improve awareness and ownership of mine action.</li> <li>- Focus on educational and support needs of the Demining Commission.</li> <li>- Additional investment in the management function of the BHMIC.</li> <li>- CIDA could continue to monitor progress in the development of BiH mine action capabilities.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Longer term funding.</li> <li>- No gap in the funding of two project phases.</li> <li>- Centralize administration of projects.</li> <li>- Landmine survivors should be brought into broader disability arena.</li> <li>- Good leadership at the grassroots level is key.</li> <li>- Decentralization promotes local ownership.</li> <li>- Review clause of CIDA contracts on Health Protection that may be grounds for discrimination against PWDs.</li> </ul>

DRAFT

November 13, 2002

Name  
Title  
Organization  
Address

Dear <name>

The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) is presently conducting an evaluation of its Mine Action Program (MAP) in the Balkans. This five-year, \$ 20 M (CAD) Program comprised 34 individual projects in the areas of: mine/UXO survey, marking and clearance; mine resistance education/awareness (MRE); institution and capacity building; and mine victim assistance. The projects were located primarily in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo with some residual programming support undertaken in Slovenia and Albania.

This unique, multi-faceted and responsive program provided for the achievement of many results and a number of valuable lessons. The evaluation of the MAP in the Balkans intends to capture these to improve future programming, particularly in light of the possible revitalization of Canadian Landmine Fund in 2003 and in terms of Canada's assistance to mine-affected countries in Africa.

An important aspect of the MAP evaluation in the Balkans is to carry out consultations to get the opinion of key stakeholders on certain elements of the program as well as to collect complementary information about the performance of the program. As such, the consultations aim at gathering input for the purpose of enhancing program effectiveness by refining project design parameters, monitoring requirements, reporting protocols and the type of results that should be expected.

The consultations will take place through an evaluation questionnaire and interviews to be conducted during an evaluation field mission to take place between November 15 and December 03, 2002. We are enclosing a copy of the questionnaire that we would like you to complete. We intend to use this as the basis for our discussions and interview with you during our field visit and the completed questionnaires will be included as part of the evaluation database.

Please do not hesitate to contact Jeff Naylor, Research Advisor, Canadian International Development Agency at phone number (819) 994-3564 or e-mail: [JEFF\\_NAYLOR@acdi-cida.gc.ca](mailto:JEFF_NAYLOR@acdi-cida.gc.ca) if you need any additional clarification or assistance in responding to these questions.

Thank you for your participation in this important evaluation. We look forward to receiving your input.

Lisanne Garceau-Bednar  
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