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# A Review of Ten Years Assistance to the Mine Action Programme in Mozambique

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**A REVIEW  
OF TEN YEARS ASSISTANCE  
TO THE MINE ACTION  
PROGRAMME  
IN MOZAMBIQUE**

Geneva, October 2005



Geneva International Centre for  
Humanitarian Demining  
Centre International de  
Démunage Humanitaire - Genève





## Preface

The Review Team wishes to thank the many people who shared their time and thoughts with us, helping to make the mission to Mozambique a success and leading directly to many of the findings contained in this report. Appendix 2 contains a list of the many people we met in conducting this review, and neither space nor energy allow a full acknowledgement of each one's contributions. We do need, however, to note the pivotal roles played by Marylène Spezzati, the UNDP Resident Representative in Maputo, and Gana Fofang, the Deputy Resident Representative, who foresaw the need for a Review and then made it happen, and by Gamiliel Munguambe, Director of the National Demining Institute (IND), for his support of the Review which allowed the Team such good access to the information and people in IND and, more widely, within the mine action community.

We also need to acknowledge those individuals who invested many hours in arranging appointments, flights, accommodation, and the myriad other details on which the success of a mission depends: Maria Isabel dos Santos and Benjamin Siteo of IND; and Alberto Alface, and Clarisse Nhabangue of UNDP-Maputo. Graeme Abernethy, the Technical Adviser for Operations at IND at the time of the mission, deserves special mention for assistance beyond the call of duty, Terms of Reference, or – in some cases – a decent night's sleep.

In preparing this final report, the Review Team also benefited from many comments received from IND, UNDP, donors, and operators. Special thanks is due to Archie Law, the UNDP Regional Mine Action Adviser for Africa, both for his own comments and for compiling those of others.

Finally, we must stress that the findings, conclusions, lessons learned, and recommendations contained in this report represent the views of the Review Team. UNOPS, UNDP, and the Government of Mozambique are not responsible for the content of this report or bound by its recommendations.

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## Executive Summary

Mozambique is a large country on the south-eastern coast of Africa. Most of its almost 19 million people live in rural areas and most households – including many in urban areas – still depend on agriculture to a significant degree. When mine action activities began just over a decade ago, Mozambique was perhaps the poorest country in the world, due in large part to prolonged under-investment in infrastructure and public services by the Portuguese colonial regime, coupled with the destruction and social dislocations wrought by almost three decades of civil war. Transportation and communication networks were woefully inadequate, and much of what did exist was unusable due to landmine contamination. This contamination caused many casualties among refugees and the internally displaced as they returned to their home communities, and further isolated these communities from access to markets and essential public services.

Mozambique has made great strides since the signing of the General Peace Agreement in 1992. Economic growth has been brisk. Three multi-party elections have been held. Infrastructure has been rehabilitated and expanded, as have basic public services. Most fundamentally, peace has been sustained. However, the country remains extremely poor and still faces enormous social and economic challenges. There is cause for optimism, but no certainty that the rapid progress over the past decade will be maintained. Poverty reduction is a particular challenge, requiring new efforts to reform policies, enhance governance, increase productive investment, and expand public services.

Mine action has played a role in Mozambique's achievements over the past decade by opening infrastructure networks, reducing the toll of casualties from landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO), assisting landmine survivors, and clearing hazards that posed a danger to lives and a constraint on development for many communities. As is true for most activities in Mozambique, observers with the benefit of hindsight can point to many ways in which mine action organisations and the programme overall could have done better. But in broad terms, the outcomes are positive. Casualties are down dramatically, and travel in the country is basically unimpeded by explosives contamination. Large areas that were suspected of contamination have been released for safe use by civilians through survey and clearance. The wellbeing of people in hundreds of communities has been enhanced – in many cases, dramatically so – by mine action. In addition, Mozambique has played an active and high profile role within the Ottawa process,<sup>1</sup> and has met its international treaty obligations to date.

At the same time, the future Mozambique's mine action programme faces significant challenges at this juncture. In part these arise because the core objectives of "humanitarian mine action" either have been achieved in a practical sense (the objective to save lives and limbs) or are in sight (attaining 'mine impact free' status for most of the country).

The core question at this point might be put, in blunt terms, as: is there life for mine action after people stop dying from landmines? This study reviews the history of Mozambique's mine action programme and addresses this core question.

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<sup>1</sup> This refers to efforts to meet the obligations of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty and to universalise the landmine ban.



## Origin and Nature of the Landmine Problem


The landmine contamination in Mozambique is the result of three distinct phases of conflict:

1. 1964-1975 – Large barrier minefields laid by the Portuguese as protection against incursions by FRELIMO, plus defensive minefields around key infrastructure.
2. 1976-1979 – Rhodesian military incursions and the emergence of RENAMO during the Zimbabwean independence war.
3. 1979-1992 – Civil conflict between FRELIMO and RENAMO.

The first official attempt to estimate the scale of the contamination problem was in 1992 when the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) requested information on the “existence and nature of the mine problem in Mozambique.” The estimate of two million mines was often quoted at the time and a 1994 report stated that mines “*have claimed more than 10,000 victims*”. Clearly, the international community viewed Mozambique as one of the most seriously contaminated countries in the world.

It is now believed that these early estimates overstated the severity of the problem. In 1993 UNOHAC contracted HALO Trust to undertake an emergency “nationwide” survey, but the budget and duration allowed were limited and HALO could compile only an incomplete picture. In 1999, CIDA commissioned a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) to define the contamination problem not in terms of the extent of the hazards, but in the socio-economic impacts on communities. When completed in 2001, the message was that the contamination problem was more extensive than intensive. The survey identified 791 mine affected communities in all ten provinces and 123 of 128 districts, but relatively few of the affected communities, home to a relatively small number of people, were scored as seriously affected.

**Figure 1 – Percentages of all affected people and communities by level of impact (from LIS)**



## Evolution of the Mine Action Programme

The mine action programme has gone through three phases:

1. Start-up (1992-95) – Following the General Peace Agreement in 1992 and without benefit of a thorough assessment of the scope of the contamination problem, separate initiatives

led to (i) clearance of roads and other key infrastructure networks by commercial demining firms;<sup>2</sup> (ii) HALO Trust “humanitarian”<sup>3</sup> demining<sup>4</sup> operations in Zambézia and the northern provinces; (iii) the Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) mine action programme in the central provinces of Manica, Sofala, and Tete; and (iv) the training of hundreds of deminers by ONUMOZ, following which the UN established the Accelerated Demining Programme (ADP) in 1994 to employ the trained deminers.<sup>5</sup>

2. Consolidation (1995-99) – in 1995 the Government of Mozambique (GoM) created the National Mine Clearance Commission (NMCC or CND in its Portuguese acronym). It had little capacity and never functioned adequately. As a result, the structure of the national mine action programme coalesced into three geographically distinct “humanitarian” programmes. HALO Trust operates in the north with NPA in the centre and ADP in the south (joined in 1998 by Handicap International [HI] which established a more limited capacity to undertake “proximity demining” in Inhambane province). In addition, demining firms collectively have significant capacities which serve almost as a shock-absorber: their activities ebbing-and-flowing with the availability of commercial contracts.

During this period, the GoM became increasingly active in the Ottawa process centred on the *Convention*<sup>6</sup> on anti-personnel landmines. The Government was in the first cohort to sign the *Convention* (in December 1997) and to ratify it (in 1998) to come into force in March 1999.<sup>7</sup> It also hosted the first Meeting of the States Parties in 1999, and has since played an active and high profile role in the Ottawa process.

3. Maturation (1999-2004) – in 1999, the GoM replaced the NMCC/CND with the National Demining Institute (IND). Reporting directly to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (MINEC), IND is a distinct statutory body, giving it some freedom from cumbersome civil service policies and procedures. In the same year, CIDA commissioned the LIS. Completed in 2001, the LIS data were stored in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) maintained by IND. Drawing upon the LIS data, in late 2001 IND issued Mozambique’s first five year strategy for mine action – the National Mine Action Plan 2002-2006 (NMAP) – which has as its central objective the

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<sup>2</sup> The initial contract rounds initiated what has been termed a “feeding frenzy” (DHA, 1997), leading some donors to adopt extremely nationalistic stances, complicating donor coordination for some years.

<sup>3</sup> The mine action community often employs the term “humanitarian” to refer to “not military” and “not commercial”, rather than in its normal use to refer to activities motivated by the “humanitarian imperative” to save lives and limbs solely on the basis of need. In the Mozambique mine action programme, “humanitarian operators” refers to the international NGOs, the UNDP’s ADP, and the firm Ronco, which is financed by the US Department of State to support Mozambican demining organisations. MgM – a German NGO – also managed a demining programme from 2000 to late 2003.

<sup>4</sup> “Demining” refers to the survey, marking, and/or clearance of minefields.

<sup>5</sup> In addition, international NGOs delivered Mine Risk Education (MRE) for refugees prior to their return and, subsequently and increasingly in conjunction with local partners, within Mozambique. Disability assistance projects had been underway since at least the mid-1980s, and from the mid-1990s assistance was targeted specifically to people disabled by landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) – in the mine action field, these are termed victim assistance activities.

<sup>6</sup> Formally the *Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction*.

<sup>7</sup> Mozambique has not passed legislation giving effect to the provisions within Mozambique.

achievement of “mine impact free” status within 10 years, with all high- and medium-impact sites cleared by the end of 2006.<sup>8</sup>

Although performing far better than the former NMCC/CND, IND has as yet been unable to establish fully adequate coordination to ensure the activities of the humanitarian operators are consistent with a overall national plan for mine action. In part this is because operators saw the LIS as flawed and largely ignored its findings or the priorities identified by IND on the basis of LIS data.

During this period US assistance, delivered via Ronco, led to the creation of two additional demining entities: army (FADM) units, and the Quick Reaction Demining Force (QRDF), available for rapid mobilisation to trouble spots such as Afghanistan and Iraq, but otherwise working in Mozambique. Commercial demining also continued, with the size of the sector rising and falling in line with the demand for demining services to support work on major infrastructure projects, and following the massive floods in 2000.

### Current Status of the Mine Action Programme<sup>9</sup>

The Minister of Foreign Affairs serves, essentially, as the national mine action authority.<sup>10</sup> He has played a respected and high profile role in the Ottawa process but – understandably given with the natural priorities of a foreign affairs portfolio – has had less influence on the domestic aspects of the mine action programme.<sup>11</sup>

The Minister is supported by IND serving, essentially, as the national Mine Action Centre (MAC), maintaining the IMSMA database, issuing annual plans and reports, preparing reports to the States Parties to the *Convention*, adopting National Mine Action Standards (NMAS), conducting some regulatory functions to ensure adherence to these standards, and providing a modest level of service to other public sector bodies when these request assistance in dealing with suspected contamination. With headquarters in Maputo, IND also has regional offices for the central and northern regions.

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<sup>8</sup> The NMAP also adopts a “*development oriented*’ approach that seeks to maximize the socio-economic impact...by integrating its program framework into the overall PARPA [Mozambique’s poverty reduction strategy].” While endorsing the aim, the Review Team notes that mine action is not mentioned in the existing PARPA. We understand that, subsequent to our mission, IND has stepped-up its engagement with the consultation processes that will lead to a new PARPA later in 2005.

<sup>9</sup> There have been significant developments since the Review Team mission in January-February 2005, including the collapse of ADP, one of the largest operators. These have been noted in a chapter added to the main report, but are not incorporated into this Executive Summary which reflects developments up to the mission. In the view of the Review Team, the validity of the recommendations and lessons learned has not been affected by the more recent developments.

<sup>10</sup> The actual divisions of authorities and responsibilities between the Minister and IND are very ambiguous in Decree 37/99, which established the Institute. Essentially, these are all assigned to IND, but then IND reports to the Minister. In many mine affected countries, an inter-ministerial group serves as the mine action authority. Mozambique lacks such a body, which would have provided a conduit for concerns from ministries with mandates more focussed on domestic concerns.

<sup>11</sup> In his interview with the Review Team, the outgoing Minister stated that it is an advantage to have the mine action programme under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs because that ministry had few other responsibilities relating to domestic development, and could devote greater political attention to mine action. While perhaps true, it also means mine action is viewed in the context of the policy agenda facing the minister, which has focussed largely on the Ottawa process and resource mobilisation from foreign donors. As a result, links between mine action and other public sector bodies, and particularly those responsible for development investments, are not yet sufficiently developed.

IND is supported by a UNDP “Nationally Executed Project” focusing on capacity-building, with three Technical Advisers (TAs) in place at the time of the Review Team’s mission. Most stakeholders agree that IND represents a vast improvement over NMCC/CND, and that its performance has been gradually improving. There remain, however, gaps between IND’s current performance levels and what is required if the national mine action programme is to enhance its contribution to Mozambique’s broader development and poverty reduction efforts.

In some cases, performance gaps do not result from a lack of staff capabilities or tools: many staff appear well trained and have sound ideas regarding how their performance, and that of the Institute, could be improved. A centralised approach to management (as is traditional in Mozambique’s public service) coupled with an absence of administrative policies and procedures to support more decentralised operations are the root cause of many of the performance gaps.<sup>12</sup> Further, the feeling is that the biggest operators would not take direction from IND, regardless of how well it functioned, which cannot be good for staff motivation. Finally, IND’s existing mandate is based on the needs perceived some five years ago, while the present and (particularly) future challenges are significantly different. A re-orientation of mandate will be required to align IND’s capacities with evolving requirements.

Over 20 demining operators are currently accredited,<sup>13</sup> but most of these are commercial operators and apparently only three of these (plus one Quality Assurance firm) had contracts in 2003. About 1300 personnel are employed by the humanitarian operators (including FADM and Ronco-QRDF). FADM’s mandate covers all regions, but the others operate regionally – HALO Trust in the north; NPA and Ronco-QRDF in the centre; and both ADP and HI in the south. HALO Trust, NPA, and HI set their own priorities, as does ADP although with greater consideration to the list of IND priorities.<sup>14</sup>

From an operational point of view, this system functions reasonably well. The organisations are technically capable and the four main humanitarian operators, representing the bulk of the capacity, have deep roots in their operating theatres, with reasonable (albeit different) systems in place for establishing priorities.

In terms of its overall structure, the programme has been stable in recent years, and three distinct regional programmes still co-exist in Mozambique. Major changes are in-stream however. The three international NGOs plan to close their operations by the end of 2006, at which point they believe their regions will be, in essence, “impact free”. ADP has been given the goal of transforming itself from a UNDP-supported project into a “local NGO” (although it seems to have made scant progress in this regard).<sup>15</sup> While these decisions have been made independently, they imply that the mine action stakeholders (GoM, IND, operators, UNDP, donors, etc.) are – collectively – facing a number of inter-related, strategic decisions which will change the structure and orientation of the programme.

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<sup>12</sup> Management and administrative approaches are, in large part, inherited from the civil service. Both the GoM and donors view these as antiquated and significant efforts are underway or planned for civil service reform – a notoriously difficult process even in industrialised countries.

<sup>13</sup> All are listed in Appendix 3.

<sup>14</sup> FADM and (to a significant degree when not called away to a trouble spot by the American government) Ronco-QRDF also take instruction from IND regarding priorities.


<sup>15</sup> ADP’s operations collapsed subsequent to the Review Team’s mission, and it remains unclear whether it will be revitalised successfully. This is touched upon in the added chapter.

## Achievements of the Mine Action Programme

The early establishment and subsequent consolidation of three semi-autonomous regional ‘humanitarian’ programmes has greatly complicated efforts to plan and coordinate Mozambique’s mine action programme on a national basis. Still, the programme has achieved or contributed to some excellent outcomes.

The numbers of landmine and UXO accidents and victims – which some had estimated at 600 a year in the early 1990s – have fallen dramatically, reaching 13 accidents and 14 victims (four of whom were deminers) in 2003;<sup>16</sup> likely the lowest number of victims per capita of any developing country with a large mine action programme.<sup>17</sup>

**Figure 2 – Annual Victims of Landmine & UXO Accidents, per capita**



While it is impossible to ascertain how much the fall in victim numbers can be attributed to mine action in general, or to any specific mine action component, certainly the programme has contributed to this important achievement. In a practical sense, landmine and UXO contamination no longer represents a humanitarian emergency in Mozambique.

In addition, significant progress has been made in terms of clearance and, more broadly, in generating a better picture of the extent and precise location of suspected hazard areas (SHA).<sup>18</sup> IND data suggest that an average of over 5.5 million square metres has been cleared per year since 2000; meanwhile, an analysis of data from IND and deminers suggest the total contamination is far lower than had been feared (perhaps in the range of 25 million square metres, although any estimate at this point should be treated with great caution). From this perspective, the “mine impact free” target is in sight, although some residual capacity for demining and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) will need to be sustained to deal with the threats emerging from residual contamination.

Given the great progress in reducing landmine accidents and victims, stand-alone MRE projects seem no longer warranted, in spite of the statement in the NMAP that “*There is an urgent need for an aggressive and sustained Mine Risk Education and Marking campaigns to*

<sup>16</sup> The numbers of victims rose to 29 in 2004, but from the same number of accidents. Most civilian accidents in recent years appear to be from UXO rather than landmines.

<sup>17</sup> Calculations are the averages for the two most recent years for which data are available. Data for Angola are thought to be very incomplete, even more so than for Mozambique. Even still, recorded casualties in Angola are 17 times higher on a per capita basis than in Mozambique.

<sup>18</sup> The term suspected mined area (SMA) is more commonly used in Mozambique. We prefer SHA as it comprises UXO as well.

*be re-launched.*” This is an important milestone, freeing scarce resources for other development priorities.

Assistance projects targeting victims of landmine and UXO accidents have generally been grafted onto larger disability assistance programmes supported by ICRC, HI, and other specialist NGOs. These disability assistance programmes have built substantial capacities in the form of orthopaedic clinics, physiotherapy centres, and highly trained personnel, but these capacities appear to be far in excess of what the GoM can sustain. Facilities are under-utilised, not because of a lack of need but because most of the disabled, including landmine and UXO victims, are unaware of the facilities, or cannot reach them, or have no accommodation close to the clinic for out-patient treatment. Further assistance to victims of landmine and UXO accidents should focus on these service gaps (as part of broader disability assistance efforts), and on the capacity of the health sector more generally.

The GoM has also played an important and greatly appreciated role on the international stage of the Ottawa process. In particular and on schedule, it reached its critical milestone for stockpile destruction in early 2003, which also symbolises the important achievements the country has made in peace-building. Mine action has made other contributions to peace-building by giving good employment to members of both former warring factions and, more generally, by contributing to human security in mine affected areas of the country. The value of such contributions may be impossible to quantify, but they are also very real given the fact that Mozambique was in armed conflict for almost 30 years.<sup>19</sup>

Claims that mine action has contributed to the country’s development and to the government’s overarching goal of poverty reduction are also accepted by most parties, although IND and other mine action organisations have found it difficult to quantify or compile a compelling picture of such contributions (a common problem for most national mine action programmes). Donors and others were also disappointed that neither landmines nor the mine action programme was even mentioned in the initial PARPA – the Government’s key development strategy document. The failure by the GoM to provide more of its own funds to the mine action programme has also been noted with concern by donors.

A significant but overlooked mine action donor contribution that has had broader developmental benefits was the support provided by CIDA to DINAGECA, the national mapping agency. While this project was motivated by the desire to benefit from the geographic information system (GIS) and mapping functionalities within IMSMA, it also provided Mozambique with the capacity to produce a wide variety of maps and other information based on digitized toponomy and a gazetteer. Such capacity is a great boon to development planners and poverty researchers.

One area of concern is the role mine action agencies may play in the transmission of HIV/AIDS infection. At 13.8 per cent of the population, HIV infection rates in Mozambique are extremely high and appear to be rising quickly. The Review Team is not aware of any studies on infection rates or, more generally, sexual practices among deminers, but significant percentages of the staff in some operators are unable to work because of illnesses that are

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
<sup>19</sup> Research by The World Bank indicates that almost half of all post-conflict countries will slip back into conflict within a decade of the peace agreement. (Collier et al, 2003)

often associated with AIDS.<sup>20</sup> Given the lag between infection and visible symptoms, there is every reason to fear that deminers serve as a vector of transmission, both to communities in mine affected areas and to their wives or sexual partners at home. In addition, by assisting to open road networks, demining may be contributing indirectly to HIV/AIDS transmission by well-known high risk groups such as long distance truckers.<sup>21</sup>

## Assistance by the International Community

The achievements garnered by Mozambique's mine action programme have, in large part, been made possible by generous donor support, which appears to have totalled over \$150 million since 1993. The level of support<sup>22</sup> appears to have been reasonably constant, at least since 2000 when IND began compiling estimates.<sup>23</sup> Certainly Mozambique has never suffered the kind of precipitous collapse in funding experienced by many other large mine action programmes, allowing IND and the major operators to plan with greater assurance.

**Figure 3 – Estimated donor funding to Mozambique for mine action**



Although collectively, donors have provided consistent support to mine action, they never have endorsed a collective plan for the national programme. UN and donor initiatives lacked coherence particularly during the start-up phase, when relations among key donors, among diverse UN agencies, and between the donors and the UN were often strained.<sup>24</sup> This validated the unofficial division of the country into three theatres of operation.

From the mid-1990s until recently, donor coordination appears to have been far smoother, with UNDP assuming the main responsibility for convening donors within a mine action

<sup>20</sup> Reportedly eight per cent in NPA. ADP acknowledges a problem of similar magnitude. Note however that Mozambican law prohibits the testing of employees to see whether they are HIV positive, so it cannot be assumed that all these employees are suffering from HIV/AIDS.

<sup>21</sup> The main operators have had HIV/AIDS policies in place for some years, but the impact of the pandemic is so great that these should be re-assessed regularly in light of best practice.

<sup>22</sup> Not all assistance was provided as financial support. A good deal has come in the form of equipment and, particularly in the consolidation phase, as technical assistance.

<sup>23</sup> Again, data are incomplete. The most complete compilation of data uncovered by the Review Team (Lambert-Madore, 2003) arrived at roughly \$100 million from 1993 to 2001. We have used those estimates for 1993-1999, and the estimates provided by IND since then.

<sup>24</sup> The Mozambique case study report from the multi-country study on indigenous capacity development (DHA, 1997) covers this period in some detail. A major problem was the multiplicity of UN agencies with different mandates – peacekeeping, relief, development, and so on. As a result of that study, the UN reformed its own architecture for dealing with mine action issues.



support group. This appears to have served as a good mechanism for sharing information, for resource mobilisation, and for delivering a unified message in policy dialogues with the GoM on occasion.<sup>25</sup> There is no indication of a concerted attempt to raise the dialogue to a more strategic level: indeed, this may have threatened established activities and, as the programme seemed to be working reasonably well, donors saw no great urgency to fix it.

As shown by its commissioning of this review, the UNDP recognises the need for greater urgency today. There is widespread talk of donor fatigue, implying that international funding for Mozambique's mine action programme is likely to fall. However, there are many factors influencing future programming decisions by donors, and these carry different weights in the decisions of different donors: the term "donor fatigue" needs to be unbundled by examining: (i) the perceived need for continued international funding; (ii) factors affecting the supply of international funds for mine action; and (iii) the degree of confidence donors have that their funds will contribute to a sustainable solution. There is a need for greater leadership on the part of the GoM to address the underlying issues that might lead to donor fatigue by:

- Formulating a national strategy that incorporates credible plans for a sustainable solution to the country's medium- and long-term mine action challenges;
- Enhancing transparency and accountability within the key organs of the mine action programme, and taking decisive action whenever problems arise in the use of funds;
- Taking credible steps to assume greater responsibility for the country's mine action problem, including enhancing the institutional foundations of the programme (i.e. its structure plus the legal and regulatory framework); the appropriate incorporation of mine action into the PARPA; and the infusion of additional government funds.

Thus, the dangers inherent from donor fatigue can be addressed if the GoM exercises the rights and responsibilities of "ownership" – the rights to determine priorities and to formulate plans for addressing these; the responsibilities to contribute materially to the solution and to account for the results achieved, in part, with foreign assistance.

## **The Links to Development**

Current efforts to improve aid effectiveness and achieve better development outcomes hinge largely on the concept of recipient government ownership. If a mine action programme is to link strongly with development, the key organs of the national programme must engage with development managers within the government arena. Given Mozambique's size and its transportation/communication difficulties, links must be forged at the macro (core economic and development policy units), meso (sector ministries, provincial governments, etc.), and micro (community) levels. In addition, sound links must be maintained with the international arena and, particularly, the mine action donor community.

### ***Links at the Macro Level***

The links between the mine action programme and the government arena in Mozambique are in some instances good, but require strengthening overall. IND is yet to engage systematically with the core economic management and development policy units and it needs to do so to

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<sup>25</sup> One example was the push for the GoM to assume responsibility for the country's landmine problem, leading to the establishment of the first National Authority in 1995 and, subsequently, the creation of the more effective IND in 1999.



ensure mine action is properly reflected in the two most critical development management instruments – the PARPA and the annual state budget.<sup>26</sup> GoM funding of mine action also remains modest.

### **Meso Level Links**

Links with certain units in sector ministries or parastatals do exist,<sup>27</sup> but these often reflect the initiative of those organisations rather than IND. IND has provided reasonable support when approached. However, other government units whose work programmes are constrained or distorted by contamination, but which do not take the initiative to approach IND, are not receiving advice or assistance. A more proactive approach by IND is warranted to ensure these government units are aware that assistance is available. A proactive approach would also pay dividends in spreading best practice among government units requiring demining assistance in support of the infrastructure work programmes.

Perhaps the most important finding of this review is the existence of substantial demand for demining services – engaged mainly through competitive processes – to support infrastructure rehabilitation and development. This demand appears likely to increase and should continue at a robust level for the next decade. The Review Team’s partial survey of public sector units suggests demand for demining could be in the range of \$10 million to over \$20 million per year over the coming decade.<sup>28</sup>

National mine action authorities are aware that commercial demining has been occurring, but not of the magnitude of demand. As well, recent plans and statements have not reflected the fact that demining services in support of major infrastructure work is almost certainly the main contribution of mine action to Mozambique’s development and to poverty reduction at the present time. For example, a recent IND document stated that “*Focus has now moved from clearing Roads, Bridges, Railways and Power Lines to Land release.*”<sup>29</sup>

The Review Team also found that planning and implementation procedures relating to demining services differ significantly across the various government units responsible for infrastructure programmes. Procedures range from excellent to non-existent. There is tremendous opportunity to substantially enhance the developmental and poverty-reducing impact of mine action simply by turning best practice into common practice.

While links between the humanitarian operators and provincial governors/district administrators appear for the most part to be adequate and improving, links between IND and sub-national administrations remain, on average, weaker. Decentralisation of IND functions should help more in this regard, but the decentralised offices require greater authority if they are to reach their potential. One of the two regional offices is making a good effort at carving-

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<sup>26</sup> Subsequent to the Review Team’s mission, the newly installed government did highlight mine action as a cross-cutting issue within its Five-Year Programme (*Programa do Governo para 2005-2009*), indicating mine action is now on the Government’s agenda and that the new PARPA (due later this year) will give it some mention.

<sup>27</sup> Of the units visited, ANE (roads) and EDM (electricity), have sound policies and procedures in place for dealing with suspected contamination. The National Water Authority also works closely with IND, although the Review Team recommends it align its procedures with those of ANE and EDM.

<sup>28</sup> Such estimates need to be treated with caution, but clearly there is substantial demand.

<sup>29</sup> IND, 2004, *Communication Elements of Plans to Implement Article 5 of the Ottawa Convention*, (marked “draft” but apparently submitted), p. 1.

out a useful role for itself, but the other needs clearer direction and support from IND headquarters in Maputo.

### ***Micro Level Links***

Much of the impact of landmine and UXO contamination is extremely localised, representing a danger to civilians and a constraint on community development. Therefore, the mine action programme also requires sound links with the community development arena comprising local officials, community-based organisations, and community development NGOs. Links between the humanitarian operators and the local community arena have improved over the years and now appear adequate or better in most cases. Those between IND and local communities are inconsistent. Again, IND's decentralisation effort has not yet delivered the full dividends in this regard, and further progress will be contingent on the delegation of appropriate degrees of authority and resources to regional offices, coupled with clear direction concerning priorities and expected levels of performance.

### ***Links with the International Arena***

Of course, in any aid dependent country such as Mozambique, much of the financing for development comes from donors. Links with the international arena remain vital therefore. For the mine action programme, these links range from excellent (in matters relating to the *Convention*) to weak (with regard to systematic dialogue between the government and the representatives of donors supporting mine action in Mozambique). The international NGOs appear to have good relations with most of their donors. A common concern expressed to the Review Team was the lack of a regular forum comprising ADP's management, UNDP, and the donors providing support to the ADP programme.

### ***Understanding Development Planning and Management Processes***

If the mine action programme is to enhance its contribution to development and poverty reduction, mine action actors need a better understanding of how development is planned and implemented by governments, and how the international community is trying to align its assistance in support of government priorities. The omission of any reference to landmines in the PARPA or in subsequent State Budgets demonstrates that mine action was not on the government's development agenda in a concrete fashion, although the significant space given to mine action in the recent Five Year Programme may herald a welcome change. However, while mention in the Five Year Programme and, eventually, the new PARPA for 2006-2010 is necessary to demonstrate that the problem of landmine contamination is firmly on the government's development agenda, it would be far from sufficient on its own.

Any national development document, such as PARPA, is based largely on more detailed planning work at the sector level. The threat of landmine contamination affects specific sectors such as transportation (roads, bridges, railways), power (electricity generation and distribution), water, and agriculture, as well as social sectors such as education, health, and social welfare. The evidence garnered by the Review Team indicates that the work programmes of these sectors and others are being constrained by contamination, but these problems are not adequately reflected in IND plans and annual reports, and there is insufficient communication between IND and the government units responsible. In turn, the development plans of these sectors and sub-sectors do not reflect their requirements for demining services.


IND needs to engage more actively with the government units and parastatals that require demining services to execute their work programmes. It needs to provide the technical advice necessary, and to encourage these units to identify landmine contamination as a problem within their sector plans and budget submissions. If this happens, IND will find a ready audience in the core economic management units responsible for compiling the PARPA and the State Budget.

## Assessment of Current Challenges

### *Extent and Socio-economic Impacts of Contamination*

The LIS was never designed to produce an accurate assessment of the area contaminated by landmines and UXO contamination: indeed, the methodology employed was certain to generate an inflated figure.<sup>30</sup> Regardless, the LIS estimate for the total area suspected of contamination – 562 km<sup>2</sup> – was for many years treated seemingly as a mantra, perhaps in an effort to demonstrate great need for continued assistance. It has always been clear to knowledgeable observers that the true area would be far smaller, and extrapolating the results from systematic re-survey work by several of the operators in the past two years (not yet fully reflected in the IND database) suggests the true figure may be in the 25 km<sup>2</sup> to 50 km<sup>2</sup> range (depicted in the graph below as ‘best guess’). Some of this contamination has no current impact on human safety or economic activity. Therefore, the contention of HALO Trust, NPA, and HI that the country can be mine impact free by the end of 2006 seems plausible.

**Figure 4 – Total suspected hazard area (SHA) as per IND (and Review Team’s ‘best guess’)**



Of course, mine impact free in this sense is a static concept. Some new investments in infrastructure will be constrained by contamination and so new impacts emerge. The evidence garnered by the Review Team suggests that mine action organisations are not fully aware of how significant this type of emergent impact is at the present time, or that it is likely to increase. As well, population and economic growth in mine affected regions will also enlarge the “economic footprints” of communities, bring them into contact with minefields and UXO which hitherto had not posed a problem. Finally, political instability within a neighbouring state could in future lead to refugees entering Mozambique. If so, minefields that do not affect Mozambicans at this time could suddenly pose a grave danger to refugees.

<sup>30</sup> Strengths and weaknesses of LIS methodologies are analysed in Scanteam & Demex, 2003.

For these reasons, the achievement of ‘static’ mine impact free status, while an important milestone, does not imply the absence of a need for mine action. A definition of ‘dynamic’ mine impact free status should incorporate the concept of a sustainable capacity to address the residual threats. The main mine action stakeholders should re-orient their thinking to focus on the achievement of dynamic mine impact free status as the next major milestone.

National organs and the operators should also re-orient their perception of the central purpose of the mine action programme. The principal contribution is no longer humanitarian (at least in a strict ‘saving lives and limbs’ sense) but rather developmental – services in support of infrastructure and community development investments to promote economic growth and reduce poverty.

### ***Mine Ban Treaty Perspective***

In addition to the humanitarian and developmental perspectives, Mozambique is a State Party to the *Convention* and an active participant in the Ottawa process. Article 5 of the *Convention* obliges mine-affected states to:

- Make every effort to identify all areas in its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced (i.e. mined areas) and
- Ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians... (paragraph 2)
- Destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party. (paragraph 1)<sup>31</sup>

Thus, the *Convention* sets a much more ambitious target – “mine free” rather than simply “mine impact free.” An additional factor is that the *Convention* imposes an absolute obligation on a States Party not to use anti-personnel landmines. Leaving defensive minefields in place along borders could be considered “use”, and Mozambique has a number of such minefields.


Meanwhile, the *Convention* also calls upon wealthier signatory states to assist mine affected States Parties in meeting their obligations. Mozambique will still have international treaty obligations after it has achieved mine impact free status, and has the right to request assistance in meeting these obligations. Presumably, the country’s excellent performance to date within the Ottawa process will be taken into account by the other States Parties.

Before turning to what might be done to address the remaining challenges, the following diagram depicts the architecture of the existing programme – including the principal links with the government, international, and local community arenas.

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<sup>31</sup> For Mozambique, the deadline is 1 March 2009. As well, paragraph 3 of Article 5 makes provision for a State Party to request an extension of up to ten years for clearing the minefields identified. Paragraph 4 of Article 5 outlines the information that should accompany a request for extension. It is unclear whether further extensions would be considered.

Figure 5 – Existing Architecture for Mine Action in Mozambique



## Responding to the Remaining Challenges

The humanitarian and development challenges posed by landmine and UXO contamination can be classified as shown in the table below.<sup>32</sup>

	Short-term: impacts now exist		Future: no current impact	
	1. Humanitarian	2. Development	3. Humanitarian	4. Development
Big Task	NGOs & ADP clearing with grant funding	Best practice (clearance by commercials financed by project budget) in some but not all sub-sectors <sup>33</sup>	Many options for clearance of emergent hazards (but how to finance?)	Clearance should be via commercial tender & financed by project budget
Small Task	NGOs & ADP clearing with grant funding	Various arrangements but with some important gaps <sup>34</sup>	“Fire brigades” needed to handle residual risks (but how to manage and finance?)	Clearance should be via commercial tender & financed via government systems

### QUANTIFYING THE CHALLENGES

The magnitude of these various challenges is not known with precision because (i) a systematic re-survey of SHA has not been completed, (ii) not all records from the operators have been entered into IMSMA, and (iii) no mechanism has been established to obtain information on a systematic basis from public sector units regarding their requirements for demining services. These omissions could be rectified in the short-term, and the Review Team has made a number of recommendations in this regard.

**Recommendation 1 (page 97) – IND should meet with HALO Trust, NPA, HI, and ADP to discuss their various understandings of the term “mine impact free” (or, better, mine/UXO impact free) and to initiate a process to formulate a common definition, to be adopted as a national standard, which should incorporate the need for a sustainable demining capacity to address the residual threat (i.e. the impacts that will emerge over time).**

**Recommendation 2 (page 97) – IND should meet with HALO Trust, NPA, HI, and ADP to:**

- discuss alternative approaches to systematic re-survey,
- agree on either (i) a common approach or (ii) a set of acceptable approaches for undertaking systematic re-surveys that would lead to similar outcomes in terms of reduced, defined SHAs and to a preliminary classification of all SHA according to the following or a similar schema:

**The SHA is now exerting:**

- a High impact (economic/risk of accident/both) on a community
- a Medium impact (economic/risk of accident/both) on a community
- a Low impact (economic/risk of accident/both) on a community
- no current impact on a community

<sup>32</sup> There is the additional challenge from the *Convention* perspective of achieving “mine free” status.

<sup>33</sup> For example, the Water Directorate requests IND to arrange both clearance and financing of clearance – a distinctly second-best approach. Best practice should be made national policy.

<sup>34</sup> For example, small-scale irrigation works.

- agree on ways and means for re-surveying the country (including all records in IMSMA which have not been re-surveyed) within two-to-three years.

**Recommendation 3 (page 98) – IND should meet with all operators to agree upon the information management system to ensure IMSMA data are accurate and up to date, including:**

- (if necessary) redesigned forms to be submitted by demining operators concerning re-surveyed SHAs;
- (if necessary) additional fields in IMSMA to record the better-defined SHA;
- format of reports from the central IMSMA unit back to the operators so they can validate that the new data they have submitted have been entered correctly;
- clear and measurable performance standards<sup>35</sup> for all operators and the central IMSMA unit; and
- formats for monthly reports on progress achieved on the national re-survey and the current figures (broken at least to provincial aggregates) on SHA, and clearance.

**Recommendation 4 (page 99) – The IND Director should draft a letter, for the Minister's, signature, to the GICHD requesting the early installation of the new version of IMSMA at IND (supported by the requisite training for staff), and documenting the reasons why Mozambique should be among the first programmes to benefit from the new IMSMA.**

**Recommendation 7 (page 102) – IND should immediately initiate a systematic outreach programme to all public sector agencies which undertake or promote development investments:**

- To ensure all such agencies are aware of the extent and impact of mine and UXO contamination on their planned development investments, and of the mine action services available; and
- For agencies which do not have clear policies in place for addressing contamination concerns in an appropriate manner, or which are lacking systems to ensure these policies are followed, to develop a clear, time-delimited plan to:
  - inventory all development investments which have been avoided because of contamination concerns;
  - develop a joint plan with the agency concerned to schedule both the demining services and the development investment;
  - assist these agencies in formulating the necessary policies and implementing systems to ensure these policies are followed;
  - agree on periodic meetings to review the agency's investment programme, identify possible contamination concerns, and initiate demining services to address these contamination concerns.

Until a more complete needs assessment is completed, it is impossible to give a proper estimate of the size and financing requirements of a national programme capable of addressing the remaining challenges. Based on our Review Team's partial survey of public sector units that will require demining support for their infrastructure work programmes, and recognising the continuing need for demining services to address public safety concerns from the residual landmine/UXO threat, it appears the future programme will be (very roughly) of the same magnitude as the existing programme. Its make-up and sources of finance will, however, be significantly different than today. There will be more demining on commercial terms and more of the financing will come from government sources, investment loans, and

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<sup>35</sup> An example of a performance standard would be: within one month of receiving an operator's monthly re-survey report, the IMSMA unit shall return the corresponding data entry report to that operator so it can verify that all records have been correctly entered – target performance standard, 98 per cent of records entered completely and correctly.

donor development funds (as opposed to dedicated mine action funds). Some donor financing dedicated to mine action will still be required for at least a transition period.<sup>36</sup>

In the opinion of the Review Team, it will be feasible to obtain the financing needed to sustain a national mine action programme with the capacity necessary to address Mozambique's remaining contamination challenges. However, a number of reform measures will be required to re-align the programme to meet the current and emerging needs.

## **ADDRESSING CHALLENGES FOR WHICH SOLUTIONS ARE APPARENT**

We have divided the challenges according to three broad parameters:

- short-term (or current) versus long-term (or future)
- humanitarian versus developmental
- small versus large tasks

Solutions are already in place for the short-term humanitarian demining requirements (both large and small tasks). This is what the humanitarian operators are focused on, and where most donor funding is going.<sup>37</sup> At least the three international NGOs now see their work will be completed by the end of 2006.

Solutions are already in place for many of the existing demining requirements in support of large development investments. Some of these are "best practice" solutions, but others could be improved. The GoM should issue policy directives to convert best practice into common practice for both public sector units and investment financing agencies (e.g. The World Bank, African Development Bank, and donors).

**Recommendation 5 (page 99) – The Government of Mozambique should issue a policy statement that, henceforth, provisions for demining services required to support any "large" infrastructure investments shall be as follows:**

- financing for the required demining services will be provided in the budget for the infrastructure rehabilitation, reconstruction, or development project, following consultations with IND on the likely extent of contamination that will be encountered;
- tender documents soliciting proposals from potential prime contractors shall specify that all bidders must include in their proposal (i) a demining sub-contractor, currently accredited in Mozambique for landmine and UXO survey, marking, clearance, and disposal, and (ii) a separate Quality Assurance sub-contractor, currently accredited in Mozambique to provide external QA with respect to landmine and UXO survey, marking, clearance, and disposal operations;
- such tender documents shall specify that the successful prime contractor shall be responsible for the efficiency and quality of work done by the demining and QA sub-contractors, and that no claim for additional compensation due to the presence of landmines or UXO shall be entertained;
- these tender documents shall also specify the minimum liability insurance requirements with respect to landmine and UXO contamination for the prime contractor, demining sub-contractor, and QA sub-contractor, as currently specified in national mine action legislation or regulations;

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<sup>36</sup> Additional donor financing would also be warranted to assist Mozambique achieve its 'mine free' treaty obligation.

<sup>37</sup> Since the Review Team's mission, the collapse of ADP means most demining activities have halted in the South.



- **all tender documents and contracts shall specify the basis of payment (e.g. fixed-price or actual-and-reasonable, plus progress payments) for expenditures related to landmine and UXO survey, marking, clearance, and disposal operations.**

**Recommendation 6 (page 100) – The Government of Mozambique should advise The World Bank, other development banks, and other agencies providing financial credits for large infrastructure projects that:**

- **Professional assessments of landmine and UXO contamination issues must be made during the project design phase, and**
- **Adequate provision for possible demining expenses must be incorporated into the financing plan for such projects.**

These policy measures will also address the future requirements for demining services in support of large development projects.

### **CHALLENGES FOR WHICH NEW SOLUTIONS ARE REQUIRED**

Appropriate responses for some of these challenges described in the above table are not yet in place or have not yet been devised for the future. For example, some demining is now provided to support smaller infrastructure/community development investments by the humanitarian operators, drawing on grant funding earmarked for mine action. However, at least the three international NGOs are planning to close their mine action programmes by the end of 2006, so no solution to future requirements is at hand for the parts of the country covered by those operators. In addition, it seems clear that some public sector units responsible for smaller infrastructure investments are avoiding rather than addressing the issue of landmine and UXO contamination. It is unclear how widespread this policy of avoidance is, which is a problem in itself. Recommendation 7 (noted previously) addresses this problem – in brief, IND should conduct a systematic outreach effort to all public sector agencies which undertake or promote development investments.

In addition, the issue of landmine contamination raises an important policy question, particularly given the poverty reduction goals espoused by the GoM and donors. It is the responsibility of the government to determine the appropriate policy and to communicate this clearly throughout the public service and the donor community.

**Recommendation 8 (page 108) – The GoM should adopt a clear policy – and communicate this to both public sector units and to donors – concerning the priority given to mine-affected communities when planning and implementing community or area development work programmes and aid projects. Two reasonable policy options exist; either...**

- **equal treatment – communities should not be penalised by the presence of landmine or UXO contamination and, if a community would benefit substantially from a small-scale investment, the additional cost of demining support should not be used as a reason for withholding that investment;<sup>38</sup> or...**
- **priority treatment – the needs of mine-affected communities for small-scale investments would receive priority attention when planning and implementing community and area development projects.**

Clarifying the policy vis-à-vis contamination and smaller investments for community or area development purposes should also lead to an infusion of funds to pay for the requisite demining: these should be bundled into the investment project (whether funded by donors,

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<sup>38</sup> In the language of cost-benefit analysis, the “shadow price” of such demining services would be set at zero as a matter of government policy.

development banks, or government<sup>39</sup>). This infusion will not be sufficient to cover all such requirements however, at least in the medium-term, because few of the existing projects that finance small infrastructure works will have incorporated funding for demining.

It is, of course, important to quantify the amount of funding that may be required in the short-to medium-term to provide the necessary demining services in support of smaller infrastructure investments, and the recommended outreach campaign (Recommendation 7) will help IND estimate the financial requirements. This will be important evidence to support the case that mine action should be appropriately reflected in the government's two key development management documents – PARPA and the State Budget.

**Recommendation 9 (page 112) – IND should, with the utmost urgency, compile its case for (i) adequate reflection of the national mine action programme and of landmine and UXO contamination as a cross-cutting issue in the PARPA for 2006-2010 and (ii) the allocation of additional financial support for mine action from resources available to the government treasury.**

It also is important to ensure officials in the various sectors that require demining services are aware that they need to reflect the need for such services in their submissions to PARPA and for the annual State Budget.

**Recommendation 10 (page 112) – As part of its outreach to government units (as per recommendation 7), IND should encourage and assist those units to reflect their requirements for demining services into their briefs during PARPA consultations and their budget submissions.**

While the policy and outreach measures recommended in this section will help ensure that the government-wide requirements for demining services are identified, acknowledged, and financed, such measures would not fully address three closely related questions:

- For tasks the international NGOs cannot undertake before the end of 2006, and after the departure of these NGOs, what organisation should provide the demining services?
- How should the demining organisation be contracted?
- How should the demining work be monitored?

Transaction costs would be high if small demining tasks were to be awarded via competitive tenders on an individual basis, and many project implementation units would lack the expertise to tender for demining services and enforce the contracts. Such concerns might be addressed by bundling many small tasks into a single tender (e.g. all demining services for small infrastructure projects in a province), but no organisation now exists to pool such requirements, issue the tenders, and monitor performance.

The planned exit of the international demining NGOs will also leave a gap in the capacity to address both big and small tasks for humanitarian purposes in the future. This gap will be difficult to fill as such tasks are inherently hard to define clearly in advance, and it is difficult to monitor the performance of any organisation assigned to demine in geographically dispersed and often remote communities.

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<sup>39</sup> In Mozambique, many “government funded” projects are, in fact, funded by donors through direct budget support.

Funders naturally want to engage trustworthy organisations for such work, and should use contractual arrangements that do not provide incentives to cut corners in terms of quality or safety. Established international NGOs working under grant agreements have generally been the preferred candidates for such assignments, at least for most donors. Local organisations such as ADP could try to fill this gap by transforming themselves into not-for-profit associations, but Mozambican law does not impose sufficiently high and clear standards regarding integrity, good governance, and transparency. Local not-for-profits are thus advised to self-impose international best practice if they expect to attract donor confidence and funding.

In short, there is no ready mechanism to provide demining services for relatively small and dispersed tasks – whether for humanitarian or development purposes – given the current institutional make-up of Mozambique’s mine action programme.

## **Toward a Sustainable Solution**

As not all of the foreseeable mine action challenges can be properly addressed given the current institutional make-up of the mine action programme, some reforms to the programme are required. The various challenges should not be considered in isolation; rather, the decisions on how to resolve all challenges should be incorporated into a single strategy because these decisions are inter-related. For example, if it is determined to create a new organisation to provide “fire brigade services” to respond quickly to community requests for small mine or UXO clearance tasks, that organisation may then be the best solution for standard demining to reduce future humanitarian risks.

Thus, the programme reforms should be incorporated into a new National Mine Action Strategy. Such a strategy should also recognise needs for:

- An enhanced policy framework – the future effectiveness of the mine action programme will depend in large part on the actions of many agencies not normally considered as part of the mine action field. For example, government agencies whose work programmes are adversely affected by landmine and UXO contamination need to be encouraged to address their problems squarely including, whenever possible, lining-up the financing required. A clear policy framework is required to ensure these diverse agencies are working in concert to address the contamination problem. Thus the policy framework needs to be government-wide and not directly purely to mine action organisations.
- Enhanced regulatory capacity – commercial demining will be growing in relative importance, putting a premium on regulation. National standards need to be issued in Portuguese. The licensing system through which firms and other demining operators are accredited needs to function better. Quality Assurance also needs to be strengthened to avoid a competitive environment that rewards firms which “race to the bottom” in terms of quality and safety. More fundamentally, there is no legislation to give national effect to the provisions of the *Convention* and to confirm the legal authority underpinning any regulations that have been, or will be, issued.
- New and enhanced services – Many public service agencies are forced to cope with landmine and UXO contamination. They need complete and accurate information concerning contamination and clearance in order understand how their planned work

programmes may be affected. They may also need information on possible solutions to any problems they face (i.e. technical advisory services).

### **Recommended Institutional Make-up**

International best practice for mine action is for the following programme structure, supported by appropriate legal, regulatory, and procedural instruments:

Level		Instrument
Government	adopts	Mine Action Legislation
National authority	adopts	Regulations & National Standards
National Mine Action Centre	enforces	
Operators	adopt	Standing Operating Procedures

The Review Team considered whether there was any reason why Mozambique would not be best served by this best practice model, but could find no such reason. Accordingly, it is reflected in our detailed recommendations. These recommendations also reflect the Review Team's belief that responsibility for mine action should shift to a ministry more focused on Mozambique's internal social and economic development, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs still playing an important role vis-à-vis the international mine ban treaty processes. As a practical matter, it may be necessary to defer this decision until the Minister of Foreign Affairs and IND have addressed the many mine action issues that need immediate attention.

**Recommendation 12 (page 123) – The Government of Mozambique should establish an inter-ministerial body to serve as a national authority responsible for Mozambique's mine action programme, chaired by a minister whose responsibilities focus on the country's socio-economic development, with the Minister of Foreign Affairs serving as Deputy Chair, responsible for Mozambique's continued participation in the Ottawa process and for the regional dimensions of landmine contamination problems. Other ministers on the body should be allowed to deputise senior officials to represent them if they so choose.<sup>40</sup>**

**Recommendation 13 (page 124) – The Government of Mozambique should establish a Mozambique Mine Action Centre (M-MAC) as a regulatory and public service body for mine action, and to provide secretariat services to the Mozambican Mine Action Authority (M-MAA).**

**Recommendation 14 (page 124) – The Government of Mozambique should appoint a Board of Directors to oversee the implementation of the government's mine action policy and the performance of the M-MAC and its Managing Director. Members of the committee should be drawn from the civil service and from other public agencies which depend on timely, high-quality mine action services, together with representatives nominated by the private sector mine action operators (both firms and not-for-profit organisations).**

As noted previously, the proposed M-MAC will need to deliver new or enhanced services to a wider range of clients. IND does not currently have the capacity to discharge these added responsibilities.

**Recommendation 15 (page 124) – The Chief Technical Adviser to IND should assess the existing capacities for (i) analysis of data from IMSMA and other sources of socio-economic and geographic data, and (ii) the provision of technical advisory services to government and**

<sup>40</sup> Traditionally donors have pressed for representation by ministers on such inter-ministerial bodies, but this has resulted in a plethora of such committees which do not function because their members do not have time to attend. This recommendation seeks to reduce the time burden on ministers, but the Review Team recognises that the organisational culture within the government may make it necessary to have only ministers.

**other public sector agencies whose work programmes are impacted by landmine and UXO contamination, then prepare a capacity development plan specifying the required levels of these capacities, how the capacities should be developed, how the staff responsible for these functions would fit into the organisation structure of IND and/or the proposed M-MAC, and what performance targets should be established for each position.**

More generally, future capacity development efforts should adopt a performance management approach. Work on this should begin immediately:

**Recommendation 20 (page 128) – To initiate the next stage of capacity development, the IND Director, assisted by the CTA, should institute a performance management approach to:**


- **clearly define the levels of performance required for the key functions of a Mine Action Centre, including: policy analysis; national planning; information exchange; regulation; information management; and services to operators, government and other public sector units, donors, and other stakeholders;**
- **set measurable performance targets for each function;**
- **communicate these performance targets to all staff;**
- **monitor performance; and**
- **take appropriate actions, including capacity building when necessary, when and if there are gaps between actual performance and the performance levels required for the proper functioning of mine action in Mozambique.**

**The support of key clients (operators, donors, and government/public sector units needing demining services) should be enlisted in defining the necessary levels of performance, establishing performance targets, and monitoring actual performance.**

The following diagram depicts the recommended architecture for Mozambique's Mine Action Programme, featuring (relative to the existing programme architecture):

- a National Mine Action Authority distinct from the Mozambique Mine Action Centre;
- stronger policy linkages with the government arena;
- common linkages – based on a commonly accepted national mine action strategy – between the programme and (i) the government arena, (ii) local communities, and (iii) the members of the international community supporting mine action in Mozambique.

Figure 6 – Recommended MA Architecture for Mozambique



### ***Recommended Process to Formulate the Strategy***

For mine action today and in the future, a national strategy should reflect a partnership between the GoM and donors. Once a strategy is in place – and accepted by all – it provides a foundation for a deepening partnership: one less dominated by funding issues but giving more attention to the reciprocal responsibilities of the partners, with the government in the driver’s seat and its partners providing considered advice and adequate support once they are assured the government is steering in the right direction.

From the donor side, this new approach to working together in support of a government’s strategy for a sector has acquired the ungainly name of Sector Wide Approach to programming (SWAp). As a SWAp is rooted in the partnership concept, donors and governments in developing countries have learned that the process (or ‘road map’) followed in formulating a sector strategy is all important. Although mine action is a cross-cutting issue rather than a sector, the same principle is true when preparing a national mine action strategy.

**Recommendation 16 (page 126) – As an essential first step, the Government of Mozambique should announce its desire to work with donors and other stakeholders on a new strategy for mine action, following the practices commonly used by Sector Wide Approaches to formulate and subsequently implement that strategy.**

**Recommendation 17 (page 126) – As an essential second step, the Government of Mozambique, the UNDP, and interested donors should formulate (based on models from existing SWAp arrangements) and adopt a statement of reciprocal responsibilities relating to the national mine action programme. This should feature:**

- the GoM in the driver’s seat, exercising the rights and responsibilities of national ownership,
- the UNDP and donors providing considered advice and adequate support once they are assured the government is steering in the right direction and is confirming its commitment to mine action with appropriate policy initiatives and levels of funding.

**Recommendation 18 (page 127) – (Step 3 on the Road Map, but to get underway immediately) Building on recommendations 1, 2, 7, and 10, the M-MAC (or IND if the M-MAC has not yet been created), assisted by its CTA, should compile a document outlining a complete and accurate assessment of needs for mine action services, now and in the future, and distribute that document to all stakeholders for discussion and refinement.**

**Recommendation 19 (page 127) – Further steps on the Road Map should be sequenced as follows:**

- **Step 4 – Confirm consensus on the needs assessment by formal adoption by the GoM, UNDP, and supporting donors – this will then provide the basis for developing the strategy itself;**
- **Step 5 – Formulate strategic options for each of the unresolved strategic issues, for discussion among the GoM, the UNDP, and participating donors;**
- **Step 6 – Formulate a draft strategy for discussion among the GoM, the UNDP, and participating donors;**
- **Step 7 – Adoption of the strategy by the GoM, the UNDP, and participating donors;**
- **Step 8 – Agree on a joint monitoring and evaluation plan for reporting on (i) the progress in implementing the strategy, and (ii) the compliance of the partners in discharging their reciprocal responsibilities.<sup>41</sup>**

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<sup>41</sup> For example, a major concern from the government side will be donor performance on such measures as (i) contributing to pooled funding arrangements for mine action rather than to separate projects; (ii) the numbers of donors incorporating funds for demining within their development projects; and (iii) measures to increase the predictability of funding (e.g. multi-year funding agreements).

## Other Recommendations

The report also contains the following recommendations related to mine action and HIV/AIDS, and to the proposed transition of ADP to a distinct legal entity.

**Recommendation 11 (page 113) – The Director of IND should meet with, at least, representatives of ANE and of the HIV/AIDS Council of Mozambique to identify best practice provisions relevant to the needs of the mine action sector. Following discussions with operators and other interested stakeholders, he should then:**

- have these best practices incorporated into the National Mine Action Standards, and
- communicate in writing to all mine action donors requesting them to take appropriate measures to ensure that all future funding agreements with mine action organisations specify the adoption of these best practices.

**Recommendation 21 (page 130) – Should ADP management, UNDP, and the GoM determine it should transform into a Mozambican not-for-profit organisation, it should incorporate within its statutes international best-practice with respect to provisions for integrity, governance, and transparency.**

**Recommendation 22 (page 130) – Should ADP management, UNDP, and the GoM determine it should transform into a Mozambican not-for-profit organisation, it should seek a partnership with an international NGO willing and able to assist it in the transition into well functioning and well governed Mozambican NGO.**

## Summary Picture

The following diagram provides a stylised picture of the stages of Mozambique's mine action programme from its commencement to today, and the Review Team's prognosis for the future. During the start-up phase, expenditures grew rapidly, driven by both the need to establish internal security (the ONUMOZ Peacekeeping Mission's priority) and to address the very real threat that landmine and UXO contamination posed for civilians.


Humanitarian concerns have dominated both the consolidation and maturation phases, and over the past decade mine action in Mozambique has generally been viewed as a humanitarian endeavour. However, it is clear that demining to support reconstruction and development has been taking place. It is also clear that demining for reconstruction and development has grown to represent a significant proportion of all mine action expenditures, but the data available does not allow a precise estimate.

Important milestones have been achieved and mine impact free status – at least in a static sense – is on the horizon. Accordingly, humanitarian mine action activities and expenditures should fall over the coming year or two, but should then continue at a reduced level to address the residual threats to lives and limbs. However, demand for demining in support of reconstruction and development should expand in line with the growth in expenditures for major infrastructure networks and facilities, and to support smaller infrastructure investments for community or area development.

The size and effectiveness of the future programme will depend largely on an enhanced policy framework and the reform of the institutional make-up of Mozambique's mine action programme.



Figure 7 – Stages of Mine Action in Mozambique



## Events Since the Review Team's Mission

There have been some major developments within Mozambique's mine action programme since the Review Team's mission. While we are unable to comment on these in depth, the report contains a brief addendum noting the following:

- a reduction in the IMSMA data entry backlog;
- inclusion of mine action as a cross-cutting issue in the new government's Five Year Programme;
- the sudden collapse of ADP, coupled with the subsequent efforts to revive it; and
- efforts by IND to engage actively in the consultation processes leading to the new PARPA.

These developments are important, but do not alter the recommendations contained in our report.



## Introduction

Mine action began in Mozambique shortly after the 1992 General Peace Agreement ended decades of civil wars, which had left the country the poorest in the world, burdened not only by crumbling infrastructure, ethnic rivalries, international debt, endemic diseases, and the other typical constraints faced by the world's least developed countries, but also the grim heritage of widespread landmine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) contamination. The complexities and rapid evolutions in post-conflict Mozambique<sup>42</sup> represented a stern test for mine action, a field that was in its infancy at the time.

A decade provides a natural anniversary for taking stock. In this case, Mozambique's ten-plus years of experience roughly coincides with the fifth anniversary of the *Convention on the Prohibition on the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction* (hereinafter, the *Convention*), marked by the Nairobi Summit on a Mine-Free World – the first Review Conference for the *Convention*.

In light of these important milestones, the UNDP Country Office in Maputo, in collaboration with the Government of Mozambique (GoM) and donor partners, commissioned<sup>43</sup> a “comprehensive review” of the mine action programme to “look at the historical context of the programme, outline the achievements, relate them to the overarching development plans and most importantly analyze the tasks that lie ahead.”<sup>44</sup>

The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) assembled a Team of four to undertake the Review: two from the Centre's staff roster (Ted Paterson, who served as Team Leader, and Tim Lardner, who served as the expert on mine action operations and management), and two independent consultants in Mozambique (Pamela Rebelo, an evaluation specialist, and Roberto Tibana, a development economist and expert in economic management). Following a preparatory phase to collect and review relevant documents on Mozambique's mine action programme and its development planning and management systems (including the rapid innovations in aid management in recent years), the Team undertook a four-week mission in Mozambique, starting on 17 January 2005.

The Terms of Reference had emphasised the need to consider the programme and its future in light of the remaining contamination, the *Convention* and the current and future links between mine action and Mozambique's development priorities. Accordingly, the consultants worked in two sub-teams: one focusing on “inside the mine action programme” issues, and the other examining links between the programme and other arenas – the government sector; the international community; and the set of local actors within the community development arena.<sup>45</sup> The basic conceptual framework is depicted in the following diagram.

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
<sup>42</sup> The term “complex emergency” originally entered the international lexicon in reference to Mozambique of the late-1980s/early-1990s.

<sup>43</sup> The UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) issued a Request for Proposals for the Review on 1 November 2004 and GICHD was awarded the contract on 26 November 2004.

<sup>44</sup> The quotes are from the Terms of Reference, which are reproduced in entirety in Appendix 1.

<sup>45</sup> For logistical reasons, the “inside the programme” team met local officials and other community development actors on the ground, while the second team met with those working on decentralization policies and programming in Maputo, as well as with Maputo-based representatives of civil society organisations active in community development.

**Figure 8 – The Architecture of Mine Action: Actors, Arenas, and Linkages**



During its mission in Mozambique, Review Team members were able to meet representatives from most of the organisations within the mine action community, and with many other stakeholders (public sector units, donors, UN agencies, the World Bank, and representatives from civil society organisations).

Unfortunately the Review Team did not benefit from the views of the newly-installed government. The outgoing Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation was generous in meeting the Team during his final week in office, but members to the new cabinet were appointed toward the end of the mission and were unable to meet the Review Team.

In early March, the Review Team submitted a draft report which, following an internal review by UNDP and IND, was distributed more widely to operators and donors for comment. These were compiled by UNDP and transmitted to the Review Team in July – this lag reflecting in large part the facts that: (i) the various development agencies had heavy agendas following the installation of the new government; and (ii) the mine action sector in particular was faced with the sudden collapse of one of the principal demining operators.

While understandable, the time lag raised questions concerning how best to complete the report. Should the final report reflect the situation at the time of the mission, or should it incorporate subsequent developments in Mozambique and, in particular, the country's mine action programme? Because the Review Team is aware of the important developments since the mission, but has not had the opportunity to study these first-hand, it has taken the following approach:

- Comments and data relating to the period up to the time of the mission have been incorporated into the main body of the report. For example, data reported in the *Annual Report on the Mine Action Programme: 2004* are reflected in the main text, although this document was not issued by IND until after the submission of the draft report.
- Important events which have taken place since the mission are described in a supplementary section (within the Executive Summary) and chapter (for the overall report). Where these recent events have an important bearings on the discussion in the text of the report, references to this supplementary chapter and to the specific event are provided in footnotes.

Therefore, readers should be aware that the main text of this report relates to developments up to February 2005.

It should be emphasised that this exercise is a review and not an evaluation. Accordingly, and in addition to its analysis of the way forward, this report focuses more on lessons learnt than on accountability issues. Additionally, and as agreed with the UNDP-Country Office, the Review Team did not attempt to encapsulate its findings in terms of the standard evaluative criteria used for development: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability.

The remainder of this report is laid out as follows:

Chapter 1 gives a brief overview of key features of Mozambique's society and economy, the history of conflict and subsequent developments in the political sphere, how people understood the problems posed by landmine and UXO contamination at the start of the programme, and how this understanding has evolved.

Chapter 2 covers the history of the mine action programme through a number of phases: start-up; consolidation; maturation. It provides a summary of achievements within each of the components of mine action – demining; MRE; victim assistance; stockpile destruction; and advocacy – touching as well on the contribution to peace-building and the possible role of the mine action community vis-à-vis the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The programme's current capacities; embodied principally in the various demining operators and IND; is next examined. The Chapter ends with a discussion of the role played by international assistance to the mine action programme.

Chapter 3 analyses the role played by international assistance in terms of supporting an assessment of needs and the formulation of a national strategy, financial assistance, and capacity development. The chapter also discussed donor coordination and the perception that donor fatigue is an important concern.

Chapter 4 focuses on the links between the mine action programme and the other arenas of interest: (i) government, responsible for development planning and management; (ii) the international arena, including the other States Parties of the *Convention* as well as Mozambique's main development assistance partners; and (iii) the local arena, embracing local authorities and other community development actors.

Chapter 5 examines the link between mine action and development from another perspective: the development management structures and practices that the mine action programme will need to link into. This includes an overview of how the Government of Mozambique (GoM) is structured and operates, focusing on the policies, practices, and instruments of development planning and management in Mozambique today and how these are evolving. The Chapter also discusses how the international assistance community delivers aid and tries to harmonise among its members and align with government priorities.

Chapter 6 provides an assessment of the current status and the challenges remaining. Following a discussion on the apparent extent of the remaining contamination, the chapter touches on what this implies in terms of socio-economic challenges (humanitarian, reconstruction, and development) and from the perspective of the *Convention*.

Chapter 7 then analyses how these humanitarian and development challenges might be addressed both today and in the future. Many of the current and most of the future requirements stem from the need to support development investments – in particular, infrastructure projects – and the Chapter provides recommendations for how mine action officials should engage with the units responsible for the infrastructure work programmes as well as with the core economic management units preparing the five-year PARPA and the annual budget. In addition, a set of issues are identified that will need to be addressed in a more strategic fashion by the main stakeholders (GoM, mine action organisations, the UNDP, and donors).

Chapter 8 concludes the main report with a discussion of the way forward. It analyses the unresolved issues highlighted in Chapter 6 and discusses how options for tackling various of these may affect the alternatives available for the other unresolved issues – in short, how the different issues are inter-related and must be approached as a set from a strategic perspective.

The Chapter then turns to the long-term requirements in terms of the legislative and policy framework for mine action, plus the structure and key organs of a national programme

(collectively termed the institutional make-up of the programme). Following a discussion on transition issues centring on the recommendation to initiate something akin to a Sector Wide Approach (SWAp)<sup>46</sup> to mine action programming, a Road Map is outlined to describe the recommended process and sequence for the transition. The Chapter concludes with a brief discussion on other transitional issues: the likely misallocation of demining assets that will emerge as the international NGOs withdraw; the proposed transition of ADP; and the possible role of FADM.

A Supplementary Chapter covers important events that have occurred since the Review Team's mission to Mozambique, chiefly: (i) a significant reduction in the IMSMA data entry backlog; (ii) the inclusion of mine action as a cross-cutting issue within the new government's Five-Year Programme, laid before parliament in March; (iii) the cessation of ADP activities in the wake of a strike by its employees over non-payment of wages, leading to (iv) the agreement by UNDP, the Irish Government, and the Government of Mozambique on financing a substantial compensation package (\$1.8 million) for ADP employees, and (v) the engagement of a consultant in June to assist IND in representing mine action within the working groups created to assist in the preparations of Mozambique's second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PARPA).

Appendix 1 contains the Terms of Reference; Appendix 2 the list of people met during the mission; and Appendix 3 the list of accredited demining organisations in Mozambique. Finally, the lessons learned from this review are listed for reference in Appendix 4.

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<sup>46</sup> Mine action does not constitute a distinct sector but rather supports activities in a variety of sectors. In this sense, the term SWAp is inappropriate. However, the SWAp approach centres on three key tasks that the GoM, donors, and operators need accomplish sequentially to formulate a new national strategy for mine action: (i) agree on a common understanding of needs; (ii) agree on a common strategy to address these needs; and (iii) agree on a common monitoring and evaluation framework to assess progress and update both the needs assessment and strategy as necessary.





# 1. General Background

## *Key features of the society and economy*

Lying in South-eastern Africa, Mozambique is bordered by Malawi, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, and has a coastline stretching almost 2,500 km. At just over 800,000 km<sup>2</sup> (almost twice the size of California), and with fewer than 19 million people, much of the country remains sparsely populated. Many communities are remote and ill-served by transportation and communication networks.

Mozambique remains a predominately rural country. About 75 per cent of the population lives in rural areas, and as many as 80 per cent of the economically active still depend of agriculture to some degree.<sup>47</sup> Agricultural productivity is extremely low. Only two per cent of those engaged in agriculture have any training in agricultural techniques, and only three per cent have access to irrigated land. Most rural households also have limited access to markets, either to sell their products or to obtain modern inputs such as fertilizer or improved seeds. This reflects the poor state of the country's transportation network. Mozambique has the lowest road coverage in Southern Africa, with only 32 km of roads per 1,000 square kilometres in 2003; one fifth the regional average (135 km per 1,000 square kilometres). Further, only 57 per cent of the road network is adequately maintained (the regional average is 71 per cent).

Mozambique is an extremely poor country, with a gross per capita income of only \$210. Recent estimates indicate that just over 54 per cent of the population were below the "absolute poverty line" and unable to satisfy their basic consumption needs. Fortunately, economic growth has been vigorous over the past decade, buoyed by peace and the return of refugees, resulting in the revival of peasant agriculture and other basic economic activities, the rehabilitation of infrastructure, and the restoration of basic public services. This has led to a reduction in poverty and a concomitant rise in many of the standard measures of human and social wellbeing (see Textbox 1 – Mozambique's progress toward the MDGs)

### **Textbox 1 – Mozambique's progress toward the MDGs**

At the Monterrey Summit in 2000, the world's heads of government adopted a development compact based on: (i) a focus on poverty reduction, (ii) the centrality of country ownership, (iii) the need for a comprehensive, long term approach, and (iv) the need for partnership. The Monterrey consensus also embraced a focus on outcomes and on the importance of agreeing benchmarks against which to measure progress. These benchmarks, recognising the multi-dimensional nature of poverty, are termed the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).\*

In spite of its excellent economic growth record, Mozambique's progress on its MDG targets has been less rapid, in part because of low absorptive capacity (i.e. limited capacities, particularly in some key ministries delivering basic services) coupled with problems of sustainability (i.e. donors deliver projects outside the public service to avoid capacity constraints, but then the benefits cannot be sustained). In some sectors, poor government policies also constrain progress.

<sup>47</sup> Even in urban areas, almost half the population engages in agricultural activities.

A recent assessment by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projected that only three of the 18 specific targets would be met: those relating to income poverty, hunger, and primary school enrolment. However, with better government policies in some of the key sectors, coupled with higher levels of aid, at least three other targets could be met: completion rates for primary school; halting the increase in HIV/AIDS infection; and halving the proportion of people without access to safe drinking water.

Even with better policies and increasing aid in line with growth in public sector capacities, the Bank does not project that targets for gender equity (to eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education) or for child and maternal mortality rates (reduce by two-thirds the under-five mortality rate; reduce by three-quarters the maternal mortality rate) can be met. (World Bank and IMF, 2003)

More recently, an expert group commissioned by the UN advocated a much more aggressive push to achieving the MDGs. Their report emphasises the need for each country to begin with an assessment of what resources are required to achieve each of the targets, and then adjust their poverty reduction strategies to aim for those targets, making it clear to donors what aid is required – what one observer has termed “aspirational financing”. (UN Millennium Project, 2005)

\* There are eight goals and 18 specific targets. For example, the first goal is to eliminate extreme poverty and hunger, and there are two targets to achieve by 2015: (i) to halve the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a day, and (ii) to halve the number of people who suffer from hunger.

## **Conflict and Political Developments**

Conflict began in 1964 when the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO), formed two years earlier in Tanzania, started infiltrating and establishing bases in northern Mozambique. By 1970, FRELIMO operations stretched well into central Mozambique. The independence struggle ended in 1974 after a military *coup d'état* in Portugal gave power to officers favouring independence for its African colonies. Following a transitional government, FRELIMO declared full independence in 1975, forming a government led by President Samora Machel.

By 1976, Mozambique was providing active support to other independence movements in Southern Africa; the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army and the African National Congress (ANC). The following year, FRELIMO declared itself a socialist vanguard party and turned to the Soviet Union for support. In the same year, the Rhodesian security forces created the Mozambique National Resistance (commonly known as RENAMO) and initiated operations in central Mozambique.

The 1979 Lancaster House Agreements ended the civil war in Rhodesia, creating hope for an end to Mozambique's conflict. However, South Africa's Military Intelligence Directorate stepped in with support for RENAMO, which soon expanded the scope of its military operations in the central provinces. By 1986, famine and intensifying RENAMO operations, including the killing and mutilation of civilians, led to an exodus to Malawi.

By 1988 the war had reached a stalemate and pressures on both sides prompted a number of initiatives to bring about peace talks. Mozambique, facing economic disaster, had exchanged its socialist economic programme for an International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural

adjustment programme in 1987. In 1990, the government adopted a new constitution, providing for multi-party elections. Meanwhile, the opening dialogues between South Africa's apartheid government and the ANC led to curtailed support for RENAMO.

Peace talks started in 1990, leading to the Rome Peace Agreement signed in October 1992. This provided for an immediate cease-fire, demobilisation of both armies, and agreement on holding legislative and presidential elections every five years. To oversee the transition to elected government, the UN deployed a 6,400-strong peacekeeping force, ONUMOZ, with a mandate that included coordinating the clearance of landmines.

## ***The Contamination Problem***

Landmine contamination in Mozambique is the result of three distinct phases of conflict:

1. 1964-1975 – Large barrier minefields laid by the Portuguese as protection against incursions from Tanzania by FRELIMO,<sup>48</sup> plus defensive minefields around key infrastructure such as the Cahora-Bassa hydroelectric dam in Tete.
2. 1976-1979 – The Zimbabwean independence war resulted in Rhodesian military incursions into Mozambique and the emergence of RENAMO, operating initially in central Mozambique.
3. 1979-1992 – Civil conflict between FRELIMO and RENAMO with limited South African and Zimbabwean interventions.

During all three stages, the forces loyal to the government of the day laid large numbers of mines to defend economic infrastructure and military installations, while the opposition forces (FRELIMO to 1975, then RENAMO supported by Rhodesians and, later, South Africans) often planted anti-tank mines on roads, bridges, and river crossings to inhibit government troop movements, interdict shipments, and cripple the economy.

During at least the conflict between FRELIMO and RENAMO, both sides also used mines more indiscriminately, resulting in many small or low-density minefields. In a 1994 assessment report, Human Rights Watch claimed evidence that both sides had targeted civilians – particularly in central Mozambique – “to deny them access to fields, water sources, and fishing points.” The same report singled-out RENAMO for “laying mines specifically to discourage or make impossible the return of displaced people.”<sup>49</sup>

The first formal attempt to estimate the scale of the contamination problem was in 1992 when the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) requested information on the “*existence and nature of the mine problem in Mozambique.*” Its mission in early 1993, which was hindered by the security constraints in place at the time, led to a provisional (and very rough) plan for clearance.

The estimate of two million mines was often quoted at the time and, clearly, the international community viewed Mozambique as one of the most seriously contaminated countries in the

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<sup>48</sup> FRELIMO also used both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines. By the late 1960s, Portuguese forces had nicknamed the north “Minas Gerais” or “General Mines”.

<sup>49</sup> Human Rights Watch Arms Project, *Landmines in Mozambique*, quoted in DHA, 1997, pp. 10-11.

world. This impression was reinforced when Human Rights Watch published its 1994 report on landmines in Mozambique, which stated that mines “*have claimed more than 10,000 victims*” and that an estimated 8,000 amputees had received medical treatment.

Today it is widely believed that the early estimates on the numbers of landmines vastly overstated the scope of the problem, from that perspective at least. IND records covering over ten years of clearance show fewer than 100,000 mines found. The number of landmines provides, of course, but a small glimpse of the problem. A clearer picture emerges from information on the number of hazardous sites, the total area suspected of contamination, the numbers of communities and individuals affected, and the nature of the impacts on people. A proper assessment only becomes possible when we have data on multiple dimensions of the contamination problem and true understanding only evolves once people begin to analyse this data. Unfortunately, in Mozambique after more than ten years of mine action, the contamination picture remains decidedly unclear and a concerted effort is required to analyse the data that are available.

After months of talking about the urgent need for a survey, in December 1993 UNOHAC contracted the HALO Trust to undertake a “nationwide” survey on an emergency basis. The budget and duration allowed for such a survey of a large country were inadequate.<sup>50</sup> Understandably, the survey teams focused particularly on roads and other facilities important to the relief agencies. It eventually identified 981 mined areas.

HALO itself recognised this survey was “seriously flawed” in some respects (DHA, 1997, p. 23), but it did generate the SHAMAN dataset,<sup>51</sup> which allowed some degree of planning and prioritisation. No national clearance plan was, in fact, produced until after the subsequent Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) was completed in 2001, so the principal use of the SHAMAN data was by the demining operators for their task planning.<sup>52</sup> In spite of its limitations, the SHAMAN database provided the only picture – however incomplete – of the extent of contamination until the completion of the LIS seven years later.

The LIS was commissioned by CIDA in 1999 to define the contamination problem not so much in terms of the numbers of landmines or the areas suspected of contamination, but rather in the socio-economic impacts at the community level.<sup>53</sup> When completed in 2001, the overwhelming message that emerged was that the contamination problem was more extensive than intensive. The survey identified 791 mine affected communities, 1,374 suspect mine areas, and a suspected contaminated area totalling 562 km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>54</sup> Contamination existed in all ten

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<sup>50</sup> Only \$395,000 and four months duration were provided. The survey was also hampered by poor roads, insecurity, inadequate maps, and simple inexperience within the Mine Action field concerning how to conduct such a survey.

<sup>51</sup> SHAMAN is the name of the database software used.


<sup>52</sup> The operators all knew the limitations of the survey, which resulted in significant inaccuracies in data on the location of hazards. Accordingly, they used the database more “as a point of departure” than as a definitive reference.

<sup>53</sup> The LIS methodology does not attempt to document national development priorities, programmes, or targets. Thus, the LIS results cannot be related to development plans without significant analysis, drawing on additional data sets. The Review Team is unaware of any cases in which such analysis has been conducted by a mine action programme, although some efforts have been made by researchers affiliated with the Survey Action Center – the NGO that oversees LIS exercises.

<sup>54</sup> Since then, re-surveying by operators has significantly reduced the suspected hazardous area (SHA). By the end of 2004, the national mine action database showed just over 170 km<sup>2</sup> of SHA (IND,

provinces and 123 of 128 districts. But relatively few of the affected communities, home to a relatively small number of people, were scored as seriously affected.<sup>55</sup>

**Figure 9 – Percentages of all affected people and communities by level of impact (from LIS)**



2005, *Annual Report: 2004*, p. 2), although most operators and the Review Team believe the true figure is much less than this.

<sup>55</sup> Community impact scoring is based on (i) the numbers of recent victims, (ii) the presence of landmines, UXO, or both, and (iii) reported blockages to various types of land or community facilities (schools, water points, etc.). Scoring is done using a separate computer module based on data stored in the LIS database.



## 2. The Mine Action Programme<sup>56</sup>

### *Origin and evolution*

#### **Start-up phase (1992 – 1995)**

Protocol VI of the General Peace Accord provided for the Mozambican government and RENAMO to take responsibility for the implementation of the ceasefire process, to “...organise and implement mine-clearing operations” and to give assurances that they would not “prevent [any] mine-clearing operations”.

The subsequent ONUMOZ deployment of 6,400 soldiers and UN workers had a mandate based on the Accord, which provided for them to work with the national authorities to coordinate mine clearance within the country. The UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) initiated early efforts to obtain information on the nature and extent of landmine contamination, and developed a preliminary plan by January 1993, within three months of the start of the UNOMOZ mandate. This however was referred to the Ceasefire Commission, comprising representatives from the UN and the warring parties, and became hostage to the tortuous negotiations in that highly politicised forum. The plan was not approved until another 11 months had passed. During this lag the UN did not initiate the preparatory actions envisaged by the plan, such as establishing the training school for deminers.<sup>57</sup>

The ONUMOZ mine clearance plan called for three phases:

1. Clearance of 2,000 km of priority roads to allow access of food supplies to refugee camps.
2. Clearance of further roads to allow refugees to return home.
3. Setting up a training school to train Mozambican deminers to complete the remainder of work required.

Thus, while the plan proposed training demobilised soldiers to develop indigenous capacity, it centred on the short-term needs of the ONUMOZ mission and, particularly, the opening of the major transportation corridors, for which tenders were issued seeking proposals from commercial contractors. This initiated a “feeding frenzy” (DHA, 1997:17) among some donors, each seeking to promote the interests of their country’s firms. This led to challenges of the tender process and ill-will among the donors. Once the successful bidder finally was selected, administrative delays within the UN caused a further seven-month delay before the contract was signed in July 1994.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> The history of Mozambique’s Mine Action programme is well documented. The Mozambique country report published by DHA in 1997 (part of *The Development of Indigenous Mine Action Capacities* study) covers the period to early 1997. The 2001 UNDP/GICHD report, *Socio-economic Approaches to Mine Action*, contains a chapter of Mozambique, covering up to mid-2000. The Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) published community-level studies in 2000-01. More recently GICHD has commissioned country case studies on Mozambique for its studies of (i) the role of local organisations, (ii) capacity development, and (iii) the use of surveys.

<sup>57</sup> UNDP and UNOPS did, however, do the groundwork so that commercial tenders for road clearance could go forward as soon as the Ceasefire Commission approved the plan.

<sup>58</sup> One of the firms in the winning consortium was an arms manufacturer: international mine action NGOs, most of which were active in the international mine ban movement, were outraged.



In the meantime, the training school opened in Moamba, Maputo Province. However, it soon became clear that no benefits would accrue from training 500 deminers unless organisations existed to deploy them. Accordingly, the UN initiated the Accelerated Demining Programme (ADP) in July 1994, proposing that the government would eventually absorb this as the implementing arm of a future national mine action centre (MAC) – a recommendation that was roundly attacked by some donors who advocated that clearance be left to the international NGOs and commercial firms already present in the country.<sup>59</sup>

Indeed, distinct survey and clearance projects had been underway as early as 1992. The first two international NGOs arrived in 1993, with Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) operating in the central provinces<sup>60</sup> and the HALO Trust taking responsibility for the northern region plus Zambézia. From February 1995 they were joined by ADP, operating in the south. This delineation of operational areas appears spontaneous rather than designed: apparently an informal agreement evolved in the absence of any national guidance to “coordinate by avoidance.”

Although the UN (and principally ONUMOZ) did try to push mine clearance forward during this start-up phase, the UN was not yet well organised to play a leading role in mine action. Multiple UN agencies were involved with overlapping mandates. In some cases such as Mozambique, early efforts to initiate a nationwide mine action programme were hamstrung when UN Peacekeeping missions were in place because demining was viewed as the preserve of the military.

As a result of the UN's lack of preparedness<sup>61</sup> and the overtly competitive behaviour of some of the principle donors, coupled with the very real need to initiate operations to cope with the humanitarian emergency, mine action in Mozambique began through a number of distinct initiatives without an overall plan to establish a coordinated response.

### Lesson 1

**When confronted by a new type of challenge such as landmine and UXO contamination following complex humanitarian emergencies, it takes time before the international community understands the true nature of the problem and then more time before it learns from experience how best to address that problem.**

Mozambique was among the first-generation mine action programmes and could not, therefore, benefit significantly from the experience elsewhere.

### Lesson 2

**In many post-conflict situations, the government is not in a position to give the necessary attention to all facets of humanitarian needs. In such situations, the international community requires an international organisation such as the UN to take the lead in defining the scope and intensity of the humanitarian emergency, and to facilitate the preparation of a strategy to address the emergency in a reasonably coordinated fashion.**

With respect to landmine and UXO contamination, the international community has learnt this lesson: in particular, in 1998 the UN issued its policy on mine action that clarified the roles of

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<sup>59</sup> All these arrangements were carried out under the auspices of ONUMOZ and with the oversight of UNOHAC (the predecessor of UNOCHA and working within DHA).

<sup>60</sup> NPA also provided mine risk education (MRE) in refugee camps.

<sup>61</sup> Some critics went as far as asserting, with some hyperbole perhaps, that demining occurred during the start-up phase “*despite, not because of the UN.*” (Boulden & Edwards, 1999, p. 87)

different UN agencies involved in this field and designated UNMAS as the agency responsible for overall coordination. However, this policy was not issued until 1997 – too late to be of guidance during the start-up of Mozambique’s mine action programme.

### Lesson 3

**In the absence of a commonly endorsed assessment of needs and a commonly endorsed strategy to address those needs, donors are likely to support a range of separate and relatively uncoordinated mine action initiatives, implemented via firms or NGOs, in response to the humanitarian emergency.**

## Consolidation phase (1995 – 1999)

Although a number of key stakeholders did not believe it was appropriate for the Mozambican government to assume control of ADP as originally intended, they did want the government to take responsibility for mine action. In May 1995, the government established the National Mine Clearance Commission (NMCC – generally known under its Portuguese acronym, CND), which comprised the Ministers of Foreign Affairs (as the responsible minister), Finance, Agriculture, Public Works, National Defence, and Industry.<sup>62</sup> The CND mandate was to:

*“...collect, process and analyse information and data relevant to demining, elaborate a strategy and action plan for mine clearance, and establish procedures for setting priorities at the local and national level; monitor and coordinate all ongoing demining activities; act as the approval and licensing authority in respect of new operator...; adjudicate public tenders for service contracts...; and promote and oversee the implementation of a national programme to improve public mine awareness.” (DHA, 1997, p. 28)*

The Executive Director’s Office within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was intended to serve as the secretariat for CND, and to coordinate, assist, propose, license, and regulate all mine action activities in Mozambique. Unfortunately, CND failed to provide leadership. It did not meet formally until over a year after its establishment. As well, its secretariat proved unable to discharge its responsibilities. It had virtually no capacity and the UN did not get a project in place to provide technical assistance until the passage of another year.<sup>63</sup> As a result, no national plan was formulated and the mine action operators in the country were left to their own direction, with no overall coordination.

Fortunately, the operators acquitted themselves well. Although mistakes were made in the early years,<sup>64</sup> the operators appear to have learned from these and have improved their performance over time. For the most part they maintained good relations with donors and developed progressively better relations with provincial governors and district administrators. The division of the country into three distinct regions complicated the task of national coordination, but it also minimised concerns over duplication and unhealthy competition among the three large “humanitarian” operators (a term embracing the international NGOs plus ADP).

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<sup>62</sup> Government decree 18/95.

<sup>63</sup> This project saw 85 per cent of the funds going to expatriate salaries and lacked a counterpart strategy, with the result that little indigenous capacity building took place. (DHA, 1997, p. 32)

<sup>64</sup> See for example PRIO, 2000, and Chr. Michelsen Institute with Nordic Consulting Group, 1997.

In 1998, Handicap International (HI) also started a mine clearance programme, but its strategy of undertaking only small tasks to free-up valuable community resources (which it termed proximity demining) was seen as a complementary rather than a directly competitive approach. As well, HI had long been active in disability assistance and then in both MRE and the collection of data on landmine victims, so it was already seen as part of the mine action community in Mozambique.<sup>65</sup>

The amount of work on offer to commercial firms declined after the initial push to demine the main roads network and other vital infrastructure. As a result, some international demining firms left Mozambique. Others however established joint ventures with local managers and a few purely Mozambican demining firms began to form, some competing successfully for smaller commercial contracts.

The main problem remained the weakness of NMCC/CND. Donors, UN agencies, and other actors questioned the viability of a Mozambican authority which enjoyed little evident support from the Government and seemingly had little to contribute that would add value to the work of the operators. The UNDP, donors, and operators pushed for improvements, leading eventually to the replacement of CND in June 1999, after perhaps \$3 million in assistance had been given by donors in support of NMCC/CND.<sup>66</sup>

#### Lesson 4

**Once a series of independent mine action programmes are established, it is more difficult to put in place an effective mechanism for national coordination.**

### Maturation (1999 – 2004)

The reformed and restructured organisation, the Instituto Nacional de Desminagem (IND) was given a mandate similar to that of CND, to: *“successfully establish and develop a coordination, supervision and management mechanism, in close cooperation with all other relevant organisations and agencies, to ensure the cost-effective execution of a national mine action plan.”*<sup>67</sup> However, IND enjoyed much greater autonomy than its predecessor, reporting directly to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and operating outside the cumbersome governmental bureaucracy.

Their unhappy experience with CND meant that donors and demining operators initially were wary of the government’s new attempt at establishing a coordination mechanism; hence, the build-up of IND was slow. There was only limited technical support at the start and it was not

<sup>65</sup> This began in 1993 with MRE projects in Tete and Zambézia, which were subsequently merged into the Programme of National Co-ordination of Education Activities to Prevent Landmines and Other Explosive Devices Accidents (PEPAM in the Portuguese acronym). See FINNCONSULT (1999) for an evaluation of HI programmes to the end of 1998. HI subsequently turned PEPAM into a nation-wide programme and, in 2001, transferred responsibility for this to IND.

<sup>66</sup> The table on p. 153 of UNDP/GICHD, 2001, *A Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action*, Geneva, shows more than \$10 million going to CND. This seems to be overstated, perhaps including funds destined for ADP. The 1997 DHA country case study for Mozambique shows on p. 29 just over \$900,000 went to MNCC/CND up to the end of 1996. A more complete dataset compiled by Lambert-Madore in 2002 indicates about \$2.4 million went to CND via UNDP from Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway. Adding to this the figures from the DHA study for Italy (\$412,000) and the U.S. (\$175,000) gives an estimate of about \$3 million, much of which came in the form of technical assistance rather than funds or equipment.

<sup>67</sup> IND Statutes.

until 2001 that a Chief Technical Adviser (CTA) was fielded (although there was a temporary adviser attached after the 2000 floods). A finance and administration adviser also was engaged in 2001 and advisers for both operations and information were added in mid-2002.

### Lesson 5

**A half-hearted attempt to impose coordination on a group of organisations with established programmes is worse than no attempt at all. It does not solve the problem and it leaves the government facing a credibility gap to overcome once it advances a better conceived coordination mechanism.**

Shortly before the creation of IND, CIDA announced funding for a national Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), to be implemented by the Canadian International Demining Centre (CIDC). The objectives were “*to collect, record and analyze information on the location of known or suspected mined areas throughout the country, and to provide an overview of their social and economic impacts as perceived by the residents of landmine-affected communities*”. The survey was a difficult undertaking in a country as large as Mozambique, with inadequate transportation infrastructure that also had been ravaged by extended conflicts. Dogged with controversy from the start,<sup>68</sup> the survey also was severely disrupted by the floods in early 2000. Ultimately, it was completed in July 2001 and certified by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) in September of that year.

The LIS data was stored on the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, which also offered Geographic Information System (GIS) and mapping functionality.<sup>69</sup> To enable this functionality, CIDA funded a parallel project with DINAGECA (the Mapping and Cadastral Authority) which yielded a national gazetteer and Mozambique’s first set of digitised maps and toponomy. This was classified as a mine action project but in fact provides very far-reaching benefits for any agency engaged in spatial planning, natural resource management, poverty analysis, etc.

Drawing on the data produced by the LIS, IND developed a national strategy and in 2001 issued a Five-Year National Mine Action Plan (termed the National Mine Action Plan or NMAP) covering 2002 – 2006; a plan that is still extant and unrevised, although annual plans have been issued.

IND has been far more successful than its predecessor. Although there was initial scepticism concerning IND’s ability to stamp its authority over mine action operators, which had been working independently in Mozambique for over five years before the Institute’s establishment, a more productive relationship gradually has evolved. The need for IND, or at least a national authority coupled with a solid national mine action information system, is more widely recognised in the Mozambican mine action community today. However, increased acknowledgement of IND’s potential importance also implies increased scrutiny concerning its actual performance in discharging its responsibilities – an issue that is taken-up later in this Chapter.

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<sup>68</sup> Some of these controversies were common to all the early Landmine Impact Surveys (e.g. the expense and the “community focus”, which typically results in huge increases in the area suspected of contamination): others were specific to the Mozambique LIS (e.g. the decision by CIDA to restrict bidding to Canadian organisations – cutting-out the more experienced Mine Action NGOs already active in Mozambique – and the award of the contract to CIDC, which was viewed as a “semi-commercial” organisation rather than an authentic NGO). See also Scanteam and Demex, 2003, particularly Annex H.

<sup>69</sup> IMSMA can plot larger scale (1:50,000) maps that are useful to demining operators.

## ***Achievements, contributions, and consequences***


### **Mine Survey and Clearance**

#### ***The Big Push to Clear Infrastructure Networks***

As noted above, various actors initiated a number of separate mine survey and clearance projects by early 1993. In broad terms, international firms were contracted mainly to survey and clear the major road and electricity networks – tasks they completed quickly because they imported specialised survey assets and because there were, in fact, few mines left on the major roads at least. The international NGOs also started with a focus on roads to facilitate the return of refugees and the work of agencies delivering humanitarian assistance, but soon shifted much of their efforts to area demining programmes.

Records for the period are incomplete, and the comparison of rapid survey and clearance of roads with area demining is not very useful: regardless, the following graph gives some indication of the scale of the survey and clearance operations undertaken from 1993 to 2001 to clear the main transportation and power networks. (Note: The data provided by IND for 1993-97 are not separated by year, so the annual averages for this period are used.)

**Figure 10 – Survey & Clearance of Infrastructure Networks: 1993-97**




In addition, clearance records show Minetech (a Zimbabwean firm) accounting for almost 20 million square metres of “area clearance” from 1993-1999. This is an improbably high figure. As well, relatively small numbers of devices were found, suggesting that most of the area covered by Minetech was declared safe following survey, and did not require actual clearance. Accordingly, the Minetech figures for this period are not included in the following section.

#### ***Other Demining***

The graph below gives the pattern of “area” demined over the years. It should be interpreted as suggestive rather than a definitive picture as some of what has been recorded as clearance – particularly by commercial firms – is either a combination of survey and clearance, or is

Battle Area Clearance (BAC – a visual inspection for surface explosives).<sup>70</sup> Once again, figures for 1993-1997 are not available by year, so the annual averages for that period is used to provide some comparison of the scale of operations over time.<sup>71</sup>

**Figure 11 – Area demining operations: 1993-2004**




Some clear patterns emerge. First, the scale of operations by humanitarian deminers rose gradually until about 2002; then levelled-off. Second, FADM has been making modest contributions since at least 2000, but there appears to be a problem in either the reporting or the recording of FADM clearance work. Third, there are much bigger year-to-year swings in the amount of work completed by commercial operators than is the case for the humanitarian operators and (probably) FADM.

This last observation is consistent with the market niche now filled by commercial deminers. Firms maintain a skeleton staff, but recruit demining teams when they win contracts. The total value of contracts issued in any year ebbs-and-flows with the pattern of infrastructure rehabilitation and development work underway in Mozambique. Over the past five years, the amount of demining conducted in any year by commercial firms has ranged anywhere from under one million m<sup>2</sup> to almost seven million m<sup>2</sup>. Commercial demining has come to account for a significant component of all demining activity since 2000 and, in 2004, the area recorded as cleared by commercial demining firms exceeded that of the humanitarian operators (again, much of what is recorded as ‘cleared’ by firms may be a combination of survey and clearance).

<sup>70</sup> We are not suggesting anything untoward: only that many of the tasks for which commercial firms have been engaged are not as resource intensive as the manual demining, which constitutes the bulk of the activity by the humanitarian and, in recent years, FADM.

<sup>71</sup> As well, the graph does not include HALO Tasks in 2004 which are recorded as “technical survey” by IND. The IND database shows 106 such tasks for HALO in 2004, which “released” over 4 million m<sup>2</sup>. As discussed later, it is likely that IND has not entered all such records from HALO.

**Figure 12 – Cumulative areas demined: 2000-2004**

Ideally it would be useful to compare the annual clearance activity against the scale of the contamination in the country to gauge how long it might take (and how much it might cost) to overcome the landmine problem. As noted earlier however, IND's existing records stem principally from the LIS, which all parties recognise overstates the total hazard (i.e. area suspected of contamination). Therefore, we defer this question until a later section where we analyse the likely extent of contamination remaining in Mozambique today.

One other point warrants mention here. Clearly, data from early years of the programme are unreliable. However, there are continuing concerns about whether the national mine action database contains complete and accurate records of demining even for recent years. This will continue to detract from what should be a valuable national asset unless it is resolved.

### Lesson 6

**An information management system capable of maintaining complete and accurate data on the landmine/UXO hazards, and on survey and clearance activities, is an essential capacity for a national mine action programme. Failure to establish such a system in the early years of a programme will severely constrain the ability of programme planners and managers to formulate proper plans and priorities for years to come.**

## Mine Risk Education

Both NPA and HI (along with a number of other agencies) were active in MRE since at least 1993. As has been the pattern in most countries, MRE shifted from (i) emergency projects featuring direct delivery organised by international agencies to refugees, displaced persons, and other at-risk groups through (ii) efforts to deliver MRE via local organisations (such as the Mozambican Red Cross – CVM) and via radio and other media, in order to reach more communities in a cost-effective manner, and finally to (iii) efforts to “institutionalise” MRE by, say, incorporating it into the school system, thus making it more likely to be sustained.


As depicted in the following graph, the number of deaths and injuries from landmine and UXO accidents has fallen dramatically, suggesting the current level of risk to civilians is modest.<sup>72</sup> (Notes: (i) These data include deminer casualties, which appear to account for about

<sup>72</sup> Note: IND records for 1996 and 1997 cover only six and seven provinces respectively. Figures shown in the graph for those years (dotted line) are estimates extrapolated to all ten provinces based on calculations made by the Review Team. The trend line is based only on data from 1998 to 2004.



a quarter of all deaths and injuries recorded since the start of 1999! (ii) IND data provided to the Review Team did not give a breakdown between the type of explosive device causing accidents, deaths, and injuries. Such a breakdown is important to understand whether the remaining risk stems largely from minefields or from UXO – obviously a critical question in assessing whether MRE is warranted and what type of risks MRE should focus upon.

**Figure 13 – Landmine & UXO Victims over time (showing trend)**



The largest programme for MRE was developed by HI. Its National Co-ordination of Education Activities to Prevent Mine and UXO Accidents (PEPAM) programme commenced in 1995.<sup>73</sup> PEPAM sought to involve local partners (e.g. provincial and district staff of Education, Social Welfare, Health and Police as well as the CVM), create district and community committees, and introduce MRE into the school system. It made significant progress on all these fronts before handing responsibility to IND in 1999, at which point HI ended its MRE activities.<sup>74</sup>

Until 2003, there were some agencies including UNICEF and the CVM still active in MRE in some form or another. Since early 2004 however, it appears that no MRE activities have taken place in the country (other than information sessions for local residents when mine clearance teams start working on a new site). UNICEF has recently undertaken a review of their activities in Mozambique and believes there is no serious requirement for further MRE.

The current IND strategic plan states that “*There is an urgent need for an aggressive and sustained Mine Risk Education and Marking campaigns to be re-launched.*” Given the current levels of accidents and victims however, the Review Team does not agree. While operators should continue to provide MRE sessions to local residents when they move to a new vicinity, and IND should continue to monitor the numbers of accidents and victims, resources that might be allocated to MRE would probably be better utilised in other mine action activities.

## Lesson 7

**Over time (and assuming a country does not return to conflict), MRE takes a progressively lower profile within a national mine action programme – a reasonable trend given:**

<sup>73</sup> See FINNCONSULT, 1999, especially pp. 24-27.

<sup>74</sup> However, HI developed further intensive MRE campaigns in the central region districts following the floods in 2000/2001. By the end of 2001, IND assumed responsibility for these activities as well.



- **Risks to civilians are highest when they are unfamiliar with the contamination in the area, such as when forced to flee conflict regions or when they return to their home communities after the conflict ends;**
- **MRE gradually reaches most of those at risk;**
- **Lessons are quickly learned when local populations venture into contaminated areas;**
- **Targeted survey and clearance operations gradually address the most dangerous minefields.**

## Victim Assistance

Similarly (and in line with experience in other mine affected countries), victim assistance has taken a back seat within the mine action programme in recent years. IND's role appears to be limited to donor liaison and reporting for purposes of the *Convention*. However the disability assistance programme within the ministries of Social Action<sup>75</sup> and Health received extensive support in the past from ICRC and the international NGOs HI,<sup>76</sup> POWER, and the Jaipur Limb Campaign, as well as from CVM.<sup>77</sup> In all, ten orthopaedic clinics were established, along with sixty physiotherapy centres and ten transit centres.

An evaluation of HI programmes conducted in 1998 found “*The orthopaedic workshops and physiotherapy units are largely under-utilised. No feasibility studies were carried out of the need for the construction of orthopaedic centres nor have the reasons for the low utilisation of the units, particularly by women, or client satisfaction been studied.*” (FINNCONSULT, 1999, p. 4) It also questioned whether the Ministry of Health would be able to sustain that number of facilities and the highly skilled staff required to make use of them, and expressed concern that the underutilised orthopaedic and physiotherapy facilities might be draining resources from other essential public health services such as maternal and child care.

One interpretation of such findings was that the facilities are, in fact, needed to serve the large number of disabled in the country (including landmine and UXO victims), but most of those in need are unaware these facilities exist or are unable to access them due to a lack of either transport or temporary accommodation near the treatment facility.

In the second half of 2001, a specific project was initiated by CVM for mine victim assistance in three provinces: Cabo Delgado, Niassa, and Gaza. The focus was on identifying amputees and facilitating their access to orthopaedic clinics, although reports on SHAs and mine accidents were also sent to IND. The targeted project for mine victims seems to have ended, although CVM still provides this service in some areas of the country for disabled people in general. Presumably, some beneficiaries are landmine victims.

In 1999, Landmine Survivors Network established a Peer Support Network of disabled people – many of whom are landmine survivors – in Zambézia Province. This provides home visits, the distribution and repair of mobility devices and medicines, and the provision of schools

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<sup>75</sup> Formally, The Ministry for Women and the Coordination of Social Action (MMCAS), which is the national coordinating agency for assistance to persons with disabilities. In 2004, MMCAS reported that 140 mine victims in Zambézia were assisted with transport to the orthopedic center.

<sup>76</sup> HI began its disability programme in the country in 1986.

<sup>77</sup> Until recently CVM worked with the Jaipur Limb Campaign to operate the Jaipur Orthopedic Center (COJ) in Gaza. It also ran a special Mine Victims assistance project to provide transport to the orthopedic centers and to facilitate accommodation in transit centres maintained for patients who need to travel to a clinic for out-patient treatment.

supplies, building materials, etc. In addition, it has organised small business training courses and assisted a group of 12 survivors to start their own business.

The Mozambican Association for Disabled Persons (ADEMO), the Association of Military Disabled (ADEMIMO), and the Forum of Mozambican Disabled Persons Association (FAMOD – a network of other associations) have been engaged in advocacy for the rights of the disabled. In June 1999, parliament enacted a national disability law and the Council of Ministers adopted a national policy on persons with disabilities (Resolution no. 20/99) that included a commitment to encourage the active participation of disabled people in the country's socio-economic development. However, implementation remains limited due to a lack of resources.

The evidence available to the Review Team suggests that, should additional resources be provided for victim assistance in Mozambique, efforts should focus on addressing accessibility problems by providing travel to and lodging near existing facilities, rather than expanding or upgrading facilities. It does not appear warranted for a distinct service of this type to be created and maintained for mine victims alone; rather, existing programmes for disabled people in general need to be supported and expanded.

#### **Lesson 8**

**Initiatives to establish orthopaedic and physiotherapy facilities available to landmine survivors, and to enhance the skills of the medical and technical personnel at these facilities, often have failed to deliver sustained benefits. Such initiatives should be undertaken as part of a broader strategy designed to:**

- **establish disability assistance programmes that the relevant government ministries, in concert with local self-help organisations, can hope to sustain,**
- **provide a range of other basic services including monitoring, transport to and lodging at treatment facilities, and referral to services for psycho-social rehabilitation and economic re-integration of landmine survivors and other disabled persons.**

#### **Lesson 9**

**National mine action programmes have a specific responsibility to promote programmes aimed at meeting the needs of landmine survivors. However, except in rare cases – often during emergencies – mine action programmes are not the appropriate vehicle for implementing these programmes, which should be part of broader efforts at meeting the needs of disabled people. Mine action programmes often can help to focus attention on the rights and needs of disabled persons, and bringing to light serious gaps in services available to landmine survivors and other disabled persons.**

## **Stockpile Destruction**

All stocks in the country were destroyed by the end of February 2003 with the exception of 1,470 mines retained by organisations for training purposes as permitted by article 7.1 of the Ottawa treaty. This is a major achievement, sending a strong signal concerning the country's commitment to the *Convention* – a particularly important message in a region that has suffered immensely from conflict. The GoM is to be congratulated for achieving this important milestone and Treaty obligation.

## Advocacy

Mozambique was among the first 40 countries to adopt the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty (or *Convention*<sup>78</sup>) The government signed on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 25 August 1998. The treaty entered into force for Mozambique on 1 March 1999. The *Convention* places a number of obligations on countries that have signed and ratified it (termed States Parties) and enjoins them more generally to push for a total ban on anti-personnel landmines.

Mozambique has been a leader in support of the *Convention*. The country hosted the first Meeting of the States Parties in May 1999. It also served as co-chair of the first Standing Committee of Experts on Mine Clearance in 1999 and 2000. This active participation, together with the destruction of the remaining stockpiles, has sent a strong message of support for the treaty. This very positive contribution appears to have been appreciated by other States Parties and rewarded by continued donor support.

In many countries, local NGOs and civil society organisations are active advocates for the ban on landmines. The Fourth International NGO Conference on Landmines: towards a Mine-free Southern Africa, was held in Maputo in February 1997. More recently, in late 2004 a “Mine Action Week” was organised, which attracted significant participation by local development NGOs as well as by government, donor, civil society, and business representatives.

## Other contributions

### *Peace-building*

Mine action makes a substantial contribution to peace-building by facilitating the return of civilians to their home communities and allowing them to live more securely. In addition, Mozambique’s support of the *Convention* and the subsequent destruction of landmine stockpiles demonstrate the government’s commitment to avoid future conflicts and to ensure the military operates under legitimate civilian authority – important messages for a country with a prolonged history of civil war<sup>79</sup> situated in a region that has suffered disproportionately from conflict in recent decades.

The principal peace-building role explicitly played by mine action related to the demobilisation effort. Mine action was not incorporated into the “official” demobilisation programme financed by a variety of donors, but many of the operators played useful roles. For example, the original recruitment policy of the international demining NGOs was to achieve a balance of former combatants from FRELIMO and RENAMO. In general this was a successful process, albeit informal – there was no general guidance and, as in many other cases, operators developed their policies based on common sense as perceived at the time.

The Mine Clearance Training Centre established by UNOHAC formally adopted a similar policy, and many of its trainees then were employed by ADP.

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<sup>78</sup> Its full title is *Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction*. It also is termed informally as the Ottawa Treaty.

<sup>79</sup> Research by The World Bank indicates that almost half of all post-conflict countries slip back into conflict within a decade of the peace agreement. (Collier et al, 2003)

The consensus is that peace-building has been largely successful in Mozambique: most visibly, the country has now gone through three cycles of democratic elections since the General Peace Agreement. Demobilisation is also seen as a success story. Social reintegration proceeded rapidly. Economic integration has been more challenging, but good agricultural conditions in the immediate post-war period, plus the buoyant economy, have helped immensely. By offering attractive employment to former combatants on an even-handed basis, mine action organisations undoubtedly made a small but worthwhile contribution to the peace-building process.

### Lesson 10

**Although typically the mechanisms are not in place for linking mine action into the broader peace-building programme in a practical and concerted fashion, mine action can make important contributions to the peace-building process.**

## Unforeseen Consequences

### HIV/AIDS

Deminers and other mine action workers, as well as others, may be spreading HIV/AIDS directly through sexual contacts with residents in communities close to their worksites and camps. They also risk becoming infected themselves and in turn infecting their wives. To our awareness, there have not yet been any studies which have focussed specifically on deminers as a vector for HIV/AIDS transmission, but the high rates of long term illness among demining teams gives cause for concern. In 2003, NPA lost eight per cent of its operational capacity to AIDS-related diseases, and ADP acknowledged that its rates are very similar.<sup>80</sup>

As well, demining activities can indirectly contribute to the spread of HIV/AIDS by opening roads and connecting previously isolated communities to the transportation network and, hence, greater exposure to long distance truckers, who constitute a well known at-risk group in Southern Africa.

The latest most reliable figures come from a report<sup>81</sup> on 36 sentinel sites dated November 2003 but referring to data gathered in 2002. The report provides the following figures on HIV/AIDS prevalence by region, which show already high rates of infection plus an alarming trend.<sup>82</sup>

	2000	2002
South	12.0%	17.0%
Centre	14.4%	16.7%
North	5.7%	8.4%

Documents continue to stress the role of the road-rail corridors in spreading the disease. They also single out the defence forces as a vector of transmission – another indicator that

<sup>80</sup> It is illegal in Mozambique for employers to test their workers to confirm who are HIV-positive, so it is impossible to know whether all these illnesses are, in fact, due to HIV/AIDS. But with eight per cent classified as too ill to work, and given the gestation period before the immune system weakens to the point when opportunistic diseases take hold, a much higher percentage may be infected – figures in the range of 30 per cent would not be inconceivable.

<sup>81</sup> *Relatorio sobre a revisao dos dados de Vigilancia Epidemiologica do HIV – Ronda 2002* Grupo Tecnico Multisectorial de apoio a luta contra a HIV/SIDA em Moçambique, 6 November 2003.

<sup>82</sup> Note that, contrary to the MA community definitions, the province of Zambézia is considered a central, not a northern province.

HIV/AIDS is a great risk to deminers and, in turn, deminers represent a source of risk to local communities and to their own wives.

Programmes to halt the spread of HIV/AIDS in Mozambique are now out of their infancy, and a variety of services are now available from specialised firms or not-for-profit agencies. The National Roads Administration (ANE) has instituted a number of sound practices for all road reconstruction projects. In broad terms, these entail requirements written into the contract of the prime contractor including:

- Engage a specialised organisation providing HIV/AIDS education and related services;
- In advance of the mobilisation of the work crews, visits by that specialised organisation to communities in the road's vicinity to assess awareness and provide education services;
- Provision of HIV/AIDS education to all workers employed by the prime contractor and sub-contractors.

At least ADP and the international NGOs have instituted measures to address HIV/AIDS concerns. However, programming to halt the spread of HIV/AIDS is a comparatively new field and there is a great deal of experimentation concerning what works best with specific groups and for specific situations. IND and operator representatives should visit the HIV/AIDS programme at ANE and with the representatives of the HIV/AIDS Council of Mozambique to investigate the entire inventory of best practice measures and assess whether existing practices within the mine action field could be improved.

## ***The main mine action organisations***

### **Operators**

The current national capacity can be analysed in a number of ways. First there are the “core” organisations that have formed the mainstay of mine clearance since 1992. In addition, there are a number of more transient (by design or accident) organisations which have added capacity to Mozambique's demining programme. Currently there are more than 1,300 people employed full time for mine action in Mozambique,<sup>83</sup> plus several hundred more who are “transient” deminers who provide services to commercial firms as and when required. Figure 10 on the following page shows the breakdown of numbers between the core agencies (i.e. not including the “transient” capacities of the demining firms).

### ***Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)***


NPA has maintained a mine action programme in Mozambique continuously since 1993. Recently it relocated from Tete to Chimoio and downsized significantly to three manual teams (60 staff), 12 dogs with handlers, two machines with 10 staff – about 126 persons – operating in Tete, Manica, and Sofala Provinces. The programme has a small dog capacity for area reduction and verification tasks. Based on a needs assessment undertaken by NPA head office, it is planning to finish clearance operations in Mozambique by the end of 2005 and mine action activities sometime in 2006. Clearance and technical survey in 2005 will focus on high priority areas indicated by IND and, finally, selected in cooperation with provincial and local authorities and using NPA's Task Impact Assessment (TIA) methodology to ensure all

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<sup>83</sup> At the beginning of 2005 there were almost 760 sappers employed by the humanitarian operators – a drop of over 230 from a year earlier.

clearance is justified and that priorities are set in accordance with expected post-clearance land use.

**Figure 14 – Core demining capacity (number of sappers): Jan 2005**



Prior to complete withdrawal, the NPA survey capacity will expand to complete a TIA survey of all tasks conducted by NPA since 1993 to establish the scope and impact of mine action work to date. It will use the national LIS, with its known limitations, as the benchmark to provide a status report of the remaining mine contamination in the areas of operations at the time of phase out.

NPA clearly has given much thought to how it should manage its exit from its demining programme in Mozambique. At this time however, it has not settled on a firm plan; rather, it has a number of options, and the choice will depend in large part on the measures taken by other stakeholders, such as the GoM/IND and NPA demining staff.

### ***HALO Trust***

The HALO Trust has operated in the northern provinces of Niassa, Cabo Delgado, Nampula, and Zambézia since 1993, when it undertook the first nationwide survey on behalf of ONUMOZ, the results of which were stored in the SHAMAN database, the basis for national planning until the completion of the LIS in 2001. HALO currently has a staff of around 600 and has developed a policy (in agreement with the IND) of working with district authorities to declare districts “Mine Impact Free”. Given progress to date and what it believes is the true level of contamination in the northern four provinces, HALO expects to have cleared all high and medium impact contaminated areas by the end of 2006.

For a number of years HALO Trust spoke of leaving an indigenous capacity in place in terms of “fire brigades”.<sup>84</sup> However, it never identified a suitable institutional home within one of

<sup>84</sup> To our knowledge, the composition of a “fire brigade” has never been completely defined, but it is clear the term refers to smaller mobile teams, cross-trained in demining and EOD, that could respond quickly to requests for assistance or reports of new mines/UXO.



the public sector ministries<sup>85</sup> and, in the absence of a clear decision by the GoM regarding its preferred solution to the need for a long term national capacity, HALO made no real progress in this regard. At this point, HALO Trust plans to close down by the end of 2006, and has no plans to leave a residual capacity of any form. The programme manager said that HALO did not feel that they could dictate to the GoM what the long term capacity should be.<sup>86</sup>

### ***Handicap International (HI)***

HI initiated operations in Inhambane province in 1998. The initial vision was to develop a capacity that would be absorbed into the provincial administration, at the disposal of the governor. However, HI no longer believes this is a feasible target. Currently, the organisation has a manual team, an integrated team, and two EOD teams. The HI philosophy is to clear, district by district, all sites less than 15,000 m<sup>2</sup> and to survey larger sites for updates to the national database. At the current rate of progress, HI expects to clear all sites smaller than 15,000 m<sup>2</sup> and survey all other suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) by the end of 2006, after which it plans to close down. HI advised the Review Team that, at this point in time, it has no concrete plans to retain or hand-over a residual capacity.

#### **Textbox 2 – What is “mine impact free”?**

The National Mine Action Programme (NMAP) five-year plan 2002-2006 defines “impact free” as “*the elimination of impediments to fundamental socio-economic activity and significant reduction in the risk of encountering landmines.*” It also specifies a number of “Impact Free Milestones” for the 2002-2006 period, as follows:

- All High and Medium Impact Sites Cleared
- All UXO Destroyed
- All Existing Stockpiles Destroyed
- Remaining Low Impact Areas Surveyed and Marked
- Fully Operational National Mine Risk Education/Marking Program
- Long-term Survivor and Victim Assistance Programs Established

More generally, IMAS 04.10 defines “impact” as “*the level of social and economic suffering experienced by the community resulting from the harm or risk of harm caused by mine and UXO hazards and hazardous areas.*” It further notes that “*impact is a product of:*

- a) *the presence of mine/UXO hazard in the community;*
- b) *intolerable risk associated with the use of infrastructure such as roads, markets etc.*
- c) *intolerable risk associated with livelihood activities such as agricultural land, water source etc.*
- d) *number of victims of mine and UXO incidents within the last two years.*”

It is unclear how closely the “impact free” vision of the humanitarian operators corresponds to that defined in NMAP. The IMAS definition simply suggests that impact must be understood in terms of both (i) the level of risk to people and (ii) economic constraints, and thus impact

<sup>85</sup> Apparently, both FADM and the police (under the Ministry of Interior) were considered at various points. (Craib, 2003)

<sup>86</sup> Clearly, this view was endorsed by the evaluator for DfID: “*The major problem has been that the government directly, or through IND, has not made the policy decisions on the long term shape of mine action.*” (Craib, 2003, section 7.6.6)

free would imply at least the removal of “intolerable risks” and constraints on economic activities needed to maintain or enhance livelihoods.

What is lacking in these various definitions – at least for countries with extensive contamination such as Mozambique – is explicit mention of a sustainable capacity to address the residual risks posed by contamination that does not impact people today, but may in the future because of population movements, expansion of economic activities, etc. Such sustainable capacity is required if “impact free” status is to be sustained.

### ***Accelerated Demining Programme (ADP)***<sup>87</sup>

The ADP was formed as part of the ONUMOZ peacekeeping operation in 1994; an extremely confused period characterised by bitter infighting among the many UN and donor agencies with some role in mine action. It was established as an organisation that filled an emergency need, and there appears to have been little initial thought put into the longer term development of the programme; simply an assumption that the GoM would assume responsibility eventually. It has, however, remained under the auspices of UNDP and currently has nine operational teams (about 350 persons) operating in Maputo, Gaza, and Inhambane provinces. ADP represents the primary capacity in the South and it is likely that such a capability will be required for the medium-term before “impact free” status is achieved.

ADP is acknowledged by most donors to be technically proficient and well-managed (although a number of donors highlighted concerns they had with the adequacy of reporting compared to that by the international NGOs).<sup>88</sup> However, the future of ADP is unclear. The organisation has been “in the process” of transforming from a UNDP nationally executed (NEX) project into a national NGO for more than three years,<sup>89</sup> but apparently has not yet developed draft statutes of association or a business plan. The Review Team understands that part of the general concept is to reduce the size of the organisation from the current level of 350, to around 250. This however requires an outlay of over \$200,000 (which the organisation does not have) to cover legally-imposed obligations relating to retrenchment.

In fact, this may represent a far higher hurdle than currently understood: there may be an obligation to cover retrenchment costs for all staff with at least three years experience prior to a transition to a legally distinct organisation, regardless of the organisation’s ultimate legal status – after all, even the staff who will be retained in the new organisation will first be laid off by the UNDP project. While clearly there has been much discussion on whether ADP could obtain the requisite operating funds if it became an NGO or a parastatal, it remains unclear to the Review Team whether all potential hurdles to any such transition have received adequate attention (see Textbox 3 – Labour Retrenchment Legislation in Mozambique).

<sup>87</sup> A few months after the mission for this review, ADP was beset by crisis and suspended operations – at least temporarily – at the end of June 2005. The final chapter contains an update.

<sup>88</sup> The Review Team did not determine whether this problem resides with ADP (which, as a project, reports to UNDP), or with UNDP, or with the reporting requirements of the donors, who may want their funds to be treated distinctly even though all donor funds are pooled via the UNDP trust fund. If the latter, the donors are non-compliant with “harmonisation” policies espoused by all major donors and international financial institutions (IFIs), and the onus for improvement lies with them.

<sup>89</sup> Donors were pushing for ADP to be converted into an NGO as early as 1996. (DHA, 1997, p. 32)



**Textbox 3 – Labour Retrenchment Legislation in Mozambique<sup>90</sup>**

Mozambique's labour law affords significant protection to workers in the formal economy. Layoffs are legal, but workers with at least three years of service are entitled to three months' salary for every two years of service, which is high by international and regional standards. For "good" employers, this adds 12.5 per cent to basic wage costs. As well, the labour law does not allow dismissal of staff on the grounds that they are sick, which depletes teams as fixed budgets don't allow 'filling gaps' as staff on sick leave remain on payroll.

This has three chief implications in the mine action sector. First, it creates a significant cost advantage for demining firms (which engage most staff purely on a contract-by-contract basis) versus the so-called humanitarian operators (which employ most staff on a long-term basis, triggering the labour law protection). Second, the inability to dismiss on the grounds of sickness depletes budgets of the humanitarian operators (the international NGOs plus ADP), leaving insufficient funds to engage replacement workers. Third, at least some of the humanitarian operators have not factored future retrenchment costs into their annual budgets and, therefore, face substantial legal liabilities that will need to be resolved before downsizing or ceasing operations entirely.

In ADP's case, it may well be that same obligations would become due if and when ADP completes a transition from a UNDP project\* (with no distinct legal existence) into an NGO, firm, or some other legal entity. If so, this existing liability could amount to \$1 million or more. But even if ADP did not have pay-out labour retrenchment costs before completing its legal restructuring, the legal obligation exists: in this case, the "new" ADP would start its existence with a financial liability of perhaps \$1 million. Unless donors or the GoM injected this amount into the organisation at the start, the "new" ADP would be, essentially, bankrupt from day one. It may not be legal – and certainly not ethical – to proceed on this basis.

\* The Review Team was advised following the mission that there are provisions by which the GoM could waive the standard labour legislation provision in the case of "projects". Because of its project status, ADP staff have been serving on a series of one year contracts. The GoM could decide that these staff did not have many years of continuous service (justifying retrenchment benefits) but rather had been engaged anew on a separate contract each year.

***RONCO Consulting***

RONCO have been operational in mine action in Mozambique since 1994 and currently provides a two-fold approach. The US Department of State (DoS) sponsored Quick Response Demining Force (QRDF) is managed by RONCO. This is a team of around 60 who operate globally but use Mozambique as a base for operations. Their deployment in Mozambique is agreed with the IND.<sup>91</sup> In addition, RONCO are providing support services, training and supervision for capacity development to the Mozambique Armed Forces (FADM).

***Forças Armadas de Moçambique (FADM)***

FADM has, over the last few years, developed some capacity for humanitarian mine clearance. In the early phase of the programme, FADM undertook some clearance tasks, but they were unrecorded and are not believed to meet the current Mozambican Mine Action Standards (MMAS). Since receiving training and equipment from the US DoS (now through

<sup>90</sup> On labour retrenchment laws, see IMF, 2004c, *Article IV Consultations*, p. 20.

<sup>91</sup> It appears much of their work has been to support rehabilitation work for rail lines.

RONCO and previously from US Special forces training teams) FADM has become a viable operator, with three teams of 30 in each of the three regions.

### ***Other clearance organisations***

Over the period reviewed, a number of other operators have operated in support of the national demining programme. These have included the German NGO Menschen gegen Minen (MgM), which operated a programme in Mozambique from 2000 to early 2004, a few so-called local NGO operators (see Textbox 4 – Legislation affecting “NGOs” in Mozambique), and a larger number of “local” firms<sup>92</sup> including Mozambique Mine Action (MMA – a subsidiary of Armor Group), JV Desminagem, and ECOMS Desminagem SARL.

### ***Quality management firms***

There are two local companies registered to undertake quality management in support of IND. Only one, CCQ, appears to be operational at the present time. It appears capable.

### ***Future intentions of operators***

All three international NGOs plan to leave the country within the next two-to-three years. HALO expects to achieve Mine Impact Free districts in the northern four provinces by the end of 2006; HI expects to have cleared all sites less than 15,000 m<sup>2</sup> and to have surveyed all remaining SHA in Inhambane, Manica, and Sofala by the same time; and NPA is planning to close their operation down (also by the end of 2006) having completed a resurvey and cleared high and medium priority tasks to the limit of its capacity. As noted previously, none of the international NGOs have adopted firm plans for transferring their assets to other demining organisations extant in Mozambique, or for leaving a local organisation in place after their departure.

ADP is somewhat different. ADP managers view the organisation as the “national capacity”.<sup>93</sup> However, its vision for the future remains unclear. While plans have been in place for some years for a transformation to a national NGO, there is no business plan in place for the conversion and indeed there are no statutes of association yet developed. (See also Textbox 4 – Legislation affecting “NGOs” in Mozambique.)

#### **Textbox 4 – Legislation affecting “NGOs” in Mozambique**

As in most countries, the term Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) has scant legal meaning. There are no legal provisions allowing an “NGO” to be created: rather, Mozambicans can form an “association”<sup>i</sup> and – perhaps – a “foundation”.<sup>ii</sup> In addition, Decree 55/98<sup>iii</sup> regulates the authorisation procedure for a foreign NGO’s operation in Mozambique.<sup>iv</sup>

In short, there is no such thing as a Mozambican NGO in any legal sense. As well, the laws and regulations governing associations are deficient in many respects. For example, there are potential obstacles to the efficient and sustained functioning of associations, including:

- the use of a “standard” organisation structure based on the members’ financial

<sup>92</sup> Some of these are joint ventures with, or subsidiaries of, foreign firms.

<sup>93</sup> Of course, existing Mozambican NGOs and firms also view themselves as “national capacity”, and the local staff and managers of the international NGOs could try to establish as local NGOs or firms as their current managers exit.

contributions, imposing lengthy decision-making procedures which may require resort to the general assembly;

- the “voluntary and non-remunerated” work to create and eventually operate the association on the part of members, including their representatives on the board.

Recognising these deficiencies, in the mid-1990s The World Bank commissioned the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law to propose model NGO legislation based on the Center’s “good practice” guidelines.<sup>v</sup> However, the government of the day did not act on this proposal and the issue does not appear to be high on the current legislative agenda.

i Under Law no. 8/91; BR no. 29 (Sup.) of 18/7/91 – law regulating the freedom of association including the establishment of associations.

ii Under Decree no. 48/94; BR no. 41 (Sup.) of 12/10/94 – Authorises the Minister of Justice to regulate procedures for registration of foundations, but such regulations do not seem to have been promulgated (i.e. published in the Government Gazette – *Boletim da República* or BR, which is a prerequisite before any statute is binding).

iii BR Series I – No. 40-2<sup>nd</sup> Supp, of 13 October 1998

iv There are also various provisions in fiscal legislation affecting the tax status of associations. It should be noted that **demining is not included in the activities which warrant special tax treatment either for the donor or the person/entity engaged in the activity.**

v e.g. ICNL, 1995, *Regulating Not-for-Profit Organizations*, <[www.icnl.org/gendocs/COMP3.html](http://www.icnl.org/gendocs/COMP3.html)>

It should be noted that the future intentions of all major mine clearance operators in the country have been developed in isolation, without real reference to IND.

The commercials remaining in Mozambique plan to stay as long as there is business. (As detailed in subsequent Chapters, demand for demining services on a commercial basis is likely to grow; perhaps substantially; over at least the medium term.)

## Instituto Nacional de Desminagem (IND)

### **Mandate and Structure**

The IND was formed in 1999 to replace the previous demining commission, CND. Article 4 of IND’s statutes states that its principal responsibilities are to “*propose policies and strategies, the setting of priorities and action plans, as well as managing, coordinating and controlling the mine action in Mozambique*”. Article 5 then lists the duties IND should undertake, including:

- Proposing policies and government strategies for mine action;
- Proposing short, medium, and long-term plans, and managing the execution of these plans once approved;
- To facilitate, coordinate, manage, and control mine action activity;
- To develop and approve mine action standards;
- Resource mobilisation;
- Maintaining a database and mine action information system; and
- To perform quality assurance on mine clearance.

IND falls under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and has the following organs:

- **The Management** – i.e. the Director and Deputy Director (now vacant), both of whom are appointed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs
- **The Board of Governors**<sup>94</sup> – the Director, Deputy Director and the heads of the various directorates/departments: Research, Planning, and Information, Operations, International Relations, Administration and Finance, and Human Resources. This is to hold monthly meetings to discharge the following functions:
  - Pronounces on the general orientation, management and direction of the IND
  - Pronounces on the acquisition of property
  - Pronounces on the opening and closing of delegations
- **The Technical Council** – A consultative body that pronounces on aspects of the programming, organization, and analysis of the operation of IND submitted to it by IND, and “*pronounces itself on the progress report of IND and the program for next year*”. The statutes do not indicate who chairs the Committee, but presumably the IND Director assumes this role. The statutes stipulate this organ should meet four times a year.

Composition: Board of Governors plus representatives of the following ministries:

- |                           |                             |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
| • Foreign Affairs         | • Agriculture and Fisheries |
| • Planning and Finance    | • Social Action             |
| • Defence                 | • Labour                    |
| • Public Works            | • Health                    |
| • Home Affairs (Interior) |                             |

The statutes also provide for semi-annual meetings with “cooperating partners” (i.e. representatives of the UN, donors, and civil society “including demining operators”<sup>95</sup>).

The statutes are curious in a number of ways, including:

- the fact that what is termed the Board of Governors (at least in the English translation of the statutes) is not a Board providing direction for and oversight of IND’s management; rather, it is simply a management committee comprising the director, deputy director, and department heads;
- the inter-ministerial Technical Council serves only an advisory function, and its membership includes the IND Board of Governors (i.e., the management committee);
- only the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the IND Director appear to have any input into the agendas of the Technical Council and the meeting of cooperating partners,<sup>96</sup> which suggests these organs do not provide an adequate forum for discussing issues which other

<sup>94</sup> The English translation of the statutes terms this body the “Board of Governors”, but it is unclear how the Portuguese term used in the original should be translated into English. In Mozambique, the term *Conselho de Administração* is normally used when referring to a Board of Directors. However, the IND statutes uses the term *Conselho de Direcção*, which often is used for what in English would be termed a Steering Committee or for a Management Council/Committee. From its composition, it seems clear that the latter would have been the most accurate translation.

<sup>95</sup> This omits mention of NGOs involved in other aspects of mine action such as MRE or victim assistance, and suggests that firms are not viewed as cooperating partners.

<sup>96</sup> For example, cooperating partners can pronounce themselves “*on important subjects... that have been submitted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation.*” (Article 17)

government agencies, donors, or implementing partners believe should merit attention, but which are not priorities for the Minister or the IND Director.

Clearly, the statutes do not provide for an inter-ministerial committee to provide policy direction that reflects the broader priorities and concerns of the GoM.

### **Capacity-building**

As its predecessor CND was moribund, IND was essentially a new organisation facing a wide range of capacity-building requirements. In 2001 a consultant completed a review on these requirements for IND (Kiggundu, 2001), and proffered the following recommendations (with the last column showing our assessment<sup>97</sup> of the progress achieved since his report):

<b>Main recommendation</b>	<b>Sub recommendation</b>	<b>Progress</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Match Mandate to capacity</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Focus mandate and priorities to match resources.</li> </ul>	Some
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Develop multi-year business plan and budget to correspond to activities</li> </ul>	Some
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Build capacities related to priorities as stated in the work plan</li> </ul>	Some
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Strengthen the Institute's Internal Management</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Re-organise and strengthen the management council into a working senior management committee</li> </ul>	No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Restructure the office of the deputy director to take direct responsibility for operations</li> </ul>	No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Clarify roles and reporting relationships</li> </ul>	No
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Address Human Resource Management Challenges</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ensure smooth working relationships between TA and counterparts by holding workshops</li> </ul>	No
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Improve operations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ensure effective transfer of data from CIDC to IND</li> </ul>	Yes
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Strengthen IND database by conducting client satisfaction surveys</li> </ul>	No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Outsource QA to contractors</li> </ul>	No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Strengthen regional offices</li> </ul>	Some
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Decentralise authority to regional offices</li> </ul>	No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Create a regional office for the South in the headquarters</li> </ul>	No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Create a LAN for internal communications</li> </ul>	Yes
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provide PCs to all managers</li> </ul>	Yes
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Improve external relations management</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Use governance bodies provided to create value for mine action community</li> </ul>	No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Publish regular newsletter for community needs</li> </ul>	Yes

The international community has provided significant assistance to IND, either by grants directly to IND or with contributions channelled via the UNDP Trust Fund (which supports a Nationally Executed Project). This project has provided a series of international experts

<sup>97</sup> This assessment has also been reviewed with the former CTA for IND, who concurred with it.

(recruited by UNOPS) for the following technical adviser (TA) positions: Chief Technical Adviser (CTA); Operations; Finance and Administration; and Information.

Clearly IND represents an improvement over CND, and virtually all informants state that the organisation's performance has been improving over time. However, performance has been constrained because the management policies and administrative procedures remain weak. The organisation remains far too centralised, to the point where no documents are allowed to be processed without the signature of the director. When the director is away on travel, service levels sometimes fall because authority is not delegated.

This makes it extremely difficult for a short review to assess staff capacities: in brief, individuals may have too little latitude to perform to the level of their capabilities. In other cases, individual performance is constrained by a lack of clear direction – staff may not have a clear idea of what is expected of them in terms of duties and performance targets. Motivation is also a problem. Employees reported to the Review Team that they work under widely different terms and conditions of service, leading to morale problems. Both tardiness and absenteeism appear to be common problems.

On the other hand, many staff appears to possess considerable skills that could be better utilised, and some provided the Review Team with solid suggestions that would lead to better performance. Staff feel that mine action is a worthy endeavour, and they would welcome the opportunity to make a larger contribution to Mozambique's development.

In short, it seems clear that IND's performance has been improving since its establishment. This is a worthwhile record given that capacity-building in the public sector of Mozambique and other post-conflict countries has been notoriously difficult to achieve and sustain (Beschel, 2002; World Bank 2005). Further, there appears to be significant scope for performance improvements in the short to medium term. In many cases what is needed is to harness the existing capacities of IND staff rather than to build additional capacities.

This broadly positive assessment must be tempered with the recognition that the current performance of IND still falls short of what is required to address the current and future challenges facing it in its central role within the national mine action programme.

### ***Performance in discharging key responsibilities***

#### **POLICY FORMULATION**

IND has supported the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Ottawa process. This entails articulation of GoM policy with respect to *Convention* matters. Owing to the changeover in government, the Review Team was unable to ascertain the degree to which policy pronouncements are referred by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Council of Ministers for ultimate decision, but our impression was that the outgoing Minister felt that he had sufficient latitude to make any policy decisions himself, within the framework of obligations outlined in the *Convention*.

Of note is that there is no mine action legislation in Mozambique to clarify precisely how the provisions of the *Convention* apply within the country.<sup>98</sup> More generally, the Review Team did not find any instances where IND, via the Minister of Foreign Affairs, proposed policies to the Council of Ministers<sup>99</sup> to guide government departments and other public or private agencies on the procedures they should adopt when dealing with issues of landmine and UXO contamination. As we discuss later in the report, there is significant potential for IND to exercise leadership in spreading best practice if it becomes more active in proposing policies for adoption by the government.

## NATIONAL PLANNING

It is clear that LIS data are, in isolation, inadequate for national mine action planning (see Textbox 5 – Landmine Surveys: Hazards or Communities). IND states that it compiles the list of priority tasks based on the LIS, but the reality many be more complex (see Textbox 6 – Where do priorities really come from?).

### Textbox 5 – Landmine Surveys: Hazards or Communities

Originally, surveys of landmine and UXO contamination focused on suspected minefields or areas of UXO contamination (collectively, “hazards”). The LIS departed from this approach, focusing instead on communities. Because of the perceived problems in getting accurate estimates of contaminated areas from the community informants, the LIS was designed so that the areas and specific boundaries of each SHA were of marginal importance. As a result, most of the first generation LIS returned vastly larger estimates of total areas suspected of contamination, with many SHA defined in very loose terms.

Of course, deminers need far more precise data on the position, shape, and size of an SHA in order to plan what resources to allocate and for how long. Thus, the demining operators found, initially at least, that data from the first generation LIS were of little practical use and – in some cases including Mozambique’s – presented a distorted picture of the contamination problem. As well, because each impacted community might be affected by multiple hazards, some follow-up step was required to determine which hazards should be dealt with as a priority, and in what way.

It should be clear that a proper assessment of contamination needs good information on both communities (who needs help first) and hazards (what specifically needs to be done to help). As part of their priority-setting processes, many mine action organisations now conduct a task planning survey to examine both the technical challenges for clearance or marking, and to collect “socio-economic” data to ensure the target beneficiaries are clearly identified and there is nothing preventing the beneficiaries from making use of the land after clearance (e.g. ownership disputes, lack of seed or tools). The first well-documented use of this approach seems to be from NPA in Angola, where it was termed Task Impact Assessment (TIA). In this case, the focus was on individual hazards that NPA was considering for clearance.

More recently in Bosnia, the TIA model was adapted for a community focus. When the LIS

<sup>98</sup> This implies that the legal authority for IND to enforce policies and standards it adopts could be questioned.

<sup>99</sup> Given there is no inter-ministerial committee with any decision-making authority above IND, it appears any such policies would need to be adopted by the Council of Ministers if they are to have government-wide effect.

identified a highly-impacted community, a second multi-skilled survey team was fielded to conduct a Task Assessment and Planning (TAP) exercise. This results in a multi-year integrated mine action plan for the community, identifying which hazards required immediate clearance, which should be marked or fenced, and which people needed mine risk education. (See Annex VII – BHMACH Task Assessment and Planning Final Report in Survey Action Center, 2004, *Landmine Impact Survey: Bosnia and Herzegovina*, available from [www.sac-na.org](http://www.sac-na.org))

#### Textbox 6 – Where do priorities really come from?

In general, IND management has been strongly supportive of the LIS – the director recently stated that the LIS represents a “quantum leap” in terms of the range and quality of data available to inform the planning and priority-setting processes. For the most part, demining operators in Mozambique have been dismissive of the LIS and the database created by the survey. The main humanitarian operators have also been established in their regions of the country for many years. They know and consult the provincial governors and district administrators concerning priorities.

However, a recent study raises some interesting questions: “A review of activities in 2003 revealed that of the 207 tasks identified by IND in its annual demining priorities, only one third were drawn from the LIS.”\* Further, operators often turn down tasks identified as priorities by IND on the grounds that their clearance assets are elsewhere engaged. The same study goes on to observe that “...of 150 tasks carried out in 2003, only 47 were derived from the IND annual plan and only 36 of those from the LIS. Among 103 tasks completed that were not in the IND priorities, 46 were identified in the LIS.” This implies that the clearance actually done by operators is more in line with the LIS (82 of 150 tasks; almost 55 per cent) than are the priorities compiled by IND (69 of 207 tasks, or 33.3 per cent)!

\* The data are from *Grau de implementacao das prioridades de desminagem 2003*, IND, 30 July 2004, and are quoted in Cumming-Bruce, “The Case of Mozambique”, Chapter 5 in GICHD, forthcoming, *A Study of the Role of Survey in Mine Action*, p. 122. The Review Team does not have the original document.

The current five year plan (2002-2006) is based on the LIS survey data that appears to have serious gaps while, at the same time, overstating the magnitude of the problem in terms of the area suspected of contamination. As well, the criteria used in categorising the level of priority for each community were deemed inappropriate by the operators which, in the main, have not followed them. It is therefore difficult to assess the achievement of the main objective – that all high and medium impact sites are cleared by 2006 – at least if the criteria used are those of the LIS impact scoring system.<sup>100</sup>

The autonomy of the four main humanitarian operators has meant that, until recently, each applied its own criteria in defining priorities. The resulting list of sites was then discussed with the provincial administration, which made the final choice in the light of the operator’s capacity. The provincial lists were then combined by IND to form its annual national plan.

The annual plan gives little analysis other than basic interpretations of the statistical data (e.g. Inhambane is the province most affected in all aspects; Zambézia was second in terms of affected communities and area, whereas Nampula was second in terms of affected

<sup>100</sup> Note that IND’s plan talks of “high and medium impact sites” but the LIS impact scores are generated for communities; not specific sites where hazards are suspected.



population). The plan has a table showing the “impact” by province and region according to three criteria (areas, communities, and population), but goes on to note with regret that the main methodological criterion – the availability of an operator – means that the most needy northern area does not receive the attention it should due to the uneven distribution of operator capacity.<sup>101</sup>

In the last couple of years there has been more emphasis by operators on community consultation (and, as a consequence, the coverage of sites missed by the LIS). The District Administrators, often supported by the District Police Chiefs, now prepare a list of all known sites and rank them in order of impact importance – specific forms are used for this purpose, with a column for a brief indication of the nature of the socio-economic impact. The District lists are then incorporated into a Provincial list to the extent possible, taking into account the operator’s capacities. This means that, in practice, it is likely that the annual provincial plans diverge from the out-dated and/or inappropriate targets in the Five Year Plan.

The current strategic plan states that the country will be mine impact free by 2009. However, both the outgoing Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the IND advised the Review Team that the new strategic plan will target a country “mine free” by 2009.

## **COORDINATION**

IND holds an annual meeting with the key operators, and this has been carried out with commendable regularity. However, annual meetings may not be adequate even to address administrative chores that require attention, let alone deal with more complex matters such as priority-setting, annual and multi-year planning, and policy dialogue (i.e. identifying issues of strategic importance that will require IND, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or the GoM to set or revise policies). For example, some operators reported that the 2004 meeting discussed customs import procedures and little else.

Of course, coordination can and should take place outside these annual meetings. Whether this is done effectively depends not only on the personal relationships among the key players but also on the access that managers of the operators have to the IND Director. We understand that relations among the various mine action managers are cordial and that they share reports among themselves to avoid deployments to tasks which have already been addressed by another operator.<sup>102</sup> Access to the IND Director also appears to have improved markedly since the appointment of the current incumbent.

## **STANDARDS AND REGULATION**

The IND is responsible for regulation of mine clearance assets. It has recently changed the system of accreditation to a system of licensing, which gives each operator authorisation to operate for up to five years. This system is flawed and does not provide an effective process of regulation. To become licensed by the IND, a local commercial organisation merely needs to show that it is a legal entity in Mozambique, has a set of Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs), and wishes to undertake demining in the country. The IND has an excellent opportunity to coordinate and manage the professional implementation of mine clearance

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<sup>101</sup> Note that the capacity of HALO Trust, which covers the north, has increased relative to that in NPA, ADP, and HI.

<sup>102</sup> Because IND clearance records are not always accurate or up-to-date, IND sometimes requests an operator to clear a site that has already be cleared.

throughout the country, but the existing licensing regime provides no real control over the operational assets.

#### **Textbox 7 – National Mine Action Standards**

Mozambique subscribes to the principles of International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and developed the first set of Mozambican National Mine Action Standards (MNMAS, which are based on IMAS) in 2002. The preparation and adoption of national standards within a year of the formal international adoption of IMAS in September 2001, and well ahead of the majority of the rest of the international community, clearly was a positive and commendable step. However, continued progress seems to have slowed considerably.

In 2005, some 12 years beyond start-up of mine action in Mozambique and eight years after the first IMAS were produced by the international community, the MNMAS (which were written by expatriate technical advisers) have still not been translated into Portuguese: this, despite the fact that operators – most of which are Mozambican organisations – requiring licensing by the IND are required to deliver detailed SOPs to IND based on MNMAS.

#### **INFORMATION MANAGEMENT**

The IND bears responsibility for the maintenance of a national database of SHA, cleared sites, and confirmed minefields. The baseline data were provided as part of the LIS undertaken in 1999-2001 by CIDC.

The LIS undertaken in Mozambique was controversial from the start. Some of the criticisms levelled were common to all first-generation LIS.<sup>103</sup> Some mine action practitioners thought the costs were too high and the surveys took too long to deliver benefits. Many in the demining community were critical that the LIS measured impacts on communities but not individual minefields, meaning an additional assessment often was required to determine which of the minefields around a highly impacted community needed to be cleared as a matter of priority. Operators were also unhappy that, because of this community focus, little attention was given to the exact boundaries of individual SHA. This typically resulted in huge increases in the total area listed as SHA in a country, which seemed to magnify the contamination problem.<sup>104</sup>

Mozambique's LIS came in for additional criticism for two principal reasons. First, CIDA decided to restrict the tender to Canadian organisations, eliminating all member organisations of the Survey Working Group – a network of (mainly) mine action NGOs – that had developed the LIS methodology. Second, a new organisation, with no prior experience in Mozambique or humanitarian demining, was awarded the contract. At least in part because of these controversies, the quality of Mozambique's LIS data has always been questioned, and many observers were unhappy with the decision by the UN Mine Action Service to certify the LIS. Regardless of its quality as a baseline, the LIS methodology used in Mozambique and elsewhere made no provision for regular updates to the socio-economic data fields. In the absence of updated data and, given the rapid pace of development in many parts of the country, the LIS data would not provide a reliable basis for planning and priority-setting

<sup>103</sup> The evaluation of "first generation" Landmine Impact Surveys (Scanteam, 2003) includes an annex on the case of Mozambique that gives a flavour of these controversies.

<sup>104</sup> Action has been taken on many of these perceived problems, and satisfaction appears to be higher with more recent LIS.

today, even had the technical data from ongoing survey and clearance work been updated assiduously.

Unfortunately, much of the technical data supplied by the operators has not been entered accurately or at all.<sup>105</sup> These information management issues have been addressed on a number of occasions, and the most recent supporting visit by the IMSMA unit of GICHD identified specific issues requiring attention by the IMSMA section of IND.<sup>106</sup> At the time of the Review Team's mission, these issues did not appear to have been addressed.<sup>107</sup> Because of this, the deployment of operators to sites which have already been cleared has been a recurrent problem. In addition, commercial organisations – and the government agencies which contract them – appear not to trust the clearance data available from IND. As a result, demining firms typically are instructed to re-survey and clear entire stretches of roads, power lines, etc. slated for rehabilitation (an issue discussed in Chapter 4).

The data handling processes are confusing for all concerned and there is no standardisation of the processes. For example, HALO Trust operates a separate *Excel* database of all the work they have undertaken in the northern region. Their clearance, progress, and cancellation reports are delivered in hard copy to the IND regional office, which then send the reports to Maputo because the northern office currently has no data entry capacity. The data are then, in theory, entered manually into the IMSMA database in Maputo. ADP on the other hand, has a “pirated” version of IMSMA which allows them to enter their data directly, which is then transferred to IND's IMSMA database.

#### Lesson 11

**When confronted by a new type of challenge such as landmine and UXO contamination following complex humanitarian emergencies, it takes time before adequate tools – such as a means for assessing the true extent of the humanitarian needs – can be developed, tested, and improved so they meet the true requirements in the field.**

Mozambique was among the first-generation mine action programmes to implement an LIS, and a number of actors involved in this exercise made decisions that – with the benefit of hindsight – led to problems which have reduced the benefits that might have accrued from the survey.

#### Lesson 12

**Proper mine action planning requires reasonably complete and up-to-date data on both suspected hazard areas (SHA) and the impacts of these on both communities and development programmes. For countries with extensive contamination, provision needs to be made not just for an initial survey to establish the baselines for physical contamination and socio-economic impacts, but also for systematic efforts to update these data to refine understanding of the contamination problem, and to assess progress.**

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<sup>105</sup> Some problems may arise because operators do not have IMSMA and do not always cross reference their data against the LIS records, presenting problems for IND, which works from LIS records in IMSMA.

<sup>106</sup> IMSMA was not designed to facilitate data entry in multiple locations, which is a constraint for large countries such as Mozambique, which have regional offices and, often, poor communication facilities. It is possible to enter data from multiple sites, but this requires additional procedures and administrative discipline to keep the databases in the various offices synchronised. IMSMA is currently being re-engineered and the new version will make this task far easier.

<sup>107</sup> Figures in the Annual Report for 2004 (released a month after the mission) suggest however that IND has since made progress in reducing the data entry backlog.

## QUALITY ASSURANCE

The IND formed three Quality Assurance (QA) teams in 2004, one allocated to each of the three regions. Each team comprises several staff, plus a vehicle, whose responsibility is to undertake quality assurance and provide post-clearance sampling of cleared sites. These teams appear to be inefficient and task planning is generally poor. In addition, the teams are not yet sufficiently equipped (18 months after initiation of the project and after more than six months of operations) for them to undertake post-clearance sampling; this is despite funding specifically for this equipment being provided by several donors.

The IND also claims to have a dog capacity to support quality assurance which, in reality, does not exist. (see Textbox 8 – IND Quality Assurance Dog Capacity)

### Textbox 8 – IND Quality Assurance Dog Capacity

For several years, the IND has stated that it has a dog QA capacity and the outside perspective is one of an organisation with an effective QA dog capacity. The reality however is vastly different. When the team visited a site where FADM were working, the FADM team was collocated with the IND QA dog capacity. What the team saw was distressing. There were six remaining dogs from the eight originally donated to CND in 1998 by Mechem when it left Mozambique. Two had died over the Christmas break period – one believed to be of starvation. The remaining dogs are too old for work, constantly caged, underfed and, in several cases, diseased. One was blind.

Although IND states it is trying to sell the dogs, they are of no use to any mine clearance programme in the country or elsewhere and should be destroyed.

The IND has spent considerable resources – both time and money – to develop these QA teams but they do not appear to provide value-for-money. The recommendation made in 2001 that this important function be contracted-out still appears the best option. A tightly controlled contractual system to enable external QA organisations to operate effectively has been proven in such programmes as South Lebanon, Kosovo, and Cambodia. In South-eastern Europe, the International Trust Fund of Slovenia (ITF) also makes extensive use of external QA provided by specialised firms on a contractual basis.<sup>108</sup>

## OTHER ISSUES WITHIN IND

**DOCUMENTATION** – The structure of administration within IND remains weak. At the lower level, reports from the operators are frequently lost and require re-submission. Every operator spoke of frustration at the lack of paper trails. Many documents apparently require the signature of the director before they can be issued to outside organisation, creating additional problems as delegation policies are either not well thought-out or not followed.

<sup>108</sup> Some observers have queried how IND could accept responsibility for any residual risk if the quality assurance of clearance tasks were sub-contracted. This is a very real concern, but it can be addressed with proper mine action legislation (e.g. specifying that mine action organisations and personnel are not liable if they have acted in accordance with prevailing national standards) and/or with well-conceived accreditation procedures for QA organisations (e.g. requiring site insurance with residual risk coverage). It is also hard to understand how IND's exposure to residual risk claims would be reduced by retaining direct responsibility for QA when it lacks the capacity to discharge this responsibility to accepted standards.

DECENTRALISATION – The establishment of the regional offices was a promising initiative and a reasonable strategy given the size of the country and the inadequate transportation and communication networks. Again however, the lack of clear and appropriate policies for delegation leaves the offices with little scope for independent action. The regional offices need greater authority and clear direction if they are to become effective. At the moment, both donors supporting the offices in Beira and Nampula plan to cease funding in summer 2005, in part because they feel effective regional capacities have not been developed in spite of their financial support.

GENERAL SUPPORT SERVICES TO THE MINE ACTION COMMUNITY – IND is also supposed to provide support to the operators in more general terms. In some cases, operators have claimed that adequate support has not been forthcoming. In one instance, an international NGO stated that IND did not move quickly to clear equipment from customs, which resulted in bonded warehouse storage charges of \$35,000, and that IND then did not process the claim for repayment until after the deadline had passed. The NGO's version has been contested by IND, which says it is not responsible for customs clearance of mine action equipment.<sup>109</sup> At the very least, the case illustrates communication problems between IND and at least some of the operators, which should be rectified.

Other areas specifically mentioned by operators include:

- delays in obtaining letters of support for work permits and visas for expatriates;
- receiving tasking instructions from IND without the accompanying background information, necessitating repeated visits by managers to IND headquarters to obtain the information IND has, which could be easily compiled in a proper task folder.

The Review Team is not in a position to assess in detail why these problems continue. The central message, however, is that dialogue between IND and the operators remains too sporadic to identify and rectify problems in a timely manner. What should be minor problems remain constant irritants, frustrating the evolution of a more effective partnership.

FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY – a senior manager of IND was implicated in the theft of Adopt-a-Minefield funds. He has been released from staff but the position remains vacant. As a UNDP staff member was also implicated (and has since been terminated), UNDP-headquarters commissioned a forensic audit. The audit report has not been distributed, but the UNDP Resident Representative provided an update on the matter to donor representatives attending the briefing session at the start of the Review Team's mission in Maputo.

About two years ago, IND purchased an expensive vehicle for use by the Director, which then was criticised in local newspapers. A number of mine action donors were upset at what they perceived to be an ill-considered expenditure and at the publicity which might damage the reputation of the national programme. The Review Team is not in a position to confirm the

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<sup>109</sup> The underlying problem is that mine action is not included in the list of tax exempt activities within Mozambique's tax laws (q.v. note iv in Textbox 4). As such, Customs has no authority to waive duties. Mozambique has instituted a system by which the government pays the Customs Department for duties on mine action equipment, but the legislature (quite properly) must authorise this spending (probably via a supplementary appropriation bill). It appears in this specific case that the storage charges payable on the imported equipment by the NGO were not included in the supplementary appropriation, so no government agency had authority to reimburse the NGO.

veracity of the newspaper accounts (and understands from IND that the controversy has been resolved to the satisfaction of the donors). But the perception that funds are being used for luxuries rather than essentials may affect resource mobilisation for IND and the mine action programme overall.<sup>110</sup>

## **SUMMARY ON IND**

To summarise, all parties agree that IND is responsible for important functions, many of which need to be sustained over the long term. Virtually all parties state that IND has performed better than its predecessor, CND, and that its performance has been improving in recent years. However, there still remain gaps between the levels of performance required – now and in the future – and what is being delivered. The Review Team is not in a position to make a thorough assessment of individual capabilities, but we are confident that many staff are able and willing to perform at higher levels. The Review Team believes that IND management and technical advisers should define and institute clear performance targets to give more concrete meaning to the capacity building efforts.<sup>111</sup>

### **Lesson 13**

**The potential benefits from developing capacities of individual staff members and functional units within an organisation will not be captured in full until the organisational management systems for (at least) human resources, financial management, information management, and performance management are functioning well and there is appropriate delegation of authority so staff and unit managers can use their skills and experience to discharge their responsibilities and achieve the specific performance standards set for them.**

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<sup>110</sup> Apparently, the funds used to purchase the vehicle were repaid by the government, but disbursements from one donor were delayed for a time pending a more complete accounting.

<sup>111</sup> Later in this report we provide some specific recommendations in this regard.



### 3. The Role of International Assistance

#### *Needs assessments and strategies*

As was well documented in the 1997 report from the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, the UN was unable to conduct a proper assessment of the extent of contamination prior to the ceasefire, and had to develop the preliminary mine action plans without the benefit of such an assessment. The resulting plan highlighted the need to clear roads required for ONUMOZ, refugee returns, and the operations of the humanitarian relief agencies, as well as the desirability of a mine clearance training facility. The plan envisaged that the GoM would eventually assume responsibility for the mine action programme, but did not outline the process by which this transfer might take place. Nor did the plan propose a forum for discussions with donors, complicating resource mobilisation and the evolution of a consensus on the needs, priorities, and strategies for achieving these.

In late 1993, UNOHAC engaged HALO Trust to conduct a rapid survey, which focused on roads, refugee sites, and other facilities of immediate importance. Such a survey could not provide a complete picture of the nature and scope of contamination and, in the absence of such an assessment, planning could never be fully adequate.<sup>112</sup> In fact, the “national” mine action programme emerged as a series of discrete initiatives without an overall strategy and, by the time CND was created as the national authority, three distinct regional programmes had been established by HALO, NPA, and ADP.

After the creation of CND in 1995, the responsibility for formulating a national strategy clearly fell to the GoM and not to the international community. Of course, the international community could and did provide assistance for this purpose, but CND proved incapable or unwilling to engage. As well, without a proper national needs assessment, any strategy put forward would be open to criticism from established interests.

In 1999 CIDA agreed to finance a national Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) based on the “community-focussed” methodology that had recently been developed by a group of mine action NGOs and endorsed by UNMAS. This promised at last to provide the kind of needs assessment required as a basis for proper planning. Unfortunately, CIDA allowed only Canadian organisations to bid on the tender and selected an inexperienced organisation with no prior exposure to Mozambique. The results of the survey were hotly contested by operators with years of experience in the country, and any opportunity for all stakeholders to agree on the needs and a strategy for addressing these was lost.<sup>113</sup> Subsequent failure to update the socio-economic fields or to compile complete and accurate records on further clearance and survey work means there still is no commonly agreed basis for assessing needs from a nationwide perspective and to formulate an appropriate national mine action strategy.

#### *Financial assistance*

The absence of a commonly accepted national strategy has not prevented significant progress. The UN and individual donors paid for the rapid survey and clearance of major roads and

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<sup>112</sup> However, it was a necessary tool for “emergency” planning of mine action in Mozambique at that time and in the absence of a more systematic national survey.


<sup>113</sup> The LIS in Mozambique was only the fifth to be initiated and was undertaken at a time when lessons from prior surveys had not been documented.



other essential infrastructure by international demining firms during the initial “big push” phase of opening essential infrastructure networks in the post-conflict period. Commercial demining firms (and, increasingly, Mozambican firms or joint ventures) have remained active in providing demining services in support of major infrastructure projects.

This work has been financed almost entirely from international sources.<sup>114</sup> While data are incomplete, the following graph provides a reasonably accurate picture of grant financing since 1999. It does not include funding for commercial demining, which may have amounted to \$3 million or more in some years according to IND estimates.

**Figure 15 – Grants to Mozambique’s Mine Action Programme**



What strikes at first glance is that the grant support has been remarkably steady in recent years, certainly when compared to many of the other heavily mine-affected countries. This has allowed the humanitarian operators to maintain their activities on a relatively even keel, which greatly enhances their ability to plan and achieve results.

Currently, however, there is considerable speculation concerning donor fatigue. The relatively low level of accidents, together with plans by the international operators to withdraw by the end of 2006, seem also to confirm the sense that Mozambique is rapidly approaching “mine impact free” status and that scarce funding should be allocated to other mine affected countries. In broad terms, this is a reasonable position. As well, donors have become increasingly discouraged that the GoM has not increased its own funding to mine action.


However, a complete and rapid collapse of donor support at the end of 2006 or before may well jeopardise the sustainability of capacities that need to be retained for: (i) addressing the residual threat to civilians that will remain after 2006 from isolated UXO or newly discovered arms caches left over from the civil war; (ii) addressing the threats to civilians that will emerge as the “economic footprints” of communities in mine affected regions expand; (iii) providing regulatory and information services to public sector agencies responsible for large infrastructure works programmes; (iv) providing similar services as well as assistance in procuring and financing demining services in support of public agencies and others responsible for smaller development investments (for community development; feeder road

<sup>114</sup> This includes both grants from donor countries and, to a lesser degree, loans from international financial institutions (IFIs); particularly the World Bank; and loans from some donors. It must be noted that these loans constitute a financial obligation on the GoM and, therefore, a financial contribution by the government. Note however that Mozambique is likely to benefit from the debt-forgiveness accord announced at the recent G-8 Summit, so past debts from IFIs and other official creditors will not constitute a significant financial burden on the GoM.

maintenance; etc.), and (v) disaster preparedness should civil conflict erupt in a neighbouring state, causing a movement of refugees into Mozambique.

While the GoM should be increasing its financial contribution to mine action,<sup>115</sup> the ideal would be for a dignified disengagement of donors from mine action rather than a rapid collapse of donor support. How to engineer such a dignified disengagement should be a central issue on the agenda of the donor support group for mine action – an issue which is taken-up again in the penultimate chapter of this report.

**Figure 16 – GoM Contributions to Mine Action**<sup>116</sup>



## **Donor coordination**

As noted previously, the original ONUMOZ plan did not incorporate a formal mechanism to facilitate donor coordination. Heated disagreements between key donors and the UN concerning the appropriate strategy for the national mine action programme, coupled with the mercantilist approach adopted by some donors in promoting demining firms from their own countries, then poisoned the atmosphere. However, by the mid-1990s a donor support group for mine action had coalesced, with UNDP taking the lead role.

The Review Team was unable to trace the ups and downs of donor coordination over the years. This task is always difficult given the regular turnover of personnel among donor and UN agencies, resulting in a loss of institutional memory. This turnover among donor representatives is also one of the reasons why donor coordination is a thankless task – knowledge and enthusiasm needs constant rekindling and new members to the group often

<sup>115</sup> This is particularly true in light of the greater resources being made available to it through budget support assistance from donors and IFIs, which is discussed later in this report.

<sup>116</sup> Note: “Appropriation” is the amount provided for IND in the annual budget approved by the National Assembly (although no budget to date have ever itemised an amount for IND); “BER” is the annual Budget Execution Report (i.e. statement of actual spending) produced by the Ministry of Finance and Planning; “CGE” is the comparable report on actual spending issued by the *Tribunal administrativo* (Mozambique’s Supreme Audit Institution).

arrive with different expectations concerning the coordination agenda (see Textbox 9 – Defining coordination). In the case at hand, until the establishment of the IND, there also was the problem of trying to coordinate donors in the absence of active government engagement, at least with respect to the domestic side of the government’s mine action programme.<sup>117</sup>

#### **Textbox 9 – Defining coordination**

The term coordination embraces different issues, including (in order of ambition):

- Simple information exchange to identify gaps and overlaps;
- Information exchange intended to fill gaps that some party has identified (e.g. resource mobilisation);
- Coordinated or joint assessments of needs, so all parties have a similar understanding of the problem to be addressed;
- Agreement on common objectives to meet the agreed needs;
- Agreement on a common strategy to meet the agreed objectives;
- Coordinated programming, so actions by different agencies are of complementary scale, are undertaken in a logical sequence and, collectively, address all essential requirements;
- Joint assessments and evaluations, so different agencies devise future plans using a common base of information.

For example, a joint government-donor working group supporting a Sector Wide Approach (SWAp – discussed later) would have all the above issues on its agenda. Coordination can be taken even further, by harmonising procedures or even developing a common budget and pooling funds to finance it.

Dissatisfaction with a coordination mechanism can arise simply because different members have different expectations concerning how ambitious the coordination agenda should be.

As well, donor coordination mechanisms should never be intended to usurp the recipient government’s authority or responsibility. A donor coordination group should facilitate the dialogue between donors and the responsible government authorities and, where there is broad agreement, facilitate resource mobilisation aligned to the government’s programme. Thus the agenda of a donor coordination group typically is impoverished in the absence of an active and committed government authority.

This being said, reasonably consistent levels of support mobilised for IND and ADP suggest that donor coordination was at least adequate for most of the period since the establishment of the IND. However, many donors expressed concern that over the past 18 months the donor coordination body has only been convened twice, and then discussion was limited almost exclusively to the planned Review of Mine Action in Mozambique rather than a wider dialogue on issues deemed of strategic importance by various donors.<sup>118</sup>

However, it is clear that mine action in Mozambique is entering a new phase, and there are many strategic issues that need thorough discussion among donors and between donors and the government. The donor support group needs to be revitalised to deal with the critical

<sup>117</sup> Again, Mozambique has always played a high-profile role on Mine Action’s international stage.

<sup>118</sup> Both UNDP and, from the government side, IND have had to cope with significant capacity constraints over the past year or more, due to the suspension of the UNDP officer responsible for mine action, the termination of the Deputy Director at IND, and the vacancy in the CTA position at IND.

issues of linking mine action to development planning, realigning mine action capacities to focus on emerging priorities, and making the transition to more complete government ownership of a sustainable programme – particularly in light of the perceived donor fatigue.

## ***Analysing Donor Fatigue***

The term donor fatigue is much in use within the international mine action field, with Mozambique being no exception. However, donor programming decisions are subject to many factors, and different factors carry more or less weight with the various donors. Accordingly, the term donor fatigue needs to be unbundled.

One approach for doing so is to examine: (i) the perceived need for continued international funding; (ii) factors affecting the supply of international assistance for mine action; and (iii) the degree of confidence donors have that their funds will contribute to a sustainable solution within a realistic timeframe. The principal factors underlying the apparent donor fatigue vis-à-vis mine action in Mozambique are listed below:<sup>119</sup>

- Main factors influencing the perceived need for international funding
  - The number of victims has been reduced to a low level relative to other mine-affected countries and in comparison with other causes of mortality and morbidity in Mozambique (particularly HIV/AIDS and malaria, but also traffic accidents, etc.);
  - The announcements by international demining NGOs that they will achieve “mine impact free” status in the near future within their respective theatres of operations;
  - The absence of significant financial contributions to mine action from the GoM and the apparent lack of growth in those contributions; and
  - The absence of any mention of landmine contamination or mine action in the first PARPA or in subsequent State Budgets.<sup>120</sup>
- Main factors influencing the supply of international funding for mine action
  - The competing demands for official development assistance for other countries and, within Mozambique, other development needs;
  - The decision by many donors active in Mozambique to shift increasingly from project aid to programme funding and general budget support; and
  - The winding-up for many donors of special funds earmarked exclusively for mine action, which were established in the build-up to the *Convention*.<sup>121</sup>
- Main factors influencing the confidence that funding will contribute to a sustainable solution
  - Perceptions that the National Mine Action Strategy does not articulate a sustainable solution to the contamination problem;

<sup>119</sup> Many of these are analysed more thoroughly in subsequent sections.

<sup>120</sup> Important developments in 2005, particularly increased financial contributions from the GoM plus mention of mine action in the new government’s ‘five-year programme’, are noted in the final chapter.

<sup>121</sup> For one example, Canada has spent all of the C\$100 million in its first tranche of funds dedicated exclusively to mine action, and has committed most of the \$72 million in the second (and, apparently, final) tranche. Future support for mine action will have to come from CIDA’s regular budget.

- Perceptions that some mine action funds have been misused or have financed non-essential purchases; and
- Perceptions of an absence of government ownership concerning its landmine contamination problem.

Many of these factors are based on fact (e.g. numbers of landmine victims) or on broad trends which are outside the influence of the mine action stakeholders (e.g. the shift to programme aid and budget support). Others however are perceptions that could be changed: most fundamentally in terms of whether more aid will contribute to a durable solution and whether the GoM is fully committed to addressing its contamination problem. There is ample opportunity to address these perceptions by:

- Formulating a national strategy that incorporates credible plans for a sustainable solution to the country's medium- and long-term mine action challenges;
- Enhancing transparency and accountability within the key organs of the mine action programme, and taking decisive action whenever problems arise in the use of funds;
- Taking credible steps to assume greater responsibility for the country's mine action problem, including enhancing the institutional foundations of the programme (i.e. its structure plus the legal and regulatory framework); the appropriate incorporation of mine action into the PARPA; and the infusion of additional government funds.

In other words, the dangers inherent from donor fatigue can be addressed, but the onus is on the GoM to exercise the rights and responsibilities of "ownership" – the rights to determine priorities and to formulate plans for addressing these; the responsibilities to contribute materially to the solution and to account for the results achieved. We return to these fundamental issues in the penultimate chapter of the report.

## ***Assistance for Capacity Development***

### **Management tools**

#### ***Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA)***

Information management is an integral part of mine action. The International Mine Action Standards 08.10 states that "*planning for mine action requires accurate and timely information about the form, scale and impact of the threat posed by mines, UXO and other explosive hazards.*" One of the main findings of the study on socio-economic approaches to mine action was that "*in many ways, mine action is as much about information as it is about mines.*" (GICHD/UNDP, 2001)

The information flow from operators to IND reflects the importance of information management to some extent, but data on the operators' actual tasks and work progress often arrives at IND only after work has completed, reducing IND's role to that of a passive "acknowledger" of work instead of an active coordination body.

Mozambique uses IMSMA as a central data management tool. IMSMA was installed in Mozambique in 2000 during the Landmine Impact Survey process as a central database for all mine action information. The main database is located in Maputo, with regional databases in the IND offices in Beira and Nampula. This decentralised structure requires tight data management in order to keep information between the different databases updated and

synchronized. This coordination has not been successful. Data are often mislaid between operator, regional office, and Maputo. Many issues concerning information management have only been vaguely defined or are handled on an ad hoc basis, with adverse effects on the quality of data available to IND and to the programme as a whole.

The IMSMA database is supported by GICHD, which has trained database operators and makes periodic visits to work with IND on operational issues. This assistance has been additional to the information management TA at IND since 2002. However, the performance of the information section remains below what is required for IND to plan, manage, and coordinate.

It is important to note that, originally, IMSMA was not designed to support data entry from multiple locations, as is done in Mozambique. However, IMSMA now is being completely re-engineered, and the new version (due later in 2005) will make decentralised data entry far easier to manage. The new system will then be installed in many countries, which will take time, and it remains unclear whether Mozambique will be toward the head of the queue – an issue addressed again in a later chapter.

### ***Geographic Information System and Mapping***

The Geographic Information System (GIS) functionality within IMSMA is extremely advanced and would be the envy of many other departments in developing and developed countries. This capacity however remains much underutilised; printing maps occasionally for IND's own purposes or on request from a demining operator. This differs markedly from the situation in some other countries in which the Mine Action Centre operates IMSMA (or another system with GIS functionality), and where there is great demand from a wide variety of organisations for maps showing suspected contamination.

As well, IND does not appear to have contacted other government agencies that conduct periodic socio-economic surveys to see whether and how the socio-economic picture of landmine impact might be updated using data collected by such agencies (such as Core Welfare Indicator Cluster surveys – CWICs – and more extensive Living Standards Measurement Surveys – LSMS).

### ***Financial Management Information System***

Although not specifically within the remit of this Review, the Team noted that the financial management system within IND is run on an *Excel* spreadsheet. It is inappropriate for an organisation with several million dollars per year in expenditures to be operating without a proper accounting and financial management package.

## **Technical advisers**

### ***At IND***

Since the initiation of the programme, there have been significant levels of TA support provided both to ADP and, more recently, to IND. Since 1999, IND has had 10 different TA with a peak of six in place in 2001. While progress has been made, IND's performance in certain areas falls short of what is needed over the long term. This is not necessarily the fault of individual TA. As noted above, the management style and administrative shortcomings of

IND – and more generally in Mozambique’s public service – mean that many staff lack motivation or clear sense of purpose, and are performing below the levels at which they could. Individual capacities appear to have been built, but they have not been exercised. Staff need to know more precisely what is expected of them and how their performance will be assessed.

The emphasis of the TAs should now be to support IND’s Director in defining and instituting concrete performance targets that would allow a clear assessment of the true capabilities of the middle management and staff. Only then can future capacity building efforts be properly focused. In addition, the CTA should assist the Director in designing and instituting the type of policies needed to support decentralisation, as well as three other complementary tasks:<sup>122</sup>

- Completing an inventory of the specific services IND should be providing to mine action operators and to public agencies, provincial governors, and any other bodies whose work programmes are impacted by landmine and UXO contamination;
- Initiating an outreach programme to reach government agencies responsible for infrastructure programmes to ensure these agencies are aware of the mine action programme, the services IND and its implementing partners can provide, and good practices in addressing contamination issues;
- Presenting the case for mine action in supporting poverty reduction and, more generally, Mozambique’s socio-economic development, to the bodies responsible for the formulation of the second PARPA and to the budget officials in the Ministry of Finance.

Fortuitously, the new CTA has a strong background in development management – precisely the skill set required at this juncture.

### ***At ADP***

ADP had a succession of military TA, who provided appropriate assistance during the emergency phase and whenever ADP absorbed new assets or implemented new techniques. However, ADP appears technically competent and well managed in terms of operations, and an extension of this type of advisory services may well fall into the “nice to have” rather than “need to have” category. The critical need now is for advisory services relating to its planned transition to an independent legal entity.

With respect to the specific plan in place to convert ADP into a local NGO, there is urgent need in particular for a business plan and for draft statutes of association. However, there is no consensus among stakeholders (GoM, UNDP, supporting donors, plus the staff and management of ADP) that re-establishing ADP as a local NGO is the optimal, or even a viable, solution. What is required at this stage is a more systematic exploration of the transition options – not-for-profit, government agency, commercial firm – in light of the current assessment of future needs and the likely actions of other demining operators. This is discussed in the penultimate chapter.

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<sup>122</sup> A more complete exposition of why these tasks are a priority is contained in Chapters 7 and 8.



## 4. Links between Mine Action and Other Arenas

The performance of an organisation is dependent on the capacities of its human and other resources, the quality of its management systems, and the vision of its leaders. But even well led organisations with sound systems and capable people may be unable to meet their performance objectives, because organisational performance is also affected by:

- the social, political, and economic environment, and
- the performance – or lack thereof – of other organisations with which it must work to promote common or complementary objectives.

Thus, the performance of any single mine action organisation is dependent in part on that of other organisations within the national mine action programme. Similarly, the performance of the programme overall is affected – for better or worse – by how well it links and works with other groups of organisations (what we have termed “arenas”). These include government bodies at various levels (the government arena), organisations in the international arena, and those operating at the very local level (community arena). The figure on the following page illustrates in a simplified form this “architecture” of arenas and linkages among them.

In the remainder of this chapter, we describe the nature of these linkages for Mozambique’s mine action programme. Note however that forging strong links requires an understanding of how the other arenas function; that is, how the diverse organisations within each arena work with one other. For mine action in Mozambique, three issues are of particular importance at this juncture:

1. How to link mine action to the government’s development planning and management systems;
2. How to link to the international assistance community; an important issue as Mozambique in general, and mine action in particular, remains heavily aid dependent; and
3. The nature of the linkages between the GoM and the international assistance community in general, as numerous reforms are underway designed to make aid work better.


Thus, if the organisations within Mozambique’s mine action programme wish to improve their collective performance in terms of promoting the country’s development objectives, they will need a deeper understanding of how the government works; how the donors work; and how the government and donors work together. Accordingly, the next chapter examines (i) national development planning and management, (ii) aid delivery and donor coordination, and (iii) aid management<sup>123</sup> in greater detail.

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<sup>123</sup> We will use the term “national development planning and management” to refer to the government processes to set development priorities and spend the financial resources it controls to advance those priorities. The next two terms refer to how official aid agencies manage their funds, both individually (“aid delivery”) and collectively (“donor coordination”). Finally, “aid management” refers to the joint efforts of the government and aid agencies to align donor funds with national development priorities.



Figure 17 – The Architecture of Mine Action in Mozambique



## **The Government Arena**

### **Working with Different Levels of Government**

#### **Provinces and Districts**

Constitutionally, Mozambique is a unitary state with a national government and administrations (i.e. non-elected public servants without a distinct constitutional mandate) at the provincial and district levels. The traditional philosophy of successive governments has been centralist, with little authority delegated to the provincial and district levels. In practice however, provincial governors and district administrators have had a fair degree of latitude, if only because the size and diversity of the country, coupled with weak transportation and communication networks, making close oversight by officials in Maputo impossible. Given that, for many years, public service delivery in much of the country depended on international assistance (see Textbox 10 – Demining in Support of Area Development Projects), many governors and administrators were able to forge constructive links with international NGOs and other aid agencies working in their regions, managing their affairs without much input from the capital.

#### **Textbox 10 – Demining in Support of Area Development Projects**

During the post-independence civil war and much of the post-conflict period, the central government lacked the capacity to set the development agenda in a concrete fashion. In this vacuum, donor countries used a number of mechanisms to maintain a modicum of co-ordination, including what might be termed “co-ordination by avoidance” – essentially, dividing the country into distinct regions and sectors, with one country then adopting a sector within a region. For example, GTZ (the German aid agency) ran a large integrated rural development (IRD) project in Manica and Sofala.

Landmine and UXO contamination was a significant concern in this area – particularly when rehabilitating roads and bridges. Accordingly, GTZ included funds for demining within its IRD project. Following competitive bidding, it engaged Minetech from Zimbabwe to provide the demining services, and hired a German demining expert to provide QA services.

In about 1998, the GoM and the donor community commenced planning for a more comprehensive sector-wide strategy for rural development, eventually leading to a national programme termed PROAGRI. GTZ began to wind-down its IRD project, providing support instead to PROAGRI.

It is unclear from IND records how much demining was financed under the GTZ project. IND records suggest Minetech accounted for 66 per cent of all clearance in the country from 1992-97, and for 48 per cent of all clearance in 1998. However, the vast majority of Minetech’s work was on roads and power pylons, and this should be interpreted as both survey and clearance rather than clearance alone.

Mine action has largely fit into this mould, with the ‘humanitarian’ operators based in different parts of the country<sup>124</sup> using individual approaches for setting priorities. In broad

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<sup>124</sup> To a degree, the location of the demining NGOs mirrored the geographic pattern of the development NGOs. Thus NPA based itself central Mozambique, where many of the Norwegian and

terms, the operators would develop lists of priority tasks in a province and then discuss these with the governor, who would endorse a final list (perhaps with the opportunity to make choices among tasks). This list would then constitute the provincial mine action plan for the coming year. Operators would then submit these to CND and later IND, which would simply compile these into the national plan.

There has been growing emphasis on community consultations<sup>125</sup> in addition to obtaining input from district administrators or police chiefs. Note that these consultations concerning priorities are never a one-way street. Operators always provide technical input on each potential task so local officials know, for example, there may be a choice between one large, time consuming tasks versus a number of smaller tasks. They also screen tasks to prevent egregious abuses of authority and some have developed more formal processes for working with local officials and communities to assess the likely socio-economic benefits from each potential clearance tasks.<sup>126</sup> Recently, HALO Trust has been working closely with local authorities to ensure declarations of “Mine Impact Free” districts and provinces are endorsed by administrators and governors respectively.

Also of note is that, in at least two cases (HI in Inhambane and HALO Trust in Zambezia), the international demining NGOs had voiced the explicit intention of turning responsibility for certain units over to provincial authorities, so these would remain as “provincial capacities.”<sup>127</sup> In neither case has this concept progressed far; stymied perhaps by the ambiguous legal authority that governors exercise over provincial government departments coupled with the limited fiscal capacities of provinces at the present time.<sup>128</sup>

In recognition of the importance of closer contacts with operators, sub-national administrations, and mine affected communities, IND has attempted to decentralise in recent years by opening offices in Beira (for the central region) and Nampula (covering the north). While some useful innovations have been introduced to capitalise on the opportunities created by decentralisation,<sup>129</sup> the move has not had dramatic impact, at least to this point in time, and donors financing this initiative advised the Review Team of plans to end their support.

## ***Working with the National Government***

### **CORE ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT UNITS**

Until this year, national economic management functions were for the most part centralised in the Ministry of Planning and Finance<sup>130</sup> and, particularly, in the National Directorate for

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other Nordic development NGOs had their projects, while HALO Trust opened first in Zambézia, where a consortium of British development NGOs were based.

<sup>125</sup> See, for example, Millard and Harpviken, 2000.

<sup>126</sup> NPA’s Task Impact Assessment is probably the most developed of these processes.

<sup>127</sup> From the start of its planning, HI intended to transfer responsibility for some of its small teams that conduct “proximity demining”, while HALO Trust at one point wished to create small teams for rapid response to community requests (the so-called “fire brigade concept”). See also Craib, 2003.

<sup>128</sup> These constraints are discussed in more depth in the next chapter.

<sup>129</sup> For example, the introduction of special forms for district administrators to list all known SHA in their jurisdiction, ranked in priority order and including a brief description of the socio-economic impact.

<sup>130</sup> The new government has created distinct ministries covering planning and finance, but the exact split in responsibility between these was not yet apparent by the time the Review mission ended. Of course, there is also a central bank responsible for monetary policy, but this is not an issue for us.

Planning and Budgeting (DNPO). It is responsible for compiling many of the key planning and expenditure management instruments, including:

- The Government Five-Year Programme;
- The Medium-Term Expenditure Framework;
- The annual Social and Economic Programme (PES);
- The annual budget (OE).

In addition, the unit was heavily involved in the preparation of the initial Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty (PARPA – Mozambique’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper). These items are touched upon later in this chapter, and covered in greater detail in Chapter 5.

The senior officials in DNPO professed little knowledge of either IND activities or the mine action programme, in spite of the fact that an officer from DNPO apparently serves on IND’s Technical Council.

## **SECTOR UNITS**

In theory, the IND Technical Council should provide a platform for solid working relations between IND (on behalf of the MA programme) and most of the relevant government units at the national level. In addition to the Ministry of Planning and Finance, and to Foreign Affairs itself, seven sectoral ministries are represented on the Technical Council: Defence, Interior, Public Works & Housing, Agriculture & Fisheries, Social Affairs, Labour, and Health.

Unfortunately, this does not appear to be the case as little or no sustained dialogue appears to exist between IND and other government units (see below). In part, this may be due to more widespread capacity constraints across the government,<sup>131</sup> but it also reflects the weak mandate of the Technical Council. In spite of this, some government units have put good systems in place to arrange for demining services they require; particularly in support of infrastructure rehabilitation.<sup>132</sup> However, they have developed their own systems through their own trial-and-error, and IND has not taken the lead in these issues..

## **ROADS AND BRIDGES**

Together with the Electricity Company (EDM), the National Administration for Roads (ANE) appears to have the best system in place. ANE first encountered serious problems with landmine and UXO contamination during its Emergency Road Programme (1994-96). Under intense time pressure, it worked with UNDP and donors to make arrangements for stand-alone demining services – typically mechanical “treatment”<sup>133</sup> followed by survey and clearance –

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<sup>131</sup> Most ministries lack an adequate management structure at the top to ensure the different units within a ministry co-ordinate among themselves. Thus, there may be no mechanism for a ministry’s representative on the IND Technical Council to communicate relevant Mine Action decisions and information to the different branches of the ministry. For example, there are 10 National Directorates within the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MADER).

<sup>132</sup> Most public works projects now underway or planned in Mozambique are for rehabilitation or reconstruction of existing networks and facilities, rather than for development of new infrastructure. This reflects to sorry state of the country’s infrastructure stock following decades of war.

<sup>133</sup> International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) do not recognise any machine that, on its own, clears land to humanitarian standards. Thus, areas that have been covered by mine clearance machines are considered “treated” rather than cleared.

so as not to delay the work of the civil engineering firms selected as prime contractors for each rehabilitation project.<sup>134</sup> This proved extremely unsatisfactory, as many explosive devices were missed,<sup>135</sup> causing the road work to stop, with ANE bearing the cost of delays.

As a result, ANE has developed a system whereby the prime contractor assumes complete responsibility for demining services. Tender documents make it clear that the bidders must include a specialised sub-contractor for landmine/UXO survey and clearance.<sup>136</sup> After the award of contract, the prime contractor is not allowed to mobilise the road works crews until the demining sub-contractor produces a certificate from IND that the roads, bridges, gravel pits, and other worksites relating to the roads rehabilitation project have been cleared. Subsequently, any missed devices incidents are the responsibility of the prime contractor and, after mobilising the heavy equipment and work teams, delays due to missed devices would be extremely costly. Note that ANE does not require external QA – it leaves this responsibility to the prime contractor.<sup>137</sup>

Financing for the requisite demining works is provided in the budget for the road rehabilitation project. A provisional two-to-five per cent of the total budget is allocated for demining services, but then ANE pays for actual and reasonable expenses. The planned work programme for ANE over the next decade is \$1.7 billion,<sup>138</sup> implying that the budget provisions for demining should be between \$3.4 million and \$8.5 million per year on average.

ANE maintains close contact with IND, with two of its engineers serving in the liaison role. It sends all its project plans to IND and requests all the relevant contamination and clearance records. Note however that, even if IND certifies that a road segment has been entirely cleared, ANE still requires the prime contractor to sub-contract a demining firm to complete another survey and clearance operation – given its costly experiences with missed devices in the past, ANE wants to put all responsibility for clearance on the prime contractor.

While IFIs and donor agencies provide the bulk of the financing for the road rehabilitation projects once these have been designed, ANE also needs demining support for the design teams. This it requests from IND, and IND has been able to arrange for this (presumably by asking one of the international NGOs, ADP, FADM, or Ronco/QRDF).

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<sup>134</sup> It was in mid-1994 that UNDP/OPS issued its large contract for road survey and clearance to the Lonrho/Royal Ordnance/Mechem consortium. Ronco was also doing road survey and clearance work by this time.

<sup>135</sup> ANE acknowledges that, in some cases, the roads contractors may have planted mines themselves in order to justify work stoppages. They certainly would have the incentive to do so if, for example, they were delayed anyway because of delays in mobilising heavy equipment or in obtaining spare parts: creating a “missed device incident” justifying a work stoppage would shift the financial cost of the delay onto ANE.

<sup>136</sup> ANE requires that the demining sub-contractor be licensed by IND. There has been one case where IND has disapproved of a sub-contractor as it was not registered.

<sup>137</sup> Yet the system works well because it is founded on good incentives structure: the prime-contractor will bear the cost of any delays in works that might result from devices discovered after road works start. They also bear the cost of site insurance and their insurance companies will require credible certificates of prior mine survey and clearance. Hence they must be serious in finding a sub-contractor for surveying and demining and equally serious in enforcing quality control.

<sup>138</sup> Some of this is financed by IDA credits (i.e. low interest loans) from the World Bank, with most of the rest coming from other donors, either through grants or soft loans.

## ELECTRICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION

The main contamination problem faced by EDM relates to the expansion of the electricity distribution network. Many pylons in the existing network had been mined for defensive purposes by FRELIMO during the civil war, but most of these were cleared by humanitarian operators or under commercial contract.<sup>139</sup> However, when opening a new power corridor to Zimbabwe in 1995, EDM began to encounter minefields around Cahorra Bassa Dam. It was completely unprepared and neither the project schedule nor budget provided for demining services. It approached NPA, which referred it to CND, which – given the importance of the project – placed it as top priority. NPA did the work.<sup>140</sup>

Since then, EDM has contingency plans for possible landmine contamination, and has tried various models for managing this work. At one point it would include provision for demining in the project budget, but then issue separate tenders for demining firms. However, they encountered problems similar to those experienced by ANE when it used that approach.

Currently EDM includes demining in the project design and budget, and requires the prime contractor to engage a specialist firm to do a combination of demining and brush clearance for both the power line corridor.<sup>141</sup> Note that, unlike ANE, EDM also requires the prime contractor to engage a separate QA firm, as well as to provide all clearance certification from IND prior to mobilising crews and equipment for the power line construction itself. In its project plans, EDM budgets between five and 10 per cent for demining, brush clearance, and external QA.

EDM's master plan for the expansion of the grid over the next 15 years is budgeted between \$750 and \$800 million. Some of this is for work in urban areas, where contamination and brush cover is less of a concern. Assuming \$450 million is for works in rural areas, this implies budget provisions for demining and brush clearance of between \$1.5 and \$3.0 million per year on average for the next 15 years. These estimates do not include power stations.

## WATER

The National Water Authority – a parastatal that maintains major water infrastructure such as dams, and then sells to bulk water users – has also experienced significant problems in the past due to mine contamination. However, unlike those in the Roads and Electricity sub-sectors, the Water Authority does not include demining services in the responsibilities of the prime contractors. Instead, it has always approached IND (or, previously, CND) to request the demining required before the start of work on the water system infrastructure.

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<sup>139</sup> IND records shows Minetech alone surveyed and cleared over 360 km of high tension power lines from 1992-97, claiming 72 million m<sup>2</sup> in “clearance”. The latter is a highly improbable figure as it implies clearance averaging 100 metres on both sides of the power line. As well, most of the “clearance” was probably survey work.

<sup>140</sup> This is a good example of the confusion created by the term “humanitarian demining”. International demining NGOs typically obtain grants for “humanitarian” purposes. A commercial project to sell power to Zimbabwe is important in development terms for Mozambique (and for Zimbabwe), but clearly is not humanitarian in nature.

<sup>141</sup> We believe the “demining” is more in the nature of “battle area clearance” (i.e. visual inspection for surface explosives in advance of the bulldozers doing the brush clearance). This is appropriate for areas in which mine fields are not likely to exist, and the main concern is light calibre UXO.

The rehabilitation of the Massingir dam in Gaza is a good example. The civil engineering and hydro-mechanical works, financed by an \$8 million loan from the African Development Bank (AfDB), began in April 2004 after long delays in the tendering process. Aware of extensive landmine contamination in the area,<sup>142</sup> some years ago the Water Authority requested UNDP and CND/IND to arrange clearance. Subsequently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was able to broker financial assistance from Japan and the U.S., and Mechem was engaged via a competitive tender process to undertake the demining.

IND also arranged for demining services in support of the Water Authority's work to rehabilitate a number of dykes in Gaza following the major floods in 2000. The Dutch government paid for the civil engineering works, but Water Authority officials are unaware of the financial arrangements made for demining.

Neither Water Authority personnel nor contractors have reported any problems with mines or UXO on work sites following demining. As well, the Water Authority has not experienced an accident in recent years relating to more routine work, such as maintenance of hydrometric stations, many of which are situated by bridges.

At the same time, the processes adopted by the Water Authority to address contamination concerns are not ideal. Separate contracting for civil engineering and demining raises transaction costs, and leaves the Water Authority at risk for the cost of work delays should explosives be uncovered after the demining has been completed. As well, it is unclear which organisation bears residual liability should an accident occur in an area certified as cleared. This is particularly true as records of earlier clearance tasks are incomplete and lack an audit trail (see Textbox 11 – A Major Demining Project).

#### **Textbox 11 – A Major Demining Project to Support Dam Reconstruction**

Demining of the areas surrounding the Massingir Dam began about five years ago, starting before IND was established. The current staff at UNDP and IND did not have the details of this project. However, records compiled by an earlier GICHD study show donations from Japan for the "Mechem tender" of \$1 million in 1998 plus \$846,000 in 2000, together with \$1 million from the U.S. in 1999 for Mechem. As well, a contribution from Switzerland in 1998 of US \$173,250 is shown going to Mechem. (Lambert-Madore, 2002, Appendix 5) Assuming this all related to Massingir, the total project cost was just over \$3 million.

IND clearance records credit Mechem with clearance of 738,100 m<sup>2</sup> in 1999, nothing in 2000, and 72,551 m<sup>2</sup> in 2001 – a total of 810,561 m<sup>2</sup>. Managers at the Water Authority believe that Mechem may have been engaged sometime before 2000 for clearance in support of rehabilitation of the Corumane dam.

Regardless of whether these cost and clearance records relate only to Massingir or to multiple projects, it implies a cost of about \$3.70 per m<sup>2</sup>, (but one cannot be certain that the clearance records are complete, particularly for the period before IND was formed).

Personnel from the Water Authority do not know the details of the mine clearance works at Massingir, but thought it had been done using mechanical clearance techniques and were unaware whether this was supported by other demining assets (dogs, manual teams).

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<sup>142</sup> The dam had been heavily protected by FRELIMO forces during the civil war, and they had laid extensive protective minefields.

Further investigation revealed that the project had been managed by UNOPS, initially on behalf of the CNDD. The UNOPS tender required the contractor to use “a combination of mechanical mine clearance equipment, manual clearance, sensor technology and other skills or technology required to achieve the required clearance standard.” Mechem won the tender and employed mechanical equipment and explosives detection dogs for survey, and manual teams for clearance to a standard of 99.6 per cent (the standard used before IMAS was adopted in 2001). UNOPS also contracted an independent quality assurance firm.

Sources: UNOPS, *Statement of Work: Massingir Dam Mine/UXO Clearance Project*; UNOPS, *Statement of Work: Massingir Dam Quality Management Project*

This year the Water Authority will begin rehabilitation of another of the existing dams, and it is conducting feasibility studies for constructing three new large dams. Thus, its draft sector work programme is large indeed – in the range of \$1 billion over the next five years – although this has not yet been approved by the new government.

## RAILWAYS

Mozambique’s railway system is undergoing significant restructuring. The railway authority (CFM) has been “corporatised” albeit not privatised,<sup>143</sup> and the rights to provide rail services are being awarded by international tenders. For example, an international consortium recently has been awarded the concession on the Sena line, and will be investing tens of millions of dollars on rolling stock and facilities as part of the agreement. CFM however is responsible for upgrading the 600 kilometre rail line itself, and has received an IDA credit of \$110 million from the World Bank for this purpose.<sup>144</sup>

The renewal of rail operations on the Sena line is a vital development initiative for Mozambique. It opens access to the large Moatize coal mine in Tete and improves access to Malawi, but also will turn a number of other public and private investments into feasible propositions, including:

- Exploitation of heavy mineral deposits at Micaune (in Zambézia), limestone quarries at Muanza (Sofala), and fluorspar at Mont Muambe (Zambézia);
- A number of rice production and processing schemes in Zambézia;
- Establishment of large-scale irrigation systems in Urema-Zangoe (in Sofala), M’Condedzi-Revuboe (in Tête), and Chinde (Zambézia); and
- Integrated rural development projects near Trigo (Tete) and Gorongoza (Sofala).<sup>145</sup>

Rail lines were, of course, constant targets during the civil wars, and contamination from both landmines and UXO is a very real concern. The first 90 km of the Sena line was demined in 1998 by Minetech,<sup>146</sup> with funding from Ireland<sup>147</sup> and QA by Ronco. Ronco then cleared a

<sup>143</sup> Corporatised means it has the legal structure of a corporation. In the case of CFM, all the shares are still held by GoM rather than sold to private investors.

<sup>144</sup> \$5.5 million of the loan is for institutional strengthening.

<sup>145</sup> Source: map entitled *Major Anchor Projects: Sena Line*, CFM.

<sup>146</sup> IND records suggest that Minetech cleared 12.5 metres on each side of the centre line.

<sup>147</sup> The Review Team has been unable to find any reference to this a “mine action” funding. The financing may have been bundled into a broader “Beira Corridor” project financed by Ireland.



further 118 km with State Department funding, apparently in 2001. In both cases, few mines or UXO were found.

When the World Bank conducted its environmental impact studies relating to the upgrading of the Sena line, it advised that clearance would be required to at least 15 metres from the centre line and, ideally, to 25 metres. However, the Bank did not incorporate funds for demining into its loan,<sup>148</sup> leaving this cost to be covered by CFM from the government's contribution to the project.<sup>149</sup> CFM sought assistance from the State Department via Ronco.

In 2003, CFM began the reconstruction of the first section of the Sena line and, pressed for time, "cleared" to 10 metres from the centre line with assistance from Ronco and the Quick Reaction Demining Force (QRDF). Basically, the QRDF (supervised by Ronco) used Battle Area Clearance techniques in advance of CFM bulldozers and work crews, which did bush clearance for access roads needed for the rail line rehabilitation. Few if any landmines or UXO were encountered<sup>150</sup> except those left overnight by villagers for the deminers to find (suggesting the villagers are afraid to keep these munitions or to deliver them to state authorities – see Textbox 12 –).

#### **Textbox 12 – The Swords into Ploughshares disarmament initiative**

Prolonged civil conflict indicates the existence of deep divisions within a society, and intensifies such divisions, increasing the likelihood of future conflicts should the country be unable to build political and social institutions that allow for peaceful resolution of disputes. For this reason, a variety of peace-building initiatives are warranted.

One such initiative in Mozambique is the "Swords into Ploughshares" programme sponsored by the Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM) – an umbrella association of Protestant denominations. In its view, the Peace Accords only "opened the door to peace." The post-war demobilisation projects just covered "official" soldiers, but both sides had distributed guns and other munitions to civilians in friendly communities, largely for self-defence. As well, at least the RENAMO forces established weapons caches in rural areas they controlled. After the war, local communities – particularly in areas that had supported, and subsequently voted for, RENAMO – were afraid of turning over these guns and munitions to government authorities.

Recognising this problem, and the danger of having so many weapons in local communities, CCM initiated the Swords to Ploughshares programme in 1995. CCM personnel make and maintain the contacts with the local communities, but work in cooperation with the ministries of Defence and the Interior, who provide specialists (e.g. non-uniformed police to transport

<sup>148</sup> CFM officials believe they were advised by the Bank's task manager for this project that the World Bank did not provide funding for demining. If so, this is a misreading of Bank policy, which was issued in 1997. That policy remains unchanged, but in 2003 the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit of Bank issued a *Task Manager's Guide* and, in late 2004, a *Social Development Note* entitled "Landmine Contamination: A Development Imperative" which reaffirmed the Bank's willingness to finance demining in support of reconstruction and development investments.

<sup>149</sup> The Bank and most other providers of project loan funds normally require a financial contribution from the recipient government, in part as an indicator that the government sees the project as a high priority. Almost one-third of CFM's capital works programme (which includes improvements of the Machipanda railway from Beira to Zimbabwe) is non-World Bank financed – this could be from government's own funds, or from grants/soft loans from donors.

<sup>150</sup> This suggests that clearance of at least the known minefields had been done shortly into the post war period, perhaps by soldiers from FADM and the Zimbabwe army, which had been deployed to keep the vital Beira transport corridor – one of Zimbabwe's principal links to a sea port – open.

guns to disposal sites or non-uniformed FADM engineers for clearance of minefields laid to protect weapons caches).

Initially thought of as a temporary initiative, it has continued to this day because “the guns kept coming.” The project is based in CCM Maputo headquarters with offices in Zambézia and Niassa. However, CCM has never been able to maintain teams in every province.

The fact the Swords into Ploughshares project has been running for 10 years suggests that many caches of landmines and other munitions remain in the rural areas. Presumably, most of these are known by the rural communities themselves. When deminers are in the vicinity, villagers leave the unwanted munitions by the demining camps for disposal. That this is done secretly at night suggests the villagers are afraid of revealing these caches to state authorities for fear of reprisal. It raises interesting issues concerning MRE and disarmament programmes.

The Tete branch of the line, from Sena itself to Moatize, is not yet cleared (work stopped in part because the QRDF was deployed to Iraq for some months). However, reconstruction of the line is not yet scheduled, so there is less urgency in completing the demining and bush clearance. CFM plans to clear to 15 metres from the centre line, and hopes the State Department will fund Ronco to assist in this.<sup>151</sup> IND records suggest there is low risk of contamination, so the work should go briskly provided CFM obtains the financing.

The existing CFM work programme also provides for the improvement of the Machipanda railway from Beira to the border with Zimbabwe. Demining will be required, particularly in the “flats” near Beira where all bridges and culverts will need to be surveyed and, perhaps, cleared. However, no financing has yet been put in place for this \$25 million project.

In the future, the line from Quelimane to Mocuba in Zambézia will require upgrading, but CFM has not yet investigated whether landmine and UXO contamination will be an issue.

#### SMALL SCALE INFRASTRUCTURE

Many other government units are responsible for smaller scale investment projects, often in rural areas. These should be important clients of IND and the demining organisations, but often are not. For example, officials from the National Directorate for Irrigation in MADER said they had no exchange of information with IND or any of the demining operators. In planning their annual work programmes, they ask district administrators whether there are any landmines in the district – if there are, they simply do not plan any small scale irrigation works in the communities suffering from contamination.<sup>152</sup> They do not follow-up with IND or with operators active in the area to see if the reports of contamination are true, or whether the precise areas suspected of contamination would interfere with the irrigation project.

When they are advised by district administrators that a village was contaminated but the areas have been cleared, they do not contact IND to request clearance certificates. Similarly, if they are told there is no contamination, they do not check with IND to verify this information.

<sup>151</sup> Its second option is for FADM to undertake Battle Area Clearance.

<sup>152</sup> This is a good example of why LIS findings concerning the degree of impact of contamination on communities should not be relied upon after a few years – community members may not even be aware they are being negatively impacted when government units, development NGOs, etc. deny them much-needed community development investments because of the suspicion of landmines.

Once the annual work programme has been planned, the Directorate engages small contractors to do the actual work. The Directorate does not include any clauses concerning landmine or UXO contamination in these contracts.

The planned work programme for small-scale irrigation in four provinces (Maputo, Sofala, Manica, Zambézia) is about \$22 million over the coming five years. It is unclear to the Review Team whether the Directorate is investing similar amounts in the other provinces.

In the same ministry, officials in the National Directorates of Forestry and Economics reported that they were unaware of any dealings with IND. Their colleague in the Agriculture Directorate said that, for their projects in most cases, the road surfaces would already have been cleared, but the roadsides might still be contaminated. They would contact IND if there was any concern. However, most agriculture projects now are commercial schemes and privately financed. The public sector now simply facilitates private sector investment by promoting producer associations, providing extension services, and encouraging private investors, and would not get involved in the design or implementation of the investment itself.

Officials at the National Directorate for Rural Development were more informed concerning contamination issues and the mine action programme. This appears to be due to the fact that many of them were actively engaged with demining issues in the immediate post-war period when there was a big push to clear roads and sites for returning refugees and IDPs.

The situation has changed in many respects. First, clearer development priorities (farm lands, feeder roads, resettlement sites) are emerging from the centre. But government units at the provincial and district levels are better placed to take responsibility for implementing work programmes. Thus, coordination with the mine action programme is not done in Maputo but in the provincial capitals and district centres, which seems to work well (even though there are no mine action committees established at the provincial or district levels).

## **STATISTICS AND MAPPING**

As noted previously, CIDA funded a toponomy digitization project with DINAGECA, the national mapping authority, so full use could be made of the GIS functionality incorporated into IMSMA. Since then, there appears to have been little collaboration between IND and DINAGECA.

One of the main problems faced by countries that have implemented an LIS has been the absence of any mechanism to update the socio-economic data fields – thus, the LIS provides only a snapshot of the contamination impact at a point of time, when a moving picture is needed. However, other agencies in Mozambique collect a great deal of statistical information that could provide IND with a sense of how the impact of contamination may be changing over time. Accessing and analysing socio-economic statistics collected by other agencies (chiefly INE – the National Statistics Institute) would also help in the task of ensuring the mine action programme is aligned with the government's broader development priorities. For example, INE has poverty data aggregated at the national, provincial, district, and locality levels. Starting in 2000, INE has also conducted periodic surveys using the Core Welfare Indicator Questionnaire (CWIQ surveys), which give an indication of how the pattern of poverty is changing over time. As well, it is compiling data on all physical and social infrastructure (schools, health facilities, wells/boreholes, other water facilities, etc.) – potentially of great use in preparing annual plans for the mine action programme.

There has been limited contact between INE and IND. The latter contacted INE to obtain a listing of community sites (required for the LIS). Since then, INE has contacted IND to borrow GPS equipment for recording the location of physical and social infrastructure.

## **Development Planning and Budgeting**

The main development planning and expenditure management instruments, which are the principal means for getting public sector bodies to work together in support of government priorities, are covered in greater detail in the next chapter. Here we simply note whether IND or the mine action programme has received any mention in these important documents.

### **Macro Planning and Budgeting**

Shortly after each election, the incoming government produces its Government Programme, outlining its priorities for the coming five years. However, the PARPA (Mozambique's Poverty Reduction Strategy) has now become far-and-away the most important medium-term development planning document, and is the fulcrum for policy and planning discussions between the GoM and the international assistance community. Neither the mine action programme nor the word "landmine" appear anywhere in the PARPA. This omission has long been a concern to the donors supporting mine action.

Similarly, neither IND nor the mine action programme has ever been noted in the annual budget. Since 2001 however, actual recurrent expenditures relating to mine action have been reported in Budget Execution Reports (BER),<sup>153</sup> and the BER for 2003 also reported an estimate of capital expenditures for mine action (although this likely represents those donor financed capital expenditures the government could identify – perhaps from customs records of equipment imports).

IND has issued projections suggesting that government contributions to mine action will increase to \$1.75 million in 2005, \$2.25 million in 2006, and \$2.75 million thereafter,<sup>154</sup> but it is unclear to the Review Team whether this has been endorsed by budget officials in the Ministry of Planning and Finance (the senior budget officials we met had no knowledge of any discussions or commitments).

### **Sector Planning**

Sector plans do not exist in all cases. Where such documents are extant, typically they have been the outcome of a prolonged government-donor effort to reorient development planning and management on a sector-wide basis – what has come to be termed a Sector Wide Approach to Programming (SWAp). SWAps exist for Health, Education, Agriculture, and some of the sub-sectors in Public Works such as Roads and Water. The Review Team did not have the opportunity to examine these sector plans, but in our meetings with officials from,

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<sup>153</sup> Actual expenditures were about \$350,000 in 2002 and \$470,000 in 2003, about 45 per cent and 58 per cent of the budget respectively.

<sup>154</sup> This is made up of \$0.5 million annually for IND and \$0.75 million annually for equipment, plus GoM contributions to demining starting at \$0.5 million in 2005 and rising over two years to \$1.5 million. IND, *Communication Elements of Plans to Implement Article 5 of the Ottawa Convention*, June 2004, p. 6.

and donors to, many of these sectors, no one was aware of any description or analysis of landmine and UXO contamination within the sector plans.<sup>155</sup>

### **Provincial and District Plans**

It appears that neither provincial nor district development plans are now prepared on a systematic basis in Mozambique, in part because more government and donor funding has been allocated on the basis of sector priorities adopted via SWAp arrangements.<sup>156</sup> However, district planning and budgeting has been piloted in Nampula, this pilot is now being replicated in the other Northern provinces and in Zambézia, and the government has announced this initiative will be implemented nation-wide. These documents would be excellent vehicles for analysing the local impacts of landmine and UXO contamination.

## **The International Arena**

### **Regional and International Mine Action Links**

Mozambique was among the first countries to sign and ratify the *Ottawa Convention*, and the GoM hosted the first annual Meeting of States Parties in 1999. Since then, Mozambique has remained extremely active in *Convention* matters, with both the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Director of IND regularly attending Meetings of States Parties as well as the recent Nairobi Review Conference.

The GoM is also supporting regional mine action initiatives. The Director of IND is a member of the SADC Mine Action Technical Committee, and Mozambique has actively supported the principle regional demining initiative promoted by SADC, the Greater Limpopo Trans-frontier Game Park, created in 2000, straddling South Africa, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe.<sup>157</sup>

In addition, the Director of ADP has been extremely active in both the regional and international mine action arenas. He is widely viewed as the most experienced and high-profile manager of local demining operators in the Lusophone world.

### **Links with Mine Action Donors**

Mine action clearly was not a priority for the GoM immediately after the 1992 Peace Agreement. This appears to have reflected not the intrinsic importance of landmine and UXO contamination, but rather:

- The fact that ONUMOZ, the UN overall, and ICRC had been given an explicit responsibility for mine action;<sup>158</sup>
- The understandable difficulties the two warring factions had in addressing issues related to demilitarisation in the immediate post-conflict period;

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<sup>155</sup> A number of World Bank project documents for large infrastructure projects do touch on such contamination – typically in the environmental and social impact reports.

<sup>156</sup> It is understandably difficult to get people to continue producing plans when there is no money to implement those plans.

<sup>157</sup> However, most donors were moving slowly on this project because of concerns over the political situation in Zimbabwe.

<sup>158</sup> For the latter two, this was through the *Guiding Principles for Humanitarian Assistance*, endorsed by both RENAMO and FRELIMO in July 1992.

- The more general capacity constraints of the government, coupled with the number and magnitude of urgent matters on its agenda.

Given this, UN bodies (principally UNOHAC and ONUMOZ) assumed the initiative for planning mine action. Lack of coordination among the different UN bodies, ponderous administrative rules and regulations, and the decision to push for an integrated Authority-MAC-Operator (the so called “Cambodia model”<sup>159</sup>) soon led to friction between the UN and the mine action donors. Soon thereafter, major donors also squabbled among themselves over the award of large contracts for commercial demining.

Given this fractious environment, it was unsurprising that mine action operations began as a series of independent, ill co-ordinated initiatives – emergency responses to facilitate the return of refugees and safeguard humanitarian assistance workers. The EC, through ICRC, financed Gurkha Security Guards and Lonrho to clear roads in Sofala and Gaza. USAID had Ronco clear roads in Sofala, Manica, and Zambézia. GTZ engaged Minetech to survey roads and rural communities to support UNHCR and to prepare the ground for its planned integrated rural development project.

Both HALO Trust and NPA also started their mine action operations during this emergency response phase, engaged initially by the UN. Shortly thereafter, the international demining NGOs began receiving support directly from donors. Meanwhile, ADP was created almost as an afterthought to provide a vehicle to employ the first cohorts emerging from the mine training facility. By mid-1995 when the GoM finally created NMCC and CND, Mozambique was already divided among the three big humanitarian operators.

The international mine action NGOs maintain their own relationships with donors and line-up their own funds. UNDP raises funds to support ADP and provides assistance in resource mobilisation to the GoM – a process that undoubtedly has been helped by the high profile the Minister of Foreign Affairs has developed on the international stage. The Ministry has also been able to raise funds directly from donors to support some of the infrastructure projects such as the Massingir dam and the Sena Railway.

Thus, what might be termed a coordination-by-avoidance approach evolved, with a number of distinct programmes co-existing in the country, sharing information, heading broadly in the same direction, but managing their internal affairs and external relations more-or-less independently. It works after a fashion.<sup>160</sup> It is adequate for avoiding major overlaps and ‘turf battles’ among operators, which can escalate so easily into squabbles among their respective donors. The IND (and CND before it) has not yet made a concerted effort to stamp its authority on the individual operators.

After about 1996, donor coordination for mine action settled into a routine, with UNDP doing most of the legwork to convene donors periodically, more to exchange information than for joint planning or serious policy dialogue. Donors rightly wanted to emphasise that it is first-

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<sup>159</sup> Military engineers from industrialised countries were dominant among the mine action advisers to UNOHAC and ONUMOZ. At this point in time, most individuals with such a background were more comfortable with clear lines of “command and control” such as would be found in armies and which worked well in the type of professional armed forces existing in their home countries.

<sup>160</sup> It was also the approach commonly used by donors for aid delivery during the emergency and post-war recovery phases – donors adopting a sector in a region of the country and, more-or-less staying out of each other’s way.

and-foremost the responsibility of the government to take responsibility for the country's landmine contamination problem. The government did indeed show leadership in some respects, but principally in the context of the international forums that are part of the Ottawa process. In the absence of an active and engaged government interlocutor, it is not surprising that the donor support group had a modest agenda.

It appears the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, representing the GoM, was comfortable with this level of interaction with donor representatives within Mozambique. It suited that Ministry's natural orientation to focus more on the world stage than on the domestic front. As well, Mozambique's active participation at international mine action events made a good impression in donor capitals, leading to continued financial support to the country's mine action programme.<sup>161</sup>

In spite the provision in its statutes for semi-annual meetings with the cooperating partners (including donors and UN agencies), IND has only convened annual meetings.

Another concern is that ADP does not have regular meetings with its donors to keep them informed, alert them to strategic issues, and to solicit their advice when warranted.<sup>162</sup> This seems inappropriate considering the long-standing plans to convert ADP into an independent organisation, which will then be responsible for its own resource mobilisation.

## **Local Communities Arena**

### **Local authorities**

The initial period of operations is always difficult for demining operators because of the lack of solid information about where minefields are and which ones pose the greatest threats to people or impose the most serious constraints to development. This is particularly true in the immediate post-conflict period as people may not have returned to their home communities or, where they have, may not yet be aware of the location of hazards. Given this, it should come as no surprise that all the humanitarian demining organisations were criticised concerning some tasks they selected during their first period of operations in Mozambique.<sup>163</sup>

Most evaluators recommended closer consultations with communities and local authorities. Such recommendations were implemented, but sometimes in a cursory fashion – the demining personnel almost always had technical backgrounds and often seemed unaware that local politics and social divisions can turn the identification of priorities from the bottom-up into a “minefield” for the unwary.<sup>164</sup> The well-known study by the Peace Research Institute of Oslo

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<sup>161</sup> In the build-up and aftermath to the Ottawa meeting at which the Mine Ban Treaty was agreed, mine action had such a high profile that most of the funding decisions were made by officials based in donor capitals, often drawing on special funds ear-marked solely for mine action. This situation is changing gradually as mine action is being “mainstreamed” within at least some of the national development programmes. Thus, and unlike the case with most official development assistance, attending international meetings can be a good fundraising strategy.

<sup>162</sup> UNDP has convened a number of meetings with donors since the collapse of ADP in April 2005.

<sup>163</sup> In some cases, such as demining around Cahorra Bassa dam, a secondary objective of the operator (in that case, NPA) was that it served as a good training site for their newly inducted deminers. See Suhrke et al., 1997.

<sup>164</sup> A complicating feature in parts of Mozambique is that there may be an official authority plus a traditional authority. For many years, FRELIMO hewed a standard socialist “vanguard party” approach and tried to undermine traditional leadership structures. Thus, the most knowledgeable and respected

(PRIO, Millard and Harpviken, 2000) contained a number of examples of land that had been cleared in the mid- to late-1990s at significant expense, but which remained underused, demonstrating the need for more thorough consultations before undertaking tasks.

Further improvements have been instituted. HI's concept of proximity demining requires close consultations with local people to identify small tasks that will deliver significant benefits in terms of improving community access to important facilities or sites. NPA is using its Task Impact Assessment (TIA) approach to ensure the beneficiaries of any clearance task are identified in advance and to assess whether there are any other impediments that would prevent the land from being used without delay, and in the intended manner, after clearance. HALO Trust works closely with district administrators and provincial governors to determine priorities and attain "mine impact free" status on a district-by-district basis.

Consultations between IND and local communities remain less developed. Decentralisation may improve the situation, but little authority has yet been delegated to the regional offices<sup>165</sup> and at least one regional office is performing at a very low level. This is not to suggest relations between IND and local authorities are unfriendly; rather, IND personnel in the regional offices still have little real influence over which hazards are cleared. This decision remains largely in the hands of the operators, and local authorities quite reasonably deal first with the operators while keeping IND informed.

## Community development actors

In the early days of mine action, many basic services were delivered by international NGOs. In the immediate post-conflict period, when there was significant worry over landmines and ignorance concerning the location of minefields was rife, support for these NGOs was a priority. For example, the original DfID grant to support HALO Trust's work in Zambézia was predicated in large part on support for the work of a consortium of British NGOs, TRINGO. (Craib, 2003) NPA located to a region that was heavily populated with Norwegian and other Nordic NGOs. With so many organisations operating in such a confused environment, there probably were cases in which community development projects were delayed because of lack of coordination with whichever demining operator was based in the region, but the Review Team has not uncovered any evaluation reports from the time that highlighted this as a significant problem. We presume such coordination has been adequate.

In recent years far more aid has been channelled through government coffers or delivered in the context of joint government-donor sector strategies. Basic public services are now being delivered through or in close cooperation with the relevant government department. Officials at the district and provincial level appear to be attuned to any problems these governments might have with SHA, so consultations with local officials appear to be the right approach for operators and, where it is active, IND.

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person in the eyes of the community may not have been identified as a local authority to demining organisations and others seen to be working in conjunction with the state.

<sup>165</sup> The point of consultations is not, of course, simply to identify local priorities: it is to address these priorities. Local authorities will allocate little time or effort on consultations with an IND official if that person cannot influence whether problems are solved by operators after these have been identified.



## Summary

The links between the mine action programme and the government arena are in some instances good, but further improvements are required. IND, as the national authority, does not engage with the government's core economic management units. Neither IND nor mine action has yet received mention in the two most critical development management instruments – the PARPA and the annual state budget. Government contributions to mine action are extremely modest.

Links with certain units in sector ministries do exist, but this reflects the initiative of those units rather than IND. IND has been able to provide support when approached. However, other government units whose work programmes are adversely affected or distorted by contamination, but which do not take the initiative to approach IND or the independent operators, are receiving no advice or assistance. A proactive approach by IND is required to ensure these government units are aware that assistance is available to address contamination problems. A proactive approach would also pay dividends in spreading best practice among government units responsible for infrastructure rehabilitation and development.

Perhaps the most important finding of this review is the existence of substantial demand for demining services – engaged mainly through competitive processes – to support infrastructure rehabilitation and development. This demand appears likely to continue at a robust level or to increase for the next decade. National mine action authorities do not seem to be aware of the magnitude or scope of this demand, or the fact that demining services in support of major infrastructure work is almost certainly the main contribution of mine action to Mozambique's development and to poverty reduction.<sup>166</sup>

The Review Team also found that planning and implementation procedures relating to demining support differ significantly across the various government units responsible for infrastructure programmes. Procedures range from excellent to non-existent. There is tremendous opportunity to enhance the developmental and poverty-reduction impact of mine action simply by turning best practice into common practice.

Links between the humanitarian operators and both provincial governors and district administrators appear for the most part to be adequate and improving. Links between IND and sub-national administrations remain weaker in general. Decentralisation should have paid greater dividends in this regard, but the regional offices are hobbled by the failure to delegate adequate authority. One of these offices is making a good effort at carving-out a useful role for itself, but the other needs clearer direction and support from IND in Maputo.

Links with the international arena range from excellent (in matters relating to the *Convention*) to inadequate (with regard to productive dialogue between the government and the supporting donor representatives in Mozambique). The GoM has also lent support to regional mine action initiatives, although it remains unclear whether these will pay dividends for the participating countries.

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<sup>166</sup> For example, a recent IND document stated that “*Focus has now moved from clearing Roads, Bridges, Railways and Power Lines to Land release.*” IND, 2004, *Communication Elements of Plans to Implement Article 5 of the Ottawa Convention*, (marked draft but apparently submitted), p. 1.

Once again, the international NGOs appear to have good relations with most of their donors. A concern expressed by donors during the mission was the lack of a regular forum comprising ADP's management and the donors providing support to the ADP programme.

Links between the humanitarian operators and the local communities arena have improved over the years and now appear adequate or better in most cases. Those between IND and local communities are more hit-and-miss. Again, a problem here has been the failure to follow-through more decisively with the decentralisation effort by delegating appropriate degrees of authority to regional offices, coupled with clear direction concerning priorities and expected levels of performance.



## 5. Development Management in Mozambique

Linking mine action with development requires that MA managers are aware of how development planning and economic management is done in a country. What are the main planning processes? What level of government is responsible for which decisions? What do MA managers need to do, when, and with whom to ensure (i) they know which government units will need mine action support in the coming months or years, and (ii) the need for MA services is properly reflected in the various development plans prepared by the government.<sup>167</sup>

Mozambique is a poor country, heavily dependent on financial assistance from donors and international financial institutions (IFIs) such as The World Bank. This greatly complicates the task of development planning and economic management, in part because there are so many donors, each with their own views on what the priorities are, each supporting many projects, and each with their own rules and reporting requirements. In Mozambique, the international assistance community has been making a concerted effort to harmonise their procedures, to align assistance more closely with the government's priorities, and to channel development financing through the government's economic management systems. Mozambique is a hotbed of experimentation on new 'aid modalities'. The new development assistance philosophy and aid modalities will have an enormous impact on any aid-dependent sector, such as mine action.

### ***Constitutional Framework***

#### **Separation of Powers**

The 1990 Constitution established a republican form of government, with a president (the head of state) elected by universal suffrage for a five-year term. The president appoints the prime minister (the head of government) and the other members of the executive branch of government (the Council of Ministers or cabinet).

The legislature (Assembly of the Republic) is elected at the same time for a five-year term. The legislature is an independent branch of government. It is intended to exercise oversight of the executive on behalf of the citizens, principally through the budget cycle. Annually, the executive is required by law to present its work programme (in Mozambique, the Economic and Social Programme or PES) and the estimates of the financial resources required to implement this programme (the "budget estimates") to the legislature each year for debate and enactment, following which it becomes the "State Budget" (OE in the Portuguese acronym) giving the government legal authority to raise finances via taxes, loans, and grants, and to spend funds for the purposes outlined in the budget. Subsequently, the executive is held to account through biannual reports on the implementation of the PES plus Quarterly Budget Reports, and when the report of the Administrative Tribunal (the Supreme Audit Institution in Mozambique, reporting to the legislature, not the executive) on the government's annual financial statements is presented.

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<sup>167</sup> National development plans are prepared by the central economic management units (budget, planning, etc.), but development plans are also prepared by sector ministries and (often) by lower levels of government (currently, 10 provinces and 128 districts, plus 33 autonomous municipalities).

While the Constitution allows a situation in which the President is from a different party than the one holding a majority in the Assembly, since independence the majority in the legislature has always been from the same party as the President. This, coupled with the fact that the legislature has few resources and little capacity, means the executive branch of government has great latitude and is not held to account in a meaningful way.

The judiciary is the third branch of government. It has its own exclusive jurisdiction, intended to ensure the rule of law prevails (i.e., the other branches of government act in accordance with the law and, ultimately, the Constitution). In practice however, the judiciary has little independence from the executive as the President appoints the Attorney General and the President of the Supreme Court, and the actions of the executive are rarely constrained by judicial oversight.

## Decentralisation and Deconcentration<sup>168</sup>

Constitutionally, Mozambique is a unitary state, with a central government and sub-national administrations at the provincial and district levels.<sup>169</sup> The structure of provincial and district administrations mirrors that of the central government, albeit with smaller departments. Thus, most public services are provided through the vertical chain of sector ministries. In a large and diverse country such as Mozambique, with widely dispersed populations and weak transport and communications networks, the quality of many public services is highly dependent on the capacities of sub-national levels of the state to adapt these services to local needs and conditions – things like road maintenance and public works to support community development simply cannot be coordinated properly from the centre. Traditionally however, Mozambique's government has been very centralised, and to date it has taken only tentative steps at deconcentration.<sup>170</sup>

Provincial governors are appointed by the President, holding the status of a cabinet minister, and are supposed to effect coordination among provincial departments. Such coordination is difficult because civil servants at the provincial level are appointed by the respective sector ministers and are expected to follow policies and priorities dictated by the national department in Maputo, leaving governors and district administrators only nominal authority over the provincial and district directorates of the central ministries.<sup>171</sup> Capacities at the provincial and (even more so) district levels are weaker than in the central government, as better conditions of work and promotional opportunities attract the best qualified to Maputo.

Preliminary efforts to stimulate multi-sectoral sector planning at the provincial level were initiated in 1993 when provincial administrations were required to formulate Triennial Public Investment Plans (PTIP) for a share of the national investment budget (12 per cent for all

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<sup>168</sup> This section is based on Annex 3 of World Bank, 2001, *Public Expenditure Management Review*.

<sup>169</sup> In theory there are elected assemblies at the provincial and district levels. However, the legal basis for these is not recognised in the 1990 Constitution, and local elections were last held over 20 years ago. In recent decades, local governments are elected only for municipalities.

<sup>170</sup> Deconcentration refers to the delegation of specific responsibilities to lower-level administrations (i.e. administrative entities not under the authority of a sub-national government of elected officials). Decentralisation is a broader term, and can also entail devolution of authority to locally elected bodies. This is being done for municipalities, but as landmine and UXO contamination now has little impact in urban areas, our focus is restricted to provincial and district administrations.

<sup>171</sup> This is the fundamental weakness of the *dupla tutela* or dual-reporting system inherited from the Portuguese colonial system.

provinces in 1995, rising to 15 per cent in 1997). This has lost steam with the newer emphasis on national sector investment programmes formulated in Maputo, often with significant donor involvement,<sup>172</sup> though a number of provinces have continued local planning in the form of strategic provincial development plans (e.g. Inhambane, where Ireland financed international and local consultants to assist in formulating the provincial development plan in 2001).

District administrators are appointed by the Ministry for State Administration (MAE). In March 2000 the Council of Ministers approved the concept of “integrated administration” at the district level which, *inter alia*, formalises the structure and roles of Local Councils and District Consultative Councils (including civil society), but the legal and regulatory framework and policy guidelines to empower these bodies and the district administrations have not yet been adopted. A model developed in Nampula province<sup>173</sup> is now being replicated in other Northern provinces with additional finance provided by The World Bank among others.<sup>174</sup> A District Development Fund (DDF) facility has been established to finance small-scale public investments and micro-projects identified and implemented by communities themselves.<sup>175</sup> Access to the fund depends on better District Development Plans, giving a strong incentive to administrators to invest more effort in this exercise.

In spite of their limited administrative and fiscal capacities, provincial and (especially) district administrations should be important partners for the MA programme because they are responsible for territorial planning (provinces) and territorial administration (districts), as well as oversight (albeit nominal) of sector departments operating within their territories. In addition, both governors and district administrators have significant status as local authority figures, and many have shown significant initiative in resolving problems and disputes within the communities within their territories.

The responsibilities delegated to provincial and district administrations with respect to land management are particularly important from the perspective of demining. Outside municipal areas, should a citizen or community apply for the right of land use and benefit over a specific parcel, a district administrator must issue an opinion following consultations with the cadastral service, local communities, and the owners or occupiers of adjoining land (Decree 66/97, article 27). The delegation of authority for authorisations then is:

- 1,000 hectares or less – authorisation by provincial governors;
- between 1,000 and 10,000 hectares – provincial governors issue an opinion and authorisation is granted by the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries;
- over 10,000 hectares – the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries issues an opinion and authorisation is granted by the Council of Ministers.

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<sup>172</sup> These cover (at least) education, health, agriculture, water, and roads.

<sup>173</sup> Nampula District Planning and Finance Project, supported by UNDP, UNCDF, and the Netherlands. The pilot effort was in three districts of Nampula, but the model has now been replicated in the rest of Nampula and most of Cabo Delgado, and has more recently started in 13 districts in Tete, Zambézia, Sofala, and Manica.

<sup>174</sup> The Mozambique Decentralised Planning and Finance Project, with an IDA credit of \$30 million.

<sup>175</sup> The latter projects are intended to include special programs targeting poor and vulnerable groups, including victims of mines. We have been unable to ascertain whether any such grants have been made for this purpose. Funds would be granted to community associations and would require in-kind counterpart contributions by association members. Implementation could be contracted-out to local NGOs. (World Bank, 2000, p. 5)

### **Textbox 13 – Land Law in Mozambique**

In 1997 the GoM enacted a new Land Law (No. 19/97) and the following year the Council of Ministers issued the Land Law Regulations (Decree 66/97). Under article 46 of the 1990 Constitution, all land ownership in Mozambique is vested with the State. However, all Mozambicans (as well as legally registered foreign corporations) and communities may hold the right of land use and benefit, through three mechanisms:

- occupancy in accordance with customary norms (restricted to Mozambican citizens and communities);
- occupancy in “good faith” (restricted to Mozambican citizens who have occupied land in good faith for at least 10 years);
- formal authorisation by state authorities.

The occupancy rights of communities, and those of citizens with respect to personal dwellings and “family development” (e.g. households practicing subsistence agriculture) are not subject to time limit. Rights based on formal authorisation exist for five years in the first instance (following an initial “provisional authorisation”) and, should a “definitive authorisation” then be granted, for 50 years (renewable for another 50). Rights over land cannot be sold, but can be inherited. As well, buildings and other improvements can be sold and, should this happen, the right of land use and benefit could be transferred.

Source: GoM, 2004, *Land Law Legislation*, MOZLEGAL, Maputo.

## **National Economic Management**

Effective national economic management is a complex task. Experience suggests it requires at least the following ‘instruments’:

- a statement of strategic development choices made by the government of the day, reflecting its philosophy and vision for the country’s future;
- a set of medium-term (three-to-five years) plans that lay-out work programmes at the national, sector, and area (e.g. provincial; district) levels;
- a sound estimate of the resources that will be available over the medium-term – regularly updated – to aid the government in determining how much it can afford to spend on the various programmes outlined in its medium-term plans; and
- annual work programmes and the budgets (which should be the financial reflection of the work programme).

Mozambique has all of these, although each instrument has weaknesses and, in many cases, the links among them remain tenuous. In general, planning is more advanced than implementation, including financial management, largely because the latter items require capacity in depth which takes significant time to develop.

## **Statutory instruments and processes**

The GoM is required by legislation to present to the Assembly a number of documents outlining its priorities and work programmes, together with the estimated costs of these activities.

### **Five-Year Plan**

Within 90 days of its inauguration, a new government is required to present a five-year development plan (the “Government Five Year Programme”) covering its term in office. This is based principally on the political manifesto of the elected party. In the most recent Five Year Programme – released after the Review Mission – the new government for the first time gave significant attention to mine action as a cross-cutting issue. Based on past experience however, not all the priorities mentioned in Five Year Programme will be reflected in subsequent annual budgets.

While still not a legal requirement (and never to date subjected to Parliament’s decision), the PARPA (see below) now serves as the development plan in practical terms and, in a sense, usurping the role originally foreseen for the Five Year Programme.

### **Annual Social and Economic Programme (PES)**

This is the government’s analysis of the state of the economy and a presentation of government priorities (both new initiatives and ongoing projects) for the coming year. It is presented as a complement to the annual budget.<sup>176</sup> The GoM does not have the funds to finance many new initiatives, so the PES still represents more of a wish list than a concrete plan. Ministers and their departments then try to find donors to make their wishes come true.

### **State Budget (OE)<sup>177</sup>**

The budget represents the allocations of funds available to the treasury (both the government’s own revenues and donor support delivered via the budget) to all departments and public agencies. Budgets cover a one year period (Mozambique follows a 1 January to 31 December fiscal year), but the full budget cycle (formulation-execution-audit) covers three years, broken as follows:

<b>Time – Budget Cycle Phase</b>	<b>Key Tasks</b>
Feb-May yr <sup>-1</sup> – Forecasting	Develop economic and fiscal forecasts for coming 3 years
May-Sep yr <sup>-1</sup> – Formulation	Formulate PES & OE (annual estimates for revenues & expenditures)
Oct-Dec yr <sup>-1</sup> – Adoption	Presentation of PES & OE estimates and adoption by Parliament
Jan-Dec – Execution	Collect revenues, pay for budgeted activities, & account
Yr <sup>+1</sup> – Reporting & auditing	Prepare report on budget execution ( <i>Relatório de Execução Orçamental</i> and <i>Balanço do PES</i> or BEP); and prepare the Consolidated State Accounts ( <i>Contra Geral do Estado</i> or CGE) that are then audited by the <i>Tribunal Administrativo</i> , which submits the audited accounts to parliament.
Quarterly and Bi-Annual Report and Monitoring	Quarterly cumulative Budget Execution Reports and mid-year <i>Balanço do PES</i>

<sup>176</sup> Formerly, a rolling three-year Public Investment Programme (PTIP) was also prepared and presented with the budget (the first year of the PTIP would correspond to the capital estimates portion of the budget). As the functions served by the PTIP are now covered by the annual review of the PARPA, this is no longer prepared.

<sup>177</sup> This section is based on Annex 4 of World Bank, 2001, *Public Expenditure Management Review*.



In most countries, the budget is the most important instrument for planning and financial management: initiatives proposed by ministers and departments will remain simply wishes unless financial resources are allocated to them through the budget approval process. Of equal importance, the budget is the principal mechanism through which the legislature can hold an executive to account. A government is legally required to present its budget each year to the legislature for debate and approval.<sup>178</sup> As well, a country's Supreme Audit Institution (SAI – for Mozambique, the Administrative Tribunal) conducts an annual audit to determine whether the government has spent funds for the approved purposes, as outlined in the budget. The SAI reports directly to the legislature and not to the government.

Unfortunately, in many aid-dependent countries such as Mozambique, the budget does not fulfil these fundamental purposes. First, the bulk of funds spent on public services and investments in Mozambique come from donors rather than the revenues raised by the government.<sup>179</sup> Most donor funds, as well as fees and charges collected by ministries, do not pass through the Treasury so the government is not in a position to account for them. As well, the GoM has only an incomplete picture of how much funding donors will provide in the coming year.<sup>180</sup> Thus, the budget does not reflect the government's true work plan and the government is not in a position to account for most of the expenditures made on its behalf.<sup>181</sup> The mechanism through which a legislature can hold the government to account on behalf of the citizens is significantly flawed.

## PARPA

The Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty (PARPA) is Mozambique's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The initial impetus for preparing this was to qualify for debt reduction under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative,<sup>182</sup> which set a tight deadline given that the guidelines for PRSP preparation called for extensive participation by civil society and other domestic interest groups, and further consultations with donors and the Bretton Woods Institutions (World Bank and IMF).<sup>183</sup> Thus, the initial draft was prepared by a small group of technocrats in Maputo, and only then were consultations undertaken with provincial authorities, private sector associations, civil society, and international partners.

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<sup>178</sup> Typically, a government has very circumscribed authority to spend public funds without prior legislative approval.

<sup>179</sup> In addition, the budget omits large sums collected directly by ministries (*receitas próprias*).

<sup>180</sup> Various mechanisms exist to facilitate the exchange of information between the GoM and donors, but actual spending by donors may bear scant relationship to announced plans because of delays in starting projects, administrative snags, and the possibility of cuts to a donor's budget for that country.

<sup>181</sup> *The accounting system is, thus, said to cover only about a quarter of the resources being applied by government institutions.* (Batley, 2004, p. 9)

<sup>182</sup> PRSPs were initially conceived to operationalise the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) principles – holistic, participatory, and country-owned planning focused on achieving poverty reduction results – advocated by World Bank President James Wolfensohn. Shortly thereafter it was agreed that countries seeking debt relief under the HIPC initiative had to complete a PRSP. Mozambique received debt relief of over \$2 billion in net present value terms via the HIPC (\$1.7 billion in 1999) and enhanced HIPC (\$306 million in 2001) initiatives (IMF, 2004a, footnote 3 on p. 9; p. 36)

<sup>183</sup> To qualify for HIPC debt relief, these two institutions also had to approve PRSPs based on the findings of a Joint Staff Assessment (JSA).

Further, the HIPC deadlines left insufficient time for modifying the document to fully reflect the input from the consultative process.<sup>184</sup>

In spite of these constraints, Mozambique's PARPA is generally acknowledged to be one of the better "first-generation" PRSPs produced in sub-Saharan Africa, in part because significant poverty assessment and analysis work had begun in the mid-1990s. The PARPA has stimulated a rapidly evolving partnership among the GoM, IFIs, and donors (see below), and provides the anchor for their joint development agenda. The GoM has also been open to more sustained consultations with civil society, trade unions, academics, and business associations, spawning a mechanism called the Poverty Observatory.<sup>185</sup>

## Medium-Term Fiscal Framework (MTFF)

A one-year planning horizon is inadequate for determining how to re-allocate financial resources to better align with government priorities, and for determining the future implications of new initiatives. A MTFF is an attempt to link medium-term (three-year) forecasts of financial resources with medium-term plans for sector expenditures. Mozambique produced its first MTFF<sup>186</sup> in 1998. However, Mozambique's MTFF has not yet proved to be a valuable tool for national economic management, in large part because of the same problems that afflict the budget. Conceptually, the MTFF should serve as the financial reflection of the PARPA but, as actual events evolved, the first attempts at producing the MTFF predated the PARPA. In addition, the MTFF is not a legislative requirement, and at least some in the government feel there is little reason to devote considerable effort on improving the MTFF process.<sup>187</sup>

## Sector Planning

Truly worthwhile national development plans and budgets can only be based on well-conceived sector plans (see Textbox 14 – The Missing Middle in Poverty Reduction). In non-aid receiving countries, sector ministries have a strong incentive to develop sound plans – if they do not, they will not obtain adequate financial allocations through the annual budget process and, increasingly, the MTFF.

Motivations are very different in heavily aid dependent countries as the national budget often covers only staff salaries and modest amounts for non-salary recurrent expenditures. In such cases, ministers may, quite understandably, avoid serious struggles with their cabinet colleagues over budget allocations (which can make political enemies), preferring instead to devote their energies in seeking donor funds. Of course, donors have their individual agendas, and ministers in desperate need of funds are unlikely to turn away any donor proposal, even if it does not fit into the government's vision for the sector or address what the government feels the priorities should be. In aid dependent countries, many sectoral ministries lack any

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<sup>184</sup> See de Sousa, 2002. On modifications that were made, see IMF and IDA, 2001. For more general critiques of first generation PRSPs, see Stewart and Wang, 2003, and Oxfam, 2004.

<sup>185</sup> This in turn stimulated greater efforts by civil society organizations represented in the Poverty Observatory to form a poverty monitoring network called G-20.

<sup>186</sup> Termed the CFMP – the acronym for *Cenário Fiscal de Médio Prazo* or Medium Term Fiscal Scenario.

<sup>187</sup> In fact it has not been even discussed or approved by the Cabinet. It has mainly remained an exercise of technocrats within MPF with their IMF counterparts.

officially endorsed strategy, while for others the strategy is written in such broad terms that there is no discernable focus (thus ensuring that any donor-funded project will ‘fit’ the strategy).

In Mozambique’s case, sector work programmes are often “*a mosaic of programs based on different philosophies, of differing quality, and with widely differing cost structures...*” (World Bank, 2003b, p. iv) Without sound sector strategies, the national development plans, annual work programmes, and budgets will almost certainly be deficient as well.

#### **Textbox 14 – The Missing Middle in Poverty Reduction**

Many observers focus on the national or macro level in development – the need to keep the key macroeconomic indicators such as the budget deficit, trade balance, and inflation rate at reasonable levels. Others focus on micro “grassroots” development at the community level, often through self-help measures. While getting the big pieces right and enhancing the ability of communities to address their own problems are both vital, there are also the in-between or meso issues including sound sectoral development plans and the need for infrastructure such as road and communication networks to connect the micro communities to the macro national market. Some recent work has tried to overcome that omission.

For example, a recent paper submitted to the Development Committee (the ministers, mostly from industrialised countries, who sit of the Boards of Governors of both the World Bank and the IMF) outlines a number of channels through which reliable and cost-effective provision of infrastructure services promote the achievement of the MDG goals, including:

- By stimulating economic growth which in turn lifts people out of poverty;
  - By increasing the welfare of poor households, who often have to pay significant sums for poor substitutes in the absence of basic services such as water and power; and
  - By assisting in the provision of basic education and health services, which add to “human capital” – often the only asset poor people may have.
- (Development Committee, 2003)

The paper concluded that many poverty reduction strategies do not fully account for the importance of infrastructure investments. In a similar vein, a report on the challenges facing “second generation” poverty reduction strategies (PRS) notes that sector ministries have not been actively engaged in most PRS processes to date – a trend reinforced by the actions of many donors to deal directly with the sector ministries responsible for the donor’s priorities. Given the focus that many donors now have on poverty reduction and high-profile issues such as HIV/AIDS and primary education, these typically are the social sector ministries, leaving the productive sectors such as agriculture under-funded, reducing growth and, hence, poverty reduction. (ODI, 2004)

The simple fact is that achieving sustainable growth and poverty reduction on a national level is a very complex task. It requires macroeconomic growth. It needs to draw upon the energy of people in their own communities, who will always and everywhere be the primary engine of development. But success and sustainability at both the macro and micro levels is based largely on what happens in the middle.

This message is particularly relevant for mine action. The greatest contributions mine action is making to Mozambique’s development is in this middle zone: promoting infrastructure development and supporting the sector plans of ministries.

## ***Aid Coordination and Management***

It has long been recognised that the existing systems for planning and delivering international assistance are flawed in many ways, including:

- Fragmentation – too many assistance agencies supporting too many distinct projects in a country, each with different management arrangements and reporting requirements, raise transaction costs<sup>188</sup> significantly and can overwhelm the capacities of governments in recipient states;
- Proliferation – the tendency of donor agencies to operate in too many sectors and in too many countries means they cannot build and maintain sufficient expertise and knowledge of local conditions to design good projects, and often cannot maintain even the administrative continuity necessary for proper oversight of project implementation;
- Lack of predictability – financial disbursements by donors often bear scant relationship to their announced commitments due to administrative snags, disagreements with recipients over implementation progress, etc., making it impossible for national economic managers to predict aid flows or manage their own financial resources effectively;
- Lack of transparency – donor domination of the development agenda means local officials cannot be held to account in a meaningful way by their own legislatures and citizens; and
- Incoherence – different arms of donor governments (e.g. the official development agency versus the export promotion agency versus the diplomatic wing) have different objectives vis-à-vis developing countries, and these different objectives can be in conflict.

At best these systemic problems raise costs and reduce the positive impact of aid; at worst they can contribute to “institutional destruction” and even state collapse.<sup>189</sup>

### **New thinking**

Because of these recognised shortcomings, many in the international assistance community have advocated a thorough re-vamping of aid system. In broad terms, there is an emerging consensus that aid should focus on poverty reduction and the aid system should be restructured so the country is “in the driver’s seat” in terms of setting priorities and policies based on a “holistic perspective” and informed by stakeholder participation. Whenever possible, assistance should be delivered through the recipient government’s own systems, both to keep it in the driver’s seat and to move toward the long-term goal that governments should be accountable first and foremost to their own citizens.

This new thinking underpins the new fashion for Poverty Reduction Strategies, and the PARPA has become the lynchpin for development dialogue in Mozambique. However, implementing this new approach will require reforms to the donor-side of the development dialogue as well; in short, better “donorship”. This has spawned a number of initiatives on

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<sup>188</sup> The costs of negotiating, administering, monitoring, and enforcing agreements.

<sup>189</sup> These problems have been well known for over 20 years. See Morss (1984) on ‘institutional destruction’ caused by project proliferation for an analysis that could have been written yesterday.

harmonisation of donor practices, good humanitarian donorship, limitations on tied-aid, linking relief and development, and many more.<sup>190</sup>

## New modalities

The new consensus is to focus on poverty with the government's own Poverty Reduction Strategy setting the agenda, while recognising that individual donor agencies need to reform their own practices. But in practical terms within a single country, how do donors improve coordination among themselves and with senior policy makers in the recipient government? A number of "aid modalities" are being tried to improve both policy dialogue and the delivery of aid. The main categories are:

- Pooled or basket funding, through which a group of donors working in the same field agree to combine their resources, rather than each administering its own programme. The principal aim is to reduce transaction costs for the developing country. This is not a new concept and, within the mine action field, pooled funding arrangements have long been common. UN trust funds for mine action are, essentially, pooled funding arrangements.
- **Sector Wide Approaches (SWAs)** are designed to formulate a single, government-adopted strategy for a sector (e.g. Health, Education, Agriculture, etc.), which all donors then agree to support with whatever delivery mechanisms are available to them: for example, some donor members of a SWA will still finance distinct projects while others will move to non-project or "programme" aid. The intent is to enhance both (i) coherence and (ii) co-ordination in implementing the strategy, and (iii) to reduce transaction costs by establishing a single monitoring, evaluation, and research agenda.
- Direct budget support, through which a group of donors who accept the recipient government is broadly committed to sound policies aimed at poverty reduction, agrees to channel some assistance through the government treasury, without earmarking these funds for a specific purpose. The government thus is able to allocate donor funds through its own expenditure management system, in line with its own priorities. In exchange, the donor group typically requests an enhanced dialogue with the government,<sup>191</sup> and agreement on how to monitor government expenditures (i.e. to ensure the extra funds are going to public services and investments to reduce poverty rather than, say, to defence).

These different modalities can be used in combination. For example, some donors may agree to pooled funding within a sector once a SWA has been agreed with the government.

## Key issues for Mozambique

The relationship between the GoM and the donor/IFI community has evolved rapidly since the General Peace Agreement. In the immediate aftermath of the conflict, donors dramatically increased their assistance to meet the country's many and urgent needs. However, government capacity was very weak and it was unable to take the lead on the development agenda. By the mid-1990s however, the government's commitment to peace and development was widely acknowledged and many donors provided encouragement and additional support to the planning units in both the Ministry of Planning and Finance and the sector ministries to enable

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<sup>190</sup> Similar initiatives are brewing within the international NGO community.

<sup>191</sup> Generally this type of dialogue emerges in the process of negotiating a shift to budget support.

the government to engage more actively in formulating the country's development strategies at the macro and sectoral levels.

This support has paid many dividends, initially in the form of SWAPs covering a number of sectors (Health, Education, Agriculture, etc.) or sub-sectors (Roads, Water, etc.). This does not mean there were not significant problems along the way. In the Roads sub-sector for instance, the consensus assessment of the first efforts at implementing a more coordinated, government-led approach was negative, in part because of poor coordination among the principal donors. (Montes et al., 2000, p. 44) The Roads sub-sector appears to be far better managed today, but this is the culmination of many years of support by donors. The Health SWAP is another example of the time and effort required on the part of progressive elements among donors and within the GoM to put the first generation of SWAPs in place.<sup>192</sup>

#### **Textbox 15 – The evolution of a SWAP**

An evaluation of the EC Country Strategy for Mozambique summarised the evolution of the SWAP for Health as follows:

*“A sector approach in the health sector has been developing for a number of years, but progress has been slow and competition between donors is reported to have been high. A 1997 assessment argued that the donor working group was ‘large and heterogeneous, more suitable for discussion than joint action’.*

*Milestones in the development of the sector approach include:*

- *1995 Joint Govt/donor audits of MoH finances*
- *1996 Donor coordination group began*
- *1996 Joint donor pool for drugs and TA...*
- *1998 Govt/donor Health Sector Coordination Committee formed, to begin SWAP process, and MoH established Technical Support Unit for Strategic Planning...*
- *June 1999 joint Govt/donor meeting to build consensus on movement towards SWAP...*
- *May 2000 Code of Conduct signed by most donors, calling for common procedures, national pay rates, transparency, gradual move towards budget support, etc.*

*A recent WHO report highlighted a number of significant constraints which remain:*

- *Insufficient consensus within MoH...*
- *Difficulties in MoH/donor relations. Some resistance from the MoH to the close control required by some donors.*
- *Limited capacity within MoH, particularly in strategic planning and in managerial capacity at provincial level.*
- *Disagreements between donors, particularly in assessments of capacity and commitment of MoH.*
- *Limited coordination of the activities of non-State actors.”*

Source: Montes et al, 2000, p. 46.

By 2000, momentum had also emerged for a more radical shift to budget support. From an initial group of four donors, the budget support group grew to seven donors by the end of 2000, 14 by 2004, and currently numbers 16 (referring to itself as the G-16 Programme Aid

<sup>192</sup> One of the avowed objectives of the new aid modalities is to reduce transaction costs. This may be a final outcome, but transaction costs increase during the transition from “old aid” to the new modality.

Partners or PAPs). This group and the GoM have agreed to a set of mutual obligations – a performance assessment framework (PAF) for monitoring government performance<sup>193</sup> and commitments by donors concerning the delivery of programme aid (see Textbox 16 – Commitments by Programme Aid Partners

#### **Textbox 16 – Commitments by Programme Aid Partners**

Article 13 in the Memorandum of Understanding between the GoM and PAPs states:

*PAPs are committed to providing Programme Aid in a way that*

- *Is aligned with Mozambican instruments, processes and systems of financial management, including: (1) Providing assistance for and undertaking dialogue around the PARPA, PES, priority aspects of the PES set out in the PAF, the CFMP and the OE. (2) Using government processes and documentation. (3) Following the government cycle for planning, implementation, monitoring, reporting and funding.*
- *Increases the predictability of the flow of donor funds, including by making multi-year agreements on programme aid, providing GoM with information on Programme Aid commitments in time for the information to be used in policy and budget planning, linking response mechanisms to agreed, realistic targets and indicators, disbursing according to the agreed disbursement schedule and not interrupting in-year disbursement, unless underlying principles are violated.*
- *Ensuring transparency of conditions and funding.*
- *Improving harmonisation by eliminating bilateral conditions and bilateral administrative and reporting requirements (as far as possible given existing legal and statutory requirements, which should be reduced over time).*
- *Lessens the administrative burden of their assistance on GoM by increasingly mounting joint missions, undertaking joint analysis, using joint procedures and by reducing the number of visits and overlapping activities;*
- *Enhances the capacity of the GoM to meet its commitments by providing appropriate technical assistance and capacity building.*

Taken from Gerster and Harding, 2004, p. 7.

One of the implications of the push to general budget support is a realignment of influence within both the donor community and the government. The PAPs in G-16 now have enhanced policy dialogue with senior government officials, marginalising at least some of the donors who cannot or choose not to shift to budget support.<sup>194</sup> On the other side, the Ministry of Planning and Finance has become more powerful within the government, in part because its senior officials are the main interlocutors with the G-16, and in part because budget support puts more resources through the government treasury for allocation through the budget process, rather than directly into sectors. Yet weaknesses of MPF management of the budget cycle do not make it a clear winner, and the newly-announced split of MPF into separate ministries for Finance and Planning may lead to the recovery of lost power by line ministries.

<sup>193</sup> There are two main parts to the PAF; one dealing with progress toward Mozambique's Millennium Development targets and the other with "process indicators" for tracking progress in implementing key reforms agreed through policy dialogue on such items as financial management, decentralisation, and legal sector reform. One of the government's objectives is to tighten the link between the PAF and the social and economic priorities outlined annually in the PES.

<sup>194</sup> However, the non-PAPs include some big donors such as the United States, which may be substantially increasing its aid to Mozambique, and Japan. These are likely to wield significant influence, at least in certain sectors.



## **Summary**

Linking mine action with development requires that MA managers are aware of how development planning and management is done in a country. What are the main planning processes? What level of government is responsible for which decisions? What do managers need to do, when, and with whom to ensure (i) they know what government units will need mine action support in the coming months or years, and (ii) the need for MA services is properly reflected in the various development plans and budgets prepared by the government.

Mozambique is a poor country, heavily dependent on financial assistance from donors and IFIs. Senior officials in the mine action programme also need to be aware of how the international assistance community operates in their country if they expect to be able to explain mine action achievements in ways that speak to donors' priorities.

The international community assisting Mozambique is also experimenting with new ways of working together and with the government. The way aid is managed is changing dramatically, and managers in any aid-dependent sector need to stay informed if they hope to get the resources they require.

To date, mine action managers do not appear to be well informed concerning these three fundamental questions: (i) how does the government arena work? (ii) how does the international assistance arena work inside Mozambique? and (iii) how do the two arenas work together? As a result, the landmine issue is missing from the PARPA and the State Budget.

In addition, national mine action managers seem not to have thought strategically about how to engage more successfully with these two arenas. There is no evidence of outreach to government units that should be allies of the mine action programme, to prepare a compelling case to the core national economic management units for more government resources. There is little evidence that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and IND have sought to strengthen partnerships with mine action donors inside Mozambique, which stands in stark contrast to the strategic and successful approach taken on the international stage with respect to the Ottawa process.





## 6. Assessment of Current Status

### *Socio-economic impacts*

#### **Humanitarian**

The direct humanitarian impact of contamination has been greatly reduced over the past decade, in large part because the resettlement of people in their rural communities is complete and local residents generally are aware of local hazards and how to avoid these. As well, clearing access to essential community assets is almost complete in many regions, and is well advanced in others. However, even after these priority clearance tasks are concluded, there will remain a residual risk due principally to:

- Continuing population movements (e.g. people re-locating communities because of depleted soil fertility, drying-up of shallow wells, migration to roadside sites, etc.);
- Expansion of the economic “footprints” of established communities due to population pressure, depletion of common pool resources in the immediate area, and expansion of economic activities resulting from better access to markets; and
- Increased presence of outsiders (traders, etc.) as access roads reach remote communities.

As well, community development projects could pose ‘life-and-limb’ risks to both project workers and local populations (e.g., excavation work exposing buried landmines and UXO). Finally, should conflict erupt in a neighbouring country, minefields near the borders and in remote areas could pose humanitarian hazards to refugees entering Mozambique.

As noted earlier, deminers may also impose additional humanitarian risks on local communities: directly by spreading HIV/AIDS and STDs; indirectly by improving transportation to remote communities and, hence, exposing them to vectors of infection.

#### **Reconstruction**

In spite of the extensive demining efforts, landmine and UXO contamination still imposes constraints on the continuing reconstruction effort. The scope of this problem remains significant for investments in the rehabilitation or reconstruction of secondary and tertiary roads, railway lines, power distribution grids, etc. because this type of infrastructure was extensively mined during the conflicts. For the most part this is more of a cost than a safety issue, and this cost burden would be reduced if the contamination and clearance records were more complete and accurate.

In some cases at least, the contamination hazards are being addressed by issuing commercial contracts for demining support, with the costs borne by the infrastructure project. This is the most appropriate manner for financing the necessary work as the priorities are reasonably well defined and the work can be monitored by those with a strong incentive for ensuring the efficiency and quality of the demining services.<sup>195</sup>

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<sup>195</sup> For national roads and for the electricity grid, prime contractors are required to include demining sub-contractors (and, sometimes, an external QA firm) in their bid and bear two main risks: (i) liability should a worker or civilian suffer an accident on land demined by the sub-contractor, and (ii) cost overruns due to delays should explosive devices be discovered after mobilising the road construction assets. Regardless of how the prime contractor manages the first type of risk (e.g. by requiring the

## Development

The evidence suggests that landmine and UXO contamination is not a significant problem in forests and other areas which have not yet been exploited for natural resources or settlements. For investments in new infrastructure, therefore, the constraints imposed by suspected contamination will arise mainly when the construction works approach existing infrastructure and settlements. Still, this would include significant areas which are now listed in IMSMA as suspect. As the focus for the infrastructure sectors remains on rehabilitation, a concerted effort by the MA programme in verification surveys to reduce the suspected hazardous areas and a general clean-up of IMSMA data is likely to pay significant dividends once the national development agenda turns to investments in new infrastructure. Should IMSMA records be more reliable, the payoff will be in two forms:

- Cost avoidance, as many infrastructure investments can be re-routed during the design phase to avoid confirmed hazards and the requisite clearance costs; and
- Cost reduction, as expensive demining support services can be more tightly targeted on the areas which are, in fact, contaminated.

Once again, the most appropriate way for large physical development projects to address the landmine and UXO hazard is by internalising the costs within the project budget. When such investments are privately financed, there may be a case for public subsidies or at least for the government to contract directly for external QA services (see Textbox 17 – Public and Private Investments). As well, for reasons of enforcement and other transaction costs, there remains a good case for central financing of demining services in support of small-scale community development investments. Funds could be provided through government's own revenues, general budget support, or a pooled funding arrangement.

### Textbox 17 – Public and Private Investments

The most appropriate way to finance demining in support of large public investments in infrastructure and other physical facilities will generally be to include the cost in the project budget and have the prime contractor assume responsibility for the work. For private investments however, where the removal of hazards will provide broader public goods (i.e. safety and public access, or to promote regional development objectives) that cannot be captured by private investors, there is a proper case for public subsidies, either to: (i) reimburse the private investor for at least part of the actual and reasonable demining costs, or (ii) by government provision of the demining services.

There are some complex policy issues at play in such decisions. For example, a private investor may not have an incentive to ensure clearance or permanent marking of sites adjacent to access roads required for an investment (say to a logging concession). In this case, the government should probably contract directly for external QA to ensure safety standards are enforced and, perhaps, also subsidise a portion of the demining itself.

Mozambique's investment promotion agency should be asked to study the options and prepare policy guidelines for consideration by the GoM.

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sub-contractor and QA firm to carry site liability insurance), the financial implications of the second risk could amount to tens-of-thousands of dollars per day. This is ample incentive to closely monitor the work of the demining sub-contractor.

The findings from the Review Team’s quick survey of a few government units and parastatal bodies yield the following estimates for the medium-term demand for demining services in support of infrastructure reconstruction and development:

	Work program \$millions/year	Estimated for demining	Projected demining costs/year	
			Low	High
<b>National Roads</b>	\$170	2%-5%	\$3.40	\$8.50
<b>Electricity</b>	\$30*	5%-10%**	\$1.50	\$3.00
<b>Railways</b>	\$31	2%-5%	\$0.61	\$1.53
<b>Water</b>	\$200	2%-5%	\$4.00	\$10.00
<b>Small Irrigation</b>	\$5***	2%-5%	\$0.10	\$0.25
<b>Total (in millions)</b>			<b>\$9.61</b>	<b>\$23.28</b>
* Rough estimate for rural distribution network only; ** includes brush clearance; *** four provinces only				

Of course, it would be inappropriate to treat these projections as anything more than suggestive, but clearly they do suggest the market for demining services will be robust over the next decade, and that demining for infrastructure investments – rather than “humanitarian” demining – will constitute mine action’s major contribution to improving the wellbeing of Mozambicans.

## **Extent of Contamination**


It is important to preface this section by stating clearly that Mozambique will not be able to clear all landmine contamination within a foreseeable period of time, let alone by the deadline imposed by the Mine Ban Treaty. ‘Mine free’ status is not a meaningful target in any practical sense, even with substantial increases in resources. Conversely, ‘mine impact free’ is a meaningful and worthwhile target.

One of the shortcomings of the MA programme has been its failure to paint a clear picture of the extent of contamination; this more than three years after the delivery of the LIS results and eleven years after the start of the programme. The most recent figures from IND at the time of the Review Mission<sup>196</sup> showed some 246 km<sup>2</sup> of suspect hazardous area (SHA) – a 56 per cent reduction from the 558 km<sup>2</sup> figure generated by the LIS but still a daunting figure given total clearance of about seven km<sup>2</sup> in 2003. All operators (and the IND itself) are confident that the current IND figures still overstate the true extent of contamination, but what might be a realistic figure?

Further analysis clearly shows that virtually the entire reduction in the SHA estimate is from the region covered by HALO Trust. Using IND figures to compare HALO areas versus the rest of the country gives the following picture. A combination of resurvey and clearance (mostly the former) has allowed HALO to reduce the SHA in the four Northern provinces by 79 per cent, while the SHA has declined by only nine per cent in the rest of the country.


<sup>196</sup> IND subsequently has released its Annual Report for 2004 which shows about 172 km<sup>2</sup> of SHA rather than the 246 km<sup>2</sup> stated here. We have not updated this section to reflect this new SHA estimate as the Annual Report does not contain the detailed figures required for the analysis which follows. The principal results of the analysis are not affected by the updated estimate from IND.

Figure 18 – Reduction in Suspected Contamination (IND data)




Further, a province-by-province breakdown of the data makes it clear that IND has not yet entered all of HALO’s re-survey data, and its current figure still overstates the SHA in the four Northern provinces by a wide margin. IND current data suggest that HALO has reduced the SHA in Cabo Delgado and Nampula by 98 per cent and 95 per cent respectively, but only by 85 per cent in Niassa and 28 per cent in Zambézia. Thus, the SHA figure for the Northern provinces would be far smaller but for the fact that IND has not entered HALO “cancellation” reports for all provinces into IMSMA on a timely basis.

Figure 19 – SHAs in Northern Provinces (IND data)



Accordingly, the Review Team obtained HALO Trust’s data on its latest estimates of SHA, and the following picture emerges (using HALO data for the North, and IND data for the rest of the country). HALO claims to have reduced the SHA by almost 99 per cent through a combination of re-surveying SHA and clearing those confirmed hazards that are now impacting people in these four provinces.

Figure 20 – Reduction in SHA (HALO Trust data)



HALO Trust’s resurvey work has not been subject to external assessment (indeed, IND does not have the capacity to perform such QA), and the Review Team only had time to visit a few sites and check a small sample of HALO Trust’s records. From this limited review, HALO’s approach appears reasonable, and the records it generates provide a far more accurate picture of the extent of contamination than the LIS figures.<sup>197</sup> We are confident that, if re-surveying was pursued systematically in other parts of Mozambique, the area estimates of SHA in those regions would fall dramatically – conceivably by 90 per cent or more from the initial figures generated by the LIS. This suggests the true state of contamination nationally might be as little as 25 km<sup>2</sup> or even less.<sup>198</sup>

It is vital to emphasise that we are not advancing the figure of 25 km<sup>2</sup> as an estimate of the true contamination. Indeed, the state of the clearance and survey data makes it impossible to put forward an estimate for the contaminated area with confidence. Rather, the ten-fold difference between the most recent figure issued by IND and the seemingly plausible figure of 25 km<sup>2</sup> serves as a measure of our ignorance, and emphasises the importance of lessening this ignorance. In a later chapter we recommend that IND and the non-commercial operators agree upon a systematic re-survey programme, with nationwide coverage, to address this important deficiency. However, there remain some questions concerning both the aims and the specific methods for such a re-survey. Ideally, such an effort would provide a clearer picture of both:

- The boundaries of each SHA;
- The socio-economic impact of each SHA and the likelihood that clearance will generate immediate socio-economic benefits to deserving beneficiaries.

HALO Trust re-survey methodology appears to provide more complete reduction and demarcation of SHA, but the Task Impact Assessment approach employed by NPA seems superior for assessing the socio-economic implications and, hence, for establishing priority

<sup>197</sup> Once again, the LIS conducted in Mozambique was not designed to generate accurate estimates of the area suspected of contamination; it was designed to identify the most impacted communities.

<sup>198</sup> ADP states that it also conducted a re-survey in the three Southern provinces, where it now estimates the SHA is about 19 km<sup>2</sup> – only 16 per cent of the figure given by IND as of October 2004, as IND has not entered the new ADP records into IMSMA. The Review Team was not provided with the ADP resurvey data.

rankings for clearance. The two approaches are complementary and it should be feasible to combine both in one re-survey effort, whether with a “hazards” or a “communities” focus.

HALO Trust does not differentiate their costs of survey *per se*, as this activity is part of an integrated approach, which includes task planning in the event an SHA is identified. Although the HALO re-survey methodology and the NPA’s TIA does entail some resources, it seems clear that the returns in terms of enhanced understanding of the contamination problem more than balance the additional costs.

## ***Treaty perspective***

The *Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-personnel Mines* was negotiated to advance multiple objectives. Obviously, humanitarian concerns – particularly for innocent civilians – loomed large. In addition however, the *Convention* promotes the overall disarmament agenda and, even more broadly, the effort by many countries to construct an international system in which the rule of law prevails to constrain the unbridled pursuit of national interests. Thus, proponents of the *Convention* advocate strict adherence to its obligations even where such actions do not serve any immediate humanitarian or developmental purpose.

Article 5 of the *Convention* obliges mine-affected states to:<sup>199</sup>

- Make every effort to identify all areas in its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced (i.e. mined areas) and
- Ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians... (paragraph 2)
- Destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.<sup>200</sup> (paragraph 1)

The *Convention* does not require a State Party to certify that it is mine free – only that it has made “every effort” to identify, mark, and clear mined areas. As well, paragraph 3 of Article 5 makes provision for a State Party to request an extension of up to ten years for clearing the minefields identified.<sup>201</sup>

An additional factor when considering the implication of a request for extension: the *Convention* imposes an absolute obligation on a State Party not to use anti-personnel landmines. Leaving defensive minefields in place along borders would probably be considered “use”.

Three other points should be considered at this juncture:

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<sup>199</sup> These are re-ordered to reflect the logical operational sequence.

<sup>200</sup> For Mozambique, the deadline is 1 March 2009.

<sup>201</sup> Paragraph 4 of Article 5 outlines the information that should accompany a request for extension, which includes “*the preparation and status of work conducted under the national demining programs...[and]...the financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of all the anti-personnel mines in mined areas*”.

- no State Party has yet requested an extension for the deadline on clearance and, as it was one of the first countries to ratify the Convention, such a request by Mozambique would set a precedent (as would the subsequent decision by the States Parties);
- Mozambique has played an active role within the international mine action community, including hosting the first Meeting of States Parties in 1999;
- the regional security and disarmament dimension.

The *Convention* also enjoins States Parties which are in a position to do so to provide financial and technical aid to mine-affected States Parties, assisting the latter in meeting their obligations. As these obligations extend beyond demining for the promotion of immediate humanitarian, reconstruction, and development aims, Mozambique has a right to request further assistance and wealthier States Parties have a duty to at least consider such a request.

It is beyond the mandate of the Review Team to untangle this skein. Suffice to say that the promotion of the aims of the *Convention* entails broad foreign policy considerations for both Mozambique and the other States Parties. As there are no practical means for attaining mine free status, even for the contamination already identified:

- the GoM will need to request an extension;
- there exists a legal obligation on other States Parties to consider the request;
- assuming the GoM also requests further financial and technical assistance, there exists a moral obligation on other States Parties to at least consider this request;
- issues such as disarmament, regional security, and the likely precedent-setting nature of the decisions will be part of the deliberations; and
- consideration will be given to Mozambique's development priorities from a "practical" perspective, but this may not be the decisive factor in donor capitals when arriving at a decision.

## **Summary**

It is clear that the need for mine action in Mozambique should no longer be viewed principally as a response to a humanitarian crisis. Accident and victim numbers are down and the remaining contamination, while not yet fully defined, is manageable. However, it would be entirely wrong to conclude that the need for certain mine action services, particularly for demining, will fall precipitously or (perhaps) at all.

First, "impact free" should not be understood purely as a static concept. A residual threat will remain after the planned departure of the international demining NGOs. Economies and societies are dynamic, particularly in countries such as Mozambique where the economic and population growth rates are so high. These forms of growth cause a rapid expansion in the economic and resource-use "footprints" of communities, particularly in rural areas of countries such as Mozambique where land-extensive agriculture predominates. Residual threats will emerge over time as clear and present dangers that need to be addressed.

Second, government, donors, and development banks are making substantial investments into infrastructure networks. Many infrastructure projects require demining services, particularly when the investment is designed to reconstruct existing infrastructure, which was heavily targeted by both factions during the last phase of the civil wars.



Third, Mozambique still has obligations as a State Party to the *Convention*. The attainment of mine impact free status by the end of 2006 would represent an enormous achievement, but the *Convention* sets an even more ambitious goal of mine free. This will not be achieved in the foreseeable future, and Mozambique will need to request an extension. Further, the continued existence of barrier minefields on some of Mozambique's borders is of particular concern given the absolute prohibition on the further use of landmines by States Parties.

Given its high profile in the Ottawa process, and as one of those in the first cohort of mine affected states to be faced with the prospect of requesting an extension, Mozambique bears a particular responsibility for upholding the aspirations of the *Convention*. Other States Parties may be expected to give close consideration to a responsible request from Mozambique for assistance in support of a responsible plan for meeting its international obligations, even beyond the country's immediate developmental and humanitarian requirements.

The Review Team has characterised Mozambique's remaining mine action challenges as manageable. It must be stressed that "manageable" problems must be managed. Failure to do so would threaten to squander the important achievements made to date, and impose an unnecessary constraint on Mozambique's development and poverty reduction efforts.

## 7. Responding to the Remaining Challenge

This Chapter analyses the nature of the remaining challenges – those apparent today and those likely to emerge in the future due to residual contamination. It also outlines solutions where these are feasible given the current institutional make-up of the mine action programme (i.e. the programme structure plus the legal and regulatory framework in place). There are some unresolved problems, in the sense that there are no readily apparent solution given the current institutional make-up of the mine action programme. Thus, a credible solution will require enhancements to the structure of the mine action programme plus its legal and regulatory framework, which is the subject of the next chapter.<sup>202</sup>

### The Different Challenges and Solutions

The humanitarian and development challenges posed by the remaining contamination can be classified as shown in the following table. For practical purposes, the dividing line between short-term and future would be the end of 2006, when the international NGOs plan to depart. In addition there may be additional requirements relating to compliance with the *Convention* (see Textbox 18 – The *Convention’s* provision against the use of landmines).

Finally, it remains to be seen whether the political systems of some states within Southern Africa will be able to accommodate ethnic and other domestic social tensions, and it remains conceivable that internal conflict could again erupt in the region. This could result in an exodus of refugees into Mozambique, perhaps to sparsely populated areas with landmine contamination that now has little socio-economic impact. Thus, there are reasons to maintain certain mine action capacities within Mozambique as a disaster preparedness measure.

		Short-term: impacts now exist		Future: no current impact	
		1. Humanitarian	2. Development	3. Humanitarian	4. Development
Task	Big Task	NGOs & ADP clearing with grant funding	Best practice (clearance by commercials financed by project budget) in some but not all sub-sectors <sup>203</sup>	Many options for clearance of emergent hazards (but how to finance?)	Clearance should be via commercial tender & financed by project budget
	Small Task	NGOs & ADP clearing with grant funding	Various arrangements but with some important gaps <sup>204</sup>	“Fire brigades” needed to handle residual risks (but how to manage and finance?)	Clearance should be via commercial tender & financed via government systems

<sup>202</sup> In that chapter, recommendations are made to re-structure the mine action programme architecture. As a result, the roles now assigned to the IND may be separated into two distinct organs: a Mozambican Mine Action Authority (M-MAA) and a Mozambican Mine Action Centre (M-MAC). Therefore in the following sections, references to IND may have to be modified in future to M-MAA or M-MAC as appropriate.

<sup>203</sup> For example, the Water Directorate requests IND to arrange both clearance and financing of clearance – a distinctly second-best approach. Best practice should be made national policy.

<sup>204</sup> For example, small-scale irrigation works.

A complete solution to any of the challenges noted in the table requires clarity on the following components:

- Demand – Who is identifying the task that needs to be done? How clearly is the task defined? How much demand for demining services exists?
- Supply – How should a task be assigned to an operator (e.g. competitive tender; ask the humanitarian operator in that region to do it)? How to match supply with demand?
- Financing – Who should pay? What kind of instrument should be used (e.g. contract; grant agreement with a not-for-profit)? How does the financing organisation determine the work has been done to high standard?

Demand, supply, and financing issues are discussed column-by-column in the next sections. In some cases, particularly relating to the future challenges, one or more of these components of a solution remain a matter of conjecture because an adequate solution would require changes to the institutional make-up of the programme. These uncertainties are noted, along with some discussion of the factors that will need to be considered to settle on a solution. However, these are strategic issues and it is premature to define a specific solution for one strategic issue in isolation of the others. What is required is to identify the main strategic issues and to formulate a new strategy for the national mine action programme. Accordingly, the next chapter re-visits these unresolved challenges as part of the discussion on what an adequate strategy needs to incorporate and the process toward the formulation of a new strategy – a Road Map.

#### **Textbox 18 – The *Convention*'s provision against the use of landmines**

It is clear the *Convention* places an absolute restriction on the use of anti-personnel landmines by States Parties. Of course, a traditional use of landmines has been for passive defence – barrier minefields to dissuade incursions by enemy forces. Indeed, large barrier minefields were laid by the Portuguese along the border to Tanzania, and subsequently by FRELIMO along the borders of, first, Zimbabwe and subsequently South Africa when those countries' regimes were supporting RENAMO.

It is unclear the degree to which these minefields presently represent a major humanitarian problem or a constraint on development.\* But even if they are not, their existence along the borders could be considered continued use of anti-personnel landmines by the Mozambican authorities. If so, Mozambique has an obligation to clear them as soon as possible, and no later than 2009.

In addition, should internal conflict erupt in one of Mozambique's neighbours, there could be large and sudden movements of refugees into Mozambique. Border minefields could quickly emerge as a major humanitarian issue. Assessments of the socio-economic impact of such minefields should incorporate a disaster preparedness component.

From discussions held between the team and government representatives (including FADM) in both Maputo and the provinces, there was no indication of any desire to maintain these minefields and, certainly, the FADM representatives appeared keen to assume some of the burden of clearing these areas.

\* The LIS did not show any border communities as heavily impacted; however, Review Team members were advised by one informant that the minefields on the Northern border are a significant concern for the Makonde people. As well, there may have been forced population displacements

involved in which case the Review Team believes strongly that the border minefields represent both humanitarian and development problems.

## Column 1: Existing Humanitarian Impacts

### *Both Large and Small Tasks*

	Who? How to?	Unresolved Issues
<b>Demand</b>	Clear all high & medium impact SHAs; mark the rest	Definition of “mine impact free”; Number & extent of SHAs
<b>Supply</b>	Humanitarian operators	None
<b>Financing</b>	Grants from donors	None

The demining NGOs and ADP are committed to achieving “mine impact free” status within the coming few years. However, each is using its own definition of what impact free implies. The different definitions (some of which are have not been formalised) do not appear to lead to dramatically different outcomes in general, but specific situations may arise where subtle differences in the definition of impact free could lead to decidedly different outcomes for mine-affected communities.

It should be possible to formulate a common definition among the operators, which then could be incorporated as a national standard. Mozambique is one country and its citizens deserve equal treatment. Therefore, the Review Team recommends:

**Recommendation 1 – IND should meet with HALO Trust, NPA, HI, and ADP to discuss their various understandings of the term “mine impact free” (or, better, mine/UXO impact free) and to initiate a process to formulate a common definition, to be adopted as a national standard, which should incorporate the need for a sustainable demining capacity to address the residual threat (i.e. the impacts that will emerge over time).**

Issues:

1. The process followed to declare a community, district, or province “mine impact free” should allow input by government officials at each level, but provide for exceptions should an official be intransigent, refusing to sign-off that the area is impact free when there is no evidence that remaining SHAs present a clear risk to civilians or a constraint on development projects which are ready for implementation within a reasonable period.
2. Impact free should refer to people in communities, districts, provinces, etc. and not to individual SHA in isolation.

For operations planning purposes, and for providing a clear benchmark to inform the strategic discussion process with government and donor officials, it is important to determine in a practical but operationally meaningful sense the extent and distribution of SHA which now pose a risk to live-and-limb and/or constrain development efforts at the local community level. This will require what in Mozambique is commonly termed “technical survey”, but which we believe is better described as “systematic re-survey” (see textbox).

**Recommendation 2 – IND should meet with HALO Trust, NPA, HI, and ADP to:**

- discuss alternative approaches to systematic re-survey,
- agree on either (i) a common approach or (ii) a set of acceptable approaches for undertaking systematic re-surveys that would lead to similar outcomes in terms of

reduced, defined SHAs and to a preliminary classification of all SHA according to the following or a similar schema:

The SHA is now exerting:

- a High impact (economic/risk of accident/both) on a community
  - a Medium impact (economic/risk of accident/both) on a community
  - a Low impact (economic/risk of accident/both) on a community
  - no current impact on a community
- agree on ways and means for re-surveying the country (including all records in IMSMA which have not been re-surveyed) within two-to-three years.

#### Textbox 19 – Re-survey for Mozambique

In Mozambique, the task of systematically re-surveying SHAs is typically termed “technical survey”. What is being done by HALO Trust, NPA, and HI does not appear to be a full Technical Survey as traditionally understood or as implied in IMAS:\* indeed, Technical Survey of every SHA would require additional assets and training and would be an inefficient use of resources.

The Review Team is recommending neither a technical survey of all SHA nor a new (and expensive) LIS. Rather, what would be useful is a systematic process of, over time, re-surveying SHA which are in the LIS database or which have been identified by other means (e.g. reports from communities) in order to:

- first, confirm or deny the existence of the SHA;
- second, for those confirmed, provide a closer assessment of both the SHA boundaries and its apparent impacts to determine whether it should be cleared or marked; and
- third, for those to be cleared, undertake the task planning necessary to undertake clearance in an effective manner (e.g. identification of the assets required, for what duration, etc.). This would *not* require full technical survey.

Such an exercise will, of course, absorb some resources. However, the experience of the operators in Mozambique and elsewhere suggests that the cost of additional surveying is more than balanced by the increased benefits accruing from better task prioritisation (clearing the right SHA) and task planning (deploying the right combination of assets for each task). In Mozambique’s case, benefits will also accrue in terms of better strategic and annual planning at the national programme level as a clearer picture of the extent of hazards emerges.

\* In IMAS 08.20, Technical Survey is defined rather broadly in terms of its purpose: “*The primary aim of a technical survey is to collect sufficient information to enable the clearance requirement to be more accurately defined, including the area(s) to be cleared, the depth of clearance, local soil conditions, and the vegetation characteristics...[to]...enable subsequent clearance operations to be conducted in a safe, effective and efficient manner.*” However, it is generally understood that invasive methods will be used to test for the presence of mines, metal fragments in the soil, etc. and IMAS 08.20 implies that land will often be released (e.g. “*Land released as a result of technical survey shall be of the same confidence level as that would be achieved by clearance.*”)

The full benefits from this exercise will not be garnered in full unless all parties have access to data on SHA that are complete, accurate, and up-to-date.

**Recommendation 3 – IND should meet with all operators to agree upon the information management system to ensure IMSMA data are accurate and up to date, including:**

- (if necessary) redesigned forms to be submitted by demining operators concerning re-surveyed SHAs;
- (if necessary) additional fields in IMSMA to record the better-defined SHA;
- format of reports from the central IMSMA unit back to the operators so they can validate that the new data they have submitted have been entered correctly;
- clear and measurable performance standards<sup>205</sup> for all operators and the central IMSMA unit; and
- formats for monthly reports on progress achieved on the national re-survey and the current figures (broken at least to provincial aggregates) on SHA, and clearance.

We are confident that IND management and staff have the basic capabilities to maintain complete and accurate data on IMSMA. However, if IND is unable to do so within a reasonable period (say, by the end of 2005), the GoM and donors should consider more draconian action, perhaps by contracting out database management to a firm (with, of course, clear performance clauses in the contract). This repository of information is too important to Mozambique – now and in the long term – to be allowed to remain in its current state.

An improved version of IMSMA (version 4.0) will be available from GICHD before the end of 2005. This will incorporate features that will significantly reduce the management burden in co-ordinating data entry from multiple locations, as is done in Mozambique. However, GICHD is supporting IMSMA in 40 programmes, and it will take time before the new version can be installed in each. It is important that Mozambique is toward the head of the queue.

**Recommendation 4 – The IND Director should draft a letter for the Minister’s signature to the GICHD requesting the early installation of the new version of IMSMA at IND (supported by the requisite training for staff), and documenting the reasons why Mozambique should be among the first programmes to benefit from the new IMSMA.**

## Column 2: Existing Developmental Impacts

### Large Tasks

	Who? How to?	Unresolved Issues
<b>Demand</b>	Government units responsible for large infrastructure projects	What is the cut-off between “large” and “small”
<b>Supply</b>	Commercial deminers & QA firms contracted by the prime contractors	Are QA firms always required?
<b>Financing</b>	Included in financing agreement for each project	Not all financing agencies (e.g. World Bank, African Development Bank) have policies re: landmines.

For demining services in support of large infrastructure tasks, best practice comprises the following steps, which are put forward as a recommendation for government-wide adoption:

**Recommendation 5 – The Government of Mozambique should issue a policy statement that, henceforth, provisions for demining services required to support any “large” infrastructure investments shall be as follows:**

- financing for the required demining services will be provided in the budget for the infrastructure rehabilitation, reconstruction, or development project, following consultations with IND on the likely extent of contamination that will be encountered;

<sup>205</sup> An example of a performance standard might be: within one month of receiving an operator's monthly re-survey report, the IMSMA unit shall return the corresponding data entry report to that operator so it can verify that all records have been correctly entered – target performance standard, 98 per cent of records entered completely and correctly.

- tender documents soliciting proposals from potential prime contractors shall specify that all bidders must include in their proposal (i) a demining sub-contractor, currently accredited in Mozambique for landmine and UXO survey, marking, clearance, and disposal, and (ii) a separate Quality Assurance sub-contractor, currently accredited in Mozambique to provide external QA with respect to landmine and UXO survey, marking, clearance, and disposal operations;
- such tender documents shall specify that the successful prime contractor shall be responsible for the efficiency and quality of work done by the demining and QA sub-contractors, and that no claim for additional compensation due to the presence of landmines or UXO shall be entertained;
- these tender documents shall also specify the minimum liability insurance requirements with respect to landmine and UXO contamination for the prime contractor, demining sub-contractor, and QA sub-contractor, as currently specified in national mine action legislation or regulations;
- all tender documents and contracts shall specify the basis of payment (e.g. fixed-price or actual-and-reasonable, plus progress payments) for expenditures related to landmine and UXO survey, marking, clearance, and disposal operations.

Issues:

1. The cut-off point for “large” infrastructure investments requires further discussion – the intent is to allocate responsibilities for demining services to prime contractors whenever this is the most practical option. At some point, such responsibility may represent an unwarranted burden on the management or financing capacities of potential prime contractors, thereby reducing competition and constraining the expansion of otherwise sound small contractors. The cut-off limits used by the World Bank for “international competitive bidding” and “national competitive bidding” may be useful reference points.
2. This recommendation does not imply that the costs of demining services should invariably be met by an agency providing international financing. Such costs could constitute a portion of the contribution to an investment project provided by the GoM.
3. Sub-sectors which are now implementing large infrastructure investment projects without provision for financing any demining services that may be required (e.g. water, railways) should continue to seek assistance as early as possible from IND, so that agency can identify operators and, where necessary, grants for the demining services. This should, however, be considered an interim measure for projects that have already advanced to a stage where the project financing arrangements have been agreed.

**Recommendation 6 – The Government of Mozambique should advise The World Bank, other development banks, and other agencies providing financial credits for large infrastructure projects that:**

- Professional assessments of landmine and UXO contamination issues must be made during the project design phase, and
- Adequate provision for possible demining expenses must be incorporated into the financing plan for such projects.

**Textbox 20 – Engaging the World Bank in Mine Action**

In the recent past, some public agencies in Mozambique have been advised by World Bank project task managers that the Bank does not finance landmine and UXO clearance. Whether this was ever true in the past, this is not the current policy of The World Bank.

The World Bank first became involved in financing mine action activities in the mid-1990s, with loans to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina following the break-up of Yugoslavia. Facing

this new challenge, the Bank issued the *Demining: Operational Guidelines for Financing Landmine Clearance* in 1997.\*

The Bank’s charter restricts it to financing reconstruction and development activities (the official name of the oldest and largest part of The World Bank is The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development – IBRD). Accordingly, it cannot provide assistance for humanitarian programmes. Other provisions in its guidelines include:

- Landmine clearance must be an integral part of a development investment – the Bank supports reconstruction and development, not landmine clearance *per se*.
- Landmine clearance should be justified on economic grounds.
- Implementation must be under the control of civilian authorities.

That being said, problems with its landmine projects in Bosnia led to an evaluation finding that the Bank does not have a “comparative advantage” in landmine clearance\*\* – which many staff would interpret as a warning that loans for landmine clearance would not advance their career prospects. Some loans were provided in exceptional cases, but most country programmes were wary of mine action for some years.

However, faced with continuing requests, the Bank’s Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction (CPR) Unit prepared a more extensive *Task Manager’s Guide*\*\*\* in 2003. In 2004, a group of donors and mine-affected countries, supported by UNDP, arranged a meeting with senior officials in the Bank to encourage its more active engagement in financing landmine clearance in support of reconstruction and development. The Bank’s management responded constructively to that approach, and James Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank, approved another publication\*\*\*\* signalling the management’s endorsement for financing landmine clearance in support of reconstruction and development activities.

Sources: \*World Bank, 1997, *World Bank Operational Guidelines for Financing Landmine Clearance*, 7 February, Washington, DC.

\*\* Alicia Kreimer et al, 1998, *The World Bank’s Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, World Bank.

\*\*\* Buré, J. and P. Pont, 2003, “Landmine Clearance Projects: Task Manager’s Guide,” *Social Development Papers, Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction*, CPR Working Paper No. 10, Washington, DC: World Bank

\*\*\*\* World Bank, 2004, “Landmine Contamination: A Development Imperative,” *Social Development Notes, Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction*, CPR Notes No. 20, Washington, DC

### Small Tasks

	Who? How to?	Unresolved Issues
<b>Demand</b>	Government units responsible for small infrastructure work programmes	How many such units are there? How many tasks are required?
<b>Supply</b>	Humanitarian operators; FADM; Ronco-QRDF; possibly commercial deminers	Will humanitarian operators accept the tasks? Is there enough capacity?
<b>Financing</b>	Donor grants; GoM contributions for FADM +/-or commercial deminers	How to manage GoM contributions?

Concerning smaller investment projects, the critical issue in the short term is to identify and eliminate gaps in the provision of demining services required for such rehabilitation and development projects. Policies of avoidance, such as currently practiced by some government units responsible for community infrastructure, mean that Mozambican citizens in mine-



affected communities are twice damned – suffering both from the contamination and from the unwarranted withholding of public investments that would enhance prosperity.

It is urgent that all situations in which development investments have been avoided because of contamination concerns are identified quickly, while substantial demining capacity remains in the country and while donors are still providing earmarked grants for mine action: if anything, higher priority should be given to providing such development investments in mine-affected communities while adequate funding and demining capacity is in place.

**Recommendation 7 – IND should immediately initiate a systematic outreach programme to all public sector agencies which undertake or promote development investments:**

- **To ensure all such agencies are aware of the extent and impact of mine and UXO contamination on their planned development investments, and of the mine action services available; and**
- **For agencies which do not have clear policies in place for addressing contamination concerns in an appropriate manner, or which are lacking systems to ensure these policies are followed, to develop a clear, time-delimited plan to:**
  - **inventory all development investments which have been avoided because of contamination concerns;**
  - **develop a joint plan with the agency concerned to schedule both the demining services and the development investment;**
  - **assist these agencies in formulating the necessary policies and implementing systems to ensure these policies are followed; and**
  - **agree on periodic meetings to review the agency’s investment programme, identify possible contamination concerns, and initiate demining services to address these contamination concerns.**

It may prove that the demand for demining services in support of smaller infrastructure projects will exceed the capacity that can be mobilised by the demining operators paid by donor grants (humanitarian operators; Ronco-QRDF; some of FADM costs) or the GoM (FADM soldiers pay etc.). In this case, a mechanism is required to contract commercial demining and QA firms and of course to pay them. This cannot be determined until IND completes the survey of government units and inventory of projects. Should commercial firms be required in the short-term, the contracting and financing issues (e.g. pooled funding with a tender board) need to be addressed as part of the formulation of a new strategy, as discussed in the next chapter.

### **Column 3: Dealing with Future Humanitarian Impacts**

Here, “large tasks” relate to standard minefield clearance operations, while “small tasks” suggest UXO or spot demining done by mobile Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams – sometimes referred to as “fire brigades”. The unresolved issues are similar for both types of challenges, and so they are discussed together.

**Large Tasks**

	<b>Who? How to?</b>	<b>Unresolved Issues</b>
<b>Demand</b>	Growing communities when they begin to encounter minefields that used to have no impact.	How big will the demand be? How & to whom do communities in need communicate their need?
<b>Supply</b>	Standard mine clearance platoons.	What type of demining operator?
<b>Financing</b>	Unknown	Who will fund? What contracting instrument should be used?

### Small Tasks

	Who? How to?	Unresolved Issues
<b>Demand</b>	Communities that discover UXO or arms caches.	How big will the demand be? How & to whom do communities in need communicate their need?
<b>Supply</b>	Fire brigade EOD teams	What type of demining operator?
<b>Financing</b>	Unknown	Who will fund? What contracting instrument should be used?

It is impossible to predict how much future demand there will be for either EOD “fire brigade” response for small tasks, or for standard demining operations because larger minefields begin to pose a humanitarian concern. A better assessment will be possible following the completion of the proposed systematic re-survey. Future demand will also depend on the precise definition adopted for “mine impact free” and the timing of withdrawal by HALO Trust, NPA, and HI. A third and perhaps the most important question is whether adequate channels are in place for local communities to call on assistance from the appropriate organisations. The best mechanism for this would probably involve communities requesting EOD or demining assistance from the district administrator, but then what organisation would respond, how would it be contracted, who would pay for the work, and how would the work be monitored?

On the supply side, the management of specialised public services to Mozambique’s widely dispersed communities has proven to be an extremely difficult challenge, and probably exceeds the current capacity of the public service. However, contracting-out options would not be easy to manage either. The geographic dispersion of relatively small tasks, coupled with the requirement for timely response when public safety is at risk, make contracting on a task-by-task basis infeasible.

Conversely, payment of a fixed fee to provide such a service for a period of time leaves insufficient incentive for operators to devote adequate effort to maintain “readiness” (e.g. equipment and vehicle maintenance), or to respond on a timely basis to all requests for assistance. Some sort of financial bonus could be integrated into a contract to bolster the incentives for high performance, but there appears to be no ready mechanism for monitoring performance in providing public services over large areas.<sup>206</sup>

Similar albeit slightly more manageable concerns exist concerning how to supply more standard minefield clearance services to address emergent risks (i.e. the expansion of a community’s economic footprint brings residents into contact with a minefield that previously had little impact). In areas where district administrators are well informed and responsive to community requests, there would be ample lead time to notify the mine action authorities to address the problem. The issues then are how to: (i) assign the work (e.g. via competitive tender) (ii) finance the work and (iii) monitor performance of the demining organisation.

<sup>206</sup> In some countries, donors have engaged local NGOs to monitor levels of public service delivery at the community level (e.g. surprise visits to village health clinics to check these have a supply of essential drugs on hand; random visits to village schools to see whether teachers are present and giving instruction). This does not seem to be happening in Mozambique, perhaps because there is little tradition of civil society organisations of this type: with a few exceptions local NGOs tend to be small, with limited geographic reach. (See Lucas et al., 2004, *Research on the current state of PRS monitoring systems*, especially pp. 14-19)

The typically small humanitarian tasks that we can safely predict will emerge in the future represent precisely the type of situation in which well-established international demining NGOs enjoy a comparative advantage. The geographic dispersion of the tasks makes it difficult and costly to monitor the performance of any organisation, but well-established international demining NGOs combine technical capacity, not-for-profit status, and clear governance and accountability structures. As a result, donors trust that such organisations will have reasonably effective systems for self-monitoring.<sup>207</sup> The planned withdrawal of HALO Trust, HI, and NPA will leave a very real gap.

It is possible that local demining not-for-profits – a transformed ADP or an association of demining staff laid-off following the withdrawal of the international NGOs – could fill this gap. Such organisations would, of course, have to demonstrate the requisite technical and managerial skills. But they would remain at a distinct disadvantage unless they adopt statutes that self-impose far higher standards for integrity, governance, and transparency than are required by Mozambique’s legislation for associations or foundations. Otherwise, they will almost certainly face difficulties in resource mobilisation.<sup>208</sup> (See Textbox 21 – Contracts or Grants? Firms or NGOs? National or International?)

**Textbox 21 – Contracts or Grants? Firms or NGOs? National or International?**

Prolonged conflicts have lasting effects on societies, in part because the rule of law breaks down, opening the door to corruption. Understandably, donor officials are wary of corruption, and their decisions concerning which organisations to fund reflect this “risk aversion”, as well as their perceptions concerning competence, costs, national ownership, and so on. One researcher\* has put forward a simple “corruption formula” as follows:

$$\textit{Discretion minus accountability = corruption}$$

Thus, a useful way of analysing the risk of corruption is to consider the amount of discretion left to organisations, as well as the mechanisms in place to make such organisations account for how they have used the resources provided to them.

Recent studies by GICHD\*\* illustrate how discretion and accountability concerns affect funding decisions in the mine action field. In demining for example, the principal types of discretion (and the associated risks of corruption or malfeasance) are:

1. Discretion in setting task priorities (e.g. which land will be cleared first) – there is a danger that clearance decisions will reflect private interests rather than the public good;
2. Discretion in reporting (e.g. on quantities of land cleared) – if demining organisations are paid on the basis of areas cleared, there are risks they will claim to have cleared more than they have in fact done;
3. Discretion in determining the area required for clearance – if demining organisations are paid on the basis of areas cleared, there are risks they will clear larger areas than are required;
4. Discretion in the quality of clearance (e.g. whether SOPs and national standards are

<sup>207</sup> Donors will still externally monitor whether the NGOs have adequate financial and quality management systems in place for self-monitoring, but this is a far less onerous challenge than externally monitoring all demining tasks.

<sup>208</sup> Concern about resource mobilisation has, of course, been one of the major impediments to progress in implementing the transition of ADP into a distinct legal entity.

followed completely) – if demining organisations are paid or judged on the basis of areas cleared, there is a risk they will take shortcuts to increase productivity, magnifying the risk to deminers and civilians.

When would these types of discretion not be a great concern? Obviously, corruption risks are minimal when some appropriate authority sets the demining priorities, the area of each task can be clearly defined, and the quality of clearance operations can be readily monitored. When these conditions are present, the best way to allocate demining work is via competitive tender – competition will keep costs down, while tasks, areas, and quality standards can be defined in a contract and easily enforced.

A good illustration is the process adopted by ANE for the reconstruction of major roads and bridges. ANE sets the priorities, based on its schedule of roads projects. The areas to be demined are clearly defined (the length of road times the width required from the centre line). The responsibility for monitoring can be left to the prime contractor, as this firm will have to bear significant costs if its work crews are delayed by missed mines or UXO, so it will closely monitor the quality of demining (and may even engage a specialist QA firm to do this).

In countries such as Mozambique, this neat solution often cannot be employed. Consider the broad task of making a province mine impact free. There are many SHAs in many communities, so it is unclear how best to set priorities and which organisations have the authority and expertise to do so. Many of the SHA are ill defined in area, so it is folly to pay based on area cleared. Many of the impacted communities are remote, making monitoring of clearance quality both difficult and expensive.

In such a situation, some donors will only fund demining organisations which are “inherently trustworthy” such as well-established international NGOs. These are not motivated by profit, but more importantly they live on their reputations – without continued support from donors and, ultimately, their members, international NGOs have no means of sustaining themselves. They must protect their reputations and will take care both in task selection and the quality of clearance. As well, the typical contracting arrangement will be a grant agreement to pay for an agreed set of assets for a period of time – rather than a contract to clear specified tasks, which (first) would be difficult to monitor and (second) would add an incentive that would reward higher productivity, perhaps at the risk of reduced safety standards.

While international NGOs perform valuable roles in mine action, it still would be ideal if local people identified the priorities and if the demining tasks could be assigned by competitive tenders, both to get the lowest price and to encourage the growth of local firms and NGOs (which may not have established reputations or statutes that require high standards of integrity, governance, and transparency and, hence, are not “inherently trustworthy”). National mine action authorities are established in large part to create local systems for establishing priorities and, then, to hold individual operators to account by undertaking QA activities. However, local systems for establishing priorities may not be transparent (i.e. some individual or organisation still has significant discretion and little accountability), and QA regulations replace some forms of discretion with new ones, specifically:

5. Discretion in enforcing regulations – staff in the national authority could abuse their authority by, say, demanding bribes before awarding licenses or clearance certificates; and
6. Discretion in setting the regulations – the national authority could set unreasonable or ill-defined standards precisely to create more opportunities for soliciting bribes or, say, for

favouring national firms over foreign organisations.

Thus, while the ideal is for legitimate national authorities to set priorities and for tasks to be assigned by competitive tender, it is difficult to reach this ideal. Lack of knowledge of the extent of SHAs plus difficulties in monitoring work in remote areas means many donors will prefer to fund “trustworthy” international NGOs. Missing or poorly written mine action legislation, standards, and SOPs leave too much discretion in the hands of local officials, and donors or local citizens may find it difficult to monitor the decisions of such officials where accountability mechanisms are weak.

\* Robert Klitgaard. See for example *Combating Corruption*, United Nations Chronicle, online edition, available at <<http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/1998/issue1/0198p90p.html>>

\*\* *A Study of Local Organisations in Mine Action*, forthcoming, GICHD, Geneva

In brief, this remains an unresolved problem. There is no straightforward solution which promises to be effective to organising and financing future tasks needed to address humanitarian concerns given the current status and plans of the organisations in the mine action programme. A deeper strategic analysis of options for enhancing the programme’s institutional make-up (i.e. its composition and structure plus the legal and regulatory framework) is required before a credible solution can be determined. While this must eventually involve the principal stakeholders and, particularly, the GoM, the next chapter of this report lays out some options for this and other unresolved problems.

## Column 4: Dealing with Future Developmental Impacts

### Large Tasks

	Who? How to?	Unresolved Issues
<b>Demand</b>	Government units responsible for large infrastructure projects	What is the cut-off between “large” and “small”
<b>Supply</b>	Commercial deminers & QA firms contracted by the prime contractors	Are QA firms always required?
<b>Financing</b>	Included in financing agreement for each project	Not all financing agencies (e.g. World Bank, African Development Bank) have policies re: landmines.

Once again, for larger infrastructure projects best practice has already been adopted within some sectors in Mozambique, and the principal requirement is for the GoM to issue a policy statement to make this standard practice. Recommendations 4 and 5 above address this issue.

### Small Tasks

	Who? How to?	Unresolved Issues
<b>Demand</b>	Government units responsible for small infrastructure work programmes	None after IND completes outreach & project inventory as per recommendation 6?
<b>Supply</b>	Many options	How best to manage the supply of demining services?
<b>Financing</b>	Many options	Who will fund? What contracting instruments should be used?

Once the grant-financed humanitarian operators exit (or are transformed), the situation is somewhat more complex concerning smaller infrastructure projects, for two principal reasons:

- Transaction costs will be relatively high if tenders must be issued for demining support on each small infrastructure project;
- Firms bidding to serve as the prime contractor on smaller projects may not have the financial resources to obtain insurance to cover residual risks, or the expertise to identify and manage specialised firms to provide the demining services.

These problems could be addressed if IND works more closely with the public agencies responsible for planning the work programmes in the relevant sub-sectors (small scale irrigation; secondary road maintenance; district roads rehabilitation; etc.) to formulate joint annual work plans. This would allow IND or a specialised procurement agency to combine a number of small infrastructure projects into larger packages (e.g. by province or by sub-sector) for tendering. For example, tender packages could be issued for demining services to support all small infrastructure projects planned for each province in the coming year. Similarly, tenders could be issued for the provision of independent QA services to monitor this work.

Thus, the implementation of recommendation 6 will make it feasible to establish some system to manage competitive tenders for demining services in support of smaller infrastructure projects. This would represent an important reform to the institutional make-up of the mine action programme; a topic covered in the next chapter. Another issue, of course, is how to pay for demining in support of smaller infrastructure works, and we now turn to the issue of financing mine action in the future.

## Financing Mine Action in the Future

Although grant funding has been reasonably steady to date, there has been a clear fall-off in the numbers of donors financing mine action as a distinct activity. While records are incomplete, the Review Team has compiled the following table, which is indicative of the trend. From this list of donors, the number providing distinct support for the mine action programme in Mozambique has fallen from 17 in the past to 13 as of last year (see table on the following page). It appears set to decline this year and in the future, although there is some uncertainty as many donors have not made their programming decisions past the current year or next. While some of the largest donors (EC, Japan, US) have not ruled-out assistance in the medium- to long-term, this trend has implications for the level of donor support in the future.

At the same time, the recorded financial contributions from GoM have been middling. While these appear to be increasing, they still represent a tiny proportion of the total financing to the programme. However, GoM records do not include the salaries and core costs related to FADM deminers, nor (and more importantly) the obligations undertaken to finance major infrastructure projects. The Review Team has not attempted to account for recent expenditures on demining services in support of infrastructure projects, but the our partial survey of planned infrastructure work programmes suggests the market for commercial demining services could be in the range of \$9+ million per annum over the coming decade.

Another consideration is that, while some past donors will not fund mine action as a distinct activity in the future, they will continue to fund development projects and many of these could incorporate demining in a support role. Of course, as discussed earlier, some public sector agencies are basically “managing” any contamination problems by avoiding them, leaving the citizens in mine-affected communities twice damned. Donors that fund the work of these agencies may be unaware that this is happening.

	Pre-2004	2004	2005	2006	After 2006
Austria	X	X	X	?	
Australia	X				
Belgium			X	X	?
Canada	X	X	X	X	
Denmark	X	X	X	?	
EC	X	X	X	X	?
Finland	X				
France	X	X	X	?	
Germany	X				
Ireland	X	X	X	?	
Italy	X	X	?		
Japan	X	X	X	X	?
Netherlands	X	X	Global support for NGOs not specific to Mozambique		
Norway	X	X	X	X	?
Sweden	X	X			
Switzerland	X	X			
UK	X				
USA	X	X	X	X	?
<b>Totals</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>10-11</b>	<b>5-10</b>	<b>Up to 5</b>

The GoM could adopt policy measures to ensure adequate amounts of development aid are provided for demining, thus leveraging-in additional funds for mine action. At the least, the GoM could announce clearly that its policy is to give equal treatment to citizens in mine-affected communities and that suspected landmine or UXO contamination should not be a reason for avoiding these communities' needs for investments in community infrastructure (such as small irrigation dams). The government could then ask donors to apply this policy in their development projects,<sup>209</sup> whether implemented by public agencies, NGOs, or firms, and to include funds for the necessary demining services within their project budgets.

The GoM could go further by adopting a clear policy that, as a poverty reduction measure, mine-affected communities should receive a degree of preference when formulating work plans for community or area development projects. Once again, the government would then have to request donors to apply this policy and to include funds for demining in their project budgets.<sup>210</sup> In this case, IND and demining operators would need to identify which mine affected-communities could benefit from which type of development investment. The Task Impact Assessment employed by NPA might, with modest adjustments, be the most useful approach for accomplishing this task.

**Recommendation 8 – The GoM should adopt a clear policy – and communicate this to both public sector units and to donors – concerning the priority given to mine-affected communities when planning and implementing community or area development work programmes and aid projects. Two reasonable policy options exist; either...**

- **equal treatment – communities should not be penalised by the presence of landmine or UXO contamination and, if a community would benefit substantially from a small-scale**

<sup>209</sup> The government should also ensure that public sector units apply the policy.

<sup>210</sup> The same should apply for the relevant SWAp and pooled funding arrangements. However, in these cases the government policy vis-à-vis mine-affected communities would need to be incorporated into the sector plan (for SWAp) or agreed upon by the group of donors pooling their funds.

**investment, the additional cost of demining support should not be used as a reason for withholding that investment;<sup>211</sup> or...**

- **priority treatment – the needs of mine-affected communities for small-scale investments would receive priority attention when planning and implementing community and area development projects.**

Of course as “mine/UXO impact free” status is reached, requirements for grant financing of mine action as a distinct activity will not be as burdensome as in the past, particularly if the costs of demining services in support of major infrastructure, community development, and area development projects are consistently built-into the individual project budgets as the Review Team has recommended. While the financing gap cannot be estimated at this time, the categories of needs that will depend on grants distinctly for mine action or the government’s own resources can be identified clearly, as follows:

1. Humanitarian demining (EOD and minefield clearance) to address the residual risk after the planned departure of the international NGOs at the end of 2006;
2. Demining services in support of small infrastructure investments which are not financed by donor-funded projects, or where donors do not provide funds for demining services in support of their projects.<sup>212</sup>

On average, the size of the tasks will be small while the task locations will be widely dispersed. This implies that transaction costs (negotiating and enforcing contracts at all levels) are likely to be high at best, and it will be vital to devise a mechanism that minimises these to the extent possible. This suggests some sort of pooled funding arrangement (government and donor funds), with a Mine Action Tender Board. Thus, a solution is feasible assuming such a pooled funding scheme and a tender board arrangement are added to the institutional make-up of the mine action programme. We return to the issue in the penultimate Chapter.

## **Estimating Future Financial Requirements and Sources**

Future financing requirements must be derived from an assessment of the future needs. As discussed in the previous chapter, a complete picture of the future needs cannot be formulated at this time – additional work is required to (i) complete the systematic re-survey of SHA (as per recommendation 2) and (ii) complete the inventory of public sector units that may require demining services in support of their work programmes (as per recommendation 6). The following table illustrates how a financing plan could be developed as better data on the needs is generated.

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<sup>211</sup> In the language of cost-benefit analysis, the “shadow price” of such demining services would be set at zero as a matter of government policy.

<sup>212</sup> This could often be the case for existing projects and for those well-advanced in the planning pipeline. As well, some donors may have their own policy restrictions that preclude them financing demining (e.g. policies to avoid residual risks).



<b>Future financing requirements and sources:</b>	
<b>3. Humanitarian</b>	
<b>4. Development</b>	
<b>Big Task</b>	<p><u>Requirement</u> – roughly \$x million/year (for area demining)                      Financing sources (could be pooled fund):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Government own funds,</li> <li>• Donor grants</li> </ul>
<b>Small Task</b>	<p><u>Requirement</u> – roughly \$x million/year (for “fire brigade” EOD teams)                      Financing sources (could be pooled fund):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Government own funds,</li> <li>• Donor grants</li> </ul>
	<p><u>Requirement</u> – roughly \$x million/year                      Financing sources:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Government own funds,</li> <li>• Loans taken by the GoM,</li> <li>• Donor grants</li> </ul>
	<p><u>Requirement</u> – roughly \$x million/year                      Financing sources:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Donor grants (part of community/ area development project)</li> <li>• Pooled fund for other small invest.                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Donor grants</li> <li>○ GoM</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

Broken like this, some speculative estimates could be offered for the various categories. Given the current state of knowledge however, huge assumptions need to be made and this exercise is again intended mainly to illustrate how a financing plan might be formulated.

#### Humanitarian

- Assumption 1 – once HALO Trust, HI, and NPA withdraw after “mine impact free” status is reached (and ADP has made significant progress toward that goal in the South), assume that a local demining NGO somewhat larger than ADP today can meet the residual demand for humanitarian demining.<sup>213</sup> IND figures show ADP expenditures averaged about \$2.7 million over 2002 and 2003, but this appears not to have included adequate provision for re-equipping and to build a fund to cover the eventual costs of retrenchment. Assume \$4 million.
- Assumption 2 – three-quarters of the annual costs will be for small tasks requiring rapid response by small and mobile EOD teams (“fire brigades”). These teams will require new equipment and training at a start-up capital cost of \$1.5 million.
- Assumption 3 – Other start-up costs for establishing regional offices plus re-equipping the traditional demining teams are modest (\$0.5 million) as some facilities and equipment from the international NGOs are transferred to the new local NGO.
- Assumption 4 – Donor grants cover all start-up costs and one-half of the annual costs.
- Total costs: Start-up – \$2 million; annual – \$4 million (\$3 million for EOD teams; \$1 million for traditional demining teams)

#### Development

- Assumption 1 – The lower-end figures for Roads, Railways, Electricity, and Water represent the total demand for demining services in support of large infrastructure projects. These total approximately \$9 million per year.
- Assumption 2 – Development loans finance two-thirds of the demining costs in support of large infrastructure investments (\$6 million) and donor grants cover \$1 million per year.
- Assumption 3 – Demining services in support of small-infrastructure investments are half as big as for large infrastructure investments – i.e. \$4.5 million per year.
- Assumption 4 – Donor-financed projects cover two-thirds of the costs of small infrastructure projects (\$3 million per year)

<sup>213</sup> FADM might also contribute to this task, but this is not factored into the calculations.

Using these rather heroic assumptions, donor grants earmarked to mine action would cover start-up costs of \$2 million. Annual costs of the demining programme would then be in the range of \$17.5 million, with financing broken as follows:

	Donor grants		GoM	
	To Mine Action	Development projects	Development loans	Own funds + budget support
Large humanitarian	\$0.5			\$0.5
Small humanitarian	\$1.5			\$1.5
Large infrastructure		\$1.0	\$6.0	\$2.0
Small infrastructure		\$3.0		\$1.5
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$2.0</b>	<b>\$4.0</b>	<b>\$6.0</b>	<b>\$5.5</b>

A number of additional comments are required at this stage:

- First, these speculative figures do not include the costs of IND (or a possible Mozambique Mine Action Centre, as discussed in the penultimate Chapter).
- Second, the total cost of demining services (\$17.5 million per year) required appears to be approximately the same as in recent years.
- Third, the purpose of demining is dramatically different that in recent years, with the bulk (\$13.5 million per year) going to support development and only \$4 million per year (23 per cent) for humanitarian demining to address the threat emerging from residual contamination.
- Fourth, the financing of the annual programme costs also would be dramatically different than today.
- Fifth, the required financing seems feasible, even with the prospect of reduced donor funding for mine action as a distinct activity, provided the GoM adopts policy measures to lever-in development financing (grants and concessional loans) to pay for demining services in support of development programmes.
- Sixth, the above analysis does not fully cover the likely requirement for clearance of border minefields to meet *Convention* obligations and as a disaster preparedness measure.

A final point needs additional emphasis. **The viability of all that has been described above will hinge on the institutional make-up of the mine action programme, and the performance of its key organs** (and we later recommend a national authority and a Mozambican Mine Action Centre).

## ***Linking with Development Management***

The mine action programme and the problems of landmine and UXO contamination are not given due recognition in the key macro instruments for development and expenditure management: the PARPA and the State Budget. The second PARPA, to cover 2006-2010, is to be adopted by November this year, while the estimates for the State Budget will be formulated before then. It is essential that IND become actively engaged in the processes to formulate these documents.

Given the recent split of Planning and Finance into two ministries, the division of responsibilities for orchestrating the PARPA process remains unclear, but clearly the budget directorate in Finance will retain the lead role in formulating the State Budget and (probably)

the medium-term fiscal framework as well, which should be reflected in the financing plan for the PARPA.

**Recommendation 9 – IND should, with the utmost urgency, compile its case for (i) adequate reflection of the national mine action programme and of landmine and UXO contamination as a cross-cutting issue in the PARPA for 2006-2010 and (ii) the allocation of additional financial support for mine action from resources available to the government treasury.**

The discussion in Chapter 3 and 4 should make it abundantly clear that the contribution of mine action to Mozambique's national development and to poverty reduction cannot be explained in terms of areas cleared or the numbers of landmine and UXO accidents. Rather, the major contribution today, and for the foreseeable future, is in providing high quality demining services to government units responsible for infrastructure work programmes: a secondary contribution is through demining services in support of local development and human security at the community level.

Thus, presentation of the mine action programme solely in terms of a cross-cutting issue or a matter of human security would not only be inadequate but also inaccurate. The need for demining services should first be reflected in the sector and sub-sector plans for transportation, water, power, agriculture, rural development, and so on, and only then second as a cross-cutting issue in a separate section. The section on mine action as a cross-cutting issue should focus primarily on how the programme will provide high-quality and timely demining services to the government units in charge of infrastructure investments and to local communities and authorities for community development: the secondary focus would be on maintaining adequate security from landmine or UXO accidents.

This approach also should be more successful in making the case for additional budget resources from GoM. The “stand-alone” case for additional resources to IND is, quite frankly, weak. The case for additional GoM resources for mine action in support of national infrastructure and community development programmes is far more compelling. The government units responsible for delivering these programmes are the natural allies of the MA programme, and IND needs to enlist their support to make the proper case for mine action.

**Recommendation 10 – As part of its outreach to government units (as per recommendation 7), IND should encourage and assist those units to reflect their requirements for demining services into their briefs during PARPA consultations and their budget submissions.**

Needless to say, this should not be a one-time exercise; rather, this outreach and consultation process should be a central element of the IND annual work programme. It is the basis for demonstrating the link between mine action and development, and for assessing whether the existing capacities of the MA programme are adequate to support the country's development.

Note that this also implies that the bulk of the public financial resources required for mine action need not, and probably should not, appear in the budget for IND. These could appear, say, in the budgets of the directorates for roads and bridges, water, small scale irrigation, etc. One of IND's tasks then would be to compile these figures for reporting to government and to mine action donors so they have a picture of how much development funding is being levered-into demining, and can better gauge how much support IND requires to inform development planners and facilitate the provision of the requisite demining services.

## HIV/AIDS

The Review Team has made very specific recommendations concerning contract provisions for demining services in support of major infrastructure projects. In addition, all tender documents should specify that all personnel employed by demining or QA sub-contracting shall be required to have a certificate of completion for an HIV/AIDS awareness course, or some equivalent provision. Finally, all demining operators should be required to institute similar measures: in some cases, these could be specified in grant agreements with, say, the international NGOs, FADM, etc., and become part of the National Mine Action Standards.

The Review Team was unable to investigate the detailed procedures used by ANE or the best practice provisions recommended by the HIV/AIDS Council of Mozambique. Therefore, we leave this as a last recommendation for immediate action.

**Recommendation 11 – The Director of IND should meet with, at least, representatives of ANE and of the HIV/AIDS Council of Mozambique to identify best practice provisions relevant to the needs of the mine action sector. Following discussions with operators and other interested stakeholders, he should then:**

- **have these best practices incorporated into the National Mine Action Standards; and**
- **communicate in writing to all mine action donors requesting them to take appropriate measures to ensure that all future funding agreements with mine action organisations specify the adoption of these best practices.**

## Summary

The organisations within the mine action programme are already dealing appropriately with humanitarian contamination problems that are apparent. Indeed, the current institutional make-up of the programme was put in place to address precisely this type of problem, and it is within sight of an important milestone – mine impact free status – which represents a substantial achievement. Some work still is required to agree on a more precise definition of “impact free” (which should incorporate UXO as well as sustainable capacity to address residual risk), and in documenting the true extent of SHA, and recommendations have been made in this regard.

Some public sector bodies responsible for major infrastructure work programmes have devised excellent policies and procedures to address any problems posed by contamination. Work is required to determine what other government work programmes are affected by landmine and UXO contamination, and to ensure that they are addressing these problems and are aware that assistance is available. Recommendations have been made in this regard and, more generally, concerning the steps required to link the mine action programme more tightly to the country’s development effort.

Some types of contamination problems that will be faced in the future cannot be addressed adequately given the current institutional make-up of the mine action programme. The strategic thinking concerning how to enhance this institutional make-up will need to embrace these types of contamination problems, which is the subject of the next Chapter.

The following table summarises the analysis to this stage.

		<b>Short-term: impacts now exist</b>		<b>Future: no current impact</b>	
		<b>1. Humanitarian</b>	<b>2. Development</b>	<b>3. Humanitarian</b>	<b>4. Development</b>
<b>Big Task</b>		Existing approaches are appropriate	Solution recommended	Solution requires changes to the institutional make-up of the programme	Solution recommended
		Existing approaches are appropriate	Solution recommended	Solution requires changes to the institutional make-up of the programme	Solution requires changes to the institutional make-up of the programme (e.g. pooled funding + tender board)

While the future financing requirements for mine action cannot be estimated with precision at the present time, it seems clear that adequate funds will be available provided the GoM takes the appropriate steps. While additional financial contributions from the GoM will be required, the most critical steps are not so much financial but rather policy measures that will lever-in development assistance (grants and concessional loans) to pay for demining services in support of development programmes.

## 8. Toward a Sustainable Solution

This chapter outlines the minimum requirements that need to be in place if the mine action programme is to address the future challenges posed by contamination in a sustainable fashion. It also contains the Review Team's recommendations for (i) how the programme should be structured and linked to other arenas, and (ii) the process (or Road Map) to be followed in developing the strategy. The final section of the report then touches on some additional transition issues.

### **Strategy**

Mozambique's current strategy, the NMAP, is inadequate in light of the country's current needs let alone those of the future. A national strategy is designed to explain how the country's needs shall be met and, obviously, a good strategy needs to be based on a thorough needs assessment. The Review Team has compiled some information that strongly suggests that landmine contamination is far less a humanitarian emergency than a very real constraint on development. The time has already come for the mine action programme to realign in support of Mozambique's development agenda, and the new strategy must reflect this.

The central purpose of the strategy is, of course, how to address the remaining challenges posed by landmine and UXO contamination. Feasible solutions for a number of these challenges have been recommended in the previous chapter, but others were identified as unresolved given the current institutional make-up of the programme, coupled with the planned withdrawal of the international demining NGOs. The strategy must address these unresolved issues together as a set because they are interlinked. The following section discusses this in some depth.

### **Strategic Thinking on Unresolved Issues**

While clear solutions exist for many of the challenges posed by the contamination that will remain at the end of 2006, there are no entirely adequate solutions for other contamination challenges given the current institutional make-up of Mozambique's mine action programme (assuming the international demining NGOs depart as they have announced). Thus, reforms to the institutional make-up are required to provide solutions to the following challenges:

1. How to contract and monitor the performance of demining organisations to provide "fire brigade" services to address humanitarian/human security risks that will emerge from residual contamination in the form of UXO and isolated landmines?
2. How to contract and monitor the performance of demining organisations to provide standard demining services to address humanitarian/human security risks that will emerge from residual contamination in the form of minefields?
3. How to contract demining organisations to provide demining services in support of small infrastructure work programmes?<sup>214</sup>

These are strategic issues because they should not be considered in isolation from one another; rather, the decisions on how to resolve them should be incorporated into a single

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<sup>214</sup> Of course, performance monitoring of this work must also be done, but assets already exist within the mine action programme to do this (e.g. independent QA firms), so a reform to the institutional make-up of the programme is not required for an adequate solution.

strategy.<sup>215</sup> This is because a decision on how to address one of these issues will affect, in a material fashion, the optimal decisions for the other challenges. For example, if it is determined to create a new organisation to provide fire brigade services, that organisation may also be the best solution for standard demining to reduce future humanitarian risks.

Solutions to the above problems must also be considered in light of major changes to the institutional make-up of the programme that are already planned. These are:

4. The withdrawal of the international NGOs around the end of 2006; and
5. The transformation of ADP from a project into a distinct legal entity.

Some of the inter-connections among these issues are now obvious. For example, the following alternatives for the provision of fire brigade services have been discussed for a number of years:<sup>216</sup>

- Build this capacity into FADM;
- Build this capacity into the police;
- Build this capacity into ADP.

However, none of these options provide an adequate solution in the absence of a mechanism to monitor the performance of whichever organisation is to provide the fire brigade services. As was discussed at length in Textbox 21 – Contracts or Grants? Firms or NGOs? National or International? – a great deal of discretion is left in the hands of an organisation responsible for small demining and EOD tasks in dispersed and remote communities. Establishing an external monitoring mechanism to reduce this discretion would be an expensive and managerially-challenging proposition. However, in the absence of a credible external monitoring system, donors are unlikely to fund the required demining services unless they have significant trust that the organisation providing those services will effectively self-monitor the performance of its personnel.

Such trust must be based on some combination of (i) high standards for integrity, governance, and transparency, (ii) satisfaction with past performance of the organisation, and (iii) absence of strong incentives that would reward abuses of discretion. While recognising there are no perfect organisations, the use of well-established international NGOs – contracted through grant agreements without strong performance incentives – is generally deemed the best option available to donors.

It is clear that ADP in its current form as a UNDP project offers many of the same “trustworthiness” features that underpin the success of the international demining NGOs in terms of raising funds.<sup>217</sup> However, continuing this arrangement is not ideal because:

- the humanitarian risks posed by residual contamination will endure for an extended period and an institutionally sustainable solution is required for the long term, and

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<sup>215</sup> In the field of decision science, the definition of a strategy is “a situation in which several decisions are to be made at the same time”. Spradlin, Tom, n.d., *A Lexicon of Decision Making*, prepared for the Decision Analysis Society, available from <<http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/daweb/lexicon.htm>>.

<sup>216</sup> This is clear from Craib, 2003, section 7.6.

<sup>217</sup> The same is true to a degree with FADM and the QRDF, with Ronco providing monitoring services on behalf of the US Department of State, although it is unlikely other donors would wish to build a solution that hinges on a US company.

- it is inconsistent with the principle (which features centrally in the *Convention*) that the primary responsibility for addressing the landmine problem lies with the country's government and its people.

Breaking the connection with UNDP would, however, raise questions concerning accountability, governance, and transparency. This is the central quandary concerning whether ADP could raise sufficient resources if it became a local not-for-profit, particularly because (i) Mozambican law does not establish sufficiently high standards for integrity, governance, and transparency of not-for-profits and, more broadly, (ii) Mozambique's justice system has not yet established a reputation as an effective and impartial upholder of the law.

Thus, none of the alternatives represents an entirely convincing solution – or at least one for which donor financial support might be sustained until the GoM has the financial resources to provide the required level of mine action services. Some interim measures could be put in place to address the shortcomings of the various alternatives. For example, the Police or (to a lesser degree) FADM would require significant capacity building assistance if they were to take-on such a hard-to-manage responsibility. Obtaining funding from the GoM would be more likely if it were to go to FADM or the Police. But without a credible mechanism for monitoring task performance, many donors would be wary of providing funds for a solution along these lines, so the GoM will likely end-up shouldering more of the financial burden.

ADP (or another group of deminers who wished to form a local NGO) would need less in the way of additional capacity development, but steps are needed to address the lack of adequate not-for-profit legislation in Mozambique. One reasonable measure would be for one (or more) not-for-profit(s) to self-impose far higher standards for integrity, governance, and transparency. However, one of the reasons the GoM might opt for this approach is that it would increase the likelihood of further donor assistance – but how would donors know such an organisation would actually live by such standards?<sup>218</sup> As an additional measure, it might agree to partner with an international NGO, with the latter bolstering donor confidence to provide additional support to effect the transition and, just as importantly, helping the new not-for-profit actually live by its high integrity, governance, and transparency standards – capacity building to be an NGO rather than simply a demining organisation.

Thus, there are interim steps that could be taken, ideally with donor support, to put in place an effective landmine/UXO fire brigade service. However, the GoM will need to assume a growing proportion of the financial burden for such a public service, so no solution will be sustainable without GoM endorsement. The GoM needs to indicate clearly which of the alternative solutions it endorses. It should do this quickly, as further delay makes it ever more likely it will have to address the problem without the support of the donor community.

Once again however, what the GoM decides concerning fire brigades also affects its options concerning how to address the future humanitarian challenges posed by larger minefields. Small, mobile fire brigades would be inefficient for large demining tasks. The same organisation(s) – with a trusted self-monitoring capacity – could be used to manage both fire

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<sup>218</sup> There are two problems here. The most obvious is that people could say they want to serve the public good, but then put their own interests first once they obtain funding. More generally, combining sound management with high transparency and accountability is an extremely difficult challenge, particularly in a country such as Mozambique where there are few role models of “true” local NGOs that are also effective.



brigades and more traditional demining platoons. But other options are also available for such larger demining tasks.

Because there will be fewer minefield clearance tasks, monitoring task performance is more feasible. These could therefore be contracted out via tender processes either individually or in batches (e.g. all the minefield clearance tasks in a province for a year), which would bring competitive forces into play. But a competitive solution requires external QA for monitoring, and at present the GoM does not have such capacities at its disposal. IND has had a programme to establish its own QA teams, but with little success as yet. Independent QA firms exist but IND has not sought funding to engage such firms to QA humanitarian demining tasks.

As noted earlier, a number of other mine action programmes use independent firms for QA, and we see no reason why this approach could not work in Mozambique. Thus, a realistic solution does exist for external QA of minefield clearance tasks. But there remains the issue of how to manage the competitive tendering process. In the past, for some very large tasks CND and then IND used UNOPS for this purpose. UNOPS would probably not be a cost-effective solution for tendering smaller tasks and, regardless, a national solution is eventually required.

There are a number of tender board models within the field of mine action. A well-known example is the Slovenian International Trust Fund (ITF) that manages both a pooled-funding arrangement and a tender board service in support of mine action programmes in the Balkans.<sup>219</sup> Tender boards have also been established in a number of sectors within Mozambique (roads, electricity, etc.). Thus, good models exist and the difficulty lies not in building the capacity for a mine action tender board, but rather in recognising that a tender board in itself solves little: it will contribute to a solution if and only if complementary measures are also taken (in this case, provision for external QA of minefield clearance tasks and a feasible plan to finance both the clearance tasks and QA services). Strategic analysis is required on the part of the GoM – ideally with the support of the donors – to formulate the package of measures that are sufficient to address the specific contamination problem.

Again, what the GoM determines as its solution for minefields that will pose a humanitarian threat as community “footprints” grow will also alter the range of options available for other categories of contamination problems, and *vice versa*. For example, in the absence of a tender board and a system for QA, it would be easiest to leave this type of humanitarian demining to whichever organisation(s) provide the fire brigade services on a self-monitoring basis. However, if the GoM decides to put a tender board/QA mechanism in place for providing demining in support of small infrastructure investments, this mechanism might also be a better solution for humanitarian minefield clearance as well.

The Review Team is not proposing specific solutions for the set of unresolved issues listed at the start of this section. These are inter-related and must be considered collectively. The questions concerning ADP’s transformation and what should become of the capacities built by the international NGOs should also be factored into the strategic thinking leading to a new strategic plan. Further, the best hope of continued assistance from the international donors and, perhaps, the international NGOs lies in their buy-in to the new strategy, and such buy-in is far more likely to emerge if they are involved in the strategic thinking.

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<sup>219</sup> The Slovenian International Trust Fund also uses independent firms for QA.

## **Policy Framework**

The current and future effectiveness of the mine action programme depends in large part on the actions of many agencies not normally considered as part of the mine action field. For example, government agencies whose work programmes are adversely affected by landmine and UXO contamination need to be encouraged to address their problems squarely including, whenever possible, lining-up the financing required. They also need to be assisted with information and advice concerning best practice.

A clear policy framework is required to ensure these diverse agencies are working in concert to address the contamination problem, rather than simply ignoring it together with the needs of Mozambicans living in mine-affected communities. Thus the policy framework needs to be government-wide and not directly purely to mine action organisations. The framework must also support the strategy.

## **Regulation**

Commercial demining will be growing in relative importance, and it appears likely the market for commercial demining services will expand – perhaps markedly – within the medium-term. This puts a greater premium on regulation. National standards need to be issued in Portuguese. The licensing system through which firms and other demining operators are accredited needs to function (and there are real questions whether this is the case today). More fundamentally, there is no legislation to give national effect to the provisions of the *Convention* and to confirm the legal authority underpinning any regulations that have been, or will be, issued. Assuming a tender board is established for mine action, regulations will also be required to guide its operations, ensuring adequate transparency and accountability, and providing clear means by which its decisions could be appealed to an independent adjudicator should a competitor have grounds to believe the tendering rules have been breached. Finally, IND has not demonstrated that it has the capacity to provide QA services, and this type of enforcement mechanism is required to avoid a competitive environment that rewards firms that “race to the bottom” in terms of quality and safety.

## **Operations**

### **Demining Capacities**

The evidence suggests that, in the long-term, most demining work should be allocated via a transparent competitive tendering process – there is simply no better way to do so when it is clear what needs to be done and when the entity or individual that would bear the cost of poor performance is also the one paying for it.<sup>220</sup> It is probable that demining firms will represent the bulk of the operational capacity in the country. But this is not certain: local not-for-profits might also compete successfully on tenders if allowed to do so.

As well, local not-for-profits might be chosen over firms for providing services to address the residual humanitarian threat, however large that may be. Whether local not-for-profits can capitalise on this depends largely on whether they arm themselves with a distinct comparative advantage relative to this “market niche”. That comparative advantage is not so much their

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<sup>220</sup> This is why it is best to have the prime contractor responsible for the demining sub-contractor.

not-for-profit legal status; rather, it is their motivation to serve the public bolstered by far higher standards imposed concerning integrity, good governance, and transparency.<sup>221</sup> Because Mozambique's laws for not-for-profits do not impose adequately high standards, local not-for-profit demining agencies will need to self-impose these standards if they expect donors and the GoM to entrust them with support in the form of grants.

Government also faces some strategic choices that will influence the composition of future demining capacities. For example, it will need to determine what role, if any, FADM should play in the mine action programme.

## **Information Capacities**

Many public service agencies are forced to cope with landmine and UXO contamination. They need complete and accurate information concerning contamination and clearance in order understand how their planned work programmes may be affected. They may also need information on possible solutions to any problems they face (i.e. technical advisory services).

Currently IND is not providing contamination and clearance information unless some public service agency specifically requests it. Even then, the level of service provided is inadequate because the IMSMA database records are not accurate and complete.

IND is not currently in a position to provide the technical advisory services required by other public service agencies. First, it is not aware of what agencies need these services. Second, it is not itself informed concerning how some of these agencies have devised workable solutions to their contamination problems, so it cannot transmit this information to other units facing similar problems.

## **Coordination**

Assuming a proper strategy and policy framework is put in place, the demands on "coordination" as a distinct activity over the long-term will be greatly reduced. The strategy will provide strategic direction based on a sound assessment of the needs, the policy framework will support that strategy (in part by putting the regulatory framework in place so that adherence to policies is enforced), and most of the actual work will be handled via competitive tendering.

That being said, there still will be need for forums of stakeholders to discuss issues and, when amendments to the strategy, policy framework, or regulations are deemed necessary, discuss the alternatives. These forums would include:

- One for "inside the programme coordination" comprising national mine action authorities and the operators (including representatives from commercial operators);
- One for coordination with the government arena comprising the government agency responsible for mine action and other government agencies which are in some way mine action stakeholders; and
- One between the government and the donors

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<sup>221</sup> Put another way, funders cannot observe "motivation"; they can observe an organisation's statutes calling for integrity, good governance, and transparency, and then assess whether that organisation adheres to its own standards.

In addition, experience suggests that donors require their own forum so they can harmonise their positions on policy matters prior to discussions with the government.

Forums currently exist for coordination discussions (i) among operators and IND, (ii) among donors, and (iii) between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and donors. Some of these are flawed in terms of composition (e.g. excluding commercial operators) or functioning, and none of these have been active at the level required to formulate a sector strategy and policy framework.

Most critically, there has not been a proper forum for policy dialogue between the government and the donors concerning the humanitarian and developmental impacts of contamination within Mozambique. In large part this is because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is by nature oriented to the international mine action arena, which is guided by the Ottawa process and attracts participants from donor capitals rather than field representatives based in mine-affected countries. The Ministry, supported by IND, has done a commendable job in the Ottawa process, but has less to offer on how the programme operates within Mozambique.

**Recommendations on the Programme Structure**


International best practice for mine action is the following programme structure, supported by appropriate legal, regulatory, and procedural instruments:

Level		Instrument
Government	adopts	Mine Action Legislation & Government-wide policies
National authority	adopts	Regulations & National Standards
National Mine Action Centre	enforces	
Operators	adopt	Standing Operating Procedures

The Review Team considered whether there was any reason why Mozambique would not be well served by this best practice model, but could find no such reason. Accordingly, it is reflected in our detailed recommendations, which follow the figure depicting the overall architecture recommended for Mozambique at this time.

Note: The Review Team understands that the new government’s agenda is extremely heavy and it may take time before it can give adequate attention to the mine action programme. As well, the collapse of ADP has undoubtedly placed heavy demands on the Minister of Foreign Affairs, reducing the time available for addressing long term issues affecting mine action. For these longer term issues, it is far more important to arrive at a correct rather than a quick decision. It may be best to defer decisions on the following recommendations relating to the key organs of the mine action programme, making them instead as part of a new national mine action strategy – an issue discussed in greater detail in the section following this. Regardless, recommendations 12 through 14 are provided as a platform for discussions on the appropriate structure for Mozambique’s mine action programme.

Figure 21 – Recommended MA Architecture for Mozambique



**Recommendation 12 – The Government of Mozambique should establish an inter-ministerial body to serve as a national authority responsible for Mozambique’s mine action programme, chaired by a minister whose responsibilities focus on the country’s socio-economic development, with the Minister of Foreign Affairs serving as Deputy Chair, responsible for Mozambique’s continued participation in the Ottawa process and for the regional dimensions of landmine contamination problems. Other ministers on the body should be allowed to deputise senior officials to represent them if they so choose.<sup>222</sup>**

The proposed Mozambican Mine Action Authority (M-MAA) would report to the Council of Ministers, whose authority is required to adopt policy measures intended to have government-wide effect and for final review of draft legislation for mine action before this is submitted to the Assembly. The principal functions should be to:

- manage the policy linkages
  - within the government,
  - with the donor support group, and
  - with the international MA community,
- provide the policy and regulatory framework for the operation of the MA programme.

Composition – ministers of:

Development and Planning (possible chair)	Agriculture
Foreign Affairs (possible deputy chair and taking the lead within the Ottawa process)	Public Works
	State Administration
Interior	Health
Defence	Social Welfare

Responsibilities to include:

- Policy recommendations to the Council of Ministers, including
  - guidelines for financing MA in support of national development priorities (e.g. infrastructure projects)
  - guidelines for financing MA in support of community development projects
  - National Mine Action Legislation
- Representing Mozambique at Meetings of States Parties to the *Convention* and other aspects of the Ottawa process
- Adoption of the National Mine Action Strategy, Standards, etc., as well as regulations to guide the implementation of the National Mine Action Legislation.
- Appointment of the Director of M-MAC (see below)
- Appointment of a Board of Directors for M-MAC (see below)
- Appointment of a Mine Action Tenders Board.

To further reduce the time pressure on the members of the M-MAA, the Review Team also recommends the establishment of a second body – the Board of Directors for the M-MAC.

<sup>222</sup> Traditionally donors have pressed for representation by ministers on such inter-ministerial bodies, but this has resulted in a plethora of such committees which do not function because their members do not have time to attend. This recommendation seeks to reduce the time burden on ministers, but the Review Team recognises that the organisational culture within the government may make it necessary to have only ministers

This is the model now in place for the Roads sector where the senior Inter-Ministerial Roads Commission (meeting at least once a quarter) is the body for government-wide policy while the Board of Directors for ANE (meeting monthly) oversees policy implementation, including the performance of ANE's Managing Director.

**Recommendation 13 – The Government of Mozambique should establish a Mozambique Mine Action Centre (M-MAC) as a regulatory and public service body for mine action, and to provide secretariat services to the Mozambican Mine Action Authority (M-MAA).**

**Recommendation 14 – The Government of Mozambique should appoint a Board of Directors to oversee the implementation of the government's mine action policy and the performance of the M-MAC and its Managing Director. Members of the committee should be drawn from the civil service and from other public agencies which depend on timely, high-quality mine action services, together with representatives nominated by the private sector mine action operators (both firms and not-for-profit organisations).**

M-MAC should have a tripartite function: (i) regulatory, ensure the policies adopted by the National Authority are observed, (ii) public service, to provide both information services and technical guidance to other government agencies, development actors, and members of the MA community (both within Mozambique and internationally), and (iii) secretariat services to the National Authority.

The Director of M-MAC should be appointed on contract incorporating clear performance clauses relative to all three of the Centre's functions: regulatory; public service; and secretariat. Appointment and, if necessary, removal of the M-MAC Director would be one of the principal functions of the Board of Directors.

The core of M-MAC would be the Information Management Department, maintaining IMSMA. This would hold both data inputs required under the legislation and policies (accreditation records; requests for demining services; survey, marking, and clearance reports from QA agents and demining operators; missed incidents and accidents reports; etc.). It would also generate information (maps, clearance certificates, licenses, tasking folders, etc.) provided as a service to government agencies, development agencies, MA operators, etc., as well as reports to be submitted to supporting donors, Meetings of States Parties, etc.

IMSMA data would also provide the basis for ongoing needs analysis concerning how contamination is constraining development. This data analysis would be complemented by feedback from the ongoing work with government and other public sector agencies responsible for national infrastructure and community development investments. The analysis of the data within IMSMA would also be enriched by accessing other data sets available in the government's statistical directorate (INE) and its mapping and cadastral directorate (DINAGECA).

Presumably, many of the staff members for the proposed M-MAC would be drawn from the employee roster of IND. The current staff complement within IND does not appear to incorporate individuals with the requisite skills in either data analysis or technical advisory services.

**Recommendation 15 – The Chief Technical Adviser to IND should assess the existing capacities for (i) analysis of data from IMSMA and other sources of socio-economic and geographic data, and (ii) the provision of technical advisory services to government and other public sector agencies whose work programmes are impacted by landmine and UXO contamination, then prepare a capacity development plan specifying the required levels of**

**these capacities, how the capacities should be developed, how the staff responsible for these functions would fit into the organisation structure of IND and/or the proposed M-MAC, and what performance targets should be established for each position.**

Likely there will be a need for a Mine Action Tenders Board to select demining organisations to support smaller infrastructure projects after the departure of the international NGOs (and perhaps before). In the past IND has provided tender board services, particularly following the 2000 floods. Conceivably this function could be built into IND, although there are many alternative models, including a regional mechanism such as the Slovenian International Trust Fund (ITF) provides in the Balkans.<sup>223</sup>

A clear reading on the demand for tender board services must await the completion of IND's first round of outreach to other government and public sector units, and compilation of an inventory of infrastructure projects require demining assistance. As well, there may be sufficient capacity to meet current needs within the humanitarian sector (before the departure of the international NGOs) together with FADM and Ronco-QRDF. A decision on the best model for Mozambique can, however, be deferred and addressed as part of the development of a new strategy for mine action.

## ***A Road Map to a New Mine Action Strategy***

### **Contents of the Strategy**

The central task for the transition period is the formulation of a new strategy for the mine action 'sector'. This will differ in many respects from the existing NMAP. First and foremost, it should focus on how mine action supports development in Mozambique, and outline this in a very concrete fashion: merely asserting that mine action supports the government's poverty reduction strategy is completely inadequate.

In addition, the required strategy is not for the mine action organisations alone, but rather for a broader set of actors and issues. It needs to incorporate the roles to be played by many actors which are not normally thought of as mine action organisations. These include the government and other public sector units responsible for infrastructure work programmes, the international agencies such as The World Bank which provide financing for infrastructure investments. This wider set of actors needs to be given policy direction, so the government's legal and policy framework needs to be incorporated into the strategy.

In short, what is required is akin to a sector strategy (although mine action is not a sector but rather a cross-cutting activity). Modern sector strategies no longer limit themselves to a listing of government investments. Rather, they articulate the government's vision for all components of the sector – public, private, community-based, etc. – and then list not only the concrete investments government will make, but also the policy and public service measures designed to encourage and enable the other components to fulfil their potentials. Obviously, a good sector strategy should incorporate input from all stakeholders.

For mine action today and in the future, a national strategy should also reflect a partnership between the Government and the donors. Once a strategy is in place – and accepted by all – it

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<sup>223</sup> This was established by the Slovenian government and endowed with \$20 million from the US to pay for commercial demining in the former Yugoslav republics, but released on a matching basis – i.e. other Mine Action donations channelled via the ITF would be matched by the US fund.



provides a foundation for a deepening partnership: one less dominated by funding issues but giving more attention to the reciprocal responsibilities of the partners, with the government in the driver's seat and its partners providing considered advice and adequate support once they are assured the government is steering in the right direction.

From the donor side, this new approach to working together in support of a government's strategy for a sector has acquired the ungainly name of Sector Wide Approach to programming (SWAp). As a SWAp is rooted in the partnership concept, donors and governments in developing countries have learned that the process followed in formulating a sector strategy is all important. The same principle is true for a national mine action strategy.

## Process

**Recommendation 16 – As an essential first step, the Government of Mozambique should announce its desire to work with donors and other stakeholders on a new strategy for mine action, following the practices commonly used by Sector Wide Approaches to formulate and subsequently implement that strategy.**

**Recommendation 17 – As an essential second step, the Government of Mozambique, the UNDP, and interested donors should formulate (based on models from existing SWAp arrangements) and adopt a statement of reciprocal responsibilities relating to the national mine action programme. This should feature:**

- **the GoM in the driver's seat, exercising the rights and responsibilities of national ownership,**
- **the UNDP and donors providing considered advice and adequate support once they are assured the government is steering in the right direction and is confirming its commitment to mine action with appropriate policy initiatives and levels of funding.**

Because of the way Mozambique's mine action programme was established and has evolved, there are many established interests at play, which can quickly lead to rivalries among key actors. It is not possible to jump immediately to a strategy, as any such document will draw criticism from actors who imagine their proper interests are being overlooked. The next step should therefore be to seek agreement on the needs to be addressed. The principal failing of Mozambique's mine action community has been the inability to generate a clear and complete assessment of needs.

The Review Team has compiled a more complete assessment of existing and future needs. Undoubtedly there are omissions and inaccuracies, but it provides a basis for further work by IND and other stakeholders, and some of the earlier recommendations specify at least some of this work. This work should be done in cooperation, with the aim of achieving a consensus.

Once a consensus on the needs for mine action services is achieved, work can then proceed on the strategy to meet those needs. Once again, it is important that all stakeholders have an opportunity for input, including (for example) commercial demining firms and FADM. There probably will be rival proposals reflecting the different interests, but the consensus achieved on needs will provide a solid basis for assessing the merit of different proposals.

Ultimately of course, it is the government that will adopt a strategy based on a proposal compiled by the M-MAC (or IND if the M-MAC has not yet been created) supported by its CTA. The government should also benefit from the input from donors. Different donors have different financing instruments at their disposal. Any reasonable strategy at this juncture will provide different ways that international assistance agencies might contribute. Some may do

so by incorporating funds for demining services directly into the project budgets for infrastructure projects. Others may contribute for technical assistance or for financing and equipping fire brigades. The strategy will lay out the needs and the approach the government has chosen to address those needs, and different donors can decide how they can best contribute.

Once the strategy is adopted, the foundation also exists for a deeper partnership between government and the supporting donors. At the minimum this should embrace a common research, monitoring, and evaluation agenda. The completion of a strategy does not signal the end of strategic thinking. Strategic thinking is based on continuous analysis to get an ever clearer picture of the needs. It is also based on continuous monitoring and regular evaluation to assess what mechanisms for contracting demining services are working best, how the various infrastructure work programmes are evolving and what this implies for demining organisations, which district administrations are most active in calling for assistance to address residual humanitarian issues and why.

Better performance in terms of analysis, monitoring, and evaluation will also encourage donors to adopt more harmonised procedures; reducing their own work loads and lowering overall transaction costs. Building on existing UN Trust Funds, pooled funding arrangements would greatly help. Joint donor missions and joint evaluations (with significant input from the government concerning the key evaluation issues) would also be a step forward.

It would be premature to attempt detailed recommendations concerning each step of the process. It is important, however, to get the process underway.

**Recommendation 18 – (Step 3 on the Road Map, but to get underway immediately) Building on recommendations 1, 2, 7, and 10, the M-MAC (or IND if the M-MAC has not yet been created), assisted by its CTA, should compile a document outlining a complete and accurate assessment of needs for mine action services, now and in the future, and distribute that document to all stakeholders for discussion and refinement.**

**Recommendation 19 – Further steps on the Road Map should be sequenced as follows:**

- **Step 4 – Confirm consensus on the needs assessment by formal adoption by the GoM, UNDP, and supporting donors – this will then provide the basis for developing the strategy itself;**
- **Step 5 – Formulate strategic options for each of the unresolved strategic issues, for discussion among the GoM, the UNDP, and participating donors;**
- **Step 6 – Formulate a draft strategy for discussion among the GoM, the UNDP, and participating donors;**
- **Step 7 – Adoption of the strategy by the GoM, the UNDP, and participating donors; and**
- **Step 8 – Agree on a joint monitoring and evaluation plan for reporting on (i) the progress in implementing the strategy, and (ii) the compliance of the partners in discharging their reciprocal responsibilities.<sup>224</sup>**

## **Government agenda**

The most important item on the government agenda is grappling with how it wishes to structure the mine action programme to better link this with the country's developmental

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<sup>224</sup> For example, a major concern from the government side will be donor performance on such measures as (i) contributing to pooled funding arrangements for mine action rather than to separate projects; (ii) the numbers of donors incorporating funds for demining within their development projects; and (iii) measures to increase the predictability of funding (e.g. multi-year funding agreements).

requirements. It would be ideal to start by identifying the ministry that should be responsible for mine action, as well as the individuals who will need to play leadership roles: a Managing Director for the proposed M-MACC and a capable individual in the policy unit of the responsible ministry to advise on and then champion the needed policy measures. However, a realistic assessment of the new government's overall agenda suggests this ideal approach may not be feasible in the short term.

Regardless, the essential core of the government's agenda vis-à-vis mine action is to engage the donor community in a more concerted fashion, with the view formulating a new national strategy for mine action. This can be initiated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, supported by the IND Director.

## Donor agenda

The basic mechanism for orchestrating the donor engagement with the government already exists, although it has not been very active in the past 18 months. Assuming the government signals its willingness to adopt much of what is recommended in this report, in principles if not in details, then the donor agenda will become much more active. The staff in most donor agencies – and certainly in Mozambique where there is so much innovation – are already stretched. UNDP and donor representatives will need to organise themselves to cope with a mine action reform agenda that will pick-up pace.

## Other transition issues

### Capacity development and performance for a national MAC

Improvements to the programme structure and strategy will be for nought if IND or the proposed Mozambique Mine Action Centre (M-MAC) does not perform well. Clearly the provision of additional assistance for capacity building is of dubious benefit where staff already have the capabilities for higher performance, but are not fully employing these because of a lack of clear direction and incentives. At the same time, certain of the functions of a MAC, many of which now fall under IND, must be performed well both to assist in formulating a well conceived sector strategy and for effective implementation of that strategy. Future efforts aimed at strengthening the MAC need to balance capacity building inputs with performance outputs. This re-orientation to a performance focus should start right away.

**Recommendation 20 – To initiate the next stage of capacity development, the IND Director, assisted by the CTA, should institute a performance management approach to:**

- **clearly define the levels of performance required for the key functions of a Mine Action Centre, including: policy analysis; national planning; information exchange; regulation; information management; and services to operators, government and other public sector units, donors, and other stakeholders;**
- **set measurable performance targets for each function;**
- **communicate these performance targets to all staff;**
- **monitor performance; and**
- **take appropriate actions, including capacity building when necessary, when and if there are gaps between actual performance and the performance levels required for the proper functioning of mine action in Mozambique.**

**The support of key clients (operators, donors, and government/public sector units needing demining services) should be enlisted in defining the necessary levels of performance, establishing performance targets, and monitoring actual performance.**

## Addressing capacity mismatches

Taking into account existing commitments for new equipment, there probably is sufficient demining capacity in the country today to meet the short- and medium-term needs, and perhaps longer – commercial firms will be responsible for meeting their own equipment and staffing needs, while the humanitarian sector is already downsizing. However, there will be a growing mismatch in the distribution of equipment and vehicles among humanitarian operators, and there is the question of what will become of the equipment now in the hands of the international NGOs, assuming they exit as planned at the end of 2006.<sup>225</sup>

In most if not all cases, the original donors will probably have to agree to any transfer of equipment to another organisation. Most donors have blanket restrictions on grants to certain types of organisations (for-profit companies, militaries), and there may be additional constraints depending on the specific funding lines used to provide the equipment (e.g. UN agencies may be ineligible for some lines). For example, ADP appears less well-equipped today than are the international NGOs, and some of its existing equipment will soon need replacing. Will it be eligible to receive surplus equipment from the international NGOs? What if donors agreed to such a transfer, assuming ADP was to become a not-for-profit, but the transformation was then delayed or ADP became a firm or a branch of the military instead?

This report is not the place to work through all these details. It is clear from discussions with and reports on the international demining NGOs (e.g. Craib, 2003) that they have considered and, in some cases, have in place, contingency plans for their exit from direct management of mine action programmes.<sup>226</sup> However, they do not believe they are in a position to adopt a specific plan at this moment, precisely because the appropriate alternatives are contingent on decisions that are beyond their control. In brief, the international NGOs are awaiting government decisions on strategic issues, such as how to organise and manage demining services to address the humanitarian threats that will emerge over time due to residual contamination.

We have recommended that the GoM work in partnership with the UNDP and interested donors to address these strategic issues leading eventually to a new national mine action strategy. The fact that the international NGOs are planning to exit by the end of 2006 simply means this process must begin as soon as possible.

One other point deserves emphasis. The international mine action NGOs (and ADP) have a wealth of experience and expertise on how best to address the impact of landmine and UXO contamination, particularly in remote communities. They have well considered views on what will and will not work for the future. They also have intimate knowledge concerning the constraints and obligations they face during the exit process. It is vital that this knowledge informs the strategic decisions on how to address the strategic issues. The IND/M-MAC should engage with the international NGOs (as well as ADP) in a far more energetic fashion.

In the previous chapter, we made a number of recommendations concerning the need for IND to meet with the operators to discuss specific issues (systematic re-survey; exchange of data;

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<sup>225</sup> It may also be that HIV/AIDS will require additional efforts in training deminers.

<sup>226</sup> For understandable reasons, the programme managers were wary of providing details to the Review Team.

etc.). IND/M-MAC needs to build on this platform of discussions to engage its operating partners in a strategic dialogue as well.

## The status of ADP

In spite of what project documents state, it is unclear that there is a consensus on the desirability of ADP becoming a “local NGO”. Certainly, the apparent lack of even a business plan or draft statutes of association would suggest that there remains a good deal of ambivalence if not outright opposition to the proposal.

The Review Team has found no reason why work could not have begun on the preparation of a business plan – or alternative business plans for, say, a not-for-profit association, a for-profit enterprise, or a parastatal. There is a good deal of information provided in this report that there will be “unmet needs” for demining services once the international NGOs depart, and that there will be growing demand for demining services via competitive arrangements. The management of ADP is well placed to expand on and refine this information and formulate a business plan that capitalises on its comparative advantages. Any such business planning should, of course, also consider the legal implications of Mozambique’s labour retrenchment legislation, the status of equipment donated to UNDP for use by ADP, and the possible availability of surplus equipment from the international NGOs.

The business plan(s) will also need to include feasible strategies for resource mobilisation – indeed, that is the very core of a business plan. If it is to be a local not-for-profit, a substantial portion of its financial resources will need to come from donors and the GoM, probably in the form of grants in return for the provision of public services (i.e. humanitarian demining). The issue of donor and GoM confidence in the new ADP will be paramount. It is clear that, should ADP and its principal stakeholders opt for not-for-profit status, Mozambique’s legal provisions for associations and foundations are, in themselves, inadequate to give donors and the GoM assurance that it will remain an effective organisation focused on the public interest. ADP would need to self-impose through its statutes far higher standards for integrity, good governance, and transparency.

**Recommendation 21 – Should ADP management, UNDP, and the GoM determine it should transform into a Mozambican not-for-profit organisation, it should incorporate within its statutes international best-practice with respect to provisions for integrity, governance, and transparency.**

Further, for an interim period until it builds a track record of performance and integrity as an independent organisation, ADP would benefit from a partnership with an international NGO which could provide assurance to potential donors and assist ADP in the transition to operating as a “true” NGO. The principal assistance requirements relate to NGO management and governance rather than technical capacities for demining.<sup>227</sup>

**Recommendation 22 – Should ADP management, UNDP, and the GoM determine it should transform into a Mozambican not-for-profit organisation, it should seek a partnership with an international NGO willing and able to assist it in the transition into a well functioning and well governed Mozambican NGO.**

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<sup>227</sup> Of course, ADP may require some technical assistance should it undertake new challenges, such as the management of mobile fire brigades to perform EOD and small mine clearance operations.

Similar considerations and recommendations are, of course, relevant should the existing workforces of the international NGOs decide to establish not-for-profit associations.

Time is of the essence in this matter. We have also recommended that the GoM begin discussions with its principal mine action partners to formulate a new strategy for mine action. Because of the inter-relationships among many of the strategic issues, decisions concerning one issue could close-off attractive options for ADP's management and staff. It is important that they move quickly to identify what role(s) they could play and to prepare a solid business case for the GoM, UNDP, and donors to consider in their strategic deliberations.

### **The role of FADM**

The Review Team believes that FADM, supported by Ronco plus equipment from the US, is performing a useful role as a demining operator. Whether it should continue in this role, or even expand, needs to be considered strategically however. An early decision by the Government that FADM should, for example, be responsible for the residual humanitarian threat, will close-off other options from consideration. Such decisions should be part-and-parcel of the strategic plan, and not made in isolation of other factors.






## Update on Events Since the Mission

### Reduction in the IMSMA Data-Entry Backlog

The Annual Report for 2004 was issued by IND in March 2005. Table 1 in that report suggests significant progress has been made in reducing the data entry backlog for reports from the operators. Data available at the time of the Review Team Mission indicated 246 km<sup>2</sup> in SHA (itself a great reduction over the comparable 2003 figure of 528 km<sup>2</sup>), but figures in the Annual Report show less than 172 km<sup>2</sup>. The improvement is depicted in the following chart.

Figure 22 – Reducing the data entry backlog



### Inclusion of Mine Action in the Five-Year Programme

A newly elected government is required to present its “programme” to the legislature within three months of its appointment. This programme outlines the government’s priorities for its entire five-year term. For the first time, the new government included mine action as a cross-cutting issue as part of its Five Year Programme.

Clearly this is an encouraging development, indicating that mine action has appeared on the government’s agenda. It is, however, only a first step. In the past, Five Year Programmes have been more of a wish list than a set of measures which could be properly financed and implemented. More important is whether mine action is incorporated into the PARPA (see below) and the annual budget. More important still to confirm the government’s commitment to resolving Mozambique’s contamination problems is whether the amounts appropriated for mine action in the budget are actually spent as planned.

### The Crisis in ADP

In early April 2005, many ADP employees went on strike over the non-payment of wages. Shortly thereafter, the government shut down all ADP operations and IND met a number of times with the strikers as well as with UNDP and donors. Subsequent investigations showed that the labour legislation provisions for layoffs would not apply to ADP employees, who never had income taxes and social security contributions deducted from their wages and



remitted to the government authorities. Regardless, by mid-June, IND had prepared a recommended compensation package amounting to \$1.8 million.<sup>228</sup> UNDP contributed \$400,000 to that package, with the Irish Government donating another 250,000 EURO (over \$300,000), and payments were issued to some of the ADP staff in early July. Subsequently, the GoM has indicated it will cover the balance – almost \$1.1 million.

In addition, the GoM announced its intention to establish a national NGO, and UNDP is providing assistance. A consulting firm has been engaged to work with ADP's remaining management team (the Director had resigned in the wake of the strike) to produce a three-year business plan for the NGO. It is unclear, however, how many of ADP's deminers are willing to join the new NGO. It is also unclear to the Review Team whether the new entity will be independent or whether all or the majority of its board members will be appointed by government. In the latter case, the new entity would function essentially as a not-for-profit agency of the government, albeit separate from the civil service.

## Mine Action and the PARPA

In June 2005, UNDP engaged a local consultant to assist IND with outreach to various government units that may require demining assistance, and in representing mine action within the working groups created to assist in the preparations of Mozambique's second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PARPA). As noted in Chapter 5, the PARPA is Mozambique's *de facto* development plan, and serves as the principle framework for policy discussions between the GoM and donors. It is important that the problem of landmine and UXO contamination receives proper reflection in the PARPA, both as a cross-cutting issue and within the sections that will cover plans for the reconstruction and development of infrastructure networks (roads, railways, electricity distribution, water system, etc.), community infrastructure (small irrigation works, etc.), area development projects (e.g., for game parks and other tourist destinations), and agriculture/rural development. The new PARPA also presents an opportunity for the mine action community to draw attention to the needs of landmine survivors, as part of a broader programme to assist the disabled.

## Summary

Clearly 2005 has been an eventful year for mine action in Mozambique. The sudden collapse of ADP has presented the GoM, IND, UNDP, and donors with serious problems that need immediate attention.<sup>229</sup> How to meet the immediate needs for survey and clearance in the Southern provinces? Can anything be salvaged from ADP, or will entirely new provisions have to be made to address contamination in Southern Mozambique?

The Review Team can provide little in the way of further comment on the ADP situation, which obviously must be dominating the attention of IND and its CTA.<sup>230</sup> In this light, it is encouraging that some progress has been made on other fronts, such as outreach to

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<sup>228</sup> It remains unclear to the Review Team whether this compensation package includes any payments for prior years service, as per the labour legislation.

<sup>229</sup> It also raises real questions concerning how matters were allowed to deteriorate to the point of crisis, and with respect to some of the information emerging in the wake of the collapse, such as why ADP employees were never registered with the government, thus escaping taxation and social security obligations.

<sup>230</sup> The other technical advisers at IND departed subsequent to the Review Mission.

government agencies responsible for infrastructure investments and getting the mine action programme more strongly reflected within the government's development agenda.



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## Glossary of Acronyms

ADP	Accelerated Demining Programme
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ANE	National Roads Administration (semi-autonomous government agency)
BAC	battlefield area clearance
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIDC	Canadian International Demining Centre
CMAC	Cambodian Mine Action Centre
CND	National Demining Commission
DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UN now OCHA)
DoD	United States Department of Defense
DoS	United States Department of State
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN)
EC	European Commission
EDM	Electricity of Mozambique
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
EU	European Union
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambique Liberation Front)
GDP	gross domestic product
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
GIS	Geographic Information System
GTZ	German Development Organisation
HALO Trust	Hazardous Areas Life-Support Organisation
HI	Handicap International
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	internally displaced person
IDRC	International Development Research Centre (Canada)
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action
IND	National Demining Institute
INE	Instituto Nacional de Estatística (National Statistics Institute)
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
LIS	Landmine Impact Survey
MAC	Mine Action Centre
MADER	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
MA	Mine Action
MAE	Ministry for State Administration
MDD	mine detection dog
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MDN	Ministry of National Defence
MGM	Menschen Gegen Minen
MINEC	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
MINT	Ministry of Interior
MISAU	Ministry of Health
M-MAC	Mozambican Mine Action Centre
MMCAS	Ministry of Labour and Social Action

MOPH	Ministry of Home Affairs
MOZMAC	Mozambique Mine Action Centre
MPF	Ministry of Planning and Finance
MRE	mine risk education
MTFF	Medium Term Fiscal Framework
NGO	non-governmental organisation
NMCC	National Mine Clearance Commission
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (United Nations)
OE	Orçamento do Estado (State Budget)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ONUMOZ	UN Operations in Mozambique
PAF	Performance Assessment Framework
PAP	Programme Aid Partners
PARPA	Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty
PEPAM	National Co-ordination of Education Activities to Prevent Landmines and Other Explosive Devices Accidents
PES	Plano Económico e Social (Economic and Social Plan)
PRIO	International Peace Research Institute, Oslo
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan
PTIP	Programa Trienal de Investimento Público (Triennial Public Investment Programme)
QRDF	Quick Response Demining Force
RENAMO	Resistência Nacional de Moçambique (Mozambique National Resistance)
SAC	Survey Action Center
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SHA	Suspected Hazard Area
SOP	Standing Operating Procedure
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SWAp	Sector Wide Approach
TA	Technical Adviser
TIA	Task Impact Assessment
U.K.	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCDF	United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner's Office for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNOHAC	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
U.S.	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UXO	unexploded ordnance

## Appendixes

### Appendix 1. Terms of Reference

#### Consultancy for Study:

#### *A review of ten years of assistance to the Mine Action Programme in Mozambique*

##### Background:

UNDP, in partnership with various donors, has supported the Government of Mozambique in the area of Mine Action since the early post-conflict period. Partnership with Government in this area has included both operational demining activities and capacity building for the government institutions involved with demining. Programmes have been financed through cost sharing arrangements with donor partners locally and internationally through Trust Funds and other funding arrangements.

It is now more than ten (10) years since the mine action programme in Mozambique came into effect. The country has now put in place a National Mine Action Plan (2002-2006). The plan covers all five principle activities of mine-action, which include demining, mine risk education, victim assistance, stock pile reduction and advocacy. The component of stockpile reduction was taken care of in Mozambique when the stocks were destroyed in March 2003.

Mozambique has in the meantime made significant socioeconomic progress since the peace agreement in 1992. The complete cessation of the civil war, introduction of multi party democracy and the launch of a programme of economic reform mainly account for the progress. Recent changes in the development area include a strong national development plan (PARPA), the introduction of the Millennium Development Goals, NEPAD, finalization of Agenda 2025 as a vision and strategy document for the country, and an increasing trend by major donors towards providing budget support as opposed to project support, aimed at increasing harmonization of donor support.

Globally within the mine action area, the Secretary-General of the United Nations will convene the first five-year Review Conference of States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, in Nairobi, 29 November-3 December 2004. Mozambique, which is co-hosting the conference, will together with other participating countries, present the national experience in mine action.

In view of the above history and context, the UNDP Country Office in Mozambique, as the main partner of the Government in the area of mine action, will undertake, in collaboration with Government and donor partners, a comprehensive review of the mine action programme in Mozambique since its inception. In agreement with the government, the study will incorporate the issues and address the objectives that were envisioned in the national mine action mid term review. The present review will look at the historical context of the programme, outline the achievements, relate them to the overarching national development plans and most importantly analyze the tasks that lie ahead. The analysis of the future of the mine action programme will be in the context of its relationship with the intermediate and long term development priorities of the country, and the international commitments and agreements the country has signed with its partners with regard to mine action.

##### General Objective:

The overall objective of this study is to assess relevance, efficacy, effectiveness, and impact of the mine action programme in Mozambique since its inception, and analyze the extent of the task that remains to be done. The analysis of the task that lies ahead will be placed in the current development context and humanitarian situation in Mozambique. Links and relationships with the existent development frameworks (most especially the poverty reduction strategy paper for Mozambique PARPA), other sectoral strategies and the MDGs are to be highlighted. Recommendations for

sustainable national interventions at the planning and operational levels, (with corresponding funding strategies) will be made.

### **Main activities to be undertaken during the review**

- Review and consolidate information from all reviews, evaluations and studies of a similar nature that have been undertaken in Mozambique, on mine action.
- Consult with a wide range of stakeholders, including government, donors, mine action operators and civil society involved in development.
- Analyse the international commitments made by Mozambique in the field of mine action (ratification of treaties, status of implementation).
- Collect information from direct beneficiaries of mine action programmes.
- Analyse the current structure of the national mine action programme, at the policy and operational levels, including both commercial and humanitarian operators, governance and coordination mechanisms, etc.
- Review the nature and extent of technical and managerial capacity built in the area of mine action in Mozambique, including an examination of the role played by the technical assistance in the form of experts and management tools extended to Mozambican institutions for capacity building.
- Discuss donor priorities and objectives on Mine Action,
- Review the current development context and framework of Mozambique, and make an analysis of the future of the mine action programme within this framework. Describe links with the overall development priorities for the country.
- Review the past and current deployment of resources for the mine action programme, including prioritization, accountability and transparency
- Make recommendations for the future of the mine action programme, taking into account the lessons learnt and the current trends in resource availability. In this context, undertake an analysis and present a forecast of future resource availability for mine action programme in Mozambique in the context of the state budget, budget support and commercial demining.

### **Outputs:**

The output of the study will be a review report, which presents an independent and comprehensive analysis of the mine action programme of Mozambique, including achievements and future prospects.

### **Duration**

The study will be undertaken over a period of eight weeks, including two weeks for desk review of existing material, one month of fieldwork and data collection and another two weeks for compilation of the report.

### **Submission of the Report**

A draft report will be submitted to the UNDP Country office at the end of the eighth week of the consultancy. The country office will share the draft report with Government and donor partners for comment. The final report will be submitted to UNDP within one week of receipt of the consolidated comments.

All reports should be submitted electronically and in hard copy.

## Appendix 2. List of Persons Met

Organisation/Name	Position
<b>United Nations</b>	
Marylène Spezzati	UNDP Resident Representative and UN Resident Coordinator
Gana Fofang	UNDP Deputy Resident Representative
Archie Law	Regional Adviser, UNDP Johannesburg
Alberto Alface	Mine Action Programme Officer, UNDP
Ricardo Mukonda	Project Officer Special Protection, UNICEF
Lutful Kabir	Chief Technical Adviser, IND (on UNOPS contract)
Graeme Abernathy	Operations Adviser, IND (on UNOPS contract)
Farah Ali	Finance Adviser, IND (on UNOPS contract)
Augusto Nogueira	Information Adviser, IND (on UNOPS contract)
<b>IND</b>	
Gamiliel Munguambe	Director IND
Aurelio Mavie Faduco	Head of planning, IND
Orlando Fernando	Head of operations, IND
Antonio Domingues	Head of quality, IND
Deodata Uetela	Head of database section, IND
Maria Isabel dos Santos	Project manager, IND
Joaquim Sylvetre Bila	IND regional manager, Nampula
Juma Dinis dos Carinas	IND regional manager, Beira
Benilde Cidalia Budula	HR deputy, IND
<b>Other Government of Mozambique</b>	
Dr. Leonardo Simão	Minister of Foreign Affairs
Col Diaz	Commanding Officer, FADM demining forces
Commander Lourenço João	Regional police commander, Inhambane
Alberto Simão	Governor, Sofala Province
Albino Saude	Provincial coordinator, Manica Province
Dr. Distina Winge	Director, External Relations, National Statistical Institute (INE)
Antonio Adriano	Head, Department of Cartography & Operations, INE
Gabriel Tembe (& others)	National Director, Rural Development, MADER
Adriano Chamusso	National Director, Economics, MADER
	National Director, Agriculture, MADER
	National Director, Forestry, MADER
Manuel Manges	Chief, Dept. of Standards, Directorate for Irrigation, MADER
Eng. Athanese	Director, National Roads, National Roads Administration (ANE)
Nelson Nunes	Chief, Operations Dept., ANE
Domingos Lambo	Deputy Director, Planning & Budget, MPF
	Regional police commander, Cabo Delgado
Carlos Abudo	Provincial Coordinator, Nampula province
	District Administrator, Morrappula District, Nampula province
Eng. Olinda de Sousa	Director, National Water Authority
Eng. Adelino Mesquit	Project Manager, CFM (Ports and Railways of Mozambique)
<b>Donors and International Financial Institutions</b>	
Adrian Hadorn	Ambassador, Embassy of Switzerland & G-16 co-chair
Dr. Bernhard Weimer	Senior Governance Adviser, SDC
Olli Sotamaa	Councillor, Embassy of Finland
Aidan Fitzpatrick	Attaché, Embassy of Ireland
Stacey Walker	Program Manager, AusAID
Charles Siebert	Counsellor, French Embassy
Cynthia Brown	Economic/Political Officer, U.S. Department of State
Kenji Ohira	Attaché (Economic Cooperation), Embassy of Japan

<b>Organisation/Name</b>	<b>Position</b>
Fumika Okane	Consultant, JICA
Eduardo Manfredini	Technical Unit for Cooperation, Embassy of Italy
Michael Butschek	Austrian mission
Berit Kristin Tvete	Embassy of Norway
Lola Lopes	Danida
Alberto da Silva	Programme Support Unit, CIDA
Emidio Oliveira	Senior Programme Officer, DFID
Gregor Binkert	Lead Economist, The World Bank
Maria del Mar Polo	EC Delegation
<b>Mine Action Operators</b>	
Steve Hughes	Regional Manager Armor Group
Jacinto Veloso	Director, JV Desminagem
Atle Karlsen	Regional representative, NPA Southern Africa
Sara Sekkenes	Programme Manager, NPA
Maxwel Gopani	Assistant Programme Manager, NPA
Aderito Ismael	Programme Manager, Handicap International
Frank Weetjens	APOPO vzw
Jacky D'Almeida	Director ADP
Lt Col Pete Curran	Adviser to Director ADP
Florêncio Chongo	Operations Manager, ADP
Les Brown	Country Manager, RONCO Consulting Corporation
Steven Brown	Demining Program Manage, RONCO Consulting Corporation
Pasqual Isaias	Country Representative, Bactec Moçambique Lda
Cameron Imber	HALO Trust representative
Nelson Verissimo	HALO Trust manager
Barkley Lozane	Managing Director, CCQ
<b>Civil Society Organisations</b>	
Respeito Chirrinze	Volunteers & Youth Co-ordinator, CVM (Mozambican Red Cross)
Dr. Marta Cumbe	Programme Director, FDC (Community Development Foundation)
Reverend Dinis Matsolo	General Secretary, Christian Council of Mozambique
<b>Others</b>	
Dr. Antonio Francisco	Professor, Eduardo Mondlane University
Manuel Cuambe	Director, Project & Electrification, Electricidade de Mozambique
Anthony Hodges	Project Manager, FoPOS, Oxford Policy Management

## **Appendix 3. Accredited organisations<sup>231</sup>**

### **“Humanitarian” Operators**

- Afrovita
- APN (NPA)
- ADDAC (Agencia de Desenvolvimento de Antigos Combatentes )
- Handicap International
- HALO Trust
- PAD (Accelerated Demining Programme)
- RONCO
- ASM (Associação dos Sapadores de Moçambique)
- BNUC (Boa Nova de União Crista)
- FADM (Mozambique Armed Forces)
- CODEG (Conselho de Desmobilizados de Guerra)
- APOPO
- Necoquinas

### **Commercial Operators**

- MMA (Mozambique Mine Action)
- BACTEC International
- Mine Tech
- ECOMS Desminagem
- Empresa Moçambicana de Desminagem
- JV-Desminagem
- Mine Kills Mozambique
- MF Investments
- SDS (Special Dog Services)
- REASeuro Worldwide
- Lince

### **Other Operators**

- CCQ (Companhia de Controle de Qualidade)

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<sup>231</sup> Based on information provided by IND 26 Jan 2005



## ***Appendix 4. List of lessons learned from this Review***

### **Lesson 1 (page 14)**

When confronted by a new type of challenge such as landmine and UXO contamination following complex humanitarian emergencies, it takes time before the international community understands the true nature of the problem, and then more time before it learns from experience how best to address that problem.

### **Lesson 2 (page 14)**

In many post-conflict situations, the government is not in a position to give the necessary attention to all facets of humanitarian needs. In such situations, the international community requires an international organisation such as the UN to take the lead in defining the scope and intensity of the humanitarian emergency, and to facilitate the preparation of a strategy to address the emergency in a reasonably coordinated fashion.

### **Lesson 3 (page 15)**

In the absence of a commonly endorsed assessment of needs and a commonly endorsed strategy to address those needs, donors are likely to support a range of separate and relatively uncoordinated mine action initiatives, implemented via firms or NGOs, in response to the humanitarian emergency.

### **Lesson 4 (page 16)**

Once a series of independent mine action programmes are established, it is more difficult to put in place an effective mechanism for national coordination.

### **Lesson 5 (page 17)**

A half-hearted attempt to impose coordination on a group of organisations with established programmes is worse than no attempt at all. It does not solve the problem and it leaves the government facing a credibility gap to overcome once it advances a better conceived coordination mechanism.

### **Lesson 6 (page 20)**

An information management system capable of maintaining complete and accurate data on the landmine/UXO hazards, and on survey and clearance activities, is an essential capacity for a national mine action programme. Failure to establish such a system in the early years of a programme will severely constrain the ability of programme planners and managers to formulate proper plans and priorities for years to come.

### **Lesson 7 (page 21)**

Over time (and assuming a country does not return to conflict), MRE takes a progressively lower profile within a national mine action programme – a reasonable trend given:

- Risks to civilians are highest when they are unfamiliar with the contamination in the area, such as when forced to flee conflict regions or when they return to their home communities after the conflict ends;
- MRE gradually reaches most of those at risk;
- Lessons are quickly learned when local populations venture into contaminated areas;
- Targeted survey and clearance operations gradually address the most dangerous minefields.

**Lesson 8 (page 23)**

Initiatives to establish orthopaedic and physiotherapy facilities available to landmine survivors, and to enhance the skills of the medical and technical personnel at these facilities, often have failed to deliver sustained benefits. Such initiatives should be undertaken as part of a broader strategy designed to:

- establish disability assistance programmes that the relevant government ministries, in concert with local self-help organisations, can hope to sustain,
- provide a range of other basic services including monitoring, transport to and lodging at treatment facilities, and referral to services for psycho-social rehabilitation and economic re-integration of landmine survivors and other disabled persons.

**Lesson 9 (page 23)**

National mine action programmes have a specific responsibility to promote programmes aimed at meeting the needs of landmine survivors. However, except in rare cases – often during emergencies – mine action programmes are not the appropriate vehicle for implementing these programmes, which should be part of broader efforts at meeting the needs of disabled people. Mine action programmes often can help to focus attention on the rights and needs of disabled persons, and bringing to light serious gaps in services available to landmine survivors and other disabled persons.

**Lesson 10 (page 25)**

Although typically the mechanisms are not in place for linking mine action into the broader peace-building programme in a practical and concerted fashion, mine action can make important contributions to the peace-building process.

**Lesson 11 (page 40)**

When confronted by a new type of challenge such as landmine and UXO contamination following complex humanitarian emergencies, it takes time before adequate tools – such as a means for assessing the true extent of the humanitarian needs – can be developed, tested, and improved so they meet the true requirements in the field.

**Lesson 12 (page 40)**

Proper mine action planning requires reasonably complete and up-to-date data on both suspected hazard areas (SHA) and the impacts of these on both communities and development programmes. For countries with extensive contamination, provision needs to be made not just for an initial survey to establish the baselines for physical contamination and socio-economic impacts, but also for systematic efforts to update these data to refine understanding of the contamination problem, and to assess progress.

**Lesson 13 (page 43)**

The potential benefits from developing capacities of individual staff members and functional units within an organisation will not be captured in full until the organisational management systems for (at least) human resources, financial management, information management, and performance management are functioning well and there is appropriate delegation of authority so staff and unit managers can use their skills and experience to discharge their responsibilities and achieve the specific performance standards set for them.

