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Sida

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Sida

# Review of Sida's Support to Mine Action 2001-2009

Final Report

September 2010



Sida

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Final Report

September 2010

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## Acronyms

AP	Anti-Personnel Mine
AT	Anti-Tank Mine
AXO	Abandoned Unexploded Ordnance
BAC	Battle Area Clearance
CLM	Community Liaison Manager
CLT	Community Liaison Team
CMD	Conventional Weapon Disposal
CPM	Country Programme Manager
DA	Dangerous Area
DCA	DanChurchAid
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War
FC	Field Coordinator
FM	Finance Manager
GDMA	General Directorate of Mine Action
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
HMA	Humanitarian Mine Action
IACG	Inter Agency Support Group
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDET	International Development and Evaluation Team
IKMAA	Kurdistan Mine Action Authority
IMCO	Iraqi Mine and UXO Clearance Organization
IMSMA(NG)	Information Management System for Mine Action (New Generation)
KRG	Kurdistan Regional Government
LC	Logistics Coordinator
LIS	Landmine Impact Survey
MAG	Mines Advisory Group
MAT	Mine Action Team
MBT	Mine Ban Treaty
MCT	Manual Clearance Team
MDD	Mine Detection Dog
MMW	Mini-Minewolf Machine
MONUC	UN Mission in DRC
MRE	Mine Risk Education
MSB	Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (formerly SRSA)
MSC	Most Significant Change Approach
MTT	Multi-Task Team
PM	Programme Manager
PO	Programme Officer
RMACC	Regional Mine Action Coordination Centre
RoC	Remnants of Conflict
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons

SHA	Suspect Hazardous Areas
SRSA	Swedish Rescue Services Agency (now MSB)
TFM	Technical Field Manager
TOM	Technical Operations Manager
TOR	Terms of Reference
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNMACC	United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNVTF	United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents the findings, conclusions and recommendations of an external review of Sida's support to mine action activities between 2001 and 2009 undertaken by COWI A/S and Channel Research. The review provides an overview of Sida's engagement in mine action during the decade, as well as assessments of the relevance of relevant Sida policies and strategies, and the results achieved through support to global organisations and country level programmes. The review included country field visits to Sida supported mine action programmes in Iraq and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The methodology applied was based on the evaluation frameworks of OECD's Development Assistance Committee and Sida, focussing on relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact, as well as the IMAS Guidelines for Evaluation of Mine Action.

### **The Mine Action Sector Context**

The Review Team presents an assessment of the current state of the mine action sector and notes that focus has shifted from hard technical issues to socio-economic issues and links to development activities. Tools and methods for clearance have improved and the donor community including Sida has generally followed and supported these developments with considerable financial allocations. Donors are now placing increased focus on outcomes, whereas most implementing organisations still report mainly on output. This poses a challenge to the organisations who are often not adequately equipped to address the broader socio-economic and developmental issues. The Review Team observes that over the years, the mine action sector has been allowed to work in isolation from other sectors and has not been subjected to conditions and requirements applied to other parts of humanitarian and development assistance, including capacity building, sustainability and exit strategies. The findings on Sida supported mine action programmes generally underpin this general sector trend, although the lack of coherence between mine action and other types of interventions is often in contradiction to policies and overall objectives of the implementing organisations.

### **Relevance of Sida's mine action policy and country strategies**

Subsequent developments in the mine action sector shows that many of the points in Sida's policy paper for supporting mine action from 2002 are still highly relevant. Sida appears however not to have promoted this policy directly vis-à-vis implementing partners, and it is not supported by an implementation strategy. This has resulted in a missing link between policy directions and decisions regarding implementation. Another finding is that mine action is invisible in a number of Sida's country strategies and not subject to any strategic considerations or approach. As a consequence progress and results are not measurable according to normal standards. As Sida moreover does not have in-house technical expertise on mine action, many of the programmes supported have been allowed to continue without sufficient technical accountability in terms of documented results, and this is a cause for concern in light of the substantial investments from Sida's side in the sector. The Review Team concludes that consistency between policy and implementation is limited.

### **The Review Team recommends:**

- More active monitoring from Sida incl. from country offices, including periodic visits to programmes.



- Sida to ensure technical expertise in mine action internally in Stockholm or through employing external experts on a consultancy basis to assist with monitoring and quality assurance of programmes.
- Implementation agencies should be held to their promises, through accountability vis-à-vis their stated objectives. Next phase funding should not be provided unless objectives are fulfilled.
- Clear strategic principles be developed to uphold quality and measurability in programmes supported, and monitoring systems and procedures be made more cohesive.
- Mine action to be integrated in Sida's country strategies (in relevant countries) and an action plan be developed to support implementation on the mine action policy.

### **Relevance of support to global organisations**

The support to the UN is in line with Sida's mine action policy and its humanitarian strategy. Furthermore, the choice of supporting key UN agencies with a mine action role enables Sida's funding to meet a range of needs in both emergencies and situations of peace - a spread of input that the Review Team also finds relevant in view of Sida's development and humanitarian role. UNDP's contributions are dispersed and flexible and at an overall level relates well to Sida objectives in terms of national capacity building. The support to UNMAS appears to complement UNDP as they are present and active on mine action where UNDP is not or is unable. Similarly, the Review Team also finds that the support to GICHD and Geneva Call has been relevant to Sida's Mine Action Policy, particularly in relation to knowledge development.

#### **The Review Team recommends:**

- Greater effort could be made to identify and report at outcome level (i.e. on results achieved) and to identify development impacts more clearly.
- Sida to continue pressing for clear guidelines on GICHD's advisory and evaluation roles, and to urge for continued focus on development impact.
- Sida support to change to core support: single Swedish contribution to core costs (MFA & Sida together).

### **Relevance of country level support**

The Sida supported mine action programmes in general appear to be well coordinated with national priorities as most implementing partners have established close links with national mine action authorities and/or UNMAS in the countries of operation. The relevance in relation to the seriousness of mine contamination is not clear in all cases, as for example DRC according to available information is not seriously affected in contrast to a much more contaminated country like Iraq. Relevance in relation to population needs and vulnerability is generally not documented in the programme, with the exception of DDG in Iraq having included socio-economic parameters and employing a project manager with a broader development background.

#### **The Review Team recommends:**

- Adding socio-economic expertise to key staff including managers.
- Introducing socio-economic surveys for needs assessments and baselines.
- Targeting programmes towards most vulnerable groups as a first priority.
- Including improvements in living conditions in mainstream project elements such as objectives, activities, indicators, outputs, outcomes, to feed into reporting on development related progress and challenges.
- Sida to consider focusing on countries facing serious contamination– or countries where links to other Sida humanitarian and/or development programmes are considered useful.

### **Effectiveness and efficiency**

The technical operational base of the programmes reviewed is strong and well developed. Planning processes and programme management are undertaken in a very effective and efficient manner, and the quality of field operations including sound clearance principles and effective land release processes is generally very high. Reporting tends to focus solely on outputs at the technical clearance and land release level and not on outcomes. This leaves a gap in reporting fully on programme objectives which in most programmes also include broader socio-economic elements. Achievement of objectives related to involving and capacitating the local population, local and regional authorities, and the national staff is not reported on systematically. From the projects visited and the documents reviews this aspect appears often to be well achieved at the operational sites but addressed unevenly and in more informal ways at the level of national authorities.

#### **The Review Team recommends:**

- More systematic requirements to progress and results reporting to be introduced in order to ensure that all objectives are reported on.
- These requirements be enforced and reports only addressing output level and technical aspects not to be approved.
- New funding should not to be allocated until satisfactory reporting from previous phase is in place.

### **Sustainability**

In general, the programmes reviewed are tightly coordinated with either national or regional mine action authorities and contains elements of capacity building and skills transfer. This way they have a good potential for leading to sustainable structures and capacities, although some of them could benefit from a more systematic approach. There is a risk that some organisations are caught in a dilemma between leaving national capacity and making themselves redundant (which is good developmental thinking) on one hand, and a desire to keep activities going and keep up their business on the other.

#### **The Review Team recommends:**

- Capacity building strategies become a standard requirement in all mine action programmes supported by Sida, and these strategies be based on negotiations with national mine action authorities in order to ensure ownership and transparency.
- That reporting on progress on capacity building becomes mandatory in annual reports.
- That all programmes develop strategies for sustainability and exit including benchmarks for exit or for re-assessment of exit dates.

### **Impact**

Documentation of impact is an area that the mine action sector has been struggling with for many years, and this review has found no shortage of good intentions but very little documentation of impact. Two significant achievements are however notable in this area: the DDG manual for impact monitoring now being rolled out, and MAG's long-awaited process of developing an impact monitoring tool based on community data already being compiled as part of the organisation's community liaison work. Considering that other organisations (like NPA and GICHD) are also developing toolboxes on this, one might raise a question of possible coordination and cost savings among organisations. Despite the good intentions and tools underway, the conclusion of the Review Team is that no documentation of impact has been traced in any of the programmes reviewed, and it raises concerns that such a vital element of results documentation have been allowed to take so long to develop.

#### **The Review Team recommends:**

- Sida to maintain close dialogue with DDG to follow the practical use of the new manual.

- Sida to encourage DDG and MAG to keep a high level of information between them and exchange ideas, tools and experiences on impact monitoring.
- Sida to liaise with GICHD to strengthen its coordination of methodological development related to impact monitoring in mine action.

### **GICHD**

While limited compared to other aspects of Sweden's support to mine action, the contribution to methodological development and knowledge management through GICHD is a valuable and relevant complement to the operational support provided elsewhere. The Review Team found that the Centre is interested in pursuing a close dialogue and partnership with Sida. This is relevant in view of the complementarity between the work of the Centre and Sida's policy and interests. At the same time, the Review Team finds that the logic for Sida's very specific programme support is less clear than it once was and that a move to core support could be considered. In this case, it would make sense to also consider combining the Swedish support into a single contribution.

#### The Review Team **recommends:**

- Sweden to continue its support of the GICHD and provision be made for core support.
- Sida, in its dialogue with GICHD, to encourage the development of practical guidelines relating to the Centre's advisory and evaluation roles in order to avoid possible conflicts of interest arising.
- Sida, in its dialogue with GICHD, to encourage the further development of operational guidelines relating to linking mine action with development.

# 1 Introduction

This document presents the results of an external review of Sida's support to mine action activities between 2001 and 2009 undertaken by COWI A/S and Channel Research. The Review Team comprised Elsebeth Krogh (team leader)(COWI), Tim Lardner (COWI/Lardner Associates), Laurent de Valensart (Channel Research), and Julian Brett (COWI).

The overall purpose of this external review is to provide Sida with a comprehensive assessment of the support provided from Sida to mine action activities between 2001 and 2009. This will feed into Sida's planning of its future engagement in the area. The primary intended users of the review within Sweden are the management and staff of Sida, the Swedish MFA, and the MSB. The secondary intended users are the implementing partners, e.g. UN agencies, MAG and DDG, not least in relation to the two country studies that were undertaken during the review in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Iraq. Another secondary intended user is the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).

The Review Team would like to thank management and staff of the mine action organisations visited in Iraq and the Democratic Republic of Congo for planning and facilitation of visits and hospitality and logistical assistance during our country visits. Sincere thanks also go to the national mine action authorities, Sida representatives, UN representatives, non-governmental organisations and other stakeholders consulted. We would also like to extend our gratitude to resource persons met at the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, Geneva Call and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Geneva.

## 2 Mine action: A sector in transition

### 2.1 Key mine action developments and donor trends

Global mine action has received in the region of USD 3.7 billion during the last decade<sup>1</sup> of which Sweden has contributed USD 178 million (around 5%).

In the early days of mine action, focus was very much on the clearance of mined areas and the numbers of mines and square metres of land cleared. Much has however changed, and the mine action industry had become much more directed towards softer, but more meaningful outputs. Tools used by mine action actors have developed and improved at the operational level (for example, metal detectors are significantly more effective and reliable than ten years ago) as well as at the implementation level (for instance, the increasing use of impact monitoring systems is helping operators to deliver mine action to the right places at the right time).

Additionally, operating methodologies and processes, such as technical and non-technical surveys as well as the relatively new “land release” concept, have improved significantly the effectiveness of programmes. The many lessons learned in the sector as a whole have undoubtedly led to the delivery of a more focused product and something of greater benefit to the beneficiaries of mine action activities, as well as the international community, including donors.

The donor community, including Sida, has followed this development closely and has shifted its focus so that funding processes now recognise the importance of impact, outcomes and results, monitoring, participatory approaches and focus on beneficiaries rather than purely the number of mines removed and square metres cleared. As our report shows, however, there continues to be a need to extend these positive developments further and optimise the outcomes of mine action efforts.

In addition, in a number of countries, the traditional mine action NGO implementers are coming under a certain degree of competition from commercial operating companies who provide effective results in certain areas – mainly operational - which may well complement the work of the NGOs by allowing them to focus on the more impact focused areas of work.

### 2.2 Defining mine action

Although the clearance of Remnants of War (and more recently *Explosive* Remnants of War {ERW}) has been undertaken to some degree or other for many hundreds of years, the formalised “Mine Action industry” only became more broadly understood and accepted at the end of the 1980s, following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Here, the effects of mines and ordnance were seen publicly to be inflicting large numbers of casualties upon the civilian population.

Mine Action entails much more than removing landmines from the ground and is, indeed, much more than just landmines. The UN's five pillars of mine action<sup>2</sup> outline actions ranging from teaching people

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<sup>1</sup> Landmine Monitor 2009 – between 1998 - 2008

how to protect themselves from the danger posed by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXOs) to advocating for a mine-free world.

The United Nations states: *“Mine action is not just about landmines. In many countries, unexploded ordnance, or UXO, poses an even greater threat to people's safety. UXO comprises bombs, mortars, grenades, missiles or other devices that fail to detonate on impact but remain volatile and can kill if touched or moved. Some of the main sources of UXO are cluster bombs. Today, mine action programmes typically address problems of landmines, UXO and "explosive remnants of war (ERW)," which include UXO and "abandoned ordnance," or weapons left behind by armed forces when they leave an area”*<sup>3</sup>.

Central to Mine Action is the focus on people and mines. According to the International Mine Action Standard's definition, mine action is “...not just about demining; it is also about people and societies, and how they are affected by landmine and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) contamination.”<sup>4</sup> The objective of mine action is to reduce the risk from landmines and ERW to a level where people can live safely; in which economic, social and health development can occur free from the constraints imposed by landmine and ERW contamination, and in which the victims' needs can be addressed”.

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**Mine action comprises five complementary groups of activities:**

- mine risk education (MRE)
  - humanitarian demining, i.e. mine and ERW survey, mapping, marking and clearance
  - victim assistance, including rehabilitation and reintegration
  - stockpile destruction, and
  - advocacy against the use of anti-personnel mines.
- 

## 2.3 The nature and scope of the mine problem

Mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) mutilate, kill and may create serious socio-economic blockages that act as barriers to development and deny people their basic rights. In 2008 (the most recent year with reliable data available), more than 70 countries and 7 areas not internationally recognised<sup>5</sup> reported landmine casualties<sup>6</sup>, of which Afghanistan, Lao PDR and Cambodia are generally regarded as the most mine and unexploded ordnance affected countries with the greatest number of civilian victims. Of the main countries in which mine action is, or has been, supported by Sida, the following table provides an overview of recent casualty rates:

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<sup>2</sup> Mine Risk Education; humanitarian demining (mine and ERW survey, mapping, marking and clearance); victim assistance, including rehabilitation and reintegration; stockpile destruction; and advocacy against the use of anti-personnel mines.

<sup>3</sup> [http://www.mineaction.org/section.asp?s=what\\_is\\_mine\\_action](http://www.mineaction.org/section.asp?s=what_is_mine_action)

<sup>4</sup> *Glossary of Mine Action Terms*, IMAS 04.10

<sup>5</sup> “Areas not internationally recognised” is the terminology referring to those areas not internationally recognised as states – the likes of Nagorno Karabakh, Western Sahara, Palestine, South Sudan.

<sup>6</sup> Landmine Monitor, 2009.

Table 2-1: Annual casualties in main Sida recipient countries<sup>7</sup>.

Country	Casualties (2007)	Casualties (2008) <sup>8</sup>
Iraq	216	263
Lebanon	130	28
DRC	28	14
Afghanistan	811	992
Sudan	91	65+
Somalia	74	116
Bosnia & Herzegovina	30	39
Nicaragua	15	3
Cambodia	352	269
Global total recorded	5,426	5,197

Source: *Landmine Monitor*, 2009.

Most countries have experienced a decrease in casualties over the years. This may partly be due to increased and improved mine risk education (leading to a higher coverage), better knowledge and avoidance of mine-affected locations. In some countries, the casualty decrease may be explained by mine clearance progress. However, it should be noted that the collection and maintenance of the statistics regarding mine casualties are dismally poor in many countries. Significant underreporting takes place because figures are based on victims that have sought assistance or come in contact with mine action personnel. Considering the distances, lack of transport and the extreme bodily harm that most accidents result in, mine action experts suggest that in some countries a high percentage die before reaching a medical facility and therefore go unrecorded.

## 2.4 The international response

Although mines and unexploded ordnance has affected military personnel and civilians over the last century, it is only in the last 20 years that a formalised response has emerged. This stemmed originally from the NGO response to the humanitarian crises in Afghanistan, Cambodia and other severely affected countries.

### 2.4.1 International treaties

There are a number of international agreements and treaties in place that regulate or ban the use of mines and ERW under certain circumstances. These instruments are a part of the body of international

<sup>7</sup> Although these figures are from a reputable source (*Landmine Monitor*), it should be noted that all such statistics have a factor of unreliability reflecting the logistic and operational challenges of operating in the country concerned. For example, Lebanon's casualty figures are likely to be far more reliable than those of Somalia or DRC.

<sup>8</sup> This figure represents casualties caused by mines, explosive remnants of war (ERW), and victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs)

humanitarian law which seeks to limit the effects of armed conflict for humanitarian reasons. The principal agreements and treaties are:

<b>Mine Ban Convention (1997) and follow-up</b> (also known as the Ottawa Convention or the Ottawa Treaty and referred to in the rest of this report as the Mine Ban Treaty)	<p>Today, 156 States are legally bound by the convention to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• never use anti-personnel mines, nor to “develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer” them;</li> <li>• destroy mines in their stockpiles within four years of the treaty becoming binding;</li> <li>• clear all mines in their territory,</li> <li>• in mine-affected countries, conduct mine risk education and ensuring that mine survivors, their families and communities receive comprehensive assistance;</li> <li>• offer assistance to other States Parties, for example, by providing for survivors or contributing to clearance programmes;</li> <li>• adopt national implementation measures (such as national legislation) in order to ensure that the terms of the treaty are upheld in their territory.</li> </ul>
Protocol 5 of the <b>Convention on Conventional Weapons</b> (2006)	<p>The Convention prohibits or restricts the use of weapons which cause excessive injuries and have indiscriminate effects on people. Protocol 5 entered into force in November 2006 and provided an opportunity for the international community to deliver effective action against ERW. Protocol 5 of the Convention aims to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reduce the risks of explosive remnants of war. This includes negotiating responsibility for clearance and providing risk education to local populations;</li> <li>• Improve the reliability of munitions through voluntary best practices to minimise the humanitarian risk of munitions that might become explosive remnants of war; and</li> <li>• Continue to implement existing international humanitarian law.</li> </ul>
<b>Convention on Cluster Munitions</b> (2008)	<p>Article 1 of the convention states that each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use cluster munitions;</li> <li>• Develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, cluster munitions;</li> <li>• Assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.</li> </ul>

In particular, the Mine Ban Treaty has proved to be an incredibly powerful piece of legislation. Statistics indicate some of the impact of the treaty - with average annual casualties now being in the region of 5,000 per year<sup>9</sup> which is a substantial reduction from the estimated 15-20,000 of the late 1990s. Not only has the treaty reduced casualties and suffering, it has also focused the world's attention on matters relating to explosive remnants of war and encouraged donors to focus their funding on effective reduction of casualties and the associated reduction in poverty. Currently, the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) for the Mine Ban Treaty is located within the GICHD and this achieves effective outreach. With the binding ratification of the CCM taking effect on the 1<sup>st</sup> August 2010, there will need to be an ISU for the CCM. The location and support to this ISU is currently being hotly debated and is politically sensitive. Sida needs to be aware of the issues around this and consider options for continuation, or not, of the MBT ISU.

<sup>9</sup> In 2008, there were 5,197 casualties caused by mines, explosive remnants of war (ERW), and victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs), Landmine Monitor 2009.



## 2.5 Key Stakeholders

The mine action sector is characterised by the presence of many different stakeholders with a variety of interests, including from the United Nations, international and national NGOs, governments in affected countries, donor governments, commercial operators, and not least affected population groups. An overview of major stakeholders and their role in relation to the principal types or sectors of mine action activities is presented in the table below. For more information on the key stakeholders, please refer to Annex 3.


Table 2-2 – Overview of key stakeholders in the mine action sector

	Sector	Mine Clearance	Mine Risk Education	Victim Assistance	Stockpile destruction	Advocacy	Capacity development	Humanitarian assistance
UNMAS		-1-	-2-	-2-	-1-	-1-	-2-	-1-
UNDP		-2-	-2-	-2-	-2-	-1-	-1-	-1-
UNICEF			-1-	-1-		-1-	-2-	-1-
Mine Affected countries		-1-	-1-	-1-	-1-	-2-		
Affected governments		-1-	-2-	-1-	-1-	-2-		
Affected populations		-2-	-2-	-2-				
Sida		2	2	2	2	2	2	-1-
Other major donors		-1-	-1-	-1-	-2-	-1-	-1-	-1-
Commercial operators		-1-						
INGOs		-1-	-1-	-1-		-2-	-1-	-1-
National NGOs		-1-	-1-	-1-		-2-	-2-	-1-
Peacekeeping operations		-1-						-1-
NMAA		-1-	-1-	-1-	-1-	-1-	-2-	-2-

Key: -1- = main role / -2- = supporting role

Analysis of the coverage, strategies, capacities, and funding modalities of the main stakeholder groups understandably reflects the roles and interests of the parties concerned. In general, the trend over the past decade has been one of increasing capacity from national mine action authorities and centres following support from the UN, GICHD and, to a lesser extent, international NGOs. INGOs continue to be the main mine action operators in the field, with funding coming from bilateral donors. UN agencies (particularly, UNMAS, UNDP and UNICEF) receive earmarked and unearmarked funding from bilateral donors, including Sida. The UN agencies and INGOs operate in the range of contextual settings, including countries in conflict. The NGO Geneva Call is unique in its explicit engagement of non-state actors in conflict settings. The key stakeholders and their relationships are shown in the figure below.

Figure 1: Key stakeholders



The figure presents an overview of the main stakeholder groups in the mine action sector, their respective roles and interaction with each other. In the comments inserted for each stakeholder the Review Team has related to the findings of this review and expressed the desired change or end situation that would follow from our recommendations. For further details on the roles of key stakeholders please refer to the matrix enclosed in Annex 3 of this report.

### 3 Approach and methodology

This review took place between March and July 2010 and was divided into four phases: 1) Inception, 2) Desk studies, 3) Field studies, and 4) Analysis and reporting.

In the **inception phase**, the research methodology was developed and approved by Sida before the Review Team proceeded to the next phases. The **desk study phase** comprised an overview of performance and results at the overall level from Sida supported mine action programmes in the five main priority countries for Sida mine action support (Afghanistan, DRC, Iraq, Lebanon, and Sudan) as well as four additional countries (Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Nicaragua and Somalia). The **field study phase** comprised field studies in DRC and Iraq during which Sida-supported programmes were reviewed. In addition, a visit was paid to Geneva for an assessment of the GICHD and for consultations with UNDP and the NGO Geneva Call.

The Review team draw from a series of evaluative questions framed around a number of **core issues**:

- **Prioritisation:** In light of the fact that mine clearance is a high-cost activity it is relevant to see how land for clearance is selected and prioritised in relation to the degree of suspected mine and UXO contamination and in relation to socio-economic factors and developmental needs.
- **Methods and tools** applied in mine action: The combination of Sida support to research and methodological development at GICHD and the support to mine action programmes provides a unique opportunity for knowledge transfer and learning processes. We attempted to gauge the extent to Sida-supported programmes emphasize learning processes and apply latest tools and methodologies, such as the land release concept.
- **Degree of local involvement:** Active participation by beneficiaries in mine action activities is likely to establish local ownership and strengthen local capacity and the potential for sustainability.
- **Linkage to development activities:** While this appears in strategies and goals of most organisations involved in mine action, it often remains a good intention and only in a few cases has it been really implemented in the field. Integration of mine action into development programmes in the countries supported is a priority for Sida and we sought to see how this is pursued in the countries supported.

This external review has assessed the relevance and outcome of Sida supported mine action programmes against the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria *Relevance, Sustainability, Impact, Effectiveness and Efficiency*, supplemented by two additional criteria from the IMAS Guide for the Evaluation of Mine Action Interventions of 2007, namely *Coherence* and *Coordination*. In addition, the UN objectives for gender mainstreaming mine action programmes have been used as criteria for assessing the gender aspects of the Sida supported programmes.<sup>10</sup>

Sida's priority-setting and management of the mine action portfolio of programmes has been mirrored against the Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles<sup>11</sup>, as a considerable part of the funding has come


<sup>10</sup> Gender Guidelines for Mine Action Programmes, UNMAS, 2005

<sup>11</sup> Please refer to [www.goodhumanitarianandonorship.org](http://www.goodhumanitarianandonorship.org) for a full list of the 23 principles

from the humanitarian budget line. International best practice for evaluations in fragile and conflict affected situations<sup>12</sup> has also been considered, since mine action programmes are often found in countries affected by conflict, either in-conflict or post-conflict. In addition, the Aid Effectiveness Framework based on the Paris Declaration (2005), which is mostly used in connection with development programmes (and is partly congruent with some of the GHD principles), is also reflected in the analysis.

The evaluation criteria and the core mine action related issues mentioned above form the backbone of the evaluative questions which are included in the Outline Evaluation Matrix in Annex 5. The analytical framework used by the Review Team is presented in the diagram below.

Figure 2 Analytical framework



In the diagram, our understanding of the interaction between the three main elements of the review is shown, these being (a) the overall, macro assessment of outcome (the results achieved from Sida's support to mine action), (b) the operational, field level and (c) the contribution made to both by the knowledge generation from GICHHD and activities undertaken by other global organisations. We see this as a dynamic process in which the main elements are interactive. For example, we have asked about the effect that GICHHD has on agencies working at field level and the contribution that the latter makes in return to knowledge generation. Guiding our overall approach to the review has been the evaluation criteria, core issues and overall principles set out in the boxes to the left and the right of the diagram.

<sup>12</sup> Please refer to the OECD DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, 2007

A mix of evaluation techniques was applied to meet Sida's wish for a **quantitative** and **qualitative** assessment. Our most important tool was **key informant** interviews with management and staff of the organisations under review, semi-structured using check lists as inputs to open-ended explorative interviews. We have triangulated information obtained by using data and information from different sources - external as well as internal. We have interviewed a broad cross-section of **stakeholders**, including relevant government authorities, NGOs, UN and other international agencies, and direct beneficiaries. **Focus group** sessions were used in particular in consulting beneficiaries, using an adapted, simple most-significant change (MSC) type of approach. It was a limitation, though, that the team only had the opportunity to talk to relatively few beneficiaries in Kurdistan and DRC due to the thinly populated areas in which the mine action operations were located. At the end of each field mission, the Review Team held a **feedback session** with the organisations under review during which core preliminary observations were presented and validated. Where important stakeholders could not be visited in person, we used **telephone interviews** to obtain information from stakeholders. Some information was also provided by e-mail.

The combination of case study countries covered by field visit and other countries covered mainly by document review posed certain **limitations**, as the two groups of countries are assessed at different levels. In the field visit countries, the Review Team had a good chance to assess at first hand the extent to which operations in the field lived up to the objectives and strategies set out in programme documentation and Sida policy. However, in the desk study countries, this was obviously not possible to the same degree and the team was reliant to a far greater extent on the documentation made available, which was in many cases of varying quality. While a number of telephone interviews were undertaken to clarify specific aspects, it was generally not possible to conduct the same level of rigorous analysis as with the field visits.

## 4 Sida's engagement in mine action 2001-2009

This chapter provides an overview of Sida's policy basis for support to mine action, its main partners, the funding provided, and the types of interventions supported.

### 4.1 Sida's policy paper for mine action

The Policy for Sida's Support to Mine Operations (an internal document from 2002) is based on the principle that a given country's mine problems and the solution to them should be 'owned' by the country itself. According to the policy, Swedish support to mine operations will primarily be directed to countries facing large and long-term mine problems, but also countries coming out of conflict situations that have prevented from mine clearance will be included as partners.<sup>13</sup> There is considerable focus in the policy on the sustainability and long-term perspective in relation to Swedish support to mine action, and national capacity building and integration of mine action programmes in development plans and programmes of the countries are strongly emphasised,

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#### Focus areas for Sida's policy paper for mine action

- Retaining interest in present programmes
- Integrating mine action with other development programmes
- Contributing to building up national structures and capacity
- Supporting short-term programmes with a humanitarian aim
- Humanitarian demining, in particular surveys and data collection, expertise where Sweden has a comparative advantage, and mine clearance
- Victim assistance
- Mine awareness
- Stockpile destruction
- Support to the international community in relation to coordination and to the UN
- Long-term financing, in particular for building national structures
- Support to transfer of know-how to affected countries.

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### 4.2 Channels and level of support at country and global level

Since the early 2000s, Sweden has been among the ten largest bilateral agencies supporting mine action with annual contributions of around SEK 100 million.<sup>14</sup> Out of the total amount disbursed to mine action between 2005 and 2009, approximately SEK 364 million was humanitarian funding and SEK 174 million was allocated from development budgets in Sida. The requirements in terms of length of project period, reporting etc. are quite different between humanitarian and development funding. Humanitarian allocations are usually delivered as rapid disbursements for up to 6 months with relatively light

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<sup>13</sup>The Policy for Sida's Support to Mine Operations, 2002


<sup>14</sup> Sida's contribution to mine action 2005-2009, Internal Memo, Sida Nov. 2009

requirements to project documentation and reporting, whereas the allocations from development budget lines are subjected to a much larger machinery of strategic, monitoring, and documentation demands. The support is primarily provided through four main channels:

- a. International NGOs: supporting delivery of mine clearance, technical capacity building, mine risk education and associated activities.
- b. United Nations and certain other international organisations (such as the Organisation of American States): the support has generally been through un-earmarked allocations for mine action and specific country programmes
- c. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining: which has provided international advocacy, methods development and work related to the MBT, and
- d. Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB): where the flexible support has been utilised in mine action in various countries


Drawing from the financial information provided to the Review Team by Sida, we can depict the approximate distribution of funds between these actors as shown below.

Figure 3: Share of Sida funding to mine action as a percentage



And the distribution according to the main countries supported as shown below:

Figure 4: Share of Sida funding to nine reviewed countries 2005 - 2009



The Swedish global contribution (SEK 94 million) to the UN, GICHD and Geneva Call covers a large number of countries, whereas the bilateral support agreed for the period 2005 – 2009 has been mainly focused on five countries (namely, Iraq, Lebanon, DRC, Afghanistan, and Sudan).<sup>15</sup> Of the nine countries covered by this review, the funding provided and the implementing partners is presented in the table below:

Table 4-1: Overview of main recipients and implementing partners

Country	Implementing Partners	Timeframe	Total funding (SEK)
Afghanistan	DDG with UNMACA and MAPA	2005-2010	57.1 million
Bosnia & Herzegovina	Bosnia & Herzegovina MAC, through UNDP Integrated Mine Action Programme	2003-2008	22 million
Cambodia	Cambodia MAC through UNDP	2001-2005	58.8 million
DRC	MAG, MSB	2005-2010	62.1 million
Iraq	DDG, MAG, MSB/ICRC	1998-2009	77.1 million
Lebanon	MSB with UNOPS and UNMAS Rapid Response Plan for Mine Action	2006-2009	65.6 million
Nicaragua	OAS with IADB	2002-2005	23.5 million
Somalia	MSB with UNDP/UNOPS and UNMAS	2004-2009	51.8 million
Sudan	MSB with UNMAS and UN Mine Action Office in Sudan, UNMAO, DDG	2004-2009	40.9 million

Source: Sida

#### 4.2.1 Types of activities supported

Sida has spread its funding widely over the core elements of mine action. Examples of projects undertaken in each of the five “pillars” are:

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**Mine Clearance.** The core element of many of Sida’s funded activities has been focussed though Sida’s partners undertaking operational programmes in countries including Afghanistan, DRC, Iraq, Somalia and Sudan. The description “mine clearance”, as well as pure demining activities, refers also to associated activities including technical survey, mapping, marking, clearance, post-clearance documentation, community mine action liaison and the handover of cleared land. More recently, activities under the generic description “land release” have come under this description. Land release is a process that has gained rapid acceptance in the global mine action community for its potential to improve efficiency of operations. Support for mine clearance activities has been channelled through MAG, DCA, DDG, NPA, the OAS, and one country programme, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre.

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**Victim Assistance.** This refers to all aid, relief, comfort and support provided to victims (including survivors) with the purpose of reducing the immediate and long-term medical and psychological implications of their trauma. Support for victim assistance activities has particularly been channelled through UNICEF activities.

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<sup>15</sup> The following countries also received Swedish funding within country frames or from the humanitarian appropriation during 2005 – 2009: Albania, Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Nicaragua, OPT, Russia, Senegal and Sri Lanka.



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**Mine Risk Education.** These are activities which seek to reduce the risk of injury from mines/ERW by raising awareness and promoting behavioural change including public information dissemination, education and training, and community mine action liaison. Support for MRE activities is a key element of the majority of operational programmes supported by Sida.

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**Advocacy.** In the context of mine action, the term refers to public support, recommendation or positive publicity with the aim of removing or at least reducing the risk from, and the impact of, mines and ERW. Direct support for advocacy has been primarily through the organisation Geneva Call and their interaction with non-States actors.

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**Stockpile Destruction.** The physical destructive procedure towards a continual reduction of the national stockpile. Support to stockpile destruction forms an element of a number of operationally implemented programmes.

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As noted in the opening chapter of this report, the mine action area is under constant development and it is worth highlighting some examples of this. The **Land Release Concept** is an attempt to improve cost-effectiveness of clearance efforts, based on a **situational analysis followed by non-technical and technical surveys**. Sida has supported the development of this concept at both the research level (through the GICHD) and at the operational level through a number of implementing partners. In many mine action programmes throughout the world, deminers, machines, dogs and other expensive assets are deployed in areas that are subsequently found to be free from hazards. While this gives confidence to the end users that the land is safe and allows them access to it again, it does, in the long run, provide very poor use of the limited resources available within the demining community. However, a more targeted process that allows the right tool to be used in the right place at the right time will improve efficiency and effectiveness and thus allow the limited resources available to the community to be used much more effectively, resulting in better value for money for donors and more rapid impact for affected communities.

**Mine Detection Dogs (MDD)** also present significant opportunities to improve the efficiency of the mine clearance process. Unfortunately, there are as many opportunities for investments to be utilised poorly and MDD assets need to be deployed and operated under tight constraints. Meanwhile, **Community Liaison** is a series of activities designed to improve the ability of an organisation to implement effective mine action. Activities include drawing information from communities and educating them about the dangers posed by ERW.

#### 4.2.2 Recipient organisations

Sida's core recipient partners consist of key actors in the mine action community whose experience provides a broad and well balanced cross section of the whole mine action environment – as shown in the overview below.

United Nations	Description	Sida support
<b>UNMAS</b>	UN's mine action coordinating body	SEK 5-7 million per year
<b>UNICEF</b>	Mine Risk Education, Victim Assistance	SEK 27,5 million between 2003 & 2009
<b>UNDP</b>	Capacity Building of national mine action authorities	SEK 10 million per year

International NGOs	Description	Sida support
<b>Mines Advisory Group (MAG)</b>	Humanitarian organisation. Operating in 16 countries. Co-laureate of 1997 Nobel Peace Prize through ICBL.	SEK 83.3 million since 2005 in Iraq, DRC and Sri Lanka.
<b>Danish Demining Group (DDG)</b>	Humanitarian Mine Action Unit in Danish Refugee Council. Operating in 7 countries.	SEK 125.3 million since 2005 in Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan and Iraq.
<b>DanChurchAid (DCA)</b>	Humanitarian Mine Action part of broader humanitarian organisation. Operational in MA in 6 countries.	SEK 4.75 million since 2005 in Burundi.
<b>Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)</b>	Mine Action Dept. in humanitarian solidarity organisation. Operational in Main 15 countries.	SEK 16 million in 2005-2006 in Angola.
Other organisations	Description	Sida support
<b>Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB)</b>	An organisation undertaking rapid interventions in emergency situations.	SEK 171.7 million between 2005-2009 in 14 countries.
<b>Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)</b>	Organisation undertaking research, supporting mine action implementation and the mine action community. Works closely with UN on IMSMA standards. Hosts the Implementation Support Unit under the Mine Ban Treaty.	SEK 49 million since 2001 (35 from MFA, 7.3 from Sida, and 6 from other Swedish sources).
<b>Geneva Call</b>	Neutral and impartial humanitarian organisation supporting non-state actors in IHL and HR compliance.	SEK 5 million in 2008-2009.
<b>Organisation of American States (OAS)</b>	Peace and justice organisation of the member states.	SEK 13.2 million in 2005-2006 in Nicaragua (declared landmine free in 2010).

### 4.3 Findings from the 2001 evaluation

Prior to this Review, the most recent evaluation of Sida's contributions to mine action<sup>16</sup> was concluded almost ten years ago and drew a number of major conclusions as well as a number of recommendations. These core recommendations were subsequently fed into the current Sida policy on mine action. The Review Team finds that the key recommendations from 2001 are still pertinent. In *table 4-2* below, the overall achievement of these recommendations is assessed.

<sup>16</sup> Sida's Contributions to Humanitarian Mine Action, Sida evaluation 01/06, Harpviken *et al*, Stockholm, March 2001,

Recommendation	Recommendation actioned in policy?	Recommendation actioned in actions?	Comments
HMA programmes need to be based on solid systems for impact assessment and on routines for converting results of assessments into sound plans and priorities.	In principle	Limited	Although programmes often claim to have effective impact monitoring systems in place, more often than not, these are not strong. <i>Examples: MAG, DDG.</i>
HMA organizations should make sure that all staff have a basic understanding of impact and its relationship to HMA. One way this can be accomplished is by integrating impact sessions in the basic training of staff.	In principle	Limited	Although basic impact and its relationship is often understood to a limited degree by technical staff, the Review Team saw little evidence of inbuilt impact training in technical staff. <i>Examples: Programmes visited in DRC and Iraq.</i>
Sida must require from any HMA programme it supports that a comprehensive and locally adapted system for impact assessment is either in place or is being developed.	In principle	Limited	In both field visit countries, the Review Team was unable, despite the claims of the operational organisations, to find substantive and effective post clearance impact monitoring systems in place.
Sida should, in internal appraisals as well as evaluations of HMA, take care not to apply simple output measures, such as cost per square metre, as a proxy for programme quality. A similar caveat can be applied to relying solely on one type of impact assessment, which may favour certain factors at the exclusion of others.	In principle	Limited	Square metres are generally not used as indicators by Sida's operators, but there remains some difficulty with operational capacities understanding of impact monitoring mechanisms. <i>No examples seen of applying this recommendation.</i>
Sida must emphasize the building of national capacities, both at the individual and the organizational level, and safeguard capacity-building during all stages of an operation, including the initial planning stage.	In principle	To some extent	Sida's implementers are doing capacity building but not consistently and often without a strategy. <i>Examples: MAG Iraq and DRC.</i>
The coordination between HMA and other sectors of reconstruction and development needs to improve. The view that HMA is a technical sector apart from other parts of humanitarian assistance remains prevalent. In order to improve coordination between HMA and other humanitarian assistance, they must be integrated at the early planning stages and steps must be taken to ensure that plans are updated to accommodate new demands.	In principle	Limited	Mine Action still sees itself as a separate entity and there is often a major challenge to integrate into the broader humanitarian assistance sector.

Recommendation	Recommendation actioned in policy?	Recommendation actioned in actions?	Comments
In general terms, there is a need to ensure that in-kind contributions to HMA constitute a relevant response to the particular needs of the recipient country. In-kind contributions that are motivated by the donor country's needs to build competence or to support its own national organizations should be avoided.	In principle	Limited	While the principle is sound, there are examples of where this has failed badly. MSB's deployment to DRC has not been entirely successful.
Sida should continue its secondment of technical advisors, as long as it is able to ensure full relevance of skills through dialogue with hosts and to uphold good recruitment procedures. No TA should be seconded unless competence-building is a central aspect of the mandate. Sida should expand its recruitment base in order to respond to requirements in all areas of HMA, such as impact assessment.	Yes	Yes	This appears to be implemented well and contributes significantly to the capacity building of national authorities and bodies. <i>MSB's secondments and capacity building projects are good examples of this.</i>
Sida needs to closely monitor the progress of the dog project in Cambodia. Historically, the project, implemented by the Swedish Armed Forces, has been a failure, with major flaws in the organizational set-up as a key problem. Sida needs to ensure its ability to withdraw from the project unless significant improvements take place.	Yes	Yes	Project is closed.
Sida should not assume that personnel involved possess a basic understanding of humanitarian assistance when they employ Swedish capacities in HMA. Sida needs to take greater responsibility in terms of building the necessary expertise and establishing relevant institutional arrangements, drawing on its broad experience in Swedish capacity-building for development cooperation.	No	No	<i>The MSB intervention in DRC</i> showed significant lack of understanding of the basic principles of humanitarian assistance.
Sida needs to apply longer funding horizons	No	No	Funding horizons reasonable as far as the Review Team could see. Closer monitoring would need to be applied if funding periods are to be made longer.

Recommendation	Recommendation actioned in policy?	Recommendation actioned in actions?	Comments
Sida needs to maintain personnel with HMA competence that can advise and build competence amongst other decision makers within the organization.	No	No	The Review Team believes this is a major weakness in Sida's internal capacity.

#### 4.4 Lessons learnt since the 2001 evaluation

The 2001 evaluation clearly pointed to some major weaknesses in the mine action sector, and the current review has found that most of these are still present in relation to projects and programmes supported by Sida. A number of lessons can be learnt from the developments since the evaluation took place and the policy was formulated. These include the need for:

- a stronger push from donors regarding outcomes and impact
- different competency profiles of staff, particularly staff with humanitarian and development experience
- a more strategic approach to building national capacities
- linking with development activities and national development plans, and
- the lack of mine action expertise within Sida can lead to a risk of inadequate monitoring and quality assurance.

These issues are taken up and discussed in the remainder of this report.

## 5 Compliance with Sida's policies and strategies

### 5.1 Relevance of Sida policies and strategies for mine operations

The *Policy for Sida's Support for Mine Operations* was produced in 2002 and is thus based on the experience of the 1990s (and the evaluation of 2001), when donors started allocating substantial amounts of funding to mine clearance operations. At the same time, global advocacy efforts led to the banning of anti-personnel mines in the Mine Ban Treaty signed in 1997 and put into effect from 1999.

As the fourth largest donor in the sector, Sweden gathered important experiences from the 1990s, as documented in reports from 2000 -2001.<sup>17</sup> One of the important findings also supported by international assessments was that the mine action activities that emerged and grew in volume during the 1990s were dominated by highly specialised technical experts with little connection to development cooperation. Costs were extremely high compared to other sectors, effects and results were rarely evaluated, coordination was weak, and mine action developed into an isolated sector. In its policy document, Sida pointed to the need for a new direction in mine action, balancing the urgency of the mine problem with consideration of longer-term post-conflict rehabilitation and development aspects. In particular, Sida wished to give more prominence to in-country capacity building and considering social needs in a broader sense.<sup>18</sup>

The focus areas defined by Sida in the policy are largely based on the experience mentioned above and all circle around aspects of coordinating and integrating mine action with other development activities, and strengthening in-country capacity and ownership.

This policy paper is now eight years old now and does not reflect the process of implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty or recent agreement on the Cluster Munitions Convention. However, the subsequent developments in the mine action sector show that many of the points are still highly relevant. For example, very few (if any) of the mine action organisations have managed to establish an effective link to development activities and most are still struggling with documentation of results and impact beyond the output level. Some have prioritised capacity building of national mine action authorities and made some headway in that area, but few have reached the point of sustainable in-country capacities and exit strategies for the international organisations.

Surprisingly, the Review Team did not come across anybody related to the Sida-supported mine action programmes in the two field visit countries who had heard about Sida's mine action policy. This could of course be explained by its age and the turnover of programme staff in the countries since 2002, but it also suggests the possibility that Sida has not promoted this policy directly vis-à-vis implementing partners.

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<sup>17</sup> *Preliminary report and analysis of Swedish support for different forms of mine action and a preliminary policy for future support* (SEKA, 2000-02787/10) and *Sida's Contribution to Humanitarian Mine Action* (Andersson, Harpviken, Millard, Hjellman, Strand) *Sida Evaluation 01/06*.

<sup>18</sup> *Policy for Sida's Support for Mine Operations, Sida 2002*

The status of the mine action policy never went beyond that of an internal Sida document, used as guidance by the focal points for mine action in Sida.<sup>19</sup> Given the lack of knowledge of its existence amongst implementing partners, it seems not to have been enforced or promoted to any significant extent outside Sida. Rather, the implementing partners stated that the donor interest (shown by donors across the board) in linking to development and documenting socio-economic impact is a recent trend felt during the past couple of years. In principle, this trend is acknowledged by them as relevant, but there is a widespread view that they should nonetheless concentrate on their core business of 'getting the contamination out of the ground' and that broader development efforts are outside their scope of work.

The apparent lack of knowledge of Sida's mine action policy indicates a possible missing link between the policy priorities of Sida and implementation on the ground. While parts of the policy relate to the selection and assessment of projects and could be considered internal Sida issues, it also mentions two focus areas that could have had significant impacts on the direction of the mine action programmes at country level if followed. These are, 'Integrating mine action with other development programmes' and 'Contributing to building up national structures and capacity'.

A further issue that could be addressed by a strategic and action oriented document could be the choice of countries to be supported in mine action by Sida. Until recently the funding has been spread among 17 countries, although five priority countries have now been selected: Afghanistan, DRC, Iraq, Lebanon, and Sudan. Of these, only Afghanistan and Iraq have had considerable numbers of casualties during the past couple of years, while Cambodia and Somalia – countries not included in Sida's priority list – according to pure accident statistics have much more serious contamination than e.g. DRC or Lebanon.<sup>20</sup> Other considerations could be to avoid 'aid orphans' in mine action through strategic use of UNDP and other global actors, or coherence with Sida's humanitarian or development programmes in specific countries. This underlines the need for a directional strategy on criteria for choice of countries to be supported.

Another issue of importance is the need for Sida to follow up on programmes to ensure adherence with the policy and assure quality and fulfilment of programme objectives. It was found during this review that Sida's monitoring of mine action programmes is not very tight and that implementing partners express a need for more feedback and communication from Sida.

In light of the considerable amount allocated to mine action programmes in the last decade (in the range of SEK 100 million per year) it is striking how light the monitoring of progress and quality has been. It appears to have been relatively easy for implementing partners to get their funding renewed from one programme phase to the next. This lack of follow up is due to a number of factors, including lack of clear monitoring guidelines for this type of programmes, several departments and desks involved with unclear assignment of responsibilities, insufficient capacity to assess these specialised programmes, and possibly also an imbalance between the political wish to contribute to mine action and the resources necessary to manage the level of commitment established.<sup>21</sup>

A clearer division of labour between Sida Stockholm and country offices, as well as a combination of close monitoring from country offices and the assistance of an external specialised expert could be a viable solution for improving the quality assurance. To some extent, GICHD has been used for this purpose (through the PAT project). However, as GICHD is an actor in its own right, it might be questioned whether this close-to-Sida advisory role is best placed there. If mine action remains a priority

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<sup>19</sup> Ref. interview with the former mine action focal point Alf Eliasson

<sup>20</sup> Landmine Monitor 2008 and 2009

<sup>21</sup> There was a standing order for a number of years that app. SEK 100 million should be used for mine action.

area, *it might be relevant to employ internal specialised expertise to ensure appropriate quality assurance*. This also resonates with the findings of the 2001 evaluation.

### Relationship to Sida country strategies

A finding from the Iraq study was that mine action is not mentioned in Sida's country strategy for Iraq that otherwise focuses on the two sectors (i) Democracy, governance and human rights and (ii) Trade, industry and financial systems.<sup>22</sup> The strategy includes a quite elaborate country analysis and current challenges faced. It even touches upon the situation of refugees and internally displaced people and the importance of the link between migration and development without any reference to mine contamination or Sida's long-standing support to mine action programmes in the Kurdistan region. It is mentioned that almost half of the Swedish development assistance to Iraq in 2003 went to humanitarian aid, but apart from that, the strategy does not cover the humanitarian part of the Swedish assistance.

Sida's country strategy for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has the overall objective to strengthen the conditions for lasting peace and improve living conditions for poor people.<sup>23</sup> The Swedish assistance is concentrated on three sectors: (i) Peace, reconciliation and democratic governance, (ii) Poverty oriented economic development with a focus on agriculture and forestry, and (iii) Health with a focus on preventing, addressing and fighting against gender-based violence and promote sexual reproductive rights and health. Gender equality has been given a prominent place in the strategy, in particular promotion of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. It is also stated that Sweden will scale up humanitarian assistance to refugees and internally displaced people with a specific focus on women and children. The country analysis states that around 70 per cent of the poorest groups are dependent on forests and biodiversity for their livelihood, in particular in the forest region in the north of the country. In addition, the decisive role of agriculture as the primary source of livelihood for the poor is emphasised, again with a particular focus on women who are responsible for 75 per cent of the food production in the country. Economic activity in these two sectors requires secure access to land and therefore mine action programmes would seem highly relevant in this context. Mine clearance is mentioned alongside other security related inputs under the peace, reconciliation and democratisation strategic cooperation area.<sup>24</sup> The results of Sida support to clearance of mines and ammunition in Eastern and Northern DRC are mentioned in the strategy among examples of specific results of Swedish support.

The Review Team undertook a selective screening of Sida country strategies from other countries where Sida is or has been supporting mine action, and this revealed a rather uneven picture in terms of the priority given to the sector.

In the country strategy for development cooperation with *Afghanistan* 2009 – 2013<sup>25</sup> it is mentioned under "Selective measures" that conditions for support to land-mine and unexploded ammunition disposal would be looked at, as the threat of mines and unexploded ammunition was seen as adding to an already serious humanitarian situation. Land mine clearance was one of five priority cooperation areas in Sweden's country strategy for *Somalia* 2003-2005, as the mine problem was seen as an obstacle to the return of refugees and their reintegration including accessing areas for

<sup>22</sup> *Strategy for development cooperation with Iraq, July 2009 – December 2014*, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>23</sup> *Strategi för utvecklingssamarbetet med Demokratiska republiken Kongo, april 2009 – december 2012*, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, page 4

<sup>25</sup> *Strategy for development cooperation with Afghanistan July 2009 – December 2013*



dwelling and small-scale agriculture.<sup>26</sup> In addition it is mentioned that Danish Demining Group had initiated a socio-economic study of the landmine problem in Somalia during the strategy period. The subsequent strategy document for Swedish aid-financed support to the peace and reconciliation process and humanitarian needs in Somalia – an ”approach” - from 2007, however, does not mention mine action. In the Swedish strategy for development cooperation with *Bosnia and Herzegovina* 2006 – 2010,<sup>27</sup> mine action is mentioned as a factor important both for human safety and security and to economic development, and it is clearly placed as a priority for Swedish support to the country i.e. describing some planned interventions in quite some detail. The country strategy for *Cambodia* 2008-2010 states that support to mine clearance activities and infrastructure projects has been phased out, in line with Cambodia’s poverty reduction strategy.<sup>28</sup> The phase-out strategy for Swedish support to *Nicaragua* June 2008 – December 2011 does not mention mine action,<sup>29</sup> nor does the Swedish Strategy for Humanitarian Assistance to Sudan 2000 – 2001<sup>30</sup> ( no newer strategy was found).

In conclusion it is found that mine action has been presented and argued for as a strategic priority in the strategies for Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan, and DRC, while the sector is not mentioned in the strategies for Iraq or Sudan. Cambodia and Nicaragua are both characterised by time limited engagement and phase-out. Even though Sida emphasises coordination and coherent approaches, humanitarian assistance is not integrated in the strategic thinking in all countries, nor is mine action. This leads to the conclusion that mine action would benefit from being more systematically included as a strategic priority in country strategies where the sector is in fact prioritised and, as a consequence, becomes a mandatory subject in the reporting and subject to more regular assessments and evaluations than is currently the case.

### **Sida’s humanitarian strategy**

The overall objective of Sida’s work on humanitarian assistance is to *save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity for the benefit of people in need who are, or are at risk of becoming, affected by armed conflicts, natural disasters or other disaster situations.*<sup>31</sup> Mine action is highly relevant to this overall objective, although Sida’s engagement in mine action is not directly mentioned in the strategy. The intention to continue supporting the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) – now MSB – is however mentioned. In this strategy from 2008 it is indicated that future support to SRSA (which in 2007 received 8% of the humanitarian budget) will be based on ‘assessed humanitarian needs, demand and the comparative advantages, competence and capacity of the SRSA’.<sup>32</sup> It is also stated that Sida will consult with the Swedish MFA regarding the support to SRSA, which presumably includes support to mine action programmes. It is noted that support to mine action may also be included in the allocations to the ICRC and UN agencies mentioned in the strategy.

The humanitarian strategy is based on a strong affirmation of Sweden’s loyalty and adherence to International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and the humanitarian principles, as well as the Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles (GHD). It also underlines the importance of supporting and defending the unique coordinating role of the UN in international humanitarian assistance, as well as

<sup>26</sup> *Country strategy for development cooperation with Somalia January 2003 – December 2005*

<sup>27</sup> *Strategy for development cooperation with Bosnia and Herzegovina January 2006 – December 2010*

<sup>28</sup> *Sida Cambodia Country Strategy 2008-2010*

<sup>29</sup> *Phase-out strategy for Swedish support to Nicaragua June 2008 – December 2011*

<sup>30</sup> *Strategy for Humanitarian Assistance to Sudan 1 January 2000 – 31 December 2001*

<sup>31</sup> *Sida’s Strategy for Humanitarian Assistance 2008-2010*, Sida 2009

<sup>32</sup> According to Sida’s website, MSB now usually receives around SEK 120 million a year amounting to a little less than 5% at an average during 2008 – 2010, [www.sida.se](http://www.sida.se) (accessed in July 2010).

backing up the European Union's Humanitarian Aid Policy. The directional goals of the strategy are centred on needs based humanitarian action, local capacity development, preparedness and risk reduction, reducing the gap between humanitarian and recovery action, and strengthening coordination and adherence to principles in the international humanitarian system.

At the time of writing the current report, Sida is undertaking an evaluation of its humanitarian assistance which will prepare the ground for formulating a revised strategy for the future, updated and adapted to current humanitarian challenges such as the increased pressure on human security and protection and humanitarian consequences of climate change. It is noted that the humanitarian strategy and the mine action policy are by and large consistent despite different publication years.

## 5.2 Is there a missing link between policy and implementation?

An overall assessment of the consistency between the policy paper and the implementation of Sida supported mine action programmes on the basis of the review of the implementation organisations shows a generally positive picture. However, there are certain areas that appear to lack coherence, notably in relation to the linkage between mine action and development, as already noted. The Review team's assessment is provided in *table 5-1* below:

Sida policy focus area (2002)	Overall status of implementation (2001-2009)
<b>Retaining its interest in present programmes</b> (...) but the possibility of reappraisal and phasing out shall be kept under continuous consideration.	Fulfilled. Sida has normally funded more than one project phase. Decision of five main recipient countries.
<b>Integrating mine action with other development cooperation programmes.</b> Sida shall integrate mine action in strategies in partner countries affected by the consequences of mines.	Generally not fulfilled. Mine action invisible in national development strategies and Sida strategies at country level.
<b>Contributing to building up national structures and capacity.</b> The support shall have the aim of contributing to (...) sustainable national capacity.	Fulfilled in terms of training local staff. Partly fulfilled in terms of strengthening national mine action authorities.
<b>Supporting short-term programmes with a humanitarian aim.</b> Use NGOs or commercial companies in certain humanitarian situations where the need of long-term support is unclear or it is not possible to create national structures.	Fulfilled.
<b>Humanitarian demining.</b> Sida's support shall focus on particular surveys and data collection, expertise where Sweden has a comparative advantage, and mine clearance.	Fulfilled. Although Swedish comparative advantage not specified.
<b>Victim assistance.</b> Sida will provide victim assistance within the framework of its regular health contributions and through its support to organisations such as the Red Cross et.al.	Fulfilled.
<b>Mine awareness</b> will be supported within the framework of support for mine clearance or as a separate activity.	Fulfilled. Integral part of most mine action programmes.
<b>Stockpile destruction</b> is not normally supported by Sida since it should be seen as a military action rather than a development cooperation contribution.	Not strictly fulfilled. Stockpile destruction is an integrated element of some mine action programmes supported.

Support the international community by building up coordinating functions for mine action in UN programmes. At present, support for this through the UN system is most appropriate.	Fulfilled. Sida has provided considerable support to UN's global organisations dealing with mine action.
Consider long-term financing of support to mine action, principally for the building up of national structures.  (Since) mine action is a long-term activity the forms of financing should be suitably adapted.	Fulfilled. Financial commitments are there as part of NGO support – but implementation varies.
<b>Support for transfer of know-how to the countries affected.</b> The participation by representatives of the countries affected is often limited in international cooperation in mine action for financial reasons. Greater participation by these countries shall be supported.	Generally fulfilled. This is achieved through the close links established between implementing partners and national authorities.

### 5.3 Options for bridging the gap

In order to improve the consistency between the levels of policy and implementation, the Review Team considers there are a number of immediate steps that Sida can take, as well as some different options to consider.

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#### IMMEDIATE STEPS

**Intensify monitoring of field programmes:** Clarify where primary monitoring responsibility lies, initiate more frequent monitoring visits to the programmes and create awareness with implementers of Sida's policy and requirements. Review reports from implementers and do not provide next phase funding unless implementing organisations report satisfactorily against technical and socio-economic objectives.

**Establish better linkages** between staff working with mine action in Sida HQ and country offices.

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#### OPTIONS FOR MEDIUM TO LONG TERM

##### Ensure mine action expertise internally in Sida:

OPTION A: Establish expertise in Sida HQ through employing a staff member with mine action background or training of existing staff.

OPTION B: employ external experts on a consultancy basis to assist with monitoring and quality assurance of programmes.

##### Continue and strengthen the policy priority of linking mine action to development:

OPTION A: In coordination with GICHD develop programmatic guidelines for implementing organisations, thereafter arranging workshops for awareness raising and training.

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OPTION B: Encourage implementing organisations to employ more staff with a development background and/or bring in external expertise to develop action plans for linking mine action programmes to development initiatives.

**Update Sida's mine action policy** according to subsequent developments in the sector and develop an action plan for policy implementation with clear assignment of responsibilities with different units in Sida HQ and embassies.

OPTION A: Maintain a separate mine action policy with an action plan.

OPTION B: Mainstream mine action in other policies and strategies (humanitarian, country strategies, etc.)

**Develop clear strategic principles for how to uphold quality and measurability** in programmes supported, e.g. through clear criteria for country selection (seriousness of contamination, avoid 'orphans' and coordinate with other donors, or coherence with other Sida programmes?).

**Policy choices:** Consider whether political objectives (e.g. fulfilling obligations to Mine Ban Treaty) or humanitarian/development objectives should direct decisions on investments and country priorities in relation to mine action.

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## 6 Overall results of support to mine action

In this chapter, the review findings and conclusions on the outcome of mine action projects and programmes supported by Sida are presented. The assessment is based on results documented by the implementing organisations in the period under review 2001 – 2009 and by information gathered during the two country studies of Iraq and DRC, interviews with GICHD and UNDP in Geneva, as well as with key Sida and MFA staff. The results are assessed in relation to the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria, the IMAS guide for evaluation of mine action interventions (consistent with the OECD-DAC criteria with a few additions), and the Sida policy paper for support for mine operations (essentially based on the principles for Good Humanitarian Donorship).

### 6.1 Outcome of support to global organisations

In this section, we review the support provided by Sida to the main organisations working on mine action at the global level. These include UN agencies, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), and Geneva Call. A somewhat greater focus has been placed on GICHD than on the other recipients due to the emphasis placed on the Centre's role in our Terms of Reference.

#### 6.1.1 UN agencies

As the focal point for mine action in the UN system, UNMAS (which is part of DPKO) is responsible for ensuring an effective, proactive and coordinated UN response to landmines and ERW through collaboration with other UN departments, agencies, funds and programmes. Sida's support to UNMAS is seen as relevant from the perspective of Sida's mine action policy and its humanitarian strategy. It also appears relevant in the context of the peacekeeping and emergency settings where UNMAS establishes and manages mine action coordination centres, plans and manages operations, mobilizes resources and sets mine-action priorities. The SEK 5-7 million a year to UNMAS' mine action programmes has been provided as un-earmarked support which is a flexible means of making contributions that also reduces transaction costs. UNMAS provides reporting through its annual reports which, while not donor specific, are generally outcome related.<sup>33</sup> In addition, Sida's contributions to MSB also support UNMAS, who have recently had secondees attached to programmes in Iraq, Lebanon and Gaza.

Sida's support to UNMAS has been unearmarked. Although it is therefore difficult to identify specific projects as a result, the Review Team understands that UNMAS' recent successful intervention into Somalia was largely funded by Sida contributions through MSB. As the focal point for mine action in the UN, UNMAS has used the Inter Agency Coordination Group (IACG) and country resident coordinators as the means of preventing overlap between UN agencies. UNMAS are beginning a coordination process through cluster approaches to develop a more transparent and effective methodology. Using UNMAS' annual multi-donor annual report as the reporting mechanism reduces the administrative report burden that UNMAS would otherwise have - and thus transaction costs are kept low. On the other hand, it is less useful as a means of monitoring the use of Swedish funds.

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<sup>33</sup> For example, UNMAS Annual Report 2006

One of UNMAS' advantages lies with it being the only UN agency completely dedicated to mine action issues without the distractions that the other agencies involved in mine action have. In its coordinating function, it also takes the lead in monitoring the UN's **Inter-Agency Mine Action Strategy**. The strategy has four objectives to be achieved by 2010:

1. Reduction of death and injury by at least 50 percent.
2. Mitigate the risk to community livelihoods and expand freedom of movement for at least 80 percent of the most seriously affected communities.
3. Integration of mine-action needs into national development and reconstruction plans and budgets in at least 15 countries.
4. Assist the development of national institutions to manage the landmine/ERW threat, and at the same time prepare for residual response capacity in at least 15 countries.<sup>34</sup>

It is difficult to identify precisely how well these objectives have been achieved – in part because the baseline was not identified in a number of cases. However, UNMAS informed the Review Team that good progress has been made regarding objectives 1 & 3. Objective 2 is proving more difficult to measure. The list of countries working with UNMAS has expanded since 2006 and this appears to have made it difficult to achieve objective 4. The current strategy is under review and is likely to be revised in the early part of 2011.

Sweden's support to UNDP has been channelled to 20 or so countries plus to the global advocacy partnerships between UNDP and NGOs (such as Landmine Action UK and others).<sup>35</sup> The funds have supported a range of activities from enabling critical support (e.g. in Senegal and Colombia), to capacity development (e.g. in Uganda and Yemen), to mine action activities like clearance, victim assistance and mine risk education (in Senegal, Albania, Yemen, etc.), and to generation of small scale economic recovery programmes linked to clearance (Lebanon). The funding has also enabled mine-affected states to complete their treaty obligations in relation to clearance provisions under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (e.g. in Malawi, Zambia, Albania).

UNDP is prioritising capacity development and treaty obligations in the support provided to national mine action authorities and affected states. One such project is the Completion Initiative which targets affected countries with a modest residual problem which a concentrated effort can address and treaty obligations fulfilled. The Review Team notes that, while this approach is necessary to achieve completion, it does raise questions regarding the opportunity cost of focusing on residual contamination which may or may not be an actual problem in relation to risk and/or access to productive land.

An example of UNDP's capacity building and policy support role is provided by the *Clearing for Results* project in Cambodia (which benefitted from modest Sida support). Since 2006, UNDP has helped the Cambodian Mine Action Authority (CMAA) with planning, prioritization and regulation of

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<sup>34</sup> United Nations Inter-Agency Mine Action Strategy: 2006-2010, UNMAS, New York 2006

<sup>35</sup> Including: Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Guinea Bissau, Jordan, Lebanon, Malawi, Mauritania, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Uganda, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Information provided by BCPR, Geneva.

mine action in Cambodia. According to a recent review, the project has made "considerable headway in affecting broader sector reform, most notably in the targeting and application of mine action assets, as well as the systematization of survey and land release approaches. There is also firm evidence that the project has been pivotal in consolidating the institutional and operational functioning of the CMAA".<sup>36</sup> UNDP informed the Review team that the community-based system used by the project for planning mine clearance activities is designed to ensure that clearance responds to community needs and therefore maximize the development impact.<sup>37</sup>

Similarly, UNDP's support to the Integrated Mine Action Programme (IMAP), with a significant Sida contribution, appears to have been both relevant and effective. IMAP has been evaluated twice, firstly by GICHD in 2006 and more recently by an independent consultant in 2010. The two assessments differ considerably in their technical detail, with the 2006 GICHD review carrying greater technical weight. Both reviews found the Programme to be effective in supporting the development of national capacities due to the quality and continuity of the UNDP technical advisers (which were gradually reduced as the national authority gained strength). A significant achievement appears to have been the programme's Community Integrated Mine Action Plans which combine clearance, technical survey, marking and MRE and result in prioritisation of areas for clearance that take into account demand for settlement and economic usage.<sup>38</sup> Despite this, and interestingly, it is only the latter (2010) review that provides details of development impact where it is noted that areas cleared include "sites with tourism potential, agricultural areas and infrastructural projects".<sup>39</sup>

Sweden provides global, multi-year, flexible funding for UNDP's mine action programmes, which is appreciated because of the flexibility it offers. Reporting on the support is provided on a country by country basis and focuses almost exclusively at the activity and output level.<sup>40</sup> Aside from demonstrating that a programme is active, the Review Team finds that the value of this as a means of monitoring deliverables against Sida's Mine action Policy and UNDP's own strategy is questionable. In their future dialogue with UNDP, the Review Team therefore recommend that Sida investigate whether this can be strengthened.

Sida's support to UNICEF's Office of Emergency Programmes has been used to build and mainstream mine action and small arms capacity. In UNICEF's *Global proposal to support the implementation of UNICEF mine action, 2006-2009*, the overall purpose is set out as to help enable UNICEF to meet its commitments in its Core Commitments for Children (CCC) in emergencies, UNICEF's Medium Term Strategic Plan (2006-2009), and the UN Mine Action Strategy (2006-2009). The proposal covers both mine action and small arms activities and Sida's funding is divided between the two thematic areas. From this allocation, UNICEF's programming staff distribute the funds to country programmes and global activities relating to mine action and small arms/violence reduction. While the two areas appear complementary rather than overlapping, the Review Team suggest that it might be useful to distinguish them more clearly in financial and narrative reporting (see below).

<sup>36</sup> Review of 'Clearing for Results' A Landmine Partnership for Cambodia (2006-2010), UNDP

<sup>37</sup> Correspondence with UNDP Cambodia, Sept 2010

<sup>38</sup> *Mid term Review of the UNDP Integrated Mine Action Programme (IMAP)*, GICHD and CIDA, July 2006 and the *Ex-Post Final Evaluation Report of the Integrated Mine Action Programme*, Emina Abrahamsdotter, April 2010.

<sup>39</sup> Abrahamsdotter, 2010

<sup>40</sup> An example is UNDP Zambia's 2007 annual report in relation to its *Support to mine action services to promote socio-economic development*.

UNICEF's Mine Action Strategy (2006-2009) highlights four key result areas which the Review Team sees as relevant in relation to Sida's own Mine Action Policy. The four Areas are: Mine Risk Education; greater integration of mine action and small arms and light weapons (SALW) into UNICEF's humanitarian, human rights and development activities; increased compliance with political and legal instruments relating to landmines, ERW and SALW; and advocacy and assistance for landmine survivors. The strategy notes that activities under these headings will build on existing programmes, be capable of being sustained, focus on areas with high concentrations of casualties, reduce risk for high risk groups and support rehabilitation and reintegration of survivors.<sup>41</sup>

In North West Pakistan, over 2.5 million people have been displaced as a result of armed conflict. The use and presence of landmines/ERW posed a direct threat to the lives and safety of returning IDPs and local communities which has been made worse by the 2010 floods. In 2010, using LASAC funds, UNICEF HQ deployed a mine action specialist for two weeks to support the country office and other partners in developing and implementing an emergency response. During the mission a coordination group was established, emergency mine/REW risk education messages and materials developed, and 27 people from partner organizations trained on implementation of emergency MRE.

From the documentation seen by the Review Team, these objectives appear to have been followed through in the activities supported by Sida.

UNICEF mine action interventions are located within its Landmines and small arms cluster (LASAC) which is part of the *Child Protection* Section. Capacity for mine action is maintained at both headquarters level as well as at country level. UNICEF staff explained to the Review Team that their approach is to work through local implementing organisations to the extent that this is possible, providing training and enhancing capacity with specialists from UNICEF's global team where required, as the example from Pakistan in the box above illustrates. It was noted that an important issue is the need to ensure that local organisations maintain their capacity and "currency" in relation to emerging trends and developments within the sector. In this respect, GICHD knowledge products, for instance on MRE and IMAS (to which UNICEF contributed), are reportedly valuable educational tools.<sup>42</sup>

UNICEF's reporting on the use to which Sida's funds were put is essentially output based and appears consistent with the programme log frame set out in the global proposal. The May 2009 report states that they helped facilitate the provision of technical guidance and assistance to country and regional offices, develop emergency mine risk education tools and training, research and knowledge management, and support to strategic coordination. Countries benefitting from Sida supported mine action interventions have included Bosnia-Herzegovina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Iraq, Laos, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines and Sudan.<sup>43</sup> Although both the mine action and small arms areas are covered in the narrative reporting that has been seen by the team, there is not a sufficiently detailed breakdown of financial expenditure to show the actual division in practice.<sup>44</sup> Given that Sida's support to LASAC falls under the general heading of "mine action" this is potentially misleading. To increase clarity, an option would be to use distinct funding lines in the future and report against the two areas separately.

<sup>41</sup> *Mine Action Strategy 2006-2009, UNICEF.*

<sup>42</sup> Interview with UNICEF HQ Staff Member, 9 Sept 2010. Note, Sida also supports violence reduction through the project *Reducing the impact of small arms and light weapons on children and their communities* which is also part of the Landmines and small arms cluster (LASAC).

<sup>43</sup> *Progress Report on UNICEF mine action and small arms activities funded by Sida*, May 2009, UNICEF and an interim update for 2010 provided to Sida in September 2010. Other countries benefitted from small arms and violence reduction activities.

<sup>44</sup> *A global proposal to support the implementation of UNICEF mine action 2006-2009*, February 2006, UNICEF.



There was a reasonable consensus amongst the mine action actors consulted during this review that these three UN agencies each fill a key and important role within mine action. UNMAS, as the key coordinating agency, is able to justify its central role in the coordination of mine action and in the implementation of effective mine action programmes where governments are unable to fulfil the role themselves.<sup>45</sup> UNDP fills an important position working with governments and supporting the development of those nations and their programmes. Both agencies are seen to be distinct and in general operating in separate environments. There are a few occasions where UNMAS have overlapped to fulfil functions that UNDP may well fill in other places (for example, in Sudan, UNMAS have just recruited a development advisor in south Sudan where UNDP were also providing a development advisor {although UNDP are now in the process of closing the whole of their Sudan mine action programme}), but in general, overlaps are few. UNICEF have such a unique role that the likelihood of overlap is very small and it seems important that core funding is maintained for them.

### 6.1.2 GICHD

The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Disarmament (GICHD) is considered highly relevant to Sida's policy for support to mine action operations, where *support for transfer of know-how to the countries affected* and *contributing to building up national structures and capacity* are highlighted as priorities. The Centre contributes directly and indirectly to these aims, including through its knowledge development activities, its support to mine action standards (IMAS), the MBT Implementation Support Unit (ISU), its evaluation activities, and information management, as well as through the provision of training, research, workshops and technical advice to NMAAs. The Centre's global reach is also a relevant factor: in 2009, for example, the Centre undertook activities (in the form of training, research, workshops or technical advice) in 64 countries.<sup>46</sup> Currently receiving around 7% of the overall Swedish contribution to mine action, the support to the Centre contributes to the latter's role as an enabling actor and it thus appears as a strategic choice given the overall success of the GICHD in its core roles.

The *relevance* of the Centre to the overall mine action context was considered in a recent evaluation of GICHD commissioned by the Swiss Government and GICHD itself.<sup>47</sup> Here it was observed that there is a generally positive view amongst stakeholders of the relevance of the Centre's products, particularly amongst National Mine Action Authorities and Centres. It should be noted, however, that the Centre also has its detractors, some of whom "felt that the Centre was wholly unnecessary and irrelevant".<sup>48</sup> Relevance was also considered in an earlier evaluation of GICHD's support for technology and mine action standards from 2008.<sup>49</sup> The following assessment draws from both evaluations as well as from interviews with a number of stakeholders.

As noted earlier in this report, Swedish funding to GICHD is provided from the MFA and Sida through core and programme funding respectively. In the latter case, the support has been provided to the Programme Advisory Team (PAT), which was initially established to support Swedish mine action interventions in Cambodia but was latter broadened to cover other countries. Support has also been

<sup>45</sup> Although, the team heard of at least one case where cohesion between the three agencies does not appear to have functioned as seamlessly as it should. Mentioned during interview with INGO in relation to Sri Lanka.

<sup>46</sup> GICHD Annual Report 2009. The Centre has around 50 full time staff and currently receives funding from around 17 bilateral donors and international organisations. Its annual operating budget in 2009 was CHF 13 million (approx. SEK 90 million).

<sup>47</sup> *A General Evaluation of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)*, 22 June 2010. David Hewitson and Arianna Calza Bini. This evaluation drew substantially from questionnaire responses.

<sup>48</sup> *ibid*

<sup>49</sup> *Evaluation of GICHD's Support for technology and Mine Action Standards*, Russel Gasser and Robert Keeley, 2008

channelled through a pool fund to sponsor participants from Mine Ban Treaty signatories at meetings of the States Parties.

**GICHD's advisory services** appear *relevant*, although their quality and usefulness depend upon the skills of the staff employed. It was noted by one interviewee that it can be useful to have GICHD as a non-partisan resource. However, the Review Team notes that there are a number of other sources of independent advice, including former mine action operators working on an individual consultancy basis, as well as commercial companies. This suggests the importance to GICHD of ensuring an appropriate focus (matching its capacity to demand) and ensuring that services offered are of high quality.

The Review Team notes that there has been discussion recently in GICHD's Advisory Board regarding potential conflicts of interest arising where GICHD undertakes evaluations in countries where it has itself taken a role. The Centre's response has been that it is aware of the concern and will be concentrating more in the future on evaluation training.<sup>50</sup> This issue is relevant to Sida given the support that has been provided to the PAT project which provides advisory services as well as occasional evaluations. It is unclear what the actual effect of this close relationship has been, for example in relation to Cambodia where GICHD was involved in both advisory and evaluatory roles. Such proximity generally goes against good practice for evaluations. *The Review Team therefore recommends that, in its further contacts with GICHD, Sida urges the Centre to develop guidelines for its evaluation and advisory services in order to increase transparency and avoid possible conflicts of interest.*

The *PAT* inputs appear to have been relevant and helpful. Most *PAT* reports are relatively detailed and include assessments of follow-up since the previous assessment, status of operating capacity, shortcomings, organisational linkages, gender, work plans and practical recommendations. While the Review Team has not had an opportunity to assess their impact, the consistent use of the same *PAT* personnel for most of the missions to Cambodia and Afghanistan will have contributed to continuity of experience, in principle enabling *PAT* to better monitor progress and provide advice.<sup>51</sup> A further advantage of this system for Sida will have been the reduced transaction costs through the on-call facility. However, while these advantages apply to the advisory role, they need to be weighed against potential conflicts of interest that could arise if the same organisation was to be involved in evaluations.

With regard to the *Sponsorship Programme*, the Review Team assesses the objective of facilitating participation by signatories at Mine Ban Treaty events to have been relevant. The key meetings supported under the Sponsorship Programme can be seen as having a catalytic effect which, while difficult to define, helps maintain momentum in the MBT. The modality used (i.e. pooled funds) is also relevant as it represents a joint effort. However, the Review Team questions the logic of this role being drawn from Swedish development funds given the political objectives involved. We note that funding from Sida to the Sponsorship programme stopped in 2008.

The Review Team was asked by Sida to assess GICHD's **contribution to knowledge development**. Overall, our findings concur with those of the separate evaluation of GICHD which reveals that most mine action actors are appreciative of GICHD's technical knowledge products, particularly IMAS and the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). The IMAS provide important benchmarks (which implementing agencies and NMAAs then incorporate into their own SOPs) and

<sup>50</sup> GICHD Board minutes, 24 March 2009. The issue was raised again at the 30 November 2009 meeting.

<sup>51</sup> *PAT* mission reports to Cambodia in 2001 - 2005.

GICHD provides a useful, and impartial, service on behalf of UNMAS in keeping them regularly updated. The development of IMAS also allows the possibility of "compliance" monitoring.

It is possible that the generally positive view of the Centre from NMAAs reflects the greater needs of these national actors for accessible information and advice. Meanwhile, the IMSMA, which is a technical database designed for mine action operators in the field, is used in more than 50 mine action programmes globally. The system has been upgraded to enable remote access which according to GICHD has improved its responsiveness.<sup>52</sup>

The 2008 evaluation of GICHD's support for technology and mine action standards concluded that the Centre provided an impartial and authoritative source of advice on technology and standards and that it had made a significant contribution in both areas. In relation to technology, it was noted that GICHD had been very active in relation to the International Test and Evaluation Programme (ITEP) and in relation to standardisation. The role in relation to mine action standards was equally well reviewed, including GICHD's own initiatives to help countries develop their own standards. There was, however, a need to improve its programming processes and particularly in relation to the linkage between overall goals and the activities needed to achieve them in order to ensure correct prioritisation (greatest impact).<sup>53</sup>

There is a generally positive view amongst stakeholders of the Centre's *effectiveness*, although, there are some detractors.<sup>54</sup> Again, NMAAs were found to be the most favourable and the work of the ISU was also regarded favourably. However, a number of interviewees consulted in the separate evaluation of GICHD expressed concern about the currency of some of the Centre's staff, noting that they had been "away from the field for too long" which might have an effect on the way in which the Centre's products are received. The Centre's management informed the Review Team that it is responding to this concern by taking steps to ensure greater throughput of staff. MSB's seconded dog expert who has been with the Centre for over ten years is one such case.

The Centre's operating methodology in relation to its knowledge products typically involves a participatory process in which key stakeholders are involved throughout the development and subsequent outreach process. An example is the development of MRE standards together with UNICEF. This is seen as an effective way of drawing from field expertise, perspectives and experience from different actors, and outreach. And thus it has some capacity building spin-offs as part of the process.

In relation to the effectiveness of its outreach and capacity building of NMAAs, the Centre's ability to maintain contacts and disseminate its products is important. In general, the success of this role depends upon the appropriateness of the inputs and the ability of the advisor to maintain momentum through sparring and follow up. Delivery through relevant languages also appears very important. In the GICHD evaluation, it is noted that some organisations appeared frustrated at the perceived "lack of communication between GICHD staff and key actors with a long time presence in affected countries." Language was also raised as an issue affecting overall effectiveness of inputs and being worthy of greater attention.<sup>55</sup> It is also noted that the choice of participants for training events is important and there has been some concern that the Centre has not consistently targeted the right recipients. The

<sup>52</sup> GICHD Annual Report, 2009.

<sup>53</sup> Gasser and Keeley, 2008.

<sup>54</sup> Hewitson and Calza Bini, 2010

<sup>55</sup> Ibid

GICHD evaluation recommended that the Centre "identify key indicators of quality associated with the delivery of its services and products".<sup>56</sup>

In relation to information management, the Review Team understands that the utility of GICHD's Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) is being increased and ensuring its broad availability is included in the current GICHD strategy as a main activity.<sup>57</sup>

In relation to coordination and the overall coherency of its approach, GICHD should be responsive to its international stakeholders, including the Advisory Board and donors. The minutes of Board meetings indicate that substantive discussion takes place on key issues - normally these are related to GICHD strategy and activities but the broad participation also facilitates useful linkages to other organisations and initiatives. This is regarded as contributing to overall effectiveness and efficiency.

The Review Team considers that GICHD's overall objectives are generally well targeted towards achieving a *sustainable* response to the threat of mines. This occurs mainly through their work relating to knowledge development (as part of which the quality and relevance of the Centre's publications is important), through the regularly updated IMAS, and through training and capacity building services to national mine action authorities. The focus on training the right people is seen by the Review Team as important because the NMAAs have a key role in ensuring sustainable national responses in the medium to long term. The PAT project contributed to sustainability in this way.

GICHD also has work streams on linking mine action to development and on impact monitoring, where they see their contribution as being mainly in area of standards and training. At the time of finalising this report, for example, the Centre's key person responsible for this area was providing training on M&E for mine action operators in Azerbaijan. The Centre's current focus on improving national M&E processes is seen to offer potential to help sustainability through making mine action more outcome orientated.<sup>58</sup> Meanwhile, the Centre's work on linking mine action to development (which includes a set of guidelines updated in 2009) responds to one of the primary gaps seen by the Review Team amongst a significant part of the sector.<sup>59</sup>

A key group of stakeholders are national authorities around the world. The Centre attempts to respond to the needs of NMAAs and is undertaking a needs assessment in collaboration with them. The Review Team finds it somewhat surprising, however, that this process has not been in place earlier (although it is appreciated that it had been done informally through working contacts). The Review Team notes that such processes often work best when facilitated and that GICHD should be in a good position to provide such facilitation (at least from a technical perspective - it may be necessary to also look at pedagogic aspects of the processes involved). As part of the needs assessment, it would also be useful for the Centre to investigate the degree and spread of its products that are considered by stakeholders to be most useful. Those which demonstrate low levels of currency or uptake should be dropped. This will help maintain the Centre's relevance and focus.

GICHD remains very keen to maintain its connection to Sweden. The Team's interviews with Sida and the Swedish MFA indicate a desire from the Swedish side for more information about GICHD's outputs and outcomes. There is a wish to see the use to which Sweden's funding has been put and the effect that

<sup>56</sup> Ibid, page 24

<sup>57</sup> *GICHD Strategy 2009-11, Strategic Goal 1.*

<sup>58</sup> E-mail correspondence with GICHD, September 2010

<sup>59</sup> *Linking Mine Action and Development: Guidelines for Mine/ERW Operastors*, November 2009, GICHD

it has had in terms of facilitating results. While the Review Team observes that there is a considerable amount of information available on GICHD's website, some of it is quite old and there would be value in GICHD's reporting being more regular and more concrete in terms of results as well as outputs. At the same time, the Team suggest that Sida and the Swedish MFA could be more demanding in their dialogue regarding the issues that they regard as important.

A further period of support should reflect progress on the key issues highlighted in the separate GICHD evaluation, particularly in relation to the continued relevance of its products and activities to key stakeholders. It should also involve greater responsiveness from GICHD towards reporting. The Review Team notes that a request from Sida at the end of 2009 for a summary of activities implemented using Sida support was, at the time of drafting this report some six months later, still outstanding. This tardiness risks a situation of diminishing confidence from one of the Centre's major donors.

### 6.1.3 Geneva Call

Sida has provided three year non-earmarked funding to the INGO Geneva Call, which is seen as a flexible and predictable way of supporting the organisation that is also in line with Sida's Mine Action Policy. The nature of Geneva Call's work requires a high degree of flexibility and ability to respond to opportunities that may arise.

The Review Team understands that a separate and more in-depth review of Geneva Call's work is underway in parallel to the present evaluation. This section of the report will therefore provide a brief summary of the organisation's perceived relevance and leave further assessment to the other review.

Geneva Call's main purpose is to engage with non-state actors (NSAs- typically rebel movements) to gain compliance with international humanitarian law and human rights law. In relation to mine action, the organisation has developed a niche focused on persuading NSAs to respect international humanitarian norms in line with the Mine Ban Treaty. The relevance of this is that anti-personnel mines have often been a weapon of choice for NSAs given their low cost and availability. In addition, the fact that NSAs may control territory means that there can be problems of access for mine action agencies with the consequence that communities receive less assistance than they need.

In response, Geneva Call's *Deed of Commitment* provides a mechanism for engaging with NSAs, who are not eligible to enter the Mine Ban Treaty, and securing their commitment to adhere to its norms. Geneva Call's 2008 Annual Report notes that, by the end of 2008, 35 NSAs from ten countries had signed the Deed of Commitment and that seven NSAs had destroyed stockpiled mines and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).<sup>60</sup> In its 2010 strategy, Geneva Call also draws attention to the potential to engage NSAs on child soldier and gender issues while addressing compliance with international standards on mines.<sup>61</sup> Sida's support to the organisation can thus be seen as also being strategically relevant from these perspectives.

Geneva Call does, however, operate in what can be a grey area with obvious political, reputational and security risks both to itself and to its donors. The organisation's management is well aware of this - and the issues were also highlighted in Sida's extensive internal assessment memo prior to the 2008 grant.

<sup>60</sup> Geneva Call Annual Report 2008. According to the 2010 Strategy, the number of NSA signatories has now risen to 39.

<sup>61</sup> Geneva Call, 2010 Strategy

Apart from the annual reports, the Review Team has not had an opportunity to review other reporting from Geneva Call to Sida.

#### **6.1.4 Conclusions on support to global organisations**

The support to the UN is in line with Sida's mine action policy and its humanitarian strategy. Furthermore, the choice of supporting the three key UN agencies with a mine action role enables Sida's funding to meet a range of needs in both emergencies and situations of peace - a spread of input that the Review Team also find relevant in view of Sida's development and humanitarian role. UNDP's contributions are dispersed and flexible and at an overall level relate well to Sida objectives in terms of national capacity building. UNICEF has the main role amongst the UN agencies for support to MRE and survivor assistance in emergencies as well as more stable situations. This enables it to act as a complement UNDP and UNMAS. The Review Team would emphasise the importance of these UN agencies pursuing a coherent and coordinated approach in countries where each is present.

Similarly, the Review Team also finds that the support to GICHD and Geneva Call has been relevant to Sida's Mine Action Policy, particularly in relation to knowledge development. In the case of Geneva Call, the Review Team would highlight the results achieved so far in relation to engaging non-state actors as well as the potential political, reputational and security risks. It is important that the latter are managed and that Sida maintains a close dialogue with Geneva Call.

In relation to GICHD, the Review Team would like to highlight the organisation's knowledge development and dissemination roles, its research, evaluation and capacity building functions, its hosting of the ISU for the MBT, and management of IMSMA (which is a key to mine action management in all countries). The location of these functions in one place make GICHD unique and a valuable asset for the mine action community. That said, to preserve these comparative advantages, it is important that the Centre maintains a role that is demonstrably non-partisan and neutral so as to avoid potential conflicts of interest. An effort should also be made to ensure its many products reflect the needs of its stakeholders, particularly national authorities.

The Review Team sees that GICHD is relevant to Sida's mine action policy and that its PAT project has contributed to capacity building of national and international implementers. Regarding the Sponsorship Programme, which Sida has also supported, it is difficult to see clear outcomes; however, the support has enabled national capitals from poorer states to be heard internationally and it has maintained momentum on mine action in these countries. Overall, with regard to GICHD, the Review Team finds that there is an argument in favour of Sida switching to core funding in a possible future collaboration. However, this should be predicated on a deeper dialogue and more regular reporting from GICHD's side.

Finally, and based on the documentation reviewed (which is not necessarily complete), the Review Team considers that greater effort should be made amongst all of the global organisations to identify and report at outcome level (i.e. on the impact achieved) and, as part of this, that there should be a clear identification of development impacts, including in relation to gender equality. The Review Team note that for this to happen, a result driven approach needs to be in place during project/programme formulation, including the setting of baselines and relevant indicators.

### 6.1.5 Recommendations

- Sida should continue to allocate a proportion of its funding available for mine action to the key UN agencies, UNMAS, UNDP and UNICEF. The allocation should be specifically for mine action (and not mixed with, for example, support to violence reduction) in order to ensure a better linkage to Sida's mine action policy.
- Sida should continue to support GICHD. It could consider a change to core support for GICHD with a single Swedish contribution to core costs. However, GICHD must improve its reporting and strengthen its dialogue with Sida in order to better communicate the results of its activities and their linkage to the needs of its stakeholders.
- Sida should also consider more stringent requirements regarding reporting from other global organisations so that the results of mine action interventions in terms of impact, including humanitarian and development impact, are more clearly displayed.

## 6.2 Outcome of support to country level projects and programmes

In this section we present the assessment of Sida-supported mine action programmes at country level against the evaluation criteria presented in chapter 3.

Countries covered in the assessment are Iraq and DRC (based on field visits) and Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Lebanon, Sudan, Somalia and Nicaragua (based on desk studies). A presentation of findings and conclusions regarding Iraq and DRC is presented in chapter 7.

### 6.2.1 Assessment of relevance

We have assessed the relevance in relation to Sida and recipient country policies, seriousness of mine contamination, and the needs of affected population groups - including gender aspects of relevance.

Sida supported mine action programmes in general appear to be well coordinated with *national priorities* as most implementing partners have established close links with national mine action authorities and/or UNMAS in the countries of operation. In many cases the programmes were started upon request of the mine action authorities and high relevance in this respect, as well as alignment with national priorities, has therefore been secured from the outset.

The relevance in relation to the *seriousness of mine contamination* is not clear in all cases, as for example in DRC which according to available information is not seriously affected by landmines or UXO. As a contrast to this, Iraq is said to have significant contamination, making the relevance of investing in mine action much higher there.

The Review Team finds that, while all the implementing organisations display a high emphasis on *improving conditions for people affected by mines* and UXOs in their overall strategies and objectives, this is rarely transformed into concrete knowledge gathering on specific needs and priorities of different groups in the population. The Review Team believes that ***a much better targeting vis-à-vis vulnerable groups could be achieved through systematically conducting socio-economic surveys as part of the needs assessment process to inform priority decisions on where to operate.*** This could also help establish a baseline for the operational areas that could be used for impact monitoring and assessment throughout the project cycle. Despite good intentions at the overall level, socio-economic aspects have

not really been prioritised or followed through in the mine action sector, and many of the programmes have developed as 'project islands' in isolation from ongoing development initiatives around them. An exception from this among Sida partners is DDG which has made some attempts to systematically include socio-economic parameters in objective hierarchies and indicators, and also started employing project managers with a broader development background than typically found amongst mine action technical experts.

RELEVANCE	
ASSESSMENT	EXAMPLES
<p><b>High relevance in relation to national strategies and priorities.</b></p> <p>Programmes well coordinated with national mine action authorities and/or UNMAS (in countries with no functioning national MA authority).</p>	<p><b>DRC:</b> MSB &amp; MAG aligned with MACC.  <b>Iraq:</b> MAG aligned with IKMAA &amp; GDMA.  <b>Afghanistan:</b> DDG aligned with UNMACA.  <b>Cambodia:</b> GICHD providing advisory services to CMAC.  <b>Bosnia-Herzegovina:</b> The BiH Mid Term Development Strategy has mine action as a priority sector.  <b>Somalia:</b> MSB and DDG contributions aligned with UN strategy.  <b>Lebanon:</b> MSB support on request from UNMAS and assisting LMAC.  <b>Sudan:</b> MSB support to national and regional mine action centres.</p>
<p><b>Relevance not clear in all cases in relation to seriousness of mine and UXO contamination.</b></p> <p>This is a comment to Sida's country priorities in relation to mine action support.</p>	<p>HIGH RELEVANCE: High Sida investments in highly contaminated countries: Iraq, Afghanistan.</p> <p>LOW RELEVANCE: High Sida investments in countries with relatively low contamination: DRC, Lebanon, Somalia, Sudan. Low Sida investments in countries with high contamination: Cambodia.<sup>62</sup></p>
<p><b>Little documentation of relevance to the needs of specific population groups affected by mines and UXOs –although socio-economic goals aspects mentioned in overall programme objectives.</b></p> <p>This is a comment to the implementing organisations' choice of operational areas in a given country.</p> <p>Much better targeting could be achieved vis-à-vis vulnerable groups through conducting socio-economic surveys as part of needs assessment processes.</p>	<p><b>DRC:</b> Limited knowledge, not documented.</p> <p><b>Iraq:</b> MAG building general knowledge in Kurdistan, but needs assessments not found. DDG maintaining focus on civilian population in context of crisis and including brief needs assessments in project documents.</p> <p><b>Nicaragua:</b> Humanitarian and development (socio-economic) goals mentioned in project documents at general level.</p> <p><b>General:</b> No systematic practice of needs assessments focusing on socio-economic factors found with implementing organisations.</p>

### 6.2.2 Assessment of effectiveness and efficiency

The effectiveness of Sida-supported mine action programmes is assessed against the degree of fulfilment of objectives of the interventions including actual release of land, the fostering of local capacities, and the extent to which activities previously hindered by landmines and UXOs have been resumed. To highlight efficiency the operations have been assessed with respect to how economically inputs and resources are converted into outputs.

<sup>62</sup> Please refer to table 2-1 for no. of casualties and table 3 in section 4.2 on Sida investments to individual countries.



The technical operations base of programmes reviewed in Iraq and DRC is strong and well developed. Planning processes and programme management are undertaken in an effective and efficient manner, and the quality of field operations including sound clearance principles and effective land release processes is generally very high. But effectiveness is not only about technical mine clearance. Reporting tends to focus solely on outputs at the technical clearance and land release level and not on outcomes. This leaves a gap in reporting fully on programme objectives which in most programmes also include broader socio-economic elements such as return to land, resuming economic activities such as agriculture, improving income etc.

Achievement of objectives related to involving and capacitating the local population, local and regional authorities, and the national staff is not reported on systematically. From the projects visited and the documents reviews this aspect appears often to be well achieved at the operational sites but addressed unevenly and in more informal ways at the level of national authorities.

EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY	
ASSESSMENT	EXAMPLES
<b>Generally high effectiveness</b> in technical operations, clearance and release of land	<b>Iraq and DRC:</b> First class technical base and management system observed during field visits.
<b>Varying effectiveness</b> in fostering local capacities	<p><b>Iraq:</b> MAG training local deminers but no systematic approach to building capacity with mine action authorities.</p> <p><b>Afghanistan:</b> DDG support to MAPA has increased capability of an Afghan independent organisation.</p> <p><b>Cambodia:</b> Evaluation 2004 showed that the Cambodian Mine Action Authority (CMAA) was judged at the time to be "weak and ineffective.....and largely ignored".<sup>63</sup></p> <p><b>Lebanon:</b> MSB effectively delivered results and added value to the Lebanese authorities.</p>
<b>Sporadic documentation of effectiveness</b> on resuming of activities previously hindered by mines/UXOs	<p><b>Iraq:</b> This aspect covered by MAG through case studies in reports but not aggregated.</p> <p><b>DRC:</b> MAG not able to document convincing results of the high investments.</p> <p><b>BiH:</b> Effectiveness documented in evaluation report (cap. building, field operations, land clearance).<sup>64</sup></p> <p><b>Nicaragua:</b> Studies indicate a direct link between mine clearance and subsequent improvements in development indicators.<sup>65</sup></p> <p><b>Sudan:</b> DDG effective in reducing risks for returnees, other community members and staff of humanitarian organisations.<sup>66</sup></p>
<b>Organisations reporting almost solely on outputs</b> rather than outcomes and socio-economic effects.	<b>Iraq:</b> MAG documenting no. of direct and indirect beneficiaries but not how they benefit.

<sup>63</sup> *Joint Evaluation of Mine Action in Cambodia*, Robert Griffen and Robert Keeley, December 2004

<sup>64</sup> *IMAP Ex-Post Final Evaluation Report, UNDP 2010*

<sup>65</sup> *Narrative report, Nicaraguan Front No.3*. OAS, 2001

<sup>66</sup> Sida DDG Evaluation, Draft Report March 2010, Korayi, Lardner and Wood, GICHD

### 6.2.3 Assessment of sustainability

The sustainability of the programmes under review is assessed from the point of what steps have been taken to ensure alignment with future needs and priorities in the countries and to what extent national capacity is built to ensure continued management of the mine and UXO contamination.

In general, the programmes reviewed are tightly coordinated with either national or regional mine action authorities and contain elements of capacity building and skills transfer. This way they have a good potential for leading to sustainable structures and capacities, even though some of them could benefit from a more systematic approach. Not all programmes have developed capacity building strategies as such, or systematic processes of transfer of knowledge with an eye on an exit strategy. There is a risk that some organisations are caught in a dilemma between leaving national capacity and making themselves redundant (which is good developmental thinking) on one hand, and a desire to keep activities going and keep up their business. This is underlined by the fact that several humanitarian mine action organisations already have started – or are considering – moving into the commercial sphere of working.

SUSTAINABILITY	
ASSESSMENT	EXAMPLES
Tight coordination with authorities generally ensure <b>alignment with future needs</b>	<p><b>Iraq:</b> MAG and DDG operations tightly coordinated with national/regional MA authorities and contain elements of capacity building and skills transfer.</p> <p><b>DRC:</b> National mine action authority not in place. Likely that DRC will need continued external support for many years to come, but until the degree of contamination is clarified, the question of sustainability remains unclear.</p> <p><b>Cambodia:</b> The support had a sustainability objective - The ultimate aim of this has been to enable CMAC to fulfil its mandate as the national mine action service provider.</p>
<b>Capacity building not always strategically addressed</b> to make INGOs redundant (few exit strategies)	<p><b>Iraq:</b> National government and Kurdistan regional government have access to considerable resources from the oil revenue, and Iraq is not a traditional developing country. An exit strategy for INGOs and Swedish support to mine action is however not in place.</p> <p><b>Afghanistan:</b> DDG provided sustained efforts and organisational development. But transition to full national control has not been successful due to corruption. A GICHD assessment in 2008 concluded that "MACA had a strong management team which had initiated "excellent" reforms, although it still did not have, and should formulate, a formal, written strategy and medium-term plan."<sup>67</sup></p> <p><b>Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina:</b> BHMAL receiving 95% of its funding from the Government by end of 2007, aim for full national funding in 2008. Clearly oriented towards establishing sustainable national capacities.</p> <p><b>Somalia:</b> Difficulties experienced in continued</p>

<sup>67</sup> Ted Paterson, Faiz Paktian and William Fryer, "Assessment of the Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan," GICHD, August 2008. Quoted by LMM.

upgrading of EOD levels and improvement of skills - which questions sustainability and whether it has been possible to sustain the national mine action capacity.

**Sudan:** High focus on capacity building and support for nationalisation process of UNMAO in MSB's programme seen as steps towards achieving sustainability of the programme. Likely sustainability of operations in DDG's project in South Sudan would benefit from firmer approaches to transition of activities to national organisations and the formulation of an exit strategy.<sup>68</sup>

#### 6.2.4 Assessment of impact

In order to detect the likely longer term impact of the mine action programmes, the links to other development actors and the tools for impact measurement have been reviewed. This brings the focus beyond the technical output level and into the broader level of socio-economic outcomes in relation to challenges and processes in the specific geographic context around the operations. Long term impact as such is difficult to document, and the review has mostly focussed on the likely outcomes and effects potentially resulting from the programmes, and on the efforts of implementing organisations to focus their activities on the change processes in society that will lead to impact. The result is that documentation of impact is not systematically produced, despite some efforts by DDG and MAG. Possible reasons for that could be lack of pressure from donors, and lack of awareness of the importance of it with implementing organisations. The team considers also, however, the factor of 'assumed impact', i.e. that once the obstacles to resuming activities on contaminated land have been removed, people will automatically start occupying the land again, start farming etc.

IMPACT	
ASSESSMENT	EXAMPLES
Good intentions but very scarce documentation – donor pressure likely to change that.	<b>Iraq and DRC:</b> MAG not documenting impact apart from case stories <b>Afghanistan:</b> Some impact documentation (DDG) <b>Somalia:</b> No reporting on impact (MSB)
Development of impact assessment tools a positive development – although slow and late!	<b>DDG</b> Impact Monitoring Tool ready for roll-out <b>MAG:</b> Impact assessment tool underway
Lack of documentation of socio-economic outcomes and impact is a sector wide problem	
Lack of socio economic baselines implies a risk of not reaching intended impact – and not tracking non-intended impact (*Do No Harm')	
Impact and links to development interventions more relevant for DEV funding than for HUM funding?	

<sup>68</sup> Sida DDG Evaluation, Draft Report March 2010, Korayi, Lardner and Wood, GICHD

### 6.2.5 Assessment of safety and quality

In all the programmes reviewed, mine action operations were carried out with adequate consideration of safety and guidelines and were clearly up to standards. This goes for the technical surveys, the marking, the clearance and the quality assurance procedures. Sida has undoubtedly chosen to work with professional mine action organisations and that shows in the high quality of operations.

All the mine action organisations looked at appeared to have sound operational contingency planning and have developed sufficient contacts with the local communities, agencies and authorities to be able to responsively react to situations where security is degraded. DDG has operated in the highly volatile area of Basra, south Iraq, for many years with no major security incidents. The only area of concern that the Review Team had in this regard was the reliance that MAG in DRC had on flying with airline companies that are blacklisted with the UN and the embassies of that country. This undoubtedly expedites the operations, but does place some of the staff (and the organisation) under a certain degree of risk.

### 6.2.6 Gender perspectives in supported projects and programmes

At a strategic level, gender is a key element of a mine action strategy and, in theory, any mine action intervention. The UN Gender guidelines for mine action<sup>69</sup> give very clear advice to programmes for the development and integration of good practice into mine action programmes. The guidelines state: “... *{the} United Nations mine action work plans will address the impact of mine action on women, girls, boys and men and seek to involve them to the extent possible in the planning and implementation of mine action initiatives*” and “*Experience of the first version of the guidelines reveals that mainstreaming gender in programming leads to better outputs in mine action.*”

Sida's gender policy<sup>70</sup> is “at the centre of Sida's mission to promote and create conditions for poverty reduction in partner countries” and the policy states that “...*equality involves ensuring that all human beings – women, men, girls and boys – are considered equal and treated equally in terms of dignity and rights.*”

Implementers analysed during the course of this review again seem to have clear perspectives, if not always policies, on gender issues. For example, MSB have a Gender equality handbook<sup>71</sup> – a guide that is primarily intended for MSB field staff and project managers working within international assistance for bringing projects into line with the needs of women, men, girls and boys in the project area. MSB's handbook's aim is “...*to mainstream a gender perspective into all international projects with the objective being to live up to all aspects of {UN} Resolution 1325.*”

At the national or project level, things often become less clear, and it is sometimes difficult to identify clearly where gender policies are being applied – or even considered to any significant degree - in a project.

**In DRC**, the projects being implemented by MAG and MSB appear to have a reasonable gender balance within the programmes although it is not always clear where the gender issues are considered in the

<sup>69</sup> *Gender Guidelines for Mine Action Programmes*, United Nations, March 2010. Lead author: Gabriele Russo.

<sup>70</sup> *Policy Promoting Gender Equality in Development Cooperation*, Sida, 2005

<sup>71</sup> *Gender equality handbook – practical advice for international assistance*, Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency 2009

project design. **MSB** does have very good guidance for project designers<sup>72</sup> but again, it is difficult to see whether this has been integrated into any of the programmes. The team did not see any formal documentation for either organisation indicating that gender had been taken into consideration, although the documentation reviewed for the DCA element of the project was focused on using a gender approach where possible.

**MAG DRC** does report on project beneficiaries<sup>73</sup> in Equateur and discusses the fact that women and children have a tendency to be more at risk, due to women being the primary users of many mined routes and the tendency of children to play with dangerous items they find. In the same report, **MAG** reports that some of their interventions were particularly beneficial to women.

In **Iraq**, **MAG** has included gender disaggregated information in their Community Liaison activities, including the economic roles of women and men.<sup>74</sup> When asked about the possibility of fielding female deminers (which the Review Team has indeed come across in other countries as e.g. South Sudan and Jordan), the issue was explained by cultural obstacles. In the Mine Risk Education activities, strong gender equality focus was however observed in relation to the beneficiaries of the teaching as well as the teachers employed.

The ex-post evaluation of the **IMAP** programme in Bosnia and Herzegovina shows that the UNDP gender equality guidelines for mine action programmes have been presented in awareness raising workshops, resulting in the formulation of intentions to advocate for female demining teams, incorporate gender into data management, encourage women to take up management positions, gender sensitize key policy documents and offer gender training for key partners. The progress on these objectives will be followed up later, but the systematic approach to gender mainstreaming of the programme is notable and could be used as a best practice for inspiration.

### 6.3 Emerging trends and variations in outcome

Overall, the Review Team finds the combination of support to the UN system, the GICHD and country level mine action programmes an appropriate way of potentially achieving an impact right from the international policy level to the situation of affected population groups in a range of countries.

Through the support to UN organisations involved in mine action, Sida acts in accordance with the Good Humanitarian Donorship principles. The support is provided to mutually complementary agencies and plays no doubt an important role in strengthening coordination and oversight. It moreover gives Sida access to crucial joint multi-donor fora important for donor harmonisation and joint prioritisation. The Review Team would emphasise the importance of these UN agencies pursuing a coherent and coordinated approach in countries where each is present and sees it as important that Sida takes a leading role in pushing for this.

The support to Geneva Call has led to results in engaging non-state actors and to GICHD to building capacity with implementing agencies, and developing and disseminating key knowledge and research in the sector.

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<sup>72</sup> *ibid*

<sup>73</sup> Report from **MAG DRC** to SIDA 1st May 2009 – 30th April 2010

<sup>74</sup> Review of formats for CL community assessments from **MAG CL** staff

The country level programmes supported are all found to have a strong technical base and are generally effective and efficient in achieving the planned outputs. At the same time the links to other relevant humanitarian or development interventions are generally not secured by the implementers nor pushed very hard for by Sida. Despite a few exceptions it is a pattern that reporting from the programmes does not go beyond output, and therefore a systematic assessment of outcome and impact is difficult to undertake. It is the assessment of the Review Team that this is primarily a question of inadequate baseline data, monitoring and documentation rather than lack of impact. It poses a risk to the future prioritisation of mine action by donors if the gap in documentation is not addressed rather urgently. Similar observations have been made in relation to activities of global organisations where the outcome in some cases can be difficult to trace.

The Review Team considers, therefore, that greater effort should be made to identify and report at outcome level (i.e. on the impact achieved) and, as part of this, that there should be a clear identification of development impacts, including in relation to gender equality. The Review Team note that for this to happen, a result driven approach needs to be in place during project/programme formulation, including the setting of baselines and relevant indicators.

Some notable best practices have been identified by the Review Team, such as the impact monitoring tool developed by DDG, some cases of employment of managers with a development background (DDG, MAG), the documentation of case stories by MAG, gender mainstreaming by UNDP in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as successful capacity building of national authorities by MSB.

## 6.4 Options for Sida

### **Options for Sida to optimise relevance of support to country level interventions:**

- In its dialogue with implementing partners, Sida should encourage the attachment of socio-economic expertise in the organisations' recruitment of key staff including managers.
- Sida should consider requiring all implementing partners to introduce socio-economic surveys for needs assessments and develop baselines to provide data from which to monitor results. Reporting on development related progress and challenges should be a standard requirement.
- There should be a focus on programmes which target most vulnerable groups (i.e. clear their areas first and other places later).
- Sida should consider choosing focus countries after assessing seriousness of contamination and then ensure linkages to other Sida humanitarian and/or development programmes where possible

### **Options for Sida to optimise effectiveness and efficiency**

- More systematic requirements to progress and results reporting should be introduced in order to ensure that all objectives are reported on. The comprehensive LFA formats applied by DDG could be used as a model for this.
- Sida should enforce these requirements and not approve reports only addressing output level and technical aspects.

- New funding should not be allocated until satisfactory reporting from previous phase is in place.

### **Options for Sida to optimise sustainability**

- Capacity building strategies become a standard requirement in all mine action programmes supported by Sida, and these strategies are based on negotiations with national mine action authorities (or *de facto* national authorities) in order to ensure ownership and transparency.
- That reporting on progress on capacity building becomes mandatory in annual reports.
- That all programmes develop strategies for sustainability and exit including benchmarks for exit or for re-assessment of exit dates.

### **Options for Sida to optimise impact**

- Sida follows the practical use of DDG and MAG's new manuals closely and maintains a dialogue with them at country level in order to gather experience and documentation.
- Sida encourages DDG and MAG to keep a high level of information between them and exchange ideas, tools and experiences on impact monitoring.
- Sida liaises with GICHD to strengthen its coordination of methodological development related to impact monitoring in mine action, enabling it also to draw from the other initiatives that are on-going and perhaps ultimately lead to the creation of IMAS giving guidelines for impact monitoring.

### **Options for Sida to optimise gender equality mainstreaming**

- Sida enforces its gender policy and the UN gender guidelines for mine action in all supported mine action programmes through awareness raising and dialogue with implementing partners.
- The gender mainstreaming approach applied in the Bosnia & Herzegovina programme could be used as a best practice for inspiration.

## **7 Results from mine action in DRC and Iraq**

This chapter presents further details on results from Sida supported mine action programmes in the two field visit countries Democratic Republic of Congo and Iraq. The field visits provided the Review Team with the opportunity to meet implementing partners, national authorities, beneficiaries and other stakeholders on location and compile primary data that will exemplify and inform the findings and recommendations of this review. The list of persons consulted is enclosed in Annex 2.

### **7.1 The Democratic Republic of Congo**

The findings on Sida supported mine action interventions in DRC are based on a field visit to MAG and MSB/DCA programmes in DRC between 14 June & 6<sup>th</sup> July 2010. The visit to the MAG programme was the second attempt – the first being cancelled off for security reasons. At the time of the mission, the Sida teams were not working and the team was thus unable to see any ongoing operations by the Sida sponsored teams. This was due to the Sida grant period up to April 2010 being completed and the fact that MAG was still awaiting confirmation of further funding from Sida for the next two years. Confirmation of this funding was received while the team was in Mbandaka.

#### **7.1.1 The mine problem in DRC**

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been affected by landmines and ERW as a result of more than 15 years of conflict. Contamination is from Unexploded Ordnance (UXO), including unexploded sub munitions, as well as from significant quantities of Abandoned Explosive Ordnance (AXO). Although the conflicts affected the whole country, it appears that the most heavily affected areas are those from the north of Equateur province, through to the south of Katanga province – areas where Sida's two operational support projects are being implemented. Although there are scarce data available, most incidents appear to be as a result of casualties carrying out normal subsistence activities (farming, travelling, hunting and collecting food/water/wood). Ammunition stockpiles also pose a significant threat to the population. To date, there has been no complete national survey. As of November 2008, a total of 2,004 suspected hazardous areas (SHA) had been identified throughout the country. The UN has declared the provinces of Equateur, Katanga, North and South Kivu and Province Orientale to be the most heavily affected.

DRC is an incredibly difficult and challenging environment to operate in. Logistics are one of the largest hurdles for not only operational activities, but also in order to gather data in order to understand the scale of the problem. Between 1999 and 2008, 1,696 casualties were recorded. In 2008, 14 casualties were reported, compared to the previous years' figure of 22. Casualties are reported throughout the country, but the figures used are most likely significantly under reported because of the serious logistical challenges in the country.

Mine Action in DRC is coordinated centrally, in the absence of a government body, by the United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre (UNMACC) which is under the remit of the UN Mission in



the DRC (MONUC<sup>75</sup>). UNMACC maintains *de facto* responsibility for planning, managing and monitoring all mine action activities on behalf of the government. There are two Congolese civil servants working as the focal point for mine action in the DRC government, but unfortunately both were unavailable for meetings for the duration of the field visit. The MACC was established in 2002 but until recently, the capacity of the UNMACC was generally considered to be poor. With the recent recruitment of several key positions, it now appears that capacity has improved and coordination is becoming more of a reality. The challenges of operating in DRC do not, however, assist in this coordination process.

A national strategic plan for DRC in draft form now exists but is still under development and discussion. The plan has three phases: 1) National General Mine Action Survey (GMAS), 2) Technical survey of high and medium priority mine and ERW affected locations. Continue MRE and launch a victim assistance project, and 3) Technical survey and clearance of remaining areas. The DRC is a signatory to the Mine Ban Treaty which obliges it to have identified and cleared all known mined areas by (in DRC's case) 1<sup>st</sup> November 2012. It seems unlikely that the country will achieve this goal.

### 7.1.2 Sida support to mine action in DRC

During 2008, Sida contributed \$3.5 million out of a total \$12.5 million to mine action in DRC. Total contributions disbursed between 2005 to date have been 62 million SEK. This figure does not include the latest grant to MAG, or the Sida support through the UN VTF to the UNMACC. Sida supports Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) (who have been operating in DRC in support of DanChurchAid (DCA) since 2008 and more recently in direct support of the UNMACC as well).

Mines Advisory Group (MAG)	
<b>Operations in the DRC since 2004</b>	<p>Equateur, Katanga, and Casai Oriental provinces.</p> <p>22 international and 179 national staff.</p> <p>5 multi-task teams<sup>76</sup>, one rapid response team, six community liaison teams (3 MAG teams, 2 Humanitas Ubungi<sup>77</sup>, and one ECC MERU<sup>78</sup> team).</p> <p>3 Small Arms &amp; Light Weapons (SALW)/Conventional Munitions Disposal (CMD) teams</p>

<sup>75</sup> MONUC changed its name on 30<sup>th</sup> June 2010 to MONUSCO (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) but this report refers to MONUC as the mission in place at the time of the mission.

<sup>76</sup> Capable of mine clearance, survey and marking

<sup>77</sup> Humanitas Ubungi is a Congolese NGO.

<sup>78</sup> A local partner faith-based organisation operating in Casai Oriental.

As an example of this, MAG's Community Liaison Teams have identified 10 Suspected Hazardous Areas in an around the community of Ikela. One of these is a road leading to an abandoned coffee plantation. The programme had given this task a high priority by making an informal assessment of the 10 tasks based on the belief that it reopening the road would provide employment to many in the local community once the factory and plantation had reopened. However they had failed to communicate with the owner of the plantation to find out whether he intended, or wanted, to reopen the factory and plantation. This task is used as an example in the final report for the 2008-2010 grant and reports an example of increasing opportunities to reconstruction and development by communities. The Review Team does **not** believe that the analysis of the data is sufficient to state that this task will deliver such results and indeed, would question the significant allocation of resources to this particular project.

The Sida funded element of the **MAG** programme has been operating in Equateur province since November 2005 over three separate grant periods (at the time of the mission, a further grant for 24 months starting in June 2010 had been agreed by Sida). For the last two grant periods, the capacity has consisted of one Manual Clearance Team (MCT) (also referred to as a multi-task team

(MTT) and one Community Liaison Team (CLT). In the grant commencing 2010, this capacity expands to include a Survey Team (ST) to support the UN MACCs goal of undertaking a national General Mine Action Survey (GMAS) (although there is still some debate between the UNMACC and the operators as to how this process will be undertaken). In addition to these core operational assets, Sida has supported the costs of expatriates such as Technical Field Manager (TFM), Community Liaison Manager (CLM), Technical Operations Manager (TOM), Country Programme Manager (CPM), Finance Manager (FM), Logistics Coordinator (LC), Field Coordinator, and Programme Officer.

MSB	
<b>Direct operational support to DanChurchAid's (DCA) Demining capacity in Katanga Province (Kabalo region<sup>79</sup>) since 2008</b>	One Mini-Minewolf machine (MMW) Seven Mine Detection Dogs (MDD) <sup>80</sup>
Technical support to the UN MACC since 2010	Information management specialist.

In 2008, **MSB** initiated an operational project designed to support the capacity of DanChurchAid (DCA)'s mine clearance programme in the Kabalo area (Katanga province). The project was intended to provide a Mini-Minewolf machine (MMW) as well as eight Mine Detection Dogs (MDD) to improve the operational efficiency of the DCA programme, which was started in 2006. The implementation of the project was plagued with problems and a mid-term review undertaken in February 2010<sup>81</sup> noted significant operational failings in the programme. This assessment took place some four months after the mid-term review and provides some updates.

In early 2010, MSB seconded an information management specialist to the UN MACC in Kinshasa at the same time as six additional information clerks were deployed to the MACC to assist with the significant backlog of data entry. The advisor is currently training these six members of staff in

<sup>79</sup> It is important to note that the Sida support refers to the support to MSB only within the constraints of DCA's operations and as such, the evaluation only looked at operations within the Kabalo region, where MSB are directly supporting DCA.

<sup>80</sup> The original concept was to use eight dogs. Unfortunately one died and there are now only seven.

<sup>81</sup> A Wolf and Eight Dogs: Mid-Term Review of MSBs Demining Activities in the Democratic Republic of Congo 2007-2009, Lardner & Nissen, Oslo & Geneva, March 2010

conjunction with the UN Information Management officer as well as overseeing the data entry and rationalisation process and assisting with the upcoming IMSMA NG implementation process.

### 7.1.3 Assessment of results

#### Relevance

In a context like the one in DRC where government structures are not strong the organisations under review have been found to align well with UNMACC, local government and other actors such as the military.

**MAG** has operated in DRC for a number of years without any real guidance from the UNMACC. During this time, the organisation developed its own system for prioritising and tasking. With the strengthening of the UN MACC over the last 12 months, the programme is operating in a rapidly changing environment. **MAG** has worked closely with the MACC to support the ongoing process of a national survey – the GMAS in DRC. However, much of the process of prioritisation seems to be done in an informal manner, with teams on the ground making assessments that focus the clearance teams. This process is again being addressed by the introduction of a formalised process. **MAG** maintains a good active dialogue with UNMACC as well as the military and local government, and is strongly supporting the national focal point for mine action in the DRC government.

In the case of **MAG** it appears that the only real interaction with populations comes when demining teams visit communities because of isolation due to geography. The Review Team found no evidence that an overall assessment of needs of different groups has been carried out.

The relevance of the **MSB** project in the Kabalo area can be questioned<sup>82</sup>, considering the absence of casualties in the area since 2005, the lack of surveys of the area and a clear perspective on the scale of the problem. The broader impact on communities around Kabalo is still unclear and neither **MSB** nor **DCA** were able to substantiate the value of the work undertaken. Despite recent efforts from **DCA**, the integration of mine activities in broader development efforts remain difficult in the **MSB** area of intervention (Kabalo), but coordination efforts with development agencies have greatly improved.

As no indication of overall assessments of the needs of population groups affected by mines or UXOs has been found, the Review Team cannot establish to what extent the targeted areas are relevant in this respect. Steps have been taken by **DCA** to strengthen survey capacity and integrate mine action with a food security programme, and this is a positive new direction potentially leading to a better foundation of the tasking in the future. There are no socio-economic analyses available at this stage for the Kabalo area. A national “Survey and MRE Coordinator” was appointed by **DCA** in October 2009 to cover the pre- and post- clearance assessments (among other survey activities) and **DCA** has employed a part time international survey consultant throughout the course of the project.

#### Effectiveness and efficiency

During the period 2008 – 2010, **MAG** removed 13,000 items of UXO. However, a more detailed analysis of data kept since the beginning of February 2009 records that between February 2009 and June 2010, a figure of 806 items of UXO, of which 490 were Small Arms Ammunition (SAA) were removed. This indicates that Sida supported MCT cleared 319 items of rockets, mortars, grenades and improvised

<sup>82</sup> As also mentioned in the mid-term review

aircraft bombs over a period of 16 months. As an illustration of the effectiveness of MAG's operations in DRC, the specific objectives for the grant period 2008-2010 as per the proposal in February 2008 are shown in the table below.

Table 7-1: MAG DRC Objectives 2008 - 2010

	Objectives	State (and comments)
1	Reduce threat of death & injury in S Equateur & Mbandaka	Achieved
2	Increase opportunities for reconstruction & development by communities and other NGOs to deliver wider relief & development activities	Achieved
3	Immediate and emergency response to requests from other NGOs delivering wider relief and development activities	Achieved to limited degree
4	Develop community awareness through CL & MRE	Achieved
5	Develop exit strategy for Equateur to be determined by (mid 2009) and achieved (by 2010)	Not achieved

The team recognises the MAG programme's impressive capacity to implement and operate the programme in the DRC given the operating environment - political, physical and environmental. The operational element of the programme is very strong and Sida are undoubtedly getting good value from MAG in this respect. MAG's technical operations, as far as the team could ascertain, appear to be solid, strong and safe. This was based on discussions with the technical staff of MAG and assessment of MAG procedural documents. The vast majority of tasks undertaken by the Sida sponsored teams (who have operated in eight operational areas over the last two years) were UXO removal tasks with very few mine clearance projects being undertaken. The MCTs always deploy with an expatriate Technical Field Manager attached to them, essentially due to the logistical and environmental conditions that MAG says tend to result in relaxation of technical and safety norms. While it is expensive to have an international member of staff with the MCT, it does tend to ensure maintenance of a high degree of professional competence. There is no doubt that the MAG capacities in Equateur enable the organisation to work in an operationally professional manner.

The current structure of the MAG programme has the Technical Operations Manager (TOM) as the line manager of both the Technical Field Managers (TFM) as well as the Community Liaison Managers. Given the TOM's experience and focus, it seemed to the team that this structure is not the most effective and that it would make more sense to provide the CLMs with a line manager whose expertise lies in the area of community liaison rather than the delivery of effective mine and UXO operational clearance capacities. At the moment there is effectively one international CLM attached to each community liaison team. As mentioned before in the context of TFMs in MCTs, this is an expensive way of doing things and although MAG is moving toward reducing the CLM ratio, the current *status quo* is very expensive. Although MAG refers to SALW in its proposal, the operational capacity funded by Sida does not include any dedicated SALW capacity.

Operating a programme with a specific focus on capacity development and national ownership requires cultural sensitivity. It was a minor concern to the team that none of the three Sida funded TA in South Equateur was able to speak even a very basic level of French. It is clear globally that the recruitment of Francophone advisors is difficult, and MAG has advanced significantly in recent months in recruitment

processes and recruitment of Francophones, but the Review Team believes that there could be more focus on the development of non-French TA's ability to speak French. (On a positive note, it should be noted that one of the advisors had some knowledge of Lingala – the local dialect). There may be a need to ensure specific training/education in the cultural awareness of expatriates working in the country.

MAG has a very well developed system of monitoring and evaluation globally and has a specific team allocated to this, the (International Development and Evaluation Team) IDET team. The IDET team last visited the MAG DRC programme in September 2008 and a copy of the report was provided to the team. The report is thorough and detailed and appears to be well integrated into MAGs quality processes. Many of the previous reports recommendations seem to have been followed up, but the focus is very much on the operational side of the programme with little oversight of the community liaison and socio-economic factors. Given that the effective implementation of the programme relies on the clearance teams actually operating in the right places, the team strongly believes MAG should consider including a community focus in the IDET team as well as operational staff.

At the national level, the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) New Generation (NG) is in the process of being rolled out throughout DRC. In the meantime, database management nationally is weak. MAG has recently begun to rationalise their database management processes. Under the more recent Sida projects, the recording of Sida funded teams since the beginning of 2009 has been effective and systematic. Before this, however, recording mechanisms appear to have been poor and data lost. MAG should be congratulated on their recent improvements, but should take note of the concerns about the period before the beginning of 2009.

When it comes to MSB's operations in DRC, a number of significant improvements have taken place since the project evaluation in February<sup>83</sup>, where a number of major problem areas were identified. The MDD are now fully operational, which together with the MMW and used together with the DCA deminers operating manually greatly increases the number of square metres surveyed/cleared per day. There is now much closer coordination with DCA with the very positive prospect of merging project at the beginning of 2011.

The Mine Detection Dogs (MDD) supported by MSB have been operational since the end of February 2010. As of the end of week 20 (mid-May), the MDD had processed a total of 26,500 m<sup>2</sup> since the beginning of the project. The MDD are now capable of reaching a level of 2,000 m<sup>2</sup> surveyed per day. The dogs have found one anti-tank mine which has been destroyed. The MMW began to operate at the end of February 2009. Land cleared by the MMW up to the end of 2009 totalled 125,837 m<sup>2</sup>. In 2010, up to the end of week 20 (mid-May), the MMW figure was 3,630m<sup>2</sup>. The MMW has not thus far located any items of UXO.

According to DCA, no new victims of mines or UXO have been reported since 2005 in the Kabalo area. The project document<sup>84</sup> stated in March 2008: "*the expected result (of the project) is therefore a significant decrease of reported mine incidents*" and "*...to date, 2010 victims have been recorded in the UNMACC-DRC database (892 killed and 1,118 injured) since 2002. The figures are expected to rise dramatically as more information is gathered from hitherto inaccessible areas*". It appears that while the project document recognises the ongoing general threat to the population, the use of resources is not targeted and the actual impact in the Kabalo area seems to be limited.

<sup>83</sup> "A Wolf and Eight dogs", Mid-term Review of MSB demining activities in the DRC 2007-2009, Tim Lardner, Lars Peter Nissen, March 2010

<sup>84</sup> Assessment memo, "Support to the SRSA in the DRC for Mechanical Mine clearance activities", 2008-2010

With regards the broad implementation of the Kabalo project, there is a clear distinction (clarified in a cooperation agreement between DCA and MSB) in roles for the two organisations. DCA is responsible for the tasking, implementation and day-to-day management of the demining programme, whereas in theory, MSB is purely operating in support of DCA with the provision of MDD, MMW and medical support. Conceptually, socio-economic surveys, impact assessments and issues surrounding linking mine action with development projects generally come under the responsibility of DCA. While this may make operational sense, it remains a broader question as to whether an operation of such a size (the MSB intervention is overall valued at 46 million SEK) should be implemented on the basis of absolute trust in a partner without any cross checking internal responsibility by the organisation.

An MSB international admin/finance officer has been based in Kabalo since March 2010 and the management seems under control. There are currently two local logistic officers operating in Katanga: one in Kalemie (DCA) and one assistant (MSB) in Kabalo. The (MSB) international admin/finance Officer in Kabalo is overall in charge of logistics as well. Pending new funding, MSB and DCA operations in Katanga are planning to merge their administrative capacity in January 2011 and discussions are ongoing regarding practical modalities. If confirmed, the MSB admin/finance officer post in Kabalo would be removed. MSB (and DCA) staff met during the course of the mission seems very dedicated and professional. International staff turnover, however, remains high, due perhaps to the heavy workload and the working conditions. New rules implemented by Sweden early in 2010 have reduced the attractiveness and competitiveness of salary packages by imposing a taxation of 25% on all international salaries. MSB and DCA have separate accommodations in the same locations (villages of Kasumba and Suya). The MSB medic is not allowed to take care of DCA staff. There may be some scope for combining and cost-sharing. No MSB or DCA staff had received the ToR of this review (including the MSB country manager), and none of the MSB staff (with the exception of the head in Kabalo) had heard of the mid-term evaluation report of the MSB's demining activities<sup>85</sup>. None of the MSB staff interviewed had a copy of the project document<sup>86</sup> which had been approved by SIDA and (former) SRSA.

## Sustainability

The Review Team has looked into elements of the two programmes that could be seen as efforts to pursue future sustainability of activities, such as cooperation with and capacity building of and local and national authorities, linking up with development actors in the areas, as well as preparing exit strategies. In a country characterised by weak governmental structures, sustainability is not the easiest goal to achieve. It seems however that serious efforts are being made by DCA to liaise with other actors on the ground and link mine action to broader development efforts, while MAG appears to be working more detached from government structures.

The evaluation team was unable to meet the Governor in Mbandaka. A meeting took place with the General in charge of the military command in the area, who complained about the fact that **MAG** does not inform him on their current activities. Development and humanitarian organisations interviewed were overall positive on MAG interventions. Some however raised concerns over the fact that MAG works independently from any government structures, which questions the issue of ownership and sustainability at the end of the funding. Unfortunately, the team could not meet their local NGO partner

<sup>85</sup> "A Wolf and Eight dogs", Mid-term Review of MSB demining activities in the DRC 2007-2009, Lardner & Nissen, March 2010

<sup>86</sup> Assessment memo, "Support to the SRSA in the DRC for Mechanical Mine clearance activities", 2008-2010.

“Humanitas Ubangui” (HU), as they were not in Mbandaka at the time of the evaluation. HU will provide the staff for the CLT in south Equateur under the supervision of a MAG CLM. It is the intention that this advisor will be phased out by the end of 2010 and the team will be able to operate independently. The Review Team was not convinced that this will happen in such a timely manner. Aid agencies are not involved in post-clearance activities and development projects. Those interviewed said they have not been approached on that matter. There seems to be no link between technical operations and development. At a local level, there is some good feedback regarding involvement of beneficiaries in MAG’s programme. Community Liaison (CL) activities for instance involve communities in identifying hazards. No exit strategy exists at the moment, although this was promised in MAG's February 2008 proposal.

Relations and exchange of information between **MSB** and the local authorities are very good as expressed by the territory administrator and the Army officer in charge of Katanga province. DCA is currently implementing a food security project in Nyunzu and Kabalo with WFP. Despite good intentions the links between these programmes and the MSB/DCA demining activities are not always clear. There is no clear evidence at this stage that cleared land would be taken into account in DCA development programmes. DCA’s coordination efforts with other agencies appear to be good. OCHA coordination meetings have taken place since May 2010. Two monthly meetings have been organised so far (hosted by WFP and FAO) and DCA was present at one of these, in March 2010. DCA is well known by the agencies operating in the Kabalo area<sup>87</sup>. The team gained the impression that coordination and communication between actors in Kabalo has improved significantly recently and that there is much potential for key actors to work closely together – including DCA and MSB. MSBs profile in Kabalo seems lower; focusing on technical issues, with DCA is taking the lead on developmental and coordination issues.

## Impact

Apart from a few MAG case studies and some general remarks in reporting from MSB to UNMACC the impact of the mine action interventions supported by Sida in DRC are not documented. It appears that some degree of tools development is taking place in MAG as well as DCA but they have not materialised into any systematic documentation of impact.

There are no comprehensive post-impact studies carried out in relation to **MAG**’s programme in DRC. The documents available are limited to three “cases studies”. The social and economic impact of MAG interventions in Equateur is at this stage unknown. Case studies in themselves are interesting, but not representative and therefore difficult to get an objective perspective from. The team was made aware of an ongoing process of the introduction of a formalised post-impact assessment reporting mechanism, but this implementation is significantly later than the initially proposed delivery of objective “*post clearance impact assessments*” that were included in the MAG January 2007 proposal to be implemented in the last 3 months of 2007 as well as being a core element of the proposal for 2008-2010 and 2010-2012. In the view of the team this is a major failing. It is understood that the majority of work being undertaken in Equateur relates to spot tasks rather than SHA, which makes a post clearance impact assessment process more challenging, but this does not detract from the fact that Sida has been funding the project since 2007 in the belief that there is a post clearance impact reporting system either in place or about to be put into place.

<sup>87</sup> Action against Hunger (ACF), Caritas, FAO, IRC and WFP

Likewise, there are no socio-economic analyses or impact surveys available at this stage for **MSB** supported activities in the Kabalo area. A standardised methodology is currently being developed for survey operations and a draft was made available to the team<sup>88</sup>. The aim of this manual is to provide staff with "...a reference for training, operations, and general conduct in the area of survey operations". DCA has designed pre-and post-clearance assessment questionnaires asking questions to individuals on socio-economic activities in the target areas. The Review Team received a completed pre-clearance questionnaire regarding a village near Kabalo<sup>89</sup>. However, the Review Team was unable to locate any post-clearance assessments undertaken within the Kabalo area.

According to paperwork provided by the DCA survey and MRE coordinator, the clearing of the road and land South of Kabalo (Nzofu-Munekela line) benefit an estimated 480,000 persons<sup>90</sup>. No clear indication was provided on how this figure had been calculated. The MSB project document<sup>91</sup> mentions a similar number of expected beneficiaries (450,000 direct and indirect), in total for South, West and Manono Territories (although only 110,000 in the Kabalo area of operations).

The text box on the right shows an example of a general and non-quantitative description on project impact from the "MSB yearly report to UNMACC" for 2009 and the monthly MSB report to UNMACC for April 2010.

"Providing safety from mine accidents to people in Kabumba on the areas mechanically cleared"

Providing agricultural land for the people in Kabumba (all cleared land in Kabumba is used for agriculture). The land cleared with the MMW is in fact already ploughed and will produce more crops than land only prepared by the local method of pick-axes.

Providing with repair/rebuild of road for vehicles and trucks, opening access for vehicles (I.E. development/aid/other) to previously not reachable and therefore isolated villages on east side of river in direction South from Kabalo towards Kasinge village.

Providing employment for people that can support their families and relatives; and stimulate the local economy by buying merchandise and services. Especially Kanteba, Kabumba and along the recent repaired road where there was practically no cash economy before.

Contributing to the local economy by procurement, construction and renting of facilities".

## 7.2 Iraq

The findings on Sida supported mine action interventions in Iraq are based on a field visit to MAG's programme in Kurdistan between the 29 May and 3 June 2010, interviews with DDG in Copenhagen and ICRC in Geneva (regarding the now ended support from MSB), as well as review of relevant documents. While the Review Team thus had the opportunity to study MAG's field operations, the activities of DDG and MSB were reviewed through document studies and interviews, as the Team was unable to visit South and Central Iraq for security reasons. This limitation has caused a bias in the level of detail in the assessment of MAG versus DDG and MSB.

<sup>88</sup> "Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for Survey Operations in DR Congo" (draft version), DCA Kabalo. Seen June 2010

<sup>89</sup> The village of Munekelwa

<sup>90</sup> Re draft memo prepared by the National Survey & MRE Coordinator (DCA) for the evaluation, 25 June-2 July 2010


<sup>91</sup> Assessment memo, "Support to the SRSA in the DRC for Mechanical Mine clearance activities", 2008-2010



### 7.2.1 The mine problem in Iraq

Iraq has been affected by mines and UXO as a result of several conflicts over the last 25 years. The full extent of the problem is not currently fully understood, although a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) was undertaken between 2004 and 2006 in all but four Governorates. Those Governorates that were not covered in the initial survey have more recently been surveyed, but the results are not yet publicly available. It is believed that the remaining four Governorates level of contamination is low. Iraq is divided into essentially two regions – the virtually autonomous northern Kurdistan region (often referred to as KRG – Kurdistan Regional Government) and the South-central region. Both regions are heavily contaminated with mines and UXO, but the north has a more significant landmine problem, whereas Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) poses the most significant threat to the population and development of the south-central region. The current security threat in the south-central regions is significant and adds a large additional burden to the cost of undertaking operations in the region. KRG has a much smaller security threat, but again, this does add to the costs of operations. The basic results from the LIS indicate significant levels of contamination in the Iraqi Kurdistan area in the north of the country, and moderate levels in the southern area. The figure below indicates the level of contamination found by the LIS.

Figure 1 - Impacted communities from LIS<sup>92</sup>



Iraqi Kurdistan consists of seven governorates, all of which are ERW affected, which are coordinated by two regional authorities – the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Authority (IKMAA), based in Erbil and covering the provinces of Erbil, Dahuk, Mosul and Kirkuk and the General Directorate of Mine Action

<sup>92</sup> Landmine Impact Survey: The Republic of Iraq 2004 -2006, Information Management & Mine Action Programmes (iMMAP), Baghdad, 2006.

(GDMA), based in Sulaimaniyah, and covering the governorates of Sulaimaniyah, Diyala and Salah ad Din.

### 7.2.2 Sida support to mine action in Iraq

Sida has been providing support to a number of operations in Iraq over the last 10 years through three partner organisations: Mines Advisory Group (Kurdistan Region), Danish Demining Group (Southern Iraq), and MSB (support to ICRC).

Mines Advisory Group (MAG)	
<b>Operations in Iraq since 1992</b>	600 staff currently deployed in 5 (of 7) governorates in Iraqi Kurdistan.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 16 Mine Action Teams</li> <li>- 4 Conventional Weapon Disposal Teams</li> <li>- 11 Community Liaison Teams</li> <li>- 2 Mechanical Teams</li> <li>- 2 Mechanical support Teams</li> <li>- 3 Mine Detection Dog Teams</li> <li>- 1 Mine Detection Dog support Teams</li> </ul>
<b>Sida supporting</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 2x Mine Action Teams (MAT)</li> <li>- 1x Community Liaison Team (CLT)</li> <li>- 1x Mechanical Team</li> </ul>

**MAG** has been established and has an unbroken period of operating in Iraqi Kurdistan since 1992, an impressive achievement given the tumultuous history of the region in recent years. Although the environment has changed significantly, MAG has maintained an independence which has probably served them well. In particular, the organisation made a conscious decision to opt out of the “Oil for Food” project managed by UNOPS. MAG also stayed operational and present throughout the 2003 conflict in Iraq – the only mine action organisation to do so.

Danish Demining Group (DDG)	
<b>Operating in Southern Iraq since 2003, the only International Humanitarian Mine Action organisation operating in south Iraq.</b>	<p>Basra region conducting Battlefield Area Clearance (BAC) and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) operations.</p> <p>4 multi-skilled (EOD) Quick Response Teams (QRT)</p>
	<p>Capacity building of national staff.</p> <p>From 2005 all the field operations were conducted by national operators supervised by national managers, field supervisors and team leaders with minimum international technical support.</p>
	National Iraqi NGO established 2007.
	In 2008, with donations from Sida DDG operation into the neighbouring governorate of Dhi Qar.

In 2003, **DDG** deployed a team from their Afghanistan programme to Baghdad to assess the opportunities to support the mine action sector in Iraq. Although under pressure following the Canal

Hotel bombing in August 2003, DDG remained present and eventually established itself in Az Zubaya in Basrah and more recently in Nazaria. In 2005, DDG assisted in the establishment of a national demining organisation – Rafadain, who subsequently commenced (and have maintained a capacity to undertake) independent clearance operations in 2007.

SRSA - now **MSB** -has been providing operational support through the International Committee of the Red Cross/Crescent (ICRC) in Iraq since 2006. The modality of the support has been primarily the provision of technical experts who were seconded directly to ICRC's mine action programme. The modality of these activities has been very much welcomed by the ICRC. When the most recent financial agreement between Sida and MSB for support to Iraq was concluded in 2009, the ICRC continued the arrangement utilising its own funds – something that seems to vindicate the degree of success of the project, from the end user's perspective.

### 7.2.3 Assessment of results

#### Relevance

**DDG** has made some attempts to liaise with the Regional Mine Action Coordination Centre (RMACC), which is the southern regional office for the National Mine Action Centre but the capacity is not really there yet for a reciprocal partnership. The mine action sector is moreover highly politicised in Iraq and apart from the mine action authorities the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Environment are major players.

DDG has been liaising with sheiks and other authorities in the local areas and often gone through lengthy negotiations before they could start operations. The organisation liaises with beneficiaries such as farmers and schools in the areas and tries to involve them in planning and prioritisation. The Review Team finds that DDG's steps towards ensuring as high a relevance and alignment as possible in relation to needs and national priorities are as far as is possible in a difficult security situation as the one in Southern Iraq.

The status of the national mine action strategy for Iraq that has been prepared recently is not entirely clear, and the strategy does not cover the Kurdistan Region. Therefore it is more relevant for **MAG** to align with of the two regional mine action authorities IKMAA and GDMA. The Review Team found that **MAG** maintains good relations with the regional authorities and that the **MAG** operations are coordinated with their priorities, although strategies as such are not yet in place. **MAG** would like to see the national and regional mine action strategies merged together and integrated into broader development strategies for the region, and the organisation has discussed this with IKMAA at several occasions. **MAG** sees its role as that of encouraging IKMAA to further this process and has been raising the issue at national level, e.g. meetings on the national mine action strategy in 2009 and 2010. **MAG** continues to lobby for IKMAA presence in the UNDP-led national level discussions on the mine action strategy and for closer links between these discussions and other relevant ministries and donor agencies. The Review Team found that **MAG** is playing a very important role in this regard based on the organisation's long-standing experience and knowledge of the sector.

**MAG** is well aware of other strategies and policies of KRG and has used information from the KRG website in strategic planning. The Review Team was informed of the five-year development plan for agriculture in the Ministry of Planning, but learned that **MAG** had not yet seen a copy of this and, as a consequence, they have not aligned to this plan in their strategic planning. However, **MAG** has supported the agricultural sector in the region for 18 years and knows the situation well, and this

knowledge has been used to make informed choices in relation to priorities in the programme. At the national level, MAG is well acquainted with the Iraqi national (development) strategy. However, this does not address mine action except for one reference to mine contamination being one of the obstacles to development.

The Review Team found that the mindset in MAG Iraq is not oriented towards integrating their mine action operations with development programmes in the region. At community level, a systematic and well functioning bottom up approach is applied, but at the overall strategic level there is no reference to development strategies or programmes in the documents made available to the Team. The Team was informed by MAG that decisions about operations and prioritisation are made strategically to link with the different phases of regional development, but the Team was not able to identify which development activities at the regional level were considered and how. MAG also informed the Team that their strategies are based on data gathered from communities, local authorities, development organisations and based on development strategies. The data collection at community and local authority level was confirmed during the Team's visit to mayors' offices in three municipalities and visits to mine action sites, whereas the reference to development organisations and development strategies was not specified in any detail.

The Review Team found little evidence of MAG Iraq using overall socio-economic statistics at region or governorate level, such as OCHA's vulnerability maps etc., when priorities are made for geographical areas of operations. This raises the question whether the mine and UXO contamination comes first as a parameter for choice of area, and to what extent the situation and needs of the population are considered. As the overall aim of the programme is 'reducing the impact of RoC (Remnants of Conflict) on individuals, communities and organisations'<sup>93</sup> it would have been logical to establish an overview of socio-economic parameters and use that as a basis for geographical priorities. The Review Team acquired some of the thematic maps produced by OCHA and found that they contain important information on e.g. IDPs, vulnerability, living conditions, food insecurity etc. that would be relevant for choice of geographical focus of mine action programmes. Even though the data is associated with insecurity and sometime a bit dated, it would be a possibility to link more closely to OCHA's data collection department in order to ensure that the information obtained is as correct as possible.

*Case from Kurdistan (MAT = Mine Action Team)- Source: MAG Iraq*

**MAG Supports Agricultural Development in Dohuk Governorate**



By the end of March 2010, the MAT had completed clearance operations in the task and had cleared 128,042 square kilometers of contaminated land to safely remove and destroy several hazardous items of Blu-97 cluster sub munitions. The Sida-funded MAT will undertake clearance operations on the second prioritized task in April 2010. After the completion of clearance operations in the second task, cleared lands will be handed over to the local communities to directly benefit more than 220 individuals of Kula population.

<sup>93</sup> MAG Iraq Business Plan 2010-11

### Effectiveness and efficiency

Although the security environment in South-central Iraq is poor, **DDG** has had no security incidents since 2003 (with the exception of one vehicle stolen through an incident that appears to have been undertaken by a disgruntled former member of staff). DDG puts this down to a combination of providing good employment conditions, hiring all staff locally and good liaison with local community leaders. Security is something that DDG takes seriously and regular assessments and re-assessments are undertaken. In addition to this, 20% of DDG's costs are spent on security.

The major challenge (aside from security) that DDG has been dealing with over recent years has been the challenges of operating in a constrained environment that has effectively prevented them from undertaking any operational work. The government of Iraq introduced a mine action "ban" preventing all operators from undertaking activities in the south and centre of the country. This was ostensibly for security reasons, but has prevented significant work being undertaken in the country. The ban was introduced in December 2008 and remained in place until 19<sup>th</sup> May 2010, when DDG undertook their first demolition. Sida's representative in Baghdad is well acquainted with the problems resulting from the ban and recently made an assessment of whether the work should be continued or not and concluded positively. Sida has also taken part in a donor meeting called by the U.S. to discuss issues with Ministries of Environment and Defence around this issue.<sup>94</sup>

From an operational perspective, DDG has "lost" 18 months productivity due to the ban, which is difficult to define as an effective use of resources, but did maintain their training capacity and survey and MRE activities. Now not under the constraints of the ban, the organisation is focusing on continuing survey activities to develop the understanding of the extant situation as well as focusing on operational activities close to Basra, where there appears to be heavy contamination. Because of the ban on mine action DDG has not been productive between December 2008 and May 2010. This is serious for the effectiveness of the programme but the decision to focus on capacity building and MRE during that period was probably be the best option considering the alternatives (which in effect would mean closing down the entire operational setup). Part of the difficulty has been that the ban has not had a fixed timescale and there has been hope that it would be rescinded on many occasions. Among other initiatives, DDG has been very successful in its capacity building project with the local NGO Rafadian.

DDG is interested in implementing the land release concept in Iraq but is concerned because a framework of national standards does not exist yet. The Review Team believes that DDG would be well placed to take the lead on furthering this process.

The technical operations base of **MAG** in Iraq is extremely strong and well developed. As a programme with almost 20 years experience in the region, MAG has established itself well and undertakes much focussed survey and clearance operations. Operational planning processes in both the headquarters in Erbil and the regional office in Dahuk are extremely impressive and the operations staff should be congratulated for their structured approach to planning and operations. In particular, in the Dahuk office, the Field Technical Manager (FTM) is running the operations in an exceptionally effective manner with enthusiasm, clarity and vision. At the field level, the operational site visited was well managed and the national site manager was thorough and clear. Sound clearance principles – including effective land release processes – were being implemented resulting in an efficient and impressive use of resources at that particular location. The team was very satisfied with the quality of the product and had no doubt that within the bounds of the technical operations; it would be very difficult to improve on

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<sup>94</sup> Ulrika Josefsson, telephone interview

the process. In addition, at the local level, the involvement of the local population, local and regional authorities, and the national staff was very well established and successful.

In terms of efficiency of operations, the team was impressed with the processes – in particular the process and methodology of land release and the technical approach seen on the site visited in Girki Husseni, Dahuk province. The way that MAG utilises flexible teams provides an efficient way of using resources at the operational level. In addition, the use of mechanical assets in a flexible manner further reinforces the efficient use of assets that MAG employ. This gives benefits not only for Sida, but to other donors and stakeholders.

One concern that the team had during its time in KRG, was that on some occasions, it seemed that this efficiency was at the expense of some degree of capacity development and local involvement. On occasions, it appeared as though the key processes and elements of the operational part of the programme were driven by expatriates with great operational experience, but much less local understanding. While it is understandable that programme expatriates are keen to get results and to “make things happen”, there were some concerns that this excluded the experienced and qualified local staff due in part to the cultural differences.

### Sustainability

**DDG** has shown a strong commitment to ensuring sustainability of operations through extensive capacity building, working with local authorities and NGOs, and through replacing expatriate staff with national and local staff in a gradual manner. Furthermore, DDG seems to coordinate as much as possible with the national mine action authority in Baghdad.

**MAG** operates in close coordination with both Regional Authorities (*de facto* National Mine Action Authorities) in Erbil and Sulaimaniyah who notionally coordinate mine action in the region. Both authorities essentially approve MAG's annual plans for clearance in their areas of responsibility following MAG's presentation of those plans to them. In addition, the authorities also undertake initial accreditation and subsequent monitoring and quality control activities of the operational assets of MAG. Although this concept fits with international best practice, the reality is that MAG's experience significantly outweighs the capacity of both authorities and the process is a much more symbiotic one, where the authorities are gaining experience and skills from MAG throughout the process. This is something that MAG seems to do well although it is an informal process. While there is undoubtedly a reasonable relationship between MAG and the regional authorities, the Review Team finds that there is room for improvement in this process. Although capacity building of the regional authorities is not strictly within the mandate of MAG, and in addition, the regional authorities have a reasonable capacity already, we felt that there may still be some room for improving the relationship at a technical level.

MAG has worked with national organisations/entities since 2005, including the Iraqi National Guard, the Peshmerga, Iraqi health and social care organisations, Iraqi Mine and UXO Clearance Organization (IMCO) as well as NGOs such as Al Ghad, Work for Peace etc. One example of this kind of partnership is that data gathered during MRE delivery to IDPs in Kirkuk by Al Ghad organisation, MAG's national partner in Kirkuk, has identified the need to distribute food to IDP families. Al Ghad provided these details to donors and managed to get funding for food distribution from OCHA. MAG informed the Review Team that a strategy for partnership with national NGOs is included in the MAG business plan for 2010–2011 involving MRE, financial training and other activities. The team has subsequently reviewed the business plan and learned that there is a description of planned activities for continued development of strategic partnerships with the three national NGOs IMCO, Al Ghad, and Work for Peace. It is also mentioned that the goals of these partnerships is to build capacities with these

organisations to work in areas where MAG is not able to operate due to security concerns (such as Basra and Mosul).<sup>95</sup> The organisations receiving support from MAG are expected to carry out activities directly related to mine action such as MRE, so this kind of partnership cannot be regarded as MAG linking up to broader development activities and organisations in the areas of operation

#### *Case from Kurdistan – Source: MAG Iraq*

The Mayor of Qara Hanjir described how military legacy of Qara Hanjir hindered the return of IDPs and reconstruction activities in the aftermath of the 2003 conflict and the fall of the Ba'ath regime and how MAG's clearance efforts has aided recovery:

##### **Before clearance**

- IDPs unable or unwilling to return to unsafe land
- Blockages for population return hinder local morale and development
- Contamination of local authority land hindered local infrastructure and industry projects
- Prevented from using scenic land for leisure activities

##### **After Clearance**

- IDPs increasing able to and willing to return to land denied to them for over 20 years
- Increased population returns has led to construction of houses, setting up of local businesses thereby boosting the local economy
- A major power station has been constructed on cleared land
- Plans to build a factory on cleared land that will provide long term jobs for approximately 400 people
- Some cleared land has been reserved as areas of interest and is enjoyed by locals and tourists who generate income during tourist trips to Qara Hanjir

The Review Team found that MAG's approach to involvement of beneficiaries is very well organised through the community liaison (CL) processes prior to and during operations. The CL system used by MAG is very impressive and probably at the forefront in the mine action sector. Basic information in communities is gathered prior to operations through basic household interviews and consultations with local authorities, and village profiles are drawn up based on that. As part of the pre-operations survey, community members are asked about their preferences in relation to clearing of mine and UXOs, and their inputs feed into MAG's priority-setting for which areas and locations to clear and in what order. During operations, contact is maintained with the communities, and a post-clearance visit is paid to the sites by CL staff. In this way, the activities are very comprehensive and provide strong direction and support to tasking mechanisms. The Team also found that the CL staff are well trained and experienced to do the job, and that guidelines and documentation related to the CL processes are excellent.

#### *Case from Kurdistan – Source: MAG Iraq*

**Zyad Muhammad Khdir walks through his wheat crop prior to harvest in June 2005. The land was cleared by MAG's mechanical and manual teams.**



Local farmer Zyad Muhammad Khdir, who lives near Chamchamal in Sulymaniyah Governorate had 39 Type 72A anti-personnel blast mines and a mortar removed from his land by the project in 2004. He said "prior to 1995 people lived in the area, breeding animals and planting crops. In 1995, people left for the cities [due to conflict between Gol and Peshmerga forces]". Now, he and his family are able to return, and thanks to the project's clearance activities he is in a better position to provide for his wife and young son.

## Impact

The Impact Monitoring Tool developed by **DDG** has been in place since 2009 and will be implemented in the Iraq programme following the restart of mine clearance in mid-2010. According to the DDG annual report to Sida for 2009, the baseline part of the impact monitoring was completed in Iraq in relation to MRE activities in 2009. (For further description and assessment of DDG's impact monitoring tool please refer to section 8.1 of this report.) Despite **MAG**'s overall emphasis on impact-driven interventions<sup>96</sup>, the field visit to the Kurdistan programme showed that surprisingly limited focus is placed on impact assessment despite the excellent rapport established with communities and the information gathered prior to and during operations in a specific area. As one of the important global actors in humanitarian mine action known to be very strong in community liaison, MAG should be expected to have potential for becoming a leader in this field. Work on developing an impact tool has been in progress in MAG for quite some time without delivering tangible results as yet. The Review Team learned that the methodology is still being refined and that a former staff member in Laos had been visiting recently to test the tools. An amended version of the village survey forms will be rolled out and used as baseline, based on data collected since 2008.

The lack of ability to document impact after almost two decades of operation in the area is difficult to assess as anything other than a lack of management priority to this area despite the positive intentions used in MAG's brochures and project proposals to donors. Until now the documentation presented to Sida on results has been in the form of narrative case studies from different project locations. These case stories are very informative on the situation at the very local level and some of the results of MAG's operations and will probably contain important information that can be aggregated and used for an overall assessment of impact.<sup>97</sup>

### 7.3 Overall assessment of mine action in DRC and Iraq

Despite different geographical contexts the Review Team can draw a set of similar conclusions from the two country visits:

- Strong technical capability and high professionalism in mine clearance operations
- Good working relations with regional and national mine action authorities and the UN
- Increasing capacities of national and regional mine action authorities
- Absence of systematic strategies for capacity building and exit plans of implementing organisations
- Concerns about the results of the programmes from the perspective of impact and socio-economic outputs.

Specific conclusions in relation to the two field countries are presented below.

#### 7.3.1 DRC

The team recognises the MAG programme's impressive capacity to implement and operate the programme in the DRC given the operating environment - political, physical and environmental. The

<sup>96</sup> As e.g. mentioned in presentation leaflet of MAG Kurdistan

<sup>97</sup> Review of a collection of case stories presented to the Review Team by MAG Iraq.



operational element of the programme is very strong and Sida are undoubtedly getting good value from MAG in this respect.

The Review Team had however serious concerns about the results of the MAG programme from the perspective of impact and socio-economic outputs. Given the investment in the project, even taking into account the challenges and additional costs of operating in DRC, it is difficult to quantify the results from the work undertaken. With the additional factor of the fact that there is no post-clearance impact monitoring system in place, the team was not convinced that the outputs from the project justified the expenditure by Sida.

Since the project evaluation in February<sup>98</sup>, where a number of major problem areas were identified, a number of significant changes have been made to the MSB programme which is considered very positive.

The relevance of the MSB project in the Kabalo area can however be questioned, the broader impact on communities around Kabalo is still unclear, and neither MSB nor DCA are able to substantiate the value of the work undertaken. In terms of sustainability, the government demining structure is not functional yet and there is no national staff in key management positions. The DCA philosophy does, however, emphasise capacity development and indications were positive in this area.

### 7.3.2 Iraq

MAG's approach to community liaison is very impressive and probably leading in the mine action sector as a whole. Community Liaison activities are carried out effectively and provide strong direction and support to tasking mechanisms. The Review Team also found that the Community Liaison staff are well trained and experienced to do the job, and that guidelines and documentation related to the liaison processes are excellent.

MAG's efforts in terms of developing national capacities, documenting impact and linking to development activities and actors are less convincing, and this leads the Review Team to question whether the programme in Kurdistan matches the priorities presented in project proposals to Sida as well as MAG's own strategies. The programme management has so far clearly concentrated on the technical operations side and has so far developed no systematic approach to capacity building of mine action authorities, linking up to development actors or documenting socio-economic impact of their operations (although a methodology for this is apparently underway). This lack of focus on capacity building and socio-economic issues has so far not been questioned by donors, but as issues around sustainability and comprehensive approaches are coming more and more in focus among donor agencies these years, the pressure to show results in these fields from mine action programmes is likely to increase. It would therefore be a wise strategy for MAG to place more attention to these issues the coming years, including ensuring appropriate competencies with staff through e.g. recruiting more staff members with broader development backgrounds at management level.

Due to security constraints, the Review Team was not able to visit DDG in South Iraq. Based on a desk review and meetings with DDG in Copenhagen, the team believes that the operation is being undertaken in an effective manner and the Sida should generally be happy with the work that DDG is undertaking on behalf of them. Notwithstanding the 18 months where DDG was not productive, DDG appears to be taking an approach that links closely with Sida's policy.

<sup>98</sup> "A Wolf and Eight dogs", Mid-term Review of MSB demining activities in the DRC 2007-2009, Tim Lardner, Lars Peter Nissen, March 2010

### 7.3.3 Recommendations to the DRC and Iraq programmes

#### General

- At the moment, the real scale of the problem of mines and UXO in DRC is unclear. A process, led by the UNMACC, to undertake a national survey is key to the understanding and prioritising of mine action in DRC. The team recommends that Sida encourages all its key partners in DRC to continue to support this process at the same time as continuing to undertake their current activities<sup>99</sup>
- All of Sida's key partners in DRC and Iraq are lacking in the area of socio-economic analysis. They should be encouraged to continue the development, and as rapidly as possible implement thorough socio-economic M&E mechanisms.

#### MAG

- MAG should be encouraged to reassess the appropriateness of their exit strategy development
- MAG should be encouraged to strengthen their current integration with other development actors and as part of this process strengthen their prioritising and tasking mechanisms
- MAG international staff in DRC should be encouraged to develop their language skills
- At an international level, MAG should be encouraged to strengthen the socio-economic element within their IDET team

#### MSB

- Given the significant investment already made into establishing the DRC programme, and the costs that would be incurred to close the programme down, the team suggests Sida considers favourably that the successes of the previous six months of the MSB programme be taken as an indication of the potential development of the programme and that Sida continue to support the MSB programme to support DCA in Katanga province.
- MSB should be encouraged to take a more pro-active role in the relationship between themselves and DCA in DRC
- MSB should be encouraged to develop a more open dialogue with their key partner, DCA, with regards to the significance and priority of the area(s) they are working within

#### DDG

- DDG should continue its work on socio-economic baseline indicators and implementation of the impact assessment tool and provide documentation as inspiration to the mine action sector as a whole.
- DDG should document its results in capacity building and local ownership in the mine action programme in Iraq as a best practice for inspiration for other stakeholders, possibly in cooperation with GICHD.

<sup>99</sup> The Review Team notes that MAG will complete a general mine action assessment for South Equateur in support of UNMACC.

## 8 Overall results of the review

### 8.1 Conclusions

#### **The changing mine action sector context**

The response to mines and other ERW has changed enormously over the last 10 years and focus has broadened to include both the hard technical issues as well as socio-economic factors, such as impact on the broader situation of the affected population groups and links to development activities. Tools and methods for clearance have improved and the donor community including Sida has generally followed and supported these developments with considerable financial allocations. Donors are now placing increased focus on outcomes rather than outputs. This is posing a challenge to the implementing organisations who are often not adequately equipped to address the broader socio-economic and developmental issues and who thus continue to report mainly on output. Because of the specialised competencies needed for mine clearance and the high risks involved, the sector has for many years been allowed to work in isolation from other sectors and has not been subjected to the same degree to the conditions and requirements applied to other parts of humanitarian and development assistance, including capacity building, sustainability and exit strategies. As the competition from commercial organisations in the sector becomes sharper (often hired by private companies), the sector is often seen more as a profit-making industry than a sector related to humanitarian and/or development assistance. This accentuates the need for reinforcing the humanitarian aspect of mine action and the importance of basing priorities on population needs, as donors otherwise will find it increasingly difficult to justify and prioritise at the global level.

#### **Continuing relevance of Sida's policy for support to mine operations**

Even though Sida's policy paper for supporting mine action is from 2002, the subsequent development in the mine action sector shows that many of the points are still highly relevant. However, Sida appears not to have promoted this policy directly vis-à-vis implementing partners and has not developed an operational strategy for implementing it. This has weakened the linkage between policy directions and decisions regarding implementation. A symptom of this is that the strategic considerations behind the choice of countries for Swedish support to mine action programmes are not very clear. As a result, there has been a spread over close to 20 countries over the years with the risk of high transaction costs in terms of follow-up and a risk of inadequate quality assurance.

As Sida does not have in-house technical mine action expertise, programmes supported may have been allowed to continue without sufficient technical accountability in terms of documented outcomes and impact. The importance of ensuring technical capacities for monitoring was also one of the findings of the 2001 evaluation. The Review Team has seen examples of Sida extension and initial delivery of programme funding based on poor quality proposals and with no systematic assessment of reports from previous phases in relation to objectives and expected outcome. Given the amount of funding allocated over the past 10 years to the mine action sector this is a cause for concern. The Review Team consider that more stringent proposal and reporting criteria coupled with selective programme reviews (with other donors where relevant) would significantly increase the quality management of Sida's mine action portfolio in the future.

**Weak linkages to Sida country strategies**

The Review Team finds that mine action has been presented and argued for as a strategic priority in the strategies for Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan and DRC, while the sector is not mentioned in the strategies for Iraq or Sudan. Cambodia and Nicaragua are both characterised by time limited engagement and phase-out. Even though Sida emphasises coordination and coherent approaches, humanitarian assistance is not integrated in the strategic thinking in all countries, nor is mine action. This leads to the conclusion that mine action would benefit from being more systematically included as a strategic priority in country strategies where the sector is in fact prioritised and, as a consequence, becomes a mandatory subject in the reporting and subject to more regular assessments and evaluations than is currently the case.

**Continued relevance of support to global organisations**

The support to the UN is in line with Sida's mine action policy and its humanitarian strategy. Furthermore, the choice of supporting key UN agencies with a mine action role enables Sida's funding to meet a range of needs in both emergencies and situations of peace - a spread of input that the Review Team also finds it relevant in view of Sida's development and humanitarian role. UNDP's contributions are dispersed and flexible and at an overall level relates well to Sida objectives in terms of national capacity building. The support to UNMAS appears to complement UNDP as they are present and active on mine action where UNDP is not or is unable. Similarly, the support to UNICEF enables inputs to be made relating to MRE and victim assistance. The Review Team would also emphasise the importance of these UN agencies pursuing a coherent and coordinated approach in countries where each is present. The Team suggests that it would be worth continuing to provide support to these UN agencies but that the quality management improvements already mentioned should also apply.

The Review Team also finds that the support to GICHD has been relevant to Sida's Mine Action Policy, particularly in relation to knowledge development. In the case of Geneva Call, the Review Team would highlight the results achieved so far in relation to engaging non-state actors. With regard to GICHD, the relevance will be maintained provided that the Centre ensures clear alignment to the needs of its stakeholders. The quality and timeliness of reporting should also improve. In a sector that is becoming increasingly competitive, it is also essential that the Centre maintains its impartiality and neutrality.

**Relevance of country level support**

The Sida supported mine action programmes in general appear to be well coordinated with national priorities as most implementing partners have established close links with national mine action authorities and/or UNMAS in the countries of operation. In many cases the programmes have in fact been started upon request of the mine action authorities and high relevance and alignment has therefore been secured from the outset.

The relevance in relation to the seriousness of mine contamination is not clear in all cases, as for example DRC - one of Sida's priority countries - according to available information is not seriously affected by landmines and UXO. As a contrast to this, Iraq - another priority country - is said to have considerable numbers of items still to be cleared, and this points to a much higher relevance of investing in mine action.

While all the implementing organisations display a high emphasis on improving conditions for people affected by mines and UXOs in their overall strategies and objectives, this is rarely transformed into concrete knowledge gathering on specific needs and priorities of different groups in the population. Socio-economic aspects have not really been prioritised in the mine action sector, and many of the programmes have developed as 'project islands' in isolation from ongoing development initiatives

around them. An exception from this among Sida partners is DDG which has made some attempts to systematically include socio-economic parameters employing project managers with a broader development background.

### **One sided effectiveness and efficiency**

The technical operational base of the programmes reviewed in DRC and Iraq is strong and well developed. Planning processes and programme management are undertaken in a very effective and efficient manner, and the quality of field operations including sound clearance principles and effective land release processes is generally very high. But effectiveness is not only about technical mine clearance. Reporting tends to focus solely on outputs at the technical clearance and land release level and not on outcomes. With a few exceptions (notably DDG in Somalia), this is also evident from the other countries examined during this review. This leaves a gap in reporting fully on programme objectives which in most programmes also include broader socio-economic elements such as return to land, resuming economic activities such as agriculture, improving income etc. The Review Team has had difficulty in assessing the quality of the interventions in other countries due to the superficial nature of much of the documentation available. This suggests the relevance of periodic field based assessments as well as the need to improve and standardise reporting.

Achievement of objectives related to involving and capacitating the local population, local and regional authorities, and the national staff is not reported on systematically. From the projects visited and the document reviews this aspect appears often to be well achieved at the operational sites but addressed unevenly and in more informal ways at the level of national authorities.

### **Good potential for sustainability – and new role for INGOs?**

In general, the programmes reviewed are tightly coordinated with either national or regional mine action authorities and contains elements of capacity building and skills transfer. This way they have a good potential for leading to sustainable structures and capacities, although some of them could benefit from a more systematic approach. Not all programmes have developed capacity building strategies as such, or systematic processes of transfer of knowledge with an eye on an exit strategy. There is a risk that some organisations are caught in a dilemma between leaving national capacity and making themselves redundant (which is good developmental thinking) on the one hand, and a desire to keep activities going and keep up their business. This is underlined by the fact that several humanitarian mine action organisations have already started – or are considering – moving into the commercial sphere of working through private companies rather than governments/donors agencies.

As discussed in connection with the stakeholder analysis in chapter 2 of this report, a new reality is emerging where national mine action authorities in many countries have developed a level of capacity that enables them to take a stronger role in tasking and operations. This gives rise to a need for rethinking the division of roles between national and international actors and points to a need for INGOs to withdraw to an advisory rather than implementing role in countries where the situation is ripe for that.

### **Difficulties in assessing impact**

Documentation of impact is an area that the mine action sector has been struggling with for many years, and this review has found no shortage of good intentions but very little documentation of impact. Two significant achievements are however notable in this area: the DDG manual for impact monitoring now being rolled out, and MAG's long-awaited process of developing an impact monitoring tool based on community data already being compiled as part of the organisation's community liaison work. At the same time, the existence of two almost simultaneous parallel processes is not the most effective way of

solving this problem. Considering that other organisations (like NPA and GICHD) are also active on this, one might raise a question of possible coordination and cost savings among organisations.

The current status for the Impact Monitoring Manual of DDG is that baseline studies have been carried out in South Sudan, Uganda, Afghanistan, Iraq and are being undertaken at this very moment in Sri Lanka. At this stage reports from Uganda and South Sudan have been completed. The authors of the reports are the national staff and the reports are good but 'there is still room for improvement'.<sup>100</sup> The manual is comprehensive and instructive and seems well suited for capacitating implementers to integrate impact monitoring in programmes right from the initial baseline stage.<sup>101</sup>

A detailed assessment relating to impact monitoring in the mine action sector is beyond the scope of this review. However, given Sida's interest in the area, the Review Team would like to present a brief 'list' of relevant issues and steps to take in order to continue the improvement of M&E practices in mine action programmes:

- Note that the general trend towards results monitoring has also reached the mine action community – increasing interest from donors (and certain NGOs) to see the effect of their work.
- This results in different requirements depending upon where the view is coming from, ie humanitarian, development, economic, impacts
- The MA community has been good at setting goals and activities but less good at clearly showing the linkages and assumptions between them. This review shows that virtually all operators are reporting at output level but that very few report on outcomes
- However, the need to identify and attribute wider impact is clearly recognised by the effort some operators (DDG, MAG, GICHD) are putting into M&E and training on M&E
- Important that donors *require* operators to include impact monitoring in their programme design
- Nb. Data needs to be sex disaggregated and multi sectoral
- Impact monitoring requires the establishment of clear baselines during project formulation against which progress can be assessed
- Indicators (proxy indicators can also be useful) need to be set related to the variables in the baseline. May be useful to have process indicators as well as concrete targets
- There is a need to involve beneficiaries and other stakeholders in this process
- Problem of attribution – need to consider how big a challenge this is for MA
- There is a need to take the counterfactual into account – does this raise ethical issues?

## 8.2 Lessons learnt

The major lessons learnt from Sida's support to the mine action sector during the past decade can be summarised as follows:

### **LESSON 1: Implementing partners need pressure from donors to increase their focus on impact.**

Since the low focus on impact is a sectorwide characteristic, the lesson learnt is that the operators may need a push from outside to improve this. The reasons for the apparent lack of interest in impact are mainly the technical background of most staff involved in mine action, and the lack of pressure from donors to build up a basic understanding of impact and develop systems for tracking it. Given Sida's general interest in knowing the results of its programmes, consideration could be given to supporting a workstream on improving programming, implementation and monitoring for impact. This could take

<sup>100</sup> Information from Roger Fasth, DDG, September 2010

<sup>101</sup> Danish Demining Group: Impact Monitoring Manual, [www.danishdemininggroup.dk](http://www.danishdemininggroup.dk)

stock of and build on the work already being done in this area within DDG, MAG, GICHD, for example.

**LESSON 2: A strategic approach for building national capacities is needed in order to make a difference.** In most programmes, capacity building does take place through cooperation with national mine action authorities, but in many cases without a specific strategy with objectives that can be monitored and followed up upon. Sida should encourage mine action operators and NMAAs to develop clear capacity building strategies.

**LESSON 3: Programme staff of mine action organisations generally do not have sufficient understanding of humanitarian assistance or of development, as they have a technical mine action background.** Some INGOs have already taken steps to employ managers and other staff with a broader humanitarian or development background. The sector needs to see more of such initiatives, and Sida could push for that.

**LESSON 4. The current lack of mine action competencies within Sida is a limiting factor for ensuring quality and for providing advice and support to implementing partners.** There is need for a balance between overall good humanitarian and development capacity with Sida desk officers and the need to bring in specialised technical expertise as and when required. A realistic solution could be to ensure that selected desk officers are engaged, have a feel of the sector and hands-on monitoring practices, and that specialists are called in at programme level for technical quality assurance on a regular basis.

**LESSON 5. The respective roles of national authorities and international implementing organisations and the increasing capacities at national level** should be reflected in the approaches taken by the INGOs in relation to sustainability measures and adjustment of their role from executive to advisory. This would encourage the move towards exit strategies for INGOs even though the process might meet with some resistance.

**LESSON 6: Mine action organisations are in most cases not ensuring sufficient coordination between mine action and other reconstruction and development activities.** Despite previous reviews, evaluations and strategic intentions, the implementing organisations place inadequate attention and resources to socio-economic and developmental aspects, leaving most programmes delinked from other development activities in the areas of operation. Mine action programmes need to be linked to PRSPs, development plans and programmes, key stakeholders including NGOs on the ground and beneficiaries, and good practices need to be developed to strengthen the process.<sup>102</sup>

**LESSON 7: The results from mine action programmes are generally documented at output level only, and the process of developing tools to document broader outcomes and impact has been very much delayed.** The realisation spreading in the donor community of this lack of documentation of results may cause the mine action sector to become isolated and loose popularity, so this is a rather urgent challenge that needs to be addressed. Effective new thinking and change in this area may very well require a pressure from outside from e.g. donor agencies.

**LESSON 8: While there will be a continuous need for clearing mines and UXOs in a number of countries, the sector as a whole needs to document and improve its performance and results in**

<sup>102</sup> The GICHD guidelines on *Linking Mine Action and Development: Guidelines for Mine/ERW Operators*, November 2009 provide some guidance in this right direction.

**order to justify the high costs of such operations.** There is an increasing pressure on prioritisation and effectiveness that operators need to take seriously.

**LESSON 9: There is a continued need for an impartial and neutral centre of knowledge and expertise within mine action, capable of being used flexibly in support of the entire mine action sector.** Relevant and updated knowledge should be freely available for all interested actors in the sector, including sharing of evaluations and best practices.

## 8.3 Immediate action and options for the future

### 8.3.1 The need to clarify future policy framework and organisational anchoring of mine action

From a variety of different angles the findings of this review largely point to a need for **firmer direction, clearer priorities and tighter monitoring and quality assurance** of the mine action interventions and organisations supported – at global as well as country level. Recommended action points in response to the weaknesses identified in the review are presented in the sections below.

Before making choices in relation to the future support to mine action it is however necessary to clarify the future policy framework for this type of support. Following the reorganisation of Sida in late 2008, the mine action policy paper from 2002 no longer has a formal status. Some of the options for Sida to consider would be:

OPTIONS	'PROS'	'CONS'
Update and enforce the policy for support to mine action as a stand-alone policy	High visibility.	Risk of marginalisation if not part of mainstream.
Place mine action in the framework of the Government policy on security and development (including a brief section about mine action)	Clear links to other interventions in countries affected by crisis and conflict.  This might fit with UN's strategy – UNMAS is situated within DPKO ORLSI and UNDP MA in BCPR.	Risk of low visibility as one out of many themes.
Adding guiding sections for mine action in other policies and/or strategies such as the humanitarian policy and country strategies	Conducive for linkages and coherence between mine action, development programmes and humanitarian action.  Will be included in mainstream reporting and programme cycle management.	Risk of low priority and funding due to competition with a range of other types of projects
Various combinations of the above.		

Once the policy framework has been decided upon it would be important to develop an **action plan** underpinning the policy priorities and principles, as well as establish a clear **central anchoring point** in Sida, and clear assignment of responsibility and lines of command for other units, desks and embassies involved.



### 8.3.2 Improving policy compliance and accountability

*Note: It is acknowledged that the future status of Sida's mine action policy paper has not been clarified, but the actions suggested here will be relevant in any case as they address some major weaknesses in programme implementation and accountability.*

#### IMMEDIATE STEPS

**Intensify monitoring of field programmes:** Clarify where primary monitoring responsibility lies, initiate more frequent monitoring visits to the programmes and create awareness with implementers of Sida's policy and requirements. Review reports from implementers and do not provide next phase funding unless implementing organisations report satisfactorily against technical and socio-economic objectives.

**Establish better linkages** between staff working with mine action in Sida HQ and country offices and implementing organisations.

#### OPTIONS FOR MEDIUM TO LONG TERM

**Ensure mine action expertise internally in Sida:**

OPTION A: Establish expertise in Sida HQ through employing a staff member with mine action background or training of existing staff.

OPTION B: employ external experts on a consultancy basis to assist with monitoring and quality assurance of programmes.

OPTION C: a combination of the above allowing Sida staff familiar with mine action policy issues to draw from specific technical expertise when required.

**Enforce policy priority on linking mine action to development:**

OPTION A: In cooperation with GICHD develop programmatic guidelines for implementing organisations, thereafter arranging workshops for awareness raising and training.

OPTION B: Encourage implementing organisations to employ more staff with a development background and/or bring in consultants to develop an action plan for linking mine action programmes to development initiatives.

OPTION C: Both of the above plus make this linkage an explicit requirement of funding proposals and future programmes.

**Update Sida's mine action policy** according to subsequent developments in the sector and develop an action plan for policy implementation with clear assignment of responsibilities with different units in Sida HQ and embassies.

OPTION A: Maintain a separate mine action policy with an action plan.

OPTION B: Mainstream mine action in other policies and strategies (humanitarian, country strategies, etc.)

OPTION C: Both.

**Develop clear strategic principles for how to uphold quality and measurability** in programmes supported, e.g. through clear criteria for country selection (seriousness of contamination, avoid 'orphans' and coordinate with other donors, or coherence with other Sida programmes?). Include such principles within a future revised policy on mine action.

**Policy choices:** Consider whether political objectives (e.g. fulfilling obligations to Mine Ban Treaty) or humanitarian/development objectives should direct decisions on investments and country priorities in relation to mine action.

### 8.3.3 Strengthening coherence and coordination

#### IMMEDIATE STEPS

**Mine action should be included in the reporting format** for country programmes in countries where Sida supports this sector, and possible synergies between mine action and other interventions should be described.

**Mine action should be mentioned** under one or more of the future thematic areas (e.g. under 'recovery' or other relevant themes) for Sida's humanitarian assistance to be decided following recommendations from the evaluation of Sida's humanitarian assistance.

Sida's current **monitoring procedures** for development programmes should be adapted as necessary and used for monitoring of mine action projects and programmes.

**Mine action should be put on the agenda** (where relevant) at donor and partner meetings in the framework of the Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles, as well as **coordination, alignment and harmonisation** in accordance with the Aid Effectiveness Framework.

#### OPTIONS FOR MEDIUM TO LONG TERM

**Mine action should be strategically placed in strategies** for humanitarian, development, stabilisation and reconstruction programmes to ensure that the sector (where relevant) becomes visible in mainstream programme documents.

### 8.3.4 Ensuring relevance and effectiveness

#### IMMEDIATE STEPS

**Sida should continue to allocate a proportion of its funding available for mine action to the key UN agencies, UNMAS, UNDP and UNICEF.** The allocation should be specifically for mine action (and not mixed with, for example, support to violence reduction) in order to ensure linkage to Sida's mine action policy.

**Sida should continue to support GICHD.** It could consider a change to core support for GICHD with a single Swedish contribution to core costs. However, GICHD must improve its reporting and strengthen its dialogue with Sida in order to better communicate the results of its activities. GICHD knowledge products must also be clearly needs related. GICHD must maintain its impartiality and neutrality.

In its dialogue with implementing partners, **Sida should encourage the attachment of socio-economic expertise** in the implementing organisations' recruitment of key staff including managers. This should

not be additional staff but replacement of existing staff working e.g. with community liaison or management at different levels.

**More systematic requirements to progress and results reporting should** be introduced in order to ensure that all objectives are reported on. The comprehensive LFA formats applied by DDG could be used as a model for this. Sida should **enforce** these requirements and not approve reports only addressing output level and technical aspects. New funding should not be allocated until satisfactory reporting from previous phase is in place.

## OPTIONS FOR MEDIUM TO LONG TERM

Sida should also consider **more stringent requirements for reporting from global organisations** so that the results of mine action interventions in terms of impact, including humanitarian and development impact, are more clearly displayed. As a first step, Sida may wish to consult other like-minded donors on how best to approach this issue.

Sida should consider **choosing focus countries after assessing seriousness of contamination** and then ensure linkages to other Sida humanitarian and/or development programmes where possible

Sida should **require all implementing partners to introduce socio-economic surveys for needs assessments and develop baselines** to provide data from which to monitor results. Reporting on development related progress and challenges should be a standard requirement. GICHD could be asked to develop guidelines for this drawing from the experience of implementing organisations.

Sida should push for a focus on programmes which **target most vulnerable groups** (clear their areas first and other places later).

### 8.3.5 Optimising impact and sustainability

#### IMMEDIATE STEPS

Sida should follow the roll-out of **DDG and MAG's new tools for impact assessment** closely and maintain a dialogue with them at country level in order to gather experience and documentation. Sida should encourage DDG and MAG to keep **a high level of information** between them and exchange ideas, tools and experiences on impact monitoring.

Sida should **liaise with GICHD to strengthen its coordination** of methodological development related to impact monitoring in mine action, enabling it also to draw from the other initiatives that are on-going and perhaps ultimately lead to the creation of IMAS giving guidelines for impact monitoring. The addition of external expertise in impact monitoring could also be considered.

**A joint impact assessment** could be launched by a group of likeminded donors in cooperation with the GICHD to provide more documentation of the results of mine action programmes. GICHD could follow up with a set of **guidelines for project cycle management in mine action**, including baseline studies, indicators, impact monitoring etc.

## OPTIONS FOR MEDIUM TO LONG TERM

**Effective tools for documentation of outcome and impact** should be required in all phases of the programme cycle from baseline indicators through to impact assessment.

**Capacity building strategies should become a standard requirement** in all mine action programmes supported by Sida, and these strategies are based on negotiations with national mine action authorities (or *de facto* national authorities) in order to ensure ownership and transparency.

**Reporting on progress on capacity building and impact** should become mandatory in annual reports.

All programmes should be required **to develop strategies for sustainability and exit** including benchmarks for exit or for re-assessment of exit dates.

# Annex 1 – Terms of Reference

2010-01-04

## Terms of Reference

### Review of Sida's support to Mine Action 2001-2009

#### 1. Background

Sida is one of the leading bilateral agencies in financial support to mine action in developing countries. During the time period 2001-2009 Sida has contributed with approximately 1 billion Swedish Kronor to mine action projects and programs in more than 17 countries. In the year 2000, an external evaluation of Sida's support was conducted covering the period 1990-2000. The findings and recommendations from that evaluation subsequently fed into the development of a Sida policy paper "Sida's support to mine operations", established in 2001. The policy paper outlines the need for ownership, long term engagement, exit strategies, and the support to national capacity. The integration of mine action with other contributions within development cooperation is also of priority. Support to the coordination function for UN's mine action, to long term financing of mine action as well as to work for poor countries' participation in the international work of mine action are also highlighted in the policy.

Sida has financed mine action through the appropriation for humanitarian assistance as well as from country and regional/global frames under the appropriation for long-term development cooperation. The main bulk of the funding has been directed to the areas of awareness/mine risk education and mine clearance. The support has been channelled through four main partners: INGOs (such as Mines Advisory Group, MAG, Danish Demining Group, DDG and others), the UN (such as UNMAS, UNDP/BCPR, UNICEF), international advocacy such as Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining-GICHD, and Geneva Call) and to the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, MSB.

In view of the current development of a Government policy on security and development (due in mid-2010) and with 10 years of contributing to the implementation of the Ottawa Convention on a mine free world the issue of mine action is at cross roads. Not only have global achievements been made in clearing land, reducing the number of victims and fatalities of landmines. The area of mine action also face increased competition from a number of pressing needs in the aftermath of conflict, all connected to the variety of perceived threats to safety and security from the individual, where each country and area has its own contextual specifics.

In order to prepare for Sida's future strategic direction within mine action, the past and current level of effectiveness, results and lessons learned need to be systematized and reviewed serving as an input to Sida's future policymaking. An external evaluation of Sida's support is therefore prioritized during the first two quarters of 2010.

#### 2. Objectives

The overall objective is to provide Sida with a comprehensive assessment of the support to mine action in order to feed into the future direction of Sida's engagement in mine action.

The specific objectives are to assess the following aspects of Sida's support:

- i) Relevance and usefulness of the support with Sida's policy paper for mine operations. The policy centers around issues such as promoting a long term perspective, national capacity and structures, the integration of mine programs in development cooperation and the need for exit strategies.
- ii) Outcome at an overall level: the results found from the projects and programs, focusing on relevance, effectiveness, sustainability, the outcome and possible impact on the target groups for the support (for instance, the use of cleared land, agriculture, communications, social effects etc.),
- iii) Outcome of support to methods development and knowledge management: the results of the Swedish support to the Geneva Centre for Humanitarian Demining, GICHD. The focus shall be on relevance, effectiveness and sustainability aspects of the Swedish support, taking into account both the core support from MoFA and the project support from Sida,
- iv) Outcome on country level: an assessment of the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability aspects of Sida's support to two of the larger recipient countries looking specifically at the implementing channels used in each country.
- v) Identification of lessons learned and recommendations: based on the above, identify lessons learned, challenges and recommendations for Sida's future engagement in mine action,

The primary intended users of the evaluation within Sweden are Sida management and staff, management and staff at MoFA engaged in issues linked to Swedish support to mine action and policy formulation, but also management and staff at MSB.

The secondary intended users are the implementing partners, e.g. UN agencies, MAG and DDG, not least with a focus on the two country studies. Another secondary intended user is GICHD, as to allow GICHD with an external review of Sweden's contribution to the Centre's work.

### **3. Scope of work**

The scope of work encompasses a comprehensive review of Sida's support to mine action, completed and ongoing agreements, including policy compliance between 2001-2009. The evaluation shall serve as an important input for Sida's future direction of its support to mine action. The review shall include the following chapters:

#### **3.1. Policy compliance-relevance and usefulness**

In terms of policy compliance, the evaluation shall look at to what extent Sida has followed its own policy and the usefulness of said policy. Has sufficient attention been paid to the main issues in the policy? (ref to 2, ii). Has compliance been assured? Has the policy been useful in the planning of contributions, assessments and follow-up?

### 3.2. Assessment of outcome on the overall level of support

With regards to the assessment of the outcome on an overall level from the contributions financed by Sida, a distinction between mine action with a development focus and humanitarian mine action<sup>103</sup> shall be made as to review and examine the respective clusters of support in line with its characteristics, including the OCD/DAC evaluation criteria for Conflict prevention and Peace building activities and Humanitarian assistance in complex emergencies, respectively<sup>104</sup>. Issues to be covered are relevance, effectiveness, sustainability, the outcome and possible impact on the target groups for the support (for instance, the use of cleared land, agriculture, communications, social effects etc). Examples of concrete results shall be highlighted as well as where concrete results are absent. In both cases explanations shall be sought and analyzed. Evaluations already performed of specific programs shall be an important source of information.

### 3.3 Country case studies

Specific country level studies shall be undertaken in two of the larger recipient countries for Swedish funding.<sup>105</sup> The countries chosen for the field studies are Iraq and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The focus shall be on the outcome and possible impact of Sida's support; assessing relevance, effectiveness, cost efficiency and sustainability with an outlook on the long-term socio-economic impact (where possible). Any relevant information in terms of identified challenges to mine action within the Swedish support in the respective country shall be provided to the evaluation team by Sida's country team.

### 3.4 The support to methods development and knowledge management -GICHD

The assessment of the support to GICHD implies focusing on the Centre's ability to spare-head methods development in mine action, its strategic direction, the internal measurement of results and a general assessment of the outcome of the Centre's work. Specific attention shall be paid to the contributions financed by Sida.

### 3.5 Lessons learned and recommendations.

The evaluation shall be formative and forward looking in the sense that it shall be able to draw conclusions regarding the outcome and possible impact of the overall Sida support to mine action during almost a decade and its linkages to compliance, usefulness and relevance of Sida's mine action policy.

<sup>103</sup> Where mine clearance and other activities are pursued with the main purpose of access for humanitarian aid and the return of refugees and IDP's.

<sup>104</sup> OECD/DAC Evaluation Quality Standards (2006), Guidance for evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies (1999), Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peace building Activities (2008),

<sup>105</sup> Iraq, Lebanon, DRC, Afghanistan, Sudan.

The conclusions on outcome shall be able to feed into a set of lessons learned for the above clusters as well as recommendations to Sida's future direction of its support to mine action, most likely to be integrated in Sida's response to the new Government Policy on peace and security, expected in mid 2010

### 3.6 Issues of specific importance

In the evaluation, not least within the country case studies as well as for the support to GICHD it is of importance to assess the coordination process between national and international stakeholders responsible for mine action and implementing channels for Sida's support at the operational level. Assessing the ownership aspect of the various contributions within mine action shall also be prioritized for the evaluation team. To what extent are the national bodies overseeing coordination, planning, and prioritization of the support? What results can be detected from capacity building of management and staff within the national bodies? Another issue in relation to coordination is whether beneficiaries have been involved in the planning and prioritization process and linked to that whether a gender and age perspective has been integrated in the contributions

## 4. Methodology

The methodology shall consist of both desk studies, field studies and interviews with stakeholders. The country studies include field visits. When looking at GICHD's work a visit to Geneva is also foreseen and included in the budget. The evaluation shall follow the standard evaluation criteria in accordance with the OECD/DAC Glossary of key terms in evaluation and results based management and the OECD/DAC Evaluation Quality Standards. The specific evaluation criteria for Humanitarian assistance and Conflict prevention and Peace building respectively, and as referred to under 3.2 shall be followed. The evaluation will hence apply the evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, sustainability and efficiency; focusing on outcome and to the extent possible, impact.

The methodology shall to a large extent be based on first and foremost a document review of Sida's support to mine action through the quantity of contributions. Interviews with key informants such as Sida, MFA, MSB and Sida's main partners is foreseen. A stakeholder mapping analysis shall be pursued as part of the contribution to the overall findings and recommendations. The field studies are complementary as to explore and validate issues and findings in the desk study. In the field studies, the Evaluation team shall engage with relevant stakeholders, national bodies for mine action, Sida's partners' in mine action in the actual country and the intended beneficiaries of the support. The inclusion of a perception study/focus group approach in each country shall be considered. The feed back in form of the final report to the participants in the perception study/focus group is compulsory work of the consultant. A gender sensitive approach, including balance as regards participants in the above approach and overall analysis shall be ensured and documented in the report.

Sida's Department for Human Security shall establish a reference group for the evaluation, to meet at two occasions for the review of the reporting from the evaluation team. The group will consist of representatives from the following teams: Humanitarian, Global



programs, and the 2 teams for the countries chosen for field studies. Sida is undertaking an evaluation of the humanitarian assistance at the same time as the review of mine action. Synergies shall be sought between the two evaluation processes as a substantial part of the support to mine action is financed from the humanitarian budget appropriation.

## **5. Reporting**

An inception report should be submitted 2 weeks after signing of the contract. The inception report, no more than 15 pages, should clearly state the purpose and methodology of the evaluation as interpreted by the evaluation team; why the evaluation is being done, how it will be pursued and who the primary intended users of the evaluation are. Furthermore should the inception report present an approach and methodology, including detailed description of the methodology, research strategy, and analytical approach specifying how the analysis will be performed, evaluation questions, description of sources of evidence, and data collection process and methods to be used. The inception report should also include a work and time plan, with key activities and plans for field work, report submissions and dissemination activities. No field work will commence until the inception report is approved. The inception report shall contain a specified budget, based on the general budget for the assignment (see Annex on Budget).

The evaluation team shall submit a first draft in English to Sida not exceeding 50 pages, including an executive summary and the country studies but excluding any annexes. For guidance on evaluation report structure, see Sida's Evaluation Manual (2007). Sida shall comment on the draft report within 10 working days. After receiving Sida's comments, the Consultant shall finalize the report, taking into account Sida's comments. The final report shall not exceed 50 pages and be submitted to Sida for publication and dissemination. It is the responsibility of the consultants that the report is professionally edited. The Consultant shall include the costs for a presentation of the evaluation at a seminar in Stockholm in May/June 2010.

## **6. Workplan**

The evaluation is planned to take place from February-May 2010.

Inception phase: February

Desk study: February-March

Field studies 2 countries + GICHD in Geneva: March-April

Preparation of report: April-May

Final report and presentation: June

## **7. Composition of the evaluation team**

The evaluation team shall consist of one team leader and 1-2 team members, preferably both male and female, covering the following area of expertise:

- substantial evaluation expertise of development cooperation
- documented experience in the area of development cooperation in settings of post-conflict

- documented knowledge of mine action
- documented knowledge of humanitarian assistance
- documented experience in conflict sensitivity and do no harm
- documented experience in gender analysis
- documented experience in livelihoods
- documented experience of processes involving strategic planning, including exit strategies, capacity building and aid effectiveness

For the Team Leader, qualified and documented experience in the above areas equivalent to a minimum of 10-15 years is requested. For the respective team members, an equivalent of a minimum of 5-10 years of qualified and documented experience in the above areas is requested.

### **8. Documentation provided**

Sida's policy for mine operations (2001)

Overview of Sida's support to mine action 2000-2009

Sida's contribution to humanitarian mine action (Sida Evaluation 2001)

Relevant material on contributions to mine action shall be provided (decisions, reports, evaluations between 2001-2009)

## Annex 2 – List of persons consulted

### IRAQ

Name	Position	Organisation
Mufleh Talouzi	Programme Manager	MAG
Mark Thompson	Technical Operations Manager	MAG
Andy Crump	Technical Field Manager	MAG
Katie Foster	Desk Officer	MAG
Meredith Wotten		MAG
Atoor Merkail	Community Liaison Manager	MAG
Soran Hamawandy	Technical Advisor	UNDP Iraq
Zagros Fatah	Director General	KRG Ministry of Planning
	Governor	Erbil Governorate
Kent Paulusson	Chief Technical Advisor	UNDP Iraq
Ulrikka Josefsson	Sida Country Representative to Iraq	Sida
Roger Fasth	Desk Officer	Danish Demining Group
Ben Lark	Head of Weapon Contamination Sector	ICRC

**DRC**

Name	Position	Organisation
Sebastien Cazenave	Programme Manager	MAG
Harouna Ouedraogo	Programme Manager	UNMACC
Asa Palmgren	Deputy chief of mission	Swedish Embassy
Brandon Mills	Mechanical Team leader	MSB
Alexander Thomas	Medical coordinator	MSB
Gabor Beszterczey	Country Representative	DCA
Matthew Willner Reid	Programme Officer	MAG
Habibulhaq Javed	Chief of Operations	UNMACC
Andy Mattingley	Operations Manager	DCA Kalemie
Christofer Warne	Operations Manager	MSB
Marcel Kabeya	Head of Office	Unicef Mbandaka
John Singa	Head of Office a.i.	FAO Mbandaka
Willy Ntuba	Database manager	FAO Mbandaka
	Head of Office	WFP Mbandaka
Pascaline Boketsu	Programme Officer	Caritas Mbandaka
Dr Louis Mpia	Head of Office WHO OCHA representative a.i.	WHO Mbandaka OCHA
	Civil affairs	MONUC Mbandaka
Alexis Kisubi	M&E expert	WFP Kabalo
Ali Abdoul Salami	Project Director	WFP Kabalo
Roger Mwanba Mutanga	Programme Officer	FAO Kabalo
François Bitha Shabani	Supervisor	IRC Kabalo
	Territory Administrator	Kabalo
Laurent Wilondja	National Survey & MRE Coordinator	DCA Kalemie
Joseph Lubarika	Food Security Programme Officer	DCA Kalemie
	Captain	FARDC Kalemie

Salim Raad	Deputy Programme Manager	UNMACC
Habibulhaq Javed	Operations Manager	UNMACC
Åsa Palmgren	Desk Officer	SIDA DRC
Josef Huber	Regional Operations Manager Goma	UNMACC
Langlis Langois	Regional Operations Manager Lubumbashi	UNMACC
Rana Elias	IMSMA Manager	UNMACC
Henrik Rydberg	Seconded Information Advisor	MSB
Brian Lewis	Programme Manager	Mechem
Johan Strydrom	Deputy Programme Manager	Mechem
Pieter Kock	Development Advisor to SYLAM	Mechem
Andy Mattingley	Programme Manager	DCA
Mathew Willmer-Reid	Programme Officer	MAG
Neil Arnold	Technical Operations Manager	MAG
Peparim	Field Technical Advisor	MAG
Steve Saffin	Operations Director	The Development Institute
Andrew Rose	Country Manager	The Development Institute
Charles Frisby	Chief of Staff	UNMACC

## Sida and other organisations

Name	Position	Organisation
Louisa Calais	Desk officer	Swedish MFA
Pernilla Tradgårdh	Desk officer	Dept for Human Security, Sida
Henrik Hammargren	Director of Human Security	Dept for Human Security, Sida
Maria Lundberg	Desk officer, Global Programmes	Dept for Human Security, Sida
Francois Landiech	Desk Officer, DRC	Humanitarian Dept., Sida
Petra Smitmanis Dry		DRC Team, Sida
Henrik Mungenast		MENA/Iraq Team, Sida
Katarina Kotoglou		Evaluation Dept, Sida
Alf Eliasson	Head of Development Cooperation, Sida	Embassy of Sweden, Tbilisi, Georgia
Doris Attve		Humanitarian Dept., Sida
Frederick Frisell	Senior Programme Officer	Conflict/Humanitarian Team, Sida
Daniel	Desk Officer, Mine Action	Embassy of Sweden, Kinshasa, DRC
Ian Mansfield	Deputy Director	GICHD
Ted Paterson	Head of Policy, Research & Evaluation	GICHD
Håvard Bach	Head, Operational Methodology Section	GICH-D
Klaus Ljoerring Pedersen	Representative Horn of Africa & Armed Violence Reduction	DDG
<i>Fredrik Pålsson</i>	Operations Advisor	DDG
Sara Sekkenes	Head of Mine Action Unit	UNDP BCPR
Justin Brady	Acting Chief of Programme Planning and Management Section	UNMAS
Martin Damary	Managing Director	Geneva Call
Judy Grayson	Head of Mine Action Unit	UNICEF
Melissa Sabatier	Clearing for Results Project Manager	UNDP Cambodia
Adam Komorowski,	Desk officer Africa	MAG
Marie Mills	Mine Action Advisor	MSB
Emilio König	Mine Action Advisor	MSB
Magnus Bengtsson	Mine Action Advisor	MSB

Tasneem Mowjee	Team Leader	Development Initiatives, UK
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## Annex 3 – Key stakeholders in mine action

### The United Nations

There are 14 UN agencies that are included within the United Nation's Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action. Three key members are UNMAS, UNDP and UNICEF to each of whom Sida has channelled non-earmarked funds over the period under review.

The **UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)** is part of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions. UNMAS is the focal point for mine action in the UN system. It is responsible for ensuring an effective, proactive and coordinated UN response to landmines and explosive remnants of war through collaboration with 13 other UN departments, agencies, funds and programmes. In peacekeeping and emergency settings, UNMAS establishes and manages mine action coordination centres in mine-affected countries, plans and manages operations, mobilizes resources and sets mine-action priorities in the countries and territories it serves. While advancing its vision of a world free from the threat of landmines and explosive remnants of war, UNMAS contributes to DPKO's efforts towards implementing sustainable peace through justice and security. During the period under review, Sida has contributed between SEK 5-7 million a year to UNMAS' mine action programme as un-earmarked support.

The **UN Development Programme (UNDP)** contributes to mine action through its country offices and its New York-based Mine Action Team within the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery. Its key role in relation to mine action is to assist mine-affected countries establish or strengthen national and local mine action programmes. In certain circumstances, UNDP also manages some or all of the elements of mine action programmes and may undertake specific mine action projects. Because landmines and explosive remnants of war are an obstacle to sustainable development, UNDP includes mine action in the mainstream of its broader development programmes. During the period under review, Sida has funded UNDP's mine action programmes through un-earmarked contributions of SEK 10 million a year to the UNDP Mine Action Team.

The **UN Children's Fund (UNICEF)** supports children in mine-affected countries globally through the development and implementation of mine risk education and survivor assistance projects and through advocacy for an end to the use of landmines, cluster munitions and other indiscriminate weapons. Sida contributed SEK 27.5 million to UNICEF in un-earmarked contributions between 2003 and 2009.

The UN's role in relation to mine action is guided by the UN Inter Agency Policy on Mine Action and Effective Coordination (2005) and, more recently, the **UN Inter Agency Mine Action Strategy (2006)**. This document sets four ambitious objectives:

- 1 Reduction of death and injury by at least 50% (by 2010).
- 2 Mitigate the risk to community livelihoods and expand freedom of movement for at least 80% of the most seriously affected communities.
- 3 Integration of mine-action needs into national development and reconstruction plans and budgets in at least 15 countries.



- 4 Assist the development of national institutions to manage the landmine/ERW threat and, at the same time, prepare for residual response capacity in at least 15 countries.<sup>106</sup>

### **Non-Governmental Organisations**

Since the early years of mine action, NGOs have played a central role in mine action, driving advocacy and lobbying for the Mine Ban Treaty, as well as setting the agenda in clearance, victim assistance and mine risk education. While the number of NGOs involved in mine risk education, victim assistance and political campaigning has increased during the last decade, there remains a core of around a dozen international NGOs directly involved in mine clearance. Although small in number, these operational NGOs have played a significant role in the development of technical and operational mine clearance.

### **International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)**

ICRC works to alleviate the suffering of mine victims and mine-affected communities: at the local level, it focuses its efforts on providing curative care and prosthetic services to mine victims, specialised training in the management of war wounds, including sessions on how to treat mine injuries. It also conducts mine/UXO risk education programmes to help reduce the threat to those living in a mine/UXO-contaminated environment.

At the national and international levels, ICRC works closely with Governments, international agencies and non-governmental organisations to universalise and implement the Amended Protocol II to the CCW and the MBT. ICRC regularly organises and participates in national and regional conferences to promote understanding of and adherence to these and other international humanitarian law (IHL) instruments. It also assists Governments in developing national legislation to implement their IHL obligations. Sida's annual contribution to the ICRC appeal includes the specific field of "victims' assistance", even if not earmarked for that purpose. Consequently it is not included in Sida's annual statistics for mine action

### **The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining**

The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (**GICHD**) is a Swiss foundation established in 1998 that supports the elimination of anti-personnel mines and the reduction of the humanitarian impact of other landmines and explosive remnants of war. The Centre provides operational assistance, knowledge and standards development, and support to the implementation of international law relating to mine action. In relation to the MBT, GICHD has observer status at the meetings of States Parties and, since 2001, has been mandated by them to provide the Implementation Support Unit (ISU). The Centre also has close relations with a large number of stakeholders within the field of mine action, including the UN, national governments, and operational mine action actors. In 2009, for example, the Centre undertook activities (in the form of training, research, workshops or technical advice) in 64 countries.<sup>107</sup> Swedish funding is provided from the MFA and Sida through core and programme funding respectively.

<sup>106</sup> *United Nations Inter-Agency Mine Action Strategy: 2006-2010*

<sup>107</sup> GICHD Annual Report 2009. The Centre has around 50 full time staff and currently receives funding from around 17 bilateral donors and international organisations. Its annual operating budget in 2009 was CHF 13 million (approx. SEK 90 million).

**Mine affected states – States parties**

Mine affected States (as well as States Parties without a mine problem) who have committed themselves to the Mine Ban Treaty have a number of obligations. As well as the more well-known obligations such as ceasing production, stockpiling and use of Anti Personnel landmines, as well as clearing all known mined areas under their jurisdiction or control, the States Parties also have the right to seek and receive assistance from other States parties and are committed to a number of obligations.

**Mine affected states – States not parties**

Mine affected States who have not committed themselves to the Mine Ban Treaty still have essentially the same fundamental humanitarian problem as the states parties, but without the same legal obligations. A number of states not parties have, however, received significant support from International organisations in mitigating the problems within their states. These include Lao PDR, Lebanon, Kosovo, and Sri Lanka.

**Mapping and analysis**

A mapping and analysis of the main mine action stakeholders is shown in the table on the next page.

	Sida	UNMAS	UNDP	UNICEF	Donors	NGOs	GICHD	NMAA	Affected populations
<b>Geographical reach</b>	5 "core" countries plus global via support, esp. UN agencies	Global	Global	Global	Global but often with a country focus	Focused	Global	National	Local
<b>Strategy/policy</b>	Policy targets include: national ownership, sustainability, long-term perspective, integration with development, contributing to national structure and capacity, Surveys and data collection, Victim assistance, MRE, and coordination	<p>Reduce casualties by 50% by 2010 Mitigate the risk to community livelihoods and expand freedom of movement for at least 80 percent of the most seriously affected communities. Integration of mine-action needs into national development and reconstruction plans and budgets in at least 15 countries Assist the development of national institutions to manage the landmine/ERW threat, and at the same time prepare for residual response capacity in at least 15 countries.</p> <p>Acts as focal point for all U.N. mine-related activities carried out by 11 departments and agencies within the UN</p>	Works with governments for reconstruction and development.	Protection of children, their families and communities,	Varies significantly - humanitarian and development related inputs	Generally focused on support to local populations	Provides capacity development, undertakes applied research, and develops standards aimed at increasing the performance & professionalism of mine action	National focus and often focused on achieving requirements under MBT	Reduction in risks, access to land, mobility, economic opportunity
<b>Main areas of work</b>	Direct operational support through NGOs. Support to UN. Support to knowledge devt (through GICHD)	Coordination of global mine action. Delivery of operational programmes. Uses UN partners on other areas. Support in peacekeeping (PSO)	National capacity development	Working with national governments and local capacities to deliver MRE and VA	Direct operational support through NGOs. Support to UN. Support to knowledge devt (through GICHD)	Generally clearance & survey, but also MRE & VA focus	Research and development to achieve more effective mine action	Focus generally on local populations through implementation	End user
<b>Context and country types</b>	All context types	Generally operating in unstable and fragile states	Operating through complete spectrum	Operating through complete spectrum	Operating through complete spectrum	Operating through complete spectrum	Operating through complete spectrum	Operating through complete spectrum	Local
<b>Emergency/humanitarian/development</b>	Emergency, humanitarian, development	Primarily Emergency and humanitarian	Primarily Emergency and humanitarian	Primarily development	Humanitarian/Development	Emergency and humanitarian	Emergency and humanitarian	Emergency and humanitarian	All phases
<b>Capacity</b>	Donor providing wide range of funding. Participation in policy debate. Limited technical expertise.	Country teams provide coordination and organise local NGO operators, provide training and policy advice, liaise with national authorities. HQ staff engage in policy development			Funding. Participation in policy debate. Limited technical expertise.	Operational mine action	Knowledge devt, ISU for MBT, evaluations and policy input, capacity building	Contributions to planning processes, participation in MRE	Contributions to planning processes, participation in M&E

	Sida	UNMAS	UNDP	UNICEF	Donors	NGOs	GICHD	NMAA	Affected populations
<b>Funding modality</b>	Sida & MFA, bilateral and multilateral funding, core & earmarked	Receive bilateral, multilateral earmarked and core support funding from donors			Multiple	Generally bilateral direct from donors	Direct support from donor governments in form of either earmarked or core funding	UN support and trust fund mechanisms, as development continues, often direct from governments	End beneficiary

## Annex 4 – Desk Study Summary

Over the evaluation period, Sida support has been provided to at least 20 countries and 5 multilateral agencies with funding coming from a mix of humanitarian and development appropriations.<sup>108</sup> Including all these in the evaluation is not realistic given the time available - and a number of the inputs have also been relatively minor. Nonetheless, both Sida and the evaluation team have considered it important that the evaluation takes as comprehensive a perspective as feasible. Therefore, in addition to DRC and Iraq where field visits have been undertaken, the team has included a mapping of inputs to other countries where the Swedish support has been significant. These are Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Somalia, Sudan, Nicaragua and Lebanon. The information summarised below is drawn from the documentation provided to the team by Sida and a number of implementing partners. Relevant background information has been drawn from the Land Mine Monitor.

### Overall observations

Sida has supported mine action in the desk study countries through two main channels: (a) multilateral organisations (including UNMAS, UNDP, UNICEF, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Deming, and the NGO Geneva Call which works with non-state actors) and (b) international NGOs, in particular SRSA/MSB, MAG and DDG with whom Sida has had a long cooperation.

The focus of the support has generally been directed towards capacity building of National Mine Action Authorities and Centres and to a mix of survey, manual demining, EOD and ERW, and Risk Education. The exact mix has depended upon the country needs/context. Sida's support also appears to have related to the extent of the mine problem, with the implication that the support has been focused on countries with significant mine challenges.

This two pronged approach enables global coverage - with support to UN agencies being provided through un-earmarked contributions. This flexible approach has been appreciated by the agencies concerned. In the case of UNDP, it has enabled the support to reach more than 20 countries in accordance with the priorities set out in the UN's Inter-Agency Coordination Strategy.

In the case of the INGO funding, the support has corresponded to Sida's policy basis and, to the extent that the team is able to assess it, has corresponded to national contexts, including humanitarian needs.

The team finds the mix of multilateral and bilateral support to be *appropriate* as it enables a very wide coverage (in line with the UN's global mandate) while also providing the means to support certain countries more directly using experienced INGOs.

The support appears *relevant* with respect to Sida's policy, although a higher focus could have been placed on a number of Sida's cross cutting issues and priority themes, including development and gender.

While development impacts are being increasingly highlighted, the team finds that the documentation that has been reviewed has not highlighted these aspects to a significant degree. There are some examples worth highlighting (e.g. DDG in Somalia). However, even where development has been

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<sup>108</sup> Overview of Sida support to Mine Action (provided by Sida). Nb. This is mainly covering the second half of the decade.

prioritised as an objective (as in UNDP programmes), it appears to be either difficult to report concrete impacts or M&E mechanisms have been insufficiently targeted towards them.

While women and children are typically referred to in contextual descriptions as part of proposals, the team found that gender aspects of mine action were not specifically highlighted in much of the documentation reviewed. In some cases, (e.g. MSB in Somalia), the employment of women in risk education teams was noted as a good way of increasing access to women in communities.

The team has experienced difficulty in identifying clear evidence of impact (as opposed to outputs) from the documentation reviewed.

In general, the reporting from INGOs has been more comprehensive and result orientated than that of UN agencies. In relation to the support channelled through the UNDP Mine Action Teams, reporting is provided on a country by country basis and focuses almost exclusively at the activity and output level.<sup>109</sup> Aside from demonstrating that a programme is active, the value of this in relation to deliverables against Sida's Mine action Policy is questionable. An alternative approach is provided by UNMAS in its annual reports which, while not donor specific, do appear more outcome related.<sup>110</sup>

The team thus places a premium on the availability of quality documentation (especially project proposals and reporting). As this varies considerably in practice, *the team suggest that Sida consider standardising its proposal and reporting requirements for INGOs so that they include a greater focus on a broader range of results*, including development outcomes. This will also assist Sida's task of appraising proposals and monitoring their implementation.

## 1 Afghanistan

Sida has supported Danish Demining Group (DDG) in Afghanistan with SEK 71 million between 2003-2010 to implement capacity building of the (UN) Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan and other mine action related activities,

The Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan recorded at least 12,069 casualties from mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) between 1999 and 2008, including 1,612 killed and 10,457 injured. Land Mine Monitor assesses that the casualties are likely to be under-reported due to the difficult terrain, ongoing insecurity which impedes access for data collectors, and because fatal casualties were often not reported from 1999–2002. The overwhelming majority of recorded casualties were civilians. The casualty toll in 2008 was less than half the level in 2001. It is estimated there are up to 60,000 survivors. Demining organizations released more than 250km<sup>2</sup> in 2008. Funding in the same year amounted to USD 105 million from 18 donor countries.<sup>111</sup>

Extensive mine/ERW risk education (RE) conducted over the last 10 years by approximately 15 organizations reached up to 3.5 million people a year. Risk reduction has focused on communities, internally displaced persons, and returning refugees. In 2003, RE began to focus more on community-based activities and behavioural change strategies. School-based RE programmes have also been developed. However, it has been found that RE programmes need more understanding of the problem

<sup>109</sup> An example is UNDP Zambia's 2007 annual report in relation to its *Support to mine action services to promote socio-economic development*.

<sup>110</sup> For example, UNMAS Annual Report 2006

<sup>111</sup> Land Mine Monitor, 2009 Afghanistan country chapter.

and to work more through established institutions. It has also been assessed that the challenges of Afghanistan's development situation <sup>112</sup>

Sida's support has been provided to Danish Demining Group (DDG) beginning in 2002 with the initial phase for establishment of a quality assurance system, Total Quality Management (TQM) within the Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan (MAPA) in collaboration with UN Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan (UNMACA). The aim of TQM was to support the development of a reliable and independent Afghan institution able to survive the transition from UNMACA to national ownership and guarantee the safety of de-miners and those using the cleared land. The project has aimed to build a strong structure with capacity to manage the technical, operational and managerial aspects of a national institution. The support was extended several times until 2008. Since October 2008, Sida has supported DDG's project on clearance of ERW in the Northern region and capacity building for national staff to expand the national operational mine clearance capacity.

Building the national capacity for mine action management is *relevant* as it contributes to developing Afghan security and development. UNMACA and DDG had identified the need in Afghanistan for a quality assurance system to secure that the national mine action management meets international standards. DDG's emphasis on building of national capacity for managing mine action was in line with Sida's policy for mine action and the selected provinces in the North are priority areas for the Swedish cooperation in Afghanistan. The national strategy for mine action, Afghan Compact has the aim that 70% of the hazard areas in Afghanistan are to be cleared by 2010 – which amounts to 2956 suspected hazard areas. DDG's objective of clearing 21 suspected hazard areas contributes to the national aim for mine action in Afghanistan.

Both projects train local personnel and thus contribute to building and *sustaining* a national capacity for management and operational mine action in Afghanistan. This is supported by DDG's practice of using only national staff in their clearance teams and most staff in administration and management is also now national, which makes for sustained efforts and organizational development. It appears, however, that the transition to full national control has not been totally successful due to issues of corruption. UNMACA has therefore proposed that the top positions in the MAPA be kept by international staff until 2013. DDG have established an Internal Development Cell to ensure continued training until then.<sup>113</sup> A GICHD assessment in 2008 concluded that "MACA had a strong management team which had initiated "excellent" reforms, although it still did not have, and should formulate, a formal, written strategy and medium-term plan."<sup>114</sup>

An assessment of *impact* is difficult to make because of the tendency to focus on outputs rather than outcomes. It is, however, noted that there has been a considerable through-put in terms of people trained and that areas have been cleared which has increased access. Community liaison is prioritized by DDG which should facilitate a participatory approach. The inclusion of women in liaison teams helps the team to reach women in communities. However, the impact on development of these aspects is unclear from the documentation. The development of an Impact Monitoring Manual by DDG should increase the visibility of results.

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<sup>112</sup> *ibid*

<sup>113</sup> DDG project documentation

<sup>114</sup> Ted Paterson, Faiz Paktian and William Fryer, "Assessment of the Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan," GICHD, August 2008. Quoted by LMM.

According to Land Mine Monitor, three-quarters of impacted communities are located in 12 of the country's 34 provinces and mines and ERW still pose a formidable challenge to the country's social and economic reconstruction. Mine and ERW contamination is particularly concentrated in central and key food-producing eastern provinces, affecting towns and urban commercial areas as well as villages, farm and grazing land, and roads. The extent of contamination makes battle area clearance and/or demining a prerequisite for most infrastructure and major construction projects.<sup>115</sup>

## 2 Bosnia-Herzegovina

The national mine action centre (BHMIC) reports 459 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties (214 killed and 245 injured) recorded between 1999 and 2008. In 2006, 1,889 km<sup>2</sup> was suspected to be contaminated. A general assessment of the mine situation in BiH conducted by BHMIC in 2007 identified 1,631 mine/ERW impacted communities. Most impacted communities are in rural areas where people depend economically on contaminated land.<sup>116</sup>

Sida has supported UNDP's Integrated Mine Action Programme (IMAP) between 2003-2008 with SEK 22 million. IMAP's overall objective is to accelerate restoration of socio-economic activities, while at the same time consolidating the national mine action structures (BHMIC) and their capacity to effectively execute mine action coordination over the long term. The latter includes adoption of a revised National Mine Action Strategy and a revised Mine Action Law and provision of communication and technical equipment to the armed forces' demining unit. IMAP also included an objective for clearance of up to 1.5 km<sup>2</sup> of mine contaminated land (selected based on its value to development and repatriation) which was extended by a further 0.5 km<sup>2</sup> in 2008. It is unclear from the documentation reviewed whether this output has been fully met.

Sida's support to mine action in Bosnia-Herzegovina is *relevant* in terms of Sida's country strategy which mentions mine action as a pre-condition precondition for the return of refugees and displaced persons and development of rural areas. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Mid Term Development Strategy also has mine action as a priority sector. The documentation reviewed indicates that the expected outputs have to a large degree been met, although it is not possible to assess the *impact* of these results on the socio-economic development and security for the communities concerned. It is unclear whether this is because of a lack of assessment. Regarding *sustainability*, BHMIC was reported by Sida to be receiving 95% of its funding from the Government by the end of 2007, and the aim was for full national funding by the end of the IMAP in 2008. The extension of the project in 2008 was to cover a phasing out of Sida's support to the IMAP.

## 3 Nicaragua

Sida has supported the Organization of American States (OAS) in collaboration with the Inter-American Defence Board (IADB) on mine action in Nicaragua starting in 1996. Between 2000-2006, Sida's contribution amounted to SEK 43 million.<sup>117</sup> The choice of supporting mine action in Nicaragua appears *relevant* taking into account that the country was at the time one of Central America's most mine contaminated countries and that access to productive but contaminated farming land would contribute towards poverty reduction goals.

<sup>115</sup> LMM 2009, Afghanistan

<sup>116</sup> Land Mine Monitor 2009, Bosnia Chapter

<sup>117</sup> In two grants: SEK 10mio (2000-2001) and SEK 24mio (2002-2005) . Sida Promemoria, June 2002



Nicaragua was contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) as a result of armed conflict between 1979 and 1990. More than 1,000 mined areas were recorded or identified, mostly located in the border areas in the north and south of the country, the majority along the Honduran border. Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 117 mine/ERW casualties of which 27 had been killed and 90 injured. In total, Nicaragua has reported 1,236 casualties since 1980. It has consistently carried out mine/ERW risk education since 1999, which has been evaluated and assessed regularly. Starting in 2006, the coverage of risk education activities and the number of beneficiaries began to decrease to just two departments of the country, corresponding to the reduction in contamination. As of March 2009, 1,107 of Nicaragua's 1,145 registered survivors had received regular rehabilitation services and 450 had also received socio-economic reintegration services with support from the OAS. Efforts to improve national capacity were limited, however, though Land Mine Monitor noted some improvements in quality and access to emergency and continuing medical care and physical rehabilitation services in 2008.<sup>118</sup> In June 2010, Nicaragua declared itself land mine free.

The objective of Sida's support was to facilitate productive use of land and increase security for the population in two municipalities in Northern Nicaragua by removing and destroying mines in accordance with international standards. This was to be accomplished based on information provided by the Nicaraguan Army and the population in accordance with the Nicaraguan Demining Plan, reducing the risk of mine injuries and deaths amongst mine affected communities, contributing to economic and social reintegration of victims, and prevention of incidents through mine awareness activities. Between 2002-2005, Sida's support covered 70 deminers and 30 personnel involved in logistics, medical assistance, and management.

The limited reporting from OAS on the Swedish contribution that the team has seen provides an overview of key contextual factors and outputs. In relation to humanitarian needs, it notes that the rehabilitation support provided has been targeted at victims whom, with out help, would have few chances for rehabilitation and reintegration into productive life in their communities.<sup>119</sup> Land Mine Monitor further reports that a study conducted on behalf of the OAS by the National Institute of Statistics and Census (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos, INEC) in 2006/2007 found a direct relationship between mine clearance in previously affected areas and subsequent improvements in various development indicators, such as health, access to education, and access to water and electricity.<sup>120</sup>

## 4 Cambodia

Sida has supported the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) in collaboration with UNDP between 1996 and 2005. The focus of the support has been on capacity building in relation to use of Mine Detection Dogs (MDD) as well as in relation to the Centre's organizational development. The Swedish contribution was channelled through a CMAC Trust Fund managed by UNDP and in cooperation with the Swedish Armed Forces. Between 2001 and 2005, a total of SEK 59 million was disbursed. In addition to this direct support, GICHD has also been involved in strengthening the mine action effort in Cambodia, including through the PAT project (with Sida funding).

According to the Land Mine Monitor, Cambodia remains one of the world's most mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) affected states, including cluster munitions remnants. Clearance of mined areas

<sup>118</sup> Land Mine Monitor, Nicaragua country report, 2009

<sup>119</sup> *Narrative report, Nicaraguan Front No.3*. OAS, 2001

<sup>120</sup> *ibid*

has increased sharply in recent years with the adoption of new methods and equipment while land reclamation by farmers and cancellation of suspected land through survey has drastically increased land release. At least 7,300 mine/ERW casualties were recorded between 1999 and 2008 of a total of more than 60,000 casualties since 1979. Extensive risk education has been conducted for over 10 years, implemented by CMAC, NGOs, and the Government. The approach has shifted from awareness-raising to risk reduction, with stronger integration into mine action, and links with development. In April 2009, Cambodia submitted an initial request for an extension to its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline for mine clearance, which put forward an estimate that 672km<sup>2</sup> of mined areas remained for full clearance. Although this was subsequently revised downwards to 648 km<sup>2</sup>, the scale of the challenge is obvious and Cambodia's mine and ERW problem still represents a major obstacle to social and economic development.<sup>121</sup>

The mine action effort in Cambodia has been extensively studied and reviewed. In late 2004, a joint donor evaluation (also supported by Sweden) recommended a number of changes aimed at increasing efficiency and effectiveness. This included a competitive demining trust fund and refocusing and streamlining of the Cambodian Mine Action Authority (CMAA), which was judged at the time to be "weak and ineffective.....and largely ignored".<sup>122</sup> The evaluation appears to have sparked a debate on a number of important issues, including the relation to development and the involvement of communities in defining the extent of the mine problem.<sup>123</sup>

The main objective of Sida's support has been to reduce the level and impact of mines in a transparently prioritized, cost-effective and safe manner, so that the maximum number of people can go about their lives free from the threat of mines, thus permitting reconstruction, re-integration and development activities to take place in a safe environment and contribute to further significant progress towards the target of zero mine victims by 2020. In addition, the support was to establish appropriate and effective coordination and regulatory structures and processes, install planning and resource mobilization mechanisms in line with national development priorities, and strengthen management systems and strategic planning processes. The ultimate aim of this has been to enable CMAC to fulfil its mandate as the national mine action service provider.

CMAC has improved in this respect after a difficult period (including corruption) in the early part of the decade when a number of donors froze their support. Part of Sida's response to this was to ask GICHD to provide advisory services to the CMAC, for which it established the Permanent Advisory Team (PAT). By 2003, CMAC was assessed to be making good progress, although it was judged that continued technical support would be necessary. It was agreed that this should be provided by Norwegian People's Aid (NPA).<sup>124</sup> This two pronged approach - combining support to CMAC through the UNDP Trust Fund and technical advice through NPA - appears *relevant* in the circumstances. Sida's close involvement (including through regular consultations with CMAC and UNDP) appears very *appropriate* given the risks to the investment already made and the need for improvements in the Cambodian response to mines in the country. The minutes of these meetings show that, while CMAC reported against its output targets, there was no substantive discussion of outcomes or overall *impact*.

<sup>121</sup> Land Mine Monitor, Cambodia country chapter, 2009

<sup>122</sup> *Joint Evaluation of Mine Action in Cambodia*, Robert Griffen and Robert Keeley, December 2004

<sup>123</sup> *Comments to Joint Evaluation of Mine Action in Cambodia*, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA). December 2004.

<sup>124</sup> Sida decision notes, 25 February 2003 and 18 July 2003.

## 5 Somalia

Sida has supported mine action in all three regions of Somalia through MSB and DDG. Between 2004-2009, the total funding made available amounted to SEK 51,8 million.

Registered human costs in relation to mines are difficult to document in Somalia, especially in the most violent areas surrounding Mogadishu. Landmine Monitor has identified 2,354 mine/ERW casualties (832 killed, 1,405 injured, and 117 unknown) in Somalia (excluding Somaliland) between 1999 and 2008.<sup>125</sup> In Somaliland, Landmine Monitor identified 814 casualties (207 killed, 500 injured, and 107 unknown) between 2000 and 2008.<sup>126</sup> A Landmine Impact Survey in Puntland has, however, shown that 151.000 people live in 35 mine-affected communities.<sup>127</sup> In South Central, the situation is probably much more acute than this, particularly following the Ethiopian intervention and subsequent withdrawal. This points to the need for mapping of ERW and training of local personnel to enable clearing of mines in order to minimize human costs and reduce socio-economic effects of mines in Somalia. Under the UN Inter-Agency Strategy, UNDP/UNOPS are building national capacity and authority for mine action in Somalia and, given the different security situation, distinctions are made between the three main regions.

MSB operations in Puntland and South Central Somalia have focused on building national capacity for management of mine action and reducing the number of injuries caused by mines through mapping, clearance and preventive information work, reducing the socio-economic effects of mines, and increasing possibilities for international humanitarian assistance for the local communities. MSB has operated in both Puntland and South central with EOD training and demolition for the Puntland Mine Action Centre and setting up the IMSMA at the South Central MAC and the field office in Baidoa as well as training and mapping, EOD, MRE, and medical assistance. The activities in South Central were planned for a three year period from 2007 with a transition period of co-financing with UNMAS (50% each) from May 2009 until November 1<sup>st</sup> 2009 where UNMAS was to take over full responsibility. MSB's inclusion of female EOD operators, medical and MRE staff has helped enable access.

The Somaliland mine action programme is managed by UNDP Somalia. In 2007, GICHD concluded that the Somaliland Mine Action Centre (SMAC) was not performing effectively, due partly to insufficient UNDP inputs.<sup>128</sup> Since 2006, support from UNDP has included subcontracting for technical services from MSB amongst others. Technical training has been provided to upgrade the skills of the police EOD teams

MSB's objective of building a strong national capacity for management of mine action in Somalia is *relevant* in relation to Sida's policy and the UN strategy. From the documentation reviewed, it appears that difficulties have been experienced in continued upgrading of EOD levels and improvement of skills - which questions *effectiveness* and whether it has been possible to sustain the national mine action capacity. The first training of national personnel in Puntland was concluded but not granted extension. The second project in South Central region was implemented, but at a slower pace and at a smaller scale than intended due to the fragile security situation in the area around Baidoa. The *impact* of the

<sup>125</sup> Land Mine Monitor 2009, Somalia chapter

<sup>126</sup> Land Mine Monitor 2009, Somaliland chapter

<sup>127</sup> Landmine Impact Survey: Phase 2: Puntland, 2005.

<sup>128</sup> GICHD, "Somalia report: Mission to Somalia (Somaliland and Puntland)," Draft, 15 May 2007. Quoted in Land Mine Monitor, 2009.

involvement is difficult to assess since no impact report appears to have been provided by MSB. The reporting includes details of outputs; for example, 26.000 persons in the South Central region benefited from Mine Risk Education in schools and refugee camps. Overall, the quality and content of the reporting from MSB has varied considerably and will have made it difficult for Sida to monitor implementation.

DDG has been funded by Sida on three occasions within the period, most recently in relation to survey, EOD and MRE tasks in Mogadishu, building upon existing DDG experience and presence in the city (as the only mine action agency apart from AMISOM EOD personnel).<sup>129</sup> The aim has been to increase ERW clearance and continue to deliver MRE and information on ERW risks to residents, IDPs and agencies. DDG also provides a call-out facility in order to assist a safe return. DDG's programme document states that monitoring will be undertaken to assess the impact on returnees and other groups - target groups, including children, are highlighted. DDG developed an Impact Monitoring tool in 2008 to support this and uses MRE staff to undertake monitoring. Cooperation and coordination is provided with UNMAS, the Somali Mine Action Centre and humanitarian agencies. It is also stated that results and lessons learnt will be fed into the IMSMA database managed by the Somali MAC.

The team consider that the overall quality of the DDG's *project documentation* is very good and provides sufficient information for decision-making and monitoring (including some outcome monitoring). It provides a good basis for dialogue with Sida and helps *Sida's decision-making* and follow up. Sida's assessment of the 2009 proposal, for example, considered the relevance to the context (Sida assessed this to be highly relevant), DDG's previous work in the area and the results (outputs) achieved, and its capacity to carry out the work (including risks).<sup>130</sup>

In Somaliland, Sida supported DDG activities have included survey, manual demining, EOD, and use of mine detection dogs. In its report on the 2004 programme, DDG notes that it had established a local staff of 102 people and was coordinating its work with the Somaliland Government, the Somaliland MAC and other mine action operators. The report notes that the threat appeared to be low level and reducing - although population movements were pushing people to settle on land previously the scene of conflict, including around Hargeisa. DDG has targeted these groups in addition to supporting the national mine action authorities. The team considers that the reporting provides a useful overview of results (outputs and outcomes), lessons learnt, and challenges.<sup>131</sup>

Given the governance difficulties in Somalia and the activities of non-state actors, Somalia has also been a focus for the NGO **Geneva Call** (which is core funded by Sida). From 2002 to 2005, 17 Somali factions signed the NGO Geneva Call's Deed of Commitment banning antipersonnel mines and have pledged to undertake stockpile destruction.

## 6 Lebanon

Sida has supported mine action activities in Lebanon between 2004 and 2009 through MSB in cooperation with UNOPS and UNMAS in support of UN's Mine Action Coordination Centre and UN aid delivery by identifying and mapping security risks and areas. In addition, support for EOD

<sup>129</sup> *Sida Somalia proposal*, Danish Demining Group, 5 May 2009.

<sup>130</sup> *Assessment Memo relating to DDG proposal on "Survey, EOD and mine risk education in Mogadishu 2009-2010*.

Sida

<sup>131</sup> *Somaliland Final Report, 2003-2004*, Danish Demining Group

competency has been provided to ICRC in Lebanon. A total of SEK 65.5 million have been made available during that time period.

Lebanon is contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), especially cluster munitions remnants, after 15 years of civil war and conflict with Israel. The 2006 conflict resulted in up to 500,000 unexploded submunitions being scattered across more than 1,000 cluster strike sites. At the beginning of 2009, the UN and NGOs reported major funding shortages to clear the remaining submunitions, which have resulted in closing operations and less clearance. The Lebanese National Mine Action Authority, a government body, is responsible for mine action policy. MACC SL was handed over from the UN to the Lebanese government and became the Regional Mine Action Centre (RMAC) in January 2009.<sup>132</sup>

MSB has supported UN's Mine Coordination in Lebanon with a Mine Detection Dog specialist in 2004 – 2005 through UNOPS, and support to UNMAS for quality assurance of mine detection dog activities in 2007 – 2008.<sup>133</sup> Following the withdrawal of Israeli forces in 2000 a considerable mine action effort was initiated, which however faded out a couple of years later because of inadequate funding. The problem was actualised again after the conflict with Israel in 2006 resulting in serious contamination with cluster munitions, and this attracted renewed funding from donors. MSB's support was in the form of providing technical assistance through the deployment of a Mine Detection Dog Quality Assurance Officer. Similarly, the MSB provided an EOD expert to the ICRC from 2007.

In 2009 Sida provided support to MSB for continuation of the support to the Lebanese Mine Action Centre (LMAC) through an allocation of SEK 6.5 million, following the transfer of the responsibility for overall coordination of all mine action activities in Lebanon from the UN to LMAC and the Lebanese Army. LMAC had requested support from MSB to clearance of specific sites in densely populated areas in the border region with Israel, where only MSB's machines were able to operate. This appears thus very *relevant* and aligned with priorities of national mine action authorities. This support is a continuation of MSB's activities in southern Lebanon since 2006 originally on request from UNMAS and supported by Sida through allocations in 2006, 2007 and 2008. UNMAS has expressed satisfaction with MSB's contribution and it is evident from the reporting made available to the Review Team that MSB had *effectively delivered results* and added value through technology, expertise and resources not available to the Lebanese authorities.

## 7 Sudan

Sida has supported mine action activities in Sudan through MSB from 2004 to 2008 and DDG in 2008 – 2009 with a total of SEK 40.9 million.

‘Sudan is contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), primarily as a result of more than 20 years of armed struggle between the government of Sudan and non-state armed groups in the south, mainly the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army. A Landmine Impact Survey was completed in 16 Sudanese states in June 2009, with the UN Mine Action Office (UNMAS) estimating that total residual contamination covered 107km<sup>2</sup>. UNMAS began mine action operations in 2002 in the Nuba Mountains with international and local NGOs carrying out demining and risk education. More

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<sup>132</sup> Landmine Monitor, Lebanon Country Profile, 2009

<sup>133</sup> Ärande D/D 513, Minröjningshundspecialist till FN:s Mine Action Coordination Centre i Libanon, MSB 2004

than 44km<sup>2</sup> of land have since been released and a further 29,000km of road verified. Mine action centres have been set up in Khartoum in the north and in Juba in the south'.<sup>134</sup>

The MSB programme started as support to national and regional mine action centres in Khartoum, Rumbek and Nuba Mountains through UNMAO with the objective of strengthening national capacity. Funding from Sida was extended for 2006 – 2008 and again for for 2008 – 2011 with a concentration on fewer intervention areas and supporting the plan for nationalisation of UNMAO in 2011. The support has been directly requested by UNMAO and there is no doubt that it has been regarded as highly *relevant*. The high focus on capacity building and also the support for the nationalisation process of UNMAO can be seen as steps towards achieving *sustainability* of the programme.

DDG started operations in Sudan in 2006 and obtained funding from Sida for a two-year project from 2008 in South Sudan. The project was aimed at supporting the repatriation process for refugees and IDPs in South Sudan by providing a safe environment for the returnees and communities, and facilitating the work of humanitarian organisations. The Sida supported project was evaluated by a team fielded by the GICHD in early 2010, and it was found to have been *relevant* at the outset, and *effective* in reducing risks for returnees, other community members and staff of humanitarian organisations. *Efficiency* could be improved, and the likely *sustainability* of operations would benefit from firmer approaches to transition of activities to national organisations and the formulation of an exit strategy. The evaluation recommended continued support from Sida for a next phase with clearer plans for activity transfer and exit considerations.<sup>135</sup>

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<sup>134</sup> The Landmine Monitor 2009, Sudan Country Profile

<sup>135</sup> Sida DDG Evaluation, Draft Report March 2010, Korayi, Lardner and Wood, GICHD

## Annex 5 – Outline Evaluation Matrix

ISSUES	TYPICAL EVALUATION QUESTIONS	METHODS AND TOOLS FOR DATA COLLECTION & ANALYSIS
<p>1. Relevance and usefulness of the support with Sida's policy paper for mine operations.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How does Sida's policy paper compare with mine action policies of other leading organisations?</li> <li>• How has Sida responded to the guidelines included in its own policy?</li> <li>• Has this policy been useful and appropriate? How has the implementation of the policy been monitored and compliance assured?</li> </ul>	<p>Document review: Mine action policies of other donors and organisations</p>
	<p>How useful is the guidance given by the policy in areas of</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• promoting a long term perspective?</li> <li>• strengthening national capacity and structures?</li> <li>• integration of mine programs in development cooperation?</li> <li>• development of exit strategies?</li> </ul>	<p>Document review: Sida policy and guidelines</p> <p>Interviews with MOFA/Sida staff</p> <p>Interviews with implementing organisations</p>
<p>2. Outcome at an overall level: the results found from the projects and programmes</p>	<p><b>RELEVANCE</b></p> <p>To what degree and in what manner have humanitarian mine activities supported by MOFA/Sida been relevant to</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• partner countries' needs and priorities, as expressed in the national development recovery and development strategies?</li> <li>• needs and priorities of population groups residing in or displaced from mine affected areas?</li> <li>• Particular interests and needs of women and men of the affected population groups?</li> </ul> <p><b>EFFECTIVENESS</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To what extent have the objectives of the intervention been achieved?</li> <li>• To what extent is the release of land according to planned objectives?</li> <li>• To what extent are the interventions fostering development of local capacities?</li> <li>• To what extent are activities previously hindered by landmines, in operation?</li> <li>• What are the lessons learned in previous</li> </ul>	<p>Document review: Project documents, progress reports, evaluations etc. related to MOFA/Sida supported projects and programmes</p> <p>Analytical matrix to ensure comparability of data at overall level</p> <p>Interviews with stakeholders</p>

	<p>planning and implementation efforts?</p> <p><b>SUSTAINABILITY</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To what extent have activities led to the development of an adequate national organisational capacity in the field of mine clearance?</li> <li>Where capacity is lacking, what supplementary mechanisms are needed to strengthen the national capacity?</li> <li>How effectively has the issue of exit strategies been dealt with by the implementing partners and Sida?</li> </ul> <p><b>POSSIBLE IMPACT WITH TARGET GROUPS</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What will be the likely impacts of the programme?</li> <li>What are the results at outcome level (initial impacts)?</li> <li>To what extent has the living condition of the mine-affected population improved?</li> </ul>	
<p>3. Outcome of support to methods development and knowledge management: the results of the Swedish support to the Geneva Centre for Humanitarian Demining, GICHD.</p>	<p>Assessing for core support from MOFA and project support from Sida:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How has the <b>RELEVANCE</b> of activities supported been ensured in relation to overall challenges in the mine action sector and pertinent needs in projects and programmes?</li> <li>How <b>EFFECTIVE</b> has the support been in relations to meeting objectives and agreements between GICHD and MOFA/Sida?</li> <li>To what extent and in which way has the GICHD dealt with the <b>SUSTAINABILITY</b> of the Swedish supported activities in relation to reaching a visible impact on methods development and knowledge management in the mine action sector?</li> </ul>	<p>Document review: Project documents, agreements, strategies, progress reports of the GICHD</p> <p>Interviews at GICHD</p> <p>Interviews with selected project managers in the field</p>
<p>4. Outcome on country level: Sida's support to two of the larger recipient countries selected for field visits</p>	<p>To what degree and in what manner have the implementing partners ensured that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Activities are <b>RELEVANT</b> to needs and priorities of the recipient government and the affected population groups?</li> <li>Activities are <b>COST-EFFICIENT</b> in relation to cost level in country and similar activities by other organisations?</li> <li>Activities are <b>EFFECTIVE</b> in meeting their objectives according to agreed time schedules?</li> <li>Activities are <b>SUSTAINABLE</b> in alignment with future priorities and needs of the</li> </ul>	<p>Document review: Project documents, progress reports, etc.</p> <p>Interviews with MOFA/Sida staff</p> <p>Interviews with implementing partners: project and programme managers and staff</p>



	<p>recipient government and the existing capacity?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What are the particular capacities and weaknesses of the implementing partners supported by MFA/Sida compared to other mine action organisations in the country?</li> <li>• How do the results of the implementing partners compare with results obtained by other mine action organisations in the country?</li> <li>• How have the interventions taken account of gender issues in their planning and implementation?</li> </ul>	<p>Interviews with actual and potential beneficiaries</p> <p>Interviews with mine action authorities and other relevant government departments</p>
5. Identification of lessons learned and recommendations for Sida's future engagement in mine action,	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What are the strengths and weaknesses of Sida-supported mine action programme?</li> <li>• What lessons can be learned from the programmes in relation to Sida's priority areas and how could they be used in future Sida engagement?</li> </ul>	<p>Possible use of SWOT. Otherwise will be subject for interviews and focus groups.</p>
6. The coordination process between national and international stakeholders responsible for mine action and implementing channels for Sida's support at the operational level.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To what extent and how has ownership of interventions been established with the national authorities and to what extent are the national mine action authorities overseeing coordination, planning, and prioritization of the support?</li> <li>• What results can be detected from capacity building of management and staff within the national bodies?</li> </ul>	<p>Interviews with national mine action authorities.</p>
7. Involvement of beneficiaries in the planning and prioritization process and linked to that whether a gender and age perspective has been integrated in the contributions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Partners to demonstrate consultative mechanisms, especially to see extent of local ownership in prioritisation, planning and implementation and the impact of this in operations.</li> </ul>	<p>Possible use of SWOT. Otherwise will be subject for interviews and focus group</p>

## Annex 6 – Reference documents

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For the desk study, the Review Team has received and reviewed the following type of documents related to mine action programmes in Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Somalia, Sudan, Nicaragua and Lebanon:

- *Proposals and funding assessments by implementing partners*
- *Decision and assessment notes by Sida*
- *Agreements and contracts between Sida and implementing partners*
- *Updates, progress, and evaluation reports by implementing partners*
- *Financial and accountant statements*