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**CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY**

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE MANAGEMENT AND SECURITY  
ANALYSIS**

**MASTER OF SCIENCE DISSERTATION**

**2002**

**Tim Lardner**

**Towards A Better Mine Action Programme**

**Supervisor:**

**Dr AM Fitzgerald**

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## ***Abstract***

In 1998, the world first became aware of the huge impact that landmines were having upon humanity when the former Soviet Union pulled out of Afghanistan and the world saw how much damage landmines were having on the population.

This study sets out to assess how the global community has set about dealing with this blight. The United Nations has played a leading role in the formation of programmes to attempt to ameliorate the situation. Whilst many of these programmes have removed a significant number of mines and undoubtedly saved thousands from death and injury, progress has generally been slow and there is a perception that the process of programme initiation is far from perfect. Whilst this may be a fair criticism, the method of programme development tries to be focussed on capacity development as well as the clearance and reduction of casualties, which in itself may cause difficulties in the initiation.

The study analyses the development of two programmes in particular – the national programmes in Cambodia and Mozambique – and then considers the influences that culture and organisational structure have had upon those organisations.

Taking these lessons, the study moves to analyse how the best methods of implementation could be implemented and recommends a number of areas to be considered in the development of future mine action organisations.

## ***Acknowledgements***

I would like to thank my colleagues at Cranfield University, particularly Professor Trevor Taylor for opening a number of doors and having faith in me. Dr Ann Fitzgerald acted as a superb Supervisor and mentor and offered me refreshing insight into the aid sector outside my myopic mine action perspective.

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Finally a note of thanks to my wife and daughter, Teresa and Hannah, who have put up with many hours of my skulking behind books with remarkable acquiescence.

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## Glossary

<b>ADP</b>	Accelerated Demining Programme
<b>BiH</b>	Bosnia and Herzegovina
<b>CMAC</b>	Cambodian Mine Action Centre
<b>CND</b>	Comissão Nacional de Desminagem
<b>CTA</b>	Chief Technical Advisor
<b>DDA</b>	Department of Disarmament Affairs
<b>DHA</b>	Department of Humanitarian Affairs
<b>DPKO</b>	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
<b>EAF</b>	Entity Armed Forces
<b>EOD</b>	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
<b>FAO</b>	Food and Agriculture Organisation
<b>FRELIMO</b>	Mozambique Liberation Front
<b>FUNCINPEC</b>	United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia
<b>HALO</b>	Hazardous Areas Life-support Organisation
<b>HI</b>	Handicap International
<b>ICBL</b>	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
<b>ICRC</b>	International Committee of the Red Cross
<b>IDP</b>	Internally Displaced Person
<b>IED</b>	Improvised Explosive Device
<b>IMAS</b>	International Mine Action Standards
<b>IMSMA</b>	Information Management System for Mine Action
<b>IND</b>	Instituto Nacional de Desminagem
<b>KR</b>	Khmer Rouge
<b>LAF</b>	Lebanese Armed Forces
<b>MA</b>	Mine Action
<b>MAC</b>	Mine Action Centre
<b>MACC</b>	Mine Action Coordination Centre (or Cell)
<b>MAG</b>	Mines Advisory Group
<b>MCTC</b>	Mine Clearance and Training Centre

<b>MCTU</b>	Mine Clearance Training Unit
<b>MDD</b>	Mine Detection Dog
<b>MOZMAC</b>	Mozambique Mine Action Centre
<b>MRE</b>	Mine Risk Education
<b>NDO</b>	National Demining Office
<b>NMCC</b>	National Mine Clearance Centre
<b>NPA</b>	Norwegian People's Aid
<b>OAS</b>	Organisation of American States
<b>ODA</b>	Overseas Development Agency
<b>OES</b>	Operation Emirates Solidarity
<b>ONUMOZ</b>	United Nations Operations in Mozambique
<b>RENAMO</b>	Mozambican Resistance Force
<b>RKAF</b>	Royal Cambodian Armed Forces
<b>SFOR</b>	Stabilisation Force (In Bosnia and Herzegovina)
<b>SOP</b>	Standards Operating Procedures
<b>TA</b>	Technical Advisor
<b>UNAMIC</b>	United Nations Advance Mission to Cambodia
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Fund
<b>UNMAS</b>	United Nations Mine Action Service
<b>UNOCHA</b>	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
<b>UNOHAC</b>	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
<b>UNOPS</b>	United Nations Office for Project Services
<b>UNSAS</b>	United Nations Standby Assistance System
<b>UNTAC</b>	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
<b>UXO</b>	Unexploded Ordnance
<b>VVAF</b>	Vietnam Veterans of America Association
<b>WFP</b>	World Food Programme



# Chapter 1

## Introduction

On the 3<sup>rd</sup> December 1997, a remarkable treaty was signed by 122 nations in Ottawa. The treaty was hailed by United Nations (UN) Secretary General Kofi Annan as “*a landmark step in the history of disarmament*” and “*a historic victory for the weak and vulnerable of our world*”.<sup>iii</sup> The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and On {sic} Their Destruction<sup>1</sup> was developed and negotiated within a 12 month period and was acknowledged by most to be a remarkable achievement<sup>iii</sup>. Since the initiation, some 140 countries have signed or acceded to the treaty, of whom, 118 have ratified, therefore fully committing themselves to all the provisions of the Anti – Personnel Mine Ban Treaty.<sup>iv</sup>

The treaty essentially prevents all signatories from using, holding, producing and transferring all anti – personnel (AP) landmines. It also commits them to destroying any stockpiles they may hold and to clearing all AP mines on their territory within a 10-year period of ratification. It is evident that the treaty is making a significant difference. As the Landmine Monitor states: “*A growing number of governments are joining the Mine Ban Treaty, and {...} there is a decreased use of antipersonnel landmines, a dramatic drop in production, an almost complete halt to trade, rapid destruction of stockpiled mines, fewer mine victims in key affected countries, and more land demined.*”<sup>v</sup>

Whilst the political movements in the anti-landmine<sup>2</sup> arena have moved on a pace, so the concept of clearance and land remediation has also altered in a significant way. In the last 10 years, the mine clearance industry has transformed itself from a tough “cowboy” industry, employing “roughnecks” who would have difficulty finding work outside the sector, to a regulated industry working to international standards and attempting to achieve the most effective methods of clearance offering value for money, safety and reliability. Although

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<sup>1</sup> Throughout this report, the convention will be known by its common name, the “AP Mine Ban Treaty”

the AP Mine Ban Treaty does not address it, Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) presents an equal threat in socio – economic terms in many countries and must also be cleared. Throughout this study, the term “mines” refers to both mines and UXO.

The general public became aware of the humanitarian problems relating to landmines in 1989 following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. During the 10-year conflict both sides had laid mines – the *Mujahadeen* to block enemy deployments and to support ambushes and the Soviets in protective and terror based tactics. In the very early days of the problem (the early 1990’s), mines were estimated to be causing between 20 and 25 casualties per day in Afghanistan<sup>vi</sup>. This was reduced in mid 2001 to an estimated *mere* 10-12 casualties per day. Figures since 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001, when around 4,000 Afghan UN deminers were withdrawn from Afghanistan during the campaign, are still somewhat sketchy.

In the late 1980s, a number of organisations attempted to ameliorate the emerging mine problem in Afghanistan although in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal, the situation proved to be frenzied and uncoordinated. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) established its first coordination centre in Afghanistan in 1990 in order to attempt to bring some order to the chaos. By the end of September 1990, 432 trained deminers were organised and working in 16 teams throughout Afghanistan<sup>vii</sup>.

Afghanistan is just one more example of how a great number of actors pulled together in demanding circumstances requiring a better focus on coordination. Afghanistan is not considered in detail in this study but is yet another example of why it is important to focus Mine Action research in this direction.

#### Aim

The aim of this study is to make recommendations for the better implementation of a national mine action centre (MAC).

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<sup>2</sup> The terms “Mine” & “Landmine” throughout this report refer to landmines, Unexploded Ordnance

## Objectives

The objectives of the study are:

- To outline the global landmine problem.
- To describe the structure of the current state of the mine clearance industry and analyse the modus operandi for the development of a MAC.
- To examine the limitations and problems associated with the current method of MAC development in order to define the best way of improving it.
- To examine the cultural influences that affect the development of a Mine Action Programme.
- To assess whether a standardised methodology for implementing a MAC would be of benefit.

The scope of this study will be bounded by extant limitations. All mine action activities will be assumed to be *humanitarian* mine action activities. There are many definitions of humanitarian mine action, but in this case, it is proposed to accept the UNs' definition of mine action as referring to:

*'those activities geared towards addressing the problems faced by populations as a result of landmine contamination. It is not so much about mines as it is about people and their interactions with a mine-infested environment. Its aim is not technical – to survey, mark and eradicate landmines – but humanitarian and developmental – to recreate an environment in which people can live safely, in which economic, social and health development can occur freely from the constraints imposed by landmine contamination, and which the victim's needs are addressed.'*<sup>viii</sup>

Mine Action is considered to contain the following five elements:

- *“Mine clearance, including survey, mapping, and marking;*

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Contamination and Booby traps.

- *Mine awareness and risk reduction education;*
- *Victim assistance;*
- *Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel landmines*
- *Advocacy to stigmatise the use of landmines and support a total ban on antipersonnel landmines*<sup>ix</sup>

It is also worth noting at this stage the UN's vision as stated in the Strategy paper for 2001-5

*“We envision a world free of the threat of landmines and unexploded ordnance, where individuals and communities live in a safe environment conducive to development, and where mine survivors are fully integrated into their societies.”*<sup>x</sup>

At the moment the UN supports the majority of MACs around the world. The majority are also funded to a greater extent, through the UN, rather than the host Government, which has a significant influence on the host nation's desire to direct the programme.

#### Study value

At the moment, the development of a MAC to a country is done on an almost *ad hoc* basis, with a host nation asking the UN for support to overcome a humanitarian problem. The UN will not move without this invitation. Thus far, the method for structuring and developing a MAC has not been completely standardised and there are strong arguments that there should not be such a protocol due to the widely differing cultural influences – what works in South East Asia may well not work particularly well in Africa. It is one of the objectives of this study to assess whether such a protocol could prove valuable.

With a standardised methodology, it does however seem probable that efficiencies could be introduced into the process of design and implementation of a MAC which would reflect well on the humanitarian community by improving the value for money spent on mine action activities in a mine affected country.

## **Origins of the study**

The author of the study spent a number of years in the field as a Technical Advisor, Programme Manager, and later Senior Technical Advisor in mine action programmes between the years of 1994 and 1999. During his time in the field, he became increasingly frustrated at the problems caused by weak management of the programmes by national staff, poor expatriate advice offered to those programmes, restricted tied aid and structural difficulties within national programmes. Much has improved since those formative years, but the author feels that there is still scope for further more structured improvement.

## **Methodology**

The study will draw on three culturally different countries, and their mine action structures, all set up under very different circumstances, but with almost identical aims of ridding their home nations of landmines. The two countries to be analysed in detail will be Cambodia and Mozambique; the third, Lebanon, will be outlined initially together with Cambodia and Mozambique and then a detailed analysis will be made in a later chapter. Whilst these three mine affected countries are not the only ones with programmes, given the history that has affected the development of these programmes, they can be considered to be representative of the majority of extant MACs. Both the Cambodia and Mozambique programmes originated during large UN operations immediately post conflict and were planned, developed and implemented in a great hurry. Lebanon will be considered in more detail later in the study to assess whether previous lessons had been learned. Lebanon is not completely unique and whilst a number of more recent programmes have had the benefit of a greater time scale, there are still a large number of programmes, such as the recently initiated UN programme in Sri Lanka and the recent UN clearance programme in Kosovo that were all implemented at relatively short notice.

Lessons learned will be drawn from these developments and these will then be compared with a number of classic organisational models. The author has carried out much of the research over recent months in his work in Mozambique, Cambodia and Lebanon and has closely worked with a number of

organisations within these countries. A number of interviews with key stakeholders were undertaken either by telephone or during the course of visits to these countries. It is worth noting that because of the relative newness of Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA), there is a paucity of quality literature in the subject area.

Whilst interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner, there was a requirement to retain some flexibility in order to allow the study to move forward in the most beneficial direction. Because of the author's position in the industry, he was able to access significant data, on both a formal and informal level.

#### Case Study analysis

During the development of the country studies, a general framework was developed to give structure to the analysis. A background section gives the historical and political reasons for the environment the countries find themselves in. Following this, a contemporary analysis will assess the development of the current mine action environment identifying a number of critical characteristics to highlight unique requirements and will then identify any key issues arising.

### **Study Structure**

The detailed structure of the study is outlined below:

- Chapter 1 – Introduction.
- Chapter 2 – Background to the Global Landmines Situation.
- Chapter 3 – Literature review. A general review of the available literature available covering both the mine action sector and Mine Action Organisational development.
- Chapter 4 – Detailed analyses of two countries, drawing on the successes and failures of both and background to Lebanon, a more recent programme.
- Chapter 5 – Conclusions from analysis and assessment of best practice in MACs.

- Chapter 6 – Structural implementation.
- Chapter 7 – Lessons learned in Lebanon.
- Chapter 8 – Recommendations and Conclusions.

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<sup>ii</sup> UN Secretary - General Kofi Annan, Address to the signing Ceremony of the Antipersonnel Mines Convention. Ottawa, Canada, 3<sup>rd</sup> December 1997.

<sup>iii</sup> The full text of the AP Mine Ban Treaty can be found at <http://www.icbl.org/lm/2001>

<sup>iv</sup> *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, (Human Rights Watch, August 2001)

<sup>v</sup> op cit, p 1.

<sup>vi</sup> Roberts S & Williams J, *After the Guns fall Silent*, (Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, 1995), p14.

<sup>vii</sup> UNOCHA Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan Workplan 2001

<sup>viii</sup> UNMAS paper, *Mine action and effective coordination: The United Nations Policy*, (A/53/496), 1998

<sup>ix</sup> op cit, annex II, para 7

<sup>x</sup> UN paper, *United Nations Mine Action: A Strategy for 2001-5*, Report of the Secretary General, 56<sup>th</sup> Session, Agenda item 38, Addendum 1, (A/56/448).

## Chapter 2

### Background

Although there is some debate as to when landmines were first used, the general history can be traced with reasonable certainty. Modern landmines are explosive traps, but their lineage derives from non-explosive predecessors such as spikes and stakes used by ancient armies as far back as 2,500 years ago. One of these devices, the four-spiked caltrop can be closely compared to the present day landmine in a tactical defensive context and design function. It comprises four spikes, usually made of iron, joined at the centre and arranged so that when thrown on the ground, one spike always points upwards with the other three forming the base. Caltrops were reported to have been used as far back as the 3rd century BC, and the same design is still being used in present day conflicts.

Explosives were introduced at a later stage to make use of their inherent properties in order to improve the killing or wounding capabilities of mines. It is worth noting that mines are generally designed to maim, rather than to kill and so increase the physiological effects upon the troops affected.

The earliest explosive-based mines were used in Southern Italy in the 14<sup>th</sup> Century, although these were initiated by a powder trail, which was inherently problematic. In addition, the gunpowder was hygroscopic and therefore could be rendered inert after just a few days, depending upon the weather.

The first pressure initiated landmine was recorded in 1726 by the German military historian, H Frieherr von Flemming who described what a fladdermine (flying mine) looked like: *“It consisted of a ceramic container with glass and metal fragments embedded in the clay containing 0.90 kilos of gunpowder, buried at a shallow depth in the glacis of a fortress and actuated by someone stepping on it or touching a low strung wire”*.<sup>1</sup>



Although noted here in 1726, the concept does not seem to have taken hold until the American Civil War, when Brigadier-General Gabriel J. Rains ordered his troops to prepare Artillery Shells so they would explode when stepped upon. On 4<sup>th</sup> May 1862, a horseman activated one of these devices and gained the epithet of being the first person to be killed by a landmine.

The first use of mines on a large scale was during the First World War, designed to outwit the newly deployed tanks. Further development followed and during the Second World War, anti-personnel (AP) mines were specifically designed to prevent enemy soldiers from removing the Anti Tank (AT) mines that had been employed. By 1945, the US Army recorded that mines were responsible for 2.5% of troop casualties and 20.7% of tank losses.<sup>ii</sup>

At this stage, mines impacted primarily upon military operations. In the 1960's however, the problem took a huge leap forward with United States operations against the Pathet Lao and in attempts to close the Ho Chi Minh trail in South East Asia. From 1965 to 1970, the US military dropped over 2.5 million tonnes of Ordnance over Indochina<sup>iii</sup> much of which failed to explode. A generally accepted principle is a 10% dud rate, suggesting that over this period, 250,000 tonnes of UXO remains over SE Asia.<sup>iv</sup> At the same time, forces of both sides were laying huge amounts of mines, particularly in Vietnam and the east of Cambodia.

The Americans found that the mines and UXO used in South East Asia were a double-edged sword. A recently declassified US intelligence document stated that mines and booby traps accounted for 65-70% of US Marine Corps casualties in Vietnam during 1965 – and a good proportion of these from their own weapons.<sup>v</sup>

It was during this period of indiscriminate bombing and mining that the humanitarian tragedy began to unfold. Although the explosives dropped along the Ho Chi Minh trail may have had some effectiveness against the Viet Cong

and the Pathet Lao, increasingly victims were civilians, and certainly once hostilities ceased, the increasing pattern of civilian casualties continued.

From those beginnings, came the makings of the global humanitarian crisis that is extant today. There are currently 90 countries affected by Landmines or UXO.<sup>vi</sup> However, classification of the severity of the problem is not straightforward. For example, the United Kingdom is on the list because of the mines laid during the Falklands conflict in 1982. Although these have caused no civilian casualties since the conflict, the classification remains. In an attempt to better understand the scale of the problem, a number of initiatives are currently under way.

The ongoing Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) initiative, aims to provide a method for assessing the scale of the problem within a country. In addition, the United Nations carries out a number of rapid assessment missions to evaluate the impact and scope of mines in a country and to recommend a suitable response. Thus far, some 30 countries have undergone assessments or surveys since 1997. Of the 90 affected countries, it would not be unreasonable to suggest that in the region of 30 of these countries should be classified as “highly impacted”. Similarly, there are some 13 affected countries that have recorded no casualties since 1999, including Costa Rica, Guatemala and the United Kingdom.<sup>vii</sup>

The next question to address is how the global community has dealt with this crisis. The first serious international intervention to deal with the problems of a country occurred in Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal in 1988. In the early days following the withdrawal, casualties were estimated to be around 20-25 per day in the country<sup>viii</sup> and this equated to a clear humanitarian crisis. This triggered a number of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), both Afghan and international, to begin setting up programmes to clear mines, using local and expatriate staff to do so.

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) set forth upon a plan to train 15,000 Afghans in manual mine clearance. The plan, with hindsight, was crudely thought out due to the lack of knowledge of how deal with such an issue, but it remains the first serious attempt to carry out and run a humanitarian mine clearance programme.

Today, some 37 affected countries<sup>3</sup> have some form of body responsible for the coordination of mine action activities.<sup>ix</sup> These bodies range from a two man government sponsored unit such as has been established in Guinea-Bissau, through to the full scale programme currently operating in Afghanistan with a headquarters coordinating 12 NGOs fielding over 6,500 deminers. Annex A shows the state of UN supported programmes and the extant state of development of those programmes.

### **The role of the UN in mine action**

The UN states that the purpose of mine action is to recreate a safe environment conducive to normal life and development<sup>x</sup>. Mine Action encompasses five complementary core components (the “five pillars”):

- Mine awareness and risk reduction education;
- Mine clearance, including survey, mapping, and marking;
- Victim assistance;
- Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel landmines;
- Advocacy to stigmatise the use of landmines and support a total ban on anti-personnel landmines.<sup>xi</sup>

The UN is probably the only viable organisation that can take on the role of coordination of the global landmine effort. From the early days of 1988, when the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

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<sup>3</sup> Abkhazia, Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Costa Rica, Croatia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Jordan, Kosovo, Laos, Lebanon, Mauritania, Mozambique,

(UNOCHA) initiated the Afghan programme, the structure and direction of the UN mine action community has changed significantly. Initially, there was minimal knowledge and little idea of how to develop a viable programme. Since then, many lessons have been learned and the structures of the UN mine action services have altered to form the basis of the system in place today.

It is important to understand that the United Nations will generally only operate within a country if the host Government has invited them to do so. A recent notable exception to this is of course Kosovo, where the UN mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) operated under a General Assembly Resolution<sup>xii</sup> allowing them to operate as the *de facto* Government. UNMIK was able therefore to focus on specific operational goals with minimal diversion. Unsurprisingly, the Mine Action Coordination centre (MACC) in Kosovo has been recognised as one of the most successful, operating, in effect, in a political void. In addition, the MACC had the benefit of being very well resourced relative to the scope of the problem.

In other countries, programmes are subject to the guidance of national governments and generally aim to build the capacity of the local staff to a level at which the (relatively expensive) expatriate staff can withdraw and leave the national programme to operate by itself. Indeed one of the specific objectives of the United Nations is to have, by 2005, '*National and local capacities {are} in place to plan, coordinate and implement mine-action programmes*'.<sup>xiii</sup> Whilst this is in itself a commendable ideal, the realities of the situation often result in programmes that are stifled by the national government that they were set up to support.

Outside the specific mine action sector, the UN has come under some criticism over recent years with regards to the competency of their Peace Keeping Operations (PKO). Most recently, the "Brahimi report", commissioned directly by the Secretary-General of the UN, stated that: "*Over the last decade, the*

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Namibia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Rwanda, Somaliland, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Ukraine, Yemen and

*United Nations has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge; and it can do no better today.*<sup>xiv</sup> The time period mentioned in the report corresponds directly with the period of time that mine action programmes have been initiated, often as part of these very PKO.

In addition to the complications of host government interventions, the potential for difficulties is compounded by the structure of the UN organisations tasked to work in the mine action environment. There are no less than 11 UN departments or agencies operating in the sector. The roles and responsibilities of the three main agencies are outlined below and are expanded upon in Annex B:<sup>xv</sup>

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#### **The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)**

UNMAS is the focal point for all mine-related activities. It is responsible for ensuring a coordinated response to landmine contamination, establishing priorities for assessment missions and coordinating the mobilisation of resources. It is also responsible for the preparation and maintenance of technical standards, the collection and maintenance of mine related data, advocacy in support of a global ban on mines and for the management of the Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) which is the central fund to which donors channel their funds through the UN system for mine action. The UNMAS is part of the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO).

#### **The UN Development Programme (UNDP)**

UNDP is the focus for the establishment of national and local capacity and addressing the socio-economic consequences of mine contamination. UNDP will normally have the prime responsibility for the development of integrated, sustainable mine action programmes where programmes have passed the “emergency” stage.

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Zambia.

### **The UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS)**

UNOPS is a service provider for integrated mine action and capacity building programmes. It implements programmes as appropriate in conjunction with the concerned partners (such as UNMAS, UNDP etc.). UNOPS is the Agency responsible for recruitment of international staff of programmes. In addition, UNOPS coordinate and manage a programme in Northern Iraq funded by the “Oil for Food” agreement between the UN and the Iraqi Government with a budget of £45 million between 1997 and 2000.

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Notwithstanding the complications inherent within the structures outlined above, there is a general intention that the agencies will work together to form, at the request of the host government, an organisation to coordinate mine action activities within a particular country.

The first step to be considered is the specific need of a nation, and UNMAS will normally plan and implement a multi-discipline assessment mission to analyse the problem and to recommend a solution. The team will be formed from a number of different agencies and will look at the situation from all angles. Once again, the UN emphasise that normally they must be requested to assist by the host nation, and often, this process can take a long time to come about.

The multi-agency team will make recommendations based upon their combined approach and expertise and if it is appropriate, a programme of some form will be initiated to overcome extant problems. All development will generally be done in close coordination with the host government. The exceptions would be if there were no host government to work with. An example of this situation would be the deployment of the Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC) in Kosovo – often referred to as “the most successful mine action programme”<sup>xvi</sup>.

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- <sup>i</sup> Flemming, cited in Croll M, *History of Landmines*. (Pen and Sword Books), November 1998.
- <sup>ii</sup> Croll M, op cit.
- <sup>iii</sup> Prokosh E, *The Technology of Killing*, (Zed books, 1995), p105
- <sup>iv</sup> Mines Advisory Group, quoted at <http://www.calweb.com/~gaia/secretwar/>
- <sup>v</sup> US Defence Intelligence Agency, *Landmine Warfare – Trends and Projections*, cited in McGrath R, *Landmines and UXO – A Resource Book*, Pluto Press 2000, p 8
- <sup>vi</sup> *Landmine Monitor Report 2001 – towards a Mine-Free World*, Human Rights Watch, August 2001.
- <sup>vii</sup> Interview with Anne Capelle of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), Geneva, May 2002.
- <sup>viii</sup> Roberts S & Williams J, *After the guns fall silent – The enduring legacy of Landmines*. (Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, 1995), p14.
- <sup>ix</sup> *Landmine Monitor*, ibid, p43. Plus interview with Martin Donoghue, UN Mine Action Service, Geneva, May 2002, noting additions of Sri Lanka and DR Congo in 2002.
- <sup>x</sup> *United Nations mine action: a strategy for 2001-2005*, United Nations General Assembly Fifty-sixth session, Agenda item 38, Assistance in mine action. (A/56/448)
- <sup>xi</sup> op cit.
- <sup>xii</sup> ***United Nations Resolution 1244 (1999), Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, on 10<sup>th</sup> June 1999***
- <sup>xiii</sup> op cit, Strategic goal Three.
- <sup>xiv</sup> *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, United Nations General Assembly Security Council, A/55/305-S/2000/809, (The Brahimi Report), 21st August 2000
- <sup>xv</sup> *Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Policy*. UN policy document A/53/496 of 1998.
- <sup>xvi</sup> Scott JJ, “The Kosovo MACC: The most successful Mine Action Programme ever”, *Journal of Mine Action*, Issue 6.1, Winter 2002.

## **Chapter 3**

### **Literature review**

#### **Introduction**

Much has been written about development in the humanitarian aid sector over recent years and there is a wide range of material to draw upon. The Mine Action sector has also been well documented, although because of the relative youth of the industry, much of the documentation is not as well developed as it might be.

The problems encountered by the United Nations and a number of governments in the setting up and development of a number of mine action programmes in numerous countries<sup>4</sup> are manifold. In some cases, the development of these coordination efforts have been meticulously recorded, in some cases, efforts have been *ad hoc* and there is little solid data to be drawn from the situation.

#### **Aim**

The aim of this chapter is to draw on relevant texts, both primary and secondary, as well as interview-based data, in order to focus more clearly on the development of national mine action capacities so that a detailed analysis of the situation can be undertaken. The chapter will also consider texts from outside the mine action sector that prove to be of benefit to the study.

#### **Methodology and Scope**

The literature review will assess the available publications in the areas of general mine action, as well as the strategic planning and organisational areas. Mine action literature is not, in general terms, well stocked with quality literature although there are a number of noteworthy exceptions

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<sup>4</sup> It is assessed by the UN that as of June 2002, there are 37 countries with coordinated mine action (either UN or other agencies) clearance efforts underway.



With such a short timescale for the development of theory of organisation structure in humanitarian mine action (i.e., the 13 years of operations since the first humanitarian mine clearance in Afghanistan), and with such a diverse catalogue of countries in which programmes are operating, the studies undertaken to analyse the structures are limited. The influences on the development of individual countries actions are as varied as the different cultural, political and environmental issues might cause them to be.

### **General background.**

The humanitarian impact of landmines on populations has had such an invidious effect on populations that much has been written on the effect of landmines from the humanitarian perspective. Much of the early writing was emotionally based and stirred huge political support but ultimately did little to develop any clear perspective on the problem. In 1994, the United States' Department of State issued a report<sup>i</sup> that described an extremely gloomy and apparently insurmountable problem estimating that there were between 80-110 million landmines planted around the world. It estimated that the previous year, only 80,000 had been lifted, whilst 2.5 million had been laid. Although the background research was generally valid, in the follow on publication<sup>ii</sup>, some 4 years later the numbers were estimated downwards to 60-70 million and the report suggested that more mines were coming out of the ground than were going in. The reality is that numbers of mines actually mean very little, and are seldom quoted these days – the humanitarian impact is by far the most valuable judgmental factor (although of course is far more subjective and therefore more open to interpretation).

In terms of this type of background, the researcher's library has been significantly bolstered by the publication of the Landmine Monitor<sup>iii</sup>. This publication was first produced in 1999 by a group of organisations under the umbrella of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) – the organisation that acted as the driver for the eventual implementation of the AP Mine Ban Treaty in 1997. The report has been published and updated annually

since then and is now recognised to be the key source of data for any research in the mine action arena. It is meticulously researched and provides a solid reference base for any researcher in the mine action arena and as well as charting the progress of signatory and non-signatory countries towards the ideal of the AP Mine Ban Treaty, provides an excellent snapshot of how each mine affected country is progressing in its mine clearance activities. It charts this under a number of sub headings such as: *'Mine Ban Policy, Use, Landmine Problem, Mine Action Activities, Mine Awareness, Casualties and Victim Assistance'*<sup>iv</sup>

Rae McGrath's Resource Book<sup>v</sup> gives an excellent insight for the uninitiated to the mine action world in defining the terms and general background. Whilst it defines the environment in simplistic terms, it was the first book that clearly explained to the layman the complications of the industry.

Finally, there is a tri-annual journal that has become accepted globally as the central forum for publication of issues from all angles, in the mine action world. James Madison University in Virginia, USA, became involved some six years ago in the mine action arena, sponsored by the United States Department of State (DoS) to promote coordination between operators and programmes. James Madison University produce the "*Journal of Mine Action*", published since the summer of 1997. The journal regularly turns out thought provoking articles, but the journal is not refereed, partly due to the cultural environment of the industry – it seems that, at the moment, it is probably too young to feel comfortable within such tight constraints.

### **Specific programme publications**

Once the general mine action theatre has been outlined and understood, a more detailed analysis of the structure of how countries and the UN attend to the problem needs to be considered. There are again here a number of papers ranging from the National Programmes unpublished and published reports, through to wide ranging studies on organisational structures.

A seminal piece of work was developed in 1997 by a 3-person team, Bob Eaton, Chris Horwood and Norah Niland. The UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) commissioned a 'lessons learned' study titled "Development of Indigenous Mine Action Capacities"<sup>vi</sup> looking at UN established programmes in four of the most severely affected countries in the world – Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia and Mozambique. The Terms of Reference (TOR) define the overall objective of the study to: "...enhance the capacity of all actors involved in the planning, development and implementation of mine-action programmes to determine the most appropriate and cost-effective means for the initiation and development of indigenous capabilities essential for the management and sustainability of mine-action programmes."<sup>vii</sup> The study produced a number of findings and made recommendations, many of which have shaped the structure of mine action today. In particular, the two case studies on Cambodia and Mozambique are of great significance in charting the development of mine action in those two countries.<sup>viii/x</sup> These reports are still regularly referred to as extremely valuable pieces of work, even though the environment has significantly changed. As an example, the TOR for the study required the team to: 'examine the role of DHA {...} in assisting local authorities to define programme goals and philosophy'<sup>x</sup>. It was perhaps unfortunate that, whilst the study was being prepared, the focal point responsibility for landmines was transferred from DHA to the Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO). Whilst these obstacles did cause some problems in the drafting, the core of the report and its findings remained valid.

Finally, a paper published by the Swedish Government as an analysis of the impact of their contributions to HMA<sup>xi</sup> is an excellent, up to date report considering a number of structural and organisational issues with the specific Swedish interventions. This particular report recognises that considerable improvements have been made over the last few years, yet also recognises that programme development is still in its infancy.

## **The role of the military**

Military forces have traditionally been responsible for the planning and deployment of minefields as well as combat breaching operations (in which it is commonly accepted that a certain number of casualties is acceptable). More recently, as a more general position, the military have begun working in Peace-Keeping Operations (PKO), a part of which may include responsibilities within HMA. Whilst the juxtaposition of the role of the military does not always sit comfortably within PKO, the recognition that the military play a strong role in supporting PKO is noted. In a recent report commissioned by the Secretary – General of the UN, the team suggested that there is a significant shortfall in quality troops and expresses a great deal of concern that nations who are on the UNs database for military assets available to the UN for support to PKO. The report says that: “...many Member States are saying ‘no’ to deploying formed military units to United Nations-led peacekeeping operations, far more often than they are saying ‘yes’.”<sup>xii</sup>

In the field of HMA, few nations are prepared to commit their forces to operational demining, preferring instead to fill specialist training and coordination roles. For example, the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) have conducted a number of courses for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) technicians from a number of countries – indeed in one recent course, technicians from all three entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) were trained together.<sup>xiii</sup> In terms of coordination, SFOR pride themselves in their coordination efforts in the field of demining. “*There are few areas where SFOR, along with the Entity Armed Forces (EAF), stand as united as in the field of engineering. They are particularly united in the clearance of mines, utilising their combined strength to do so.*”<sup>xiv</sup>

National armed forces also have a significant role to play in the clearance of their own territory. As noted, the EAF in BiH take the lead in clearance under the coordination of SFOR & the BiH MAC. In the United Kingdom, the MOD are showing increasing interest in the clearance of mined areas in the Falkland

Islands and on the 17<sup>th</sup> July 2001, the UK and Argentine Foreign Ministers agreed that an Exchange of Notes on a demining feasibility study should take place. The study and the subsequent clearance will be funded by the Argentine Government.<sup>xv</sup> The feasibility study is underway and a contractor has been identified but not, as yet, accredited as required by IMAS. Costs are difficult to assess but an Argentinean estimate suggested that around \$253 million would be required to clear all minefields on the islands.<sup>xvi</sup> It is worth noting that although the Falklands has many thousands of mines laid throughout the islands, there had not been a human casualty since September 1983. However, the government of the United Kingdom is a States Party to the AP Mine Ban Treaty, which commits them to clearing all AP mines from the Falklands by 1 March 2009.

### **Mine issues**

There are a number of studies and reports to study the structures of mine action and the development of mine action in these two countries. By far the most significant is the Development of Indigenous Capacity Study as mentioned previously. In Cambodia, the most significant publication is “War of the Mines”<sup>xvii</sup> which outlines the scope of the mines problem in Cambodia, followed by a number of specific programme reports. In particular, the Cambodian Mine Action Centre’s (CMAC) own publication, “From Emergency to Development”<sup>xviii</sup> provides logic for many of the decisions taken during the development of CMAC. Many of these publications recognise that the industry has come a long way in a short time and that whilst much has improved, there is still great scope for continued improvement. Another key factor identified by the majority of authors on the subject area is the difficulties in making the transition from emergency into development.

The development of literature over the last five years (prior to this point, there was very little indeed to use in any substantive way, primarily because the industry was so young and undeveloped) has been rapid and the amount of

quality research increased from virtually nil, to a state where there is quality literature, if the researcher looks hard enough.

Finally, for Mozambique, there is one key publication. Laurie Boulden was a researcher with the South African Institute of International Affairs in the late 1990's and produced a book<sup>xix</sup> in which she outlines the political intricacies and bureaucratic tangles that hindered clearance efforts in Mozambique in the post ONUMOZ years. The problem in Mozambique, she says, is that “*poor national coordination, rivalries amongst the various actors and bureaucratic minutiae have each hindered efforts...{but that}... However, that projects are under way is the most important fact*”. Boulden summarises by stating that “*no matter how crooked or long the path might be, de-mining in Mozambique has clearly been making an impact where it is needed, not in the boardrooms of Maputo or the capitals of Europe, but in the fields and villages of the country.*”<sup>xx</sup>

## Summary

Much of the writing has focussed on the analysis of detailed elements of the mine action industry since 1990 and recognises that, although there are still huge problems in the industry, some mitigation may be allowed for because of the development span of the industry. Many recommendations have been made, some of which have been acted on, to the benefit of the community, and other recommendations, which may be less acceptable for political or financial reasons.

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<sup>i</sup> United States Department of State; Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “*Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis*”, (Washington DC, December 1994)

<sup>ii</sup> United States Department of State; Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “*Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis*”, (Washington DC, September 1998)

<sup>iii</sup> *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, (Human Rights Watch, 2001)

<sup>iv</sup> op cit.

<sup>v</sup> McGrath R, “*Landmines and Unexploded Ordnance – A Resource Book*”, (Pluto Press, 2000)

<sup>vi</sup> Eaton R, Horwood C, Niland N, *Multi - Country Mine Action Study: Study Report - The Development of Indigenous Mine Action Capacities*, New York: United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1997, and associated four case studies for Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia and Mozambique.

<sup>vii</sup> op cit.

<sup>viii</sup> Eaton R et al, *Multi - Country Mine Action Study: Cambodia - The Development of Indigenous Mine Action Capacities*, New York: United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1997.

<sup>ix</sup> Eaton R et al, *Multi - Country Mine Action Study: Mozambique - The Development of Indigenous Mine Action Capacities*, New York: United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1997.

<sup>x</sup> Eaton R, *Study Report*, op cit.

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- <sup>xi</sup> Harpviken K, Millard A, Kjellman K, Strand A, “*Sida’s Contributions to Humanitarian Mine Action – Final Report.*”, Sida evaluation 01/06, (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, 2002)
- <sup>xii</sup> *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, United Nations, A/55/305 S/2000/809, August 2000, (“The Brahimi Report”), p17
- <sup>xiii</sup> James IS Lt Col, “UK explosive ordnance disposal course for EAF”, *SFOR Informer Online*, <http://www.nato.int/sfor/engineers/expdisp/t991119b.htm>
- <sup>xiv</sup> Egeburg K Lt, “United de-mining effort”, *SFOR Informer Online*, <http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/106/s106p02a/t0102072a.htm>
- <sup>xv</sup> *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, *ibid*, p423; also interview with Col ARR McAslan July 2002.
- <sup>xvi</sup> Andrea Centeno, “Talks to be Held with Britain on Feasibility of Clearing Falkland Malvinas Mines,” *La Nación* (Buenos Aires), 16 October 2000
- <sup>xvii</sup> Davies P, *War of the Mines: Cambodia, Landmines and the Impoverishment of a Nation*, (Pluto Press, 1994).
- <sup>xviii</sup> Cambodian Mine Action Centre, “*From Emergency to Development*”, 1999.
- <sup>xix</sup> Boulden L & Edmonds M, *The Politics of Demining; Mine Clearance in Southern Africa*, (South African Institution of International Affairs, 1999)
- <sup>xx</sup> *op cit*, p 111-2

## **Chapter 4**

### **Analyses of mine action programmes**

#### **Structure**

The development of the two country studies uses a general framework to give structure to the analysis. A background section gives the historical and political reasons for the environment in which countries find themselves. Following this, a contemporary analysis assesses the development of the current state of affairs and identifies a number of critical variables and key issues arising.

In addition to the detailed analysis of Cambodia and Mozambique, this chapter will also provide a more general introduction to a more recent programme in Lebanon, which will be analysed in more detail for lessons learned, in chapter 7.

#### **Mozambique**

On the 4th October 1992, 30 years of fighting in Mozambique drew to a close as the leader of the rebel forces (RENAMO), Afonso Dhlakama signed the General Peace Accord, together with President Joaquim Chissano, of the Republic of Mozambique.

Protocol VI of the Accord provided for the Mozambican government and the former rebels, RENAMO, to take responsibility for the implementation of the cease fire process and to “...*organise and implement mine-clearing operations*” and assured that they would not “*prevent {any} mine-clearing operations*”.<sup>1</sup> The same accord also allowed the UN to verify compliance with the accord.

The subsequent UN deployment, ONUMOZ (Organização Nacional Unido de Moçambique) of 6,400 soldiers and UN workers had a mandate that spanned from the accord, which provided for them to work with the national authorities to coordinate mine clearance activities within the country. The ONUMOZ mine



clearance plan (based upon an essentially military organisation) was in three phases:

1. Clearance of 2,000 km of priority roads to allow access of food supplies to refugee camps.
2. Clearance of further roads to allow refugees to return home.
3. Setting up training school to train Mozambican deminers to complete the remainder of work required.<sup>ii</sup>

Unfortunately, even though the peace accord had been signed, any effort to coordinate demining was delayed until November 1993 and in reality, it was not until mid 1994 that efforts began in earnest. The first two objectives of road clearance and opening the way for refugee return were achieved by contracting out to commercial organisations to open the roads and the opening of a training school in Moamba, Southern Mozambique, began to achieve the third phase.

All these arrangements were carried out under the auspices of ONUMOZ and with the oversight of UNOHAC (the predecessor of UNOCHA and working within DHA). It soon however became clear that the concept of training 500 deminers was not viable unless some organisations were formed which were capable of managing their deployment. With this in mind, ONUMOZ set up the Accelerated Demining Programme (ADP) in August 1994. The programme was organised along classic military lines, with Headquarters and ten “platoons” of 40 deminers each. At the beginning, the ADP was heavily reliant upon the 40 plus expatriates working within the programme – a roughly equal split between military staff working within ONUMOZ (mainly New Zealand and Australian military, with little or no experience of demining) and civilians (a good proportion of whom are former military) who were hired for their previous experience within mine action programmes or within specific functional areas such as administration, finance and logistics as well as operational elements.

It is worth noting that ONUMOZ's original intention was to develop ADP into a viable national entity, and they hired and trained (on the job) quality national staff. It is also interesting to note the US Ambassador to Mozambique during the ONUMOZ period wrote a damning report detailing the failures of the mission, in which he states: "*ONUMOZ was the first UN PKO {Peace-Keeping Operation} to incorporate a large humanitarian component. Perhaps it should be the last (...). In the case of both mine clearance and demobilization, UNOHAC insisted on pushing a long-term developmental approach designed to empower the local government. Such an approach could never be completed successfully and would have jeopardized key parts of the process*".<sup>iii</sup> Perhaps he would have been less critical with the hindsight of analysing the demining capacities in Mozambique today, although it was recognised that the US were particularly critical of the UN's efforts in Mozambique.<sup>iv</sup>

Blaikie et al<sup>v</sup> lay down a number of principles for managing disaster recovery. Whilst a UN mission post conflict does not fit directly into the category of disaster recovery, there are interesting parallels. Principle 12 proposes that efforts should: "*Maximise the transition from relief to development*".<sup>vi</sup> Blaikie et al suggest that "*relief creates dependency, so it is vital that as soon as the emergency needs are satisfied there is a return to a development approach*".<sup>vii</sup> In Bangladesh following the 1991 cyclone, a refugee was reported as saying "*we want work, not relief*".<sup>viii</sup> The comment would be as appropriate for the Mozambican as for the Bangladeshi.

Whilst the UN was clearly attempting to drive the process of clearance forward, there was an enormous lack of coordination. A number of survey and clearance projects had been under way since as early as 1991. Indeed critics asserted that demining occurred "*despite, not because of the UN*".<sup>ix</sup> Unfortunately, these efforts were not coordinated and even with the arrival of ONUMOZ, there seemed to be little hope of this.

As noted previously, the original intention was always to develop the ADP into a fully independent, sustainable Mozambican demining organisation that would be passed over to the Mozambican government in 1996. Training of deminers was carried out at the school and in the headquarters and two contractors provided 'on the job' training for the management staff. After ONUMOZ withdrew in early 1995, ADP came under the auspices of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP). All parties concerned felt that ADP would not be ready to become fully independent of international assistance, and ADP became a 'Nationally Executed Project (NEX)'<sup>6</sup> of the UNDP in early 1996.

Although a number of key stakeholders did not believe that the Mozambican government was ready to take on the ADP, they did accept the government's responsibility to exercise sovereignty over mine action activities by the creation in May 1995 of the Comissão Nacional de Desminagem (CND) – the intention being to provide a national coordinating body. CND was an executive branch of the National Mine Clearance Commission (NMCC), which comprised the Ministers of foreign affairs (as chair), finance, agriculture, public buildings, national defence and industry.<sup>x</sup> CND was charged at this time with coordinating, assisting, proposing, licensing and regulating all mine action activities in Mozambique.

Unfortunately however, a number of objectives were not met by NMCC/CND and the donors, UN and other actors were beginning to doubt the viability of a Mozambican authority with little support from the Government<sup>xi</sup>. During this phase, UNDP became the prime UN point of contact as DHA stepped back and focussed on ADP.

At the same time as the formation of the NMCC/CND, both UNDP & DHA were tabling a proposal for a Mozambican Mine Action Centre (MOZMAC). The

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<sup>6</sup> The term nationally executed programme essentially describes a project run by a governmental agency although under UNDP auspices and is described in more detail in the UNDP programme manual published December 2000. See the UNDP programme manual at <http://www.undp.org/osg/pm/>

intention was that MOZMAC would be responsible for all aspects of demining (including coordination and execution)<sup>xii</sup>. This was the first suggestion in Mozambique that a Mine Action Centre be formed. There was limited support but many donors felt this proposal was too top heavy and required too many resources. They may also have felt that the task was beyond the capability of the Mozambican government. With hindsight, that failure to develop MOZMAC may well have been a blessing in disguise.

The NMCC failed to collect any form of momentum, and although it was formed in May 1995, it did not formally meet until over a year later<sup>xiii</sup>. Its mandate was clear:

“{to} collect, process and analyse information and data relevant to demining, elaborate a strategy and action plan for mine clearance, and establish procedures for setting priorities at the local and national level; monitor and coordinate all ongoing demining activities; act as the approval and licensing authority in respect of new operators...; adjudicate public tenders for service contracts...; and promote and oversee the implementation of a national programme to improve public mine awareness.<sup>xiv</sup>”

In reality, CND failed to achieve any of these objectives and, as a result, many of the mine action operators in the country were operating to their own direction, with no coordination. The drive, primarily from the donors but also from operators, for improvement eventually led to the restructuring of CND in June 1999 after more than \$10 million had been given by donors in support of NMCC/CND<sup>xv</sup>.

The restructured organisation, Instituto Nacional de Desminagem (IND) was left with a similar mandate to *“successfully establish and develop a coordination, supervision and management mechanism, in close cooperation with all other relevant organisations and agencies, to ensure the cost-effective execution of a national mine action plan”<sup>xvi</sup>*, but with much greater autonomy and reporting direct to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and outside the cumbersome governmental bureaucracy to carry out its functions. Indeed, the IND has had

greater success than its predecessor organisation. The donors have been more positive about supporting IND and the future for IND looks to be much more secure. Even though there was some initial scepticism over IND's ability to establish authority over mine action operators who had been working effectively independently for the previous eight years, a productive relationship has now been established between all the stakeholders in Mozambique.

The ADP has however had different types of difficulties. Following its early success, ADP has continued to move forward and has seldom had a problem with funding – something rare in the mine action industry.<sup>7</sup> There are a number of reasons for this – the organisation is recognised as one of the more effective in mine action throughout the world and the donors also trust the organisation to a greater extent than many other organisations. In addition, the ADP has an extremely charismatic Director who has been with the programme since 1995 and has a flair for raising funds from donors. Unfortunately, there is currently a large question mark over the ADP and its status. Since the formative ONUMOZ days, the ADP has evolved from a UN operated and managed programme to being an independent NEX project with minimal UNDP involvement. In 1999, ADP began the planning for the process of transformation into a national non-governmental organisation (NGO), which follows completely the rationale of a nationally executed project. Unfortunately, this is now unlikely to come to fruition as a recent consultants' report<sup>xvii</sup> recommended that this transition is not a viable option and recommended that ADP should become part of IND, although with some autonomy. The principle reason for this problem is the lack of legislation within Mozambique for the support and structuring of NGOs. It appears that there are significant organisational and structural problems inherent within this particular recommendation, but it remains to be seen if these recommendations are implemented.

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<sup>7</sup> Based on the author's experiences since 1994, funding is a perennial problem.

## Cambodia

Cambodian history is a tragedy in itself. Since the intervention of the US, the Khmer Rouge and the subsequent genocide, huge problems have beset the country. The first landmines were laid in the country by North Vietnamese troops in 1967 and throughout the Vietnam War period to protect Vietnamese bases and the Ho Chi Minh trail which ran through Eastern Cambodia. Between 1969 and 1973, the United States responded in the form of covert operations on the ground (including extensive mine laying) and by dropping 539,129 tonnes of ordnance in and on neutral Cambodia.<sup>xviii</sup> In 1970, following the overthrow of the Royal government, civil war broke out and mines continued to be laid by the succeeding Government and subsequently between 1975 and 1979, by the ruling Khmer Rouge regime. Even following the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge in 1979, mines continued to be laid by the government as a protective act, even as late as 1993, after the deployment of the UN mission to Cambodia.

In 1991, with the signing of the Paris Peace Accord, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was mandated to oversee the implementation of the accords and oversee the forthcoming elections. In addition, it was given a mandate of “... *assisting with clearing mines and undertaking training programmes in mine clearance and a mines awareness programme among the Cambodian people.*”<sup>xix</sup> In December 1991, the advance mission of UNTAC set up the Mine Clearance and Training Unit (MCTU) to achieve the training element of this mandate. The TOR of MCTU were very clear with an aim of the unit to recruit and train deminers and supervisors and also set up the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC). The plan was to train over 5,000 deminers<sup>xx</sup>. There was one unfortunate and major glitch with the mandate – there were no funds available for the implementation of this plan. UNTAC had no specific budget for mine clearance and as such, much of the earlier funds were acquired directly from donor countries, outside the standard UN system. This situation remained extant until the end of the UNTAC

deployment in 1993. In February 1993, MCTU had trained 1,960 deminers, yet 1,354 were not employed as deminers.<sup>xxi</sup> A second point to note in respect to the mandate is that in the early discussion phases, there were no considerations made with regards the need to plan and coordinate mine clearance activities in the country – including the coordination of NGOs. With hindsight this would prove to be somewhat naïve.

CMAC was formed on 10<sup>th</sup> June 1992 and was envisaged to oversee mine action activities in Cambodia throughout the period and in theory, MCTU was subordinate to CMAC. In reality however, this relationship was virtually non-existent and there was little interaction between the two. In fact the coordination role envisaged for CMAC was not undertaken at all. Expatriate advisors carried out virtually all management functions and: “*were effectively operating as Executive Directors of all activities undertaken {by a Cambodian agency}...and were not usually familiar with Cambodia culture and tended to lack pedagogical skills*”<sup>xxii</sup>.

In 1994, MCTU and CMAC combined under the CMAC umbrella and effectively gave the organisation a combined policy setting, management, coordination and implementation capacity. Again, as in Mozambique, in theory this organisation had an executive inter ministerial body with representatives from a number of government ministries. CMAC was, in theory, responsible for the coordination of all mine action activities in the country, but although some NGOs operating were keen to establish links with CMAC, many found themselves unwilling to be coordinated by an organisation that had proved itself to be painfully slow and inefficient.

CMAC lurched from crisis to crisis without effective resolve and without an effective executive body. A December 1995 UNDP evaluation found that CMAC was deficient in terms of: “*short and long term planning, monthly cash flow crises, and poorly trained mid level management.*”<sup>xxiii</sup> All this was difficult to comprehend as the 3,000+ strong organisation had 36 highly qualified

expatriate technical advisors overseeing the activities.<sup>xxiv</sup> This figure actually increased to over 60 following this assessment mission.<sup>xxv</sup>

In 1995, a Royal decree (effectively a statute), changed CMAC's terms of reference and gave CMAC full authority to coordinate all demining activities in Cambodia,<sup>xxvi</sup> as well as to carry out demining activities, and CMAC became an autonomous Cambodian institution with an overseeing Governing Council to direct the overall policy and direction of the organisation. The governing council never really seemed to have an impact even though the European Commission supported it during the years 1997-8. As in Mozambique, it appears that the council was too moribund and bureaucratic to have any real impact.

A further crisis occurred in 1999, which culminated in the removal of the Cambodian director of CMAC as well as the resignation of the UNDP Project Manager. It also led to CMAC shedding 90% of its staff of 3,000. This time the catalyst was an allegation of financial impropriety on the part of senior management, leading to an audit that confirmed some of the charges on the Cambodian side and which was leaked in large part to local news organisations. No financial mismanagement was revealed in the UNDP administered Trust Fund, but the KPMG audit did describe serious managerial deficiencies. Predictably this led to a breakdown of donor confidence in the organisation.<sup>xxvii</sup> Three years on, CMAC now appears to have regained some confidence of the donors and had an annual budget in 2001 of \$7.5 million as opposed to the \$13 million budget before the scandal. The organisation now employs 2,264 people. The subsequent donor initiated financial and management audit classified CMAC as: "*seriously deficient*" as opposed to the most recent audit results in 2001 showing the organisation to be "*marginally deficient*".<sup>xxviii</sup>

The need for high-level coordination in Cambodia may be questioned. In early 2002, there are only two operators (HALO Trust and Mines Advisory Group) operationally involved in mine action in Cambodia outside of CMAC. Nonetheless, these two organisations, as well as a number of others involved



on the periphery, have all indicated their intention to work to a central coordinating agency and in earlier days did so to some degree to the then coordinating agency, CMAC.

The most recent change in the structure of demining in Cambodia has been the introduction of a new organisation, the Cambodian (National) Mine Action Authority (CMAA), an organisation set up with the intention of coordinating all demining activities in Cambodia – again, with parallels to the setting up of the IND in Mozambique. This agency is a government body with a significant amount of autonomy. The organisation is somewhat behind the development timeline originally planned – having been set up for over one year (as of June 2002), it has only two members of staff and one expatriate advisor attached to the CMAA<sup>xxix</sup>. Nonetheless, it appears to be an appropriate development that may lead to the improvement of more focussed coordination activities in Cambodia, as well as allowing CMAC to deliver their core business – that of the operational delivery of mine action.

### **Comparison and summary**

Whilst it is clear that the two countries considered are very different in many ways, there are undoubtedly parallels and the influences that have affected the development will undoubtedly affect the advancement of other future programmes around the world. Both were developed under UN PKO, one of which (Cambodia) was under severe strain at the time. Both went through very difficult times and structural difficulties but emerged a decade on into what are now beginning to be recognised as structurally sound establishments.

The two countries whose developmental processes have been briefly outlined in this chapter are not unique. They represent two typical situations but are unique amongst themselves. Perhaps if a short cut could be found around this process, much suffering, both humanitarian and institutional, could be eliminated.

## Lebanon

The aim of this section is to outline the background to the mine action environment in Lebanon. This brief background will be expanded upon in chapter 7 where the study will analyse lessons learned against the development of the programme

The main landmine problem in Lebanon began during the civil war between 1975 and 1990. At the same time, The Israeli Armed Forces (IF) occupied a zone in the South of the country to provide a security buffer zone. Israel and their South Lebanon Army (SLA) allies used mines to protect and consolidate their positions in the zone of occupation as well as mining the border between Israel and Lebanon. In addition to the civil war, some mines and UXO had been left behind from the French Mandate in Lebanon between 1920 and 1943.

Following the period between 1975 and 1990, the Lebanese military began an assessment of the country using maps, military records and general intelligence. Their conclusion was that there were in the region of 150,000 mines, *excluding* the previously occupied zone in the South.<sup>xxx</sup>

The IF also handed over a number of records of minefields to the United Nations peacekeeping operation in place at the time, United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which indicated that there were approximately 130,000 mines and some 288 booby traps in the former occupied zone.<sup>xxxi</sup>

In February and June 1999, UNMAS led two inter-agency assessment missions, at the request of the Government of Lebanon (GOL), to determine the requirement for UN assistance. The result of the two missions was the establishment in July 2000 of a regional (i.e. in the Southern former occupied zone) Mine Action Coordination Cell (MACC)<sup>8</sup> under the mandate of the UN PKO in place then (and still in place), UNIFIL. The organisation was established within the compound of the UNIFIL in Naqoura, Southern Lebanon.

The UN MACC is donor funded through the Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF), which is coordinated by the UNMAS and through assessed contributions from the regular UN budget because of the UNIFIL mandate.

The Lebanese military had also been carrying out mine clearance operations since the cessation of hostilities in 1990 and in September 1999 a structured national body, the National Demining Office (NDO) was established in Beirut. The NDO is effectively the *de jure* national mine action authority and reports to the government through the Lebanese Armed Forces. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) had been carrying out clearance operations under the authority of the national government. The NDO was set up with limited financial support from the US Government.


Another element added to the complexity of the management of the situation when in 2001 the Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) expressed its desire to assist the GOL in their efforts to clear landmines. This effort was in the form of a programme called Operation Emirates Solidarity (OES), which pledged funding for up to \$50 million to fund operational demining support in Lebanon. Unlike the majority of donors, the UAE wished to have direct management control of the money they were contributing and as such, established a cell, which became attached to the UN MACC as well as the NDO.

The coordination of the three extant agencies; the NDO, the UNIFIL MACC and the UAE cell presented a problem thus far not encountered anywhere in the mine action industry. Within the realms of the UNIFIL MACC, the integration proved to be less difficult than had been first envisaged. Figure 4-1 shows the organisational structure of the UNIFIL MACC in terms of the specific roles funded and filled by the UN and the UAE. It is interesting to note the balance between the positions. The reality of this implementation was that the balance

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<sup>8</sup> The UN MACC has changed names a number of times during its existence. Initially it was the UNIFIL MACC (cell), then the UN MACC (cell) and in 2001, it became the UN MACC (centre).

was achieved without too many difficulties due to the broad perspective of the advisors within the organisation at that time.



**Figure 4-1 – UN MACC South Lebanon establishment as of September 2001.**

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- <sup>i</sup> General Peace Agreement for Mozambique signed in Rome 4<sup>th</sup> October 1992.
- <sup>ii</sup> Boulden L & Edmonds M, *The Politics of De-mining* (South African Institution of International Affairs, 1999), p82.
- <sup>iii</sup> Jett D, “Lessons Unlearned - Or Why Mozambique's Successful Peacekeeping Operation Might Not Be Replicated Elsewhere”, *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, 1995, at <http://www.jha.ac/Ref/aar008.htm>
- <sup>iv</sup> Berman E, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique*. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1996. cited in Boulden L & Edmonds M, *ibid.*, p83.
- <sup>v</sup> Blaikie Cannon T, Davis I, Wisner B, *At Risk – Natural Hazards, people’s vulnerability and disasters* (Routledge, 2001)
- <sup>vi</sup> *ibid.*, p 212
- <sup>vii</sup> *op cit.*
- <sup>viii</sup> Sattaur O, “Counting the Cost of Catastrophe”, *New Scientist*, 29<sup>th</sup> June 1991, p21-223.
- <sup>ix</sup> Jett D, cited in Boulden L & Edmonds M, *ibid.*, p87.
- <sup>x</sup> Boulden L & Edmonds M, *ibid.*, p101.
- <sup>xi</sup> Eaton R, Horwood C, Nilands N, *Multi - Country Mine Action Study: Mozambique. The Development of Indigenous Mine Action Capacities*, New York: United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1997, para 99
- <sup>xii</sup> *op cit*, para 104
- <sup>xiii</sup> *op cit*, p102.
- <sup>xiv</sup> Bernander B, Westerberg & Christer, *The Mine Clearance Programme in Mozambique*, (Stockholm Group for International Studies, 1996)
- <sup>xv</sup> UNDP/Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, *A Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action*, Geneva, 2001, p153.
- <sup>xvi</sup> IND, *Strategy for the Development of an Integrated Mine Action Coordination Capacity in Mozambique*, p2.
- <sup>xvii</sup> Discussions with Carlos Mucapeira, UNDP Programme Officer, Maputo, 12<sup>th</sup> June 2002.
- <sup>xviii</sup> Personal correspondence with Michael Sheinkman, Data analysis officer, UXO Lao, Thai Mine Action Centre & CMAC
- <sup>xix</sup> CMAC publication, *The Cambodian Mine Action Center: From Emergency to Development*, p3
- <sup>xx</sup> Eaton R, Horwood C, Nilands N, *Multi - Country Mine Action Study: Cambodia. The Development of Indigenous Mine Action Capacities*, New York: United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1997, p 17.
- <sup>xxi</sup> Davies P, *War of the Mine*, (Pluto Press, London 1994), p92/3
- <sup>xxii</sup> Eaton et al, *ibid*, p 18.
- <sup>xxiii</sup> UNDP, *In depth Evaluation Mission Report on Assistance to Demining operations in Cambodia*, UNDP December 1995.
- <sup>xxiv</sup> Eaton R, *et al*, *Multi - Country Mine Action Study: Cambodia. The Development of Indigenous Mine Action Capacities*, *ibid*, (plus the addition of 6 Technical Advisors in Demining Unit 4).
- <sup>xxv</sup> Authors personal recollection from working with CMAC at that time.
- <sup>xxvi</sup> Royal decree signed on 25<sup>th</sup> February 1995 by King Norodom Sihanouk, Article 3.
- <sup>xxvii</sup> Author’s personal correspondence between himself, UNDP and the European Commission at the time of the crisis.
- <sup>xxviii</sup> Ball M, “*CMAC Funding Recovers from Scandal’s Taint*”, Phnom Penh Post, 20 June 2002.
- <sup>xxix</sup> Interview with Hemi Morete, Chief Technical Advisor to CMAA, Phnom Penh, 24<sup>th</sup> June 2002.
- <sup>xxx</sup> *Annual report Mine Action Coordination Cell (UN MACC)* (South Lebanon) project no: LEB00R71, January 2001 to December 2001.
- <sup>xxxi</sup> UN MAS document April 2002, p3

## Chapter 5

### Organisational Structures and roles and a global model?

#### Introduction

The previous chapters have outlined the current state of the industry in terms of the history, development and current state of global mine action. The two case studies of Cambodia and Mozambique have given the reader an idea of the typical development processes and problems encountered throughout the development. The environment in which the mine action community exists is not a vacuum and it is important to realise that there are a large number of external influences impacting on the development of strategy and concepts. Perhaps one of the best examples of this is the development of the Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC) in Kosovo. As already mentioned, the Kosovo MACC has been called the “*most successful mine action centre ever*”<sup>i</sup>. It is not the intention of this study to agree or disagree with that assessment, but it is worth noting that the Kosovo environment was unique, with no national government in place, and the MACC programme manager acting as the *de facto* Minister of Landmines within a homogeneous and receptive population and with an enviable level of resources relative to the scale of the problem.

Both of the two countries identified and outlined in Chapter 3 have been through almost 10 years of development since the identification of a requirement to establish a mine clearance capacity. Both responded (or were forced to respond) in completely different ways and are now at different phases in their development.

There are many good reasons, culturally, politically and practically as to why the two countries have developed in such different ways, yet there are also common threads throughout both these situations.

Whilst the mine action environment is unique, it is not unreasonable to suppose that there are other situations, outside of the mine action arena, indeed outside

the humanitarian aid sector, where similar problems occur and where strategic planning could be applied to optimise future developments.

This chapter will assess the development of organisations in the mine action arena. It will consider the roles of culture and organisational structures in the development and consider the strategic planning processes that are (or are sometimes not) undertaken.

## **Culture**

Culture is a key element in the development of an organisation and the development of a model needs to keep in mind the diverse influences of culture on organisations. The classic theorists of organisational theory have attempted to label the way organisations are designed, run and planned. From the “Classical” Approach of Taylor, Urwick, Brech *et al*, through Mayo and Maslow and their “Human Relations” approach, to today’s “Contingency approach” encompassing fundamentals of both types of thinking with a holistic perspective on the organisation, all theorists have a perspective on the ideal for the structure of an organisation.

The influences of culture are manifold. Culture can be defined as “*intellectual or moral discipline and training; a state of intellectual and artistic development*”<sup>ii</sup> or as a “*distinctive pattern of values and beliefs which are characteristic of a particular society or sub-group within that society*”<sup>iii</sup>. Whilst these descriptions in themselves help us begin to understand what culture is, it is still a very difficult concept to define. The way we behave and our previous experiences all contribute to our reactions to situations – rationality is sometimes difficult to relate to reality when decisions and processes are analysed. The studies of organisations by the classicists provide useful ground rules but most of the studies were undertaken in western societies. Organisational culture and norms vary hugely between west and east. Many mine affected countries are coming out of long periods of time where normal social structure had broken down (Cambodia being an example where any sense of normality had been

forcibly removed from every single member of society) or where structures and systems had been implemented that were completely alien to western society. In Mozambique for example, all systems post Portuguese departure in 1975 were based around Communist systems being imposed over the extant African tribal systems.

Many of the difficulties occur when the UN attempts to apply a standard solution to a problem. Often, that solution will be based on a system or structure that has been used by a member of the implementing team previously in other circumstances. In terms of the area being studied here, the operational elements of both the ADP and the CMAC are built on classic western military structures. In these cases the imposition seems to work and both organisations seem to operate effectively and safely in what is potentially a hazardous environment. There are however some dangers:

*“And you must know this law of culture: two civilisations cannot know and understand each other well. You will start going deaf and blind. You will be content in your own civilisation surrounded by the hedge, but signals from other civilisations will be as incomprehensible to you as if they had been sent by the inhabitants of Venus.”<sup>iv</sup>*

The imposition of a different set of values on an organisation can be hugely problematic. In Cambodia for example, in 1993 at the height of the UNTAC deployment, the average pay of a Government minister was \$68/month, and a deminer earned \$125/month. In this case, the whole of CMAC was on the same upwardly distorted salary scale. In Mozambique in 1995, the head of the CND was earning a government salary of in the region of \$120/month; an ADP deminer was earning \$200/month and the Director of ADP was earning around \$5,000/month. In cases like this, there are clearly huge difficulties and government employees (who are also part of the “capacity development” process) will be handling large amounts of money and may be “disincentivised”



from keeping the process moving forward at a reasonable speed. This almost guarantees resentment; it also is an invitation to corruption.

Culture is still a subject strongly debated between experts. Robins states: *“Most people are unaware just how their culture will affect them. Culture is like fish to water. It is there all the time but the fish are oblivious to it.”*<sup>v</sup> Within organisations, we find ourselves with a grouping of individuals with widely different backgrounds, upbringings and beliefs all of who meld together into an organisation with one corporate goal. In developing countries as well, some of the influences may be less positive, indeed, some of the actors may well be operating in competition with the organisational objectives for personal reasons. In his treatise on international relations, Machiavelli notes:

*“There is nothing more difficult to plan... more doubtful of success... nor more dangerous to manage... than the creation of a new system. For the innovator has enemies of all who profit by the preservation of the old way...and merely lukewarm defenders in those who gain by the new.”*<sup>vi</sup>

One suspects that Machiavelli may have had in mind an organisation that was mono-cultural, but whilst this was written some 500 years ago, there are still many truisms within and it appears as valid today as it did then.

### **Technical Advice and Culture Clash**

In the early days, the *modus operandi* of the UN when setting up a MAC or national institution was to overload the country with expatriates who may or may not have had experience in setting up similar programmes in other parts of the world. Mozambique had ONUMOZ and Cambodia had UNTAC. In the early stages, many of these advisors were military and inexperienced with the situations they might face in a developing country, particularly ones so damaged by war. The logic and rationale for such a method may seem clear but military forces are not always renowned for their cultural sensitivity. This issue is highlighted in the Brahimi report where the panel state that:

*“United Nations personnel in the field, perhaps more than any others, are obliged to respect local norms, cultures and practices. They must go out of their way to demonstrate that respect, as a start, by getting to know their local environment and trying to learn as much of the local culture and language as they can. They must behave with the understanding that they are guests in someone else’s home, however destroyed that home might be, particularly when the United Nations takes on a transitional authority role.”<sup>vii</sup>*

There are however a number of militaries who have made a speciality out of such operations. New Zealand for example has a cadre of officers who have specialised in the setting up and development of such operations and as such maintain a certain credibility and skill. For short-term assignees, militaries tend to assign staff on short durations of 6 months and recognise (off the record) that their staff tend to draw more from the experience than they give back. The national and long – term expatriate staff would agree with that assessment more publicly. Often a six-month deployment means three months acclimatising to the culture, perhaps two relatively effective months, followed by a month winding down prior to return. In these circumstances, it is no wonder that there is a certain amount of cynicism at the input the military have into HMA.

### **Not for profit culture**

Another interesting perspective is the dynamics of a not for profit organisation. Commercial organisations are generally operating with the primary objective of making money. National Mine Action Programmes are clearly not (although there are sometimes commercial organisations operating in the arena who may well work with, or for, these mine action programmes). The differences may be significant, but Handy suggests that the differences should not be interpreted to assume that a not for profit organisation should be inefficient.

*“... voluntary organisations are not businesses, but they do have clients, they provide services and they have to finance themselves in one way or another. It makes just as much sense to ask a voluntary organisation what its strategy is as it does to ask a business. **It is not sinful to be business-like** [authors emphasis].”<sup>viii</sup>*

In more recent years, the use of strategic planning tools has introduced more cost-effective, value-added and results-based measures to the humanitarian arena, something that had not always been a priority for donors. FitzGerald and Neal suggest that commercial companies offer an efficient business approach and the diplomatic experience to operate in the humanitarian environment<sup>ix</sup> and that these companies can maintain shareholder value, whilst at the same time catering to the needs of the donors, host governments and local communities as well. There is a suggestion that NGOs could do well to learn some lessons from such organisations. In a separate report, Harpviken *et al* suggest that: *“Even in the NGO sector, many would argue that {commercial companies} presence has stimulated efforts to increase cost-effectiveness in the sector more generally.”*<sup>x</sup>

Miles and Snow<sup>xi</sup> developed a series of frameworks for organisations against which comparisons or benchmarking exercises could be undertaken. These models examined how organisations adapted to changes in their environment. Essentially they intended the framework to be used to *“describe organisational behaviours and prescribe alternative directions for change where necessary”*. Miles & Snow categorised the four configurations as: Defender, Prospector, Analyser and Reactor. A summary of the features of these four types is shown at table 5-1

**Table 5-1 – Miles & Snow’s Typology**





Type	
<b>Defender</b>	Essentially Conservative & mature. Enjoys stability and aims for efficiency. Management is expert in their own field of operations and does not strive to operate outside that domain. Organisation will aggressively defend if it feels threatened
<b>Prospector</b>	Opposite end of scale to defender. Seek innovation but do not strive for efficiency. Will often cause change for changes sake in order to exploit the opportunities created. They look to operate within a broad and continually developing domain.
<b>Analyser</b>	Operates in both domains. Tries to have the best of both worlds. Develops strong stable base but also seeks occasionally to act as prospector, looking for opportunities to exploit.
<b>Reactor</b>	Can identify changes in their environment but does not have the capacity to respond. Lack structural and managerial ability to exploit changing environment and will only make adjustments if forced to do so.

An alternative benchmarking process has been proposed by Handy who classified the culture of organisations into four distinct types:<sup>xii</sup>

- The club culture
- The role culture
- The task culture
- The person culture

A summary of the four types can be seen at table 5-2

Table 5-2 – Handy’s Typology

Type	Description
<b>Club</b>	 <p>Key to the organisation is one individual, centrally located. Could be interpreted as a dictatorship. At best based on trust and communication. Thrive when speed of response and personality are important – in “<i>guerrilla warfare and politics</i>”. Many club cultures feel nepotistic and too ‘closed’ to those outside.</p>
<b>Role</b>	 <p>Formalised communications, logical and rational and follow rules and procedures. Organisation has standards, quality controls and evaluation procedures. Generally found in mature organisations. Work well in routine, stable and unchanging environment</p>
<b>Task</b>	 <p>Evolved in response to speedier change than <i>role</i> but less individualistic than <i>club</i>. Organisations thrive in problem solving situations needing more than one person to input.</p>
<b>Person</b>	 <p>Stars loosely grouped in an organisation make up the person type organisation. Individual talent is all-important. These professionals need to be run on a loose reign.</p>

Whilst this categorisation of organisations in such simplistic terms may be somewhat idealistic, the point is that we become adapted to the particular style or method based often upon more a matter of faith than of logic – in other words, whichever society we were nurtured within is most likely to be the one which we feel most comfortable in.

Unfortunately, it is often the case that the clash between two cultures is compounded by the organisational design as described above. Someone who has spent their formative years in a *role* type organisation will feel uncomfortable if they then find themselves working within a *club* type organisation. Even more difficult to analyse are those persons for whom any of these working environments are alien.

It seems from experience in the field, that the two more commonly found structures encountered are the *club* and *role* type organisations. Unfortunately, they often clash with the expatriate technical advisors often coming from typical *role* stereotypes and the local institutions having a *club* culture.

In cross-cultural situations, behaviours can either be attributed to the situation (i.e. cultural differences) or to the personal characteristics of the individual, such as laziness, arrogance or disrespect. It is important to understand the cultural environment in order to make these attributions correctly. Gordon suggests that:


*“For example, managers of a multi-cultural workforce must not equate poor grammar or mispronunciation with a lack of ability because it often indicates use of a second language instead.”*<sup>xiii</sup>

This does not bode well for the parachuting in of expatriate technical advisors to projects where they are not prepared to begin to understand the culture of the environment to which they are applied.

## **Planning**

Planning processes can also differ significantly based on cultural background. How for example, does one convince a Khmer who has spent 30 years at war, 3 years under the Khmer Rouge with no guarantees of even the next meal, and may never have received any formal education that it is essential to draw up strategic plans for the next 5 years of development of their organisation?

The western world generally uses a *formal* structure for planning and it has been well documented.<sup>9</sup> Figure 5-1 places the *formal* and *informal* planning processes side by side as a direct comparison.<sup>xiv</sup> The *formal* process provides



what the west considers to be a logical clear process by which the strategic planner can develop a plan. Establishment of the strategic direction, definition of strategies and the achievement of those strategies as well as the essential feedback loops within the process allow for a logical progression from one step to the next.

Often however, any planning system in place in a less developed country will be an *informal* planning process. At the bottom of Figure 5-1 is a representation of

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<sup>9</sup> Johnson & Scholes are strong proponents of the formal school of Strategic Planning – see “*Exploring Corporate Strategy*”, (Prentice Hall Europe, 1999).

the informal process for strategic planning. The arrows entering from the bottom indicate the relatively random and broad inputs into the process that are applied in an informal culture. Whilst in many situations this thinking “out of the box” is productive and can benefit the organisation substantially, it is not necessarily always so. Creative thought and a creative culture however are often seen as a virtue in western societies, yet in other societies, there is distinct discouragement to think laterally.

The development of strategy in itself however is not necessarily the be all and end all. There is an interesting suggestion that, whilst a superior strategy may be necessary, it is seldom sufficient on its own. Koopman suggests that the key attributes separating organisations that succeed brilliantly rather than those who succeed with mediocrity, is usually the execution. The irony, he goes on to say, is that few strategies are bad, and even fewer are fatal.<sup>xv</sup>

Even further, Mintzberg suggests that formal planning may not necessarily be the best way to develop an organisation. He suggests that strategic planning in itself may actually be overly restrictive in certain organisations. He says: “*{strategy is} a creative phenomenon that depends more upon redrawing lines than on respecting them*”.<sup>xvi</sup> His overarching argument is that the formalisation of strategic planning stifles human creativity and that it is virtually impossible to make valuable judgement and decisions on purely quantitative data. A system based on emergent planning is recommended by Mintzberg allowing the creativity of the human mind to be best utilised.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has considered the influence that culture has on the development of an organisation and the structural difficulties therein. The problems incurred with imposition of external values is noted and it is clear that what is required in the early stages (the emergency stage) of a programme are not necessarily what is required in the latter stages (the development stage). That juxtaposition causes difficulties in the smooth development of any programme. That same



difficulty links to the development of plans and the fundamental philosophical difference required in this planning between national staff and expatriate staff whose norms and values may differ significantly.

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<sup>i</sup> Scott JJ, “The Kosovo MACC: The Most Successful Mine Action Program Ever”, *Journal of Mine Action*, Issue 6.1, Winter 2001, pp 26-27

<sup>ii</sup> *The Concise English Dictionary*, (Omega Books, 1982), p273

<sup>iii</sup> Mullins L, *Management and Organisational behaviour*, (Financial Times Management, 5<sup>th</sup> Edition, 1999), p31.

<sup>iv</sup> Kapuscinski, R, *The Emperor, Downfall of an Autocrat*, (Harcourt Inc, 1983)

<sup>v</sup> Robins S, *Essentials of Organizational Behaviour*, (Prentice Hall, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, 1992), p14

<sup>vi</sup> Machiavelli N, *On the art of War*, (1517).

<sup>vii</sup> *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, United Nations General Assembly Security Council, A/55/305-S/2000/809 (The Brahimi report), 21<sup>st</sup> August 2000, p46

<sup>viii</sup> Handy C, *Understanding Voluntary Organizations*, (Penguin Books, 1988), p4

<sup>ix</sup> Fitzgerald A & Neal D, “Dispelling the myths between Humanitarian and Commercial Mine Action Activity”, *Journal of Mine Action*, Issue 4.3, Fall 2000.

<sup>x</sup> Harpviken K, Millard A, Kjellman K, Strand A, *Sida’s Contributions to Humanitarian Mine Action – Final Report*. Sida evaluation 01/06, (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, 2002)

<sup>xi</sup> Miles R & Snow C, *Organisational Strategy, Structure and Process*, (McGraw-Hill, 1978)

<sup>xii</sup> Handy C, *ibid*, p86.

<sup>xiii</sup> Gordon JR, *A Diagnostic Approach to Organizational Behavior*, (Allyn & Bacon, 1993), p39

<sup>xiv</sup> Adapted from: Ward J & Griffiths P, *Strategic Planning for Information Systems*, (John Wiley & Sons, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, 1999), p317

<sup>xv</sup> Koopman J, “Strategic Execution”, *The Canadian Manager*, Vol 26 (Fall 2001), p19.

<sup>xvi</sup> Mintzberg H, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning*, (Prentice Hall, 1994), p77, *cited in* Molinaro P, Fitzgerald A & Neal D, *Assessing the utility of strategic planning tools and techniques for improving responses to sudden onset emergencies*, (unpublished paper, 2002).

## Chapter 6

### Formalising and integrating the approach

The previous chapters have described the outline of the mine action industry and explained the problems behind the setting up of national programmes. Whilst these problems are manifold, they are not insurmountable. This chapter will consider the benefits of different structures as applied in a number of programmes and alternatives to the 'standard' approach. The importance of considering the position of the host nation in terms of emergency and development will also be noted as will the role of staff in the transition of the programme from emergency to development.

A recent study undertaken for the Swedish government assessing the benefits attributable to their donations to mine action<sup>i</sup> grouped the main options for setting up a coordinating body into the 'standard' UN MAC model, the government model and the NGO implementation model. The three are studied briefly here before looking at the wider issues.

#### Structural environment

In a previous project<sup>ii</sup>, a stakeholder analysis of the mine action environment was undertaken. At the national level, the MAC was identified as a key stakeholder in the environment. The study suggests that the MAC (assuming its position as a central body) in a country is: *"...one of the few organisations that is genuinely capable of coordinating the mine action in country" ... "the authority that upholds and monitors mine action organisations against International Standards"* and that the greatest strength of a MAC is: *"its ability to coordinate activity across a whole system...it can coordinate other stakeholders, from NGOs to deminers, and it can coordinate all HMA activities"*.<sup>iii</sup>

The report also goes on to note that one of the greatest weaknesses attributed to most MACs is: “*their time of arrival in theatre [sic]*” suggesting that detailed planning is not usually carried out before the deployment of a set up team.

Harpviken *et al* however, view the problem from a different perspective. They identify a number of implementation channels for HMA projects. They note that the most common is the UN MAC concept, but identify two further channels for implementation within HMA. The second channel they identify is the use of extant government institutions and the third being the use of commercial companies.<sup>iv</sup> They summarise the criticisms and merits of the three alternate methods of implementation and contend that the NGO option has the greatest number of advantages because of the NGO’s ability to adapt to the needs of a particular context. They do however criticise NGOs for their general lack of capacity building. They summarise by stating:

*“Most fundamentally, the strengths and weaknesses of different implementing channels will vary according to context. In a stable political situation with legitimate and competent government agencies, the arguments for NGOs or commercial operators appear to be weak. NGOs, on the other hand, appear to have been doing a good job in situations of political turmoil, whilst commercial companies operate best when there is some degree of political stability.”<sup>v</sup>*

Historically, primarily as a result of the influential DHA study in 1997, the UN in particular, and a number of other donors, have steered toward the MAC implementation approach. The emphasis was particularly focussed on allowing the MAC to pose as a coordinating body, and having the authority to subcontract independent agencies (NGOs, commercial or possibly governmental {such as military} organisations) to conduct HMA operations. This is the direction in which both Cambodia and Mozambique are currently heading.

### **The Government implementation model**

The Harpviken study goes on to note that the second channel, implementation by the government, has had few opportunities to be analysed. There is a programme in Nicaragua where the government (with a great deal of assistance from the Organisation of American States) has assumed virtually all responsibility for mine action in the country, including prioritisation of tasks, general HMA coordination and HMA operational implementation (which is carried out by the Nicaraguan military). A similar situation is also in place in Columbia.

Although in Nicaragua and Columbia (as well as in the rest of Latin America), the scale of the mine problem has never reached the scale of the likes of Cambodia and Afghanistan, this works to some advantage for the national governments in that it is far simpler to envisage an end state and, as such, easier to plan accordingly. However, with around 80 victims per year<sup>vi</sup> in Nicaragua and 243 (although it is worth noting that 105 of those were police or military) in Columbia in the first 10 months of 2001<sup>vii</sup>, it is clearly a problem that governments take seriously.

In Nicaragua, the choice of the government to use the military to carry out demining operations was not taken by default. Nicaragua took a clear decision that it wished to effectively take control of its own destiny and NGOs were not felt to have “added value”. Unfortunately, as the study states:

*“Although the military is accountable to the government, the government is not accountable to anyone. In theory, the NDC {National Demining Commission} is mandated to control decisionmaking (sic) regarding priorities. In reality, the NDC lacks the expertise to make decisions and winds up rubber-stamping government decisions.”<sup>viii</sup>*

It can therefore be seen that there is clearly more than one way to approach a problem other than the standard template UN solution and this is clearly a key

factor that needs to be borne in mind during the initiation of a mine action programme.

### **The NGO implementation channel**

The third method of implementation noted in the study is that of NGO led programmes and the example of the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) run programme in Northern Iraq is cited. The study suggests that the benefits of MAGs flexibility in operating in this environment (albeit that there is no operational government within the region) and the NGO ability to innovate, without the sometimes constrictive bureaucracy of a large organisation. There is some general criticism of lack of capacity building, but the study also notes that from a start in 1992 where the programme had 14 expatriates, the programme had scaled down to 4 in 2000.<sup>ix</sup>

### From emergency to development

Critical to the development and structuring of any HMA organisation is the state of the country at the particular time of implementation – in other words; where the country falls on the ‘emergency – development continuum;’ whether the country is considered to be in a state of complex emergency or whether it is partly through a redevelopment initiation phase is a very significant factor. As Harpviken *et al* say:

*“Too often, when a situation is defined as an emergency it serves as an excuse for launching short-sighted operations, even though consideration of the broader and more long-term implications of an intervention is no less important in an emergency situation...Additionally, it is often true that what is first seen as an emergency requires a long-term response. This is indeed the case with HMA. Most cases that have a dramatic mine problem that can be solved within a short time frame will also have a more enduring mine problem of a less dramatic character that will require a long-term, sustainable response.”<sup>x</sup>*


It seems, therefore, that one of the critical factors impinging on the implementation of a programme on a country should be that country or region's position on the 'emergency – development continuum'.

Many of the countries that require UN support are right at the beginning of the continuum and tend to be classified as an emergency operation. In theory, all UN mine action efforts are coordinated by the UNMAS, which should be cognisant of the impact of the timing - effectively placing the country on this continuum. Again, in theory, the UNMAS takes advice from the UNDP Mine Action Team (MAT) who will advise on precisely this issue and on the development of a sustainable capacity. This development should consider the whole range of options, from the basic training of deminers through to creating capacity at the governmental level (which is where the UNDP focus tends to be).

The UNDP recognises that there is potential for conflict between the emergency start-up phase of an operation and attempt to include plans for the development right from the start. In a recent article, Ian Mansfield, former team leader of the UNDP MAT, outlined a set of principles that should be adhered to during the build up and development of a MAC (or indeed a Mine Action *Coordination* Centre – MACC).<sup>xi</sup>

Mansfield notes that capacity building, which is traditionally (within UNDP) aimed at national and local governmental level, should be applied throughout, and at all levels of, mine action activity. He produced a model of how he envisaged a National Mine Action Structure should be. This is reproduced at Figure 6-1

**Figure 6-1 - Proposed National Mine Action Structure**



It is however worth reinforcing the Harpviken quote: “*Additionally, it is often true that what is first seen as an emergency requires a long-term response.*”<sup>xii</sup> Yet again, the importance of differentiating between emergency and development, and at all levels, is emphasised.

### **Management perspectives**

Perhaps one of the other problems is the significant difference of management styles required for running an emergency operation as opposed to a developmental programme. In the emergency phase, management style is required to be ‘hands-on’; inspirational; and could be classified as a ‘*Prospector*’ or ‘*Club*’ type styles. As the continuum moves on, the requirement for management style shifts across to a requirement for a ‘*Defender*’ or ‘*Role*’ type organisations. One of the difficulties is of course recognising the requirement to make the shift, and indeed, to changing the culture of the organisation to allow

this to happen. Of course it may be impractical to change the whole staff of an organisation after a relatively short period of time, but it may be necessary to change some of the key players. Unfortunately it is often those key players who need to make the decisions to change and it is quite likely that this will not be a decision that comes easily. Fitzgerald and Neal recognise this when they say: *“An operation may start as an international emergency and as such, agencies may take whatever measures are deemed necessary. However, as the situation progresses, the emphasis in skills may move from technical to management.”*<sup>xiii</sup>

The deployment of international military advisors into the setting up of a new organisation fits reasonably well into this model. Albeit the military tend to be of a ‘Defender’ or ‘Role’ type people by the nature of their organisations, the individuals tend to be flexible enough to set up a reactive, ‘Prospector’ type organisation.

The role of the military is also considered in the Brahimi report, which recommends the UN consider greater use of the military in PKOs. The UN Standby Assistance System (UNSAS) maintains an ‘on call’ capability to deploy military (as well as police and specialised civilian assets) within 7, 14, 30, 60 or 90 days notice. The report recommends augmentating the existing arrangements.<sup>xiv</sup> At first glance this seems to make sense. Whilst UNMAS do not currently have a formal role within the UNSAS, they have made a number of recommendations to DPKO (who oversee the UNSAS) and the UNSAS will in future, if required, include an emergency logistics support capacity including a number of demining ‘kits’ for rapid deployment from the UN logistics base in Brindisi.<sup>xv</sup> What must never be forgotten however is the input of UNDP in the planning and deployment process. It is interesting to note that the UNDP MAT in New York now consists completely of specialists who have no intimate experience of military systems and modus operandi. This is certainly no bad thing, but conversely, UNMAS need to recognise their lack of expertise in the



developmental sector and perhaps even consider expanding their skills base to include more of a focus on developmental issues.

The Brahimi recommendation fits relatively comfortably with the current UNMAS plans for the development of a rapid reaction response team. The rapid Reaction Plan (RRP), currently under development by UNMAS is planned to enable UNMAS to ensure an: *“effective, proactive and coordinated response to landmine contamination in both humanitarian emergency situations, and insupport of peacekeeping operations.”*<sup>xvi</sup> On a positive note, it is encouraging to see that the RRP calls for the UNDP to be responsible for: *“participat{ion} in discussions regarding longer-term capacity building activities.”*<sup>xvii</sup>

One further point to note is the selection of expatriates sent as advisors or programme managers. In the early stages, the great majority of these positions were selected on their technical (and often specialist EOD) skills. Whilst there is increasing recognition that these skills are not necessary to advise on the structure, set up and development of programmes, it seems that this has taken time to filter down to the ground. Still, many of the current technical advisors are former military officers with a technical focus. In the emergency stage of an operation, this does no harm at all; indeed it may well be beneficial. Where the real problem begins however, is the continuation of these staff into the deep developmental stage and the UN (MAS, OPS and DP) need to consider expanding the pool of development specialists within mine action. This is not to say that all technicians are unable to make the transition to viewing the situation from a developmental perspective, merely that it may be simpler to find the right skills in the first place.

## **Conclusion**

The debate over the best structure for a national programme remains. UN, NGO or governmental structures all have their place depending upon their position along the emergency – development continuum. In addition to the structure required depending on the continuum, the management requirement

varies significantly as well. Early stages require ‘doers’ and later stages require ‘developers’ – something that does not seem to have received the full attention of the planners thus far.

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<sup>i</sup> Harpviken K, Millard A, Kjellman K, Strand A, “*Sida’s Contributions to Humanitarian Mine Action – Final Report.*” Sida evaluation 01/06, (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, 2002)

<sup>ii</sup> No 3 DTC (MA) Project: *Humanitarian Mine Action (U)*, (Cranfield University, 1999)

<sup>iii</sup> op cit, p3-12

<sup>iv</sup> Harpviken K, *et al, ibid*, p26

<sup>v</sup> op cit, p40

<sup>vi</sup> Centro de Estudios Internacionales CEI, *Minas Antipersonales y Desminado en Nicaragua: Avances y Limitaciones*, 1999, cited in op cit, p 34

<sup>vii</sup> Programa Presidencial de Derechos Humanos y DIH, *Minas Antipersonel en Columbia*, December 2001.

<sup>viii</sup> Harpviken *ibid*, p37.

<sup>ix</sup> op cit, p32

<sup>x</sup> op cit, p15

<sup>xi</sup> Mansfield I, “Building National Mine Action Capacity: It is no Myth”, *Journal of Mine Action*, Issue 6.1, Winter 2002.

<sup>xii</sup> Harpviken *et al, ibid*, p15

<sup>xiii</sup> Fitzgerald A & Neal D, “Dispelling the myths between Humanitarian and Commercial Mine Action Activity”, *Journal of Mine Action*, Issue 4.3, Fall 2000.

<sup>xiv</sup> *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, United Nations, A/55/305 S/2000/809, August 2000. (“The Brahimi Report”), p20

<sup>xv</sup> Discussions with Martin Donoghue, Programme Officer, UNMAS, New York, July 2002

<sup>xvi</sup> UNMAS paper, *Mine action and effective coordination: The United Nations Policy*, (A/53/496), 1998

<sup>xvii</sup> UNMAS paper (unpublished), *UN Mine Action Rapid Response Plan*, DRAFT (Version 5), July 2002

## Chapter 7

### Lessons learned in Lebanon

The intention of this chapter is to look at the initiation of a very recent programme and analyse how any lessons learned from previous experience were noted and applied in this process. The very recent development of mine action in Lebanon since 1999, when the Government of Lebanon (GOL) first established a structured national body (the National Demining Office {NDO}), will be used as a model. The more general background to the development of Lebanon has already been given in chapter four and the following section aims to develop on that and analyse the lessons learned from the Lebanon programme.

#### UN Assessment Missions and results

There have been a number of UN assessment missions in Lebanon over recent years. In 1999, an interagency mission led by UNMAS proposed a MACC to be formed as part of UNIFIL. A mission by UNMAS immediately prior to the formation of the UNIFIL MACC consolidated this in 2000.

The 2000 mission recommended a three-phase procedure to initiate the programme<sup>i</sup> and suggested a detailed breakdown of the support provided which is shown at Annex E.<sup>ii</sup> The concept of the 2000 mission was to develop a coordinated national response, *“under the guidance of the personal representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations, the UN Resident Coordinator and the Force Commander UNIFIL”* and emphasised that *“the programme will focus on what can realistically be achieved in the short term to accelerate mine action on the ground and to enhance the national capacity to provide a medium-to-longer term sustainable response.”*<sup>iii</sup> The three phases of the UNIFIL MACC were:

1. **The establishment, mine awareness and liaison phase.** This initial phase was planned to take up to the end of 2001 and, although this was achieved, there were problems along the way. There were a number of

NGOs (particularly those working within the mine awareness {now known as Mines Risk Education – MRE}) already working in Lebanon, who had difficulty with the imposition of a coordinating agency. This had already proved to be a problem in both Cambodia and Mozambique during the establishment of CMAA and CND/IND. In Lebanon, it should theoretically have been easier to implement this regime because the NGOs had not been established for a great period of time. As an aside, most NGOs would state that they fully support coordination-based policies. Nonetheless, in the early stages, this difficulty created extra work for the recently established UNIFIL MACC

2. **Consolidation Phase.** The programme would build upon the developments of Phase 1 by continuing to develop the emergency mine action plan to facilitate the safe return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and enhance the mobility of UNIFIL troops. The actual implementation of phase 2 was again problematic and it was at this stage that the coordination between the national authority, the NDO, and the UN MACC became a major issue.

The NDO at this point began to open up their relationship with the UNIFIL MACC in Tyre. The NDO had recently received a technical advisor, who reported to the head of the NDO and to the UNDP resident representative in Lebanon. The advisor also received policy guidance and technical backstopping from the UNDP MAT in New York. The appointment of this position meant that the relationship opportunities between the two agencies were expanded and national planning began to be seriously considered. There was however still some difficulty between the GOL and the UN and the liaison was far from perfect.

3. **The final phase of the project.** This phase was to assist in the development of a medium to long-term mine action response to rid South Lebanon of mines, UXOs, and booby-traps. The mine action assets

established during the previous phases would then be integrated into a national mine action programme managed by the GOL, coordinated through the NDO and supported by the UNDP.

By this stage relationships between the NDO and UNIFIL MACC had improved to the point where the two organisations were prepared to begin working on the development of a national plan. This plan was presented to the GOL in May 2001. In addition the UNIFIL MACC programme manager was tasked to begin detailed planning of the integration of the OAE project. The GOL, UN and UAE ratified the subsequent MOU in October 2001 and almost immediately began the process of developing the UNIFIL MACC with the UAE funded positions inside the organisation. One of the primary reasons for the positive way that the UAE moved forward in the integration into the UNIFIL MACC was its desire that all its operations be carried out in accordance with the recently introduced International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), the development of which was led by the UN. The UAE thus saw the UN as the key to implementing operations in accordance with IMAS.

Once the MOU was signed between the UAE, GOL & The UN, the UAE then began the process of issuing tender documents for the operational work to be funded by them. They dealt with this contracting process themselves, outside of the UNIFIL MACC, although the NDO and the UN MACC were informed of developments. In addition, the UAE went through the UNIFIL MACC to ask the assistance of the UNOPS Mine Action Unit in New York, to contract for the quality assurance and monitoring of the work they contracted out.<sup>iv</sup>

### **The shift from UNIFIL MACC to the South Lebanon MACC**

In February 2001, a high level mission consisting of the chiefs of both UNMAS and UNDP recommended moving the UNIFIL MACC away from UNIFIL and strengthening the relationship with the NDO. This mission recognised that a national capacity (in the form of the NDO) did already exist, but that its area of

operations did not extend to the south of the country, where it was becoming apparent that there was a significant humanitarian problem. The mission recommended a strategy, of which the two objectives were to:

- *“ensure the acceleration of mine action operations, particularly in the south.*
- *assist the Government of Lebanon in strengthening its capacity in all areas of mine action.”<sup>v</sup>*

This shift occurred over the course of 2001 until the UNIFIL MACC effectively ceased to exist and the organisation became the South Lebanon MACC (the final ‘c’ shifting meaning to centre in recognition of its increased role).

### **Capacity Building**

One of the less positive elements of this phase was the planned capacity building element. The UNDP had been working towards the development of a “capacity building” position within the NDO to aid the long-term viability and national ownership of the coordination process. Unfortunately, the politics within the NDO made this extremely difficult and the advisor found it virtually impossible to make any headway in the development of a long-term national capacity. As the UN MACC annual report for 2001 states:

*“UNDP was facing difficulty in achieving the desired partnership with the NDO for this project and by year’s end it looked most likely that the capacity building support project would be withdrawn. While this would not stop the UN MACC’s immediate and intermediate term objectives it would require a rescheduling of the UN MACC exit strategy and re-think on how best to achieve any sort of integration with the NDO.”<sup>vi</sup>*

As a result of this, the advisor was not replaced at the end of his contract at the end of 2001. The perspective of the GOL was that there was little need for assistance for long-term capacity development and the perspective of the

UNDP was that there was little value in staffing this position in the absence of a receptive national counterpart.<sup>vii</sup>

In early 2002, a key personality with the NDO was replaced, and as a result, the approach of the GOL long-term capacity development shifted to a much more forward thinking position and at this time, plans are being made to fill the position of “capacity development” technical advisor, supported by the UNDP in the NDO.<sup>viii</sup>

The most significant breakthrough however has been the establishment of a more open and cooperative dialogue with the NDO that had previously been very protective of its role and mandate. During the earlier stages in the development of the UNIFIL MACC it had been made clear that the NDO did not support the establishment of it and it appeared that they felt threatened by the existence of the UNIFIL MACC. Over time many of the negative perceptions held by the NDO toward the UNIFIL MACC have been changed as a more open and transparent working relationship has developed. This relationship will be further strengthened in 2002 as the strengthened MACC in South Lebanon takes shape.<sup>ix</sup>

### **Lessons learned from previous set-ups**

The UNIFIL MACC in Southern Lebanon was initiated some 10 years after the organisations in Cambodia and Mozambique. Although the institutional structures were different in all cases, it is important to assess just how effective this implementation has been and what mistakes were made along the way.

The Eaton *et al*/ DHA study undertaken in 1997 outlined a number of conclusions and recommendations (see Annex D). Although clearly not all of these conclusions are relevant to the development of a programme in Lebanon, and there are individual elements of the new programme there that require special attention, it is worth attempting to reconcile some of these.

Recommendation number eight suggests that:

*“... the UN should take a proactive role in needs assessment, planning and, when necessary, the creation of Mine Action Centres. This should include assistance with resource mobilization and the development of skills needed to ensure continuity and sustainability. Support should be provided in a manner which will allow for a seamless transition between the initiation and consolidation phases.”<sup>x</sup>*

In the case of Lebanon, the assessment and planning elements were successfully undertaken with the formation of the UNIFIL MACC. It seems however that the development of a successful link to the government structure, as well as the evolution of a viable capacity development plan and exit strategy (in other words the implementation of the consolidation phase) was not carried out successfully and the UNIFIL MACC was established without the genuine support of the national authorities. Whilst UNMAS did write to the GOL to open a dialogue, the GOL did not reply and UNMAS did not follow up in this issue and thus no formal agreement was put in place.<sup>xi</sup>

A “lessons learned” report issued to UNOPS from the UNIFIL MACC in January 2001 proposes that: “{in future projects} *The Project must be approved, or at least supported by, the Host Government.*”<sup>xii</sup>. Clearly in this case, it would have been much more effective if the support of the GOL were obtained before implementation of the UNIFIL MACC, even though it were initially within the UNIFIL mandate and, as such, not technically required to obtain this authority. The lack of coordination between the NDO and the UNIFIL MACC produced considerable problems in the early stages of the programme.

The same report identified a problem in the coordination at the headquarters (New York) level. The report stated that:



*“UNMAS, if establishing a project in country, must ensure that it adequately consults with all interested parties in the host country. It is important that duplication of effort is avoided and that there are no misunderstandings as to the purpose and roles of the various agencies or organisations. In the case of Lebanon, the US Government had assisted the Government of Lebanon with the establishment of the National Demining Office. The UNMAS Project was not incorporated into the development plans of the NDO and hence there exists some confusion between US objectives, NDO objectives, UNDP objectives, and the UN MACC.”<sup>xiii</sup>*

Clearly this should be a fundamental element in the planning of any particular programme and seems to have failed in the case of the UNIFIL MACC.

More positively, the Eaton *et al* DHA study also specified a number of other issues that they felt strongly should be implemented. There are a number which appear to have been adopted and which, it could be argued, have contributed significantly to the development of a relatively successful programme. Two of these in particular are worth noting:

**RECOMMENDATION ONE:** *“In line with its central coordination responsibilities, the MAC will generally be responsible for planning, for a central data bank on minefield information, for resource mobilization, for monitoring, and overall programme development {...} It should also act as the country’s regulatory agency”<sup>xiv</sup>*

Whilst the UNIFIL MACC is in an exceptional situation, with a responsibility only for a specific region of the country (i.e., South Lebanon within UNIFILs area of operations), it coordinates all MA activities within this area. The UNIFIL MACC in addition maintained a central database (Information Management System for Mine Action – IMSMA) which is now closely coordinated with the NDO, who now operate IMSMA for the rest of the country. Probably the most successful

element within these recommendations is that of regulation and accreditation of operational capacities. Within the remit of OES, the UN MACC is fully responsible, through the NDO, for the accreditation and coordinating of operational assets within South Lebanon with the NDO being responsible for the formal licensing of these assets

**RECOMMENDATION TWO:** *“Donor nations that choose to fund NGOs and commercial entities directly should do so through a tripartite agreement involving the donor, the implementing agency, and the Mine Action Centre. This will facilitate coordination and ensure adherence to standards”.*<sup>xv</sup>

Again, this has proved to be a great success. OES pledged to fund the implementation of up to US\$50 million of operational support through the UNIFIL MACC and have provided a number of key positions with the organisation. Even more positively, the UAE (clearly supported by the UN) insisted on the application of the recently introduced IMAS on all mine action activities to be carried out in the country under their funding remit. This is in itself a huge step forward and supports and reinforces the UN (and the practitioners in the community) in their desire to regulate the industry into a professional standards led industry.

**RECOMMENDATION THREE:** *“The MAC should take a proactive role in ensuring that expatriate Technical Advisers have appropriate qualifications and skills needed for the task of training and transfer of knowledge. Similarly, an effort must be made to avoid the rapid turnover of personnel involved in training activities. All such personnel should be available for a minimum of 12 months and, preferably, for 24 months”.*<sup>xvi</sup>

This is another area where the UN MACC has proved to be a success. The key advisor, the Chief Technical Advisor, has been in place since the beginning of the programme in July 2000 and has remained in place. He is eminently qualified, having taken another programme through a difficult developmental

stage. Similarly placed is the advisor for information management, a Somali whose skills and cultural approach are well placed for the situation.

### **Lebanon's unique perspective**

Clearly the unique circumstances in Lebanon, with the separation of South Lebanon from the government's programme, caused difficulties, but it does allow the two organisations to operate side by side with a certain amount of complementarity yet focus on their particular areas. The NDO, operating throughout the country, with the exception of the South, have focussed on data gathering and are coordinating two survey projects (Landmine impact survey and a technical survey) which will enable a much clearer picture of the mine problem in Lebanon to be reached. These surveys will also cover the South and will assist the MACC. The MACC on its part, has focussed on the application of standards and the coordination of efforts in the south, together with the coordination of the OES project.

Such hybrid projects may well be implemented again in other locations, particularly in the context of a competent and stable government. In this particular case, UNMAS led on the development and seemed not to be particularly cognisant of the UNDP input. In future cases, these liaisons between the two agencies need to be reinforced.

One of the major opportunities in Lebanon has been the development of the relationship between the three agencies involved. In many programmes, the problems in the development of relationships between a national government and the UN are difficult enough. The potential for problems within Lebanon, with the involvement of an additional government (the UAE) were therefore increased significantly. Yet, although there have been significant obstacles along the way, the status of the programme(s) at the moment demonstrate that it is possible to achieve a successful organisation within such constraining circumstances. In this particular case, much of the success can be put down to

the general selection of technical advisors with the right skills set, although there were exceptions.

It is also interesting to consider where the national government is on the “emergency – development continuum”. In both Cambodia and Mozambique, the development of CMAC/CMAA/CND/IND/ADP was all undertaken under relatively ineffective governments at the time. In these cases, the UN took the lead without too much concern over the influence of the governments and with inadequate reference (in hindsight) to it, and focussed on both initiating the programme and looking at the longer-term development of the programme, combined with the wider UN position of supporting the incremental development of the country. In more recent cases, it may not necessarily be the case that a programme is set up under a weak government. Lebanon, for example, has (and had during the initiation phase) a very capable government whose major problem was their inability to fund demining operations in their country. The same goes for Eritrea, where a recent UN programme was established within a country with a strong, effective and coordinated government and a recently initiated UN MACC.<sup>10</sup> The difference seems to be that in Cambodia and Mozambique, the steps along the emergency – development continuum were taken sequentially, whereas with the strong governments of Lebanon and Eritrea, the steps taken overlapped.

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<sup>i</sup> Annual report Mine Action Coordination Centre (South Lebanon), *ibid*.

<sup>ii</sup> *Outline Strategy for UN Assistance to Mine Action in Lebanon*, May 2001, United Nations Mine Action Service. Annex A.

<sup>iii</sup> *op cit*, p6.

<sup>iv</sup> Discussions with JJ van der Merwe, Technical Advisor, UNOPS Mine Action Unit, New York, January 2002

<sup>v</sup> *Outline Strategy for UN Assistance to Mine Action in Lebanon*, *op cit*

<sup>vi</sup> *Annual report Mine Action Coordination Centre (South Lebanon)*, *op cit*

<sup>vii</sup> Interview with Ms Judy Grayson, acting chief UNDP Mine Action Team, 21<sup>st</sup> July 2002, New York.

<sup>viii</sup> *op cit*

<sup>ix</sup> Personal documents *ibid*.

<sup>x</sup> Eaton R, Horwood C, Niland N, *Multi - Country Mine Action Study: Study Report - The Development of Indigenous Mine Action Capacities*, New York: United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1997

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<sup>10</sup> At the time of writing, the statement stands, however, Eritrea’s security situation seems to be deteriorating, possibly at the cost of strong national direction in its MACC.

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<sup>xi</sup> Personal conversation with unattributable source.

<sup>xii</sup> Memorandum from UNIFIL MACC to UNOPS HQ New York dated 9<sup>th</sup> January 2001.

<sup>xiii</sup> op cit

<sup>xiv</sup> Eaton *et al*, op cit.

<sup>xv</sup> op cit.

<sup>xvi</sup> op cit.

## **Chapter 8**

### **Conclusions and recommendations**

This study has analysed the mine action environment and a number of programmes within it. It has looked at the development of mine action over the last 13 years and how, although certain elements of the mine action arena have changed, there are still a number of areas which do not seem to have developed in the right direction. The recent introduction of the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) has been a significant driver for technical change in the industry as well as directing the quality issues within mine action. IMAS is a quality based series of documents and allows the national authorities some flexibility in the initiation of programmes although ultimately the national authority of the country of implementation will have the final say in any programme.

- The first chapter outlined the structure of the study and identified the aims and objectives as well as defining the methodology.
- Chapter two presented a brief history and overview of the mine action environment and outlined how the humanitarian community has begun to attempt to overcome this appalling global problem that has emerged over the last 13 years. The role of the UN, the key body involved in global mine action is explained as is the basic structure of the key agencies involved in mine action; UNMAS, UNDP and UNOPS.
- Chapter three analyses the literature that is available, from the general humanitarian and developmental perspective, through to specific publications looking at particular countries and programmes. The chapter then considers a number of previous studies that have analysed the management structures of mine action programmes and organisations.

- Chapter four develops case studies of two specific countries – Cambodia and Mozambique – and outlines the development of the programmes therein and the influences that caused their development in their particular direction. The chapter assesses the mine action programmes in the two countries and the fact that they were both initiated under very different circumstances and therefore shaped in significantly different ways, yet over the last ten years, have emerged to be shaped into remarkably similar national structures. In contrast to Cambodia and Mozambique, addition, the chapter gives a brief history of the relatively recent development of the mine action environment in Lebanon, which was then expanded upon in chapter seven.
- Chapter five considers the external influences placed upon national programmes and how programmes have addressed such influences. In particular, the cultural difficulties between expatriate advisors and national staff are identified. Several benchmarking processes for organisational structures are analysed, and existing mine action programmes considered against these models. Finally this chapter assesses how planning processes vary depending on cultural background and the difficulties of operating in a culturally alien environment.
- Chapter six draws on a number of structural environments that could be applied in the development of a national mine action programme and goes on to discuss the differences and difficulties inherent within the position along the emergency – development continuum.
- Chapter seven draws together the various issues raised during the course of the study and looks at how some of the lessons learned in previous studies have been utilised in the initiation phase of a relatively new programme in Lebanon.

## **A global model?**

Whilst the concept of a global model of a mine action programme may at first sight seem to be attractive, it has become apparent from the research undertaken that the development and attempted application of standard model would, in reality, be neither applicable, nor welcome due to the huge amount of external influences involved.

There are however indicators that can be drawn from the stage of development of the country and its position along the emergency – development continuum that can and should be used for the more formal structuring of any future mine action programme.

What is perhaps more positive is the development that mine action *has* undertaken in the last 13 years. From questionable beginnings, the industry is developing towards becoming a quality driven environment, which offers huge opportunities for humanitarian relief. Steps are being taken towards formalisation and standardisation. Several examples can be given. The virtually global usage of the standardised UN initiated Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) by the vast majority of mine action programmes throughout the world give a benchmark for the management of data on all aspects of landmines in a structured and consistent way.

In addition, one further standardised initiative deserves mention. In the formative days of mine action, there was general recognition of the fact that whilst at least some of the mine action advisors moving into programmes had a formal education and understanding of management structures, very few of the national staff had the benefit of such an education. This realisation, coupled with a desire to improve the quality of management, and therefore incrementally the quality of mine action programmes, resulted in the successful preparation and delivery of a number of structured and consistent management training



courses, starting in 2000. Interestingly enough, when the idea was initially mooted in 1997, there was a great deal of scepticism in many circles, within and without the UN. Since a series of courses was started, run by Cranfield University for UNDP, the critics have realised the benefits and the courses are now widely held up to be a great success.

Both these two initiatives in particular have resulted in a much more standardised environment in the global mine action community which should provide a catalyst for future improvement through the sharing of experience, knowledge and expertise.

## **Recommendations**

From analysis of the study thus far, it is apparent that the recommendations fall into three mutually complementary categories.

- **INTEGRATION**
- **CULTURE**
- **APPROPRIATENESS**

It is recommended that the following principle factors should be considered prior to implementation of future mine action programmes:

### **INTEGRATION**

- Emphasis is placed on improving the liaison between the UN agencies involved in mine action.
- Greater importance is given to the inclusion of UNDP in the early planning stages of new programmes where UNMAS have the lead because of peacekeeping operations mandates.

- UNMAS, together with UNDP, consider closer and more formal integration into the UN SAS to support DPKO in rapid deployment to peace support operations that may require the involvement of mine action assets.
- More consideration is given to coordinating with other humanitarian agencies and NGOs operating within and without the mine action sector.

## **CULTURE**

- From day one of the initiation of any new programme, in whatever form, priority is given to the integration of the mine action programme into the national structure. If such a structure does not exist, the programme should be designed such that it will be possible to easily integrate into a national structure if and when this commences.
- Selection criterion for expatriate advisors are expanded to consider greater cultural awareness, ability and willingness to adapt to a local culture.
- Military advisors in UN PKO are given clearer guidance on appropriate behaviour and management styles.

## **APPROPRIATENESS**

- Better selection of expatriate technical advisors should be considered as a priority, based on their organisational, developmental and management skills rather than their technical background.
- Consideration is given to the widening of UNMAS' base of staff with developmental experience.

- Greater notice is taken of where the country to be operated in is situated on the emergency – development continuum.
- Greater involvement is given to the consideration of longer-term development planning even during the emergency stage – with emphasis on increasing the input from UNDP where applicable.

### **Further areas for study**

- There is a need for a detailed study to be carried out to assess more accurately how the various influences bearing on a mine action programme impact upon the best means of structuring that programme. Placing the country upon the emergency – development continuum may be a significant step forward but a clear understanding of how the multiple other influences bear on this process would be valuable.
- A study to consider the best strategy for expatriates operating closely with national staff in diverse cultures would be worth considering in an attempt to ease the difficulties that appear to be prevalent in many countries.
- A detailed study of the interaction of all the UN agencies involved in mine action, in particular the key agencies of UNMAS, UNDP and UNOPS, would be of benefit in continuing to develop the slowly improving relationships between the agencies.
- Further study is merited in the area of governmental control and implementation of mine action centres and also the transfer of UN initiated programmes across to governmental structures.

- There is a need for a detailed analysis of how technical advisors transfer their skills across to their national counterparts. There is currently little rigour applied to the training and skills transfer that expatriate advisors offer to national staff and if it is successful, it is often by luck rather than judgement. A vague work plan may not be the most effective way to monitor and evaluate this process.

## **Conclusions**

The world of humanitarian mine action has undergone a sea change since the first operations were undertaken in Afghanistan in 1989. Beginning with a group of people who were keen to help, but had no concept as to the scale or humanitarian and developmental impact of the problem, the industry has transformed itself into a quality driven, standards based professional humanitarian industry which has resulted in a great improvement in the quality of life for many hundreds of thousands of people living in mine affected countries. From a small group of people working from a makeshift office, though to current organisations with thousands of employees, turning over tens of millions of dollars per year, professionalisation has been the focus of development for the industry.

Whilst this professionalism can only be applauded, during the early development of the industry, operational issues and humanitarian concerns tended to be the major focus, often overriding good management practices. This is understandable, yet good management practices will bolster the effectiveness of programmes and can only benefit the industry in the long term. This study considers a key part of the whole implementation process and identifies a number of areas requiring further study. It recognises that there can be no boilerplate solution for implementation of a programme, yet identifies that there is benefit in gaining a more detailed understanding of what is required to implement effective programmes.

If the mine action industry can evolve as rapidly and successfully over the next 13 years as it has over the past 13, the impact of landmines may be ameliorated with more cost effective solutions and effective programmes, together with the development of a national management capacity to assist the development of those nations less fortunate than our own.

## The nature of mine action in current UN-supported programmes

<i>Country mine action programme ▼</i>	<i>Open conflict</i>	<i>Humanitarian emergency</i>	<i>Transition assistance</i>	<i>Assisted development</i>	<i>Stable self-dependency</i>
Afghanistan	○	●	○		
Albania		○	●		
Angola	○	●			
Azerbaijan		○	●		
Bosnia-Herzegovina			●	○	
Cambodia			○	●	
Chad		○	●	○	
Colombia			○	●	
Croatia			○	●	○
Egypt				○	●
Ethiopia		○	●	○	
Guatemala			○	●	
Guinea-Bissau			○		
Iraq		○	●		
Jordan				○	●
Kosovo		○	●		
Laos			○	●	
Lebanon		●	○		
Mozambique			○	●	
Nicaragua				●	
Panama				●	
Sierra Leone	○	●			
Somalia	○	●			
Sri Lanka	○	○	○	●	
Sudan	○	●	○		
Thailand				●	
Yemen			○	●	

*Key:*

- primary state of mine action in each country programme
- other states of mine action recognisable in each country programme

## ***Roles and Responsibilities of UN Agencies in Mine Action***

### **The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) {KEY AGENCY}**

UNMAS is the focal point for all mine-related activities. It is responsible for ensuring a coordinated response to landmine contamination, establishing priorities for assessment missions and coordinating the mobilisation of resources. It is also responsible for the preparation and maintenance of technical standards, the collection and maintenance of mine related data, advocacy in support of a global ban on mines and for the management of the Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) which is the central fund to which donors channel their funds through the UN system for mine action.

### **The UN Development Programme (UNDP) {KEY AGENCY}**

UNDP is the focus for the establishment of national and local capacity and addressing the socio-economic consequences of mine contamination. UNDP will normally have the prime responsibility for the development of integrated, sustainable mine action programmes where programmes have passed the “emergency” stage.

### **The UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) {KEY AGENCY}**

UNOPS is a service provider for integrated mine action and capacity building programmes. It implements programmes as appropriate in conjunction with the

concerned partners (such as UNMAS, UNDP etc.). UNOPS is the Agency responsible for recruitment of international staff of programmes. In addition, UNOPS coordinate and manage a programme in Northern Iraq paid for by the “Food for Oil” agreement between the UN and the Iraqi Government with a budget of £45 million between 1997 and 2000.

**The UN Children’s fund (UNICEF)**

UNICEF is the focal point for Mines Risk Education (MRE), one of the “five pillars” of mine action.

**Department of Disarmament Affairs (DDA)**

DDA are responsible for disarmament issues and focal point for the Ottawa treaty implementation.

**The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)**

UNOCHA works to consider the humanitarian implications of the landmine problem, which feeds into policy planning processes.

**World Health Organisation (WHO)**

WHO advises on public health consequences of landmines.

**The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)**

UNHCR are responsible for refugee/Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) safety in mine affected countries.



**World Food Programme (WFP)**

WFP offer food assistance and agricultural development and provide useful mechanisms for coordination in mine affected areas.

**World Bank**

The World Bank finances development and reconstruction initiatives.

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**UN STRATEGY OF SUPPORT TO MINE ACTION IN LEBANON**

<b>SERIAL</b> (a)	<b>UN AGENCY</b> (b)	<b>ACTIVITY</b> (c)	<b>FUNDING</b> (d)	<b>TIMEFRAME</b> (e)	<b>REMARKS</b> (f)
1	UNDP	Capacity Building Support to the NDO	\$272,000	12 months	Funding not yet secured
2	UNDP	QA/QC Support to NDO	\$480,000	8 months	Funding not yet secured.
3	UNICEF	Mine Awareness including support to NDO	\$245,000	12 months	Plus additional \$50,000 support costs including activities in Serial 3.
4	UNICEF	Victim Assistance	\$250,000	12 months	Funding not yet secured.
5	UNESCO	Mine Awareness	\$220,000	12 months	Funding not yet secured.
6	WHO	Victim Assistance	\$30,000	12 months	\$300,000 allocated to health care training in collaboration with AGFUND. \$30,000 for direct action victim assistance.
7	UNMAS	Support to the NDO Provision of IMSMA Version 2	\$50,000 To be funded through MACC Budget	April – May 2001	Currently under assessment and procurement action
8	UNMAS	Direct Support to UNIFIL	\$50,000 To be allocated to UNIFIL for Mine Awareness, Victim Assistance, Marking	April – July 2001	Funding to be confirmed. Method of allocation to be confirmed.
9	UNMAS	MACC Operations UNIFIL AO	\$342,000	Funded to 30 June 2001	Funding to December 2001 to be confirmed
10	UNMAS	Level Two Survey	\$500,000 50% Co-funded by Government of Norway	10 months commencing April/May 2001	Mines Advisory Group (MAG) UK has been given a grant to conduct this activity by the European Community.
11	UNIFIL	Emergency Clearance	Activities funded through current UNIFIL Budget	April– July 2001	Time frame indicates current mandate period.
12	UNIFIL	Mine Awareness	To be funded through UNMAS Allocation	April – July 2001	\$5,000 As for serial 10
13	UNIFIL	Victim Assistance	To be funded through UNMAS Allocation	April – July 2001	\$5,000 As for Serial 10
	UNIFIL	Mined area Marking	To be part-funded through UNMAS Allocation	April – July 2001	As for Serial 10
<b>14</b>	<b>UN SUPPORT PACKAGE</b>	<b>ALL ACTIVITIES</b>	<b>\$2,439,000</b>	<b>COMMENCING APRIL 2001</b>	

## **Summary of recommendations from UN DHA multi-country study 1997**

### **Measurement of the Socio-Economic Impact of Mines.**

1. A more structured approach should be taken by the United Nations and its partners to document and analyse the impact of mines on civilian life and the way in which social and economic activity is hindered or rendered impossible as a result of mine warfare. Resources should be made available to improve data collection and analysis on the socio-economic impact of mines.
2. The UN, in collaboration with all concerned parties, should mobilize resources for the development of a simplified methodology to measure the impact of mines on poverty and on the coping mechanisms of affected communities.

### **The International Campaign to Ban Landmines**

3. As a supporter of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, the UN focal point for landmines should monitor ongoing conflicts, to the extent that this is appropriate and feasible, and use its position to influence all concerned parties to cease the use of mine warfare. This should include action to identify suppliers of such weapons.
4. Directors of all UN-supported mine action programmes should ensure that all their staff are fully familiar with the Secretary-General's position on landmines and should not, in their official duties, advocate against the ICBL.
5. The UN should explore all available opportunities to work with mine-affected countries to develop legal frameworks inhibiting the stockpiling and use of landmines.

### **UN Support for Mine Action Programmes**

6. The mandate of the United Nations focal point for landmines should be affirmed and supported by all concerned entities of the United Nations system. Such a mandate includes advocacy for a total ban on the use, manufacture, trade, and stockpiling of landmines and on behalf of landmine survivors. This mandate should also include responsibility for analysing the use and impact of landmines and helping ensure that peace negotiations address the issue of landmines.

7. The UN focal point for landmines should develop specific mechanisms to ensure that an appropriate exchange of information and cross-fertilization occur between programmes. Activities already undertaken in this connection, such as the Landmines Newsletter and Global Database, should be strengthened and expanded.

8. In terms of helping affected countries address the immediate and long-term consequences of landmines, the UN should take a proactive role in needs assessment, planning and, when necessary, the creation of Mine Action Centres. This should include assistance with resource mobilization and the development of skills needed to ensure continuity and sustainability. Support should be provided in a manner which will allow for a seamless transition between the initiation and consolidation phases. The UN focal point should take an active role in ongoing development and promotion of operational and safety standards. It should monitor the application of new technologies and should facilitate an exchange of expertise between programmes.

9. Given the difficulties inherent in the application of UN rules and regulations in crisis situations the UN focal point should not get directly involved in the implementation of field activities. It should contract out specific tasks and projects to UN bodies not bound by UN Secretariat Rules and Regulations, to national and international NGOs, or to commercial firms. DPKO, UNOPS and UNDP collaboration in the organization of contractual arrangements should be periodically reviewed and steps taken to maximize effectiveness.

### **Delineation of Responsibility Between Humanitarian and Operational Mine Action Activities**

10. Given inherent time constraints and the difficulties which have been encountered in trying to ensure that activities launched to meet operational mission objectives form the basis for an indigenous long-term capacity, there should be a delineation of responsibility, authority and budgetary resources for all activities related to “humanitarian” and “operational” mine action initiatives. This in effect means that “operational” mine action activities such as the clearance of major routes or other areas needed to facilitate the deployment and movement of mission personnel will be undertaken under the direct authority of the Force Commander utilizing mission resources. All “operational” mine action activities should, however, be undertaken in close consultation with the Mine Action Centre or coordination mechanism established for the purpose of organizing a national programme to ensure that all UN activities are mutually supportive. In this connection, the UN focal point should ensure that all Force Commanders and their staff are fully briefed on the different requirements of “operational” and “humanitarian” mine action and the support needed to develop indigenous capabilities.

### **National Authority**

11. The United Nations should facilitate the creation of a national mine action authority with an appropriate mandate and composition. The purpose of a national authority is to ensure that mine action activities have an appropriate governance body. In general, the authority’s mandate will include overall responsibility for broad policy guidance, selection of the Executive Director of the Mine Action Centre and appointment of external auditors. It should also ensure that periodic independent evaluations are undertaken. The mine action authority would normally ensure that a portion of the national budget is made available annually for the country’s mine action activities. The authority should ensure that mine action policy is non-partisan and is in accord with

humanitarian considerations including the allocation of resources to address the mine-related problems of those who are most vulnerable.

### **The Mine Action Centre**

12. The UN focal point should take a proactive role in the creation of a Mine Action Centre. The core function of such a Centre is to ensure that programme activities give effect to established policy. This necessarily involves the development of an overall plan and ensuring that a coherent and comprehensive approach is pursued in a safe and cost-effective manner. In line with its central coordination responsibilities, the MAC will generally be responsible for planning, for a central data bank on minefield information, for resource mobilization, for monitoring, and overall programme development including the investigation of accidents and follow up activities. It should also act as the country's regulatory agency.

### **Operational Modalities**

13. The study team strongly recommends in favour of distinct coordination and implementation arrangements. Operational activities should be undertaken by independently managed mine action agencies (such as national and international NGOs) under contract to the MAC. The MAC should not become directly involved in implementation activities but retain overall control through sound contractual arrangements. This approach puts less strain on human resources at the centre in terms of management and control capabilities. It is more transparent for donors and more responsive to shifting priorities and demand as the mine problem is brought under control and the level of activities decrease over the years. There are situations, however, where the vertical integration approach will be the option preferred by the national authorities. If the mine action authority and the MAC determine to directly execute operations in the field then the central management structure must be considerably enlarged to provide management and logistical support to units in the field.

### **Early Collection of Data**

14. In many situations of protracted or sporadic conflict, or where parts of a country are stabilized, information, for example on population displacement due to mines, is one indicator of the need for future mine action activities. The UN should take a more proactive approach in collecting and analyzing available information on the presence of landmines in situations likely to harm civilians.

### **Multi-Disciplinary Assessment**

15. The UN focal point should systematically undertake a multi-disciplinary assessment mission prior to the initiation of programme planning as has increasingly been the case in recent years. Assessments should be undertaken in consultation with all relevant in-country parties to determine the nature and general scope of the problem including its socio-economic implications, the resources available at the local and national level which can be drawn upon to reduce vulnerability, and the factors which are likely to affect the launching of the programme.

### **Clause on Landmines in Peace Agreements**

16. The UN focal point should take a proactive approach and promote the inclusion of an appropriate clause on landmines in peace agreements. Such a clause would, for example, stipulate that parties to the conflict must desist from using mines, that they undertake to make available information on minefield and patterns of mine use, and facilitate in every way possible humanitarian mine action activities.

### **Use of Voluntary and Assessed Contributions**

17. The Mine Action Centre and operational activities should be funded by the government and voluntary contributions. Assessed budget funds from peace-keeping missions should be utilized solely for “operational demining” under the

control of the peace-keeping forces until such time as the UN reforms its accounting and accountability procedures.

### **Tripartite Agreements**

18. Donor nations that choose to fund NGOs and commercial entities directly should do so through a tripartite agreement involving the donor, the implementing agency, and the Mine Action Centre. This will facilitate coordination and ensure adherence to standards.

### **Financial Tracking**

19. Given the importance of a better understanding of expenditure on mine action programmes, the UN focal point should work with donors and country programmes to develop a simple and reliable system of financial tracking.

### **Financial and Administration**

20. Mine action is too important to be held hostage to procurement and recruitment delays dictated by out-dated and inappropriate rules and regulations. Mine Action Centres need maximum authority delegated to the field, particularly in the Planning and Initiation phases. In consultation with the relevant authorities, expedited field procedures must be introduced by the UN. If it is unable to do so, the UN should acknowledge its ineffectiveness and find another institutional home for the development of mine action activities. During the critical early phases, before donors have confidence in newly formed Mine Action Centres, the UN must find ways to mobilize funds and establish a project document and budget. The UN must appoint a Programme Manager with delegated authority to procure and recruit within the project



document and its budget. Qualified Admin and Finance staff should be available from the very beginning of MAC activities.

### **Quality Control, Monitoring, Evaluations**

21. The Mine Action Centre should establish a quality control unit to continually assess staff performance in the field to ensure that field activities are undertaken in line with the highest standards appropriate to humanitarian mine action. Remedial training should take place when problems are identified.

22. The Mine Action Centre should regularly conduct monitoring missions to the field composed of MAC staff, donor representatives, and relevant UN agencies and other concerned actors as appropriate. The reports of these missions should be forwarded directly to the Director of the MAC.

23. The mine action authority, in consultation with major donors, should regularly contract a competent outside agency to conduct a thorough evaluation of all aspects of the mine action programme including financial, management and operational activities. This evaluation should take place roughly every two years and should include a team member identified by the UN focal point to facilitate continuity and exchange of information between programmes.

### **Programme Profile**

24. The profile and range of field operational activities should be the result of a multi-disciplinary assessment of the minefield threat and should be based on a thorough review of available resources including different technologies and capabilities which are available in-country or elsewhere.

25. The Programme Manager of the MAC should pursue a needs-driven and proactive response in the orchestration of field operational activities. This means that whether the MAC is directly responsible for the development and implementation of field activities, or whether operational activities are carried out under contract to the MAC, resources must be allocated in a manner which

ensures priorities are met and demining teams are not sitting idle because communication and logistics infrastructure are not yet available.

### **Mine Awareness**

26. All programme planners and managers should take a proactive approach to mine awareness and ensure that it is an integral component of a comprehensive mine action programme. All mine awareness activities should be coordinated with UNICEF and the MAC.

### **Prioritisation**

27. Programme Managers of Mine Action Centres should develop and establish processes to enable prioritisation of minefield clearance and survey tasks. Prioritisation should be developed with the advice and expertise of personnel familiar with rural development and social issues in affected communities.

### **Training**

28. Training programmes should be designed as inherent components of building an indigenous capacity. Greater attention must be given to the development of administrative and management skills as well as to specializations such as surveying and data management. Whenever expatriate personnel are used in training and advisory functions, national counterparts should be available and given maximum on-the-job training.

29. Programme planning should ensure that training timetables are in synchrony with operational objectives.

30. The Mine Action Centre should take a proactive role in (a) coordinating the organization of training facilities for all in-country teams as appropriate and (b) in the development of a standardized training curricula; it should monitor all training initiatives with a view to ensuring that all graduates meet basic

minimum standards.

31. The MAC should take a proactive role in ensuring that expatriate Technical Advisers have appropriate qualifications and skills needed for the task of training and transfer of knowledge. Similarly, an effort must be made to avoid the rapid turnover of personnel involved in training activities. All such personnel should be available for a minimum of 12 months and, preferably, for 24 months.

### **Standard Operating Procedures**

32. Agreed Standard Operating Procedures must form the methodological basis for the conduct of mine action activities. Mine Action Centres should ensure that all agencies operate according to accepted SOPs. SOPs used in humanitarian mine action activities must reflect the humanitarian nature of the intervention and will differ significantly from SOPs developed for military or commercial mine and UXO clearance. Endorsement of approved SOPs and enforcement of these must be seen as a basic coordination and regulatory function of the Mine Action Centre.

### **Operational Safety**

33. All accidents occurring during minefield mapping, marking and clearance or in areas declared free of mines must be fully investigated. The MAC should compile and circulate the results of accident investigations and ensure that all operators and commercial agencies circulate information concerning accidents.

34. The MAC should establish a Board of Enquiry to oversee the investigation of all accidents. The Board should, in terms of its membership, draw together appropriate personnel so that objective investigations are undertaken if and when the MAC itself sustains accidents.

35. The issue of protective clothing should be further examined and modifications, as appropriate, reflected in the international standards set out in the document “International Standards for Mine Clearance Operations”.

### **Remuneration Levels**


36. Programme Managers should carefully consider salary levels both in terms of sustainability and the appropriateness of the expertise being provided. The Mine Action Centre should set standard conditions of employment for all organizations operating within the country programme.

### **Productivity, Research and Development**


37. The UN should take a more proactive role in helping Mine Action Centres collect, analyse and document empirical data on the productivity levels of different methodologies in different conditions. This should be seen as an important planning and evaluation tool. The UN should also take a proactive role in developing indicators and criteria useful for measuring overall productivity levels.

38. The UN should facilitate information sharing as a routine task between programmes and relevant actors and help ensure an effective dialogue between programme managers and research and development work.

**OUTLINE RELATIONSHIPS AND COORDINATION IN MINE ACTION**



**FUNCTIONAL GROUPINGS OF KEY ACTORS IN MINE ACTION**



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