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**Blurred Intersections: The Anti-Black, Islamophobic Dimensions of
CVE Surveillance**

By

Zeinab A. Dahir

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree of

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**Blurred Intersections: The Anti-Black, Islamophobic Dimensions of CVE
Surveillance**

Zeinab A. Dahir

This thesis has been examined and approved by the following members of the student's committee.

Dr. Laura Harrison

Dr. Danielle Haque

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Abstract:

Modern mechanisms of state surveillance reinforce gendered, raced, classed and sexed power hierarchies. Forms of control and regulation of “problem bodies” are framed as neutral or benign forms of bureaucratic bookkeeping (Dubrofsky and Magnet, 2015). This thesis explores the possible Islamophobic and Anti-Black dimensions of Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) program, a counterterrorism community outreach program initiated by the federal government in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area, which targets the Somali community. I will be evaluating whether CVE programs, initiated by state agencies, transform into a site of surveillance. This thesis will examine declassified state documents from sources such as Homeland Security and the FBI relating to CVE programs, which detail program rationale, function, and implantation. My research will examine the presence of Anti-Black racism and Islamophobia in the purpose and deployment CVE programs. Additionally, I will be analyzing how mechanisms of surveillance operate at the intersections of Anti-Black racism and Islamophobia and how do CVE programs impact and shape the lived realities of Somali Muslims. This study of CVE programs is, by necessity, an analysis of power relations, and relies on an intersectional feminist approach to surveillance studies. Through this, I will produce a coherent understanding of how surveillance mechanisms build on the criminalization and over-policing of Black communities to surveil, mark and easily monitor Somali Muslims in Minnesota. The recent election of Donald Trump and the looming threat to activate a Muslim registry makes this research more relevant and necessary.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

On October 3rd, 2012, Muslim Advocate—a national legal advocacy organization that focuses on protecting civil rights and liberties of Muslims—filed a first amendment complaint on behalf of eleven Muslim organizations and individual plaintiffs (Center for Constitutional Rights, 2015). The lawsuit “challenges the New York Police Department’s suspect-less surveillance of Muslim Americans in New Jersey solely because of their Muslim identity” (Center for Constitutional Rights, 2012). The systemic surveillance of Muslim communities and individuals by the New York Police Department began shortly after the attacks on the World Trade Center. The NYPD “established a sprawling and secretive human mapping and suspicion-less surveillance program that targeted Muslim American communities in New York, New Jersey, and beyond” (Center for Constitutional Rights, 2012). New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio’s attempt to settle the lawsuit was rejected by a federal judge because the proposed deal did not provide sufficient oversight of an agency that habitually, and purposefully violated free speech and religion laws (Apazu and Goldman, 2016). On the election trail, then-presidential candidate Donald Trump urged Mayor de Blasio to reinstate NYPD’s surveillance of Muslims, arguing that surveillance of Muslims is beneficial and needed (ACLU, 2016). Trump’s statement reflects the impasse in the United States where fear and suspicion around Muslims has reached a tipping point. During the first few weeks of his presidency, Donald Trump issued an executive order that barred refugees and immigrants from seven Muslim-majority countries from entering the United States (ACLU, 2016). In the same month, Reuters News Agency reported that Trump would revamp Counter Violent Extremism, a program focused on preventing violent domestic extremism, to concentrate solely on Muslims (Edwards, Volz and Cooke, 2016). Trump included Somalia in his Muslim ban. One of the justifications

given by the Trump administration for banning Somali immigrants is the threat to national security that Somalis pose (Siddiqui, 2017).

The success of Al-Shabaab— a Somali terrorist group, founded in 2007— in recruiting members of the Somali diaspora, both in Europe and North America, caused an intense scrutiny and monitoring of the Somali diaspora in Europe and the United States. The suspicion and fear amplified when a group of Somali-American men from Minneapolis, MN left the United States to join Al-Shabaab insurgency in Somalia in 2009. At least five Somali-Americans were killed while fighting for Al-Shabaab, while the United States government indicted another 14 for providing logistical and financial support to the Minneapolis Al-Shabaab network (Vidino, Pantucci, and Kohlmann, 2010). The intensified scrutiny around radicalized Somali men from Minnesota served as justification for police and profile Somalis, especially young Somali men, as potential terrorists (Abdi, 2015). The anxieties around the Somali community materialized in a distinctly anti-Somali expression of Islamophobia— or racism directed at Muslims or those who present as such— fueled by Somalia’s geopolitical instability (Abdi, 2015). Such paranoia and fear place Somali communities at the center of the global war on terror. As such, this research contextualizes the surveillance of Somali immigrants within the increased suspicion of Somali Muslims as potential terrorists to examine the possible Anti-Black and Islamophobic dimensions of state surveillance vis-à-vis Counter Violent Extremism programs. The study examines whether Anti-Black racism and Islamophobia underpin the purpose and deployment of CVE programs. Therefore, this thesis utilizes an intersectional feminist approach to surveillance studies to produce a coherent understanding of how surveillance, Anti-Blackness, and Islamophobia intersect in the experiences of Somali Muslims.

Throughout the United States, Muslims are targeted through suspect-less surveillance and intelligence gathering (ACLU, 2016). The heightened paranoia around Somali Muslims legitimizes invasive, unconstitutional and discriminatory programs like the NYPD's surveillance program, which exploits the Islamophobic political climate. Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) programs and Building Community Resilience, the rebranded Minnesotan articulation of CVE program, are part of a larger initiative developed by the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (Strategic Implementation Plan, 2015). CVE programs are counterterrorism preventive measures that focus on community engagement and outreach to foster collective response to violent extremism. CVE programs' community outreach element directs communities to identify radicalized individuals, then stage "interventions" to prevent them from engaging in violent extremism (Building Community Resilience, 2015). However, law enforcement agencies remain central to the "communal" targeted-intervention model of CVE programs. Additionally, CVE programs do not provide any oversight or safeguarding measures to ensure that community outreach programs cannot be used for the surveillance of Muslims (Prince, 2015). Consequently, the possible discriminatory use of CVE programs in Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN raised concerns among Somali Muslims and civil right groups about the stigmatizing and marginalized impact CVE initiatives can have on the Somali community. With the potential for institutionalizing Islamophobia and racism, repressive effects CVE programs need to be examined. Much like the 1980s and 1990s moral panic around drugs, early articulations of the war on terror focused on direct action tactics such as waging wars, occupation, drone warfare, entrapment, extralegal confinement, detention, and torture. However, counterterrorism recently began shifting from direct action to soft-counterterrorism measures that attempt to address the

underlying causes of radicalization and domestic terrorism (Aziz 2014). Early national strategies to combat violent extremism focused on the possible ways communities can provide solutions through localized CVE initiatives that federal officials believed will foster better relationship between local police agencies and communities (The White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism, 2015).

While language in official documents detailing CVE strategy is careful, and politically neutral, CVE programs are facilitated and deployed within a political climate that is hostile, suspicious, and hyper-focused on Muslims' supposed criminality. Although CVE programs do not necessarily single out Muslims, community engagement dimension of CVE programs exclusively focuses on Muslim communities in the three pilot cities: Boston, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis. The White House's official CVE strategic plan did not include other types of domestic terrorism such as eco-terrorism, right-wing white terrorists, and anti-abortion violence. CVE propaganda materials— which ranges from online videos to funding community programming— often targets Muslims. For example, a Department of Homeland Security report stipulates the creation of a CVE grant program “to support comprehensive, community-based initiatives, in coordination with U.S. Attorney offices” (CVE Program Assessment, 2016, pg. 6). The report lists possible grants recipients and almost all listed organizations and programming initiatives target Muslims (CVE Program Assessment, 2016). During the aftermath of the Boston Marathon bombing, then Attorney General Eric Holder announced that CVE programs will be revamped to focus on the threats posed by Islamic terrorist organizations. The directive tasked local authorities in the three pilot cities to “develop[e] local CVE frameworks aimed chiefly at ISIS-related radicalization” (Vidino and Hughes, 2015, pg. 7).

The revamping of CVE strategy in the aftermath of the Boston Marathon bombing demonstrates that CVE initiatives operate within the larger impetus of counterterrorism and war on terror. From random TSA searches to the FBI's abuse of "voluntary" interviews, where regular conversations with FBI agents often turn into interrogation sessions, to the use of informants to infiltrate Muslim spaces, counter-terrorism initiatives have always been selectively enforced against Muslims (Aziz 2014). The color-blind approach to CVE efforts and the lofty language of strategic partnership with communities are utilized to mask the behavioral risk assessment and surveillance dimensions of CVE programs. The use of social services and community engagement is intended to reinstate the trust of the Muslim community, even at minimal levels, in law enforcement agencies, and normalizes the soft-surveillance and soft-counterterrorism elements of CVE programs. Therefore, CVE's targeted intervention approach must be situated within the larger context of suspect-less surveillance of Muslims in America. Subsequently, this chapter will examine the Twin Cities pilot CVE program to excavate the Islamophobia and Anti-Black rationale that underpins the function, deployment, and intent of CVE programs. The study explores how the Minnesota CVE pilot program becomes a surveillance apparatus, which builds on the existing infrastructure of public safety initiatives and intelligence-gathering tactics that local Minnesotan law enforcement agencies utilized to police and criminalize working class, Somali immigrants.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

While concerns over the unwarranted surveillance of the Somali community in the Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota area are intensifying with the recent election of Donald Trump, government surveillance has always been a challenge and reality that Somali immigrants faced daily. A central task of this literature review is to assemble and contextualize relevant scholarship on the Somali diaspora in the United States to understand the impact that race, class, religion, and immigration status has in shaping the Somali experience with state surveillance. The literature review will be informed by theoretical perspectives such as feminist theory, postcolonial theory, critical race theory and feminist approaches to surveillance studies, while attempting to historicize the Somali immigrant experience in the United States. Also, the literature review will analyze and examine relevant scholarship on Islamophobia, state surveillance, and race to explore what it means to be at the intersections of Blackness and Islam with regards to Somali immigrants. Due to the lack of substantial and relevant scholarship on the Somali immigrant experience and the Black Muslim experience in relation to Islamophobia, the literature review will supplement the gaps in scholarship by examining the ways in which Somalis are racialized as Black and as Muslims. Also, the literature review will contextualize the Somali experiences within the greater history of the Black American experience with Islamophobia and state surveillance.

The significance of this research has increased with the recent election of Donald Trump as president, which ushered an unprecedented rise in Islamophobic rhetoric and hate crimes against Muslims (Lichtblau, 2016). This project will contribute to the emerging field of surveillance studies, as well as bridge gaps that exist within the academic scholarship on Islamophobia and the Black Muslim experience. Numerous research efforts on the intersections

of Islamophobia and state surveillance have been undertaken, however, further research is need to examine how Blackness impacts experiences of surveillance and Islamophobia. Not only does my research attempts to bridge the gap that exists, but it also serves as a space to articulate a different narrative that counters the invisibility of Black Muslims in scholarship on Islamophobia and state surveillance. The literature review will survey scholarship on the history of Somali immigration to Minnesota as well as ethnographic and sociological studies on the lived experiences and material realities of Somali immigrants. This will allow me to map the socio-economic positionality of Somali immigrants and explore how they are impacted by Anti-Black racism and forms of institutionalized Islamophobia. Additionally, the literature review will assess scholarship on Islamophobia, especially discussions on the racialization of Muslims to interrogate how Blackness factors into the racialization of Black Muslims. Lastly, this literature review will provide a summary of scholarship on surveillance utilizing a feminist approach to surveillance studies to foreground the theoretical approach applied in this research.

Historicizing Somali Immigrant Experience in Minnesota

In July of 1960, two Somali territories— Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland— united to form the independent Republic of Somalia. The burgeoning post-colonial state would experience upheaval when the Somali army staged a military coup, killing the second Somali president, Abdirashid Ali Shermarke in 1969. Major General Siad Barre assumed power, establishing a military junta in Somalia for two decades. In 1989, the northern Somali opposition to Siad Barre’s regime intensified and culminated in a resurgence of armed resistance. For the next few years, Somalia would become increasingly divided and fractured across tribal lines, due to the use of tribalism by Barre to prolong the life of his autocracy. By January of 1991, the constant battling on multiple fronts debilitated the Somali army and

Barre's dictatorship dissipated in the quicksand of armed conflict. The fall of Barre's regime led to a political fiasco that inflicted more wounds on the country's fragile stability and ushered a new era of violence and conflict. Somalis fled the violence to neighboring nations or relocated to Europe and North America via refugee resettlement programs managed by the International Organization for Migration (Yusuf, 2013). The Somali civil war is the primary cause of the increased Somali migration to North America. Minnesota has become a vibrant hub during the third wave of Somali immigration to the United States (Alasow, 2004). Estimates indicate that between 20,000 and 70,000 Somali immigrants live in Minnesota, making the state the home for the largest Somali diaspora in the United States (Abdi, 2003). An accurate and updated population count of Somalis in the United States is unavailable. However, according to the Office of Refugee Resettlement, more than 100,000 Somali refugees have been resettled in the United States since 9/11, and almost 16,000 Somalis have resettled in Minnesota (Goodenough, 2016). Economic factors also contributed to the increased Somali presence in Minnesota. According to Abdulkadir Alasow (2004), the high demand for unskilled labor and availability of networks of social support and welfare made Minnesota an ideal place for Somali refugees to start a new chapter in their lives.

The Somali experience in the Midwest has been significantly impacted by the meatpacking industry and other forms of unskilled labor such as assembly line factory work (Alasow, 2004). The meatpacking industry has been vital to the vibrancy and strength of the Midwest's economy and ranked as one of the most important industries in terms of output, the number of workers, and manufacturing value (Warren, 2007; Arts, 2012). The meatpacking industry shaped the culture and population shift in the Midwest by attracting Latinos and African immigrants to relocate to the rural part of the Midwest (Alasow, 2004; Warren, 2007).

Many of meatpacking plants relocated to rural parts to the Midwest and Southern parts of the United States, making the industry reliant on immigrant labor. Somali immigration patterns were and still are heavily influenced by the demand for unskilled labor (Alasow, 2004; Haverluk and Trauman, 2008). Additionally, worker wages dictate the quality of life in communities where meatpacking factories dominate the job market (Warren, 2007).

Somalis began to relocate to the rural parts of Southern Minnesota and began to form isolated clusters of communities in mostly white towns and cities. The racial, religious, linguistic and cultural difference between white Americans and immigrants created racial tensions. For example, the surge of Somali immigrants in Minnesota pushed locals in the rural town of Owatonna, located in Southern Minnesota, to form a lobbying body that pressured Congress to decrease the numbers of documented immigrants admitted to the United States to the pre-1970 levels. The lobbying group also demanded stronger border-control policies to be implemented by Congress (Alasow, 2004). This exemplifies some of the disapproving responses to immigrants in Minnesota. Additionally, a Somali-owned business in St. Cloud, Minnesota, was vandalized in 2016 (Mahamud, 2016). A news article in City Pages decreed the city of St. Cloud, MN as one of the most hostile city to Somalis. The article recounts various examples of racism and xenophobia Somali immigrants experience. For example, plans to build a Mosque in St. Cloud incited a wave of racism and Islamophobia in the city where churches and veteran groups began hosting anti-immigration speakers and programming (Du, 2016).

These cultural, racial and religious tensions exacerbate the type of alienation experienced by Somali immigrants, who struggle to be integrated into the wider American labor force (Abdi, 2015). In her seminal book, *Elusive Jannah: The Somali Diaspora and a Borderless Muslim Identity*, Dr. Cawo Abdi (2015) presents a sociological analysis of the

Somali immigrant experience that is shaped by structural discrimination, systemic income inequality, and socio-cultural barriers. Abdi's research (2012) shows that Somali immigrant communities have been marred by poverty, the fracturing of the Somali familial structure through refugee relocation policies, spiritual alienation, and a sense of dislocation that is exacerbated by intense scrutiny from the federal government. International and federal refugee resettlement programs often prioritized women and children, which forces incoming Somali immigrants to redefine traditional roles of motherhood and femininity (Abdi, 2015).

International and American refugee resettlement programs often prioritize vulnerable groups such as children, women and female-headed households for assistance and support. As seen in the Syrian refugee crisis, refugee families opt to register as female-headed household, forcing male family members who are of age to register separately, thereby altering the structure of the refugee family (Turner, 2016). Not only does this place Somali families in difficult economic situations, but also creates an unusual gender arrangement that forces Somali families to be under the watchful eye of the American welfare regimes and law enforcement agencies (Abdi, 2014b/2015c). While the shift in normative gender structures of Somali refugee families might be subverting patriarchal dynamics of power relations, it also impacts the socioeconomic conditions of Somali refugees (Abdi, 2014).

Somali Immigrants: Conditions and Material Reality

In her essay "The Newest African-Americans? Somali Struggles for Belonging," Dr. Cawo Abdi (2012) argues that the lack of formal education and English language skills hindered Somali refugees' access to viable employment opportunities. Due to their refugee status, Somali immigrants automatically qualify for various types of federal and local assistance, which ranged from subsidized housing to cash assistance. While Somalis in social

welfare programs report a higher average income than other welfare recipients, obligations to support families left in conflict zones compromises the economic stability of the Somali households. The few limited economic opportunities afforded to Somali refugees, especially for female-headed households, necessitates a reliance on state and federal welfare support. Government assistance often supplements the income Somali refugee families earn from their low-wage, unskilled labor employment and provide some economic relief (Abdi, 2012a). Stretching an income that is already low has significant consequences for the refugee household in America. This cycle of work, public assistance, and financial remittances to families elsewhere diminishes the ability of individuals and families to save and execute long-term financial planning for Somali families. Many resorts to survival techniques that involve planning from month to month, placing them in a precarious socioeconomic position (Abdi, 2012). Somali refugees occupy a marginal economic position in the American society. Somali immigrants experience extreme poverty with 51 percent of Somalis living in poverty—four times the rate for African Americans. In contrast, 41 percent of Arab and South Asian Muslim families in America have an average income mean of \$50,000 (Abdi, 2012). The dependency of Somali immigrants on government assistance for survival makes the Somali immigrant community highly visible to state surveillance as the state retains uninterrupted access to Somali immigrants. Historically, poor Black women have been racially profiled and surveilled through welfare regimes that focus on possible criminal and fraudulent behavior of Black mothers. Law enforcement agencies often intimidate, police and surveil Black families on welfare assistance and assume unrestricted access, especially to Section 8 voucher holders and public housing residents, by engaging in warrantless searches of Black homes and investigating the intimate lives of Black women (Ocen, 2012). Welfare has been a site of surveillance of

Black motherhood. For example, welfare recipients' sensitive and private information such as income, immigration status, and criminal records are collected by welfare agencies and shared with various government agencies (Maki, 2011). This demonstrates that the racial and economic realities of Somalis exacerbate their vulnerability to state surveillance in the same way Black women are rendered susceptible to racial harassment and invasive monitoring vis-à-vis the welfare state.

As welfare programs become more reliant on surveillance and other punitive measures, connections between poverty and criminality deepen in the public imagination. The vulnerability of Somali immigrants to state surveillance cannot be accurately assessed without contextualizing the socially manufactured docility of Somalis in their racial, gendered, and economic background. Material conditions of Somali refugees in the United States are rooted in the legacy of Black oppression. In "Somali Social Justice Struggle in the US: A Historical Context," Jesse Mills (2008) contextualizes the Somali diasporic experience within the greater history of Black Americans. Mills argues that the Blackness of Somali immigrants coupled with their immigration status produces a distinct racialization experience that is rooted within the Black experience in America. The Somali immigrant experience is heavily impacted by the tangible reality of being racialized as Black. Somalis are more likely to live in poverty, be unemployed, lack access to adequate healthcare, and have higher rates of incarceration due to their Blackness (Abdi, 2012; Mills, 2012). An American Community Survey found Somalis have the highest poverty rate of all new immigrants, with 51 percent of Somalis live in poverty (Abdi, 2012). Burdened by their socioeconomic positionality, Somali immigrants rely on communal bonds to lessen the economic burdens they face, forcing Somalis to become involuntarily segregated by opting to form community clusters in low-income rental properties

and public housing facilities (Abdi, 2012). The social location of Somali immigrants in the American stratification systems is similar to that of African American communities, yet it is complicated by their immigration status and Muslim identity (Mills, 2012; Abdi, 2012a/ 2014b/ 2015c). The low socioeconomic status of Somalis is often used to advance a narrative that assumes Somali youth are naturally susceptible to radicalization and criminality (Sperber, 2015). Therefore, any analysis on the realities and material conditions of Somalis must be situated and contextualized within the condemnation of Blackness in the United States. For example, Somali immigrants are regulated via “dependence-making, and ethnocentric (often racist) life instruction by professionals, and the emergent chilling raids, detentions, and deportations that are billed as gang intervention and anti-terrorism” (Mills, 2012, p. 56). Such processes reflect eerily similarities to the ways the neoliberal, carceral state controls and regulates Black bodies (Wacquant, 2010). In *Punishing the Poor*, Loïc Wacquant (2010) demonstrates how welfare and penal systems, within the neoliberal state, converge in a systemic effort to punish and regulate poor, working class inner-cities communities. Wacquant engages with Bourdieu's concept of bureaucratic fields, or the splintering of state institutions that act in contradictory and competing ways. As welfare support and assistance for poor, working class communities declined, prisons expanded (Wacquant, 2010). Wacquant’s analysis of the carceral-assistential mesh illustrates how neoliberal governance resituates the disciplinary and regulatory measures within welfare and penal systems. This shift to penalizing the poor is exemplified by the ways refugee resettlement agencies and other refugee-centric programs targeting Somali immigrants reinforce punitive war on terror polices and often invites further scrutiny from law enforcement agencies (Mills, 2012). Additionally, fears around welfare fraud leads to further scrutiny and surveillance of Somali immigrants (Howson and

Damp, 2016). For example, suspicions that Somali immigrants attempt to defraud welfare services led to investigations that encouraged police officers to attend eligibility meetings for Somalis seeking public benefits (Howson and Damp, 2016). This demonstrates that the criminalization of Somali immigrants cannot be separated from the criminalization of the poor and how the demonization of the poor is vital to carrying out the punitive measures of the neoliberal carceral state. The connections made between poverty and Somali criminality often provides justification for the state to surveil and carefully monitor Somali immigrants while allowing the state to masquerade its surveillance mechanism as after school programs and recreational sporting activities. In her article for The Guardian, Amanda Sperber (2015) reports that Somali nonprofit organizations in Minneapolis, MN such as Ka Joog receive grants from Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) programs to provide recreational and after-school programs for Somali youth. However, many Somalis fear that CVE-funded programs have a covert surveillance component (Sperber, 2015). An essential part of assessing the vulnerability of Somali immigrants to state surveillance is determining the ways the material conditions of Somalis exposes them to the watchful eye of the state.

Racializing Islamophobia: All Muslims as Arab

Historically, religious identities were used to organize and categorize people within social hierarchies. For example, Europeans, who were Christian, deemed non-Christians as inferior. Medieval European notions of difference positioned Muslims as inferior and other. Additionally, Europeans inscribed religious difference on the body by insisting that true Christians were pure blooded to mark themselves as different from non-Christians and Christian converts (Selod and Embrick, 2013). Historicizing the racialization of Muslims reveals the historical and social process of marking Muslims as other. Scholars often center

their analysis of the racialization of Muslims on the intersections between Orientalism and Islamophobia (Arjana, 2015; Said, 1997). Such an approach, while useful, does not account for the ways Somalis are racialized and culturally othered as Black Muslims. The presence of Islam in America is often mischaracterized as alien and immigrant. Blackness and Islam are assumed to be mutually exclusive, entailing that the lived realities and conditions that characterize the Black experience are not interrogated when discussing Islam in the United States. In the west, Islam is consumed and understood through the prism of orientalism. In *Covering Islam*, Edward Said (1997) contends that “the misrepresentation and distortions committed in the portrayal of Islam argue neither a genuine desire to understand nor a willingness to listen and see what there is to listen to” (p. 5). As Moustafa Bayoumi (2016) contends in his seminal work *This Muslim American Life: Dispatches from the War on Terror*, that Islam has become a marker of racial difference, in which Arabs were deemed as foreigners. Religion determined the racial identity of Arab immigrants in early twentieth century as non-white, thereby designating Arab immigrants as unassimilable. The racialization of Islam is intimately linked to religious prejudices against Arabs and political anxieties around Islamic terrorism. Bayoumi (2016) argues that orientalism is deeply embedded in American cultural narratives and politics, both domestic and foreign. Racializing Islam exclusively through the lenses of orientalism imposed new racial meanings on the Muslim body, which often lies at intersections of diverging identities. Within the American public imagination, any visible signifiers of Islam will automatically render Muslims as foreigners and erases the diverse assemblies of identities within the Muslim community. Bayoumi’s analysis demonstrates how the cultural othering of Muslims through the prism of orientalism makes Islam incompatible

with other vectors of identities. Thus, erecting contradictions that positions Blackness, for example, as irreconcilable with Muslim-ness.

In “The Story of Islamophobia,” Junaid Rana (2007) traces the anxieties around Muslims to the Iberian Inquisition, which conflated religious affiliation of Muslims with racial and ethnic identities. In other words, the Spaniards’ hostility towards the Moorish Islamic Empire in Southern Spain racialized Muslims and lumped the existing diverse ethnic identities within the Islamic Empire in Andalusia as one. The racial construction of Muslims, in Andalusia, utilized religious and ethnic markers to delineate Muslims as “other.” In “Imagining the Moor in Medieval Portugal,” Josiah Blackmore (2006) states that: “Moor is alternately denotative and connotative, precise and imprecise, historically accurate and imaginatively construct [which] gave birth to mouro as a generic label” (pg.29). Although the racial politics produced by the Iberian Inquisition cannot be understood to be the same as modern conceptualizations of race, it provides a historical example of a racialized Muslim construct in medieval Europe. Additionally, the indiscriminate use of “mouro” to describe all Muslims in Andalusia mirrors what Bayoumi (2016) described as “racing religion,” or articulating cultural and racial othering through demonizing and demeaning Islam. In a post 9/11 American context, the racialized imagery of Muslims replaced culture with race, or the assumed biological and phenotypical differences amongst Muslims, as the vehicle to imagine and inscribe the inferiority of Muslims. As such, Islamophobia, as a form of racism, is a complex process of cultural othering wherein Islam or Muslim-ness is intimately tied with “brown” cultural politics, or orientalist stereotypes of people in the Middle East and South Asia. As Mehdi Semati (2010) argues in “Islamophobia, Culture and Race in the Age of Empire,” the category of “brown”— at the intersections of Islamophobia and “brown” cultural politics— transforms it

from an exotic other to signify terrorism and violence. Specific identities such as Arab, South Asian and even North African are replaced with a generic category of “brownness” (Semati, 2010). Tracing the emergence of Muslims as others enables us to understand Islamophobia as a continuous discursive process that situates existing racial hierarchies within the cultural othering of Muslims.

Moreover, the racialization of Muslims in the United States is heavily influenced by assimilation politics and the proximity of Arabs to Euro-American racial identities. Post 9/11 discussions about the rise in discriminatory practices towards Muslims became interlinked with the Arab American experience in the United States (Alsultany, 2012). The historical racial classification of Arabs as white motivated scholars to situate analysis on Arab identities within race scholarship to account for their experiences of Islamophobia (Bayoumi, 2016; Selod and Emrick, 2013). Arabs become increasingly rejected from whiteness as social and political anxieties around Muslims intensified (Selod and Emrick, 2013). However, Saher Selod and David Emrick (2013) argue that such scholarship often assume that Arab American identities are monolithic and overlook the complex arrangement of identities within “Arab-ness.”

“This application of racialization to Arab bodies should be questioned because it does not accurately reflect or represent all Arab experiences. It is important to clarify the specific factors, which result in an Arab population being stripped of privileges associated with whiteness and whether or not this universally impacts the entire Arab population.” (Selod and Emrick, 2013, pg. 7).

In other words, while some Arabs enjoy a close association with whiteness such as Syrians (Bayoumi, 2016), many Arab Americans occupy diverging intersectional identities,

which complicates their relation/proximity to whiteness. Religion is an important vector of identity that Arab Americans utilize to negotiate and situate themselves in relation to whiteness. For example, 73 percent of Arab Christians identify as white, while only 50 percent of Arab Muslims identify as white (Selod and Emrick, 2013). Additionally, Lebanese Shia Muslims indirectly embrace whiteness by emphasizing their “Americanness” to combat the historical stigmatization of Shias in Lebanon (Kusow, 2007). These examples demonstrate, not only the complexities of Arab American identity formation, but the impact of religion in the racialization of Arabs in the United States.

Frequently, scholarly analysis of the racialization of the Arab Muslims produces an approximation that links or associates the Arab and/or brown Muslim experience to the Black American experience (Elver, 2012). For example, law professor Khaled Beydoun (2016) states that “CVE policing suspicion of Somali-Americans is linked more closely to [sic] these ‘immigrant’ proxies to Muslim identity than it is Blackness, while anti-terror suspicion of indigenous Black Muslims is closely tied to conversion or political subversion” (pg. 290). In other words, Beydoun argues that the cultural othering of Somalis as Muslim forms the basis of surveilling and policing Somali Muslims vis-à-vis CVE programs. Beydoun reinforces the notion that Somalis are culturally distinct from Black Americans. Such notions often essentialize cultural and religious traditions of Somalis in a way that denotes a deviation in Somalis’ phenotypical expression of Blackness. In other words, the Blackness of Somalis is mitigated, and erased, through a homogenous understanding of Muslim-ness. Even though Beydoun acknowledges the distinct material reality Blackness imposes on Somali immigrants, Beydoun conceptualizes Somali immigrants’ experiences of Islamophobia through subjective cultural elements that does not account for the ways Anti-Black racism transforms and

complicates the experience, condition, and material realities of Islamophobia in the Somali immigrant experience. Being poor, working class immigrants exacerbate the vulnerability of Somalis to over-policing and state surveillance. Thereby, one of the central tasks I undertake in this research is to demonstrate how the socioeconomic realities of Somali immigrants intersect with structural forms of Anti-Black racism that enables the state to surveil Somali communities.

The consolidation of the religious identity of Muslims and ethnic identities, as discussed by Rana (2007), entails that Muslim bodies are racialized in orientalist terms that heavily rely on “brown” cultural politics. In her analysis of the Black Muslim experiences, law professor Hilal Elver posits immigrant Brown Muslims in opposition to Black Muslims by extenuating cultural difference to explain divergence in experiences of Islamophobia between the two communities. This stands in contrast to the earlier findings of Abdi (2014) and Mills (2012) wherein the racialization of Somali Muslims, who are immigrants as well, is heavily impacted by anti-Blackness. For example, Abdi (2015) showcases how Somali immigrants in the United Arab Emirates experience Islamophobia through being perceived as Arab, while Somali immigrants in the United States recognize the role their apparent Blackness plays in shaping and producing a diverging experience of Islamophobia. In an empirical study of Islamophobia, Steve Garner and Saher Selod (2014) argue that despite the diversity within Muslim communities, Muslims are homogenized and presented as monolithic. Their research attempts to complicate Muslim experiences of Islamophobia, especially in their discussion of the experiences of white Muslim converts, however, the scope of the project does not leave room to include an empirical analysis of the impact of Anti-Blackness in experiencing Islamophobia. Somali Muslims occupy intersections of diverging transnational, cultural, and racial identities, placing Somali diaspora in an isolating cultural space that strips Somalis of any sense of

belonging (Biglow, 2010). While academic scholarship indicates that Somali Muslims are racialized along ethnic and racial lines, analysis on the racialization of Somalis along religious lines remains underdeveloped. It is important to move beyond assumptions that Somali Muslims only experience Islamophobia as Muslim immigrants and examine the intersections of Black and Muslim identities, especially with regards to state surveillance.

Characterizing Islamophobia

Questioning the place of Muslims within the United States in the wake of 9/11 began as Islamophobia, or racism directed at Muslims or those who present as such, became more visible. John Esposito and Nathan Chapman Lean (2012) argue that Orientalist imagery of Islam serves as the basis for manufacturing fear and anxiety around Muslims. Esposito and Lean argue that despite the lack of statistical and material basis for Islamophobia, the fear of Muslims persists because of a “tight-knit and interconnected confederation of right-wing fear merchants.” (Esposito and Lean, 2012, pg. 10). The consensus of their book, *The Islamophobia Industry*, is that Islamophobia is nurtured and sustained by powerful political institutions and became a hallmark of American political rhetoric (Esposito and Lean, 2012).

While Esposito and Lean’s project is not contingent upon developing a stable definition of Islamophobia, it must be noted that the research question and methodical approach dictate the emerging definition of Islamophobia in academic scholarship. For example, due to the scope of their research. Esposito and Lean (2012) define Islamophobia as fear of Muslims, while Kambiz GhaneaBassiri (2013) considers Islamophobia a form of prejudice and symptom of violent media representations of Islam and Muslims. The attacks of 9/11 made Muslims become ultra-visible, continuously scrutinized, and marked as the number one enemy of the

United States (Rana, 2007). As Andrew Shryock (2010) argues in the introduction of *Islamophobia/Islamophilia*, “a careful assessment of contemporary geopolitics and deep historical relations between Muslim and non-Muslim societies” is a prerequisite to producing a nuanced and sophisticated understanding of Islamophobia (pg. 3). Consequently, limiting Islamophobia geographically to Europe and North American erases the transnational, globalized nature of Islamophobia. For example, theorizing of Islamophobia as the irrational fear of Muslims obscures the ways Muslim communities and countries are designated as a threat that must be neutralized (Shryock, 2010).

Additionally, limiting Islamophobia geographically obscures how Muslim nation-states utilize Islamophobia that is masked as anti-Islamist policies. Jonathan Brown (2016), the Alwaleed bin Talal Chair of Islamic Civilization at Georgetown University, argues that, on a global scale, “Islamism” often becomes the politically correct way to mark Muslims as terrorists. In Brown’s analysis, Islamism is often assumed to be transnational and universal, when Islamist movements emerge within and as a response to local political and social realities. For example, the Saudi government’s militarized response to armed conflicts in Yemen and Libya is a direct result of the emergence of Islamist groups in both countries. The militarized Saudi response was justified using the rhetoric and language of the war on terror, successfully evoking the stereotype of the dangerous, radical Muslim. Brown’s analysis proves the necessity of placing the global and local formations of anti-Muslim rhetoric and linking anti-Muslim practices and policies to overarching transnational and geopolitical structures. One cannot deny that local Muslim communities in the global south are impacted by 9/11 and the mobilization of the international community to eliminate the Muslim threat. For example, the Islamophobia Somali Muslims experience is often dictated by their geographical location (Abdi, 2015).

Therefore, any analysis of Islamophobia in the Somali-American immigrant experience must account for the ways the “Somali terrorist” archetype has been constructed through American foreign policy and the global war on terror. Global and local formations of anti-Muslim rhetoric must be linked to Islamophobic practices and policies emanating from domestic and transnational geopolitical structures. In other words, the Somali experience with Islamophobia cannot be properly assessed without accounting for the impact of war on terror on Somalis, both at home and abroad. While the supposed threat of Muslims did not directly create the American surveillance state, the United States’ war on terror and its Islamophobic policies galvanized and justified the expansion of the surveillance state (Murry, 2011).

Islamophobia and the Black Muslim Threat

Although the threat of the “Somali terrorist” has been a recent phenomenon, historicizing the assumed threat of the Black Muslims uncovers historical and political accounts that expose the ways Islamophobia and Anti-Blackness intersect. In “Common Heritage, Uncommon Fear,” Peter Gottschalk and Gabriel Greenberg (2013) trace the historical presence of Islamophobia in the United States and British India from 1687-1947. Gottschalk and Greenberg’s study indicates that the lack of recognizable Muslim presence in the United States allowed the threats of “Mahometan” to be transferred into the American imagination by the British panic over the 1857 Indian Revolt (Gottschalk and Greenberg, 2013). Similarly, Edward E. Curtis IV (2013) traces America’s fear and loathing of Islam to the resurgence of political Black Islam during the early periods of the twentieth century. Black Americans were attracted to Islam’s redeeming and humanizing qualities, making Islam a vehicle for inspirational progressive Black politics in the early parts of the twentieth century (Curtis 2013; Jackson, 2009). Much like Marcus Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement Association,

Muslim organizations like Moorish Science Temple, the Moslem Welfare Society and the Nation of Islam (NOI) incorporated Black Nationalism and religion to uplift and advanced Black communities. Such organizations empowered Black Americans through proclaiming cultural pride and emphasizing on economic and social development of Black communities (Curtis, 2013).

Edward Curtis, IV (2013), Professor of Religious Studies at Indiana University – Purdue University Indianapolis, dissects the anatomy of state-sanctioned Islamophobia directed at Black Muslims and grounds his analysis within the history of Black Muslims in America. Curtis (2013) argues that the federal government perceived The Nation of Islam (NOI) and Malcolm X as a threat to the republic with their Black Nationalist rhetoric, pan-Africanism, and anti-imperialist politics. The federal government began tracking and eliminating “foreign-inspired agitation among American Negroes” as Islam became intertwined with Black Nationalism and resistance (Curtis, 2013). There are clear connections between the demonization of Muslims, the emergence of blanket surveillance of Muslim subjects in America, and the rise of politically active Black Islam that rejects America’s racial apartheid (Curtis, 2013). Curtis’ “The Black Muslim Scare” provides a historical context that focuses on the Anti-Black basis of state-sanctioned Islamophobia and its impact on shaping the early configuration of the American surveillance state. By the 1930’s, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began to monitor and gather intelligence on Black Muslim organizations that were politically active in the larger project of Black liberation and resistance. Curtis (2013) argues that the rise of Islam among Black Americans at the turn of the twentieth century is essential to historicizing Islamophobia in the United States. The FBI poured enormous resources to combat the rise of Islam among Black Americans, while the federal government

labeled Islam as dangerous political ideology along with Black Nationalism and Marxism (Curtis, 2013). The scale of tracking and neutralizing the Black Muslim threat to the United States would not intensify until the end of War World II. With Edgar J. Hoover in charge of the FBI, the Federal Bureau of Investigation began its covert operation (nicknamed RACON), which involved full surveillance on all forms of Black dissent. The FBI associated Black Islam with foreign influences, particularly Marxist, anti-imperialist movements, and pro-Japanese sentiment, which were deemed as anti-American. The American surveillance apparatus would become especially fatal and potent in neutralizing dissent in the 1960s where Islamophobia would form an integral part of FBI's surveillance rationale and tactics. The FBI began a smear campaign against NOI, Black Nationalist organizations, and New Left groups, and utilized its counterintelligence program COINTELPRO to disrupt, misdirect and neutralize political activities of Black Muslim organization and civil rights groups.

In a way, Islamophobia became a state policy to deal with an imaginary Muslim threat that helped shape and manufacture America's anxieties around Islam (Curtis, 2013). The historical analysis of the state's response to the Black Islam reveals the historical presence of Islamophobia in the Black American Muslim experience. The historical entanglement between Anti-Blackness and Islamophobia validates the inquiries made by this research into the intersections of Islamophobia and Anti-Black racism in the Somali immigrant experience. Historicizing the paranoia around Islam exposes how Black Muslims have always been assumed to be a danger to national security. Curtis' nuanced analysis exposes the entanglements of Anti-Black racism with state-sanctioned Islamophobia and surveillance of Muslim subjects. The current paranoia and anxiety around Muslims reveal the persistence of historical trends of constructing Muslims as a viable danger to national security that must be

monitored and surveilled. This exposes the historical role of Anti-Blackness in producing and institutionalizing Islamophobia, which complicates analysis on the intersections of Islamophobia and Anti-Black racism in the Somali immigrant experience.

Theorizing on State Surveillance

Although the tracking and historicizing the formations of the American surveillance state are beyond the scope this literature review, tracing the transformation of the American surveillance state in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks is essential to understand how Somali Muslims' interactions with surveillance apparatuses are impacted by Islamophobia. In the context of this research, surveillance simply means the gathering of intelligence (e.g. personal, biometric information, etc.) whether that information was gathered by monitoring, harvesting from personal devices, electronic records or through CCTV. In the introduction to the edited collection of *Feminist Surveillance Studies*, Rachel Dubrofsky and Shoshana Magnet (2015) define surveillance as the notion of watching real people without their knowledge or consent. Dubrofsky and Magnet (2015) conceive of surveillance as a systemic mechanism wherein information is gathered to control, manage and manipulate subjects. Thus, state surveillance is not only a mechanism of social control but invested in producing submissive, docile bodies.

The threat of terrorism has forced the United States to reformulate the pathos surrounding national security and restructure its security policies and practices around its war on terror. The emerging formulation of national security is situated within existing ideologies of discipline and control that hinges upon the reproduction of docility and fortify the government's biopolitical powers (Murry, 2011). American officials exploited the surprise element of the September 11 attacks to downplay the United States' existing structures of

surveillance, while demanding that legal and bureaucratic purviews be eliminated to increase the state's capacity to detect and neutralize terrorist threats (Haggerty and Gazso, 2005). It is important to note that the United States had the ability to expand surveillance in the same trajectory scholars have observed in the past decade; however, the expansion of what Nancy Murry (2011) calls the "terrorism industrial complex" requires the normalization of surveillance through fostering a climate of coercive transparency. The pervasiveness of counter-terrorism climate links innocence and lack of guilt with becoming hyper-visible to the watchful eye of the state and consenting to become transparent (Hall, 2015). The reconfigured American surveillance apparatus produces a centralized form of surveillance that became increasingly integrated into the government's function. Thus, the American surveillance apparatus transforms into a decentralized, synchronized, and coordinate effort wherein multiple governmental agencies and organizations work to combine, integrate and deploy multifaceted systems of surveillance (Haggerty and Gazso, 2005, p. 185). The political approval for mass surveillance caused mechanisms of identity documentation to expand beyond birth registries, passports, and biometric data to include body and retinal scans, thermal imaging, and facial recognition technologies. Thus, the bureaucratic power of documentation gained the capacity to turn the body or subject of surveillance inside-out.

While violation of privacy is a valid concern in the age of mass surveillance, feminists have long argued that framing discussions of surveillance as a violation of privacy incapacitates any possibility of critical and intersectional analysis of surveillance. Privacy concerns often mask the hyper-focus of surveillance mechanisms to categorize bodies, and communities, as either normal or deviant, which results in a gendered and racialized vision of the surveilled

subject. As Dubrofsky and Magnet (2015) mention in the introduction to *Feminist Surveillance Studies*:

“state surveillance practices, which we might simply call state practices (since surveillance is so seamlessly embedded), are processes that are simultaneously about seeing and not- seeing—that is, some bodies are made invisible, while others are made hyper-visible. [...] whiteness is transparent—a racialization that does not require monitoring—whereas racialized bodies are opaque and therefore suspect.” (Dubrofsky and Magnet, 2015, pg. 7-8)

The visualization of the enemy within the American surveillance apparatus promoted the need to produce undetectable weaponry that can provide the American regime an expansive vision of the globe. Drones “appear to affirm the primacy of visual modalities of surveillance” as well as retaining the technological capacities to sort surveilled subjects into categories and proceed to neutralize subjects that are deemed suspicious or dangerous (Wall and Monahan, 2011, pg. 240). Optimizing the panoptical gaze, the indiscriminate deployment of drones exemplifies the brutal, dehumanizing dimension of Islamophobia. As Tyler Wall and Torin Monahan (2011) argue, the deployment of drones in civilian areas, borders, and other non-combatant settings facilitate the dehumanization and grouping of various people (e.g. armed fighters and civilians) as targets. The indiscernibility of drones enabled the United States to conduct covert military operations in Somalia and eliminate terrorist threats to the American national security. As of 2013, the Somali death toll of drone strikes is estimated to be between 58-170 victims— most of whom are innocent civilians (Boyle, 2013). The indiscriminate deployment of drone strikes amplifies the collective guilt of targeted victims, disabling any

ethical obligations to victims of drone strikes, and enabling the United States to target anyone and everyone with total impunity (Boyle, 2013).

After the 9/11 attacks, there has been a greater shift that pushed local and federal agencies to focus more on the collection of intelligence and prevention of terrorist attacks. The change generated financial support from the federal government to improve the intelligence-gathering capacities of federal and local law enforcement agencies (Dubal, 2015). Thus, local law enforcement agencies have become increasingly involved in state surveillance, which focuses on the political profiling of certain groups and concentrating on non-criminal “suspect behaviors” that do not specify a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity (Dubal, 2015). A powerful surveillance mechanism has been community outreach programs such as Counter Violent Extremism that are used as covert surveillance operations to collect data on Muslim communities (Shahabuddin, 2015). Deploying a feminist approach to surveillance will reveal the complex Islamophobic and Anti-Black contingencies CVE’s surveillance operates within to unmask the dangerous intersections of Anti-Blackness, Islamophobia, and surveillance in the Somali Muslim experience.

Conclusion

A feminist approach to surveillance studies entails that we recognize the state’s interest in controlling problem bodies— or those who do not fit into the norm of white, middle-class, able-bodied male— and the ways in which surveillance is a tool to maintain and protect the existing system of oppression and inequality. Also, how the prevailing systems of oppression render inequalities invisible and undetectable. However, systems of state surveillance make problem bodies, or those who need to be surveilled and controlled, visible while other bodies

become invisible; therefore, state surveillance often targets marginalized and disenfranchised groups (Dubrofsky & Magnet, 2015). Surveillance studies must extend beyond concerns over privacy, which obfuscate how systems of oppression and social inequality are reproduced vis-à-vis surveillance thereby limiting the depth and rigor of critical analysis on surveillance (Dubrofsky and Magnet, 2015). A feminist approach to surveillance is, by design and principle, intersectional, as surveillance is often integral to the function and deployment of systems of oppression (Dubrofsky and Magnet, 2015) given the efficacy of surveillance in controlling and disciplining entire communities as well as individuals (Ali, 2016). There is a pressing need to reframe the conversation on state-sanctioned surveillance against Muslim subjects that is inclusive of the Black Muslim experience. Utilizing an intersectional lens is key to producing nuanced analysis that can grapple with complexities the Somali immigrant experience. Legal and social resistance to state-sanctioned surveillance often centralizes “Muslim” identity categories as a precursor to political profiling. However, surveilling apparatus is a direct response to unwarranted fear and anxiety around Muslims; a nexus of racialized, gendered and classed perceptions that govern and influence official response. The literature review demonstrates the exposure of Somali immigrant to state surveillance and monitoring. The low socioeconomic position, reliance on state-funded social welfare services and the segregated nature of Somali communities in Minnesota compounds its vulnerability to state surveillance and limits its agency to resist measures such as CVE programs.

Chapter 3: Methodology

This thesis is particularly concerned with what Gary Marx (1984) calls “hidden and dirty data,” or information that has been kept secret at structural level, which reveals institutional failure, illegal behavior, and the miscarriage of justice and due process (pg. 79). The “dirty data” in question are records regarding a multi-agency initiative called Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) programs that are implemented in various Muslim communities across the country. CVE programs are designed to identify and prevent the radicalization of American Muslims by encouraging community members to categorize young people as potential terrorists (Brennan Center v. DHS & Department of Justice, 2016). Consequently, this study will undertake the task of assessing whether Anti-Black racism and Islamophobia are apparent in the development and deployment of Counter Violent Extremism programs. The objective of the research necessitates an active engagement with fragmented and extensive sets of information to produce a coherent illustration of the structure, function, and implication of CVE programs in the Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota area. I will be assembling fragmented data into an intelligible body of information utilizing rhetorical and literary analysis of the state documents to identify thematic trends and patterns in the “dirty data.” Different pieces of information will be gathered, analyzed and combined to reveal a complex and expansive illustration of CVE programs. Piecing disparaging, incomplete and redacted pieces of information from various declassified government documents is meant to bypass the structural and bureaucratic limitations imposed on my research by state agencies as well as the inability of researchers to develop a systemic approach to collect data using the Freedom of Information Act. The information is later re-assembled and contextualized within the theoretical framework

of this research to piece together and transform innocuous pieces of information into a nuanced and complex account on the nature of state surveillance vis-à-vis CVE programs.

Academics and researchers have longed petitioned and sued governmental agencies to obtain access to classified documents to resist the state's power to deny and restrict the disclosure of government documents (Yeager, 2012). State agencies are required to protect both dirty and clean data for multiple reasons that include: benign bureaucratic regulations, privacy protocols, and the cover-up of corruption and legal violations (Marx, 1984). Historically, state agencies that are invested in protecting "dirty data" either withhold information from the public or silence citizens who, otherwise, retain the right to free speech (Jaffer, 2010). Mixing various analytical methods in the research process is a creative solution to the lack of governmental transparency and the bureaucratic obstacles researchers face in obtaining classified records (Hameed and Monaghan, 2012). The development of flexible methodological strategies that adapt to the contentious and restricted access to governmental agencies will allow researchers to undermine and subvert the full bureaucratic process, which restricts access to state records and documents. "Dirty data" is an appropriate and productive site, for researchers, to interrogate existing inequalities and inform, not only the research itself but also broader social politics.

Methods

I began the research process by obtaining government documents about CVE programs from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Department of Homeland Security. The ACLU is a legal nonprofit organization that prides itself on being the guardians of American liberty (ACLU, 2016). The ACLU filed several lawsuits against the United States

under the Freedom of Information Act to access classified state documents about CVE programs. The ACLU published declassified CVE documents, obtained via FOIA, on its official website. Keyword searches such as “CVE program,” “CVE Minneapolis St. Paul,” and “CVE program Somali” were used to find relevant documents. Official records and press releases, such as the White House’s CVE Strategic Implementation Plan, that detail the strategy, intent, and function of CVE programs were obtained from the DHS official CVE Resource website. Additionally, articles and announcements about Minnesota’s CVE pilot program were acquired from the official web page of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Additional media content was included to assess Somali community’s response to CVE programs. I used news database LexisNexis to gather relevant news articles that reported on how the Somali community responded to the CVE pilot program in Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN. Keyword searches such as “CVE program,” “CVE Minneapolis St. Paul,” and “CVE program Somali” were used to find relevant news articles. Of all obtained documents, articles and media content, declassified FOAI documents about the Minneapolis-St. Paul CVE pilot programs and official CVE press releases from the DHS were prioritized. Supplementary FOIA documents such as intelligence reports, federally commissioned research reports, program assessment reports, and heavily redacted documents were examined as well.

The first round of analysis reviewed the official, declassified CVE documents, prioritizing documents focusing on Minnesota. Gathered data, from the initial review, was later used to create a description of CVE programs, which detailed official strategy of CVE programs, planning process, and implementation process, and expected outcomes. In the second round of review, supplementary FOIA and DHS documents were examined to construct a cohesive understanding of CVE program’s function and deployment beyond sanitized official

statements. For instance, supplementary documents revealed that CVE community intervention model was built on the Department of Justice's gang-intervention models— something that was absent from official press releases. Additionally, examining supplementary documents revealed the rationale that influences and informs CVE strategy. Research findings from the first two rounds of the review were coded and cataloged through developed categories of discursive and thematic trends, which were informed by the literature review. For example, the state's decision to focus its counterterrorism efforts on Somali youth was contextualized within the dominant narrative of Somalis as natural-born terrorists, which was born out of the global war on terrorism. The project's analysis on the impact and interconnectedness of Islamophobia and Anti-Black racism within CVE's soft surveillance expanded on literature review findings, while accounting for the material conditions and realities of Somali immigrants. Then, the results were analyzed and contextualized through established theoretical frameworks. For example, modeling of CVE's targeted-intervention program after gang-intervention models takes on a different meaning when placed in conversation with the finding of the literature review. Surveyed scholarship discussed how Somali immigrants are racialized as Black, which entails that analysis of CVE's targeted-intervention model must be contextualized within the history of over-policing Black communities. This reveals how the threat of the Black Muslim is constructed within the rationale and function of CVE programs.

Applying Jenny Sharpe's (1993) concept of truth effects, or the ability of discourse to reconstruct non-sustained truth into a reality, I will be reassembling diverging pieces of information to fill gaps that exist in scholarship and the collected data. For example, I will be building on existing scholarship on the criminalization of Black people and immigrants, which are often treated as two separate processes, to theorize on the criminalization of Somalis as

Black, Muslim immigrants. In her research, Sharpe notes how British colonialism discursively produced the construct of the dark-skinned Indian rapist as a response to the unexpected Mutiny Rebellion of 1857. According to Sharpe, the Mutiny Rebellion transformed the colonial stereotype of the “mild Hindu” into a savage rapist, despite the lack of evidence, to allow British colonial project to consolidate its authority and justifying its imperial project in the Indian subcontinent. The purpose of examining the discursive and thematic patterns of the obtained CVE related documents is to analyze how the social construction of the Muslim terrorist threat informs the function and deployment of CVE programs. As Jonathan Githens-Mazer (2012) argues in “The Rhetoric and Reality: Radicalization and Political Discourse,” the current discourse on radicalism “are based on an emotional response to the shock of 9/11 and the subsequent securitization of Islam” to explain Muslim’s inherent violent propensity against the West (pg. 557). Thus, Islam and Muslims have become synonymous with phrases such as terrorism, fundamentalism, radicalization, jihad, etc.

Jeffrey Monaghan’s (2014) study and analysis of Combating Violent Extremism Working Group (CVEWG), a network of eighteen governmental departments and agencies in Canada, concluded that such projects have an immense impact on the production of knowledge about Islam and radicalization. Such projects develop “discursive structures,” or frameworks or ideas that inform and dictates how individuals grasp and comprehend what radicalization entails. Those discursive structures underpin the practices of projects such as CVEWG that dedicate the tone and direction of radicalization discourse, and scholarship. Therefore, such projects utilize what Monaghan calls “security traps” where security experts and government officials use academic scholarship to construct possible threats to the safety of the nation to expand the power and reach of surveillance apparatus. Thus, by controlling the knowledge

production and dissemination of information surrounding national security, government officials can provoke fear by constructing an imaginary scheme as a tangible reality.

“[...] Security traps affirm the authority of security experts to define and manage the terrain of legitimate knowledge surrounding various sources of social threat(s) and unease, resulting in a narrowly constructed domain of freedoms whereby iterations of potential threat can only be understood and/or addressed through co-referent mechanisms of security.” (Monaghan, 2014, pg.19)

Deconstructing and contextualizing the documents obtained by the ACLU and Brennan Center will allow this research to assess whether security traps inform the function and practices of CVE programs. Also, examining the apparent discursive structures in the obtained documents can illuminate on the possible ways radicalization discourse and the war on terror intersects with Islamophobia and Anti-Black racism in the Somali Muslim experience with CVE programs. A cohesive critical analysis of the language and rationale of CVE programs will expose how Somali Muslims are perceived to be sources of radical extremism and viable threat to the United States' national security.

Positionality

Feminist research is inherently connected and materialized through feminist struggle. The political nature of feminist research enables it to challenge systems and structures of oppression by applying the findings of feminist research “in the service of promoting social change and social justice” for the marginalized and oppressed (Brooks, 2007, pg.4). As a feminist project, I emphasize the importance of interlinking epistemology, and methodology in informing how data is collected and analyzed (Brooks, 2007). Through feminist theory,

postcolonial theory, and the feminist principle of intersectional research and analysis, I will situate this research within the appropriate political, historical and social context, which interrogates the need for surveillance mechanisms such as CVE programs. Whereas feminist surveillance studies often focus on the capacity of surveillance technologies to regulate and control bodies and spaces, the theoretical frameworks stated above will enable this project to also interrogate power relation and social formations of inequality in relation to CVE programs. By accounting for histories of imperialism, colonization, patriarchy and Anti-Black racism, a coherent analysis of the possible Islamophobic and Anti-Black dimensions of CVE programs can be produced.

In her book *Decolonizing Methodologies*, Linda Tuhiwai Smith (1999) argues that feminist research must be situated within the realities of the oppressed and the marginalized. Additionally, indigenous and marginalized researchers must ground their academic work within specific historical, political and social contexts that form their intersectional identities (Smith, 1999). As a Black Somali immigrant, I am directly impacted by the formation of the American surveillance apparatus and the ongoing criminalization of Muslims in the War on Terror. While the lived experiences of communities subjugated to state surveillance vary based on factors of gender, race, class, ethnicity, immigration status, and sexuality, being a Black Muslim means that I am primarily concerned with the influence of Anti-Blackness in the state's surveillance practices against Black Muslim communities. With the systemic and continuous disregard for the Black Muslim experience, the lack of academic research on the intersections of Islamophobia and Anti-Blackness and the possible rise of a totalitarian American regime, this project has become is deeply personal and political. Feminists have long utilized positionality as an epistemological tool to critique and decenter positivist scientific assumption about

researcher's neutrality and objectivity (Tsantili and Topini, 2015). By asserting my position as a Black, Somali Muslim researcher, I am forcefully announcing that our struggles, as Black Muslims, cannot be ignored both by the academy and feminist activism. As Patricia Hill Collins (1990) argues in *Black Feminist Thought*, knowledge production is inherently linked to the gendered, racialized and classed position of individuals or groups. As such, this research is an attempt to create a space for the Black Muslim experience within the emerging discourse and research on surveillance (Hill Collins, 1986).

Chapter 4: Analysis

CVE in Minnesota: “Building Community Resilience”

Minnesota’s pilot CVE program, which began in 2015, retained the core vision, function, and strategy of the White House’s CVE strategic implementation plan. Official documents and narrative reuses the White House’s language and rhetoric, which stresses the importance of community outreach and developing localized targeted-intervention models. However, the Minnesotan CVE model distinguishes itself by expanding on existing community outreach programs to obtain the input of community members (Building Community Resilience, 2015). In the “Building Community Resilience” factsheet, which was presented at the White House CVE Summit in 2015, Minnesota officials provided an overview of the Minneapolis-St. Paul CVE pilot program (Building Community Resilience, 2015). They outlined the program's strategy and the development of a localized action plan to address homegrown Somali violent extremism. In the Building Community Resilience” factsheet, public officials singled out extremism trends within the Somali community as their primary concern and cited the increased number of radicalized Somali-American youth as the justification for the singular focus on Somalis. The factsheet also cited the well-being and safety of Somali communities as motivation to take an active stance against Minnesotan homegrown terrorism. Minnesota public officials revealed efforts such as the hiring of Somali law enforcement officers, participation in Community Advisory Committee meetings, and developing educational and recreational youth programs. The goals of these activities were to foster a community partnership between public safety agencies and the Somali community. BRC fact sheet specified that DHS, FBI, St. Paul Police Department, Minneapolis Police Department, and Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office will capitalize on their “long history of

effective community outreach [and] solid foundations of trust” with the Somali community to build and establish the pilot program (Building Community Resilience, 2015, pg. 1).

In the process of constructing CVE pilot programs in, law enforcement and the office of the U.S. Attorney began holding various meetings with a diverse coalition of Twin Cities Community members and leaders in early 2014. Religious leaders, mental health professionals, parents, youth leaders, and victims of recruitment were invited to CVE community meetings. Additionally, CVE partners in the Minneapolis-St. Paul school systems, nonprofit organizations serving the Somali community, interfaith organizations, and members of local government were invited to said meetings. The meetings focused on outlining the concerns of the Somali community and the causes of radicalization, as well as possible solutions to homegrown Somali extremism. According to public officials, an action plan was formulated based on the input collected from CVE community meetings. The officials created a partnership with community leaders to develop two intervention models that enable community members and leaders to identify and respond to early signs or stages of radicalization. Public officials emphasize the collective and communal dimension of Minneapolis-St. Paul’s CVE program, positing it as a cornerstone to combat terrorism (Building Community Resilience, 2015).

During the White House CVE Summit, public officials released “Building Community Resilience Minneapolis-St. Paul Pilot Program: A Community-led Local Framework,” a comprehensive report on BCR Factsheet that outlined the framework and strategy for the CVE pilot program. The “Building Community Resilience” report shared the findings of a stakeholders meeting with the Somali community and local partners, which were conducted in the early stages of planning Minnesota’s CVE strategy. Minnesota officials reviewed the available literature on radicalization while seeking the input of experts to identify root causes of

radicalization among Somali youth. They argued that “disaffected youth; a deepening disconnect between youth and religious leaders; internal identity crisis; community isolation; lack of opportunity—including high employment, lack of activities for youth, and few mentors” increase Somali youths’ vulnerability to violent extremism (Building Community Resilience, 2015, pg. 3). What is clear from the BCR factsheet is that “strategic partnerships” with various community organizations and leaders are an essential component of CVE programs. The “strategic partnership” will give the state access to spaces that might have been beyond the reach of federal and local law enforcement agencies. This increases the risk of CVE programs becoming sites of surveillance and intelligence-gathering. While the impact of CVE pilot program on Somali Muslims is yet to be determined, the incorporation of community organization and services into the CVE enterprise might exacerbate social and economic inequalities Somali immigrants face in Minnesota. As demonstrated by this chapter, combating a non-existing threat of Somali terrorism diverts valuable efforts and resources away from addressing disparities in Somali Muslims’ socioeconomic condition, while stigmatizing and criminalizing the community.

The Urban Terrorist: Merging Counterterrorism and Anti-Gang Policing

The existing anti-radicalization models used by CVE programs are built on anti-gang initiatives developed within the St. Paul – Minneapolis community that reinforce the criminalization of Somalis. This strategy is demonstrated by declassified documents that directly compare urban gang activity to the process of terrorist radicalization. Among the documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the ACLU published a thesis completed by Jeffery Jones (2010) at the Naval Postgraduate School that focuses on best practices to circumvent Al-Shabaab’s recruitment of Somali youth. Al-Shabaab successfully

recruited numerous Somali-Americans after an aggressive recruitment campaign that capitalized on intense Somali nationalist rhetoric, which emerged during the Ethiopian occupation of Somalia in 2006 (CREATE, 2016). Jones' thesis was classified by the DHS as an intelligence and analysis report that might have been used to inform the strategies and approaches the United States took to implementing CVE agenda and programming. The inclusion of Jones' research in the declassified documents regarding CVE programs exemplifies the growing shift within national security scholarship to utilize existing models of community-oriented solutions to address criminal behavior. The White House Summit on CVE programs, the "Building Community Resilience" report and the first official CVE strategy "Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States," all revolve around the idea of targeted-prevention, or focusing on individuals on the path of radicalization. The reliance on existing anti-gang models provides a cheap alternative for law makers, federal and, local law enforcement agencies since existing scholarship and polices are repurposed to inform future counter violent extremism policies and programs.

In "Countering Islamic radicalization and Al-Shabaab Recruitment Within the Ethnic Somali Population of the United States," Jones states that his thesis is concerned with the threat radicalized Somali youth pose to American national security. Jones (2010) argues that within homegrown Somali extremism, "many of the causative socioeconomic factors are nearly identical to those at the root of the decades-old problem of youth gang formation in the United States" (Jones, 2010, pg. 3). Jones (2010) builds on erroneous assumptions that gang involvement and terrorism involvement occur within similar processes to extrapolate best CVE practices from public safety strategies that address gang recruitment and violence. In popular research and scholarship, radicalization is often presented as a mutated renovation of gang

recruitment, and this framing is becoming increasingly popular due to the increased involvement of teenagers and young adults in extremist activities (Vidino and Hughes, 2015). The perceived similarities between gangs and terrorist organizations, regarding recruitment and engagement, nourishes the fallacy that examining radicalization utilizing youth gang research methods and theory can yield an informative analysis on radicalization and violent extremism. Gangs are formed on a continuum— some are hierarchical and highly organized, while other gang formations are chaotic and disorderly— and understanding the various organization structure of gangs is important (Borum, 2011). Decker and Pyrooz contend that the organizational structure for organized crime groups, which includes terrorist groups and human trafficking rings, are less hierarchal and more horizontality structured, while street gangs are less formal with fluid structure (Borum, 2011). However, research on radicalization into violent extremism lacks the conceptual and theoretical clarity that can accurately differentiate between structure and hierarchies of gangs and terrorist organizations. For example, youth gangs’ structural models are assumed to follow traditional structural hierarchies, while terrorist groups are deemed as “networked” (Borum, 2011). Nonetheless, researchers habitually label both street gangs and terrorist groups as networked without accounting for the extent of how gangs and terrorist organizations are structured and arranged (Shapiro, 2005).

Moreover, the theoretical application of criminology and youth gang formation to understand violent extremism is inappropriate as it fails to account for nuances and difference in hierarchies, structures, and assembling of terrorist organization. Additionally, criminology does not account for the social and political context in which terrorism emerges from. In “The Geometry of Terrorism,” Donald Black (2004) argues that terrorism is a collective, morally inspired crime that is conceived as a social response to address and handle grievances. Black’s

approach to theorizing about the evolution of radicalization into violent extremism relies on sociological methodology and theories of social control. Terrorist organizations are well organized covert collectives that practice guerilla warfare (e.g. launching attacks from hideouts). Classifying the formation, structure, and practices of terrorist organizations as similar to street and drug gangs “obscures its sociological identity and obstructs its scientific understanding” (Black, 2004, pg. 17). The convergence of national defense agendas and international security gives rise to this specific strain of research. Due to the moral panic after the attacks of September 11, Politicians, military leaders and security experts emphasized the globalization of crime and terrorism to encourage collaboration between nation states. However, the assumed globalization of crime and terrorism obliterates distinctions between various constellations of criminal and extremist activity (Bigo, 2006). Moreover, the lack of clarity in theoretical tools and methodologies used to understand radicalization— as well as concepts such as extremism and terrorism— is compounded by the ambiguity of the concept of radicalization itself. There is no consensus on the meaning of radicalization and definitions are produced based on perceived political ideology and social context in which radicalization occurs. There are multiple definitions of radicalization, ranging from the religious movements towards extremism to the process of acquiring radical beliefs, to the movement away from mainstream society. As Numann argues, radicalization can only be understood within the context of what constitutes “normal” or “mainstream” in each political and economic context (Numann, 2013, pg. 875). Within the United States, radicalization is exclusively understood as acquiring radical, Islamic beliefs and said radicalization is often assumed to result in violence (Numann, 2013).

The discrepancies in the use of criminology to understand violent extremism begs the question of why do CVE programs utilize gang formation theory to understand the radicalization of Somali Muslim youth in Minneapolis-St. Paul? First, I would argue that the use of gang intervention model is both strategic and cost-effective for federal law enforcement agencies. Due to the complexities and variable nature of radicalization— as a social phenomenon— large, nationally-scaled preventative programs are costly and ineffective. As a result, the individualized nature of anti-gang intervention models provided a cost-effective alternative, which enables law enforcement agencies to measure the success of CVE initiatives, whatever the definition of success may be. Additionally, relying on criminology enables local and federal law enforcement agencies to position CVE initiatives as public safety measures. Using “safeguarding” language, officials reframe radicalization as an issue akin to gang recruitment, drug use and pedophilia, which encourages community members to take on the onus of monitoring and reporting vulnerable and at-risk youth. Presenting counter extremism propaganda as comprehensive, multi-pronged solutions to radicalization establishes a level of credibility with the targeted community. By creating unfounded links between radicalization and socio-economic problems (Aldrich, 2012) faced by Muslim communities, state officials and law enforcement agencies normalize the overt infiltration of state agents and informants in, almost, every aspect of Muslim Americans daily lives. With the lack of definite and factual profiles of radicalization, communities are encouraged to report any, and all, perceived changes in individuals, inciting the racial profiling and suspicion of Muslims. Reconstructing CVE framework within existing “public safety” strategies of law-and-order policing and stringent anti-gang protocols broadens the span and scope of CVE’s surveillance apparatus.

The lack of cohesive and scientifically accurate research on radicalization (Neumann and Kleinmann, 2013) expedited the adoption of anti-gang policing models for domestic counterterrorism policies and practices. Interestingly, anti-gang policing, which emerged from the 1980's and 1990's war on drugs, lacked a stable and cohesive definition of what constitutes a "gang" (Rosich, 2007). In the absence of a tangible definition of "gang," anti-gang policing initiatives profiled large numbers of young men and women of color as suspecting gang members without merit or proof. The American Sociological Association's report on the American criminal justice system revealed that by 1992, "almost half of all Black men ages 21 to 24 in Los Angeles county were identified [...] as 'gang' members, and in Denver, Black young men between ages 12 and 24, who were 5 percent of the city's population, made up 57 percent of the police department's list of suspected 'gang' members" (Rosich, 2007, pg. 7). Policing practices associated with the "war on drugs" led to discriminatory and targeted forms of policing against Black communities in the United States (Bass, 2001; Burnson, 2007; Brunson and Miller, 2006). The emergence of the neoliberal carceral state entails that poor Black communities are increasingly managed and governed as criminals (Wacquant, 2010) and subjugated to aggressive Anti-Black forms of policing and surveillance (Rosich, 2007). As such, adopting theories and practices of anti-gang policing into counterterrorism programs and practices targeting the Somali community in the Twin Cities, who are already over-policed (Abdi, 2012), raises concerns around racial profiling and criminalization of Somali Muslims. Given that law-and-order policing informs the ways in which Black criminality is reinforced and inscribed on Black communities, institutionalizing Anti-Black forms policing, such as anti-gang initiative, within the function and deployment of CVE programs demonstrates how the criminalization of Somalis is at the heart of domestic counterterrorism efforts in Minnesota.

CVE propaganda and literature correlates the poverty of Somalis to their susceptibility to radicalization (Jones, 2010; CREATE, 2016). For example, Jones (2010) argues that poverty and the presence of gangs in Somali neighborhoods cause Somali youth to be more susceptible to radical extremism. Jones' statement recycles mainstream discourse on gang prevention, which often explains criminal behavior as personal pathology born out of poverty and depravity. "Culture of poverty" is an example of dog-whistle politics, or racially coded political messages, which posits the defectiveness of culture, ethnicity, and nationality as the origin of criminal behavior (Mills, 2008). Fear and anxieties surrounding the criminality and violent radicalism of Somalis dictate how law enforcement agencies police within and around Somali communities. The scripts of criminalizing Somali youth are pre-existing within racial stereotypes that interlink Black masculinities with criminality and violence. Synonymizing Blackness and criminality provides justification for discriminatory targeting and policing of Black men in the United States. For example, Jesse Mills (2008) details the moral panic of the San Diego Police Department around recently formed Somali gangs with "full blown criminal enterprises," which, supposedly resulted in "spikes in certain crime" (pg. 73). The two newly formed Somali gangs in the suburbs of San Diego had less than twenty members in a city of 15,000 people (Mills, 2008). Similarly, Somali teenagers in Minnesota reported numerous experiences of racial profiling, discrimination, and Islamophobia by law enforcement officials and teachers (Bigelow, 2008). The racialization of Somalis as Black in conjunction with the portrayal of Muslims as barbaric, violent extremists compounds the marginalization of Somali youth.

The merger between anti-gang policing and counterterrorism in the rationale, function and deployment of CVE programs in Minnesota demonstrates how Islamophobic rhetoric

around Somali Muslims is passed over and imposed through existing infrastructures of law-and-order policing that criminalizes Black communities. Somali terrorism is closely linked with pathological assumptions about Black criminality as rhetoric that racializes and criminalizes poverty is increasingly used to inform domestic counterterrorism practices and policies. In “Disclaimed or Reclaimed? Muslim Refugee Youth and Belonging in the Age of Hyperbolisation,” Dr. Cawo Abdi (2015), an Assistant Professor at the University of Minnesota, reports examples of police brutality, violence, and abuse against Somali youth in Minneapolis-St. Paul area. A social worker recounts how Twin Cities law enforcement officers, for example, created an unofficial database— a Black binder— of supposed Somali gang members by taking random photos of Somali youth in their neighborhoods. The “Black binder” policy, according to the Twin Cities Daily Planet, transformed into a gang database, where “documented” gang members are included indefinitely. Some of the Black binder’s problematic inclusion criteria were: being photographed with “known” gang members, hanging out with “known” gang members and using gang-related symbols and hand signals (Charles Hallman, 2009). The generic and subjective gang database inclusion criteria mirrors the AMICOP’s absurd method of identifying “radicalized” Somali youth through including individuals who refused or failed to participate in AMICOP’s Police Athletic League or other YWCA sponsored programs and individual who declined to cooperate with police requests and entrapment schemes (Prince, 2015). The AMICOP’s database, SPPD’s gang database and Minneapolis PD’s informal “Black binder” were possibly incorporated within CVE’s surveillance apparatus. Law enforcement agencies’ anti-gang and counterterrorism modes of policing targeted, criminalized and racially profiled Somali immigrants, while obscuring its intrusive surveillance and intelligence-gathering practices. The suspect-less, Islamophobic targeting of Somali

Muslims through counterterrorism initiatives impersonates forms of racialized policing Somali Muslims have historically experienced in the Twin Cities and further demonizes Somali immigrants. Building on a decade-long ethnographic study of Somali communities, both in the Minneapolis-St. Paul and internationally, Dr. Caw Abdi (2015) traces public debates about immigrants and radicalization with regards to the Somali diaspora. Examining the impact of gang-related violence on Somali men, Abdi argues that radicalization discourse not only criminalizes Somali youth but normalizes the notion that violence is intrinsic to Somali communities. Somali Muslims are pathologized through radicalization discourse that evokes images of Black criminality and posits the Somali community as inherently criminogenic and violent. Portraying Somali youth as prone to criminal behavior and violence provides the necessary justification to over-police, monitor and surveil Somali Muslims via CVE programs.

In documents obtained by the Brennan Center through FOIA, the Saint Paul Police Department's Somali outreach program, which focused on combating gang activity, underwent a major transformation. Through a two-year grant, SPPD's community outreach program expanded to focus on the radicalization of Somali youth alongside its gang prevention programs. Thus, the Somali community outreach program was expanded and rebranded as African Immigrant Muslim Coordinated Outreach Program or AMICOP. Official statements regarding SPPD's community outreach program presented the initiative as a continuum of the department's effort to combat violent crime and gang activity. However, AMICOP's program narrative stipulates that the "radicalization of 20 youth from [the Minneapolis/St. Paul] area who have left for Somali[a] to fight for the terrorist organization al Shabaab" must be a primary concern for the program (Prince, 2015, pg. 5). AMICOP was also used to develop a database to track at-risk Somali youth and allow law enforcement agencies to intervene directly. AMICOP

touted a strict zero-tolerance policing where officers are encouraged to crackdown, surveil, investigate, and interrogate at-risk Somali youth.

Additionally, the St. Paul Police Department submitted a 2007-2009 grant proposal to target crime, gun violence, and gang activity. In the grant proposal, SPPD declare that the department will be “Using established criteria that will stand up to public and legal scrutiny, the SPPD will establish a list that identifies the BADDEST of the BUNCH (BOB) . . . to implement an automated ‘flagging’ system” to track and document Somali gang members (Prince, 2015, pg. 6). As this report demonstrates, the criminalization and targeted law-and-order policing of Somali youth in the Twin Cities area has been a salient and constant in the Somali Muslim experiences before the emergence of CVE enterprise. Therefore, expanding the law-and-order policing of Somalis in the Twin Cities to encompass counterterrorism intelligence-gathering exemplifies the entanglement of Anti-Black racism and Islamophobia in the Somali immigrant experience. Intrusive, illegal intelligence-gathering practices embedded in the criminalization and policing of Somali youth via anti-gang programs functioned as the foundational blueprint for CVE’s surveillance apparatus.

The merging of anti-gang initiatives and anti-radicalization strategies both rely on moral panic around the Black Muslim threat to the United States. The criminality of Somalis is constructed through exaggerated racialized, Anti-Black and Islamophobic stereotyping, evoking the trope of the violent, irrational Somali terrorist. In “From Starving Child to Rebel-Pirate: The West’s New Imagery of a ‘Failed’ Somalia,” Aman Sium (2012), from the University of Toronto, argues that failed states narratives are discursive categories that inscribe inferiority on bodies and communities of African countries by arguing that race determines which political communities can successfully govern themselves. Failed state narratives

associate Black nation-states with chaos, authoritarianism, economic disorganization, while white nation-states are associated with fiscal responsibility, democracy, economic stability, and wealth. Thus, failed state etches the inferiority and savagery of Black folk, implying that African nations are incapable of self-governance. The Blackness of Somalis produces enduring suspension and panic around the “Somali terrorist/criminal figure” (Sium, 2012). Failed state logic necessitates that democratic, stable governments must intervene and facilitate the transformation of failed state into civilized, modern nation-state. CVE enterprise evokes the threat of the “Somali terrorist/criminal figure” by transporting and inscribed the qualities associated with the nation-state of Somalia— such as chaos, instability, and violence— to its citizens.

The AMICOP documents reveal how anti-gang policing practice such as identifying and documenting “known” gang members converges with counterterrorism surveillance practices. Moreover, the expansion of anti-gang Somali community outreach programs to policing violent extremism accentuate the intersections of Islamophobia and Anti-Blackness in the Somali immigrant experience. The moral panic around Black criminality, Islamic radicalism, and the outlaw foreigner abated the convergence of Anti-Black policing and Islamophobic reconnaissance. This early articulation of CVE-esque intelligence-gathering in AMICOP expose the decentralized, networked nodes of the American surveillance apparatus and how clandestine Islamophobic, xenophobic and Anti-Black operations are consolidated within the perimeters of the neoliberal carceral state. While it is unknown if local law enforcement conducted counterterrorism surveillance before 2007, the merging of local and federal surveillance enterprise signifies a shift in the (in)visibility of Somalis’ racial and religious identities.

Prefacing Soft Surveillance

The concept of “soft surveillance” is often used to describe the coercive forms of volunteerism within the national security apparatus that compel individuals to reveal personal information to guarantee or protect their welfare. This section will examine the soft surveillance dimension of CVE pilot program in the Twin Cities. The analysis will focus on the existing intersections between soft surveillance and community policing within CVE’s community outreach initiatives that grant the state adequate access to surveil targeted communities while encouraging community members to perform the labor of surveillance. Gary Marx (2005) argues that “soft” is facilitated through tactics such as: “persuasion to gain voluntary compliance, universality or at least increased inclusiveness, and emphasis on the needs of the community [over] the rights of the individual” (pg. 1). As a mechanism of social control, soft surveillance is presented as a harmless and innocuous act, while valorizing individual choice by rewarding and/or praising those who voluntarily share personal information. A Muslim traveler might volunteer to undergo invasive illegal TSA security measures to be perceived as a good citizen, while a suspect in a crime might voluntarily provide authorities with a biometric sample (e.g., DNA) to obtain the benefits of cooperating. Although Marx situates the potency and impact of soft-surveillance mostly within corporations that collect and use personally identifiable information of its customers and/or users, governments are increasingly utilizing soft-surveillance mechanisms that engineer people’s decisions to produce compliant behavior (Kerr et. al, 2006).

Compliance is often interlinked with the notion of good citizenship where individuals volunteer to share and allow law enforcement agencies— both physically and virtually— into their private lives. In other words, good citizenship hinges upon transparency and the

continuous supply of private information to the state in the form of an open-sourced alibi. A good citizen would volunteer to be under the watchful eye of the state as a marker of good will and innocence. Soft surveillance is driven by the notion that innocent individuals have nothing to hide and thus should forgo the right to privacy (Marx, 2005). The work of CVE surveillance is, thus, democratized and bureaucratized by requesting community leaders, teachers, counselors, families, and friends to spot, identify and report radicalized and at-risk Somali youth. Furthermore, CVE strategies cement soft surveillance by exploiting the socioeconomic vulnerabilities, and the minimal access of poor communities to adequate social and support services.

The Soft Surveillance of Community Outreach

Reframing social malaise and disparities faced by Somali Muslims as causes of radicalization and violent extremism serves to encourage community members and strategic partners to co-opt themselves into performing the labor of surveillance. The Minneapolis CVE framework utilizes a community intervention model that creates a class of “community volunteers” who work directly with Somali youth to prevent radicalization (Building Community Reliance, 2015). CVE strategies normalize soft surveillance through community outreach programs that encourage community members to disclose information about other individuals to law enforcement agencies. In other words, community members, teachers, counselors, social workers, and religious leaders effectively become informal informants who are tasked with surveilling and monitoring Somali immigrants.

A leaked classified National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) document revealed a rating system, created by the agency, that encourages law enforcement agents, teachers,

counselors, coaches, healthcare providers and social service employees to evaluate the vulnerability of any given Muslim to violent extremism. Titled: “Countering Violent Extremism: A Guide for Practitioners and Analysts,” the document encourages law enforcement agencies and community members to focus on individual behaviors to rate “risk and resilience factors” (CVE Guide for Practitioners, pg. 18, 2014). A similar pattern appeared when the Minneapolis Public Schools, one the strategic partners of the CVE pilot in Minnesota, was tasked with identify “at risk” Somali students attending public schools. Kourtney Kiernat, the Executive Director of External Partnerships and Institutional Advancement at Minneapolis Public Schools, announced that the city’s public schools would begin a CVE initiative to monitor Somali youth during lunch break, in non-class environments and after-school programs (C-SPAN, 2015). According to the Minneapolis Public Schools representative, local schools trained “youth workers” from the community to monitor and spot potentially disaffected Somali youth in places like the lunchroom, the classroom, and after school programs. This, naturally, deepened the Somali community’s suspicion and anxiety around increased state surveillance of Somali youth. The turn to surveil Somali youth demonstrates how the criminalization of Somalis is deeply ingrained in public discourse and policy. The achievement gap for Somali students in Minneapolis Public Schools is increasing as the school district fails to meet the specific needs of Somali students. For example, the Minneapolis school district cut funding for afterschool programs, which provided Somali students with additional tutoring and academic support. Thus, only 11 percent of Somali students in the district met Minnesota’s achievement standards (amatos122, 2014). Implicating Minneapolis Public Schools, a somewhat segregated school district (Abdi, 2015), within the CVE’s surveillance apparatus exposes the breadth of soft surveillance vis-à-vis community engagement. Additionally, this

reveals how structural and discursive forms of oppression intersect to further criminalize and alienate Somali Muslims, especially in the ways socioeconomic realities of being poor, Black, inner-city residents, harsh policing and counterterrorism initiatives converge to produce a distinct, yet all too familiar, experience of discrimination and othering.

The Minneapolis Public Schools CVE initiative is based on the same premise as the NCTC risk assessment rating system, as well the general CVE strategy. Normal expressions of teenage angst such as low self-esteem, hostility, and alienation are assumed to be indicators of Somali youth's vulnerability to violent extremism. For example, while Minneapolis Public Schools workers will attempt to spot identity issues and dissatisfaction, the NCTC monitors behaviors such as hopelessness, economic stress, and sense of victimization. In the same vein, a low score obtained by an individual or a family indicates a vulnerability to violent extremism and an intervention strategy is formulated based on an aggregated assessment of risk (CVE Guide for Practitioners, 2014). Even though academic scholarship and research specify that risk of radicalization cannot be predicted since radicalization is not a linear process (Patel and German, 2015), the insistence of government agencies on utilizing baseless measurements for radicalization reinforces the criminalization and the need for suspicion-less surveillance of Somali Muslims. The Minneapolis Public Schools partnership with the CVE enterprise is a testament not only to the ways the labor of surveillance has been diversified but on how soft-surveillance is essential to CVE's intent, function, and deployment. No longer does the state need to deploy its own labor force to surveil mosques, covertly infiltrate Muslim spaces, target Muslims or entrap them through informant-led terrorist plots. Similar to the way drones bureaucratized political assassination and murder, enmeshing public school boards, civic organizations, and social services providers expands circuits of surveillance and intelligence-

gathering while breaching defensive measures placed by the Somali community to evade the watchful eye of the state. For example, Somali immigrants often avoid programs, organizations and individuals they suspect to be involved in state-sanctioned intelligence-gathering schemes. When the FBI recognized the leadership efforts of a known Somali nonprofit organization, Ka Joog, the Somali community became increasingly suspicious of possible surveillance and tracking of Somali students via the organization's free after-school programs (Sazawal, 2016).

The function and implementation of the CVE pilot program in Minneapolis-St. Paul area follows a typical criminal justice approach to policing that uses an inverted model of community policing where the labor of policing and monitoring possible criminal activities are delegated to members of the community. Traditional models of community policing are designed, in theory, to empower marginalized people to communicate with law enforcement agencies about problems facing their communities (Aziz, 2014). In "Policing Terrorists in the Community," Sahar Aziz (2014), Professor of Law at Texas A&M University, points out that CVE programs are defined differently by the state depending on the audience while the state rebrands invasive and unconstitutional counter-radicalization dimension of CVE programs as community engagement. For example, the Brennan Center obtained documents that demonstrated that the FBI directed its field office in Minneapolis, in 2009, to use community outreach programs directed at Somali immigrants for surveillance and intelligence gathering purposes (Prince, 2015). Although the Minneapolis FBI field office resisted the order, anxieties persist among Somalis even with the U.S. attorney signing a memorandum in 2012 assuring Somali Muslims that the FBI will not use community outreach programs for surveillance and intelligence-gathering (Sazawal, 2016). The promise is belied by intelligence documents that suggest that CVE programs intentionally utilize community outreach programs for this purpose.

The heavily redacted intelligence and analysis assessment “Empowering Somali [redacted] Key for Countering Youth Radicalization and Their Travel Abroad for Terrorism” (2015), outlines how federal and local law enforcement agencies increasingly outsource counterterrorism obligations to community leaders, teachers, and social service workers, while holding various kinds of interventions in private and communal spaces that are designated as “pre-criminal.” In March of 2015, officials, in conjunction with religious leaders and social service administrators, “sought to engage [redacted] who may be targeted by violent extremists in the “pre-criminal space” to help these youths before they cross the line into significant terrorism-related activities (Empowering Somali [redacted], 2015, pg. 7)”. Additionally, the report contends that NGOs should provide “non-punitive” intervention services to Somali Muslims so they can resist violent extremism. For example, a hotline was established in April of 2014 with a “Somali language counseling services, to provide [redacted] an alternative to informing the [redacted], which most are reluctant to do [redacted]. There are hotlines in [redacted] to field calls from seeking advice, counseling, referrals, and other services to address potentially radicalizing [redacted]” (Empowering Somali [redacted], 2015, pg. 7). The assessment report provided an example of a private organization that works with law enforcement to counter radicalization by providing counseling services, educational material, and interventions.

While the assessment report contends that such partnerships are forged to avoid militarized tactics of counterterrorism such as raids, this CVE strategy enables the state to deploy the public, private and nonprofit sectors in coordinated, networked and efficient manner to surveil targeted communities. This pattern demonstrates that, in the context of CVE strategies in Minnesota, federal and local agencies are not merely managerial and executory. Rather, federal and local law enforcement agencies’ role is often restricted to organizing and

arranging first respondents to any detected radicalization. As such, the role of law enforcement agencies has been bureaucratized as the labor of surveillance, and monitoring has been digitized and outsourced as advocacy-based social services. This networked approach to intelligence-gathering and surveillance does not mean that the structure of the American surveillance apparatus— and by extension, the government— has become decentralized. Neoliberal economic policies that subcontracted social welfare services and public facilities to corporations (Ronfeldt and Arquilla, 2001) created, what Professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Leeds Adam Crawford (2006), calls a post-regulatory state, which is increasingly reliant on networked governance. Crawford argues that post-regulatory governments engage in ambitious projects of social engineering that normalizes interventionism, policing and behavioral control. The regulatory nature of the state as a punitive government is obscured through plural policing— where the presence of policing agencies is diluted through employing community support officers and third-party policing. The success of post-regulatory governance lies within the networked connections between the state and non-governmental entities, whether public, private, or civic (Crawford, 2006). The suspect-less, Islamophobic surveillance of Somali Muslims in Minnesota necessitates constructing infrastructures of networked, covert surveillance agents— both individuals and entities— who perform the labor of intelligence-gathering. As such, the “hard” consequences of CVE’s soft surveillance of Somali Muslims cannot be separated from the historical and contemporary ways the U.S government punishes and criminalizes poor, Black people.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

The "Hard" Consequences of CVE's Soft Surveillance

In the early evening of February 10th, 2015, an "ongoing" neighborly dispute resulted in the death of Shaddy Barakat, Yusor Abu-Salha, and Razan Abu-Salha in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. Chapel Hill police claim that the execution-style murder was motivated by a "parking dispute," while further investigation into the killer's background reveals that Craig Stephan Hicks was a staunch Islamophobe who bullied and targeted his neighbors before murdering them in cold blood (Katz, 2015). Despite the obvious racist motivation behind the Chapel Hill murders, national media outlets, which only began reporting on the story after a robust social media campaign by Muslim activist and community leaders, whitewashed their reporting, ignoring how anti-Muslim sentiment triggered the murders (Ose, 2015). The outrage over the killings grew as hashtags #MuslimLivesMatter, and #ChapelHillShooting were trending worldwide (Ose, 2015). Hundreds of Muslim American organizations signed a letter requesting then Attorney General Eric Holder to investigate the murders as hate crimes, while the world rallied behind Muslims in a rare show of solidarity and support (Mirza, 2015).

The outpouring of support and solidarity in the wake of the Chapel Hill murders stands in contrast to the deafening silence and disregard to the death of Mustafa Mattan, which occurred sixteen hours before the Chapel Hill murders. Mattan, a 28-year-old Somali-Canadian, was killed in his home three weeks after moving into Fort McMurray (Hill, 2015). Mattan's murder became a footnote in the greater narrative of the growing Anti-Muslim sentiment in the West, as did the killings of Mohamedtaha Omar, Adam Mekki, and Muhannad Tairab in Fort Wayne, Indiana, and the murder of 15-year-old Somali teen, Abdisamad Sheikh-Hussein, by a known Islamophobe in Kansas City, Missouri. All were Muslims, but most importantly, all

were Black (Mirza, 2015). This reflects tensions within the American Muslim community where Black Muslims are pushed to the periphery and erased from issues and narratives that impact American Muslims.

The curious case of selective mourning over the murdered Black Muslims reveals the brutal and deadly cost of interlinking Islamophobia with, and only with, anti-Arab sentiment. Muslims, united by Islamophobia and divided by Anti-Black racism, continue to erase the existence and experiences of Black Muslims, not only from mosques and communal spaces but from larger narrative and discourse. The erasure of Black Muslims (Karim, 2007), embodies the binary nature of American racial hierarchy— where different categories of identities are placed within a narrow, rigid range spanning between whiteness and Blackness— failing to accommodate the diverse, and diverging identities present within Muslim communities. This manifests itself within the academic scholarship on Islamophobia that focuses on the othering and racialization of Muslims as foreign and brown. The immigration narrative at the heart of the public and scholarly discourse on Islamophobia muddies how Anti-Black racism, police brutality, mass incarceration, and poverty are inherently Muslim issues that impact at least one-third of the American Muslim community. For example, in the wake of Freddie Gray's death at the hand of Baltimore police, The Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) expressed its concern over the escalation of violence, while failing to demand accountability from Baltimore Police Department (MuslimARC, 2015). The selective Muslim outrage at the forms of state-sanctioned violence Black Americans experience further disassociate the Black and Muslim identities Somalis occupy.

In an era where fascist, white supremacist sentiments are becoming increasingly normalized, accounting for the intersections of Anti-Black racism and Islamophobia is essential

for any meaningful and sustainable forms of resistance. The moral panic around Muslims in the wake of Trump's "Muslim ban" intensifies the law-and-order policing and scrutiny by law enforcement agencies. Consequently, it is likely that CVE programs will continue to explicitly and exclusively focus on Muslims. For example, reports emerged in early March of this year that Donald Trump wanted to make CVE programs exclusively focused on Islamic terrorism and cease all CVE work around other forms of violent extremism such as white nationalist groups. The repackaging of CVE program to "Countering Islamic Radicalism," as intended by Donald Trump (Ainsley, Volz and Cooke, 2017), will aggravate the surveillance and discriminatory over-policing of Somali Muslims through CVE initiatives. CVE programs will continue to criminalize, demonize and single-out Somali Muslims while violent extremism becomes intimately and exclusively linked with the Somali community. Moreover, in an increasingly Islamophobic America, the surveillance of Somali Muslims cannot be divorced from the criminalization and mass surveillance of all Black communities and organizations across the United States. From COINTELPRO to NYPD's Demographic Unit, which surveilled Muslims across the state of New York, clandestine surveillance and monitoring of Muslims evolved from Anti-Black forms of policing and social control (Browne, 2015; Curtis, 2013). As demonstrated by this research, infrastructures, rationale and mechanisms of surveilling Somali Muslims in the Twin Cities were born out of the criminalization and over-policing of Somali communities.

By situating Islamic extremism as intrinsic and inherent to the Somali community, CVE policies reinforces the "cultural distinctiveness," or ethnic difference, of Somalis. In this context, the ethnic, religious and cultural identities of Somalis are presented as a basis for racial difference, thereby essentializing their cultural and ethnic difference. This reveals how complex

Anti-Black racist ideologies and Islamophobia underpin the demonization of Somalis.

Describing Somali immigrants as unassimilated and isolated implies that the lack of social progress or mobility in the diasporic community is pathological and inseparable from their Blackness and Muslim-ness. The insurgency and violence associated with Somalia's failed state status are positioned as intrinsic qualities of Somalis. The vulnerability of Somalis to violent extremism is measured by their proximity to Blackness and the designation of their country as "a destination of those who are seeking to join the 'jihad' against the infidels, non-believers, and apostates" (Countering Violent Extremism Scientific Methods & Strategies, 2011, pg. 0921).

The cultural othering of Somalis demonstrates how Islamophobia can easily evolve and grow out of Anti-Black sentiment. The equivalency between the Muslim terrorist figure and the Black criminal figure is easily made through the supposed deviance, criminality and violence of Somali Muslims. During an election rally in Minneapolis, MN, then presidential candidate Donald Trump stated that Somali Muslims are "joining Isis and spreading their extremist views all over our country and all over the world" (Jacobs and Yuhas, 2016). Trump's irrational fear of Somalis would later manifest itself in an executive order, which banned the entrance of Somalis to the United States along with immigrants from six other Muslim majority countries. The executive order is an extension of the United States' long history of discriminatory mass deportation of African immigrants and Black Muslim. Immigrants from African and Caribbean descent with criminal convictions are twice more likely to be deported compared to other racial and ethnic groups. In a study conducted by The Black Alliance for Just Immigration, "76% of Black immigrants were deported on criminal grounds, in contrast to [sic] 45% overall, 38% of Asian immigrants, 47% of South American immigrants and 54% of European immigrants" (Feltz, 2016). The propensity of the American government to deport African and Black immigrants is

aligned with the state's tendency to target Black Americans through law-and-order policing and state-sanctioned violence. Since issuing the Muslim ban, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is in the process of deporting 4,000 Somalis (teleSUR, 2017). The Muslim Ban reveals how Islamophobia and Anti-Blackness intersect to aggravate the vulnerabilities of Black Muslims from Sudan and Somalia and other banned countries.

The insidious forms of Islamophobic violence and Anti-Black state-sanctioned violence continue to fracture the energies and priorities of Somali Muslims. Somali Muslims struggle with being invisible in Muslim spaces that situate themselves as largely Arab and South Asian, while being hypervisible to the state vis-à-vis CVE's soft surveillance. The first and most important step to resisting the consequences of the Muslim ban and suspect-less surveillance of Somali Muslims is to acknowledge the historical and contextual complexities of being Black, immigrant and Muslim. American Muslim communities must pull from historical memory and lived experiences of Black Americans to appropriately reframe, not only the conversation around Islamophobia, but the means, forms, and agenda of Muslim resistance. The erasure of Black Muslims within American Muslim communities must be confronted. In Muslim occupied spaces, especially places of worship, race does not exist; Blackness is drained of the contested meanings that arise when a melanin rich body enters a mosque. It is in this context that African American Muslims feel marginalized within the American Muslim community (Karim, 2007).

Towards a Framework of Black Muslim Resistance

What can Somali Muslims do to address the experience of Anti-Black marginalization within Muslim communities, and both racist and Islamophobic policing? The Somali community is marred with significant achievement gaps in education, unemployment, housing and incarceration (Abdi, 2014) and much of the funding Somali-focused nonprofit organization

comes from CVE grants (CREATE, 2015). CVE programs leverage funding for nonprofit and local governmental agencies to ensure that organizations who receive CVE funding carry out programming with counter-radicalization messages (CVE Program Assessment, 2015). CVE grant programs support the development of community-based CVE initiatives as well as providing funds to create and facilitate CVE programming. Moreover, CVE provides funds to non-profit organizations that provide additional support and services to targeted communities such as after school programs, sporting activities, mental health care. For example, the Somali-led nonprofit organization Ka Joog received generous CVE funding for engaging with Somali "at-risk youth" through STEM mentoring and women's empowerment programs, while Somali Action Alliance focuses on educational civil rights and civic engagement initiatives for Somali-Americans (CVE Program Assessment, 2015). In 2017, Ka Joog and another Minneapolis-based nonprofit organization rejected CVE grant worth half a million dollars to protest Trump's Muslim ban (Montemayor, 2017). However, the Somali Muslim community remains suspicious of Ka Joog and other nonprofit organizations who received CVE grants in the past. Co-opting social services and programs through CVE's soft surveillance had traumatizing effects on poor, working class Somali Muslims who lack adequate access to social and support services. The Muslim community is often suspicious and reluctant to reach out to CVE related service providers, which includes law enforcement agencies, faith-based organizations, non-profit organization social service agencies, mental health services, and school systems. (Williams et al., 2016).

In response to the environment of suspicion, surveillance, and disregard for Black lives, the Young Muslim Collective (YMC), a grassroots community organization led by young Somali Muslims in the Twin Cities, held a vigil for the three young Black Muslim men

murdered in Indiana. The vigil was part of YMC's larger effort to combat Anti-Black racism and Islamophobia through community organizing and education initiatives. Additionally, the YMC is leading the local resistance against CVE programs in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area. The YMC has organized numerous community forums and rallies against CVE programs, published literature to educate the public on the adverse impact of CVE programs on Somali Muslims, and held meetings with public officials and civic leaders to voice the concerns of Somali community. Unlike most nonprofit organizations serving the Somali community in Minnesota, the YMC does not receive any public funding and relies on donations and fundraisers to fund its community organizing (Mirza, 2017). As a decentralized collective, the YMC believes that its proactive resistance and community organizing against surveillance and criminalization of Somalis cannot be sustained while receiving CVE funding grants (Mirza, 2017). The YMC organizing and fundraising model enable the collective to organize effectively against CVE initiatives while refusing to co-opt the organization and the resources it provides to Somali Muslims in Minnesota. CVE grants entrench surveillance and policing within the Somali Muslim community, and the YMC's activism and resistance underscored the contradictions embedded in the work of nonprofit organizations such as Ka Joog, whose message of serving the Somali community was undermined by their connections to CVE initiatives.

The rejection of CVE funding by some Minneapolis-based nonprofit organizations reveals the impact of the YMC in interrogating the practices of CVE-funded nonprofit organizations and holding such organizations accountable. The YMC's tactics include disrupting meetings and forums held by CVE-funded organizations and publically questioning civic leaders (Mirza, 2017). This has been an effective method of demanding responsibility

from such organizations. Furthermore, the YMC's community engagement initiatives are often created to provide an alternative for the Somali Muslim community to CVE-funded initiatives and programming. For example, Big Brothers Big Sisters (BBBS), a community mentorship program targeting Somali youth, received CVE funding in 2015. BBBS' mentorship program, which was slotted to begin in early 2016, did not attract much attention as Somali youth preferred to participate in the YMC's mentorship program. According to Ayaan Dahir, an organizer with the YMC, "[the YMC] wanted to ask the school to not partner with [BBBS]. At the same time, we did not want to deny students any enrichment they would have gained" (Mirza, 2017). The YMC's mentorship programs remains popular and in -high-demand within the Somali Muslim community.

Additionally, the YMC is working to create a comprehensive report that documents organizations and individuals who applied for CVE funding, and lawmakers who lobbied and advocated for CVE initiatives. YMC hopes that the report will enable the public to hold lawmakers and nonprofit organizations accountable and to efficiently respond to the damaging consequences of CVE programs (AFSC, 2017). Adhering to its intersectional vision and politics, the YMC situates its struggle against Islamophobia and the surveillance of Muslims within its larger anti-racist framework (Mirza, 2017). Interrogating the entanglement of Anti-Black racism and Islamophobia is central to the politics, vision, and practices of the YMC, which exemplifies how acknowledging the material condition and lived realities of Somalis as Black Muslim results in efficient and powerful form of resistance. Sustained collective and communal organizing are essential in the struggle against the suspect-less surveillance and criminalization of Muslims in the United States. Black Muslims have a long and rich tradition of resistance and organizing against state-sanctioned surveillance and violence and situating

their activism within Black working-class resistance (Curtis, 2006). The YMC's model of community organizing, outreach, and inclusive programming is a useful paradigm of resistance that is collaborative, communal and productive. The YMC's versatile organizing and forms of resistance empower the Somali Muslim community and enables Somalis to practice a level of control and resistance that was not possible before. The insights provided by the Black Muslim experience and the foregrounding of CVE resistance within larger Anti-Black and anti-racists politics provides an expansive and inclusive framework of Muslim resistance. The revival of mass-mobilization, protest and collective organizing in the wake of Trump's presidency offers hope and opportunity for collaborative, national and communal responses to existing social, economic and political inequalities. The YMC and Black Muslims struggle against surveillance and criminalization of Somalis signifies the beginning of a transformative social movement.

Directions for Future Research

This research is deeply political and personal endeavor that was born out of my own frustration at the constant erasure and marginalization I felt as a Black Muslim woman. I wanted to understand my social location, to reconcile the fractures in my intersectional identity and, more importantly, to find my existence, and that of my people reflected in my work and writing. This is my way of exclaiming that Black Muslim lives matter! My anxieties around undertaking such personal and significant project have been compounded by the election of Donald Trump to office. Theorizing at the intersections of Anti-Black racism, Islamophobia, and state surveillance has been emotionally and mentally taxing, especially given how I am intimately impacted by these structures. The intentional focus of the research is designed to theorize about the systemic relation between Anti-Black racism and Islamophobia and how such oppressive practices are deployed within and vis-à-vis the American surveillance

apparatus. Contextualizing forms of suspect-less surveillance of Black Muslims within the overarching state practices of social control, especially those targeted at Black communities, counters the historical and contemporary erasure of the Black Muslim experience in the United States.

Although I endeavored to fill gaps within academic scholarship on surveillance and the intersections of Anti-Blackness and Islamophobia, the Black Muslim experience, and especially the Somali immigrant experience, remains an underdeveloped field of study. Future research is required to fully interrogate links between Anti-Black racism and anti-Muslim sentiment. Future research must incorporate ethnographic and qualitative methods that examine the experiences of Black Muslims with forms of institutionalized Islamophobia and Anti-Black racism. Additionally, exploring how Black Muslims' immigrant status complicates their experience of Islamophobia will provide much-needed nuances that is lacking from academic scholarship.

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