


Center for Professional Ethics, Volume 2, Issue 2, 2000

Case Western Reserve University

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Case Western Reserve University, "Center for Professional Ethics, Volume 2, Issue 2, 2000."
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Don't Lump Press in with Media Ted Gup Speaks about Journalism's Bad Press

The Center for Professional Ethics was fortunate to have Ted Gup, the Shirley Wormser Professor of Journalism and Media Studies at CWRU, speak at our last dinner of 1999.

After thanking Director Robert Lawry for the invitation, Professor Gup quipped, "When I pick the movies that my wife and I attend, I always say, 'lower your expectations' — and that's what I am telling you." Fortunately, there was no need to heed that warning, as Gup gave an enthusiastic and informative talk peppered with ethics stories from the frontline of his impressive career in journalism, which includes time at both the *Washington Post* and *Time* magazine.

"I think a lot about ethics," noted Gup. "But, perhaps I am not sophisticated in the way that I think about ethics....I think ethics are a private matter, a lot like sex; that is, best practiced in private."

He explained that he has become wary of reporters who constantly speak of ethics. "Within the realm of journalism, the people who spend the most time talking about ethics tend to be more about self-canonization. Folks in the newsroom get suspicious of people talking about ethics—it makes you want to double-check their stories."

He also spoke about one of the first "ethics quagmires" he faced as a relatively new reporter at the *Washington Post*. He had been

writing articles on prison life for the paper. One day he received a phone call from a man who had been sent to prison for armed robbery and had read Gup's articles while he was there. The dilemma was that this inmate had just broken out of prison and wanted to see him.

"I had been out of law school for a year or so, and there was something in my mind, some wheels turning and saying, 'There's a problem with this guy and this phone call.' But it wasn't any more sophisticated than that," admits Gup. The escaped prisoner said he would call back shortly.

Gup went to his editor at that time, David Marin, and told him about the phone call and his sense that there was "something sticky" about it, but he couldn't quite articulate what. Marin was also stumped and suggested that they talk to the managing editor, Howard Simons. "Simons was the resident rabbi. This is the guy everyone turned to whenever there were ethical quagmires," Gup explained.

However, Simons' answer wasn't exactly what Gup had hoped for. Simons said, "I am kind of ashamed of you, Gup. You don't know what to do here? Didn't you just go to law school? We can't be a party to this; we're the *Washington Post*...you want to harbor a fugitive and obstruct justice?"

Gup responded with a question of his own. He asked Simons whether he would give the

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same order if it were Patty Hearst on the lam calling the paper. “I argued with him, asking why he thought the guy was calling in the first place. I explained that this man was out of prison, so if he wanted to lay low, he wouldn’t call a paper with a million circulation. He has something else going on. Maybe he was being gang-raped in prison; maybe someone is going to murder him; maybe someone’s drug trafficking; maybe he’s innocent and can prove it. Or what if he knows of massive corruption in the prison?”

Simons told him that there was only one thing to do: turn him in to the authorities — end of story. “He told me that he was ordering me to wait for his call, find out where he is, and turn him in.”

A few minutes later, the escaped prisoner called back. “I broke all the rules and told him that I had been ordered to turn him in if he told me where he was, and then he hung up on me,” said Gup. The man was apprehended a few days later and was returned to prison. Gup wrote him a letter, and when there was no reply, he called him, all to no avail. The man never responded. “And to this day, I have no idea why he tried to reach me,” Gup said regretfully.

“This story is emblematic of the kind of problem I face so often that you would think I was exaggerating,” he remarked. In his mind that problem lies in the complexity of battling loyalties. All at once, he had to deal with his obligation to the *Post*, his desire to protect the public from someone who might be dangerous, and his pride in not wanting to compromise his integrity in the newsroom before his superiors. Then Gup spoke of the only true driving force behind his decision-making process. “The whole reason I entered the field of journalism in the first place is to serve the public. This was an individual who was putting himself at risk to contact me. He had some-

thing to tell me that I can only think had some serious public value.”

Gup rarely talks to his students or peers about “easy ethics”—about plagiarism or being on the take, i.e., accepting free vacations. He believes that his colleagues and students inherently know that this behavior is wrong. He prefers to talk about the enormous cynicism the public has for journalists and journalism: “If you talk about journalistic ethics, everyone views it as an oxymoron. It’s like they’re mutually incompatible. Thomas Jefferson was something of a champion of the free press, but he also loathed it. Jefferson said that newspapers have only four categories: truth, possibilities, probabilities, and lies, and there are a lot of people who still subscribe to that notion.”

Gup made a point of explaining that he was speaking about press and journalism ethics—not media ethics. “In my opinion, there is no such thing as the media. You tell me what Sally Jesse Raphael has to do with Ted Koppel, or Sony Film Studios has to do with the *New York Times*. We have mongrelized this thing called the media. If you do talk specifics about the press, it’s a very different creature than all these things lumped into the media. I don’t like to be smeared by being lumped into the media. I don’t identify with the rest of the media.”

When Gup runs into what he calls an “ethical quagmire,” as he did when the escaped inmate called, he goes through a process that begins with discovering what values are at stake. “I try to figure out what values are in conflict and what I can do to resolve them in order to promote the things I want to promote. It’s pure situational ethics, I suppose. I don’t know any books or indexes I can turn to to find the

“You tell me what Sally Jesse Raphael has to do with Ted Koppel, or Sony Film Studios had to do with the *New York Times*. We have mongrelized this thing called the media. If you do talk specifics about the press, it’s a very different creature than all these things lumped into the media. I don’t liked to be smeared by being lumped into the media...I don’t identify with the rest of the media.”

“There are journalists who imagine themselves as important because they spend time with people who imagine themselves as important. There is this symbiotic relationship between journalists and politicians which confirms that we are all on Olympus,” he said wryly—and knowingly.

answers to the problems I face daily. I can find books that articulate values that I hold dear, but not solutions to the sorts of things I face. I have to particularize my answers based on the things that confront me. These are numerous, confounding, and very often painful.”

Gup believes that people judge newspapers so harshly because of an element of self-loathing. “People feel about newspapers the same way they feel about a mirror; they may not like what they see, and it’s easier to blame the mirror. If there is such a thing as the sin of the audience, then we are what we reflect about our societies and ourselves. It is much easier to hold the press at a distance and say, ‘This is not our soul, this is their soul.’”

Gup believes that his ideas about the ethical problems of the press probably differ from the rest of society’s. He believes that the press is most often very honest about what they write. It is what the papers chose to leave *out* that bothers him. And it’s hard to indict someone for something they *didn’t* do. He used the *Cleveland Plain Dealer* as an example.

“I have no bone to pick with the *Plain Dealer*, but if you look at what they don’t cover in the city, it could fill volumes. If you strip out the sports and the silliness, there is an awful lot of room to cover stuff—the stuff that should be in there. It is what I call a crime of omission, because there is an affirmative obligation on our part to inform the reader, and when we don’t, that’s an ethical issue. We have an enormous impact on the way readers see the world. If every time they read ‘African–American youth’ they read ‘murder,’ they will forge an association. If the reporter doesn’t create context and a perspective, the reporter will create a distortion.”

He believes that, first and foremost, it is a journalist’s duty to give an honest reflection of the world. The components of this reflection are accuracy and truth, and he asserts that journalists focus too much on ac-

curacy. “Truth is something radically different from accuracy. Truth involves context, perspective, balance—it’s making sure that the entire universe of the story is provided. Everything material that is needed to assess the information provided is there. That’s truth. Accuracy is merely an absence of false statements. These are radically different elements. It’s very easy to talk about truth in vague terms, but where the rubber meets the road, it’s a whole different thing.”

Gup is also concerned with oversimplification of stories, which is a problem that exists not only with journalists, but also with readers. He cited the success of *USA Today* as proof.

If journalists teach about the world by giving their own perspective on the news, is there a danger that they will see themselves as more important than they actually are? Ted Gup believes that this is a real peril of journalism.

“There are journalists who imagine themselves as important because they spend time with people who imagine themselves as important. There is this symbiotic relationship between journalists and politicians which confirms that we are all on Olympus,” he said wryly—and knowingly. Gup has flown on Air Force One, and at one point possessed a card that would “pull any senator off the floor within two or three minutes just to answer my questions.” After he left *Time*, he became a freelancer and, for one story, needed to call his old stomping grounds, Washington, D.C. He remembered, “I called some people there and they said, ‘Who are you with?’ I looked around my office bedroom and say, ‘no one,’ and I, of course, was treated accordingly.”

So, after all the discussion of the press’s ethical shortcomings—crimes of omission, oversimplification, the inability to differentiate between truth and accuracy, the imagined self-importance of journalists—who are

the people that Gup finds the most objectionable? The answer may surprise you. "The people I fear most in my profession are not the people who are amoral; it's the people that I call supermoral—zealots who think they are in possession of the truth. That is the stuff that unnerves me."

As an example of how he fights against this moralizing, he proffered a story about his new book on the C.I.A. "The C.I.A. asked me not to write it because they said it violated national security and put people at risk. Initially they said, trust me. And I said, show me. Show me where it will affect national security. In one instance they did, and I took something out of the book. That's an ethical question. Who am I to say that the director of the C.I.A. is lying or that his invocations of national security are illegitimate?"

Finally, in the same modest manner in which he began his speech, Gup ended it by saying, "You will not find anyone more confused than I am. I have no answers to this stuff. I don't pretend to, and I would be a little more nervous if I did." Then he added, only half jokingly, "I am more comfortable with confusion."

End....

Ted Gup graduated from the Case Western Reserve University School of Law in 1978 and is the Shirley Wormser Professor of Journalism and Media Studies at the university. From 1978 to 1987, he worked as a reporter at the *Washington Post*. From 1987 to 1993, he was the congressional correspondent and national projects correspondent for *Time* magazine. He has worked as a freelance writer since 1990, with his articles appearing in more than 20 magazines. Gup has won several major journalism awards and was a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize for national reporting. His book on the C.I.A., *The Book of Honor*, will be out in June 2000. It is being published by Doubleday Books.

Thinking about Ethics:

Quotable Quotes

"The term *Satyagraha* was coined by me in South Africa to express the force that the Indians there used for full eight years, and it was coined in order to distinguish it from the movement then going on in the United Kingdom and South Africa under the name of Passive Resistance.

It's root meaning is 'holding on to the truth,' hence, truth-force. I have also called it love-force or soul-force. In the application of *Satyagraha*, I discovered in the earliest stages that pursuit of truth did not admit of violence being inflicted on one's opponent, but that he must be weaned from error by patience and sympathy. For what appears to be truth to the one may appear to be error to the other. And patience means self-suffering. So the doctrine came to mean vindication of the truth not by the infliction of suffering on the opponent, but on one's self."

— Mohandas Gandhi

The Dark Days of France

A Look at Vichy Law, Part II

In the Fall 1999 issue of this newsletter, we printed Part I of "A Look at Vichy Law," an article based on a speech that Professor Richard Weisberg of the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law at Yeshiva University gave at Case Western Reserve University in April 1999. The first part of his talk, "Vichy Law and the Holocaust in France," covered the beginning of the German occupation of France. Now, as we continue on to Part II, the Nazi stranglehold on France is beginning to loosen.

Professor Weisberg noted that even when the French had a chance to pull away and change their behavior, they did not. "Not even a sense that the war was turning against the Nazis stopped the French from a kind of a rigorous onslaught against the Jews. Wouldn't an opportunist say, 'So far I've been working with these laws and people have been suffering, but maybe I had better stop right now, because it looks like the Nazis are going to lose the war?'"

As the laws against Jews grew more and more severe, anti-semitism became visible in everyday transactions as well. It seemed that nothing would stop the creators and enforcers of these laws—not even the knowledge that they were going to be associated with something the allies might hold against them. Remarkably, judges in France were still figuring out the intricacies of racial definitions as allied bombs were falling on their court-houses.

Then, a new Justice Minister, Joseph Barthélemy, came to power. "When Barthélemy took over from Alibert, most of the French felt that he would turn things around. People knew that the French had choices. This was a man of distinction who was in fact a prewar anti-fascist and a vocal anti anti-Semite who had spoken up against Hitler as late as 1938. And Barthélemy was far more representative of the legal community in France than was Alibert. Barthélemy was a distinguished law professor whose books you'll find if you go to the Sorbonne. His books on administrative law are still authoritative and respected. I have seen telegrams sent to Barthélemy from the beleaguered Jewish population, law students, and other idealists in France reading, 'Thank goodness you are now the Justice Minister. You will change things. We know you will turn things around.'"

However, when Barthélemy got to the seat of power, he signed "an even more Draconian, expansive, definitional law on June 2, 1941." This filled in the loopholes of the first law. This new "improved" version now made life difficult for an individual of mixed grandparental heritage regardless of marriage. "Even if that person considered himself perhaps an atheist or a Roman Catholic, or even if that person had never thought about religion, it didn't matter. If you had two Jewish grandparents, that was it. After Barthélemy's law was signed, you often had to prove that you were not Jewish," explained Weisberg.

In the Vichy courts, the burden of proof was on the individual. "It's not so hard to prove a negative, particularly in the case of male suspected Jews, because they were circumcised. But how do you go about satisfying that difficult burden of proof? The question of who bore the burden of proof was on the agenda of the French courts for four years. Gradually the courts liberalized and put the burden largely on the state to prove that the individual was Jewish," said Weisberg. Many, many cases were difficult to decide. For example, perhaps a person was circumcised, but also baptized. Perhaps he occasionally went to church, but would also go to synagogue once a year. The courts even looked at what kind of religious paraphernalia people had in their homes.

Again, these hideous mutations of the law beg the question: What happens to people when they come to power? In Weisberg's words, "What mechanism of adjustment can explain relatively decent individuals throwing themselves with zeal into questions like this?" Weisberg went on to explain that the French law professors took pride in the draftsmanship of their Jewish

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laws, which contained “a certain elegance and a certain logic,” divorced, of course, from the horrible context.

Because of the many ambiguities and new issues created by the laws, they became a great topic for law professors to write about. “What better way to start your law career than by commenting “neutrally” in a law review or even in a book-length manuscript about what these laws mean,” Weisberg explained. “However, even when writing in a neutral style, there is still an attempt to rationalize. Some of these law professors wrote that maybe Jews do deserve a special law, not necessarily because there were so many Jews in the Third Republic government, but because the Jews believe in the Talmud. These professors wrote that perhaps people who lead their lives according to the Talmud are too different than the rest of French society.” Weisberg noted that this was an extreme deviation from the normal patterns of French law making, which, as he noted, bears a great resemblance to our own.

So now Jewish individuals had to turn to the legal community for help. “I was in the archives of one of 20th century France’s greatest lawyers, Maurice Garçon,” remarked Weisberg, “and about 15 percent of his very rich calendar for 1940–1943 concerns the anti-Semitic laws. Garçon would take these cases, and he was a very good lawyer. However, I have seen his internal memoranda and his arguments, and although he would try to help these clients, he never attacked the law on the larger level that the Belgian and the Italian legal communities did, not even in his private memoranda to his fellow lawyers. He never says that these laws are simply not French and we can’t enforce them. Instead he takes the issue on a very technical, low level.”

But the story goes deeper than that. Jews were losing their jobs. Jews were increasingly being imprisoned. And as time went on, Jews began to be deported. Their families were left alone, and many times, these families couldn’t pay the rent. “Landlords would walk into Maurice Garçon’s office, and he represented them, too,” said Weisberg. “He made arguments insisting that the Jewish families pay their rent or else be evicted. He also represented large, corporate clients like Coco

Chanel, who, after the law of July 1941, was instructed to get all Jewish influence out of her corporation.”

Even as the Nazis were losing the war, the French laws became more and more anti-semitic. The French often bragged that the Germans were more liberal than they on the question of mixed grandparental heritage. The French elaboration on this subject pleased the Germans so much that they accepted French law into the occupied zone. Noted Weisberg, “The property law of July 22, 1941 was very extensive, and it insisted that all Jewish property be ‘aryanized,’ which meant ‘put in the hands of an Aryan trustee.’ Banks were instructed to block 50 percent of the bank accounts of all their Jewish clients. If the banks had a problem figuring out who was Jewish, they sent out genealogical surveys. It was also big business at the Bar. Apparently the Bar couldn’t find it in their heart or in their training to protest. Even Jacques Charpentier, the head of the Bar Association of Paris who protested to Petain anytime he thought Petain did anything wrong, said not a word against these laws that were so foreign also to the traditions to the Bar.”

In 1949, Charpentier explained this by saying, ‘We were all upset by the laws, especially when some of our great colleagues at the Bar, whose families had been in the country since the 18th century, were deported. We saw our Jewish colleagues who we respected deeply, and

Again, these hideous mutations of what happens to people when they come to power. “What mechanism of adjustment do we have for individuals throwing themselves with pride in the draftsmanship of their laws, with a certain elegance and a certain logic, divorced from the horrible context.”

who we never distinguished from ourselves before this, being sent off. Many of my colleagues at the Bar, however, welcomed the anti-Jewish laws, and particularly the numerous clauses in these laws which said that only two percent of the lawyers in any Bar association could be Jewish. They were upset by the influx of foreign lawyers that had come from different traditions like Central and Eastern Europe...who fill the hallways with their oriental customs—customs of the bizarre.’” Added Weisberg, “Also, Charpentier admits that so many of his colleagues were busy aryanizing property themselves, or helping Aryan trustees to take over property, that it was difficult to muster the political will within the Bar Association to protest.”

It took Weisberg three years to get the Bar Association of the City of Paris to submit, for that first time, any record of its own behavior during the period, and the Bar was the hardest archival source to get into. “[The full record] admits, tragically, that the French threw themselves into removing the Jewish influence from their own Bar Association. None of the individuals that you would have expected to take a leadership role did.

“This is the France of yesterday,” said Weisberg. “Of course, the laws were removed from the books as each town and city was liberated. But the postwar period in France (1945–1946) needs our attention for a moment.

What happened to the property that was taken away from the Jews? What happened to the property that was aryanized? What happened to law practices that were stripped away? Were there any reparations? Was there any judicial or other kind of trial of the individuals who were involved in this terrible process? The answer is either no or very little on all counts. What ensued in France is called the Vichy Syndrome. Americans must keep in mind that we have periods in our history where we would prefer to forget something, and where myths take over for realities.”

Under President de Gaulle, universal resistance was the myth that the French purported about Vichy. When Weisberg began his research in 1982, he couldn’t get into many archives, and nobody wanted to speak about this terrible era. “When I did interview people, they would say, ‘we were all in the resistance.’ I knew from the records of some of the people I was talking to that that just wasn’t true. Eventually, I would just stare at someone incredulously, and their eyelids would droop down, and they would say, ‘at least after 44.’ Which, of course, was after all of the harm had already been done.”

However, about this period de Gaulle has said, “France was elsewhere.” Notes Weisberg: “He says that because he was elsewhere; he was in Britain mustering up Free French forces. But there were 40 million French people left in France. From de Gaulle through Mitterrand, there was no change in that myth. However, Mitterrand, who was a leftist, deserves credit because he at least opened up the archives to people like me when no one had been allowed to look into them. But it wasn’t until Chirac, in the summer of 1995, that a president finally said, ‘France is responsible for what happened during Vichy; we were all there; we weren’t all part of the resistance.’”

Has the French myth been turned around because of Chirac’s statement? “Yes and no,” answered Weisberg.

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“More and more material is coming out about Vichy. Jewish historians courageously amassed documents during the period itself and have set up a wonderful documentary center in Paris. A handful of French historians are writing about the period. And there have been several notable trials, including a war crimes trial against a French bureaucrat whose behavior was very similar to that of the French lawyers I have been describing. Yet, if you watch what has been going on, the myth has great endurance. Each country in Europe had its own myth. The French myth is proving to be enormously important to them. So much so, that I don't think it's turned around.”



Richard Weisberg holds a Ph.D. in comparative literature from Cornell University and a J.D. from Columbia University. He is the Walter Floersheimer Chair in Constitutional Law at the Benjamin N. Cardozo Law School of Yeshiva University. Weisberg is the author of numerous scholarly articles and has also written four books—*The Failure of the Word: Protagonist as Lawyer in Modern Fiction*; *When Lawyers Write: Poethics; and Other Strategies of Law and Literature*—and a major work in legal thought and history, *Vichy Law and the Holocaust in France*. He is currently working on a book dealing with the subject of public and private discourse in America.

End....

Not Allowed to Shrug

Those of us who work in the field of “practical” ethics have determined that the urgent questions of “what should we do” and “how should we live” are the ones that must engage our intellectual and moral energies first. It is by grappling with these that we begin to push ourselves back into examining first principles, or trying to come to terms with the great philosophical and religious ideas that challenge and inspire us. Well and good. But what happens when our carefully determined decisions do not “compute” at any larger level? Or what are we to do when we act against first principles? These questions, always hovering just beneath the surface of our efforts, broke loose anew for me when a friend sent me a recent review by Peter Berkowitz of two books by Peter Singer, “perhaps the world’s most controversial ethicist” (*The New Republic*, January 10, 2000, pp. 27–37).

As Berkowitz notes: “Singer is controversial for certain remarkable views that he holds: that infanticide and euthanasia (and, of course, abortion) are not only permissible in certain circumstances, they are sometimes also morally obligatory. But the major part of his influence stems from certain other views, in particular his argument that many nonhuman animals are, in truth, persons, possessing the same special claim to be protected usually thought to be the peculiar privilege of human beings.”

Despite the temptation to deal with these claims, I want to focus on another position that Singer has taken.

In a recent article, he maintains that middle-class households have a moral obligation “to contribute more than one-third of their income (and all households every cent earned above \$30,000) to the hungry and disadvantaged around the globe.”

The arguments upon which such a position rests are lengthy and complex. For my present point, nothing about their substantive merit is of any moment. It is sufficient to note that they are based on considerable thought and effort to get at the philosophical truth of the matter. Moreover, the goal of providing more help to the disadvantaged is surely a worthy one. Nevertheless, the point I want to stress is that Singer reports “that he has hired, at considerable expense, health care workers to tend to his mother, who is suffering from Alzheimer’s disease.” Of course, as Berkowitz points out: “...what makes this otherwise common act of filial piety noteworthy is that it flagrantly violates the son’s own moral theory.”

What are we supposed to make of this?

We could say that the theory is wrong and needs further examination. Or we could say that the practice Singer engages in is wrong and must be stopped. What we cannot say is that both theory and practice are right. Most of us, of course, would shrug and live with contradiction or would ditch the theory in a heartbeat because we somehow “know” that spending considerable sums of money on a mother’s care is surely not wrong. In fact, most of us would consider the act worthy of moral praise. It seems to me, however, that

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“Perhaps only truly great philosophic minds can — or think they can — solve all the moral problems the world presents; but all of us ought to be striving for some integrity between what we may think (or believe) and the way we act. Surely, that is what we mean by the very word ‘integrity.’ ”

“How can we in the ‘practical ethics’ business help? By lowering the volume on both our theories and on recommendations for handling concrete cases. We have to keep teaching the complexity of things. That is not easy when even we are subject to the media’s constant demand for ‘the sound bite.’ ”

those of us in the field of “practical ethics” are not permitted to shrug. It would be permissible to suggest that the theory needs to be amended—even if we were not sure how the amendment might be made. Beyond that, we might just give up theorizing altogether and keep concentrating on concrete cases, letting the fragments cohere or not in willy-nilly fashion. Most of us in the “practical ethics” world lean in that direction. Something worries me about that approach, though. Perhaps only truly great philosophic minds can — or think they can — solve all the moral problems the world presents; but all of us ought to be striving for some integrity between what we may think (or believe) and the way we act. Surely, that is what we mean by the very word “integrity.”


All of this is simply a cautionary tale. What we need to do is recognize how difficult it is to think coherently about larger questions, and how tough some practical moral questions are. The trouble is that so many of our difficult moral questions (abortion, same-sex marriage, assisted suicide) are questions that increasingly demand a public policy response. That usually means a legislative response. In turn, that usually means an advocate’s rhetoric, i.e., a one-sided argument trashing the opponents’ position, and lobbying frenetically for our own.

That is unfortunate. So how can we in “practical ethics” business help? By lowering the volume on both our theories and our recommendations for handling concrete cases. We have to keep teaching the complexity of things. That is not easy when even we are subject

to the media’s constant demand for “the sound bite.” That is not easy when fame and fortune come often to the pugnacious and the controversial.

Recently, Peter Singer was appointed to a new chair in bioethics at the Princeton University Center for Human Values. In light of his recent pronouncement on the moral obligation to contribute our “excess” monies to the needy and his simultaneous expenditure of much of his own money on special care for his mother, Professor Singer would do all of us in the “practical ethics” business a huge favor if he would say, in the immortal words of Fagan (in the musical version of *Oliver Twist*), “I guess I’d better think it out again.”

End....



Robert P. Lawry is the Director of the Center for Professional Ethics and a Professor of Law at Case Western Reserve University School of Law. His column, *Director’s Corner*, appears in each issue.

Winter 2000

News, Notes, and Events

The University of Montana Presents: Summer Courses in Ethics

The University of Montana will offer the nation's first master's degree and mid-career preparation programs for **Teaching Practical Ethics Across the Curriculum** on July 24–28, 2000. This five-day workshop is designed to help instructors integrate the teaching of ethics into curricula throughout the university. Ethical issues to be explored include justice, blameworthiness and praiseworthiness, loyalty, honesty, and special role-related responsibilities and privileges. Participants will be assessed a materials fee of approximately \$35 the first day of class. Cost is \$350 for 2 graduate credits or \$250 to audit.

The university is also offering a course on the **Foundations of Moral Philosophy** from August 14 to 25, 2000. This two-week intensive workshop provides an introduction to three major Western approaches to ethics: virtue theory, deontology, and utilitarianism. The class includes feminist critiques of these approaches and application of theories and critique in the teaching of practical ethics. Readings include Aristotle, Kant, Mill, and 20th century contemporary philosophers. Cost is \$400 for 4 graduate credits or \$300 to audit.

For more information on the classes or hotel/housing accommodations contact the Practical Ethics Center: 406/243-5744; or e-mail: ethics@selway.umt.edu

Employee Relations Ethics

In early 2001 *Ethics & Behavior* will publish a special issue on Employee Relations Ethics under the guest editorship of Andrew Sikula, Sr., Ph.D., a member of the magazine's editorial board.

The guest editor welcomes articles addressing the ethical implications of the changing social contract between employers and employees in both the public and the private sectors, with a focus on the American experience. Articles on topics addressing the changing nature of work; the altered composition of the work force; downsizing; employer/employee loyalty and commitment; early retirement programs; and the declining impact of unions are also welcome.

Please send manuscripts in triplicate before July 1, 2000 to:
Andrew Sikula, Sr.
Associate Dean—Elizabeth McDowell Lewis College of Business
100 Angus E. Peyton Drive
South Charleston, WV
25303-1600
or e-mail: sikula@marshall.edu

CWRU Ethics Fellows Update

Sigma Theta Tau International, the honor society for nurses, recognized **Kimberly Adams-Davis** (School of Nursing) for her expertise in writing and lecturing. Adams-Davis was named a distinguished lecturer. The recipients were honored at Sigma Theta Tau's 35th Biennial Convention in San Diego, November 1999.

The Ohio Nurses Association Cornelius Leadership Congress inducted **Kathleen Montgomery** (School of Nursing) in October 1999. The Congress recognizes ONA members and staff who display the leadership characteristics of Dorothy Cornelius, former ONA Executive Director.

Two of the CWRU Mortar Board "Top Prof Awards" for 1998–99 went to Ethics Fellows **Christopher Cullis** (Biology) and **Atwood Gaines** (Anthropology).

Katherine Wisner (Psychiatry and Reproductive Medicine) was chosen to be on the Mind and Body panel for "Woman2000: Forging a Vision" to be held at held on Saturday, April 8 at Case Western Reserve University and Severance Hall. The symposium is sponsored by the Flora Stone Mather Alumnae Association.

The Center for Professional Ethics

Robert P. Lawry
Director

Jeanmarie Gielty
Department Assistant and Writer

Tess Knerik
Editorial Consultant

The Center for Professional Ethics at Case Western Reserve University provides opportunities for students, faculty, administrators and professionals to explore more fully the foundations of personal and professional ethics. To join, please fill out the membership form on page 4 of this issues newsletter. This newsletter is printed four times yearly. All rights reserved.

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