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Ten Years of the Agnes Kirsopp Lake Michels Lectures at Bryn Mawr College

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**Ten Years of the Agnes
Kirsopp Lake Michels Lectures
at
Bryn Mawr College**

Edited by
Suzanne B. Faris
and Lesley E. Lundeen



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Lake Michels Lectures at
Bryn Mawr College

EDITED BY

SUZANNE B. FARIS
AND LESLEY E. LUNDEEN

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Front Cover:

Denarius, Obverse: CAESAR AVGVSTVS, Augustus with oak wreath; c. 19/18 BCE, Minted in Spain. Gift of Agnes K. L. Michels, Originally in the Collection of Lily Ross Taylor, Bryn Mawr College Art and Archaeology Collections

Back Cover:

Denarius, Reverse: DIVVS IVLIVS, Comet of eight rays; c. 19/18 BCE, Minted in Spain. Gift of Agnes K. L. Michels, Originally in the Collection of Lily Ross Taylor, Bryn Mawr College Art and Archaeology Collections

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“To Agnes Lake, [Bryn Mawr College] was not merely a place of study, a place of professional career, a place of teaching: Bryn Mawr was destined to become her life.”¹

Agnes Kirsopp Lake Michels (1909-1993) spent nearly fifty years at Bryn Mawr College, first as an undergraduate receiving her A.B. magna cum laude in Latin, in 1930, and then as a graduate student working under such legendary figures as Lily Ross Taylor. After receiving her Ph.D. in 1934, she continued her academic career at the college as a professor until 1975. Though she then moved to the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, she remained professor emeritus at Bryn Mawr until her death in 1993.

Mrs. Michels was a meticulous and original scholar, both curious and demanding, not only in the study of Roman literature but also that of Roman archaeology, history and epigraphy. Her doctoral work consisted of a study of pottery from the University of Pennsylvania’s excavation at Minturnae, and she published an important monograph on “The Archaeological Evidence for the ‘Tuscan Temple.’” From there she turned to Latin poetry, particularly Lucretius and Virgil. In 1967, she produced her seminal work, *The Calendar of the Roman Republic*, her only book. Her work consistently demonstrates two traits: a willingness both to tackle controversial issues and take controversial positions, and a life-long interest in Roman religion.

A passion for research and teaching characterized Mrs. Michels throughout her life, and she was especially committed to graduate education at Bryn Mawr. In 1993, the year of her death, an anonymous donor endowed a lecture series in her honor to be organized entirely by the graduate students in the Department of Greek, Latin and Classical Studies. Invited speakers give a public lecture as well as a private seminar for the graduate students. This volume showcases the work presented over the course of the first 10 years of that lecture series. Some of our speakers, like Bruce Frier, Robert Palmer and Jerzy Linderski, Mrs. Michels’ literary executor, knew her personally. Others, like Michael Putnam, Richard Thomas and Denis Feeney have spoken on topics directly related to her areas of interest, specifically Roman poetry and religion, Virgil, and Roman chronography. But whether they focus on the Greek world, like Jeffrey Rusten and Mark Munn, or issues of Roman social history, like W.V. Harris and Susan

¹ J. Linderski, “Agnes Kirsopp Michels and the *Religio*,” *The Classical Journal* 92.4 (1997), 325. He provides a more extensive (and more personal) overview of Mrs. Michels’ life and work, as well as an appendix providing both biographical and bibliographic information.

Treggiari, all of our speakers possess the same devotion to students and to the ancient world, the original and curious mind, and the wide array of interests and skills that were held by Agnes Michels.

In the last ten years, several of these lectures have formed the basis of larger works. Half of the selections in this volume thus consist of articles or excerpts of books related to either the lecture or to Mrs. Michels' interests and are reprinted here at the request of the author. The remaining submissions are transcripts of the lectures delivered with the addition of footnotes and bibliography.

In the 1993 inaugural Michels lecture, "Marriage and Motherhood in Roman Egypt," Frier addressed the problem of whether scholars should stress the ancient world's similarities to or differences from modern society. Looking at Egyptian census returns from the first through third centuries CE, he finds evidence for the high mortality rate, early female marriage age, and slow but steady population growth common to many pre-modern societies. Having the majority of women marry and marry early, with an emphasis on marriage's function as that of procreation, has long been considered a method of maintaining the population and encouraging its growth in the face of such high mortality.

Yet, fertility rates fall well below the maximum possible number, and Roman Egyptian men and women spent significant periods of their lives unmarried and thus bearing far fewer children. Frier argues that overpopulation was as much a concern as population decline, not only in Roman Egypt but also, in fact, in many such pre-modern societies. Here, a variety of factors, such as the implementation of indirect forms of birth control; poor health; separations due to migrations; and a cultural tendency for older women not to remarry, prevented the fertility rate from increasing. Thus, Frier points out, pre-modern societies could withstand a limited amount of individual independence while continuing to stress and promote the community as a whole. Although Frier admits that such statistical analysis is flawed and fails to give us a clearer idea of a Roman-Egyptian woman's lived experience, demography emerges as a far less influential factor in the development of societies than previously assumed, thereby opening up new avenues of research. An appendix addresses Louis Henry's 1961 article on age distribution of marital fertility rates in pre-modern societies.

Harris' 1994 lecture, "The Roman Version," addressed Roman attitudes towards the public display of anger. This discussion was part of a larger work on anger in the ancient world, *Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity* (Harvard University Press, 2002). Here, we have reprinted Chapter 9, "The Roman Version," in which Harris

turns from the Greek world to that of the Romans. He notes that early on in Roman history there was little emphasis on the restraint of public expressions of anger. Open competition and opposition between the Roman elite was the norm and not considered a threat to the established social order of society. By the chaotic Late Republic, however, uncontrolled expressions of rage jeopardized one's status and reputation. At this time, significantly, they had also begun to be considered a feature of barbaric peoples, and thus were actively discouraged. The necessity for anger management appears in Cicero, Caesar and Sallust inspired, in part, by the stance taken by Greek philosophers.

Yet, anger retained some positive aspects – it was necessary to the effective orator, for example. Similarly, one had the right to revenge one's self, even if the appropriate means of doing so was via the legal system. Writers like Livy and Virgil did not wholly disapprove of *ira* but instead attributed the emotion to positive figures and certain, clearly necessary situations.

Although later writers like Seneca, Musonius Rufus, and Juvenal continued to be concerned with anger's effects on elite status and its barbaric connotations, the focus from Caesar's dictatorship on increasingly shifted away from the elite and towards the ruler and his court. Anger was now viewed as a primary cause of civil wars, while the right of revenge began to be questioned. Harris concludes by discussing the effect that these new views on anger may have had on public behavior at large, as well as on the emergence of a new widespread tolerance for revenge during the Severan Age.

With his lecture "Flora and the Sybil," delivered at Bryn Mawr College in 1995, Robert Palmer, in the true spirit of the occasion, sought to honor his friend and fellow Romanist Agnes Kirsopp Lake Michels. With that end in mind, he selected a topic he knew would have piqued her interest, the annual Floral Games of Rome. Much uncertainty has surrounded the question of the origin of the notoriously licentious Floral Games in Rome, and much scholarship has been devoted to showing, in one way or another, that the Games must have been foreign, most probably Greek, in origin. In a well-thought out argument, however, Palmer unravels much of the confusion surrounding the establishment of the Floral Games at Rome. Beginning with the discrepancy among the ancient sources for the date and occasion of the first Floral Games, Palmer demonstrates the connection between the Roman cult of Flora and the cults of Demeter/Ceres and Kore of the Greek cities of southern Italy.

Palmer's judicious review of both the ancient sources on the Floral Games, which include the Elder Pliny, Velleius Paterculus and Ovid's *Fasti*, and the modern scholarship on the question beginning with Theodore

Mommsen, exposes the sources of the confusion surrounding the issue of the Floral Games. After clearing up the confusion surrounding the construction of the Temple of Flora by the *aediles* Publicii, he proceeds to tease out the actual order of the events that led up to the vowing of annual Floral Games in perpetuity, in 174 BCE, after consultation of the Sibylline books.

In the spring of 1996, Michael C.J. Putnam, as the annual Agnes K. Michels lecturer at Bryn Mawr College, delivered a lecture on the ritual aspects of Horace's Ode 3.23 entitled "Horace Odes 3.23: Ritual and Art." This lecture, subsequently revised and published in *Rome and her Monuments: Essays on the City and Literature of Rome in Honor of Katherine A. Geffcken* (Bolchazy-Carducci, 2000), is reprinted here with the permission of the author and the publishers. In it, Putnam examines the manner in which Horace conveyed the idea of religious ritual in the poem by means of such devices as synecdoche, metonymy, assonance and enjambment.

Ode 3.23 is addressed to Phidyle, the frugal mistress of a rural household, who is depicted making simple, but wholly appropriate, offerings to her household gods. Of particular significance, thematically speaking, Putnam explains, is the manner in which the poet contrasts the images of Phidyle's humble private offering with the large-scale sacrifices of livestock by the priests and magistrates of Rome to the major gods of the state. As Putnam points out, the poem literally begins and ends with the scene of Phidyle making offerings to her Lares and Penates in the first and last stanzas. Significantly, however, this tranquil scene is interrupted first by a litany of the seasonal dangers to be avoided by such offerings, then by a digression on the herds being fattened in preparation for grand and ostentatious sacrificial ceremonies in honor of the major gods of the state religion.

In his lecture of 1997, wittily entitled "Left and Right, Right and Wrong in Roman Religion," Professor Jerzy Linderski of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill outlined the definitive augural procedure, while clearing up uncertainty surrounding the distinction between the commonly confused terms augury and auspices, as well as that between *auspicia privata* and *auspicia publica*. The latter constitutes the primary focus of his memorable talk, reproduced here with the title "Founding the City." He also explains the principles of celestial and terrestrial geography with regard to propitiousness, and sets forth clearly the hierarchy of *signa*, aviary and celestial. Linderski painstakingly re-examines previous scholarship on the subject and dispels certain long-standing misconceptions concerning augural orientation and the significance of the terms *dextra* and *sinistra*, right and left, in the observation of *signa*. He judiciously employs and synthesizes

descriptions from Ennius' epic and Livy's history, supplementing these sources, where appropriate, with references to the meticulous first-century antiquarian Varro. To corroborate the textual evidence, Linderski looks to the archaeological remains of Bantia in southern Italy, where a series of well-preserved stone *cippi* were arranged in rows, corresponding with the different quarters of the officiant's field of vision and clearly marked with indicators of divine approval, divine warning, strength and weakness. Drawing upon both the literary and the archaeological evidence, Linderski argues convincingly that the directional terms "left" and "right" were wholly dependent upon the position and point of view of the officiating magistrate.

Susan Treggiari's case study of Cicero's daughter, Tullia, the last chapter of her book *Roman Social History* (Routledge, 2002) served as the basis for Treggiari's 1998 lecture. After determining and evaluating the limited available evidence for Tullia's brief life, she examines the various approaches, as well as methods of interpretation open to the social historian. She stresses the variety of questions both raised and answered by the evidence, touching on a number of key issues. These include the problems associated with limited primary evidence; the lack of information on Roman women in general; the important historical and social context of the mid-first century BC; the use of secondary sources and the debates engaged in by these sources. Treggiari emphasizes Tullia's silence. Still, she asserts that, though it is ultimately impossible to gain a full understanding of Tullia as an individual, a great deal of valuable information emerges from the evidence at hand. Different approaches to this evidence can provide new understanding of both Tullia herself and of Roman social history in general.

In 1999, Jeffrey Rusten addressed the problems raised by the "Archaeology" section of the first book of Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*, in his lecture "Thucydides' Archaeology." This section, Rusten observes, has come increasingly under attack from both archaeologists and classicists, especially as new archaeological discoveries have uncovered gross inaccuracies in the historian's account of events from the reign of Minos in Crete to the Trojan War. Here, Rusten objectively and thoughtfully addresses both the claims of Thucydides' critics and the responses offered by the historian's die-hard apologists, acknowledging the substantive validity of many such critics' attacks while placing Thucydides' frequently speculative guesswork into its proper context as an example of fifth-century Athenian intellectual practices. Rusten focuses particularly upon Thucydides' highly idiosyncratic formula for calculating the size of the Greek expedition at Troy, a seemingly unscientific mode of estimation – significantly – that has its parallel elsewhere in the *History*.

Richard Thomas, our eighth Michels lecturer, took us back to Agnes Michels' beloved Virgil but away from the classical world and into eighteenth century England. His 2000 lecture on Dryden's Virgil became the chapter "Dryden's Virgil and the Politics of Translation," reprinted here from his book *Virgil and the Augustan Reception* (Cambridge University Press, 2001). Dryden's translations of Virgil's poetry, in particular, have markedly influenced both classical scholarship and the popular reception of Virgil from the eighteenth century on. In this chapter, Thomas examines Dryden's use of "translation with latitude" in order to convey his specific interpretation of Virgil's authorial intent, an interpretation prompted by the contemporary political situation in England and by Dryden's Royalist position. In Dryden's hands, Virgil's poems became instruction manuals advising the monarch -- that is, Augustus -- on how to rule and his subjects on their duties towards their leader. This stance owed much to Dryden's familiarity with contemporary French literary critics like Père René Le Bossu and French translators like Charles de la Rue and Jean Regnault de Segrais, all of whom were members of the court of Louis XIV.

To Dryden, Virgil's Aeneas stood for Augustus, who, in turn, acted as the model of the "perfect prince." To preserve this image, he embellished, modified, added, and even ignored parts of the epic in his translation, overemphasizing, for example, Aeneas/Augustus' *pietas*. In so doing, Dryden stripped not only the *Aeneid* but also other Virgilian poems of their carefully crafted ambiguity, replacing Virgil's complex intertextuality with Dryden's own. Dryden's translations reveal the eighteenth-century poet's conception of the Augustan Age as an earlier, but essentially equivalent, version of his own time. It established the propagandistic, pro-Augustan image of Virgil dominant from then until the twentieth century and still prevalent at the popular level.

Agnes Michels never shied away from controversial topics or positions. Thus, Mark Munn's challenge to the *communis opinio* concerning the date and composition of Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* is truly in keeping with the spirit of the lecture series that bears her name. Received wisdom holds that the Athenian historian died before the end of the war, and before he could complete his work, hence the break-off of his narrative with events in 411 BC and the seemingly "unfinished" quality of the eighth and last book of his *History*. In his 2001 lecture, entitled "*Ktēma es aiei*: The Occasion of Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*," Munn challenged the conventional view with a thought-provoking argument as to the date of Thucydides' composition of his *History*. Taking into account the cultural and political *Zeitgeist* in which the historian was writing, Munn argues for a much later date of composition, well after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian War and on the eve of the so-called "Corinthian War" in

396/395 BCE.

After a judicious review of the major theories and schools of thought concerning the composition of the *History*, Munn launches into a detailed discussion of the logistics involved in composing the *History*. Drawing upon a wide variety of independent sources, including Aristophanes, as well as from the opening words of the *History* itself, Munn compellingly argues for a much later date of composition. He also suggests a novel solution to the problem of why a number of passages in Thucydides' *History* seem to allude to conditions *after* 404 BCE. Thucydides, Munn concludes, hoped his history of the Peloponnesian War would offer his fellow-citizens practical guidance in the event of a resumption of hostilities with Sparta.

Denis Feeney's 2002 lecture, the tenth in this series, specifically addressed the Romans' attempted synchronization of historical and quasi-historical events in the eastern and western Mediterranean. His contribution to this volume, "*Mea Tempora: Patterning of Time in the Metamorphoses*," is well in keeping with the lecture's general themes, as well as with Agnes Michels' work on Roman calendars. Feeney asserts that Ovid constructs a unique chronography for Greek and Roman history in the *Metamorphoses*, one distinctly his own. Beginning with the chronographical models available to Ovid, particularly those of Eratosthenes, Cato, Ennius, Apollodorus, Nepos, Varro, and Virgil, he underscores their similar patterning of time. Each of these writers emphasizes key historical moments such as the fall of Troy, often correlating Greek and Roman histories, and marking clear divisions between mythical/historical events. In the *Metamorphoses*, however, Ovid breaks the majority of these established patterns, destabilizing such boundaries and de-emphasizing key chronological markers like Troy's demise. Other canonical moments, in addition to standard Greek/Roman synchronisms, are omitted entirely.

Instead, Ovid imposes a chronographical pattern unique to the internal world of the poem and devoid of any definite end point. This pattern, in turn, highlights the poet's sole power and control over this world. Ovid recognized that great power lay in the ability to control the patterning of time, and this realization allowed him to escape not only his predecessors but also Augustus and the new Augustan chronographical construction evident, for example, in the revisions of the Julian calendar. Although Feeney admits that Ovid never succeeds in divesting the poem entirely of Augustan time, and the resulting tension between the two chronographies, namely the *mea tempora* of the *Metamorphoses* and the *tua tempora* of the *Tristia*, Ovid asserts his position outside of the limits of time itself at the epic's close.

We would like to thank all of our Michels lecturers from the series' first ten years for agreeing to take part in this tribute to Mrs. Michels; the

Department of Greek, Latin and Classical Studies at Bryn Mawr College, particularly the Chair of the department, Professor Darby Scott, for their support and encouragement; Bryn Mawr Classical Review and Professor Richard Hamilton for publishing this volume; Oliva Cardona department administrator; our assistant editors A. Maureen Beabout, Michelle Domondon, and Yasmin Mathew; all of the graduate students who have organized and overseen this series; and finally, the series' anonymous donor. We were not privileged to know Agnes Michels personally, but we have felt her influence in the classroom, the vibrant graduate community, and, not least, in the spirit of this lecture series. The series has given us a unique learning opportunity, from the details involved in organizing such an event to direct contact with distinguished scholars and new, unpublished material. It is our hope that this volume will both express our appreciation for her and perpetuate her legacy.

Suzanne B. Faris and Lesley E. Lundeen
Co-editors

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Marriage and Motherhood in Roman Egypt

Bruce W. Frier

It is one of the honors of my life to have been asked to deliver this first lecture in a series named for Agnes Kirsopp Michels, Professor Emerita in the Department of Latin at Bryn Mawr. I first met Nan in 1969, when I came to Bryn Mawr as her designated replacement during her sabbatical. In reality, I doubt anyone could really replace Nan for an instant. I, in any case, was not that person. Nan's elegant and uncanny scholarship on Roman religion was already known to me long before my arrival in Bryn Mawr. The special strengths of her scholarship lie in her unflagging respect for both literary and archeological sources, her concern for the details of how institutions operated both in theory and in practice, and above all her crisp, commonsensical approach to reconstructing historical reality. During my year at Bryn Mawr I fell very much under Nan's influence. It is an influence that has remained with me throughout my scholarly life.

* * * *

Those who study Roman social history must often choose, at least implicitly, between two approaches: whether to emphasize a fundamental similarity in outlook and values between our world and theirs, or instead to stress the differences dividing us from them. Indeed, the Romans often seem Janus-like in precisely this way: at times they are so similar that it is frighteningly like looking at yourself in a mirror; at other times, they are as alien as anything in science fiction.

My topic today, however, presents no such difficulty. In matters of marriage and motherhood, the barrier dividing us from the Romans, and from all other pre-modern societies, is as lofty as any in human history. This barrier is of surprisingly recent origin. Two centuries ago, an American woman who survived to age 50, and who during adulthood bore children at the average rate for women her age, would have given birth to more than seven children.¹ Today she would give birth to less than two. What has intervened is the great fertility transition, the second stage of a mighty

¹ Easterlin 1976; Heer 1975.

demographic revolution that has seen large portions of the world move from "high pressure" regimes in which both birth and death rates are elevated, to "low pressure" regimes in which mortality and fertility are comparatively modest. The revolution continues today. It has already profoundly affected every aspect of our social, political, and cultural life; and there is, as of yet, not the slightest sign that its consequences are close to being fully worked out. These consequences are exciting to many of us, incomprehensible and frightening to others. But barring some global catastrophe of unprecedented scale, the revolution itself is irreversible.²

When social historians look back across this mighty barrier, their vision is inevitably confused by the glare of modernity. They often find it hard to understand what simple generational survival meant in past societies, the requirements and conditions it imposed on the entire fabric of human life. For the Roman Empire, the inadequacies of backward vision are still further aggravated, since much of the upper-class literary tradition, on which antiquity's vast historical influence depends, is all but oblivious to an underlying demographic regime that, for the most part, ancient authors took for granted as part of the natural order.

Therefore let me restate a question I first posed, in a footnote,³ more than ten years ago: to what extent was ancient humanism, with its emphasis on individual liberty and self-responsibility, ultimately reconcilable with the demographic realities that underlay Greek and Roman societies? This question, is, of course, vast. In the compass of a single lecture, I cannot hope to provide a convincing answer to it, or even a convincing analysis of its many ramifications. Instead, I adopt a more indirect strategy: first, to describe a concrete, and what I will take to be a typical, example of the ancient demographic regime; and second, to suggest at least some of the more salient implications of that regime, particularly for the position of women in the Greco-Roman world.

My example is Egypt during the first three centuries of the Roman Empire. Through an accident of history and climate, there survive about three hundred census returns filed by ordinary people in the Roman province of Egypt; I provide an example on the first page of my handout, from the census of A.D. 117/118. During the early Roman Empire, the census was taken in Egypt at 14-year intervals. Extant Egyptian census returns range in date from the census of A.D. 11/12 to that of 257/258; but the great majority—nearly 90 percent—are concentrated in the second and early third centuries. Like other documentary papyri from Egypt, the census returns are also geographically concentrated; more than three-quarters come either from

² See, e.g., the essays in Gillis *et al.* 1992. Japan may also have undergone a fairly easy fertility transition.

³ Frier 1982, 248 n.72.

the Arsinoite nome (the Fayyum area, a fertile lake valley to the southwest of the Nile Delta), or from the Oxyrhynchite nome to its south, with only scattered representation from other nomes. Surviving returns are about evenly divided between small Egyptian villages (with an average population of ca. 1,000 persons) and the nome capitals, the metropoleis (with an average of ca. 25,000); but since village population in Egypt is likely to have been at least double that of cities, the villages are undoubtedly underrepresented.⁴ Regrettably, there are no returns at all from the great city of Alexandria.

In any case, the singular merit of this corpus is that it opens to our gaze the lives of quite ordinary individuals situated far beneath the Roman Empire's social and political elite: farmers, laborers, soldiers, scribes, weavers, goldsmiths, gardeners, ropemakers, stonecutters, donkey-drivers, and their families and households, all persons commonly met with in the Egyptian census returns.

Over the past several years, Prof. Roger Bagnall of Columbia and I have been closely examining the nearly eleven hundred persons who are registered in these returns.⁵ Many returns are poorly preserved, and the information they contain is therefore often difficult to retrieve. But insofar as we can now determine, they are surprisingly good and reliable from a demographic standpoint, with little of the systematic distortion in age reporting that characterizes most other data from the Greco-Roman world. Although the Egyptian census returns are nonetheless not perfect documents, they appear to provide the best opportunity for a deeper understanding of the ancient demographic regime. In what follows, I do no more than briefly describe the main characteristics of that regime, particularly as they relate to marriage, motherhood, and the general situation of adult women.

A large majority of Egyptians in the census returns lived not in simple conjugal (or "nuclear") families, but rather in complex households. The main reason is that males who married did not normally leave their homes and form new households, but instead brought their brides into their homes. The result is many households with "multiple families": either families in two different generations, or several families in the same generation—most typically, brothers living together with their wives and children after their parents have died. Also common are families that are "extended" through the presence of kin (parents, siblings, or cousins). Such complex households are markedly more frequent in Egyptian villages than in nome metropoleis; it is likely that better than three-fifths of the Egyptian population lived in complex households, a pattern that was typical of pre-modern Mediterranean

⁴ On population, see Rathbone 1990, who probably understates the total population of metropoleis (pp. 120-121).

⁵ Bagnall and Frier 1994; all data used in this lecture derive from the book and are provisional. Our computer catalogue now lists 1082 persons.

societies.⁶ Although “nuclear” families were not uncommon in Egypt, they usually result from attrition, through the death of parents and other kin.

Beyond doubt, mortality in Roman Egypt was extremely high. On the likeliest estimate, Egyptian females had a life expectancy at birth of approximately 21 to 24 years.⁷ What this means is that about a third of newborn females would die before their first birthday; nearly half, by age 5; and nearly 99 percent, by age 80. This is a harsh demographic regime chiefly because of high infant mortality; but even at age 20 about one woman in twelve would die within five years. Male life expectancy seems to have been similar to female, or perhaps slightly higher. As a result, the population was young. In the census returns the average age of females is 26, and of males, 26.6 years. Better than a third of the population is 15 or younger, while less than five percent are 65 or older.

At first sight, such low life expectancy may seem breathtaking, but it is, in fact, comparable to that obtaining in China and India during the early decades of the twentieth century.⁸ Thus it seems fair to say that life expectancy in Roman Egypt was low, but not necessarily unexpectedly low; the life expectancy levels that the census returns imply accord with all other remotely plausible evidence for the early Roman Empire generally.⁹

The broader historical implications of this life expectancy are, however, more grim. Life expectancy at birth is among the most frequently used measurements of overall social welfare. On this purely statistical standard, the Roman Empire apparently brought its subjects no real improvement in their social welfare. As two Hungarian demographers observed in 1970, Roman “mortality characteristics do not differ substantially from those of the Eneolithic or Bronze Age.”¹⁰ To be sure, the Roman Empire is not unique in this respect; subsequent societies apparently experienced only small and intermittent improvements in life expectancy before the eighteenth century,

⁶ Gallant 1991, 21-27, with comparative data.

⁷ The female age distribution (over age 5) in the census returns is most consistent with a slowly growing population (ca. 0.1 to 0.3 percent per year) in which female life expectancy at birth is within two years or so of 22.5. Coale and Demeny 1983, 42, for Model West, Level 2, and pp.56 and 81 for stable populations associated with this model; 32-33 for the technique used to estimate life expectancy from age distribution.

⁸ China (rural): Barclay *et al.* 1976, 606-635; also several essays in Hanley and Wolf 1985. India: essays in Dyson 1989.

⁹ Frier 1982 (cited n. 3) and Frier 1983, 328-344. But note also Hopkins, “Graveyards for Historians,” in Hinard 1987, 113-126 (doubting whether any demographic statistics are reliable for the Roman world).

¹⁰ Acsádi and Nemeskéri 1970, 216. Compare Weiss 1973, 48-51.

when mortality decline, the first stage in the modern demographic transition, began in earnest within many European countries.

Against this severe backdrop, marriage and motherhood became issues crucial to the survival of population. It may seem, on first impression, that the high mortality populations such as Roman Egypt had to achieve the highest possible level of childbearing simply in order to endure. For example, the English historical demographer E.A. Wrigley once observed that, at such high levels of mortality, "a population could hardly allow private choice since it must mobilize maximum fertility if it is to survive at all."¹¹ Wrigley's observation restates, of course, the dilemma that I raised earlier. If, for some historical societies, demographic survival depended upon the social suppression of private choice, then a deliberate cultural humanism, encouraging individual independence and the pursuit of private goals, would appear to undermine its chances of survival. This is the central dilemma that I want to resolve today.

I have always believed that lectures should not be treasure hunts; so let me indicate, right now, where my solution lies. Wrigley has overstated the problem; or, perhaps more precisely, he has misstated it. Although Wrigley was obviously correct in observing that populations with very high mortality require fertility rates that are also high by modern standards, it by no means follows that such populations are obliged to "mobilize maximum fertility." Indeed, as we shall see, the opposite is true. Even under what we might consider extreme conditions of mortality, overpopulation remains as great a threat as underpopulation, so that personal or social restraint of fertility is of central importance to a population's survival. Thus, even though most historical populations had very limited technological control over both mortality and fertility, they did not entirely lack room for maneuver.

Pre-transition populations usually had life expectancies at birth ranging from 20-40 years, with most populations probably falling into the lower half of this range. But the (at first sight curious) fact is that, irrespective of their mortality rates, virtually all these populations usually had long-term growth rates between -0.5 percent per year (slight decline) and +1.5 (fairly rapid growth); and the great majority lay in an even narrower band from 0.0 to 0.5.¹² That is, except in abnormal periods, most populations experienced slow long-term growth irrespective of their overall mortality; and our best evidence suggests that Roman Egypt, and the Roman Empire generally, experienced similarly slow growth.¹³ How did pre-modern populations achieve this?

¹¹ Wrigley 1987, 209 (from an essay published in 1978).

¹² See, e.g., Livi-Bacci 1991, 1-10.

¹³ See, e.g., Rathbone (cited n. 4) 123-124, conjecturing an annual growth rate from 31 B.C. to A.D. 166 of about 0.26 percent. Actual growth

Broadly speaking, historical populations used two main demographic strategies to cope with high mortality rates. The first strategy is illustrated by early modern France, which in 1750, four decades before the French Revolution, still had a life expectancy at birth of about 25 years.¹⁴ Surprisingly, the French response was to delay female marriage until women were in their mid-20s, and also tolerate fairly high levels of female celibacy (women who never married at all); but those French women who did marry bore children at a very high rate, apparently with almost no use of contraception or any other means of fertility limitation. The French strategy, then, was to restrict the burden of reproduction; only a portion of adult women were exposed to the risks of childbearing, and then only during a specific period of their lives. This strategy worked reasonably well; on one estimate, the population of France, within its modern borders, varied by no more than seven percent from 22.5 million during the two centuries from 1550 to 1750.¹⁵

However, most pre-modern populations did not use this strategy, but relied instead on early marriage by all or almost all women. In these populations, as E.A. Wrigley has put it, "marriage for women ... was almost universally a life-cycle stage in a physiological as well as a social sense in that it occurred at or close to menarche. Few women failed to marry and those who married moved into their new state because of physical maturation."¹⁶ In early-marriage populations, the challenge posed by high mortality was typically met by a demographic strategy in which the heavy risk of childbirth was distributed as widely as possible among women of childbearing age; socialization into marriage and childbirth was thus an all but invariable part of a woman's experiences when she became an adult. Although I presumably need not dwell on the social and cultural costs of such a demographic strategy, it at least spreads the risks of childbearing as broadly as possible among adult women.

Roman Egypt is a typical example of a population that used an early-marriage strategy. Within the census returns, we are able to trace, with considerable accuracy, the marriage process among young Egyptian women;

may in fact have been even lower; we conjecture ca. 0.10 (from four to five million).

¹⁴ On French demography in this period, see Dupâquier *et al.* 1988. The classic article on this subject is Henry and Blayo 1975, 71-122.

¹⁵ France resembled most northern European countries in delaying age at marriage, but had markedly higher mortality levels than its neighbors, perhaps because its population level was well above optimum under then existing economic conditions. See, e.g., Sauvy 1956, 186-187; Goubert 1960, 604-616.

¹⁶ Wrigley (cited n. 11) 7, contrasting early modern Europe.

I provide a reconstructed model on the second page of my handout. My model is based upon the current marital status of 202 free women registered as aged 10 or older.¹⁷ Women begin to marry at about age 12, just after the onset of female puberty. During their late teens, women marry at a rapidly increasing rate, until by age 20 some sixty to seventy percent are married; by age 30, all or virtually all women have married at least once. (The curious dip in the percent of women married during their early and mid-20's is a statistical fluke.¹⁸)

At age 30, about eighty percent of women are still married; but after age 30 the percentage of still married women begins to decline, and by their late 40s only about 35 to 40 percent of women are still married. What this indicates is that many women whose marriages were broken prematurely by divorce or their husband's death did not remarry. This pattern is typical for pre-transition populations in the Mediterranean.¹⁹ I will return presently to the demographic significance of this tendency not to remarry.

Egyptian males have a somewhat more complex marital pattern. As it seems, they begin to marry especially in their later teens and early 20's, and by age 25 around half are married; but thereafter the rate of male marriage slows considerably. However, unlike for women, the percentage of men who are still married continues to rise as men age, until in their 40s about seventy percent of men are currently married. By age 50 or so, all surviving males are attested as married or previously married.

These seemingly contradictory patterns are explained by three further aspects of Egyptian marriage. First, marriage in Roman Egypt is normally "virilocal"; that is, a newly married woman resides in her husband's household. However, marriage is not "neolocal"; a newly married couple is not expected to find a new dwelling. Instead, they commonly reside in the same household with the husband's surviving parents, or, if the parents are deceased, with his surviving siblings, one or more of whom may also be married. The result is a large proportion of complex households with extended or multiple families co-residing under the same roof. Such a pattern

¹⁷ The model for this reconstruction was developed by Coale and McNeil 1972, 743-749; briefly described by Newell 1988, 167-170. The reconstruction, which uses $a(O)$ of 9 and k of 0.93, is visually fitted to the Egyptian data for ages 12 to 20 and 28 to 30; all Egyptian women in the census returns are attested as married from ages 26 to 32 (23 women). Five-year moving averages smooth the Egyptian data, which derive only from complete or nearly complete returns.

¹⁸ The dip results from a chance decline in the number of attested women at this age, and a consequent weakening of the statistical basis for the marriage curve.

¹⁹ Gallant (cited n. 6) 26-27, with bibliography.

of household formation presumably facilitated early marriage, since couples did not have to obtain the resources required for establishing new households.

Second, Egyptian males who marry while still young usually marry women fairly close in age to themselves; the age gap between husband and wife averages only about three to four years. However, as males age, they increasingly prefer brides who are considerably younger than themselves; for husbands in their 40's or older, the gap in age rises to well over twelve years, and in about a fifth of attested marriages the husband is more than fifteen years older than his wife. This means, in effect, that older Egyptian males often competed within the "marriage market" for much younger women. As a result, a large proportion of younger males, although they may have desired to marry and start a family, were apparently elbowed aside.²⁰

The third aspect of Egyptian marriage is more startling. A large fraction of first marriages, perhaps as much as a third in some areas of Egypt, were contracted between extremely close kin: in most cases, between full brothers and sisters. Much has been written about brother-sister marriage in Roman Egypt; it is today usually believed to have been a Hellenistic innovation, which gained widespread acceptance because it allowed families to avoid the immediate necessity of dividing their property in order to provide a dowry for a daughter.²¹ The census returns support this view. They suggest that during the Roman period, brother-sister marriage as an institution was gradually spreading from north to south in Egypt, and also from larger cities outward into the countryside. This strongly suggests its origin among Greeks settled in the cities of Lower Egypt, although the practice was soon taken up by native Egyptians as well.²²

More important for demographic purposes, however, is what the census returns imply about the use of brother-sister marriage as an institution. Insofar as we know, brother-sister marriages are always first marriages for both spouses. The brides are often extremely young, in many cases still in

²⁰ A similar effect has been observed in present-day India: Visaria 1971, 64-65. It is likely that, as in India, Roman Egypt had a sex ratio unbalanced toward males; but the degree of the imbalance has proved impossible to measure from the census returns.

²¹ As to the usual motives for close-kin marriage, see, e.g., Hombert and Préaux 1952, 140, and Goody 1990, 332-339, against Hopkins 1980, 322-323, and Shaw 1992, 276-277. All these authors have further bibliography. Avoidance of property partition is the motive usually given by modern practitioners of close-kin marriage; e.g., Atran 1985 on cross-cousin marriage among the Druze of Isfiya.

²² Prior to the Hellenistic period, close-kin marriage among Egyptians is apparently no closer than half-sibling: Pestman 1961, 3-4.

their mid-teens. Further, brother-sister marriages may have been unstable; statistics on divorce, which was available virtually on demand in Roman Egypt, suggest that many close-kin marriages ended in divorce. Finally, as males age, they appear increasingly reluctant to marry within their own families, and instead seek marriage outside their families; the proportion of close-kin marriage thus drops from about a third for males ages less than 30, to only around ten percent for males aged 50 and over. All this is consistent with the supposition that many brother-sister marriages were often contracted under the influence of a prior generation.²³ As time passed and that generation's influence waned, brother-sister marriage became infrequent.

I do not mean to suggest that brother-sister marriages were always loveless. At least some endure for decades. When this occurs, they are extremely productive of children, obviously because they are usually contracted so young; one brother-sister couple has eight children, another six. Four census returns show brother-sister marriage continuing at least two generations, while two other papyri describe it continuing across three.²⁴ If Egyptians recognized the adverse effects of such genetic inbreeding (and there is no sign that they did), they obviously counted the costs as outweighed by the benefits.

Relaxing incest taboos against close-kin marriage has the unexpected demographic effect of raising the overall growth rate of the population, all else being equal. The reason is that early marriage is facilitated for both sexes: choice is widened, and the need for personal initiative in finding a spouse is reduced; marriage thus tends to be earlier.²⁵ This is what seems in fact to happen in Roman Egypt.

Marriage is important to demographers because it signals the onset of regular sexual relations for most women; hence it is closely tied to fertility. Although this is by and large true for Roman Egypt, there are two important exceptions, both of which made the link between marriage and fertility weaker than in pre-modern Europe. First, Egypt also knew informal marital couplings that produced children described in the census returns as "fatherless," *apátōres*, because they lack legitimate fathers. It is today widely accepted that *apátōres* were usually the issue of long-term stable unions, which did not rise to the level of true marriages simply because the couple lacked the legal capacity to marry; the classic example is the

²³ See Hopkins (cited n. 21) 351-353, who, however, then rejects this theory for unconvincing reasons.

²⁴ *P.Tebt.* II 320 and *P.Amh.* II 75 (neither is a census return).

²⁵ Hammel *et al.* 1979, 972-977; Keyfitz 1985, 300-301. Socially, these consequences are usually considered negative: Fox 1967.

concubine serving the Roman soldier.²⁶ The number of such illegitimate children was not negligible in Roman Egypt, probably three to five percent of the freeborn population though higher in some localities.

Second, female slaves also gave birth to illegitimate children. Fertility rates among Egyptian slaves appear to be about as high as those among free persons, but it is virtually impossible, even by way of conjecture, to detect slave "families" constructed analogously to free families. Since slaves are more than a tenth of the persons registered in the census returns, their fertility is of considerable significance to overall Egyptian fertility rates.

Thus far I have tried to describe, from a demographic standpoint, marriage in Roman Egypt. Not surprisingly, some aspects of Egyptian marriage are distinctive to the Greco-Roman world (such as concubinage and slavery), and others are idiosyncratic to Roman Egypt within the Greco-Roman world (such as brother-sister marriage). But in general the Egypt of the census returns resembles most other pre-modern Mediterranean populations: complex households predominate; free women marry early, and virtually all women marry; men marry somewhat later, and almost all males who survive eventually marry.²⁷

Yet already some oddities have emerged. Above all, large numbers of both sexes were normally unmarried during much of their adult lives. Earlier I quoted E.A. Wrigley to the effect that a population with a level of mortality as high as Egypt's "must mobilize maximum fertility if it is to survive at all." This view was once fairly common among demographers; it certainly corresponds to general intuition. However, historical demographers have more recently come to realize that, although pre-modern fertility rates were high compared to modern rates, as a rule they were not remotely close to the maximum fertility that human societies are capable of sustaining. In fact, the vast majority of historical populations not only did not attain maximum fertility, but in various ways sought to prevent its occurrence, since for these societies the dangers of sharp population growth were as fearsome as those of population decline.²⁸

Maximum fertility is associated in demography with a small number of historical communities consciously organized so as to promote childbearing; the preeminent case is the Hutterites, a prolific Anabaptist sect that flourished in the upper Great Plains during the 1920s. In accord with what they regarded as biblical injunctions, Hutterite women married fairly early,

²⁶ Youtie 1975, 723-745, reprinted in Youtie 1981, 17-34.

²⁷ Laslett 1983, 513-587, esp. 525-531 and 576-577. However, Laslett's typology is less than universal; see Kertzer 1991, 155-179, reviewing recent scholarship.

²⁸ The (basically Malthusian) reasons are well explained by Wrigley and Schofield 1989, 454-484.

scrupulously avoided contraception and abortion, weaned their children as quickly as possible, and otherwise promoted high birth rates; they also kept exact records on all children ever born, including those who died in infancy. Hutterite women who survived to age 50 had a Total Marital Fertility Rate of more than twelve children, the highest rate ever recorded for a human population.²⁹

Egyptian fertility was undoubtedly much lower, probably slightly less than half of Hutterite fertility. Granted what we know of Egyptian mortality, a Total Fertility Rate can be reconstructed for Egypt on the assumption (which appears to be justified) that Egypt experienced very low intrinsic growth during the early Roman Empire. The reconstruction (see Fig. 1 at the end of the article) indicated that an Egyptian woman who survived to age 50, and who during her adulthood bore children at an average rate for women her age, bore a total of just under six children.³⁰ The reconstructed model fertility pattern for Egyptian women corresponds fairly closely to that actually attested for Roman Egypt in 207 cases where the census returns preserve the age both of a mother and of her child or children, thus making it possible to restore the age at which a woman gave birth.³¹

We can reckon, then, with a Total Fertility Rate of about six children. This rate may seem very high, but by pre-modern standards it is not. I observed earlier that around 1800 the Total Fertility Rate in the United States probably exceeded seven children—an extremely high rate that doubtless resulted from the new economic resources of the frontier. Contemporary less developed countries also frequently exhibit very high fertility: “In 1982 the total fertility rate was between 6.2 and 8.3 for 36 of the 45 lowest income

²⁹ See generally Henry 1961, 81-91; also Eaton and Mayer 1953, 206-264, and Tietze 1957, 89-97.

³⁰ The reconstruction uses a model developed by Coale and Trussell 1974, 185-258; see also Newell (cited n. 17) 170-175. The Total Fertility Rate here estimated stems from other evidence about the likeliest long-term mortality and growth rates in Roman Egypt; but the TFR only scales the graph and does not affect its shape, which is determined by the previously selected values of $a(O)$ and k (see n. 17) and by the value of m (estimated at 0.2); shape is our primary interest. Average age of maternity in the census returns is 27.5 years.

³¹ The age of maternity is back-reconstructed, from census data, through a simplified form of the “Own-Children” method: Cho *et al.* 1986; this standard method is used to correct for age distortion in raw census data. Seven-year moving averages smooth the data, which are also rescaled to produce the same number of births from age 12 to 44 as in the model. Discrepancies between the attested rates and the model probably result, in the main, from slight age misstatement in the census returns.

countries of the globe where income per capita in 1982 dollars ranged from \$80 to \$660."³² These fertility rates, markedly higher than the ones probably prevailing in Roman Egypt, have resulted in extraordinary, almost uncontrolled population growth among many less developed countries; at its current rate of growth, for instance, the population of the continent of Africa will double every 23 years.

Population growth is, of course, the key issue. In order to obtain a better grasp on the relation between population growth and fertility in Roman Egypt, we must look more closely at the likely fertility rates for women of particular ages. At the peak of their fertility, from ages 20 to 29, Egyptian women would probably have given birth at a rate of about one child every 46 months (3.8 years). By contrast, the average like-aged woman in Bangladesh, 1974, gave birth every 37 months; and the average Hutterite woman, every 23 months, double the Egyptian rate. My point is simply to emphasize how far below the maximum Egyptian fertility rates probably lay.

Comparative research strongly suggests that fertility rates in traditional populations were in fact usually close to replacement levels, enough to maintain, in normal times, a slight level of population increase, but no higher. This research is in marked contrast to earlier assumptions that pre-industrial societies always sought, and were forced to seek, maximum levels of fertility. As the eminent demographer Ansley Coale has recently observed, "The statement that traditional societies developed customs that promoted high fertility, or faced extinction, should therefore be amended to say that traditional societies developed customs that kept fertility at *moderate* levels, avoiding both fertility so low that negative growth would make the population shrink to zero, or so high that positive growth would lead to an overcrowded habitat, and hence to higher mortality, and greater vulnerability to catastrophe or rival groups ..."³³

I do not mean to minimize the burden of fertility on Egyptian women; this burden was unquestionably heavy. But the problem of fertility for Roman Egypt, as for the rest of the ancient world, was, in the end, much less how to attain fertility levels that would ensure replacement, than how to restrain population growth in excess of the low prevailing levels of economic growth. With studied vagueness, Coale wrote: "traditional societies developed customs that kept fertility at *moderate* levels." What were these customs, and how were they "developed"? How did Egyptians prevent a population explosion?

³² Donaldson 1991, 9.

³³ Coale 1986, 7 (Coale's emphasis; reference omitted), and generally pp. 2-21; compare Schofield, in Rotberg and Rabb 1986, 17-18. Failure to recognize this point is an abiding flaw of Parkin 1992, e.g., p. 84.

It might seem that, on present evidence, no answer can be given to this question; but in fact that is untrue, thanks largely to the recently published results of the Princeton European Fertility Project.³⁴ This project was established to study the modern fertility transition in Europe, a transition which began in parts of France during the late eighteenth century, but spread to the remainder of Europe during the period between 1880 and 1920. The Princeton study has many implications for the contemporary fertility transition in less developed countries, but also is important for what it says about control of fertility in pre-transition populations.

The Princeton researchers broadly distinguish between two forms of fertility control, especially within marriage: on the one hand, contraception and induced abortion, which, if they are effective, facilitate direct control over fertility and the size of families; on the other hand, indirect methods of fertility control, such as breastfeeding practices and taboos on sexual intercourse, that tend to restrain overall fertility but are not overtly related to limitation of family size.³⁵ The core of the Princeton argument, which is supported by masses of empirical data, is that the crucial change marking the onset of the European fertility transition was the widespread and effective use of contraception and (to a lesser extent) abortion as a means of family limitation within marriage. By contrast, married couples in pretransition populations had relied chiefly on indirect methods of fertility control; pre-transition societies practiced fertility control but not family limitation.

Figure 3 illustrates the essence of the fertility transition by contrasting fertility rates in two modern countries: Egypt, where family limitation is still rare; and Greece, where it is common.³⁶ The two countries have dramatically different growth rates: Egypt's population is rising at about 2.3 percent per year, while Greece's is virtually stationary even though its life expectancy at birth is about 10 years higher than Egypt's. But what is important in this graph is not so much the overall fertility rate, as the shape of its age distribution: Egypt's "tilted mesa" curve, compared with the much more

³⁴ Coale 1986; the results are summarized in Coale's introductory chapter (1-30).

³⁵ To put it differently, fertility control is either parity-specific (related to the number of previous children a woman has borne) or non-parity specific. This distinction originates in the original observation of Louis Henry (cited n. 29) that pre-transition fertility patterns were invariably nonparity-specific irrespective of overall fertility rates.

³⁶ United Nations, Demographic Yearbook 41 (1989) 319 and 322. Surveys and indirect evidence show use of contraceptives is still rare esp. in rural Egypt: *The Estimation of Recent Trends in Fertility and Mortality in Egypt* (Comm. on Population and Demography, Report no. 9; 1982) 21-23. Greece underwent the fertility transition between 1910 and 1920.

sharply peaked curve in Greece. As you can see, women in these two populations have similar fertility rates up to age 24, but thereafter diverge sharply. In Egypt, women continue to bear children at declining but quite high rates well into their 40's, a pattern that is found in all pre-transition populations; by contrast, in Greece fertility drops dramatically already by the early 30's, once desired family size is reached. In consequence, the fertility curve of contemporary Egypt is bowed upward during much of adult female life, while that of Greece is bowed downward from age 30 on. This marked change in the distribution of fertility is what the modern fertility transition produced. Insofar as we can now determine, in all populations prior to the modern fertility transition, fertility rates (especially marital fertility rates) resemble closely in shape, although not necessarily in level, those found in modern Egypt.³⁷

These results are directly applicable to Roman Egypt. Although ancient sources, especially medical writers, show that at least some Romans did try to limit fertility through contraception and induced abortion, little is known about their use and effectiveness within the general population; some suggested methods could probably have worked for their purpose, some were effective only by endangering the mother's life, but most partook of folk magic.³⁸ In any case, thanks to the Princeton study, we now have an indirect method for assessing their actual effects. The key indicator is fertility rates among older married women; if contraception and abortion are widely used, older married couples curtail childbirth after reaching desired family size, and hence fertility rates among women over 30 drop dramatically. But fertility figures from Roman Egypt show that married women bore children at high rates throughout their 30's and well into their 40's, a certain sign that married couples were not making widespread and effective use of contraception and abortion as a means of family planning.³⁹

³⁷ Demographers refer to this fertility distribution as "natural" fertility, cf. Wrigley (cited n. 11) 198-199; the theory originates in a famous article by Henry (cited n. 29), which is discussed in the appendix to this lecture. As Wrigley also notes (p. 198 n. 4), "Natural fertility is ... quite compatible with a relatively low absolute level of fertility." An example is rural China, which in the 1930s had low marital fertility despite near universal marriage and no use of contraception. Barclay *et al.* (cited n. 8), 611-617. Compare also Hyrenius 1958, 121-130 (Estonia).

³⁸ See esp. Hopkins 1964/1965, 124-151; and further bibliography in Parkin (cited n. 33) 129-132. Contraceptive techniques must be very effective in order to have an appreciable effect on fertility rates; for an explanation, see Keyfitz (cited n.25) 303-315.

³⁹ Figure 4 shows the age distribution of fertility among all women, not just among married women; however, omission of illegitimate births does

This need not mean that contraception and abortion were unknown; effective methods may even have been available, as John Riddle has recently argued.⁴⁰ But if so, their use was probably confined, for the most part, to non-marital sexual relations, and perhaps also (if we may judge from the history of early modern Europe) to the status elite.⁴¹ At least in Roman Egypt, the general married population either did not use them, or did not use them effectively, for purposes of family limitation.

Indirect methods of fertility control are poorly known. But breastfeeding practices may well have played a significant role in deterring excess fertility. Contemporary wet-nursing contracts from Roman Egypt⁴² regularly envisage a period of breastfeeding that lasts for at least two years, sometimes for as long as three; it may be assumed that this was also the usual period of maternal breastfeeding in the general population as well. Lactation acts to delay postpartum pregnancy, but does not altogether prevent it.⁴³ However, the wet-nursing contracts also prohibit the wet-nurse from sexual intercourse while she is nursing. Contemporary medical writers explain this prohibition by citing a variety of familiar (and uniformly erroneous) folk beliefs; Galen, indeed, enjoins abstinence on all nursing women.⁴⁴ Postpartum abstinence from sex for up to three years is not unusual in pre-modern populations, although, obviously, it requires considerable reserves of character. Demographers have noticed that in many less developed countries the effects of modernism, in discouraging maternal breastfeeding, postpartum sexual

not affect the curve substantially. The census returns record 18 births to women aged 40 and older; all but one are to married women.

⁴⁰ Riddle 1992, 66-73, on papyri.

⁴¹ On non-marital fertility, see Knodel and van de Walle, 400-408. On the upper classes, compare Livi-Bacci, in Coale 1986, 182-200, with McLaren 1990, 42-72 (on Rome); also Dixon 1988, 93-95, with further bibliography.

⁴² Collected by Manca Masciadri and Montevecchi 1984; see also Bradley 1980, 321-325. It appears that only the well-to-do made use of wet-nurses.

⁴³ Guz and Hobcraft 1991, 91-108, with bibliography. This subject remains controversial; the contraceptive effects of lactation are somewhat unpredictable. Ancient medical writers may dimly perceive the contraceptive effects of lactation. Suder 1991, 135-141. Unfortunately, high rates of infant mortality mean that normal birth spacing cannot be reliably reconstructed from the census returns; but some larger families, lucky with respect to infant mortality, indicate a two- to three-year spacing between births.

⁴⁴ Soranus, *Gynaecia* 2.19; Galen, *de Sanitate Tuenda* 1.9.4-6. Medical writings rest on cultural theories about sexual intercourse that are discussed by Rousselle 1983, esp. 57-59.

abstinence, and other indirect forms of fertility restraint, have in the short term actually tended to raise fertility rates.⁴⁵

But fertility rates are also influenced by other less obvious community practices, such as health-related factors (e.g., reduced sexual activity in populations subject to chronic fevers) or separation of spouses during seasonal migration.⁴⁶ What is common to all these practices is that they operate to depress overall fertility rates irrespective of the number of children a woman had previously borne; that is, these methods are not instrumentally related to family limitation as such, but instead tend to operate with more or less equal effectiveness over the entire period of marital fertility. Through these practices, married couples could reduce overall fertility while simultaneously accepting and implementing the prevalent Greco-Roman view that procreation was the primary purpose of marriage.⁴⁷ Although the result may seem odd from a modern perspective, demographers have shown that in fact this pattern was universal in pre-transition populations.⁴⁸

Further, couples in Roman Egypt also had available to them one other method of fertility control unavailable in most pre-modern societies. Both infanticide and exposure of newborns were not illegal in the Greco-Roman world, nor were they generally regarded with more than distaste.⁴⁹ Exposure differs from infanticide in that the exposed newborn may be taken in and raised by strangers, most often as a slave; so death is not the inevitable result. Ancient literary sources and papyri imply that neither practice was extremely rare, but little is certain about their frequency; however, both practices were more commonly applied to female newborns. The census returns give no clear indication that either infanticide or exposure was common in Roman Egypt; nor do they display any marked pattern of

⁴⁵ Nag 1980, 571-580; compare Orubuloye 1981.

⁴⁶ See Davis and Blake 1956, 211-235, the classic "Davis-Blake" list of intermediate variables affecting fertility (a list much refined in later scholarship); cf. Heer (cited n. 1), 68-79.

⁴⁷ See, e.g., Treggiari 1991, 205-228; Dixon 1992, 61-71.

⁴⁸ Coale 1973, 53-72, notes three preconditions for the decline of marital fertility: fertility must be "within the calculus of conscious choice," parents must want smaller families, and the means to limit fertility must be available. For pre-transition societies, debate continues about which of these preconditions were met, but it is often supposed that at least the first was not: e.g., Ariès 1960, 311-327.

⁴⁹ On the infanticide controversy, see Parkin (cited n. 33) 95-105, with further bibliography, esp. Oldenziel 1987, 87-107; also Riddle (cited n. 40) 10-14, rightly doubting its frequency. On exposure, Boswell 1982, 51-137; Memmer 1991, 21-93.

parental sex preference for children. This accords with other evidence for Roman Egypt; for example, exposure of female infants does not appear to have been a major source of slaves, and we are explicitly told, by many sources, that at least native Egyptians consciously avoided infanticide.⁵⁰ Such deliberate or grossly negligent infant death as did occur was probably confined to larger cities, where Greek cultural influence predominated.

Finally, the tendency of Egyptian women not to remarry is also conceivably related to fertility limitation. Earlier I noted that, especially after age 30, the percentage of surviving women who are still married begins to decline from its peak around eighty percent, until by age 45 or so less than forty percent of women are still married. The census returns indicate that men were considerably more likely than women to remarry after a first marriage was broken by divorce or a spouse's death; and in fact there is no secure case of female remarriage after age 35. Thus, despite the very early age at which Egyptian women married, only about sixty percent of free women aged 15 to 50 are married at any given time, a rate similar to that usually prevailing in the pre-modern Mediterranean.⁵¹

The social causes of this phenomenon are undoubtedly complex. High adult mortality and the relative accessibility of divorce resulted in numerous prematurely broken marriages; on the other hand, older males often preferred marriage (or remarriage) to much younger women, rather than to women near in age to themselves. Nor is it in any way precluded that many older women, faced with the risks of childbearing, chose not to remarry.

But the demographic consequences of this marriage pattern, which is common in the pre-modern Mediterranean, should also be borne in mind. In much of early modern Europe, populations often display crude ability to control population growth by raising or lowering the Total Fertility Rate for females. By contrast, in the Mediterranean, where women most commonly married at an early age, a different demographic strategy evolved, though with much the same effect: high female fertility was attained as early in life as possible (usually by the late 'teens), but overall fertility was limited in

⁵⁰ Exposure and slavery: Straus 1988, 841-911, at 854-856, with bibliography. Egyptian avoidance of infanticide: e.g., Diodorus, 1.80.3; Strabo, 17.2.5; Tacitus, *Hist.* 5.5.6; with Pomeroy 1985, 135-138.

⁵¹ See Coale and Treadway (cited n. 33) 48-52, with their Map 2.6 (Spain, southern France, Italy, Dalmatia, and Greece in 1870). The burden of reproduction appears to have fallen very heavily upon free married women; in the census returns, their total fertility was probably about 70 percent of maximum "Hutterite" fertility. The Total *Marital* Fertility Rate was probably in excess of eight children.

part through social restraints on female remarriage. This is the demographic equivalent of modest birth control among older but still fertile women.⁵²

In sum, ordinary Egyptians restrained population growth mainly through indirect practices, such as maternal breastfeeding or abstinence, that delayed postpartum pregnancy irrespective of parity (the number of previous births to a woman). The tendency of women not to remarry after age 30 or 35 also had a substantial contributing effect. By contrast, contraception and abortion, as prenatal forms of birth control, had little or no consequence at least within marriage. The effects of deliberate or negligent infanticide, as post-natal forms of birth control, are harder to assess, but were in any case probably confined mostly to metropoleis. How this combination of restraints operated in practice, and also their sensitivity and flexibility in the face of varying demographic situations, cannot be evaluated on present evidence.⁵³ But the age distribution in the census returns does imply (and this point is fundamental) that Egyptians successfully avoided excessive population growth at least in the long term, although only within the constraints of extremely high mortality.⁵⁴

Let me now return to the more basic question that I raised earlier: to what extent was ancient humanism, with its emphasis on individual liberty and self-responsibility, ultimately reconcilable with the demographic realities upon which Greek and Roman societies were constructed? I find this question troubling, not least in light of the excellent feminist scholarship that has proliferated in the past decade; for it is self-evident that marriage

⁵² The effect is usually small; see Coale *et al.* 1981, 151-156, 199-211, and 605-615, respectively. But the effect in India, where caste taboos prevented many widows from remarrying, was larger: Mari Bhat, in *India's Historical Demography* (cited n. 8) 110-111.

⁵³ In general, they are likely to have been less flexible than delay in female age at marriage, as practiced in early modern Europe after the "Malthusian" revolution (delaying female age at marriage).

⁵⁴ However, it bears asking, in this connection, whether Egyptian fertility controls were adequate to prevent high levels of mortality. See Wrigley and Schofield (cited n. 28) xxiv, on "the 'Chinese' situation," in which "the disease environment was less deadly but social convention made early and universal marriage mandatory. As a result, fertility was high and, because rapid growth had to be short-lived, mortality was high too. In the 'Chinese' case high fertility 'caused' high mortality." See, for instance, Rathbone (cited n. 4), for an argument that Roman Egypt's population neared the "carrying capacity" of its land under ancient conditions of technological and economic development; and Duncan-Jones 1990, 146-147, on rising Egyptian grain prices during the early Empire, possibly a Malthusian response to overpopulation.

and childbearing profoundly influence the social position and status of women.

Rather than addressing my question directly, I will use a more oblique approach, by briefly noting a current dispute among demographers about the European fertility transition. We now know what occurred: fertility rates dropped dramatically when large numbers of couples began deliberately to stop childbearing earlier in their lives, and thus to restrict the size of their families, using contraception, and to some extent abortion as well, for this purpose. What demographers disagree about is what caused this change in behavior. Unfortunately, the European fertility transition took place against an exceedingly rich and intricate historical background, in which a large number of potentially relevant changes occurred almost simultaneously; among them are the industrial revolution, the rise of modern urbanism, the improving status of women, the increasingly wide acceptance of conjugal (nuclear) families as a model, and the general decline in mortality rates. Such complexity renders the fertility transition historically problematic.

If I may risk oversimplifying considerably, there are now two main theories regarding the fertility transition.⁵⁵ The first theory, strongly endorsed by the United Nations in 1974, holds that social and economic development leads of itself, in the passage of time, to lower fertility. This is a comforting theory because it means that less developed countries can avoid the politically sensitive business of influencing the marital lives of their citizens; development alone will do the job. However, many (though by no means all) demographers now believe that at least the European fertility transition actually resulted, not chiefly nor even in appreciable measure from economic development alone, but rather from the cultural diffusion of new attitudes regarding families—a diffusion, so one might put it, of a new “taste” for limited families and restrained fertility, and also of a radically new concept of the family itself. The detailed results of the Princeton European Fertility Project largely bear out the second theory.⁵⁶

These strikingly divergent theories, each with major implications for fertility control in present-day less developed countries, suggest the range of options that are open to us in evaluating marriage and motherhood within Roman Egypt and the Greco-Roman world more generally: from a sort of technological or economic determinism, to a more culturally based critique. But these options also open the way to at least a tentative solution of my central question. As I have repeatedly stressed, the ancient demographic

⁵⁵ For good introductions to the question, see Yaukey 1985, 188-196; Alter (cited n. 2), 13-27.

⁵⁶ Knodel and van der Walle in *The Decline of Fertility* (cited n. 33) 416-419, also summarizing the central recommendation of the 1974 World Population Conference at Bucharest.

regime, although undeniably harsh by modern standards, was far less inexorable than it may seem at first glance; maximum fertility was certainly not its goal, and restraints on fertility, although different in kind and in operation from those that are usual in modern post-transition populations, nonetheless played a major part in general social survival. In this traditional demographic regime, societies could tolerate, and even encourage, a fair degree of personal choice, provided that the minimum goal of generational replacement was met. Personal choice (the exercise of “taste”) on matters of family limitation was therefore theoretically possible, so long as—and only so long as—it was not in fact exercised widely.⁵⁷

Crucial, therefore, was maintenance of at least a broad cultural link between marriage and procreation; and it is in this light that I would interpret, for instance, Augustus’ legislation encouraging marriage and childbirth. Regardless of its specific legislative purposes, and regardless of how successful it may have been in encouraging upper-class childbearing, this legislation stood to symbolize, and perhaps publicly to reaffirm, a fundamental cultural link that could not be broken. What we confront, in short, is one further aspect of *libertas*, that extraordinarily elusive and confusing concept that informs all of Roman civilization: freedom to act, but only under severe restrictions.

In conclusion, I must emphasize inherent limits to the type of study that Roger Bagnall and I have undertaken. Demography approaches questions of population primarily through an objective approach that stresses statistical description. Such an approach has both strengths and weaknesses. The strengths are considerable, above all in providing a firm basis for criticizing the intuitions and presuppositions that may inform, or misinform, a less stringent approach to the subject. On the other hand, a demographic approach also has palpable weaknesses. Demographers can use statistics to show, for instance, that an Egyptian woman aged 25 was more likely than not to have already married and to have borne children; they can also use statistics to estimate how many of her children would be likely to die within five years of their birth. But such facts, though useful in themselves, are obviously not equivalent to historically recreating the experience of the

⁵⁷ This consideration is relevant to the issue of whether (as I suspect but cannot prove) the Roman upper classes successfully used contraception and abortion in order to lower mortality and limit family size. In any case, upper-class mortality may have been significantly lower than Roman mortality generally; see, e.g., Hopkins 1983, 146-147, and Duncan-Jones (cited n. 54) 93-104, both noting evidence for upper-class male life expectancy at age 25 of ca. 30 to 34 years. This would imply life expectancy at birth in the lower 30s.

woman, as she and her family and her society understood it.⁵⁸ The basis for such an historical recreation must lie elsewhere, above all in assessment of social and cultural institutions that explained and mitigated demographic realities for ancient societies. What demography can do, however, is to put us on the right track in isolating and appraising these institutions. Demography, can, in effect, open the way to a deeper and more searching historical critique of ancient society.

⁵⁸ Demographers often distinguish between demography, as an objective statistical study, and “population studies,” which looks to wider links with social, economic, and cultural context. E.g., Petersen 1983, 677-687.

Appendix: A Note on "Natural" Fertility

In a short article published in 1961 (it is cited in note 29 of my lecture), the great French demographer Louis Henry noticed something unexpected and important about the age distribution of marital fertility in populations prior to the modern fertility transition. Since I have not seen Henry's discovery mentioned in any article or book on ancient demography, and since many ancient historians may find it difficult to accept on first impression, I think it worth describing briefly here.

Figure 5 shows the pattern of marital fertility rates for five pre-transition populations, and that for the United States in 1984.⁵⁹ In each case, the rate shown in the graph is the probability that a married woman in this age group, during one year of her life, will give birth to a child of either sex. As one would anticipate, all the pre-transition populations have rates substantially higher than the modern United States. But more important is that pre-transition populations vary enormously among themselves in their relative fertility rates. The Hutterite rates are believed to be about the highest that are socially sustainable. Most pre-transition populations have marital fertility rates at around the level of Iran and India in the 1940s. Normandy's fertility rates in late eighteenth century are high by pre-modern standards, while China's in 1930 are exceptionally low, about half of Hutterite rates.

What Henry noticed, however, was that no matter their relative levels of marital fertility, all these populations had very similar age distributions of fertility. This is illustrated in the graph (Fig. 6), where the marital fertility rate at ages 20 to 24 is assigned a value of 100, and fertility in subsequent pentads is measured as a percentage of that for ages 20 to 24. All five pre-transition populations lie within a narrow band, while the United States, a post-transition population, is sharply divergent. Henry adduces several other examples of the pre-transition pattern, and subsequent research has added many more from around the world.

How is this pre-transition pattern explained? When we compare the two graphs, it is evident that whatever factors keep marital fertility in most pre-transition populations from reaching Hutterite levels, these factors operate with more or less equal effectiveness across the entire span of adult female fertility; they do not alter the age distribution of marital fertility. By contrast,

⁵⁹ Source of data: Henry (cited n. 29) 84, for Hutterites (marriages from 1921-1930), Normandy (Sotteville-lès-Rouen, marriages and births from 1760-1790), Iran (villages, marriages from 1940-1950), and India (Hindu villages of Bengal, marriages from 1945-1946). Barclay *et al.* (cited n. 8) 615, for China (Chinese Farmers data from villages surveyed in 1930-1931). Newell (cited n. 17) 43, for USA in 1984.

after the fertility transition younger married women tend to bear children at a much higher rate than older women. The result is a markedly different age distribution of marital fertility between pre- and post-transition societies. Insofar as we know, all populations prior to the fertility transition have an age distribution of marital fertility that is virtually identical to the bowed-upward curve in my graph; and all populations after the transition resemble more or less closely the bowed-downward curve for the United States in 1984.⁶⁰ For Roman Egypt, the marital fertility rates attested in the census returns lie extremely close to Henry's bowed-upward curve, as I show in my final graph.⁶¹

Henry referred to the standard bowed-upward curve as "natural" fertility, and this rather unfortunate term has stuck; there is no accepted substitute. What Henry meant by the term, in any case, is "fertility which exists or has existed in the absence of deliberate birth control."⁶² In populations with "natural" fertility, marital fertility rates are, as it seems, primarily determined by two things: first, the ordinary level of adult female fecundity (potential fertility); second, social or individual practices such as breastfeeding that act, with varying degrees of effectiveness, to restrain this fecundity irrespective of the number of children that a woman had previously borne ("parity"). As Henry showed, these two considerations apparently suffice to explain the entire pattern of "natural" fertility; marital fertility rates decline slowly in the 20's and 30's, then abruptly in the 40's, more or less precisely as a function of increasing physiological infertility as adult women age.

In present-day less developed countries with a "natural" fertility pattern, it can also be easily demonstrated (through field surveys and other evidence) that married couples very rarely use contraception or induced abortion to

⁶⁰ See, especially, Knodel 1977, 219-249, and Bulatao and Lee 1982, 61-102.

⁶¹ The Egyptian marital fertility rates were derived directly from attested fertility in the census returns, using the "Own Children" method to correct for age distortion introduced through use of census evidence (see n. 31), and then a Gompertz Relational Fertility Model, as described by Newell (cited n. 17) 175-178, in order to smooth the data. The pattern of Egyptian marital fertility is compared with the average of ten "natural" fertility schedules given by Henry, and also with the pattern in one of Henry's populations (Norway, marriages from 1874 to 1876) that is virtually identical to Roman Egypt not only in shape but also, probably, in level.

⁶² Henry (cited n. 29) 81. By contrast, "Control can be said to exist when the behavior of the couple is bound to the number of children already born and is modified when this number reaches the maximum which the couple does not want to exceed ..."

space births or to limit family size.⁶³ The reasonable, and indeed inevitable, inference is that, in historical populations with this same “natural” fertility pattern, married couples likewise made little or no use of contraception or abortion for this purpose. By contrast, limitation of family size (in Henry’s phrase, “controlled” fertility) is of course ubiquitous in all post-transition populations, and contraception and abortion are now the almost exclusive means for achieving this end.

Henry’s eleven-page article had resonated profoundly in modern demography; for example, most of the vast Princeton European Fertility Project is erected on this foundation. For historians, the implications are also large, since the pre-transition pattern implies a relationship between procreation and marriage that is wholly alien to modern ways of thinking. As to Greco-Roman antiquity, a strong presumption has now been created against the general use of contraception and abortion within marriage, unless such use can be indisputably demonstrated; for there is no sound *a priori* reason to believe that the ancient world departed in this respect from a pattern found in all other pre-transition populations of which we have reliable knowledge, and in any event the Egyptian census returns provide strong evidence against such a departure. But once contraception and abortion have been removed from consideration, we still need to know how and to what extent fertility was in fact restrained in ancient populations; and this, of course, is far from easy to determine. Finally, it is clear that even before the fertility transition some elite groups in European society did successfully attempt family limitation (see note 41); and this research also needs to be extended to the ancient world.

More generally, much work remains to be done on the broader social and cultural implications of Henry’s discovery, and of modern demography generally, for the Roman family. This research should also take into account additional factors associated with the European fertility transition, above all patterns of female marriage, and the relationship between fertility and prevailing mortality levels. In my lecture, I tried to suggest at least some directions that future research could take; but plainly my suggestions are just a beginning. If (under Moses Finley’s influence) a central issue in Roman social history during the last decade was why the Roman Empire did not experience an economic takeoff, a central issue for historians in the 90’s might conceivably be why it also failed to experience a demographic transition. I think this a no less significant theme.

⁶³ For an example, see n. 36 (contemporary rural Egypt).

A Sample Census Return: *P. Giss. 43* = *P. Alex. Giss. 14* = *SB X 10630* (117-Αρ-7)

1...[.].

Ἀπολλωνίῳ στρατηγῶι Ἀπολλωνο(πολίτου)

(Ἑπτα)κωμίας

- 5 παρὰ Ἀρπ[ο]κρατίωνος Διοσκόρου
 τοῦ Ἀρμάιτος Σενορσενού(φιος) τῆς
 Ψενανούφι[ι]ος τῶν ἀπὸ Ταννάθεως. ἀπ[ο-]
 γραάφομαι εἰς τὴν τοῦ β (ἔτους) Ἀδριανῶ
 Καίσαρος τοῦ κυρίου κατ' οἰκίαν ἀπο-
 γραφὴν κατὰ τὰ κελευσθέντα ὑπὸ
- 10 Ῥαμμίου Μαρτυάλις τ[ο]ῦ κρατίστου
 ἡγεμόνος εἰς οἰκί(αν) [κα]ἰ ψιλ(όν) τόπ(ον) Σεροννώ(φριος)
 Ἀρποκρατίω(ρος) καὶ ἀδελ(φῶν) ἐ[ν] τῆι ἀπὸ νότ(ου) λα[ῦ]ρα
 Ταννάθεως ἐμαντὸν γραμματ(έα) (ἐτῶν) ο
 οὐλ(ῆ) κνημ(ι) ποδ(ός) ἀριστέρην,
- 15 Διόσκορος υἱὸς μη(τρὸς) Σεnpαχοῦμ[ι]ος
 τῆς Ἀνόμπεως ἄση(μος) λατρὸς (ἐτῶν) ιζ,
 Σεnpαχοῦμ[ι]ος Ἀνόμπεως γυ(νή)
 Ἀρποκρατίωνος (ἐτῶν) λβ,
 Τα[β]ῆς ρ[ε]ω(τέρα) θυγ(άτηρ) (ἐτῶν) ιε.
- 20 Καὶ ὁμνῶ τὴν Αὐτοκράτορος Καίσαρος
 Τραιανῶ Ἀδριανῶ Σεβαστοῦ τύχην ἐξ ὑ-
 [γ]ιού(ς) καὶ ἐπ' ἀ[ν]ληθείας ἐπιδεδωκ(έναι) τὴν προκ(ειμένην)
 ἀπογρα(φὴν) καὶ μηδ[ε]ν[ε]ρα παρεικέναι ἀναπόγρα(φον) ἢ ἔνο(χος)
 [εἶ]ην τῶι [ἄρ]κ[ω].
- 25 (ἔτους) γ Αὐτοκράτορος Καίσαρος Τραιανῶ
 Ἀδρι[αν]ῶ Σεβαστοῦ [Πα]λ[χ]ῶν κ.
 Ἀρποκρ(ατίων) Διο[σ]κόρου]] ἐπιδέδωκα [τὴν ἀ]πογρα(φὴν) [ὡς] πρόκ(είται).

To Apollonios, *strategos* of the Apollonopolite district:

From Harpokration son of Dioskoros (son of Harmais) and of Senorsenouphis (daughter of Psenanouphis), from Tanyaithis:

I register for the house-by-house census of Lord Hadrian Caesar's second year (A.D. 117/118), in compliance with the commands of Rammius Martialis the most noble Prefect, in a house and vacant land belonging to Senonnophis (daughter of Harpokration) and her siblings, in the southern quarter of Tanyaithis:

myself, scribe, aged 70, scar on the shank of the left leg;

Dioskoros, a son, his mother being Senpachoumis daughter of Anompis, without scar, doctor, aged 17;


Senpachoumis daughter of Anompis, wife of Harpokration, aged 39;

Tazbes the Younger, a daughter, aged 15.

And I swear by the fortune of the Emperor Caesar Trajan Hadrian Augustus that I have honestly and truthfully presented the above return, and that no one is left unregistered, or may I be liable on my oath.

In the third year (A.D. 118/119) of Emperor Caesar Trajan Hadrian Augustus, 15 May. I, Harpokration son of Dioskoros, presented the return above.

Figure 1



Model Fertility Curve and Adjusted Fertility Rates for Egypt




Figure 2

Figure 3





Figure 4

Age-Specific Marital Fertility Rates Before and After Fertility Transition



Standardized Marital Fertility Rates: Ages 20-24 = 100




Figure 5

Marital Fertility Rates in Roman Egypt and Average "Natural" Fertility




Figure 6

*The Roman Version*¹

W.V. Harris

On the day of Rome's foundation, the founder killed his brother in a fit of anger.² This element in the foundation story is likely to have been archaic, but it was still acceptable in Livy's time (and it could have a positive cast: Romulus was willing to kill *even* his brother, such was his determination to defend the new city wall). Vergil, however, saw that in the new, officially harmonious Augustan age, Romulus and Remus would have to be reconciled.³ Then there is the endlessly discussed end of the *Aeneid*: in the last lines of the national epic, the hero puts the enemy Turnus to the sword in a transport of rage, without presumably undermining the political program of the poet's patron and friend Augustus (but many disagree). It is clearly not going to be easy to discover how far, when, and why, the Romans came to believe in a measure of anger control, or what this had to do with their views about the internal order of their state and society.

The aristocracy of the mid-republican period, the earliest Romans we can study in any detail via texts, was a highly contentious group. Its members competed with each other fiercely, though most of the time non-violently, for public office and honors. Senators also showed themselves periodically to be short-tempered as well as arrogant in dealing with foreign states. But political and religious and social institutions, sustained by a highly adaptive ideology, succeeded in maintaining the internal cohesion of the state, while permitting competition to proceed. As for angry behaviour towards other states and their inhabitants, some Roman leaders, from the time of Flaminius (consul in 198) onwards, learned a modicum of tact in

¹ Reprinted by permission of the publishers from *Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity* by William V. Harris (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), copyright © 2001 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College.

² Liv. i.7.2: *inde cum altercatione congressi certamine irarum ad caedum vertuntur.*

³ *Aen.* i.292, with the comment of Wiseman 1995, 145. Horace did not approve of the fratricidal squabble, *Epod.* 7.18-20.

dealing with the Greeks,⁴ but until the very late Republic there is no indication that any Roman political figure set much store by restraining his temper with respect to other states or their populations.

Is there anything to discuss in this chapter, one may wonder, other than the Hellenization of the Romans? Was the Cicero of *Tusculan Disputations IV*, or the Seneca of *De ira*, attempting anything other than a demonstration of his own cleverness in adapting Greek philosophy and literature to a Roman public? Did they have anything to say in those works which was important for Roman politics or Roman society? Seneca and many other Romans did indeed offer doctrines about how emperors should behave, and how their subjects, especially their courtiers, should behave too. But first let us consider more broadly how the Romans adapted, and developed Greek thinking about the restraint of the angry emotions between citizens in the political and civic spheres—staying alert to the fact that the central Latin concept, *ira*, is a wider one than Greek *orge*.

Through the thick mist that envelops most Latin literature before Cicero, we catch glimpses of works which put classic scenes of Greek mythological rage before Roman audiences.⁵ When Cicero wished to describe the quarrels of Agamemnon with Menelaus and of Atreus with Thyestes, he quoted the versions adapted for the Roman stage some two generations earlier by Accius.⁶ What this adaptation had done to the moral framework of the original Greek stories can sometimes be detected: Accius, for instance, wrote a play called *The Myrmidons* in which Achilles seems to be much more on the defensive over his anger against Agamemnon than he ever is in the *Iliad*.⁷ Indeed he seems to be on the point of being tried for treason. Perhaps a Roman audience at this date (somewhere within the period between 140 and 100), with its tradition of military discipline still largely intact, would not have tolerated easily a hero who set his rage, however justified, above the orders of his commanding officer.⁸ Yet we do not normally think that Roman

⁴ In the account of Greek opinion about Roman imperialism in Polyb. xxxvi.9, not even the critics of Rome refer to Roman irascibility, possibly because it was not much noticed, more probably, in view of xxxviii.4.7, because Polybius' respect for Roman power persisted.

⁵ This was probably the kind of context in which Ennius had called anger "the beginning of madness" (Cic. *Tusc. Disp.* iv.52).

⁶ *Tusc. Disp.* iv.77.

⁷ See especially lines 108-13, 118 Dangel = 452-57, 462 Warmington; the last of these lines is "*ego me non pecasse plane ostendam aut poenas sufferam.*" For Aeschylus' *Myrmidons* as a principal source, see J. Dangel's edition, 290-295.

⁸ But Accius was generally quite hard on the Homeric heroes (Dangel 38-39).

playwrights were delivering messages to receptive audiences “about matters of moral or political principle” (as was said about the Athenian tragic poets). No one should doubt the political importance of the theater in the middle and late Republic,⁹ but in spite of the fame some playwrights achieved, they never acquired the authority of the great tragic poets of Athens.

Mid-republican Roman society was too structured and in some ways too disciplined for anger in public life to be an issue. There were of course occasional times of intense civic strife, and the possibility of further angry conflict was visible to Polybius and presumably to others.¹⁰ Perhaps the angriest man to become conspicuous in Roman politics for a long time rose to prominence at the very end of Polybius’ life and embodied the popular aspirations Polybius detested—namely Gaius Gracchus.¹¹ But there are no reliable details.¹²

It would never, I think, have occurred to any mid-republican Roman to suggest that anger, rather than the ambition and corruption of his opponents, was responsible for the often intense tensions in public life. But there was certainly plenty of public anger expressed in the last century of the Republic, in the shape of slave rebellions as well as Italian discontent and strife among the Romans of older citizen stock. The responses of the Roman elite were practical: they answered serious opposition with more or less firm measures of repression, while from time to time *popularis* politicians attempted to inflame the anger of the city plebs. On the theoretical level, the response was not very profound, as far as we can tell: Cicero’s efforts, unless the loss of most of Books IV and V of his *Republic* is obscuring something important, were substantially limited to nostalgia for the past, combined with a somewhat desperate desire for a benevolent rector or leader who would keep the lower orders in their place.

But the growth of Roman interest in philosophy had roots going back well before 150 B.C.; by the last decade of the second century this interest

⁹ Cf. Wiseman 1995, 133-138.

¹⁰ Val. Max. ix.3.1-8 lists some angry incidents.

¹¹ Plutarch alleges that he was harsh and passionate (*thumoeides*) (*TG* 2); cf. Dio Cassius fr. 85.

¹² An anecdote suggests that Gaius was self-conscious about his own irascibility. Realizing that he was often carried away by anger as he was speaking in public, he arranged to be attended by a slave with a musical instrument who on such occasions sounded a soft note, “on hearing which Gaius would at once remit the vehemence of his passion and speech and become milder.” But this story is Plutarch’s (*TG* 2), and it is quite likely to have been distorted by his interest in anger therapy. Cicero’s earlier and more credible version simply has it that Gaius used a flautist to regulate the pitch of his voice (*De orat.* iii.225-227).

affects a certain number of senators and a few others, and it spreads out among other educated persons after the Social War.¹³ In the late Republic some notion of the primary ethical views of the famous Greek philosophical schools could be assumed among the upper social elite, municipal as well as metropolitan. No doubt this knowledge was often superficial, but many people were now well enough informed to know that anger could be of questionable moral standing.

Of great importance here is the letter Cicero wrote to his younger brother Quintus in late 60 or early 59 B.C. to give him advice about the governance of the province Asia, which the younger Cicero had been ruling for some two years. It deserves to be quoted at length (*QF* i.1.37-40):

There is one point about which I shall not cease to instruct you, and insofar as it is within my capacity I shall not tolerate any exceptions in your reputation [i.e., I shall attempt to cure you of your only vice]. Everyone who comes from there ["Asia"] speaks of your good character, integrity and kindness [*humanitas*], but there is one reservation in their encomia of you, and that concerns irascibility [*iracundia*]. This vice is considered, even in this private, normal life I lead, to be a sign of irresponsibility and weakness, but nothing is so unbecoming as showing harshness [*acerbitatem animi*] while one holds the highest office. I will not undertake to describe to you now what is always said by learned men about irascibility, since I don't want to be prolix and secondly because you can easily find out from many authors' writings ...

[38] This is what practically everybody reports, that as long as you keep your temper, they find you the pleasantest person in the world; but when you are upset by some fellow's rascality or wrongheadedness, you become so exasperated that everyone longs for the return of your kindness ... And I am not now urging you to do what is perhaps difficult in human nature at any time, but especially at our time of life, and that is to change one's disposition and suddenly pluck out some evil deeply ingrained in the character; but this much advice I do give you, that if you cannot possibly avoid it, because anger [*iracundia*] takes possession of the mind before reason has been able to prevent its being so possessed, in that case you should prepare yourself beforehand, and reflect daily that what you have to fight against is anger, and that when the mind is most under its influence is just the time when you should be

¹³ Ferrary 1988, 602-615.

most careful to bridle your tongue; and indeed I sometimes think that this is as great a virtue as not feeling anger at all. For the latter is not exclusively a sign of strength of character, but also occasionally of slowness [*lentitudo*]; while to govern one's mind and speech when angry, or even to hold one's tongue and retain one's sway over mental perturbation and resentment, that though not a proof of perfect wisdom, is a mark of great natural ability ...

[39] Passion, curses and insults are not only inconsistent with literary culture and *humanitas*, they are inimical to the dignity of imperial office, for if one's outbursts of anger are implacable, that is a sign of extreme harshness, but if they are capable of being mollified, that is a sign of frivolity—which is, however, to be preferred to harshness.

The long letter from which this passage is taken was a somewhat formal literary performance,¹⁴ in which Cicero modestly put himself in the role of a former philosopher-ruler giving counsel to another philosopher-ruler.¹⁵ The writer takes it for granted that Quintus, who was an educated man but not an intellectual, would understand a discussion of anger control, and could easily find out, if he did not already know, what the extensive philosophical literature had to say about anger. Meanwhile, an important political issue was at stake, namely the acceptability of a provincial governor to those he ruled over and to those whose interests he could affect. Locally, this power was very personal and in consequence subject to the governor's passions. In the following letter, Marcus spells out in considerable though allusive detail how his brother had offended both Greeks and Romans by his sharpness and irascibility.¹⁶

There is evidence that talk about anger control was in these years familiar to people well outside senatorial circles.¹⁷ When Cicero defended the consul-elect L. Murena in 63, he was addressing a jury made up of property-owning Romans, most of whom can have had no special education in

¹⁴ Cf. D. R. Shackleton Bailey's commentary, 147.

¹⁵ Cf. Rawson 1989, 239-240.

¹⁶ i.2.4-7. But *QF* ii.16.3 end suggests that in later years Quintus himself looked back on Marcus' advice as something of a joke. *Att.* i.17.1-4 shows at some length how one made excuses for such a person (*irritabilis animos esse optimorum saepe hominorum et eosdem placabilis*).

¹⁷ In attacking another provincial governor, Verres, Cicero had earlier made some use of the accused's supposedly furious outbursts: *II Verr.* v.106, etc. Part of the point was that the provincials reacted with their own indignation to unjust treatment (sect. 115).

philosophy. The prosecutor in the case was the younger Cato, tribune-elect and inflexible Stoic. This was the way to attack him (Mur. 61-63): "There was a certain man of genius, Zeno ... his rules are of such a kind as this: the wise man ... never forgives anyone's crime ... a man worthy of the name cannot be mollified or placated, only the wise man is handsome or rich ... it is as bad a crime to kill poultry unnecessarily as to suffocate one's father ... You said something in anger. 'The Wise Man [Cato is imagined as saying] is never angry.' " Whereas, according to the Platonists and Aristotelians, so Cicero goes on, the wise man sometimes does get angry. We may draw the conclusion that it was by now possible to discuss anger control, if only in very general terms, before an audience such as made up the judicial panel trying Murena. Elsewhere Cicero confirms that he really did make such comments in the speech he delivered.¹⁸ And among the *periti homines*—that is to say, those who were interested in philosophy—it was by now possible to assume a notably higher level of knowledge.

It is a pity that we cannot know whether Caesar really gave a speech at the great Catilinarian debate in 63 anything like the one which Sallust later attributed to him. He is made to comment emphatically on the trouble that can come to prominent people who show *iracundia* (Cat.51.12-14), and he or Sallust must have been thinking of real damage to a man's reputation. "A public man is expected not to be angry: what in others is called *iracundia* is called in a public official arrogance and cruelty."

By now a reputation for irascibility seems to have been genuinely harmful. Whatever the origin of these words of Sallust's, Caesar's self-presentation, even before he became dictator, shows a distinct interest in anger. The great political innovator already seems to have applied his mind to the matter by the time of his first consulship in 59, if not earlier. Dio's account is striking: Caesar as consul tended to ignore Cicero's insults, he says, but

¹⁸ The published speeches are not of course transcripts of what was really said, but *De fin.* iv.74 seems to show that the substance of the *Pro Murena* passage was actually delivered to the *iudices* (jurymen) ("omnia peccata paria dicitis. non ego tecum ita iam iocabor, ut isdem his de rebus, cum L. Murenam te accusante defenderem. apud imperitos tum illa dicta sunt, aliquid etiam coronae datum"). In their presence he was naturally more polite: "non est nobis haec oratio habenda in imperita multitudo aut in aliquo conventu agrestium" (Mur. 61). The obvious comparison is with the passages in *In Pisonem* (59-60, 68-72) in which he made mock of his opponents alleged philosophical views; but casual allusions before juries (e.g., *Pis.* 20, 37) are clear indications that such men were expected to know something about the great philosophical schools.

he did not disregard him entirely. For although Caesar possessed in reality a rather mild nature [*epieikesteran* (= *clementiorem*)], and was not at all easily moved to anger [*ethumouto*], he nevertheless punished many, since his interests were so numerous, yet in such a way that it was not done in anger [*di'orges*] not always immediately. He did not indulge in *thumos* at all, but watched for the right moment, and he caught up with most of his enemies without their knowing about it ... he visited his retribution secretly and in places where one would least have expected it, both for the sake of his reputation, in order to avoid seeming to have a wrathful character, and also so that no one should learn of it beforehand.¹⁹

A cold and treacherous enemy, in other words.²⁰ It is hardly to be doubted that this sort of analysis of Caesar's conduct had already started in the 50s,²¹ and I take it that it started with Caesar himself. It looks as if he knew the prescriptions of the philosophers, and how to make use of them.²² The year 59 or 57 is the most likely date for Philodemus' tract *On the Good King according to Homer*,²³ which Caesar may well have read (it was addressed to his father-in-law and ally, L. Calpurnius Piso²⁴). There seems at all events to have been political credit to be gained as early as the 50s by avoiding the appearance of an irascible character, or by gaining the positive

¹⁹ xxxviii.11.3-5. More reflection about anger attributed to Caesar: xxxvii.55.2.

²⁰ "What strikes a modern observer most in Caesar's conduct [in 59] ... is the masterly way in which he put his opponents morally in the wrong," wrote Gelzer, with no apparent irony (1968, 78).

²¹ But Dio Cassius' speeches are notoriously unreliable, and there is no really firm evidence that Caesar was interested in anger until as late as 49. Furthermore, Dio used Caesar as a model for the behaviour of emperors in his own time (cf. Millar 1964, 80-81).

²² Such as the warning of Philodemus against the enjoyment of punishing, *De ira* 7 (col. xliii.21-25). Rawson's judgement (1989, 242) that Caesar was not interested in philosophy was in part mistaken; of course such statements are always relative, but his behaviour and language with respect to anger suggest *informed* calculation.

²³ For 59: Murray 1965, esp. 178-181, and T. Dorandi's edition, pp. 39-46. For 57: Paolucci 1955. Momigliano argued (1941, 152-153 = 1960, 380-381), as have others, that it was written when Caesar was dictator, and that cannot be excluded.

²⁴ See ch. 9 (col. xliii.16).

reputation of being able to control one's anger. The dictator's *clementia* ideology was practically predetermined.

Yet another reason for thinking that a reputation for irascibility or the reverse may really have carried weight is that anger control is reasonably prominent in the description which Cicero gives of the ideal Leader in his *Republic* (54-51 B.C.). Authoritative historical figures, Scipio Aemilianus and Laelius, are exploited there in the interests of the argument that the state should be ruled by one man, just as the *animus* should be ruled by reason, with the passions, anger in particular, eliminated.²⁵

There is only one Roman who in the entirety of Caesar's writings is said to have been affected by *iracundia*—his enemy and one-time fellow consul Calpurnius Bibulus.²⁶ It was probably a serious matter when Caesar was in effect called upon, at the beginning of the civil war which led to his dictatorship, to respond to charges of *iracundia* and excessive anger. An emissary came from Pompey to try to make peace: he invited Caesar "to give up his party spirit [*studium*] and anger [*iracundia*] for the sake of the state" (this is all recounted by Caesar himself), and "not to be so seriously angry [*adeo graviter irasci*] with his personal enemies" as to harm the state too. Caesar answers with a whole chapter of self-justifying argumentation.²⁷ The appearance of excessive anger was now a political liability,²⁸ and in March 49 Caesar had time to explain to correspondents that his "new method of winning" the civil conflict consisted of mercy (*miser cordia*) and generosity (*liberalitas*),²⁹ a most striking statement for a hard-hearted warlord in the middle of campaign. Another watchword was *lenitas*, kindness (*BC* iii.98.2).

And he succeeded in spreading the message. In the speeches which Cicero wrote to cajole Caesar when the civil war was practically over, he portrayed him as a man of mercy, claiming on one occasion that Caesar's self-restraint, including his control over his temper, was even more

²⁵ *De rep.* i.38.59-60. He represents Laelius as claiming, to Scipio's applause, that though he was sometimes angry he did not allow *iracundia* to dominate his soul, and as referring to the authority of Archytas of Tarentum. There must be no place in the ruler's soul, Laelius says, for *libidines* or *irae/iracundiae*. No expectation here, therefore, that to *thumoeides* will ally itself with reason. Hellenistic denunciations of strong anger had done their work.

²⁶ *BC* iii.16.3 (the word is repeated). See Syme 1978, 224.

²⁷ *BC* i.8.3, i.9 (where he avoids referring directly to his anger, except with "aequo animo tulisse," sect. 3).

²⁸ It would be interesting to know when the story was invented that the tyrannical Sulla died in a fit of rage (*Val. Max.* ix.3.8).

²⁹ Transmitted as *Cic. Att.* ix.7C.1.

remarkable than his conquests and made him comparable to a god.³⁰ This was all the more admirable because civil war is preeminently a time of *iracundia*.³¹ Caesar's own interest in anger is confirmed in an unexpected way: one of the most prominent adornments of the most important of his monuments, the temple of Venus Genetrix, was a pair of paintings, for which he paid a huge sum, by the contemporary artist Timomachus of Byzantium. The subjects, rather incongruously, were Medea and Ajax³²—a pair linked to each other by their rage.

Since Caesar saw displays of anger in such a negative light, it is not surprising that he continued the practice of Herodotus and other Greeks who had associated irascibility with barbarian enemies, thus denigrating both: Caesar makes the German prince Ariovastus a man of *iracundia*,³³ and later this was a tedious topos. Tacitus, for instance, did the same for the German Arminius and for the Batavian rebel Civilis and his followers.³⁴

It would be a rather poor method to gauge the opinions of the Roman upper class by means of the gnomic lines of Caesar's protégé Pubilius Syrus, but there is nonetheless some interest in the fact that his sentiments about *ira* and *iracundia* are negative (he praises revenge, however).³⁵

At all events, the notion that anger should be *completely* avoided had emphatically not, in the late Republic, won the assent of all Romans. It is in Cicero's philosophical works that one finds the "absolutist" doctrine on this

³⁰ Cic. *Marc.* 8-9: "animum vincere, iracundiam cohibere"; cf. *Deiot.* 40, *Lig.* 29.

³¹ *Marc.* 90. Some people thought that Caesar followed up his forgiveness of M. Marcellus (consul in 51) by having him murdered (Cic. *Att.* X.1.3).

³² Plin. *NH* vii.126, xxxv.26 (*praecipuam auctoritatem publice tabulis fecit*), 136. This picture of Medea was often written about by epigrammatists (see A.S.F. Gow & D.L. Page on Antipater of Thessalonica xxix [*Garland of Phillip II*, pp. 43-44]); they emphasize how well Timomachus represented her emotions, including anger. A Herculaneum painting of Medea (Naples, Archaeological Museum, inv. MN 111436, often illustrated) is probably a copy of Timomachus' work.

³³ *BG* i.31.13, and for Gauls, see vi.5.2, vii.42.2. For the *ira* of the Gauls ("which that race cannot control") see also Liv. v.37.4.

³⁴ *Ann.* i.59, *Hist.* iv.13, 21, 29. See also Sen. *De ira* ii.15, Tac. *Germ.* 25.

³⁵ Esp. 87 Meyer, 88, 290 ("iracundiam qui vincit hostem superat maximum"), 301, 311, 319, 344, 345, 514, 638, 679. But see 230, 455. Revenge: 270, 323, 334, 580. Line 127 may be recommending "ventilation": "cui nolis saepe irasci irascaris semel"; cf. 550. Line 695 may possibly sum up his point of view: "tarde sed graviter <vir> sapiens irascitur."

subject; elsewhere he is more moderate. That does not mean that his expression of "absolutism" was casual or "insincere," but it imposes a certain caution. Cato will have been unusual in being a root-and-branch preacher against the passions. There is no reason to think that Caesar went beyond the view that public figures should maintain appearances in respect of anger. And the traditional attitude subsisted. When *viri fortissimi*, vigorous public men, are injured they resent it, when they are angered they are carried away (*effervuntur*), when they are provoked they fight (Cic.*Cael.*21). In the *First Philippic* Cicero asked Antony not to be angry if he, Cicero, spoke his mind, but realizing that in the circumstances this was too much to ask, "I ask him to be angry with me as with a fellow citizen," which meant stopping short of violence (*Phil.*i.27).

It was recognized that an effective orator needed to display anger as well as stimulate it. It may be that in *De oratore* (of 55 B.C.) Cicero tried to avoid directly endorsing this view when he attributed it to the unrefined though highly successful orator of the previous generation, M. Antonius (Consul in 99).³⁶ The latter is imagined as mocking the philosophical opinions of those who had theorized about anger.³⁷ Nine years later, however, in his *Orator*, Cicero stated with great frankness that he had used every possible means of arousing anger in juries when he needed to do so, and that he had felt anger himself.³⁸ And while Cicero's philosophical works are "absolutist" about anger, his private attitude admitted bursts of appropriate anger, both in his friends³⁹ and in himself: "Insane wretch," "I am bursting with indignation."⁴⁰ These lines were written under the extreme provocation of Caesar's invasion of Italy in 49, which seemed likely to overthrow most of what Cicero had struggled for in public affairs (this anger he no doubt felt to be altruistic). Nonetheless his letters may leave the impression that he also made some serious effort to avoid anger when he could.⁴¹

³⁶ Antonius' practice: ii.189-204. The pretending option: ii.189.

³⁷ *De orat.* i.220-222. But he is interestingly represented as assuming that "omnia haec" (apparently expressions of anger) "are thought to be bad, troublesome and to be avoided in our daily life together" (221).

³⁸ *Orator* 131 ("est faciendum etiam ut irascatur iudex")—133; Cicero celebrates his own *vis animi*, and looks to Demosthenes as his only worthy forerunner in this respect.

³⁹ E.g., *Att.* i.17.4 ("irritabilis animos esse optimorum saepe hominum et eosdem placabilis").

⁴⁰ *Att.* vii.11.1 ("O hominem amentem et miserum"), vii.12.3 ("dirumpor dolore")—this at the beginning of the civil war.

⁴¹ See, e.g., *Att.* vi.3.8, vii.18.2 ("stomachari desinamus").

Roman revenge also seems to have undergone some real but limited criticism.⁴² We must be careful not to invent an unhistorical story here, and it may well be that traditional beliefs already held that revenge should be strictly in proportion to the offence committed, and that one should always seek legal redress, not violent retaliation. Vendetta in the Anglo-Saxon sense was probably never approved of in the historical period. But it must be emphasized that even in such a relatively civilized location as Cicero's writings on rhetoric, the existence of a general right of revenge (*ius ulciscendi*) is taken for granted.⁴³

Orators of the first century B.C. argued, when it suited them, that "punishment" exacted outside the legal system was to be deplored.⁴⁴ Nothing surprising about that. But a passage of Lucretius suggests that, among the elite at least, opinion had moved somewhat further. He contrasts the present day with the time before a social contract came into being: in those days "each man in his anger sought to avenge himself more fiercely than is now permitted by just laws" (*De rerum natura* v.1148-1150). But that is very vague. So was Cicero when he spoke about revenge after he returned to Rome from exile in 57. His speech of thanks to the *populus Romanus* comes, at its close, to the question of retaliation. Marius, Cicero reminds the audience, had avenged himself in blood "with an angry heart" when he came back from exile in 87; but he, Cicero, will instead employ oratory—as if he had any alternative. "I will avenge individual crimes," he asserts—but by good political leadership and other peaceful means. At the end of this section, Cicero said something else—a textual problem prevents us from knowing exactly what—about the good repute which attaches to the man who is *neglectful* about revenging himself.⁴⁵ And he wrote piously in a philosophical work that "there is a limit to vengeance and punishment," hardly in itself a radical thought.⁴⁶ An anonymous late-republican writer

⁴² There seems to be no general account of this matter, but see Y. Thomas 1984, who, however, sometimes fails to distinguish revenge from general expression of hostility.

⁴³ *Topica* 90, *Part. Or.* 42 (and see *Sulla* 46); cf. *De inv.* ii.65-66, 161.

⁴⁴ *Rhet. ad Her.* ii.15.22, *Cic. De inv.* ii.27.81 (specifically against revenge). Cf. Y. Thomas 1984, 74.

⁴⁵ *Post red. ad pop.* 19-23 ("qui in ulciscendo remissior fuit, in eo consilium aperte laudatur," Peterson; the MSS have "in eo aperte utitur," or something similar). Marius was supposed to have been a man of anger: *Phil.* xi.1.

⁴⁶ *De off.* i.34: "Sunt autem quaedam officia etiam adversus eos servanda a quibus iniuriam acceperis. est enim ulciscendi et puniendi modus." Cicero often represents *inimicitias deponere* and *redire in gratiam* as positive acts.

rejects the notion of violent revenge as barbaric.⁴⁷ Philodemus as well as other philosophers opposed it, as we saw earlier. And the cause of *clementia* received further advertisement when it became part of Caesar's propaganda arsenal.

Whatever the nature of the political struggle in the Late Republic—whether it was mainly a struggle within the upper class, as implied by the still dominant *Roman Revolution* by Ronald Syme, or whether popular discontent and reactions to it were also vitally important (as it is tempting to think)—it was undoubtedly a time of strong political passions. As far as the urban plebs is concerned, these passions defy analysis.⁴⁸ To start with, the sheer numbers were such as no city on earth, not even Alexandria or Beijing, had ever seen; and inevitably the sources incorporate the biases of the elite. The trend towards the political violence began in the middle of the second century and accelerated in the 80s. It had its roots in the heightened unscrupulousness of the senators, few if any of whom disdained violent methods by the 50s, as well as in the restlessness of the poor—and also of the slaves.⁴⁹

If the political rage of the late Republic gave rise to any Thucydides-like reflections about the role of strong emotion in political *stasis*, they are lost to us. There is, however, some reflection of late-republican *stasis* in the great philosophical poem of Lucretius. In the passage just referred to, he tells a traditional story: experience of violence and feuds (*inimicitiae*) made the human race become more willing to submit to the rule of law: “because each man in his anger sought to avenge himself more fiercely than is now permitted by just laws, for this reason men were utterly weary of living in violence” (*est homines pertaesum vi colere aevum*) (v.1150). He explains that violence recoils on the man who is guilty of it. Law thus exists in part to limit the operation of anger. More difficult to comprehend fully is what he has to say about warfare when he addresses Venus at the start of the poem. Having made the request, revolutionary for a Roman of this time, that Rome be freed from warfare (he even seems to include foreign wars), he contrasts the existence of humans with that of the gods. The placid existence of the

⁴⁷ Ps.-Sall. *Epist. ad Caes.* i.3.4.

⁴⁸ For a good short account of the ways in which the city *plebs* expressed its discontents in the late Republic, see Purcell 1994, 676-680.

⁴⁹ Quite apart from the great slave rebellions, it would be worth studying all the signs of slave owners' nervousness in the late Republic, including the vivid warning uttered in Philodemus' *De ira* 5 (col. xxiv.17-36), and such passages as Cic. *Cat.* iv.12, *Mil.* 87, 89.

latter is "untouched by anger," and we may be left with the implication that it is anger which leads humans to fight so many wars.⁵⁰

It is likely that the critical Epicurean and Stoic views about *orge*-anger and *thumos*-anger, having been translated into criticism of *ira*, began to have a certain effect on people's opinions even outside the circles of those who had an intense interest in philosophy. One recalls the evidence that Epicureanism had acquired a numerous following in Italy during the last generation of the Republic (*Cic.Tusc.Disp.* iv.7), a following which must admittedly have been partly dilettantish in character.

The political and civil consequences of these philosophically based criticisms of anger at Rome were in a sense nil.⁵¹ But *ira*, like *clementia*, became a weapon in the propaganda wars which accompanied the long painful transition from republic to monarchy, and as such probably had some effect. Under the new system, from Caesar's dictatorship onwards, since the anger of the ruler was of intense practical importance at the center of power, anger discourse took on a new life.

Although the civil wars of the years 49 to 30 were a time of anger, anger which touched the lives of every Roman, the great contemporary writers who make civil strife their subject do not for the most part make anger the culprit. Both Vergil (*Eclogues* I and IX) and Horace (*Epodes* VII and XVI) avoid the theme in the political poems they wrote in the 30s. In the end, however, in the culminating work of his lyric poetry, Horace alluded to the wars which were now twenty years in the past in these terms (*Odes* iv.15.17-20): "With Caesar as guardian of our affairs, no rage [*furor*] or violence between the citizens will drive out peace, and no anger which sharpens swords and makes wretched cities of their own enemies." The poet simultaneously identifies part of the real psychology of the civil wars, and awards the new dictator the prize for having put a stop to the workings of an appalling vice.

The official version was that the civil wars had been fought for the sake of revenge.⁵² But this very claim allows us to catch a glimpse not only of evolving imperial ideology but also perhaps of evolving Roman attitudes towards revenge. Fighting the Battle of Philippi in 42 against the assassins of his "father," Caesar, Octavian (without Antony) promised a temple to Mars

⁵⁰ i.29-49. It is fairly plain that it is war in general, not simply civil war, which Lucretius wishes to be rid of ("per maria ac terras," 30, suggests that without fully proving it).

⁵¹ Their effects on the private individual may of course have been profound.

⁵² In the official version, the war against M. Antonius was of course a foreign war.

the Avenger (Mars Ultor).⁵³ Appian's narrative of these times, which emphasizes Octavian's determination to avenge the famous assassination, presumably reflects the official line; Octavian is shown praising Achilles' vengeful reaction to the death of Patroclus.⁵⁴ The old ethos of revenge was clearly alive and well—never better, one might say, since Mars Ultor was a new conception.⁵⁵

After Actium there is some retrospective Roman discourse about political anger such as the passage in Horace quoted above: we used to fight with each other because of excessive *ira*. But now the main contemporary questions about anger control in the public sphere concern emperors (and those petty emperors, the provincial governors). Can the emperor be prevailed upon to restrain himself? How should his subordinates react to his rage? But there is also the separate issue, anger between citizens.

The history of such anger could in theory follow many paths—the anger of and against gladiators,⁵⁶ the anger of hungry town populations in times of shortage, the anger of communities against each other (neighboring towns; Greeks and Jews in Alexandria and elsewhere), anger against religious dissidents. But the track we are following, though it will bring us in sight of each of these themes, is a different one: the repute of the angry emotions, and the origins of attempts to restrain them.⁵⁷

Before completing the transition to the new period of monarchy and, soon, absolute monarchy, let us consider a political historian, Livy, and a political poet, Vergil, who can perhaps help to indicate to us what point Roman thinking about *ira* had reached by Augustan times.⁵⁸

It was mentioned before that Livy makes heavy use of anger words. While such terms are scattered throughout his history, they are used with

⁵³ The sources include Ov. *Fast.* v.573-377, Suet.*Aug.* 29; cf. Cassius Dio xlvii.42, xlvi.3.

⁵⁴ App. *BC* iii.13.

⁵⁵ As to the manner in which Augustus dealt with this later, when it turned out to be inopportune to emphasize revenge against citizens (the temple of Mars Ultor was not dedicated for a full forty years, and by then the supposed victims of the *ultio* were not Romans but the Parthians).

⁵⁶ Gladiators were volunteers (Veyne 1999), and unconscious rage may have been an important part of their psychology.

⁵⁷ In the Greek world, the spectre of popular *orgê* reappears from time to time: *IGRR* i.864 (line 20), Dio Chrys. iii.49.

⁵⁸ It is not of course suggested that their opinions were necessarily typical, but we can take it that in their principal works they were addressing the Roman elite at large.

particular frequency in Book II,⁵⁹ which describes the murderous strife and virtual civil war among the Romans after the expulsion of the last of the Tarquins. Livy's first ten books in general, the era of the "Struggle of the Orders" and Rome's rise to power in Italy, are only slightly less irate. The contentiousness of the age when the republican state was under construction stands out from his narrative, and it is probable that he gave at least some thought to *ira/iracundia*. The historian had written philosophical dialogues,⁶⁰ which presumably concerned moral philosophy, and in his history there are occasional (banal) asides on the subject.⁶¹ *Ira* and related words are immensely commoner in his usage than, say, *avaritia* words or *odium* words.

Not that Livy was an uncompromising critic of anger, far from it. He is supposed by some scholars to have been deeply influenced by Stoicism,⁶² but he sometimes attributes *ira* to people whom he evidently approves of, including the Roman Senate and victorious Roman armies,⁶³ as well as to others. That in itself makes any theory that he was in any serious sense a Stoic quite untenable. Admittedly a patriotic historian of Rome faced a difficult task if he held Stoic views—but he could at least have followed Polybius in suggesting that the Senate was almost always guided by reason not passion.

As for contemporary lessons, the fact that he often makes kings irascible⁶⁴ confirms his contemporary reputation for republicanism or something like it. The monarch of his own time noticed,⁶⁵ but was much too sensible to do anything about it; after all, it was the last of Augustus' intentions to institute overt *regnum*.

⁵⁹ There is also plenty of *indignatio*. In Book II we find forty-three instances of *ira*, *iracundia* and *irascor* (of course other terms are relevant too); twenty-nine in Book VIII is the next largest concentration.

⁶⁰ Sen. *Ep.* 100.9.

⁶¹ E.g., xxxiii.37.8: "then it was clear how much strength *ira* has for stirring the spirit [*ad stimulandos animos*]"—and the Romans slaughtered their enemies almost to a man.

⁶² Walsh 1963, 59, 64, 94.

⁶³ The Senate: e.g., ii.5.1, xxiii.25.6, vliv.35.4 (*ingentem iram*). Armies: e.g., ix.14.9, x.5.2, xxxviii.25.16. Hardly any Roman is likely to have been in the least troubled by the fact that Roman armies sometimes showed *ira* towards foreigners: cf. Vell. ii.119.2.

⁶⁴ Kings are irascible (so is the *plebs*): i.36.4; ii.6.1, 7, 12.12, 13.7, 19.10; xlii.25.8. In ii.3.3 royalist traitors say there is a place for royal anger.

⁶⁵ Tac. *Ann.* iv.34.3.

The closing lines of the *Aeneid*, in which the poet describes Aeneas' furiously angry killing of Turnus (xii.945-952), have become a notorious scholarly problem. Investigating the history of anger criticism shows without too much difficulty what the solution should be. But before we come to that issue, we must consider Vergil's general attitude towards anger.

Let it be said at once that neither issue is to be approached by *labeling* the poet, whether as "Stoic," "Epicurean," "Aristotelian," or anything else.⁶⁶ Next, we should admit that *ira* was an important topic in the *Aeneid*. Not only was the climax of the poem a scene of anger, the whole framework of the epic is provided by the anger of the goddess Juno against the hero.⁶⁷ If the legitimacy or seriousness of her anger were to be denied, the poem would be in severe danger of collapsing. Admittedly the *Aeneid* is not "about" *ira* in the same way as the *Iliad* is "about" angry emotions. And we might conclude that this anger of Juno's is merely part of a regime poet's effort to breathe life into the traditional gods. But at least the anger of Juno and other Vergilian gods proves that the author of the *Aeneid* cannot possibly be considered an Epicurean,⁶⁸ even though as a young man he had had a connection with Philodemus.⁶⁹

It is plain that some kinds of anger are acceptable to Vergil. Even if, as some think, he intends to undermine Aeneas at the end of the poem by showing him in the grips of rage, it is not to be believed that this (explicable) anger was supposed to delegitimize Aeneas altogether. Elsewhere he writes of "just anger."⁷⁰ And in Book VIII no less a personage than the beneficent hero Hercules gives way to furious anger in exacting vengeance — clearly vengeance which Vergil thought was thoroughly deserved—from the monster Cacus.⁷¹ Yet anger in the *Aeneid* is associated above all with the arch-enemy Turnus.⁷² And there is something angular, at the very least, about Aeneas' rage at the end of XII: the economy of the poem does not require it; the dramatic circumstances do not require it; the whole tendency of the high culture is against showing a great hero being overwhelmed by an ugly

⁶⁶ Cf. Gill forthcoming.

⁶⁷ *Aen.* i.3-4. This anger is not surrendered until a few pages from the poem's end, xii.841: "adnuit his Iuno et mentem laetata retorsit." For the pervasiveness of anger in the *Aeneid*, see Wright 1997.

⁶⁸ Pace Erler 1992. The private Vergil is obviously unknowable.

⁶⁹ For the papyrus linking Philodemus with Vergil (who was some forty years his junior), see Gigante & Capasso 1989.

⁷⁰ *Iusta ira*: x.714; cf. viii.500-501. Vergil quite often justifies anger elsewhere (Laurenti 1987, 21).

⁷¹ viii.219-261 constantly emphasizes Hercules' passion ("ter totum ferveridus ira / lustrat Aventini montem," 230-231, etc.).

⁷² F. Cairns 1989, 71, 74.

passion.⁷³ The solution to this dilemma concerns the person of the princeps, and will therefore be discussed later when I examine the anger control of rulers.

Educated Romans of Augustus' time were well aware that philosophers had often found fault with angry emotions. Some of them held more or less strict Stoic views on the subject. Most, however, probably assumed an attitude which was a simplified form of Aristotle's—in other words, they approved of *ira/iracundia* when it was directed in appropriate quantity against an appropriate target (and *ira* was such a wide term—it was difficult to be altogether against it). While they may not have been quite as enthusiastic about revenge as Aristotle seems to have been, they had no difficulty at all in approving it if the provocation was sufficient. The ideal woman of the time, "Turia," when she is eulogized in an inscription, is praised for, among other things, having avenged her parents.⁷⁴ Horrendous crimes—those of Cacus in the *Aeneid*, or later the supposed poisoning of Germanicus—were naturally thought of as being suitable occasions for revenge; Vergil describes Hercules as "the great avenger."⁷⁵

How, it may be asked, did Roman law regard crimes of anger and acts of revenge?⁷⁶ One kind of violent revenge was legally sanctified: the Julian law on adultery, the definitive statute on that subject for several centuries, permitted the betrayed husband or his wife's father to kill the intrusive male, subject to certain conditions, and the guilty woman's father was permitted to kill her too.⁷⁷ But we should not take it for granted that these were the actual

⁷³ Gill (forthcoming) argues effectively that for most of the *Aeneid* the poet purposefully associates Aeneas with unangry responses, which makes it all the more desirable to find a specific explanation for the ending.

⁷⁴ *Laudatio Turiae* I, lines 5 and 8 (to be read in the edition of Durry & Lancel).

⁷⁵ *maximus ultor*, *Aen.* viii.201. For the case of Germanicus, see Suet. *Cal.* 3.

⁷⁶ The subject here is the pre-Severan law of the Roman Empire; some later developments will be mentioned further on. In the late Republic, when Milo was charged under the *Lex Pompeia de vi*, Cicero seems to have thought of pleading, among other things, that his client had acted out of anger (*Mil.* 35), but he did not do so directly, and such a plea would have been a rhetorical obfuscation—perhaps not without some possible effect, however, for otherwise he would not have mentioned the matter.

⁷⁷ *Dig.* xlviii.5.24-25. The father-in-law could do this lawfully only if he killed both wife and lover (he had to kill them: "prope uno ictu et uno impetu ... , aequali ira adversus utrumque sumpta," 24.4, cf. 33 pr. [this was the jurists' interpretation]); see further Mommsen 1899, 624. It was thought to show exceptional *robor*, toughness, to kill an unmarried daughter for a

social practices in Augustan times: Augustus was busy for his own reasons making a demonstration against adultery, and the government seems to have recognized that, even when cuckolded, few real-world husbands will have wanted to go as far as murdering the paramour if he was a respectable citizen.⁷⁸ A husband who killed his adulterous wife was deemed guilty of murder, though second-century emperors said that his punishment should be reduced because of the resentment (*dolor*) he felt.⁷⁹

Generally, of course, revenge was supposed to be judicial not personal. This sort of revenge was taken for granted: one of the Cyrene Edicts shows that *not* avenging (by means of prosecution) the death of a relative would have been remarkable.⁸⁰ We have seen that Athenian law courts and some Greek legal theory made a certain amount of room for uncontrolled anger as a mitigating plea. The criminal law of classical Rome, however, did not regard loss of self-control as a mitigation of any offence, with the exception noted above, unless this was a result of madness. Nevertheless, in several matters of civil law, jurists sensibly ruled that statements made in anger could be declared invalid or inoperative.⁸¹

Let us turn once more to Seneca. His purposes in writing *De ira* seem to have been multiple: in part they were literary, in part they were therapeutic. Insofar as they were political, they concerned the behaviour of the emperor and the reactions of his courtiers (see below).⁸² In addition, we can learn from this text Seneca's opinions about how other Romans (those of his own

sexual liaison, even when the lover was a slave: Val. Max vi.1.3. The husband's right to kill was also limited to those whose social status was impaired in certain ways (at least so the third-century jurist Macer said, xlviii.5.25 pr.; was this part of Augustus' law?).

⁷⁸ The husband who stayed married and let the paramour go was liable to punishment for *lenocinium*, Dig. xlviii.5.30 pr., "for he ought to have been angry with his wife."

⁷⁹ Dig. xlviii.5.39.8; cf. xlviii.8.1.5. Cohen 1991, 118, maintains that at Rome "the natural impulse of the husband is to avenge adultery in blood," but he relies too much on the artificial and macabre world of Seneca senior's *Controversiae*, and the law was as stated in the text. It was supposed that in the elder Cato's time a husband was permitted to kill his adulterous wife if he caught her in the act (Gell. x.23.5), but this must have been at most a dead letter by the first century B.C.

⁸⁰ *Cyrene Edict* (FIRA I no. 68 Riccobono) I, line 34.

⁸¹ Dig. xxii.3.29.1, xxiv.2.3 (see, too, 1.17.48) (in both situations it is female anger which is held to render an intention inoperative, but in the second instance this was probably to women's advantage).

⁸² But iii.2 also contains the sketch of an interesting reflection to the effect that anger is the only emotion which can affect a whole nation.

social class, naturally) ought to behave when anger is in question. He claims to make it possible to enjoy *tranquillitas animi*. But that, for a man in Seneca's position or indeed for any Roman of rank, involved intricate social interactions: not for him the relatively simple life of a philosopher.

The judgement that it is risky to be angry with an equal, insane to be angry with a superior, and squalid (*sordidum*) to be angry with a social inferior is merely a prudential social and political maxim (*De ira* ii.34.1). So much for philosophical principles. But Seneca recommends, with detailed examples of his own practice, a nightly examination of conscience with respect to anger. What follows is one of the few sections of *De ira* which appears to consist of the author's own sustained reflections and not simply the more or less skillful cutting, pasting and recasting of earlier material.⁸³ And here it is the author's social relations, and by implication the reader's, that are the focus of attention as much as his psychic well-being. Addressing himself, he imagines himself having spoken too pugnaciously in a debate (moral: keep away from the ignorant), having admonished someone too candidly (moral: in future, consider whether the person can bear the truth), having been upset at a party by jokes and comments at his expense (moral: keep away from parties with the common people). It is noticeable that all this advice gives excuses for Seneca as well as indicating how one can avoid anger. Other situations in which he imagines himself being misguidedly angry are these: on a friend's behalf when the latter is mistreated by a rich man's concierge, or again at a dinner if he (Seneca) is assigned an insufficiently honorific place, or yet again when someone speaks badly of his talents (*ingenium*). A sensible public man does not, he implies, grow angry when someone insults him (unlike Cornelius Fidus, who burst into tears when a fellow senator called him a "plucked ostrich").⁸⁴ Seneca undertakes the difficult task of showing that these offences against one's dignity (for that is what most of them are) do not merit anger. All this was practical advice for the smooth conduct of the social life of the upper-class male.

Seneca's advice about anger concerns other areas of public life too, including both penology and foreign affairs. He does not bother with the masses: the multitude in the forum is a crowd of wild beasts, except that wild beasts are less aggressive (ii.8.3). Scholars who have supposed that Seneca was addressing a mass public which cut across social classes are grossly

⁸³ iii.36-38. A little earlier, in iii.33.1, the thought that "most of the fuss is about money," whether it is anger in the family or in the state, seems as formulated to be original with Seneca.

⁸⁴ Seneca expresses his disapproval of this reaction in *De const.* 17. Presumably most senators would have grown angry and replied in kind.

anachronistic.⁸⁵ His penological theory, at all events, is corrective or curative. Since man's nature, at its best, aims at kindness, it is not *poenae adpetens*, eager to punish.⁸⁶ Revenge is an inhuman word.⁸⁷ He contrasts punishment as a remedy with punishment inflicted in anger, and naturally prefers the former.⁸⁸ We are a little surprised to hear a Stoic saying that the anger-free judge will often let a guilty party go free if he seems likely to reform (i.19.5)—not that such notions are likely to have had much impact on real-life judicial behaviour.⁸⁹

And even Seneca's condemnation of revenge has something equivocal about it, since he allows exceptions. In saying that "it is often better to dissimulate than to revenge oneself" (ii.33.1), he allows room, on undefined terms, for any claim that in a particular case revenge would be better—provided, of course, that it is not angry but cold-blooded.

Seneca, like many other imperial writers, repeats the topos about the anger of the barbarians. He contends that "those who live towards the frigid north have harsh temperaments that are, as the poet says, 'very like their native skies,'" whereas empires generally occur in milder—that is, Mediterranean—climates.⁹⁰ In part, this simply continues the long tradition of attributing irascibility to the Other, with the corollary that we Romans are good at limiting our anger. The irascibility of the barbarians—sometimes idealized now as *free* people—continues as long as there is any Roman literature.⁹¹

The at-first-glance strange contest between empires and the world of anger makes sense in the new period of Roman imperialism now beginning,

⁸⁵ I have in mind the usually well-informed Cupaiuolo 1975, 167, who does not realize the limitations of Roman education and book circulation. According to Donini 1982, 40-41, Stoic doctrines enjoyed some diffusion in "the lowest classes of Roman society," which at the very least gives the wrong impression. They were not in any case the object of Seneca's interest.

⁸⁶ *De ira* i.5 and 6.4. But the most important text is *De clem.* i.20-24. Protagoras and Plato and others (cf. Cupaiuolo 1975, 116 n.82) had already opposed retributive punishment.

⁸⁷ *De ira* ii.32.1. The MSS read "ultio et talio," but editors have seen that one noun or the other has to go; since Seneca seems to use *talio* to mean "retribution" in general (Ep. 81.7), it is not important which.

⁸⁸ Punishment as remedy: i.16.2-4, 19.5 and 7.

⁸⁹ For some subsequent controversy about the principles of penology, see Gell.xx.1.

⁹⁰ ii.15.5; the poet is unknown.

⁹¹ See, e.g., Lucian, *Toxaris* 8 (Scythians); Xen. Eph. ii.3.5-6, etc.; Helioid. ii.12.4; *Pan. Lat.* vi.10.2 (Franks); Themistius, *Or.* x.131bc. For Tacitus, see above, n. 34.

in which educated Romans thought of Rome as having brought not only justice and law, *iura et leges*, to the conquered peoples, but also *humanitas* and harmony.⁹² This thought did not logically entail giving up military expansion on the frontiers, but it is true that Seneca asserted that it was *ira* that led rulers into misguided foreign wars.⁹³ Now that imperial expansion had decelerated for severely practical reasons, there could be some real discussion at Rome about the justification for expansionist wars, and this discussion can be traced from Seneca's time until that of Cassius Dio, and indeed beyond.

In short, Seneca appears to have a wide range of concerns about anger's political and social effects. We should not dismiss any of them as entirely rhetorical or frivolous; on the other hand, the most serious probably involve the figures we have not yet examined in detail, the emperor and the courtier.

Musonius Rufus, Seneca's younger contemporary, went a good deal further, as we might have expected. By Roman standards, he was an apostle of mildness. As we saw in Chapter 6, he argued that the Wise Man should forego retaliation, and should not even go to court when he has suffered "outrage" (*hubris*): "We should not be implacable towards those who have wronged us, but rather a source of good hope to them, [which is] characteristic of a civilized and benevolent way of life."⁹⁴ Musonius was quite widely admired in "all social orders," according to Pliny, meaning both inside and outside the Senate. In this age, the 60s and 70s of the first century, this could happen to a prominent Roman who was held to be a man of philosophical principle. It would be mistaken to deny him any practical influence among those who frequented the same social and intellectual circles.⁹⁵

The social limits of this influence were vividly illustrated in 69. With the Flavian army of Antonius Primus on the outskirts of Rome, the new

⁹² A vital text here is Plin. *NH* iii.39, written under Vespasian: Italy was chosen by the gods to "unite scattered empires, to make manners gentle, to draw together in converse by community of language the jarring and uncouth tongues of so many nations, to give mankind civilization [*humanitatem homini dare*], and in a word to become throughout the world the single fatherland of all peoples." The idea that a Roman administrator should show *humanitas* was old, but most of the passage quoted is, as far as surviving texts go, original.

⁹³ *De ben.* vi.30.5. But for Pliny and Trajan, a barbarian king could deserve the emperor's *ira* and *indignatio*: *Pan.* 16.5.

⁹⁴ Musonius fr.X = p.78 Lutz.

⁹⁵ Plin. *Ep.* iii.11.7 mentions that he had *omnium ordinum adsectatores*. For his influence among contemporaries and near contemporaries, see Lutz 19-20. He was sent into exile both by Nero and by Vespasian (Lutz 14, 16).

usurper Vitellius sent a senatorial delegation to make terms. Musonius, though only a knight, joined in, but his attempts to expound to the angry soldiers the blessings of peace and similar themes were found ludicrous or boring, and in spite of his rank he narrowly escaped violence. "Poorly timed philosophy" (*intempestiva sapientia*), Tacitus comments.⁹⁶ A poorly chosen audience too. Musonius saw where there was anger, and rashly went to confront it. On a later occasion his choice of audience, while superficially more reasonable, turned out to be almost equally over-optimistic: we are told that a Roman philosopher, and there can be little doubt that it was Musonius, reproved the Athenians for staging gladiatorial combat—that great expression of unconscious rage—in no less a place than the Theatre of Dionysus. The Athenians were so annoyed with the philosopher over this matter, says Dio Chrysostom, that he decided to give up Athens and go to live somewhere else.⁹⁷

It was the accepted wisdom of the imperial age that anger characterized barbarians, and that anger inside the body politic was a principle cause of civil wars. These were both ancient ideas to which first and second-century Rome contributed nothing more than elegant reformulations. Encapsulating 200 years of Rome's violent internal struggles in a single chapter of his *Histories*, Tacitus remarked that the armies of 48 B.C. and 42, and those of Otho and Vitellius, were all driven into battle by the same forces—the anger of the gods and the furious passion (*rabies*) of mankind (ii.38). The most interesting Tacitean remark about anger may be the most famous one—his claim that he is able to write the history of emperors from Augustus onwards "*sine ira et studio*," "without anger or affection" (*Ann.* i.1). The accumulated ill repute of the angry emotions is likely to have required that a declaration of impartiality should be in those terms.

Besides Seneca and Musonius, the other great apostle of emotional restraint as a vital element in political Stoicism was of course Epictetus: he supposed that avoiding "contentiousness" would produce, among other benefits, "concord in the *polis* and peace between nations" (iv.5.35-37). The first of these consequences, which fitted Epictetus' generally fatalistic politics, was by now banal; the second was still a distinctive point of view. The Roman Stoics—some of them anyway—had also taken up a distinctively humanitarian view of slavery (as we shall see in Chapter 13). All in all, therefore, it is not enough to see Stoic morals as merely an expression of the hegemony of the dominant social elite. Anger control was

⁹⁶ *Hist.* iii.31; Cassius Dio, who does not mention Musonius, says that Primus' soldiers were in an angry mood (lxv.19.2).

⁹⁷ Dio Chrysostom xxxi.122, who does not name Musonius; for this old identification see Lutz 17 n. 60.

in the interest of that elite as a whole, but suggested to them certain ways of behaving which they did not unanimously want to accept.

Not that political anger was always seen in a negative light—we must not let our account be unduly influenced by morally superior intellectuals. It was Aelius Aristides, of all people—scarcely a man to slander the imperial power—who pronounced with satisfaction that under Roman rule political trouble-makers are punished: they are overtaken by the *orge* and revenge of Rome (To Rome 65, 143 A.D.). No hint here that *orge* might be disapproved.

Juvenal's satires, however, suggest how the traditional ethos had changed. In the first part of his collected works, his persona, like that of his predecessor Persius, is the satirist in his pure form—that is to say, bursting with fury. "How can I express the amount of anger that burns in my fevered liver?" (i.45). *Facit indignatio versum* ("outrage compels me to write")—the famous phrase well expresses the essence of the first six satires, which culminate in a misogynistic attack on marriage sustained at outlandish length. These satires gain some of their force from the very fact that anger has been attacked from so many directions: the angry poet knows that he may be thought to be behaving badly—the works of anger are among his targets, after all (i.85)—but such is the provocation that he cannot restrain himself. He justifies his *indignatio* at the supposed degeneracy of contemporary Rome in ample detail.⁹⁸

We might possibly expect this atrabilious persona, which draws on a very long literary tradition including the prototypical Roman satirist Lucilius,⁹⁹ to be maintained (though the subtle variations within Horace's *Satires* and so-called *Epistles* might have warned us). Instead, it is not only abandoned but negated. In Juvenal's later satires, at least from Satire Ten onwards, the poet takes on a persona which sometimes expresses scorn, but turns against all passion. He urges the reader to ask for a soul which "knows not how to be angry" (*nesciat irasci*) and has no desires.¹⁰⁰ What, if anything, in the way of personal experience may have given rise to the new personality of the poet we cannot know. Part of the purpose is obviously to instill a philosophy of acceptance. This is how we should probably take Satire

⁹⁸ For a succinct account of this justification, see Anderson 1962, 146-149 = 1982, 278-281. For the interchangeability of *indignatio* and *ira* in some imperial writers, see Anderson 158 n. 6 = 290 n. 6.

⁹⁹ Angry, or pretend-angry, poetic invective flourished greatly at Rome; cf. the pseudo-Vergilian *Catalepton* 13, as well as the well-known works of Catullus and Horace.

¹⁰⁰ x.357-362. On the programmatic nature of this change, see Courtney's commentary, p.446. Braund 1988, esp. 189, argues that the transition was gradual.

Thirteen, which treats at length the indignation felt by Calvinus (because of a bad debt), indignation which finds the satirist thoroughly unsympathetic.¹⁰¹ Satire Fifteen describes an incident of bestial cannibalism in Egypt, for which the poet says that *ira* was to blame (or *furor* or *rabies* or hatred)¹⁰²—yet another horror story attributing extremes of angry behaviour to the Other.

Satire Thirteen is in fact a prolonged attack on *vindicta*,¹⁰³ revenge. Punishment will not make good a financial loss, and revenge is (usually? always?) contrary to philosophy (*sapientia*).¹⁰⁴ In any case it is not as effective a punishment as the torture inflicted by a criminal's own conscience and his fear of divine wrath. The culminating argument is that revenge is especially enjoyed by women.¹⁰⁵ All this is likely to represent an important strand in contemporary Roman thought. Satire Thirteen shows that the dubious moral status of revenge and of inappropriate anger was familiar to, and accepted by, a large proportion of moderately educated Romans.¹⁰⁶ But Juvenal's position was not extreme: the addressee is chided because his reaction seems to Juvenal to be *disproportionate* to his loss;¹⁰⁷ and the very end of the poem seems to promise that the wrongdoer will suffer in the end, to the addressee's delight.

It can be hypothesized that from Seneca's time onwards a certain number of highly educated Romans felt increased concern about the propriety of revenge.¹⁰⁸ It would be simpleminded to assume that such speculations had no effect at all on contemporary behaviour, and we shall see later that during the succeeding century there was a certain tendency within the Roman upper class to regard slaves in a more humane light, a tendency which was to have some surprising legislative effects in the reign of Antoninus Pius. The Roman Empire was still full of curse tablets, casual violence, litigation and religious contention; the extreme ferocity of magical

¹⁰¹ On Satire Eleven, cf. Anderson 1962, 157-158 = 1982, 289-290.

¹⁰² xv.131, 169.

¹⁰³ See esp., but not only, lines 174-249. For a recent treatment, see Braund 1997, who, however, somewhat mistakes the target.

¹⁰⁴ xiii.189-191 ("... quippe minuti / semper et infirmi est animi exiguique voluptas / ultio"). Note that he explicitly rejects Stoicism, xiii.121, but invokes Chrysippus (184).

¹⁰⁵ xiii.191-192.

¹⁰⁶ Moderately indeed if they thought that Thales had been a critic of revenge (xiii.184).

¹⁰⁷ xiii.11-17, 124-144, 247-249.

¹⁰⁸ The idealism of the emperor Marcus went further: he wrote that it is the mark of a human being to love even those who make blunders, and one should forgive the wrongs of others against oneself and not get angry (*To Himself* vii.22,26).

spells, in particular, must strike any reader.¹⁰⁹ Nonetheless it should be assumed that the widespread and often intense disapproval of *orge* and *ira* on the part of articulate second-century opinion had some effect on the *public* expression of the angry emotions.

Not that the personal price was necessarily very heavy:

Philagrus of Cilicia was ... the most hot-tempered [*thermotatos*] and splenitic [*epicholotatos*] of the sophists, for it is said that once when someone in the audience was dozing off he went so far as to strike him on the cheek ... But though he lived among many peoples and won a great reputation among them for his skill in handling rhetorical themes, at Athens he showed no skill in handling his own bilious temper [*chole*] but started a feud with Herodes just as if he had come there with that purpose ... [Once while he was displaying (artificial) anger in a rhetorical display,] his voice was extinguished by his *chole*—this happens with splenetic people. Later on, however, he won the chair <of rhetoric> at Rome, though at Athens he was deprived of his proper fame for the reasons I have explained.¹¹⁰

Philagrus' enemy and fellow sophist Herodes Atticus (consul in 143) was something of a contrarian voice on the subject of anger, and his career, too, suggests what one could get away with. But it cannot have been pleasant for him in old age to have to respond to Athenian charges of "tyranny" before his former pupil, the emperor Marcus; it seems probable that his quarrelsome and ill-tempered nature had been at least partly responsible.¹¹¹

As to how much disapproval of revenge was still left in Severan times, one may be sceptical. The Severan evidence includes the "indictment for unavenged death," *crimen mortis inultae*, a charge which was supposed to

¹⁰⁹ For the material, see Gager 1992, and see more specifically Versnel 1998, 247-267. A wide-ranging study of Roman imperial sadism is overdue.

¹¹⁰ Philostratus, *VS* ii.8 (578-580); *PIR*² P 348. On the quarrelsome propensities of the second-century sophists, see Bowersock 1969, 89-100.

¹¹¹ The contrarian voice: Gellius xix.12 describes a speech he gave "against the *apatheia* of the Stoics," in which he argued that it was both impossible and undesirable to eradicate the passions, undesirable because they were intimately linked to man's good and useful qualities (here he was following his teacher Calvisius Taurus). In so saying, he seems to have been justifying some of his own personality traits: see Philostr. *VS* ii.1: *PIR*² C 802. The charge of tyranny (notwithstanding his extensive philanthropy): *VS* 559. He was probably responsible for the violent death of his wife, cf. *VS* 555-556. See in general Tobin 1997.

follow failure to avenge a murder.¹¹² Even though the imperial government's motive was to disqualify heirs in order to justify seizing property, something is revealed about the acceptability of revenge.

Anger and the need to control it are not absent from the literature of the Roman Empire of the second to fourth centuries, far from it. But the reasons why anger is an issue mostly seem to concern either the relationship between the emperor and his subjects, or family peace, or the psychic well-being of the individual—and the pretensions of philosophers who claimed to be able to ensure it. All these themes will need treatment in their own contexts.

¹¹² *C. Iust.* vi.35.1 pr.; cf. *Dig.* xxix.5.9, xxxvii.14.23 pr.

Flora and the Sibyl

Robert Palmer

It seems fitting that on a campus where some rites of the month of May directly traceable to the cult of Flora have persisted, we should gather to honor the memory of Agnes Kirsopp Michels, professor of Latin at Bryn Mawr College, exponent of the Roman calendar, and loving devotee of Roman religion and literature. Some here may recall that in antiquity the Floral Games were notorious. I hasten to state that Mrs. Michels would have been devoted to the *intent* of the cult of Flora, though, I dare say, *she* would not have blushed to have witnessed the games. The church fathers condemned the entertainment offered at Flora's games. "Bumps and grinds by stripping prostitutes," one pious firebrand deemed them. But then, the church fathers found their small worldly pleasures in *writing* about pagan lubricity!

This afternoon we may disappoint, for we shall not dwell on the meretricious participants in the Floral games, or on the fullest development of their spectacle. Rather, we shall examine their beginnings. Our survey supplies a study in the writing of *religious*—which is to say at Rome, *civil*—history. Thus, no Cato need consider leaving this lecture as *the* Cato left the Floral Games in 55 B.C.E., and the spectators might watch and listen with their delights unabated.

Flora was anciently reckoned a goddess of high antiquity. Her worship is attested among Romans, Sabines, and Samnites. In one Italic community, she evidently named the month we know today as July. At Rome, she had her own priest called *flamen Floralis*. Within the old city limits, she had an archaic shrine of which we know little, save its anniversary date of May 3, the terminal date of the much later Floral Games. On the Aventine Hill, religiously outside the old city bounds, was built a second shrine to Flora near the temple of Ceres. This shrine was built in the third century B.C.E., at the end of the first war with Carthage, i.e., in or shortly after 241 B.C.E.

This new second temple and its games for Flora constitute the lesson for today. The date of foundation, the nature of the magistrates who gave the sacred games, the impulse behind these games, their nature, and the character of the new Flora will occupy our attention.

To clarify the primitive function of the goddess Flora, who the Romans associated with flowers, we can quote a reliable record that Flora received a new shrine dedicated April 28. A calendar explanation of the day was inscribed in the age of Augustus (F. Praen.): "the temple of Flora, who is in charge of making things begin to bloom, was dedicated on account of the barrenness of the fruits and crops" (*rebus florescendis*).¹ Flora's domain embraced not the full decorative blossoms alone, but also the budding of plants whose produce gave life to the Italian peoples. Without the budding expected after the spring equinox, plants would not yield their fruits and Romans would have naught to eat. While happy enough to have roses, the Romans truly needed the wheat, the barley, the grape, the apple, and all the other fruits whose buds they awaited after winter gave way to spring.

Now we turn to the date of the foundation of the second temple to Flora, or, more precisely, to the rites and famous games of Flora. The historian Velleius Paterculus interested himself in the foundation dates of Roman colonies. Accordingly, he writes of the establishment of Spolegium (1.14.8):² "... and three years later [than the founding of the colonies Fregensae and Brundisium,] Spolegium [was founded] in the year that the Floral games were first given." The year of the first offering of games to Flora was 241 B.C.E. according to this relative reckoning.

The other similar date is found in Pliny's *Natural History* (18.286).³ Although he is writing on weather signs, Pliny seems to be drawing upon the Roman encyclopedist and expert on religion, Terentius Varro: "Accordingly the same men [who feared the three occasions in a year harmful to crops] established the *Floralia* also on April 28 [when the dogstar sets] in the 516th year of the city in accordance with the oracles of the Sibyl so that all might bud (*deflorescerent*) well. Varro determines that this day falls when the sun holds forth a fourteenth part of Taurus. Therefore, if the full moon has fallen in this four-day period, crops and all that bud must be harmed." The day of *Floralia* of April 28 was fixed in the absolute chronology at our year 238

¹ Evidence of religious observances and public games in honor of Flora, also called Flora Mater, is collected and discussed by A. Degraffi in *Inscriptiones Italiae* 13.2 ("Fasti Anni Numani et Iuliani"), Rome, 1963: *Ludi Florae*, April 28ff (pp. 449-451); *dies natalis* of the old temple, May 3 (p. 454).

² Vell.Pat. 1.14.8 = 241 B.C.E.

³ Pliny *NH* 18.286. = 238 B.C.E.:

itaque iidem *Floralia* IIII kal. Eisdem instituerunt urbis anno DXVI ex oraculis Sibyllae, ut omnia bene deflorescerent. Hunc diem Varro determinat sole tauri partem XIII obtinente. Ergo si in hoc quadriduum inciderit plenilunum, fruges et omnia, quae floreant. Laedi necesse erit.

BC, upon interpretation of the Sibylline prophecies (better known to us as the Sibylline books owned by the Roman state).

The identity of the founder of the games is uniformly given as a pair of brothers called Publicii, but variously named as plebeian aediles and curule aediles. The variation affects the choice of the year 241 or 238, if we must make a choice between Velleius and Pliny.

First, let us look at a conventional passage from Ovid's poem on the calendar, here for the month of May (*F.* 5.277-94). The poet converses with Flora herself and asks about the beginning of her games. In brief, says she, in the good old days there was no curb on the rich man who would graze his flocks on public land. Then the aediles of the plebs, the Publicii, put an end to this practice, fined the graziers, and from the fines, they established new games, put out a contract for a steep street, now the Clivus Publicius, that brings [would bring] traffic [up the Aventine].

An approximate idea of the site of the new temple to Flora which Ovid omits to mention is to be inferred from a notice of the rededication of the second temple (*Tac. Ann.* 2.49): "At the same time, some temples of the gods, fallen in old age or in a fire and begun anew by Augustus, [the emperor Tiberius] dedicated: that to Liber and Libera and Ceres beside the Circus Maximus that [which] the dictator A. Postumius had vowed, and at the same place that to Flora which had been founded by the aediles L. and M. Publicii." This author declined to say what kind of aediles the Publicii were.

Varro, who we have seen was the probable source for Pliny's notice that the *Floralia* was established in the 516th year of the city by consultation of the Sibylline books, has yet another notice in his *Latin Language* (*LL* 5.158): that the Publicii who built the Clivus Publicius were aediles of the plebs. Varro, however, stands at variance with Ovid in his report of the new Clivus Publicius. Varro claims that they built at public expense; Ovid, that they built with fine-mones. Our last witness on the matter is a lexicon entry ultimately recurring to the age of Augustus (*Fest.* 176 L), wherein we learn that the two brothers Publicii Malleoli, as curule aediles, built the Clivus Publicius to the Aventine with money realized from condemning some *pecuarii* to fines, who were by Ovid's reckoning, graziers.⁴

⁴ Ovid *Fasti* 5.277 = 294:

'Dic dea,' respondi 'ludorum quae sit origo.'

Vix bene desieram, rettulit illa mihi:

'Cetera luxuriae nondum instrumenta vigeant,

Aut pecus, aut latam dives habebat humum;

Ilinc etiam locuples, hinc ipsa pecunia dicta est:

Sed iam de vetito quisque parabat opes.

Venerat in morem populi depascere saltus,

The identification of the aedileship of the men who built the temple of Flora and the Clivus Publicius and began the Floral Games was long ago thought to have a bearing on the matter of which year we chose for the first offering of the games. According to Velleius Paterculus, it was 241, and according to Pliny, the establishment of *Floralia* was in 238. Before we look to a resolution of the problem, let it be said that the Floral Games, the *ludi Florales*, were not in fact identical with the rites of Flora, the *Floralia*. Thus, theoretically, two foundation dates have always been possible, though never countenanced in modern times.

The aedileship of the plebs was always held by plebeians. The Publicii were plebeians. Therefore, the brothers could have held the office, i.e., the plebeian aedileship, in any year Ovid and Varro state. The curule aedileship, by contrast, could be held by plebeians only in alternate years, what we call "even" years. Accordingly, the Publicii could have been curule aediles in 238, but not in 241 B.C.E. As you determined their magistracy, so you could determine the year of their magistracy. In 1860, the father of modern Roman history, Theodore Mommsen, chose the year 238 B.C.E. or 240 B.C.E., the latter not available in sources, on the basis of his interpretation of a passage in Cicero (2 *Verr.* 5.36-37: not quoted), from which he inferred that the curule aediles gave the games for Mater Flora (*Munzwesen; Str.; RF*). Then in 1939, Lily Ross Taylor, professor of Latin at this college and teacher of Mrs. Michels, demonstrated that the aediles of the plebs gave the Floral Games. Accordingly, in his masterwork, T. Robert S. Broughton, another teacher of Mrs. Michels, adopted Mrs. Taylor's argument and dated the plebeian aedileship of the brothers Publicii to the year 241 as he believed Velleius Paterculus would have it.⁵ Yet in his review of Broughton's *MRR*,

Idque diu licuit, poenaque nulla fuit.
 Vindice servabat nullo sua publica volgus;
 Iamque in privato pascere inertis erat.
 Plebis ad aediles perducta licentia talis
 Publicios; animus defuit ante viris.
 Rem populus recipit, multam subiere nocentes:
 Vindicibus laudi publica cura fuit.
 Multa data est ex parte mihi, mangoque favore
 Victores ludos instituere novos.
 Parte locant clivum, qui tunc erat ardua rupes:
 Utile nunc iter est, Publiciumque vocant.'

The temple of Ceres, Liber and Libera was destroyed in an act of arson in 31 BC (Cassius dio 50.10) and its building was long delayed.

⁵ *MRR* s.aa. 241, 240, 238, 69; for Varro's account, see n. 2, above; cf. Tac. *Ann.* 2.49 = A.D. 17.

Franz Boemer chose for close scrutiny only the years at issue, i.e., 241 and 238, out of the nearly 500 years covered in Broughton's book.⁶ Evidently, Boemer examined the issue, and he added with no great acumen, because he was preparing his commentary on Ovid's *Fasti*. In all events, when you appeal to his comments (see notes 4 and 8 in this paper) you will find reference to his review of the *MRR*. All well and good, if, of course, he had picked the scab to heal the wound.

Matters of date and office, as well as Mommsen's authorial preponderance, do not end with the passage we have already addressed. In his calendar discussion of the month of May, Ovid expresses the belief that the Floral games were given every year after their establishment by the Publicii. Not true, replies Flora. For some years, in which the games were not given, crops were damaged by foul weather. At *Fasti* 5.325-30, we find our next notice of importance when the goddess says, "Neither did I wish to become harsh nor to be harsh when angry, but I had no concern to warn off bad weather. The senators met and vowed annual rites to our Divine Will if the plants would bud well (*floreat*).⁷ We acknowledged the vow. The consul (M. Popilius) Laenas with his colleague (L.) Postumius (Albinus) requited me the vowed games."⁸

This passage was too much for Mommsen. He and all after him could not accept consuls, Rome's highest magistrates, giving the Floral Games in 173 B.C. He therefore found instead an aedile whom he called curule, but

lisdem temporibus deum aedis vetustate aut igni abolitas
coeptasque ab Augusto dedicavit, Libero Liberaeque et Cereri
iuxta circum maximum, quam A. Postumius dictator voverat,
eodemque in loco aedem Florae ab Lucio et Marco Publiciis
aedilibus constitutam, et Iano templum, quod apud forum
holitorium C. Duilius struxerat, qui primus rem Romanam
prosperè mari gessit triumphumque navalem de Poenis meruit.
Spei aedes a Germanico sacratur; hanc A. Atilius voverat
eodem bello.

⁶ *BJ* 154, 1954, 188-90.

⁷ Festus 176 L. ("Publicius clivus appellatur quem duo fratres L. M. Publicii Malleoli aediles curules pecuariis condenatis ex pecunia quam ceperant munierunt ut in Aventinum vehiculis ... possit").

⁸ Ovid *Fasti* 5.325-330 = 173 BC:

'Nec volui fieri, nec sum crudelis in ira;
Cura repellendi sed mihi nulla fuit.
Convenere patres, et, si bene floreat annus,
Numinibus nostris annua festa vovent.
Annuimus voto. Consul cum consule ludos
Postumio Laenas persolvere mihi.'

whom today Broughton calls plebeian. This man was a Servilius. Where did he come from? He is, in fact, the figment of a coin trick, like a stage magician's *leger-de-main*.

Now we shall look at two coins of the late Roman republic. The coin of C. Memmius, minted in 56, has a legend *Memmius aed(ilis) Cerialia primus fecit* (RRC 427/2).⁹ "The aedile Memmius was the first to give the Cerialia." Mommsen looked at the legend of a Floral coin, minted in 57 B.C.E. by C. Servilius (RCC 423; see n. 10, below) and read the legend *Floral primus* to mean: an aedile ancestor of Servilius, the moneyer, first gave the *Floralia*.¹⁰ Of course, the coin does not say *aedile*, nor does it even have a verb. Mommsen wanted an aedile, any aedile, for the year 173, although Ovid explicitly, or at least as explicitly as a poet can, states that *consuls*, namely Laenas and Postumius, gave the first annual games for Flora in that year. And so Mommsen inserted Servilius in the year 173 as a curule aedile. This Servilius is still in that year, in fact, in Broughton's *MRR*, but as an *aedile* of the plebs.

The student of Republican coinage, Crawford, piles Pelion upon Ossa: he challenges Mommsen and interprets *Floral primus* as a reference to a Servilius who had been the first *flamen Floralis*. This seems bizarre piety on the part of the moneyer. First, King Numa Pompilius was traditionally credited with establishing the Floral flaminiate. Few Romans indeed had the hardihood to claim such detailed knowledge of his reign nearly seven centuries earlier. Secondly, if the moneyer Servilius made such a boast, it

⁹ Crawford RRC no. 427/2, 56 BC:

1. 427 C. Memmi C.F (Mint—Rome 56 BC) *BMCR* Rome 3937

B. Memmius 9-10; Bf. I, 185; S. 920-921; *RE* Memmius 9; see above, pp. 83 ff: *Denarius* (Pl. LI): obv. Head of Ceres r; before, C. MEMMI. C.F downwards; border of dots (obverse dies: [33]). Rev: Trophy; before, kneeling captive with hands tied behind back; on r. C.MEMMIVS downwards, on l., IMPERATOR downwards. Border of dots (reverse dies: [37]).

2. *Denarius* (Pl. LI) *BMCR* Rome 3940

Obv. Laureate head of Quirinus r.; behind, QVIRINVS downwards; before, C. MEMMI.C.F downwards, border of dots (obverse dies: [39]). Rev: Ceres seated r., holding torch in l. hand and corn-ears in r. hand; before, snake; around MEMMIVS.AED.CERIALIA.PREIMVS. FECIT. Border of dots (reverse dies: [43]).

¹⁰ Crawford RRC no. 423 (Mint—Rome 57 BC) *BMCR* Rome 3816

Denarius (Pl. LI): Obverse: Head of Flora r.; behind, lituus; before, FLORA.PRIMVS. Border of dots (obverse dies: [99]). Reverse: Two soldiers facing each other and presenting swords; in exergue, C.SERE/L; on r., C.F upwards. Border of dots (reverse dies: [110]).

would be as if Charles Francis or Henry Adams had once claimed their *most illustrious* ancestor a deacon in the Baptist church. I think not. Of course, if there is any worth in Crawford's guess, then Servilii have nothing to do with the Flora of the Aventine, the second Flora and the one who interests us today.

Here let us recapitulate the evidence. In 241 B.C.E., the Floral Games were first given, and/or in 238 the feast of *Floralia* was established after reading and interpreting the Sibylline Books. The temple to Flora, the games for Flora and the street up the Aventine slope were the works of two plebeian aediles named Publicii. In 173 the two consuls first gave annual Floral Games, in accordance with a vow made by the Roman senate. A Roman moneyer of 57 B.C.E. minted a coin with Flora herself represented on the obverse, whereon is the legend *Floral. primus*.

Let us look at the circumstances of the year 173 B.C.E. It stands recorded in the first ten chapters of Livy Book 42. Some religious activities are reported, but without reference to Flora. Livy, however, does report consultation of the Sibylline Books in another regard, special sacrifices, and a thanksgiving that had been vowed in the prior year, i.e. 174, being done in 173 BC *valetudinis populi causa*, for the sake of the people's strength. The priests called the Ten Men (*decemviri sacris faciundis*) had issued a written ritual for the feast that had been so vowed (42.2.6-7). If we look at Livy's account in Book 41, a mutilated book, we learn that in 174 B.C.E. the Ten Men had consulted the Sibylline Books on account of sickness and plague (41.21.10-11). If we go back to the year 182, however, we learn that a stormy spring was recorded. The day before *Parilia* (i.e. 20 April) at mid-day a heavy storm with wind rose and ruined many holy places, cast down bronze statues, tore a door from one Aventine temple and pinned it to the back wall of the Temple of Ceres. Columns holding statues were also toppled in the Circus Maximus, and some temple pediments were broken up (Livy 41.2).

Three years later, in 179, the winter and its storms were so harsh that they burned all trees subject to frosts. This winter lasted longer than most. Storms interrupted holy rites; statues were scattered in Rome. In 179, then, the Ten Men consulted the Sibylline Books. No very foul weather is reported in Livy among the *prodigia* in subsequent years. The year 175 is virtually lost in Livy Book 41. The illness and plague of 174 was so harsh as to preclude levying troops. But according to Livy, the plague had been detected first in cattle the previous year. The human plague left all streets in Rome heaped with unburied men to be eaten by dogs and vultures. Slaves, especially, were dying (Livy 41.21).

From these facts, we may infer that some especially harsh and late winters recorded in 182 and 179, followed by plagues in 175-174, would have induced the Romans to extraordinary measures upon reading the

Sibylline Books. Of the circumstances prior to events in 241 and 238 B.C.E., we have no historical narrative at all. In a late antique historical digest based on Livy we read that in 237, “the mightiest king of Sicily, Hiero, came to Rome to watch the games and he displayed the 200,000 measures of fine wheat he brought as a gift to the Roman people” (Eutr. 3.1-2; Diod. 25.14). This act of largesse is construed as a sign of dearth. What games Hiero watched we are not told. But in this regard, and in regard of the Floral Games, we should bear in mind that in 240 B.C.E. Livius Andronicus first mounted a stage play, either in its original Greek or in a Latin translation (Cic. *Tusc.* 1.3, *Brut.* 72, *Sen.* 50; Gell. 17.21.42-43). These, the first tragedy and comedy, were given at the *Ludi Romani* by the curule aediles of 240 (Cass. *Chron. Ann.* 239).

Let us turn now to the source of funds for the second temple for Flora and the first occasion for giving the *Ludi Florales*. Ovid (see *n.* 4, above), seconded by Festus (*n.* 7), says that the funds were available from fines levied on rich men illegally grazing on public land, a misdeed the two Publicii first put an end to (*n.* 4). On the latter point, Ovid has borrowed poetically the *licentia* he attributes to the grazier. Further, on the subject of which aediles, plebeian or curule, were empowered to fine graziers, Boemer, reviewing Broughton’s *MRR*, has gone astray like a sheep.

Pecuarii, graziers or traders in sheep and goats, are attested twice as fined by plebeian aediles (Livy 10.23.13; 33.42.10; *cf.* 34.53.4) and twice fined by curule aediles (Livy 10.47.4; 35.10.11-12) in a span of time from 295 to 193 B.C.E. In 292, curule aediles paved a stretch of the highway with such fine-monies (Livy 10.47.4); in 196, the aediles of the plebs used the fine-monies to build a temple to Faunus, which one of them dedicated as praetor two years later (Livy 33.42.10; 34.53.4). Otherwise, the aediles of both kinds gave gifts to their gods, as they are known to have done, in consequence of fines they exacted in cases concerning malefactors other than *pecuarii*. Neither in the matter of the temple for Faunus, nor in any of the many cases known to have been tried by the aediles (whether or not a temple was the outcome of fining), did the Senate intervene, the Ten Men consult the Sibylline Books, or the Sibyl order a temple or games. *Never!* The role of the Sibylline oracles cannot be introduced into the story of the two brothers Publicii, whether they were curule or plebeian aediles.

Therefore, we are compelled to look again at our evidence for what has eluded, to my knowledge, all earlier students of this problem. To recapitulate: when Pliny (see *n.* 3, above) reports that in the 516th year of the city, the *Floralia* of 28 April was established in accordance with the Sibylline oracles, he cannot have been referring to any aedilician activity—that is to say, neither the building of the temple nor the giving of the Floral Games attributed to the *aediles Publicii*. Yet, in effect, the exotic peculiarities of the Floral Games should be attributed to the Sibylline Books,

presumably an ambiguous melange of religious notions alien to Romans, who in moments of distress avidly embraced the bizarre.

Indeed, if we look again at what Ovid has to say about how the games became permanent annual offerings to Flora in 173 (see *n.* 8, above), we can understand that the matter came before the Senate. It becomes equally apparent that, in the midst of this later crisis, the Senate, in its turn, vowed annual games in circumstances precisely analogous to many others in which such public vows were made. Specifically, the Senate met at some point in 174 B.C.E., ordered the Ten Men to read the Sibylline Books, and heard the priests' response that the Sibyl had ordered annual, not occasional, games to Flora. They then made the vow accordingly, and presumably ordered the consuls of the next year (i.e., 173) to give the games. As *occasional* games, they had, in fact, been given by plebeian aediles before 173. Later by contrast, as attested in 69 and 55 B.C.E., the aediles of the plebs routinely gave the Floral Games every year.

The great student of Roman religion, Georg Wissowa, believed that the second Flora—the Flora of the games—was the Greek goddess Aphrodite Antheia, Aphrodite of the Blossoms. That was an easy guess, since this Greek goddess is attested only once, in a lexicon of late antiquity and without a shred of detail about her. Wissowa and others start from the premise that any deity introduced into Rome in consequence of the Sibylline gospel had to be Greek, or at least seem Greek.

The Floral Games seem Greek so long as you keep your eyes on the lewd aspects of the Games. There were stage plays. The players were dancers of both sexes, *mimi* and *mimae*. The prostitutes of Rome also joined in the public performance. All players, evidently, were pelted with chickpeas. What could be more Greek, or to put it protestantly, more un-Roman? If we let our gaze turn to the hunt of hares and goats, however, two animals fabulously fecund, we may doubt that the Floral Games were entirely Greek.

But we should keep in mind that Flora was not an exotic goddess imported by suggestion of the Sibyl, as were, for example, Aesculapius from the Peloponnesus or the Magna Deum Mater Idaea from Asia Minor. Flora had a priest, the *flamen Floralis*, as old as King Numa and an old temple, to boot.

In an inscription carved on bronze in the language of the mountain-dwelling Samnites living southeast of Rome, in an inscription probably older than the new Flora at Rome, we learn that the local Ceres had a sacred grove. On the feast of the local (Samnite) Flora, *fluusasiis* or *Floralia*, sacrifice was offered at the statue of *fluusai kerriai*, i.e. the Flora belonging to Ceres.

Let us look again at our old Roman cult of Ceres, Liber and Libera, introduced from some Greek community in the early fifth century. That was nothing more than a joint cult of native Italic gods who were likened to the

Greek Demeter, Dionysos (or Triptolemos), and Persephone (also called Kore). Look again at Tacitus (p. 60, above). The Temple of Flora was situated near that of Ceres, Liber and Libera. The latter had been vowed by a Postumius. Over three centuries later, one of his descendents, the consul of 173 (see *n.* 8, above), carries out the Senate's vow of giving annual games to Flora, the new neighbor of Ceres, Liber and Libera.

Ludi Florales are in fact attested as an old celebration in one of the western Greek cities, namely Massilia (today Marseilles) in Southern France. Massilia was founded by Greeks from Phocaea in Asia Minor (Strabo 4.1.4-5, 6.1.1; Justin 43.4-4; *cf.* 36.1.1). Before the Phocaeans sailed off to find Massilia, they had already founded the colony of Elea, or Velia, in southern Italy (Strabo, *loc. cit.*).

In a famous passage from a defense of a man's Roman citizenship, Cicero (*Balbo* 55; *cf.* Val. Max. 1.1.1) pointed out that the rites of Roman Ceres had been borrowed from the Greeks, and were always maintained by Greek women—nearly always women from Naples or Velia—to whom the Romans granted citizenship so that they might pray to the goddess with foreign and alien knowledge as well as with the mind of a Roman citizen. One Roman priestess of Ceres attested in an inscription of the Republic (*ILLRP* 61), has a Roman name and may perhaps be referred to a Roman officer who served in Sicily (*ILLRP* 398). The one priestess of Ceres after the Republic calls herself a Sicilian, though she too has a Roman name (*ILS* 3343).

A well founded inference may be drawn from the fact that Flora and Ceres are religiously associated in south Italy, that the temple of the second Flora was situated near that of Ceres, Liber and Libera on the Aventine slope by the Circus Maximus, that routinely the priestess in the latter temple was a woman of Naples or Velia, and that Velia and Massilia, where *Ludi Florales* are attested for the archaic period, had common Greek beginnings. From this, the following inference may be drawn: the second Flora received games suggested by a Roman priestess of Ceres who originated in Velia, and warranted by the Ten Men who had read the Sibylline Books.

Here we can demonstrate entirely from the Livian account of the *Ludi Apollinares* how games of a Greek nature were being introduced long after the foundation of a temple and its cult. Apollo had had a cult in a Roman temple since the fifth century B.C. In 212 B.C.E., two privately sung prophecies were put abroad in Rome. One was construed to have foretold the Roman defeat at the hands of the Carthaginians in 216, four years earlier. The other laid out a simple prescription: "to drive the Carthaginian enemy out of the land, I [the seer] think games should be vowed to Apollo ... Let the urban praetor be in charge of offering the games. Let the Ten Men sacrifice in the Greek manner the victims." Upon report of this explicit prophecy, the Senate bade the Ten Men consult the Sibylline Books about the games and

sacrifice for Apollo. Upon report of the Ten Men, the Senate voted that the games be vowed and offered, and that the Ten Men sacrifice to Apollo and to Latona with specified victims in a specified way. The urban praetor gave the games not for good health—as one might have supposed in the worship of Apollo—but for victory (Livy 25.12). Such were the events of 212. The games for Apollo were given in 211 and in 210, when the Senate vowed them in perpetuity (Livy 26.23.3). But in 209, the *Ludi Apollonares* were still being decreed as if occasional until finally in 208, the urban praetor brought a bill to the people who, in turn, legislated that the games for Apollo be vowed for ever to fall on a fixed day. Accordingly, the praetor was the first to vow and give the games on July 5 (Livy 27.11.6, 23.5-7), that forever after marked the first day of the *Ludi Apollonares*.

The Temple of Apollo had been vowed in 433 and dedicated in 430. Games for this Apollo were first vowed in 212, on warrant of the Sibylline Books. Then, and for the next three years, the games were occasional and became permanent by legislative act only in 208.

The Romans evidently did not always rush to embrace foreign cults. Nor could they build a temple in a day. To seek an analogy, look at the temple of Faunus that the plebeian aediles built from fine monies taken from the *pecuarii* in 196. Only in 194, however, when one of these aediles served as urban praetor, was the temple to Faunus actually dedicated by him (Livy 33.42.10, 34.53.4).

Now we can better recreate the activities concerning the second Flora summarily recorded outside an historical context. In 241 B.C.E., the brothers Publicii, in their capacity as aediles of the plebs, fined *pecuarii* and applied these moneys to building a new temple to Flora near that of Ceres, Liber and Libera on the Aventine, and to paving a street up the slope to both of these temples, the one old and the other new. Games were not given, as Velleius Paterculus (see *n.* 2, above) and Ovid (*n.* 4, above) claim, in 241. In 238, the new temple to Flora on the Aventine was completed and ready for dedication. But between 241 and 238, a dearth of food had occurred because the crops and fruits had not budded. The dearth is to be inferred from King Hiero's visit to Rome in 237, when he brought wheat as a gift to the people. In 239 or 238, the same dearth prompted the Roman authorities to have the Sibylline Books consulted.

As Pliny (*n.* 3 above) reports the event, in 238 *Floralia* were established for April 28 by virtue of the oracles of Sibyl. Indeed, *Floralia*, the rites of Flora, could not have been fixed until the dedication was made. On April 28 of the 516th year of the city, the new temple was dedicated to Flora. Pliny and Velleius make no mention of *Floralia* observed or *Ludi Florales* being offered, or presided over, by the *aediles Publicii*. That information comes from Ovid (see *n.* 4, above). It is highly unlikely that the Publicii were in office as aediles in 238 if they had so served in 241. Moreover, we do not

need two dates for understanding the fixing and planning for the temple on the one hand and later for dedicating the temple on the other. Since one of our Publicii brothers was to be consul in 232, he, and perhaps his brother too, held the praetorship, the next magistracy after the aedileship and the normal prerequisite of the consulship. Since Ovid (*n.* 4, above) believed that the Publicii gave games to Flora, these games can be construed as offered at the dedication of the new temple in 238 by a praetor Publicius.

Thereafter, the games for Flora would have been neglected, as Ovid suggests elsewhere, or given only on occasion until 173 B.C.E., when the agricultural situation proved so serious that the Senate (*n.* 8, above) had the Ten Men go back to the legacy of the Sibyl, and then voted that the consuls give games to Flora. Subsequently, the Floral Games were annually offered. One of the consuls of 173 was descended from the man who had vowed the temple to Ceres, Liber and Libera over three centuries earlier. The Publicii had situated their new temple near that old temple. Since *Ludi Florales* are attested at Phocaean Massilia, and since some Roman priestesses of Ceres were recruited from Velia, another Phocaean colony, we may infer that the priestess of Ceres *ca.* 238 had an idea of what kind of entertainment would delight the goddess. Indeed, the male and female mime players will have been imported for Floral theater. So, too, the *Ludi Apollonares*, first offered in 212, included mime theater.

Who was Flora in the minds of the Roman priestess of Ceres? Let us return to the coin of C. Servilius who showed Flora on his *denarius* of 57 B.C.E. with the legend *Floral.primus*. In his chapter on marble sculptures by great Greek artists, Pliny remarks (*n.* 11, below): "At Rome the works of Praxiteles are [the statue group of] Flora, Triptolemus and Ceres in the Servilian Gardens ..." This statue group must be compared with another known in Athens, also anciently attributed to Praxiteles. The group of Demeter, Kore and Iacchos stood in the Athenian temple of Demeter (Paus. 1.2.4). Pliny's Ceres is anyone's Demeter. Pliny's Triptolemus is the Attic Iacchos and commonly of course, the Roman Liber. Pliny's Flora must be the Attic Kore, Demeter's daughter, also known as Persephone. Accordingly, the new Roman Flora must be reckoned the same as the goddess Libera, enshrined along with Liber in what we normally call the temple of Ceres. I refer you to Tacitus (p. 60, above) and Cicero (2 *Verr.* 4.99, 102, 106-10, cf. 128). No wonder, then, that our supposed priestess of Ceres, Liber and Libera from Velia was in a position to suggest a new kind of religious observance for the new Flora.

Finally, we must ask ourselves whether by accident or design in the garden named for a Servilius was displayed the statue group of Flora, Triptolemus and Ceres, rather than of Libera, Liber and Ceres, and on the coin of a Servilius Romans read the legend *Floral.primus*—for which no explanation is ready to hand.

Here I must stop lest my words last so long as it took the Romans to build the new Temple to Flora. I leave you with these matters unresolved:

1. Which Servilius established the Gardens mentioned by Pliny?
2. What did the Romans install in their gardens?
3. What did the legend *Floral.primus* intend?
4. How may we now write the history of Kore/Persephone in southern Italy?
5. Was there a relation between the deity chosen for a new temple and the character of the men and women fined by aediles, curule *and* plebeian?

and, of course, that perpetual question—

6. How rich in invention were the ambiguous words of Apollo's Sibyl?

Lectures ought to instruct in a practical fashion. So, should mine today. I have spent some time in the garden of Nan and Mike Michels on Red Fox Lane, and this is the season to think about our own gardens. When the winters have been long and harsh and the springs have been stormy, consider a statue of Flora for your patch of land. Yet, I fear that for truly efficacious Floral gardening, you'll need to take off your clothes.

*Horace 3.23: Ritual and Art*¹*Michael C.J. Putnam*

Caelo supinas si tuleris manus
 nascente Luna, rustica Phidyle,
 si ture placaris et horna
 fruge Lares avidaque porca,

 nec pestilentem sentiet Africum 5
 fecunda vitis nec sterilem seges
 robiginem aut dulces alumni
 pomifero grave tempus anno.

 nam quae nivali pascitur Alcido
 devota quercus inter et ilices 10
 aut crescit Albanis in herbis
 victima, pontificum securis

 cervice tinguit; te nihil attinet
 temptare multa caede bidentium
 parvos coronantem marino 15
 rore deos fragilique myrto.

 immunis aram si tetigit manus,
 non sumptuosa blandior hostia,
 mollivit aversos Penatis
 farre pio et saliente mica.

If you raise your upturned hands to heaven at the birth of the moon, rustic Phidyle, if you appease the Lares with incense, with this year's grain and with a greedy sow, then your teeming vine

¹ Reprinted with the permission of the author from S.K. Dickison and J.P. Hallett (edd.), *Rome and Her Monuments. Essays on the City and Literature of Rome in Honor of Katherine A. Geffcken* (Bolchazy-Carducci, 2000).

will not feel disease from Africa's wind nor your crop the blight of iron rust nor your sweet younglings the sickly season of fruitful autumn. For the destined victim that grazes on snowy Algidus among the oaks and ilexes or fattens on the grass of Alba will dye the axes of the priests with its neck. There is no need for you to make trial with much slaughter of sheep if you crown your tiny gods with rosemary and brittle myrtle. If a giftless hand has touched the altar, though commended by no elaborate offering, it has soothed the adverse Penates with holy grain and a dancing speck.

Horace's ode to Phidyle brings to a conclusion a group of three poems devoted in different ways to the experience of religion.² The first, c. 3.21, is the witty parody of a hymn in which the speaker catalogues the qualities of Corvinus' "holy wine-jar" and the importance of its epiphany to grace and enhance his *convivium*. There follows a two-stanza address to Diana, virgin goddess of the wild and of childbirth, and a dedication to her of a pine-tree looming over the speaker's villa to which he will offer yearly the blood of a sacrificed boar. For the third in the series, we remain in a country setting, but we turn from an outer to an inner world, from an address to the divinity presiding over untamed nature, with her appurtenances of tree and feral oblation, to the domestic existence of Phidyle, to the household gods, Lares and Penates, upon which this life depends, and to the domain of agriculture and husbandry of vines, crops and animals whose well-being is crucial to her own welfare.

In scanning this trio of odes, we move from two acts of apostrophe introducing individualized examples of prayer, a hymn and a dedication, to a poem where the religious content is devised by a didactic speaker telling his addressee about the processes and efficacy of her orisons. It is to the poetics

² I have found the following commentaries upon, or critiques of, c. 3.23 most useful: *Quinti Horatii Flacci: Opera Omnia*: I, ed. E.C. Wickham (1877); *Q. Horatius Flaccus: Oden und Epoden*, ed. A. Kiessling and R. Heinze (9th ed.: 1958); G. Williams *The Third Book of Horace's Odes* (1969) 119-22; H.P. Syndikus *Die Lyrik des Horaz (= Impulse der Forschung 7 [1973])* 201-6; F. Cairns "Horace, *Odes*, III, 13 and III, 23," *L'Antiquite Classique* 46 (1977) 523-42, who sees the poem as an example of the "genre *anathematikon*, in which gifts are offered to gods and to men, ..." (523); M. Santirocco *Unity and Design in Horace's Odes* (1986) esp. 136-140 which trace the close connection between c. 3.23 and the two preceding odes; D. Porter *Horace's Poetic Journey* (1986) 184 (for parallelisms with c. 3.17) and 191. The ode is not discussed by E. Fraenkel (*Horace*: 1957) or S. Commager (*The Odes of Horace*: 1962).

behind the words of this initiated seer that I would like to direct this essay. My interest is in three particular areas. I will examine Horace's use of rhetorical devices of synecdoche and metonymy and search out reasons for their prominence in the poem. I will then turn to uses of word repetition and figures of sound to complement the ritualistic qualities of the ode itself, to bring it full circle and imitate Phidyle's incipient solemnization through a ceremony of words. Finally, I will trace Horace's use of allusion, especially to Tibullus and Virgil, to enhance his poetic project and help the reader formulate the ode's originality.

Let us first survey the poem itself.³ With the address to *rustica Phidyle*, we confront immediately two focal concerns of the ode. As we follow the details of the protagonist's future ritual, we are reminded, through her epithet, that, in setting, this is a country matter whose implementation, because it too is implicitly "rustic," can also imply, at least on the surface, a certain simplicity or lack of refinement. But it is her name itself, Phidyle, that contains the nub of the poem's ideas. It is an abstract noun with the meaning of "sparing" or "restraint" ("Let there be no holding-back of spears" in the imminent conflict, shouts Athena, disguised as Deiphobus, to Hector, in the word's first appearance in literature).⁴ Phidyle as an imagined creature of flesh and blood is a representation of her *nomen* in human form, someone who puts into actual practice the implications of her nomenclature. She performs a god-pleasing ritual that depends on the modest piety of the officiant, reflected in the unpretentiousness of the offering itself, rather than in any grandiosity of gift or presentation. Restraint in name is restraint in behavior.

The second stanza magnifies the effectiveness of Phidyle's incipient ceremony by detailing not only the objects in her rural world that are vulnerable but the enormity of the hazards they must face. Once again the omniscient speaker is in charge. He knows the farmer's world and its fragility and is aware that reference to the "heavens" looks two ways. The celestial sphere launches the Afric winds and the "heavy season" that destroys, but it also harbors the gods who, if approached with due propriety, can ward off such menaces.

A reader of Virgil's *Georgics* would glean parallel information about the threat of winds, about the dangers of *robigo* to crops and what disasters autumn might have in store for animals. He would also appreciate the necessity of constant veneration of the gods. When, in fact, Virgil's didactic speaker turns, in book 1, to the need for particular veneration of Ceres, he

³ On the structure of the poem, see also Syndikus, 203-4.

⁴ Homer *Il.* 22.243-44. There may be a connection between the name Phidyle and the word *fruge* (4) through the indeclinable adjective *frugi* with its meaning of "sober, thrifty."

utilizes a rhetoric similar to that adopted by Horace's *persona* here, with the listener, soon to become prayerful celebrant, as a continuous presence.⁵

Horace instinctively senses the powerful Virgilian amalgam of labor, violence, suffering, and prayer that helps shape the conflict between man and nature. His accomplishment is to personalize both the scene and its rituals. The speaker does not command "you," as everyman-worker of the earth, to venerate the gods in due season and by doing so, all might be well. Rather, scholastic warnings of what will not happen if the farmer follows suitable prescriptions are transferred to the immediate world of a country woman's responsivity and of the potential of her private, home-bound, modest ceremony to effect her safe-keeping from the calamitous visitation of negative external forces. Both poets lived with rich understanding of the importance of the sacred. Horace claims lyric particularity as vehicle for its manifestation.

The transition from the first to the second stanza is in part accomplished by parallelism between the three objects that constitute Phidyle's offering—incense, the year's produce, a greedy sow⁶—and the three objects that are to be protected—vines, crops, animals—themselves set forth in a quatrain structured appropriately enough through Horace's familiar triadic principle. But the equally tripartite, interlarded catalogue of dangers the agricultural world will confront helps the reader to look ahead as well. Our thoughts momentarily leave the instant of Phidyle's monthly prayer to pay heed to larger, distant reaches of space (sciroccan winds) and time (the fall's ominous heaviness), as well as to a disease (iron rust) sufficiently perilous to the land's yield to achieve the status of a divinity, Robigus, worshipped with his own feast-day.⁷ In all these instances our inner eye moves away from

⁵ Virgil *G.* 1.338-50. For the dangers of *robigo*, see *G.* 1.151 and 2.220 (and cf. 1.495).

⁶ For the meaning of *avida*, cf. Virgil *G.* 2.375, referring to *avidae iuvencae* who eat crops and therefore deserve sacrifice. Wickham also notes Ovid *F.* 1.349-52 where a pig is sacrificed to Ceres because it grubbed up *sata ... lactentia* (351) in the spring. Cf. also Ovid *M.* 15.111-13, and, for further details, Boemer and Frazer on *F.* 1334-39 and Boemer on *M.* 15.111-13. Specifically on pigs's destructive of crops see now J. Henderson "Horace, Odes 3.22, and the Life of Meaning," *Ramus* 24 (1995) 147 n. 99.

On monthly prayers to the household gods, see Tib. 1.3.34 and Prop. 4.3.53 (further citations in Syndikus, 202 n. 3). On the offering of a pig to them, see Plautus *Rud.* 1208; Hor. *Sat.* 2.3.165; Tib. 1.10.25.

⁷ Robigus is one of the gods whom Varro invokes at the beginning of his *Res Rusticae*. His festival, the Robigalia, was celebrated on April 25. For details, see H.H. Scullard, *Festivals and Ceremonies of the Roman Republic* (1981) 108-10.

domestic ritual to realms apart whose potential impact on Phidyle's georgic life cannot be ignored.

This combination of immediacy and distancing helps effect the transition to the poem's middle stanza. We remain still in the countryside, but this setting now takes on a distinctiveness lacking in the portrayal of Phidyle and her *rus*. Horace's speaker calls our attention to Mount Algidus and to the range of which it forms a northern height, the Alban Hills. Each has its own characteristic, cold Algidus punningly known for its snow, the "white" hills complemented not only by the snow's gleam but by the verdancy of their slopes. The dissimilarity with Phidyle's situation is continued by means of the creature that this new setting harbors, a victim readied to dye the immolating axes of priests. Phidyle's animal sacrifice, a greedy pig, is as different from the cattle whom the *pontifices* would kill as she is herself from the priests. This distinction, in turn, suggests a series of further dichotomies: namely, between our rustic celebrant in her domestic retreat and those who implement the religion of state, between private and public, between country dwelling and the temples of Rome, between a home's Lares with Penates and the Great Gods, the *Magni Di*, whom the city and its rulers must worship.

These pivotal lines, therefore, not only move us away from Phidyle's ceremony but also set up a distinction that is crucial for the poem's development. The explicit grandeur of the mountains southeast of Rome and the implicit urban setting of the metropolis for which they serve as pasturage for cattle designated to be sacrificed are contrasted with Phidyle's enclosed, delimited space. But it is the dissimilarity in victims, as suggested by the middle stanza, that makes it a focus of the poem. It establishes, as literally and figuratively central and crucial to the poem's meaning, the challenge between small and large, unassuming and ostentatious, plain and fancy, that will ultimately privilege "rustic" Phidyle over any possible sophistication or implied preeminence that might gain favor for those city-dwellers involved in the elaborate gestures of governmental power.

Having articulated this correlation and after a brilliant enjambment, which I will look at in a moment, the poem turns briskly back to "you," Phidyle, and to further details about the mode and meaning of her ritual. But the return is a reminder as well. She will not have to rely on "much slaughter" of yearling victims to gain her request. She need not seek to cajole her divine sponsors by an offering that announces the affluence of its tenderer. In fact, her supplication would succeed even if she were to approach the altar "without a gift" (*inmunis*) at all.⁸ Her only requirement,

⁸ On the meaning of *inmunis*, which I understand as "giftless" rather than "innocent," see A. Treloar "Horace, *Odes*, iii.23.17-20," *CR* 6 (1956) 4-

the speaker tells her and us, is humble plant life, rosemary or myrtle, to crown her divinities, and *mola salsa*, the salted meal employed during animal sacrifice.⁹ These will serve her as token gestures, presumably revealing—in their limited way—the depth and extent of her piety, and therefore allowing her to dispense with what in her case would only be an irrelevant, not to say unseemly or duplicitous, demonstration of a social or ethical state that was not her own.

This notion of the token gesture, of something smaller (physically) standing for a larger entity (spiritually), of reductions and expansions, of exchanges and displacements that reveal ethical truths, is the thematic core of the poem. It is reinforced and complemented by a use of synecdoche and metonymy that permeates the poem with a consistency rare even for Horace. The supplanting of part for whole, of name for name, is a crucial rhetorical element in configuring a world that centers on Phidyle, her gods and her offerings, in which the small, the restrained, the limited, replaces anything showy, elaborate, expansive. We have seen the importance of substitution in regard to the last item, but we must also remember that we are attending to a poem whose protagonist embodies an abstraction. She comes alive through the speaker's initiating apostrophe and her ethical attitudes reify the essence of her name.

By contrast, Lady Thrift's chief concern, the *parvos deos* of her domestic space, exemplify the reverse procedure. Hers are not the Olympian gods of state religion but divinities of less lofty stature, represented, metonymically, by images of small size.¹⁰ These in turn are correlated to the simplicity and spareness of the offering that they will receive. Distant objects of worship are displaced for Phidyle by home-centered statues, which in turn symbolize the concept of frugality that their adorer incarnates. Once more poetic figuration and poetic theme are brilliantly congruent.

5; Williams, 121; Cairns, 540; and the trenchant arguments of Santirocco (208 n. 16).

⁹ On *mola salsa* and Roman religious practice see most recently K. Freudenberg, "Canidia at the Feast of Nasidienus (Hor. *Sat.* 2.8.95)," *TAPA* 125 (1995) 207-19, esp. 214 and nn. 24-25.

Syndikus (205 and n. 16), citing Ovid *F.* 1.337ff. and ps.Tib. 3.4.10, speaks of *mola salsa* as "das alleraltuemlichste Opfer." But reference to the hoariness of the procedure is less important to Horace here than appreciation of its role in Phidyle's total ritual.

On an offering of *far* and *sal* as a normal gesture during a Roman meal see Williams, 121, citing W. Warde Fowler, *The Religious Experience of the Roman People* (1911) 73.

¹⁰ Santirocco (138) speaks correctly of "a humorous conflation of the gods with their images."

Figurative replacements of this sort dot the poem. The phrase *nascente Luna* (2), for instance, meaning “at the start of the month,” is a duplex example, with birth standing for beginning and Moon for month, the celestial sign for the time its appearance defines. In the extraordinary phrase *pontificum securis // cervice tinguet*, the neck of the animal stands for the beast itself and for its blood whose flow is what in fact will dye the hatchets of the priests. Much the same holds true for our next look at the grander sacrifices elsewhere, *multa caede bidentium*.¹¹ Two-teethed is a synecdoche for the creatures themselves, seen in terms of their physical development, and ‘much slaughter’ stands, metonymically, for the vast number of animal victims whose killing appeases the gods in other contexts, a rhetorical heightening which only further illustrates the containment and reserve of Phidyle and her spiritual world.

The poem itself is framed by two salient examples of this figuration. In the conditional *protasis* which constitutes the ode’s opening line, the verb *tuleris* is conspicuous for running counter to regular Latin idiom.¹² We would ordinarily expect the verbs *tendo* or *tollo* to be coupled with *manus*, when hands are lifted heavenward in a gesture of prayer. To replace ‘stretch’ or ‘raise’ with ‘bear’ brilliantly converts *manus* from the hands of the gods’ beseecher into the offering that those hands bring. This, in turn, expands *caelo* from the locality toward which prayer is directed into the celestial creatures who inhabit that locality and who will bless Phidyle’s ritual. You, Phidyle, will “produce” hands that hold “produce” acceptable to the gods.

The final two lines of the poem illustrate an even more astonishing figuration. *Farre pio et saliente mica*, a hendiadys for *mola salsa*, has several rhetorical effects. First, for Phidyle to offer *mola salsa*, the salted meal that would ordinarily be sprinkled on the animal victim, is to replace sacrificial offering by a ritual accompaniment of that offering. It is appropriate that Horace conclude his survey of Phidyle’s religious practice with a look at her final act of modesty, complemented poetically by a last example of metonymy which, in an act of diminishment, substitutes the appurtenances of a victim for the victim itself. But the hendiadys, by rhetorically expanding the offering, by enlarging it verbally before our eyes, works on the reader in an opposite manner.

The poet seizes two other means to dramatize the event and magnify rather than demean the importance of Phidyle’s sacrifice. The first is his use of *figura etymologica* in the verb *mollivit*. Phidyle “softens,” which is to say

¹¹ Kiessling-Heinze, on 1.14, note that this is the first use in Latin of *caedes* with the meaning ‘Opfer’.

¹² The unusual usage of *fero* here is pointed out by Kiessling-Heinze on 1.1.

soothes, the adverse household gods by her actions. But a Roman reader would think of Varro's etymologizing that "mills (*molae*) come from softening (*mol[li]endo*): for by their motion the objects thrown [into them] are softened (*molluntur*)."¹³ Once more, we pay close attention to the relationship of Phidyle's gods with the salted meal she offers them, as we observe the careful lexical connection between *mollire*, the mill (*mola*) that literally grinds the grain poured into it, and the resulting *mola* that, with the addition of salt, appeases the gods as the ultimate part of Phidyle's offering.

Finally, we have the aural pun achieved through the participle *saliente*. The "leaping speck" is of course salt (*sal*), brought vividly before us both by another metonymy and, most directly, by the initial letters of *saliente*.¹⁴ These spell out for us what we are watching but in the process invest the *mola salsa* with the dancing sparkle it would conjure up for the participant's eye, as the poet's description does for the reader's.

This growing development toward climactic exactness is nothing new for Horace. We see this evolution, for instance, when we move from winter's chill, relieved by indoor fire and wine, and from a Greek-named addressee, Thaliarchus, to an outdoor scene of lovemaking [c. 1.9]. The localization of the poem progresses from *campus et areae* to whispers, laughter, and in the last line, a girl's ringed finger. The detailed immediacy, as c. 3.23 comes to its close, is equally purposeful. The initial world of Phidyle is also touched with the remoteness of a Greek name, here derived from a Greek abstraction. By the poem's end, however, we are securely in a situation both very Roman and very present.

The ode's concluding lines, therefore, which detail its final metonymy, turn on one of Horace's wittiest ironies. For all the humility of Phidyle's offering, its climactic position and multifaceted figuration help it form an exciting example of replacement. The gift itself may be small in scope but

¹³ Varro *L.L.* 5.138. The standard etymology of *mola* ("ground grain") from *molare* as found at *L.L.* 5.104 (for further examples see R. Maltby, *A Lexicon of Ancient Latin Etymologies* (= *Arca* 25 [1991]) 389). On the connection of *mola* ('mill') to *mola* ('grain') by extension see A. Ernout and A. Meillet, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue Latine* (1959), s.v. *molo*.

¹⁴ In a direct bow to Horace, the poet Lygdamus, his near-contemporary, hammers home the connection with an explicit mention of *sal* coupled with unsubtle alliteration (ps.Tib. 3.4.10: ... *farre pio placant et saliente sale* ...). If Lygdamus was imitated by Horace, which seems unlikely given his birth in 43 (ps.Tib. 3.5.18) and the publication of c. 1-3 in 23, Horace has put his own refining skills to work. Cf. Ovid *F.* 2.539 (*mica salis*). In a context similar to that of Horace, the author of the *Panegyricus Messallae*, probably writing between 31 and 27, uses the phrase *parva mica* of salt. (ps.Tib. 3.7.14 = 4.1.14).

its rhetorical substitution is expansive and elaborate. It is the poet's verbal way to show, for one last time, however reduced her offering literally might be compared to that of Rome's priests, figuratively it achieves the eminence of a more opulent gesture through the poet's happy, honoring magniloquence.

The opening and closing segments of the poem, which describe Phidyle's ceremony and surround the central quatrain with its precis of a fatuous, contrasting liturgy, are connected in other important ways. We move from the Lares in stanza one to the Penates in the last stanza to form a linked chain of meaning embracing the major household gods at the poem's start and at its conclusion. This sense of unity and enclosure is supported by an act of verbal repetition unusual for Horace but significant for his poetic purposes here. Both of the poem's delimiting stanzas begin with conditional clauses which carefully echo each other: *inmunis ... si tetigit manus* (17) is anticipated in *supinas si tuleris manus* (1), and the resonance brings the lyric full circle. This reverberation is reinforced in the repetitions of sound and rhythm that forge the last lines of the first, fourth and fifth stanzas together, the stanzas that describe her performance. We attend to both forms of poetic resonance as *fruge lares* leads to *rore deos* and *farre pio et*, and as *avidaque porca* becomes, first, *fragili myrto* and, then, *saliente mica*, unifying gods and gifts in an extraordinarily rich whole.

All these devices—verbal repetition, especially when it serves as a structural and coalescing factor, and the regular iterations of rhythmic and sonic patterns—are appropriate not only for a hymn itself but also for a poem about ritual performance. The speaker may serve as all-knowing arbiter of liturgical practice, advising and directing his addressee and predicting the outcome of her ceremony. But the poet has created a lyric that itself shares in aspects of the agenda it describes. Both ode and the solemnity it adumbrates center on parallel, complementary acts of performance. In his search for form, Horace demonstrates for us not only the art of ritual, according to the understanding of his speaker, but the ritual of art as well, the poet's art.

A third area of concern to the critic of c. 3.23 is Horace's interplay with his contemporary poets, especially Tibullus and Virgil. The two major bows to his elegist friend constitute an enriching supplement to Horace's primary concerns.¹⁵ The first, brief and general, comes in the midst of elegy 1.3 when, contemplating imminent death on the island of Phaeacia where he has been abandoned by his patron Messalla, he imagines himself back in his country setting, making due offerings to the gods of his dwelling (33-34):

¹⁵ Wickham, on 1.2, refers to Tib. 1.3.34 and 1.10.15-28 "where many expressions of this Ode find a parallel."

At mihi contingat patrios celebrare Penates
Reddereque antiquo menstrua tura Lari.

But [may] it fall to my lot to celebrate the Penates of my ancestors
and monthly to offer incense to my ancient Lar.

The second, embedded in elegy 1.10, is both more specific and more detailed. It, too, forms part of a speaker's reflection on the difference between peace and war, the calm of rural living and the perils of foreign conflict. Here, however, the meditation in its very elaboration is more congruent with Horace's creation of Phidyle and her setting. "Lares of my ancestors, save me," is the speaker's prayer (15). Though the god (*deus*) be only of wood (20), he will be calmed (*placatus*, 21) by the offerings brought before him, including pure honeycomb tendered by a young girl (*filia parva*, 24). Again he prays: Lares, ward off bronze weapons from me (25). And there are still further gifts (26-29):

Hostiaque e plena rustica porcus hara.
Hanc pura cum veste sequar myrtoque canistra
Vincta geram, myrto vinctus et ipse caput.
Sic placeam: ...

... and as rustic victim a pig from a full sty. This I will follow
in spotless apparel and I will carry a basket bound with myrtle,
and my own head will be bound with myrtle. Thus may I
please you.

Verbal correspondence with Horace's ode is here at its most intense. In Tibullus it is a male pig instead of a sow that will serve as a victim, and Tibullus' *alter ego* will wrap myrtle around the reed-basket and around his own head, to placate the Lares while Horace's speaker urges Phidyle to crown the gods themselves with Venus' plant. Yet whatever differences exist, the parallels are clear enough.

But there is more than lexical overlap, and the commonality of worship of the Lares it supports, between the two poems. In no other ode does Horace exhibit greater appreciation for the contents and tone of the elegies of his contemporary and fellow poet. If the sumptuous cultic practices in Rome are, for Horace, the antithesis of Phidyle's ethics of restraint, in Tibullus it is once again militarism that forms a contrast with his beloved rural world. This difference aside, the two poems share deep sympathy for the simplicity of country living, for the continuity of tradition and above all for the importance of religious celebration, especially of domestic forms of worship, as a crucial ingredient of enlightened living with, and for, the earth. And

even the distinction between the two poems and poets may be to Horace's point. Horace's references to his poet friend, lover of the countryside turned reluctant soldier, could be seen as another way, through innuendo, to point in fact a parallel between pernicious effects of Rome's martial ambitions and aspects of the city's religious worship that seem, at the least, pretentious by comparison to Phidyle's.

A look at Horace's allusions to Virgil will help confirm my point. They are both more complex and yet more specific in their poetic purposes than those to Tibullus. All come from the initial six books of the *Aeneid*, a segment of the poem which I will assume that Horace had heard recited or perhaps might even have read in part before he composed his lyric. The first bow to Virgil comes in the opening line of the ode:

Caelo supinas si tuleris manus ...

I have already spoken of the anomalous use of the verb *fero* in this idiom. The remaining nouns and adjective, *caelo supinas ... manus*, all appear together in an act of supplication for the only time in Virgil's epic, in conjunction now with the standard verb *tendo*, at 3.176-77 which I quote with two additional lines to complete the context:

corripio e stratis corpus tendoque supinas
ad caelum cum voce manus et munera libo
intemerata focus. perfecto laetus honore
Anchisen facio certum remque ordine pando.

I snatch myself from the bed and stretch my upturned hands to heaven in prayer and make pure offerings on the hearth. After the rite is performed I happily inform my father and reveal the whole matter as it unfolded.

The curiosity for the reader of Horace's ode is that Aeneas the narrator is recounting an appearance to him in a dream of the Penates which he had brought from Troy and which put forward an outline of his future in Italy. It is to the household gods that he stretches forth his hands in prayer, in response to the vision, and to whom he makes an offering, prior to informing his father of the events.

Anchises also figures in Horace's second bow to the *Aeneid* that we will be considering. We are now nearing the end of book 5 and on this occasion it is the hero's father who comes as an apparition to his sleeping son. His role, parallel to that of the Penates in book 3, is once more to apprise his son of events soon to occur after the arrival in his promised land. Here is

Aeneas' response, once he has chided his father for fleeing his embrace (5.743-45):

haec memorans cinerem et sopitos siscitat ignis
 Pergameumque Larem et canae penetralia Vestae
 farre pio et plena supplex veneratur acerra.

Speaking thus he rouses up the ashes and the slumbering flames,
 and humbly worships the Lar of Troy and the shrine of hoary
 Vesta with holy grain and full censer.

The Penates themselves had spoken in book 3. Here it is the other important figure among Aeneas' domestic gods, the Lar of Troy, that the hero venerates along with Vesta, again after receiving further knowledge of his future. This passage also caught Horace's attention. He has utilized the phrase *farre pio et*, which begins the last line of Virgil's paragraph, to initiate his own concluding line.¹⁶

The two connections with Virgil are clear enough. On the order of composition and appropriation we cannot pronounce with any certainty, but I would suggest that the manner of Horace's uses strongly implies priority of composition for the epic from which the lyric poet borrows for his own purposes. Horace has turned to two separate occasions in the *Aeneid*, each concerned with apparitions or with moments of worship of Aeneas' household gods, and adopted them carefully to lend structure to his ode. The first bow initiates the poem, the second helps round out its conclusion. Yet, if the organizational principle of allusion is here clear enough, we must still seek out the imaginative reasons for the appropriations. In particular we should ask why, in a poetic gesture that at first seems incongruous, the lyric poet should turn to the partially accomplished epic of another contemporary and friend for crucial inspiration as he creates his own masterful gem.

Subject matter itself supplies one ready answer. In making his bows to the *Aeneid*, Horace has turned to two of the rare moments in the poem that anticipate serenity and rootedness in the hero's future. Though the predictions uttered hint at hardships in the journey to Italy or at on-going

¹⁶ The continuation and conclusion of Virgil's line—*plena supplex veneratur acerra*—is different from Horace's in one interesting way. Each adds a new detail, Horace's the *saliente mica*, and Virgil's the suppliant with his *plena acerra*. For the epic poet, the incense container serves paratactically to add one further detail to a list of essentials for a ceremony of prayer. Horace's *mica*, because it is the component of a hendiadys, is both supplement and enhancement, a fresh particular but also one intimately by figuration to what precedes. Lyric intensity supplants epic elaboration.

conflicts necessary for Aeneas to pursue once he reaches his destination, nevertheless the very appearance of the household gods suggests the peace and stability that suitably enough center around hearth and home, around domesticity and the worship of private divinities and the acts of *pietas* which assure permanence and security for a Trojan time to come in Italy. No grand ideological pretensions enter Horace's poem. Instead, he adapts two Virgilian moments of intimate ceremony to his own poem about the validity and puissance of simpler forms of worship. In so doing, he has taken already quiet moments in epic and transformed them, not without a touch of irony, into crucial ingredients for the figuration for his ode. Epic both brings order to, and suffers the ordering of, lyric in Horace's extraordinary invention.

The *Aeneid* makes another striking appearance nearer the center of the poem which, by comparison with and distinction from the allusions I have just discussed, helps clarify and confirm their purpose. On this occasion Horace would have us cast our thoughts back to the epic's second book and to Aeneas' narration of the misfortunes of Laocoön. According to the familiar story, he, as priest of Neptune, is in the process of offering a bull to the god of the sea when twin snakes, skimming the water from Tenedos, strangle and devour first his two sons, then the celebrant himself. At the moment of his demise, Virgil has Aeneas compare his cries, in simile, to the bellowing of a bull [that] has only been maimed by the act of sacrifice. They were (2.223-24):

qualis mugitus, fugit cum saucius aram
taurus et incertam excussit cervice securim.

like the bellowing when a wounded bull has fled the altar and
has shaken the unsure axe from his neck.

Unlike the treacherous Sinon, who in the preceding episode had characterized himself as an incipient human sacrifice who was able to elude his executioner, Laocoön is the sacrificer sacrificed, the human victim who serves the part of animal offering.

In sketching his own brief vision of the grand priestly rituals which contrast with Phidyle's more circumspect ceremony, Horace has turned also to this macabre moment of sacrifice in the *Aeneid*, through the phrase *pontificum securis // cervice tinguet*. I have already noted the metonymy in *cervice tinguet*.¹⁷ In connection with Virgil it is the phrase *securis cervice* which demands our attention, echoing as it does the final words of his simile

¹⁷ The metaphor of dyeing also plays a powerful part in this extraordinary phrase. Cf. Virgil's more straightforward usage of *ting(u)o* at G. 3.492 (*ac vix supplex tinguntur sanguine cultri*).

devoted to Laocoön. Here again I would propose that Horace's treatment suggests that he has co-opted and refashioned Virgil's language for his own intentions. Though the assonantal doublet *cervice securis* remains powerful as the ending of the hexameter line, Horace has done Virgil one better not so much by reversing the word order as by his astonishing enjambment of the phrase not only between lines but between stanzas. The result is a graphic presentation of the moment of sacrifice whose pictorial quality, dependent on a verbal continuum that is dramatically "cut" between strophes, becomes nearly worthy of a George Herbert, though, of course, without the strictly representational quality of concrete poetry.

This extraordinary combination of enjambment and stanza break, therefore, serves several purposes. It is emblematic, most immediately, of the act of killing, in fact of the actual moment when the ax gashes the victim's neck. But, through the larger friction between onrush and overflow of meaning from quatrain to quatrain and the regulating pattern of the alcaic stanza itself, Horace puts emphasis on the way that Roman sacerdotal procedure for an instant "breaks" climactically into the rustic restraint of Phidyle's meager offering. For a brief but violent moment Rome makes an incursion into the fourth stanza which, from our expectation of balance with the second quatrain, should belong to Phidyle. She takes over after the first two words, as lyric *te* reaffirms the ode's initial focus, but only once the reader has sensed, from the vivid deployment of words on the page, the skewing power of Rome and its differentiation from Phidyle's world.¹⁸

And once again Horace's allusion to the *Aeneid* is for an important imaginative purpose. In the first two bows to the epic that we have traced, Horace's adaptations of Virgil have outlined a community of feeling between moments in the epic of sacrifice to the gods of the household and Horace's lyric *precis* of Phidyle's ceremonial. Here the parallel with Virgil, placed as the central, contrasting section of the ode comes to a vivid close, helps again confirm the distinction Horace's poem addresses between the grandiosity of Roman sacerdotal procedure and the rural simplicity of Phidyle's rites. And the specific allusion grants a further negative tone to the ode's middle segment. Unlike the references to the household gods in *Aeneid* 3 and 5 that frame the ode, and the envisioning of settlement and pious living that they seem to foreshadow, Horace's reminder of *Aeneid* 2 recalls for the reader the violent aspects of the epic's on-going story line. In particular it focuses on a doubly perverse moment of sacrifice where the

¹⁸ The poet makes no attempt to place his lyric in a particular location. For this reason, the naming of Algidus and Albanus in the third stanza gives the entrance of Rome into the poem a certain cachet. Phidyle's rural setting is anonymous. Roman priestly doings are locatable, and such specificity takes us by innuendo into the dynamic world of Rome and its history.

sacrificer becomes the sacrificed and human replaces animal victim. For a brief moment Horace would have us re-witness in the actions of Rome's priests an especially ghastly instance from among the many occasions that dot the epic where human victims must be offered for Aeneas and Rome to march on their fated way.

This contrast also spills over into the immediately following lines as Horace's instructional speaker returns to Phidyle. Line 14 offers the unique instance in Horace of the phrase *multa caede*. Its only appearance in Virgil occurs at *Aeneid* 1.471 during the ekphrasis of the scenes on Dido's temple to Juno. Among them Aeneas recognizes a depiction of the tents of Rhesus which

Tydides multa vastabat caede cruentus, ...

bloody Diomedes had laid waste with much slaughter ...

The "great slaughter" that Phidyle will shun concerns only the offering of yearling animals whereas the havoc that murderous Diomedes wreaks, and that Virgil portrays in a splendid "golden" line, is of human beings, surprised and butchered during a nocturnal military operation. But there remains a further hint of epic violence in Horace's sketch of a ritual deed that Phidyle will not perform. And here too the contrast is purposive. Just as in the case of allusion to the gruesome death of Laocoön, so the reference to Diomedes' elaborate killings gives a further sinister touch to Horace's synopsis of Roman sacerdotal activities. Here, too, as we trace the complement between poetics and story line, the grandiosities and exaggerations of epic, particularized in the brutal events associated with Laocoön and Diomedes, are limned at the poem's center only to be framed and controlled by lyric's outline. Simplicity of poetic performance and simplicity of content go hand in hand. Meanwhile Virgil, in the several aspects of his final masterpiece that the odist chooses to draw upon, serves as foil for his poet friend as Horace creates the proper tonality both for Phidyle's liturgy and for his own quasi-hymnic preceptorial about its implementation.

Reviewing the challenge that epic offers lyric, and that lyric overcomes, might help us, in conclusion, survey other essential polarities in the poem. The revolution of the poem around a contrast between country and city, simple offering and elaborate ritual, posits an even more basic complementarity between female and male. It is Phidyle, female sacrificant, who wins the day over the deeds of *pontifices*, on the level of plot, and over Virgil's Laocoön, on the level of poetic allusion. The immediacy of Roman sacerdotal maneuvers and the ironically juxtaposed bloodshed centered on the epic's priest-victim are countermanded both in Phidyle's liturgies and in lyric's gentle procedures. It is lyric, and its female protagonist, who embody

stability and who mollify menace both in nature and in masculine gods who could be inimical (*aversos*) to her situation. Prayer assuages, and therefore coopts, potentially negative divinities just as lyric readily absorbs epic's moments of ritual order but eschews its violence.

Seven odes later, in the famous *envoi* to his first collection of odes, Horace once again mentions a *pontifex*, this time actually in Rome itself, climbing, ever climbing, the Capitolium as analogy for the continuity of his own lyric achievement.¹⁹ There the priest has as companion for his ritual progress the silent Vestal. This combination of male and female, serving as complement to poetry's longevity, is expanded in the remainder of the poem which looks to a parallel endurance for the poet himself.²⁰ It is roaring Aufidus and Daunus, arid but regal, who locate his past and future while the muse Melpomene crowns his present glory. Masculine and feminine elements once more unite, now to define the poet's prospects for immortality. No such conjunction occurs in *c.* 3.23 where the sexes are carefully separated and Phidyle has the upper hand, dominating a woman's world carefully distanced from the priestly sphere of butchered animals.

Finally, we might look at the poem in terms of Horace's interpretation of the poetics of Callimachus. For the poem itself demonstrates a remarkable turn on "Horace's" prayer to Mercury at *Sat.* 2.6.14-15:

pingue pecus domino facias et cetera praeter
ingenium, ...

may you make the flock fat for its master and the rest, except
for his imagination ...

"Horace" there yearns for plump animals on his farm and for expansiveness in other ways as long as his wit remains trim. There is every reason to believe, however, that both the speaker of the poem and the writer of a fine-spun lyric would be in sympathy with Phidyle and the tasteful subtlety of her spiritual world. The speaker admires her restraint and the writer, Horace, in good Callimachean fashion, manipulates his own contemporary "big" poem, Virgil's *Aeneid*, for his own spare purposes. She

¹⁹ The only other use of the word *pontifex* in the *Odes* is at *c.* 2.14.26, where it also occurs in close proximity with the verb *tinguo*.

²⁰ In *c.* 3.30 the idea of growth (*cre scam*, 8) can be directly associated with the poem's creative protagonist, now powerfully analogized in Rome and its *pontifex*. In *c.* 3.23 the same verb (*cre scit*, 11) is associated with the Alban *victima* and thus with priests and, implicitly, Rome. Here, though, the poem's speaker would seem to distinguish himself from such "growth," in order to side with Phidyle and her more moderate spiritual environment.

may not offer the equivalent of a “fat” victim, but she is the recipient of a poem in special ways analogous for, and complementary to, her cultic practice. Here spare song and neat offering become equivalents, and rustic Phidyle is the recipient of the highly urbane vehicle that joins the two.

Founding the City¹

Jerzy Linderski

The foundation day of the City: Romulus takes the auspices. In the poet's soaring words, *servat genus altivolantum*, he looks out for the high-flying tribe. It is dawn, and it is also the dawn of Latin literature. The rays of the sun break out of the night's darkness (Enn. *Ann.* 91-94 V. = 86-89 Sk):²

¹ Abbreviations:

AL = J. Linderski, "The Augural Law," *ANRW* I.16.3 (1986) 2146-2312.

Catalano, *Contributi* = P. Catalano, *Contributi allo studio del diritto augurale* I (1960).

Catalano, *Aspetti* = P. Catalano, "Aspetti spaziali del sistema giuridico-religioso romano," *ANRW* II. 16.1 (1978) 440-553.

Jocelyn = H.D. Jocelyn, "*Urbs Augurio Augusto Condita*: Ennius ap. Cic. *Div.* I.107 (*Ann.* 77-96 V²)," *PCPhS* 197 [n.s. 17] (1971) 44-74.

Pease = A.S. Pease, *M. Tulli Ciceronis De Divinatione Libri Duo* (1920, 1923, repr. 1963).

RQ = J. Linderski, *Roman Questions* (1995).

Skutsch (Sk.) = O. Skutsch, *The Annals of Quintus Ennius* (1985).

Vaahtera = J. Vaahtera, *Roman Augural Lore in Greek Historiography* (= *Historia Einzelschriften* 156 [2001]).

Vahlen (V.) = J. Vahlen, *Ennianae poesis reliquae*² (1903).

Wiseman = T.P. Wiseman, *Remus* (1995).

² The fragment (72-96 V. = 72-91 Sk.) is preserved by Cicero, *Div.* I.107-8. For the sake of completeness and clarity, I give here the full text: "atque ille Romuli auguratus pastoralis non urbanus fuit nec fictus ad opiniones inperitorum sed a certis acceptus et posteris traditus. Itaque Romulus augur, ut apud Ennium est, cum fratre item augure

curantes magna cura tum cupientes

regni dant operam simul auspicio augurioque.

In monte [in Mauro Sk.] Remus auspicio se devovet [auspicio sedet

Sk., cf. RQ 527-30] atque secundam

solus avem servat. At Romulus pulcher in alto

quaerit Aventino, servat genus altivolantum.

et simul ex alto longe pulcherrima praepes
 laeva volavit avis, simul aureus exoritur sol.
 Cedunt de caelo ter quattuor corpora sancta
 avium, praepetibus pulchrisque locis dant.

“and just then there flew from the height the luckiest messenger, a lofty bird on the left, and all golden there came out the sun. Thrice four hallowed shapes of birds moved down the sky, and betook themselves to places lofty and of good omen.”

The commentators of Ennius have valiantly struggled with this famous passage.³ It must be interpreted in the light of our knowledge of augural lore. Some points are clear. The verb *servare* is a well-known technical term: it describes an act of deliberate watching for signs as opposed to a casual observation.⁴ Romulus (and Remus too) observed the flight of birds. They were the high-flying birds, *altivolantes*. This is a poetic epithet, not recorded in technical handbooks, but Ennius used it on purpose. It nicely matches the locution *pulcherrima praepes*. The word *praepes* is derived

Certabant urbam Romam Remoramque vocarent.
 Omnibus cura viris uter esset induperator.
 Expectant [cf. Sk. in app.] veluti consul quom mittere signum
 volt, omnes avidi spectant ad carceris oras
 quam mox emittat pictos [cf. Sk. ad loc.] e faucibus currus:
 sic expectabat populus atque ore timebat
 rebus [cf. Sk. ad loc.] utri magni victoria sit data regni.
 Interea sol albus recessit in infera noctis.
 Exin candida se radiis dedit icta foras lux
 et simul ex alto longe pulcherrima praepes
 laeva volavit avis, simul aureus exoritur sol.
 Cedunt de caelo ter quattuor corpora sancta
 avium, praepetibus sese pulchrisque locis dant.
 Conspicit inde sibi data Romulus esse propritim [cf. Sk. ad loc.]
 auspicio regni stabilita scamna solumque.”

³ See esp. Pease ad Cic. *Div.* 107-8; Jocelyn, *passim*; Skutsch, 221-38. For the Ovidian account of the foundation (*Fasti* 4.801-49), see the commentary by E. Fantham, *Ovid, Fasti, Book IV* (1998), 241-51; and for the accounts of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Ant. Rom.* 1.86.1-4) and Plutarch (*Rom.* 9.5), Vaahtera, 97-104.

⁴ Servius auctus, ad *Aen.* 6.198: “servare enim et de caelo et de avibus verbo augurum dicitur.”

from *peto* in its original and lost meaning of flying, akin to Greek *pétomai*. The term was embraced by the poets, but in augural idiom it had a specific application.⁵

P. Nigidius Figulus, the senator, *polyhistor* and astrologer of the Ciceronian time, is said to have predicted from the conjunction of stars the rise of power of the future emperor Augustus (Suet. *Aug.* 93.5); more importantly, he also composed a treatise on augural signs.⁶ An excerpt was preserved by Aulus Gellius in the second century, in his *Noctes Atticae* (7.6.10), and Gellius adduced it to elucidate the verse of Ennius. “*Discerpat dextra sinistrae, praepes inferae*,” “the right is opposed to left, *praepes* to *infera*,” wrote the learned Nigidius. To this Gellius appended his own commentary: he astutely observed that since birds that are the opposite of *praepetes* are called *inferae*, the “low” birds, *praepetes* must be birds which have a higher and loftier flight.

Pulcher is a common adjective, but it was also an expression of religious speech. In that realm it occurs in two varieties, pontifical and augural. In the language of pontiffs, it denoted a person or a thing that was perfect, in particular a perfect offering, fit for the gods. Festus, in his abridgement of the treatise *De Verborum Significatu* of the early imperial scholar Valerius Flaccus (who in his turn had extensively used Varro), notes that *pulcher bos* is the animal (a cow, bull or ox) *ad eximiam pinguitudinem perductus* (274 L.), fattened to the extreme. Such an offering was called *hostia optima* (202 L.).

The augurs used the adjective *pulcher* to describe a propitious sign or a person who received or was about to receive such a sign. In Ennius, Romulus—when he watches out for favorable birds—is *pulc[her]* himself. In Ovid (*Fasti* 6.375) Quirinus, a *hypostasis* of Romulus, is *lituo pulcher*, blessed through his augural staff. C. Licinius Macer, another contemporary of Cicero, described in his *Annales* (Peter, fr. 6) the auspices at dawn. Ennius here followed strictly the established practice.⁷ The person who intended to auspicate would spend the night outdoors, and sleep in a hut (*tabernaculum*); he would rise early in the morning (*mane*), in silence, so that no untoward noise would disturb the auspices. He took his seat on a *solida sella*, apparently constructed of one piece, often of stone, so that again no creaking noise would be heard, and while looking out for birds he sat

⁵ See TLL (1987), 763-65, s.vv. *praepes*, *praepeto*; J. Linderski, *Der Neue Pauly* 10 (2001), 256-7, s.v. *praepes*; Vaahtera, 36-7.

⁶ See A. Swoboda, *P. Nigidii Figuli operum reliquiae* (1889), 3-63 (*Quaestiones Nigidianae*, still indispensable), 91-2; A. Della Casa, *Nigidio Figulo* (1962), *passim*.

⁷ On the procedure and terminology of *auspicatio*, see AL 2261, 2171-74, 2191-92, 2246, 2258-60, 2270-72, 2276-78, 2282-89.

motionless, never turning his head or body.⁸ With his eyes, he was thus marking out his field of vision. In augural parlance, this is a *templum*, a term not employed here by Ennius but appearing in a similar context already in Naeuius with respect to Anchises, who was in Roman tradition regarded as knowledgeable in every art of augury: “*Postquam avem aspexit in templo Anchisa ... limmolabat auream victimam pulchram,*” “After Anchises had seen a bird in his field of vision, he proceeded to sacrifice a beautiful golden victim.”⁹ A beautiful image for a Roman reader, combining *auspicia* and *sacra*: a propitious bird corresponds to a *pulchra victima*, made even more perfect (*aurea*), by its gilded horns.

To Romulus twelve birds appeared, an unusual number, and of an unusual kind: vultures (although Ennius does not specify this). The occasion was also unusual—a number and kind not to be repeated until Octavian brazenly imitated the auspices of Romulus on the occasion of his annexation of the consulship in 43. The *aves* apparently dropped down from the sky (*de caelo*) toward Romulus, and then they turned and flew away to the places Ennius describes as lofty and lucky (*praepetibus sese pulchrisque locis dant*). What these places were no commentator of Ennius has so far succeeded in discovering.

The favorable and high-flying bird (*pulcherrima praepes*) was further qualified by Ennius as *laeva*. This is generally, and rightly, taken to mean a *laeva*, “on the left” or “from the left,” or perhaps “toward the left.” But what is left? Is it an established and immutable left, be it south, east, north or west, anchored according to the cardinal points, or is it each time dependent upon the direction of the observer? The Ennian Romulus appears to have been looking eastward, for at the very moment he spotted the lucky bird (one bird, *avis*, is here hardly to be taken with Skutsch as a collective noun), the sun rose. Should it then be north? Or perhaps the left side of the field of vision, and thus east (or northeast)? Or perhaps *laevus* is to be taken in a general sense of “favorable”? But if so, why should *laevus* (and *sinister*, too) have this connotation?

⁸ Servius, ad *Aen.* 6.197: “ad captanda auguria [in Servius’ terminology = *auspicia impetrativa*; cf. Cic. *Div.* 1.31] consueverant.” Disregarding all explicit testimonies, a recent student replaces the stationary auspiciant with an auspiciant who “switched positions periodically (R.Taylor: “Watching the Skies: Janus, Auspication, and the Shrine in the Roman Forum,” *MAAR* 45 [2000], 1-40 at 21-22). This is exactly the same error committed by Plutarch (*Numa* 7.1-3; cf. *AL* 2297; Vaahtera, 107-8, and below, n. 34), deriving in both cases from a profound misconception of the *ratio templi* (cf. Catalano, *Aspetti* 467-72).

⁹ Naev. *Bell. Pun.* Fr. 25 Strz. = 2-4 Warm.

These are not trivial questions, at least not to those conversant with Roman gods. For here we stumble upon a curious but fundamental and surprisingly overlooked feature of Roman deities: they understood Latin, but did not speak it. Addresses and entreaties, prayers and vows (*precationes* and *vota*), hymns and songs, the formulas of dedication and consecration, and of auspication too, were composed in Latin. The Latin was perhaps a little archaic, and not always fully comprehensible to humans, but crystal clear to the gods. But only a few minor or ill-defined deities are on the record as actually having spoken Latin, and they did not have much to say. We hear of the *voces Faunorum* (the utterances of the Fauns), of a voice from the temple of Juno on the Arx, and above all of Aius Locutius, the Divine Voice *par excellence*, who had, however, spoken but once, warning the Romans—to no avail—that the Gauls were coming.¹⁰ No direct message, in Latin, or in any other language, from Jupiter, Mars or Minerva. In contrast, the God of the Hebrews used the Hebrew tongue extensively, and later also Aramaic.

The difference is fundamental. Ancient students of divination, above all the Stoics (known to us mostly through the intermediary of Cicero), distinguished between two kinds of divination: natural and artificial.¹¹ We can follow their lead and extend this classification to the whole realm of religion. The great conceptual divide will thus lie between the artificial and natural creeds. The latter we would call today revealed, but the Roman cult did not have a revealed creed. It was assembled through trial and error.

Natural divination (and natural or revealed religion) relies upon divine inspiration, upon *instinctus divinus*. The main ingredient is here emotion or *furor*; the Greeks called it enthusiasm (*enthousiasmos*). This kind of divination is proper to *vaticinantes* and also *somniantes*, to prophets and dreamers. They are the conduits for divine words. In divination proper, these words may give a glimpse of the future, but through the mouth of a *vates* the Deity may give an extensive message concerning all facets of life and death. These messages may be committed to memory or to writing, and so become sacred books. The Revealed Book occupies such a central position in all religions derived from the Judean tradition that we tend to take its existence for granted, obvious and natural.

Not at Rome. The king Numa was regarded in Roman tradition as a great religious founder, but when in 181 B.C.E., at the foot of the Janiculum hill, a stone casket was unearthed containing (allegedly) the books of Numa, the senate decreed that they should be burned (Liv. 40.29). This was a standard procedure. During the Hannibalic war, *sacrifuli* and *vates*—petty sacrificers and prophets—took hold of the minds of men and women. The

¹⁰ Cic. *Div.* 1.101; 2.69, and Pease *ad locc.*

¹¹ Sources and discussion in *AL* 2230-39.

senate decreed, and the urban praetor issued the edict, that any person who had books of prophecies or of prayers or of a ritual of sacrifice should surrender to the authorities all such books and writings (Livy 25.12). When the Bacchanalian conspiracy shook the city, Livy (39.16.8) has the consul Spurius Postumius remind the populace that the forefathers had often entrusted the task to the magistrates of excluding from the city *sacrificulos* and *vates*, sacrificers and prophets, and of searching out and burning *vaticinos libros*, the books of prophecies. The official tenor is reflected in Ennius (in a fragment of his tragedy *Telamo*) and in Cicero (*Div.* 1.132), who quotes the poet's ringing denunciation of "credulous prophets, shameless gut-gazers, clumsy, crazy, or crooked, who do not know their own path, yet point the way for another."

There existed, of course, the Sibylline books.¹² They were, however, not a Roman product. Acquired in the gray and hallowed past by King Tarquin of Old, written in Greek hexameters, they were kept under lock and key in a stone chest in a cellar under the Capitoline temple. They were guarded by a board of priests in charge of foreign rites, the *decemviri* (later *quindecimviri sacris faciundis*). The books were believed to contain the *fata populi Romani*. Nobody read them, and nobody was supposed to know their entire content. Only in times of particular danger or of particular need did the senate order the priests to approach the books (*libros adiri*). The scrolls were opened at random, and the passage thus selected was deemed to refer to the situation at hand; there was advice hidden in it, and the illumination of the will of the gods. The books thus served simply as an instrument of divination; they were not repositories of moral precepts. The *libri* themselves were inspired and prophetic, but their interpreters were not. They tried to understand the selected passage in the light of the current situation and past experience, taking above all into account the results of previous consultations.

On Italian soil, the closest we come to native and accepted revelation is the vaticination of Tages, who sprang out from a furrow and dictated the teaching of the *haruspicina* (*disciplinam haruspicinae dictavit*).¹³ At Rome, the *haruspices* were fully accepted, but they were deemed aliens. Although their services were in great demand, they had never achieved the status of official priests (*sacerdotes populi Romani*). Their approval as diviners finds explanation in the following circumstance: although the core of their *disciplina* may have been revealed, the *haruspices* themselves were not prophets but experts. In Cicero's account, they appear together with the

¹² The most detailed account is still A. Rzach in *RE* 2A (1923), 2105-17.

¹³ *Sch. Bern. ad Lucanum* 1.636; Cic. *Div.* 2.50, and Pease *ad loc.* The unrivaled study of the *haruspices* and of their craft remains C.O. Thulin, *Die etruskische Disciplin* (1905, 1906, 1909, repr. 1968).

augurs as the main representatives of artificial, that is, 'scientific,' divination.

This branch of divination was an empirical science; it was based on two procedures characterized by Roman experts as observation and inference (*observatio* and *coniectura*).¹⁴ The term *observatio* denoted the process of long-lasting observation (*observatio diurna*) of phenomena whether it was the course and the significance of the stars, understood by the Chaldeans, or the various signs from the gods. Already in the remote past this procedure had resulted in the acquisition of positive knowledge (*scientia*) concerning certain categories of signs. This painstakingly assembled body of knowledge was committed to memory and to writing; this is the origin of the books of augurs, of pontiffs, and of a good portion of the haruspical books. How different is this avowed origin from that of the revealed scripts!

If a recorded sign appeared, the augurs would know its meaning, or in any case could find it in their books.¹⁵ These books were like dictionaries. But, if you needed to communicate on the spot, and did not remember the correct words, it would have been of little help to know that all the words were in the dictionary. The Roman observer had to interpret signs immediately, and he had either to accept them expressly or expressly reject them as not pertaining to him.¹⁶ Hence, the principal ingredient of a good augur was *memoria*. But there was also another requirement: *ratio*, reason.¹⁷

For there could come a sign that was entirely new or whose meaning was not well established. To interpret such a sign,—a *nova res*—the augur or haruspex had to rely on all his knowledge and experience, apply the power of reasoning, and boldly draw inferences (*coniecturae*) from the situation at hand. The sign would be recorded, for future use, and also recorded were any *eventus*—any happenings that accompanied the *signum* or followed in its wake. The aim of this procedure was to ascertain a causal and temporal link between the sign and the event. In a technical phrase, this process was described as *signa eventis notare* (Cic. *Div.* 1.12). In due course, after many repeated observations, the precise meaning of the sign might finally be deciphered, and the *signum* would then be moved from the category of the unknown or uncertain *novae res* into the category of *veteres res*, the established signs.

¹⁴ AL 2231, 2233-34, 2237-38.

¹⁵ On the books of augurs, see AL 2241-56.

¹⁶ Plin. *NH* 28.17: "in augurum certe disciplina constat neque diras neque ulla auspicia pertinere ad eos, qui quamque rem ingredientibus observare ea negaverint"; Serv., ad *Aen.* 5.530: "nam nostri arbitrii est visa omnia vel improbare, vel recipere." This rule referred, however, only to the *signa oblativa* (Serv. ad *Aen.* 12.259).

¹⁷ AL 2232-34, 2240.

An attentive student will realize that we are here in the process of deciphering a (divine) language. Our task is now to re-decipher what the Romans had deciphered.

Atop Mount Sinai, Moses received instructions written in Hebrew. When Romulus climbed onto the Palatine (or was it the Aventine, as Ennius has it?), Jupiter spoke to him in the language of signs. And yet Romulus (and the readers of Ennius) had not the slightest difficulty in understanding the message. From the gyrations of the birds (*inde*), Romulus saw (*conspicit*) instantly that through this sign (*auspicio*) was given to him a firm chair and a seat of kingdom (*regni stabilita scamna solumque*). In augural idiom, the verb *conspicere* denoted not only the act of observation but also the act of comprehension.¹⁸

When we study a language, be it Hebrew or Jovian, we must consider not only vocabulary but also grammar and syntax. Words alone are not sufficient. Nor can *signa* be treated in isolation. They receive their full significance within a peculiar system of grammar. In this case, the context was a temporal and spatial grid, and the main concepts of this grammar were the ideas of left and right.¹⁹

In Roman divine communications, the basic lexical unit was a sign (*signum*). *Signa* represented words, or rather notions; they were ideograms, quite like Chinese characters or Egyptian hieroglyphs. When we glance at an Egyptian hieroglyphic text, we cannot help noticing (very appropriately in the context of the birds of Romulus) the ubiquitous presence of the vulture sign. The frequent appearance of this sign is explained by its double function: as an ideogram, it represented a vulture, and in the more general sense, any bird. But it also functioned as an alphabetic sign with the phonetic value of a glottal stop (corresponding to Hebrew aleph).²⁰ The Egyptian scribes mastered and perfected their complicated script; so did the Roman augurs.

The augurs (and pontiffs) classified the *signa* in various ways; the result was a maze of crisscrossing semantic lines.

First, the *signa* were classified according to their material quality, the manner in which they manifested themselves. Here, the Roman *augures publici* distinguished five categories of signs: from the sky (*ex caelo*, that is,

¹⁸ Skutsch 236-37; *AL* 2269, 2287-89.

¹⁹ *AL* 2258-60, 2280-86. The recent studies by B. Liou-Gille, "Dexter et sinister et leurs équivalents," *Glotta* 69 (1991), 194-201, and by A. Aretini, *A destra e a sinistra. L'Orientamento nel mondo classico* (1998), 74-98, would fail the test of an augur. Their ignorance of the augural stones from Bantia (see below, nn. 52-53) rendered their studies obsolete at the very moment of their publication.

²⁰ Cf. A. Gardiner, *Egyptian Grammar* (1927), 27, 458.

from thunder and lightening), from the birds (*ex avibus*), from *tripudia* (*ex tripudiis*, that is from the eating matter of the sacred chickens, the *pulli*), from quadrupeds (*ex quadripedibus*), and finally from unusual or frightful occurrences (*ex diris*).²¹ The particular importance that was attached to the avian signs can be gleaned from the fact that etymologically *auspicium* derives from *avis spicium* (*avem spi(e)cere*), the sighting or observation of birds. The term then becomes synonymous with *signum*, and came to denote a whole variety of divinatory phenomena that had nothing to do with birds.

These signs were arranged in, so to speak, a pecking order. "It is well known that among the augurs there are many grades of auspices," observed a Vergilian commentator.²² Some were stronger, some were weaker, some were *maiora*, and some were *minora*. They could annul and override each other. Again, the commentary on Vergil: "the lesser auguries (*minora auguria*) yield to greater (*maiora*), and have no force whatsoever even if they (appeared) first,"²³ and in another place: "if, for instance, a barn-owl (*parra*) or woodpecker (*picus*) gave the *auspicium*, and subsequently an eagle gave a contrary sign, the eagle's *auspicium* prevails."²⁴ But it was *signa ex caelo*—i.e., lightning and thunder—that the augurs regarded as the greatest and strongest auspices (*auspicia maxima*).²⁵

Next, a sign could be sent by the Deity asked or unasked. This consideration produced two further divisions of signs, on the one hand the signs especially solicited or impetrated (*impetrare*), *signa* or *auspicia impetrativa*, and on the other the *signa* or *auspicia oblativa*, that "offered" themselves spontaneously to a viewer.²⁶

Further, we have to distinguish carefully between action and status, and consequently between the signs that pertained to a concrete and well defined undertaking, contemplated or being executed, and those signs that referred to

²¹ Festus ex Paulo 316-17 L.: "Quinque genera signorum observant augures publici: ex caelo, ex avibus, ex tripudis [sic], ex quadripedibus, ex diris."

²² Servius *auctus*, ad *Aen.* 3.374: "notum est esse apud augures auspiciorum gradus plures."

²³ Serv. ad *Ecl.* 9.13: "minora enim auguria maioribus cedunt nec ullarum sunt virium, licet priora sint." Cf. Serv. *auctus*, ad *Aen.* 3.466. In Servius, the term *augurium* often appears in the sense of *auspicium*, especially *auspicium impetrativum*; cf. Serv. *auctus*, ad *Aen.* 3.89; Catalano, *Contributi* 80-95.

²⁴ Serv. *auctus*, ad *Aen.* 3.374: "ut puta, si parra vel picus auspicium dederit, et deinde contrarium aquila dederit, auspicium aquilae praevalet."

²⁵ Serv. *auctus*, ad *Aen.* 2.693; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.5.5; Cass. Dio 38.13.3-4.

²⁶ *AL* 2195-96; 2212-16; 2239; *RQ* 613-14.

the status of persons or things. The former are the *auspicia*; the latter the *auguria*; hopelessly confused in everyday Latin and by modern students, but religiously distinguished by the augurs and by Ennius. *Auguria* were administered solely by the augurs, and the augurs appear to have used the auspices only in connection with the auguries.²⁷

The *auspices* referred to action. And any action proceeded through two distinct augural phases: the phase of contemplation and the stage of execution. The impetrative auspices pertained to the stage of contemplation, *ad agendi consilium* (Cic. *Leg.* 2.32). Before any important task was executed it was prudent to ask for divine permission.

Every person could address a deity. If we reformulate this statement in the language of augurs, we can say that every person had the auspices (*auspicia habere* is the technical term). But these auspices were latent. To be used they had to be activated. The activation occurred at the ceremony of auspication. At this ceremony, the auspices were “taken”; the technical term was *auspicia capere* or *captare*. This was accomplished by watching for the signs, *servare*, and by observing, comprehending, and accepting the message (*conspicere*).²⁷

Every person could auspicate—but only with respect to his own affairs. This is an important limitation, and it introduces us to another fundamental division into *auspicia privata* and *auspicia publica*. An often-quoted example of private auspices is the auspices taken before the marriage ceremony, a custom that survived long into the empire. The *auspicia publica* were administered by the magistrates and the public priests (*sacerdotes publici*). They could consult the auspices only with respect to actions that lay within the sphere of competence in each particular office or priesthood.²⁸

The impetrative auspices revealed the will of Jupiter, but only in a very limited sense. They did not reveal the future. Cicero states this explicitly (*Div.* 2.70): “*non enim sumus ii nos augures qui avium reliquorumve signorum observatione futura dicamus*”—“for we are not those augurs (like the augurs of the Marsi to whom Cicero had previously alluded) who from the observation of birds and other signs predict the future.” Thus, the *auspicia impetrativa* pertained to the present, or more exactly, to the action the ausplicant was contemplating to undertake. In an ideal situation, the deity either permitted or prohibited it unequivocally.

²⁷ Catalano, *Contributi* 33-71; *AL* 2217-18; *RQ* 476-77, 572-73; 613-14; *OCD*³ (1996) 223-24, s.v. *auspicium*.

²⁷ Liv. 6.41.6 (*habere*); Servius *auctus*, ad *Aen.* 2.178 (*captare*); and above, nn. 3, 15.

²⁸ *RQ* 560-74; *AL* 2217-18.

Furthermore, this permission or prohibition was valid for one day only; we frequently hear of the auspices concerning a particular day (*auspicium eius diei*).²⁹ This temporal limitation was perhaps the most remarkable feature of impetrative auspices: Jupiter was apparently not interested in the substance of the proposed undertaking, but rather in the propriety of its being carried out in a given day.

The auguries, on the other hand, had no temporal limitation. Through this ceremony, a special enhanced status was imparted to places and persons; in the language of augurs, they were inaugurated. An inaugurated *locus* becomes a *templum*, and the inauguration was also necessary for higher priests and kings. The adjectives used about such people and places were *augustus* and *sanctus*, "increased" and "holy." This status was doctrinally different from that of *sacer*, "sacred" (the latter was the province of pontiffs). Not every *aedes sacra* was a *templum* and not every *templum* was an *aedes sacra*.³⁰ The holiness lasted until it was removed by a reverse ceremony of *exauguratio*.³¹

The auguries were enacted by the means of auspices. As Ennius writes, Romulus and Remus *dant operam simul auspicio augurioque*, a phrase spectacularly misunderstood by commentators.³²

The auspiciant pronounced a formula. This enunciation, *nuncupatio verborum*, was defined as *legum dictio*.³³ It described the parameters, *leges* or *condiciones*, of the ceremony. At the auspicy pertaining to *agere*, the celebrant asked for permission to act that day: to fight a battle or hold an assembly. At the auspicy connected with augury, the celebrant—always an augur, and hence Cicero (and perhaps also Ennius) duly specifies that the brothers were augurs—asked the deity for permission to inaugurate this place, declare this man a king or found this city, Roma or Remora, as Ennius puts it.

The *locus classicus* is Livy's description of the inauguration of Numa as king of Rome.³⁴ In Livy, it is not Numa himself who takes the auspices (as

²⁹ See the sources in Catalano, *Contributi* 42-5.

³⁰ The *locus classicus* is Varro in Gell. *Noct. Att.* 14.7.7.

³¹ Catalano, *Contributi* 211-334; *Aspetti* 473-78; *AL* 2215-25; 2249-50 (*sanctus*), 2290-91 (*augustus*); *OCD*³ 1483, s.v. *templum*.

³² Skutsch, 223-4 may stand for all when he writes: "one and the same act is meant." It was sufficient to consult Catalano (cf. above, n. 31) or various studies of Valeton (see the list in *AL* 1311) to apprehend the augural incorrectness of that statement.

³³ Servius *auctus*, ad *Aen.* 3.89.

³⁴ Liv. 1.18.6-10; see a detailed analysis in *AL* 2256-97. For Plutarch's account of Numa's inauguration (*Numa* 7.1-3), see *AL* 2296-97, and the learned investigation by Vaahtera 104-113.

Romulus does in Ennius), but an (unnamed) augur who consults the gods concerning Numa's *regnum*.

First, looking from the *arx*, the auger strictly delimits his field of vision, his *templum*, in the air stretching over the *urbs* and the *ager*. M. Terentius Varro, always interested in archaic diction, has preserved for us in his treatise *On Latin Language* the actual formula the late republican orators recited on the citadel when they delimited their field of view for their various observations.³⁵ In that formula much remains, for us, obscure; but still Varro and Livy very fortunately tried to elucidate each other. The most important point is this: using the markers in the terrain below him, placed most likely on the line of the pomerium, the auspiciant exactly defined his *fines*, the right and left border of his field of vision. But he also looked straight ahead as far as he could see, to the end of the horizon, and with this (imaginary) line he dissected his *templum aereum* in two parts, left and right, left toward the north, and right toward the south.

Next, he pronounced another formula, another *precatio*. Of this formula we have unfortunately only the version of Livy, but Livy preserved well its augural flavor. The augur asked Jupiter for *signa certa*, and then he described exactly (*peregit verbis*) the *auspicia* he wished to be sent.

What specifically those auspices were to be, Livy, as is his exasperating custom, does not explain. But from the mention of *urbs* and *ager* in his description, and the trees as markers of the *fines* in Varro, we can deduce, with full certainty, that the Livian and Varronian augur watched out for birds and not for *fulmina*, the observation of which certainly did not require any particular terrestrial markers.

The auspiciant thus asked, naturally, only for favorable signs. In Ennius, Remus *secundam avem servat*, looks out for a favorable bird. This qualification of the bird is not redundant and illogical, as some earlier and current interpreters think, but springs out from the very essence of impetrative auspices: the auspiciant expected the deity to accede to the request specified in the *legum dictio* and dispatch a propitious sign.³⁶

Jupiter's answer could come in three forms: yes, no, and (most unnerving) maybe, when he sent a sign of ambiguous meaning, a *signum*

³⁵ Varro *Ling. Lat.* 7.8. See the stupendous analysis by E. Norden, *Aus altrömischen Priesterbüchern* (1939), 3-106, 181-86, a study inspired by intuition and informed by erudition. Cf. *AL* 2267-79; C. Pavone, "A proposito della formula augurale (Varrone, *de Lingua Latina* VII 8)," *BSL* 23 (1993) 265-81.

³⁶ Skutsch 225 (following Vahlen) is to be commended for having recognized the augural relevance of the adjective. Cf. Servius *auctus*, ad *Aen.* 3.361: "praepetes sunt, quae secundo auspicio ante eum volant, qui auspiciatur."

dubium, an *avis incerta*. Hence the request of *signa certa*, the signs whose augural interpretation could not be in doubt.³⁷

To characterize the positive answer the augurs employed the hallowed word *addico*: *aves addicunt* (they also used the expressions *admittere*: *aves admittunt* and *auspicium ratum facere*).³⁸ Now in a different field of Roman public life, in civil law, the praetor could pronounce (*fari*) the three legal, and magical, words, *do, dico, addico*, only on *dies fasti*. How potent this formula was is best illustrated by the following circumstance (reported by Varro, *Ling. Lat.* 6.30; cf. 6.53): if the praetor inadvertently uttered these words on a *dies nefastus* he had to offer a sacrifice of expiation, a *hostis piacularis*. But if he uttered them *prudens*, on purpose, fully understanding what he was doing, he was (according to the opinion of the learned *pontifex maximus* Q. Mucius Scaevola) *impius* forever, and his impiety could not be washed away by any expiation. In the realm of augury it must have been also a grave responsibility to say the word *addico* and to make the pronouncement *aves addicunt*.

But in pontifical law, the strong and blanket condemnation of the erring praetor had a peculiar side to it: even if he uttered the three words, knowingly or unknowingly, on a *dies nefastus*, this error did not affect at all the legal validity of the act he performed. For instance, if he manumitted a slave (this presupposes the *manumissio* in the form of *vindicatio, in iure*, in the court) the slave was, as Varro puts it, *vitio liber*. He was free, and his freedom was not circumscribed in any way, but he achieved his new status in a faulty way. The praetor was guilty, but his act was valid. Furthermore, the praetor was not subject to any human punishment but only to divine wrath. It was a firm tenet of Roman cult that the gods should fend for themselves, "*deorum iniuriae dis curae*" (Tac. *Ann.* 1.73.4).

The same principle was followed also in the augural law. It was possible to make an honest mistake: ascribe to an ambiguous sign, *dubie datum*, a positive interpretation, admit it *pro certo*. Still worse, an eager or unscrupulous observer could falsify the auspices (*auspicia ementiri* and *auspicia ementita* were the technical terms).³⁹ Now the falsified auspices were valid, that is to say they were binding on the deity. Here we are in the presence of a peculiar phenomenon: the ritual formula was rather like a spell:

³⁷ It is of some interest to observe that Cicero, in his lost treatise on augury, discussed the concept of *avis incerta* (Cic. in Charisius 122 Keil = 156 Barwick). Cf. *incerta auspicia*: Liv. 8.30.1; 8.32.4, 7; *dubia auspicia*: Liv. 8.34.4. It could happen that "*aliquod signum dubie datum pro certo sit acceptum*" (Cic. *Div.* 1.124).

³⁸ For the evidence, see AL 2208, 2285, 2293, 2295.

³⁹ On this concept, see C. Schäublin, "Ementita Auspicia," *Wiener Studien* 99 (1986) 165-81.

if properly pronounced, it was so potent that it could create, so to speak, a propitious bird *ex nihilo*, and bend the will of Jupiter himself.

Livy gives a celebrated description of this augural tenet.⁴⁰ Before a battle with the Samnites, a zealous keeper of the sacred chickens (*pulli*), reported to the consul L. Papirius the best possible omen, the *tripudium solistimum*: the chickens were eating greedily (whereas in fact they refused to eat). The consul was soon apprised of the falsification, but he insisted on the validity of the auspices: he had accepted the message of the *pullarius* as true, and hence it was—for him, the Roman People and the army—an excellent sign, *auspicium egregium*. And thus undaunted he drew up his army for battle, but also very astutely he took a religious precaution. To facilitate Jupiter's revenge, he placed the keeper of the *pulli* in front rank. And indeed before the battle began, an errant javelin pierced the mendacious *pullarius*. The consul (or rather the antiquarian author of Livy's story) was well versed in augural precepts. He formally accepted this event as a good omen: he proclaimed that the guilty person had paid his penalty, and that the gods were in the battle on the side of the Romans. The ritual ball was now in the court of Jupiter. He could show his continuing displeasure by sending a dire sign, an owl for instance; he could do nothing, thus perhaps tacitly endorsing the enunciation of the consul. But Jupiter was now fully satisfied: to show his support he dispatched a propitious oblativ sign. In front of the consul (*ante consulem*) a raven (*corvus*) uttered a clear cry (*clara voce occinuit*). The consul again formally accepted this message and ordered the trumpets to sound. The Romans duly routed the enemy.

Agnes Michels had once observed that the Roman gods were divine citizens of Rome.⁴¹ They were also divine jurists of Rome: legalistic Beings who could appreciate fictions and dodges. The Romans created their gods in their own image. Papirius was able to outwit Jupiter because he knew the law: it was the *pullarius*, not the consul, who was guilty of deceit. His deed, if not expiated, could have irreparably polluted and constrained, through a religious fault (*religione constringere*), the *res publica* itself.

There is a story, in Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Plutarch, that Romulus falsified the auspices. He sent messengers to Remus reporting the sighting of the vultures, whereas at that point no birds had yet appeared.

⁴⁰ Liv. 10.40; for an augural interpretation, see *RQ* 615-616, 623-24, utilized by A. Feldherr, *Spectacle and Society in Livy's History* (1998) 61-63, and in a confused summary entirely attributed to him by M. Jaeger, *CJ* 92.4 (1997) 323-45.

⁴¹ For a discussion and appreciation of Agnes Michels as a student of the Romans and their gods, see J. Linderski, "Agnes Kirsopp Michels and the *Religio*," *CJ* 92.4 (1997) 323-45.

They appeared later, and in this version Romulus, through his pronouncement, will have successfully compelled the hand of Jupiter.⁴²

All is upright in Ennius: Romulus, like Numa in Livy, had received *auspicia certa*. Even more, he received the best possible auspices. The birds flew in an optimal way.

Julius Hyginus, a learned antiquarian who was appointed director of the Palatine Library by Augustus, discussed in one of his scripts the augural meaning of *aves praepetes*. We already know from Nigidius Figulus that they were the high-flying birds. From Hyginus (in Gell. *Noct. Att.* 7.6.3), we learn that they either propitiously fly in front of the observer or alight in suitable places (*praepetes aves ab auguribus appellantur, quae aut opportune praevolant aut idoneas sedes capiunt*).⁴³ In his celebrated commentary, Otto Skutsch regards the latter explanation of Hyginus as decisive, and writes that "the settling of the birds foreshadows the settlement of Romulus and his followers" (236). Quite wrong. In Ennius, the twelve birds do not settle at all, we may say *nullam sedem capiunt*; they fly away toward the *loca pulchra*.

In the poem about his great compatriot, Cicero (*Div.* 1.104) describes the omen Jupiter gave to Marius (whom Cicero pointedly calls *divini numinis augur*), presaging Marius' return from exile and his renewed glory. Marius saw an eagle victoriously fighting against a serpent; the eagle dropped the mangled snake *in undas*, into the sea, and turned away from the west toward the shining east, *obitu a solis nitidos convertit ad ortus*, exactly like the birds of Romulus. And exactly like the birds of Romulus, the eagle of Marius flew *praepetibus pinnis*, with auspicious wings on high, in a gliding course (*lapsu*), and this image corresponds to Ennius' *cedunt de caelo*. And like Romulus, Marius *conspexit* the bird and *notavit*; not only observed but accepted it as a *signum faustum*. In Livy, when the consul Papirius accepted his omen, Jupiter sent a corroboration in the shape of a raven; in Cicero's poem, Jupiter strengthened (*firmavit*) the sign of the eagle by the peal of thunder in the left part of the sky (*partibus caeli sinistris*). The old question emerges again: what is the "left part of the sky"?

Still, this imitation of Ennius by a learned augur⁴⁴ with its description of the flight of the eagle, and the pronounced opposition between the west and

⁴² Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1.86; Plut. *Rom.* 9.5; (also Diod. 8.5; see Vaahtera 34-7). But it is important to stress that this story appears only in Greek sources; as Vaahtera (99) convincingly argues, "the cheating Romulus is a Greek invention."

⁴³ Cf. Festus 224 L: "praepetes aves quidam dici aiunt, quia secundum auspiciam faciunt praetervolantes."

⁴⁴ We must not forget that Cicero was an augur! Unfortunately, the book by F. Guillaumont, *Philosophe et augure: recherches sur la théorie*

the east, directs us toward a better understanding of the Romulean foundation of the city. So does a passage from Livy (7.26.4-5) describing the famous duel between the young Marcus Valerius, the future Corvinus, and a mighty Gaul. On the helmet of Valerius a raven (*corvus*) alighted (*consedit*).⁴⁵ Valerius, strictly according to the augural precepts, formally accepted the omen, and said a prayer. The raven is described as *praepes*; it came, like the birds of Romulus, from the sky (*caelo missus*). And it not only held steadfastly to its *sedes*, but also repeatedly attacked the Gaul aiming at his eyes. When the Gaul was cut down, the bird flew off toward the east and was lost to sight (*ex conspectu elatus orientem petit*). The direction of its flight again parallels exactly the *volatus* of the Romulean birds and of the eagle of Marius.

When Jupiter wished to deter the auspiciant, he could disrupt the ceremony of auspiciation (*auspicia dirimere*). We know that for valid auspiciation there was a prerequisite of *silentium*. But the augurs interpreted *silentium* in a broad way, not just as mere silence, but rather as the absence of any fault or error—i.e., the absence of *vitium*—and to ascertain this a person versed in augural regulations was required, a *peritus*, a perfect augur. But any untoward sound (*strepitus*) was a sure indication of a *vitium*, and the surest of all was the squeak of the shrew-mouse, *occentus soricum*.⁴⁶ (It would have been a great story, though worthy of Lucilius rather than Ennius, if the foundation of the City had been prevented by the squeak of a mouse!).

All this discouragement could have occurred even before the beginning of the formal observation (*servare*). For if a noise was heard, the auspiciant could not rise up in silence (*silentio surgere*, Festus 474L), and the ceremony of auspiciation had to be postponed to another day. But even when the auspiciant took his seat, and established his field of vision, his *templum* in the air, unfavorable birds could have appeared to prevent him from undertaking any action. For any *signa infausta* that appeared in the auspiciant's pre-established field of vision were addressed specifically and personally to him, and could not be repudiated. And even when an impetative favorable sign was observed and accepted, Jupiter could still change his mind, and countermand his signal. It was for this reason that the auspiciants, after they saw the desired signs, would immediately jump up from their seat and their place of observation, the terrestrial *templum*. In this way, they dismantled

cicéronienne de la divination (= Collection Latomus 184 [1984]), is with respect to *res augurales* very deficient. Cf. *RQ* 485-90.

⁴⁵ On this expression, cf. *AL* 2259.

⁴⁶ *Dirimere*: *AL* 2151-52, 2170, 2173, 2197-98; *silentium*: Cic. *Div.* 2.71-2, and Pease *ad loc.*; *AL* 2172-73; *vitium*: *AL* 2162-77; *occentus*: Plin. *NH* 8.223.

their field of vision.⁴⁷ If any unfavorable bird showed up at this moment, it was solely an oblativ sign that had no defined addressee and consequently could be declared as not pertaining to the person who saw it.

A good example of the ceremony of auspication that went terribly astray is the misadventure of Seianus, shortly before his fall from grace. In his capacity as consul, he was taking auspices, but as Cassius Dio reports (58.5.7), "not one bird of good omen appeared, but many flew around him and cawed, and then all flew together and perched on the *oikêma*." The augurs would characterize the birds of Seianus as *aves vagae*, wandering aimlessly, or perhaps *circaneae*, flying in circles.⁴⁸ Not only was their flight all wrong, but also the cry. It was heard all over the place, whereas Jupiter established that the raven functioned as a good omen only if it sang on the right (*ab dextra caneret*).⁴⁹ The sign was unfavorable indeed, but soon it was to become outright dire: the ravens did not fly away toward the east, but settled (in augural idiom, *sedem ceperunt*) on the *oikêma*, certainly not a *pulcher locus*, but the jail to which Seianus was soon to be dragged.⁵⁰

Our final task is to define the seat of Romulus and of Jupiter, and plot the course of birds with respect to both of them.

We happen to know exactly where the Roman gods lived. As Varro (in Festus 454 L.) explains, their abode, their *sedes*, was located in the north. They looked from their seats southward, and consequently had the east to their left, and the west to their right. And because the sun rises in the east, this part of the world is propitious, and thus the left auspices (*sinistra auspicia*) are regarded as better than the right (*dextra*). Right and left is here defined from the standpoint of the gods. We now begin to understand why the *laeva avis* comes from the east, and why the propitious birds return to that quarter.

From various other sources (Dionysius of Halicarnassos, Pliny the Elder, and Servius), we can reconstruct the system in greater detail. The north was more honorable and stronger than the south, and the east was more favorable and had pre-eminence over the west. The abode of the gods stretched on the north side from west to east. It was not of an even height. It was lowest in the west (i.e., north-west) and the highest in the east (i.e., north-east). For it was that part of the sky that Jupiter himself had as his

⁴⁷ Servius, *ad Aen.* 2.699: (*augures*) "visis auspiciis surgebant e templo." Cf. *AL* 2273.

⁴⁸ The birds are naturally *vagae* (cf. Hor. *Carm.* 4.4), and thus in that state they are opposite of the augural birds that fly with a purpose; *circaneae*: Paulus ex Festo 37 L.

⁴⁹ Cic. *Div.* 1.12.85.

⁵⁰ Cass. Dio 58.11.1; on the meaning of *oikêma*, see the judicious remarks by Vaahtera 114, n. 90.

domicilium and where the *summa felicitas* dwelt. On the other hand, the most calamitous regions (*partes maximae dirae*) were in the northwest. This system the augurs shared to a great degree with the haruspices; to this arrangement of the sky corresponds rather exactly the haruspical arrangement of the regions on sacrificial livers.⁵¹

This obscure and shadowy doctrine received a beam of light when, some thirty-five years ago in the Roman colony of Bantia in southern Italy, nine stones came to light marking an augural *templum* (dated to the last century of the Republic). Only three *cippi* were found *in situ*, but the complete arrangement has been brilliantly reconstructed by Mario Torelli.⁵² The stones were placed in three rows forming a rectangle some nine meters long. They were on average some thirty to fifty centimeters high, and had a diameter of about thirty centimeters. They were inscribed on top, and inclined toward the west, so that the inscriptions could be read only by the observer looking east. He sat on a large stone, found *in situ*. He thus used the inscribed *cippi* as the markers on the ground to project into the air his field of vision.

We begin deciphering the stones with the northern row, found *in situ*. In the northeastern corner, we have the stone-inscribed *B(e)ne I(uvante) AV(e)*, and in the northwestern corner the stone inscribed *C(ontra)ria A(ve) A(uspicium) P(estiferum)*. On the middle stone, the inscription most probably referred to *avis arcula*. These stones remarkably corroborate the doctrine reconstructed from literary and antiquarian sources. The most propitious bird, positively assisting the auspician in his projected undertaking (*bene iuvans*), is connected with the northeast, the region of *summa felicitas*. The northwest is indeed *maxime dirum*: if a bird appeared in this region, it meant not merely the prohibition to proceed. It was not merely a *contraria avis*; it was a warning that a calamity impends, an *auspicium pestiferum*. In the middle, the north proper, we have a relatively neutral region: *avis arcula*, a bird that according to the augural definition *vetebat aliquid fieri* (Paulus ex Festo 15 L.), prevented the action, but was not threatening.

The middle row corresponds to the mental line drawn by the Livian augur straight ahead up to the end of the horizon. It has three stones with the

⁵¹ Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.5.2-4; Plin. *NH* 2.142-43; Servius *ad Aen.* 2.693. Cf. *AL* 2282-85.

⁵² M. Torelli, "Un templum augurale d'età repubblicana a Bantia," *Rend. Lincei* 21 (1966) 293-315, a fount of erudition and acumen, with some interpretations partially superceded, partially refined in a great article with an unassuming title: "Contributi al supplemento del *CIL IX*," *Rend. Lincei* 24 (1969) 39-48. For further comments, see *AL* 2258-60; 2284-85; *RQ* 493-95.

names of deities: Jupiter, Sol, and Flusa (an Oscan counterpart of Flora); their exact arrangement is a matter of dispute.⁵³

For our purposes, more interesting is the southern row. The stones (which were not found *in situ*) are so arranged as to correspond to the northern row, and to what we know of the augural doctrine. As expected, the birds in this quarter are less strong, both less helpful and less dire, than those in the north. In the southeast, we have *SIN(ENTE) Av(e)*, a bird that allows us to proceed, but does not indicate divine assistance. In the southwest we found *C(ontraria) A(ve)*: it positively prohibits the action, but does not utter threats. It is not *pestifera* like its counterpart in the north-east, but merely *EN(ubra)*, according to an antiquarian notice a sign restraining and hindering (Paulus ex Festo 67 L.).

But for the readers of Ennius it is the middle stone in the southern row that offers a treat: it reads *R(emore) AVE*. The *remores aves* fortunately are also known from antiquarian sources; they are the “delaying birds,” compelling the auspiciant to delay whatever he intended to do.⁵⁴

In the story of Romulus and Remus that became canonical, and strangely overshadowed the account of Ennius, both brothers received the message: Remus first, Romulus next. This is peculiar, for to an augurally minded reader, the name “Remus” must mean “the slow one.”⁵⁵ Remus saw six vultures, Romulus, later, twelve, and his augury prevailed—again strictly according to the rule that a subsequent stronger sign annuls the earlier weaker message.⁵⁶

Of this version not a trace in Ennius. In his poem, the twelve birds of Romulus directed their flight toward *loci praepetes* and *pulchri*. We are now in a position to solve this riddle. They flew in the direction not just of east,

⁵³ Cf. the illuminating remarks by R. Beck, “Cosmic Models: Some Uses of Hellenistic Science in Roman Religion,” in T.D. Barnes (ed.), *The Sciences in Greco-Roman Society = Apeiron* 27.4 (1994) 101, 110-12.

⁵⁴ Festus 345 L: “Remores aves in auspicio dicuntur, quae acturum aliquid remorari compellunt.”

⁵⁵ Very well underscored by Wiseman 7, 111, 171, n. 36. The phrase “Remus auspicio se devovet” Wiseman (171, n. 34, following Jocelyn 62-3) “tentatively” translates “Remus by his auspicy vows himself to the gods below,” thus taking *auspicio* as an instrumental ablative. This makes little sense, augurally or otherwise; Remus and his birds were slow, but he certainly was not asking the underworld for help. Wiseman’s study suffers from an almost total neglect of the augural perspective; he does not consider the Bantian stones. We can either try to understand our sources or write our own fable.

⁵⁶ Liv. 1.7.1; Ovid, *Fasti* 4.817 (he specifies the birds solely as *volucres*); cf. above, nn. 21-2.

but precisely northeast, toward the *sedes* of Jupiter, the highest and best place in all the universe, a veritable *locus praepes* and *pulcher*, lofty and fortunate. The *aves* of Romulus were *bene iuvantes*; Jupiter not only gave his nod—he actively supported Romulus. The *regnum* of Romulus was indeed firmly established.

We can now admire not only the art of Ennius but also his augural prowess. But above all, we look at the contest with genuine apprehension. Like the followers of Romulus and Remus, we are well aware of how many things could have gone wrong, and how many insidious dangers lurked around the auspican's augural *templum*. But all ended well, no mouse squeaked, no *avis pestifera* appeared, and western civilization continued on its course from Rome to Bryn Mawr and this lecture.

*Case Study I: Tullia*¹*Susan Treggiari*

“It is important to approach the ancient world with questions and directions of research in mind, since mere accumulation of material or parallels is rarely rewarding. In this context, one can go far beyond the largely moral categories of explanation common in antiquity, though one must always be careful not to impose modern categories or preconceptions on a very alien world. This caution is particularly important where our suggested explanation involves the attribution of motives; the thought structure of the ancients was very different from our own.”²

Ancient historians, to put it crudely, fall into two groups, those inspired by their material and those inspired by questions. But even the former will have questions in mind which may dictate their choice of material to study and must put questions to themselves about the material, and the latter must get to grips with the evidence. In this chapter we will take a manageable body of material, study it as critically as we can and see to what sort of questions it might provide answers.

I have chosen a body of material which will support a partial reconstruction of the private life of one woman of the senatorial class. The public life of an individual man may be documented by so much evidence that a full-scale book is possible: Cato the Elder, Cicero, Caesar, many of the emperors, Seneca and so on. But not even for these, not even for the best documented do we have the kind and variety of sources needed for a complete biography of the sort which may be written on a twentieth-century politician: Cicero, for instance, is seen chiefly from Cicero’s own point of view, and he also dominates the contemporary evidence on Caesar’s activity in civil life in Rome. Less rounded studies may be attempted for lesser politicians (Crassus) or women of the imperial family (Livia, Antonia,

¹ Reprinted from *Roman Social History* (Routledge 2002) 49-128, with the permission of the author and the publisher, Taylor and Francis Books Ltd.

² Crawford 1983, xi.

Agrippina the Younger). At the other extreme, individual women attested only by their epitaphs will only yield a paragraph or so (on job, marriage, or children, perhaps), with a few exceptions such as the anonymous wife eulogised by her husband for her behaviour in the civil wars and in private life ('Laudatio Turiae'). So I have chosen to discuss Tullia, the daughter of Cicero. She has been the focus of study in her own right (especially in recent years) as well as an ancillary figure in discussions of her father.

The demographic regime, socio-legal framework, economic context and physical environment of the mid-first century BC are well known. We must keep in mind the general situation of women as it will have affected Tullia. In turn, the specific experience of Tullia is part of the evidence for women of her class and time. The obvious dangers of circularity and of arguing from the general to the particular and from the particular to the general cannot be entirely avoided. Only if we had a larger sample of senatorial women, with comparable documentation, could we feel secure.

These are my practical considerations. Another motive is that the letters of Cicero, which will form our main source, are endlessly fascinating, and unique among all our sources for Roman social history. Thanks to the work of Shackleton Bailey, they can be handled by the beginner with confidence as well as enjoyment.

The translations which follow are his.³ Because of the size and variety of Cicero's extant writings, and especially because he was relatively frank in his letters to his closest friends and members of the family, he is the best documented Roman of the classical period. Family life has frequently been explored from his point of view, especially in the modern biographies.

Apart from the intrinsic interest of the source—and students who have read, say, Cicero's self-righteous and carefully calculated first speech against Catiline as a Latin set-book are often amazed to find he was a human being—there is the interest of attempting to find out about an individual woman. Men as well as women seem to find this attractive.

In the last quarter of the twentieth century, serious attempts have been made to reconstruct, as far as possible, the experience of women from written sources predominantly produced by and for men. The effort parallels work on slavery and the lower classes. Women (obviously) belonged to all social classes, and socio-economic status determined what sort of life was open to them. Literary evidence allows us to explore the lives of the richer classes, chiefly the women of senatorial and equestrian families. How far did a *paterfamilias* control his daughter-in-power (*filiafamilias*)? How were marriages arranged? What motives did people have in agreeing to a particular marriage? What property might a woman own and how did she administer it? How and where did people live at different periods of their

³ Bailey 1988, 1999.

lives? What were a mother's duties to her children? How did high infant mortality affect mothers' attitudes to babies? What were the ideals for affection between married people and blood relations? How did the legal availability of divorce to both husband and wife work out in practice? What feelings did people have when a relative died, and what were the social conventions in governing the expression of grief? Questions can be asked about law and practice, about physical realities, about ideas and emotions. These are the sort of questions which have been asked in books and articles about the Roman family: the material we shall look at will suggest some answers specific to Tullia.

To understand the general context of family life, you might begin by looking at Dixon 1992. The three conferences held at Canberra, resulting in volumes of papers, have been influential for family history.⁴ On specifics such as engagement or divorce, various sections in Treggiari 1991 might give us an idea of social norms.

The method here is that of content analysis. For successful examples compare the acute study by Bradley 1993: 246-50 on Pliny and Bradley 1991: 177-204 on Cicero's relationship with his brother and nephew. We aim to take account of the whole body of evidence and assess what it can tell us.

The Evidence

Finding and collecting data

If we want to find out about Tullia, we shall first need to assemble the data. There are two ways of doing this. One can read through the relevant writings of Cicero in chronological order and collect the references to her. This has the important advantage that we always see her in a context of her father's writings and preoccupations at a given time. We ought not to fall into the errors which occur when we rely on snippets of text. Having read everything that Cicero has to say about her, we could trawl through other Greek and Roman literature. Since she is unlikely to be mentioned except in such works as Plutarch's *Life of Cicero* or in attacks on her father by his contemporaries (reflected in Cassius Dio and Ps.-Sallust), this procedure is inadvisable, unless Tullia is merely part of a larger project—say, on the subject of Roman women of the senatorial class. It happens that I have collected the evidence on Tullia in this manner. But I shall assume here that this is not the way you would want to do it. For a research paper or short thesis a student would take a different line.

⁴ B. Rawson 1986, 1991; Rawson and Weaver 1997.

Standard reference works will direct you to the main sources outside Cicero. For instance, Ernst Badian in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* says that Cicero's *Letters* and Plutarch's *Cicero* are the main sources. Groebe's article in *RE* (s.v. Tullius 60) adds sources on Tullia's husbands and puts Tullia in context. *Kleine Pauly* has a column (s.v. Tullius 21), with a selection of references to Cicero's correspondence. *Neue Pauly* had not reached the Tullii at the time of writing. The older Drumann-Groebe deals with Tullia thoroughly.⁵

For the far more informative Ciceronian evidence, first recourse should be to the three *Onomastica* (name-lists) for Cicero's writings compiled by D. R. Shackleton Bailey.⁶ In the volumes on speeches and letters, under Tullia there is a rich but still manageable haul of references. The passages in the former can be found in any reliable text or translation (the Loeb volumes will be the most accessible to English readers). It will be advisable to pay attention to the context of each passage and to know why and in what circumstances each speech was being delivered. Bailey's list of references in the speeches (with the titles written in full and dates added) is reproduced in Appendix 1.

Bailey's references to the letters are given in traditional form. But it is inadvisable to exploit the letters without paying the strictest attention to his own commentaries. We also want to read the letters in the order in which they were written, as far as possible. So the first chore is to look up the numbers which Bailey himself gives the letters in his editions. The concordances will be found in *A, F*, 1980, 1988, 1999:iv. Once that is done we have a list, of which a sample (all the citations from Book 1) would look like this:

A 1.3.3 = 8
 1.5.8 = 1
 1.8.3 = 4
 1.10.6 = 6
 (1.18.1) = 18

Bailey also refers us to *mulieres* ('the women'), a word which Cicero uses to refer to two or more of his and Atticus' female relations, Terentia, Tullia, Pomponia and Pilia. We can excise those irrelevant to Tullia.

These letters then need sorting into chronological order (as far as that can be determined). One may adopt the dating of Bailey, which commands invariable respect and usually assent. Here we should follow the revisions given in the 1988 second edition of the translation of *Letters to Friends and*

⁵ 1929: vi 614-28

⁶ 1992, 1995, 1996.

Letters to his brother Quintus and to M. Brutus and in the 1999 Loeb translation of the *Letters to Atticus*. It is still a tedious job, but in the doing of it we can improve our familiarity with the source. With this additional information, the consequent reshuffling of the data and the details on who wrote the letter (Cicero, unless otherwise stated), to whom, from where, we have a list which I give in Appendix 1. The dates are those of writing: the letter might be received considerably later. We now have a workable list of the letters where Tullia is referred to by name or by some descriptive noun or adjective. By reading other letters near these, or by following up the cross-references in commentaries, we should pick up evidence on e.g. the problems with her dowry.

Difficulties

Various problems at once present themselves. The absolute number of letters Cicero wrote varied at different periods of his life. Correspondence with specific individuals fluctuated with need. He did not usually write to Atticus if they were both in Rome and able to meet.⁷ His twenty-four extant letters to Terentia, though sparse, cluster during their separations: the period of his exile (58-7 BC), the time of the civil war when they were often apart even while he was still in Italy (49 BC) and from the time he left for Greece until he returned to Rome after a long period of living in Brindisi (where Plutarch says she failed to visit him (*Cic.* 41.2)). None survive from the other long separation of his provincial governorship in Cilicia (51-50 BC), except one from Athens on his way home.

Then there are the problems of survival. No letters to Tullia alone exist in the collection which has come down to us. (She is named in the headings to 14.1/8 and 2/7, as Tulliola; in 14.3/9, 4/6, 14/14, as Tullia, and in 14.18/144 as *filia* (daughter), but these are all primarily addressed to Terentia.) There are references to Tullia in correspondence with fellow-members of the senatorial class when circumstances made it necessary, but confidential information (on marriage and financial arrangements) and hints of the intimacies of family-life are almost entirely restricted to the correspondence with his wife and with a friend who was also a member of the family (by the marriage of his sister and Cicero's brother) and a trusted financial aide. In public pronouncements, Cicero alludes to his daughter to well-calculated rhetorical effect.

The nature of the evidence does not permit a rounded biography of Tullia. Space does not permit us to analyse all the snippets. But a reading of the texts may allow us to highlight certain features of the father-daughter relationship. I am deliberately sparing with comment on what we know from

⁷ Bailey 1965, 4, 6, 12, etc.

other evidence, since the object is to see what this restricted collection of texts tells us directly. I hope this will give you some sense of discovery, though nothing substitutes for exploring the evidence for yourself. I have cited specific evidence for each statement I make and have given the dates of letters when it seemed useful for you to have them in front of you. It is important in historical argument to substantiate statements. This results here in a high density of sources in footnotes. You will be able to check the source quite quickly if you want to do so. You will find in what follows that the same text may be used to illustrate different specific points. The technique of skimming lightly over citations (whether in parentheses or footnotes) should be cultivated. But if you want to look at the evidence first hand for any particular point, you will be able to do so easily.

Known biography

Family background

The salient facts of Tullia's life are briefly listed. Her parents were Cicero and his wife Terentia (about whose natal family tantalisingly little is known: she brought a good dowry and had as cousin or half-sister a patrician Vestal Virgin called Fabia). Tullia's birthday was 5 August (*Cic. A* 4.1/73.4), but we do not know the year of her birth. Her parents could have married 80/79 BC, before Cicero left in mid-79 to study oratory and philosophy in the Greek East, or after his return in mid-77. If she was born 5 August 79, that raises questions about Cicero's solicitude for his wife and unborn child. Many scholars, therefore, choose the later date,⁸ putting her birth about 75 BC and the marriage to Piso in 62 or late December 63. If he married on his return, she was born at earliest 5 August 76, perhaps not until 75. Some find that this date involves real difficulties about the date of her first marriage. The only loophole that it offers is that Cicero might have taken his bride on his tour and she might have borne her child abroad. Other Ciceronian evidence suggests that senatorial women travelled more routinely than scholarship has recognised.

First marriage

Tullia's engagement to C. Calpurnius Piso Frugi (quaestor 58 from a high-ranking plebeian family and son of an ex-praetor)⁹ is announced by her

⁸ E.g. Sumner 1971, 258.

⁹ *RE*, Calpurnius 93.

father at the end of 67 BC.¹⁰ We cannot be sure that she married him as early as 63, though Cicero calls him his son-in-law.¹¹ Sumner's conjectural dating to after Cicero's speech in 63 BC or to 62 may still be too early, since he takes 12-15 to be the normal age for first marriage of girls among the upper classes. Many, following Shaw 1987, would now think 12-14 uncommonly early. The marriage must have taken place before Cicero was driven out of Rome in 58 BC. Piso died during his father-in-law's exile in 57, after supporting him bravely.¹²

Second and third marriages

She was engaged and probably married to Furius Crassipes¹³ in 56 BC¹⁴ but divorced perhaps in 52 or early 51: in any case, she was again on the marriage-market when her father left for Cilicia in May. On 1 July 1950 she married the patrician (but later adopted by a plebeian so that he could hold the tribunate) P. Cornelius Dolabella, perhaps aged now 25 or 26, so very much Tullia's own age, in my view.¹⁵ A premature boy, born May 49, did not long survive. They divorced in 46, a few months before Tullia was delivered of another boy in January 45 (Lentulus), who probably died in babyhood. She herself died of complications in February.

Content analysis

Tullia's girlhood

In the earliest reference, in the published, but never delivered, second part of the prosecution of Verres in 70 BC, Cicero, attacking a decision of Verres which went against a daughter, makes out that he and his auditors, as devoted fathers, are equally shocked. He emphasizes the affection he feels for "my daughter" and the duty all fathers feel to do their best for their daughters. Cicero strikes this note repeatedly: he aligns himself with a norm of fatherly love and plays on the sympathies of his audience (whether judges or senators or the People).

¹⁰ A. 1.3/8.3; on the later dating of her birth, she was just at an age when she might understand.

¹¹ *Cat.* 4.3; see Treggiari 1991, 128 n. 17, *pace* SB F 1977, i.285-6.

¹² *F* 14.4/6.4, 14.2/7.2, 14.1/8.4, *On his return, to the citizens* 7; *Sest.* 54; *Pis. fr.* xiii Nisbet.

¹³ *RE*, Furius 54.

¹⁴ Bailey 1965: 2.186-7, but see also P. Clark 1991, who argues that the marriage perhaps never took place.

¹⁵ *RE*, Cornelius 141; Drumann-Groebe 1902, ii 486-97; *tribune* 47.

The letters of the 60s, with frequent references to “little Tullia,”¹⁶ affectionate epithets like “darling”¹⁷ and small private jokes about her interaction with Atticus,¹⁸ make it clear that the paternal affection was genuine. We cannot say that the enthusiasm Cicero shows at the belated birth of his son in 65 BC¹⁹ would not have been paralleled when Tullia was born.

In the published version of his heroic speech on what to do with the confessed conspirators in 63 BC, Cicero claims he is ready to risk his life and happiness to save those of his audience and their wives and children: still, he is not hard-hearted enough not to be moved by his brother (present in the Senate) and the thought of his fainting wife, terrified daughter and little son at home, and the sight of his son-in-law (standing outside).²⁰ Tullia is again part of the close family group in which Cicero delights in early 60 BC.²¹ In April 59, she was apparently accompanying Cicero on all or part of a spring tour, planned to include a three-day festival at Anzio which she wished to attend.²²

Her father’s exile and her life with Piso

In the crisis of 58-7 BC, Cicero wrote emotional letters to Terentia and family, giving a prominent place to “Tulliola.”²³ His exile and the confiscation of his property imperilled her married status and reputation²⁴ and Cicero was worried about her and blamed himself.

To you and our Tulliola I cannot write without many tears, for I see that you are very unhappy—you for whom I wished all the happiness in the world. I ought to have given it to you, and should have done so if I had not been such a coward.

(F 14.2/7.1)

¹⁶ A 1.5/1.8, 1.3/8.3, the name he usually gave her down to 57 (Bailey 1995: 99).

¹⁷ *Deliciae*, 1.8/4.3.

¹⁸ 1.8/4.3, 1.10/6.6: it is easier to think of an eight or seven year old here than of an eleven year old.

¹⁹ A 1.2/11.1.

²⁰ *Cat.* 4.3.

²¹ A 1.18/18.1: it is not clear whether she is by then a married woman(?) in her mid-teens.

²² 2.8/28.2.

²³ F 14.2/7.1.

²⁴ F. 14.4/6.3; Bailey suggests her dowry had not yet been fully paid.

In the subsequent letter, he wallows in apologies for his mistakes and their suffering:

And to think that our Tulliola should be suffering so much grief on account of her papa, who used to give her so much pleasure!

(F 14.1/8.1)

Cicero continues to use affectionate diminutives²⁵ and, when he tells his brother in a highly emotional passage, how much he is missing his family, gives a lightning sketch of her: "the most loving, modest, and clever daughter a man ever had, the image of my face and speech and mind."²⁶ The egocentric note is unmistakable, but so is the affection.²⁷ He is confident that her uncle will regard her and her brother as his own children²⁸; similarly Atticus is asked to look after them.²⁹ Public figures are later credited with having defended them.³⁰ In public Cicero laments the "solitude" of his children and the ruin of his family³¹ and his own separation from them.³² Cicero's recall, in prospect and retrospect, is regarded as restoration to his family.³³ His house was restored to him and his children.³⁴

It is clear that, like her mother and husband, Tullia interceded on her father's behalf.³⁵ Cicero claims that she and her husband went down on their knees to the consul Piso, who repelled his kinsmen and relative by marriage with arrogant and cruel words.³⁶ But later Cicero downplays the women's visibility to the People, since their grief and mourning-garments were observable indoors (presumably by influential members of the upper classes on whom or on whose wives and daughters Terentia and Tullia, with the pathetic seven-year old Marcus, worked for Cicero's recall), while his male supporters could be seen in the forum.³⁷ He also mentions their "necessary

²⁵ E.g. F 14.4/6.3, 6.

²⁶ QF 1.3/3.3.

²⁷ Cf. A 3.10/55.2.

²⁸ QF 1.3/3.10.

²⁹ A 3.19/64.3.

³⁰ Sest. 144; Planc. 73; Mil. 100.

³¹ On his house 96.

³² Sest. 49, 145.

³³ A 3.15/60.4, On his return, in the Senate 1.

³⁴ On the reply of the haruspices 16.

³⁵ A 3.19/64.2.

³⁶ On his return, in the Senate 17, not in the *Onomasticon*; for the son-in-law alone cf. Sest. 68.

³⁷ On his return, to the citizens 8.

journeys." Where had they been? Elsewhere he claims that Tullia's grief and mourning garb excited general pity.³⁸ Once Cicero claims that his children's lives were threatened,³⁹ but this may allude to Marcus.⁴⁰ There may have been some real physical danger to Tullia, since the Palatine house was attacked and fired.

Her father's restoration and her widowhood

This completes the explicit mentions of Tullia during the exile. She was involved in her father's happy return, for she undertook the fairly arduous overland journey to Brindisi (360 miles⁴¹) to greet him the day after the law to recall him was passed, which happened to be the birthday of the port-city as well as hers. She was given special treatment by the citizens and presumably by all the other deputations which feted Cicero on the way back to Rome (although he does not mention her presence then: as so often, we must read between the lines).⁴² Cicero evokes her to the Senate on 5 September when he claims that the passing of the law was like a birthday for him, his brother and his children.⁴³ The Senate had conferred benefits on all of them (1; he says the same of the People). A few days later, he magnifies his sacrifice, as he had done earlier, prospectively, in the *Fourth Catilinarian*, and strikes the same note as in the *Verrines*:⁴⁴

What sweeter thing has Nature given to the human race than each man's children? My own, because of my love toward them and their own excellent character, are dearer to me than life. But I did not acknowledge them at birth with as much pleasure as now when they are restored to me.... The immortal gods gave me children; you have given them back.

(*On his return, to the citizens 2,5*)

Cicero, at the time of his recall, thought he could rely on the affection of his brother and daughter: there was apparently some estrangement from Terentia.⁴⁵ Tullia's loss of her husband and her grief for him are directly mentioned only in Cicero's allusion in court to their first poignant meeting

³⁸ *On his house 59.*

³⁹ *Sest. 54, cf. Mil. 87.*

⁴⁰ *On his house 59.*

⁴¹ Bailey 1965, ii 166.

⁴² A 4.1/73.4-5; the occasion is also triumphantly described in *Sest. 131.*

⁴³ *On his return, in the Senate 27.*

⁴⁴ Cf. also *Planc. 69*

⁴⁵ A 4.2/74.7, cf. 4.1/73.8.

on his return.⁴⁶ A new marriage-alliance had to be sought without delay. Finding the right eligible young man at the right moment was not always easy: search and approaches might take some time.

Her life with Crassipes

On 4 April 56 BC, after some negotiation, Cicero betrothed Tullia⁴⁷ to the young, wealthy patrician and prospective senator Furius Crassipes (? quaestor 54, which would make him about 26 now⁴⁸). On 6 and 8 April Cicero and Crassipes gave dinners for each other.⁴⁹ It is not clear if the future bride was invited. The engagement elicited correct congratulations from at least one political ally.⁵⁰ Apart from the relationship between the two men,⁵¹ the marriage itself leaves no trace in the correspondence. But mentions of Tullia in the late 50s are sparse in the extreme: we find her hoping that Atticus' young wife Pilia will visit her at Anzio,⁵² but other details of her life escape us. We can only speculate on the luxurious life-style which her husband could command for her and on a social circle in which she should now have been an accepted figure.

The search for a third husband

On Cicero's departure for his province in late spring 51 BC, when letters to Atticus resume after a break since November 54, arrangements for Tullia's remarriage after the divorce were on the front burner. He and Atticus must already have had face-to-face discussions. The surviving evidence gives us their interchanges on possible candidates and their pluses and minuses. Although Cicero wanted Atticus to sound out various possibilities and keeps urging him on,⁵³ it is clear that Tullia's consent was essential,⁵⁴ and he later claims that he had left the decision to her and her mother.⁵⁵ We lack letters to Terentia, though of course Cicero was writing to

⁴⁶ *Sest.* 131.

⁴⁷ *QF* 2.4/8.2, 2.6/10.1.

⁴⁸ Bailey *F* 1977, i. pp. 138-9.

⁴⁹ *QF* 2.6/10.2, 3.

⁵⁰ *F* 1.7/18.11.

⁵¹ E.g. *F* 1.9/20.20.

⁵² *A* 4.4a/78.2.

⁵³ *A* 5.4/97.1, 5.13/106.3, 5.14/107.3, 5.17/110.4, 5.21/114.14, 6.1/115.10, 6.4/118.2, 7.3/126.12.

⁵⁴ 5.4/97.1.

⁵⁵ *F* 3.12/75.2-3.

her.⁵⁶ Other people too were involved⁵⁷; again no letters survive.⁵⁸ The engagement to Dolabella was made without Cicero's knowledge (just when he had decided to recommend Nero),⁵⁹ and he had to think away what he knew of the man's character and record when responding to other people's congratulations or more negative reactions.⁶⁰ He hoped all would turn out well for Tullia and himself.⁶¹

Life with Dolabella and civil war

Writing from Athens on his way home, Cicero was anxious for Atticus to report on the match⁶² and sent affectionate wishes to the women.⁶³ Dolabella's unsteadiness in sexual and political life were to outweigh the charm he exuded both for Tullia⁶⁴ and for Cicero⁶⁵ and eventually to wreck the marriage. To judge from the annual date for instalments of the dowry, the wedding took place on 1 July, in Cicero's absence.⁶⁶ Cicero met the new couple apparently near Trebula on his journey back in early December.⁶⁷

Dolabella would soon be leaving Tullia for active service. Caesar invaded Italy on 11 January 49. Dolabella commanded a fleet in the Adriatic that year. In 48 BC he served under Caesar at Dyrrachium and Pharsalus, returning to Rome in the autumn to stand for the tribunate. In 47, holding that office, he was in Rome. (His activities were not approved by Cicero or, more important to him, Caesar.) He was again with Caesar in the new theatres of war, Africa in 46 BC and Spain in 45. So the marriage was interrupted by considerable absences. When Dolabella was in Rome as tribune, Tullia left him for a considerable time to visit her father.

The next cluster of references to Tullia belongs to the uncertain days of the civil war in the winter of 49 BC, after Caesar had crossed the Rubicon but before Cicero had finally committed himself to Pompey by leaving Italy. A major fact, known to Atticus and the family, remains unmentioned: Tullia

⁵⁶ A 6.1/115.10.

⁵⁷ 5.17/110.4.

⁵⁸ See further Treggiari 1991, 127-34.

⁵⁹ A 6.6/121.1, cf. 6.4/118.2.

⁶⁰ F 8.13/94.1, A 6.6/121.1, F 2.15/96.2, 3.12/75.2-4, A 6.8/122.1, 7.3/126.12.

⁶¹ F 3.12/75.2.

⁶² A 6.9/123.5

⁶³ F 14.5/119.1-2.

⁶⁴ A 6.6/121.1.

⁶⁵ A 7.3/126.12.

⁶⁶ Treggiari 1991, 133 n. 36, *pace* SB 1977, i. 435-6.

⁶⁷ A 7.3/126.12.

was expecting a child. Because Dolabella sided with Caesar, Tullia had a foot in both camps and could expect protection.⁶⁸ Should she and her mother stay in Rome? Would it be safe?⁶⁹ Would it look bad, reflecting on them and on Cicero?⁷⁰ What were other ladies of rank doing? He voiced concerns both to them and to Atticus. The letters to the women are markedly affectionate and explicit about the problems. It appears that both were at the Palatine house, which was to be barricaded and guarded. Cicero felt that they would be safer at one or other of his villas, but he leaves it to them to discuss the matter with trusted advisers and make their own decision. He repeatedly consulted Atticus, who had also remained in Rome.⁷¹

On 2 February, the women came to the villa at Formiae, intending to return to Rome soon.⁷² Now it was their return to Rome which might be interpreted politically.⁷³ That pressure could be exerted through Tullia is demonstrated by Antony's later appeal to Cicero not to join Pompey, where he reminds him of his fondness for Dolabella and "that most admirable young lady your daughter,"⁷⁴ and by Caelius' similar attempt "in the name of your ... children,"⁷⁵ pointedly rebutted in a disingenuous reply.⁷⁶ Tullia may have been back in Rome by 4 April⁷⁷ but was with her father at the villa near Cumae by 7 May.⁷⁸

In the meantime, Cicero was pondering his own position, with occasional explicit reference to the interests of his children.⁷⁹ The thought of them and Terentia, he claims, prevented him from throwing in his lot with Pompey, although they wanted him to do so and thought it the more honourable course.⁸⁰ But his purpose constantly shifted.

By May, Tullia was urging delay, to see how the civil war went in Spain.⁸¹ But when Cicero left Italy to join Pompey in Greece, he later represented himself as having acted in obedience to members of the family.⁸²

⁶⁸ *F* 14.18/144; *A* 7.13/136.3.

⁶⁹ *A* 7.12/135.6; *F* 14.14/145.

⁷⁰ *F* 14.18/144; *A* 7.13/136.3; *F* 14.14/145; *A* 7.14/138.3.

⁷¹ E.g. *A* 7.13a/137.3, 7.16/140.3.

⁷² *A* 7.18/142.1, 7.20/144.2, cf. 7.22/146.2 and Bailey's detailed calendar in *A* 1968, iv 428-37 which plots Cicero's movements.

⁷³ *A* 7.23/147.2.

⁷⁴ *A* 10.8A/199A1.

⁷⁵ *A* 10.9A/200A.1.

⁷⁶ *F* 2.16/154.5.

⁷⁷ *A* 10.1a/191.1.

⁷⁸ 10.13/205.1, probably having travelled with her mother: 10.16/208.5.

⁷⁹ *A* 8.2/152.4.

⁸⁰ *A* 9.6/172.4, 11 March.

⁸¹ *A* 10.8/199.1.

... nothing ever needed writing more than this, that of all your many kindnesses there is none I have valued more than your tender and punctilious attention to my Tullia. It has given her the greatest pleasure, and me no less. Her courage and patience in face of public disaster and domestic worries is really wonderful. How brave she was when we parted! She combines natural affection with the most delicate sympathy. Yet she wishes me to do the right thing and to stand well in men's eyes.

(A 10.8/199.9)

By 7 May, Tullia had rejoined her father at the villa near Cumae, where on the 19th, she gave birth to a boy, two months premature. "For her safe delivery let me be thankful. As for the baby, it is very weakly."⁸³ How would you assess the grandfather's reactions?

Cicero was waiting, not for the birth, but for a favourable wind. On 7 June, he wrote from his ship to bid Terentia farewell:

All the miseries and cares with which I plagued you to desperation (and very sorry I am for it) and Tulliola too, who is sweeter to me than my life, are dismissed and ejected ... I should give you words of encouragement to make you both braver had I not found you braver than any man.

(F 14.7/155.1)

Then the practicalities: he would commend them to friends and he begged them to look after their health and to use the country houses (particularly those furthest from army units). If food prices went up, they should go to the ancestral house near Arpinum with the town-staff, if they thought fit. The child was dead and forgotten, no doubt. Another gap in our evidence follows. Cicero was busy until Pompey was defeated at Pharsalus in August 48 BC. At Caesar's invitation he returned to Italy and waited at Brindisi until Caesar authorised his return to Rome (September 47 BC).

From now on it is problems with Tullia's marriage which form the major theme in the references to her (though in the correspondence as a whole Cicero agonised over other political and private problems as well). Atticus, as usual, was deeply involved. Cicero had problems in 48 BC paying the second instalment of the dowry, due annually, and worried that

⁸² A 11.9/220.2.

⁸³ A 10.18/210.1.

Tullia's maintenance was not being paid.⁸⁴ He asked Atticus to intervene. All this made Cicero unhappy.⁸⁵ Here I underline Cicero's insistence that he had failed in his duty to his "poor girl."⁸⁶ Cicero blamed his steward and may have held that Terentia was implicated.⁸⁷ Already, in spring 48, the alternatives were clear: to continue to invest money in the marriage or to bring about a divorce: Cicero left the decision to Atticus' "friendship and good will, and to her judgement and inclination."⁸⁸ Any one of three people had the legal right to end the marriage unilaterally: Cicero, if he was, as we assume, the wife's *paterfamilias*; Dolabella, or Tullia herself. (If Dolabella's *paterfamilias* had been alive, he could have acted too.) From the point of view of social convention it might be more comfortable for Tullia if her father, on her instructions, took the initiative.

In May, Dolabella, making another effort to get Cicero away from Pompey, reported from Caesar's camp that Tullia was well, news he must himself have had by letter.⁸⁹ After Pompey's defeat and his own return to Brindisi in about mid-October, Cicero heard from Atticus that Tullia was ill and weak⁹⁰ and expressed his "agony" to Terentia.⁹¹ Soon after, news that Atticus was "being pressed" by Tullia's creditors, made Cicero weep and beg Atticus to intervene.⁹² And Tullia's continued illness worried him.⁹³ His own ruin threatened to deprive her of his presence and her inheritance.⁹⁴ Cicero deplored Dolabella's behaviour in 47 BC.⁹⁵

When Tullia joined him at Brindisi on 12 June 47, he told Atticus:

Her own courage, thoughtfulness, and affection, far from giving me the pleasure I ought to take in such a paragon of daughters, grieve me beyond measure when I consider the unhappy lot in which so admirable a nature is cast, not through any misconduct of hers but by grave fault on my part.

⁸⁴ A 11.2/212.2, cf. 11.3/213.1,3, 11.4a/214, 11.4/215.

⁸⁵ A 11.3/213.3. For the details of what was going on, see Dixon's masterly reconstruction (Dixon 1984, 88-93, slightly abridged in 1986, 102-7), as well as Bailey's commentary.

⁸⁶ A 11.3/213.1.

⁸⁷ Bailey 1966, 5.266-7.

⁸⁸ A 11.3/213.1.

⁸⁹ F 9.9/157.1.

⁹⁰ A 11.6/217.4.

⁹¹ F 14.19/160.

⁹² A 11.7/218.6.

⁹³ F 14.9/161, 14.17/162.

⁹⁴ A 11.9/220.3.

⁹⁵ A 11.15/226.3, 11.23/232.3.

(A 11.17/228)

He thought of sending her back to her mother as soon as she was willing⁹⁶ but this was delayed.⁹⁷ To Terentia he says:

She is so wonderfully brave and kind that it gives me even greater pain to think that through my carelessness she is placed far otherwise than befitted a girl of her station and so good a daughter.

(F 14.11/166)

A 11.25/231.3, 5 July, when he asks Atticus to discuss Tullia's situation with Terentia, also conveys the flavour of his relationship with his daughter at this difficult time:

This poor child's long-suffering affects me quite beyond bearing. I believe her like on earth has never been seen. If there is any step in my power which might protect her in any way, I earnestly desire you to suggest it. I realize that there is the same difficulty as formerly in giving advice (?). Still, this causes me more anxiety than everything else put together. We were blind about the second instalment. I wish I had acted differently, but it's too late now. I beg you, if anything in my desperate situation can be scraped together, any sum raised and put away in safety, from plate or fabrics (I have plenty of them) or furniture, you will attend to it.⁹⁸ The final crisis seems to me to be upon us. There is no likelihood of peace terms ...

Cicero thinks now that he had made the wrong decision in paying a fraction of the dowry on 1 July 48: he ought to have withheld it and perhaps proceeded to the second option, a unilateral divorce from Tullia's side. He blamed himself repeatedly for making a mess of providing for Tullia, on the occasion of her third marriage⁹⁹ and by making political decisions which imperilled the family's prosperity. It is striking that he never, as far as we know, blamed Tullia for choosing Dolabella.

⁹⁶ A 11.17a/229.1.

⁹⁷ F 14.15/16, A 11.21/236.27.

⁹⁸ Cf. A 11.24/234.1-2.

⁹⁹ Bailey 1977: I 502-3.

I implore you to think about this poor girl, both as to the matter on which I wrote to you in my last letter, how to raise something to keep the wolf from the door, and also as to the will itself (Terentia's). I wish the other thing too (marriage) had been taken in hand sooner, but I was afraid of everything. Certainly there was no better choice among evils than divorce. That would have been doing something like a man—whether on the score of the debt cancellation (Dolabella's proposals as tribune) or his nocturnal housebreakings or Metella (his adulteries) or the whole chapter of delinquencies. I should have saved the money and given some evidence of manly resentment Now he seems to be threatening it on *his* side.... Accordingly I am in favour, and so are you, of sending notice of divorce. He may ask for the third instalment (due 1 July 47), so consider whether we should send the notice when he himself takes the initiative or before.

(A 11.23/232.3, 9 July 47; cf. *F* 14.10/168)

The next day, Cicero toned down these instructions, telling Terentia:

As regards what I wrote in my last letter about sending notice of divorce, I don't know how powerful he is at the present time, nor how excited the state of popular feeling. If he is likely to be a formidable enemy, don't do anything—perhaps he will take the initiative even so. You must judge of the whole position and choose whatever you think the least of evils in this wretched situation.

(*F* 14.13/169)

The matter remained in suspense: next summer Tullia was still uncommitted¹⁰⁰ and Cicero was maintaining dialogue with Dolabella,¹⁰¹ who returned from the African campaign and made his wife pregnant again.

A pregnant divorcee

In the meantime, Caesar had returned victorious from the East and permitted Cicero to leave unhealthy Brindisi and return to his house in Rome and his villas. Divorce from Terentia followed (46 BC¹⁰²). Before the next reference to Tullia in the letters (where Cicero longs to return, after a brief

¹⁰⁰ A 12.5c/241, 12 June (?) 46.

¹⁰¹ A 12.7/244.2.

¹⁰² Dixon 1984, 92 = 1986, 106.

absence, to Tullia's embrace and little Attica's kisses),¹⁰³ she and Dolabella were also divorced. This must have been some time after *A* 12.5c/241, 12 June (?) 46, probably in November (SB). We do not know who took the formal initiative, Dolabella, Tullia or her father. The divorce may even have been bilateral and consensual. She was apparently living chiefly in her father's house, though she may have given birth at Dolabella's as later, muddled accounts suggest.¹⁰⁴ A letter to Lepta, an officer under Cicero in Cilicia, (dated to January by the reference to her) has the brief but frank mention:

My Tullia's confinement has kept me in Rome. But even now that she has, as I hope, fairly well regained her strength, I am still kept here waiting to extract the first instalment out of Dolabella's agents.

(*F* 6.18/218.5)

It was now the ex-husband's turn to repay the dowry.

Impact of her death

Tullia never recovered and the rest of our references deal with Cicero's grief at her death (? mid-February; at his Tusculan villa).¹⁰⁵ Our list of references is lacunose, since in writing to Atticus, voluminously, about his own sorrow and his plans to commemorate her, Cicero only once uses her name. What can be gleaned about Tullia herself and about her life in all the letters which treat his attempts to control or conceal his grief?¹⁰⁶ Among the spate of letters of condolence which Cicero will have received,¹⁰⁷ the elegant literary/philosophical composition by the consular Servius Sulpicius Rufus argues that Tullia had little left to live for.¹⁰⁸ Her father would have had difficulty finding her a worthy (new) upper-class husband to protect her among the modern generation; the political situation meant that children "whose bloom would cheer her eyes" could not grow up with the expectation of freedom and intact inheritance or (for sons) the right of independence in a public career (3). In any case, she was a mortal: it made little difference if she died young!

¹⁰³ *A* 12.1/248.1, 27 Nov.; *F* 7.23/209.4, Dec. 46.

¹⁰⁴ Asc. 5C; Plutarch *Cic.* 41.5.

¹⁰⁵ *A* 12.44/285.3, 12.46/287.1.

¹⁰⁶ Treggiari 1998, 16-23.

¹⁰⁷ E.g. from Brutus: *A* 12.14/251.4; cf. Plutarch *Cic.* 41.5.

¹⁰⁸ *F* 4.5/248; Hutchinson 1998, 62-77.

Tell yourself that she lived as long as it was well for her to live, and that she and freedom existed together. She saw you, her father, Praetor, Consul, and Augur. She was married to young men of distinction. Almost all that life can give, she enjoyed

(5)

Although Sulpicius could comment politely (6) on her love for Cicero (*amor*) and dutiful affection (*pietas*) towards all her family, this is an outsider's view of the vicarious happiness she must have enjoyed through father and husband, and gives little sense of Tullia as a person. Cicero's deft reply gives an insider's view, but an egocentric one:¹⁰⁹

I had a haven of refuge and repose (from public troubles), one in whose conversation and sweet ways I put aside all cares and sorrows

(2)

Bailey rightly comments "This is what Sulpicius' letter ignores." We could wish that the letters to Atticus, which resume several weeks after her death, after Cicero had had plenty of time to talk his heart out at Atticus' house in Rome¹¹⁰ had more on this subject, but Atticus did not need to have it explained to him. Cicero reiterates the theme that Tullia was all that made life worth living¹¹¹ and he claims that he is so changed that everything Atticus liked in him is gone for good.¹¹² He regarded the intended shrine as a debt to be paid.¹¹³

What the data document

The relationship between Tullia and her father was slandered in antiquity by political enemies.¹¹⁴ It was clearly recognised as particularly close, and the letters attest this. Observing the delight Atticus took in his small daughter, at a time when he had just seen Tullia after a year's absence, Cicero insists that parental affection is natural, as philosophers averred.¹¹⁵ We have repeatedly come across his conviction that he had a duty to secure

¹⁰⁹ *F* 4.6/249.

¹¹⁰ Bailey 1966, v.309.

¹¹¹ *A* 12.23/262.1, 12.28/267.2; cf. *Tusculan Disputations* 1.84.

¹¹² *A* 12.14/251.3.

¹¹³ *A* 12.18/254.1, 12.38a/279.2, 12.41/283.4.

¹¹⁴ Reflected in ps.-Sallust *Against Cicero* 2, Cass. Dio 46.18.6.

¹¹⁵ *A* 7.2/125.4.

his daughter's happiness. He never criticises her for any fault towards him (remarkable in so prickly a man) and the praise he bestows on her is heartfelt and unparalleled except perhaps sometimes in the warmth of his expressions about Atticus.

Cicero wanted to find his sons-in-law "agreeable"¹¹⁶ and real members of the family, but in these marriages as in his own, it is striking how independently husband and wife operated (not only in financial matters), often separated by the husband's absence on public or private business, but often too in their leisure, for instance dinner engagements. Although married, Tullia continued to be her father's responsibility, and was almost certainly a daughter-in-power.¹¹⁷ This would mean that Cicero could, in law, unilaterally bring about a divorce from Dolabella. It is clear that he would not have dreamt of doing it unless she authorised him. But her feelings would be spared if her family rather than she sent the notice of divorce.

I find nothing on Tullia's emotional relationship with her brother: affection is taken for granted. The same appropriate attitudes appear to characterise the interaction of mother and daughter. Cicero expects Terentia to look after her and be concerned for her¹¹⁸ and disapproved of the provisions of Terentia's will.¹¹⁹ When she helped Tullia financially in 48 BC, Cicero thanked her, too, in the correct but surely chilly words, "As to what you say about our girl thanking you, I am not surprised that you should give her good reason to do that."¹²⁰ As for Tullia's attitude, she was with her mother more than with her father, and to him seemed long-suffering. Tullia was said to be fond of her uncle Quintus,¹²¹ who mentions her affectionately.¹²² She had known Quintus' wife, Atticus' sister, since childhood, but nothing indicates her reactions to that temperamental woman, or to her child, young Quintus, of whom Tullia must have seen a good deal in his childhood. Cicero reports on her whereabouts to Tiro,¹²³ his confidential secretary who, after his manumission, was treated almost as a member of the family, and joins the name of Tullia, as well as of Marcus, Terentia and the Quinti, to his own, when all the family were together in January 49 and Tiro had been left behind sick in Greece.¹²⁴

¹¹⁶ *F* 1.7/18.11, 2.15/96.2.

¹¹⁷ Dixon 1984, 90 = 1986, 105.

¹¹⁸ E.g. *F* 14.19/160, *A* 11.9/220.3.

¹¹⁹ Dixon 1984, 96 = 1986, 110.

¹²⁰ *F* 14.6/158; Dixon 1984, 90 = 1986, 104.

¹²¹ *QF* 2.4/8.2, March 56.

¹²² *F* 16.15/44.1.

¹²³ *F* 16.12/146.6.

¹²⁴ *F* 16.11/143.

The relationship between Tullia and Atticus seems to have been close and they often talked or corresponded.¹²⁵ A particular friendship with his wife Pilia is indicated.¹²⁶ Of her father's fellow-senators, Sulpicius claimed to be upset by her death.¹²⁷ Of the younger set, Caelius knew her well enough in 50 BC to refer politely to her "modest ways" (*pudor*) when congratulating Cicero on her new engagement.¹²⁸ By 49 he is treated as a friend.¹²⁹ She and Antony seem to have been acquainted. As Dolabella's wife, she must have been expected to entertain Caesarians, with their wives, when they came to Rome, and they would pay courtesy calls, as Hortensius did on her mother.¹³⁰ We have a little vignette of her social interactions when she attempted to help a friend of Cicero's to buy a house and went to work through the potential vendor's wife.¹³¹ She had contacts and channeled news to Cicero and Atticus.¹³²

Her father found her charming company. He attributes good sense (*prudentia*) to her,¹³³ tacitly emending Caelius' *pudor* (perhaps not because it was impertinent of Caelius to use the word, as Bailey seems to suggest, but because it was not for her father to claim such a virtue). In 54 BC he tells Atticus he refrained from speaking out at a trial, out of consideration for Tullia, who was unwell and afraid he might annoy Clodius.¹³⁴ He discusses politics and the course of the civil war with her. In the *Consolation* which he wrote after her death, he claimed the right to consecrate her, with divine approval, like the heroes of old, as the best and most learned of all.¹³⁵ It is not clear how she was educated, but growing up in Cicero's household, with its books and shifting company of learned men and visitors, and talking to her father, must have had an impact, even if Cicero is generous in terming her "learned."

Questions

What questions can we usefully put to this evidence? We can ask for the salient events of Tullia's life, but they are few; vital ones (such as the date of

¹²⁵ A 10.8/199.9-10, 10.13/205.1, 11.7/218.6, 11.17/228, 11.24/234.1.

¹²⁶ A 4.16/89.4, 6.8/122.1, 12.14/251.4.

¹²⁷ F 4.5/248.1.

¹²⁸ F 8.13/94.1.

¹²⁹ F 2.16/154.7.

¹³⁰ A 10.16/208.5.

¹³¹ F 7.23/209.4.

¹³² A 10.1a/191, 10.2/192.2, 10.8/199.10.

¹³³ F 2.15/96.2.

¹³⁴ A 4.15/90.4.

¹³⁵ Lacatantius *inst. div.* 1.15.16-20 = Cicero 1904, iv 3.335.

her birth) are not covered; as far as they are recoverable, they are part of the standard reference works.

Attitudes

We can ask how Cicero reacted to those facts. Did he take the line we would expect, because of our personal experience of relationships between father and daughter? Or do we find that here “the thought structure of the ancients was very different to our own?” It is, I think, undeniable that Cicero’s love for his daughter was highly emotional. This is not usually called into question. But two strands of the relationship might surprise people who have heard about the legal power held by a Roman father and who have not read the letters. The first is the importance Cicero gives to this duty to Tullia (in looking after her well-being and happiness), a duty which continues even after her death. The other is the way in which he defers to her judgment and feelings, not only in matters such as her choice of her third husband or in the decision whether to divorce, but in his own practical and moral dilemma about whether to join Pompey. Almost certainly Tullia was a daughter-in-power, so that Cicero’s consent was essential for her marriages and he could unilaterally have brought about a divorce from Dolabella. But it is unthinkable that Cicero would have crudely invoked his power. We have seen that he had no chance to give his formal consent to her marriage. His general instructions in advance, the fact that he did not signify lack of consent at the time of the wedding, and the fact that he acquiesced in the match and cordially accepted Dolabella as his son-in-law were enough to signify retrospective paternal consent. Similarly, if he did in fact initiate the divorce, it would have been at her bidding. His relations with her are characterised throughout by warmth and tact, not the legal power nor even the moral authority of the heavyweight father.

It is not surprising that frank, personal letters are full of Cicero’s own reactions and feelings. This limits the questions we can ask. We wish for Tullia’s own letters, which, like anyone’s, must have been partly egocentric, and her diary (the Romans are not known to have invented this genre) or even her engagement book and household lists. But, even, as seen through the eyes of her father and other men, she is an independent personality of whom account must be taken.

Circumstances of life

The other area in which snippets provide some evidence is the details of daily life. Where did she live? How and why did Tullia travel? Whom did she know socially? How far did pregnancy restrict her activities? Did she attend games?

Our evidence on Tullia forms part of the data which Suzanne Dixon exploited in “a ‘case study’ of the economics of Roman marriage,”¹³⁶ when she tried (successfully) to piece together a picture of the extent and function of a wife’s contribution to the economy of a senatorial marriage, and to gauge the scope of her material obligations to the children.¹³⁷ Such a study seeks the answer to specific questions rather than trawling for whatever comes up as this chapter has done.

Summing up

If you had performed the work I have outlined here, you would no doubt have come to conclusions different than mine. Krista Pelisari, for example, one of my Stanford students, was able to deploy the data in order to support the hypothesis that Cicero might have had what today would be seen as an unhealthy psychological dependence on his only daughter. Although the dead cannot be put on the psychiatrist’s couch, she showed that Cicero’s reactions are often consistent with habits which in our society would be regarded as dangerous for both parent and daughter, for instance a father’s tendency to use a child rather than a wife as his main confidante. She rightly pointed out that, as the Cicero/Tullia relationship is much the most fully attested father/daughter relationship in antiquity, it is impossible to be sure if it transgressed Roman norms. Such fresh and thought-provoking views are a testimony to the continuing fascination exerted by our sources.

We end up with many unanswered questions. But the individual escapes from the stereotypes.

¹³⁶ Dixon 1984, 78 = 1986, 97.

¹³⁷ Dixon 1984, 78 = 1986, 93.

Appendix: Sources on Tullia

Shackleton Bailey's citations from the speeches of Cicero.

In Verrem/Against Verres 2.1.112 (70 BC)

In Catilinam/Against Catiline 4.3 (5 Dec. 63 BC)

Post Reditum ad Quirites/On his return, in the Senate 1, 27 (5 Sept. 57 BC)

De Domo/On his house 59, 96 (29 Sept. 57 BC)

Pro Sestio/In defence of Sestius 49, 54, 131, 144-5 (trial Feb.-March 14 56 BC; Cicero spoke last)

De Haruspicum responso/On the reply of the haruspices 16 (?late May 56 BC)

In Pisonem/Against Piso fr. xiii Nisbet (late summer 55 BC)

Pro Plancio/In defence of Plancius 69, 73 (late Aug. or early Sept. 54 BC)

Pro Milone/In defence of Milo 87, 100 (trial 4-8 April 52 BC)

Shackleton Bailey's citations from the letters of Cicero.

(Bailey's number follows the slash.) The fourth number is that of the paragraph and does not appear in all translations.

A 1.5/1.8, to Atticus, Rome, November 68

A 1.8/4.3, to Atticus, Rome, after 13 February 67

A 1.10/6.6, to Atticus, Tusculum, c. May 67

A 1.3/8.3, to Atticus, Rome, end of 67

A 1.18/18.1, to Atticus, Rome, 20 January 60

A 2.8/28.2, to Atticus, Antium, 16 (?) April 59

F. 14.4./6.3, to his family, Brundisium, 29 April 58

F 14.4/6.6., to his family, Brundisium, 29 April 58

QF 1.3/3.3, to his brother, Thessalonica, 13 June 58

QF 1.3/3.10, to his brother, Thessalonica, 13 June 58

A 3.10/55.2, to Atticus, Thessalonica, 17 June 58

A 3.15/60.4, to Atticus, Thessalonica, 17 August 58

A 3.19/64.2(f), to Atticus, Thessalonica, 15 September 58

F 14.2/7.1, to his family, Thessalonica, 5 October 58

F 14.1/8.1, to Terentia, Dispatched from Dyrrachium, 25 November 58

F 14.1/8.6, to Terentia, Dispatched from Dyrrachium, 25 November 58

A 4.1/73.4, to Atticus, Rome, about 10 September 57

A 4.2/74.7, to Atticus, Rome, beginning of October 57

QF 2.4/8.2, to his brother, Rome, mid March 56

QF 2.6/10.1, to his brother, en route to Anagnia, 9 April 56

A 4.4a/78.2, to Atticus, Antium, c. June (?), c. 20 June (Loeb) 56

F 1.7/18.11, to Lentulus Spinther, late June or July 56

A 4.16/89.4, to Atticus, Rome about 1 July 54

A 4.15/90.4, to Atticus, Rome, 27 July 54

F 16.16/44.1, Q. Cicero to Cicero, Transalpine Gaul, May (end) or June (beginning) 53

A 5.4/97.1, to Atticus, Beneventum, 12 May 51

A 5.13/106.3, to Atticus, Ephesus, 26 July 51

A 5.14/107.3, to Atticus, Tralles (?), 27 July 51

A 5.17/110.4, to Atticus, en route, 15 August (?) 51

A 5.21/114.14, to Atticus, Laodicea, 13 February 50

A 6.1/115.10, to Atticus, Laodicea, 20 February 50

F 8.13/94.1, Caelius Rufus to Cicero, Rome, early June 50

A 6.4/118.2, to Atticus, en route, mid (?) June 50

F 8.13/94.1, Caelius Rufus to Cicero, Rome, early June 50

A 6.4/118.2, to Atticus, en route mid (?) June 50

A 6.6/121.1, to Atticus, Side, c. 3 August 50

F 2.15/96.2, to Caelius Rufus, side, 3 or 4 August 50

A 6.8/122.1, to Atticus, Ephesus, 1 October 50

F 14.5/119.1, to Terentia, Athens, 16 October 50

F 14.5/119.1f., to Terentia, Athens, 16 October 50

A 7.3/126.12, to Atticus, near Trebula, 9 December 50

A 7.12/135.6, to Atticus, Formiae, 22 January 49

F 14.18/144, to Terentia and Tullia, Formiae, 22 January 49 (added item)

A 7.13/136.3, to Atticus, Minturnae, 23 January 49

F 14.14/145, to Terentia and Tullia, Minturnae, 23 January 49 (added item)

A 7.13a/137.3, to Atticus, Minturnae, 24 January 49

A 7.14/138.3, to Atticus, Cales, 25 January 49

F 16.12/146.6, to Tiro, Capua, 27 January 49

A 7.16/140.3, to Atticus, Cales, 28 January 49

- A 7.17/141.5, to Atticus, Formiae, 2 February 49
 A 7.18/142.1, to Atticus, Formiae, 3 February 49
 A 7.20/144.2, to Atticus, Capua, 5 February 49
 A 7.23/147.2, to Atticus, Formiae, 10 February 49
 A 8.2/152.4, to Atticus, Formiae, 17 February 49
 A 9.6/172.4, to Atticus, Formiae, 11 March 49
 A 10.1a/191, to Atticus, Laterium, 4 April 49
 A 10.2/192.2, to Atticus, Laterium or Arcanum, Arcanum (Loeb), 5 or 6 April 49
 A 10.8/199.1, 9f., to Atticus, Cumae, 2 May 49
 A 10.8A/199A.1, Antonius tribune, propraetor to Cicero *imperator*, place uncertain, 1 May (?) 49
 A 10.9A/200A.1, Caelius to Cicero, Liguria (?), c. 16 April 49
 F 2.16/154.5, to Caelius Rufus, Cumae, 2 or 3 May 49
 A 10.13/205.1, to Atticus, Cumae, 7 May 49
 A 10.18/210.1, to Atticus, Cumae, 19 May 49
 F 14.7/155.1f., to Terentia, aboard ship, Caieta, 7 June 49
- A 11.2/212.2, to Atticus, Epirus, middle of March (?) 48
 F 9.9/157.1, Dolabella to Cicero, Caesar's camp near Dyrrhachium, May 48
 A 11.3/213.1, to Atticus, Pompey's camp at Dyrrhachium, May 48
 F 14.19/160, to Terentia, Brundisium, 27 November 48
 A 11.6/217.4, to Atticus, Brundisium, 27 November 48
 A 11.7/218.6, to Atticus, Brundisium, 17 December 48
 F 14.9/161, to Terentia, Brundisium, 17 (?) December 48
 F 14.17/162, to Terentia, Brundisium, 23 (?) December 48
- A 11.9/220.3, to Atticus, Brundisium, 3 January 47
 A 11.17/228, to Atticus, Brundisium, 12 or 13 June 47
 A 11.17a/229.1, to Atticus, Brundisium 14 June 47
 F 14.11/166, to Terentia, Brundisium, 14 June 47
 F 14.15/167, to Terentia, Brundisium, 19 June 47
 A 11.25/231.3, to Atticus, Brundisium, 5 July 47
 A 11.23/232.3, to Atticus, Brundisium, 9 July 47
 A 11.24/234.1 (f.), to Atticus, Brundisium, 6 August 47
 A 11.21/236.2, to Atticus, Brundisium, 25 August 47
- A 12.5c/241, to Atticus, Tusculum, 12 June (?) 46
 A 12.1/248.1, to Atticus, Arpinum, 27 November (by the sun) 46
 F 7.23/209.4, to M. Fabius Gallus, Rome, December 46
- F 6.18/218.5, to Q. Lepta, Rome, January 45

- F* 4.5/248.1, Servius Sulpicius Rufus to Cicero, Athens, mid March 45
F 4.5/248.2-6, Servius Sulpicius Rufus to Cicero, Athens, mid March 45
(*A* 12.23/262.1, to Atticus, Tusculum, 19 March 45)
(*F* 4.6/249.1f.), to Servius Sulpicius, Atticus' villa near Nomentum, mid
April 45
A 12.3/239.2, to Atticus, Tusculum, May or June 46 (??), now redated to
30 May 45 (Bailey 1999, 300-1), which involves removing the
reference to Tullia.

Thucydides the Prehistorian

Jeffrey Rusten

Introduction

Several years ago, I had the good fortune to spend a year as Whitehead Professor at the American School of Classical Studies in Athens, while preparing among other things a commentary for students on Thucydides I along the lines of my commentary on book II.

In deciding what to concentrate on there, it seemed ideal to pursue the question of Thucydides' so-called *Archaeology* (1.2-19).¹ It also seemed ideal to present it at Bryn Mawr, an institution so well known for its archaeological strength and achievements, by the invitation of its graduate students, several of whom I came to know and admire in my year at Athens. Finally, I am honored to deliver it as a memorial lecture to the legendary Nan Michels.

What my prejudices on Thucydides led me to think I would find was that the criticisms of his apparent ineptitude in gathering and applying archaeological and traditional evidence could be shown on closer examination to be unjustified, just as I believe the criticisms of his stylistic elaboration in the *Archaeology* are unwarranted. But what I came to be convinced of was not that the archaeologists had been too harsh, but that philological admirers of Thucydides had been insufficiently critical in judging the *Archaeology*. We must admit that occasionally in this section Thucydides' working methods and his conclusions seem somewhat puzzling, to say the least.

I will first try to describe to you the place of the *Archaeology* in Thucydides' work, then its contents. After that, I will look at some of its most enthusiastic admirers, then some very harsh criticisms, especially by archaeologists and historians. Then these critics will themselves be subjected to some criticism. Finally, we will come back to try to make a more careful

¹ The section is first called this by the scholia (A) on 1.12.1. For another early use of the term, see in Part vi below. Thucydides himself uses ἀρχαιολογεῖν differently in 7.69.2 "say oft-repeated things." On the section in general, see Täubler 1927, Jacoby 1956, Romilly 1956, Parry 1972.

judgment of the *Archaeology*, and why understanding what it does and does not aspire to do and its difference from the rest of Thucydides' work has something to do with the greater questions of why we ought to study Thucydides, and classical Athens.

I. The Place of the Archaeology in Thucydides' History

What we now call the *Archaeology* is in some respects merely a preliminary to the first book, and the first book itself a preliminary to the main historical narrative. Beginning with Book 2, we have an organized and integrated narrative of the first years of the war, but his attempt to present its antecedents is much more ambitious, and as a result the structure of Book I is, as Wilamowitz said, "chaos": Thucydides leaps from the moment of publication (1.1) to the distant past (1.2-19), then to the years just before the war (1.24-87), then to the interval after the war with Persia (1.88-119), and finally to the eve of hostilities (1.119-146).

The different time-frames and methods of presentation correspond to the complexity of his concept of causes: just as he applies different words and adjectives for cause to distinguish the variety of them, so Book I narrates the war's different kinds of causes, from the specific to the most universal, in different parts of the book. In increasing order of abstraction, they are:

- Rupture of the 30 years' peace and disagreement over the Megarian decree (diplomacy leading to the declaration of war, 1.119-146).
- Colonialist and imperialistic structures and spheres of influence in conflict (Corcyra and Potidaea, 1.24-67)
- Spartan disengagement vs. Athenian imperialism (the "Pentakontaetia," 1.88-118)
- Different national characters of Athens and Sparta (Debate at Sparta, 1.66-87).
- At the most universal level, the human impulse toward the accumulation of wealth and the acquisition and maintenance of power, and the fear and rebellion it provokes in the ruled.

It is these ultimate causes, operating in all human history according to Thucydides, that are first presented in the *Archaeology*.²

² The recurring Good/Bad factors leading to δύναμις ἀσθενεία (Parry 1972) include:

- 1) securely settled, the same people dwelled there, secure / migrations, changes of home;

Its formal purpose, however, is to justify the initial assertion (1.1.2), that the Peloponnesian War was the greatest Greek upheaval, by examining possible rivals in the period we might call Greek “prehistory”—before the Persian wars—which he divides into events before, during and after the Trojan War. In the first section (1.2-8), he speaks almost exclusively of sea-power. In the second (1.9-11) he offers a model for Agamemnon’s hegemony at Troy, and assesses his real military power. The third section (1.12-19) is a more loosely connected list of rulers and conflicts; but there is still a clear focus on the development of sea-power and the impending face-off between Athens and Sparta.³

II. Praise of the Archaeology

But the most perceptive modern scholars agree that what really characterizes these opening sections is not their contents, but their deductive methodology. Romilly in particular (*Histoire et raison*, 242) notes the “highly logical terminology, which is found in exceptional abundance”:

- δοκεῖ “It seems” (1.3.2; 1.3.3; 1.9.3; 1.10.1; 1.10.4)
- εἰκός “It is probable (1.4; 1.10.3, 2x; 1.10.4)
- καὶ παράδειγμα “a model is” (1.2.6)
- μαρτύριον “evidence is” (1.8.1); δηλοῖ “it makes clear (1.3.1; 1.5.2) τεκμηριοῖ “it attests (1.3.3; 1.9.3)
- οὐκ ὀκνεῖ ἀπιστεῖν εἰκός, οὐδὲ τὰς ὄψεις τῶν πόλεων μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἢ τὰς δυνάμεις, νομίζειν δέ ... “Nor is it reasonable to disbelieve, nor to speculate⁴ on appearances of cities rather than power, but to think ... ” (1.10.3)
- οὐκ ἀκριβεῖ ἂν τις σημείῳ χρώμενος ἀπιστοίη “If someone uses an exact piece of evidence he would not be doubtful” (1.10.1)
- εἰκάζειν “Conjecture” (1.9.4, 1.10.2)
- οἶμαι “I think” (1.10.2)
- φαίνεται + Participle “It is obviously true that” (*passim*)

2) surplus of resources, of nourishment / lack of money; lack of access to nourishment, subsistence-cultivation;

3) at peace / under constraint of force;

4) trade / farming;

5) in common, joint / individually;

6) army, fleet / piracy.

³ See Romilly 1956, 244 n. 1.

⁴ This translation of σκοπεῖν is argued for in section VI below.

The *Archaeology* is thus taken as emblematic of Thucydides' historical method in general (Connor 1984, 26-7): "In summary, then, the opening chapters of the work are not so much a description of early Greece or a chronicle of events of early times as the establishment of a way of looking at the past ... The *Archaeology* is also, however, a demonstration of Thucydides' techniques of historical analysis" (cf. Parry 1972, 51). Rarely after 1.23 does Thucydides reveal how he establishes the truth, so that this is our last chance to "look under the hood" so to speak, and see how the engine of Thucydides' historical narrative really runs.

Romilly's tellingly titled *Histoire et raison* saves the discussion of the *Archaeology* for its closing chapter, the climactic instance of his new method (242-3): "Thus these chapters are privileged in the work, showing us the constructive rationalism of Thucydides coming to grips, not so much with problems of how to present history, but with inquiry into truth itself." But these approving critics are looking to Thucydides as a writer and thinker, not as a source.

III. Criticisms of Thucydides' Methods in the Archaeology

When it comes to historians and archaeologists, Thucydides' reputation for accuracy has often elevated his statements on prehistory (e.g., on the Dorian invasion, the role of sea-power, Carian piracy) into presumed facts that it was archaeology's job to confirm. It was he, not Homer, who gave us Minos and Agamemnon as the two fixed points of Bronze Age archaeology. But in the absence of any such confirmation, opinions of his opening 19 chapters nowadays are markedly critical. One charge is that he uncritically used legendary material as if it were historical fact: "All that we now know about the nature and function of origin legends must argue against taking them at face value in the way that Thucydides did" (Dickinson 1994, 295).

A more serious accusation is anachronistic invention. George Grote had already accused Thucydides of this in his account of Minos' thalassocracy (1.41, 1.8.2): "Here we have conjectures, derived from the analogy of the Athenian maritime empire, in the historical times, substituted in the place of fabulous incidents, and attached to the name of Minos."⁵ Since the hypothesis of Minoan sea-power is still unsupported by any material evidence from Bronze Age Crete, the prevailing opinion today is that Thucydides' account of Minos is historically worthless.⁶

The two occasions where Thucydides had been praised for deductions based on archaeological remains have now been argued to be especially

⁵ Quoted with approval by de Souza 1999, 16.

⁶ Starr 1955; Hägg and Marinatos 1984.

incompetent.⁷ When he says that the small size of Mycenae is no reason that the legends of the Trojan expedition should be doubted (1.10.1-2), R.M. Cook suggests that he reveals his ignorance of the existence of more extensive Bronze Age remains (which are undeniably impressive and would have suggested power), as well of the possible break in habitation: "Agamemnon's Mycenae and fifth-century Mycenae could be thought of as one city, repaired and casually rebuilt but essentially one and the same" (Cook 1955, 267).

Similarly Thucydides' deduction of Carian ethnicity (1.8.1) from the burials scrutinized at the purification of the island of Delos in 426/5 (Thuc. 3.104) has been criticized by R.M. Cook, on the basis of the probable identification of the reburials in 1898: the bones were not saved, but in addition to 50 small iron sickles and two daggers, there was mostly pottery, all Greek, going back no more than four centuries. Thus:

Thucydides or an informant he considered reliable did not recognize Geometric (and perhaps Orientalizing) pottery as being particularly Greek and dated it at least 300 years too early ... Secondly ... either Thucydides did not know what we call the Bronze Age, or he dated its end too early.⁸

Moses Finley's condemnation was more forceful:

Twice in this section, Thucydides argues explicitly from what we should call archaeological evidence ... The arguments are clever and cogent, but are they valid? On the contrary, they reveal a gross ignorance and misunderstanding of the past on several points of major significance.⁹

Is Thucydides' account of prehistory characterized by incompetence or, even worse, tendentious invention? Before attempting an explanation of Thucydides' practices here, it would do well to also question some of the deductions he makes in the *Archaeology* from myth and literature as well.

IV. Questionable Deductions on the Trojan War

In his attempt to minimize the size of the Greek expedition to Troy, Thucydides makes several deductions based on mythological/poetic

⁷ Cook 1955, 266-270.

⁸ Cook 1955, 269.

⁹ Finley 1975, 19.

evidence, which seems even stranger. The invading Greeks, he argues, must have won a victory after their arrival, otherwise they could not have constructed the wall for their camp (1.11.1 δῆλον δέ· τὸ γὰρ ἔρυμα τῷ στρατοπέδῳ οὐκ ἂν ἐτείχισαντο). This wall, however, is unknown: in the *Iliad* the Greeks do in fact build a wall around their camp for the first time, but this is in the tenth year of the war, and the result of a military setback, not a victory (*Iliad* 7.382-482). A variety of more or less radical solutions, none very probable, have been proposed to “save” Thucydides from a lapse of memory or an outright invention.¹⁰ Next Thucydides argues that the Greeks *must have* had more men than money, because they had to scatter to engage in piracy and in the farming of the Chersonese for want of supplies (1.11.1). Greek raids of towns around the Troad are indeed mentioned in Homer, but of farming there is not a single trace in the *Iliad*, and again critics assume either a source in the epic cycle or that Thucydides’ memory is faulty.

The final example seems the worst blunder. His method of estimating the size of the Greek force at Troy is to note the 1200 ships total mentioned there, the largest (120) and smallest (50) crews mentioned, then find the average crew (85) and multiply by the number of ships, which he says amounts to “not many.” He does not give us the result, but $1200 \times 85 = 102,000$, which is surely larger than any force assembled in the Peloponnesian War!

Thus to our questions about Thucydides’ handling of archaeological evidence are added equally serious ones about deductions based on literary sources. Gomme noticed the last one in particular, and offered a theory: sheer carelessness.

Thucydides cannot in fact be acquitted of a certain inconsequence; this excursus, like most of the others, has not been fully thought out. Some of the sentence constructions, as 9.2, 11.2 (if the MS are right) and 18.1 point to the same conclusion.

In stating the problem, he is, if anything, too kind. Yet the idea that the *Archaeology* is carelessly written is not at all supported by the sections he singles out. As I hope to show in my commentary, complex sentences in Thucydides are a sign not of haste, but of elaboration, and that these three

¹⁰ Change ἐκράτησαν (“They conquered”) to ἐκρατήθησαν (“They were conquered”) (Thiersch, cf. Dolin 1983, 119-49. The contrasting 10th-year wall in *Iliad* 7 might be a post-Thucydidean interpolation (Page 1959, appendix II). The *Cypria* or some other lost epic must have mentioned the wall (many defenders).

(particularly 1.9.2) are works of art. Similarly artful is the use of ring composition throughout the *Archaeology* to mark the start and end of both small and large topics.¹¹ It is hard to believe that a rough draft was clothed in such stylistic virtuosity.

V. Neglected Influences on Thucydides in the *Archaeology*

Convinced of serious difficulties with at least some of Thucydides' methods in the *Archaeology*, let us revisit the individual passages and attempt not to vindicate or defend him, but merely to look deeper into aspects of them we may have neglected. There are several possibilities:

A. We have overlooked evidence that Thucydides might have used that is unavailable to us today. This is most obviously true in the case of the Achaean wall (1.11.1), since Thucydides does not specify Homer as his reference, and in his day there was active interest in the legendary traditions of the Troad (Hellanicus' *Troika*, also the Trojan sections of Pherecydes, *FGrH* 3F136-144), and perhaps even in the physical remains of Troy beyond the Homeric poems and the cycle. The masters of the Troad at this time were the Athenians, as seen not only from the tribute lists but also from Athena's words in Aeschylus, *Eumenides* 397-402. It is quite likely that as an Athenian general Thucydides had been to Sigeion (Herodotus 5.95), and a man with historical interests might well have viewed the presumed sites of the mythical Greek camps in that area just as Hellenistic antiquarians did.

B. We are holding Thucydides to an unrealistically modern standard. For Cook and Finley to maintain that Thucydides' inattention at Mycenae to the strata of settlement, or at Delos to the chronological importance of pottery styles or the presence of iron vs. bronze, convicts him of "gross ignorance and misunderstanding" may be an overreaction to the exaggerated respect for Thucydides shown in the past. What ancient author knows of such things? If we accept some reasonable limitations on his method, what he takes for Carian artifacts may well have been, as Poulson suggested,¹² the fifty small sickles and two daggers found at Delos (cf. Herodotus 7.93 on Carians in the army of Xerxes: τὰ μὲν ἄλλα κατὰ περ Ἑλληνες ἐσταλμένοι, εἶχον δὲ καὶ δρέπανα καὶ ἐγχειρίδια). In the case of Mycenae, Thucydides does not say it had been unimpressive, but physically small (μικρὸν ἦν), and that is true even of the Mycenaean citadel.

It is equally unrealistic to criticize Thucydides for using traditions and poetry for historical purposes, since in his day he had little else to work with.

¹¹ See Connor 1984, Appendix I, and even more radically Ellis 1991, 344-380.

¹² *MonPiot* xvi 31-2, dismissed by Cook 1955, 268-9.

(As we will see below, he is well aware of their shortcomings). Since he uses them to postulate the presence of ethnic identity groups (Hellen son of Deucalion, 1.3.1-4), he seems close to the insight that eponymous ancestors say less about the past than about the power pretensions of those who claim them.¹³

C. We are ignoring widespread popular assumptions about the investigation of the past, which Thucydides is likely to have shared. Thucydides clearly liked to distance himself from popular misconceptions, but Minos was one he did not dispute: far from Thucydides' anachronistic imperialist invention on the model of Athens' empire, Minos was a familiar tyrannical figure from the Attic stage and other poetry, with a career of conquest and subjugation. He besieged and captured Megara (Aeschylus *Choeph.* 613ff.); at Keos he took Dexithea as wife and left a garrison (Bacchylides 1.112ff and Pindar *Paeon* 4).¹⁴ At Paros, he was performing sacrifice when interrupted by news of his son's death in Athens (Callimachus *Aitia* frs. 3-5, from Agias and Derkylos *FGrH* 305F8). His siege of Athens and the tribute he exacted from it are known from numerous Theseus-stories. Finally, after being betrayed by Daedalus, Minos pursues him to Kamikos in Sicily, where he is killed by treachery and his fleet dispersed (Sophocles, *Kamikoi*, Aristophanes, *Kokalos*). Minos' tomb-temple was supposedly discovered by Theron of Acragas in the early fifth century (Diodorus 4.79, Lindos temple chronicle 27).

Clearly Thucydides did not invent Minos as a thalassocrat, anymore than he invented the numerous settlements called "Minoa" in Sicily, Corcyra, Monembasia (Paus. 3.23.11), Megarid, Siphinos, Paros, Crete, and Palestine (= Gaza).¹⁵

VI. *σκοπεῖν*: a Different Mode of Historical Inquiry

None of these mitigating factors can be applied to the proposed calculation of the Greek army at Troy, an argument that remains puzzling. But in his discussion of the number of Spartan troops at the battle of Mantinea (5.68) Thucydides' procedure is curiously similar.

¹³ He makes a similar association of naming and military power with Pelops (1.9.2), Akarnan (2.102.6), Amphilocus (2.61.3), and Italos (6.2.5). Cf. Hermocrates' appeal to the Sicilians to unite behind their common name (4.64.3). See Hall 1998, 1-19.

¹⁴ Since Bacchylides was from Keos this may be local tradition: Davis 1979, 143-157.

¹⁵ Hdt. 1.171, 3.122; Bethe 1910, 200-232.

He says first that it is impossible to write down the number exactly (ἀριθμὸν δὲ γράψαι ... ἀκριβῶς) because of Spartan secrecy and Athenian exaggeration, but it is possible for one to speculate (ἔξεστί τῳ σκοπεῖν) on their numbers, with the following method: one counts seven battalions (less the 600 Skiritai), then each battalion consisting of four companies, each company of four squadrons, each squadron with four men in the front rank, on an average of 8 rows deep.

Just as in 1.10.4-5, he does not give the final total, and just as in the former passage, the total that one can work out ($4 \times 4 \times 4 \times 7 = 448$, total in whole front rank $448 \times 8 = 3584 + 600$ Skiritai = 4184) is greatly at odds with what one would have expected. In this case, it is “surprisingly low.”¹⁶ Andrewes comments in exasperation at his procedure: “Why did not Thucydides here, without any of this elaborate to-do, state simply that the Lacedaimonians numbered about 4000?” Our reaction to the “elaborate to-do” in the *Archaeology* was, as we have seen, even more exasperated.

There is one other thing that the two passages have in common, i.e., the verb that Thucydides applies to his procedure of estimation: for in 1.10.4-5, he says “for one who speculates on the average, those who went were clearly not many” (τὸ μέσον σκοποῦντι οὐ πολλοὶ φαίνονται ἐλθόντες)?

From the close of the *Archaeology* (1.20.1 τὰ μὲν οὖν παλαιὰ τοιαῦτα ἦϋρον), one would think that εὐρεῖν and σκοπεῖν were synonyms; but in 1.10 and 5.68, σκοπεῖν is not factual historical research, but a practice to be engaged in for particular cases where the evidence is insufficient, but a judgment still has to be made. The contrast is even clearer in 1.21:

For though the events of remote antiquity, and even those that more immediately preceded the war, could not from lapse of time be clearly determined (σαφῶς μὲν εὐρεῖν), yet the evidence which speculation (σκοποῦντι) carried as far back as was practicable leads me to trust, points to the conclusion that there was nothing on a great scale ...

Thus, the troop-count at Mantinea, like that at Troy, are distinguished as cases where proper historical investigation—the kind Thucydides normally practiced (cf. 1.22.2-4, ἀκριβεία περὶ ἐκάστου ἐπεξεληθῶν. ἐπιτόνως δὲ ἠύροσκατο ...)¹⁷—had to give way to abstract reasoning, with little attention

¹⁶ Andrewes 1970, 112, where the comparative evidence is given.

¹⁷ There is only one exception to this pattern for using σκοπεῖν in the *Archaeology*: τὰ μὲν οὖν παλαιὰ τοιαῦτα ἦϋρον, χαλεπὰ ὄντα παντὶ ἔξῃς τεκμηρίῳ πιστεῦσαι (1.20.1). Perhaps the need to put forth conclusions here excluded the open-ended σκοπεῖν; in any case, the speculative quality of the procedure is still emphasized.

to “facts.” That may be the explanation for the astonishing failure to complete the calculations described, and the failure to discern that the factual result would be objectionable. As Romilly observed about several of these sections in the *Archaeology*, the methodology is privileged not only over the evidence, but also over the result.¹⁸

Consistent with this use of σκοπεῖν are Thucydides’ constant reminders in the *Archaeology* that the evidentiary basis of this part of the narrative is weak. Here are just a few examples:

- παλαίτατος ὧν ἀκοῆ ἴσμεν (1.4.1)
- λέγουσι δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ σαφέστατα Πελοποννησίων μνήμη παρὰ τῶν πρότερον δεδεγμένοι (1.9.2)
- ὡς Ὅμηρος τοῦτο δεδήλωκεν, εἴ τῳ ἱκανὸς τεκμηριῶσαι (1.9.4)
- οἷ τε ποιηταὶ εἰρήκασιν καὶ ὁ λόγος κατέχει (1.10.1-2)
- τῇ Ὀμήρου αὐτοῖ ποιήσει εἴ τι χρεὶ κάναταῦθα πιστεύειν (1.10.3)

What then of the critical praise heaped on Thucydides’ rationalistic method here as a harbinger of the whole work to come? Battling that idea leads me to my conclusion.

VII. Conclusion: Four Misconceptions about Thucydides

Misconception Number 1: The methods of the *Archaeology* reveal those that the rest of the history will employ.

In fact, the language of “deduction” listed in section II above, which occurs so much more frequently here than elsewhere, might also be called the terminology of “speculation.” It attempts to bridge the gap between the weak evidence available and the hard facts required with logic and argument. Friedrich Solmsen gave a true judgment of his method here:

On the whole, speculation of the boldest type holds sway in these chapters; yet, as though to make up for this boldness, Thucydides everywhere lets us know how he arrived at his

¹⁸ “Le procédé de démonstration passe donc encoure une fois avant la chose démontrée” (Romilly 1956, 250, on the grave at Delos); “La méthode est ici plus importante que son résultat” (Romilly 1956, 248, on the estimate of Greek troops at Troy); “On peut cependant admettre fort bien qu’il s’agit ici de quelque témoignage qui ne nous soit pas parvenue: Thucydide le rétient d’autant plus volontiers qu’il sert mieux sa démonstration, mais le mentionne d’autant plus brièvement qu’il s’agit d’une confirmation plus secondaire” (Romilly 1956, 258, on the Achaean wall and farming).

conclusion. The one feature as well as the other sets the Archaeology apart from the bulk of his work It would be a serious mistake to think that in the account of the Peloponnesian War, there is the same degree of imagination, speculation, and over-confidence in the powers of human intelligence that characterizes the Archaeology.¹⁹

As we have seen, Thucydides is constantly emphasizing the weakness of his evidence, and he has left it up to us to keep in mind the corresponding weakness of his conclusions.

Truth Number 1: Thucydides' reputation for accuracy derives from his decision (which he does not foreground in his introduction) to write primarily about *contemporary* events, which both he and his sources witnessed first-hand.²⁰ It need not apply with equal force to his discussion of *previous* events (*Archaeology*, *Pentekontaetia*, other "Digressions"). He reverts to these deductive methods only occasionally in the rest of his history.

Misconception Number 2: Reconstruction of prehistory by deduction is Thucydides' own invention.

In fact, speculative deductions about prehistory to illustrate a particular argument are fairly well-known from the late fifth and early fourth centuries. Even if the Democritean anthropological treatise argued for by Thomas Cole remains unproved,²¹ there is the rise of mankind by cooking and diet in the Hippocratic treatise *Ancient Medicine* 3 and 7. Other examples are Theseus' account of early human life in Euripides (*Suppliants* 201-213), and the account of early humanity in Plato's *Laws* III.²² As Hippias (in the pseudo-Platonic but early *Hippias Major*, 285D) responds to Socrates' question about his most popular lectures "[a]bout families of heroes and mortals, and their settlements, how the cities were established in antiquity, and in a word, they take most pleasure in hearing the whole archaeology" (καὶ συλλήβδην πάσης τῆς ἀρχαιολογίας ἥδιστα ἀκροῶνται).

Like these other authors, Thucydides' *Archaeology* favors argument over substance; it also takes any possible occasion to introduce topics of interest to him and his audience, like the three unnecessary intrusions of Athens to illustrate particular points (on early migration 1.2.6, luxurious clothing 1.6.3, and size of temples and public buildings 1.10.2).

¹⁹ Solmsen 1975, 237.

²⁰ Collingwood 1956, 25f.

²¹ Cole 1967.

²² See Weil 1959. An ἀρχαιολογία Σαμίων is attributed to Semonides of Amorgos (T1 West, see Fowler 1996, 65 n. 25).

Truth Number 2: Thucydides' speculative methods and use of evidence in the *Archaeology* are merely those of an educated Athenian or sophist. He does not break new ground here.

If the argument in the *Archaeology* is tendentious and speculative, what then of its purpose, i.e., is to show the superiority of the Peloponnesian War to all that preceded it? This question leads us to the third common misconception.

Misconception Number 3: The Peloponnesian War is greater than any other prior event.

This is a misconception not by Thucydides' critics, but by the historian himself.²³ There will always be scholars who feel bound to uphold him,²⁴ but it is hard to deny that 1) most of Thucydides' *Archaeology* is not really concerned with making this point, and 2) he needs rhetorical skills to keep the spotlight off the Persian Wars, which would clearly seem more momentous, even to Greeks. He withholds the Persian Wars from both the *Archaeology* and the *Pentekontaeteia*, and when he does get around to it in 1.23.1, his dismissal is a rhetorical one, confined to a single sentence: "The Persian War, the greatest achievement of past times, yet found a speedy decision in two actions by sea and two by land." By contrast, his evocation of the Peloponnesian War resorts to exaggerating its pathos (earthquakes, eclipses) to avoid betraying the weakness of his case.

Truth Number 3: Thucydides does not make a serious attempt to prove the case that the Peloponnesian War is greater than the Persian War, and his argument about earlier wars in the *Archaeology* is not a strong one either.

Implicit in the third misconception is another not stated by Thucydides openly, but I think implied:

Misconception Number 4: This magnitude is what makes his war worth writing about.

If Thucydides composed the greatest history because he had the greatest war for its subject, then he would have become irrelevant long ago, since the magnitude of war has unfortunately grown by many multiples. I do not in fact think that Thucydides thought this himself, however, for when he comes in 1.22 to state what he hopes his reader will do with his work, he uses a verb that we have already seen, σκοπεῖν: "If those who wish to theorize coherently (τὸ σαφῆς σκοπεῖν) about what has happened, and about what is going to happen again someday in human events in a similar or resembling form—if they judge it (my work) useful, I will be content."

²³ In belittling the Trojan War, he is like Pericles boasting of his swift defeat of the Samians (Plut. *Pericles* 28 = *FGrH* 392F15-16).

²⁴ Gomme 1937, 116-125, but cf. Woodman 1988, 28.

And that is, in fact, how we use Thucydides today. Whether we are trying to understand the cold war and nuclear deterrence, or the behavior of populations during plagues, or the difficulties a great power experiences in maintaining itself and its principles intact, we turn to his work—not for facts, but for patterns and ideas. Thucydides somehow managed not only to express these ideas in the argument of the *Archaeology*, but also to evoke them in the narrative of the history. Although that has not been my primary subject today, it is always important to reaffirm this final truth.

Truth Number 4: The value of his work does not depend on the magnitude of his subject, but on his ability to discern in it patterns and structures that can be applied *universally*. Indeed, we use his descriptions today (as we use Athens in general) as a microcosm of historical analysis.

*Dryden's Virgil and the Politics of Translation*¹

Richard F. Thomas

the most noble and spirited translation I know in any language.

ALEXANDER POPE on Dryden's Virgil²

the *Aeneid* was evidently a party piece, as much as *Absalom and Achitophel*. Virgil was as slavish a writer as any of the gazetteers.

ALEXANDER POPE, quoted by his friend
Joseph Spence.³

"May execration pursue his memory":

Virgil in the eighteenth century

In 1685, even more than a decade before Dryden published his translation of the *Aeneid*, Matthew Prior could write in *A Satyr on the modern Translators*:

If VIRGIL labour'd not to be translated,
Why suffers he the only thing he hated?
Had he foreseen some ill officious Tongue,
Would in unequal Strains blaspheme his Song;
Nor Prayers, nor Force, nor Fame should e'er prevent
The just Performance of his wise intent:
Smiling he'd seen his marty'd Work expire,
Nor live to feed more cruel Foes than Fire. (151-8)

Dryden himself, by this time translator of Ovid's *Heroides* (1680), is one of the objects of the satire (23 "In the head of this Gang too *John Dryden* appears"), and it is fair to say that when the 1697 Virgil translation came out,

¹ Reprinted from *Virgil and the Augustan Reception* (2001) 122-53, with the permission of the author and Cambridge University Press.

² *Complete Poetical Works*, ed. H.W. Boynton (Boston and New York 1903) 259.

³ For details see White 1993, 300, n. 16.

at the end of a century that had seen around thirty partial or complete translations, largely Royalist, of the *Aeneid* alone, it drove all from the field. So much so that Prior could later write, now in satire against the lack of learning of his age:⁴

Hang HOMER and VIRGIL; their meaning to seek,
A Man must have pok'd in the *Latin* and *Greek*;
Those who Love their own Tongue, we have Reason to Hope,
Have read them Translated by DRYDEN and POPE.

The English reception of Virgil, particularly in the eighteenth century, is as much as anything the reception of Dryden's *Virgil*, and in some quarters it continues to be so. As C. Burrow has recently put it: "Someone who has taught us, or someone who has taught someone who has taught us, will have read and absorbed, say, Dryden's *Virgil*."⁵ Another critic has summed up an excellent treatment of Dryden's poem with the following:

Through his *Aeneis* Dryden honoured his father [Virgil] with a work which would be one of his richest gifts to his own posterity. With the *Aeneis* Dryden finally brought into his own language the Latin poem that had lived in his mind since childhood, and had inhabited—as guest and ghost—so much of his adult writing.⁶

What are the implications of Dryden's translation for the reception of *Virgil*? A strong translation such as his was bound to have an effect of some sort. From a political perspective, as we shall see, Dryden tied *Virgil* closely to Augustus, and the reputation of Dryden and *Virgil* would suffer it accordingly. As H.D. Weinbrot has succinctly put it:⁷

hostility to Augustus by the major classical historians, especially Suetonius and Tacitus, was transmitted to renaissance Florence and then much of western Europe; it temporarily submerged during the triumph of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century royalism, re-emerged in England late in the seventeenth century, and by the earlier eighteenth century had become entrenched in libertarian commonplaces, historical discussions, and practical politics. The years of verbal and printed combat during the opposition to Walpole

⁴ On this see Frost 1955, 2.

⁵ Burrow 1997, 21.

⁶ Hammond 1999, 282.

⁷ Weinbrot 1978, 233.

were especially rich in anti-Augustanism, as Whig and Tory administration and opposition smeared each other with the same brush.

Dryden himself is not unlike Virgil in that both were caught in a transitional time, without the benefits of knowing how history would judge those times and the princes to whom they would be so closely tied. We will return to the issue of Dryden's affiliation (nostalgia for the exiled James II or paranesis for the new order of William III?), but for now what matters is the eighteenth century's received hostility to Augustus and to Virgil, or rather the received, imperial Virgil who was in part the creation of Dryden.

The eighteenth century shows resemblances to the twentieth in its ideological response to Virgil and Augustus.⁸ As Gibbon on Augustus anticipated and influenced Syme, so Pope on Virgil has strong similarities to the anti-authoritarian negative readings of Graves and, to a lesser extent, of Auden.⁹ We even find, in Robert Andrews' 1766 translation to Virgil's *Aeneid*, an attitude not unlike that of the current ambivalent reader, somewhat polemically defined by Harrison:¹⁰

[Andrews] is everywhere inspired by "the spirit of Liberty" in Virgil, and yet he has nothing but liberal condemnation for Augustus. There is only one way for a mind to reconcile these positions and that is to make Virgil a kind of fifth columnist. This is precisely what Andrews does, but in such waxing and assertive oratory that it would be difficult for any reader not to detect the severity of his desperation. Virgil, it is admitted, is in the position in which his detractors place him, as the poet of a despotic court.

Also resonating with our own times, by the end of the eighteenth century, Lucan is the "Bard of Freedom," "Hating with Stoic pride a Tyrant's arms," while Virgil evokes the following: "May execration pursue his memory, who

⁸ The best work on this topic is Harrison 1967, a short piece, and somewhat inaccessible; also important is the work of Erskine-Hill 1983, 234-66, "The Idea of an Augustan Age," and particularly Weinbrot 1978, 120-49, "'Let Horace blush, and Virgil too': The degradation of the Augustan Poets."

⁹ See Ziolkowski 1993, 99-10, 140-1.

¹⁰ Harrison 1967, 6-7; also Weinbrot 1978, 123-9 for vigorous debate in the early- to mid-eighteenth-century over the degree of Virgil's flattery.

has placed a crown on the brows of a tyrant, that were much too bright for the best of Kings."¹¹

That Virgil's stock was low by the end of the eighteenth century (at least Virgil of the *Aeneid*) is beyond dispute, particularly when compared to the end of the previous century. And Dryden's stock was at a similar ebb, for much the same reason: both had praised princes, and the times were no longer conducive to princes. My concern here will be with the degree to which Dryden converted Virgil into a flatterer, with the way he viewed Virgil and Virgilian poetry through the lens of his own times, whether Jacobite or Williamite, and consequently made Virgil's poem something that it had once not been. The eighteenth-century reputation of Virgil was in my view in part a product of the royalist translations of that poet which burgeoned throughout the seventeenth century and culminate in Dryden's version. To the extent that the eighteenth century is also the site of the genesis of modern classical scholarship, the fixing of the Augustan Virgil in this version has implications for nineteenth- and twentieth-century reception as well. But first, Dryden as a theorist of translation.

"Translation with latitude"

In a well-known passage of the *Examen Poeticum* (1693) John Dryden defends his preference for "paraphrase, or translation with latitude," which occupies a middle ground between the more literal "metaphrase" on the one hand, and free "imitation" on the other.¹² In his *Life of Lucian*, Dryden says the following:¹³

A translator that would write with any force or spirit of an original must never dwell on the words of his author. He ought to possess himself entirely and *perfectly comprehend the genius of his author*, the nature of the subject, and the terms of the art or subject treated of. And then he will express himself

¹¹ Harrison 1967, 7 quoting William Hayley 1782 on Lucan, Robert Heron (i.e. John Pinkerton [1785]) on Virgil.

¹² Kinsley 1961, viii. "Sure I am, that if it be a fault, 'tis much more pardonable, than that of those, who run in the other stream, of a literal, and close Translation, where the Poet is constrained so streightly to his Author's Words, that he wants elbow-room, to express his Elegancies. He leaves him obscure; he leaves him Prose, where he found him Verse." On Dryden's theory and practice, see Frost 1955, and for a good brief account, Steiner 1975, 267-70.

¹³ Thus Dryden in Watson 1962; included in Schulte and Biguenet 1992, 29-31.

as justly, and with as much life, as if he wrote an original; whereas he who copies word for word loses all spirit in the tedious transfusion ... [emphasis added]

True as that may be, and is, of the aesthetic reception of the translator's work, it immediately points to problematic aspects of translation as interpretation. The potential for a particularly insidious form of hermeneutic circularity is great. And in the "Dedication of the *Aeneis*," Dryden is quite clear about his procedure: "Some things too I have omitted, and sometimes have added of my own. Yet the omissions I hope, are but of Circumstances, and such as would have no grace in *English*; and the Additions, I also hope, are easily deduc'd from Virgil's Sense."¹⁴ We shall soon observe some of those additions.

As C. Martindale has aptly noted: "If translation is inseparable from interpretation, and if reading can profitably be seen as a form of translation, enquiry into translation becomes an important part of the hermeneutic process."¹⁵ Now Martindale is here concerned not so much with actual translation as with conceptualizing what happens when translations take place. Nevertheless, although he does not mention Dryden, his three models map well onto those of Virgil's greatest translator. In Martindale's first model translation identifies a "single, stable meaning" which it then tries to reproduce (Dryden's "metaphrase"); his second model, close to Dryden's "translation with latitude," is one in which the translation "selects and arranges elements that are 'there' in the original." Presumably those elements may with collaboration from communities of readers be judged to be not only "there," but also there. Thirdly, the most radical model, which may parallel Dryden's free "imitation": "On an alternative model, involving a more radical untying of the text, translations determine what is counted as being 'there' in the first place, and good translations thus unlock for us compelling (re)readings which we could not get in any other way" (93).

If we are not compelled by the hermeneutic created by the translation, then how can it continue to have a meaningful relationship to the original? Has not the model ceased to be? Furthermore, and more insidiously, if the original comes to be perceived through the translation, because that translation is a strong version, with claim to poetic and meaningful status of its own (but still posing at least as paraphrase), what happens to a reading that engages the translation alone? For if translation is (among other things) a form of hermeneutics, it is at the same time a particularly potent and seductive form, since it poses as a paraphrase rather than a description of a

¹⁴ Frost and Dearing 1987, 5.329.

¹⁵ Martindale 1993a, 92, and generally 92-4. He well emphasizes that translation can be used as an interpretive aid in the classroom.

poetic text in a way that other hermeneutic enterprises (commentary, interpretive writing, and the like) do not. Translations, then, may exert enormous power over the possible meanings of the original, and may control and direct reading with an authority that is not usually conceded by the reader to those other forms of interpretation or commentary. This applies particularly to translations that immediately become classics (such as Dryden's *Virgil*) and that are read in ages that identify themselves closely with the culture of the source text (as did the eighteenth century with Augustan Rome).

As P. Hammond has recently noted, Dryden, unlike Milton, wrote no Latin for publication, Hobbes and Locke both wrote in English, and from the Restoration into the eighteenth century Latin generally declined as a international language.¹⁶ In such a setting, Matthew Prior's humorous couplet also conveys the new status of translation, now as a *substitute* for the original: "Those who Love their own Tongue, we have Reason to Hope, | Have read them Translated by DRYDEN and POPE." Hammond elsewhere captures what is great in Dryden's achievement in the context of its own tradition, but also, for the reception of *Virgil*, what is highly problematic about that achievement:¹⁷

Dryden writes poetry in which the Roman poets are not guests but ghosts: in his translations from *Virgil*, *Horace*, *Ovid*, and *Lucretius* he is remaking poems from the Roman period which have a strong hold over him because of the wit or the philosophy of the original ... In quotation the Latin text enters the English in fragments, as a sign of authority elsewhere but at the same time testifying to the power of the modern author. In translation the Latin text is banished from the page, but haunts every line as we hear echoes of the ghostly original. Impossible but necessary, translation provided Dryden with the ground which he could fashion for himself, a territory where he was free to explore Roman insights about the gods, and sexuality, and death, and the loss of the homeland.

Others, Hammond most recently, have explored what Dryden did in his *Aeneis* and nothing, or little, in these pages is intended to detract from Dryden's achievement as a poet; I am concerned with what he did to the *Aeneid*, and to *Virgil*'s other poems, in the process.

"Comprehending the genius of his author"

¹⁶ Hammond 1999, 42.

¹⁷ Hammond 1999, 21.

If Dryden's procedure for translation involved a latitude that was justified by comprehending his author, as he put it, an inquiry into that comprehension will be appropriate, and we may begin with a contemporary, Luke Milbourne, who in 1698 reacted sharply: "No man can admire Virgil who can't understand him, nor can any man who understands him be pleased with Mr. D.'s translation."¹⁸ At times Milbourne is simply unhappy with the aesthetics of Dryden's translation: "'*And all the Sylvan Reign.*' I have heard Mr. D. was once a *Westminster Scholar*. Dr. Busby, I doubt, would have *whip'd* a Boy for paraphrasing *omne nemus* so *Childishly*. The *three next verses* are worthy of Mr. D. but unworthy of his *admirable* Author."¹⁹ But Milbourne, a contemporary who was therefore attuned to the political and ideological potential of the translation, at other times provides more valuable information. The "three verses" to which he here objects are Dryden's translation of Eclogue 6.11-12: *nec Phoebus gratior ulla est / quam sibi quae Vari praescrisit pagina nomen* ("and no page pleases Phoebus more than that which has the name of Varus at its head"). Here is Dryden's offending translation:

Thy name, to Phoebus and the Muses known,
 Shall in the Front of every Page be shown;
 For he who sings thy Praise, secures his own. (16-18)

The last line, expressing the reciprocity of literary patronage, is presumably what Milbourne objected to as being "worthy of Mr. D." Dryden has given us a line which finds no trace in Virgil's Eclogue, cannot be said to be "there" in any sense, but which belongs rather to the circumstances and cultural position of Dryden, not Virgil. Similarly at the end of the *Georgics*:

Caesar dum magnus ad altum
 fulminat Euphraten bello victorque volentis
 per populos dat iura viamque adfectat Olympo.
(G. 4.560-2)

Such a theme calls for six lines from Dryden:

While mighty *Caesar*, thund'ring from afar,
 Seeks on *Euphrates* Banks the Spoils of War:
 With conq'ring Arms asserts his Country's Cause,
 With Arts of Peace the Willing People draws:

¹⁸ Milbourne 1698, 30.

¹⁹ Milbourne 1698, 72.

On that glad Earth the Golden Age renews,
And his great Father's Path to Heav'n pursues.

(4.809-14)

"This is one of Mr. D's *Interpolations* ..." grumbles Milbourne (205), "Mr. D. abuses [Virgil] by presuming to teach him how to Court his *Patrons*." The source of one of his interpolations (i.e. "On that glad earth the Golden Age renews"), of which there is again not a trace at the end of *Georgics* 4, is *Aeneid* 6.791-4,²⁰ the familiar lines from Anchises on Augustus and the *aurea saecula*, lines with which this study began. Once a reader has encountered Anchises' line transplanted by Dryden to the final lines of *Georgics* 4, the effect is produced: the poem which began with the transition away from golden age is made to close with the triumphant return of that golden age, utterly false to Virgil's Latin and to his poem. The Virgilian closure is otherwise: Octavian fulminating like Jupiter, laws (absent from the real golden age) created, and the age of toil (the age of Jupiter, and of iron) secured. I might add here that the Virgilian narrator nowhere in the entire corpus with his own voice associates Augustus with the golden age. Posterity consigned Luke Milbourne to the Rare Book Library, while Dryden's "translations" lived on to produce whole genres of upbeat georgics in the eighteenth century, all with the return to a golden age featuring prominently.

Luke Milbourne's literary judgment for the most part need not detain us, and his own translations of Virgil lack any poetic merit of their own.²¹ But his sense of the political situation is another matter. Quoting Dryden's claim in the "Dedication" that he can speak more freely than French court poets (283), Milbourne (11) throws his words back at him: "*He can speak what the French durst not.*" Yet would not a *French army*, with the P. of W. at the head of it, be very welcome to Mr. D., and, without doubt, they'd make us all *Free Subjects* presently." Or again, imputing nostalgia for the days of James II (35): "Things are mightily altered with him since the days of the *Hind and the Panther*, and the *Defence of the Strong Box Papers*. This *tempora mutantur.*"

²⁰ "The sixth *Aeneid* figures in more than one-seventh of Dryden's Virgilian allusions, quotations or adaptations," Frost and Dearing 1987, 6.850.

²¹ The clergyman published his polemical Notes on Dryden's Virgil the year after the appearance of Dryden's translation (London 1698). Time has sided with Dryden's response to Milbourne's jibe that Ogilby's translation was far superior to his own: "For 'tis agreed on all hands that [Milbourne] writes even below *Ogilby*: That, you will say, is not easily done; but what cannot M__ bring about?" Sloman 1985, 239, n.2.

What of Dryden himself on his comprehension of his author? In "Postscript to the Reader" he distinguishes his own conditions from those enjoyed by Virgil:

What Virgil wrote in the vigour of his age, in plenty and at ease, I have undertaken to translate in my declining years; struggling with wants, oppressed with sickness, curbed in my genius, liable to be misconstrued in all I write; and my judges, if they are not very equitable, already prejudiced against me, by the lying character which has been given them of my morals.

These words, and his view of the *Aeneid* and its relation to Augustus, cannot be separated from his own experience in the forty years preceding publication, particularly in 1688. After the Revolution of that year Dryden lost his position as poet laureate and chief court poet, but he never lost his sense that the highest function of poetry was to advise the prince and win the people to him. A Dryden critic has put the matter succinctly: "the persona of Virgil which Dryden exhibits is, like Dryden himself, frankly practical and political. Indeed, he reduces the epic to a commentary on Augustus and his Age which is almost as narrowly topical as *Absalom and Achitophel* itself."²²

In the lengthy "Dedication to the *Aeneis*," it is inevitable that we connect Dryden's own circumstances to his vision of Virgil, a vision that recalls and validates the ex-laureate's own previous happy state: Virgil, he says:²³

Proves that it is possible for a Courtier not to be a Knave ... Obliged he was to his Master for his Bounty, and he repays him with Good Counsel, how to behave himself in his new Monarchy, so as to gain the Affections of his Subjects, and deserve to be call'd the Father of his Country.

Dryden's construction of the Virgilian political outlook is to be found first of all in the "Dedication," where, on the basis of the positive reference to Cato at *Aeneid* 8.670, he hypothesized that Virgil was a republican at heart, a reluctant supporter of the Augustan regime.²⁴ Dryden then has Virgil converting fully to the cause: "[Virgil] consider'd it in the Interest of his

²² Proudfoot 1960, 258.

²³ Frost and Dearing 1987, 283.

²⁴ Recently, scholars have suggested that Dryden's hatred of William III is tempered by republicanism, rather than nostalgia for James II; Burrow 1997; Ross 1984.

Country to be so Govern'd [by Augustus]: To infuse an awful respect into the people, towards such a Prince: By that Respect to confirm their Obedience to him; and by that Obedience to make them Happy."²⁵

Along with the larger question of Dryden's comprehension of Virgil's *Aeneid* and its political purpose is the enormously complex issue of Dryden's own view of Aeneas, Augustus and the other kingly figures in Virgil's poem; also of the parallels and equations he drew between those figures and the kings under whom he had either flourished or was in decline. Dryden's translation constantly evokes contemporary events, even if the nature and function of the evocations is not consistent but is itself ambiguous—not unlike the case of Virgil. P. Hammond well notes of Dryden's enterprise, that it "invites us to recognize both similarity and difference, and to weigh discontinuous correspondences rather than seek a totalizing allegory."²⁶ At times, as H. Erskine-Hill has shown, Aeneas, particularly from early in the poem, seems to represent the exiled James II; so the very opening of the poem where the single word *profugus* (1.2) becomes "expell'd and exil'd," which is hardly appropriate to the realities of Aeneas' flight, and where *dum conderet urbem / inferretque deos Latio* (1.5-6) is expanded in ways that immediately bring into play the British succession:²⁷

and built the destin'd Town;
His banished Gods restor'd to Rites Divine,
And settl'd sure succession in his Line. (1.6-8)

"Sure succession" alone would be evocative, even without the punning gloss "Rites Divine," conjuring up those rights of which Charles I as well as James II were stripped.²⁸ Likewise Hammond has shown how the language of restoration is woven into the motives and desires of Dryden's Aeneas: so at *Aeneis* 2.1066 his Creusa turns her Virgilian model's *illic res laetae* (2.783) into "There Fortune shall the Trojan line restore"; so Dido to Aeneas: "Were Troy restor'd and Priam's happy Reign" (4.451), while Aeneas states his preference "And *Priam's* ruin'd palace to restore" (495).²⁹ It is hard through all of this—and the contemporary Milbourne found it impossible—not to hear a Jacobite voice yearning for a second Stuart Restoration. Likewise Dryden's Jupiter is made to allude to a restoration of Catholicism, as he

²⁵ Frost and Dearing 1987, 281. Good work has been done on the preface by Zwicker 1984, 62-9, 178-88 and Hammond 1999, 219-28.

²⁶ Hammond 1999, 225.

²⁷ Erskine-Hill 1996, 203-5.

²⁸ The pun is noted in Erskine-Hill 1996, 204.

²⁹ Hammond 1999, 249, and generally 249-60.

converts the Virgilian *cana Fides ... iura dabunt* (1.292-3) into “then banish’d Faith shall once again return (1.398);³⁰ the language of banishment, return and restoration is nowhere to be found in the entire prophecy of the Virgilian Jupiter (1.257-96).

Elsewhere Dryden is openly hostile to William and Mary. Among the tortured of Virgil’s Underworld are those who commit crimes against family (6.608-9 *hic quibus inuisi fratres, dum vita manebat, / pulsatusve parens*). No reader would miss the conversion of the simply familial to the monarchical: 824-5 “Then they, whose Brothers better claim disown, Expel their parents, and usurp the Throne.” And a few lines later, Virgil’s domestic traitor (6.621-2 *vendidit hic auro patriam dominumque potentem / imposuit*) has acquired a detail that specifies William of Orange: 844-5 “To Tyrants others have their country sold, / Imposing Foreign Lords, for Foreign Gold”—with the anaphora of “Foreign” bringing out what was not there in Virgil.³¹ But as Hammond has also argued, Aeneas is not simply a Jacobite allegory, and in that he was not in lineal succession to Priam, his right action elsewhere may serve as an exemplum for how William III should conduct himself as an elective king.³²

Even more distant events of seventeenth-century history are made to revise Virgil’s poem and bring it into contemporary contexts. In 1656 John Denham had published his *Destruction of Troy*, a translation of lines 1-558 of *Aeneid* 2.³³ Although not an extreme Royalist early on in the Civil War, he attended on Charles I, and seems to have been close to him, and he deplored the regicide in a 1650 poem: “By his untimely Fate, that impious Stroke, / That sullied Earth and did Heaven’s Pity choke.”³⁴ It was perhaps in the early 1650s, while he was in contact with the exiled Prince Charles, that Denham was both working on his *Aeneid* translation and involving himself in the Royalist cause.³⁵ It is significant that his *Destruction of Troy* in fact ends at 2.558, with another headless Monarch, with the corpse of Priam on the Trojan shore: “On the cold earth lies th’ unregarded King, / A headless Carkass, and a nameless Thing” (547-8). It is hard to imagine Denham’s choice to have Troy end at this point was entirely unconnected with the recent death of Charles I. And so it is that Dryden’s intertext at this point is

³⁰ Hammond 1999, 254-6.

³¹ For these connections see Proudfoot 1960, 201; Erskine-Hill 1996, 206.

³² On this see Hammond 1999, 225-6.

³³ Parts of it, and parts of his translation of *Aen.* 3, were in fact written as early as 1636.

³⁴ *An Elegie upon the Death of Lord Hastings* 31-2; for these details on Denham, see Banks 1928, 6-9; O’Hehir (1968) 54-82.

³⁵ See Banks 1928, 15-16; O’Hehir 1968, 101-8.

noteworthy. Dryden is indebted to Denham as to many of the other Royalist translators, and he mentions him favorably in the Dedication. In fact, as Venuti has noted, Dryden "absorbed more than eighty lines of it in his own version."³⁶ For the death of Priam he in fact borrowed from Denham, with slight alteration: "On the bleak Shoar now lies the abandoned King, / a headless Carcass, and a nameless Thing" (2.762-3.) What is more noteworthy is that at this point, uniquely in his entire translation, even though he takes many lines over from predecessors, Dryden has a footnote: "*This whole line is taken from Sir John Denham.*" Could the footnote be drawing attention to the historical reference implicit in Denham's translation?³⁷

Royalist French theory

From the point of view of reception, it matters little whether Dryden was writing with nostalgia for James II or as an adviser to William III, and the two are not mutually exclusive. For the eighteenth century, the Whig ascendancy and the proliferation of the Tacitean view of Augustus and Augustanism, all that mattered was that Virgil's poem had become a poem depicting and exhorting right action by the prince and urging the obedience of his subjects. Dryden's vision for this function came from France.

Père René le Bossu

"Impartially speaking," says Dryden, "the *French* are much better Critics than the *English*, as they are worse Poets" (Dedication 287). Le Bossu is such a critic, author of the *Traité du Poème épique* of 1675, a work much read in England both in French and in English, into which it was translated (by the mysterious "W.J.") in 1695, when Dryden, who knew it in the French, was translating the *Aeneid*.³⁸ A. F. B. Clark has noted the oddity of the British obsession: "one of the strangest phenomena in the strange annals of neo-classicism is the history of le Bossu's reputation; for this man, who represents that literary *régime* at its woodenest, is most quoted in England of all the French critics."³⁹ All one need really know of this work is its central premise, which resides in its very definition of epic, a definition that fits any epic poem of classical antiquity, but would be readily embraced by Dryden: "epic is an artistically produced discourse, whose function is

³⁶ Venuti 1995, 64.

³⁷ For a somewhat different reading of the footnote, see Hammond 1999, 239-40.

³⁸ For a good, brief assessment of le Bossu, see Clark 1925, 243-61.

³⁹ Clark 1925, 243.

through instruction to form morals disguised beneath the allegories of an important narrative, which is recounted in verse in a manner which is plausible, entertaining and spectacular."⁴⁰

Peter White has demonstrated just how much of our view of ancient Roman patronage is in fact a whole-cloth creation of the seventeenth century, chiefly shaped by the court of Louis XIV, and by le Bossu in particular.⁴¹ As White notes, le Bossu "held that Virgil wrote in order to justify a change of government" (101), not just to praise Augustus, as Servius had held. Le Bossu, constantly using Virgil as his paradigm, talks of the epic poet's need to instruct the prince, and his related drive to urge the people to act in obedience to the prince. As White points out, Dryden took only the second part of this theory, that the poet (Virgil/Dryden) writes to urge obedience to the government of the prince (Augustus/James II or William III), in whose interests it is "to be so Govern'd." White discusses the modification of French thought by English political and literary writers in the eighteenth century, and we can see in the politicizing of literature and the rise of the Press the ways in which propaganda in a modern sense took hold, and was then back-formed onto Virgil, with the help of Dryden's new classic. Consequently by 1735 Pope could say "the *Aeneid* was evidently a party piece, as much as *Absalom and Achitophel*. Virgil was as slavish a writer as any of the gazetteers."⁴² The Augustan Virgil was thus firmly entrenched in England by the early eighteenth century, and his ideological status would rarely be questioned until the middle of the twentieth. And it is also the case that in generally literate non-classical circles, the Augustan Virgil remains the orthodoxy. His popularity might rise and fall depending on the political outlook of his reader, but his ideological position, which John Dryden helped to create, has rarely been doubted.

"*Spencer* wanted only to have read the rules of *Bossu*; for no Man was ever Born with a greater Genius, or had more knowledge to support it." So Dryden in his Dedication (323), again in a discussion of the superiority of French theory and its role in guiding the political program of the poet. Luke Milbourne's voice is of interest in this setting (26): "Mr. D. used to talk in Days of Yore of an *Heroic Poem* to the *Honour* of Charles II. Had it ever been finished, doubtless *Mr. Bossu's Rules* would have appeared in every line."

⁴⁰ "L'Épopée est un discours inventé avec art, pour former les moeurs par des instructions déguisées sous les allégories d'une action importante, qui est racontée en vers d'une manière vraisemblable, divertissante et merveilleuse."

⁴¹ White 1993, 95-109.

⁴² White 1993, 106, quoting Pope's friend, Joseph Spence.

As we look to the means whereby Dryden so emphatically and so effectively produced a poem to match his own political horizons, it is worth recalling his operating principle from the Dedication:⁴³

I have already said from Bossu, that a poet is not obliged to make his hero a virtuous man; therefore neither Homer nor Tasso are to be blamed, for giving what predominant quality they pleased to their first character. But Virgil, *who designed to form a perfect prince*, and would insinuate that *Augustus, whom he calls Aeneas in his poem*, was truly such, found himself obliged to make him without blemish, thoroughly virtuous; and a thorough virtue both begins and ends in piety. [emphasis added]

We will return later to the ways in which Dryden went about the task of making Virgil's Aeneas "a perfect prince," a character "without blemish." But first a second French critic, this one an editor and commentator.

Charles de la Rue

J. M. Bottkol, in a study defending Dryden's scholarly strategies for constructing his translation, writes as follows:⁴⁴

For Virgil he used almost exclusively another volume of the Dauphin's library, the very popular edition of Ruæus ... he sat with a favorite edition before him (Præteus [Juvenal], Ruæus [Virgil], Casaubon [Persius], or Cnipping [Ovid]), read the

⁴³ Frost and Dearing 1987, 5.287-8.

⁴⁴ Bottkol 1943, 242-3; Dryden also used existing translations, from which he liberally borrowed, in the case of the Earl of Lauderdale's with some infamy. Cf. Proudfoot 1960 *passim*. Since my concern is with the reception of Dryden's translation, I do not here distinguish where he adopts the wording of those predecessors, some of whom are also imposing Royalist readings on Virgil. On Dryden's liberal use of prior translation (not unusual for the day) see Proudfoot. We shift from moral ideologies to political ones. Whether or not all the details in Dryden are of his own invention, or borrowed from one of his predecessors, the text becomes "Dryden," and its influence is not diminished by the previous voices that silently inhabit it. For a stemmatics of Dryden's use of other translations, see MacPherson 1910, 74-95—a Scotsman writes a German dissertation about translations of a Latin poet into English! Dryden ("Dedication," Frost and Dearing 1987, 5.325) talks about his differences with Ruæus.

original carefully, often the Latin prose *Interpretatio*, and invariably studied the accompanying annotations.

Ruaeus' edition may have been popular, but we should not lose sight of the function of his edition, as of the Delphine editions in general: to instruct the prince. Unfortunately the lavish Latin hexameter *Epistola* is only to be found in the first edition (Paris, 1675), for it is a good specimen of encomium and sycophancy, and indicates well how Ruaeus (de la Rue, a Jesuit)⁴⁵ would handle any ideological ambiguities. It also shows how the Virgilian relationship to Augustus is tailored to fit the French court: Louis should not envy the fact that Virgil was encomiast for Augustus, he too will have a Maro for every war he fights (*totque tui quondam, quot erunt ea bella, Marones*).

Milbourne on a few occasions refers to Dryden's dependence: 73 "Ruaeus and others to whom Mr. D. is *blindly gathered*"; 122 "as Mr. D's *Dictionary* may teach him, or his friend Ruaeus' Notes": 145 "*The thin leav'd Arbutus hazle*. Here Mr. D. is misled by Ruaeus, who *misunderstanding* the Arbutus, made *horrida* signifie *thin-leav'd*; but Virgil's sense is *The true Nut is grafted on the prickly Thorn*." Dryden worked with Ruaeus' text and commentary, but for the reader of Dryden's translation the commentary recedes and becomes invisible, which leaves the "translation" with greater authority, seeming to be a representation of Virgil, but in fact representing the no longer visible arguments, often quite flimsy, of a commentator charged with producing a Virgil most congenial to the training of the prince. A famous example, and one we saw Servius struggling to neutralize, has Virgil's prince plucking the resistant golden bough:

corripit Aeneas extemplo avidusque refringit
cunctantem, et vatis portat sub tecta Sibyllae.

(Aen.6.210-11)

He seiz'd the shining bough with griping hold,
And rent away, with ease, the ling'ring gold.

(Dryden 6.303-4)

The offending *cunctantem* is done away with; worse, it has been replaced with its virtual opposite—Aeneas tore it away "with ease" as the Sibyl had said he *should*. The justification is presumably to be found in Ruaeus' commentary, which draws from the rationalization of Servius: "How is it '*lingering*' when the Sibyl had said 'it will follow easily if the Fates call

⁴⁵ For the sake of consistency with them, I have followed Dryden, Milbourne and contemporaries in using the Latinate name.

you?' The problem is solved by the word 'eager;' for to an eager person things which are quite swift seem slow."⁴⁶

Ruaeus' commentary could be usefully studied in a comprehensive way as a text providing the hidden voice of the exegete in Dryden's rewriting of Virgil, but one more example will suffice here.⁴⁷ At the beginning of *Aeneid* 11, Aeneas sets up the trophy of Mezentius' arms, including his breastplate, whose twelve perforations suggested to readers as early as Servius a ritual desecration of the corpse by each of the twelve Etruscan cities—from which Mezentius had asked Aeneas' protection at the end of Book 10. Virgil's lines are quite specific:

Aptat rorantis sanguine cristas
Telaque trunca viri, et bis sex thoraca petitum
Perfossumque locis, clipeumque ex aere sinistrae
Subligat atque ensem collo suspendit eburnam.

(*Aen.* 11.8-11)

Ruaeus' discussion at least starts out objectively, but soon becomes desperate:⁴⁸

perfossumque: Mezentius had received only two wounds from Aeneas: one in the groin (10.785), the other in the neck (907). Whence then those twelve holes in the breastplate? Servius suspects that after his death the Etruscans in their anger inflicted many blows on him, as with Hector and Tydeus. But at his death Mezentius had begged that Aeneas not expose him to the hatred of his people. I think that the number "twelve" is given for any undetermined number.

⁴⁶ Ruaeus on 6.210: "quomodo *cunctantem*, siquidem dixerat Sibylla: *faciliusque sequetur, Si te fata vocant?* Nodum solvit vox ista *avidus*: quippe avido citissima quaeque tardiora videntur."

⁴⁷ Løsnæs 1963, 115-57 has studied Dryden's dependence on Ruaeus in a limited way, skillfully showing that Dryden has access to the second edition (Paris 1682; also Amsterdam 1690; London 1687, 1695).

⁴⁸ "duo tantum vulnera Mezentius ab Aenea acceperat: alterum in inguine, *Aen.* 10.785, alterum in iugulo, *ibid.* 907. unde igitur duodecim illa thoracis foramina? suspicatur Servius eum ab Etruscis infensis post mortem fuisse multis ictibus appetitum: ut fuit Hector et Tydeus. oraverat tamen moriens Mezentius Aeneam, ne suorum odiis eum objiceret. numerum autem *duodenum*; pro quolibet incerto numero, a poeta positum puto."

Dryden presumably saw that twelve was not a plausible indiscriminate number, but Ruaeus' discussion of the implications of the violation would seem to have heightened his anxiety about the actions of his "perfect Hero." His translation removed those implications:

Above his Arms, fixed on the leafless Wood,
Appear'd his Plumy Crest besmear'd with Blood;
His brazen Buckler on the left was seen;
Truncheons of shiver'd Lances hung between:
And on the right was plac'd his Corselet, bor'd
And to the neck was ty'd his unavailing Sword.

The "breastplate aimed at and stabbed in twice six places" is diminished to "his Corselet, bor'd"—with the implication that it was Aeneas who bored it. Certainly any trace of desecration is gone, and with it the subtlety, openness and potential for oppositional meaning of the Virgilian original. Critics may argue against the suggestion in Servius; Dryden preferred to remove even the evidence for the discussion.

Jean Regnault de Segrais

Dryden also acknowledges his debt to Segrais, whose translation of Virgil, "*avec privilege du roi*," was published in two volumes in the years before Dryden began his own, but more importantly in the years in which he held a central place in the English court (Paris 1668, 1681). Dryden will have related in particular to Segrais' preface, which is in the form of a letter to Louis XIV, even more slavish than that of Ruaeus: he directly connects the greatness of the Prince to the valor of the Hero. Were Virgil to come back he would recognize in Louis the reborn Augustus, and so on. The only quality Segrais shares with Virgil, he avers, is "the same zeal for the glory of Your Majesty, that that great man had for the glory of his Prince."⁴⁹

Segrais' preface in fact contains some good material on Virgil's narrative style, on invention, and on other rhetorical aspects of the poem. But when it turns to political aspects, it is a creature of its time:

Virgil was a subject of Augustus and he lived during the splendor of the Roman Empire in the most abundant, luxurious and just century that has ever been in the whole duration of the Latin language: he spent his life under the

⁴⁹ Segrais, "Epistre au Roi": "Mais, SIRE, de toutes les qualitez de Virgile, je n'ay que ce mesme zele pour la gloire de V.M. que ce grand homme eut pour la gloire de son Prince."

reign of a prince who showered him with riches and who was one of the greatest men one could set forth as an example to others.⁵⁰

Segrais in fact, like Dryden in his Dedication, responds to those who think that Virgil in any way vitiated the perfection of his hero, perhaps most strikingly when he states (reasonably) that we should not judge the ancients by the standards of other eras. His example? No need to be concerned about the treatment of Dido (36): "Le divorce passoit à Rome pour une galanterie; & l'Empereur auquel il vouloit plaire, l'avait autorisé dans sa famille." Charles II would certainly have gone along with this, although he did not bother with divorce. This "courtly" attitude towards divorce makes Dryden, paradoxically, one of the most honest of translators of some parts of *Aeneid* 4. Aeneas' actions did not disturb him; no need therefore to change Virgil.

These, then, were the courtiers of Louis XIV who so influenced Dryden and helped shape his political reading of Virgil. We should not forget that England was at war with France for the entire period that Dryden was writing the translation.⁵¹ And all the while James II, who would outlive Dryden, was living in exile in the palace at St. Germain through the beneficence of Louis. For Dryden, the memory of James, and of the favor he and his brother had lavished on the poet, seems to have lived on through his vision of Virgil and his connection to the French Criticks he so admired, Louis' own Augustan writers, Ruæus, Segrais and le Bossu, all of them, with Dryden, truer "Augustan" writers than Virgil ever was. It may also well be the case, as Erskine-Hill has claimed, that "Dryden sees Aeneas as a 'monitory ideal' to William III, and a hero who served to highlight the sufferings, piety, and destiny of the exiled Stuarts."⁵² But again the ambiguity of Dryden's specific associations is immaterial for the issue of reception of Virgil. What matters here is what Dryden did to Virgil's "Augustus, whom he calls Aeneas in his poem."

The perfect prince: Dryden's Augustus as Aeneas

⁵⁰ Segrais, Pref. 7 "Virgile se trouva sujet d'Auguste, il vescu pendant la splendeur de l'Empire Romain dans la siecle le plus poly, le plus delicat, & le plus juste qui est jamais esté dans toute la durée de la langue Latine: Il passa sa vie sous le regne d'un Prince qui le combla de richesses, & qui est esté l'un des plus grands hommes qu'on puisse proposer aux autres pour exemple."

⁵¹ War of the Grand Alliance (1689-97).

⁵² Erskine-Hill 1996, 205.

Whatever the contemporary function of Aeneas, Dryden's view of his hero is beyond doubt, both in the translation and in the dedication, where as we saw he merged Aeneas and Augustus, and defined them so:⁵³

Virgil had consider'd that the greatest Virtues of *Augustus* consisted in the perfect Art of Governing his People; which caus'd him to Reign for more than Forty Years in great Felicity. He consider'd that his Emperour was Valiant, Civil, Popular, Eloquent, and Religious. He had given all these qualities to *Aeneas*.

Virgil gives Aeneas Piety first, "knowing that Piety alone comprehends the whole Duty of man towards the Gods; towards his Country, and towards his Relations."⁵⁴ Next he assigns him Valour "in a Heroical Degree." In this he follows Segrais, with whom he agrees that heroes, literary and historical, weep, including Achilles, who "went roaring along the salt Sea-Shore, and like a Booby, was complaining to his mother, when he should have reveng'd his Injury by Arms."⁵⁵ But when Aeneas is struck by fear of the storm in the first scene in which we see him, Dryden knows that "his fear was not for himself, but for his People." His actual translation editorializes accordingly:

extemplo Aeneae solvuntur frigore membra;
ingemit et duplcis tendens ad sidera palmas
talia voce refert ...

(Aen. 1-92-4)

Struck with unusual Fright, the Trojan Chief,
With lifted Hands and Eyes, invokes reliefs.

(1.135-6)

The effect of "unusual" is remarkable, given that as readers we have no standard by which to judge Aeneas, at least on the linear reading that Virgil assumed, and that Dryden breaches in this couplet. The addition of the word constitutes a powerful embedding of tendentious hermeneutics into the poem. Protecting Aeneas' conventional heroism is the mission here; gone is the powerful metaphor *solvuntur frigore membra*, gone the power of those words to resonate when they recur, at the other end of the poem, applied to the victim Turnus as he falls to the sword of Aeneas (12.951), gone also the

⁵³ Frost and Dearing 1987, 288.

⁵⁴ Frost and Dearing 1987, 288.

⁵⁵ Frost and Dearing 1987, 290-2.

sense that Aeneas in the storm is, like us, human and *not* perfect, the most Virgilian aspect of heroism.

A focus on these qualities in the *Aeneis*, particularly where the actions of Aeneas might be called into question, is quite instructive, for Dryden's creative manipulations, in line with the theory expressed in the Dedication, are thereby put into practice. Dryden embellishes so as to add such qualities where they were either more muted or absent from Virgil. So Virgil's *insignem pietate virum* (1.10) becomes "so brave, so just a Man" (1.14);⁵⁶ at 1.111 *miserabile visu* is "(A horrid Sight) ev'n in the Hero's view" (1.1.63); and when Aeneas emerges from his cloud and addresses Dido (594-5), with no help from the Latin Dryden has "And thus with manly Modesty he spoke" (1.833). Aeneas' depictions of his own actions in Book 2 has the hero speaking with anything but modesty. At 2.314-17, Aeneas acts with frenzy (*arma amens capio*), resolving to rush the citadel and seek a beautiful death:

arma amens capio; nec sit rationis in armis,
sed glomerare manum bello et concurrere in arcem
cum sociis ardent animi; furor iraque mentem
praecipitat, pulchrumque mori succurrit in armis.

As Harrison has noted, "Dryden's hero proceeds almost meticulously with conscious purpose, and not through fear, rage, or desperation."⁵⁷ Dryden ennobles Aeneas, assigning him courage, patriotism, and honor, none mentioned by Virgil, while removing the troubling *furor iraque*:⁵⁸

With frenzy seiz'd, I run to meet th' Alarms,
Resolved on Death, resolv'd to die in Arms:
But first to gather friends, with them t'oppose,
If Fortune favor'd, and repel the Foes:
Spurr'd by my courage, by my Country fir'd
With sense of Honour and revenge inspir'd.

(2.423-8)

⁵⁶ It is notable that Aeneas is *iustus* in the *Aeneid* only once, in the words of Ilioneus (1.544-5 *quo iustior alter / nec pietate fuit, nec bello maior et armis*), words which Dryden perhaps imports to the narrative voice at the poem's beginning; kingly justice is more an issue for Dryden than for Virgil.

⁵⁷ Harrison 1969, 157, and 152-9 for Dryden's hero as a response to the lack of courage of Virgil's Aeneas.

⁵⁸ Cf. also at the end of the poem, where Virgil's *furiis accensus et ira / terribilis* (12.946-7) becomes "Then rowz'd anew to Wrath, he loudly cries, (Flames, while he spoke, came flashing from his Eyes)."

A few lines later in response to Panthus' report of Troy's destruction, Aeneas rushes into combat:

talibus Othyraeae dictis et numine divum
in flammis et in arma feror, quo tristis Erinys,
quo fremitus vocat et sublatus ad aethera clamor.

(*Aen.* 2.336-8)

Again, Dryden interpolates on behalf of his perfect prince, who is now "well-born" and "undaunted," with the final line editorializing by replacing the recklessness of Virgil with patriotic purpose:

I Heard; and Heav'n, that well-born Souls inspires,
Prompts me, thro' lifted Swords, and rising Fires
To run, where clashing Arms and Clamour calls,
And rush undaunted to defend the Walls.

When Aeneas and the remnants of his group are drawn by the noise to Priam's palace (2.437 *protinus ad sedes Priami clamore vocati*), once more Dryden's additions underscore the heroism of the speaker:

New Clamors from th'invested palace ring:
We run to die, or disengage the King.

Dryden's second line is not only absent from Virgil; it is refuted by the plot of Book 2 since Aeneas neither dies nor disengages the king.

Scholars have noted Dryden's emphasis on Aeneas' *pietas*,⁵⁹ unsurprising given his treatment in the Dedication. It is often inserted into the text where it was at best implied by Virgil (2.766 "My Father's Image fill'd my pious Mind" for 2.561 *subiit cari genitoris imago*).⁶⁰ Likewise in Dryden's Book 12, when an arrow is shot at Aeneas, we have "A winged Arrow struck the Pious Prince" (482); likewise at 719 "The Prince, whose Piety ..." and 850 "And stretching out to Heav'n his Pious Hands." The point is not that Aeneas is impious, rather that the repeated insistence produces an emphasis and consistency absent from the original.

Where Aeneas' actions might seem excessively violent or disruptive of the *pietas* of other characters, Dryden protects his hero. At *Aeneid* 10.808-

⁵⁹ On this subject, see Garrison 1992, 234-47 and *passim*; also Hammond 1999, 261-71.

⁶⁰ This in fact translates 10.824 *mentem patriae subiit pietatis imago*, the moment following Aeneas' slaughter of Lausus, who died for his father: see below.

32, for instance, Virgil recounts Aeneas' slaying of the young Lausus, whose downfall is his pietas for his own father; and Dryden is at pains to disengage Aeneas: *Lausum increpitat Lausoque minatur* (810) has become "And thus to Lausus loud with friendly threat'ning cry'd" (1148). Lausus does not desist, and savage anger swells up in Aeneas: *nec minus ille / exsultat demens, saevae iamque altius irae / Dardanio surgunt ductori* (812-14). Dryden interpolates a humane Aeneas:

Nor thus forborn
The Youth desists, but with insulting Scorn
Provokes the ling'ring Prince: Whose Patience try'd,
Gave Place, and all his Breast with Fury fir'd (10.1151-4)

At 10.815-19 Aeneas drives (*exigit*) his forceful (*validum*) sword through the youth and buries it completely in him; the sword's point (*muco*) goes through (*transiit*) the light shield, too light for one who threatened so, and it also goes through the tunic his mother had woven from soft gold (*transiit ... tunicam molli mater quam neverat auro* 817-18)—the sense of quasi-sexual violation and of fragility crushed by overwhelming force is unmistakable.⁶¹ Dryden begins by brilliantly shifting the agency to the sword:

And lifted high the flaming Sword appears:
Which full descending, with a frightful sway,
Thro Shield and Corslet forc'd th' impetuous way. (10.1156-8)

This is followed by a more subtle change. Even the unattached sword is not permitted to go through the tunic the mother wove; that is unmentioned until we see the blood come out, and as far as Dryden's version reveals it is neither made of soft gold nor even punctured:

The purple Streams thro' the thin Armor strove,
And drench'd th' imbroider'd Coat his Mother wove.

The effect is still pathetic, but the violence of the Prince, and his violation of the mother's loving token, is greatly reduced in the process.

Dryden will not even allow other characters to question Aeneas' piety. Just before delivering her curse on Aeneas, Dido attacks him for his breaking faith:

See now the promis'd Faith, the vaunted Name,

⁶¹ See Adams 1982, 19-22 for the metaphorical status of weapons (*muco* included).

The Pious Man, who, rushing through the Flame,
 Preserv'd his Gods; and to the Phrygian Shore
 The burthen of his feeble Father bore! (4.857-60)

The first line convicts the hero of breaking his word to Dido (as she sees it), as with “see now” she contrasts his behavior with his earlier piety in rescuing Anchises from Troy. But Virgil’s Dido had a more fundamental and devastating charge:

en dextra fidesque,
 quem secum patrios aiunt portare penatis,
 quem subiisse umeris confectum aetate parentum!
 (Aen. 4.597-9)

For Virgil’s Dido Aeneas’ present actions are in no ways out of character, for *aiunt* “implies that Aeneas’ *pietas* was all a traveller’s tale.”⁶²

Misquotation

P. Hammond writes of the way Dryden’s quotation, cited from memory, often becomes neo-Latin: “These ‘misquotations’ are not signs of an unscholarly carelessness, but creative refashionings of texts which had long ago lodged in his memory and become transposed into something new.”⁶³ This rewriting of the model achieves a text that fits the perfection in his hero—almost like a form of cento. In a discussion of the unqualified heroism of Aeneas in the preface he downplays the fact that Jupiter tips the balance by sending the Dira against Turnus and Juturna; he maintains it is a metaphorical sign of the greater strength of Aeneas, and of the inevitability of Turnus’ death. In the course of this he twice quotes Turnus’ words to Aeneas, obviously from memory (Dedication 316, 317):

“non me tua turbida virtus
 terret” ait; “dii me terrent et Jupiter Hostis”

“It is not your wild valor that terrifies me,” he said, “the gods and a hostile Jove terrify me.”

Thereby even Turnus is made to confess the courage of Aeneas. The problem, of course, is that Virgil wrote:

⁶² Austin 1955, 175.

⁶³ Hammond 1999, 56.

non me tua fervida terrent
dicta, ferox; di me terrent et Iuppiter hostis (12.894-5)

In the Virgilian reality, at the end of the *Aeneid*, *virtus* in the face of the Dira's assault is ascribed to Turnus (12.913 *quacumque viam virtute petivit*), something which Dryden will not allow (12.1319-20 "whatever means he try'd / All force of Arms, and points of Art employ'd"—not quite *Virtus*). Dryden has rather assigned the quality to Aeneas, and has Turnus acknowledge it, when it was never in Virgil's Latin. Virgil's "boiling words" have become Dryden's "turbulent valor," and Turnus' designation of Aeneas as *ferox* has been quietly dropped, replaced with a metrical filler (*ait*). Whether the misquotation is willful or accidental the effect is transformative of Virgil.⁶⁴

Erasing ambiguity

For Dryden literal translation of the model is to be avoided, for it "leaves him obscure."⁶⁵ But what if he was obscure in his original? Another translator, more than a century later, would answer that question:⁶⁶

The obscurity one often finds in the writings of the ancients—*Agamemnon* presents an excellent example of this—is a result of the brevity and the boldness with which thoughts, images, emotions, memories, atonements, as they come out of the impassioned soul, are linked together with a disdain for any mediating connective sentences. As one thinks oneself into the mood of the poet, into his time, into the characters he puts on the stage, the obscurity gradually fades and is replaced by an intense clarity.

⁶⁴ Oddly, Dryden's actual translation is further confused (12.1295-6) "No threats of thine my manly mind can move: / 'Tis hostile Heav'n I dread, and partial Jove"; Turnus now claims for himself a "manly mind"; *ferox* is still missing. Cf. also the translation of Mezentius' words to the victorious Aeneas (10.900-1), where even an enemy is not allowed to use a negative epithet (*amare*) of our perfect hero: *hostis amare, quid increpitas mortemque minaris? / nullum in caede nefas, nec sic ad proelia veni*. "Why these insulting words, this waste of breath, / To souls undaunted, and secure of death?"

⁶⁵ Cf. Kinsley 1961, viii.

⁶⁶ Von Humboldt 1816, 59.

That may be an admirable aim in a translator, but these words also expose the hermeneutical pitfalls of thinking oneself into the mood of the poet and in particular into his time. The clarity which emerges, and which replaces the apparent obscurity of the original, may be more constructed by the translator than that very obscurity which he first experienced.

True to his sense of Virgil as the poet of a wholly beneficent prince, Dryden was constantly at pains, even outside the *Aeneid*, to remove any hint of ambiguity in the Virgilian depiction of Rome or of Octavian. So in the first *Eclogue*, where we find Meliboeus evicted from his pastoral realm, there is a clear indictment of what is unmistakably a Roman soldier, and we saw the Servian commentary struggling with the identity of that soldier (Octavian's or Antony's?) (70-2):

impius haec tam culta novalia miles habebit,
 barbarus has segetes. en quo discordia civis
 produxit miseros: his nos consevimus agros!

An impious soldier will take possession of these well-tilled fields, a foreigner of these crops—look to what point of misery has strife brought the people: for such as these have we sowed our fields!

It is hard to separate *impius* ... *miles* from *barbarus*, and indeed from the perspective of Meliboeus the three words almost form a single entity. But Dryden easily broke up the group (97-9):

Did we for these barbarians plant and sow?
 On these, on these, our happy fields bestow?
 Good heav'n! What dire effects from civil discord flow!

The tricolon is most effective, and gives a good sense of the original Virgilian pathos and indignation; but the *impius miles*, the soldier of Rome, the displacing veteran of Servius and the whole biographical tradition, is gone, to be replaced by a generic "barbarian," who offers the reader evasion of the more troubling implications in *miles*.

A similar moment comes in the *Georgics*, at the end of Book 2, where the idealized life of the farmer is contrasted in Virgil's well-known priamel with those of rulers, politicians, and military figures (495-512). Nothing perturbs the man who knows the gods of the country—neither the vagaries of political life, nor regal trappings, not civil strife or Dacian uprisings, nor "the affairs of Rome and kingdoms which must fall" (498):

non res Romanae perituraque regna

We will recall Servius' attempt to keep *peritura* completely uninvolved in *res Romanae*; as he said "*non enim Romano male dixit imperio.*"⁶⁷ Against this attempt Latinity fairly easily attaches both nouns *apo koinou* to the participle; in other words we seem to be dealing with a potential ambiguity. Dryden's rewriting is brilliant: he was able to maintain the balance of the Virgilian line, but at the same time to neutralize it from the perspective of ideology (711-12):

Nor with a superstitious fear is awed,
For what befalls at home, or what abroad.

"At home" and "abroad" preserve the balance of the original, though antithesis is stronger, and *peritura* is reduced to the ideologically anemic "befalls," a word with no meaningful connection to "fall" in the sense meant by *peritura*. Dryden has given us *domi militiaeque*.

Again, at *Georgics* 2.170-2, we find rewriting and antithesis used to remove ambiguity:

et te, maxime Caesar,
qui nunc extremis Asiae iam victor in oris
imbellem avertis Romanis arcibus Indum.

and you, greatest Caesar, who now, victorious on the furthest
shores of Asia, turn the unwarlike Indian away from the
citadels of Rome.

We have already discussed this passage in its Servian context;⁶⁸ here is Dryden's solution (237-40):

And mighty Caesar, whose victorious arms
To furthest Asia carry fierce alarms,
Avert unwarlike Indians from his Rome,
Triumph abroad, secure our peace at home.

The final line, again involving the antithesis "abroad" and "at home," is an interpretation of the Virgilian passage. Where the original has Octavian at the ends of the earth, somewhat oddly (as it seemed to Servius, not just to some of us moderns) averting the unwarlike, in a scenario that is at least ideologically open, Dryden offers a way out *via* "defensive imperialism"

⁶⁷ See Thomas, 118-19.

⁶⁸ See Thomas, 121.

("Triumph abroad, secure our peace at home")—which is fine so long as we recognize that this is an interpretation, not just a translation or representation. He has offered us something that not all readers will agree was "there" in the Latin.

Turnus and the end

Following the lion-simile at the beginning of the twelfth book, Turnus blazes, his violence growing: *haud secus accenso gliscit violentia Turno* (12.9). Dryden responds:

So Turnus fares; his Eye-balls flash with Fire
Through his wide Nostrils Clouds of Smoke expire
(12.15-16)

And again, following his pledge to bring down Aeneas:

Thus while he raves, from his wide Nostrils flies
A fiery Stream, and Sparkles from his Eyes.
(12.157-8)

At least "eyes" are in the Latin, but whence the "wide nostrils" emitting "Clouds of Smoke" and a "fiery Stream?" The effect is first of all to tie him closely to the animals of three similes juxtaposed to these passages (lion and bull), particularly since Virgil at 12.115 describes the horses of the Sun as having lifted nostrils (*elatis naribus*), for which Dryden gives "From out their flaming Nostrils breath'd the Day" (176). Indeed Dryden creates his own examples of "trespass" by blurring the demarcation of tenor and vehicle. But the effect also verges on the grotesque, which may be the intention, and another possibility presents itself. Watkins has noted that Turnus in the Middle Ages was equated with the Devil, a connection that is made, for instance, in Maphaeus Vegius' "Thirteenth Book of the *Aeneid*."⁶⁹ Dryden surely could have known this tradition, and if he did, he may well have had in mind a familiar intertext. At *Paradise Lost* 10.272-81, Sin and Death share an exchange prior to leaving the Gates of Hell and passing into the world. Death is compared to a carrion bird:

So saying, with delight he snuffed the smell

⁶⁹ Watkins 1995, 108, quoting Vegius *De Perseverantia Religionis* I.iiii.x *Tum priusque [Aeneas] promissam latio quietam assequatur turnum id est dyabolum infestum habet* "Then before Aeneas gains his promised rest in Latium he meets his enemy Turnus, i.e. the Devil."

Of mortal change on earth. As when a flock
 Of ravenous fowl, though many a league remote,
 Against the day of battle, to a field,
 Where armies lie encamped, come flying, lured
 With scent of living carcasses designed
 For death the following day, in bloody fight;
 So scented the grim feature, and upturned
 His *nostril wide* into the murky air,
 Sagacious of his quarry from so far.

Dryden may already have played on Milton's lines, with his translation of the love-crazed mares of *Georgics* 3.274:

The Mares to Cliffs of rugged Rocks repair,
 And with *wide Nostrils snuff* the Western Air.
 (Dryden, *Georgics* 3.430-1)

Whether animalized or diabolical, Dryden's Turnus is here transformed.

The end of Virgil's *Aeneid* is one place where many readers have found it difficult to sustain Dryden's paradigm of "thoroughly virtuous" Aeneas, and where Augustan criticism has struggled most keenly to keep the genie in the bottle. Turnus has seemed to such readers to die in a way that at least shifts attention and even sympathy away from Aeneas, resulting in a complicating of the ethical status of the close. Other responses to the end will occupy us in Chapter 9; for now here is Dryden's version:

ast illi solvuntur frigore membra
 vitaeque cum gemitu fugit indignata sub umbras.
 (*Aen.* 12.951-2)

The streaming blood distain'd his arms around:
 And the disdainful Blood came rushing thro' the wound.

Vita indignata, that moving and vivid phrase, has become "disdainful blood," a reversion to the characterization of Turnus at his most brutal—a characterization absent from the end of the poem. It combines powerfully in paronomasia with "distained" in the preceding line.⁷⁰ But it does more than that: as with "befall" as a representation of *peritura*, so here "disdainful"

⁷⁰ Noted by Corse 1991, 25. For different readings of these intratexts, see Erskine-Hill 1996, 213-15 and Hammond 1999, 238-9. Neither is aware of Corse's study and neither treats the death of Camilla, which is central to my view of Dryden's purpose, on which more below.

misrepresents and exploits the linguistic connection to *indignata*. And *cum gemitu* is gone, omitted.

Now it is well known that Virgil had also used the poem's last line for the death of Camilla (11.831), thereby creating one of the most powerful pieces of intratextuality in the poem. The "thoroughly virtuous" Aeneas is uninvolved in Camilla's death, however, and so the great poet Dryden is free to match Virgil's poetry, which he does:

In the last Sigh her struggling Soul expires,
And murm'ring with Disdain, to Stygian Sounds retires.

Dryden in fact talked about the phenomenon of Virgilian repetition, as Corse has noted:⁷¹ "Dryden says, in his Dedication, that he 'found it very painful to vary Phrases, when the same sense' returned upon him; he excuses himself, however, by referring us to Virgil: 'Even he himself, whether out of necessity or choice, has often express'd the same thing [thought or sense] in the same words' (5:333-34)." It may thus seem odd that in the case of the deaths of Camilla and Turnus, where we have the fairly rare phenomenon of precise Virgilian repetition extending over an entire line, Dryden should fail to do precisely what he apologizes for being about to do. So important was it for him to deny to Turnus the pathetic Virgilian death he permitted to Camilla.

As Corse has noted, Dryden does however ally the dying Turnus to another warrior, notably the dying Mezentius;⁷² the parallel is clear and close:

The Crimson Stream distain'd his Arms around:
And the disdainful Soul came rushing thro' the Wound.
(10.1312-13)

It is worth considering the Latin describing the death of Mezentius, since it is clear that the verbal approximation of Mezentius to Turnus is a creative act performed by Dryden, not by Virgil:

haec loquitur, iuguloque haud inscius accipit ensem
undantique animam diffundit in arma cruore. (10.907-8)

⁷¹ Corse 1991, 25-6.

⁷² Corse 1991, 25; he is not interested in ideology and seems mainly concerned with the fact that Dryden took the phrase "disdainful Soul" from Spenser's *The Faerie Queen* (2.11.42).

Here is the origin for the phrase "distain'd his arms," an expression to be found in the Latin describing the death of Mezentius, but nowhere in that at the end of *Aeneid* 12. Dryden's revision unites these adversaries of Aeneas and at the same time through the words "disdainful Blood" characterizes them in ways absent from the Virgilian text. My guess, moreover, is that the use of "disdainful" ultimately comes not from the Latin *indignata* at the end of the poem (although there is an etymological connection there), but rather from the opening characterization of Mezentius in the catalogue of Book 7, where the Etruscan warrior is designated *asper ... contemptor divum Mezentius* (647-8), which Dryden has rendered thus:

Mezentius first appear'd upon the Plain:
Scorn sate upon his Brows and sour Disdain,
Defying Earth and Heav'n.

Dryden's brilliant ending convicts Turnus of "guilt by association." Virgil's poem had it otherwise.

Readers who encountered their Virgil *via* Dryden will have found him familiar and domesticated, that is familiar to their own literary, linguistic and cultural context. L. Venuti has recently developed the theory of translation presented by Friedrich Schleiermacher who in 1813 argued for essentially two opposed methods of translation: "Either the translator leaves the author in peace, as much as possible, and moves the reader towards him; or he leaves the reader in peace, as much as possible, and moves the author towards him."⁷³ Virgil finds little peace in John Dryden's translation; he is moved to the reader's and the translator's territory, and the disruption of Virgil was all the greater for Dryden's belief in the contiguity of his own and Virgil's societies. Venuti puts it so:⁷⁴

Translation is the forcible replacement of the linguistic and cultural difference of the foreign text with a text that will be intelligible to the target-language reader ... Whatever difference the translation conveys is now imprinted by the target-language culture, assimilated to its positions of intelligibility, its canons and taboos, its codes and ideologies. The aim of translation is to bring back a cultural other as the same, the recognizable, even the familiar; and this aim always risks a wholesale domestication of the foreign text, often in highly self-conscious projects, where translation serves an

⁷³ Venuti 1995, 19-20, quoting Lefevere 1977.

⁷⁴ Venuti 1995, 18.

appropriation of foreign cultures for domestic agendas,
cultural, economic, political.

The domestication and appropriation of Aeneas as seventeenth-century prince is only part of the story of Dryden's translation. It is time now to see how he deals with Dido, the foreign, eastern queen of Carthage.

*The Occasion of Thucydides'
History of the Peloponnesian War*

Mark Munn¹

I begin with a question: *Why* did Thucydides write history? According to some, discussion of this subject can be very short. We should simply consult what Thucydides says himself. Shortly after the opening of his work, in 1.22.4, he declares that he wrote so that:

Those who will want a clear understanding of the past as well as of the future, which at some time or other, as far as human nature is concerned, will occur again in much the same way, will have in this a sufficiently useful guide. It is compiled not for a contest of the moment but as a possession for all time.

He wrote, in other words, to provide an enduring record, and that is all that needs to be said on the subject. After all, why does any writer write, or any artist create, except to fulfill some inner drive to leave a lasting expression of our transient existence?

This is surely true, but—I would have to reply—why did Thucydides choose to express existence in the form of *history*? History, as Thucydides states, is devoted to the pursuit of an understanding of events in terms of

¹ I am grateful to the graduate students of the Department of Greek, Latin and Classical Studies at Bryn Mawr College for their invitation to prepare the following paper. This essay is an expansion of aspects of the interpretation of Thucydides that I have presented in *The School of History: Athens in the Age of Socrates* (California, 2000), esp. 1-12 and 300-327. In preparing this version of the paper, I have benefited from the comments of my Bryn Mawr audience, in particular from Julia Gaisser and James Wright. A portion of this essay has also been presented at the 133rd annual meeting of the American Philological Association in Philadelphia, January 6, 2002, and I am indebted to members of that audience, and in particular to Steward Flory and Daniel Tompkins, for their comments and criticisms. My gratitude is in no way conditioned by the agreement of these scholars with my arguments.

human nature. What is the nature of historical understanding that Thucydides was so instrumental in defining? According to some, the answer to this question must be long—precisely as long as the history that Thucydides has left to us. The understanding *is* his history itself, in other words, which becomes permanent and enduring through writing it down.

I am neither so frivolous as to present the short answer, nor so presumptuous as to labor over the long one. Instead, I invite you to look with me in between, for the intersection between the course of historical events and the experience, within those events, of the author himself, in search of the particular motivation of Thucydides for the particular task that he undertook. This is what I propose to do in this paper: to outline a new understanding of why Thucydides wrote history and, through this, to indicate a new understanding of how historical knowledge is historically grounded.

I fully realize, however, when in dealing with an author as fundamental and as difficult as Thucydides, that scholarly viewpoints are not lightly changed. So, even if I do not succeed in persuading you of my answer, I hope that you will at least be convinced of the importance of making the effort to answer this question: Why did Thucydides write history?

Those who accept a short answer to this question are encouraged to do so by our contemporary perspective on his work. From our point of view, Thucydides' resonant description of a work written as a *ktēma es aiei* has been verified by the test of time. For we, who live in Thucydides' "ever after," certainly continue to treasure his *ktēma* as our own "possession." We do so for a host of reasons. Simply by virtue of its subject matter—Athens, Sparta, empire, war—it lies at the core of the study of Greek history. By virtue of its form and masterful execution I would assert—with all due respect to Herodotus—that Greek historiography otherwise is either prologue or epilogue to Thucydides. More than any other, his work has established the parameters for the debate about what a historical narrative of *any* period should be. Whether in emulation, rejection, or reconfiguration of his prototype, historians have ever after acknowledged their debts to Thucydides in matters such as chronological rigor, thematic focus (on war and politics), the political science of human behavior (leaving gods to one side), the use of speeches (with its testimony to the power of rhetoric), and—the trickiest of issues—his standards of objectivity and critical use of sources.²

But standards of objectivity and the critical use of sources are *subjective* issues. As soon as we begin to recognize how much these matters depend upon Thucydides' choices, we begin to appreciate the importance of the

² The influence of Thucydides may be gauged in a small sample of the opinions of both classicists (Momigliano 1961/1990, 29-53; Connor 1984, 3-19) and non-classicists (Collingswood 1946, 28-31; Egan 1978; Robinson 1985).

understated presence of the author within his work. Our perspective, looking back on his work, is not identical to his, as he contemplated undertaking it. And when we probe below the surface, into Thucydides' unexpressed motives, then all of the defining qualities in his work must be examined. To answer the question, why did Thucydides write, we must also understand *when* he wrote, and *how* he wrote—and in particular, how he compiled the speeches that he reports. In other words, we must confront the “composition question.”

The “Composition Question”

As surely as rivers find their way to the sea, so Thucydidean scholars inevitably end by subordinating their researches to the ‘composition question.’³

This is a most vexed question, and one which students of Thucydides have spent most of the past half-century tip-toeing around. Let me give a brief precis of its nature.

We have already noticed Thucydides' concise statement of *why* he wrote. As to *when*, at the opening of his work, he states that he wrote “beginning as soon as the war began, expecting that it would be a great war and more noteworthy any of those in the past” (1.1.1). Further along, in book 5, he states that he lived through the whole of the twenty-seven-year war, and paid constant attention to what was going on. This process was aided, he tells us, by the fact that for nearly three quarters of the duration of the war, he was in exile from Athens and therefore had the opportunity to be in contact with men on both sides of the conflict. From these statements, it is commonly deduced that Thucydides began composing his work when the war began in 431 and continued writing while the war was in progress. But the project was left unfinished, for it breaks off in the midst of the events of 411, the twenty-first year of the war.

From these data—that he wrote while the war was in progress and that he left it incomplete—it is commonly assumed that Thucydides died soon after the war, before he was able to complete his task. Remarkably, however, since passages in books 1, 2, 5, 6, and 7 refer to conditions after the end of the war, Thucydides clearly made substantial revisions to what he had already written even before he had finished his narrative of the whole war.

This observation raises a problem, according to some the central problem, of “the composition question,” namely, which passages were

³ So Virginia Hunter, from her 1973 book (which began as a Bryn Mawr dissertation), *Thucydides the Artful Reporter*, 4.

written early and which were revised after the end of the war? Those who pursue these questions, seeking to separate out the various “layers” of composition revealed, like archaeological strata, are sometimes called “analysts.”⁴ Close study of the text of Thucydides, sometimes almost word by word, pursued by the “analysts,” has yielded many shrewd observations. But this approach imposes a serious handicap on the study of Thucydides: it can produce no articulate answer to our overarching question, *why* did Thucydides write? It is the “analysts” who must resort either to the short answer—he wrote in order to record the past—or the long answer—which is to review each “fact” that he recorded. According to the “analyst” approach, there is no middle ground.

As a demonstration of my point, let me quote two leading “analyst” scholars on this subject. Kenneth Dover, one of the contributors to the *Historical Commentary on Thucydides* begun by Arnold Gomme, has written, “I feel no need to ask *why* Thucydides wrote.”⁵ For Dover, the joy of recording the past is sufficient explanation. Simon Hornblower, also the author of a multi-volume *Commentary on Thucydides*, is only slightly less dismissive of our question when he writes: “We have no easy clue as to what kind of enterprise he thought he was engaged in.”⁶

Both Dover and Hornblower shy away from formulating an answer to our question because, I submit, the very premise of their approach forces them to view all of the relevant evidence as disarticulated bits, scattered across time. Thucydides wrote and revised, according to them, by fits and starts across time, and never articulated a single viewpoint. The resulting work must speak for itself—like events themselves, from different times, in different voices. The “analyst” approach, in effect, forbids any conclusion to the question, *why* did Thucydides write, beyond the tautological answer, because he wished to record events. This inability of “analysts” to generalize may in fact explain their need to particularize, and therefore may

⁴ Simon Hornblower’s article on “Thucydides” in the third edition of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (1996), 1520-21, provides a useful survey of the development of “analyst” scholarship and its aftermath. Hornblower’s article is presented as an appendix to the article by H.T. Wade-Geary (1996), 1516-19, originally published in the first edition (1949), which is a concise presentation of the “analyst” point of view.

⁵ Dover 1983/1988, 53.

⁶ Hornblower 1987, 8. Hornblower might object to being classed simply as an “analyst,” and it is certainly true that his work is by no means “simply” of this cast (see his review of scholarship, including his own, in the *OCD*³ 1996, pp. 1520-21). The assumptions of successive stages of composition do, however, fundamentally underlie and inform his interpretation of Thucydides, particularly in this question of purpose.

explain why Hornblower has felt the need to express his own many insights into Thucydides' work in the form of another multi-volume commentary, almost as extensive as the one that took Gomme, Dover and Andrewes nearly four decades to complete.

Counterposed to the "analyst" school of progressive composition are the "unitarians" who see no true fault-lines within Thucydides' work. Relying on the several references to the final outcome of the war that are scattered throughout, "unitarians" argue that the whole of the work represents a post-war viewpoint. According to various formulations of this interpretation, the coherence of Thucydides' work derives either from the thoroughness of his revisions, undertaken after the war was over, or from the fact that the very idea of writing history came to Thucydides only after the war. I am an advocate of the latter, perhaps more "fundamental unitarian" viewpoint, a minority view which until now has been best represented by John Finley in his various works on Thucydides. Probably the majority of Thucydides scholars today subscribe to some form of the former, "unity-through revision," or let's call it, "progressive unitarian" view most influentially argued by Jacqueline de Romilly, in her book, *Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism*.⁷

The "progressive unitarian" approach is a sort of compromise understanding of Thucydides' history. It has allowed scholars to defer judgment on the "composition question" and get on with discussing other aspects of the work. In this respect, it has been a boon to scholarship. Ultimately, however, the compromise is not a solution. For it fails to deal with the second major problem of the "composition question": at what stage of the work the speeches were composed.

When were the Speeches Composed?

Because book 8, the final and evidently incomplete book of Thucydides' work, has no speeches recorded in direct discourse as are found in all other books of his work, it is widely assumed that the speeches were the last element to be "worked up" in Thucydides' process of final revision. This deduction poses what some consider to be the most troublesome problem of the "composition question," the question of the authenticity of the speeches.

The speeches are the most distinctive aspect of Thucydides' manner of recording history. They are a major element in the creation of a sense of "presence" that his work conveys. More than this, the speeches are a fundamental aspect of the narrative structure of Thucydides' account of the war. They were the medium through which the forces of war were placed in motion. Through them, especially in the counter-posed debates that

⁷ De Romilly 1947/1963, esp. 344-54.

Thucydides frequently depicts, we witness the moods and attitudes in which options were weighed and decisions were made. They are a fundamental aspect, in other words, of “the clear understanding of the past” that Thucydides has promised to provide. But if the speeches were written up only after the war was over, in most cases decades after they were delivered, how faithful to what was actually spoken are they likely to be?

Thucydides tells us, in effect, that he intends to record both what was said and what was done in the war as accurately and literally as possible. The majority of scholars credit Thucydides’ claim to accuracy regarding his narrative of events by supposing that he gathered information and wrote his narrative as the war went along. The accuracy, even the vividness of Thucydides’ narrative, then, is seen as the direct result of the proximity of original composition to the events themselves. But the commonly accepted notion of progressive composition, which puts the speeches into the narrative last of all, stands on its head Thucydides’ similar claim to accuracy in the speeches.

This is a quandary from which no student of this period of history can escape. As Geoffrey de Ste. Croix has put it, near the beginning of his *Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War*,

A modern historian who makes considerable use, as we all must, of the History of Thucydides ought to begin by explaining to his readers ... in what light he sees the History. In particular he should discuss his attitude to the speeches, so that it will be clear what criteria he has employed when utilising the evidence they provide, and how these criteria differ from those he has applied when using the narrative passages.⁸

The usual result of this process of confession is a statement somewhat to the effect of that made by Harvey Yunis, in his *Taming Democracy*: “the speeches are plausible fiction.”⁹ More serious, in my view, than the question of the relationship between Thucydides’ speeches and the words that were actually spoken is what this process of composing “plausible fiction” means to our understanding of Thucydides’ emphasis on the accuracy of his account, of words as well as deeds. Do we need to grant Thucydides a double standard, as de Ste. Croix implies? If Thucydides can invent “plausible fiction” to put in the mouth of a Pericles or a Cleon or a Socrates, how can we tell where he draws the line of creative license anywhere else?

⁸ De Ste. Croix 1972, 5.

⁹ Yunis 1996, 62.

What did Thucydides begin to write in 431?

I will take up de Ste. Croix's challenge and explain in what light I see the history, and, in particular, my attitude to the speeches. The speeches, which purport to be the words of others, are in fact the key to our understanding of how Thucydides wrote his history, and why.

We must begin by reconsidering what Thucydides might have meant when he said that he began writing as soon as the war broke out. This statement is of cardinal importance to the notion of the accuracy of Thucydides. But *what* was it that Thucydides began to write as soon as the war began? Could it really have been history? Or notes for the first draft of his history? Why should he have thought of writing anything like a history of the war in the first place? For one thing, no one had ever done such a thing. At the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, Herodotus had not yet written his *Histories*, or had certainly not yet finished them, since they mention several events that took place after the beginning of the Peloponnesian War in 431.¹⁰ I suggest that we set aside as improbable the notion that Thucydides set out from the first to write history, and consider instead what someone in Thucydides' position, at the beginning of the war, was most likely to have been writing.

Thucydides was a well-born, wealthy Athenian with ambitions for a public career in the early years of the war. We can be certain of this since he tells us himself that he controlled gold mines in Thrace, and he was an elected general sent to a command in Thrace in 424. We may take it for granted (since his work provides such abundant evidence) that he was as interested in rhetoric as any politically ambitious Athenian must have been at that time. This fascination with the power of rhetoric is well attested in the 420's. It is typified by the fame of Gorgias of Leontini's arrival at Athens in 427. In the same year, we find that it is also a feature of the Athenians which the demagogue Cleon blasted when he criticized the assembled Demos for re-opening the debate over the fate of Mytilene:

You have become regular speech-spectators ... You are slaves of novel expression, and despise the commonplace, and most of all each one of you wants to be able to give a speech himself, or failing that, you regard yourselves as competitors with those who speak such novelties, not wanting to appear to

¹⁰ On at least four occasions, Herodotus refers to events in the war that began in 431: 6.91 (Aeginetans expelled in 431); 6.98 (war between the leaders of Greece, after 431, probably after the death of Artaxerxes in 424); 7.137 (the Athenians arrest Spartan envoys, 430); 9.73 (the Spartans leave Deceleia unravaged, after 431).

be left behind by the argument, but applauding a point already the instant it is made and eager to grasp beforehand what is being said ... To put it bluntly, you are overwhelmed by the pleasures of listening, and have come to resemble the audience of sophists more than people who are deliberating affairs of state!¹¹

This conspicuous fascination with rhetoric must have been demonstrated in some visible behavior among the Athenians in the assembly. The behavior is not likely to have been mere anticipatory applause—how could applause show that “each one of you wants to be able to give a speech himself”? And what does the audience of sophists *look* like, as opposed to an assembly deliberating the affairs of state?

I suggest that what irritates Cleon here is that members of his audience are taking notes on his speech. And they are talking among themselves about the speech as they are scribbling their notes, nodding knowingly at each other whenever the speaker takes a predictable turn, and asking each other what that new word or turn of phrase was when the speaker coins a novelty. They are so visibly preoccupied with the words being spoken that Cleon could accuse them of failing to realize that the real point lay in the world of facts and events beyond the speeches of the assembly. Such a preoccupation with words, spoken and written, *could* be described as disrespectful of the real point of the meeting and certainly *would* make the event look more like a gathering of the students of Gorgias.

Further evidence to confirm this picture comes from Aristophanes. In the *Knights*, Aristophanes describes a group of young men who should have something better to do but instead waste their time discussing and dissecting the modes of expression that they heard Phaeax employ to good effect in his recent court case.¹² Writing is not mentioned here, but it is easy to imagine that what they are doing is comparing their various written notes on the speech so as to get a more complete, or more accurate, sense of the whole speech. Writing *is* mentioned in another Aristophanic scene from the same decade, confirming that the writing of notes on speeches was a commonplace occurrence. In the *Wasps*, Bdelucleon challenges his father, Philocleon, to a rhetorical contest to see who has a better grasp of how politics work at Athens. As the old “Lover-of-Cleon” gets ready to deliver his speech, the sophisticated young “Detester-of-Cleon” says to a slave:

“Bring me my chest right away, and *then* he’ll see what he’s made of, if that’s how he wants it.”

¹¹ Thucydides 3.38.5-7.

¹² Aristophanes *Knights*, 1375-83.

The chest (*kiste*) is evidently Bdelucleon's briefcase, for it contains his writing implements, as his next remarks show:

"And *whatever* he says, I'll write down in my notes (*mnemosyna grapsomai*)."

Later, in his father's speech, Bdelucleon has two further asides:

"I'll just make a note of that argument ..."

and

"A second point for me to write ... and I'll take note of the other points you mention ..."¹³

Here the devices that annoy Cleon have become comic props, and they verify that it was common, at least among those who pretend to rhetorical sophistication, to take notes on speeches *as they are being delivered*. They did this in order to pick the speeches apart afterward, either in direct rebuttal (which is what Bdelucleon does), or in a discussion group among those who want to learn just exactly how the clever speaker constructed his argument.¹⁴ How might this have been done? Herodotus attests the recording of oracles on writing tablets as they were spoken.¹⁵ Aeschylus presents Prometheus, at the opening of a lengthy speech, advising his listeners to "inscribe the story in the tablets (*deltoi*) of your mind."¹⁶ True, this is a figure of speech, but it must be based on some familiarity with the actual practice of committing spoken words directly into writing, such as Aristophanes depicts. As to how *much* could be transcribed, and how quickly, we can only conjecture. The

¹³ Aristophanes *Wasps*, 530-31, 539, 559, 576-77.

¹⁴ Running transcripts jotted down during a speech must have been on *deltoi* or *deltia*, wax-covered writing tablets. Herodotus attests the recording of oracles on writing tablets (*deltoi*) as they were spoken: 1.47, 8.135. The practice of committing memorable words directly into writing was well enough known for Prometheus, in the Aeschylean *Prometheus Bound* 789, to use the figure of speech, "inscribe the story in the tablets (*deltoi*) of your mind," as a way of urging his audience to attend closely to his words.

¹⁵ Herodotus 1.47, 8.135.

¹⁶ *Prometheus Bound* 789 (if it is by Aeschylus); cf. Aeschylus *Suppliants* 179.

likelihood is that notes were fragmentary and served largely as mnemonic prompts.¹⁷

This would account for Cleon's characterization of his audience of would-be speech-givers as "not wanting to appear to be left behind by the argument ... and eager to grasp beforehand what is being said," yet visibly responding to neologisms by "applauding a point already the instant it is made." This audience had cultivated the habit of recognizing (and therefore predicting) conventional phrases, and so was all the more impressed—and eager to write the novelty down—when a new trope was introduced. Such habits would also account for Aristophanes' vignette of young men gathered in the perfumer's shop appraising each technical trope of the speech of Phaeax, as if each listener were offering his partial notes to the group for the purpose of reconstructing the whole speech.¹⁸ Testimony to the manner in which Socrates' various conversations were later "remembered" in writing suggests that it was regular practice to reconstruct speeches from partial notes and recent recollections into a full, reconstituted text, written in a *biblion*, or book.¹⁹

¹⁷ Plutarch *Demosthenes* 8.2 describes the habit of Demosthenes, in the studious development of his own rhetorical style, of "remembering" (*analambanon*) the "propositions" (*gnomai*) and "periods" (*periodoi*) of speeches that he happened to hear, and reworking these elements into his own speeches. The interplay of memory and written memorandum is close, sometimes simultaneous. *Diamnemoneusai*, which Thucydides 1.22.1 uses to describe his own memory of speeches, can mean "to preserve the memory of [in writing]," as it does in Diodorus 12.13.2; cf. Xenophon *Memorabilia* 1.3.1. Likewise, *epimnesasthai* means to "remember [in writing]" in Thucydides 1.97.2 and 3.104.5.

¹⁸ Aristophanes *Knights* 1375-83. The habitual gathering for conversation of Socrates' friends in the court where his trial had been held, before their daily visits to Socrates in prison (Plato *Phaedo* 59d) may well have been the occasion when notes from his defense speech were reconciled, giving rise later to the versions of Socrates' *Apology* handed down by Plato and Xenophon. See Xenophon *Apology* 1-2, referring to the written accounts of "others," and relying in particular on the account of Hermogenes, who is named by Plato (*Phaedo* 59b) among those present, along with the Socratic writers Phaedo, Aeschines, Antisthenes, Simmias, Cebes, and Euclides.

¹⁹ Plato *Theatetus* 142c-43c is the most explicit account of a dialogue reconstructed from immediate memory and checked in detail against the memory of another—in this case, Socrates himself—all resulting in the production of a *biblion* having the form of a complete transcript. Diogenes Laertius 2.122-123 reports that Simon the cobbler used to listen to Socrates converse, and "he used to make notes (*hyposêmeiōseis*) of all that he could

This, I suggest, was precisely the sort of writing that Thucydides was doing "as soon as the war began": he was taking notes on speeches where he was present, and transcribing these notes from *deltoi* into full, durable texts in *biblia*. What is more, Thucydides was doing something that many educated and ambitious Athenian lovers-of-words were doing, in political assemblies, in the law courts, and in the company of sophists. For political speeches, we have Thucydides' own statement that some of the speeches he has written were known to him only through the reports of others—and by this we should understand that he means through various forms of notes and collated transcripts that others were collecting in the same way that he was himself. Regarding forensic speeches, we also have the evidence of Thucydides' own assertion about the trial of Antiphon on a capital charge of treason in 411. When Antiphon spoke in defense of his involvement in the oligarchy of the Four Hundred, Thucydides says, "he gave what appears to have been the best defense ever delivered up to my time" (8.68.2). Thucydides, who was in exile at the time, could not have heard the speech as it was given. He must have relied on a written account of this famous speech which he read either hundreds of miles away, in Thrace, or years later, after he had returned to Athens. In either event, he was confident enough of the account he had received to pass this superlative judgment on it.

The use of written notes on speeches, jotted down while a speech was being delivered, fundamentally transforms our notion of the speeches in Thucydides. They are no longer just "plausible fiction," but partake of a level of documentary accuracy, verified (in many cases, at least) through multiple witnesses, that closely parallels the widely accepted accuracy of Thucydides' narrative of events. To be sure, there will be questions about the possible source of eyewitness note-takers in some instances, and questions about how much detail could actually have been recorded while a speech was being delivered; and there will be more important questions about the extent of editorial interpolation or revision that Thucydides might have introduced into the polished versions that he presents to his readers. But no longer do we need to voice such deep doubts about Thucydides' candor when he lays claim to a high standard of fidelity to actual words.

Awareness of this process also recasts our understanding of the means by which Thucydides was able to compose his work. Anyone as interested

remember," producing from these notes the earliest Socratic dialogues, allegedly during the lifetime of Socrates and (the younger) Pericles (whose Socratic connections are also attested by Xenophon *Memorabilia* 3.5). Plato *Phaedrus* 227c-28e, 230d-e, represents a speech of Lysias that Phaedrus pretends to give from memory, until Socrates discovers that he has a text of the speech in hand, and declares that he is ready to listen to "volumes of speeches (*logoi en bibliois*)" from Phaedrus.

as Thucydides was in recording the rhetoric of the day must have also been concerned with the relationship between rhetoric and events. Indeed, this point has been expressed, in slightly different terms, by Virginia Hunter when she concludes that, "The juxtaposition of *logoi* and *erga* permeates the work from beginning to end."²⁰ We may go on to observe that an interest in speeches, *logoi*, must originate from concern for the facts and events, *erga*, that were the subjects of the speeches. It therefore follows, with reasonable likelihood, that anyone as interested in gathering notes on speeches as Thucydides was, probably also collected notes to record the circumstances of the speeches. Such material, all gathered in the pursuit of rhetorical proficiency, could well have provided the basis for the narrative. I suggest that we regard the speeches, both those he reports in direct discourse and those given in indirect discourse, as the backbone of his history.

A further, and still more significant, conclusion follows. By this process, we can accept that written notes underlay most aspects of Thucydides' composition without also insisting that the idea of writing history from these notes was with Thucydides from the start. He and others gathered such notes because they were students of rhetoric, and students of politics. Only later did it occur to Thucydides to use this material to write history.

Now at last we have turned an important corner in our pursuit of the question of *why* Thucydides decided to write history. To approach the answer, we must now reconsider the question of *when* Thucydides decided to compose a history.

When could Thucydides have composed his work?

An opinion about when Thucydides decided to write clearly depends upon some notion of when he was alive and capable of writing. Taking him at his word, he was capable of writing at least as early as the beginning of the war, in 431, and was still writing after the war ended, in 404. When we take into consideration that he was an elected general in 424, then we can deduce that he must have been at least thirty years old by that time, and therefore at least 50 years old when Athens surrendered in 404. These deductions are about all that we know with reasonable certainty about Thucydides' lifespan. Evidently, not much more was known by the biographers of late antiquity. Marcellinus (34) reports that Thucydides "ended his life over the age of 50, not having fulfilled the premise of his work."

This quote from Marcellinus introduces another consideration that has played a role in every biographical sketch of Thucydides since Roman

²⁰ Hunter 1973, 178.

imperial times, namely, that his death explains the unfinished condition of his work. It also hints at an inference that has become a cardinal assumption in Thucydidean studies, namely, that since he did not have time to "fulfill the premise of his work," his death must have been unexpected, and it must have come not long after his return to Athens in 404. It is commonly assumed, therefore, that he died prematurely, and therefore that he died by illness or by murder, or possibly by shipwreck.²¹ It is important to keep in mind, however, that all of this is guesswork, based on the assumption that death cut short his writing.

It is entirely possible that unexpected death did cut short Thucydides' work (although I do not think that this conclusion is necessary). We should recognize, however, that Thucydides could have decided to write history, using the notes at his disposal, at any point within his lifetime after the war, however long or short his lifetime was. If we assume that Thucydides lived a natural lifespan, then we must admit that there is no reason why he might not have lived one or two, or even three decades after the end of the Peloponnesian War. As it happens, we do have some reasonably good testimony to indicate that he was alive for more than five years after the end of the Peloponnesian War. I refer not to the useless speculations of the late biographical traditions about Thucydides, but to a source quoted in one of them, who preserves significant information that has been almost completely overlooked because the prejudice that Thucydides died by about the year 400 is so strong.

Marcellinus cites the Peripatetic philosopher, Praxiphanes of Mytilene, who wrote early in the third century BCE, therefore barely a century after the lifetime of Thucydides. Praxiphanes says that "Thucydides remained obscure as long as Archelaus [king of Macedon] lived, but afterwards he achieved great renown."²² Archelaus, who is mentioned by Thucydides in his history, died in 399. Thucydides' fame is surely synonymous with his writing, and this is a strong indication Thucydides' work was written, or became known, only after 399.²³ Moreover, Praxiphanes also reports that

²¹ Death by illness: *Anonymous Life of Thucydides*, 9. Death by murder: Pausanias 1.23.9; Didymus, citing Zephyrus, in Marcellinus 32. Death by shipwreck is an idea developed by Adcock 1963, 100-106, 138-40, based on Marcellinus 31.

²² Praxiphanes, fr. 18 (Wehrli = Marcellinus 29-30). Momigliano 1971/1993, 66-7 briefly discusses this passage. Tuplin 1993-1994 discusses it at greater length, and is the only recent scholar that I have found to discuss the significance of Praxiphanes' naming of contemporaries to Thucydides.

²³ Thucydides 2.100 refers to the affairs of Macedon in a manner that strongly suggests that Thucydides was writing after the death of Archelaus. This implication is accepted by Hornblower 2000, 372: "To return briefly to

Thucydides was a contemporary of Plato the comic poet, Agathon the tragedian, the epic poets Nicaretus and Choerilus, and the dithyrambic poet Melanippides. These last four are all most famous for their work around the end of the fifth century, and all could well have lived for many years into the fourth century. Plato Comicus, in particular, began his career in the 420's and was still producing plays in the 380's. So, there is no good reason for us to rule out the possibility that Thucydides was writing in the early fourth century.

Does Thucydides Suggest an Occasion for Writing?

At rare moments, Thucydides gives us a glimpse of the world as he viewed it while he was writing his history. The most famous of these is the passage at 1.22.4, which I quoted at the beginning of this talk, where he affirms that:

Those who will want a clear understanding of the past as well as of the future, which at some time or other, as far as human nature is concerned, will occur again in much the same way, will have in this a sufficiently useful guide.

So we may begin by asking, within any reasonable period when Thucydides *might* have been writing, is there an occasion when an Athenian or a Greek audience *might* have needed such a guide? Is there any occasion when events looked like they *might* “occur again in much the same way” as they did in the Peloponnesian War?

The answer is “yes.” Only nine years after the surrender of Athens in 404, the Athenians were about to go to war again with Sparta, only this time the Athenians were about to do so in alliance with their former foes in Boeotia and Corinth. The war that followed is known to us as the Corinthian War of 395-386 BCE. Was that war foreseeable, in such a way that Thucydides could have written the history of the previous war with the possibility of this war in view ahead of him? The answer is again “yes.” The histories by Xenophon, Ctesias, and the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* all make it clear that tensions leading to the outbreak of the Corinthian War were noticeable at least two years, and possibly as much as four years, before fighting began.²⁴ From the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* in particular we learn that

Thucydides' composition date, I would add that in my view the material about Archelaus of Macedonia at 2.100 virtually compels a terminal date later than 399, the known date of Archelaus' death.”

²⁴ Xenophon *Hellenica* 3.5.1-3, 10, describes the mission of Timocrates inciting war, and the eagerness for war of the Athenians and the Thebans

in 396 the Athenians were sending clandestine support to Persian forces already at war with the Spartans, and may have been doing so for a year or more previously. At the same time, the Athenian council was deliberating on diplomatic and military matters in closed sessions. The assembly was openly debating about whether or not it was time to make a break with Sparta.²⁵ These are the circumstances, I suggest, where the Athenians most needed clear guidance from past experience, and where Thucydides will have realized that he was able to provide it in a new and compelling way. We also have reason to believe that Thucydides did not start to write until 396 *at the earliest*, because events in that year explain a remarkable feature about the beginning of Thucydides' work.²⁶

The remarkable feature is the excursus on ancient history known as the "Archaeology," which occupies most of the first twenty chapters of book 1. The Archaeology is famous as a rational account of the nature of military power, and especially of the role of naval power, across the history of Greece before Thucydides' day. The central argument of the Archaeology is conveyed in the passage where Thucydides discusses the armament that Agamemnon led against Troy.

Agamemnon's force was the greatest ever assembled up to its time, Thucydides tells us (1.9.1). He goes on, in a famous passage, to enumerate exactly how large we should believe that it was, in terms of ships and men, and years spent fighting—all based on the testimony of Homer. His conclusion was that this was indeed a very great force, but it was not a very effective force, as judged the standards of naval power in his own day.

even before Timocrates, in 396/95. Ctesias *Persica* (epitome) 63 describes the appointment of Conon as naval commander for Persian forces, which took place in 398/97.

²⁵ *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* 6-7.1 (Bartoletti) describes closed meetings of the council, and covert diplomatic contact and military assistance sent from Athens to Conon and to the Persian king in 397/96.

²⁶ Hornblower 1987, 143-4, following arguments made by others (e.g., Gomme 1956, vol. 2, 432), has claimed that the reference to the eruptions in Mount Etna on Sicily by Thucydides 3.116 implies that Thucydides did not know of the eruption of 396 (Diodorus 14.59.3), indicating that "therefore Thucydides was dead by 396." But in 3.116.2, Thucydides states that "since Sicily was colonized by the Greeks there have been three eruptions in all," and he names only two eruptions: one in 425 (the occasion for mentioning the history of eruptions), and one fifty years earlier. It is perfectly possible to take the third, unmentioned, eruption to be that of 396. Accepting the topical impact of Thucydides' work as argued here, it is even more plausible that this item of current news would not *need* to be mentioned, than to believe that there was some earlier eruption that Thucydides did not identify.

Agamemnon had no revenue or supplies to support his force as it made war on Troy. So his army had to divert its attention to agriculture and to plundering raids in order to support itself, with the result that it was never capable of bringing its full force to bear against the Trojans. If Agamemnon had had a better-developed infrastructure for revenue and supply, the siege of Troy would have been over far sooner than ten years.

Why Thucydides should take Homer's numbers so seriously has puzzled modern commentators, especially when Thucydides makes the point several times that the poets are prone to exaggeration and are not reliable guides to the past. The passage is therefore usually explained as a *tour de force* demonstration of Thucydides' method of historical reasoning. By his objective treatment of the evidence available to him, Thucydides shows his readers at the very beginning of his work how he will make the past intelligible to them. All of this may well be correct, but I am convinced that Thucydides, and his readers, had a very specific reason for wanting to know just how great Agamemnon's expedition actually was, and how it measured up to the standards of warfare conducted by a true naval power in Thucydides' own day. This was no mere academic question. Political matters of the highest importance depended upon it.

In the spring of 396, King Agesilaus of Sparta set sail on his first military expedition, against the forces of Persia in Asia Minor. His departure from Greece was attended by some ceremony. While his forces were gathering at Geraestus in southern Euboea, Agesilaus went to Aulis on the Boeotian coast, to sacrifice on the altar of Artemis in imitation of the sacrifice made by Agamemnon before he sailed to Troy. The significance of this act was clear: Agesilaus was comparing his leadership of Greeks against the barbarians of Asia to that of Agamemnon. But Agesilaus of Sparta believed that his undertaking was more auspicious than Agamemnon's. We are told that Agesilaus announced, on this occasion, that he was "king of a more prosperous city than was Agamemnon, and, like him, he was overlord of all of Greece" (Pausanias 3.9.4).²⁷

Although Agesilaus' army of some 6000-8000 soldiers was not nearly as large as the force Agamemnon had taken with him, by Homer's reckoning, it was larger than the infantry force that set sail from Athens to Sicily in 415. The assembly of this force in the waters off the east coast of Attica and the announcement at Aulis were all clearly designed to strike fear into all those Greeks planning opposition to Sparta, the Athenians and Boeotians chief among them. And Agesilaus' appeal to the symbols of the past, enshrined in epic poetry, was a challenge to his opponents. Thucydides' matter-of-fact analysis of that past, pointing out the weaknesses

²⁷ On this episode, also described by Xenophon *Hellenica* 3.4.2-4 and Plutarch *Agessilaus* 6.4, see Munn 2000, 317-9.

in Agamemnon's force that happened to be shared by Agesilaus' smaller replica of it, was a response to this challenge. The matter-of-fact account of the recent war between Athens and Sparta that followed this introduction was, likewise, an instruction from the lessons of the recent past on what to expect in events to come, since it was all but certain that they were about to "occur again in much the same way."

Why Thucydides Wrote

We are at last in a position to answer our original question: why did Thucydides write history? Thucydides wrote, taking great pains, as he himself says, to get the facts right, in order to provide instruction to the Athenians and their prospective allies, the Boeotians, Corinthians and Argives in particular, as they contemplated how and when they would go to war against Sparta. In 396, there really was no question about whether there would be a war, it was merely a matter of when. Thucydides wrote, moreover, not simply to satisfy curiosity about a tumultuous past generation, but for the immediate and pressing purpose of reconciling former foes, and creating firm and unqualified commitments to act together in the name of a common vision of the future. To do this required that all parties share a common vision of the past.

Consider the circumstances in which the Boeotians and the Corinthians, both committed enemies of Athens during the generation-long Peloponnesian War, now sought to negotiate terms of a joint alliance with Athens against Sparta. Consider, further, that these new allies were hoping to attract other Greeks into this alliance. Every party was sure to have its special interests, its grievances arising from past decades of war, and, above all, its version of what happened in the past war, who was to blame for it, and what everyone should learn from this past, bitter experience. With the stakes as high as they were—all-out war in Greece—there was every incentive to iron out any inconsistencies of memory, and *get it right*. Only after this troublesome past could be seen from a unified point of view could all the parties move forward, chastened, united, and ready to act more wisely for the future.²⁸ This could *only* be done in reasoned detail, with a comprehensive scope, and by someone who could claim objectivity, or at

²⁸ A comparison can be made between this process, undertaken at Athens ca. 396-395, and the forging of a new national identity in South Africa after the end of Apartheid. National unity required parties divided by past conflict to relive painful events of the past through formal testimony before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (I am indebted to James C. Wright for this comparison).

least, could claim equal access to partisan views from all sides. These were the qualifications that Thucydides himself claimed.²⁹

This understanding affirms some of the most perceptive observations of “unitarian” scholarship, made without the benefit of our present solution to the “composition question.” I refer again to what Virginia Hunter calls Thucydides’ “method of composition.”

By means of [the juxtaposition of *logoi* and *erga*] men are represented as learning or incapable of learning from their own and others’ experiences ... For the reader earlier events exist as *paradeigmata*, model situations, the outcome and possibilities of which he knows. By bringing this knowledge of the past with him into the present, he is equipped to compare and judge, even to predict ...³⁰

Hunter has thus exactly described what I argue is the *historical* purpose of Thucydides’ history. But this conclusion immediately presents us with the question: How could such a massive written work, a work of history, provide instruction to political decision-makers?

Such a work could only be studied, or perhaps heard as a lecture in several sittings, by a dedicated group of readers or listeners who had a personal stake in the events that were likely to unfold at any moment. The Athenian council, the Boule of 500, was precisely such a group. The council was responsible for deliberating on the business of the state. It received the reports of experts, of generals, and ambassadors—both foreign ambassadors arriving at Athens and Athenian ambassadors returning to Athens—and the council formulated proposals for executive action to put before the full Athenian assembly. It was the council’s job to figure out *what* to do. The council could summon experts to advise its members on matters of technical information, and it frequently received such information in the form of written reports. I believe that Thucydides was such an expert who gave his report to the council, probably within the year 396-395. The usual term for such a report is a *syngraphê*, a “composition,” which is how Thucydides would describe the work that he says he *synegrapse*, “composed.”³¹

²⁹ See the various declarations of scope, diligence, and non-partisan objectivity that Thucydides makes: 1.1, 1.20-23, 2.1, and especially 5.26 (quoted in part below, at n. 35).

³⁰ Hunter 1973, 178, 180.

³¹ Note the regular formulae by which Thucydides describes his work, beginning at 1.1.1 (*xynegrapse*). Marcellinus usually refers to Thucydides’ work as a *syngraphê* (18, 34, 41-42, 46, 48), and most manuscripts bear the heading *Thoukididou Xygraphê*. For *xyggrapheis* who *xyggrapsantes* a

Can we really believe that his *syngraphe* of the Peloponnesian War could have been such a report? In 396-395, the Mediterranean world was on the brink of a new *kinesis*, or "disturbance" that promised to involve Greeks and barbarians as extensively as had the war of the previous generation (cf. Thucydides 1.1.2, discussed again below). Athens, and in particular the Athenian council, lay at the focal point of events about to develop into open warfare. These were *precisely* the circumstances that would justify such a comprehensive *syngraphe*, testimony itself to the seriousness with which the Athenians viewed their place in world events.

A "*ktêma es aiei*"

If, as I argue, Thucydides wrote his entire account for the immediate and specific purpose of preparing for war with Sparta in 395 BCE, then why did he not say so? Why did he, instead, misdirect everyone's attention by stating that he wrote to create a *ktêma es aiei*, a "possession for all time"? The answer to this question is two-fold.

First, his immediate audience did not need to be told why he wrote. To the Athenian council, his purpose was self-evident. But for Thucydides to claim that his work had a transcendent quality, a universal applicability, was essential to asserting the authority of *his* account of the war—this was not just "the Athenian version," Thucydides wants his readers to understand, but it was the Truth, equally meaningful to all who consulted it.

Second, it is frequently the case that a solution to an especially difficult problem is described as "once and for all," that is, *es aiei*. This, for example, is the case in Aeschylus' *Eumenides*, where Orestes' immediate problem, his blood-guilt and the consequent anger of the Furies, finds a judicial solution that is said to be an achievement *es ton aianê chronon* (572, cf. 836), "for the eternity of time." At the time when Thucydides was writing, it is not surprising to find the Greeks yearning for a solution to their crisis, "once and for all." It is therefore certainly significant that, for the first time in the history of Greek diplomatic terminology, the phrase *es aiei* is used to describe a treaty of alliance, "for all time," in the heading of the inscription

proposal to be introduced by the presidents of the council for action by the assembly, see Thucydides 8.67.1-2. Aristotle *Ath. Pol.* 29.2-3 demonstrates that the instructions to prepare this written report included an instruction to conduct historical research (in this case, into the laws of Cleisthenes). Thucydides uses the noun *xyggraphê* only to refer to the work (also considered a historical treatise) by Hellanicus, 1.97.2. See the discussion in Munn 2000, 88-9, 276-7, 323-5.

containing the oath of alliance sworn in 395 between the Athenians and the Boeotians, *es ton aiei chronon*.³²

The alliance of Athenians and Boeotians was the linchpin of the coalition of forces against Sparta in 395.³³ The alliance was therefore seen as the key to stability in perpetuity, once the excesses of Sparta had been checked. The war begun in 395, however, ended in a rather different configuration of powers, according to the terms of the “King’s Peace” of 386. This treaty, by which Greek states were compelled to agree to terms worked out between Persia and Sparta, was also a treaty in perpetuity.³⁴ In keeping, therefore, with a new spirit of globalism recognizable among Greeks, and between Greeks and barbarians, Thucydides wrote his history of events that affected “Greeks and a certain part of the barbarian world—one might say, the majority of mankind” (1.1.2). This global perspective was encouraged by the nexus of events that had brought war to a close in 404, and that now, in 396-395, promised to set it in motion again.

Thucydides Reappraised

Seen in the perspective set forth here, Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War becomes not only an important document of fifth-century history, but also an artifact of Athenian perspective at the beginning of the fourth century. A variety of issues appear in a new light as a result of this explanation. Among those directly concerned with the text of Thucydides’ work I will single out, in these closing observations, two of the central puzzles of the “competition question.” I refer to the so-called “second preface,” and to the unfinished condition of the work.

This “second preface” is found in book 5, right after Thucydides quotes the terms of the Peace of Nicias of 421, which brought an end to what he

³² Tod 101 = *IG II²* 14: Earlier treaties occasionally used the phrase *es aidion* (so Meiggs and Lewis nos. 10.4-5, 63.12, 64.22-23), but such perpetual alliances are rare before the fourth century, and the Athenian Boeotian alliance is the first using the phrase *eis ton aiei chronon*.

³³ Xenophon *Hellenica* 3.5.8-15, devotes significant space to the speech of the Theban ambassador requesting the alliance, which, Xenophon reports (3.5.16), was approved unanimously by the Athenians.

³⁴ Xenophon *Hellenica* 5.1.31, cites the terms of the “King’s Peace.” The terms make no reference to time, but, as noted by Ryder 1965, 5, “the King’s Peace was the first Greek peace treaty known to us that did not include a time limit.” The notion of perpetual stability was at the heart of the idea of *koinê eirênê*, Common Peace, that matured at this time, as Ryder’s study demonstrates.

calls "the first war," and also the "ten-year war." It will be useful here to quote most of this "second preface":

The same Thucydides the Athenian wrote these things sequentially, as each event occurred, by summers and winters, until the time when the Lacedaemonians and their allies put an end to the empire of the Athenians, and took control of the long walls and the Piraeus. The total number of years until this point in the war was twenty-seven. And no one will be justified in supposing that the intervening period under the treaty agreement was anything other than a period of war. Let him reckon together all the various events, and he will find nothing that resembles peace during the period in which the sides neither gave back nor received all that had been agreed, and in which both sides committed various offenses in addition to waging war around both Mantinea and Epidaurus, while the allies in Thrace were as hostile as ever and the Boeotians maintained a truce for only ten days at a time.³⁵

Coming in the middle of his work, right after a peace treaty that ended "the first war," this "second preface" looks like "second thoughts." It has long been taken as a strong indication that Thucydides *originally* wrote an account of the ten years of the war from 431 to 421. Only *later*, when he realized that the peace treaty of 421 actually brought no lasting peace, did he add this "second preface" to justify his continuing narration, now for the first time envisioned as extending down to the surrender in 404.³⁶

The explanation presented here allows no such "second thoughts," since the work was written from the start to abrupt finish in a relatively short period of time *after* the whole war was over, when everyone already knew that the peace of 421 was not a lasting peace. So why does he make such an issue of the "period of the treaty agreement that was no different from a period of war"?

³⁵ Thucydides 5.26.1-2.

³⁶ J.H. Finley 1940/1967, 162-63, has commented that the "second preface" in Thucydides 5.25-26 has been "without a doubt the principal cause of the whole controversy on when he wrote his work and, from the time of Ullrich on, has afforded the chief argument to those who doubted its unity." The work referred to is F.W. Ullrich, *Beiträge zur Erklärung des Thukydides* (1846). The influence of the idea of the "second preface" on analyst scholarship is illustrated, e.g., by Wade-Gery in the *OCD* (1949/1996, 1518-19) and by Andrewes and Dover, in Gomme *et al.* 1981, vol. 5, 431-37.

The answer again can be found precisely in the circumstances of 396-395. At that time, Athens, Thebes, Corinth, and numerous other states were all technically bound by treaty to cooperate with Sparta. But, through various aggressive actions, the Spartans had spread far an ill-will, encouraging the belief among the leadership and populace of Athens, Thebes, and Corinth, among other states, that the peace settlement imposed by Sparta after the end of the Peloponnesian War was not a legitimate settlement. The war that was likely to resume was therefore seen, by the majority of those listening to Thucydides' account, as a resumption of a state of war that had only been temporarily suspended, but never truly ended. It was part of what Thucydides describes, at the opening of his work, as the "greatest disturbance [*kinêsis*] in the history of the Hellenes, affecting also a large part of the non-Hellenic world, and indeed, I might say, "almost the whole of mankind" (1.1.2). History, in other words, was about to repeat itself, and the war was about to continue.

The final question to consider, in this essay, is this: Is there an explanation for the unfinished condition of Thucydides' work? There is no real reason to believe that Thucydides died suddenly, before he completed the task he had set for himself (although this cannot be ruled out). So is there any reason why he might have *chosen* to stop where he did? I believe that there is a plausible reason, and, if I am right about it, it has a good deal to say about the *precise purpose* for which Thucydides was writing, and furthermore, it signifies a fundamental link between the nature of history, and the nature of democracy.³⁷

The 8th and final book of Thucydides' history contains a number of oddities, which, if I am correct, have more to do with the odd turn that events in the war between Athens and Sparta have taken than they have to do with irregularities in Thucydides' writing style or editorial thoroughness. The oddest turn that the war has taken, as many commentators have noticed, is that Persia now begins to play a significant role. Almost invisible before the events of 413, where book 8 begins, Persian negotiators appear at Sparta early in the book, and conclude a series of treaties with the Spartans that enable them to bring the war against Athens to the sea. The Athenians, meanwhile, against all odds, husband their resources and hold their own. They even survive a disastrous episode of mismanagement that they bring on themselves, in the form of the short-lived oligarchy of the 400. By the time

³⁷ Note that, according to Dionysius of Halicarnassus *On Imitation* 3.208.17, Philistus the Sicilian historian, a younger contemporary of Thucydides, so much admired the form of Thucydides' work that he left his own history incomplete in imitation of him. This certainly suggests that incompleteness *could* have been a deliberate choice on Thucydides' part as well.

book 8 ends, the Athenians have even managed to take the offensive and have begun to drive back their foes on the sea.

Here Thucydides ends, abruptly, while describing how the Spartans and Persians are scrambling to regroup in the face of the new Athenian onslaught. Is there a logic to this ending?

I suggest that there is, and it is very much in keeping with the thematic structure of the history that Thucydides has written to this point, and with the point in time at which Thucydides was writing this history. For after the events at the end of book 8 we find the affairs of Athens becoming ever more deeply entwined with Persia. The Athenians hope to draw the Persians away from their support of Sparta, and for a while it appears that they will be successful. Ultimately, however, the fate of Athens was sealed unexpectedly, and at a whim. In 405, the young Persian prince, Cyrus, entrusted his financial resources to the keeping of his favorite courtier among the Greeks, Lysander of Sparta. Only this windfall of Persian money, as Thucydides himself states (2.65.12), enabled Lysander to bring into action an effective naval force that destroyed the Athenian fleet.

This turn of fate was not the outcome of deliberative counsel. It was the product of personal relations and private negotiations—the sort of court intrigue for which Persia was famous, and at which Alcibiades, among the Athenians, was ever so good, but in which the Athenian Council and Assembly had very little influence. Decisions made behind closed doors in the halls of Susa, or the pleasure gardens of Sardis, had little to do with the rhetoric of the council chamber or the assembly. Thucydides, with his collection of Greek deliberative speeches, had no direct insight into Persian court politics. Recognizing this shift in the balance of affairs, I suggest, and perhaps becoming even more aware of how pervasive the Persian factor was through his close review of the events covered in book 8, Thucydides realized that he had reached the end of the practical instruction that he could provide for the Athenians and their Greek allies. His work had traced events to the point at which, in effect, the Athenians ceased to be masters of their own fate. Thereafter, more depended upon the personal tact and charm of those who had influence in the courts of Persia.

This circumstance parallels the situation facing the Athenians in 396–395. Their hopes in striking down the power of Sparta depended upon the support of Persia, and the influence in Persian courts of men like the Athenian admiral, Conon. On the brink of the Corinthian War, Thucydides could certainly recognize that the same factors that had dictated the outcome of the last war would come into play again in this one. He was prepared to provide instruction to a democratic council, and to instruct its members on the limits of their abilities to judge the future for the benefit of a democratic state. But his history, and his method of compiling it, could take no account

of the private whims of monarchs. Thucydides' *ktema es aiei* was conceived as a possession for democracy.³⁸

³⁸ This suggestion invites a consideration of the place of Ctesias' *Persica*, a work closely contemporary to Thucydides' (by this argument), as an endeavor to clarify the *Persian* perspective on affairs of the world. In view of the decisive role that Persian potentates would continue to play in Greek affairs in the fourth century, this suggestion also serves to highlight the interest in Persian thought and policy manifested by Xenophon, particularly in his *Cyropaedeia*, and also in his *Anabasis* and *Hellenica*.

Mea Tempora:
*Patterning of Time in the Metamorphoses*¹

Denis Feeney

As he begins the *Metamorphoses*, Ovid invokes the gods and asks them to spin out the poem unbroken from the first origin of the universe down to *mea tempora*. The first person possessive adjective *mea*, although regularly mistranslated as a plural, is vitally singular, as Alessandro Barchiesi has insisted: not, as so often, 'our time', but 'my times'.² And not just 'my times', 'the era I happen to live in', but, as Barchiesi further demonstrates, 'my Times', with a capital 'T', i.e., the *Fasti*, whose first word and alternative title is *Tempora*. The arrow of Ovid's hexametric time will carry on down until it hits the circle of his elegiac time.³

The power of the adjective *mea* is shown, as Barchiesi also points out,⁴ when Ovid rewrites these words in his *Epistle to Augustus*, describing the *Metamorphoses* as being 'the few verses in which, rising from the first origin of the universe, I spun the work down to your times, Caesar' (*pauca quibus prima surgens ab origine mundi / in tua deduxi tempora, Caesar, opus, Tr.* 2.559-60). The singularity of both of these possessive adjectives is very important: not 'our times', but either 'mine' or 'yours', Ovid's or Augustus'—depending, partly, on the time of writing, or reading. I shall begin my argument by taking that first-person *singular* possessive adjective at the beginning of the *Metamorphoses* very seriously, and exploring how and why Ovid's patterning of time is *his*, and not anyone else's. In conclusion, I shall take up the implications of his rewriting of the adjective in exile, from *mea* to *tua*.

As Ovid sat down to ponder over the problem of how to organize the whole sequence of history, of past time, into some kind of fifteen-book order, he had many possible models, since chronography, the writing of

¹ Reprinted with the permission of the author and the Cambridge Philological Society, from P. Hardie, A. Barchiesi, and S. Hinds (edd.), *Ovidian Transformations. Essays on the Metamorphoses and Its Reception* = Cambridge Philological Society, Suppl. Vol. 23 (1999) 13-29.

² Barchiesi 1989, 91 and 1991, 6.

³ Barchiesi 1991, 6-7.

⁴ Barchiesi 1989, 91.

time, the listing of dates and the synchronization of different dating systems, had been a serious scholarly pursuit for 250 years, with origins dating back almost another 200 years before that.⁵ The first Roman to work in this genre, the first person systematically to bring Roman events within the framework of Greek chronographic scholarship, was Cornelius Nepos.⁶ His work was entitled *Chronica*, after the famous works of that title by Eratosthenes and Apollodorus, who will engage our attention shortly. We all know this work from the dedication poem of Catullus, who hails Nepos as the one who 'alone/first of Italians dared to unfold the whole of past time in three rolls, learned ones, by Jupiter, and full of hard work' (*ausus es unus Italorum / omne aeuum tribus explicare cartis / doctis, Iuppiter, et laboriosis*, 1.5-7).

In parenthesis, we may remark how this programmatic poem of Catullus' gives us another angle on the issue of how to conceptualize Ovid's simultaneously *perpetuum* and *deductum carmen*. If we read the Catullan programmatic poem from the viewpoint of Ovid we see that the *Metamorphoses* is both Catullus and Nepos. Like Nepos' *Chronica*, it includes *omne aeuum*, with *doctrina* and *labor*; it also has the aesthetically desirable qualities of Catullus' *libellus*, so that like the *libellus* it is *nouum* at the beginning (compare *In noua* as the first words of Ovid's poem) and *perenne* at the end (compare Ovid's claim in his last sentence that he will be carried above the stars *perennis*).

Nepos synchronized events in Greek and Roman history, using Olympiads together with the key fixed point of the foundation of the city of Rome, which he followed Polybius in assigning to the second year of the seventh Olympiad (751/50 BCE). So we know that Nepos gave a date for the *akme* of Homer, 160 years before the foundation of the city (fr. 2 Peter); and for the *akme* of Archilochus (in the reign of Tullus Hostilius, fr. 4 Peter). He also ranged into events of myth, giving dates for the reign of Saturn (fr. 1 Peter).

On the basis of the Catullan evidence, Nepos' work will have been available in the mid-50s BCE. A few years later, by the end of 47 BCE, Nepos' mentor, Cicero's friend T. Pomponius Atticus, also published a chronological work with elements of synchronization, the *Liber annalis*.⁷ For Ovid, however, as for any educated person of his generation, the canonical Roman chronographic work would have been the *De gente populi romani* of the polymath Varro, completed probably in the year of Ovid's birth, 43

⁵ On the importance of this intellectual context for the *Metamorphoses*, see Ludwig 1965, 80.

⁶ *RE* 4.1.1410; Horsfall 1989, 117-18; in general on the chronographic work of Nepos and Varro, Wiseman 1979, 157-66.

⁷ *RE* Suppl. 8.520-1.

BCE.⁸ It was Varro, very probably, who defined the date for the foundation of Rome which became canonical, the third year of the sixth Olympiad, 754/3 BCE. As Rawson points out, Atticus already had this date, 'but although his *Liber annalis* was earlier than the *De gente*, it is perhaps unlikely that Varro borrowed from him; he may have put it forward in an earlier work which Atticus used';⁹ Varro's interest in chronography is evident in many of his works besides the *De gente* (*Annales*, *Antiquitates*, *De scaenicis originibus*), and, as the prototypical academic, he was not above recycling research material from one book to another.

In the *De gente* Varro divided the whole of human time into three categories (fr. 3 Peter): the obscure period (ἄδηλον), from the origins of human beings to the first flood; the mythical period (μυθικόν), from the flood to the first Olympiad, which lasted about 1,600 years; finally, the historical period (ιστορικόν). Fascinatingly, Varro, with his astrological interests, also had things to say about future time: 'Evidently Varro's historical works included predictions of the future as well as data about the past. His connection of celestial omens and astrology with history was no doubt meant to find yet more *portenta* that the historians had failed to note, and thus to bring to light the hidden, underlying causes of Roman history, past, present and future'.¹⁰ Ovid's demarcations are different from Varro's first flood and first Olympiad, but we shall see that he keeps to the broad conception of three temporal categories, and that he had other points in common with Varro's schemes as well.

The poem of Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, then, looks as if it is promising some such work as that of Nepos or Varro—from the origins down to the present time. It looks like the programme for a chronography, and Ludwig is certainly right to suggest that Ovid is working with the conception of providing some kind of poetic counterpart to these monumental pieces of synthesizing scholarship.¹¹

Such Roman works ultimately go back to the great Hellenistic scholars Eratosthenes and Apollodorus.¹² Eratosthenes, writing in the third century, first gave a canonical date to the fall of Troy, which is then the beginning of

⁸ *RE* Suppl. 6.1237-42; Rawson 1985, 244-6.

⁹ Rawson 1985, 245.

¹⁰ Grafton and Swerdlow 1985, 461; cf. Peter 1902, esp. 243-51.

¹¹ Ludwig 1965, 80.

¹² On Eratosthenes, Pfeiffer 1968, 255-7; on Apollodorus, Jacoby 1902, Pfeiffer 1968, 163-4. They too had their pre-Hellenistic predecessors, most importantly Hellanicus of Lesbos (c. 480-395 BCE), whose 'Priestesses of Hera in Argos' used the local dating-system of Argos as its point of departure in synchronizing pan-Hellenic events from mythical times down to his own age: *RE* 8.1.144-8.

history—408 years before the first year of the first Olympiad, what we call 1184/3 BCE (or what we call 1184/3 BC: the choice of a dating-system, as this example shows, and as I shall be arguing throughout, carries considerable ideological weight). Indeed, Eratosthenes even gave a calendrical date for the sack, the 7th or 8th day before the end of the month Thargelion, a date that Virgil alludes to in *Aen.* 2.255, *tacitae per amica silentia lunae*.¹³ Eratosthenes went on to give dates from the fall of Troy until the first Olympiad, 776/5, from which point he carried on using the Olympiad system that he had laid out in a separate work of Olympian victors, building on the initiative of the fifth-century sophist Hippias, the first person to compile a list of Olympian victors in order to make synchronization possible across the chaotic range of incompatible Greek time-systems.¹⁴ Eratosthenes stopped with the death of Alexander (an interesting terminus), a century or so before his own time. Apollodorus, in his *Chronica*, actually wrote in verse, in iambics. He too began with the fall of Troy, but, like Hellanicus of Lesbos, he extended his time-frame down to his own time, in his case the end of the second century. And of course Eratosthenes and Apollodorus, and Nepos and Atticus and Varro, did it all in chronological order—that was the whole point.

It goes without saying that these catalogues and series, whether Greek or Roman, are not simply helpful lists of scholarly fact, but frames of exclusion as well as inclusion, with their own strategies and ideologies. I may mention some examples here, although running the risk that by this prolepsis I will reduce the impact of what I have to say concerning Ovid's exclusions and inclusions and strategies. It is a very striking fact, for example, that neither Apollodorus nor Eratosthenes in their respective *Chronica* mentioned, i.e., gave a synchronic date for, the foundation of Rome. Of course, with lost and fragmentary works it is difficult to be entirely confident about pronouncing that something was *not* in them, but Jacoby's arguments on this score in his *Apollodors Chronik* seem conclusive.¹⁵ Indeed, according to Jacoby, Apollodorus and Eratosthenes only took notice of Roman events when they impinged on Greece, and only *started* to take notice of Roman events *at all* when they got to the invasion of Pyrrhus—when Roman affairs are directly involved with those of mainland Greece, in the person of a descendant of Achilles. From this perspective Nepos' initiative in his new Roman *Chronica* takes on added significance, as Peter Wiseman remarks: 'Nepos

¹³ Grafton and Swerdlow 1986.

¹⁴ Pfeiffer 1968, 51, 163.

¹⁵ Jacoby 1902, 26-8.

remedied the omission, bringing the events of the Roman tradition into the mainstream of 'world history' as created by the Greeks'.¹⁶

The Roman counterpart of this Greek exclusion is represented—as one might have predicted—by Cato the Censor in his *Origines*, a work that was essentially a Roman *Chronography-cum-Aetia*. Dionysius of Halicarnassus uses very significant language when reporting Cato's dating of the foundation of Rome. Although, says Dionysius, other early Roman historians dated the foundation of the city by the Olympiad system, Cato 'does not make Greek time-divisions' (Ἑλληνικὸν μὲν οὐχ ὀρίζει χρόνον), 'but being as careful as anyone in the compilation of ancient historical data places it four hundred and thirty-two years after the Trojan war' (*Ant. Rom.* 1.74.2; fr. 17 Peter). The Trojan war, not a Greek athletic festival, is the reference-point for dating the beginning of Rome, since the Trojan war, according to Cato's way of doing things, is an event in universal, or Roman, history, not Greek, an *origo* in a profounder sense than simply marking the start of ascertainable history.

In the hexameter tradition that Ovid was writing in, the pre-eminent time-writer, of course, was Mr. Time himself, Quintus Ennius, the author of the *Annales*, the books of years. Like Eratosthenes before him, and like Apollodorus after him—Apollodorus was about ten years old when Ennius died in 169 BCE—Ennius began with the fall of Troy; he anticipated Apollodorus in carrying on down to his own times.

Lucretius shows how time is built into Ennius' very name (1.117-19):

Ennius ut noster cecinit, qui primus amoeno
detulit ex Helicone perENNI fronde coronam
per gentis Italas hominum quae clara clueret.

As our Ennius sang, who first from pleasant Helicon brought
down a garland of perENNIAL leaf to be spoken of as brightly
famous through the Italian races of mankind.

It has often been pointed out that Lucretius here puns on the author's name, with its lurking 'years' within, in order to reinforce the claim to immortality through the years; but he is simultaneously punning on the title of the masterpiece which will guarantee that immortality, the *Annales*, 'The Books

¹⁶ Wiseman 1979, 157; on Nepos' originality here cf. Geiger 1985, 69-72. Some thirty years after Nepos, the Greek Dionysius of Halicarnassus 'remedied the omissions' of Eratosthenes and Apollodorus from the Greek side, publishing a *Chronica* or *Chronoi* that adapted Roman time to Greek canons for a Greek audience, as part of his larger project of accommodating the Roman *imperium* to the Greeks: Gabba 1991, 198-9, Schultze 1995.

of Years'.¹⁷ Ennius was born to sing his way through the Years and to live through the years as a result.

Even in fragments, Ennius is someone who yields a rich harvest of material on time. His narrative began with the canonical chronographer's moment of the fall of Troy: *Quom ueter occubuit Priamus sub Marte Pelasgo* ('When old Priam fell under the war of the Greeks', 14 Sk.). The fall of Troy is not just a starting-point for Ennius, however, but becomes an especially significant marker for counting years. As Gratwick has so brilliantly suggested, the original fifteen books of the *Annales* may have spanned exactly 1,000 years, from the fall of Troy in 1184/3 all the way down to the year 184/3. This year was important to Ennius' *first* patron, Cato, for it was the year that Cato was censor, and this year was important also to Ennius' *current* patron, M. Fulvius Nobilior, for, on Gratwick's hypothesis, it was the year that Fulvius dedicated, *ex manubiis* from his triumph over Aetolia in 187, the temple of Hercules Musarum.¹⁸ In this temple Fulvius erected nine statues of the Muses that he had looted from Greece. In a massive piece of ring-composition, the *imperator* introduces the Muses into Roman cult for the very first time at the end of the poem, as the poet had introduced them into Roman poetry for the very first time with the first word of the first line of the first book, *Musae*. And the temple of Hercules Musarum is a time-machine of a different kind as well. It is not just the culmination of 1000 years of Roman imperial and cross-cultural history, but the location of the first sets of Roman *Fasti*—both kinds of *Fasti*, a list of the Roman consuls, and a calendar of the Roman year. This was Fulvius' responsibility, but who better to advise him on all this than Mr. Years himself, the expert on Roman time, Quintus Ennius?¹⁹ By bringing a work from the origins to the present, and then linking it to the annual calendar, Ennius himself may be a precursor for Ovid's plotting of the *Metamorphoses*' trajectory into the *Fasti*, noted by Barchiesi (above, n.3).

The fragmentary remains of the poem reveal other key moments in the time-patterning of the *Annales*: the seven hundred years since the city's foundation (*septingenti sunt, paulo plus aut minus, anni | augusto augurio postquam incluta condita Roma est*, 'it is seven hundred years, plus or minus a little, since famous Rome was founded by august augury', 154-5 Sk.);²⁰ the

¹⁷ Ennius *must* have punned on his significant name and title himself: hence the key use of *perennis* in such contexts in Lucretius, Catullus (1.10), Horace (C. 3.30.1), and Ovid (*Met.* 15.875).

¹⁸ Gratwick 1982, 63-5.

¹⁹ Rüpke 1995, 331-68; on *Annales*, temple, and *Fasti* see too Barchiesi 1994a, 276-7.

²⁰ It is important to remember that Ennius' date for the city's foundation was much earlier than the later canonical mid-eighth-century date, for

cycle of reincarnation, perhaps another cycle of 1000 years, this time of the individual's soul (I x Sk.); the poet's own age at the time of writing the final book of the poem (he gave his age as sixty-seven, *sed. inc. lxx Sk.*).²¹

Ovid's other great epic precursor, Virgil's *Aeneid*, is likewise rich in meaningful patterns of chronology. The poem's first prophecy shows Jupiter counting off a significant cycle of 3 + 30 + 300 years from the end of the poem down to the birth of Romulus and Remus (1.265-74):²² in a daring act of authorial self-assertion, the end of the narrative, a moment of no inherent chronological import in relation to other schemes, has hereby become a chronological milestone in its own right. In Virgil's Underworld, Anchises presents us with a 1000-year cycle of reincarnation (6.748), and then prophesies the return of the Golden Age under Augustus, alluding specifically to the Secular Games, the rite by which Augustus would inaugurate a new cycle of time for the Roman state (6.792-4).²³ The simultaneously aetiological and teleological conception of historical time that links Aeneas and Augustus is but the latest in a series of Roman attempts to find meaning in the links between the fall of Troy and the present—whenever that present happens to be.²⁴

Now, having sketched the chronographic models at Ovid's disposal, I need to say that Ovid ignores, refuses, renounces all such schemes and ideologies, or else subverts the canonical reference-points that no account of history could totally ignore.

To begin with, the canonical divisions of the epochs of human history are blurred in Ovid, the rigidity of their outlines smudged: I may be brief here, by referring to the arguments of Barchiesi and Holzberg.²⁵ More or less everyone is agreed that there is a general and broad division in the poem between the epochs of the gods, the heroes, and of history.²⁶ Like all divisions in the poem it is fluid, but just recognizable. The division between gods and heroes comes with the introduction of the city of Athens (6.419 ff.); that between heroic and historical time comes with the introduction of

Romulus was Aeneas' grandson according to Ennius, with a consequent date for the Romulean foundation of c.1100 BCE: Skutsch 1985, 314.

²¹ Following Skutsch 1985, 675 for the final book as the one in which he declared his age.

²² Virgil would have been able to find in Varro the year, the day and the hour of the birth—indeed, of the conception—of Romulus: Grafton and Swerdlow 1985, 456.

²³ Zetzel 1989, 277-84.

²⁴ A guide into these dense matters in Zetzel 1997.

²⁵ Barchiesi 1994a, 247-8; Holzberg 1998, 144-5; cf. Croisille 1985, 57-9 on the imperceptible transition from heroic to historical time.

²⁶ Ludwig 1965, 12-13 on earlier literature; Holzberg 1998, 126-53.

the city of Troy (11.194 ff.). As Barchiesi has shown, these crucial moments of division are linked with distinctively odd geographical features, the Isthmus of Corinth, and the Hellespont. Both of these are demarcations, but also provide passage: they are barriers, and transitions.

Troy in particular is an interesting case. We have seen how vital the fall of Troy was as the definitive demarcation of the beginning of the history in the great majority of chronographic schemes. Even Varro, who did not begin his historical period with the fall of Troy but with the first Olympiad, still made the fall of Troy a crucial watershed within his 1600-year mythical period, as the last of a series of events staggered at 400-year intervals between Ogygus' flood and the first Olympiad.²⁷ Varro gave great structural prominence to the fall of Troy in the arrangement of his *De gente populi romani*, for this event closed off his second book (Aug. *Civ.* 18.13, fr. 14 Peter). Further, according to the very attractive speculation of Peter, the third of Varro's four books will have covered the time between Troy's sack and the foundation of Rome, marking out a definitive epoch in world-history, and trumping those Greek scholars who had made Troy's fall the vital beginning moment without cataloguing the most important event it had given rise to.²⁸

Note, then, how when we first see Troy in Ovid it is not falling, but being built, or rebuilt (11.199-201):²⁹

inde nouae primum moliri moenia Troiae
Laumedonta uidet susceptaque magna labore
crescere difficili ...

from here he sees Laomedon first building the walls of a new
Troy, and the mighty undertaking growing with difficult
labour ...

There are, in fact, two pre-Homeric sacks of the city mentioned in this immediate context (*bis ... superatae ... Troiae*, 11.215), one involving Hercules, who bursts in from the previous 'mythic' section in a moment described by Ludwig as 'die stärkste chronologische Diskrepanz im Aufbau der Metamorphosen'.³⁰ Of course Ovid anticipates the canonical sack of Troy

²⁷ Peter 1902, 232.

²⁸ Peter 1902, 238, 242; but note the reservations of Dahlmann in *RE* Suppl.6.1240.

²⁹ And the language used here to describe Troy's rebuilding evokes the Virgilian language of the building of Rome (*altae moenia Romae*, *Aen.* 1.8), which is the consequence of the fall.

³⁰ Ludwig 1965, 60.

by the Achaeans when he soon mentions the marriage of Peleus and Thetis, the parents of Achilles (11.217-20); and the fall of Troy is certainly of huge importance in the poem as a defining epic and tragic moment. Its value as a chronological anchor, however, is another matter, as we shall see now.

After Troy is mentioned the first time, we have over 530 lines of erotic and conjugal myth before we return to Troy:³¹ first, the marriage of Peleus and Thetis, then the introduction of Ceyx, and then various stories linked to him until the main Ceyx and Alcyone story, with their transformation into halcyons. Only then, as he describes people watching the halcyons, does Ovid return to the topic of the city (11.749-58):

Hos aliquis senior iunctim freta lata uolantes
spectat et ad finem seruatos laudat amores:
proximus, aut idem, si fors tulit, 'hic quoque', dixit
'quem mare carpentum substrictaque crura gerentem
adspicis' (ostendens spatiosum in guttura mergum),
'regia progenies: sunt, si descendere ad ipsum
ordine perpetuo quaeris, sunt huius origo
Ilus et Assaracus raptusque Ioui Ganymedes
Laumedonque senex Priamusque nouissima Troiaet
tempora sortitus ...'

These some old man sees flying joined together over the broad seas, and he praises the love they preserved to the end. Someone standing next to him, or the same man, if that's the way chance had it, said 'This one too, that you see skimming the sea with his legs tucked up' (pointing out the diver with his elongated neck) 'is of kingly stock: his ancestry, if you wish to start at the top and come down to him in an unbroken orderly sequence, consists of Ilus and Assaracus and Ganymede, snatched by Jupiter, and the old man Laomedon and Priam, the one who drew the lot of the last time-period of Troy ...'

Much is destabilized here: after all, even the identity of the speaker is uncertain (was it the same old man who praised the constancy of the halcyons, or was it by pure chance someone standing next to him?). In line 755 *ordine perpetuo* ('unbroken orderly sequence') is, as always in this

³¹ Although, as Holzberg 1998, 146-7 points out, Ovid's awareness of the fact that we should now be plunging into martial terrain is revealed by his marked deployment of epically martial metaphor and terminology throughout these 530 lines.

poem, a certain sign that some serious chronological dislocation is afoot; and, sure enough, as we go through the line of Trojan kings we arrive at 757-8, where Priam is described as 'the one who drew the lot of the last time-period of Troy'. Troy has already fallen, in other words, although the last time we saw Troy—the first time we saw Troy—it was described as being built. From the vantage-point of the birdwatchers on the cliffs, in the here-and-now of ornithology, Troy now is described as already over and done with, before we have actually got to the narration of the war and the fall. The whole of the war's narrative is analepsis: the fall is over before it is narrated. But then, we knew that anyway. Everything is always over before it is narrated.

The fall of Troy, then, is made entirely valueless as a secure foundation for the time-frame of the poem. When the fall of Troy finally occurs in 13.404 it may be assigned a date, 1184/3 BCE, to be the first of only a handful of datable events in the poem (along with the foundation of Rome in 753 BCE, the importation of Aesculapius in 291 BCE, and the assassination of Julius Caesar in 44 BCE); yet its embedding in retrogression and analepsis has robbed it of its talismanic demarcating power.

If Ovid subverts the chronological value of the fall of Troy, other canonical benchmarks he ignores altogether. The return of the Heracleidae was another important marker for many Greeks: this was the beginning of Ephorus' *History*, for example.³² Nothing in Ovid. What of the first Olympiad, the great moment for all chronographers, when accurate dating and synchronization first really become possible? No mention in Ovid of Coroebus of Elis, the first victor in the first footrace, the first man in Eratosthenes' or Hippias' lists. No mention of the Olympic games at all, in fact, until book 14, when we read this description of the age of Picus at the time of his transformation (324-5):

nec adhuc spectasse per annos
quinquennem poterat Graia quater Elide pugnam.³³

He could not yet have seen four quinquennial contests at
Grecian Elis.

This is the report of Ulysses' former companion, Macareus, describing an account he heard from a nymph in Circe's palace. The notional date of the

³² Fornara 1983, 8-9.

³³ The text of 325 is problematic, but I trust that my argument will show why I prefer the reading which gives us a reference to the Olympic games here (and I am pleased to report that Richard Tarrant approves this reading, which has the authority also of Heinsius).

original conversation, then, is, say, 1180; but mark how the nymph describes the age of Picus: 'He could not yet have seen four quinquennial contests at Grecian Elis'. This is one way of saying that someone is about 19 years old;³⁴ but of course in 1180 no one could have seen even one contest at Grecian Elis, because the first Olympiad was still more than four hundred years in the future. The single most significant dating device in ancient history has here been dislocated four hundred years out of context. As an anchor for a time-scheme the Olympic Games have become valueless.

Any great time-counting schemes are missing. We do not have a hallowed 1000-year cycle of history or of individual reincarnation. We do have one 1000-year period mentioned, at 14.136-53; but this is no grand scheme, simply the lifespan of the Sibyl, haphazardly equivalent to the number of grains in a pile of sand, a random total randomly split into 700 and 300 years by her contingent meeting with Aeneas.³⁵ The catabasis of Aeneas is exactly at the point in the narrative when we might expect some genuinely significant historical number-crunching, but instead we get a pile of sand and an individual's life (an individual with a more than passing resemblance to Ovid, as the end of her speech shows, 152-3: *usque adeo mutata ferar, nullique uidenda, / uoce tamen noscar, uocem mihi fata relinquunt*, 'so changed shall I be said to be, and visible to none; but by my voice shall I be recognized, the fates will leave me my voice').³⁶

Ovid avoids significant synchronisms of the kind cultivated by Eratosthenes, Apollodorus, Nepos, Atticus and Varro. He does not correlate events in the Greek and Roman worlds; with one significant exception, as we shall see, he passes from one to the other, from Greece to Italy.³⁷ If we are given no synchronisms between Greece and Rome, neither are we given any of the material that chronographers are supposed to provide about the

³⁴ For this interpretation see Bömer 1969-86, ad loc.

³⁵ Ellsworth 1988b, 53 makes an unconvincing attempt to see chronographic significance in the splitting of the Sibyl's span into 700 and 300 years. 700 years do not take us back to any important benchmark, and 300 take us forward, not to the time of Tarquinius Priscus, but to a period still over a century before Romulus. If Ovid had wanted to endow the Sibyl's 1000 years with non-contingent meaning, he could have split her lifetime into, for example, 600 and 400, and thereby brought her nearly into line with Varro's scheme, which allowed for some 400 years between the fall of Troy and the first Olympiad.

³⁶ Ellsworth 1988b, 53. Note, too, how Aeneas sees only his ancestors in the Underworld, as one might naturally expect (14.117), with no view of the future/present that in Virgil was inextricably linked with Aeneas' present.

³⁷ Excellent discussion of this transition from the Greek to the Roman at the end of the poem in Myers 1994, ch.3.

relative dates of important artists, poets, or philosophers; again, with one significant exception, the same exception, Ovid does not mention *any* historical artists, poets, or philosophers. We get Pygmalion, not Phidias; Orpheus, not Homer.

Notoriously, even the very foundation of Rome itself is practically glossed over in passing (14.772-5):

Proximus Ausonias iniusti miles Amuli
 rexit opes, Numitorque senex amissa nepotis
 munere regna capit, festisque Palilibus urbis
 moenia conduntur ...

Next the soldier of unjust Amulius ruled the resources of Ausonia, and old Numitor gains his lost kingdom by the help of his grandson, and on the festival of Palilia the city's walls are founded ...

There is a date here, but it is not the Varronian date of the foundation, the fulcrum for Roman historical chronography, but a Fasti-type day of the year date (the only one explicitly given in the poem). And the secure significance of this foundation-date is practically immediately undermined by the beginning of the next book, when we get a really proper elaborate foundation story, the foundation of ... Croton; for Ovid's account of the foundation of Croton leads in turn into the most famous anachronism in the whole poem, indeed, the most famous anachronism in Roman history.³⁸ This anachronism is the exception I have just mentioned twice, for we pass back to the Greek world momentarily, and we also meet an actual historical philosopher, as Numa goes to Croton to meet Pythagoras—and Pythagoras, as every modern schoolboy knew, was not born until Numa had been dead for over 100 years. Here is Livy on the subject of where Numa derived his famous wisdom (1.18.2):

Auctorem doctrinae eius, quia non exstat alius, falso Samium
 Pythagoram edunt, quem Seruio Tullio regnante Romae
 centum amplius post annos in ultima Italiae ora circa
 Metapontum Heracleamque et Crotona iuuenum aemulantium
 studia coetus habuisse constat.

³⁸ For other links between these foundations, see Hardie 1997b, 195-8. On the complex Roman tradition concerning the meeting of Numa and Pythagoras see Gruen 1990, 158-70.

People falsely proclaim Pythagoras of Samos as the source of his learning, because there isn't anyone else on record as his teacher, but it is agreed that Pythagoras had his coteries of young men studying his lore while Servius Tullius was on the throne in Rome, more than 100 years later, right on the very edge of Italy around Metapontus and Heraclea and Croton.

Even more pertinent for Ovid is a lengthy discussion between Scipio and Manilius on the subject of Numa and Pythagoras in Cicero's *De re publica* (2.27-9), for here the speakers address the quintessentially Ovidian themes of fictional plausibility and Roman Hellenization. After hearing Scipio praise the reign of Numa and the chronological accuracy of 'our friend Polybius', who established thirty-nine years as the length of that reign, Manilius asks if there can be anything to the tradition that Numa was a student of Pythagoras. Scipio responds in animated terms:

Falsum est enim, Manili, ... id totum, neque solum fictum, sed etiam imperite absurdeque fictum; ea sunt enim demum non ferenda in mendacio, quae non solum ficta esse, sed ne fieri quidem potuisse cernimus.

The whole thing is false, Manilius, and not just a fiction but on top of that a bungled and ludicrous fiction. For that's what's really intolerable in lie-telling, when we can tell that something's not just made up but couldn't even have actually happened.

These words must have been an irresistible challenge to Ovid, a disciple of the man who had once written *ψευδοίμην, αἰόντος ἄ κεν πεπίθοιεν ἀκούην* ('If I'm going to lie, let me at least tell lies that are going to persuade the person who hears them', Callim. *Hymn* 1.65). Scipio produces elaborate chronological proofs of the impossibility of the meeting, provoking a fine exclamation from Manilius:

Di immortales, inquit Manilius, quantus iste est hominum et quam inueteratus error! ac tamen facile patior non esse non transmarinis nec inportatis artibus eruditos, sed genuinis domesticisque uirtutibus.

Ye immortal gods, said Manilius, what a monster of an error, and how long-standing! Still, I can easily live with the fact that we were not educated by arts brought in from overseas, but by virtues that were innate and homebred.

This question of whether or not Roman learning is native or imported is clearly the key. Cicero very much wants to imagine a time of pristine Romanness before foreign influence;³⁹ Ovid knows full well that it is a great historical mistake to deny that Roman culture is Hellenized as far back in time as it is possible to go, and he is prepared to repeat a famous anachronism in order to correct this mistake.

The poem, then, contains one synchronization of the Nepos/Varro variety between Roman time and Greek intellectual history, yet it is the one synchronization that all of his readers would have agreed had been exploded by modern research.⁴⁰ The chronological uncertainty generated here throws its effect back to the preceding foundation story, of Rome: the Catonian, Varronian and Virgilian overarching connections between Troy's fall and Rome's foundation have been broken.

If the canonical moments of demarcation and origin are missing or destabilized, there are of course passages where Ovid marks a new beginning, a new phase. These, however, are not the standard chronological points of demarcation, but the generic ones that matter to Ovid: *primus amor* ... ('the first love', 1.452); *primus in his Phineus, belli temerarius auctor* ('first among these was Phineus, the rash originator of war', 5.8: note the significant words with which this particular first *auctor* is petrified by Perseus: *quin etiam mansura dabo monimenta per aeuum*, 'indeed I shall give a monument to endure through time', 5.227). Ovid is, in sum, consistently evasive about offering connected rationales for the poem except those artistic ones for which he can claim full credit.⁴¹ A sense of Ovidian time is indeed created in the internal world of the poem, one created by the sheer experience of reading. The clearest example of this sensation is given by the story of Salmacis, which is 'brand new' when we first encounter it quite early on (4.284), and known to absolutely everybody when Pythagoras alludes to it in the last book of the poem (15.319).

The canonical and authoritative time-structures available to Ovid, then, are put under extreme pressure in his poem.⁴² His scheme is ordered in its own ways, but he does not want it to be anyone else's order: he wants it to be *mea tempora*. After all, he knows how arbitrary and constructed any time

³⁹ Zetzel 1995, 184-5.

⁴⁰ Pythagoras, of course, is an ideal figure to generate chronological uncertainty: he keeps *coming back* (*Met.* 15.160-2).

⁴¹ As Raphael Lyne put it to me.

⁴² As are, indeed, all manner of authoritative structures: Barkan 1986, 84-5. Compare, in particular, the pressures Ovid's poem puts on the concepts of ordered and controlled space which the new imperial geography was attempting to enshrine (Lyne 1999).

pattern is, since originally there was no time, no demarcation of night and day, for there was no sun or moon (1.10-11):⁴³ the first word of the poem's narrative proper, after the proem, is a word of time, *ante*, signalling a time before time (1.5). At the beginning of book 2, with the help of allusions shuttling back and forth between the *Metamorphoses* and the *Fasti*, Ovid reveals that this primal chaos is lurking at the heart even of established natural time. Here we may glimpse chaos potentially in even the most ordered time presentation of all, the palace of Sol (2.25-30):⁴⁴

a dextra laevaue Dies et Mensis et Annus
 saeculaue et positae spatiis aequalibus Horae
 Verque nouum stabat cinctum florente corona,
 stabat nuda Aestas et spiceaserta gerebat,
 stabat et Autumnus, calcatis sordidus uuis,
 et glacialis Hiems, canos hirsuta capillos.

On right and left there were Day and Month and Year, and the Centuries and, positioned at equal intervals, the Hours; there stood new Spring, crowned with a flowering garland, there stood naked Summer, carrying garlands woven out of ears of corn, there stood Autumn too, stained with trodden grapes, and icy Winter, his white hair all shaggy.

This parade of regularity is most imposing, but the very next line reminds us that this order is all brand new: the character Phaethon may be frightened by the 'novelty' of what he sees (*rerum nouitate*, 2.31), but the reader also knows that the post-Chaos order of time is indeed 'novel', 'new' at the date of Phaethon. The reassuring order is further unsettled if we remember the beginning of the *Fasti*, where Janus first declares himself to be the one whom those of old called Chaos (*me Chaos antiqui (nam sum res prisca) uocabant*, 1.103), and then claims that he presides over the gates of Heaven, along with the Hours (*praesideo foribus caeli cum mitibus Horis*, 1.125)—between lines 26 and 27 of *Metamorphoses* 2, in other words. Sure enough, before the narrative of book 2 has proceeded much further, we see the chaos unleashed by Phaethon and hear a protest from Earth herself: *in chaos antiquum confundimur* ('we are being poured back into the chaos of old',

⁴³ Cf. Zissos' and Gildenhard 1999's discussion of the prologue, with their references to Pl. *Tim.* 37d-e and Macr. *Sat.* 1.8.7 on the absence of time in the original state. Their whole discussion, in particular of the palace of Sol, should be read in tandem with mine.

⁴⁴ Cf. Brown 1987, 213-14.

299)—here the collocation of *chaos* and *antiquum* is a clear intertextual echo of Janus' words in the *Fasti*, quoted above, *me Chaos antiqui* (1.103).

It is vital to Ovid, then, to make his own time, and to break down the domination of the accepted patterns of time. He wants to create a space for uncertainty, for contingency, for unreality, for a different construction of the individual self in time. Here Helga Nowotny affords us some very thought-provoking ways into the larger issue of time.⁴⁵ First of all, she evokes the all-pervasive nature of the time-schemes which regulate any aspect of human experience and the inevitable issues of power involved in the tensions of that regulation: "Time is made by human beings and has to do with power they exercise over one another with the aid of strategies of time."⁴⁶ As she says, "Knowing the right moment is useful; determining it confers power and promises control."⁴⁷ This regulatory pressure of the canonical forms of time is what Ovid wants to break away from, in favour of what Nowotny calls a different "search for the moment", one which "can also point inwards, to the unfolding of one's own, temporal self, to the development of an identity repeatedly reassembled from fragments. Then time is made by the flow of time momentarily stopping to let in the unexpected, to break routine, and to be open to the experience of spontaneity and to the 'vicissitudes' of life."⁴⁸

In the *Metamorphoses*, then, despite the ostensible form of the arrangement, Ovid is interested in an altogether different use of time from the chronographic. And I can think of no clearer proof of Ovid's genius, if we wish to talk in these terms, than the fact that while he was composing the time-machine of the *Metamorphoses* he was simultaneously composing the quite different time-machine of the *Fasti*, which is precisely all about Nowotny's "strategic use of time as a central aspect in the emergence of power," as Newlands 1995 in particular has recently shown. We have already seen above that Ennius may be a precursor in this task of composing

⁴⁵ My thanks to Henderson 1995 for alerting me to the importance of Nowotny's work. Henderson is describing there Horace's and the state's use of time to control and regulate: Ovid's *Metamorphoses* is the counter-example.

⁴⁶ Nowotny 1994, 143; cf. *ibid.*, 'The strategic use of time as a central aspect in the emergence of power, and the purpose of maintaining it, runs throughout the whole of social life, from interpersonal relations to the big institutions and their built-in tendencies to persist.'

⁴⁷ Nowotny 1994, 152.

⁴⁸ Nowotny 1994 152: she is speaking generally here, and not—however much it may appear that she is!—about the *Metamorphoses*. This is an apposite place to acknowledge how stimulated I was by a brief paragraph on the *Metamorphoses* in a synopsis of Alessandro Schiesaro's ongoing project on 'Knowledge in Roman poetry.'

two quite different works on time, one that starts at the origin and moves sequentially on to the present, and another that describes the annual round of the calendrical year. Of these two Ennian works, only one, the *Annales*, was in verse; perhaps, then, for a model of how to compose two poems of time, one sequential from the origins, and one annually circular, we may look even further back, to Hesiod. Hesiod's calendrical *Works and Days* is acknowledged as a model by Ovid in the *Fasti*, where he is addressed by Janus and by Mars as 'a bard working on days' (*uates operose dierum*, 1.101, 3.177).⁴⁹ Hesiod's *Theogony* begins, as does the *Metamorphoses*, with Chaos, and moves through divine time until the poet reaches the present ordered state of the universe, at which point he bids farewell to the gods and their ordered world, and turns to the heroes (963-8).⁵⁰ Although there are only some forty more lines to go in the text of the *Theogony* as we conceive of it (and as Hesiod conceived of it), Ovid would have seen the end of the *Theogony* as a transition to the five books of the *Catalogue of Women* or *Ehoiai*, a parade of heroic genealogies and myth.⁵¹ From this perspective Ovid is a modern Hesiod in both his works.⁵²

If Ovid is determined to maintain a strategic uncertainty in his configurations of time in the *Metamorphoses*, then his plan has, of course, a corollary—Ovid's metamorphic poem must do its best to disavow Augustus' time-constructions, along with Nepos' and Varro's and Apollodorus' and Ennius'.

For a start, the teleology of Augustus' *Aeneid* is severely compromised by Ovid.⁵³ Now, at first the *Metamorphoses* does appear to buttress a Virgilian picture of the Roman state being inevitably predestined in the structure of the cosmos and the poem, for the first two books have repeated prophecies or prolepses looking forward to the coming Roman, and Augustan, *imperium*. The first comparisons of the poem look forward from mythical time to the contemporary world of Augustus' Palatine establishment, and to his relations with the Senate (1.175-6, 200-4). The first prophecy of the poem shows Apollo foretelling the laurel's role in Roman triumphal ritual and as an honorific adornment for Augustus' house (1.560-

⁴⁹ Hardie 1991, 59.

⁵⁰ On the importance of the *Theogony* to Ovid's ideal of a 'Weltgedicht', see Ludwig 1965, 74-5, 83-6; Myers 1994, 6; Barchiesi 1994a, 220-2.

⁵¹ M.L. West 1985, 127-8.

⁵² Although he owes to the chronographers the extra conception of extending the heroic time down into history, and the present: Ludwig 1965, 75-6.

⁵³ As eloquently stated by Kenney 1982, 441: 'For him the Augustan settlement was not, as it had been for Virgil, the start of a new world, *nouus saeculorum ordo*, but another sandbank in the shifting stream of eternity'.

3). The Phaethon episode has two almost casual glances forward to Roman dominion and custom, as if to show that the threatened chaos will not materialize this time: in the list of rivers dried up by Phaethon's careering chariot, we see Tiber, *cui ... fuit rerum promissa potentia* ('to whom power over the world was promised', 2.259); and at the end of the episode we are told that the tears of Phaethon's sisters, transformed into amber, will be carried down the Po to become jewellery to be worn by Roman brides (*electra ... quae lucidus amnis | excipit et nuribus mittit gestanda Latinis*). Not long afterwards comes the final such forward reference, an even more offhand allusion, as the former whiteness of the crow is compared to the current whiteness of various birds, including the geese who were to save the Capitol (*nec seruatoris uigili Capitolia uoce | cederet anseribus*, 2.538-9). The opening of Ocyroe's prophecy on Aesculapius (2.642-54) should perhaps be mentioned here too, for it looks forward allusively and inexplicitly to the second to last historical event in the poem, Aesculapius' importation into Rome in book 15 (compare 2.642 and 15.744). Still, after book 2 these forward references stop. This is an interesting and underexamined problem, but for our present purposes it is enough to observe that a teleological reading of the poem as a whole becomes harder and harder to sustain as a result.⁵⁴

The end of the poem multiply defeats our attempts to read it as the end of time, a definitive *telos*.⁵⁵ In all kinds of ways the energy of the poem sweeps us on towards the future. The power of Ennius' *Annales* as a model comes into its own at this point, for the first Roman poem of time was also in fifteen books of hexameters, but it was continued, with a supplement of books 16-18, as Ennius grappled with the Tristram Shandy problem of having to write more the more he lived.⁵⁶ The end of the poem shows how the future cannot be contained or controlled, and it picks up on Virgilian

⁵⁴ After book 1 these forward references cluster around Phaethon (even the reference to the Capitoline geese is immediately followed by a reference to the swan, whose metamorphosis is narrated at the end of the Phaethon story). I am not sure of the effect of this, but the place to begin an investigation would be with the paper in Hardie et al. 1999 by Zissos and Gildenhard, which shows how fundamental categories of natural and narrative time are broken down in book 2, despite the hairsbreadth escape from total chaos.

⁵⁵ Barchiesi 1994a, 243-65. As ever, we must guard against failing to do justice to the complexities of the model when doing justice to the complexities of the text under discussion: see Zetzel 1997 for a bracingly non-reductive approach to Virgilian teleology.

⁵⁶ The end of the *Fasti* deploys Ennian allusion to similar effect: Feeney 1992, 24 n. 64.

hints in order to do so, especially the death of Marcellus at the end of *Aeneid* 6, where the crisis of succession opens before the readership, as we see the loss of what had been going to be the future.⁵⁷

Political succession is a vital concern at the opening and close of the last book of the *Metamorphoses*.⁵⁸ Book 15 opens with a problem of succession, after the death of Romulus, using language that must have been current in senatorial and courtly circles towards the end of Augustus' life.⁵⁹ At the end of the book we see the problem of succession picked up again, in a double context of futurity, as Jupiter looks into the future to tell Venus how Augustus will attempt to control the unknowable and unmanageable future (834-7):

inque futuri
temporis aetatem uenturorumque nepotum
prospiciens prolem sancta de coniuge natam
ferre simul nomenque suum curasque iubebit.⁶⁰

and looking forward into the age of future time and of the descendants to come, he will order the offspring born from his chaste wife to take up at the same time his name and his cares.

⁵⁷ Hardie 1993, 92.

⁵⁸ Hardie 1993, 94 rightly stresses Ovid's comparative lack of interest in 'generational continuity', referring to Ovid's preferences for other kinds of continuity than the one provided by 'the biological fact that the only kind of perpetuity lies in the replacement of one generation by the next'. It is striking that all of the successions of book 15 are specifically non-biological ones (Romulus is succeeded by Numa, Caesar by Augustus, and Augustus by Tiberius: in this last case Ovid places high stress on the fact that Augustus' successor is the biological product of Augustus' wife, not of Augustus himself, *prolem sancta de coniuge natam*, 836).

⁵⁹ Compare *Met.* 15.1-2 (*quis tantae pondera molis / sustineat*) and 5 (*animo ... capaci*) with the Tacitean language which clusters around the abilities to succeed Augustus of, respectively, Agrippa Postumus (*neque ... tantae moli parem*, *Ann.* 1.4.3) and Tiberius (*solam diui Augusti mentem tantae molis capacem*, 1.11.1): see Goodyear 1972 ad loc. and cf. Hardie 1997b, 182-3.

⁶⁰ *curas* in the final line of this quotation is another of the quasi-technical words in common with Tacitus' account of Tiberius' succession (*in partem curarum ab illo uocatum*, 1.11.1). Versnel 1994, 202-5, has a fascinating discussion of this attempt by the emperors to control future time as well as present, and he takes the end of *Metamorphoses* 15 as his text.

Here the poet, the readership and the *princeps* are all attempting to foresee 'un futuro senza Augusto';⁶¹ he will, after all, one day be indubitably *absens*, as the last word addressed to him in the poem reminds us (15.870).

Nothing shows the mutability of the poem's time categories more powerfully than the rewritings of the poem from exile, as Stephen Hinds has shown in his 'Booking the return trip' (1985), and in his return trip to the issue in Hardie et al., 1999.⁶² As Ovid's Pythagoras says, times are always new (*tempora ... noua sunt semper*, 15.183-4). Time will always move on, and become different, and make past times, *tempora*, different from the new perspective. The new *tempora* of exile are divorced irrevocably from the *tempora* of the composition of the *Metamorphoses*.⁶³

In view of the passages from exile, in particular, it would be romantic to see the *Metamorphoses'* time and authority patterns as straightforwardly independent of Augustus' time and authority patterns. However strenuously Ovid attempts to keep the *tempora* of the *Metamorphoses mea* and not *tua*, however hard he tries to emancipate his masterpiece from time and power constraints which he wishes to project as external, Ovid's schemes inevitably mesh in with Augustus', and the two define themselves in interaction. As far as the issue of time is concerned, this is most clear when we remember the way that the end of the *Metamorphoses* takes us on a trajectory right into the Roman calendar, the Julian calendar which Augustus and Ovid were both hard at work rewriting for the new times. The temporal links between the two poems have been compellingly analysed in Philip Hardie's discussion of Janus, the patron god of the *Fasti's* opening, and in Alessandro Barchiesi's discussion of the way in which the second to last historical event of the *Metamorphoses*, the importation of Aesculapius, takes us forward to the *Fasti*, where the feast day of Aesculapius is marked in red on the first day of the year, the first of January.⁶⁴ Once again, Nowotny offers us some very thought-provoking perspectives, now on the dialogic nature of the construction of time, whether we are considering the issue from the perspective of the *Metamorphoses*, *Fasti*, or (most piquantly of all) *Tristia*:

⁶¹ Barchiesi 1994a, 265.

⁶² 'Time itself is always a loaded term as the *Tristia* get under way, a term which moves between Ovid's lived experience and his poetry, negotiating a transition from the world-views of Ovid's own Roman past to the world-views of his Pontic present and future. Ovid puts life and art in dialogue not only to construct his exiled self, but to construct the time-frame which his exiled self must inhabit'.

⁶³ See Hinds' discussion of *Tristia* 1.1.4 & 122, 1.7.4 in the opening section of his paper in Hardie et al. 1999.

⁶⁴ Hardie 1991; Barchiesi 1991, 6-7.

Paradoxically ... proper time is made possible only through the time of others. Only when a common time is created as a frame of reference, which neither belongs completely to the one or completely to the other nor is occupied by him or her, can the constraint of time at least be loosened, even if it cannot be totally removed. Between two individuals, this presupposes a process of constant development, of negotiation and argument by means of their continued temporal strategies. Many sets of strategies are at the disposal of strategic action in time and through time: accelerating and slowing down; fixing a deadline; promising; waiting and keeping the other waiting; acting at the right moment, deciding or biding one's time.⁶⁵

Mea tempora, then, but also, inevitably, at the same time, *tua*.

Still, since I have been arguing that Ovid tries very hard to keep the *Metamorphoses* independent of the dominant patterns of time in his world, let us conclude by acknowledging his chronological superiority to the Caesars at the end of the poem. Julius Caesar had an allotted span of *tempora*, which he filled up in March 44 (as Jupiter points out to Venus, *hic sua compleuit ... l tempora, perfectis, quos terrae debuit, annis* 'he has completed his times, and finished the years that he owed to the earth', 15.816-17).⁶⁶ His adopted son, Augustus, as Jupiter also prophesies, likewise has a span of years which will one day end (*annos*, 838).⁶⁷ Ovid's future, however, is different. A day will come that will mark the boundary of the extent of his contingent lifespan (*illa dies ... incerti spatium mihi finiat aevi*, 15.873-4), but in his better part he will be *perennis* (875). Ovid begins by asking the gods to spin the poem down to 'his own times', but since he will keep going 'through the years' and never die the times are always 'his own'. The word that begins the poem's final paragraph, on Ovid's future fate, is *iam*, 'now'—the 'now' of the poet's act of completion, but always into the future the ongoing and ever-changing 'now' of each new reader's act of coming to the end.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Nowotny 1994, 144-5. Once again, I must caution that, despite appearances, she is not talking about Ovid and Augustus.

⁶⁶ Only two months (by the Roman reckoning) before Ovid's earthly *tempora* began; as Barchiesi points out in Hardie et al. 1999, Ovid was conceived in the year Caesar died.

⁶⁷ The text is corrupt, but *annos* at least is certain.

⁶⁸ Cf. Smith 1997, 5-6, 194-6.

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