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Labor Market Attitudes and Experienced Political Institutions

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Abstract

In this paper I first present a novel fact: women who have experienced democratic institutions during their adolescence are more likely to participate in the labor market, keeping constant the country, age and many other confounding factors. I then present evidence suggesting that discriminatory attitudes may be a channel for such a finding. Other explanations receive less support from the data.

Keywords: gender economics, institutions, democratization, discrimination, labor supply.

JEL codes: D72, J16, J71.

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1 Introduction

The positive effects of good institutions can not be overstated. This paper aims at contributing to the literature of the positive consequences of inclusive institutions by showing how they favor the female labor force participation, by reducing discriminatory attitudes toward women, and toward immigrants.

The ideal experiment for uncovering the relationship between democratization and female labor participation would consist in assigning different young women to live in different countries with different degree of democratization. Then, subsequently, at different points in time, observing them and inquiring them about their labor force participation. Such an experiment is unfeasible, also because often countries with different institutions have different languages, making the random assignment unfeasible.

An easy way to understand the identification strategy of this paper is observing the evolution of the democratization of different countries, represented in Figure 1 and Figure 2, from the 1900s to 2016.¹ In the figures I consider Egypt, Spain, Afghanistan and Syria. We consider two indicators of how democratic the institutions are. The first one is the *polity score*, and the second one is the extent to which there are *constraints on the executive*. These series exhibit both cross-sectional and time variation.

The series show that different cohorts of people will be exposed to different degree of democratization throughout their life. For instance, people born in the 1920s in Spain experience in their 20s similar democratization rates than those people born in the 1990s, but different crime rates than the people born in the 1940s. One can repeat a similar exercise across time and space for every country that had some relevant regime transitions.

The main idea of the empirical strategy of this paper is exploiting such variation for identification purposes, to alleviate the concerns arising from purely cross-sectional comparisons.

There is a hypothesis in experimental psychology which has received considerably empirical support according to which people between about 16 and 25 years old tend to be more impressionable, and experiences lived during those ages tend to persist for a long period of time (Krosnick and Alwin, 1989).

Therefore, it is possible to link the regime to which people were exposed during one of their impressionable years, say, 18 years old, to data coming from the *World Value Survey* to compute whether democratization matters for labor market outcomes.

¹Data from Syria start in 1940.

The same idea has been used by economists to identify, for instance, the effect of recessions on preferences for redistribution (Giuliano and Spilimbergo , 2014), or the effect of recessions on preferences for stock market participation (Malmendier and Nagel , 2011).

It should be noted that *the specific* timing of the regime transition and the intensity of the transition are not easy to predict. Therefore, after accounting for the predictable part of the series, the specific geographic, time and intensity differences of those series can be thought as relatively quasi-random.

The starting point of this paper is the observation that female labor supply responds to the experienced level of democratization. A standard deviation increase in the polity score raises female labor participation by 1.2 percent of its mean, in the most demanding specification; a standard deviation increase in the constraints of the executive variable increases female labor supply by 2.8 percent of its mean.

In order to shed more light to the channels through which this happens I look at whether attitudes toward women respond to the democratization level experienced during adolescence. I first consider the most commonly used measure for attitudes toward women in the labor market, the World Value Survey question: *When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women*. I observe that people who experienced democracy while they were aged 18 years old are more likely to respond negatively to such a question.

Having established that attitudes may be a channel for such a response, I look at which kind of attitudes may matter. I first consider discriminatory attitudes toward women and discriminatory attitudes toward immigrants (regardless of the gender), and I find evidence that those attitudes respond strongly to the type of institutions experienced during impressionable years.

Another channel may be that people who experienced inclusive institutions may be less conservative toward women in the workplace. However, when I look at conservatory attitudes toward women in the workplace, I find that those attitudes are not responsive to the experienced institutions during adolescence.

Motivated by the fact that some respondents may be concerned that the inclusion of women in the workforce may push away the older people, I also look at attitudes toward seniority, and I find that those attitudes are not responsive to the experienced institutions during adolescence.

Another possibility may be that people who experienced inclusive institutions feel in general more proactive toward work. Therefore, I consider attitudes toward work, regardless

of gender, but I find that also those attitudes are not responsive to the experienced political institutions during adolescence.

All in all, the body of evidence presented suggests that female labor participation is favored by having experienced inclusive political institutions, perhaps because people that have had those democratic experiences tend to behave inclusively themselves, by having less discriminatory attitudes.

This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, it contributes to the literature on the consequences of democratization. While there is a large literature on the macro-economic consequences of democratization, the one about micro-economic consequences (at the individual level) is much smaller. Democratization has been shown to matter for social capital (Muller and Seligson , 1994, Paxton , 2002) and inequality (Mueller and Stratmann , 2003). By connecting female labor supply to political outcomes the paper is connected to the literature focused on the relationship between female political representation (measured by female voting or proportion of females in political power) and female labor force participation (Iversen and Rosenbluth , 2007, 2006).

Second, it contributes to the growing literature focused on estimating the economic effects of experienced events during impressionable years (Giuliano and Spilimbergo , 2014, Malmendier and Steiny , 2016, Malmendier and Nagel , 2011, 2015, Roth and Wohlfart , 2016, Troiano , 2017). Economic conditions and inequality experiences experienced during impressionable years have been shown to matter for economic and financial decisions and preferences for redistribution. Experiencing violent crimes has been shown to matter for social capital and political behavior.

Third, it contributes to the literature on the economic effect of attitudes (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales , 2006). Attitudes toward women have been shown to matter for the implementation of government programs intended to favor female labor participation such as maternal leave (Givati and Troiano , 2012) and for fertility decisions (Fernández and Fogli , 2009), among others. Tabellini (2008) and Tabellini (2010) suggest a mutual feedback between attitudes of civic culture and good political institutions.

It is also important to note that attitudes and culture in general have been shown to matter for female labor supply, both by using cross-sectional variation and time series variation (Fortin , 2005, Giavazzi, Schiantarelli and Serafinelli , 2013).

Finally, it contributes to the vast literature focused on the causes of female labor supply. Summarizing the female supply literature is beyond the scope of this paper. Explanations

for the increase in female labor supply of the last century include: the rise in the gender gap that encouraged many women to join the work force (Smith and Ward , 1985, Jones, Manuelli and McGrattan , 2015), the increasing use of oral contraceptives that decreased the unwanted pregnancies (Goldin and Katz , 2002), technological innovation that reduced the time to do chores at home (Greenwood, Seshadri and Yorukoglu , 2004), more favorable attitudes toward working women (Fernández, Fogli and Olivetti , 2004, Burda, Hamermesh and Weil , 2007)

The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 I present the data. In Section 3 the empirical strategy is presented. In Section 4 the results are discussed. In Section 5 I conclude.

2 Data

2.1 Political Institutions Data

The data about how democratic a country is in a given year, from 1800 to 2016, come from the Polity IV project (Polity IV , 2017). The Polity IV is the fourth edition of the Polity project, whose main goal was to code the authority characteristics of states in the world system for purposes of comparative, quantitative analysis (Eckstein and Gurr , 1975).

There are two main measures about how democratic a country is that we use for the purpose of this study. The first one is the flagship measure: *polity*. The second one is the most commonly used measure of the series, the *constraints on the executive* measure.

The *polity* score ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic country). It is the combination of two different measures, one about how democratic a country is, and another one about how autocratic a country is. The former measure gives weights to: (i) the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders; (ii) the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive; (iii) the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation. The latter measure gives weights to: (i) sharp restriction or repression of competitive political participation; (ii) selection of chief executives within the political elite; (iii) exercise of power with few institutional constraints.

The *constraints on the executive* score ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity or subordination). The variable refers to the extent to which the power of the chief executives can be constrained by any accountability groups. Accountability groups could

include legislatures, as is typical in Western democracies, or people in the ruling party (in one-party state), council of nobles or powerful advisors in monarchies, and, in many countries, a strong independent judiciary system. The main goal of the measure is therefore to pick up the checks and balances between the various parts of the decision-making process (Polity IV , 2017).

The previously described two variables are arguably the most commonly used to measure democratic political institutions by political economy scholars, and among the very few that are available since the 1800s.² Because of the nature of the research design used in this paper, it is very important to have data about political institutions that span far back in time, to include survey respondents coming from as many generations as possible.

2.2 World Value Survey

I merge the information about political institutions, at 18 years old, to data coming from the *World Value Survey*. I adopt the integrated 1981-2014 World Value Survey (World Value Survey , 1981-2014). I measure whether the female respondent works with the following answers to the following question:

Employment status: 1. Full Time; 2. Part Time; 3. Self Employed

I exclude from the respondents to the previous question women younger than 18 and older than 70, but the results keeping those women in are stronger than the results that will be presented later on.

The main question that has been used to measure labor market attitudes toward women in previous studies (see for instance Givati and Troiano (2012)) is the following:

Do you agree with the following statement? When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.

I measure discrimination toward women with the answers to the following two questions:
“Do you agree with the following statement? University is more important for a boy than for a girl. ”
“Do you agree with the following statement? Men make better political leaders than women do. ”

²Another variable that has been commonly used to measure political institutions is the *expropriation risk*. However, the latter variable is available only starting in 1984, and this would significantly reduce the number of generations included in this study, and its power, because values and beliefs tend to change slowly.

As general measures of discrimination I also consider the answers to the following two questions, that deal specifically with discrimination toward foreigners, independently of the gender: *“Do you agree with the following statement? When jobs are scarce, jobs should be given to local people.”* *“On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors? Immigrants.”*

It should be noted that I consider attitudes toward immigrants but I do not focus on the immigrants as a group in this study. The main reason is that the question about whether the respondent is an immigrant or not has been asked in limited years in the World Value Survey. Limiting to the years where the question has been asked cuts the sample size by about 80 percent. Within the subset of years that the question has been asked, only about 2 percent of the respondents reports to be born in a country different from the one where the survey is being conducted: therefore I do not consider immigrants *per se* in this study, nor I exclude them from the study, without too much loss of generality.

I measure conservative attitudes toward women with whether the respondent agrees with the following two statements: *“A woman has to have children to be fulfilled”* and *“Being a housewife just as fulfilling as working”*.

I measure whether people are concerned with seniority with the answers to the following question: *“Do you agree with the following statement? When jobs scarce, older people should be forced to retire.”*.

Finally, I measure attitudes toward work in general, independently of gender, with whether the respondent agrees with the following question: *“Is work very important?”*.

I summarize the variables used in this paper in Table 1.

3 Empirical Strategy

In this section, I outline the approach to estimate the consequences of experiencing inclusive political institutions during adolescence.

The main idea of the empirical strategy is to associate to every respondent the measure of how democratic the political institutions were when they were aged 18 years old. Controlling for country fixed effects alleviates the time-invariant concerns arising from geography; controlling for year of the survey fixed effects alleviates the concerns for the space-invariant time-specific shocks. I also control for age fixed effects, and age interacted linearly with year

of the survey fixed effects, to account for the fact that for instance people as they age tend to get more conservative. The baseline equation I estimate is the following:

$$Y_{ict} = \alpha + \beta P_{ic} + G_i + A_i + \phi_c + \phi_t + \phi_t * A + \epsilon_{ict} \quad (1)$$

where Y_{ict} is the outcome of interest, α is the constant, P_{ic} is the political institution variable (when the survey respondent has 18 years old), G_i is the gender of the respondent, A_i are age fixed effects, ϕ_c are country fixed effects, ϕ_t are the year of the survey fixed effects, $\phi_t * A$ are the interactions between the years of the survey fixed effects and age (entered linearly), and ϵ_{ict} are robust standard errors clustered at the country level.

An identification threat could be the possibility that age matters differently in different countries. To account for this possibility I will always show, together with the baseline specification, a specification that adds the interaction between country fixed effects and age (entered linearly):

$$Y_{ict} = \alpha + \beta P_{ic} + G_i + A_i + \phi_c + \phi_t + \phi_t * A + \phi_c * A + \epsilon_{ict} \quad (2)$$

where $\phi_c * A$ are the interactions between the country fixed effects and age (entered linearly).

4 Main Results

In this section I will present the main results of the analysis.

In Table 2 I present the results of female labor supply. I find that in the most demanding specification a standard deviation increase in the polity score at 18 years old makes female labor participation higher by 1.2 percent of its mean; a standard deviation increase in the constraints of the executive variable increases female labor supply by 2.8 percent of its mean.

To uncover whether attitudes may have a role in explaining this fact, I look at whether the respondents think that if jobs are scarce, men should have priority compared to women. I present those results in Table 3. I find that an increase of a standard deviation in the constraints of the executive variable increases the probability that the respondent thinks that men should have the priority by about 2 percent of its mean.

Having established that attitudes may have a role in explaining this effect, I look at which

kind of attitudes could matter. I look at four different kind of attitudes. Discriminatory attitudes; conservative attitudes; attitudes toward the older workers; and attitudes toward work in general. I find evidence that discriminatory attitudes are those that seem to respond to the experienced institutions during adolescence.

I measure discriminatory attitudes with the answers to four questions. The first two are targeted specifically toward women and measure discrimination during the education time, and in leadership position. The latter two target immigrants, regardless of gender. I find that all the four measures are very responsive to the type of institutions experienced during adolescence. I present those results in Table 4 to Table 7. Specifically, I find that one standard deviation increase in the constraints of the executive measure makes the probability of thinking that a university education is more important for a boy higher by 5 percent of the mean, and that men make better political leaders by 2.6 percent of the mean. Additionally the same standard deviation increase raises the probability of thinking that when jobs are scarce priority should be given to local by 1.5 percent of the mean, and the probability of not wanting foreigners as neighbors by 5.3 percent of the mean.

A possibility is that people who experience inclusive institutions are more progressive, and therefore more prone to accept working women. To test this hypothesis I measure conservative attitudes toward women with whether the respondents think that women need children to be fulfilled, and whether the respondents think that being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working regularly. I present those results in Table 8 and Table 9. I find that none of these attitudes are affected by the experienced institutions during adolescence: coefficients are typically small and statistically insignificant.

Another possibility is whether the respondents are concerned with increased labor force participation because it would push the more senior people out of the labor force. In order to shed light on this hypothesis I consider whether the respondents think that when there is job scarcity, older people should be forced to retire. I present those results in Table 10. I find that the responses to this question are not affected by the experienced political institutions during adolescence.

Finally, I consider in Table 11 the possibility that attitudes toward work, in general, are affected by the type of political institutions during adolescence, finding no evidence of that.

5 Conclusion

Inclusive institutions matter positively for a number of macro-economic outcomes. Despite this, the micro-economic consequences of inclusive institutions are largely neglected by the existing literature but are an exciting field of research.

In this paper I considered the effect of inclusive institutions on female labor supply, finding evidence that democratization makes the female participation in the labor market easier.

I then investigated the channels through which that happens, finding evidence supporting the view that democratization lowers discriminatory attitudes toward women and toward immigrants. Other explanations, such as the possibility that conservatism or attitudes toward the elderly change, receive less support from the data.

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
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
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Figure 1: Political Institutions Trends



Notes: The *polity* score ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic country).

Figure 2: Political Institutions Trends



Notes: The constraints on the executive score ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity or subordination).

Table 1: Summary Statistics

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	Obs.
<i>Outcomes</i>					
Work - Females	0.43	0.50	0.00	1.00	130621
Priority Men	0.40	0.49	0.00	1.00	252384
University more Important for Boys	0.24	0.43	0.00	1.00	231364
Men Better Leaders	0.49	0.50	0.00	1.00	226374
Priority Local	0.72	0.45	0.00	1.00	236057
No Foreign Neighbors	0.22	0.41	0.00	1.00	243672
Women Need Children to be Fulfilled	0.63	0.48	0.00	1.00	115332
Being Housewife just as Fulfilling	0.64	0.48	0.00	1.00	237262
Old Should Retire	0.42	0.49	0.00	1.00	62631
Working is Very Important	0.67	0.47	0.00	1.00	256896
<i>Other Variables</i>					
Polity Score at 18 years old	1.91	7.17	-10.00	10.00	270341
Constraints on the Executive at 18 years old	4.61	2.29	1.00	7.00	264466

Notes: *Work - Females* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the employment status of a female respondent between 18 and 70 is the following: 1. Full Time; 2. Part Time; 3. Self Employed. *Priority Men* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with the following statement: "When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women." *University more Important for Boys* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with the following statement: "University is more important for a boy than for a girl." *Men Better Leaders* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with the following statement: "Men make better political leaders than women do." *Priority Local* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with the following statement: "When jobs are scarce, jobs should be given to local people." *No Foreign Neighbors* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent mentioned "Immigrants" as an answer to the following question: "On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors?" *Women Need Children to be Fulfilled* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agreed with the statement: "A woman has to have children to be fulfilled." *Being Housewife just as Fulfilling* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agreed with the following statement: "Being a housewife just as fulfilling as working." *Old Should Retire* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agreed with the following statement: "When jobs scarce, older people should be forced to retire." *Working is Very Important* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent mentioned "very important" as an answer to the question "Is work very important?" The *polity* score ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic country). The *constraints on the executive* score ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity or subordination).

Table 2: Effects of Democratic Experiences on Probability Females Work

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Work - Females	Work - Females	Work - Females	Work - Females
Polity Score at 18 years old	0.00145 (0.0010)	0.000726 (0.0011)		
Constraints on the Executive at 18 years old			0.00613* (0.0031)	0.00528* (0.0029)
Age Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interaction between Year of Survey FE and Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interaction between Country FE and Age	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	126473	126473	123739	123739
R ²	0.186	0.194	0.187	0.195

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. The number of clusters is 90 and 88 respectively for columns (1)-(2) and (3)-(4). *Work - Females* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the employment status of a female respondent between 18 and 70 is the following: 1. Full Time; 2. Part Time; 3. Self Employed. The *polity* score ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic country). The *constraints on the executive* score ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity or subordination).

Table 3: Effects of Democratic Experiences on Attitudes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Priority Men	Priority Men	Priority Men	Priority Men
Polity Score at 18 years old	-0.00134** (0.0006)	-0.000960** (0.0004)		
Constraints on the Executive at 18 years old			-0.00513*** (0.0018)	-0.00341*** (0.0013)
Gender	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interaction between Year of Survey FE and Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interaction between Country FE and Age	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	250337	250337	244627	244627
R ²	0.203	0.205	0.204	0.206

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. The number of clusters is 89 and 87 respectively for columns (1)-(2) and (3)-(4). *Priority Men* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with the following statement: “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.” The *polity* score ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic country). The *constraints on the executive* score ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity or subordination).

Table 4: Effects of Democratic Experiences on Attitudes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Univ. Imp. for Boys	Univ. Imp. for Boys	Univ. Imp. for Boys	Univ. Imp. for Boys
Polity Score at 18 years old	-0.00163*** (0.0005)	-0.00162*** (0.0005)		
Constraints on the Executive at 18 years old			-0.00568*** (0.0016)	-0.00526*** (0.0016)
Gender	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interaction between Year of Survey FE and Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interaction between Country FE and Age	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	229516	229516	224518	224518
R ²	0.103	0.106	0.104	0.106

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. The number of clusters is 89 and 87 respectively for columns (1)-(2) and (3)-(4). *Univ. Imp. for Boys* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with the following statement: “University is more important for a boy than for a girl.” The *polity* score ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic country). The *constraints on the executive* score ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity or subordination).

Table 5: Effects of Democratic Experiences on Attitudes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Men Better Leaders	Men Better Leaders	Men Better Leaders	Men Better Leaders
Polity Score at 18 years old	-0.00177*** (0.0005)	-0.00185*** (0.0004)		
Constraints on the Executive at 18 years old			-0.00679*** (0.0015)	-0.00561*** (0.0013)
Gender	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interaction between Year of Survey FE and Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interaction between Country FE and Age	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	224540	224540	219658	219658
R ²	0.201	0.204	0.202	0.204

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. The number of clusters is 89 and 87 respectively for columns (1)-(2) and (3)-(4). *Men Better Leaders* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with the following statement: “Men make better political leaders than women do.” The *polity* score ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic country). The *constraints on the executive* score ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity or subordination).

Table 6: Effects of Democratic Experiences on Attitudes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Priority Local	Priority Local	Priority Local	Priority Local
Polity Score at 18 years old	-0.00113** (0.0005)	-0.00147*** (0.0004)		
Constraints on the Executive at 18 years old			-0.00438*** (0.0014)	-0.00484*** (0.0011)
Gender	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interaction between Year of Survey FE and Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interaction between Country FE and Age	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	235034	235034	229996	229996
R ²	0.119	0.122	0.120	0.122

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. The number of clusters is 85 and 83 respectively for columns (1)-(2) and (3)-(4). *Priority Local* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with the following statement: “When jobs are scarce, jobs should be given to local people.” The *polity* score ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic country). The *constraints on the executive* score ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity or subordination).

Table 7: Effects of Democratic Experiences on Attitudes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	No Foreign Neighbors	No Foreign Neighbors	No Foreign Neighbors	No Foreign Neighbors
Polity Score at 18 years old	-0.00115*** (0.0004)	-0.00128*** (0.0004)		
Constraints on the Executive at 18 years old			-0.00486*** (0.0011)	-0.00512*** (0.0014)
Gender	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interaction between Year of Survey FE and Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interaction between Country FE and Age	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	242164	242164	236597	236597
R ²	0.123	0.125	0.123	0.125

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. The number of clusters is 88 and 86 respectively for columns (1)-(2) and (3)-(4). *No Foreign Neighbors* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent mentioned “Immigrants” as an answer to the following question: “On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors?” The *polity* score ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic country). The *constraints on the executive* score ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity or subordination).

Table 8: Effects of Democratic Experiences on Attitudes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Needs Children	Needs Children	Needs Children	Needs Children
Polity Score at 18 years old	-0.000790 (0.0007)	-0.0000669 (0.0005)		
Constraints on the Executive at 18 years old			-0.00260 (0.0021)	-0.000662 (0.0015)
Gender	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interaction between Year of Survey FE and Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interaction between Country FE and Age	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	114351	114351	111508	111508
R ²	0.213	0.216	0.214	0.217

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. The number of clusters is 66 and 64 respectively for columns (1)-(2) and (3)-(4). *Needs Children* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agreed with the statement: "A woman has to have children to be fulfilled." The *polity* score ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic country). The *constraints on the executive* score ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity or subordination).

Table 9: Effects of Democratic Experiences on Attitudes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Housewife Fulfilling	Housewife Fulfilling	Housewife Fulfilling	Housewife Fulfilling
Polity Score at 18 years old	-0.000319 (0.0007)	-0.000198 (0.0005)		
Constraints on the Executive at 18 years old			-0.00176 (0.0019)	-0.00146 (0.0014)
Gender	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interaction between Year of Survey FE and Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interaction between Country FE and Age	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	235334	235334	230074	230074
R^2	0.103	0.106	0.103	0.106

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. The number of clusters is 89 and 87 respectively for columns (1)-(2) and (3)-(4). *Housewife Fulfilling* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agreed with the following statement: "Being a housewife just as fulfilling as working." The *polity* score ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic country). The *constraints on the executive* score ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity or subordination).

Table 10: Effects of Democratic Experiences on Attitudes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Old Should Retire	Old Should Retire	Old Should Retire	Old Should Retire
Polity Score at 18 years old	0.000341 (0.0007)	-0.000351 (0.0008)		
Constraints on the Executive at 18 years old			-0.000241 (0.0022)	-0.000516 (0.0025)
Gender	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interaction between Year of Survey FE and Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interaction between Country FE and Age	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	62239	62239	60338	60338
R^2	0.117	0.120	0.117	0.121

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. The number of clusters is 49 and 48 respectively for columns (1)-(2) and (3)-(4). *Old Should Retire* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agreed with the following statement: “When jobs scarce, older people should be forced to retire.” The *polity* score ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic country). The *constraints on the executive* score ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity or subordination).

Table 11: Effects of Democratic Experiences on Attitudes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Work Very Important	Work Very Important	Work Very Important	Work Very Important
Polity Score at 18 years old	0.000250 (0.0005)	0.000319 (0.0007)		
Constraints on the Executive at 18 years old			-0.000463 (0.0015)	-0.000162 (0.0015)
Gender	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interaction between Year of Survey FE and Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interaction between Country FE and Age	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	254858	254858	249107	249107
R^2	0.116	0.119	0.116	0.119

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. The number of clusters is 89 and 87 respectively for columns (1)-(2) and (3)-(4). *Work Very Important* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent mentioned “very important” as an answer to the question “Is work very important?” The *polity* score ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic country). The *constraints on the executive* score ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity or subordination).