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## **Oil prices and the world business cycle: A causal investigation**

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# Oil prices and the world business cycle: A causal investigation

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*Abstract:* Oil shocks have been often considered as exogenous factors responsible of economic downturns. In this paper the hypothesized exogeneity of oil prices is investigated by using running cross-correlations, distributed lag-regressions, Granger causality tests, and VAR models applied to annual data 1960-2014 of oil prices and global economic activity—as measured by world GDP. Strong evidence is found that (a) the relation between oil prices and the global economy has significantly changed since the 1960s to the present, and (b) oil prices are endogenously influenced by the level of activity in the global economy. Evidence of a negative effect of oil prices on the global economy is weak for the whole sample and null for recent decades. These findings are consistent with former results using the Kilian index, which is shown to be a leading indicator of activity in the world economy. As such it is significantly correlated with other indicators of the global business cycle, such as the rate of growth of world output and the annual growth of CO<sub>2</sub> global emissions.

## 1. Introduction

Shocks to productivity have been often mentioned as the cause of economic disturbances since real-business-cycle models were proposed in the 1980s. The nature of these shocks remains usually unspecified, but oil price shocks are often mentioned as major contributors, if not determinant factors, to explain the recessions occurring after World War II. Hamilton has been probably the most prominent proponent of the view that recessions of the U.S. economy were related to oil shocks (Hamilton 1988, 2009, 2011). The view that oil shocks are also responsible for *recessions of the global economy* has been espoused in a recent IMF publication. For its authors, Kose and Terrones, a sharp increase in oil prices drove the global recession of 1975, oil price shocks played significant roles in the global recessions of 1982 and 1991, and in the run up to the global recession of 2009 they “also increased sharply (spiking to \$133 a barrel in July 2008 from \$53 in January 2007)” (Kose and Terrones 2015, pp. 44-47). As explained by Kose and Terrones, in considering oil shocks as causes of global downturns they follow what was proposed long ago by Blanchard (2001).

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In a context of a national economy, oil price shocks causing recessions would imply an exogenously determined business cycle. Things are different, however, when a global business cycle is considered. At any rate, in several schools of economic thought the business cycle is an endogenously generated phenomenon of the market economy.

Versus the view that oil-price shocks are exogenous to the economy, determined by maneuvers of the producer nations, or political events like wars and revolutions, it has been argued that actually movements in oil prices are to a large extent endogenously determined by the demand for oil in international markets; the world economy itself would be only moderately responsive to changes in oil price (Barsky and Kilian 2004; Kilian 2009).

This investigation examines whether oil prices can be considered exogenously determined in a framework in which the unit to be analyzed is not a national economy, but the wider system of which all national economies are part, the world economy. The analysis focuses on annual data of (a) real oil prices and (b) world economic output (global GDP).

Figure 1 shows how strongly correlated are the rates of growth of the US and the world economy. In the recessions of the US economy in 1974-1975, in the early 1980s, 1991 and 2001, the annual rate of growth of the US economy reached negative territory. Though in these occasions the global economy continued expanding, in each of them the rate of growth of the world economy had major dips. I have argued elsewhere (Tapia 2014) that these four episodes in the mid-1970s and in the early years of the next three decades can be considered indeed recessions or crises of the world economy. My claim is that these four episodes together with the slump of 2009, when the output of the US and the world economy shrank respectively by 2.8% and 2.1% (Table 1, Figure 1), constitute five crisis of the world economy. In other terms, they are the most recent troughs of a business cycle of the global economy. To organize this framework these global recessions can be named according to monikers already in use—even if they are quite improper. Thus we have the First and Second Oil Crises in the mid-1970s and the early 1980s, the Crisis of the Soviet Bloc Breakdown in the early 1990s, the Asian-Latin American Crisis at the turn of the century, and the Great Recession of 2008-2009.

An eyeball examination of the relation between movements in oil prices and changes in the rate of growth of the world economy (Figure 2) does not provide much evidence of a strong link between movements in oil prices and the world economy. Certainly in the recessions of 2001 and 2009 both oil prices and the world economic output dropped after having been rising together during the previous years of expansion. But in 1973-1974 oil prices grew at the same time that the world economy quickly decelerated and in the period 1980-1995 both variables seem to follow quite independent trajectories. As mentioned, the global downturns of the mid-1970s and early 1980s have been repeatedly blamed on oil shocks, particularly those caused by the actions of the Organization of Petroleum Exporter Countries (OPEC). However, no less an authority on oil issues as Robert Mabro wrote that “despite appearances to the contrary the price rises of 1973, 1979-80 and 1990 were fundamentally market phenomena although OPEC claimed, in macho style, kudos for the achievement and suffered the associated odium” (Mabro 1992).

The analyses in the present investigation add to the view that oil prices are largely endogenous and show that the relation of crude oil prices with the global economy has considerably changed in recent decades. Statistical methods applied to the period 1960-2014 for which data on world GDP are available show that an expanding world economy *causes* rising oil prices, as well as a stagnant or contractionary oil economy *causes* cheapening of oil. There is also some weak evidence that considering the period 1961-2014 oil prices have had a lagged effect on the world economy, so that falling oil prices stoked the world economy and rising prices dampened the global expansion. However, focusing in the past three decades, the evidence that oil prices have a negative effect on the rate of growth of the world economy is basically null, while the evidence that the level of global economic activity has a positive effect on the growth of oil prices is particularly strong.

In the next four sections I present descriptive statistics as well as results of distributed lag regressions, Granger causality tests, and VAR models; section 6 discusses identification and causality issues, and section 7 concludes. Issues of stationarity of the series used in the analysis

are examined in the Appendix, where I present results of additional analyses using series detrended with the Hodrick-Prescott filter.

## **2. Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis**

During the past five decades real prices of crude oil—in 2009 US\$ per barrel, Table 1— oscillated mostly at levels below \$50 per barrel. Significant increases took place in 1972-1974, when prices multiplied fourfold (Table 1, Figure 2), in 1978-1979, when they doubled, and in the decade leading to the Great Recession when they multiplied sixfold from \$16.11 in 1998 to \$98.43 in 2008. Only after the Great Recession prices went briefly over \$100 per barrel, to drop steadily during 2015.

Spikes of oil prices in the years leading to a recession are the base on the common consideration of a causal effect of high oil prices as the trigger of economic slumps (Hamilton 2011). But it has been also noted that each oil price spike in the period since 1975 to the present was preceded by large increases in the world demand for oil and “the impact of demand on the movement of oil prices is also evident during periods of oil price decline” (Balardini 2010). Thus, the longest period of falling oil prices during six consecutive years since 1981 (Figure 2) occurred coinciding with the only episode in which in the past 40 years world demand for oil decreased for four consecutive years, 1981-1984 (Balardini 2010).

Correlations between the annual rates of growth of world GDP and crude oil price reveal a changing pattern. In 30-year samples (Figure 3) or 20-year samples (Figure 4) starting before the mid-1970s, correlations show a null or even negative correlation between the two variables (Figures 3 and 4, top left panels). Then with the passage of time a clear positive link appears between world economic growth and change in oil prices, so that in samples including the years 1975-2014 the correlation is positive and statistically significant. The lag-zero positive correlation between the oscillations of the world economy and the changes in oil prices is thus a phenomenon of the most recent decades.

Lag correlations suggest mutual and changing influences between the world economy and oil prices. In 30-year samples starting before the mid-1970s the growth of oil prices was negatively correlated with the growth of the world economy next year (Figure 3, left mid panel). This is strongly suggestive that at that time increases in oil prices had a dampening effect on the world economy while declining oil prices worked as a stimulus for world economic activity. After the mid-1970s this effect seems to occur with a longer lag, as the correlation between oil prices and world economic growth 2 or 3 years later, which had been statistically zero before the mid-1970s, becomes negative and, at least at marginal levels, significant (Figure 2, middle center and right panels).

Examining correlations that would be suggestive of causality in the other direction, it seems that world economic growth was in the past a clear stimulus for the increase of oil prices, as in 30-year samples starting before the mid-1970s world economic growth had a positive and statistically significant correlation with change in oil prices next year (Figure 3, left bottom panel). This correlation, however, disappears in more recent decades. At longer lags of 2 or 3 years (Figures 3 and 4, bottom row) the world economy does not have any significant correlation with oil prices—which is evidence against any causal effect. With a 4-year lag the world economy and oil prices are totally uncorrelated (Figures 3 and 4, center and right top panels), which is evidence against any of them having an effect on the other at this lag.

### **3. Lag regressions**

To further explore the potential effects of changes in world economic activity on oil prices I regressed the annual growth of oil prices on the present value and lag values of the rate of growth of the world economy. Then I switched the explanatory and the dependent variable to investigate potential influences in the opposite direction. Eleven specifications were computed, including one without any lagged value of the explanatory variable, another one with one lagged value, and so on until ten lagged values. To be able to compare the goodness of fit of specifications—to choose the specification with the number of lags of the covariate that provides

the best fit—specifications must have the same set of data for the dependent variable, so dependent variable data from 1971 to 2014 were used to have up to 10 available lags (1961-1970) for the explanatory variable.

Both for models of world economic growth explaining growth of oil prices and for models of growth of oil prices being explained by world economic growth, the specification which minimized all criteria of goodness of fit (AIC, AICC, HQC and SBC) was the specification including the covariate at lags 0 and 1. That is:

$$gW_t = 3.103 + 0.005 gOIL_t - 0.010 gOIL_{t-1} \quad R^2 = 0.11 \quad \text{Durbin-Watson } d = 1.45 \quad [1]$$

(0.233) (0.005) (0.005)

$$gOIL_t = -25.45 + 1.38 gW_t + 10.50 gW_{t-1} \quad R^2 = 0.15 \quad \text{Durbin-Watson } d = 2.18 \quad [2]$$

(16.83) (4.22) (4.20)

where  $gW_t$  is growth of the world economy at year  $t$ ,  $gOIL_t$  is growth of oil prices at year  $t$ , figures in parenthesis below parameter estimates are standard errors, and equation errors are omitted.

With a sample reduced to the period 1990-2014, also the specifications with only one lagged value of the explanatory covariate minimize the information criteria, indicating best fit. The corresponding equations are the following:

$$gW_t = 2.483 + 0.035 gOIL_t - 0.008 gOIL_{t-1} \quad R^2 = 0.42 \quad \text{Durbin-Watson } d = 1.61 \quad [1a]$$

(0.235) (0.009) (0.009)

$$gOIL_t = -25.97 + 11.27 gW_t + 1.18 gW_{t-1} \quad R^2 = 0.40 \quad \text{Durbin-Watson } d = 1.77 \quad [2a]$$

(11.40) (2.98) (2.94)

Considering the results for the general sample, the estimated equations [1] and [2] indicate that the ability of world economic growth for predicting growth of oil prices is slightly higher than the ability of oil prices to predict world economic growth, 15% vs 11%. But in the general sample oil price has a significant negative effect ( $-0.010 \pm 0.005$ ) on world economic growth next year, while in the restricted sample 1990-2014—equations [1a] and [1b]—the significant effect of oil prices on world economic growth ( $0.035 \pm 0.009$ ) is at lag 0 and positive, and the lag 1 effect is negative and not statistically different from zero ( $-0.008 \pm 0.009$ ). It must be also noticed that

the models computed for the restricted sample (equations [1a] and [2a]) have a much higher ability to explain the depended variable, over 40%, than the models computed with the general sample, which predict 15% or less of the variation of the dependent variable.

Assuming zero growth of the world economy in two consecutive years  $t-1$  and  $t$ , the oil price model (either with the general or the restricted sample, i.e., equation [2] or [2a]) predicts a decrease of about 25% in oil prices. In the restricted sample model (equation [2a]) two consecutive years of world expansion at a rate of say, 4% (more or less the rate of expansion of the world economy in the years immediately before the Great Recession), would be associated with a rise of  $-25.97 + 11.27 \cdot 4 + 1.18 \cdot 4 = 23.8\%$  in oil prices. In the expanded sample model (equation [2]) the corresponding rise in oil prices would be very similar, 22%.

While the model estimated with the general sample (equation [1]) predicts world economic growth of 3.1% after two consecutive years of zero growth in oil prices, two consecutive years of 100% growth in oil prices would reduce world growth to a rate of 2.6% ( $= 3.103 + 0.005 \cdot 100 - 0.010 \cdot 100$ ).

Equation [1a] estimated with data from the past quarter century predicts a positive effect of rising oil prices on the world economy. Thus a 100% oil price increase during two consecutive years would be associated with an expansion of 5.2% of the world economy ( $= 2.483 + 0.035 \cdot 100 - 0.008 \cdot 100 = 5.183$ ). Of course, to take this at face value would be naïve. The lag-0 positive statistical effect of oil prices on the world economy ( $0.035 \pm 0.008$ ) in equation [1a] rather than indicating a stimulating effect of rising oil prices on the world economy must be picking the high lag-zero correlation of recent decades between changes in oil prices and changes in the world economy, which is revealed by the statistically significant lag-0 effect of the world economy on oil prices ( $11.27 \pm 2.98$ ) in equation [1b]. It will be discussed later that these lag-0 correlation and effects in regression models are more appropriately interpreted as evidence of causality from the world economy to oil prices.

On the assumption that the lag-0 positive and statistically significant effect of oil prices on world economic growth is likely a spurious result of causality in the opposite direction, we can



for identification purposes make that effect zero and compute models in which world economic growth is a function of just *lag* values of growth in oil prices. For such kind of regression, computed for the sample 1971-2014, all information criteria are minimized by the model with just lag 1,

$$gW_t = -3.159 - 0.010 gOIL_{t-1} \quad R^2 = 0.09 \quad \text{Durbin-Watson } d = 1.35$$

(0.225) (0.005)

in which the effect of oil prices on the world economy is barely significant ( $P = 0.050$ ). For the sample 1990-2014 the information criteria are minimized by the specification in which  $gW_t$  is regressed on just  $gOIL_{t-1}$ . In this specification the effect of  $gOIL_{t-1}$  on  $gW_t$  is statistically zero ( $-0.007 \pm 0.012$ ). All this is quite inconsistent with oil prices having an effect on the rate of growth of the world economy particularly in the most recent decades.

#### 4. Granger causality

Using the whole set of annual rates of growth of oil prices and the world economy, tests provide evidence of G-causality from oil prices to the world economy in specifications including five or less lags (Table 2). In the other direction, G-causality from the world economy to oil prices is supported just by a marginally significant  $P$ -value in the specification including just one lag. Specifications including 12 and 13 lags are consistent with evidence that the world economy predict oil prices, but the fact that they appear isolated among specifications with more or less lags in which G-causality is rejected suggests that they are likely to be false positives (Eichler 2006).

The stability of G-causality to sample selection was also tested (Table 3) revealing that for autoregressive (AR) orders of 5 or less, G-causality from world economic growth to oil prices is only found in samples not including recent years (Table 3, left panel). This is consistent with the fact that correlations of lagged world economic growth and present change in oil prices are basically zero in 30 or 20-year samples starting after the 1970s (Figures 3 and 4, bottom row). In tests with AR order greater than 5 (results not shown), G-causality from the world economy to oil prices is only found in two isolated samples 1982-2012 and 1984-2014 when AR is 9.

G-causality from oil prices to world economic growth is found in basically all samples when the AR order is 1 and the sample does not include recent decades. For any AR order, samples including the three or four past decades do not support G-causality from oil price change to growth of the world economy.

Thus the evidence of G-causality between changes in the price of oil and growth of the world economy is mostly restricted to samples that exclude the years since the 1970s and the present. Since G-causality tests only consider the effect of past but not present values of the supposedly causal variable, this would be consistent with a causal relation between world economic growth and oil prices which in an annual timeframe occurs in recent decades exclusively at lag zero.

## 5. VAR models

In VAR models including the whole sample 1961-2014, information criteria (AIC, AICC, HBP, and FPEC) are minimized by including just one lag and no moving average term ( $p=1, q = 0$ ).

The estimated VAR equations are as follows:

$$gW_t = 0.92 gW_{t-1} - 0.01 gOIL_{t-1}$$

(0.06)            (0.01)

$$gOIL_t = 3.08 gW_{t-1} - 0.01 gOIL_{t-1}$$

(1.40)            (0.14)

With samples restricted to more recent years the VAR model cannot be computed unless the sample includes at least years from 1985 to 2014. In this sample information criteria are minimized for  $p = 1$  and  $q = 2$ . The estimated equations (with error and moving average terms omitted) are:

$$gW_t = 1.04 gW_{t-1} - 0.04 gOIL_{t-1}$$

(0.08)            (0.07)

$$gOIL_t = 1.85 gW_{t-1} - 0.73 gOIL_{t-1}$$

(2.51)            (0.37)

With the exception of the AR effect of  $gW_{t-1}$  on  $gW_t$ , all the AR and MA effect coefficients (MA coefficients not shown) are very far from being significant.

Impulse response functions reveal that responses are much stronger and lasting in the general sample 1961-2014 (Figure 5, 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> rows) than in the sample restricted to 1985-2014 (Figure 5, 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> rows). Also, the response of oil prices to the world economy is much greater than the response of the world economy to oil prices. The fact that in the sample restricted to 1985-2014 the responses of both variables are much smaller is consistent with the fact that VAR models exclude effects at lag 0, and most of the association between the change in both variables occurs precisely at lag zero in recent years.

## **6. Identification and causality**

In the past three decades the annual rates of growth of oil prices and world economic activity have been highly correlated. For the sample 1985-2014 the correlation is 0.44 ( $P = 0.014$ ), while correlations of each of these variables with the other one lagged one year are far from being significant. G-causality tests and VAR models suggest that lagged values of each variable have presently little ability to help predicting the other value, though they had more ability in samples including the 1970s and 1960s. Is it possible to interpret this array of statistical evidence in terms of causality and identify the actual relation between the two variables?

Cross-correlations, distributed lag regressions, G-causality tests and VAR models suggest that both oil prices and the level of activity of the global economy had a lagged effect on each other in the expected direction. That is, while growth of oil prices dampened world economic activity, the growth of the world economy was a clear a stimulus for rising oil prices. But these lagged effects have disappeared in recent decades in which only a lag-zero correlation persists. Is this lag-zero positive correlation indicative of causality? It seems the answer must be positive, as since John Stuart Mill it is generally accepted that the explanation of two variables being associated in their movements is one causing the other if a third variable is not the cause of both (Mill 1846; Pearl 2000). But what could be a third variable causing both oil prices and the world economy to move in the same direction? Astronomical events? Political changes affecting at the same time and in the same direction oil prices and the level of activity in the global economy? Sudden

changes in the propensity to drive of the world population? The precautionary demand for crude oil has been extensively discussed as a reason for sharp increases in the price of oil when the supply of oil is inelastic and political events like wars or the threat of war in the Middle East led to oil consumers to demand more oil for being suspicious about future supply. But for this mechanism to generate a zero lag positive correlation between oil price and global economic growth the same uncertainty should led to happy consumers expending more, or enthusiastic animal spirits leading to increased investment. All of which is, of course, highly hypothetical. Thus in the absence of a different explanation, the lag-zero correlation must be taken as plausible evidence of causation from global economic activity to change in oil prices. Interpreting the lag-0 correlation as a manifestation of causation in the opposite direction would mean that rising oil prices stimulates the growth of the global economy, something that is incompatible with economic theory of any kind.

The conclusions must be therefore, first, that presently movements in oil prices are endogenous to the global economy, and second, that oil prices have presently a very doubtful effect, if any, on the global economy. These are the only inferences which are consistent with the fact that in samples restricted to the past quarter century the response of oil prices to the conditions of the world economy is strong and basically at lag 0, while the response of the world economy to oil prices is basically null.

Evidence obtained in the analysis of annual data 1961-2014 in this investigation leads to conclude that oil prices are endogenous, which is confirmative of the analysis by Lutz Kilian, who analyzed the relation between global economic activity and oil prices in a monthly timeframe for the years 1973-2007 (Kilian 2009). Kilian created an ingenious index of global economic activity based on rates of cargo shipment. Since cargo shipment rates are low when demand for transportation of commodities is low in global downturns and they rise when there is more demand for transportation of commodities, and more demand for transport means more economic activity worldwide, a composite index of cargo rates can provide an index of activity in

the global economy. Kilian proved that his index had a high explanatory ability to predict changes in oil prices.

The Kilian index in both annual and monthly timeframes is indeed highly correlated with oil prices (Figure 6). For the years 1973-2007 in which the Kilian index is publicly available, the correlation between the annual mean of the Kilian index and the annual real price of oil is 0.40 at lag 0 ( $n = 35, P = 0.017$ ) and 0.56 ( $n = 35, P = 0.0005$ ) when the index is lagged one year. The correlation decays at longer lags and with the index lagged 3 years is already statistically insignificant. Lagging one year oil prices with respect to the Kilian index, the correlation is just 0.06 ( $n = 35, P = 0.75$ ). The correlation of the index with the annual rate of growth of oil prices is 0.59 ( $n = 35, P = 0.0002$ ) which declines to 0.38 when the index is lagged one year and is not significant at longer lags. Also, when the rate of growth of oil price is lagged just one year, it correlates only 0.18 ( $n=35, P= 0.31$ ) with the Kilian index.

Using data for the months 1973:2-2007:12, the Kilian index correlates with monthly averages of real prices of crude oil 0.37 at lag zero ( $n = 419, P < 0.0001$ ), but the crosscorrelation increases when the index is lagged, reaching its highest value, 0.47, at lag 11 ( $n = 408, P < 0.0001$ ). The correlation is still significant at lags of more than 30 months, suggesting an extended effect of the level of global economic activity on the price of oil. Lagging instead the price of oil, the crosscorrelation with the Kilian index decreases rapidly, and it is no longer significant at the usual levels of confidence when the price of oil is lagged 10 months. The asymmetries in these crosscorrelations, with lagged oil price (or oil price change) correlating zero with the Kilian index while the lag Kilian index correlates significantly positive with oil price (or oil price growth) argue in favor of causality from economic activity—proxied by the Kilian index—to oil prices, and against causality in the opposite direction.

The Kilian index and the rate of growth of the global economy as estimated by the World Bank are validated as measures of global economy activity by being strongly correlated between them and with other indicators of global economic activity. Though the correlation between the Kilian index and the rate of growth of the global economy at lag zero is just 0.23 ( $n = 35,$

$P = 0.180$ ), the index correlates 0.45 with the growth of world GDP lagged one year ( $n=35$ ,  $P = 0.006$ ). This shows that the Kilian index is indeed a leading indicator of the business cycle of the global economy. An additional validation of the Kilian index and the World Bank estimate of global economic growth is given by their correlations with the growth of global emissions of CO<sub>2</sub>. Both national and global emissions of CO<sub>2</sub>, estimated by the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC) from consumption of fossil fuels, production of cement, etc., depend tightly on the level of activity in the respective economy (Tapia, Ionides, and Carpintero 2012, 50-62; Tapia and Carpintero 2013). Therefore any index of annual economic activity at the global level should correlate with the annual growth of global emissions of CO<sub>2</sub>. Indeed in the period 1973-2007 for which the Kilian index is available, the annual growth of global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions correlates 0.72 ( $P < 0.0001$ ,  $n = 35$ ) with the rate of growth of global output at lag zero, while the annual Kilian index correlates 0.23 ( $P = 0.18$ ) with the growth of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions at lag zero and 0.45 ( $P = 0.007$ ) with the rate of global emissions lagged 1 year. This provides a further confirmation that the Kilian index is a leading indicator of global economic activity.

The results of this paper raise the issue of why in an annual timeframe the lagged effects between world economic activity and oil prices have mostly disappeared to be substituted by a contemporaneous association that has to be interpreted as a causal effect of the world economy—and therefore, world demand for energy—on oil prices. A possible explanation would be a decreasing capacity of oil supply to respond to increases in oil demand. Total consumption of oil almost doubled from the 1950s to 2013 (from 50 million barrels per day in the early 1950s to 91 mb/d in 2013) and the increase was only momentarily reversed in the early 1980s and in 2008-2010, during two major crisis of the world economy. With demand steadily climbing in the long run, production in the past two decades declining in a number of major producers, and OPEC's spare production capacity declining since the mid-1980s (Fattouh 2006), it seems plausible that slack production capacity is becoming increasingly tighter (Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, The University of Texas at Austin). But this issue is beyond the scope of this paper.

## **7. Conclusion**

Annual data 1960-2014 of world GDP and oil prices show that the relation between both variables has substantially changed during the past five decades. The evidence presented here suggests that analyses assuming stability of parameters for a long period are problematic. At any rate, results are consistently suggestive that global economic growth is a major determinant of crude oil prices. For the whole period since the 1960s to the present spikes and drops of oil prices are largely explained by upturns and downturns of the global economy, but this effect is even more intense in the past three decades. On the other hand, evidence of a stimulating effect of cheap oil on the global economy—or a dampening effect of expensive oil—is weak considering the whole sample, and mostly null for recent decades. These results are consistent with the fact that the demand for oil is tightly connected with economic activity and oil prices are responsive to the global demand of oil. Because demand for oil is tightly connected with the world demand for energy, it is also correlated with the level of industrial activity, trade and transportation of goods, services, and people, as proxied for example by the global emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> or the rates of cargo shipment summarized in the Kilian index.

## **Acknowledgement**

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**Table 1.** Annual growth of the world economy (gW, %) and annual mean price of crude oil in US dollars of 2009

Year	gW	Oil price	Year	gW	Oil price
1961	4.3	10.16	1988	4.7	24.05
1962	5.6	10.04	1989	3.8	28.29
1963	5.2	9.93	1990	3.0	35.50
1964	6.6	9.78	1991	1.4	28.96
1965	5.5	9.60	1992	1.9	27.35
1966	5.9	9.34	1993	1.6	23.47
1967	4.5	9.08	1994	3.1	21.42
1968	6.1	8.71	1995	2.9	22.58
1969	5.8	8.30	1996	3.3	26.93
1970	4.3	7.88	1997	3.7	24.45
1971	4.1	9.33	1998	2.6	16.11
1972	5.6	9.91	1999	3.4	22.44
1973	6.4	12.46	2000	4.3	34.80
1974	1.7	40.26	2001	1.8	29.15
1975	0.8	36.68	2002	2.1	29.40
1976	5.1	38.60	2003	2.8	33.27
1977	4.0	39.54	2004	4.1	42.97
1978	4.3	37.21	2005	3.6	59.18
1979	4.1	77.49	2006	4.1	68.97
1980	1.8	82.80	2007	3.9	74.70
1981	2.1	73.84	2008	1.5	98.43
1982	0.4	63.87	2009	-2.1	61.86
1983	2.7	55.07	2010	4.1	78.67
1984	4.6	51.80	2011	2.8	107.39
1985	3.8	48.06	2012	2.2	106.45
1986	3.2	24.66	2013	2.4	101.97
1987	3.6	30.77	2014	2.5	91.34

Rates of growth of the world economy are from the World Development Indicators database of the World Bank. Oil prices 1960-2000 in current dollars were taken from *BP Statistical Review of World Energy* 2010, prices 2001-2014 correspond to Dated Brent, from [www.indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodity=crude-oil-brent&months=180](http://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodity=crude-oil-brent&months=180). They were converted into 2009 dollars using the US GDP deflator.



**Table 2.** Results of G-causality tests. The null hypothesis in test 1 is that oil prices are not influenced by the world economy; in test 2 the null hypothesis is that the world economy is not influence by oil prices. AR is the autoregressive order of the test model

AR	Test 1	Test 2
1	†	**
2		*
3		*
4		*
5		*
6		†
7		†
8		
9		
10		
11		
12	*	
13	*	
14		
15		
16		
17		

The sample includes 1961-2014. For AR orders above 17 the number of data points was insufficient for the model to be computed.


\* $P < 0.05$ , \*\* $P < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $P < 0.001$ , † $P < 0.1$ .

**Table 3.** Results of G-causality tests in 30-year samples for specifications of autoregressive order between 1 and 5


First year of the window	H <sub>0</sub> : the growth of oil prices does not depend on the growth of the world economy					H <sub>0</sub> : the growth of the world economy does not depend on oil prices				
	Autoregressive order					Autoregressive order				
	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
1961	†					*	†	†	*	*
1962	†					*	†		†	†
1963	†					*	†		†	
1964	†	†				*	†		†	
1965	*	†				*	†		†	
1966	*	*		†	†	*	†		†	
1967	*	*	*	†	†	*			†	
1968	*	*	*	*	†	*				
1969	**	**	*	*	*	*				
1970	**	**	**	*		†		†		
1971	**	**	**			*				
1972	**	*				*				
1973	**					*				**
1974						*			*	*
1975							*	**	*	**
1976							*	**	*	**
1977								*		**
1978										*
1979						†		†		
1980										
1981										
1982						†				
1983						†				
1984										

\* $P < 0.05$ , \*\* $P < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $P < 0.001$ , † $P < 0.1$ .


**Figure 1.** Annual rates of growth (%) of the world economy (gray line) and the US economy (black dots)




**Figure 2.** Annual rates of growth (%) of the world economy (left scale) & oil prices (right scale)




**Figure 3.** Correlations between the annual rates of growth of oil prices (gOIL) and the world economy (gW) at lags 0 to 4. The dotted line is the correlation computed in 30-year samples starting at the year indicated in the horizontal axis, the smooth lines are the upper and lower limits of a 95% confidence band



**Figure 4.** Correlations between oil prices and world economic growth at lags 0 to 4. All specifications as in Figure 3 but with 20-year rather than 30-year samples



**Figure 5.** Impulse response graphs in VAR models with the general sample 1961-2014 (1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> rows) and the restricted sample 1985-2014 (3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> rows)



**Figure 6.** Kilian index of world economic activity and oil prices, annual (top panel) and monthly values (bottom panel). The correlation is 0.40 for the top panel of annual data ( $n=35$ ,  $P = 0.017$ ) and 0.37 for the bottom panel of monthly data ( $n=419$ ,  $P < 0.0001$ )



## Appendix

Some of the statistical tests in this paper rely on the assumption that annual rates of growth of both real oil prices and the world economy are stationary series. However, testing of stationarity of these two series provides strong evidence that the annual rate of growth of oil price is a stationary series, as for a reasonable number of lags included in the regression the ADF test systematically rejects the hypothesis of a unit root (results not shown). Only for very large lags (over 4 years) some P-values greater than 0.05 are found, compatible with a unit root. However, in the case of the annual rate of growth of the global economy, including less than 4 lags in the regression some *P*-values are found that do not allow rejecting the hypothesis of a unit root at the usual levels of statistical confidence (Table A1). Thus for instance, for a zero mean ADF test with only one lag included in the regression, the hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected ( $P = 0.105$ ). More clear evidence however that to consider the rate of growth of the global economy as a stationary series is just a linear regression of the series on time (year), which produces a estimated slope of  $-0.005 \pm 0.01$ . With a  $t = -4.61$ , there is strong evidence that the rate of growth of the world economy series is declining over the period 1961-2014.

It seems therefore reasonable to test how robust are the results to using different measures of the business cycle that fit more astringently the requirements of stationarity. For that purpose I computed the Hodrick-Prescott trend for the series of world GDP values in 2005 US dollars and

**Table A1.** Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests for the series of annual rates of growth of the global economy, 1961-2014

Type	Lags	Pr < Rho	Pr < Tau	Pr > F
Zero Mean	0	0.098	0.072	
	1	0.156	0.105	
	2	0.292	0.185	
Single Mean	0	0.001	0.001	0.001
	1	0.001	0.005	0.001
	2	0.010	0.072	0.098
Trend	0	<0.001	<0.001	0.001
	1	<0.001	0.001	0.001
	2	<0.001	0.020	0.022

as a measure of the business cycle I used the percent deviation of world GDP with respect to the GDP trend. Since for annual data there is no consensus on what is the more proper value to be chosen for the smoothing parameter  $\gamma$  in computing the Hodrick-Prescott trend (Maravall and del Río 2007; Ravn and Uhlig 2002), I used the two values that constitute the extremes of the range of the recommended values, that is  $\gamma = 6.25$  and  $\gamma = 100$ . For the years 1961-2014 the

percent deviation from the HP filter computed with  $\gamma = 6.25$  has a correlation of 0.41 ( $P = 0.002$ ) with the rate of growth of world GDP, while the corresponding correlation is 0.28 ( $P = 0.038$ ) when  $\gamma = 100$ . Figures A1, A2, A3, and A4 are the corresponding correlates of figures 3 and 4 in the paper when the deviations from the Hodrick-Prescott trend are used instead the rate of growth of world GDP.

I also computed the contemporaneous and lagged correlations of world GDP and real oil prices, both detrended with the Hodrick-Prescott filter (Table A2).

The evidence of associations between the world business cycle and movements in oil prices derived from Table A2 and Figures A1 to A4 is basically consistent with that in Figures 3 and 4. At long lags of 3 or 4 years (right panels and middle panel of the top row) there is no evidence of effect except an association of change in global activity with change in oil prices in the opposite direction 4 years later which disappears in recent decades (Figure A1 top middle panels). Also, it seems as if in recent decades a negative correlation would be appearing between the global business cycle and movements in oil prices 2 years later (Figures A1 to A4, mid bottom panel), but the association is just marginally significant.

What Figures A1 to A4 clearly show (top left panels) is evidence of a positive correlation at lag 0 between oil prices and the business cycle as measured with deviations of world GDP from trend. This significant correlation, maintained in both 20-year and 30-year running samples in

**Table A2.** Correlations between world GDP and real oil prices both detrended with the Hodrick-Prescott filter (computed with a smoothing parameter  $\gamma = 6.25$  or  $\gamma = 100$ ). In the first panel the correlations are contemporaneous, in the other two panels one variable is lagged one year with respect the other

A. Contemporaneous correlations		
Sample	$\gamma = 6.25$	$\gamma = 100$
1960-2014	0.15	-0.03
1960-1979	-0.30	-0.25
1970-1989	-0.21	-0.25
1980-1999	0.34	-0.02
1990-2009	0.73***	0.65**
2000-2014	0.82***	0.76***

B. Correlation between detrended world GDP and detrended real oil prices lagged 1 year		
Sample	$\gamma = 6.25$	$\gamma = 100$
1960-2014	-0.29*	-0.38**
1960-1979	-0.75***	-0.70***
1970-1989	-0.55*	-0.56**
1980-1999	0.14	-0.30
1990-2009	-0.02	0.05
2000-2014	0.00	0.16

C. Correlation between detrended world GDP lagged one year and detrended real oil prices		
Sample	$\gamma = 6.25$	$\gamma = 100$
1960-2014	0.26	0.15
1960-1979	0.31	0.11
1970-1989	0.36	0.17
1980-1999	0.26	0.24
1990-2009	0.14	0.30
2000-2014	0.19	0.26

\* $P < 0.05$ , \*\* $P < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $P < 0.001$


the period since the 1960s to the present, is consistent with oil prices being endogenous to the world economy, but, as discussed in the paper, it is not consistent with oil shocks being determinants of global recessions.

The correlations in Table A2 provide consistent evidence that a lagged negative association of oil prices and global economic growth, which was apparent at lag 1 in the 1960s, is presently missing (Table A2, panel B). On the other hand, the lag-zero correlations between detrended world GD and detrended oil prices (Table A2, panel A) indicate clearly that both series, which were contemporaneously decoupled or even perhaps slightly negatively correlated in the 1970s and 1970s, are today clearly coupled oscillating contemporaneously with a very strong correlation.


Since the rate of growth of world GDP seems to be a trended series I tried distributed lag regressions like equations [1], [2], [1a] and [2a] in which I substituted the percent deviation from a Hodrick-Prescott filter for the rate of growth of world GDP. The results obviously change in term of magnitude, but they are basically identical in terms of sign and statistical significance of the effects for specific lags. However, as it can be guessed from the results of running correlations, the effect of lag-1 growth in oil price on the world economy—this one measured by GDP deviation from trend—is not significant.




**Figure A1.** Correlations between gOIL (the annual percent growth of oil prices) and Yd625 (the percent deviation of world GDP from a Hodrick-Prescott trend computed with  $\gamma = 6.25$ ) at lags 0 to 4. The dotted line is the correlation computed in 30-year samples starting at the year indicated in the horizontal axis, the smooth lines are the upper and lower limits of a 95% confidence band




**Figure A2.** Correlations between gOIL and Yd625 at lags 0 to 4. All specifications as in Figure A1 but with 20-year rather than 30-year samples.



**Figure A3.** Correlations between gOIL (the annual percent growth of oil prices) and Yd100 (the percent deviation of world GDP from a Hodrick-Prescott trend computed with  $\gamma = 100$ ) at lags 0 to 4. The dotted line is the correlation computed in 30-year samples starting at the year indicated in the horizontal axis, the smooth lines are the upper and lower limits of a 95% confidence band



**Figure A4.** Correlations between gOIL and Yd100 at lags 0 to 4. All specifications as in Figure A3 but with 20-year rather than 30-year samples.



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