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## **Revenue and Wealth Maximization in the National Football League: The Impact of Stadia**

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Revenue and Wealth Maximization in the National Football League:  
The Impact of Stadia

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### Abstract

The opening of the Palace of Auburn Hills, SkyDome, and Oriole Park at Camden Yards led to the beginning of a construction boom in professional sport. In the National Football League (NFL) alone, 26 stadiums have been built or renovated in the past ten years. Due to the additional revenue generated by these facilities and the NFL's current revenue sharing system, professional football franchises are building new stadia for economic reasons rather than to replace unusable or unsafe facilities. The purpose of this study was to determine if a significant difference in net revenue change existed for NFL teams that moved into a new facility and to determine if there was a significant change in valuation for these franchises. The findings indicated that new stadia significantly increase revenue and franchise value in the NFL; therefore, the primary goal of every firm, wealth maximization, is met for teams after opening a new facility.

## Introduction

Fans of American professional sports have recently seen dramatic changes in the facilities in which teams play. The opening of the Palace of Auburn Hills in 1988 for the Detroit Pistons, SkyDome in 1989 for the Toronto Blue Jays, and Oriole Park at Camden Yards in 1992 for the Baltimore Orioles sparked the beginning of a construction boom in professional sport not seen since the late 1960s (Greenberg & Gray, 1996). In the 1990s, teams in the major American professional sport leagues began demanding new facilities or the remodeling of existing ones despite the structural viability of their current homes. The Miami Heat of the National Basketball Association typified this *need* for a new facility when they moved from 11 year-old Miami Arena to the new American Airlines Arena in 1999.

In the National Football League (NFL), 26 stadiums have been built or renovated during the past 10 years. Nine NFL teams have plans to move into a new stadium, or actively pursue a new facility within the next three years, including teams like the Indianapolis Colts, who recently renovated their current venue and are now pursuing a new venue (Duberstein, 2002). It is likely that within five years, few, if any, NFL facilities will exist that were built or significantly remodeled before 1992. Signifying this construction and remodeling trend is the discussion of expanding Texas Stadium or building a new facility for the Dallas Cowboys, despite their consistent rank in the top 15% of NFL team revenues and their multiple Super Bowl victories in the 1990s (Robinson, 1997).

*NFL Financial Structure*

The NFL's stadium construction and remodeling boom can be attributed to its current revenue sharing system, rather than immediate needs to replace unusable or unsafe facilities. Although the NFL shares a greater percentage of its total revenue among its teams than the other major North American professional sports leagues (Badenhausen & Nikolov; 1997, Gotthelf, 1998), the current financial structure of the league has encouraged teams to attempt to expand the revenues generated from their stadium, as these income sources are not shared. The NFL equally distributes revenues from national broadcasting contracts (Greenberg & Gray, 1996; Robinson, 1997) and maintains a 60-40 split of home/visitor ticket revenue (just altered to more fairly distribute incomes to all teams). The NFL recently allowed teams to become exclusive distributors of their licensed merchandise; however, only the Dallas Cowboys have assumed control of the potential of this unshared revenue source (Bernstein, 2001).

The NFL currently shares 70% of its total proceeds through its revenue sharing plan (Alesia, 2002). From this shared revenue pool, each franchise received approximately \$75 million during the 2002 season (Green Bay Packers, 2002). However, since the NFL is a multi-billion dollar entity, the remaining 30% of unshared revenues can result in team revenue discrepancies which, according to the NFL, exceed \$50 million (Kaplan, 2003a). The unshared 30% of league revenues primarily are generated from stadium operations (e.g., naming rights deals, parking, concessions, and luxury suites), hence the perceived need to build or remodel facilities to maximize these revenue sources.

The salary cap created through the NFL's present Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) also encourages franchises to seek increased unshared revenues from

their facilities. Retaining current players or signing free agents with up-front signing bonuses enables teams to circumvent (in the short term) the present year's salary cap by allocating the bonus to future years. CBA rules governing signing bonuses state that the cap does not include all salary paid to players in a given season (National Football League, 1998). For example, in 2000 a player signed a three-year contract for \$2 million per year, with a \$6 million signing bonus. While the player received \$8 million in the first year of the new contract (the \$6 million signing bonus plus the \$2 million in salary), only \$4 million counted against the cap that year. CBA rules state that signing bonuses are allocated equally over the years (a maximum of seven) of the player's contract. Therefore, teams without the increased revenues derived from a new facility may not have the cash necessary to attract or retain the league's top performing players while using CBA rules to manipulate the salary cap to the team's advantage.

#### *NFL Stadium Construction*

One goal of every firm is long-term wealth maximization, which is reflected in a firm's overall financial worth or its stock price (Groppelli & Nikbakht, 2000; Shim & Siegel, 2000). The primary determinants of a firm's value are cash flow, growth rate of cash flow, and risk or uncertainty of cash flow. While an increase in the amount of cash flow tends to increase the value of an asset, the value decreases if cash flow becomes uncertain. As these relationships are essential to the valuation of any asset, the responsibility of a financial manager is to increase cash flow while controlling for risk (Groppelli & Nikbakht, 2000). Therefore, the primary concern of firms when maximizing value is to acquire secure revenue sources (Shim & Siegel, 2000). Although owners of professional sport franchises have differing opinions regarding expenditure or retention

of revenues and the method by which to maximize yearly or long-term profits (e.g., streamline player and operational costs versus acquiring and marketing a better on-field product) (DeSchrive & Jensen, 2002), a new stadium, depending on ownership and lease agreements, provides additional sources of revenue and cash flow that can be employed in whichever fashion an owner wants.

In an effort to maximize wealth through new or refurbished facilities, NFL owners have often sought public assistance through taxes, infrastructure improvements, land, or other political considerations (Badenhausen & Kump, 2001). NFL teams have argued that financial subsidies are repaid to the citizenry by the positive financial and psychic effects the stadium and the teams' presence have upon the local community (Noll & Zimbalist, 1997; Rappaport & Wilkerson, 2001). Despite economic studies (Baade, 1994; Rosentraub, 1997; Badenhausen & Kump, 2001) disputing the benefits to the citizenry in relationship to the incredible investment requirements (often exceeding \$200 million) and growing public backlash to corporate welfare, numerous NFL teams, including the Denver Broncos, Detroit Lions, Tampa Bay Buccaneers, Seattle Seahawks, and Pittsburgh Steelers, have recently been successful in obtaining large public subsidies for new stadium construction.

Additionally, the NFL has created new sources of funding to augment financial shortfalls for teams wanting to construct a new facility. Franchises that are unable to individually finance construction or cannot persuade the local citizens or government to provide funding may utilize low interest loans from the NFL G3 Fund ("It's All About," 2002). This fund became necessary as the cost of NFL stadia rose and as the proportion of construction costs paid by the team increased. According to Duberstein (2002), the

average cost of an NFL stadium built in the 1990s was \$232 million, while in the early 2000s the cost rose to \$391 million. Further, teams have paid an average of 30% of the construction costs for a new facility since 1995 (“It’s All About,” 2002).

G3 Fund guidelines and league rules stipulate that a franchise may borrow up to \$150 million from the fund. This capital is then paid back over a 15 year period from the visitor’s share of club-seat revenue (Kaplan, 2003b). The capital available from the G3 Fund signifies the importance the NFL has placed upon improving cash flow and acquiring new revenues from facilities. The importance the league places on new sources of cash flow was reinforced in 2002 when the NFL increased the size of the available fund by \$350 million, a 75% increase over the fund’s initial amount (“It’s All About,” 2002).

### Purpose

The purpose of this investigation was to determine if a significant difference in net revenue change existed for NFL teams that moved into a new facility from 1995-1999 and to determine if there was a significant change in valuation for these NFL franchises.

### Methodology

#### *Sources of Data*

Until recently, the ability to analyze the impact of a new stadium on NFL revenues and expenses was educated guesswork (Badenhausen & Nikolov, 1997; Leonard, 1998). Teams were unwilling to release confidential financial records, even after claiming a significant operating loss during labor negotiations. Fans, members of the media, and even NFL team officials have speculated and discussed the financial adjustments that will result when teams occupy a new facility. However, the ability to



accurately assess these changes was not possible until recent litigation involving the Oakland Raiders led to the release of the 1995 -1999 financial information for each NFL franchise (King, 2001). Although NFL owners and other consultants disputed the accuracy of the expense and profit portions of the report, the accuracy of revenues for each team has not been challenged (Zimbalist, 2001).

Since the early 1990s, *Financial World* and *Forbes* have calculated and reported the value of franchises in the four major North American sport leagues. These reports have often led to complaints from team officials that the value computed for a franchise is not accurate (“Forbes: Red Wings,” 2002; “Redskins Score Touchdown,” 2002). However, it has been stated that franchise executives might purposefully dispute the numbers as being an overstatement of a team’s financial position and value in order to keep fans from demanding that a team spend more on players (“Forbes: Red Wings,” 2002). In addition, maintaining financial secrecy helps prevent teams from legitimately justifying increased ticket prices, limits on salaries and benefits to players in collective bargaining, and the need for public financing for new facilities. In fact, Zimbalist has implied that the *Forbes* estimates might be conservative, as *Forbes* bases value on current sources of revenue and does not consider future sources such as additional revenue from new luxury suites (Alesia, 2002).

### *Sample*

Seven NFL franchises opened new stadia during the 1995 – 1999 timeframe: Washington Redskins, Carolina Panthers, Tampa Bay Buccaneers, Baltimore Ravens, St. Louis Rams, Tennessee Titans, and Cleveland Browns. The financial information released during the Oakland Raiders lawsuit (King, 2001) was examined to determine the

changes in local team revenue after moving into a new facility. Valuation information for each franchise was gathered from *Financial World* and *Forbes* magazines<sup>1</sup>.

### *Procedures*

To control for inflation, the financial data for the seven teams and the valuation of the teams were first converted to 2001 dollars using the Consumer Price Index ([www.bls.gov/cpi/](http://www.bls.gov/cpi/)).

The financial statements released during the Oakland Raider's lawsuit included revenue (local and shared) and expense statements for each NFL team ("NFL Team Financial," 2001) (see Figure 1 for an example). In the court documents, local team revenue was divided into ticket sales, local television and radio, loge boxes, concessions, advertising/parking/other, and miscellaneous. Information on franchise values was gathered from *Financial World* (1995 – 1997) and *Forbes* (1998 – 1999).

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Insert Figure 1 about here.

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### Data Analysis and Results

Using the *Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test*, a pretest-posttest design was utilized to measure the effect of stadium opening on local revenue and franchise value. The *Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test* is a nonparametric test used to measure the effect of a treatment on pre and post-treatment observations, where the same subjects are measured twice (Zikmund, 2000).

The results indicated that there was a significant difference between pre-stadium opening revenue and post-stadium opening revenue at the .05 level in the areas of ticket

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<sup>1</sup> *Financial World* provided estimates until its demise in 1998. *Forbes* continued the analysis in 1999.

sales, loge box revenue, advertising/parking/other and total local revenue. The average increase in total local revenue was 85%, with a 54% increase in ticket sales, a 623% increase in loge box revenue, and a 202% increase in advertising/parking/other (see Table 1). Significant differences at the .05 level were not found in the areas of local television and radio revenue, concessions, and miscellaneous revenue.

A significant difference at the .05 level was found in firm value. The average increase in firm value was 35% (see Table 2).

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Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here.

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### Discussion

These data indicate that new stadia significantly increase gross operating revenues in the NFL, with the largest percentage increase in loge box revenue (623%). The importance of loge boxes as a revenue source for NFL team owners can be seen through an examination of luxury suites in stadia/arenas based upon professional sport league. In 2000, there were 3,379 luxury suites in the NFL. This total was 1,406 more than the National Hockey League, the league with the second greatest number of suites (Miller, 2001). At the team level, FedEx Field, home of the Washington Redskins, has 280 luxury suites. Prior to moving to FedEx Field in 1997, the Redskins played at RFK Memorial Stadium, a facility with no luxury suites (Duberstein, 2002).

Club seating is a source of revenue that is not completely shared among NFL team owners. Again, stadia in the NFL have a far greater number of club seats than the remaining three major North American professional sport leagues. According to Miller (2001), NFL stadia held 47% of all club seats for the four major professional sport

leagues (228,408 club seats). Going further, if one examines NFL stadia by decade built, the importance of this form of revenue to team owners is evident. For the 16 stadia built prior to 1990, the average number of club seats per stadium is 3,961. The average is 8,740 for those 16 stadia built in the 1990s and 2000s (Duberstein, 2002).

This study confirms the theory that the revenue-generating power of an NFL franchise is primarily predicated upon stadium economics rather than factors traditionally associated with market size (population, media outlets, etc.). Prior to moving into the new stadia, the range of local revenue for the seven teams was \$27.2 million to \$38.1 million. After the move to the new stadia, the range was \$42.3 million to \$72.0 million (Table 3). Each of these teams generated more local revenue than the New York Jets (\$40.4 million), a franchise located in the largest market in the United States. Also interesting to note, of the seven teams opening new stadia during the timeframe of this analysis, three teams, St. Louis, Baltimore and Tennessee, were teams that relocated to new, smaller (by population) cities because of the willingness of those municipalities to build new facilities for the franchises.

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Insert Table 3 about here.

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Further, the data indicate that new stadia significantly increased franchise value. As Table 4 depicts, the value of each franchise increased by an average of 35%. The 2001 value of each of these franchises was greater than the value of the New York Jets and New York Giants, the two teams in the largest media market in the U.S. (Badenhausen & Kump, 2001).

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Insert Table 4 about here.

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### Conclusions

As Groppelli and Nikbakht (2000) and Shim and Siegel (2000) noted, the primary goal of a firm is long-term wealth maximization, which is reflected in a firm's overall financial worth. NFL owners moving their teams into new stadia will achieve long-term wealth maximization.

Value for an NFL franchise in a new facility is increased as cash flow improves and the risk and uncertainty of future cash flow diminish. Importantly, of the teams examined for this study, unshared local revenue increased an average of 85%. This increase in franchise revenue coincided with an average increase in franchise value of 35%. As a new stadium significantly improves a franchise's revenue and value, the supposition of Shim and Siegel (2000) is supported. The primary concern of firms, which in this study were NFL franchises, when maximizing value is to acquire secure revenue sources, or to develop additional sources of unshared revenue via a new stadium.

As the results of this study indicated, the primary goal of the firm is met for NFL franchises when they move into a new stadium, therefore justifying a team owner's desire for a new venue. In order to keep meeting the goal of the firm, the financial managers of NFL franchises will have to continue looking for ways to increase cash flow while controlling for risk. Mahony and Howard (2001) specifically addressed problems financial managers will face in regard to risk, and their main concern was whether the debt will be repaid prior to the end of the useful life of the facility.

A new stadium, as previously indicated, will greatly increase the unshared revenue of a NFL franchise; however, a financial manager must be aware of the costs of building the new stadium and the risk associated with potential revenue streams. With teams presently paying a greater percentage of stadium costs and the overall costs of building new stadia increasing at a rate greater than inflation, debt load could become problematic for franchises, especially if the payment period is extended beyond the financial life of the facility. As Mahony and Howard (2001) noted, since the 1990s, major league teams have spent \$120 million, on average, on new facility construction. For many of these franchises, this has meant an annual debt obligation ranging from \$15 million to \$30 million per year. As a result, some or all of the added revenue generated by a new facility may be tied to the team's debt service.

The NFL tried to address this issue when it created the G3 Fund. Instead of each team attempting to secure a loan based upon its own revenue streams, the league borrowed money using its \$18.3 billion television contract as collateral; therefore, the league can lend teams money from the fund at a lower rate than the teams can acquire individually ("It's All About," 2002), resulting in smaller debt service for NFL franchises when compared to franchises in other professional sport leagues.

Despite the creation of the G3 Fund, teams in the NFL are still increasing their financial dependence on the corporate community (Mahony & Howard, 2001). For example, the New England Patriots opened Gillette Stadium, a \$397 million privately financed<sup>2</sup> facility in 2002 (Duberstein, 2002). Assuming that the Patriots borrowed \$125 million from the G3 Fund, an additional \$272 million was needed to construct the

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<sup>2</sup> The Patriots did receive between \$75 and \$100 million from the State of Massachusetts for infrastructure improvements around the stadium.

stadium. The Patriots plan to use luxury suite rentals, club seating, and stadium naming rights to secure the remaining portion of stadium debt (Munsey & Suppes, 2002). As Mahony and Howard (2001) noted, this can become challenging when revenue from luxury seating is the primary source of income for a team's debt obligation. The Patriots plan to generate \$80 million over the first 10 years of the stadium's use from luxury seating (Munsey & Suppes, 2002). However, once the 10 year leases expire on the luxury suites at Gillette Stadium, the Patriots must renew current suite holders or find new corporations to replace those choosing not to renew in order to meet long-term debt service obligations. Renewal or sales to new corporations could be difficult in times of economic uncertainty or duress.

Reliance on naming rights to secure stadium funding can also be problematic. Again the New England Patriots provide an example of the risk associated with naming rights revenue. CMGI purchased the naming rights for the Patriots new stadium from 2000 – 2020, for \$120 million. However, CMGI filed for bankruptcy in February, 2002 (Duberstein, 2002). Subsequently, Gillette purchased the naming rights from 2002 to 2016 for \$90 million, which when annualized averages \$6 million per year, the same amount as the CMGI rights deal (“Naming-rights Deals At,” 2002). However, the Patriots will have to resell the stadium name again in 2016 to completely recover the amount they were to receive from CMGI. The Patriots are not unique when it comes to bankruptcy and naming rights deals. Baltimore, St. Louis, and Tennessee have just renamed their NFL stadia after original naming rights holders filed for bankruptcy. Additionally, financially troubled 3Com recently let their naming rights contract expire with San Francisco.

Mahony and Howard (2001) also stated that the increase in debt load will result in an increase in cost to fans. The results of this study support this assertion. For the seven NFL franchises opening new stadia during the timeframe of this study, the average inflation adjusted increase in ticket revenue was 54% while the average increase in seating capacity was 14%.

### Recommendations

The importance of new stadia for increasing local, unshared revenue and firm value is evident. However, there is a need to continue to examine the available NFL financial data. It is unknown if the increase in local revenue and franchise value will be maintained over time. Once initial interest in a new facility wanes (Howard & Crompton, 2003), fans may require other qualities from their entertainment experience to continue to attend games in person (a winning team, promotions, etc...). It is important to note that the NFL has a capacity constraint problem, with over 95% of tickets being sold across the league. Combined with the fact that the NFL regular season schedule consists of only eight home games, the novelty effect may last longer in the NFL than in other leagues.

In addition, despite their comprehensive revenue sharing system currently in place, the NFL may again need to revisit their revenue sharing plan after every (or nearly every) team builds a new facility. Once all teams are in a new facility, large market teams would more than likely be able to maintain football income superiority to those in small markets as market size, not venue amenities, will then dictate the amount of unshared revenues generated. Of course, the willingness of municipalities to fund new facilities may wane now that financial data exists which indicates that a new facility dramatically changes an individual NFL owners' football income.



A need also exists to examine the stadium effect in other professional and collegiate sport settings. As Greenberg and Gray (1996) stated, a facility boom has been occurring in Major League Baseball, the National Basketball Association, and the National Hockey League. As each league has a different economic system dictating the financial structure of the league and its teams, issues related to the financing of stadia and arenas in these leagues must be examined along with the effect of new stadia and arenas on wealth maximization and franchise value within the leagues.

The model used by professional sport franchises to fund facilities is now being incorporated by colleges and universities as well. While priority seating has been used in collegiate sport for decades and facilities have been named for prominent alumni who have donated to the university, the use of corporate naming rights, club seating, and luxury seating is increasing. The Ohio State University athletic department recently completed a \$200 million renovation of Ohio Stadium and built a \$120 million basketball and hockey arena. Debt service, paid by the athletic department, on these two facilities and other smaller projects was \$20 million in 2002 (the average NCAA Division I-A budget was \$23.3 million in 2001). The money to pay off the debt is generated from luxury suite rentals, surcharges on tickets, seat license fees, and club seats in both facilities (Suggs, 2002). An example of financing a portion of these facilities can be seen through an examination of Ohio State's Value City Arena. For the arena, naming rights were purchased for \$12.5 million and \$26.9 million was raised through the sale of seat licenses (Wolf, 2002).

Finally, sport organizations must seriously compare the benefits of a new stadium or arena to its costs prior to entering into an agreement to build a new venue, especially if

the sport organization has to leverage its future revenue to acquire the capital to build. Today, few organizations (e.g., Cincinnati Bengals) have obtained governmental support for the entire cost of constructing a new facility. As previously stated, a team or its owner has had to contribute on average \$120 million when constructing a NFL facility. Often the team includes naming rights as part of its financing portion, even though at the time it may be unclear if the team or the municipality controls this revenue source.

Three major factors need to be considered prior to entering a commitment to build. First, the organization must determine the level of financial support the community is willing to provide. It is always in the interest of a franchise to secure as much public financing as possible, even if economic factors indicate a team could successfully finance the project privately (e.g., the San Francisco Giants and PacBell Park). An owner considering alternatives to increase revenue can invest \$30 million on player payroll or he/she can invest \$120 million into a \$400 million facility, from which the organization will receive nearly 100% of revenues. The owner must realize that \$30 million in payroll gets \$30 million in payroll investment, while a \$120 million facility investment gets \$400 million in overall facility investment. Investment in payroll does not guarantee a greater return on investment. However, data show that a substantial capital investment in new venue construction does produce a substantial return on investment in both the short term (incremental revenue) and, more importantly, in franchise value appreciation over time.

Second, the organization must determine the increase in cash flow that will occur once the facility is built. Can enough revenue be generated via the facility in its current market to make an organizational investment in a facility worthwhile? Or, after covering

debt service obligations, is there enough money left to effectively attract quality players? If not, is the municipality/region willing to build a new facility for the organization so that it can remain competitive when attempting to retain current players or attract free agents?

Third, the organization must determine the risk associated with the capital project. The organization must look at long-term economic forecasts for the market, the market's ability to support a franchise, and the degree to which they are leveraging their franchise to build the venue. For example, in the National Hockey League, the Ottawa Senators filed for bankruptcy in 2003 because debt totaling over \$240 million depleted the resources needed to issue paychecks (Beaudan, 2003). Included in the debt was \$140 million outstanding on the team's facility, the Corel Centre (Dupont, 2003). The Senators were also hurt financially because they play in a market of just over one million people and they pay players in US dollars (as all other Canadian teams do) while generating revenue in Canadian dollars. With the Canadian dollar at a record low as compared to the US dollar, Canadian franchises struggle to keep and pay top players (Beaudan, 2003; Dupont, 2003).

If the risk of building a new stadium or arena is determined to be too great and little local, public support is available for either entirely funding the venue or increasing the public's share of venue costs, the organization should avoid mortgaging its future. A new market could then be sought. Or, the organization could examine a less costly solution to increasing venue revenue, renovation.

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Table 1

*Increase in Total Local Revenue of Teams Moving into New Stadia (1995 – 1999)*

Team	% increase
Baltimore Ravens	62
Carolina Panthers	77
Tampa Bay Buccaneers	83
Tennessee Titans	134
Washington Redskins	109
Cleveland Browns <sup>a</sup>	NA
St. Louis Rams <sup>b</sup>	NA

<sup>a</sup>Began play in new Cleveland Stadium in 1999

<sup>b</sup>Moved into new stadium in middle of season



Table 2

*Increase in Value for Teams Moving into New Stadia  
(1995 – 1999)*

Team	% Increase
Baltimore Ravens	38
Carolina Panthers	22
Tampa Bay Buccaneers	83
Tennessee Titans	12
Washington Redskins	6
Cleveland Browns <sup>a</sup>	NA
St. Louis Rams <sup>b</sup>	NA

<sup>a</sup>Expansion franchise not ranked by *Financial World* or *Forbes* during first year of existence

<sup>b</sup>Moved into new stadium in middle of season

Table 3

*Local Revenue<sup>a</sup> Pre and Post Move to new Stadium (in Millions)*

Team	Pre Move	Post Move
Baltimore Ravens	\$34.9	\$56.5
Carolina Panthers	\$38.1	\$67.2
Tampa Bay Buccaneers	\$35.6	\$65.3
Tennessee Titans	\$27.2	\$63.6
Washington Redskins	\$32.7	\$68.4
Cleveland Browns <sup>b</sup>		\$72.0
St. Louis Rams <sup>c</sup>		\$42.3

<sup>a</sup>Adjusted to 2001 dollars<sup>b</sup>Began play in new Cleveland Stadium in 1999<sup>c</sup>Moved into new stadium in middle of season

Table 4

*Team Value<sup>a</sup> Pre and Post Move to New Stadium (in Millions)*

Team	Pre Move	Post Move
Baltimore Ravens	\$259	\$357
Carolina Panthers	NR	\$150
Tampa Bay Buccaneers	\$206	\$376
Tennessee Titans	\$349	\$392
Washington Redskins	\$208	\$221
Cleveland Browns <sup>b</sup>	NR	\$563
St. Louis Rams <sup>c</sup>	\$178	\$218

<sup>a</sup>Adjusted to 2001 dollars<sup>b</sup>Expansion franchise<sup>c</sup>Moved into new stadium in middle of season

## Figure Caption

*Figure 1.* Washington Redskins team financial performance, 1999

Revenues (in \$1,000s)	
Ticket Sales	44,463
Local TV and Radio	8,549
Loge Boxes	14,642
Concessions	3,547
Advertising/Parking/Other	9,914
Miscellaneous	<u>2,812</u>
Total Local Revenue	83,927
Common Revenues <sup>a</sup>	<u>64,784</u>
Total Revenues	148,711
Expenses (in \$1,000s)	
Player Costs	73,207
Team Expenses	10,068
Stadium Rental	-
Stadium Operations	20,367
G&A	7,553
PR	<u>1,518</u>
Total Operating Expenses	112,713
Common Expenses <sup>b</sup>	<u>3,640</u>
Operating Profit (in \$1,000s)	<u>32,358</u>

<sup>a</sup>Includes National Television and Radio, International Television, NFL Properties, Enterprises, and Films.

<sup>b</sup>Includes League Office and Management Council expenses.