

FOLKLORIC BEHAVIOR:
A THEORY FOR THE STUDY OF
THE DYNAMICS OF TRADITIONAL CULTURE
[With Case Analysis of the
Egyptian Community in Brooklyn, New York]

by

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TO THE PEOPLE OF EGYPT, WHO HAVE
SPONSORED MY STAY AND STUDIES AT
INDIANA UNIVERSITY FOR SIX OF
THEIR LONG AND HARD YEARS, THIS
WORK IS AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED.

H. El-Shamy
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[PREFACE]
[2010 Edition]

The proposal for this work was submitted to the Folklore Department, Indiana University in 1964-65. The dissertation--in its present state--was defended in August 1967. Regrettably, agreements for publishing it in book form in a medium dedicated exclusively to FOLKLORE did not materialize. This work is made available here through Indiana Universities IUScholar Works for students of folklore and related disciplines to evaluate and assess its contributions to subsequent folklore theories.

There are few *wholly stylistic* differences between the original (1967) and the present format. No ideas or sources were altered or added to PART I except for correcting typographical errors:

1. Original pagination is indicated within curled brackets: { } : {9} = p. 9 in the original.
2. German and French texts in the original are given here in English.
3. Endnotes in the original were converted to footnotes.
4. All notes in the fieldwork materials (PART II) are added for clarity and meaningfulness.
 - 4.1. The APPENDIX (List of Tale-types and Motifs pp. 219-220) is added.
5. The transliteration of Arabic into Latin letters has been changed so as to be more comprehensible to the contemporary reader. For technical considerations, under-dotted Arabic letters--depicted as upper case (e.g., H, S, Z, X) in the 1967 system--are given here as underlined letters (i.e., H/h, S/s, Z/z, Kh/kh) respectively.

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"We can observe *behavior* - *what the organism does or says*. And let us point out at once: that saying is doing - that is, *behaving*. Speaking overtly or to ourselves (thinking) is just as objective a type of behavior as baseball."

John B. Watson, *Behaviorism*,
2nd. ed. (Chicago, 1930), p. 6.

INTRODUCTION [ABSTRACT]

"Folklore" may be defined as a class of learned, traditional responses forming a distinct type of behavior. The individual must undergo the psychological process of learning in order to acquire the responses of folkloric behavior, and this learning process occurs under conditions determined by social and cultural factors. The fundamental factors involved in learning are: drive, cue, response, and reward. Secondary factors such as repetition, recency, and ego-involvement can contribute, but their presence is not required in the process of learning.

Folkloric behavior is distinguishable from non-traditional, non-folkloric behavior, and consequently, folkloric responses are distinguishable from other classes of responses, such as those characteristic of modern science and technology. Thus, folklorists should initially concern themselves with folkloric responses (*narrating*, *believing*, *singing*, *applying* a proverb, or *dancing*) and relevant social and cultural factors before proceeding to the study of the folklore items themselves (narratives, beliefs, songs, proverbs, or dances).

Through the application of psychological theories of individual and social learning to folkloric phenomena, we can gain an understanding of the forces affecting the perpetuation or extinction of folklore and thus can explain the function of a particular folkloric response in a particular community.^[*]

*[As a consequence of Professor Seymour Berger's participation in this dissertation, the Psychology Department adopted "Folklore" as a research tool for graduate work. For several semesters Professor Dorson's seminar enrolled some 25-28 graduate [social] psychology students. Regrettably, as the University records will show, the Psychology Department discontinued the newly adopted practice vis-a-vis "Folklore".

CHAPTER I

OF PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY

IN FOLKLORE SCHOLARSHIP AND ANTHROPOLOGY

Theories of Analytical Psychology and Folklore

{01}

Sigmund Freud's *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900) introduced theories concerning the subconscious and cultural phenomena which have had a profound influence on the modern fields of folklore scholarship and anthropology. In their comprehensive survey of various psychological theories employed by anthropologists, George and Louise Spindler indicate that the psychoanalytic and the neopschoanalytic (Jung, Kardiner, Linton, Fromm, Erikson) interpretations have dominated psychologically oriented anthropology.¹ Similarly, folklorists, in comparable surveys of the various folklore theories, only give accounts of psychoanalytic studies. Such folklorists as Friedrich von der Leyen and Max Lüthi have expressed this opinion, and Richard M. Dorson suggests that the psychoanalytical folklore theory is the only representative of the psychological approach in "Current Folklore Theories."²

Anthropologist Thomas Gladwin notes that the influence of psychoanalysts and of neopschoanalytical anthropologists, such as Ralph Linton and Abram Kardiner, "... was so great that since their time the main stream of research and theoretical development in culture and personality has virtually taken for granted the assumption that its primary data are to be found in the realm of emotion."³ {02} Under psychological mechanism ... the individual is both the subject and the unit for analysis. Such issues in culture and cultural behavior as "origin," "diffusion," "change," and "stability" are analyzed and "*explained in terms*" of individuals, their conscious and subconscious, and other elements of their personalities.

¹ {261} George and Louise Spindler, "Psychology in Anthropology: Application to Culture Change." In: *Psychology: A Study of a Science*, Vol. 6: *Investigation of Man as Socius: Their Place in Psychology and Social Sciences*, ed. Sigmund Koch (New York, 1963), pp. 510-551.

² Friedrich von der Leyen, *Das Märchen* (Heidelberg, 1958), pp. 25-29; Max Lüthi, *Märchen* (Stuttgart, 1962), pp. 81-86; and Richard M. Dorson, "Current Folklore Theories." In: *Current Anthropology*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1963), 105-109. J.L. Fischer also presents this view in his discussion of the "psychological functions" of folktales in his article: "The Sociopsychological Analysis of Folktales." In: *Current Anthropology*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1963), 255-258.

³ Thomas Gladwin, "Culture and Logical Process." In: *Explorations in Cultural Anthropology*, ed. Ward H. Goodenough (New York, 1964), p. 167.

Actually, the psychoanalytical theory of folklore, emerging in the twentieth century under the influence of Freudian theory, is not markedly different from the naive theories popular in the second half of the nineteenth century. The first psychoanalytical treatments of myths and folktales merely substituted sexual symbolism for the solar symbolism which had prevailed earlier. Furthermore, the substitution of symbols did not influence the traditional methodology and techniques employed in the new approach to folklore scholarship. A direct, historical connection is apparent between the German celestial mythologists and the Austrian school of psychoanalytic folklorists, as Dorson notes:

The Viennese psychoanalytical school could scarcely have avoided familiarity with the German nature mythologists, and the extent of their reading is seen in Otto Rank's study of *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero*. Rank cites a shelfful of writings by the older school, disparaging them but adopting their method of interpretation. Only the symbols change ... Just as the celestial mythologists wrangled over the primacy of sun, storms, and stars, so now do the psychoanalytical mythologists dispute over the symbols from the unconscious. Formerly it was Müller, Kuhn, Preller, Goldziher, Frobenius, who recriminated; now it is Freud, Jung, Ferenczi, Fromm, Kerényi, Róheim, Reik.⁴

{03}

Scholars contributing to psychoanalytic studies have proven prolific, yielding an abundance of theories and explications to folkloric and anthropological phenomena.⁵ In 1913, Carl G. Jung, severed his intellectual ties with Freud and established his own school of analytical psychology.⁶ However, his school did not develop innovations in the psychoanalytic treatment of cultural material, nor radically alter the concept of symbolism which remained the basis of the psychoanalytic approach. The differences between the two schools were limited to questions of the

⁴ Richard M. Dorson, "Theories of Myth and the Folklorist." In: *Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, Vol. 88 (1959), 283-284.

⁵ For examples of the psychoanalytic school, see Sigmund Freud and D.E. Oppenheim, *Dreams in Folklore* (New York, 1958); K. Abraham, *Dreams and Myths, a Study in Race Psychology*, trans. William A. White, *Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series*, No. 15 (New York, 1913); Otto Rank, *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero and Other Writings*, ed., Philip Freund (New York, 1959); Rank, *Das Inzestmotiv in Dichtung und Sage* (Leipzig, 1912); Geza Róheim, *The Eternal Ones of the Dream, a Psychoanalytic Interpretation of Australian Myth and Ritual* (New York, 1945); and Geza Róheim, *The Gates of the Dream* (New York, 1952).

⁶ For examples of the Jungian approach, see C.G. Jung, *Psyche and Symbol, a Selection from the Writings of C.G. Jung*, ed. Violet S. de Laszlo (New York, 1958); Joseph Campbell, *The Hero with a Thousand Faces* (New York, 1964); and C.G. Jung and C. Kerényi *Essays on a Science of Mythology* (New York, 1948).

origin of the symbol and its significance for the behavior and cultural values of an ethnic group. Similarly, the neopsychoanalytic school was to cling to the essentials of the psychoanalytical approach as formulated by Freud.⁷ According to Freud, the symbol in dreams and myths is a product of the individual's unconscious; Jung and his followers believe that the symbol in myths is a product of the collective unconscious. This symbolic significance of motifs and themes--with definite reference to "the unconscious mind of the individual," or the "collective unconscious" of the ethnic group--has been criticized methodologically and conceptually on the one hand and theoretically and ontologically on the other.

First: Blindness to the social and cultural forces peculiar to certain cultures has been the main methodological criticism leveled against the psychoanalytical school by anthropologists and folklorists. L. Bryce Boyer, (04) 'Investigator ... in Anthro-psychoanalytic Techniques,' states:

During the period when their knowledge was dominated by the topographic viewpoint, psychoanalysts studied myths, frequently without knowledge of cultures within which the myth had been produced. Using their newly acquired knowledge concerning unconscious mechanisms and especially symbolism, they sought simultaneously to interpret myths from their manifested contents and to use the interpretations to support psychoanalytic concepts particularly those related to infantile sexual wishes. Social scientists of varying persuasions object to such manipulation of data.⁸

Social and cultural scientists had become sharply aware of the determining effects of the structure and value of regional, social and cultural forces on the personalities of individual members of the society. Clyde Kluckhohn criticized early psychoanalysts for imposing universal "pan-humanic" symbols, supposedly having the same meaning and organic psychological significance for all cultures.⁹ John Whiting defined "personality" as an "intervening hypothetical variable determined

⁷ (262) For examples of the neopsychoanalytical school, see Erich Fromm, *The Forgotten Language* (New York, 1959); and Abram Kardiner, *The Psychological Frontiers of Society* (New York, 1945).

⁸ L. Bryce Boyer, "An Example of Legend Distortion from the Apaches of the Mescalero Indian Reservation." In: *Journal of American Folklore*, Vol. 77 (1964), 118.

⁹ Clyde Kluckhohn, "Myth and Ritual." In: *Harvard Theological Review*, Vol. 35 (1942), 45-79. Kluckhohn himself noted that certain themes and motifs of mythology are apparently universal; see his "Recurrent Themes in Myth and Mythmaking." In: *Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, Vol. 88 (1959), 653-681. Alan Dundes, in his article "Earth Diver: Creation of the Mythopoetic Male." In: *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 64 (1962), points out that Kluckhohn's recurrent themes "... are strongly analogous to Freud's typical dreams as proposed in Freud's *The Interpretation of Dreams*," (see pp. 1032-1051).

by child rearing, which is determined by maintenance system and which is finally reflected in projective systems"¹⁰--a concept foreign to early psychoanalytically oriented schools of anthropology and of folklore, which largely ignored the role of social and cultural forces involved in the formation of personality.

In contemporary anthropology social structure has been stressed as a determining influence upon the socialization process, which in turn affects the expressive (05)cultural phenomena. For example, Malinowski indicated that the object of childhood resentment among the Trobriand Islanders is the matrilineal uncle (the boy's sociological father) and not the biological father.¹¹ This "ambivalent attitude" of the boy towards his mother's brother rather than towards his father refutes the assertion of the psychoanalytical school of a universal innate father-son Oedipal complex. Furthermore, William Lessa pointed out the incongruous fact that the oedipal motif and tales appear in cultures lacking the conditions necessary for the Oedipus-complex situation, and do not appear in Africa, most of Asia, the two Americas, or Australia.¹² Similarly, Melville J. Herskovits examined the Oedipus complex with reference to family structure and cultural traits of non-Western cultures, and noted other factors, such as rivalry for the mother's favor and lack of acute awareness of the father's presence,¹³ which Freud had overlooked. Thus the all-embracing psychoanalytical theories have generally proved of little value for the study of culture. Weston La Barre has found that the writing by several psychoanalysts on cultural issues have been based on the outmoded theory of cultural evolutionism, and he attacks Jung's concept of the "*Universalgedanke*," or "archetype" (a core of psychological attitudes common to all men which override social and cultural influences), because it contradicts ethnological data.¹⁴

Second: The psychoanalytical approach to the study of culture has been attacked on theoretical grounds. The (06)problem is a philosophical one, considering the ontological aspects of culture

¹⁰ John W.M. Whiting, "Socialization Process and Personality." In: *Psychological Anthropology*, ed. F.L.K. Hsu (Homewood, Ill., 1961), p. 356. See also, John W.M. Whiting, "Sorcery, Sin and the Superego." In: *Symposium on Motivation*, ed. M.R. Jones (Lincoln, 1959), pp. 174-195; and John W.M. Whiting and Irving L. Child, *Child Training and Personality*. (New Haven, 1953).

¹¹ Bronislaw Malinowski, *The Father in Primitive Psychology* (New York, 1928); and Bronislaw Malinowski, *Sex and repression in Savage Society* (New York, 1960), p. 75.

¹² William Lessa, "Oedipus-type Tales in Oceania." In: *Journal of American Folklore*, Vol. 69 (1956), 63-73.

¹³ Melville J. Herskovits, "Sibling Rivalry, The Oedipus Complex, and Myth." In: *Journal of American Folklore*, Vol. 71 (1958), 1-15.

¹⁴ Weston La Barre, "Folklore and Psychology." In: *Journal of American Folklore*, Vol. 61 (1948), 382-389.

regarding allied "levels" of human activities, such as the psychological, social, and cultural. In 1911, Franz Boas observed that the explanation of cultural phenomena in terms of innate biological differences leads to the assumption that

The whole problem of the development of culture is ... reduced to the study of psychological and social conditions which are common to mankind as a whole and to the effects of historical happenings and of natural and cultural environment.¹⁵

Boas' criticism of the psychological treatment of culture as a reduction of cultural phenomenon to a psychological level was persuasively expressed by Alfred Kroeber, whose theory of the "superorganic" explained cultural phenomena without reducing culture to the plane of purely psychic activities and products. In 1917 Kroeber wrote:

The reason why mental heredity has nothing to do with civilization, is that civilization is not mental action but a body or stream of products of mental exercise ... Mentality relates to the individual. The social or cultural on the other hand, is in its very essence non-individual.¹⁶

He denied that the three levels of human existence--the individual, the social and the cultural--were linked together: "As against [Herbert] Spencer and other sociologists, Kroeber maintains the complete disparity of biological and cultural evolution."¹⁷ Thus he concluded, "The dawn of the social ... is not a link in any chain, not a step in a path, but a leap to another plane."¹⁸ Consequently, David Bidney (1973) concludes: "... Kroeber came to regard the abstract mental products of society, which he called culture, or civilizations, as a reality *sui generis*, subject to autonomous historical processes of development which were independent of psychological experiences and actual social behavior."¹⁹ Kroeber's theory of the superorganic has had a tremendous impact on American anthropology. Bidney reports that "Kroeber's paper on 'The Superorganic' has since become a classic in American anthropological literature, and his term 'superorganic' ... has achieved recognition among American scholars ..."²⁰

¹⁵ Franz Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man* (New York, 1938), p. 33.

¹⁶ Alfred Kroeber, "The Superorganic." In: *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 19 (1917), 192.

¹⁷ David Bidney, *Theoretical Anthropology* (New York, 1953), p. 37.

¹⁸ (263) Kroeber, "The Superorganic," (1917), p. 208.

¹⁹ David Bidney, *Theoretical Anthropology*, p. 51.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

Culture, being "the superpsychic product of special mental process,"²¹ would not accept psychology as a tool for investigating its phenomena and measuring its dimensions. As the Spindlers point out, the "Equation of the individual [and culture] with psychological process leaves the problem at an idiosyncratic, unpredictable, unique level."²² This idiosyncrasy led to the "... rejection of psychologizing by some anthropologists: they see such a focus as a form of reduction (from the cultural level) that is likely to lead nowhere."²³ In other words, explaining such cultural phenomena as the mythology of a nation or an ethnic group, in psychoanalytical terms of the "ego" and the "subconscious" would be as meaningless as measuring weights in feet and inches and distance in pounds and ounces.

Thus, since its beginnings [sixty-five years earlier], the psychoanalytic approach to (08)folklore theory has suffered a great deal of criticism. Today, most folklorists dismiss pure theory unsubstantiated by field material and functional evidence, and consider the psychoanalytical approach "the most speculative body of current folklore theory."²⁴ Their opposition to the "speculative" aspect of psychoanalytical treatment ranges from the cautious, qualified approval of empirical anthropologists such as Herskovits, Lessa, and Jacobs, to the complete rejection by conservative folklorists like Alexander H. Krappe, who quoted Karl Abraham solely "for the entertainment of the reader," and considers his work "trash."²⁵ Stith Thompson dismissed the work of psychologists as "unreal" in 1946,²⁶ and, more emphatically in 1955, described psychological symbolists as inconsistent, "fantastic," and "absurd."²⁷ Claude Lévi-Strauss blamed the unfortunate influence of psychoanalytic theories for the fact that the study of myth has remained in a chaotic state despite fifty years of scholarship.²⁸

In light of these hostile views, the psychoanalytic approach to the study of folkloric

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

²² Spindler and Spindler, "Psychology in Anthropology," p. 521.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Dorson, "Current Folklore Theories," p. 105.

²⁵ Alexander H. Krappe, *The Science of Folklore* (London, 1930), p. 43.

²⁶ Stith Thompson, *The Folktale* (New York, 1946), p. 385-386.

²⁷ Stith Thompson, "Myths and Folktales." In: *Journal of American Folklore*, Vol. 68 (1955), 483.

²⁸ Claude Lévi-Strauss, "The Structural Study of Myth." In: *Myth: A Symposium*, ed. Thomas A. Sebeok (Bloomington, Ind., 1958), p. 50.

phenomena, particularly when their social and cultural contexts are disregarded, merits little further consideration. Clearly, a new psychological theory that can account in empirical, behavioristic (verifiable) terms for the stability in these phenomena is necessary.

Psychological Theories of Learning and Culture

^{09}

The idea that culture is "acquired" was introduced by Edward B. Tylor in 1871 in the opening statement of *Primitive Culture*.²⁹ This tenet was first supported by such anthropologists as Clark Wissler, Ruth Benedict, and Ralph Linton, in opposition to the previously accepted theory, espoused by Lamarck, Darwin and Spencer, which attributed cultural phenomena to biologically determined conditions. In our own time, Herskovits reports that "The clearest definition of culture in psychological terms states: *culture is the learned portion off human behavior*."³⁰ Similarly, Bidney asserts: "There is ... general agreement among social scientists that culture is historically acquired by man as a member of society and that it is communicated largely by language or symbolic forms and through participation in social institutions."³¹ Herskovits stresses the learning process as the factor which keeps culture alive: "... it is recognized by all students that whatever forms susceptible of objective description may compose a culture, they must be learned by succeeding generations of a population if they are not to be lost."³² The concept that culture is acquired through learning has undergone constant modification and clarification since its introduction to the field of ethnology. Under the influence of learning theories, the idea that culture is acquired gained a sharply ^{10}empirical dimension. Their impact on the study of culture led to insistence in empiricism in defining cultural phenomena, and to the denial of superorganicism. Consequently, E.A. Hoebel suggests that the rejection by anthropologists of Kroeber's classical superorganic theory was "... a legacy of behaviorism in psychology."³³

The empirical approach to the study of cultural phenomena has resulted in the use of the term "culture" to denote basic empirical principles: culture is a learned³⁴ behavior³⁵ which is necessary

²⁹ Edward B. Tylor, *The Origin of Culture*, part I, *Primitive Culture* (New York, 1958), p. 1.

³⁰ Melville J. Herskovits, *Man and His Works, The Science of Cultural Anthropology* (New York, 1964), p. 25.

³¹ Bidney, *Theoretical Anthropology*, p. 125.

³² Herskovits, *Man and His Works*, p. 25.

³³ E.A. Hoebel, *Man in the Primitive World* (New York, 1949), p. 425.

³⁴ Definitions of culture embodying this concept were proposed by anthropologists such as Alfred

for problem solving and adjustment³⁶ in a society.

Experimental psychology inevitably had an impact upon cultural studies because culture was defined as an abstract logical construct, rather than an actual, behavioristic entity. The Spindlers suggest that "If stimulus-response reinforcement theory, the frustration-aggression hypothesis, and aspects of cognitive theory can be lumped together as broadly representing what can be called 'learning theory,' this field of psychology runs a close second to the psychoanalytic and neopsychoanalytic category in extent of influence upon anthropology."³⁷ Concepts and terminology from learning psychology have penetrated the active, concept-impregnated vocabulary of many anthropologists "... to such a degree that they are used freely without specific citation much more frequently than with it."³⁸ The influence of learning theory (particularly Clark Hull's theory "which (11)has had a considerable vogue in anthropology"³⁹) reached a high point during "The Anthropological First Step Toward a Psychocultural Approach" between 1936 and 1948. A few of the psychological attempts to develop a framework to analyze cultural stability and change employed learning theory. For example, G.P. Murdock argued that "*culture is learned*," "inculcated," ("... [taught] or [instilled] by frequent repetitions or admonitions"), "*gratifying*," and "*adaptive*"⁴⁰--all of these concepts are directly affiliated with learning theory. Similarly, John Gillin equates cultural custom to psychological habit and discussed the extinction of old customs (habits) when their practitioner is punished. He utilizes the "primary" and "secondary" drive theory and cites Hull, O. Hobart Mowrer and Neal E. Miller and John Dollard.⁴¹ Gregory Bateson, cited by

Kroeber, *Anthropology* (New York, 1948), pp. 8-9; and Ralph Linton, "Present World Conditions in Cultural Perspective." In: *The Science of Man in the World Crisis*, ed. Ralph Linton (New York, 1945), p. 203.

³⁵ The idea that culture is "behavior" was introduced and defended by Kimball Young, *Introduction to Sociology* (New York, 1934), pp. 18-19; Ralph Linton, *The Cultural Background of Personality* (New York, 1945), p. 5, 32; Ruth Benedict, *Race, Science and Politics* (New York, 1947), p. 13; Hoebel, *Man in the Primitive World*, pp. 3-4; J.S. Slotkin, *Social Anthropology* (New York, 1950), p. 76; and David Bidney, "Human Nature and the Cultural Process." In: *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 49 (1947), 376.

³⁶ [264] This aspect has been stressed by Kimball Young, *Introduction to Sociology*, pp. 18-19; and C.F. Ford, "Culture and Human Behavior." In: *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 55 (1942), 555, 557.

³⁷ Spindler and Spindler, "Psychology in Anthropology," p. 535.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ Gladwin, "Culture and Logical Process," p. 188.

⁴⁰ G.p. Murdock, "Uniformities in Culture." In: *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 5 (1940), 361-369.

⁴¹ John Gillin, "Acquired Drives in Cultural Contact." In: *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 4 (1942)

Margaret Mead as an anthropologist influenced by the learning theory,⁴² distinguished between those cultures in which learning occurs through the experience of reward or punishment, and those in which learning occurs by instrumental avoidance and is never extinguished because it is never overtly practiced in social life.⁴³

The influence of learning theory in anthropology reached a climax in Malinowski's later works. In *A Scientific Theory of Culture*⁴⁴ he referred to the stimulus-response learning theory in the Hullian tradition to account for the origin of cultural and social institutions (see⁽¹²⁾ *post*, page 36). Studies of cultural diffusion began to emphasize the role of the individual as a culture carrier--a factor which had previously been ignored. A. Irving Hallowell states that individuals are never passive culture bearers; abstract "cultures" never meet, only individuals meet. His concept of cultural diffusion was built on psychological factors in learning such as motivations in contact situations, stimuli and responses, anxiety reduction, and rewards and punishments. All these factors first appeared in Miller and Dollard's *Social Learning and Imitation*, which served as the theoretical basis for Hallowell's work.⁴⁵ However, the new approach represented in such pioneering studies did not radically alter the existing state of culture studies, The Spindlers summarized the situation:

During the latter phase (the mid-forties) of the period during which these constructs and their applications were emerging, the more broad personality and culture group was gaining strength ... Although the influence of behaviorism and, to some extent, Gestalt psychology was represented in these writings, the influence of psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic psychiatry was decidedly dominant.⁴⁶

Thus defined, "culture" recognizes the individual's role in cultural processes. Neal E. Miller and John Dollard, emphasizing the psychological nature of this role, state:

545-554.

⁴² Margaret Mead, *Continuities in Cultural Evolution* (New Haven, 1964), 125.

⁴³ Gregory Bateson, "Social Planning and the Concept of Deutro Learning." In: *Science, Philosophy and Religion, Second Symposium*, eds. Lyman Bryson and Louis Finkelstein (New York, 1942), pp. 81-97.

⁴⁴ Bronislaw Malinowski, *A Scientific Theory of Culture* (New York, 1944).

⁴⁵ Irving Hallowell, "Sociological Aspects of Acculturation." In: *Science of Man in the World Crisis*, ed. Ralph Linton (New York, 1945), pp. 171-200.

⁴⁶ Spindler and Spindler, "Psychology in Anthropology," p. 518.

Human behavior ... which is widely felt to characterize man as a rational being, or as a particular nation or social class is acquired rather than innate. To understand thoroughly any item of human behavior - either in the social group or in the individual life - ⁽¹³⁾one must know the psychological principles involved in its learning and the social conditions under which this learning took place.⁴⁷

These concepts had their greatest impact in the forties and early fifties. In search for relations between "Culture and Logical Process," Gladwin notes that although the "... theory of learning formulated by Clark Hull has had considerable vogue in anthropology, ... this theory is far more concerned with motivation and reward for learning than it is with the cognitive integrations accomplished in learning,"⁴⁸ and, by 1964, the general attitude was that "Aside from the Hullian theory, attention to the process of learning and thinking, and to the nature of intelligence, has been minimal in anthropology"⁴⁹ The utilization of psychological concepts in anthropology declined considerably during the fifties and early sixties: "Ten years ago there was a considerable flow of ideas and applications for the most part from psychology to anthropology ... But somehow fatigue has set in. Anthropologists have wearied of complicating further their already complicated professional lives."⁵⁰ Between 1929 and 1952 seventy-three percent of the articles on culture change published in the *American Anthropologist* were psychologically oriented; whereas in the same journal between 1952 and 1962 only thirty-four percent of that literature showed psychological influence.⁵¹ The difference between the two periods proves to be phenomenal.

⁽¹⁴⁾The search for explanations of cultural phenomena and the similarities to be found in different cultures has led anthropologists to accept theories which are applicable to mankind in general and transcend the particular characteristics of individual societies. Thus, "It is no accident

⁴⁷ Neal E. Miller and John Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation* (New Haven, 1941), p. 1. It is worth noting that the work is a psychological theory developed with reference to culture, rather than a cultural study, employing a psychological theory.

⁴⁸ Gladwin, "Culture and Logical Process," p. 168.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ Spindler and Spindler, "Psychology in Anthropology," p. 543.

⁵¹ ⁽²⁶⁵⁾ *Ibid.*, pp. 538-540. One of the latest anthropological works to apply the learning theory to culture is Alan P. Merriam's *The Anthropology of Music* (Evanston, Ill., 1964), in which he assigns a full chapter to the "learning" of music pp. 145-183. Although Merriam does not make use of recent developments in the field of learning psychology, the work could serve as a stimulus for future anthropological studies employing learning theory.

that the kinds of psychology contributing most to anthropology and receiving the most from it were primarily psychoanalytically oriented psychoanalytic models [which] were most analogous to anthropological models."⁵² It was also no accident that learning psychology, "a close second" to psychoanalytical psychology, has only contributed what anthropologists were willing to accept. The Hullian and related learning theories have had only partial success in defining and explaining the characteristics and mechanisms of cultural learning, transmission, and change. Gladwin noted the irony that "... anthropology, with its primary emphasis on the regularities of behavior as they are transmitted through culture from one generation to the next, is the one [field of inquiry into human behavior] which most consistently ignores the cognitive learning involved in this cultural transmission."⁵³

Folklore and the Superorganic Process

Before examining early principles of learning and memory which found expression in folklore scholarship, mention should be made of other efforts to account for the independent (15)origin and stability of folklore materials--apart from the individual; also some differences between these two trends in the study of folklore should be pointed out.

In 1908, Axel Olrik presented his "epic laws of folk-poetry,"⁵⁴ to the Historians' Congress in Berlin, postulating structural laws to determine the conditions and aspects of the *Sagenwelt* (akin to Herskovits' "oral literature" and Bascom's "verbal art;" (see *post*, page 79, n. 369). According to these laws, the *Sagenwelt* is completely autonomous of psychological and social forces. Alan Dundes, in his introductory statement to the English translation of Olrik's work,⁵⁵ has legitimately equated "Olrik's conception of these laws ... [as] analogous to what anthropologists term as superorganic conception of culture." Thus, "The folk narrator, according to this view, can only blindly obey the epic laws. The superorganic laws are above any individual's control." Dundes concluded: "This kind of thinking ... takes the folk out of folklore;"⁵⁶ thus reducing folklore scholarship to the study of lifeless texts which exist independently of the individual. Folklorists have found fault with Olrik's theory on grounds other than its disregard for the human agent. Van Gennep, for example, felt that the theory had no realistic basis, its laws having been arbitrarily

⁵² Spindler and Spindler, "Psychology in Anthropology," p. 543.

⁵³ Gladwin, "Culture and Logical Process," p. 168.

⁵⁴ Axel Olrik, "Epische Gesetze der Volksdichtung." In: *Zeitschrift für Deutsches Altertum*, Vol. 51 (1909), 1-12.

⁵⁵ Alan Dundes, *The Study of Folklore* (Englewood Cliffs, 1965), pp. 129-130.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

devised: "The supposed epic laws of Axel Olrik: these are formal techniques, [a] machinery arbitrarily isolated."⁵⁷

⁽¹⁶⁾In 1930, André Jolles presented his theory of the *einfache Formen* (simple forms), which not only "took the folk out of folklore," but also claimed autonomy of origin, function, form, and existence for folklore genres through language. As Jolles saw it, "The entire work, which fulfills itself in peasants, hand-workers, and priests, fulfills itself in language once more."⁵⁸ Once this product of average workers, craftsmen and professionals entered the language, it is re-created by language, language re-creating what life has produced. Jolles described the process:

Everything which peasants, craftsmen, priests have thus far achieved in terms of work belongs to living, dissolves with living, revitalizes itself in living or has constancy only within life. But through the work of language, ... [all] achieves a new permanency via language itself. In two ways: Firstly everything engendered, created, [and] explained is named through language. But secondly--and here we probe deeper--is[n't] language itself something which engenders, creates, [and] explains[;] something within which ordering, reordering, and delegating [may] unifyingly self-create.⁵⁹

For Jolles, the "simple forms" (religious legend, legend, myth, riddle, saying, 'case,' memorate, fairy-tale, and joke) are formed not by the human agent but by language, which extracts events from life and re-creates them as independent entities. Thus folklore--through language--becomes an autonomous, abstract, cultural process, *sui generis*, requiring no reference to social or psychological conditions for an explanation of its origin, development, or existence.

Dundes did not observe that superorganicism, through language, is the dominant factor behind Jolles' concept of ⁽¹⁷⁾the "simple forms." Unfortunately, he includes Anderson's "law of self-correction" as another case of "superorganic law,"⁶⁰ without realizing that in Anderson's "law of self-correction"⁶¹ (see *post*, page 15) narratives 'correct themselves,' [so to speak], through the folk. However, this characteristic of Anderson's law, that is: being psychological or organic rather

⁵⁷ Arnold Van Gennep, *La formation des legendes* (Paris, 1910), pp. 287-290.

⁵⁸ André Jolles, *Einfache Formen: Legende/ Sage/ Mythe/ Rätsel/ Spruch/ Kasus/ Memorabile/ Märchen/ Witz* (Tübingen, 1958), p. 16.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ Dundes, *The Study of Folklore*, p. 130.

⁶¹ Walter Anderson, *Kaiser und Abt, Folklore Fellows Communications*, Vol. 42 (1923), 397-403.

than superorganic, was not recognized in any of the writings by folklorists dealing with this problem. Anderson himself did not specify the psychological nature of his own theory until 1956, when Kurt Schier attacked his 1947 "Ein Volkskundliches Experiment"⁶² presented as a defense of his 1923 work, "the law of self-correction." Schier charged that in Anderson's work "The method is psychological, not folkloristic." Anderson readily justified the psychological nature of his approach vis-a-vis folklore research: "Obviously ... [the method] is psychological: it is a psychological study dealing with a folklore object."⁶³

Concepts of Memory and Learning Theory in Folklore Scholarship

Gladwin commented on the ironic disregard anthropology has shown for cognitive learning theory. Folklore research, while emphasizing the regularities of traditional behavior as they are transmitted from one generation to the next, and the relative stability of folklore genres, "transmissible at a distance in time or space"⁶⁴ through oral transmission, has made only minimal use of learning theory. The irony is ⁽¹⁸⁾ greater when we recall that in the first quarter of this century leading folklorists treated issues central to learning psychology. Learning, forgetting and remembering were recognized and examined by leading folklorists; yet this aspect of their work exerted practically no influence on the field. The influences of Freud, and that of Bartlett-Anderson, for example, on folklore scholarship are not comparable. As already pointed out, the psychoanalytic school has played a major role in the study of folklore, whereas learning theory, though influential in anthropology, never played a significant role.

⁶² W. Anderson, "Ein Volkskindliches Experiment." In: *Folklore Fellows Communications*, No. 141 (1951).

⁶³ W. Anderson, "Eine Neue Arbeit zur Experimentellen Volkskunde." In: *Folklore Fellows Communications*, No. 156 (1956), 11.

⁶⁴ Folklore material is expressed in genres and forms possessing elements of autonomous existence, as has been stated by cultural scientists and carried to an extreme by the superorganicists. These genres and forms--already available in a society--constitute one of the three basic elements involved in transmission of culture: "the capacity to learn," "the capacity to teach," and "the capacity to embody knowledge in forms ..." (see M. Mead's views, *post*, pp. 20-21). In addition to general classificatory significance, Jan Vansina, examining oral traditions, especially "formulas" such as "slogans," "didactic formulas," and ritual formulas, poetry, "tales," such as myths, legends and memorates, stresses "fixity of form" and "typology" for each genre and the influence of form and structure on the process of transmission. Jan Vansina, *Oral Tradition*, trans. H.M. Wright (Chicago, 1964), pp. 142-159.

Antti Aarne

The Grimm brothers interpreted the similarities in tales told by different peoples as proof of an original Indo-European common source.⁶⁵ Antti Aarne responded to this explanation, "If this concurrence had developed in this manner, it would not have extended beyond the main ideas or the main traits of the narrative." These congruencies are so remarkable that "One now often recognizes similarities even in the least significant side-circumstances, and the composition of long, complicated narratives is the same in many countries."⁶⁶ Thus Aarne thought that questions of stability and change were answered in "the inner life of the *Märchen*," leading him to conclude ^[19] that "the changes follow certain laws of thinking and of imagination."⁶⁷ Aarne proceeded to formulate laws of change according to these "definite laws of thinking and imagination (fantasy)." However, he dealt only with the "changes in the *Märchen*,"⁶⁸ which constituted only "forgetting" and "alterations,"⁶⁹ leaving the laws of "learning" and subsequent "stability" unexplained.

The "laws" of change were introduced to field workers later in a different form. Vansina perceived of two basic "types" of change, rather than "laws"--change in oral tradition "... due to transmission ... and failure of memory,"⁷⁰ and a functional change, in which "... alterations are made so that the tradition should fulfil its social function," these alterations being "usually unintentional." However, in addition to these two, the "... private purpose of the informant [might] lead to falsification."⁷¹

There had been, of course, earlier efforts to account for the stability of folklore in terms of structure and inner factors peculiar to the genres or forms concerned (Jolles' principle of "simple forms" and Olrik's "epic laws of folk-poetry"). However, it was Walter Anderson, a decade after Aarne had introduced his laws of change, who made the first serious attempt to formulate laws of stability in terms recognizable as psychological principles of learning, or Aarne's "laws of thinking and of imagination."

⁶⁵ [266] Wilhelm Grimm, *Kinder- Und Hausmärchen*, Vol. 3 (Berlin, 1856), p. 427-429.

⁶⁶ Antti Aarne, *Leitfaden Der Vergleichenden Märchenforschung*, *Folklore Fellows Communications*, No. 13 (1913), 7.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 23-29.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁷⁰ Vansina, *Oral Tradition*, p. 40.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

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F.C. Bartlett

In 1920, shortly after Aarne had introduced his laws of change, Frederick C. Bartlett,⁷² conducted an experiment on remembering, using folklore material to test the effect of "Repeated Reproduction by the Same Individual," and "Serial Reproduction" on a "... story^[73] ... [which] belonged to a level of culture and a social environment exceedingly different from those of ... [the] subjects."⁷⁴ Himself a psychologist, Bartlett stated that "One possible line of approach to the study of these problems ... [was] by way of psychological experiment to point out 'social factors in recall,'" a treatment that is usually classified as dealing with "Perception, Memory, and Motivation."⁷⁵

In his introductory statement, Bartlett noted that "When a story is passed on from one person to another, each man repeating as he imagines, what he has heard from the last narrator, it undergoes many successive changes before it at length arrives at that relatively fixed form in which it may become current throughout the whole community."⁷⁶ Thus he was dealing with two distinct problems: the mechanism of transmitting material from one person to another, and the effect of cultural and social values on the mechanism. Unlike the followers of the psychoanalytical approach fashionable at that time, Bartlett did not attribute the origin of folktales to the symbolic representation of psychic phenomena; instead he felt that these origins, involved the perception ^[21] of certain cultural and social phenomena, memory for meaningful details, and motivation for certain goals. Moreover, he did not theorize or hypothesize, but rather experimented "... to discover the principles according to which successive versions in such a process of change may be traced."⁷⁷

Bartlett's major concern was discovering the social and cultural factors which exerted change and instability on the folktale. He took it for granted that changes would take place and was interested in the sociocultural aspects of these changes. However, a secondary conclusion implicit

⁷² Frederick C. Bartlett, "Some Experiments on the Reproduction of Folk Stories." In: *Folklore*, Vol. 31 (1920), 30-47.

⁷³ Actually a legend titled "The War of Ghosts," from Franz Boas, "Kathlamet Texts." In: *Bureau of American Ethnology*, Vol. 26, Bul. 26 (1901), 182-154.

⁷⁴ Frederick C. Bartlett, *Remembering* (Cambridge, England, 1932), p. 63.

⁷⁵ E. Maccoby, T. Newcomb, and E. Hartley, *Readings in Social Psychology* (New York, 1958), p. 47.

⁷⁶ Bartlett, "Some Experiments," p. 30.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

in his experiment may be inferred from its context. In his study on *Memory*, Ian M.L. Hunter casually remarked that in both series in Bartlett's experiment the story was drastically shortened because "... few adults could, at a single hearing, memorize the original word for word."⁷⁸ Thus the lack of repetition caused instability in the text in both cases of "Repeated Reproduction by the Same Individual," and in "Serial Reproduction."

Walter Anderson and Albert Wesselski

In concluding his monumental work, *Kaiser und Abt* (1923), Anderson offered some "general remarks" resulting from his study. The first observation was "The Law of Self-correction of Folk-narratives,"⁷⁹ intended to explain J. Bédier's remarks on the changes occurring in a folklore item as it is expressed in various cultures.⁸⁰ In a footnote Anderson stated that the "law of ^[22] self-correction" is not limited to narrative genres of folklore but it "... more or less refers also to the other creations of oral traditions: songs, riddles, proverbs, etc."⁸¹

Anderson was responding to the phenomena that "... long and complicated narratives live through many centuries and spread from mouth to mouth almost all over the globe, without suffering on their way any major changes." The law which he formulated sought to establish "how could this unbelievable stability be explained ..."⁸² To account for this stability, Anderson introduced two psychological factors (see *ante*, page 12). The first, explicitly formulated, was the "law of frequency," "law of exercise" or "repetition" a concept expressed in the Latin proverb "Repetitio est mater studiorum."⁸³ The second was the concept that *cues* elicit and guide responses to drives.⁸⁴ Anderson's inclination toward some principles of learning psychology had little effect on the orientations of other folklorists, just as Bartlett's experiment had failed to draw the attention of psychologists to the field of folklore.⁸⁵

⁷⁸ Ian M.L. Hunter, *Memory* (Baltimore, Md., 1964), p. 148.

⁷⁹ Anderson, *Kaiser und Abt*, p. 397.

⁸⁰ Joseph Bédier wrote: "Le Suédois Pierre a conté les *Souhails* ridicules à l'Allemand Paul qui les a contés à l'Italian Jacques, et ainsi de suite un million de fois." (*Les fabliaux*, Paris, 1895), p. 228.

⁸¹ Anderson, *Kaiser und Abt*, p. 397, n. 1

⁸² ^[267] *Ibid.*, p. 397.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 399.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 400-402.

⁸⁵ Although not folklorically-oriented, the following works examine the psychological factors contributing to the rise of rumor and other fictitious material in a community: Gordon W. Allport and

Eight years after Anderson's theory of the stability of folktales appeared, Albert Wesselski presented a rebuttal in the form of a demonstration, or empirical, experiment⁸⁶ which was the first non-psychological experiment. Wesselski attributed the idea for his experiment to Friedrich Schlegel's comment that folksongs were produced through ^[23] the process of failure of transmission; for it is where there are folksongs to be collected, they would facilitate the generating of more of the same in any amount one would like.⁸⁷ Schlegel suggested that this degenerative process could be verified through a demonstration experiment and provided the outline of this demonstration experiment as well as the results, which he forecast as inevitable. Schlegel envisaged the demonstration experiment as follows:

Take any poem by Gellert or Hagendorn and have a four or five-year old child memorize it; certainly there will be no lack of romantic confusion and truncations, and one may repeat the procedure [only] three or four times, and to one's own amazement, one will find an excellent folksong fitting to the newest taste instead of the honest, old poem of the golden age.⁸⁸

Following this pattern, Wesselski set up a demonstration experiment (with the approval and help of Dr. Gustav Jungbauer, "Advocate of German *Volkskunde* at the German University of Prague") to establish "... with older children, who all have read their *Märchen*, what of it remains in their memory, how far an effect this memory and the understanding of the *Märchen* have in the narrating of it."⁸⁹ Wesselski was certain that the results would coincide with Schlegel's predictions and

Leo F. Postman, "The Basic Psychology of Rumor." In: *Transactions of the New York Academy of Science*, Ser. II, Vol. 8 (1945), 61-81; Gordon W. Allport and Leo F. Postman, *The Psychology of Rumor* (New York, 1947); R.H. Knapp, "The Psychology of Rumor." In: *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 8 (1944), 22-37; and Hunter, *Memory*, pp. 143-183.

⁸⁶ The term "demonstration experiment" is used to distinguish this form of experimental investigation from "control experiment," or laboratory experimentation which is carried out under definite, controlled conditions.

⁸⁷ Quoted in Wesselski, *Versuch einer Theorie des Märchens* (Reichenberg, 1931), p. 127.

It should be pointed out, however, that Wesselski introduced Schlegel's suggestion as a forerunner to the concept of deterioration theory for it was introduced "long, before the word *zersingen* [(sing to pieces)] had come into use for the first time." *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

defined *the* purpose as the establishment of "... to what degree *Märchen* disintegrate with these [children]." ⁹⁰ _{24} This "disintegration" was anticipated in spite of the fact that these older children "... [who]--except for the people who occupy themselves with this professionally--must have or have had the most interest for [*Märchen*]." ⁹¹ For that purpose "Dornröschen," (Type 410, *Sleeping Beauty*) was selected for the experiment and told to a class of thirty-eight students between twelve and thirteen years of age. Of these students, five were disqualified because they were "uninterested." The result was that "of the remaining thirty-three presentations of the *Märchen*, only eighteen narrated all of its main parts." ⁹² The renditions of the tale recited by the girls showed numerous and varied changes. Moreover, the influences from the Grimm and Bechstein literary versions were remarkable.

Wesselski concluded that "... the *Märchen*, even if it has not only been heard, but also been received in printed and illustrated form, if it is available at any hour [in such printed form], often disintegrates when it is retold, even for the first time." ⁹³ Wesselski predicted the future of both the tale and his subjects as narrators, pointing out that even in the hands of these "small girls in Komotau," who still "..., remembered parts better than some other [girls did] when reading and hearing the *Märchen*," ⁹⁴ the tale would suffer more in the future "...should they tell it to their little daughter ... then their little daughter [as] teenager, and then again [the teenagers] as mothers, and so forth." ⁹⁵

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Wesselski refused as "something that perhaps could be thought of [at most] as an exception" ⁹⁶ Anderson's explanation of folktale stability ("...each narrator [must] have heard the *Märchen* [or anecdote, religious legend, etc.] under consideration from his predecessor usually not once but several times.") ⁹⁷ For Wesselski, tale-telling is a maimed creature which must depend upon the

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 131.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 130.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

⁹⁷ Anderson, *Kaiser und Abt*, p. 399.

"crutch [in form] of books"⁹⁸ if any stability is to be gained in its constant state of flux, and oral repetition--as postulated by Anderson--does not contribute to this stability because, simply, it does not occur.

Sixteen years later Anderson refuted Wesselski's conceptual attacks and avoided Bartlett's methodological "fundamental errors," with a second demonstration experiment designed to establish "...what results, when a *Märchen* or legend really passes about a dozen times from mouth to mouth according to the one-source-principle."⁹⁹ This demonstration experiment was conducted between June 16 and July 22, 1947,¹⁰⁰ and involved thirty-six students, from the University of Kiel, divided into three "tradition-chains."

The results of this demonstration experiment and those of an earlier experiment conducted in Dorpat¹⁰¹ prove to be "exactly the same."¹⁰² Both experiments substantiated Anderson's original theoretical contentions, that "if it was really so, then the memory failure and the personal fantasy of the narrators would constantly bring changes to the text, which would cumulate and in the shortest amount of time ^[25]would disfigure the text so that it couldn't be recognized any more."¹⁰³

The six demonstration experiments known to have been conducted in this field--Bartlett's Cambridge experiment in 1920; Anderson's Dorpat experiment in the twenties; Wesselski's Komotau experiment in 1931; Anderson's second Kiel experiment in 1947 (published in 1951); Gyula Ortutay's Budapest experiment in 1953;¹⁰⁴ and Kurt Schier's Gauting experiment in 1955,¹⁰⁵

⁹⁸ Wesselski, *Versuch einer Theorie*, p. 131.

⁹⁹ Anderson, "Ein Volkskundliches Experiment," p. 5

¹⁰⁰ ^[268] The experiment was not published until 1951, a gap of twenty years elapsing between Wesselski's experiment and Anderson's.

¹⁰¹ The Dorpat experiment and the conditions under which it was conducted are little known because the research manuscript was lost. Anderson gives the following brief résumé of the experiment: "In den zwanziger Jahren dieser Jahrhunderts habe ich das Bartlettsche Experiment an der Universität Dorpat wiederholt, und zwar liess ich nach und nach etwa 8 parallele Traditionsketten von je 10 Gliedern bildern." When compared to Bartlett's experiment, "... die Resultate waren denjenigen Bartlett's vollkommen analog." Anderson, "Ein Volkskundliches Experiment," (see p. 5).

¹⁰² Anderson, "Eine Neue Arbeit," p. 5.

¹⁰³ Anderson, *Kaiser und Abt*, p. 399.

¹⁰⁴ The only information about this experiment was given briefly by Anderson in 1956. He reported that "Im Jahre 1953 wiederholte Prof. Dr. Gyula Ortutay an der Universität Budapest aus eigenem

have all led to the same conclusion: lack of repetition results in failure to reproduce the material correctly and the ensuing distortion is produced by idiosyncratic and cultural differences characteristic of the individual subjects.

Finally, it should be pointed out that Bartlett's experiment, as conducted by Anderson, virtually served as a model for all of the experiments which followed. Although Wesselski's experiment was proposed and executed independently, it was strikingly similar to the Bartlett-Anderson model in its procedures and goal. It will be remembered that Anderson was interested in *positive* aspects, such as learning and stability, in his "law of self-correction." Under Bartlett's influence he turned to negative aspects of the folklore process, such as forgetting and change, without ever trying to prove his original assertion that stability in folk narrative relies on repetition.

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With the exception of the Bartlett-Anderson approach, which itself has had only a very weak and sporadic impact on folklore scholarship over the past fifty years, learning psychology has largely been ignored in folklore studies. This situation persists in spite of attempts by leading folklorists to establish laws for stability and change in folklore. Although concepts and terms of learning theory have been unwittingly adopted by folklorists, no learning theory has yet been applied in a field which is primarily concerned with traditional behavior.

An example is Ortutay's "Principles of Oral Transmission in Folk Culture,"¹⁰⁶ in which the author discusses "acceptance by public," "repudiation," and "refusal,"¹⁰⁷ without reference to the law of effect in learning theory. He also discusses "modeling,"¹⁰⁸ following Hans Naumann's concept of imitation of a superior social class, but does not refer to the theory of "imitation," and

Antrieb mein Kieler Experiment, und zwar unter genau denselben Bedingungen und mit derselben pommerschen Teufelssage als Grundlage ... Wiederum ergab sich genau dasselbe Resultat." Anderson, "Eine Neue Arbeit," (see pp. 5-6).

¹⁰⁵ This is an unpublished doctoral dissertation. A critical résumé is given by Walter Anderson, who describes Schier's goals: "Im 1955 beschloss ... Kurt Schier gleichfalls meinen Kieler Versuch zu wiederholen, aber unter abgeänderten Bedingungen," and quotes Schier's statement concerning the objectives of his work to be "um treffendere Ergebnisse gewinnen zu können, als es Anderson getan hatte." *Ibid.*, (see p. 6).

¹⁰⁶ *Acta Ethnographica*, Vol. 8 (1959), 175-221.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 191.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 200.

introduces the concept of "affinity" and the "law of attraction"¹⁰⁹ without reference to the theory of contiguity and association as explained by Guthrie and Watson (see *post*, page 31, n. 34) or to Thorndike's sublaws of "polarity," and "belongingness."

Implicit references to learning concepts, particularly the concept of reward, appear in Cecil Sharp's comments on the "evolution" of the folksong¹¹⁰ (often quoted by Ortutay), C.W. Von Sydow's *Selected Papers on Folklore*,¹¹¹ Wolfram Eberhard's *Minstrel Tales from Southeastern Turkey*,¹¹² ^[28] Linda Dégh's "Some Questions of the Social Function of Story-telling,"¹¹³ and *Märchen, Erzähler und Erzählgemeinschaft*,¹¹⁴ and Albert Lord's *The Singer of Tales*.¹¹⁵ Similarly, functionalism is based on the Hullian learning theory, with particular stress on the concept of reward or satisfaction, the formula for functionalism being: Drive-Response-Reward (see *post*, page 36, n. 64). Unfortunately, both the process of learning and learning mechanisms have been ignored by functionalist folklorists, and anthropologists, who have sought to establish the "function," (goal or result) of cultural objects and phenomena in a community without referring to the mechanism involved in the process of achieving satisfaction. Other folklorists have used individual learning principles in connection with psychological characteristics. Lauri Honko, for example, in "Memorates and the Study of Folk Beliefs,"¹¹⁶ applied the question of "stimuli" and "perception" to the memorates, local legends, and legends which develop from beliefs through the perceptual mechanisms characteristic of individual members of a community.

The importance of the learning process in folklore is evidenced by its role in the transmission of folklore material from one generation to the next or from one culture to another, transmission constituting one of the most vital aspects of folklore scholarship.

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¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 217.

¹¹⁰ Cecil Sharp, *English Folksongs, Some Conclusions* (London, 1954, first published in 1907), pp. 16-31.

¹¹¹ Copenhagen, 1945

¹¹² ^[269] *Folklore Studies* No. 5, University of California Publications Berkeley, 1955).

¹¹³ In: *Acta Ethnographica*, Vol. 6 (1957), 91-147.

¹¹⁴ Berlin, 1962.

¹¹⁵ New York, 1965, first published in 1960.

¹¹⁶ *Journal of the Folklore Institute*, Vol. 1 (1964), 5-19.

The Complex Process of Transmission

The basic factor which keeps folklore and all other aspects of culture dynamic within a society is the transmission of culture from person to person, and from one generation to the next. Without transmission culture would become static, and folklore material would either perish or be relegated to lifeless, written texts. Most folklorists accept transmission as a recognizable process that can be explained through such routine factors¹¹⁷ as the name and age, and occasionally the social status of the informant and the peripheral circumstances accompanying the item when it was first observed. Actually, the transmission process is quite complex, being a composite arising from a series of cultural activities.

Mead writes, "The term *cultural transmission* covers a series of activities, all essential to culture, which it is useful to subdivide into the capacity to learn, the capacity to teach, and the capacity to embody knowledge in forms which make it transmissible at a distance in time and space."¹¹⁸ Mead's analysis of the components of cultural transmission can be rephrased in three main categories for application to folklore scholarship:

1. **The Capacity to Formulate:** Folklore scholarship, as a science mainly concerned with traditional aspects of culture, identifies the "forms" ⁽³⁰⁾ which render folkloric knowledge transmissible through both time and pace. The elements of traditionality and continuity are both common denominators in most of the definitions for "folklore" given in *the Standard Dictionary of Folklore Mythology and Legend*.¹¹⁹ Definitions of particular classes of folkloric material, such as "verbal art" and "oral literature" (see *post*, page 79) also include these two principles as basic characteristics. Åke Hultkranz divided the many definitions of "folklore" into three basic groups: "First, there is the idea that f. [folklore] presents cultural traditions ... Then there is the notion that f. ought to be restricted to folk literature ... [and] lastly, f. is understood as the total culture of the folk

¹¹⁷ Kenneth S. Goldstein, recognizing this limitation in folklore research, wrote: "The transmission process of folklore is still largely undocumented." He also realized the necessity for such information as "when," "where," "from whom," "how," "how often," and "why." Unfortunately, Goldstein does not go beyond a simple listing of these questions to a study of their operative significance in the process and mechanisms of transmission. *A Guide for Field Workers in Folklore, Memoirs of the American Folklore Society*, Vol. 52, No. 52 (1964), (see p. 107).

¹¹⁸ Mead, *Continuities in Cultural Evolution*, p. 38.

¹¹⁹ Funk and Wagnalls *Standard Dictionary of Folklore Mythology and Legend*, Vol. 1, ed. Maria Leach (New York, 1949), pp. 398-403.

in contradistinction to the culture of the higher classes." This last concept not only stresses traditionality, but also alludes to the concept of survivals (the notion of continuity of material despite the loss of its original function), Hultkranz states that this attitude was "... easily developed in Europe as a functional broadening of [William] Thoms' definition."¹²⁰ Andrew Lang consequently defined "folklore" as "... the study of survivals."¹²¹ Referring to the continuity of form and content in the folktale, Thompson noted that "... we shall find these forms not so rigid as the theoretician might wish, for they will be blending into each other with amazing facility. Fairy tales become myths, or ⁽³¹⁾ animal tales, or local legends."¹²² Similarly, Dorson points out instances of narrative genres metamorphosing poetic genres.¹²³ Yet, despite this dynamic quality, folklore remains "remarkably stable."¹²⁴

The existence of folklore material in definite forms, and the influence of these forms on the mechanisms of the transmission process may be regarded as two complementary elements of the folklore phenomena. Theorists have sought to establish structural laws for different forms of folklore genres. Olrik postulated "epic laws of folk-poetry" to characterize the structure of the *Sagenwelt* (see *ante*, page 11), while Jolles perceived of certain folklore genres as inevitable linguistic "simple forms," independent of external influences (see *ante*, page 11). Rank,¹²⁵ V. Propp,¹²⁶ Raglan¹²⁷ have also postulated structural patterns for the folktale.

With regard to transmission, Vansina suggests that folklore forms are determined by function, and that these forms each determine their own transmission process.¹²⁸ Mead outlines the

¹²⁰ Åke Hultkranz, *General Ethnological Concepts* (Copenhagen, 1960), p. 138.

¹²¹ Andrew Lang, "Preface to Folklore Record." In: *Folk-lore Record*, Vol. 2 (1879), vii.

¹²² Thompson, *The Folktale*, p. 10.

¹²³ Richard M. Dorson, *American Folklore* (Chicago, 1959) pp. 158-189.

¹²⁴ Richard M. Dorson, *Buying the Wind* (Chicago, 1964), p. 4.

¹²⁵ Rank, *Der Mythos von der Geburt des Helden* (Leipzig, 1909); and Rank, *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero and other Essays*, pp. 3-96.

¹²⁶ Vladimir Propp, *Morphology of the Folktale*, ed. Svantava P. Jakobson, trans. Lawrence Scott (Bloomington, Ind., 1958)

¹²⁷ ⁽²⁷⁰⁾ Lord Raglan, "The Hero of Tradition." In: *Folklore*, Vol. 45 (1934), 212-231; and *The Hero: A Study of Tradition, Myth and Drama* (New York, 1956, first published in 1936), pp. 173-204.

¹²⁸ Vansina, *Oral Tradition*, pp. 79, 200.

influences exerted by internal elements of form and content, as opposed to those exerted by the external form of society:

... the social structure of a society and the way learning is structured - the way it passes from mother to daughter, from father to son, from mother's brother to sister's son, from shaman to novice, from mythological specialist to aspirant specialist - determine far beyond the actual content of the ⁽³²⁾learning both how individuals will learn to think and how the store of learning, the sum total of separate pieces of skill and knowledge which could be obtained by separately interviewing each member of the society, is shared and used.¹²⁹

Thus a joke, a tale, a song, a proverb, or a belief exists in a definable basic form characteristic to its genre. The knowledge of this characteristic form and content must be a part of the individual's perception (covertly comprehended) before he can transmit it to another person. The folkloric knowledge of the characteristic values, forms, and content of these genres must exist as "artifacts," and "mentifacts" or "socifacts"¹³⁰ before the individual can learn these folklore items through transmission. After all, we cannot transmit what does not exist, nor what we do not know; to tell a story, one must first know the plot; to sing a song, one must know the words; and to apply a proverb to a situation, one must know its meaning and wording.

2. The Capacity to Teach: In the context of folklore, the "capacity to teach" is the capacity to communicate folkloric knowledge in its *traditional forms* to others. However, the verb "to teach" is somewhat ambiguous, especially when applied to culture. Herskovits assigns three basic components to the process of enculturation: "socialization," "education," and "schooling."¹³¹ The latter, "schooling," refers to "... those processes of teaching and learning carried out at specific times, in particular places outside the home for definite periods by persons especially prepared or trained for the task."¹³¹ "Education," on the other hand, is a direct learning process and can occur both formally and in formally. The elements of teaching and learning are present in all three processes. Nevertheless, teaching understood in the conventional sense to mean instructing with the

¹²⁹ Mead, *Continuities in Cultural Evolution*, p. 79.

¹³⁰ Bidney has proposed the classification of cultural products into three types: "artifacts," "mentifacts," and "socifacts," these cultural facts constituting "the material, formal, and final causes of cultural development." Bidney, *Theoretical Anthropology* (see p. 33). Julian Huxley, "Evolution, Cultural and Biological." In: *Current Anthropology*, ed. William L. Thomas Jr. (Chicago, 1956), (see p. 9); Mead also accepted Bidney's terms, Mead, *Continuities in Cultural Evolution* (see p. 37).

¹³¹ Herskovits, *Man and His Works*, p. 310.

intention of transferring knowledge or skills to a recipient, is not necessarily part of folklore transmission, for intentional teaching is not always a factor in the process of *everyday folkloric activities*. Exceptions are cases of coaching and apprenticeship among professional minstrels and narrators,¹³² and the performers of rituals and highly institutionalized activities.¹³³

Whether or not there is a conscious intention to teach, knowledge of the material is necessary if it is to be communicated to others, and the process of transmission occurs only when the student incorporates the communicated knowledge into his own folklore repertoire. Thus, "teaching" and "learning" are interdependent, the learning occurring as a result of reaching while the teaching can occur without necessarily producing learning. In other words, to be a performer of folklore one must have already learned the material from another person. On the other hand, one's performance before an audience may "teach" none, some, or ⁽³⁴⁾ all of one's knowledge to the spectators.

3. The Capacity to Learn: This capacity is the determining factor in cultural continuity; without it transmission would not occur and folkloric material would die with the generation which possessed knowledge of it. The complicated process of learning has several forms, depending upon the nature of the material "learned," the method used in "teaching," or communicating, and the conditions under which transmission takes place.

Conclusion

As we have seen, social and cultural anthropologists have been partially successful in their application of learning theories to such problems of culture as cultural phenomena, cultural mechanisms, and the dynamics of culture. Folklorists, on the other hand, despite an early awareness of the influence of learning on *stability* and change in folklore, have not utilized learning principles, and consequently, their studies have derived minimal benefit from advances made in learning theory. Over the past fifty-five years, folklorists have attempted to devise their own laws of stability and change in folklore tradition, employing fragments of learning ⁽³⁵⁾ concepts developed through common sense or isolated empirical facts (such as the "law of repetition") and a terminology unrelated to learning theory designations (such as "affinity" and the "law of attraction"). Moreover, folklorists have established a *negative* tradition of folklore scholarship. Considering only problems

¹³² See Lord, "Singer: Performance and Training." In: *The Singer of Tales*, pp. 13-29; and Eberhard, *Minstrel Tales from Southeastern Turkey*, pp. 5-11.

¹³³ See Mead, "Border Lines Between Learning and Teaching," in her *Continuities in Cultural Evolution*, pp. 107-141; and Merriam, "Learning." In: *The Anthropology of Music*, pp. 145-163.

of change in folk tradition, rather than pursuing the original positive studies initiated by Anderson and Aarne, they have left questions of stability and continuity unanswered.

CHAPTER II

LEARNING

Although the meaning of the word "learning" seems clear enough, psychologists have noted that a precise comprehensive definition of it is difficult to achieve. A great many definitions have been proposed, but only a few are acceptable to all learning theorists; L. Postman wrote,

... there is little disagreement among learning theorists about the classification of experimental facts as instances of learning. The disagreements center around the necessary and sufficient conditions of learning and interpretation of learning process ... The fact that the definition of learning has not been a major theoretical issue reflects a considerable amount of agreement on the *empirical* independent and dependent variables that define an experiment on learning.¹³⁴

E.R. Hilgard concluded: "The controversy is over fact and interpretation, not over definition."¹³⁵

Independent and Dependent Variables

In experimental psychology, "variables" are defined as "Characteristics that can vary from one situation to another,"¹³⁶ and are divided into two major types: dependent and independent. A *dependent variable* is "... one about which we make a prediction,"¹³⁷ and it "... changes in response to change in other [independent] variables."¹³⁸ An *independent variable* is "... one we use to {37} make the prediction,"¹³⁹ and one "... whose changes are used to produce or predict changes in other

¹³⁴ (271) Leo Postman, "Perception and Learning." In: *Psychology: A Study of a Science*, Vol. 5: *The Process Areas, the Person, and Some Applied Fields: Their Place in Psychology and in Science*, ed. Sigmund Koch (New York, 1963), p. 4; and Winfred F. Hill, *Learning: A Study of Psychological Interpretations* (San Francisco, 1963), p. 1.

¹³⁵ Ernest R. Hilgard, *Theories of Learning* (New York, 1956), p. 6.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 227.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 227.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

[dependent] variables."¹⁴⁰

Thus, when a folklorist attempts to establish principles of stability and change in oral transmission through experimentation each of the texts utilized in the experiment can be an independent variable and the responses made by his subjects the dependent variables. Had Bartlett, Anderson, Wesselski, Ortutay, and Schier varied their texts (i.e., "The War of Ghosts," used by Bartlett;¹⁴¹ "the very best poem by Gellert or Hagendorn," suggested for Schlegel's hypothetical experiment;¹⁴² "Dornröschen" [(Sleeping Beauty)], used by Wesselski;¹⁴³ and "Teufel als Mädchen" [(Devil as Maiden)] used by Anderson,¹⁴⁴ Ortutay,¹⁴⁵ and Schier¹⁴⁶) each text would have been an independent variable among the "conditions" of these experiments. Unfortunately, these men did not change their texts from one experiment to another. The results they obtained are all dependent variables.

Other independent variables in folklore which should have been treated individually in these demonstration experiments can be accounted for in references to "good" or "bad" conditions. Thus Anderson's statements, "the fundamental errors of the Bartlett experiment"¹⁴⁷ and "the stipulations of the experiment were more acute,"¹⁴⁸ and Schier's "improvements" to avoid Anderson's "five most serious sources of error"¹⁴⁹ are all references to factors which influenced the results⁽³⁸⁾ of the experiments and are recognized by experimental psychologists as independent variables.

Variables in Experimental Folklore Scholarship

Altogether folklorists and psychologist Bartlett have conducted six different demonstration

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 227.

¹⁴¹ Bartlett, "Some Experiments."

¹⁴² Quoted by Wesselski, *Versuch einer Theorie*, p. 127.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴ Anderson, "Ein Volkskundliches Experiment."

¹⁴⁵ Anderson, "Eine Neue Arbeit."

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷ Anderson, "Ein Volkskundliches Experiment," p. 5.

¹⁴⁸ Anderson is referring to the conditions (independent variables) of his Dorpat experiment. "Eine Neue Arbeit," (see p. 6).

¹⁴⁹ The improvements were quoted by Anderson, *Ibid.* (see p. 13).

experiments in which the basic issues treated as independent variables were: the structure, length, and impressiveness of the material; the social and cultural conditions of the subjects; the age of the subjects; the time lapse between the recitation of the material and its reproduction by the subjects; and the media used in the transmission of the material to and from the subjects.

1. **Structure:** Structure was one of the presumed "independent variables" of Anderson's 1951 demonstration experiment. Anderson recognized the relevance of the structure to the process of learning and remembering: "for text[,] a ... simple ... legend was selected."¹⁵⁰

2. **Length:** Length was another presumed "independent variable" in the Anderson experiment of 1951. He perceived the importance of this secondary structural feature to the process of learning and retention and wrote, "for text[,] a ... simple ... legend was selected."¹⁵¹

3. **Impressiveness:** The impressiveness of the tale was a third presumed "independent variable" in Anderson's 1951 ⁽³⁹⁾ demonstration experiment. Anderson noted that this relative psychological factor, differing from one culture to another, was important to the process of learning and retention, and stated that the "legend" was "very impressive."¹⁵²

4. **Subjects:** The social and cultural conditions of the subjects was one of the presumed "independent variables" of Bartlett's demonstration experiment. This demonstration experiment was designed to establish the influence of social and cultural factors on the reproduction of a "... story ... [which] belonged to a level of culture and social environment exceedingly different from those of ... [the] subjects."¹⁵³ Wesselski, Anderson, Ortutay, and Schier chose their "independent variables" on basis differing from Bartlett's.

5. **Age:** Age of the subjects was a presumed "independent variable" of Anderson's 1951 demonstration experiment. He observed that neither Wesselski's nor Schier's subjects were selected according to Von Sydow's view that "... one should have strictly distinguished between active and passive bearers of traditions!"¹⁵⁴ Dundes agreed with Anderson's criticism, stating "Most children

¹⁵⁰ Anderson, "Ein Volkskundliches Experiment," p. 6.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁵² (272) *Ibid.*

¹⁵³ Bartlett, *Remembering*, p. 63.

¹⁵⁴ Quoted by Anderson, "Eine Neue Arbeit," p. 14.

are strictly passive bearers as far as *Märchen* are concerned."¹⁵⁵

6. **Span of time:** Span of time, or "recency" was one of the presumed "independent variables" in both Bartlett's 1920 demonstration experiments and Anderson's 1951 demonstration⁽⁴⁰⁾ experiment. In comparing the 1951 experiment in Kiel with the 1920's experiments in Dorpat, Anderson wrote: "the time between listening and writing down was always only 24 hours (whereas in the Dorpat experiment always 3 days ...)." He found that the dependent variable (the result), was very different, for "... the occurring changes still were starker."¹⁵⁶

Dundes also recognizes the importance of this "independent variable" in the transmission of folklore material: "The time element in particular is critical. Bartlett's subjects had a half-hour interval between receiving and transmitting; Anderson's interval was one day."¹⁵⁷

7. **Media:** The media used to transmit the material to and from the subjects was an "independent variable" in Schier's demonstration experiment of 1955. Schier felt that one of the "five most serious sources of error" in Anderson's experiment was that "The oral rendition is imparted through writing-fixty."¹⁵⁸ Similarly, Dundes states, "Even non-folklorists know that there is a great difference between the conventions of writing and speaking. One does not write as one speaks, nor does one speak as one writes. Bartlett made quite a point of the amount of rationalization that was added to the test material ... Had the subjects reproduced the tale orally, there may or may not have been the same amount of rationalization."¹⁵⁹

Had these experiments been conducted according to the psychological criteria for experimentation, all of the⁽⁴¹⁾ so-called "factors" would have actually been independent variables and the "results" dependent variables.

Definition of Learning

Learning is conceptualized as a "... *change in performance which occurs under the conditions of practice*."¹⁶⁰ In 1945 Hilgard proposed a more detailed definition, describing learning as "... a

¹⁵⁵ Dundes, *The Study of Folklore*, p. 246.

¹⁵⁶ Anderson, "Ein Volkskundliches Experiment," p. 7.

¹⁵⁷ Dundes, *The Study of Folklore*, p. 245.

¹⁵⁸ Quoted by Anderson, in his "Eine Neue Arbeit," p. 12.

¹⁵⁹ Dundes, *The Study of Folklore*, p. 244.

¹⁶⁰ John A. McGeech and Arthur L. Irion, *The Psychology of Human Learning* (New York, 1961), p. 5.

process by which an activity originates or is changed through training procedures (whether in laboratory or in the natural environment) as distinguished from changes by factors not attributable to training."¹⁶¹ In 1963, Postman verified Hilgard's 1945 interpretation, stating that "... few investigators are likely to object to the definition offered by Hilgard."¹⁶² This general agreement is possible because "learning" has been very loosely defined by theorists. Hill observed that "... psychologists use the term 'learning' more broadly than it is used in popular speech," adding, "we can at least note certain phenomena to which the term is or is not applied."¹⁶³ Miller and Dollard state that "Learning" is relevant to phenomena which "... range all the way from the simple, almost reflex, learning of a child to avoid a hot radiator to the complex processes of insight by which a scientist constructs a theory."¹⁶⁴

Hill outlines the vast field of learned behavior: "In psychological usage, what is learned need not be 'correct' ⁽⁴²⁾ or adaptive (we learn bad habits as well as good); need not be conscious or deliberate." Sometimes we consciously try to learn and practice folklore activities, as in the case of apprenticeship (see *post*, page 84), while on other occasions we realize that we can recollect a legend, joke, or proverb heard casually some time earlier, or that we can still perform a game, dance, or rites previously witnessed or practiced. We also "... need not involve any overt act (attitudes and emotions [i.e., affect] can be learned as well as knowledge and skills)," in our attitudes towards certain folklore activities. For example, male members of the Egyptian community in Brooklyn, New York have traditionally respected folk-singing performances and belittled *hawadît* (*Märchen*) performances; revered Moslem saints like el-Sayyid el-Badawî (in Tanta, Egypt), and Abu-ed-Derdâr (in Alexandria) and doubted Christian saints; hated "villainy" and admired "heroism;" feared ghosts, *afarît* and *jinn*; were intolerant of obscenity within the family circle. Skilled knowledge of folkloric activities can involve a wide range of pursuits: folk

¹⁶¹ Hilgard, *Theories of Learning* (1948), p. 4. Hilgard rephrased his definition in 1956; stressing the negative aspects of learning which are absent in his 1948 definition: "Learning is the process by which an activity originates or is changed through reacting to an encountered situation, provided that the characteristics of the change in activity cannot be explained on the basis of native response tendencies, maturation, or temporary states of the organism (e.g., fatigue, drugs, etc.)." *Theories of Learning* (1956), (see p. 31). The majority of definitions of learning in James Drever's *A Dictionary of Psychology* (Baltimore, Md., 1964), place emphasis on "practice," "training," "experience," or other terms denoting the behavior as acquired rather than as an innate propensity, (see pp. 154-155).

¹⁶² Postman, "Perception and Learning," p. 54.

¹⁶³ Hill, *Learning*, p. 1.

¹⁶⁴ Miller and Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation*, p. 13.

medicine and the efficacy of various saints in particular situations; the events of a folktale or sequence of verses in a folksong; the dramatic elements of a successful performance (evoking audience participation, accenting certain parts, dramatic pauses); performing a physical activity, such as a folk dance or folk game; manufacturing a folk artifact, such as a basket, musical instrument or earthenware item. "Reactions ⁽⁴³⁾ as diverse as driving a car" or playing a folk game; "remembering a pleasant vacation" or a pleasant tale-telling session; "believing in democracy" or in the existence of ghosts, *jinn* and *`afarît*, and "disliking one's boss," or a boring minstrel, "all present the results of learning."¹⁶⁵

Miller and Dollard concluded that with reference to learning, "Throughout the whole range ... the same fundamental factors seem to be involved, ... These factors are: *drive*, *response*, *cue* and *reward*."¹⁶⁶ Most learning theories include two¹⁶⁷ or more of these basic factors, with stress on a particular element or relationship between elements as the fundamental operant in the learning process.¹⁶⁸

Causes of Behavior

Studies in learning psychology commonly employ three terms to denote causes of behavior: stimulus, drive, and motivation. Although these terms may appear to be synonyms, they are not interchangeable; over the past fifty years their meanings have altered so greatly that today each represents a particular aspect of behavior.

Stimulus, Drive, Motivation

A *stimulus* is "Any energy change which excites a receptor,"¹⁶⁹ or, more simply, "... *anything a*

¹⁶⁵ Hill, *Learning*, p. 1.

¹⁶⁶ Miller and Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation*, p. 13.

¹⁶⁷ For example, contiguity theorists, such as Watson and Guthrie, attribute learning to stimulus-response relationship, ignoring the role of reward. For Watson and Guthrie, "... learning is assumed to depend only on contiguity of stimulus and response, in other words, on the fact that they occur together." Hill, *Learning* (see p. 55).

¹⁶⁸ [273] "Whereas Skinner makes the concept of reinforcement central to his interpretation of learning, Miller does the same with drive." *Ibid.* (see p. 80).

¹⁶⁹ Drever, *A Dictionary of Psychology*, p. 283. Similar definitions of 'stimulus' are offered by Hill: "any sensation, significant in that it elicits or controls a response," *Learning* (see p. 226); Miller and Dollard: "Any event to which a response can be connected," *Social Learning and Imitation* (see p. 59).

person can receive through one of his senses,"¹⁷⁰ while a *drive* is "an aroused state of an organism, which motivates action."¹⁷¹ A drive can be an extended stimulus, for any stimulus may become strong enough to act as a drive. While a stimulus is ^{44} simply a state of excitement or arousal a drive is positively compelling. Miller and Dollard define drive as "... a strong stimulus which impels action,"¹⁷² and Kimball Young states that "... a drive is a strong stimulus resulting from disequilibrium in the organism which impels it to respond and react."¹⁷³ In folkloric behavior, when a person observes "I *feel* like singing (telling a joke, or dancing)," he is reacting to a particular stimulus, and when this "feeling like" turns into the actual singing, telling the joke, or dancing, he is responding to a drive.

The term *motivation* is "exceedingly broad," and its study being "... a search for the determinants (all determinants) of human and animal activity."¹⁷⁴ However, the functional aspect of motivation (stimulus, drive, need) causes "deprivation," "restlessness,"¹⁷⁵ and a general state of "disequilibrium."¹⁷⁶

Social and Biological Motivation

Following the Hullian learning theory Miller and Dollard distinguish between two classes of motivation: primary or innate, and secondary or acquired.

First: "While any stimulus may become strong enough to act as a drive, certain special classes of stimuli seem to be the primary basis for the greater proportion of motivation. These might be called the primary or innate drives. One of these is pain."¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁰ David K. Berlo, *The Process of Communication* (New York, 1961), pp. 74-75.

¹⁷¹ Hill, *Learning*, p. 222.

¹⁷² Miller and Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation*, p. 14.

¹⁷³ K. Young, *Social Psychology*, p. 38.

¹⁷⁴ Paul T. Young, *Motivation and Emotion* (New York, 1961), p. 24.

¹⁷⁵ Charles N. Cofer and Mortimer H. Appley state that these fundamental, operational elements are "conceived as resulting in deficits (as in hunger) or in excess (as in sex) which provided stimulus that goaded the organism into activity." *Motivation: Theory and Research* (New York, 1964), (see p. 514).

¹⁷⁶ Young, *Social Psychology*, p. 38.

¹⁷⁷ Miller and Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation*, p. 18.

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Second: Man, being "active, purposeful, predictive, and capable of controlling his responses,"¹⁷⁸ does not satisfy his primary needs as they originally appear, but transforms them through "acquired" (cultural and social) factors into needs which are acceptable and satisfiable in the context of his society. Thus he does not grab the first woman he sees to satisfy his sex drive, nor does he urinate wherever he may happen to be, the moment he feels the drive to relieve his bladder. Each and every primary drive is altered and practiced within the confines of cultural and social institutions. Thus, Miller and Dollard write:

The importance of the innate drives is further obscured by social inhibitions. [...] The conditions of society tend, besides obscuring the role of primary drives, to emphasize certain secondary or acquired drives. These secondary drives are acquired on the basis of the primary drives, represent elaborations of them, and serve as a facade behind which the functions of the underlying innate drives are hidden. [...]

Such terms as pride, ambition, and rivalry point to another powerful core of acquired drives. These are probably related to the desire for approval, but are somewhat more generalized and have crystallized into the desire for institutionalized symbols of approval somewhat analogous in function to money.¹⁷⁹

Similarly, in her article "Are Basic Needs Ultimate?" Dorothy Lee writes:

I believe it is value, not a series of needs, which is at the *basis* of human behavior. In my opinion ..., the motivation underlying Hopi behavior is *value*. To the Hopi, there is value in acting as a Hopi within a Hopi situation; there is satisfaction in the situation itself ...¹⁸⁰

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Early psychologists attempted to ascertain the power of the drive-force exerted by social and cultural situations on the individual under particular social and cultural circumstances (cues).

In 1941 Miller and Dollard suggested as *probable* the concept that social and cultural situations possess a drive-force similar to that of their underlying primary drives. This proposal has since become accepted as fact, and in 1954 J.B. Rotter presented a psychological theory which classified social learning according to "six major needs": "recognition-status,

¹⁷⁸ K. Young, *Social Psychology*, p. 47.

¹⁷⁹ Miller and Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation*, pp. 19-20.

¹⁸⁰ Dorothy Lee, "Are Basic Needs Ultimate?" In: *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 43 (1948), 392-393.

protection-dependency, dominance, independence, love-affection, and physical comfort."¹⁸¹ Of Rotter's six major needs, only one--physical comfort--is purely innate, the other five being basically social and cultural. Later, M. Horwitz demonstrated that some "needs" are generated by the social environment, and reported a number of experiments proving that the social situation is capable of creating drive-states.¹⁸² According to Cofer and Appley, Horwitz maintains that such social situations possess "... motives as paralleling, for the social or psychological case, such physiological motives or drives as hunger and thirst."¹⁸³ L. Festinger states that "Just as hunger is motivating, cognitive dissonance is motivating. Cognitive dissonance will give rise to activity oriented to reducing or eliminating the dissonance. Successful reduction of dissonance is rewarding in the same sense that eating when one is hungry is (46) rewarding."¹⁸⁴ Muzafer Sherif proposed a classification for "social stimulus situations" using "... 'stimulus situation' as a generic term for factors which at a given time are external to the individual, the skin being the usual limit for externality."¹⁸⁵ As Sherif suggested, "The conception of stimulus situations that has functional significance in social psychology deals with objects and situations in their contextual relationship."¹⁸⁶ Thus, "The individual experiences and reacts to social objects, persons, groups, cultural items (furniture, tools, words, music, and so on) in terms of meaningful relations prevailing in the characteristic patterning of these stimulus agents."¹⁸⁷ This concept is not new to students of

¹⁸¹ [274] J.B. Rotter, *Social Learning and Clinical Psychology* (New York, 1954), p. 132. In *Theories of Learning*, Hilgard remarked that Rotter's theory is regarded as having "... a rather different flavor from the familiar ones, because of its social ... reference" and that it "... brings new comers to learning theory." *Theories of Learning*, (see p. 451).

¹⁸² M. Horwitz, "Psychological Needs as a Function of Social Environments." In: *The State of the Social Sciences*, ed. L.D. White (Chicago, 1956), pp. 162-183.

¹⁸³ Cofer and Appley, *Motivation*, p. 781.

¹⁸⁴ L. Festinger, "The Motivating Effect of Cognitive Dissonance." In: *Assessment of Human Motives*, ed. G. Lindzey (New York, 1958), p. 70. In an earlier work, Festinger proposes that cognitive dissonance is, or gives rise to a motivational state of tension. See, L. Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Evanston, Ill., 1957).

¹⁸⁵ M. Sherif, "Social Psychology: Problems and Trends." In: *Psychology: A Study of a Science, Vol. 6: Investigation of Man as Socius: Their Place in Psychology and Social Sciences*, ed. S. Koch (New York, 1963), p. 34.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

¹⁸⁷ Sherif, "Social Psychology," p. 35. "Following the above cultural rationale," Sherif proposes to "... divide the varieties of social-stimulus situations in the following general categories." 1. Other people (a

culture, Malinowski having introduced it as "functionalism" two decades earlier (see *post*, page 36).

Finally, Cofer and Appley concluded their study on acquired motives with the summation:

The hypotheses and findings we reviewed ... were developed to a large extent in the context of drive theory. This is to say that learned motive states, such as fear and anxiety, aggression, and dependency, have been conceived as logically equivalent in status, character, and function to such drives as hunger and thirst.¹⁸⁸

Social Motivation in Marxist Psychology

At the time social motivation was slowly gaining recognition among social scientists in America, it had already become popular in Europe.¹⁸⁹ It was particularly attractive to the Marxist social scientist who "... conceives⁽⁴⁸⁾ of the individual as a product of institutions, whereas the Freudian scheme considers institutions to be the product of individuals." As a general rule, "The Marxist locates sources of motives in the social structure rather than the individual."¹⁹⁰ Thus, the origins of folklore are to be found in social and cultural motivation rather than in individual psychological mechanisms and organic factors. A.R. Lindesmith and A.L. Strauss partly agreed with the Marxist view of social motivation, stating that "There is a certain amount of significance and truth in the idea that [social and cultural conditions] ... are important sources of motivation."¹⁹¹ They conclude: "The Marxist theory is much too one-sided,"¹⁹² because it discards all individual psychological

individuals, b. groups, c. collective interaction) 2. cultural products: products of human interaction in the past or present: (a. material culture, b. Nonmaterial culture). Sherif, "Social Psychology," (see p. 37).

¹⁸⁸ Cofer and Appley, *Motivation*, p. 768.

¹⁸⁹ Alfred R. Lindesmith and Anselm L. Strauss state, "Most American social psychologists pay scant attention to it [motivation in Marxism], although in some of the other social sciences - political science for example - it is more influential. European social scientists give considerable attention to it, and, of course, in Communist countries Marxist ideas of motivation are dominant." See their *Social Psychology* (New York, 1956), p. 295

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.* They also observed, "Soviet writers are generally contemptuous of psychologies which place the main-spring of human behavior in the individual organism." *Ibid.*, (see p. 296).

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 297.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*

factors, and the "Freudian conception of motivation, which emphasizes unconscious wishes and desires, has serious weaknesses arising mainly from the fact that no theory about the content of the 'unconscious' can be proved because the unconscious is, by definition, virtually unknown."¹⁹³ As a rule, "... gross organic needs ordinarily do not lead to anything but random or restless behavior, and ... merely prepare the organism to respond when an appropriate situation appears and thus to learn rapidly."¹⁹⁴

The theory of social drive is quite significant for the study of folklore. Assessing "National Folklore Theories," Dorson states that in Russia, ⁽⁴⁹⁾ "The association of folk tradition with the theme of social protest is not to be shrugged off as simply propaganda." The importance of social motivation is also reflected in American folklore; "Although labor folklore has received little attention in the United States, the pioneering collections ... reveal clearly enough bitter resentment against harsh working conditions and selfish employers."¹⁹⁵

Malinowski's Need, Drive, and Function

Although psychological terms for motivation were not used in folklore studies, Malinowski's influence brought such concepts as the "derivation of cultural needs," "basic needs and cultural responses," and "the nature of derived needs" into usage among anthropologists and folklorists. It should be noted that Malinowski used the terms "need"¹⁹⁶ and "drive" synonymously. Under direct influence from Miller¹⁹⁷--an exponent of Hull's learning theory--Malinowski developed his theory of needs. It states that there are basic, organic needs which create a state of distress within the

¹⁹³ [275] *Ibid.*, p. 310.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 303.

¹⁹⁵ Dorson, "Current Folklore Theories," p. 99. Similarly, scientists of the social system and social structure recognize the role of both "psychological motivation" and "social motivation," as a direct influence of learning theory on the process of "socialization." Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (New York, 1964), (see pp. 201-207).

¹⁹⁶ "Need" as defined by Malinowski is "... the system of conditions in the human organism, in the cultural setting, and in the relation of both to the natural environment, which are sufficient and necessary for the survival of group and organism." *A Scientific Theory of Culture* (New York, 1960), (see p. 90).

¹⁹⁷ In the study of "Behaviorism in *Psychological Anthropology*," Robert A. LeVine writes: "From the viewpoint of the history of anthropology, the most interesting student at Yale ... was Bronislaw Malinowski ... He came to Yale in 1939 and attended a course given by Neal Miller on learning theory for non-psychologists." *Concepts of Personality*, eds. Joseph M. Wepman and Ralph W. Heine (Chicago, 1963), (see p. 364).

organism. The organism must react to reduce the need, eliminate the drive, and restore a state of equilibrium. According to the stimulus-response formula, "Habits ..., learned responses and the foundation, of organization ..., [are developed] to allow the basic need to be satisfied."¹⁹⁸ According to Bidney, ⁽⁵⁰⁾"Malinowski reinterpreted the concept of origin so that to eliminate entirely any association with temporal historical sequences."¹⁹⁹ Ralph Piddington, appraising this theory, states, "The specific contribution of the theory of needs, is that it emphasizes, at all levels, the biological determinants of cultural activities and so provides a principle of analysis and comparison of universal validity."²⁰⁰ This emphasis on biological determinism led to the interpretation of social and cultural institutions as extensions of primary, biological needs, and consequently the drive-force of primary needs was attributed to social and cultural needs. Thus Malinowski writes:

Thus the origins of science, religion and magic are not to be found in some single idea, corporate belief, or particular superstition; nor yet, in a specific act of an individual or a group. By origins we mean the conditions, primeval and enduring, which determine the occurrence of culturally established response, the conditions which, limited by scientific determinism, define the nature of an act, device, custom and institution. We mean the establishment of the primary biological need for such organized activities as the search for or production of food, the organization of mating and marriage, the building of houses, the production of clothing ...

The search for origins thus becomes really an analysis of cultural phenomena in relation, on the one hand, to man's endowments, and on the other, to his relationship to the environment.²⁰¹

For Malinowski, "origin" is an analysis of biological and geographic needs (drives) and conditions, and the ⁽⁵¹⁾ devices (responses) for their satisfaction: social and cultural institutions and conditions. The function of these devices is *de facto* origin, for the original function and present function of an artifact are the same, time having no influence on function. Timeless biological conditions are the only factors necessary to the invention (origin) of a social or cultural item: it is universal motivations or primary drives that produce the cultural responses.

¹⁹⁸ Malinowski, *A Scientific Theory of Culture*, p. 90.

¹⁹⁹ Bidney, *Theoretical Anthropology*, p. 224.

²⁰⁰ Ralph Piddington, "Malinowski's Theory of Needs." In: *Man and Culture: An Evaluation of the Works of Bronislaw Malinowski*, ed. Raymond Firth (London, 1960), p. 38.

²⁰¹ Malinowski, *A Scientific Theory of Culture*, pp. 202-203.

Since function and origin are one and the same, and origin and needs are collateral, motivation and function are inseparable. In a sense, functions *denote* drives as much as drives *determine* functions: this was the basic concept upon which Malinowski formulated his ethnological theory. His primary concern was the integration of parts in a culture. In his examination of Melanesian Culture, Malinowski attempted to show how deeply fairy tales, legends, sacred traditions and myths affected native life, controlling the individual's moral and social behavior. In *Argonauts of the Western Pacific* (1922), *Myth in Primitive Psychology* (1926), and *Sex and Repression in Savage Society* (1927), Malinowski presents his thesis and his collected evidence of the meaning and function, thus establishing the origins of various folklore genres. ⁽⁵²⁾ Malinowski noted that the native distinguishes between types of narratives, the time of year when they are told, and their use. There are the *libogowo*, which "we would call tradition;" the *kukwanebu*, or "fairy tales," recited for amusement at specific seasons; the *wosi* or "various songs;" the *vinavina*, or "ditties chanted at play or under other special circumstances;" "the *negwa* or *yopa*, importing 'the magical spells;" and the *lili'u*, depicting "myth narratives deeply believed."²⁰² Natives perceive these narrative forms in terms of needs (or drives), social, cultural and geographical conditions (cues), and functions (reward, or the reduction of the drive through satisfaction of need).

Malinowski's theory of primary and secondary drives has repeatedly been attacked.²⁰³ However, it should be pointed out that, despite his oversimplification, the theoretical core of his thesis is, generally, regarded as valid. Anthropologists and sociologists agree with Malinowski's historical assumption. Concerning the early stages of human motivation, Talcott Parsons states: "There is no reason to doubt that the motivation of all secondary drives or derived needs goes back in the genetic history of the individual to the satisfaction of primary drives."²⁰⁴ Parsons maintains, however, that "... in mature individuals the 'ultimate' motive for any specific act of learned behaviour must be the ⁽⁵³⁾ continuing satisfaction of a specific primary drive is certainly not an established psychological doctrine."²⁰⁵ Although Malinowski attributed all social and cultural behavior to biological primary drives, he was unaware--(nor was Parsons; cf. *ante*, page 39, n. 62)--of the position of contemporary psychologists who maintain that social and cultural situations,

²⁰² Malinowski, *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*, pp. 299-300.

²⁰³ Parsons points out that "... even on the basis of learning psychology alone, Malinowski takes up only the one idea of instrumental learning and altogether ignores the possible significance of contiguity learning and classical conditioning," Parsons, "Malinowski and the Theory of Social Systems," (see p. 88).

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

per se, possess a drive-force equal to that of a primary drive. While Malinowski's hypothesis that social and cultural institutions were established to satisfy "primary drives" has not been fully accepted, his concept of the social and cultural drives, *per se*, has been incorporated into the present psychological view: Social and cultural institutions *do* possess a drive-force equal to that of primary drives.

Folklorists and cultural and social anthropologists alike have adopted Malinowski's principle of functionalism, without necessarily accepting his biological interpretation. In psychological terms, "function" designates a complex operation with a fixed sequence of collateral phases. In contrast to a "survival,"²⁰⁶ a "functional" element implies a need which gives rise to a drive requiring satisfaction through a particular cultural or social device. Lee stresses the occurrence of behavior as a reaction to the state of deprivation and restlessness which accompanies a need; she writes, "I use the term *need* in a broad sense, to cover the ^[54] stimulus-response phrasing of behavior."²⁰⁷ Thus "functionalism" simply designates the instrumentality of a certain item in reducing a drive through satisfying a particular need. In application, functionally oriented folklore studies are those which attempt to ascertain the motivations behind folkloric activities.

Motivation and Folkloric Behavior

In folklore studies, motivation must be divided according to its function [on the individual bearer of tradition] into two classes: the informant's motivation, and the operant's motivation. [These may be briefly described as the forces which motivate a person to act as informant to a collector, and the forces which motivate a person to live according to the community's traditions, i.e., emit folkloric

²⁰⁶ [276] The term "survival" was introduced by Edward Tylor in *Primitive Culture* (1871). He applied it to "... that great class of facts of processes, customs, opinions, and so forth which have been carried on by force of habit into a new state of society different from that in which they had their original home." *The Origins of Culture* (New York, 1958), (see p. 16). Thus a survival exists on the principle of "force of habit" rather than on its function. Tylor's concept of survival influenced folklore scholarship to the extent that Andrew Lang defined "folklore" as "... the study of survivals." *Folklore Record*, Vol. 2 (1879), (see p. vii). Malinowski, on the other hand, postulated that survivals in the sense of functionless "cultural fossils" does not exist. "The real harm done by the concept of survival in anthropology consists in that it functions on the one hand as a spurious methodological device in the reconstruction of evolutionary series; and worse than that, it is an effective means of short-circuiting observation in field-work." Malinowski, *A Scientific Theory of Culture* (see p. 29).

²⁰⁷ Lee, "Are Basic Needs Ultimate?" p. 391.

behavior].

(1) The Informant's Motivation

Most of the research on motivational factors in folklore studies has dealt with the problem of stimulating informants to yield their folkloric knowledge. Some folklorists feel that stumbling onto a motivated, willing informant is "... very much a matter of timing, chance, and circumstances,"²⁰⁸ while others believe that finding the proper informants is a matter of planning, motivating and responding. Whatever the folklorist's orientation, he will find, even in a case of "transient collecting,"²⁰⁹ that the informant is motivated by external factors (other than the collector himself).

A motivational factor can be personal psychological gratification, as Sean O'Sullivan remarked in his observation ⁽⁵⁵⁾ that "The country people seem to realize instinctively that we (folklorists) are doing something important for them."²¹⁰ Similarly, Dorson noted that "illiterate old Trefflé Largenese sat idly on a porch fronting the main street in town, bursting with contes and hungry for visitors."²¹¹

Monetary payments have been used as incentives to elicit cooperation, Vansina recognizes the difference between drives exerted by genuine, communal social and cultural forces and artificial stimuli created by the collector. Alteration of traditions which may occur "... so that the tradition should fulfil its social function are usually unintentional,"²¹² and thus are significant to our assessment of the actual value of the item in the society.

Drives created by payment can lead to intentional distortion because of the informant's expectancy of reward and his eagerness to tell the collector material which will net him the greatest reward. To combat this tendency, Vansina cautions: "... the amount paid must be reckoned according to the number of hours ... and never according to the quality;"²¹³ and *Notes Queries on*

²⁰⁸ Richard M. Dorson, *Bloodstoppers and Bearwalkers: Folk Traditions of the Upper Peninsula* (Cambridge, Mass., 1952).

²⁰⁹ The term is used by Kenneth Goldstein, in his work *A Guide for Fieldworkers in Folklore*, p. 160.

²¹⁰ Sean O'Sullivan, *Four Symposia on Folklore, Indiana University Folklore Series*, No. 8, ed. Stith Thompson (Bloomington, Ind., 1953), p. 14.

²¹¹ Dorson, *Buying the Wind*, p. 11.

²¹² Vansina, *Oral Tradition*, p. 79.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 200.

Anthropology,²¹⁴ and Piddington²¹⁵ offer the same advice.

A gift or non-material aid can present similar obstacles to collecting authentic information as a monetary payment. George Pullen Jackson stated that "collectors and people who want to give something have often to be very sly ^[55] about it," and he himself has resorted to such schemes as carrying "... two or three bags of tobacco ... and [ask] the story teller [to] relieve him by accepting just a little of it."²¹⁶ Kenneth S. Goldstein divided the informant's motivation into "Psychological gratification," "material inducement," "non-financial assistance," and "liquor,"²¹⁷ all of which have been utilized by collectors in the field. Although the psychological principle of stimulus-response (S-R) relationship was not recognized by these fieldworkers as the basic operative force in the collecting process, this principle accounts for the fieldwork phenomena.

(2) The Operant's Motivation

The operant's motivation is his everyday behavior as a member of a community in his social and cultural milieu. The solar mythologists regarded folklore as a symbolic representation of (response to) heavenly phenomena, while "Another and rival group beheld in the records of folklore the surviving relics of savage customs and beliefs."²¹⁸ Such early theories ignored the crucial roles of the individual, whose behavior is partially determined by folklore, and of society, whose values reflect folklore as a functional, dynamic class of responses.

Freud interpreted folklore phenomena as a product of the individual and a symbolic projection of the psyche. For Freud, such genres as myth, legends, fairy tales, and jokes ^[57] were responses to the individual's psychological drives that were denied fulfillment in actual social life because of unfavorable social and cultural conditions (cues). Therefore, the psychological school ascribed the origin and occurrence of folkloric phenomena to wish-fulfillment drives. Freud's *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900), *Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious* (1905), and (with Oppenheim) *Dreams in Folklore* (1909), as well as Abraham's *Dreams and Myths* (1913), Rank's *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero* (1909), and *Das Inzestmotiv in Dichtung und Sage* (1912), and, more recently, Warren J. Baker's "The Stereotyped Western Story"²¹⁹ (1955), Kenneth Munden's "A

²¹⁴ London, 1951.

²¹⁵ Ralph Piddington, *An Introduction to Social Anthropology*, Vol. 2 (Edinburgh, 1957), p. 550.

²¹⁶ George Pullen Jackson, *Four Symposia on Folklore*, p. 18.

²¹⁷ Goldstein, *A Guide for Field Workers in Folklore*, pp. 166-173.

²¹⁸ Dorson, "Current Folklore Theories," p. 93.

²¹⁹ Warren J. Baker, "The Stereotyped Western Story: Its Latent Meaning and Psychoeconomic

Contribution to the Psychological Understanding to the Origin of the Cowboy and His Myth,"²²⁰ (1958), and Boyer's "An Example of Legend Distortion ..." (1964) are studies examining folklore as a response formula to wish-fulfillment. Investigations of non-narrative folklore genres, such as Hedwig Keri's "Ancient Games and Popular Games: Psychological Essay,"²²¹ J.L. Fischer and Marc J. Swartz's "Socio-psychological Aspects of Some Trukese and Ponapean Love Songs,"²²² and Israel Zwerling's "The Favorite Jokes in Diagnostic and Therapeutic Interviewing,"²²³ are also based on the premise that folklore is essentially institutionalized response to psychological drives.

The reduction of folklore to purely psychological motivations has proved unsatisfactory for both folklorists and ^[58] anthropologists (see *ante*, page 4). While accepting the relevance of psychological drives, Malinowski and the functionalists introduced social and cultural drives as companion aspects of folklore also worthy of consideration. The functional school thus attributes the rise [and continued existence] of myth, legend, and other narrative folklore genres and beliefs in a given society logical needs (drives). Malinowski criticized the psychoanalysts for having "... come at last to teaching that the myth is a daydream of the race, and that we can only explain it by turning our backs upon nature, history and culture, and diving deep into the dark pools of the subconscious ..." ²²⁴ He and other functionalists viewed myth as a living reality; "... it expresses, enhances, and codifies belief; it safeguards and enforces morality; it vouches for the efficiency of ritual and contains practical rules for the guidance of man ..." ²²⁵ Accordingly, myth occurs as a response not merely to organic psychological drives but to social and cultural drives as well.

Following Malinowski's precepts, William Bascom ascribed four basic functions to folklore, encompassing psychological, social, and cultural "functions" (drives): "wish-fulfillment," (the only psychological drive in the Freudian tradition accepted by Malinowski), "validating culture," "education," and "social approval."²²⁶ All of these drives, ^[59] except for the first, are basically

Function." In: *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, Vol. 24 (1955), 270-280

²²⁰ ^[277] *American Imago*, Vol. 15 (1958), 103-148.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 41-89.

²²² *Journal of American Folklore*, Vol. 73 (1960), 218-224.

²²³ *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, Vol. 24 (1955), 104-114.

²²⁴ Bronislaw Malinowski, "Myth in Primitive Psychology," *Magic, Science and Religion and Other Essays* (New York, 1948), p. 99.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

²²⁶ William Bascom, "Four Functions of Folklore." In: *Journal of American Folklore*, Vol. 67 (1954),

socio-cultural drives. Studies of non-narrative folklore genres, such as, "Kru Proverbs" by Melville J. Herskovits and S. Tagbwe,^[227] *Jabo Proverbs from Liberia* by G. Herzog,²²⁸ and "The Role of Nigerian Proverbs in a Nigerian Judicial System" by John Messenger,²²⁹ as well as studies of singing activities, such as "Folksongs as Regulators of Politics" by Betty Wang,²³⁰ and *American Folksongs of Protest* by John Greenway,²³¹ interpret folklore along functionalist lines as a response to social and cultural drives (stimulus-response formula). Having asserted that "functions *denote* drives as much as drives *determine* functions," (see *ante*, page 37) it may be concluded that folklore activities occur as responses to social and cultural, as well as to purely psychological, drives.

Cues and Responses

Thus far, we have established the principle that social and cultural situations and objects *do* possess motivational forces as powerful and effective as those exerted by primary biological drives. We have also established the fact that primary drives are generally satisfied within the social and cultural contexts of the society. However, the acquired or primary drive must be perceived by the organism is reactive behavior is to occur: "Without drives, either primary or acquired, *the organism does not behave and hence does not* ⁽⁶⁰⁾*learn.*"²³² Thus, any sort of behavior--simple or complex, biological or cultural and social--occurs only as a response to a definite drive. To eat, drink or sleep, or to sing, narrate a tale, or dance; to learn and practice folklore material or to repress such material and deny knowledge of it; to believe in mythical and legendary figures and their powers or to disbelieve in their existence: all such activities are not haphazard occurrences, but are responses produced by motivation possessing drive-forces. Hill in *Learning* states that, for Hull as well as "... for Watson, Guthrie, Thorndike, and Miller, all behavior involves stimulus-response connections.

333-349.

²²⁷ *Journal of American Folklore*, Vol. 43 (1930), 225-293.

²²⁸ London, 1936.

²²⁹ *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, Vol. 15 (1959), pp. 84-73.

²³⁰ *Sociology and Social Research*, Vol. 20 (1935), 161-166.

²³¹ Philadelphia, 1953.

²³² Miller and Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation*, p. 21. (The italics are mine:).

A response is never simply emitted; it is always a response *to* a stimulus."²³³

Responses and motivations (drives) are closely connected; David K. Berlo, a communication process specialist, states: "We can define the term *response* in terms of a *stimulus*. Given an individual who has perceived a stimulus, *a response is anything that the individual does as a result of perceiving this stimulus*. A response is a reaction of the individual organism to a stimulus, behavior that is elicited by a stimulus."²³⁴ Responses do not occur in *vacuo*, but within definite confines. A drive, whether original or acquired, impels the organism to respond to certain "*cues*," but "Before any given response to a specific cue can be rewarded and learned, this response must occur."²³⁵

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A *cue* is defined by Drever as an "... often obscure, secondary stimulus, which functions as a guide to our response, by way either of perception or of action, to a situation, though it may not itself be clearly discriminated."²³⁶ In folkloric terms, a child feeling boredom is receiving a stimulus and, if this stimulus grows to a certain intensity, it will become a drive. The child will have to respond to this drive to restore his equilibrium and his response will be elicited by the cues which he perceives in his surroundings: a mother who can tell folktales, a father who is not supposed to tell folktales, a friend with whom he can play, a television or radio which can entertain; times of the day when he is expected to perform or avoid certain activities, and many other factors contribute to the child's decision of the response which he will make. Cues are always perceived in wholes and, as K. Young writes, "... are largely innately [i.e., covertly] determined and the response follows at once."²³⁷

Miller and Dollard report that cues and stimuli are very closely related, thus they write:

In general, stimuli may vary quantitatively and qualitatively; any stimulus may be thought of as having a certain drive value, depending on its strength, and a certain cue value, depending on its distinctiveness ... Since drive and cue functions are two different aspects of the ^{62} same thing, a stimulus, any given stimulus may possess ...

²³³ Hill, *Learning*, p. 133.

²³⁴ Berlo, *The Process of Communication*, p. 75.

²³⁵ Miller and Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation*, p. 24.

²³⁶ Drever, *A Dictionary of Psychology*, p. 57.

²³⁷ Kimball Young, *Social Psychology*, p. 39.

an important amount of both functions.²³⁸

Similarly, Kimball Young states:

The term 'cue' has been used by Hull and others to mean a stimulus that determines how the particular response will occur ... Since both drive and cue have their source in a stimulus, they have much in common. The cue value of a stimulus, however, arises in its *distinctiveness*, whereas that of the drive, lies in its *strength*. Nevertheless, under certain circumstances, cues may serve as drives.²³⁹

If a child is accustomed to having his mother tell him folktales at night the mere appearance of the mother at that time will serve as a stimulus for the child to ask for a tale, whereas the appearance of a policeman or milkman at the same time will not be a stimulus for a tale. In the earlier example of the child who is bored, the mother's presence, in addition to the convenient time and place, each will act as cues to determine the type of response he will make. In another instance, if a person feels the need to play music, his response will be limited by the instruments at hand, each of which serves as a cue determining the type of musical sounds he can produce; if there are no musical instruments available, his response may be limited to whistling. On the other hand, a person who can play a certain instrument will feel the drive to play the instrument if it happens to be in front of him.

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The key to the role of stimuli, both primary (drives) and secondary (cues), is expressed by Sherif as follows:

The individual experiences and reacts to social objects, persons, groups, cultural items (furniture, tools, words, music, and so on) in terms of meaningful relations prevailing in the characteristic patterning of these stimulus agents.²⁴⁰

Therefore, in a society where social distance is maintained among different age groups within a family, a child will not expect his father to tell him a fairy tale or a joke. Similarly, an individual cannot make use of an artifact unless he knows what it is used for; a child motivated by boredom cannot opt for watching television as a possible response unless he is aware of that object, and of its function.

²³⁸ Miller and Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation*, pp. 22-23.

²³⁹ K. Young, *Social Psychology*, p. 39.

²⁴⁰ Sherif, "Social Psychology," p. 35.

In the former example, the child's request for a folktale will serve as a stimulus to the person he approaches and if this stimulus is sufficiently strong (insistence, crying) it will become a drive, forcing the mother to react. The mother's response, in turn, is elicited by the cues surrounding her and the child. If she tells the child a folktale, her telling is a response to the stimulus of the child's request, and if she refuses, the refusal is a negative response elicited by adverse cues. The mother might, for example, feel that it was not the right time for telling tales (in some rural areas of Egypt it is believed that a folktale told to a child during the day will cause the money of the teller's ^{64} father to rust), or she might consider her child too old to listen to folktales, or might feel that watching television or reading a book would be more profitable for him.

In short, as Whiting, and Miller and Dollard point out, "The drive impels a person to respond. Cues determine when he will respond, where he will respond, and which response he will make."²⁴¹ Thus, the relationship between an individual and a folkloric activity is a "contextual relationship," where "Emphasis on the relationship of parts within patterned wholes becomes indispensable in characterization of social-stimulus situations"²⁴² The activity will be determined by every factor the operant can perceive: the status of the individuals involved, the nature of the folkloric activity involved, the time and place, and the nature of the objects involved.

Social Factors and Perceiving Cues: [Roles and Norms]

These evaluations of individuals, objects, and activities can be summed up as the "norm" for the operant's group, and the two basic social factors involved in the process of perceiving cues are: (1) the role of the individual, and (2) the norms of the group. Roles and *norms* are interdependent, roles being ascribed to certain individuals according to the social norms of the particular community.

The concept of *role* is defined by F.L. Bates as "A part of social position consisting of a more or less integrated or related sub-set of social norms which is distinguishable from ^{65} other sets of norms forming the same position."²⁴³ Bates would describe the position of the head of a family as a composite of his role as provider, playmate, disciplinarian, spouse and so on. J.W. Thibaut and H.H. Kelley agreeing with Bates, define role as "... the class of one or more norms that applies to a person's behavior with regard to some specific external problem or in relation to a special class of responses," and conclude that it is "... apparent that even in the dyad each person may be in several

²⁴¹ Miller and Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation*, p. 21, n. 21.

²⁴² Sherif, "Social Psychology," p. 35

²⁴³ ^{278} F.L. Bates, "Position, Role, and Status: A Reformation of Concepts." In: *Social Forces*, Vol. 34 (1956), 314.

different roles."²⁴⁴ N.M. Brandburn emphasizes the function of *expectation* in the formation of roles: "A 'role' ... is a set of behavioral expectations associated with socially recognized positions such as 'mother,' 'friend,' ..." ²⁴⁵

In terms of folkloric behavior one of the mother's roles is to entertain the youngsters at night, thus keeping them out of adult activities; and the minstrel's role is to sing and perform for the community; it is the role of certain individuals to be the entertainers, of the group rather than other individuals because they belong to a special class of persons, entertainers. Thus individuals *expect* particular types of behavior from *certain* persons, while the same type of behavior would not be expected from others. In certain cultures a child does not ask his mother to tell him a joke and a mother does not ask her child to tell her a *Märchen*, for this type of activity is not a prescribed aspect of their respective roles; and neither the child, nor the mother would ask the father to perform a folk-dance for them at home although ⁽⁶⁶⁾ he might be the best performer in his own *shilla* (group, clique--see *post*, page 169) outside the home.

G.C. Homans defines *norms* as "... an idea in the mind of the members of a group, an idea that can be put in the form of a statement specifying what the members or other men should do, ought to do, are expected to do, under given circumstances." The norm's importance to a group is stressed by the fact that "... any departure of real behavior from the norm is followed by some punishment."²⁴⁶ Norms possess a social force which dispenses punishment for deviant behavior and reward for compliant behavior. L. Festinger, S. Schachter and K. Back state that this social force is "... a uniform set of directions which the group induces on the forces which act on the members of the group."²⁴⁷ Thus, norms are both abstract ideas and social forces constituting "... a pressure existing between a norm-sender and a norm-receiver's behavior in a category of recurrent situations."²⁴⁸

Turning to norms as they are expressed in folkloric behavior, for example, the norms of an Upper Egyptian peasant community forbid a child to ask his mother to tell him a joke (especially an obscene one), and deviation will induce punishment. Similarly, a man is not permitted to tell ⁽⁶⁷⁾

²⁴⁴ John W. Thibaut and Harold H. Kelley, *The Social Psychology of Groups* (New York, 1966), p. 143.

²⁴⁵ Norman M. Brandburn, "The Cultural Context of Personality Theory." In: *Concepts of Personality*, eds. Joseph M. Wepman and Ralph W. Heine (Chicago, 1963), p. 334.

²⁴⁶ G.C. Homans, *The Human Group* (New York, 1950), p. 123.

²⁴⁷ L. Festinger, S. Schachter and K. Back, *Social Pressure in Informal Groups* (New York, 1950), p. 166.

²⁴⁸ R. Rommetveit, *Social Norms and Roles* (Minneapolis, 1954), p. 45.

Märchen, for the group norms assign this type of activity to women, and his violation of this norms brings about punishment.²⁴⁹ Every folkloric activity is perceived in terms of its value to the group and the communal norms; roles are assigned to those members who best fulfill the particular requirements of the various positions.

Cues Are Covertly Determined

In relation to folklore, cues are the social and cultural conditions which govern folkloric activities and determine folkloric responses. To an operant, every stimulus, (a cue being a secondary stimulus), contributes to the action or behavior which he will make in response to the drive (primary stimulus) motivating him to behave. For example, when a narrator is asked to tell a tale, he will consider the nature of the request, the person who made it, and the relationship of this person to himself, suitability of place and time, the audience, his own physical and mental fitness, and other factors perceivable at the moment of the primary stimulus for narrating. Cues are always perceived in meaningful wholes and "... are largely innately [i.e., covertly] determined and the response follows at once."²⁵⁰

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Cues and Folkloric Behavior

For the folklorist or social anthropologist, it is important to determine the presence or absence of social objects and forces functioning as cues and to assess their influence on the operant. However, since cues are covertly determined, their role in social behavior is sometimes difficult to observe at all, much less to determine. An individual who has mastered a good deal of social learning can perceive the stimuli successfully. Cues (secondary stimuli forces) play their role by controlling his social behavior according to the norms and values of his culture. Failure to recognize cues results in improper or inadequate behavior and leads to punishment for deviation. The importance of cues has gained attention in folklore studies in recent years. In 1959, Melville Jacobs criticized both Boas and the Finnish School for diminishing the field of "folklore" to the study of abstract texts rendered lifeless by severing them from their original social and cultural context.²⁵¹ He repeated this

²⁴⁹ For descriptions of the role of tales in influencing social activities where social distance is rigorously maintained among separate social groups--especially between men [on one hand], and women and children [on another]--see: C.B. Klunzinger, *Upper Egypt--Its People and Its Products* (London, 1878), p. 163, 170, 180; W.S. Blackman, *The Fellahin of Upper Egypt* (London, 1927), p. 37, 268-269; and H.M. Ammar, *Growing up in an Egyptian Village* (London, 1954) p. 141 161, 162.

²⁵⁰ K. Young, *Social Psychology*, p. 39.

²⁵¹ Melville Jacobs, "Folklore." In: *The Anthropology of Franz Boas, Memoirs of the American Anthropological Association*, No. 89, ed. W. Goldschmidt (1959), pp. 119-138; and Melville Jacobs, "Review

criticism in 1964 in his presentation of a theoretical pattern for oral literature in cultural anthropology:

When Boas, that most assiduous collector of precisely recorded anthropological folklore, suggested somewhat weakly about 45 years ago that a folklore collection mirrored the life of a people who had expressed it, he meant only that ethnographic items of technology, economy, social organizations, and religion ...

⁽⁶⁹⁾ Boas resembled others in leaving most features of content, style, and connected socio-cultural phenomena untouched by theory.²⁵²

Commenting on Jacobs' statement, Dorson has written, "In Jacobs' view, both the Boasian and the Finnish schools have reduced folklore study to an arid descriptivist and mechanical procedure."²⁵³ Melville J. and Frances S. Herskovits recognized the need for furnishing considerable additional information about the "given" norms and values of alien cultures. They state that their knowledge of such Dahomean cues as "... patterns of family life, economic structure, educational techniques; of aesthetic values, religious concepts, and ritual ... [and] of the political development" all "facilitated" their task in fieldwork.²⁵⁴

Similarly, Jacobs realized the importance of social and cultural forces on folkloric activities. In *The Content and Style of an Oral Literature, Clackamas, Chinook Myths and Tales*; he sought to establish the role of these forces (i.e., cues, though he does not use the term or utilize learning theory) in understanding Clackamas narratives. Dorson has noted Jacob's contribution:

The most recent and most energetic suggestions for an anthropological theory of folklore came from Jacobs ... He seeks for an imaginative advance over the Boas type of literal text which renders the oral literature of tribal cultures so perplexing ⁽⁷⁰⁾ and distasteful to Western readers. In his presentation of Clackamas narratives Jacobs enlarges upon the literal text to supply details of cultural reference and nuance understood by a Clackamas audience but entirely lost to a Western reader.²⁵⁵

of V. Probb's *Morphology of the Folktale*." In: *Journal of American Folklore*, Vol. 72 (1959), 195-196.

²⁵² Melville Jacobs, *Pattern in Cultural Anthropology* (Homewood, Ill., 1964), p. 326.

²⁵³ Dorson, "Current Folklore Theories," p. 102.

²⁵⁴ Melville J. and Frances S. Herskovits, *Dahomean Narrative, A Cross Cultural Analysis* (Evanston, Ill., 1958), p. 8.

²⁵⁵ Dorson, "Current Folklore Theories," pp. 102-103.

The issue involved in this controversy is the perception and interpretation of the cues (social and cultural forces) influencing folkloric behavior. These cues are correctly and successfully perceived by natives because of their social learning, and are incorrectly and unsuccessfully perceived by Western observers coming from a different background of social learning. The resultant misunderstanding leads to subsequent misinterpretation of the folkloric responses.

The Concept of Cues in Folklore Scholarship

Cues as a psychological factor relevant to the learning process and behavior have been ignored in the study of folklore, although the concept of cues as an operative factor having empirical effects has been discussed by a number of fieldworkers. Folklorists have long been aware of the influences of social and cultural conditions on the transmission of folklore (i.e., the capacities to teach, to incorporate material into forms transmissible through time and space, and to learn) and on the folklore genres themselves. Folklorists devised hypotheses, and theories concerning the social and cultural setting of folkloric activities from their fieldwork experiences and independent of (71) psychological learning theory. These theories, nonetheless, have psychological significance.

Perhaps the most important analysis and discussion of the concept of cues (social and cultural conditions) is that offered by Dégh²⁵⁶ in her presentation of the thesis on the "opportunity for narration" in various communities and groups. Dégh was elaborating on Iouri Sokolov's suggestion that the folktale satisfies a social need and is practiced only within a social group:

The tale is essentially a social phenomenon. If one can chant a song for one's self, and independently of the milieu where one resides, the tale [is] to the contrary[.] the tale is said in loud voice, presupposes an audience for whom it is recited.²⁵⁷

Along this line Dégh writes as follows:

The *Märchen* arises from a need experienced at a certain developmental stage in human society. It is the circumstances which engender a tale, that form its conception, its shape, and its narrative style; and as long as these circumstances persist, so will the *Märchen*.²⁵⁸

²⁵⁶ Dégh, "Some Questions of the Social Function of Storytelling." In: *Acta Ethnographica*, 91-147; and *Märchen, Erzähler und Erzählgemeinschaft*.

²⁵⁷ [279] Iouri Sokolov, *Le folklore russe* (Paris, 1945), p. 224.

²⁵⁸ Dégh, *Märchen, Erzähler und Erzählgemeinschaft*, p. 66; and Dégh, "Some Questions of Social

There are three basic principles to the cues concept in Dégh's formula, and all of them have been examined by a number of folklorists:

Principle 1 [S-R]: A stimulus-response relationship exists between the individual and the *Märchen*; man feels the need for entertainment and *Märchen* emerges as a response to satisfy ^[72] this need. This principle is not limited only to *Märchen* but applies to every other folklore genre which occurs as a response to stimuli. As postulated by Sokolov and Dégh, the inevitable emergence of the folktale in response to human needs at a particular phase of social and cultural development is basically a stimulus-cue-response formula.

This same stimulus-cue-response formula has been introduced into cultural studies independently of its psychological learning content and has been adopted by functionalists. William Bascom was the first to apply the functional approach, and hence the stimulus-response formula, to folklore scholarship. The principle that folklore is a response to social and cultural as well as psychological drives had long occupied fieldworkers, for if folklore is elicited by social and cultural motivations and conditions, it must reflect the traits of that milieu. Boas introduced this concept, independent of learning theory, as early as 1891²⁵⁹ and developed it further in *Tsimshian Mythology*,²⁶⁰ and *Kwakiutl Culture as Reflected in Mythology*.²⁶¹ After Boas, the concept evolved in the works of students such as Ruth Benedict, who concluded in her study *Zuni Mythology*²⁶² that "tales tally with, and yet do not tally with" the culture. Herskovits defined the role of tales in society, stating that "A substantial body of folk-tales is more than the literary expression of a people. It is, in a very real sense, their ethnography which, if systematized by the student, gives a penetrating picture of their way of life."²⁶³

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In their study, "Socio-psychological Aspects of Some Trukese and Ponapean Love Songs,"²⁶⁴ J.L. Fischer and Marc J. Schwartz explored the possibilities for content analysis and

Function of Storytelling," p. 91.

²⁵⁹ Franz Boas, "Dissemination of Tales Among the Natives of North America." In: *Journal of American Folklore*, Vol. 4 (1891), 13-20.

²⁶⁰ *Bureau of American Ethnology Annual Report*, No. 31 (1916).

²⁶¹ *Memoirs of the American Folklore Society*, No. 28 (1935).

²⁶² 2 vols. (New York, 1935).

²⁶³ Herskovits, *Man and His Works*, p. 418.

²⁶⁴ *Journal of American Folklore*, Vol. 73 (1960), 218-224.

responses elicited by cues, and concluded that the content of the songs is in accordance with the male-female relationship as provided and formed by the social forces in these two Micronesian subcultures. As Dorson points out, their study also discloses the fact that "The psychological attitudes revealed in the songs are ... genuine and can be traced to anxiety-producing situations in the culture."²⁶⁵ In other words, Fischer and Schwartz, through their analysis of empirical phenomena, arrived at the same conclusion as psychological theory: songs are responses elicited by cultural and social cues to the psychological drive of anxiety.

Dégh classifies the "tale-telling communities" into three major groups: "migrant working communities outside the village," "village work-communities," and "involuntary work-communities, which last for a short duration."²⁶⁶ Tale-telling in all three groups follows a characteristic pattern: presence of drive, convenience of cues leading to the traditional response of tale-telling (such as the presence of a narrator and an audience because "There is no such thing as solitary story-telling,"²⁶⁷ and being able to spare the time), and reward. Tale-telling is a rewarding response because it successfully reduces the drive for entertainment or wish fulfillment among these groups.

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Principle 2 [Context]: The conditions under which the *Märchen* exists and operates in a society determine two major facets of *Märchen* as a folklore genre.

A. It determines the relationship between the *Märchen* and the cues necessary for its elicitation as a response to certain motivation. W. Eberhard and Pertev N. Boratav confine *Märchen* activities to particular social classes, whose economic life limits the possibilities (cues) for entertainment (drive) and the folktale appears as the most convenient response. Eberhard and Boratav observe that "... *Märchen* are always told in circles of the middle classes or of the poor."²⁶⁸ Similarly, Wilhelm Wisser, in his introduction to *Plattdeutsche Volksmärchen*, states that "For the most part,

²⁶⁵ Dorson, "Current Folklore Theories," p. 103.

²⁶⁶ Dégh, *Märchen, Erzähler und Erzählgemeinschaft*, pp. 71-72.

Von der Leyen had originally suggested that collective jobs provided the opportunity for tale-telling; see, "Aufgaben und Wege der Märchen Forschung." In: *Aufsätze zur Kultur und Sprachgeschichte* (München, 1916), pp. 409-410; J. Bolte and G. Polivka, *Anmerkungen zur den Kinder-und Hausmärchen der Brüder Grimm*, Vol. 4 (Leipzig, 1930), p. 8; and Von Sydow, "Various Bearers of Tradition and Their Importance," *Selected Papers on Folklore*, pp. 13-15.

²⁶⁷ Gyula Ortutay, *Hungarian Folk Tales* (Budapest, 1962), p. 50; and Iouri Sokolov, *Le folklore russe*, p. 224.

²⁶⁸ Wolfram Eberhard and Pertev N. Boratav, *Typen türkischen Volksmärchen* (Wiesbaden, 1953), p. 12.

the persons who narrated to me, belong overwhelmingly to the lowest strata of the population."²⁶⁹

Jan De Vries ascribed two separate "functions" to the *Märchen*: an original function as entertainment, and a wish-fulfillment function developing at a later stage. He postulated that "The *Märchen* as a product of a singular culture-phase in aristocratic circles, has so characteristically come to be," and that it "... was able to maintain itself in its original function for only a short period," for it has acquired a different function with a change in stimuli. The *Märchen* now (1954) "... found the way easily to the lowly folk stratum[,] where it acquired an important ^[75] role as a sort of wishful-poetry."²⁷⁰ In other words, *Märchen* as a folkloric phenomena originally occurred in response to the entertainment drive under the cues provided by aristocratic society, but today it occurs as a response to the wish-fulfillment drive under the cues provided by the lower social classes.

The historical aspect of change in *Märchen's* role in society is also stressed by the psychoanalyst Martin Grotjahn, who wrote:

The folklore and fairy tales of yesterday take up where the mythology of the ancients left off. They are, as Freud said, the run-down mythology of former times. Today a new form has been found. It is represented by the movies, the funnies' or comic strips, and most recently by the new art of television, which is the latest stage in this progression.²⁷¹

Thus, although human motivation remains basically the same throughout the stages of social and cultural development, responses differ from age to age as the cues eliciting them change.

B. Cues also determine the form and structure of *Märchen*. This principle has been accepted both by theorists, such as Stith Thompson, and by fieldworkers, such as Eberhard, and Lord. Thompson attributes the development of the frame story to "Vagabonds [who] often use their narrative ability to secure food and lodging." Under such a drive and with convenient circumstances "One of the frequent tricks ... is to ^[76] string out their stories to an inordinate length so that they will last till dinnertime or bedtime." Moreover, "Sometimes, indeed, the scheme of Scheherazade is successfully employed and the hearer left in suspense until the next day."²⁷²

²⁶⁹ Wilhelm Wissler, *Plattdeutsche Volksmärchen* (Jena, 1927), p. xvi.

²⁷⁰ Jan De Vries, *Betrachtungen zum Märchen*, *Folklore Fellows Communications*, No. 150 (1954), 178.

²⁷¹ Martin Grotjahn, M.D., *Beyond Laughter: Humor and the Subconscious* (New York, 1966), p. 231.

²⁷² Thompson, *The Folktale*, pp. 451-452

Also, Eberhard noted the influence of the Moslem fasting month of *Ramadan* on minstrel tales in Turkey: "The structure of a narration is influenced by its social function as an evening entertainment. The greatest logical length is the twenty-eight evenings of the Lenten month of Ramadan."²⁷³ The identical influence of *Ramadan* as a cue is noticeable among the Moslems of Yugoslavia. Lord observed that "... the festival of Ramazan [was] ... a perfect circumstance for the singing of one song during the entire night," for "... men fast from sunrise to sunset and gather in coffee houses all night long to talk and listen to epic."²⁷⁴

Principle 3 [Context and Change]: The *Märchen* exists intact only as long as the favorable conditions exist, and if these conditions change corresponding aspects of *Märchen* will change accordingly.

As has been pointed out, a "cue" is a "... secondary stimulus, which functions as a guide to our responses"²⁷⁵ and the term "... 'cue' has been used by Hull and others to mean a stimulus that determines how a particular response will occur."²⁷⁶ Thus, all social conditions could serve (77) either as stimuli or cues to folkloric activities. The perception of the cue-value of an object, person, or situation is not a fixed, mechanical process, but varies from one culture to another and, to a lesser extent, from one person to another within the same culture.²⁷⁷ Sherif has analyzed the flexible nature of stimuli as follows:

The conception of stimulus situation that has functional significance in social psychology deals with objects and situations in their contextual relationship. [...] relations among various items, even in simple judgment and perception, are as important as the component items themselves. The psychological significance of any item cannot be determined independently of others which constitute a functional system. [...] The individual experiences and reacts to social objects, persons, groups, cultural items (furniture, tools, words, music and so on) in terms of meaningful relations prevailing in the characteristic patterning of these stimulus agents.²⁷⁸

²⁷³ (280) Eberhard, *Minstrel Tales from Southeastern Turkey*, p. 58.

²⁷⁴ Lord, *The Singer of Tales*, p. 15.

²⁷⁵ Drever, *A Dictionary of Psychology*, p. 57.

²⁷⁶ K. Young, *Social Psychology*, p. 39.

²⁷⁷ N.M. Brandburn, "The Cultural Context of Personality," p. 333.

²⁷⁸ Sherif, "Social Psychology," p. 35.

An engineer, for example, does not derive the same significance from a folktale as a five-year-old child, and similarly, in a peasant community, a long, complex epic does not have the same significance for a five-year-old child that it has for an adult. It follows that whenever the "terms" of these "meaningful relations between the individual and these social objects, groups, [or] cultural items" change, the type and nature of the stimuli-value and cue-value attached to them will also change. Thus, what was acceptable yesterday is rejected today, and those who were deemed respected ⁽⁷⁸⁾ and desired and had "status" in the community are regarded differently today. Change in attitude because of change in stimulus-cue value accounts for the appearance and continuity, as well as the vanishing and discontinuity of folkloric activities.

Changing Cues and Folkloric Behavior

As Edward Sapir stated, "Every profound change in the flow of civilization, particularly every change in its economic basis, tends to bring about an unsettling and re-adjustment of culture values."²⁷⁹ Folklorists have noted that broad social trends (changes) have altered folkloric activities and phenomena so radically that entire genres vanish from folk life (as in the case of mythical "priestly and literary" traditions in Europe "which have long ceased to enjoy currency,"²⁸⁰) or will decline, shrinking in geographical area or in the social group which employs them. Dégh ascribed the recession of folklore in West European countries to a historical phenomena: "The powerful industrial development in West-Europe raised the peasantry into the middle class at an early date, banishing folktales to the circles of small peasants, petty tradesmen and children."²⁸¹ That is, industrialization not only affected the quantity and quality of material production, but also affected social relations, causing cues responsible for eliciting folkloric genres, such as the folktale, to disappear. "With the gradual ⁽⁷⁹⁾ disappearance of collective jobs tales [became] confined more and more to the family circle,"²⁸² where social conditions (cues) remained unchanged to eliciting tales as responses to the entertainment drive.

Correspondingly, wherever social conditions did not change, the entertainment drive continued to be satisfied through the traditional channels. "The powerful industrial development in West-Europe" forced the folktale's influence to recede to areas unaffected by industrialization, "... whereas in the economically backward countries of East-Europe tales were sustained till 1945 by

²⁷⁹ Edward Sapir, *Selected Writings of Edward Sapir*, ed. David G. Mandelbaum (Berkeley, 1948), p. 317.

²⁸⁰ Dorson, "Current Folklore Theories," p. 108.

²⁸¹ Dégh, "Some Questions of the Social Function of Storytelling," p. 99.

²⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 114.

the agricultural proletarians of the capitalist-landowner system whose manner of life was hardly different from that of the cotters and servants of the feudalism."²⁸³ Lord reported the similar decline and retreat of the Yugoslavian epic tradition to areas where conditions still encouraged its elicitation as a convenient response:

What we have been describing ... was in existence in Yugoslavia in the 1930's and to an extent still continues ... In the old days the ruling class of Moslems celebrated the feast of Ramazan in its courts rather than in the Kafana. When the Turkish rule was overthrown, the celebration took place more commonly in the Kafana rather than in private Moslem homes.²⁸⁴

Likewise, Eberhard noted that the Turkish tradition of minstrelsy "is close to its end" because of ⁽⁸⁰⁾ changes in the social milieu, and that it continues only under traditional conditions.²⁸⁵

Economic changes have not only affected the social structure of communities, but have also altered the traditional roles of the individual, changing his norms and values as he ascends the social scale. Miller and Dollard, observing the function of alcohol in different social classes, state that "If an individual moves from one of these social classes to another, he must change his habits with regard to the use of alcohol." For example, "If he moves into the lower-middle class from the lower class, he must learn to stop drinking or he will be thought vulgar."²⁸⁶ The basic operative element is compliance with the norms and values of one's social class, primary group, or culture (see *ante*, pages 46-47). Similarly, the folktale or any other folklore genre, as a characteristic feature of the social life of a group, will occur as a convenient response only when the surrounding conditions (cues) provide for its elicitation. Dégh reports that in eastern Europe, for example, "The typical peasant farmer, in his rise towards the bourgeoisie, wants to hear 'true', i.e. historical stories, read newspapers, and refuses to listen to tales of wonders which he will stamp as [...] lies."²⁸⁷

The continuity of change has reversed the position of *Märchen* in society. Max Lüthi sums up the situation: "Formerly, when there was no radio and only a few books were available, stories

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

²⁸⁴ Lord, *The Singer of Tales*, p. 16.

²⁸⁵ Eberhard, *Minstrel Tales from Southeastern Turkey*, p. 57.

²⁸⁶ Miller and Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation*, p. 8.

²⁸⁷ Dégh, "Some Questions of the Social Function of Storytelling," p. 125.

were narrated in the evening circles."²⁸⁸ When the ^[81] situation changed (different cues were introduced), the response changed; at present "The true life of the *Märchen* fulfills itself ... in children's room," thus, "The work of the folklorist, which seeks to observe the life of the *Märchen* among adults is, mostly, research in relics."²⁸⁹ Similarly, every other folklore genre is accepted and practiced or discredited and abandoned according to the same "whole" or "reference scale"²⁹⁰ mechanism.

EFFECT

The concepts of *reward* and *punishment* are important in the development and strengthening of habitual folkloric practices. The individual does not respond unless he expects his responses to reward directly, through obtaining a desirable object (satisfier), or indirectly, through avoiding undesirable influences (annoyers). The rewarding factor not only determines the formation and strength of habits, but also the speed of their formation and their durability against the forces of time and social interaction.

The expectancy of reward is a vital factor in stimulating individuals and groups to act or react overtly, and also, to perceive and interpret stimuli, i.e., to act covertly. If the individual does not expect reward, he may refuse to select, perceive, and interpret a stimulus, for things that do not mean anything to him fail to attract his attention and have virtually no motivational impact.

^[82]

Reward

A major concern of philosophical and psychological investigation has been the principle that pleasure and pain, being the consequences of human acts, are cardinal factors in determining the continuity or discontinuity of behavior. Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) postulated that we do that which gives us pleasure and avoid that which produces pain. This idea developed into the theory of psychological hedonism: "... the theory that man's actions are determined primarily by the seeking of pleasant, and the avoidance of unpleasant feelings."²⁹¹

²⁸⁸ Max Lüthi, *Es war Einmal* (Göttingen, 1964), p. 19.

²⁸⁹ Max Lüthi, *Märchen*, p. 81.

²⁹⁰ The terms "whole" and "reference scale" are used by social psychologists to refer to the "gestalt" value judgment of items. Sherif, "Social Psychology," (see p. 35).

²⁹¹ Drever, *A Dictionary of Psychology*, p. 118.

John Dewey, whose system of philosophy dwelt on education and learning, clarified psychological hedonism in his writings on "self-interest." He, perhaps more accurately, describes man's behavior as being primarily "in his own self-interest." Dewey concluded: "All members of the empirical school emphasized ... [self-interest as] the sole motive of mankind;"²⁹² man only does things which he thinks are in his own interest and naturally avoids doing things he believes to be harmful. He evaluates his milieu according to 'what's in it for me.'

The first scholar to systematically test the effect of reward and punishment on behavior was Edward L. Thorndike (1874-1949), whose "Law of Effect" was one of three principal and five subordinate laws which constituted his psychological theory of learning. Thorndike's primary law in his theory of ⁽⁸³⁾ "reinforcement" is the law of effect. It stated that "the stamping in of stimulus-response connections depended, not simply on the fact that the stimulus and response occurred together [Guthrie's basic principle of learning] but on the effect that followed the response."²⁹³ Later, P.T. Young, in accord with "a good many psychologists," was to define reinforcement as "... a kind of strengthening of associative bonds that is revealed by an increased probability that a given stimulus situation will elicit a specific response."²⁹⁴

Through experiments with animals and humans, Thorndike concluded that the stimulus-response connection could be reinforced if a stimulus was followed first by a response and then by a satisfier; but if the stimulus is followed by a response and then by an *annoyer*, the stimulus-response connection would be weakened. The terms *satisfier* and *annoyer* are defined by Thorndike as follows:

By a satisfying state of affairs is meant one which the animal does nothing to avoid, often doing things which maintain or renew it. By an annoying state of affairs is meant one which the animal does nothing to preserve, often doing things which put an end to it.²⁹⁵

According to the "Law of Effect," the relationship between a certain motivation and a folkloric response (a response represents the value attached to a genre, such as the pronouncements that

²⁹² John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (Boston, 1962, first published in 1920), p. 194. See also Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York, 1930), pp. 134-139.

²⁹³ ⁽²⁸¹⁾ Hill, *Learning*, p. 58.

²⁹⁴ P.T. Young, *Motivation and Emotion*, p. 235.

²⁹⁵ Edward L. Thorndike, *The Psychology of Learning* (New York, 1913), p. 2.

Märchen are "women's stuff," "songs are to be sung only to an appreciative, friendly audience," or "dancing is shameful") depends upon the type of reaction the operant ^[84] receives when he expresses the genre. If a person employs a proverb to rationalize certain odd conduct and the proverb's validity is accepted by the group, the individual's association of rationalization with proverbs would be strengthened (or learned). If, however, the proverb is unacceptable to the group, the individual's association of rationalization with proverbs will be weakened. In the first instance, where the connection was strengthened by the reward, the response will be *more* apt to be repeated under similar circumstances, while in the second instance, where the connection was weakened by punishment, the response will be *less* apt to be repeated. According to this learning principle, folklore genres either prosper or perish.

Thorndike's law of effect²⁹⁶ has undergone many re-phrasings, reflecting various views as to *how* the stimulus-response relationship is strengthened by reward or weakened by punishment; but the essential premise, that reward strengthens while punishment weakens connections between a stimulus and its response, has remained unchanged.²⁹⁷

Punishment

Thorndike introduced the law of effect in 1913 (see *ante*, page 58) and restated it in 1931. Initially he described "reward" as a factor which "stamps in" and "punishment" as a factor which "stamps out" a stimulus-response connection. ^[85] Over the years, however, he reversed his position concerning the effect of punishment on the learning process: "rewarding a connection always strengthened it substantially," but, contrary to his original viewpoint, "punishing weakens it little or not at all."²⁹⁸ He finally concluded that reward has a *direct* strengthening effect on a connection whereas punishment operates *indirectly*, weakening a connection only if it leads the individual to change his behavior until a new response is learned to replace the old, punished one.²⁹⁹

²⁹⁶ Thorndike's Law of Effect was one of three principal and five subordinate laws: The other two principal laws are "law of readiness," and "law of exercise," and the remaining subordinate laws are: "multiple response," "set or attitudes," "prepotency of elements," and associative shifting. Hilgard, *Theories of Learning* (see pp. 21-22).

²⁹⁷ H.A. Carr proposed the term "empirical law of effect," because the law was developed empirically. "The Law of Effect: A Round Table Discussion." In: *Psychological Review*, Vol. 45 (1938). See pp. 191-199.

²⁹⁸ Edward L. Thorndike, *Reward and Punishment in Animal Learning, Comparative Psychological Monograph*, Vol. 8 (1932), p. 58.

²⁹⁹ E.L. Thorndike, *The Psychology of Wants, Interests, and Attitudes* (New York, 1935), pp. 135-144, 248-255.

Turning from Thorndike's position, the question remains: *what is the real effect of punishment on learning, and where does the principle of punishment stand today?* These questions are of tremendous importance, for punishment is the major operating factor controlling change and stability in folklore material.

"Punishment More Effective Than Thorndike Believed"

In his *Theories of Learning*, Hilgard appraised Thorndike's conclusions under the title "*Punishment More Effective Than Thorndike Believed*." For Hilgard, Thorndike erred in calculating certain factors in his experiment, and he notes that "In several experiments, Thorndike made a faulty assumption about the baseline of chance expectation."³⁰⁰ Had Thorndike's calculations been accurate, he would not have reversed his original stand concerning the direct effect of punishment on the learning. In other words, the influence of punishment on ⁽⁸⁶⁾ the learning process supported rather than discredited its effectiveness as a factor in "stamping out" punished responses.

The research of W.K. Estes,³⁰¹ and R.L. Solomon and L.C. Wynne³⁰² clarified the role of punishment as a "stamping out" force, noting that it only exerts this pressure when the punishment is strong enough to actually "stamp out." In other words, the characteristic effects of punishment are absent if the punishment is so mild that it constitutes no more than lack of reward. At the same time, ample evidence appeared to prove that punishment suppresses the punished response and leads to its disappearance. Experiments conducted by James A. Dinsmoor³⁰³ and W.K. Estes³⁰⁴ have shown that severe forms of punishment can indeed promptly suppress the punished response, the results of such suppression being unmistakable.

The law of effect as it is accepted today remains close to Thorndike's original formulation³⁰⁵

³⁰⁰ Hilgard, *Theories of Learning*, p. 30.

³⁰¹ William K. Estes, *An Experimental Study of Punishment*, Comparative Psychological Monograph, Vol. 57, No. 263 (1944).

³⁰² Richard L. Solomon and L.C. Wynne, "Traumatic Avoidance Learning: The Principles of Anxiety Conservation and Partial Irreversibility." In: *Psychological Review*, Vol. 81 (1954), 353-385.

³⁰³ James A. Dinsmoor, "Punishment II, An Interpretation of Empirical Findings." In: *Psychological Review*, Vol. 62 (1955), 96-105.

³⁰⁴ Estes, *An Experimental Study of Punishment*.

³⁰⁵ McGeoch and Irion quote Thorndike's 1931 statement on the basis that "A number of ... specifications have been attempted," and that "the best known, perhaps, being that of Thorndike (1931).

(see *ante*, page 58). McGeoch and Irion define "effect" as follows:

*Effect means, throughout, what happens following the act in question, usually what happens within a few seconds after it ..., I, ... acts are fixated and eliminated as function of their effect ... II: Acts followed by a state of affairs which the individual does not avoid, and which he often tries to preserve or attain, are selected and fixate, while acts followed by states of affair which the individual avoids or attempts to change are eliminated.*³⁰⁶

In terms of folkloric behavior the principle of effect could be regarded as the actual factor that "stamps in" or "stamps out" the "connection" between a folklore genre and the ⁽⁸⁷⁾ function it performs in a community. If a person makes a folkloric response to a given motivation, using a folklore item for a definite purpose (*Märchen* to entertain, a proverb to rationalize, a legend to explain, a joke to elicit laughter, an amulet to cure, etc.), he will learn to make the same response (genre or folk item) under similar conditions, if his first and succeeding attempts prove rewarding. On the other hand, if the first and succeeding attempts are punishing the person will *not* make the same response to similar motivations in the future. Instead, he will seek new responses in hopes of producing a rewarding "state of affairs" instead of the annoying "state of affairs" produced by his old responses.

These studies and their results are relevant to learning on an individual basis: now let us consider the nature of the learning of folklore in a communal or social context.

The Concept of Effect in Anthropology and Folklore Scholarship

Anthropologists have recognized the importance of reward for the continuity of culture in general, and specific cultural traits in particular. Kroeber and Wissler (quoted by Miller and Dollard) applied the principle of reward to issues of cultural borrowing and cultural invention (innovation). In 1923, long before anthropology was influenced by any major learning theories, Wissler argued that if a borrowed or invented cultural trait provided reward, (such as ⁽⁸⁸⁾ the reward obtained by using iron instead of bronze) it would be adopted and put to use.³⁰⁷ Similarly, Kroeber stated that cultural traits die out "... from inanition, from sterility of social soil, through supplanting by more

This specification is made in statement II. McGeoch and Irion." In: *The Psychology of Human Learning* (see p. 40).

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 239-240

³⁰⁷ [282] Clark Wissler, *Man and Culture* (New York, 1923), pp. 208-209.

vigorous descendants"³⁰⁸ which prove more rewarding.

During the early and middle forties, under the influence of Hull's learning theory (see *ante*, page 8), these implicit references to the positive effect of "reward" on the space-time continuity of a cultural item grew in importance until it became an accepted facet of culture basic to a great many anthropological definitions. Murdock's definition of culture includes the principle of reward as one of its basic seven components; for Murdock "*Culture is gratifying*: culture always and necessarily, satisfies basic biological needs and secondary needs derived therefrom."³⁰⁹ Similarly, Kluckhohn states that "In every culture ... success, or reward, is essential to all learning. If a response is not rewarded, it will not be learned. Thus all responses which become habitual are 'good' from the organism's point of view; they necessarily provide some sort of satisfaction."³¹⁰ This basic Hullian concept, i.e., satisfaction of biological primary drives, and derived, secondary (cultural and social) drives, became the foundation for Malinowski's functionalist approach (see *ante*, page 36) whereby "function" signifies satisfaction of a need and reward for response.

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As previously stated, drives are not merely "primary," biological ones; social and cultural drives (secondary drives) exist in their own right, and can equal "biological needs" in drive-force (see *ante*, pages 32-35). In folklore scholarship, the term "function" imparts the same meaning it has in anthropology: Bascom's "Four Functions of Folklore," is basically the application of functionalism (Drive-Response-Satisfaction or Reward) to folklore. Thus, function-oriented studies, such as the Herskovits' *Dahomean Narrative*, Messenger's "The Role of Proverbs in a Nigerian Judicial System," and William A. Lessa's "Divining from Knots in the Carolinas,"³¹¹ attempt to establish the drives eliciting folklore genres as responses and the rewarding role of these genres *per se*, whether these drives are purely organic and psychological or social and cultural.

This type of reward is intrinsic, deriving from the function of the folkloric item; the operant's response constitutes his own reward (drive - folkloric response - reward).

³⁰⁸ Alfred Kroeber, *Anthropology* (New York, 1923), p. 329.

³⁰⁹ Murdock, "Uniformities in Culture," p. 366.

³¹⁰ Clyde Kluckhohn, "The Educational Process." In: *Exploring the Ways of Mankind*, ed. Walter Goldschmidt (New York, 1960), p. 185. Extracted from Clyde Kluckhohn, *Mirror for Man* (New York, 1949).

³¹¹ William A. Lessa, "Divining from Knots in the Carolines." In: *Journal of the Polynesian Society*, Vol. 68 (1955), pp. 188-204.

A second type of drive-reward/punishment relationship is found in folkloric response as a function of *other* cues and *not* as a function of the folkloric response *itself*. This type of reward/punishment has been sporadically cited by folklorists from their field experiences.

Folklorists consider social reward a major factor in motivating narrators, singers, minstrels, dancers, etc., to perform their art before an audience. In reference to raconteurs, ⁽⁹⁰⁾ Thompson stated "The man who excels is rewarded with the esteem of his fellows and with much coveted prestige."³¹² Berze Nagy, quoted by Dégh, thus described the storyteller:

He is always the center of the society, enjoys the privileges of a veritable chieftain, be it in the house or around the fire in the stable. He has the right to drink first from the flask, and is offered the best sort of tobacco. If the storyteller happens to be a woman she is in command of the inmates of the house even if she is not in her own home: this is her privilege.³¹³

It is mainly this type of social reward that motivates performers; while it is psychological satisfaction (wish-fulfillment), social satisfaction (entertainment), or cultural satisfaction (performing religious or mythical rites), that motivates an audience to reward the performer for his response.

Effect and Social Learning

Rewards and punishments are *not* merely aftereffects of behavior, experienced after making a certain response stamping in, or stamping out the rewarded or punished response. They are also, in their social and cultural context, vital factors motivating a person to act. Expectation of reward is a major drive which impels individuals to some acts, while expectation of punishment impels them to others. Non-biological, social or acquired rewards, are enormously important in social life. ⁽⁹¹⁾ "Relief from anxiety ... Receiving money, social approval, and higher status ..." are examples of acquired rewards which motivate individuals and groups.³¹⁴

Rotter's "Behavior Potential"

Reinforcement is a basic motivational element in Rotter's theory for predicting responses.³¹⁵ In his

³¹² Thompson, *The Folktale*, p. 449.

³¹³ Berze Nagy, quoted and trans. by Dégh, "Some Questions on the Social Function of Storytelling," p. 113.

³¹⁴ Miller and Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation*, p. 30.

³¹⁵ Rotter, *Social Learning and Clinical Psychology*.

study of responses for application in clinical psychology, Rotter introduced a formula for behavior potential (B.P.). According to his theory, the potentiality of certain behavior is elicited through expectancy of reinforcement (E), and the value of the reinforcer (R.V.) for the individual. That is, the probability of certain behavior to occur is determined by two variables: the expectancy that the behavior in question will be reinforced (rewarded), and the value of the reinforcement (reward) to the subject (his basic formula is $B.P. = f(E.R.V.)$). For example, a person will not tell a tale unless he *expects* to be rewarded and unless the reward, which is determined by social and cultural values, is important to him. If a person has a choice between two anticipated rewards for two separate responses (such as listening to a tale and watching television), or can choose between being rewarded by an important member of the community or an unimportant one, he will choose the more advantageous reward.

In their *Social Learning and Personality Development*, Albert Bandura and Richard H. Walters concluded that "... ^{92} the presentation of positive reinforcers (rewards) ... [is] a means of producing socially approved patterns of behavior," while punishment is used for "the suppression or *inhibition* of responses"³¹⁶ that are socially or otherwise undesirable.

Berlo's "Fraction of Decision"

An occupational hazard for folklorists in the field is the problem of drawing informants into conversation. Whether as informants, or as operants, behaving naturally in their social and cultural milieu, people make conscious and unconscious decisions for every response they make. *What makes a person decide to tell tales, sing songs, or perform a ritual dance?* In other words: *What changes the individual's behavior potential for folkloric responses?*

As noted earlier, drive impels the organism to behave and cues elicit his response and guide his behavior. Reward of the response strengthens the S-R relation, which is the essence of learning; without reward people fail to learn, and their unrewarded responses will disappear. Berlo's "Fraction of Decision" theory employs a formula for this process in which reward plays the decisive role in determining the responses an organism makes. Following the suggestions of Fred Cottrell in *Energy and Society*,³¹⁷ Berlo proposed that "... people and societies differ in the amount of energy available to them; therefore, they differ in the amount of learning or change in behavior that they can tolerate. In any given ^{93} situation, however, behavior change is determined by reward expected vs. energy required."³¹⁸ Berlo applied the principle of "energy and society" to a

³¹⁶ A. Bandura and R.H. Walters, *Social Learning and Personality Development* (New York, 1964), p. 11.

³¹⁷ Fred Cottrell, *Energy and Society* (New York, 1955).

³¹⁸ Berlo, *The Process of Communication*, p. 98.

communication equation developed by Wilbur Schramm to determine the "Fraction of Selection,"³¹⁹ which led to the more general equation of "Fraction of Decision."³²⁰

According to Berlo's "Fraction of Decision" principle and Rotter's "Behavior potential" theory, "We decide to perform those behaviors which we expect will be 'worth the effort,'" that is when the behavior potential is major. Meanwhile, "We decide not to perform behaviors when we believe they are 'not worth the effort,'"³²¹ that is, when the behavior potential is minor. Thus, whenever the individual considers the expected reward to be greater than (>) the expected energy required (behavior potential is major), he will make that response, and whenever the individual considers the expected reward to be lesser than (<) the "expected energy required" he will *not* make that response (behavior potential is minor). The equation for Berlo's principle is:

$$\text{Fraction of Decision} = \frac{\text{Expected Reward}}{\text{Expected Energy Required}}^{322}$$

By "expected energy required" for a response, Berlo means a group of relevant cues requiring the expending of energy in an activity, such as walking, talking, and working, or in an emotion, such as embarrassment, degradation, or frustration. As Berlo points out:¹⁹⁴

Although it is difficult, if not impossible, to put quantitative values in the fraction, the implication is of value. The greater the reward an individual perceives in making a response, the more energy he will expend (if he has it available) to make the response. As perceived reward decreases, required energy must also decrease if the response is to be made.³²³

The Role of Reward in Folkloric Behavior: (Equations/[Quantifying])

Overt folkloric behavior (narrating, singing, performing or making folk artifacts) and covert folkloric behavior (believing in ghosts and saints) are both determined by the individual's decision to expend the effort necessary to secure the rewards implied by surrounding cues. Archer Taylor,

³¹⁹ Wilbur Schramm, "How Communication Works." In: *The Process and Effects of Mass Communication*, ed. Wilbur Schramm (Urbana, Ill., 1954), p. 19.

³²⁰ Berlo, *The Process of Communication*, p. 98.

³²¹ *Ibid.*

³²² *Ibid.*

³²³ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

for example, in his introduction to *The Proverb*, declined to define the complex genre of his study and justified his omission by stating that the effort required would not produce a satisfactory, worthwhile result:

The definition of a proverb is too difficult to repay the undertaking; and should we fortunately combine in a single definition all the essential elements and give each the proper emphasis, we should not even then have a touchstone.³²⁴

Attempting to define the proverb "is too difficult": the energy to be spent on the attempt is greater than (>) the anticipated reward. Taylor's rationale, in terms of the "Fraction of Decision" principle, could be represented by a formula:

$$\text{Fraction of Decision} = \frac{\text{Expected reward (achieving a proper definition)}}{\text{Expected energy required}}$$

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Since expected reward is < [lesser than] expected energy required: Fraction of Decision is negative / Behavior potential is minor.

This principle is applicable to operants in a society as well as to informants in their dealings with field collectors:

I. Operants

1. Von Sydow regarded reward as central to all aspects of the process of folklore continuity:

An active teller of tales will become a passive bearer of folktale tradition when nobody cares to listen to him any longer and this may happen for various reasons. In religious revolutions a great variety of tradition will always become obsolete because they do not conform to the new form of religion, which will often take up a hostile attitude to them and force their bearers to inactivity. A similar change may occur in the case of political or social revolutions.³²⁵

In other words, even an active narrator, (whose expected reward is always greater than the energy required to perform) can be forced to abandon his practice of tale-telling through lack of reward (a process of extinction), or through punishment (a process of inhibition, suppression, or repression),

³²⁴ Archer Taylor, *The Proverb* (Hatboro, Pa., 1962), p. 3.

³²⁵ Von Sydow, *Selected Papers on Folklore*, p. 15.

although the amount of energy required for his performance remains the same.

The equation for Von Sydow's argument is:

A. In the case of active teller:

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Fraction of =	<u>expected reward</u>	=	<u>social attention</u>
Decision	expected energy required		time, effort, possible embarrassment

Expected reward > energy = positive response/Behavior potential is major.

B. In the case of neutralized teller (active teller becoming a passive bearer):

Fraction of =	<u>expected reward</u>	=	<u>expected reward</u>
Decision	expected energy required		time, effort, and drawing attention of audience

Expected reward < energy = negative response/Behavior Potential is minor.

2. Another example is given by Eberhard in his study of the minstrels of Southeastern Turkey.

A. In the case of an active performer, Eberhard reported:

... traditional minstrels sing upon invitation at weddings or other ceremonial affairs or drop into coffee shops and simply start to sing, receiving whatever money the public cares to contribute.³²⁶

Fraction of =	<u>expected reward</u>	=	<u>monetary reward and possible social reward</u>
Decision	expected energy required		energy, time and possible embarrassment

Monetary reward and possible social reward > energy required = positive response/Behavior potential is major. The result is a Positive response: singing for the expected reward.

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B. In the case of a neutralized performer, Eberhard noted:

... the tradition is close to its end ... They [the Turks] will ... prefer to read the stories rather than listen to them, and will ask for more and different types of books, a demand

³²⁶ W. Eberhard, *Minstrel Tales from Southeastern Turkey*, p. 9.

the minstrels are certainly unable to fulfill. Even now a tendency to prefer crime stories and 'Westerns' is noticeable, and even in the hamlets the population is beginning to regard the narrations as 'old-fashioned' ...³²⁷

Thus, when a minstrel is called upon (stimulus) to perform, he will take all of these factors into consideration, and his decision will be influenced by the energy required to surmount the various obstacles and by the reward he expects to gain.

Fraction of = $\frac{\text{expected reward}}{\text{expected energy required}}$ = $\frac{\text{little or no reward}}{\text{great energy requirements and possible embarrassment}}$
Decision

Expected reward < expected energy required = negative decision / behavior potential minor.

The same formula applies to the audience in deciding to attend the performance as to the minstrel in deciding to perform.

a. Positive decision, or listening to the minstrel:

Fraction of = $\frac{\text{expected reward}}{\text{expected energy required}}$ = $\frac{\text{great reward (best available)}}{\text{time, less freedom of movement, and payment}}$
Decision

Expected reward > energy required = positive decision/ Behavior Potential is major

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b. Negative decision or choosing forms of entertainment other than the minstrel:

Fraction of = $\frac{\text{expected reward}}{\text{expected energy required}}$ = $\frac{\text{small reward (not best)}}{\text{time, less freedom of movement, and payment}}$
Decision

Expected reward < expected energy required = negative decision/Behavior potential minor.

Lord reports the following:

In market centers such as ... Novi Pazar and Bihac, market day ... is a good opportunity for the singer because, although his audience may not be stable, it does have money and is willing to reward him for his pains.³²⁸

³²⁷ {283} *Ibid.*, p. 57.

³²⁸ Lord, *The Singer of Tales*, p. 15.

$$\text{Fraction of Decision} = \frac{\text{expected reward}}{\text{expected energy required}} = \frac{\text{monetary payment}}{\text{energy, time, unstable audience, a mixed audience}}$$

Monetary reward > expected energy required = positive decision / Behavior potential is major.

II. Informants

An informant being interviewed by a folklorist will consider the type of reward he is going to get out of narrating, describing, or singing (see *ante*, page 40). The informant yields folklore information only when the expected reward is greater than (>) the expected energy required (behavior potential is major).

1. Some informants, like "Trefflé Largenesse [who] sat idly on a porch fronting the main street in town, bursting with ⁽⁹⁹⁾ *contes* and hungry for visitors;"³²⁹ or the Irish country people who seemed "to realize instinctively that we [O'Sullivan and his colleagues] are doing something important for them,"³³⁰ are self-rewarding, deriving benefit through psychological gratification. The equation for these similar cases is:

$$\text{Fraction of Decision} = \frac{\text{expected reward}}{\text{expected energy}} = \frac{\text{psychological gratification}}{\text{time, effort required}}$$

Expected reward > required energy = positive / Behavior Potential decision is major.

2. Not all informants attain a sense of fulfillment through communicating their knowledge. Jan Vansina, *Notes and Queries on Anthropology*, and Ralph Piddington (see *ante*, page 40) find it necessary to add monetary payment to the expected reward in order to raise the behavior potential and to tip the balance to a positive decision. Expressed in an equation:

A. Fraction of Decision is negative; behavior potential is minor.

$$\text{Fraction of Decision} = \frac{\text{expected reward}}{\text{expected energy}} = \frac{\text{self-rewarding}}{\text{time, effort required}}$$

Expected reward < expected energy required = negative / Behavior Potential decision is minor.

³²⁹ Dorson, *Buying the Wind*, p. 11.

³³⁰ O'Sullivan, *Four Symposia on Folklore*, p. 14.

B. Fraction of Decision is positive; behavior potential is major.

Fraction of = $\frac{\text{expected reward}}{\text{expected energy}}$ = $\frac{\text{self-rewarding and monetary}}{\text{payment, time, effort required}}$
Decision

Expected reward > expected energy required = positive decision / Behavior Potential is major.

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Other folklorists find that they can influence the equation to their advantage by adding tobacco, liquor, etc. to the expected reward to increase "Behavior Potential." Whether the effect of such non-monetary payments is psychological or purely economic, the result is the same--major behavior potential and positive fraction of decision.

Berlo concluded his explication of the "Fraction of Decision" principle with a reassessment of the validity of the maxim "... that 'it is more blessed to give than to receive,'" stating, "... man does not behave on this principle unless he gets more from the giving than he does from receiving."³³¹ The maxim complies with the general rule of the effect of reward, the degree of giving being affected by the greatness of the reward to be gained. If, for example, the state of grace falls to individuals who have lived righteously, an individual's giving is not giving at all, but merely the discarding of minor rewards in expectation of the major reward--eternal joy in the afterlife. Thus, an individual's "giving" is actually an exchange of rewards, determined by the type of reward which he values most highly.

Conclusion

Reward and expectancy of reward play a decisive role in the acquisition of new responses and modes of behavior, for they strengthen responses, crystallizing them into habits. At the same time, punishment and the drive to avoid punishment ^{101} are responsible for the inability to learn and acquire new, punished responses and for the inhibition, suppression, and repression of habitual, punished responses. In Rotter's terms, reward and punishment determine an individual's Behavior Potential at a certain time and under given circumstances. In a social and cultural milieu, the learning process influences a broader range than when it is limited to individual instances of learning. As has been shown, social and cultural conditions and forces determine motivation and cues as well as the nature and degree of rewards and punishment. Also, in a society whose members interact in a network of close daily contacts, reward and punishment acquire a wider scope of *effect* over a greater number of individuals, because learning becomes an imitative

³³¹ Berlo, *The Process of Communication*, pp. 98-99

process. In imitative behavior, social and cultural factors provide the mechanism and components of the learning process, rather than individual factors, even though the actual mechanism of the learning process resides in the individual.

In the preceding discussion we have been mainly concerned with the learning of folkloric responses and the acquiring of folkloric behavior on an individual basis. Now let us consider folklore learning on a communal basis, as it occurs in cohesive societies.

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CHAPTER III
SOCIAL LEARNING
IMITATION

The idea that man imitates rather than creates is at least as old as "Aristotle's theory of poetry and fine art,"³³² and man's behavior has largely been attributed to his reproduction of the behavior he has perceived in others. However, imitation did not influence psychological theory until the turn of the century. Early psychologists like Lloyd Morgan,³³³ G. Tarde,³³⁴ and W. McDougall³³⁵ regarded imitation as an instinctive (innate) faculty. With the declining importance of instinctual psychology and the emergence of the Pavlovian theory of conditioned response, scientists such as F.H. Allport³³⁶ and E.B. Holt³³⁷ attempted to account for learning and behavior sequences as the response of one person acting as a stimulus to elicit a similar response from another person. In these early studies, imitative learning was regarded as copying from a model through conditioned responses in a reflex circle. However, as a psychological behavioristic mechanism, imitation was not incorporated into behavior theory and questions of imitative behavior until 1941, in Miller and (103) Dollard's *Social Learning and Imitation*.³³⁸ They broadly defined imitation as follows:

Imitation is a process by which "matched," or similar, acts are evoked in two people and connected to appropriate cues. It can occur only under conditions which are

³³² (284) Aristotle's *Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*, trans. and ed. S.H. Butcher (New York, 1951), pp. 121-162.

³³³ C. Lloyd Morgan, *Habit and Instinct* (London, 1896).

³³⁴ G. Tarde, *The Laws of Imitation*, trans. E.C. Parsons (New York, 1903).

³³⁵ W. McDougall, *An Introduction to Social Psychology* (London, 1908).

³³⁶ F.H. Allport, *Social Psychology* (Cambridge, Mass., 1924).

³³⁷ E.B. Holt, *Animal Drive and the Learning Process*, Vol. I (New York, 1931).

³³⁸ K. Young (*Social Psychology*, p. 57) states that Miller and Dollard's book "... has become something of a classic in social psychology." Also, Bandura and Walters (*Social Learning and Personality Development*, p. 54) state that "The theory of imitation pronounced by Miller and Dollard, has ... been widely accepted ..."

favorable to learning these acts. If matching, or doing the same as others do, is regularly rewarded, a secondary tendency to match may be developed, and the process of imitation becomes the derived drive of imitativeness.³³⁹

According to this theory, the necessary conditions for learning through imitation include a motivated subject who is positively reinforced for matching the correct responses of a model. In many situations people do not solve problems by trial and error, but by doing what they see others receive rewards for doing.

In terms of folkloric behavior, imitation is a "do like" process. A tells a tale or sings a song and is rewarded for it; B watches A and is aware of A's behavior and of the reward A received. Then B--who had not yet learned how, when, or where to tell tales or sing songs-- takes A as a model, and under similar circumstances responds in a similar manner, matching A's behavior in expectation of a similar reward. If B is rewarded for matching A's behavior, telling tales or singing tends to enter B's behavior pattern, and B's behavior will be an imitation of A's behavior.

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The Intricate Concept of "Learn from"

In folklore scholarship, the factor "learned from" is basically a standard procedure and an automatic part of the techniques of any field collector. A folklorist in the field will ask his informant, "From whom did you learn this tale (song, joke, proverb, recipe, dance) ?" before he will ask "Where did you learn it?" or "When did you learn it?"

We have already discussed the meaning of the word "learn," as well as the complexity of learning factors (drive-cues-response-reward). The preposition "from" in the phrase "learn from" is no less complex than the word "learn." To learn is simply to acquire new responses or change old ones; to "learn from" is to acquire types of responses from others or to benefit from the experience of others by "matching" or avoiding their behavior. However, in social and cultural traditional behavior (acquiring new responses, enculturating and learning from others) "to learn" is to *match the responses* of those from whom one learns.³⁴⁰ "From" denotes an operation with two collateral aspects, the first being the nature of the learned responses, and the second being the source of these responses. Kimball Young writes:

The word 'from' in the expression 'learns from' serves to convey two ideas: first, the idea that the learned responses of at least two persons are 'matched' or alike; second,

³³⁹ Miller and Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation*, p. 10.

³⁴⁰ An individual can learn to avoid the behavior of another. In this case "learning from" a model is not "matching" the responses of the model, but is a form of negative identification.

the idea that the learned responses of at least one of two persons are 'dependent' upon the responses of the other.³⁴¹

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Thus, if A has learned from B to tell tales to her children at bedtime, A was "dependent" on B, and B's action was a "necessary condition" for A to acquire the learned response. In terms of learning theory, some of B's responses served as cues for A, these cues enabling A to learn to tell tales in a specific situation. Hence, A's learned response is matched to B's response and, at the same time, is dependent on it.³⁴²

Matched dependent behavior generally "covers what has been called 'cultural behavior'"³⁴³ and is especially crucial to the perpetuation of folklore, a branch [i.e., category] of culture that requires stability of "types" and "motifs" in the material transmitted through time and space from one person to another and from one generation to the next. To acquire responses by learning from another person how to tell a tale, apply a proverb, legend, or myth to a situation, or to perform a folk dance or ritual "would be cultural learning," or matched dependent behavior, whether a person simply observed the action to be imitated or underwent formal oral or written instruction.³⁴⁴

³⁴¹ K. Young, *Social Psychology*, p. 48.

³⁴² [285] It is the contention of Kimball Young in *Social Psychology* that this type of learning--his example was "how to tie a knot"--covers both types of imitation defined by Miller and Dollard: "matched dependent behavior" and "copying" (see p. 45). In "copying," as they define it, "... the copier must slowly bring his responses to approximate that of a model, and must know when he has done so that his act is an acceptable reproduction of the model act." Miller and Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation* (see p. 11).

In folkloric behavior, copying is most vividly represented in cases of apprenticeship; cases of this type of learning in attempts of disciples to approximate the behavior of their models or senior performers are given by Eberhard in *Minstrel Tales from Southeastern Turkey*, and Lord in *The Singer of Tales*.

³⁴³ K. Young, *Social Psychology*, p. 48.

This application of the term "matched dependent behavior" is broader than that designated by Miller and Dollard, who applied the term to situations where "the leader is able to read the relevant environment cues, but the follower is not; the latter must depend upon the leader for signal as to what act is to be performed and where and when." They apply this principle to "fluid collective interaction situation" (to use Sherif's words) such as mob behavior. (Miller and Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation*, p. 11). However, according to K. Young, the term "matched dependent behavior" does not necessarily have to involve collective behavior but is equally valid in a situation involving two persons, one performs, while the other learns.

³⁴⁴ K. Young, *Social Psychology*, p. 48.

The Concept of Imitation in Anthropology and Folklore Scholarship

Imitation is a basic and vital factor in the acquisition and alteration of all types of behavior, whether ⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ it be conforming or deviant. The principle of imitation is equally applicable to groups and individuals, and to cultural and social levels. As early as 1936, Linton observed that culture could be acquired through imitation. For Linton, "The culture of any society consists of the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior which the members of that society have acquired through instruction or imitation and which they share to a greater or less degree."³⁴⁵ As an aspect of cultural learning, imitation is stressed in anthropological and folklore reports on varying cultures and subcultures found throughout the world. Gladys A. Reichard in her article, "Social Life," noted that "... children do not do what adults tell them to do, but rather what they *see* other adults *do*."³⁴⁶ Her statement can serve as an operative definition for *imitation*. This learning mechanism is a fundamental factor in the acquisition of both specific activities and the general attitudes and concepts of a given culture. Mead, discussing how a Manus child learns from an older child or an adult, states that in certain cases "... the learning can be said to proceed by *imitation* of a specific act."³⁴⁷ Similarly, Dorothy Leighton and Clyde Kluckhohn described how the Navaho child learns to perform certain biological acts by merely imitating a grown-up: "The ⁽¹⁰⁷⁾ mother or an older sister takes the child out when she herself goes to defecate and tells the little one to imitate her position and her actions."³⁴⁸

Folkloric knowledge is acquired in the same imitative manner. Children and adults acquire folkloric responses and acts ranging from a simple individual response, such as how to make a clay doll, to complex adult roles, such as how to perform an elaborate healing ritual, using either folk medicine or witchcraft, or a mixture of both arts.

Complex adult-role behavior is sometimes learned entirely through the imitative process rather than through instruction or teaching and coaching performed by the experts or the older for the benefit of the younger. M. Nash described how a young Guatemalan girl is provided with miniature

³⁴⁵ Linton, *The Study of Man*, p. 288.

³⁴⁶ Gladys A. Reichard, "Social Life." In: *General Anthropology*, ed. Franz Boas (Boston, 1938), p. 471:-.

³⁴⁷ Mead, *Continuities in Cultural Evolution*, p. 55; and *Growing Up in New Guinea* (New York, 1930), p. 34.

³⁴⁸ Dorothy Leighton and Clyde Kluckhohn, *Children of the People* (Cambridge, Mass. 1947), p. 35.

household utensils so that she can imitate her mother's domestic activities and thus acquire a repertoire of sex-appropriate responses. At the same time, small boys acquire their sex-appropriate responses by accompanying their fathers and imitating their occupational activities with miniature models of the adult's implements.³⁴⁹

Ethnomusicologists find imitation as vital to the acquisition of musical responses as it is to the learning of other social and cultural responses. In his study of the process of "learning" music Alan P. Merriam quotes numerous anthropological reports on primitive and ⁽¹⁰⁸⁾ nonliterate cultures which signified imitation as a basic operative factor. Merriam suggests that "There is ... considerable evidence to indicate that children begin their musical training, and that in some cultures adults continue to expand their musical knowledge, through imitation."³⁵⁰

Diffusion: In folklore, imitation has been studied under various names. *Diffusion* as an ethnological concept is basically an act of imitative learning; it is copying from a neighboring culture or subculture. "Copying" and "diffusion" are distinguishable in that "copying" refers to an act of a human agent, whereas "diffusion" refers to the geographical movement of a cultural object and presupposes that culture can diffuse independently of a human agent.

Diffusion formed the basis of numerous folklore theories mainly interested in establishing the source (model) from which folktales spread to (copied by) other peoples and cultures. Copying, thus understood, formed the basis of such theories as Wilhelm Grimm's,³⁵¹ which attributed the origins of folk narratives to Indo-European (Aryan) peoples, and C.W. Von Sydow's asserting that true *Märchen* existed solely within Indo-Germanic linguistic boundaries.³⁵² Similarly, the "Indianist" theory, suggested by Loiseleur-Deslongchamps³⁵³ in 1838, and developed by Theodor Benfey³⁵⁴ ⁽¹⁰⁹⁾ and Emmanuel Cosquin,³⁵⁵ was based on the principle of copying, citing India as the

³⁴⁹ M. Nash, *Machine Age Maya: "The Industrialization of a Guatemalan Community."* In: *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 60 No. 2, Pt., No. 87 (1958).

³⁵⁰ Merriam, *The Anthropology of Music*, p. 150.

³⁵¹ Wilhelm Grimm, *Kinder- und Hausmärchen*, Vol. 3 (Leipzig, 1856), pp. 427-429.

³⁵² C.W. Von Sydow, "Das Märchen als indogermanische Tradition (Auszug) übertragen von Lily Weiser." In: *Neiderdeutsche Zeitschrift für Volkskunde*, Vol. 4 (1926), 207-215.

³⁵³ ⁽²⁸⁶⁾ Loiseleur-Deslongchamps, *Essai sur les fables indiennes et sur leur introduction en Europe* (Paris, 1838).

³⁵⁴ T. Benfey, *Panchatantra: fünf Bücher indischer Fabeln, Märchen, und Erzählungen*, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1859).

original source for all folktales except Aesop's fables. Both the Grimm-Von Sydow school and the Indianists attributed folktale origins to racial stocks, suggesting the "Indo-Europeans," or the Aryans and the Indians, as the initiators of the tales which later spread throughout the world. The Aryans and the Indians then, served as *models* for other peoples who *copied* the folktale tradition from their behavior.

Naumann's *Gesunkenes Kulturgut* [(Sunken Culture Material)] In 1902, E. Hoffmann-Krayer suggested that folktales did not spring from a particular social class present in all societies. Hoffmann-Krayer further stated: "The folk do not produce, they re-produce," thus attributing the acquisition of folkloric responses by a folk social stratum to imitative learning.³⁵⁶

Hans Naumann developed this argument into a theory,³⁵⁷ abandoning the primitive ritualistic theory³⁵⁸ which he had originally espoused in company with van Gennep³⁵⁹ and P. Saintyves.³⁶⁰ Naumann's theory credited the origin of folklore to a socially superior *Oberschicht* (upper-stratum, intelligentsia), whose creative responses were borrowed (imitated) by the socially inferior *Unterschicht* (lower-stratum, peasantry). Although the process was one of matched dependent behavior, the behavior of the model (the-*Oberschicht*), degenerated into "folklore" (110) in the course of being acquired and re-produced by the *Unterschicht*. These folkloric responses of the *Unterschicht* were degenerated imitations of the original *Oberschicht* models because they were garbled and reflected the ignorance and misunderstanding of the unsophisticated *Unterschicht*. Naumann called the product adopted from the *Oberschicht* models: *Gesunkenes Kulturgut*.

***Herrenvolk* [(Master Race)]:** The views of Naumann, Hoffmann-Krayer, Riehl (a sociologist, whose study: *Die Volkskunde als Wissenschaft*, was published in 1858) and others who viewed folklore in nationalistic terms, were later incorporated into Nazi political ideology. Thus, what began as sociological and anthropological thesis became fundamental to the development of the nationalistic "Herrenvolk" concept. Kimball Young described the dependence of Nazi ideology on folk tradition:

³⁵⁵ Emmanuel Cosquin, *Les contes indiens et l'occident* (Paris, 1922).

³⁵⁶ Eduard Hoffmann-Krayer, *Die Volkskunde als Wissenschaft* (Zürich, 1902).

³⁵⁷ Hans Naumann, *Grundzüge der deutschen Volkskunde* (Leipzig, 1922).

³⁵⁸ Hans Naumann, *Primitive Gemeinschaftskultur* (Jena, 1929).

³⁵⁹ Van Gennep, *La formation des legendes*.

³⁶⁰ P. Saintyves, *Les contes de Perrault et les recits parallèles* (Paris, 1923).

It has sometimes been said that, in contrast to revolutionary communism which had systematic formulation at the hands of Marx and Lenin, National Socialism had no basic theory. This is not quite accurate. Its roots lie deep in German political theory and practice. There was a firm belief that racial and folk ideals were basic to the state and that an intense nationalism is an important means of survival.³⁶¹

In their search for the spiritual and national ancestry of the German peoples, the "Nazi folklorists bypassed the famous names of German scholarship like Grimm, Mannhardt, ⁽¹¹¹⁾ Köhler and Bolte ... and fastened on Riehl,"³⁶² and other scholars of similar nationalistic inclinations. Thus, the theory of the "Herrenvolk" became synonymous with the earlier concepts of 'leading,' 'higher,' or 'formative' social strata of a population: "Führerschicht,"³⁶³ "Oberschicht,"³⁶⁴ and "Bildungsschicht."³⁶⁵ All of strata were thought to have served as "models" for the imitative behavior of lower, less gifted social groups, or nations.

Thus, the first step towards a theory of the imitative learning in culture was introduced by folklorists at the beginning of the twentieth century. It never gained popularity because it was employed by political ideologists as a scientific justification for extreme nationalism. The defeat of the ideology doomed the theory as well. With the violent downfall of the Nazi regime, Naumann's "Gesunkenes Kulturgut" itself became *Gesunkenes Kulturgut*, and the concept of imitative learning in culture was aborted.

Theory of Imitation: Marxist and Western Positions

Western psychologists have only recently become interested in social motivation; Miller and Dollard in their work *Social Learning and Imitation* (1941), being the first scholars to give the subject serious consideration. Although cross-cultural learning (copying) has always been a dominant factor in folklore scholarship and anthropology, social motivation and imitation, as learning processes, were rarely associated with the transmission of culture. Copying has been ⁽¹¹²⁾ particularly important in folklore studies, receiving attention from the influential "Finnish" school of folktale scholarship. The "Finnish" school employs a historic-geographic data to ascertain

³⁶¹ K. Young, *Social Psychology*, p. 481. (The italics are mine).

³⁶² Dorson, "Current Folklore Theories," p. 97.

³⁶³ Adolf Bach, *Deutsche Volkskunde: Wege und Organisation Probleme - System - Methoden Ergebnisse und Aufgaben Schrifttum* (Heidelberg, 1960), pp. 661-662.

³⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 139-140.

³⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 438-440.

folktale origins, considering tale types and motifs apart from the human agents, who diffuse the material after acquiring it through a learning process.

Soviet and East-European scholars have criticized Naumann's views as "crude sociological errors,"³⁶⁶ emphasizing social motivation as Western psychologists and folklorists did not. Y.M. Sokolov stated the Soviet objection to Naumann and offered a counterpart:

Naumann did not perceive in popular poetry that which, among us, has been so finely observed by that wonderful connoisseur of popular life, Maxim Gorky, who emphasized, above all, the living creative beginning in the art of the working people, and the close connection of the popular creative work with labor, the basis of human culture.

The haughty preconceived attitude of Naumann toward the masses of the working people, and the denial of their creative power, of course, were not accidental, but were nourished by the general world view of Naumann, that typical representative of the bourgeois science of the era of decaying capitalism.³⁶⁷

Naumann's theory was concerned only with the content and style of folklore genres (mainly as "oral literature,"³⁶⁸ (113) or "verbal art,"³⁶⁹) than with national or political ideology and dogma. The unfortunate political implications later associated with his theory led to the rejection of its tenet that folklore could have originated, at least partly, in the upper classes and the tenet that folkloric behavior was imitative learning of responses to drives, elicited by cues.

Imitative learning of such responses, however, is a verified psychological fact, occurring both

³⁶⁶ Y.M. Sokolov, *Russian Folklore*, trans. Catherine Ruth Smith (Hatboro, Pa., 1966), p. 119.

³⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

³⁶⁸ Used by Katharine Luomala in *Voices on the Wind* (Honolulu, 1955); and Jacobs in *The Content and Style of an Oral Literature*. Yet, John Greenway points out that the term "oral literature," suffers from an "irreconcilable contradiction" or "oxymoron," between the words "oral" and "literature," literature being derived from the Latin *literature* by which the Romans meant learning, grammar, and writing. Greenway, *Literature among the Primitives* (Hatboro, Pa., 1964), (see p. xii)

³⁶⁹ [287] The term "verbal art" was jointly introduced by William Bascom and Richard Waterman in their definition of "folklore" in *Funk and Wagnalls Standard Dictionary of Folklore, Mythology and Legend*, Vol. I, p. 398. Later Bascom elaborated on the meaning of the term, in *Journal of American Folklore*, Vol. 88 (1955), 245-252.

on the local level (such as village, or a quarter) where the political chief, hero, religious leader, and folk artist are models for prestigious behavior and on the national level, where models are provided by celebrated cultural and political figures. Mowrer, equating imitation with habit formation, states, "In imitation and in habit alike ... we can say a model for or *image of* desirable, attractive ... promising action emerges."³⁷⁰ The principal difference between habit and imitation is that "... in habit the learner himself provides the original 'model.' That is to say, an organism acts in a particular way (with certain stimulus consequences),"³⁷¹ while in imitation the organism imitates the reward-promising responses of another organism.

Imitation in Folkloric Behavior

Folklorists have noticed the influence imitation exerts on the process of acquiring folkloric responses by certain ⁽¹¹⁴⁾ individuals in a community due to the influence of models. Lord, Eberhard, Dégh, and a number of other folklorists in the field have studied the influence of imitation of models on folkloric responses. The models for folkloric behavior, that is the individuals who "inspire" others to imitate them (match their responses), can come from a variety of groups or classes. According to Miller and Dollard, there are "four classes of persons who are imitated by others".³⁷²

1. Superiors in an age-grade hierarchy.
2. Superiors in a hierarchy of social status.
3. Superiors in an intelligence ranking system.
4. Superior technicians in the field.

First: Imitation of Age-grade Superiors

Sociologist S.N. Eisenstadt states that age-status expectation "... constitutes one of the strongest, most essential links between the personality system of individuals and the social system in which they participate."³⁷³ The concept of "age class," "age set," or "age grade" has been affirmed as a "... prerogatives of those who belong to a certain class,"³⁷⁴ by cultural and social anthropologists such

³⁷⁰ O. Hobart Mowrer, *Learning Theory and the Symbolic Process* (New York, 1960), p. 113.

³⁷¹ Mowrer, *Learning Theory and the Symbolic Process*, pp. 112-113.

³⁷² Miller and Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation*, p. 183.

³⁷³ S.N. Eisenstadt, *From Generation to Generation: Age Group and Social Structure* (Glencoe, Ill., 1956), p. 32.

³⁷⁴ A.H.J. Prins, *East African Age-class System: An Inquiry into the Social Order of galla, Kipsigis, and Kikuyu* (Groningen, The Netherlands, 1953), p. 10.

as Ralph Linton³⁷⁵ (whose work *The Study of Man* is quoted by Miller and Dollard) and Radcliffe-Brown.³⁷⁶ The psychological effect of "age-grade" stratification within the same social class is regarded as "undoubtedly one of the major circumstances under which imitation can take place,"³⁷⁷ especially ^[115] when the social distance between "age-grades" is rigorously observed. Older persons are superior in social learning because "They certainly have had more practice in specific fields of response and have connected a larger number of relevant responses to cue stimuli."³⁷⁸ In other words, they have had "experience" and they know their way around. Because of this superiority, the elderly enjoy privileges accorded them by society.

Folklorists have frequently reported this type of imitative learning. Apart from the general assumption that the "best" informants (see *post*, pages 81, 107) are usually older persons, the actual examples of imitating the folkloric behavior of age-grade superiors can be found within the family. Dégh remarks that in acquiring "storytelling" (as a response or mode of behavior), "The first source is, of course, the paternal house."³⁷⁹ In the "paternal house," the fathers or mothers will provide the models for their children to imitate and "... it is frequent that children in the families of storytellers are taught how to tell tales or that children, imitating adults, try to exercise the art among themselves."³⁸⁰ This fact is further stressed by numerous field reports which note that the honor of being a *raconteur* is bestowed by the community on those individuals who have reached maturity.³⁸¹ Thompson concluded that it was "Elderly or at least middle-aged persons [who] have nearly always ^[116] yielded the best folktales,"³⁸² and thereby receive the "honors" of the community.

³⁷⁵ Ralph Linton, "A Neglected Aspect of Social Organization." In: *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 45 (1940), 870-886; and R. Linton, "The Natural History of the Family." In: *The Family; Its Function and Destiny*, rev. ed. (New York, 1959), pp. 30-52.

³⁷⁶ A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, "Age Organization-Terminology," *Man*, Vol. 29 (1929), 21.

³⁷⁷ Miller and Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation*, p. 184.

³⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 186.

³⁷⁹ Dégh, "Some Questions of the Social Function of Storytelling," p. 137.

³⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁸¹ W. Wissler, *Plattdeutsche Volksmärchen* (Jena, 1927), P.X.V.; J.H. Delargy, "The Gaelic Storyteller." In: *Proceedings of the British Academy*, Vol. 39 (1945), 23; L. Uffer, *Rätoromanische Märchen und ihre Erzähler* (Basel, 1945), p. 8; and Dégh, "Some Questions of the Social Function of Storytelling."

³⁸² Thompson, *The Folktale*, p. 408

Second: Imitation of Superiors in Social Status

Miller and Dollard ascribe "social status" to those individuals belonging to a "class hierarchy," the social class being defined as "... a large body of persons who occupy a position in a social hierarchy by reasons of their manifesting *similarly valued objective criteria*."³⁸³ "Similarly valued objective criteria" which are characteristic of a particular social class are linked with the value which folklore responses hold for members of that class and are manifested in such evaluations as "good," "low," "of the peasants," "of the educated," "common," and "vulgar." The value of folkloric responses can be dependent on the status of the performer. As Alex Inkeles points out, "A man's social class can, of course, be a quality attributed to him and reacted to by others in the same way as they react to his color or his personality."³⁸⁴ The direction of imitation indicates that the upper classes exert an influence which "... is greater than that going in the opposite direction." Miller and Dollard state that psychological and social lines of evidence demonstrate that "... people tend to imitate those above them rather than those below them in social status." Since classes which are in close proximity are ⁽¹¹⁷⁾ more aware of each other because of social interaction, "... imitation in a class hierarchy takes place between juxtaposed classes rather than between those which are socially distant from one another."³⁸⁵

Miller and Dollard attributed the motivation for imitating the responses of an upper class to biological or primary drives and rewards:

The arrangement of social classes is not an accidental or irrelevant phenomenon. The members of these classes have differential access to the goods and services of our society - the higher the class, the more and better the access. Possession of symbols of superior ranks gives superior control of direct reinforcement, such as softer beds, better food, better drinks ... To seek higher social status and the symbols evaluated as 'superior' in the society, therefore, no idle quest for mere prestige.³⁸⁶

³⁸³ [288] Gideon Sjöberg, *The Preindustrial City: Past and Present* (Glencoe, Ill., 1960), p. 109. (The italics are mine.); and Talcott Parsons, *Essays in Sociological Theory* (Glencoe, Ill., 1949), pp. 171-172.

³⁸⁴ Alex Inkeles, "Sociology and Psychology." In: *Psychology: A Study of a Science*, ed. Sigmund Koch, Vol. 6: *Investigation of Man as Socious: Their Place in Psychology and Social Sciences*, ed. S. Koch (New York, 1963), p. 373.

³⁸⁵ Miller and Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation*, p.

³⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 188.

This operation is cyclical, for "once imitation of social superiors has been rewarded in one situation, it tends to extend to other stimulus situations and other responses."³⁸⁷

Lord Raglan's "Ritualistic Theory" of Imitation

In folklore scholarship, the early, turbulent career of Naumann's imitative-degenerative theory of the acquisition of folkloric responses by the "Unterschicht" from the "Oberschicht" created a hostile attitude toward the mere discussion of such a learning process. Ironically, Raglan's ⁽¹¹⁸⁾ similar theory remains little known in European folklore circles because it did not acquire the political notoriety of Naumann's theory. Without referring to any specific race, nation, or social class, Raglan formulated a theory of ritualistic origin of folklore. According to Raglan, the origins of narrative genres are to be sought in ancient, dramatic "royal ritual," developed and phrased by the royal and priestly classes.³⁸⁸ The ritual drama was imitated by the masses (lower classes) who were too unsophisticated to understand its meaning, and through an evolving process of degeneration, it reached its present "folklore" state. Thus, epic, legend, myth, and folktales were "invented" by an upper class and imitated by a lower class, which rendered them in their present state.

Raglan argues that the "invention" of such genres could not be credited to "peasants" and "savages" (his label for nonliterate peoples³⁸⁹). He asserted: "No popular story-teller has ever been known to invent anything,"³⁹⁰ and that "... the peasant and the savage, though they are great hands at making up stories, are nevertheless incapable of making up the simplest story of the doings of ordinary human beings."³⁹¹ Raglan's theory implies that creative "imagination" is a sophisticated phenomenon found only among the upper classes, and that the "peasant" and "savage" or "illiterate" possesses only "... memory [which] is more or less retentive, but ... will add nothing to his or ⁽¹¹⁹⁾ anyone else's ideas ... since it can invent nothing."³⁹² Thus, the "peasant" and "savage" or illiterate merely imitates and distorts, responding negatively and unable to create anything himself.

In summary, Raglan's theory of the imitative learning of folkloric responses from superior classes is almost identical with Hans Naumann's. Raglan merely spoke in general terms of "royalty" and "peasantry," while Naumann's theory described European "Oberschicht" and "Unterschicht,"

³⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 189.

³⁸⁸ Raglan, *The Hero*, p. 135.

³⁸⁹ Herskovits and Herskovits, *Dahomean Narrative*, p. 105.

³⁹⁰ Raglan, *The Hero*, p. 130.

³⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

³⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 137.

which would later be interpreted as definite "Führerschicht" as opposed to ignorant masses and German "Herrenvolk," in contrast to inferior races.

The Raglan-Naumann theory of imitative learning remains alive in folklore scholarship in unoffensive contexts. Eberhard refers to the desire of the minstrels of Southeastern Turkey to become writers or movie stars although these occupations are foreign to their social class,³⁹³ and Dégh reports that the farmer, rising above his original peasant status, adopts middle class responses:

The typical peasant farmer, in his rise towards the bourgeoisie, wants to hear "true," i.e. historical stories, reads newspapers, and refuses to listen to tales of wonders which he will stamp as so many lies. His mentality is rational, and tales are relegated by him to the nursery to be told there by the womenfolk for the amusement of the children, the situation in that respect being similar to that encountered in cities.³⁹⁴

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"The typical peasant farmer" not only acquires new, "bourgeois" responses, by imitating his social superiors, but also abandons the old, cultural responses, which identify him with the class he aspires to leave behind. This mechanism, known as "non-imitation"³⁹⁵ or negative imitation, is always noticeable in the activities of those "mobile individuals" who would ascent the social ladder. They "very carefully avoid the habits characteristic of their former social status,"³⁹⁶ and will inhibit the folkloric behavior associated with their prior class and imitate new responses associated with the upper class they wish to enter. [See post, pages 169, 197].

Third: Imitation of Technicians [(Apprenticeship)]

The third and fourth classes in Miller and Dollard's system of factors eliciting imitation--"imitation in an intelligence ranking system," and "imitation of superior technicians"--are combined in folklore practice. This type of imitation is not limited to one class or one age-grading, it "... cuts across age-grading and social class,"³⁹⁷ distinctions: a technician will be imitated by those interested in his specialty, regardless of his age or social class, and thus the paradox may arise of the highly educated person who takes instructions from an illiterate {121} laborer in order to learn a

³⁹³ Eberhard, *Minstrel Tales from Southeastern Turkey*, p. 50.

³⁹⁴ Dégh, "Some Questions of the Social Function of Storytelling," p. 125.

³⁹⁵ Miller and Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation*, p. 197.

³⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁹⁷ Miller and Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation*, p. 195.

particular craft, tale, or folk instrument.

This type of imitation, [apprenticeship], has been recognized by folklorists not as a psychological principle but as a matter of empirical fact. Folklorists seem to agree that it is the "gifted" narrator, not necessarily the oldest or the socially prominent one, who keeps *Märchen* alive, and is a dynamic factor in the society. Eberhard noted, in tracing the sources of tales rendered by minstrels in Southeastern Turkey, that "They had learned their art from older minstrels who had inspired in them an *interest* in the art."³⁹⁸ The older minstrel--as a member of both an age-class and a technician-class and above all, as a talented performer--served as a model for younger ones. In his study *The Singer of Tales*, Lord affirmed these findings and distinguished "three states of learning" in the acquisition of folk material.

The first stage is "the period of listening and absorbing," in which the person "... has decided that he wants to sing himself, or he may be unaware of this decision and simply be very eager to hear the stories of his elders."³⁹⁹ This is a selective period in which certain individuals are chosen as models by younger members of the community, and certain desirable types of their responses are observed so that they can be matched.

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The second stage is "the period of application," during which the singer attempts to match the behavior, or specific responses, of his chosen model. "Learning in this second stage is a process of imitation both in regard to playing the instrument and to learning the formulas and themes of the tradition,"⁴⁰⁰ Lord added, "It may truthfully be said that the singer *imitates the techniques of composition of his master* of masters rather than particular songs"⁴⁰¹ for it is the general behavior--the sum of the minstrel's responses--not merely the content and style of his material, which the student wishes to grasp. It is a case of matched dependent behavior.

The "third and last stage of the learning process" is "... that of singing before a critical audience" after the imitation process is completed and the behavior of the student is matched to that of the model.⁴⁰²

³⁹⁸ Eberhard, *Minstrel Tales from Southeastern Turkey*, p. 5. (The italics are mine).

³⁹⁹ Lord, *The Singer of Tales*, p. 21.

⁴⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 23-24. (The italics are mine).

⁴⁰¹ Lord, *The Singer of Tales*, p. 24. (The italics are mine).

⁴⁰² *Ibid.*, pp. 21, 24

Vicarious Instigation and Indirect Reinforcement

So far, we have only considered cases of direct reinforcement, where reward or punishment were dealt directly to the individual (organism) that made the response. It was the singer of the song, the narrator of the folktale, the applier of the proverb, who received the reward or punishment for his activity. And it was the singer, narrator, or applier ⁽¹²³⁾ who learned, i.e., it was the relationship between the stimulus (S) and his response (R) (singing, narrating, using) that was strengthened by reward or weakened by punishment.

However, this principle of direct reinforcement does not account for all the folkloric behavior of an individual nor for the total existence of a folklore genre (subclass of folkloric responses) in a community, since not every individual member is directly rewarded for his folkloric responses. Although folklore is deemed a communal phenomenon, shared and projected by most, if not all, of the community, active bearers of traditions represent only a small percentage of the population.⁴⁰³ If direct reward or punishment were essential to "stamping in" or "stamping out" a response such as tale-telling, every member will have to tell tales before he could be rewarded for the response and tale-telling is incorporated into his behavior. Actually, the spectator's role is also a positive one, eliciting a type of reward *for listening* which differs from the reward the teller receives *for narrating*. However, this implies an inflexibility of roles with narrators always narrating and listeners always listening. A listener or passive bearer of the folk tradition, would have to be rewarded for becoming an active bearer before he could begin to make the rewarded responses (narrating, performing).

⁽¹²⁴⁾

Psychologists Albert Bandura, Dorthea Ross, and Shiella A. Ross have noticed:

It is becoming increasingly apparent that social learning cannot be adequately explained in terms of direct reinforcement principles. New social responses may be acquired or the characteristics of existing response hierarchies may be considerably modified as a function of observing the behavior of others and its response consequences without the observer's performing any overt responses himself or receiving any direct reinforcement during the acquisition period.⁴⁰⁴

⁴⁰³ [289] Wesselski introduced this concept in his article "Die Formen des Volkstülichen Erzählgut." In: *Die Deutsche Volkskunde*, ed. Adolph Spamer, Vol. I (Lepizig, 1935), pp. 219-220, and it was further developed by Von Sydow, *Selected Papers on Folklore*, pp. 13-18, 203-204.

⁴⁰⁴ Albert Bandura, Dorthea Ross and Shiella A. Ross, "Vicarious Reinforcement and Imitative Learning." In: *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 67 (1963), 601; and Albert Bandura, "Social

In other words, not every single member of a community has to be rewarded before the community acquires the response of listening to folktales, nor is it necessary to punish every member in order to inhibit or repress an established folkloric response. This is a significant factor in the spread of folkloric responses among non-active bearers of traditions as well as in the cessation and disappearance of certain folklore genres (subclasses of responses).

The principle of indirect reinforcement is closely associated with the concept of "vicarious instigation." Seymour M. Berger, an early figure in the area of vicarious learning, introduced this operational definition for vicarious instigation:

If an observer responded emotionally to a performer's unconditioned emotional response (UER), then vicarious instigation has occurred [...] UER. [...] is meant to refer to the performer's ⁽¹²⁵⁾ emotional state, following the presentation of an unconditioned stimulus (UCS), as *perceived by the observer*. The actual state of the performer is not-directly observable. The observer must infer the performer's UER from observable events in the environment. Typically, the observer will rely upon the UCS and the performer's overt unconditioned response (UCR) as cues to the performer's UER. Consequently, the performer's UCS and UCR are important determining factors in vicarious instigation.⁴⁰⁵

In terms of folkloric behavior, A responds to a wedding ceremony by singing a folksong. A is rewarded for this response and the reward produces an emotional state of satisfaction in A. B does *not observe* A's emotional state, but *infers* that A was emotionally rewarded for his response from "observable events in the environment," such as encouragement from other individuals at the ceremony. "Typically," B will rely upon the wedding ceremony as a stimulus, and A's singing (overt unconditioned response) as cues to A's emotional state of satisfaction. If B responds emotionally to A's satisfaction, the vicarious instigation has occurred.

This principle, which had long been a hypothesis among psychologists, has been confirmed as a valid operative factor. R.H. Walters, Marion Leat, and L. Mezei summarized the results of one of their experiments as follows: "Generally speaking, confirmation was obtained of the hypothesis

Learning through Imitation." In: *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation*, ed. M.K. Jones (Lincoln, 1962), pp. 211-269.

⁴⁰⁵ Seymour M. Berger, "Conditioning through Vicarious Instigation." In: *Psychological Review*, Vol. 69 (1962), 450.

that observation of a model-rewarded film facilitated deviation, while observation of a model-punished film inhibited deviant behaviour."⁴⁰⁶

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Applying the notion of vicarious instigation to folklore and cultural behavior, one may ask: *To what degree does the observer learn through this type of imitative process?* J.F. McBrearty, A.R. Marston, and F.H. Knafer report their experimental findings: "The amount of learning exhibited by the observer can, in fact, be as great as that shown by the reinforced performer [or model]."⁴⁰⁷ More important to our present study is the fact that the administration of punishment to the performers may produce in observers a conditioned emotional reaction⁴⁰⁸ and response inhibition⁴⁰⁹ very similar to those produced in the performer himself. Thus, when an Egyptian sailor sings in a bar in Brooklyn in the mixed company of members of his ethnic group and Americans and he is punished by the Americans for singing, this punishment will affect not only the performer but the Egyptian observers as well. As will be shown (see Chapter V), vicarious instigation has been responsible for the disappearance of such "genres" or subclasses of responses as *Märchen*, folksongs and other patterns of folkloric behavior such as marriage ceremonies from the overt behavior of the Egyptian community in Brooklyn.

Learning by Identification

The concept of "identification" was introduced by Freud as a subconscious mechanism to indicate "... a {127} process by which an individual, unconsciously or partially so, as a result of an emotional tie, behaves, or imagines himself behaving, as if he were the *person with whom the tie exists*."⁴¹⁰ Today, however, the term "identification" has a broader meaning, and, in one sense, is the process of imitation "... wherein 'habits' or 'traits' of others are taken over, 'incorporated,' quite literally and totally by the subject."⁴¹¹ The difference between "identification" in psychoanalytical terms and "imitation" in terms of learning theory is that imitation "... usually implies some specific action

⁴⁰⁶ R.H. Walters, Marion Leat, and L. Mezei, "Inhibition and Disinhibition of Responses through Empathetic Learning." In: *Canadian Journal of Psychology*, Vol. 17 (1963), 242.

⁴⁰⁷ J.F. McBrearty, A.R. Marston and F.H. Knafer, "Conditioning a Verbal Operant in a Group Setting: Direct vs. Vicarious Reinforcement," (abstract), *American Psychologist*, Vol. 16 (1961), 425.

⁴⁰⁸ Berger, "Conditioning through Vicarious Instigation," 450-466.

⁴⁰⁹ Bandura, "Social Learning through Imitation." In: *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation*, pp. 211-289; and Bandura, Ross, and Ross, "Vicarious Reinforcement and Imitative Learning," pp. 801-807.

⁴¹⁰ Drever, *A Dictionary of Psychology*, p. 128.

⁴¹¹ Mowrer, *Learning Theory and the Symbolic Process*, p. 346.

whereas identification is a more general modeling process."⁴¹²

Miller and Dollard proposed two processes of learning through imitation: "matched dependent behavior" and "copying." In his *Learning Theory and the Symbolic Process*, Mowrer introduced the two additional forms of imitative learning: through "identification" and "empathetic learning."⁴¹³ In learning through identification

... the initial 'model' for an act is supplied by organism A, but the reward (reinforcement) goes to organism B. ... The result is inevitable: the *stimulus consequences* of A's action, as they impinge on B, take on secondary reinforcement; and B when properly motivated, tries to recreate them ...⁴¹⁴

For example, A is a singer or narrator; every time A makes a folkloric response (sings a song or tells a ⁽¹²⁸⁾ folktale) B is directly rewarded by mere listening to the song or the tale. Thus, singing and tale-telling have a secondary reward value for B and through identification he attempts to reproduce A's responses, singing or narrating at times when A is not: B is identifying with A because of the reward. Within this learning context, Mead has observed that "Among the Manus one can ... recognize *identification* behavior in the way in which a little boy reproduces the exact stance, walk, and tone of voice of his father,"⁴¹⁵ who was his model and the person with whom he identified. Other sorts of folkloric behavior, such as dancing, joke-telling, narrating, singing, and performing folk drama, represent rewarding "habits" or "traits" (Mowrer's terms) and could be acquired from folklore-projecting models by individuals who identify with the performer when he himself is not making the response.

Learning by Empathy

⁴¹² Roger Brown, *Social Psychology* (New York, 1965), p. 396.

⁴¹³ Mowrer, *Learning Theory and the Symbolic Process*, pp. 346, n. 112.

⁴¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 112, n. 112.

⁴¹⁵ [290] Mead, *Continuities in Cultural Evolution*, p. 56. It should be pointed out that Mead confuses the general and the particular in imitative learning. She stated that "empathy is far simpler and more global concept than either imitation or identification, both of which are involved in much inexplicit, nonverbal, nonformalized learning," (see p. 55), suggesting that "empathy" and imitation are two different and independent processes of learning, whereas all four processes, ("matched dependent," and "Copying," proposed by Miller and Dollard in *Social Learning and Imitation*, as well as "identification," and "empathy" proposed by Mowrer in *Learning Theory and the Symbolic Process*), are merely different types of imitative learning.

The second form of vicarious imitative learning Mowrer introduces is "empathetic" learning based on psychological empathy. Carl R. Rogers defines the "state of empathy" as the capacity

... to perceive the internal frame of reference of another with accuracy, and with the emotional components and meanings which pertain thereto, as if one were the other person, but without ever losing the 'as if' condition. ⁽¹²⁹⁾ Thus it means to sense the hurt or the pleasure of another as he senses it, and to perceive the causes thereof as he perceives them, but without ever losing the recognition that it *is as if* I were hurt or pleased, etc. ⁴¹⁶

The Egyptian proverb *'idrâb el-marbût, yikhâf es-sâyib* (Beat the tied-[one], the loose-[one] will get scared) illustrates empathetic behavior; when used in a particular "frame of reference," as is the case with all proverbs of this type, provides a *model* for *teaching* through empathy. Basically, empathetic learning is "simple imitation" with the "added" element of "empathy"⁴¹⁷--a state of vicarious emotional arousal wherein "... an observer responds emotionally to a performer's unconditioned emotional response."⁴¹⁸ Empathy accounts for many instances of learning, and much cultural and social behavior. Mead judged empathy to be a "far simpler and more global concept" than other forms of learning; she equated it to "Einfühlung," a German psychological term "... which was originally used to describe an overall response to the form of a situation, as when an individual experienced discomfort if a picture hung askew on the wall."⁴¹⁹

Mowrer points out that in the case of "empathetic learning,"

A not only provides the 'model' but *also* experiences the reinforcement. If an observing organism, B, experiences some of the same immediate sensory consequences of A's behavior ⁽¹³⁰⁾ as A experiences it and also 'intuits' A's satisfaction (or dissatisfaction), then we may suppose that B will be rendered more or less likely to repeat A's behavior. ⁴²⁰

⁴¹⁶ Carl R. Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy, Personality, and Interpersonal Relationships, as Developed in the Client-centered Framework." In: *Psychology: A Study of a Science*, Vol. 3: *Formulation of the Person and the Social Context*, ed. Sigmund Koch (New York, 1959), p. 210.

⁴¹⁷ Mowrer, *Learning Theory and the Symbolic Process*, p. 115.

⁴¹⁸ Berger, "Conditioning through Vicarious Instigation," p. 451.

⁴¹⁹ Mead, *Continuities in Cultural Evolution*, p. 54.

⁴²⁰ Mowrer, *Learning Theory and the Symbolic Process*, p. 115.

For example: A tells a tale to her child to put him to sleep and is rewarded when her goal is achieved and the child falls asleep; B observes, or is cognizant of A's situation, knows the device or response A uses, and "intuits" A's satisfaction; through the empathetic process of learning, B, in turn, will tell tales to put her own child to sleep; B as "... an observer, responds emotionally to a performer's unconditioned emotional response,"⁴²¹ that is, satisfaction through telling tales. Another example: A tells jokes to an audience and is rewarded for his behavior; B watches A's performance, "intuits" his satisfaction and, in turn tries to tell jokes to the group. A third example: A responds to a critical situation in which he has to rationalize his conduct; A responds with a proverb which the group accepts, thus creating a reward for A by liquidating the stimulus situation; B is watching, "intuits" A's satisfaction and will, in turn, use proverbs to justify future conduct of his own when rationalization is required.

Although folklorists have never specifically cited learning psychology, they have been aware of its influence. Von Sydow, for example, remarked significantly on the role of imitative learning, calling it "inheritance."^{131} His concept of the *inheritance* of tradition is basically an act of imitative behavior, incorporating models, empathy, and identification:

The simplest way to become an active bearer of tradition is by inheritance from home, because the children of a family will often hear the same rules, tales, songs, and songs, and see the same custom observed; and thus taught they will often carry on the same tradition later ...

The children will therefore become bearers ... of a good many traditions which they have not received from the parents, but from other families in the village, from comrades ...⁴²²

Similarly, Eberhard states that the minstrels of South-eastern Turkey "... had learned their art from minstrels who had *inspired* in them an interest in the art."⁴²³ Lord describes the different stages of "learning" the art of a minstrel: "In the first stage it generally happens that the neophyte has chosen one singer, perhaps his *father*, or a *favorite* uncle, or some *well-known* singer of his neighborhood, to listen to most closely."⁴²⁴ Thus the "neophyte," instigated by the rewarding responses of the models, by identification, or through empathy, attempts to "repeat" their behavior.

⁴²¹ Berger, "Conditioning through Vicarious Instigation," p. 451.

⁴²² Von Sydow, *Selected Papers on Folklore*, p. 13.

⁴²³ Eberhard, *Minstrel Tales from Southeast Turkey*, p. 5. (The italics are mine).

⁴²⁴ Lord, *The Singer of Tales*, p. 22. (The italics are mine).

Punishment and Vicarious Learning

The psychological principles of "empathy" and "identification" apply to both rewarding and non-rewarding types of behavior. Bandura and Walters criticized Mowrer for ⁽¹³²⁾ focusing his attention "almost exclusively" on positively rewarded behavior and its role in habit formation.⁴²⁵ Mowrer contended "It goes without saying that exactly the same reasons can be applied to explain the *negative* imitation."⁴²⁶ Negatively imitated behavior is illustrated in a case in which A makes a response and at the same time B is punished (because of A's behavior). A's response will take on secondary punishment value for B and B will avoid those responses.

For example, A is a singer, whenever A sings, B is punished by outsiders who do not like this type of art (of A and B), singing will take on secondary negative reward (punishment) value for B, B will not try to reproduce A's singing, and will avoid A's responses.

"Negative identification" is clearly noticeable in a community composed of a major culture and several minor sub-cultures. The minority groups, having a low social status, are usually described as "doing something we do not do."⁴²⁷ On the individual level, a particular person is singled out because of an undesirable characteristic, quality, or response, and his deviant trait is observed in the phrase "he does something I don't do." In empathetic learning, negative reward functions in the same manner as normal punishment. A will provide the model and experience the punishment and B "... experiences some of the same sensory consequences of A's behavior as A experiences it and also 'intuits' A's ... ⁽¹³³⁾ dissatisfaction." Thus, B is not likely to repeat A's behavior.

For example, if A sings and is punished for singing, B experiences some of the consequences, "intuits" A's dissatisfaction, and will probably not repeat A's behavior.

This process is particularly noticeable among minority ethnic groups. In Brooklyn, when an Egyptian's traditional (native) response is negatively rewarded by "full Americans" [or 'true' Americans] ("being American by father and grandfather," i.e., third generation Americans, the entire group "intuits" the punishment. The group also experiences the effects of the punishment on the manifested native behavior, and on the process of learning in the same manner as does the

⁴²⁵ Bandura and Walters, *Social Learning and Personality Development*, p. 56. (It should be pointed out that Bandura and Walters did not notice or take into consideration Mowrer's statement, perhaps because of its secondary position as a footnote).

⁴²⁶ Mowrer, *Learning Theory and the Symbolic Process*, p. 114 n.

⁴²⁷ Mead, *Continuities in Cultural Evolution*, pp. 72, 384

punished member; [consequently, singing native songs will be inhibited--(see *post*, pages 185, 187, 194)]. It is through this mechanism that subclasses of folkloric responses, i.e., genres, are extinguished from the life of a social or cultural group.

Conclusion

Thus far, folklore has been treated as a class of traditional responses which form a distinct type of behavior. Folkloric responses occur to definite stimuli and are elicited by cues, or social and cultural conditions. Folklore, in this sense, is distinguishable from nontraditional, non-folkloric behavior, and consequently, folkloric responses are distinguishable from such classes of responses as those ⁽¹³⁴⁾ provided exclusively by science and technology. Folkloric responses, such as singing folksongs, narrating folktales, listening to minstrels, believing in witchcraft, applying folk medicine, rationalizing behavior by applying a proverb, and making a folk artifact in a traditional manner, are a class of responses and a type of behavior essentially different from modern responses. Listening to opera or jazz, reading a novel, watching television, explaining one's experiences through psychology, applying modern medicine, citing a legal precedent, and buying mass-produced utensils are a *different* class of responses and a different type of behavior.

However, folklore is more than mere responses: the style and content of folklore genres (subclasses) such as a *Märchen*, folksong, or epic are as much a characteristic of folkloric behavior as the tradition and nature of these responses.

In the following section we shall consider the factors which act as stabilizers of content and style in folkloric responses as the responses undergo transmission through space and time.

CHAPTER IV

THE STYLE AND CONTENT OF FOLKLORE

The Nature of Retention of Folklore Material

Memorization

Folklore, particularly in its verbal forms, requires memorization if it is to survive the transmission process through time and space. Memorization is a complex process, resulting from a series of mental processes: it involves "... the activities of learning, retaining, and remembering with detailed precision."⁴²⁸ In memorizing, "the material involved is either factual or verbatim in nature,"⁴²⁹ and is not restricted to solely verbal activities. A narrator must memorize his tales, the minstrel his epics, and the singer his songs, before they can present them accurately to an audience. Similarly, the fortune teller and medicine man must memorize the material of their professions before they can successfully practice. Folkloric responses initially occur independently of the details of style and content, singing, narrating, or applying a proverb first occurring as a response before the individual learns to reproduce the material in the detail which requires memorization and accuracy. An individual may respond to the drive to sing a folksong only to find, to his surprise, that he can only remember one stanza or just a few words.

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Hunter defines memorization as "... learning, retaining and remembering with detailed precision." From our previous discussion, the term "learning" should be clear; however, the term "retaining" and other related concepts require some explanation.

Retention: "Retention" refers to "The amount of something previously learned available for performance at any particular time."⁴³⁰

In terms of folklore performance, the amount of *any* folkloric knowledge an individual is capable of displaying at a given time equals the amount of retention resulting from his previous learning experiences. Thus retention is the total knowledge a person is capable of using at any particular time.

Forgetting: "Forgetting" is "... the other side of the retention coin; retention refers to the amount of

⁴²⁸ {291} Hunter, *Memory*, p. 94.

⁴²⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴³⁰ James Deese, *Principles of Psychology* (Boston, 1964), p. 469.

previously learned material which persists or has been retained by the subject, whereas forgetting refers to the amount which has been lost or has not been retained."⁴³¹ The term also denotes "Failure at any time to recall an experience, when attempting to do so, or to perform an action previously learned."⁴³² In their definition of "forgetting," Delos D. Wickens and Donald R. Meyer indicate that "time is the basic factor which causes forgetting." "Forgetting" is "A decrement in retention as a result of the passage of time."⁴³³

In terms of ⁽¹³⁷⁾ folkloric performance, an individual who fails to recall a tale or song which he still associates with a positive reward is not suppressing or inhibiting the material, but has lost it due to the process of forgetting.

Recall: "Recall" is a *process* by which a person can "... revive or reinstate in memory, verbally, or in concrete imagery, a past experience."⁴³⁴ Recall results in remembering, if the material was retained, or in the inability to remember, if the material was forgotten, inhibited, or suppressed.

In terms of folklore performance, when a person attempts to recall an incident, folktale, or folksong heard previously, his efforts may result in remembering the full item (if he had retained all the details), in remembering only a fragment, or in total failure to remember it.

Recognition: "Recognition" means "perceiving (or recalling) an object, accompanied by a feeling of familiarity, or the conviction that the same object has been perceived before."⁴³⁵ Remembering and recognizing differ in that through remembering a person recalls the object remembered, while through recognition he begins with the object and later identifies it as a familiar object he had encountered previously.

In terms of folkloric performance, after making a response such as singing or narrating, a person must *first* remember what he wants to sing or narrate; if he fails to do so, ⁽¹³⁸⁾ the activity will not occur although the response has occurred. A member of the audience may recognize what is being performed (sung, narrated) as something he has seen or heard before. In other words, the recognized item must be present before recognition can occur.

⁴³¹ John F. Hall, *The Psychology of Learning* (Philadelphia, Pa., 1966), pp. 547-548.

⁴³² Drever, *A Dictionary of Psychology*, p. 101.

⁴³³ Delos D. Wickens and Donald R. Meyer, *Psychology* (New York, 1961), p. 744.

⁴³⁴ Drever, *A Dictionary of Psychology*, p. 241.

⁴³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 242.

Active and Passive Bearers of Tradition

Recall and recognition are significant for the study of folklore perpetuity in that they denote the amount of retention of folklore material in a given community under particular circumstances. As Hunter points out, "The value of any fact lies in its being available for use when required."⁴³⁶ Therefore, it is the availability of folkloric responses when required that renders them functional for the individual and the group. An item, on the other hand, that is only recognized when already present and is not remembered with the appropriate drive arises, has not been fully retained and is *losing* its impact and function. An item that has been retained and can be recalled is an active item with its own distinct function and impetus in the community. Finally, an item which has been forgotten has lost its relevance and meaning and becomes socially and culturally obsolete.

Von Sydow divides the bearers of tradition into active bearers and passive bearers.⁴³⁷ differentiated by their retention and capacity to "spread" tradition (see *post*, page 108, ⁽¹³⁹⁾ n. 72). That is, those who can *memorize* and recall and those who only retain some features and thus can only *recognize*. "An active teller of tales will become passive," if the degree of his retention declines; and "a passive bearer of tradition may likewise change into an active one through being so accustomed to listening to a tradition or to seeing it being practiced," that his retention increases through "exercise." In other words, passive-bearing of tradition is synonymous to recognition while active-bearing of tradition is synonymous to remembering; the former denotes a low degree of retention while the latter denotes a high degree thereof.

Memorization of Folklore Material

Retention and memorization occur as functions of a host of learning variables.⁴³⁸ In this section we shall examine the effect of these variables on learning, retention, and memorization of folklore material, that is, on the style and content of folkloric responses.

Memorizing as a Function of Meaningfulness

Although "memorizing" is "contrasted unfavorably" with "understanding" in the popular thought,

⁴³⁶ Hunter, *Memory*, p. 100.

⁴³⁷ Von Sydow, *Selected Papers on Folklore*, pp. 12-15.

⁴³⁸ Hall, in his discussion of "The Influence of Learning Variables on Retention," lists "...overlearning," "Retention as Function of Speed of Learning," "Retention as a Function of Serial Position," "Retention as a Function of Meaningfulness," "Retention as a Function of Distribution of Practice," "Retention as a Function of the Similarity of the Material Learned," "Retention as a Function of Delay of Reinforcement," "The Role of Warm-up in Retention," as principal variables "contributing" to retention. *The Psychology of Learning* (see pp. 558-576).

Hunter points out that "It is often the case that when 'memorizing' is compared unfavorably with 'understanding' what is meant is that the ⁽¹⁴⁰⁾ person has abstracted and retained from the material details which are specific and not generalizable."⁴³⁹ For example, when a singer memorizes a song, his knowledge of the song encompasses the specifics of its tune, rhythm, and lyrics, but does not include generalities about that song in comparison to other songs. Similarly, a narrator can tell several *Märchen*, conceiving of each tale as a separate entity, while the folklore scholar may examine the contents of each and find their thematic content so similar that they can validly be classified as variants of a single type. The narrator "understands" the facts described only within the context of the tale itself, and cannot abstract its contents into generalized knowledge in comparison with other tales; the folklorist, on the other hand, "understands" without necessarily memorizing, arriving at particulars of the tale in the sense that he abstracts them into "types," comparable to abstractions drawn from other tales. Thus, while the narrator thinks in terms of a repertoire of distinct tales, the folklorist operates in context of tale "types" and, on a broader scale, of "genres."

Memorization is affected by understanding. A person can recall only those facts which he understood at the time he learned them; what he did not understand he will probably forget, particularly if a long period of time has elapsed. Hunter explained the effect of the variables of "understanding" and "length of time" on the memorization of narrative material:

⁽¹⁴¹⁾

... the recaller produces, out of cumulative effects of his past experiences, those characteristics which he believes to specify the story. Such production may be difficult, especially if recall is attempted a long time after hearing the original ... Whatever their nature, the person is unlikely to recall any relevant characteristic which he did not originally abstract from the story: his reconstruction is hardly likely to be more faithful than his initial interpretation.⁴⁴⁰

It is in this sense that most children are passive bearers of tradition, for although children listen to tales more frequently and with greater interest (ego-involvement) than adults, their ability to narrate (recall and reproduce what they have retained), is limited because their ability to "understand" and "abstract" is insufficiently developed for the complex process of transmission. Adults, however, have developed the capacity to reproduce what they know, and, as Miller and Dollard point out, "This superiority of the older group [for performing] undoubtedly has several roots. Older children have superior learning ability for straight biological reasons."⁴⁴¹ A child's memory is not as

⁴³⁹ Hunter, *Memory*, p. 99.

⁴⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 157.

⁴⁴¹ Miller and Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation*, p. 186.

retentive as an adult's, the span of memory being "a function of the age of the subject ..." An adult's span for meaningful words is usually higher than a child's.⁴⁴²

To "understand" then is to be able to abstract facts from the original material; this is the first and basic aspect in the process of memorization. Yet, abstracting does not necessarily mean that the person understands correctly; a false assumption or abstraction is as recallable ⁽¹⁴²⁾ as a correct one. An individual's abstractions are dependent upon his interpretation of what he has seen or heard; and "... individualistic interpretations often mark distinct turning points in a series of reproductions."⁴⁴³ Misinterpretations and deviant abstractions characteristically occur when the material seems alien and puzzling to those who are trying to learn it. In assessing the results of Bartlett's experiment, Hunter concludes that "A story which is foreign to the subject's mode of thinking is not recalled accurately either in general theme or in detail."⁴⁴⁴

Experimental psychologists have concluded that retention is a function of meaningfulness. Hall⁴⁴⁵ cited the experimental works by R.A. Davis,⁴⁴⁶ B.J. Underwood and J. Richardson,⁴⁴⁷ Postman and L. Rau,⁴⁴⁸ and R.H. Lindley,⁴⁴⁹ all of whom established that "meaningful" material was learned more quickly and retained better than meaningless material.⁴⁵⁰ In 1924, H.B. Reed wrote, "Repetition has been called the golden rule of learning, but a study of association will convince us, I think, that association is entitled to a place of equal, if not of greater importance."⁴⁵¹ Association,

⁴⁴² McGeoch and Irion, *The Psychology of Human Learning*, pp. 487-488

⁴⁴³ ⁽²⁹²⁾ Hunter, *Memory*, p. 150.

⁴⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁵ Hall, *The Psychology of Learning*, pp. 565-567.

⁴⁴⁶ R.A. Davis, *The Psychology of Learning* (New York, 1935).

⁴⁴⁷ B.J. Underwood and J. Richardson, "The Influence of Meaningfulness, Intralist Similarity, and Serial Position on Retention." In: *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, Vol. 52 (1958), 119-126.

⁴⁴⁸ Leo Postman and L. Rau, "Retention as a Function of the Method of Measurement." In: *University of California Publication in Psychology*, Vol. 8 (1959), 271-396.

⁴⁴⁹ R.H. Lindley, "Effects of Controlled Coding Cues in Short-term Memory." In: *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, Vol. 66 (1963), 180-187.

⁴⁵⁰ Hall, *The Psychology of Learning*, p. 565.

⁴⁵¹ H.B. Reed, "Repetition and Association in Learning." In: *Pedagogical Seminary and Journal of Genetic Psychology*, Vol. 66 (1963), 180-187.

as Reed understood it, is a function of meaningfulness, and "How to make the material meaningful is ... [the] problem ..."⁴⁵² in learning.

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Reed's experiment

To test this theory, Reed ran a series of experiments on his students. One of the experiments involved comparing the measured amount of factual material retained from an easily understood story entitled the "Marble Statue," to the retention of the more difficult abstract ideas presented in Hume's *Origin of Ideas*.

Reed summarized his experiments as demonstrating "that the perception of meaning greatly increases the quantity of material which can be grasped in one act of thought, that it greatly increased the speed and ease of learning and that it greatly increased the amount retained."⁴⁵³ McGeoch and Irion affirmed that "Verbal materials are distributed along a dimension of meaningfulness, upon which their relative positions may be determined by methods of scaling or by simple ranking."⁴⁵⁴ Their examination of earlier experiments with the variable of meaningfulness established that "Two hundred words of poetry were learned 9 times more rapidly than were 200 nonsense syllables," because "The prose and poetry were clearly more meaningful than the digits and syllables."⁴⁵⁵

In 1961, McGeoch and Irion quoted the results of Reed's 1924 experiment⁴⁵⁶ to illustrate their conclusion that narratives are more meaningful than abstract ideas:

A. Learning

261.25 seconds required to learn 67 ideas from the *Origin of Ideas* {144}

111.25 seconds required to learn 67 ideas from "Marble Statue"

B. Recalling: Immediately	<u>After 1 Week</u>	<u>After 2 Weeks</u>
<i>Origin of Ideas</i> : 11.50 (ideas)	3.75	4.00
"Marble Statue": 49.00	56.00	39.50

⁴⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 155.

⁴⁵³ H.B. Reed, "Meaning as a Factor in Learning." In: *Journal of Educational Psychology*, Vol. 29 (1938), 421.

⁴⁵⁴ McGeoch and Irion, *The Psychology of Human Learning*, p. 469.

⁴⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 470.

⁴⁵⁶ Reed, "Repetition and Association in Learning," 149.

McGeoch and Irion attributed Reed's results to the fact that "*The Origin of Ideas* almost certainly meant less to the subjects than did the narrative." They added, "Meanings or 'ideas,' are ... notably easier to learn than are meaningful verbal sequences learned by rote."⁴⁵⁷

In terms of folkloric performance, the factors of learning and forgetting are functions of the meaningfulness of folklore material. Meaningfulness is most clearly represented in the structure and content of folk narratives, while meaninglessness is represented in the charms and magic incantations which are living folk knowledge *only* for a distinct minority (priests, witches, medicine men) of bearers in any community. Stith Thompson, examining "The European Tale among Africans and the North American Indians,"⁴⁵⁸ demonstrated that misunderstood European material assumes different forms in these primitive cultures. Although "... the African finds enjoyment in nearly every kind of European folktale," he is incapable of retaining the borrowed tales in their original state. "He may do some queer things with them and change them around so that little more than a skeleton of the original remains."⁴⁵⁹ The same type of metamorphosis has ^[145] occurred when European tales entered the narrative knowledge of the North American Indian tribes. Thompson reports that "Just as is true in Africa, the degree of adaptation to the native lore differs profoundly as we go from tribe to tribe."⁴⁶⁰ These changes occur because the natives are unable to perceive, abstract, retain, and render tales accurately when they are ignorant of the culture (cues) which produced the tales and find the tales meaningless in the context of their own culture.

On the other hand, meaningfulness is a stabilizing factor in the preservation of the original versions of the tales, and is achieved through better learning, and better retention which result in better recall. Thompson notes:

Particularly among the eastern tribes where there has been long contact, the French tales have suffered little change. The opposite extreme is found in some of the Pueblo stories where an almost complete adaptation has been made to local religious and mythological patterns.⁴⁶¹

⁴⁵⁷ McGeoch and Irion, *The Psychology of Human Learning*, p. 471.

⁴⁵⁸ Thompson, *The Folktale*, pp. 284-293.

⁴⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 255.

⁴⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 287.

⁴⁶¹ *Ibid.*

The native's religious and mythological patterns were more meaningful to him than the transmitted tale, for he adapted the incomprehensible, alien material according to the understood values of his own environment. The problem of the native who tries to recall a tale told by a European is essentially a problem of reconstructing and not of transforming or garbling. Hunter states, "A story which is foreign to the subject's mode of thinking is not recalled accurately either in general theme or in detail."⁴⁶² it is in the process of ⁽¹⁴⁶⁾ making sense out of the small fragmented details perceived, abstracted and retained from the original that transformation and garbling occur.

Thus, "adaptation," "garbling," and "change" are not deliberate innovations but reflections of the inevitable psychological processes of perceiving, understanding, abstracting, coding, retaining, [decoding], and recalling.

Structure and Meaningfulness: Memorization as a Function of Structure

The meaningfulness of folklore material is directly affected by its structure. The structure of folklore genres range from the memory-defying epic,⁴⁶³ "A long narrative POEM in elevated STYLE presenting characters of high position in a series of adventures which form an organic whole through their relation to a central figure of heroic proportions ..." ⁴⁶⁴ to the proverb, "... a terse didactic statement that is current in tradition."⁴⁶⁵

As McGeoch and Irion point out, "Whatever is to be learned must be practiced in some amount per practice period." The amount of learning acquired every time a person practices "... raises the question of the relation between the amount of material which is practiced as a unit and the time required to learn it," and subsequently the effort required for learning, since "Difficulty ... [could be] measured by time."⁴⁶⁶ ⁽¹⁴⁷⁾ To illustrate the problem, McGeoch and Irion asked: "Does a list of 16 words take twice as long to learn as a list of 8, and one of 24 three times as long, or what is the

⁴⁶² ⁽²⁹³⁾ Hunter, *Memory*, p. 150.

⁴⁶³ Eberhard, *Minstrel Tales of Southeastern Turkey*, p. 60.

⁴⁶⁴ William Flint Thrall and Addison Hibbard, *A Handbook to Literature*, rev. and enl. C. Hugh Holman (New York, 1960), pp. 174-175.

Examples of such epics and minstrel tales are the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* of Homer, the *Ramayana* and *Mahabharata* of India, the *Kalevala* of Finland, *Antar*, *Sayf ibn dhi-Yazan*, and *Abu-Zaid [the Hilâlite]* of the Arab Middle East, and *El Cid* of Spain.

⁴⁶⁵ Archer Taylor, "Proverb." In: *Dictionary of Folklore Mythology and Legend*, Vol. 2, p. 902.

⁴⁶⁶ McGeoch and Irion, *The Psychology of Human Learning*, p. 487.

relation?"⁴⁶⁷

With regard to meaningfulness, we can ask the same question about the learning of folklore material: Does a tale of 160 words take twice as long to learn as a tale of 80, and one of 240 three times as long?

McGeoch and Irion found that "Difficulty, as measured by time, might increase, however, at a disproportionately faster rate than the increases in length ..., or at a disproportionately slower one."⁴⁶⁸ "The question of the influence of the amount of material ..., " (a structural characteristic) on learning, is recognized as "... a function of the material and its mode of presentation."⁴⁶⁹ Hunter presents the problem as follows:

It is true that we can often recall a strange name, a telephone number, or a particular phrase in a foreign language after a single hearing or reading. But such learning is the exception rather than the rule and is certainly not typical of memorizing a poem or passage of prose.⁴⁷⁰

In terms of folkloric performance, one can recall a proverb, maxim, short tale, or simple legend after a single hearing, but this is not the case with longer complex material, such as an epic or a lengthy *Märchen*. Such material requires longer exposure: "Material which is lengthy or unfamiliar has to be read or heard several times before it can be recalled with memorized exactness."⁴⁷¹

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McGeoch and Irion state that "a subject's memory span is the starting point of the present problem [the question of remembering]."⁴⁷² The memory span varies from one person to another, however, generally it "... is a function of the age of the subject, [and] the character of the items presented ..."⁴⁷³ G.A. Miller studied the influence of the character of material on memory span and amount of retention, and concluded that, within the immediate memory span, the individual codes

⁴⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷⁰ Hunter, *Memory*, p. 94.

⁴⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷² McGeoch and Irion, *The Psychology of Human Learning*, p. 487.

⁴⁷³ *Ibid.*

unfamiliar material into "chunks," or familiar units. Although the capacity of the individual for retention of these "chunks" is usually fixed (about seven chunks), the amount of material that is recalled can be increased effectively by developing increasingly larger chunks through *practice* and appropriate coding,⁴⁷⁴ which are a function of mental age. Hall described studies by B.B. Murdoch, Jr.⁴⁷⁵ and B.H. Cohen⁴⁷⁶ which supported G.A. Miller's "chunk" hypothesis. This principle is significant for folklore scholarship because familiarity with the content and structure of the learned material affects the speed and the amount of effort required for retention and recall.

Folklorists have attempted to explain the transmission of verbal arts in terms of generic structure and its influence on the bearers of tradition. Although these efforts were independent of any particular psychological theory, some of the conclusions corroborated the findings of experimental psychological studies. Anderson, it will be remembered, chose^[149] the material for his 1951 Kiel experiment primarily on the basis of structure. In comparing the "conditions" of his 1951 demonstration experiment with those of the Dorpat experiment in the 1920's, he stated that "the stipulations of the experiment were more acute," one of the reasons for this added 'distinctiveness' of conditions being: "for text[,] a ... simple ... legend was selected."⁴⁷⁷ Unfortunately, length and structure were not the only factors considered as independent variables: such factors as time span and recording method were involved, preventing the investigator from determining the actual effect structure had on the results of the experiment, and on the process of transmission.

Von Sydow, whose studies do not have the demonstration-experimental orientation characteristic of the majority of research on this problem, attempted to formulate laws for the transmission of folklore in terms of structural aspects peculiar to the different genres. His remarks on the problem appear in three separate statements concerning different folklore genres, and together form a hypothetical theory based on empirical field data and experience.

Von Sydow's first postulate is as follows:

⁴⁷⁴ G.A. Miller, "Magical Number 7, Plus or Minus Two." In: *Psychological Review*, Vol. 83 (1956), 81-97.

⁴⁷⁵ B.B. Murdoch, Jr., "Short-term Retention of Single Paired Associates." In: *Psychological Reports*, Vol. 8 (1961), p. 28.

⁴⁷⁶ B.H. Cohen, "An Investigation of Recording in Free Recall." In: *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, Vol. 53 (1963), 225-233.

⁴⁷⁷ Anderson, "Ein Volkskundliches Experiment," p. 6.

The short *Animal* and *Jocular Fables* consisting of a single episode are, as a rule, easy to remember, and in that respect they are of much the same nature as the ... evental [...] sagns. Whoever has the narrative gift and is alive to the contents of these little stories, can learn them quickly, perhaps even by having listened to them once.⁴⁷⁸

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His second postulate is:

The long *Chimerates* and *Novellates* make still greater demands on the retentive memory as well as the narrative gifts of the raconteur. Whereas short animal fables and jocular fables may be casually told in a few minutes, this is entirely out of the question in the case of the long narrations, which may require half an hour, or even a whole [hour], and must be told by a special raconteur with the direct purpose of beguiling the time for a listening audience.⁴⁷⁹

The third postulate is:

Popular Poetry, in particular the *Popular Ballad* delights listeners not only by its contents, but also by its form, and thus makes great demands on accurate memory ... The bearers of ballad tradition must accordingly go through a more systematic training.⁴⁸⁰

Thus, Von Sydow's postulates agreed with McGeoch and Irion's statement: speed and amount of learning are "a function of the material and its mode of presentation." The length and coherence of ideas presented directly affect the process of learning. As Reed had shown, a simple tale constructed around a single idea and proceeding in a logical sequence of episodes requires less time to learn and is more resistant to memory lapse than a complex piece of prose composed of a group of subtly related ideas.

Memorization as a Function of Repetition

The idea that repetition has a direct effect on learning and retention is at least as old as the Latin proverb ^{151} "Repetito est mater studiorum," and the Arabic *at-tikrâr yu`allimu al-ḥimâr* ("Repetition teaches [even] the donkey"). Reed summarizes the classic position of repetition in

⁴⁷⁸ Von Sydow, *Selected Papers on Folklore*, p. 19.

⁴⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁴⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 22

learning theories; "Repetition has been called the golden rule of learning ..." ⁴⁸¹ and McGeoch and Irion state, "The law of frequency is one of the oldest and most widely accepted principles of learning." ⁴⁸² Hunter reports: "... few adults could at a single hearing, memorize the original word for word;" ⁴⁸³ "So verbatim recall is hardly to be expected after only one presentation. To achieve such recall it would be necessary for the person to study the original repeatedly." ⁴⁸⁴ In terms of experimental psychology, "Frequency is, of course, one of the experimental variables of learning experiments and is typically the variable against which progress is plotted in drawing curves. *The usual finding, of course, is that learning progresses with frequency.*" ⁴⁸⁵

Even in theories which assert that learning occurs suddenly, such as Guthrie's theory known as the "all-or-nothing bond" ⁴⁸⁶ between stimulus and response, "... frequency serves as a bearer for the conditions under which sudden learning occurs." ⁴⁸⁷ According to Gestalt psychology, or learning by insight ("by definition, ... a sudden process") frequency is "a less important process" ⁴⁸⁸ *only* insofar as S-R relationships are concerned. Frequency, or repetition, is an aspect of the law of exercise proposed by Thorndike in 1913: "... man's learning is fundamentally ⁽¹⁵²⁾ the action of the law of readiness, exercise, and effect." ⁴⁸⁹ Basically, the "Law of Exercise" is a "Law of Use," for it "... refers to the strengthening of connections with practice ... and to the weakening of connections of forgetting when practice is discontinued (Law of Disuse)." ⁴⁹⁰

J. B. Watson and Edward C. Tolman, following Thorndike's learning theory, made the principle of frequency a basic constituent in their learning theories. In 1959, Tolman concluded, "In general there are two main classes of conditions which have been advanced. These may roughly be identified with Thorndike's law of 'Exercise' and of 'Effect.' Under 'Exercise' I should put all the

⁴⁸¹ Reed, "Repetition and Association in Learning," p. 147.

⁴⁸² McGeoch and Irion, *The Psychology of Human Learning*, p. 51.

⁴⁸³ [294] Hunter, *Memory*, p. 148.

⁴⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 154.

⁴⁸⁵ McGeoch and Irion, *The Psychology of Human Learning*, p. 51. (The italics are mine).

⁴⁸⁶ Hill, *Learning*, p. 43; and McGeoch and Irion, *The Psychology of Human Learning*, p. 53.

⁴⁸⁷ McGeoch and Irion, *The Psychology of Human Learning*, p. 51.

⁴⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

⁴⁸⁹ Thorndike, *The Psychology of Learning*, pp. 22-23.

⁴⁹⁰ Hilgard, *Theories of Learning*, p. 19.

factors of frequency, recency, and distribution of trials ..."⁴⁹¹

The Principle of Repetition in Folklore Scholarship and Anthropology

Scholars in folklore and anthropology attributed the stability of cultural phenomena, despite the process of transmission, to the repetition factor. However, repetition in its psychological context was not emphasized by anthropologists as a part of culture learning until the early 1940's. As the second part of his seven fundamental assumptions "which characterize culture," George P. Murdock suggested that "culture is inculcated;" in the modern context, "inculcate" meant "to teach or instill by frequent repetition and (153) admonition."⁴⁹² It will be remembered that anthropologists in general and Malinowski in particular applied Hull's theory of Stimulus-Organism-Response⁴⁹³ to their investigations. Habit formation, for Hull, is the function of "reinforcement."

Malinowski rephrased the Stimulus-Response-Reward learning formula in the functional terms of Need-Response-Satisfaction. In so doing, he disregarded such mechanisms of learning process as Thorndike's law of exercise, Watson's principles of frequency and recency, and all other non-Hullian "secondary" laws of learning. In folklore scholarship, however, the "Law of Exercise" as a "Law of Use" and the principle of repetition have received attention.

Since the beginning of the century, folklorists such as Antti Aarne⁴⁹⁴ have attempted to solve the problems of stability and change in folktales in terms of "thinking," "fantasy," and "forgetting." Anderson introduced the modern concept of repetition into folklore scholarship as a part of "the law of self-correction of folk-narratives," Anderson's rationale for his law of stability and self-correction was based on the Latin Proverb "Repetitio est mater studiorum," reinforced by his own field observations of the transmission of folklore. According to Anderson, the "unbelievable stability,"⁴⁹⁵ of folk narratives is partially accounted for because ". . .each narrator [must] have heard the Märchen (or anecdote, religious legend, etc.) under consideration from his predecessor (154) usually not once but several times."⁴⁹⁶ Through repetition, both the narrator and audience

⁴⁹¹ Edward C. Tolman, "Principles of Purposive Behavior." In: *Psychology: A Study of a Science*, Vol. 2: *General Systematic Formulations, Learning and Special Processes*, ed. Sigmund Koch (New York, 1959), p. 124.

⁴⁹² Murdock, "Uniformities in Culture," pp. 364-385.

⁴⁹³ K.W. Spence, "Clark Leonard Hull: 1884-1952." In: *American Journal of Psychology*, Vol. 65 (1952), p. 646.

⁴⁹⁴ Aarne, *Leitfaden der Vergleichenden Märchenforschung*, pp. 23-39.

⁴⁹⁵ Anderson, *Kaiser und Abt*, p. 397.

⁴⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 399.

acquire additional knowledge, that is, both increase their retention of the item.

Anderson's suggestions and Bartlett's "experiment" inspired a series of demonstration experiments aimed at establishing the influence of the transmission process on folkloric narrative material. In spite of the absence of experimental procedures in the psychological sense, in addition to inconsistency in selecting the "independent variables," all of the experiments conducted by Bartlett in Cambridge, Anderson in Dorpat, Wesselski in Komotau, Anderson in Kiel, Ortutay in Budapest, and Kurt Schier in Gauting produced the same results: *lack* of repetition, among other factors, produced an inability to learn and retain, and thus an inability to recall and remember correctly. These experiments verified the negative side of learning but neglected the positive aspect of verbatim learning.

Other folklorists proposed "repetition" as an effective factor in learning and in "improving" the style of performance. Thompson analyzes two major factors in the learning of narratives: "exercise" by repetition, and interest in learning, or--in Thorndike's words--the "law of readiness."⁴⁹⁷ Thompson writes:

Elderly or at least middle-aged persons have nearly always yielded the best folktales. Assuming that they are interested in learning ⁽¹⁵⁵⁾ stories--and if they are not, they will probably never learn to tell them well--they have had a long life in which to acquire a repertoire and to improve their style of delivery.⁴⁹⁸

Similarly, Von Sydow explained the transformation of "passive bearers of tradition" into "active ones" in terms of readiness and practice. Von Sydow states:

A passive bearer of tradition may ... change into an active one through being so accustomed to listen to a tradition or to see it being practiced that he grows conversant with it and thus comes into a position to take it actively in hand.⁴⁹⁹

Von Sydow supported this hypothesis with examples of passive bearers who, through *empathy* or *identification* with active bearers and practice, became active bearers. One of his examples was himself: Von Sydow testified, "I myself was only passive [bearer] ... Even yet I can recollect clearly a formula, which was repeated in several places in the tale whereas I only remember

⁴⁹⁷ E. Thorndike, *The Original Nature of Man* (New York, 1913), p. 128; Hilgard, *Theories of Learning*, pp. 18-19.

⁴⁹⁸ Thompson, *The Folktale*, p. 408.

⁴⁹⁹ Von Sydow, *Selected Papers on Folklore*, p. 15.

disconnected features of the rest of the content."⁵⁰⁰ He added that the "verbatim" learning characteristic of active bearers is "... instilled into their minds" through "... frequent repetition of the same traditions."⁵⁰¹

Dégh agrees with Von Sydow, stating that "... socially popular people have their own stories which ... become polished by numerous repetitions ...," and that this principle of polishing-through-repetition "... applies to gifted raconteurs even more..."⁵⁰²

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Similarly, Dorson notes that repetition plays a vital role in the emergence and stability of the folk legend; he states, "In closely knit communities a legend lives on through constant repetition."⁵⁰³

Ortutay reflected Walter Anderson's "law of self-correction of folk-narratives," in his observation that "The repeated performance of a melody sung by and listened to by various persons strengthens the typical structure, prevents ad-hoc embellishments and hinders the stringing together of invariants."⁵⁰⁴

Finally, Lord attributed instability in the concluding episodes of epic songs to the lack of repetition:

One of the reasons ... why different singings of the *same song* by the *same man* vary most in their endings is that the end of a song is sung less often by the singer.⁵⁰⁵

Conclusion

Although these folklorists' hypotheses--the direct result of fieldwork--developed independently of learning theory, they fully agree with the psychological principles of repetition and readiness. Folklorists have provided numerous instances of empirical, cross-cultural evidence which concur with psychological findings on these two learning principles. Thus, Thompson's observation that

⁵⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁵⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 13

⁵⁰² {295} Dégh, "Some Questions on the Social Function of Storytelling," p. 135.

⁵⁰³ R.M. Dorson, *Folk Legends of Japan* (Rutland, 1962), p. 20.

⁵⁰⁴ Ortutay, "Principles of Oral Transmissions..." p. 19.

⁵⁰⁵ Lord, *The Singer of Tales*, p. 17. (The italics are mine).

uninterested persons will never ⁽¹⁵⁷⁾ learn to tell folktales well, is simply a different phrasing of Thorndike's statement:

... practice without zeal - with equal comfort at success and failure - does *not* make perfect ... When the law of effect is omitted - when habit formation is reduced to the supposed effect of mere repetition ... by the resulting practice, unproductive or extremely wasteful forms of drill are encouraged.⁵⁰⁶

Memorization as a Function of Recency

In his *Behaviorism*, Watson attached primary importance to the principles of recency and frequency in the learning process. Hill describes Watson's theory as being "a reduction of complex behavior patterns to sequences of conditioned reflexes ..." with recency and frequency "playing a major role."⁵⁰⁷ Watson's principle of recency is that "... the more recently we have made a given response to a given stimulus, the more likely we are to make it again."⁵⁰⁸

As in the case of "frequency," Tolman, in his "Principles of Purposive Behavior," considers the principle of recency as a part of the law of exercise.⁵⁰⁹ Recency has an important function in theories of contiguity: Guthrie's single law of learning states, "A combination of stimuli which has accompanied a movement will on its recurrence tend to be followed by the same movement,"⁵¹⁰ and "A stimulus pattern gains its ⁽¹⁵⁸⁾ full associative strength on the occasion of its first pairing with a response."⁵¹¹ Hilgard, corroborating V.W. Voekes,⁵¹² concludes that contiguous conditioning "... can be thought of as a kind of recency principle, for if learning occurs completely in one trial, that which was last done in the presence of a stimulus combination will be that which will be done when the stimulus combination next recurs."⁵¹³ Appraising Guthrie's contiguous

⁵⁰⁶ Thorndike, *The Psychology of Learning*, p. 22.

⁵⁰⁷ Hill, *Learning*, p. 37.

⁵⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰⁹ Tolman, "Principles of Purposive Behavior," p. 124.

⁵¹⁰ E.R. Guthrie, *The Psychology of Learning*, rev. ed. (New York, 1952), p. 23.

⁵¹¹ E.R. Guthrie, "Conditioning: A Theory of Learning in Terms of Stimulus, Response, and Association." In: *The Psychology of Learning*, Yearbook Nat. Social Stud. Educ., Vol. 41 (1942), p. 30.

⁵¹² V.W. Voekes, "Postremity, Recency, and Frequency as Bases for Prediction in the Maze Situation." In: *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, Vol. 38 (1948), 495-510.

⁵¹³ Hilgard, *Theories of Learning*, p. 53.

conditioning principle, Hill notes that it "... sounds much like Watson's principle of recency, since the last thing that occurred in a situation is the one that will occur again."⁵¹⁴

In terms of folkloric behavior, if a person has responded to a certain drive (such as a wedding ceremony) by singing he will tend to respond to the drive in the same manner whenever it appears, provided that he does not make a different response to the drive in the intervening occurrences.

We have discussed the influence of the recency factor on learning in its behavioristic, S-R relationship and the occurrence of a certain response. How does this principle of recency apply to the memorization of details? psychologically, "recency" denotes "A name given to one of the so-called secondary-laws of association, to the effect that recent impressions or recently formed associations have, other things being equal, an advantage for recall."⁵¹⁵ That is, ⁽¹⁵⁹⁾ the principle of recency is applicable to the details of a response as well as to the response itself. An example of this principle is Reed's experiment,⁵¹⁶ where 11.50 "ideas" learned from the *Origin of Ideas* dropped to 4.00 ideas after two weeks, and 49.00 ideas from the narrative "Marble Statue" dropped to 39.50 in the same period.

Hall's recent study, *The psychology of Learning*, includes a chapter on "The Nature of Forgetting," in which the author asserts:

No one retains all the material which he has learned. Over a period of time an individual forgets, often regardless of the conditions under which the learning took place. For many individuals, it has been this time period which provides the fundamental reasons as to why we forget. Poems, speeches, definitions and formulas which once have been learned, following the passage of time, can no longer be recalled. Since time appears to be the common denominator in all such instances, it is not surprising that time has been looked upon as the basic contributor to forgetting.⁵¹⁷

Hunter, referring to Bartlett's demonstration experiment of serial reproduction, commented on the conclusion that recency is an important factor in recall: "In real life, this time lapse [between hearing the story and reproducing it] is variable and may be sufficiently long to enable the

⁵¹⁴ Hill, *Learning*, p. 42.

⁵¹⁵ Drever, *A Dictionary of Psychology*, p. 242.

⁵¹⁶ Reed, "Meaning as a Factor in Learning," p. 149.

⁵¹⁷ Hall, *The Psychology of Learning*, p. 590.

additional forgetting of details and the further introduction of distortions to take place."⁵¹⁸ The ability to recall after the initial learning is the exception, not the rule. Hunter reported a case of ⁽¹⁶⁰⁾ "... a recalled version of 'The War of the Ghosts' produced by a man after a lapse of twenty-nine years," and concluded from this extraordinary feat that "Admittedly, this particular man is a genius."⁵¹⁹

Folklorists have observed that in most cases where individuals attempt to recall material learned in the distant past, their reproduction is affected by the length of time which has elapsed. Dundes, introducing such works as Bartlett's experiment on memory, notes "The time element in particular is critical"⁵²⁰ to the process of reproduction of tales. Similarly, Anderson, in comparing the results of his Dorpat experiment of the twenties with those of his 1951 Kiel experiment, acknowledged that the element of recency aids recall: "the time between listening and writing down was always only 24 hours," while "in the Dorpat experiment always 3 days." The results in the Dorpat experiment were that "... the occurring changes still were starker"⁵²¹ than those of the Kiel experiment where, only hours separated the two processes of learning and recalling.

Ego-involvement and the Law of Exercise: Memorization as a Function of Ego-involvement

Concept System

In *Principles of psychology*, William James wrote:⁽¹⁶¹⁾

Most men have a good memory for facts connected with their own pursuits. The college athlete who remains a dunce at his books will astonish you by his knowledge of men's 'records' in various feats and games, and will be a walking dictionary of sporting statistics. The reason is that he is constantly going over these things in his mind, and comparing and making series of them. They form for him not so many odd facts, but a concept-system - so they stick ...

In a system, every fact is connected with every other by some thought-relation. The consequence is that every fact is retained by the combined suggestive power of all the other facts in the system and forgetfulness is well-nigh impossible.⁵²²

⁵¹⁸ Hunter, *Memory*, p. 178.

⁵¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 159.

⁵²⁰ Dundes, *The Study of Folklore*, p. 245.

⁵²¹ Anderson, "Ein Volkskundliches Experiment," p. 7.

⁵²² William James, *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. 1 (1891), pp. 662-663.

Hunter substantiated James' account of the "concept-system," adding that in the concept-system, "When the new fact fits into a system of interrelated facts, this facilitates its being memorized in the first place ... Again, there is reference to the role of repetition in preventing subsequent forgetting of memorized fact."⁵²³ This, in learning familiar material, such as well-known themes or motifs appearing in an unfamiliar folktale or legend, the familiar elements aid in the retention of the entire item because the material is rendered meaningful, while learning these material in the new context is an exercise (repetition and recency) for the familiar material. Because of familiarity, repetition, and recency, the amount of retention is higher than would be the case with totally unfamiliar material. The "concept-system" introduced by James and developed by Hunter appears in the experimental psychology literature as the concept of "ego-involvement."

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Ego-involvement

According to Cofer and Appley "the term ego-involvement is used to refer to circumstances in which attitudes relative to the person himself and his possessions, the people, groups, values, and institutions with which he is involved are engaged."⁵²⁴ Paul T. Young states ego-involvement begins in early childhood, when the individual [child] ceases to refer to himself in the third person and learns the concept of "I." Subsequently, "In the normal adult, ego-involvement has developed very far," and is important in that it "... gives interest and zest to pieces of property, systems of belief, plans for action, or whatever it may be that the individual accepts as beholding to himself."⁵²⁵

As in James' "concept-system," ego-involvement directly influences learning and retention. In 1948, Thelma G. Alper found that ego-involvement was related to memory gains over retention intervals, for memory gains were absent in situations when the subjects were merely task-oriented.⁵²⁶ Cofer and Appley summarized experiments on ego-involvement as a factor contributing to faster learning and better retention over long periods of time: "A number of experiments have found that recall is superior for material that agreed with a subject's attitudes, values, or beliefs, for material favorable to his sex or color, for material produced by the subject

⁵²³ Hunter, *Memory*, pp. 96-97

⁵²⁴ [296] Cofer and Appley, *Motivation*, p. 784.

⁵²⁵ P.T. Young, *Motivation and Emotion*, p. 529.

⁵²⁶ Thelma G. Alper, "Task-orientation vs. Ego-orientation in Learning and Repetition." In: *American Journal of Psychology*, Vol. 59 (1946), 236-248; and Thelma G. Alper, "Task-orientation and Ego-orientation as Factors in Reminiscence." In: *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, Vol. 38 (1948), 224-238.

such as associations, and for story titles labeled normal rather than abnormal, etc."⁵²⁷

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These experimental findings and the James-Hunter explanations of this phenomena as mental repetition by "constantly going over these things in ... [one's] mind"⁵²⁸ complement one another and support evidence for the Law of Exercise. Ego-involvement provides a type of reward which, according to Rotter's "Behavior potential," David Berlo's "Fraction of Decision" equation and the general principle of reward, provides a strong drive for behavior. Ego-involvement also provides the conditions necessary for the exercise of learned material, thus producing greater retention: ego-involving folklore material can be recalled longer and remembered easier than material which is not ego-involving.

The Concept of Ego-involvement in Folklore Scholarship

Malinowski noted that among the Trobriand Islanders, "Every story is 'owned' by a member of the community. A story, though known by many, may be recited only by the 'owner;' he may, however, present it to someone else by teaching that person and authorizing him to retell it."⁵²⁹ Since Malinowski, folklorists have learned that narrators can experience ego-involvement with certain *Märchen* and other folklore material which they regard as their personal property. Dégh points out the same phenomenon "among European peoples;"⁵³⁰ also Grudde,⁵³¹ Brinkmann,⁵³² Uffer,⁵³³ Delargy⁵³⁴ and many others have reported instances of ego-involvement experienced by informants. As a psychological factor, ego-involvement is most dramatically evident in rivalries between narrators. Stith Thompson discussed "The sense of rivalry" among the Shanachies of Western Ireland and concluded, "The best way to get one of them started with telling a particular tale is to remark that a certain rival has told it well. He will then insist that you have never heard the

⁵²⁷ Cofer and Appley, *Motivation*, p. 785.

⁵²⁸ James, *Principles of Psychology*, p. 662.

⁵²⁹ Malinowski, "Myths in Primitive Psychology," p. 102.

⁵³⁰ Dégh, "Some Questions on the Social Function of Storytelling," pp. 137-138; and Dégh, *Märchen, Erzähler und Erzählgemeinschaft*, p. 95-96.

⁵³¹ Hertha Grudde, *Wie ich meine, "Plattdeutschen Märchen aus Ostpreussen," Aufschrieb, Folklore Fellows Communications*, Vol. 102 (1932), p. 95-96.

⁵³² O. Brinkmann, *Das Erzählen in einer Dorfgemeinschaft* (Münster i.w., 1933), pp. 26-27.

⁵³³ Leza Uffer, *Rätoromanische Märchen und ihre Erzähler*. (Basel, 1945), p. 75.

⁵³⁴ Delargy, "The Gaelic Story-teller," pp. 20-21.

story really told as it should be, and he then proceeds to demonstrate."⁵³⁵ In this case of imitation ("vicarious instigation," if the narrator responds emotionally to his rival) the narrator's imitative behavior is produced by empathy, with ego-involvement playing a crucial role.

Ego-involvement as a Function of Folklore Genres

Certain folkloric items, then, can be ego-involving for particular individuals who regard these items as their own property. By the same token, certain subclasses of folkloric responses (i.e., folklore genres) could be ego-involving in the same manner and with the same learning results. Just as a narrator or singer can be ego-involved with a particular *Märchen* or song which he considers his own, so social, religious, vocational, and ethnic groups, and even entire communities and nations, can be ego-involved with a particular folk item which they consider characteristic of ⁽¹⁶⁵⁾ their own identity. The genres (subclasses of responses) which may be subject to communal ego-involvement are: beliefs, myth,⁵³⁶ legends, memorates,⁵³⁷ and proverbs.

As ancient national mythology (Egyptian, Greek, etc.) or the current "myths" of a folk community are similar in that both belong to a class of folkloric responses which have historically been ego-involving for members of their respective cultures. Those folkloric responses which are ego-involving for a group will not be questioned by the adherents. For the outsider, however, the very same narratives would have no meaning or identification, and he might reject them as erroneous, obsolete "myths" or superstitions.

William Hugh Jansen refers to the relative value of folk items as "... *the esoteric-exoteric factor in folklore*." "The esoteric applies to what one group thinks of itself and what others think of it," while, "The exoteric is what one group thinks of another and what it thinks that other group thinks it thinks."⁵³⁸ In other words, what could esoterically be a valid religious belief for one group could exoterically be superstitious nonsense for another.

⁵³⁵ Thompson, *The Folktale*, p. 454.

⁵³⁶ Traditionally, "Myth" is limited to primitive societies; Dorson contends that "If by mythology is meant priestly and literary tradition, then it belongs to a different class of cultural artifacts from folk tradition. The Euro-American folklorist does not encounter mythical tales, since these have long ceased to enjoy oral currency." "Current Folklore Theories," (see p. 108).

⁵³⁷ Although memorates are by definition limited to the individual, a memorate is, generally, based on a communal belief, (see *post*, page 116).

⁵³⁸ William Hugh Jansen, "The Esoteric-Exoteric Factor in Folklore." In: *Fabula*, Vol. 2 (1959), 206-207.

Beliefs: As stated earlier, the concept of "belief" is, *per se*, ego-involving. Psychologically, a belief is "An attitude involving the recognition or acceptance of something as real."⁵³⁹ "If people believe things to be true, then they are true for ^{166} them and have social consequences."⁵⁴⁰ Malinowski, Kimball Young, Robert MacIver and Christiansen associated belief with myth as a development from the simple to the complex. For MacIver, myths are merely value-impregnated beliefs,⁵⁴¹ and Malinowski described myth as "charts of belief," and adds: "The *myth* comes into play when rite, ceremony, or a social or moral rule demands justification, warrant of antiquity, reality and sanctity."⁵⁴² Christiansen divided mythology into "higher" and "lower" classes: "lower mythology" being "...folk beliefs' or, to be more exact, 'ancient folk belief,'" and "higher mythology" referring to a "... rich and colorful store of tales, whether of the gods of the classics or of the sterner, less gracious deities of the Norse." "Lower mythology" functions as "... the background to all these elaborate tales about the doings of the gods, or the 'heroes'"⁵⁴³ (i.e., to higher mythology).

Bidney described three categories of belief, based on the relative value of myth and belief in different cultures as follows:

First, there is scientific belief which may be verified. Secondly, there is myth which refers relatively to any belief which we discredit, although acceptable to others in the past or present [superstition]. Thirdly, there is a sphere of belief which lies between science and myth. Religious beliefs, such as the belief in God, are neither scientific nor mythological.⁵⁴⁴

⁵³⁹ Drever, *A Dictionary of Psychology*, p. 28

⁵⁴⁰ ^{297} Steuart H. Britt, *Social Psychology of Modern Life* (New York 1949), p. 182; and P.T. Young, *Motivation and Emotion*, pp. 339-340.

⁵⁴¹ Robert M. MacIver, *The Web of Government* (New York, 1947), p. 4.

⁵⁴² Malinowski, "Myth in Primitive Psychology," p. 107.

⁵⁴³ Reidar Th. Christiansen, "Myth, Metaphor, and Simile," pp. 39-40. It may be noted that Christiansen does not use the word "ancient" in the traditional sense as referring to an object dating back to antiquity. Instead, he uses the word as a value-judgment to mean a "survival" as opposed to a belief still being practiced. For Christiansen, "Lower mythology" is superstition, or "invalid" beliefs; thus, he confuses the subjective perspective of the ego-involved native with the objective perspective of the ethnologist, who is not ego-involved with the material.

⁵⁴⁴ Bidney, *Theoretical Anthropology*, pp. 300-301.

The individual draws the differentiating lines between myth and superstition, on one hand, and belief and religion, on ⁽¹⁶⁷⁾ the other according to his own viewpoint. Thus, it is the principle of ego-involvement that sets myth and superstition apart from belief and religion. In William Jansen's terminology, it is the esoteric versus the exoteric in value judgment.

Myths: In spite of the disagreements among mythologists over such issues as the form, subject matter, and origin of myths, they do agree that a 'myth' must be believed if it is to exist. The definitions offered by [such scholars of diverse orientations as] Boas,⁵⁴⁵ Malinowski,⁵⁴⁶ MacIver,⁵⁴⁷ Kimball Young,⁵⁴⁸ Jung and Kerényi,⁵⁴⁹ Bidney,⁵⁵⁰ Thompson,⁵⁵¹ and Christiansen,⁵⁵² concur that myth is associated with belief. John Greenway summed up the present situation in myth scholarship: "... regardless of the disparity of their exegeses, all the writers on myth over the last 2500 years agreed that myth is a narrative associated with religion,"⁵⁵³ and religion, by definition, is ego-involving.

Legends: Similarly, the legend is believed by its adherents and is a part of their concept-system. Dorson defines legend as "... a true story in the minds of the folk who retain it in their memory and pass it along to the next generation ... the legend is further distinguished by describing an extraordinary event."⁵⁵⁴ This learning aspect of oral tradition ("memory") is achieved "In closely knit communities ... through constant repetition"⁵⁵⁵ and other ⁽¹⁶⁸⁾ factors of learning. In various forms (migratory legend, local legend, or saint's legend), this aspect of retention which Dorson calls

⁵⁴⁵ Franz Boas, "Mythology and Folklore." In: *General Anthropology*, ed. Franz Boas (New York, 1938), pp. 609-610, 616.

⁵⁴⁶ Malinowski, "Myth in Primitive Psychology," pp. 100-101.

⁵⁴⁷ MacIver, *The Web of Government*, pp. 4-5.

⁵⁴⁸ Kimball Young, *Social Psychology*, pp. 196-197.

⁵⁴⁹ Jung and Kerényi, *Essays on a Science of Mythology*, p. 219.

⁵⁵⁰ Bidney, *Theoretical Anthropology*, p. 324; and Bidney, "Myth, Symbolism, and Truth," p. 1.

⁵⁵¹ Thompson, *The Folktale*, p. 9; and Thompson, "Myths and Folktales" p. 106.

⁵⁵² Christiansen, "Myth, Metaphor, and Simile," pp. 39-40.

⁵⁵³ Greenway, *Literature Among the Primitives*, p. 39.

⁵⁵⁴ Dorson, *Folk Legends of Japan*, p. 18.

⁵⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

"memory" remains. The transmission of legends amounts to the transmission of "historical facts" for the folk. The Brothers Grimm, over a century ago, noted that while "The *Märchen* is poetic," by contrast, "the legend is historical."⁵⁵⁶ The combining of historical events from the past with memory (retention of the characteristics of these historically true events) indicates ego-involvement as a functional factor in the legendary tradition of a particular culture.

The importance of "memory" (oral tradition) as an aspect of ego-involvement is stressed by the fact that if the legend ceases to be ego-involving it disappears: Dorson observed, "If interest lags, the legend dies. What maintains interest is the intimate association with family or neighborhood history." In this sense, "Legends represent the folk's-eye view of history;"⁵⁵⁷ that is, the folk's *own* interpretation of facts as they *believe* they happened.

The definitions of legend suggested by Stith Thompson,⁵⁵⁸ Heinrich Günter,⁵⁵⁹ Raymond Deloy Jameson and Alfred Metraux,⁵⁶⁰ and Kimball Young⁵⁶¹ all emphasize the necessity of belief or alleged historicity.

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Memorates: "Memorate," as proposed by Von Sydow, denotes "the narratives by people about their very own personal experiences."⁵⁶² Both the legend and the memorate are sub-types/[(sub-genres)] of belief; they differ in that the memorate is "personal experience" based on common belief, while the legend is a group, or communal, experience based on what is believed to be historically true. Honko, in "Memorates and the Study of Folk Beliefs," emphasized the presence of a communal belief and the individual's perception of this belief as basic to the formation of the memorate: "Memorates are a valuable source for the study of folk religion primarily because they reveal those situations in which supernatural tradition was actualized and began directly to

⁵⁵⁶ Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm, *Deutsche Sagen*, Vol. 1 (Berlin, 1865), p. v

⁵⁵⁷ {298} Dorson, *Folk Legends of Japan*, p. 19.

⁵⁵⁸ Thompson, *The Folktale*, p. 8.

⁵⁵⁹ Heinrich Günter, *Psychologie der Legende* (Baden, 1949), pp. 4, 5.

⁵⁶⁰ Raymond Deloy Jameson and Alfred Metraux, "Local Legend." In: *Standard Dictionary of Folklore, Mythology, and Legend*, Vol. 2, p. 640.

⁵⁶¹ K. Young, *Social Psychology*, pp. 196-197.

⁵⁶² Von Sydow, *Selected Papers on Folklore*, p. 73.

influence behavior."⁵⁶³ When a memorate acquires relevance, that is ego-involvement, for a social group, it develops into a legend. According to Honko, "When an existing description of a supernatural experience spreads from one district to another, it becomes schematic ... Then it can be called belief legend."⁵⁶⁴

A memorate, then, cannot exist in a community where it is not believed or ego-involving. This does not rule out the possible existence of legendary material in areas where it is not ego-involving, but it means that the material survives through factors other than ego-involvement. Honko argued that "Many legends are preserved by means of their drastic fantasy motifs and their narrative value (their humor, and their ⁽¹⁷⁰⁾ exciting nature)."⁵⁶⁵ Undoubtedly, structural and aesthetic qualities are also influential.

Proverbs: Folklorists and psychologists alike have noted that proverbs function as action-producing agents in society. Archer Taylor, for instance, states that a proverb "... ordinarily suggests a course of action or passes a judgment on a situation."⁵⁶⁶ On the other hand, Greenway would confine the proverb's function to a psychological process which follows behavior, rather than instigates it. For Greenway, "... the proverb is used by all the peoples of the world (except perhaps the American Indian) as a rationalization for all kinds of behavior."⁵⁶⁷ Rationalization is "the process of justifying by reasoning after the event, as, for example, an act after it has been performed; often a defense mechanism against self-accusation, or feeling of guilt."⁵⁶⁸ Whether or not we agree with Greenway's definition of the proverb as a rationalizer of action,⁵⁶⁹ both his position and Taylor's presuppose that the proverb is ego-involving. In his consideration of "Myth

⁵⁶³ Honko, "Memorates and the Study of Folk Beliefs," p. 10.

⁵⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁵⁶⁵ Honko, "Memorates and the Study of Folk Belief," p. 13.

⁵⁶⁶ Taylor, "Proverb," p. 902.

⁵⁶⁷ Greenway, *Literature Among the Primitives*, p. 84.

⁵⁶⁸ Drever, *A Dictionary of Psychology*, p. 239.

⁵⁶⁹ Greenway probably did not use the term "rationalization" in its psychological sense, which implies the presence of the rationalization which "... comes after an act has been completed." Drever, *A Dictionary of Psychology* (see p. 239). Irving Sarnoff points out, "Rationalization ... is inferred whenever the individual interprets as expressions of consciously acceptable motives those of his behaviors that are actually reductive of his consciously unacceptable motives." See, Irving Sarnoff, *Personality Dynamics and Development* (New York, 1962), (see p. 230).

and Legends," in *Social Psychology*, Kimball Young also stressed the ego-involving nature of the proverb, thus he writes:

It is but a step from myth, legend, and superstition to much of that homely wisdom we call proverb and folk philosophy. The observations of men on their own and others' conduct have produced a vast body of everyday concept and judgment into which apparently sound sense and much ⁽¹⁷¹⁾ stereotype and fantasy enter. Proverbs are but cultural precipitates of concrete experiences of men in society ... [proverbs] are not consistent and ordered body of knowledge, but are common sense though often contradictory distillation of prior experience. Moreover, they are often the result, from a logical point of view, of what we call 'reasoning from one case' only.⁵⁷⁰

Proverbs and Syllogism: A proverb loses its social function if it ceases to be ego-involving. Bert R. Sappenfield points out that "Though rationalization involves conscious 'understanding' or conscious 'explanation,' it should not be understood to involve a conscious attempt to give misleading explanations. Conscious attempts to give *misleading* explanations should be termed lying or hypocrisy rather than rationalization."⁵⁷¹ Applying a proverb to a situation (or "reasoning from one case," in K. Young' words) is an instance of *sylogistic logic*; the *major premise* is given by the culture and enforced by social norms, and the *minor premise* is provided by the person applying the proverb (major premise) and thus implying the conclusion. Since the major premise is given by social norms, applying a proverb either to rationalize or entice behavior, requires ego-involvement. Unless the value of the proverb is perceived in the proper social and cultural "frame of reference" by both the applier and the recipient, it will fail to perform its function.

The following are examples of proverb-responses produced by members of the Egyptian community in Brooklyn (1965):

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Example 1: I was speaking to Ali--(a northern-Egyptian Moslem)--about Hal.'s--(a southern-Egyptian Christian)--talent as a narrator of folktales. Ali was unimpressed and said, "I don't know him that well." When I questioned him about his antipathy he replied, "*talâta ma-ti'manlihumsh: masîhi sî'îdi, we-muslim dumyâtî, we-yahûdi maghrabî*" (Three shouldn't be trusted: a southern-Egyptian Christian, a Damittan [from Damitta, Egypt] Moslem, and a Moroccan Jew). This proverb revealed an ego-involving social value of Ali's group. The example can be

⁵⁷⁰ K. Young, *Social Psychology*, pp. 200-201.

⁵⁷¹ B.R. Sappenfield, *Personality Dynamics, An Integrative Psychology of Adjustment* (New York, 1961), p. 381.

explained according to syllogistic logic:

Major Premise: All southern-Egyptian Christians are not to be trusted.

Minor Premise: Hal. is a southern-Egyptian Christian.

Inference: Hal. should not be trusted.

Example 2: As I was talking to Mr. Ata (now a restaurant owner), I mentioned a certain woman and her daughters. Ata stated that her daughters were "no good." When I asked why, he said, "She (the mother) is a belly-dancer." I then asked: "What has that got to do with her daughters?" and he replied, "*ikfi el-garra `ala fommahâ, titla` el-bint l-ommahâ*, (Upset a jar on its mouth, a girl turns out like her mother," i.e., nothing comes out of the jar except what is in it; they are two of a kind). [See *post*, page 190].

Major Premise: Every object produces only its like (its content).⁽¹⁷³⁾

Minor premise: A daughter is a product of the mother--(she is like the mother).

Inference: This daughter is like her mother.

A proverbial simile such as the Arabic "As a camel" (i.e., patient and strong, [see *post*, page 170, n. 6]), or the European "As white as snow," cannot be understood except within its [physical], social and cultural frame of reference; a person who had never seen a camel or snow, would not understand the phrase, especially if the modifiers "strong" and "white" were omitted. Moreover, every proverb expresses a social value just as the low status of a woman entertainer (*`âlma*) in Ata's community as voiced by his observation about the character of her daughters. The proverb is part of a concept-system which illustrates one's own ego-involving norms, values and beliefs, functioning as a "frame of reference" for his behavior.

Conclusion

The factor unifying these subclasses (genres) of folkloric behavior (beliefs, superstitions, myths, legends, memorates, and proverbs) is their common ego-involving belief, conviction, or value system. As already noted, retention and remembering [recall] can be a function of ego-involvement.

It follows that all folkloric responses involving the ego are, other things being equal, better retained than responses which are not so. This fact will be demonstrated in the forthcoming analyses of [the proceedings of the] fieldwork among members of the Egyptian community in Brooklyn, New York.

CHAPTER V

LOSS OF FOLKLORIC RESPONSES

Throughout the preceding chapters we have examined learning and memorization as a function of the laws of effect and exercise. We have observed the Law of Effect in the function of reward as a stamping-in factor, and punishment as a stamping-out factor, and have seen the Law of Exercise manifested in learning and retention as a function of repetition and recency and the factor of meaningfulness in the structural characteristics of the learned material. Ego-involvement, which could have been considered an aspect of the factor of meaningfulness, was treated as a part of the Law of Exercise; following James Hunter's suggestion, we introduced the principles of mental repetition and recency as a function of ego-involvement, without overlooking the fact that ego-involving material offers greater rewards, and could be more meaningful.

Thus, the acquisition of folkloric responses as well as the maintenance (retention and memorization) of these responses are functions of these factors. Their presence is essential to the process of acquiring new responses and maintaining them, while the absence of all or any of these factors will prevent or handicap learning. The two processes of extinction and inhibition function to cause the loss or disappearance of already acquired responses from the behavior of the individual.

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Extinction

In 1927 Ivan p. Pavlov⁵⁷² introduced the concept of "Experimental extinction," the phenomenon whereby "Under repeated non-reinforcement there is a tendency for the conditioned response to weaken or even to disappear completely."⁵⁷³ As already noted, reinforcing reward is essential for the acquisition of new responses (learning), and for habit formation which occurs as a function of repeatedly or heavily rewarding a given stimulus-response connection. It is also essential for the maintenance of a habit, for without reward, habits weaken and disappear over a time span which varies according to the strength of the habit. P.T. Young concludes: "extinction" is the "... disappearance of the responses when reward is withheld ..."⁵⁷⁴ Miller and Dollard point out, "Stronger habits are more resistant to extinction than weaker habits. Other things equal, any factor which will produce a stronger habit will increase its resistance to extinction. One such factor is a

⁵⁷² (299) Ivan P. Pavlov, *Conditioned Reflexes: An Investigation of the Psychological Activity of the Cerebral Cortex*, trans. and ed. G.V. Anrep (London, 1927).

⁵⁷³ Hilgard, *Theories of Learning*, p. 51.

⁵⁷⁴ P.T. Young, *Motivation and Emotion*, p. 243.

greater number of rewarded training trials."⁵⁷⁵ In terms of folkloric behavior, the minstrel's habit of performing, established by being rewarded whenever he performs, or the mother used to being rewarded whenever she narrates a tale to her children, other things being equal, will be more resistant to extinction than the same habit when practiced only for a short period of time and with fewer rewards per performance.

⁽¹⁷⁶⁾

Two additional factors contributing to the formation of a stronger habit "... and hence a greater resistance to extinction are: a stronger drive during training and a greater amount of reward per trial during training."⁵⁷⁶ (See *ante*, pages 57-59).

Learning Dilemma

When social and cultural conditions change, cues change accordingly, and to avoid the social dissonance caused by making obsolete, inappropriate responses, the individual must learn new responses to replace the former ones. If older habits inculcated by long periods of practice and large rewards are very strong, the adjusting individual will suffer a learning dilemma. Miller and Dollard described this phenomenon:

... in order to get the individual to try a new response which it is desired that he learn, it is often necessary to place him in a situation where his old responses will not be rewarded. Such a situation may be called a learning dilemma. In the absence of a dilemma new learning of the trial-and-error type does not occur.⁵⁷⁷

The difficulty of breaking habits and forming new ones is expressed in the proverb "You can't teach an old dog new tricks." As Miller and Dollard point out, "The absence of a dilemma is one of the reasons why it is often difficult to teach successful people new things. Old heavily rewarded ⁽¹⁷⁷⁾ habits must be interrupted before new learning can occur."⁵⁷⁸ Extinction interrupts old habits in order that new, adaptive responses may be learned.

Extinction and Forgetting

⁵⁷⁵ Miller and Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation*, p. 38.

⁵⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 33-34.

⁵⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

Although forgetting and extinction may appear to be the same phenomena, since both have a corroding effect on learned responses and retention, they must not be confused with each other. Forgetting, as pointed out earlier (see *ante*, page 95), is the "... cumulative effects ... from an ever-lengthening past. What was retained at one time may no longer be retained and so cannot now be remembered;"⁵⁷⁹ whereas "forgetting occurs during an interval in which a response is not practiced,"⁵⁸⁰ and is a negative process, evoked by the passage of time. Extinction, on the other hand, is a positive process of cultural and social adaptation; "Extinction occurs when a response is practiced without reward,"⁵⁸¹ and is "... a means by which a non-adaptive reaction can be cut down or eliminated."⁵⁸² After unacceptable social and cultural responses are eliminated, extinction functions "... to force the subject to try new responses. If any of these responses are rewarded, they will be strengthened to the point where their competition may permanently eliminate the old habits."⁵⁸³

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In terms of folkloric behavior, a song or *Märchen* that has not been heard or told for a long time will simply be forgotten, whereas one which has continued in circulation but has become non-rewarding will weaken and disappear. The person who once produced these folkloric responses will adapt by seeking new responses, such as watching television, or going to the movies, which, if found rewarding, will extinguish the former one's. Thus, extinction is an effective tool in producing behavioral changes.

However, Bandura and Walters have noted that "Extinction may not always be the most effective and economical method of eliminating deviant behavior;"⁵⁸⁴ there are more effective mechanisms for "producing behavior change."⁵⁸⁵ It is necessary for the organism to experience several unrewarded occurrences of the response before extinction occurs; this process requires a longer time span varying in length according to the strength of the habit. Moreover, extinct habits are subject to "spontaneous recovery."

⁵⁷⁹ Hunter, *Memory*, p. 217; and Hall, *The Psychology of Learning*, p. 591.

⁵⁸⁰ Miller and Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation*, p. 35; P.T. Young, *Motivation and Emotion*, pp. 234-236.

⁵⁸¹ Miller and Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation*, p. 38.

⁵⁸² K. Young, *Social Psychology*, p. 43.

⁵⁸³ Miller and Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation*, p. 43.

⁵⁸⁴ Bandura and Walters, *Social Learning and Personality Development*, p. 231.

⁵⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 231-238.

Spontaneous Recovery

The principle of "spontaneous recovery," as delineated by Miller and Dollard, posits that "The effects of extinction tend to disappear with the passage of time."⁵⁸⁶ Thus, following a series of unsuccessful attempts, a minstrel may abandon his habit of singing in a particular locale, or a mother may ⁽¹⁷⁹⁾ stop telling her children *Märchen* when she puts them to bed. Yet, "as time goes on," the tendency to try these old responses "... again gradually recovers from the effects of extinction" and in another month or year the minstrel or narrator "may take another chance"⁵⁸⁷ on the old responses. "The fact of recovery demonstrates that extinction does not destroy the old habit, but merely inhibits it. With the passage of time, the strength of the inhibiting factors produced during extinction is weakened more rapidly than the strength of the original tendency to perform the habit."⁵⁸⁸ Thus, an abandoned old unrewarding habit can be spontaneously recovered, even though the adverse social and cultural conditions (cues) remain. The resulting state of anxiety produced by this reversion to non-rewarding behavior will motivate the individual to avoid it again in the future.

Inhibition

Hilgard agrees with Miller and Dollard that "The fundamental form of inhibition in most conditioning theories^[589] is represented by experimental extinction - the reduction in response with repeated non-reinforcement."⁵⁹⁰ However, Cofer and Appley pointed out that the concept of inhibition "... in its present dictionary meaning of 'an action of preventing, hindering, or checking,'"⁵⁹¹ is derived from T.L. Brunton's ⁽¹⁸⁰⁾ classic definition (1883). Brunton defined inhibition as the "... arrest of the function of a structure or organ by the actions upon it of another, while its power to execute these functions is still retained and can be manifested as soon as the restraining power is removed."⁵⁹² At present, "inhibition" is a "Condition where a function, or

⁵⁸⁶ Miller and Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation*, p. 42.

⁵⁸⁷ Paraphrased from Miller and Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation*, p. 42.

⁵⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸⁹ Such as Hull's description in Hull, *Essentials of Behavior* (New Haven, Conn., 1951), pp. 74-81; and Hull, *A Behavior System: Concerning the Individual Organism* (New Haven, Conn., 1952), p. 10.

⁵⁹⁰ [300] Hilgard, *Theories of Learning*, p. 137.

⁵⁹¹ Cofer and Appley, *Motivation*, p. 147.

⁵⁹² T.L. Brunton, "On the Nature of Inhibition, and the Action of Drugs upon It." In: *Nature*, Vol. 27 (1883), 419.

functions, or some circumstance prevents the manifestation of some other function, or activity, or mode of expression, the phenomena ... may be physical or mental in origin or in manifestation."⁵⁹³

Inhibition and Subconscious Mechanisms: Unlike suppression and repression, inhibition is *not* a psychological defense mechanism. L.S. Levine states, "... behavior inhibition is correctly considered a result of conflict itself and not of the defenses necessary to protect against the anxiety aroused by conflict."⁵⁹⁴ Inhibition also differs from repression and suppression in that it "... refers to the prevention of overt action rather than to the prevention of ideas or impulses from entering, or remaining in consciousness."⁵⁹⁵ Freud has observed, inhibition is a voluntary process which helps the individual adjust to the group and avoid anxiety-producing responses; thus he has written: "Many inhibitions are an obvious renunciation of function, because ^{181} the existence of the function would give rise to anxiety."⁵⁹⁶ Similarly, Levin described an experiment in which the subjects did not report seeing "anxiety-arousing" words although they were aware of them, and explained that "... inhibition of the overt response [occurred] because such response [expression] seemed unsafe."⁵⁹⁷ It is this feeling of being "unsafe" that motivates a person to inhibit certain anxiety-producing responses.

In terms of folkloric behavior, when an individual accustomed to being rewarded for certain folkloric responses such as singing, dancing, or narrating, receives punishment instead of the expected reward, these responses will acquire an "anxiety-arousing" function and their performance will become "unsafe." To avoid anxiety the individual will inhibit these responses, particularly when he associates them with punishment. A response formerly rewarded but currently punished will be, to use Brunton's words, "arrested," even though the "power to execute these functions is retained and can be manifested as soon as the restraining power is removed." That is, as soon as the new expectation of punishment is replaced by the former expectation of reward. This process can be observed in the behavior of the Egyptians living in Brooklyn, who were forced to inhibit singing, telling legends and tales, and overt practices employing certain folk beliefs, because these traditional responses became dangerous, especially in the presence of native Americans.

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⁵⁹³ Drever, *A Dictionary of Psychology*, p. 137.

⁵⁹⁴ Louis S. Levine, *Personal and Social Development, The Psychology of Effective Behavior* (New York, 1963), pp. 104-105.

⁵⁹⁵ Sappenfield, *Personality Dynamics*, p. 197.

⁵⁹⁶ Freud, *The Problem of Anxiety* (New York, 1938), p. 16.

⁵⁹⁷ Levine, *Personal and Social Development*, p. 105.

**Social and Cultural Forces and the process of Learning:
A Concluding Statement**

In summary, social and cultural forces and learning are totally interdependent upon one another. Social and cultural forces provide the stimuli which drive the individual to behave, as well as the cues that determine the type of behavior elicited (folkloric response, scientific response). These forces also provide rewards and punishments for the responses, the amount being determined by the value of the reward or the punishment for the individual in his social and cultural milieu.

We have also seen that other laws of learning are determined by social and cultural forces. Whenever a folkloric response is elicited by these forces the principles of repetition and recency affect the learning process. On the other hand, when social and cultural forces are adverse to a folkloric response and the response vanishes for a period of time, the three processes of loss of learned responses (forgetting, extinction, and inhibition) become pertinent. It will be remembered that forgetting is due to lack of recency and repetition, extinction to lack of reward, and inhibition to punishment. If extinction and inhibition periods are long enough retention could be affected by forgetting (lack of use or maintenance).

Thus, since social and cultural forces provide: 1) the drive for folkloric behavior, 2) the cues eliciting ⁽¹⁸³⁾ folkloric responses, 3) the reward and punishment of the folkloric responses and value of models for folkloric behavior, and 4) norms for folkloric behavior--as well as such learning principles as ego-involvement, meaningfulness, recency, and repetition--it is apparent that these forces determine two facets (variables) of the learning process:

1. The material to be learned.
2. The process of learning, as well as the process of losing learned responses.

Whenever social and cultural forces change, the process of learning will change accordingly, thus stamping-in new modes of behavior and stamping-out the old modes. This "change" in the process of learning is not a change in the nature of learning itself, but rather a change occurring in the cultural and social mechanisms which guide the learning process.

PART II^[*]

CHAPTER VI

TWO CASE STUDIES OF FOLKLORIC BEHAVIOR IN THE EGYPTIAN COMMUNITY IN BROOKLYN, NEW YORK

Introduction

The changes evoked by social and cultural forces are dramatically reflected in the transitions which have occurred in the Egyptian community in Brooklyn, New York during the past two decades. The following proceedings have been selected from more than fifty-four interviews conducted in that community during a period extending from the summers of 1961 to the summer of 1965. While these transcriptions cannot be considered representational of the total folkloric behavior of the community, they are case examples of the broad social and cultural trends characteristic of the Egyptian society in Brooklyn.

In field work presentation, two devices will be used to render the reproduction as accurately as possible:

1. An ellipsis (...) will be used to indicate:
 - a. brief pauses for recall
 - b. dramatic short pauses
 - c. unfinished or interrupted ideas

2. A dash (-) will be used to indicate:
 - a. interruptions of ideas
 - b. abrupt shifts to different ideas

^[*][Note: Form-wise, all footnotes in Part II are additions to the original work. The notes contain the transliterated Arabic texts and explanatory remarks that appeared within the main text in the original; to allow for easier reading, data cited in Arabic has been moved to the footnotes section. Further explanatory cultural remarks, motif and tale type numbers are provided. Names of some informants were slightly altered].

Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used in the case analyses to denote the type of folkloric behavior represented:

Folklore Genres

A = Anecdote	M = <i>Märchen</i>
B = Belief	N = Novella
D = Dance	P = Proverb
J = Joke	R = Riddle
L = Legend	S = Song
Me = Memorate	Sb = Ballad

Behavioral Responses

OFR = Operant's Folkloric Response
ONR = Operant's Negative Response
OR = Operant's Response
IFR = Informant's Folkloric Response
INR = Informant's Negative Response
IR = Informant's Response
NR = Negative Response

Abbreviations in "ANALYSIS OF CASE" section are provided in the following order:

Genre - type of response - and number of response in the interview; i.e., S (folksong). OFR1 (Operant's Folkloric Response No. 1) = S.OFR1

Independent responses are separated by a comma (,), while related responses are separated by a dash (-).

CASE 1

The Folkloric Behavior of the Changing Family

Time: Sunday, December 27, 1964; about 10:00 p.m.

Place: The Brooklyn apartment of Mrs. Nima I. (Mrs. Hal. H.).

Persons: Nima (professional dancer, a divorcee, of humble origins in Cairo, Egypt, was married to an American serviceman and accompanied him to the U.S.); her daughters Dana (18, student: shy and reserved) and Fadya (16, student: sociable and flamboyant);⁵⁹⁸ Mr. Talat Saber (24, a native Cairene, doctoral student in chemistry--my host in New York City). [Absent: Hal., Nima's new husband].

Setting: The living room is the entrance to the apartment; it is fairly large, with armchairs placed at the corners. In one corner stands a Christmas tree with ornaments and presents. In an inner room, Fadya and Dana are watching television and the sound penetrates the living room. A tape recorder and record player stand on a table. A huge picture of Nima in her dancing costume hangs above a closed-off fireplace facing the entrance way. Fadya enters, followed by a little dog. Dana comes in later, greets Mr. Saber and myself, stays a short while, and leaves as soon as I bring up the subject of recording. I had collected from Nima and Hal., (her friend at the time), and from Faṭma (another friend)⁵⁹⁹ and her "brother," Isma`îll, in 1961. Nima's daughters: Dana, Carol ([... who did not participate and was always away]), and Fadya observed the sessions but did not participate. I visited Nima whenever I went to New York, but had not attempted to re-collect the material collected from her in 1961 until this session in 1964.

The following is the first of three interviews held between December 22, 1964 and January 1, 1965, in which I [(**El-Shamy: henceforth the "Col."**)], attempted to re-collect the material given by informants in 1961. Following Hal.'s return, two more sessions were held in August 1965. These last two sessions involved {187} only Hal. and Nima--Dana and Fadya being too busy to participate. [The following interview was conducted mostly in English].

⁵⁹⁸ She presented her materials in the style of television-reporting.

⁵⁹⁹ One of Fatma's tales is included in H. El-Shamy's "An Annotated Collection of Egyptian Folktales Collected from an Egyptian Sailor in Brooklyn, New York." M.A. thesis, Indiana University, 1964. See tale no. 2, pp. 27-34.

Col.: What is your Name?
Fadya: Fadya B ...
Col.: I understand that you are going to tell me stories.
Fadya: Yes, I am going to tell you a story about three little girls with their nasty old stepmother.
Col.: Where did you hear that story?
Fadya: My mother told it to me when I was about five years old.
Col.: How long ago was that?
Fadya: [jocularly] Oh, last year! [laughter]
Col.: No, no, I am serious.
Fadya: That was about ... let us see ... eleven years ago.
Col.: Eleven years ago? That means that you are sixteen years old now?
Fadya: Ya.
Col.: When was the last time your mother told you a story?
Fadya: About eleven years ago. [laughter]
Col.: I understand that you tried recently to get her to tell you stories but she refused.
Fadya: Ya, she said we were too old. [*Operant's Negative Response 1*]
Col.: What did she mean by saying "too old"?
Fadya: Too old to hear this type of stories again. [*Cues, Norms*]
Col.: OK, now you can proceed.
Fadya: All right, thank you. Well, the story is told like this: [*Informant's Folkloric Response 2*]⁶⁰⁰

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There are three daughters who lived with an old nasty stepmother. Ya, the stepmother favored two of the daughters more than one. These two she gave good food, and good clothing, too, and so forth. And this one daughter whom she didn't like at all-- because they weren't hers, they were

⁶⁰⁰ Type: 480, *The Spinning Women by the Spring. The Kind and Unkind Girls*. This rendition is influenced by the European "Cinderella."

[Dana corrects Fadya ...] [*Operant's Response*].

.... Well, the other two belonged to her and this one was only a stepdaughter by marriage.

So she made her eat scraps from the table, and so forth, because she figured she was no more than an animal to her. Well, after years and years of suffering, and beating and making a servant out of this girl, she hated the stepmother so much, and the stepsisters. Well, as time went on she got more of the same treatment from the stepmother and the stepsisters and she just couldn't bear it any more. So, she decided, she was finally going to leave the stepmother and the stepsisters and try to make a life of her own.

Well, she had nothing to take with her on the road, so she just took herself and the rags she was wearing. Just one morning she got up early and she left. And during the travel she came upon this well. Now, as she stood above the well, she spoke into it, and she said, "Gee, I wish that something would be good for me. I'd never had nothing all my life," and so forth, and so forth, and she wished so many things that she always wanted and never could get. Well, at this time--because she had wished so hard and wanted something so bad and never had anything--the well spoke to her, and told her to come down. Well, she came ... she went down to the well slowly and was down there for--(oh), about ... an hour, two hours. She didn't come up. And all of a sudden she came up, ^{189} and she had beautiful gems and clothing, she had on one of the most beautiful gowns she could expect to see on a young lady; her hair was just combed ... she was just more beautiful than ever!

Well, she decided she'd run home and show everybody what had happened to her. Well, she didn't get wonderful greetings from her stepmother and stepsisters. And when they saw this! ... They became extremely jealous. So, naturally, the stepmother chased her two daughters out and said, "Go to the well. Go to the well. I want you to go down and get rich as she did. She is not better than you, you should have better than her, and much more." So, the two sisters ra-a-a-a-an to the well and they spoke into the well and they said, "We want these things, too, and we want beautiful clothes, just as she got." Well, the well said, "Come down." But! They were deceived by the well because the well knew that they had treated her rotten all these years. They were going to get ... to be taught--a lesson.

Now!! The two girls went down into the well and were down there for about two--three, four--hours and all of the sudden they came up, and they came running up! They've got bugs and ... nastiness all over them! They run back and they run back and say to the stepmother, "Look what happened to us. She did it! She did it!" And the girl only replied that it was not her fault and that they were only getting paid back for the nastiness they have given her all those years.

That's all. [*Repetition, Lack of Recency*]

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Nima: [excitedly, in Arabic] You forgot the well, [you did not say]:
 "O well, O well, dress her⁶⁰¹ in many dresses;"
 "O well, O well, put many earrings on her ear." [*Operant's Folkloric Response 3*]

Fadya: [in English] Oh, well [i.e., apparently I did] ...

Col.: [to Nima] Would you please! Tell the story in the same manner you told it to them.

Nima: [in Arabic]
 A man had a daughter; he married a woman [*Informant's Folkloric Response 4*]

Fadya: [interrupts jocularly] "Married a woman!" [laughter]

Nima: He married that woman and had two daughters from her. This woman always set the table for her daughters to eat, and then she brought the daughter of her husband to eat what was left. She made her wash [floors] and dishes ... and ... just like a servant.
 Everyday she said to her, "Go and get water in this tin⁶⁰² from the well." So, she goes to fill the tin and bring the water to the house. While she [the stepmother] and her daughters are staying 'lady-like'⁶⁰³ inside the house, naturally!

⁶⁰¹ The pronoun "her" indicates that the character which orders the well to perform the magical feats is--contrary to the present text--someone other than the heroine; typically that character is an ogress; this is the '**normal form**' for this tale in Egyptian communities. That form may be outlined as follows:

I. At the behest of his only child--a daughter, a widower marries a widow who also has one daughter (sometimes, after she has induced the girl to kill her own mother). II. The stepmother tries to get rid of the stepdaughter; she sends her to the ogress to borrow a sieve. III. On the way, the heroine encounters various animals and plants to which she acts kindly: each bestows on her its good attributes. IV. At the ogress's house, she performs household chores and flatters the ogress (by pretending to eat her lice): she is rewarded with many fine presents from a magic well. A prince sees her and is enamored. V. The stepmother forces her own daughter to imitate; but due to her unkindness, each animal and plant inflicts upon her its bad quality. Because of her disobedience and lack of 'social tact,' the ogress asks the magic well to cover her with dirt, insects, and ['crawly-creepers']. VI. The heroine is to marry the prince; her stepmother substitutes her own daughter for the true bride. A cat (or rooster) reveals the deception. The true bride is rescued and reinstated; the stepmother and her daughter are severely punished.

⁶⁰² *ṣaflūlah*, a large tin can, typically an empty container of liquid goods, used in lieu of a water jar.

⁶⁰³ *hawānim*.

Then the girl went to the well and started crying, and said to it, "O well, O well, dress me in many dresses." ...

Fadya: [interrupts excitedly, in English] She did not!
She looked into the well and said [in Arabic] "*ana ga'âna* (I am hungry)."
[Operant's Folkloric Response 5] [The others laugh at Fadya's inability to produce the glottal "ʿ" [*ʿayn*] sound in: *ga`âna*, and at her accent]

Dana: [adds in Arabic]
"*ana ga'âna*" (I am hungry), "*mafîsh filûs*" (there is no money), [laughter] "*ana 'âyza 'âku*" (I want to eat). [Operant's Folkloric Response 6] [continued laughter at Dana's inability to produce the glottal "ʿ" sound and at her accent]

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Nima: [continues in Arabic]
... and she said, "O well, O well, put on many earrings on my ears." The well answered her, "Come down." She went down. It dressed her in many dresses and gave her all she wanted and asked for. Then where did she go? She went to her stepmother! She said to her, "Look, I went to the well and asked for ..." She [the stepmother] said to her, "What did you say to it?" She said, "I said to it, 'O well, O well, dress me in many dresses! O well, O well, put on many earrings on my ears!'" She asked her, "What next?" She answered, "The well answered me and said 'Come down'. I went down and it gave me all I asked for."

She [the stepmother] said to her two daughters, "Go there and ask exactly as she did." So they went there--her children, the two girls--and said, "O well, o well, dress us in many dresses! O well, o well, put on many earrings on our ears!" The well said to them, "Come down." They went down; they came out full of snakes, scorpions [Fadya and Dana laugh sarcastically] ... lice, and other wicked things! They ran to whom? To their mother. Their mother shrieked in horror [Nima shrieks and Fadya laughs with satisfaction] [*Empathy*] "What happened!?" They said, "We went to the well just like our [step]sister; it covered us with dirt and horrible things!" ... Their mother said to them, "Go and take a bath!" She changed their clothes and everything and then she came to ... to ... to ... the wife ... the daughter--,... her stepdaughter!! She ordered her, "Take all that off!" She [the stepmother] stripped the jewelry and dresses off her and dressed her own daughters in these dresses and things and said to her [stepdaughter], {192} "Take the bones of the water-buffalo [the stepdaughter's] and bury it underneath the tree."

The girl took the bones. While crying, she dug and buried the bones.⁶⁰⁴ She [the

⁶⁰⁴ Type: 511A, *The Little Red Ox*. [Cow helps orphans].

stepmother] said to her, "Throw it." She [the stepdaughter] buried it. While she was crying she heard a voice saying, "Why are you crying?" She answered, "My stepmother; she well dressed me in many dresses and put on many earrings on my ears. And my stepmother took all this from me and gave it to my sisters, and she said to me, 'Take the bones and throw them away' but I buried it instead." She [the voice] said to her, "Is that all!" She [the stepdaughter] said, "And she didn't feed me." She [the voice] said, "Is that all!" She [the stepdaughter] said, "Yes."

She [the voice] said, "Turn around." She turned around and looked! She looked under the tree and saw a table set with everything. She ate to her satisfaction. She [the voice] said to her, "Every day at dinnertime come here; you will find this table set and waiting for you."

The stepmother would give her the leftovers, she would say, "No, I have no appetite." Where did she go? To the tree: under the tree, she would find her table set, and she would eat.

One day her stepmother followed her. She [the stepmother] said (to herself) "I would like to know what she does." She [the stepmother] went there and saw her sitting at a set table, and she alone was eating. She said to her, "Tell me, who sets this table for you!" She [the stepdaughter] said, "I don't know. When I took the bones and buried them, I heard a voice. This voice tells me every day at ⁽¹⁹³⁾ dinnertime I should come here ... 'You will find your table set.'" So, what does her stepmother do? Every day before dinnertime she would send her daughters before her stepdaughter and says to them, "Go there, under the tree you will find a table all set." When they go there they wouldn't find anything except a burning heap: burning fire and smoke. So they would run back to the house and tell their mother.

So, her stepmother went to her [the girl's] father and said, "This girl is no good. We must tie her up and lash her with the whip every afternoon." Naturally, the father listened to her. Every day he would tie the girl up at dinnertime and beat her up, and he wouldn't let her go to the tree.

So! ... What happened? It happened that the man would beat his daughter ... after that the rope would untie itself and she would go to the tree ... The man, ... The stepmother wanted to tie her up. She looked exactly like his daughter. One day the man wanted to tie her [his daughter] up ... He tied her up and kept on beating her. The girl came in ... she found that he was beating who!? Her stepmother! The man looked and said, "How come I am beating you up, how could you be standing there?" And he looks to find who! To find that his wife died, for he has beaten her too much.

'Bit by bit, the tale is over.'⁶⁰⁵

Fadya and

Dana: [together, excitedly] No! No! It didn't end like that ..., [but as follows]:

The father discovered the truth and divorced her! [*Operant's Folkloric Response 7*]

Col.: [to Nima] Did you notice that your *haddûta* is different from hers?

Nima: Yes.

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Col.: She told the *haddûta*, basically the same, as I know it, but yours has got an addition.

Nima: Well!

Col.: How many times did you tell it to them?

Nima: Oh, many times.

Col.: Approximately how many?

Nima: Oh, I used to tell it to them when they were four or three years old. I used to tell it almost every night.

Col.: [in English] What was their favorite?

Nima: *Nuss-Nuṣaiṣ*.⁶⁰⁶

Col.: *Nuss Nuṣaiṣ* was their favorite?

Nima: Oh, yes!

Col.: [to Fadya] Do you think you can reproduce it?

Fadya: No. All what I remember is that he was half boy and ...

Col.: Go ahead! Just put down whatever you remember!

Fadya: Alright! [*Informant's Folkloric Response 8*]

Col.: Would you please come closer. [Fadya's dog runs in and interrupts things for a while.

⁶⁰⁵ *tâta tûta firghit el-haddûta*.

⁶⁰⁶ Type: 327B, *The Dwarf and the Giant*. [*Nuss-Nuṣaiṣ*, *Hdaydûn*, etc.].

Fadya puts the dog in her lap].

Nima: [emphatically] Would you please put him [the dog] down!

Fadya: The only thing I remember about the *Nuss Nuṣais* story is ...

Col.: Your mother told it to you in Arabic?

Fadya: No, it was told to me in English.

Col.: OK.

Fadya: There is this boy who is only half a boy, actually, [laughter] because he had one leg, naturally. (We are getting to the story now.) This boy, *Nuss Nuṣais*, was more-or-less messenger of good will; he always tried to help out people, and got himself in mischief at the same time. (One story I don't remember very well ... I remember one where he was involved with the gorilla in a cage.)

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[interruption] ... (Stop! My mother is hitting my dog ... stop!! [laughter] [narrator talks at her mother] I wish he bites you back. Alright. Now the dog is hitting my mother. [addressing the dog] Come here. She'll bite you! ...)

Now, anyway, getting back to the story: He was involved with this gorilla, and ... he stood combing the gorilla's hair,⁶⁰⁷ and ...

Dana: [interrupts] No! No! That was the little girl. [*Operant's Folkloric Response 9*]

Fadya: No! He was not.

Dana: He combed the gorilla's hair!?!.

Fadya: And was picking the bugs out of the gorilla's hair, ... the '*amlas* [lice].⁶⁰⁸ ...

Dana: No, that was somebody else.

Fadya: [emphatically] Yes, he was ... He picked out the '*amlas* [lice] out of the gorilla's hair. [laughter] [Nima interrupts to correct Fadya]

⁶⁰⁷ This motif occurs in Type 480, pt. VI, *The Old Woman's [Ogress's] Tasks*. See *ante*, page 129, n. 3. Dana recognized this fact and interrupted her sister so as to correct her. This sort of interruption supports the premise of Anderson's "Law of self-correction." See *ante*, pages 12, and 15ff.

⁶⁰⁸ i.e., *qaml*, lice; the Arabic word is given in the English plural form.

- Nima: [the comment is not clear on the tape due to the excitement of all the three] He ...
- Fadya: Oh!! I am sorry. I forgot ... I am thinking of the one with a little girl.
- Nima: That's right.
- Col.: [to Fadya] How come you don't remember that!
- Fadya: This ... the one I was referring to with the gorilla--was when a little girl was in the cage picking the 'amlas ..., the bugs out of the gorilla's hair, [laughter] cleaning him up. And the gorilla returned the favor to her when she really needed it and so on and so on, that is to cut this short story short ...
- Nima: [excitedly] He don't want it [the story] short!
- Col.: Just give it the way you remember it.
- Fadya: H-m-m-m. Anyway, getting back to Nuss Nuṣaiṣ, he ⁽¹⁹⁶⁾ is the one I like best. [Laughter from others and comments about her failure to remember correctly the story she 'likes best'].
- Nima and
Dana: [comment that the story has not been told for a long time] ... [*Lack of Recency*]
- Fadya: I mean ... I am always trying to be truthful! Well, anyway,
Nuss Nuṣaiṣ was a kind of boy, as I said before, who was always trying to help people; but he got himself in trouble while doing it. And ... he had this friend ... [to her mother] Didn't he? Nuss Nuṣaiṣ had this friend?
- Nima: Yes, his brother.
- Fadya: He had three brothers. They were all normal: they had two legs, two arms, and, ... you know, all that ...
- Dana: You didn't tell him their names. [*Operant's Folkloric Response 10*]
- Fadya: [asks Nima] What was their names?
- Nima: Hasan ... and ...
- Fadya: Hasan ...
- Nima: *we* Sayyid [(i.e., And Sayyid)].

Fadya: [with surprise] Sayyid!?⁶⁰⁹

Dana: And Meḥammad, [not 'Sayyid']. [*Operant's Folkloric Response 11*]

Fadya: ... And Meḥammad, were his three brothers, and his name was Nuss Nuṣais. [laughter]
We are having fun ... I hope no one else listens to this. Now ... ha ... let's see.

Nima: [volunteers information, not clear]

Fadya: No!

His three brothers wanted to get rid of him because he was only a half a boy. And so ... once--you know ... they thought he was ugly and all this. (Frankly, I wouldn't get rid of him myself. I think he is a cute kid. How often do you wander into someone with one leg and one arm.) [laughter]

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Dana: [comments] ...

Fadya: My sister said, "If he goes, we go, all!"

Col.: Dana, why don't you grab a chair and join us?

Dana: No! No! [*Inhibition*] [*Operant's Negative Response 12*]

Fadya: [into the microphone] He is trying to convince my sister to get into this now.

Dana: [sharply] Whom are you talking to!

Fadya: ...

Nima: [reprimandingly] He does not want to hear you yakking! Stop the story [i.e., the tape recorder].

Fadya: Actually, to be completely truthful, my family is funnier than any story. [laughter]
Anyway, getting back to Nuss Nuṣais.

Nuss Nuṣais's brothers wanted to get rid of him and they thought of all sorts of schemes and got him into trouble to get rid of him, you know. They made him meet up with thieves and robbers just to ... But no one wanted to have him, they felt sorry for him.

Dana: Who said so?

⁶⁰⁹ The name: 'Sayyid' has not been reported as a hero's name in Egyptian *ḥawadīt* (*Märchen*).

Fadya: I am not making this up. Believe me, I am not!

Dana: You are making this up. [*Operant's Folkloric Response 13*]

Fadya: (Unfortunately, I'll have to cut this for a minute to argue with my sister ...) [shouting excitedly] I am not making this up, Dana! I remember every single word!

Dana: [sarcastically] I can see that!

Nima: Fadya! His brothers say to him, "Go to the big cage." There was what you call it ... you know ... gorilla. So ... [*Operant's Folkloric Response 14*]

Fadya: No! The gorilla was with the little girl in the other story. (198) Dana: And here, too, there is a gorilla. [*Operant's Folkloric Response 15*]

Nima: He tell him, ... his brother tell him that he is engaged to the sultan[s] daughter. So he [the sultan] tell him, "If you get the straw ... (you know ... that the gorilla sleep [on]) I'll let you marry my daughter." So, nobody is going to get it, because the gorilla was going to kill everybody.

Dana: No, that wasn't there ... [*Operant's Folkloric Response 16*]

Nima: Yes [it was]!

Dana: These were three other boys.

Nima: No! No! ...

Fadya: [explains] We are all confused because our mother hasn't told it to us in eleven years! [laughter] [*Lack of Exercise*]

Nima: So he went. What [i.e., whom] are they going to send! They send Nuss Nuṣais. They tell him, "You my [our] brother, you like me?" He [Nuss Nuṣais] say, "Yes!" So he say, "Well, go and get me the straw, what this, you know, the gorilla sleep on it." So he say, "OK." So he go hopping on one leg, hopping on one leg [laughter]. So he go there and get the straw and run. He is still running. So that gorilla call him. She say, "Nuss Nuṣais." So he look, he say, "Yes!" She say, "Nuss Nuṣais, you take my straw. Are you coming back?" He say, "If God will." And he run and give his brother.

Col.: *In-shâ'-Allah?* [If God wills?]

Nima: Yes, '*In-shâ'-Allah*'.

So he went and gave it to his brother. His brother went to the sultan. He say, "I bring the straw." So he still don't believe it, he don't want him to marry ⁽¹⁹⁹⁾ his daughter. He say, "OK, now, you want my daughter? You got to get me the dish the gorilla eat from." So he went to his brother again. He said, "Nuss Nuṣais, you my brother. You love me?" He say, "Yes!" He say, "I want you to go again to the gorilla and get me the dish she eat from."

Col.: [interrupts] By the way, was that gorilla a *ghûl* [ogre] before, but you translate it as 'gorilla'?

Nima: *Ghûl* ... Ya: I say it in English but in Arabic it is *ghûl* ... *el-ghûla* [i.e., ogress].

Fadya: I remember this. They used him as a sucker to run back and forth.

Nima: That is it! They want to get rid of him. The sultan doesn't care who is going to marry his daughter; you see?

Dana: I remember now. [Recognition]

Col.: [to Dana] You think you can tell it?

Dana: No, but I remember that he'll go several times and finally he will marry the king's daughter, and his brothers will get punished.

Nima: The sultan doesn't care who marry his daughter as long as he obeys him. So, he went, you see, he said, "OK." He runs there, you know. He wait there, you know, until she leaves, you know. He went to get the dish. The *ghûla* said--she see him--she say, "Nuss Nuṣais." He say, "Yes." She say, "You take my straw, you take my dish; you coming back?" So he say, 'if God permits.'⁶¹⁰

So 'he gathered himself' and went,⁶¹¹--to whom? To his brother; he give the dish to him, so the brother take the dish and go to the sultan. Now, he tell the sultan he is [the one] getting it, not his brother. So the sultan think, "How wonderful." Every time he send somebody there, that gorilla, you know, eats--she kills them. But this one, he doesn't get killed. So he say, "Do I marry your daughter?" He say, "No. ⁽²⁰⁰⁾ One more thing." He say, "I want you to go back to the gorilla." He say, "I want the spoon she eat with. I want you to get me the spoon." He said, "Ok." So he went again to his brother Nuss Nuṣais.

⁶¹⁰ *bi 'izn-Allâh.*

⁶¹¹ *khad ba`duh we*

He said, "Nuss Nuṣais, I am your brother." He say, "Yes." He say, "You love me?" He say, "Yes." He say, "I want you to go back again and get me the spoon--you know, the big wooden spoon--from the ape. I want it for myself." So he say, "Ok."

So, he went, he wait, you know, he look, he don't see the ape. He went and got the wooden spoon, then he give it to his brother. Nuss Nuṣais, you see, is hopping, hopping on one leg. She [the gorilla] say, "Nuss Nuṣais." He say, "Yes." She say, "You steal my straw. You steal my dish. Now you steal my spoon; are you coming back?" He say, "If God will." He went and gave it to his brother. His brother took the spoon to the sultan. He say, "This is the spoon." The sultan, you know, is getting ... [uneasy] ... He say, "I want to find out how you don't get killed." So he say, "Well, you got me all I ask for, so I am asking for one more wish." So he say, "Yes." He say, "I want you to bring me the gorilla (the ape aw ["or"] the gorilla)." So he say, "Sultan, how am I going to bring it?" He say, "You bring three thing, I don't know belong to the ape (or the gorilla). Now, I want you to bring me the gorilla to convince me you got this from him [her]." So he said, "OK."

He went to who? To Nuss Nuṣais. He say, "I am your brother?" He say, "Yes." He say, "You love me?" He say, "Yes." ... [Fadya laughs]

Dana: [interrupts from the other room] He will succeed. [Recognition].

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Col.: Why don't you come out and say it? [laughter].

Dana: ...

Nima: He said, "I want you to go and get me the ape aw [(or)] the gorilla." So he say, "How am I going to get it?" He say, "I am your brother. You love me." [Fadya laughs] He say, "Ok." So, poor Nuss Nuṣais is hopping [on] one leg ...

Fadya: [correcting Nima] He jerked.

Nima: He went and got for her, you know, bean, the *fûl*. *`amalu* (He prepared it) ... He cooked it. He cook the *fûl*, you know, fava beans, and the gorilla come, and she see that and she eat; you know, it taste good. So she eat it and she get sick.

Dana: [interrupts, copying the advertising slogan for Winston cigarettes] They taste good, like beans should. [laughter]

Nima: So, she eat; she get sick. What Nuss Nuṣais has with him? He has a rope. He go and tie her head, and he wait till she get up. And she get up and say, "O Nuss Nuṣais!" She

is tied with the rope. She said, "Nuss Nuṣais, you stole my dish, you stole my straw, and you stole my wooden spoon. What are you going to do now with me?" He say, "I got to take you to my brother." So the *ghûla* (that is, the gorilla) say, "Why do you want to take me to your brother?" He tell her, "My brother say so. He is my brother. So I got to get you to him." So she say, "Ok." She say, "What are you going to do with me?" He say, "He is not going to hit you. If he hit you, I let you go." So, he is hopping on one leg, and she is following him. He is holding the rope. [Fadya laughs]

So, he called his brother. "Come in," he say, "Here she is." *El... el-ghûla*. So he take her, he with help of his brother. He take her and go to the ⁽²⁰²⁾ sultan's house. The sultan say, "Ya!! You are going to marry my daughter." Who is listening? The ... *el-ghûla*.

Dana: [translates] The gorilla.

Nima: Ya, *el-ghûla*.

He say [to her], "I got you the dish, I got you the straw, and I got you the wooden spoon." So the gorilla ..., she understand all that ... he will marry the sultan[s] daughter. So he [the sultan] say, "Well, now, you could marry my daughter." So he say, "What are you going to do with the gorilla?" He [the sultan] say, "We are going to burn her."

So he went, and Nuss Nuṣais wait to see what they'll do with the gorilla. He promised her nobody is going to hit her. So, the sultan[s] servants making the big fire. They are going to burn the gorilla. Nuss Nuṣais got mad; he say, "My brother promised me nobody is going to hit her." Now, he [Nuss Nuṣais] wants to see her. So he sneak in, hopping on one leg--hopping, hopping, hopping, he open the door. He say to her, "I promise I'll let nobody hit you." So she tell him, "Your brother made you steal for him; you stole for him because he wanna marry the sultan[s] daughter. He can't come in so he sent you, because everybody the sultan sends, we [gorillas] kill him." So, she say to him, "I am gonna tell the sultan what happened." So here she went to tell the sultan. She tell him, "Nuss Nuṣais is the one who brought everything, and you promise whoever bring stuff [that] belong to me and my husband will marry your daughter. So your daughter will marry Nuss Nuṣais, not his brother." So, he say, "Well, I don't know." He bring *esh-shâtîr* [clever] Hasan; he bring him and he bring Nuss Nuṣais. He tell him, "Tell me the truth, what really happened? Who bring ⁽²⁰³⁾ the stuff from the *ghûla*?" So, Hasan--he say, "Me." Nuss Nuṣais say, "Me." The *ghûla*--she say, "No, Nuss Nuṣais is the one [who] come." He [the sultan] ask '*amîr* [prince] Hasan, "Who bring it? You or Nuss Nuṣais?" He say, "My brother get it-- Nuss Nuṣais."

So, he say, "OK." He take *esh-shâtîr* [clever] Hasan, and he put him in the fire and he got burn. He say ...

Dana: [interrupts, commenting jocularly on clever Hasan's fate; she adds:] Then Nuss Nuṣaiṣ marries the princess.

Nima: 'Bit by bit, the tale is over.' [loud applause, cheers, and laughter] [*Reward*]

Col.: [to Fadya] Was this the one you wanted to tell?

Fadya: No.

Nima: Yes !! This is the one.

Dana: Don't put this on tape.

Col.: That is OK. Is this the story your mother used to tell you?

Fadya and

Dana: No. No. She used to tell us another one.

Col.: About Nuss Nuṣaiṣ?

Dana: [to Nima] Remember, you used to tell us that story about the three brothers? One married a ...

Nima: Oh, oh, this is different story. [*Recall*]

Fadya: Tell us. This is a good one.

Col.: Wait a minute. I'd like to ask you about this one first.

Fadya: Which one?

Col.: Do you think that if a friend of yours at school, for example, asked you to tell him a folktale, you would do it? Would you tell him?

Fadya: ...

Col.: Would you be embarrassed?

Fadya: No!! I think it is a very cute story.

Col.: Did you ever tell anybody a story?

Fadya: No ... because nobody ever asked me. [laughter]

Nima: You will tell it to your children when you get married; you will have your own. [*Norms: mother's role*]

- Col.: Would you tell it to your children?
- Fadya: If I remember it.
- Dana: She'll buy a book, probably, and read it.
- Nima: [proudly] They are not in the book [i.e., in any book]!
- Col.: [to Dana] Did it ever happen that anybody asked you to tell him tales?
- Dana: No.
- Col.: Do you remember any nursery rhymes?
- Dana: American?
- Col.: No, you know, any nursery rhymes that either your mother told you, or you heard from Hal.?
- Dana and
Fadya: They never told us any. [laughter]
- Fadya: We had to learn them in kindergarten ourselves. [laughter]₍₂₀₄₎
- Nima: What?
- Fadya: You know! Nursery rhymes!
- Dana: [recites an example rapidly to her mother] ... [*Informant's Folkloric Response 17*]
- Nima: Oh!
- Dana: [proudly] You don't know American fairy tales.
- Nima: I know all the Egyptian stories; the American ones are stupid. [*Value Judgment*] [*Cues*].
- Dana: You just don't know the difference between the American ones and the others ones.
- Col.: How stupid?
- Nima: Very stupid!
- Col.: [to Fadya] Now, how does that story [*Nuss Nuṣais*] go?₍₂₀₅₎
- Fadya: [laughs in embarrassment]
- Col.: Why should you be embarrassed? How does it go?
- Fadya: No! No! [*Inhibition*]

Dana: [rapidly] That story of the monkey. *[Informant's Folkloric Response 18]*

Fadya: [into the microphone] Dana was giving her own version of a fairy tale.

Dana: [to Nima] These things just never left lasting effect on my mind.

Nima: [sarcastically] I wonder if you've got one!

Fadya: Dana, how does Little Jack Horner go?

Dana: [rapidly]

Little Jack Horner sat in a corner

Eating his pie.

He put in his thumb,

And pulled out a plum,

And said, "What a good boy am I!" *[Informant's Folkloric Response 19]*

Nima: Do you call this a fairy story?

Dana: It is not a fairy story; it is a rhyme!

Dana and

Fadya: [reciting a rhyme together]

Jack be nimble,

Jack be quick,

Jack jump over the candlestick. *[Informant's Folkloric Response 20]*

Fadya: That is it.

Fadya and

Dana: [rapidly]

Wee Willy Winkle, sitting in the house

Sitting downstairs in his nightgown

Knocking at the window, crying at the lock

All good children should be in bed now;

it is eight o'clock.

... (I forgot [the rest]!) *[Informant's Folkloric Response 21]*

Fadya: Baa-Baa, Black sheep, have you any wool? ...

Dana: [continuing]

Yes sir, yes sir, three bags full.
 One for my master, one for my dame.
 One for the little boy who lives down the lane. [*Informant's Folkloric Response 22*]

Col.: I remember a story that you were told, you know, about "the sparrow and locust."⁽²⁰⁶⁾
 Fadya: Oh, I have got a good joke my mother told to me. It is an Egyptian joke, but it is in English. Can I say it Mom?

Nima: Go ahead.

Fadya: It is about a dog. This is an Egyptian joke, but my mother told it to us in American.

Dana: [corrects Fadya] In English, idiot.

Fadya: [In English]. [*Operant's Folkloric Response 23*]
 There was this man who had a dog. That dog was still a puppy (just like mine). That dog did on the floor what he was not supposed to do ...

Dana: [interrupts] No! No!

Nima: Just a moment; I want to hear it.

Fadya: Then, his friend came over and he said-- ..., he says, "Listen, the only problem you have got is ... You live on the basement floor; whenever your dog does it, stick his nose into it and he will jump out and do it over there." So the guy leaves and comes back after six month later and talks, and says, "Hey, how is your dog doing? He doesn't do it on the floor any more." [The dog's owner answers] "Oh, he is fine; whenever he does it, he sticks his nose in it and jumps ou[t] the window." [laughter and comments]

Dana: That one was funny!

Col.: When did she tell it to you?

Fadya: Oh, she told it to us ... about five years ago?

Dana: Yes!

Fadya: Ya, five years ago!

Col.: More than once?

Dana: Yes, she told it to us occasionally.

- Nima: I used to tell them all the stories I know.
- Col.: Can you tell me the story about "Garâda and `Aṣṣûr?"⁶¹²
- Fadya: No. [*Informant's Negative Response 24*]
- Col.: Are you sure you don't remember it?⁽²⁰⁷⁾
- Fadya: Ya.
- Col.: Absolutely?
- Fadya: ...
- Col.: How about you, Dana?
- Dana: I wasn't even around when they told it. [*Informant's Negative Response 25*] [*Inhibition*]
- Saber: [surprised] You weren't? You told it!
- Col.: No, no. This is about the geomancer, you know--the fortuneteller, [i.e., she heard it but did not tell it].
- Nima: [emphatically] This is Hal.'s.
- Fadya: My mother has a very good story that I don't remember off hand, but ... It is about three men that married the gorilla (that my sister mentioned before) who turns into a princess. Go on, Mama, tell him.
- Col.: I want you to tell it!
- Fadya: Offhand, I can remember only that the gorilla had a ring on--a golden ring--and she is the one who turns into a beautiful princess later on. You know, he was the fortunate one that married the gorilla that turned into a princess.⁶¹³ [*Informant's Folkloric Response 26*].
- Dana: The three of them married ... [*Operant's Folkloric Response 27*]
- Fadya: [interrupts] Two of them married.

⁶¹² Type: 1641, *Doctor Know-All*. [A fortuneteller's accidental successes]; it was narrated in 1961 by Hal.. See El-Shamy, "An Annotate Collection ...," no. 1, pp. 18-26.

⁶¹³ Type: 402, *The Mouse (Cat, Frog, etc.) as Bride*. [Three brothers seek wives; youngest marries a she-monkey, (tortoise)]. This tale was narrated by Nima in 1961.

Dana: The other two married the two beautiful girls and left the gorilla; the third one married her and she turned out to be the princess.

Saber: This is awfully short.

Col.: [to Saber, in Arabic] Do you remember the story of "Tell us the story of 'sayyidnâ [(Prophet)] Joseph"?"

Saber: [laughs] Yes.

Nima: A joke?

Col.: A sheik [cleric] was invited to a dinner party. He was eating so fast that the others wanted to slow him down so that they may have something left for them ⁽²⁰⁸⁾ to eat. One said to him, "Master sheik, tell us the story of Prophet Joseph."⁶¹⁴ He answered, "Very simple: somebody got lost and was finally found." And he went back to his food.⁶¹⁵
[laughter]

Nima: [in Arabic] [*Operant's Folkloric Response 28*]

Once there was an Egyptian butcher who had a dog. A [neighboring] Greek-Egyptian, also, naturally--had a dog, too. The two dogs used to meet, and they are always together.

Fadya: (You can hear it; it is clear. [I was pushing the microphone closer to Nima]).

Col.: Yes, I can. But it sounds on the tape as if it is coming from a far away place.

Nima: 'Master'⁶¹⁶ Hasan, are you listening?

Col.: Sure.

Nima: [in Arabic] These two dogs, every day--afternoon--met together. The dog of the Greek would say to the dog of the Egyptian. "Let us go to my master. If he has something for us, he will feed it to us; if he doesn't he will say to us, 'Exo! ['Go away!']"
They went to the Greek. The Greek looked around; he had no food for them so he

⁶¹⁴ One of the longest narratives in Koran occupying an entire *sûra* (Chapter: XII).

⁶¹⁵ Type: 1526C§, *Eating the Most by Making the Others Talk while Eating*. Trickster makes a long story short. It was narrated by T. Saber.

⁶¹⁶ 'ustâz, (i.e., 'ustâdh), lit.: teacher, instructor, professor; a title typically used to refer to, or to address, an educated person.

said, "Exo!" The [Greek's] dog said to the other, "This means he has nothing. Now, let us what? Let us go to the other one." When they went to the butcher, he was cutting up the meat. He said [to his aid] "*walad, nawlu!* [Boy, let him have it!]" The boy grabbed a stick and chased the two dogs away while beating them.

The dog with the Greek master looked at his friend (whose master is the butcher), and said to him, "You know something?" The other dog answered, "What?" The first dog said, "A thousand 'Exo' would be far better than one 'nawlu'." [Nima, Saber and I laugh]. [Dana and Fadya missed the point, since the supposedly Greek word ⁽²⁰⁹⁾ 'Exo,' used by Egyptians to mean "Go away," was unfamiliar to them. They asked for a translation].

Nima: [in English] Once there was a dog. The owner is an Egyptian-Greek. So, when the two dogs ..., they everyday meet each other--they go to the Greek, if he have food for them, he feed them. If he has no food he tell them "Exo!"--that mean: "Go away!" Do they go? They went to who? To the butcher, the owner of the other dog.

The butcher look and see the two dogs walking together and coming. So he say to the boy working for him, "Boy!" He say, "Yes, master." He say, "Give it to them" The boy pick up a stick and he really fix the two dog up. So the other dog (the one who[se] owner is Egyptian-Greek), look at the other dog and say, "You know something?" The other dog say, "Yes." He say, "Thousand `Exo,' [i.e., would be preferred to] one `nawlu'." It means give him a beating. Thousand *Exo* and not one "give it to them." [Dana and Fadya do not laugh]. [cf. Mot.: X1915§]

Fadya: There is a story that I heard on television that is similar to that. [*Operant's Folkloric Response* 29]

Dana: [interrupting] She probably heard it on "Rocky and His Friends [T.V. Show]."

Fadya: No!

And the dog was chased away everywhere. It was a hungry, skinny, ugly dog. This butcher felt sorry for him, so he gave him something to eat. He would only go out for a walk once in the afternoon and then comes back again.

Pretty soon the dog ... the dog started to do things, like doing things for the man. And the man couldn't understand it, he thought these things were so human! "This dog is so human," he said, "You know, I have a feeling ..." (he was talking to the dog now), "I have ⁽²¹⁰⁾ a feeling you are more than just a dog." So the dog walked to him with a sort of a peculiar look on his face. So he says, "Can you do special things?" (He was talking to the dog.) So the dog looked at him again and turned his head from side to side, like any

normal dog would do. He was just giving him a look, like: 'are you out of your mind or something?'

So finally, as if the dog was going to say something, he opened his mouth to the man, and the man thought he was going to say something to him, so he fainted, even before the dog finished opening his mouth. [laughter] So, the man all of a sudden ... he [the dog] woke him by licking him on the face. He fainted only for a minute, and the dog woke him up by licking him. So, when he was on the floor, before he had gotten up, he saw a coin next to him which was a nickel, and the dog went and touched the coin over with his paw, and it turned into a quarter. So the man got all so excited and said, "I knew all the time! I knew it all the time!" And he started giving the dog steaks and sausages and everything that not even a king would eat every day. So he said, "I knew you were a good dog." So the dog started seeing how greedy he started getting. Before--he just liked him as a dog, but now, when the man saw that he can change a nickel into a quarter, right away he started feeding him all sorts of delicious things. Because he was greedy, and he wanted to keep the dog.

Well, when the dog realized this, he said to himself, "I am not going to; "--(this is only my translation of the dog's thought)--"I am not going to hang around this greedy old guy." So that evening as the butcher was closing his shop, the dog snuck out, just before he locked the door. The next morning the butcher opened his shop and he wasn't there! Then he was going to go crazy; ⁽²¹¹⁾ he walked all around the store, "Where is my dog? Where is my dog?" The man saw the point; the dog felt bad, and he finally came back. He was watching him all the time. He thought that the man was not going to be as greedy as he was before. So, instead of changing money he decided to make his butcher shop famous for him. Because, after all, the dog saw that he [the man] did him a favor when he needed it. Well, people started coming to his shop, and he had never been making more money than this in his whole life before. He knew that he had the dog to thank for it.

Well, years and years went by, and the dog was becoming very old and he figured, "Well, I have repaid my debt to this man. I am going to leave now." After that, the dog left, and the man's business still kept coming in good. Now, by this time, the dog was back on the road again, and he started to get hungry again. He was getting beaten up and dirty, as he was years ago. Well, at this time the dog was about ... At this time the dog was about a couple of miles from the town where he had left, and he, you know, started thinking, 'Gee! Should I go back to that butcher shop I left? I did a lot for him; he should take me back. There is no reason why I shouldn't.' So he says, "Oh, I don't know. I'll go back and visit my butcher friend. He gave me a pretty good home. I deserve it anyway."

Now the dog was thinking on sort of greedy, nasty terms. So the dog went back to

the butcher and he started scratching on the door. The door was already locked, because it was after closing time. And he howled and he scratched, and all sorts of things. No one heard him. So he went over to the door where the butcher lived and he scratched and howled, but the butcher did not come down. So by this time, the dog was getting ⁽²¹²⁾ disgusted and said, "This nasty old man! Even after all I did to him, he wouldn't let me in his house now." So he says, "I know what I'll do; I'll get even with him." He went to the door and stood there, and said, "Nobody will ever come to this store again. If he wants to be nasty, I'll be nasty to him, too, and he will not get one customer."

Sure enough, the next day, the day after ..., nobody passed through the door, and the butcher became poor. Well, by the dog doing this, when the dog went in the next morning, the butcher did not want him anymore. So, the dog, by hurting the butcher, he hurt himself and lost his home. And that was the end of that.

Col.: Do you expect your dog to change nickels into quarters?

Fadya: No, but I wish he would. I'll say! [laughter]

Col.: You say you saw that on television?

Fadya: Ya, I saw it ... actually, it was in a sort of a play.

Col.: When was that?

Fadya: Oh, that was about two or three years ago.

Dana: [dubiously] On what program?

Fadya: I don't know; it was a special program on television. You know, plays for children and that sort of thing.

Col.: So, you were describing what you saw?

Fadya: Yes, that was sort of a fairy tale. This is not exactly ... it was just a story being told. It was a narrated play. It was a play narrated by someone.

[Nima asked me to turn off the tape recorder. After a few minutes I returned to the topic of 'fairy tales.' Dana made a comment.]

Col.: What did you say, again?

Dana: I didn't say anything. The point is ...

Col.: [repeating Dana's words] Lots of people wouldn't ⁽²¹³⁾ waste their time on stupid foreign

fairy tales.' *[Operant's Response 30]*

Dana: [smiles in a manner denoting admission] No, no!

Col.: You said that.

Dana: Because she heard it, this doesn't mean that everybody else has been [hearing it] yet, because I have never been ...

Col.: I realize that. I am kind of sure that your mother did [tell you that tale] but she does not seem to remember it off hand, now.

Dana: She didn't tell us everything, obviously--she didn't want us to end up telling them ourselves.

Col.: Your sister does.

Fadya: I just remember ...

Dana: Ah ... that is her [gestures indicating that if her sister cares for such foolishness it is her business]

Nima: [in Arabic] This last time she came and said, "Tell me a story." ... That was when she was twelve. She came and say to me, "Tell me a story." I tell her, "Get out of here, you are too old for that!" *[Norms] [Operant's Response 31]*

Dana: Ya, but sometimes she did tell them for a joke, too. *[Norms]*

Nima: [interrupts excitedly] No!!

Col.: But you certainly can tell some [tales].

Dana: Believe me, I don't tell ... *[Informant's Negative Response 32]*

Nima: [emphatically] Ya, you say stories [jokes] nobody ever liked it.

Dana: You don't understand them. I think they were real funny.

Nima: Because even if they were, I wouldn't sit down and listen. [laughs]₍₂₁₄₎

Dana: No, because I laugh at it; it is so funny.

Fadya: [to me] I can tell you a lot of ghost stories. [roaring laughter and comments] *[Informant's Positive Response 33]*

- Fadya: They are not fairy tales.
 Col.: I am interested in them, too. [to Nima] Hey, you never told me that thing you told to Talat [Saber].
- Nima: About what?
 Col.: About the ghost in the house.
 Nima: [emphatically] Oh, this is true! This is here--in America.
 Col.: All right.
 Saber: This thing happened here?
 Col.: Sure! With your permission, this is what we call a *memorate*. [curious comments about the term]
- Dana: This is true; it actually happened.
 Fadya: [calls for everyone's attention] Hey! Wait a minute; just listen to Mommy. It is true!
 Nima: It happened that year in Florida.
 Col.: Did it happen to you?
 Nima: Yes.
 Col.: OK.
 Saber: Do you want me to tell it to you? [*Operant's Response 34*]
 Nima: [in Arabic] Mr. Talat will tell it to you.
 Col.: [jocularly] I am not interested in him. I have seen enough of him already.
 Nima: [in English] [*Operant's Folkloric Response 35*]
 I don't ... know what year--nineteen ... forty ... seven. We went to Tampa, Florida. We looked at the newspaper for a house. So we see a house in a real estate, you know; they have a house that we are interested in. So, we--this house is very cheap, you know, it is this ⁽²¹⁵⁾ type of house with the price \$8,500--so, we went to see it. It was in a place called Orien[t] Park. So I went and looked at the house. It has two bedrooms, two showers, two bathrooms, a dining room, a good size dining room. The house is made ... is really beautiful. So for that kind of price, I was really surprised why this house did not sell, because it is a corner house--it was right in the corner. So I don't like it because I feel there is something funny when I walk in the house. There is something, but I don't

know what. So I say, "I don't want this house." So my husband look at me and say, "Listen, you have been seeing houses now for two weeks. You don't like them. So let us not make a fuss about this house. You think it is a good buy; I think so, too." I told him, "There is something about the house I don't like." He didn't see why. So, I bought it. We finished it, fixed it, and lived in it.

The first night I hear the noise; it was one o'clock. I hear somebody walking through the house. So I woke my husband and said, "Somebody is walking in the house." So I woke him up; [he answered] "I hear nothing." He go out and look. There is nothing there. Every night it was like that for three months. [to Mr. Saber] 'Master' Talat, I lost ..., I went down to eighty-five pounds. I didn't live in that house in the daytime. My husband go to work, I take my two daughters [Fadya wasn't born then] and go outside in the garden and, you know, in front of the house ...

Col.: [interrupts] Did you see the *`afirât* [ghost]?

Nima: [points to Dana emphatically] She did!

Dana: Yes, I did.

Fadya: [explains excitedly] It was a ghost; it wasn't a devil.

Nima: The man himself, who sold the house [to us] after we found out--said that a man was killed in it.⁶¹⁷ (216)

Col.: Dana, did you really see it?

Dana: Well, I was three years old. I saw something!

Col.: What was it?

Dana: I ... I don't know. A devil, maybe. Oh, it kept me out of bed for a while. Somebody ... maybe.

Col.: What did you really see?

Nima: Something black in the bathroom.

Col.: OK.

Nima: I had a friend from Pennsylvania, sleeping in the house at that time. She went to the bathroom and saw it there. She was scared. She said, "I'll never go to that bathroom

⁶¹⁷ Mot.: E275.3§, "Murder scene is haunted by ghost of murdered person."

again!"

Anyhow, I told my husband, he said, "This is all Egyptian superstitions and they believe that kind of stuff." So I didn't tell him anything no more. One day he called in (he work in that company in Tampa), so they sent him to Miami. So he say he got overnight--to sleep overnight--there. He called me and said, "I won't be coming tomorrow." I locked all the doors, I left the lights on. Then I heard at one o'clock he [the *'afrit*] come in walking again. Then I heard the noise, you know, like somebody is sick. Ya, ... and ... and all I hear is [in an eerie tone]: "A-a-h ... A-a-h."

[Fadya is frightened; she nervously pleads with her mother to stop imitating the ghost.]

[Operant's Response 36]

So I went to look from the window before I locked myself in the room and went to bed. All the house had lights on. I couldn't turn the key [to open the door], so I broke the window and the screen, and all. I grabbed her [Dana] from the cradle, you know. I put her, from the window, on the grass. I grabbed the other one, Carol, she was eight months old.

So the neighbor come to the house. All I heard him tell me was, "Did you see him? He came to you?" I ^{217} wasn't paying attention, really. After I sat down, I said, "Listen, somebody is in the house." I sat down, I said, "Listen, somebody is in the house." I said, "How long did you live in this [your] house?" He said, "Fifteen years." I said, "Was anybody killed in that house?" Then he said, "Yes! My friend. He is the one killed in that house. He was killed, but when the police came in--the sheriff--to take him [the body] ... we know his wife and her boyfriend ... he is the one that killed this man. But of course they [the police] thought he was drunk and he fell on his head, or something. And the case did not stick against the wife, or anything. So nobody talk about it no more. But every time somebody buys the house, in six month time the house is for sale again." So I went the next day to the real estate and I tell him, "This house has ghost in it. I don't want it; I want my money back." (Because when we bought it we paid for it cash.) He said, "There is nothing wrong with it! This is something I never heard about." I said, "I am going to the *Tampa Tribune*; I am going to tell them the story. And I am going to take you to the court, because I want my money back. I don't want the house!" So I went to the newspaper. I told them the story and I went home. So the man's son-in-law, he is in real estate, too. He called me and said, "We will quietly come to agreement tomorrow. What you want, we will do. We don't want you to get mad ..." and all that.

So the next day he brought me the money and I left the house and left there everything. I even left my clothes. Before that, my sister came from England--I forgot to tell you--she came to visit me. She sleep in the other guest bedroom. So she come one

night, running to me, and she say, "Nima." And I said, "Yes?" She said, "What ⁽²¹⁸⁾ is the matter with your husband? He is in my room." When she fell, she fell on top of my husband (she thought). She looked and said, "There is a man in my room." There was nobody. So she ... three o'clock in the morning this happened. My sister went to a hotel.

Col.: [in Arabic] These things happen only in Egypt.

Nima: This thing happened here!! In America! In Tampa!

Col.: But did anything like that happen to you in Egypt?

Nima: No, no, I only see it in America!

Col.: You never saw *`afârît* [ghosts] in Egypt at all?

Nima: No.

Fadya: I remember ... [*Operant's Folkloric Response 37*]

Nima: I believe I saw one, but this was when I was small.

Fadya: My mother told us about the place when she used to play.

Nima: In the cemetery ... [sarcastically]: A lovely place. [laughter]

Fadya: This I remember very good ... because my mother told it to us a long time ago, shortly after we brought up the discussion of ghosts--you know--spirits and things like that. Just, you know, as a conversational piece. And it was ...! When she was very young girl in Egypt, she used to play in the cemetery. (She told us two stories, but I'll tell you this one first). She used to ... ([to the dog]: Thank you! My dog just spilled the peanuts.) Well, anyway, [to Nima] Shall I tell him the one about the skeleton?

Dana: What skeleton?

Fadya: When she found the skeleton with the body ...

Nima: Oh, yes, this is ...

Dana: [interrupts] Yes, I remember: with the things written on it.⁶¹⁸ [*Operant's Folkloric Response 38*]
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⁶¹⁸ Cf. Mot.: M302.2, "Man's fate written on his skull." See El-Shamy, "An Annotated Collection," no. 12; narrated by Hal.

Fadya: One afternoon my mother was playing in the cemetery. And she found ...

[Dana interrupts with sarcastic comments about playing in a cemetery]

... she found ... it is the truth! ... she found a ... a ...

Nima: A skull!

Fadya: [continues] ... a skull of a baby. And there was green light ..., [to Col.] Don't laugh! It is the truth! [*Operant's Folkloric Response 39*]

Col.: I am not laughing.

Fadya: She saw that green light on the forehead of the skull. And my mother ... she didn't know what it was, so she brought it home to her grandmother. When my grandmother saw it, it was just like her tongue was tied. She couldn't talk; she knew what the writing said [Nima comments on Fadya's accuracy], but God wouldn't let her say it. He wouldn't let her repeat it. She could just look at it, but she couldn't talk. She couldn't say what it meant. And she just told my mother to go and put it back where it came from. That is what my mother did. Actually, my grandmother is the only one that knows what was said on the ...

Nima: [interrupts]

But ... she didn't like the light [written words] which she saw coming from he [i.e., it, the skull]. So she said to me, "Take it back where you find it." I found it in the middle of the cemetery. You know, they have it like ... like a roof ... you know; Moslem cemetery ...

Col.: Sure! Sure!

Nima: They have roofs, and I put on the top of that roof ... that grave was open and I used to go inside all time. But I didn't know [it] was this cemetery.

Col.: Do you remember that, Dana?

Dana: [nods] Yes! It is true. [*Informant's Folkloric Response 40*].⁽²²⁰⁾

Col.: You couldn't have forgotten it? Tell it.

Dana: It is as she told it to ...

- Nima: [interrupts] No! This is really ... this really--I'll never forget!
- Fadya: And another time in the summertime, when you used to talk with that woman. [*Operant's Folkloric Response 41*]
- Nima: No ...
- Col.: [interrupts Nima] Wait a minute, why don't you let her tell me that? [to Fadya] I am interested in your style.
- Fadya: Well, my mother told us this about the same time she told us the other story.
- Col.: How long ago was that?
- Fadya: Oh! Years ago.
- Dana: No! It is on and off, though. You know we talk about it once in a while.
- Fadya: As I said, we discuss every once in a while stories that my mother told us, you know, occasionally, when we get together and have a conversation.

The first time she told us this--I'd say about five years ago, it may be more--well, anyway, this was at the time when my mother was playing in cemetery where she had found the skull of the baby. And she used to go to the cemetery practically every afternoon, and she used to meet this woman there. She was a woman and she had something like a cape over her head, and her face was shadowed-like so you couldn't see it, really, you know. You know it is there, but you couldn't really see it.

- Nima: [agrees] You know, she was ...
- Fadya: [interrupts] You know she wasn't an *`afrīt* [ghost, Afrit], a devil, or anything, but you couldn't call her a human, either. She used to teach my mother games in the cemetery. You know, like building a castle, and things like that. She taught my mother games and they used to play them together. ⁽²²¹⁾
- Nima: This is true!
- Fadya: And once ..., but my mother new; [she] saw her hands. She showed her how to do the games, but she never brought out her hands. She had something like a rope.

- Nima: [in Arabic] She was wearing ... you know, a burnous [North African hooded mantel].
- Col.: Do you remember this, Dana?
- Dana: [nods] Yes.
- Col.: You couldn't have forgotten it?
- Dana: Now I remember it, but otherwise I couldn't have remembered it. Just as she brought it up, I remembered it. *[Recognition]*
- Col.: But do you believe it?
- Dana: Do I believe it? I don't believe in anything.
- Col.: That is too bad.
- Nima: No, this one really happened in Cairo. Just outside ... do you know, in el-Madbaḥ ['Slaughterhouse'-District], I think they call it Zain el-`Abdīn. *[Operant's Folkloric Response 42]*
- Saber: Yes, [it is called] Zain el-`Abdīn.
- Nima: There is *qarāfa* [cemetery] in this area. I used to go there to play. Nobody was ever there. There is a tree at the entrance. There is a narrow lane, then you get inside; [There is] the *qarāfa*. Even the guard used to notice me playing there. There is a big tree there. I would sit down under the tree. This woman came regularly. Every afternoon I used to skip school and go there, and she used to come. We used to build ovens, mosques, then she shows me how to build a house. I used to go home and say to my mother, "There is a woman ..." She would ask me, "What does she look like?" I would say, "She is wearing a *burnus* and she comes regularly and play with me." ^{222} Every time she came I saw her only when she was on my back. I never saw where she comes from. One day my mother said to me, "I'll go with you and you show her to me." I said, "All right, come along." That day I asked her to go with me; she said "Not today." I went alone. That woman! ... My mother asked, "Where is she from? Didn't she tell you where she come from?" I said, "No." I asked her--I said to her, "Where do you live?" She said, "I live here." She asked me "Why? Is it because your mother asked you about where I live?" I said to her, "Yes, my mother wants to come and see you." She said to me, "Ah! She will not come." She said, "If she came I will not show up." She said, "I don't like anybody else."
- That day, I went and said to my mother, "She says she doesn't like you and she doesn't want to see anybody else. If you come with me, she will not show up." She told me I was lying. I used to find money in the cemetery. Always I would take the money

and show it to my mother [who] would say "We don't believe you." (By Allah the Mighty, this something--if that was told to me by somebody, I wouldn't have believed it.) I used to find money as I walked down the street--and, you know, in Egypt nobody finds any money.

That day I was punished [at school]. My mother had a terrible dream. She dreamt of something like a *ghûla* [ogress]. That day my mother came to school and took me [home]. That woman came to her [in the dream] just as I described her to her. They sent me away to my [maternal-]aunt at Fayyoun. Later I went to my other aunt in ... in Ismailia. They want to take me away so that I wouldn't go to that cemetery. I went there no more. But my mother became ill. She was always ill because of that dream she saw.

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Col.: Now, about that skull. Couldn't your grandmother read what was on it?

Nima: No! She wouldn't say what was [written] there. She only said, "Take it back to the same spot where she picked it up." And I had to go alone. [End of tape]

Col.: [in jest] Don't mistreat the dog; he might be a *`afrîr* in the form of a dog; it is late.

Nima: This dog is American. We've known him all his life. [Argument over dog goes on].

Meanwhile, I asked Dana to re-tell the last two legends to me, and she complied without hesitation. However, when I asked her to tell one of Hal's *ḥawadîr*, she again refused.

ANALYSIS OF CASE 1

Stimulus-Response Formula

1. Positive:

The mechanism involved in Informant's Folkloric Response 2 (*M.IFR2*):

- Drive: Col.'s (El-Shamy's) request
- Cues: Nature of material requested. Material is familiar. Mother's value judgment that this material is exclusively for children. Presence of two strangers who are not of the community. Absence of inhibiting forces. Expectancy for reward.
- Response: *Märchen*
- Reward: Achievement of goal by eliminating the drive posed by Col.'s request.
Comment from Col., self-gratification.

This formula--composed of social drive, convenient cues, *expectancy* for reward, folkloric response, and reward, applies to the following responses:

M.IFR2 - *OFR3*, *M.IFR4* - *OFR5* - *OFR6* - *OFR7*, *M.IFR8* - *OFR9* - *OFR10* - *OFR11* - *OFR14* - *OFR15*, *OFR16*, *S.IFR17*, *S.IFR19*, *S.IFR20*, *S.IFR21*, *S.IFR22*, *A.OFR23*, *M.IFR26* - *OFR27*, *A.OFR28*, (Art/[popular culture]-tale).*OFR29*, *L.IPR33*, *L.OFR34*, *Me.OFR35* - *OR36*, *L.OFR38* - *OFR39*, *L.OFR41* - *Me.OFR42*.*

* Abbreviations are provided in the following order: Genre - type of response - and number of response in the interview.

Independent responses are separated by a comma (,), while related responses are separated by a dash (-). Also see *ante*, page 129.

2. negative:

The mechanism involved in Operant's Negative Response 1 (ONR1):

- Stimulus: Fadya requests a *ḥaddûta* from Nima.
- Cues: Nature of material requested (*Märchen*). Material had been frequently told by the mother (operant) as an proper response. *Märchen* normally told only to children. Fadya is too old to hear *ḥawadît*.⁽²²⁵⁾
- Response: Refusal.
- Reward: Escape from anxiety created by social norms adverse to relating material to audience of the wrong age.

This formula--composed of social stimulus, adverse cues, negative response in expectancy for reward and escape from anxiety as reward--applies to the following responses:

ONR12, ONR25, OR30, OR31 (reported), ONR32.

Inhibition and Forgetting

Inhibitory folkloric responses are clearly reflected in Dana's behavior. Although Dana volunteered corrections and information, thus revealing her familiarity with the material (OFR6, OFR9, OFR10, OFR11, OFR14, OFR15), she initially refused to participate in the session (ONR12), later denied that she was present when the tales were narrated in 1961 (ONR25), and assured me that she did not tell tales herself (ONR32). The basic inhibitory factor was Dana's conviction that "Lots of people wouldn't waste their time on stupid foreign fairy tales" (OR30).

Back in 1961, Nima had refused to tell me any *ḥawadît*, for she regarded them as unfit for circulation among upper class adults. Although she herself [presumably] had come from the lower class, hailing from el-Madbaḥ, a lower-class quarter of Cairo situated near a cemetery, she had come under the influence of individuals boasting aristocratic ancestries. One of her friends was [a young man named] Aḥmad R., an unsuccessful artist and a narcotics addict, who had come from an upper class group in Egypt.⁶¹⁹ [Another friend of Nima], Fatma, boasted repeatedly: "My husband was a big banker in Egypt, and we knew the highest people."⁶²⁰ In order not to be outclassed, Nima

⁶¹⁹ His father is reported to have been high-school headmaster, renowned for severity.

⁶²⁰ Fatma cited royal courtiers as her source for one of her tales. See *ante*, page 131, n. 2.

used to claim, "Bâbâ [papa] is engineer from England." All members of the group initially ⁽²²⁶⁾ denied having ever heard *hawadît* as children. However, after I convinced them that the *hawadît* are "fine literature," respected and circulated among educated and refined people, like Mr. Saber (a chemist) and myself (a university student), everyone except Ahmad R. admitted that they had heard *hawadît* long ago, and agreed to try to narrate them.

Ahmad was, then, Saber's roommate. His main interest was dance, and had given several belly-dancing⁶²¹ performances for friends. He often used proverbs, occasionally resorted to stylized vulgarities,⁶²² and believed in the existence of *ginn* and *`afârît*. Yet, he denied emphatically having ever heard a *haddûta*, as his family had "never allowed such things to enter our home." [The discussion was as follows]:

Col.: Didn't you have servants in your home?

Ahmad: Of course. We never had less than six at one time.

Col.: Didn't any of them tell you *hawadît*?

Ahmad: "Are you kidding!" Of course not. We had our quarters, and they had their own private wing. We never mixed together.

Col.: You never talked!?

Ahmad: Only my father [would talk to them]. He never allowed us to mix or talk to them.

Col.: Why?

Ahmad: [protesting] 'Nobody left but' servants! [i.e., Have all respectable people of proper social class gone, leaving only servants for us to socialize with!]⁶²³

Noting the insistence by members of the group, in their desire for upward mobility, on upper

⁶²¹ To be differentiated from the positively-valued men's dances. Most members of the sailors' group held Ahmad in low esteem as *ṣabî `âlmahî* (a belly-dancer's boy, or apprentice). See *post*, page 170, n. 5.

⁶²² Mot.: Z87.1Ṣ, "Women's duel with formulistic insults (*radh, tashlîq*)."

⁶²³ Cf. Abdu's 'Negative Identification' with a 'dishwasher;' see *post*, page 189, n. 73.

class origins (status), Mr. Saber jokingly whispered to me, "Everybody here is a son of somebody. There remains only me and you who are 'sons of a dog' [i.e., a nobody]!"

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The impact of this inhibition on Nima's knowledge of "American fairy tales," (which had been told to the daughters by their native American father) is reflected in her statement, "I know all the Egyptian stories, the American ones are stupid." She admitted having heard "Jack and the Bean Stalk" and "Jack the Giant Killer"⁶²⁴ several times, but could not remember their plots because "... they are stupid."

Forgetting

The folkloric responses illustrating forgetting can be divided into three groups:

1. *M.IFR2* - *OFR3*. In the initial response (*M.IFR2*) the informant forgets an episode or more. The audience (Nima) is motivated by an error: an omitted episode; she responds to correct it (*OFR3*).
2. *M.IFR4* - *OFR5* - *OFR6* - *OFR7*. Although Nima had frequently told the tale to her children, the suspension of repetition for several years had resulted in the loss of certain episodes. The audience (the daughters) is motivated by the narrator's error and responds to correct it (*OFR5* - *OFR6* - *OFR7*).
3. *M.IFR8* - *OFR9* - *OFR10* - *OFR11* - *OFR13* - *OFR14* - *OFR15* - *OFR16*. In the first response (*M.IFR8*) the informant forgets several episodes. The audience (Nima and Dana) is motivated by the narrator's error and makes responses to correct it (*OFR9* - *OFR10* - *OFR11* - *OFR13* - *OFR14* - *OFR15* - *OFR16*).

Fadya realized that the confusion occurred because the material was no longer elicited periodically and had not been heard at all for a long time (**lack of exercise**): "We are all confused because our mother hasn't told it to us in eleven years!," she stated. Since this tale had been a favorite, and Nima had had to tell it "almost every night" repetition contributed to its stability even after the lapse of "eleven years"^{228}--(actually only three years--El-Shamy had recorded it [from Nima, in their presence] in 1961).⁶²⁵

Change in cues: This absence of repetition (**exercise**) occurred through changes in cues provided

⁶²⁴ Type: 328, *The Boy Steals the Giant's Treasure*. Jack and the Beanstalk.

⁶²⁵ It is not certain that the daughters, who did not participate, were fully attentive to the tale.

by the family's environment. Nima refused to continue telling her daughters *hawadit* because they had grown up and she did not expect them to come in contact with the *hawadit* again until they will have had children of their own. The mother's degree of retention had been affected by this absence of repetition [lack of exercise], for in 1961 she was able to recall the material easily and more accurately.

Behavior Potential and Fraction of Decision

Dana, who consistently denied knowledge of folktales and declined active participation in the session, responded positively to a different kind of motivation--namely the drive to correct an error (OFR6 - OFR7, OFR13 - OFR15 - OFR16). Her two instances of behavior potential (minor and major) were as follows:

First (minor): The reward provided by El-Shamy as a collector of *Märchen* did not equal the inhibiting drive to escape the negative results of telling *Märchen*.

Col. asks Dana for *Märchen* which she had heard before.

Cues are adverse to Dana's telling a *Märchen* (nature of the material requested, energy required and possible embarrassment).

The reward Col. offers is not valuable to Dana.

Behavior potential of Dana is minor.

Fraction of Decision = Negative.

Second (major): Dana recognizes an error in the narrative.

Cues are not as adverse as before (material requiring correction is shorter and less energy required than in the previous case; no fear of embarrassment).

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Dana places high value on the reward of correcting an error.

Behavior potential increased to a major degree.

Fraction of Decision = Positive (numerous corrections).

Ego-involvement and Retention

The conversation turned from *Märchen* to memorate and legend when Fadya suggested that she tell "a lot of ghost stories;" her suggestion evoking **laughter** from the others because the two [**genres**] are radically different. Fadya herself was aware of this difference, observing that ghost stories "are not fairy tales." The whole group's reaction to the ego-involving memorates and legends differed from their reaction to non-ego-involving *Märchen*.

1. All four informants: Nima, Fadya, Dana, and Mr. Saber willingly reported their accounts of these incidents. Fadya's offer to report the incident of the encounter with the ghost (IPR33) functioned as a drive for the others to make responses (OR34, Me.OFR35 - L.OFR37, L.OFR38, L.OFR39, L.OFR40, OFR41, OFR42).

2. The effect of ego-involvement on the group's behavior is clearly seen in two different types of responses:

First: Although Fadya realized that Nima was telling a ghost story, her deep ego-involvement with the material led her to experience fear; consequently, she called on her mother to stop (OR36). This type of response was not made to the *Märchen* narrated earlier, even though they had also involved violent [supernatural] episodes.

Second: Although Dana was only three years old when the incident (reported as a memorate) was supposed to have occurred she could still remember Nima's ghost story (OFR35). Curiously, Fadya, **who was not even born at the time**, remembered it as a factual personal event. She could also remember, report, and experience ego-involvement with events which had happened to her mother when still a child as she played in a cemetery in old-Cairo ⁽²³⁰⁾ (OFR38 - OFR39)--events which Fadya could only have learned of through Nima's account in the form of a memorate.

Although Nima and her daughters narrated ego-involving material with detailed description and imagery, their renditions of *Märchen* lacked this precision and they disagreed over the details and the sequences of episodes:

(M.IFR2 - OFR3, OFR5 - OFR6 - OFR7, OFR9 - OFR10 - OFR11 - OFR15 -OFR16).
All three agreed unanimously over the primary events and details of the mother's memorates (Me.OFR35 - OFR36 - OFR37, L.OFR38 - OFR39 - OFR40, OFR41 - OFR42).

C A S E 2

The Folkloric Behavior of the Disintegrating Clique

Time: Tuesday, December 22, 1964; about 10:00 p.m.

Place: The Nifirtiti restaurant, recently opened by Ata on Broadway, upper Manhattan.

Persons: Ata (37, formerly a sailor, hails from Alexandria, Egypt); Ahmad-'Texas' (50, a construction worker, literate, Kenzi Nubian, had lived in Alexandria);⁶²⁶ Abdu (50, cook, illiterate, from the Alexandria region); and Talat Saber (See *ante*, page 131).

Setting: Ata, the owner-manager of the restaurant, had formerly been a sailor. When I first met him in the summer of 1961, he divided his free time between the "Egyptian Club" and the "Yemen Seamen Club;" both establishments were dominated--at least numerically--by Egyptians. When both clubs were closed after hours, the group members would move chairs out to the sidewalk--as they used to do back home in Egypt--and sit in the street in front of a Syrian cafe. Many considered Ata a snob; one girl described him as "greasy" and unpalatable.⁶²⁷ However, Ata had once been a dynamic personality in his clique of closely-knit group of friends;⁶²⁸ his behavior encompassed the activities esteemed by the group:⁶²⁹ he always managed to make himself the center of attention; he danced Egyptian

⁶²⁶ His real name is Aḥmad Ḥ...; he hails from the village of Ambarkâb, his mother hails from Qirshah, Nubia, Egypt. He acquired the nickname 'Texas' in the 1950's as a result of an unsuccessful attempt to live in that State without being subjected to racial segregation. He carried his passport with him at all times so as to prove that he was "not an American 'negro,' but an Egyptian." However, due to the salience of his negroid features, his attempts did not succeed and he returned to New York City: hence, the name.

⁶²⁷ *dammu-tqîl*, lit.: "heavy-blooded;" i.e., stolid, insufferable, or unappealing.

⁶²⁸ *shilla*; colloquial for *thullah*.

⁶²⁹ These are some of the character traits attributed to an '*ibn-balad* (pl., '*awlâd balad*)--meaning: a native 'son-of-the-town,' and a *gada`* ('good-guy,' 'real-man,' pl., *gid`ân*); cf. Mot.: P147.1§, "Characteristic behavior of urban community's strongman," (see *post*, page 172, n. 13). Ata had graded his other friends on a similar value-base. He once described one of his friends, Hal., as having become 'unmanly' due to the fact that he occasionally cooked a meal for Nima, his girl-friend. Yet, he still described Hal. as a *gada`*, and elaborated: "Meaning that if he were to be in a fight with [the residents of an entire] lane, he would close it up, and turn it into darkness [i.e., breakup the whole community]." Also among the qualities of a

men's dances,⁶³⁰ gambled, sang, drank, smoked, spent lavishly,⁶³¹ told stories about his love affairs, and was generous (hospitable, and helpful). One of Ata's traits admired most by his peers was his physical prowess and willingness to introduce force when it was needed.⁶³² Endowed with a well-built body that stood well over six feet, Ata separated fighters, blocked the way of unwelcome individuals, and won contests of physical strength, such as Indian wrestling, squeezing beer cans, and lifting a chair with one finger. Ata considered himself the leader of the group. Having finished two years of high school, he was relatively 'educated,'^[232] identified with the upper-middle class, spoke of planning on marrying a university graduate, and carefully eschewed committing debasing acts of 'unmanly behavior'.⁶³³

As a folklore informant, Ata--in 1961--was initially slightly hesitant to yield information, and doubted the significance and value of folksongs for a person like myself

'real-man' is to deal with his counterparts on one-to-one basis; during a dispute with Ata over a backgammon game, one of his friends asked the present writer to arbitrate: Ata considered this act as that of a non-*gada`*. (For other attributes of a *gada`*, see *post*, page 182, n. 50-55).

⁶³⁰ Especially *raqs el-`aṣā`* ('cane-dance'), which may also include a mock cane-fight between two 'dancers' (typically labelled: *talḥīb*). Among 'countrymen,' a cane is the typical personal weapon; it is also viewed as part of being dressed-up. By contrast, belly-dancing is considered effeminate and unmanly; see *ante*, page 166, n. 24.

⁶³¹ Ata gave the following proverbial sayings (truisms) as explanations for his economic views: '*isrif mā fi-l-gaib, ya' tik mā fi-l-ghaib* (Spend what is in the pocket, that [money] which is in the unknown would come to you); '*min akhad we-a`ṭā sarr el-māl* (He who gives and takes pleases the money, [i.e., money likes to be circulated]);' and '*hūn qirshak, wala thūn kirshak* (Labor your penny, and don't labor your belly [i.e., Hire others to do the menial work])'.

With reference to food and table manners, Ata lived by the saying: *kol 'akl el-gimāl, we qūm qabl er-rigāl* (Eat in the manner of camels, and quit ahead of [the other] men);' thus, he usually ate much and hurriedly. See *ante*, page 120.

⁶³² On the eve of June 23, 1961, `Ali W. (nicknamed: Ali-Baba) walked into the Club; he was greeted with hugs and kisses on the cheeks by most of those present. Ata spoke of him admiringly: "This is Ali-Baba. He has just been released from prison. He is one of the 'Most-wanted Seven' in America!" However, Ata, and others, viewed Ali-Baba, not as a 'friend,' but as a person to be appeased. At a later date Ata described Ali-Baba as a mere *ṣabī m-eṣ-ṣubyān* ('boy among the other boys')ⁱⁱⁱ for a big Mafia boss. Most crimes would not be considered acts of 'manliness' (*gad`anah*).

⁶³³ *ṣaghranah`* (unseemly behavior): committing acts that reduce one's communal standing (worth).

[the collector]. But--unlike many others--he never denied knowledge of the material, or--once having agreed to sing--evaded divulging what he knew; in a single private session he performed for me at his 'apartment'⁶³⁴ twenty-two songs: nineteen full songs, a one-stanza song, and two songs of his own composition. A few days later at the Egyptian Club, in the company of Texas and Tulbah,⁶³⁵ Ata participated in singing twenty-two additional songs; the recording of that session took place in the presence of many non-Egyptian customers.⁶³⁶

However, with his acquisition of the restaurant, Ata became an entirely different person. His traditional behavior patterns have undergone radical changes.

* * *

⁶³⁴ Only a very modest room in a 'boarding house'. Describing the life-style of 'those Egyptian sailors,' numerous outsiders--mainly Egyptian graduate students--commented: "They spend thousands [of dollars] on *hugss* (worthless frolic, trivial matters), yet if you were to visit one of them at his home you would find him living in an 'out-house' [i.e., dirty, scantily furnished, and unkept quarters]." Cf. *post*, page 195, n. 89.

⁶³⁵ A tall, thin man, with a deep baritone-like voice; he works as a cook.

⁶³⁶ In these early 1961-sessions, under the conditions provided by the coherent clique, the group rewarded the performance of a 'good' song by singing a traditional 'refrain' addressed at the singer:

warda, we-n-nabî!

warda, we-n-nabî!

warda, we-n-nabî!

wa-Allâ-â-âhi el-â-â-âzîm, warda; we-n-nabî!

(A rose: [I swear] by the Prophet!

A rose: [I swear] by the Prophet!

A rose: [I swear] by the Prophet!

By the Alm-i-i-i-ghty God, [it is] a rose; and by the Prophet!).

A variation on this refrain, used in jest, replaces the last line with the following:

By God! By God! By the Almighty God!

You are '*awanlagî*' (i.e., a fibber, deceiver, an imposter)!

In either case, all members of the group would subsequently laugh and cheer loudly.

Talat Saber and I went to the Club, where we met a group of Egyptians. 'Texas' offered to take us to Ata's restaurant, commenting, "... Since the day he opened that restaurant, I saw him only once." When we arrived at the restaurant, Ata was in the kitchen; Texas entered and announced us. Ata left the kitchen to an assistant and came out to welcome us. He had to go back frequently to prepare special orders but returned whenever possible. Ata offered Saber and myself supper, but we declined; however, contrary to custom, Ata did not insist. Texas later remarked on this lack of insistence, observing that Ata did not behave 'like a manly person'⁶³⁷ or ^{233} 'countryman'.⁶³⁸ Texas walked into the kitchen and returned; shortly afterward Ata appeared with some Egyptian dishes he personally prepared. He refused payment, since paying him "would be an insult."⁶³⁹

A man with a small-build entered and Ata immediately called him over to our table and introduced him to us.

Ata: This is 'brother'⁶⁴⁰ Abdu--an Alexandrian, like us. And this is 'Master'⁶⁴¹ Talat, and this is 'Master' Hasan; [sarcastically] and this is our 'philosopher',⁶⁴² Aḥmad Texas. [Texas does not react]

Abdu: "Welcome, Welcome."⁶⁴³ [Congratulates Ata on his success with the restaurant, noting that this is the first restaurant ever opened by an Egyptian in New York.]

Ata: This place yields--after paying everything--\$120 a day, and when the business is 'asleep' [i.e., sluggish]: \$90 or \$85.

⁶³⁷ *mish-gada`*, not [like] a 'real-man'. Cf. acts of *ṣaḡhranah* (*ante*, page 170, n. 8).

⁶³⁸ *'ibn balad*, lit., son-of-the-country, or the neighborhood: a person exhibiting the behavior expected of a 'real-man' in his home area: chivalrous, hospitable, polite, *qalbu-'abyad* ('white-hearted,' i.e., trusting, bears no malice).

⁶³⁹ Texas, presumably, went into the kitchen so as to reprimand Ata for his unseemly initial behavior, and to offer to pay for the meal himself. It is worth noting that a few month later, I visited Ata at the restaurant; he offered me neither food nor drink. I ordered a light meal; at the time of my departure, Ata was conspicuously absent, presumably so that he would not be obliged to offer that I should not pay. Thus, the transformation of his character into one of an efficient 'businessman' was complete.

⁶⁴⁰ *el-'akḥkh*.

⁶⁴¹ *el-'ustâz*; see *ante*, page 150, n. 19.

⁶⁴² *ḡhalabâwî*; i.e., talkative smarty, or 'smart-aleck'; also labelled: *faylasûf* ('philosopher').

⁶⁴³ *'ahlan*, *'ahlan*.

Abdu: [proudly] I told you! See! Didn't I choose the location for you? That is all 'from God's guidance.'⁶⁴⁴

Ata: [reluctant to admit Abdu's assistance] True! *All* was 'God's guidance,' [not yours].

Abdu: You see, I've always been a businessman. I used to have a business--the first time I was here, there in New Jersey. But, you know, I had to go back home. They say, [he recites rapidly, in semi-classical Arabic, the first verse of a poem]: [*Operant's Folkloric Response 1*]

Col.: Let us hear it [in full].⁽²³⁴⁾

Abdu: If a stranger overstays in (any) a land,
it would be like building bridges on the wind.
And if wind were to blow, it would demolish the building,
[thus] inviting the stranger to become homebound.⁶⁴⁵

Col.: This is very beautiful. What is it? [*Reward*]

Abdu: You like it?

Col.: Yes! What is it?

Ata: [interrupts] It is just [empty] talk.

Abdu: [defensively] This is poetry--some of the best poetry!

Ata: [sarcastically] Oh, ya!⁶⁴⁶ And what next? [*Negative Reward*]

Abdu: [baffled] Nothing.

Ata: [playfully] Are you offended, or what?

Abdu: No, no! Why [should I be]!?

Texas: [changes the subject] 'Master' Talat is studying chemistry and things like that.

⁶⁴⁴ *tawfiq min Allâh.*

⁶⁴⁵ 'izâ tâl el-gharîb bi-'ayy (fi) 'ardîn
ka-bunyân el-qusûri `ala-r-riyâhî
w-inn habb er-rîl biyihdim el-binâyah
biyi`zim el-gharîbi `ala-r-rawâhî.

The first hemistich is a distortion of: 'idhâ 'a^tâla al-gharîbu baqâ' an bi-'ardîn.

⁶⁴⁶ *yâ sal-â-â-âm!*

Abdu: By God, every time I meet one of you [college students] my heart feels very happy. Certainly we are a family. [*Positive Identification*]

Texas: And 'Master' Hasan is studying in Indiana.

Abdu: Is it far from here?

Ata: [sarcastically] Merely: 'A rubbing of [one's] heel.'⁶⁴⁷

[Ata leaves briefly.]

Abdu: [to Saber] What do you do with that thing [chemistry] you are studying?

Saber: ... What do you mean?

Texas: He is working with difficult things. He will make an atomic bomb for Egypt tomorrow. But, unfortunately, (235) the Jews are giving him a hard time.

Abdu: Naturally! But they are all over the place! This is their country! Who here is not a Jew?

Texas: Not all of them are bad. I have good friends who are Jews.

Abdu: 'Your fingers are not all alike.'⁶⁴⁸ [*Operant's Folkloric Response 2*] Do you know, 'Master' Talat, this thing you are studying is very difficult. I know that! It is not easy to get that stuff they make those bombs with. You know, when the sun strikes on the water surface ...

Texas: [reprimandingly] Come on! Stop it! They know! ... What water!? They are ..., This is their business! [Abdu looks confused and a little embarrassed. Col. signals Saber to reinforce Abdu].

Saber: What he is saying is right.

Abdu: [to Texas, victoriously] Sure it is right! True I don't read or write, but I understand!

Texas: [to Saber, in disbelief] 'Master' Talat! [You cant' be serious]!!

Saber: Yes, it is! [*Reward*]

Abdu: [continues] ... When the sun strikes on the surface of the water for a long time, a layer of scum shows up. This scum is yellowish and reddish and greenish. From this, the atomic

⁶⁴⁷ *farkit ka`b*, i.e., 'A very short walking-distance.'

⁶⁴⁸ *ṣawab`ak mish zayy ba`adaha*, syllogistically: as is the case with the fingers of a hand, members of the same group still differ from one another; every group has the good and the bad within it.

bomb is made.⁶⁴⁹

Texas: [laughs, puzzled] What kind of [silly] talk is this!?

Col.: [to Abdu, changing the subject] Do you know! I liked your poem. It is really beautiful. Do you sing? [Reward]

Abdu: You really like it?

Col.: Sure! Do you know any more?

Abdu: Was it really good?

[Ata returns].

Col.: [to Abdu] Go ahead.

Abdu: U-m-m-m ...

Ata: What is the matter? (236)

Texas: Abdu is going to say [sing] a *mawwâl* [folksong].

Ata: [playfully, in a slighting tone] *mawwâl!!?*

Abdu: [tries to think] 'May God praise our Master, Muhammad!⁶⁵⁰ [supplication believed to aid memory] ... [recites]:

The boats of patience left me, while I was wounded. [Informant's Folkloric Response 3]⁶⁵¹

Ata: [sarcastically, echoing Abdu's words] Oh, ya! 'While I was wounded.'⁶⁵² [Negative Reward]

Abdu: [ignoring the interruption, repeats the first line to himself, then continues]:

And I went to the wounds'-doctor; he said to me, "As you came, go back."

Nights of mirth have returned; they come, and fleetly go.

Separation between a lover and his beloved is more severe than the departure of the soul.⁶⁵³

⁶⁴⁹ Clearly, Abdu is talking about the 'heavy water'. Mot.: J2260, "Absurd scientific theories--general."

⁶⁵⁰ *Allah-umma ṣalli `ala sayyidinâ Muḥammad.*

⁶⁵¹ *marâkib eṣ-ṣabr fâtuni w-anâ magrûḥ.*

The word "ṣabr" may also mean: aloe; i.e., that which is bitter.

⁶⁵² *yâ salâm! 'wana magrûḥ.'*

⁶⁵³ *we-ruḥt li-ṭabīb l-agrâḥ qalli, "zayy magait rūḥ."*

Ata: [sarcastically] On your word of honor!?! [Negative Reward]

Abdu: [irritated] What is the matter, Ata? Let me speak!

Ata: And who kept you from speaking?

Col.: [to Ata] Could you say any?

Ata: Not me. [Informant's Negative Response 4]

Col.: Why? You used to be very good, you--along with Ahmed Texas and Tulba--sang for me in the Club not long ago. I think you are an excellent [singer].

Ata: [playfully] "That was a long time ago: (237) [this stuff is] sold out."⁶⁵⁴

Col.: Why 'sold out'?

Ata: Brother, 'Every prayers-time has a call of its own' [i.e., 'Things change'].⁶⁵⁵ [Operant's Folkloric Response 5]

Col.: [to Abdu] Did you hear this one? [The following song was sung by Ata in 1961]:

"O Daughter of the councilman, why are you standing by the door so sad?"

She said, "My sweetheart: they took him away from me. What helplessness [of mine]!"⁶⁵⁶

Ata: [...]

Col.: [to Ata] Do you know it?

Ata: I forgot. [Inhibition]

Abdu: Here is one! [Operant's Folkloric Response 6]

*ʿâdit layâli el-hanâ; bitfîgi qawâm we-trûlî
bu`d el-ḥabîb `an ḥabîbu 'aṣ`ab min tulû` er-roah.*

The 'extracting' [by the Angel-of-Death] of a soul, or its 'departure' from the body of a living being, is believed to be the most harrowing experience in existence.

⁶⁵⁴ *kân zamân we-gabar*; an idiom meaning: 'That was in the good old days, but not anymore.'

⁶⁵⁵ *kull zamân we-luh 'adân.*

⁶⁵⁶ "yâ bint shaikh el-balad, mâlik waqfa `al-bâb ḥazîna?"
qâlit, "ḥabîbi khadûh minni; ya qillit el-ḥîla!"

O Daughter of the councilman, why are you always standing by the trail?
 She said, "My sweetheart has just appeared on the trail,
 I am standing-by for him.

"Had I had ..."⁶⁵⁷ {238}

Ata: [interrupts, protesting] Did you come to sing or to visit?

Col.: Both.

Texas: [to Col.] In this type of singing a letter is chosen and men [singers] must produce a *mawwâl* [folksong] according to [the rhyme of] that letter. All this before the [last] word [of a song would] *tuqa`* ['hits the floor,' i.e., the response must come simultaneously with, or before a song's ending, and without a pause]. This requires a 'sitting'⁶⁵⁸ [with special arrangements and conditions].

Abdu: This is a 'sitting!' We all are men, and *gid`ân* [real men] and *wilâd balad* ['sons-of-the-neighborhood,' i.e., men who know the rules and abide by them!] [*Norms, Cues*]

Ata: [to Saber] Tell us a joke.

Saber: [surprised] I don't know any. [*Operant's Negative Response 7*]

Ata: Don't know or don't want to? Don't be 'too-cool'.⁶⁵⁹

Saber: I am not 'too-cool!' Where did you get this idea from?

Abdu: [excitedly] Hear this one! [*Operant's Folkloric Response 8*]

Once there was a man ... a southern-Egyptian⁶⁶⁰ ... This southern-Egyptian

⁶⁵⁷

"*yâ bint shaikh el-balad, malik we-mâl ed-darb wagfa luh?*
qâlit, "habîbi khatâr `ad-darb waqfâluh.
"laww `andi"

⁶⁵⁸ *qa`dah*: A getting together by clique members for the purposes of 'having fun' or, simply, 'converse'.

⁶⁵⁹ *tiqîl*, lit.: heavy; i.e., stuck-up, aloof, hard-to-get.

⁶⁶⁰ *ṣi`îdî*: a native of southern-Egypt; stereotyped in jokes as stupid, stubborn, rustic, etc.; the Arabic dialects spoken by souther-Egyptians are characterized by noticeable pronunciation traits, especially the drawl. In other contexts the southern-Egyptian is cast in a radically differed stereotype: proud, generous, helpful, gallant, etc. While collecting (mainly jokes, many of which dealt with southern-Egyptians, and humorous anecdotes of the tricksters *Gohâ* and 'Abu-n-Nawwâs') at the home of an Egyptian immigrant

got married. He saw a good girl, from a family that he knew, so he got married ... [Texas and Ata are restless] When he got married ... that is, the evening of marriage ... he went into the room with the bride ... then ... they--the two of them, the man and his bride--were alone in the room ...

Texas: You'll ruin it! [*Operant's Response 9*]

Abdu: Wait a minute!

... The man kept on curling his mustaches up [imitates the motion], a southern-Egyptian ... Ah ... [tries to remember by uttering a supplication]⁶⁶¹ ... Ya! ... He saw a mouse ... (239) a mouse! A little mouse--[the man] said to his wife ... said to the mouse, "Get out!" A mouse! [laughs], just a little mouse ... He said again [shouts], "I said to you 'Get out!'" [laughs] Only a mouse! ... He [the man] took his cane and hit the mouse ... [laughs] but he missed ... He did not hit the mouse, he hit the mirror ... he then said to his wife ..., said to his wife, "Woman, go! You are divorced!" ... he couldn't kill the mouse ...

Ata: [interrupts] Is this a 'fairy tale,'⁶⁶² or what? [*Operant's Response 10*]

Texas: Not like that! ... [*Operant's Folkloric Response 11*]

[It is told like this]: The man hit the mouse to scare his wife; when he missed, the woman laughed. So he said, "You are laughing! All right! Go! You are divorced!" The woman laughed again. He hit the mouse again and killed it. The woman was still laughing. He said, "You are divorced and ten of the neighbor-[women] are divorced, as well." The mother of the girl heard; she opened the door and walked in.⁶⁶³ She saw the mouse dead. She said [strikes

named Hamâda--himself a southern-Egyptian, he narrated some 'American jokes' concerning 'Kentuckians'. His wife--a native white American from Kentucky--described American southerners as: "... the *ḡi'îdîs* of America." Her husband retorted: "No! the southern-Egyptians are the 'Kentuckians' of Egypt!"

⁶⁶¹ '*Allahu-mma ḡalli `ala sayyidina Muḡammad.*' Clearly, Abdu is struggling with his memory; he is unable to reproduce the anecdote satisfactorily.

⁶⁶² *ḡaddûta*; i.e., it is too long and choppy to be a joke.

⁶⁶³ This detail reveals Texas's "behavioral space," or the stage for action as he experienced it. Residence of the newlyweds in his Nubian community is of the initial matrilocal type: the bride and groom must spend the first forty days at the home of the bride's mother. Texas himself underwent a comparable experience: In order to save him from 'city-women,' his elder brother ordered him to travel from Alexandria--where they were residing--to Nubia so as to find a wife. There, he was shown a pretty

his chest in shock], "A lion! This is not a mouse! This is a lion!" ...

Abdu: [interrupts] When she said that, the man said [to the bride], "You have been reinstated (as wife) and ten of the neighbors have been restored, as well."

Texas: No! When she said that, he said to his woman, "You have been reinstated." Then the mother said, "A lion killed a lion!" He said, "All right, you have been reinstated, and ten of the neighbors have been reinstated, as well."⁶⁶⁴ [light laughter].

Ata: This is a fairy tale, not a joke!⁶⁶⁵ Say something good.

Col.: Why don't you say one?

Ata: I can't tell jokes! [*Operant's Negative Response 12*]

Col.: Why can't you? You used to be good!

Ata: 'Used to,' [but no more]. Say one, Texas.⁽²⁴⁰⁾

Texas: There is that joke about the southern-Egyptian and his wife [*Operant's Folkloric Response 13*]. That southern-Egyptian had a beautiful wife; the doctor of the village ... [*deviation from text*] (that is, after things have improved and doctors had offices in villages instead of patients having to travel to big cities for treatment. You know, before that ...)

woman at the river bank, and was told she is the bride-to-be; he agreed. On the wedding night--as he waited alone in the bridal chamber in his in-laws' home, where he was to meet and see the bride's face for the first time--a "little scrawny girl" walked in. Suspecting that she might be a curious guest, he ordered her to leave; she wept and headed to the door. The bride's mother, who was standing just outside the door, walked in and advised him that the girl is his paternal-cousin and that she is his bride, (Mot.: K1305.1§, "Man deceived into marrying an ugly woman by showing him a beautiful girl as the bride-to-be").

Texas summed up his dilemma in this no-win situation by citing a proverbial simile: *taffah: foaq f-wishshak; talat fi-`ibbak* ("[Like] a spittle: if [spat out] upwards [it comes down] on one's face; if [spat out] downwards, [it falls] into one's bosom," i.e., I lose in either case). [*Operant's Folkloric Response*] He resigned himself to the marriage. (Mot.: J210.3.1§).

His attempts to teach his bride the urban lifestyle of 'Alexandrian women'--via a semstress, who agreed to teach her *ed-dardaha* ('being-with-it')--led to conflict with his elder brother, and ultimately to his immigration to the U.S. By contrast, residence in most traditional communities in Egypt is patrilocal.

⁶⁶⁴ Type: 901A§, *The Mouse-slayer: Conditioning the Outspoken Bride*.

⁶⁶⁵ "di *hadduta mish noktah*." A 'joke' is expected to be brief, dramatic, and climactic.

Ata: What happened to the joke? [*Operant's Response*]

Texas: 'One type of talk calls for another.'⁶⁶⁶ [*Free-association*].

The doctor used to ... (*la mu'akhza* ['Don't blame me!]), it is not clean ...
[*Inhibition*] ...

Col.: Go ahead, we are all one clique (*shilla*).

Texas: Perhaps 'Master' Talat will not like this. [*Cues*]

Saber: Why not? It only has to be good.

Texas: The doctor ... used to [narrator moves his lightly clinched fist--turned downwards--forward and backward imitating sexual intercourse] [*Traditional Gesture*] [*Inhibition*] ... well ... [abruptly] used to f... her!

One time the doctor said to the woman, "Woman, I have to bang you in front of your husband." She screamed, "How catastrophic!"⁶⁶⁷ He would kill us both." He [the doctor] said to her, "Don't worry, all you have to do is pretend you are very sick and he will bring you here, and leave the rest to me."

The woman did as he told her. The [husband]⁶⁶⁸ took her to the doctor. The doctor examined her [narrator imitates examining a body] and finally said, "Come here," [imitates taking someone aside] and said, "How do you sleep with your wife?" The southern-Egyptian exclaimed, "How do I do what!" The doctor said, "Be calm. She is all messed up, you seem to be too big for her. I'll tell you how. First you go in for two centi[meter], then turn right for another centimeter, then go forward another three centimeters!" And he kept telling him things ⁽²⁴¹⁾ like that. Finally he said to him, "Now show me how." Naturally he couldn't. So the doctor said, "I'll show you. Like this ..." [laughter]. Then the southerner exclaimed, "Oh me-e-e-e!"⁶⁶⁹ He who doesn't know medicine would say he [the doctor] f.... my wife!"⁶⁷⁰ [laughter].

⁶⁶⁶ 'el-kalâm bi-ygîb kalâm,' lit.: talk brings talk.

⁶⁶⁷ *yâ kharâ-â-âbi!*

⁶⁶⁸ *si`idî*: southern-Egyptian; i.e., the husband who happened to be a southerner.

⁶⁶⁹ *wah, ya bû-û-ûy!!*: lit., "O my fa-a-father!;" uttered in characteristic southern drawl.

⁶⁷⁰ Type: 1424A§, *Seduction by Pretending to Show (Instruct, Teach) Husband How it is Done*.

Ata: I've heard it before, I just didn't want to 'burn it'.⁶⁷¹ [*Recognition*]

Col.: Who told it to you?

Ata: I think Meḥammad M. [an Egyptian engineering doctoral student] ... you were with us!

Col.: You're right! Do you recall the rest of the jokes he told?

Ata: No! That was a long time ago. Ho, ho, [it has been] four or five years now. [*Inhibition*]

Col.: But you seem to have remembered that one!

Ata: [steps lightly on my foot, signaling his desire to drop the subject] Well, some other time.

Texas: [*Operant's Folkloric Response 14*] Another one!

A man knew a nurse. He used to say to her, "Oh! Ah! If you just saw my thing, if you just let me show you!"

Abdu: [interrupts] I'll say this one for you. [*Operant's Folkloric Response 15*]

Texas: [irritated] Let me finish first!

Abdu: You said the first one, too ...

Now, after all that, one day she said, "Alright!" He took her home and when he took his clothes off, everything became clear. He only had ... [sticks out half his index finger]. [*Traditional Gesture*] [laughter] It was only this big! ... (Where is all that talk! Where is all that bragging)... He said, ... he was embarrassed. He said, "Now, where am I going to give it to you?" She said, she was a nurse and knows about shots ... (242)

Texas: [interrupts] Don't ruin it! Say it straight! [*Operant's Response 16*]

Abdu: [grins, extends his arm] She said [sarcastically], "Give it to me 'in the vein!' [i.e., intravenously]" [laughter].⁶⁷²

Col.: Who said this joke first?

Texas and

Ata: This is Aḥmad Faḍl's [joke]!

⁶⁷¹ 'alraq-hâ, i.e., spoil it by preempting the punch line.

⁶⁷² Type: 901B§, *Enlightening the Presumably Innocent (Naive) Bride*.

Texas: There is a similar one. [*Operant's Folkloric Response 17*]

This is about the man who 'said to himself,' "Marry one who had never seen a man's 'thing!'" Every time he'd marry one, he'd show her his thing and ask her, "What is this?" She would say, "This is a cock!" He would say, "You, daughter of a dog! Go! You are divorced!" Finally he got that girl and showed her his thing and said, "Woman, what is this?" She said [shyly], "Oh, I don't know." He said, "What is this?" She said, "A finger ... A piece of skin ..." The man thought, "This is the perfect woman." Finally he thought, "It is about time I opened her eyes to things [facts of life]." So he said, "So-and-so, come here. This is not a finger. This is a cock!" She said [excitedly], "Cock!? 'Get lost!'⁶⁷³ Maybe they are transistorized nowadays!" [laughter]

Ata: The 'sitting' has warmed up.⁶⁷⁴ Let us move downstairs. [We moved to the basement].

Texas: [nostalgically] This is just like older times.

Ata: The 'sittings of the real-men!'⁶⁷⁵ [A cigarette is hand-wrapped and passed around]

Col.: [the cigarett reaches the Col.] Sorry. I don't smoke. (243)

Abdu: Don't smoke!? This is not just smoke!

Col.: I know! I don't!

Abdu: How, then, could you be a *gada`* [without smoking this stuff]? [*Norm, Role*]

Col.: Do I have to smoke ... to be a *gada`*?

Abdu and

Ata: [together] You have 'to be the size of the sitting.'⁶⁷⁶ [*Operant's Folkloric Response 18*]

Col.: [pretends to smoke] How often do you have 'sittings' like this?

Texas: [sorrowfully] Once in a long while.⁶⁷⁷ Egyptians here used to be unequaled in

⁶⁷³ *'itnayyil!*: lit. "Go paint yourself [with] indigo (blue-black)."

⁶⁷⁴ *el-qa`dah hilyit*, lit., 'the sitting has become sweet'. (The basement is also used as storage area).

⁶⁷⁵ *qa`dat el-gid`ân*. See *ante*, page 177, n. 33.

⁶⁷⁶ *lâzim tibqâ qad el-qa`ada*; i.e., it is a requirement for being in the gathering, and you must abide by the rules.

⁶⁷⁷ *kull hîn we-mîn*, i.e., rarely.

'dependableness,⁶⁷⁸ 'manliness,⁶⁷⁹ and 'big-time spending.⁶⁸⁰ [sadly] Now it is all dead. Everybody has gone after his own affairs. We meet just like this, once a year or twice, that is all.

Ata: [emphatically] Atlantic Avenue used to be ours! Every evening, not less than forty, fifty, maybe even seventy of us used to get together [there]. It was just like Râs-et-Tîn [a district in Alexandria, Egypt]. Now, only the straw[-men] remain.

Abdu: [nostalgically] I've been to every spot in this world, from Japan to the Lands of the Greeks. I never saw anything that equals Egypt. 'Egypt is the mother of the world!'⁶⁸¹ Nothing else ... By God, if it weren't for money, I wouldn't have stayed here one second longer ...

Ata: Yes, one should make some money to be able to return with 'unbroken pride'.⁶⁸²

Abdu: I have `_dil and Meḥammad [sons]; they are now in the best schools--schools that are only for the sons of Pashas and Beys of the older days ... [proudly] They are getting ...

[Positive Identification, Imitation] (244)

Texas: [annoyed, interrupts] What best schools? Everything is equal now [i.e., there are no privileged social classes]. That was years and years ago [before the 1952 Revolution]!

[The cigarette is finished].

Ata: Let us go upstairs; it is very humid in here.

Abdu: [hums a song] Hm-m-m [*Operant's Folkloric Response 19*] [*Inhibition*]

Col.: [to Abdu] We didn't finish our *mawwâl* [song]; I would like to sit down with you and talk freely about folksongs.

Abdu: You really like them?

Texas: What do you do with this stuff?

⁶⁷⁸ *magda`ah*: the state of being a *gada`* (a real man).

⁶⁷⁹ *we-l-margalah*: the state of being a he-man.

⁶⁸⁰ *fangarah*: profligacy; also: being openly generous or hospitable to a fault, especially to strangers.

⁶⁸¹ *Maṣr 'Omm ed-dunyâ*, i.e., the best.

⁶⁸² *magbûr el-khâtîr*, lit.: with his mind mended; i.e., satisfied, content.

Col.: I collect it before it all dies out. It is very pretty and precious, just like philosophers' and poets' writings.

Abdu: True we didn't go to school ...

Texas: [protesting] Don't say "We"!

Abdu: [offended] Yes, sir! I ...! I didn't go to school, but this doesn't mean I can't think. This is wisdom, too.

Col.: I know. Did you hear [the ballad of] "el-'Adham ..."

Abdu: [interrupts] Sure! [recite one verse] [*Informant's Folkloric Response 20*]
The name is: 'Adham, and the surname is Sharqâwî⁶⁸³

Col.: How does it go?

Abdu: [tries to remember] ('I beg Almighty God's pardon')⁶⁸⁴ [recites]:
Where do we get people for the meanings of this talk, to recite it.
Like recorded [facts], if sciences are to be studied and recited
This incident which happened to a *sharqâwî* lion⁽²⁴⁵⁾
The name is 'il-Adham, but the surname is: Sharqâwî
The boy was bred in school when he was thirteen years old
And remained in school until he became eighteen.

[Abdu tries to recall but fails, he gives a brief prose account of the forgotten part]: The government sent him a letter telling him that his paternal-uncle was killed ... Then ... [returns to verse]:

He went to the Bedouins of the wilderness.
And he sent letters to the government notifying it:
"He who wants me should come out to meet me in the hills."
They looked for his dearest friend, they found him to be a soldier [i.e., private] in the army.
He said to them, "I'll get him [for you] without a reward of [being awarded the rank of] Bey or a Pasha."
They gave him two stripes; he became a corporal.

⁽²⁴⁶⁾

[(Excitedly) For two stripes he betrayed el-Adham! People are 'dead corpses'! By the way, el-Adham was a

⁶⁸³ *el-'ism l-Adham we-n-naqb 'Sharqâwî'*.

⁶⁸⁴ *'astaghfar Allâh el-`azîm*: supplication believed to aid memory.

gada! [Positive Identification]. He used to take from the rich and give to the poor! Yes! He takes from rich and gives to the poor [Abdu imitates the motions of taking and giving], [Traditional Gesture]. They say that he [the friend] shot him while they were talking! ... While they were talking!! ... [i.e., what a horrible treachery]. [Abdu returns to the verse]):

The first bullet struck his left bosom accurately.
He said, "If I were to live, government, I'll dress you in [women's] veils instead of fezes!"
(They killed him by treachery!)⁶⁸⁵

Ata: [returning] What is going on? "Killed who?"

Abdu: Nothing. We were just chatting. [Operant's Negative Response 21] [Inhibition]

Ata: About what?

Texas: 'Master' Hasan was asking about el-Adham.

Ata: Adham who?

Texas: [el-Adham] esh-Sharqâwî: the *mawwâl*.

Ata: Man! This story is a million years old!

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*minain nigîb nâs li-ma`nât el-kalâm yitlûh
shibh el-mu`ayyid `iza hifzu l-`ulûm we-talûh
el-`hadsa `illî garat `ala sab` sharqâwi
el-`ism l-Adham we-n-naqb `SharqâWi'
el-`walad kân mitrabbi f-el-madrâsa lamma kân talattasher
we-tannu fi-l-madrâsa lamma balagh tamantâsher*

[...]

*nizil `ala `Arab `awhâshu
we-ba`t l-el-`hukûma gawabât we-`a`lanha:
"illî `ayizni yigî-li f-el-gabal barrah."
dawwaru `ala `a`zz `ashâbu laqûh `askari fi-l-gaish
qâl luhum. "ana `agîbuh wala nâkhud `alaih baih wala bâsha."
`iddûlo shiritain fa-baqâ umbâsha.*

(...)

*`awwil rusâsa gat fi bizzu esh-shimâl bi-nishân
qâl, "in `isht yâ hukuma l-alabbisik bidâl et-`tarabîsh turali
we-shishân!"*

Col.:Do you know it?

Ata: I heard it. Isn't it about that fellow who was fighting the government and they got his friend to kill him? [*Operant's Folkloric Response 22*]

Col.:Do you remember the *mawwâl*?

Ata: Of course not! [*Operant's Negative Response 23*]

Col.:You remember the [factual] incident?

Ata: I hear that it is true, but that *mawwâl*-thing is not. [It is] not in the original thing.⁽²⁴⁷⁾

Col.:What is the original thing?

Ata: [annoyed] The thing that did happen! Did he fight the government with the *mawwâl*!

Col.:Did you hear it, Texas?

Texas: Ya! Several times.

Col.:Do you remember it?

Texas: As he told it to you; but ... I heard it long ago. I know the story. [*Recognition*] [*Informant's Response 24*]

Col.:Ata used to be really talented; his songs were amazingly refined. I don't know what happened to him!

Ata: Nothing happened to him: Ata is still the same.

Col.:I don't think so. Your memory has weakened. Do you remember this *mawwâl*? [Ata sang the following in 1961]:

A beauty invited me and said, "Enter my garden.
 "And if you like my cheeks' roses, beautiful-one,
 "cull and kiss again."
 I rode the navel and held the reigns with my teeth.
 I bit the lip, O beauty, honey came abundantly.⁶⁸⁶ [cheers and comments]

⁶⁸⁶

gamîl `azamnî we-qal-li "khush bustâni.
 "w-in `agabak ward khaddî, ya gamîl, 'uqtuf we-bûs tâni."
 'ana rikibt `ala gurriṭu we-'akhdî es-sur` fisnâni.
 `addait `ala shiffitu, ya gamîl, sar el-`asal gâni.

It should be noted that in poetry, a female is most often referred to in masculine pronouns; the present

Abdu: [amazed and amused] How come you know that? [*Norm, Role*] This is 'sweet' [fine].
Col.: [to Ata] Remember it?

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Ata: Naturally.

Col.: Why didn't you say it?

Ata: I just didn't. But I remember. [*Informant's Negative Response 25*]

Col.: [to Ata] I bet you've forgotten.

Ata: Bet [against] yourself, because you'll lose.

Abdu: [mummers ...] Hear this. [looks at Ata apprehensively]

Col.: [to Ata] Don't 'burn it' [i.e., ruin Abdu's song by interruptions].

Abdu: A tan, tiny, young-one killed me.

Wore my body out; and even my family, [she] made me leave.

A beauty made the navel into a boat and ferried me across.

Then, tricked me, and in mid-seas, threw me off.

I said, "Captain of ferryboat, swing-by and pick me out."

"The 'rope of amity' has been severed: who will rejoin it!," [he answered].⁶⁸⁷

[Cheers and comments] [*Reward*] [*Operant's Folkloric Response 26*]

Ata: Good!

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Col.: Aren't you going to say one?

Ata: Leave me out of this. [*Operant's Negative Response 27*]

text is an example of this poetic trait.

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'*asmar, suḡhayyar, saḡhūr es-sinn mawwitni.*

huluk `idāya we-hatta l-'ahl fawwitni.

gamīl `amal-li surritu markib we-`addāni.

we-dihik `alayya we-f-wiṣt el-buḡūr we-rāmāni.

'*ana qult, "ḡawwid ya rayyis el-ḡhalyūn we-khudni."*

"*ḡabl el-maḡabba inqā`, yâ-mîn yiwṣilu tâni!"*

Abdu: [Operant's Folkloric Response 28]

The boats-of-love are due from distant [lands]; and have arrived.⁶⁸⁸

...

Oh! ... [Inhibition] I forgot! These things used to come to me immediately!

Ata: [interrupts, offering refreshments and changing the subject].

[It is getting late and we have to leave. I (Col.) agrees with Abdu to return in two days so that we can record "some of his art." I visited Ata alone the next day and asked him why he had refused to participate in "our talk" last night]:

Ata: Things are different. As you see, I am a businessman now. This is not good for business.

[Cues]

Col.: Aren't they your friends and your clique (*shilla*)?

Ata: Friends, yes! Now Abdu works for me; [points to an assistant] if that *Spanioli* [Spaniard] kid saw him getting too informal with me he will do the same and this girl [the waitress] will do the same and the kitchen boy will do the same. Then I'll become a *tarṭūr* [fool's cap, i.e., a joke, powerless].

Col.: Couldn't you keep them as friends ... I mean without losing your prestige?

Ata: I'll tell you something. I lost forty pounds since I started this business. I have to be here watching everybody and every bell [ring of the cash register]. Look at that Spaniard ... 'his hand is very light;' ⁽²⁵⁰⁾ 'like a razor' [i.e., a clever thief, hard to detect].⁶⁸⁹

Col.: What has his dishonesty got to do with friendship?

Ata: 'A low wall will be ridden by dogs.'⁶⁹⁰ [Operant's Folkloric Response 29] ... If you are not 'filling out your clothes,' [i.e., to be seen as not 'up to your responsibility'],⁶⁹¹ anything may happen.

[Ata was busy and couldn't talk any longer. I went several times to record from Abdu, but he was

⁶⁸⁸ *marâkib el-hobb halla [or halla] min bi-îd w-ahî gât.*

⁶⁸⁹ *'îdo khafffa, zayy el-mûs;* i.e., lifts money from the box with lightning speed.

⁶⁹⁰ *el- haitah el-watya tirkabha el-kilâb;* i.e., a weak person will be taken advantage of by every opportunists.

⁶⁹¹ *malw hudûmak,* i.e., to have stature; to command respect corresponding to the demands of the role you play.

always busy. Finally, on December 28, I talked to both Ata and Abdu before Abdu and I left for my residence in Brooklyn to record his songs. Ata was busy talking to someone.]

Abdu: [indicates the stranger] Do you know who this is? This is the chief of police!

Col.: The real chief?

Abdu: Not the biggest head, but a boss. He can say, "Do this!" "Don't do that!," and what he says goes.

Col.: What is he doing here?

Abdu: He and Ata are friends. [whispering] We also give him [bribes] ...

Col.: How?

Abdu: I mean every now and then he gets something ... Anything here [in the restaurant] can be his, and ..., 'Pennies are like ointments'--[they cure ailments]⁶⁹² [*Operant's Folkloric Response 30*]

[The policeman finished his meal and offered to pay, but Ata refused to charge him. Ata walked proudly towards us and looked back at the policeman, who was already out the door.]

Ata: [He is] my friend: a 'Lieutenant' ...! [Ata explains how helpful his friend can be].

Col.: Abdu told me.

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Ata: The police! This [man] is the whole police department.

Col.: How!

Ata: He is the boss. We are friends. Anything I want, he does it for me.

Col.: Like what?

Abdu: Anything! Little things, big things, anything. [turns toward Ata] Ata pays him well, too.

Col.: Why should you pay him; you say you are friends.

Ata: Not here [in America]. Friends? Yes: but 'everything has its price!⁶⁹³ 'Feed the mouth, the eye

⁶⁹² *ad-darâhim k-al-marâhim*; i.e., [bribe] money solves problems, or 'greases the wheel'.

⁶⁹³ *kull shai' bi-tamanuh*.

will become shy.⁶⁹⁴ [*Operant's Folkloric Response 31*]

Abdu: Sure! 'Pennies are like ointments.'⁶⁹⁵ [*Operant's Folkloric Response 32*]

Ata: We go out together. He is from a very high class. He is an American 'after father and grandfather.'⁶⁹⁶ [*Norm*] [*Positive Identification, Imitation*]

Col.: Does every American have to be American 'after father and grandfather'?

Ata: Sure. This country is full of 'bums'.⁶⁹⁷ Not everyone of them is an American: *Bortorica* [Puerto-Ricans], Negroes, and all the rest ... [*Negative Identification*]

Abdu: But there are respectable people here, too. Very! ... You will like the 'clean' [i.e., refined] classes here: ... politeness, fine clothes, no monkey-business, or things of that sort. [*Positive Identification, Imitation*]

Ata: The best cars, the best women, the best houses are theirs.

[A boy of about 18 comes in to talk to Ata and remains to listen to the conversation.]

Abdu: This kid is a *bush* [an insult with homosexual ⁽²⁵²⁾ connotations] ... His boss fired him and he wants a job. He is a Greek! Instead of coming and saying "I want to work here," he is beating around the bush.

[Another young man comes from the kitchen and talks to Ata].

Abdu: [to Ata, in annoyance] What is this!? Are we going to mix with dishwashers!⁶⁹⁸ ... [*Negative Identification*]

Ata: [flattered] Not all ... Not like that [i.e., one must not go to an extreme]!

⁶⁹⁴ 'it̄im el-fom tistil̄i-l-`ain, i.e., if you ingratiate a person, he cannot stare you down, or refuse your demands.

⁶⁹⁵ See *ante*, page 188, n. 67.

⁶⁹⁶ 'aban *an gadd*; i.e., third generation American; not a recent immigrant. (Mot.: P1.1.1§)

⁶⁹⁷ *halafit*; sing.: *halfūt*: an inconsequential person (a bum). In another context, Ali (see *ante*, page 120) cited a proverb he had heard from a Moroccan friend which explains this antipathy among immigrant groups: "*ed-dāif yikrah ed-dāif, w-sāhib ed-dār yikrah el-'itnain* (A guest does not like another guest, and the host does not like either)." (Mot.: P798.1.2§).

⁶⁹⁸ Cf. Ahmad's 'Negative Identification' with 'servants;' See p. 160, n. 26.

Col.: By the way, what is that story about Nima's daughter marrying an Italian?

Ata: [disappointedly] You went there!

Col.: [realizing that my friendship with Nima would be interpreted to the detriment of my research]

No! That was a few years ago.

Abdu: Thank God you weren't [viper]-bitten [i.e., duped or taken advantage of].

Ata: She is a 'professional dancing-broad!'⁶⁹⁹ [*Norm, Role*]

Col.: What is wrong with that? 'To gain a livelihood.'⁷⁰⁰

Ata: 'To gain a livelihood': Yes! But: "'Good morning to you, O neighbor of mine. You attend to your affairs and I'll attend to mine."⁷⁰¹ [*Operant's Folkloric Response 33*]

Col.: But her daughter could be different.

Ata: Never! 'Upset a jar on its mouth, a girl turns out like her mother.'⁷⁰² [*Operant's Folkloric Response 34*]

Col.: 'He [God] may create an impious-one from the loins of a pious-one.'⁷⁰³

Ata: And 'He may create an impious from the loins of an impious.'⁷⁰⁴

Col.: Isn't she married to Hal. now?

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Ata: Why should I know!

Col.: Weren't you and Hal. friends?

⁶⁹⁹ *mara`ālmah*, i.e., 'no-good'; *mara*: derogatory word for "woman."

⁷⁰⁰ 'akl`aish, lit., 'bread-eating;' i.e., 'to make a living,' or 'it is work.'

⁷⁰¹ "sabāh el-khair ya gārī: 'inta f-hālak w-na-f-hāli," i.e., "Let us be at peace by observing formalities, but each keeping his distance."

⁷⁰² 'ikfi el-garrah`ala fommahâ, ... [etc.]. See, *ante*, page 120.

⁷⁰³ *yikhlaq min dahr el-`ālim fāsīd*, [*w-yikhlaq min dahr el-fāsīd`ālim* (and He may create a pious-one out of the loins of the impious)]. This proverb is composed of two parts, citing one, as is case here, implies the other.

⁷⁰⁴ *yikhlaq min dahr el-fāsīd fāsīd*. A variation patterned after the previous proverb.

Ata: That was a long time ago; 'Sold out'.⁷⁰⁵

Col.: I remember you telling me once (in 1961) that you were mad at him because he was cooking for a woman [Nima], and that he wasn't a man. Don't you think things have changed now?

Ata: What things?

Col.: You cook for everybody now! Don't you?

Ata: [offended] No, Mister!⁷⁰⁶ This is business! With me, everybody knows his place!

Later Ata told the Col. that he had to hire a new waitress because the previous one wanted to 'be too mushy' with him.⁷⁰⁷ He added, "Those son of a bitch, they want to be done; I take them and I f[...] them; after that they try 'to ride me,' and 'be too mushy' with me, in here [in the business place]! But now! Everyone should know his limits! [Do] not tell me: '[You do like] Hal.'! Hal. who!?! There is no way for comparison!" [*Negative Identification*]

[Ata gives Abdu money to buy groceries at Arab stores in Brooklyn and asks him to collect his mail at the postoffice. Before leaving, Abdu takes a ham out of the oven and shows it to Ata; Ata compliments him on his cooking skills. Abdu in turn compliments himself.]

Col.: 'Not everyone who rides a horse is a horseman'⁷⁰⁸.

Abdu: Sure! But the proverb goes like this: 'Not everyone who wore a turban is a credit to it, and not whoever got pregnant will beget a boy.'⁷⁰⁹ [*Operant's Folkloric* (254) *Response* 35] It also goes, of course, the way you said it. I've been cooking for thirty years or more; with me it is an art!

[Abdu and I leave. In the subway station, he complains that Ata abuses him even though they have been 'brothers' for a long time.]

Col.: I wonder why these songs you sing are not sung more often. Every time I am in the Club I see nothing but cards and gambling. Why don't you sing there?

⁷⁰⁵ See *ante*, page 176, n. 29.

⁷⁰⁶ *yâ-fendi*, (effendi); a formal and less friendly way of address.

⁷⁰⁷ *tâkhud`alayya*: becomes too informal.

⁷⁰⁸ *wala kull min rikib el-faras khayyâl*; i.e., not every cook is a master-chef [as you are]. This is the second part of the proverb; the first is: *mish kull min libis el-`imâmah yizinhâ*, ... (Not whoever wore a turban ...).

⁷⁰⁹ *mish kull min libis el-`imâmah yizinhâ; wala kull min hîblit gâbit ghulâm*.

Abdu: This stuff comes only from a brother to his brother. This is not for everybody. You have to be a real-man (*gada`*) to be able to appreciate it!⁷¹⁰ [*Norms, Cues*]

Col.: Aren't they all men?

Abdu: Most of them are women with moustaches. You know! Real men are all gone. There is only the straw [now remaining].

Col.: Yesterday I was talking to M[...] el-Muslimani ...

Abdu: [interrupts] Muslimani who! He is useless!⁷¹¹ His father was a Christian and became a Moslem. This is why he is called el-Muslimani. He is not a man to sit with!

Col.: Whom do you consider your real friends now?

Abdu: Nobody except Ata.

⁷¹⁰ A private recording session with Abdu proved him to be a gold-mine of folksongs.

⁷¹¹ *daldâl*, lit.: something which 'dangles down,' with no visible use; a 'yes'-man.

ANALYSIS OF CASE 2

Stimulus-Response Formula

1. **Positive:** The mechanism involved in the first Operant's Folkloric Response (S.OFR1) is:

Drive: Explaining the necessity of returning to Egypt.

Cues: Nature of Material.
Presence of two educated persons.
All Egyptians, speaking the same language. Expectancy for reward.

Response: Semi-classic poem.

Reward: Achievement of goal: Praise from Col.

This formula, which is basically: social drive - convenient cues -folkloric response, expectancy for reward - reward, applies to the following responses:

P.IFR2, S.OFR3 (+ Negative reward), P.OFR5, S.OFR6, J.OFR8 - OR9 - OR10 - OFR11, J.OFR13, J.OFR14 - OFR15 -OR16, J.OFR17 - OFR18, Sb.IFR20 - OFR22, IR24, S.OFR28, S.OFR28 (+ Inhibition), P.OFR29, P.OFR30 - OFR32, P.OFR31, P.OFR33, P.OFR34, P.OFR35.*

2. **Negative:** The mechanism involved in the Informant's fourth Negative Response, INR4, is:

Stimulus: Request from Col.

Cues: Nature of material requested.
Presence of 'inferior' employees; being the boss.
Expected reward not desirable.

Response: Refusal.

Reward: Escape from anxiety.

* Abbreviations are provided in the following order: Genre - type of response - and number of response in the interview. Independent responses are separated by a comma (,), while related responses are separated by a dash (-). See *ante*, page 129.

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This formula, which is basically: social stimulus - adverse cues - negative response in expectancy of reward - escape from anxiety as reward, applies to the following responses:

INR7, ONR12, ONR23, INR25, and ONR27.

Inhibition

There are four different readily identifiable instances of inhibitory response:

1. Mr. T. Saber, who had contact with "these sailors" only when I was present and avoided them whenever possible, displayed an inhibitory response in refusing to tell a joke (INR7). He knew many jokes, which he reserved for telling to other students in his age-group and social class.⁷¹²

2. Texas's 'telling of a joke' (OFR13) was inhibited by the presence of Mr. Saber, whom he knew only on formal basis. Texas considered his own obscene joke a threat to his social status with Saber. Mr. Saber's assurance that he would accept the joke as long as it was good removed the adverse conditions.

3. Ata's presence, because of his adverse comments on Abdu's singing responses, inhibited additional responses. Abdu ceased to proudly sing aloud, and began to murmur or whisper the words (OFR19, OFR21). This inhibitory process climaxed in total failure to recall the songs (OFR28). Four days later, when the conditions were encouraging and the rewards abundant, Abdu was able to remember **sixty-one** songs, some of them very long (150 verses), including songs which he had failed to recall in Ata's presence.

4. The most dramatic case of inhibition involved Ata, and his attitude toward *mawwâls* and jokes. His inhibitory responses (S.INR4, J.ONR12, S.INR25, and S.ONR27) illustrate the transformation he has undergone from an active bearer of folklore to a passive bearer.^{257} Although his companions during the 1964 recording were virtually the same as in 1961--reflecting traditional patterns of behavior (both Abdu and Tulba--who was involved in the 1961 singing session--are cooks). In 1961, singing folksongs and telling jokes were desirable and highly rewarding activities for Ata; he participated in singing-sessions and joking competitions, tried to

⁷¹² His repertoire included Types: 1526C§ (See *ante*, page 149, n. 18); 1534, *Series of Clever Unjust Decisions*; 1861A, *The Greater Bribe*. The recordings from New York are on deposit at IUFTL: N.Y. 61-6ff., Tape no. 112 ff.

excel, made the most comments and laughed the loudest; he also took pride in performing songs of his own composition. In 1961, Ata sang twenty-two songs; he was motivated by M. Mursi's success (Mursi sang folksongs for me and was rewarded for his response). Ata also joined Tulba and Texas in another session yielding twenty-two songs (solo, group, and dialogue); he often had punning duels (*qafya*)⁷¹³ with Texas. In 1964, the situation was very different. His inhibitory responses represented the negative value he recently attached to the traditional behavior (class of responses). Although Ata would still listen to jokes, he would not tell any himself; he rejected singing altogether.

Shortly afterwards, I visited Ata in his new residence--an apartment in Manhattan, located on the same block as his restaurant.⁷¹⁴ In response to my challenge, he had promised: "I'll show you that I didn't really forget." He recited--*but did not sing*--four songs; his expected reward being: proving to me that he has not forgotten. The songs were ones he had performed in 1961, but proved to be shorter because, in spite of his confidence, he had forgotten some stanzas. Instead of singing, he offered to play records on his recently acquired phonograph. Unlike his tape collection in 1961, which featured only Egyptian music and songs, Ata's record collection was more diverse. Beside [art songs by] Abd-el-Wahâb and (Mrs.) 'Omm-Kalsûm,⁷¹⁵ it included recordings of popular-songs by American singers, and one or two classical music works. During the conversation Ata said of his [new] collection, "This is the music of **respectable** (258) **people**. For a high class house, a record-player is a must!"

Clearly, Ata had shifted from Egyptian folk models of behavior⁷¹⁶ to American "upper" class, more "respectable" models, as represented by his American new-"friends": the accountant, the police official, and a neighboring department store manager.

Effect, Behavior potential, and Fraction of Decision

There were two major sources for reward in this interview:

⁷¹³ Mot.: M401, "Cursing match (flying) [contest, duel];" Z86S, "*qâfyah*: males' formulistic satire match (duel)."

⁷¹⁴ Compared to his Brooklyn living quarters, Ata's apartment in Manhattan was well furnished and kept. See *ante*, page 170, n. 9.

⁷¹⁵ Muḥammad `Abd-el-Wahhâb, and (Mrs.) 'Omm-Kulthûm: the foremost singers of popular and art-songs.

⁷¹⁶ As represented by the Alexandrian, urban 'he-man' (*gada` , ibn-balad*).

1. Reward provided by individuals, such as that provided by the Col. for folksongs, that provided by the whole group for jokes, and the reward provided by escape of punishment (Ata's negative comments on songs).

2. Reward provided by the contextual relationship between operant and social and cultural forces, such as the successful use of proverbial expressions in response to social drives for explaining, rationalizing, or determining particular behavior.

Whenever the reward seemed to be greater than the energy required, an individual's behavior potential increased.

1. Ata asks Saber for a joke (INR7)
Cues are adverse for Saber telling a joke
The reward offered by Ata is not valued by Saber
Behavior potential of Saber is minor
Fraction of Decision = Negative
2. Abdu senses the value of the joke to Ata (INR7)
Cues are favorable for joke-telling
The reward offered by the group is valuable to Abdu
Behavior potential of Abdu is major
Fraction of Decision = Positive (OFR8)
3. Ata is asked to tell a joke (ONR12)
Cues are adverse for Ata telling a joke
The reward offered by the group, and the added reward₍₂₅₉₎ offered by Col. are not valuable to Ata
Behavior Potential of Ata is minor
Fraction of Decision = Negative
4. Texas tells a joke (OFR13) and is rewarded
Abdu senses Texas's satisfaction
Abdu starts to tell another joke (OFR14)
Cues are favorable
The reward offered is valued by Abdu
Behavior potential of Abdu is major
Fraction of Decision = Positive (OFR15)
5. Abdu sings songs

Ata punishes him with negative comments
 Cues are adverse
 Reward given by Col. does not equal Ata's punishment
 Behavior potential of Abdu becomes minor
 Fraction of Decision (finally) = Negative (OFR28)

6. Ata's memory is challenged
 Cues are adverse
 Reward offered is not valuable to him
 Behavior potential is minor
 Fraction of Decision = Negative: "Bet against yourself"
7. Ata's memory is challenged
 Cues are neutral, being neither adverse nor favorable
 Reward offered by Col. is valuable to Ata
 Behavior potential is increased to major
 Fraction of Decision = Positive (four songs; no melody)

When the challenge is met, and reward (proof that he had not forgotten) was achieved:

Behavior potential is reduced to minor
 Fraction of Decision = Negative

Models and Positive Identification

1. Abdu identified positively with Saber and emulated ⁽²⁶⁰⁾ his behavior in accounting for "how the atomic bomb is made."

2. Ata ceased to identify with his old *shilla* (clique), and renounced its characteristic behavior--as he perceived it; he replaced the old behavior patterns with those of the new social class which he has adopted [and aspired to join--(also see *ante*, page 170)]. The police official and department store manager, among others, provided the models for behavior in Ata's new social and cultural milieu. Ata's identification with "true Americans"--[who are in positions of authority, and have "the best cars, the best women, the best houses."]-led to his replacing of folksongs, and "mixing with lesser classes and inferior persons" with such tangibles as a phonograph, and some knowledge of American popular and classical music. Rejection of the new Ata by his former [Egyptian] peers did not constitute a punishment of sufficient intensity to force him to return to his prior habits and patterns of behavior.

Thus, in his upward social mobility, Ata's patterns of folkloric behavior are willfully and consistently inhibited; with passage of time, these responses are bound for disappearance through forgetting, or extinction. This very pattern of change is manifested, but perhaps to lesser degrees of consistency and intensity, by other members of the Egyptian community in Brooklyn. The net result: their folklore is a rapidly-vanishing pattern of behavior

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[APPENDIX]
[LIST OF TALE TYPES AND MOTIFS]

LIST OF TALE-TYPES*

Tale-type	Page 1967 / 2010
0327B, <i>The Dwarf and the Giant</i> . [Nuss-Nuṣais, Hdaydûn, etc.].	{138} 194
0328, <i>The Boy Steals the Giant's Treasure</i> . Jack and the Beanstalk.	{138} 194
0402, <i>The Mouse (Cat, Frog, etc.) as Bride</i> . [Three brothers seek wives; youngest marries a she-monkey, (tortoise)].	{207} 150 n.16
0901A§, <i>The Mouse-slayer: Conditioning the Outspoken Bride</i> .	{239} 182 n.39
0901B§, <i>Enlightening the Presumably Innocent (Naive) Bride</i> .	{242} 185 n. 47, 48
1424A§, <i>Seduction by Pretending to Show (Instruct, Teach) Husband How it is Done</i> .	{242} 183 n. 45
1526C§, <i>Eating the Most by Making the Others Talk while Eating</i> . Trickster makes a long story short.	{208} 150 n. 18, {256} 198 n. 87
1534, <i>Series of Clever Unjust Decisions</i> . (cf.)	{256} 198 n.87
1699, <i>Misunderstanding Because of Ignorance of Foreign Language</i> .	{208} 151
1861A, <i>The Greater Bribe</i> .	{256} 198 n.87

LIST OF MOTIFS*

Motif	Page 1967 / 2010
E0275.3§, Murder scene is haunted by ghost of murdered person.	{216} 156 n.20
J0003.1§, ‡Reward stamps in (reinforces, establishes) rewarded responses.	{84} 61
J0003.2§, ‡Punishment stamps out (eliminates) punished responses.	{84} 61
J0030.0.1§, ‡Syllogistic logic: paradigmatic (Gestalt) perception. Inferring judgment in one case on the bases of another.	{171} 124
J0148.0.1§, ‡`Repetition teaches [even] the donkey'.	{151} 107
J0210.3.1§, ‡"[Like] a spittle: if [spat out] upwards [it comes down] on one's face; if [spat out] downwards, [it falls] into one's bosom," i.e., I lose in either case).	181 n.38
J2260, Absurd scientific theories--general.	{235} 178 n.24
M0302.2,-cf. Man's fate written on his skull.	157 n.21

M0401, Cursing match (flyting) [contest, duel].	{258} 199 n.88
N0884.2.1§, Robber (thief) steals from the rich and gives to the poor.	{246} 187
P0001.1.1§, ‡"From father after grandfather" (" <i>ab-an `an gadd</i> ").	189 n.71
P0005.2§, ‡Social connections (friends) as indicator of social status.	{258} 199
P0147.1§, Characteristic behavior of urban community's strongman.	169 n. 4
P0503.7.1§, ‡The power of bribery.	{251} 192 n. 69
P0752.1§, ‡Lower classes imitate upper.	{251} 193, {258} 199
P0752.2§, ‡Lower classes honored by association with upper.	{258} 199
P0785§, ` <i>saghrranah</i> ' (unseemly behavior): committing acts that reduce one's communal standing (worth).	170 n.8, 172 n.12
P0798.1.2§, A foreigner (guest) does not like another foreigner (guest), the native (host) does not like either.	{251} 193 n. 72
U0066,-cf. Every man has his price. [Behavior potential].	{251} 192 n. 68
U0121.0.2.1§, "Upset a jar on its mouth, a daughter turns out like her mother".	{172} 123
U0245§, Empathy: one person (animal) experiences pain or pleasure, another also feels its effects. "Vicarious instigation".	{128} 93
U0246§, Empathetic punishments.	{131} 94
U0246.1.1§, To beat the one who is caught, is to frighten the one who is at large (unbound).	{129} 92
U0249§, Behavior potential: expected effort (trouble) required for performing task, and self-interest, determine whether task will be undertaken.	{91} 67
W0256.2§, Stereotyping: social class.	{126} 92, {251} 193
W0256.4§, Stereotyping: religious traits.	{172} 123
X0420.2§, Jokes on <i>fu'ahâ</i> 's gluttony.	149 n. 18, 194 n. 87
X1915§, Humor based on cross-lingual puns (phonetic similarities between words of different languages); e.g., Arabic: <i>grât</i> (I ran away)--English: great.	{208} 151
Z0070§, ‡Formulas signifying uselessness (being inconsequential, insignificant).	188-89 n.72
Z0086§, <i>qâfyah</i> : males' formulistic satire match (duel).	{258} 199 n.88
Z0087.1§, Women's duel with formulistic insults (<i>radh</i> , <i>tashlîq</i>).	{258} 199 n.88
Z0105§, ‡Shape (form, color) symbolism: association based on similarities of visually perceived properties of object.	{242} 185 n. 47, 48
Z0166.3.2.4§, ‡Limbs (organs; e.g., finger, pinky, toe, nose): penis.	{242} 185
Z0192.2.1§, ‡Symbolism: viper--treacherous female.	{251} 193

* Editorial note:

§: (Section sign) at the end of a number indicates a new motif added by Hasan El-Shamy to the Thompson motif system or a new tale-type added to the Aarne-Thompson tale-type

system. (This replaces the dysfunctional practice of indicating an addition by an asterisk to the left of the number).

‡: (Double dagger) indicates a newer motif developed or added after the publication of El-Shamy, *Folk Traditions of the Arab World* (1995).

Sources:

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