

THE RHETORIC OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS:  
TOWARD A PERSPECTIVE FOR CRITICISM

by

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## Chapter I

### THE RHETORIC OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: "AS IT WAS IN THE BEGINNING. . . . "

For though ours is a godless age, it is the very opposite of irreligious. The true believer is everywhere on the march, and both by converting and antagonizing he is shaping the world in his own image. And whether we are to line up with him or against him, it is well that we should know all we can concerning his nature and potentialities.<sup>1</sup>

## Introduction

Throughout his long existence man has sought to explain his world and his place in it. He has been perplexed since the days of ancient Greece by the notion of permanence and change. In the Twentieth century, the situation is no different. Institutions which have lasted unchanged for centuries have fallen to the onslaught of the new; buildings created as an expression of mankind and of his hopes have been demolished only to be replaced by bronze and glass representations of "progress." There is, in man, this unfathomable and unquenchable dichotomy -- the appeal of tradition and the stable counteracted by the novelty of the new and the changing. The German-born philosopher, Ernst Cassirer, addressed this in his book, An Essay on Man:

We may speak of a tension between stabilization and evolution, between a tendency that leads to fixed and stable forms of life and another tendency to break up this rigid scheme. Man is torn between these two tendencies, one of which seeks to preserve old forms whereas the other strives to produce new ones. There is a ceaseless struggle between tradition and innovation, between reproductive and creative forces.<sup>2</sup>

The only permanence, beyond the cosmos, that man may ever experience is that of change. And, as if to demonstrate the ceaselessness of change, a new philosophy developed during the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuries -- a philosophy predicated upon a "new key" in understanding man. It is, writes Susanne Langer, "not higher sensitivity, not longer memory or even quicker association [that] sets man so far above other animals that he can regard them as denizens of a lower world: no, it is the power of using symbols -- the power of speech -- that makes him lord of the earth."<sup>3</sup>

And it is Cassirer's development of symbols, as a symbolic form, that provides the permanence and change for man's understanding of himself. For Cassirer, the symbol is the product of an interaction between the sensuous -- the sensory, physical world -- and the sense in the terms of meaning, the significance, which the interaction has to the intellect. The sensory data, the perception, interacts with the spirit, the intuition, and produces a form of hyper-image which is made to represent the whole of the experience. And this representative of the whole experience, including the way of acting toward it, is the symbol.

The question of being and knowledge perplexed philosophers for eons; but for Cassirer, the "reality", the "being", becomes subordinate to the symbolic forms through which the reality is experienced:

. . . myth, art, language and science appear as symbols; not in the sense of mere figures which refer to some given reality by means of suggestion and allegorical renderings, but in the sense of forces each of which produces and posits a world

of its own. In these realms the spirit exhibits itself in that inwardly determined dialectic by virtue of which alone there is any reality, any organized and definite Being at all. Thus, the special symbolic forms are not imitations, but organs of reality, since it is solely by their agency that anything real becomes an object of intellectual apprehension, and as such is made visible to us.<sup>4</sup>

There may be a physical reality "out there", but it can only be known through man's symbolic forms. It is the forms which provide the permanence; but it is the changing of the forms and the inherent dialectic within them that produces the change.

The notion of social order is no different. Cassirer maintains that there are tensions among myth which are essentially conservative and defend the old order; yet at the same time there is some change, for the original religion -- as myth must be viewed -- is not present in the entelechial interpretation of religion. There is change and movement toward more encompassing doctrines of the mythic approach. The same is true of the social order. A sociologist, Anthony Oberschall, writes that:

Conflict overcomes the basically conservative tendencies in the social order; it prevents the ossification of institutions and builds pressures for responsiveness and innovation. During mobilization and confrontation, new leaders, organizations, ideas, and programs emerge and grow. . . . So far in history, change has been seldom if ever brought about by implementing a conscious, carefully thought out plan in which the consequences and complex ramifications of social action are correctly spelled out in advance and compensating corrections and modification are incorporated into the design. Change occurs rather as a response to cumulative pressures and social forces whose result benefits some groups while it creates misery and hardship for others. After a

period of social conflict, the imbalances are redressed somewhat, but newer processes of change, equally poorly designed, are initiated and call forth yet further conflicts.<sup>5</sup>

It is this notion of society in conflict which makes the study of social movements important. None can deny the impact of social movements upon the lives of the people who inhabit a given society which has experienced a collective movement for change. The values which guide our existence were shaped by a religious movement centuries ago; the institutions which govern us are the products of a movement against the policies of an English King; and the policies which consume tremendous amounts of national resources are designed to combat the fulfillment of a movement which gained its expression through Marx, Lenin, and others. The importance of social movements which succeed cannot be denied; and the very success of some provides a rationale for others to attempt to change the world in which they, and we, live.

This is not to say that social movements are entities which can be easily defined; instead, there "are challenging, often daunting, empirical and methodological problems: identifying the political goals, principles or ideologies predominant in a given movement at a given time; deciding which leaders and ideas are in control . . . ." <sup>6</sup> But we cannot permit difficulties such as these to obstruct man in his search for learning and understanding. There is something in man's nature which demands that he seek understanding; it is, in fact, this constant search which provides the

ultimate meaning for the existence of Cassirer's functional forms of culture. Man must seek to understand himself; and he can only do so through his artifacts as they are symbolically interpreted.

This means that, given the existence of different symbolic forms, there will also be different methods of perspectives of attempting to understand. And, we will agree with Julien Freund that "No one can say a priori that some one procedure per se is better than another; everything depends on the scientist's [we would prefer "critic's"] perspicacity, the aim of his research and his skill in applying the particular procedure, so that its validity can be determined only retrospectively, in the light of the results obtained."<sup>7</sup> There is no universal method of study, for it depends upon the act to be studied and the perspective of the critic. Attempts to understand the phenomenon of social movements have been made from the perspectives of the sociologist, the psychologist, the psychoanalyst and many others. But, recently, embodying the principle of symbol -- of the new key -- a rhetorical approach to movements has also arisen. The pervasiveness of this new key is all-encompassing. It is not only the philosopher who is enamored by it; but the sociologist also recognizes its importance. Robert A. Nisbet writes:

It is language, spoken and written, above any other symbolic element that makes human culture possible. And it is language alone that makes possible the development of the human mind, the sense of self, the consciousness of personal identity, and that very fundamental capacity, unique in mankind, of being able to adopt one or more of the social roles that confront

each newborn infant in human society. Verbal language is by far the most important of all forms of symbolic communication, but it is not the only form. Music, painting, sculpture, and physical mannerisms such as the raising of an eyebrow . . . are also modes of symbolic interaction.<sup>8</sup>

Cassirer posits that there are certain forms of culture and that each of these may receive greater emphasis. Every function of the human spirit embodies a creative, formative power; and each of these functions (art, myth, language, science, and history) "creates its own symbolic forms which, if not similar to the intellectual symbols, enjoy equal rank as products of the human spirit. None of these forms can be reduced to, or derived from, the others; each of them designates a particular approach, in which and through which it constitutes its own aspect of 'reality.'"<sup>9</sup> Each of them provides, as it were, an occupational psychosis or a terministic screen; and the importance of this perspective cannot be overemphasized in its impact upon man. However, the inherent difficulty with each of these as a form of knowing is that each comes to believe in its own preeminence. The artist argues that his reality is "more real" than the scientist's, who in turn hypothesizes that his is more valid than the theologian's. What Cassirer hoped to achieve was a more universal approach, which could encompass each of the different perspectives and the dialectical tensions between and within them. He found it in the symbolic forms:

. . . a standpoint which would make it possible to encompass the whole of them in one view, which would seek to penetrate nothing other than the purely innaten relation of all these forms to one another,

and not their relation to any external "transcendent" being or principle. Then we could have a systematic philosophy of human culture in which each particular form would take its meaning solely from the place in which it stands, a system in which the content and significance of each form would be characterized by the richness and specific quality of the relations and concatenations in which it stands with other spiritual energies and ultimately with totality.<sup>10</sup>

Thus, the nature of the symbolic forms is such that it is only through the interrelations of the others individually that the entirety, or the totality, of culture can be perceived and understood.

We would submit that the situation with social movements is analogous. It is not through a purely sociological, nor through a purely psychological-psychoanalytic approach that social movements are able to be understood. Even, we would submit, it is not purely through rhetoric or only "symbolic" means that movements reveal their secrets. It is, rather, only through a combination, a series of relations between and among them, that we are capable of examining social movements productively. It is, however, through language -- or, in a somewhat broader sense, through rhetoric as purposive symbolism -- that we are able to draw these diverse elements together. Movements change man's life; and he must make choices relative to them. For this reason, he must understand them; and it is through the interpenetration of social, psychological-psychoanalytic and rhetorical perspectives that man can best accomplish this. It is this interrelationship and the role of the rhetorical critic toward it that we shall pursue in the following pages.

### Resources for the Study

In conducting this inquiry into a perspective of rhetorical criticism of social movements, reliance will rest primarily upon secondary sources. Disciplinary journals, books and convention papers in the fields of sociology, psychology, psychoanalysis and rhetoric and rhetorical criticism will be examined. Such materials will cover a wide temporal range with emphasis given to early and seminal writings, to major theoretical approaches and to later refinements and modifications.

### Limitations of the Study

No study of an area as broad as the role of rhetorical criticism and social movements can be covered adequately in one small effort. In this study we make an attempt only to inquire into the broad nature of movements as viewed from the sociological and psychological-psychoanalytic perspectives. In each instance, the role and importance of rhetoric is examined. Such a study, however, can neither list nor critically examine all approaches from each of the disciplines considered. We cannot fully develop, for example, the controversy surrounding Freudian psychoanalysis. All we can do is briefly present the major assumptions and theoretical statements and consider the major modifications of them. It is these and the influence upon the movement and its rhetoric that we shall examine. Additionally, we cannot fully explore any particular movement nor any combination in the hopes of proving the efficacy of our interpretation of a theoretical approach to the study



of social movements. To do so would be to expand the bounds of this study beyond all reasonable limits. Rather, we shall seek to consider some major controversies in the criticism of movements and to reflect briefly upon them as they affect the rhetorical critic. We shall, then, assume a position . and argue for it. It must be understood that this method may not necessarily be productive for each and every movement study; it is, rather, a tentative consideration of a unification of the "forms" of movements so that we may understand them in their entirety.

### Organization of the Study

The organization of this effort will proceed from a general consideration of the nature of social movements to a position statement regarding the overall perspective, and the necessity of such, and the role of the rhetorical critic and his responsibilities toward this phenomenon.

I. The Rhetoric of Social Movements: "As It Was in the Beginning. . . ." This chapter considers a broad philosophical consideration of the concept of man's capacity and means of knowing; of the importance of social movements and of details of the study necessary for placing it in perspective.

II. The Nature of Social Movements. This chapter reviews the importance of social movements to the societies in which they occur and the implications for mankind. Historical and philosophical foundations of the study of

movements are provided which indicate the development of studies of movements from the French Revolution to the present and of the impact upon movements of differing schools of philosophical thought. Social movements are then defined from a sociological perspective; and the implications of sociological, psychological and rhetorical approaches to the study of movements are presented. Finally, the characteristics of movements -- source of strain, ideology, membership, leadership, organization and social control -- are considered.

III. Rhetoric, Criticism, and Social Movements. This chapter advances a definition of rhetoric and contrasts more traditional conceptualizations of the term with that advanced in this study. The development of rhetorical criticism and the duties and responsibilities of the critic are briefly examined; and the application of these to social movements as exemplified in recent publications is considered.

IV. Rhetoric and the Social Aspects of Movements. The application of traditional and modified sociological thought to the study of social movements is pursued in this chapter. General approaches to social change as advanced by four major sociological theories are considered; and an application of the characteristics of movements and the rhetorical implications of such characteristics are also presented.

V. Rhetoric and the Psychological-Psychoanalytic Aspects of Movements. In this chapter, the "traditional" view of movements is presented which considers such manifestations of

popular action as "deviant" and "abnormal." After arguing against such a perspective, the investigation of psychological constructs and the application of them to the study of movements is made. Following this, the psychoanalytic approach is considered relying largely upon Sigmund Freud's theories and modifications of them. Again, as in the chapter preceding, the integrative function of rhetoric as a centripetal force is considered.

VI. ". . . And So Shall It Be in the End." This concluding chapter attempts to draw the diverse threads of this study together. The study of social movements is viewed from the perspective that only by the "interpenetration" of the various individual approaches can we attempt to fully reveal the implications of movements. The final section of this study considers the responsibility of the rhetorical critic as a member of the larger society of mankind. He is not merely operating in the role of the critic, but is bound by the larger, and more important role of a participant in the human experience.

Notes

- <sup>1</sup>Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (New York: Perennial Library Edition, 1966), p. x-xi.
- <sup>2</sup>Ernst Cassirer, An Essay On Man (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1970), p. 247. Originally published by Yale University Press, 1944.
- <sup>3</sup>Susanne K. Langer, Philosophy In a New Key (New York: A Mentor Book, 1951), p. 33.
- <sup>4</sup>Ernst Cassirer, Language and Myth, Translated by Susanne K. Langer (New York: Dover Publications, 1946), p. 8.
- <sup>5</sup>Anthony Oberschall, Social Conflict and Social Movements (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 344-345.
- <sup>6</sup>Paul Wilkinson, Social Movement (London: Pall Mall, 1971), pp. 104-105.
- <sup>7</sup>Julien Freund, The Sociology of Max Weber (New York: Pantheon Books, 1968), p. 40.
- <sup>8</sup>Robert A. Nisbet, The Social Bond (New York: Knopf, 1970), pp. 58-59.
- <sup>9</sup>Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Volume I: Language, Translated by Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), p. 78.
- <sup>10</sup>Ibid, p. 82.

## Chapter II

### THE NATURE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

For three hundred years, the Church of England has had in its litany this supplication: 'From famine, from battle and murder and from sudden death, from all seditions, privy conspiracy and rebellion, Good Lord deliver us.'<sup>1</sup>

#### Introduction

During the hectic decade of the 1960's, America broadcast the image of a nation in danger of being torn asunder by internal dissension. Protest, demonstration and riot became commonplace as various groups attempted to influence or alter the policy decisions of various institutionalized authorities -- be they universities, businesses or governments. More than isolated violent expressions of sentiment, however, Paul Wilkinson notes that these groups identified themselves as participants in "the Movement," and as presenting demands for justice, equality and humanity:

Parties and groups of every ideological persuasion claim proudly to be part of a national or international 'movement', claim to have the support of their own youth movements, women's movements, labour movements, peasant movements. In recent years among student protesters, peace campaigners, anti-Vietnam War groups and civil rights crusade, the rhetoric of 'movement' has maintained its irresistible and universal appeal.<sup>2</sup>

As students of rhetoric, we must first gain some insight into the nature of social movements before we can begin to understand this "irresistible and universal appeal."

It is this framework -- within which we shall seek a more detailed investigation -- which shall be examined in this chapter.

### The Function of Social Movements

Most individuals probably maintain negative predispositions toward social movements. While admitting that an occasional movement will provide some benefit, one easily envisions some undisciplined mob intent on destroying the stability and institutions of society. Just as many no longer consider the American Revolution (euphemistically entitled the War of Independence) as falling within the purview of revolution, so too do many consider "good" social movements as distinct from the genre of social movement. And yet, despite these preconceptions -- and the fears of the Church of England -- social conflict and social movements perform valuable services to society. An early sociologist, George Simmel, wrote that "conflict is a form of socialization."<sup>3</sup> The conclusion from such analysis is that no group, nor any society, can function without disharmony for it would then be without incentive to change or even to maintain itself. Lewis Coser is quite precise when he states, "Groups require disharmony as well as harmony, dissociation as well as association; and conflicts within them are by no means altogether disruptive factors. Group formation is the result of both types of processes."<sup>4</sup> Such an analysis does not posit that all change, especially continual or drastic change, is of itself beneficial for a given society at a given time.

What it does contend is that there are times and situations in which values and norms must change if society is to survive. It is during such times as these, and when the majority of society either refuses to recognize the necessity for change or else refuses to make change of the magnitude required, that adjustments must be achieved by "concerted action of other groups -- in other words, by a social movement."<sup>5</sup>

The primary thrust of any social movement is a change of some sort, of varying degrees of magnitude and intensity, in the prevailing social order. While by no means an exhaustive listing, social movements may perform several functions in society: movements may change the entire nature of the society -- as in the Russian Revolution of 1917; "movements can frequently change the ideology of a society without greatly affecting the substructure or even the social structure"<sup>6</sup> -- e.g., the impact of the Women's Christian Temperance Union on American society during the early part of the twentieth century resulting in the passage of Prohibition; movements may change institutions "associated with but not central to the class structure" -- for example, working conditions and welfare reforms.<sup>7</sup> Additional functions of movements may be less obvious but no less important: the contribution to the formation of public opinion by bringing issues to the fore of public discussion; and by providing training for potential leaders in both public and private institutions of society.<sup>8</sup> This again is not to maintain that

all social movement is beneficial (for as Eric Hoffer has written, "No mass movement, however sublime its faith and worthy its purpose, can be good if its active phase is overlong, and, particularly, if it is continued after the movement is in undisputed possession of power.")<sup>9</sup>, but it is to emphasize that such movements need not be detrimental and may, in fact, be necessary for the very survival of society.

#### The Study of Social Movements: Historical Foundations

As with the study of any phenomenon, that of social movements has a discernible and progressive tradition. The violent and dramatic events of the French Revolution stirred inquiries into the nature of collective behavior. Continental scholars attempted to discover how and why these occurrences were created and published studies of crowd behavior. Across the Channel William Cobbett commented on the disorders among English poor in 1812: "'This is the circumstance that will most puzzle the ministry. They can find no agitators. It is a movement of the peoples' own.'"<sup>10</sup> At this point the primary emphasis was upon collective behavior. The pioneer effort to establish a scientific conceptualization of social movements and to develop a theory of social change was made by the German Lorenz von Stein writing his History of the Social Movement in France, 1789-1850, first published in 1850. Wilkinson maintains that "instead of surveying the French Revolution and its aftermath from the point of view of changes in governmental structure or personnel, Stein stressed its significance as a series of endeavors to create a new



society."<sup>11</sup> It was in Stein's work that the original meaning of the term "social movement" emerged: "the movement of the new industrial working class, with its socialistic, communistic and anarchistic tendencies."<sup>12</sup> From this conceptualization, social writers and commentators discussed the social movement. In somewhat the same line of analysis, Ferdinand Tonnies, another German, made the distinction between a social organization and a social collective. The former is a "corporate body which is pure artifact and which 'is never anything natural, neither can it be understood as a mere physical phenomenon'";<sup>13</sup> whereas social collectives are natural creations which display certain physical traits. In what was an important insight, Tonnies held that the substance of these social collectives was their "natural and psychological relationships." Tonnies further recognized that collectives were "consciously affirmed and willed."<sup>14</sup>

After Tonnies, other writers began to explore and to speculate about the nature of social collectives -- Durkheim, Marx, Weber, and so on. Social movements received occasional scholarly glances from the end of the nineteenth century until the mid-1930's. With the rise of Fascistic movements and their phenomenal successes in Japan, Italy and Germany, a new fascination developed in the rise and consequences of social movements. Studies of totalitarianism, especially Nazism, resulted in formulations that have often been applied to other, widely divergent movements. In recent years, scholars from various fields have branched out to examine a

variety of movements -- from vital to miniscule, from totalitarian to anarchistic.

### The Philosophical Foundations of Social Movements

The rise of social movements is a relatively recent occurrence -- being largely exhibited, at least until just recently, only in Western cultures during the last two hundred years. The primary stimulus was the removal of divine perspective from the thought of eighteenth century man. Rudolf Heberle explains:

Movements aiming consciously at a radically different social order, a 'change from the roots,' are possible only when the social order is seen not as a divine creation but as a work of man, subject to man's will. Movements of this kind are concomitant with the secularization of thought. This is why such movements have occurred in the West only since the eighteenth century and in the East quite recently as a consequence of cultural contact with the West. Earlier revolts and disturbances among the lower social strata typically aimed at improving their social position without attacking the social order in its foundations. Radical movements of earlier periods tended to assume the character of millenarian religious or quasi-religious sects.<sup>15</sup>

Perhaps the foundations of a philosophic rationale for social movements can be found in Rousseau's contrat social. For, as Paul Wilkinson has written, ". . . there is an implicit and appealing revolutionism underlying the whole conception of contrat social."<sup>16</sup> Rousseau maintains that the "general will" remains hidden beneath the strains of the old regime; and that when it is identified and understood by the leaders of the revolutionary movement (the rise of the movement) such sentiment must be transported to the

throne of power (the revolutionary seizure of power). Concurrent with the rise to power, the counterrevolutionaries must be destroyed. Having seized power and eliminated social and political opposition, the revolutionary will commence the "creation of a revolutionary kind of man, and the final ushering in of the new millenium."<sup>17</sup> The pervasiveness of Rousseau's doctrine of the social contract may be inferred from the wide-spread use made of the "right of revolution" and the "legitimate supremacy of the popular will" in "practically every secular, reformist or revolutionary ideology, and every Western politicized movement, in the past two hundred years."<sup>18</sup>

Not only did Rousseau provide a philosophic base for the existence and justification of social movement as a revolutionary force, but in his description of the archetypal revolution, he provided what may have been a self-fulfilling prophecy. Such an analysis provides the basis upon which many "natural history" approaches to social movement study rests.

If Rousseau provided the philosophical rationale and justification for political and revolutionary movements, Karl Marx -- drawing heavily upon the philosophy of Hegel -- offered a simple explanation of social conditions to the emerging class of workers in Europe. Wilkinson explains the Marxian approach:

The historical movement does not proceed from an entirely incomprehensible and random manner, but rather by a series of organic evolutionary stages. Each stage is ushered in by a fresh revolution in the modes and social relations of production which

can be causally explained as dialectic response to the changes in the real material conditions and class antagonism of the society. This pattern of response-reaction-response takes the form of thesis, (movement), antithesis, (counter-movement), and synthesis, (the fusion or reconciliation of thesis and antithesis).<sup>19</sup>

For the wage earner struggling with the capitalist who exploited his labor and coerced him to live in unsatisfactory conditions, the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engles offered a clear and attractive explanation of the past, present and future conditions of society. What was even better, the proletariat was to emerge on top because of the inherent contradictions within the capitalist system. ". . . the overthrow of the capitalist exploiting class, their ruling class ideology and their power structure, did not entail a retrogression in the technology or the loss of the social benefits of the capitalist method of production."<sup>20</sup>

Relying largely upon these two philosophical approaches, Ralph Turner posited that there have existed two major themes of social movement during the past two hundred years: the liberal humanitarian tradition and the socialist. Each of these depends upon the provision of certain needs to the masses. In the first, the liberal humanitarian, movements were primarily concerned with guaranteeing political participation; in the second, the socialist, with providing the essential economic necessities. What is particularly interesting about Turner's position is his understanding of the theme -- of contemporary and future social movements. The new rallying call is man's search for value:

a new revision is in the making and is increasingly giving direction to the disturbances of our own era. This new conception is reflected in a new object for indignation. Today, for the first time in history, it is common to see violent indignation expressed over the fact that people lack a sense of personal worth -- that they lack an inner peace of mind which comes from a sense of personal dignity or a clear sense of identity. . . .The idea that a man who does not feel worthy and who cannot find his proper place in life is to be pitied is an old one. The notion that he is indeed a victim of injustice is the new idea. The urgent demand that the institutions of our society be reformed, not primarily to grant man freedom of speech and thought, and not primarily to ensure him essential comforts, but to guarantee him a sense of personal worth is the new and recurrent theme in contemporary society.<sup>21</sup>

This new search for dignity, for worth, arises from the existentialist philosophers. "Existentialism focuses on the problem of man's alienation, on the problem of man's existence and the dilemma of his efforts to uncover a viable sense of self."<sup>22</sup>

Whether one agrees with Turner or not, and probably no substantive evaluation can be made until movements have emerged, the philosophic foundations provide an additional means by which the student may "place" the social movement.

#### A Definition of Social Movement

Thus far, we have been discussing social movements and their study as if all were familiar with the term. To continue without attempting to pin down the phenomena which we are studying would be to commit a serious error. In preceding sections we have used the term to denote specific attempts at social change and large, more societal occurrences.

If we accept the admonition that "social movements are not particularly precise units of analysis,"<sup>23</sup> we may nevertheless recognize that the boundaries of that animal which we seek should be identified as clearly as possible.

We have stated earlier that change is inevitable in virtually any society. We may now maintain that, very broadly, collective behavior is an important factor in this change. The very existence of collective behavior is probably not a sufficient condition for change to occur within a society or culture; but it may provide "the major vehicle of change when contact between diverse cultures or development within the culture supply novel values about which collective behavior can become focused."<sup>25</sup> In the broadest sense of the term, Herbert Blumer defines collective behavior as:

the behavior of two or more individuals who are acting together, or collectively. Each is under the influence of the other and fits his line of action to that other. Behavior is collective or concerted as opposed to a mere addition of the separate lines of individual activity.<sup>26</sup>

A more formalized definition is provided by Neil Smelser -- collective behavior is "an institutionalized mobilization for action in order to modify one or more kinds of strain on the basis of a generalized reconstitution of a component of action."<sup>27</sup>

Within both these definitions are found the components of multi-individual action directed against some strain in concert with others sharing similar beliefs. Included as

examples of such behavior would be riots, mobs, fads, and social movements. A social movement, however, is not merely collective behavior even though there is varying interpretation as to just what it is. The following definitions will provide some insight to how social movements have been conceptualized:

- (1) As a mode of pluralistic behavior, it [social movement] belongs to a general class of social phenomena which includes mob actions, booms, crazes, panics, revolutions and so forth. As a sub-class, a social movement is circumscribed by pluralistic behavior functioning as an organized mass-effort directed toward a change of established folkways or institutions.<sup>28</sup>
- (2) A social movement occurs when a fairly large number of people band together in order to alter or supplant some portion of the existing culture or social order.<sup>29</sup>
- (3) . . . collective enterprises to establish a new order of life. They have their inception in a condition of unrest, and derive their motive power on one hand from dissatisfaction with the current form of life, and on the other from wishes and hopes for a new scheme of system of living.<sup>30</sup>
- (4) . . . an attempt on the part of interest groups to change some of the existing social practises [sic] in a society, or to bring about a new way of life; . . . a widespread, but not consciously organized nor coordinated trend in social conduct or in the ways of thinking which seems to be developing in a certain direction.<sup>31</sup>
- (5) . . . large-scale, widespread, and continuing, elementary collective action in pursuit of an objective that affects and shapes the social order in some fundamental aspect.<sup>32</sup>
- (6) . . . a concerted and continued effort by a social group aimed at reaching a goal (or goals) common to its members. More specifically, the effort is directed at modifying, maintaining, replacing or destroying an existing social institution.<sup>33</sup>

- (7) . . . a purposive and collective attempt of a number of people to change individuals, or societal institutions and structures.<sup>34</sup>
- (8) . . . a set of attitudes and self-conscious action on the part of a group of people directed toward change in the social structure and/or ideology of a society and carried on outside of ideologically legitimated channels or which . uses these channels in innovative ways.<sup>35</sup>
- (9) . . . socially shared demands for change in some aspect of the social order.<sup>36</sup>
- (10) . . . emergent ideological realities given social significance during periods of a consciousness of dysfunction, which provide referents for mobilization to being about desired change within and/or of the social system.<sup>37</sup>

This listing of definitions indicates that although there is some broad, general agreement to what constitutes a social movement, there is not agreement concerning its most salient characteristics. What does seem to emerge from this composite is that social movements are a form of collective action directed toward some change in society -- be it institutional, customary, ideological or whatever -- which exists over time and arises out of some dissatisfaction with the present or some hope of the future. Another important consideration is that the social movement is comprised of a voluntary membership. It is ideology that provides both the enemy and the salvation which guides the movement along some path.

With this conceptualization of a social movement, perhaps the boundaries may be more clearly drawn by stressing what a social movement is not. First, it is not merely crowd action. The notion of duration eliminates from consideration such short-term, spontaneous outbursts of collective action as



riots, lynchings, demonstrations, etc. It is possible that such volatile crowd actions may compose a part of the movement or may even arise as a result of such actions (as "when the Jacobins made use of the Paris crowds, . . . , when the communards played on the grievances of the Paris National Guard, or when the Bolsheviks helped to foment and unleash the frustration of demoralized Russian troops in the 1917 revolution");<sup>38</sup> but it would be incorrect to conclude that such transitory collective action can masquerade as social movements.

Second, social movement is not mass migration or fad. In mass migrations the motives for action remain entirely individual with no group consciousness whereas social movements involve volitional action on the part of the individual within the context of a group. Demographic movements (or mass movements) "are not synonymous with social movements. They do not involve attempts to change society; they are responses to external 'pushes' or 'pulls' and do not have an internal dynamic of ideology . . . "<sup>39</sup> Thus, although the implications of mass or demographic movements for society may be great, they are not the same as social movements.

A social movement is not the same as an institution. The notion of institution implies established, prescribed and normative practices which operate within the social order as it now exists; social movements consistently attempt in varying degrees to alter this existing order in some way.' As a result, depending upon the degree to which the social movement threatens the foundations of the institutions, the

movement will operate outside of the established channels.<sup>40</sup> Additionally, if we grant that the fundamental purpose is to change the institutions via their structure or ideology, we must also exclude "palace revolutions" and coup d'etats as well. Both seek not to change the structure, nor to alter the existing power relationships with society, but merely to secure specific personnel changes.<sup>41</sup> When, however, the seizure of control is the culmination of a longer, more fundamental change in society or permits such a change to occur, it is possible that the coup d'etat may prove an integral component of the overall social movement.

Fourth, although we have maintained that social movements are composed of a membership making voluntary choices as to association, a social movement is more than an association. Associations tend to operate within the normative structures of the existing social order: ". . . the Parent-Teacher Association, the National Association of Manufacturers . . . cannot be classed as social movements, unless, of course, they were to challenge the existing normative and structural order."<sup>42</sup> In a similar vein, Gladys and Kurt Lang note that organizations usually confine their activities to

the joint pursuit of interests that members as individuals have in common and that constitute the reason for forming the organization in the first place. . . . Sometimes, when it furthers the aims of the association, mass support is carefully elicited, but it is never permitted to dominate the organization. Hence, established political parties, though forced to appeal to the mass of voters at election time, are not social movements.<sup>43</sup>

If an association finds that its legitimate attempts to influence policy decisions within the area of interest are frustrated for one reason or another, it may well "start to spread the gospel" and become the core around which a social movement may emerge.

One important aspect of the existence of social movements not yet specifically discussed is the matter of size or numbers. It shall be the position of this study that while members may be an important consideration in achieving the goals of the movement and even as an estimation of its importance, the true significance of any social movement will depend more upon the acceptability of the movement's ideology within the framework of society at large. Paul Wilkinson, expressing some criticism of the "numbers approach," wrote the following: "The assumption that 'numbers count' is in harmony with recent fashions in quantification in the social sciences and humanities. Some find it reassuring to have something concrete to measure and upon which to found explanations. However, the belief that 'you cannot argue with numbers' has never convinced the leaders or followers of movements."<sup>44</sup>

#### A Perspective of Social Movements

It may have become obvious in the previous section that most of the definitions and analyses of social movement relied upon came from sociologists. While this does not reflect any enshrinement of the sociologist, it does place an emphasis on social movements which shall heavily influence

how we view and how we shall study them. Even in this discipline -- e.g., sociology -- recognition is granted to the observation that one sees that which he is looking for. We are told by Gary Bush and R. Serge Denisoff, for instance, that when "sociologists look at social movements, they do so in terms of certain implicit conceptual frameworks. These are part of the conventional wisdom of the discipline and may be traced to the sociological trinity -- Durkheim, Marx and Weber."<sup>45</sup> As a result, most views of social movements center on three concepts: social disorganization, class, and status. Much of the early work (early in terms of pre-1950's) was performed by social and abnormal psychologists which may help to explain why collective behavior is often typified as congregations of the "frustrated" and "maladjusted."

Generally speaking, most studies of social movements have been from one of three perspectives: first, "the analysis of groups and other social structures that defines situations for individuals"; second, a psychological approach which explains "recruitment to movements" and "an examination of cognitive structures and the patterning of meaning in every day life."<sup>46</sup> Third, relying largely upon the Rousseau model, a natural history approach to discern certain sequential patterns.<sup>47</sup> These varying types of analysis have been performed by the sociologist, the psychologist and the historian. The sociologist attempts to define the movement in terms of dysfunction, alienation, class struggles, role and norms; whereas the psychologist defines them in terms of

the participant's cognitive structuring of the environment or in psychoanalytic terms. Neither of these is sufficient for a complete understanding of social movements; but, according to Neil Smelser, each is vital for a complete understanding:

A social role may integrate many of an individual's drives, skill, attitudes, and defenses; an individual's motivational predispositions determine in large part whether a system of roles (e.g., a network of friendship) will persist or not; a social role (for example, that of a parent) may be internalized to become part of a child's personality.<sup>48</sup>

Thus, both the sociologist and the psychologist/psychoanalyst make vital contributions to our understanding of the social movement.

In addition, the historian adds to the wealth of knowledge concerning movements. It is through the historian's concern with documents, spokesmen and events that we are able to better understand the forces shaping social and psychological determinants and their implications. In developing his analysis, the historian relies heavily on the case study method and often follows the temporal progression through the natural history approach.

In recent years, a fairly heavy indictment of attempting to define and study social movements from only one perspective has occurred. Sociologists have indicted historians: "a specific case under study is all too frequently viewed as an isolated phenomenon. Investigations limited to the consideration of a given movement tend to ignore other more important aspects of general theory"; and "a related difficulty

of the case study is that the phenomenon being investigated may not be representative of the class of phenomena under which it is subsumed."<sup>49</sup> Sociologists themselves have been criticized: "Even if a listing of social conditions could provide a degree of discrimination between participants and nonparticipants, it would do little to explain the different types of participation."<sup>50</sup> And even psychologists have been on the receiving end: " . . . shifting allegiances in radical movements may be attributed more to the external effects of history and to ideology than to psychological quirks."<sup>51</sup> What seems to emerge from this competition among disciplines is the bulldog-gripping, holding on to an area where the given discipline perceives itself as having an important contribution to make while contending that other disciplines do not "have the answer" -- even though reluctantly admitting that others may provide some insight which clarifies or deepens the original concept.

In somewhat the same line, an effort has been made in recent years to define movements in terms of rhetorical evaluations. As a result, traditional perspectives have been criticized. Rhetorical critics fault the historian because he can provide no more than a historical definition of the phenomenon. In a seminal essay on the rhetorical study of social movements, Leland M. Griffin posited that the "student's task is to isolate the rhetorical movement within the matrix of the historical movement . . ."<sup>52</sup> Griffin posited three periods of the rhetorical movement which corresponded quite

closely with the typing of Rousseau. Later rhetorical critics objected to such advice because it "would appear to place an extra burden on the rhetorical critic to distinguish between that part of the movement which is historical and that part which is his special province, the rhetorical."<sup>53</sup> Other objections to the historical approach in terms of its utility to the rhetorical critic are that: (1) "it is too confining. We are not only limited to past human interactions, but we should wait for a complete cycle of the interaction to take place before it can be recognized as the act in question."<sup>54</sup> (2) ". . . the lineal interactions necessary to the movement are not sufficiently distinct in quality or degree to permit us to isolate the movement from other human interactions occurring at the same time."<sup>55</sup> Finally, perhaps the unkindest cut of all was delivered by Robert Cathcart:

When historians tell us that a movement has taken place they usually do so by identifying the important documents, spokesmen, and events associated with the movement. As rhetoricians we then proceed to analyze these documents and the spokesmen believing that we will encompass the movement. This type of criticism turns out to be much like traditional speaker-speech analysis.<sup>56</sup>

One cannot help but wonder after examining these indictments whether they are criticisms of the historian and his method of analyzing social movements or an indictment of the failures on the part of rhetorical critics themselves for not using the historical data when applicable and then delving into uncharted waters on their own initiative.

Much the same criticism may be leveled at the rhetorician's complaints about the social scientist. Dan Hahn and Ruth Gonchar note that "Sociologists assume that social movements are found in certain demographic pockets (youth, poor, black, etc.) because these people have similar experiences. This is one explanation -- but it is also possible that movements are located in communication pockets or networks."<sup>57</sup> Granted, but most sociologists would recognize the importance of communication networks as vital to the spread of the movement. Yet one wonders if the networks exist because of sociological and/or psychological considerations such as similar cognitions of the environment in which they function and similar belief systems.

But more important (and more vague) condemnations have been levelled by such critics as Cathcart:

Besides being too general and imprecise, the definitions of social movements utilized by the social scientists are misleading in a way which is detrimental to the work of the rhetorical critic of movements. The social psychologists usually look at collective behavior in contrast to individual behavior rather than contrasting certain collective behaviors with larger societal behaviors. They tend not to be as concerned with those collective behaviors which vary in relationship to the established social system. It is, however, precisely this latter relationship -- and not the relationship between one individual and the group -- that concerns the rhetorical critic of social movements.

The social scientists tend . . . to overlook or neglect the dynamic quality of the larger social system, or what is sometimes called the evolving status quo. When they talk of collective behavior organized to produce change, they are often describing the status quo rather than a social or a political movement.<sup>58</sup>



Besides such indictments being themselves "too general and imprecise," one need only refer to the sociological constructs and those of the psychologist presented later in this study to indicate that, indeed, it is the comparison of collective behavior with that of a larger, institutionalized, society that provides much of the study of social movements. Comparisons are made of the psychological characteristics of groups of individuals found in particular types of social movements as opposed to other groupings of collective behavior and of the general cognitions of society as a whole. The sociologist emphasizes the importance of the ideology of a given movement and its appeals to certain social groupings as opposed to others. Further, to indict the social scientist for neglecting the dynamic nature of the social movement appears to create a straw man when sociologists themselves have emphasized the changing nature of social movements: "the genesis of a social movement involves an interactional process between an interest group and its social environment".<sup>59</sup> Others have noted that successful tactics depend largely upon the actions of agents of social control.<sup>60</sup> Therefore, the tactics of a social movement may change as it grows -- they may become "less revolutionary as the movement gains influence, or they may become more aggressive as the chances of success increase."<sup>61</sup> While this may seem like overkill, for a discipline to deny the contributions and constructs of another is to bring into question the motives of that criticism. Rhetorical criticism can make its own contribution to the study of social movements

by relying upon those made by others and by virtue of its own special skills.

Additional questions are raised, however, about the applicability of social scientific definitions -- such as we have provided -- to the rhetorical critic. Authur L. Smith delivered the most fundamental indictment when he wrote, "a movement is a rhetorical trend, a tendency in the use of communication which may be understood by the prevalence of a certain metaphor, whereas a mass movement suggests not just language tendencies but mobilization and reconstitution."<sup>62</sup> Yet to find a linguistic tendency without some social relevance, or some language without purpose is to question the significance of the discovery. Smith further maintains that:

To discuss a social movement or an historical movement is to indicate an emphasis which does not preclude but seriously impairs our rhetorical vision. A mass movement is itself a river of communication with diverse tributaries, heading in the same direction . . . It is elementary that movements are never formed without rhetoric; all grievances, frustrations, and reformist or revolutionary aims must be communicated in order to create the specific social collective which supposedly will sustain the ideological directions. The problem then with a sociologically based theory is its emphasis on the mobilization of a collective to implement a program for reconstituting social norms and values without recognizing that it is communication alone that determines mobilization and reconstitution. There is no reason to seek elsewhere for an arching view of mass movements; rhetoric isolates and collectivizes and establishes itself as the essence of a movement.<sup>63</sup>

This whole position may be summarized in three generalizations.

1. A movement presupposes that a collective of human beings have entered into a dynamic fraternity with each other to verbalize their aims. The movement is not the people apart from their rhetoric.

2. A movement presupposes the creation and production, through rhetoric, of symbols and metaphors which characterize its ideological direction.
3. A movement is the sum total of the adherent's communicative activity, internal and external.<sup>64</sup>

Such an expression of movements, while perhaps initially . ego-satisfying to the student of rhetoric, does not long stand under scrutiny. Most social scientists would admit that communication performs a function without which the movement cannot become viable: "Communication is essential if enough people are to share their similar dissatisfactions and find the numbers of kindred spirits to permit effective collective action";<sup>65</sup> and "agitation operates to arouse people and so make them possible recruits for the movement. It is essentially a means of exciting people and of awakening within them new impulses and ideas which make them restless and dissatisfied."<sup>66</sup> Thus, it appears that few sociologists, or even psychologists, would deny that rhetoric is an important -- even vital -- portion of the movement's emergence; but what the rhetorical critic seems unable to provide merely by his grouping of metaphor is determination of the belief systems which may make one rhetorical appeal effective in one situation and impotent in another. It is this that the social scientist can provide and thus make the rhetorical study of social movements more viable. The rhetoric must appeal to the masses in the first place for them to be effective, the symbolic expression of discontent must reflect the very real discontent experienced by the

individual. Through the investigation of the social norms, roles and strains and of the psychological characteristics of those susceptible to the movement, we more adequately may analyze the rhetorical strategies employed -- or, given the chance, more effectively design the rhetorical appeal. At the very least, we must give the devil his dues.

To call for an analysis of a rhetorical as opposed to a social movement provides no useful purpose. If social scientific definitions are "too imprecise and general," it would seem that "a trend, a tendency in the use of communication" is guilty of the same fault. To analyze communications without understanding the social context in which they occur and assume relevance is to deny one of the primary components of any rhetoric. To fault a sociological theory for its emphasis upon mobilization and reconstitution of alternative norms and values within a society is not to demonstrate that the emphasis denies the importance of rhetoric.

If we are to study any phenomenon, we must attempt to define its boundaries as best we can -- even if we must ultimately admit that we have been imprecise. But to argue for the conceptualization of a rhetorical movement as opposed to a social movement based upon trends in communication and metaphor is not defining boundaries by which we can separate the phenomenon from the welter of other interactions occurring simultaneously. Therefore, we shall contend that the sociological and psychological constructs and definitions

provide a valuable perspective from which to commence our rhetorical analysis of social movements. We must recognize, and do so readily, the importance of rhetoric in the life of movements -- whether successful or not; but we shall continue to refer to social movements as collective actions directed toward changing societal norms and/or values which exist over a period of time and attempt to provide some ideological foundation for current dissatisfaction and future hope. We shall gladly emphasize that the social movement will receive expression through rhetoric. A social movement may, then, be perceived as a confluence of social, psychological and rhetorical elements each contributing to the shaping and understanding of the others.

Methodological problems exist in the study of social movements as to identifying the goals, principles and ideologies which dominate a given movement, choosing which leaders are in the fore and which of the conflicting ideas expressed by the movement assume preeminence, and even evaluating if the obvious implications of a message are the real ones -- but whatever methods we arrive at, the vital consideration which must remain uppermost is that "they are constructs. This carries with it the obvious implication that they may be faulty. They may be defective in at least two ways. In the first place, they may not be coherent; there may be too many gaps and unintelligible items for our liking. This can be cured by further knowledge . . . A worse defect is almost the reverse: we may be too satisfied with our model."<sup>67</sup>

### Characteristics of the Social Movement

Implicit throughout our discussion of definitions and perspectives of social movements has been the idea that there exist different types of movements; and that depending upon the type, various components will be emphasized to the detriment of some others. While much of what is presented in this section will be examined more completely and from different perspectives in later chapters, it nevertheless seems beneficial that an overview of types and components of social movements be given at this time.

Each author writing on the subject has attempted to create the typology of social movements depending upon his particular terministic screens. Herbert Blumer has posited three types (general, specific, and expressive);<sup>68</sup> and Paul Wilkinson ten (religious movements, millenarism and sects; movements of rural and urban discontent; nativist, nationalist and race movements; imperialism and pan-movements; class and occupational interest movements; and so on).<sup>70</sup> These have been "typed" largely on the basis of the functions or purposes of the movement.

Movements have been labeled depending upon the "sociopsychological types" of membership based upon the motivation of a movement's adherents (the "value-rational" fellowship of believers, the "emotional-affectual" following of a charismatic leader, the "purposive-rational" collection for individual interests).<sup>71</sup> While many other typologies

exist, for the purposes of this study those employed by Bush and Denisoff shall be used: reform, revolutionary, regressive and expressive movements.<sup>72</sup>

Reform movements "are directed at the alteration of a segment of the power distribution of a social system in order to achieve a specific goal"; and "their intent is only a modification of the power distribution."<sup>73</sup> Within this larger category it is possible to subsume many of the other typologies advanced: that section of Blumer's specific movements which advocate modification rather than destruction of existing social institutions; Wilkinson's movements to the extent that they meet the same criteria; and, more clearly perhaps, Smelser's norm-oriented movement which he defines as "an attempt to restore, protect, modify or create norms in the name of a generalized belief."<sup>74</sup> Within reform movements any norm (or legitimated institution) may be altered -- i.e., social, political, educational, economic, religious, etc.

Revolutionary movements are concerned not with reforming existing social order but with more radically altering the fundamental structure or ideology of institutions. For Bush and Denisoff, the revolutionary movements are characterized by those of the left and "possess a metaphysical rationale for bringing about a new social order based upon body of thought which defines the past and the present and interprets the future (e.g., anarchism, utopian socialism, and the various models of the ideal Communist state)."<sup>75</sup> Within the context of this study,

revolutionary movements shall be those indicating a "left-leaning" ideology. Those general and specific movements exemplified by Blumer which advocate structural replacement within the ideological context given will fall within this type. Some of Smelser's value-oriented movements (which envision a "reconstitution of values")<sup>76</sup> will also fit -- whereas others will fall in the regressive typology. Perhaps the crucial distinction made between the revolutionary and the regressive movement by Bush and Denisoff is the difference in ideological perspective. On the one hand,

the ideology of revolutionary movements minimizes the role of the individual actor in determining social conditions and instead stresses societal dysfunctions and contradictions as the source of problems and offers collective solutions designed to achieve an 'ideal' future state.<sup>77</sup>

whereas, on the other hand, regressive movements

come about to counteract existing trends in society and to change the values and institutions of the system from their present (decadent) form to those of a historical or idealized past . . . . Ideologically, this type of movement emphasizes individual weaknesses and "deviation" as the sources of social problems and suggests as solutions individualism, charismatic leadership, and a return to past value systems.<sup>78</sup>

It is within the broad general outlines of regressive movements that the remainder of Smelser's value-oriented movements would most probably fall.

The final form of social movements are expressive movements, a term initially introduced by Blumer. For him, expressive movements do not "seek to change the institutions of the social order or its objective character."<sup>79</sup>



Rather, they are conceptualized as statements of dissent in response to social conditions which "alienate" the individual. While typified largely by "symbolic dissent," they may exert "profound effects on the personalities of individuals and on the character of the social order."<sup>80</sup> .

Regardless of the specific type of social movement, it appears that each is created in response to very general considerations existing throughout the social system -- i.e., although one movement may be expressive, another reformist and so on, each arises in response to some strain, some dissatisfaction between the individual's perceptual evaluation of the existing situation and the evaluation of the way the situation should be. Various explanations for this phenomenon have been offered and will be examined at some length at a later time. Suffice it to say that whether one subscribes to -- or finds most useful in understanding a given movement -- the theory of alienation, class conflict, status inconsistency, relative deprivation or psychological inconsistencies and personality considerations, there must exist some form of strain ("an impairment of the relations among and consequently inadequate functioning of the components of action")<sup>81</sup> within the social structure. This strain may occur between any and/or all of the following components:

- (1) values -- "the broadest guides to purposive social behavior";
- (2) norms -- the "regulatory rules governing the pursuit of these goals";
- (3) mobilization -- the

consideration of factors which motivate the individual and how these individuals are organized within the social system; and (4) the situational facilities -- that which the actor uses as means to achieve the other components.<sup>82</sup> Thus, if the individual finds an inconsistent relation between his situational facilities (e.g., his standard of living) and the norms or values structuring his belief system (e.g., every man has a right to a minimal standard of living) which cannot be resolved, a strain between these will develop. If the individual is made aware of the strain, if some means of resolution can be advocated which he comes to regard as capable of eliminating this strain (largely through rhetoric), and if he exists in a social milieu under which he can congregate with others, a social movement may begin.<sup>83</sup>

Eric Hoffer, longshoreman-cum-social commentator, has remarked that "Mass movements can rise and spread without belief in a god, but never without belief in a devil."<sup>84</sup> And it is this function that an ideology provides for a movement. In accordance with Hoffer's prescription, perhaps the most important aspect of an ideology is the establishment of a devil. In reform or revolutionary movements the individual is pictured as the victim of the whims of the social system. The source of strain is the inability of the legitimate authority to effectively deal with imbalances. It is the social order which is not functioning and which is to blame for the

difficulties encountered. There is an indictment, a criticism, a condemnation for the existing social arrangements. There is thus great anxiety about the person's place and position in society, an anxiety which can partially be alleviated by finding something to dislike, such as those who represent that portion of society resisting changes which could remedy the imbalance.<sup>85</sup> If the movement is regressive, the devil -- while changed -- is still present and becomes those social agents who have perverted the idealized state to such an extent that it has sunk to its present putrid level. The object of hate then becomes those who refuse to change toward the idealized form in much the same fashion as in the reform/revolutionary movement.

On the positive side, the God-term will provide the hope for the future, the means of salvation. As soon as the proposed changes are implemented, the social imbalances will cease to exist and unlimited happiness shall be the vision of the future. Such an approach may ultimately create difficulties for the movement leadership if such changes cannot be implemented and provide the desired nirvana. The effectiveness of the movement's ideology can be enhanced if it combines both elements; but whatever the god and devil terms which are created, both must be symbolic responses to the perceived strain which created the desire for change. Whether the collective action is a riot or a social movement, the "solution" (i.e., the ideology) is

directed toward some specific problem whether it be the symbolic destruction of a despised institution (e.g., storming the Bastille) or an attempt to change the existing normative order. "Collective behavior," writes Neil Smelser, "is . . . embellished with symbols to explain and justify the participant's actions. To determine why certain objects and symbols are chosen, we must refer to the specific strains."<sup>86</sup>

As the ideology appeals to dissatisfied individuals throughout the social system, it is conceivable that many will seek membership in the emerging movement. Membership has been analyzed in terms of when they joined the movement, in terms of social and economic class, and in terms of motivations. If nothing else, perhaps the study of social movements reveals the preconceptions of the student. Among those who differentiate on the basis of time of joining, Lang and Lang describe the "early converts, won over to the movement when it is still small and sectarian"; followed by the active reinforcements -- those who join while the movement is beginning to develop some significance; the joiners -- jumpers-on-the-proverbial-bandwagon as the movement achieves some respectability. And finally, the resisters who begin to display some affinity toward a movement which they strongly resist.<sup>87</sup>

Another division of membership occurs based upon a division of labor. Lang and Lang also write:

There is a 'division of labor' among the followers of every social movement. A central core of followers . . . perform the routine work and dedicate what spare time they have to the

movement. Some of them consider themselves leaders, but in fact they only do the work. Opposed to this cadre is the larger rank and file of the movement, who 'march' along. The majority of them are loyal; they attend meetings, participate in activities, believe its ideology, and learn its songs and slogans. Beyond them is a much larger periphery of individuals, not clearly either in or outside the movement. They act as a 'cheering' section, whose support can be mobilized on occasion. Although their connection to the movement is tenuous, they are crucial to its success.<sup>88</sup>

In addition to this "functional" categorization of membership, some have described the nature of social movements according to the types of memberships attracted. Thus the class theorists find that the bulk will be made up from "the aggregate of persons playing the same part in production, standing in the same relation toward other persons in the production process, these relations being also expressed in things (instruments of labor)."<sup>89</sup> Examples of movements classed according to this general method would be most of the reform movements of Europe and England during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Others, however, such as Hadley Cantril, have posited that we must look not at economic considerations to find the sources of membership, but rather to the

beliefs and opinions of men. For when these components of an individual's psychological world are violently jarred by worries, fear, anxieties, and frustrations, when he begins to question the norms and values which have become a part of him, when the customary social framework can apparently no longer satisfy his needs . . . . . the individual is susceptible to new leadership, to conversion, to revolution. <sup>90</sup>

Again, as in discussing the various "causes" of social movements, it seems that one must ultimately admit to a basic formulation: that some dissatisfaction has been created in the individual, regardless of the specific source, and it has been blamed on the existing social structure. As a result, believing that a particular course of action poses some probability -- or certainty -- of solving that unhappiness, he will have a tendency to seek that particular social movement which most nearly relates to the perceived imbalances. When presenting a definition of social movements, we stressed their volitional nature. And it is this which makes their membership viable and permits the movement to grow and function. It is this voluntary commitment to the norms and practices of the social collective which binds the movement together and gives membership the esprit de corps necessary to endure the dark days which virtually every movement must face. The implications of this volition are explained by Paul Wilkinson:

It is, therefore, not only the choices of great leaders, which may be decisive, but just as important, the choices of thousands of the rank-and-file humanity who have the moral responsibility for deciding whether they will join or support a given collective action, how they will select their programmes and leaders, what means they are prepared to employ to realize the movement's aims, and so forth.<sup>91</sup>

If the membership of a movement is important (and it is), then equally so is the type of leadership exhibited. As in most other aspects of the movement mystique, typologies of leadership have been advanced. Perhaps the most famous, or infamous, whichever the case may be, is Max Weber's charismatic leader. Not only because of his high visibility, but also because of this era's almost pathological preoccupation with charisma, it is the most widely reported type. Charisma is "the real or imagined extraordinary qualities of any group leader," and charismatic leadership is dependent largely on the specific characteristics of the individual -- be they attributes of heroism, sanctity, or whatever. The success and validity of a movement itself may rest upon the qualities and broad shoulders of the leader.<sup>92</sup> Another type is the institutional leader whose "authority is founded on the belief in the legality and constitutionality" of the means by which the leader was placed in his position of responsibility.<sup>93</sup> Membership follows not because of any special qualities of the leader, although in fact he may have these, but rather because he occupies a position which has been consecrated by the norms of the movement. Closely related is the distinction between the leadership functions of symbol and decision-maker. The former is one whose activities are not so important to the success of the movement as are the qualities which he represents -- the ideology, the struggle, or whatever. The decision-maker

is important not so much for the symbol which he presents to the membership and to the opposing social structure but rather for the pragmatic abilities he displays for guiding the movement through the maze of problems.<sup>94</sup> It is imperative that these types should not be interpreted as being mutually exclusive. Like all categorizations, they are valuable only so long as they aid rather than obscure our analysis of movements.

Another vital consideration is that the requirements for leadership may vary over time depending upon the conditions which the movement encounters. Depending upon the particular time in a movement's development, Eric Hoffer maintains that leadership will be provided by the man of words (the initial phase), the fanatic (the crisis stage) and the man of action (the consolidation phase). It is the rare man who can effectively fulfill all three roles and guide the movement from its inception through the active phase toward the fulfillment of the original prophecy.

Membership and leadership combine -- along with other factors -- to influence the organization of the movement. The movement's organization will be a general reaction to five major influences: (1) the degree of opposition encountered -- the greater the opposition, the more militarily structured the organization will tend to be; (2) the social position of the followers -- a middle class membership will probably produce a parliamentary organization or at least one providing some degree of



participatory democracy whereas one composed of largely lower social-economic classes might be presumed to rely more upon an autocratic structure; (3) the aims of the movement -- one advocating reform may be much more open than a revolutionary movement; (4) the cultural ethos of the society -- reflecting the country and the period in which the movement exists. For example, in a democratic state a movement may function much more freely than in a totalitarian system where any dissent is considered revolutionary. And (5) the type of leadership -- charismatic leader versus institutional.<sup>95</sup>

Generally speaking, when one considers the organization of a movement -- or of any collective behavior -- he tends to conceptualize it as tending toward a hierarchical structure culminating with some Olympian group ultimately controlling or directing the movement. Heberle gives some testimony to this when he writes that ". . . the general tendency in any social movement is toward complete and intensive organization of its adherents."<sup>96</sup> The reasons for such concentration appear obvious: a more efficient division of labor, less duplication of effort, a more responsive leadership and membership, a united front to the opposition, and so forth. Recently, however, some social scientists have begun to question this, and relying largely upon data gathered from contemporary movements, have posited that a movement ". . . is neither a centralized conspiracy nor an amorphous collectivity, a spontaneous mass eruption.

Instead, it has a defineable structure which we term 'segmentary, polycephalous, and reticulate' in structure."<sup>97</sup> It might be well to explain these multisyllabic words for those who, like us, lack a working knowledge of the Oxford English dictionary. "Segmentary" means, quite simply, that the movement is composed of diverse groups, or cells, which exhibit all the life-cycles of the larger movement. "Polycephalous" recalls the multiheaded Hydra -- i.e., the movement organization does not have one centralized command-post or decision-making structure. Rather, the various cells each have independent leadership or even competing leaders within each cell. And finally, "reticulate" implies that there exists no random collection of ideologically-similar groups: instead, they are connected through a communication network, inter-linking memberships or leaderships. Contrary to what may be popularly believed about such a structure, Luther Gerlach argues that it is

not inefficient but rather is highly effective and adaptive in innovating and producing social change and in surviving in the face of established order opposition. It is also possible that such segmented, many-headed and networked organization will be adaptive not only for social movement, but also for established order in business, industry and government . . .<sup>98</sup>

So, like other aspects of the social movement, the organization will be a product of interaction among a wide range of components.

Throughout this section, we have discussed the role of the opposition. It is implicit in the very nature of social

movements that they must encounter resistance of some degree as they seek to fulfill their goal. Each of the types we have presented, with the sole exception of the expressive movement, seeks at least some change in the existing social structure; and additionally blames some existing imbalance upon it. The source of this resistance may vary quite drastically depending upon the particular norm or value the movement seeks to alter: government officials, churches, community leaders, courts, other social movements -- each may oppose the actions of a given collective.

More importantly, the attitude of the governmental agencies may have great influence upon the future role of the movement: if the governmental authority is ". . . persistently hostile and repressive toward modest demands for reform, those desiring reform may be driven into underground organization, may become more extreme in their demand for change, and may even begin to challenge the legitimacy of the political authorities."<sup>99</sup> Such action may frustrate the reform movement even more and, accepting that norms cannot be changed, challenge the values of the system and become revolutionary. Thus, as forms of social control, there exist three major methods of resisting movements: suppression (which may rely on intimidation, dismissal from positions, arrest and detention, physical violence and murder) may only serve to strengthen the member's commitment; co-optation (granting the changes desired in the social system or else

symbolically incorporating them into the existing structure) of the grievances will remove the *raison d'être*; and denigration (attacks on the ideology, the leader, and so on to reduce the credibility of a movement's ability to fulfill the needs of potential members) relying largely upon rhetorical appeals. The choice of resistance is often dependent upon how seriously the "establishment" perceives itself as being threatened, and how the strength of the public (and governmental) conscience limits the use of violence in suppressing dissent.

One further approach to the study of social movements remains and it arises out of the natural history approach to their study. Various writers from different backgrounds, among them Hoffer and Leland M. Griffin, have advanced phases of social movements, largely derived from Rousseau's model. Hoffer describes the phases as marked by the man of words, the fanatic and the man of action. These correspond closely to Griffin's period of inception (when the movement emerges into public notice through the actions of the aggressor rhetorician -- a striking similarity to Hoffer's "man of words"), period of rhetorical crisis (when opposing rhetoricians compete for the minds of men), and a period of consummation (when either the movement is successful or the cause is lost.).<sup>100</sup> Sociologists have very nearly described these same periods as the "preliminary stage" -- in which general dissatisfaction emerges although the masses do not interact nor recognize that they are in fact a group

of similarly-minded people; the "popular stage" -- the fomenting of discontent by intellectuals, the emergence of an ideology, and the formation of group-consciousness; and the "formal stage" -- the full-blown social movement.<sup>101</sup>

Throughout this discussion an erroneous assumption may have entered: that all social movements are successful. That is not the case. Most probably fail to emerge into fully grown movements with a developed ideology and organizational structure of any type. Of those that do, many are suppressed by resistance which cannot be overcome, or their demands are co-opted without struggle. Many more may fail to create sufficient discontent among enough people to acquire the characteristics of social movements. And finally, leadership may fail to emerge. Whatever the reason, every social movement contains the seeds of its own destruction. If it cannot achieve modifications in existing structures, it must fail and the reason for its existence no longer remains; on the other hand, if it indeed is successful, the moment that its reforms are adopted or else it changes the social order, it, again, no longer has any justification. It becomes the institutionalized order and must now contend with newly emerging social movements. This is not to say that the movement's organizational structure may not find other goals to supplant the original, but in so doing it is acknowledging that the original dissatisfactions which brought it into existence have ceased to be vital concerns.

### Summary

In this chapter we have examined the functions of social movements in contributing to the betterment of a given society; have briefly considered the roots of the study of social movements; and have considered the philosophical premises of some of the major approaches to social movements -- i.e., the liberal humanitarian, socialist and the new existentialist foundations which are the cornerstones upon which movements are built. A definition has been advanced which emphasized that social movements are forms of collective behavior directed toward some change in societies which exist over time and arise out of some dissatisfaction with the present or some hope of the future. In addition, the movement is composed of voluntary members who are attracted by the movement's ideology.

Attention was directed to the perspective from which we shall view social movements and, after an examination of sociological, psychological and rhetorical approaches, concluded that to view a movement from one perspective at the exclusion of the others would severely limit our knowledge; rather, a movement was perceived as a confluence of the three.

Finally, a brief analysis of the major components of the movement was made so that a general framework might be established by which we may make more detailed examinations into the rhetorical nature of social movements.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup>J. O. Hertzler, "Crises and Dictatorships," in Ralph H. Turner and Lewis M. Killian (eds.), Collective Behavior, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1957), p. 367.
- <sup>2</sup>Paul Wilkinson, Social Movement, (London: Pall Mall, 1971), pp. 13-14.
- <sup>3</sup>Georg Simmel quoted in Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 1956), p. 31.
- <sup>4</sup>Lewis Coser, p. 31.
- <sup>5</sup>Rudolf Heberle, Social Movements, (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1951), p. 456.
- <sup>6</sup>Roberta Ash, Social Movements in America, (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1972), p. 11.
- <sup>7</sup>Ibid, p. 12.
- <sup>8</sup>Rudolf Heberle, "Types and Functions of Social Movements," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, David I. Sills, ed., Vol 14, (New York: McMillan and the Free Press, 1968), p. 444.
- <sup>9</sup>Eric Hoffer, The True Believer, (New York: Perennial Library Edition, Harper & Row, 1966), p. 139.
- <sup>10</sup>Wilkinson, p. 11-12.
- <sup>11</sup>Ibid, p. 20.
- <sup>12</sup>Heberle, "Types and Functions," p. 439.
- <sup>13</sup>Wilkinson, p. 21
- <sup>14</sup>Wilkinson, p. 21.
- <sup>15</sup>Heberle, p. 440.
- <sup>16</sup>Wilkinson, p. 38.
- <sup>17</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>18</sup>Ibid, p. 35.
- <sup>19</sup>Ibid, p. 40.
- <sup>20</sup>Ibid, p. 40-41.

- <sup>21</sup>Ralph J. Turner, "Contemporary Themes of Social Movements," British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 20, No. 4, p. 395.
- <sup>22</sup>Ibid, p. 396.
- <sup>23</sup>Harold A. Nelson, "Leadership and Change in an Evolutionary Movement: An Analysis of Change in the Leadership Structure of the Southern Civil Rights Movement," Social Forces, Vol. 49, No. 3, March 1971, p. 353.
- <sup>24</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>25</sup>Turner and Killian, p. 526.
- <sup>26</sup>Herbert Blumer, "Collective Behavior," in Joseph B. Gittler, ed., Review of Sociology, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957), p. 128.
- <sup>27</sup>Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior, (New York: The Free Press, 1962), p. 71
- <sup>28</sup>Theodore Abel, "The Patterns of a Successful Political Movement," in Gary B. Bush and R. Serge Denisoff, eds., Social and Political Movements, (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1971), p. 280-281.
- <sup>29</sup>William B. Cameron, Modern Social Movements, (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 7.
- <sup>30</sup>Herbert Blumer, "Social Movements," in A. M. Lee (ed), New Outline of the Principles of Sociology, (New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1946), p. 199.
- <sup>31</sup>John T. Zadrozny, Dictionary of Social Science, (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1959), p. 313.
- <sup>32</sup>Gladys Lang and Kurt Lang, Collective Dynamics, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1961), p. 490.
- <sup>33</sup>Julius Gould and William L. Kalb, eds., A Dictionary of the Social Sciences (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 658.
- <sup>34</sup>Mayer N. Zald and Roberta Ash, "Social Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay and Change," Social Forces, Vol. 44, No. 3, March 1966, p. 329.
- <sup>35</sup>Ash, p. 1.
- <sup>36</sup>Joseph R. Gusfield, "The Study of Social Movements," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, David I. Sills, ed., (New York: McMillan & Free Press, 1968), Vol. 14, p. 445.



- <sup>37</sup>Gary B. Bush and R. Serge Denisoff, Social and Political Movements, (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1971) p. 252.
- <sup>38</sup>Wilkinson, pp. 81-82.
- <sup>39</sup>Cameron, pp. 25-33.
- <sup>40</sup>Ibid, p. 177.
- <sup>41</sup>Ash, p. 9.
- <sup>42</sup>Bush and Denisoff, p. 177.
- <sup>43</sup>Lang and Lang, p. 494.
- <sup>44</sup>Wilkinson, p. 19.
- <sup>45</sup>Bush and Denisoff, p. 37.
- <sup>46</sup>Ash, p. 21-22.
- <sup>47</sup>Lang and Lang, p. 505.
- <sup>48</sup>Neil J. Smelser, Essays in Sociological Explanation, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 95.
- <sup>49</sup>Bush and Denisoff, p. 119.
- <sup>50</sup>Smelser, Essays, p. 101.
- <sup>51</sup>Bush and Denisoff, p. 158.
- <sup>52</sup>Leland M. Griffin, "The Rhetoric of Historical Movements," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 38, No. 2, April 1952, p. 185.
- <sup>53</sup>Robert S. Cathcart, "New Approaches to the Study of Movements: Defining Movements Rhetorically," Western Speech, Spring 1972, p. 83-84.
- <sup>54</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>55</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>56</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>57</sup>Dan F. Hahn and Ruth M. Gonchar, "Studying Social Movements: A Rhetorical Methodology," The Speech Teacher, Vol 20, p. 44.
- <sup>58</sup>Cathcart, p. 85.
- <sup>59</sup>Robert H. Lauer, "Social Movements: An Interactionist Analysis," The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 13, Summer 1972, p. 320.

- <sup>60</sup>Smelser, Collective Behavior, p. 359.
- <sup>61</sup>Heberle, "Types and Functions," p. 442.
- <sup>62</sup>Authur L. Smith, "Historical and Social Movements: A Search for Boundaries," Paper presented at the SCA Convention Dec. 30, 1972, Chicago, Illinois.
- <sup>63</sup>Ibid, p. 2.
- <sup>64</sup>Ibid, p. 4.
- <sup>65</sup>Cameron, p. 11.
- <sup>66</sup>Blumer, in Lee, p. 204.
- <sup>67</sup>W. J. H. Sprott, Social Psychology, (London: Methuen & Co., 1952), p. 9.
- <sup>68</sup>Blumer, in Lee, p. 68.
- <sup>69</sup>Smelser, Collective Behavior, p.
- <sup>70</sup>Wilkinson, p. 51.
- <sup>71</sup>Heberle, "Types and Functions," p. 440.
- <sup>72</sup>Bush and Denisoff, p. , While other typologies may prove equally useful, we believe that most can be subsumed within Bush and Denisoff's tripartite typology. Thus, largely for parsimony, we have adopted these descriptions.
- <sup>73</sup>Ibid, p. 353.
- <sup>74</sup>Smelser, Collective Behavior, p. 270.
- <sup>75</sup>Bush and Denisoff, p. 325. Parentheses in original.
- <sup>76</sup>Smelser, Collective Behavior, p. 313.
- <sup>77</sup>Bush and Denisoff, p. 326.
- <sup>78</sup>Ibid, p. 339.
- <sup>79</sup>Blumer, in Lee, p. 214.
- <sup>80</sup>Ibid, p. 214.
- <sup>81</sup>Smelser, Collective Behavior, p. 47.
- <sup>82</sup>Ibid, p. 24-25.
- <sup>83</sup>Cameron, p. 10.

- <sup>84</sup>Hoffer, p. 86.
- <sup>85</sup>Smelser, Essays, p. 116.
- <sup>86</sup>Smelser, Collective Behavior, p. 66.
- <sup>87</sup>Lang and Lang, p. 525.
- <sup>88</sup>Ibid, p. 526.
- <sup>89</sup>Nikolai Bukharin, "Historical Materialism" in Bush and Denisoff, p. 64.
- <sup>90</sup>Hadley Cantril, The Psychology of Social Movements, (New York: John Wiley & Son, 1941), p. 15-16.
- <sup>91</sup>Wilkinson, p. 152-153.
- <sup>92</sup>Heberle, Social Movements, p. 288.
- <sup>93</sup>Ibid, p. 287-288.
- <sup>94</sup>Turner and Killian, p. 465.
- <sup>95</sup>Lang and Lang, p. 534.
- <sup>96</sup>Heberle, Social Movements, p. 279.
- <sup>97</sup>Luther Gerlach, "Movements of Revolutionary Change," American Behavioral Scientist, Vol 14,6, pp. 816.
- <sup>98</sup>Ibid,
- <sup>99</sup>Smelser, Essays, p. 207.
- <sup>100</sup>Griffin, p. 186.
- <sup>101</sup>Rex D. Hopper, "The Revolutionary Process: A Frame of Reference for the Study of Revolutionary Movements," Social Forces, cited in Turner and Killian, p. 311-316.

## Chapter III

### RHETORIC, CRITICISM, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

"'. . . the power which has always started the greatest religious and political avalanches in history rolling has from time immemorial been the magic power of the spoken word, and that alone.'"<sup>1</sup>

#### Introduction

The importance of social movements to the continuation of any given social system and the nature of social movements have already been briefly examined; and although movements have been analyzed and described largely in sociological terms, it is imperative that the function of communication receive adequate emphasis. Without rhetoric to spread the word of the movement, to acquaint the disenchanted masses with the salvation of the movement's ideology (which is itself a symbolic restructuring of reality) indeed, often to create the dissatisfaction among these very masses, there would be no movement.

In point of fact, it is largely in times of social disorder and upheaval that the rhetorical means may become most important. Edwin Black, writing in Rhetorical Criticism, states that:

The accounts of Germany under the Weimar Republic, or of Russia under Nicholas II, disclose situations of extreme and pervasive anxiety on all levels of the society and the rapid deterioration of institutions and ideals that bind people together and supply them with a common fund of attitudes, of cues for feelings, of regulations governing propriety and impropriety. It is at just such moments in history that persuasive discourse asserts its fullest power over human affairs.<sup>2</sup>

Because of the importance of these speeches, man must understand the phenomenon of rhetoric -- how does it function, what does it do, how does it exert its impact upon society? And man can best turn to the rhetorical critic for these answers; for, as Charles Lomas has written, the "rhetorical critic brings to this event a specialized training which enables him not merely to record a description of the event more precisely than the untrained observer, but to interpret the rhetorical basis for whatever effect the speech may be shown to have had."<sup>3</sup> For these reasons, then, we shall consider the nature of "rhetoric," the purposes and ideals of criticism, and the joining of these two toward an understanding of social movements.

#### A Perspective of "Rhetoric"

Whenever one versed in, or even exposed to, writings about speech communication or rhetoric encounters the term, he immediately recalls Aristotle's famous dictum that rhetoric is "the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion."<sup>4</sup> A more recent approach is that of Kenneth Burke, for whom rhetoric is rooted in language itself and is the "use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols."<sup>5</sup> But each of these definitions is broad, permitting various theorists to offer their own interpretations of "what rhetoric really is" -- or ought to be.

Perhaps the most widespread notion of rhetoric, held in sway by rhetoricians for decades, is that which places rhetoric in the realm of verbal discourse -- either written or oral. Thonssen and Baird, writing in 1948, maintain that authorities both ancient and modern agree that "the fundamental purpose of oral discourse is social coordination or control."<sup>6</sup> Marie Hochmuth Nichols uses "rhetoric" to "apply to verbal activity primarily concerned with affecting persuasion, whether it be done by writing or speaking. Rhetoric operates in the area of the contingent, where choice is to be made among alternative courses of action."<sup>7</sup> Edwin Black would qualify this conceptualization somewhat and add that it is intent that determines whether a particular statement is rhetorical or not, not the effect of the discourse.<sup>8</sup>

But if Aristotle wants to include the means of discovering, and probably using, all the available means of persuasion, and if Burke wants to include language that induces cooperation, men such as Everett Hunt and Karl Wallace want to limit rhetoric to "reasoned discourse." They desire to lessen, if not eliminate, the impact of emotional and ethical modes of proof in attaining persuasion. Hunt wants rhetoric to be the study of "men persuading men to make free choices";<sup>9</sup> while Wallace would characterize rhetoric as "the art of finding and effectively presenting good reasons."<sup>10</sup> "Good reasons" are those statements offered in support of "ought" propositions or propositions of value which are consistent with one another and which emphasize the logical:

. . . the word reason indicates that the process of proof is a rational one and can be used to cover such traditional forms of reasoning as deduction and induction, the syllogism, generalization, analogy, causation, and correlation. Furthermore, the term good reason implies the indissoluble relationship between content and form, and keeps attention on what form is saying.<sup>11</sup>

While not being quite so definitive as Wallace, Donald C. Bryant telegraphs an empathy with such an approach when he defines the function of rhetoric as being "adjusting ideas to people and of people to ideas."<sup>12</sup>

But like it or not, man is not always persuaded by the "rational" or by "good reasons"; and if we are to understand the phenomenon of rhetoric -- particularly the rhetoric of social movements -- we must acknowledge that rhetoric "deals in the main with man's motives and desires and . . . basic human nature has not changed essentially in two thousand years. The way to a man's heart in ancient Athens is still the way to a man's heart today."<sup>13</sup> Man is motivated by love, and hate, and jealousy, and duty, and all of the other emotions which dwell within us. Aristotle seemed to acknowledge this with his three modes of proof which could combine for altering beliefs; Burke seems to advance this notion when he argues that language is motive -- and as such reveals the attitudes of the speaker. Thus, it seems unreasonable to limit our concept of rhetoric to the expression of "good reasons."

Writing in 1953, Bryant stated quite flatly that some types of persuasion did not fall within the scope of rhetoric:

Some means of persuasion, however, in spite of Aristotle's comprehensive definition, are not within the scope of rhetoric. Gold and guns, for example, are certainly persuasive, and the basic motives which make them persuasive, profit and self-preservation, may enter the field of rhetoric; but applied directly to the persons to be persuaded, guns and gold belong to commerce or coercion, not rhetoric.<sup>14</sup>

But the intervening two decades may have done much to shake the strength of such a statement. Rhetoricians write articles on the "Rhetoric of Confrontation",<sup>15</sup> books on the Rhetoric of Agitation and Control,<sup>16</sup> and even ponder if the "Rhetoric of Black Power" reveals two dimensions of moral conflict<sup>17</sup> or justifies violence.<sup>18</sup> The problems of transition and of coping, not only from a theoretical perspective but from that of ethics as well, is perhaps best expressed by Barnet Baskerville at the Wingspread Conference on Rhetoric:

Until quite recently one would have found in our ranks almost universal assent to the familiar statements of Jefferson, Mill and Lippman concerning the necessity for open competition of ideas in the marketplace. We once quoted Everett Hunt's definition of rhetoric as "the study of men persuading men to make free choices," and Karl Wallace's: "the art of finding and effectively presenting good reasons." We accepted Sidney Hook's admonition that "the cardinal sin, when we are looking for truth or wisdom of policy, is refusal to discuss, or action which blocks discussion."

But suddenly we are not so sure. The streets echo the angry voices of those who would usher in a new order by destroying the old, and some rhetoricians -- rightfully indignant at the enormity of past injustices, warmed by sympathy for the goals proclaimed -- jettison the old axioms and scramble to rationalize the new reality . . . .

I do not wish to be unfair . . . . I see the need for understanding the rhetoric of the New Left and for analyzing the rhetorical effects of shouts, obscenities, and the like. Such analyses are



already being made, and I am sure that some of our colleagues who are dealing with these subjects are in patient, kindly quest for understanding. But the evidence seems too clear to be ignored that others have identified understanding with approval, and are rapidly moving beyond approval to implicit or explicit justification.<sup>19</sup>

Authur Kruger unites Wallace with the new rhetorics (admitting that, ". . . yes, people are persuaded by irrelevant factors but they should not be")<sup>20</sup> and advances the ethical concern of the rhetorician more explicitly than Baskerville. "A truly ethical speaker," he posits, "respects the intelligence of his listeners and tries to get them to think about what he is saying, however difficult thinking might be for some. Only in this way does he show any respect for democratic values, which presume that people can think for themselves and govern themselves intelligently."<sup>21</sup>

Most of those who advance the "reasonable" approach to rhetoric do so in terms of promoting the best interests of a democratic society. It is, after all, a society which permits the free expression of ideas and evaluates those ideas logically that can best determine those courses of policy which will "promote the general welfare." But throughout the analyses of those who write about the rhetoric of confrontation, of protest, of the streets, runs the theme that such rhetorics emerge largely because traditional rhetorics, the rhetoric of "good reasons", fails to gain a voice -- much less an ear -- in the marketplace; or that even if it does, the "good reasons" advanced are never considered by the institutional powers of the status quo. It is in this realm

that the rhetoric of social movements becomes most apparent. Leland Griffin provides an outstanding example of such thinking when he related the type of rhetoric which emerged to the type of culture which surrounded it:

If debate ("forensic drama," "reasoned discourse") .  
is the creating myth of American democracy, [Bayard]  
Rustin's justification of the necessity of "body"  
rhetoric on the ground that "the accepted demo-  
cratic channels have been denied the Negro" might  
be entertained in light of the Burkeian "scene-act  
ratio" (non-rational, non-democratic "acts" in a  
non-rational, non-democratic "scene") . . . .<sup>22</sup>

Thus, if society were truly democratic, then rational discourse such as advocated by Baskerville, Wallace and others would hold sway, or at least would be more influential than it now is; on the other hand, if society does not permit such freedom of expression, or is non-responsive to its legitimate demands, then dissatisfaction continues to grow until the perceived differences between the "have-nots" and the "haves" are no longer over means but become questions of value, of ends themselves.

If rhetorical scholars are divided over the question of whether physical acts, of gold or guns, constitute "rhetoric" or not, there are others in our society from diverse backgrounds who hold no such doubts. Justice John Harlan wrote in 1961 in a concurring opinion to overturn the convictions of blacks conducting a lunch counter sit-in (in *Garner v. Louisiana*, 368 US 157, 201-101): "Such a demonstration in the circumstances . . . is as much a part of the free trade in ideas . . . as is verbal expression more commonly thought of as speech. It,

like speech, appeals to good sense and to the power of reason as applied through public discussion . . . just as much as, if not more than, a public oration delivered from a soapbox at a street corner. This Court has never limited the right to speak . . . to mere verbal expression."<sup>23</sup> And, somewhat less eloquently, a student activist asked if "violence" was not "sometimes a form of speech, of communication, perhaps the only effective form? Wasn't the most eloquent speech we heard in a long while the flames in Washington, D. C.? The tear gas in Washington, D. C.? The flames in Detroit? The sound of guns in a motel in Detroit -- didn't they say something to us? What do you do about Fred Hampton and Rap Brown? How do they speak? They can't do it in the press."<sup>24</sup> While each of us may not condone such actions, in this age of street demonstration, of riot, and of establishment violence, can we as rhetorical scholars afford to ignore such activities with all of their symbolic meaning and yet still claim that we want to make "realistic" contributions to society?

We have maintained that such physical acts, or verbal expressions of threatening behavior, are replete with symbolic meaning. But one might well ask wherein lies the symbolism of throwing bags of feces and urine into the faces of policemen in Chicago, of threatening to burn universities and cities? James R. Andrews attempts to create the distinction between persuasion (which apparently leans toward the "good reasons" approach) and coercion. "Rhetoric becomes less persuasive," writes Andrews, "and more coercive to the extent that it limits

the viable alternatives open to the receivers of communication. For while persuasion aims at moving a receiver to select one of the many avenues of action open to him, coercion attempts to offer only one route by removing all other approaches from the realm of the possible."<sup>25</sup> This, however, is a distinction that might well be questioned, for one "rarely observes significant political, commercial, or international rhetorical address that does not bristle with 'dire consequences' swiftly to follow if one elects the wrong candidate, fails to purchase the right product, or continues a foreign policy of dangerous initiatives."<sup>26</sup> Instead, even those situations which threaten ("Your money or your life!" "America will burn!") still allow room for symbolic interpretation.

The hoodlum who demands our hard-earned money, the black or the student who occupies our buildings, and the politician who threatens our nations, each of them seeks to constrain the symbolic world in which we live. And yet, though the world be "turned upside down," we must still function symbolically, we must still reason. To the extent that we interpret the gun in the hoodlum's hand as a symbol of his intent to inflict harm should we not comply with his command, and to the extent that we interpret the agitator's demands (or threats) as pleas for attention, we have functioned symbolically; and given the available evidence, we have even created "good reasons" for our having acted as we have.

Even the purely physical act may become symbolic. Just as Justice Harlan recognized that sit-ins constituted a form of speech, so may other, less acceptable, actions function. For physical acts may specifically have two kinds of intention: (1) to inflict physical force in order to constrain or promote action or to inflict punishment; and (2) to "say something." Parke Burgess argues, for instance, that "the American venture in the Vietnam War has been essentially rhetorical in intention and thus largely ineffectual in result";<sup>27</sup> and Bowers and Ochs contend that:

If an agitator says to an establishment spokesman, "You are disgusting, like urine," he is using arbitrarily symbolic behavior that must be decoded by the application of the rules of syntax and semantics. If, instead, he throws at the establishment spokesman a plastic bag filled with urine, he is using more naturally symbolic behavior. We consider both kinds of behavior symbolic, since they stand for general concepts that an observer easily infers.<sup>28</sup>

Thus, since man does use threat and physical act to express his views and to influence his environment, these acts too must fall within the scope of rhetoric along with Wallace's "good reasons" and Hunt's persuading of men to make free choices.

For a social movement to develop, real or perceived problems must exist within society; and as men attempt to deal with these and to urge their removal, the type of rhetoric which they employ will depend to a large extent upon the societal conditions in which they must seek to persuade others. If grievances are not perceived as significant or as deeply felt, we may expect the rhetoric to assume milder forms. But to the extent that "traditional" persuasive techniques -- i.e.,

verbal symbols either written or oral -- are not permitted or are ineffective, and to the extent that the dissatisfactions which gave rise to the rhetoric are not alleviated and such grievances remain important, we may expect the rhetoric to convey the value-laden elements of the scene. In such situations norm-oriented or reform movements become shifted toward revolution. If we are to understand social movements, we must understand the rhetoric which propels them -- and it may be the rhetoric of "good reasons," the rhetoric of "coercion," or the rhetoric of "the street."

#### A Perspective of Rhetorical "Criticism"

Rhetoric is the means by which man influences other men, or by which he symbolically induces his cooperation; and rhetorical criticism is the study of how man has used rhetoric. The goal of criticism is the "understanding of man himself",<sup>29</sup> is "illumination, the providing of insights into the work which will deepen the reader's [auditor's, observer's] understanding and appreciation."<sup>30</sup> While criticism per se has a long and glorified history, ranging from Aristotle and beyond, the growth of rhetorical criticism as a particular form of criticism is relatively new.

Perhaps the first American to call for the study of rhetoric according to the principles of its own existence was Brander Matthews in 1898:

The painters have long protested against any judgment of their work in accordance with the principles of another art; and at last they have

succeeded in convincing the more openminded of us that what is of prime important in a picture is the way in which it is painted, and that its merely literary merit is quite secondary. They are not unreasonable when they insist that the chief duty of a picture is to represent the visible world, not to paint a moral or adorn a tale, and that in the appreciation of a picture we must weigh first of all its pictorial beauty. Nor are sculptors asking too much, when in a statue they want us to consider chiefly its plastic beauty.

Now, the orator and the dramatist ask for themselves what has been granted to the painter and the sculptor: they request that an oration or a drama shall be judged not as literature only, but also in accordance with the principles of its own art.<sup>31</sup>

Even if we may question the standards of judging painting advanced by Matthews (one must wonder how he responded to the Impressionists), there can be little doubt that rhetoricians strongly agree with his claim to judge the "art" of rhetoric by those standards most appropriate.

Following upon Matthew's lead, Josephy Denney published a collection of speeches showing the way for all who would follow with his categories of legislative, farewell speeches, eulogies, and so on in 1910; and J. M. O'Neill published his Models of Speech Composition in 1922. These early works for the most part consisted of representative speeches which one studied in an effort to improve his own platform performance.<sup>32</sup>

If Matthew's cry was the conception, Herbert A. Wichelns "The Literary Criticism of Oratory" was the birth of rhetorical criticism when it was first published in 1925. Wichelns distinguished oratory from poetics; and then, in a passage

that would control (at least dominate) the discipline for the next half-century, wrote the following:

The scheme of a rhetorical study includes the element of the speaker's personality as a conditioning factor; it includes also the public character of the man -- not what he was, but what he was thought to be. It requires a description of the speaker's audience, and of the leading ideas with which he plied his hearers -- his topics, the motives to which he appealed, the nature of the proofs he offered. These will reveal his own judgment on the question he discussed . . . . Nor can rhetorical criticism omit the speaker's mode of arrangement and his mode of expression, nor his habit of preparation and his manner of delivery from the platform; though the last two are perhaps less significant. "Style" -- in the sense which corresponds to diction and sentence movement -- must receive attention, but only as one among various means that secure for the speaker ready access to the minds of his auditors. Finally, the effect of the discourse on its immediate hearers is not to be ignored, neither in the testimony of witnesses, nor in the record of events. And throughout such a study one must conceive of the public man as influencing the men of his own times by the power of his discourse.<sup>33</sup>

Among rhetoricians in 1925, Wichelns probably appeared as a Messiah; for his methodology was historic and, in a way, scientific. The critic was forced to study effects and thus to become kin to the historian -- who had academic respectability. By making the categories of criticism relatively uniform and laying out the areas which might be profitably studied, the approach smacked of rigor, of objectivity and offered the possibility of various critics producing similar results. In the words of Walter Fisher, it was as "though the adoption of method in rhetorical criticism was not only a matter of the identify of rhetoric as an academic discipline but also a means of redemption as well."<sup>34</sup>



In any field of inquiry there are milestones; and Wichelns' essay was perhaps the first in the field of rhetorical criticism. Although other works were published in the ensuing years <sup>35</sup> it was not until 1943 that the second appeared: William Brigance's A History and Criticism of American Public Address, a collection of essays on major orators which was patterned heavily in the Wichelns' method. But perhaps the one milestone which has had the greatest effect upon contemporary rhetorical critics is that published in 1948 by Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird -- Speech Criticism: The Development of Standards for Rhetorical Appraisal.<sup>35</sup>

Speech Criticism, as either a stimulant or an irritant to other critical methods and as a "guide" for critics, has probably had an effect unmatched by any other single work upon the field (with the exception of Aristotle's Rhetoric). Rhetorical criticism was defined as "a comparative study in which standards of judgment deriving from the social interaction of a speech situation are applied to public addresses to determine the immediate or delayed effect of the speeches upon specific audiences, and, ultimately, upon society."<sup>37</sup> The critic is warned that the success of the critical appraisal "depends heavily upon the critic's ability to effect faithful reconstructions of social settings long since dissolved";<sup>39</sup> and that "Aristotelian conceptions" are "safe points of departure into criticism."<sup>39</sup> We have an influential work heavily influenced by Wichelns' essay.

As might be expected of such an undertaking, it received both praise and blame. Charles Stewart wrote:

Speech Criticism presented the first histories of rhetorical criticism, treated aspects of criticism that writers had previously only mentioned, and explained the purposes and functions of rhetorical criticism. But this work offered a rather rigid scheme not readily applicable to studies of movements, issues, or campaigns; stressed political speaking; presented discovery of effect as the single goal for all criticism; and unwittingly opened the door for continued "cookie-cutter" studies in which the critic looked for a little emotional appeal, a little logic, a little ethos, a little style, and did not recognize the inter-relationships of these rhetorical principles.<sup>40</sup>

Other critics leveled other charges. Otis Walter responded to the tendency of using Aristotelian conceptualizations to discover all the available means of persuasion by asking, "Is it, after all, of much importance whether or not the Sermon on the Mount used the available means of persuading the audience of shepherds and fishermen? Suppose we found that the Speaker missed using some means of persuading the Galileans He addressed? Would not one be tempted to say 'so what?'"<sup>41</sup> And, among other criticisms leveled, Edwin Black objected because the heavy speaker-speech orientation, which stressed the speaker's background influencing his discourse which in turn influenced the audience, as ignoring the dynamics of the situation, i.e., the impact of the speech upon building expectations among the audience for future speeches, for committing the speaker to particular courses of action both rhetorically and ideologically, and the public image which he creates (or destroys).<sup>42</sup>

Perhaps the last word should go to those who would defend the neo-Aristotelian approach to rhetorical criticism (as the Wichelns/Thonssen and Baird approach has become known) when they contend, perhaps rightly, that the "critics who have decried traditional criticism have objected actually to its incomplete application" by practitioners and not by theorists.<sup>43</sup> Rightly or wrongly, any art is defined by its practice; a cross it must bear.

Arising out of this tradition, however, certain basic functions of rhetorical criticism have become reasonably standard among both neo-Aristotelian critics and their detractors. In one form or another, many of the more widely known critics have expressed statements similar to that made by Barnet Baskerville when he concluded, "The making of an intelligent critical judgment involves (1) thorough understanding of the thing being criticized, (2) formulation of acceptable criteria or philosophic principles of judgment, and (3) application of criteria to the object, idea, or event for the purpose of evaluation."<sup>44</sup> An evaluation contains more than just positive or negative valences toward the rhetorical phenomenon under consideration; for, as Edwin Black has written, "The person who hears a speech and says, 'I like it,' is not making a critical statement. He is reporting the state of his glands. . . ."<sup>45</sup> What is required is that the critic offer some justification for his evaluation, that he jump headlong into Wallace's "good reasons" for concluding as he has.

Once having made up his mind to make up his mind, the critic must still have some criteria by which to evaluate the speech, i.e., what shall be evaluated. And here the controversy begins. Thonssen and Baird opt for effect, arguing that a "rhetorical judgment is a composit of data and interpretation that is intended to reveal the effect of a given speech upon a particular group of listeners. The word effect, or response, is all-important. It suggests the central reason for rhetorical criticism."<sup>46</sup> While recognizing that effects need not be immediate, the implication from Thonssen and Baird is that we are usually concerned with the observed effect of the speech upon the immediate audience -- the one for whom the speech was originally conceived.

Thomas Nilsen, however, would have us "ask what the speech implies about rationality, tolerance, and the moral autonomy of the individual; what it implies about the expression of opinions, deliberation and persuasion . . . . Only if what the speech implies about these attitudes and procedures is made clear, can we make significant judgments about the ends to which the speech is moving men."<sup>47</sup> Wayland Parrish and Marie Hochmuth agree that we need to measure effect, but only as a subordinate factor to the quality of the speech, because "the judge or listener as Aristotle conceives him is always a qualified judge -- a person of good education, sound sense, and judicious temper. This is the kind of audience we must assume in assessing the effectiveness of a speech, for it is the kind of audience

aimed at in the best efforts of all our orators."<sup>48</sup> Perhaps so; but persons of good education, sound sense and judicious temper are few and far between, even in Athens. If we are to measure effect, it seems we are forced to consider that the audience in question may not have these characteristics -- and that if the orator spoke to such an audience as Parrish and Hochmuth have envisioned, he might well fail in the marketplace of ideas.

The most reasonable approach, and the most difficult, is one which seeks some compromise between the immediate effect and the "contribution the speech makes to, or the influence it exerts in furthering, the purpose of the society upon which it has its impact."<sup>49</sup> If we limit ourselves to the former we may be so time-bound that the true significance of the rhetorical act may not be felt; and if we deal only with the impact upon the society and the promotion of the societal goals, we may find ourselves unable to judge the speech since its complete influence may not be felt yet either, or else we may find ourselves defining "effective" rhetoric in terms of the institutionalized norms against which the rhetoric is addressing itself. With typical scholarly stance, Anthony Hillbruner has found a way out:

The general aim of the critic of public address is to discover what happened as a result of a given speech or a series of speeches. Specifically, such a study can take two distinct routes. The first is to determine the immediate effects of the speech. The second is to discover what the long range effects were. The critic can emphasize the one or the other of these areas, or obviously, he can deal with both, showing relations, comparisons, contrasts.<sup>50</sup>

The most reasonable approach seems to use which ever provides the greatest insight, the greatest illumination. However, the critic must remember that the rhetorical situation is not one-way as many of the neo-Aristotelians visualized it; rather, the response of the audience is a vital part of the message-method that produces the rhetoric of a given time and place. Thus, "rhetoric is shifted from a focus of reaction to one of interaction or transaction."<sup>51</sup>

Whenever one makes critical judgments, he must grapple with the choice of evaluating the work according to some "objective," readily identifiable standards or of allowing his subjective reactions to the work and its subject matter to enter into his considerations. While the application of standard criteria -- such as the use of proofs, syllogistic argumentation, etc. -- may provide clues and insights to the critic by which he may more completely understand the workings of the speech and gauge its effect, either immediately or in the long term, to do so without making some critical evaluation about the morality involved within the speech is to avoid the critic's primary responsibility -- that of providing understanding to man. Since each act has consequences for others, regardless of how miniscule, it is infused with morality. By considering these moral implications, as well as being aware of the ethical dimension of his own critical act, the rhetorical critic can provide a more complete illumination of the act under consideration. To the extent that the critic uses language to describe the speaker, the speech, the

historical setting, and the other factors mentioned as important by Wichelns and others, he is displaying an attitude, a symbolic construction of reality. The speech act being examined is perceived in terms of the critic's perceptual field; he is offering "a view of social reality. Through his criticism, the critic invites his reader to share in this reality . . . . The purpose of writing criticism is to share a world of meaning with other human beings. What is shared is not merely the evaluation of an object, but a way of ordering the universe."<sup>52</sup> The critic must interact with the object; and in so doing, experiences two types of existential interactions: (1) he must understand and interpret the experience which forms the content of the work; and (2) "the impact of the [rhetorical] work on him is itself an experience . . . ."<sup>53</sup>

In fully grasping the implications of each of these, the critic assumes a responsibility -- because of his special skills, and because of his own involvement in what happens to society -- for evaluating the speech act in terms of its (the speech's) impact upon society's moral fabric as perceived through his (the critic's) value system. Perhaps Marie Hochmuth Nichols provides the best example of this:

Surveying the rhetoric of Hitler's Mein Kampf, Kenneth Burke notes: "Here is the testament of a man who swung a great people into his wake. Let us watch it carefully, and let us watch it, not merely to discover some grounds for prophesying what political move is to follow Munich, and what move to follow that move, etc.; let us try also to discover what kind of 'medicine' this medicine-man

has concocted, that we may know, with greater accuracy, exactly what to guard against, if we are to forestall the concocting of similar medicine in America." Such an observation suggests the responsibility of the critic. His place should be in the vanguard, not in the rear -- wise-after-the-fact. He should be ready to alert a people, to warn that devices of exploitation are being exercised, by what skillful manipulations of motives men are being directed to or dissuaded from courses of action.<sup>54</sup>

It is to this end that the rhetorical critic must function.

Before departing our general discussion of rhetorical criticism, there is one additional area of disagreement which has particular concern for the student of the rhetoric of social movements. And it is a concern that arises from the encyclical of Wichelns himself. We are told that we are to analyze the historical setting in which the particular rhetorical act occurs; that we must analyze the audience to understand the reasons for the selection of various message components; and at the same time we are warned that we must "not get lost in such studies, since they are, strictly speaking extraneous to rhetoric. They are useful only insofar as they help in the rhetorical analysis of the speech itself. Properly speaking, they are excursions into the fields of history, sociology, or biography which furnish a background against which the speech itself may be studied."<sup>55</sup> Even such traditionalists as Thonssen and Baird warn us that "speeches are meaningful only when examined in the social settings of which they are a part";<sup>56</sup> and yet a field that is seeking to define its own discipline and to preserve its bailiwick



from the encroachments by other academic departments must be especially careful of preserving its own identity and chastity. Given the debate previously discussed about whether we have "rhetorical" or "social" movements, the student of movements must be particularly susceptible to such charges.

While we would not be so rash as to urge with Ross Winterowd that "those who are genuinely interested in developing rhetorical theory should leave the field of rhetoric and use it only as 'a system of classification that reconstitutes linguistics, psychology, sociology, or whatever as rhetoric'",<sup>57</sup> we would argue that the nature of rhetoric can only be properly understood as not so much a product but an interaction between the psychological constructs of the participants and the social surrounding. Rhetoric is vital to social movements; but the reasons for the success or failure of particular symbolic creations, indeed, even their existence at all, can only be fully comprehended within the framework which permits full exposure and consideration of the interactions among components.

We recognize that the rhetorical critic must be particularly careful of avoiding histories and of going beyond sociological and psychological monographs; but at the same time mere explication of metaphors and "rhetorical strategies" without an appreciation of the soil from which they spring are equally barren. We perhaps may draw some

solace from Kenneth Burke:

. . . once the door that gives us a glimpse of the speech's background is opened at all (as it must be), the aim to make a profound study of a text will and should require that it be opened much wider, even at the risk that the intrinsic examination of the text may get lost in the documenting of extrinsic factors.<sup>58</sup>

We may be able to avoid some of Burke's dichotomy of intrinsic and extrinsic factors if we view the rhetorical situation in terms of a confluence or interaction of the social environment, the psychological constructs of both individual and collective participants, and the symbolic expression which fuses them all together. To analyze this convergence, to interpret and evaluate it is the purpose of rhetorical criticism.

#### Rhetorical Criticism of Social Movements

We began this chapter with a testimonial from Adolf Hitler as to the value of the spoken word to social change. Eric Hoffer would apparently disagree:

There is hardly an example of a mass movement achieving vast proportions and a durable organization solely by persuasion. Professor K. S. Latourette, a very Christian historian, has to admit that "However incompatible the spirit of Jesus and armed force may be, and however unpleasant it may be to acknowledge the fact, as a matter of plain history the latter has often made it possible for the former to survive." It was the temporal sword that made Christianity a world religion. Conquest and conversion went hand-in-hand, the latter often serving as a justification for the former. Where Christianity failed to gain or retain the backing of state power, it achieved neither a wide nor a permanent hold.<sup>59</sup>

But, in claiming that rhetoric -- or persuasion -- is vital to the growth and success (or even failure) of social movements, we need not burden ourselves with claiming that such occurs "solely by persuasion." We can find justification enough for our study by turning to the devil himself when Hoffer remarks that it is "the militant man of words" who prepares the "ground for the rise of a mass movement."<sup>60</sup> Through such symbolic acts as "discrediting prevailing creeds and institutions", as "creating a hunger for faith in the hearts of those who cannot live without it", as "furnishing the doctrine and the slogans of the new faith", and as "undermining the convictions of the 'better people'" the ground for the movement is prepared. It is not solely rhetoric that provides the ferment; but it is largely rhetoric that brings the ferment to conscious awareness and raises the hope that there is something that may be done about it.<sup>61</sup>

It is the purpose of rhetorical criticism to provide understanding of rhetorical acts; and traditionally it has fulfilled this responsibility largely through studies of speakers, speeches, and the genres of particular forms of discourse. But if the masses have "lost confidence in the ability of a single speaker or a great man to deliver an adequate response," as James Golden has contended,<sup>62</sup> then it is largely through extended campaigns of rhetorical transactions that opinion is formed. During the Civil Rights Movement and the Peace Movement, it seems unlikely

that any one specific speech exerted great influence on the great bulk of American citizens. It is possible that particular speeches did persuade in that existing attitudes were reinforced; but the great mass of opinion change about human equality and the Vietnam War appears to be the response to long, varied rhetorical messages. And these messages were largely the products of social movements which dealt with the issues facing our society. It is largely for this reason that the Report of the Committee on the Advancement and Refinement of Rhetorical Criticism at the National Conference on Rhetoric urged further examination of social movements:

Rhetorical criticism should continue to examine, insofar as it can, contemporary rhetorical movements; that is, the rhetoric of the black power movement, the chicano movement, student protest movements, the women's liberation movement, and so forth.<sup>63</sup>

The impact of this call was already apparent before it was ever uttered (leading one to remember the old adage about the leader running to catch up with his people so he could find out where to lead them!). The trend of rhetorical criticism during the period of 1965 through 1970 found movement studies coming into the fore. A survey of movement studies from 1949 to 1969 by Charles J. Stewart found that 43 of seventy-five were completed in the four years following 1965.<sup>64</sup> In J. Jeffery Auer's Rhetoric of Our Times, only three of thirteen case studies in contemporary rhetoric deal with campaigns or movements, although two additional studies deal with a series of individual speakers.<sup>65</sup>

Concern with movements is not limited merely to the troubled decade of the 1960's. As early as 1923, the Department of Public Speaking at Cornell included among a listing of some subjects for graduate study, the following: "The oratory of definite periods and movement: Louis XIV, the French revolution, the American revolution, the rise of Puritanism, the southern secession."<sup>66</sup> In 1937, Donald C. Bryant gave passing reference to movements in a journal article<sup>67</sup>; and in 1943, rhetoricians hit the "mother lode." In the same issue of the Quarterly Journal of Speech, October 1943, Bower Aly and Dallac C. Dickey each gave special attention to movements as areas of future research:

. . . we need to study the movements and issues in different periods of American history and give attention to the interrelations of various speakers with the issues. Immediately we think of such problems as Abolition. Countering the Abolitionists were the forces of pro-slavery. Again there are such movements as Temperance, Populism, Agrarianism, Woman Suffrage, Tariff, Labor, Imperialism, and Isolationism.<sup>68</sup>

and:

Movements. American speeches have been peculiarly associated with certain great movements of public opinion. What were temperance orators like? What arguments did they use in persuading their audiences? What emotions did they arouse or attempt to arouse? What were the effects of their speeches? What did their listeners think about them? What kind of men were the abolition speakers? Was the movement for Woman's Suffrage advanced or impeded by speaking? These and countless similar questions confront anyone interested both in history and in speechmaking.<sup>69</sup>

Two things become apparent about these early calls for study of social movements (or historical movements, or rhetorical movements). First, they are still largely

conceptualized in terms of individual speakers within the movement; it is the single orator that sweeps up and surges the movement forward rather than the movement providing the occasion for the speaker. Second, they open the nasty door about which Burke spoke, for they require historical analysis.

It was not until S. Judsen Crandell published his monograph on social movements in 1947 that a broader approach was taken. Crandell, in what may well be the first major theoretical position to view movements as rhetorically unique and not an addendum to speaker-oriented studies, posited that a "social control study of the public speaking activities of a movement involves history, sociology, and social psychology."<sup>70</sup> He turned to sociological constructs to conceptualize the movement because, as he put it:

The traditional study of individual speakers employs a methodology of historical-literary-rhetorical criticism which has become fairly well standardized and accepted. The application of that methodology, however, to a number of speeches by different speakers becomes cumbersome in some of its divisions and neglects certain aspects of social control techniques not usually the concern of the rhetorical critic [is Crandell, at this early date, providing some justification for the study of nonverbal rhetoric?]. It is therefore necessary to bring to bear on the problem a methodology of a different sort and of changed emphasis.<sup>71</sup>

Crandell relied upon sociologist Jerome Davis' cycle of change, which begins with the expression of some need resulting in propaganda and agitation. From this there develops a growing number who organize and, if successful, become the new pattern which must then deal with other

movements.<sup>72</sup> Crandell's approach is important for the reasons mentioned -- i.e., it broke away from the "traditionalist" school and it gave particular importance to the role of persuasion (agitation and propaganda) within the social setting.

If Thonssen and Baird represent the touchstone for critics of individual speakers and/or speeches, Leland Griffin sets the original standard for most rhetorical critics of social movements. Griffin published "The Rhetoric of Historical Movements" in the Quarterly Journal of Speech in April 1952. Since then, many critics have utilized Griffin's methodology or have reacted against it. Griffin limits his concern to the rhetoric of persuasion, "not through the forces of wealth and arms", and calls for the isolation of "the rhetorical movement within the matrix of the historical movement."<sup>73</sup> While Griffin establishes a format or cycle of movements, based upon a natural history conceptualization, he does place emphasis upon the criticism of the rhetorical aspect:

A first, and obvious, principle is that the critic must judge the effectiveness of the discourse, individual as well as collective acts of utterance, in terms of the ends projected by the speakers and writers. He will not need to be cautioned against the error of assuming a necessary identity between ends publicly announced and those privately maintained.

A second, and derivative, principle is that the critic must judge the discourse in terms of the theories of rhetoric and public opinion indigenous to the times. This principle means that the critic will operate within the climate of theory of rhetoric and public opinion in which the speakers and writers he judges were reared, and in which they practiced . . . .<sup>74</sup>

While such an approach is commendable in dealing with the rhetorical acts and in gaining additional insights into the justification for selecting a particular course of action, to limit the criticism of the rhetoric to that prevalent at the times seems to ignore much of the value of rhetorical studies. Hopefully, what we have developed during decades, even centuries, of study represents some advancement. Assuming so, to only utilize what was available at the time places unjustified restrictions upon the critic seeking to completely understand the rhetoric of the movement.

Other writers gave cursory examination to the rhetorical criticism of movements throughout the early '60's; among them Sillars (who proclaimed that "there has been little attention to the rhetoric of movement. What pioneer work has been done on the procedure for examining movements has not gone much beyond the problem of definition.")<sup>75</sup> and Edwin Black. Black included the "movement study" as one of three "distinct approaches to the practices of rhetorical criticism . . . ." <sup>76</sup> Black generalizes from Griffin to conclude:

They [the techniques for examining the movement] are techniques fashioned for the analysis of argument on a large scale, for widening the scope of the rhetorical critic from the individual performance to the sweep of a persuasive campaign. And to characterize these techniques in this way is to reveal their limits as well as their applicability, for it is precisely the subject matter of criticism rather than its practice that the movement study affects.<sup>77</sup>



Such criticisms, which may well have been justified based upon the prevailing practices at the time Black wrote, seem nevertheless to be of the same cloth as his criticism of the neo-Aristotelian approach; hence, subject to the same rejoinder. Such a criticism seems more a fault of the practitioner than the theoretical perspective. But, if the traditionalist has his cross, so too must the student of movements. Many movement studies no doubt fall into the same trap as speaker-oriented criticism and become monographs on history and sociology rather than criticism;<sup>78</sup> but the movement critic who focuses upon the symbolic means by which the social setting, the issues and the participants are fused together would appear to avoid such a trap.

In 1966, Griffin again broke with the mold and advanced "A Dramatistic Theory of the Rhetoric of Movements", based largely upon Kenneth Burke's study of language and the nature of hierarchy. Griffin's approach still relied upon his earlier concept of movement as progressing through three phases (inception, rhetorical crisis, and consummation), but now the emphasis was quite different:

. . . man moves through the movements of his drama, which are also the movements of his movement: moves, all told, from Order, Guilt, and the Negative, through Victimage and Mortification, to Catharsis and Redemption. He moves, and is moved, through speech -- through the rhetorical power of the word, the persuasive power of language (for rhetoric is the essentially human mode of striving). He is moved by words of meaning, value, and desire; words that draw

him a fonte, futuristically. And engaged in struggle, in the act of strife, he is cleansed by the dialectical power of the word, the purifying power of language (for dialectic is the essentially human mode of transforming).

And thus, the study of a movement implies the study of its rhetoric. And thus the significance of "order, the Secret, and the Kill": for "to study the nature of rhetoric, the relation between rhetoric and dialectic, and the application of both to human relations in general, is to circulate about these motives."<sup>79</sup>

As an example of this approach, it is during the period of inception that one finds the rhetoric of an anti-movement, for it must be founded in the expression of the Negative to the established order and to infuse the masses with a rejection of the established hierarchy.

Following the application of Burke's hierarchical analysis to social movements, a virtual flood of approaches to the study of movement appeared throughout the professional journals of rhetoricians and communicationists. In 1970, Herbert Simon published the first major journal article since 1952 to provide a conceptualization of the rhetorical problems of movements. Interestingly enough, it concentrated upon a speaker-centered approach to movements and attempted to provide an analysis of the difficulties encountered by a leader-centered movement:

Rooted in sociological theory, [this paper] assumes that the rhetoric of a movement must follow, in a general way, from the very nature of social movements. Any movement . . . must fulfill the same functional requirements as more formal collectivities. These imperatives constitute rhetorical requirements for the leadership of a movement. Conflicts among requirements create rhetorical problems which in turn affect decisions on rhetorical strategy. The primary

rhetoical test of the leader -- and, indirectly, of the strategies he employs -- is his capacity to fulfill the requirements of his movement by resolving or reducing rhetorical problems.<sup>80</sup>

Simons then analyzed the potential problems, strategies and requirements in terms of confrontations between the leader and his movement membership, the leader and his opposition and the questions of media coverage and physical rhetoric.

Simons' article attempted to analyze the rhetorical aspects of a social movement largely from a traditional approach -- even though he objected to the applicability of "traditional" approaches to the study of movements. But what he is essentially doing is analyzing the means by which the speaker maintains his credibility and influence within both the movement and in opposition to the established order. As Simons presents the issue, the leader must analyze his audience and make the appropriate response. This is not to say that such an approach is not justified or valuable; but it does place a concentration upon the expressions of leaders which may detract from an analysis of broader, more sublimated strands of rhetoric throughout the movement.

Another approach, by Dan F. Hahn and Ruth Gonchar, expressed the belief that "social movements can be studied through the intertwining of four traditional categories of analysis, (ethos, logos, pathos, and style) . . . ."81 Under ethos, the student will seek to determine the nature

"of an ideal member of the movement"; logos will consider the premises, arguments, and evidence employed by the movement"; as the name suggests, pathos will be revealed by discovering which emotions the movement appeals to, which are ignored and "the target audiences of the emotional appeals"; and finally, style concentrates largely upon the metaphorical use of language by movement speakers.<sup>82</sup>

While the authors maintain throughout that each of these elements will interact with others, the danger that one readily sees apparent from such an approach is that it may encourage "cookie-cutter" criticism of social movements. The temptation looms large, as under speaker criticism, to merely catalogue the various elements and ignore the difficult examination of the interactions among them. Further, such an approach seems to concentrate the analysis upon the intention of the speakers themselves without giving sufficient attention to the interaction between the movement and the social setting or the movement and those it is addressing.

If Hahn and Gonchar are concerned with the metaphorical use of language in movements, as is evidenced by their definition of style, then Art Smith finds in metaphor the very essence of the movement:

. . . while it is possible to examine a movement from the viewpoint of a leader and his dilemmas [referring to the Simons article], it is crucial to a full rhetorical investigation to see what kinds of metaphors are employed to fire the movement's ideological engines. In other words, a sociological based theory is adequate neither as a description nor presentation of the rhetorical

dimension of a mass movement. What is argued then, is a message centered theory that affirms the communication phenomenon and explains the use of principal metaphors.<sup>83</sup>

As an example of this validity of metaphor, Smith posits that the crucial difference between the civil rights movement led by Martin Luther King and the Back-to Africa movement of Marcus Garvey was the rhetorical creation of reality. Smith asserts that

Little was changed in terms of choices, fundamental opposition, followers, and socio-economic positions of blacks relative to whites. Rhetoric as the producing art defined the metaphors that guided the movements, in fact, the metaphors were the rhetoric. This point is further advertised by the fact that Garvey and King were both close enough to the traditional prototype of the black orator to attract large crowds, both understood certain basic organizational principles, both possessed a keen sense of black history, both had a core of ardent followers, both appealed to the middle classes, and both led movements that lasted for nearly a decade. But studying sociology or history alone provides no explication of the external and internal messages generated by the movement. Not even a combination of these disciplines can adequately describe the nature of the communication inherent in the movement phenomenon.<sup>84</sup>

We would agree with much that Smith claims: for instance, equation of rhetoric and metaphor -- for both are manifestations of the use of language, that rhetoric guides movements depending to some extent upon the rhetorical choices made by the leaders or speakers, and even that sociology and history cannot "adequately describe the nature of the communication inherent in the movement . . . ." However, we would not agree with the

conclusion which one must derive from this that it is the function of these disciplines to do so. Just as we ought not to claim too much for rhetoric (for, even as important as it is, rhetoric cannot provide all the answers), neither should we attack something for not doing what it cannot do and does not claim to do. History and sociology (even throwing in psychology for good measure) cannot "adequately describe" the communication of movements any more than a mere analysis of the Back-to-Africa theme can explain the sociological and psychological characteristics which either made it appropriate or not. We would tend to agree with Smith that one major difference between the King and Garvey movements was the message and the metaphor; but one cannot adequately explain why one metaphor achieved preeminence in a given time among a given group, or why it failed to do so, without consideration of external factors.

Sharing Smith's dissatisfaction with sociological and historical conceptualizations of movements, largely on the grounds that such views obscure our perceptions as rhetoricians, Robert Cathcart has proposed an alternative. Cathcart argues that a movement is "not a historical palce, but a dramatic situation where moral strivings for salvation bring human agencies into conflict."<sup>85</sup> A dramatic theory of movement requires a similar definition; which is provided by "two Burkeian ratios -- agency-scene and agency-act. . . ."<sup>86</sup>

. . . for a movement to come into being there must be one or more actors who, perceiving that the "good order" (the established system) is in

reality a faulty order full of absurdity and injustice, cry out through various symbolic acts that true communion, justice, and salvation cannot be achieved unless there is an immediate corrective applied to the established order. On the other hand, there must be a reciprocating act from the establishment or counter rhetors which perceives the demands of the agitator's rhetoric, not as calls for correction or re-righting the prevailing order, but as direct attacks on the foundations of the established order. It is this reciprocity or dialectical enjoinder in the moral arena which defines movements and distinguishes them from other dramatic forms.

The essential attribute here is the creation of a dialectical tension growing out of moral conflict.<sup>87</sup>

Such an approach seems to verge back to the sociological in a number of ways. First, the very nature of the agency-scene ratio brings into focus the interaction between the rhetoric and the social setting in which it occurs, which would require -- if not sociological definitions -- at least sociological consideration. Second, the emphasis upon the "moral conflict" would tend to limit the concept of movement in this instance to only those which might be called value-oriented, or as we have called them, revolutionary.

Thus far, several writers have commented on the usefulness of certain of Kenneth Burke's ideas as tools of analyzing social movements. Griffin relied upon the nature of hierarchy and of the negative; Cathcart mentions two specific ratios. Perhaps it would be well for us to briefly present Burke's notion of the pentad:

We shall use five terms . . . . They are: Act, Scene, Agent, Agency, Purpose. In a rounded statement about motives, you must have some word that names the act (names what took place, in thought or deed), and another that names the scene (the background of the act, the situation in which it

occurred); also, you must indicate what person or kind of person (agent) performed the act, what means or instruments he used (agency), and the purpose. Men may violently disagree about the purposes behind a given act, or about the character of the person who did it, or how he did it, or in what kind of situation he acted; or they may even insist upon totally different words to name the act itself. But be that as it may, any complete statement about motives will offer some kind of answers to these five questions: what was done (act), when or where it was done (scene), who did it (agent), how he did it (agency), and why (purpose).<sup>88</sup>

Without advocating or using what might be called a "Burkeian analysis" of social movements, such an overall framework does express the interrelationships which we advocate should be examined. Additionally, it suggests that the use of an act must be in accordance with, appropriate to, the remainder of the pentad -- i.e., we would not expect a violent call for force from a movement ostensibly dedicated to the promotion of peace. For, in the rhetorical act which is part and parcel of the social movement, "such naming as friend, foe, automobile or bastard not only names things, but in growing out of experience, suggest appropriate courses of action."<sup>89</sup> As Marie Hochmuth Nichols has contended, "language-using is an act. The motive is the situation in general. Thus words act upon us as the result of an agent who uses them, the scene out of which they grow, the purpose for which they are intended, and the strategies that are employed in manipulating them. . . . a symbolic situation represents a coordination or interrelationship of act, agent, agency, purpose and scope [scene]."<sup>90</sup>



One aspect of Burke's pentad which is particularly flexible in use is the notion of circumference, which for Burke means that, "when 'defining by location,' one may place the object of one's definition in contexts of varying scope. And . . . the scene-act ratio . . . suggest that . . . the choice of circumference for the scene in terms of which a given act is to be located will have a corresponding effect upon the interpretation of the act itself."<sup>91</sup> As an example of this, Burke discusses Thomas Mann's work, contending that virtually all of the "errors" which marked National Socialism were present in Mann's writings. He adds, however, that, "He contains them, but encompasses them within a wider frame -- and as so encompassed, they act entirely differently than they would if 'efficiently' isolated in their 'purity.'"<sup>92</sup> The entire nature of an act may be altered depending upon the context, the circumference in which the critic places it. Thus, a traditional speaker-speech, neo-Aristotelian critic might well focus upon a given speech and be concerned with the immediate audience, while a movement study might place this act, within a larger context, in an entirely different light.

It is, then, the rhetorical act -- the use of symbolic expression, verbal or not -- that fuses the elements of scene, agent, purpose together. And it is the function of the rhetorical critic to analyze such occurrences and to report his interpretations and evaluations to his fellow man. Bruce Gronbeck has maintained that there are four

classes of force which affect society: social-psychological forces (which are beliefs and perceptions creating individual and collective attitudes); political-institutional forces (the centers of influence among institutions, cultures and individuals); philosophical-ideological forces (the values and ideational structures available); and rhetorical forces. It is the latter which are the "great integrative forces. Communication binds men into social-psychological groups, interlaces centers of power, and gives form to philosophical-ideological prepositions. It is discourse which allows a power-center to advance a philosophy-ideology to a social-psychological grouping. Rhetorical forces function as a set of skills able to create, sustain, and terminate movements by uniting the other forces."<sup>93</sup> It is this view of rhetoric, of symbolic action, which appears to us as the most reasonable as critics attempting to understand social movements. Rhetoric does not explain the existence, the growth or failure of movements; but it does become the visible product/producer of the interface among the other components. "A perfect symbol," writes Geroge Knox, "might fuse biographical factors, psychological archetypes, social patterns, and specific requirements of formal progression."<sup>94</sup> In order to understand this "perfect symbol" -- the rhetoric of social movements, we must often "look to a work by leading" oneself "away from it."<sup>95</sup> It is for this reason that we advocate the rhetorical criticism of social movements; and that we advocate the use of sociological and psychological

constructs, where useful, in the process of rhetorical criticism. Perhaps we may find some encouragement, as well as awareness of the difficulties of good criticism, in Carroll C. Arnold's "Reflections":

To be comprehensive, rhetorical studies must treat the influential roles of untraditional media and of nonverbal communication. To be incisive, rhetorical studies must probe the various aspects of rhetorical transactions philosophically, as well as historically, psychologically and sociologically. To be penetrating, rhetorical studies must probe rhetorical transactions, phenomenologically and existentially, as well as traditionally. To be clear, rhetorical studies must stipulate better than they have how "reason" and the "rational" are understood to exist and function in communications aiming at influencing human choice. Withal, rhetorical studies ought not abandon any linguistic, historical, or analytical prescience developed through past inquiry and experience.<sup>95</sup>

#### Summary

We have in this chapter attempted to explore some of the relationships between rhetoric, criticism and social movements. Rhetoric is unquestioningly an influence in social movements; and because of this importance, the place of rhetorical critics within society is assured. However, it is a place which must be claimed -- and it may best be done through difficult to do, meaningful criticism. Rhetoric is not only the "reasoned discourse" or the good man speaking well that many would wish it be. It is, rather, virtually any form of symbolic action by which man attempts to influence his environment. As such, it encompasses the traditional platform speech, the media broadcast, the pamphlet;

and it also includes the gesture, the nonviolent demonstration, and other forms of "coercive-persuasion." It is because of an attempt at understanding such actions that rhetorical criticism may provide such useful functions as it explains the phenomenon under examination, interprets it . using all there is to use which will add meaning to the act, and then evaluates the act in terms of its immediate and its "broader-circumferenced" impact and implication. Finally, we have reviewed several approaches toward the rhetorical study of social movements; opting for one which enables us to view the rhetorical (i.e., symbolic) act as integrating and fusing the other constituents into an interacting relationship. It is an understanding, an illumination, of social movements through this integrating element of rhetoric that we shall now pursue.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup>Adolf Hitler, quoted in Marie Hochmuth Nichols, Rhetoric and Criticism, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963), p. 29.
- <sup>2</sup>Edwin Black, Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method, (New York: MacMillan Co., 1965), p. 126.
- <sup>3</sup>Charles W. Lomas, "Rhetorical Criticism and Historical Perspective," Western Speech, Summer, 1968, Vol. 32, No. 3, p. 203.
- <sup>4</sup>Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1355b, 26-27, in Richard McKeon, (ed.), The Basic Works of Aristotle, (New York: Random House, 1941), p. 1329.
- <sup>5</sup>Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), p. 43.
- <sup>6</sup>Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, Speech Criticism: The Development of Standards for Rhetorical Appraisal, (New York: Ronald Press, 1948), p. 5.
- <sup>7</sup>Marie Hochmuth (ed.), A History and Criticism of American Public Address, Volume III, (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1955), p. 8.
- <sup>8</sup>Black, p. 15.
- <sup>9</sup>Everett Hunt, "Rhetoric as a Humane Study," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 41, No. 2, April 1955, p. 114.
- <sup>10</sup>Karl R. Wallace, "The Substance of Rhetoric: Good Reasons," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 49, No. 3, October 1963, p. 248.
- <sup>11</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>12</sup>Donald C. Bryant, "Rhetoric: Its Functions and Its Scope," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 39, No. 4, December 1953, p. 413.
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- <sup>14</sup>Bryant, pp. 404-405.
- <sup>15</sup>Robert L. Scott and Donald K. Smith, "The Rhetoric of Confrontation," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 55, No. 1, February 1969, pp. 1-8.

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- 22 Leland M. Griffin, "The Rhetorical Structure of the 'New Left' Movement: Part I," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 50, No. 2, April 1964, p. 127.
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- 29 Black, p. 9.
- 30 Barnet Baskerville, "Rhetorical Criticism, 1971: Retrospect, Prospect, Introspect," Southern Speech Journal, Vol. 37, No. 2, Winter 1971, P. 118.

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- <sup>33</sup>Herbert A. Wichelns, "The Literary Criticism of Oratory," in Robert L. Scott and Bernard L. Brock (eds.), Methods of Rhetorical Criticism: A Twentieth-Century Perspective, (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 56-57. Originally published in Studies in Rhetoric and Public Speaking in Honor of James Albert Winans, by Pupils and Colleagues, Century Co., New York, 1925.
- <sup>34</sup>Walter R. Risher, "Method in Rhetorical Criticism," Southern Speech Journal, Vol. 35, No. 2, Winter 1969, p. 103.
- <sup>35</sup>Nichols,
- <sup>36</sup>Thonssen and Baird,
- <sup>37</sup>Ibid, p. 16.
- <sup>38</sup>Ibid, p. 312.
- <sup>39</sup>Ibid, p. 15.
- <sup>40</sup>Charles J. Stewart, "Historical Survey: Rhetorical Criticism in Twentieth Century America," in G. P. Mohrmann, Charles J. Stewart, and Donovan J. Ochs, (eds.), Explorations in Rhetorical Criticism, (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1973), p. 11.
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- <sup>43</sup>Robert L. Scott and Bernard L. Brock, "The Experiential Perspective," in Scott and Brock, Methods on Rhetorical Criticism, p. 124. Also, J. A. Hendrix, "In Defense of Neo-Aristotelian Rhetorical Criticism" Western Speech, Vol. 32, No. 4, Fall 1968, pp. 246-252.
- <sup>44</sup>Barnet Baskerville, "The Critical Method in Speech," Central States Speech Journal, Vol. 4, No. 2, July 1953, p. 1. Others who have expressed the same or nearly the same opinion are Scott and Brock, in Methods of Rhetorical Criticism, p. 9; Edwin Black in Rhetorical Criticism, p. 4; Charles Lomas, "Rhetorical Criticism and Historical Perspective" in Western Speech, Vol. 32, No. 3, Summer 1968, pp. 197-198; Thonssen and Baird, "Methodology in the Criticism of Public Address," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 33, No. 2, April 1947, p. 134; and Marie Hochmuth "The Criticism

of Rhetoric," in History and Criticism of American Public Address, Volume III, p. 4.

<sup>45</sup>Black, pp. 7-8.

<sup>46</sup>Thonssen and Baird, Speech Criticism, p. 9.

<sup>47</sup>Thomas R. Nilsen, "Interpretative Function of the Critic," in Nilsen (ed.), Essays on Rhetorical Criticism, p. 95.

<sup>48</sup>Parrish and Hochmuth, p. 12.

<sup>49</sup>Thomas R. Nilsen, "Criticism and Social Consequences," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 48, No. 2, April 1956, p. 176.

<sup>50</sup>Anthony Hillbruner, Critical Dimensions: The Art of Public Address Criticism, (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 59.

<sup>51</sup>Scott and Smith, "Rhetoric of Confrontation," p. 3, footnote.

<sup>52</sup>Philip Wander and Steven Jenkins, "Rhetoric, Society, and the Critical Response," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 58, No. 4, December 1972, p. 450.

<sup>53</sup>Northrop Frye, The Well-Tempered Critic, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1963), p. 128.

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<sup>56</sup>Thonssen and Baird, p. 11.

<sup>57</sup>W. Ross Winterowd, "Review of The Prospect of Rhetoric," Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol. 6, No. 1, Winter 1973, p. 51.

<sup>58</sup>Kenneth Burke, "Comments," Western Speech, Vol. 32, No. 3, Summer 1968.

<sup>59</sup>Eric Hoffer, The True Believer, (New York: Perennial Library Edition, Harper & Row, 1966), p. 100. Quoting Latourette, The Unquenchable Light, (New York: Harper & Bros., 1937), Vol. I, p. 164.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid, p. 128.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid.



- <sup>62</sup>James L. Golden, "Social Movements as Rhetorical Situations," Paper presented to the Speech Communication Association Convention, Chicago, Illinois, December 1972, p. 8.
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- <sup>67</sup>Donald C. Bryant, "Some Problems of Scope and Method in Rhetorical Scholarship," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 23, No. 2, April 1937, p. 187.
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- <sup>70</sup>S. Judson Crandell, "The Beginnings of a Methodology for Social Control Studies in Public Address," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 33, No. 1, February 1947, p. 36.
- <sup>71</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>72</sup>Ibid, Methodology is taken from Jerome Davis, Contemporary Social Movements, 1930, pp. 8-9.
- <sup>73</sup>Leland M. Griffin, "The Rhetoric of Historical Movements," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 38, No. 2, April 1952, p. 184-185.
- <sup>74</sup>Ibid, p. 187.
- <sup>75</sup>Malcom O. Sillars, "Rhetoric as Act," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 50, No. 3, October 1964, pp. 281-282.
- <sup>76</sup>Black, p. 18-19.
- <sup>77</sup>Ibid, p. 20.

<sup>78</sup>As an example of a "movement study" which is more a treatise in political science with only minimal applicability to rhetoric of social movements, see Herbert W. Simons, James W. Chesebro, and C. Jack Orr, "A Movement Perspective on the 1972 Presidential Election," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 59, No. 2, April 1973, pp. 168-179.

<sup>79</sup>Leland M. Griffin, "A Dramatistic Theory of the Rhetoric of Movements," in William H. Rueckert (ed.), Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969), p. 457-458.

<sup>80</sup>Herbert W. Simons, "Requirements, Problems, and Strategies: A Theory of Persuasion for Social Movements," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 56, No. 1, February 1970, p. 2.

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<sup>82</sup>Ibid, pp. 47-51.

<sup>83</sup>Arthur L. Smith, "Historical and Social Movements: A Search for Boundaries," Paper presented at the Speech Communication Association Convention, Chicago, Illinois, December 1972, p. 10.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid, p. 6.

<sup>85</sup>Robert S. Cathcart, "New Approaches to the Study of Movements: Defining Movements Rhetorically," Western Speech, Vol. 36, No. 2, Spring 1972, p. 87.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid, p. 87.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid.

<sup>88</sup>Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), p. xv

<sup>89</sup>Nichols, p. 83

<sup>90</sup>Ibid, p. 90.

<sup>91</sup>Burke, p. 77.

<sup>92</sup>George Knox, Critical Moments; Kenneth Burke's Categories and Critiques, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1957), p. 36-37. Quoting Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form, LSU Press, 1941, pp. 49-52.

<sup>93</sup>Bruce E. Gronbeck, "The Rhetoric of Social-Institutional Change: Black Action at Michigan," in Mohrmann, Stewart and Ochs, p. 98.

<sup>94</sup>Knox, p. 50-51.

<sup>95</sup>Ibid.

<sup>96</sup>Carroll C. Arnold, "Reflections on the Wingspread Convergence,"  
in Prospect of Rhetoric, p. 199.

## Chapter IV

### RHETORIC AND THE SOCIAL ASPECTS OF MOVEMENTS

Talking once with a miner I asked him when the housing shortage first became acute in his district; he answered, "When we were told about it. . . ."1

#### Introduction

Social movements have been defined as a form of collective action directed toward some change in society -- be it institutional, customary, ideological or whatever -- which exists over time and arises out of some dissatisfaction with the present or of some hope for the future. Additionally, the movement is composed of a voluntary membership bound together by an ideology.<sup>2</sup> It is rhetoric, the symbolic expression through which man acts to influence his environment, that enables such movements to emerge, to develop and perhaps to succeed. At the same time, it is often rhetoric which sounds the death-knell for a movement's acceptance and expansion. If we are to study movements, then we must inquire into its rhetoric; and yet our inquiry into its rhetoric will prove fruitless unless we consider the social forces operating to make it effective or not -- for "the rhetorical act of any speaker cannot be isolated by the critic from the life-world (Lebenswelt) by which the rhetor and his auditors personally construct or affirm their intercommunication."<sup>3</sup>

Any examination of the "social world" requires that we consider the discipline of sociology which is defined by Talcott Parsons as:

a science which attempts the interpretive understanding of social action in order thereby to arrive at a causal explanation of its cause and effects. In "action" is included all human behaviour when and in so far as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to it. Action in this sense may be either overt or purely inward or subjective; it may consist of positive intervention in a situation, or of deliberately refraining from such intervention or passively acquiescing in the situation. Action is social in so far as, by virtue of the subjective meaning attached to it by the acting individual (or individuals), it takes account of the behaviour of others and is thereby oriented in its course.<sup>4</sup>

Such a conceptualization of sociology reveals a social system involving a process of interactions between actors, occurring in situations in which the other actors "are objects of cathexis." "There is . . . interdependent and, in part, concerted action in which the concert is a function of collective goal orientation or common values, and of a consensus of normative and cognitive expectations."<sup>5</sup>

In the attempt to discern causal explanations for social movements various interpretations of the workings of the social system, the interactions among actors, have been advanced. This chapter will briefly consider some of these approaches and will view the social interactions (largely through rhetoric) which emerge from the sociological characteristics of movements as presented, i.e., the existence of a source of strain, an ideology, membership, leadership, organization, and social control.

## General Approaches of Sociology

While no examination of sociological theory can hope to be complete when placed under rather severe space limitations, a brief presentation of some major approaches to social change are necessary before any more detailed examination of social interactions can be made. This section does not attempt to survey all of the theoretical analyses of social action; it does, however, present certain generalizations from what appear to us as the most pervasive in contemporary sociological literature.

We shall ignore from the outset certain theories predicated upon supernatural forces, environmental determinants and biological factors; for, as Amitai and Eva Etzioni have written:

The supernatural theories have been discarded on the ground that the factors they deal with are not amenable to scientific inquiry; the environmental and biological theories because the factors they deal with change extremely slowly and therefore could hardly explain the changes of human society, which are occasionally quite rapid. The amount of rainfall in Russia and its racial composition hardly changed from 1817 to 1917 and so cannot adequately account for the shift from a tsarist to a communist regime.<sup>6</sup>

Instead, we shall consider theories of class, of status, of functional-stratification and of mass-man.

Perhaps the most widely discussed theory of social change, and the one which generates more heated discussion than others, is that of class distinctions. Rudolf Heberle contends that "the great social movements have very largely

been the expression of class sentiments, class aspirations, and more or less class-conscious action."<sup>7</sup> While it need not be so, most interpretations of class have been derived from economic positions and find their genesis in the writings of Karl Marx and Fredrich Engles.

Marxian theory developed from the Hegelian dialectic and envisioned a world where economic competition between classes would prepare the ground for a new class arrival. Thus, from the thesis of fuedalism and the antithesis of serfdom arose the synthesis of capitalist economies; which then emerged into the thesis of the bourgeois-capitalist and antithesis of the proletarian-worker. This is not to say that there is constant conflict. In fact, Marx even envisions cooperation during stable periods and that some will develop a "false class-consciousness" which means that initial loyalties will be to the capitalist and not the proletariat. Ultimately, however, polarization between these two classes will occur:

The law of the falling rate of profit, of competition, overproduction, and periodic depression, of the pauperization of the masses, will bring about the economic ruin of intermediate layers of the population such as shopkeepers, artisans, small masters and the like. In time, differences in religious belief, regional traditions, rural and urban life-styles, skills based on craftsmanship and training, even national sentiments will be erased by the inevitable march of technological and economic change under capitalism. As these differences disappear, the increasingly homogenous proletariat will become more organized, disciplined, class-conscious, and militant. In time, the revolutionary overthrow of the bourgeois-minority becomes inevitable.<sup>8</sup>

Two interesting implications emerge from this analysis: first, the resulting dictatorship of the proletariat becomes uniquely immune from dialectical tension of thesis-antithesis which predominated all other economic orders (and hence, social orders); and second, that class in these terms is predominantly economic. We should submit, however, that when individuals perceive themselves as downtrodden in terms of status, wealth, power and so on, the tendency will be inevitably to consider themselves as constituting a "class."<sup>9</sup>

We should not, however, accept such theories without reservation. Seymour Lipset, in a rather long passage, raises serious doubts about the "inevitability" of the Marxian approach to overcome interest-group differences among working classes:

Before 1914, the classic division between the working-class left parties and the economically privileged right was not based solely upon such issues as redistribution of income, status, and educational opportunities, but also rested upon civil liberties and international policy. The workers, judged by the policies of their parties, were often the backbone of the fight for greater political democracy, religious freedom, minority rights, and international peace, while the parties backed by the conservative middle and upper classes in much of Europe tended to favor more extremist political forms, to resist the extension of suffrage to back the established church, and to support jingoistic foreign policies.

Events since 1914 have gradually eroded these patterns. In some nations working class groups have proved to be the most nationalistic sector of the population. In some they have been in the forefront of the struggle against equal rights for minority groups, and have sought to limit immigration or to impose racial standards in countries with open immigration. The



conclusion of the anti-fascist era and the emergence of the cold war have shown that the struggle for freedom is not a simple variant of the economic class struggle.<sup>10</sup>

What seems to be the important factor, mentioned earlier, is that economic considerations are not the sole determinants of social change, and hence, social movements. Economic-class concepts may be applied to any interest group and it may perceive itself as being an "oppressed class," but to apply the more traditional Marxian analysis to an examination of social movements would seem most profitable in those societies characterized by fairly rigid social systems where class distinctions are reasonably distinct. In Europe, for example, social movements have historically assumed the mantle of class distinction; and in underdeveloped countries, working class and agrarian interests may agitate for social change largely from the perspective of class.<sup>11</sup>

Status is another orientation from which sociologists have explained social movements. Such movements are usually centered about social values and power considerations and have been used as explanations for middle class, conservative and Fascist movements. "In contemporary writings, status analyses have been most frequently applied to North America . . . . Here, consumer credit and cheap imitations of symbols of rank are available to all but the most wretchedly, and largely invisible, poor. As a consequence, most Americans subjectively consider themselves part of the nebulous middle class."<sup>12</sup> The difficulty with such an analysis of

social movements is that it does not adequately explain middle-class involvement or precipitation of left-oriented movements. In terms of status theory, those who are most threatened with elimination or decreasing status will initiate regressive movements so as to maintain their positions. However, often the middle-class has been the primary source of leftist movements (e.g., the Civil Rights Movement in its early stages and the Peace Movement). Additionally, differences in status may also be perceived as reflecting "class" distinctions; and the analysis is not particularly helpful in these terms.

Other theorists tend to view society as structured along functional lines. According to some criteria -- whether it be on educational, skill, intelligence levels or even upon tolerance for unpleasant work -- distinctions are made among positions within society. Those which are deemed as more important are then accorded greater reward (either material or symbolic) to motivate more capable persons into these positions so that society may function more efficiently. "Thus", writes Alvin Boskoff, "stratification systems result from a combination of (a) specialization, (b) differential value of roles, (c) the law of supply and demand, and (d) a presumed rationality in ordering or adjusting valuation of roles and valuation of persons."<sup>13</sup> It is this latter characteristic that will determine the ideology or values of the social order. As such, when the system of rewards is no

longer commensurate with necessary skills, intelligence, or other determinants of how reward ought to be distributed within society (e.g., lower strata may decide that the services they perform to society are increasingly important, and hence, deserving of greater reward), we may expect strains to develop within society. Among those sociologists who might be considered as "functionalists" are Talcott Parsons, Edward Shils and, although placing greater emphasis upon the subjective will of the individual, Max Weber.<sup>14</sup>

The final broad approach we shall consider is that of "mass theory." Mass society theorists make significant distinctions between earlier and post-industrial societies. Whereas pre-industrial life was predicated upon close-knit, relatively small and stable organizations and relationships, the modern, industrial society is characterized by impersonal bureaucracies, technological standardization of both products and beliefs, and greater central control over the pre-existing smaller units of organization. According to Joseph Gusfield, "the emphasis is upon the breakdown of immediate relationships and differentiations so that the population is now more homogeneous but also less sharply identified and affiliated with distinctive social groupings. It is in this sense that the theorist of mass society views the traditional categories of sociological analysis -- family, class, community, ethnic identity, etc. -- as having lost significance in mass societies."<sup>15</sup> It is this breakdown between culturally defined norms and goals,

and the structural capabilities of members within that culture to act congruent with them, that creates anomie -- a breakdown of norms.<sup>16</sup> When man is placed in such a position, he may "either . . . escape from the burden of this freedom [i.e., man is no longer constrained by traditional norms and conduct] into new dependencies and submission, or to advance to the full realization of positive freedom which is based on the uniqueness and individuality of man."<sup>17</sup> This new freedom consists "in the spontaneous activity of the total, integrated personality."<sup>18</sup> For Erich Fromm, this means largely the expression of the individual will emotionally, intellectually and sensuously. In either instance of man's "escape from freedom", whether into new dependencies or spontaneous activity from the will, such expression may well lead to the existence of social movements to the extent that collective behavior occurs.

The notion of "mass society" has largely been advanced by Emile Durkheim, A. W. Kornhauser, Rolf Dahrendorf and Erich Fromm. But, as Paul Wilkinson has maintained in Social Movement, such theorists

do not begin to explain why some highly industrialized societies have developed powerful totalitarian movements while others have not. No adequate empirical evidence has yet been adduced to prove that, in certain societies, populations are foredoomed to a state of nihilism, apathy or 'privatized' docility. Furthermore, how is one to identify a quantitative increase in 'social alienation' (which Kornhauser defines as the 'distance between the individual and his society')? Again, although a totalitarian movement or regime will, by definition, attempt to bring all secondary

group activity under its own central control, we have no evidence for assuming that pluralist groups in non-totalitarian societies have entered on a period of inevitable decline.<sup>19</sup>

It is, in fact, these voluntary associations which predominate in open-societies and mitigate the effects of anomie.

Sociologists have debated the merits and demerits of these theoretical approaches for decades, and we cannot hope to resolve them here. Rather, it seems that each of these attempts to account for some imbalance in society between the prevalent values or norms and the capability of individuals, or groups of individuals, to live lives, perhaps of quiet desperation, which are congruent with the broader, overarching values of society. Such theories may be more helpful in examining social change, and hence social movements, on an individual base depending upon the characteristics of a given society (i.e., class distinctions may be more beneficial in explaining the socialist movement in Britain than the Peace Movement in America) than in providing one, all-inclusive theory for all movements. In each of these perspectives, however, with the possible exception of the more dogmatic interpretations of Marxism, we can see man striving consciously for greater congruence between societal and individual norms and values. Man is an actor within a system of actors; and his actions will both be the result of and a creator of the system in which he exists. Man acts to the extent that he consciously attaches meaning to human behavior -- and he does so largely through symbolic means.

## Rhetoric and the Social Characteristics of Movements

A reading of contemporary literature on social movements from a sociological perspective tends to reveal that certain characteristics are discussed consistently -- among these are the necessity for some source of strain, the ideology, membership, leadership, organization and social control of movements. Regardless of which specific general approach toward social change one takes (that is, whether a class theory, status or mass society), these characteristics all are equally applicable. In class analysis, the source of strain is the natural tension between the capitalist and the proletariat, each forced into polarization by mutually exclusive interests; the ideology may be provided by the theory itself -- the inevitability of the success of the proletariat; the membership will be composed of the working class; leadership and organization will provide the most efficient means of assuring the rise of the dictatorship of the proletariat; and the social control employed by the capitalists will have an influence upon the specific difficulties which the movement must overcome and how extreme the measures taken to insure success must be. While specific interpretations or applications will probably differ depending upon which approach (and consequently what one considers the "underlying cause" or the source of strain) is used, each of these specific characteristics will appear.

It is for these reasons, then, that we shall not consider each specific theoretical approach and the rhetorical

implications arising from it as an analytical tool for our study of movements; but rather we shall concentrate upon an analysis of each of these components of the movement which typify interactions among actors and upon how rhetoric is vital for each, and vice versa. Unfortunately, whenever concepts are arbitrarily divided for analysis, interrelationships among them tend to become increasingly obscure. Therefore, it is imperative that we remember that ideology does not function except in relation with leadership, sources of strain, organization and so on. With this caveat in mind, let us pursue our study of rhetoric and the social characteristics of movements.

Throughout this study we have maintained that a necessary, but not sufficient, prerequisite for the emergence of any social movement is some source of strain, which Smelser defined as "an impairment of the relations among and consequently inadequate functioning of the components of action."<sup>20</sup> Just as conflict is inevitable, so too is the formation of strain within a society. Edward Shils, Talcott Parsons and James Olds write:

There cannot be a society in which some of the members are not exposed to a conflict of values; hence personality strains with resultant pressures against the expectation-system of the society are inevitable. Another basic source of conflict is constitutional variability and the consequent difficulties in the socialization of the different constitutional types. It is impossible for the distribution of the various constitutional endowments to correspond exactly to the distribution of initial or subsequent roles and statuses in the social system, and the misfits produce strains and possibly alienation. What is more, the allocative process always produces serious strains by denying to some members of the society what they think they are

entitled to, sometimes exacerbating their demands so that they overreach themselves and infringe on the rights of others. Sometimes denial deadens the motivation of actors to role fulfillment and causes their apathetic withdrawal from the roles which they occupy. Where the sense of deprivation is associated with an identification with a collectivity or a class of individuals who come to identify themselves as similarly deprived in their allocation of roles, facilities, and rewards, the tasks of the control mechanism, and the strains on the system, become heavy indeed.<sup>21</sup>

The existence of strains need not necessarily lead to a social movement, but to the extent that the sources of strain are societally sanctioned and maintained, the political authorities will increasingly be held accountable for the discrepancy between individual and societal expectations. In the modern state, we can contend that existing political entities incur such attacks for two reasons. First, the state will be held responsible "not simply by default, but because of widespread organizational, ideological, or elite-generated expectations that the state has ultimate responsibility not only for a narrow set of security and regulatory functions but for the general welfare of its citizens."<sup>22</sup> Thus, ambiguities within the political system itself will create the tendency to hold the state accountable. Second, the state may create new norms and values while simultaneously preventing their fulfillment. An excellent and recent example is provided by Murray Edelman:

The enactment of civil rights laws and the proclamation of egalitarian public policies are symbols that they [Blacks] can expect equal treatment and that policymakers view them as deserving equal treatment. At the same time, these policies cannot effectively convey to the Negro living in a ghetto a perception of significant advancement toward that happy state of



affairs. His experiences in virtually every waking moment are unambiguous evidence that he is not progressing, that he remains subordinate, and that many of the whites he encounters expect to exploit him . . . . Insofar as these whites are policemen or other local officials, their actions and policies effectively counter the largely empty rhetoric of national civil rights policy . . . . Such blatant conflict between the self-conception and expectations conveyed by different public policies inevitably generates further alienation, fear, and anger.<sup>23</sup>

Thus, because of ambiguity about the responsibilities of the state -- ambiguities generated by "official" pronouncements such as "to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare . . . ." <sup>24</sup> -- and of the establishment of values within the society which are then thwarted, sources of strain are attributed to the State either through commission or omission.

One sociological concept which seems most inclusive in accounting for sources of strain is that of relative deprivation. Relative deprivation is defined as "a perceived discrepancy between men's value expectations and their value capabilities."<sup>25</sup> Thus, in the example just provided, the value expectation would be that blacks are entitled to equal treatment, while the value capability would be that he is prevented from being treated in this fashion. The severity of the perceived discrepancy, or of the deprivation, will depend upon the "distance" between the value and the capability and upon the degree of importance which the individual attaches to the value. We would also maintain

that deprivation can exist among norms as well as values, but that the discrepancy between value expectations and capabilities will be perceived as more important to the individual.

Three general types of relative deprivation may account for most strains. "Decrimental deprivation" describes those situations where expectations remain relatively stable yet capabilities are perceived to decline. Our previous discussion on status theories of social change would be an example of decremental deprivation: the individual sees his expectations in terms of the degree of status which he ought to have as remaining constant, or perhaps increasing. However, he perceives threats to his status and seeks to block these changes. If the changes have already occurred, he may seek to restore a former condition. Often, such types of deprivation are manifested in rightist or regressive movements. "Aspirational deprivation" occurs when capabilities remain relatively static while expectations increase. This specific form of deprivation is also entitled the problem of "rising expectations," and is often applied to developing nations. However, its applicability to industrialized nations is just as warranted, witness the example of the black who is proclaimed as equal yet prevented from fulfilling his expectations. The third and final form of deprivation is "progressive deprivation", occurring when expectations

arise and capabilities decrease. While probably the least common form, we would also expect it to be the most intense creating the greatest strain.<sup>26</sup>

The values which may be brought into conflict between the expectations created in the individual, largely through reference groups or society at large, and the capabilities to attain value fulfillment have been expressed by Ted Robert Gurr as welfare values (those contributing directly to physical well-being and security), power values (the extent to which man can control his environment, including political participation), and interpersonal values ("the psychological satisfactions we seek in nonauthoritative interaction with other individuals and groups").<sup>27</sup> The similarities between these value levels and Maslow's need levels should be obvious.<sup>28</sup> As stated previously, we might also expect norms to be sources of deprivation as well.

Just as the miner who was not aware of the housing shortage until someone told him about it, deprivation per se does not exist either. It must be perceived by the individual. Thus, as Denton Morrison has stated, ". . . before a goal [norm, value] can be legitimately expected, we must presuppose contacts of the kind and intensity that establish the awareness, the desirability, and the possibility of certain goal-states."<sup>29</sup> Such behavior, or expectations, must be learned, either through experiences which relate specifically to the individual or "by identification with persons and groups whose investments are perceived as similar

to and, thus, no more deserving of, certain awards than one's own but whose actual returns are greater. Thus one comes legitimately to expect returns equivalent to persons in such 'reference groups.'"<sup>30</sup> Such "learning" may be either through rhetoric or through the socialization process -- in either case through symbolic means.

Some sociologists have contended that relative deprivation does not adequately explain all social movements. Robert Lauer, examining the LSD movement, which assumes the characteristics of Blumer's expressive movement, argues that it "appealed strongly to mature, educated, and successful people. Among the thirty-five participants in the Zihuatanejo project [a project experimenting with LSD in Mexico], for example, were six clinical psychologists, five businessman [sic], three physicist-engineers, three teachers, three artists, a rabbi, a minister, a psychopharmacologist, an editor, and an architect."<sup>31</sup> Lauer concludes from this description of participants that "members are not necessarily the most deprived segments of the population nor even those who experience relative deprivation."<sup>32</sup> While we would certainly agree that one usually does not think of clinical-psychologists and rabbis as being "deprived" (although teachers may well be), it seems as if Lauer is only considering deprivation in an economic sense. If one considers the values expressed by Gurr, particularly those of interpersonal values or those relating to the higher

need levels in Maslow's hierarchy, such a blanket denial no longer seems supportable.

This is not to say that deprivation need always result in action. Those who are the most deprived, and who have been so for so long that they have come to accept their fate, most probably will not perceive discrepancies between expectations and capabilities. Or, if they do, they will not perceive them as being obtainable. Seymour Lipset analyzed the plight of such people:

Extreme ignorance and illiteracy [often signs of severe deprivation] make communication and understanding of any political program difficult. People completely occupied by the day-to-day task of keeping alive have no surplus of time and energy to invest in long-run ventures for betterment through political action. They may also be too powerless to stand up to the economic pressure or violence used against them by local privileged classes.<sup>33</sup>

Such symptoms are characteristic of many blacks prior to the moves for equality.

We have discussed deprivation largely in abstract terms; but the dissatisfactions which are most real to individuals are "usually related to rather limited social settings (e.g., the family, the job, transportation, leisure-time for specific social categories, and religious groups)."<sup>34</sup> Thus, the deprivation has social implications only to the extent that it affects interactions between actors; but it must appeal initially to personal values. Theodore Abel, writing in 1937, discussed the dual nature of deprivation:

No movement can occur unless personal values are involved, such as social status, income and so forth. This was the case in the Hitler movement, insofar as it grew out of the dissatisfaction and opposition induced by such events as the revolution of 1918, the inflation, the economic insecurity of the white-collar class, unemployment -- all of which affected directly the personal welfare of many individuals. But for a movement to materialize, a threat of impairment of personal values must be linked to the experience of a threat of impairment of social values. These values are shared by members of the same group or community, such as traditions, group prestige, group symbols, and possessions.<sup>35</sup>

Thus, when social strain exists, attempts are made to relate this strain to an individual, i.e., to make him aware of his deprived state and to appeal to his own recognized deprivations, while also relating such deprivation to socially shared values. In the example of the black, the individual must recognize the discrepancy between values of being treated with dignity and as an equal to others with the "reality" of being denied such dignity and equality. In order to create the foundations of a movement, however, others must share his feelings -- they must be reconstituted in terms of social values, such as racial equality. As Neil Smelser concluded, "attempts are made to move to higher-level components, reconstitute them, then incorporate the new principles back into the more concrete, operative levels of social action."<sup>36</sup> If initial efforts to create feelings of deprivation fail, then efforts are usually made to appeal to higher order values; and then to reconstitute back to the more specific. Thus, the rhetor attempting to

to create feelings of deprivation will attempt to place smaller, more specific actions which have significance for the individual in the context of broader, more socially shared symbols or traditions (which also can be understood only symbolically). If the symbolic structure at the higher order is appropriate, it can then be "re-translated" by others back into more specific actions which then have individual significance for them. The result is that movement "rhetorics . . . seize on conditions of real deprivation or on sharp discrepancies between conditions and expectations -- the reformist urging change or repair of particular laws, customs or practices, the revolutionary insisting that a new order and a vast regeneration of values are necessary . . . ." <sup>37</sup> Deprivation is thus both constructed by rhetoric and a force which calls it forth.

The rhetoric which identifies personal and social levels of deprivation as elements of a unified concept will more than likely express the ideology of a movement. The term ideology, as originally coined by an eighteenth century French philosopher named Destutt de Tracy, referred to the search for truth by means other than faith and authority, the traditional methods advocated by Church and State. For de Tracy, one "'purified' ideas by reducing them to sense perceptions -- a belated French variant of British empiricism with a barely concealed anti-religious bias -- and this new science he called

'ideology.'"<sup>38</sup> It was Marx who put this term through a twist in interpretation that remains with us today. In his German Ideology, Marx linked traditional conceptualizations of ideology to philosophical idealism, or that ideas independently have the power to reveal truth and consciousness. Marx did not accept such linkings, however, and maintained that this was "false since 'existence determined consciousness' rather than vice versa; any attempt to draw a picture of reality from ideas alone could produce only 'false consciousness.'"<sup>39</sup> Marx proceeded one step further, however, and argued that ideologies in fact masked particular group interests. They claim to be true; but are actually expressions of group interest. It is this usage which is currently more predominant.

For most sociologists, "every revolution has a great myth or ideology."<sup>40</sup> And, while stated somewhat differently, most would also agree with Alan Haber's explication of an ideology:

Ideology as an intellectual production has several elements: 1) a set of moral values, taken as absolute, 2) an outline of the "good society" in which those values would be realized, 3) a systematic criticism (or, in the case of status quo ideology, affirmation) of the present social arrangements and an analysis of their dynamics, 4) a strategic plan of getting from the present to the future (or, in the case of status quo ideology, how continued progress is built into the existing system). . . .

For ideology to be linked to a political movement and for that movement to develop a mass following certain requisites must be met: 1) the ideas must be easily communicated which usually involves their simplification and sloganization, 2) they must establish a claim to truth, and 3) they must demand a commitment to action.<sup>41</sup>



It is largely through such cries as "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," as "Freedom Now," "Back to Africa," and others that the ideology of a movement, albeit a bit truncated, is expressed. All of the elements mentioned by Habar can be found, or can be interpreted as being found, in such statements.

Recently, an idea has circulated to the effect that we have experienced the "end of ideology." Daniel Bell maintains that:

Few serious minds believe any longer that one can set down "blue-prints" and through "social engineering" bring about a new utopia of social harmony. At the same time, the older "counter-beliefs" have lost their intellectual force as well. Few "classic" liberals insist that the State should play no role in the economy, and few serious conservatives . . . believe that the Welfare State is the "road to serfdom." In the Western World, therefore, there is today a rough consensus among intellectuals on political issues . . . . In that sense, . . . the ideological age has ended.<sup>42</sup>

Such a belief is predicated upon an apparent disillusionment among many scholars following the Second World War and with the inability of Marxism to achieve the predicted utopias. Marxism thus no longer appears as a viable intellectual-political system. Further, class conflict within the Western World, in terms of Western Europe and the United States, no longer seems as perilous as it once did; and the political problems facing modern states are not easily resolved by appeals to "conservatism" or "state-operation."<sup>43</sup>

Such a position, while defensible if one equates only Marxism and its ideological counterparts (conservatism or classical-liberalism) as ideology, seems overly restrictive. The failure of Marxism as an ideological foundation for social change in the West must not be equated the end of ideology. While the cries of "Freedom Now" and "Black Power" do not entail nearly so extensive a formulation of the world as did the Communist Manifesto and Das Kapital, failure to recognize that they encompass a set of moral values, a vision of the "good life", a criticism of the existing structure just as did "workers of the world, Unite!" is to ignore their justification and power.

Bell seems to equate the slogans per se with the ideology which they represent; and given this perspective he may well be correct -- at least to the degree that a movement cannot call for freedom and equality in opposition to established political order. But what he apparently does not recognize is that the conceptualization of freedom for the white policeman in Chicago or Los Angeles may be quite different for the black, Chicano or Oriental who protests for equality. Ideology in terms of massive, world-wide appeals like Marxism may well be dead; but ideology as a moral orientation for groups of people is not.

From the examples we have given of ideological slogans, one might conclude that ideologies are rather broad statements of general belief. In fact, Rudolf Heberle, a sociologist,

writes that "modern social movements typically resort to abstract principles concerning the nature of man, his destination, and his natural rights in combination with a certain critique of the existing economic, political and cultural institutions."<sup>44</sup> And Herbert Simons, a rhetorician (in the broadest sense), maintains that "mass support is more apt to be secured when ideological statements are presented as 'generalized beliefs,' oversimplified conceptions of social problems, and magical, 'if-only' beliefs about solutions."<sup>45</sup> Such statements appear to receive confirmation with "Freedom Now" and "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity."

A more fundamental statement, one which apparently raises a rhetorical dichotomy, is made by Edwin Black:

It is well known that we are much more likely to respond to concrete language than to abstraction, particularly when our convictions are as yet unformed or uncommitted. We would unhesitatingly acknowledge our disapproval of hunger and starvation, but this disapproval would be of a concept merely. We must apprehend specific cases of starvation, either directly, imaginatively, or through the medium of descriptive language, before we experience a strong affective response. Abstract nouns such as democracy, freedom, equality, salvation, the fatherland, power, grace, may, as a result of prior conditioning or prior persuasion, have become so deeply associated with a person's values and point of view that they have the ability to evoke in him an emotional response. But when, at the beginning of a suasive process, one's conversion still hangs in the balance, abstractions do not have the power to move one to a new conviction.<sup>46</sup>

Two implications from this apparent dichotomy tend to make it less severe, however. First, Black's call for specificity states that we must "apprehend specific cases of starvation,

either directly, imaginatively, or through . . . language . . . ."

To those of a specific group who experience starvation, or its more latent causes, the phenomenological foundations of sources of strain have already been apparent. There is no need for "descriptive" language -- it is already such that language can probably only evoke the specific experiences of the individual involved. Secondly, the dichotomy can be resolved rhetorically, through the linking of the specific (e.g., unemployment) to the general, value-laden symbol of racial discrimination. Black is probably correct to some extent, as are Simons and Heberle -- but once the rhetorical link has been forged, the unique capacity of symbolism can carry within one term the specific personal slight and the moral wrong perpetrated by society. It is this multivalence, the "capacity to express simultaneously several meanings the unity between which is not evident on the place of immediate experience" which is the essential character of religious symbolism according to Mircea Eliade. We would extend the circumference of "religious symbolism" such that it includes, in varying degrees, all symbols.

Eliade continues:

This capacity of religious symbolism to reveal a multitude of structurally united meanings has an important consequence: the symbol is capable of revealing a perspective in which diverse realities can be fitted together or even integrated into a "system" . . . . One cannot sufficiently insist on this point: that the examination of symbolic structures is a work not of reduction but of integration. One compares and contrasts two expressions of a symbol not in order to reduce them to a single, pre-existent expression, but in order to discover the process by which a structure is capable of enriching its meanings.<sup>47</sup>

It is the function of uniting the individual with others, of creating a community, as well as providing mental reminders "of the nature and causes of his discontent" that such slogans as we have presented perform.<sup>48</sup>

We have previously discussed how reform movements, which call for normative changes in specific customs, laws and so on, may be transformed into revolutionary movements, which call for structural changes predicated upon values. This is in fact a primary distinction made by Smelser in types of social movements.<sup>49</sup> Similarly, Seymour Lipset argues that tensions, or sources of strain, which are resolved one at a time usually produce stable political systems. The Progressive Period in the United States would be an example. However, "carrying issues from one historical period to another makes for a political atmosphere characterized by bitterness and frustration . . . . Men and parties come to differ with each other, not simply on ways of settling current problems, but on fundamental and opposed outlooks. This means that they see the political victory of their opponents as a major moral threat . . . ." <sup>50</sup>

With the escalation to moral levels, social movements no longer have programs obtained for a specific purpose; but develop ideologies encompassing moral positions. It is at this point that elements of social control will be more firm, and that the conflict will further intensify. Thus, the inherent Catch 22 of the emerging social movement appears:

if sources of strain are maintained at specific levels, the impact of them may not be significant enough to warrant collective action, and if the movement is to attract a following it must use appeals that will make the source of deprivation shared (or "socialized"). It is at that instant, however, that moral, or value-laden terms and judgments are attached which make it more difficult for the established order to accept change and more difficult for the emerging movement to accept limited change which will alleviate the specific source of deprivation upon which the movement was founded. "The change we are speaking of is represented in the difference between conceiving of a problem as a misfortune and conceiving of it as a state of injustice."<sup>51</sup> The difficulty is presented by Anthony Oberschall:

. . . conflicts over symbols [those reflecting morals and value-judgments] tend to be more intense and more difficult to regulate than nonsymbolic conflicts. Symbols are collective representations expressing the moral worth, claim to status, and collective identity of groups and communities. The defense of these symbols is seen as an unselfish action worthy of group support; disrespect for symbols or an attempt to substitute different symbols will be perceived as an attack on the integrity, moral standing, sense of identity, and self-respect of the entire nation or group, threatening the basic consensus and the principles of legitimacy upon which social order is founded.<sup>52</sup>

This observation, which is quite close to that of Georg Simmel,<sup>53</sup> also helps explain the role of the intellectual -- or, as Eric Hoffer would describe him, the man of words -- in the social movement. They have historically "objectified" the movement from specific, concrete conflicts of interest

between groups into conflicts of ideas, of ideologies. This may well constitute the main energizing force and the main hindrance of the movement.

Besides providing the primary means of extending specific personal perceptions of deprivation into social, shared perceptions which permits the movement's emergence, ideology performs a number of other social and psychological functions. While the two are inextricably entwined, we shall here concentrate upon the social and discuss the psychological implications later. By far, the most important is that of promoting identification among members.

Identification represents an attempt by man to overcome his inherent division; for, as Kenneth Burke has told us, "Identification is affirmed with earnestness precisely because there is division. Identification is compensatory to division. If men were not apart from one another, there would be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity."<sup>54</sup> In his attempts to overcome division, the movement's rhetorician must persuade men that their interests are the same, or at least that they perceive them to be so. Burke seems to discuss three forms which identification may take, each of which may be found in the social movement. In the first, identification is predicated upon perceived similarities between the individuals or groups involved -- "I was a farmer once myself." Burke refers to this as identification through properties, most often materialistic, but quite possibly meta-physical as well.<sup>55</sup> Thus, we would here emphasize the similarities by which men may be identified.

Burke's second form of identification results from the omnipresent division among men; and if we may identify on the basis of that which we share in common, so too may we identify through that which we both dislike. Burke refers to this as the "dialectic of the scapegoat"; but is quite clear about its identifying potential:

. . . a scapegoat cannot be "curative" except insofar as it represents the iniquities of those who would be cured by attacking it. In representing their iniquities, it performs the role of vicarious atonement (that is, unification, or merger, granted to those who have alienated their iniquities upon it, and so may be purified through its suffering).<sup>56</sup>

Burke concludes that this "new merger" presents "the unification of those whose purified identity is defined in dialectical opposition to the sacrificial offering."<sup>57</sup>

The third form of identification is made both by the individual and, probably more importantly, by others -- the identification of "autonomous activity." Burke is referring to the identification of an individual with a larger grouping, based primarily upon specialized activities. For example, Burke writes that:

Any specialized activity participates in a larger unit of action. "Identification" is a word for the autonomous activity's place in this wider context, a place with which the agent may be unconcerned. The shepherd, qua shepherd, acts for the good of the sheep, to protect them from discomfiture and harm. But he may be "identified" with a project that is raising sheep for market.<sup>58</sup>

In the same way, because of specialized activities, men may be "identified" with social classes or with protesting groups. Ideology appears to perform identification for the first two forms of identification, and perhaps the third as well. But it seems more likely that the actions of social



control may well be the best promoters of this last form (an area which will be discussed subsequently).

Identification through similarity may be achieved through the means of "symbolic inclusion." A common theme of Nazi rhetoric was the "historical community and accomplishments of the Germanic people. Traditions symbolizing German unity were revived or created out of whole cloth, Germanic culture was glorified. . . ."59 If the collectivity being forged has experienced deprivation for considerable periods of time and does not have a positive self-concept, ideology may provide the self-image -- a self-image which links one of this group with its other members. A good example is provided by Robert L. Scott and Donald K. Smith in their analysis of dominant themes of black militancy:

- a. We are already dead. In the world as it is, we do not count. We make no difference. We are not persons. "Baby, it don't mean shit if I burn in a rebellion because my life ain't worth shit. Dig?"
- b. We can be reborn. Having accepted the evaluation of what is, agreeing to be the most worthless of things, we can be reborn. We have nothing to hang on to. No old identity to stop us from identifying with a new world. . . . You, the enemy, on the other hand, must cling to what is, must seek to stamp out the flames, and at best can only end sorrowing at a world that cannot remain the same.
- c. We have the stomach for the fight; you don't. Having created the Manichean world, having degraded humanity, you are overwhelmed by guilt. The sense of guilt stops your hand, for what you would kill is the world you have made.
- d. We are united and understand. We are united in a sense of past dead and a present that is valuable only to turn into a future free of your degrading domination.<sup>60</sup>

Such an ideological presentation meets most of the "characteristics" of ideology presented by Haber; but they do so predominantly through creating a common identity through shared perceptions. Admittedly the elements of "scapegoating" are also present -- we would be surprised to find any ideology which would not exhibit both -- but the major theme is the sharing of oppression, of a common meta-physical reality and a common denial of material benefits. It is through the unique properties of symbolism, of rhetoric, that group consensus is thus attained: "The Cross and the Crescent, the Stars and Stripes and the Hammer and Sickle, the Magna Charta, the Declaration of Independence. . . are and will continue to be potential forces for creating and maintaining consensus."<sup>61</sup> It is because of the capacity for striking to personal values as well as to providing a broader overarching value which can encompass many of these personal experiences that symbols are able to create the unification, the identification, of social collectives.

If ideology and its attendant symbols provide the means of inclusion, they also provide the means of exclusion, of setting the group in question apart from the larger society. Just as the black ideology presented above provided common properties for one group, i.e., courage for a fight, it denied those same values to the other, out-groups. In so doing, ideology performs the second type of identification based on common enemies -- or scapegoating. The value of the scapegoat is that he, and he alone, can absorb the guilt

of social movement's denial of the values upon which society has been structured:

Though hierarchy [social stratification] is exclusive, the principle of hierarchy is not; all ranks can "share in it alike." But: It includes also the entelechial tendency, the treatment of the "top" or "culminating" stage as the "image" that best represents the entire "idea." This leads to "mystifications" [or, as some sociologists have used the term, distance] that cloak the state of division, since the "universal" principle of the hierarchy also happens to be the principle by which the most distinguished rank in the hierarchy enjoys, in the realm of worldly property, its special privileges. Hence, the turn from courtship to ill will, with ironic intermediate grades. At the stage of blunt antithesis, each class [or strata] would deny, suppress, exorcise the elements it shares with other classes. This attempt leads to the scapegoat . . . .<sup>62</sup>

Thus, the scapegoat becomes the receptacle for all the sins of the rebelling collective; and it is through the destruction of the scapegoat, real or symbolically, that sin is expiated.

Concurrently, however, the scapegoat loses his human qualities and becomes not a social being but an object "embodying a particular abstract function: aggression, evil, domination, obedience, and so on. [He does] not exist for mutual role taking, but . . . serve [s] the function in the mythic scenario that . . . inherent nature requires . . . . The political myths portray scenarios of manichean struggle or of a stratified social order in which all must play their parts. . . ."<sup>63</sup> Not only does he lose his humanity, but the ideal scapegoat -- or "devil" for Eric Hoffer -- must assume mythic proportions beyond those of mere mortals. He becomes the sole cause, the one adversary,

which has prevented the rightness of the social movement's doctrines being practiced. It was for these reasons that, when "Hitler was asked whether he was not attributing rather too much importance to the Jews, he exclaimed: 'No, no, no! . . . It is impossible to exaggerate the formidable quality of the Jew as an enemy.' Every difficulty and failure within the movement is the work of the devil, and every success is a triumph over his evil plotting."<sup>64</sup> The "devil" may assume any form -- be he Jew, black, "honkie," Establishment, "commie" or whatever; but the symbolic attributes attached to him will convey the antithesis of those attached to the movement through its ideology. In the early days of the New Left, "devil terms" such as "competition, alienation, conformity, absurdity (the irrational), loneliness, passivity, fear, bondage (authoritarianism), hate" were prevalent. In contrast, "god terms" were associated with the New Left -- "cooperation, identification, commitment, sanity (the rational), community, action, freedom (autonomy), love, peace" and so on.<sup>65</sup> From this, a conflict occurs between the symbolic representations of good and evil, between the movement and the repressive social structure.

We have examined the nature of identification in terms of both its inclusiveness and its exclusiveness; but the function of ideology is broader than this. It also provides a weltanschauung, or world-view, to the participant by which he can structure his life and attribute cause within it. Most ideologies relate to both the past and the future as

referents for the present. By referring to a glorious past, the ideology of a movement can perform two vital functions: First, it can attribute some particular characteristics to the rebelling group (a glorious past, a strong heritage, and so on). Such appeals need not be limited to positive characteristics; but through rhetoric such "unheroic" circumstances as slavery, bondage and so on can be restructured and presented as demonstrating the superiority of the enslaved group -- after all, if they had not been endowed with unusual characteristics, how could they have survived such horrendous conditions. The second function of restructuring a past, not necessarily accurately, is to justify the existing protest and to belittle the present.

But the past is not left alone; for most movement ideologies present a utopian element -- a plan for the future. Bush and Denisoff maintain that "this applies not only to the left wing movements but also to movements of the right. To argue that right wing extremists desire to go back in time does not refute the fact that their idealized conceptions of the past become incorporated into their utopian plan for the future."<sup>66</sup> Devil terms will be applied to the past and to the future; and it is in the future that the benefits of the "good society" envisioned by the movement and its ideology will be realized. Such convictions are given strength by the exhorter who, "clad in the mantle of prophecy, proclaims that there will be" social change.<sup>67</sup>

When the present is viewed in the perspective of a mere, and very transient, link between a glorious past and a glorious future, it loses much of its mystification; and hence, much of its hold over the values of the people.

By recognizing that any ideology is symbolic, we inherently recognize that it too is a "deflection of reality." But such distortion may often be heightened when the ideology seeks to move the level of experiential misfortune to that of social, or moral, injustice. Saul Alinsky, a professional organizer, presents the example of the American Revolution:

Jefferson, Franklin, and others were honorable men, but they knew that the Declaration of Independence was a call to war. They also knew that a list of many of the constructive benefits of the British Empire to the colonists would have so diluted the urgency of the call to arms for the Revolution as to have been self-defeating. The result might well have been a document attesting to the fact that justice weighted down the scale at least 60 per cent on our side, and only 40 per cent on their side; and that because of that 20 percent difference we were going to have a Revolution. To expect a man to leave his wife, his children, and his home, to leave his crops standing in the field and pick up a gun and join the Revolutionary Army for a 20 per cent difference in the balance of human justice was to defy common sense.<sup>68</sup>

It is, then, the purpose of ideology to give expression to the grievances which precipitate the movement. In doing so the ideology will encompass the symbolic means by which men are identified and by which they may expiate their guilt. It provides them with a view of the world which promises them a future free of the grievances which have mobilized them, and at the same time diminishes the importance of the present.

Two further implications emerge from this ideology. First, if the movement is to succeed, the ideology (or program) must relate specifically to the perceived deprivations of the masses. The Union Party which campaigned on a platform of financial reform faced a potentially receptive audience in 1936. But the party refused to relate the ideology and its more obvious symbols to the perceived needs of the voters: "Despite overwhelming evidence that prospective. . . supporters were concerned mainly with personal economic recovery, party speakers discussed economics solely in institutional terms."<sup>69</sup> The voters might face problems of acquiring enough food, clothing and shelter for their families; but the Union Party was concerned primarily with paying of a national debt.

The second implication arising from an ideology is that once the membership has accumulated and accepted the ideology, failure of the movement to accomplish its goals may well precipitate further perceptions of relative deprivation, perhaps leading to more extreme movements or voices within the original. Just as the "established society" may create perceived deprivation by promulgating values and then denying the capabilities for reaching them, so too may the social movement. Parke G. Burgess indicates that this may have accounted for some of the disillusionment and splintering in the Civil Rights Movement as it moved from the South into different conditions in the North:

"Freedom Now" appealed to the clear-cut legal issues in the South. . . . Confronted by the more subtle machinations of the culture at large, this rhetoric seemed to get a response to which Negro citizens had long been accustomed: promises, delays, and piecemeal tokens could only be taken now as an actual denial.

King has said, with some pain, that the very success of the rhetoric of Freedom Now, the "positive gains" it in part produced, only made matters worse. This rhetoric was most effective in raising the hopes and expectations of Negro citizens. When hopes and expectations were not realized, however, they seemed cynically to produce worse conditions, especially in Northern ghettos.<sup>70</sup>

It is for these reasons that the ideology must at the same time provide the appeals for justice at a social level, probably encompassing demands of morality, while at the same time responding and presenting hope for the specific grievances of the individual member.

Even with the existence of specific grievances and an ideology which expresses those grievances, the reasons for an individual joining a particular social movement must receive further analysis. To be sure, since each man retains the ultimate choice over his social acts, such an analysis must consider psychological factors; but to the extent that a social system is defined as the attachment of meaning to interactions between individuals, sociology may provide some useful insights.

One of the most complete, and yet at the same time least complete, analyses is that man acts as he does because he shares interests and perspectives with those individuals surrounding him. Robert Merton's "reference theory" advocates additionally that man can also be perceived as acting because of groups which he does not perceive himself as being a potential member:



That men act in a social frame of reference yielded by the groups of which they are a part is a notion undoubtedly ancient and probably sound. . . . There is, however, the further fact that men frequently orient themselves to groups other than their own in shaping their behavior and evaluations. . . .

In general, then, reference group theory aims to systematize the determinants and consequences of those processes of evaluation and self-appraisal in which the individual takes the values or standards of other individuals and groups as a comparative frame of reference.<sup>71</sup>

Thus, an individual who is "socialized" into a particular group will have a tendency to behave in certain ways, largely because the norms of the group have been internalized. Man performs, or fulfills, certain "roles" which are structured patterns of behavior appropriate to particular social situations.

While such a concept may be helpful, it does not explain why, or how, membership within a given movement occurs. To understand the significance of role, we must refer to G. H. Mead's notion of the socialization of the individual through the creation of "generalized other." A biological unit, man, is born into a particular community largely by virtue of temporal and geographic determination. By his very nature, man will make "gestures" and, when some meaning is attached to a gesture by other biological units through some adjustive response, he develops "symbols." Importantly, it is the consequence which is anticipated from the fulfillment of the gesture that requires the adjustive response, and hence, its meaning.<sup>72</sup> Through play and games, the child learns to apply meaning to specific stimuli -- or gestures -- and to

anticipate the responses of others, largely through organized games. He must understand the anticipated consequences of any action not only through his own eyes but through an awareness of the responses of others. It is in this fashion that the child begins to assume "roles:"

Each one of his own acts is determined by his assumption of the action of the others who are playing the game. What he does is controlled by his being everyone else on that team, at least in so far as those attitudes affect his own particular response. We get then an "other" which is an organization of the attitudes of those involved in the same process.<sup>73</sup>

By expanding the circumference of the "game," the individual expands his concept of other into a "kind of corporate individual, a plural noun, a composite photograph. . . . It is the universalization of the process of role-taking," -- i.e., a "generalized other."<sup>74</sup> Thus, the individual takes attitudes (formed symbolically through social interaction) of other humans toward himself and still other humans into his realm of personal experience in order for him to function without conflict. He must additionally, however, take the "other's" attitudes toward "the various phases or aspects of the common social activity . . . in which they are all engaged."<sup>75</sup> It is this attitude toward the larger social system which then permits the individual to define and to develop his "self."

Two further terms must be introduced into our discussion of Mead -- the "I" and the "me" which are the components of the developed self. The "I" is that part which is unique,

assertive and subjective which must be so because ultimately, each individual retains some degree of intuitive force which is not found in social relationships; and the "me" is objective and formed from the values of the social group. The "me" limits individual expression, or acts as a censor to the "I" and promotes social stability. Thus, the "me" tends to shape man's reactions to society and to his own attitudes; but it is that something "new" which continually emerges in social relationships which demands an "I" response. And it may well be that "I" response which signifies an acceptance of a social movement.

From this we might expect that a given individual will tend to behave in accordance with specific groups with whom he has interaction, his total "self" being an amalgam of the values and attitudes held by the specific groups with whom he has contact. If an individual has contact with limited numbers of groups, or if his social interactions in relation to a particular issue are bound only within one group, then he is likely to have only the one perspective. Murray Edelman writes that the ability "to be self-critical (and therefore tentative, skeptical, and curious) is a function of the number of roles . . . a person can take or of his internalization of a generalized other."<sup>76</sup> If the individual is exposed to many interactions with different groups, he is likely to attempt to incorporate many partially-competing attitudes and to develop a diversified self-concept which permits understanding of other positions.

It is through such capacities to expand interactions with others, either directly or mediated through such factors as communication media and education, that one may develop a reference group which is beyond the specific group within which one exists due to geography or class status. It is through such an acceptance that we may explain an intellectual's identification with lesser privileged classes. He may either accept the less privileged groups' value system, hence acting in accordance with that group's values or attitudes toward social structures, or he may expand his horizon and include as his reference group the society as a whole and maintain that social values exist which supersede those of his particular group; and thus change his attitudes toward those of the higher, or larger, group. In either case, it is through his capacity to change the orientation of his "universal other" that he brings into question the values of one particular group.

We generally assume, in a pluralist nation such as this, that individuals will be members of several groups and that this multitude of interactions will more completely integrate the individual into the "mainstream of society." Even in a society which has distinctive social strata, the potential for social mobility often reduces the potential for social movements.<sup>77</sup> But, distinctions must be made between "linked pluralism" on the one hand, and "superimposed segmentation" on the other, as does Anthony Oberschall:

In linked pluralism, each individual is affiliated with multiple groups but memberships in any one intermediate group cut across memberships in others, and all groups draw their members from a variety of social groups, status groups, or classes. It is only in this type of social structure that cross pressures act to moderate conflict and prevent the division of society along lines of superimposed cleavage.

Superimposed segmentation, on the other hand, means that although there may be high rates of participation in intermediate groups and many such groups and associations, memberships in these groups draw predominantly or exclusively from particular social classes, strata, or status groups. Thus, each class or stratum is highly participatory and bound together in dense but mutually exclusive networks of intermediate groupings.<sup>78</sup>

To the degree that one individual is likely to develop an attitude toward some manifestation of deprivation, so are those members of his group unless there are mitigating influences. If the interactions of the group and those of society at large are frequent, it may be that there is greater likelihood that what deprivations occur will be minimized in the future; on the other hand, if such interactions are not frequent, the hopes for solution within the "system" may be minimized and the potential for collective action encouraged.

A common assumption in most literature on social movements is that membership will be recruited from the lower strata of society. Seymour Lipset writes that the "social situation of the lower strata . . . with low levels of education, predisposes them to view politics as black and white, good and evil. Consequently, other things being equal, they should be more likely than other strata to prefer

extremist movements which suggest easy and quick solutions to social problems and have a rigid outlook."<sup>79</sup> Other things, however, are usually not equal, and Eric Hoffer argues that an important element is that a sense of the ability to resolve problems or to achieve higher standards of living must also be present:

Discontent by itself does not invariably create a desire for change. Other factors have to be present before discontent turns into disaffection. One of these is a sense of power.

Those who are awed by their surroundings do not think of change, no matter how miserable their condition. When our mode of life is so precarious as to make it patent that we cannot control the circumstances of our existence, we tend to stick to the proven and the familiar. . . . There is thus a conservatism of the destitute as profound as the conservatism of the privileged, and the former is as much a factor in the preparation of a social order as the latter.<sup>80</sup>

Hoffer provides a typology of the poor, and concludes that it is only in two of these that the potential for social movement participation exists: (1) the abject poor -- those who are so concerned with the staples of life that they have no time for other matters; (2) the creative poor -- who are usually free of frustration so long as they are able to create; (3) the unified poor -- who are also usually free of frustration, because of the meaningfulness of sub-group relations (for this group to be susceptible, group norms and values must be disrupted); (4) the new poor -- those who remember "how it used to be" and want to change their lives; (5) and the free poor -- those who have freedom but who are frustrated.<sup>81</sup> It is these latter two categories, the new poor and the free poor, who are most likely to

experience relative deprivation -- the new poor to experience decremental deprivation and the free poor to encounter aspirational deprivation.

Some support for Hoffer's hypothesis is found in Crane Brinton's analysis of the English Revolution of 1640, the French Revolution of 1789, and the American Revolution of 1776 and the Russian Revolution of 1917. He concludes: "The strongest feelings seem generated in the bosoms of men -- and women -- who have made money, or at least who have enough to live on, and who contemplate bitterly the imperfections of a socially privileged aristocracy. Revolutions seem more likely when social classes are fairly close together than when they are far apart. 'Untouchables' very rarely revolt against a God-given aristocracy. . . ."82

The importance of similarities among groups as a foundation for spreading the ideology of a movement is made quite clear by Mead. "You cannot build up a society," he writes, "out of elements that lie outside of the individual's life-processes."<sup>83</sup> To the extent that an individual is socialized into a given group, or accepts one group as opposed to another as his "frame of reference," he will have shared life-experiences with the other members of that group. They are likely to have developed similar attitudes toward particular social acts, to which they are likely to respond in kind. Such associations are made through rhetoric, the use of symbols, and such associations may only be enlarged through symbolic means. Again, we turn to Mead -- "One may seemingly have the symbol of another

language [or frame of reference for a group], but if he has not any common ideas (and these involve common responses) with those who speak that language, he cannot communicate with them. . . ."84

If there are groups of individuals who experience some source of strain, yet who are relatively isolated and do not interact, an individual may emerge who has the capacity to create an enlarged group, a collective, a community. "Occasionally a person arises who is able to take in more than others of an act in process, who can put himself into relation with whole groups in the community whose attitudes have not entered into the lives of the others in the community. He becomes a leader."85 Leadership only exists to the degree that it is accepted as legitimate by those who follow. For Max Weber, whose discussion of authority remains the model for most that have followed, leadership is "legitimate" to the extent that members who follow consider it "binding" or that the leader's actions constitute "a desirable model for him to imitate."86

Legitimacy may be ascribed to an order by those acting subject to it in the following ways:

(a) By tradition; a belief in the legitimacy of what has always existed; (b) by virtue of affectual attitudes, especially emotional, legitimizing the validity of what is newly revealed or a model to imitate; (c) by virtue of a rational belief in its absolute value, thus lending it the validity of an absolute and final commitment; (d) because it has been established in a manner which is recognized to be legal. This legality may be treated as legitimate in either of two ways: on the one hand, it may derive from a voluntary agreement of the interested parties on the relevant terms. On the other hand, it may be imposed on the basis of what is held to be a legitimate authority over the



relevant persons and a corresponding claim to their obedience.<sup>87</sup>

To some extent those who participate in a social movement have denied the legitimacy of the "established" leadership in a society. To the degree that the movement seeks to alter societal structure, so too will it deny the legitimacy of the structure. Thus, a movement directed toward specific laws, customs or norms will probably question the legitimacy of government only insofar as it relates to the specific source of strain. Once the movement has raised the level of conflict from one of specifics to that of moral opposition, the concomitant denial of an authority's legitimacy will also escalate.

Neil Smelser posits that "charismatic" leadership characterizes value-oriented movements.<sup>88</sup> This is, to some degree, inevitable. The legally and traditionally established legitimation of authority has been denied; and new leadership must be found. According to Weber's formulation, the alternatives are based on affectual attitudes and on a "rational belief in its absolute value." Both of which characterize charismatic leadership. Weber defines charisma as "a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a leader."<sup>89</sup>

We may be hesitant to completely accept the charismatic-institutional dichotomy of leadership; for as Weber himself admits, it is often difficult to distinguish among certain individual cases, and most organizations -- and social movements are organized -- will exhibit charismatic aspects of leadership which assume traditional and legal legitimacy within each movement. As the movement grows, and particularly if it lasts for some time, the phenomenon known as "the routinization of charisma" comes into focus. By this, "the charismatic element does not necessarily disappear. It becomes, rather dissociated from the person of the individual leader and embodied in an objective institutional structure, so that the new holders of authority exercise it at second remove, as it were, by virtue of an institutionally legitimized status or office."<sup>90</sup> Thus, the very success of the movement in terms of existing for some duration tends to diminish the charismatic effect attributed to a single person and transfers much of this charisma to the organization or the movement's ideology, which then establishes Weber's other forms of legitimation.

There are, however, other factors which operate against continued charismatic leadership. First, initial successes may fuel the demands for additional challenges to the authority, which the leader must not only undertake, but which must be successful if he is to retain his mantle of charisma. Secondly, the very success of a movement brings with it an increasing number of specialized demands. From

this, if the movement is to survive, individuals with particular skills must emerge in order to handle such problems. Such an occurrence operated within the Civil Rights Movement, as explained by Harold Nelson:

With the snowball effect of what was now legitimate movement activity, an increasing number of specialized problems were brought to the organization. Specialized leaders became known for their specialties and frequently the charismatic leader was bypassed and the problems brought directly to them. . . . The more this procedure was repeated, the more the charismatic leader was reduced to figure-head status and the administrative leader raised to the dominant position in the organization and recognized as such by the following.<sup>91</sup>

A third difficulty with charismatic leadership, particularly evident as the movement expands, is the relatively short amount of time that a leader can spend on what are specific, localized actions. R. Peter Lewis explained such difficulties:

When Martin Luther King, Bayard Rustin, Saul Alinsky . . . came into a community in which slow, painful grass-roots participatory and separatist organizing has been going on, they are more and more resented. By coming in with a well-trained army of "bureaucrats" (middle-class Northern Negroes and white college students), and efficiently taking over all the chores from the little people who were just getting involved but still groping for basic skills, the latter tend to withdraw again. They watch the community (e.g., Selma) come into the international spotlight with the presence of the great charismatic leader. Then perhaps something big is accomplished (e.g., a new voting rights bill is passed). Just as suddenly the great leader moves on to the next confrontation, and the little people wait for the promised changes -- which do not occur. A great weight of court costs, and bitterness on the part of the local whites may ensue.

During this experience the incipient organization has fallen apart, and later it is totally demoralized. However, it may take such a lesson to "radicalize" the people, by convincing them that their answer lies in their first attempts -- and perhaps they will begin to re-organize -- this time convinced that the ultimate answers are not in this form of "coalitionism" or in any form of "permeationism."<sup>92</sup>

Such difficulties all work to minimize the potential for continued charismatic leadership, and act as forces for the development of leadership at all levels of the organization. The charismatic leader may well retain his symbolic role, and perform it well; but the charisma which he embodies becomes increasingly transformed into a symbol of the movement and further from the daily operation and control of the movement. A helpful distinction of charisma may be that of the leader who inspires an almost hypnotic acceptance by his following, close to Weber's original conception, and another type of "charismatic" leadership "who strengthens those he influences, inspiring them to work on their own initiative."<sup>93</sup> In the long run, leadership exemplifying the latter characteristics may prove most beneficial to the movement.

Thus far, our discussion has progressed as if the leadership of a movement functioned at the pinnacle of a well-established, rather rigidly defined concept of organization. However, certain characteristics of leadership behavior may emerge for specific movements which do not exhibit these assumptions and may find them anathema. Ideological beliefs about the "rotation of leadership" may require that one individual not be permitted continual access to the throne in order to minimize the "power of incumbence" and the growth of special interest groups. There is, additionally, the pragmatic reason that often leadership has been "co-opted" or "bought-off" by the establishment -- not to mention jailed or murdered. By having leadership

functions scattered throughout the organization, elimination of a prominent member (or leader) need not mean the end of the movement.<sup>94</sup>

It appears that both the Civil Rights Movement, or the Black Power Movement, and the Peace Movement exhibited many of these characteristics. Several leaders emerged who provided charisma -- who could inspire other members within the movement to work for its goals independently and at local levels -- yet none of whom were able to direct the movement along any particular course of ideology (except the broad overarching values that encompassed the entire movement) or action.

The type of leadership that is associated with a movement is often a function of the perceived organization. Crane Brinton has noted that two competing theories of a movement's organization tend to emerge from any revolution, and we would extend Mr. Brinton's analysis to any social movement. The defeated supporters of the "old regime" argue that the movement is directed by a handful of ideological zealots who have succeeded only by unscrupulous tactics; on the other hand, the revolutionists maintain that far from an organized conspiracy, the movement was the manifestation of a spontaneous uprising of the masses against an oppressive regime.<sup>95</sup>

Much of the foundation for modern acceptance of the strictly organized movement springs from the writings of

Vladimir Lenin and his pamphlet published in 1902, What Is To Be Done?

I assert: 1) that no revolutionary movement can endure without a stable organization of leaders that maintains continuity; 2) that the wider the masses spontaneously drawn into the struggle, forming the basis of the movement and participating in it, the more urgent the need of such an organization, and the more solid this organization must be (for it is much easier for demagogues to sidetrack the more backward sections of the masses); 3) that such an organization must consist chiefly of people professionally engaged in revolutionary activity 4) that in an autocratic state, the more we confine the membership of such an organization to people who are professionally engaged in revolutionary activity and who have been professionally trained in the art of combating the political police, the more difficult will it be to wipe out such an organization, and 5) the greater will be the number of people of the working class and of the other classes of society who will be able to join the movement and perform active work in it.<sup>96</sup>

Such a conception of the leader and his organization entails consideration of factors beyond mere organization, which will be partially a function of the type of leadership, the stage of the movement's development and the degree and type of social control applied against it. But, such a conception does create the impression that communication within the movement will be largely directed from the leadership down toward the masses. One can envision the smuggling of illegal papers and pamphlets which carry the line to the movement's faithful and the spectacle of the Nürnberg Party Rallies of the 1930's. Interestingly enough, however, even in these situations the party -- the movement -- developed largely through the organizational activities of smaller, independent

units who spread the ideology and recruited largely by word of mouth. Even a revolutionary such as Trotsky "marveled how anything was done at all during the Russian Revolution because people spent so much time talking and debating with each other."<sup>97</sup> George Rudé commented that the spread of the movement was carried out largely by means other than "mass oratory"<sup>98</sup> but from his consideration of mass oratory he excludes addresses before the French National Assembly and other forms of symbolic expression that we have embraced within our definition of rhetoric. Even so, however, what appears the most important means of spreading the ideology of the movement is that of personal contact among individuals of similar reference groups interacting: "Close personal contacts between such people [those with common problems] further awareness of a community of interests and of the possibilities of collective action, including political action, to solve the common problems."<sup>99</sup> Such a perspective seems particularly applicable to many contemporary movements -- especially those in democratic countries. In their analysis of the Black Power and Pentecostal movements, Luther Gerlack and Virginia Hine found a cell-like organization, i.e., no all-orienting national organization but rather locally autonomous organizations linked together through five major bonds:

- (1) Lines of friendship, kinship and other forms of close association between individual members of different local groups. Often a single individual will be an active participant in more than one group as well.

- (2) Personal, kinship, or social ties between leaders and other participants in autonomous cells from networks that sometimes extend beyond the local community. . . .
- (3) Every movement has its traveling evangelists who criss-cross the country as living links in the reticulate networks.
- (4) Closely related to the rally or the revival meeting of the traveling evangelist are the more permanent cross-cutting activities of the area wide, regional or national "ingathering."
- (5) A crucial cross-cutting linkage providing movement unity are those basic beliefs which are shared by all segments of the movement, no matter how disparate their views on other matters.<sup>100</sup>

It can be seen in this analysis of movement organization that the interplay of other sociological and psychological factors all influence the final form the movement will assume. The lines of friendship, the multiple memberships among various movements all provide certain reinforcing and competing beliefs for the individual. If we remember the distinction made between linked pluralism and superimposed segmentation we can make certain assumptions about the direction of the movement. The charismatic leader, who may be necessary for the inception of the movement and to serve as a symbol may be envisioned as Gerlach and Hine's "evangelist" who spreads the overarching values of the movement, providing inspiration for other's participation and spreading news of other activities. The locally autonomous cells are probably more likely to respond to specific sources of strain than the national "organization." This is not to say that a national organization does not exist, it very well may, but the main thrust of any movement must still be at the grass-roots level



if it is to gain support. Grass-roots may well be the "new poor" or the middle-class, but it will be those who who experience some strain between value expectations and capabilities.

At first glance, one might argue that such diversity among the movement's organization would lead to duplication and overlapping -- in other words to inefficiency. And, to some extent this is inevitable. But the schisms also permit greater assurances that, even if one fails, others may have opportunities for success. Such factionalism also permits appeal to wider membership:

Factionalism and schism facilitate penetration of the movement into a variety of social niches. Factionalism along lines of pre-existing socioeconomic cleavages provides recruits from a wide range of socioeconomic and educational backgrounds with a type of black power group with which they can identify. The variety of ideological emphases and types of organizational structures produces an organizational smorgasboard which has something for everyone, no matter what his taste in goals or methods might be. A segmented social structure is designed for multipenetration of all sociological levels and psychological types.<sup>101</sup>

If the movement can detect, or create, sources of strain among each socioeconomic group, or reference groups, and can then relate the movement's ideology -- in whatever variations -- to this strain, the potential for a widespread membership exists. It appears that great social movements require strategies and symbolic orientations of both militancy and moderation. "Tom Hayden can be counted on to dramatize the Vietnam issue; Arthur Schlesinger, to plead forcefully within inner circles."<sup>102</sup>

Robert Cathcart argues that the main attribute of a social movement is a "dialectical tension growing out of a moral conflict."<sup>103</sup> And, while we would not limit movements only to those encompassing moral issues, the element of conflict, or of competition is vital. The movement is against some form of established structure resulting from specific laws, customs, norms or from broader, moral applications. Just as those within the movement seek to promote their self-interests, or what they perceive the interests of society, so do the established structures. It is for such reasons that the existing social arrangement, largely through government action, will seek to maintain itself through social control of the movement. It is vital that we recognize the role of government in any society -- it is not only a "representative" of the people, but it is their informer as well. Murray Edelman writes:

Government affects behavior chiefly by shaping the cognitions of large numbers of people in ambiguous situations. It helps create their beliefs about what is proper; their perceptions of what is fact; and their expectations of what is to come. In the shaping of expectations of the future the cues from government often encounter few qualifying or competing cues from other sources; and this function of political activity is therefore an especially potent influence upon behavior.<sup>104</sup>

The degree of control that a government can exert in counteracting a movement's actions is dependent upon the legitimacy attached to it by the citizenry. So long as the government within a locality, area or nation state is perceived as being legitimate, of providing for the needs

of the people, of acting in a manner deemed a "good example," and of maintaining its capacity to "bind" the people to its decisions -- perhaps through force, the government will be perceived as legitimate. When circumstances indicate that such legitimacy no longer exists, social movements may well emerge. In Crane Brinton's analysis of four revolutions, in each of them the governmental machinery was inefficient and incapable of dealing with pressures arising in society.<sup>105</sup> Murray Edelman concludes that "the perception that social support for the established order was decaying and that power could be seized was a necessary condition for genuine revolt. . . ."<sup>106</sup> Even a movement not intent on revolt, seeking only change in specific institutions, must still be aware of the support or legitimacy of the existing institutions. Often a measure of the degree of freedom of action by authorities is the degree of legitimacy they can employ that does not rest upon "popular support." "Power-vulnerables" are "leaders of public- and quasi-public institutions: elected and appointed government officials who may be removed from office. . . ; church and university leaders who are obliged to apply 'high-minded' standards in dealing with protests. . . ."<sup>107</sup> "Power-invulnerables" are "those who have little or nothing to lose by publicly . . . acting on their self-concerns."<sup>108</sup> As a general rule, the degree of vulnerability will be a function of the type of society in which the movement exists -- democratic societies are most vulnerable while highly authoritarian are less so.

The very use of civil disobedience depends upon a relatively vulnerable power structure in which the "political leadership is extremely reluctant to resort to armed force to suppress demonstration. . . ."109 For a norm-oriented, or reform movement to occur, movement toward some sort of confrontation must exist. Such confrontations may be purely verbal or physical, but in either sense they will be symbolic.

Many of these confrontations, however, never reach fruition. The authorities may admit the justification of the grievances and initiate actions to remedy them. Other forms of co-optation may occur which are largely symbolic, but perform the same function of depriving the movement of justification for further agitation. Herbert Simons writes that:

Theorists from Machiavelli to Marcuse have suggested that control may be exercised in a number of rhetorical ways: by such co-optative techniques as the appointment of riot commissions and the creation of regulatory agencies; by the enactment of quasi-religious rituals of affirmation and victimage; by dissemination of secular theodicies of good and evil; by . . . "non-decision-making;" by defining and restricting issues, choices and ranges of opposition; by information control and control over the mass media; by acting on policies first, then discussing them afterwards; by creating diversions and escape mechanisms; by political socialization; and by invoking the threat of defeat of common enemies.110

A review of recent history, both American and international, will disclose large numbers of co-optive techniques: the appointment of the Kerner Commission to study riots and civil disorders, creation of a Consumer Protection Agency, the taking of issues "under study," the labeling of "protest" as "riot", minimizing the number of marchers or participants

in demonstrations, and invoking the appeals of "disloyalty" and claiming that protest "prolongs the war."

Often, however, co-optation is ruled out -- either because the authorities actually believe that only a small handful of "agitators" are responsible, that "caving in" will precipitate further and more extreme demands, or that appearing weak and subject to manipulation will undermine the legitimacy of the regime.<sup>111</sup> In such a situation, the regime may well resort to suppression as a means of social control.

Suppression has the function of forcibly eliminating the movement's leadership through banishment, incarceration or more extreme methods and of reducing the desirability of membership by increasing personal danger. The difficulty with such methods, however, is that they close the avenues of peaceful protest (both figuratively and literally); the only means left available are more extreme measures which then seek control of the governing apparatus in order to achieve what are likely to become moral ends. Repression often produces escalation.

Another result of repression is that it may promote the identification of individuals with the movement. In responding to peaceful protest, violent action on the part of "legitimate" authority may inflict damage upon by-standers and upon those sympathetic to the movement but not yet strongly committed. Kenneth Burke refers to this as identification with an "autonomous activity."<sup>112</sup> An individual is "identified" as being part of a larger, more

encompassing activity. If a person is marching with a protest demonstration, he is a member of the march and fully accepts its principles; if someone is on the streets, he is a member of the march. Thus, when the authorities respond, they often do so indiscriminately, besides it's probably quite difficult to distinguish between active demonstrators and "innocent bystanders." Once the repression is commenced, however, changes in attitudes may occur quite dramatically. An example of such change was reported by J. M. Treuhaft describing the actions occurring during a demonstration against hearings by the House Committee on Un-American Activities in San Francisco in 1960:

There was by no means uniform hostility toward the committee nor uniform sympathy for the witness [among those who had come to observe the hearings].

At the moment of the clash with police something changed . . . . All neutrality vanished, to be replaced with a hot, sustaining anger still evident in those who witnessed the events. One of the merely curious who was hosed and arrested returned the next day to join the protest commented ruefully, "I was a political virgin, but I was raped on the steps of City Hall."<sup>113</sup>

Two hundred had taken part in the initial march; on the following day more than four thousand picketed the hearings.

Not only does such action by the authorities "identify" people with the movement, their consequent violent behavior often forces people to identify themselves with the movement through either or both of the other forms of identification -- i.e., they have shared an experience, properties if you like, and they can unite in that which they both dislike or hate. Franklyn Haiman recognized the potential of these forms of "body rhetoric" in 1968, when he said

An important by-product of these activities is that they not only convey a message to outsiders but play an important role in reinforcing the convictions and developing the solidarity of those who are already members of the persuading group. Singing together, marching together, sitting-in together, being cattle-prodded or water-hosed together are much more potent ways of becoming involved in an issue than listening to one's leader make speeches from a public platform.<sup>114</sup>

While such activities may make the person identify more rapidly with the movement and its goals than "traditional rhetorical means," once this sort of identification has occurred, then the individual will be more receptive to such appeals. Additionally, the very sight of such behavior or the communication of such actions to the population not initially involved may create perceptions of discrepancies between the values expressed and accepted within society (value expectations) and the capacity for realizing those values. The expectation of "peaceful assembly" may be denied by the exercised capacity of the authorities. Such sources of strain, or relative deprivations in terms of welfare and power values, may then make the individual -- and others like him -- potential acceptors of the movement's ideology or of another movement.

#### The Integrative Function of Rhetoric

In the early parts of this chapter we stated that a movement's development required the interaction of each of the characteristics examined. The importance of such interactions is made more clear when we return to the discussion of

of sociology by Parsons in which action involved the attachment of meaning to behavior. Action could be characterized by positive action, by passive acceptance or deliberate inaction. But in each instance, meaning is attached to behavior which removes it from the realm of motion. Once meaning is attached, behavior becomes purposive and, as such, produces consequences for others.<sup>115</sup> But it is in fact the anticipation of these consequences, although perhaps not quite the same ones anticipated, that gave purpose -- or meaning -- to initial act.

In each characteristic examined (whether it be the source of strain, leadership, organization or whatever) an act relating to one had consequences for the others. As it became clear in the discussion, the particular source of strain which developed influenced the ideology, the likely sources of membership, the form of the movement's organization and the means of social control. Similarly, the forms of social control employed to curtail the movement often precipitated new forms of strain, having additional impact upon membership, leadership, and types of organization most beneficial for a specific movement. Without developing a mathematically progressive formulation of the specific number of combinations of interactions, suffice it to say that the essence of any movement is a product of the interactions among these elements.

Such interactions do not just "occur" out of the blue, however, but they exist only as they are perceived to exist,



as they are given meaning. And, it is through symbols and their conscious use, i.e., rhetoric, that such interactions occur and are given meaning. Sources of strain are "meaningful" only so long as they are perceived to have consequences -- however far reaching -- for individuals; and collectives develop only so long as sources of strain have consequences for groups of individuals symbolically united. Thus, ". . . human beings interpret or 'define' each other's actions instead of merely reacting to each other's actions. Their 'response' is not made directly to the actions of one another but instead is based on the meaning which they attach to such actions. Thus, human interaction is mediated by the use of symbols, by interpretation, or by ascertaining the meaning of one another's actions."<sup>116</sup>

Social movements are not "caused," rather they are "created" by the interactions of men with other men and their institutions. And, they are created through the capacity of rhetoric, of symbols, to attribute meaning to such interactions. Conscious movements must, in the words of Herbert Blumer,

. . . depend on effective agitation, the skillful fomentation and the exploitation of restlessness and discontent, an effective procedure for the recruitment of members and followers, the formation of a well-knit and powerful organization [a remark which we would modify in light of Gerlach and Hines' research], the development and maintenance of enthusiasm, conviction, and morale, the intelligent translation of ideology into homely and gripping form, the development of skillful strategy and tactics, and finally, leadership. . . .<sup>117</sup>

And it is only through rhetoric as we have conceptualized it that such constructions may occur.

Both the antagonist and the protagonist must rely upon rhetoric to attack and to champion the existing structure of social relationships. In the process they will often appeal to the same values using the same linguistic constructions. Just as the movement will justify its existence in terms of humanitarian ideals, so too will the established order. But symbolic interpretations will differ drastically reflecting the different worlds of symbolic interactions from which they emerge. "'Justice' for Senator Eastland means the continued exploitation of his sharecropping black people; 'peace' for Mayor Daley means crushing the skulls of demonstrators; 'prosperity' for the trade union membership men as exclusion of blacks. . .; and the United States' notion of 'self-determination' implies counterrevolutionary repression. . . ."118

Just as it is symbolic interpretation which originally united the various groups into a social system, so too is it symbolic interpretation which promotes the cleavage between them and the unity of adversaries for the conduct of conflict.

#### Summary

In this chapter we have examined the general approaches of sociology toward social change, considering briefly theories of class, status, functional-stratification and mass theory. The social characteristics of movements -- source of strain,

ideology, membership, leadership, organization, and social control -- were examined largely through the use of sociological concepts. In each of these areas, the importance of the specific characteristic to the general progress of the movement and the vital role of rhetoric was examined. Throughout, the necessity for viewing each element not as an independent determinant of a movement's progress was stressed; rather, each is important only in so far as it interacts with the others in order to promote an interpretation, an understanding, of the movement as a whole. Finally, the integrative nature of rhetoric was briefly examined to demonstrate that movements are the creation of actors within a social system influencing each other, and themselves, by symbols.

## Notes

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- <sup>2</sup>See Chapter 1.
- <sup>3</sup>Richard L. Lanigan, "Rhetorical Criticism: An Interpretation of Maurice Merleau-Ponty," Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol. 1, No. 2, Spring 1969, p. 62.
- <sup>4</sup>Max Weber, in Talcott Parsons, ed., Max Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: The Free Press, 1964), p. 88.
- <sup>5</sup>Edward Shils, Talcott Parsons and James Olds, "Categories of the Orientation and Organization of Action," in Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils, eds., Toward A General Theory of Action (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1962), pp. 54-55.
- <sup>6</sup>Amatai Etzioni and Eva Etzioni, Social Change: Sources, Patterns and Consequences (New York: Basic Books, 1964), p. 6.
- <sup>7</sup>Rudolf Heberle, Social Movements (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1951), p. 151.
- <sup>8</sup>Anthony Oberschall, Social Conflict and Social Movements (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 285. See also Alvin Boskoff, The Mosaic of Sociological Theory (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1972).
- <sup>9</sup>Roberta Ash, Social Movements in America, (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1972), p. 14.
- <sup>10</sup>Seymour Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Books, 1963), p. 89.
- <sup>11</sup>Gary B. Bush and R. Serge Denisoff, Social and Political Movements (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1971), p. 99.
- <sup>12</sup>Ibid, p. 99.
- <sup>13</sup>Boskoff, pp. 144-145. See also Seymour Lipset, Revolution and Counterrevolution, (Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Books, 1970), pp. 178-179.
- <sup>14</sup>Parsons and Shils, Toward A General Theory of Action, and Parsons, ed., Max Weber.

- <sup>15</sup>Joseph R. Gusfield, "Mass Society and Extremist Politics," in Bush and Denisoff, eds., Social and Political Movements, Originally published in American Sociological Review, 27 (February 1962), pp. 19-27. p. 42.
- <sup>16</sup>Emile Durkheim, Suicide, translated by John A. Spaulding and George Simpson (New York: The Free Press, 1951).
- <sup>17</sup>Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York: Holt, Rinehart. and Winston, 1941), p. viii.
- <sup>18</sup>Ibid, pp. 258-259.
- <sup>19</sup>Paul Wilkinson, Social Movement (London: Pall Mall, 1971), p. 113.
- <sup>20</sup>Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (New York: The Free Press, 1962), p. 47.
- <sup>21</sup>Shils, Parsons and Olds, p. 229.
- <sup>22</sup>Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 180.
- <sup>23</sup>Murray Edelman, Politics as Symbolic Action (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1971), p. 20.
- <sup>24</sup>Constitution of the United States, in James MacGregor Burns and Jack Walter Peltason, Government by the People, Fourth Edition (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960), p. 927.
- <sup>25</sup>Gurr, p. 13.
- <sup>26</sup>Denton E. Morrison, "Some Notes Toward Theory on Relative Deprivation, Social Movements, and Social Change," American Behavioral Science, Vol. 14, No. 5, p. 680.
- <sup>27</sup>Gurr, pp. 25-26.
- <sup>28</sup>Gurr places Maslow's need hierarchy as follows: physical needs and self-actualization are considered as welfare values; safety and order are power values; and love, belongingness and self-esteem are interpersonal values. Gurr cites A. H. Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," Psychological Review, L (1943), pp. 370-396, summarized and discussed in James C. Davies, Human Nature in Politics: The Dynamics of Political Behavior (New York: Wiley, 1963), pp. 8-63, Gurr, p. 26.
- <sup>29</sup>Morrison, pp. 677-678.
- <sup>30</sup>Ibid.

- <sup>31</sup>Robert H. Lauer, "Social Movements: An Interactionist Analysis," The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 13, Summer 1972, pp. 324- 25.
- <sup>32</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>33</sup>Lipset, Political Man, pp. 273-274.
- <sup>34</sup>Boskoff, p. 222.
- <sup>35</sup>Theodore Abel, "The Patterns of a Successful Political Movement," in Bush and Denisoff, pp. 281-282. Originally published in American Sociological Review, Vol. 2, June 1937, pp. 347-352.
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- <sup>37</sup>Herbert W. Simons, "Requirements, Problems, and Strategies: A Theory of Persuasion for Social Movements," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 56, No. 1, (February 1970), p. 4.
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- <sup>39</sup>Ibid, p. 425.
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- <sup>41</sup>R. Alan Haber, "The End of Ideology as Ideology," in Bush and Denisoff, pp. 460-461. See also, Theodore Abel, also in Bush and Denisoff, and Mostafa Rejai.
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- <sup>44</sup>Rudolf Heberle, "Types and Functions of Social Movements," David I. Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 14 (New York: McMillan and The Free Press, 1968), p. 440.
- <sup>45</sup>Simons, pp. 5-6.
- <sup>46</sup>Edwin Black, Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method (New York: McMillan Co., 1965), p. 143.
- <sup>47</sup>Mircea Eliade, The Two and the One (Harvill Press, 1965), pp. 201,203.
- <sup>48</sup>Gurr, p. 196.
- <sup>49</sup>Smelser,

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- <sup>70</sup>Parke G. Burgess, "The Rhetoric of Black Power: A Moral Demand?" Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. LIV, April 1968, pp. 128.
- <sup>71</sup>Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1957), p. 234.
- <sup>72</sup>George Herbert Mead in Charles W. Morris, ed., Mind, Self, and Society, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 145-146.
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- <sup>74</sup>Paul E. Pfeutze, Self, Society, Existence: Human Nature and Dialogue in the Thought of George Herbert Mead and Martin Buber (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961), p. 84.
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- <sup>77</sup>Boskoff, p. 168.
- <sup>78</sup>Oberschall, pp. 106-107.
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- <sup>82</sup>Crane Brinton, "The Anatomy of Revolution: Tentative Univormities," in Etzioni and Etzioni, eds. p. 419.
- <sup>83</sup>Mead, p. 257.
- <sup>84</sup>Ibid, p. 259.
- <sup>85</sup>Ibid, p. 256. Emphasis added.
- <sup>86</sup>Weber, pp. 124-125.
- <sup>87</sup>Ibid, p. 130.
- <sup>88</sup>Smelser, p. 356.
- <sup>89</sup>Weber, p. 359.
- <sup>90</sup>Ibid, p. 67.



- <sup>91</sup>Harold A. Nelson, "Leadership and Change in an Evolutionary Movement: An Analysis of Change in the Leadership Structure of the Southern Civil Rights Movement," Social Forces Vol. 49, No. 3, March 1971, p. 360.
- <sup>92</sup>R. Lester Lewis, "The New Left: A Political Movement," in Bush and Denisoff. Originally an unpublished paper, San Francisco St. College, 1966, p. 488.
- <sup>93</sup>Luther P. Gerlach and Virginia H. Hine, People, Power, Change: Movements of Social Transformation (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, Co., Inc., 1970), p. 39.
- <sup>94</sup>Lewis, pp. 486-487.
- <sup>95</sup>Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, Revised Edition, 1952), p. 86. As an interesting sidelight further demonstrating how similar the successful movement becomes to the regime just replaced is also found in Brinton: "It is interesting to note that even the revolutionists' explanation for the success of the revolution seeks to gloss over violence, seems in a way ashamed of the fact of revolution. This again is perfectly natural, since once in power the revolutionists wish to stay in power. A useful help to this end is a general feeling among the governed that it is wrong to resist those in authority. . . . they endeavor to create a myth of their own revolution, which becomes the last one necessary. Marxist theory even anticipates this, since the proletarian revolution ushers in the classless society, where there will be no class struggle, and no need for revolution." p. 86.
- <sup>96</sup>Vladimir Lenin, What is to be Done?, quoted in Paul Wilkinson, pp. 141-142.
- <sup>97</sup>Oberschall, pp. 173-174.
- <sup>98</sup>George Rudé, The Crowd in History (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1964), p. 249.
- <sup>99</sup>Lipset, Political Man, p. 262.
- <sup>100</sup>Luther P. Gerlach, "Movements of Revolutionary Change," American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 14, No. 6. p. 823.
- <sup>101</sup>Ibid, p. 826.
- <sup>102</sup>Simons, p. 11.
- <sup>103</sup>Robert S. Cathcart, "New Approaches to the Study of Movements: Defining Movements Rhetorically," Western Speech, Spring 1967, p. 87.

- <sup>104</sup>Edelman, p. 7.
- <sup>105</sup>Brinton, Anatomy of Revolution, p. 265.
- <sup>106</sup>Edelman, p. 26.
- <sup>107</sup>Simons, p. 9.
- <sup>108</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>109</sup>Wilkinson, p. 123.
- <sup>110</sup>Herbert W. Simons, "Persuasion in Social Conflicts: A Critique of Prevailing Conceptions and a Framework for Future Research," Speech Monographs, Vol. 39, No. 4, November 1972, p. 242.
- <sup>111</sup>Oberschall, p. 296.
- <sup>112</sup>Burke, Rhetoric, p. 27; and Chapter 4, pp.
- <sup>113</sup>J. M. Treuhart, in Bush and Denisoff, p. 269. Taken from "The Indignant Generation," The Nation, Vol. 192, No. 21, May 27, 1961, p. 453.
- <sup>114</sup>Franklyn S. Haiman, "The Rhetoric of 1968: A Farewell to Rational Discourse," in Donn W. Parson and Wil A. Linkugel, eds., The Ethics of Controversy: Politics and Protest (Lawrence, Kansas: House of Usher, 1968).
- <sup>115</sup>Burke, Grammar, p. 14.
- <sup>116</sup>Herbert Blumer, Symbolic Interactionism (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), p. 79.
- <sup>117</sup>Herbert Blumer, "Collective Behavior," in Joseph B. Gittler, ed., Review of Sociology (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1957), p. 147.
- <sup>118</sup>Peter L. Berger and Richard J. Neuhaus, Movement and Revolution (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1970), p. 156.

## Chapter V

### RHETORIC AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL-PSYCHOANALYTIC ASPECTS OF MOVEMENTS

In the eighth century AD Alcuin enjoined his readers, "Nor should we listen to those who say, 'The voice of the people is the voice of God', for the turbulence of the mob is always close to insanity."<sup>1</sup>

#### Introduction

Social movements have been examined from the sociological perspective in the preceeding chapter; but we must avoid the reductionist tendency to accept sociological explanations as explaining all of the important aspects of social movements and their resulting rhetoric. Any movement involves a membership, and if we are to explain why particular uses of symbolic construction were successful or not or what their implications are over the long run, we must consider the masses to which they were directed and the individuals who created them. To do so requires that we consider psychological and psychoanalytic constructs; for, as an emminent sociologist, Neil Smelser, has written, "any account of the recruitment into, the internal composition of, and the quality of participation in a collective episode must rest on a consideration of the psychological dynamics of the individual person."<sup>2</sup> Smelser extends his analysis:

[collective behavior] has a psychological dimension, since the deepest and most powerful human emotions -- idealistic fervor, love, and violent rage, for example -- are bared in episodes of collective behavior, and since persons differ psychologically

in their propensity to become involved in such episodes.<sup>3</sup>

We may, therefore, gain some insights into the use of rhetoric and its impact upon potential membership, and enemies, through an analysis of psychological characteristics. Additionally, through an analysis of the rhetoric, we may be able to gain some insights into the "speakers" and recipients of the messages since "genuine speech is the expression of a genuine personality."<sup>4</sup> If, as Kenneth Burke maintains, man's motives "are merely shorthand descriptions of situations", we would expect that language -- or, in a broader sense, symbolic behavior -- both describes those situations (and motives) and at the same time proves a source of motivation.<sup>5</sup> And further:

If we say that we perform an act under the motivation of duty, for instance, we generally use the term to indicate a complex stimulus-situation wherein certain stimuli calling for one kind of response are linked with certain stimuli calling for another kind of response. We act out of duty as against love when we finally respond in the way which gives us less immediate satisfaction (we do not throw up our job and elope) though promising more of the eventual satisfactions that may come of retaining the goodwill of irate parent or censorious neighbors.<sup>6</sup>

Thus, motives are symbolized in man's discourse and are stimulated or created by it as well. It is through such rhetorical analysis that we may inquire into the birth and existence of social movements.

----- In this chapter we shall not attempt to provide a complete explanation of either psychological theory or the controversies surrounding different approaches or of disputes about the values and difficulties resulting from .

different approaches to psychoanalysis. Such a treatise would be beyond both the limitations of this study and the competency of this writer. We shall, however, present rudimentary and generalized interpretations of some attempts to explain these areas and will attempt to demonstrate . their relevance to the rhetorical critic of social movements.

#### The "Traditional" View of Movements

The modern study of collective behavior, and from it the study of social movements, began with Gabriel Tarde and Gustave Le Bon's examinations of "the crowd." Le Bon tended to indiscriminately lump mobs and parliamentary bodies into the same cauldron and concluded that a man "descends several rungs in the ladder of civilization" when he became a member of such a collective.<sup>7</sup> His approach, while valuable for discrediting democratic enemies (and perhaps finding renewed acceptance among students of Congress) nevertheless does not help to explain such actions. Le Bon found the crowd swayed by "rumours, hatreds, fears and superstitions." "Not surprisingly," writes Paul Wilkinson, "such a view leads him to conclude that crowds and mass movements are basically a diabolic influence. If unleashed they risk wrecking the civilization created by a small elite. They act . . . 'like microbes which hasten the dissolution of enfeebled bodies. The moment a civilization begins to decay it is always the masses that bring about its downfall.'"<sup>8</sup>

Such conceptions of the membership of movements are not limited to nineteenth century Europeans. Eric Hoffer notices that "when the frustrated congregate in a mass movement, the air is heavy-laden with suspicion. There is prying and spying, tense watching and a tense awareness of being watched. The surprising thing is that this pathological mistrust within the ranks leads not to dissension but to strict conformity."<sup>9</sup> Several factors seem to have attributed to this tendency. Most men of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries tended to view social order as the natural state of society. Such conceptualizations were consistent with doctrines as diverse as Social Darwinism and with more elaborate models positing an "equilibrium" among social groupings. Psychologists also contributed to the difficulties since most who investigated social movements labeled participants as "abnormal" or as "deviant." Much work was performed by intellectuals of all disciplines following the collapse of the Third Reich so as to explain how such a phenomenon could have occurred -- and hopefully how such a repetition could be prevented. The horrors of National Socialism were projected, intentionally or not, onto the genre of social movements as a whole.

Modern research reveals that social movements are "not irrational, and involvement in them is, on the whole, a conscious act on the part of the participants." While defending movements, Bush and Denisoff still seem to maintain the irrational image of crowd behavior -- "Crowd behavior is, as its analysts point out, basically irrational

and spontaneous."<sup>10</sup> This seems somehow, like a modern version of the War between the Roses. Anthony Oberschall advances a more "enlightened" view:

The destructive and violent behavior of the rioters was confined to specific kinds of behaviors and situations within the riot situation. Eyewitnesses reported that rioters and looters in cars were observing traffic laws in the riot area -- stopping for red lights, stopping for pedestrians at crosswalks -- even when carrying away stolen goods. Firemen were obstructed in putting out fires set to business establishments, yet one incident is reported where people beseeched firemen to save a house that had caught fire when embers skipped to it from a torched commercial building, and during which firemen were not hindered in any way from carrying out their job. These and similar incidents testify to the ability of riot participants to choose appropriate means for their ends. Though riot behavior cannot be called "rational" in the everyday common meaning of that term, it does contain normative and rational elements and is far more situationally determined than the popular view would have it.<sup>11</sup>

Oberschall makes an important distinction which perhaps should receive further elaboration: that is, while such action may not be "rational" in terms of criteria defined by rules of logic and of optimal societal approval, such behavior is often "reasonable" and is "reasoned" to the extent that participants perceive that they are acting in their best interests and have "thought through" their actions. It is in an effort to better understand how men "think through" their actions that we shall now turn to an examination of psychological conceptualizations and how these apply to our study of social movements.

## Psychology, Individuals, and Social Movements

Psychological explanations of human action tend to be predicated upon two fundamental assumptions. The first of these was expressed by Kenneth Gergen: "Several hundred years before Christ, both Epicurus and Aristippus (a pupil of Socrates) developed a theory of human motivation that has continued to provide a challenge even to the present day. Boldly stated, the core assumption of the theory is that man is motivated by a single principle: to achieve pleasure and to avoid pain."<sup>12</sup> Whether described as hedonism, behaviorism, drive-reduction, or a learned basis of social motivation, the movement toward satisfaction and from dissatisfaction seems to underly most theories of psychic functioning.

Following closely behind, perhaps as a means of providing this satisfaction, is the claim that man seeks prediction, or understanding. George Kelly claims that anticipation "is both the push and pull" of psychological systems.<sup>13</sup>

There seems to be adequate evidence for such assumptions. Man does avoid those items or events which he knows to be painful just as he seeks out those experiences which provide him with satisfaction. It must be kept in mind that one man's (or woman's) pleasure is another's pain -- which partially explains happy masochists and sadists. Man must also seek to order his world, to understand qua understanding, for he has progressed beyond where his mere animal instincts would lead him. By understanding, by anticipating consequences



of events and acts, man is better able to structure his world and so to promote his satisfaction.

Several approaches have been advanced by psychologists explaining how man does structure his world -- at least psychologically. Perhaps the most widespread of these is that of attitudes and attitude systems. While much discussion has occurred over the properties of an attitude, most definitions seem reasonably consistent with that presented by Daniel Katz:

Attitude is the predisposition of the individual to evaluate some symbol or object or aspect of his world in a favorable or unfavorable manner. Opinion is the verbal expression of an attitude, but attitudes can also be expressed in nonverbal behavior. Attitudes include both the affective, or feeling core of liking or disliking, and the cognitive, or belief, elements which describe the object of the attitude, its characteristics, and its relation to other objects.<sup>14</sup>

Such attitudes do not, however, exist as independent entities floating around man's psychic space. They are incorporated into systems, usually thought to be in groupings of similar and dissimilar attitudes.

Even those psychologists who do not use the term attitude end up with systems very similar to what we have discussed. Milton Rokeach, for example, creates belief and disbelief systems:

The belief system is conceived to represent all the beliefs, sets, expectancies, or hypotheses, conscious and unconscious, that a person at a given time accepts as true of the world he lives in. The disbelief system is composed of a series of subsystems rather than merely a single one, and contains all the disbeliefs, sets, expectancies,

conscious and unconscious, that, to one degree or another, a person at a given time rejects as false. Thus, our conception of the disbelief system is that it is far more than the mere opposite of the belief system.<sup>15</sup>

Rokeach does not distinguish between cognitive and affective components, maintaining instead that it makes little difference whether one thinks, believes, or feels something -- the end result is the same. Thus, for him, each cognition has affective loadings and each emotion has cognitive relations as well.

In somewhat the same vein, George Kelly has proposed a "psychology of personal constructs." A "construct" is an abstract relationship which encompasses both similarity and contrast and is used to provide a "structure, within the framework of which the substance takes shape or assumes meaning" -- i.e., an interpretation is placed upon some phenomenon in terms of its similarities or contrast with other phenomena which have been interpreted previously.<sup>16</sup> Thus, constructs may exist such as "good -- bad", "warm -- cold" and so on. Like attitudes and Rokeach's concept of beliefs, Kelly's constructs do not exist independently but are systematized. Kelly writes that "a person's construction system is composed of complementary superordinate and subordinate relationships. The subordinate systems are determined by the superordinate systems into whose jurisdiction they are placed. The superordinate systems, in turn, are free to invoke new arrangements among the systems which are subordinate to them."<sup>17</sup> Unlike Rokeach's belief system,

constructs are in effect mirror-images -- that is, each construct has the positive and negative interpretation included.

One final construction of cognitive and affective elements is that provided by Fritz Heider in his influential The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. Heider posits two types of relations among individuals, objects, and so on. There is the "sentiment relation" ("This refers to a person's evaluation of something . . . .") and the "unit relation" ("Persons and objects are the units that first come to mind; the parts of such units are perceived as belonging together in a specially close way").<sup>18</sup> Sentiment and unit relations are not independent but rather the one influences the other; they are, in Heider's words, "mutually interdependent." The importance of examining briefly each of these approaches is that they ultimately come very close to positing the same thing. Heider's unit relation is certainly close to Katz' concept of a belief and the sentiment relation similar to the affective element. When we consider their mutual interdependence, it does not seem unreasonable to call the entire unit-sentiment relation an attitude. Kelly's constructs may also be subsumed under the heading of attitude -- for to the extent that some interpretation is attached to some phenomenon, a perceived relation must also exist, thus the cognitive element. And, if an interpretation is made of it, this also includes the affective component.

We shall, then, discuss man's psychological construction and interpretation of his world -- both physical and psychic -- in terms of his attitudes; attitudes which are related to one another in a hierarchically arranged system, which Katz defines as a "value system." We will adopt Rokeach's notion of regions of belief -- central, intermediate, and peripheral -- which shall become regions of attitude. For the sake of this discussion, we shall equate values with those attitudes which are "superordinate" and are near to the central regions.<sup>19</sup>

One more assumption is made about attitudes which is vital for our discussion of their importance for social movements and the resulting rhetoric. That is the concept of balance -- "by a balanced state is meant a situation in which the relations among the entities fit together harmoniously; there is no stress towards change. A basic assumption is that sentiment relations and unit relations tend toward a balanced state. . . . if a balanced state does not exist, then forces toward this state will arise."<sup>20</sup> Such a concept, which has been developed under such differing names as congruity, strain toward symmetry, cognitive dissonance and others, will be interpreted to mean for this study a very broad area of "cognitive consistency."<sup>21</sup> Thus, man will, except for occasional desire for novelty and paradox, seek and attempt to maintain consistent relations among his attitudes. This should not be interpreted to limit the attitudes which man holds to those which are only consistent with one another, for the development of a

system, and of subordinate attitudes under a broader attitude or value, means that there may be inconsistent attitudes which do not provoke a tension for balance. What is important is that such attitudes not be brought into a direct relationship: "The beliefs a person has acquired are safe as long as they are not put to the test. A person can live with inconsistencies as long as these do not confront each other, and he can operate on the basis of invalid assumptions if these are not directly matched against experience."<sup>22</sup>

In case anyone may have forgotten, we are concerned with the help that psychological constructs can provide in our study of social movements. And, James Geschwender states unequivocally the benefit that theories of attitude change have for understanding movements:

All of the patterns of temporal change which produce revolutionary activities may be explained with dissonance theory [we would prefer the use of "consistency theory"]. Changes in objective conditions produce a state of mind in which individuals believe that they are unjustly deprived of a better way of life. First, they develop the image of a state of affairs which is possible of attainment. Second, they develop the belief that they are entitled to that state of affairs. Third, they know that they are not enjoying that state of affairs. The simultaneous possession of these three cognitions produces a state of dissonance. Dissonance is not comfortable and it produces pressures toward dissonance reduction. One means of reducing this dissonance is to alter the environment so as to produce the desired state of affairs. Therefore, dissonance-reducing activities often take the form of social protest or revolutionary behavior.<sup>23</sup>

While we would not agree with Geschwender that "all" of the changes producing protest activity can be explained by

consistency theory, we would certainly agree that it proves a beneficial tool in understanding why protest may occur. In each of the examples provided in the previous chapter on the creation of relative deprivation, some inconsistency between attitudes was apparent. One limitation which Denton Morrison applies to deprivation, which he defines as a "special type of cognitive dissonance," is that the "intensity of dissonance will be a function of the rate at which the perception of blockage probability for a legitimate expectation increases."<sup>24</sup> It is the possibility of creating such perceptions of legitimate expectation and of authoritative blockage that rhetoric provides for the movement. Thus, appeals to universally accepted values coupled with rhetorical explanations of how such values are being distorted or prevented from being fulfilled all create the potential for social movement. Thus, when we examine movements from the social perspective of relative deprivation, we may better understand the existence of such deprivation by understanding the attitudes of those individuals comprising the group experiencing deprivation.

Theories of cognitive consistency are often relied upon to explain attitude change; and to the extent that a rhetorician can bring inconsistent attitudes into relation, or can create attitudes which are then inconsistent with pre-existing attitudes, inconsistency will create tensions which should be reduced. In analyzing the nature and effects of agitative rhetoric, Mary McEdwards provides this example:

Forced by such rhetoric ["Hey, hey, L.B.J.! How many kids did you kill today?"] to a sharp personal awareness of the situation, Americans rush to the defense of the President's policy. In doing so, they need specific knowledge of conditions in Viet Nam and must learn something about the United States' foreign policy. It is this process of evaluation, of development of proof for a judgment or an opinion that is the valuable and necessary result of agitative rhetoric.<sup>25</sup>

If, in developing the proof needed to support his beliefs or attitudes, the individual finds evidence to create inconsistency among his existing beliefs a pressure will arise to resolve it. This does not mean that he will resolve it in the direction of the appeal, for much will depend upon which attitude is more crucial to his world-view and self-concept; but the likelihood of gaining acceptance is created. Once a doubt is planted, additional information -- which may have been ignored or distorted into supporting the prior attitude -- may now be perceived as supporting the "doubt" and thus potentially increasing the possibility of attitude change.<sup>26</sup>

Attitudes are heavily shaped by the groups with which individuals identify;<sup>27</sup> and we would expect individuals sharing certain social characteristics to have shared attitudes, in a very general manner. People will still react to a given event in an individual manner, but certain similarities are likely to exist across the specific responses. Once an initial commitment is made toward some group or movement -- based initially on individual responses, the member begins to identify with the group and it exerts a greater influence upon his psychological structure. Hans Toch provides the example of the Montgomery bus boycott

which began largely with individual discomfort at physical inconvenience and embarrassment from having to sit at the back of buses and give up seats to whites.<sup>28</sup> Remembering the tendency of normative movements to escalate to value-oriented movements when not resolved, the failure of the City Council to respond to specific grievances forced the blacks of Montgomery to either acquiesce or to continue. By this time, however, the blacks had invested time and personal effort and the protest had grown beyond the initial issue. Lewis Coser describes the nature of commitment:

The member who for the sake of the group relinquishes some of his immediate personal interests feels that he has invested in it; he has projected upon it part or all of his personality. Through introjection of the group's purpose and power and through projection of his own self into the group, the group has become but an extension of his own personality. Under these conditions, threats to the group touch the very core of his personality.<sup>29</sup>

Thus, once the member has identified with the group and has projected his interests as being the same as the group's, the attitudes which were once peripheral have now become either intermediate or core. They now define the member's self-concept and he will be more reluctant to change them. This not only is true of protestors but of those who identify with the agents of social control. Thus once the protest and acts of social control are perceived as being attacks upon the self, upon values, and not upon specific roles or norms, the possibility for easy resolution seems to disappear.



The more extreme the individual attitudes, the less likely he is to perceive any similarities between himself and others. Anthony Oberschall writes:

. . . the further away on the ideological left-right spectrum, the less likely it is that he can discriminate between various shades of difference in that range. For an extreme right-winger, anybody left of center, whether he be a liberal, socialist, communist, Maoist, Trotskyite, is lumped together under one broad category of "communist" or "revolutionary," whereas a left-winger will tend to see conservatives, Birchites, Goldwaterites, neo-Nazis, racist groups, and so on as "Fascists" pure and simple. Thus, a mental image of the opposition as far more homogeneous, united, and able to act in concert is created. Evidence of disunity, factionalism, rivalries, and the absence of an overarching organization and leadership is conveniently omitted. A similar principle also holds for the perception of social, as well as ideological, differences.<sup>30</sup>

Thus, once the opponents in a struggle are perceived as sharing common values and as being united, organized and prepared for action, the more extreme attitudes and acts of the group with which the individual identifies become justified. Consistency theory is valuable in creating initial attitude change, but once an individual has identified with a particular position or group, it is increasingly difficult to alter his perceptions.

The creation of inconsistency does not necessarily explain the formation of movements, however. One can still feel uncomfortable and not know the specific reason why. A partial answer, however, may be found in discussions among psychologists about man's need to understand -- to attribute causes. While those schooled in rigorous scientific method

would probably disagree with our conception of cause, arguing a real distinction between "causes" and "reasons,"<sup>31</sup> we will use the term as providing an explanation for certain actions and the consequences of those actions.

There is a tendency to personify the causes of acts,. especially since each act must have an agent. Albert Hastorf and others write the following:

We perceive them [people] as causal agents. They are potential causes of their behavior. They may intend to do certain things, such as attempting to cause certain effects; and because we see them as one source of their actions, we consider them capable of varying their behavior to achieve their intended effects. . . . Our perception of others' intentionality leads us next to organize the behavior of other people into intent-act-effect segments which form perceptual units. We infer the intentions of others.<sup>32</sup>

Tied to perception of agents being responsible for their actions is the relative importance of negative informational and behavioral traits. If, for example, "an individual believes that most people are sincere, he is likely to be relatively unimpressed with the information that person X is sincere.

. . . credit for it attaches to social pressure to the simple fact of being human rather than to person X.

Insincerety, however, is another matter. By standing in contrast to the norm, the insincere individual invites attributions of responsibility for this trait. These attributions in turn are likely to increase the importance and centrality of the trait in evaluations of him qua individual."<sup>33</sup>

The importance of attributing responsibility, or causal influence, to individuals and the relative importance attached to negative information become valuable in understanding the creation of social movements. We have already discussed that the "political system is the agent most likely to be held responsible in the modern and modernizing nation" and it thus becomes a causal agent for the actions and policies within a given nation.<sup>34</sup> When an individual perceives some expectation as being "just" and also perceives some blockage of that expectation, he increasingly attributes responsibility to the political system. If we relate this attribution with the importance of negative behavior, as this blockage of "legitimate" expectations will be perceived, it becomes increasingly likely that individuals and groups of individuals sharing similar perceptions will tend to see the political system in increasingly negative terms. These negative images will become the central traits or characteristics of the governmental agencies. Once such perceptions occur, the legitimacy of governmental authority declines and protest action becomes easier to commence -- inconsistency between the desire to protest and the traditional acceptance of institutional authority is thus reduced.

Such attributions are not limited to those challenging legitimate power, however. For if attributions are made to individuals as causal agents, and if negative behavior is given more importance, these elements function to organize

perceptions by agents of social control. Those who comply with illegitimate authority will also be perceived as being responsible for their actions. It is through such perceptions that authority identifies anyone involved with protest with the elements who have organized the activity. It is through such perceptions that innocent bystanders and those partially sympathetic to a movement are given broken heads, hosings and jail sentences just as those who are more committed. As has been previously discussed, such actions often lead "bystanders" to identify with the dissident elements of society and thereby increase the potential force of the movement.<sup>35</sup> Such perceptions will be the result of rhetoric -- be it verbal or "body rhetoric."

Implicit within this preceding discussion is the notion of "implicit personality theories." Assuming that agents are responsible for their actions, and assuming further that certain actions occur with some frequency, "we are prone to perceive the other as having an enduring personality characteristic."<sup>36</sup> As Hastorf and others have written:

. . . the idea that the perceiver has an implicit theory of personality is useful in explaining regularities in person perception. Because they have theories, people, can make inferences about others from limited information. The regularities in the inferences made by various perceivers about a given individual [or group of individuals, or institution.] suggest that members of a given culture share an implicit theory of personality. Finally, there is evidence to suggest that individuals have stable implicit personality theories of their own . . . .

Such implicit theories of personality appear to have the functional value of organizing the stimulus complex and of allowing the prediction of regularities in the behaviors of others. Since the patterns of inferences of individuals and groups of individuals can be described by a dimensional structure, the theories may consist of a series of dimensions which channel information and help form the linkages between stimulus traits and traits the perceiver infers.<sup>37</sup>

Such groupings are quite similar to what Heider calls "dispositional properties:" ". . . those properties that 'dispose' objects and events to manifest themselves in certain ways under certain conditions. Dispositional properties are the invariances that make possible a more or less stable, predictable, and controllable world. They refer to the relatively unchanging structures and processes that characterize or underlie phenomena."<sup>38</sup>

If we assume that such personality traits, as we infer, dominate a given individual or such characteristics as dominate an institution or grouping, are reflections of core attitudes, we both perceive that they are more durable and, hence, less susceptible to change and at the same time more likely to be in conflict with our own values -- given that we perceive differences between us. We tend, therefore, to associate such personality characteristics or traits, as we infer them to exist, with the value system of the individual or grouping. And, as we have repeatedly maintained, "disagreement at the level of values will have more widespread effects than disagreement at a more specific level, in the sense that the persons in conflict will see a wider range of their

behaviors as being in conflict with the behaviors of the other person."<sup>39</sup>

The importance of implicit theory of personality for the rhetoric of social movements arises in that perceptions will influence the form and content of the rhetoric as created and will also influence its interpretation by those to whom it is addressed:

" . . . each word and message has a cluster of images, some applicable to the society, some applicable to the individual, and some applicable to both." The relationship between cognitive "realities" and communication is a reciprocal one, i.e., the quality, intensity, shape, and force of images comprising an individual's symbolic reality will influence the character of his communication, and in a similar fashion a person's symbolic reality is to some extent shaped and colored by the communicative messages he receives.<sup>40</sup>

The importance of perceptions is that they influence how we act toward those to whom we make attributions -- acts encompassing physical responses and those we have subsumed under rhetoric, those which are symbolic. In many instances it is impossible to make a clear distinction, nor is it even necessary that we do so. But underlying our acts is another assumption; an assumption receiving expression by Kenneth Gergen:

. . . there is a strong tendency on the part of individuals to respond in kind to the behavior they receive. If rewards or satisfactions are received from another, there is a tendency to provide rewards in return; if dissatisfaction is received, the response is to punish the other.<sup>41</sup>

Attacks upon an enemy by identifying him as an "oppressor" and as having "dangerous intentions" may actually cause him

to perceive the attacker as challenging his values and position in society, forcing him to respond as predicted. Such labels may well provoke a self-fulfilling prophecy.<sup>42</sup>

A failure to understand such concepts may provoke the situation described by Park G. Burgess:

As Norman Cousins observes, "When Negroes act like Ku Klux Klanners, they must be treated like Ku Klux Klanners." [from "Black Racism," Saturday Review, September 27, 1964, p. 34] Racism and power become the idiom of the battle on both sides. Whatever the vocabulary of the culture may be, it is likely to be pregnant with the undertones and overtones of power, of force, of violence. And the intended target will be clear enough and often justifiable. As this response to the crisis intensifies, the full effect will be for the culture to consider Black Power advocacy in all its forms as violent, reprehensible, and un-American, and for Negroes to consider responses to it as but further evidence of the racist attitudes and rhetoric of the civic culture.<sup>43</sup>

In the development of social movements it must be the dissenting elements of society who say "No" to the established institutions, even though such a No may have been precipitated by institutional action. Once the No has occurred and the challenge has been made, the future development of the movement depends upon the response by the agents of social control. If the dictates of the concept of behavior exchange are observed, escalation is likely which may produce a deep division within society which can only be resolved by suppression -- either by the agents of control or by the movement when it assumes power. On the other hand, implementation of policies which deal with the grievances of the people or a return to acknowledgement of legitimacy by protesting individuals and groups should have the tendency to de-escalate

the conflict from one of values to less threatening areas.

In this section, we have attempted to consider briefly certain aspects of psychological thought and to inquire into its value in exploring social movements. We do not claim to have presented a complete investigation of psychological theory; nor do we claim to resolve arguments surrounding various approaches to attitude change, whether cognitive consistency or attribution theory most helpfully explains man's behavior, or even whether there is a correspondence between attitudes and behavior.<sup>44</sup> Our own opinion is implicit in the discussion presented; but the real value of psychological theory for the critic is that such constructs as we have examined can prove helpful in better understanding the rhetoric of social movements.

#### Psychoanalysis, Individuals and Social Movements

The applicability of psychoanalytic techniques to social movements may appear somewhat suspect from first impressions. It is, after all, concerned with individuals and what holds true for one does not necessarily hold true for society. With this we must, of course, agree; but that in no way denies the value of psychoanalytic theory in understanding why individuals may join movements, or -- perhaps more importantly -- why those movements heavily influenced by individuals -- Weber's charismatic leaders,



for instance -- assume the dimensions they acquire. Few would deny the potential for fruitfully inquiring into the personalities of individuals via psychoanalytic theory. It is our contention that psychoanalytic theory then becomes valuable for understanding social movements "because men are the actors in the drama of politics, [and] their personalities are important contributors to the character of their political participation."<sup>45</sup> We may conclude, as does E. Victor Wolfenstein, that "for political men private motives are displaced on public objects and rationalized in terms of the public interest."<sup>46</sup>

While some apparently accept the potential value of at least partially explaining, or understanding, movements in terms of such constructs, there remains an implicit assumption that not all elements of a movement can be so examined. Gary Bush and Serge Denisoff, for instance, write that:

The social psychologist, it appears, is primarily concerned with the psychological characteristics of members and their collective impact rather than with the organizational structure of the movement, its ideology, or the structural problems generating revolutionary activity. This emphasis on the individual may be attributed, in large measure, to the influence of Sigmund Freud on American social psychology. His influence is reflected in the literature on social movements in terms of three basic themes: (1) the frustration of individual drives by social restraints, (2) collective behavior,<sup>47</sup> and (3) the neurotic or psychotic personality.

Such objections, however, appear to be resolved by some of the recent practitioners of psychoanalytic theory and its

application to sociology and history. As we shall discover, the development of ideology and its appeal to the individual as well as the organization of a movement may often be heavily influenced by psychological factors. Just as the use of metaphor and reliance upon sociological principles could not adequately explain all aspects of social movements, neither can we expect psychological or psychoanalytic techniques to provide all the answers. We must rely upon an interaction of them all.

Any discussion of psychoanalysis must begin with Sigmund Freud, for it is he more than any other single individual who has influenced development of the discipline. Freud's theories have not gone unchallenged and they have certainly been modified in light of more recent developments and refined thought. But it is Freud who still permeates the literature of psychoanalysis.

Freud posits three major portions of the mind: the first is the id, which he describes as containing "everything that is inherited, that is present at birth, that is laid down in the constitution -- above all . . . the instincts"; the ego which is that portion "under the influence of the real external world around us"; and the superego which is a special agency "in which . . . parental influence is prolonged." During the course of the individual's development, the superego "receives contributions from later successors and substitutes of his parents, such as teachers and models in public life of admired social ideals."<sup>48</sup> The superego is often referred to as the "conscience."

Each of these has certain functions within the development and action of the individual. Freud assumes that there are two basic instincts within the id, "Eros and the destructive instinct. . . . The aim of the first of these . . . is to establish ever greater unities and to preserve them thus -- in short, to bind together; the aim of the second is, on the contrary, to undo connections and so to destroy things."<sup>49</sup> The ego has the task of self-preservation:

As regards external events, it performs that task by becoming aware of stimuli, by storing up experiences about them (in the memory), by avoiding excessively strong stimuli (through flight), by dealing with moderate stimuli (through adaptation) and finally by learning to bring about expedient changes in the external world to its own advantage (through activity). As regards internal events, in relation to the id, it performs that task by gaining control over the demands of the instincts, by deciding whether they are to be allowed satisfaction, by postponing that satisfaction to times and circumstances favourable in the external world or by suppressing their excitations entirely.<sup>50</sup>

Even so, however, the instincts will still tend to cause difficulties and place the ego in a continually balancing position.<sup>51</sup>

Erik Erikson has analyzed three crises of identity during the development of the child, an analysis which derives from Freud's states of growth: "The first crisis is the one of early infancy. How this crisis is met decides whether a man's innermost mood will be determined more by basic trust or by basic mistrust."<sup>52</sup> This first crisis depends upon its resolution largely upon the successful ministrations of the mother. Her concerns for the child must be consistent

and predicated upon a certain mutuality which produces certainty and prediction to the "original cosmos of urgent and bewildering body feelings" of the baby. Thus, the more gratifying his mother's treatments, the more trustful the adult will be.<sup>53</sup>

The second crisis, which equates to Freud's anal phase, develops the infantile "sources of what later becomes a human being's will, in its variations of willpower and wilfulness." The child is expected to develop certain controls over his excretory functions, and to the extent he is successful he will develop a sense of autonomy. If, on the other hand, he fails the child will develop a sense of guilt or shame.<sup>54</sup>

The third crisis, "that of initiative versus guilt, is part of what Freud described as the central complex of the family, namely, the Oedipus complex. It involves a lasting conscious association of sensual freedom with the body of the mother and the administrations received from her hand; a lasting association of cruel prohibition with the interference of the dangerous father; and the consequences of these associations for love and hate in reality and in phantasy."<sup>55</sup> It is this latter crisis, which must be resolved during the phallic stage, that becomes the overarching concern of the adult. "Society," write Fred Weinstein and Gerald M. Platt, "in these terms has evolved on the basis of repression, renunciation, and sublimation, as a defense against the fulfillment of the wish; society is based on the existence of the

common impulse, which must be controlled if man is to achieve any kind of stable organization."<sup>56</sup>

The question of how applicable such speculations are to the study of social movements is certainly open to question. Bush and Denisoff maintain that for an analysis of class-based movements, such theories are of little use. They are led "to concur with [Leonard] Reissman that: 'The studies [on class and child-rearing practices] do not provide firm enough findings to point the way. It still seems plausible to assume that different class environments create important differences for the socialization of the child, even though none of the studies fully substantiated that assumption.'"<sup>57</sup> This area will be examined generally in just a bit. However, the importance of child-rearing practices, along with other events in his life, may prove especially beneficial in examining movements heavily influenced by individual leaders. In a most interesting work, E. Victor Wolfenstein has examined the lives of Lenin, Trotsky and Gandhi and the movements which each influenced. Relying largely upon biographies, personal statements and examinations of the movements, Wolfenstein has found strong relationships between the child's resolution of Erikson's crises and future behavior of the adult, behavior which manifested itself in political action and heavily influenced the movement. Lenin, for example, emerged from his first crisis largely mistrustful of those surrounding him -- a characteristic which produced a secretive revolutionary

organization. On the other hand, Trotsky emerged trustful, and never worried about organization or about being captured by Tsarist police.<sup>58</sup> Other writers, notably Erik Erikson, have also discovered similar relationships.<sup>59</sup>

While Freud placed heavy emphasis upon the role of the id in the development and future action of the child, he also recognized the role of external forces. In Civilization and Its Discontents, initially published in 1930, Freud painted a rather gloomy picture:

The existence of . . . inclination to aggression [emanating from the id], which we detect in ourselves and justly assume to be present in others, is the factor which disturbs our relations with our neighbour and which forces civilization into such a high expenditure (of energy). In consequence of this primary mutual hostility of human beings, civilized society is perpetually threatened with disintegration. The interest of work in common would not hold it together; instinctual passions are stronger than reasonable interests.<sup>60</sup>

However, something occurs which makes man's aggression less harmful:

His aggressiveness is introjected, internalized; it is, in point of fact, sent back to where it came from-- that is, it is directed towards his own ego. There it is taken over by a portion of the ego, which sets itself over against the rest of the ego as super-ego, and which now, in the form of "conscience", is ready to put into action against the ego the same harsh aggressiveness that the ego would have liked to satisfy upon other, extraneous individuals. The tension between the harsh super-ego and the ego that is subject to it, is called by us the sense of guilt; it expresses itself as a need for punishment. Civilization, therefore, obtains mastery over the individual's dangerous desire for aggression by weakening and disarming it and by setting up an agency within him to watch over it, like a garrison in a conquered city.<sup>61</sup>

Writing some ten years later, the importance of external forces becomes even more pronounced:

The details of the relation between the ego and the super-ego become completely intelligible when they are traced back to the child's attitude to its parents. This parental influence of course includes in its operation not only the personalities of the actual parents but also the family, racial and national traditions handed on through them, as well as the demands of the immediate social milieu which they represent.<sup>62</sup>

The importance of these rather long passages is that they illustrate Freud's recognition of the importance of social factors in developing the personality of the adolescent and the adult. It is not the id which necessarily exerts the greater influence, but the social interactions which impinge upon the individual's experiential field. The relationship between Freud's conceptualization and that of Mead as presented earlier becomes remarkably clear. Most of Mead's ideas were developed prior to 1900 and were initially published in 1930, while Freud's work was published from approximately 1895 through the next half century. It seems likely that these two men developed independently, yet produced similar conceptualizations -- a most remarkable occurrence.

An interesting modification of Freud's original position is made by Talcott Parsons who argues that "categories of instinctual and learned components cut across the id, the ego, and the superego."<sup>63</sup> If we assume this to be true, a more complex relationship develops where the symbolic environment becomes even more pervasive. We are not able at this time to pursue this particular discussion, but the

only way we can understand the functioning and influence of the id is through its symbolic expression. It was this that Freud presumed occurred in dreams, when the id wrestled with the ego -- the result being dream distortion.

We may, and will, admit that there are idiosyncratic aspects of personality whether one labels them as the id or the "I" -- in fact, it is this individuation which makes man both so difficult and fascinating to study. But there are additionally shared aspects of personality; and "the symbolic codes on which the sharing is based have a controlling influence over the individual's experience, within a believable latitude, similar erotic and aggressive feelings or inhibitions, or how similar frustrations, fears, and anxieties can arise in a group of people faced with the same social conditions."<sup>64</sup> Even if the child-rearing practices do differ among classes, the shared symbolic world will be similar for each and will exercise its influence, perhaps even upon the unconscious.

Lest one think that we have forgotten about relation of psychoanalysis and social movements, we may turn toward a brief example of how such factors coalesce to present a fertile breeding ground for movement. Jerome Bruner writes that "it is not simply society that patterns itself on the idealizing myths, but unconsciously it is the individual man as well who is able to structure his internal clamor of identities in terms of prevailing myth. Life then produces myth and finally imitates it."<sup>65</sup> It is this which



may account for Freud's Oedipus complex. A more specific example, however, can be found in National Socialism. Fichte proclaimed in his addresses to the German Nation in 1807 the notion of a "superior German 'Kultur.'"

Hegel "praised the power of the state and the virtues of war;" and von Treitschke and Nietzsche "stressed the principle of survival of the fittest." Wagner portrayed a Weltanschauung of unconscious racial forces and anti-Semitism in his operas and political writings. And Arthur de Gobineau and Houston Chamberlain wrote of theories of racial superiority. Hitler synthesized these and promulgated "images which gathered their force from ideas and themes ["an exaggerated romanticism, a science of racism, a vague economic socialism, and the alleged supernatural and unconscious forces of Volk activity"] already implanted in German tradition. . . ."66

In Bruner's terms, the myth was being lived. However much we might like to think of ourselves as rational men, or at least as reasonable, and however inhibited we are by ethical considerations, we must recognize that the unconscious -- whether strictly instinctual or modified by a symbolic environment -- remains a powerful force in man's life.<sup>67</sup>

Given the complex interrelationships between the instinctual elements of man, his id, and the forces external to him, we may expect that some degree of psychic disorganization may occur from either of these two directions. In either case, they must threaten some element of his identity, his self-concept, if he is to respond to a movement. Instinct conflict between the eros and destructive

portions may become intense and, in Freudian terms, overcome the fragile balance maintained by the ego. At the same time, however, efforts by the ego may not be strong enough to integrate cognitive functions with changing external conditions. Thus, when cognitive relations have been created regarding certain elements of the perceived reality and another part of "reality" fails to operate in accordance with these expectations, it may be difficult to operate effectively. When those elements of the superego are neither applicable to this particular situation nor capable of maintaining their influence (if, for instance, some major component of the superego which has provided guidance in the past fails to act in conjunction with expectations) the difficulty of maintaining the previous perceptions and actions may become extremely difficult. A feeling of isolation, of detachment, of alienation, may result. This is quite similar to Erikson's concept of identity crisis:

. . . it occurs in that period of life cycle when each youth forges for himself some central perspective and direction, some working unity, out of the effective remnants of his childhood and the hopes of his anticipated adulthood; he must detect some meaningful resemblance between what he has come to see in himself and what his sharpened awareness tells him others judge and expect him to be.<sup>68</sup>

The resolution of this identity crisis, carried over for the most part from experiences encountered during the three phases described earlier, will have a profound influence upon future development of the adult life.

Eric Hoffer seems to believe that involvement in a social movement requires a denial of self-identity:

To ripen a person for self-sacrifice he must cease to be George, Hans, Ivan or Tadao -- a human atom with an existence bounded by birth and death. The most drastic way to achieve this end is by the complete assimilation of the individual into a collective body. When asked who he is, his automatic response is that he is a German, a Russian, a Japanese, a Christian. . . . He has no purpose, worth and destiny apart from his collective body; and as long as that body lives he cannot really die.<sup>69</sup>

The thrust of Hoffer's statement is that the individual gives up his self-identity; but, in fact, he is really searching for it. And he may often find it in a movement. If we remember that the two basic instincts are those of eros and of destruction, and remember further that each of these are present during the Oedipal stage -- in that there is an identification with the father while at the same time a hatred of him, and the erotic attachment toward the mother -- we may find the resolution of this ambivalence in attachment to a social movement.

By identifying with the movement, ambivalence is split apart and dealt with separately. The love relationship is applied to the group and its members; while the hatred is applied to those who are not members, especially to the authority who has created the difficulties and who stands as the personification of Oedipal father. Within any movement exists an ideology -- and it performs valuable functions for the movement's membership and leadership. Such ideologies may "gratify unconscious wishes, and it is usually possible

to identify a variety of drive contents in them. But this is an acceptable position only insofar as ego and reality functions are included and any implied notion of 'endogenous potentiality' is not limited to drive expression; and only insofar as we understand that such unconscious wishes . . . are structured to some degree from the beginning by words, behaviors, feelings, and ideas sanctioned by the moral order in which they appear."<sup>70</sup> The god and devil terms of the ideology become the superego, the source of justification for the individual, and the hated authority figure. Thus, the ambivalence growing out of the identity crisis is resolved. However, since the ideology must account for all relationships, it must be totalist. Thus, "because this system of rationalization is so intimately tied to the individual's view of himself, it must be clung to unalterably. The root characteristics of the ideology serve as the conscious justificatory formula for the individual, the token of his management of intense and disruptive feelings."<sup>71</sup>

Not only does the ideology provide a new self-identity in many cases, but often such new identities are strengthened through rhetorical means, as explained by Richard Gregg:

A [n] . . . aspect of the ego-function of rhetoric has to do with constituting self-hood through expression; that is, with establishing, defining, and affirming one's self-hood as one engages in a rhetorical act. The idea here refers to self-persuasion in a peculiar way, for what is at stake is not the nature of the rhetorical claims or the sense and probity of appeals and arguments for their own sakes, but just the fact that the rhetoric must be verbalized in order for one's self-hood to be realized. Rhetoric, in this sense, takes on the aspects of both act and appeal, the two occurring simultaneously.<sup>72</sup>

In addition to Richard Gregg's discussion of the verbal aspects of rhetoric, Murray Edelman posits virtually the same thing about "body rhetoric:"

Riot support or participation is. . . both a mode of self-expression and a source of self-definition, particularly for the young. To participate in a riot is dramatically to make the point, both to oneself and to others, that one no longer accepts the subordinate role and status defined for blacks by the prevailing belief in a symbiotic social order.<sup>73</sup>

Thus, whether it is the black verbally establishing his identity by claims of the beauty of blackness or demonstrating his denial of acquiescence to the white power structure by hurling a stone, the result is the same: he is attempting to establish his identity through rhetorical means. At the same time, he is identifying in terms of whom he is against, with whom he is sharing common experiences or "properties"; and is being identified with part of a larger activity. We can see, then, the close similarities between Burke's notion of identification and that provided by Freudian, or psycho-analytic, analysis.

Within this, too, is the redemptive identification which occurs through the process of shared guilt. In Burkeian terms, those who utter the Negative, the "No", to the established order, are burdened by guilt at having broken the covenant which infused the hierarchy. They have denied the bonds of love and are then chastised by the superego, the conscience. It is then by means of a new identification, one which splits the ambivalent feelings regarding the authority figure, that

these men create a new order -- a new order based upon new covenants and justified by placing their collective guilt upon the eternal scapegoat: "The persecutors attribute to a sacrificial victim all the sins which plague them internally and then are purged of sin by the actual or symbolic destruction of the victim."<sup>74</sup> It is in these ways that psychoanalytic theory helps provide a means of gaining greater understanding for the critic of movement rhetoric.

### The Integrative Function of Rhetoric

The assumption underlying this entire analysis is quite simply that man can only understand through symbolic forms, and that all his psychic space which functions in providing order for his environment and his functioning within it depend upon symbolic transformation. We have argued that because of this process, motive becomes expressed as situation, which then becomes expressed as symbol. The symbol does not necessarily "represent" the thing so much as it represents a way of acting toward it. The act may be explicit, as in language or physical expression, or it may be incipient, as Burke describes an attitude. In either instance, the external manifestation of man's inner being is there for examination. By examining these acts the critic is gaining insight into the inner workings of the human mind -- and can better understand why particular symbols are used by individuals and why they affect others as they do.

Attitudes are symbolic and they are often the result of interactions between the one and the many surrounding him. But they are the result of those interactions only to the extent that meaning is attached to them; and meaning, or understanding, can only exist symbolically. Those symbols then are both products of and shapers of the way in which we perceive the world. If language, or other nonverbal forms of rhetoric, are actually expressive of a way of acting, then Murray Edelman's analysis of political metaphor becomes increasingly important:

Metaphor. . . defines the patterns of perception to which people respond. To speak of deterrence and strike capacity is to perceive war as a game; to speak of legalized murder is to perceive war as a slaughter of human beings; to speak of a struggle for democracy is to perceive war as a vaguely defined instrument for achieving an intensely sought objective. Each metaphor intensifies selected perceptions and ignores others, thereby helping one to concentrate upon desired consequences of favored public policies and helping one to ignore their unwanted, unthinkable, or irrelevant premises and aftermaths.<sup>75</sup>

In somewhat more explosive language, Peter L. Berger writes that linguistic usage is highly important: "Anyone who remembers the Nazi usage of Saujuden should stop to reflect about the human implication of the current usage of the term 'pigs.' But even those with shorter memories should be aware of the fact that, by definition, pigs are designated for slaughter."<sup>76</sup> The implication of each of these is that such linguistic expression portrays an attitude, a predisposition to act, or a motive which produces action within a situation. Through the rhetorical analysis of movement

symbol we can gain insights into attitudes, clusters of perceived personality traits and make inferences about the reasons for past or existing behavior and guesses about the potential consequences of such symbolic groupings. One need only remember the warning in Kenneth Burke's "Rhetoric of Hitler's Battle" -- a warning that went largely unheeded. If the rhetorical critic can provide anything, better illumination of acts may provide other men information by which they may make more reasoned choices.

The relationship between symbols and psychoanalytic approaches is even more clear. It is, in fact, largely through a form of "rhetorical analysis" that the psychoanalyst functions. In Wolfenstein's study of The Revolutionary Personality, it is largely through a combination of biographical information and a symbolic analysis of writings, speeches and symbolic actions that relationships between the crises of childhood and of identity and the manifestations of the resolution of such crises in the adult attachment to and influence on a given movement are explored. Once such relationships may be discerned, a better understanding of the function of rhetoric in movements may be gained.

John Rathbun indicates that we can only understand, for example, the rhetoric of Martin Luther King by examining the identity which he assumed, the public role of prophet:

. . . this role of Dr. King was consciously held. At one time he said that in his quest for social justice he left his home to aid the down-trodden "just as the eighth-century prophets left their little villages and carried their 'thus saith the Lord' far beyond the boundaries of their home towns." . . . without some understanding of



the prophetic role played by Dr. King, such problems as his sense of the continuity of universal history as opposed to secular history, the case for social justice through the exercise of love, the collective guilt of institutional forms, and the divine judgment on public policies and actions seem to lack significant relation. But when we establish the prophetic point of view and acknowledge that it is something more than mere "image-making", these fall into place.<sup>77</sup>

The importance of Rathbun's statement seems clear; but we would disagree that mere "conscious" expression of a metaphor indicates a "conscious" awareness of the identity crisis' resolution. Such may profitably be explained through psychoanalytic theory, which gives an additional and valuable perspective by which our analysis of movement rhetoric can become much deeper and richer. It must also be stated that the relationship between psychology and psychoanalysis is relatively close -- perhaps to the chagrin of both. But the resolution of the childhood crises is reflected in the individual's attitudes and perceptions of his world. The social psychological explanation of personal and social development constructed by Mead and the psychoanalytic explanation advanced by Freud bear more than a passing resemblance. But in either case, it is only through symbols that such psychic phenomena can be manifested and explored, and through an understanding of psychological and psychoanalytic explanations of symbol formation. In either case, it is only through symbols that such psychological and psychoanalytic development occurs. And it is these symbolic constructs which then strike to psychic structures of other men and make social movements living entities.

### Summary

This chapter attempts to examine the contribution of psychological and psychoanalytic theory to the rhetorical criticism of social movements. While recognizing that these constructs are ultimately of symbolic origin, they nevertheless provide insight into the creation, use and consequences of later symbolic forms. It is for these reasons that a study of such approaches may be beneficial to the rhetorical critic.

Traditional views of social movements were examined, and were largely predicated upon assumptions that such behavior was "pathological" and violated the sensible, acceptable norms or values of civilized society. A more modern view maintains that such actions are often assumed to be "rational" or are at least reasoned. Such acts are encompassed by rhetoric, and may be partially understood through psychological constructs.

The role of attitudes, balance (or cognitive consistency), commitment, attribution of cause to personal agents and implicit personality theories were briefly examined and illustrations were given to indicate their potential usefulness to the critic. Additionally, Freudian theories and more recent modifications of them were presented. The relationship between rhetoric and the development of personality was explored and the identification features of modern protest rhetoric were related to specific ego-functions.

Finally, the integrative notion of rhetoric was again explored and the implications of rhetorical analysis as an indicator of attitudes and potential acts.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup>Paul Wilkinson, Social Movement (London: Pall Mall, 1971), p. 86.
- <sup>2</sup>Neil J. Smelser, Essays in Sociological Explanation (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), p. 102.
- <sup>3</sup>Ibid, p. 92.
- <sup>4</sup>Northrop Frye, The Well-Tempered Critic (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1963), pp. 41-42.
- <sup>5</sup>Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1965), p. 220.
- <sup>6</sup>Ibid, p. 30.
- <sup>7</sup>Jerome H. Skolnick, The Politics of Protest (New York: Ballantine Books, 1969), p. 330.
- <sup>8</sup>Wilkinson, p. 86. Such a position received eloquent expression from Friedrich Engels. He is quoted by Seymour Lipset as follows: "As far back as the 1890's, Engels described those who 'throng to the working-class parties in all countries' as 'those who have nothing to look forward to from the official world or have come to the end of their tether with it -- opponents of inoculation, supporters of abstemiousness, vegetarians, anti-vivsectionists, nature-healers, free-community preachers whose communities have fallen to pieces, authors of new theories on the origin of the universe, unsuccessful or unfortunate inventors, victims of real or imaginary injustice, . . . honest fools and dishonest swindlers.'" Lipset does not necessarily do much better: "It is often men from precisely such origins who give the fanatical and extremist character to these movements and form the core of believers." Quoted in Seymour Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1963), p. 178-9. The Engels quote is from Friedrich Engels, "On the History of Early Christianity," in K. Marx and F. Engels, On Religion, (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957), p. 319.
- <sup>9</sup>Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (New York: Perennial Library Edition, 1966), p. 114. Also, see Hoffer, pp. 49-50.
- <sup>10</sup>Gary B. Bush and R. Serge Denisoff, Social and Political Movements (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1971), p. 140.
- <sup>11</sup>Anthony Oberschall, Social Conflict and Social Movements (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973), p. 330. See also Skolnick, pp. 339ff.

- <sup>12</sup>Kenneth J. Gergen, The Psychology of Behavior Exchange (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1969), p. 10.
- <sup>13</sup>George A. Kelly, A Theory of Personality (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1963), p. 49.
- <sup>14</sup>Daniel Katz, "The Functional Approach to the Study of Attitudes," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 24, 1960, p. 163. A somewhat different description is provided by Edward Shils, Talcott Parsons and James Olds, "Systems of Value-Orientations," in Shils and Parsons, eds., Toward A General Theory of Action, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1962), pp. 162-163: "Symbol systems in which the cognitive function has primacy may be called 'beliefs' or ideas. Symbol systems in which the cathectic function has primacy may be called 'expressive' symbols."
- <sup>15</sup>Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1960), p. 33.
- <sup>16</sup>Kelly, p. 78.
- <sup>17</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>18</sup>Fritz Heider, The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958), pp. 200-201.
- <sup>19</sup>Rokeach, pp. 39-40. "(1) a central region represents what will be called the person's 'primitive' beliefs. These refer to all the beliefs a person has acquired about the nature of the physical world he lives in, the nature of the 'self' and of the 'generalized other'. . . . (2) An intermediate region represents the beliefs a person has in and about the nature of authority and the people who line up with authority, on whom he depends to help him form a picture of the world he lives in. (3) A peripheral region represents the beliefs derived from authority, such beliefs filling in the details of his world-map."
- <sup>20</sup>Heider, p. 201.
- <sup>21</sup>For an excellent discussion of these various approaches to cognitive consistency, see Robert P. Abelson, Elliot Aronson, William J. McGuire, Theodore M. Newcomb, Milton J. Rosenberg, Percy H. Tannenbaum, eds., Theories of Cognitive Consistency: A Sourcebook (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1968). Another excellent discussion is included in C. Kiesler, B. Collins, and N. Miller, Attitude Change: A Critical Analysis of Theoretical Approaches (New York: Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1968).

- <sup>22</sup>Hans Toch, The Psychology of Social Movements (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1965), pp. 117-118. While not explicitly examined as a mechanism of construct theory, George Kelly writes of a similar concept when he discusses "validation:" "A person commits himself to anticipating a particular event. If it takes place, his anticipation is validated. If it fails to take place, his anticipation is invalidated. Validation represents the compatibility (subjectively construed) between one's prediction and the outcome he observes. Invalidation represents incompatibility (subjectively construed) between one's prediction and the outcome he observes. . . . The notion of validation is quite different from the notion of 'reinforcement,' as the latter term is commonly used. Reinforcement carries the implication of meeting the person's needs, of satisfying him in some way, or of gratification. Validation refers solely to the verification of a prediction, even though what was predicted was something unpleasant." Kelly, p. 158. Such an approach seems entirely consistent with consistency theory.
- <sup>23</sup>James A. Geschwender, "Explorations in the Theory of Social Movements and Revolutions," Social Forces, Vol. 47, No. 2, December 1968, p. 133. Also see Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 40ff.
- <sup>24</sup>Denton E. Morrison, "Some Notes Toward Theory on Relative Deprivation, Social Movements, and Social Change," American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 14, No. 5, p. 682. Heider posits a similar position: "When a person wishes for something and finds out that the wish cannot possibly be fulfilled, that p and x [person and object] will remain forever separated, the wish is likely to die out. When a person finds out that something had never before entered his mind is possible, a wish for it may be aroused. The more it becomes possible the more the wish may increase." Heider, p. 142.
- <sup>25</sup>Mary G. McEdwards, "Agitative Rheotric: Its Nature and Effects, in J. Jeffery Auer, ed., The Rhetoric of Our Times (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), p. 11.
- <sup>26</sup>It is important that the reader be aware of other theories of attitude change, an excellent review of which can be found in Kiesler, Collins and Miller. It seems, however, that once all the qualifications have been added to the major approaches, including the Social-Judgment Involvement Approach, that virtually all involve some form of consistency theory.
- <sup>27</sup>The preceding chapter discusses this phenomenon and examines the Meadian approach in some detail.

<sup>28</sup>Toch, p. 201.

<sup>29</sup>Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 1956), p. 114. An additional discussion may be found in Toch: ". . . the effects of being a member are a cumulative progression from first commitment to dogmatism. The social movement that presents its inductee with authoritatively reinforced beliefs responsive to his problem unwittingly initiates a chain of events which may culminate in the confined, self-contained world of the veteran member." p. 155.

<sup>30</sup>Oberschall, pp. 305-306.

<sup>31</sup>R. Harre and P. F. Secord, The Explanation of Social Behavior (Totawa, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1973), p. 159ff.

<sup>32</sup>Albert H. Hastorf, David J. Schneider, Judith Polefka, Person Perception (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1970), p. 11-12. The use of attribution theory does not deny the value of consistency theory as an explanation of attitude change; for Jones et. al. write: "Attribution theory, with its emphasis on the reality and control orientation of the individual, does not supplant the cognitive consistency theories. To propose that the individual seeks information enabling causal attribution does not imply that this information search is unaffected by other motives suggested by cognitive consistency theories -- self justification or the maintenance of preferred cognitive configurations." Edward E. Jones, David E. Kanouse, Harold H. Kelly, Richard E. Nisbett, Stuart Valins, and Bernard Weiner, eds., Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior (Morristown, New Jersey: General Learning Press, 1972), p. xii. Some further explanation may be provided by Heider. "The effective personal force is also analyzed into two contributing factors: a power factor and a motivational factor." Power usually refers to ability and the motivational power includes the person's intention and his "trying to do it."

Power (often ability) ————— Effective environmental force —————  
Trying ————— Effective personal force ————— x

The personal components, power and trying, are multiplicative; since no power or no trying will yield zero even if the other is present. On the other hand, the motivational forces demonstrate where the perceived "cause" of the action is to be found. "X" is the outcome. Heider, p. 83.

<sup>33</sup>David E. Kanouse and L. Reid Hanson, Jr., "Negativity in Evaluations," in Jones et. al., p. 57.

<sup>34</sup>Gurr, p. 180.

<sup>35</sup>Harold Kelly, "Attributions in Social Interaction," in Jones et. al., p. 24.

<sup>36</sup>Hastorf et. al., p. 12.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid, p. 46.

<sup>38</sup>Heider, p. 80.

<sup>39</sup>Henry C. Triandis, "The Impact of Social Change on Attitudes," in Bert T. King and Elliot McGinnies, eds., Attitudes, Conflict, and Social Change (New York: Academic Press, 1972), p. 130.

<sup>40</sup>Richard B. Gregg, "A Phenomenologically Oriented Approach to Rhetorical Criticism," Central States Speech Journal, Vol. XVII, No. 2, May 1966, pp. 84-85.

<sup>41</sup>Gergen, pp. 75-76.

<sup>42</sup>Coser, pp. 105-106.

<sup>43</sup>Parke G. Burgess, "The Rhetoric of Black Power: A Moral Demand?" Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. LIV, April 1968, p. 131.

<sup>44</sup>For a discussion of studies regarding the correspondence between attitudes and behavior, see Kiesler, Collins, and Miller, pp.

<sup>45</sup>E. Victor Wolfenstein, The Revolutionary Personality (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 3.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid, p. 164.

<sup>47</sup>Bush and Denisoff, p. 121.

<sup>48</sup>Sigmund Freud, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, Translated and edited by James Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969), pp. 2-3.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid, p. 5.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid, pp. 2-3.

51For an example of the balancing between hate and the love instincts, Eric Hoffer quotes Frantz Funck-Brentano, Luther (London: Jonathon Cape, Ltd., 1939), p. 319: ". . . one cannot escape the impression that hatred is an all-pervading ingredient in the compounds and combination of our inner life. All our enthusiasms, devotions, passions and hopes, when they decompose, release hatred. On the other hand it is possible to synthesize an enthusiasm, a devotion and a hope by activating hatred. Said Martin Luther: 'When my heart is cold and I cannot pray as I should I scourge myself with the thought of the impiety and ingratitude of my enemies, the Pope and his accomplices and vermin . . . so that my heart swells with righteous indignation and hatred and I can say with warmth and vehemence: "Holy by Thy Name, Thy Kingdom Come, Thy Will be done!" And the hotter I grow the more ardent do my prayers become.'" Hoffer, p. 92.

52Erik H. Erikson, Young Man Luther (New York: The Norton Library Edition, 1962), p. 255.

53Wolfenstein, p. 92.

54Erikson, p. 255.

55Ibid, p. 257.

56Fred Weinstein and Gerald M. Platt, Psychoanalytic Sociology (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), pp. 2-3. Also see Sigmund Freud's Totem and Taboo (New York: 1952). In Totem and Taboo, Freud posits that the Oedipus relationship arises from a phylogenetic history. Thus, the Oedipal drama is the "representative anecdote" for society. See pages 56-69. Additionally, the relative similarities between Freud's stages and those of Jean Piaget are apparent. Freud maintains that there is an "evolution of the human views of the universe . . . an animistic phase followed by a religious phase, and this in turn by a scientific one." In the first phase, men ascribe power to themselves. In the second, they ascribe it to gods but retain some power through their capacity to influence the gods in a number of ways. Finally, in the scientific phase, men abandon the "illusion" of controlling power. For Piaget, the child passes through certain stages during which the elements of causality become differentiated. In the initial stage, causality is attributed to both "efficacious" (where cause is vaguely sensed as being inherent within the individual's actions without seeing the self and those actions as separate causal agents) and "phenomenalistic" causes (where the cause is temporally -- but not spatially -- contiguous between two events. As the child passes beyond the initial stages, he enters a period where he incipiently makes some distinction



between act and external result. Next, additional differentiation occurs through stage 4 (where external sources are perceived as being causal only when the child's actions intervene in some manner) and 5 (the child now experiments in his universe and increasingly objectifies and spatializes causality) until stage 6 where she/he is capable of making inferences of effect when only cause is observable or vice versa. See John H. Flavell, The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1963), pp. 142-147.

<sup>57</sup>Bush and Denisoff, p. 159. These authors quote from Leonard Reisman, Class in American Society (Glencoe, Ill: The Free Press, 1959), p. 243.

<sup>58</sup>Wolfenstein, especially p. 303.

<sup>59</sup>Sigmund Freud wrote Leonardo da Vinci, translated by A. A. Brill, (New York: 1947) and Moses and Monotheism (New York: 1939); Fawn M. Brodie, Thaddeus Stevens (New York: 1959). Many have been written in this vein, far too numerous to mention here; but one of the most widely acclaimed is Erikson's Young Man Luther.

<sup>60</sup>Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, Translated and edited by James Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1961), p. 59.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid, pp. 70-71.

<sup>62</sup>Freud, Outline, p. 3.

<sup>63</sup>Talcott Parsons, "Social Structure and the Development of Personality: Freud's Contribution to the Integration of Psychology and Sociology," in Parsons, ed., Social Structure and Personality (Glencoe, Ill: The Free Press, 1964), p. 110.

<sup>64</sup>Wennstein and Platt, p. 23.

<sup>65</sup>Jerome Bruner, "Myth and Identity," in Henry A. Murray, ed., Myth and Mythmaking (New York: Brazillier, 1960), pp. 282-283.

<sup>66</sup>Gregg, pp. 86-87.

<sup>67</sup>Eugene Ionesco gives an example of the importance of the unconscious: "In 1938 the writer, Denis de Rougemont, was staying in Germany, at Nuremberg, during a Nazi demonstration. He tells us how he found himself in the midst of a dense crowd awaiting the arrival of Hitler. The people were beginning to show signs of impatience when the Fuhrer and his entourage came in sight, at the far end of an avenue, looking very small in the distance. As they drew near, the narrator watched the crowd, gradually caught up in a kind of hysteria, frenziedly acclaiming the sinister man. The hysteria spread and advanced, with Hitler, like a tide. This delirious enthusiasm first of all astonished the writer.

But when the Fuhrer came quite near and all the people round him gave way to the general hysteria, Denis de Rougemont felt the same raging madness in himself, struggling to possess him, a delirium that electrified him. He was on the point of falling under the spell when something rose from the depth of his being and resisted the rising storm. Denis de Rougemont tells us how uneasy he felt, how terribly alone in the crowd, offering hesitant resistance. His hair stood on end, literally, he says, and then he understood what is meant by Holy Terror. Just then it was not his mind that resisted, but his whole being, his whole personality that bridled." Eugene Ionesco, Quoted in "Eugene Ionesco's Rhinoceros," The American Film Theatre Cinebill, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 6, 9.

<sup>68</sup>Erikson, p. 14.

<sup>69</sup>Hoffer, p. 60.

<sup>70</sup>Weinstein and Platt, p. 80.

<sup>71</sup>Wolfenstein, p. 173.

<sup>72</sup>Richard B. Gregg, "The Ego-Function of the Rhetoric of Protest," Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol. 4, No. 2, Spring 1971, pp. 74-75.

<sup>73</sup>Murray Edelman, Politics as Symbolic Action. (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1971), p. 90.

<sup>74</sup>Michael C. Leff, "Redemptive Identification: Cicero's Catalinarian Orations," in G. P. Mohrmann, Charles J. Stewart and Donovan J. Ochs, eds., Explorations in Rhetorical Criticism (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1973), p.

<sup>75</sup>Edelman, p. 67.

<sup>76</sup>Peter L. Gerger and Neuhaus, Movement and Revolution (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1970), p. 46.

<sup>77</sup>John Rathbun, "The Problem of Judgment and Effect in Historical Criticism: A Proposed Solution," Western Speech, Vol. 33, No. 3, Summer 1969, p. 155.

## Chapter VI

". . . AND SO SHALL IT BE IN THE END"

In the beginning was the word. But, just following the word, there is the critic who observes, analyzes, describes, and evaluates.<sup>1</sup>

### Introduction

Throughout these many pages we have attempted to inquire into the specific relationships between rhetoric and the social and psychological-psychanalytic aspects of social movements. We must agree with those who claim that a movement can be studied from the perspective of either of these approaches; but at the same time, to do so would appear to deprive the movement of much of its uniqueness, of its dynamism and of the completeness which makes it so manifestly a human product. In this concluding chapter, we shall briefly explore the rationale by which we believe social movements should receive study. It is wise, however, for us to reiterate our caveat from the beginning of this effort -- that neutrality cannot be attained and that what follows must be recognized solely for what it is, a personal statement of position.

### An Interpenetration of "Forms"

Ernst Cassirer writes in An Essay on Man that:

The philosophy of symbolic forms starts from the presupposition that, if there is any definition of the nature of "essence" of man, this definition can only be understood as a functional one, not a

substantial one. We cannot define man by any inherent principle which constitutes his metaphysical essence -- nor can we define him by any inborn faculty or instinct that may be ascertained by empirical observation. Man's outstanding characteristic, his distinguishing mark, is not his metaphysical nature but his work.<sup>2</sup>

The only way we can understand man is by examining the function in which his creative capacities operate. It is this function rather than substance, which makes man unique.

We may borrow the notion of function rather than substance in our examination of social movements. If we strive for a unified synthesis of a given movement rather than a particularization of it, we must consider the functions of these various approaches, or perspectives, to the whole of the created work. Just as Cassirer uses the concept of cultural forms -- language, art, myth, science, and history -- to better understand man, so too may we employ Burke's notion of circumference and draw an analogy to the "forms" of social movements -- social aspects, psychological-psychoanalytic aspects, and rhetoric. This is not to claim that such is an exhaustive listing of the "forms" of a movement, but it does seem to encompass most of the writings about them. We might want to consider history and political science as additional areas of study, but it appears that they may be incorporated into the broad rubrics that we have considered.

We must also admit, as students of rhetoric, that our main focus is upon the use of rhetoric within the confines of the movement. We are seeking to discover, or to better understand, how rhetoric is shaped by social and mental factors while at the same time shaping them. We are, then, examining

social movements from a given perspective which will concentrate our efforts upon that particular aspect or "form."

But we find that rhetorical criticism, for that is what we do as we provide illumination to our fellow man about rhetoric and the movements which use it, encompasses many of man's creative perspectives. Robert L. Scott has maintained:

. . . the human territory in which we are interested is one in which many humans are at work from many points of view. These points of view go by various names, among them, political science, sociology, psychology, philosophy, linguistics, anthropology and history. If we want to know the territory we refer to as "rhetorical," we must . . . repudiate "once and for all" the notion of a takeover and embrace rather the notion of a pluralistic set of arts, learning from all relevant disciplines and indeed willing to be absorbed by other disciplines at appropriate moments.<sup>3</sup>

Rhetoric, as we have defined it, is a symbolic means of inducing cooperation. As such, it may imply that cooperation is the ultimate goal -- but it is a goal that can never be attained. Kenneth Burke posits that language (and we would expand his notion to include all purposive symbolic behavior) is the means by which man overcomes his inherent biological division. If we adhere to the principle of entelechy we might expect that the perfection of such inducements to cooperation would be "pure persuasion." Pure persuasion would be free of strife by definition, for man would have been induced to a state which can only be conceived of as the absence of division, or conflict. But the ideal can never be reached. Therefore, man must remain within the realm of "inducing" cooperation, within the realm

of overcoming division which can never be completed. Man must always be moving "towards the better life."

There is, within language, "a dialectical dimension in that it contains in itself the property of transcension, the capacity to separate and unite, name and divide."<sup>4</sup> If we refer to the concept of identification, it was often sought in order to more effectively and efficiently promote division, a segregation by congregation. It is language which permits the growth of the self, the incorporation of the individual into the group (his unification) but it is the use of symbols and the consequences of such use that makes man conscious of his separateness from other men.

Symbol, we would submit, is the centripetal force of human existence. It provides the creation of psychological structure and expression; and it permits man's interaction with other men -- which is the creation of the social world. But it is the interpenetration of these "forms" which in turn create new symbols and new uses of them. Man seeks understanding based largely upon an anticipation of the consequences of actions by other men. It is through symbols that such actions are created and it is through symbols that they are understood.

But crucially, rhetoric is not all -- it is not, as Art Smith claims, the "essence" of the social movement:

For if rhetoric gives rise to the various other dimensions of a movement, if it functions to coordinate, sustain, and produce the thrust of a movement, it is essential to a movement. Rhetoric becomes a productive structuring art. Furthermore, if rhetoric constitutes, as it does, the essence of a movement it is meaningful as an understanding

of human behavior to identify, analyze and study movements by their rhetorical indicators. Movements differ not merely in the origin of their grievances or the composition of their votarists but principally in their rhetorical manifestations.<sup>5</sup>

Smith concludes that it is only "after a researcher has isolated the principal and minor metaphors can he begin to make sense out of the historical and sociological aspects of a movement." He can then "refer to the social and historical contexts for clarification of the symbol's purposes and values, historically and contemporarily."<sup>6</sup> To take such an approach is to employ a reductionist outlook. The symbol is not merely a "product" of the social and historical context, but rather is a shaper of that context as well. It is only through the interrelations of such contexts and the symbol, or metaphor, that any meaning is ascribed to the symbol. "Since . . . the meaning of language derives salience from social context," writes George Knox, "all symbolic charge must depend upon extraliterary situations."<sup>7</sup> Just as we must argue against approaches that attempt to reduce social movements to social factors and to psychological-psychoanalytic, so too must we object to those who would reduce movement to metaphor.

Throughout, we have stressed the importance of rhetoric -- which we have defined as the symbolic inducement of cooperation -- to both the social and psychological-psychoanalytic aspects of social movements. It is only through symbolic means that these factors develop; but at the same time they exert influence upon the use of symbols which in turn create another, different "reality." Additionally, the interpenetration

of the social and mental aspects of movement should also have become clear. The social system is conceived of as the interactions of actors toward whom each is cathectic. On the other hand, the psychological aspects of movement are shaped by these interactions. Thus, it is only through the interpenetration, or interrelatedness, of these three aspects that we can adequately attempt to understand social movements.

Talcott Parsons describes the potential source of movement through means of this interrelationship:

Any situation where an established institutional order has to a considerable extent become disorganized, where established routines, expectations and symbols are broken up or are under attack is a favourable situation for such a movement. This creates widespread psychological insecurity which in turn is susceptible of reintegration in terms of attachment to a charismatic movement.<sup>8</sup>

Thus, it is symbols under attack, institutions becoming disorganized (which can only be understood through symbols; or, for that matter, only attacked symbolically -- which may include physical means) producing psychological disorganization. But at the same time, it is rhetoric in the form of the movement's ideology which provides the unification.

According to Clifford Geertz:

. . . . it is . . . the attempt of ideologies to render otherwise incomprehensible social situations meaningful, to so construe them as to make it possible to act purposefully within them, that accounts both for the ideologies' highly figurative nature and for the intensity with which, once accepted, they are held. As metaphor extends language by broadening its semantic range, enabling it to express meanings it cannot or at least cannot yet express literally, so the head-on clash of literal meanings in ideology -- the irony, the hyperbole,



the overdrawn antithesis -- provides novel symbolic frames against which to match the myriad "unfamiliar somethings" that . . . are produced by a transformation in political life. Whatever else ideologies may be -- projections of unacknowledged fears, disguises for ulterior motives, phatic expressions of group solidarity -- they are, most distinctively, maps of problematic social reality and matrices for the creation of collective conscience.<sup>9</sup>

As such, ideology reflects the interpenetration of these "forms" of social movement. Ideology is a "symbolic frame" which provides a "map of social reality" and a series of structures by which a "collective conscience" (a superego) can be created.

The implication of such an analysis can best be stated by Gary Bush and Serge Denisoff. Bush and Denisoff argue that movements of neither the Right nor the Left have been viable when the other was ascendant. The reason for such occurrences is that "the solutions they offered for social problems were not historically significant. Quite simply, social significance is bestowed on those ideologies (and the groups espousing them) which provide a viable solution to the problems about which publics are concerned."<sup>10</sup> Admittedly, all this can ultimately be reduced to symbols, or metaphor, but to do so distorts the nature of the interaction to such an extent that we are no longer examining the same phenomenon that we initially considered. Just as Cassirer posited that it was only through an understanding of each of the functional forms of culture that man could be understood, it is only through an understanding of the "forms" of social movements that we can understand their

emergence, their success or failure, and their consequences.

### The Moral Responsibility of Criticism

If man can only be described by his work, by his creation, then he is ultimately creating his own essence. Abraham Kaplan writes:

First, man is; and what he is is settled in the course of his existence and is not predetermined, not an antecedent condition of his existence. A man's existence is not exhausted by his exhibiting a particular essence, by his being just a man of whatever kind he is. He is more than just a type, a character defined by some role or other. The human being, in his every action, defines his own essence. . . .

Now to conceive of man as the existent which determines its own essence is to recognize that the most fundamental attribute of the human being is his capacity for choice. . . . What makes us fully and distinctively human is not choosing between willing good on the one hand and willing evil on the other, but consists rather just in choosing to will. It consists in the bare fact that we genuinely make a choice.<sup>11</sup>

Man does have choice; and no matter how constrained his freedom of selection among alternative becomes, he has the ultimate choice of "No." In examining the Sartrean notion of freedom, William Barrett writes that "where all the avenues of action are blocked for a man, this freedom may seem a tiny and unimportant thing; but it is in fact total and absolute, and Sartre is right to insist upon it as such, for it affords man his final dignity, that of being man."<sup>12</sup>

The element of choice for man also becomes apparent in the joining or not joining of the social movement, and the

similarities of Sartre and Kenneth Burke, including those who borrow from him, are readily apparent: "Movements begin when some pivotal individual or group -- suffering attitudes of alienation in a given social system, and drawn (consciously or unconsciously) by the impious dream of a mythic Order -- enacts, gives voice to, a No." <sup>13</sup> But the creation of the No, which at the same time is a Yes to an alternative -- again demonstrating the inherent dialectical nature of language, is in fact a choice of man; and so, too, is his choice of the reality which he creates symbolically. If man is influenced by the symbolic world which surrounds him, he still retains the capacity for rejecting it. And if he does, he is choosing an alternative reality -- it becomes a symbolic creation of man's own artifact.

The mere "choosing," however, is not the all; for in the choosing there must exist a moral responsibility. Again, Kaplan:

But man's freedom is also inseparably linked with responsibility. The significance of a choice is not exhausted by the act of choosing, but extends also to what is chosen: It lies, that is, in the consequences of the act and not just in the act itself. Responsibility is only the measure of the farthest reaches of freedom. In the existentialist account, each man is plainly responsible, to start with, for his own individuality. What we are, each of us, is determined by one thing and by one thing only -- ourselves. The limitless freedom of choice in which man's existence consists is thus at the same time a boundless responsibility for what he makes of himself.

. . . we are responsible for more than what becomes of us; we are also responsible for what becomes of others. When we make a choice we are choosing, not merely for ourselves, but for all men. . . . It is my choice that makes me human, and thereby

it makes something of humanity. My individuality is constituted by my choice and does not stand antecedent to it. In the choice itself I am acting as a representative of mankind. . . . [We must, then, adopt]. . . the Kantian categorical imperative: You must never will what you cannot consistently will<sup>14</sup> should be willed by all other rational beings.

If we perceive of every act, regardless of how apparently insignificant, as having consequences which affect others, then each act becomes fused with moral choice. Even though we have equated value-oriented movements with what are usually considered moral issues in this study, to some degree the moral element is present in all choices. Just as the principle of the hierarchy is present in all elements of it even though it receives its ultimate and clearest expression at the pinnacle, so too with morality of choice. To commit the ultimate moral act and deprive one of his freedom or life is without question fused with the issue; but, to a lesser degree, so is the act of saying no to some social order or even of maintaining an attitude, an incipient act, about such an order. At every turn the moral concern is pervasively present. To argue further, as we have done, however, that the symbolic forms which we use to create our reality and that of our "listeners" is to assume a moral obligation. For as Richard Vatz has maintained, "To view rhetoric as a creation of reality or salience rather than a reflector of reality increases the rhetor's moral responsibility. We do not just have the academic exercise of determining whether the rhetor understood the 'situation' correctly."<sup>15</sup> But we must recognize the potential consequences of his act and judge it accordingly.

Arthur Kruger has written that "Argumentum ad baculum, or the appeal to force or threats, is often available and quite persuasive." But because of his philosophic preference for a rhetoric composed of "good reasons" Kruger finds no justification for the study of such methods: .

. . . even if we grant that closely reasoned arguments are ineffective, is it educationally defensible to teach the doctrine that in influencing others, "valid arguments," per se, are not enough?

If we look closely at these so-called "extra-logical" appeals, we find that none of them can be justified from the standpoint of either responsible teaching, logic, or ethics.<sup>16</sup>

Kruger may represent his ethical position very well, but it appears to leave modern man in a lurch. There is much talk about "relevance" -- about the value of criticism to the "real" world in which man functions. The common complaint is that rhetorical criticism does not help the man who must make choices in the social or political arena to make "more reasoned" choices. But Kruger will not help him. If, as we have claimed, the goal of criticism is to help man understand himself, then we must examine all his creations, for it is by these creations that we have defined man. This means that we cannot pick and choose among those which we find personally pleasing; but rather that we must explain man in all his facets -- even those which we find deplorable. For it is only by understanding such creations that we can either avoid them or develop the means to change them. It is this function that the rhetorical critic can perform.

We, as critics, are then forced to concern ourselves with moral issues. We must interact with the creative episode we study in order to examine its consequences. While we must recognize the limitations of our studies -- in that, after all, we are not being "objective" and reporting just "fact" -- we may nevertheless take heart from our position so long as we remember our fundamental principle: that in choosing we are a representative of mankind, and make our choices and statements accordingly. If, in order to help man better understand himself, the critic is forced to make moral judgments, he must at the same time recognize that his statement of criticism is itself a creative act, a symbolic construction of reality. The benefit of moralistic criticism is expressed by Parke G. Burgess:

. . . critical assessment of symbolic action from an amoral view of generic categories alone runs the grave risk of missing the significance of the action. The risk of critical myopia would be greatest . . . when moral motives are most vitally involved, generating exactly the kind of strategic distinctions to which an amoral critic is blind. No wonder his perspective produces critical commentary often superficial and bland next to moralistic outbursts, and no wonder that most concerned observers of moral conflict would prefer the latter. However subjective it may be, moralistic commentary at least confronts motives and discriminations vital and significant in moralistic rhetorical elements.<sup>17</sup>

Just as we emphasized the importance of the voluntary nature of movement membership, in that each member made a choice and hence shared responsibility for the actions of the movement, so too must the critic confront the moral choices made by the rhetoric of social movement as well as

the choice, and moral implications, of his symbolic construction of that movement through his criticism.

The value of such criticism is apparent in Kenneth Burke's "Rhetoric of 'Hitler's Battle.'" The potential warning, the threat of the exorcism of Hitler's Jewish "devil" arrived in the criticism of Mein Kampf before the Final Solution was expressed or implemented in Germany. The warning was there, and the refusal or failure of the non-Germanic nations to respond to the plight of the Jews is a moral blight that must be confronted eternally. It is the responsibility of the critic to discern such principles; and it can be done by the rhetorical critic. He must recognize that, in the America of the Seventies, "'crowd control' may mean splitting open the heads of bystanders; a 'looter' may in fact be an ordinary ghetto resident . . . trying to get off the street. By invoking the concept of 'looter,' however, public officials can conjure the picture of heinous crime, can sidestep the normal penalty structure of the criminal law, call for the use of deadly force, and be applauded for a firm stand on 'law and order.'"<sup>18</sup> It is the responsibility of the critic to study, to explain this to himself and to his fellow man. At the same time, he must study the implications of "pig," "establishment," and "up against the wall."

Social movements are vital to modern societies, particularly to those societies which are relatively open

open for the expression of dissent. Such movements must be studied, not only because they help man better understand qua understanding, but also for the more pragmatic reasons that the consequences of movements and responses to them have vital ramifications to the type and functions of institutions in society, and in man's relation to them.

William Barrett concludes his chapter in Irrational Man on Sartre:

It may be that, as the modern world moves on, the Sartrian kind of freedom will be more and more the only kind man can experience. As society becomes more totalitarian, the islands of freedom get smaller and more cut off from the mainland and from each other -- which is to say from any spontaneous interchange with nature or the community of other human beings. Sartre's Orestes says to his celestial oppressor, "I am a man, Jupiter." One imagines the last Resistant of the last Resistance saying No in a prison cell in the Lubianka; saying No without any motive of self-advantage and without any hope that future humans will take up his cause, but saying No nonetheless simply because he is a man and his liberty cannot be taken from him. This last man would exist in a night darker than that into which the great Descartes cast himself, in that historic inn in Holland, when he paused to think and said No to the demon.<sup>19</sup>

So long as man says No, the potential for social movements exists; and as a creation of man, they must be studied.



## Notes

- <sup>1</sup>Jon M. Ericson, "Evaluative and Formulative Functions in Speech Criticism," Western Speech, Vol. 32, No. 3, Summer 1968, p. 173.
- <sup>2</sup>Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1970), p. 74. Originally published by Yale University Press, 1944
- <sup>3</sup>Robert L. Scott, "On Not Defining Rhetoric," Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol. 6, No. 2, Spring 1973, p. 92.
- <sup>4</sup>Marie Hochmuth Nichols, "Burkeian Criticism," in Thomas R. Nilsen, ed., Essays on Rhetorical Criticism (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 83.
- <sup>5</sup>Arthur L. Smith, "Historical and Social Movements: A Search for Boundaries," Paper presented at the Speech Communication Association Convention, December 1972, Chicago, Ill. pp. 5-6. A further example of Smith's bias against sociological approaches may be found in the same paper on page 10, where he writes: "What is argued, then, is a message centered theory of mass movements, not to replace historical or social theories which are useful for contextual and mechanistic considerations. . . ."
- <sup>6</sup>Ibid, p. 8.
- <sup>7</sup>George Knox, Critical Moments: Kenneth Burke's Categories and Critiques (Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press, 1957), p. 50.
- <sup>8</sup>Talcott Parsons, "Introduction," in Max Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, Translated by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, Talcott Parsons, ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1964), p. 71.
- <sup>9</sup>Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," in David E. Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent (New York: The Free Press, 1964), p. 64.
- <sup>10</sup>Gary Bush and R. Serge Denisoff, Social and Political Movements (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1971), p. 316.
- <sup>11</sup>Abraham Kaplan, "The Meaning of Life to the Existentialist," in The National Observer, November 9, 1964, p. 22.
- <sup>12</sup>William Barrett, Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1962), p. 242.
- <sup>13</sup>Leland M. Griffin, "A Dramatistic Theory of the Rhetoric of Movements," in William H. Rueckert, ed., Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969), p. 462.

<sup>14</sup>Kaplan, p. 22.

<sup>15</sup>Richard E. Vatz, "The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation,"  
Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol. 6, No. 3, Summer 1973, p. 158.

<sup>16</sup>Authur N. Kruger, "The Ethics of Persuasion: A Re-examination,"  
in J. Jeffery Auer, ed., The Rhetoric of Our Times (New York:  
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), p. 154.

<sup>17</sup>Parke G. Gurgess, "The Rhetoric of Moral Conflict: Two  
Critical Dimensions," Quarterly Journal of Speech,

<sup>18</sup>Jerome H. Skolnick, The Politics of Protest (New York:  
Ballantine Books, 1969), p. 7.

<sup>19</sup>Barret, 263.

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