


GRANT AND JOHNSON 1865-1869


by

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Preface

The subject of this thesis is one of a group of subjects clustering around the character of General Grant taken up for study by the seminar class in American History conducted by Professor James C. Malin of the University of Kansas in the Summer Session of 1929.

The study of the relations of President Johnson and General Grant during the Reconstruction Period, culminating as they did with the unseemly but spectacular quarrel is of interest to every student of American History.

The value of such a study is apparent when we remember the notorious conflict between President Johnson and Congress and recognize that Grant as General of the Army was the focus through which all orders for the execution of the reconstruction acts of Congress so antagonistic to the President, and that while Secretary of War ad interim he played the part of moderator between the Executive and Congress.

The importance of the study is amplified by the realization of the definite relationship of the quarrel to Grant's candidacy to succeed Johnson as President.

The relationship of Johnson and Grant has long been misunderstood due to the inadequate and unfair treatment of the subject in our histories. The ridicule and maledictions heaped upon Johnson during the Reconstruction days and the consequent tainting of the source material of that period with propaganda against Johnson have given the historians a pre-

judiced viewpoint and consequently their writings reflect bias. Biographers of Johnson and Grant have uniformly interpreted the controversy and quarrel according to their original predilections and in favor of the one it was their purpose to eulogise. Even Stryker, the most recent biographer of Johnson, although his work is to be commended as being the most exhaustive and probably the most reliable of any, in dealing with the controversy has been so anxious to vindicate Johnson and give him his rightful place in history that in attempting to do so he ~~has~~ belittled the character of Grant and relegated him to a standing far beneath his deserts.

In writing this thesis it is our purpose simply to demonstrate the truth, without partiality and with as much generosity in attributing motives and analyzing the reasons for conduct as a conservative interpretation of the facts will permit.

The objectives of this treatise are:

First, to review the facts of the relationship of President Johnson and General Grant.

Second, to interpret these facts in the light of the other events of that period.

Third, to show the causes of the estrangement of Johnson and Grant and of their final quarrel.

Fourth, to demonstrate the truth and error of the Grant-Johnson correspondence by a critical analysis of the same.

Fifth, to evaluate the political importance of the Grant-

Johnson controversy.

I am indebted to Dr. James C. Malin and Dr. F. H. Hodder of the History Department of the University of Kansas for valuable criticisms and for suggestions for improving the style and form of the manuscript.

---Russell J. Anderson

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GRANT AND JOHNSON 1865-1869

Chapter 1. Introduction

THE TIMES AND CIRCUMSTANCES

The reconstruction of a country after a great war is always fraught with perplexing problems for those in power. The stabilizing of the monetary system, the reestablishment of normal commercial relations within the nation's borders and with foreign countries, the return of the military population to civil life, the repair of material damage due to conflict; all must be accomplished before the normal conditions of peace may be restored.

In 1865 at the close of the Civil War Reconstruction embraced not only the above propositions awaiting solution, but also the political problem of the restoration of the seceded states to their normal relations with the Union. Reconstruction was all the more complicated because of the delicate arrangement of our Federal system, because of the questionable status of the freedman, and because the Constitution provided for no such state of affairs as existed after the conflict. The difficulties were increased by the bitterness of feeling between the two sections. Lincoln realized the enormity of the problem when he addressed the serenaders of Tuesday night of the last week of his life. "Reconstruction...is fraught with great difficulty," he declared. "Unlike a case of war between independent nations, there is no authorized organ for us to treat with -- no one man

has authority to give up the rebellion for any other man. We simply must begin with and mold disorganized and discordant elements. Nor is it a small additional embarrassment that we, the loyal people, differ among ourselves as to the mode, manner, and measure of reconstruction...."²

Had Lincoln lived through the Reconstruction period he would have found that the lack of unanimity "as to the mode, manner, and measure of reconstruction" was an exceedingly great embarrassment. In this divergence of opinion is to be found the key to the problems of reconstruction.³

The solution of these problems was in the hands of the Republicans. With the South as yet unrepresented, with the Peace Democrats of the North in desrepute and therefore powerless and the War Democrats hopelessly in the minority, the Republican party was practically unopposed and in undisputed possession of the National Government.

In 1860 the Republicans had been in the minority. Made up of the fragments of the old Whig and Know Nothing parties, the Free Soilers, the Anti-Nebraska Democrats and the abolitionists, the new party had been some what insecurely bound together by the common interest in the limitation of slavery. It was able to remain united and to keep the ascendancy of power throughout the war because of the urgent necessity of showing a united front to the foe, and because the issues which might have disrupted the party were overshadowed by the common program of preserving the Union. Now that the

war was over the leaders of the Republicans faced not only the many sided program of reconstruction but other urgent questions as well. The curtailment of government expenses, tax reduction, contraction of the currency, and the tariff were all pressing issues. Other problems destined soon to occupy the center of the stage of politics were appearing on the horizon. Already there was a demand for redemption of National bonds in Greenbacks. There was a growing dissatisfaction with the newly established National banks. There were the beginnings of the Anti-monopoly movement in the west. Already the farmers were asking for the regulation of railroad rates and fares.⁴

On these economic issues the Republicans were divided roughly according to sections. The industrial and creditor classes of the North East were in favor of sound money, the contraction of the currency, the extension of the National Banks, unrestricted opportunity for Big Business and the railroads, and protection of industry; while the agrarian and debtor classes of the West took an opposite stand on these questions.

Even before the close of the War division had appeared in the ranks of the Republicans. In 1864 certain radical abolitionists, dissatisfied with Lincoln, whose emancipation program was too moderate to suit them, organized a movement to replace him with Fremont.⁵ Although this project soon collapsed there remained the antagonism of the

Radical group in Congress toward Lincoln. This antagonism developed apace with the President's efforts to initiate a moderate program of reconstruction for the yielding rebel states.

Now, while this recalcitrant group in Congress represented Radical opinion of the North East on the questions of slavery and reconstruction, they represented the conservative interests of, roughly, the same region in business and industry. In fact, on the great economic issues which concerned finance and industry the North East had differed with the rest of the country for generations. During the pre-war decades these economically conservative interests had made little headway against the agrarian South and West. But now that the South lay prostrate and impotent, unrepresented in Congress, the Radicals saw their opportunity to continue their work already begun during the war, of favoring industry, subsidizing the railroads, and promoting Big Business. This could only be accomplished by keeping the South out of Congress; for they realized that should the South be restored the South and West could outvote the conservative business groups. By keeping war hatreds alive, by magnifying the problems of Southern reconstruction and prolonging their existence, and by keeping economic issues in the back ground they could gain time to make their power supreme.⁶

The probability of success of the Radical cause was augmented by the fact that their program of Congressional control in the Southern States followed the general tendency of

the age toward the centralization of power in the hands of the National Government. The States Rights principle had been repudiated by Northern success in the recent contest in arms.⁷ The spirit of Nationalism, increased by the tidal surge of patriotism incident to the war, now dictated that the National Government should safeguard the fruits of victory; should make secure the national principles of Unity and Freedom won at so great a sacrifice. This should be done by the National Government even to the disregard of the Constitution and almost to the obliteration of state lines. The Radicals had only to steer their program into the wake of the war spirit and the undertow of Nationalism would carry it to realization.

It is a matter of recorded history now, that the Radicals were eminently successful in carrying out their purposes. Beale comments on their success as follows: "During long years when 'reconstruction' monopolised Northern politics, unperceived changes took place, the nationwide significance of which overshadows temporary experiments in remaking an unwilling South; a new social and economic order under Radical favors grew to maturity; the age of Big Business dawned; and the factors underlying modern agrarian unrest gained strength."⁸

An understanding of the purposes of the Radicals serves to explain what happened in the South: military domination and economic exploitation, the disfranchisement of ex-confederates and the enfranchisement of the negro, and carpet-bag

rule and misgovernment. To a degree it explains the methods they used to attain their ends: the campaign of propaganda, the play upon the bogie that if the Democrats got back into power the Rebellion would be triumphant, the misrepresentation of conditions in the South, and the vituperation against "copperheadism". And what is more important to us in our consideration of the subject confined to the more narrow scope of this paper, it explains to a marked degree the personal ridicule and abuse heaped upon President Johnson by the Radicals, their courtship of General Grant, and their efforts to bring about an estrangement between the two.

The problems of Reconstruction were many, and diverse, and difficult. It is one of the facts of history much to be regretted that assassination removed the leader best fitted to cope with them. Abraham Lincoln, with his winning personality, his ability to handle men, his diplomacy, his political sagacity, with the prestige which the victory in war had given him, would have had many advantages which his successor lacked. Lincoln was a Northerner and knew the temper of the North and the personalities of its leaders. He was at the head of the powerful party machine and controlled it through his political influence. The man who followed him in office, a Southerner and a War Democrat, did not succeed to Lincoln's position of leadership in the

ruling party, and could not succeed to the control of the Republican political machine.⁹ With the executive lacking party support in ordinary times it is disastrous; in times like those of the Reconstruction days it is nothing short of calamitous.

The conflict between President Johnson and Congress is historic. The President's work of reconstruction by executive orders, the repudiation of the same by Congress, the labors of the Reconstruction committee, the Reconstruction laws passed by Congress and the executive vetoes; all are commonplace facts of history. The crisis came in the election of 1866.¹⁰ The Radicals were victorious over the President and the Conservatives because of their campaign of misrepresentation, claptrap and vituperation, and their insidious play upon postwar hysteria.¹¹ The election gave the Radicals an overwhelming majority in Congress, enabling them to carry out their program roughshod over the President and the Constitution. Their power was extended to the control of the War Department and executive removals from office. Even the power of the Supreme Court was impaired; its functions curtailed. The impeachment project, had it been successful, might have resulted in the change of our government into the parliamentary type of Europe. The Reconstruction period was truly one of the most critical of all periods in our history.

The conflict between the President and Congress, their rivalry for popular support of their respective programs, and

the political complications involved in the struggle affected the relations of President Johnson and General Grant to the extent that it may be said their relationship was practically controlled by these exigencies. However the factors of personality and character are always potent determinants of human action. An understanding, therefore, of the traits of character and personality of the two principals of this study will assist in explaining the vicissitudes of their relationship to each other.

ANDREW JOHNSON

Our history abounds with the stories of men who, starting life in lowly circumstances, by dint of hard labor and perseverance, came up through extreme difficulties and hardships to positions of eminence and power. We have no better example than the life of Andrew Johnson.

Born of poor parents in the slave state of North Carolina where poor whites were looked down upon and free labor was considered a disgrace, and left an orphan when but a small boy by the death of his father, Johnson faced life with serious handicaps. He was apprenticed to a tailor at the age of ten. He had no opportunity to go to school. Possessed with a burning desire for knowledge he tutored himself to read and then spent hours of his spare time studying orations of famous British statesmen. He early became ambitious to become an orator and enter public life.¹²

Ability to read was the extent of his education when

at the age of eighteen he removed from Raleigh, North Carolina to Greenville, Tennessee, with his mother and sister, who were dependent upon him for support. After his marriage at the age of nineteen, his wife, who was an accomplished young school teacher taught him to write and to cipher.¹³

Forced to earn his living by hard work he learned while he plied his needle and shears as a tailor. His shop became his schoolroom where he learned much of history and political lore by having his wife or some one else read to him. His neighbors came in so frequently to discuss with Johnson the news of the times that his shop was vitually a political forum.¹⁴

He became interested in debate and joined the debating club at Greenville college. For several years he took part in debate and engaged in political discussion of every kind. He developed into one of the best informed and most forceful speakers of his community.

Johnson's stubborn ambition brought him into politics at an early age. In 1828 when he was twenty years old he was elected alderman. He served two years in this position and was then elected mayor. In a slave state where free labor was degraded and the slave holding aristocracy in control of the government it was a noteworthy achievement for an uneducated tradesman to rise in politics. Yet Andrew Johnson rose rapidly and by his own merit and perseverance. "He owed nothing to luck," says McCulloch, in Men and Measures of Half a Century. "He was his own architect. To nothing was he indebted for his rise except the strong

qualities which he had inherited, and an open field for their development and exercise."¹⁵ After serving several terms as mayor he became a candidate for representative in the lower house of the State Legislature and was elected. His next office was that of State Senator. Having pleased his constituents in state offices they honored him by electing him their representative to Congress in 1843. He was probably the first tradesman ever sent to Congress from a slave state. He represented his district in Congress until 1853, when he was elected Governor of Tennessee. In 1857 he entered the United States Senate to which he had been elected the year before. In 1862 he was appointed by President Lincoln military Governor of Tennessee. He was occupying this position when elected Vice-President in 1864.¹⁶

Until 1861 Johnson was a Democrat and a supporter of the leading measures of his party. His greatest boast was that he was a common man, the friend of common men. "I am a Democrat, now," he said in 1862; "I have been one all my life; I expect to live and die one...they shall never divert me from the polar star by which I have ever been guided from early life--the great principles of Democracy upon which this Government rests."¹⁷ In 1860 he supported the campaign of Breckenridge and Lane but in 1861 severed his relations with that wing of the Democratic party and became a staunch supporter of the Union, "the only distinguished politician of the South who never faltered in his adherence to the government".¹⁸

Johnson was not a demagogue.¹⁹ He was fearless in his support of a principle he believed to be right and would boldly denounce a measure which was in his opinion unjust or corrupt regardless of the opinions or prejudices of his constituency. During the secession movement he was uncompromising in his support of the Union. His speeches in the Senate were strong and bold for the preservation of the Government. As he had disregarded threats of personal violence in the rough-and-tumble politics of Tennessee so in the National Senate he refused to be affected by threatened danger involved in his bold denunciation of Secession.²⁰

His services as Military Governor of Tennessee were difficult but were faithfully performed and that state was the first of the disloyal commonwealths to come back into the Union.

Tradition has given a very unfair picture of Andrew Johnson to the popular mind. His political enemies and a mendacious press have caricatured Johnson as a vulgar, drunken tailor, honest and well meaning, but illiterate, ill-mannered, stubborn, quarrelsome; a willing tool of Copperheads, a drunken wretch, whose incompetency was a disgrace to the White House and a calamity to the nation.²¹ Many people even today have a distorted idea of Johnson and think of him in terms of contempt.

Much of the defaming of Johnson's character has been due to propoganda.²² It has been charged that he was a

drunkard; that at different times he disgraced himself in public by being intoxicated. On one important occasion, that of his inaugural as Vice-President on March 4, 1864, Johnson did conduct himself in an unseemly manner due to the influence of liquor. He gave a very poor rambling speech which shocked his hearers and the public and gave his enemies an opportunity to ridicule him. But when it is realized that the Vice-President had just been through a siege of fever and that on the morning of the inaugural he was ill and only took a little whisky as a stimulant, and that there is no evidence that he ever became intoxicated afterward, Johnson cannot be branded as a drunkard. Shortly after the unfortunate inaugural incident, Lincoln said to a cabinet member, "I have known Andy Johnson for many years; he made a bad slip the other day, but you need not be scared; Andy ain't a drunkard."²³ Jefferson Davis, Major Truman who was Johnson's private secretary, Crook, Johnson's body-guard, Senator Doolittle, Secretaries Welles and McCulloch, and other influential men of the times testify to Johnson's sobriety.²⁴

Recent historians and biographers have done much to correct the misconception of the true character of this much abused man.

Howard K. Beale in his book, The Critical Year, A Study of Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction, gives the following pen portrait of Johnson: "Of only average

height, he was none the less broad-shouldered and imposing. His complexion was swarthy, his features good. He had sparkling, penetrating eyes. A mass of thick dark hair topped his head. Deep lined into his countenance was a look of mingled determination and distress. A stolidity resulting from patient suffering under accustomed hardship, and a somber serious-mindedness not often relieved by any sign of joviality, were characteristic. His greatest physical asset was a voice, mellow and pleasing in tone, but of such power that without appearing to raise it, he could make himself heard to the outer edge of vast throngs of people. His manner and the peculiar magnetism of his personality as he spoke to a crowd, lent a vigor and dignity to speeches that in print were unimpressive."²⁵

Johnson was a good debater and when he took time for preparation he was capable of making excellent speeches. His state papers compare favorably with those of other presidents. Johnson was methodical. He instituted what the White House had never before possessed, a system of records of all business transacted. He carefully preserved all letters received and kept a scrap book of the times. He handled the great amount of work which reconstruction imposed, with orderliness and efficiency.²⁶

Johnson was industrious. He possessed tremendous energy and was tireless in his devotion to duty. His days were long and difficult. Besides receiving throngs of visitors, he handled the routine of government administration and spent

long hours in reading, writing and holding conferences. He had little time for recreation.²⁷

Johnson possessed positive characteristics of honesty, truthfulness, incorruptibility, courage and industry which had brought him advancement. "The President," comments Welles, "has great capacity, is conversant with our public affairs beyond most men, has much experience, possesses great firmness, sincere patriotism, a sacred regard for the constitution, is humane and benevolent."²⁸

Unfortunately for Johnson he was handicapped by certain peculiarities of character, and mannerisms which marked him as being of plebian origin and which were serious drawbacks upon his usefulness in public life. He possessed a spirit of combativeness which made him enjoy controversy, and this love of controversy coupled with his lack of tact sometimes caused him to make very serious blunders which he might have avoided. His speeches which he made off hand were often crude and when encouraged by hecklers he sometimes engaged in unbecoming personalities.²⁹

He was naturally distrustful and was reluctant to give his confidence to anyone. Gideon Welles, a member of President Johnson's cabinet writes that, "Many of his most important steps have been taken without the knowledge of any person whatever. He has wonderful self-reliance and immovable firmness in maintaining what he believes to be right, is disinclined to be familiar with men in prominent positions, or to be intimate with those who fill the public eye."³⁰

One of Johnson's weaknesses was his inordinate faith in his own power of persuasion. He thought that if he could only present his case to the people in person they would be bound to support him. He was never really popular. He possessed none of the charm which makes men popular. His reserve deprived him of many close friends. People did not know the true Andrew Johnson and therefore could not love him.³¹

Johnson's habit of boasting of his humble origin was unfortunate. In political campaigns he had learned to exploit successfully the fact that he had risen from a lowly trade to a high place in the state. But it was bad taste for him as President to make references to his humble past.³²

His indecision was perhaps his most costly fault.³³ He did not know whose advice to shun; what counsel to take. And while he waited, indecisive, the Radicals acted and too often Johnson was thereby put to a disadvantage which was costly to his program. Johnson once said of himself; "The elements of my nature, the pursuits of my life, have not made me either in my feelings or in my practice, aggressive. My nature, on the contrary, is rather defensive in its character".³⁴

Once his mind was made up Johnson became uncompromising. When he became convinced of the righteousness of a cause or the justice of a decision he could not be moved. "He could not", says Beale, "accept the situation as he found

it, turn partial support to his ends, or yield on details to attain large advantages. In the restoration of the Southern States, Johnson saw the salvation and future happiness of the country; fundamental principles were at stake; both his duty and his honor were involved. He could gladly face death or political ruin, but he could not be swerved from the path whither every fiber of his passionate soul told him duty led In other times and other men, Americans have lauded this quality. But it was disastrous at a time when infinite tact, yielding here, forcing there, was necessary."³⁵

Nominated for Vice-President by the Republicans in 1864 to forestall the criticism that theirs was a sectional party, and to win the Union Democratic vote, it was only natural that Johnson, having all his political life been an apostle of Jeffersonian Democracy, should enter the Presidency with ideals and principles at variance with the dominant party in Congress. In a sense Johnson represented the repudiated principle of States Rights while Congress, representing Northern sentiment, was atune to the rising spirit of Nationalism and alive to the opportunities for Nationalizing the Government through the control of Reconstruction by the North. Having been reared in the South and having labored publicly for years in the interests of the Southern people Johnson was naturally sympathetic with their problems. Knowing the peculiar relations of the white people to the colored race and the problems of the social and industrial life of the

South, he was predisposed to consider the arbitrary reconstruction measures of Congress as the attempt of the triumphant North to subjugate and humiliate the conquered South. Realizing all of this there is no wonder at Johnson's opposition to the Radical Congress nor at his efforts to mitigate the harshness of the reconstruction laws which he believed so unjust and so flagrantly unconstitutional.

Johnson would have been lenient with the South. His policy of reconstruction (a better term for it would be "restoration") followed that of Lincoln.³⁶ Johnson assumed that the subdued Southern states were still in the Union;³⁷ that the rebellion had been made up of individuals fighting against the Federal Government. He offered these individuals, with certain exceptions, general amnesty, when they should take a solemn oath of allegiance. Those of the excepted classes might be pardoned upon personal application.³⁸ Upon fulfilling certain just and fundamental requirements, repealing their ordinances of secession, ratifying the thirteenth amendment, and repudiating their war debts³⁹ the recalcitrant states might resume all the privileges of states in the Union.

But Congress chose to repudiate the policy and undo the work of Johnson, and to fasten upon the South military rule and negro suffrage. And Americans today are ashamed of the page in history which records what followed. While unprejudiced students of that period of history now acknowledge that Johnson's policy was both just and unquestionably con-

stitutional. Andrew Johnson, for his accomplishments in spite of handicaps and hardships, and for his staunch support of the principles which he believed to be right, deserves a far more dignified place in history than has been accorded him in the past.

ULYSSES S. GRANT

The story of the life of General Ulysses S. Grant illustrates to a remarkable degree how rapidly a man in lowly circumstances and with no apparent opportunity to succeed in life may, through the chances of rapid promotion in time of war and through the focus of the attention of the public upon the leaders in conflict, rise to heights of fame and accomplishment.

Prior to the Civil War Grant lived an obscure life. There was little indication that he possessed extraordinary qualities of leadership or resourcefulness, of superior intellect or driving ambition. His appointment to West Point came to him not because he was ambitious for that honor but through the efforts of his father to secure for him an education without cost. He was loath to attend the military academy after his appointment, and his decision to go was largely because of his desire to travel. The trip to West Point would give him the opportunity of visiting Philadelphia and New York.⁴⁰

At West Point Grant showed no special aptitude for study or drill.⁴¹ He was, in all branches except math-

ematics, below mediocrity in his class and graduated twenty-first in a class of thirty-nine.⁴²

After graduation Grant showed little ambition for promotion in the army. He served with credit throughout the Mexican War and for more than four years afterward remained an officer of regulars. But he did not rise rapidly in the service. During his later days as a Captain in the army in California he fell into habits of intemperance and for a time a cloud was over his life. In 1854 he resigned from the Army and began the life of a farmer on his wife's farm near St. Louis.⁴³

Grant found it hard to adjust himself to civilian life and failed to succeed in one after another of business enterprises. Ague and fever drove him from the farm. He did not stay in his next occupation, the real estate business, long enough to be successful. When the Civil War broke out he was working for the meager salary of eight hundred dollars a year in his father's leather store at Galena, Illinois.⁴⁴

Although Grant seemed to have little capacity for business and at the age of thirty-nine was an apparent failure, he really possessed qualities of character which only needed the stirring scenes and challenging problems of warfare to bring out. His natural indolent and sluggish nature required great crises to become thoroughly aroused. Had it not been for the War, there is little doubt that he would have lived a poor man and died in obscurity.⁴⁵ But in the War his characteristics of indomitable resolution, perfect

self possession and dauntless courage were aroused and asserted when those qualities would count the most.

Grant's early successes gave him confidence in his own powers, and self-confidence is an excellent quality for a general. Grant was said to be absolutely without fear. In battle he seemed almost insensible to danger. The overthrow of the enemy absorbed his every thought and he had none to give to fear or concern about his own welfare. His bulldog tenacity of purpose is probably best epitomised in his famous statement after the terrible battle of Spottsylvania that he would "fight it out on this line if it took all summer."

Grant was not the clever tactitian that Lee was, nor did he have the great organizing ability of McClellan, but he understood both the duties and the responsibilities of a commander. "His business was to fight", comments McCulloch, "to persistently push the enemy at all points, and at all sacrifices, was, in his opinion, the surest as well as the speedest way of terminating the war."⁴⁶

Grant's skill in handling large bodies of troops is well proven in the Vicksburg campaign which was entirely planned by him, and executed in spite of many difficulties. He had a clear perception of the War as a whole and knowing the conditions of the South planned the campaigns of the Northern armies with strategy on a grand scale which finally won the war.

That Grant was a great commander of troops in war, few

critics will question. That he was personally honest of heart, pure in thought, generous toward defeated foes, and kind to the weak and helpless is the common conception of every one. Had Grant's public services ended with Appomattox or even if he had confined further services to military affairs his life as a whole would have been more of a success. Grant's subsequent career in politics and as the chief executive of the nation added little to his credit; and the corruption in high places, the misgovernment, the unwise policies of state during his administration, combined to detract from his prestige and to lessen the universal admiration of a grateful people.

Grant did not possess a broad comprehension either of the principles of Government or of practical politics. Prior to the war he had taken so little interest in political affairs that he had voted only once in a presidential election. After the War he was not a close student of the principles of government, being inclined to take the most commonly accepted viewpoints and ideas as his own and to follow the advice of his intimate friends. He made no close distinction in regard to the constitutionality of the Reconstruction Acts but was rather inclined to justify the action of Congress on the grounds of expediency, considering the majority as being infallible.⁴⁷

Having lived most of his life in the army or in the simple pursuits of farming and trading Grant had little knowledge of the wiles and artifices of the politicians

and was easily influenced by them. He was very susceptible to flattery and was always ready to accept gifts, sometimes returning favors to the givers without realizing that such action was not proper for a public officer. His use of patronage led many to believe that it was in return for favors he had personally received. He was not a good judge of men and accepted the advice of those who were irresponsible and dishonest.⁴⁸

"He had few affections" says Badeau in his "Grant in Peace", "but these were intense; he did not hate many, but he could be implacable."⁴⁹

General Grant, although brave and possessing indomitable courage was simple in his manner and unpretentious in demeanor. He was naturally undemonstrative, even giving the appearance of stolidity. However he had the ability to express himself clearly and directly and his conversation was to the point without exaggeration. He could think clearly, possessed a ready and accurate memory and was quick in his decisions.⁵⁰

Perhaps Grant's greatest weaknesses as a civil officer were his lack of an understanding of political affairs and his consequent reliance upon the opinions of others. Grant's opinions and ideas unquestionably were the reflections of the opinions and ideas of those with whom he associated. Politicians, by appealing to his patriotism, which was unquestioned, could influence him to pursue a course favorable to their ends. While General of the Army

Grant was influenced by General Rawlins, Secretary Stanton and others. Badeau asserts that Rawlins, especially had "at intervals enormous influence with Grant."⁵¹ Throughout his tenure of the office of Secretary of War ad interim there are repeated evidences of Grant being influenced by Radical advisers. "Obviously he has been tampered with and flattered by the Radicals, who are using him and his name for their selfish and partisan purposes," writes Gideon Welles in his "Diary" August 22, 1867.⁵²

This susceptibility to the influence of his political satellites is to a marked degree explained by the fact that Grant lacked moral courage.⁵³ This peculiar trait Grant himself acknowledges several times in his Memoirs. In civil matters where he was on unfamiliar ground this concern for the opinion of others, coupled with his natural easy going disposition made him prone to follow the opinions of the majority rather than take the trouble to think out a course of action for himself. To blaze out an independent trail of precedence in the tangle of Washington politics might jeopardize his popularity and his reputation for wisdom and good judgement, Grant took the course pointed out to him.

During Johnson's administration Grant held a very important position. As General of the Army he held a pivotal place in the execution of the reconstruction laws. While Secretary of War ad interim he was in the position of a moderator between the President and Congress. Distrusting the President, Congress intrusted the administration of the

military laws of reconstruction to Grant and his subordinates. Hence Grant was compelled, much against his inclinations to take a stand in political affairs. In the position he was forced to assume he stood between the President and Congress. The place was one of great difficulties; friction was inevitable.

More over, Grant, as the successful commander of the Union troops was the most popular man in the country. His military fame made him a logical candidate for the Presidency; hence he became the object of solicitude of both political parties. He became the center of political storm and stress. Johnson repeatedly tried to strengthen his cause by gaining Grant's support. When Grant's real support could not be secured Johnson arranged matters so as to have his apparent support. The Radicals too, courted his favor.

As the conflict between the President and Congress approached its climax the difficulties of Grant increased; the friction became greater. The Presidential campaign was in the offing and Grant was hailed as the next President. Intrigue and political strife centered around Grant. On one hand Johnson accosted him for his assistance in his fight against Congress. On the other side were the "Radicals, and the most mischievous of them, ... hounding and stimulating and cautioning him."⁵⁴ The strain must have been terrible. Something had to give way. It did. The

violent quarrel between the President and Grant was but the natural consequence of all that had gone before.

Yet through all this turmoil Grant's conduct was directed more by circumstances than by personal ambition. His purpose in deceiving the President was a patriotic one, not for self. He quarreled with the President because circumstances forced him to, not because he realized the political consequences of such action.⁵⁵

Grant was above all a patriot. His services in the Civil War were inspired by a spirit of loyalty to his country. While it is true that after the war Grant became ambitious for office, and that his later career was marred by an unbecoming ambition for a third term of the Presidency, yet his character was such that he always put the interests of his country before his own desires for advancement.⁵⁶ For this trait and his characteristics of simple unpretentiousness, resolution, and courage, the memory of Grant will always be honored and beloved by a grateful people

Chapter 2 Passive Acquiescence

When Andrew Johnson took up the reins of the Federal Government after the death of Lincoln in April 1865, General Grant was in complete harmony with the new President in politics as well as in personal relations. "General Grant was a democrat and thought and acted in harmony with President Johnson in politics and reconstruction for a time after the close of the War" says Major A. E. H. Johnson, confidential clerk for Grant.¹ The General, in fact, had no strong political bias.² He had never taken much interest in political affairs. As a soldier he believed it was his simple duty to obey the orders of the government and that it was not his concern how policies of the administration were formulated.³

If he had any political affiliations they were with the Democratic party. The only time that he had ever voted in a Presidential election, he voted for the democratic candidate (Buchanan in 1856). The Democrats now claimed him. Early in 1865 it was suggested to Grant through his confidential secretary Adam Badeau, that he become the Democratic candidate for the Presidency in 1868. The leader of the Democrats in the House of Representatives, James Brooks, made overtures to Grant with that end in view. He predicted that Grant would be the next President, and he was avowedly anxious to secure him for the Democrats. General Grant did not indicate whether or not he was so much as pleased with the suggestion and took no steps toward

securing the favor of the Democrats with the view of becoming a candidate. He gave no evidence of political ambition at this time.⁴

Although Grant did not actively give support or encouragement to the Democrats the Republicans distrusted him.⁵ It was evident that he was on the most cordial terms with the President. The latter did much to make these cordial relations apparent. He was not slow to see that Grant's popularity in the North made it highly important that the administration have his support. Moreover, since General Grant's demonstration of magnanimity toward the conquered foe at Appomattox he had had the confidence of the people of the South and his personal and political support of Johnson would be an influential factor in making the President's plan of the reconstruction of the Southern states a success. Consequently Johnson tried to cultivate the friendship of General Grant. He formed the habit of dropping in casually at Grant's home or office.⁶ He sent him personal and familiar notes and cards, some times requesting that Grant call to see him. He often enclosed slips from Southern Newspapers, complimenting Grant on his magnanimity and predicting that he would support the President in his reconstruction policy.⁷ These attentions continued as Congress became more hostile to Johnson's efforts of reconstruction. Throughout the early months of the administration Grant accepted the President's overtures with

good grace and without comment. He would not commit himself to any line of policy.⁸

In the spring of 1866 General and Mrs. Grant gave an evening reception. "There had been," writes Welles in his Diary, "some pre-understanding on the part of the Radicals, or a portion of them, to attend and to appropriate General Grant, or at least his name and influence to themselves. But, most unexpectedly to them ... the President and his two daughters appeared early, and Montgomery Blair ... also Alexander H. Stevens, Vice-president of the late Confederacy, so called. When, therefore Thad Stevens, Trumbull, and others, not exactly homogeneous though now acting together, came in, they were evidently astonished and amazed."⁹ President Johnson stood by the side of Grant and received the guests and, "the circumstance", said Badeau, "was heralded all over the country as an indication of the cordial political understanding between them."¹⁰

The General held himself to be merely a military officer, and would not intrude in civil matters. He believed that Congress should have been called in special session to meet the problems of reconstruction but since Congress was not summoned and some system of reconstruction was indispensable, he acquiesced in the action of the President. But, Badeau in his biography of Grant writes, "He always maintained that the action was provisional; that Congress, as the representative of the people, must eventually decide what should be done, and to that decision all must bow.

I frequently heard him express this view."¹¹

With respect to the treatment of paroled Confederate leaders there was at first disagreement between the President and General Grant. A United States Judge at Norfolk had a grand jury find indictments against some of the former Confederate leaders, and when Robert E. Lee heard that he, too would be indicted he wrote to General Grant reminding him of the protection he understood was granted by his parole and in a separate letter applied for amnesty and pardon. Grant sent both of these letters to the President with the recommendation that the pardon be granted and with the statement that the officers and men paroled at Appomattox could not be tried so long as they observed their paroles. He went in person to discuss these papers with the President but Johnson was not satisfied and wanted, he said, "to make treason odious."

"When can these men be tried?" he asked.

"Never," said Grant, "unless they violate their paroles."¹² "I insisted on it that General Lee would not have surrendered his army and given up all their arms if he had supposed that after surrender, he was going to be tried for treason and hanged." said Grant, later. "I thought we got a very good equivalent for the lives of a few leaders in getting all their arms and getting themselves under control bound by their oaths to obey the laws. That was the consideration, which I insisted upon we had received."¹³

The President still insisted that the time must come when the Southern leaders would be tried and punished and his Attorney-General wrote an official letter in opposition to Grant's arguments. Finally Grant declared that he would resign his commission in the army unless the terms of parole which he had granted were confirmed. The President, realizing Grant's popularity, relented and orders were given to discontinue the proceedings against Lee.¹⁴

Many other Southern officers besides Lee applied to Grant for protection and hundreds of civilians who wished to be granted amnesty requested his favorable endorsement and in most all of the cases he saw fit to use his influence favorably in their behalf.¹⁵ He urged the restoration of confiscated property as well as general amnesty. In consequence there developed a remarkably warm feeling for Grant among the Southern people.

In April 1865 Grant wrote to his wife from North Carolina that the suffering that must exist in the South the next year would be beyond conception. "People", he said, "who talk of further retaliation and punishment, except of the political leaders, either do not conceive of the suffering endured already or they are heartless and unfeeling and wish to stay at home out of danger while punishment is being inflicted."¹⁶

Grant was anxious to prevent unnecessary friction between the officers and troops quartered in the South and the

people. In August 1865, he suggested to Stanton that officers "should be appointed who can act from facts and not always be guided by prejudice in favor of color."¹⁷ In March, 1866 he prevented a negro celebration organized by the Radicals which threatened disorder in Richmond.¹⁸ He urged Stanton to muster out the colored troops as rapidly as practicable because they were apt to cause outbursts of violence.¹⁹

With eight states reconstructed according to the Presidential plan and awaiting action of Congress on the admission of Congressmen, Grant was sent by Johnson to the Southern States to ascertain the feeling among the people there who had lately been in rebellion. Johnson wished to make a favorable report to Congress. Grant left Washington November 29, 1865 and visited Raleigh, Charleston, Savannah, Atlanta and other cities. His trip was short, but everywhere he conversed freely with the citizens and with the Generals of the army who had been stationed among them.²⁰ When he returned he gave both an oral and a written report, and in both he declared that he was satisfied that the people of the South accepted the new situation in good faith. "My observations lead me to the conclusion that the citizens of the Southern States are anxious to return to self-government within the Union as soon as possible; that while reconstructing they want and require protection from the Government, not humiliating to them as citizens, and that

if such a course was pointed out they would pursue it in good faith." Neither officers of the Government nor citizens thought it practical to withdraw the troops.²¹

Grant criticised the Freedman's Bureau stating that in his opinion its affairs had not been conducted with good judgment or economy.²² He characterized the officers of the Bureau as "a useless and dangerous set" and recommended that they be replaced with military officers.²³ However, he thought that the conditions necessitated that the Bureau be continued for a few years to care for the negroes and give them counsel. He believed that the North should be tolerant. "It is to be regretted that there cannot be a greater co-mingling at this time between the citizens of the two sections and particularly of those entrusted with the law making power," he asserted. Grant thought that every consideration called for the early reestablishment of the Union.²⁴

Although there is no express commendation of presidential reconstruction to be found in his reports or elsewhere, yet we see that Grant's observations and recommendations were quite in line with Johnson's plans.

Gideon Welles, who was thoroughly in sympathy with the President's conciliatory policy thought that Grant's views were "sensible, patriotic and wise."²⁵ In the country at large the report of Grant was taken to be an endorsement and support of the restoration views of Johnson, and placed him in opposition to the Radicals in Congress.²⁶ However

Grant's support of Johnson was probably unintentional. Johnson's ingratiating personal attentions had not succeeded in making him a staunch personal supporter. They rather annoyed than pleased him. He did not have confidence in Johnson's judgment. Coolidge, in his biography of Grant, asserts that Grant in talking to General James H. Wilson in command at Macon, Georgia (during his trip to the South) "did not hesitate to discredit the judgment of Andrew Johnson". On the other hand he did not conceal his dislike for Stanton's arbitrary ways. "He distrusted the senatorial group with which Stanton was associated and declared that his own views were not only thoroughly conservative, but thoroughly kind as to the generals and politicians of the South."²⁷ We may safely conclude that Grant, although not actively giving his support to Johnson's reconstruction policy at least acquiesced to what had been accomplished up to the time of the meeting of Congress in December, 1865.

It is apparent that through-out the year 1865 and most of the following year Grant avoided taking sides in the political controversy on Reconstruction. "I put on the uniform of no party" he asserted. By March 1866, however, he began to emphasize a little more markedly the difference between the President's plan of reconstruction and his own. "It is probably also" says Garland in his Life of Grant, "that Rawlins, Babcock, and others of the politicians on his staff had produced an effect by harping on the belief that he was to be

the irresistible choice for the Presidency at the end of Johnson's term. Grant admitted his aspirations at this time but said he was too young to become a candidate in 1868, but he might think of becoming a candidate in 1872."²⁸

It is certain that the Radical politicians in Congress were trying to win Grant over to their standard. In July, 1866 Congress passed a law reviving the grade of General, with the purpose in view, of course, of Grant's promotion to that exceptional office. The bill had been for a long time hung up in a committee when Secretary of War, Stanton, thinking to turn Grant from Johnson's influence and secure his loyalty to Congress went to the committee and gave reasons which, although entirely political, were nevertheless accepted as sufficient for the passage of the bill; and it was passed.²⁹ Stanton recommended to the President that the bill be approved. Johnson hesitated, considering the law unnecessary and stating that an additional grade would not give more effect to Grant's services than had already been done by conferring upon him the rank he then held. The bill was finally signed, July 25, 1866.

Grant understood that the law reviving the grade of General was passed for his benefit. He called at the Executive Mansion, and requested that when his name was sent to the Senate for approval, General Sherman's should accompany it for Lieutenant General.³⁰ Stanton gave his personal attention to the promotion and took pains to let Grant know that he wanted it.³¹

Johnson wished to have it appear that General Grant

supported him in his reconstruction policies. Especially was this important to his interests in the on-coming congressional elections in the fall of 1866.

On August 18, a committee from the political convention at Philadelphia, held to promote the interests of the Democratic party, called on the President to present resolutions of sympathy. Late in the morning of their arrival Johnson sent a note to General Grant requesting that he be present at the reception, which was to take place at one o'clock. Grant felt obliged to obey the summons although he did not wish to have his presence indicate that he supported the President politically. He called at the White House with the intention of excusing himself, but opportunity to do so did not offer itself. So Grant, out of courtesy to the President's wishes was compelled to stand by Johnson during the entire demonstration, greatly to his own disgust and chagrin.³² During his speech to the delegation Johnson made reference to the heroism of the soldiers in the war (turning to Grant) and stated that their support was still needed to aid the efforts being then made to restore the government and perpetuate peace. Badeau, Grant's secretary, later wrote that the General "returned to his headquarters afterward full of indignation at the device by which he had been entrapped, and beginning to detest the policy of the President, if for nothing else, because of his petty maneuvering".³³

In August of 1866 President Johnson determined to make a speaking tour of the northern states for the purpose of carrying the issues of reconstruction to the people. It was important for the success of his program that the Radicals should not win in the fall Congressional elections. He had been asked to speak at the ceremony of laying the cornerstone to the Douglas monument in Chicago. Ostensibly his trip was made with that end in view, but the excursion was made to include visits to important cities quite distant from the direct route to his destination.

The presidential party included Secretaries Seward and Welles of the Cabinet, Admiral Farragut and General Grant and other celebrities who had won fame in the late war. General Grant, on being invited to go with the party, had offered repeated excuses and finally consented only because of the urgent personal solicitation of the President.³⁴

The political friends of Grant, believing the President had asked him to accompany him in order that it might be apparent that he had the General's political support, urged him not to go,³⁵ but the General considered it his duty to obey his superior officer. He thought that since he was a soldier and not a political candidate for office the political considerations of the trip would not effect him.³⁶ However, Grant saw that his presence in the party would be construed to mean that he was supporting the Administration's policies and resolved to be noncommittal

on the subject of politics. During the trip the President and Mr. Seward gave out implications designed to convey the impression that General Grant was a political supporter of the President's policy.³⁷ Johnson, speaking at a banquet at Delmonico's at New York said, "I know, as you know, that we have just passed through a bloody, perilous conflict; we have gentlemen who are associated with us on this occasion who have shared their part and participated in these struggles for the preservation of the Union. (Great applause.) Here is the Army, (pointing to the right, where sat General Grant) and here the Navy, (pointing to the left in the direction of Admiral Farragut.) They have performed their part in restoring the Government to its present condition of safety and security; ... As for the humble individual who now stands before you, and to whom you have so kindly and pleasantly alluded, as to what part he has performed in this great drama, in this struggle for the restoration of the Government and the suppression of rebellion, I will say that I feel, though I may be included in this summing up, that the Government has done its duty. (Cheers) But though the Government has done its duty ... there is still a greater and more important task for you and others to perform. (Cheers)"³⁸ Two other references were made to Grant in the same speech, one of which was as follows: "I have helped my distinguished friend on the right, General Grant, to fight the rebels South, and I must not forget a

peculiar phrase, that he was going to fight it out on that line. (Applause and laughter) I was with him, and did all that I could; and when we whipped them at one end of the line, I want to say to you that I am for whipping them at the other end of the line. (Great applause and laughter) I thank God that if he is not in the field, militarily speaking, thank God! he is civilly in the field on the other side. (Cheers for Grant)"³⁹

As is well known the speaking tour proved to be a very unprofitable one for the President. His addresses were not well received and many times the crowd heckled. "At Cleveland there was evidently a concerted plan to prevent the President from speaking or embarrass him in his remarks", wrote Welles in his diary. "Grant, I think had been advised of this and it affected him unfavorably."⁴⁰ The President in his speeches at Cleveland and elsewhere greatly lowered his dignity by answering those who would heckle him from the crowd. Everywhere Grant was the popular hero. Johnson continued to lose favor. At Chicago it was with difficulty that the board of trade and the city officials were brought to offer a decent welcome to the President.⁴¹ Public interest seemed to center around Grant and Farragut. At the meeting at Springfield the calls for Grant were so insistent and powerful that the President quite lost his head and cried out, "We are not here in the character of candidates for office running against each other!" Later, to those who were dis-

posed to disturb, he shouted, "I am in the line with General Grant, contending for the union of the States."⁴²

Grant was generally reticent throughout the journey, not being persuaded to speak, or take part in the political discussion. However in Cincinnati the demonstration for Grant became so marked that the General felt obliged to talk. He said that he stood next to the President as the head of the army, but that he was not the leader of a political party; that he did not consider the army a place for politicians, and would not therefore be committed to the support of the present political party, or consent that the army be made a party machine. He would not allow anything to be said which would seem to foreshadow his resignation from the army and his candidacy for political office.⁴³

The meetings at Indianapolis and at Pittsburg were stormy and turbulent. At the latter place the crowd became so noisy that the President could not be heard. Cries for Grant were so loud and incessant that the President called the General to the front of the platform. The crowd responded with mighty cheers. When he bowed and retired the President found it impossible to get a further hearing.⁴⁴

During the tour General Grant left the Presidential party on two different occasions, after each of which he rejoined Johnson.⁴⁵ After the President's unpleasant experience with the crowd at Cleveland, General Grant, with his close friend, General Rawlins, left the party and went

by boat to Detroit.⁴⁶ The Radical press made much of this, stating that General Grant had separated from the party out of disgust at Johnson's "drunken display" in Cleveland. At the Southern Loyalist's Convention which was then in session at Philadelphia, the report came that Grant and Farragut had deserted the President. This dispatch was greeted with "the wildest enthusiasm, the entire Convention rising and waving their hats, and giving three cheers for Grant and Farragut."⁴⁷ From the reports in the papers many people got the impression that Grant had really deserted the President, but Grant rejoined Johnson's party at Chicago.⁴⁸

Welles tells us that the reason for Grant's first absence from the party was due to intoxication. "Grant," he says, "left the party at Cleveland and went by steamer to Detroit. He had abstained from liquor, until our arrival in Buffalo. Thence through the day until we reached Cleveland he became garrulous and communicative to Mrs. F(arragut) as she afterward informed me, and was with Surgeon Gen. Buvois put on board the steamer for Detroit, both of them intoxicated."⁴⁹

Grant's second absence was occasioned by the visit he paid to his father in Ohio. He left the party at St. Louis and rejoined Johnson at Cincinnati. While waiting for the Presidential party at Cincinnati an attempt was made by the Radicals there, to stage a demonstration for him, but this Grant would not allow, but he promised that, in company with the President he would be glad to see them the next day.⁵⁰

Very apparently there were deliberate plans of concerted action back of the demonstrations for Grant and the persecution of the President. Gideon Welles in his Diary writes that at Columbus and other places there was "some scheming to antagonize General Grant and the President and make it appear that the interest was especially for the former. Great pains have been taken by partisans to misrepresent the President and misstate facts and to deceive and prejudice the people against him. There is special vindictiveness and disregard of truth by members of Congress everywhere."⁵¹ And in another place Welles writes "General Grant whom the Radicals have striven to use and to offset against the President, who generally received louder cheers and called out more attention than the President himself, ... saw, as did all others, the partisan designs and schemes of the Radicals."⁵²

Welles believed that Grant still retained convictions in harmony with the administration. In a personal interview with Welles the General agreed with him that the Union should be reestablished at once in all of its primitive vigor and that all of the states should be represented in Congress.⁵³

But if Grant still entertained views on reconstruction similar to the President's, he could hardly be expected to retain confidence in and remain on good terms with the President personally, disliking as he did the petty maneuvers of Johnson to implicate him in the apparent support of his policies. Moreover, Johnson's undignified contentions with the

hecklers in the meetings, the demonstrations against the President and the running comment of criticism and ridicule in the newspapers were all conducive to lowering his estimation of the President.

Stanton commented as follows: "The exhibition now going on" [of "the head of our nation reeling through the country as set forth daily in the public prints"]... "would do more to bring the General to his senses than anything I can possible do".⁵⁴

"For more than half of our journey" declared Welles, "Grant clung to the President.... But first at Detroit, then at Chicago, St. Louis, and finally at Cincinnati, it became obvious he had begun to listen to the seductive appeals of the Radical conspirators. The influence of his father ... finally carried him into the Radical ranks".⁵⁵ Before the tour was completed Grant, excusing himself on the grounds of illness, left the Presidential party in disgust and returned to Washington.⁵⁶

The events of the "Swing Around the Circle" did much to alienate Grant from the President. The General could no longer hold in respect the man who had endeavored to use him unfairly for political purposes and who had lost so much in the public's estimation. Just how much the Radicals succeeded in influencing Grant to change his personal views on Reconstruction is difficult to estimate. It is certain, however, that the antipathy and distrust with which Grant henceforth held the

President precluded further confidence of the General in his chief and made him ready to take an opposite stand on political issues.

Chapter III Secret Mistrust

Several influences contributed to alienate General Grant from the President and to make him sympathetic to, if not quite won over to the Radical Cause. As pointed out above, the events of the "Swing 'Round the Circle" lowered ^{the} General's esteem for the President. It must be remembered also that a heated political campaign was being fought. The Radicals were using every means to discredit the President and his policy. Johnson was held up to ridicule. He was called a "trickster", a "calamitous and traitorous Executive", a "drunker tailor" a "purjured and usurping traitor", and a "demagogue ... consumed with egotism".¹ Thomas Nast caricatured him unmercifully in the papers, while in the humorous writings of "Petroleum Nasby" Johnson's dignity suffered disastrously.²

Johnson's policy was condemned. He was blamed for the riots at New Orleans and Memphis.³ General Logan predicted that Johnson's plan would "inaugurate another revolution and more bloodshed."⁴ The Radical papers--and nearly all of the Republican journals and small town newspapers were Radical,⁵ --were arrayed against the President. False reports were common. A good example of a very damaging report is found in the widely published story of Johnson's plot to overthrow Congress.

On October 11, the Philadelphia Ledger, printed what purported to be a verbatim copy of a list of questions submitted by Johnson to Attorney-General Stanberry on the con-

stitutionality of the actual Congress. Reports had been rife during the summer that Johnson was planning to use the army to overthrow Congress and to set up in its place a new body composed of Southerners and Copperheads. These questions, first appearing in the Philadelphia Ledger, were widely printed throughout the country as proof of Johnson's plot.⁶

When traced to their source it was discovered that the questions had been written by Henry M. Flint, the Ledger's Washington correspondent and then sent to the paper as a verbatim copy of Johnson's. Flint had heard indirectly, that the President had recently stated to an intimate friend "that he had never made any hasty or unconsidered statements about the constitutionality or legality of the present Congress, and that all that he had said he intended to abide by, and that the Radical leaders of Congress seemed disposed to carry matters with a high hand next winter but that unquestionably the Constitution conferred certain powers upon him, ... which he would not shrink from performing, but that he would take no step ... without consulting his constitutional legal adviser and would be governed by his advice." Flint had also learned that a paper had been seen in the Attorney-General's office, but by accident and only for a moment, purporting to have come from the President's office.⁷

Upon these inferences, then, Flint had built his story and concocted the questions himself. Never-the-less the story was believed by many who had no chance to read the facts.

It is not known whether or nor General Grant believed this story. When a witness before an investigating committee of Congress in the spring of 1868 he testified that he had heard Johnson say "that if the North carried the election by members enough to give them, with the Southern members, a majority why should they not be the Congress of the United States".⁸ Grant now possibly thought Johnson might attempt to overthrow the Radical Congress by force of arms. Certainly he became suspicious that the President was contemplating some "disloyal" act as we shall see later.⁹

The influence of his Radical friends who urged upon Grant the idea that he was to be the choice for the Presidency¹⁰ at the end of Johnson's term undoubtedly affected the General's attitude toward Johnson.

General Rawlins had been willing for Grant to continue on the trip with Johnson to Chicago. It would, he had said, "do Grant good, whatever may be his aspirations in the future, and fix him in the confidence of Mr. Johnson, enabling him to fix up the army as it should be, and exert such influence as will be of benefit to the country."¹¹ But when Johnson's defeat in the elections of 1866 was certain Rawlins changed his attitude toward the President.¹² James H. Wilson in his biography of Rawlins writes that Rawlins was now convinced "that Grant's chances for the succession would be injured by further identification with Johnson and his policy."¹³

In October Grant gave such assurances to his Radical friends that his supporters in Illinois predicted he would be

the choice for the Presidency in 1868.¹⁴

Unquestionably the overwhelming Radical victory in the election of 1866 helped to convert Grant to the Radical Cause. To this Badeau testifies as follows: "Grant had taken no decided step up to the time of the election of 1866, but when the will of those who had won the war was definitely known, he declared that their decision should be accepted.... Grant had ... a double reason for disapproving Johnson's course; not only the deliberate decision of the people was against the President, but the voice of the vast majority of Union men had reached their leader."¹⁵

Grant now used his influence to prevail on the South to accept the results of the election. Many Southerners who came to Washington visited Grant's headquarters. The General pleaded with them to accept the terms of the North. He told them that submission would secure a lightening of the conditions about to be imposed. He even advised the President about the course he thought he (Johnson) should take, in view of the verdict of the late elections.¹⁶

Henceforth, General Grant was to work in opposition to the President, believing as he did that Johnson was hindering the work of bringing the North and the South once more into peaceful union. "He avoided offending, and he never disobeyed the President", says Badeau. "There was still no open rupture, no appearance of difference before the public; and at the very time when many at the North suspected Grant of favoring the President's, he was in reality

doing more than all the country besides to thwart Johnson's designs."¹⁷

That General Grant thoroughly distrusted the President in the fall of 1866 is proven by the following letter which he wrote to General Sheridan at New Orleans. The letter is dated Oct. 12, 1866.

(Confidential)
 Armies of the United States,
 Washington, D.C.

Dear General,--I regret to say that since the unfortunate differences between the President and Congress, the former becomes more violent with the opposition he meets with, until now but few people who were loyal to the Government during the Rebellion seem to have any confidence with him. None have unless they join in a crusade against Congress, and declare their acts, the principal ones, illegal and indeed I much fear that we are fast approaching the time when he will want to declare the body itself illegal, unconstitutional, and revolutionary. Commanders in Southern States will have to take great care to see, if a crisis does come, that no armed headway can be made against the Union. For this reason it will be very desirable that Texas should have no reasonable excuse for calling out the militia authorized by their legislature. Indeed it should be prevented. I write this in strict confidence, but to let you know how matters stand in my opinion, so that you may square your official action accordingly.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. Grant

To Major-General P. H. Sheridan
 P.S.--I gave orders quietly two or three weeks since for the removal of all arms in store in the Southern States to Northern arsenals. I wish you would see that those from Baton Rouge and other places within your command are being moved rapidly by the ordinance officers having the matter in charge. U.S.G.¹⁸

During the month of October 1866, while the election difficulties in Maryland were pending President Johnson decided to send Grant on a mission to Mexico.

Napoleon III had not yet removed his army from Mexico. The existence of the Maximilian empire supported by French troops had, for years been a problem confronting our State Department. In March of 1866, however, Napoleon under pressure of Secretary Seward's diplomacy and in apprehension of difficulties at home gave directions for the gradual withdrawal of the French troops.¹⁹

In bringing pressure to bear on France, Seward let it be known that he might accredit an envoy to the Mexican Republic, thus recognizing the Juarez Government.²⁰ Later the State Department proceeded to carry out this plan. Lewis D. Campbell was appointed plenipotentiary to the Juarez Government in May 1866.²¹ However the envoy was prevented from proceeding immediately to Mexico because of the disturbed conditions there. Finally in October it was determined that Campbell should go and that General Grant should accompany him as his military advisor.

General Grant had shown great interest in the Mexican question. He had repeatedly urged Johnson to send an army to Mexico, arguing that the North and South would be united by a war with a foreign country. He had even gone so far as to give secret orders to General Schofield to organize if necessary an army of American volunteers in Texas for enrollment under the Liberal Government of Mexico to drive out the French.²² Since Grant had taken such an interest in Mexico he would be the logical man to accompany Campbell. Moreover this diplomatic mission would take on an air of

greater importance than otherwise the President thought, if the famous General was a party to it.²³

The official instructions to Campbell stated that "some disposition of the land and naval forces of the United States, without violating the laws of neutrality" might be made, "which would be useful in favoring the restoration of law, order, and republican government in that country [Mexico]." "The General of the United States Army possesses already, discretionary authority as to the location of the forces of the United States in the vicinity of Mexico. His military experience will enable him to advise you concerning such questions as may arise during the transition stage of Mexico, from a military seige by a foreign enemy, to a condition of practical self government. At the same time it will be in his power, being near the scene of action, to issue any orders which may be expedient or necessary for maintaining the obligations resting upon the United States in regard to proceedings upon the borders of Mexico.

"For these reasons he has been requested and instructed by the President to proceed with you to your destination."²⁴

Johnson sent for Grant on the 17th of October 1866, and mentioned the subject of sending him on the mission to Mexico. Grant at that conference seemed to show satisfaction with the proposed arrangements.²⁵ However he states that he wished to be in Washington on the return of Congress in December. President Johnson assured him that this could be done. During the course of the conversation, the President

asked Grant if there was any objection to General Sherman coming to Washington for a few days. Grant replied, of course, that there was none. The General in accordance with the will of the President wrote to Sherman requesting that he come to the city.²⁶

On Thursday the 18th the instructions to Mr. Campbell were completed and were read to General Grant to ascertain whether or not he had any suggestions to make. Grant said that he had none to submit.²⁷

However, the General, after some consideration decided that he did not wish to go on the mission and in cabinet meeting declared that he did not think it expedient for him to go out of the country. Stanton had expressed these same views at a previous cabinet meeting.²⁸

On Sunday the 21st Grant addressed a letter to the President in which he begged to be excused from the proposed duty. "It is a diplomatic service for which I am not fitted either by education or taste," he said. "It has necessarily to be conducted under the State Department with which my duties do not connect me."²⁹

Notwithstanding this refusal, in a day or two Grant was summoned to a full cabinet meeting when the instructions were read to him by the Secretary of State exactly as if he had not declined to accept the mission. The General, now aroused, declared his unwillingness to go. The President, becoming angry, asked the Attorney General if there was any reason why General Grant should not obey his order. "Is he in any way

ineligible to this position?" he inquired. Grant started to his feet and exclaimed, "I can answer that question, Mr. President, without referring to the Attorney General. I am an American Citizen, and eligible to any office to which any American is eligible. I am an officer of the army and bound to obey your military orders. But this is a civil office, a purely diplomatic duty, and I cannot be compelled to undertake it. Any legal military order you give me I will obey; but this is civil and not military; and I decline the duty. No power on earth can compel me to do it!" No one replied and Grant immediately left the cabinet room.³⁰

Grant had declared that he was not bound to obey orders of the State Department. The formal letter of Seward, however expressly stated "By direction of the President, I request you to proceed to Mexico...." To meet General Grant's objection Johnson decided to give directions through the War Department. Accordingly he drew up a letter to the Secretary of War directing him to "instruct General Ulysses S. Grant commanding the armies of the United States to proceed to Mexico...."³¹

This letter was submitted to the cabinet, when after consideration, it was decided, that as the duty asked of General Grant was of a civil character and might be open to question as to the authority of the government to send him on such a mission, the communication to Stanton was modified to ask the Secretary of War to "request General Grant to proceed to some point on our Mexican frontier most suitable and convenient for communication with our minister, or (if General Grant

deems it best) to accompany him to his destination in Mexico, and to give him the aid of his advice in carrying out the instructions of the Secretary of State" etc.³²

Receiving the instructions through the Secretary of War, Grant in a note to that official once more declined to accept the proffered duty. He gave as an additional reason to those already mentioned that the reorganization of the army and the redistribution of the troops required that he keep within telegraphic communication with the department commanders and with Washington from where orders must emanate. He suggested that either General Sheridan or General Hancock who were already in the Southwestern United States or General Sherman who was in command of the Western Military Division might be sent instead of himself. "If it is desirable that our minister communicate with me," Grant continued, "he can do so through the officer who may accompany him,... I might say that I would not dare counsel the minister in any matter beyond the consent of the administration. That concurrence could be more speedily had with me here than if I were on the frontier."³³

In the meantime General Sherman had arrived in Washington. He went immediately to Grant's home as Grant had invited him to do and the latter explained the situation to him. Grant felt that there had been a plot to get rid of himself and told Sherman so. He declared that he was determined to disobey the order and stand the consequences.³⁴

General Sherman then went to call upon the President

who informed him that Grant was to be sent to Mexico and that he was to command the army in the absence of the General-in-Chief. Sherman assured Johnson that Grant could not be persuaded to go and said plainly that the President could not afford to quarrel with Grant at that time. The President "seemed amazed," wrote Sherman in his memoirs. Johnson "said that it was generally understood that General Grant construed the occupation of the territories of our neighbor, Mexico by French troops, ... as hostile to republican American ... that Mr. Campbell had been accredited to Juarez, and the fact that he was accompanied by so distinguished a soldier as General Grant, would emphasize the act of the United States"³⁵

Sherman indicated his own willingness to go instead of Grant and the President agreed to the substitution. "Certainly," he said, "if you will go, that will answer perfectly"³⁶

As the vessel carrying Sherman on his mission left New York harbor, General Sherman remarked to a friend, "My mission is already ended. By substitution myself I have prevented a serious quarrel between the administration and Grant."³⁷

Two questions naturally arise in regard to the attempt to send Grant to Mexico. First, what were the President's real motives in thus desiring that the General-in-Chief should leave Washington on a diplomatic mission of such a useless character? Secondly, what were the real influences which prompted Grant's refusal to go?

In answer to the first question it may be said that there is much evidence to show that Johnson wished to get rid of General Grant, temporarily at least, so that Sherman, who was more friendly to the President's reconstruction program could be put in his place. General Sherman says in his memoirs, "I am sure this whole movement was got up for the purpose of getting General Grant away from Washington."³⁸

Since the return of the Presidential party from the Swing Around the Circle in September Grant had been working against Johnson's Southern policy. While Johnson was urging the Southern States to reject the 14th Amendment³⁹ which had been submitted to the states for ratification, Grant was using every opportunity presented to him to advise the people of the South to accept the amendment and conform to the situation that was thrust upon them by the North. He argued, thus, to a deputation of men from Arkansas who were visiting Washington for political reasons. With every Southerner he met, and many came to see him, he pleaded the necessity of submission to the will of the North.⁴⁰

In thus engaging in politics, Grant's motive was not so much to thwart the President as to keep peace in the land and to save the country from turmoil and strife.⁴¹ But certainly he was working against the President's interests and his presence in Washington was to that extent objectionable. Sherman in a letter to the President the preceding February had strongly endorsed the President's policy of reconstruc-

tion. On the day that Johnson first proposed to General Grant the trip to Mexico he read Sherman's letter to Grant, at its conclusion remarking that he thought of publishing it. Grant expressed disapproval, saying that military men did not like expressions of theirs which were calculated to array them on one or the other side of antagonistic political parties to be brought before the public.⁴² The fact that Johnson wished to publish Sherman's letter of approval at the time he was calling him to Washington and sending Grant away on a useless mission, coupled with the rumors published in the newspapers that Stanton would resign and be sent as Ambassador to Spain seem to indicate that it was the President's intention to elevate Sherman to the position of Secretary of War.⁴³ This could most gracefully be accomplished while the Commander-in-Chief of the army was away and Sherman was in acting command at Washington.

Badeau states that Grant's course in the Maryland Elect-ions had helped to convince the President that Grant could not be used by him in his schemes.⁴⁴ This could hardly be the case because Grant had declined to go on this Mexican trip on the 21st.⁴⁵ of October while he did not write the letter to Johnson arguing against military intervention in Maryland until October 24.⁴⁶

As to the influences which kept Grant from accepting the duty of accompanying Campbell, it may be said with certainty that Grant suspected Johnson of designing to get rid of him so that he could not obstruct the President in carrying out his policies. That jealousy of Sherman's pro-

motion to a position superior to his own was one of his motives for refusing to relinquish direct control of the army is probably not true. During the war when Congress had under consideration a proposal to make General Sherman Lieutenant General and eligible to command the army and some thought that Sherman should supplant General Grant, the latter wrote to Sherman as follows: "If you should be put in command and I put subordinate, it would not change our relations in the least. I would make the same exertions to support you that you have done to support me and I would do all in my power to make our cause win."⁴⁷ Sherman declared that Grant was willing that he should be Secretary of War but he (Sherman) was not.⁴⁸ Sherman always expressed a loathing for politics in general and in particular he did not wish to be involved in the intrigue at Washington.

Undoubtedly the rumors which were afloat that the President would not recognize the Congress when it met in December, and might even attempt to disperse it by force of arms had come to Grant and made him suspicious of Johnson's motives in wishing to send him to Mexico.⁴⁹ In this he was influenced by Stanton's attitude of opposition toward the President. No doubt Grant had been influenced by the Radical Republicans as his actions certainly reflected their propaganda.⁵⁰ Grant believed that whatever Johnson's motives were, his actions were highly suspicious in view of the political situation, and conceived that it was his duty to stay in Washington at the head of the army in order to be

able to thwart any movement which Johnson might make to use the power of the army for disloyal purposes.⁵¹

Stanton had told Grant that Johnson wanted to get rid of him in order that he (Johnson) might use the army against Congress.⁵² C. B. Comstock recorded in his diary that Grant believed the story.⁵³ Unquestionably Grant was opposed to the President's policy now and distrusted his motives. Undoubtedly he wanted to remain to reorganize the army. Comstock suggests in his diary that Grant feared that if he went on the mission and the negotiations failed, "it would not fail to damage him, while if he did anything, Seward, whom he dislikes thoroughly would either overrule or appropriate the credit."⁵⁴ This was possibly an influential factor but when all of the evidence of Grant's distrust of the President is considered it is clear that it was Grant's fear of a coup d'état against Congress that was the determining factor in his decision to remain in Washington.

As the time for the fall elections approached it was further demonstrated that Grant had swung over to the side of the Radicals and that he completely distrusted the President. Riots threatened the city of Baltimore. In the month of October, 1866 the authorities in Maryland were engaged in the work of registering the voters in all parts of the State. At that time the Democrats were in control of the state government. It was claimed by the Radical Republicans that many thousands who had engaged in the rebellion and who were legally excluded under the constitution had been registered

by the authorities and especially by the police commissioners of Baltimore.⁵⁵

The newspapers took up the controversy. Forney in the Chronicle, and other radical editors denounced the Democratic Governor Swann and his adherents and called on the Radicals of other states to be prepared to assist in putting down the state authorities. Governor Swann conferred repeatedly with President Johnson, appealing to him for armed support.⁵⁶

At the same time the Radicals were carrying their side of the question to the Secretary of War. One of the leading Radicals, Judge Bond, conferred with Mr. Stanton as often as the Governor consulted the President.⁵⁷

Johnson believed that steps should be taken to preserve the peace. He consulted General Grant, requesting that troops be sent to the vicinity of Baltimore. Grant distrusted the President's motives. He and Stanton thought that in the excited state of feeling of the people the use of troops would be exasperating. Could it be possible that the President wished to tempt his Radical opponents to commit some illegal act which would result in conflict and thus stigmatise the Radical element as being in rebellion to the Government? Grant believed that Johnson would be glad to put those who opposed his policy into the position of rebels while the Southerners would seem to be loyal to the Governor.⁵⁸ Grant protested against the sending of troops. In a letter to the President

dated October 24, 1866 he said, "It is a contingency I hope never to see arise in this country whilst I occupy the position of General-in-Chief of the Army, to have to send troops into a state in full relations with the General Government, on the eve of an election, to preserve the peace. If insurrection does come, the law provides the method of calling out forces to suppress it. No such condition seems to exist now."⁵⁹

In the mean time the Radicals had set up a rival board of Police Commissioners in Baltimore.⁶⁰

Johnson, on the 25th of October wrote General Grant that "From recent developments serious troubles are apprehended from a conflict of authority between the executive of the state of Maryland and the police commissioners of the City of Baltimore I therefore request that you inform me of the number of Federal troops at present stationed in Baltimore and vicinity."⁶¹

General Grant on the 27th reported to the President that there were 1,550 troops available.⁶²

It was known that there were over five-hundred disbanded, but armed, negro soldiers in Baltimore. The President and the Cabinet, with the exception of Stanton, who no doubt was in conspiracy with the Radicals, thought that there should be additional troops in the vicinity. Johnson realized that if there was a riot and bloodshed and the United States troops were not there he would be much criticized. He also knew that if he sent troops to Baltimore, he would be accused of

trying to control the election by military force.⁶³ Very likely that was the reason why he did not take the responsibility of giving a direct order for sending the troops himself.

Having failed in his attempts to induce Grant to send troops to the disaffected city he took the circuitous method of writing to the Secretary of War on November 1st, as follows:

"In view of the prevalence in various portions of the country of a revolutionary and turbulent disposition which might at any moment assume insurrectionary proportions and lead to serious disorders, and of the duty of the government to be at all times prepared to act with decision and effect, this force [of 1550 men] is not deemed adequate for the protection and security of the seat of government."⁶⁴

Secretary Stanton referred the President's letter to General Grant with instructions to "take such measures as in his judgment are proper and within his power to carry into operation the within directions of the President." As a result of this order six or eight companies from New York on their way to join regiments in the South were detained at Fory Henry, and a regiment in Washington was under orders to be ready to move upon notice.⁶⁵ Whereas, in his letter to Stanton on the 1st of November Johnson expressed anxiety for the security of "the seat of government," in another letter to the Secretary of War on the following day he expressed concern for the City of Baltimore, evidently he wished to attain his ends without a break with the General of the Army or he would have given a direct order for troops to be con-

centrated at Baltimore.⁶⁶ He wished to make it appear that Stanton and Grant were cooperating in the movement for the support of the legal authorities in Maryland, thus in a measure, relieving himself of the responsibility of what the Radicals would term "interference" in the elections, the outcome of which was so vital to his own interests.

The elections passed without any disturbance in Baltimore. The legal commissioners had been imprisoned and the illegal ones kept in place until after the election.⁶⁷ General Grant used his personal influence to prevent bloodshed, making two visits to Baltimore and conferring with both parties to the dispute. He persuaded them to leave the decision to the courts.⁶⁸ When the election was over and the Radicals were beaten, the judge ordered the legitimate commissioners of the city to be freed and ordered the Radical commissioners to vacate their position.⁶⁹

Whether or not General Grant by his personal influence prevented a riot in Baltimore, it would be speculative to try to answer. At any rate he was honest in trying to prevent any opportunity being given the President, whom so many including himself distrusted, to attempt any movement which would be harmful to the country. Grant thought that the President might attempt a coup d' état and possible ever set aside the Congress of the United States. He thoroughly shared the Radicals' distrust of Johnson and looked upon every move of the President with suspicion.⁷⁰

That Grant was biased in favor of the Radicals is shown by the fact that when there were threats of disturbances by Conservatives in Tennessee at election time in July 1867 similar to the circumstances in Maryland in the fall of 1866 Grant telegraphed to Stanton recommending that Federal troops be used to preserve order.

In the Fall of 1866 Grant became thoroughly committed to the Radical viewpoint of Reconstruction. As we have noticed he recommended to the Southern leaders that the 14th Amendment be adopted.

In order that Congress should have more apparent cause for passing reconstruction legislation for the military rule of the South, Grant cooperated with Stanton in securing evidence of violence in the Southern States. In a letter dated Jan. 18, 1867 to General Howard, commanding the Freedmen's bureau, he asked that official to send him, "a list of authenticated cases of murder and other violence upon freedmen, northern or other Union men, refugees, etc. in the Southern states for the past six months or a year. My object in this," he said, "is to make a report showing that the courts in the states excluded from Congress afford no security to life or property of the classes here referred to, and to recommend that martial law be declared over such districts as do not afford the proper protection."⁷¹

More than four months before, Congress had asked the President for facts concerning any failure to enforce the

Civil Rights Law. At the request of Johnson all of the members of the Cabinet except Stanton had prepared reports. Stanton waited until General Grant through reports from the Freedman's Bureau had secured a mass of evidence. About the middle of February 1867 when Congress was considering the Stevens' Reconstruction bill, Stanton submitted to the President his report accompanied by one also from General Grant and the evidence gathered by General Howard of murders, neighborhood strife and troubles in the South. This evidence was turned over to Congress.⁷² Gideon Welles in commenting on the action of Stanton wrote that "Stanton had delayed his answer until Howard and his subordinates scattered over the South could hunt up all the rumors of negro quarrels and party scandal and malignity and pass them, through General Grant, on to the President. It would help generate difference between the President and the General, and if sent out to the country under the call for information by Congress, would be used by the demagogues to injure the President, and perhaps Grant also."⁷³

It is plain that the report was to be a justification for Congress passing the law establishing military governments over the Southern States. Welles believed that "there had been evident preconcert in the matter, and Radical congressmen were acting in concert with the War Department." "I could perceive," said Welles, "Grant had been strongly but unmistakably prejudiced, perhaps seduced, worked over, and enlisted,

and that gradually the Administration was coming under the War department."⁷⁴

Johnson took no steps to find out how far Grant was involved in the matter.⁷⁵

The Military Reconstruction Act was drawn up with the advice of General Grant. Badeau, his secretary, says that Grant was constantly consulted during the preparation of the bill.⁷⁶ As originally passed by the House of Representatives the bill authorized the General of the Armies (instead of the President) to appoint the commanders of the military districts. This, however, Grant disadvised. He urged that the appointment of district commanders should be left with the President and that the President, rather than the General of the Armies should have supervisory authority over reconstruction.⁷⁷

In the Senate the bill was amended so as to place the power of appointment of departmental commanders in the hands of the President, and in this manner it was finally passed by the House which was at this time contemplating the passage of the Army Appropriation Rider. Concocted by Stanton and Boutwell this amendment to the Army Appropriation bill as passed provided that the President should transmit all military orders through the General of the army. Thus it was planned to prevent any possible attempt by the President to overthrow Congress by force,⁷⁸ and to safe guard congressional reconstruction from possible obstructive action on the part of the President by permitting the General of the Army, who had the

confidence of Congress to visage all military orders. At the same time a trap was being laid for the President so that Congress might find legal grounds for impeachment.⁷⁹

Grant believed the Reconstruction measure of Congress to be the solution of the Southern problem⁸⁰ and predicted that everything would be well under the new act "if the Administration and copperhead influence do not defeat the objects of that measure." In a letter to his friend Washburne, in April 1867, Grant said, "I see no possible chance of getting abroad this year.... Congress has made it my duty to perform certain offices, and while there is an antagonism between the Executive and the Legislative branches of the Government, I feel the same obligation to stand at my post that I did whilst there were rebel armies in the field to contend with...."⁸¹

Thus, ~~we see that~~ Grant was completely won over to the Radical viewpoint. He even accepted the doctrine that negro suffrage, because of the dissatisfaction at the South, was a necessary expedient to preserve the Union and to prevent the Southerners from returning to their former position of power in the Union. "The process of conversion [of Grant] was slow," wrote Badeau, "and the convert unwilling but when once he accepted the new faith, he remained firm."⁸²

In the administration of the Reconstruction act Grant acted in harmony with its apparent meaning and endeavored to carry out the intentions of the framers of the law.⁸³

When General Sheridan in command at New Orleans removed certain civil officers, President Johnson immediately declared that district commanders had no power under the law to make such removals. In this he was supported by the Attorney General. Grant telegraphed to Sheridan, approving his course, but advised that he should make no further removals unless absolutely necessary.⁸⁴

On April 5, 1867, Grant wrote to Sheridan as follows: "There is decided hostility to the whole Congressional plan of reconstruction at the White House, and a disposition to remove you from the command you now have. Both the Secretary of War and myself oppose any such move.... There is nothing clearer to my mind than that Congress intended to give District Commanders entire control over the Civil government of these districts, for a specific purpose, and only recognized present civil authorities within these districts at all, for the convenience of their commanders to make use of, or so much of as suited them and as would aid them in carrying out the congressional plan of restoring loyal permanent governments." He again advised Sheridan not to remove officers unless he found it absolutely necessary.⁸⁵ Grant advised the military commanders that in case civil officers obstructed the laws they should be suspended and tried by military commission. This he believed to be unquestionably the right and province of the district commanders to do.⁸⁶ In so instructing them he tried to avoid direct conflict with

the President.

General Grant's dispatch to General Pope, April 11, 1867 was of such a character that Badeau in commenting upon it remarked: "There are passages in this letter which in ordinary times might have subjected its writer to trial by court martial for insubordination and disrespect to the President." The dispatch reads in part as follows:

"My Dear General: ... My views are that District Commanders are responsible for the faithful execution of the Reconstruction Act of Congress, and that in civil matters I cannot give them an order. I can give them my views, however, for what they are worth and above all, I can advise them of views and opinions here which may serve to put them on their guard.

"When Sheridan removed civil officers in the State of Louisiana, an act which delighted the loyal North, and none more than the supporters of the Congressional Reconstruction Bill in Congress, it created quite a stir, and gave expression to the opinion in other quarters, that he had exceeded his authority. ... Rest assured that all you have done meets the approval of all who wish to see the Act of Congress executed in good faith."⁸⁷

In carrying on the registration of voters required by the reconstruction act the District Commanders found that many people were taking false oaths and thus a great many men were being registered whom Congress intended should be disfranchised. The Attorney General drew up an interpretation of the Reconstruc-

tion law in which he denied the right of boards of registration to adopt any measures for protecting the ballot against false oaths of applicants for registration. According to his opinion no man could be disqualified who was willing to swear that he was qualified.⁸⁸

This liberal opinion of the Attorney General's was sent out to the military commanders the 20th of June 1867. When General Pope, one of the District Commanders, wrote to Grant inquiring whether the Attorney General's opinion was to be treated as a presidential order to him to conform his action, to that opinion Grant replied, "Enforce your own construction of the military bill until ordered to do otherwise. The opinion of the Attorney General has not been distributed to commanders in language or manner entitling it to the force of an order; nor can I suppose that the President intended it to have such force." He gave similar instructions to General Sheridan when that official inquired as to whether he was to regard the opinion of the Attorney General as an order.⁸⁹

i In writing to General Ord he said, "The law, ... makes district commanders their own interpreters of the power and duty under it."⁹⁰

Congress soon passed supplementary reconstruction legislation leaving no doubt as to the power of the District Commanders. They were given the right to suspend or remove civil officers. The conditions of registration were defined

so that it would be impossible to evade the intention of the law. The acts of the District Commanders were made subject to the approval of the General of the army, while the same original power of removal and suspension of civil officers was conferred on him which they enjoyed, and it was made his duty to exercise this power whenever necessary to carry out the purpose of the law. Thus we see Congress now had complete confidence in General Grant and conferred upon him the responsibility of supervising reconstruction.⁹¹

Grant had been consulted in the drafting of the supplementary reconstruction act. But his counsel was on the side of moderation. He probably was not ambitious for additional power. Certainly he shrank from assuming an attitude of superiority or of avowed antagonism to the President.⁹² He maintained the appearance of amicable relations with Johnson and showed him the deference due his office.⁹³

Grant at this time was exceedingly popular. His generals in the South took his advice as orders. He had the confidence of the people.⁹⁴ Both political parties were anxious to have him considered as belonging to them. But if he had any political aspirations at this time he did not make them known.⁹⁵

Johnson, of course, was aware that Grant was working in harmony with Congress but because of the great popularity of the General, the President doubtless felt that it would be unwise to remove him.⁹⁶

Secretary Stanton had been secretly working for the interests of the Radicals of Congress for a long time and was

more or less openly hostile to the President's policies. Congress had hoped to carry out military reconstruction through the Secretary of War and the generals of the army.⁹⁷ In order that Stanton might not be removed from office by the President, Congress passed the Tenure-of-Office Act which required the concurrence of the Senate in the removal of Cabinet or other officials appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate.

Stanton's relations with the General of the Army had been strained on account of the former's harsh and austere manner. The Secretary seemed to take delight in showing his authority, sending for Grant to come to his office on all sorts of occasions and in all sorts of weather. Perhaps he believed it to be his duty to assert the superiority of the civil over the military.⁹⁸

Notwithstanding his personal annoyance at Stanton's arrogance Grant cooperated with the Secretary of War in their common efforts to thwart the purposes of the President. They consulted often how they might execute the will of Congress and neutralize the opposition of Johnson. Grant felt that either he or Stanton should be in Washington at all times and if necessary both should be on duty ready to confuse any "disloyal" schemings of President Johnson.⁹⁹

Grant on a visit to West Point suddenly returned to Washington in response to a telegram from the Assistant Adjutant General at his own head quarters containing only the words "you are needed here." This was in consequence of an agree-

ment between him and Stanton that he would be summoned in this way should the President be plotting to go against their plans.¹⁰⁰

In whatever the District Military Commanders did which was clearly in harmony with the reconstruction acts of Congress, Grant supported them and defended them before the President when the latter was disposed to criticise. As early as July 1866 the President was dissatisfied with General Sheridan's arbitrary actions at New Orleans. Sheridan's course at the time of the riot at that place was the subject of warm contention between Grant and the President. Grant urged the President to have all of Sheridan's dispatches on the subject of the riots published in order that the public might get a fair opinion of Sheridan's actions not hitherto obtainable in the partial publications of his dispatches which had appeared. In writing to Sheridan at the time Grant said, "Persevere exactly in the course your own good judgment dictates. It has never led you astray as a military commander, nor in the administration of the affairs of your military division."¹⁰¹

When in March 1867, Sheridan removed from office the Attorney General of the State of Louisiana, the Mayor of New Orleans, and the Judge of the First District Court of the city, Grant wrote to him approving of his action.¹⁰²

When rumors were afloat in May that Sheridan would probably be removed Grant wrote again to that officer of his assurance that he had the confidence of himself and of Sec-

retary Stanton and "the loyal people generally." "You have carried out the acts of Congress," he said, "and it will be difficult to get a general officer who will not. Let me say, dismiss all embarrassments on account of rumors of removal. Such an act will not reflect on you."¹⁰³

In June after Sheridan had removed Governor Wells "that officer having made himself an impediment to the faithful execution of the Reconstruction act", Grant wrote him a commendatory letter as follows: "I have no doubt myself that the removal of Governor Wells will do great good to your command, if you are sustained, but great harm if you are not sustained. I shall do all I can to sustain you in it."¹⁰⁴

Chapter IV Open Opposition

President Johnson had been foiled in his endeavors to remove the harshness from military reconstruction. Stanton, Grant and the military department commanders had all worked to neutralize his efforts and to carry out the literal intentions of Congress. For months the President had considered the advisability of removing the objectionable Stanton and certain of the District Commanders. Now that his authority was growing less and less and the power of the military more secure he determined to act. He proposed first of all to remove the "fountain head of mischief", the Secretary of War.¹ And to this important position thus vacated he decided to appoint General Grant!

The man who, next to Stanton, had probably been most influential in carrying out the Radicals' plans of administering the reconstruction act was to be Stanton's successor! What could be Johnson's purpose in naming Grant as Secretary of War? Probably he did not know of the General's secret consultations with the Radical leaders, of his confidential advice and suggestions to the military commanders. But something of this he must certainly have surmised.

Johnson realized that Grant's appointment would help to silence criticism for suspending Stanton. Replacing Stanton with the popular war-hero could not be a serious blunder in the eyes of the people. Grant, as a member of the Cabinet would surely strengthen Johnson with the people, and

as formerly he had entertained the idea of Grant's advancement to position in the cabinet with the view of strengthening himself, so now that probably was one of his chief motives.² Grant had so well concealed his opposition to the President from the public knowledge that the mass of the people could easily be led to suppose he was Johnson's adherent.³ As Johnson had earlier in his administration endeavored to make it appear that Grant was in accord with him so now it was, no doubt, the President's purpose to give the impression that he had Grant's support as his chief lieutenant.⁴

Considered from every angle Grant was a pivotal man. His great power of appointment given him by the Military Appropriation Act, his influence with the Army commanders, his popularity with the people and his potentiality as a presidential candidate made it extremely desirable that he be attached to Johnson's cause. If he could be won over to become a whole hearted supporter of the President it would be a great victory.

On the 1st of August President Johnson sent for General Grant and on his arrival informed him of his intentions to remove both Stanton and Sheridan and stated that he would be pleased to have the General act as Secretary of War. Grant remonstrated against the removal of Stanton arguing that those who sought Stanton's removal were generally persons who had opposed the War. He said there were many claims pending in the War Department of which he (Grant) knew nothing and doubted if he would be able to handle them. Mr. Johnson answered that

his action was not based upon any personal hostility toward Mr. Stanton, but upon "public considerations of a high character"; that as to the pending claims they could be examined and settled by a special commission or referred to Congress; and that he did not wish to place the General in the attitude of seeking the position of Secretary of War.

General Grant replied that he would not shirk from the performance of any public duty that might be imposed upon him, but again stated his opinion that the proposed removal was not a good policy.⁵

That same day Grant wrote a long letter to the President in which he remonstrated against the proposed removals of Stanton and Sheridan. Concerning Stanton, Grant declared that "his removal cannot be effected against his will without the consent of the Senate". He urged that it was the intention of Congress to place Cabinet ministers beyond the power of executive removal and that it was "pretty well understood" that the Tenure-of-Office Bill" was intended especially to protect the Secretary of War in whom the country felt great confidence."⁶

Johnson told Secretary Welles of the conference with Grant and showed him the letter Grant had written. Welles wrote in his diary that this letter was not such as he would have expected from Grant. Welles thought that Grant had "perhaps without being aware of it, had his opinions worked over and modified within the year."

As Welles finished reading the letter and handed it back

to Johnson, he remarked, "Grant is going over". "Yes," said Johnson, "I am aware of it. I have no doubt most of these offensive measures have emanated from the War Department." "Not only that" remarked Welles, "but almost all the officers of the army have been insiduously alienated from your support by the same influences."⁷

After Grant's letter of protest against the removal of Stanton there were several interviews between the President and Grant within the next few days at which the General tried to dissuade his superior against the proposed removal.

When the President had first made known to him his intention of removing Stanton and Sheridan, Grant had immediately gone to see Stanton and discussed with him the course he should pursue in case Johnson persisted in carrying out his plans.⁸ Grant explained that if he should conclude to accept the appointment of Secretary of War, it would be for no purpose whatever beyond that of preventing the War Department from falling into the hands of some one of Johnson's adherents who would use it for the subversion of Congress.⁹ Thus, it will be noticed, Grant proposed to accept the position with the intention of working in harmony, not with the chief executive but with his enemies. Grant consulted others beside Stanton. However since "Congress was not in session," Badeau explains "the principal people whom he might have consulted were absent."¹⁰ The General was evidently in the habit of consulting Radical Congressmen.

On the fifth of August, President Johnson sent to Stanton the following note:

Executive Mansion, Washington, D.C., Aug. 5, 1867

Sir: Public considerations of a high character constrain me to say that your resignation as Secretary of War will be accepted. Very respectfully, Andrew Johnson."

To which Stanton replied the same day "...I have the honor to say that public considerations of a high character, which alone have induced me to continue at the head of this Department, constrain me not to resign the office of Secretary of War before the next meeting of Congress."¹²

Whereupon the President made up his mind to suspend Stanton until Congress should convene in December and appoint Grant, Secretary of War ad interim. But before taking this final step he thought it wise to sound out Grant's position. Accordingly on August 11th the President conferred with Grant, telling him of his decision to suspend Stanton and remarking that the place thus vacated must be filled, and the question was, whether it would not be better that the General should be made acting Secretary than that a stranger should be selected for the position. Johnson went on to say that as commanding General of the Army Grant understood the want and interests of the service, and besides was intimately connected by the reconstruction acts with their execution. The President wished to know if General Grant would take the place if appointed. General Grant replied that he would of course obey orders. The President then said that he thought that he had a right to ask if there was any thing between them, (the General and himself). He had heard it intimated that there was, and he would now really like to know how it was. General

Grant replied that he knew of nothing personal between them, and then alluded to the difference of opinion between the President and himself respecting the constitutional amendment and the reconstruction acts. Here the interview ended.¹³

The next day Johnson sent a note to Secretary Stanton suspending him from his office and instructing him to turn the War Department over to General Grant. At the same time he notified Grant of his appointment to the position of Secretary of War ad interim.¹⁴ Whereupon Grant wrote to Stanton transmitting his letter of appointment from the President. "In notifying you of my acceptance," he said, "I cannot let the opportunity pass without expressing my appreciation of the zeal, patriotism, firmness, and ability with which you have ever discharged the duties of Secretary of War."¹⁵

Stanton replied, denying the right of the President to suspend him from office. "But in as much as the President has assumed to suspend me from office as Secretary of War," he wrote, "and you have notified me of your acceptance of the appointment of Secretary of War ad interim, I have no alternative but to submit, under protest, to the superior force of the President."

In recognition of Grant's expressions of appreciation he said, "You will please accept my acknowledgement of the kind terms in which you have notified me of your acceptance of the President's appointment, and my cordial reciprocation of the sentiments expressed."¹⁶

Stanton was manifestly displeased with Grant's accep-

tance, while the General was nettled by Stanton's letter which seemed to imply that he was in accord with the President.¹⁷

The purpose of Stanton's language, however, was probably not so much to reprove General Grant (he wrote to Johnson in the same words saying "I have no alternative but to submit, under protest, to the superior force of the President.") as to give the impression to the public that he was forced to leave his post by the President through the military, thus putting Johnson in a bad light and justifying his own action before the Radicals who had urged him to stay in office.¹⁸

When President Johnson first mentioned to General Grant his intentions of removing Stanton from the War Department he also disclosed his desire of relieving General Sheridan from his command of the 5th military district comprising the unreconstructed states of Louisiana and Texas. There were many reasons why the President wished to remove Sheridan. The latter had used his authority in a very arbitrary manner as we have noticed above, removing civil officers and replacing them with his own appointees. Sheridan's most aggravating offence was the writing of disrespectful and disobedient remarks about President Johnson in a letter to General Grant which was published by the Radical press to the discomfort of President Johnson and his supporters.¹⁹

In this letter he criticised Stanbery's interpretation of the law in regard to registration in the South. "Mr. Stanbery's interpretation," he said, "is practically in registration opening a broad macadamized road for perjury and fraud

to travel on."²⁰ He then said, "I regret that I should have to differ with the President, but it must be recollected that I have been ordered to execute a law to which the President has been in bitter antagonism."²¹

Late in July 1867, Sheridan removed Governor Throckmorton of Texas and put E. M. Pease in his place, whom Throckmorton, by a vote of six to one had defeated for that office twenty months before. He also dismissed the legislature because there was a disagreement between it and the Governor.²² Moreover the General continued to enforce the Reconstruction act according to his own interpretation and not that of the Attorney General. In doing this he was only following the council of General Grant who had instructed him to "Enforce your own construction of the military bill until ordered to do otherwise."²³ But Johnson did not know that Grant was secretly influencing his subordinate.²⁴

If Grant secretly advised Sheridan to act contrary to the wishes of the President, he openly defended his subordinate when the chief executive proposed to remove him. In a letter dated August 1, 1867, he wrote to the President commending Sheridan for his valient service in the War and for his capable civil administration in the 5th district. In conclusion he stated that it was his opinion that "It is more than the loyal people of this country will quietly submit to, to see the very men of all others whom they have expressed confidence in removed."²⁵

After writing thus to the President, Grant directed one

of his staff to write to Sheridan as follows: "General Grant wishes me to write to you that President Johnson has made up his mind to remove you and also the Secretary of War. He sent for General Grant yesterday and told him this. The General said all proper for him to say against such a course, and when he came back he put his views in writing and sent them to Mr. Johnson. I send you a copy of this letter. The General wishes me to say to you to go on your course exactly as if this communication had not been sent to you, and without fear of consequences. That so long as you pursue the same line of duty that you have followed thus far in the service you will receive the entire support of these headquarters."²⁶

On August 1st Sheridan removed twenty-two New Orleans aldermen and appointed others in their stead. Later in the same month he removed the City Treasurer, the Chief of Police, and the City Attorney, and a number of officers outside of the city.²⁷

On the 17th of August, Johnson decided to act, and sent to General Grant orders relieving General Sheridan of his command at New Orleans and assigning him to the department of the Missouri and appointing General George H. Thomas to take Sheridan's place. Accompanying the order was a note to General Grant saying "Before you issue instructions to carry into effect the enclosed order, I would be pleased to hear any suggestions you may deem necessary respecting the assignment to which the order refers."²⁸

General Grant promptly replied as follows: "I am pleased

to avail myself of this invitation to urge, earnestly urge, urge in the name of a patriotic people who have sacrificed hundreds of thousands of lives, and thousands of millions of treasure to preserve the integrity and union of this country that this order be not insisted upon. It is unmistakably the expressed wish of the country that General Sheridan should not be removed from his present command."

"This is a republic," he continued, "where the will of the people is the law of the land. I beg that their voice be heard." He further urged that the removal of Sheridan would be regarded as an effort to defeat the laws of Congress and would embolden the Southern people to renewed opposition.²⁹

There was reason for Grant believing that the people would not stand for the removal of Sheridan. "The editor and speakers", wrote Welles "have undertaken to control the course of the Government as regards Sheridan, and Grant, if not a participant with, has been led away by them. Undoubtly many people have read the newspapers and come to the conclusion that the President could not--dared not--remove Sheridan."³⁰

Grant, no doubt, also remembered that the House of Representatives in July had by a strict party vote tendered Sheridan its thanks for the "able and faithful performance of his duties"³¹ when he wrote that it was "unmistakable the expressed will of the country, that Sheridan should not be removed from his present command."

To this urgent appeal in behalf of Sheridan the President replied that he was "not aware that the question of re-

taining General Sheridan in the command of the Fifth Military District has ever been submitted to the people themselves for determination." "General Sheridan," he continued, "has exercised the power conferred by Congress and still more so by the resort to authority not granted by law.... His removal therefore, cannot be regarded as an effort to defeat the laws of Congress."³²

"The correspondence between the President and Grant in relation to the removal of Sheridan has been published...." Welles wrote later in his Diary "Of course the Radical Press will indorse and extoll Grant, but he certainly does not in this matter appear to advantage. His letter is weak, his logic is weak, the thing is feeble. The letter was written plainly for publication, but the President's reply is dignified and conclusive."³³

Upon receiving the President's reply on the 19th Grant went to see the President "and after a brief conversation," the President's private secretary Colonel Moore relates, "acquiesced in the President's reasons for the change of commanders in the Fifth Military District, expressing the belief that Sheridan, who he said was familiar with the Western country, would do admirably in a command in the Indian region."³⁴

"He said, however," continues Col. Moore, "that it had been rumored that first Sheridan would be removed by the President, then the other district commanders, and finally himself. The President smiled, and reminded the General

that long ago he had desired him to act as Secretary of War. The General replied 'Yes, he did not see the use of a civilian as Secretary of War.' and gave the President to understand that after all the removal or suspension of Mr. Stanton was not a bad thing."³⁵

Here it appears that General Grant either was actually won over to the President's point of view or let the President believe that he was convinced of the righteousness of the latter's actions. Or perhaps Johnson was too ready to interpret Grant's matter of fact statements too liberally. Secretary Welles writes that later he became satisfied that "Sheridan had been secretly prompted and influenced by Grant in his reprehensible course in New Orleans and Texas." "Most of the viceroys, or military governors," he thought "had secret telegrams, or oral instructions from the General-in-Chief, who was in collusion with Stanton (whom, however, he disliked) and the chief Radical conspirators. In all this period, Grant with great duplicity and vulgar cunning succeeded in deceiving not only the President but the rest of us. Sheridan was flattered by the confidential communications and encouraged in his insolence and insubordination towards the President by his superior officer, who had become enlisted in the Conspiracy against the chief magistrate."³⁶

Soon after issuing of the order for the change of commanders at New Orleans the President found it expedient to remove General Sickles from command in the Carolinas. Johnson had previously contrived to have Sickles give up his

command by first offering him collectorship of New York and then various diplomatic positions. When a mission to Neatherlands was proposed to him Sickles wrote to Grant, and declared that unless the General-in Chief desired a change he would prefer to remain in his military command. Grant informed Sickles that he had no wish to supercede him and so Sickles declined the diplomatic appointment.³⁷

Sickles had counseled with Grant how best to carry out the policy of Congress and was entirely set against the President.³⁸

On the 23rd of August a dispatch from General Sickles was laid before the cabinet. It related to his order No. 10 abstracting by military force the judgments and processes of all the courts within the Carolinas. He gave as his reason that if he did not the court would pass on the Reconstruction acts and pronounce them unconstitutional. General Grant said that he had at first countermanded Sickle's order in so far as it applied to United States Courts, as he promised he would, but, after thinking of it, he had come to the conclusion that General Sickles might have had his reasons for what he was doing, and as there are always two sides to a question, he had countermanded his order that Sickles might have an opportunity to be heard. Congress had put in his (Grant's) hands the execution of this law, and he intended to see it was executed.³⁹

General Grant was feeling his responsibility to Congress, and no doubt believed it was his patriotic duty to support

congressional reconstruction regardless of the constitution.

General Sickles was soon removed, being replaced by General Canby. A month later Grant presented Sickles' case in Cabinet meeting stating that Sickles wished to have a court of inquiry. Grant thought an officer could demand a court of inquiry. Obviously it was the purpose of Sickles, (and of Grant) to vindicate the former's conduct in Reconstruction; as Welles puts it "to try the President and Attorney General for disapproving his conduct."⁴⁰

On the 22nd of August Gideon Welles had a long conversation with Grant where-in the latter expressed his radical views on reconstruction. "It pained me to see how little he [Grant] understood of the fundamental principles and structure of our Government, and of the constitution itself," confided Welles to his Diary, "On the subject of differences between the President and Congress, and the attempt to subject the people to military force, there were, he said, in Congress, fifty at least of the best lawyers of the country who had voted for the Reconstruction law, and were not, he asked, the combined wisdom and talent of these fifty to have more weight than Mr. Johnson, who was only one to fifty? Congress had enacted this law, and was not the President compelled to carry it into execution? Was not Congress superior to the President? He thought Congress might pass any law, and the President and all others must obey and support it until the Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional."

"He thought" continued Welles, "that where the constitution says that Congress may by law confer inferior appointments on heads of departments. 'Are not those districts under General Sickles and other Generals departments?' Grant asked. He said the will of the people was the law in this country, and the representatives of the people made the laws. He believed in the conquered territory idea; Southern States under complete jurisdiction of Congress, Congress to say who should vote and direct when and how these states were to be readmitted."⁴¹

Having heard Grant's political views Welles went to see the President and told him of his apprehensions concerning Grant. He also called on Judge Blair and requested him to "see Grant, talk with him, get others who are right minded to talk with him also, and write him,--enlighten him. He needs instruction."⁴²

On the 26th Welles significantly confided to his Diary that Grant "has been willing to be courted but is not quite prepared to have it published that the parties are engaged and to be married." "The President is still reluctant to believe that Grant is unfaithful."⁴³

On the 26th of August President Johnson issued his order for the relief of General Sickles from his command in North and South Carolina, replacing him with General Canby.

On the same day he modified his orders relative to the commandant of the 5th military district. On the 17th he had ordered General Thomas to take Sheridan's place in New Orleans. Since that time General Grant had given him infor-

mation which showed that General Thomas was in ill health and urged that Thomas should not, therefore be sent. Accordingly the President now issued his modified order appointing General Hancock to the position at New Orleans instead of General Thomas. Johnson was secretly glad to have the excuse to appoint Hancock to the position vacated by Sheridan, for Hancock was in harmony with the administration while Thomas sympathised with the Radicals.⁴⁴

Tuesday August 27th witnessed a vary important Cabinet meeting in which the Secretary of War ad interim openly indicated his purpose to support Congress even to the extent of disobeying the President. The Governor of Idaho territory had been suspected of being a swindler and a cheat, and the President had nominated a man to succeed him. The matter of confirmation of the President's appointment had been before the Senate and had not been definitely settled when that body adjourned in July. Could a successor be appointed or would the Tenure-of-Office Act prevent it? And if a new appointment could be made, suppose the first incumbent would not give up the office? What should then be done? Secretary McCulloch was ready with an answer. He suggested that if the Governor refused to vacate, the militia should be called out. All looked toward Grant for an answer to this bold suggestion. Grant answered that in such a case the "military" would not respond. They would sustain the Tenure-of-Office bill, which Congress had enacted, until the judges said it was unconstitutional.⁴⁵

Here was indeed a presumptive insubordinate statement by the new Secretary of War. He looked to Congress rather than the President for orders and considered himself the rightful interpreter of the will of Congress. In the same Cabinet meeting Grant proceeded to bring up his objections to the Executive orders of the preceding day relative to Generals Sheridan and Thomas. He thought now that Sheridan should remain in New Orleans until Thomas was able to relieve him. When Sheridan was relieved Grant wished him granted leave to visit Washington. The law, Grant went on to say, placed the execution of the Reconstruction acts in his (Grant's) hands. He had not been consulted when he received orders, and those orders counteracted, in their terms some of his orders. While he had no wish to conflict with any one, he had a duty to perform. He must see the Reconstruction law executed. "The President," recorded Welles, "was very cool, calm and deliberate in his reply to this studied and premeditated speech. He [the President] reminded General Grant that he himself had brought the Surgeon's certificate in regard to General Thomas health, had stated it was such that he thought it imprudent for General Thomas to go at this time to New Orleans, and had asked to have the order suspended. That as regarded a leave to Sheridan that could as well be granted after he reported on the frontier as before. Let him repair to Leavenworth or Denver and relieve General Hancock, then, if he can be spared for a visit, he can take his time and the several orders would be carried into effect."

Johnson now let General Grant know his place in no uncertain terms. "General Grant," he said, "will understand it is my duty to see the laws are executed, and also that when I assign officers to their duty my orders must be obeyed. I have made this arrangement and performed this work deliberately, and it will go with as little delay as possible."⁴⁶

Grant was humbled by this rebuke and changed the subject. He said if General Sickles was to be detached, no better man than General Canby (the man whom the President had appointed) could succeed him. Canby could not, however, be very well spared from Washington, where he was familiar with details, and above all his services were important on the Board of Claims. As regarded General Sickles, two of his orders, the one intended as a stay law and the one establishing a code, were unauthorized. Both were good in their selves, he said, but General Sickles had no authority to issue such orders.⁴⁷

The President said he was glad that there was concurrence of view in regard to General Canby and that as for his being on the Board of Claims, it would not weigh much since the board itself was of little importance.

Grant then proceeded to say in a subdued manner, that he wished to say that while it was proper he should discharge the duties ad interim of the Secretary of War, he was no politician and preferred not to be mixed up in political questions. He would, therefore prefer not to sit at the Cabinet consultations and pass opinions on the subjects which came up for consideration and decision.⁴⁸ The President told him that was

his own option. Grant then excused himself, saying he had much work to tend to at the War Department.⁴⁹

Notwithstanding Grant's declaration that he wished to be excused from political discussion, on that very day at three o'clock in the after noon there was handed to President Johnson a letter from General Grant, most of it being on matters political.

Chapter V Violent Controversy

When President Johnson suspended Secretary Stanton from the War Department in August, he was only ridding himself temporarily of that objectionable officer. He only postponed the settlement of the question of whether or not he could legally remove a subordinate officer without the concurrence of the Senate in that removal. The Tenure-of-Office Act had provided that any suspension in accordance with the provisions of that act, which the President might make during a recess of the Senate, would be subject to the approval of the Senate when that body met in its next session.¹

Mr. Johnson could fore-see that the Senate would likely refuse to concur in the suspension of Mr. Stanton, and would thus reinstate that officer to his former position as Secretary of War. Here, thought the President, would be an opportunity to test the constitutionality of the Tenure-of-Office Act. If the Secretary-of-War ad interim would refuse to give up the office to Mr. Stanton upon the latter's reinstatement, the question as to who should occupy the office would be settled in court, where the President's confident view that the law was unconstitutional could be vindicated. But could General Grant be depended upon to hold on to the office in event of the Senate attempting to restore Mr. Stanton to office?

Sometime after the appointment of Grant as Secretary-of-War ad interim President Johnson called upon him to ascertain what would be his action should an attempt be made to restore Mr. Stanton to the War department.²

As to what General Grant actually promised the President he would do under those circumstances, not definite assertions can be made since the two parties to that conversation later gave different accounts.

Grant's version is as follows: "The President asked me my views as to the course Mr. Stanton would have to pursue, in case the Senate should not concur in his suspension, to obtain possession of his office. My reply was, in substance, that Mr. Stanton would have to appeal to the courts to reinstate him, illustrating my position by citing the ground I had taken in the case of the Baltimore police commissions.

"In that case I did not doubt the technical right of Governor Swann to remove the old commissioners and to appoint their successors as the old commissioners refused to give up; however, I contended that no resource was left but to appeal to the courts.

"Finding that the President was desirous of keeping Mr. Stanton out of office, whether sustained in the suspension or not, I stated that I had not looked particularly into the Tenure-of-Office bill, but what I had stated was a general principle, and if I should change my mind in this particular case I would inform him of the fact."³

President Johnson's recollection of what transpired is quite different:

"I sought that interview calling myself at the War Department. My sole object in then bringing the subject to your attention was to ascertain definitely what would be your own action should such an attempt be made for his

(Stanton's) restoration to the War Department. That object was accomplished, for the interview terminated with the distinct understanding that if, upon reflection, you should prefer not to become a party to the controversy, or should conclude that it would be your duty to surrender the department to Mr. Stanton, upon action in his favor by the Senate, you were to return the office to me prior to a decision by the Senate, in order that, if I desired to do so, I might designate some one to succeed you."⁴

Thus the President believed he had a positive understanding with General Grant, that the latter intended to remain in the office after the Senate's action thus forcing Stanton to resort to legal procedure and that if he should change his mind in regard to remaining in office he would give the President notice so that Johnson might have time to make another appointment.

But according to General Grant, he only promised to let the President know of his change of mind in regard to the method he thought Stanton would have to use in reestablishing himself in the office of Secretary of War; he did not agree to aid the President in carrying the matter to the courts nor to resign in order that the President might appoint a successor who would perform that function for the President.

Whatever Grant may or may not have promised the President at this interview, he at least understood that it was the President's purpose to use him to prevent Mr. Stanton from securing the War office. And it must have been apparent to

him, even though there was nothing said in regard to it, that should he decline to aid the President in this project it was the President's purpose to relieve him from the further discharge of the duties of the Secretary-of-War ad interim, and to appoint some other person in that capacity.

The President had later conversation with Grant on the subject of his retaining the office of Secretary-of-War, all of them leading the President to believe that General Grant would cooperate with him.⁵

In pursuance with the requirements of the Tenure-of-Office law President Johnson on December 12th 1868, sent to the Senate his reasons for the suspension of Mr. Stanton. The newspapers took up the discussion of the possibility of the reinstatement of Stanton and of Grant's probable action in that event. On the seventh of January the President's secretary called the attention of his Chief to certain of these newspaper reports which asserted that General Grant had expressed an intention to transfer the War Department to Mr. Stanton in case the Senate should decide in the latter's favor. The President answered that General Grant had told him that his action would be limited to withdrawing from the department and leaving it in the hands of the President as fully as when it was conferred upon him.⁶ Thus it is apparent that Johnson trusted that Grant would not turn the office back to Stanton in any case.

The President at that time expressed to his secretary the opinion that perhaps it would be well for the Senate to

reinstate Stanton, as he could at once be removed, and in the mean time General Grant be gotten out of the War department. Grant, he remarked, had served the purpose for which he had been selected, and it was desirable that he should be superseded in the War office by another.⁷

On that same day by the direction of the President Col. Moore prepared a letter of removal for Mr. Stanton and also a brief message to the Senate informing that body of the terminations of Stanton's connection with the War department. The President wished to have these papers ready for use.⁸

The time approached when the Senate was expected to reach a decision in regard to the suspension of Stanton. General Sherman, who was on duty in Washington as President of a board to revise the regulations of the army, was very intimate with General Grant, the two conversing frequently on the affairs of the times. On January 11th, General Grant in conversation with General Sherman discussed the question of Stanton's reenstatement and of his probable action in that event. General Sherman has left us an interesting account of this conversation in his Memoirs. He recounts that General Grant said that he had more carefully read the Tenure-of-Office law, and that it was different from what he had supposed; that in case the Senate did not consent to the removal of Secretary-of-War Stanton, and he (Grant) should hold on, he should incur a liability of ten thousand dollars and five years imprisonment. "We all expected," relates Sherman, "The resolution of Senator Howard, of Michigan virtually restoring Mr. Stanton to his office, would pass the

Senate, and knowing that the President expected General Grant to hold on, I inquired if he had given notice of his change of purpose; he answered that there was no hurry, because he supposed Mr. Stanton would pursue toward him (Grant) the same course which he (Stanton) had required of him the preceding August, viz, would address him a letter claiming the office, and allow him a couple of days for the change. Still, he said, he would go to the White House the same day and notify the President of his intended action."⁹

It seems strange that General Grant would need to be prompted by Sherman to make good his promise to notify the President of his change of mind in regard to holding to his office.

General Grant proceeded to the White House the afternoon of Saturday the 11th and had a protracted interview with the President. As subsequently related by Grant in his letter of January 28th, 1868 to President Johnson the interview was as follows;

"Taking this view of the matter, (that he could not, without violation of the law refuse to vacate the office of Secretary of War the moment Mr. Stanton was reinstated) I went to the President for the sole purpose of making this decision known and did so make it known." "The President, however, instead of accepting my view of the requirements of the Tenure-of-office bill, contended that he had suspended Mr. Stanton under the authority given by the constitution.... That, having appointed me under the authority given by the constitution, and not under any act of Congress, I could not

be governed by the Act. I stated that the law was binding on me, constitutional or not, until set aside by the proper tribunal. An hour or more was consumed each reiterating his views on this subject, until getting late, the President said he would see me again.

"I did not agree to call on Monday, nor at any other definite time, nor was I sent for by the President until the following Tuesday."¹⁰

President Johnson in his letter of January 31, 1868, to General Grant, gives a different account:

"After a protracted interview, during which the provisions of the Tenure-or-Office bill were freely discussed, you said that, as had been agreed upon in our first conference, you would either return a successor before final action by the Senate upon Mr. Stanton's suspension, or would remain at its head, awaiting a decision of the question by judicial proceedings. It was then understood that there would be a further conference on Monday, by which time I supposed you would be prepared to inform me of your final decision."¹¹

Thus, according to Grant he had literally fulfilled his one promise of giving the President notice of his change of mind. Johnson on the other hand, understood the General to be still indecisive about retaining the office and that he would let him know definitely on Monday.

Commenting on the matter Gideon Welles wrote in his Diary January 13th as follows; "I cannot but think, from what I see and hear, that General Grant is acting in concert with them, (the Radical leaders) though the President on Saturday

(the 11th) was unwilling to believe that Grant was false and was deceiving him.¹²

General Grant was not anxious to see Mr. Stanton return to the War office. He believed that Stanton could do no further good in the War department and that the Government's actions would be needlessly thwarted by Stanton's unwelcome return.¹³ Grant had never personally liked Stanton. At the time of Stanton's suspension in August 1867, Grant had been offended by Stanton's ungracious manner of relinquishing the War department to him.¹⁴ Now, probably for personal reasons as well as out of consideration for the welfare of the country he wished to see someone else in the War office.¹⁵

General Sherman, being friendly to the President, was anxious that there be no conflict between the Executive and Congress over the Stanton episode and thought that the best way out of the difficulty was for the President to nominate some good man as Secretary-of-War whose confirmation by the Senate would fall within the provisions of the law. At the suggestion of Sherman Honorable Reverdy Johnson, Senator from Maryland, called on the President on Sunday (the 12th) and advised him to appoint General J. D. Cox of Ohio, a Republican of the more moderate type, as Secretary of War. But President Johnson had made up his mind to continue in the course he had started regardless of consequences. General Sherman in conference with General Grant on Sunday the 12th told him of his plan for the President to send in the name of Cox to the Senate. "So anxious was he [Grant] about

it" wrote Sherman in his Memoirs, "that he came to our room at the War Department the next morning (Monday) the 13th, and asked me to go in person to the White House to urge the President to send in the name of General Cox."¹⁶ Sherman did interview the President on Monday but Johnson did not consider the suggestion of Cox's nomination favorably. Thomas D. Ewing in a letter of Jan. 12 also recommended to the President that he nominate General Cox for the War office, but Johnson was determined to bring matters squarely to an issue with Congress.¹⁷

Monday afternoon at six o'clock, after a long executive session, the Senate resolved that the causes for removing Stanton were insufficient, thus refusing to concur in the suspension. Notices of this action were sent to General Grant and to the President, and Mr. Stanton was immediately informed by a friend.¹⁸

That same evening General Grant attended a levee given by the President. The General had opportunity to advise the President of his intentions in regard to the War office but remained silent on the question.¹⁹ Either Grant honestly believed the matter settled and thought Johnson understood his intentions, or he was deliberately holding aloof in order to prevent the President from settling the matter in the courts.

Early on the morning of the 14th (Tuesday) General Grant went to the office of the Secretary of War, locked and bolted the door on the outside, and handed the key to the Adjutant General, E. D. Townsend,²⁰ saying, "I am to be found over at

my office at army head-quarters. I was served with a copy of the Senate resolutions last evening." General Townsend went upstairs and delivered the key to Mr. Stanton who was there waiting for it.²¹

General Grant, after thus relinquishing the office of Secretary of War, immediately sent a formal note to the President announcing that he had received notice of the Senate's action and that by the terms of the Tenure-of-Office act his functions as Secretary of War ad interim ceased from the moment of the receipt of the notice.²²

The question now arises: had General Grant and Mr. Stanton made a previous arrangement for the transfer of the office? Evidence is conclusive that they had not. W. S. Hellyer, who seems to have been a friend of both the President and General Grant, had conversations with General Grant and General Rawlins and wrote to Johnson January 14, as follows: "I am now fully satisfied that General Grant never had any conversation or collusion with Mr. Stanton in regard to his (Stanton's) restoration to the War officer. That Grant never expected that Stanton would resume the duties of the War Office."²³ George O. Gorham the biographer of Stanton states that "Mr. Stanton went directly to the War Department, and took possession without any show of ceremony or any call upon General Grant."²⁴

"General Grant did not like the way in which Mr. Stanton resumed control of the War office," wrote James G. Blaine in his Twenty Years in Congress. "He did not think that he had

been treated with the same courtesy which he had shown to Mr. Stanton when he succeeded him the preceding August. In fact, he had not expected, nor did he desire the restoration of Mr. Stanton, and but for differences that arose between him and the President might have used his influence against Mr. Stanton's remaining."²⁵

Gorham explains why Stanton took over the office so unceremoniously. "If Stanton could have known that General Grant would immediately notify the President as he did, that he regarded the vote of the Senate as terminating his functions as Secretary ad-interim, he would undoubtedly have extended the same courtesies that under similar circumstances had been shown to him. But being in doubt as to the General's position, he pursued the prudent course of entering upon the possession of the office without conceding the right of any person to be consulted."²⁶

Grant wished to avoid any possible infraction of the law by relinquishing the office immediately upon receipt of notice. Whether or not Stanton immediately reestablished himself in the War Department Grant probably considered as being of none of his affairs. He was living up to his conception of the law, and probably considered himself to be literally fulfilling his promise to Johnson to deliver the office back to the President in the same condition it was in when he was appointed to the position. Locking the office and sending immediate notice to the President, he no doubt thought, would literally fulfill that promise.

When the President received Grant's notice of his relinquishment of the War office he sent word to the General requesting him to be present at the Cabinet meeting that afternoon. Grant obeyed the summons and when he arrived was addressed as "Mr. Secretary". The General disclaimed the title saying that he had notified the President that he could no longer serve in that position.²⁷

President Johnson was convinced of Grant's duplicity. He had heard that it had been asserted by some one that previous to the General's attendance at the levee, the General and Secretary Stanton had had a conference at the former's residence and agreed upon a course of action, and laughed at the fact the Radicals had actually legislated Grant, their favorite for the Presidency, out of the War department. The failure of Grant to give up the office till the Senate had acted and the immediate reoccupation by Mr. Stanton seemed to bear out the rumors of Grant's intrigue with Stanton.²⁸ Johnson now demanded an explanation of Grant's apparent misconduct. Five members of the Cabinet: Seward, McCulloch, Randall, Welles, and Browning were present. Welles, faithfully preserved an account of the meeting and it is related here as recorded in his diary.

"The President asked if this proceeding conformed to previous understanding, etc. General Grant without answering directly, said he had promised sometime ago that he would give the President notice before relinquishing the office; but that he had not then examined closely the 2nd and 5th sections

of the Tenure-of-Office bill. He was not willing to suffer five year imprisonment and pay ten thousand dollars but preferred to give up the office.

"The President asked why, when he had read the sections and come to the conclusion to leave he had not informed him as agreed and remarked that he would undergo the whole imprisonment and fine himself, which might be adjudged against General Grant and said he so told Grant on Saturday when he spoke of apprehensions.

"The General said he was not aware of the penalties in the Tenure-of-Office bill, until he saw the discussion in the papers; did not know when he had his first talk with the President; and he came over on Saturday expressly to take up this subject. Had spoken of these difficulties at that time, and expected to see the President again on Monday, but he was busy with General Sherman, and had a good many little matters to attend to. He did not suppose the Senate intended to act so soon.

"'Was not our understanding --- did you not assure me sometime ago, and again on Saturday, that if you did not hold on to the office yourself, you would place it in my hands that I might select another?' said the President. 'That,' said Grant, 'was my intention. I thought some satisfactory arrangement would be made to dispose of the subject. Mr. Johnson (Reverdy) and General Sherman spent a great deal of time with me Sunday. Didn't Mr. Johnson come to see you? I sent General Sherman yesterday after talking the matter over. Didn't

you see Sherman?' The President said he saw each of them, but he did not see what the interview with either had to do with giving back into his hands the place agreeably to the understanding. 'Why did you give up the keys to Mr. Stanton and leave the Department?' General Grant said he gave the key to the Adjutant General and sent word to the President by General Comstock, 'Yes,' said the President, 'but that, you know, was not our understanding.'

"Grant attempted some further apologies about being very busy, stammered, hesitated, said Sherman had taken up a great deal of his time, but he had intended to call on the President on Monday; asked to be excused and left."²⁹

Welles says, "This is, as near as I recollect, the substance of the conversation as it occurred. I do not claim to give the precise words, though in many instances I probably have done so. My intention and wish is to do injustice to neither, but fairly present what took place and the remarks of both. I wrote this on the evening of Tuesday, the 14th, while the subject is fresh in my mind."

"The President," says Welles, in describing the scene, "was calm and dignified, though manifestly disappointed and displeased. General Grant was humble, hesitating, and he evidently felt that his position was equivocal and not to his credit. There was, I think, an impression on the minds of all present (there certainly was on mine) that a consciousness that he had acted with duplicity--not been faithful and true to the man who had confided in and trusted him--oppressed

General Grant. His manner, never very commanding, was almost abject, and he left the room with less respect, I apprehend, from those present than ever before. The President though disturbed and not wholly able to conceal his chagrin from those familiar with him, used no harsh expression, nor committed anything approaching incivility, yet Grant felt the few words put to him, and the cold and surprised disdain of the President in all their force."³⁰

That same afternoon General Sherman went over to Army headquarters where he found General Grant, who expressed himself as being much displeased with the manner in which Mr. Stanton had regained his office. He stated that Mr. Stanton had sent a messenger for him that morning as of old, with the word that "he wanted to see him." Grant and Sherman, before they separated arranged to go together the next morning to see the President.³¹ They, no doubt, planned to make some sort of explanation of Grant's conduct.

The next morning (Wednesday the 15th) in the National Intelligencer, a Washington newspaper friendly to the President, appeared a long article on "The Stanton Affair", in which was related an account of General Grant's relinquishment of the War office and its subsequent occupation by Mr. Stanton. The article accused General Grant of having acted in bad faith to the President. It told of the Cabinet meeting of the day before and stated that upon being reminded by the President of his reiterated promise, and especially of the promise made only the last Saturday morning. General Grant admitted the promise in the presence of members of the Cabinet.³²

Because of the article in the Intelligencer, Grant was loath to accompany Sherman to see the President as they had previously arranged but did finally go with him. The President received them promptly and kindly. Being seated General Grant said, "Mr. President, whoever gave the facts for the article of the Intelligencer of this morning has made some serious mistakes."³³

"General Grant, let me interrupt you just there," replied the President. "I have not seen the Intelligencer of this morning, and have no knowledge of any article there in." General Grant then went on: "Well, the idea is given there that I have not kept faith with you. Now, Mr. President, I remember, when you spoke to me on this subject last summer, I did say that, like the case of the Baltimore police Commissioners, I did suppose Mr. Stanton could not regain his office except by a process through the courts." The President stated that he remembered the reference to the case of the Baltimore Commissioners. Grant resumed: "I said if I changed my opinion I would give you notice, and put things as they were before my appointment as Secretary of War ad interim."³⁴

The President and his guests then engaged in friendly conversation, both Grant and the President professing to be satisfied. The President claimed that he had always been most friendly to General Grant and Grant insisted that he had taken the office of Secretary of War ad interim, not for honor of profit, but in the general interests of the army. General Grant volunteered to call on Stanton and urge upon him that

"the good of the service required his resignation."³⁵

As the two Generals withdrew, Grant at the door said, "Mr. President, you should make some order that we of the army are not bound to obey the orders of Mr. Stanton as Secretary of War." The President intimated that he would do so.³⁶

It appears that a reconciliation of the President and General Grant was now in sight, thanks to General Sherman's efforts. "To-day the mutual explanations are full and partially satisfactory," wrote Sherman to his wife.³⁷

After the departure of his visitors the President requested his secretary to read the Article in the Intelligencer. Both the President and Secretary Welles who called on the President later in the morning, agreed that the Article was substantially correct so far as it related to what had taken place at the Cabinet Meeting.³⁸

At the close of the Cabinet meeting, Friday January 17. President Johnson desired to know of the Cabinet members whether or not their recollection of the interview between himself and Grant on Tuesday corresponded with his own. He then directed Colonel Moore to read a compendium of the articles in the Intelligencer describing the Cabinet meeting. Each of the members present, (Seward having already left) McCulloch, Randall, Browning and Wells concurred in the correctness of the statement.³⁹

General Sherman was deeply troubled by the tangle of affairs in the War Department. He was especially anxious that the misunderstanding between General Grant and the President

should be completely straightened out. Sherman believed that Stanton had no right to hold a position in the Cabinet against the President's wishes.⁴⁰ However Sherman thought that rather than resort to legal methods or to resort to force to expel Mr. Stanton from the War office, the President should ignore Stanton and send his orders direct to the General of the Army.⁴¹

General Sherman exerted himself to further the reconciliation between the President and General Grant. After interviewing the President on the morning of January the 18th, Sherman conversed with General Grant and offered to go with him on the following Monday to Mr. Stanton, and to say that it was their joint opinion he should resign. But this was found to be impossible because of General Grant's proposed trip to Richmond. Sherman wrote to the President the same day as follows: "The General (Grant) proposed this course: He will call on you tomorrow, and offer to go to Mr. Stanton to say, for the good of the Army and of the country, he ought to resign. This on Sunday. On Monday I will call on you, and if you think it necessary, I will do the same, viz., go to Mr. Stanton and tell him he should resign."⁴²

The next morning General Grant called upon the President as agreed. In the course of the conversation Grant spoke of the insignificance to which Mr. Stanton could be reduced in his position. The President agreed and said that Stanton would amount to nothing more than a clerk. General Grant then stated that he would not obey Mr. Stanton's orders, unless he knew

they emanated from the President. Johnson replied that the General would be doing right in pursuing such a course and asserted that he (the President) did not consider Mr. Stanton as authorized to act as Secretary of War; he had suspended him from office, and did not intend to recognize him.⁴³ "All that Mr. Johnson said was pacific and compromising," Grant wrote to Sherman, "while I think he wanted the constitutionality of the 'Tenure Bill' tested, I think now he would be glad either to get the vacancy of Secretary of War, or have the office just where it was during suspension."⁴⁴

On the same day Grant called on Mr. Stanton with the intention of asking him to resign but somehow was so overawed by Stanton's imperious bearing and gruff demeanor that he failed to do so. "I soon found," he wrote to Sherman, "that to recommend resignation to Mr. Stanton would have no effect, unless it was to incur further his displeasure; and, therefore did not directly suggest it to him."⁴⁵ I explained to him, however, the course I supposed he would pursue, and what I expected to do in that case, namely to notify the President of his intentions and thus leave him to violate the 'Tanure-of-Office Bill' if he chose, instead of having me do it.

"I would advise," he continued in his letter to Sherman, "that you say nothing to Mr. Stanton on the subject unless he asks your advice. It will do no good and may embarrass you."⁴⁶

General Grant's position was now very embarrassing. He greatly disliked Stanton, whose arrogant manners and condescending demeanor he had endured for so long. He had not colluded

with Stanton to turn over the War Department to him and had become very angry at Mr. Stanton's taking such early and unannounced possession of the War office on the morning of the January 14th. Stanton had sent for him that morning in the usual manner, by an orderly, announcing that he "wanted to see him". This condescension on the part of the Secretary had so nettled General Grant that he declared to Sherman that he would never again enter the Department while Stanton was its head, unless sent for.⁴⁷ To General Schofield, on whom he called in Richmond January 22nd, Grant confided that Stanton's conduct had been "intolerable" to him, and in emphatic terms declared his intention to demand either Stanton's removal, or the acceptance of his own resignation.⁴⁸

But General Grant did not make any demand for Stanton's removal; neither did he offer his own resignation. To do either would have been inconsistent with his record of adherence to the Radical side of the conflict between the President and Congress. To demand Stanton's removal would have meant taking the President's side and furthering his interests. Such a demand would have been a condemnation of the Tenure-of-Office Act and Grant believed in the authority of the Tenure-of-Office Act.

To resign the position of General of the Army would not only mean personal sacrifice. It would remove the officer in whom Congress had, according to his opinion, intrusted the responsibility of administering military reconstruction in the

South.

But, to remain as General of the Army subordinate to the Secretary of War would be extremely embarrassing to him. As a subordinate to both the President and Secretary Stanton he was subject to receive orders and instructions from either of them. In conversing with the President on the 19th of January Grant had made the statement that he would not obey Mr. Stanton's orders unless he knew they emanated from the President. The President had assented to this and had said that he did not consider Mr. Stanton as authorized to act as Secretary of War and did not intend to recognize him. Here was an agreement between the President and Grant that the latter should not obey Stanton. But it was not an order; at least not a written one. Grant must have begun to realize that to proceed to ignore the orders of Secretary Stanton, the officer purporting to be his legal superior, without being officially authorized to do so by the President would be a dangerous course. Should it be proven that Stanton had a lawful right to his office, Grant having ignored his orders would be guilty of insubordination. Why should he run this risk, take this responsibility, fight this battle for the President, who was apparently trying to use him and profit by his doing the unauthorized act without burning his own fingers? Certainly it was more than could be expected of the General of the Army, a military officer, to presume to choose to disobey a civil officer purporting to be his superior. It was not for him to decide this question. Thus Grant must have reasoned to himself.

As to whether or not Grant received orders from the War Department authorities differ. General Sherman wrote to his wife on January 23rd as follows: "...Stanton is still in office and makes no sign of retiring. He makes no orders to the Army and therefore cannot test his power. Sooner or later this will cause and bring about a direct collision and Congress stands ready and willing to impeach if Mr. Johnson does any positive act of breach of law."⁴⁹

According to Badeau, Grant twice "received important orders from Stanton requiring immediate action and inclosing communications from the Treasury which recognized Stanton as Secretary of War."⁵⁰

At any rate General Grant, mistrusting the President and feeling apprehensions as to personal danger in proceeding to disregard Stanton's orders without written authority decided to ask for written orders from the President. On January 24th he wrote to Johnson requesting to have, "in writing the order which the President gave me Grant verbally on Sunday, the 19th; instant, to disregard the orders of the Hon. E. M. Stanton, as Secretary of War, until I Grant knew from the President himself that they were his orders."⁵¹

Johnson must have been puzzled by this note. What were Grant's motives? Was Grant working with his Radical friends to trap Johnson? Was the purpose of this request for orders to provide written evidence on which the impeachment conspirators would claim that Johnson was a law breaker?

Johnson concluded that he would not furnish this evidence.

To his secretary, Colonel Moore, he remarked that he did not think he would give the order; that the General had been very restive under Mr. Stanton, had evidently been very glad to get rid of him, had now put him back in the War Department; and he thought he would let them fight it out.⁵²

However, Johnson did send a message to General Grant relative to his duties but wrote no order.⁵³

President Johnson could not forgive General Grant for his apparent duplicity in giving up the War office to Mr. Stanton. Grant had promised to see Stanton and ask him to resign. This he had not done; if he had, Johnson had no knowledge of it. Johnson had relied upon Grant and Sherman to help extricate him from his difficulties.⁵⁴ Grant had refused to take the responsibility to disregard or oppose Stanton. The President now turned to General Sherman for assistance. Sherman had been sympathetic with Johnson's one-man fight against Congress; had expressed his good will to the President;⁵⁵ and had signified his willingness to help straighten out the difficulties existing between the President and General Grant. Johnson was now determined to test the constitutionality of the Tenure-of-Office Act. On the day that Grant sent his request for a written order Johnson sent for General Sherman and offered to appoint him Secretary of War ad interim and to remove Stanton.

Sherman doubted the President's power to do this and expressed a desire for time to consult his father-in-law, Thomas Ewing.⁵⁶ Both Sherman and Mr. Ewing thought it inadvisable to nominate a new secretary at this time. Sherman thought

that "If the President wants to make an issue to go to the Supreme Court, why not let the Secretary of the Treasury refuse one of his warrents and deny that Stanton is Secretary of War, or that his restoration is made by the Tenure of Civil Office Bill?"⁵⁷

Ewing thought that it was "not expedient for the President to take any action now in the case of Stanton. So far as he and his interests are concerned, things are in the best possible condition. Stanton is in the Department, not his secretary, but the secretary of the Senate, who have taken upon themselves his sins, and who place him there under a large salary to annoy and obstruct the operations of the Executive. This the people well enough understand, and he is a stench in the nostrils of their own party."⁵⁸ On Jan. 28th Sherman wrote to his wife; "On Sunday I saw your father Mr. Ewing and got him to write me a letter, which yesterday I submitted to the President with one of mine, which ends this matter...."⁵⁹

The reinstatement of Mr. Stanton with all the details of the President's plans to carry the matter to the courts, the alleged promise of General Grant to hold on to the War Office for that purpose, Grant's relinquishment of the office and its subsequent reoccupation by Stanton together with the happenings at the cabinet meeting on the 14th were all the subjects of comment by the newspapers. The journals which were in sympathy with the President printed Johnson's side

of the story in every detail. The New York World had come out with big headlines "The Surrender of General Grant", condemning Grant's action in giving up the office. The newsboys had run about the streets of Washington shouting "The Surrender of General Grant". The contents of the National Intelligencer, the principle organ of the administration, on January 18 must have been especially annoying to General Grant and his friends. After saying that Radical newspapers were questioning the facts of the Stanton-Grant-Johnson episode published January 15, this paper published these again and followed with these belecose statements: "The above statement of facts was made by us deliberately, carefully, and advisedly. We repeat and reiterate it in the most emphatic manner. We knew it to be true in all its length and breadth, and we challenge General Grant to deny it in a single particular. On this point we refer to the Washington Correspondent of the New York World, confirming our statement." Then follows an account headed as follows: "INTERVIEW of the PRESIDENT--MR. JOHNSON will not RECOGNIZE MR. STANTON as SECRETARY OF WAR". The account was a special despatch to the New York World in which the reporter told of an interview with the President wherein, the reporter said, the President gave his version of Grant's apparent betrayal of trust.⁶⁰

Saturday January 25, the National Intelligencer printed an account of the Cabinet Meeting of January 17 when the President had called the attention of members of the Cabinet to the Article in the Intelligencer of the 15th and they had con-

curred as to its accuracy. The account had been furnished by the Washington correspondent of the New York World who had somehow secured the notes of the cabinet meeting.⁶¹ It purported to give literally the comments of the various members of the cabinet upon what transpired when Grant was called before the cabinet on the 14th to explain his actions. These comments were distinctly unfavorable to Grant and upheld the President's version of the episode.⁶²

According to General Sherman, these newspaper articles making the most of the notes secured of the cabinet meeting, "by wide-spread publication and by rubbing in of the most galling parts"⁶³ and "the constant receipt of letters asking him if it was possible he had purposely betrayed the President" goaded Grant into action.⁶⁴

On the 28th of January General Grant wrote to President Johnson a lengthy letter in which he attempted to explain his side of the controversy. He first renewed his request of the 24th for written instructions not to obey any order of Mr. Stanton unless he knew it came from the President. "To this written request of the 24th," he said, "I received a message that had left doubt in my mind of your intentions. To prevent any possible misunderstanding, therefore, I renew the request that you will give me written instructions, and, till they are received, will suspend action on your verbal ones.

"I am compelled to ask these instructions in writing", he continued, "in consequence of the many and gross misrepresen-

tations affecting my personal honor, circulated through the press for the last fortnight, purporting to come from the President, of conversations which occurred either with the President privately in his office, or in cabinet meeting. What is written admits of no misunderstanding."

"In view of the misrepresentations referred to," continued Grant, "it will be well to state the facts of the case." He then gave his version of the agreement with Johnson; that he had stated it was his belief that Mr. Stanton would have to appeal to the courts to reinstate him, that however, he had not looked particularly into the tenure of office bill but that what he stated was a general principle, and if he should change his mind in this particular case he would inform the President of the fact. This promise, he said, had been fulfilled when he called upon the President the Saturday evening of the 11th of January and notified him that upon further study of the Tenure-of-office law he found that he could not hold on to the office without violating the law and that it left him no discretion in the matter. He denied that he had agreed to call and see the President again on Monday.

"From the 11th to the Cabinet meeting on the 14th instant", Grant wrote, "a doubt never entered my mind about the President's fully understanding my position, namely, that if the Senate refused to concur in the suspension of Mr. Stanton, my powers as Secretary of War ad interim would cease, and Mr. Stanton's right to resume at once the functions of his office

would under the law be indisputable, and I acted accordingly. With Mr. Stanton I had no communication, direct or indirect, on the subject of his reinstatement during the suspension." Grant denied that he had ever agreed to continue in the War Department until displaced by the courts or to resign if he did not resist the reinstatement of Stanton. He denied that at the cabinet meeting of the 14th instant he had admitted that he had made any of the promises which Johnson alleged that he had; namely to hold onto the War Office until displaced by the courts or resign so as to place the President where he would have been had Grant never accepted the office.⁶⁵

It would be supposed that, upon receiving such an offensive letter as the foregoing, President Johnson, who had a reputation for contentiousness would have been provoked into writing an immediate reply in kind. Had he been the aggressor in this quarrel that historians have commonly pictured him he certainly would have taken up the fight at this juncture but he did not.

The next day after receiving this lengthy and argumentative letter of Grant's President Johnson wrote on the back of Grant's note of January 24th: "As requested in this communication General Grant is instructed, in writing not to obey any order from the War Department, assumed to be issued by the direction of the President, unless such order is known by the General commanding the armies of the United States to have been authorized by the Executive."⁶⁶

It will be noticed that the President took care to word his instructions in such a way as to effect only orders "assumed to be issued by the direction of the President." Such instructions would not violate even the radical Tenure-of-Office Act.

On the 29th of January President Johnson again sent for General Sherman and asked him to take the office of Secretary of War.⁶⁷ He wished to thus test the constitutionality of the Tenure-of-Office Act. Sherman requested time to think the proposition over and the next day wrote the President declining to accept the office.⁶⁸

On the 31st Sherman wrote to the President as follows: "To bring me to Washington would put three heads to the army-- yourself, General Grant and myself: and we would be more than human if we were not to differ. In my judgment it would ruin the army, and would be fatal to one, or two of us" "with my consent," he said with emphasis, "Washington, never."⁶⁹

To his wife Sherman wrote as follows: "Stanton's mere sitting in his office don't make him a cabinet officer, but he can do certain parts of the office without the President's consent. I, however, rest my declination on the ground that I do not want to live in Washington. It is full of spied and slanderers who stop at nothing to make game, and I should regret even Grant's elevation as that might force me to this position. Grant tells me that he will avoid the nomination if he can, but it is doubtful, if Chase can get the votes, and

Grant don't want to see Pendleton come in because he was an open enemy of the War, which we must maintain was right.... All sorts of names are bandied about, but Grant's seems to be the favorite...."70

General Grant was not satisfied with the written order which the President had sent him on the 28th. He seemed determined to quarrel with the President and now wrote him an insubordinate and offensive note. He acknowledged the return of his note of the 24th January with the President's endorsement there-on and then continued: "I am informed by the Secretary of War that he has not received from the Executive any order or instructions limiting or impairing his authority to issue orders to the army as has heretofore been his practice under the law and customs of the department. While this authority to the War Department is not countermanded, it will be satisfactory evidence to me that any orders issued from the War Department, by direction of the President, are authorized by the Executive."71

Grant's request of the 24th was to have in writing the order of the President to disregard the orders of Stanton as Secretary of War until he knew from the President that they were his (the President's) orders. The President in his endorsement of this note had complied with Grant's request only for those orders from the War Department, assumed to be issued by the direction of the President. This, the President had a perfect right to do. And General Grant was legally

bound to obey his chief superior in this order. He may have considered it as being foreign to the duties of the General of the Army to differentiate between orders "assumed to be authorized by the President" and those merely issued by Stanton as head of the War Department; to obey the latter and not the former. Ordinarily such discrimination would have been beside his duties as General. But the circumstances and times were extraordinary and the President had given him an extraordinary command. General Grant had no legal choice but to obey, no matter what his personal opinions may have been as to the legal status of Mr. Stanton as secretary of War. The fact that Grant, after receiving the order which he had solicited, cavilled and refused to obey, stating that Stanton had received no instructions limiting his authority, shows conclusively that he was taking the side of the Radical congressmen and their Tenure-of-Office act and would support them even to the extent of disobeying his commander-in-chief. General Grant was in politics pure and simple. His actions also are presumptive evidence that he had conferred with the Radical leaders and was under their influence, a catspaw to secure written evidence on which the impeachment conspirators would claim that the President was a law breaker.

There is little wonder that Johnson now took up the pen to answer Grant's provocative letter of the 28th. On the 31st of January he wrote Grant a lengthy letter reciting in detail his recollections of all that had transpired between himself and General Grant relative to the giving up of the

War office and flatly contradicting Grant's own account. The President emphatically asserted that there was a distinct understanding between General Grant and himself that in case General Grant "should prefer not to become a party to the controversy", or should conclude that it was his duty to surrender the department to Mr. Stanton upon action in his favor by the Senate, he would return the office to him (the President) prior to the decision of the Senate, in order that the President might designate someone to succeed him. This promise, said Johnson, was reiterated on the Saturday evening of January 11th at which time it was understood General Grant would call on the following Monday for a further conference. "You thus, in disregard of the understanding between us", continued the President, "vacated the office without giving me notice of your intention to do so. It is but just, however, to say that in your communication you claim that you did inform me of your purpose, and thus 'fulfilled the promise made in our last preceding conversation on this subject'. The fact that such a promise existed is evidence of an arrangement of the kind I have mentioned. You had found in our first conference 'that the President was desirous of keeping Mr. Stanton out of office, whether sustained in the suspension or not'. You knew what reasons had induced the President to ask from you a promise; you also knew that in case your views of duty did not accord with his own convictions, it was his purpose to fill your place by another appointment. Even ignoring the existence of a positive understanding between us, these con-

clusions were plainly deducible from our various conversations. It is certain, however, that even under these circumstances, you did not offer to return the place to my possession, but according to your own statement, placed yourself in a position where, could I have anticipated your action, I would have been compelled to ask of you, as I was compelled to ask of your predecessor in the War Department, a letter of resignation, or else to resort to the more disagreeable expedient of superseding you by a successor."

Johnson stated that he considered General Grant's proposal to visit Stanton and ask him to resign "as a sort of reparation for the failure" on Grant's part to act in accordance with the understanding.

As for the cabinet meeting of January 14th the President's recollection of what transpired was "diametrically the reverse" of Grant's narration. Johnson stated that in the presence of the cabinet Grant admitted the President's version of the promise Grant had made to hold on to the War Office and abide by judicial proceeding or put the President in the same position he had been previous to his appointment. The President asserted that Grant also admitted that on the preceding Saturday he had stated in response to the President's inquiry as to what he intended to do that his action in regard to the War Office would be consistent with the understanding reached in former conversations.

"I next asked", the President continued, "If, at the conclusion of our interview of Saturday it was not understood

that we were to have another conference on Monday, before final action by the Senate in the case of Mr. Stanton. You replied that such was the understanding, but that you did not suppose the Senate would act so soon; that on Monday you had been engaged in a conference with General Sherman, and were occupied with 'many little matters', and asked if General Sherman had not called on that day."

"Sincerely anxious...to be correct in my statements", continued Johnson, "I have to-day read this narration of what occurred on the 14th instant to the members of the cabinet who were then present. They without exception, agree in its accuracy."⁷²

On the third of February General Grant again wrote the President. He acknowledged the receipt of Johnson's letter of January 31st saying; "I find it to be but a reiteration, ... of the 'many gross misrepresentations' contained in these articles [the articles in the National Intelligencer and the New York World] and which my statement of facts set forth in my letter of the 28th ultimo was intended to correct; and I here reassert the correctness of my statements in that letter, anything in yours in reply to it to the contrary notwithstanding." He once more denied there existed any promise after Saturday the 11th^{of} January either expressed or implied that he would hold on to the office of Secretary of War ad interim against the action of the Senate or surrender it before action of the Senate, or that he would see Johnson again at any fixed time on the subject.

"The performance of the promises alleged by you to have been made by me", he continued, "would have involved a resistance to law, and an inconsistency with the whole history of my connection with the suspension of Mr. Stanton."

Grant, then revealed the real reason why he had accepted the appointment of Secretary of War ad interim. When Stanton was suspended from office Grant had feared that the President would appoint some one who would embarrass the army in the Reconstruction Acts. "It was to prevent such an appointment", he declared, "that I accepted the office of Secretary of War ad interim, and not for the purpose of enabling you to get rid of Mr. Stanton by my withholding it from him in opposition to law, or not doing so myself, surrendering it to one who would, as the statement and assumptions in your communication plainly indicate you sought." "And it was to avoid the same danger", he asserted that he had urged the appointment of Governor Cox. He stated also that, now he could not advise Stanton's resignation, "lest the same danger I apprehended on his first removal might follow".

"The course you would have it understood I agreed to pursue", he continued, "was in violation of law, and without orders from you; while the course I did pursue, and which I never doubted you fully understood, was in accordance with law, and not in disobedience of any orders of my superior."

"And now, Mr. President, when my honor as a soldier and integrity as a man have been so violently assailed,

pardon me for saying that I can but regard this whole matter, from the beginning to the end, as an attempt to involve me in the resistance of law, for which you hesitated to assume the responsibility in orders and thus destroy my character before the country. I am in a measure confirmed in this conclusion by your recent orders directing me to disobey orders from the Secretary of War--my superior and your subordinate--without having countermanded his authority to issue the orders I am to disobey."⁷³

Secretary Welles comments in his Diary on this letter as follows: "It is throughout highly discreditable to Grant's integrity, honor, ability, and truth. He is in this matter the tool of Stanton and the victim of his own selfish aspirations. He has vulgar flattery, is deceptive and unreliable... "The correspondence shows that he played a false and treacherous part with the President throughout. From the first he has studied to deceive the man who trusted him... Prevarication and downright falsehood, with deception and treachery towards his chief, mark the conduct of U. S. Grant."⁷⁴

On February 4, the President submitted the correspondence to the cabinet. It evoked expressions of denunciation. Attorney General Stanbery said that aside from the facts in the case, the tone and taste of Grant's letters struck him as extraordinary. Secretary Browning remarked that it was the weakest and most disreputable letter that he could have written. Secretary McCulloch asserted that Grant's conversation in the Cabinet's meeting of the 14th of January was exactly the co

contrary of what he said in the letter; that General Grant seemed so greatly disturbed at the Cabinet meeting that it was not surprising that he did not recollect what he had then said.

A suggestion was made that an answer should be returned simply stating that the character of Grant's latest letter was such as to preclude any further correspondence upon the subject. This met with the approval of the members present. Attorney General Stanbery thought that the acknowledgment of the letter should be made by the Private Secretary--not by the President.

"How does he explain why he entered into an explanation as an excuse for not having called on Monday?" asked Secretary Browning, "If he had not promised, there was no necessity for any excuse."⁷⁵

Disregarding the advice of his Cabinet, the President decided to reply to Grant's letter of the 3rd February. "You here admit," Johnson wrote, "that from the very beginning of what you term 'the whole history' of your connection with Mr. Stanton's suspension, you intended to circumvent the President. It was to carry out that intent that you accepted the appointment. This was in your mind at the time of your acceptance. It was not, then, in obedience to the order of your superior, as has been heretofore been supposed, that you assumed the duties of the office. You knew it was the President's purpose to prevent Mr. Stanton from resuming the office of Secretary of War, and you intended to defeat that purpose. You

accepted the office, not in the interest of the President, but of Mr. Stanton.... The 'history' of your connection with this transaction, as written by yourself,...shows that you not only concealed your design from the President, but induced him to suppose that you would carry out his purpose to keep Mr. Stanton out of office, by retaining it yourself after an attempted restoration by the Senate, so as to require Mr. Stanton to establish his right by judicial decision."

Johnson now charged Grant with holding the War office for the object of defeating an appeal to the courts. "You perfectly understood," Johnson continued, "that in this interview 'sometime' after you accepted the office, the President, not content with your silence, desired an expression of your views, and you answered him, that Mr. Stanton 'would have to appeal to the courts'". "At the date of this conversation", Johnson asserted, "you did not intend to hold the office with the purpose of forcing Mr. Stanton into court, but did hold it then, and had accepted it, to prevent that course from being carried out.... The excuse you made...that afterwards you changed your views as to what would be a proper course, has nothing to do with the point now under consideration. The point is, that before you changed your views you had secretly determined to do the very thing which at last you did--surrender the office to Mr. Stanton."

To the statement in Grant's letter of the 3rd of February to the effect that performance of the promise alleged to have been made by Grant would have involved him in the resistance of the law, Johnson answered, "I know of no statute that would

have been violated had you--carried out your promises in good faith--tendered your resignation when you concluded not to be made a party in any legal proceedings."

In the letter of 3rd February Grant had complained of Johnson's recent orders directing him to disobey orders from the Secretary of War "without having countermanded his authority to issue the orders...." The President answered as follows: "On the 29th, in compliance with your request, I did give you instructions in writing not to obey any order from the War Department assumed to be issued by the direction of the President, unless such order is known by the General commanding the armies of the United States to have been authorized by the Executive."

"There are some orders which a Secretary of War may issue without the authority of the President; there are others which he issues simply as the agent of the President, and which purport to be 'by direction' of the President.... Mr. Stanton states in his letter of the 4th instant,... 'No orders have been issued from this Department in the name of the President with my knowledge and I have received no orders from his.' My order to you had only reference to orders 'assumed to be issued by the direction of the President'. It would appear from Mr. Stanton's letter that you have received no such orders from him. However, in your note to the President of the 30th ultimo,...you say that you have been informed by Mr. Stanton that he had not received any order limiting his authority to issue orders to the army, according to the practice of the Department, and state that 'while this authority to the

War Department is not countermanded, it will be satisfactory evidence to me that any orders issued from the War Department by direction of the President are authorized by the Executive'. You will not obey the direct order of the President but will obey his indirect order. If, as you say there has been a practice in the War Department to issue orders in the name of the President without his direction, does not the precise order you have requested, and have received, change the practice as to the General of the Army? Could not the President countermand any such order issued to you from the War Department? If you should receive an order from that Department, issued in the name of the President, to do a special act, and an order directly from the President himself not to do the act, is there a doubt which you are to obey? You answer the question when you say to the President, in your letter of the 3rd instant, the Secretary of War is 'my superior and your subordinate'; and yet you refuse obedience to the superior out of deference to the subordinate."⁷⁶

Grant answered Johnson's last letter with a note disclaiming any intention of insubordination, or any purpose "to disobey any legal order of the President distinctly given...." He claimed that he had received a letter from Stanton directing him to carry out a request of the Secretary of the Treasury. With Grant's letter were two enclosures showing recognition of Mr. Stanton as Secretary of War by both the Secretary of the Treasury and the Postmaster General.⁷⁷

ANALYSIS OF THE CORRESPONDENCE

To those who read the story of the controversy between President Johnson and General Grant, two questions naturally arise. First, the question of veracity. In the several controversial points in which each asserted he was right and the other party wrong, was there simply a misunderstanding or was one or the other party untruthful and if so which one was untruthful? Second, did General Grant intend to deceive and circumvent the President by inducing him to suppose that he would assist him in one way or another to carry out his design to keep Mr. Stanton out of the War office, while determining in his own mind not to aid the President in his purpose?

The question of veracity is one which is difficult to answer with certainty. However, a careful analysis of the correspondence, the conversations of Johnson and Grant, and other pertinent sources will reveal very significant truths. There are six points in which the question of veracity is involved and these will be considered individually.

1. GRANT'S ORIGINAL PROMISE TO THE PRESIDENT.

Johnson: "The interview terminated with the distinct understanding that if, upon reflection, you should prefer not to become a party to the controversy, or should conclude that it would be your duty to surrender the department to Mr. Stanton, upon action in his favor by the Senate, you were to return the office to me prior to a decision by the Senate, in order that, if I desired to do so, I might designate some one to succeed

you." (Johnson to Grant, Jan. 31, 1868)⁷⁸

Grant: "Finding that the President was desirous of keeping Mr. Stanton out of office, whether sustained in the suspension or not, I stated that I had not looked particularly into the tenure of office bill, but what I had stated [that Mr. Stanton would have to appeal to the courts to be reinstated] was a general principle, and if I should change my mind in this particular case I would inform him of the fact." (Grant to Johnson, Jan. 28, 1868)⁷⁹

General Grant's promise to the President no doubt included the agreement to let Johnson know of his change of mind in regard to the method Mr. Stanton would have to use to secure the War office but that was not his only promise. In his conversation with the President Wednesday, January 15th after Stanton had come back into office he admitted that there was more to the agreement. In this interview Grant tried to explain his conception of the agreement to the President. "Now, Mr. President", he said, "I remember, when you spoke to me on this subject last summer, I did say...that Mr. Stanton could not regain his office except by a process through the courts. I said if I changed my opinion I would give you notice, and put things as they were before my appointment as Secretary of War ad interim."⁸⁰

Whether, Grant couched his agreement in these general and ambiguous statements or definitely and unequivocally promised that if he changed his mind he would resign before the action

of the Senate as Johnson said that he did, there is no positive way of telling. But other references to the agreement are enlightening. On January 7th, before the reinstatement of Stanton, Johnson remarked to his Secretary Col. Moore, "that General Grant had told him that his action would be limited to withdrawing from the Department and leaving it in the hands of the President as fully as when it was conferred upon him...."⁸¹

On the day of the famous cabinet meeting of the 14th of January Col. Moore wrote in his "notes" as follows: "...the President...referred to the War Department asking the General if he did not distinctly tell the President that should the Senate reinstate the Secretary of War, and he (Grant) should not feel himself at liberty to resist such action, he would at least leave the office at the disposal of the President. This, the President said, the General acknowledged...."⁸²

Thus, there are several references to Grant's promise being worded in a general statement that he would put the office in the hands of the President, but nowhere, outside of Johnson's controversial letters to Grant, is there evidence to show that Grant definitely and distinctly promised to retain the possession of the War Office in order to force Stanton to resort to the courts for reinstatement or resign before the action of the Senate so that the President might appoint a successor who would carry out his purpose to test the constitutionality of the Tenure-of-Office Act.

If Grant's promise was in the form of a general statement that if he changed his mind he would give Johnson notice "and put things as they were before [his] appointment as Secretary of War ad interim" the President might very naturally assume that he had Grant's promise to resign before the action of the Senate. The President knew that Grant understood his plan to prevent Stanton from coming into possession of the office. The President also knew that Grant understood that in case his views did not accord with the President's it was Johnson's purpose to fill his place by another appointment.⁸³

Yet this very promise could be interpreted to mean simply turning the office over to the President upon the action of the Senate and it was so interpreted by Grant who fulfilled this meaning by locking the doors of the War Office and sending notice to the President.

The fact that this original promise was not in definite terms but ambiguous in character would easily lead to a misunderstanding. And the very reiteration of this promise in general terms would lead to further misunderstanding.

It may be safely inferred, therefore, that Grant's original promise was in general terms, capable of multiple interpretation. And since each interpreted the agreement according to his own interests further misunderstanding continued. In this first point of veracity therefore there was probably no intentional untruthfulness. Johnson thought he had Grant's definite promise but was mistaken. Grant's story of the agreement in his letter to Johnson January 28th is probably correct

except for the omission of an acknowledgement of his promise "to put things as they were before [his] appointment as Secretary ad interim."

2. GRANT'S REITERATION OF HIS PROMISE TO THE PRESIDENT ON SATURDAY EVENING, JANUARY 11TH.

Johnson: "After a protracted interview, during which the provisions of the tenure-of-office bill were freely discussed, you said that, as had been agreed upon in our first conference, you would either return the office to my possession in time to enable me to appoint a successor before final action by the Senate upon Mr. Stanton's suspension, or would remain as its head, waiting a decision of the question by judicial proceedings." (Johnson to Grant Jan. 31, 1868)⁸⁴

Grant: "You know that we parted on Saturday, the 11th ultimo, without any promise on my part, either express or implied, to the effect that I would hold on to the office of Secretary of War ad interim against the action of the Senate, or declining to do so myself, would surrender it to you before such action was had...." (Grant to Johnson, Feb. 3, 1868)⁸⁵

Badeau was at Grant's office when the General returned from his interview with Johnson on the 11th January, and related what Grant stated had occurred. "He declared," says Badeau, "that he told Mr. Johnson that on no account could he consent to hold the office after the Senate should act. The President pleaded and argued, and would not be satisfied with

Grant's decision." "The President ... would not accept the refusal, and when Grant left the room Johnson said he should expect to see the General again."⁸⁶

Col. Moore relates in his "notes" that on January 14th Johnson declared "that no later than the preceding Saturday Grant had distinctly told him that if he found he could not, in his own opinion, properly resist the action of the Senate, he would at least leave the office of Secretary of War in the condition in which it was when he had been appointed to the position."⁸⁷

On close examination these two accounts of what was said at the Saturday interview are not so contradictory as they at first seem. General Grant might refuse "to consent to hold the office after the Senate should act" and still agree to "leave the office of Secretary of War in the condition in which it was when he had been appointed to the position."

Johnson in his letter to Grant, January 31st says, "I then asked you at the Cabinet meeting January 14th if, at our conference on the preceding Saturday, I had not, to avoid misunderstanding, requested you to state what you intended to do, and further if, in reply to that inquiry, you had not referred to our former conversation, saying that from them I understood your position and that your actions would be consistent with the understanding which had been reached. To these questions you also replied in the affirmative." (Johnson to Grant, Jan. 31, 1868)⁸⁸

Now, it is clear that at the interview of Saturday January 11th the President and Grant misunderstood each other; each taking a different view of the original promise. According to Johnson's idea of the promise if Grant was unwilling to hold on to the office after the action of the Senate he should resign then. Since the General did not offer to do so the President very likely did ask him, "to state what he intended to do" in order to avoid a misunderstanding. And if Grant did answer by referring to their former conversations and stating that his "action would be consistent with the understanding which had been reached," it would only lead to further misunderstanding. Such a remark would be quite natural for Grant to make even though he sincerely wished to avoid misunderstanding, since to carry out his version of "former conversations" would mean simply to return the office to the President upon the action of the Senate. If Grant made any remark whatsoever to the effect that his action would be consistent with their former understanding, this remark coupled with the fact that Grant did not then and there offer to resign would naturally lead Johnson to suppose that Grant in another interview might be persuaded to hold on to the War office. Badeau tells us that afterwards Grant "was at first willing to admit that the President might have persuaded himself ... that in another interview he could induce Grant to take the step he asked." "Grant with his usual plainness of speech," continues Badeau, "having said what he in-

tended saw no need to confirm, or repeat, or amplify; and when Johnson said he would see him again, Grant did not refuse."⁸⁹

There is no proof; no good reason to believe that either Johnson or Grant was consciously untruthful in his statements regarding the interview of Saturday January 11th. While, considering the vagueness of the original promise there is much evidence in support of the view that here as well as in the case of the original promise, there was simply a misunderstanding on the part of the President of Grant's intentions.

3. THE UNDERSTANDING THAT GRANT SHOULD CALL ON THE PRESIDENT AGAIN ON MONDAY JANUARY 13th FOR ANOTHER INTERVIEW.

Johnson asserted: "It was then understood that there would be a further conference on Monday, by which time I supposed you would be prepared to inform me of your final decision. (Johnson to Grant Jan. 31, 1868.)"⁹⁰

General Grant denied this, saying, "You know that we parted on Saturday, the 11th ultimo, without any promise on my part, either express or implied, ... that I would see you again at any fixed time on the subject." (Grant to Johnson, Feb. 3, 1868)⁹¹

Here again, there was probably a simple misunderstanding. It will be noticed that the President did not say that Grant promised to see him on Monday. He simply stated that there was an understanding, which could have been a one-sided understanding. Badeau says that "when Johnson said he would see him again, Grant did not refuse. But neither did he assent."⁹²

While it very probably is true that Grant did not misstate the facts when he asserted that there was no promise on his part to call on Monday, yet he had let the President think that he could expect to see him then.

4. GRANT'S ADMISSION AT THE CABINET MEETING TUESDAY JANUARY 14TH OF THE CORRECTNESS OF JOHNSON'S VERSION OF THE ORIGINAL PROMISE

Johnson: "In the presence of the Cabinet I asked you: First; if in a conversation which took place shortly after your appointment as Secretary of War ad interim, you did not agree either to remain at the head of the War Department and abide any judicial proceedings that might follow non-concurrence by the Senate in Mr. Stanton's suspension; or, should you wish not to become involved in such a controversy, to put me in the same position with respect to the office as I occupied previous to your appointment, by returning it to me in time to anticipate such action by the Senate. This you admitted." (Johnson to Grant, January 31, 1868)⁹³

Grant: "I in no wise admitted the correctness of the President's statement of our conversations, though, to soften the evident contradiction my statement gave, I said (alluding to our first conversation on the subject) the President might have understood me the way he said, namely, that I had promised to resign if I did not resist the reinstatement. I made no such promise." (Grant to Johnson January 28, 1868)⁹⁴

There are five witnesses to what was said at the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday January 14th. Secretaries Welles, McCulloch, Seward, and Browning and Postmaster-General Randall were present. Each was later requested by President Johnson to state what was said in that conversation.⁹⁵ Welles, McCulloch, and Randall affirm the correctness of the President's version of the conversation as given in his letter to Grant, Jan. 31; without giving their own recollections of what was said. They simply, in general statements endorse the President's account. Seward and Browning are more explicit and their letters are conciliatory to Grant's point of view.

Seward testifies as follows: "I did not understand General Grant as denying or explicitly admitting these statements (in the President's conversation) in the form and full extent to which you made them. His admission of them was rather indirect and circumstantial though I did not understand it to be an evasive one."⁹⁶

Browning gives his recollections in detail of what Johnson and Grant both said. His narration of what Grant declared at the cabinet meeting was his promise to Johnson follows so closely Grant's version of his promise in his letter of January 28th to the President that it is practically a reiteration of the same. Browning says nothing about Grant admitting the truthfulness of the President's statements.⁹⁷

The three witnesses, therefore, who did not write out detailed recitations of what was said at the cabinet meeting

testify to the truth of Johnson's statements in their sweeping endorsements of his whole account. The testimonies of the two secretaries who took the trouble to be explicit admit the possibility of Grant's statements as to the promise being different from those of the President and hence that Grant's admission of the correctness of the President's statements was qualified and endorsing only part of the President's assertions.

5. GRANT'S ADMISSION AT THE CABINET MEETING TUESDAY, JANUARY 14TH OF THE CORRECTNESS OF JOHNSON'S VERSION OF GRANT'S PROMISE OF THE PRECEDING SATURDAY EVENING.

Johnson: "I then asked you [at the Cabinet meeting] if, at our conference on the preceding Saturday, I had not, to avoid misunderstanding, requested you to state what you intended to do, and further, if, in reply to that inquiry, you had not referred to our former conversations, saying that from them I understood your position, and that your action would be consistent with the understanding which had been rendered. To these questions you ... replied in the affirmative." (Johnson to Grant Jan. 31, 1868)⁹⁸

Grant: "After hearing the President through, I stated out conversations substantially as given in this letter.... I in nowise admitted the correctness of the President's statements of our conversations...." (Grant to Johnson January 28, 1867)⁹⁹

Welles, Randall, and McCulloch through their blanket endorsements of the whole of Johnson's letter of January 31st line up with him on this question.¹⁰⁰ Secretary Seward testifies as follows : "You claimed that General Grant finally said in that Saturday's conversation that you understood his views, and his proceedings there after would be consistent with what had been understood. General Grant did not controvert, nor can I say that he admitted this last statement. Certainly General Grant did not at any time in the Cabinet meeting insist that he had in the Saturday's conversation either distinctly or finally advised you of his determination to retire from the charge of the War Department, otherwise than under your own subsequent direction."¹⁰¹

Secretary Browning in his lengthy account of the Cabinet meeting verifies the President's statements in his letter January 31 as to what he (the President) asserted in the meeting was the conversation of the previous Saturday evening. However Browning does not say that Grant admitted the correctness of the President's assertions in regard to the Saturday evening conference. Browning recounts what Grant said at the Cabinet meeting and it agrees with Grant's version of Saturday evening conference as narrated in Grant's letter to Johnson, January 28th.¹⁰²

Here again the three cabinet members who wrote general endorsements to the President's side of the controversy agree with him. While the two who wrote out their own versions of

what was said at the Cabinet meeting testify to no statements made at the meeting which would brand Grant as being untruthful.

6. GRANT'S ADMISSION AT THE CABINET MEETING TUESDAY, JANUARY 14TH THAT THERE WAS AN UNDERSTANDING AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE SATURDAY EVENING CONFERENCE THAT HE WAS TO INTERVIEW THE PRESIDENT AGAIN ON MONDAY.

Johnson: "I next asked if, at the conclusion of our interview on Saturday it was not understood that we were to have another conference on Monday, before final action of the Senate in case of Mr. Stanton. You replied that such was the understanding, but that you did not suppose the Senate would act so soon; that on Monday you had been engaged in a conference with General Sherman, and were occupied with 'many little matters,' and asked if General Sherman had not called on that day." (Johnson to Grant, January 31st, 1868)¹⁰³

General Grant nowhere in his letters to the President specifically denies this assertion.

All of the five cabinet members agree that Grant admitted that there was an understanding that he was to visit the President again on Monday. Seward writes that "He [Grant] acquiesced in your [the President's] statement that the Saturday conversation ended with an expectation that there would be a subsequent conference on the subject, which he as well as yourself supposed would reasonably take place on Monday.... Grant admitted that it was his expectation or purpose to call upon

you on Monday."¹⁰⁴ Browning testifies that Grant said that "he left the President Saturday without any conclusion having been reached, expecting to see the President again on Monday. He then proceeded to explain why he had not called on the President on Monday, saying that he had had a long interview with General Sherman, that various little matters had occupied his time till it was late, and that he did not think the Senate would act so soon and asked, "Did not General Sherman call on you on Monday?"¹⁰⁵

Here the two witnesses who write the details of what was said at the cabinet meeting show that Grant acknowledged that it was expected he was to see the President on Monday. They do not say that Grant admitted it was understood that there was to be another conference on Monday.

The second question was: Did Grant intend to deceive and circumvent the President? This may best be answered by proving certain propositions.

First, it may be shown that Grant never seriously intended to assist the President by holding on to the War Office in order that the Tenure of Office Act might be tested in the courts.

In his letter to the President of February 3, Grant makes the following significant statement: "The performance of the promised alleged by you to have been made by me would have involved a resistance to law, and an inconsistency with the whole history of my connection with the suspension of Mr. Stanton."

(Grant to Johnson, Feb. 3, 1868) 106

This is true. Grant had been working in harmony with Congress. He had suspected the President of disloyal intentions.¹⁰⁷ He had felt it to be his responsibility to see that the Reconstruction Acts were administered according to the intentions of Congress.¹⁰⁸ The Tenure-of-Office law was passed to prevent the President from circumventing the will of Congress. Certainly it was not to Grant's interests to see the law annulled. He had declared his opinion of the law in his letter of protest against the suspension of Stanton. "It certainly was the intention of the legislative branch of the government" he had said, "to place cabinet officers beyond the power of executive removal, and it is pretty well understood that as far as Cabinet ministers are affected by the 'Tenure-of-Office' bill it was intended especially to protect the Secretary of War, whom the country felt great confidence in. The meaning of the law may be explained away by an astute lawyer, but common sense and the views of loyal people will give to it the effect intended by the framers."¹⁰⁹

In his letter to the President February 3rd Grant asserts that he did not take over the War office "for the purpose of enabling [the President] to get rid of Mr. Stanton." He took it rather for the purpose of preventing an appointment of a Secretary who might embarrass the army in carrying out the reconstruction laws. (Grant to Johnson Feb. 3, 1868)¹¹⁰

Badeau says that Grant "was determined to hold the post

only ad interim and to give no appearance of permanence...."¹¹¹

Secondly, it is plain to be seen that Grant never intended to give up the office of Secretary of War ad interim before the action of the Senate. This, Grant admits in his letter to Johnson February 3. He says, "It was to avoid the same danger [that the President might appoint some one who would embarrass the army in carrying out the reconstruction laws] ... that I urged the appointment of Governor Cox"¹¹²

In his conversation with General Sherman on the 11th of January Grant revealed this fact when he said that there was no hurry about notifying the President of his change of mind "because he supposed Mr. Stanton would pursue toward him (Grant) the same course which he (Stanton) had required of him the preceding August, viz., would address him a letter claiming the office, and allow him a couple of days for the change."¹¹³

General Sherman in his conference with the President February 3, said that General Grant seemed to have made up his mind to await Mr. Stanton's written demand for the office, and then to have referred the matter to the President.¹¹⁴

Thirdly, it is self-evident that the statements which Grant admits that he made would easily lead the President to assume that he (Grant) would either hold on to the office so that Stanton would have to appeal to the courts or that he would resign in time for the President to appoint a man who would carry out this procedure.

He admits that he said to the President that Stanton would have to appeal to the courts to reinstate him.¹¹⁵

He admits that he knew the President "was desirous of keeping Mr. Stanton out of office, whether sustained in the suspension or not."¹¹⁶

He admits in his conference with the President Wednesday, Jan. 15, that if he changed his opinion he would give the President notice "and put things as they were before (his) appointment as Secretary of War ad interim."¹¹⁷

Johnson, in writing of Grant's promise to either hold on to the War Office or resign before the action of the senate, says, "Even ignoring the existence of a positive understanding these conclusions were plainly deducible from our various conversations."¹¹⁸

If Grant did not intend to carry out his implied promises to the President why did he make these statements? There is but one conclusion: Grant really meant to deceive the President. It is clear that he understood the President's plans and that he permitted him to believe he (Grant) would cooperate in carrying them out. While, there is no evidence to show that Grant was literally untruthful and, there is much evidence to show that there was simply a misunderstanding, yet it is clear that Grant allowed this misunderstanding in the first place and permitted it to continue.

In taking the course that he did Grant's motives were mixed. He distrusted Johnson and probably thought it was his patriotic duty to prevent him from carrying out his plans. At the same time he was anxious to keep in the popular favor him-

self. Years later Johnson commented as follows: "Grant did the proper thing to save Grant, but it pretty nearly ruined me. I might have done the same thing under the same circumstances. At any rate most men would."¹¹⁹

GRANT AND THE PRESIDENCY

The personal and political relationship between President Johnson and General Grant cannot be fully comprehended without an understanding of Grant's aspirations for the office of President.

Grant came out of the War the most popular of its heroes. As such he would be an ideal candidate for the Presidency and the leaders of both parties began to consider his availability.

Even as far back as 1863 many suggestions were made to Grant that he should be a candidate for the Presidency. But having no ambition at that time to be President he refused to consider these proposals and would not allow himself to be quoted on political issues. He believed that as an officer of the army he had no right to give his views concerning political affairs.¹²⁰

As early as 1865 the Democrats were endeavoring to secure General Grant as their candidate for the Presidency in the coming election of 1868.¹²¹ General Richard Taylor, formerly of the Southern army proposed to Grant, through General Badeau, Grant's confidential secretary, that Grant should become the candidate of the Democrats, promising the support of the South in mass if it were permitted to vote. The leaders of the Dem-

ocrats in the House, James Brooks, also suggested to Badeau that General Grant be the Democratic candidate.¹²² But Grant apparently was not interested in politics at this time and in no way responded to these proposals.¹²³

The Republicans were of course greatly interested in Grant as a possible candidate for their party. But, because of his trip through the South in December 1865 and his conservative report of conditions there, and because of his acquiescence to Johnson's reconstruction program they mistrusted him. He was not a Republican. By March 1866 however, Grant was letting it be known that there was a difference between the President's plan of reconstruction and his own. "It is probably, also," says Garland "that Rawlins, Babcock, and others of the politicians on his staff had produced an effect by harping on the belief that he was to be the irresistible choice for the Presidency at the end of Johnson's term." Grant admitted his aspirations for the office at this time but said he was too young to become a candidate in 1868, but he might think of becoming a candidate in 1872.¹²⁴

The Republicans worked assiduously to win Grant over to their ranks. In July 1866 Congress passed a law reviving the grade of General in order that Grant might be honored with that distinctive title.¹²⁵ We have seen how Stanton used his influence to secure the passage of this act.¹²⁶

Grant's friends tried to dissuade him from accompanying Johnson on his "Swing Around the Circle". It was their pur-

pose to create an estrangement between Grant and the President.¹²⁷ During this trip the Republican press tried to convince the public that Grant was not in harmony with the President and that he accompanied Johnson only in obedience to orders.¹²⁸ The Radical leaders worked hard to win Grant over to their ranks during the tour and were at least partially successful.¹²⁹

Probably the most enthusiastic promoter of Grant's candidacy was General Rawlins his chief of staff. Since 1861 Rawlins had served on Grant's staff. Grant valued him very highly and became very much attached to him.¹³⁰ At times Rawlins exerted enormous influence over Grant.¹³¹ Rawlins seemed to consider himself as a self-appointed manager of Grant's career; his ultimate purpose being to make Grant President.

Rawlins was glad to have Grant accompany Johnson on his trip to Chicago because, he said, "it will do Grant good, whatever may be his aspiration in the future...."¹³² Rawlins saw that Grant's popularity was being enhanced by his being exhibited throughout the country and that he was making a good impression with the people. By his determined silence throughout the tour Grant acquired a reputation for great dignity and wisdom.¹³³

Rawlins had been sympathetic toward President Johnson. But when he saw the effects of the "Swing Around the Circle" upon Johnson's standing throughout the country his attitude changed. He now favored the Radical program.¹³⁴ And no

doubt he saw that Grant's political fortunes would be jeopardized if he did not cut clear from a seeming allegiance to the unpopular President and come out in favor of the Radical cause. From then on we notice that Grant let it be known in a more pronounced way that he differed with the President.

Yet Grant still disclaimed any partisan bias and did not wish to be called either a Democrat or a Republican. He would not make any statement to the effect that he would be a candidate for the Presidency.¹³⁵

It was evident however, that if Grant were willing he might be the Republican candidate in 1868. On January 10, 1867, Welles commented in his Diary, "General Grant will likely be the next President of the United States."¹³⁶ On June 27, 1867 Welles expressed it as his opinion that Grant "was disposed to be a candidate, and if so would probably be elected."¹³⁷ On August 22 Welles writes: "General Grant has become severely afflicted with the Presidential disease, and it warps his judgment.... Obviously he has been tampered with and flattered by the Radicals, who are using him and his name for their selfish and partisan purposes.... It appears to me he was somewhat excited by appeals of the Radicals and fears that he might lose their good will. None but Radicals, and the most mischievous of them, are hounding and stimulating and cautioning him."¹³⁸ A few days later Welles comments that he "had been willing to be courted, but is not quite prepared to

have it published that the parties are engaged and to be married".¹³⁹ And on September 5, Welles says that "Grant... is more in the hands and the control of active Radical party managers than he or the country is aware. Hence he is misled, blunders, misconceives, and takes feeble positions. I think he is committed to the Radicals but gets his lessons imperfectly."¹⁴⁰

But if Grant had such aspirations as Welles attributed to him he was careful not to mention them. He told General Sherman that he did not want to be President "that fifty millions of dollars would not compensate him therefore, but that events might force him ⁱⁿ spite of inclination--just such events as would 'compel him to throw himself into a breach!'," "If the Republicans can find a good nominee he [Grant] will be content" Sherman believed.¹⁴¹

With the fall elections of 1867 going against them the Republicans were greatly concerned about the next presidential election. It was not at all improbable that the Democrats might elect the next President.¹⁴² "The danger now is," John Sherman wrote to his brother, "that the mistakes of the Republicans may drift the Democratic party into power."¹⁴³ The Republicans were now all the more anxious to receive the popular Grant as their standard bearer.

When impeachment was in the air in the fall of 1867 the Radicals in Congress were talking of arresting the President prior to his trial. After Grant had declared in Cabinet

meeting that the President could not be arrested before impeachment and conviction, Boutwell, who was much in favor of Grant's candidacy began to disavow any intention of arresting the President. It is very probable as Welles suggests that Boutwell learned that Grant would not support the proposition to arrest the President and therefore opposed the action himself.¹⁴⁴ The Radicals could not afford to alienate Grant or let him appear in the role of defender of the President.

On November 1, 1867, Senator John Sherman wrote as follows: "... Grant, I think is inevitably the candidate. He allows himself to drift into a position where he can't decline if he would, and I feel sure he don't want to decline. My judgment is that Chase is better for the country and for Grant himself. But I will not quarrel with what I cannot control."¹⁴⁵

Grant took care to let it be known whenever he seriously disagreed with the President. He would not permit the public to think he agreed with Johnson in all of the latter's policies. When Johnson proposed to suspend Stanton and Sheridan, Grant protested in writing against it. This letter was later published.¹⁴⁶ After Sheridan and Sickles had been relieved of their posts Grant gave them a reception to show his approval of their course.¹⁴⁷ When Grant accepted the office of Secretary of War ad interim he assumed the attitude that he was ordered to do so and therefore had no choice in the matter but to obey.¹⁴⁸

And in notifying Stanton of his appointment he took the opportunity of expressing his appreciation to Stanton (and to the public for the letter was published) for his "zeal, patriotism, firmness, and ability."¹⁴⁹

On September 4th, 1867, the papers published the rumors of sharp differences between the President and Grant. Welles thought that there was "something more than a willingness on Grant's part" to have these differences known.¹⁵⁰

It is apparent that Grant was, as John Sherman believed, allowing himself "to drift into a position" where he would be the inevitable candidate of the Republicans.

Welles on December 24, 1867, thought that Grant was not only willing to be a candidate but was daily growing more anxious for the honor. "...his aspirations," he says, "although he strives to conceal them, are equal to and even surpass those of the Chief Justice [Chase]. His reticence is all a matter of calculation, he fears to commit himself lest he should lose votes."¹⁵¹

It is quite probable that Grant's secret ambition for the Presidency made him all the more anxious to oppose the President's policies for the sake of appearances.

In the meantime Grant's Republican friends were carefully preparing the way for his candidacy. The chief of his promoters was General Rawlins who, although he realized that Grant was not especially fitted for the Presidency yet "rely-

ing upon the sound judgement and unselfish patriotism" of Grant considered the popular war hero as "fairly entitled to the succession."¹⁵²

Since Grant was so reticent concerning political affairs it was deemed proper by Rawlins and his friends that some one should speak for him. Rawlins, who was considered by his friends to be Grant's mouthpiece on both civil and military affairs and who was better able to speak than Grant himself, agreed to prepare an address upon the political questions of the times and give it at some suitable time.¹⁵³

Rawlins prepared the manuscript with great care and submitted it to Grant who gave it his approval. The speech was delivered by Rawlins on June 21, 1867 at Galena, Illinois, Grant's home town. It became known at the time that the speech was approved by General Grant. Therefore, it was given a greater importance and wider circulation than would otherwise have been the case.¹⁵⁴

The address reviewed the political causes of the war and dealt with the problems of reconstruction. It gave arguments for the 14th Amendment and negro suffrage and in general supported the Congressional program of Reconstruction.¹⁵⁵

"It was justly considered," says Wilson in his Life of John A. Rawlins, "as setting forth Grant's opinions and policy on the questions then uttermost in the minds of all." It was published shortly after as a campaign document by the Union Republican Congressional Committee at Washington. In telling

about the speech in a letter to his wife Rawlins said "The Tribune says: 'It is the platform of the army; it is the platform of the Republican party; it is emphatically the platform of the country, and it is unquestionably the platform of General Grant.'"¹⁵⁶

With Rawlin's Radical campaign speech before the country as Grant's platform and with Grant allowing himself "to drift into a position" where he would be the logical candidate, the way was rapidly being prepared for the launching of the Republican campaign. The stage was all set for a Radical triumph with Grant as the winning candidate,--except for one particular. To the masses of voters Grant was seemingly still on friendly relations with President Johnson.

In other ways Grant was the ideal candidate. He was renowned as a military hero. The people had confidence in his integrity and judgement. His popularity was increased by the fact that he was not a politician.¹⁵⁷ But he was not considered to be a Republican. It was well known that he had never voted for Republican candidates in all his life.¹⁵⁸ Certain other facts in his official career also stood out. His report of the conditions in the South had favored Johnson's program and had displeased the Republicans. He had accompanied Johnson on his "Swing Around the Circle." He was a member of the President's Cabinet, as the successor to Stanton, and as such apparently had the confidence of Johnson. Indeed, to the mass of people Grant must have seemed firmly attached to the

unpopular President.

As the Republican leaders prepared for their National Convention they realized how awkward it might be for the members when they denounced the President in their platform to be reminded that their candidate and Johnson had seemed to be on terms of personal friendship. "Such a fact," wrote Blaine, "would embarrass the canvass in many ways, and would dull the edge of partisan weapons already forged for the contest."¹⁵⁹

Many of the Republicans, therefore, earnestly desired that something might happen which would remove even the semblance of friendly relations of General Grant with the President.¹⁶⁰ In fact the Republican supporters of Grant could not have hoped for anything more encouraging to their cause than the quarrel which arose between the President and Grant in the winter of 1868.

The questions now naturally arise: Did the Republicans who wished for the estrangement between the President and Grant deliberately cause the quarrel? Did General Grant, aware of the political consequences which would follow a disagreement with the President, voluntarily seek an altercation?

The latter question may be answered with finality by referring to General Sherman who says: "I know of my own knowledge that General Grant did strive all he could to avoid that unpleasant controversy with the President which he knew full well would be damaging both to him and the President."¹⁶¹

In answer to the first question it may be pointed out that

there are a number of contributing causes which brought on the quarrel.

First, the anomalous situation of Grant: a man unschooled in the arts of politics holding an important political position; occupying a place of confidence and trust in the cabinet of him, whom he thought it his patriotic duty to circumvent and deceive.

Second, the misunderstanding in regard to Grant's agreement.

Third, the peculiar position in which Grant found himself under the reinstated Stanton whom the President had verbally instructed him to disobey but whom Grant respected as his legal superior.

Fourth, the publication in the papers of the alleged unfaithfulness of Grant.

Fifth, the "constant receipt of letters asking him [Grant] if it was possible he had purposely betrayed the President."^{16 2}

Now it is very probable that, had it not been for the strictures in the newspapers and the letters Grant received asking him if it were possible he had purposely betrayed the President, Grant would never have written the letter of January 28th giving his views of his understanding with the President. It is very probable also, that as Stryker suggests, Grant was in the hands of the Radicals and that they were using their influence to goad Grant into quarreling with Johnson.¹⁶³ No doubt some of the letters Grant received asking him to explain his position were written with that end in view.

According to Wilson, General Rawlins, the chief promoter of Grant's candidacy, who was away from Washington returned to the city at the height of the discussion "and at once became interested in mastering the facts of the case and giving aid and council to his chief."¹⁶⁴ The letter of February 3rd in which Grant openly defies the President and says that he had accepted the war office only in order to thwart the President's purposes was in the main the actual handiwork of Rawlins. Grant had written another letter "with less acrimony than the second, and which admitted the possibility of the President's misconstruction, but," says Badeau, "Rawlins, who was a politician by nature, and who had long foreseen the result of all the political complications, felt that at last the time had come.... He took the letter that Grant had written and said: 'This will never do, it is not enough;' and then prepared the draft of the important passages directly contradicting and defying the President."¹⁶⁵ "The language" continues Badeau, "was afterward modified, but the sentiment remained, and this was suggested by Rawlins. This made the rupture with Johnson personal, and reconciliation impossible. It was a stroke of genius, for it made any other candidate than Grant impossible for the Republicans."¹⁶⁶

Nothing was said by those present about the political consequences of the letter at the time it was written. Grant recognized that Rawlins was expressing his (Grant's) own sentiment and acquiesced. If Grant perceived the political

significance of the letter he did not let on, but after the publication of the correspondence he no longer declined to acknowledge the probability that he would be the Republican candidate and the party leaders now consulted him freely.¹⁶⁷

Now, the Radicals were ready for their convention. "In every point of view," wrote Blaine, "the political situation was satisfactory to the Republicans. The last possible suggestion of discontent with General Grant's expected nomination for the Presidency having been banished from the ranks of the party."¹⁶⁸

On May 21, Grant was unanimously nominated by the National Republican Convention at Chicago and the platform drawn up was substantially the same as Rawlins had outlined in his speech at Galena the year before.¹⁶⁹ Rawlins and the other aspiring friends had triumphed; had succeeded in making him the Republican candidate without Grant's having lifted a finger in his own behalf. With Grant as the Republican candidate, Republican success was assured. It was soon to appear what would be given to Rawlins as a reward for his faithful service.

Shortly before Grant's inauguration as President, Rawlins let Grant know through his friend General Wilson that he wished to be appointed Secretary of War. Rawlins thought that he was "fairly entitled" to the position. Grant had intended to assign Rawlins, who was ill with tuberculosis, to the Department of Arizona believing that a prolonged residence in that

country would be beneficial to his health. But when Wilson made known to him Rawlins desires, Grant without showing surprise and without hesitation said, "You can tell Rawlins he shall be Secretary of War."170

Chapter VI Active Hostility

The relations between the President and General Grant were now entirely hostile, each having nothing to do with the other. The break was complete and as far as Grant was concerned, irreparable. Johnson regarded Grant as deceitful and unfaithful to a trust imposed. Grant felt that Johnson had tried to ruin his good name before the country; to destroy his reputation for veracity and trustworthiness and hence was unforgiving and implacable.

Grant now conspicuously avoided the President in society and was to be found frequently with the Radicals. "There is an attempt to establish a Radical ton, or condition of society in Washington", wrote Welles in his diary on February 13th., "General Grant, Stanton, Colfax and others show signs of this.... The two (Stanton and Grant) attended the last weekly reception of Colfax; the two were last night at Senator Chandler's. Neither of them attended the receptions at the President's or members of the Cabinet...."1

Open cooperation with the Radicals and wanton denunciation of the President now characterized Grant's conduct and speech.

The Radicals in Congress sought to find grounds for impeachment against Johnson in the correspondence between the President and General Grant. A Resolution by Representative Hubbard in the House of Representatives called on the President for the correspondence between the President, Secretary of War and General Grant. Mr. Hubbard, a friend of Stanton's intro-

duced the resolution about an hour before Grant's letter of the 3rd. of February had reached the President. The object evidently was to close the correspondence with Grant having the last word, and to "foreclose all opportunity for reply by the President".² "The whole shows an intrigue on the part of Stanton, Grant, and certain Radical leaders", wrote Welles,³ Stanton immediately furnished the requested letters. On February 10th Thaddeus Stevens led in a movement for the impeachment of the President. But on that day Johnson sent his final letter--the letter of February 10th which so successfully answered Grant--together with the statements of the Cabinet members,⁴ and the movement toward impeachment came to a standstill. The impeachment resolution was laid on the table by a vote of six to three in Stevens committee.⁵

Had Grant actually connived with Stanton and Radicals of Congress to entrap the President? Did he write his insubordinate letters to provoke the President into the commission of some rash act or the writing of some indiscrete statement? The evidence is inconclusive. It is probable that Grant was the innocent tool of the Radicals who used him, without his suspecting their purposes. "Reckless and unprincipled men in Congress", says Welles, "contrived to get General Grant, not unwilling, I apprehend, in their interest. He had entirely changed his ground. Having been suddenly elevated to position without much culture, with no experience, knowledge, or correct information of the Principles of Government,

Grant was intoxicated with his success and beginning to believe that with the army he could make himself permanently supreme. The Radicals consider him an instrument in their hands.... They are acting together, however, at this time, and will until the crisis comes."⁶

The crisis for Johnson was soon to come. Already, as we have noticed, Congress had pounced upon the President's controversial correspondence with the General of the Army in hope that some evidence might be found which could be used as a basis for impeachment charges. "These things," wrote Welles, "and other occurrences fully convince me that there is a conspiracy maturing for the overthrow of the Administration and the subversion of the Government and our Federal system."⁷

As early as November of the preceding year when Congress was considering impeachment there was a proposal to remove the President from office until after trial.⁸ At the time the President had been so concerned that he brought up the question in Cabinet meeting,⁹ and had attempted to sound out the loyalty of General Grant.¹⁰

Now, the same or a similar danger was threatening. Some of the extreme Radicals intended, Welles thought, "by any measure, no matter how unprincipled and violent, to get possession of and to exercise the executive authority."¹¹ On the 5th of February, the President and Secretary Welles discussed the situation. Welles asked Johnson if he was prepared for the

crisis. "Should the [Radicals] attempt to seize the government-- to arrest him--, had he determined the course he would pursue?" Welles thought Grant would help the Radicals; that Congress, unmindful of the Constitution, would place the army at his disposal instead of the President's. "Who", Welles asked the President, "had he got in whom he could confide, if a collision took place?"¹²

The President seemed nervous and walked the room. He suggested that Washington might be made into a military district and General Sherman ordered to it. Welles expressed his doubt as to the wisdom of having Sherman come to Washington. He thought he would follow Grant rather than the President. "Their military association", Welles wrote, "and the ties and obligations of military fellowship and long personal intimacy and friendship would attach him to Grant, though I hoped not to the overthrow of the Government."¹³

On the next day, February 6th the President issued an order creating the Military Division of the Atlantic, to be commanded by General Sherman who was to make his headquarters at Washington. General Sherman was to assume command as early as practicable. This order was withdrawn on the 7th but was again renewed the 8th, however the President now omitted the part of the communication which directed that General Sherman should assume command "as early as may be practicable."¹⁴

The President thought that with Sherman at Washington he would have an officer in command that would obey his orders,

Grant being no longer dependable. On the 13th. of February the President nominated Sherman to be "General by brevet in the Army of the United States for distinguished courage, skill and ability displayed during the war of the rebellion."

But General Sherman did not want either to come to Washington or to be named brevit General. He telegraphed to his brother John Sherman who was in the Senate to oppose the confirmation "on grounds that it is better not to extend the system of brevets above Major General". Out of deference to General Sherman's wishes, the Senate took no action on the President's nomination.¹⁵

In a lengthy letter to the President which he sent through General Grant, Sherman expressed his displeasure with the order for him to command the newly created division of the Atlantic urging that such a department was unnecessary and superfluous. The new arrangement would be bound to cause a cloud to come between General Grant and himself and then he would have to resign from the Army. He begged that his headquarters might be at New York or some other place rather than Washington.¹⁶ To General Grant he wrote, "I never felt so troubled in my life. Were it an order to go to Sitka, to the devil, to battle with rebels or Indians, I think you would not hear a whimper from me, but it comes in such a questionable form that like Hamlet's ghost, it curdles my blood and mars my judgement."¹⁷

Sherman's real reasons for not wishing to come to Washington were his friendship for Grant and his fear that the President wished to use him to stir up trouble. He saw that the

creation of the new department with himself in command at Washington was an indignity to the General of the Army who was already there. "Grant and I were bound by such ties during the War", he wrote to Thomas Ewing, "--he acted so fairly and generously by me on all occasions...and if we continue as now, are likely to rise and fall together, that I would be mean indeed to allow myself to be used against him in the few short months remaining to President Johnson.¹⁸ "...he [Johnson] infers, I suppose, that because I gave him full credit for his first efforts to reconstruct the South, on principles nearer right than have since been attempted, that I will go with him to the death, but I am not bound to do it."¹⁹

On the same day General Sherman in writing to his brother at Washington said, "The President would make use of me to beget violence, a condition of things that ought not to exist now. He has no right to use me for such purposes."²⁰

Grant advised Sherman that he would be glad to have him in Washington if the public were not losing by bringing him away from his post in the West and if it were not for the annoying position in which Sherman would be placed. "Under no circumstances tender even a contingent resignation", he wrote, "you do not own Mr. Johnson anything, and he is not entitled to such a sacrifice from you."²¹

Considering all of the circumstances (Sherman's telegram to his brother asking that the title of Brevet General be not approved, his correspondence to the President through General Grant which the President thought showed that Sherman wished

to conciliate Grant and his disinclination to come to Washington) Johnson concluded that General Sherman could not be relied upon,²² and so on February 19th he notified Sherman that he might stay in St. Louis and retain his old position.²³

The President now planned to bring things to a crisis in regard to Stanton and the War department. He thought that he had the constitutional right to eject Stanton from office. If the latter should refuse to leave the office or if he did leave and the Senate refused to concur in his removal the President thought the case would go to the courts, which was exactly what he wanted.²⁴

Accordingly, on February 21 he appointed Lorenzo Thomas to the Office of Secretary of War ad interim and issued an order addressed to Stanton removing him from office.²⁵ Thomas went to the War Office and handed the letter of removal to Stanton. After reading it Stanton asked if he were to vacate the office at once or would he be given time to remove his private property. "Act your pleasure", Thomas replied.²⁶ While they were talking General Grant came into the office. Thomas withdrew to his own room to have a copy made of the order of removal. When he returned Stanton said to him, "I do not know whether I will obey your instructions or not".²⁷ Upon Stanton's refusal, finally, to give possession Thomas departed. It is possible as Stryker suggests that during Thomas' absence from the room Grant may have said something to encourage Stanton to remain in the office. At any

rate Stanton during the interval seemed to have made up his mind to remain in possession of the War Department.²⁸

Both Stanton and Johnson notified the Senate of the President's order of removal. The Senate adopted a resolution "That under the Constitution and laws the President has no power to remove the Secretary of War and to designate any other officer to perform the duties of that office ad interim," and refused to confirm Thomas' appointment.²⁹

Grant now was working hand and glove with the Radicals. Stanton had ordered Thomas "to abstain from issuing any orders other than in your capacity as adjutant of the army." He now sent an order to General Grant to arrest and confine General Lorenzo Thomas, adjutant General, for disobedience to superior authority in refusing to obey his orders as Secretary of War. "A few minutes later," testified Col. Worthington of the War Department, "General Grant and his side clattered into the hall. Holding the order of arrest in his hand, Grant entered the Secretary's room and a private conference of perhaps half an hour followed. The nature of it can only be surmised, but the arrest was not put on file"³⁰

It is not known why Grant objected to the arrest of General Thomas at this time, but he certainly did not do so in the interests of Thomas or in behalf of the President. He probably thought that it was not yet the proper time to act. At any rate Thomas was arrested the following morning.³¹ When requested to issue an order, as General-in-Chief to the heads of Departments to turn over to Thomas all letters, papers,

and documents in, and coming into their possession Grant refused to obey.³² But when directed by Stanton to detail a guard to protect the person of the Secretary of War and the War Department he complied with Stanton's request.³³ Grant placed General E. A. Carr in charge of the War Department building and detailed a guard to act under his orders. He also empowered General Carr to call upon any and all troops in and about the city.³⁴

In fact the whole military personnel at Washington seemed to be pledged to support Stanton against any attempt by Thomas to secure the War Office or any possible movement on the part of Johnson to resort to force. General Emory was in command of the Department of Washington. On the night of February 22 a party was being given by a Mrs. Ray and a number of officers were in attendance. After the company had assembled an orderly appeared asking that all officers of the Fifth Cavalry appear at Headquarters. A little later, another orderly came with the order requiring all officers of General Emory's command to report at Headquarters.³⁵

When the next morning Secretary Welles reported these happenings to the President, Johnson said that he had not issued the orders. "Some one has", said Welles, "Who is it and what does it indicate? While you, Mr. President, are resorting to no extreme measures, the conspirators have their spies, --have command of the troops. Either Stanton or Grant or both issue orders which were proclaimed aloud and peremptorily

at this large social gathering."³⁶ Johnson sent for General Emory. When questioned by the President as to whether or not there had been any troop movement in and about Washington, Emory replied that he thought no changes had been made and referred to the recent order issued for the government of the army which provided that all orders must be "transmitted through General Grant of the Army," and that as any such order would come necessarily through him, he would know.³⁷

Under the authority of the Army Appropriation Act of March 2, 1867, General Grant could control the military since all orders would have to go through him. On Monday February 24 General Emory instructed the officers commanding the garrison of the city to send verbal orders to officers in charge of troops that all orders must come through proper channels.³⁸

With the House pressing forward the impeachment proceedings there was great alarm throughout the city of Washington that the President might resort to arms. "Not since the assassination of Lincoln", says Rhodes, "had Washington been in such a state of excitement and each new move added fuel to the flame."³⁹ The President on March 14, was informed that for two days the troops had been under arms, furnished each with forth rounds of cartridges.⁴⁰

General Grant had originally been greatly opposed to impeachment. Not until after his quarrel with Johnson did he favor the movement to impeach the President.⁴¹ "He took the liveliest interest in the proceedings", says Badeau, "and

though he preserved a proper reticence in his public utterances, he did not scruple with those in his confidence to express his opinion that the action of Congress was entirely justified."⁴² But did Grant observe "a proper reticence in his public utterances"? On April 4th, the New York Tribune printed the following: "We have assurance from Washington that General Grant finds it not inconsistent with his duty as a soldier to announce it as his opinion that the only hope for the peace of the country is the success of the pending impeachment trial. He feels that the national security demands the removal of the President. If the trial should fail, the people can only expect more assumptions of power, and a more determined resistance of law. When the General of our armies entertains this conviction, there is no room for doubt as to the duty of the Senate. The Loyal Nation demands the President's removal."⁴³ The General of the Army was using his influence in civil and political affairs to a remarkable degree.

President Johnson after reading the above article remarked: "What a few years since would have been the fate of the General commanding the military forces if he had done what the Tribune, with such an air of authority, says Grant has done?" Johnson was inclined to doubt the accuracy of the statement in the Tribune. He thought Grant could hardly be so indiscrete as to express himself thus. The President thought the purpose

of the Radicals was a military despotism. He commented freely on Grant saying that the General seemed to be daily growing guiltier in the estimation of the public and predicted that the time would come when Grant would be held in contempt by the people.⁴⁴

Grant was at one time summoned before Congress to testify as to statements he had heard the President say. It is only fair to him to say that he did not exaggerate in his testimony but confined himself to simply stating the truth.⁴⁵

When there was doubt as to the outcome of the trial, and pressure was being brought to bear on the Republican senators who seemed uncertain how to vote, Grant was urged to use his influence with them. Grant did converse with those whom he thought he might influence arguing in favor of conviction.⁴⁶ He even visited Senator Frelinghuysen at his home.⁴⁷ Senator Henderson was another whom he asked to vote for conviction.⁴⁸

During the heat of the trial the lawyers for the President sought to reassure certain Senators as to the disposition of the War Office by having General Schofield's name presented to the Senate for the position of Secretary of War. This would possibly win votes for the Defense.⁴⁹ Before agreeing to his appointment General Schofield consulted General Grant to obtain his sanction to the proposal. Grant gave Schofield his opinions.

General Grant asserted that he did not believe in any compromise of the impeachment question. The President should be

convicted or acquitted fairly and squarely on the facts proven. He predicted that if Johnson were acquitted, that as soon as Congress adjourned he would trample the laws under foot and do whatever he pleased. Congress would have to remain in session all summer to protect the country from the lawless acts of the President; the only limit to his violation of law had been and would be his courage which had been very slight heretofore but which would be vastly increased with his acquittal. He (Grant) would not believe any pledge or promise Johnson might make as to his future conduct. The only safe course and the most popular one would be to remove the President.⁵⁰

How similar to the radical views of the Radicals were Grant's. Yet it is probable that his remarks to Schofield expressed actually what he thought of Johnson at this time. The air was so full of excitement and rumor as to what the President might do,⁵¹ one can scarcely wonder at Grant believing them.

It will be noticed in respect to Grant's conversation with Schofield that while he assented that the President "ought to be convicted or acquitted fairly and squarely on the facts of the case", he also argued that conviction was "the most popular" course. Grant was urging the course which the people were demanding, because it was popular.

Grant was probably sincere when he declared that "the acquittal of Johnson would threaten the country and especially

the South with revolution and bloodshed."⁵² But that was when sentiment was running strongly against the President. Later, Badeau says, "his judgment changed and he thought on the whole it was better for the country that the President should not have been removed. He believed that Johnson had been taught a lesson which he would not forget, and that the precedent of a successful impeachment would have been a greater misfortune to the State than any evil that Johnson might still have been able to accomplish."⁵³

Grant's opinions and ideas unquestionably were reflections of the opinions and ideas of those who influenced him. "As years went by Grant's judgment changed on several points" says Badeau.⁵⁴ As the years passed he must have looked back upon the days of the Johnson administration and realized that he had been mistaken,--as the men who had surrounded him had been, --about Andrew Johnson and his Policy. Grant in particular changed his ideas about the Tenure of Office Act which he as President found to be an obstruction.

In order to bring pressure to bear on the Senate to pass the bill for the repeal of the Tenure of Office Act, Grant let it be known that as long as the law was in force he would neither make appointments nor remove men from office except for flagrant misconduct. The Republicans were anxious to get Johnson's appointees out of office and fill the vacancies thus created with faithful Republicans.⁵⁵

The Senate proposed an amendment for the suspension of the

Act until the next session. This would give Grant the opportunity to dismiss the offensive Democrat Office holders. But this proposal was so "shamelessly partisan" that the men with principle turned against it.

The law finally adopted, permitted the President during any recess of the Senate, to suspend civil officers until the end of the next session, but if in the mean time the Senate were to refuse its consent to such suspension or to the appointment of a successor, the suspended officer was to be restored.⁵⁶

"Casting off all political disguises and personal pretenses," Blaine wrote later, "the simple truth remains that the Tenure of Office Law was enacted lest President Johnson should remove Republican office holders too rapidly, and it was practically repealed lest President Grant should not remove Democrat office-holders rapidly enough."⁶⁷

But the amendment to the act did not please President Grant who wanted total repeal. He thought the law contrary to "the intentions of the framers of the Constitution." In his annual message in December 1869 he said, "The law is inconsistent with a faithful and efficient administration of the Government. What faith can an Executive put in officials forced upon him, and those, too, whom he has suspended for reason? How will such officials be likely to serve an administration which they know does not trust them?"⁵⁸

Johnson had objected to the Tenure of Office law for these same reasons. But Grant had taken a different stand then. He

had sided with Congress. He had believed in the wisdom of Congress. "Was not Congress superior to the President?" he had asked.⁵⁹ Now, when he found Congress obstructing the will of the President he took a different view of affairs. After the quarrel and the correspondence Grant could not forgive Johnson. He refused to have anything to do with him. He avoided the members of the cabinet who had testified in behalf of the President.

In November 1868 a dinner was given by the New York Bar association in honor of Attorney General Evarts, to which all the members of the cabinet were invited. Grant, who was to be a guest, announced that he would not attend if Secretaries McCulloch and Welles and Post Master General Randall were to be present. "Everyone seems disgusted with Grant's conditional acceptance....", commented Welles, "None of his friends attempt to befriend him. The little man is exhibiting his true traits. Very malignant, revengeful, because exposed in his equivocation and falsehood. An enemy of truth and those who assert it."⁶⁰ The Radicals contrived to have a rival dinner in the city so that Grant might attend it in case any of the cabinet members objected to, accepted their invitations to the Evarts dinner. But as none of the members attended, Grant had no excuse and so was present at the Evarts banquet.⁶¹

President Johnson showed a different spirit. He appointed Grant's brother-in-law to the Chilean Mission.⁶² During the Christmas holidays of 1868 he invited Grant's grandchildren to his dinner celebrating his sixtieth birthday. Two or three hundred young people met at the President's Mansion. But Grant's

grandchildren were not among them. The President-elect would not permit them to attend.⁶³

General Grant was invited to the President's New Year's reception. But Grant left Washington with his wife to spend New Years Day in Philadelphia. The papers announced that he did this to avoid calling on the President that day according to custom.⁶⁴

"He Grant has never called on the President, nor exchanged a word with him since the deception which he practised in the Stanton matter and his detection and exposure" writes Welles, "I apprehend he has neither called on nor spoken to any of those who witnessed that occurrence; (except Seward who debased and belittled himself to get in communication with Grant), he has not with me. The President-elect proposes to fight truth; is mad that he was exposed."⁶⁵

As the time for the inauguration of Grant was approaching and a committee on ceremonies was making arrangements for the affair, General Grant informed the committee that he would not ride in the same carriage with Johnson nor speak to him. The committee planned, therefore, to have the President and the President-elect proceed up Pennsylvania Avenue in separate carriages, the former on the right, the latter on the left.⁶⁶ The President took the ground that he could not with self respect take part in the inauguration ceremonies of the man he deemed to be faithless and untrue and who had attempted to impugn the veracity of the President and members of the cabinet⁶⁷

so remained at the White House while the inauguration took place.⁶⁸

When Johnson returned to Washington as Senator from Tennessee during Grant's second administration He did not hesitate to attack the President because of the abuses in his administration. In particular he spoke against Grant's reconstruction policy. In March 1875 a resolution was introduced in the Senate to approve Grant's conduct in supporting his military favorite Gov. Kellogg in the election difficulties in Louisiana.

"The President of the United States", said Senator Johnson, "assumes to take command of the state and assign the people a governor.... It has been bitterly alleged that Kellogg was not elected. Whether he was or not is not altogether certain, nor is it any more certain that his competitor McEvery was chosen. The Election was a gigantic fraud and there are no reliable returns of its result." Because of the election fraud both contestants, declared Johnson, were disqualified, "but the President finds a usurper in power, and He takes it upon himself to make the government of the United States a party to his usurpation.... Is not this monstrous in a free government?"⁶⁹

Thus, in their later relationship the scene is changed. Positions are reversed. Grant is on the defensive and Johnson is attacking. It is significant that Andrew Johnson, once abused, despised, and discredited, has now regained favor with the people and is representing his native state in the highest capacity possible. While General Grant although serving his second term as President is under fire; the gross corruption in the federal government reflecting upon his wisdom and states-

manship, if not upon his character. The evils of military reconstruction under Republican rule are now realized. In the light of these later events one can gain a clearer understanding of this interesting relationship.

Chapter VII Conclusions

1. At the outset of Johnson's administration Grant was in harmony with the President on all important policies of Reconstruction except Johnson's proposal to try the confederate leaders.

2. Until the fall of 1866 Grant avoided taking sides actively in the political controversy but he acquiesced generally in the President's conciliatory program of reconstruction.

3. Although Grant had begun to differ somewhat with the President by March 1866, the real turning point in their relations was during the election campaign in the fall of 1866.

4. The important contributing factors which alienated General Grant from the President and made him sympathetic with the Radical cause were as follows: (1) Johnson's petty manoeuvring to implicate him in an apparent support of his policies. (2) Johnson's loss of public esteem due to the events of the "Swing Around the Circle". (3) The ridicule of Johnson and his policies by the Radical campaigners. (4) The overwhelming Radical victory at the polls. (5) The subtle personal influence of his Radical friends.

5. Johnson's purpose back of his plan to send Grant to Mexico in October 1866 was to get rid of Grant temporarily so that General Sherman, who was more friendly to the President's

program might be more gracefully elevated to the position of Secretary of War.

6. Grant's mistrust of the President and his fear that Johnson might attempt some disloyal act against Congress were the important factors which influenced him to refuse to go to Mexico.

7. Grant's distrust of the President and his sympathy with the Radicals, coupled with a sincere desire to promote peace prompted him to object to the President's request that troops be sent to Baltimore to prevent election disturbances in the fall of 1866.

8. Grant cooperated with Congress and Secretary Stanton in the preparation of the Congressional program of Reconstruction and worked whole-heartedly to carry out the purposes of Congress, in spite of interference by the President.

9. Grant instructed the military commanders to enforce the reconstruction acts in accordance with their own views as to the purpose of those laws, and by inference directed that they should disregard the President's and the Attorney General's opinions as to the methods which should be used in carrying out reconstruction.

10. In whatever the District military commanders did which was clearly in harmony with the reconstruction acts of Congress Grant supported them and defended them before the President when the latter was disposed to criticise.

11. Grant considered himself responsible to the people and

to Congress for the faithful execution of the Reconstruction laws.

12. Grant accepted the office of Secretary of War ad interim in order that the President might not appoint another to the place who would not be in sympathy with Congress.

13. Grant objected to the removal of Stanton, Sheridan, and Sickles partly because he had approved of their actions, partly because he really believed their removal would not be to the best interests of the country.

14. Grant received his political philosophy from the Radicals. His ignorance of political principles made him accept the popular viewpoint.

15. Johnson expected Grant to either hold on to the War office and thereby force Stanton to resort to the courts to be reinstated, or resign before the action of the Senate so that the President might appoint another who would carry out this plan.

16. Grant understood what Johnson expected of him even though the President may not have explained his desires to him definitely.

17. Grant's original promise was couched in general terms, capable of multiple interpretation. It was to the effect that he believed Stanton would have to appeal to the courts to be reinstated; that he had not looked particularly into the Tenure of Office bill but what he stated was a general principle; that if he changed his mind he would inform the President of the fact and return the office to him in the same condition it was in when he was appointed to the position. Returning the office to

the President "in the same condition it was when he was appointed to the position" might simply mean relinquishment of the office to the President after the action of the Senate.

18. Grant in subsequent conversations with the President regarding what he intended to do with the War office reassured him by referring to his original promise and stating that his action would be in accordance with this understanding. Thus Grant prevented any possible movement on the part of Johnson to replace him with someone who was not sympathetic with the Radicals.

19. Grant never seriously intended to hold on to the War office after the Senate had reinstated Stanton.

20. Grant never intended to relinquish the War office before the action of the Senate. It was his purpose to prevent Johnson from making another appointment until after the Senate acted.

21. Yet the statements which Grant admits that he made would easily lead the President to assume that he would easily lead the President to assume that he would either hold on to the office so that Stanton would have to appeal to the courts, or that he would resign in time for the President to appoint a man who would carry out this procedure. Because Grant permitted Johnson to interpret a different meaning than his own conception of the promise, and because he let this misunderstanding continue until the Senate acted he was guilty of deception.

22. Grant believed he was fulfilling his promise in a literal way by giving the President notice at the Saturday evening interview that he had changed his mind and by locking the door of the War office on Tuesday and sending immediate notice of this action to the President.

23. There was no connivance between Grant and Stanton that the former should turn the War office over to the latter. Stanton realized the importance of taking immediate possession and acted accordingly. Grant was not anxious to see Stanton back in office. He was anxious to carry out the wishes of the Radicals and avoid breaking the law.

24. The fact that Grant, after asking for and receiving written directions from the President not to obey Stanton's orders, declined to obey the President shows conclusively that he was under the influence of Stanton and the Radicals.

25. The immediate causes for Grant writing his controversial letters to the President were the publication in the newspapers of his alleged unfaithfulness, and the receipt of many letters asking him if it was possible he had purposely betrayed the President.

26. There is evidence to show that the Radicals encouraged the quarrel with the end in view of its political effects upon the country.

27. While Grant had allowed himself to drift into a position where he was the logical candidate of the Republicans he did not deliberately quarrel with the President for

the sake of the political consequences which would follow. Nevertheless he quietly permitted his friend Rawlins to make the quarrel personal and reconciliation impossible. Rawlins did this to make Grant President and Grant rewarded him for his efforts.

28. Grant was the aggressor in the quarrel. Johnson did not take up his pen to answer until Grant had written his insubordinate note of January 29 in which he said he would not obey the President's orders.

29. In the several controversial points in the correspondence, in which each asserted he was right and the other party wrong, there is no evidence to prove that either party was purposely untruthful; there is much evidence showing that there was simply misunderstanding in each case. However each made the best of his side of the question.

30. The ambiguous terms in which Grant's promise was first couched, led to this misunderstanding.

31. Grant's motives for deceiving the President were partly patriotic and partly personal: He sincerely wished to prevent Johnson from appointing a man to the War office who would be out of harmony with Congress and unsympathetic toward Congressional reconstruction. At the same time it was to his own personal and political interests to govern his conduct in accordance with the will of the Republican majority. To aid and support the unpopular Johnson would detract from Grant's popularity and his chances for the Presidency.

32. After the quarrel Grant and Johnson were openly and actively hostile toward each other.

33. Grant now refused to obey the President's orders, but complied with the directions of Stanton in the management of the military.

34. Not until after the quarrel did Grant favor the impeachment of the President. Then he worked to bring about the success of the trial.

35. After Grant's election Johnson was willing to be friendly with him but Grant was implacable.

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73. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, pp.44-45.
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75. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, pp.45-46.
76. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p. 65.
77. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p. 65.
78. Boutwell, Sixty Years Vol. 2, pp.107-108.
 In December 1866 Secretary Stanton in a conference with Boutwell said that he had been more disturbed by the conditions of affairs in the preceding weeks and months than at any time throughout the War. Orders, he said, had been issued to the army of which neither he nor Grant had knowledge. He told Boutwell that he "apprehended and attempt by the President to reorganize the government by the assembling of Congress in which the members from the seceding states and the Democratic members from the North might attain control through the aid of the Executive." Stanton and Boutwell then proceeded to draw up the amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill.
 Stryker suggests that Grant may have conferred with Stanton ^{about} this plan to limit the power of the President over the Army. Stryker, Andrew Johnson, p. 401.
79. Stryker, Andrew Johnson, p. 441.
80. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p. 59.

81. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p.59.
82. Badeau, Grant in Peace, pp.58-59.
83. George C. Gorham, Life and Public Services of Edwin M. Stanton, 2 volumes, (Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. The Riverside Press, Cambridge, 1899), hereafter cited as Gorham, Stanton; Vol.2, p.378.
84. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p.60.
85. Badeau, Grant in Peace, pp.60-61.
86. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p.65.
87. Badeau, Grant in Peace pp.67,68.
88. Gorham, Stanton, Vol.2, p.372.
89. Gorham, Stanton, Vol.2, p.381.
90. Gorham, Stanton, Vol.2, p.380.
91. Badeau, Grant in Peace, pp.71-72.
92. Badeau, Grant in Peace, pp.72-73.
93. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p.74.
94. Badeau, Grant in Peace, pp.68-70.
95. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p.73.
96. Badeau, Grant in Peace, pp.68-70.
97. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p.84.
98. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p.82.
99. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p.86.
100. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p.86.
- 101.. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p.101.
102. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p.60.
103. Badeau, Grant in Peace, pp.101-102.
104. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p.103.

Chapter IV.

1. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, p. 157.
2. "Notes of Col. W. G. Moore", Am. Hist. Rev. Vol.XIX, p.105.
3. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p. 88.
4. Stryker, Johnson, p. 491; Badeau, Grant in Peace, p.88.
5. "Notes of Col. W. G. Moore", Am.Hist.Rev. Vol.XIX,
pp. 107-108.
6. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p. 90.
7. Stryker, Johnson, p. 485; Welles, Diary, Vol.3,
pp. 154-155.
8. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p. 90
9. Flower, Stanton, p. 321.
10. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p. 90.
11. Mc Pherson, Reconstruction, p. 261.
12. Mc Pherson, Reconstruction, p. 261.
13. " Notes of Col. W. G. Moore", Am. Hist. Rev., Vol.XIX,
p. 109.
14. F. A. Flower in his life of Stanton p. 322 says that when notice of his appointment was handed to Grant by Col. Moore, he said, "This is an order (It was in reality not an order but only an appointment) from the President. I do not see how I can disobey." Col. Moore's version of Grant's acceptance is as follows: " He deliberately read it, folded it up, and said 'Very well'." (See Am. Hist. Rev. Vol.XIX, p. 109.)
15. McPherson, Reconstruction, p. 261.
16. McPherson, Reconstruction, p. 262.
17. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p. 87.
18. Flower in his biography of Stanton takes a different view. "Stanton" he says, "was silent and manifestly displeased when Grant informed him that if he should accept it would be simply to tie the President's hands so he could not get possession of the War office. He did not want Grant to accept. He was fearful of the outcome. He knew that Grant could not take his own place and had no influence with Congress, and he could not see how anything was to be gained by the change. His letter to the President unquestionably reflected his true feelings about the matter."

19. Stryker, Andrew Johnson, p. 478.
20. Rhodes, History of the United States, Vol. 6, p. 173.
21. Stryker, Andrew Johnson, p. 478.
22. Stryker, Andrew Johnson, p. 476-483; Welles Diary,
Vol. 3, p. 146.
23. Stryker, Andrew Johnson, p. 478.
24. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, p. 500.
25. McPherson, Reconstruction, p. 307.
26. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p. 104.
27. Stryker, Andrew Johnson, p. 500.
28. McPherson, Reconstruction, p. 306.
29. McPherson, Reconstruction, pp. 306-307.
30. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, pp. 174-175.
31. Stryker, Andrew Johnson, pp. 478-479.
32. Coolidge, U.S. Grant, p. 257.
33. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, pp. 185-186.
34. Am. Hist. Rev. Vol. XIX, pp 110-111.
35. "Notes of Col. W.G. Moore," Am. Hist. Rev. Vol. XIX,
pp. 110-111.
36. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, p. 175.
37. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p. 385.
38. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p. 385.
39. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, pp. 182-183.
40. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, p. 207.
41. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, pp. 176-181.
42. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, pp. 176-181.
43. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, pp. 184-185.
44. "Notes of Col. W.G. Moore," Am. Hist. Rev., Vol. XIX, p. 111.
45. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, p. 186.

46. Welles, Diary Vol.3, p.187.
47. Welles, Diary Vol.3, p.187.
48. Welles faithfully records in his diary that Grant continued to attend the Cabinet meetings.
49. Welles, Diary, Vol.3, pp.186-188.
50. The act of July 18 provided that the Johnson State governments should be "subject in all respects to the military commanders of the respective districts and to the paramount authority of Congress". The commander of each district might remove any State, municipal or other official and fill his place subject only to the disapproval of the General of the Army (Grant). Rhodes, History of the United States VI, p.175.
51. Badeau, Grant in Peace, pp.567-569
52. Welles, Diary, Vol.3, p.189
53. "Notes of Col. W.G. Moore", Am.Hist.Rev. Vol.XIX, pp.112-113
54. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, pp.188,189
55. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p.569.
56. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, p.189.
57. Welles, Diary, Vol.3, p.193.
58. Badeau, Grant in Peace, pp.104-105.
59. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p.386.
60. Welles, Diary, Vol.2, p.606.
61. W.T. Sherman to Thomas Ewing, Sherman's Home Letters, pp.362-363.
62. Welles, Diary, Vol.3, pp.233-234.
63. Welles, Diary, Vol.3, p.234.
64. Welles, Diary, Vol.3, p.234.
65. Welles, Diary, Vol.3, p.234.
66. Welles, Diary, Vol.3, pp.237,238.
67. Welles, Diary, Vol.3, pp.245-249.
68. Welles, Diary, Vol.3, p.189

Chapter VI.

1. McPherson, Reconstruction, p.176.
2. McPherson, Reconstruction, p.284.
3. McPherson, Reconstruction, p.283.
4. McPherson, Reconstruction, p.284.
5. McPherson, Reconstruction, p.284.
6. "Notes of Col.W.G. Moore," Am.Hist.Rev. Vol.XIX, p.115.
7. "Notes of Col.W.G. Moore," Am. Hist.Rev.Vol.XIX, p.115-116.
8. "Notes of Col.W.G. Moore," Am.Hist.Rev. Vol.XIX, pp.114-115.
9. W.T. Sherman, Memoirs, Vol.2, p.421.
10. McPherson, Reconstruction, p.283.
11. McPherson, Reconstruction, p.285.
12. Welles, Diary, Vol.3, p.258.
13. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p.111
14. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p.94.
15. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p.111.
16. W.T. Sherman, Memoirs, Vol.2, pp.422-423; Badeau, Grant in Peace, p.111.
17. Rhodes, History of United States, 1850-1896, Vol.6, p.212.
18. Flower, Stanton, p.370.
19. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p.110.
20. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p.111.
21. W.T. Sherman Memoirs, pp.420-421.
22. McPherson, Reconstruction, p.262.
23. Rhodes, Vol. 6, History of the United States, 1850-1896.
Footnote p.211.
24. Gorham, Edwin M. Stanton, Vol.2, p.428.
25. James G. Blaine, Twenty Years in Congress, 2 volumes,
(Norwich, Conn. The Henry Bill Publishing Co., 1884),
Hereafter cited as Blaine, Twenty Years; Vol.2, p.350

26. Gorham, Stanton, Vol. 2, p. 429.
27. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p. 112.
28. "Notes of Col. W. G. Moore", Am.Hist.Rev. Vol.XIX, pp. 115-116.
29. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, pp.259-260.
30. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, pp. 259-260.
31. W. T. Sherman, Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 422.
32. National Intelligencer, Thurs., Jan. 16, 1868, Vol. LXIX, No. 10, 19th, p. 189.
(Column under date Jan. 15)
33. W. T. Sherman, Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 423.
34. W. T. Sherman, Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 423.
35. McPherson, Reconstruction, p. 285 and 286.
36. W. T. Sherman, Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 423.
37. Home Letters of General Sherman, p. 365.
38. "Notes of Col. W. G. Moore", Am.Hist.Rev. Vol.XIX, p.116.
39. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, p. 262.
40. Home Letters of General Sherman, p. 365.
41. W. T. Sherman, Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 427.
42. W. T. Sherman, Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 427.
43. Am. Hist. Rev. Vol. XIX, p. 116.
44. W. T. Sherman, Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 424.
45. Flower in his biography of Stanton (Flower; Edwin McMasters Stanton, p. 330) states that through a soldier detailed at the White House Stanton knew all that transpired at the executive mansion and knew the purpose of Grant's visit before hand and prepared for it.
The report came to Secretary Welles through Postmaster General Randall that Stanton "put on an imperious and angry look, and spoke loud and violently of some matter that offended him, which completely awed Grant, who sat and smoked his cigar, but preserved his remarkable quality of reticence for half an hour, when, without saying a word, he quietly left."
Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, pp. 273-274.
46. W. T. Sherman, Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 424.
47. "notes of Col. W.G. Moore". Am. Hist. Rev. vol. XIX, pp. 117, 118.

48. Schofield, Forty-Six Years in the Army; N. Y. 1897, p. 413 quoted in Stryker, Andrew Johnson, p. 542.
49. Home Letters of General Sherman, p. 367.
50. Badeau, Grant in Peace, pp. 126,127.
51. Mc Pherson, Reconstruction, p. 283.
52. Am. Hist. Rev., Vol. XIX, p. 117.
53. McPherson, Reconstruction, p. 283.
54. W. T. Sherman, Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 424.
55. Home Letters of General Sherman, p. 361.
56. Home Letters of General Sherman, p. 369.
57. Home Letters of General Sherman, p. 368.
58. W. T. Sherman, Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 425.
59. Home Letters of General Sherman, p. 369.
60. National Intelligencer, Vol. LXIX, No. 10,190.
Jan. 18, 1896.
61. Home Letters of General Sherman, p. 371.
62. National Intelligencer, Saturday, Jan. 25, 1868,
Vol. LXIX, No. 10, 194.
63. Home Letters of General Sherman, p. 371.
64. Home Letters of General Sherman, p. 375.
65. McPherson, Reconstruction, pp. 283-284.
66. McPherson, Reconstruction, p. 284.
67. Home Letters of General Sherman, p. 369.
68. Home Letters of General Sherman, p. 369.
69. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p. 127.
70. Home Letters of General Sherman, pp. 369-370
71. McP herson, Reconstruction, p. 284.
72. McPherson, Reconstruction, pp. 284-286.
73. Mc Pherson, Reconstruction, pp. 286-287.

74. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, pp. 269-270.
75. "Notes of Col. W. G. Moore", Am.Hist.Rev., Vol.XIX,p.118.
76. McPherson, Reconstruction, pp. 287-288.
77. Mc Pherson, Reconstruction, p. 292.
78. Mc Pherson, Reconstruction, p. 284.
79. McPherson, Reconstruction, p. 283.
80. W. T. Sherman, Memoirs, Vol. 2, 423.
81. Am. Hist. Rev., Vol. XIX, p. 115.
82. Am. Hist. Rev., Vol. XIX, pp. 116-116.
83. McPherson, Reconstruction, p. 285.
84. McPherson , Reconstruction, p. 284.
85. Mc Pherson,Reconstruction, p. 286.
86. Badeau, Grant in Peace, pp. 110-112.
87. Am. Hist. Rev., Vol. XIX, p. 115.
88. Mc Pherson, Reconstruction, p. 285.
89. Badeau, Grant in Peace, pp. 113-114.
90. Mc Pherson, Reconstruction, p. 284.
91. McPherson, Reconstruction , p. 286.
92. Badeau, Grant in Peace, pp. 113-114.
93. McPherson, Reconstruction, p. 285.
94. McPherson, Reconstruction, p. 284.
95. McPherson, Reconstruction, p. 289.
96. McPherson, Reconstruction, p. 291.
97. McPherson, Reconstruction, p. 290.
98. McPherson, Reconstruction, p. 285.
99. McPherson, Reconstruction, p. 284.
100. McPherson, Reconstruction, p. 289.

101. McPherson, Reconstruction, p. 291.
102. McPherson, Reconstruction, p. 290.
103. McPherson, Reconstruction, p. 285.
104. Mc Pherson, Reconstruction, p. 291.
105. McPherson, Reconstruction, p. 290.
106. McPherson, Reconstruction, p. 286 (Italics by author)
107. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p. 53.
108. Badeau, Grant in Peace, pp. 567, 569.
109. Coolidge, U. S. Grant, p. 252.
110. McPherson, Reconstruction, p. 286.
111. Badeau, Grant in Peace, pp. 109-110.
112. McPherson, Reconstruction, p. 286.
113. W. T. Sherman, Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 421.
114. "Notes of Col. W. G. Moore", Am. Hist. Rev., Vol. XIX,
pp. 117-118.
115. McPherson, Reconstruction, p. 289.
116. McPherson, Reconstruction, p. 289.
117. W. T. Sherman, Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 423.
118. McPherson, Reconstruction, p. 285.
119. Stryker, Andrew Johnson, pp. 758, 759.
120. Grant to I. N. Morris Jan. 20, 1864; McPherson,
Reconstruction, p. 295.
121. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p. 33.
122. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p. 33.
123. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p. 33.
124. Garland, Ulysses S. Grant, p. 347.
125. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p. 47.
126. Flower, Stanton, pp. 307-308

127. Beale, The Critical Year, p. 307.
128. Beale, The Critical Year, pp. 305,307.
129. Welles, Diary, Vol. 2, p. 592.
130. Grant, Memoirs, Vol. 1, pp.255,256.
131. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p. 114.
132. J. H. Wilson, Life of John A. Rawlins p. 334, quoted in Beale, The Critical Year, p. 307.
133. Beale, The Critical Year, pp. 307-309.
134. Beale, The Critical Year, pp. 307-309.
135. Badeau, Grant in Peace, pp. 73,74.
136. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, p. 15.
137. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, p. 121.
138. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, pp. 180,181.
139. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, pp. 184-185.
140. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, pp.196.
141. Sherman to Thomas Ewing, Oct. 18, 1865, in Home Letters of General Sherman, p. 362.
142. Rhodes, History of the United States, Vol.6,p.204.
143. John Sherman to W. T. Sherman, The Sherman Letters, p. 299.
144. Rhodes, History of the U.S., Vol.6, p. 204.
145. John Sherman, Recollections, Vol. 2, pp.415-416.
146. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, pp. 185-186.
147. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p. 385.
148. Am. Hist. Rev., Vol. XIX, p. 109.
149. Mc Pherson, Reconstruction, p. 261.
150. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, p. 196 quoted in Stryker, Andrew Johnson, p. 505.
151. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, pp. 244-245.

152. Wilson, Rawlins, pp. 337-338.
153. Wilson, Rawlins, p. 338.
154. Wilson, Rawlins, p. 338.
155. Wilson, Rawlins, pp. 470-502.
156. Wilson, Rawlins, p. 341.
157. Edward Stanwood, A History of the Presidency from 1788 to 1897, 2 volumes, (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., The Riverside Press Cambridge 1898), hereafter cited as Stanwood, History of the Presidency; Vol. 1, p. 317.
158. Stanwood, History of the Presidency, Vol. 1, p.317.
159. Blaine, Twenty Years in Congress, Vol.2, pp.251-252.
160. Blaine, Twenty Years in Congress, Vol. 2, pp.351,352.
161. Home Letters of General Sherman, pp. 374-375.
162. Home Letters of General Sherman, p. 375.
163. Stryker, Andrew Johnson, p. 542.
164. Wilson, Rawlins, p. 348.
165. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p. 114.
166. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p. 114.
167. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p. 134.
168. Blaine, Twenty Years in Congress, Vol. 2, p. 252.
169. Wilson, Rawlins, p. 348.
170. Wilson, Rawlins, p. 348.

Chapter VI.

1. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, p. 278.
2. National Intelligencer, Thurs. Feb. 6, 1888, Vol. LXIX,
No. 10,199 p. 1.
3. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, p. 269.
4. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, p. 276.
5. Stryker, Andrew Johnson, p. 554.
6. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, p. 271.
7. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, p. 270.
8. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, p. 234.
9. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, pp. 237,238.
10. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, p. 234.
11. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, p. 271.
12. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, p. 271.
13. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, p. 272.
14. "Notes of Col. W. G. Moore", Am.Hist.Rev., Vol. XIX,
p. 118.
15. Badeau, Grant in Peace, pp. 330,331.
16. W. T. Sherman, Memoirs, Vol. 2, pp. 432,433.
17. W. T. Sherman, Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 431.
18. Home Letters of General Sherman, p. 372.
19. W. T. Sherman to Thomas Ewing, Home Letters of General Sherman, p. 373.
20. John Sherman, Recollections of Forty Years in the House, Senate and Cabinet, an Autobiography, 2 volumes,
(Chicago and New York: The Werner Co., 1895), here-
after cited as John Sherman, Recollections: Vol. 1, p.419.
21. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p. 131.
22. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, p. 282.

23. "Notes of Col. W. G. Moore", Am.Hist.Rev., Vol. XIX,
p. 120.
24. Rhodes, History of the United States, Vol. 6, p.216.
25. Rhodes, History of the United States, Vol. 6, p. 217.
26. Rhodes, History of the United States, Vol. 6, p.217.
27. Stryker, Andrew Johnson, p. 561. (Stryker quotes from records of the impeachment trial of Johnson).
28. Stryker, Andrew Johnson, p. 561.
29. Rhodes, History of the United States, Vol. 6, p. 218;
Flower, Stanton, p. 334.
30. Flower, Stanton, p. 333.
31. Rhodes, History of the United States, Vol. 6, p. 219.
32. Flower, Stanton, p. 342.
33. Gorham, Stanton, Vol. 2, pp. 440,441.
34. Gorham, Stanton, Vol. 2, p. 442.
35. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, pp. 288,289.
36. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, pp. 288,289.
37. Stryker, Andrew Johnson, p. 570. (Stryker quotes from the records of the Trial of Johnson.)
38. "Notes of Col. W.G.Moore," Amer. Hist. Rev., Vol. XIX,
No. 1, pp. 122, 123.
39. Rhodes, History of the United States, Vol. 6, p. 224.
40. Amer. Hist. Rev. Vol. XIX, p. 123.
41. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p. 134.
42. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p. 134.
43. New York Tribune, Sat. April 4, 1868 quoted in noted of
Amer. Hist. Rev., Vol. XIX, p. 129.
44. "Notes of Col. W.G.Moore," Amer. Hist. Rev., Vol. XIX,
No. 1, Oct. 1913, P. 131.
45. Badeau, Grant in Peace, pp. 135, 140; Boutwell, Sixty Years, pp. 74,75.

46. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p. 136.
47. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p. 136.
48. Winston, Andrew Johnson, p. 475.
49. Rhodes, History of the United States, Vol. 6, pp. 237, 238.
50. Schofield's Forty Six Years, p.413 quoted in Rhodes,
History of the United States, Vol. 6, pp. 213, 214.
51. Rhodes, History of the United States,^{Vol. 6,} p. 224.
52. New York Tribune May 15, 1868, quoted in Stryker,
Andrew Johnson, p. 719.
53. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p. 137.
54. Badeau, Grant in Peace, p. 137.
55. Blaine, Twenty Years in Congress, Vol. 2, P. 449.
56. Blaine, Twenty Years in Congress, Vol. 2, p. 689.
57. Blaine, Twenty Years in Congress, Vol. 2, p. 455.
58. Blaine, Twenty Years in Congress, Vol. 2, p. 455.
59. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, pp. 176, 181.
60. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, pp. 467, 468.
61. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, pp. 467. 468.
62. Winston, Andrew Johnson, p. 475.
63. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, p, 494.
64. Winston, Andrew Johnson, p. 475.
65. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, p. 491.
66. Burgess, Reconstruction and the Constitution, p. 218,
quoted in Stryker, Andrew Johnson, p. 770.
67. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, p. 500.
68. Welles, Diary, Vol. 3, p. 539.
69. Stryker, Andrew Johnson, p. 820 who quoted from the
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