

TERROR ATTACKS AND THE DURATION OF CIVIL WAR

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Abstract

Several factors that scholars have thought relate to the duration of civil war including: low per capita income, ethnic divisions, resources/contraband, and terrain were found to have no correlation to the duration of civil war. Another factor that scholars have suggested relates to the duration of civil war is rebel group strength. It has been found that a rebel group with weak military capacity may prolong a civil war. Weak rebel groups use irregular tactics and an irregular tactic that a weak rebel group may use is terrorist attacks. The contribution of this thesis is that it analyzes a variable that few scholars have looked at which is tactics, specifically terrorist attacks, to see whether or not terrorist attacks are related to the duration of civil war. The findings suggest that the number of terror attacks relates to the duration of civil war. A high number of terrorist attacks is a sufficient condition, but not a necessary condition for a prolonged civil war.

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Introduction

From 1975 to 2007 there have been approximately 156 civil wars that have caused economic turmoil and have taken countless lives in countries around the world. The duration of civil war varies from country to country and scholars are unsure as to what factors increase the duration of civil war. Literature suggests that the duration of civil war may be longer when a rebel group is weak. It is also suggested that a weak rebel group may use the tactic of terror attacks. This thesis seeks to tie the two areas of research together by quantitatively and qualitatively researching the relationship between terror attacks and the duration of civil war.

Peru is an example of a country that experienced a long lasting civil war. The civil war, according to the Correlates of War database, lasted ten years and six months. During that time, 70,000 people died. While researching about the conflict in English, the conflict is always referred to as civil war. In contrast, in Lima, Peru the conflict was never referred to as civil war, but rather terrorism. On the other hand, in the highlands town of Ayacucho, Peru, the conflict was referred to as an internal war. Ayacucho is where the rebel/terrorist group Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) began. The region experienced intense fighting between the Shining Path and the military. The Shining Path sought to overthrow the government and control the state. Learning about the conflict in Peru, is what really started me thinking about how terrorist attacks and civil wars, especially those in which rebel groups are vying for control of the central government, may relate to one another.

Some civil wars last longer than others and there is no clear consensus as to how terrorism plays a role in duration. This is related to the general literature on civil war duration. A plethora of factors have been studied to determine the influences on duration of civil wars. Some

scholars have suggested that per capita income influences duration (Collier, 2004). Some have suggested that certain types of terrain may relate to the duration of civil war (DeRouen and Sobek, 2004). Other scholars have researched whether or not the strength of the rebel group may influence the duration (Buhaug et al., 2009; Cunningham et al., 2009).

Even though all sorts of variables that may influence the duration of civil war have been analyzed, one possible factor that few scholars have researched in detail is the relationship between tactics and the duration of civil war. Tactics may vary from group to group and they may also vary during a conflict. Indeed, one tactic that may be used by a weak rebel group is terrorist attacks.

This paper adds to the research on the duration of civil war and factors that may influence duration. It looks at tactics specifically terrorist attacks. This paper seeks to answer the question: Is there a relationship between the number of terrorist attacks and the duration of civil war?

I approach this question by building on the theory that the duration of civil war is related to weak military capacity. In this case, weak military capacity is explored as a type of tactic, specifically terrorist attacks. The data I use is primarily from the Correlates of War database and the Global Terrorism Database. I also adopt a mixed methods approach for the analysis. The quantitative methodology will be used to analyze the cases and the methods used are descriptive statistics and statistical analysis. A qualitative case study will also be done on one of the outliers.

This research paper proceeds as follows. Section one is a literature review which examines several factors that are thought to relate to the duration of civil war including: low per capita income, ethnic divisions, resources/contraband, terrain, and the strength of the rebel

group. The contribution of this thesis is that it analyzes a variable that few scholars have looked at which is tactics, specifically terrorist attacks, to see whether or not terrorist attacks are related to the duration of civil war. Section two, the theory portion of the paper, introduces the weak rebel theory. The weak rebel theory is based on findings that suggest a rebel group with weak military capacity may relate to a long duration of civil war. Weak rebel groups use irregular tactics. An irregular tactic that a weak rebel group may use is terrorist attacks. Thus, it is hypothesized that there is a relationship between terrorist attacks and duration of civil war. In section three, the reader will find the research design. Section four shares the data analysis. The results of the study find that there is a moderate, positive relationship between the number of terrorist attacks and the duration of civil war. The data analysis also shows that the condition of terrorist attacks is a sufficient condition for prolonged duration. This means that if there are a high number of terrorist attacks there is a long duration of civil war, but not all civil wars with a long duration have a high number of terrorist attacks. The data analysis also contains an in depth case study of Peru. Finally, the paper is tied together in the conclusion which reiterates the key findings. None of the previously suggested variables: low per capita income, ethnic divisions, or mountainous terrain are found to relate to the duration of civil war in this study. There is a relationship between the number of terrorist attacks and the duration of civil war. A high number of terrorist attacks was found to be a sufficient condition, but not a necessary condition for a prolonged civil war.

Literature Review

While it is apparent that some civil wars last longer than others, it is unclear as to why the duration varies. Key variables that scholars suggest influence the duration of civil war include: lower per capita income, ethnic divisions, resources/contraband, terrain, and the strength of the

rebel group. Scholars have been looking for what conditions are necessary to explain the prolonged duration of civil war. Instead of finding necessary conditions, so far what scholars have found is several sufficient conditions. This means that if the condition (variable) is present there will be a long duration of civil war, but there may also be a long duration of civil war even if the condition is not present. One condition that few scholars have analyzed is whether or not tactics, specifically the tactic of terrorist attacks, relates to the duration of civil war.

One factor that is thought to relate to an increased duration of civil war is low per capita income. Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler and Måns Söderbom (2004) find that low per capita income in a country is related to an increased duration of civil war. They found that “a 10% increase in per capita income is associated with a 5% reduction in the duration of conflict” (Collier et al., 2004). This is because a higher per capita income is associated with higher opportunity costs for the society due to conflict (Collier et al., 2004). So, a lower per capita income would mean that opportunity costs are lower and it may make it easier and less expensive to recruit people to join the rebel cause. On the other hand, James Fearon (2004) suggests there is no relationship between a nation’s income level and civil war.

Another possible factor that has been suggested as influencing duration is ethnic divisions. Paul Collier et al. (2004) found that moderate ethnic fractionalization may play a role in the increased duration of civil war. It has also been found that ethnic wars tend to last longer (DeRouen and Sobek, 2004). It is suggested that ethnic wars are harder to resolve.

The influence that natural resources have on the duration of civil war is not so clear and there have been varied findings. Ross (2004) suggests that gemstones, coca, opium and cannabis seem to lengthen civil war. He finds that oil, on the other hand, is not linked to conflict duration.

Fearon (2004) also finds that contraband which may include gems, coca, and opium may make for longer civil wars. However, Buhaug, Gates and Lujala (2009) find that gemstones and petroleum do have a relationship with the duration of civil war, but drugs do not relate to the duration of the conflict. In terms of natural resources and which relate to the duration of civil war, it seems that the results are inconclusive. Gemstones, drugs and petroleum have all been found to relate to the increased duration of civil war by at least one scholar.

Another area that has been hypothesized to play a role in influencing civil war duration is terrain. The focus on terrain may have been inspired by Che Guevara's quotation about terrain that is favorable to guerrilla warfare. He wrote, "Guerrilla fighting will not always take place in country most favorable to the employment of its tactics; but when it does, that is, when the guerrilla band is located in zones difficult to reach, either because of dense forests, steep mountains, impassable deserts or marshes, the general tactics, based on the fundamental postulates of guerrilla warfare, must always be the same" (Hendrix, 2011, p. 345). Scholars have found differing results in regards to the role that terrain may play in the duration of civil war. DeRouen and Sobek (2004) suggest that mountainous terrain offers a cover that usually helps rebels. Forest cover was not necessarily found to help rebels defeat the state, but it was found to increase the probability of a prolonged duration (DeRouen and Sobek, 2004). Collier et al. (2004) found that neither mountainous terrain nor forest coverage were significant. They suggest that if the rebels were able to become strong enough to be involved in a conflict that became a civil war it could be continued militarily without the need for favorable geography. Thus, there is no clear consensus as to whether or not terrain increases duration of civil war.

The duration of civil war may also relate to another possible factor which is the strength of the rebel group. Buhaug et al. (2009) suggest that conflicts in which the rebels have weak

military capacity tend to last longer. Along the same lines, Collier et al. (2004) suggest that increased external military support for rebels shortens conflicts. This is because the increased external military support would mean that the rebels no longer have weak military capacity and thus the rebels are more equal in capacity to the state. This equality or near equality in military capacity often leads to negotiations (Hultquist, 2013). These studies find that the strength of a rebel group relates to the duration of civil war.

A factor that may help a weak rebel group is the location of the rebel group's stronghold. It is suggested that the distance from the center of government may correlate to increased civil war duration (Fearon, 2004; Buhaug et al., 2009; Cunningham et al., 2009). Conflicts that are closer to the border of the country may also relate to increased civil war duration. To summarize, location may influence duration of civil war in conflicts where the rebel group is located far from the center of government and close to the border of the country.

However, these factors examine national level characteristics and how the characteristics may relate to duration. Another body of civil war research focuses on analyzing the dyadic relationship between rebel group and state to determine how duration may be influenced.

Civil wars often start with a weak rebel group challenging the stronger state. In most cases in comparison to the state the rebel group lacks legitimacy and military capabilities (Clayton, 2013). There is also usually a large asymmetry in relative power between the rebel group and the state even when the state is considered to be a weak state (Hultquist, 2013). Due to their lack of military capabilities and legitimacy, the rebels have difficulty defeating the state at any point, but if the rebels make it through the first months their chance of winning increases and if the state does not achieve a quick victory the chance of government victory decreases (De

Rouen and Sobek, 2004). Rebels may appear to be significantly weaker than the state but as a conflict continues the chances of the state defeating the rebels decreases (Cunningham et al, 2005). Mason, Weingarten, Fett (1999) also, found that the government has less of a chance of overcoming the rebels as time progresses, but they added that this is not necessarily in favor of the rebels. They found that, “As conflicts become protracted, the most likely outcome is not a victory by either side but, instead, a negotiated settlement” (Mason et al., 1999, p. 264). Although the state wants to quickly defeat the rebels, using too strong of an army in an attempt to quickly defeat even a very weak rebel group could increase the duration of the war because the weak rebel group has the option of going into hiding (DeRoeun and Sobek, 2004).

The rebels may hide amongst the civilian population, in mountainous regions, or in forests and jungles. Hiding serves multiple purposes. For rebels with weak military capacity who do not engage in direct attacks, hiding makes it more difficult for the government to identify and target rebels. It can also increase recruitment for the rebels if the state military is overly zealous and indiscriminate and ends up killing civilians in attempts to target and eliminate rebels (Butler and Gates, 2009). If the rebels are able to become stronger and form a larger rebel group they would not be able to hide as easily nor would they want to because the goal would be to concentrate people in order to attempt to defeat the state military (Butler and Gates, 2009). Once the rebel group has been able to gain enough strength to attack the state military through means of conventional warfare the state may be willing to enter into negotiations (Clayton, 2013). Attacking the state military by means of conventional warfare shows that the rebel group is near parity with the state. In civil wars, this parity often leads to a settlement (Hultquist, 2013). Occasionally, rebel groups will become stronger than the state. When a rebel group has become stronger than the state it is unlikely that the group would be willing to settle or negotiate with the

state because the rebel group believes it would lose power in relation to the state (Hultquist, 2013). This scenario of the rebel group becoming more powerful than the state tends to be rare.

In most cases, a rebel group is weaker than the government military and too weak to directly attack the state, so it will attempt to hurt the state in ways that avoid direct encounters with the military (Hultman, 2007). As Hultquist states, “The hit-and-run tactics associated with the weak rebels, such as terrorism and guerrilla warfare, allow them to avoid direct conflict with the government forces and build military strength for a later period...” (Hultquist, 2013, p. 625). This suggests that weak rebels engaged in irregular or asymmetric warfare tend to use terrorist tactics.

This leads to the final factor which may relate to the strength of the rebel group which is tactics. Few scholars have looked at the types of tactics used by rebel groups during civil war. In terms of guerrilla warfare, Che Guevara wrote in the above quotation that the tactics must always be the same. But, perhaps this is not the case; although, as Ethan Beuno de Mesquita (2013) points out most scholars (with a few notable exceptions) have tended to treat rebel tactics in isolation of one another. He explains that the literature and theory on guerrilla warfare, terrorism, insurgency, conventional war fighting, etc. have all been separate from one another.

When looking at warfare, tactics are not always the same from conflict to conflict nor do they necessarily remain the same throughout a conflict. Mesquita (2013) suggests that rebels have two types of available tactics which they choose strategically in response to varying factors such as geographic and military constraints to name a few. Mesquita (2013) refers to the tactics as conventional and irregular. He suggests that when the rebels have a large number of fighters conventional tactics are most effective. In contrast, the irregular tactics such as terrorism or guerrilla attacks can be effective when used by even small groups. He later goes on to add that

when the rebel group is perceived as too weak to attract support, which would make conventional tactics a viable option, the rebels then turn to irregular tactics (Mesquita, 2013). This ties in with the Buhaug et al. (2009) theory on the rebel military capacity and the duration of civil war. If a rebel group has weak military capacity, then the group will most likely use irregular tactics. And, as Mesquita (2013) wrote, one tactic that weak rebel groups can use is terrorist attacks. This research takes this logic one step further and aims to find out whether or not the irregular tactic of terrorist attacks may relate to an increased duration of civil war.

While all of the above factors may influence the duration of civil war, when looking at the different studies, it becomes apparent that there is no general consensus and researchers have differing results. For instance, in regards to low per capita income as mentioned above, although Paul Collier et al. (2004) find that lower per capita income effects duration, that is low income is a sufficient, but not necessary condition for long duration of civil wars. However, other scholars find different results. For example, in 2009, Halvard Buhaug, Scott Gates, Paivi Lujala conducted research that found a weaker correlation between low per capita income and duration. And, James Fearon (2004) suggested that per capita income is insignificant to the duration of civil war that is it is neither a sufficient nor necessary condition for long duration of civil wars. So, in regards to the how per capita income relates to duration some researchers have found that there is an influence, while others have found that there is no influence.

Data and Definitions

How is it that so many scholars studying the same variables may come up with different results and conclusions? As Geddes (1990) suggests, the answer to the research question depends upon the cases that are chosen. Yet, the cases that are chosen often depend upon the available data, as well as the criteria that are used for inclusion. In the case of civil war research, scholars

use a small set of databases. Nicholas Sambanis (2004) writes that “most civil war lists rely heavily on the Correlates of War (COW) project” (p. 814). Another popular dataset is the UCPD/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. It includes conflicts that are defined as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” (UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, p. 1). It seems that many researchers choose one of the two above datasets and then modify and create his/her unique dataset.

Determining how exactly a researcher created his/her dataset can get a bit confusing. Sambanis has eleven coding rules that are used to identify what is or is not a case of civil war and when the case started and ended. He thoroughly explores the variations in civil war definitions and the differing ways to determine start and end dates for civil wars (Sambanis, 2004).

Thus, as established above, the Correlates of War is a reliable data set. The Correlates of War database defines intrastate war as a war that involves sustained combat, involving organized armed forces, resulting in a minimum of 1,000 battle-related combatant fatalities within a twelve month period. The Correlates of War database further subdivides intra-state wars into three types. Civil war is one of the types. Civil wars involve the government of the state against a non-state entity. From here, different criteria may be chosen as to which cases/countries are to be included in the study. For instance, this may be limited by the years that are chosen for the study. It may also be limited by which criteria for civil war are used.

There are different ways to divide civil wars into subsets. Buhaug (2006) suggests that “distinguishing between territorial and governmental conflicts provides additional insights into the correlates of civil war” (p. 706). Conveniently, in the Correlates of War database, the civil wars are divided into those that are for control of the central government and those that are over

local issues. This research will focus on those that are for government control. These categories are further divided into those that did or did not have international intervention. In this research, only the civil wars that did not have international intervention will be included because intervention changes the dynamics of the civil war. It has been found that conflicts with more actors tend to have a longer duration (Cunningham, 2006).

Defining civil war and duration is relatively clear-cut in comparison to definitions of terror or terrorist attacks. It has been said that few political terms have been as difficult to define (McCormick, 2003; Weinberg, et al. 2004; Stohl, 2007). There is an inability within the international community as well as amongst governments and scholars to establish a single definition for terrorism. Gordon McCormick explains that interest in studying terrorism began in the early 1970s. Decades later there has been little progress in establishing one all-encompassing, agreed upon definition for terrorism. He elaborates by saying, “[T]errorism has remained a contentious field of inquiry. One of the most controversial aspects of the subject involves its definition” (McCormick, 2003, p. 473). Michael Stohl (2007) adds, “Given the political context in which terrorism occurs it is not surprising that governments would have trouble agreeing upon a definition but scholars have also failed to consistently define (and thus as a consequence delimit) the behavior and thus the actors, organizations and events that should be included in the study of terror, terrorism, and terrorists” (p. 259). When attempting to search for the definition of terrorism, newcomers to the field soon realize that there is not one agreed upon definition for terrorism. It seems that international organizations, governments, news agencies/journalists, and scholars all define terrorism in different ways.

Yet, while many believe it is impossible to agree upon a definition of terrorism, others believe that terrorism must have a set definition so they go about trying to define terrorism.

Boaz Ganor (2002) said, “An objective definition of terrorism is not only possible; it is also indispensable to any serious attempts to combat terrorism” (p. 288). He adds that it is not enough for individuals “to say that what looks like a terrorist, sounds like a terrorist, and behaves like a terrorist is a terrorist” (Ganor, 2002, p. 287). Boaz Ganor and Alex Schmid look to international law to help define terrorism. Ganor (2002) says, “A correct and objective definition of terrorism can be based upon accepted international laws and principles regarding what behaviors are permitted in conventional wars between nations. These laws are set out in the Geneva and Hague Conventions which in turn are based upon the basic principle that the deliberate harming of soldiers during wartime is a necessary evil, and thus permissible, whereas the deliberate targeting of civilians is absolutely forbidden.” (p. 288) International law focuses on the distinction between civilian and combatant. Schmid (2004) explains, “Most of contemporary terrorism is not a fight against the armed forces of an opponent; rather it is ‘designed’ chiefly against civilian targets who ordinarily, according to the rules of land warfare, enjoy immunity from deliberate attack” (p. 204). This definition of terrorism looks at who is targeted in order to define terrorism.

While looking at who is targeted is one way to define terrorism, others think this definition does not include many of the important elements of terrorism and is too simplistic. Walter Laqueur has said, “Too much has been made, in my opinion, of the element of ‘noncombatant targets’ in order to define terrorism” (Laqueur, 2007, p. 20). There are many more elements that may be used to define terrorism.

Walter Laqueur, a terrorism scholar, does not find it surprising that it is so difficult to define terrorism but rather believes it is impossible to create one definition for terrorism. He has said, “No all-embracing definition will ever be found for the simple reason that there is not one

terrorism, but there have been many terrorisms, greatly differing in time and space, in motivation, and in manifestations and aims” (Laqueur, 2007, p. 20). Like Walter Laqueur, many agree that terrorism cannot be described or classified with a single definition, but nevertheless many continue to attempt to define terrorism.

And thus, since some semblance of a definition is needed for this research, a look back through history will help provide the basis for how terrorism is defined as a tactic. Charles Tilly explains the origins of the word terror. He writes, “The word terror itself first entered the West’s political vocabulary as a name for French revolutionaries’ actions against their domestic enemies in 1793 and 1794.” (Tilly, 2004, p. 8). At that time, terror referred to the government use of terror and repression mainly through executions (Tilly, 2004). Approximately fifty years later, one of the first written justifications for the use of terrorism by a revolutionary group was penned by the radical German publicist Karl Heinzen (McCormick, 2003). He wrote in 1849 which was the year after the Communist Manifesto had been published and it was during the start of the revolutionary outbreak in Europe. Karl Heinzen wrote an essay explaining the importance of terrorism as a tactic (p. 475). In the essay he wrote that he was in agreement that killing is immoral; but he argued that in the context of a murderous tyrannical regime murder is self-defense. He wrote that in order to fight against an immoral, murderous tyranny “revolutionaries must turn their weakness into a political strength by pursuing an offsetting strategy of high-profile violence” (McCormick, 2003, p. 475). In other words, terrorism is a violent strategy or tactic that may be used by the weak non-state actor. This simple definition will be used as the basis for the conceptual definition of terrorism. As Martha Crenshaw said, “The observation that terrorism is a weapon of the weak is hackneyed but apt” (Crenshaw, 1981, p. 387)

Going back to the saying that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” succinctly summarizes why terrorism is so hard to define. It is often defined in terms of the individual and there tends to be an emotional debate surrounding who is or is not a terrorist. Following in line with researcher, Jakana Thomas (2014), this paper circumvents the debate of who is and who is not a terrorist by focusing on the tactic rather than the individual. Thomas looks to the definitions and reasoning’s of the researchers Tilly and Lake as to why it is justifiable to assert that as Thomas summarized, “any actor can employ terror” (Thomas, 2014, p.2). And while any actor can employ terror as a tactic, terror attacks by the state are now often renamed as possibly genocide or crimes against humanity and thus fall outside of the area of research for this study. Only terror attacks by rebel groups are analyzed in this paper.

Ironically, the scholarship on terrorism and civil war rarely overlap. Sanchez-Cuenca and de la Calle (2009) write, “The focus on international terrorism is unfortunate” (p. 32). This is because as they say, “Domestic terrorism represents by far the greatest part of all terrorist violence” (p. 32). And, terrorism usually, but not always, takes place during political conflicts (Schmid, 2004). With these two ideas in mind that terrorism is predominately domestic and that domestic terrorism takes place during conflicts one can see that terrorism or terror attacks can take place during civil war.

In the past decade, there has been a growing interest in seeing how the two fields of study relate. Some recent researchers have begun to see how important it is to study the fields together (Findley and Young, 2012; Stanton, 2013; Thomas, 2014). Findley and Young (2012) write, “Most current research on these topics either explicitly or implicitly separates the two, in spite of compelling reasons to consider them together...we examine the extent to which terrorism and civil war overlap and then unpack various temporal and spatial patterns” (p. 285). They do this

by coding geographic coordinates for the terrorist attacks that are in the Global Terrorism Database. They then map the attacks to see how they relate to civil wars in countries. Their data shows “a high degree of overlap between terrorism and ongoing civil war...” (Findley and Young, 2012, p. 285). Findley and Young through their geo-referencing are able to show that terror attacks occur during civil war. Stanton (2013) states, “Although scholars have focused primarily on transnational terrorism, much of the terrorism occurring worldwide is domestic terrorism carried out by rebel groups fighting in civil wars” (p. 1009).

What are the outcomes when rebel groups use terror attacks during civil war? Fortna (2011) specifically looks at the outcomes of civil wars when rebels use terror attacks.¹ She notes that terrorists do not win civil wars and she finds that civil wars last longer when terrorism is involved (Fortna, 2011). Her study first attempts to identify whether or not a rebel group should be classified as terrorist or not terrorist. Her study also differs in that she uses the Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan dataset (the UPCD/PRIO dataset) rather than the Correlates of War dataset.

This study does not try to identify a rebel group as terrorist or not terrorist. It assumes that any actor can employ terror attacks as a strategy. And, it seeks to find the relationship between the numbers of terror attacks that a rebel group uses during a civil war and the duration of civil war. This thesis relies on the Global Terrorism Database for the operational definition of terrorism as well as for calculating the number of terror attacks in a country. From 1970 to 1997 the Global Terrorism Database defined terrorism as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation” (Global Terrorism Database). The definition of terrorism from

¹ She did not publish her paper or results but a draft version was available online.

1998 to 2007 became slightly more nuanced. It is still conceived as “an intentional act of violence or threat of violence by a non-state actor” but it also had to meet two of three criteria which include: “the violent act was aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal; the violent act included evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate or convey some message to a larger audience (or audiences) rather than the immediate victims; and the violent act was outside the precepts of International Humanitarian Law” (Global Terrorism Database). The database was used for the number of individual terror attacks that have occurred domestically within a country. The attacks were then added together for the duration of the civil war to see if there is a correlation between the number of attacks and the duration of civil war.

Thomas (2014) also uses the Global Terrorism Database. Her study finds that in civil war in Africa, “rebel groups are more likely to be granted the opportunity to participate in negotiations and offered more concessions when they execute a greater number of terror attacks during civil wars” (Thomas, 2014, p. 1). These results seem to differ from Fortna (2011) in that negotiations and concessions; although not an outright victory for a rebel group, also do not seem to be a loss for a rebel group as Fortna found. Fortna’s findings also suggested that the duration is longer in civil wars in which rebel groups use terror attacks, but Thomas’s study suggests that within months of terror attacks negotiations and concessions may follow (Thomas, 2014). The different findings may be due to the fact that only African civil wars are tested, but Thomas writes that “there is no reason to expect the results will not hold outside of the region” (Thomas, 2014, p. 13). Yet, there is a chance that the results may vary if other regions are included in the study. Africa may be different than other parts of the world in terms of civil war outcome and duration. For instance, some studies have shown that civil wars in Africa are harder for governments to win and tend to last longer (DeRouen and Sobek, 2004).

This leads back to the idea that there is a lot of variation in the way that a researcher chooses data and definitions. Many factors that may influence the duration of civil war such as: low per capita income, ethnic fractionalization, terrain, access to natural resources or contraband and the strength of a rebel group have all been suggested to have an effect on duration. This study seeks to contribute to this existing body of research by looking at a specific tactic which is terror attacks that a weak rebel group may use. In doing so, the fields of civil war research and terrorism research are being combined. In the past, due to lack of data as well as debates in regards to definitions, few scholars have studied terror attacks and the relation that the attacks may have on the duration of civil war. Now that data is available through the Global Terrorism Database it is possible to do a quantitative study. This thesis contributes to the field by helping to fill a gap in the literature between terror attacks and civil war duration. Specifically, the contribution of this thesis is that it will quantitatively calculate the total number of terror attacks that occur during a civil war, which is fought for control of the central government and has no international intervention, to see if there is a relationship between the number of terror attacks committed by a rebel group and the duration of civil war.

Theory

While several theories have been proposed suggesting different factors that may relate to duration of civil war, this research seeks to add to the theory that there is a relationship between the strength of a rebel group and the duration of civil war. In 2009, Halvard Buhaug, Scott Gates, and Paivi Lujala (2009) suggested that conflicts in which rebels have weak military capacity tend to last longer.

This study builds on the theory of weak rebels and irregular tactics. Mesquita suggests that weak rebel groups will resort to irregular tactics such as terrorism. This is because a rebel group that is too weak to directly attack the state military will attempt to attack the state in ways that avoid direct encounters with the military (Hultman, 2007). As Hultquist (2013) says, “The hit-and-run tactics associated with the weak rebels, such as terrorism and guerrilla warfare, allow them to avoid direct conflict with the government forces...” (p. 625). If this is tied in with the Buhaug et al. (2009) suggestion that conflicts in which rebels have weak military capacity tend to last longer; it may be assumed that conflicts in which weak rebels use the tactic of terrorist attacks may last longer. This may be referred to as the weak rebel theory. One implication of the weak rebel theory is that the tactic that a weak rebel group may choose to use, in this case specifically terrorist tactics, influences the duration of the civil war.

The hypothesis is that there is a relationship between the number of terrorist attacks in a country during a civil war and the duration of the civil war. Given the complexity of the civil war and terrorist attacks, the hypothesis is testing correlation rather than a direct test of causation. This is because even in the literature, the direction of causation between number of terrorist attacks and duration of civil war is unclear.

Research Design

While many factors may influence the duration of civil war, the theory that is guiding this research is that weak military capacity is related to an increased duration of civil war. Since weak military capacity is being conceptualized as a specific type of irregular tactic, terrorist attacks, the assumption is that terrorist attacks will relate to duration of civil war.

The key dependent variable is civil war duration. The generally agreed upon definition of civil war is that the conflict is an intra-state war that results in a minimum of 1,000 battle-related fatalities per year. Civil wars are a type of intra-state war that involves the government of a state and a rebel group (a non-state entity). Countries included are those categorized in the Correlates of War database as civil wars that were fought for control of the central government. Civil wars that were fought over local issues were not included in the study. The literature suggests that rebel groups fighting for control of the central government tend to use a wide range of tactics to achieve their desired goal. Also, only civil wars that did *not* have international intervention were included. The duration of the civil war was considered to be the length of time that the civil war lasted in months as recorded by the Correlates of War database.

The key independent variable is terrorist attacks. How best to define terrorism is an ongoing debate, but this study adopts Thomas's (2014) definition that considers terrorist attacks to be a tactic and thus are viable options for any actor. The Global Terrorism Database is the first comprehensive database to collect data on domestic terrorist attacks. It does not include terrorist acts which are known to be committed by the state.

Other independent variables include other factors that may influence the duration of civil war. These variables include the per capita income of a country and ethnic fractionalization. Ethnic divisions may be formed in a country based on a common racial, linguistic, religious, tribal, or cultural origin/background. These ethnic divisions may cause ethnic fractionalization. Natural resources and terrain also may play a role in civil war duration. Also, for this study terrain is conceptualized as the percentage of mountainous terrain.

The data collected and analyzed is quantitative. For the key dependent variable, the duration of civil war, the Correlates of War database is being used. The civil wars included in the study range in starting date from 1975 to 2007. They are civil wars that are fought against a rebel group for control of the state government and there is no international intervention. In total, 42 cases were selected from the Correlates of War database. Many of the countries had more than one civil war during the time period included in the study. The duration was calculated from the Correlates of War database in months.

Data from the Global Terrorism Database was used for the key independent variable. The number of terrorist attacks per month that a country experienced during the duration of its civil war were added together to give the total number of terrorist attacks. Data for the Global Terrorism Database began being collected in 1970, but it was not considered to be very thorough until 1975. This is why the civil wars included in the study are from 1975 onward.

Another independent variable that is included in the study is per capita income. This data comes from the World Bank. The data was presented in the GDP per capita in US dollars. For each country, the GDP per capita in US dollars was found and recorded for the first year of the conflict.

For the independent variables of ethnic division and the percentage of mountainous terrain the operational definitions were established by James Fearon and David Laitin (2003). This is because their data was used and replicated for these two variables in this study. Ethnic fractionalization in their study was defined based on only one dimension which was ethnolinguistic groups. They conceptualized it as the chance that individuals selected at random would be of the same ethnolinguistic group. Calculating the percent of mountainous terrain is a

difficult task which is explained in more detail by Fearon and Laitin. A number of scholars studying civil war tend to use the Fearon and Laitin (2003) variables.

The data used in this study are both primary and secondary sources. The data includes data from: the Fearon and Laitin dataset (2003), the World Bank, the Global Terrorism Database, and the Correlates of War Database. The years included in the study are limited to the data available in Global Terrorism Database and then matched with the Correlates of War. The Global Terrorism Database began in 1970, but the year of 1975 was chosen as the start year for this study for the cases/countries selected because before this time data in the Global Terrorism Database was thought to be less thorough and comprehensive. The latest date for the start of a civil war in the current Correlates of War database is 2007. In total 42 cases were selected based on the dates of 1975 to 2007. Five cases had no terrorism data so they were eliminated from the study. This left a total of 37 cases. The research was limited to a certain extent by the secondary data that was available.


The methodology used is quantitative and qualitative with 37 county level cases in the study. One of the outliers, Peru, is chosen as an in-depth a case study to explain the process and how weak rebels use terrorist attacks. The methods are descriptive statistics and statistical tests which are discussed in greater detail in the following section.

Analysis

The data set has 37 cases that only include the wars that were fought for governmental control and did not have international intervention between 1975 and 2007. Figure 1 shows the total number of terrorist attacks that each country experienced during the duration of its civil

war. The two outliers in Figure 1 are El Salvador and Peru. Peru and El Salvador each experienced more than five-thousand terrorist attacks during the time the country was engaged in a civil war. According to the Global Terrorism Database, after all terrorist attacks were summed during the time the country was engaged in civil war there were 5,425 terrorist attacks. El Salvador experienced 5,020 attacks. There were only three other countries that experienced over one-thousand terrorist attacks. They were Algeria, Guatemala and Nicaragua. Sri Lanka also experienced a high number of attacks at 930 attacks.

Figure1. Number of Terrorist Attacks per Country




Source: Global Terrorism Database N=37

The cases of El Salvador and Peru were removed from the majority of the descriptive and statistical analysis so they would not skew the results. Peru, since it had the highest number of terrorist attacks of any country, and this is the choice for the in-depth case study.

Figure 2 displays the duration in months of each civil war experienced in a particular country. The graph shows that Sudan, which experienced a civil war lasting 245 months or approximately 20 years, is an outlier. The other two outliers El Salvador and Peru, which were identified in the previous graph based on the very high number of terrorist attacks they experienced, also had very long lasting civil wars. The civil war in El Salvador lasted 151 months and the civil war in Peru lasted 126 months. There were three other countries that experienced a very long duration of civil war. The war in Afghanistan lasted 128 months. Nicaragua experienced a civil war lasting 97 months. And, the war in Algeria was 88 months. As mentioned previously, the two outliers due to the very high number of terrorist attacks of El Salvador and Peru are being removed from the descriptive and statistical analysis so they do not have a strong effect on the correlation. And, Sudan with its very long duration of civil war is also being removed which leaves 34 cases in the following analysis portions (unless otherwise mentioned and noted). In order to see graphs with the outliers removed for the total number of terrorist attacks per country and the duration of civil war in a country, please refer to the appendix.

Figure 2. Duration in Months per Country



Source: Correlates of War Database N=37

Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics. The average duration in months was 32 months. The duration range is 3 months in Rwanda in 1994 and the civil war in Syria to 128 months for the civil war in Afghanistan.

The average number of terrorist attacks in a country was 204 attacks. The standard deviation is 387 attacks and this is more than the mean number of attacks that indicates the existence of extreme outliers in the data set. As one can see, there is a wide range in the number of attacks ranging from a minimum of one attack to a maximum of 1,399 attacks. The civil war in Uganda had one attack as well as the civil war in Chad in 1998. The civil war that started in Nicaragua in 1982 had 1,399 attacks.

The average number of people wounded by terrorist attacks in a civil war was 532 people. The standard deviation was 1066 which means that there a few cases that are significantly influencing this variable. The minimum number of people wounded in the attacks was zero. The civil wars in Congo, Liberia, Uganda, and Chad in 1998 had no people wounded in the terrorist attacks that occurred in the countries during the civil war. The country that experienced the most wounded people from terrorist attacks during the country's civil war was Algeria which had 5,721 people wounded during the attacks.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Median	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Duration in Months	32	22	31	3	128
Number of Terrorist Attacks	204	49	387	1	1399
Number Wounded in Attacks	532	124	1066	0	5721
Per Capita Income in US \$	678	404	647	73	2314

Source: Global Terrorism Database, Correlates of War, World Bank. N=34

Figure 3 shows the bivariate analysis of duration and the number of terrorist attacks (also see the appendix). As the number of terrorist attacks increases the general trend is that the duration in months also increases. The correlation between duration and the number of terrorist attacks is .59. But, as the figure shows it appears there are a few cases that have significantly more attacks than the rest of the cases. These cases will be clearly identified in Table 3.

Table 2 shows the correlations between the number of terrorist attacks and duration. The correlation coefficient is 0.59. This is a positive, moderately strong relationship between the variables. Another variable that showed a positive, moderately strong relationship with the duration is the number of people wounded. The correlation coefficient was 0.50. The variables of mountainous terrain and ethnic fractionalization have no relationship with the duration of the civil war. The per capita income in a country and the duration of civil war had a correlation coefficient of -.0210. This means that the relationship is negative but not significant. This table shows that the strongest correlation between any of the variables was between the number of terrorist attacks and the duration of the civil war.

Table 2. Correlations

Independent Variable	Dependent Variable	Correlation Coefficient
Number of Terrorist Attacks	Duration	0.59
Number Wounded	Duration	0.50
Mountainous Terrain	Duration	0.01
Ethnic Fractionalization	Duration	0.07
Per Capita Income	Duration	-0.02

Source: Global Terrorism Database, Correlates of War, World Bank, Fearon and Laitin data set. N=34

After looking at the data analysis one sees that there is a moderate, positive relationship between the number of terrorist attacks and the duration of civil war. The data supports the hypothesis that the duration of civil war varies with the number of terrorist attacks. As suggested, rebel groups that have weak military capacity tend to use terrorist attacks as a tactic to prolong the civil war.

The data results for the other factors differ from the results of other researchers. None of the other proposed factors which were suggested to influence duration by other researchers were found to relate to civil war duration. The results did not support Collier et al. (2004) finding that low per capita income may lengthen the duration of civil war. This study suggests that there is no relationship between per capita income and duration of civil war.

Other independent variables that were analyzed also showed no relationship to the dependent variable. For instance, the results did not support Fearon's (2004) suggestion that ethnic fractionalization may increase the duration of civil war. Based on this analysis, there was no relationship between ethnic fractionalization and duration of civil war. There was also no relationship found between the percentage of mountainous terrain and the duration of civil war.

This research contributes to the existing field of research by analyzing tactics specifically the tactic of terrorist attacks which is a factor that few other scholars have analyzed. The results of the bivariate analysis suggest that there is a relationship between the number of terrorist attacks and the duration of civil war.

While the correlation suggests that there is a positive, moderately strong correlation between duration and the number of terrorist attacks, it is important to keep in mind that correlation does not mean causation. The data results suggest a grouping of the civil wars into four categories. The first is short duration and a low number of attacks, second is short duration

and a high number of attacks, third long duration and a low number of attacks, and finally long duration and a high number of attacks.

Table 3 includes all of the cases. Thus, the average for the duration and the number of attacks was recalculated to reflect all 37 cases. The average duration for all civil wars was 43 months. If the duration of a civil war in a particular country was 43 months or less, it was considered to be a short civil war. If the duration of a civil war in a country was 44 months or more, it was considered to be a long duration.

The average number of terrorist attacks was also calculated. The average was 468 attacks. If the country had 468 or fewer attacks, it was placed in the low attack group. If it had 469 or more attacks, it was placed in the high attack group. Table 3 may be found on the following page.

Table 3

Duration		
	Short 43 months or less	Long 44 months or more
Terrorist Attacks		
<p>Low</p> <p>468 and below</p>	<p>Rwanda Syria Georgia Rwanda Yemen Iran Burma Guinea Yemen Nicaragua Congo (Brazzaville) Chad Uganda Nepal Chad Liberia Rwanda Cambodia Angola Argentina Burundi Somalia Nepal Angola</p>	<p>Cambodia Burundi Zimbabwe Sierra Leone Iran Afghanistan Sudan</p>
<p>High</p> <p>469 and above</p>		<p>*Sri Lanka Guatemala Algeria Nicaragua Peru El Salvador</p>

Source: Global Terrorism Database, Correlates of War


In Table 3, the category with the most cases was the one that consisted of civil wars in countries that were of a short duration with a low number of attacks. This category contained 24 of the 37 cases in the study. The next category of a long duration and a low number of attacks contained 7 cases. There are no cases in the category for a short duration and high number of attacks. The other 6 cases fit into the long duration and high number of attacks category. Sri Lanka has an asterisk beside it because the Correlates of War dataset coded the civil war as lasting for 29 months, but in reality it lasted for approximately 30 years. Sri Lanka, Guatemala, Algeria, Nicaragua, Peru and El Salvador were the six cases in the study that had a high number of attacks and a long duration.

The vast majority, 24 out of the 37 cases, had a short duration and a low number of attacks. So, from this analysis it can be said that civil wars that had a short duration had a low number of attacks. This does not mean that all civil wars in the study with a low number of attacks had a short duration because there were seven cases of a low number of terror attacks and a long duration. Interestingly, though there were no cases for a high number of terror attacks and a short duration. To reiterate not all countries that had a long duration of civil war had a high number of terrorist attacks, but all countries that experienced a high number of attacks during civil war had a long duration of civil war. Therefore, it seems like a high number of terror attacks is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for a prolonged civil war.

To reiterate, this study found that a high number of terrorist attacks are a sufficient condition for a prolonged civil war. This means that when there are a high number of attacks during a civil war there will be a long duration. But, a high number of terrorist attacks is not a necessary condition, because there can be a prolonged civil war even when a high number of

terrorist attacks is not present. So, in several countries there was a long duration even though there were a low number of terrorist attacks. The figure below shows this relationship.

Figure 4. Sufficient Condition



This relationship between a high number of terror attacks and a long duration will be explored more thoroughly in the case study of Peru, which had the highest number of terrorist attacks, 5,425, of any case in the study. Other variables that have been shown to increase duration but where shown to have no correlation to duration in this study will also be explored.

The case study will seek to explore the weak rebel group theory in more detail by specifically focusing on one weak rebel group; the Shining Path. An in-depth case study is necessary in order to understand how the mechanism of terrorist attacks is associated with the duration of civil war and how the tactic of terrorism was used by this weak rebel group. The case study will also reveal some of the other causal mechanisms since the quantitative portion only explored correlation.

Terror and Conflict in Peru

The high number of terrorist attacks in Peru during its civil war made it an extreme outlier which is why it was chosen for a case study. This case study will explore how the weak rebel group, the Shining Path, used terror attacks as a strategy in hopes of ultimately overthrowing the Peruvian government. As shown above, a high number of terror attacks is a

sufficient condition for a long duration. But, civil wars are complicated and messy and this case study shows that in the case of Peru several other factors which past researchers have suggested that may relate to civil war are present.

The armed struggle in Peru began on May 17th, 1980, which was the eve of the first democratic elections in Peru since 1963. Sendero Luminoso (PCP-SL)- the Shining Path, burned ballot boxes to symbolize the beginning of the war against the Peruvian state (Gorriti, 1999). The act that was meant to declare the start of the armed struggle of the Shining Path against the state was noticed by few since it occurred in a tiny village in the Ayacucho region of Peru which is one of the poorest regions and its located high in the Andes Mountains far from the coastal capital city of Lima.

It is not a surprise that the first symbolic act of the civil war was overlooked because throughout the conflict the severity of the conflict was often underestimated since the revolution was strategically started in the countryside with the goal of eventually reaching and taking over the cities. Articles from the mid- 1990s estimated that the total number of people who died during the conflict was approximately 30,000 people. But, in 2003, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission reported that more than double that number or approximately 70,000 individuals died during the conflict. Peru is an interesting case because many people in Peru, especially in Lima, still refer to the conflict as terrorism and not a civil war. But, the articles in English refer to the conflict as a civil war because a conflict in which 70,000 people die far exceeds the threshold for the number of casualties per year that is one of the defining factors of civil war. The case of Peru is an example of a country in which terrorist attacks were used as a strategy, one of the main strategies, in the case of the Shining Path, to try to wage and win a civil war.

Another reason why Peru should be considered a civil war with terrorist attacks is due to the fact that to call the conflict terrorism and not terrorism in the context of civil war seems to negate that two sides were responsible for the deaths of nearly 70,000 people in Peru. And those two sides were the Shining Path and the military of Peru. The commission concluded that the Shining Path was responsible for 54% of the deaths during the conflict or the murdering of 37,000 people. The Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) was responsible for killing approximately 1,000 people (the MRTA will not be further addressed in this thesis since they are not considered one of the active groups in the civil war). The other 31,000 people or 45.5% of the deaths were committed by the police, army, navy, or armed peasant militias.

The Communist Party of Peru- Shining Path had been planning the armed struggle for nearly a decade before it finally acted. Its emergence can be traced back to mid-1960s, when a Maoist faction split from the Communist Party (Degregori, 1991; McCormick, 1987). Abimael Guzman, the founder of the Shining Path and a philosophy professor at Huamanga University, later formed another splinter group, the Shining Path. He did so due to the unwillingness of the other groups to “take up arms against the Peruvian government” (Starn, 1995). According to Orin Starn, Huamanga University, which is located in Ayacucho, reopened at the same time as the escalation of radical politics in Peruvian universities. One university student commented that the universities were ‘temples to Mao Zedong’ (Starn, 1995, p. 403). Beginning in 1971 when Guzman became personnel director at Huamanga University, Guzman was able to use the “temple” to his advantage by hiring faculty with similar ideology who then recruited and indoctrinated students who would become members of the Shining Path (McCormick, 1987). The Shining Path “offered the seductive promise of an active role in an imminent ‘world proletarian revolution’ under the wise guidance of a charismatic leader who seemed to speak in

the omniscient, almost magical, voice of scientific truth” (Starn, 1995, p.405). Abimael Guzman believed and was able to convince his followers that with the communist ideology and through the military doctrine of Mao Zedong that armed struggle could lead to radical change. Ivan Hinojosa (1998) writes, “It was hard to believe, moreover, that a handful of fanatic followers of Mao, armed with “humble dynamite” (in Guzman’s words), would have any chance against the solid, modernized army Velasco had built” (p. 77). The Shining Path is an example of how much terror and destruction can be wrought if there is a leader with a very strong and compelling ideology even when the group has a weak military capacity.

The conflict was an ideological conflict for control of the government, but ethnicity also played a role in the conflict. Interestingly, Orin Starn (1995) says that “despite claims of radical upheaval, the new party’s internal organization replicated the colonial stratification of regional society: a privileged elite of white professionals commanded a mass of brown-skinned youth of humble origin” (p. 405). In Peru, often times the indigenous, rural labors were dark skinned while the individuals living in cities that had the privilege of higher levels of education often times had lighter skin. Many frustrated young indigenous people joined the Shining Path along with idealistic college students. After the conflict ended the TRC found that 79% of the people killed lived in rural areas and 75% of the people who died during the conflict spoke Quechua or a native language other than Spanish. According to the TRC this shows, “[T]he veiled racism or scornful attitudes that persist in Peruvian society almost two centuries after its birth as a Republic”. So, even though the conflict was not considered an ethnic conflict ethnicity still played a role in the conflict.

After graduating from Huamanga University, many of the early Shining Path members became school teachers throughout the regions of Ayacucho and Apurimac. In addition to

working as schoolteachers, many Shining Path members throughout the late 1970s began to enter very rural and isolated areas in order to take over the towns by forcibly removing state officials, capitalists, and large landowners (Kent, 1993). The Shining Path was beginning to establish a widespread presence in Ayacucho and parts of Apurimac.

In the first few years of the 1980s, the people in the villages in Ayacucho and Apurimac, who were mostly indigenous rural agricultural laborers, supported or at least accepted the Shining Path. Even though the movement was spreading, the government was slow to respond to the Shining Path for many reasons including that they misjudged the attacks in Ayacucho and they figured they were insignificant works of a handful of criminals and thus left the problem to be solved by the local police rather than the military (McCormick, 1990). The police forces were caught off guard and unprepared to counter the Shining Path. They attempted to confront the Shining Path but they were unsuccessful due to a lack of coordination, plans and equipment. This led the population in the regions that were being overtaken by Shining Path to reject the police forces and the government. It wasn't until 1981 that 1400 hundred members of the Peruvian Civil Guard were dispatched and the army finally sent 2000 troops to put down the insurgency in December of 1982 (McCormick, 1990). The government counterinsurgency was ruthless.

The military responded to the Shining Path with extreme brutality. Individuals who were thought to be Shining Path members or collaborators were tortured, murdered or they disappeared. The people in the villages had few options because if the villagers did not support the Shining Path, they were killed by the Shining Path by “macabre means-often by stoning or slitting throats to heighten fear and save bullets” (Starn, 1995, p. 561). According to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, out of the entire conflict the most people were killed in 1983. The TRC reported, “These were caused by the PCP-SL’s assassination campaigns and the bloody

official response, which according to the TRC's calculations left 19, 468 victim fatalities, or 28 percent of the total estimated for the entire internal armed conflict. These casualties went almost unnoticed by the rest of the country, due to the serious ethnic divisions in our society". The Truth and Reconciliation Committee also found that the Popular Action party, which was the governing party at the time, ignored reports of massacres and human rights abuses because the party hoped that the brutality would lead to a short conflict. Eradicating Shining Path in any way possible was of more importance than protecting the lives of citizens in remote regions like Ayacucho.

The violent counterinsurgency which led to tens of thousands of deaths and massive human rights violations was unable to eliminate the Shining Path, but the military was able to successfully prevent the Shining Path from establishing territorial control in the highlands regions of Ayacucho and Apurimac (Kent, 1993). But, the state's brutality had unintended consequences in that it caused the villagers to side more with the Shining Path than the state. As Carlos Ivan Degregori (1998) writes, "...upon unleashing a genocidal violence, the Armed Forces converted the countryside of Ayacucho into an Armageddon. In many instances, this made Shining Path appear as the 'lesser evil'" (p. 142). In addition, the Shining Path had already begun to expand its operations north and south throughout the Central Andes and northeast into the jungle region in the Upper Huallaga Valley. By moving into the Upper Huallaga Valley, the Shining Path was able to put itself in a location where it was able to form ties with local coca growers and extract profits.

The Upper Huallaga Valley is the main coca growing region in Peru. In 1983 Peru became the world's leading exporter of cocaine paste and the product which is used in cocaine made up approximately 70 percent of the world market (Kay, 1999). The Upper Huallaga Valley

was an “organizational no-man’s land in the 1980s” and this power vacuum led to drug traffickers controlling the area with bribes, coercion, and death threats (Kay, 1999). The Shining Path was able to enter the valley and form a relationship with the local population by becoming allies with the locals against the drug traffickers and against governmental forces that were trying to eradicate coca. Since the Shining Path was able to establish order, they gained territorial control through the support of the locals and they were able to set up a base of more than a thousand militants (Kay, 1999). This territorial control also allowed them to have access to a substantial amount of money. They taxed the coca growers for protection and they forced drug pilots to pay landing fees estimated anywhere from \$3,000 to \$10,000 per flight (Kay, 1999). It is unknown how much money the Shining Path brought in but it is estimated between \$20 million and \$250 million (Kay, 1999). It is not certain what all of the drug funds were used for but it is thought that the money allowed the Shining Path to finance operations, pay salaries to the militants and to purchase arms that weren’t acquired through other means (Kay, 1999).

The rebel group remained relatively weak throughout the conflict, and the Shining Path often relied on stealing weapons. Guzman was quoted as saying that the Shining Path “is waging the most economical war on earth”. He went on to say, “The enemy has the weapons, consequently, the problem is to wrest them from him... They have an obligation to give them to us... And we have to admit they are starting to deliver” (McCormick, 1990, p.23). Weapons were often taken from police stations and the armed forces. Dynamite was stolen from mining camps in the Peruvian highlands. In one report, 92,000 sticks of dynamite were reported to have been stolen (McCormick, 1990). Even so, the rebel group was still poorly armed in comparison to the army but this was made up for with ruthlessness as well as the ability to make surprise attacks. An example of a surprise attack in Lima occurred in 1982. The Shining Path which often

targeted electric power facilities created a two-day blackout which left half of the country's population without electricity. During this time, the Shining Path drove through Lima throwing sticks of dynamite. At least fifty public offices were bombed during the first night (McCormick, 1990). Although lacking in weapons, the Shining Path was able to create fear and wreak havoc in Peru.

In 1987 McCormick wrote that, "Sendero must be singled out for its simple ruthlessness. Murder, dynamite bombings and arson are the instruments of political violence. Few terrorist groups in modern times, however, have employed high order violence with the same determination, lack of discrimination and wide spread effect as the Shining Path" (p. 109). According to the Global Terrorism Database there were approximately 5,500 terrorist attacks during the civil war in Peru which was coded as starting in March of 1982 and ending in September of 1992 (according to the Correlates of War dataset). It is possible that the number of attacks was much higher than what was recorded in the database. In 1987, McCormick estimated that the Shining Path had carried out as many as 12,000 terrorist attacks. Around this time, Guzman, claimed they had carried out approximately 30,000 terrorist attacks (McCormick, 1987). The Peruvian Ministry of Interior estimated nearly 6,000 terrorist attacks had occurred between 1982 and 1985 and the number of attacks were increasing yearly (McCormick, 1987). The Shining Path continued to increase the number of regions they had infiltrated in Peru as well as the number of terrorist attacks they committed. The high number of terrorist attacks can be explained in part by ideology. Degregori (1998) writes, "Sendero's ideology took violence beyond the classic Maoist confines of the people's war...The militant's ideological zeal was fed constantly by the leadership, particularly by the supreme leader Abimael Guzman, who tended to exalt violent purification" (p. 136). He adds, "...Guzman propagated the idea of "the blood

quota” that would be necessary for the triumph of the revolution, and warned of the necessity of preparing for an inevitable “blood bath” (p. 136). The Shining Path was also considerably weaker than the state and had a weaker military capacity. The government forces were believed to have been numbered around 100,000 people while the Shining Path was believed to have less than 10,000 rebels (Fielding and Shortland, 2012). Thus, the terrorist attacks carried out by the Shining Path were in part due to strong ideology that exalted extreme levels of violence and in part due to weak military capacity.

As the Shining Path continued to expand through the country, the military continued to have difficulties in properly countering them. First, the majority, 60 to 70 percent, of the military combat units were stationed along the northern and southern frontiers in order to respond to potential threats made by Ecuador or Chile (McCormick, 1987). The military was unprepared to “wage an unconventional rural campaign against a poorly armed, elusive opponent” because it had “no means of systematically collecting, analyzing and exploiting intelligence on Sendero...no corpus of unconventional, small unit tactics; little ability to react quickly to guerrilla actions; and chronic problems with sustaining large numbers of forces in the field” (McCormick, 1990 p.35). In addition, the military did not have the resources it needed. For instance, it had few high altitude helicopters that could reach the mountainous, highlands regions. In 1990 McCormick wrote, “For institutional and practical reasons, in short, the campaign against the Shining Path is not going well. Nor is there any reason to believe that the army’s ability to contain and eventually defeat insurgency will improve greatly in the near future” (p. 37).

Peru seemed to be on the verge of national collapse by the beginning of the 1990s. In May of 1991 the Shining Path announced that they had reached the “strategic equilibrium” stage

of the war which “choked Lima with fear during the next fifteen months” (Stern, 1998, p.4). The bombings and the assassinations of political leaders followed by President Fujimori’s self-coup in April of 1992 seemed to indicate that the Peruvian government and state would soon collapse (Stern, 1998). But, then it was the Shining Path who collapsed. Abimael Guzman was captured in September of 1992 which considerably weakened the movement. But, some scholars say that in hindsight the Shining Path had actually lost the war earlier (Stern, 1998).

It’s suggested the Shining Path had lost the war earlier because the villagers had become alienated with the Shining Path so with the assistance of the military they began to form *rondas campesinas* (defense units). The units were used to defend themselves from the Shining Path attacks as well as to show the army that they were not siding with the Shining Path (Stern, 1998). Without the support of the villagers and with the formation of the *rondas campesinas* the Shining Path had little chance of winning a revolution which would topple the government. But, it was the capturing of the supreme leader, Abimael Guzman, who provided the ideological backbone for the movement, which led to the defeat of the Shining Path. While the Shining Path was effectively defeated when Guzman was captured, even today there are still factions of the Shining Path remaining in Peru and on occasion their actions are still making headlines.

The Shining Path in Peru is an example of a rebel group with weak military capacity initiating and fighting a civil war for control of the government. As the weak rebel theory suggests, a rebel group with weak military capacity such as the Shining Path uses terrorist tactics as a way to compensate for the weak military capacity in an attempt to combat the stronger and larger government military. Although the military greatly outnumbered the rebels, it was difficult for the military to reach the mountainous and later the jungle regions that the Shining Path operated in showing that terrain may have played a role in the duration. It was also difficult to

target just the Shining Path members since they hid in the mountains, jungles or amongst the villagers. The military's violent counterinsurgency, which killed tens of thousands of people, caused many villagers to see the Shining Path as the lesser evil which helped the rebels to win some support. This support was not based on the Shining Path's local policies or tactics, but due to the government's extreme response. While the rebel group continued to use terror tactics to prolong the civil war and maintain their position in parts of the country, the increase in terrorist attacks eventually lost the support from villagers. Thus, while this irregular tactic is a weapon for the weak rebel group it is no replacement for institutional development and it is not sustainable in the face of a relatively strong central government.

The case study of Peru is an example of a civil war in which several sufficient factors may have played a role in duration. To summarize, the conflict originated in the poorest region of the country and most of the actual fighting took place in mountainous and/or forested terrain. Also, the conflict shows the ethnic divisions within the society, but it was not an ethnic war; it was an ideological war. Contraband also played a role since later in the conflict the Shining Path rebels were subsidized by tapping into the illegal coca trade. But, even though all of these factors were present one of the key factors to focus on is that in order for the Shining Path to remain a threat the group relied heavily on terror attacks since they lacked the economic and military capacity to engage in a conventional war against the state. This shows how vital terror attacks were in prolonging the duration of the civil war.

Conclusion

In conclusion, civil war researches have not found one key factor that always relates to the duration of civil war. Several sufficient conditions have been suggested and found to relate to duration by different scholars, but no necessary condition has been found. It's important to

continue analyzing which factors or variables in civil war may contribute to the duration because civil wars continue to wreak havoc on countries. Following in line with past research, this thesis also analyzed possible variables that may influence duration including economic factors such as per capita income, sociological factors such as ethnic fractionalization, and geographic factors such as terrain. No correlation was found with any of the factors that were suggested to relate to civil war duration by other researchers such as per capita income, ethnic fractionalization or the percentage of mountainous terrain.

Another factor thought to relate to duration is the strength of the rebel group. As mentioned, Buhaug et al. (2009) suggest that conflicts in which rebels have weak military capacity tend to last longer. This idea was connected to Mesquita's (2013) suggestion that weak rebel groups will resort to irregular tactics such as terrorism. This weak rebel theory was explored in this thesis. In doing so, the fields of civil war research and terrorism research were combined. This was possible due to data available through the Global Terrorism Database and the Correlates of War.

The results supported the hypothesis that the duration of civil war relates to the number of terrorist attacks. The relationship can be explained as follows. Civil wars that were short in duration had few attacks. Civil wars that had a high number of attacks had a long duration. But, not all civil wars that had a long duration had a high number of terrorist attacks which means that a high number of terrorist attacks is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for a prolonged civil war.

These results are different from the results found by Thomas (2014) that suggested that a greater number of terror attacks in civil war led to more concessions and opportunities to negotiate. It is expected that concessions and negotiations will lead to shorter duration. All cases

in this thesis with a high number of terror attacks had a long duration of civil war. The difference in findings could be due to a difference in how “greater number” and “high number” have been defined. The findings could also differ due to her emphasis specifically on Africa whereas my research paper focused on all regions, but only on civil wars that were for control of the government.

The results were more in line with Fortna’s (2011) conclusions. She found that civil wars last longer when terrorism is involved. She used a different dataset and defined the rebel groups as either terrorist or not terrorist, but we both had results that suggest that there is a relationship between terror attacks and the duration of civil war.

This research is limited in that the number of cases is a bit small for a quantitative study. Future research may be done that includes more cases and different types of civil war. Since the quantitative study was small it only explored correlation.

Thus, an in-depth case study of Peru was needed in order to reveal some of the causal mechanisms. The Peru case suggests that weak military capacity which in part led the Shining Path to commit a high number of terrorist attacks, as well as the combination of terrain, contraband, and strong ideology in a poor country with ethnic divisions all contributed to the long duration. The group was so weak that it quite literally stole weapons or used stones as weapons. It would seem that such a weak rebel group should be easily defeated. But, the overzealous, brute forces that were sent into the highlands to squash the rebels ended up killing thousands and committing massive amounts of human rights violations and ultimately were unable to overcome the Shining Path. Even with such weak military capacity, the Shining Path was able to wage a decade long war that relied heavily on terror attacks. The group was defeated not by the military strength of the government, but rather by the capture of their leader.

Thus, the key finding is that the quantitative and qualitative data is suggestive (not casual) that a high number of terror attacks relates to a long duration of civil war. The results also warrant further research on terror attacks and civil war. The policy implication would be that in countries that are experiencing a civil war, if a rebel group is using terror attacks, it may mean that the rebel group has a weak military capacity. In such a case, effective intelligence and specific, targeted counter-insurgency that is not overzealous or indiscriminate may be a better option than countering with a strong army in order to end the civil war quickly.

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
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
Appendix

Figures 5 and 6: Univariate analysis with outliers removed




Source: Global Terrorism Database N=35

Figure 6. Duration in Months per Country




Source: Global Terrorism Database, Correlates of War N=34

Figure 8 . Ethnic Fractionalization and Duration in Months




Source: Global Terrorism Database, Fearon and Laitin dataset N=34

Figure 9. Mountainous Terrain and Duration in Months



Source: Global Terrorism Database, Fearon and Laitin dataset N=34

Figure 10. Per Capita Income and Duration in Months



Source: Global Terrorism Database, World Bank N=34