

BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS CULTURES: A CASE STUDY OF THE PEOPLE-TO-  
PEOPLE CAMPAIGN, 1956-1975

BY

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## **Abstract**

This study traces origins, operation, successes and failures of the People-to-People program featured during the second term of the Eisenhower presidency. The program was a product of and a reaction to the Cold War international conflicts that emanated from diametrically opposed ideologies of democracies and the communist world. U.S. claims to the superiority of democracy over communism were rooted in immediate post-war America's quest for world leadership. The People-to-People campaign was a government-backed popular movement, which spread in the 1950s and expanded into the 1960s. It was partially coordinated and partially funded by the United States Information Agency during its first few years, with the expectation that it would attract private as well as grassroots support once it was launched. This dissertation explores People-to-People's various programs and projects including the Sister-Cities and the University chapter as models for secular voluntary movements of ordinary citizens who were committed to improving mutual understanding between peoples from different cultures.

The idealistic nature of people-to-people diplomacy, along with a wide variety of personal and social stakes associated with international travel and relations, made the People-to-People University program one of the most popular student organizations on college campuses in the 1960s. People-to-People's popularity and ideals at that time attracted young Americans and provided them with both the opportunity and the enthusiasm to interact with foreign peoples at the grassroots level. It also gave them a sense of belonging to a broader, constructive human network, which promoted an appreciation of diverse cultures and a way to contribute to building the "bonds of solidarity" among people of many nations during the contested period of the Cold War.

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## Chapter One. Introduction

### *Winning Hearts and Minds as Historical Experience*

The idea of winning hearts and minds of a global audience was a crucial part of America's grand strategies during the Cold War era. But this idea was far from new. In a letter penned to James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, then American Ambassador to France recounted: "You see I am an enthusiast on the subject of the arts. But it is an enthusiasm of which I am not ashamed, as its object is to improve the taste of my countrymen, to increase their reputation, to reconcile to them the respect of the world and procure them its praise."<sup>1</sup>

Jefferson's enthusiasm for the role and influence of culture was inherently related to America's mission of being a role model for the rest of the world, which was manifested in the vision of its earlier settlers. As early in 1630, John Winthrop emphasized that his Puritan community "shall be a "city upon a hill, the eyes of all people upon us." Assumptions of the idealization of America became a policy priority by the late nineteenth century. The diplomatic historian Emily Rosenberg contended that late nineteenth and early twentieth century cultural and economic relations embodied a fundamental condition of a national interest and international betterment.<sup>2</sup>

It is rather complicated to define the interrelationships between diplomacy and the outreach initiatives undertaken by ordinary individuals in conducting international relations. According to the public diplomacy scholar Jan Melissen, in recent years non-

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<sup>1</sup>Letter dated 20 September 1785 was quoted in Cynthia P. Schneider, "Culture Communicates: U.S. Diplomacy That Works," in *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, ed. Jan Melissen (New York: Palgrave, 2007), 147.

<sup>2</sup> Emily S. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion 1890-1945* (New York: Hill& Wang, 1982), 230.

state actors “have turned out to be extremely agile and capable of mobilizing support at a speed that is daunting for rather more unwieldy foreign policy bureaucracies.”<sup>3</sup> The increasingly active role of ordinary individuals in the practice of public diplomacy was especially visible during the Cold War era.

However, the first effort to disseminate American ideals at the institutional level was Woodrow Wilson’s initiative to create the Committee of Public Information in 1917 after the United States relinquished its claim of neutrality and was drawn into global conflict. By appointing his long-term friend and a former newspaperman George Creel as head of the committee, Wilson placed a strong emphasis on the upcoming operations that would conceivably counteract against the propaganda of the Central Powers. Wilson’s emphasis served as a crucial boost for the fledgling committee. Creel stressed that “the fight for the minds of men as of almost equal significance to victories or defeats in the muddy trenches of the Western Front.”<sup>4</sup> Although Creel’s committee actions successfully influenced the positive construction of America’s overseas image throughout the war, it was attacked at home and ultimately was abolished by Congress in 1919.<sup>5</sup>

It is interesting to note, however, that while government-led information programs were labeled as “psychological approaches” or “propaganda,” educational and cultural exchanges were characterized by such terms as “cooperative,” mutually

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<sup>3</sup> Jan Melissen, “The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice,” in *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, ed. Jan Melissen (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 24.

<sup>4</sup> Quoted in Robert Elder, *The Information Machine: The United States Information Agency and American Foreign Policy* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968), 34.

<sup>5</sup> Richard Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture Since World War II* (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 8.

understanding,” and “reciprocal.” Accordingly, there was a contested congressional debate that insisted the two be kept separate.<sup>6</sup> Ultimately, in 1939, along with Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “good neighbor policy,” a division of cultural relations was created within the State Department. The Division was responsible for a variety of government-backed activities, including exchanges of students and teachers, book translations, and cultural broadcasting programs in Latin America. A year after the Division’s creation, the Office of Cooperation for Inter-American Affairs headed by Nelson Rockefeller was established. Roosevelt’s policy toward the newly established office was to encourage Rockefeller to “freewheel” his office “beyond the State Department’s cautious constraints.”<sup>7</sup>

The government’s effort to disseminate pro-American information came to be no longer restricted within her southern neighbors when the Office of War Information (OWI) was established in 1942 under the direction of the well-known journalist Elmer Davis to promote U.S. war policies both on the home front and the battlefield. During this time, the phrase “psychological warfare” was created to “demoralize populations in enemy and enemy territories.” After the war’s end Truman “liquidated” the OWI because conservatives in Congress saw it as the “promoter of the hated New Deal.”<sup>8</sup> So whether it was a “dirty business of propaganda” or a worthy approach for mutual understanding and reciprocal cooperation, the post-war American outreach initiatives on winning hearts and minds of overseas men and women were continually expanded by differing committees and diverse programs of similar missions. The most prominent ones were

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<sup>6</sup>Philip Coombs, *The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy: Educational and Cultural Affairs* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 31.

<sup>7</sup>Coombs, *The Fourth Dimension*, 26.

<sup>8</sup>Kenneth A. Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence: The University of Kansas Press, 2006), 29-32.



the Fulbright Program (1946) and the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (popularly referred to as the Smith-Mundt Act), both of which were tailored to the circumstances of the dawn of the Cold War. The former has been the most “celebrated” academic exchange program that maintains intellectual and scholarly integrity between Americans and their foreign counterparts. To support this point, Richard Pells states that the Fulbright program seemed “more pristine and less corrupted by politics” than any other cultural enterprises undertaken by Washington in the second half of the twentieth century.<sup>9</sup>

America’s effort to disseminate her ideals intensified by the end of the 1940s as Soviet communism expanded beyond its territory. President Harry S. Truman once described the Cold War as a “struggle, above all else, for the minds of men.” By denouncing the Soviets’ efforts in this culture war as directed at “undermining America’s truth,” Truman stated in his Campaign of Truth that the American people would eventually succeed if they made themselves “heard around the world in a great campaign of truth.”<sup>10</sup> The extensive broadcasts of the Voice of America to Eastern Europe, for instance, was one of the most prevalent operations of the postwar American public diplomacy that the Truman administration used as an overt media offensive for spreading America’s values in the region. The Voice of America was one of the information programs that survived McCarthyism in 1953. But McCarthy’s relentless

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<sup>9</sup> Pells, *Not Like Us*, 58.

<sup>10</sup>Quoted in Pells, *Not Like Us*, 65.

attacks on overseas information programs “delivered a final blow to the public diplomacy shop at the State Department.”<sup>11</sup>

The Eisenhower administration was instrumental in disseminating American values through a variety of approaches. As the United States Information Agency (USIA) was created in 1953, the American mission to spread its ideology to combat Soviet communism became officially institutionalized. The USIA promoted two “dichotomized themes” during the Cold War: anti-communism and “positive” themes about the United States.<sup>12</sup> Just as the Voice of America suffered from McCarthy’s attacks, the USIA fell victim to a witch-hunter’s rampages. In April 1953, Joseph McCarthy identified seven USIS libraries in Europe for investigation and claimed that he found 30,000 pro-communist books. Dulles soon ordered books authored by “communists, fellow travelers et cetera” to be removed from the libraries of American overseas information centers. The USIA removed books authored by those who refused to testify before the House Un-American Activities Committee and those who were overly critical of the U.S.; the works of Thomas Paine, Albert Einstein, Helen Keller, Henry David Thoreau, Charles Beard, W.E.B. Du Bois, Jean-Paul Sartre, Ernest Hemingway, Arthur Miller, Upton Sinclair and even of Foster Rhea Dulles, the State Secretary’s own cousin, were among those removed and censored.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Justin Hart, *Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 2013), 4-5.

<sup>12</sup> Richard Nelson and Foad Izadi, “Ethics and Social Issues in Public Diplomacy,” in *Routledge Handbook for Public Diplomacy*, eds. Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor (New York: Routledge, 2009), 336.

<sup>13</sup> Thomas G. Paterson, et al., *A History of American Foreign Relations*, vol. 2 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 280; Osgood, *Total Cold War*, 294-96.

As a nationwide campaign created by the Eisenhower administration, the People-to-People movement was one of the major undertakings that was partially coordinated and partially funded by the USIA. Just as both Wilson's Committee of Public Information and Roosevelt's OWI were swiftly shut down as their mission accomplished after the wars' end, Eisenhower's USIA was dissolved after the Cold War 'ended' by the Clinton administration in 1999.

The People-to-People program was indeed the first secular voluntary movement initiated as part of the nation's foreign relations with the goal of facilitating interactions between peoples to preserve peace and mutual understanding during the tumultuous years of the Cold War. As the first secular voluntary movement, People-to-People was thus a unique program featured during Eisenhower's second term as president. Eisenhower relied chiefly on "massive retaliation," the mighty force that he hoped would prevent the Soviet Union from extending its expansionist policies, but he also believed in the role of a 'massive mobilization' of ordinary people both in shoring up the contagious spread of communist ideologies, and ultimately preserving a "true and lasting peace," as he remarked during the initial People-to-People conference held in September, 1956.<sup>14</sup>

It is true that not every diplomatic initiative of the Eisenhower administration resulted in positive change or impact. Eisenhower's handling of an invasion of Egypt and the Suez Canal and his approval of the CIA covert operations in the emerging so-called "third world" countries such as Iran and Guatemala were the occasions of the

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<sup>14</sup> Dwight D. Eisenhower, Remarks presented at the 1956 White House Conference on a Program for People-to-People Partnerships at Washington, D.C. on September 11, 1956, Dwight D. Eisenhower.: Records as President (White House Central Files) Official File, Box 391 OF 325 People-to-People (5). Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas, (hereafter EL)

administration's failed strategies that sought to stem "the tide of revolutionary nationalism" in the region.<sup>15</sup> Suffice it to say that the rich body of scholarly literature on these aspects of the Eisenhower presidency occupies great linear footage on library shelves. Because of the emphasis on the administration's political and military actions, however, its cultural and humanitarian dimensions have been inadequately researched.<sup>16</sup> Only a handful of scholars have dealt with the People-to-People program, and their works have uniformly ignored the role and the motive of its volunteers.<sup>17</sup>

### ***Review of the Literature***

The classic, comprehensive monographs and biographies that discuss Dwight Eisenhower's military, presidential, and civilian life all are virtually silent on his People-to-People campaign. Even those few scholarly works, which provide a detailed analysis of the USIA only cast a glance at the program and none has addressed the case in detail. While providing the reader with a quick overview about People-to-People, Philip Coombs in his book entitled, *The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy: Educational and Cultural Affairs (1964)*, states that the People-to-People Program was "ill-timed" as it overlapped with the many existing organizations and programs conducting the same missions. The Eisenhower administration's miscalculation therefore led the initial People-to-People campaign to lose wider public support.<sup>18</sup> *The Information Machine: the*

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<sup>15</sup> Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 217.

<sup>16</sup> Ira Chernus, *Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002); Nicholas J. Cull, *The Cold War and The United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 119; Glenn Wesley Leppert, "Dwight D. Eisenhower and People-to-People as an Experiment in Personal Diplomacy: A Missing Element for Understanding Eisenhower's Second Term as President" (Ph.D. diss., Kansas State University, 2003).

<sup>17</sup> Osgood, *Total Cold War*; Leppert, Dwight D. Eisenhower and People-to-People and Helen Laville and Nicholas Cull, eds., *The U.S. Government, Citizen Groups and the Cold War* (London: Routledge, 2006).

<sup>18</sup> Coombs, *The Fourth Dimension*, 67.

*United States Information Agency and American Foreign Policy* (1968), a comprehensive history of the USIA written by Robert E. Elder, mentioned People-to-People's affiliation with the Office of Private Cooperation.<sup>19</sup> To my surprise, however, the extensive analysis of the USIA's operational history entitled, *The Strategy of Truth: the Story of the U.S Information Service* written by Wilson P. Dizard (1961) and its extended edition, *Inventing Public Diplomacy: the Story of U.S. Information Agency*(2004) published by Wilson Dizard Jr.,<sup>20</sup> totally excluded Eisenhower's People-to-People Program despite the fact that the latter stated that the president "gave a special boost to what he called people-to-people diplomacy" by making globe-trotting travels to eleven countries, an approach which has become a "model" for world leaders.<sup>21</sup> Focusing on radio propaganda, private organizations, and cultural exhibitions, historian Walter Hixson's *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture and the Cold War 1945-1961* (1997), an oft-cited book on this theme, analyzes the history of American foreign policy from Truman's propaganda initiatives to Eisenhower's gradualist approach. Hixson provides some insights about the People's Capitalism and the Moscow Exhibition, both of which were initiated and organized by the Eisenhower administration, but the People-to-People program receives no mention at all.<sup>22</sup>

In recent years, however, some historians, such as Kenneth A. Osgood and Glenn Wesley Leppert analyzed the history of People-to-People as part of Cold War American foreign policy. Investigating the program's history from the perspective of the

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<sup>19</sup> Elder, *The Information Machine*, 296.

<sup>20</sup> Dizard, Wilson, *The Strategy of Truth: The Story of the U.S Information Service* (Washington DC: Public Affairs Press, 1968) and Dizard, Wilson Jr., *Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story of U.S. Information Agency* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004).

<sup>21</sup> Dizard, *Inventing Public Diplomacy*, 78.

<sup>22</sup> Walter Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture and the Cold War 1945-1961* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1997).

“cultural offensive,” Osgood’s *Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle At Home and Abroad* (2006) contends that the program’s concern was to counteract an increase in the Soviet cultural initiatives that would, down the road, undermine America’s overseas image.<sup>23</sup> Osgood’s book provides useful information about several questions regarding the ways in which the People-to-People Program was operated in the Cold War culture front. Yet he misses other important initiatives such as the Sister-Cities Program and the People-to-People University Program, both of which were important corollaries to the larger People-to-People Partnership.

Leppert’s unpublished dissertation, however, uncovers the organizational and operational history of People-to-People by locating the program in the context of Eisenhower’s Cold War peace initiatives. Compiling rich archival documents from the program files and using a vast array of published sources pertinent to the Cold War history, Leppert provides an informative historical narrative.<sup>24</sup>

While Osgood criticizes People-to-People as a “camouflaged approach to propaganda that used...private individuals as surrogate communicators for conveying propaganda message,” Leppert looked at the program as an “opportunity” for ordinary Americans to interact with foreign people.<sup>25</sup> Given the fact that scholars, such as Osgood and Leppert, have recently devoted some effort to the topic, it is indisputable that the People-to-People Program is not entirely a “missing element” in the Cold War U.S. historical scholarship. Yet, none of these works have investigated the roles and motives of People-to-People volunteers.

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<sup>23</sup> Osgood, *Total Cold War*.

<sup>24</sup> Leppert, *Dwight D. Eisenhower and People-to-People*.

<sup>25</sup> Osgood, *Total Cold War*, 5; Leppert, *Dwight D. Eisenhower and People-to-People*, ii.

Moreover, there do not exist, it appears, any comprehensive scholarly works about the Sister-Cities program which was very successful and is still a popular practice in broader U.S. foreign relations. The only available works regarding this aspect of the topic examined “sister-cities” from the perspective of geography, political economy, entrepreneurship, and advertising. By investigating a sister-city approach from the geographic and historical perspective, Wilbur Zelinsky argued that city twinning as the “formation of an interactive planetary society” provided intimate interdependencies of all strata of humankind, not just a “privileged elite,” and thus it created “transnational commonalities of thought and social behavior.”<sup>26</sup> In their studies of the concept of “sister-cities,” Rolf Cremer, Anne de Bruin, and Ann Dupuis emphasized the operation of multi-level entrepreneurial partnerships, which facilitated active sister-city relationships. These scholars conceptualize a hybrid form of “municipal-community entrepreneurships” by focusing on sister-city relationships in Australia and its affiliated countries in South Asia. Cremer, Bruin and Dupuis’s study provides a comprehensive view of key features unique to international sister-city partnerships, which rooted in the Sister-Cities program of the People-to-People program.<sup>27</sup>

Although scholarly works which have placed a particular emphasis on the People-to-People program and its various elements are limited, there exists a number of relevant works that are valuable for writing this dissertation. The following were the select monographs and anthologies which were most informative for both understanding

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<sup>26</sup> Wilbur Zelinsky, “The Twinning of the World: Sister Cities in Geographic and Historical Perspective,” *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 81 (1991): 2.

<sup>27</sup>Rolf Cremer, Anne de Bruin and Ann Dupuis, “International Sister- Cities: Bridging the Global-Local Divide,” *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 60 (2001): 380-81; See also Chadwick F. Alger, “The World Relations of Cities: Closing the Gap between Social Science Paradigms and Everyday Human Experience,” *International Studies Quarterly* 34 (1990).

and interpreting the cases I have discussed in this project. The diplomatic historian Frank Ninkovich's *The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950* (1981) which illuminates the role of culture in the U.S. foreign policymaking in the late 1930s through the later years of the Truman administration and Akira Iriye's *Cultural Internationalism and World Order* which conceptualizes "cultural internationalism" as it was elevated to a central position in the postwar international relations were most informative for this dissertation.<sup>28</sup>

Ninkovich states that the entire foreign policy process itself is subordinate to larger cultural dynamics, although cultural relations are a minor form of diplomacy.<sup>29</sup> Culture and diplomacy in this sense are not contradictory but complementary concepts as the latter is a fraction of all intercultural transactions. Before the state's innovative step in using culture as a constituent element of the nation's foreign relations, there had been philanthropic initiatives led by private foundations (The Carnegie Endowment, the Rockefeller Foundation, and The Guggenheim Foundation were the giants among others) the heads of which believed that international understanding would be bettered through cultural interchange. These entities generously promoted "intercultural fraternity," the idea formulated by the author as "philanthropic internationalism."<sup>30</sup> By the end of the 1920s, America's cultural relations were institutionalized by private leadership under the auspices of corporate philanthropy.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>28</sup>Akira Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1997), 15.

<sup>29</sup>Frank Ninkovich. *The Diplomacy of Ideas: US Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 2.

<sup>30</sup>Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas*, 15-6.

<sup>31</sup>Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas*, 22.



During the power diplomacy era of the 1930s, however, the function of a relatively informal system of cultural relations came under scrutiny. The realist and statist philosophies tended to prevail in the country's foreign relations as national interest and security issues were underscored in foreign policymaking. By the same token, totalitarian cultural and propagandistic policies challenged America's liberal cultural values, urging a governmental coordination of private individuals' cultural initiatives.<sup>32</sup> At this crucial time, the State Department pronounced its proposition to create the Division of Cultural Relations and private sectors were welcomed to share their activities.

By the advent of WWII, however, the mutual coherence of culture and "organizational concomitants" was disrupted. War-driven pressures hit traditional cultural relations. The State Department, as the coordinating body, was under pressure to be "revolutionized," while not entangling itself with cultural policy. By mid-1941 the role of private philanthropies in funding and making cultural policies was on the way to being diminished. Yet, considering its 'comprehensive' leadership role in postwar power relations, the U.S. was less satisfactory with culture's "voluntarist approach."<sup>33</sup>

Akira Iriye addresses the questions as to how peace and civilization can be incorporated with realist views on international relations.<sup>34</sup> While doing so he focuses on cultural internationalism which is an idea of "fostering international cooperation through cultural activities across national boundaries."<sup>35</sup> In particular, cultural internationalism was elevated to a central position in postwar international relations.

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<sup>32</sup>Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas*, 23.

<sup>33</sup>Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas*, 38-41.

<sup>34</sup>Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order*, 15.

<sup>35</sup>Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order*, 3.

Iriye states that the League of Nations was the “most spectacular instance of postwar internationalism” and was the best example of political internationalism as long as it embodied humanity’s long search for an institution that would promote cooperation among nations to consolidate peace.<sup>36</sup> Indeed, the League’s attraction (rather than inclusion) of non-western members indicated the rise of cosmopolitanism at the global level.<sup>37</sup> These and other efforts by cultural internationalists assured the potential of intercultural communication. Yet, cultural internationalism had come into better shape by the advent of Third World countries in the 1950s and 1960s. Culture in the following decades was (and remains) more likely to redefine international relations, though nation-states emphasized their interests and power.

Historian Justin Hart in his book *Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy* (2013) traces the origins of U.S. public diplomacy by referring to the 1936 Buenos Aires Conference. The first phase of U.S. public diplomacy lasted between 1936-1953, when the U.S. decided to incorporate techniques for shaping the nation’s overseas image with its foreign policy objectives. The idea was to promote the objectives of Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy in Latin America. According to Hart, using public diplomacy as an explicit component of U.S. foreign policy strategy was transformative because policymakers “recognized that U.S. foreign relations had entered a new era in which [the] U.S. government could no longer remain indifferent to perceptions of the United States abroad.”<sup>38</sup>

The public diplomacy anthology entitled, *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations* (2007), edited by Jan Melissen, discusses public diplomacy

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<sup>36</sup>Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order*, 57.

<sup>37</sup>Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order*, 61.

<sup>38</sup>Hart, *Empire of Ideas*, 5.

from the post-Cold war perspective<sup>39</sup> and Gary D. Rawnsley's *Cold-War Propaganda in the 1950s* (1999), which discusses propaganda as an integrated part of foreign policy examined how its organization was increasingly a professional undertaking, and how international politics was no longer the practice of government officials and foreign policy elites, but started to involve ordinary citizens and elaborates upon the usefulness of such a turn in understanding both traditional and contemporary meanings of public diplomacy and propaganda.<sup>40</sup>

Richard Pells's *Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture Since World War II*(1997) and *American Exceptionalism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Public Diplomacy at the End of the Cold War*(2001) written by Siobhan McEvoy-Levy, *Here, There and Everywhere: The Foreign Politics of American Popular Culture* (2000), edited by Reinhold Wagnleitner and Ellen Tyler May, and Reinhold Wagnleitner's *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War* (1994) were helpful in understanding America's global hegemonic mission. Pells examines critical questions as to why Europeans, who adopt American methods, buy American products, watch Hollywood movies, listen to American hits, eat at McDonald's, and visit to theme parks, do not want to be "like us" by refusing to embrace the American way of life. What would be the possible repercussions if they insist on remaining un-American and even anti-American? Having interpreted Europe's reaction to the "totality of American culture," Pells concludes that European influence on America's fashion and products and

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<sup>39</sup> Jan Melissen, ed., *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations* (New York: Palgrave, 2007), 11.

<sup>40</sup> Gary D. Rawnsley, ed., *Cold War Propaganda in the 1950s* (London: Macmillan Press, 1999), 2.

American impact on Europe's technology and mass entertainment are the result of a complex interaction between two different and increasingly heterogeneous cultures and therefore "Americanization of Europe is a myth."<sup>41</sup>

Reinhold Wagnleitner and Elaine Tyler May's edited book is a collection of essays on Americanization of the world through movies, music and popular culture, media and commercial advertising. The first three essays provide historical and theoretical frameworks for Americanization: John Blair writes on the nineteenth and early twentieth century export of American cultures especially blackface minstrel and wild west shows, James T. Campbell on America's long-term influence in South Africa, and Oliver Schmidt on the impact of the Salzburg seminar per se on the relationship between Cold War politics and culture. The next four essays focus on the impact of Hollywood movies on Spanish, Italian and Nigerian societies: Ted Wilson discusses policy restrictions on Hollywood movies in the 1940s, Aurora Bosch and Fernanda del Rincon concentrate on the perception of American movies in post-Civil war Spain, Giuliana Muscio studies the impact of American movies on post-war Italy and Nosa Owens Ibie examines the cultural and economic power of American programs in his country. The subsequent five essays explore the role of music: Elizabeth Vihlen on the cultural politics of jazz in France, Penny von Eschen on America's use of jazz tours as image-making during the Cold War, Michael May on American jazz influence in the Soviet Union, Thomas Fuchs on the resentment of rock 'n' roll stars by Germans, and Christoph Ribbat on the case of rap music from cultural and racial perspectives. Four other essays discuss the perceptions and misperceptions of American culture in other

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<sup>41</sup> Pells, *Not Like Us*, xiv.

countries: Masako Notoji's analysis of the rather benign perception of American culture by Japanese, Myles Dungan's and David Gray's essay on the love-hate perception of American pop culture in Ireland and England, Gulriz Buken's critical essay on Turkey's disdain toward Americanization of its local cultural values, and Michael Ermarth's revelation of German elite attitude toward Americanization. And the last three essays investigate the role of the media and the internet in global culture: Rob Kroes on America's image behind its freedom in the Netherlands, Michael Jaffe and Gabriel Meimann on media domination theories, and Reinhold Wagnleitner on the future of worldwide internet and transnational impacts.

Wagnleitner and May argue that the spread of American culture *here, there* and *everywhere* represents the global triumph of the American century along with the resentments from localities, as a diverse set of local studies with a vast range of theoretical and empirical implications.<sup>42</sup> Two essays in particular provide provocative contrasting views of how the international audience perceives American cultural transfer. Masako Notoji, Professor at the University of Tokyo and an active member of the Japanese Association of American Studies, presents a sympathetic essay on the Americanization of Japanese society focusing on two cultural themes: John Philip Sousa, the most popular American musical figure in the 1890s and Tokyo Disneyland exported by the U.S. as a symbol of its cultural hegemony. Having analyzed the impact of Sousa's "Stars and Stripes Forever" and Disneyland's theme parks, Notoji notes that

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<sup>42</sup>Reinhold Wagnleitner and Elaine Tyler May, eds., *Here, There, and Everywhere: The Foreign Politics of American Popular Culture* (Hanover: University of Press of New England, 2000), 10.

sending and receiving American culture is “the dynamic process in which meaning and function of the original culture is reconstructed in the new context of the receiver.”<sup>43</sup>

Both Sousa’s marches and the Tokyo Disneyland, as an enduring influence on Japanese generations, symbolize not necessarily American cultural triumph in Japan but rather reveal that the American culture is not a “monopoly” of Americans. They characterize both the individual and collective identities of people around the world. As such, American culture is “deconstructed and re-conceptualized into the everyday experience of Japanese people.”<sup>44</sup> The spreading of American culture therefore should be interpreted as the “totality of values people practice anywhere and everywhere.” Masako Notoji’s conclusion provokes the reader to define America from a more diverse perspective.

Choosing an entirely different perspective from Notoji, Gulriz Buken, Associate Professor of American Literature and American Studies at Bilkent University, Turkey warns in her essay entitled, “Backlash: An Argument against the Spread of American Popular Culture in Turkey” that Americanization is a serious threat to retention of cultural heritage by the younger generations in Turkey. Americanization negates Turkish mores and moral values. Utilizing strong vocabularies and casting frequent criticisms of almost every aspect of American culture and lifestyle, Buken is concerned that American culture is infecting Turkish society. She is particularly irritated with the inclination of Turkish youth toward an American-style social behavior characterized by “comfort-seeking, self-satisfaction, mechanical homogeneity,” dictated by what is in

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<sup>43</sup>Masako Notoji, “Cultural Transformation of John Philip Sousa and Disneyland in Japan,” in *Here, There and Everywhere*, eds., Reinhold Wagnleitner and Elaine Tyler May, 222.

<sup>44</sup>Notoji, “Cultural Transformation,” 225.

vogue.<sup>45</sup> American shopping mall cultures and their surrounding food courts and debit cards, Buken claims, promote spending rather than thrift and American culture is exported with its behavior of conspicuous consumption.<sup>46</sup> All these “American” behaviors tend to undermine traditional Turkish behavioral norms based on decorum and austerity.<sup>47</sup> Buken concludes that the U.S. is quite undemocratically contributing to traditional cultures in other countries. It is complicated to assess whether popular culture imports are superimposed on or presented to or chosen by people.

Reinhold Wagnleitner’s *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War* examines U.S. cultural politics in Austria, especially the acceptance of American pop culture by young Austrians. Wagnleitner argued that although the presence of American culture in Europe is an “unstoppable phenomenon accompanying the rise of the United States as an imperialist world power,” products of American culture “collided with already-existing powerful European clichés, stereotypes, associations, perceptions and misperceptions of this *Strange New World* in the cognitive maps of Europeans.”<sup>48</sup> But spreading American culture via all sorts of avenues, including consumer products, literature, language, movies, music, and news and other information programs saw remarkable success in the Old World. The author claims that the Hollywood effect was especially successful in coca-colonizing a receptive audience in Austria by spreading American ideals to young Austrians.

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<sup>45</sup> Gulriz Buken, “Backlash: An Argument against the Spread of American Popular Culture in Turkey,” In *Here, There and Everywhere*, eds., Reinhold Wagnleitner and Elaine Tyler May, 222 and 233-244.

<sup>46</sup> Buken, “Backlash,” 246.

<sup>47</sup> Buken, “Backlash” 254.

<sup>48</sup> Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 10.

The complex interrelationship of race, culture and diplomacy during the Eisenhower administration is well presented in Naima Prevots' *Dance for Export: Cultural Diplomacy and the Cold War* (1998). When requesting five million dollars to be spent on America's overseas cultural programs, which later became the President's Emergency Fund, Eisenhower stated in 1954 that he would consider it "essential that we take immediate and vigorous action to demonstrate the superiority of the products and cultural values of our system of free enterprise."<sup>49</sup> Eisenhower's Emergency Fund for International Affairs, which "underwrote the nation's first cultural export program," sponsored the American National Theater and Academy (ANTA) groups and individual actors and authorized ANTA to serve as a professional administrative agent for performing arts programs overseas.<sup>50</sup>

Through the ANTA-State Department contract, famous American performing arts groups such as the Jose Limon Dance Company and George Gershwin's *Porgy and Bess* reached audiences in South America, Europe, the Middle East and the Soviet Union under the auspices of the President's Emergency Fund in the mid-1950s. Referring to the folk opera *Porgy and Bess* performed in Yugoslavia in 1954, a *New York Times* story wrote: "... All of the warm emotion of the Slav character welled up in a joyous affection for the seventy Negroes... With charm and grace, members of the cast created new perspectives here for a Communist-led people sensitive to reports of American race prejudice and discrimination."<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Quoted in Naima Prevots, *Dance for Export: Cultural Diplomacy and the Cold War* (Middleton: Wesleyan, 1998), 11. Eisenhower's letter written was to the House Committee on Appropriations on 27 July 1954.

<sup>50</sup> Prevots, *Dance for Export*, 37.

<sup>51</sup> Quoted in Prevots, *Dance for Export*, 28.



The use of African-American artists as “good will ambassadors” is analyzed in Penny M. Von Eschen’s *Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War* (2004) in detail. Von Eschen argued that by sponsoring famous jazz artists including John Birks “Dizzy” Gillespie, Louis Armstrong and Duke Ellington, U.S. officials “pursued a self-conscious campaign against worldwide criticism of U.S. racism, striving to build cordial relations with new African and Asian states.” In real life, Von Eschen contends, the government’s strategy to promote African-Americans as symbols of American democracy collided with the glaring fact that “America was still a Jim Crow nation.”<sup>52</sup>

According to McEvoy-Levy, public diplomacy or rhetoric is a response to and a product of, a complex network of elements such as changes in the international distribution of power, the personality and experience of elites, and competitions and coalitions with other rhetorical policy networks both at home and abroad.<sup>53</sup> It is strategic as it is a “subset of political communication.”<sup>54</sup> The primary vehicles of government public diplomacy are speeches, statements, interviews, strategic and symbolic appearances, document signings, foreign visits, wider cultural, educational and or commercial initiatives and exchanges.<sup>55</sup>

U.S. foreign policy seems to be conditioned and sometimes constrained by the idea of American exceptionalism, a “para-ideology” which has the potential both to

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<sup>52</sup> Penny M. Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 4.

<sup>53</sup> Siobhan McEvoy-Levy, *American Exceptionalism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Public Diplomacy at the End of the Cold War* (New York: Palgrave, 2001).

<sup>54</sup> Quoted in Jarol B. Manheim, *Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy: The Evolution of Influence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

<sup>55</sup> McEvoy-Levy, *American Exceptionalism*, 3.

foster and prevent international peace and stability.<sup>56</sup>McEvoy-Levy argues that the uniqueness and moral superiority of America referred to in the earliest writings of Puritan ideology—a City upon a hill (John Winthrop)—were later enhanced by enlightenment ideals such as human perfectibility (Thomas Jefferson). Defined in contrast to old world aristocracy and feudalism and promoted via the strength of the idea of American superiority, American exceptionalism tended to grow from generation to generation: American democracy (Alex de Tocqueville), common sense-revolutionary rhetoric (Thomas Paine), manifest destiny (John L. O’Sullivan), frontier thesis--distinctive American character and democracy, and Americanization (Fredrick Jackson Turner), Monroe Doctrine (James Monroe), Fourteen points- internationalism (Woodrow Wilson), the American Century—the most vital nation sentiment (Henry Luce), America’s (not Europe’s) responsibility to contain communism (George Kennan) ‘bound to lead’ (Joseph Nye)—all these politicians, historians, businessmen, even foreign travelers left their imprints on the idea of American exceptionalism. It is therefore American exceptionalism that shaped the overall thrust of American foreign policy and, indeed was ‘justified’ and legitimized by the end of the Cold War when the U.S. emerged as a dominant global power that survived a half-century of world conflict.<sup>57</sup>

Elizabeth Cobbs-Hoffman’s *All You Need is Love: The Peace Corps and the Spirit of the 1960s*(1998) was invaluable in presenting an example of how one could write an institutional history of voluntary organizations such as Peace Corps from the perspective of idealism and self-interest. As Hoffman puts it, many people, including Americans would “reject US government pretensions to helping others as nothing but a

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<sup>56</sup>McEvoy-Levy, *American Exceptionalism*, 5.

<sup>57</sup>McEvoy-Levy, *American Exceptionalism* , 65.

cynical farce” as the heyday of the Cold War passed. But the Peace Corps tended to encounter skeptical views. Because it was shaped and functioned by the tens of thousands of volunteers, the history of the Peace Corps is the history of humanitarianism in U.S. foreign relations.<sup>58</sup>

### ***A Statement of Purpose***

Was People-to-People an “instrument” of Cold War American foreign policy which was designed to combat the influence of communist ideology around the world, or was it “personal diplomacy” that provided ordinary Americans with an opportunity to interact with foreign people at the grassroots level? Or was it both? By relying on both archival sources and personal interviews with People-to-People volunteers, this dissertation explores the People-to-People movement as the case of both power politics and idealism undertaken at the national and institutional levels by emphasizing volunteer motives. It would be inadequate to reach any useful conclusion about the questions posed above without listening to actual participants of the People-to-People campaign.

The dissertation also attempts to answer questions as to why President Eisenhower proposed the People-to-People program and what personal and political motives he held that led to the creation of people-to-people diplomacy, and why thousands of ordinary Americans at home and thousands more abroad were willing to support it and volunteer for it. Based on the three case studies, the People-to-People program (1956-1961), the People-to-People University program (1961-1975) and the Sister City program (1956-1966) I argue that volunteers had the tendency to join the

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<sup>58</sup> Elizabeth Cobbs-Hoffman, *All You Need Is Love: The Peace Corps and The Spirit of the 1960s* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 4.

program from personal motives rather than politically prescribed ones (i.e. from the government), such as personal cultural enrichment and a sense of belonging to a campus organization of good reputation.

Those individuals who devoted their time and skills to thousands of cultural, educational, and environmental initiatives undertaken by People-to-People acted not necessarily because they were imposed by the power and prescriptions of institutional norms to espouse narrow-minded nationalist ideologies, but because they believed, for a variety of reasons, that they were volunteering to do good and that they could benefit from the personal enrichment gained from travel and reciprocal international friendships. Association with the program entailed that one was “open-minded” and culturally savvy by showing interest in the cultures of others. By relying on both primary sources and personal interviews with former volunteers, this dissertation attempts to uncover a story of the involved ordinary Americans’ hopes, motives, and actions “as they see them.”<sup>59</sup>

### ***Theoretical Framework***

Given the fact that a key part of this dissertation considers both government and volunteer motives behind the People-to-People program, the following concepts such as *public diplomacy*, *soft power*, *social capital* and *reciprocity* are useful in understanding and explaining political, social, cultural, moral, and humanitarian dimensions of the broader people-to-people diplomacy. This dissertation interchangeably uses such concepts as *public diplomacy* and *cultural diplomacy* and/or *soft power* to discuss the political objectives and implications of the cases.

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<sup>59</sup> Herbert Bloomer, *Symbolic Interactionism: Method and Perspective* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969), 22.

Although there is a lack of consensus as to an acceptable definition and an analytical framework among public diplomacy scholars and practitioners, most scholars in this field agree that the phrase ‘public diplomacy’ was first coined during the height of the Cold War and was introduced into an American political discourse by Edmund Gullion, a career diplomat and director of the USIA during the Kennedy/Johnson years. Recent works, however, question whether Gullion’s definition is justified enough to be operationalized under any circumstance. But this dissertation uses Murrow’s definition as it is the most comprehensive and the most “convenient” among other justifications.<sup>60</sup> An earlier definition of the term can also be found in the work by Gifford Malone who views public diplomacy as “direct communication with foreign peoples, with the aim of affecting their thinking and, ultimately that of their governments.”<sup>61</sup> In the early 1990s Hans Tuch provided a more comprehensive definition. According to Tuch, public diplomacy is a “government’s process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and current policies.”<sup>62</sup>

By choosing the term “cultural diplomacy,” Geoffrey Berridge and Alan James define a country’s outreach initiatives as the “advertisement of achievements in science, technology as well as in the arts, humanities and social science.”<sup>63</sup> It attaches special

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<sup>60</sup> Nicholas J. Cull, “Public Diplomacy before Gullion: The Evolution of a Phrase,” In *Routledge Handbook for Public Diplomacy*, eds. Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor (New York: Routledge, 2009), 19-23

<sup>61</sup> Gifford Malone “Managing Public Diplomacy.” *Washington Quarterly* 8, (Fall 1985), 199-213. Quoted in Eyton Gilbao, “Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 57, (2008), 616.

<sup>62</sup> Hans N. Tuch, *Communicating with the World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 3.

<sup>63</sup> Geoffrey R. Berridge and Alan James, *Dictionary of Diplomacy* (Hound mills: Palgrave, 2001), 56.

importance to promoting links between parallel institutions at home and abroad.<sup>64</sup> In his recent work, however, Berridge defines cultural diplomacy as “an effort of the embassies of some countries to influence the foreign policy of the receiving state by helping to export their own cultures to them.”<sup>65</sup>

While many scholars consider public diplomacy as the greatest foreign policy asset, few of them—namely Joseph Nye Jr. and Mark Leonard—have offered well-grounded conceptual frameworks thus far. Mark Leonard’s *Public Diplomacy* (2002) is a pioneering effort in defining the topic from a scholarly perspective. According to Leonard, public diplomacy is about “building relationships: understanding the needs of other countries, cultures and peoples; communicating our points of view; correcting misperceptions; looking for areas where we can find common cause.”<sup>66</sup> As such, public diplomacy is much broader and more inclusive than traditional diplomacy. Leonard offers three-dimensional characteristics and identifies two other public diplomacy purposes that are accomplished based on national interests. Leonard contends that since public diplomacy pursues inclusive policies targeting at broader audience, it has a hierarchy of effects that it can achieve. These hierarchies include: a. *increasing people’s familiarity with one’s country*; b. *increasing people’s appreciation of one’s country*; c. *engaging people with one’s country* and d. *influencing people*. Therefore, public diplomacy cannot afford to be a one-dimensional process. The three dimensions include *daily communications (reactive)*, *strategic communications (proactive)* and *long-term*

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<sup>64</sup>Berridge and James, *Dictionary of Diplomacy*, 56.

<sup>65</sup>Geoffrey R. Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 129.

<sup>66</sup>Mark Leonard, *Public Diplomacy* (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2002), 8.

*relationship building*, all of which combined are essential in engaging in more efficient public diplomacy.<sup>67</sup>

According to Leonard, public diplomacy is not necessarily a part or a 'disguised' face of propaganda. Thus, to distance such initiatives from "crude" propaganda activities and to effectively facilitate public diplomacy, one needs to cope with certain challenges. First and foremost, it is important to understand the audience at whom public diplomacy is aimed. By citing outreach initiatives undertaken by both the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the U.S. Department of State, Leonard argues that the target audience is no longer a passive recipient of messages and information from the other end. Thus, public diplomacy's job is to convey not just messages but "legitimized" messages so the desired result would be legitimate. One does not know whether his or her message is legitimate or not if he or she ignores his or her target audience's beliefs and values. Because western values such as freedom, democracy and human rights are not necessarily ultimate destinations of humanity and thus they should not have to be accepted as universal.<sup>68</sup>

In his widely quoted work, *Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics*(2004) the political scientist Joseph Nye offers a fresh, broader view of public

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<sup>67</sup> Leonard, *Public Diplomacy*, 10-20.

<sup>68</sup> Leonard, *Public Diplomacy*, 47. Indeed, this idea was discussed to a greater extent by Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft in their recent book entitled *America and the World: Conversations of the Future of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Basic Books, 2008), 227-252. As the authors argue, information, technology and sophisticated communication system offer the world people more opportunities and make them politically activated. In this era of "global political awakening" as Brzezinski defines, the U.S. and western democracies need to relook at their values and beliefs "superimposed" on the rest of the world. Whether western values are absolute and universally better conditions of humans is a real question to be revised in depth. So long as the western values are not necessarily the ultimate choice for all humans, their proposition was to respect 'dignity' of the human beings--the notion that can be universalized.

diplomacy by introducing the phrase “soft power,”—a country’s ability to get what it wants through attraction rather than coercion or payments. Soft power, Nye asserts, arises from the “attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.”<sup>69</sup>

According to Nye, soft power is one of the best workable approaches that America should combine with its “hard power” (military power) in the pursuit of national and global interests.<sup>70</sup> By emphasizing American soft power initiatives during the Cold War, Nye contends that America proved to be the strongest nation in large part because it accumulated rich experience in the conduct of public diplomacy. Nye’s concept of soft power indeed is not a brand new term. By the time of the demise of the bipolar world early in the 1990s, he correctly observed that power was becoming less “fungible, less coercive, and less tangible.” In other words, the decline of communism and the return of a multi-polar international system tended to make “co-optive behavior” and soft power more important than ever before.<sup>71</sup> Soft power, according to Nye, is much more frugal than hard power so that it can offer “more bang for the buck.” This assumption, if valid, could illuminate one of the most important features of people-to-people relationships.

Nicholas Cull’s comprehensive definition of the term public diplomacy based on five core components is informative for this dissertation as well. According to Cull, public diplomacy is an “international actor’s attempt to conduct its foreign policy by engaging with foreign publics,” which is similar to the Manheim’s scheme on government-to-people

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<sup>69</sup> Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in the World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), x.

<sup>70</sup> Joseph S. Nye Jr., *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 171.

<sup>71</sup> Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990), 188.



contact. Five core elements that constitute public diplomacy are *listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy, and international broadcasting*. Another conceptual work written from a top-down perspective of public diplomacy is the political scientist Jarol Manheim's *Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy: the Evolution of Influence* which presents the reader 'the formality' of the concept. Having entitled his book as "strategic public diplomacy," Manheim attempts to elucidate the intellectual and economic dynamics which affect the representation of foreign interests in the US and its ultimate impact on the making of U.S. foreign policy.

Manheim categorizes four different kinds of diplomatic activities conducted between states and people. *First* is government-to-government, which is viewed as traditional diplomacy between states. *Second* is diplomat-to-diplomat, personal diplomatic interactions at individual level; *next* is people-to-people, which is public diplomacy in its broader meaning, characterized by cultural exchanges and *last* is government-to-people-- another form of public diplomacy (but emphasis is on top-down approach). This top-down approach of public diplomacy is employed by the government of one nation to influence public/elite opinion in a targeted country for a political advantage.<sup>72</sup> The scholarly literature on government-to-people diplomacy reveals that early efforts were typically labeled as "propaganda" and conceptualization efforts tend to scatter around and across disciplines including communication, political science, psychology (and manifestly diplomatic history had he mentioned this subfield). Indeed, Manheim does not avoid using the term propaganda in substitution for the recent à la

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<sup>72</sup>Jarol B. Manheim, *Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy: The Evolution of Influence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 4.

mode phrase—public diplomacy as long as they characterize activities embodying the same purpose.<sup>73</sup>

“Strategic public diplomacy”, as Manheim defines the term, is the international manifestation of a relatively new style of information management which is termed by some practitioners as strategic political communication. Strategic political communication incorporates the “use of sophisticated knowledge of such attributes of human behavior as attitude, preference, cultural tendencies, and media use patterns” to shape messages so as to increase their desired outcome while minimizing undesired effects. Strategic public diplomacy in this context is not a mere art but an “applied transnational science of human behavior.”<sup>74</sup>

According to Manheim, the goals of image managers are to reach a larger world audience and their motivations are manifold: all efforts of “mobilization,” “legitimation,” and “empowerment” of one’s own sources and credentials, and all manipulations of “demobilization,” “delegitimation” and disempowerment of the adversary’s facts and potentials are attempted to be undertaken. In other words, the art of image-management, especially during a war is to consolidate the circumstances and objectives of the ensuing conflict to the favor of one’s own needs and interests.<sup>75</sup> The author also discusses the foreign state officials’ visits to the U.S. by locating the actual visits in the context of public diplomacy and image-building. Visits of heads of states,

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<sup>73</sup> By citing Edmund Gullion’s definition of public diplomacy along with activities conducted by the Voice of America, the USIA, and even Fulbright Exchanges, Manheim states that all these are public diplomacy activities from which their old “label” of propaganda was removed. He further states that this is “a sort of gentrification of the art of influence reflective of the greater legitimacy that attends to such functions in a world more accustomed to bombardment by mediated messages.” Manheim, *Strategic Public Diplomacy*, 5.

<sup>74</sup> Manheim, *Strategic Public Diplomacy*, 7.

<sup>75</sup> Manheim, *Strategic Public Diplomacy*, 41.

Manheim argues, not only assure that the U.S. is the “popular destination of international leadership circuit,” but they also become “instruments” of public diplomacy.<sup>76</sup>

What is common in the above definitions of public diplomacy is that it, public diplomacy, is the targeting of government-backed information or communication at foreign publics with the intention to change their pre-conceived views of or attitudes towards the originating country. In such a sense, the purpose and meaning of public diplomacy are perhaps similar to those of propaganda. While the purpose of propaganda, according to historian Osgood, is “to persuade—to change or to reinforce existing attitudes and opinion,” it is also a “manipulative activity.”<sup>77</sup> For Osgood there is no difference between the terms of public diplomacy and propaganda, albeit the former is a “less bellicose” term which is used to make the idea of the latter “more palatable to domestic audiences.”<sup>78</sup> By referring to Nazi and Communist propaganda, the public diplomacy scholar Jan Melissen states that the term propaganda has two key features: “manipulation and deceit of foreign publics” and therefore it has negative connotations in western consciousness. But the difference between public diplomacy and propaganda lies in their purposes and the “pattern of communication.” While public diplomacy engages in two-way communications, propaganda tends to convey one-way messages to foreign publics. In short, public diplomacy is similar to propaganda in a way it tries to persuade people what to think, but it also tries to “listen to what people have to say.”<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> Manheim, *Strategic Public Diplomacy*, 79.

<sup>77</sup> Osgood, *Total Cold War*, 7.

<sup>78</sup> Osgood, *Total Cold War*, 374.

<sup>79</sup> Melissen, *The New Public Diplomacy*, 17-18.

Such an interchangeable usage of the terms by both scholars and practitioners in the field tend to make already controversial debates even more complicated. Richard Holbrooke, a well-known American diplomat and a Peace Corps official, once stated that “call it public diplomacy, call it public affairs, psychological warfare, if you really want to be blunt, propaganda.”<sup>80</sup> But it is true, as the public diplomacy scholar Nicholas Cull once stated, that if propaganda is to be used interchangeably with the term public diplomacy, “it first has to be divested of its pejorative connotations.”<sup>81</sup>

Entities that play active roles in soft power initiatives do not believe themselves to be political in nature. Non-state actors including non-governmental organizations, educational, philanthropic, religious, and humanitarian groups and numerous individuals are not necessarily ‘exercising’ soft power to gain certain political goals. Each and every non-state actor has its own mission and priorities and thus the activities being conducted under the realm of non-governmental institutions in most cases are designed and disseminated without governmental coordination or policy recommendations. In this sense, commitments made by non-state actors tend to grow out from personal choice and preference and therefore different and distant from government politics.

Yet the notion that “the personal is political” which has been elaborated by historians Sara M. Evans, James J. Farrell, and Rusty L. Monhollon tends to complicate the common belief that individual person’s motive for volunteering for grassroots is non-political. As historian Monhollon argued, Americans in the 1960s “increasingly personalized their political responses to pressing issues.” Some Americans “personalized their politics” through their participation in grassroots, or protest

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<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>81</sup> Melissen, *The New Public Diplomacy*, 18.

movements, such as civil rights, feminist or antiwar struggles, while others did so through their “resistance to these movements and their goals, or by appealing to a narrow definition of national citizenship expressed through Cold War and anticommunism.”

Personalization of politics therefore helped Americans “create, or in some cases, recreate, new group and individual identities, a common past, shared cultural and political values, and economic status while challenging those of others.”<sup>82</sup> The social and political challenges that pervaded across the nation in the 1960s provided young Americans with “new expression and meaning to the political process.” Perhaps this is what drove those college students to volunteer for the People-to-People University program. Perhaps People-to-People volunteers hoped that taking part in a grassroots organization was an opportunity to express alternative politics from a personal perspective. Perhaps Monhollon was right when he stated that “the everyday choices individuals make about their lives, communities, and sense of self” have political implications.<sup>83</sup> Or even Carol Hanisch was correct when she once stated that “...personal problems are political problems.”<sup>84</sup> While personal experiences are shaped by official political contexts, they are not less political, nor are they wholly determined by government design. The People-to-People volunteers’ motives were not identical to those of government politics.

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<sup>82</sup>Rusty L. Monhollon, *“This is America?:” the Sixties in Lawrence, Kansas* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 5.

<sup>83</sup>Monhollon, *“This is America?”*, 5.

<sup>84</sup>Carol Hanisch, “The Personal is Political,” available at <http://carolhanisch.org/CHwritings/PersonalisPol.pdf>. (June 3, 2014). Sara Evans, *Personal Politics: The Roots of Women’s Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and New Left* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979) and James J. Farrell, *The Spirit of the Sixties: Making Postwar Radicalism* (New York: Routledge, 1997) provided detailed discussions on the political implications of personal life.

Considering the two realms of the political, therefore, the present dissertation attempts to locate volunteers' motive in the context of ordinary human interactions at the grassroots level by using the political scientist Robert Putnam's concepts such as *social capital, reciprocity, bonding* and *bridging*. Explaining the participants' personal motives and ethical inclinations from the perspectives of accumulation of social capital and engagement in reciprocal actions helps me depoliticize the genuine interests of volunteers who were involved in the programs. Especially, Putnam's *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (1995) serves as a framework for this dissertation's conceptualizing of the motives of volunteers of the People-to-People University program.

### ***Methodology and Sources***

This dissertation is largely based on archival sources accessed at the Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas and the University of Kansas Archives at the Spencer Research Library in Lawrence. The vast collections in the Eisenhower library contain the White House Central files which consist of speeches, letters, memorandums and other official records. In addition, the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Papers, the Ann Whitman files, and the Jacqueline Cochran papers were especially useful for chapter three. Mark Bortman's papers relating to the Civic committee and the Sister-Cities program, gave the basic framework for the second half of chapter three. People-to-People records, which included government documents, official speeches, personal correspondence, the program pamphlets, guides as well as an assortment of newspaper and magazine clippings, accessed at the University of Kansas Archives at the Spencer Research Library were used for chapter four.

The second important set of primary sources included the data from the oral history interviews the author conducted with volunteers of the People-to-People University program. The interview data were primarily used in the second half of chapter four. The research methods employed in conducting oral history interviews with People-to-People University program volunteers proved both a challenging and intellectually rewarding experience.

In addition to archival sources and oral history, this project used unpublished sources pertinent to the People-to-People program. Among them, Public Papers of Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953-1961, Eisenhower's memoirs *Mandate for Change* and *Waging Peace*, and two dissertations produced by John E. Juergensmeyer and Glenn Wesley Leppert, which were respectively done at Princeton University in 1960 and Kansas State University in 2003. The only scholarly work which addressed the People-to-People program in its early years is Juergensmeyer's dissertation entitled, "Democracy's Diplomacy: The People-to-People Program: A Study of Attempts to Focus the Effects of Private Contacts in International Politics." Written from a political scientist perspective, Juergensmeyer's dissertation argued that the People-to-People program was "quite successful in expanding mutual contacts," but it "lacked a sense of direction and specific goals because of a deficiency in conceptual underpinnings." Thus, the author suggested People-to-People improve its structural and administrative policies, to "encourage a mass increase in private contacts" and should attempt to focus on the trend of private interactions so it will promote a "long-range establishment of democratic political values."<sup>85</sup>Leppert's

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<sup>85</sup>Juergensmeyer, *Democracy's Diplomacy*, 2-3.

dissertation entitled, “Dwight D. Eisenhower and People-to-People as an Experiment in Personal Diplomacy: A Missing Element for Understanding Eisenhower’s Second Term as President” is a recent study to uncover the organizational and operational history of the People-to-People program as Eisenhower’s “tool for waging peace.”<sup>86</sup>

### ***Chapter Summaries***

This dissertation is divided into four chapters. The introductory chapter provides a summary of America’s pre-cold war experience in public diplomacy initiatives. Here I introduce relevant scholarship on People-to-People and discuss the theoretical and methodological perspectives. Chapter two presents the historical context surrounding the broader People-to-People movement. By focusing on the political and social environment in the early postwar years through the 1960s this chapter discusses the connections between cold war ideologies, internationalism and American vision for world leadership, and meaning and usage of people-to-people diplomacy. Chapter three and four are case studies which examined the origin, actions, successes and setbacks of the national People-to-People movement, the Sister-Cities program, and the People-to-People University program, which was launched at the dawn of the 1960s. Chapter four turns to oral history interviews conducted by the author to explore the motives of People-to-People volunteers—motives that were previously unheard and neglected to be recognized by previous scholarly works and which this work hopes to bring to light as any scholarly work on this topic would be incomplete without them.

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<sup>86</sup>Leppert, *Dwight D. Eisenhower and People-to-People*, 24.



## Chapter 2

### **Prelude to People's Diplomacy in Postwar America: Pride and Paradoxes at Home and Abroad**

In late May of 1956, Abraham J. Feldman, President of the Synagogue Council of America, received a “gracious invitation” from President Dwight D. Eisenhower that asked him to join a group of American citizens to the White House conference on the People-to-People partnership. Having deemed the president’s call a “patriotic task”, Rabbi Feldman accepted it as a “privilege to serve” either in his “personal or official capacity” as head of the nation’s first cross-denominational Jewish institution.<sup>87</sup> Dr. Feldman was one of about hundred and fifty Americans, whom Eisenhower invited to the “special” conference on people-to-people diplomacy.

The inaugural meeting of the People-to-People partnership, which was held in September 1956 right after Eisenhower’s recovery from his heart attack, was a founding moment of citizen diplomacy calling for the American people to contribute their part to the American Cold War effort in defense of American freedom and democracy. Humbled before the experts in the fields about which he was expected to talk, yet “emboldened” by the purpose of the meeting, Eisenhower prompted during the announcement of his People-to-People idea that “if we are going to take advantage of the assumption that all people want peace, then the problem is for people to get together and to lead government—if necessary, to evade governments—to work out not one method but thousands of methods by which people can gradually learn a little bit more of each other.” Governments can do “no more than point the way,” Eisenhower

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<sup>87</sup>Dr. Abraham J. Feldman to Eisenhower, June 1, 1956, Dwight D. Eisenhower.: Records as President (White House Central Files) Official File, Box 932 OF 325 People-to-People (10), EL.

continued, to “assist in mechanical details,” but ordinary people would help to “widen every possible chunk in the Iron Curtain and bring the family of Russia or of any other country... and sit down between us to say, ‘Now, how do we improve the lot of both of us?’ That would be the “truest path to peace.”<sup>88</sup> Although Eisenhower’s motives for promoting peace through People-to-People were not limited to only his foreign policy, the Cold War ideological battle with the Soviet Union served as the major force for the Eisenhower administration to take new outreach actions. Yet, Eisenhower neither wanted to demonstrate his People-to-People program as propaganda nor did he prefer it to be directly linked to government agencies. For American policymakers, as Osgood argued, propaganda is only a “communists’ tool” with which they sought to apply Soviet models, while American outreach initiatives such as People-to-People diplomacy were designed to create “mutual understanding” between ordinary peoples.<sup>89</sup> According to Leppert, however, People-to-People was a “shift in Eisenhower agenda for peace,” and an “experiment in low-key personal diplomacy.”<sup>90</sup>

In addition, given his high popularity rate, Eisenhower believed that regardless of their political preference, most Americans would stand behind his idea of citizen diplomacy that was needed to supplement the nation’s foreign policy. Henry Wallace, the presidential candidate from the Communist-backed Progressive Party, remarked in 1948 that “Ike was sincere about peace.” The beat novelist Jack Kerouac supported Ike,

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<sup>88</sup> Dwight D. Eisenhower, Remarks presented at the 1956 White House Conference on a Program for People-to-People Partnerships at Washington, D.C. on September 11, 1956, Dwight D. Eisenhower.: Records as President (White House Central Files) Official File, Box 391 OF 325 People-to-People (5), EL.

<sup>89</sup> Osgood, *Total Cold War*, 235.

<sup>90</sup> Leppert, *Dwight D. Eisenhower and People-to-People*, 1-2.

and the civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr., voted for the GOP in 1956. Indeed, as Stephen Whitfield once stated, “virtually everyone liked Ike.”<sup>91</sup>

Many of those Americans who were moved by Eisenhower’s speech believed that “playing a part” in the president’s project to help the government in spreading American freedom and democracy the world over was an “honor” and “interest” close to “the heart of every American.”<sup>92</sup>By the same token, it was a personal sense and moral choice evolved from political and cultural circumstances, which shaped an individual citizen’s passage to altruistic motives, belonging to and even recuperation during the turbulent years of social discontent. In particular, the creation of the People-to-People University chapters on college campuses in the early 1960s awakened young generation’s consciousness of their role in, and reaction to, a democratic society Americans have been envisioning to build for themselves and model for the rest. Taken together, these beliefs, choices, and consciousness encapsulated the key impulses that motivated many Americans to be part of the People-to-People program.

Eisenhower proposed the People-to-People program amid the Cold War confrontation, national insecurity, uncertainty in world peace, prevailing anti-Americanism, and the Third World decolonization. At home, Americans were [plagued] with political and social turmoil such as McCarthyism, the revival of racial and ethnic consciousness, and attendant social movements; and contradictions of continuing poverty and inequality along with unparalleled growth of the nation’s economy and

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<sup>91</sup> Stephen J. Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 17.

<sup>92</sup> Letters sent by Cyrus S. Ching, Former Chairman of Labor Management Council; Robert R. Mathews, Vice President of American Express Company; George Brett, President of the Macmillan Company Publishers; Theodore S. Replier, President of the Advertising Council, Inc., Melvin J. Maas, Chairman of the President’s Committee on Employment of the Physically Handicapped; Howard J. Carroll, General Secretary of the National Catholic Welfare Conference and Robert G. Simmons, Chief Justice of State of Nebraska. Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President (White House Central Files) OF 325 Box 391, EL.

wealth. As we look at the roots of these changes and challenges, we need to trace the ways in which America responded to both realities and expectations in the immediate postwar years.

Although the People-to-People movement was originated in the mid-1950s its motives were largely influenced by the immediate post-WWII time America's prediction of and due reactions to the emerging quest for a new world order. This chapter will focus on the political and social environment in the early postwar years through the 1960s to figure out the connections between cold war ideologies, internationalism, America's quest for world leadership and the broader people-to-people diplomacy. To understand the meaning behind the People-to-People program properly, we need to consider carefully how and why it was launched and what events and influences came before this nation-wide movement. This chapter situates the People-to-People idea as a product of a complex historical time period with a variety of political and ideological realities and imaginations.

### ***American Society in the Early Postwar Years:***

#### ***Affluence, Influence and Anxieties***

With the defeat of fascism and the drastic decline of the traditional powers, the United States entered the postwar era without military or economic rival. America's unparalleled prosperity and affluence rendered it the strongest postwar nation. If "there could ever be such a thing as a good war," the diplomatic historian John Lewis Gaddis states, "then this one, for the United States, came close."<sup>93</sup> The end of the war and the overwhelming victory of the United States thus brought most Americans a "sense of

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<sup>93</sup> John Lewis Gaddis. *The Cold War: A New History*. New York: Penguin Books, 2005, 9.

national pride” and triumph.<sup>94</sup> Such a victory justified America’s military and economic capability that none of the industrial nations had possessed at the time providing the country with an ambitious vision to act as a leading player in international relations. The vision under the auspices of spreading American freedom and democracy to the postwar world was deeply embedded in America’s politico-economic and cultural and humanitarian missions that the country had engaged in throughout the second half of the twentieth century.

In the immediate postwar years, American policymakers such as Harry S. Truman and John F. Dulles reinforced the overarching notion that the United States was obliged, if not destined, to shape the postwar world according to American democratic values and moral leadership. Early in 1946, President Truman called upon the nation to use the moral leadership to “save a world which is beset by so many threats of new conflicts, new terror and new destruction,” and to “save the starving millions in Europe, in Asia and in Africa.”<sup>95</sup> The same year, John Foster Dulles, the would-be Secretary of State for the Eisenhower administration, more bluntly stated that the “United States ought to take a lead... in restoring principles as a guide to conduct. If America “does not do that,” Dulles insisted, “the world will not be worth living in.”<sup>96</sup> Dulles later claimed during his campaign speech in 1952 that a Republican administration would use “all means to secure the liberation of Eastern Europe.”<sup>97</sup>

The media mogul Henry Luce’s prediction of America’s preeminence seemed assured. “The vision of America as the dynamic leader of world trade,” Luce asserted in

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<sup>94</sup> John Fousek, *To Lead the Free World: American Nationalism & the Cultural Roots of the Cold War*, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 16.

<sup>95</sup> Quoted in Fousek. *To Lead the Free World*, 68.

<sup>96</sup> Quoted in Fousek, *To Lead the Free World*, 76.

<sup>97</sup> Quoted in Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War*, 7-8.

1941, “has within it the possibility of such enormous human progress as to stagger the imagination. Let us not be staggered by it. Let us rise to its tremendous possibilities.”<sup>98</sup>

The postwar world was ready to embrace Luce’s “American Century” that would be shaped in line with American leadership. Indeed, the preliminary plans were already sketched out even before the end of the war based upon U.S.-led political and economic arrangements manifested in the Atlantic Charter (1941), the Bretton Woods Conference (1944), and the creation of the United Nations (1945).

On August 14, 1945, President Truman announced from the Oval Room of the White House to his fellow Americans: “I deem... full acceptance of ... unconditional surrender” of Japanese militarism. Signs of the overwhelming victory across America flared. As the crowds in Washington chanted “We want Harry,” Truman appeared with his wife Bess on his side and proclaimed that is a “great day.”<sup>99</sup> With the skyrocketing number of the death toll in the post-bomb Japan, Truman’s popularity rate skyrocketed at home. The United States dealt with “a beast” and entered the newest of its eras.<sup>100</sup> The president declared a two-day national holiday. The V-J America was peaceful, prosperous, and powerful. Two months after V-J Day, *Fortune* magazine wrote about the day of the Japanese surrender: “It marked not only the war’s end but the beginning of the greatest peacetime industrial boom in the world’s history.”<sup>101</sup>

Hundreds of thousands of GI veterans headed toward college degrees and thousands more set up businesses of their own, purchased homes, and started families.

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<sup>98</sup> Quoted in Marty Jezer, *The Dark Ages: Life in the United States 1945-1960*, (Boston: South End Press, 1982), 18.

<sup>99</sup> Douglas T. Miller and Marion Nowak, *The Fifties: The Way We Really Were*, (Garden City: Doubleday Press, 1957).

<sup>100</sup> J. Samuel Walker, *Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs against Japan* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina, 2004), 6.

<sup>101</sup> Thomas G. Paterson. “The Origins of the Postwar International System.” In Robert Griffith. *Major Problems in American History since 1945*, (Lexington: DC Heath & Company, 1992), 11

The nation's economy prospered on unprecedented scale; middle class had expanded and unemployment lowered. For many, the "American Dream" seemed to become a reality. A young mother in St. Louis exclaimed, "Oh, things are going along just wonderfully. Harry has a grand job, there is the new baby." Then in a moment, she would frown, "Do you think it's really all going to last?"<sup>102</sup> The moment of victory seemed to easily turn into the moment of fears and anxieties in the early postwar America.

While the advent and usage of the atomic bombs evidenced how human beings could perish in a matter of seconds, it also profoundly "revolutionized American life" at home.<sup>103</sup> On the next day after the first atomic bomb fell on Hiroshima, the *New York Herald Tribune* states, "...one senses the foundations of one's own universe trembling." Many ordinary Americans perceived the news in a rather pessimistic tone. The Reverend John Hayne Holmes of the Community Church of New York City sadly observed, "It seemed to grow cold as though I have been transported to the waste spaces of the moon... For I knew that the final crisis in human history had come. What that atomic bomb had done to Japan, it could do to us."<sup>104</sup>

The American people did not dare to earnestly accept the reality of peace and prosperity as something enduring. The fact of the atomic bomb hung over all the victory celebrations "like some eerie haze from another world."<sup>105</sup> Would peace and prosperity

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<sup>102</sup> Allan M Winkler. *Life under a Cloud: American Anxiety about the Bomb*, (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1993), 9.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>104</sup> Quoted in Bruce H. Franklin, *War Stars: The Super Weapon and the American Imagination*, (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2008), 155.

<sup>105</sup> Eric Goldman. *The Crucial Decade—And After: America, 1945-1960*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), 3-15

be just a “prelude” to another war and depression?<sup>106</sup> Historian William Graebner coined the term “culture of peace” for the second half of the 1940s because of its private, familial and idealistic trends. But the peace seemed to be for many Americans only a symbolic dimension of the deteriorating relations and growing conflicts between the two wartime allies—the United States and the Soviet Union, which ultimately led to the almost half-century long dispute. At this point, the period was the crucial precursor to political, social and cultural trends that “came to fruition (bitter or sweet) in the 1950s and the 1960s.”<sup>107</sup>

Most Americans in the early years after World War II were hopeful about their future despite their fears and anxieties of possible depression or another war. Only few Americans anticipated the cold war ... or thought that the “burden of free-world leadership would become permanent.”<sup>108</sup> These views were reflected in the major political thoughts on America’s future as a rising world power. Liberal-leftists (or sometimes called progressives) as strong supporters of the United Nations, stood on a positive line by speculating that the “people’s peace” would end colonialism and promote social revolutions. Conservatives (or isolationists) held less optimistic views by showing little interest (and faith) in the role and power of the UN. For the American

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<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>107</sup> William Graebner, *The Age of Doubt: American Thought and Culture in the 1940s*, (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990), x.

<sup>108</sup>The Gallup Poll conducted on March 16, 1945 reveals that while 38% said that the U.S. “will find itself in another war within the next 25 years” while 45% responded “No,” which indicated the mixed public opinion about the peace outlook right after WWII. *The Gallup Poll*, 493. William L. O’Neill, *American High: The Years of Confidence, 1945-1960*. (New York, The Free Press), 6.



people, however, *peace*, not war, was their hope, though the majority of them thought that Washington was treating its rival, the Soviet Union, “too soft[ly]”.<sup>109</sup>

Although some influential figures such as George F. Kennan, who was a staunch advocate of professionalism in foreign policy, underestimated the role of public opinion because it bears “emotionalism” and “subjectivity,”<sup>110</sup> it is no exaggeration that public opinion has tended to constrain to a certain extent American politicians’ choice of policy agendas, especially starting from the postwar years.<sup>111</sup> In the early 1950s, the political scientist Gabriel Almond stated that the “public cannot make an effective foreign policy, it can only support one. People know about blast and fallout- not in their technical details, but enough to appreciate that general war would probably mean catastrophe for the United States in general, and for themselves in particular.”<sup>112</sup> Years later the well-known expert on public opinion, Ole Holsti, noted that the public (though often ill-informed) is more likely to play more potent role during the post-Cold War era even though it is a “plausible hypothesis” rather than a “firmly established fact.”<sup>113</sup> And what the diplomatic historian Melvin Small stated was a verdict of what the above two experts

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<sup>109</sup>The public opinion poll released by July, 1948 showed that 69% of Americans believed that the U.S. was being “too soft” with Moscow, and only 3 percent viewed America’s deal with the Soviet Union “too tough.” O’Neil, *American High*, 68. The Gallup Public Opinion Poll of March 11, 1945 indicated that 55% of Americans responded that Russia “can be trusted to cooperate” with the US after the war. Even Russia was among top “ideal” 4 places Americans would “want to visit” when the war was over. George H. Gallup, *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935-1971*, vol. I, 1935-1948, (New York: Random House, 1972), 492, 498.

<sup>110</sup> George F. Kennan. *American Diplomacy*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 93.

<sup>111</sup> Ole R. Holsti. *Public Opinion and American Public Foreign Policy*, (Ann Harbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996).

<sup>112</sup> Gabriel A. Almond. *The American People and Foreign Policy*, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), xxii-xxiv; Thomas A. Bailey, *The Man in the Street: The Impact of American Public Opinion on Foreign Policy*, (New York: Macmillan, 1948).

<sup>113</sup>Holsti, *Public Opinion and American Public Foreign Policy*, 298.

had speculated. According to Small, “one cannot understand American diplomatic history without understanding the central role of public opinion.”<sup>114</sup>

At the time of the nation’s anxiety, President Truman was tempted to reassure the American people of his decisiveness to be tough on his foreign policy. Thus his post-Hiroshima-Nagasaki impression consequently led to the increase rather than decrease on the Manhattan Project budget from the late 1945. Truman asked Congress in a few years to appropriate a billion dollar for nuclear-weapons production. As such, there was no immediate disarmament that would bring peace, but immense interest in making more bombs.

The post-Hiroshima-Nagasaki reactions were still mixed, however. The American people viewed that the atomic weapons had brought to the nation a pride and power in leadership, and a prestige and superiority in the nation’s scientific and technological advancement. It was not “universal horror but unalloyed joy and relief for Americans and their allies.”<sup>115</sup> Yet until America’s new postwar enemy, the Soviet Union, tested their first atomic bomb by the decade’s end, very few people would pause over the “larger meaning” and moral implications of such technological advancement for the postwar world peace and stability. Despite this, however, Americans in the late 1940s began to accept Truman’s assertion, with or without choice, that “there is no complete protection against an atomic air attack, but there is a great deal that can be done to reduce the

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<sup>114</sup> Melvin Small, “Public Opinion,” In *Explaining American Foreign Relations*, Eds. Michael Hogan and Thomas Paterson, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 176.

<sup>115</sup> Kenneth Rose, *One Nation Underground: The Fallout Shelter in American Culture*, (New York: New York University Press, 2001), 14.

number of deaths and injuries that might result.”<sup>116</sup> As historian Paul Boyer states, an “overwhelming approval of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings reflects that fact that Americans had already been conditioned to accept the terror bombing of cities as a legitimate military strategy.”<sup>117</sup>

By the same token, the “spontaneous impulse” of most Americans to stand behind their government’s decision to use the atomic bomb was justified by many in Washington, though Truman’s Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson’s thoughts about the bombs had quite changed after the usage of the bombs. Stimson urged Truman to negotiate with Stalin because he believed that the bombs could not be used as “a direct lever to produce the change.” America’s further engagement in nuclear bombs, Stimson warned, would produce nothing but “suspiciousness” and “distrust” for the Soviet Union.<sup>118</sup>

Truman’s Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace also cautioned in his 1946 letter to the president that America’s continued production of atomic bombs “must make it look to the rest of the world as if we were only paying lip service to peace at conference table.” As the “strongest single nation,” Wallace hoped, the United States would have the “opportunity to lead the world to peace” if it pursued a more conciliatory

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<sup>116</sup> Alan M. Winkler, *Life under a Cloud: American Anxiety about the Bomb*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 116. As the summer of 1949 Gallup poll indicated, “70 percent of Americans opposed any U.S. pledge not to be the first to use atomic weapons in a future war.” A year later, “77 percent of Americans said the US should use the atomic bomb in any future world war.” Cited in Paul Boyer, *By the Bomb’s Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 336-39.

<sup>117</sup> Boyer, *By the Bomb’s Early Light*, 189.

<sup>118</sup> Walter LaFeber, *The American Age: US Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad, 1750 to the Present*. 2<sup>nd</sup>ed, (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1994), 460

approach toward the Soviet Union.<sup>119</sup> Stimson's warning was ignored and Wallace was soon asked to resign. After he resigned from Truman's cabinet in September 1946, Wallace became a prominent critic of "America's 'get tough' posture toward the Soviet Union." With similar frontier experience, Wallace believed, Americans and Russians could understand each other. He wrote that the "history of Siberia and its heroic population reminds one of the history of the Far West of the United States."<sup>120</sup> Thus, Wallace's hope for constructive U.S.-Soviet relations was shattered, especially after the Marshall Plan. When the Soviets refused to receive American aid, Wallace stated that "warlords and moneychangers' had perverted the plan's good intentions and planned to use it to divide Europe."<sup>121</sup>

As chief decision-maker, Truman was willing to listen to hard-liners, including his Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who had no intention of diminishing the nation's military strength and atomic supremacy. There were even stronger and more authoritative voices beyond Washington that influenced public opinion and therefore affirmed the president's stance as well. Karl Compton, the influential physicist and the then President of MIT stated that the atomic bomb "strengthened the hands of those who sought peace and provided a face-saving argument for those who had hitherto advocated continued war."<sup>122</sup> But the most influential figure whose positions "perfectly fit Truman's and Acheson's view of Soviet issues" was George Frost Kennan, an

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<sup>119</sup> Henry Wallace's letter to President Truman, in *Major Problems in American History since 1945: Documents and Essays*. Edited by Robert Griffith, (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1992), 104-105

<sup>120</sup> J. Samuel Walker, *Henry A. Wallace and American Foreign Policy*, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1976), 105-106 and Graham White and Zone Maze, *Henry A. Wallace: His Search for a New World Order*, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 224.

<sup>121</sup> Thomas W. Devine, *Henry Wallace's 1948 Presidential Campaign and The Future of Postwar Liberalism*, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2013), 95.

<sup>122</sup> Boyer, *By the Bomb's Early Light*, 189-90.

American diplomat residing in the Kremlin during the early postwar years.<sup>123</sup> What Kennan observed and then suggested in U.S.- Soviet relations after WWII was power politics, which was precisely what Truman was envisioning in Washington.

### ***Kennan, Containment and Truman's Foreign Policy Commitments***

Fluent in Russian and well-versed in foreign affairs, George F. Kennan, while in a diplomatic post in Moscow, witnessed the “political personality” of Soviet Russia and urged American strategists to embrace the concept of the “innate antagonism between capitalism and socialism,” which was deeply embedded in the foundations of the Soviet power. In the “long telegram” sent from Moscow in 1946, Kennan urged “every courageous and incisive measure to... improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow worth a thousand diplomatic notes and joint communiqués.” A year after his famous “long telegram,” Kennan, in his article, “*The Sources of Soviet Conduct*,” published under the pseudonym Mr. X, prescribed that the U.S. pursue a policy of containment to deal with Soviet military power and its geopolitical intentions. So long Kennan’s containment policy was ideological, he emphasized that “informational activities are too important” to disseminate the “impression of a country.”<sup>124</sup> Indeed, the architect of the containment policy was one of the supporters of American humanitarian aid to European and non-communist countries and once praised that the Marshall Plan was “a great act of statesmanship.”<sup>125</sup>

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<sup>123</sup>LaFeber, *The American Age*, 473-76.

<sup>124</sup>George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950*, (New York: The New American Library, 1984), 126.

<sup>125</sup>Kennan, *American Diplomacy*, 168.

Although Kennan's containment policy was not the only template that framed political, economic, and cultural dimensions of America's Cold War preparedness, it was a quite commanding and compelling strategy for cold war tacticians. In particular, major foreign policy actions taken in the early Cold War years were designed according to the containment orientation: the *Truman Doctrine* (1947) laid the foundation for America's growing interest beyond Western Europe to hold the Soviet monolith; the *Marshall Plan* marked the first of the largest economic aids the U.S. offered; the creation of the *North Atlantic Treaty* (NATO) in early 1949 marked Washington's serious commitment to anti-communist, military foreign policy, and the *National Security Council* paper 68 (NSC-68), which called for a tripling of American defense spending, was initiated by Truman in 1950.<sup>126</sup>

Along with such hard power undertakings, however, the merit of cultural and communication outreaches has always been considered by US analysts as a crucial dimension of the nation's foreign relations. America's first state-sponsored student exchange initiative, the *Fulbright Program*, was launched in 1946; *Voice of America*, a first overseas radio system opened during WWII, started to broadcast in Russian from 1947; Truman's *Campaign of Truth* was announced to demonstrate the "truth and freedom on our side" in 1950, and his administration established the *Psychological Strategy Board* in 1951. In most occasions, these actions were designed to inculcate a favorable image of the United States overseas.

In the early postwar years, American policymakers believed that poverty and economic depression bred totalitarianism and disruption of free trade—a belief they long held. By early March 1947, the United States had laid out its first massive aid for

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<sup>126</sup>LaFeber, *The American Age*, 504-506

Greece and Turkey “to support the peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”<sup>127</sup> Soon after Truman’s aid to the Mediterranean countries, dubbed as the *Truman Doctrine*, his Secretary of State George C. Marshall, proposed a similar program during his commencement speech at Harvard. Marshall stated that “our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos.” Marshall’s idea soon reached Congress, which approved over \$13 billion dollars in economic assistance to be spent on war-torn Western Europe between 1948 and 1952.<sup>128</sup>

Unlike the World War I allies who had tried to “punish” Germany with the harshest war reparations, the United States followed a different path after the end of WWII. The harsh treatment of Germany would make it “weak for a long time.” Thus, America’s benevolent position toward Germany might have been directed at building a prosperous, orderly Europe which required a “prosperous, orderly Germany at the center.”<sup>129</sup> But it could also have had another impulse. The historian Stephen A. Ambrose noted that America pursued a “policy of magnanimity towards the losers” and to “teach the ways of democracy.”<sup>130</sup> The American benevolence at the time not only assisted the war-devastated Europe, but it also attracted the sentimentality of world leaders. Ho Chi Minh “hailed the Americans as the true friends of the oppressed of the earth.” So did de Gaulle, Churchill and even Stalin. In a desperate, devastated war-torn

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<sup>127</sup> Andrew J. Dunar, *America in the Fifties*, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2006), 17.

<sup>128</sup> Although the Marshall Plan was designed to help European economic recovery, as the majority in the Congress defended and argued, it would also help to “unify Western Europe, contain communism and pave the way to a multilateral system on which American prosperity depended.” Michael J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 190.

<sup>129</sup> LaFeber, *The American Age*, 440-45

<sup>130</sup> Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley. Editors, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938*, (New York: Penguin Books, 1997), 50.

world, no one but the United States was almost universally regarded, and even welcomed, as the “champion of justice, freedom, and democracy.” America never enjoyed such high prestige before or since.<sup>131</sup>

Yet, as the historian Jonathan Bell argues, the rationale behind the *Marshall Plan* was more than economic and/or humanitarian; it had racial and ideological elements. In his testimony before the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee, George Marshall explicitly stressed “western civilization” as something America needed to preserve. Without American help, Marshall claimed, there was no escape for Europe “from economic distress so intense, social discontent so violent, political confusion so spread, and hopes of the future so shattered that the historic base of western civilization... will take on a new form in the image of the tyranny that we fought to destroy in Nazi Germany.”<sup>132</sup>

President Truman expressed much the same thought in his earlier statement. “We cannot sit idly by and seen totalitarianism spread to the whole of Europe. We must meet the challenge if civilization is to survive. We represent the moral God-fearing peoples of the world. We must save the world from Atheism and totalitarianism. Only our strength will save the world,” Truman noted.<sup>133</sup> These were the politically sensitive messages that Truman and Marshall revealed at a historically vulnerable time for wartime allies and that hinted the alienation of the Soviet Union, both geographically and culturally, from the unified European continent. Indeed, the foundation of such a chilling atmosphere in U.S.-Soviet relations was already created during Bretton Woods

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<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>132</sup> Jonathan Bell, *The Liberal State On Trial: The Cold War and American Politics in the Truman Years*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 108.

<sup>133</sup> Truman, quoted in Scott Lucas, “Campaigns of Truth: The Psychological Strategy Board and American Ideology, 1951-1953,” *The International History Review*, vol. 18, No.2, (May 1996), 279-302.



conference days. Disappointed with the U.S. defining the postwar economic structure based on its dollar standards, the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov stated that, if the Bretton Woods system prevailed, American commerce and culture would dominate in Europe. “Was this what we fought for when we battled the fascist invaders?” Molotov asked.<sup>134</sup> Both Truman and Marshall’s unprecedented international commitments, though conducive to American economic and political interests, “hardened the division of Europe” and provoked the Soviet ambition for world power, which already started sprouting before the war’s end.<sup>135</sup> The American wartime ally now abandoned its previous stance.

The Soviet Union left the battlefield with immense losses, but arose from it with enormous military experiences, as its Red Army was the determining factor in the victory of the Allied forces. Despite the devastating human losses and destruction of the entire infrastructural system that almost brought the Eurasian empire to its knees, the Kremlin leaders did not want to yield to American power and eminence. Nor did they wish to abandon their strong belief in communist ideology that they would continue to fight for until it eventually eroded from within. Campaigning for a postwar world regime guided by the principles of communism, rather than acknowledging dependency on western influences, was the determined policy choice that would serve Soviet interests for the second half of the twentieth century. It would be hard to imagine that a country such as the postwar Soviet Union with its battle-tested military might and activist foreign policies equipped with aggressive totalitarian ideologies would simply shy away from its

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<sup>134</sup>LaFeber, *The American Age*, 460.

<sup>135</sup>George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S Foreign Relations since 1776*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 622.

desire for world domination.<sup>136</sup> Indeed, the soul of polarizing interests behind the imminent conflict between the wartime allies was already lingering in the immediate postwar years.

American economic assistance was offered to the Soviet Union at a sorely needed time, but Stalin did not accept it.<sup>137</sup> Indeed, according to historian Arnold Offner, neither Truman nor Marshall nor the State Department including Kennan wanted the USSR included in the Marshall Plan. Such exclusion, as historian Michael Hogan stated, was not only “containment but also the strategy of economic integration that militated against the Soviet involvement in the European Reparation Program.”<sup>138</sup> Both Stalin and Molotov did not doubt that it would happen.<sup>139</sup> Historians provide multi-dimensional interpretations regarding the Soviet denunciation of America’s aid, yet the political implications behind the Marshall Plan perhaps embodied Truman’s hope (and Stalin’s fear for that matter) to “whet the appetites of the satellites for the capitalist

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<sup>136</sup> As of 1948, the capacity of the Soviet Army was more powerful than that of America. Vladimir Oligovich Rukavishnikov, *Kholodnaia Voina, Kholodnyi Mir: Obshchestvennoe Mnenie vSShA in Evrope o SSSR/Rossii, Vneshnei Politikei Bezopasnosti Zapada*. (Moskva: Akademicheskii Proekt, 2005).150.

<sup>137</sup> Indeed the Marshall planners offered the aid to the Soviets assumed that they would not accept it. The Soviet Union might have calculated one of the major goals of the Marshall Plan, which was to strengthen the integration and unity of a “Western European bloc of nations of sufficient size and coherence to withstand the dual dangers of Communist subversion and Soviet aggression.” Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Patterson. Editors. *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991),192. The relationship between America’s emergence as superpower and its economic assistance programs in the postwar bipolar world was thoroughly discussed in earlier accounts on America’s economic policies. See David Baldwin, *Economic Development and American Foreign Policy, 1943-1962*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966).

<sup>138</sup> Michael Hogan quoted in Arnold A Offner, *Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945-1953*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 227. Stalin’s rejection of the Marshall Plan seemed to be connected with his disappointment with U.S. “sloppiness” in responding to Russia’s \$6 billion loan request in 1945. The Americans demanded in return, “proper Soviet ‘behavior in international matters’” meaning that the Soviets were expected to join the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. But Stalin was “unwilling to sell out Soviet security... for any amount of money, no matter how large.”Offner, *Another Such Victory*, 218 and LaFeber, *The American Age*, 440.

<sup>139</sup> Offner, *Another Such Victory*, 228.

system.”<sup>140</sup> Furious with the U.S. policies, which, according to some scholars, “were designed to undermine” Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, the Kremlin swiftly moved toward different economic arrangements with the countries in the region, which later became known as the Molotov Plan. The historian George Herring notes that the United States “did not rely exclusively on economic assistance to contain communism in Western Europe.” But despite their successes in helping European recovery, the early postwar American economic initiatives were dramatic enough to provoke the hypersensitive Soviet leaders to distance themselves from the West. Thus, the evolving rhetoric of the divided world (and hence East-West division) manifested in George Kennan’s “*Long Telegram*” (1946) and Winston Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech at Fulton, Missouri (1946) became a reality culminating in the so-called Cold War.

The question of who was responsible for the Cold War has been one of the most controversial issues for historical analysis.<sup>141</sup> Three major schools of thought have prevailed in the Cold War scholarship thus far: *traditionalism*, *revisionism*, and *post-revisionism*. Traditional (orthodox) historians argue that it was caused by the Soviet Union under the leadership of Joseph Stalin, and its expansionist policy throughout

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<sup>140</sup> John Patrick Diggins, *The Proud Decades: America in War and in Peace, 1941-1960*, (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1988), 75-80.

<sup>141</sup> For divergent views on this topic, see Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and the United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1972); Thomas Paterson, *Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); Fraser Harbutt, *The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America and the Origins of the Cold War*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War*, (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1987); Melvyn Leffler, *The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994); Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996) and Odd Arne Westad, *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, and Theory*, (London: Frank Cass, 2000).

Eastern Europe and beyond. Growing domestic anti-communist sentiments triggered by Senator Joseph McCarthy and the intense actions by the House Un-American Affairs Committee (HUAC)—all perhaps created a fertile soil for scholars to sharpen their words for the common problem the nation faced in the early postwar period. George F. Kennan, Herbert Feis and Arthur Schlesinger Jr. are among those historians who viewed the Soviet Union as the embryo with which East-West rivalry had sprouted and matured for half a century.

Inspired by Marxist-Leninist philosophy, Kennan argued, the Soviet Union was founded on the “innate antagonism between capitalism and socialism.” The “secretiveness, the lack of frankness, the duplicity, the wary suspiciousness, and the basic unfriendliness of purpose,” all were the main features of its foreign policy. As long as these characteristics would remain in the Kremlin’s policy, there would be no sign for changes whatsoever. So “Americans should not be misled by tactical maneuvers”—which can come in possible disguised gestures.<sup>142</sup>

As Feis stated in 1970, it was the “mistrust and hostility of western capitalism,” which deeply lingered in the Soviet consciousness for many years, that “sundered the bonds formed during the war.”<sup>143</sup> In his earlier account of Soviet-American relations/tensions from 1942 through the first UN meeting at Dumbarton Oaks, Feis also viewed that it was the Soviet Union under Stalin which was trying to extend their boundaries and their control from their neighboring states and extend their revolutionary

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<sup>142</sup> Kennan, *American Diplomacy*, 572

<sup>143</sup> Herbert Feis, *From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War*, (Norton: New York, 1970), 5

effort throughout the world.<sup>144</sup> Thus, the orthodox scholars tended to blame Stalin's Russia for triggering the Cold War, and regarded the United States as a late-comer to the scene. In general, these scholars "echoed the U.S. government's mindset, reflecting the Cold War consensus that bound American society during this time."<sup>145</sup>

During the 1960s and early 1970s, revisionists proposed counterarguments by viewing the U.S. as the responsible side for the origin of the Cold War. The revisionists' goal was to prove their (anti)thesis from an economic perspective. Major contributors of this school of thought are William Appleman Williams, Gabriel Kolko, Gar Alperovitz, Lloyd Gardner, Walter LaFeber, and Thomas Paterson. In his book, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (1959), Williams stated that at the end of WWII "most American leaders were strongly inclined to deal with the problems of the world by relying on the traditional approach" of internationalism and collective security, "organized and led by the U.S. in opposition to the Soviet Union."<sup>146</sup> These policies were assured by President Truman and other statesmen who continued to see the world in terms of "open-door expansion"—a policy which offered Russian leaders "no real choice on the key issues of economic aid and military security."<sup>147</sup> Thus the postwar U.S. leaders exerted their "open door policy" on the Soviet Union in the expectation that Soviets would confront American hostility unless "they do not accept American proposals," a political dilemma which "crystallized the cold war."<sup>148</sup> A decade after his original interpretation of the roots

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<sup>144</sup>Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and The Peace They Sought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 655.

<sup>145</sup>Geraint Hughes and Saki Ruth Dockrill, "Introduction: The Cold War as History," in *Palgrave Advances in Cold War History*, eds., Saki R. Dockrill and Geraint Hughes, (New York: Palgrave, 2006), 6.

<sup>146</sup>William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, (New York: Norton, 1988), 16.

<sup>147</sup>Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, 151

<sup>148</sup>*Ibid.*

of the Cold War, Williams provided an in-depth analysis of Russian-American relations from the 1917 October Revolution through 1947, by focusing on the “frontier-expansionist thesis.” This expansionist thesis envisioned American relations with the rest of the world in terms of a continuing need to expand in order to maintain prosperity, democracy, and domestic well-being.<sup>149</sup> In addition, the escalating war in Vietnam, the domestic public opposition to it, civil rights movements, and the revival of racial and ethnic consciousness all completely changed the domestic political environment and challenged whether the “assumption that the U.S. system was morally superior” and its foreign policy was “inherently benign.”<sup>150</sup>

Like Williams, Gabriel and Joyce Kolko argued that only the U.S. emerged from the war with “strength and confidence of its ability to direct the world reconstruction,” but with a “comprehensive and remarkably precise vision of an ideal economic order” in the belief that “world capitalism become a unified [and ideal] system.”<sup>151</sup> The Cold War, according to the Kolkos, therefore “was far less the confrontation of the United States with Russia than America’s expansion into the entire world—a world the Soviet Union neither controlled nor created.”<sup>152</sup>

Paterson’s study on the origin of the Cold War was based on both economic and political motives. The U.S. policy was “haughty, expansionist, and uncompromising” while the Soviet foreign policy was “flexible in the immediate postwar years.”<sup>153</sup> Thus there were not only economic motives but also diplomatic and policy ingredients that

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<sup>149</sup>Williams, *The Roots of the American Empire*, xiv.

<sup>150</sup>Dockrill and Hughes, *Palgrave Advances in Cold War History*, 6.

<sup>151</sup>Gabriel Kolko and Joyce Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and The United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 3

<sup>152</sup>Kolko and Kolko, *The Limits of Power*, 31.

<sup>153</sup>Thomas Paterson, *Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1973), 260-261

triggered the origin of the Cold War. Paterson presented several factors including “peace and prosperity ideology,” “presence and awareness of power,” “get-tough leaders,” a “particular reading of history,” and the “notion of American superiority,” all of which led the American leaders to the “unilateral application of the power they knew they possessed.”<sup>154</sup> In this way, revisionists basically agreed that it was not the Soviet Union at whom the Americans point for the presence of the Cold War, but that it was the United States and “its greed for overseas markets” (and combined with its nuclear power, according to some) which constrained the former to “communize Eastern Europe.”<sup>155</sup>

In the late 1970s and 1980s, post-revisionist historians tended to provide a balanced interpretive framework for the Cold War historians. Major post-revisionist scholars include John Lewis Gaddis, Melvyn P. Leffler, Robert James Maddox, and Fraser Harbutt, although their interpretations of the origin of the Cold War, to some extent, differed in their works. But post-revisionism, be it an independent school of thought or just a rebuttal of revisionism, or a “new consensus” or “synthesis” which “draws from both traditional and revisionist interpretations,”<sup>156</sup> was a “much vaguer school of interpretation than the other two representing the middle ground between traditionalism and revisionism.”<sup>157</sup> The end of the Cold War actually was not, of course, the end of the debate on its origins. It was actually the beginning of more sophisticated,

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<sup>154</sup>Paterson, *Soviet-American Confrontation*, 263

<sup>155</sup>Dockrill and Hughes, *Palgrave Advances in Cold War History*, 7.

<sup>156</sup>Samuel J. Walker. Quoted in John L. Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History*, (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 172

<sup>157</sup>Geir Lundestad, “How Not to Study the Origins of the Cold War,” in *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, and Theory*, ed. Odd Arne Westad, (London: F Cass, 2000), 65. He claimed that he has long been a self-declared post-revisionist.

balanced, interdisciplinary, and multi-archival research at its root and all other dimensions.<sup>158</sup>

By the dawn of 1950, America's Cold War ideological offensive strategies had been quite well framed. America's comprehensive preparation for imminent international tensions in the late 1940s seemed not an empty cold war obsession at a time. It was prompted by a chain of events that could have potentially threatened America's security and shaken its vision and ambition to fill the postwar power vacuum. In 1948, the Soviets orchestrated a coup d'état in Czechoslovakia to oust anti-communist rulers. Three months later the Soviet occupation forces in eastern Germany began a blockade of all contacts between Berlin and the west. Yet the most shocking and unforeseen event was the Soviet Union's detonation of its first atomic bomb in late August of 1949, which not only brought America's atomic supremacy under threat, but it also forecast a potential communist influence beyond its border. It was shocking, indeed, because American scientists [and CIA] predicted that "Russia would not perfect atomic weapon until 1952 and even some had not expected Soviets to succeed before 1955."<sup>159</sup>

Making the situation even worse, the Soviet Union's potential ally, China, became a "red-state" within a month after the former's possession of atomic weapons. Territorial skirmishes between the two Koreas had escalated to the level of open

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<sup>158</sup> The most telling works from the post-Cold War period include Melvyn Leffler's *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, The Truman Administration and the Cold War*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), *The Scepter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917-1953*, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994); H.W. Brands, *The Devil We Knew: Americans and the Cold War*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's War: From Stalin to Khrushchev*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); John L. Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Geir Lundestad, "How (Not) to Study the Origins of the Cold War," Ed. Odd Arne Westad, *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, and Theory*, (London: Frank Cass, 2000); William Chafe, *The Unfinished Journey: America since World War II*, (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 2007).

<sup>159</sup> Goldman, *Crucial Decade*, 100.



warfare by mid-1950, and consequently, communist North Korea invaded South Korea in June, 1950. UN/US troops under the supervision of General Douglas MacArthur entered the war on the South's behalf and soon after both the Soviet Union and China, directly or indirectly, supposedly committed to the north. With the Korean War, the first of several proxy wars in the cold war began.

By the time Truman passed down the presidential power to his successor, the United States was well prepared, both militarily and psychologically, to wage (and presumably to win) the Cold War, at all costs. At this point, the diplomatic historian Michael J. Hogan candidly remarked that the economic burdens on defense commitments "put serious limits on domestic social welfare programs," and the "outcome would be an American national security state that was shaped as much by the country's democratic political culture as it was by the perceived military imperatives of the Cold War."<sup>160</sup> It raised new concerns about a "garrison state that could undermine American democracy."<sup>161</sup> Even *Time* magazine's choice for "Man of the Year" was the "U.S. Fighting Man," the first time the magazine has chosen a "symbol" instead of an individual. In such a climate, both nationwide mobilization and militarization of American society affected the cold war mentality at large and helped to shape the postwar years. How did all of these realities and imaginations in an international conflict impinge upon American foreign and domestic policies in the next two decades or so?

As history witnessed, the Cold War was the fierce rivalry between the two nations--the United States and the Soviet Union--contending for full spectrum

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<sup>160</sup> Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 22.

<sup>161</sup> Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, 103.

domination of their diametrically opposed political, economic, and cultural ideals and ideologies. The power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, by and large, occurred in the so-called “free world” in the hope that one could expand its sphere of influence, if it would invest more sources and effort to those who were not yet aligned with either Moscow or Washington. Postwar American presidents and their key foreign policy advisors were challenged and constrained, but in general, they fully, if not overly, committed with all possible politico-economic and socio-cultural resources to curbing the Soviet sphere of influence to secure freedom, peace, and democracy at home and abroad. Yet the containment policy was not a single framework for his foreign policy. As a battle-hardened war hero, Eisenhower relied on “massive retaliation,” the mighty force that he hoped would prevent the Soviet Union from extending its expansionist policies, while believing in the powerful role that ‘massive mobilization’ of ordinary people could play, not only in shoring up the contagious spread of communist ideologies but also in creating cooperative international community, and ultimately in preserving a “true and lasting peace.”<sup>162</sup>

### ***McCarthyism and the Anti-Communist Crusade at Home***

So long as the cold war was cumulatively defined as the conflict between capitalism and communism, the most dramatic action of it was a ruthless justification of one’s ideologies over the other that gradually led to the intensification of the Cold War. One of the earlier ideological fanaticisms that played out so powerfully in American society was a “frenzied search” for communists by Joseph McCarthy, the Republican Senator from Wisconsin. Such hysteria of anti-communism had already established its

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<sup>162</sup>Remarks by Dwight D. Eisenhower, September 11, 1956. DDEPL.

firm ground by the dawn of the 1950s, as a “permanent feature” in American social and political life.<sup>163</sup> The greatest fear of communism that haunted the country came to be known as McCarthyism, which lingered in the American society well beyond its initial period of turmoil. From 1950 to 1954, McCarthy “played upon cold war emotions,” the historian John Diggins noted, and “made charges so fantastic that frightened people believed the worst...” He was not just a “consummate demagogue... but also a master of the pseudo-event.” To some scholars, McCarthyism was a “calculated movement” for the sake of big business groups “to turn back the whole welfare state by likening liberalism to communism.” To others, McCarthy’s “vulgar anticommunism was opportunistic and aimed not at uncovering spies but simply winning publicity and harassing dissenters who spoke out against cold war orthodoxies.”<sup>164</sup>

Despite this frenzied “witch-hunting”, McCarthyism, as a byproduct of the Cold War, could not completely overcome the immunity of the American core public that viewed the ideological confrontations between the U.S. and the USSR as a “continuity of war against fascism, of democracy against totalitarianism.”<sup>165</sup> But McCarthy’s anti-communist campaign brought a “hysterical pandemic” to the entire American society. Whether or not McCarthyism was born out of political imperatives of the 1950s, “most Americans accepted its effects quite willingly, believing their nation to be locked in a death struggle with evil communists...”<sup>166</sup>

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<sup>163</sup> Alan Wolfe, “Roots of Postwar Politics.” In Robert Griffith, *Major Problems in American History since 1945*, (Lexington: D.C. Heath & Company, 1992), 28.

<sup>164</sup> Diggins, *Proud Decades*, 110-116.

<sup>165</sup> Noam Chomsky, et al. *The Cold War and The University: Toward an intellectual History of the Postwar Years*. (New York: The New Press, 1997), 40.

<sup>166</sup> Douglas T. Miller and Marion Nowak, *The Fifties: The Way We Really Were*, (Garden City: Doubleday, 1957), 22.

In the late 1960s, the historian Ellen Schrecker contended that the academia's responses to McCarthyism were institutional rather than individual (although it was) and these were responses to the "political pressures of the period." Many scholars, however, tend to agree that McCarthyism did not start with McCarthy. President Truman's 1947 *Executive Order #9835* which established a new loyalty- security program for federal employees and succeeded in "establishing anti-communism as the nation's official ideology" laid the foundations for it.<sup>167</sup> So was the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1947 to which Truman gave the authority to conduct covert political operations, or what Dean Rusk would later call it the "back alley war" against communism.<sup>168</sup> Such institutionalization of intelligence not only increased the power and prerogatives of a national security bureaucracy, but it also affected American political culture in the years to come. In short, as the historian Jonathan Bell states, "the foundations of Cold War liberalism were completed with the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security apparatus to use American state power to combat the geopolitical expansion of unfriendly states overseas."<sup>169</sup>

Backed by Truman's executive order, the Congress's *House Un-American Activities Committee* (HUAC) soon stepped up its investigation of communist infiltration into government, industries, organized labor, and the universities. Many innocent, ordinary Americans, including intellectuals, politicians, and actors were blacklisted and victimized as "communist spies" by the HUAC in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

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<sup>167</sup>Ellen Schrecker, *No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 4-5.

<sup>168</sup>Quoted in Walter LaFeber, *The American Age: US Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad, 1750 to the Present*, (New York: WW Norton Company, 1994), 483.

<sup>169</sup> Jonathan Bell, *The Liberal States on Trial: The Cold War and American Politics in the Truman Years*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 78.

Indeed, “no other event, no political or congressional hearing, was to shape the internal Cold War as decisively as the Truman administration’s loyalty-security program.”<sup>170</sup> Along with political repressions and intellectual humiliation, McCarthyism (as well as the government’s loyalty program) also “destroyed the left” and affiliated unions from the scene, silenced feminism, black equality, cultural diversity and aborted all progressive and positive movements and initiatives; door closed in the cultural arena as well—teachers, artists, writers, movie directors “modulated their voice.”<sup>171</sup>

### ***Conformism, Corporatism, Consumerism in the 1950s America***

McCarthyism’s repercussions were far and wide reaching to all sectors of society and yoked free thoughts and academic innovations at educational institutions. Such a nationwide panic promoted a culture of consensus and conformity, which characterized a collective national mind in the 1950s. The conformist tendencies were deeply embedded in all media outlet products and popular cultural practices.

The burgeoning corporate culture was particularly fed by conformity creating the “other-directed” personality, as the social analyst David Riesman illuminated in his book, *The Lonely Crowd* (1950). Riesman’s analysis argued that individuals became dependent on the “other fellow’s preference” and therefore were molded and modeled by institutional bureaucracy, which is a sign of centralized, collectivistic society. Such individual’s loss of self-reliance was incongruous with the notion of individualism America has cherished for a long time. In such circumstances, “other-directed” ideal

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<sup>170</sup>Ibid, Schrecker, *No Ivory Tower*, 9. See also *The Age of McCarthyism* (1994) and *Many are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America* (1998) for the most comprehensive accounts on the subject, which treat a variety of issues, events, institutions, and individuals that are connected with McCarthyism as the well as the patterns of actual repression that characterized the McCarthy era.

<sup>171</sup>Schrecker, *No Ivory Tower*, 396.

society is the corporation, which is forceful enough to dictate the values and beliefs of citizens, and powerful enough to alienate them from their community and family.

Followed by Riesman's criticism of an organized society, the social critic William Whyte also addressed the conformist, corporate culture in his book, *The Organization Man* (1956), by arguing that "belongingness" as group identity and group solidarity naturally guides human beings, which is dangerous for the pure Protestant ethic—or "social ethic." Focusing on the notion of "the age conformity," Whyte was concerned about the degrading nature of an individualistic society. What he suggested was to "fight the organization."<sup>172</sup> Whyte's book referred to the emerging social trend of the fifties, which was characterized by the bureaucratic corporate culture. Sloan Wilson's *Man in the Gray Flannel Suit* (1955) criticizes the pointless nature of a conspicuously materialistic society to which Americans were pressured to conform. A corporate and consumerist culture prospered at the expense of public goods such as education, healthcare, law enforcement and environment, and therefore it failed to bring real social progress. The economist John Kenneth Galbraith's groundbreaking analysis of this painful true scenario of the "affluent society" uncovered the "social imbalance" characterized by overproduction of private goods and underproduction of public goods.<sup>173</sup>

The sociologist C. Wright Mills is also one of the social critics who addressed the bureaucratic power in a mass, industrialized society. Mills more explicitly defined the corporate society in his book, *The White Collar: the American Middle Class*, published in 1956. According to Mills, "the decline of the free entrepreneur and the rise of the

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<sup>172</sup> William H. Whyte Jr., *the Organization Man*, (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1956).

<sup>173</sup> John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Affluent Society*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969).

dependent employee on the American scene have paralleled the decline of the independent individual and the rise of the little man in the American mind.” This “small creature” pushed by “big ugly forces... never talks loud, never talks back and never takes a stand.” These “little people” therefore are “estranged from community and society in a context of distrust and manipulation; alienated from work and, on the personality market, from self; expropriated of individual rationality, and politically apathetic.”<sup>174</sup> Mills’ *The Power Elite* (1957) rightly identifies centralized power within American society. Governments, armies, and corporations shape modern life, Mills argued, and families, churches and schools “adapt” to them. These three major national powers “turn lesser institutions into means for their ends.”<sup>175</sup> Under such circumstances, the “higher immorality is institutionalized” and “money is the one unambiguous criterion of success, and such success is still the sovereign American value” in the corporate era.<sup>176</sup>

Such a rapidly growing consumerist populace, which fell into a never-ending swirl of spending and embraced the advertising promoted by the booming television industry, was a defining character of American culture in the 1950s. The historian David M. Potter’s well-known 1954 study, *People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and the American Character*, argued that “social mutation had become both rapid and violent, and values were increasingly relative rather than absolute.”<sup>177</sup> America’s influence was not “ideological but material... and it was not our ideal of democracy but our export of

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<sup>174</sup> C. Wright Mills, *White Collar: The American Middle Class*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), xii-xviii.

<sup>175</sup> C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957), 6

<sup>176</sup> Mills, *The Power Elite*, 343-46

<sup>177</sup> David M. Potter, *People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and the American Character*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1954), 52.

goods.” The United States, according to Potter, “has certainly played a far greater part than any other country in displaying to the world the variety and magic of the new abundance... and disseminates the belief that this abundance may actually be placed within the grasp of ordinary men and women.” Popular cultures such as the Hollywood films presented “conspicuous consumption not as a mere practice but ... as a system and an act of faith.”<sup>178</sup> Dissemination of democracy and abundance is destined to go hand-in-hand, Potter asserted, if the United States wanted to assume world leadership.

For a country destined, as ours has been, to play such a role it was a tragic fallacy that we conceived of democracy as an absolute value, largely ideological in content and equally valid in any environment, instead of recognizing that our own democratic system is one of the major by-products of our abundance, workable primarily because of the measure of our abundance... In our own country the promise of equality meant the right to advance, without discrimination, to easily attainable ends. Hence the principle of equality could be upheld with genuine sincerity... But in countries where even decency, much less comfort, lay beyond the point of attainability for most people—where the number of advantageous positions was negligible—it seemed a kind of deception to offer to individual as good a chance as anyone to compete for non-existent prizes or to assure him of his freedom to go where he wished.<sup>179</sup>

When Eisenhower remarked in 1956 that Americans need to “show other peoples how they work, what they earn and how they achieve their pay and the real take-home pay they get,” he referred to the material comfort of the American people, which could also be attainable for people from other countries.<sup>180</sup> The Eisenhower administration’s demonstrations of American consumerism and abundance through various presentations and exhibitions such as *People’s Capitalism*, which was held in Moscow in 1959, did not just symbolize the presumably successful American democratic system and its convenient lifestyle; it also served as a compelling tool to justify the nation’s foreign policy.

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<sup>178</sup> Potter, *People of Plenty*, 135-36.

<sup>179</sup> Potter, *People of Plenty*, 137.

<sup>180</sup> Remarks by Dwight Eisenhower at the White House Conference, September 1956, DDEPL.



Providing a solution for “the problems of the youth” in a bureaucratically organized society, Paul Goodman in his landmark book *Growing Up Absurd*, which was published in 1960 after being rejected by dozen publishing companies, argued that Americans live increasingly in a society in which “little direct attention is paid to the object, the function, the program, the task, the need; but immense attention to the role, procedure, prestige and profit.” He believed that if this “inefficient” system would radically change and Americans could recover from their “mesmerized condition,” then America would see a “fairly general prosperity.” So what’s worth doing? Goodman suggested that Americans could think of “necessary community enterprises” into which they throw themselves “enthusiastically and spontaneously” and be “proud of the results.”<sup>181</sup> It was true that most Americans were engaged in a corporate-driven lifestyle in the 1950s. But it was equally true that many Americans, by their personal spirit and choice, tended to get involved in social activities by participating in a “common life.” The human personality could be constituted, maintained, and nourished through interaction with and involvement in civic life.<sup>182</sup>

The major premises illustrated by these social critics such as David Riesman, C. Wright Mills, David Potter, John Galbraith, Paul Goodman and other writers from the 1950s were American fears and anxieties about the characteristics of a collectivistic society, an antidote to American democracy and free market system. Most importantly, however, these intellectuals sought to uncover the meaning of life and the national identity in a conformist society, which favored pressured commonalities rather than

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<sup>181</sup> Paul Goodman, *Growing Up Absurd: Problems of Youth in the Organized System*, (New York: Random House, 1956), xiii-xvi.

<sup>182</sup> Robert Fine and Shirin Rai. Eds., *Civil Society: Democratic Perspectives*, (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 35.

rationalized conflicts. These analyses of social trends jointly and cumulatively portrayed a 'lost society' that the "consensus school" of historians of the decade was reluctant to acknowledge.<sup>183</sup>

### ***Anxiety Healing, Identity Searching, Social Connections...***

In such a climate, the social critics in the 1950s urged Americans to seek active, meaningful community affiliations, as Paul Goodman suggested, through which one would attain challenging experiences and real sources of individual identity. Religious affiliation served one example. In the 1950s, the church membership and proportion of Americans who claimed religious affiliations reached the highest levels the twentieth century has ever seen. Some scholars claim that the Cold War and the nuclear threat pushed Americans to seek comfort and relief. Others argued that the "depersonalizing" nature of a mass society made people look for social connections with other fellow citizens. Still others stated that the American people went to churches in search of their ethnic identity and belonging.<sup>184</sup> The popularity of religion was not only increased by its membership but also by various practices of popular culture. Novels and non-fictions with religious themes inspired people, as did Hollywood movies.

Norman Vincent Peale's *The Power of Positive Thinking* and Paul Tillich's *The Courage to Be* both of which were published in 1952, offered the American people a

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<sup>183</sup> The Consensus interpretation of history tended to reflect "American celebration" that typified intellectuals in post-World War II America. The Consensus historians were more willing to see consensus rather than conflict in American history. In that sense, these historians refused to interpret American history from both the ideological and economic perspectives. The consensus school of thought was attractive in the 1950s especially because it emphasized the unity of the American people and celebrated the values of American political institutions. The major advocates of the consensus school of thought included Daniel J. Boorstin, Richard Hofstadter, Louis Hartz, and Clinton Rossiter whose writings argued that ideology and propaganda were conspicuously absent in American political thought and behavior.

<sup>184</sup> Andrew J. Dunner, *America in the 1950s*, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2006), 181-82.

positive outlook on life and inspired them to build confidence and optimism in the most anxious time of the nation's history. They also implied that "positive thinking" could be America's moral contribution to the chaotic world. Having urged the American people to "go to church," Peale's "self-improvement manual" offered hands-on techniques that people could utilize to live a "happy, satisfying life." According to Peale, "positive thoughts create...an atmosphere propitious to the development of positive outcomes."<sup>185</sup> The existentialist philosopher Paul Tillich investigated the problems of human existence and the meaning of life from a religious perspective. By emphasizing individualism over collectivism, Tillich argued that "conformism might approximate collectivism... very much in the pattern of daily life and thought. But whether this will happen or not is partly dependent on the power of resistance...."<sup>186</sup>

Despite his late religious affiliation, Eisenhower as president wanted to show the American people moral and religious leadership. Envisaging the role of diverse religious cultures in American life, Eisenhower once stated that "our government makes no sense unless it is founded on a deeply felt religious faith—and I do not care what it is."<sup>187</sup> According to the historian William Inboden, "religious faith helped define for Eisenhower – as it did for Truman—the line of division between the free world and the communist world" and "it appealed as a powerful device to bolster domestic support for anticommunism while also undermining communist regimes abroad."<sup>188</sup> Eisenhower wrote about his religious conviction to his close friend Swede Hazlett: "I believe

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<sup>185</sup> Norman Vincent Peale, *The Power of Positive Thinking*, (New York: Prentice Hall, 1952), 204.

<sup>186</sup> Paul Tillich, *The Courage to Be*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), 112.

<sup>187</sup> Dunner, *America in the 1950s*, 185. Eisenhower added "Under God" to the pledge of allegiance and "In God We Trust" became the nation's motto in the 1950s. Protestant culture no longer dominated in people's faith, leading to the rise of religious pluralism, a precursor to electing the first Catholic president in the nation's history.

<sup>188</sup> William Inboden, *Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945-1960*, (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2008), 258.

fanatically in American democracy, a system... that ascribes to the individual a dignity accruing to him because of his creation in the image of a supreme being.”<sup>189</sup>

In particular, Eisenhower believed that people’s faith and belief had to play a crucial role to uplift the national spirit and to strengthen anti-communist consensus at home. In his September 1954 statement, which was widely disseminated behind the iron curtain, Eisenhower even invited the “whole world” to join Americans in prayer for peace:<sup>190</sup>

May the many millions of people shut away from contact and communion with peoples of the free world join their prayers with ours. May the world be ringed with an act of faith so strong as to annihilate the cruel, artificial barriers erected by little men between peoples who seek peace on earth through Almighty God.<sup>191</sup>

Encouraging people’s religious practices and values, the United States kept alive the freedom of worship—a basic human right that America’s cold war rival could not grant for their people. At this point, America’s adherence to religious values created a positive image for the rest of the world where many countries were startled over Soviet atheism and its enmity to religion. Eisenhower’s promotion of social connections, however, was not limited to people’s religious affiliation. He encouraged the American people to forge personal contacts beyond their churches and cultures to create not just a better society at home but also to establish a better understanding between peoples the world over through social bonding. The changing nature of political and social environment that characterized the mid-to-late 1950s created a fertile soil for such an

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<sup>189</sup> September 20, 1954 Letter from Eisenhower to Senate Majority Leader William F. Knowland, Quoted in Inboden, *Religion and American Foreign Policy*, 259.

<sup>190</sup> Inboden, *Religion and American Foreign Policy*, 307.

<sup>191</sup> Quoted in Inboden, *Religion and American Foreign Policy*, 307.

internationalist idea, which Eisenhower emphasized throughout the second term of his presidency.

### ***Shifts in Socio-Political Life in the mid-1950s America***

Although the 1950s tended to be depicted, by and large, as the age of McCarthyism, conformism, corporatism and consumerism, which fed fear, silence and mindless affluence, the second half of the decade was also the crucial time during which the seeds of political activism, racial and ethnic consciousness, and moral idealism of American citizens were planted.<sup>192</sup> The decolonization movement, which was taking place in colonized continents, strongly resonated with, and brought international dimensions to, the civil consciousness of black Americans whose history was shaped by an ongoing fight their basic human rights and to define their social, cultural and political identities in American society. Nourished by the Third World decolonization, black Americans sought to gain their freedom and equality in social services, including education. A series of events such as President Truman's 1948 executive order for the desegregation of armed forces and the Supreme Court's declaration of outlawing de-jure school segregation in 1954 after the *Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas*, which sorely tested the conflicting views of segregationists and integrationists during the *Little Rock Crisis* of 1956, were pivotal events in the period that preceded the civil rights movement that flared in the 1960s.

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<sup>192</sup> Reflecting the changing nature of political and social environment of the mid-1950s, the phrase the "long sixties" inclusively dated from 1955 through 1974 starting from such dramatic events as the Montgomery bus boycott to the resignation of President Nixon. Along with these imminent changes and challenges, the 1950s were also seen as the 'good old days' as Americans nostalgically enjoyed the decade's idealized vision of their life in the television sitcom, "Happy Days" which debuted in 1974 and continued to air for a decade.

The widespread interest and involvement in religious practices in American society brought charismatic figures such as Martin Luther King, Jr. to the public realm as well. Backed by the black community of Montgomery, Minister King successfully organized a bus boycott in Alabama from 1955-1956, which signaled the quest for ending the century-long struggle for constitutional rights and human decency for black Americans. Dr. King's leadership in civil rights movement inspired and influenced young generation to develop the social consciousness of American life in subsequent decades.

It was both the "opportunity and the misfortune" of Eisenhower to be a president during the years when African Americans moved to gain their rights.<sup>193</sup> Some sources suggest that Eisenhower's lukewarm position towards civil rights can be explained in part by his record on racial issues. Born and raised in all-white South and Midwest small towns and educated at all-white U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Eisenhower's "experience of people of color was in the role of servants." But he never was "an explicit bigot" and "occasionally showed a dislike of raw prejudice."<sup>194</sup> And none of Eisenhower's closest advisors, including his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who was "very very white in his politics as well as his skin tone," encouraged him to change the existing racial status quo.<sup>195</sup> Such personal beliefs and attitude toward racial issues were not uncommon among American leaders of the Eisenhower generation. The historian William L. O'Neill connected Eisenhower's handling of civil rights revolution with generational symptoms. As a "child of [the] nineteenth century," O'Neill reasoned,

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<sup>193</sup>Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race relations in the Global Arena*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 85.

<sup>194</sup>Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line*, 86-87.

<sup>195</sup>Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line*, 85.

“[Eisenhower] did not believe that segregation could, or should, be brought by coercion.”<sup>196</sup>

President Truman, the historian Thomas Borstelmann argues, was a “racist” by birth and upbringing, but he “chose to move away from the explicit racism of his childhood as his political career developed and his contacts in the world widened.” The Cold War strategist, George F. Kennan also showed racist attitudes when he pointed out the “suspiciousness and inscrutability of Soviet diplomats” as the “results of century-long contact with Asiatic hordes.” Therefore, Borstelmann concludes, Kennan’s “perspective on race is not its singularity but its commonness within American policymaking circles.”<sup>197</sup> At this point, Eisenhower’s attitude toward racial issues was more conventional than exceptional by the standards of the given time period.

While critics scathingly condemn the Eisenhower administration’s slowness to deal with racial issues, others refer to political and social factors of the decade, which constrained Washington planners. As an elected president, Eisenhower did not ignore the fact that not all white voters in the South were anti-segregationists at the time. By the same token, being a commander in chief made him extremely vulnerable to disturb the spirit of national unity and solidarity during a tumultuous period of America’s struggle during the Cold War. In all, Eisenhower did not directly display his political (and personal) preference regarding a century-long unsettled issue of racial tensions in the United States. By the same token, Eisenhower believed that he was the “right man to

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<sup>196</sup> William L. O’Neill, “Eisenhower and American Society,” In Bischof, Gunter Bischof and Stephen E. Ambrose, Eds, *Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 104.

<sup>197</sup> Quoted in Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena*, (Harvard University Press, 2001), 48-50.

lead all Americans responsibly along the 'center line,' including all black Americans."<sup>198</sup> But it is crucial to note here that the Eisenhower administration made some progress in civil rights: Eisenhower believed in the Fifteenth Amendment and supported voting rights for African Americans; he did eliminate racial barriers in public spaces and schools, and by 1955 the United States Army, Air Force, and Navy had become integrated institutions.<sup>199</sup>

The journalist Merlo Pusey stated that Eisenhower critics ignored what the president has done to eliminate the racial segregation because Eisenhower did not want to "beat the drums" to popularize his works. Because he knew that "shouting from the housetops about such achievements undercuts their value." Nor did he want to filibuster this vulnerable issue in the Senate. Eisenhower for the first time appointed an African-American secretary in the White House. He filled several dozen important posts with African-Americans, half of which had never been taken by people of this race. These actions had been taken long before the *Brown vs. Board of Education* case.<sup>200</sup> At this point, one could draw the conclusion that although racism, which had long been a "scandalous betrayal of America's democratic principles," was not perfected in the 1950s, the "significant progress," was made during the Eisenhower administration.<sup>201</sup>

Domestic conundrums such as racial relations and its international implications, however, could perhaps derail the American pursuit of world influence, especially at the crucial time of decolonization movements in non-white continents. Most importantly,

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<sup>198</sup>Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line*, 93

<sup>199</sup>Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line*, 90-91

<sup>200</sup> Merlo Pusey, *Eisenhower the President*, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956), 231.

<sup>201</sup> William O'Neill, "Eisenhower and American Society" in Bischof, *Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment*, 102; Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line*, 105.



such a prolonged delay in settling equal rights issues among its citizens at home was incongruent to American democratic creeds. As the Swedish social scientist Gunnar Myrdal in his book, *An American Dilemma* (1944) once stated, “The negro problem” was not just “America’s greatest failure” but also its “great opportunity for the future.” Thus, if the racial justice is ensured at home, Myrdal hoped, America would gain a “spiritual power many times stronger than all her military and financial resource—the power of the trust and support of all good people on earth.”<sup>202</sup>The Swedish scholar’s prophecy seemed to be not a plain hope as the United States saw a sweeping progress in its domestic racial relations in the following decade, which led to unprecedented civil rights legislations in the nation’s history.

Of all Eisenhower’s convictions, cautions, and calculations it is reasonable to assume that he was not “blind” to the urgent national objective. Rather Eisenhower well understood that the deep-seated issues such as racial prejudice do not change overnight, not even in a generation. To rush at the wrong time would invite larger challenges in the future. At this point, the diplomatic historian H.W. Brands states that “repeatedly during his presidency, Eisenhower resisted calls to do something dramatic in response to fast-breaking developments.” Referring to Eisenhower’s some noticeable international achievements, Brands claims that his handling of Dien Bieu Phu in 1954 and the Hungarian crisis of 1956 both served as good instances of his successful crisis management skills. He understood the risks of “erring on the side of activism” and therefore “wisely accepted a minor setback rather than the hazard of a major

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<sup>202</sup>Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma*, 1021-1022, Quoted in Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin, Eds., *America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s*, 4<sup>th</sup> Edition, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

disaster.”<sup>203</sup> That he so skillfully managed to do so by maintaining peace in many occasions, which prevented unnecessary direct confrontations between the two superpowers, is something the American people on both sides of political choices graciously admired and accepted.<sup>204</sup>

### ***Eisenhower’s International Commitments and the People-to-People Diplomacy***

With a firsthand experience in the battlefield and influenced by his upbringing with a pacifist mother, Dwight D. Eisenhower’s daily language included the term “peace.” Stephen E. Ambrose states that General Eisenhower “hated war” and the President Eisenhower “promoted peace.” As a man he left the American people a “legacy of love for life, for people, and for democracy.” He assured the American public that they could not achieve security by building more weapons of mass destruction. By bringing peace in Korea even before his inauguration and avoiding war thereafter throughout his presidential years, and by holding down, almost single-handedly, the pace of the arms race, Eisenhower achieved his major accomplishments. He made peace and he kept the peace.<sup>205</sup>

In 1953 the newly inaugurated president revealed his deepest concern about the cost of war and the daring need of peace:

The world to be feared and the best to be expected [from a continuing arms race] can be simply stated. The worse is atomic war. The best would be this: a life of perpetual fear and tension; a burden of arms draining the wealth and the labor of all peoples. Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired, signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is

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<sup>203</sup> H.W. Brands, “Eisenhower and the Problem of Loose Ends,” In Bischof, *Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment*, 126.

<sup>205</sup> Stephen E. Ambrose, “Eisenhower’s Legacy,” in Bischof, *Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment*, 251.

not spending money alone. It is spending sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, [and] the hopes of its children. We pay a single fighter plane with a half-million bushels of wheat. We pay for a single destroyer with new homes that could have housed more than eight thousand people. This is not the way of life at all, in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron.<sup>206</sup>

Eisenhower promoted peace with the “same intensity that he had given to fighting war.”<sup>207</sup>In December 1953, Eisenhower proposed international cooperation in the peaceful use of atomic energy. In response, in 1957, the world organization, International Atomic Energy Agency was founded.<sup>208</sup> He proposed his *Food for Peace* program in 1953 to dispose agricultural surplus abroad and the same year, *Chances for Peace* speech was delivered after Stalin’s death, and his *Atoms for Peace* speech of December 1953 was dedicated to non-military uses for atomic energy. In 1958, Eisenhower stated in a press conference: “There is no place on this earth to which I would not travel, there is no chore I would not undertake, if I had any faintest hope that, by so doing, I would promote the general cause of world peace.”<sup>209</sup>As Eisenhower left the office he warned against the “military-industrial complex” and his memoir titled, *Waging Peace* tells much about Eisenhower’s international commitments to peace and stability during the second half of his presidency.

The United States “never lost a soldier or a foot of ground in my administration,” Eisenhower proudly declared to the nation when he left Washington in 1961. “We kept the peace. People asked how it happened—by God, it didn’t just happen, I will tell you

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<sup>206</sup> Public Papers: Eisenhower, 1953, 179-88. Quoted in Ambrose, “Eisenhower’s Legacy,” 252.

<sup>207</sup> Leppert, *Dwight D. Eisenhower and People-to-People*, 162

<sup>208</sup> Akira Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order*, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1997), 155

<sup>209</sup> Quoted in Goldman, *Rendezvous with Destiny: A History of Modern American Reform*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), 327.

that.”<sup>210</sup> Notably, the celebration of the centennial of Eisenhower’s birth which was held in 1990 at the University of Kansas and the Gettysburg College was not accidentally organized under the name *Meeting for Peace*.<sup>211</sup>

Eisenhower’s commitments to winning and maintaining peace were, however, overshadowed by some assessments, especially during his immediate post-presidential years. Those assessments tended to rely more on his style rather than substance of his policies by magnifying Eisenhower’s “occasional [and deliberate] failure to use the presidency as a podium from which to advance his convictions,” which according to the Eisenhower revisionist Fred I. Greenstein, “have stemmed from a selflessness and freedom from vanity that permitted him to pass from the scene without revealing a good many of his most effective actions and methods.”<sup>212</sup> Such arguments were especially prevalent in earlier journalistic accounts in which Eisenhower was viewed as a weak, politically inactive, inarticulate and inexperienced president who delegated his responsibilities to his powerful subordinates. He was thus criticized for being “soft” on communism and McCarthyism, hard on civil rights and the Third World.

Yet the new trend in scholarly assessments of the Eisenhower’s presidency had come in much positive tone by the end of the 1960s. According to these writers who were labeled as revisionists, Eisenhower was shrewd and surprisingly cunning in his

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<sup>210</sup> Peter Lyon, *Eisenhower: Portrait of the Hero*, 851, quoted in Stephen E. Ambrose. “Eisenhower’s Legacy” In *Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment*, edited by Gunter Bischof and Stephen E. Ambrose, 1995, 251

<sup>211</sup> More than three hundred delegates, including WWII veterans representing all former fifteen Republics of the former Soviet Union were invited to the Eisenhower centennial ceremony. This was a historical meeting, as one of the Soviet delegates recalled, that convened in a very warm and friendly atmosphere. Sergey Khrushchev, a son of Nikita Khrushchev, who accompanied his father during the 1959 visit to the US, was among the Soviet delegates. Robert Ivanov, *General v Belom Dome*, (Smolensk: Rusich, 2000), 494-96.

<sup>212</sup> Fred Greenstein, *The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), xvii.

leadership style as well as intelligent and conscientious in his decision-making. He was a “bright and exuberant man, full of charm bounce and vigor,” who showed profound respect for the dignity of the office and a conviction of limitations of constitutional power and prerogatives of the presidency. These principles were reflected in all actions stemming from Eisenhower’s handling of McCarthyism to the civil rights domestically and from the Korean War to the Congo crisis, internationally. Eisenhower was conscious of the fact that the dignity of the presidency as an institution is not allowed to be equated with that of an antagonist individual like Senator McCarthy. His decision-making ability was based on both his character and he has the “most carefully organized staff and departmental system” the American government has yet seen.

Comparing both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to that of Eisenhower Arthur Larson contended that JFK and LBJ’s use of their cabinet, National Security Council, and Operations Coordinating Board was inefficient. Both Kennedy and Johnson underused (if not failed to use) especially the NSC during the most crucial times of handling national security issues.<sup>213</sup> Unlike Harry Truman and Dean Acheson, Eisenhower was willing to negotiate with the Soviets.<sup>214</sup> The political scientist Fred I. Greenstein argued, referring to Eisenhower’s successors, about the “fragility” of modern presidencies, which started from the immature death of John F. Kennedy and then transferred to a “politically crippled” Lyndon Johnson and from a “politically discredited” Richard Nixon and then handed off to the “failed” to be reelected Gerald Ford followed by Jimmy Carter whose presidency was “plainly on the ropes.” “Neither the presidency

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<sup>213</sup> Sherman Adams, *Firsthand Report: The Story of the Eisenhower Administration*, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961), 3.

<sup>214</sup> Thomas Paterson, et al., *A History of American Foreign Relations*, 278

itself nor the larger political system,” Greenstein contends, “could be expected to serve the nation well when presidents were such birds of passage.”<sup>215</sup>

According to the historian Herbert Parmet, Eisenhower was a “humane battler for virtue and freedom, a leader desiring above all the restoration and maintenance of peace, a man who truly was a ‘soldier of democracy.’”<sup>216</sup> Eisenhower was not an ambitious competitor with the Soviets in the field of military. His sole mission was “national solvency and strength that would achieve the goal of peace with justice.”<sup>217</sup> He left the white House with a remarkable record.

As the Gallup Poll indicates, Americans considered Eisenhower’s greatest single achievement as the fact that “He kept the peace.” Those scholars who rely on recently declassified documents argue that Eisenhower focused on broader horizon of issues rather than on raw, miscellaneous problems. He would make his cabinet members thoroughly investigate issues and “boil them down to a single page” so he would later come up with a final decision. He was a principal decision-maker. But, occasionally, Eisenhower’s international commitments did not receive a full consensus, especially concerning the following two cases.

From the early years of the Eisenhower administration, the Soviet-American rivalry increasingly focused on the Third World, where anti-colonial movements accelerated the decolonization process across the former colonies. The social and economic turmoil in Iran—the “troubled area” which shares a border with the Soviet Union, flared up in the country, as the nationalist leader Mohammed Mossadegh

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<sup>215</sup> Fred I. Greenstein, *The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), vii.

<sup>216</sup> Herbert S. Parmet, *Eisenhower and the American Crusades*, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1972), 4.

<sup>217</sup> Parmet, *Eisenhower and the American Crusades*, 572.

expropriated the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, placing the Iranian relations with the British government in a limbo. Desperate to save his country from “suffering financial hardships and political intrigues,” the Prime Minister Mossadegh sent a personal letter to a newly inaugurated President Eisenhower in January and then in May 1953 hoping to get a “sympathetic and responsive attention” from the American government. But Eisenhower’s suspicion of communist expansionism in the region and his fear of disturbing British-American relations led him to turn down the Iranian government’s request.<sup>218</sup> Without American economic assistance that the country sought to gain at much needed time, Mohammed Mossadegh had to turn to Moscow for help, which was believed to be the reason for the United States to overthrow the Iranian Prime Minister with CIA involvement and to return the pro-American Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi to the throne.<sup>219</sup>

Similar strategies were applied to America’s southern neighbor when the Guatemalan President Jacob Arbenz Guzman sought to modernize his nation’s mineral resources by launching a massive land reform program. Arbenz nationalized huge acres of the United Fruit Company’s holdings owned by influential Americans, which is why Washington was so actively involved. In one sense, the above politico-economic changes that occurred in Iran and Guatemala did not put the United States national security in danger but they were crucial for America to maintain her hegemonic power within the region. Scholars argue that Cold War America’s preoccupation with the anti-communist psyche greatly contributed to Eisenhower’s decision-making process in the Guatemalan case. After “careful and complete investigation” of communist suspicion

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<sup>218</sup> In 1947, half the entire crude oil and natural gas produced in the Middle East came from Iran. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, 159.

<sup>219</sup> Merlo Pusey, *Eisenhower the President*, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956), 132-35.

and the overall Latin American public opinion, Eisenhower wrote in his memoir, the U.S. identified that immediate actions against the Soviet-backed Arbenz government were necessary to reverse the communist infiltration in the region. CIA interventions were successfully carried out by Colonel Castillo Armas, who later became the Guatemalan President.<sup>220</sup> Herbert Parmet stated that Eisenhower is a politically acute and publicly conscious man. He was not indeed a “political genius,” but knew perhaps better than anyone else around him what the people wanted and how they wanted it. “Ike had a remarkable political instinct.”<sup>221</sup> Undertaking similar lines of arguments, the younger generation of scholars contends that domestic pressures and the “relentless engagement” of Moscow and Beijing in the Third World countries and the unrealistic economic and military assistance from the leaders of newly decolonized countries all made the Eisenhower administration difficult to “extricate [itself] from the containment framework.”<sup>222</sup>

Despite the pressure exerted from the British government in the 1953 Iranian case, however, Eisenhower’s cold-war driven overreaction to local elites’ leadership style evoked much criticism from both Latin America and Europe.<sup>223</sup> At this point, some

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<sup>220</sup> Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, 420-27.

<sup>221</sup> Parmet, *Eisenhower and the American Crusades*, 577.

<sup>222</sup> *Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment*, edited by Gunter Bischof and Stephen E. Ambrose, (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University, 1995), 10.

<sup>223</sup> Frank Ninkovich, *The Wilsonian Century: The US Foreign Policy since 1900*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999), 203-205. Much of the recent literature on the Eisenhower presidency has sought to develop revisionist perspectives by praising Eisenhower’s leadership skills and decision-making style. See, for example, Richard Melanson and David Mayers, eds., *Reevaluating Eisenhower: American Foreign Policy in the 1950s; Urbana*, 1987; Stephen G. Rabe, “Eisenhower Revisionism: A Decade of Scholarship,” *Diplomatic History* 17 (Winter 1993); Fred I. Greenstein, *The Hidden- Hand Presidency: The President as Leader*, (New York: Basic Books, 1982); Jeff Broadwater, *Eisenhower and the Anti-Communist Crusade*, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1992); Shirley Anne Warshaw ed., *Re-examining the Eisenhower Presidency*, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1993); Gunter Bischof and Stephen E. Ambrose, eds., *Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995 and Robert Bowie and Richard Immerman, *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped and Enduring Cold War Strategy*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).



accounts speculate that both Iranian and Guatemalan incidents were part and parcel of US economic policies in the respective regions.<sup>224</sup> But others argue that Eisenhower failed to understand or appreciate the power of nationalism in the emerging Third World countries.<sup>225</sup>

It is sometimes hard to distinguish democracy as an ideal and democracy in practice. American presidents and strategists, by implication, are expected to find an amalgam of the two. The political scientist G. John Ikenberry formulated this characteristic of U.S. foreign policy as an “American liberal grand strategy” in which the American promotion of democracy in the broadest sense reflects a “pragmatic, evolving and sophisticated understanding of how to create a stable international political order and a congenial security environment.”<sup>226</sup> The British political scientist Harold Laski similarly framed that “... The essence of the presidency is the fact that it is an American institution that it functions in an American environment that it has been shaped by the forces of American history, that it must be judged by American criteria of its response to American needs.”<sup>227</sup>

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<sup>224</sup> Brands, “Fractal History, or Clio and the Chaotics.” *Diplomatic History* 16 (Fall 1992).

<sup>225</sup> Robert J. McMahon, “Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists,” *Political Science Quarterly*, CI, 1986, 453-73, Stephen G. Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina, 1988).

<sup>226</sup> G. John Ikenberry, “America’s Liberal Grand Strategy: Democracy and National Security in the Post-War Era,” *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays* edited by G. John Ikenberry, (New York: Pearson Longman, 2005), 268.

<sup>227</sup> Harold Laski. *The American Presidency*. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1940), 7. Quoted in Marian D. Irish, *Politics of American Democracy*, (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1959), 413-14. Yet, Eisenhower later in the 1960s argued against major American involvement in the Middle East as Nixon’s National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger recalled: “...Probably the reflecting the agony he went through over Suez in 1956, he thought the best course was to let the parties work it out themselves. If we became active we would be forced in the end to become an arbiter and then offer the parties our own guarantee of whatever final arrangement emerged. This would keep us embroiled in Middle East difficulties forever...” Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 451-52. Quoted in Greenstein, *The Hidden-Hand Presidency*,<sup>17</sup>

The linkage between moral idealism and political pragmatism suggests that moral dimensions were not absent from the Eisenhower administration's policies including the president's People-to-People program. Nor did Eisenhower solely rely on power politics. Indeed, the promotion of both democracy and free trade and economic liberalization, which constituted the post-war "liberal grand strategy" as the political scientist John Ikenberry put it, was America's cold war foreign policy framework rooted in the "American political experience and an understanding of history, economics and the sources of political stability." This "distinctively" American liberal view is not a "single theoretical claim" but is built around a "wide-ranging set of claims and assumptions about how democratic politics and economic interdependence, international institutions and political identity contribute... to encourage stable and mutually acceptable political order." This liberal grand strategy therefore was rich, persistent, dominant and appealing. It oriented and united the factions of the right and the left in American politics.<sup>228</sup>

By the same token, Eisenhower believed that if the country's foreign relations could not effectively be pursued between governments, it could be pursued between citizens. So did his Secretary of State, John F. Dulles. At the onset of the People-to-People Partnership, Eisenhower stated that the people-to-people idea was based upon the simple assumption that "no people want war" and that "all people want peace." That is the idea that must become a deed into which all American sources and efforts should be poured, which otherwise were being spent on "every bomb we can manufacture,

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<sup>228</sup>Ikenberry, *American Foreign Policy*, 269.

every plane, every ship, every gun,” to “give us time to prevent the other fellow from starting a war, since we know we won’t.”<sup>229</sup>

Eisenhower’s Secretary of State John F. Dulles was a man of *realpolitik* who advocated professionalism in the American foreign policy establishment. But he believed in ordinary people’s contribution to spreading freedom and democracy the world over. At the opening meeting of the People-to-People conference, Dulles contended that the task of the United States, because of its position in the world, is to make sure that competition with a “nation which does not believe in free enterprise” is going “to be gotten through on a peaceful, nondestructive basis.” This process “must be made one of evolution and not one of violent revolution...and is determined under our form of society not by government but by you... who are working in an individual and in a private capacity.” If ordinary people by their works “make clear throughout the world that freedom is the preferable form of society,” Dulles insisted, then “other problems...will be soluble by your government.”<sup>230</sup> Both Eisenhower and Dulles’s remarks implied that private citizens could contribute to establishing world peace and mutual understanding through exchanges of peoples, ideas, cultures and knowledge in which the People-to-People movement successfully engaged at the national and international levels from the mid-1950s and beyond.

The People-to-People program was the first and the largest government-initiated voluntary movement that prevailed across America in the mid-1950s throughout the

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<sup>229</sup> Remarks by DDE, September 11, 1956

<sup>230</sup> Remarks by John F. Dulles, September 11, 1956.

sixties.<sup>231</sup> It was the first official effort to incorporate secular voluntarism into the nation's foreign relations. Secular voluntary movements became a new experience by mid-twentieth century, especially following the end of WWII and the onset of decolonization in the Third World. The Peace Corps historian Elizabeth Cobbs-Hoffman argues that the "rise of secular conscientious objection," which was legally recognized in many European countries during and after WWII, "paralleled the rise of secular volunteering service overseas."<sup>232</sup> It is true that the fervency and enthusiasm of postwar Americans were fueled by a "shared consciousness" and experience of war and revolution leading to voluntary movements across the world. It is also true that the Cold War ideological rivalry between the communist and democratic worlds raised the grand question as to whose ideals were best and therefore universal.

Promising lavish economic and technical assistance, the Soviets sought to gain influence in newly independent countries, efforts which looked "more dangerous than Stalin's propaganda programs," hypothesized the Eisenhower administration. In particular, the Kremlin's "policy of russification and modernization of their non-Russian subjects" was so intense that it could impress both decolonized, non-democratic countries, including its Asian neighbors. The Soviets believed that their country had been "endowed with a special destiny to clear the Asian wilderness and civilize the

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<sup>231</sup> As part of President Truman's "bold new program... for the improvement of underdeveloped areas," the Point Four Program was launched in 1949, and countries such as Afghanistan and Panama received millions in Export-Import Bank loans for modernization projects to create "environment in which societies which directly or indirectly menace ours will not evolve" and to combat "communist-influenced subversive elements." Paterson, 246 and 254; Nations "lined up" for U.S. aids that a "few years earlier would have been seen as a colonial intrusion." Indeed, Point IV was one of the American development projects that mushroomed during the Cold War. In that sense, Point IV was more of an overseas initiative as People-to-People was a two-way program. Nick Cullather, "Damming Afghanistan: Modernization in a Buffer State." *The Journal of American History*, Vol 89. No.2, September 2002, 512-537

<sup>232</sup> Elizabeth Cobbs-Hoffman, *All You Need Is Love: The Peace Corps and the Spirit of the 1960s*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 15.

tribes of the East” and ultimately modernize the “Asian wilderness.” What was so impressive about the Soviet modernization campaign for those satellite countries was Russia’s proclaimed belief in a kind of equality and justice that rivaled those advocated by the US.<sup>233</sup>

Every president, especially those who served two terms in his position, has a tendency to reflect on both strengths and weaknesses of his major policy outcomes and thereupon reviews his past actions to reformulate, if possible revise, what he deems imperative to define his legacy. Much of presidential politics is shaped by political climate and context in which he operates. And some resulted from the president’s personal belief system and values. These values are reinforced by education and experience. In Eisenhower’s case, his personal values and convictions were sustained by his international experience that he obtained during his time both in Asia and Europe. It is not an exception but a rule that every president’s presumably successful actions tend to occur in a changing political and social atmosphere favorable for his personal and political convictions. The changing character of political environment in the mid-1950s laid the groundwork for renewed or changed foreign policy priorities for the Eisenhower administration. The postwar shift in public opinion from isolationism to internationalism illustrates the point.<sup>234</sup>

Eisenhower embarked on a series of bold diplomatic initiatives, particularly during the second half of his presidency. The Big Four, the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France, met to negotiate for possible solutions amid the potential

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<sup>233</sup> Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 40

<sup>234</sup> According to the Gallup Poll released in October 1945, 71% of the American people favored their country’s active part in world affairs, Gallup Poll, 534.

advent of the thermonuclear war at the 1955 Geneva Summit. Eisenhower's hope at the Geneva Summit was to have international agreements on disarmament with Soviet leaders, the proposal he called "Open Skies." To Eisenhower's dismay, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev did not accept the proposal, but the general agreements on "development of contacts between East and West" did reach at the Summit. Eisenhower later noted that "though the communists would miss no opportunity to gather intelligence when visiting in the West, the chance to show the life of the Free World to visitors from the East promised real results. And we could surely learn more about Communist ideas and culture by sending 'citizen ambassadors' eastward." Indeed, some exchanges between the United States and Russia soon began, which were "small beginnings," but they "could not have transpired in the atmosphere prevailing before Geneva."<sup>235</sup>

The Geneva Summit resulted in several cultural exchanges including a tour of American jazz ambassadors to Moscow and elsewhere and Vice President Nixon's 1959 trip to the Soviet Union for a "kitchen debate" with the Soviet Premier on American capitalism and consumerism. The Vice President's Moscow trip was soon followed by Soviet Premier's visit to the US during which Khrushchev unveiled his "peaceful coexistence" doctrine. Impressed by American capitalism yet still confident in the Soviet system, Khrushchev during his ten-day tour challenged, "You may live under capitalism and we will live under socialism and build communism. The one whose system proves better will win." The Soviet leader's visit was wrapped up in Camp David where both sides opened their way to détente.<sup>236</sup> This is the atmosphere through which the real genesis of the People-to-People idea originated in Eisenhower's call for "... a free and

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<sup>235</sup>Dwight D. Eisenhower. *The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-1956*, (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1963), 503-31.

<sup>236</sup> Thomas Patterson, *American Foreign Relations*, 290-91

friendly exchange of ideas and people” at the 1955 Geneva Summit as a practical means for ending the Cold War.<sup>237</sup>

As a man with considerable overseas experience, Eisenhower was more lenient toward internationalism which he believed could create a peaceful, cooperative world. Eisenhower’s internationalist approach, which he especially stressed during the second term of his presidency, was applied into a variety of America’s overseas outreaches including the People-to-People program. The people-to-people diplomacy as such was not just part and parcel of U.S. containment policy. It was a necessary part of the postwar world atmosphere which tilted toward facilitating international cooperation by weaving into the warp of people’s common needs, concerns and values. The idea of global cooperation through an internationalist stance thus contributed substantially to the creation of the People-to-People program. Eisenhower was aware of the global demand of the time, to be sure. By the time, Eisenhower left the White House, Republican isolationism was dead and internationalism was sufficiently alive.<sup>238</sup>

As Eisenhower’s tenure in office came to a close his conviction in creating a social network at the grassroots level strengthened. As such, he did not abandon the People-to-People program. Instead, the retiring president became an official chairman of the People-to-People program with the approval and encouragement of his successor. Eisenhower expanded the program into broader nationwide initiatives including those which prevailed on college campuses throughout the sixties.

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<sup>237</sup> Glenn Wesley Leppert. “Dwight D. Eisenhower and People-to-People as an Experiment in Personal Diplomacy: A Missing Element for Understanding Eisenhower’s Second Term as President.” Unpublished Dissertation, Kansas State University, 2003, 2, DDEPL.

<sup>238</sup> Parmet, *Eisenhower and the American Crusades*, 573-74.

***“Torch passed to a new generation”***

Come mothers and fathers  
Throughout the land  
And do not criticize  
What you cannot understand  
Your sons and daughters  
Are beyond your command  
Your old road is rapidly aging  
Please get out of the new one  
If you can't lend your hand  
For the times they are a-changin'

*The Times They Are a-Changin, Bob Dylan, 1963*<sup>239</sup>

As the 1950s drew to a close, the nation's very soul dramatically changed. So did the people's attitude towards the need for social change. These changes especially influenced the young generation and challenged their existence in society. The growing demands of racial equality did not just spur the nation's conscience but it also fueled intellectuals to look deeper into society's faults, though this wasn't the first time as other intellectuals in the 1950s had spoken out before but were censored and silenced by McCarthyism's anti-communist hysteria. Perplexed by the real meaning of human life and social progress, American intellectuals viewed a mass society as a failure, for it did not serve all its members and consequently made the poor, women, and ethnic and cultural minorities even "lonelier" among "the lonely crowd." Along with persisting injustices in race, class, and gender relations, the mass, consumerist society had already left its cataclysmic consequences on nature and the environment. For the poor, the social critic Michael Harrington claims, the "progress is misery" and therefore a "menace and a threat to their lives."<sup>240</sup> Harrington's *The Other America: Poverty in the United States* bravely disclosed a "different kind of people"--the unskilled workers, the

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<sup>239</sup> Bob Dylan, "The Times They Are a-Changin," 1963 cited in Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin, *America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 159.

<sup>240</sup> Michael Harrington, *The Other America: Poverty in the United States*, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962), 12-14.



migrant farm workers, the aged, the minorities and all the others who live in the economic underworld of American life... in other America.”<sup>241</sup> These people, who constituted two-thirds of the total population, were becoming socially “invisible” as they were simply “misfits.” At the same time, they were politically invisible not simply because they did not belong to unions, to fraternal organizations, or to political parties but because “the very development of American society is creating a new kind of blindness about poverty.”<sup>242</sup>

The American poor, Harrington argued, “do not suffer the extreme privation of the peasants of Asia or the tribesmen of Africa, yet the mechanism of the misery is similar.”<sup>243</sup> At this point, the welfare state is “up-side down,” “helping those least who need aid most.”<sup>244</sup> After all, “this country seems to be caught in a paradox.” And the American dream for those “different kind of people” was more a wish than a reality. Harrington’s “other America” was not discovered by aliens, but rather disclosed from within--quite a sign and symptom of a presumptively democratic society in which the voice and virtue of intellectuals are merited.<sup>245</sup> But one would enter the time factor. The early 1960s was a ripe time for such imprudent thoughts of Harrington’s whose writings sprang from the fledgling intellectual endeavors accomplished by such people as John Kenneth Galbraith and others in the preceding decade. The historian, Richard H. Pells

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<sup>241</sup> Harrington, *The Other America*, 2.

<sup>242</sup> Harrington, *The Other America*, 4-6.

<sup>243</sup> Harrington, *The Other America*, 158.

<sup>244</sup> Harrington, *The Other America*, 147.

<sup>245</sup> Harrington’s book was not just widely circulated among both the young and the old during and beyond the decade, but the author himself was also invited to serve for the LBJ administration as an advisor for the president’s War on Poverty project.

once rightly stated that “with the appearance of [Michael Harrington’s] book, a new decade had truly dawned and a new generation was about to emerge.”<sup>246</sup>

Notions such as affluence, luxury, and consumerism, all of which were so alien to others outside the mainstream of American society, were not the best measure for human happiness, as Rachel Carson’s *Silent Spring* (1962) revealed. Men’s assault upon the environment brought by technological advancement and a mass society made the world “synthetic creations of man’s inventive mind.”<sup>247</sup> “Along with the possibility of the extinction of mankind by nuclear war,” Carson argued, “the central problem of our age has therefore become the contamination of man’s total environment with such substances of incredible potential for harm—substances that accumulate in the tissues of plants and animals and even penetrate the germ cells to shatter or alter the very material of heredity upon which the shape of the future depends.”<sup>248</sup> Ironically, the chemicals that have “the power to kill every insect”—the good or the bad—are invented to “maintain farm production,” which has already faced “overproduction.”<sup>249</sup> After all, it would alter human gene mutations, not to mention the environmental degradation and extinction of biodiversity. How long would industrial-technological society’s “progress” last in order to reach regression in human life and the natural world? As history has demonstrated, one need not go that far to witness the consequences.

The decade also witnessed increasingly explicit explosions and protests among black Americans for their civil rights. Partly influenced by and partly emulating the flaring decolonization movements led by black and brown peoples in Asia and Africa, American

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<sup>246</sup> Richard H. Pells, *The Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age: American Intellectuals in the 1940s and 1950s*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), 454.

<sup>247</sup> Rachel Carson, *Silent Spring*, (Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962), 6-7.

<sup>248</sup> Carson, *Silent Spring*, 8.

<sup>249</sup> Carson, *Silent Spring*, 9.

civil rights activists, namely Rosa Park, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Thurgood Marshall stood for abolishing the persistence of the “Jim Crow system” throughout the country, especially in the south. Using a variety of nonviolent methods of resistance, including sit-ins, kneel-ins, boycotts, marches and speeches, these activists were followed by thousands of supporters and simultaneously faced brutal resistance and status quo bias.

Many activists were becoming disenchanted with nonviolent resistance. While struggling to figure out “what it meant to be black in white America,” Eldridge Cleaver appealed from prison in his *Soul on Ice* (1968) that “black Americans are too easily deceived by a few smiles and friendly gestures, by the passing of a few liberal-sounding laws which are left on the books to rot unenforced.” And the only way they can ensure this is “to gain organizational unity and communication with their brothers and allies around the world, on an international basis.” Ridiculed by the mobilization of black soldiers to fight for America in Vietnam, Cleaver was appalled that “black Americans are considered to be the world’s biggest fools to go to another country to fight for something they do not have for themselves.”<sup>250</sup> Same question here: “How could the mobilization of civil rights movements affected attitudes towards people’s involvement in the country’s foreign relations?”

The newly elected president John F. Kennedy’s reaction to evolving demands for racial justice as well as his positions on independence and self-determination of African countries defined the dawning of a new age in American domestic and foreign relations and created politically favorable environment for not only the protests but also for

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<sup>250</sup> Eldridge Cleaver, *The Soul on Ice*, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1968), 123-127.

unprecedented legislative achievements, which culminated in the Civil Rights Act 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In addition, Lyndon B. Johnson's land slide victory and his party's majority status both in the Senate and the House set the ideal timing for social welfare initiatives and civil rights legislations: Medicare and Medicaid proposals were passed; Congress approved a bill providing funds to strengthen international studies and foreign languages in 1966; and the Johnson administration declared an "unconditional war on poverty", which the president hoped the "richest nation on earth can afford to win."<sup>251</sup>

Racial prejudice, poverty, inequality and environmental degradation were not the only domestic issues that policymakers had to tackle, but these issues also became a part of the country's foreign affairs agenda. America's domestic problems shadowed, by and large, the effectiveness of the nation's foreign policy strategies during the contested time between the United States and its communist rival. Thus, the Cold War and its concomitant domestic social and racial dilemmas drove the change in the nation's attitude that America was not living up to its democratic ideals. The impersonal, alienating mass society inflicted with such paradoxical domestic issues changed perceptions and attitudes of young Americans toward their country, and led them to resort to their own individual identities for personal recuperation.

Those young Americans were willing to give their time and effort to activate the People-to-People University program which, they believed, was designed to create a favorable and hospitable atmosphere for foreign students studying in the U.S. As historian Monhollon stated, the "campus culture was generally racist, sexist, and

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<sup>251</sup>Griffith, *Major problems in American History*, 310.

conservative, reflecting the culture at large” during the 1960s.<sup>252</sup> By participating in such a grassroots program, the People-to-People volunteers hoped that they were contributing to a change in the status quo of the KU campus environment, and to a reform of a broader campus culture.

### ***Youth, Idealism, and the Expansion of the People-to-People Campaign***

An understanding of the causes, events, and legacies of the 1960s is incomplete without referring to student activism that sprouted at the dawn of the decade. Tellingly, inspired by the events as well as works critical of the American consumerism, conformism, racial and minority issues, as well as poverty (i.e. *The Power Elite*, *Growing Up Absurd*, *Soul on Ice*, and *The Affluent Society*) that embodied the moral imperative of civil rights and social justice that were contested from the mid-1950s and throughout the 1960s, younger Americans were ready to embrace new ideas and ideals. The young generation was better educated than their parents and had more credentials and self-confidence to “challenge conventional wisdom and take on established authorities.”<sup>253</sup> These young liberal activists, who came of age during the paradoxical period of American society, hoped to contribute their passion, values and beliefs to social change and national renewal. That is how the new generation’s conscience and “youthful bravado” would dictate what they could do for their country.<sup>254</sup>

Young people in the 1960s had been raised with the belief that the U.S. was the greatest country in the world and the only country that had the power and the potential

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<sup>252</sup> Rusty L. Monhollon, *“This is America?” the Sixties in Lawrence, Kansas*. (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 64.

<sup>253</sup> Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin, *America Divided*, 52.

<sup>254</sup> *Ibid.*

as well the moral responsibility to lead the world. Exactly from this environment for youth idealism, emerged the People-to-People University program with a “youthful spirit of idealistic commitment” of young Americans. Coming from a military general, however, the idea of “people-to-people” was not exempt from skepticism as to whether it embodied “genuine” goodwill. It was even viewed as a symbolic gesture of American imperialism. Did People-to-People really stand for peace and democracy or was it merely an example of Cold War propaganda?

The People-to-People program was a part of an overarching strategy that postwar Presidents, including Eisenhower, all followed. To many of the program volunteers, however, the heart of its idealistic and humanitarian-altruistic drive was a noble cause. Thus supporting this noble cause was morally superior than opposing it. The idealism of the program, however, does not reflect Eisenhower’s personal convictions alone, although he, as president, was concerned with sustaining a peaceful world to which he substantially contributed as a war hero. He emphasized the significance of the role of each and every single American in forging people-to-people contacts across the world, and insisted that his proposed program is “something that lays very close to the hearts of ... every man, woman and child in America and the world ... except for those few who want to unjustly and improperly rule others.”<sup>255</sup>

Although the People-to-People movement was not as successful as the initial organizers believed since its popularity petered out after its first two years because it was criticized for duplicating the overseas activities undertaken by non-governmental

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<sup>255</sup> Remarks by DDE, September 11, 1956. White House Conference on People-to-People Partnerships, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President (White House Central Files) OF 325 Box 391. EL

and other philanthropic organizations and it failed to fund its operations by private capital alone and was forced to request for funds from the government (which undermined its supposed independence from the government), it did more good than harm to the “American cause” as defined by Cold War agenda, such as distributing a favorable image of the United States in politically strategic locations around the world. The misunderstanding and distrust that have chilled relations between almost all nations for about half a century could have gone far too long if there were no contacts between ordinary peoples at the grassroots level. The people-to-people idea was thus appealing for young Americans, its moral, altruistic tone was urgent and its sweeping scope was impressive.

Eisenhower’s statements are not the only evidence for complicating the narrow view that the People-to-People partnership was merely propaganda at best and an imperial manipulation of popular sentiments at worst that supplemented the administration’s foreign policy. Most importantly, it signified a fundamental shift in the nature of the U.S. outreach approaches by giving an enormous boost to the idea of secular voluntary movements applied for the first time in American foreign relations. To that end, the people-to-people idea *per se* was directly replicated in Eisenhower’s successor’s foreign policy which was manifested in the Peace Corps. As the following chapter will demonstrate, interviews with former volunteers also suggest that their motives for being part of People-to-People were not politically impersonal but individual.

The People-to-People program was, in the end, one dimension of the overall multifaceted national strategy under the Eisenhower administration. The idealistic rhetoric involved in its promotion and the idealistic motives with which the volunteers

associated their attractions to the program were connected, but did not completely match.



### Chapter 3

#### **“Telling America’s Stories Abroad:” The People-to-People Movement, 1956-1966**

Eisenhower believed in America’s preeminent role in postwar world politics, and he forged it neither in a unilateral way nor even through military encounters. He stated in his first political speech delivered in Abilene, Kansas, his boyhood hometown, that as “partners with others America must carry the burden of world leadership because of [her] strength.” Therefore, America “must be spiritually, economically, and militarily strong, for her own sake and for humanity.”<sup>256</sup>

Along with this manifested role of postwar America in international relations, the Eisenhower administration sought to win the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, a war-time ally Eisenhower once cherished. Indeed, the emergence of U.S. confrontations with the Soviet Union was the greatest disappointment for Eisenhower even before his presidency.. His disappointment with Soviet leaders’ behavior was quite explicit, especially because he had been a good friend of Marshal Georgi Zhukov and had valued Russian contribution to decisively wind down World War II.

After his talk with Zhukov during the 1955 Geneva Conference, Eisenhower was privately astonished with how the Soviet repressive regime changed his “old friend” as a person. “Zhukov was no longer the same man he had been in 1945... He had been [an] independent, self-confident man who... was always ready to meet cheerfully with me ...

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<sup>256</sup> Eisenhower recalled that the “Abilene talk was useful” later in the campaign because it came to be regarded as a “good statement of sound progressive Republican doctrine.” Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change: The White House Years, 1953-1956* (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, INC., 1963), 33-35; See also William Bragg Ewald Jr., *Eisenhower the President: Crucial Days: 1951-1960*. (New York: Prentice Hall, 1981), 44-5.

and to cooperate. Now, ten years later, he was a subdued, worried man, who repeated in low monotone to me the same arguments that had been presented to the conference by the Soviet chairman... He was devoid of animation, and he never smiled or joked as he used to do...,” wrote Eisenhower in his memoir *Mandate for Change*.<sup>257</sup> For Eisenhower, it was the Soviet regime and its communist ideology that made ordinary Russians isolated from peace-loving countries, such as the United States. It was tempting to reach out to ordinary Russians at the grass-roots level. Eisenhower stated that “real peace meant no accommodation with the Soviet system, but a full victory over it leaving the world no option but to emulate the American system.”<sup>258</sup>

The People-to-People campaign originated in this contested time of the Cold War characterized by ideological and political bipolarity. By the same token, decolonization, the emergence of newly independent states and their ideas of non-alignment greatly challenged the U.S. and the Soviet Union to instigate a “new look” in the conduct of their foreign policy and diplomacy.<sup>259</sup> As politicians in Washington viewed, communists already started to occupy the neutral world by initiating their propagandistic activities. Soviet propaganda programs “with their distortion of the U.S. [were] being jacked up;” Red China was moving in on “Oriental movie market” showing nostalgic appeal in story which “recalls China’s past glories;” Russia’s influence on Middle East and Africa was

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<sup>257</sup> Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, 525

<sup>258</sup> Ira Chernus, *General Eisenhower: Ideology and Discourse* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2002), 206.

<sup>259</sup> Between 1946-1960 thirty seven new nations emerged from colonial status in Asia, Africa and Middle East. These countries as referred to the Third World, “backward,” or developing nations consisted of basically agricultural peoples that served as raw material providers and a huge market for manufactured products. As of 1959, for instance, more than one-third of American direct foreign investments were in the Third World. Paterson, *American Foreign Relations*, 295.

deepening as they “hold prestige showings in embassies, use block booking to tie propaganda with non-propaganda good films.”<sup>260</sup>

Having been largely preoccupied with a “falling dominoes” theory, the Eisenhower administration applied *containment* to these emerging new nations to edge the Soviet capture of the neutral nations. Eisenhower needed a compelling approach that could effectively counteract communist propagandistic activities. He sought to mobilize more civilians, not troops, to combat communist expansion in the free world. The People-to-People program was a product of the containment policy which was a part of America’s liberal grand strategy.<sup>261</sup> Yet, just as containment policy was not the only framework for Cold War American foreign policy, containment was not the only motive behind the People-to-People idea. Granted, President Eisenhower liked power and he knew how to exercise it when necessary. This does not mean, however, that he did not possess any moral imaginations or that his actions were relegated to only power politics.

The People-to-People program was molded out, in part, of Eisenhower’s personal conviction that if people want peace then they need to get together to share their common purpose. He believed that peace would not come suddenly, but would come by gradual growth of common interests among nations. It may be true that the people-to-people approach could not directly impact a nation’s foreign policy, as Eisenhower viewed, but it could potentially contribute to it in the long run. That was the true purpose of the people-to-people diplomacy that Eisenhower envisioned.

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<sup>260</sup> *People-to-People News*, vol. 1, no 2, October 1956, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Records as President (White House Central Files) Official File, Box 931 OF 325 (6).

But the People-to-People movement also began during a difficult time of racial relations and social unrest at home. It was a time when African-Americans were discriminated against, excluded, and lynched. It was a time when civil rights movement leaders were blacklisted, spied on, and red-baited for advocating for their cause. To many Americans, domestic racism was more dangerous than Soviet communism. Repercussions of a mass society and corporate capitalism were more concrete than atomic war. Many Americans were uneasy within equality and poverty amidst plenty and prosperity. People of plenty were prosperous but many others were underfed, unemployed, and unequally treated. The United States was divided and the American dream was a mere dream for many Americans. In such circumstances, America's credibility (and ingenuity) of spreading ideals of democracy abroad would be questionable, as it did not make them real at home. "Telling America's stories" abroad as they were was a camouflaged tale, but not a truth.

The idea of promoting ordinary citizens' role in the nation's foreign relations was a crucial part of the Cold War American foreign relations, which was later formulated as "public diplomacy." Edmund Gullion, dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a retired foreign service officer, defined "public diplomacy" when he established an Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy in 1965. Thus Gullion defined the term:

Public diplomacy ... deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as

diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of intercultural communications.<sup>262</sup>

Although the phrase “public diplomacy” can be traced to the nineteenth century diplomatic discourse, Cull contends, it was Gullion who first used the term in modern diplomacy because the old word “propaganda had accumulated so many negative connotations.”<sup>263</sup> Yet, the term “soft power,” which was coined by the political scientist Joseph Nye Jr., is the most frequently used to broadly and inclusively define outreach activities conducted by both state and non-state actors to improve country’s image, attractiveness, or reputation. As Nye viewed, the United States won the Cold War because it used its soft power in combination with its hard power--military and economic assets. But according to Nye, soft power is not just a matter of an image or public relations, but rather a “form of power—a means of obtaining desired outcomes.”<sup>264</sup>

According to critics, people-to-people diplomacy was ineffective political propaganda, and those people who volunteered for this tended to be viewed as mere “do-gooders.” As the diplomatic historian Emily Rosenberg put it, however, public diplomacy would result in the long run, in greater mutual respect and understanding and would in time provide a sound basis for successful diplomacy.<sup>265</sup> At this point, the diplomatic historian Thomas Paterson stated that the role of the American “cultural

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<sup>262</sup> Edward Murrow Center on Public Diplomacy, available at <http://www.publicdiplomacy.org>. Quoted in Nicholas J. Cull. “Public Diplomacy before Gullion: The Evolution of a Phrase,” In *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, eds., Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor. Because of its pejorative connotation of the phrase “public diplomacy,” which frequently confused with propaganda, different phrases were formulated by diplomatic and cultural historians and political scientists. See also diplomatic historians Frank Ninkovich’s *Diplomacy of Ideas* and Akira Iryie’s *Cultural Internationalism* for earlier conceptual frameworks.

<sup>263</sup> Cull, “Public Diplomacy before Gullion,” 19.

<sup>264</sup> Nye, *Soft Power*, 129

<sup>265</sup> Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream*, 215. America’s usage of public diplomacy elements in her foreign policy objectives has been discussed in chapter one.

diplomacy” that “parted the curtain” (or at least tore a big hole in it) was a significant counter approach during the Cold War.<sup>266</sup>

One official at the United States Information Agency (USIA) stated to the press that for years the “world has been bombarded with government propaganda—Nazi, Fascist and now Russian Communist.” In an attempt to counteract the Cold War campaign of the Russians, the U.S. government “has been devoting large sums of “telling the American story.” But even though the USIA claimed to have based its efforts on “truth” rather than “propaganda,” many observers question whether the government-to-people approach “packs a punch any longer.” The people in Europe, Asia and Latin America have been so “surfeited with propaganda... they are inclined to be suspicious of anything that comes from government—even the American government.” So how could America have reached these people? The USIA thought it has the answer in a people-to-people approach.<sup>267</sup>

The idea of the people-to-people approach was mentioned during his re-election campaign when Eisenhower stated that the strength of the free world lay in the unity that would come of the voluntary associations of diverse nations that could ultimately help ensure greater understanding between the peoples of widely varying political

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<sup>266</sup> Paterson and Garry Clifford, *American Foreign Relations*, 276. Although the term “cultural diplomacy” is interchangeably used with public diplomacy, the former frequently refer to cultural activities and exchanges.

<sup>267</sup> William McGaffin, “People-to-People: U.S. Trying a New Way to Tell Stories Abroad: Low-Pressure Approach Is Working: Here’s How,” *Chicago Daily News*, May 26, 1956.

perspectives.<sup>268</sup> To establish and sustain the unity in the free world, Eisenhower wanted to do something that would touch ordinary people at the grass-roots level.

The present chapter discusses the institutional history of the People-to-People program by giving particular attention to its origin, development, its various activities as well as public reactions to and financial challenges of the program. The chapter will also discuss the program's most successful initiative—the Sister-City program—which has been under-researched by scholars.<sup>269</sup>

### ***Origin of the People-to-People Idea***

On July 15 1956, less than an hour before his departure for the Geneva Summit, President Eisenhower addressed his fellow Americans: “For the first time, a president goes to engage in a conference... to prevent wars, in order to see whether in this time of stress and strain we cannot devise measures that will keep from us terrible scourge that afflicts mankind.” And he positively continued his speech, “We want peace, and pessimism never won a battle... Peoples everywhere want peace, a peace in which they could live happily and in confidence.” He was heading to Geneva, he underscored, to represent the “convictions, beliefs, and aspirations of all Americans.” As he concluded his speech, Eisenhower asked all Americans on the “next Sabbath... to crowd their places of worship to ask for help...in [showing] America’s earnest desire for peace.”<sup>270</sup>

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<sup>268</sup>Branyan and Larsen, *The Eisenhower Administration 1953-1961: A Documentary History* vol.2, (New York: Random House, 1971), 613-614.

<sup>269</sup> See Osgood, *Total Cold War*. Both Juergensmeyer and Leppert’s dissertations have not covered sister-cities in detail.

<sup>270</sup> Dwight D. Eisenhower. *Public Papers of the Presidents, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955*, #161, 701-704. American delegates to the Geneva Conference consisted of Department of State officials and several

The day after his speech in Washington, Eisenhower saw on the other side of the Atlantic the same “convincing evidence of people’s deep longing for peace.” These people in the city of Geneva, he recalled, were “clearly praying that from this conference reliable East-West agreements might open the door to a better era.”<sup>271</sup> Eisenhower believed that people across the world wanted the peace he hoped to ensure with other delegates at Geneva.

Attended by the delegates from the “Big Four” nations, the Geneva Summit met on July 16, 1955 with President Eisenhower presiding. The Conference was not a typical international conference, as Eisenhower recalled, where only government officials would “exploit their nationalistic goals without enough attention to the spirit in which differences of ambition and ideology might be resolved.” But the President and his Secretary of State did not expect “any spectacular results” from the conference, and only hoped to “detect whether Soviets really intended to introduce a tactical change to ease tensions.” Despite his tentative hope in the conference’s “worth” and “real value,” Eisenhower arrived in Geneva with a set of priority subjects: general disarmament, reunification of Germany, cultural exchange between East and West as well as his

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ambassadors, including John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, Dillon Anderson, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Charles E. Bohlen, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Robert R. Bowie, Director of Policy Planning Staff at the Department of State, James C. Hagerty, White House Press Secretary, Douglas McArthur II, the counsel of the Department of State, Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Herman Phleger, the legal advisor of the State Department, Llewellyn E. Thompson, US Ambassador to Austria. Eisenhower later noted that he met his cabinet members, including Harold Stassen, president’s special assistant on Disarmament, Nelson A. Rockefeller, special assistant for cold war strategy, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Alfred M. Gruenther, then commanding the military force of NATO, and Robert B. Anderson, the Deputy Secretary of State for consultation and thought it would be best not to take them to the conference. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, 510-12.

<sup>271</sup> Eisenhower. *Mandate for Change*. 510-13; *Public Papers, 1955*, #164, “Opening Statement at the Geneva Conference,” July 1955, 707.



extemporaneous “Open Skies” proposal, which encouraged an open aerial surveillance of military units and supplies of each nation under inspection.<sup>272</sup>

While he was suspicious of communists who would “miss no opportunity to gather intelligence when visiting in the west,” Eisenhower hoped that promoting exchanges of officials, scientists, students, teachers, engineers, and others would open new paths of contact between East and West and would produce “real results.” Americans could “surely learn more about Communist ideas and culture by sending citizen ambassadors” eastward.<sup>273</sup> Thus, the idea on east-west exchange along with other issues was outlined in conference documents, and was to be discussed at the Foreign Ministers’ meeting scheduled to convene in October.<sup>274</sup> Invigorated by the spirit of Geneva, officials of the United States Information Agency (USIA) and its Office of Private Cooperation (IOC) hammered out strenuous tasks in order to mold the president’s idea into something feasible in the post-Geneva months.<sup>275</sup>

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<sup>272</sup> Despite Eisenhower’s “exclusive attempt” to persuade the Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, the latter viewed that Open Skies plan was nothing more than a “bald espionage plot against USSR.” Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, 522.

<sup>273</sup> Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, 506-7; *Public Papers, 1955*, #167, “Statement on East-West Contacts Delivered at the Geneva Conference,” July 22, 1955, 716-18.

<sup>274</sup> Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, 527. See also Theodore Repliers’ June 1956 Report. Replier reported that “to win the cold war, [America] needed to win hearts and minds of more people in the “free world,” which did not fall yet under “Moscow-centered communism.” “Our propaganda program is a little like a skeleton complete with all its bones—except a spine.” And that America needed an “inspirational theme...” Theodore S. Replier. “Some Thoughts about American Propaganda.” Eisenhower Exchange Fellow, London, England, June 17, 1955.

<sup>275</sup> The United States Information Agency (USIA) was established in 1953 by the proposal of President Eisenhower. The basic mission of the agency was to submit evidence of peoples of other nations by means of communication techniques that the objectives and policies of the U.S. are in harmony with and will advance their legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress and peace. USIA: YRIS-22, 12 March, 1954, EL; Abbott Washburn commented later that he concept of people-to-people contact and partnership was in the President’s speech at New Orleans in October 1953: “each of us, whether bearing a commission from his government or traveling by himself for pleasure or for business is a representative of the United States of America...” Eisenhower urged graduates to “join with like-minded men and women in many voluntary associations that promote people-to-people contact around the world.” While Soviets “ordered the whole society into their ideological struggle for world domination,” the president as calling for “voluntary actions by free Americans.” Memorandum for Governor Sherman Adams. USIA, September 7,

Yet, according to Theodore Streibert, the USIA director, the idea of the people-to-people contact and partnership was first disclosed in the President's speech in New Orleans in October 1953, when he departed from his prepared text and said: "Each of us, whether bearing a commission from his government or traveling by himself for pleasure or for business, is a representative of the United States..." Again at Baylor University, Eisenhower urged the graduates to "join with like-minded men and women in the many voluntary associations that promote people-to-people contact around the world."<sup>276</sup>

In addition, as the archival sources indicate, Eisenhower and other People-to-People organizers were motivated by Theodore S. Replier's 1955 report on the state of America's overseas image and "propaganda problem." As an Eisenhower Exchange Fellow, Replier sent a provocative report from London to Washington on June 17, 1955 after he came back "with supreme frustration" from a six-month around the "world inspection trip" to 13 countries, including Japan, Hong Kong, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Burma, India, Pakistan, Egypt, Greece, Italy, France and England. Replier, who later became a chairperson of one of the People-to-People committees, warned that "we lack the inspirational idea" and suggested that the President "make a significant speech stating that it is the policy of this nation... to press on toward the goal of a world in which poverty is unknown, a world in which all men are free to develop those abilities given them by their creator." He urged American policymakers to focus "especially on Japan and India in Asia, and Italy and France in Europe from a propaganda point."

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1956, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Records as President (White House Central Files) Official File, Box 931 OF 325 (6), EL.

<sup>276</sup> Theodore Streibert to Governor Sherman Adams, the White House, USIA, Washington, September 7, 1956, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Records as President (White House Central Files) Official File, Box 931 OF 325 (6), EL.

Replier hinted a more authoritative program as he stated that America's "propaganda offensive needs more power."<sup>277</sup>

### ***Paving the Path for People-to-People***

As the Deputy Director of the USIA, Abbott Washburn had close relationship with the Executive Office of the President. He had much experience obtained from government agencies of similar mission serving as the Executive Secretary of the Jackson Committee and the Executive Vice Chairman of the Crusade for Freedom. As such, Washburn was the most suitable person within his agency, who would and could shape a logistical framework and budgetary possibilities for new initiatives such as the People-to-People program.

Despite the fact that his agency's constant target of several "outspoken" Congressmen's criticisms for its higher allocations and "propaganda in a democracy," Washburn then swiftly moved to draft a new project while the "Geneva Spirit" was still lingering in the White House. Washburn believed that his move indeed would be right for his young fledgling agency which recently became independent of the State Department. The agency earnestly needed to "widen and intensify its impact" to reach a broader base of ordinary Americans. Most importantly, Washburn believed, it was necessary for the U.S. to increase, not to decrease, its outreach initiatives as the Soviets were spending more on similar activities overseas, which would allow them to achieve a "status quo peace" not a "dynamic peace."

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<sup>277</sup> Theodore S. Replier, "Some Thoughts on American Propaganda." Replier stated that "propaganda should be understood in its dictionary sense without sinister tones."

Washburn's first draft memorandum embodying all these pressing concerns reached Theodore Streibert, the Agency's Director, on August 17, 1955. Although the memorandum carried not the actual name of the People-to-People, but rather a vague one, "President's Program for International Understanding," it served as the basic sketch for the later People-to-People program.<sup>278</sup> Streibert instantly accepted the idea considering the same factors as Washburn formulated, and he immediately called a meeting with other government officials, including the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. As both Washburn and Streibert hoped, the meeting, which was held in two weeks, reached a "general agreement" on the tentative proposal waiting now to be approved by the President.

Streibert met Eisenhower on Labor Day, September 5, 1955. The president accepted his inter-governmentally approved proposal. But Eisenhower wanted the program to be both non-governmental and non-propagandistic. To avoid misperception, he also suggested that potential committee chairmen should not be called to a Washington meeting until their agreements were secured in principle. Now that all approvals were guaranteed, it would be up to Streibert and his agency to build the program and turn it into reality.

Then, two crucial events occurred which diverted the group's attention from the program proposal for an indefinite time. The first and the most important reason for the postponement was Eisenhower's heart attack in September 1955. Washburn and other

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<sup>278</sup> Abbott Washburn later commented that the actual name of People-to-People thought of by Eisenhower while he was ill in Denver Remarks made by Washburn at Board of Trustees International, 1980/81, Washington DC, August 17, 1981, Washburn, Abbott.: Papers, 1938-2003, Box 162, EL. Reynolds even suggested Operation People-to-People. IOC Memo, February 20, 1956, Reynolds to Washburn, Quoted in Juergensmeyer, Democracy's Diplomacy, 241.

major organizers calculated that the president's presence with an official address was necessary to attract the public. The second reason was an unexpected result from the follow-up meeting of the Foreign Ministers, held in October in Geneva in which the Soviets showed a "sweeping rejection of all Western proposals" including the one on east-west exchanges.<sup>279</sup> Not only was the ailing President frustrated, but so was the top staff at the White House, including those working on the People-to-People project. Eisenhower later commented that the "Soviet duplicity" at the October Foreign Ministers' meeting, which was held in the "same room as the Summit Conference" was a "disillusionment" and a "grievous disappointment, indeed."<sup>280</sup>

Although active focus on the program proposal was interrupted by Eisenhower's heart attack, Washburn, Streibert and Sherman Adams continued their discussion on the People-to-People program. By December 1955, as the president recovered from his illness, Streibert reconvened on planning the conference. Sherman Adams drafted a letter that would be sent to prospective chairmen. Adams suggested that the President's opening speech should mention neither the Geneva Summit nor the Iron Curtain.<sup>281</sup>The

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<sup>279</sup> Dulles to Eisenhower, *The Foreign Ministers' Meeting at Geneva, October, 1955*, Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, 528; Much of the information in this chapter is drawn from the many memoirs and histories of the Eisenhower presidency. In particular, pertaining to the information on the origin on the program, I am most indebted to the following dissertations: John Eli Juergensmeyer, "Democracy's Diplomacy: The People-to-People Program: A Study of Attempts to Focus the Effects of Private Contacts in International Politics," (Ph.D., diss., Princeton University, 1960) and Glenn Wesley Leppert, "Dwight D. Eisenhower and People-to-People as an Experiment in Personal Diplomacy: A Missing Element for Understanding Eisenhower's Second Term as President," ( Ph.D. diss., Kansas State University, 2003).

<sup>280</sup> Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, 529. But the agreement on cultural exchange programs with the Soviets which resulted in Vice President Nixon's trip to Moscow in 1959 and the Soviet Premier Khrushchev's face-to-face talk to Eisenhower in Washington in the same year was the constructive outcome the Eisenhower administration saw after the Geneva summit.

<sup>281</sup> Juergensmeyer, "Democracy's Diplomacy," 225.

President's talk at the People-to-People Conference would stress the problem of Soviet "propaganda mechanism," which was "as serious as the threat of armed attack."<sup>282</sup>

Structurally, Eisenhower initially envisioned fewer committees with clear purposes as well. By January 1956, it became clear that the White House, USIA and IOC would be the major backbone for at least planning the program, and seed money not exceeding \$5000 would be provided by the USIA. During this early planning stage, the "concept of committees" was suggested and possible individuals were identified as potential chairmen of committees. Thus, the preliminary planning for the conference was completed by mid-May which culminated in invitation letters to be sent to conference attendees. The conference was scheduled to be held on June 12, 1956, which did not happen because of Eisenhower's ileitis attack. Abbott Washburn and other conference organizers had to hold off the people-to-people proposal for another three months.

### ***Inauguration of the People-to-People Program***

After a year-long preparation by the United States Information Agency, mostly by its Office of Private Cooperation, the White House conference on the People-to-People Partnership opened on September 11, 1956. With high hopes of appealing to the audience, the conference dignitaries included the President, Vice President, and the Secretary of State, who delivered personal remarks at the opening session. The

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<sup>282</sup>Suggestions [by Adams] for the President's Talk at the People-to-People Conference, July 31, 1956, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Records as President (White House Central Files) General File, Box 1310 GF 229 (5).

audience of more than 150 people consisted of American citizens representing every sector of the society. Among them were doctors and lawyers, teachers and theologians, politicians and philanthropists, congressmen and cartoonists, entrepreneurs and entertainers, writers and publishers, actors and activists. The demographic feature of the program committees was as diverse as their activities; they were republicans, democrats and independent politicians, Christians, Catholics and Jewish, white and black, and men and women.<sup>283</sup>

The opening remarks delivered by Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles emphasized every individual American citizen's role in creating an understanding between peoples. Vice President Richard Nixon warned "against a superior attitude towards others and called for a recognition of the fact that other peoples may have old and distinguished cultural traditions." There are no backward nations," Nixon stated, "nations are just different, and different peoples have different values." Therefore the "unforgiveable sin is to go to peoples with an air of superiority or condescension."<sup>284</sup>

Eisenhower's people-to-people idea boosted the participants' patriotism and civic activism, resulting in the creation of forty-two committees during the conference. It was seen as a "bold new expansion of popular relations activities on a grand scale."<sup>285</sup> The

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<sup>283</sup> A White House Conference on the People-to-People Partnership, Washington D.C. on September 11, 1956, Eisenhower, Dwight. D.: Records as President (White House Central Files) Official File, Box 391, EL.

<sup>284</sup> Summary Report on White House Conference, Eisenhower, Dwight. D.: Records as President (White House Central Files) Official File, Box 391, EL.

<sup>285</sup> Perhaps Eisenhower's popularity rate influenced the public acceptance of the people-to-people idea. He was one of few American politicians who never received a job approval rating lower than 49%. His highest rating was 79%, taken shortly after his re-election in 1956. Gallup Poll's "Most Admired Men and Women of the Last Half Century," Dwight Eisenhower was also ranked second preceded by Reverend Billy Graham and followed by Pope John Paul II. <http://www.gallup.com/poll/3415/Most-Admired-Men-Women>; Of Eisenhower's personality, Harvard law and political science Professor Robert Bowie once recalled, "What struck me was the vibrant personality, the very magnetic appeal which he had, even in

following day, the conference participants engaged in four major sessions to discuss the issues concerning the Cold War America's overseas image and potential contributions that could be made by individual citizens and non-governmental organizations.

During the discussion sessions, committee chairpersons exchanged their ideas: Justice Simmons said that people in the Middle East ask that "we see their problems with their eyes... we cannot go to these people and tell them what to do. We must accept them as equals and let them know that." As one of the committee chairpersons, Mr. Meany noted that if the program is to "encourage private groups to enter into exchanges with the Iron Curtain, [he] cannot be a party to that crime against America," because people behind the curtain are "prisoners, and government controlled," so he could not "deal with the Russian people." Another chairperson stressed the importance of people-to-people being a "two-way proposition." "We must not just tell America's story abroad," she said, "rather we must show the people overseas that we want to know about them and their institutions."<sup>286</sup>

The opening speeches moved the conference attendees and brought their goodwill sense and "morale into high gear." To them, the logic behind promoting world peace through people-to-people communication seemed acceptable. The conference organizers frequently emphasized that the People-to-People program was an ideal device for managing America's distorted image so it was urgent to institutionalize it

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dealing with people that he had not met or known before. Quoted in Fred I. Greenstein, *the Hidden-hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader* (Baltimore: the Johns Hopkins University, 1994), 31.

<sup>286</sup> *Ibid.*



under government guidance. The program's target would be the "free world," where Theodore S. Repplier had completed a six-month trip in 1955.<sup>287</sup>

The USIA's personnel provided the newly appointed chairmen with the nuts and bolts for carrying out the program errands in each specific area of concern. Examples of potential activities were presented during the conference: contacting people in corresponding fields, popularizing the people-to-people concept, and sponsoring exchanges. Some of those suggested activities were as mundane as sponsoring exchange of hobby and craft shows or promoting international photo contests or increasing the number of international pen-pals while others such as organizing community salutes (e.g., Boston-to-Rome) or implementing projects for the handicapped as evidence of America's "respect for human dignity" were unique. But some of the activities such as "stimulating writing books on American ideology and People's capitalism," or sponsoring "briefing booklets" for Americans visiting and working overseas were clearly politicized.<sup>288</sup>

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<sup>287</sup>Theodore S. Repplier, "Some Thoughts about American Propaganda," June 17, 1955, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Records as President, (White House Central Files) Confidential File, Box 99, EL. After travelling more than dozen countries in Europe, Asia and Middle East, Repplier submitted a detailed report to the White House describing about the status quo of both America and the Soviet Union. As Repplier warned, the effectiveness of American propaganda in the free world was the "supreme frustration" because Communists so widely and effectively promised "relief to the oppressed, help for the helpless, self-respect for the downtrodden—all ideas with a tremendous inspirational life." Repplier noted, "Communists have a theme for a Crusade, Americans have none." Therefore the U.S. must "unmask and counter communism." Repplier's report, which was submitted a month before the Geneva Conference, might have served as the background for the U.S. agenda presented to the conference.

<sup>288</sup> About a dozen-page of potential projects were provided to the committee chairmen during the conference. A Program for People-to-People Partnership: Examples of possible Activities, White House Conference on the People-to-People Partnership, Washington D.C. on September 11, 1956, Eisenhower, Dwight, Records as President (White House Central Files) Official File, Box 391, EL.

### ***Committees, Commitments, Controversies...***

People-to-People Committees included categories such as advertising, banking, cartoonists, books, businesses, farmers, the hotel industry, insurance, labor and letter writing. Within a month after the conference most of 42 committee chairmen completed their membership rosters, and 16 committees had held their organizational meetings shaping hospitality plans, each in their own field. The basic idea was to give overseas visitors “warmer U.S. welcome... more meaningful look at American life at home and at work.” The Letter-writing committee targeted at “naturalized citizens” who would be encouraged to supply names of overseas friends, relatives. The major task for The Book committee was to find out “how to get better books... and what kind of books do most good overseas.” The Public Relations committee provided a guide for travelers abroad under the theme, “When you go, make a friend for yourself, your industry, your country.” The Hobbies committee chairman, H.L. Lindquist wrote that if the program was “successfully carried out, it could be [a] means of changing world history.”

The Advertising and the Cartoonist committees would “exploit language of humor” to “interpret democracy,” to make peaceful policies and democratic ideals of the U.S. understood and to work for a “true partnership with other peoples to gain their sympathetic understanding in happier, friendlier and more peaceful world.” The Magazine committee planned to find out “reading habits and preference abroad” so it would be used to “sharpen aims of U.S. magazine collection drives.”<sup>289</sup> The Writer’s

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<sup>289</sup> *People-to-People News*, vol. 1, no 2, October 1956, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Records as President (White House Central Files) Official File, Box 931 OF 325 (6), EL.

committee chaired by the Nobel Laureate William Faulkner sent a letter to American writers a “unique” letter requesting them to write their ideas about People-to-People:

Faulkner’s letter said: “The president asked me to organize American writers to see what we can do to give a true picture of our country to other people. Will you join such an organization? And he asked his writers to send their ideas and enclosed his own ideas as a “sample.”

1. Anaesthetize, for one year, American vocal cords
2. Abolish, for one year, American passports
3. Commandeer every American automobile. Secrete Johnson grass seed in the cushions and every other available place. Fill the tanks with gasoline. Leave the switch key in the switch and push the car across the Iron Curtain.
4. Ask the government to establish a fund. Choose 10,000 people between 18 and 30, preferably communists. Bring them to this country and let them see America as it is. Let them buy an automobile on the installment plan, if that is what they want...

Comments and counterproposals came in and thirty well-known authors met in New York to hear Faulkner pursue in “seriousness his idea of bringing in our enemies to see us.” Finally, after some abstentions, twenty-five writers including John Steinbeck and the young poet Donald Hall accepted Faulkner’s statement. Steinbeck suggested the committee bring to America people from all over the world who “do not agree with us.”<sup>290</sup>

### ***The Perception of People-to-People at Its Early Stages***

With various motivations many of the chairmen of the People-to-People committees expressed their willingness to engage in the nation’s civic activities through their letters sent to the President before the conference. The letter sent by the President’s Office of Macmillan Company Publishers stated that it was a “privilege and

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<sup>290</sup> William Harlan Hale, “Every Man an Ambassador,” reprinted from the *Reporter*, March 21, 1957, EL.

an honor” to help “the government’s endeavor to sell the American ideology of freedom throughout the world.”<sup>291</sup> Robert R. Mathews, the Vice President of the American Express Company, responded on behalf of his chief Mr. Reed, who was returning from Europe, that Mr. Reed directed him to “accept immediately [the president’s] invitation to attend the conference”<sup>292</sup> These are few of the many letters which viewed that it was timely to call for the combined efforts of all citizens to make the American way of life and its ideals better known to the rest of the world.

Dulles defined the people-to-people idea as a new effort to bring the individual forces of America’s democracies to work upon these great world problems the country faced.<sup>293</sup> Nixon noted, “Smile and a handshake is the same abroad as in the United States... thus people-to-people program would be more suitable than the government-to-government approach to convey the real affection and friendship.”<sup>294</sup> These were only a few of the flowing praises for the People-to-People Program. But in spite of inspirations and motives expressed by its actual participants, critics did not overlook the program.

During the initial kick-off conference, some committee chairmen raised the questions pertaining to its link with the government, tax deductibility, security, and funding issues. One chairman asked as to why it was necessary to “obtain security clearance” of committee members if the program is non-governmental. The USIA’s

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<sup>291</sup> Letter from the President’s Office of the Macmillan Company Publishers, 1 June, 1956, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Records as President (White House Central Files) OF 325, EL.

<sup>292</sup> Robert Mathews to Eisenhower, June 4, 1956, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Records as President (White House Central Files) Official File, Box 931 OF 325 (6), EL.

<sup>293</sup> Report on the White House Conference on People-to-People Partnership, 3 October, 1956, 3, EL.

<sup>294</sup> USIA Memorandum for Mr. Gerald D. Morgan, Special Counsel of the President, Report on the White House Conference on People-to-People, October, 1956, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Records as President (White House Central Files) OF 325 (6), EL.

initial reply to People-to-People chairmen was explicit and straightforward. Conger Reynolds, Chief of the Office of Private Cooperation (IOC) stated that his office would only provide “seed money” probably under a contract basis and insisted that funding for the program would come from private sources through fundraising.<sup>295</sup> Such a response was compliant with Eisenhower’s objective to create *a self-sustaining private organization* without government affiliation so the genuine and enduring friendship would be maintained by individuals’ initiatives.

Many chairmen, however, preferred government’s leadership role and guidance at the program’s initial stage. The People-to-People organizers and its participants who optimistically looked at the program’s success could not anticipate the implications of the persisting fear and aversion of the program’s tie with the government agencies. Thus, due to continued suspicions and animosities towards the relationship between People-to-People and the government, many of the proposed projects lacked financial support from trusted foundations. In a report sent by Nelson Rockefeller to the President, the real reason all foundations were reluctant to sponsor the People-to-People program was their fear that it would take over everything that everybody else had been doing.<sup>296</sup> The Ford Foundation Trustees, upon request of funds from the People-to-People Foundation, made the same statement.<sup>297</sup> In response to the letter sent by Charles Wilson, President of the newly established People-to-People Foundation, the Ford Foundation CEO, Henry T. Heald stated that if they were to

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<sup>295</sup> Minutes from White House Conference, September 11, 1956, the White House Conference on the People-to-People Partnership, Washington D.C. Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Records as President (White House Central Files) OF, Box 391, EL.

<sup>296</sup> Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President (Ann Whitman File) DDE Diary Series, Box 27, EL.

<sup>297</sup> In 1957, a year after its establishment, the People-to-People Program was expanded into the People-to-People Foundation to raise funds for running its activities outside of government financial support.

support the People-to-People Program financially, it would lose, as a private agency, the selectivity they wished to retain and would inevitably be thought to be linked to the government.<sup>298</sup>

Some professional institutions and experts engaging in the field of cultural and humanitarian programs saw the People-to-People program as “starry eyed amateurs swarming all over the world and messing around with delicate matters of foreign affairs.”<sup>299</sup> But many people including politicians and pundits appeared to accept the people-to-people idea. As one of the most cosmopolitan senators, Hubert Humphrey suggested that “we institute people-to-people diplomacy in the battle to win over newly developing nations.” He continued, “we should be wise and prudent to search out areas of contact and understanding that are over and beyond the political... We have a natural ability for this type of contact.”<sup>300</sup> One article in the *U.S. and World News Report* noted that President Eisenhower’s appeal is one of the “most constructive peace efforts of current history.”<sup>301</sup> Demaree Bess in the *Saturday Evening Post* wrote that the People-to-People movement would develop “permanent world-wide outlets for the friendliness” which should be the most effective answer to the Kremlin’s hate-America propoganda.<sup>302</sup> Resolutions pledging to support People-to-People were coming in from national organizations: Photographic society of America, American Stamp Dealers

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<sup>298</sup> White House Memorandum of Conference with the President. 10 October, 1957, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Records as President (White House Central Files) OF, EL. But according to Juergensmeyer, early setbacks faced by the People-to-People were not with the involvement of government agencies but because of lack of them.

<sup>299</sup> Notes for Talk with Henry Ford II on People-to-People. March 1957, EL.

<sup>300</sup> People-to-People News, Vol.2 No.2 February 1958, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Records as President (White House Central Files) Official File, Box 931 OF 325 (6), EL.

<sup>301</sup> David Lawrence, “People-to-People,” *U.S. News and World Report*, January 17, 1958.

<sup>302</sup> Demaree Bess, “Our Propaganda Warriors,” *Saturday Evening Post*, March 16, 1957, Bortman, Mark.: Papers, Box 53, EL.

Association; National Philatelic Museum; Brand Names Foundation, Inc., and many more “declared in support of People-to-People and are ready to be of service.”<sup>303</sup>

Along with domestic reactions, the international audience expressed their perceptions of the program: A French cultural affairs official in America remarked: “I do not know what all this American initiative and activity portends. It may mean simply that Washington has some new political aim in mind. But I am reporting to Paris that it may possibly be a good one.”<sup>304</sup> The U.S. neighbor’s reaction was optimistic as the following statement suggested: “Two presidents had a quite talk about the program and the president of Mexico said it was the “best one of its kind in existence.”<sup>305</sup> Venezuela, West Germany and Italy were planning to send an increasing number of local employees and students to America.<sup>306</sup>

While advocating for Eisenhower’s idea, historian Philip Coombs has asserted that the fault that led to the obscurity of the program resided not in the President’s basic assumption but in the strategy.<sup>307</sup> Coombs believes that the Eisenhower administration did not really recognize that “a large and diverse people-to-people program” had been under way for a long time. Thus, the real need at that time was not to launch a new people-to-people program, but to strengthen the many existing organizations and programs which linked both private and public sectors.<sup>308</sup>

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<sup>303</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>304</sup> Quoted in Hale, “Every Man An Ambassador.”

<sup>305</sup> Letter from Ann C. Whitman, Personal Secretary to the President to George V. Allen, Director of the USIA, October 26, 1960, Eisenhower, Dwight. D.: Records as President (White House Central Files) Official File, Box 391, EL.

<sup>306</sup> Hale, “Every Man An Ambassador.”

<sup>307</sup> Coombs, *the Fourth Dimension*, 42.

<sup>308</sup> Coombs, *the Fourth Dimension*, 42-43. In the late 1940s and the 1950s the U.S. was hosting hundreds of students from all over the world, including the former enemy countries. Such exchange programs later

The archival sources suggest, however, that Eisenhower was well aware of individual-initiated programs that were already well known abroad. Despite numerous church-sponsored outreach initiatives, secular volunteer service organizations such as Kiwanis and Rotary International, which aimed at providing people with a practical means to form enduring friendships, to render altruistic service and to build better global communities had already shown international commitments recognized both at home and overseas.

But Eisenhower was dissatisfied with what America was doing to maintain her overseas image. At this point, Dr. Gabriel Hauge, administrative assistant to the President commented that Eisenhower took “cognizance of the large amount of people-to-people work” carried on by many American organizations, but he believed that Americans needed more.<sup>309</sup>

Theodore Replier’s detailed study of America’s overseas image problems played a great role in designing and developing People-to-People. Frustrated with the progress of America’s public diplomacy overseas, Replier submitted to the USIA and the President a report, including his suggestions which he believed deserved earnest consideration. Replier’s study provided an alternative view of the inception of the People-to-People idea. Thus, having been informed of America’s image problem, it was Eisenhower’s intention to systematize all the overseas actions being conducted by

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came under the GARIOA (Government Appropriation for Relief in Occupied Areas) program. Some twelve thousand Germans and two thousand Japanese students and scholars visited the U.S. under the auspices of American government. The Fulbright program became the most active and popular program for government-sponsored exchange of people. Akira Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism*, 155-56.

<sup>309</sup>Summary of the Minutes of the White House Conference on People-to-People, 11 September, 1956, The White House Conference on the People-to-People Partnership, Washington D.C., Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Records as President (White House Central Files) OF 325, Box 391, EL.



private and government agencies subsumed under one institution to be named the People-to-People Program.

***Financial Hurdles, Displaced Committees, “Disenchanted Foundations”***

More than two hundred papers in big and small towns carried stories about people-to-people over next several months. Americans were getting to know about the program. But how to finance the fledgling program was People-to-People’s “most immediate dilemma” from the very beginning.<sup>310</sup> Committee chairpersons were “generally under the impression that they would not be expected to raise funds personally for their individual committees.”<sup>311</sup> Thus non-government financing of the program continued to be the basic principle, which was in the hands of Jacob’s committee, The Special Task Force on Finances. The USIA officers boasted that their department was an “idea factory,” so “we think up ideas and then get private American citizens and organizations and businesses to carry them out. We have worked more than 1000 organizations.” Thus the “only expense to the U.S. taxpayer is the cost of running the idea factory—a small government department of twenty eight persons.”<sup>312</sup>

Discontented by the lack of sources, People-to-People organizers came up with an idea that establishing a private foundation would be the most effective tool for fundraising through various avenues. Thus, the People-to-People Foundation was incorporated in 1957 primarily to raise money for its committees which lacked resources of their own. First, it applied to Ford Foundation for a grant of \$570,000 but the

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<sup>310</sup> People-to-People News, October 1956, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Records as President (White House Central Files) OF 325, Box 931 (6), EL.

<sup>311</sup> “The People-to-People Program Dilemma,” Confidential Inter-Office Memorandum, the People-to-People Foundation. Inc., New York, March 18, 1958.

<sup>312</sup> McGaffin, “People-to-People: U.S. Trying a New Way to Tell Stories Abroad.”

foundation turned down the request. The Ford foundation reasoned that people-to-people volunteers were “amateurs” and the program had possible duplication with existing Ford-supported activities.”<sup>313</sup> After the requests for funds were turned down by three major foundations, several minor ones and most of the 500 biggest American business corporations, Charles E. Wilson, President of the newly established People-to-People foundation, sent a memorandum to its Trustees explaining that the foundation had been “extremely unsuccessful” in raising funds for the People-to-People to date. The major foundations were “disenchanted with the People-to-People program.”<sup>314</sup>

Frustrated, Wilson then wrote a letter to Eisenhower hoping that the president would lend a personal support to “his” program. The government thus far has provided, Wilson stated, the foundation with funds in the amount of \$89,000 for the primary purpose of initiating a fund raising campaign to finance the operations of the 41 People-to-People committees. Unfortunately, this effort “has never gotten off the ground.” The last \$32,000 advanced... was agreed upon as the final try.”<sup>315</sup> What “we have not understood is why the USIA has persisted in maintaining a large staff to run the Program instead of giving the Foundation a contract that would have enabled us to develop this project and raise funds.” Therefore, if “you want to carry on this program, it will be necessary to divert funds” now used by the USIA in the form of a contract with the People-to-People Foundation, wrote Wilson.<sup>316</sup> Wilson also mentioned that he

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<sup>313</sup> Ford Foundation rejection of grant application by People-to-People, Eisenhower, Dwight. D.: Records as President (White House Central File), OF 325, Box 934, EL.

<sup>314</sup> Memo from Charles E. Wilson to the Trustees and Directors, People-to-People Foundation, Inc., Jan 20, 1958. Eisenhower, Dwight. D.: Records as President (White House Central File), OF 325, EL.

<sup>315</sup> Memo from USIA acting director Abbott Washburn to Governor Sherman Adams, White House, March 13, 1958, EL.

<sup>316</sup> Charles E. Wilson’s letter to President Eisenhower, April 2, 1958, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Records as President (White House Central Files,) OF 325, Box 931, EL.

wanted to go directly to Congress for \$500,000 as several senators including Hubert Humphrey expressed their support. But he “would not do it without president’s approval.”<sup>317</sup> To Wilson’s dismay, Eisenhower was not clear whether he should request funds for People-to-People from government agencies nor did he show any sign of “divert[ing] funds” from the USIA. Wilson’s People-to-People foundation discontinued its activities as of June, 1958.

When suggesting his initial people-to-people idea back in 1956, Eisenhower hoped that private foundations and individuals would potentially be a financial backbone for the program. Thus he, from the beginning, did not anticipate any financial support to be appropriated by government agencies. Eisenhower thought that a monumental task such as people-to-people diplomacy would impress and invigorate volunteer-funders. For him, promoting the president’s initiative for the sake of America’s national purpose should be a matter of the unified spirit that the nation sorely needed during the height of the Cold War.

Despite its financial difficulties, volunteers behind the People-to-People program’s various committees did not give up their hope and effort. As of 1959, half of the initial 42 committees were actively engaging in outreach activities. Through the Garden committee, the USIA Chief Information Officer Mr. James Macfarland, a “diplomat with the watering can,” who “introduced squash to Germany,” brought a “positive result in German-American friendship.”<sup>318</sup> The committee of the Armed

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<sup>317</sup> USIA Memo for Governor Sherman Adams, from Abbott Washburn, Deputy Director, May 13, 1958

<sup>318</sup> “World Peace Through People-to-People Contacts,” *Congressional Record*, vol. 105, August 27, 1959.

Services was engaging in more civilian initiatives: 4000 iron lungs were sent to polio-stricken Japanese Hokkaido; a group of soldiers and their wives organized “Operation

Friendship” in Panama; Chief Petty Officer on Formosa donated his savings of \$9.400 to help build a nursery for the children of Chinese workers; 100,000 textbooks for elementary schools were donated to the Republic of Korea and doctors and corpsmen of the US Naval Air Station visited every six weeks to treat villagers in neighboring provinces.<sup>319</sup>

By the time Eisenhower left the White House in 1960 to become a chairperson of the People-to-People International with the recommendation of President John F. Kennedy, who would later become an honorary chairman of People-to-People, out of the initial 42 committees, 26 were actively engaging in People-to-People activities. The rather unsuccessful nature of the People-to-People campaign might be explained by several reasons: it was initiated by the government and abandoned by it thereafter; it therefore did not have coherent leadership; it did not have fixed financial support neither from the government nor from private groups; it was too broad and too inclusive and its political motive and private target were contradictory.<sup>320</sup>

Since the time the People-to-People International was formally chartered in November, 1961 and permanently headquartered in Kansas City, private groups and individuals, including Joyce C. Hall, President of Hallmark Cards and its associated

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<sup>319</sup> People-to-People Program Activities in the Armed Services, Assembled by the Staff of the Armed Services of the People-to-People program, December 1960, Bortman, Mark.: Papers, Box 2, EL.

<sup>320</sup> Many of the committee chairpersons were attracted to the People-to-People program simply because they hoped that there would be governmental funds to defray the costs of their committees’ activities. The lack of these anticipated funds caused “frictions and disappointments.” Leppert, “Dwight D. Eisenhower and People-to-People,” 148.

foundation, financially supported it. Joyce C. Hall was not only a personal friend of Eisenhower—a “golfing buddy”—but he was also interested in Eisenhower’s people-to-people idea as it “matched” those of his own Hallmark Foundation.<sup>321</sup> Hall once remarked that “the unanimous opinion seems to be that People-to-People is a sound approach to our greatest problem...that while much has been accomplished, only the surface has been scratched ... that the program should be continued and expanded independent of government or political association.” He was the most active and instrumental person among other board members who worked to restructure Eisenhower’s program.<sup>322</sup> As Hall planned, there were to be additional programs such as the People-to-People University program, Classroom exchange program, People-to-People Travel and Civic Committees and Mexican Program (*Saludos Amigos*) which would expand initial People-to-People campaign.<sup>323</sup>

The People-to-People program earned bi-partisan support and President John F. Kennedy became its first Honorary Chairman. The opening ceremony of the People-to-People International was attended by all of the living ex-presidents—Eisenhower, Truman and Hoover and ambassadors and delegates from sixty countries. With renewed purposes and structure, the People-to-People campaign was expanded by new programs and projects. The People-to-People University Program, Classroom Exchange Programs and numerous other Community chapters were all newly “built-in projects.” Among them the Civic Committee’s Sister-City program was the most successful and one that continues until the present day.

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<sup>321</sup> Leppert, “Dwight D. Eisenhower and People-to-People,” 226.

<sup>322</sup> Leppert, “Dwight D. Eisenhower and People-to-People,” 227.

<sup>323</sup> Leppert, “Dwight D. Eisenhower and People-to-People,” 230-31.

### ***Cities and Citizen Diplomats: The Sister-Cities Program, 1956-1966***

One of the more successful initiatives undertaken by the People-to-People Program was a sister-city approach which was developed under its Civic Committee. The Civic Committee's purpose was to accomplish People-to-People's objectives on a city-to-city basis.<sup>324</sup> Eisenhower's intention was to "involve individuals and organized groups at all levels of society in citizen diplomacy hoping that personal relationships fostered through sister cities, counties, and state affiliations, would lessen the chance of future world conflicts."<sup>325</sup> In its early stages, the Civic Committee's activities were guided by the Office of Private Cooperation (IOC) of the USIA and were basically aimed at expanding community affiliations, establishing international friendship councils, and organizing community salutes. The officially appointed chairman of the committee was George Schuster, President of Hunter College.<sup>326</sup>

A year after the White House conference, the IOC made an analysis of the progress of the overall People-to-People program and stated that out of the initial forty-two committees, twenty were organized and had already done something that had impact abroad and other committees had taken some preliminary actions and few were not yet organized.<sup>327</sup> The Civic Committee, as one of those "not yet organized" groups, had no chairman and thus lacked organizational leadership. The best way to get those

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<sup>324</sup> White House Conference Report, February, 29 1960 Washington D.C., Bortman, Mark.: Papers, Box No. 57. EL.

<sup>325</sup> Quoted in Cremer, 380.

<sup>326</sup> USIA Memorandum for Governor Adams. The White House June 6, 1956, (WHCF) Box 22, EL.

<sup>327</sup> USIA Memorandum for Committee Chairmen of the People-to-People Program, August 9, 1957, WHCF-Box 13, EL.

“unorganized” committees move ahead was to “freshen up the leadership of the committees.”<sup>328</sup>

Thus, the IOC wanted a fresh appointee who would take care of the Civic Committee. For this purpose, Schuster was replaced by Mark Bortman, Director of the Bortman Plastic Company, and one of the most “active” members of the People-to-People program. Upon completion of his overseas trip and extensive conversations with chiefs of states, ambassadors, and businessmen about the People-to-People program, Bortman noted that “the idea of the People-to-People community was applauded as [the] best means to world peace and understanding...ever developed...”<sup>329</sup> For his enthusiasm and extension of People-to-People’s overseas reputation, Bortman was recognized by the program’s monthly news published by its Public Relations committee.

Bortman was an experienced leader who served in high-ranking positions both in private corporations and in governmental organizations. Under his leadership and in close cooperation with the American Municipal Association (AMA), which “pledged its full support to the President in promoting peace and understanding through People-to-People,” the Civic Committee’s Sister City Program was “reconstituted” in 1958 and started to undertake dramatic initiatives to expand various town affiliations projects. According to the official correspondence of the National League of Cities which was sent to the Civic Committee, a questionnaire was distributed to more than two hundred

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<sup>328</sup> USIA Memorandum to Washburn, p.6. August 8, 1957, (WHCF) Box 13, EL.

<sup>329</sup> *People-to-People News* Vol.1, No.7, March 1957, Bortman, Mark.: Papers, Box 3, EL.

American communities, which either started or had been operating Sister-City programs with two hundred fifty cities abroad.<sup>330</sup>

The majority of people involved in this program were unpaid volunteers. The government “[did] not control and [did] not finance sister-city programs.”<sup>331</sup> But the government would respond “with no strings attached” if the leaders of the town affiliation program needed “additional” help.<sup>332</sup> The USIA official emphasized people not to be involved in sister-cities if they would not be willing or able to put forth the time and effort and resources to establish “meaningful, continuing” relationships with a sister city abroad. The program was “no field for dilettantes or the once-over-lightly approach;” it was not a way in which people could do “something” for their country “cheaply, effortlessly and without trouble or bother.”<sup>333</sup>

The procedures for establishing affiliations between cities were self-starting though somewhat bureaucratic. What community people would need to do was first to find out whether certain group or community members would be willing to take part. Then a community representative would be sent to the mayor of a town for furthering a new initiative. Once the mayor’s office was introduced to the community’s willingness to have a sister-city, a community-based steering committee for carrying out the program would be set up. Principally, the mayor would act as honorary chairman as the committee would act independently. The steering committee’s first agenda would be to

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<sup>330</sup>Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix A illustrate the lack of accurate data regarding the size of the total community people involved in the program. But the statistics provides rather comprehensive information regarding visitors to and from affiliated cities.

<sup>331</sup> Sanford S. Marlowe, “Sister Cities,” October 14, 1961

<sup>332</sup> Hubert Humphrey, “Town Affiliation: Friendship for Peace,” *Congressional Record*, vol. 107, June 14, 1961, no.99.

<sup>333</sup> Marlowe, “Sister Cities.”



select a prospective sister-city based upon mutual interests, similar size, economic characteristics, cultural interests, ethnic composition of the community, and some historical ties with some assistance from the American Municipal Association (AMA).

To provide a prospective sister-city with some background information about a proposing city or town, a detailed background sketch would be prepared and sent to the AMA for review. A final step was to write to a prospective partner and wait for an acceptance of a prospective sister-city.<sup>334</sup> Finding a “suitable” sister-city overseas would take more than half a year due to the complexity of matching both cities’ mutual interests that would lead to a close, presumably long-lasting relationship. The scope and nature of the privately sponsored exchanges of ideas and persons that would form the core of a continuing town affiliation tended to rely on resources of participating communities. Yet the elements of continuing personal contact and wide community participation would constitute the only basis of a town affiliation that would live up to “its promise of passing on to the next generation a heritage of improved relations on a very small planet.”<sup>335</sup>

Although the grand People-to-People project was intended to run its activities with less (if any) interference from government agencies, from the initial stage, the IOC was responsible for guidance and facilitation of the committees’ overall actions. Under this procedure, the People-to-People committees were initially provided with policy directions by USIA officers. There was no federal government control over the program, nor were federal funds available in support of sister-city activities by local communities.

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<sup>334</sup> Guideline released by the Mayor’s Council for International Visitors and Sister Cities. Bortman, Mark.: Papers, Box 16, EL.

<sup>335</sup> *Ibid.*

Typical activities in which sister-cities engaged included educational television, lecture series, mutual visitations of dancers, craft persons, teachers, workers, exchange of students, medical books, photos, tapes, boy scout programs, garden clubs, speakers' bureaus, after Luncheon club, language instruction, libraries, photograph collection, athletic and music events, all of which forged both a transatlantic and a transpacific nature of broader social, cultural, and commercial cooperation. Some archival sources deserve a special mention.

The International Friendship Council of Fresno has shipped 200 pairs of used glasses and 200 eyeglass lens blanks to the Schell Eye Hospital at Velore, India. There is more evidence that reveals a commercial impetus of the program. The Iowa Yamanashi Pork-Lift project sent 35 pure-bred hogs to Kofu, the capital of Yamanashi to form the nucleus of a hog-breeding industry in Yamanashi. The latter case set the tone for an assumption that cities or businessmen were more likely to prioritize economic benefits and thus seemed to have very little to do with fostering world peace. Yet, it was assumed, that it would be unlikely that mutual commercial interests would hurt genuine friendships between private individuals and would generate hatred and misperception. Businesses, if they were to succeed on a broader global scale, needed to take American foreign policy into account when conducting their overseas actions. They needed to be invested in propagating a positive image of the U.S. abroad. The Town Affiliation program organizers were aware of the view that "businesses do not live in a house alone, but should help to improve the American image abroad and to help identify

itself with the US. Business can make itself perfect in its overseas position, but if the national prestige falls, then the image of business falls.”<sup>336</sup>

Among sister-city activities, the exchange program was one of the more popular means of demonstrating the effectiveness of the town affiliation programs. For both American and foreign visitors, their travel purpose and destination were varied. The number of American business people who visited their sister-cities was nearly twice than that of international visitors.<sup>337</sup> But the overseas visitors for student and youth exchange purposes outnumbered American visitors. These suggest that the more emphasis on education and culture was given among overseas youth and students while business and corporate organizations tended to be more interested in overseas visitations of town affiliation programs in the United States.

By the end of 1958, the Sister-City program already had seventy American cities affiliated with foreign cities, largely in Europe.<sup>338</sup> To celebrate this achievement and publicize the sister-city idea, the AMA, in cooperation with Bortman’s Committee, organized its annual congress in December 1958, during which Ambassador George Allen, Director of the USIA made a lengthy statement about the process and progress of the Town Affiliation Program<sup>339</sup>.

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<sup>336</sup> Results of the Town Affiliation Workshop, 39<sup>th</sup> Annual American Municipal Congress, August, 1962, Bortman, Mark.: Papers, Box 1, EL.

<sup>337</sup> For some details on the international visitations see tables 1 and 2 in the appendix A.

<sup>338</sup> American Municipal Association News, December 1, 1958, Bortman, Mark.: Papers, Box 1; Address by George V. Allen to the 35<sup>th</sup> Annual Congress of the AMA. December 1, 1958. Bortman, Mark.: Papers, Box 9, EL.

<sup>339</sup> As archival sources reveal, different terms, including sister city, town affiliations, city twinning, community affiliations were used. Yet all terms connoted the same meaning for the Sister City Program organizers and participants.

Allen, a seasoned ambassador who served in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, was a cosmopolitan man with a strong belief in the role of ordinary citizens in foreign relations. He stated in his address that America and Japan once had the “worst” relations but “cordial affiliations” between cities of the two countries now made the mutual relations “better than ever.” Ambassador Allen’s conviction was reflected in his ambitious goal to have town affiliation programs carried on “until America [had] 3000 city affiliations.” Such a development, Allen noted, could have a “robust impact” in the projection of America overseas.<sup>340</sup>

Indeed, the term “town affiliations” came into currency right after World War II. But a sustained, nationwide effort was encouraged and promoted by organizations of national significance only after the first general meeting of the AMA and the Civic Committee of the People-to-People held in 1958.<sup>341</sup> Ambassador Allen once remarked that Americans have heard of the so-called “adoption of foreign cities” for many years. But affiliations between towns would be better than adopting foreign cities.<sup>342</sup>

Prior to Eisenhower’s initiative to reinvigorate town affiliations, the city twinning projects were spread during the war through war relief organizations, including Bundles for Britain, Russian War Relief, and American Aid to France, Inc., and these mechanisms became liaisons between the U.S. and war devastated countries for relief aid and the facilitation of rehabilitation.<sup>343</sup> The idea was developed, however, as an American aid program for war-ravaged cities and was redirected by the committee from its original charitable base to a broader and more permanent foundation which was built

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<sup>340</sup> “Sister-Cities in Europe,” Bortman, Mark.: Papers, Box 9, EL.

<sup>341</sup> *American Municipal Association News*, December 1, 1958, p.3, Bortman, Mark.: Papers, Box 1, EL.

<sup>342</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>343</sup> Zelinsky, “City twining,” 6.

on mutual interest and friendly understanding. Thus, town affiliations took on new meaning and purpose under the leadership of the People-to-People's Civic Committee, and it became a relationship of reciprocal exchanges rather than one of a simple one-way demonstration of American sympathy.<sup>344</sup> Some city twinning efforts began even before the People-to-People program in the U.S.

Sister-City affiliations between Yokohama in Japan and San Diego, for instance, began in 1954 with a proposed gift of a Japanese Stone Snow Lantern from the Yokohama city residents to the people of San Diego. At that time, there were no prescribed methods for developing such an affiliation.<sup>345</sup> Along with war relief reasons, some sister cities were affiliated on a namesake basis and had close ties with the city in that foreign country. One such affiliation was New Bern, North Carolina, which had been affiliated with Bern, Switzerland. It suggests that this kind of city twinning was not simply a namesake affiliation but a long, historic bond since New Bern was founded by the people who came from Bern, Switzerland about 200 years ago.<sup>346</sup> But why did America need a newer rationale for town affiliations during the Cold War?

As the Sister-City program's guideline states: Town affiliation helps people make friends for their country and help it promote world peace: it will "help demonstrate how your ideals are reflected in your way of life; you help bring about a better understanding of what your country is doing to bring peace and understanding in the world today and

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<sup>344</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>345</sup> Office of the Mayor, San Diego, California, April 18, 1958. "San Diego-Yokohama Affiliation: History, Purpose, and Plan and Organization." Bortman, Mark.: Papers, Box 49, EL.

<sup>346</sup> American Municipal Association, Committee on International Municipal Cooperation. 1960. Bortman, Mark.: Papers, Box 1, EL.

you help combat the distortions of Communistic propaganda.”<sup>347</sup> Whether town affiliations brought about a better understanding between the US and other countries, the people involved in the exchange articulated their way of life as a reflection of their national ideals.

Some of its projects suggest that the Sister-City program was not opposed to the idea of combating the distortions of communist propaganda. The city of Tacoma, Washington made a large exhibit about its lifestyles at the request of the sister-city, Kokura, Japan. 1,150,000 Japanese people visited Tacoma’s exhibit. It was housed next to a Chinese Communist exhibit and made a singular contribution to Japanese understanding of the American way of life.<sup>348</sup> According to the United Towns Organization (UTO) which promoted Franco-British twinning throughout the world from both sides of the Iron Curtain and from Africa, American sister-city program, which was conducting its activities through the DOS, was a “serious obstacle to a better world understanding.”

Thus, UTO sent a memo to President Kennedy claiming that the State Department sought to use city twinning mainly for “immediate narrow political purposes.” For example, twinning of American cities with those of Japan in an effort to obtain support for the Japanese-American pact, and with various Southern American cities in countries where it was desired to “enhance US prestige.” Such activity “has an artificial character because formal prefabricated links lack spontaneity.” Only civic

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<sup>347</sup>Civic Committee Handout, “Your Community in World Affairs,” Bortman, Mark.: Box 58, EL. The handout was published in English, French and Japanese.

<sup>348</sup> “Sister Cities and the Improvement of International Understanding,” An address at the Sixty-Second Annual Convention of the Pennsylvania League of Cities, Philadelphia, by Sanford S. Marlowe, Director, Office of Private Cooperation, USIA, October 14, 1961. Bortman, Mark.: Papers, Box 1, EL.

leaders benefit and actual townspeople who are conscious of the political implications are mistrustful and gain nothing from such contacts.” UTO’s twinning was “essentially cultural and non-political in character and exist to promote real contacts among the people.”<sup>349</sup> But it would be difficult to find a division between the cultural and non-political since a transfer of cultural notions to other countries is always political. Thus cultural exchange activities could still be highly politically charged.

It seemed to be true that American officials supported city twinning programs for some geopolitical and strategic purposes. Pleased by the “effectiveness” of the Civic Committee’s activities, in a letter sent to Bortman, President Lyndon B. Johnson stated that twinning American cities with Japanese, German, and Latin American cities was important as these were the “vital areas of the world.” Thus, he proclaimed, we “should quadruple our efforts and have a thousand sister programs in the near future.”<sup>350</sup>

Out of all the countries involved in the sister-city program, Japan was the most active. As of 1963, 59 Japanese cities had already had their sister cities in the U.S. and ten more were expected to enter that year.<sup>351</sup> There was only one Japanese-Soviet sister city, Maizuru-Nakhodka. As the source noted, Soviet-Japanese city twinning was for economic benefits. No other Japanese city took, as of June 1961, Soviet offers for city affiliations even though officials from Kremlin repeatedly made efforts. Japanese

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<sup>349</sup> Memorandum for President Kennedy, sent by Senator Edgar Faure and Canon Felix Kir, Honorary Presidents of United Towns Organization, Mr. Harry Stanley, Lord Mayor of Coventry, President of UTO., and Charles Dutheil, Deputy Executive President of UTO, Jan 1961, Bortman, Mark.: Papers, Box 7, EL.

<sup>350</sup> Lyndon Johnson to Mark Bortman, April 1964, Bortman, Mark.: Papers, Box 12, EL.

<sup>351</sup> “Sister-City Affiliations Seen Increasing This Year,” *Japan Times*, Tokyo, February, 1963, Bortman, Mark.: Papers Box 40, EL.

mayors took “refuge in excuses.” And few other Japanese town affiliations existed, mostly in name only with other Western European countries as well.<sup>352</sup>

Yet archival sources suggest that many sister-cities were engaging in non-political, humanitarian and cultural activities: Brest, France had a children’s health clinic built by funds from Denver, CO; Medford, Oregon, had a kindergarten for deaf children because Alba, Italy sent over dolls hand-made in Italian homes to be sold in America; Coral Gables, Florida, sent a truck to Cartagena, Columbia, and the truck delivered lunches to children in 25 schools; schools and libraries in Seattle, Washington, received hundreds of books on the Orient from Yokohama, Japan; Hagerstown, Maryland, had severe unemployment in 1960, so Wesel, Germany offered financial help,<sup>353</sup> and wheel chairs were donated to old people’s home in Moulmein, Burma.<sup>354</sup> In many occasions, sister-cities’ intentions showed nothing but “friendliness and hospitality,” as city residents stretched their helping hands to their twin cities: the city of Madison, Wisconsin presented a “70-pound cheddar cheese to the visiting Norwegian ship as a “gesture of friendship” to its sister city Oslo. Norwegian sailors were amazed and delighted with the huge Wisconsin cheese.”<sup>355</sup> Thus, it earned bi-partisan sympathies and support.

Edward R. Murrow, the USIA Director and an enthusiast of public diplomacy, stated that “there are those who would suggest that in the magnitude of our cataclysmic

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<sup>352</sup> Memo sent from USIS Tokyo to USIA Washington, Status of Japan-American City Affiliations, Feb 7, 1961, Bortman, Mark.: Papers, Box 41, EL.

<sup>353</sup> Address by Edward R. Murrow, Director of USIA at the Washington-Bangkok Sister-City Celebration, December 1962, Bortman, Mark.: Papers, Box 4, EL.

<sup>354</sup> Town Affiliation Activities Report, 1964, Bortman, Mark. : Papers, Box 5, EL.

<sup>355</sup> Action! The People-to-People Community Chapter Program Newsletter, Vol.2 No.5, Sept-Oct, 1964, Bortman, Mark.: Papers, Box 52, EL.



anxiety, linking two cities may seem a little contribution. But “It is better to understand a little, than to misunderstand a lot.”<sup>356</sup> President John F. Kennedy appraised the Town Affiliation Program as an “opportunity to assist the United States materially in carrying out its peaceful objectives abroad.”<sup>357</sup> Eisenhower said that the People-to-People movement stands “apart from government, it is not a propaganda agency, not another foreign aid program... and it should be expanded a hundredfold.”<sup>358</sup> The USIA officer stated that he was “certain” that The People-to-People program “has inaugurated a new chapter in American history.”<sup>359</sup>

One feature of the various interpretations of the sister-city approach was that rather than an “irrational” focus on the one-dimensional goal of Americanization or American supremacy, as it was reflected in previous city twinning initiatives, this one demonstrated reasonable concern for integration and internationalization of world communities through a variety of activities at the grass-roots level. The Sister-City Program was therefore different from the Truman Doctrine or the Marshal Plan or even other cultural/student exchange programs funded by the government, which were initially designed to influence leaders and elites rather than build bridges between ordinary citizens. With this broader mission, the Sister City program contributed to changing the nature of international atmosphere through both domestic communities and affiliated foreign cities.

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<sup>356</sup> Edward R. Murrow Address, Bortman, Mark.: Papers Box 4, EL.

<sup>357</sup> Kennedy Lauds Sister-City Program, Congratulates Municipal Officials for ‘Excellent’ Cooperation, American Municipal Association News Release, September 1962, Bortman, Mark.: Papers, Box 13, EL.

<sup>358</sup> Eisenhower, “An Epidemic Friendship,” Reprinted from the Reader’s Digest, Nov 1963 Issue, Bortman, Mark.: Papers, Box 56, EL.

<sup>359</sup> Town Affiliations: The US Experience by George G. Wynne, Program Executive, Office of Private Cooperation, USIA, 1961, Bortman, Mark.: Papers, Box 4, EL.

Since the sister-city approach was reaffirmed, however, by the President and partially directed by the USIA, its potential link with the government was a concern for the general public. Especially for those who were not personally involved in the actual program, town affiliations tended to be viewed as a politically “invisible” instrument for winning the hearts and the minds of foreign audiences. Prescribed answers to the public misperception and suspicion highlighted volunteers who enjoyed friendship across national boundaries as an “avocation” and a “rewarding hobby.”<sup>360</sup> Yet, despite the initial involvement of government agencies in citizen diplomacy, there were fewer political incentives for voluntary participants who would not act as official diplomats for the government, but as ordinary citizen mediators for their communities.

Under the auspices of “sister cities,” American communities were collaborating with foreign publics on a day-to-day level. The nature and objectives of the Civic committee’s actions were multidimensional and covered a multiplicity of issues across ordinary American citizens, including doctors, actors, teachers, farmers, engineers, writers, dancers, athletes and even schoolchildren whose enthusiasm and cosmopolitan minds were shared by their foreign counterparts. But when government agencies, including the USIA provided them with basic thoughts and directions for their interactions, it would seem to be mere brainwashing.<sup>361</sup>

From the outset of its “freshened up” leadership, the Civic Committee’s work on town affiliations was extensive as it reached a “phenomenal record” of three hundred affiliations in less than a year, which testified to the program’s achievement in

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<sup>360</sup> “Town Affiliations: The U.S. Experience” by George G. Wynne Program Executive Office of the Private Cooperation USIA, 1962, Bortman, Mark.: Papers, Box 4, EL.

<sup>361</sup> *Ibid.*

international public relations. Committee Chairman Bortman's leadership would inspire interested Americans to devote their time and energy to a voluntary program. By 1958, the Civic Committee already had a membership of about one hundred Americans active in community and national organizations.

Bortman's committee was able to mobilize the interest and support of private and non-governmental organizations, including the International City Manager's Association, the Inter-American Municipal Organization and the International Union of Local Authorities, all of which promoted sustained personal contact between cities as a pathway to world friendship and cooperation.<sup>362</sup> As a chairman, Bortman travelled 50,000 miles to more than forty countries by visiting eighty-two foreign cities to personally investigate potential opportunities to collaborate with the foreign public. One source claims that the Civic Committee and its affiliated organizations made more than 2,000 telephone calls in promoting the program in 1959.

The committee claimed that by virtue of its "confidence-inspiring" expression of America's good will towards other peoples of the world, it fulfilled the description provided by Senator Clair Engle of California as "the most dynamic development in the field of US foreign relations since WWII." It would be an example of the basic objectives of public relations—the creation of a favorable image of integrity and responsibility. Secretary of State, Christian Herter advocated that this interchange between cities struck him as a basic way for peoples of different cultures to get to know one another

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<sup>362</sup> Town Affiliation: The U.S. Experience. By George G. Wynne, Program Executive, Office of Private Cooperation, USIA. 1961, Bortman, Mark.: Papers, Box 4, EL.

better. The Director of the USIA, George Allen noted that “town affiliations can break down barriers and foster respect and understanding among peoples in other nations.”

Despite praise for the program at home, its value and effect as public officials and cultural leaders attested to an “instrument of international understanding” from the participant countries. One of the French visitors to New York wrote: “When I left France I did not have any precise idea about the U.S. But I found people ready to share the advantages of this beautiful country with anyone who is ready to enjoy them. I found a friendly nation where I feel at home... He further stated that when he met an American in France he wouldn’t have the “feeling of a stranger,” but a “fellow countryman.”<sup>363</sup> Particularly, its tangential effects in international industrial and commercial relations implicit in the large number of exchanges of business and professional groups were no less important than its cultural value.

Through sister-city arrangements, many Americans had an opportunity to travel to foreign countries to enhance their understandings about other countries and cultures. According to the survey conducted by the National League of Cities, visits between sister cities in the United States and abroad increased by 81% in 1964. And visits between the people of U.S. and Latin American cities were the “most popular.”<sup>364</sup>

Moreover, the views provided by people from foreign cities provided some clues. According to the USIA report, the affiliation ceremony was held with the Foreign Minister, Aichiro Fujiyama, as principal speaker in Yokohama. This was, as the USIA official remarked, “the first time I have heard of a foreign minister presiding at a town

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<sup>363</sup> People-to-People Annual Report, October 21, 1959, p.3, Bortman, Mark.: Papers, Box 2, EL.

<sup>364</sup> The National League of Cities News Release, September 1965, Bortman, Mark.: Papers, Box 14, EL.

affiliation ceremony.” The heads of a hundred leading organizations in Yokohama attended the ceremony. Large press corps, including CBS television, covered the event. Ross Tharp, Vice Mayor of San Diego, was the main speaker at the Centennial ceremony, which was held before 30,000 people at the Peace Stadium. The audience included the Crown Prince of Japan, the Foreign Minister, the Dean of Diplomatic Corps and the U.S. Ambassador Douglas MacArthur. According to the press note, one million people lined the streets. A centennial concert was held and the audience of more than 5,000 Japanese people gave a standing ovation to the San Diego delegation when it entered the concert hall. All these would suggest that more requests from other Japanese cities would be expected in the future.<sup>365</sup>

Even though the 1960 questionnaire, which was conducted by the AMA among communities affiliated with foreign cities, seemed unsystematic and unsubstantial, it carried information about the activities and accomplishments of the Town Affiliation Program.<sup>366</sup> In particular, the level and the percentage of citizens’ advocacy of town affiliations program and its impact on the “improvement of good-will toward an understanding of the U.S.” would demonstrate the Sister City Program’s achievement. The program helped improve collaboration among local communities and perception of the U.S.<sup>367</sup>

As of October, 1966, 321 communities affiliated with 363 cities in 56 countries. Among them 96 cities were from California and 18 from Florida. Internationally, 128

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<sup>365</sup> USIA Correspondence sent by Snowden Chambers, Program Executive Officer of Private Cooperation to Mark Bortman, May 26, 1958, Bortman, Mark.: Papers, Box No.49, EL.

<sup>366</sup> For the details see the actual survey in appendix B.

<sup>367</sup> 71 percent of the surveyed responded positively.

were from Europe, 100 from the Far East, 114 from Latin America and 6 were from Africa.<sup>368</sup> But the fate of the Town Affiliations Program almost came to the brink as People-to-People, Inc., was reorganized and all funds for the program support was terminated by 1966. Patrick Healy, Executive director of the National League of Cities worried that People-to-People's non-funding status placed his program "in jeopardy," and the sister-cities activities were "threatened with termination" by the end of 1966. But sister-city organizers still did not want to separate from People-to-People Inc., as the people-to-people concept *per se* was "prominent."<sup>369</sup> But they continued seeking private funding opportunities and hoped that a Congressional Charter would be issued to incorporate the Town Affiliation Program.<sup>370</sup> In 1967 People-to-People's Sister City program was incorporated as Sister Cities International and became an independent organization.

No doubt that the People-to-People campaign and its Sister-City program aided in improving cultural understanding between the U.S. and other countries, even if its motive behind this "understanding" was also political. But it is important to note that the intention of a program like this is not the only factor in a discussion of its effects. For the purposes of this dissertation, what matters is that there were effects, which, at least for the U.S., were politically advantageous, even if the people who volunteered in the program did not consciously think they were participating in a broader political movement.

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<sup>368</sup> Active town affiliations by state and foreign country as of October 1966, Bortman, Mark.: Papers, Box 16, EL.

<sup>369</sup> Minutes of the first meeting of the Incorporators of the Town Affiliation Association of the United States, September 1966, Bortman, Mark.: Papers, Box 53, EL.

<sup>370</sup> Patrick Healy Executive Director, National League of Cities (former AMA), December 5, 1966.

## Chapter 4

### Youth Idealism, Campus Activism and the Sixties: A Case Study of the People-to-People University Program, 1961-1975

Almost overnight Lawrence, a small town in [the] American mid-west, received wide publicity as a City-Citizen of the World. Thirty five thousand residents of the city realized that their home is a neighbor to the world.

**The University of Kansas Alumni Magazine, 1962**

William F. Dawson, a twenty-two-year old junior at the University of Kansas began thinking about foreign students' "problems" after he had attended an International Club meeting on campus in March, 1961. At that session, Dawson said, "my eyes were really opened." He talked to students from all over the world and learned that they were not having a "good time." Most of them had never seen anything beyond campus. As he told a reporter for the *Saturday Evening Post*, he was "really upset" at what he heard.<sup>371</sup> This KU student's "discovery" of international students' "problems" revealed a similar situation on American college campuses that encompassed about seventy thousand students from all over the world at the time.

It would be tough to predict the impressions that they would take home, Dawson noted, and he was afraid as he "knew the answer," after talking to international students.<sup>372</sup> The *Wall Street Journal* commented in the same year that thousands of international students attending American colleges and universities would go home "mad" at the United States. Mostly these "potentially influential" friends for America

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<sup>371</sup> "This One Man Peace Corps Made Friends for the U.S.," reprinted from the *Saturday Evening Post*, October 7, 1961, People-to-People: Records, the University of Kansas Archives, the Kenneth Spencer Research Library, Lawrence, Kansas (hereafter UKA).

<sup>372</sup> *Ibid.*

would return “disillusioned and disenchanting” with Americans because few people showed personal interest in them.<sup>373</sup>

According to the statistics released in 1961, over twenty thousand American students studied abroad each year and tens of thousands more travelled to foreign countries. At the same time, though seldom recognized, thousands of young men and women from other countries came to America each year to study at American institutions and learn from its people. A surprising number of those students coming to the U.S., however, “never gained” this understanding. Americans too often failed to recognize the “cultural adjustment and loneliness foreign students faced.”<sup>374</sup> Since foreign students coming to the U.S. were very likely to be the leaders of tomorrow’s world, Dawson reasoned, “keeping them excluded from the American colleges and communities in which they were living is not only completely inhospitable, but it is also a danger.”<sup>375</sup>

From the “neglected and isolated living” that foreign students experienced in the U.S. would grow the “roots of enmities”... that may “never be erased through good-will activity by Americans abroad,” the *Christian Science Monitor* commented in 1961.<sup>376</sup> But why did it matter what foreign students on U.S. college campuses thought about America? It may not seem important, as advocates of the People-to-People diplomacy viewed, until one remembered that the “anti-American attitude of Ghana’s President

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<sup>373</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>374</sup> The People-to-People University Program Guideline, the People-to-People National Headquarters in Kansas City, Missouri, People-to-People, Records, UKA.

<sup>375</sup> Quoted in Godfrey Sperling Jr., “Foreign Students Integrated,” *the Christian Science Monitor*, November 13, 1961, People-to-People, Records, UKA.

<sup>376</sup> *Ibid.*



Kwame Nkrumah has been traced to the discrimination he experienced in the US during his student days... and we are probably still turning out Nkrumahs.”<sup>377</sup>

The need for an effective international student program was also emphasized in 1960 by two letters received from overseas by W. Clarke Wescoe, Chancellor of KU. In a letter sent to Wescoe, one former KU student from abroad wrote: “Of every ten students who go back to their country, nine carry ill feelings toward the American people. They live in packs while they stay there. I was sorry to find that the great majority of the students at KU are not interested in foreign students and do not know nor want to know their problems.” The student also wrote about the city of Lawrence, which was doing, as a community, “very little” to make foreign students feel “less isolated and despised. I advocate that the beginning to the solution of world problems is through real friendship.”

The other letter sent to Wescoe was from an international student who had lived in a fraternity house while attending KU. The letter said: “I mean it when I say that I came in contact with what I consider American tradition in the very best sense of the word. The credit for my quick adjustment mainly belongs to my friends there.”<sup>378</sup> Whether or not Dawson’s concern about international students and Wescoe’s receipt of letters from former international students mutually stimulated one another to initiate the People-to-People program at KU, these documents provide insights into interrelated scenarios at that time.

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<sup>377</sup> James Poling, “College Diplomats at Work,” People-to-People, Records, UKA.

<sup>378</sup> Burton W. Marvin, “KU, People-to-People Program at KU and throughout the U.S.,” People-to-People Records, UKA.

### ***Bill Dawson and the Birth of People-to-People at KU***

It was thus urgent for Bill Dawson that something had to be done to change the situation. He arranged a meeting for a number of foreign students to talk to campus leaders so they could “air their gripes.” As a result of the meeting, the People-to-People Council was set up on the KU campus at the end of March 1961. Dawson’s fledgling organization had a set of goals: to help foreign students in their early orientation and provide them with an opportunity to “assimilate” themselves with Americans; offer domestic students the opportunity to meet and talk with international students on an intimate basis so that it would eliminate the “contrived” and “superficial” nature of relationships between the two groups. The Council predicted that international students at American colleges would depart with a feeling of close friendship with the American people and a better understanding of the U.S., and hoped that Americans would receive an equal service in foreign lands.

The People-to-People program organizers believed that “benefits will work in reverse, too.”<sup>379</sup> Dawson believed that “if it is successful it really can pay dividends.”<sup>380</sup> KU was selected as a pilot site and it was an “ideal ground” for such a program as it had a high number of foreign students enrolled on its campus.<sup>381</sup> The town of Lawrence, the home for the University of Kansas, “may have been the most atypical Kansas towns— thanks largely to the liberalizing influence of the university,” but it “on the whole was

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<sup>379</sup> “Domesticated Peace Corps for Armchair Ambassadors,” *Lawrence Journal World*, March 21, 1961, People-to-People, Records, UKA.

<sup>380</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>381</sup> Swaebou Conateh, “The People-to-People as a Grass-root Drama,” *Kansas City Star*, July 6, 1966, People-to-People Records, UKA.

politically conservative” and “not cosmopolitan.” As Lawrence grew from a “small, sleepy” college town after WWII, it experienced “acute growing pains.”<sup>382</sup>

But political and social turmoil that prevailed throughout the 1960s “transformed” Lawrence. Student activism and changing perceptions of youth created “new identities” of young people, both as students and citizens. All these changes and challenges defined “politics more personally and helped to transform the whole community.” Thus, as Wescoe defined, it was not only a “new era,” for the university, but for the city as well.<sup>383</sup>

KU’s proximity to Kansas City where the People-to-People International was headquartered was another reason for its selection. The People-to-People International was at that time headed by former President Eisenhower and financially supported by Joyce Hall, president of the Hallmark Foundation. Dawson talked with Hall, who not only “warmly endorsed the plan but offered assistance.”<sup>384</sup>

With an initial enrollment of fifty, Dawson’s new group plastered the campus with one thousand posters and asked fraternities and sororities to donate \$20 each to the new program. As Dawson said, “the toughest thing at first was to overcome the complacency of American students.” The program hoped, however, that American students would realize the “need of opening their eyes” and beginning to “think on [an] international scale.”<sup>385</sup>

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<sup>382</sup>Monhollon, “*This is America?*” 5- 7.

<sup>383</sup>Monhollon, *This is America?*” 63- 4.

<sup>384</sup>Marvin, *People-to-People Program at KU and throughout the U.S.*

<sup>385</sup>William F. Dawson, “Forty Thousand Good-Will Ambassadors,” *Overseas*, Magazine of Educational Exchange, May 1962, vol.1, no.9, People-to-People Records, UKA.

The People-to-People movement, initiated by Eisenhower in 1956, indeed inspired Dawson's new program. Eisenhower was coordinating at that time the overall operation of the program at the recommendation of President John F. Kennedy.<sup>386</sup> As Swaebou Conateh, a senior at KU from Gambia stated, "this bipartisan nature of the organization has remained an important factor in People-to-People." Dawson and his friends made People-to-People a voluntary effort of private citizens to advance the "cause of international friendship."<sup>387</sup> Without spending a "single government cent," People-to-People was initially a non-governmental, non-political voluntary movement. So its duplication at universities was then a "sort of stay-at-home Peace Corps operation," springing spontaneously from the students.<sup>388</sup>

As the program coordinator, Bill Dawson was proud to claim people-to-people's non-affiliation with the government. Although the program "is receiving the guidance and assistance from the national People-to-People movement," Dawson stated, "it will be financed and operated by students."<sup>389</sup> From the very beginning of the People-to-People campaign, Eisenhower did not want to affiliate it with government and he did not ask for government funding. He expected that it should be an ordinary people's endeavor.

### ***People-to-People Commitments***

Although the overall People-to-People University chapters and their organizational procedures and areas of operation were designed by the individual

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<sup>386</sup>Dawson said that the National People-to-People Council was watching KU's pilot project so if it succeeded, more chapters would be launched across college campuses in America. Quoted in "KU People Plan Needs Local Help," *Lawrence Journal World*, May 12, 1961, UKA.

<sup>387</sup>Conateh, "The People-to-People as a Grass-root Drama," People-to-People, Records, UKA. Conateh was working as a student intern for the Kansas City Star during the given time.

<sup>388</sup>"This One Man Peace Corps Made Friends for the U.S." People-to-People, Records, UKA.

<sup>389</sup>"Service Plan Aids Foreign Students," *Times-NEA*, People-to-People, Records, UKA.

university chapters' executive members and volunteers, the general operational guideline was designed and developed by the People-to-People Headquarters located in Kansas City. It was based on a typical program which was viewed to be workable at any school.<sup>390</sup>The People-to-People University program's typical program consisted of six committees: Brother-Sister relationships, Hospitality, Forums, Publicity, Job Placement and Student Ambassadors.

**The Brother-Sister Relationships** committee would begin functioning even before foreign students arrived in Lawrence. Letters from KU students would reach foreign students in their home a month before their departure for the U.S., extending their welcome and asking for information on their arrival time and place. Upon receiving a reply, the People-to-People brother or sister would send a second letter informing that he or she would meet the incoming foreign student on arrival and help him or her get settled in Lawrence. Dawson said that eighty percent of the Brother-Sister relationships endured throughout the school term, and they frequently extended beyond campus boundaries. Brothers and sisters corresponded with the families of their students as well. Dawson, himself a brother of Ranbir Singh, a student from India, exclaimed that students who come to the U.S. are "scholars" in their home countries, but one would be "amazed at how baffled they are by many things we take for granted."<sup>391</sup> The simple questions such as how to dial a phone number, or how to read a timetable, or what is the right thing to say or to do would be tremendously complex for foreign students coming to a new country and culture. "Naturally, they've got handicaps to overcome."

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<sup>390</sup> The People-to-People University Program Guideline, the People-to-People National Headquarters in Kansas City, Missouri, People-to-People, Records, UKA.

<sup>391</sup> Quoted in Fred Kiewit, "Foreign Students Feel At Home," *Kansas City Star*, 1962, UKA.

What might be considered ill-mannered here may be the polite thing to do in another country, Dawson said. Brothers and sisters were “selected based on their scholastic records.”<sup>392</sup>The Brother-Sister program was later renamed Contact to “make the entire program more one of personal contact and concern than a one-to-one problem.”<sup>393</sup>

**The Hospitality Program** consisted of two major subprograms: home placement and tours. The Home Placement program provided foreign students with an opportunity to visit American families in Lawrence and Kansas communities during weekends, holidays and school breaks. And foreign students were invited to speak to civic groups, churches and schools about their countries. Tours allowed students to visit interesting places near Lawrence and metropolitan Kansas City, such as industrial plants, museums, art galleries, civic centers and farms, to meet Americans and see their operations. The Hospitality program was later expanded into the Lawrence Host Family program, which is currently coordinated by the Office of International Student Services and is still popular among international students at KU.

Through a variety of meetings and gatherings, **The Forum Program** allowed both American and international students to exchange their views on diverse global issues, including debates on successes and failures of U.S. foreign policy, so that cultural exchanges could be made more “meaningful.” **The Public Relations** committee publicized every People-to-People activity and encouraged news sources to feature the program. This committee was responsible for publishing the monthly magazine *People-to-People News*—a magazine that covered the entire operations of the People-to-

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<sup>392</sup> Marvin, “People-to-People Program at KU and throughout the U.S.,” People-to-People, Records, UKA.

<sup>393</sup> “People-to-People Program Lags No More” *University Daily Kansan*, September 22, 1964, UKA.

People program. Further the committee's *People Talk* magazine told stories about the KU program to its members and other interested people.

Having realized international students' need to work to maintain their lives, the People-to-People organizers initiated the **Job Placement** committee which offered a list of potential jobs for international students. Immediately after the program was established in summer of 1961, about sixty foreign students showed up at the People-to-People program's office seeking summer jobs. Yet, finding jobs for them in the city of Lawrence with only about thirty thousand people presented an impossible task for the organizers. Even for Americans, summer jobs sometimes were "hard to come by," Dawson said. <sup>394</sup>Raymond W. Edwards, one of the chairmen, stated in 1963 that it would be difficult to find jobs for foreign students because of the "racial, physical and religious barriers," even if they were "entitled for manual labor" and not for jobs in their areas of studies. <sup>395</sup>

But Dawson, his friend Rick Barnes, the first chairman of the Job Placement committee and fourteen others called a well-known businessman in nearby Kansas City to talk about the People-to-People mission. The businessman promptly wrote thirty-seven leading firms in the state urging them to provide jobs for international students at KU. Only one came through hiring two students. Dawson and Barnes however did not give up their work. They would continue to call potential employers including local businessmen, newspaper editors, radio stations, chambers of commerce and anyone else who would listen to their story. Their "unstinting efforts" paid off as they received

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<sup>394</sup> Quoted in Conateh, "The People-to-People as a Grass-root Drama," UKA.

<sup>395</sup> Quoted in "People-to-People Seek Employment for Foreign Students," *University Daily Kansan*, February 15, 1963, UKA.

offers for the remaining job requests.<sup>396</sup> The students worked in “bowling alleys, on construction projects, on farms and pumping gas,” Dawson recalled. A shoe store in Topeka that hired one foreign student was proud to put a sign in its window that read, ‘French, German, Spanish spoken here’ and asked for another student from People-to-People the next summer, as it “helped their business.”<sup>397</sup> A construction company man wrote Dave Waxse, now chairman of the Job Placement committee, commented thus on an international student’s skill: “After Madanmohan Fadia left, we had to hire three men to do the work he did by himself.”<sup>398</sup>

**The Student Ambassadors Program** had two goals: to enable American students to go abroad to learn more about other cultures and to “make them as good travelers” as possible. The program was quite successful in its early stages. As Dawson noted, in the summer of 1962 eight hundred students representing People-to-People University programs from all over the country visited about hundred and twenty colleges and universities in Europe. The primary goal of the European trip was to “improve student-to-student relations and help Europeans toward a better understanding of Americans.” During the orientation sessions which were held in Washington D.C., People-to-People student-ambassadors were taught to convey a favorable image of the United States to people they would meet overseas. However, from the perspectives of students, there were many incentives for travelling to foreign countries. Being a student ambassador for People-to-People was an opportunity to live a life of high adventure. Moreover, obtaining foreign experience through voluntary programs would also serve as

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<sup>396</sup> “This One Man Peace Corps Made Friends for the U.S.”

<sup>397</sup> Conateh, “The People-to-People as a Grass-root Drama,” People-to-People, Records, UKA.

<sup>398</sup> Norma C. Romano. “People-to-People Aids the Foreign Student: 300 members at KU,” *University Daily Kansan*, 1966, UKA.



an attractive record in their future credentials. According to Monhollon, in the late 1950s and early 1960s most students at KU were “more intent on making grades, seeking the credential for a job and status in corporate, Middle-Class America than in learning.”<sup>399</sup>

From the points of view of student ambassadors, the “most common misconception” they encountered in Europe was that people thought that “all Americans are rich.” Especially in Berlin, the students reported, they felt the “gravity and importance” of their trip. Viewing the wall, talking to East Berlin students and watching families risk their lives to escape to West Berlin made them even more determined to work toward better international understanding. The program coordinators were overwhelmed with the success of the program as many students showed interest in being student ambassadors and planned to send fifteen hundred student ambassadors not only to Europe but also to other pilot areas.<sup>400</sup>

### ***Successes and Expansions***

In the early years of the People-to-People University program, its achievements were “tremendous.”<sup>401</sup> The program officers were “extremely pleased with the response,” as Dawson noted, as they had more than 800 applications from KU students who want to help with People-to-People.<sup>402</sup> Dawson hoped that in the end it “might do more good

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<sup>399</sup> Monhollon, “*This is America?*” 64.

<sup>400</sup> “An Inspiring, Educational, International Understanding Journey, Students Say,” *People-to-People News*, vol.1, no 3, September 1962, People-to-People, Records, UKA.

<sup>401</sup> “People-to-People Has Tremendous Success,” *KU Alumni Magazine*, 1962, p.30, UKA.

<sup>402</sup> “Letter by Bowles Reflects Interest in ‘People’ Plan,” *Lawrence Journal World*, June 4, 1961, UKA.

than President Kennedy's Peace Corps." And an active People-to-People program on every campus could go far in "correcting foreign students' perception" of the U.S.<sup>403</sup>

At the beginning of the fall semester of 1961, every international student was met on arrival in Lawrence by his or her "brother" or "sister" from the People-to-People program with whom they had corresponded during the summer. Both foreign students and visitors were provided with housing, if they had not arranged in advance; some were invited to live at the Hotel Eldridge for one dollar a night; churches, civic organizations and clubs encouraged support of the program; numerous invitations came from farmers houses, fraternity houses, from modest dwellings and large ones; each fraternity and sorority offered free room and board for a full term for one foreign student and a restaurant owner "adopted" two Philippine girls. Fraternities, the Student Government Body and individual Americans donated approximately four thousand dollars to help the program.

For hundreds of college students from Saconika to Sacramento, the summer of 1962 was a "third semester in which building international goodwill was their assignment and the world was their classroom." Embarking on People-to-People projects in the U.S. and abroad, the students engaged in a variety of volunteer activities: five Japanese students from Waseda University set out on foot from San Francisco to "walk out across the United States so they could get to know our country from the ground up;" an American student spent two days "giving cholera shots to three thousand fluttering, pecking chickens on a farm in Israel;" thirteen young men from colleges in Europe and the Middle East spent three weeks in little Paola, Kansas "building a lakeside park and

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<sup>403</sup> Quoted in Bill Moore, "Summer Jobs for Some Who Most Need It," *Kansas City Star*, June 30, 1961, UKA.

barbecue pit as a gift of understanding.” They worked “without pay as guests” of Paolo city.<sup>404</sup>

Student ambassadors from Big Eight schools—the University of Missouri, The University of Nebraska, The University of Colorado, the Oklahoma State University, the University of Iowa and the University of Kansas—travelled abroad to “learn about other people, their interests, problems, ambitions, and points of view and make friends abroad for America.”<sup>405</sup> Before leaving for foreign tours, these ambassadors attended a two-day rigid orientation session conducted by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Department of State (DOS), Peace Corps, Civil Rights Commission, USIA and U.S. Travel Agency. Robert Kennedy discussed “How Students Can Help United States Foreign Relations” and government agencies oriented students on issues such as “Selected World Political Problems,” civil rights, integration, right to work and progress in Vietnam, Laos and Berlin. These Americans were not “Ugly Americans” because “they talk, exchange ideas and review common problems” with their foreign fellows.<sup>406</sup>

Student Ambassadors visited European countries as well as the Soviet Union. They were received by dignitaries including the West Berlin mayor Willy Brandt.”<sup>407</sup> Upon returning from an overseas trip, student ambassadors remarked that “students and young people are all alike the world over.”<sup>408</sup> Such observations made by the students were appropriate to the overall purpose of the program prescribed by the government since seeking similarities rather than differences between the American culture and the cultures of other nations created the sense that the American culture

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<sup>404</sup> “The Third Semester,” *People*, vol. 2, no 8, November, 1963, People-to-People, Records, UKA.

<sup>405</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>406</sup> Conateh, “The People-to-People as a Grass-root Drama,” People-to-People, Records, UKA.

<sup>407</sup> *People Talk*, vol. 1, no 4, 1962, People-to-People, Records, UKA.

<sup>408</sup> “The Third Semester.” UKA.

can be accepted as good almost anywhere. Overseas dissemination of the People-to-People program started in the summer of 1962 as the program's first office opened in Brussels, Belgium. Jim Murray, a freshman and Mike Hites, a sophomore at KU joined the European People-to-People to coordinate the Brussels office and the Student Ambassadors program.<sup>409</sup>

In the summer of 1962, the National People-to-People program sent seven KU foreign and American students to the Seattle World Fair to advertise the program. Reuben McCornack, an Abilene junior, said that five thousand memberships were received by the Kansas City headquarters by the end of the summer due to a "successful selling" of People-to-People at the Seattle Fair.<sup>410</sup>

As such, the People-to-People program "quickly gained momentum." Foreign and domestic students at KU as well as the university administration, local and national officials and citizens of Lawrence were "unstinting in their praise of the achievements" of the program.<sup>411</sup> Chancellor Clarke Wescoe noted that the People-to-People program was a "tremendous success" as "it makes an international exchange what it should be." American students returned home with the sense that they were received favorably overseas and international students felt at home on American college campuses. Wescoe further stated that "actually the program, at this stage, is more successful than any of us had hoped it would be."<sup>412</sup> Wescoe served as a Board of Trustees member of the People-to-People International, which presented a "special citation" to the

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<sup>409</sup> Jim Tice, "KU On-Campus Friendship Program Goes World-wide" *Alumni Magazine*, University of Kansas, May 1962, UKA.

<sup>410</sup> Quoted in Trudy Meserve, "The World's Fair Visit Called Delightful," *University Daily Kansan*, November 9, 1962, UKA.

<sup>411</sup> Dawson, "Forty Thousand Good-Will Ambassadors," UKA.

<sup>412</sup> Clarke Wescoe, Remarks, *Alumni Magazine*, University of Kansas, May 1962, UKA.

Chancellor in “recognition and appreciation of KU’s pioneering work in the college-level People-to-People movement.”<sup>413</sup>

Joyce C. Hall, the President of the Hallmark Foundation and a major sponsor of the People-to-People program, stated that Lawrence and the University “should be proud of their work with foreign students,” and “I hope you sense your responsibility and I hope you give other campuses a program which they cannot duplicate. It is [an] exciting thing for the University and Lawrence to be so internationally aware.”<sup>414</sup> Kenneth Holland, president of the Institute of International Education once called Dawson’s success at KU “the first attempt on a national scale to better relations between American and foreign students.”<sup>415</sup> Chester Bowles, Undersecretary of State remarked that “students at KU have done a remarkable job” and deserve all the encouragement and support we can give you in Washington.” The most compelling statement regarding Dawson’s people-to-people diplomacy provided by the *Saturday Evening Post*, which wrote that “If there had been more Bill Dawsons around when Kwame Nkrumah, the president of Ghana, was a university student in Pennsylvania a number of years ago, perhaps he would not be the leading pro-leftist in Africa today.”<sup>416</sup>

Archival sources demonstrating international students’ reactions to the People-to-People program are rather limited; though those few students who expressed their feelings were happy and satisfied with the program. Shafik H. Hashmi, a senior at KU from Bombay, India and President of the International Club noted that “there is both

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<sup>413</sup> “People-to-People to Present Citation for KU,” *Lawrence Journal World*, June 5, 1963, UKA.

<sup>414</sup> “Crowd of 325 Attend Picnic Sponsored by LIFE and People-to-People,” *University Daily Kansan*, October 15, 1962, UKA. LIFE—Lawrence International Friendship Enterprise was also an organization closely worked with People-to-People in the 1960s.

<sup>415</sup> Quoted in Conateh, “The People-to-People as a Grass-root Drama,” UKA.

<sup>416</sup> “This One Man Peace Corps Made Friends for the U.S.A.,” UKA.

quantitative and qualitative increase of American membership... More than half of about four hundred members of the Club are Americans and this is an important contribution of the People-to-People program.”<sup>417</sup> The People Program “has changed KU” and “truly created a new spirit and atmosphere at KU as far as relations between the American and international students are concerned.” Hashmi said that he found “great interest and zest” among more than three hundred KU students, who were associated with various parts of People-to-People.

Three hundred Lawrence residents expressed their interest in accommodating international students as “house guests.” Achievements were “significant, impressive, and praiseworthy.” The fact that KU was taking “this lead” should be a “matter of pride for all Jayhawkers and inhabitants of Lawrence.” One had only to attend a meeting of People-to-People to appreciate the “enthusiasm, energy and confidence” of its workers.<sup>418</sup>

A student from Philippines said that the climate on campus “soon changed so noticeably.”<sup>419</sup> Rosella Mamoli, a graduate student from Italy wrote in *the University Daily Kansan* that she had personally met quite a few students who had given lots of their time and good will working for People-to-People. They had not done it for “prestige,” Mamoli said, but they “just help us... and believe it or not... people-to-people had not failed in the eyes of foreign students.” She added, “we only wish we could help the American students who will come to our countries just as much as you have helped us.”<sup>420</sup> Said Lalit Kothari, a junior from India said that he had “a new view of America and

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<sup>417</sup> “The People-to-People Program Has Changed KU,” *Lawrence Journal World*, October 27, 1962, UKA.

<sup>418</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>419</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>420</sup> “The People Say...” *University Daily Kansan*, March 9, 1964, UKA.

a new feeling for Americans” after attending People-to-People activities.<sup>421</sup> There was even a request from Athens, Greece, which was sent to the People-to-People National Office indicating that the “program is the most dynamic change in the college scene in years. “Since I naturally want to send our students to campuses where their happiness will be furthered,” the Greek educator wrote, “I would like a list of U.S. schools which are affiliated with People-to-People university program.”<sup>422</sup>

Encouraged by its “tremendous success,” the People-to-People program coordinator Bill Dawson with his friends Rick Barnes and Rafer Johnson, a graduate of University of California at Los Angeles and an Olympic champion, decided to interrupt their studies to expand the KU program to other college campuses across the country. Johnson, the 1960 Olympic decathlon champion and the winner of the 1960 Sullivan award as the nation’s outstanding amateur athlete, extensively travelled for the State Department and for Peace Corps.<sup>423</sup> Johnson was not only a high-echelon addition to People-to-People volunteers but he was also a representative of African-Americans. He once stated that “one of the most reassuring elements in my many trips abroad was the evidence of interest and understanding given to me, as a human being and an athlete, by young people in every country. People-to-People is a means by which our students can show the same interest and understanding to foreign visitors on our campuses.”<sup>424</sup> Johnson turned down other “glamorous commitments” on the west coast, including “movie contracts” to support what he terms, “a more worthy cause”<sup>425</sup> Indeed,

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<sup>421</sup> Jim Tice, “KU On-Campus Friendship Program Goes World-wide” *Alumni Magazine*, University of Kansas, May 1962, UKA.

<sup>422</sup> “College Diplomats at Work,” UKA.

<sup>423</sup> Tice, “KU On-Campus Friendship Program Goes World-wide,” UKA.

<sup>424</sup> Swaebou Conateh, “The People-to-People as a Grass-root Drama,” UKA.

<sup>425</sup> *People Talk*, vol. 1, no 4, 1962, People-to-People, Records, UKA.

as it was noted in *People-to-People News*, “all university students are urged to accept the responsibility of participating in the People-to-People activities planned for the coming school year.”<sup>426</sup>

Dawson and his friends went to other states, “preaching the virtues” of the program, seeking from governors the “same moral support and encouragement” given already by President John Kennedy and General Eisenhower.<sup>427</sup> Along with other political figures such as the former President Herbert Hoover, the people-to-people concept received endorsement from two KU Chancellors—Chancellor Wescoe and former Chancellor Franklin D. Murphy who left KU to become the President of UCLA, both of whom served as members of the National People-to-People Program Board of Trustees.<sup>428</sup> They asked governors to request the support of chancellors and presidents of universities and colleges to arrange meetings of student representatives. By 1962 the governors of ten states had given them “overwhelming” support.

At the meetings on college campuses, Dawson and his friends described the origin and development of KU’s People-to-People, underscored its importance as supported by the opinions of national leaders and educators and presented an operational guideline, which could be adapted to each local campus situation. At such a speed, Dawson hoped, by spring 1962 more than six hundred colleges and universities in America would be participating in the People-to-People University program.<sup>429</sup> As of 1965, just as the national People-to-People program was growing by generating six million contacts in three years, so was the People-to-People university program by

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<sup>426</sup> “Information on People-to-People,” People-to-People, Records, UKA.

<sup>427</sup> Conateh, “The People-to-People as a Grass-root Drama,” UKA.

<sup>428</sup> “Information on People-to-People,” UKA.

<sup>429</sup> Dawson, “Forty Thousand Good-Will Ambassadors,” UKA.



opening more than hundred University chapters and bringing more than seven thousand American and foreign students in personal contact.<sup>430</sup>

### ***Conflicts, Controversies and Setbacks***

The People-to-People University program was not without flaws. It experienced administrative and financial hurdles. Its activities were criticized for duplicating efforts given by campus student organizations. As did many other campus student organizations, People-to-People wanted to be, both organizationally and financially, an independent group—not to be funded or dependent on All Student Council (ASC) at KU. It wanted to have its own representation. But for the People-to-People organizers, these goals were not fulfilled.

During the Board Members meeting Bill Schaefer, People-to-People's new co-chairman for the academic year of 1962-63, noted that "all of the committees and members of People-to-People must work toward elimination of weaknesses" within the organization." Co-chairman Reuben McCornack added that as committee heads, "we must not be glory-seekers," but "must strive to realize the goals of People-to-People and work for the good of all." Before leaving KU for a new People-to-People mission in Europe, Tu Jarvis, a former chairman warned:

We must have personal contact with international students and must realize that although discipline and organization are needed to make the organization function, that the international students are equal, perhaps of more importance and we must remember that they will not understand the organizational side of People-to-People so we must not emphasize that side of the organization in talking with them. It is, instead, more important that we set up a means for them to meet others.<sup>431</sup>

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<sup>430</sup> Poling, "College Diplomats at Work," UKA.

<sup>431</sup> People-to-People Executive Council, Minutes of Executive Board Meeting, April 17, 1962, People-to-People, Records, UKA.

Jerry Harper, Schaefer's successor, noted in 1964 that the People-to-People program "must be unyoked from ASC" because their relationships were "highly unsatisfactory." Harper and other Executive Committee members were willing to separate from the ASC because the latter decided to "undercut People-to-People funding request by some three hundred dollars and reduced the budget for the program by a little over hundred dollars while Peace Corps committee had its budget increased over a thousand dollars." As the People-to-People officers argued, the Peace Corps committee "serves very little function which is of direct benefit to the individual student." Thus, People-to-People leaders were "perplexed by the ASC decision" and refused to submit the program's budget report.<sup>432</sup>

According to the 1965 research conducted by Prakash F. Nagori, a student from India at KU, the effectiveness of the People-to-People programs at Big Eight Conference universities was "not very satisfactory" due to the following reasons: it had lack of effective administrative leadership; it needed more volunteer American students involvement; its collaboration with other campus student organizations was inefficient; it was not adding new programs and projects; it lacked continuity and it superimposes a national program on a local campus" which was "not always appropriate." Thus People-to-People, Nagori concluded, "has not been living up to the expectations" of the Big Eight Conference schools."<sup>433</sup>

Foreign student advisors at some universities criticized People-to-People for "heavily being run by 'Greeks' who were only interested in personal publicity." They

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<sup>432</sup> Roy Inman, "People-to-People Refuses to Submit Required Budget Report," *University Daily Kansan*, February 5, 1964, UKA.

<sup>433</sup> Prakash F. Nagori, "The Effectiveness of University People-to-People in the Big Eight Conference Schools," in *the International Campus*, International Student Studies Series, no. 16, August 1965, v, UKA.

responded that in some cases volunteer-students attracted to People-to-People used it as a “ladder” to more prestigious campus organizations. They also criticized the program for its focus on few programs such as Student Ambassadors through which American students would travel abroad. As such, it “did not take advantage of the opportunity to get much out of the co-mingling” with the eighty thousand foreign students who were physically present on American college campuses.<sup>434</sup>

Although the People-to-People university program expanded into more than one hundred college campuses, some universities refused to have a People-to-People chapter on their own campuses, such as Colorado University. Azmy Ibrahim, the Foreign Student Senator at CU published a long article in the *New Conservative* stating that there was “no place” for People-to-People at CU because it duplicated many activities conducted by campus student organizations, especially for foreign students.<sup>435</sup>

Yet, both international students and their advisors wanted People-to-People to continue its activities as its “potential ... was tremendous.”<sup>436</sup> After attending the 1966 Midwest Regional People-to-People Conference, Anima Bose, another student from India, suggested that people-to-people could be useful on university campuses if it would “assist in destruction of prejudice; serve as a link between different cultures and provide an opportunity for American students to participate in improving communication between foreign students and the rest of the student body.”<sup>437</sup>

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<sup>434</sup> Nagori, “The Effectiveness of University People-to-People in the Big Eight Conference Schools,” 4-7, UKA.

<sup>435</sup> Azmy Ibrahim, “No Place for People-to-People,” *New Conservative*, January 9, 1963, UKA.

<sup>436</sup> Nagori, “The Effectiveness of University People-to-People in the Big Eight Conference Schools,” 7, UKA.

<sup>437</sup> Romano. “People-to-People Aids the Foreign Students: 300 members at KU,” UKA.

Clark Coan, Dean of Foreign Students and People-to-People advisor at KU, once warned that “one must remember that you can provide the opportunity but you do not twist arms.” People-to-People activities “must be planned well and properly explained to foreign students. And their participation must be voluntary.” It is important for People-to-People “not duplicating services of his office.”<sup>438</sup> Coan also warned against “spreading the organization too thin.”<sup>439</sup>

Previous scholars have stated that government-initiated programs such as the People-to-People campaign were nothing but instruments of U.S. policy, which “rallied to combat the influence of communist ideology” through propaganda.<sup>440</sup> But the questions about its volunteers, their voices and their motives were often overlooked, if not entirely omitted, in their studies. Based on personal interviews with the People-to-People University program volunteers, the remainder of this chapter attempts to look at the program through the eyes of its volunteers.

### ***Volunteer Stories***

Dale Sprague was born in Ellsworth in 1945 and raised in McPherson, Kansas. Both were small Midwestern towns and, as he put it in our interview, nothing was “special” there. But Sprague had already had rich international experience by the time he came to the University of Kansas. Sprague’s parents—his father Perry was a chemical engineer and his mother Viola was a teacher at a local school—invested much into their son’s childhood experience by providing him with an opportunity to learn about

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<sup>438</sup>People-to-People Executive Council, Minutes of Executive Board Meeting, April 17, 1962, People-to-People, Records, UKA.

<sup>439</sup> People-to-People Executive Council, Minutes of Executive Board Meeting, September 18, 1963, People-to-People, Records, UKA.

<sup>440</sup> Osgood, *Total Cold War*, 232-52.

cultures other than his own. Sprague started travelling at about the age of nine or ten and had been in more than fifty foreign countries before he started college. He loved to travel and meet people from other countries. Thus for Sprague the “place to meet international people was People-to-People.”<sup>441</sup> As a senior at KU, he said that “a great deal of my interest in foreign students stem from my travels to foreign countries.”<sup>442</sup> Sprague became one of hundreds of People-to-People volunteers “as soon as he got to KU” in 1963, was very active in his sophomore and junior years, and eventually became the program chairperson in 1967.

The People-to-People University program was a product of the early “sixties,” a period with complex political and cultural upheavals. It was a time of movements that quested for changes in American society. It was a time of “youthful revolution” which brought radical challenges to the old generation. It was a time of social movement and student activism which hoped to bring a change into American society.<sup>443</sup> As one critic stated, “the naïvité of some of the millennial dreams of the period is today, yet somehow this vision remains one of the most attractive features of the sixties.”<sup>444</sup>

The growth of youth activism led to the ideal of personal growth and search for self-fulfilment for young Americans, especially college students, who defined the moral climate of the era. During such an idealistic time emerged student activists and their sense of personal commitment that could be confirmed by action, and from this time

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<sup>441</sup> Personal interview with Dale Sprague, July 2013, Lawrence, Kansas.

<sup>442</sup> *KU News Bureau*, December 30, 1966, UKA.

<sup>443</sup> Miller, “*Democracy Is in the Streets*,” 15. The percentage of students who agreed to the statement “America is a sick society” rose steadily after 1960, and until in 1970, solid majority agreed. And as of May 1970, three quarters of American college students believed that “basic changes” were “necessary to improve the quality of life in American society.” Almost half of those students believed that “these changes were most likely to come from radical pressures from outside the system” rather than from “traditional system” such as government. Miller, “*Democracy Is in the Streets*,” viii.

<sup>444</sup> Morris Dickstein, *Gates of Eden: American Culture in the Sixties* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), xiii.

period, student volunteers who would be attached to secular voluntary movements such as People-to-People and Peace Corps emerged as well. For many People-to-People volunteers, the idea of promoting world peace through mutual understanding between people was highly charged with idealism. Dale Sprague viewed that People-to-People was a “very idealistic organization and idea. I think that it probably, from a practical viewpoint, had many problems trying to get people to understand what it was doing. However, I think as a whole, People-to-People is an excellent concept and idea.”<sup>445</sup> Perhaps individual youth idealism was therefore one of the driving forces for People-to-People volunteers, not political commitment.

As Keniston contends, “youths tend to get together with other youths in youthful countercultures, characterized by their deliberate cultural distance from the existing social order but not always by active political or other opposition to it.” Thus “youth is a time when solidarity with other youths is especially important...”<sup>446</sup> To corroborate this point, Sprague said that he “never saw any politics in People-to-People, at least on the college level.” They were “just people interested in being together and doing things together, nothing more.” It was “nothing to do with Cold War or Russians. I did not see any fear of Russia as far as Russians are individuals... That was “part of the beauty of People-to-People that we were not working with governments so much as we were working with people. Just like you and just like me.”<sup>447</sup> From a volunteer perspective, Halley Kampschroeder, a chairperson from 1966 to 1967 also emphasized the lack of political impulse behind the University chapter of People-to-People. According to

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<sup>445</sup> Interview with Dale Sprague.

<sup>446</sup> Kenneth Keniston, *Youth and Dissent: The Rise of a New Opposition* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), 11.

<sup>447</sup> Interview with Dale Sprague.

Kampschroeder, “probably [People-to-People] had some political undertones,” as “Eisenhower’s goal was political.” But “we were not political.”<sup>448</sup>

Although there was no formal recruitment process for People-to-People, the most active group of volunteers was the one from campus Greek societies. Dale Sprague and his friend David Waxse, who was also, at one time, a People-to-People chairperson, both were members of campus fraternities. As the archival sources indicate, a typical People-to-People volunteer tended to be a white, middle class American student who was involved with more than one campus student organizations. In most cases, board members were honor students, many of whom were recognized through university published sources such as the Jayhawk Year Book. The International Student Club was an important organization to popularize the People-to-People program among international students.

David Hann’s background was different. He had a “blue collar childhood, pretty normal.” He did not belong to a campus fraternity and his motive for People-to-People was different from that of other volunteers. As a Vietnam war veteran, Hann liked to “mingle with international students” because “most Americans [at that time] did not like veterans.” Thus joining People-to-People seemed attractive, although he “considered” Peace Corps when he came back from Vietnam. Hann was in Okinawa, Japan for some time thus his international experience also influenced him to volunteer for campus organizations, including the International Student Club.<sup>449</sup>

As these volunteer stories and archival sources thus indicate, the opportunity to meet people from different cultures and travel to different countries attracted many

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<sup>448</sup> Personal Interview with Halley Kampschroeder, July 2013, Lawrence, Kansas.

<sup>449</sup> Personal Interview with David Hann, July 2013, Lawrence, Kansas.

American students into the People-to-People University program. Sprague's interest in and experience with the program in many respects were characteristic of most volunteers' motive for the People-to-People University program, though certainly not all volunteers had his unusually extensive background in international travel. What was common for volunteers was their sense of involvement in campus organizations where they could meet international students. For them, People-to-People was an attractive choice, as the program was a "significant, well-known" and a "well respected" organization on campus in the 1960s.<sup>450</sup>

For American students, the People-to-People program provided an opportunity for personal enrichment. Sprague affirmed that "understanding our cultures was really our objective. Thus People-to-People ran both ways, for Americans to learn from them, teach and help them. It "has definitely given me an open mind."<sup>451</sup> For international students, most of whom were culturally, linguistically, and even academically struggling to settle down in a new country, the People-to-People program was, as one student from Philippines said, "as if a fairy godmother had suddenly popped up in the silent hours of what had been a long dark night."<sup>452</sup>

People-to-People volunteers helped foreign students accommodate themselves into American society in a variety of ways and at most critical moments. At a college in California, for instance, four students from Kenya found almost every door in town closed when they tried to find rooms on their own. Two of them finally managed to rent a "filthy basement in an old house" and the other two ended up in "a cockroach-infested, unfurnished one-room shack." There was a situation "bound to generate deep

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<sup>450</sup> Interview with Sprague.

<sup>451</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>452</sup> "People-to-People," *Jaypeople*, April 1965, p. 200, UKA.



resentment” until the university’s People-to-People program’s Housing committee stepped in. The committee “stirred up embarrassing publicity about the community’s discriminatory practices, carried the case to the county Fair Housing Board, and finally won for each African student a clean room at a reasonable cost.”<sup>453</sup> This practical help was not just a case of handling unfair and intolerable human behaviors such as racial prejudice, but it was an example of domestic students’ effort to help international students to overcome so-called “culture shock” that Americans could also encounter in foreign lands.

As Sprague said, he “cannot help, but think that people who knew each other, although they live in their own countries, have good feelings or better understanding about Americans, for example, just as I have better understandings about people from India and from the Middle East. And that is very, very helpful to me as an individual.” In such circumstances, the People-to-People program’s idealistic goal—helping foreign students to integrate into American society and to create conditions for mutual flourishing of both domestic and international students—could also be framed, naturally, under the concepts of “social capital” and “reciprocity.”

Social capital, according to the sociologist Robert Putnam, is connections among individuals in its most simplistic sense. Yet the term was first used in the early twentieth century by L.J. Hanifan, one of the reformers of the Progressive Era. Hanifan defined social capital as:

...those tangible substances [that] count for most in the daily lives of people: namely good will, fellowship, sympathy, and social intercourse among individuals and families who make up a social unit... The individual is helpless socially, if left to himself... If he comes into contact with his neighbor, and they with other neighbors, there will be an accumulation of social capital, which may immediately satisfy his social

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<sup>453</sup> Poling, “College Diplomats at Work,” UKA.

needs and which may bear a social potentiality sufficient to the substantial improvement of living conditions in the whole community. The community as a whole will benefit by the cooperation of all its parts, while the individual will find in his associations the advantages of the help, the sympathy, and the fellowship of his neighbors.<sup>454</sup>

According to Putnam, social capital-- that is social networks and the “associated norms of reciprocity”—comes in many different shapes and sizes with many different uses. Through those different networks, social capital is accumulated. Some forms involve repeated, intensive, and multi-stranded networks. Some tended to be informal while others are quite organized, formal with regular meetings, with written goals and a constitution and affiliation with larger national, international organizations. Some forms of social capital are, by choice or necessity, tending to reinforce exclusive identities such as fraternal societies, church-based women’s groups and the like. Still some networks are more likely to include people across diverse cultural, social, and political cleavages.

By integrating both American and international students, People-to-People was an example of a social network through which both groups accumulated diverse cultural and social assets. Through People-to-People volunteer had an opportunity to create human networks, which are maintained to foster the norms of reciprocity: I’ll do this for you now, in the expectation that you (or perhaps someone else) will return the favor. Or, as Putnam puts it, reciprocity can be specific and generalized depending on whether or not you expect mutual benefit. A specific reciprocity is defined by such network as “I will do this for you without expecting anything specific back from you.”<sup>455</sup> But the generalized reciprocity—“I will do this for you now, without expecting anything

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<sup>454</sup> Quoted in Robert Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 19.

<sup>455</sup> Putnam, *Bowling Alone*, 22.

immediately in return and perhaps without even knowing you, confident that down the road you or someone else will return the favor”—is the “touchstone” of social capital.

As its goal suggested, People-to-People hoped that if American students helped foreign students coming to the U.S., they would depart with a warm feeling of Americans so perhaps they could be of equal service to Americans in their countries. Such reciprocal nature of the people-to-people idea connoted a combination of “short-term altruism and long-term self-interest,” which together typically make both participants better off.<sup>456</sup>

### ***“People-to-People at KU Ceased...”***

The People-to-People University program at KU was abruptly ended after the 1974-1975 academic year. There are no available archival sources that provided reasons of the short destiny of the program. The *University Daily Kansan* noted in 1971 that People-to-People needed American volunteers.<sup>457</sup> Bud Huffman in his article “People-to-People Program Lacks Manpower” claimed that “the program was once formerly organized with elected officers and membership requirements, but now it has five or six active students and much more informal.”<sup>458</sup> Nancy Kaul, a Shawnee Mission sophomore and the chairperson of the program for the last two academic years, stated that “more students were needed to find homes for sixty foreign students during spring break.”<sup>459</sup> These archival sources suggest that the People-to-People program’s activities were limited to Tutorial System and Home Stay by mid-1970s. In 1971 Clark

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<sup>456</sup> Putnam, *Bowling Alone*, 134.

<sup>457</sup> “Club Needs U.S. Tours,” *University Daily Kansan*, September 28, 1971, UKA.

<sup>458</sup> Bud Huffman, “People-to-People Lacks Manpower,” *University Daily Kansan*, February 13, 1974, UKA.

<sup>459</sup> Quoted in Huffman, “People-to-People Lacks Manpower,” UKA.

Coan stated that the “biggest problem with People-to-People is getting American students involved in the tutorial system.”<sup>460</sup> It seemed to have been true that “the destiny of this program rests in the hands of American students,” as Dawson said in the program’s early stage.<sup>461</sup>

Why then were Americans less interested and involved in people-to-people by the mid-1970s. In a 2003 interview with me, David Hann, who was a chairperson of People-to-People in 1969-1970, referred to the end of the Vietnam War. “It is kind of winding down the Vietnam War,” Hann recalled, and “there was still a lot of campus unrest and so forth.” According to Hann, one of the things that might have caused the closure of the program was the “unsuccessful recruitment of potential new members”—ones who would actually take “leadership roles.” People-to-People volunteers did not realize that in order to maintain the organization they had to be thinking almost continually about the future, about reaching up getting more American students to join in finding up which of those would be interested in staying taking leadership in trying to train them and orient them about People-to-People and its importance.<sup>462</sup>

As the war in Vietnam escalated, a growing number of students came to view that the United States was an imperialistic country and that it was not living up to its democratic ideals that it tried to spread to the rest of the world. In such circumstances, students’ trust in government declined, as did their interest in campus organizations such as People-to-People. As early as in 1970, according to the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan, “trust in government” was low in every section of

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<sup>460</sup> Clark Coan Remarks, *University Daily Kansan*, 1971, UKA.

<sup>461</sup> Dawson, “40,000 Goodwill Ambassadors,” *Overseas: The Magazine of Educational Exchange*, 1962, UKA.

<sup>462</sup> Interview with Hann, April 2003, Lawrence, Kansas.

the population. Public opinion surveys conducted in 1971—after seven years of intervention in Vietnam—showed an unwillingness to come to the aid of other countries, assuming communist-backed forces attacked them.<sup>463</sup>

According to historian Howard Zinn, “much of the national mood of hostility to government and business came out of the Vietnam War, its fifty five thousand casualties, its exposure of government lies and atrocities.”<sup>464</sup> On top of this came, Zinn contends, the political disgrace of the Nixon administration in the Watergate scandals, which led to Richard Nixon’s resignation in 1974, a first in American history.<sup>465</sup> This dislocation of political and social life of the nation undoubtedly influenced the American people’s civic virtue and trust in public life.

In addition, the changing attitude of the Greek system, then popular at KU, also added to the decline of People-to-People. Fraternities and sororities at KU were privately owned and operated but they were largely dependent on the university’s support and recognition. But the racially exclusionary politics of fraternities and sororities had become a serious issue during the 1960s. Indeed, discriminatory politics was promoted by the national charters of the fraternity and sorority houses. They “specifically forbade” local chapters from pledging racial or religious minorities and “forced local houses to pledge only individuals acceptable to every member of the fraternity nationwide.” Several fraternities at KU still had the offending clauses well into the 1960s and alumni, benefactors and national officers continued to pressure local houses not to accept minorities. But with the presence of the SDS on campus in 1965,

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<sup>463</sup> Quoted in Howard Zinn, *A People’s History of the United States: 1492-Present* (New York: Harper Collins, 1999), 541.

<sup>464</sup> Zinn, *A People’s History of the United States*, 542.

<sup>465</sup> *Ibid.*

however, the issue of racial prejudice at fraternity houses “was transformed into a referendum on the existence of the entire Greek system.” According to the radical groups, the Greek system was a “microcosm of elitism and class divisions” in American society and therefore the mere existence of fraternities and sororities was “anachronistic and undemocratic.”<sup>466</sup> Since the majority of the People to People volunteers were Greek society members, the decline in Greek system also reflected a decline in the People to People Program.

Moreover, having enjoyed more free time and freedom, Americans became more likely to feel free to “do their own thing.” Hann stated that “our society, even though we have high standard of living, seems like everybody is so busy, worried about their job, or their money, or whatever, that is part of it.”<sup>467</sup> Hann’s points seemed to be reflected in Michael Walzer’s observation which stated that American society, which is “perhaps the most individualistic society in human history” gives its citizens an opportunity to enjoy free affiliation to surrounding world, and which ultimately changed social, political, and personal identities.<sup>468</sup>

According to the social psychologist Kenneth Keniston, the “overwhelming majority” of American students and young people in 1960 were “politically apathetic, accepting and inert.” But by 1970, the “situation had changed profoundly.”<sup>469</sup> The 1970 Gallup Poll considered campus unrest to be the nation’s “main problem” as of July 1970.<sup>470</sup> As Todd Gitlin, one of the decade’s popular figures, defined the late 1960s as a “long unraveling, a fresh start, a tragicomic *Kulturkampf*, the overdue demolition of

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<sup>466</sup> Monhollon, “*This is America?*” 69-71.

<sup>467</sup> Interview with Hann.

<sup>468</sup> Michael Walzer, *On Toleration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 104.

<sup>469</sup> Keniston, *Youth and Dissent*.

<sup>470</sup> Quoted in Keniston *Youth and Dissent*, 5.

fraudulent consensus, a failed upheaval, unkept promise, valiant effort at reforms camouflaged as revolution—and it was all of those.”<sup>471</sup> Thus, the deteriorating political and social climate of skepticism due to Vietnam war could be the major factor in KU’s People-to-People’s loss its volunteers in the mid-1970s. The People-to-People University program faded away with the decade.

The People-to-People program evolved at the intersection of national interests and the idealistic beliefs and personal goals of the American volunteers and international students who were drawn to it. Whether or not it provided measurable impact on how volunteers thought about their life and identity, the people-to-people idea *per se* is morally charged, and not distinguishable from politics. The People-to-People University program volunteers hoped that what they were doing was good for international students and themselves as long as it had good intentions on the individual level. The People-to-People University program was derived from a government-backed program, but grew up in a small midwestern town and prevailed across the nation. It appealed to the ideals and personal and social goals and needs of its volunteers—whether they were interested in the adventure and pleasure of travelling abroad or were genuinely interested in making foreigners feel at home—who facilitated a human network in which the American hosts could be comfortable in their belief in the superiority of American culture and the foreign guests could have their pragmatic needs met. Such a reciprocal relationship between international and domestic students passed as one that promoted a “mutual understanding” between people.

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<sup>471</sup> Todd Gitlin, *The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage* (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1987), 286-87.

## CONCLUSION

The national People-to-People campaign was the first government-initiated secular voluntary movement of ordinary people initiated as part of the nation's foreign policy. Founded in the mid-1950s, it was a product of and a reaction to the Cold War international conflicts that emanated from diametrically-opposed ideologies of democracies and the communist world. U.S. claims to the superiority of democracy over communism were rooted in immediate post-war America's quest for world leadership.

As the architect of the nationwide People-to-People movement, Dwight D. Eisenhower urged the American people to be "good-will ambassadors" who would "help make the truth of our peaceful goals and of our respect for the rights of others known to more people overseas."<sup>472</sup> He believed that every single American citizen's role is crucial in disseminating American ideas and ideals to the rest of the world, presumably to the free world, to win the hearts and minds of a foreign audience. It was thus Eisenhower's belief that it was not only governments, but also civilian populations who had a role in, and even responsibility for, the maintenance of world peace.

The elevation of ordinary people's role in foreign policy rendered people-to-people diplomacy as a part of the Cold War American liberal grand strategy, which was aimed at containing communism and creating a favorable political, economic, and cultural environment conducive to American democracy. For such a commitment, communism was a common enemy for Cold War American leaders, regardless of their political philosophy and constituencies, and their containment policy was non-partisan.

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<sup>472</sup> Malvina Lindsay, "Crash Program for Citizen Envoys," *Washington Post*, June 11, 1956, Bortman, Mark: Papers, Box 3, EL.



In 1960, the Democratic presidential candidate, John F. Kennedy stated, “The enemy is the communist system itself—implacable, insatiable, and unceasing in its drive for world domination... [This] is a struggle for supremacy between two conflicting ideologies: freedom under God versus ruthless, godless tyranny.”<sup>473</sup> Yet, the American struggle for overseas supremacy played out parallel to its struggle over domestic doldrums that defined the decade as well.

The People-to-People campaign was therefore a product of the tumultuous decade of the “Long Sixties,” a historical time which started from the mid-1950s and continued through the mid-1970s. It was a time of the “affluent society” with apparently contradicting, morally compelling issues of race, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, religion, wealth and status. As Maurice Izerman and Isserman and Michael Kazin rightly defined:

In the sixties many Americans came to regard groups of fellow countrymen as enemies with whom they were engaged in a struggle for the nation’s very soul. Whites versus blacks, liberals versus conservatives (as well as liberals versus radicals), young versus old, men versus women, hawks versus doves, rich versus poor, taxpayers versus welfare recipients, the religious versus the secular, the hip versus the straight, the gay versus the straight—everywhere one looked, new battalions took to the field, in a spirit ranging from that of redemptive sacrifice to vengeful defiance.<sup>474</sup>

With the changing nature of American political and social life, young Americans in the early 1960s embraced radical perspectives embedded in the philosophies and values of civil rights, feminist, and other social movements. The activist era awakened consciousness of young generations, especially college students who came to question not just the morality and the efficacy of American political institutions, but also the meaning of their lives and their relationship to the wider world.

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<sup>473</sup>Isserman and Kazin, *America Divided*, 8.

<sup>474</sup>Isserman and Kazin, *America Divided*, 3-4.

Many of those Americans who volunteered for the National People-to-People program launched in the mid-fifties were driven by their patriotism and a sense of moral obligation to be part of America's effort to disseminate its democratic ideals to the world over. The activist environment of the 1960s, however, motivated young college students to devote their time and effort to humanitarian, altruistic undertakings by participating in volunteer movements such as the People-to-People program.

In this study I have traced the origins, operation, successes and failures of the People-to-People program featured during the second term of the Eisenhower presidency. The People-to-People program was a government-backed popular movement which spread in the 1950s and expanded into the 1960s. It was partially coordinated and partially funded by the United States Information Agency during its first few years. As the previous chapters have explored, People-to-People and its various programs and projects including the Sister-Cities and the University chapter, while government-initiated, were models for secular voluntary movements of ordinary citizens that were committed to improving mutual understanding between peoples from different cultures.

The idealistic appeal of people-to-people diplomacy, along with opportunities to travel and create reciprocal community among domestic and international students made the People-to-People University program one of the most popular student organizations on college campuses in the 1960s. People-to-People's popularity and ideals at that time attracted young Americans and provided them with both the opportunity and enthusiasm to interact with foreign peoples at the grassroots level. It also gave them a sense of belonging to a broader, constructive human network which

promoted an appreciation of diverse cultures and the “bonds of solidarity” that nations needed during the contested period of the Cold War.<sup>475</sup>

Taking part in a government-initiated program might have rendered private individuals “surrogate communicators” for conveying Cold War propaganda messages, but the People-to-People volunteers in this study did not position themselves as government agents. Upon consultation with archival sources and oral histories, this dissertation argued that it was not the Cold War ideology exclusively that moved volunteers to be a part of People-to-People, but their personal hopes, goals, prior experiences, beliefs, curiosity, and desire for reciprocal international relationships that led them to choose to mingle with people from other countries and cultures.

To understand secular volunteer movements such as People-to-People we have to understand its volunteer motives and their efforts which were different from those of government politics. Thus, this work hopes to contribute to the existing scholarship on secular voluntary movements by taking actual participants’ voices in relation to government motive, which is a previously neglected perspective. When studying a program at the interface between the government and the public, unofficial public side must be considered as well as the official government side so that one may acquire a more complete picture of the given program.

In addition, in giving significance to a program that contributed to a positive experience for international students on American university campuses, this study also hopes to integrate the international students’ experience as a target for American public

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<sup>475</sup> Hoffman, *All You Need Is Love*, 259.

diplomacy. It was strategically important for the United States to initiate a program that operated upon foreign students who were already well-prepared to affirm their positive view of the United States, as evidenced by their presence on the U.S. soil in the first place, and it was important that they not be disappointed and return home disillusioned. The People-to-People program as a tool for Cold War American public diplomacy thus played an important role in solidifying and affirming a pleasant experience for international students. Since, as historian Paul A. Kramer states in a Bernath Lecture in 2009, “the problem of student attitudes towards American society also became one of the heightened concerns”<sup>476</sup> for the United States, it was a logical move to address these student attitudes—attitudes of a “picked group” whose impressions would be carried back to their home countries “to spread if good, like bountiful propaganda; if bad like a festering virus.”<sup>477</sup>

Judging by the government’s involvement with the initial idea of the People-to-People campaign, it is not arguable that it had a political purpose. Some volunteers and organizers may have been in agreement with the Cold War agenda of ensuring a positive view of the U.S. to future international leaders in American universities. But this does not capture the motives expressed by volunteers and organizers in the research for this dissertation. Moral and idealistic impulses, as well as social and personal goals and desires, defined People-to-People volunteers’ contribution to the relatively successful nature of this nationwide movement. In particular, in the case of the People-to-People University program, for volunteers and international students who benefitted

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<sup>476</sup> Paul A. Kramer, “Is the World Our Campus? International Students and US Global Power in the Long Twentieth Century,” *Diplomatic History* 33 (Fall 2009), 802.

<sup>477</sup> Quoted in Kramer, “Is the World Our Campus? International Students and US Global Power in the Long Twentieth Century,” 802.

from the program, personal motives, goals, and assessments were not identical to those of the government. Both sides of the story are necessary for historical understanding. This dissertation is a call for more studies of the neglected perspectives of volunteers and for the insights in reciprocity in international relations among people that they provide.

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Appendix A

Table 1. Exchange of persons by geographic regions<sup>478</sup>

Number of reporting	Area	Visitations from other countries	U.S. visitations to sister cities	Total
70	Europe	77	178	255
20	Far East	659	458	1117
23	Latin America	1515	2272	3787
1	Near East and South Asia	4	10	14
1	Africa	0	0	0
52		2255	2918	5173

Table 2. Exchange of persons by interest area<sup>479</sup>

Area	U.S. sister-city to foreign cities	Foreign sister-cities to the U.S.
Youth summer exchange	387	533
Youth for school semester	77	183
Teachers	198	141
Business people	1017	570
Municipal officials	89	161
Skilled labor	156	43
Legal	27	22
Journalists	40	22
Radio & TV	11	8
Professional	140	54
Artists	23	63
Actors, musicians, and dancers	145	133
Others (tourists, sports groups, and misc. individual travelers)	608	322
<b>Total</b>	<b>2918</b>	<b>2255</b>

<sup>478</sup> National League of Cities (Formerly American Municipal Association) Official Correspondences from Patrick Healy, Executive Director to Mark Bortman, Chairman of Civic Committee of the People-to-People Program, p 2.

<sup>479</sup> Ibid, p 4.

Appendix B.

Table 3. Results of Town Affiliation Questionnaire<sup>480</sup>

<b>Questionnaire result: American Municipal Association, 1960</b>			
<b>1956-1960</b>		2. Response Indicators	3. Actual results and AMA comments
#	1. Questions (copy from the AMA's official document)		
1	When was your affiliation started?	a). 4%-1956 and before b). 8%-1957 c). 0%-1958 d). 9%-1959	a). After 1956 the rate steadily increased b). More communities became aware of the program
2	List the projects undertaken by your community last year and indicate which was most successful and why?	a). Host cities-pen pal letters b). Suite extensive-exchanges of children's clubs c). Big area of exchanges-scrapbooks, boy and girl scouts d). Others-art work, tape recordings, seeds, plants, trees, exhibitions, fashion shows, naming streets and buildings, exchange of students, workers, teachers and municipals, annual fiestas, and celebrations of affiliation day	a). These exchanges had been done at no cost to the government b). More projects, including establishment of parks, implementation of language classes for future affiliations planned
3	Has your affiliation helped improve local community relations any?	a). 5%-definitely the program helped improve community relations both socially and economically b). %-reported that the program did not help improve community relations	a). People were brought together to work for a common goal and common good of the community b). Community members enjoyed more close cooperation of people of all walks of life c). Increased personal

<sup>480</sup> The Questionnaire was conducted among the American communities affiliated with sister cities abroad. American Municipal Associations, 1960. MBP-B-1. EL.

			relationship
4	What percent of your population knows of your affiliation?	<p>a). 8% indicated 10-50% of the population were aware of the affiliation</p> <p>b). 3% said 50-100% of the population knew the affiliation</p> <p>c). 3% did not know</p>	<p>a). Affiliation committees should work more actively for press cooperation</p>
5	How many people from your community visited your sister-city last year?	<p>a). 9%-any number from 1-22 and above</p>	<p>a). The visits were reciprocated and the people overseas were as much interested in their sister city in the US and vice versa</p>
6	Has there been any participation in your community or sister-city by members of the armed forces?	<p>a). Approx. 40%-there had been some armed forces near or in the area of one or both cities</p> <p>b). About 50%-there had not</p> <p>c). 0% no response</p>	<p>a). Affirmative answer to this question</p> <p>b). Participation had ranged from band concerts to march in celebrations</p>
7	Have you been able to detect any improvement of goodwill toward an understanding of the U.S. as a direct result of your sister-city program?	<p>a). 1%-had noticed an improvement in goodwill and understanding</p> <p>b). 9%-had not noticed any improvement</p> <p>c). % no response</p>	<p>a). Increased note of friendliness in the exchange of letters and increased note of greetings</p> <p>b). Great many residents of sister-cities learned enough of the local</p>