

Rethinking the Clinical vs. Social Reform Debate: a Dialectical Approach to Defining Social
Work in the 21st Century

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Abstract

There is a historical tension in social work between the clinical and social reform perspectives. The original goal for this dissertation was to offer pragmatism as a philosophical orientation that would make sense of these two seemingly disparate perspectives by explaining how they may coexist. A historical analysis of nine key social work scholars and four major social work conferences was conducted in order to better understand this historical debate. The findings were unexpected as they reveal a historical understanding of social work in which pragmatism is already present in nearly all of the conceptions of social work analyzed. Moreover, all of the major social work scholars understand social work to be dual focused, meaning that there is no divide between the clinical and social reform perspectives—social work comprises both. Conclusions and implications for social work practice, research, education and policy are discussed.

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Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview

In perhaps its simplest form this dissertation involves an investigation into re-visioning, or reframing, how we think about the clinical vs. social reform debate in social work. This debate is often characterized as an enduring, thorny problem for social work, which reflects an ongoing identity conflict and confusion in the field. This ‘identity crisis’ of sorts has been a problem for social work since its inception as some in the field have focused their attention on interventions at the individual level, while others have focused on interventions at the societal level. Many conferences, books and articles spanning the course of over 100 years have deliberated over this often divisive issue. But the problem endures, at least in part because it is assumed that a legitimate profession cannot have two seemingly disparate foci, along with a widely varying collection of practice and research methods.

The goal of this dissertation is to rethink this supposed problem from a pragmatist perspective. Doing so will change the whole approach to the issue, which, if successful, will translate what was a conundrum, into an expected, though ongoing, tension. All professions and academic disciplines have inherent tensions and issues that are debated, discussed and refined over time by successive generations of practitioners and scholars. Social work is no different in this regard, and the clinical vs. social reform debate—if viewed through a pragmatist lens—should not leave present-day social workers with undue conflict or confusion about who they are and what their role is as professionals. To be sure, social work is different in some ways from the traditional fields of medicine, law and ministry, particularly in its newness as a response to the needs of modern society. It also overlaps with them in many ways. But social work has its own

identity which is solidly founded upon at least a century of historical scholarship which is widely connected to the social sciences and humanities.

The following work will involve a review of historical literature in social work in order to better understand this ongoing tension between the competing philosophies. In order to rethink the clinical vs. social reform tension, it will be viewed through a pragmatist lens, or framework. Pragmatism is a fairly diverse subfield of philosophy, so a working definition must be generated in order to apply it to this issue in social work (or otherwise). In order to maintain fidelity to the historical trajectory of social work scholarship, and with the supposition that social work may already possess a pragmatist sensibility, the working definition of pragmatism will be generated dialectically between John Dewey's pragmatist philosophy and a number of social work theorists. In other words, pragmatism, as a philosophical perspective, and philosophies of social work (i.e. that pertain to the social work identity), will be put into conversation with each other. The purpose of this is to generate a working definition that can be then used to reconsider the clinical vs. social reform debate. The final step in the dissertation will be to apply this pragmatist working definition, or framework, to the stated problem as a solution. The implications for social work practice, research, education and policy will also be discussed.

The following set of propositions shall serve as a rough summary of the dissertation and a guide to the organization of this introduction.

1. Social work, as a relatively new profession and academic discipline, has been developing its identity for over 100 years. There is ongoing conflict and confusion about what social work is—that is, what its mission, practice methods, values and research methods should

be. One specific issue that has not been resolved is the debate between the clinical and social reform perspectives. This issue will serve as a focal point for the dissertation.

2. There are a number of reasons for this ongoing tension, many of which are specific to the nature of social work itself as a nascent discipline.
3. Over time there have been a variety of attempts to define social work, even as late as 2011. Many of these are useful, and more recent frameworks in particular tend to be very inclusive of the diverse theories, practices and contexts that comprise social work in general.
4. Pragmatism offers a 'reframe' for thinking about the social work identity crisis. The problem, from a pragmatist perspective, is not that social work involves multiple populations served, in multiple settings and contexts, using many different theoretical frameworks and intervention strategies. The problem is that social work continues to seek a one singular theory, framework, method and/or knowledge base that will serve to capture the breadth and depth of what social work is. Each proposal of this sort inevitably leaves something out. But even if a generally satisfactory, comprehensive, descriptive and prescriptive framework were invented for social work, it would still leave an unanswered question: why should a single, absolute, unchanging definition of social work be sought in the first place? Is social work even conducive to such absolutist thinking? A pragmatist perspective states that we should abandon the quest to discover or invent the 'real' social work, and instead accept social work for what it is—an internally diverse and ever evolving profession. The pragmatist answer does not involve one more putatively comprehensive and solitary definition of social work—this would be to attempt an answer to the wrong question yet again. Instead, pragmatism offers a

reorientation of the approach to defining social work—a reorientation of the thinker, if you will. Pragmatism does not offer new answers to old questions, it rejects the old questions as obsolete and offers a new perspective.

5. A number of problems and issues are associated with the ongoing identity problem in social work (e.g. internal divisiveness and tension; confusion among students and practitioners as to their professional status/identity). Changing the way we think about defining social work has great potential to positively impact social work education, practice and research. Pragmatism offers a ‘paradigm shift’ of sorts such that these ongoing ‘problems’ in social work are transformed into legitimate ‘tensions’ that comprise all professions.

The Identity Problem in Social Work

Not even physics has discovered or invented a ‘unified field theory’ to describe, explain and predict all physical phenomena at both the macro and quantum levels (Greene, 2003). Social work, in its quest for a singular self-definition, has fared comparably worse because it is such a new and broad discipline. This section is comprised of a general discussion of the identity problem in social work, including ideas from several thinkers who have begun to re-conceptualize this supposed problem as a potential strength.

The clinical vs. social reform debate is part of this broader problem in social work that goes all the way back to its early years as a value-based response to changing social needs in a modernizing society. Any new profession will have to go through a process, however long or short, to determine what it stands for, what its knowledge base is, what its methods are, what its values are and how it is to be sanctioned (e.g. by the community, particular stakeholders, etc.) (Gordon, 1962). Social work is no exception, and as a relatively new profession—arguably

beginning in the late 19th or at least by the early 20th century—it has undergone a long history of self-discovery that has not yet come to a satisfactory conclusion. This ongoing process of determining what social work is has raised many questions, and a number of salient dichotomies remain. Perhaps the most striking and pervasive of these, possibly due to its ability to comprehensively encompass multiple aspects of social work philosophy at once, is the clinical vs. social reform debate—the great dichotomy—the focus of this dissertation. Other related dichotomies include the generalist vs. specialist debate, the professionalism vs. lay/volunteerism debate and the art vs. science debate (Leighninger, 1980). These and other tensions in the philosophy of social work will be referred to as needed but will not become focal points for this discussion.

Defining terms is an important practice, especially in a longer piece such as this, and several definitions are in order here at the outset. The term “philosophy of social work,” at least for the purposes of this dissertation, shall refer generally to conceptions, understandings or ideas about what social work is, and what its purposes, methods, values, sanction and knowledge base are. This is consistent with other uses of the term “philosophy of...” (fill in the blank), that also refers to the nature of a thing, whether it be the “philosophy of” science, mind, education or what have you, and also reflects previous uses of the term by social work scholars such as Herbert Bisno (e.g. his book entitled *The Philosophy of Social Work*) and Gisela Konopka, who wrote a book on Eduard Lindeman’s “philosophy of social work” (1958). Throughout the dissertation those who conceive of the various ideas labeled “philosophy of social work” are referred to as “thinkers,” “scholars,” “theorists”—all terms intending simply to point, with some variety, to the fact that they are individuals who offered their own perspectives on what social work is. It is not intended that each person labeled a social work “theorist” generated a new theory of sociology,

psychology, economics, or the like (e.g. Marxism or symbolic interactionism), only that they stated their own version of social work ‘theory,’ a comprehensive definition of social work. The terms “clinical” and “social reform” are also used regularly throughout this work; they are basically shorthand for the two major perspectives in social work that historically reside on the one hand with Mary Richmond and the Charity Organization Societies (COS), and on the other with Jane Addams and the Settlement House movement (respectively). The COSs focused their philosophy of social work and ensuing social actions on the betterment of the individual in adjusting to societal conditions, while the settlement residents focused theirs on the improvement of the societal conditions themselves. Richmond and Addams still stand out as progenitors of these two major types or schools of thought in social work that still exist in various forms today. The term “clinical” then may refer to any practice and/or practice theory, or social work philosophy, which focuses on the individual, and may culminate in such practices as case management, crisis intervention, family work, group work or other ‘direct practice’ intervention. The term “social reform” refers to those practices that are consistent with theory and/or philosophy in social work that aims to change the environment—the social, political, economic, or even physical context in which people live (e.g. community organizing). The terms “philosophy” and “theory” are somewhat interchangeable, but for this dissertation, “philosophy” will be used to refer to the most abstract levels of thinking (e.g. supporting assumptions about the nature of knowledge and reality, such as whether or not it should be assumed that things have one essential and identifying feature that should be sought in order to know what they are, or not), whereas the term “theory” will be used in reference to what are often called “mid-level” theories in social science discourse (e.g. empowerment theory or systems theory). These latter

ideas generally do not tend to be as comprehensive in their ability (or pretense) to explain the phenomena in question.

Important questions about the philosophy of social work are still being raised. As recent as 2011 articles still appear in professional social work journals that offer new perspectives, or new answers, to questions about what social work is and how it should be thought about and practiced. Many of these are written in response to the CSWE's call to offer a coherent and integrated framework for teaching social work practice (Garner, 2011). Garner's "integral model" of social work practice is one example of such an article. She justifies the need for her model, in part, by stating "[T]hese inquiries also reveal the inherent need for development of a larger, higher-order intellectual space in the competent social worker, wherein the complex multiple mandates, guidelines, and theories of practice may simultaneously coexist and be considered" (P.2). This quote indicates the need in social work for the existence of a very broad "latticework" (to use Garner's term) that permits practitioners to utilize diverse theories and practice tools in order to solve a variety of problems in multiple contexts. This is relevant here for two reasons. First, it points to the diversity of ideas and practices that still comprise the field of social work (more about this shortly); and second, it highlights the gap still present at least 100 years after social work began in the US: there is still uncertainty and conflict about what social work is and how it should be practiced. This may be true to a certain extent for every profession, but it seems to be profound and difficult for social work in particular.

The history of social work is a history of diverse and often competing philosophies, theories and methods, used with positive aims in mind to transform individuals and/or societal conditions. This wide agglomeration of ideas has made for a difficult time in determining a philosophy of social work that captures everything that is putatively 'social work' without

leaving anything (or anyone) out, and at the same time maintaining some sense of parsimony and coherence. This has been a long process and many ideas, models and definitions have been proposed over time, none to the satisfaction of all involved (Gibelman, 1999). These related tensions can be seen in the writings of Jane Addams and Mary Richmond, at the beginnings of social work in the US, and continue over the next hundred years or so to the present. In 1959, nearly 60 years after the inception of social work, the Council on Social Work Education (CSWE) stated that there was a lack of any coherent, consistent and widely accepted statement on the aims and purposes of social work—it concluded that the core of social work had not been established. “The quest for status and identity has occupied center stage within social work since its inception” (Gibelman, 1999, p. 4). More recently, Cnaan & Dichter (2007) state, “More than 100 years after social work evolved from its humble origins, we still lack a clear understanding as to what exactly social work is and what social workers do” (p. 278). Over the years many social work scholars have stated the same thing, that there is a general lack of a coherent identity in the field of social work (Bisno, 1952; Goode, 1969; Gordon, 1965; Walz & Groze, 1991). This has led to several unsatisfying conclusions being offered for social work. Because social work did not possess the requisite specificity and singularity of definition in comparison to medicine and law, Etzioni (1969) and Toren (1972) labeled social work a “semi-profession.” David Schon (1983) labeled social work a “vagrant profession” for similar reasons.

Not everyone thinks disparagingly about the fact that the social work identity is a somewhat fluid, and ongoing, conversation. Stanley Witkin (1998) states,

The breadth of the social work profession is both its strength and a source of conflict.

Social worker’s ability to address a wide range of factors that impinge on individuals and communities gives them a wide-angle lens that leads to important perspectives on social

issues. Such breadth also creates space within which opposing viewpoints exist. The classic conflict is that of individual change versus social reform (483).

He goes on to write that though social work has this great dichotomy, it must remember both perspectives and not separate “private troubles” from “public issues” (Schwartz, 1969).

Similarly, Netting (2005) states, in her article on macro practice, that “[T]he history and context of social work macro practice continues to be written and rewritten as new analyses reveal important diverse perspectives on the profession, its underlying philosophy, and the methods used to carry out strongly held assumptions” (52). In this statement she seems to understand the history of social work more as a necessary process than a failure to establish a once-for-all definition. She goes on to say “[T]his diversity of thought will continue into the future and is a strength of the profession” (52) “Within continuously changing contexts there are and will be divergent views, perspectives, and strongly held beliefs about what actions should occur in order to perform the work of the profession” (52). These statements not only normalize the ongoing discussion about the social work identity, but suggest it as a strength to be embraced and cultivated, rather than a weakness to be overcome in a futile effort to become more like medicine or law. There are many others, such as Cooper (1977) who recognize social work in this ongoing discussion precisely because they understand that social work is a living, growing and developing field that must remain this way in order to continue to be relevant to the constantly changing social conditions in our communities. Cnaan & Dichter state

But this presumed weakness is also a strength for an evolving profession such as social work. After a mere one century, social work is still in search of its limits and domain.

Being able to search for new fields of practice, identify new potential clients, and

compete with other disciplines over fields of practice will mature social work and solidify its place in society. This is a normal process of growth (p. 281).

Finally, Gibelman (1999) reflects the same sentiment with her statement that the duality and interaction between competing social work philosophies "...constitutes the special purview of the profession and makes it distinct from other helping professions." (p. 300). She adds that any attempt to define what social workers do must consider the limitations of that statement. Social work cannot be constrained by just one definition. The profession grows and changes to suit the needs of vulnerable, poor and oppressed, and must continue to do so to remain relevant. "We start...from a belief that life is infinitely varied, dynamic and changing, and that social work is, like any phenomenon which appears at some moment in history, an integral part of life" (Reynolds, 1970).

The stakes are high for social work in determining how to think about the identity question, both for the profession and for the clients served. Regarding self-definition, Witkin (1998) writes,

When we call ourselves social scientists and therapists, we claim membership in high-status groups and indirectly assert professional legitimacy. The problem with this "we're like you" strategy is that it ensures a second class citizenship relative to those groups.

There is a quality of apprenticeship, of being an aspirant rather than an authority.

Emulating other disciplines gives them power to define us and our difference. (p. 483)

Perhaps more importantly, who we are affects what we do, which in turn affects those we serve. We serve in specific social, political, and economic contexts and address difficult problems in all areas. Our chosen identity will shape how we address these problems. For instance at the time of his article, Witkin inquired as to how he should be supporting intervention in the Littleton

Colorado school shootings: should efforts be aimed at helping victims and families cope with violence and loss? Should social policy related to cultural problems such as alienation and bullying of youth be the focus? The answer to both questions is “yes.”

These statements raise important questions about how we think about the philosophy of social work. What if we abandoned ‘physics-envy,’ or more aptly, ‘medicine-envy,’ and sought to develop an approach to the questions of social work philosophy that were generated not from the medical or legal fields, but from social work itself? What if we challenged the assumption that social work, in order to earn legitimacy, must generate a self-definition that can be encapsulated in a nutshell? As one well known saying goes, “any philosophy that can be put in a nutshell, belongs in one.”

Ambiguity in Social Work Identity and Practice

Why is there so much diversity in social work philosophy, theory and practice? The answer to this question is plural and complex. It stems not only from the simple fact that any social entity and/or institution, such as social work, needs some sufficient form of self-definition in order to function in society, but also from the quest for professional status. The issue of professionalism and social work goes at least as far back as 1915 when Abraham Flexner famously declared that social work was not a profession (Flexner, 1915). Charged with the task of determining whether social work was a profession, Flexner, via comparison to already established professions (primarily law, medicine and ministry), established criteria that all professions must possess: a clear purpose, an identifiable and communicable technique, a professional organization or “brotherhood,” a knowledge base, primary responsibility in the practice purview, and the achievement of large social ends. Since social work—at least, according to Flexner, who prefaces his critique by stating that he has little substantive knowledge of social work or the topic at hand—did not have a clearly delineated and transmissible practice

technique or a scientific knowledge base of its own, it could not be its own profession. Thus the quest, not only for identity and professionalism, but also for legitimacy, began. It should be noted that Jane Addams and many of the settlement house community opposed the idea of professionalism for social work, so the push for identifiable practice methods, procedures and theories came primarily from the COSs (at least in the early years), and especially Mary Richmond (e.g. her book *Social Diagnosis*, 1917).

The ambiguity and conflict related to the social work identity can be linked to a number of factors that include at least the following: internal divisions within the field, sociopolitical conditions, the diversity of social work practices, practice contexts, and professional (and non-professional) overlap (Thyer, 1987; Gibelman, 1999; Netting, 2005; Carroll, 2001; Billups, 1984). Cnaan & Dichter (2007) state

The perceived ambiguity of the field, we believe, in part, stems from the fact that social work is a diverse field and that social workers are involved in numerous types of activities. Social workers as part of their core function can provide psychotherapy and still be mainstream social workers; they can plan a takeover of city hall and also be mainstream social workers; they can care for individuals, families, communities, institutions, causes, and even states and in all be part of mainstream social work (p. 280).

Over its relatively short history as a profession social work has had many roles and purposes as it aims to “...enhance human wellbeing and help meet the basic human needs of all people, with particular attention to the needs and empowerment of people who are vulnerable, oppressed, and living in poverty” (NASW, 2011). Of course, this statement by the NASW as part of the preamble to the Code of Ethics, represents *current* thinking, at least from this national organization, about the mission of social work. But a broad statement such as this took over 100

years to generate. The mission itself is still debated, as are the methods that may be used to carry it out. “Adding to the confusion, social work is both a type of work and a discipline” (Cnaan & Dichter, 2007). As a discipline it has its own sense of values, mission and practices, yet the type of work done is carried out by both social workers and non-social workers: there is overlap in job description between social workers, professional counselors, psychologists, nurses, marriage and family therapists, and other ‘helping professionals.’ Moreover, some work traditionally performed mostly by licensed social workers, or at least by individuals trained in social work departments, such as case management in child welfare, is performed by people who have no social work or other behavioral science training at all. These factors often present a “...polarity, or even a paradox, that present a hindrance to social work’s being considered within the professional and scientifically-based realm of practice” (Cnaan & Dichter, 2007, p. 280).

The variety of practice roles and contexts for social work comes with an even more variable set of theories and ideas about how to conceptualize problems and intervene, and when, where, and with whom. Over time most of these ideas have been useful, but none have proven to be sufficiently enduring as ‘the’ social work philosophy. Marxism, for instance, has been proposed and used for social work, but tends to be too focused on economics and conflict to be generally accepted (Cooper, 1977; Furman, Canda & Chatterjee, 2008). In the 1920s in particular (and to some extent still today) Freudian theory and the psychodynamic legacy have been proposed—these tend to be difficult to verify empirically and raise many ethical problems (e.g. sexism), and have not been widely accepted. Even general systems theory in its day (c. 1950s) became popular as a potential theory for social work, and though it can be useful to describe how groups work it does not provide obvious insights for practice applications.

More recently Bruce Thyer (1987) has offered “contingency analysis”—a reductionistic perspective that applies operant conditioning principles from behavioral psychology to social work—as yet another candidate for a single theory that is (supposedly) at once scientific and comprehensive enough to capture all of social work thinking and practice, from community organizing to psychotherapy. Other recent theorists of a less positivistic bent have offered various conceptions and frameworks (e.g. : Lavitt, 2009; Kirst-Ashman and Hull 2008) or “lattice works” (e.g. Garner, 2011) for social work that attempt to broadly capture the breadth of social work while pointing to a useful and user-friendly way to practice that is linked to the scientific knowledge base. This is likely in response to the call by some for a new way to conceive of social work, still in response to Flexner and the need for a single theory. Billups (1984) states that “...social work needs a broadly endorsed practice frame of reference at still a higher level of abstraction and generalization than that of any single theory” (P. 173). Carroll (2001), for example, created the “three dimensional” social work model that includes social problems (e.g. child abuse), social units of concern (e.g. families) and social technologies (e.g. casework). This idea, and surely many others, seem useful for social work in a variety of ways. Yet the continued conflict and discussion, along with new critiques of extant ideas, and the ongoing proposal of still newer ideas, indicates that no particular philosophy of social work (or mid-level theory) has become sufficiently established as ‘the one’ for social work. And more concretely, no one practice or practice model has become established as ‘the one’ that denotes social work practice in general. Thus the question as to what broad social work philosophy, mid-level theory, or practice model should fill the gap for social work, is still open.

The History of the Problem & Attempts to Answer the ‘Old’ Questions

Some of the more recent attempts to provide an answer to the social work identity question have just been reviewed. This section will consider a number of further ways this same question has been answered more broadly and historically. Since a significant portion of the actual dissertation will include an in-depth review of several historical conferences and social work theorists (see methodology section), this section shall serve merely as an introduction to this history.

The history of social work is in many ways the history of society’s response to changing geographic, religious, sociopolitical and economic conditions, and the accompanying social needs (Hofstadter, 1955; Axinn & Stern, 2005; Jansson, 2001). “Social disequilibrium, such as that caused by rapid secularization, urbanization, and technological change, requires that both the individual and his society readjust to meet the new exigencies of the emerging social order” (Kellner & Tadros, 1967). The modern (or pre-modern) version of this phenomenon goes at least as far back as J.H. Pestalozzi in late 17th century Europe. He called for new ways in European society to address issues of secularization, immigration and urbanization.

Pestalozzi tried to identify the specific relationship between urbanization, industrialization, and secularization and the social problems which arose in the cities. He believed that, in order to understand these problems, one needed an individualized and sympathetic approach which would have to replace moralistic, judgmental generalizations (Kellner & Tadros, 1967, p. 45)

To this end, a new profession including “conscience counselors” could be created, which would provide a place where people could go when they need to be heard and understood. A variety of issues and problems could be addressed in this way, including unplanned pregnancy and cultural

orientation for new immigrants. These ideas, while progressive at the time, were also still quite moralistic and paternalistic, yet represent an early awareness of the needs of changing, modernizing cultures. This early example also represents an early emphasis on helping, or social work (generally speaking) via changing the individuals involved, and not the social conditions. This represents just one side of what became the great dichotomy in social work—the clinical vs. social reform debate, to use modern terms.

The origins of social work in the United States, which stem from European, and particularly British, ideas about social welfare, were dichotomous from the outset. “The process of divergence began in the United States when two streams of thought appeared in the nineteenth-century arena of social welfare, then called “charities and corrections” (Gitterman & Germain, 2008, p. 5). The latter was more interested in theories of social reform, while the former focused more on practical methods of intervention. Both were a response to changing need. Post-Civil War US culture was changing quickly and dramatically: people were migrating westward in droves; farmers were rapidly becoming city dwellers; immigrants from many countries were occupying Eastern urban centers (among other locations); new developments in industry and science were transforming the cultural landscape in dramatic ways. Industrialization led to the concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a few elites, while urbanization led to overcrowding and scarcity. Old problems in new forms erupted, including poverty, wretched housing conditions (e.g. tenements), inadequate schools, cyclical economic depressions, oppressive work arrangements, racial and ethnic tensions, and outbreaks of disease (to name a few). By 1904 at least one in eight Americans (approximately ten million) were impoverished. “Poverty was bred of miserable and unjust social conditions” (Hunter, 1904). Questions arose as

to the cause of social problems: were they caused by individual moral decay and irresponsibility, or by the institutions and structures of society?

New state institutions arose in an attempt to deal with these problems, such as prisons, insane asylums and boards of charities. In 1865 a group of New England intellectuals formed the American Social Science Administration (ASSA) in order to have a forum for discussing issues such as relief for the impoverished. It did not take long, however, before conflict overshadowed their mutual interests, due to their opposing responses to the questions about the cause of the problems. The dichotomy was apparent: on one side were those concerned with the conditions of the new social order and ways to change them. On the other were those concerned with direct care and control of society's "misfits."

The dichotomy became increasingly reified as the practice-focused people in the ASSA split off to form the Conference of Charities (though some overlapping membership remained), which in 1879 became the National Conference of Charities and Corrections (NCCC) and in 1917 the National Conference on Social Work (NCSW) (Bruno, 1948). "It gradually ceased being a body interested in scientific inquiry primarily, and shifted its major emphasis to administration and methods of practice, giving only secondary consideration to scientific procedure under the general title of "prevention" (p. 7) The NCSW and others of like mind tended to be concerned with reforming the poor themselves so that they would take responsibility for their lives. They feared that many of the reformist strategies would corrupt the moral fortitude of the poor and lead to multigenerational pauperism. The new ASSA, on the other hand, sought to utilize the new social science to discover theories and laws of human social life and apply these toward changing and improving environmental conditions. "[I]ts method was defined as the statistical interpretation of findings and their application to the entire social situation, and

the purpose of social science is to promote human welfare” (p. 5) People of this persuasion were “awakening” to an understanding of poverty as a social problem, attributable to the policies, institutions and structures of society (Bremner, 1956). Thus the two sides of the dichotomy became increasingly entrenched: one side believing the cause and cure of social problems lay in the individual, the other believing it lay in the environment.

Following this ideological trend were two new groups that formed practically simultaneously in the late 1800s: the Charity Organization societies (COS) and the Settlement Houses (Bruno, 1948; Trattner, 1999). The settlement philosophy emphasized the role of the environment as the cause of urban misery. This perspective reflected new thinking from the social sciences that understood problems such as poverty as being caused by unjust conditions in the institutions and macro structures of society, such as the under-regulation of corporations (Hunter, 1904). The solution followed from this conception and involved various approaches to social reform. One essential feature of most settlement houses, specifically Jane Addams’ Hull House in Chicago, was the idea of sympathetic knowledge (Addams, 1964). This concept centered on the idea that knowledge and change necessarily involves relationships between people, especially between people of different classes. Solutions to societal problems are best addressed when people know each other on a personal level. “Living with their neighbors, the settlement leaders were soon moved to action, to programs which related organically to the felt needs of the immediate community rather than to preconceived notions on the part of residents of what might be good for the neighborhood” (Chambers, 1963). The programs formed at Hull house were many and varied and included kindergarten, playgrounds, political clubs, women’s groups, men’s groups and legislative action committees (Addams, 1912). Though Addams

espoused the environment side of the dichotomy, she also recognized and respected role of the COSs in alleviating suffering and promoting change (see later chapter for details).

The competing, individual-focused philosophy in the emerging social work field was championed by Mary Richmond who was the director of the Charity Organization Society of New York. “The Charity organization societies, whose philosophy was characterized by the watchword “scientific philanthropy,” aimed for the rational, efficient distribution of alms, modeled after the division of labor and other methods of the new capitalistic bureaucracies” (Gitterman & Germain, 2008). The COS philosophy provided “a friend” and not “alms,” because of fears that the giving of alms itself would lead to dependency and pauperism. In addition, Richmond’s new case work method detailed methods for careful investigation and intervention techniques for individuals and families in need (Richmond, 1917). The COSs generally utilized voluntary “friendly visitors,” mostly upper class white women who would at once provide an example and advise the poor. Richmond, like Addams, recognized the interdependence of individual and environmental change, and labeled these “retail” and “wholesale” (respectively). Retail services refer to personalized individual welfare—adjusting individuals to their environments. Wholesale refers to the adjustment of the environment in order to create more just and opportune social conditions for all. Richmond’s synthesis of the social work dichotomy by the use of these terms represents the first significant attempt at a solution to the problem at hand.

Both the individual-focused COS philosophy and the society-focused Settlement ideas spawned further refinements and developments which created a more complex scene regarding the clinical vs. social reform debate. The individual side dates back at least as far as the Association for Improving the Conditions of the Poor (AICP) in the 1830s, succeeded by the emergence of casework in the 1890s. This, as just stated, was further defined and developed by

Richmond around 1917 (Bruno, 1948; Gitterman & Germain, 2008). By the 1920's much of the casework that was done may be referred to as the "diagnostic school" due to its heavy reliance on the terms and concepts borrowed from Freud and medicine, such as "diagnosis," "social disease" and "treatment." It thus adopted the idea that what is problematic occurs in the individual as a pathological psychosocial state that must be diagnosed, treated, and potentially cured. Flexner's critique of social work, stating that it was not a legitimate profession, was particularly devastating to the clinical side because of their intent to develop social work as a paid profession modeled after Freudian psychoanalysis. By the 1920s, largely due to their quest for professionalism, social work had adopted Freudian theory as its major practice model (Trattner, 1999). This eventually led to a split between the existing "diagnostic," and newly formed "functional" schools, both still focused on the individual.

The functional school utilized the work of Otto Rank (A psychoanalytic theorist who broke away from Freudian orthodoxy) and differed from the diagnostic school in many ways, particularly because it focused attention on the role of the agency (Stein, 2010). Jesse Taft states

This difference was evidenced primarily in our emphasis on the importance of the social agency and its particular function as a determinant of the case-work process, in contrast to a tendency to allocate to the case worker himself [sic] greater responsibility for determining and meeting the need of each individual client (Taft, 1944).

The "functional approach," developed by Taft and other faculty members at the social work school at the University of Pennsylvania, diverged from the diagnostic school in three primary ways: first, it re-centered the focus of change from the clinician's diagnosis of pathology to the client's potential for growth; second, the purpose of social work was to provide agency support for individuals who could utilize it as a services according to their own, self-determined choices;

and third, instead of the “treatments” that were the focus of the diagnostic school, the functionalists used the concept of the “process” of relationships as the healing and productive agent for practice (Roberts, 1970). “Diagnosis” was also considered an ongoing process, not a static event. The debates and developments of the psychoanalytic phase of social work occurred largely between the 1920s and 1950s, at which time thinkers like Bertha Reynolds responded to critiques that this form of social work had become overly focused on the individual, to the neglect of the environmental circumstances (Reynolds, 1934; 1970). Reynolds in particular (though not popular among peers at the time) attempted to shift focus from the social worker and his or her diagnoses, to broader socioeconomic issues, adopting Marxism in particular as a societal-level conflict theory (Cullen, 1980), which suggests an attempt to offer balance to the dichotomy.

On the other side of the great social work dichotomy, the Settlement philosophy, which represented the societal-level thinking, also spawned further developments. The dialectical democratic processes in the philosophies and practices of the settlements led to the emergence of social group work in the 1920s (Gitterman & Germain, 2008). This form of group work was inspired, at least in part, by John Dewey.

From the progressive education movement, group work acquired a philosophic base. Dewey (1930) had stressed that democratic citizenship was best assured through democratically oriented classrooms, in which the group experience was used to help pupils learn and discover together. To live democracy represented the most effective means for learning democracy (p. 21-22).

Based on these ideas about “living democracy,” group work took many forms, but focused on responsible citizenship, mutual aid and collective action. According to Smalley (1967)

...the same generic principles operate for social group work as for social casework, they require a specific kind of application in the different social work process because of the different purpose of the process itself...the different configuration of relationships involved; and the different place of the worker in relation to the life and activity of the group as against the life and activity of an individual client... (p. 244).

Thus, the principles of group work overlapped with the principles of case work, but with significant differences. Group work focused on the relational processes of the group as opposed to the supposed pathology of the individual. The outcomes were different as well: instead of a solution for the individual, the group would be charged with developing an action plan that would benefit not just the whole group, but the larger social context, be that neighborhood, village or city, as well (Papell, 1966). Generally, group models tended to emphasize prevention, restoration, or both. There were expected benefits for the individuals involved, however.

“...[T]hey conceived group work functions as including the development of personality to its greatest capacity, the fostering of creative self-expression, the building of character, and the improvement of interpersonal skills” (Gitterman & Germain, 2008, p. 22). Further models of social work practice developed that capitalized on these common elements in the original COS and settlement philosophies, such as the community organization and social administration methods.

While there were some who attempted to make use of multiple philosophies and methods in social work, the great dichotomy tends to remain. “Because of the separate development of practice methods, agencies and workers defined themselves as casework agencies and caseworkers, or as group work agencies and group workers, or more recently as grassroots organizations and community organizers” (Gitterman & Germain, 2008, p. 28). These theoretical

and methodological divides have inhibited the development of social work as a unified profession. This has led to ongoing disputes and problems in determining a core knowledge base and training/education program for social work. They have also inhibited the production of ideas and interventions that involve the transactions of both persons and environments.

As these (and other) ideas and practice models have developed in social work, there have been a number of attempts along the way to define just what social work is. Probably the earliest conference dedicated to discerning a definition of social work was the Milford conference (Brieland, 1977). Milford consisted of a number of meetings between 1923 and 1929 that raised many essential questions that would need to be answered in order to formulate a definition, such as what rights clients should have, when people should become the responsibility of the state, and under what circumstances it would be preferable to break up a family. The conference participants discussed and debated these and many other questions, the intent being to determine whether a common thread existed in social work practice that could be identified. They concluded that social case work, though diverse in practices, practice settings and approaches, did possess a common technique and skill such that generic social case work comprised one profession (Leighninger, 1980). The outcome of this conference culminated in a conclusion that brought disparate entities together. Each subsequent definition also tended to be composed of elements of both the clinical and social reform camps, but with swaying emphasis—some leaned more towards one side, some more towards the other. It is noteworthy as well that the various attempts at a definition for social work did not just consider the great clinical vs. social reform debate, but also the other ongoing dichotomies such as persist between generalist practice and specialist practice, or the idea of social work practice as art vs. science.

Arguably the next significant attempt at a ‘working definition’ of social work comes from the Commission on Social Work Practice (1958). At this time the commission generated a tentative statement stating that the purpose of social work was to assist individuals and groups to minimize problems arising out of disequilibrium between themselves and their environments, and to otherwise strengthen individuals and groups in order to prevent further problems from occurring (Gibelman, 1999). This definition leans toward the clinical side of the debate by emphasizing the change process as taking place in the individuals and groups. However, it does include mention of the role of environment and equilibrium. To be fair, the use of the term “groups” could be considered broadly to include groups as large as communities, cities or nations. It was understood that the 1956 statement would need to be revised over time, and by 1970 the NASW endorsed the following statement: “Social work is the professional activity of helping individuals, groups, or communities enhance or restore their capacity for social functioning and creating societal conditions favorable to this goal (NASW, 1973, cited in Gibelman, 1999, p. 300). The addition of the latter part of the statement about creating favorable societal conditions serves to balance the statement with regard to the great dichotomy. However, a 1981 statement by the NASW labor force task force—another attempt to create a general defining statement for the social work profession—leaned back toward the clinical side again when it stated that

The profession of social work, by both traditional and practical definition, is the profession that provides the formal knowledge base, theoretical concepts, specific functional skills, and essential social values, which are used to implement society’s mandate to provide safe, effective and constructive social services (p. 300).

This definition is somewhat more sophisticated in that it captures more of the attributes of a profession (i.e. knowledge, method, value, sanction, mission), but it couches them in terms of “social services” to society, which points more toward clinical services than social reform. By 1996 the NASW statement modifies the 1981 definition to include not only a dual focus on the environmental conditions in society, but also reiterates that social work is concerned with serving poor, oppressed and vulnerable people, both of which apparently serve as correctives to the more individually focused 1980s when private (clinical) practice social work became popular (Trattner, 1999).

There were many other social work theorists and conferences that addressed the social work identity question over time (see later sections for details on these); they varied greatly in their emphases and theoretical orientations to the question. For instance, Porter Lee accounted for the distinction between the social reform and clinical perspectives in social work by thinking of them as “cause” and “function” (respectively). He interprets social work as a movement and profession that includes both cause, defined as “...usually a movement directed toward the elimination of an entrenched evil [sic]” (Lee, 1929, p. 3), and function, which is the “...slow methodical organized effort needed to make enduring the achievement of the cause...” (p. 4). Lee believed that in order for social work to have a transformative effect on society it must retain both the zeal that can make for social change, as well as the dedicated intelligence necessary to sustain and carry out the day-to-day work with particular individuals and groups. Writing nearly three decades later, Herbert Bisno also acknowledged the same continuing tension in social work (Bisno, 1952). His ideas focused on a dual role for social workers as both micro and macro practitioners at the same time. The dual role permits the “adjustment” of individuals and environments, with an emphasis on micro level interventions that ‘bridge the gap’ between the

individual and his or her social, economic and political context. Other social work theorists have generated similar theories, such as Clark Chambers' social worker as "priest and prophet," or the "real opportunity" and "individual engagement" of Arthur Todd.

The current (2011) NASW definition of social work clearly values both sides of the great dichotomy and offers a rather balanced and inclusive view, as can be seen in the following excerpts from the current preamble to the code of ethics:

A historic and defining feature of social work is the profession's focus on individual wellbeing in a social context and the wellbeing of society. Fundamental to social work is attention to the environmental forces that create, contribute to, and address problems in living...

These [social work] activities may be in the form of direct practice, community organizing, supervision, consultation, administration, advocacy, social and political action, policy development and implementation, education, and research and evaluation. Social workers seek to enhance the capacity of people to address their own needs. Social workers also seek to promote the responsiveness of organizations, communities, and other social institutions to individuals' needs and social problems (NASW, 2011).

This is clearly the longest, most inclusive and most sophisticated definition of social work yet. It not only mentions both the person and environment, but further refines the definition in its list of specific social work practices to include those conducted by clinical and social reform workers. Overall, what tends to emerge is a philosophy of social work (to the extent that it is summarized by the succinct definitions) that represents a 'both/and,' rather than an 'either/or' scheme. As has been stated, however, the old dissensions and dichotomies remain in many ways, and are still

seen in various social work theories and practice orientations, and in particular social work academic departments, agencies and individuals.

To be sure, the point of this dissertation is not to offer a new theory or model for social work practice, integrative and inclusive of the great dichotomy, or otherwise. The need for the present work remains even if a sufficient model were generated that not only reflected broad NASW (or other) definitions of social work, but that somehow incorporated all of social work practice, and at the same time retained significant power to describe said practices, prescribe specific interventions, incorporate the scientific research base—all without leaving anything, or anyone, out. This need lies at a higher level of abstraction, or meta-level. The way of thinking that assumes we must have one, timeless, absolute definition still requires its own justification. On the other hand, the idea that social work may be considered a *unified* profession and discipline, though it is not *uniform* in its theories and practices, also requires justification. That is the goal of this dissertation: to explain how pragmatism—considered dialectically with social work philosophy—can serve in that capacity.

Impact and Implications for Social Work

What we believe social work is, and who we believe we are as social workers, ultimately influences the social *work* that gets done (Witkin, 1998). In other words, we must attend carefully to our mission and purpose if we are to do ethical, constructive practice, and avoid becoming part of the problem instead of part of the solution. As stated, many (if not most) social workers would agree that social work should rightly involve both clinical and social reform perspectives (as per current NASW statement). What is missing from the mere statement that both are valid is a general theory that describes and explains how and why both perspectives

work together. Applying pragmatism dialectically strengthens the idea of unity in social work in this regard. What this offers is a way to unify the field of study without attempting to make it uniform. This means that both clinical and social reform perspectives would continue to be respected as valid approaches, but no attempt would be made to accommodate one to the other in a way that would involve alienating or destroying either. Pragmatism offers a potential solution to this divide in the field.

The significance of reconciling this tension in social work can have profound impact, particularly in pedagogy and practice. Pedagogically speaking, it is of utmost importance that students understand what social work is, and develop a professional identity as a social worker. This can be difficult to achieve if they are not taught a unified perspective on social work, but instead must learn to navigate the difficult waters of a profession divided, by piecing together bits from either side in order to create a solid foundation for their practice. Alternatively, students must choose one of the two perspectives at the expense of the other. This is reflected in many social work program curricula as students must select either clinical or social reform tracks for their course of study. If social work is a profession that involves the unity of persons *and* environments (e.g. Germain, 1981; NASW, 2011), and the adaptation of one to the other, then this trend in social work education seems counterproductive for the positive development of students' identities. Instead of students understanding social work as a profession that deals with persons in their environments, they are forced to understand themselves *either* as clinicians *or* as social reformers and administrators. This seems only to add fuel to the tension, which not only spurs continuing divisiveness, but also hinders the development of ideas and interventions that bring together both the person and environment perspectives in order to solve problems at the micro, mezzo and/or macro levels. Not only this, but students can become confused by the

identity crisis and instead of developing a more mature understanding of themselves as social workers, and what that role means, they often take on the identity of a separate discipline, but with an unofficial standing. For instance, many social work-trained micro practitioners identify themselves as “counselors,” “mental health professionals,” “psychotherapists,” or even “traumatologists,” (depending on their area of emphasis) and de-emphasize, or even disown, their training as social workers.

Practicing social workers who remain either confused about their identity as social workers, or who have disavowed their social work training and social work identity, are likely less equipped to utilize the training they have received and to develop ongoing approaches to micro or macro intervention that incorporate both persons and environments. Thus, ‘social workers’ either end up doing micro practice that elides influential macro issues such as race, class, gender, and social and economic justice, or they end up doing macro practice that ignores the particularity and diversity of individual circumstances and needs. Either situation is unfortunate as it leads to practice that does not take into account the wisdom of proper social work training which has been developed over the past century.

Another positive benefit of unification in social work is that it reconnects contemporary social work theory and practice to its historical roots. Social work is not just ahistorical applied social science. One of its great strengths is its historical trajectory as an emerging discipline, responsive to the needs of modern society. This involves the depth and richness of history, philosophy, theology, sociology, political science and psychology (among others). Social work also has its own philosophers, specifically Jane Addams, Mary Richmond and John Dewey, and (arguably) its own meta-philosophy, pragmatism. Social work is a historical discipline and profession rooted in social ethics, social justice and human rights (Addams, 1920; NASW,

2011); Reichert, 2003). Reconciling this ongoing tension by revisiting the writings of our historical progenitors in order to better understand how they thought about social work as a nascent profession can open up new possibilities for how to think about social work presently and for the future.

Chapter 2: Pragmatism and Social Work

This section shall serve as a brief introduction to pragmatism (see later chapter for a detailed discussion of John Dewey and pragmatism). Pragmatism as a philosophical movement has been around since the late 19th century, and was developed arguably the most comprehensively by John Dewey in the early to mid 20th century (Melchert, 2007). As a new perspective on a very old philosophical scene, pragmatism made a break with many of the dearly held tenets of European philosophy dating back at least as far as Plato. To this point in the late 19th century, philosophers had been attempting to figure out what is real (metaphysics), how one comes to know what is true and real (epistemology), and what one should do in life (ethics). The assumption was (and still is in many philosophical camps) that the ‘truth’ about who we are, who god is (if he/she/it exists), and what the world is like, is knowable by humans if we just come up with a sufficiently robust and sophisticated philosophical perspective to capture it, be that rational, empirical or otherwise. In other words, the assumption of philosophers was that the human mind is oriented in the universe in such a way as to be capable of grasping, knowing, understanding itself and its surroundings in an absolute and objective way. Pragmatism shatters this pretense and states instead that this endeavor has failed; and moreover that it is misguided and should be revised.

When would philosophy learn to leave to religion these perplexing problems of another life, and to psychology these subtle difficulties of the knowledge-process, and give itself

with all its strength to the illumination of human purposes and the coordination and elevation of human life? (Durant, 1961, p. 520)

Durant here reflects the pragmatist notion that the pretenses, and the very questions that the philosophers had been wrestling with, are now antiquated. Thus, pragmatism does not suggest that further answers to the questions of absolute knowledge and truth be sought. Instead, these 'old' questions should be abandoned (or at least left to others to deal with).

Pragmatism adopted a post-Darwinian world view which accepted the idea that human beings are animals that evolved alongside the rest of the flora and fauna in the natural world. It is therefore often referred to as a 'naturalized' philosophy. As such, "[t]hings are to be explained, then, not by supernatural causation, but by their place and function in the environment" (Durant, 1961). The human mind, accordingly, is not an instrument for knowing timeless, objective truths in the abstract. "This does not mean that mind is reduced to matter, but only that mind and life are to be understood not in theological but in biological terms, as an organ or an organism in an environment, acted upon and reacting, moulded [sic] and moulding" (1961). Thought is an instrument of adaptation and re-adaptation of bodies to environments. "Ideas are imagined contacts, experiments in adjustment" (1961). This leaves the human minds in their environments, with no escape to abstract reason; we are stuck with the contingencies and 'messiness' of everyday living (Glaude, 2007). This is the appropriate content for philosophy.

In sum, pragmatism is a very recent perspective, "...often hailed as America's contribution to world philosophy" (De Waal, 2005, p. 2). It offers a 'third way' of thinking between the pretenses of positivism on the one hand, and the skepticism (and possible nihilism) of constructivism (particularly relativistic understandings) on the other. The 'old' philosophical

trappings have also traditionally devalued the particular and the concrete. Pragmatism is concerned with just those things that so much philosophy of the past ignored: namely, the common life of non-aristocratic, 'real people' in ever-changing social, geographical, ecological, political and religious environments. "Taken broadly, pragmatism draws an intimate connection between theory and practice, between thought and action" (De Waal, 2005, p. 1). And as such, refocuses scholarly attention on identifying and solving social problems in human communities. The great 'understanding' that pragmatism seeks to develop is about who we are as human beings in relationship to each other in various ways, and how we shape, and are in turn shaped by, our social and physical environments. This knowledge, combined with the assumption that what is good and right is the growth, development and flourishing of all people, both as individuals and groups, leads to ongoing social 'experimentation' in a variety of ways, that serves these ethical ends.

Pragmatism was first developed alongside social work in the US, both of which were responding to the challenges facing society during modernization (e.g. urban poverty and disease). Pragmatism and social work were inextricably linked from the beginning, at least in the thinking of John Dewey and Jane Addams (see later chapter for details). The relationship between pragmatism and social work from the early years up to the present, at least in the philosophy of social work, is a question to be determined in part by this dissertation.

There is evidence that pragmatism is still influential in social work as it is referenced in a number of recent professional journal articles on a variety of topics. For instance, Caputo (2005) uses John Dewey's pragmatism as a primary theoretical framework for thinking about how social workers should consider religious and political issues and respond intentionally, both to individual and environmental needs. Similarly, Gibson (2005) responds to the polarization in

American politics a decade prior and again recommends a pragmatist approach as an alternative to the usual ‘either/or.’ This would mean trading in polarized political dogmatism (i.e. either republican or democrat) for finding common ground, particularly when it comes to ideals of freedom, community and family.

Pragmatism has, at least more recently, been recognized and utilized as one of several primary research paradigms in social work (Feilzer, 2009; Kazi, 2000). Pragmatism contrasts with positivism and post-positivism, which hold that there is an objective reality that scientific research can describe, explain and predict, on the one hand, and constructivism, which denies such claims, on the other. Pragmatism is offered as an alternative framework to the ongoing “paradigm wars” in social work research. Like with social work practice, the ‘lens’ one uses to view research (i.e. positivism, constructivism or pragmatism) has a profound impact on what questions one asks and which methodology is utilized, and therefore shapes the results obtained. Positivist research primarily uses quantitative research methods, constructivist research primarily uses qualitative methods. Pragmatist research, since it is anti-dualist and therefore more concerned with “what works,” than with the ongoing and “remarkably unproductive” research debates, is free to utilize both quantitative and/or qualitative research methods, and their variants (Feilzer, 2009). As such, pragmatism is often used as the paradigm of choice for mixed-methods research.

Pragmatism has also been applied to a wide variety of different issues relating to social work practice, including defining racism (Bruening, 1974); teaching statistics to social work students (Calderwood, 2008); foster care concerning the placement of sibling groups (Hollows & Nelso, 2006); conceptual analysis in gerontology concerning “aging-in-place” and “migration” (Cutchin, 2001). Whether the subject is the philosophy of social work, or more specific topics

relating to research, policy and practice, the relevant philosophical assumptions, or meta-philosophy, will have a significant impact in shaping how problems and issues are conceptualized, as well as how interventions are constructed and applied.

Chapter 3: Methodology

The methodology used in this dissertation is conceptual. The historical identity crisis in social work, specifically the clinical vs. social reform debate, is the problem—this dissertation proposes a solution. The method for solving this problem is the application of Deweyan pragmatism as a philosophical orientation for social work at the broadest level. Deweyan pragmatism is used because it is arguably the most widely recognized and comprehensive form of pragmatism, and because Dewey was closely allied with Jane Addams. Any use of pragmatism must also utilize one or more theorists as a referent since ‘pragmatism’ as an appellation refers to a fairly wide and diverse set of ideas. Too, the application of pragmatism to social work will be a dialectical process whereby the central ideas of pragmatism will be considered ‘in conversation’ with relevant ideas found in the selected social work texts. In so doing pragmatism will not simply be applied to social work, but pragmatist concepts will be compared and contrasted with central concepts found in the philosophies of social work.

Pragmatism will also provide a philosophical backing for asking questions about the philosophy of social work (i.e. regarding its mission, practices, methods, etc.). For instance, asking the question “what is *the* practice method of social work?” contains the assumption that the answer must be singular. This assumption would be consistent with some form of absolutism which would state that things such as professions (or academic disciplines) must be singular in their mission, purpose, identity, practice, etc. Pragmatism does not make this assumption and instead offers a process-oriented, pluralistic perspective (see section on pragmatism). This

changes the nature of the question and the potential answers (see discussion section). Thus the method used for this dissertation is the formation of conceptual linkages between pragmatism and social work, specifically related to the clinical vs. social reform debate. The method can also be considered an application: the application of pragmatism as a broad philosophical background to the stated problem in social work.

Since pragmatism and social work are historically linked (at least in the work of Jane Addams), the determination of a pragmatist perspective for this dissertation will be generated from social work itself, and from John Dewey. There is a 'nested' method involved in this step: in order to determine the pragmatist framework extant in social work (if it exists), inductive reasoning will be used to cull pragmatist elements (starting with Addams' work) from significant texts and arrange them thematically. It is assumed at this point that the pragmatism drawn from social work texts will not provide a sufficiently abstract and comprehensive pragmatist perspective, so the works of John Dewey will also be consulted. A pragmatist perspective will then be synthesized from these two sources. This pragmatist perspective will then be applied to the clinical vs. social reform debate. Each step in this dissertation will also involve reviewing (e.g. analyzing, synthesizing) relevant professional literature in order to determine the nature and history of the stated problem, to understand historical solutions and/or perspectives that have been proposed related to the problem, and to understand pragmatism and its relationship to social work.

There are four primary tasks to be accomplished in this dissertation, each with concomitant methods. The first task is to generate a pragmatist framework. The method used will be a literature review involving primary and secondary sources, analyzed for content related to pragmatism. These will then be synthesized and summarized into the pragmatist framework

involving Dewey's pragmatism, which will be similarly generated (e.g. using primary and secondary sources of literature). The second task will be to gain a richer and deeper understanding of the problem—the clinical vs. social reform debate. The method for this will be to review primary and secondary source materials (books and journal articles) from selected national social work conferences and scholars. These sources will be analyzed according to a five-item framework taken from social work itself (Gordon, 1965) in order to understand the philosophy of social work for each selected conference or scholar. This process will be further focused in order to understand how the perspectives offered relate to the clinical vs. social reform debate. The third task will be to apply the pragmatist framework to the newly gained perspective on the clinical vs. social reform debate. The method for this will be to make explicit conceptual linkages between the elements of pragmatism and the problem in social work. Analysis of the connections and relationships between ideas will be the primary tool in all of these processes, as it will be in drawing conclusions from this application. Finally, implications of the application will be discussed as they relate to social work pedagogy, practice, research and policy. As with previous sections, discussing implications will involve a survey of relevant empirical and theoretical literature from professional social work or other relevant journals and books.

Text Selection Criteria

Generally speaking, texts will be included for this study primarily because of the relevance of their content—that is, because they are relevant social work and/or pragmatist texts, whether books or professional journal articles, that generally deal with issues in the philosophy of social work, and specifically focus on issues pertaining to the clinical vs. social reform debate. Since the issue at hand for this dissertation is a debate, texts will be selected that include

perspectives from both sides (i.e. both clinical and social reform). In addition, texts will be selected with attention to the race, age, ethnicity and gender of the authors, with an aim at inclusion of diverse perspectives. Texts will also be sought that represent the perspectives offered at different time periods. For all selection, a sufficient, yet reasonable, number of texts will be selected in order to exhaust the discussion of relevant ideas.

The texts selected shall be representative of the ideas of the theorist and/or conference being considered. There will be four national-level social work conferences, and 9 social work theorists surveyed and analyzed for this dissertation in order to gain a deeper understanding of the development of the philosophy of social work, specifically regarding the clinical vs. social reform debate. Several criteria were used to select each conference and theorist. These included them being regularly cited in relevant professional social work literature and books. Conferences selected must have been widely attended by social workers, including leaders in the field at the time. Theorists were also selected because of the impact and significance of their ideas for social work, as evidenced by their participation in national level conferences and/or holding leadership positions in the social work field. Each theorist also wrote at least one major book on a relevant topic and a number of articles that have been published in the professional literature. Conferences and theorists are also well recognized, and recommended as essential to the present work, by contemporary scholars in social work, including those on the present dissertation committee.

The selected conferences/proceedings include: 1) The Milford Conference (AASW, 1929); 2) The Hollis-Taylor report (Hollis & Taylor, 1931); 3) The NASW subcommittee on the “working definition” (NASW, 1958); and 4) The Madison Meeting (*Social Work*, special issue, 1977). The selected social work theorists include: 1) Jane Addams; 2) Mary Richmond; 3)

Bertha Reynolds; 4) Arthur Todd; 5) Herbert Bisno; 6) Edward Lindeman; 7) Edward Devine; 8) Charlotte Towle; 9) Jesse Taft.

Analytical Frameworks

There will be two frameworks used for this dissertation. The first includes criteria for analyzing the philosophy of social work and has been previously generated from the social work field itself—the Gordon framework (1962). The second framework will be generated in response to the dissertation question that asks whether social work has a strong pragmatist element present in it over time. This will involve the analysis of selected conferences and texts according to the Gordon framework. The outcome of this analysis will then be considered in light of Dewey’s pragmatism, and a conception, or framework, of pragmatism for social work will be constructed. This will be subsequently applied to the clinical vs. social reform debate.

The Gordon framework for analyzing the philosophy of social work has been chosen because it provides five specific elements that are putatively denotative of any profession (Gordon, 1962). Gordon, along with the first subcommittee of the NASW charged with creating a “working definition,” generated the framework after considerable study of the history of professionalism and the history of the quest for professional status in social work (particularly post-Flexner). This framework is comprised of the following five elements: purpose, value, method, knowledge and sanction. The term “purpose” refers to the mission of social work (or other) practice and what it aims to accomplish. “Value” refers to the ethical mandate of social work—states what is of value in pursuing the mission. “method” refers to the specific practices and procedures that will be used in order to carry out the mission, according to the stated values. “knowledge” refers to the methodologies and methods that will be used to generate information

that will inform the practices. Finally, “sanction” refers to the “authoritative permission; countenance, approbation, or support” for social work, supporting its legitimacy as a profession and discipline (p. 6). The reason this is considered a ‘framework’ is because it contains only the criteria for discussing a professional discipline, and not any particular content. The content will be a variable according to the particular social work theorist or conference under consideration. The framework exists as a useful tool for the consistent summary and evaluation of different thinkers and ideas.

The use of the term ‘framework’ for pragmatism is somewhat different. In this case the framework to be generated via the dissertation is not a set of criteria for evaluation, it is simply a summary statement of key concepts that will serve to define pragmatism so that it can be applied to the stated problem in social work. The framework will not serve as a tool for systematic summary (as explained above), but as a focused working definition of pragmatism. Pragmatism as a philosophical perspective or ‘school,’ is quite broad and diverse (De Waal, 2005) and therefore notoriously difficult to succinctly define. Any attempt to capture a supposedly timeless and all-encompassing definition of pragmatism would also be an ironic pursuit, antithetical to the primary tenets of pragmatism itself. Thus, the construction of this definitional framework of pragmatism should be considered an attempt to define pragmatism fairly and accurately, but without pretense that the definition generated could serve as a representative definition of pragmatism. The inclusion of social work pragmatism (if discovered) will also contextualize the definition for the purposes of applying it as a solution to the clinical vs. social reform debate—this is the primary purpose and intended use. Construction of the definition will involve not only the search for pragmatist elements/themes in the selected social work texts (conferences and major theorists), but will also involve a broad survey of texts by or on John Dewey, and texts on

general pragmatism (including both primary and secondary sources). These texts will be selected because they are well known to Dewey/pragmatism scholars, because they are cited in reputable and relevant books and professional journal articles in philosophy and/or social work, and because they are written by experts on the topic.

Chapter 4: Deweyan Pragmatism

The following summary of Dewey's philosophy will consist of a discussion around three central themes: the Darwinian revolution in philosophy that characterizes pragmatism, the idea of organisms in environments (Dewey's anthropology), and Dewey's democratic method for building knowledge called instrumentalism (this last theme will contain ethics as well, which are also generated via democratic processes). These themes have been generated from a number of his major works, and will serve as the definition of pragmatism for subsequent analysis and discussion. Dewey wrote voluminously over his long career and usually did not attempt any sort of encapsulated or systematic approach to his philosophy (as it would be inconsistent with pragmatism to do so). Thus, any summary of Dewey must reflect some difficult choices about how to organize a large amount of material, and ideas that are by definition somewhat malleable. The three themes presented here reflect an attempt to adhere to the three primary questions of philosophy: metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. However, since the focus is on the application of pragmatism to social work, the metaphysics theme emphasizes anthropology and the radical reorientation of philosophy since these are both most pertinent to social work. The epistemology and ethics themes too reflect an attempt to glean from Dewey those ideas most relevant to social work and the discussion at hand.

A Revolution in Philosophy

“John Dewey ranks as the most influential of America's philosophers. That influence stems, in part, from the originality of his mind, the breadth of his interests, and his capacity to synthesize materials from diverse sources” (Dewey, R., 1977, p. ix) Dewey was born in Burlington, Vermont in 1859 and lived a long life as an American public philosopher (died in

1952) (Ecker, 1997). His pragmatism continues to be influential and led him to write at length on many aspects of modern life, particularly education and social issues. Pragmatism is a comprehensive meta-philosophy (e.g. contrast with positivism and social constructionism) that offers novel views on every aspect of philosophy from ethics to metaphysics (Thayer, 1982). Dewey's ideas also represent an unwavering hopefulness despite the radical changes that occurred in modernization which gave rise to new forms of social conditions such as poverty, crime and homelessness (Fishman & McCarthy, 2007). This (among many other things) makes his ideas particularly well suited for applicability to social work.

Pragmatism represented a revolution in philosophy akin to the radical paradigm shift that occurred when Copernicus challenged the geocentric view of the universe and offered heliocentric theory in its place (Melchert, 2007). Dewey's philosophy makes a break with the tradition going back at least 2,500 years to Plato. The philosophical stage was set for this new thinking in the modern era with rationalism and empiricism, and in the nineteenth century in particular with the ideas of Nietzsche, Feuerbach, and particularly Darwin. Pragmatism itself was not invented by Dewey, but existed already in a somewhat different form generated by C.S. Peirce (and others), which Dewey followed and (arguably) developed further than any other pragmatist thinker. Dewey is considered to have made a 'Darwinian revolution' in philosophy by offering a method for framing and understanding human questions. Prior to Dewey's Darwinian approach, philosophical questions took the form of inquiring about eternal, universal truths (Plato), fixed essences (Aristotle), and more recently attempts were made to establish foundations for truth and knowledge based on a priori truths (e.g. the rationalism of Rene Descartes) or empiricism (e.g. David Hume). For instance, in philosophical discourse, an ethical inquiry may take the form "what *is* an ethic—truly, universally, absolutely?" or "What is the

indubitable foundation for knowledge that always marks it as distinct from mere opinion or conjecture?” These questions, and multitudes of others like them, presume that human beings are in a position to access transcendent, pure, timeless information from a perspective unbiased by any human standpoint. Dewey rejects any form of putative objectivity, transcendence, or ultimate empirical grounding, particularly those assuming a ‘god’s eye’ view of the world.

Dewey’s response to this antiquated philosophizing is to offer, following Darwin, a naturalized philosophy.

The conceptions that had reigned in the philosophy of nature and knowledge for two thousand years, the conceptions that had become the familiar furniture of the mind, rested on the assumption of the superiority of the fixed and final; they rested upon treating change and origin as signs of defect and unreality (Dewey, 1909, p. 39).

Naturalized philosophy runs contrariwise and embraces the notion that the universe and biological species—particularly human beings—are constantly in flux and subject to alteration and change. The starting point for philosophy is not seeking truth and reality beyond the very earthly, animal realm, but the recognition that humans, and human thought, are a product of the same dynamic evolutionary processes that are responsible for everything else in the environment. Dewey does not believe it is possible to know what lies beyond the purview of human perception. Thus, much of traditional philosophizing lies in the futile realm of fantasy speculation as it seeks fixed states of knowledge and truth. There is no point in attempting pure contemplation of transcendent forms, or of building various ‘houses of cards’ out of supposed rational axioms or empirical foundations. Dewey assumes instead a *process* metaphysic whereby what *is* always involves the dynamic flux of relationships in the material world.

Supplanting traditional philosophy does not occur by logical disproof, however, but by realizing that the questions themselves are problematic (Dewey, 1925, p. 4). Instead of asking “what *is* truth?” and seeking certainty yet again, Dewey takes a turn toward humility and responsibility and concerns himself instead with the conditions and consequences of human values and actions. This is a turn toward issues and problems of daily living, not of transcendent forms or imagined truth systems. Clinging to the questions and problems of the past *is* the problem, according to Dewey. He hoped to bring about new intellectual habits in his action-oriented philosophy, leaving the old questions behind, unanswered (unanswerable). The new, emancipated philosophy is one that reorients the thinker to a contingent, contextualized, biological world—a world where the thinker starts with the realization that he or she has already been influenced by culture and history, and is not in a position to grasp certainty as if from outside. This release from the old pretensions of philosophy leaves pragmatism as a problem-focused, scientific (using the term broadly), fallible and revisable method of thinking. Dewey does not think the history of philosophy should be summarily jettisoned, however—in fact, on his view this would be impossible even if it were desired, since it has already shaped current thinking. The best one could achieve would be to remain ignorant of the consequences of having already been exposed to previous thought and history in various ways. Instead, philosophy should focus on who we have been (i.e. intellectual history) and move forward according to pragmatic thinking and activity.

The Organism-in-Environment Perspective

In order to understand Dewey’s conception of what a human being is, an example is in order. He discusses the understanding of human *experience* in order to illustrate his new,

pragmatist way of thinking, demonstrating a point of departure from traditional thought (Dewey, 1917, p. 47-49).

In the orthodox view, experience is regarded primarily as a knowledge-affair. But to eyes not looking through ancient spectacles, it assuredly appears as an affair of the intercourse of a living being with its physical and social environment. According to tradition experience is (at least primarily) a psychical thing... (Dewey, 1917, p. 47).

The contrast he is drawing here is between the old view, which considers human experience to be a state of consciousness, or mental impression of an objective world upon the human mind (e.g. Hume). In other words, the “psychical thing” equates to a purely individual conscious event, disconnected from historical and environmental context. Without discarding the fact that humans have conscious experiences that can be considered subjective, he offers a broad reorientation of what is going on in human experience. Instead of focusing on the presentation of ‘reality’ to a human sensory apparatus, he asserts that experience is the interaction of the person (or non-human animal) with his or her physical and social environment. The key difference is that he finds no clear and obvious subject/object distinction. Dewey focuses instead on happenings, or processes, not static states, and therefore views the occurrence of human experience as best characterized by an exchange, an *interaction* as the human organism and the physical and social contexts meet and intermingle in various ways.

There is a further distinction to be made regarding human experience. The old way of thought considers the human organism a passive recipient of information which is imprinted upon its senses and mind. This is the view of the human as a mirror that reflects its surroundings. For Dewey, not only does a person not merely reflect an objective external reality,

he or she is inextricably involved in the event of that putative reality. Simply put, there is no such thing as just a person, or just an environmental context. This does not imply a relativistic constructionist perspective whereby the external world is reduced to human culture and language (e.g. Derrida). Dewey's perspective is a refocusing of our attention from the subject/object dichotomy, which leads us from either absolutist perspective—objectivism or subjective relativism (of some sort)—to a perspective focused on the *interaction* of subject and object. In so doing, the subject and object 'disappear' and attention is rightly placed upon the dynamic relationship.

There is a temporal dimension involved in this reorientation. The old way focuses on what is given already—what has already happened. Pragmatism focuses instead on what is occurring in the present as the organism adapts to and modifies the environment in various ways. For instance, one idea in early psychology that Dewey challenged was the 'reflex arc' (Dewey, 1896, p. 3). According to the reflex arc concept, humans operate as organisms responsive to external stimuli (i.e. there is a 'reflexive' neuronal reaction that occurs between the brain and external stimuli). A child touching a candle, for instance, recoils at the heat of the flame. This is a motor response to the perceptual stimuli. Dewey does not see it this way, however. The reflex arc concept has three main problems. First, it makes a dichotomy between sensation and thought (reminiscent of the old mind/body dualism), second, it renders the human a passive agent in the encounter, and third, it only looks backward in time. The pragmatist reorientation focuses not on the component parts of the candle touching (or any) situation, but on the whole process that unfolds. Foiling the sensation/thought dichotomy, it understands sensation and thought as continuous neurological functions of the interacting organism. The organism is also considered an active agent in the candle situation: the child first thought of and reached for the hot candle,

and also recoiled at its burn. In so doing, a continuity existed between ocular sensation in the act of seeing, motor coordination in the act of reaching, proprioception in the bodily movement, motivation in the desire to reach in the first place, as well as heat sensation and recoil. Even this description only captures a few of the processes going on in the reaching situation. Dewey's point is to view the whole scene and not just a disjointed concatenation of physical and psychic events. Dewey understands that physical bodies involve neural circuitry, and that there are stimulus/response processes taking place in human movement and cognition. The difference is the holistic view focused on the entire transaction as it unfolds in time.

Temporally, the pragmatist perspective focuses more on the future than the past.

[E]xperience in its vital form is experimental, an effort to change the given; it is characterized by projection, by reading forward into the unknown; connexion with a future is its salient trait... An experience that is an undergoing of an environment and a striving for its control in new directions is pregnant with connexions (Dewey, 1917, p. 48).

Thus, people in their physical and social environments do not merely respond passively to external stimuli and become shaped, they also actively pursue interactions that serve their intended ends. They must struggle with and endure their environmental circumstances; they seek to adjust themselves to the environment, but also seek to adjust the environment to their needs and preferences. "...[L]ife goes on by means of controlling the environment. Its activities must change the changes going on around it; they must neutralize hostile occurrences; they must transform neutral events into cooperative factors or into an efflorescence of new features" (Dewey, 1917, p. 48). The 'good life,' even survival itself, requires social and physical

environments conducive to life and flourishing. Human survival and development therefore involve an active pursuit of environmental transformation—a future-oriented outlook.

Transformation of the sort that is preferable and conducive to good living also necessarily involves active risk taking—pragmatism is a philosophy of adventure in many ways (p. 49).

Obstacles must be overcome and problems must be constantly addressed in order for people to “live forward” (p. 49) in a world where things are always changing. Successful thriving must involve more than just a backward-looking reflection—a being impressed upon—but also, and more importantly, it must involve an “imaginative forecast,” an anticipation of future possibilities. These, combined with the application of intelligence to daily living, are necessary for the “...achieving of good and averting of ill...” (p. 50)—the highest interests of human kind.

Instrumentalism: the Method of Intelligent Action for Democratic Ethics

In pragmatist thought *method* replaces the quest for absolute certainty and truth (Dewey, 1977). Experience and knowledge are depicted by interactions between organisms and environments. These interactions constantly alter both: environments shape organisms and organisms shape environments. And in the process, organisms may apply intelligent interventions in order to best shape their environments to fit their needs and interests. This is a matter of applying a method in order to bring about the intended transformation (Melchert, 2007). This, for Dewey, is what knowledge is about—“..the formation of new dynamic connexions...” (Dewey, in Hickman & Alexander, 1998, Vol. 1, p. 53). Pragmatic ‘knowing’ is much less a knowing *that* (e.g. that such and such a proposition is ‘true’), and much more a knowing *how*. Knowing how involves understanding how things happen—being able to anticipate various schemas and the consequences they produce.

But if it be true that the self or subject of experience is part and parcel of the course of events, it follows that the self *becomes* a knower. It becomes a mind in virtue of a distinctive way of partaking in the course of events. The significant distinction is no longer between the knower and the world; it is between different ways of being in and of the movement of things; between a brute physical way and a purposive, intelligent way (Dewey, 1917, p. 65).

Knowing therefore means dealing with extant conditions in such a way as to direct future possibilities. In so doing, the anticipated future event becomes the stimulus in the mind of the thinker. As stated, this is an engagement of the thinker temporally: past experience informs present cognition in such a way that a creatively imagined future instigates present action. The thinker is in this sense ‘in tune’ with the flux of events. Instead of considering knowledge as a ‘cross-sectional’ snapshot—a timeless, universal proposition—pragmatic knowledge is longitudinal, a “redirection given to changes already going on” (p. 66). Redirection requires experience in order to develop the ability to anticipate and predict events of a particular sort. “Knowing is the act, stimulated by this foresight, of securing and averting consequences” (p. 66). Pragmatism is about developing ideas that are relevant to effectively dealing with the actual crises of life, and testing them by considering their usefulness.

Achieving useful, desired ends requires application of the method of intelligent inquiry. The method should not be thought of as a routine application, however. While there is a rough process to it, pragmatism is about vision, imagination and reflection. Method without these will not effectively modify environments to support productive ends. Dewey understands the world as a complicated and dangerous place where action that is not informed by vision, imagination and reflection is likely to increase confusion and conflict, not solve problems (Dewey, 1917, p.

67). "...[I]ntelligence is itself the most promising of all novelties, the revelation of the meaning of that transformation of past into future which is the reality of every present" (p. 68). Dewey's method is therefore the means by which transformation can occur. "Faith in the power of intelligence to imagine a future which is the projection of the desirable into the present, and to invent the instrumentalities of its realization, is our salvation" (p. 69)

Dewey's method is called instrumentalism. The idea is that human ideas, concepts and terms are intellectual *tools* that can be used for various purposes, primarily toward coping, adapting and solving problems (Melchert, 2007). Problem solving requires creative, reflective thinking of which Dewey generated five phases, or aspects. Each will be discussed briefly in turn. When perplexing, troubling or confused situations present themselves, reflective thought will involve first, suggestions—these are the initial solutions that quickly come to mind and present themselves as possible solutions. Typically, only further reflection can produce an intelligent response (Dewey, 1933, p. 139). Second, the experienced problem will be translated into a question that can be answered. Third, various possible solutions are considered, leading to the generation of a hypothesis which can guide observations and the collection of relevant information. Fourth, reasoning occurs which imagines possible outcomes of hypotheses in light of the observations. Logical connections, and perhaps mathematical manipulations, will be involved in this phase. This is a honing and refining of the problem, the observations and the hypothesis. Finally, phase five involves the actual testing of the hypothesis by action. The aim is experimental observation and corroboration, or verification, of the conjectured idea, the hypothesis. This is a move from the hypothetical outcomes that occur in phase four, to observing actual outcomes of applying the best solution to the concrete situation. This may result in corroboration or rejection of the ideas in question. The five phases should not be thought of as

necessarily linear or sequential; they may occur in an iterative fashion as the intelligent inquiry proceeds—the list is only an outline for how things may go.

The point of the method is to solve concrete problems of human living. The method is not meant to convey the (contradictory) notion that it produces objective, universal truths. Dewey finds his method ultimately fallible and revisable. It is a process that is ongoing and subject to the values of those who apply it. It should be noted as well that though the pragmatic method is scientific, Dewey rejected scientism. His whole project was to eliminate the dogmatic, privileged status of traditional inquiry, whether religious, philosophical, or scientific. Thus, science does not possess some special magic that accesses truth and reality. Dewey believes painters may know color as well as a meteorologist; educators and dramatists may know human nature as well as the professional psychologist; farmers may know soils and plants as well as a botanist (Melchert, 2007). Scientific concepts, like all other concepts, are simply tools used to satisfy certain interests, and the interests of physical science (or any science) are not the only ones valuable for human development. All events are naturally imbued with meaning, so each inquiry must be guided by reflection upon what interests and purposes it serves. For Dewey, science and common sense are continuous methods, each capable of being productive in facilitating human flourishing.

The purposes served—the values which guide this practice-oriented way of knowing—are not generated from a priori rational foundations or empirical means (Anderson, 2010). As with his metaphysics and epistemology, Dewey rejected any notion of discovering timeless truths that exist somehow ‘out there,’ objectively beyond the ‘real world’ of concrete human experiences and environments. Ethics are thus generated from within communities of people. Dewey was not an ethical relativist who believed that any ethic is as good as any other, or that

one individual's ethics were no more useful or valid than any those of any other. He understood ethics as values that must be selected by individuals and groups, hopefully (and not surprisingly) by democratic processes that take into account the consequences of different valuing. What is valued is not itself simply 'good' or 'right'—it is what a particular value leads to that matters. As such, ethics are understood to guide actions. Over time people have tried many different ways of living, some produce beneficial ends, others lead to atrocities. Dewey hoped people would learn from their history (both individually and collectively) and learn to make better choices. Dewey's ethics focus therefore on actions and their consequences—these can even be empirically tested to determine which actions produce the most preferential outcome. The same is true with politics. Dewey refused to dogmatically apply any one political theory—he believed this is a tendency toward destruction and suffering. Instead, one should select and apply the most suitable approach given the context and situation at hand. As such, ethics require much reflection—reflection on possible outcomes, research and history. One should also personally reflect on their desires, motivations and intentions. What is valuable should be determined and action should be taken. This should be a creative application of human intelligence toward solving problems. It is an ongoing process of thought and reflection, selecting values, taking action, then evaluating the outcomes. Dewey valued social justice, peace and human flourishing, with special attention to those in society who were oppressed, exploited, ill or impoverished. He did not attempt to ground these ethics on a rational or empirical foundation. He was more interested in continued discussion and consciousness-raising about what they meant, and above all, taking action to transform society so as to bring them about.

Chapter 5: Historical Context: National Conferences

This section and the next (chapters 5 and 6) are comprised of a systematic analysis of the philosophies of social work from four major conferences and nine major theorists of the 20th century. For each conference and thinker, the ideas will be summarily expressed here according to the conceptual framework (Gordon, 1962) which includes five categories: purpose, method, knowledge, values and sanction. Following this, pragmatist elements, should they be present, will be discussed. Finally, the ideas will be discussed with more specificity as to how they inform the clinical vs. social reform debate.

The Milford Conference

By the late nineteen-teens and early to mid nineteen-twenties, social work, even represented by social case work, had already become a rather diverse and varied field of practice. This situation is demonstrated by the growing number of different professional organizations that were forming (Leighninger, 1987). For example, hospital social workers formed the first specialized professional association in 1918; the American Association of Visiting Teachers (AAVT) formed not long after in 1919; the American Association of Schools of Social Work (AASSW); followed by others such as the American Association of Psychiatric Social Workers (AAPSW) in 1926. These organizations, among others, reflected a diverse array of social case work occurring in a variety of settings such as hospitals, schools, probation departments, family welfare agencies, and child guidance clinics. This raised one primary concern about social case work: is there such a thing as 'generic' social case work, or are these distinctive practices so specialized that they lack sufficient common ground to be considered one 'genus?'

At the first meeting of the Milford Conference an attempt was made to define the several fields of social case work. The discussion made it clear that the group were [sic] not able

at that time to define social case work itself so as to distinguish it sharply from other forms of professional work nor the separate fields of social case work so as to differentiate them sharply from each other (AASW, 1929, p. 3).

The reason for the Milford study was therefore to determine whether social case work was one ‘generic’ thing, or several ‘specific’ things.

The Milford report (1929) represents the conclusions of meetings that occurred over five years (starting in Milford, Pennsylvania) which addressed questions (such as just mentioned) about the philosophy of social case work (Brieland, 1977). Attendees primarily included case work leaders from New York, and a few from Boston and Philadelphia (Leighninger, 1987).

The report concluded that the similarities among the various specialties were greater than their differences and that practitioners in the specialties required a common base of knowledge that should come from common training programs (Brieland, 1977, p. 341).

This was a landmark statement at a time when cohesion in social work—even social case work—had not been established. As the specialized practices and their representative organizations grew, so did the forces for cohesion, such as the American Association of Social Workers (AASW) in 1921. The AASW sought to establish general, professional standards for practice and training which cut across all fields of practice (Leighninger, 1987). The unifying conclusion of the Milford report thus represented a move toward understanding case work as a ‘generalist,’ rather than ‘specialist’ practice. This was consistent with the views of Mary Richmond and the COSs as well.

The five-item analytical framework (see methods section) will now be applied to the Milford report. It is noteworthy that precursors to this framework exist in rudimentary form in

the Milford report itself. The “introductory statement,” for instance, states “[t]he marks by which a professional service is distinguished from other professional services are its field, its objectives, its vocational resources and its characteristic methods of work” (AASW, 1929, p. 15). These items loosely correspond to “sanction,” “purpose,” “knowledge,” and “methods”—“values” are conspicuously absent. It should also be noted that the conference did not attempt to generate a definition of either social work, or of social case work; it only attempted to identify aspects of case work in order to determine if it is one or many things.

Purpose. In a sense, the mission of social work, at least according to the Milford report, is for social work—or at least for social *case work*—to further refine its mission. The report in many ways is a call for case workers to discover and invent their mission with more intentionality and specificity. “The conclusion of the Committee on this point is that there is no greater responsibility facing social case work at the present time than the responsibility of organizing continuous research into the concepts, problems and methods of its field” (AASW, 1929, p. 12).

The report does offer distinct ideas about the present purpose of social case work, however, though not about social work more broadly speaking. In general, social case work “...deals with human beings one at a time” (AASW, 1929, p. 22). “The ultimate goal is to develop in the individual the fullest possible capacity for self-maintenance in a social group” (p. 29). The purpose of social case work is to assist individual functioning in the capacity of “self-maintenance.” This falls within the purview of social case work especially when deficits in self-maintenance rise to crisis levels. “We suggest that the distinguishing concern of social case work is the capacity of the individual to organize his [sic] own normal social activities in a given environment” (p. 16). The self-maintenance of “normal” activities means that various

“deviations” of human social functioning have been alleviated. These “norms” or normal conditions of human living include the ability to successfully engage in activities such as education, marriage, nationality, parenthood, recreation, self-support, sex and social behavior. Deviations include such things as alcoholism, crime, dependency in old age, homelessness, illiteracy, insufficient wage, prostitution, pauperism and unemployment (to name a few).

[social case work] has made its highest contribution when its client no longer needs the social case worker, not because he [sic] no longer faces these deviations but because his developed capacity for self-maintenance is equal to the task of dealing with them unaided by a social case worker (p. 17).

Self-maintenance is the capacity of the individual to conduct him or herself in everyday life such that he or she is able to cope successfully with life’s demands.

Method. The methods considered in the Milford conference fall within a limited range. The primary question asked was whether social case work, as a generic entity, actually exists. “This report does not attempt to analyze the professional aspects of social work as a whole. It does attempt to present descriptions of the aspects of social case work as one division of social work” (AASW, 1929, p. 15). They conclude, “...in any discussion of problems, concepts, scientific knowledge or methods, generic social case work is the common field to which the specific forms of social case work are merely incidental” (p. 8). This conclusion clearly excludes discussion of any social work practice method that is not social case work. But as social case work, many specialties were recognized, such as take place in hospitals, correctional facilities, social welfare agencies, schools, and the like.

The methods utilized in social case work include gathering a social history in order to determine deviations from accepted social norms in order to develop a “social treatment” that involves various community resources. The goal is to assist the individual in becoming self-sufficient (i.e. self-maintenance). Procedures include case selection, diagnosis, treatment, case closure and evaluation of results (AASW, 1929). Diagnosis is predicated upon a wide variety of information—the “social case history”—which makes the case “particularized” to the individual. Social case history includes family history, educational background, marital status, social status, employment history, daily habits, personal attitudes, church involvement, etc. The method of treatment involves first determining the current state of deficiency with regard to self-maintenance via social case history. Following this, the worker determines the cause of these deviations and prescribes a treatment that will restore self-maintenance.

The prescription or “methods” that will help a client develop his or her capacity for self-maintenance shall include such as the following, conducted by the case worker: analysis, commitment, interviewing, observation, planning, relief allowance, treatment, and transportation (AASW, 1929). Most of these methods are defined in the report and include, for instance, the establishment of relationship with a client (in “interviewing”). Twenty-five methods are listed for social case work, but the list is not meant to be exhaustive as new methods are regularly being generated in various forms of case work practice. The methods inevitably involve various community resources, so the job of the social case worker in many respects is to connect the client with these agencies and services. These include, but are not limited to, churches, medical agencies and schools. In sum, the methods of social case treatment include the interplay of three primary elements: 1) the use of social resources by the worker (such as those just mentioned). 2) Helping the client to understand his or her needs and possibilities. 3) Helping him or her to work

out a particularized social program. “The flesh and blood is in the dynamic relationship between social case worker and the client...” (p. 29). And, reflecting Richmond, these all serve the intent to develop, to the fullest extent possible, the client’s personality. The application of these methods to each particular case should also be considered not as a routine procedure, but as an art. As such, a final method for social case work involves the worker: he or she should actively pursue the ongoing development of his or her own personality in order to ensure more effective treatment.

Values. The primary contribution of the Milford report to the question of values for social work was in raising several significant *questions* which continue to be important even today. There is a clear understanding of the need for a defined set of guiding value-based principles.

Inherent in the practice of social case work is a philosophy of individual and social responsibility and of the ethical obligations of the social case worker to his client and to the community. Such concepts of responsibility must direct the use of all methods...
(AASW, 1929, p. 28)

The answers to various questions will orient the case worker and guide him or her in professional practice. These questions include, but are not limited to: “what are the client’s rights as an individual?” “Under what circumstances is it good to try to break up a family?” “In what circumstances, if any, should the client’s confidence be violated by the social case worker?” (p. 28) The report does not provide answers to these questions, but, importantly, raises the questions so that they may be discussed and debated in the future.

Despite the fact the report primarily serves to *raise* questions about values for social work (among other things), as opposed to *answering* them, there are prefatory indications of at least two values that will become salient over time. First, the simple concept of helping—clearly the goal of social casework (according to the Milford conference) is to offer assistance to individuals who are in need of some sort. Approximately two decades after the Milford conference, Charlotte Towle will still define the primary purpose of social work as simply offering help (of course, she also offers further details about the nature of the client-practitioner relationship). Second, assessment for casework is considered to be done with respect to the client’s “self-maintenance.” This value will also be developed further in the future in discussions about client responsibility, the goals of casework, and the role of the caseworker (e.g. Jesse Taft’s Rankian theory).

Another feature of the Milford conference that can be considered a “values” is the discussion around “norms” (1929, p. 18). The report states that “[c]oncepts of desirable social activities in individual lives are based upon certain norms of human life and human relationship” (p. 18). It then lists a number of norms such as education, family, justice, marriage, religion, sex, social behavior and work. These norms are presented as necessary for purposeful activity by social workers, and should therefore be used in all aspects of casework (e.g. diagnosis, treatment). This provides a significant example of how social work reflects the ‘norms’ of the society it serves—it does so quite literally and intentionally.

Knowledge. As stated above, knowledge in social work should be sought, and it should be scientific in nature. The content of knowledge for social case work should be based on “norms” of human life and relationships such that “deviations” from accepted standards of social life can be determined. As such there is a need for “...knowledge regarding these symptoms and

their causes which is part of the professional equipment of the social case worker..." (p. 17). This would seem to reflect the psychodynamic influence on social work at the time. With this in mind, knowledge, even of a scientific nature, may be gained through the study of "one's own experience" as a case worker (p. 41). Presumably then, scientific research may include (what will later be termed) quantitative and qualitative methods. The report also explicitly states that research should be conducted by those who know their subject matter well, in this case the case workers themselves and the relevant agencies involved. This implies that practice wisdom or experience is essential for determining research questions, methods and for carrying out the procedures of study.

The Milford conference did not directly and explicitly address the question of what the knowledge source should be for social work as a point of deliberation. There is a call for social case work to grow and develop as a profession, with one primary vehicle for this being the addition of a body of research that is "scientific in character" (AASW, 1929). In addition to developing its own body of scientific knowledge, social case work should, in order to better accomplish its purposes, draw from knowledge in the established sciences such as biology, economics, law, medicine, psychology and sociology.

Sanction. Sanction in the Milford report must be gleaned somewhat indirectly as there is no dedicated content, or specific statement about which individuals or institutions to which social work is accountable. In general, case work and case workers are, according to this report, sanctioned by the community and the employing agency (AASW, 1929). The role of the client, as seen in earlier sections, is diminished here as well. In other words, there is no statement indicating that case workers or agencies are sanctioned by clients, though there is a brief statement (quoted above) that case workers are accountable to clients. The details of this are left

as an open question, however. In addition, it is stated with a bit more specificity that agencies are responsible to each other (e.g. for not significantly overlapping their services) and to the community. For instance, agencies should limit their intakes and activities such that they are able to provide effective services to the communities they serve and maintain good relationships with government, other agencies and presumably other community organizations such as churches. As such, it appears that the agency is the primary agent of responsibility for maintaining relationships, setting ethical standards and establishing and ensuring effective practices. The language used in this regard is fairly vague and does not spell out anything directly pertaining to sanction *per se*. There is an indication that social case work as a practice, and as something to be negotiated between agencies, government and community, is a new phenomenon which will require further development. “As compared with medicine, the ministry, law and probably teaching, social work is much less well-equipped with programs for professional education, with professional organization and technical literature” (p. 51). The recommendations in the report tend to center, therefore, upon development: in training and education, scientific research, and practice methods.

Pragmatist themes. There are no overtly pragmatist themes detectable in the Milford report. However, there are at least two ways in which the thinking represented in the report can be said to be consistent with pragmatist thought. Two elements of pragmatism, the openness to contextualized and multiple knowledges and realities, and the process metaphysic (see chapter on pragmatism), are consistent with the philosophy of social work in the Milford report. First, the report states that it does not seek one definition, either for case work or for social work. It further states that while case work is one discernable entity or genus, due to its largely overlapping practices, it also has many variants, or species, that, while still considered case work, vary in

significant ways. Philosophically speaking, for an entity such as social work, or social case work, pragmatism would likely prescribe first that it need not be precisely, essentially, absolutely, universally, or eternally just one thing, applicable in practice to all persons and contexts. Pragmatism would not prescribe sloppiness in defining terms, but there would be room for variation depending on context. The tool-like nature of concepts and the emphasis on their usefulness would be most important. As an analogy, consider a screwdriver—it may be defined as a device for turning screws, but if it is also defined as a lever and as a hammer (assuming these are functional in different contexts) then it does not suffer identity loss because of its plural uses. Likewise, social case work must have some identifying features, but there is room for great variability.

The second overlapping idea between pragmatism and the Milford report is the idea expressed in the report that the discussion will be ongoing. The Milford conference itself took five years, and the authors of the report indicate that their questions and ideas will need ongoing deliberation as social work ‘grows up’ as a profession and as a discipline. The pragmatist idea of process applies here: pragmatism does not assume that there is an eternal and essential reality ‘out there’ that human minds are somehow comparing to their observations and ideas. Instead, pragmatism understands that ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’ involve both objective realities and social constructions (with great limitations as to human ‘access,’ especially to the objective aspects). So whether a conference is discussing social case work or the problem of consciousness, it will necessarily involve a process of discussion, hopefully democratic in nature, that will develop ideas and practices ongoing. There is no assumed end or goal other than to continue to figure out what is useful for promoting human flourishing and well being. The Milford conference, in this

sense, is a nice example of this process, and even reflects these pragmatist values, though not overtly.

Discussion of the clinical vs. social reform debate. The Milford conference in many ways represents a beginning: of conceptualizing an analytical framework, of developing an understanding of social work practice, and of beginning to ask important philosophical questions, which were later developed into social work values and principles (e.g. the current NASW Code of Ethics).

The conference focused on four main questions, all addressing issues in social case work: what is generic social case work, what is a competent agency for social case work, what is the division of labor for social case work, and what is the training for social case work (AASW, 1929, p. 10). These questions, and even the topic itself “social case work general and specific,” indicate that the conference was already more focused on the clinical or individualistic side of this historical tension. The term “case work” denotes social work with individuals and families, not community organizing or policy practice. The report lists as examples of case work only these individual-level interventions: family case work, probation work, medical and psychiatric work, among others (p. 11). The report also states that it is not concerned with the social reform side of social work. “This report does not attempt to analyze the professional aspects of social work as a whole. It does attempt to present descriptions of the aspects of social case work as one division of social work.” (p. 15) The report continues, “[t]he committee has avoided any attempt at definition because it doubts whether there is any substantial value in a definition of so complex a thing as a professional activity and because it believes that at the present stage of its development no definition of social case work can distinguish it sufficiently from other professional fields.” (p. 15) And presumably, if it would not be of value to offer a definition of

social case work because of its complexity, then attempting to offer a definition of social work as a whole would be at least premature, if not impossible. Thus, the Milford conference didn't really attend to the social reform side of the debate at all. This makes sense as it reflects the trend in the 1920's in which the clinical, or individual, side of social work was emphasized, largely because many social work leaders—particularly the case workers—were enamored with Freudian psychoanalysis.

That the Milford conference focused its attention on social case work as one part of what was more broadly considered 'social work' does not seem completely unreasonable. As the first conference of its kind it seems that 'one must begin somewhere,' and why not with at least four of the most pressing concerns of the day. Of course, a social reformer of the day may not have agreed with the assertion of reasonableness since their entire purview of social work was omitted from the conversation. Milford does suggest the strong lean toward 'clinical' work and the relative neglect of the reform side at the time. And while it raised many important questions for social work practice, ethical and otherwise, would it not have been more interesting and/or productive if social reformers had been invited to the discussion? If it had, perhaps this initial social work conference would have saved some time in the years to come as the social work identity was developed.

The Hollis-Taylor Report (1951)

The Hollis-Taylor report, commissioned by the newly formed National Council on Social Work Education (1946), defined both professional and non-professional social work activities and impacted undergraduate and graduate social work education in the United States (Holosko, 2003). It addressed the clinical vs. reform debate and reaffirmed the understanding of generic

social work practice established previously at the Milford Conference (NASW, 2012; Brieland, 1977). Also like Milford, the Hollis-Taylor report addressed questions about whether social work has an established base of knowledge and skills for practice (Cnaan & Dichter, 2008). With the support of social workers and social agencies, and led by Harriett Bartlett (chairperson) and Ernest Hollis (director), one primary goal of the report was to generate a comprehensive structure, or “benchmarks,” for what constitutes an acceptable program for social work education for the present and future (Hollis & Taylor, 1951). It was hoped that accrediting bodies, schools of social work, practitioner organizations, and agencies could use this as an agreeable document in this regard. The interrelationship of social work education and social work practice was therefore a primary focus of the report. As such, the report states that social work education is the responsibility not only of the colleges and universities, but also of agencies and practitioner organizations.

The report had a significant impact due to its representation of social work and its recommendations for social work education. It concluded that social work education should be focused on the last two years of undergraduate work and a two year masters degree program (Pins, 1967). It also recognized the possibility of terminal, professional (i.e. not “pre-professional”) programs at the undergraduate level. It stated that social work education should be broad, not technical or vocational in nature. After the report, one-year social work education programs began to disappear and the Council on Social Work Education (CSWE) was formed as a comprehensive accrediting body for all social work education.

It is noteworthy for the purposes of the current project that the Hollis-Taylor report did not set out to define social work *per se*.

The character of the report, therefore, has been largely shaped by the necessity of establishing a tentative framework for use in deciding what social work *is* and what it *is not*, and for use in appraising the educational implications of the nature, scope, status, and trends of social work (Hollis & Taylor, 1951, p. xi).

This quote reiterates the point that the report represents efforts to establish a *framework* for what social work is (and is not), as pertains to social work education, and not efforts to actually generate or report specifically on a philosophy of social work, or to offer a definition of social work. In addition, the report, as a framework, also does not offer specific curriculum for social work, only a structure for those who wish to do so in the future. That being said, the report does reference sufficient definitional information about social work in order to gain a sense of what the authors understood social work to be (though this often consists of borrowed information and speculative suggestions).

According to the report, the purposes and methods of social work are in process of being determined, but should be focused on serving individuals, families, groups and society using methods such as case work, group work, community organizing and policy advocacy. Values for social work include the dignity and worth of each individual and the opportunity for them to develop fully. Democracy, social justice and human rights are also valued. Knowledge for social work includes a broad and integrative program of study including humanities and sciences, not an attempt at a comprehensive set of skills or procedures. Social work is sanctioned by the public, government and the society and culture it serves (both changing and developing together). The approach to social work in the report can be said to be generally consistent with pragmatism, specifically in the Dewey-referenced suggestion that social workers can offer a common sense approach to helping individuals and groups adjust to the biological and social

conditions of their environments. The report clearly recognizes both the clinical and the social reform perspectives in social work, suggesting a balance of both, and as such, recommending that social work needs to focus more on the social reform side (at least c. 1951).

Purpose. Perhaps most notable about the purpose of social work in the Hollis-Taylor report is its suggestion that the purpose of social work has not been determined and is in process. Speaking of the purposes of professional education, the report states that not only has social work not yet undertaken the task of stating broad principles for education, but “[i]t also has not yet undertaken a comprehensive and systematic study of social work practice that can be used in fixing the substantive character of educational objectives” (Hollis & Taylor, 1951, p. 217). Regarding the future of public need for social work, the report states that “[w]ithout a working agreement as to what constitutes social work and who is entitled to be called a social worker it is not possible to determine which developments in the nation’s life will increase or decrease the demand for social work services” (p. 113). “Both *social work* and *social worker* should be looked upon as evolving concepts that are as yet to fluid for precise definition” (p. 54). And possibly, both terms have remained, and should remain, too fluid for precise definition (see discussion section).

Despite their statements that social work has not yet established a firm and agreeable definition of itself, Hollis and Taylor do offer some indication of the purposes for social work (1951). Three problem areas are identified that social work should purposely address: first, economic insecurity of individuals and families should be a practice area for social workers, particularly following the new legislation in the 1930’s such as the Social Security Act of 1935. Second, social work should address the needs of individuals, and of the community, with regard to “social misfits” such as criminals, people with mental illnesses, or those addicted to drugs and

alcohol. And third, vulnerable and disadvantaged groups in society have provided a “stimulus” for social work services (e.g. orphaned children, widowed mothers). The purpose of social work in these three problem areas would be to address the needs of individuals and groups in order to increase their overall wellbeing, to improve the conditions for social justice, and to improve the wellbeing of the community as a whole. A dual purpose for social work is indicated by these suggested problem areas: both individuals/groups and the larger community should be served, both by individual-level work and by policy/institutional change (p. 142).

Hollis and Taylor offer further definition of the purposes of social work via reference to the United Nations Social Commission, which provided an international definition of social work based on the replies from thirty-three countries on the definition of social work (1951, p. 58). They use this statement as an authoritative, yet still developing understanding of what social work is. According to the United Nations statement, the purpose of social work is to engage in helping activity “...designed to give assistance in respect to problems that prevent individuals, families, and groups from achieving a minimum desirable standard of social and economic well-being” (p. 58). Social work services should benefit members of the community who have been identified as “requiring assistance.” Social work is also a liaison activity “...through which disadvantaged individuals, families, and groups may tap all the resources in the community available to meet their unsatisfied needs” (p. 59). Generally speaking, the purposes of social work include promoting social well-being by addressing specific social ills in an integrative fashion so that people in need can access designated services and improve their social and economic functioning. These purposes will always be relative to the needs of changing social and economic conditions (p. 117).

Methods. The methods of social work, according to the Hollis-Taylor report, are also somewhat unknown and under development. “No one knows the facts. An analysis of social work practice might identify from one to a dozen types of semiprofessional technician positions for which preparation could be given in colleges...” (p. 168). That being said, a number of fields of practice and their accompanying social work methods have been identified. Fields of practice include multiple areas such as child welfare, mental health, medical, immigration, and general community work such as the YMCA. As the need for social work expands (as suggested by the report), so will its primary methods, which include case work, group work and community organization (p. 132). These three main methods of social work are identified for practice and also said to characterize those methods trained for in the schools of social work (p. 141). However, given the expansion of social work, the profession can decide “...to broaden its educational program to prepare persons who can provide leadership in such areas as social administration, public policy research, and evaluation” (p. 141). Social work schools should therefore consider broad training programs which will prepare students for social work practice that may involve anything from social services administration to counseling and psychotherapy (p. 122-125).

Values. The values for social work that are evident in the Hollis-Taylor report follow from the purposes and methods and include, like with the other analytical categories, what seems common in the field to the authors at the time. The value of social justice is evident in the United Nations Social Commission report, along with the methods. This report emphasizes the systemic impact of social and economic forces on individuals, families and various demographic groups, along with the purposes and methods of social work to be used to assist people and transform the policies and institutions of society so that it is more equal and fair for all (1951, p. 58-59). A

certain, though undefined, minimum standard of living should be sought so that no person or group should be forced to live in abject conditions whether due to poverty, disease or other unfortunate condition. These point clearly to human rights and social justice as values for social work. Hollis and Taylor also note that the value and dignity of each individual person and the idea of democracy as a way of life are both generally considered primary values for social work (p. 114).

Knowledge. Knowledge for social work should be broad, inclusive, and integrative in order to provide students (in particular, and practitioners generally) with the tools needed for a variety of potential practice settings and client populations. “Study of the basic aspects of social work theory and practice should rest on an examination of social welfare objectives and processes, rather than on acquiring skill in social work methods and techniques...” (Hollis & Taylor, 1951, p. 209). “What is needed is broad but professionally oriented scholarship” (p. 209). Fostering the development of appropriate knowledge for social work practice should begin in the classroom, and, according to Hollis and Taylor, should include courses such as “The Field of Social welfare,” “History and Status of Social Welfare in the United States,” and “Introduction to Social Work” (p. 209). Social work schools in general should attempt to teach students and practitioners how to acquire and apply knowledge rather than trying to teach them everything they might need to know for every possible situation (which is impossible).

A sufficiently broad education for social work will include information from a number of fields of study (Hollis & Taylor, 1951, p. 191-208). This should include the humanities, such as English language and effective communication skills. The study of literature should be used to cultivate a sense of the human condition, human culture and motivation, in addition to the ways in which social and economic forces affect human being. Philosophy should be studied in order

to increase self-awareness about the beliefs and assumptions that may be unconsciously held, as well as to develop reasoning abilities and familiarity with the content of historical and contemporary human thought systems. In addition, the arts and physical and social sciences should be studied.

A concentration in social work should be broad enough to include concepts of the natural and social sciences and the humanities selected to produce a realistic understanding of the biological, economic, cultural, and political factors that fashion and condition social welfare programs in the United States (p. 181).

The importance of this knowledge is the application of it to facilitate the purposes of social work in individual and group practice, and to develop an understanding of the impact of social institutions on individuals, families and communities (p. 114).

Sanction. Sanction for social work comes from the government, the public, and the always changing culture. Hollis and Taylor, when discussing the responsibility for social work education, state that it lies primarily with social work itself, including schools, practitioner organizations and agencies, and it also includes the “supporting public,” indicating the significant role that the public plays in sanctioning social work itself, including the education and training of social work practitioners (1951, p. viii). They reiterate this notion later when discussing possible factors that will shape the future of social work.

Whether or not the role of social work in the future will continue to be the same as in the past and whether society will need a larger or smaller number of such professionally prepared persons will depend chiefly upon social, economic, and scientific developments, and on the capacity of the profession to keep pace in education and practice (p. 117).

This quote moves the focus somewhat from the public in particular, to the idea of the socioeconomic and cultural conditions in which the public itself shapes and is in turn shaped by. Various trends such as decisions about the use of government to address social issues, social trends affecting the stability and functioning of families and various developments in science, will all contribute to shaping and sanctioning the future of social work. The use of government as an instrument to modify the distribution of goods and services will continue to be a significant factor (p. 119). “Hitherto...one of the statistically most important stimuli to the demand for social workers has been the growth of public action to assure income stability” (p. 120). Of course, consistent with their general ideas on this matter in all of the other areas of social work, Hollis and Taylor emphasize sanction for social work as another aspect undergoing significant growth and development.

Social work needs to face up to the fact that it is not likely to be given the social sanction accorded such professions as law, medicine, teaching, and theology until its principal agencies have and use legal authorization to select social workers from certified lists of professionally trained social workers (p. 57).

Thus, there is an interconnection between social sanction and government sanction via the authorization of social workers as professionals as certified by a professional licensing division of government, who may only then be recognized as such by the public.

Pragmatist themes. The Hollis-Taylor report is generally consistent with many pragmatist themes, such as the value focus on democratic ideals such as the value of the individual and the intent for each person to have the opportunity to develop as fully as possible. Also the notion that social work is in process and under development could be considered

pragmatist. However, each of these could be considered something other than pragmatist as well. For instance, the report leaves open the question as to whether social work's 'in process of development' status is leading toward a definition that will be more pragmatist (e.g. one that understands social work as *always* in process of self-definition, as part of its identity), or one that is, say, more positivist (e.g. leading toward a universal, immutable self-definition that will not change). As stated at the outset, the Hollis-Taylor report does not so much presume to state what social work *is* so much as it offers some general structure for developing social work education. The latter does require some sense, descriptively, of what social work has been up to the time of their writing. This is where the general themes may be detected.

There is one specific reference to John Dewey that does point more to a pragmatist orientation for social work. In the discussion of a general direction for undergraduate social work, the report offers a Deweyan perspective as a sort of general guide post for what social work is. Contrasting with several other thinkers (including Freud) who state that the goal for psychosocial interventions should be health (which they don't reject outright), the report offers the adjustment of an organism to its environment may also be a, or the, goal for social work interventions. It states, "...John Dewey uses still another approach to the same end, namely, keeping the human organism reasonably well related to the often contrary pulls made on it by biological and by social forces" (Hollis & Taylor, 1951, p. 200). The social worker, adept in understanding the demands of the culture and society in which he or she serves, may offer assistance to others who can use help adjusting. The education required for this need not be an onerous and systematic knowledge of biochemistry, biophysics, etcetera, but need only include a general orientation to many different fields of study, from humanities to physics to economics, in

order to sufficiently equip the worker with the tools needed to offer a more ‘common sense’ approach to helping. This general orientation may be considered pragmatist.

Discussion of the clinical vs. social reform debate. The philosophy of social work that is recognized in the Hollis-Taylor report clearly includes both the clinical and social reform sides of the debate (see previous sections). This is evident in its inclusive nature (i.e. purpose and methods include serving both individuals and groups, large or small, via case work, group work, community organizing for policy change, etc.). The report also makes explicit reference to the clinical vs. social reform tension when it recommends that the field should move more toward the social reform perspective in order to be properly balanced.

The social work profession in the last quarter century has predominantly concerned itself with the second of these approaches [clinical] and has, to an increasing degree, concentrated on the improvement of the quality of individualized service, in so far as this could be achieved by a refinement of the skills of the practitioner who deals directly with the individual or group (Hollis and Taylor, 1951, p. 142).

A continuation in this direction “...will seriously limit the expanding role of social work” (p. 142). The report goes on to recommend that social work should concern itself more with education, legislation and other items of public policy. For example, they state that social work has neglected the newly expanding field of social insurance, yet this is one of the primary vehicles for enhancing the well-being of the nation’s families. In sum, the report not only acknowledges both the clinical and reform perspectives, but also offers a balancing function, stating that if one side becomes neglected then this should be corrected.

The Working Definition (1958)

In 1955 seven different and unique social work professional organizations joined forces and formed the National Association of Social Workers (NASW) (Holosko, 2003). One primary task of the newly formed NASW was to continue to develop social work as a unified profession with a common base of practice. As such, it was important to generate a working definition that would be acceptable to members of all the now joined organizations. To accomplish this task, Harriett Bartlett headed the NASW's Commission on Practice which generated this definition by 1956 and revised it in 1958. In order to create a working definition, Bartlett (et al.) used a pentahedral constellation which included the same analytical components as are being used in this dissertation.

Bartlett's constellation is the primary source of the analytical structure for this dissertation. "Social work practice, like the practice of all professions, is recognized by a constellation of value, purpose, sanction, knowledge, and method" (Bartlett, 1958). No particular component of the constellation, according to Bartlett (et al.), is unique to social work, but all of the components must be defined in any philosophy of social work. In other words, all five are necessary (and must be defined with specific content) for any conception of social work, but none by themselves are sufficient to be considered social work. Each component also overlaps with many other fields such as psychology or family counseling. Bartlett's goal was to fill each component with specific content that would be inclusive of all social work practice specializations. This furthers the unified practice stance initially agreed upon at the Milford conference, but now adds more detail and depth. This is no small task: to capture all of social work practice without leaving anyone out, yet offering a definition that is pointed enough that it

actually captures something meaningful about particular practices. Note that given the brevity of Bartlett's report, much of it will be simply reproduced in what follows.

Purpose. Three main purposes were briefly identified for social work:

1. To assist individuals and groups to identify and resolve or minimize problems arising out of disequilibrium between themselves and their environment.
2. To identify potential areas of disequilibrium between individuals or groups and the environment in order to prevent the occurrence of disequilibrium.
3. In addition to these curative and preventive aims, to seek out, identify, and strengthen the maximum potential in individuals, groups, and communities. (Bartlett, 1958, p. 6)

Methods. "The social work method is the responsible, conscious, disciplined use of self in a relationship with an individual or group" (Bartlett, 1958, p. 7). The relational focus involves the social worker facilitating (as per the purposes identified above) the interaction of the individual with his or her environment. This takes place with regard to the individual's relation to the environment, the environment's relation to the individual, or the interaction of each with the other. Social work of any sort involves observation, assessment, planning, action and evaluation. Social work methods primarily involve social casework, group work and community organization. These methods require the use of some combination of techniques such as support, clarification, information-giving, interpretation, development of insight, differentiation, identification of agency function, use of structure, use of activities, teaching, stimulation of group interaction, provision of positive experiences, limit-setting, utilization of resources, effecting change in the environment, and synthesis. The skill of social work practice involves

both the worker's contribution and also the worker's ability to elicit participation of the client or client system in solving problems and addressing issues.

Values. A philosophical foundation for social work practice is provided by the following:

1. The individual is the primary concern of this society.
2. There is interdependence between individuals in this society.
3. They have social responsibility for one another.
4. There are human needs common to each person, yet each person is essentially unique and different from the others.
5. An essential attribute of a democratic society is the realization of the full potential of each individual and the assumption of his social responsibility through active participation in society.
6. Society has a responsibility to provide ways in which obstacles to this self-realization (i.e., disequilibrium between the individual and his environment) can be overcome or prevented. (Bartlett, 1958, p. 6).

Knowledge. "Social work, like all other professions, derives knowledge from a variety of sources and in application brings forth further knowledge from its own processes" (Bartlett, 1958, p. 6). Social workers must integrate diverse knowledge and also understand that knowledge is never final or absolute. Social work practice requires knowledge from many sources, including human development, psychology (particularly related to giving and taking help), human communication, group processes, religion and spirituality, relationships, community processes, social services, and self-awareness.

Sanction. “Social work has developed out of a community recognition of the need to provide services to meet basic needs, services which require the intervention of practitioners...”

(Bartlett, 1958, p. 6). Social work is sanctioned by three primary sources:

1. Governmental agencies or their subdivisions (authorized by law).
2. Voluntary incorporated agencies, which have taken responsibility for meeting certain of the needs or providing certain of the services necessary for the individual and group welfare.
3. The organized profession, which in turn can sanction individuals for the practice of social work and set forth the educational and other requirements for practice and the conditions under which that practice may be undertaken, whether or not carried out under organizational auspices (p. 6).

Pragmatist Themes. Three pragmatist themes in particular stand out in the working definition: the organism in environment perspective, the understanding of knowledge as always in process and fallible, and democratic ethics/purpose centered upon the individual realizing his or her full potential. The organism in environment perspective is evident in both the values and purposes for social work set out in the definition. The emphasis in both is upon the interdependence between individuals and their environments. Both individuals and components of the environment (e.g. government) bear responsibility for adjustments and accommodations in order for people to thrive. Dewey stresses this same understanding of organisms both affecting, and being affected by, their physical and social environments. This element is directly connected to the trajectory or goal that individuals, via these person-environment interactions, should be able to develop their full potential—a goal reflecting the democratic ideals and values of

pragmatism. The understanding of knowledge for social work in the working definition is also rather pragmatist. The definition states that knowledge is never final or absolute, and that it should come from a variety of sources. This reflects the pragmatist idea of fallibilism—that knowledge is not immutable, universal and statically ‘true.’ Pragmatist knowledge is always provisional and value-connected. When properly conducted, pragmatist knowledge endeavors to foster more just and equal environments so that all people can have more opportunities to develop and actively participate in the community.

Discussion of the Clinical vs. Social Reform Debate. The working definition offers a dual focused purpose for social work practice. With the goal being the establishment of equilibrium between individuals and the environment, action is called for at both the individual and community level. Methods involve both clinical and social reform elements as case management, group work and community organizing are all prescribed in order to help individuals adjust to their environments, as well as to change environments in order to strengthen individuals.

The Madison Conference (1976)

Decades of discussion and invention in social work led to the Madison meeting which focused on conceptual frameworks—it was the next step in an ongoing conversation about what social work is and what it does (Brieland, 1977). Commissioned by the NASW, and reminiscent of previous conferences (e.g. Milford), the Madison meeting focused on whether there is a common conception to social work (Holosko, 2003). The conference was comprised of invited presentations and papers from five selected leaders in the social work field at the time. Each author offers his or her perspective on social work. Instead of attempting to summarize all five

papers according to each of the five analytical elements, I will briefly summarize each of the five perspectives which were all published later in a special issue of the journal *Social Work* (1977). Each of the articles was written according to the five analytical categories used in this dissertation (these will be bolded for ease of identification).

Social work for social problems by William J. Reid. Reid offers a rather positivistic approach to social work. He states that though most social workers and social work scholars would agree that the **purpose** of social work is to “alleviate social problems,” this is a loose and vague understanding of what social work is for. He suggests that nothing of much substance has been accomplished in this regard since the Milford conference since there is no “typology” of problems to be solved, no clear and simple definition of what exactly social problems are. He acknowledges that since Milford it seems agreeable that social work addresses issues from alcoholism and mental illness to vagrancy, but these are ill-conceived and there is no “master classification system” that clearly delineates the boundaries and properties of social problems. Therefore, a better conceptualization is needed.

Like with the problems social work addresses, the **methods** are equally broad and varied, and also equally vague and difficult to specify. They are also increasing rapidly. What is needed, according to Reid, is a precise and effective method for aligning particular problems with particular interventions. He suggests we get rid of “esoteric theories” and instead build up social work practice models “brick by brick” from empirical research. This will require reliable and valid measures, operationalization of problems and interventions, testing of everything. The goal is a new way where models explain and predict human behavior such that particular problems can be reliably and effectively solved by way of specifically delineated practice methods. criterion in determining what social workers do” (Reid, 1977, p. 378). **Knowledge** for social

workers would then come in the form of “X situation” is treated by “Y intervention” which produces “Z outcome.” The practitioner would know which interventions work for which social problems and simply apply them. Micro theories could be generated from the (preferably) experimental data to explain behavior. This, combined with the X Y Z method would constitute the focus of knowledge for practice.

Sanction for social work, since the practices of social work concern human behavior in the community, should come from the public and private sectors. Sanction would involve such entities as legislation, the courts, community groups, professional organizations, and to some extent clients. Sanction, Reid argues, is difficult at the time of his writing since there is such a lack of clarity on what social work objectives and methods are—it is difficult to sanction vague conceptions. Since there are cases where social work ‘treats’ involuntary clients, the courts or legislation would have to sanction those practices. Reid did not include a **values** section in his paper. His conclusion states that the primary implication of this new approach in social work is more detailed practice methods and specialization for social work practice.

Reid’s approach, because of its hyper-positivistic, or “scientific” approach (to use Dewey’s term), makes a significant break with the **pragmatist** tradition. Moreover, the elimination of a base in values also indicates the move away from pragmatism. Reid’s X Y Z approach impacts the **clinical vs. social reform debate** by limiting practice to interventions that are researchable as such. This would likely lead to an emphasis toward the clinical side since research in this area is (arguably) more feasible.

Back to activism by Walter Dean. Walter Dean’s argument invites the reader to reconsider what he believes was the original mission of social work: to be activists for social causes—to positively change the social environments that individuals live in. He believes social

work is in danger of abandoning its primary mission to the extent that it succumbs to the trend in American society toward further individualism and privatism. Social work was (in 1977) and has continued to provide individual psychotherapeutic services, often in the venue of private practice. This is disagreeable to Dean as perhaps the clearest sign that the original social work mission has been lost. Instead of retaining the primary role as change-agents in the macro level activism arena, social work will instead take on a merely palliative role within the social environment which it no longer influences.

It seems that what Dean intends in his article is to remain in fidelity to what he believes is the original **purpose** of social work, which is to ameliorate poverty and injustice in our increasingly complex, industrialized and urbanized American society. According to Dean, accomplishing this mission requires work with individuals, but without abandoning social activism. He finds the sociopolitical environment to be a pluralistic, multifaceted and culturally mixed situation that is as complex as it is diverse. The persons who live within it are subject to a variety of forces from philosophical ideas such as Darwinism to neighborhood problems such as crime and drug abuse. Thus, problem solving by social workers should reflect awareness of this rich cultural milieu and address issues in their complexity from a macro and micro perspective. “The social work practitioner has two major objectives: to change the individual and to change social conditions.” (32) What Dean has in mind here is to offer that “culturally-relative” practice **methods** to be offered to people in need, but more importantly, that services offered should be keen to avoid stanching people’s individuality. In other words, social workers should not act as mere institution-agents who mold human personalities according to a predetermined pattern, like cutting cookies. He also states that services must consider the cultural context of the service receiver.

Values are briefly summarized as being those associated with democracy and include the dignity and value of the individual, equal opportunity for all, client self-determination, and the connection of rights with personal responsibilities toward self, family and society.

Dean lists several sources of **sanction** for social work according to the idea that as a profession it has taken on a “mending” role in a post-Christian society. These sanctions come from societal needs/legislation, clients, colleagues, social work itself, the NASW code of ethics, and the personal ethics of the individual social worker. Dean values democracy. He seems to think that social work can serve society best when there is a free, open and functioning dialectical interaction between the various structures of society. He clearly desires to address social problems such as poverty and mental illness, and hopes to find good communication between social workers, legislators, educators, clients and other stakeholders.

Dean envisions competency and accountability in social work far beyond its current state (c. 1977). His vision is of a social worker who, because of the variety of people and social contexts she might find herself in, must be well educated across the relevant disciplines. In order to face the problem-solving challenges in a complex society, the social worker must develop **knowledge** competency in sociology, psychology, economics, political theory, family theory and philosophy. Social workers must know the interrelations of different aspects of society such as changes in population and family composition, social stratification, political structures. This competence requires development in social work education. Dean recognized the lack of scientifically tested and validated practice theories and suggested the requisite changes in order to bring these about. He called for clearly defined conceptions that would provide students with the tools to “...enhance and restore the social functioning of people and groups.” (35) Social work education, according to Dean, should transcend categorization and prepare the worker as an

adaptive problem solver who can apply method in different ways depending on the situation and the particular problem to be solved. His was a generalist problem-solver model of the social worker. The worker would start out more specialized in the undergraduate training, borrowing from various fields and synthesizing knowledge and skills on focused problems. With more training the practitioner would become more of a generalist due to the expanded horizon of knowledge, experience and the honing of problem solving skills.

Dean's approach is consistent with **pragmatism** with its breadth of practice and knowledge sources, and roots in social work values. He seems to desire a balancing effect with regard to the **clinical vs. social reform debate** by calling for a return to the latter.

Caring for vs. caring about people by Robert Morris. Morris understands social work to have missed its opportunity to define itself properly. He starts by stating that there is a certain ambiguity in social work practice, which leads him to propose an alternative mode. In the past, social work has been, according to Morris, merely adjunctive to other, presumably more legitimate, professions such as medicine. Social work thus has no clear identity with clear functions. This is what he hopes to remedy. The **purpose** of the new social work would be to stake a professional claim specifically in the area of long-term care of persons with chronic ailments. Despite the 19th century hope for a cure for all diseases, many persist. Social work can carve out a new identity helping people with these conditions. Uncurable problems include such things as Down's syndrome, chronic mental illness, chronic substance abuse, spinal cord and brain injuries, poverty, and juvenile delinquency. Given the decrease in the ability of families to care for people with these conditions, social work can step in. The **methods** for social work include prevention of these conditions as well as finding better ways to help improve functional capacity. The roles social work may take would be more specified and would include

administrative and direct care. For instance, in day care settings, social workers could work directly with the children, as well as administrate programs. In general, the social worker would be responsible for the creation and management of social environments. The apparent goal would be to move social work to the forefront of the other professions by making social workers responsible for determining what kind of care is necessary for clients, and then determining what kind of treatment to apply. It also includes social workers as the counselors or caseworkers who would not only apply psychological treatments, but social level interventions as well. Social workers would also develop social policies that would benefit clients.

Morris does not directly address **values** or **sanction**, but does indicate that **knowledge** for social workers would have to change. The idea of a broad base for social work education would be replaced with a highly specific training program for each new and specialized category of social work professional, whether administrator, counselor or otherwise. This way each new specialist can be held accountable for providing the appropriate service designated for each type of condition being treated, or for each type of job category.

Morris offers a divergence from the **pragmatist** tradition in social work by failing to acknowledge the existence and legitimacy of social work as a profession that had existed for a good seventy years at the time. His suggestion that social work be redefined along very narrow lines of care primarily for patients with “chronic care” issues greatly emphasizes the clinical side of the **clinical vs. social reform debate**.

Social work: a dissenting profession by Shirley Cooper. Like the others in this series, Cooper spends a fair amount of time practically lamenting the apparent confusion and complexity of social work. She expresses anxiety about defining social work (or, rather, her

perception that social work is not sufficiently defined), clarifying its **purposes** and goals, and generally understanding a professional identity. She states that these confusions and tensions are attributable to multiple factors, such as that social workers perform so many different jobs, using many different **methods**, in so many different settings. There is no one answer, according to Cooper. There are so many “dualities” in social work which indicate confusion over tensions. These include tensions between individual and group work, agency (public) vs. private work, work with the poor and oppressed vs. work with middle class (or other) more privileged groups, among others. She blandly suggests that perhaps the role for social work is as society’s “dissenters.” Perhaps this position is what social work has reluctantly been **sanctioned** for by a society that somehow desires to retain its “change agents,” though it does not desire to properly acknowledge and respect them (another lament). Social work’s “person in environment” perspective perhaps leaves it with this role, given the overlapping competition with other fields.

Knowledge for social work consists of a variety of things, but should include an understanding of personality, developmental, cognitive and interpersonal processes, as well as biological information (e.g. evolution), social policy, and socioeconomic information. Social workers also have to balance the “head” and “heart,” as well as navigate the distinctions between theory, science and practice. Given the difficulty involved in learning what is needed for social work practice, she suggests using specified models for such things as crisis intervention. Overall, social work can only persist in its endeavors, continue to ask questions about who it is and what it should do, and continue to seek firmer ground. Tolerating ambiguity seems key to Cooper. As an afterthought (last one line of the paper), she adds the recommendation that social work **values** be retained. These include social work tasks: ameliorate suffering, identify vulnerabilities, restore functioning and call for social justice.

Cooper retains the breadth of social work regarding the **clinical vs. social reform debate**, but fails to acknowledge the legitimacy and significance of the extant profession of social work as it had existed for many decades at the time according to the **pragmatist** tradition.

Conceptual framework for social work practice by Anne Minahan and Alan Pincus.

The mission, or **purpose**, according to Minehan & Pincus, of social work is to promote the values that underlie the ends and means of social work. The **values** of social work include three primary things. First, people should have access to resources so that they are able to accomplish life tasks in order to realize their own aspirations and values. Second, self-determination should lead to human dignity and individuality. And Third, there is a mutual responsibility between the citizen, to contribute to the society, and the society, to make conditions favorable for the individual. As such, social work is **sanctioned** by society to deal with social problems. There are two types of sanction. First, official sanction refers to the right given by the state to offer services such as child abuse investigations. Second, negotiated sanction involves voluntary clients and the worker and/or agency (self-determination is key here).

There are three primary **methods** to social work. First, social workers are charged with developing new resource systems for clients. Second, social workers make linkages between various resource systems and clients who need services. Workers may also facilitate linkages between clients and their own internal resources, such as problem-solving capacities. Third, social workers facilitate the interactions between individuals within the various service systems. In order to competently perform these broad methods of social work, social workers need **knowledge** including information about social problems and their related social policies and various resources available. They will also need a theoretical understanding of interpersonal relationships, formal communication (e.g. grant writing), administration (e.g. staffing a

committee), and sufficient education for competence in teaching, consulting and problem solving. The goal is not to teach social workers a set of techniques that may be applied, but to cultivate the creative use of knowledge from diverse sources in order to carry out their mission. Social workers may perform specialized tasks at times, but should retain a generalist social work perspective that reflects the social work values.

Minehan & Pincus, with their emphasis on a new conceptual framework for social work, retain some facets of the extant **pragmatist** tradition (e.g. by emphasizing values), but fail to recognize others (e.g. social work is more than just an entity that connects people to services). They attempt to include elements from both sides of the **clinical vs. social reform debate**, but their new, limited “framework” for social work also becomes much more constricted than either side of the original debate would have ‘framed’ it.

Chapter 6: Historical Context: The Philosophy of Social Work

Jane Addams (1860-1935)

Purpose. Perhaps the simplest way to express Addams' purpose would be to state that she hopes to cultivate peace and justice through cooperative, democratic fellowship (Addams, 1910). To accomplish these goals she draws upon the works of philosophers (e.g. Locke, Pestalozzi), theologians (e.g. Tolstoy), and Christian faith. Addams desired to put faith and doctrine (whether theological or philosophical) into action. Her "Christian humanitarianism" led her to translate ideas into new concrete social conditions, especially for the poor. The opening of Hull House combined three trends: "...first, the desire to interpret democracy in social terms; secondly, the impulse beating at the very source of our lives, urging us to aid in the race for progress; and , thirdly, the Christian movement toward humanitarianism" (Addams, 1910, p. 98). Addams' vision is of a more just and equal society. Hull House, for instance "...is an attempt to relieve, at the same time, the overaccumulation at one end of society and the destitution at the other" (Addams, 1910, p. 98).

Method. Addams' method for social change is centered upon human relationships. The settlement house itself is a method for social action and social change. Addams understands the work of the settlements as art and action in meaningful relationship.

This, then, will by my definition of the settlement: that it is an attempt to express the meaning of life in terms of life itself, in forms of activity. There is no doubt that the deed often reveals when the idea does not, just as art makes us understand and feel what might be incomprehensible and inexpressible in the form of an argument (Addams, in Lasch, 1965, p. 187)

Her method involves living democratically. This means putting thought into action by way of democratic deliberation among diverse people in a community. The setting for developing the requisite relationships for this process can be anywhere, but specifically centers on the neighborhood and Hull House (or other settlements) as a gathering place for a variety of activities. The various activities of Hull House can also be thought of as methods for social change, whether they are political clubs, book groups for men and women, or kindergartens for children. It is the ongoing development of relationships that serve community needs that must be cultivated in order for growth and change to occur.

Only by retaining this sense of always ‘being in process’ can Hull House remain open to those who need its services. People and social conditions rapidly change, and if Hull House is to remain relevant to such changes it must be adaptable. This requires grounding “...in a philosophy whose foundation is on solidarity of the human race, a philosophy which will not waver when the race happens to be represented by a drunken woman or an idiotic boy [sic]. Its residents must be emptied of all conceit...” (p. 98). Thus living side-by-side with a spirit of neighborliness and mutual interest are key methods for Hull House. Hull House, as an experimental vehicle for change, must therefore maintain its

...flexibility, its power of quick adaptation, its readiness to change its methods as its environment may demand. It must be open to conviction and must have a deep and abiding sense of tolerance. It must be hospitable and ready for experiment (Addams, 1910, p. 98).

In so doing, Hull House also generates and disseminates “data” for legislative action. When people know each other then they know each others’ problems, issues and struggles and can,

with a sense of solidarity, join forces to affect policy change, whether at the neighborhood or national level. Methods therefore also included community organizing and legislative action.

Another way to understand Addams' purpose, which leads directly to the use of the settlement house as a method, is in terms of the "objective" and "subjective" necessity (Fischer, 2009). The objective need for settlements stems from the miserable working conditions, housing arrangements and other ills and injustices facing the poor. Anyone concerned with social justice should understand that these conditions represent objective facts which support the need for reform. There is an equally important subjective side as well. Since any perpetual hierarchical exchange of goods, no matter the supposed good will or philanthropic spirit, will corrupt those with the upper hand, a reciprocal, relational exchange must also take place. As much as the poor are in need of goods and services—and ultimately a more just social structure—the rich and privileged are in need of enlightenment regarding these structures and institutions that create the conditions of poverty and suffering. In other words, the proper method for social work is not just philanthropy, which can, by itself, only serve to perpetuate the inequality and injustice that created the need in the first place, and calcify the arrogance and condescension of the privileged.

Values. Addams makes a significant contribution to our understanding of ethics, both philosophically and for social work. She introduces the idea of a social ethic, particularly in her book *Democracy and Social Ethics*, originally published in 1907 (Addams, 1964). She begins by stating that "[c]ertain forms of personal righteousness have become to a majority of the community almost automatic" (p. 1). We don't, for instance really question—at least as a society—whether or not it is wrong to steal or murder. We have decided that these and similar activities are wrong and have outlawed them. But each generation has its own test, and for the new modern world, a new ethic will be required in order to achieve a more just society. "To

attain individual morality in an age demanding social morality, to pride one's self on the results of personal effort when the time demands social adjustment, is utterly to fail to apprehend the situation" (p. 3). Moving beyond individual morality, or personal piety, requires a sense of solidarity and community that only comes via the formation and maintenance of relationships between classes—or generally between people of diverse backgrounds and life circumstances. One primary key to the development of a new, social morality is human motivation. When people are aware of each others' burdens, their motivation changes because of this acquaintance.

To follow the path of social morality results perforce in the temper if not the practice of the democratic spirit, for it implies that diversified human experience and resultant sympathy which are the foundation and guarantee of Democracy" (p. 7)

The 'formula,' if you will, for the new social ethic, then, is relationship, or acquaintance between diverse human beings, which leads to knowledge of each other, which leads to sympathy and solidarity, which motivates a social ethic. Social ethics are therefore intimately related to "sympathetic knowledge" (see next section). In sum, what is of value for social work, according to Addams, is community and relationships, and the resulting solidarity and sympathy that motivate concerted action toward social justice for all.

Knowledge. Knowledge, according to Addams, is not something to be captured in the abstract, as if it were meaningful outside of human relationships and the potential for action. As such, knowledge must always be intimately connected with her purposes, ethics and methods. Regarding settlement houses, she states

The ideal and developed settlement would attempt to test the value of human knowledge by action, and realization, quite as the complete and ideal university would concern itself

with the discovery of knowledge in all branches. The settlement stands for application as opposed to research; for emotion as opposed to abstraction, for universal interest as opposed to specialization (Addams, in Lasch, 1965, p. 187).

In a word, knowledge must be “sympathetic” (Hamington, 2009). “Sympathetic knowledge emphasizes actively knowing other people for the purpose of understanding them with some degree of depth” (p. 71). As such, knowledge, as a social affair, cannot be divorced from either action or interest, and has the potential therefore to disrupt lives and open up possibilities for empathic caring.

Addams’ sympathetic knowledge “...transgresses Western epistemologies traditionally grounded in separations of mind and body, separations of reason and emotion, and separations of ethics from epistemology” (Hamington, 2009, p. 74). This way of thinking about knowledge involves the full range of human being, including not just rationality but also emotions and concrete experiences. It offers a way to balance dispassionate reflective analysis with emotional, activist epistemology. Addams intends that knowledge is not just about descriptive ‘facts,’ but includes seeking an understanding of racism, war, and poverty. This sort of knowledge demands a challenge to the status quo, which includes a sense of “perplexity.” Perplexity refers to a person’s involvement in a situation that is baffling and confusing. It involves an interplay of intellect and emotions in the construction of knowledge about a given topic or situation. This is not to equate Addams’ epistemology with emotivism, which reduces knowledge to mere human emotional reactions and sentiments. Instead, knowledge is considered integrated: emotions, relationships and empiricism and rationality are involved in knowledge as a process. This way knowledge remains relevant to actual human living, and has the broad capacity to include information from the social sciences and from individual lived experiences.

Sanction. Since the *work* of social work is performed by neighbors in community, the sanction also comes from neighborhoods and other forms of human community. In contrast to the sanctioning bodies for social case work which primarily include organizations such as social welfare agencies or government, the sanctioning bodies for social reform primarily include the people (who are not considered ‘clients’). People ‘sanction’ social work, not as a profession or institution, but because the *work* that is *social* is being done by *them*. The people, or would-be ‘clients,’ have ideally been involved in a democratic process whereby they have come to an understanding of some social problem (such as unsafe working conditions in factories), and have collectively decided to take a certain action (such as lobbying congress) in order to change the laws or other conditions such that the problem is solved. Use of the term ‘sanction’ can be somewhat misleading because it seems to assume that there is a profession or organization that must be promoted or supported by some other entity such as government, business or ‘the people.’ Social reform is not that sort of thing. In fact, for social reform to take place, or perhaps for it to be called for in the first place, there is likely an absence of sanction. For example, there is an absence of sanction for child welfare when ten year olds are working fifteen hour days in factories as the status quo; there is no sanction for sanitation when garbage has not been collected for weeks or months at a time. Social reform then *is* sanction, taken up by people who will fight for equality, peace and justice.

Pragmatist themes. Since Jane Addams and John Dewey were known to be friends and colleagues, and since they joined forces on multiple endeavors, both intellectual and practical, this section will focus more specifically on the pragmatist themes in John Dewey’s philosophy, in comparison to Jane Addams’, as opposed to pragmatism more generally. Given their close relationship, and the significant involvement of Addams in generating Dewey’s and her own

pragmatism, more attention will be given to this section for Addams. Addams is considered a pragmatist in her own right and is respected as an intellectual, an activist, and as a feminist (Fischer, in Schook & Margolis, 2006; Whipps, 2004). The goal for this section is to assert that the philosophical perspectives of Jane Addams and John Dewey are overlapping, and often identical.

Numerous books and articles written on topics related to John Dewey and Jane Addams will report their professional relationship in which they mutually influenced one another's thought (e.g. Franklin, 1986; Hamington, 2009; Leffers, 1993; Fischer, 2009). They are also reported to have been friends and regularly engaged in dialogue about philosophy, politics and social action (Whipps, 2004). When considering Addams' philosophical views, Dewey is often quickly associated with her. However, as stated, Addams was an author, activist and intellectual in her own right. "[T]hey shared many of the same commitments, including a belief in the value of a robust democracy as well as the importance of education that engages students' experiences" (Hamington, 2009, p. 35). They both understood knowledge not as something referring to universal truths that exist beyond the human condition, but as a practical application of intelligence that is significant because it is relevant to the human condition. This knowledge, and associated social action, begins with the "common experience" of diverse people engaging in interpersonal exchanges. Addams' conception of "sympathetic knowledge" "...emphasizes actively knowing other people for the purpose of understanding them with some degree of depth" (Hamington, 2004, p. 71). This level of acquaintance is necessary, for instance, in bridging class conflict. Sympathetic knowledge can only be gained by having personal encounters which lead to mutual understanding and a sense of solidarity (Addams, 1902). Addams' understanding of human interdependence—the idea that what affects one portion of society affects the whole—

is consistent with Dewey's anthropology and highlights the need for communication between classes (Whipps, 2004). Accordingly, Addams believed the upper class people who participated in the goings on at Hull House benefited at least as much as those from the lower classes. Dewey similarly rejected notions of atomistic individualism in favor of a holistic and interdependent understanding of human societies.

Dewey and Addams were "intellectual soul mates" from the time they met in 1892 (Hammington, 2009, p. 37). Dewey visited Hull House shortly after it opened and subsequently moved to Chicago to teach at the University of Chicago. Dewey later expressed his appreciation for the work going on at Hull House: "I cannot tell you how much good I got from my stay at Hull House. ... My indebtedness to you [Addams] for giving me an insight into matters there is great" (Dewey, quoted in Hammington, 2009, p. 37). Dewey started a "lab school" at the University of Chicago that in many ways paralleled the experiential and experimental nature of Addams' methods at Hull House (Schultz, 2009). There was much "cross fertilization" intellectually between Hull House and the University of Chicago: Addams occasionally taught at the university, and when Hull House incorporated Dewey became a board member. He also lectured frequently at Hull House's Plato club. Dewey's indebtedness to, and affection for, Addams is also reflected by his dedication of his book *Liberalism and Social Action* to her, as well as his naming one of his daughters in her honor. Both John Dewey and later his daughter, Jane, credited Addams with developing his own thought on philosophy and education. Addams was clearly an inspiration and a valued intellectual peer who influenced, and was influenced by, Dewey (Fischer, in Shook & Margolis, 2006).

Addams' pragmatism (which overlaps with Dewey) is evident in her 1892 lecture/essay "The Subjective Necessity for Social Settlements" (Addams, 1910). The essay weaves both the

aims of pragmatism—the progressive improvement of social, political and economic conditions for all—along with the methods of pragmatism—the democratic process (as opposed to ideological dogmatism). If this work is representative of Addams' ideas and general project then it should suffice to show significant consistency between Dewey and Addams. Addams begins by stating the desire of many young people who wish to put their democratic ideals, their sentiment of “universal brotherhood,” into action. As stated previously, Addams understood Hull House as benefiting both the upper and lower classes. Hull House should serve as the intersection of people at both ends of the economic spectrum. It is a place where theory becomes practice, where thought becomes action. She speaks of young people being able to “socialize” their democratic ideas via “common intercourse.” “We have in America a fast-growing number of cultivated young people who have no recognized outlet for their active faculties” (Addams, 1910, p. 94). Hull House is an answer to this problem. For Addams the impetus for Hull House was rooted in her non-dogmatic understanding of Christianity. “Jesus had no set of truths labeled religious. On the contrary, his doctrine was that all truth is one, that the appropriation of it is freedom. His teaching had no dogma to mark it off from truth and action in general. ... his motives for action are his zeal and affection with which he regards his fellows” (p. 96). Addams goes on to state that the Settlement movement is part of a wider humanitarian movement involving this spiritual force.

The ethos of many young, educated people in Addams' day matches with this “zeal” inherent in the Settlement movement. Both are aimed at action that produces positive results: “It aims, in a measure, to develop whatever of social life its neighborhood may afford, to focus and give form to that life, to bring to bear upon it the results of cultivation and training” (Addams, 1910, p. 97). The ethos of the young generation is not a force of dogmatic political or social

doctrine per se. It is a direction, a trajectory toward a better society for all, the “good” in Deweyan terms. Its methods include applied experimental intelligence and democratically engaged fellowship. This reflects Addams’ non-dogmatic understanding of Christianity as an impetus toward social service based on the force of love and genuine concern for one’s fellow man or woman. Neither of these starting points for the Settlement movement originate with a priori dogmas or doctrines, but instead embrace their inherited historical, religious and social contexts and engage in future-oriented action.

Dewey has very similar ideas regarding the establishment and use of government and the role of democracy. To be sure, his religious ideas should be considered perhaps even more progressively ‘post-Christian,’ as he was clearly a materialist—but again, the pragmatism overlaps. The good of the state, according to Dewey, is determined by

...the degree of organization of the public which is attained, and the degree in which its officers are so constituted as to perform their function of caring for public interests. But there is no *a priori* rule which can be laid down and by which when it is followed a good state will be brought into existence. In no two ages or places is there the same public (Dewey, 1927, p. 291).

What he intends is a statement that even for the determination of, and use of, government, one must not set out with one particular political ideology and apply it dogmatically in all situations and all places. The people in various locations and times are different and will require different ideologies in order to care for public interest. “[T]here is no form of state which can be said to be the best...” (p. 291). Addams, in her speech, is considering Settlement houses as a social intervention, and here Dewey is considering the establishment and use of the state, for social

welfare. Their applications differ in scope, but the philosophical approach to both is the same pragmatism. Accordingly, the establishment of an institution and/or organization should not be limited to a dogmatically appropriated ideology. The thought or ideology used in either case should be considered a tool for use in establishing desired ends, which for both thinkers includes the improvement of society such that it is better for all.

Thus, Dewey and Addams are similar in their methods. As stated, for Hull House Addams desires the application of intelligence in an experimental and democratic form. Dewey, again referring to statecraft, writes

The formation of states must be an experimental process. The trial process may go on with diverse degrees of blindness and accident, and at the cost of unregulated procedures of cut and try, of fumbling and groping, without insight into what men are after or clear knowledge of a good state even when it is achieved. Or it may proceed more intelligently, because guided by knowledge of the conditions which must be fulfilled. But it is still experimental (Dewey, 1927, p. 291).

Both Addams and Dewey are teleological in the sense that they aim at pre-established goals. But they are inherently flexible in their use of theory as tools toward those ends. In short, method replaces dogma. For Dewey, statecraft is an ongoing *process* rather than the establishment of a *static* institutional set. Addams likewise invents and reinvents Hull House to suit the needs of the community and the gifts and abilities of the residents, instead of relying upon a single dogmatic stance. She states

The Settlement, then, is an experimental effort to aid in the solution of the social and industrial problems which are engendered by the modern conditions of life in a great city.

... From its very nature it can stand for no political or social propaganda. ... The one thing to be dreaded in the Settlement is that it lose its flexibility, its power of quick adaptation, its readiness to change its methods as its environment may demand. ... It should demand from its residents a scientific patience... (Addams, 1910, p. 98).

“Addams explains her method in pragmatist terms. Hull House is a site for experimentation, a place to try out ideas in action. In performing these experiments one needs to be highly flexible and responsive to the environment, carefully gathering data and working with one’s neighbors in sympathetic partnerships” (Fischer, in Shook & Margolis, 2006). Dewey recognizes as well that there are conflicting interests in society, otherwise there would be no social problems to begin with. The question is, how are conflicting claims to be settled so that the best outcome for all is attained? Dewey answers

The method of democracy—insofar as it is that of organized intelligence—is to bring these conflicts out into the open where their special claims can be seen and appraised, where they can be discussed and judged in the light of more inclusive interests than are represented by either of them separately (Dewey, 1937, p. 331).

Thus, both Dewey and Addams appeal to democracy, applied human intelligence in the form of scientific experimentalism, and the goal of improving conditions for all in an egalitarian fashion. They both recognize the inherent fallibilism involved in either endeavor—that this will be a messy and “fumbling” sort of process that unfolds over time. Both also prescribe ongoing human contact between people of different economic status and sociopolitical orientation in order to cultivate and develop the solidarity necessary to improve social conditions for all. Dewey and Addams are speaking the same pragmatist philosophical language.

Discussion of the clinical vs. social reform debate. The ‘work’ of social work, for Addams, is not clinical and it is not professional. She does not desire a new band of trained practitioners called ‘social workers’ who will go out into the homes of the poor, sick and oppressed in order to investigate, diagnose, and offer various treatments. For Addams, social work is about forming democratically-oriented communities. It is about putting people together—people from many different classes, ethnicities and backgrounds—so that they may know each other well enough to develop the solidarity that breeds motivation to unite and take action. If people will come together then they can change the structures of society, the institutions and the laws, so that justice may increase, so that all people (e.g. children, immigrants, women) may have real opportunities to grow and develop (e.g. via education and work). Working together, people can become empowered to regulate corporations, ensure proper sanitation in their neighborhoods, and fund schools for their children. These are the proper methods and tasks for social work. Addams is not naïve, however, and she does acknowledge and respect the individual case work ideas and methods of Mary Richmond and the COSs (see chapter 9). Addams understands that in addition to social reform, there is an important role for case workers to assist those who are in present need (e.g. due to addiction and hunger). She understands this clinical side of social work to be interdependent with her own ideas about social reform.

Mary Richmond (1861-1928)

Mary Richmond, along with Jane Addams, should be considered one of the progenitors of social work, particularly related to casework practice with individuals and families. Richmond was an excellent theoretician, practitioner, author, scholar and teacher (NASW, 2012). She authored several well known books, the most famous likely being *Social Diagnosis*, which

offered the first comprehensive description of social casework. Richmond originally started as an assistant treasurer for the Baltimore Charity Organization Society, but as her great skills and intelligence were recognized (as she had little formal education), she was soon promoted to the office of general secretary. Concerned with the quality of casework services, Richmond called for social work to become professionalized, which included formal social work education at the university level. Despite this, she recognized the need for ongoing voluntary social work as well. Richmond served in many other significant roles over her career, including researching and teaching at the New York School of philanthropy, and offering summer institutes for heads of charity organization societies.

Purpose. Richmond believed that social casework is a unified field with a common purpose. She states her thoughts after reviewing fifteen years worth of case notes, illustrations and some drafting work

It soon became apparent...that no methods or aims were peculiarly and solely adapted to the treatment of the families that found their way to a charity organization society; that, in essentials, the methods and aims of social case work were or should be the same in every type of service, whether the subject was a homeless paralytic, the neglected by of drunken parents, or the widowed mother of small children (Richmond, 1917, p. 5).

She does go on to state that there will be specialization according to the specifics of a given field of practice, but that these are a “convenience rather than a necessity” (p. 5). Richmond imagined social casework as a new and emerging professional field of practice—one that would primarily be concerned with social work (e.g. serving the needs of impoverished children or homeless people), but one that also served as an adjunct to law, medicine and government services. The

adjunctive role for social work is due to its focus on “social diagnosis,” which involves an investigation into all aspects of a person’s social world in order to develop a holistic and useful understanding of their situation (see methods section for details). Armed with this newly formulated diagnostic skill, social caseworkers may use it in the capacity of a social worker, but may also ‘investigate’ cases as needed for physicians or judges—anyone who needs a complete, or as complete as possible, a picture of a person’s situation.

The goal of social casework (including social diagnosis is to “affect better adjustments between the individual and his [sic] environment” (Richmond, 1922, p. 6). Richmond also states the purpose of casework as to assist clients such that they return to a “right relation in society” (1917, p. 39). This is done with an aim toward “the development of the personality,” considering personality quite broadly to include genetic inheritance, psychological and social characteristics (Richmond, 1922, p. 90). Personalities may develop and grow, or they may atrophy, depending on many different factors and influences. The caseworker may assist in adjusting the personality in many ways, which may involve teaching a skill, putting someone in contact with a new social group, referring them to a service. In any situation, even casework will be focused on both the individuals and their environments.

That field [casework] is the development of personality through the conscious and comprehensive adjustment of social relationships, and within that field the worker is no more occupied with abnormalities in the individual than in the environment, is no more able to neglect the one than the other (Richmond, 1922, p. 98).

Richmond continues the same theme later in the paragraph.

So long as human beings are human and their environment is the world, it is difficult to imagine a state of affairs in which both they and the world they live in will be in no need of these adjustments and readjustments of a detailed sort (p. 98).

The adjustment, therefore, of the individual, always has “two poles:” one pertains most specifically to the particular client, and the other to the environment, with special focus on the social situation.

Methods. Social diagnosis is the primary method of social casework. This is the generic method that crosses all boundaries of specialization. “In social diagnosis there is the attempt to arrive at as exact a definition as possible of the social situation and personality of a given client” (Richmond, 1917, p. 51). This involves first extensive investigation—the gathering of evidence—which is then examined and compared. After this, logical reasoning is applied in order to generate a broad and holistic picture of the situation. Thus, social diagnosis is an interpretive process involving information from multiple sources such as neighbors, friends, clergy, social services workers, police, judges, physicians. Sources also may include various documents, such as court reports or educational transcripts. Richmond understands social diagnosis to be a process that unfolds over time—it is a profession, yet also an art form that requires broad interpersonal skills, investigative skills, and a scientific attitude of openness and creative insight. Once a social diagnosis is made, the process continues as the practitioner determines a treatment to be applied to solve practical problems with the individual and the environment.

Values. Social casework, as a formal profession, was new to the early 20th century and as such did not yet have a well developed ethical code. Richmond states as much (1916), but does

raise several important points for professional ethics. The professional caseworker should be truthful and fair in the client-worker relationship, and uphold the highest standards. This would involve, for instance, sharing pertinent information with the client in an effective and timely manner. The practitioner must also attend to the dual responsibility that he or she has to both the client and the community. “The social case worker must discover and protect his [sic] real client – the one, that is, whose social need is most urgent, He [sic] must never lose sight of public welfare in his endeavors for the welfare of individuals...” (Richmond, 1916, p. 393). The caseworker should also avoid the habit of “scolding” and offering advice.

Richmond’s professional ethics are generally grounded in her values. These include the value of the individual and his or her ability to function in society. In addition, Richmond valued interdependence (1922). Whether considering the diagnostic or the treatment process, the interdependence of clients with the other people and institutions in their environment must become part of the process. Richmond stated that “[t]here is no such thing as a ‘self-made man’” (1922, p. 134)—everyone is affected profoundly by their environment, whether for better or worse, and anyone is capable of falling out of adjustment with their environment.

Knowledge. Knowledge for social work primarily centers upon knowledge of the client & client systems, knowledge of relevant social work (and other) theory, and scientific knowledge. These should be put in concert to effectively diagnose and treat clients, whether individuals or families. Gaining a fair and sufficiently robust understanding of the client requires extensive knowledge gained from the multiple sources listed above. A caseworker may, as is permitted, also gain significant information by observing the client “in being,” meaning in his or her own environment as he or she interacts with others. Social caseworkers should be apprised of relevant theory as well, such as George Mead’s ideas regarding the social construction of the

self. For example, Richmond cites Mead's work in her book *What is Social Casework?* as she discusses human interdependence. "We all need to get rid of whatever vestige of an idea still remains with us that a man's [sic] mind is somewhere in his head..." She states that the mind is a social thing which is always in process of development, and therefore may be changed via social diagnosis and treatment. This whole process should take into account any relevant knowledge from the social and biological sciences as well.

Sanction. Sanction for social work comes from the community. The social caseworker's diagnosis and treatment should keep in mind the "community sanction" as a matter of ethical course (Richmond, 1916, p. 393). In adjusting the individual and the society, it would seem that the cultural mores of the society would have to be taken into account, otherwise proper adjustment would be impossible as there would be no 'standard.' There is at least a nod toward client sanction as well when Richmond states that caseworkers have a right to their opinions, but that they have no right to impose them upon clients, unless sanctioned by professional experience and something well beyond his or her own private views (p. 392). This seems to fall well short of the idea of 'client self-determination' which emerges later in the development of social casework.

Pragmatist themes. Jane Addams and John Dewey are philosophical 'birds of a feather.' There are also overlapping ideas between Richmond and Dewey. Richmond is not a pragmatist scholar *per se* as Addams is, but there are at least three Deweyan themes that are recognizable in Richmond's work: 1) the adaptation of organisms and environments; 2) instrumentalism; 3) democracy. I'll consider each of these in turn, as pertains to Richmond's theory of social casework.

John Dewey's anthropology and metaphysics (see previous section) put forth a Darwin-inspired philosophical view of the world (naturalism) such that biological organisms, including humans, are inextricably derivative of their environments. Organisms are also, however, always involved in altering and shaping their environments in a continual process of developing tools and strategies aimed at continued survival. In sum, Dewey's understanding is that the adaptation of humans to environments and vice versa is what comprises not only the state of affairs in which we find ourselves, but it also reveals a trajectory for human ethics and goals, namely free democratic deliberation in an ongoing effort to further the growth and development of human individuals and societies toward increased knowledge, justice and peace—in a word, human flourishing. Mary Richmond has very similar conceptions of the human predicament and of desirable human ends. In her book *Social Diagnosis* (1917) Richmond opens with a statement of the goal of social casework, which "...has for its immediate aim the betterment of individuals or families.." (p. 25). In another of her books, *What is Social Casework?* (1922) Richmond offers a hopeful account of what social casework can do presently and in the future to improve human lives. She continues by stating "[i]t follows that one of the great, unused opportunities to serve humanity and further social progress lies in the endowment of special ability in this particular field" (Richmond, 1922, p. 251). The overlapping philosophical ideas will become apparent as these very general goals are 'unpacked' as we proceed.

Further specifying her goals for social case work, Richmond says that "[i]ts theories, its aims, its best intensive practice all seem to have been converging of late years toward one central idea; namely, toward the development of personality" (Richmond, 1922, p. 90). "Social case work consists of those processes which develop personality through adjustments consciously effected, individual by individual, between men and their social environment" (p. 98-99). With

the term “personality” Richmond intends a holistic understanding of the human self that is broad and

Signifies not only all that is native and individual to a man but all that comes to him by way of education, experience, and human intercourse. Our physical heredity, our innate qualities transmitted and unalterable are individual, but all that portion of our social heritage and our environment which we have been able in day by day living to add to individuality and make a part of ourselves is personal; and the whole becomes our personality (p. 92).

Her definition shows that she understands the human person to be comprised of biological, psychological and environmental (i.e. physical, social and cultural) factors. People are inherently related to each other by their social and cultural inheritance, despite individual differences. She also sees personality as a process that is always in flux, both for “native” and “acquired” qualities. As such, learning—primary for social case work—is also considered a process whereby the individual changes as a result of direct encounters and interactions with various social contacts in the world. Gordon called this the “zone of transaction.” Thus, Richmond’s definition of social casework is consistent with Dewey’s understanding of the human being as essentially a *transactional* being who grows and changes via interactions with various other individuals and elements in his or her environment.

Richmond also reflects Dewey’s understanding of *experience*—that it is not merely a passive affair. The individual does not just react to stimuli, but equally acts upon the environment, in a reciprocal relationship. Dewey’s *reflex arc* example comes to mind again as demonstrating that the human being must first have intention and act (i.e. reach toward the

flame) before a reaction to the heat can occur. Again, this is a process of continual and dynamic interaction. Richmond's understanding of the individual is also that he or she is not a static, merely reactive being. Otherwise the efforts of social case work would be rendered futile from the outset. Instead she writes that the role of the case worker is to facilitate that process whereby "adjustment" between individual and environment takes place, with the aim toward better conditions for both. "That field is the development of personality through the conscious and comprehensive adjustment of social relationships, and within that field the worker is no more occupied with abnormalities in the individual than in the environment, is no more able to neglect the one than the other" (Richmond, 1922, p. 98). She goes on to say that ongoing adjustments and readjustments will be necessary, overlapping with Dewey's notion of fallibilism.

Richmond further develops this point as she moves the discussion toward the methods of social casework and democracy. Contrary to the "solitary horseman" view of the individual, where "[h]e had been trapped into the social contract, we used to think, and should protect himself against its encroachments as best he could," Richmond realizes that "... a human being's knowledge of his very self is pieced together laboriously out of his observations of the actions and reactions of others" (Richmond, 1922, p. 129).

We all need to get rid of whatever vestige of an idea still remains with us that a man's mind is somewhere in his head, or that it has any location in space whatever. At any given time a man's mental make-up is the sum of his natural endowment and his social experiences and contacts up to that time. ... the human mind is not a fixed and unalterable thing, unless it be defective or hopelessly diseased. On the contrary, it is a living, growing, changing, highly suggestible thing, capable of receiving strong

impressions from without, of forming new habits, of responding to opportunity, of assimilating the good as well as the bad (p. 131)

One consequence of Richmond's thought on human interdependence is that there is no such thing as a "self-made man." Each individual is indebted to the others for their very being and for their ongoing adjustment, survival, and, if lucky, their thriving. Dewey's understanding of human interdependence is consistent. On his thinking, the adjustments between organisms and environments can (and must) occur on many levels and in multiple ways (e.g. socially, physically). The intended direction of course, is toward greater freedom and democracy.

On democracy, Dewey states that since the "public" (both individuals, groups, social and physical environments, etc.) is always in flux, and since the goal is always to promote the public interest (especially for those most vulnerable), there can be no a priori dogmas about political ideology. Instead, democracy is a fumbling and fallible, experimental and ongoing process whereby issues and problems are brought to open public deliberation. Richmond also values freedom and democracy in very similar ways. To be sure, she emphasizes the need for individual tailoring of policy and program more than Dewey does, but their ideas otherwise line up. Richmond writes, "Here are suggested the two sides of a genuinely democratic program: It equalized opportunity by intelligent mass action; it recognizes diversity by establishing forms of public administration which do different things for and with different people at every turn" (Richmond, 1922, p. 154). The focus on "mass action" generally attributed more to Dewey (and Addams) is not rejected here, but Richmond is very concerned that broad policies are adaptable to individual needs, an essential role for social case work. Generally speaking, Richmond reflects Dewey's non-dogmatic stance as an essential aspect of democracy. For instance, with regard to the use of government or private resources for the betterment of individuals, Richmond states

“[n]ot one or the other, but both public and private auspices will continue to be necessary, though there is the third possibility that some social case workers will develop a private, independent practice of their own” (Richmond, 1922, p. 248). She believed that however social casework was to go forward, respect for personality is essential. “Such respect implies a democratic point of view” (p. 248). Richmond’s perspective is pragmatic as she is interested in there being useful services made available for people who need them, and in so doing, avoiding a dogmatic principle of the role of government in social affairs. She goes on to state that “[d]emocracy, however, is not a form of organization but a daily habit of life” (p. 249). Dewey also regularly discusses his own conception of human habit as a central feature of his anthropology. The cultivation of democratic processes as an interpersonal habit is thus shared by both.

Discussion of the clinical vs. social reform debate. While Richmond focused her energies on developing interventions (social casework) at the individual level, she fully recognized the value and need for social reform. She stated that clinical work and social reform work are “interdependent” as they are both necessary aspects of social work (please see chapter 9 for details).

Arthur J. Todd

Arthur Todd was a sociologist and chair of the Sociology Department at Northwestern University from 1926 to 1943 (Northwestern University Sociology Department, 2012). He wrote on topics such as social progress, the family, religion, and he wrote one book—*The Scientific Spirit and Social Work*—just after the conclusion of the first world war (1919), which offers a particular perspective on the role and function of social work. This summary will largely be taken from this work, his primary address to the topic at hand.

In the preface to this work Todd states that his motives for writing on this topic are directly related to the need for detailed thinking about what social work is, given that it was becoming accepted by the president and other political leaders as an important institution to be used in the post-war reconstruction process. Like Mary Richmond, Todd is intent upon making social work more robust (i.e. a profession with principles and ethics). Richmond does this with her principles on social diagnosis, Todd does it by framing social work as a profession rooted in the methods and spirit of science (though Richmond too presented her principles as scientific in her own way).

Todd's goal is to use social work as an instrument for social progress. He believes that both the human and the environment are involved in a "creative evolution" that involves the transformation of both toward better biological, psychological, social, economic and political circumstances and increased peace and justice overall (Todd, 1918). This will involve plural social work methods under a dual perspective involving both clinical and social reform work. Values include social justice and human rights, leading to increased freedom and equality. Social work knowledge should be thoroughly scientific in both attitude and technique. Sanction comes from both the public and government. Todd's philosophy of social work is pragmatist generally in its progressivism, specifically in its instrumentalist perspective on science and its emphasis on the organism-in-environment perspective.

Purpose. Todd's ultimate purpose for social work is the facilitation of social progress. He proclaims social progress itself with near Nietzschean fervor as a new interpretation of the Great Commission (i.e. the Christian impetus to spread the good news of the Gospel of Jesus Christ). His new hope does not reside with the divine, but with what humanity can achieve for

itself if it applies itself diligently and intentionally toward progressive ideals of democracy, human rights and peace.

The road to the great house of many mansions which humanity is building for itself is long and winding; it has to be built over morasses of human depravity which must be drained; it must be blasted through mountain ranges of selfishness and prejudice; it must skirt giddy chasms full of the bones of the unwary. But it is building, and will continue building just so long as men lend their science and their love and their skill to the great commission. Is it not a glorious privilege that social workers are permitted to share increasingly in this supreme and thrilling enterprise of human engineering? (Todd, 1919, p. 207)

Todd enthusiastically invites the public, and social work itself, to embark on the great challenge that is the gathering of the "...fruits of peace in a democracy of service" (p. 206). These highly significant purposes of social work should be carried out with "military preparedness" and the best "adventurous spirit" (p. 206, 160). What Todd has in mind for social work circa 1919 reflects the purposes of Jane Addams and Mary Richmond both as he offers a dual-focused philosophy. "To that putting forth of effort the social worker contributes in two ways: through case work with individuals or families, and through general measures of utility to whole classes or groups" (p. 194). The purposes of the individual and family case work include assisting with "...progressive amelioration of human character, growth in knowledge, self-control, productive capacity, obedience, loyalty, thrift, teamwork, unselfishness, prudence, and imagination" (p. 194). On the other hand, social reform requires environmental conditions that promote "...education, discipline, controls, rewards, penalties, and opportunity" (p. 194).

The twofold purpose of social work should also manifest itself in three areas: the physical environment, the human biopsychological environment, and the human social environment (including institutions, laws, beliefs and customs). For example, social workers may intervene in the physical environment following a tornado or other natural disaster to assist survivors in various ways. They may also be involved in planning and prevention for other types of potential human or naturally caused disasters. A further mission for social work—one not consistent with current or recent professional social work ethics—is eugenics. Social progress, according to Todd, means, among other things, “.health, vitality, and capacity in a population” (p. 199). This means encouraging “productive citizens” and preventing increasing the numbers of “morons.” Thus, he supports the “. . .birth control, sterilization or segregation of the unfit, encouragement of the fit. . .” (p. 199). This is only one role for social work, however. Further roles fit more easily with contemporary ethical standards and include, among other things, supporting legislation that helps release women from “sexual dependence,” advocating for anti-poverty policies, and taking an active stance toward international peace. Todd desires that “. . .social work ought to stand for organizing scientifically the forces, personal and material of a community in such a way as to eliminate waste and friction, and to raise progressively the capacity of every member for productivity, service, and joy in life” (p. 65). What Todd ultimately proposes is that social work should become an instrument for positive change in the post-WWI American society. “It stands as padding against the buffetings of the physical environment, it aids in keeping unobstructed the channels of human biology, and it modifies and promotes the institutional life of mankind [sic]” (p. 196). He hopes to raise the bar of living standards and well being especially for vulnerable groups, and to orient the American public toward the same goals. “Social betterment, then, is not

something imposed by Powers above, but an attitude of human minds, sentiments, and wills” (p. 17).

Methods. Todd’s work is more philosophical than practical and as such he does not offer extensive detail on the methods for social work. That being said, it is clear that he assumes a wide variety of methods will be used by diverse groups of social workers in many different venues. His methods seem to be consistent with his dual purpose of serving individuals as well as society as a whole. The methods at the individual level clearly include case work as primary, which may take place in service of different populations. For example, in reference to serving the ends of education, relief, and prevention, Todd mentions visiting nurses, friendly visitors, and juvenile court judges (p. 65). Presumably, this indicates that individual social work includes not just case workers in varying capacities, but even judges and others, professional or otherwise, who may be involved in serving the social work mission. Further roles at the individual and/or small group level include standing as a “shock absorber” between capital and labor, and dealing with family problems.

At the social reform level, social work methods should be consistent with the trends Todd identifies in his day which include obtaining reliable factual information via social science, supporting proactive state functions (i.e. welfare programs for the poor, sick, disabled), and garnering public support for socially progressive policies, institutions and practices. Todd states and/or implies that the methods for social reform include legislative action and advocacy, group work and community organizing.

Values. Todd’s values for social work can be summed up by stating that he offers both a social justice and human rights perspective. Both of these offer values that are essential aspects

of any social work practice. The centerpiece for his discussion of human rights is the right to freedom. The bill of rights, as part of the United States Constitution, is the primary referent for Todd, and he states that "...the right to freedom is perhaps the most outstanding of these" (1919, p. 9). Freedom for all people is the base value of Todd's socially progressive ideology. Freedom is further subdivided into other rights, including the right to a decent income/living wage, the right to organize for economic protection (i.e. to form trades unions), the right to leisure and recreation, the right to education, the right to health (e.g. sanitary living conditions and preventive medicine), the right of women to "equality in all social life" (Todd, 1919, p. 14; Todd, 1913), and the right of children to have a fighting chance for survival in general. Rights should "...serve as lighthouses for the social worker as he [sic] steers his course through the troubled currents of modern social life" (p. 16).

In addition to rights, Todd offers various values for social work that can loosely be categorized as social justice. These values stem from his central theme that social progress means the establishment of minimum standards of living.

But here again the point is that the whole level of our standard of decency has risen measurably in the last three or four centuries, and that we cannot tolerate from either public or private authorities any standard of treatment of any class whatsoever which is out of keeping with our minimum ideal of what any human creature should receive (1919, p. 14).

This means that the poor should be entitled not just to some form of welfare relief, but that it should be a "decent relief" consistent with the set minimum standards of living. It is noteworthy

that this discussion of justice occurs alongside the discussion of rights, which indicates that they work together.

The achievement of the minimum ideal will require that individuals take responsibility for contributing positively to society, and also that society become responsible for the wellbeing of the individual. “Like the ‘halves’ in Plato’s symposium they are complementary and indispensable to each other. They are the same thing” (Todd, 1919, p. 20). This idea, like all of Todd’s philosophy of social work, runs directly counter to the prevailing libertarian strain in his day which suggested that individuals should be considered as autonomous, self-interested and rational agents in competition for a limited number of resources. Todd finds this thinking repugnant and his philosophy of social work is meant to counter the values consistent with *laissez-faire* with new values of rights and justice based on an understanding of human cooperation and interdependence. Todd states

Charity is often simply an attempt to plaster a sore; constructive social service is paying back into the common fund the capital which has made us what we are, with a reasonable interest which may be used to swell the common fund for the benefit of others and perhaps of ourselves (p. 34).

The quote indicates duties between individuals, and between the individual and society, that will transcend mere charity and form a new social ethic involving the redistribution of resources, prevention and services for those in need. In so doing he hopes for a more egalitarian society where the differences between the propertied upper classes and the wage-earning weaker classes are minimized. The achievement of this will require dedication to the value of “social opportunity”—this is the ideal to be held up.

The new democracy of which we dream will be progressive and indeed possible only as we are able to develop a skilled leadership consecrated to unselfish service, and a sufficient measure of income, leisure, and education to enable the average citizen to sense the common need, to feel the thrill of the common purpose, and to enlist for its realization (Todd, 1919, p. 200).

Knowledge. From the outset of *The Scientific Spirit and Social Work* Todd clearly states that knowledge for social work must be scientific in nature. Regarding social workers who will participate in the post-war efforts, he states

Whether they elect to seek professional training or whether they enlist only as volunteers and amateurs, if they are to become permanent assets instead of liabilities to scientific social work they must somehow or other get the scientific and professional attitude toward their work (1919, p. v).

With this statement Todd offers a double emphasis on science as the method for social work: he not only states that social workers must adopt an “attitude” that is scientific and professional—which he previously defined as humble and modest—but the very term he uses to denote social work is “scientific social work.” Social work, that is, social work *without* the scientific aspect, on Todd’s view, would be a sub-standard social work which would fail to “...make good and justify by their works the new faith placed in them” (p. v). The scientific attitude is an essential aspect of Todd’s definition of a professional—that alongside following principles specific to one’s field and a code of ethics.

Social science, for Todd, is more than just a procedure to follow. “Science, then, is adventure in spirit and method, although to be sure we judge it finally by its works” (1919, p.

160). In other words, it is both “attitude” and “technique.” The attitude is comprised of an openness to new ideas, possibilities and novel solutions to problems. It is the cultivation of a progressive, critical and adaptable mindset. Science also seeks to utilize its methods in order to generate accurate, useful information. “To work for the truth that shall make you free—that is the scientific spirit” (p. 85). Todd accepts and promotes a wide variation in scientific methods, including those used in sociology, political science, economics and psychology. “But remember that the technique of science is never fixed. Science always moves on. The charitable methods of twenty years ago may be utterly obsolete now” (p. 85).

The adoption and use of scientific methods for social work is important both for individual and societal level interventions. At the individual level science aids in avoiding bias (among other things). “To see a problem clearly means also to get away from mere impressions” (p. 84). Thus, science can help charitable visitors to avoid stereotyping and discriminating against people who are different from themselves and who may be of low status for a variety of reasons. Perhaps more importantly, and in a more positive sense, science aids social work by providing necessary information and problem solving skills. “The first distinctive test of a scientific worker is his ability to see and formulate a problem clearly. This is diagnosis equally in medicine, law, in education, and in social work” (p. 83). Good casework requires the ability to see beyond what “everybody believes” and gain an accurate—that is science-based—understanding of the situation at hand. This means both the application of scientific findings to the case as well as using a scientific “spirit” of critical thinking to navigate one’s way through the case. For instance, when working with a family that is experiencing economic hardship due to unemployment, the case worker will not simply assume, as does most of the population (according to Todd’s cited research), that the problem is of necessity due to laziness and some

form of intemperance. Instead the worker will understand that economic hardship, though it may be caused by those things, may also be caused by other individual-level factors, or by factors that are out of the hands of the individual (e.g. recession).

At the societal change level, scientific methods should be employed for a variety of reasons as well. For instance, determining the needs of a community in the first place should be discerned via scientific research. In addition, efficiency and wise use of resources demands that duplication of services be avoided—this too should be a subject of scientific research. Research should also be used to show effectiveness and efficiency of charities and services. “Social control over vestigial philanthropy must become very much more vigorous before we can be assured of relief from the inefficiency and loss it now entails” (Todd, 1919, p. 112). The methods of science in Todd’s day were used for business, education and vocational guidance—he wanted to use them similarly for social work. They may also be used internally for social work to better understand the role and function of social workers (e.g. that vacations are necessary as one way to decrease worker burnout and agency turnover).

Sanction. Todd begins his book with the topic of sanction.

...the unparalleled official recognition of social work by the government—by President Wilson, Secretary Baker, Secretary Daniels, Secretary Lane, the governors of various states, and others—puts social workers, new and old, on their mettle (1919, p. v).

He goes on to state that social workers, formerly stigmatized, were becoming accepted as necessary agents who will “save a country in its hour of crisis” (p. v).

Social work, for Todd, must be sanctioned by both government and the public. This generally reflects Todd’s implicit social constructionist view. For instance, he briefly discusses

the metaphysics of rights, in which he indicates that rights are constructions of culture and society, not something naturally extant. “Now if we summarize this conception, we may define a right as an interest that has been approved, selected, tested, and generalized through social experience. In other words, society creates rights” (1919, p. 5). As such, rights are “social privileges;” the term is used to reflect this constructionist metaphysic. Even his conception of the individual is similarly constructionist: “The individual is not, then, a natural product; he [sic] is a product of civilization; and civilization is a social achievement” (p. 25). To be consistent, social work too, as an agglomerate human institution, is a social product, and as such must be sanctioned by the social community—the public, government, business, and other societal institutions—in order for it to commence being or perdure.

It is noteworthy that Todd does not mention clients or client systems as being necessary sanctioning bodies, at least not directly. His focus on democratic process would imply that that any recipients of social work services should have a ‘place at the table,’ but Todd does not indicate that this should be the case. It is also noteworthy, though not explicitly stated, that science itself seems to be a sanction for social work, for without science Todd is concerned that social work will not develop positively for the purposes of social progress, but may become mired in sentimentalism, bias and class conflict instead.

Pragmatist themes. Todd’s philosophy of social work overlaps easily with several pragmatist themes. First, it overlaps with Dewey’s concept of instrumentalism. Dewey has in mind a fairly loose, yet still scientific method (which replaces modern rationalist and/or empiricist epistemology and speculative metaphysics) in mind as the ‘instrument’ of applied intelligent inquiry that should be used to discern ‘truth’ as that which is functional. Todd overlaps with this functionality: “science, then, is adventure in spirit and method, although to be

sure we judge it finally by its works” (1919, p. 160). To be sure, any scientific theory will be aimed at producing useful results, but Todd captures the pragmatist spirit here with his adventurous notion, and with the idea that the “works” of science prove its mettle. Pragmatist truth is centered upon function, or ‘what works’ and much less so on lining up research findings with a supposed ‘real’ objective reality. Todd’s science is also fallible, similar to Dewey’s: he states “...the technique of science is never fixed” (p. 85), indicating that science itself, as well as its results, will vary and adapt over time to the functional needs of the society that uses it as a tool toward its own ends (e.g. social progress in Todd’s case). Todd’s science, also like Dewey’s, is considered continuous with everyday thinking: “the new quality which science adds to the impulse to serve is ordered intelligence, the discipline of knowledge” (p. 70). He also quotes Huxley who states that “science is nothing but trained and organized common sense” (p. 70).

Todd also overlaps with Dewey’s organism in environment thinking. Todd states that the individual is the product of his or her environment, but also affects his or her environment, and on Todd’s view, has a moral duty to do so positively—this human environment interaction is the key to Todd’s ideas about social progress as summarized in his use of the term “creative evolution.” The term simply indicates that neither human nature or biophysical (or social) environments are static—they evolve together, and can do so in a positive way if there is intentionality applied to this growth in creative, progressive ways (Todd, 1918). Social work should be used to help bring about an environment conducive to equal opportunity for all people so that they may become educated, learn, grow and flourish according to their own designs. These goals—Todd’s goals regarding “social progress”—could be taken from Dewey’s ethics, which state the same thing. Dewey’s ethics are not dogmatic and fixed, but aim for a trajectory in the progress of culture (e.g. public policy, rights) toward increased equality and justice for all,

the method being democratic processes, whether on the micro or macro scale. Todd too values democracy as a means and an end—in his discussion of social reform (among other places) Todd indicates that democracy is the goal, the end worth fighting for, along with peace.

Discussion of the clinical vs. social reform debate. Todd's philosophy of social work, with his statement that its purposes and methods should be "twofold," is consistent with Jane Addams' and Mary Richmond's ideas during the same time period (see later section on Addams and Richmond). Todd's statement is both descriptive and prescriptive: he indicates that what early social work was doing included both individual and societal level work, whether it meant case work or social action groups. This early statement of social work philosophy could not be more clear: to reiterate, Todd states that social work contributes in two ways: "...through case work with individuals or families, and through general measures of utility to whole classes or groups" (1919, p. 194). He goes on to state that this twofold mission extends to the three domains of physical, biopsychological, and sociopolitical. Thus, social work is to be a holistic enterprise aimed at bringing social progress to post-WWI America and beyond.

One focal question that would be dealt with in the emerging social work profession over the next decade following Todd's book is whether social work is one, unified profession, with a single theory for itself, or whether it is comprised of multiple, loosely associated professions (or sub-professions). Todd does not raise this question specifically, but he only indicates that there is unity—that social work is one thing, though it has its twofold function. After mentioning several goals for social work, he states

this does not mean that for each of these crops we must have a separate type of "social worker." Indeed the opposite ought to be true. Every juvenile court judge, or visiting

nurse, or friendly visitor should combine the three functions of education, relief, and prevention. But for purposes of concentration and economy of effort, a division of labor may be necessary. Yet such a division ought to leave room for each type of worker to play into the other's hand (1919, p. 65)

The last line in particular is a near reproduction of what Mary Richmond said in her book *Social Diagnosis* two years earlier. Both recognize that though social work must have a “division of labor,” and a dual focus, this does not imply a divided profession. To the contrary, social workers in diverse capacities must recognize their interdependence and respectfully cooperate to bring about their shared goals.

Edward T. Devine (1867-1948)

Edward T. Devine was a major figure in early social work. In addition to his scholarly works he served in several significant administrative roles: he was the General Secretary of the New York Charity Organization Society from 1896 to 1916, and Secretary of the journal *Survey*, which was widely read by social workers and reformers of the day (NASW, 1998). Like with those in the settlement house movement, he believed that social work had a duty to strike out at the forces of injustice and “evil” which caused intolerable living conditions that harm and destroy human lives. Devine also joined forces with Lillian Wald in New York—together they promoted the idea of a federal children's welfare bureau, an idea that finally became a reality when President Taft signed the Children's Bureau into law only after years of dedicated advocacy work.

Devine's philosophy of social work is explicitly dual-focused on both the individual (clinical) and society (social reform). It is also centered upon addressing various social problems:

methods include anything (and anyone or any group) which serves the “new social order” (Devine, 1922) The new social order denotes social justice as minimum standards of human living and decency of sufficient quality beyond mere existence (e.g. counter-Libertarian). Social work values include human rights, social justice, virtue ethics, diversity, and good character for workers. Knowledge sources include the humanities and social sciences—anything that can be applied to solving social problems. Social work is sanctioned by the public and the state.

Purpose. Devine’s purposes for social are very similar to those of Arthur Todd. They each offer nearly identical social principles, but Todd’s work is more philosophical while Devine’s is more focused on generating solutions to social problems. Devine begins his 1922 book called *Social work*, by defining social work:

Social work is the serious vocation of a considerable number of men and women, and an avocation of a larger number...[all] doing what they can by the way to lessen poverty, ignorance, disease, and crime; to make the lives of their less privileged neighbors happier and more satisfying; to secure justice for individuals who suffer from injustice and hardship; to advance the new social order which some visualize as a decent place for human beings to live in, and some call the Kingdom of Heaven (1922, p. v).

Devine interprets the “Kingdom of Heaven” in a very this-worldly way as a “decent place” for humans to live. This definition captures both his social principle (the “new social order”) and the problem focus, both of which aim “for the promotion of the common welfare” (Devine, 1911, p. v). Devine’s social work is also very diverse and inclusive of many different professional and lay persons who support the cause in different ways. This diversity is required in order to properly address the many social issues occurring in modern, urbanized, individualized, industrialized

society, including problems such as tenement housing, crime, drug/alcohol addiction, homelessness, disability and mental illness (Devine, 1911). Devine's ideas also extend beyond the individual and include issues in business and industry such as the conservation of forests, as opposed to the exploitation of all natural resources, including timber.

Devine's social work also has a dual purpose: First, it is concerned with "the care of those who through misfortune or fault are not able under existing conditions to realize a normal life for themselves or who hinder others from realizing it" (1922, p. 3). Second, social work concerns itself with "the improvement of conditions which are a menace to individual welfare..." (p. 3). The first purpose addresses social work at the individual, or clinical level, and the second addresses the societal, or social reform level. For example, Devine supported the temperance movement and stated that it had two main divisions, the "moral appeal for personal temperance...abstinence," and "the political agitation for the control, eventually for the entire prohibition, of the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages" (p. 207).

In sum, Devine advocates for a social work that recognizes and serves to improve the well being of disempowered individuals and groups (Devine, 1914). Social work should be rooted in social justice and the standards of decency and normalcy of the time so that everyone has the opportunity for a good life.

Methods. Consistent with his broad purposes for social work, Devine's methods are equally broad and diverse and include relief for a variety of people, from orphaned children, to widowed women, to the physically and mentally ill (Devine, 1914). Devine's writing about methods, whether for helping people who have endured a natural disaster or long-term unemployment, are broad and hopeful: by 1921 he reports that many important strides had been

made in the preceding two decades of the development of social welfare (e.g. many new welfare agencies had begun to address a host of social problems by then) (Devine, 1921). Devine does not systematically describe methods for social work as a particular set of skills, techniques or competencies—surely an overly narrow set of skills and techniques would not be applicable similarly to the great breadth of his purview for social work. However, there are methods for social work and they are evident throughout his writing. Devine states that the methods of social work include “...the whole complicated net-work of activities which center around the social problems of poverty, disease, crime, and other socially abnormal conditions” (1922, p. 19). Methods are thus discussed relative to the problems and issues being addressed, and range from settlement houses at the social reform end of the spectrum, to social case work on the individual, clinical end. “The unifying element in social work lies in these common social problems with which it is concerned, rather than in a common method or motive” (p. 19).

The methods of social work include both prevention and seeking solutions to existing problems. They “may be carried out by the government or by an incorporated society or by an informal group or by an individual...” (Devine, 1922, p. 22) Social work methods include “...everything which is done by society for the benefit of those who are not in position to compete on fair terms with their fellows...” (p. 22). The agencies of social work are those formally designated for social work tasks, or those who conduct social work secondarily, and include, among others, churches, clubs, lodges, government organizations, settlements, craft unions, non-profit organizations, political organizations, schools and individual citizens. The tasks they perform in the efforts toward creating a “new social order” are also myriad and may include helping someone find a job, reconciling a couple, intervening on behalf of someone who is addicted to alcohol, assisting an immigrant with acculturation, or advising a tenant of his or

her rights. As such, no particular “technique” is characteristic of social work, but any who participate in doing social work should become familiarized with the diversity in human populations so that they may apply “common sense” in an appropriate manner.

Values. Not surprisingly, Devine’s values for social work are also plural. Social work ... may be inspired by the altruistic or humanitarian motive; it may represent a responsibility accepted by the people in their corporate capacity and detailed to public officials; it may reflect rising standards of taste with reference to what is decent to allow in civilized society, and rising standards of what constitutes justice (1922, p. 3-4)

While he starts with these rather vague suggestions of value for social work, Devine does add some ‘teeth’ to his philosophy of social work as he develops his ideas more specifically toward valuing human “life, health, and character” (p. 12). Like other progressives, Devine clearly states that any such values for social work run contrary to the Libertarian Social Darwinism that would leave the ‘economic losers,’ the vulnerable, sick, oppressed, and children to the ‘survival of the fittest.’ Stemming from the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution, Devine proposes that the spirit of social work, the “new social order” is concerned not just with the right to life—that is, merely to not be interfered with as a living being (the Libertarian interpretation—but with “positive rights” beyond this that include

... certain economic rights: the right to life in the only sense in which it has meaning to us, the right to a life of economic security and independence, the right to a decent standard of living. The positive right to the available sources of happiness must be made as secure as the negative freedom from interference in the pursuit of happiness (1922, p. 45).

These rights to life imply the value of a reasonable and just standard of living for all people (Devine, 1933). This just and reasonable standard of living includes categories, but not content, for good living (Devine, 1922, p. 45). For example, just standards include minimum levels of income, leisure time, housing, nutrition, work hours, healthcare and the like, but they do not at the same time prescribe (or proscribe) particular leisure activities that should be undertaken, or that any particular person must work any particular job, or that certain foods should or should not be consumed (other than drugs and alcohol). Above all, the value of freedom is paramount. “Among the political ideals which Americans have cherished the foremost is undoubtedly that of individual freedom” (Devine, 1933, p. 44).

Social work values also generally include a number of virtues such as temperance, sexual morality (e.g. eliminating prostitution), efficiency (e.g. in non-overlapping services), and sympathy/empathy for people who are suffering. Devine also states specific values that social workers themselves should possess: “character is interpreted to mean integrity, responsibility, resourcefulness, and initiative; efficiency, to mean thoroughness, accuracy, promptness, courtesy, and industry; judgment, to cover both common sense and scientific attitude” (1922, p. 299). In addition, any who participate in social work, whether professional or not, should also seek knowledge and wisdom in order to avoid prejudice and discrimination.

Knowledge. Again it should come as no surprise that Devine’s ideas about appropriate sources of knowledge, like with his values and methods for social work, are diverse. Since social work has such a broad purview under the mission to bring about the new social order, the knowledge that may be applied to alleviating a particular social ill, or solving a particular problem, begins with common sense. And since much, if not most, of social work is performed by non-professionals, in Devine’s philosophy, there must be room for broad thinking, as long as

it is consistent with the stated purposes and values. “Social work appropriates from all sources whatever will be useful in the rescue of individuals or the amelioration of adverse working or living conditions” (1922, p. 303).

Beyond intentional, directed common sense, Devine appeals to knowledge from ethics/morals, from history and philosophy, and from science. Moral/ethical knowledge (e.g. temperance, the value of diversity) informs social work in its mission and guides its methods. This knowledge is gained from general college education, especially focused studies in history and philosophy related to social justice.

The historical background of social work is fully as important as its current operations, and the neglect of this historical background is the sufficient explanation of much that is superficial—even if pseudo-professional and pseudo-scientific—in the social work of the present generation. Serious thought about human welfare did not begin the day before yesterday (Devine, 1922, p. 306).

Devine goes on to explain how social justice theory—as well as the accompanying unjust social conditions and vulnerable, exploited groups—were considered by the ancient Jews, ancient Greek philosophers, and many others throughout history. Education in history and philosophy is essential for professional social work in Devine’s philosophy, and includes, among many other topics, social, as well as personal ethics. Social ethics may center, for instance, upon economic forces that shape communities and impact individual lives, and the policies that shape economic forces. Devine, for instance, understood that all industries, whether food and drug manufacturers or power plants, affected individuals and groups, and therefore affect public interest. “That interest is not adequately safeguarded by the inter-action of conflicting selfish interests” (Devine,

1933, p. 44). In other words, the competition of self-interested businesses and corporations (i.e. Neoclassical economics) alone offers no guarantee of well-being, justice or any public good. Social workers who hope to serve justice must have an understanding of such things.

Along with the need for common sense and historical/philosophical education, Devine is also a strong proponent of science as knowledge for social work.

Biology, physiology, geography, history, and the applied sciences of sanitation and engineering, may be named especially among the sources from which we derive ideas and knowledge of value in social work. There is scarcely any department of human knowledge which will not have its quota of available material for the social worker who is qualified to apply it (1922, p. 303).

In addition, social work can be considered applied sociology, applied economics and applied psychology—so long as they are aimed at improving human conditions. Science for social work is also considered to be an “attitude,” which fits in as part of the social work character, along with other pieces such as integrity, responsibility and compassion. Devine was concerned that too much emphasis on a particular technique, or set of techniques, for social work could lead to uniformity and rigidity. Instead he promoted “open-minded experimentation” for social workers so that they may remain flexible, adaptable in order to best carry out their mission. Social workers themselves may conduct scientific research in order to better understand the social problems they address. For instance, one may want to study the dynamics of alcoholism.

Sanction. Devine does not systematically address the issue of sanction. He does make various relevant statements, however, which indicate that the sanction for social work comes from both the public and from the state.

Hospitals, dispensaries, homes for aged and infirm, child welfare agencies, and many other kinds of social work, are in the United States partly governmental activities, supported by taxation and managed by public officials, and partly private activities, supported by voluntary contributions and managed by boards of elected managers or trustees or by self-perpetuating boards (1922, p. 315).

The government must support services such as police, reformatories, probation commissions or other organizations dealing with crime, for instance. Other agencies and services are more closely linked to private charities, relief societies and other organizations dedicated to services of a particular type that relies more on the public. Generally speaking, social work is always subject to "...the degree of public interest in social problems, the character and ability of the leaders in social work, the financial and intellectual resources available for it, and other circumstances..." (p. 28). Schools, for instance, became free and mandatory in America, though they were not always set up this way (with the intent that everyone gets a minimum education), and if public interest demands it "...the time may come when we shall consider the providing of competent medical service, free to all citizens, as a suitable undertaking of government, financed by taxes, just as we came to that decision about educational facilities" (p. 30).

Devine sums up sanction (implicitly) by stating that there are four primary sources of financial support for social work: taxation; income from endowments or gifts; earnings such as payments made by or on behalf of beneficiaries of services; and voluntary contributions. This list is inclusive of the dual sanction from government (taxes) and the public (endowments, contributions), but interestingly it adds at least a nod to sanction by the recipients, or clients, of social work services, at least those who are in a position to offer payment for services. He does not elaborate on this so it should not be considered a full endorsement of client or client system

sanction, but it may point in that direction. Generally speaking it seems reasonable to imagine sanction to be ever increasing as societies develop into an increasingly global citizenship (Devine, 1933).

Pragmatist themes. There are few, if any, overtly stated pragmatist themes in Devine's philosophy of social work. This may be due to the fact that his ideas are presented in a much less philosophical manner than are those of other social work philosophers such as Arthur Todd. That being said, there is a certain implied, or hidden pragmatism in this same fact: that Devine does not wax philosophical (whether about pragmatism or otherwise) does not mean that his work is not pragmatist. Every presentation of social work (or anything else) is of necessity consistent with some philosophical school or other. And Devine's problem-focused social work, centered upon the "new social order," is no exception. The idea that social work is about applying 'advanced' common sense, a scientific attitude of "open-minded experimentation," alongside relevant ethics, wisdom and information from the humanities and social sciences, is quite pragmatist indeed, despite the fact that Devine never comes out and says so. This idea of applying human intelligence to solving various social problems is, loosely speaking, the Deweyan idea of instrumentalism. One major aspect of Dewey's reorientation of philosophy is the replacement of speculative metaphysics with practical, intelligent problem solving. Dewey did not believe humans are in a position relative to the 'secrets' of the universe to command 'god's eye' view knowledge. Instead, he suggested we should refocus on the ethics we do have, such as ideals of justice and human rights, and seek to bring about a better society. This is what Devine's new social order is all about. Beyond this, Devine offers only vague hints at what might be construed as pragmatist philosophy. For instance, when discussing the role exploited workers should take on their own behalf, he states

...instead of gathering in the saloon to indulge in drunken cursing against the boss, gather instead in their homes or their unions, with clear brains, to think out their economic problems, and to decide thoughtfully how they may transform their drudgery into such work as a rational human being may enjoy (1922, p. 209).

While this may be stated by any reasonable person, the use of the term transformation strikes a Deweyan note as his philosophy, in many ways, can be summed up with that one word.

Discussion of the clinical vs. social reform debate. Devine's philosophy of social work offers yet another clear example of early unity in social work mission and methods. His dual focus on both the individual, clinical level, as well as the macro, social reform level, is stated explicitly and leaves no doubt about the broad purview of social work. Devine does not observe or prescribe any contradiction or tension between clinical social work and reform-oriented social work. His examples (e.g. alcoholism) overtly state that social work, with regard to whichever problem being addressed, should focus on both individual needs and environmental circumstances. This means that social work must include individual-level interventions such as case management, as well as societal-level interventions such as policy advocacy. If anything, Devine may be criticized for being overly broad, for his social work encompasses literally everything that falls under the mission of his "new social order" idea. Thus, the social work purview may be so large that it loses any real sense of coherence, particularly for any who desire a more precise definition for the sake of establishing social work as a profession, which was a problem being dealt with at the time of Devine's writing (c. 1920's).

Further evidence for Devine's dualist view can be found in his "Constitution of a Charity Organization society," added as an appendix to his 1914 book *Principles of Relief*. The

Constitution is a template document that containing articles for purposes, membership, funds, etcetera, which could be tailored to suit the needs of any particular charity organization society. In his Constitution, Article II, Section 2 states (as one of the purposes of a COS) “To provide...adequate material assistance and intelligent care for needy families in their homes and for homeless persons” (1914, p. 471). This indicates a clinical emphasis. In addition, Article II, Section 4 states “To promote the general welfare by social reform affecting the living condition of wage-earners.” Thus, both the individual and the environmental pieces are clearly defined as both being purposes of his vision for any charitable society.

Eduard Lindeman (1885-1953)

Eduard Lindeman made a significant contribution to the emerging field of social work as a philosopher, scholar, teacher and social reformer (NASW, 2012). In his early career (c. late nineteen-teens to the early nineteen-twenties) he served as a teacher at the YMCA College in Chicago and the North Carolina College for Women. He had to flee the latter due to pressure from the KKK because he invited African Americans into his home. Lindeman is perhaps most noted for his twenty-six years of service as a professor in the New York School of Social Work (now the Columbia University School of Social Work), beginning in 1924. There he taught courses in community organization, unions and labor economy and developed foundational ideas in group work, community organizing and adult education (Murdach, 2007). Lindeman was also active in community and professional organizations such as the National Urban League and the National Conference on Social Welfare, and even served as an educational advisor to the British army in Germany. He wrote voluminously and offered much by way of leadership, consultation and scholarship.

Lindeman created a philosophy of social work that reflected his interest in social issues and his desire to put democratic ideas into practice (Konopka, 1958).

His early interest was in recreation and community organization because they expressed the freedom of independent voluntary groups and could be means by which people learned to solve their own social problems (p. 12).

This led him to develop the idea of social group work, his primary method for social action, which also benefits the individual participant. His purpose for social work is dual-focused, as both clinical and social reform strands existing side by side, but also transcends this parallelism with the group emphasis. Group work at once serves the individual and the larger society, and is rooted in the values of interdependence and worth and dignity of the individual. Social work as group work utilizes both the humanities and social sciences in an integrative fashion for solving problems via creative and critical thinking, sanctioned also by groups, whether small advocacy groups or by government.

Purpose. To begin, Lindeman's philosophy was a response, or reaction, to much of the thinking of the 19th century that tended to be deterministic, whether economically, psychosocially, or theologically. In *Social Discovery* he states

One by one the various determinants which were presumed to act as unyielding and unyielding fates in marking the course of human behavior have dropped by the wayside. Man [sic] no longer believes himself to be the helpless victim of gods, fates or innate forces (1924, p. 114).

In addition, Lindeman's ideas reacted to any assumption of centralized, 'top-down,' power and control structures, whether this might take place in a small group or a national government.

Instead, his vision was of power in small groups, fueled by motives rooted in values, aimed at transforming social structures and institutions at various levels for a better society. His vision for group work—community organizing, for instance—can be thought of as “democracy in action” (Lindeman, 1921, p. 58). It is about individual people coming together and uniting around common interests. “The Community Movement represents an attempt on the part of the people who live in a small, compact, local group to assume their own responsibilities and to guide their own destinies” (p. 58). Stated this way, the power for positive social change lies with the power of democracy itself: the power of the demos—the people—to gather, to deliberate, and to take action. And, according to Lindeman, this group process works best on a small scale as it offers resistance to the hyper-individualistic, egoistic, laissez-faire thinking. Lindeman’s ideas, in many ways, offer balance instead between the needs of the individual and the needs of groups, and between freedom (e.g. rights) and responsibility.

Lindeman’s purpose for social work is to utilize the group process by way of integrating values and knowledge in order to establish good relationships (Konopka, 1958; Lindeman, 1921). “Man [sic] is destined by nature and by environment to live in cooperation with his fellow-men. The purpose of social organization is to bring about amicable relationships between men and groups of men [sic]” (Lindeman, 1921, p. 1). As such, social work has a dual purpose: it should help individuals in their present and particular situations, and it should also seek to change social conditions and institutions so that they are more favorable for all. Lindeman refers to these two forces as the “democratic process” and “specialism” (1921, p. 139). The former denotes the organization of people in groups (e.g. intentional community action) working toward a common goal; the latter indicates a need for the specialist who applies scientific and value-based knowledge toward helping people one at a time. Lindeman recognized the complexity of

human social problems such as poverty and mental illness and therefore attempted to achieve social justice via balanced action in light of multiple causes. In both cases social workers, whether professional case workers or groups of citizens, should act to facilitate greater independence and self-sufficiency for those with whom they are concerned.

Methods. In accord with his dual purpose, the methods of social work will vary and may include case management in particular, at the individual level, and community organizing/action and group work for serving broader, societal goals. Group work is designed to serve the interests of both individuals, the group as a whole, and societal change needs, though these groups are not considered ‘therapeutic’ in a psychotherapeutic sense (Konopka, 1958). “The professional social worker does not organize a community for the sake of organization. He [sic] always has in mind a concrete, specified goal” (Lindeman, 1956, p. 199). While group work of any sort may increase well-being (e.g. of the aged, sick, handicapped, impoverished), Lindeman’s ideas about groups and their functions run contrary to the Freudian, psychoanalytic models of his day, and generally resist the temptation to reduce social work to a limited and overly-specific set of ‘techniques.’ And while Lindeman is open to social work including case work and other individual-focused methods, his own focus is upon the work that can be done in and by groups.

Modern life is group life. The individual of the modern world who has no vital adherence to and expression through a group is an individual who plays a diminishing role; he is insignificant and unimportant to the social process in direct proportion to his lack of membership in a functioning group (Lindeman, 1924, p. 111).

With the possible exception of the artist, Lindeman sees the value of citizenship and social significance as being essentially linked to group participation. What this looks like for each

individual will vary depending on his or her needs and interests. In a strong sense, then, the method of social work as group work is a broad and necessary feature of common modern life. Lindeman believes that all people will (or should) be involved in groups such as schools, churches and social organizations. This is necessary to provide a sense of belonging, identity, investment, and to maintain (if not improve) society.

The work and mission of groups will vary and may be more intentionally focused on social work *per se*. Lindeman defines groups as “two or more persons consciously acting together for the purpose of advancing a mutual interest” (1924, p. 207). Community Action groups, for instance, will focus their resources on particular social problems and follow a flexible, but structured process (Lindeman, 1921, p. 136). They begin by raising consciousness of a need in the community—this involves consciousness-raising in the group and beyond. This new awareness is followed by connecting it with motivation, or an emotional desire to meet the need. Finally, a solution will be generated via intellectual discussion of the relevant information and values. The process of group work—that is, the process of democracy—serves not only to produce positive change in the community, but the process itself is healthy mentally for the individuals involved and for fostering good relationships among the group and between the group and the larger community. On Lindeman’s thinking it appears that there are as many types of groups as there may be people and reasons to gather. For example, groups for social work include (but are not limited to) charity organizations, recreation organizations, commercial organizations, religious organizations (1924). More specifically these have been represented by the work of the YMCA/YWCA, the Farm Bureau, various settlement houses and community centers, and the Consumer’s League. The problems addressed by these groups also vary widely and may include housing issues, delinquency, immigration, child welfare and public health.

Group work can also be thought of as integral to social work of all sorts as it falls along the continuum of democratic social action. Lindeman writes

Group work is now an established and integral sector of professional social work, and group work is fundamentally an extension of case work from the individual to the collective plane. Likewise, community organization is permanently integrated within the profession and again demonstrates that the basic approach of case work is applicable to an ecological unit as well as to individuals and groups (Lindeman, 1956, p. 195).

Values. Lindeman understands all human knowledge to be rooted in history and culture, and as such he understands that facts and values are not independent of one another. Social work must rely on both, which mutually inform one another. Konopka summarizes Lindeman's primary and secondary values for social work well

The two primary values of social work are the *dignity and the right of each individual* to full development of his [sic] capacities and *the interdependence of individuals* and their consequent responsibility toward each other in the framework of their capacities (1958, p. 178)

These two primary values are meant to permeate all aspects of social work whether focused on individual or group work. These are essential aspects of democracy, and are essential for effective social work practice. Professionals, or “specialists,” in social work (or any other profession) should maintain a real concern for others—this is good citizenship. Those “...who hold no concern for man [sic] himself, will prostitute their skills for any purpose” (Lindeman, 1956, p. 190).

In addition to the primary values are secondary values that shift relative to the social and cultural needs and preferences in a given community, and the specific context of the social work situation (including relevant scientific information—another instance of fact-value overlap). For example, maintaining the dignity and right of each individual may or may not include the use of rewards in a particular social work program or agency. These values, taken together, support further theoretical ideas for social work such as the supposition that people have the capacity for growth and change, the importance of interaction and inclusion of people in various groups, respect for and acceptance of human diversity, and the importance of intentional relationships for social work practice.

Lindeman understands the social worker as citizen, whether formally trained and paid, or informally, still as a valuable member of some democratically mediated group that provides an important function in the community. The values espoused develop within the individual and the group such that as realization of interdependence increases, so does their “social regard” (Lindeman, 1921, p. 8, 103). The process of increasing social regard follows a course starting with the individual’s regard for family, then moving outward to include first the neighborhood, then the community, the nation/state, and finally the whole world. This is ultimately Lindeman’s balancing of individual and community needs—via group work: at once, the individual develops social regard outwardly as responsibility to serve the community, while the community “...is a form of social organization which meets [individual] human needs” (p. 78). In this way there is interdependence not just among individuals, but also an emerging, developing interdependence between individuals and larger groups. The needs which are regarded as having a universal bearing on the lives of all people include health, social needs, materials (e.g. housing, nutrition), knowledge (education), recreation and ethics.

Thus, we may think of human needs as being primary and secondary. Primary needs...would consist of those things which are requisite to life, such as food, shelter, and clothing. The secondary needs would include all of those accumulated needs which lead to a higher form of life (p. 81).

Social work consists of the intersection of needs and values, utilizing democratic groups in particular to bring about better human relationships and social justice.

Knowledge. When Lindeman refers to social work he often labels it the “science of social work” (1921, p. 91). Again, what Lindeman has in mind with a scientific social work is not a form of absolutism or ‘scientism,’ but a balanced view that brings together many forms of knowledge—including science—to make sense of the human social world (particularly group dynamics) and to solve social problems. Science, for Lindeman, does not reveal pure ‘facts,’ but is always infused with values and related to problems—this is his “functional view” of science (p. 10). “One need but analyse [sic] the scientific methodology as it proceeds under actual conditions in order to see that science is fundamentally an adjustment to problems” (p. 10-11). The sciences involved in understanding group dynamics and/or solving problems include psychology, sociology, economics and others that may provide relevant information that may be brought to serve the interests and values of social work. “In this connection it should be remembered that all knowledge, regardless of its genesis, must ultimately prove itself in action” (Lindeman, 1956, p. 196). In addition, the sciences should not be understood as being in competition, but as interdependent with one another. Relevant sciences may be brought together to address questions such as “what is a social group?” or “how does a social group behave in relation to its total environment?” (p. 112).

Lindeman's approach to knowledge is an integrative, multidisciplinary approach that includes not just the sciences but the humanities as well (Konopka, 1958). Social workers must learn about the religious and humanistic heritage of the values and methods for practice. What one thinks has a profound impact upon his or her practice choices, and affects how one behaves in group processes.

Lindeman's great contribution was to point out the need for consciously learning and thinking through philosophical concepts. Without more seminars in philosophy (which must be in the form of inquiries, not dogmatic teaching), social work will continue its unstable swing from one extreme to another and its tendency to indoctrination (1958, p. 201-202).

Lindeman's integrative understanding of the use of sciences and humanities for social work reflects his understanding of the use of human intelligence as well. He also held an integrated and democratized view of reason which, when combined with emotion, instinct, impulse and neuromuscular activity, encompassed intelligence (Lindeman, 1926). The intentional combination of human intelligence, knowledge, and the group process is what may lead to the transformation of societies and the benefit of individuals.

Sanction. Lindeman states "I have looked upon the community as the unit of social organization in which lies the greatest element of hope for permanent progress" (1921, p. viii). He continues by stating that he does not intend just one level of community to be solely responsible for this, nor just one aspect. Smaller units such as intentional social action groups, as well as larger units at the community, or even the state or national level, may be the vehicles for hope and progress. Since the purpose for social work is to generate better human relationships

and to maintain and positively develop social structures and institutions, those in which he names as primary for hope in these endeavors must also be those who sanction relevant features for social work. Since Lindeman's social work is a dual focused philosophy, the sanction for individual, professional social work such as case management in cases of destitution and poverty, as well as for more democratically engaged group work, will also come from various groups. This simply reflects Lindeman's emphasis on groups as the central unit for society, and as such, for social work as well. It would be inconsistent with his entire perspective for social work to be sanctioned by anything but the group. Which group sanctions what social work agency or practice will, of course, vary relative to the specifics of the situation. For instance, the ownership of property (like pretty much everything else) requires sanction. "Such ownership implies rights and privileges which must have some sanction in order to receive respect. The institutions of government give such sanction" (1921, p. 84). Lindeman indicates that things such as rights and privileges all have some sanction—this is stated as a general principle. Likewise, the enforcement and enhancement of rights and privileges will of necessity involve sanction by government (or other forces), which, in a democratic society, requires active participation of individuals in groups who engage in the great conversation which is democracy and advocate for policies and institutions according to their values.

Pragmatist themes. Lindeman's philosophy of social work was deeply influenced by the philosophy of John Dewey (Konopka, 1958; Stewart, 2011). Lindeman's own writings are peppered with quotes and references to John Dewey indicating a pragmatist influence (e.g. in *Social Discovery* pgs. 138 & 149, among many others). The connections between pragmatism and Lindeman's philosophy of social work are numerous and could easily fill an entire book-length work. There are three key themes that will be noted here. First, and perhaps most

obviously, Lindeman's emphasis on group work as a democratic process is consistent with Dewey's own emphasis on democratic process. Lindeman states as his "principle number one" for community organization that it "is that phase of social organization which constitutes a conscious effort on the part of a community to control its affairs democratically..." (1921, p. 173). Dewey (and Jane Addams) also emphasizes the role of democracy—also largely related to group and/or political processes in a free society—as an essential aspect for many things, particularly for generating and maintaining ethics, for the establishment and maintenance of large and small scale organizations (governmental or otherwise), and even for teaching and learning (see section on John Dewey).

A second overlapping point between Lindeman and Dewey is Lindeman's "functional view" of science. On this view, science is not understood as a method that produces universal, timeless and completely objective facts. Instead, Lindeman understands science to be infused with values, and always relative to solving some sort of human problem. "If science is to be regarded as a method, it is a method to be used for something...this means that the use is to be that of solving some specific problem" (1924, p. 27). As such, science is a tool—one among many—that humans use to generate information, to understand themselves and to solve problems. Dewey could hardly have said it better himself. Lindeman's conception practically restates Dewey's notion of fallibilistic science as a specific type of human applied intelligence, which occurs as humans—as organisms in environments—attempt to act upon their world in order to survive and to thrive. This raises a third overlap—both thinkers understand the human being to be an organism-in-environment. For instance, while discussing the nature of human habit (another Deweyan term) and how it may change, Lindeman states

...no adequate explanation of a changed habit can be arrived at if exclusive attention is paid to the environment. The *beginning* of behavior is a function of environment. *Total* behavior is a change in both the organism and the environment and hence must be a function of both (1924, p. 147).

This idea is taken directly from Dewey's *Human Nature and Conduct* (and is cited as such in Lindeman's book). In sum, Lindeman seems to have taken Dewey's ideas (and other pragmatists such as William James, among other thinkers) and developed and refined them for the purposes of doing social work as a group function.

Discussion of the clinical vs. social reform debate. Lindeman offers a philosophy of social work that emphasizes balance between sociopolitical forces and between individuals and groups. His dual-focused purposes and methods reflect this general attempt at balance as he makes room for the existing clinical focus in his own day, but also carves out new and pioneering territory for group work at various levels. But though he states a dual focus, his ideas are clearly directed toward the group and the impact the group can have on social reform. He does mention that groups can be a positive force for individual needs such as mental health, but without developing groups in the direction of 'group psychotherapy.' This would be to lean too far into the Freudian, psychodynamic camp which, apparently to Lindeman, overemphasizes the individual at the expense of the community and group as a whole. Lindeman is a more holistic thinker than this and understands the group instead to be healthy and useful for the individual participant (in many ways, simply due to his or her participation as this aids identity development, investment and provides a sense of belonging), yet he never disconnects the individual benefit from the broader purposes of the group in affecting social change. Lindeman's dual focus leaves room for an understanding of social work as two parallel processes—clinical

and social reform—existing side by side, each working to solve problems at different levels using somewhat different methods. But to see this only would be to miss his point. What he was working toward was a social work that was much more integrated than this: his vision was for a broad understanding of social work as always existing at the nexus where individual and group needs meet. In this nexus there are not only converging needs, but overlapping responsibilities: the group (whether the small group or society in general) has responsibility for the individual—to provide just and favorable conditions so that each may develop their potential. But the individual has responsibility to the group—to join, participate, and engage in the democratic process: this at once serves to meet individual needs (e.g. belonging) while the individual takes responsibility for setting and reforming the policies and institutions of the community. For Lindeman, the clinical vs. social reform debate dissolves into his group-oriented philosophy: no longer are there two competing strands, there is only one integrated social work that moves forward together.

Bertha Reynolds (1885-1978)

Bertha Reynolds made a significant contribution to social work primarily with her integrative understanding of generic social work that brought together the clinical and social reform perspectives through her application of Freudian and Marxist thought (Social Welfare Action Alliance, 2012). Reynolds was educated at Simmons College in social work, then was accepted to the first class of students in the new psychiatric social work program at Smith College in 1917-1918. Once her studies were completed she taught in the program and became the Associate Dean by 1925 (NASW, 2012). Reynolds was also a participant in the historic Milford conference. Tensions with the Dean of the school led to her dismissal—mainly due to her Marxist leanings(which inspired the ‘Rank and File’ movement)—and she was subsequently

shunned by the profession for the same during a relatively conservative time (c. 1938). Reynolds eventually found employment with the Maritime Union where she spent many years working with men and their families. She also taught sporadically at the University of Michigan. Despite her ousting by the profession during the McCarthy era, the value and significance of her work was eventually rediscovered by the social work profession during her later years.

Reynolds' purpose for social work is ultimately, and simply, living well. The methods for the "art" of social work include the gathering of relevant information from the client (i.e. 'diagnosis') and the use of relationship to assist the client in seeing things anew so that he or she may be empowered to grow and change as desired. Values include self-determination, the value and dignity of each individual and the focus on relationship. Social workers must have an integrated knowledge that incorporates scientific information, practice wisdom, and information about the client in his or her context (as well as much self-knowledge). Generic social work is sanctioned by both the client and the community, which reflects pragmatist themes of process and change (e.g. social work will always develop and change alongside the community it serves), as well as the organism in environment perspective. Reynolds' perspective, being centered upon both Freud and Marx, offers a dualist perspective that understands social work as necessarily involving case work, group work, and community organizing (e.g. unionizing, policy advocacy) as all essential to perform the functions of clinical work and social reform work—in sum, generic social work.

Purpose. Reynolds' does not begin her inquiry into the nature and purpose of social work with the assumption that social work is to be discovered as a monolithic and static entity. "We start, rather, from a belief that life is infinitely varied, dynamic and changing, and that social work is, like any phenomenon which appears at some moment in history, an integral part of life"

(Reynolds, 1942, p. 3). Social work is to be understood as a phenomenon with a historical trajectory, influenced and influencing the culture in which it exists. As such, social work must always be adapting, growing and developing alongside the culture it serves. Reynolds states that social work should not be thought of as either essentially “good” or “bad” even, nor should it be understood as merely palliative, and as such negating real justice for the poor, yet not merely concerned with societal justice issues either to the neglect of the individual. Either perspective would render social work a static entity and would therefore describe an unreality, since the needs at both levels are quite real. Reynolds believed that the social work of her day would not endure, but would morph and change into a somewhat different entity more suitable to the needs of a future society with its own issues and challenges.

If social work is an always changing institution, then the purposes of social work will change as well. Granted this, Reynolds does not forfeit an attempt to offer some defining and enduring features of social work.

Summing up, social work consists of skills in work with people which are related directly to what people are doing for themselves in the life situation in which they are. Social work is administered by social agencies organized to make available these services, and operating under controls which make for efficient service” (Reynolds, 1942, p. 42).

Reynolds’ main idea here is to discern a generic social work that is basic to all forms of practice, which diminishes the lines between categories of case work, group work, and community organization. “It is all of these and more, because all of these are interrelated as varying aspects of an art of working with people” (p. 5). The boundaries of social work practices overlap such that case work regularly involves work with groups (e.g. families); group work agencies must

deal on a day-to-day basis with individuals; and community organizing involves identifying and working with key individuals in the community.

One of the most significant areas of Bertha Capen Reynolds' work which is recurrently expressed in her writings and which was always tested out and modeled in her own practice, is the notion that social work must maintain a dual focus on the individual in need and pain and on the socio-economic and political forces of the society which cause the misery (Cullen, 1980).

Reynolds, like so many other social work scholars, offers yet another dual focused perspective, which values both the individual, or clinical, practices, as well as those that serve to change society's institutions and laws so that they are more just and beneficial to all. As such, the purpose of social work is to promote good living. "...[G]ood professional social work is tested...by its likeness to living well, living as a social being, and it gets its professional stamp from being practiced by people who make a special study and discipline of how to live" (Reynolds, 1951, p. vi).

Methods. The primary aim of Reynolds' work is to offer a generic approach to social work practice that is inclusive of case work, group work, and community organizing (Reynolds, 1942, p. 9). The recognition and development of a generic core can provide stability as the profession changes—this will help alleviate the tendency of workers, especially students, to get caught up in fads, and thus applies to social work education as well. Reynolds states "...education for social work is basically an integrated whole, and...it can be discussed in terms that both case workers and group workers can understand and use in their special situations" (p. 10). Since all social workers deal with people, there are more similarities than differences among

the core methods of any social work practice. Reynolds sums up her approach to social work methods by stating

A scientific orientation to social work is known by certain unmistakable signs: It is focused upon a diagnostic understanding of the people and situations with which it deals. It sees people as dynamic forces in the situations in which they are, and expects to influence them only by becoming a part of the situation, as a person with professional awareness and experience. It uses the invigorating power of the relationship between the personality of the social worker and that of the persons worked with, and uses it in a professional way, that is, with mutual confidence and co-operation, with conscious upbuilding of self-respect, with rigorous discipline of the worker's self in order that, freed from personal preoccupations, he [sic] may give his best skills in service (p. 30).

This long quote points to two particular elements in Reynolds' generic social work: an enduring use of diagnosis, and the use of relationship as intervention method. Diagnosis is an essential element for case work, group work and community organizing. But Reynolds' view is not limited to a Freudian or medical understanding which focuses on the worker instead of the client or client systems (Reynolds, 1942). What she intends with diagnosis is a client-centered idea: the worker must elicit sufficient information about the client in the situation or context in which he or she is found. But this is not for the purposes of coercing the client into doing what the worker desires. To the contrary, it is for the purposes of clarifying what the client needs and how he or she may meet these needs. Reynolds thus emphasizes the responsibility of the client in the 'diagnostic' process.

The second element of generic social work is the use of relationship as the primary intervention method. The use of relationship is an example of an early form of a strengths perspective designed for client empowerment (Kaplan, 2002). Commenting on the respect for the intelligence that is extant in clients Reynolds states “[a] corollary to this fundamental respect for people and for the facts of their situation is that our efforts will be directed toward increasing the potentialities of *the people themselves*, building them up, not tearing them down” (Reynolds, 1942, p. 25). The goal of social case work, for instance, is not for the worker to set some goal for the client to do which then marks some achievement for the worker. Instead the goal is for the worker to facilitate the client’s own development via engaged relationship so that the client can increase his or her capacity for living and satisfaction within the social group (Reynolds, 1934, p. 35). The client must remain the ultimate authority in his or her affairs. Social work is therefore not an advice giving enterprise, but an empowering one.

The effect of a relationship to a person in whom they have confidence is to give them the support that comes from sharing a burden, to release energies formerly tied up in fear and hostility, and to free them to see more than they were able to bear to see before of the meaning of the situation (Reynolds, 1942, p. 27).

The method of using relationship for empowerment is an art that involves perception, sensitivity, personality, skills and knowledge of social relationships (both experiential and scientific). This is not something that one can be simply trained in, any more than one can be trained to be a good poet. “The art, or skill, of professional social work consists of activities which cannot be standardized” (p. 52)—it must be learned by experience, illumined by theory, honed by practice.

Values. The values for generic social work have already been alluded to in the preceding sections. They include client self-determination, the use of relationship, and the value and dignity of each person. Reynolds believed that social work had come a long way toward avoiding authoritative methods. “A tangle of family relationships or the reactions of a child to a complex home situation can only be solved by a cooperative consultation to find a solution which shall be the client’s own” (Reynolds, 1934, p. 6). Self-determination, however, should not be understood as dogmatically making clients responsible in the same way in each case. There are times when a more directive approach is useful to the relationship and for the benefit of the client. This should depend on what will benefit the client most relative to his or her developmental stage (p. 38-39). This last statement is indicative of the “art” of social work—there are few absolute or prescribed ‘treatments’ or ‘techniques’ that should be used generically. What is generic are the emphases on relationship, self-determination and the inherent dignity and value of the individual. Reynolds acknowledges this last element for her own theory and states that has been part of social work—an evolving part—for many years (Reynolds, 1951). As an example, it can actually hurt to accept help when one is not in a position to repay. The worker who respects human dignity and worth must take this into account and seek to avoid degrading clients by making them feel that they are permanently outsiders to the putatively ‘able’ or ‘normal’ group.

Knowledge. Knowledge for generic social work practice must be an integrated whole that involves science, theory, experience (e.g. self awareness) (Reynolds, 1942, p. 10). For starters, Reynolds’ states that appropriate knowledge for social work does not involve superstition or magic of any sort. Science has well supplanted the need for these, yet even science cannot be taken and applied dogmatically or formulaically. Reynolds acknowledged the difficulties that social work had at the time (which remain to a certain extent today) due to its

own early developmental stage of science—for instance, social work research is difficult because it is usually impossible to set up true experiments. She suggested that science for social work relies largely upon borrowed information from other disciplines. Social workers need to have any and all information relevant to their practice situations. “...[I]mplied in the concept of a scientific orientation, is the characteristic that social work is concerned to understand the material with which it deals, that is, the relationships of human beings to their world of other persons and social situations” (p. 22). This includes both awareness and understanding of self and of the context and personal information about those being served. One essential aspect of social work is the application of knowledge to serve its values and purposes (see previous sections). For instance, one may take ideas from Freud, such as the concept of repression and apply it to practice: a client may not be able to deal successfully with his or her own problems, not because of lack of intelligence or information (though these too may be limited), but because fear, hostility or anxiety has made them repress information that is essential in order for them to make progress. The worker may employ encouragement and support, sharing the burden with the client, so that repressed information and energies may be released and the client may be able to see more than they were able to before the encounter with the worker. Thus, the art of practice must be interwoven with scientific information and with theoretical concepts (p. 137).

Sanction. Reynolds’ social work is sanctioned by both the client and the community. This is due at least in part to the transient and transitional nature of social work as it develops and adapts to the community it serves: “...social work is an integral part of the society in which it serves” (Reynolds, 1942, p. 31). Reynolds states “nothing is more unlikely than that social work as we know it will continue beyond the set of conditions which gave it birth and which are themselves changing” (p. 4). That social work continues to change is indicative to Reynolds of

the influence and sanction of the community. “Social case workers do their work under the limitations of community standards...Whatever the source of their salaries, taxes or private funds, the community as well as their clients has a stake in what they do...” (Reynolds, 1934, p. 25). Thus not only the broader community as a whole, but individuals—clients—play an essential role in sanctioning social work as well. This must be the case in order to remain consistent with Reynolds’ values and purposes for generic social work. For example, regarding the worker-client relationship, Reynolds states “...the client has a right to decide whether he [sic] wants treatment, and how much. He [sic] must be willing to accept responsibility...” (1934, p. 7). In this way the client has both a right and a responsibility in the sanctioning of social work services.

Pragmatist themes. Two pragmatic themes stand out in Reynolds’ generic social work: the centrality of process and change, and the organism in environment perspective. The first of these involves the idea (as discussed above) that social work, as an institution relative to, and sanctioned by, the culture and community in which it serves, will of necessity change, often in radical ways, over time, as the community and culture change. This indicates a process, not a static state. Dewey’s reorientation of philosophy centered upon the idea that the questions asked by philosophy—by humans—should shed the pretence of universality, immutability, etc. and be replaced with questions that recognize our knowledge of ourselves and the world around us—including the philosophy of social work—as a work in progress, a fallible process of creation and discovery that will not likely reveal timeless truths, but functional ones. Second, and following from the first, Reynolds understands the person as mutually influential and interdependent with the environment. The idea of the primary ‘treatment’ modality being the relationship between client and worker assumes this mutuality on a small scale. Moreover, her connection between the

clinical and social reform elements is dependent upon this in at least one significant way: the client, positively influenced by the worker-client relationship (e.g. such that he or she 'sees' more clearly in an important way), may then proceed to make a contribution to the larger society. The sum of individual contributions in effect makes positive changes to, say, the policies of that larger society such that it becomes more equal and just for the individual. This is a perspective which understands the mutual influence of the organism in its environment.

Discussion of the clinical vs. social reform debate. Despite being overall less explicitly dual focused, Reynolds' philosophy of social work is quite focused on both the individual and society as a whole. Reynolds' means of expressing this duality is less pronounced than other thinkers (e.g. she does not herself use the term 'dual focused'), but while her emphasis leans toward individuals, the social reform piece is very present (Cullen, 1980). The whole reason Reynolds was scandalized at Smith College was because of her Marxist ideas which led her to promote the unionization not only of workers in general, but for social workers as well. And when she writes about generic social work practice, this includes not only case work and group work, but community organization as well. As with case work, community organizing has plural sub-categories such as unionization and policy advocacy. For Reynolds, social justice means never polarizing the clinical as opposed to social reform work. It would make no sense to Reynolds, for instance, to offer psychotherapy to a person who lacks food for survival. On the other hand, it would be equally foolish on her thinking to advocate for sound and just policies yet ignore the needs of the individual, be they material or psychosocial. Perhaps the only reason for her scandal among her own profession of social work was its conservative leaning at the time, paired with the Freudian influence. Fortunately, her works were re-discovered, revalued and

stand now as essential theory for present NASW ethics and social work practice standards in general.

Charlotte Towle (1896-1966)

Charlotte Towle made a significant contribution to the field of social work. She is particularly well known for her ideas about generic, client-centered social casework and her development of a program for teaching and training social workers both in the field and in the classroom (NASW, 2012). Born in Montana, and known throughout her career as a ‘Westerner,’ Towle earned a Bachelor degree and began her career as a volunteer for the Red Cross. She subsequently worked for the Veterans Bureau in San Francisco and then at the Neuro-psychiatric institute in Tacoma, Washington. As for formal social work education, she studied for one year at the New York School of Social Work, and within four years accepted a teaching position at the University of Chicago’s School of Social Service. As a professor for thirty years in this position (and beyond) she wrote sixty-nine articles, three books, and developed her own skills and ideas about education and supervision. Her most well known book, *Common Human Needs* (1945), was scandalized at the time (McCarthy era) for being “socialist,” and with the help of the American Medical Association, the printing template for this work was actually destroyed by the US government, which had hired Towle to write it in the first place. Previously, as ‘required reading’ for workers in New Deal agencies, Towle’s ideas represented the scare of ‘commies in government,’ which was propagandized by McCarthy. The NASW has subsequently republished this important work which makes connections between human behavior and needs, and the various social services that may be offered (University of Chicago Profiles of Distinction Series, 2012).

Reminiscent of Jane Addams' social ethic, Towle also hoped to transcend the idea of private morality in order to foster a broader social conscience, so that values such as the intrinsic worth of each individual would become part of public discourse and debate (Manning, 1997). Moral citizenship demands both head and heart, informed and engaged for transformational practice at multiple levels. As such, Towle's social work involves a dual focus: both social action and social casework are necessary in order to promote the wellbeing of each individual and of society as a whole. These two aspects of social work come together in an attempt to make it possible for each individual to develop his or her full potential. The methods of social work include both social action and Towle's particular, psychologically-informed style of generic casework (i.e. the use of relationship). The values for social work include self awareness, self-determination, the individual value of each person, and the right of each individual to develop his or her potential (including the right to public assistance). Knowledge for social work includes scientific knowledge of relevant content (e.g. psychopathology) as well as knowledge of self and knowledge of the client and his or her context. Social work is sanctioned by the public, and also by the client. Towle is pragmatic in her emphasis on democracy, the goal of having each person able to develop to their potential (human flourishing), and her understanding of the individual as interdependent with the social environment. She also evokes both Addams and Richmond to integrate and unify the cause and function (i.e. Porter Lee) of social work.

Purpose. Charlotte Towle was interested in the welfare of both the individual and society as a whole and understood social work as an instrument and an institution to be used for the purposes of promoting that welfare.

...perhaps it would simplify matters if we were to consider the function of our profession in a society in which we are aligned with the struggle for the survival of democracy...all

our efforts go back to the good of the individual for the survival of democracy. A democratic society is one in which the individual is assured of something more than physical survival (Towle, 1969, p. 235).

Towle understood the threats to democracy from the hyper-capitalist, Libertarian political perspectives and sought to correct or mitigate these forces by using state and private agencies to improve individual and environmental conditions for all people. “In this scene the profession of social work might be described as an expression of the conscience of the community and as having an integrative function” (p. 235). As such, the charge of social work is to help individuals and groups to make productive use of their environments. This means providing assistance utilizing both relationships (e.g. casework) and resources (e.g. material goods). The end goal for social work is “...the creation and development of a democratic society which will afford every individual [the] opportunity for the maximum development of which he [sic] is capable” (Towle, 1969, p. 100). Carrying out this charge involves a dual focus for social work:

- (1) The reshaping of social and economic institutions which are failing to fulfil [sic] their functions and
- (2) The creating of special services for groups of individuals where needs are not being met. Appropriate measures in the attainment of both these aims long have been the active concern of social work, but those that have fulfilled the second objective have been more peculiarly its province (p. 100).

This dual purpose for social work should be integrated, meaning that it attempts to bridge the needs of the individual with the needs of the larger society. It involves the adaptation of the individual to his or her social environment, as well as the accommodation of the social

environment to each individual's needs (Towle, 1945, pgs. 4-11). The focus for social work should always remain on social ills and the needs of vulnerable groups who need to be protected and defended. Social work should offer help, but should do so in such a way as to promote human development and people's ability (eventually) to contribute to society. In other words, social work should "help people help themselves" (Towle, 1969, p. 239).

Methods. Following her dual purpose for social work, the methods fall in line as casework for individuals—this is Towle's main focus—and also social and legal action for society as a whole. Towle also focused on field supervision and education as a part of casework. "In social casework we deal with people who are experiencing some breakdown in their capacity to cope unaided with their own affairs" (Towle, 1969, p. 101). The breakdown may be due to environmental factors such as the unavailability of jobs, other circumstances beyond the individual's control such as physical or mental handicap, or the individual may be primarily responsible for his or her own problems. Either way, the social worker is charged with offering assistance, in a variety of settings such as schools, correctional facilities or mental health services (p. 110). "In general three sets of factors interplay in casework treatment. The function of the agency, the professional qualifications of the worker, and those factors inherent in the client's total situation..." (Towle, 1969, p. 47). First, the function of the agency is important as factors such as the fit between agency services and client needs must be considered. The agency itself must be evaluated to ensure that it does not become discriminatory or punitive since its call is to serve the individual while protecting his or her self-determination and confidentiality (among other things, see next section on values) (p. 113). Second, the relationship between the caseworker and the individual served is perhaps the primary 'method' of social work. This relational capacity or ability constitutes the primary qualifications of the worker. Casework, for

Towle, involves diagnosis and treatment, but these terms can be misleading because her focus is much more client-centered than previous thinkers who use the language of the diagnostic school. While the caseworker does diagnose, and offer treatment (e.g. help with problem solving), he or she does so with an emphasis on the relationship itself, which seems indicative of a bridge between the diagnostic and functional schools. There are five primary relational methods for the worker, along with concomitant benefits to the client. First, the client may be able to release tension and bring repressed thoughts to consciousness via the worker's neutrality and active listening. Second, the worker's non-judgmental stance may elicit candid discussion by the client of his or her wrongdoing, which may enable him or her to take responsibility. Third, the modeling of understanding and acceptance by the worker may elicit the capacity in the client to offer understanding and acceptance to self and others. Fourth, the change in the way the client feels, due to the first three factors, may lead to a positive change in the way the client thinks about his or her problems and issues, which could lead to productive action. And fifth, the positive change in the individual may in turn have a positive effect upon the way people react to him or her in his or her social environment (p. 104). "...[T]he professional relationship is in and of itself a treatment measure" (p. 136).

In addition to her general, relationship-focused casework methods, Towle also understands social work to be charged with affecting "...comprehensive and integrated government action" (Towle, 1969, p. 99). As a democratic society, the government, as an agent of the public, should take responsibility for human welfare (Towle, 1945; Hollis, 1968). Government, including law, should be used to promote the wellbeing of all people, especially those least well off. "...[S]ocial services and social welfare measures should be brought up to date to assure, when adversity strikes, adequate financial and medical assistance, vocational and

educational opportunity to every citizen regardless of race, color, and creed” (Towle, 1969, p. 99).

Values. The values for social work, according to Towle, can also be divided into two overlapping and interacting areas: values for work with individuals and values for work at the societal level. The values for individual work fit directly with her ideas about generic social casework and constitute a significant portion of her major contribution in this regard. The values for societal level work are consistent, and highlight her contribution regarding the “common human need” (Towle, 1945).

Towle’s values for social work at the individual level can be summarized using three primary terms or concepts: self awareness, self-determination, and the individual worth of human beings. First, self awareness is presented as an essential aspect of social casework, requisite to effective practice (Perlman, 1969). A social worker’s awareness (e.g. of his or her own personality, attachments, relationships, preferences, biases, etc.) enables him or her to deal with transference/counter-transference reactions, avoid projections (e.g. moralizing), and utilize essential relational methods such as identification, intentionally and for the benefit of the client. Identification, for instance, as the ability to empathize with a client—with proper self-awareness—can help establish and maintain good rapport without the worker becoming over-identified and thus enmeshed with the client (perhaps to the point that the worker reacts and behaves as the client does). Second, client self-determination, as an essential principle of effective practice, ensures that “the client has not been threatened or put to rout by unrealistic demands as the imposition of the worker’s standards and goals, by pressure for information that is beyond that essential in order to help...” (Towle, 1969, p. 125). Self-determination not only serves to ensure that the client’s own values and goals are directive, but also protects the worker.

“...[B]ecause of the reciprocal nature of the relationship between worker and client...in frustrating the client, the worker inevitably has interfered with his [sic] own development” (p. 31). Third, the individual worth of every human being means that he or she “...has a right to survive on satisfying terms with himself [sic] and the world...the right to manage his [sic] own affairs, which implies the opportunity to learn, the chance to work, the desire to marry and establish a family” (p. 105-106). Generally speaking, the value is on the opportunity for each person to develop their individual capacities, not just mere survival (Towle, 1954). In carrying out this value the social worker is charged with emphasizing client strengths, avoiding shaming and punitive actions, embracing human diversity, realizing that even uncommon human behavior serves a functional purpose in people’s lives, and making informed and proper referrals as necessary.

Towle also connects societal level practice with values, starting with the social conscience. “Social work as a profession is one of society’s instruments for enabling the social conscience to find expression. The very core of social work is social reform” (Towle, p. 121). The social conscience, directed toward social action, emphasizes the value of each individual having the opportunity to develop his or her self as fully as possible. This is the essence of freedom in a modern democratic society (Towle, 1945). As such, it is the right of every person to assistance when needed, to be provided by the state or other public institution. The associated values are the common human needs and include the physical (e.g. nutrition, shelter), psychological (e.g. personality development), intellectual (e.g. education), social (e.g. employment, family), and spiritual domains.

Knowledge. What every social worker should know, in order to practice effectively and ethically, is a combination of skills and knowledge. Knowledge for social work is three-fold and

involves knowledge of self, knowledge of the client/client systems, and content knowledge. First, knowledge of self equates to self-awareness (see previous section on methods). Second, knowledge of the client involves careful observation and communication with the client, as part of the relational process.

This entails a continuous selective exploration of each case situation for relevant facts; the formulation of significant questions and tentative hypotheses, that is, interpretative statements; the testing of the facts against the interpretation and against the client's response to the help given, to determine need for further inquiry and need for changing treatment emphasis (Towle, 1969, p. 103).

As the caseworker gains more depth of knowledge of the client, the caseworker's own biases and reactions are also taken into account as the relational process develops over time for the benefit of the client. The third source of knowledge is content knowledge, which involves understanding of relevant information pertaining to the subject. For instance, a caseworker working with people who have mental illness needs to have a sufficient knowledge of psychopathology and the various approaches to the treatment of mental illness. Towle believed that scientific enlightenment could serve (if used intelligently and ethically) to "...render the life of all people more satisfactory than ever before" (Towle, 1945, p. 3). As such, the social worker must have a working knowledge of the relevant scientific developments in his or her field of practice. "The study of personality and the social sciences is certainly an essential step in acquiring mastery of individual and social behavior" (p. 4). In addition, social workers should not only have content knowledge of their relevant subject matter, but be adept at critical thinking and problem solving. This three-fold knowledge, along with the right skills and values can be put forth to serve the common human needs of all people.

Sanction. The sanction for social work, like with the other analytical elements in Towle's understanding, comes from the individual and from the larger society. On the individual level Towle's main contribution here is the inclusion of the individual client as one who sanctions the service delivered. Unlike earlier forms of the diagnostic school which emphasize the role of the worker in investigating, diagnosing and determining the treatments to be applied, Towle's version, while remaining diagnostic, changes the emphasis to the client. This reflects the aforementioned values. Effective practice thus requires that the client not be considered dependent when he or she is not, and that the strengths of the client are emphasized in a non-coercive way such that the client, to the extent possible, determines not only the course of treatment and the goals, but also whether the treatment is applied in the first place (Perlman, 1969).

The public—that is, the people at large in a democratic society—must also serve as the sanctioning body for social work. Towle states regarding education that

...first and foremost, social work has a distinctive relationship to its community. By social work's very character and function, by reason of the group it serves as well as by the nature of its relationship with its supporting public, social work education must emphasize the development of a high degree of social conscience and social consciousness (Towle, 1969, p. 236).

With this statement Towle not only reiterates the importance of social work as the action arm of the "social conscience," but indicates the responsibility of social work to its "supporting public" in that regard. Social work, in other words, is accountable to both the people it serves, both individually and in groups, as well as to the public, to carry out its mission in society.

Pragmatist themes. Charlotte Towle is not nearly as overtly pragmatist in her thinking as are many of the social work scholars surveyed thus far. That being said, there are two significant points of overlap worth mentioning. First, Towle's emphasis on democracy and the function of social work in a democratic society to help promote the possibility for each individual to develop and flourish to his or her best capacity are both reminiscent of Deweyan pragmatism. Of course, one need not be a pragmatist in order to promote democracy and human flourishing, so the point cannot be stated too strongly here. The consistency is what is noteworthy. The methods of pragmatism are always inclusive of democratic means (e.g. solving problems in groups), and the ends tend toward some more concrete objective that leads to human flourishing. Second, Towle's understanding of the nature of the human being in relation to his or her environment is also consistent with pragmatism. She does not elaborate philosophically on the nature of humanity or how the individual and the environment interact. However, she does at many points reflect an understanding that humans are interdependent with their social and physical environments (e.g. 1969, p. 236). Towle's central idea that the relationship between the caseworker and the client is what comprises the primary treatment of social work reflects this idea. For instance, that the social worker may, by offering acceptance to the client, evoke a similar response in the client toward others, implies that humans are mutually influential. Moreover, the idea that the social worker who over-identifies with the client may become him or herself developmentally stunted as a result reflects the same. Towle's philosophy of social work seems to understand people as being ensconced from birth in their physical and social contexts, which may be oppressive and disabling, or supportive and enabling, both at the micro and macro levels.

Discussion of the clinical vs. social reform debate. The primary observation of Towle's work regarding the clinical vs. social reform debate is that she is inclusive of both, and thus offers yet another dual-focused philosophy of social work. Her ideas not only include both the individual and the societal level as proper purview for social work, but she speaks to the intersection of the two—clinical work and social reform work should not be considered just parallel, but integrated. To do this she evokes both Porter Lee and his conception of cause and function, as well as Mary Richmond and Jane Addams. With regard to Lee, Towle states that both the cause and the function are important, moreover that “[t]he union of cause and function implies an informed heart” (Towle, 1969, p. 280). This indicates her interest in bringing these two supposedly opposing and different forces together into one. Not only this, but it speaks to the orientation of the individual who is thinking about social work and suggests that his or her social consciousness includes both in a holistic way as he or she thinks about and goes about doing social work.

Towle moves on from Lee to evoke the early progenitors of social work, Jane Addams and Mary Richmond. “A review of the works of Jane Addams and Mary E. Richmond, and of what has been written about them, shows that professionally they had much in common” (Towle, 1969, p. 280). She goes on to state that Addams and Richmond were “pragmatic idealists” who sought to improve physical, social and economic conditions such that life might be worth living for all people. It is noteworthy that Towle evokes both Addams *and* Richmond to capture the spirit of social work from the days of its inception. For it is only with the cause of Addams, combined with the function of Richmond that this spirit can progressively move forward. Towle further suggests that the integrative compatibility of cause and function can be served by continued administrative leadership in that spirit, continued appraisal and remembering of the

cause, and accountability to the community who is served. “This is a time for the social work profession to have faith in its cause, to reaffirm its humanistic values, and to work positively for conditions of life that will promote man’s humanity to man [sic]” (Towle, 1969, p. 299).

Jesse Taft (1882-1960)

Following the years of American prosperity in the 1920’s during which social casework largely reflected the influence of Sigmund Freud, Jesse Taft, primarily in the 1930’s and 1940’s, offered a different view of social casework. Taft’s philosophy of social work was primarily aimed at developing a theory of casework based on the ideas of Otto Rank, a disciple of Freud’s who broke away and formed his own psychoanalytic perspective (Furman, 2002). Taft’s approach has been identified with the functional school in social work, and as such emphasized the role of the social work agency in providing structure and purpose for the relational process of social casework that she developed. The purpose of social work is the help people grow and develop according to their own desires and goals, within the range of agency function. The method used for this is functional social casework, which focuses on agency purview and the relational process between client and worker as the central feature. Values include client self-determination, the value of each individual and the opportunity for each person to develop their potential. Social work is sanctioned by the client (primary here), the community, and the agency. Social workers must balance knowledge from science, the nature of the helping relationship, and the particulars of each client’s situation (objective and subjective knowledge are both considered important). Taft’s functional perspective is implicitly pragmatist and offers a clinically-focused view that intends to promote the well-being of the larger society.

Jesse Taft earned a bachelor and a doctorate degree from the University of Chicago, studying under John Dewey and George Herbert Mead (NASW, 2012; Smalley, 1969). Taft worked as the assistant superintendent for the New York Reformatory for Women, worked for the State Charities Association of New York, and held marginal academic positions at the University of Chicago before accepting a position in the social work school at the University of Pennsylvania. During this period Taft underwent psychoanalysis with Otto Rank and arranged for his immigration to the United States, as well as his appointment in the social work school at Penn. In 1934 Taft became the director of the social work school at Penn. and served in that capacity until her retirement in 1950 (Deegan, 2012).

Purpose. Breaking away from the Freud-influenced diagnostic school of social casework, which emphasizes an illness-focused, worker-centered, diagnosis and treatment model, the functional school focuses instead on the client and his or her capacity for development—the will of the individual toward growth and change. This reflects Rankian thinking which rejects the deterministic notion that a person’s childhood experiences are causal of all subsequent behavior, and the concomitant idea that any change in behavior must be linked to working out something from the past (Smalley, 1969). Rank understood the will as the central feature of human psychology (Rank, 1950). But unlike Freud, who pathologized it (as repressed id impulses), or Adler, who sought to re-educate it (according to adaptive goals reflecting social interest), Rank embraced the will as a constructive, though ambivalent, force of individual development. As such he did not idealize the will as “all good,” or as something to be completely embraced (which he attributes to Nietzsche), nor did he condemn it, which is his understanding of what the Judeo-Christian tradition has done. Instead, he desired to let each individual will grow and develop itself:

the aim is self development; that is, the person is to develop himself [sic] into that which he is and not as in education and even in analytic therapy to be made into a good citizen, who accepts the general ideals without contradiction and has no will of his own (Rank, 1950, p. 228).

On Rank's view, the client should be able to "make himself what he is," without force from moral, religious, or other sources of social mores, including psychoanalytic perspectives.

"Without the understanding and courage of a constructive therapy, individual therapy degenerates into a mass education which is based on the traditional world view and the Jewish-Christian morality" (p. 231).

Taft adopted the Rankian idea of the will—that there is a positive energy, impulse or life force that is creative and motivates human beings to survive and thrive in creative and innovative ways. She states that "[t]hey are the *given* internally, the basic limiting forces within which, if he [sic] can submit to them, he yet has freedom to create, to organize, to develop, to refine, and to expand—indefinitely" (Taft, 1962, p. 213). This view of human potential, or "will," contrasts with Freud's deterministic view.

Needs and impulses are part, then, of the positive, creative forces found in the universe of our experience and are the energies through which we are enabled to work, to think, to fight, to control, but they themselves are not subject to complete human determination in the self or in the other, any more than are the basic physical forces of the universe (Taft, 1962, p. 213).

In other words, the determination of human thought and behavior are not *determined* by other humans or outside forces, at least not completely. This leaves much room for each human being to grow and develop in a variety of ways.

The client, in our belief, is not a sick person whose illness must first be classified, but a human being, like the worker, asking for a specific service. He [sic], no less than any other human being, finds it painful to put out a need that he can no longer meet independently, and to subject his will, however feeble, to the possibility of unwelcome control in obtaining what he [sic] seeks (p. 269-270).

Three Rankian ideas are central to the functional approach. First, the emphasis on the client's resistance to help and his or her will to grow and change. Second, clients accept help and change in their own unique ways. And third, the focus on the helping relationship as a process that facilitates change (Furman, 2002). The above quote captures these, particularly the first and third Rankian ideas: clients, on Taft's view, want to do things on their own, according to their own will—they do not wish dependence. This fact must be taken into account as part of the relationships process to be engaged by the worker.

Taft's philosophy of social work is therefore a theory of social casework that moves beyond the diagnostic school into new territory. The goal of social casework is the relational facilitation of human growth and development via relational processes between worker and client (Taft, 1962, p. 246). This is not general such that any developmental issue or problem may be addressed—social work, unlike counseling or psychoanalysis, remains ensconced within the purview of the agency, which determines the problem or issue to be worked on. The goal of social work is, stated simply, “to help” (p. 208). The type of helping that occurs is relative to the

agency and may include helping children with issues in school or immigrant families adjusting to new social conditions. The functional school does not aim merely to help people or groups *adjust* to existing social conditions, it aims to help them *transform* themselves and their environments for the better, according to the specific issues and problems being addressed. Smalley defines functional social casework as "...a method for engaging a client through a relationship process, essentially one to one, in the use of a social service toward his own and the general social welfare" (Smalley, 1970, p. 81). The latter part of this quote points to the diminished, yet present dual focus of Taft's philosophy of social work. She indicates that the social reform aspect may be transformed via the clinical, or individual aspect. She offers that the functional perspective operates for social work regardless of task or venue, which includes both individuals and groups of varying sizes, and includes the corresponding methods of social work such as casework, group work and community organizing.

Methods. Simply put, the method of social work, on Taft's view, is functional social casework. Taft states that casework is "...a basic helping experience and process which is common to all professional helping, but is to be controlled and made specific only in relation to the particular function that determines and directs it" (Taft, 1962, p. 291). Taft's "functionalist" method for social work is thus helping relative to agency directives.

The very term *function* implies a direction and a goal, so that it could not possibly be thought of as non-directive, nor could it ever be completely client-centered, since social casework as we know it today is always related to a social organization, an agency with its own character, its own particular purposes, its conditions and limitations, and its community sanction (p. 280).

This quote is meant to indicate a contrast with general counseling (particularly Rogerian), not to suggest that the social worker, as opposed to the client, is central in determining the course of the helping process. It is the agency, if any, that is the limiting factor. Taft recognizes that this agency limitation raises important questions as to whether the agency can and should actually restrict the purview of the helping relationship (Taft, 1946). When a family agency, for instance, offers assistance to a couple, is it “counseling” if no financial assistance is required (which would then render it “social work”)? “It seems to me that casework has been thrown into confusion by its inability to find its place between pure therapy and public relief” (Taft, 1962, p. 219).

Despite the potential for variation, or perhaps even confusion, Taft’s functional casework model, despite its break with the diagnostic school and Richmond, does still retain a sense of diagnosis and treatment. However, the functional method is different. “Diagnosis” does not involve investigation as did Richmond’s methods (e.g. Richmond, 1917), but merely the gathering of information, from the client, relevant to the problem being addressed.

We understand diagnosis, then, not as a categorizing of the client’s makeup, with a resultant prescription for his [sic] needs, from the viewpoint of an adjusted personality, but an attempt on the part of the worker and client to discover whether the client need and agency service can be brought into a working connection that is mutually acceptable (Taft, 1962, p. 270).

Taft does not use the term “treatment,” which implies that the worker alone administers some sort of salve to remedy the client’s situation. Instead, the functional model understands that the client and the worker will collaborate to generate a plan. “Diagnosis in this view leads not to

treatment but to a working relationship, set up under certain determining conditions, with a purpose or plan worked out by the client and accepted as tentative arrangement by the agency” (p. 270). While the worker and agency continue to bear responsibility for competence and examining outcomes, the client ultimately bears responsibility for him or herself in the process. “[T]hat child or adult [client] must ultimately take help in his own way, create his [sic] own salvation out of the source the other has provided” (p. 277). The method of social casework is thus primarily the worker’s use of self in the relationship with the client, relative to the purview of the agency.

Values. There are three primary values for social work in Taft’s functionalist social casework philosophy (Furman, 2002). First, self-determination, specifically directed toward the particular differences that occur in each casework client as he or she engages in the relational process differently—this is a right of clients. The will of each individual guides that person toward controlling their own set of values and goals and actions. “Social workers have taken a long, long time to discover...a basic factor in offering the services of a social agency, which is that the applicant not only asks for help, he also resists taking it, unless he controls it completely” (Taft, 1962, p. 275). Taft’s second value is the dignity and worth of every individual. This value drives the need for social work services in the first place, and once established, provides the justification for the functionalist perspective. The change from the diagnostic school’s focus on diagnosing and treating a client, with little regard for their consent and participation is dehumanizing as it does not recognize the value inherent in the individual, but merely treats him or her as an objectified being, subject to the values and desires of the worker and his or her value-based diagnostic scheme. This leads to bias and judgment on the side of the worker, and resistance on the side of the client, neither of which are conducive to positive

outcomes for the client. This leads directly to the third value, the opportunity for each person to realize his or her potential. Anything short of this would be a contradiction of the ideas of the functional school and of Rank's psychology, both of which embrace the idea that human beings, when permitted the freedom and opportunity for growth—whether economic, social, political, or physical—will move forth and develop in a positive direction according to their own abilities and interests (Robinson, 1969). The whole idea of the functional school is to accommodate this realization about the human spirit and to actively participate, as social caseworkers, by setting up specific agencies designed to unleash this potential for all people.

Knowledge. For caseworkers in the functional school, the requisite knowledge must conform to a humanistic understanding and not become too positivistic (Furman, 2002). Taft suggests a balance of knowledges such that both objective and subjective knowledge are valued for the purposes of effective social casework. As such, a caseworker must keep apprised of at least three main areas: self-knowledge, knowledge about the helping process, and knowledge of the problem and client. In all cases the balance must be maintained so that the worker has

...knowledge of economic and social conditions as well as psychological understanding of her client. Yet neither of these shifts from inner to outer, from the more subjective and personal to the more objective and social, holds the solution for a social work that intends to arrive at a technical grasp of its own practice. It is necessary to know and appreciate the economic, the cultural, the immediate social setting of those who constitute our clientele, it is essential to understand and accept tolerantly but without evasion, the human psychology that is common to worker and client in our culture... (Taft, 1962, p. 208).

For Taft, while information from the social sciences is important, specifically when it relates to the client population and problem that is addressed by the agency, it is important to avoid getting caught up in scientism, which becomes deterministic, atomistic and has potential to objectify the client. “In science, the hypothesis, the problem, the experiment...are only various forms of putting up a manmade limitation to nature... In social work, the limitation with which we operate is necessarily the function” (p. 214). This puts a limitation on science: the values and goals of social work must remain central to the task, though scientific information may be used accordingly.

With this general approach in mind, the first category of knowledge is self-knowledge (Furman, 2002). “The functional approach demands of the worker a fundamental understanding of change and growth, a deep comprehension of what it means to take help, derived from his [sic] own training and experience...” (Taft, 1962, p. 270). This involves emotional development and awareness, and an understanding that emotions are neither good or bad, but can either be recognized and accepted or not. This seems similar to what would later be called emotional intelligence. Self knowledge is required so that cases workers can recognize the difference between their own emotional responses and those of their clients, which is required in order to maintain self-determination. Case workers must also have knowledge of the nature of the helping process itself, the second category. Like with general knowledge, even what is known in a particular case, in a relationship with a particular client, can become unbalanced with regard to objectivity and subjectivity. “Either concentration destroys or ignores the reality that lies only in the living relationship between the two” (p. 207).

This shift from the tendency to an even deeper and more futile analysis of either side, subject of object, client or worker, to an attempt to grasp the nature of the process itself in

all its relativity and immediacy, is as important for the advancement of our understanding of human psychology as it is for social work (p. 210).

What is therefore, most important is the concreteness of the particular situation and the focus on the human need in that situation—this is what marks social work as distinct from psychology, medicine or other professions or sciences. Finally, the worker must develop his or her knowledge of the context and details of the particular problem that is the focus of his or her agency. “The worker carries full responsibility for agency service, for the knowledge of the problems this very service can create for the client and his family...” (p. 271). This includes relevant knowledge from the social sciences (e.g. psychology, sociology) as well as the worker’s own practice wisdom.

Sanction. There are three basic sources of sanction for Taft’s functionalist social casework: the client, the community and the institution/agency. The sanction of the client is primary and reflects the ethics of the functional school (see previous sections). Taft asserts that “...no worker knows, or should presume to try to control, the vital process through which a client experiences change in his [sic] use of agency” (1962, p. 271). This reiterates the value of client self-determination, even to the point that the client must sanction the service rendered itself. Second, the community must sanction the agency and worker. This may be direct, as in when a community votes for a particular social welfare-related policy action to be taken, or indirect, as social work reflects the values and preferences of the community it serves. For example, when discussing the role of a school counselor (a social worker in this case), Taft writes “[t]he counselor has the power given to him [sic] not only by the principal but by the meaning of school to the community” (p. 290). This provides a good example of agency function (in this case social work at a particular school) being sanctioned by the community: the functional model of

casework does not serve broad and generic ends, it serves ends within a particular range, which is determined, at least in part, by the community. This example also serves to illustrate the third sanctioning body, the agency or institution. Taft does mention not only the community which determines the meaning of school, but the principal who co-creates and directs the function of social work within the school. There will be set of guidelines which establish which clients are appropriate for services within this purview, and what the desired outcomes will be. The determined outcomes, of course, must be put into dialogue with clients so as not to violate self-determination, but they must remain—at least on Taft's view—in order to provide a necessary framework in which the relational process can unfold to benefit the client in his or her particular aims.

Pragmatist themes. Taft does not make many explicit references to pragmatism or John Dewey. However, she did study under both Dewey and George Herbert Mead while earning her doctorate at the University of Chicago. It is evident upon reading Taft's work that there is much that can be said about a pragmatist influence. Hers is interesting to note as well because her philosophy of social work is very centered upon the individual, or the clinical side of the clinical vs. social reform debate (see next section). Pragmatism is usually associated with Jane Addams and the settlement house tradition, which is associated with the social reform side of the debate. Taft shows how pragmatism need not be limited to social work philosophy aimed primarily at social reform. Pragmatism can also be useful to the individually focused social work scholar, and it is so in at least three primary ways for Taft. The pragmatist themes that are evident in her work include the process metaphysic, the organism in environment perspective, and the method of intelligence.

First, Taft's theory is centered upon the idea of process (see previous sections)—in her case, the process of relationship involving clients and social workers. One of the central themes of Dewey's pragmatism is the change in thinking from a static way of looking at the world (e.g. assuming that human nature, the universe, etc. are ultimately singular, universal, immutable, etc.) to a process way of looking at it. Dewey understood everything to be in a process of evolution, growth and development which involved not only the influence of the environment, but also the influence of the individual upon the environment. This brings in the second overlapping theme, the organism in environment perspective. As such, both influence one another and co-cause the development and outcome. Taft's functionalist casework reflects this as it involves not only the process ongoing between the client and the worker, but also the evolving process between the client-worker relationship and the agency. Moreover, it involves all of these in process with the community at large. Taft seems to have understood all of these relational means as working together. The point of social work is to intentionally open certain possibilities (i.e. agency functions) to individuals in the society so that they may develop their potential. The third overlapping theme is Taft's ideas about science. She welcomes the sciences as they are relevant to social work practice, but refuses to become overly positivistic—or scientific—in her thinking. In other words, Taft understands the importance of the subjective aspect of human nature—that ignoring or diminishing this can only be detrimental to human being, and as such, it would be particularly detrimental to social work as it is necessary to understand the nature of human psychology itself, and is essential to the methods of social casework.

Discussion of the clinical vs. social reform debate. Taft's functional school emphasizes the clinical side of the debate. There is no evidence that she does not value the social reform side, and if she is consistent in her pragmatist thinking and values then she must value it. Her

approach, however, is to get at the social reform side by way of individual casework (though she does acknowledge group work and community organizing as valuable methods). It seems the idea is to promote or facilitate the development of individuals one at a time with the understanding that they will then move on to benefit society as a whole.

Herbert Bisno (1922-2006)

Beginning in 1952 Herbert Bisno worked as a sociology professor at the University of Oregon (Eugene Register, 1953). He also served as the director of the school of social work at the University of Louisville from 1971-1975 (University of Louisville Deans and Directors, 2012), after which he moved to Australia to head the social work school at the University of Wollongong (University of Wollongong Campus News, 1975). He had previously earned a MSW degree from the University of California and was active not only with his various research projects in sociology and social work education, but also wrote one book on social work theory called *The Philosophy of Social Work*, which will serve as the primary reference for this section. Bisno offers a philosophy of social work that is very pragmatist in orientation and is focused on both the clinical and social reform perspectives. As such, the methods for social work are broad and include case work, group work and community organizing. Social work values include self-determination, the intrinsic value of each individual, diversity, and the opportunity for each person to develop as fully as possible. Knowledge for social work should be largely derived from the social sciences. Social work is sanctioned by various community organizations such as businesses, churches, government and civic groups.

Purpose. Herbert Bisno's philosophy of social work, labeled "scientific humanism" by Eduard Lindeman (in Bisno, 1952, p. v), involves the clarification of principles of social work that Bisno takes from statements of leaders in the field at the time, as well as from the actions of

professional social workers. In Bisno's words, "[t]he primary purpose of this study is the formulation and interpretation of those basic concepts, attitudes, and values which underlie the present theory and practice of social work in the United States" (p. ix). He states the need for his work is rooted in the lack of a clear and coherent philosophy of social work at the time. Bisno's stated goal is not a once-for-all philosophy of social work, but a contribution to the ongoing conversation. As such, he derives his ideas about what social work is from the practices of social work in his day, including case work, group work, community organizing and social action (among others).

As for the purpose of social work, Bisno states that it is dualistic: "(1) social work operates to assist individuals in adjusting to the institutional framework of society, and (2) social work also attempts to modify the institutional framework itself in appropriate areas" (Bisno, 1952, p. 72). Bisno clearly understands social work as being comprised of at least these two primary purposes, as well as their myriad concomitant roles, functions and methods. He offers a slightly more detailed "working definition" of social work at the outset of *The Philosophy of Social Work*. "Social work is the provision of services designed to aid individuals, singly or in groups, in coping with present or future social and psychological obstacles that prevent, or are likely to prevent, full and effective participation in society" (p. 1). This part of the definition matches with (1) above, and clearly captures the clinical side of social work. He does not conclude the definition there, however. Instead, he continues the definition in the next paragraph, stating "...the function of social work is the creation of those conditions within the society, and the development of those capacities within the individual, that increase the probability of a more satisfying way of life for the members of that society" (p. 1). This second portion captures the social change element.

This dually purposed social work is meant to reflect the needs of both individuals and groups. According to Bisno, methods (see next section) of social work intervention aimed at individuals are not useful for solving issues at the societal level, and vice versa. Both case work and social action are legitimate and important for social work: they are complementary rather than conflicting. This is not to say that there is no room for competing viewpoints along the way. Bisno recognizes the theoretical confusion and ideological inconsistencies that can and do arise because of the dual focus. For example, the emphasis on Freudian psychoanalysis in individual social work at the time of Bisno's writing is understood to be problematic as it does not support Bisno's dual understanding, but favors an understanding of social problems and their causes only at the level of the individual and his or her pathology. As such, social issues such as oppressive labor conditions and racial intolerance get overlooked. Moreover, in addition to significant social issues being eclipsed, an overly individualistic focus can also, according to Bisno, lead to oppression of clients by way of the assumption that clients must conform to various societal standards. The "adjustment" of the individual must therefore always take into account each person's environmental circumstances (e.g. relevant laws and social mores). In other words, social work should not be an instrument for cultural conformity—for 'normalizing' individuals according to certain societal standards. The social change aspect of social work must always remain present to critically examine whether the 'normal' social conditions in a particular place and time are also adequate and just. The social mores, standards and laws may be equally or more 'sick' than any individual.

Methods. Bisno's methods for social work reflect his purposes. Since the purpose is dual, so are the methods. These include social case work (primarily) at the individual level, and social and political action at the societal level. He adds a third general method that is integrative of both

foci which includes group work and community organizing. He is also clear that the role of social workers must involve thinking and action at all levels regardless of the worker and agency focus. This does not mean that each worker cannot specialize, but that each worker must be engaged and thinking about interventions and relevant effects at multiple levels, and that each social worker (and agency) should be involved at multiple levels of action, even if not equally. A case worker, for instance, may also participate in social action as an individual, through professional organizations, or through social agencies (among other possibilities).

The key to understanding Bisno's methods lies in his statement that the primary, overarching method that has been adopted by social work, whether at the individual or societal level, is democracy.

The literature of American social work clearly indicates an almost complete acceptance of the democratic way of life. As a matter of fact, social work is so interwoven into the fabric of its democratic matrix that it can hardly be understood if viewed apart from it (1952, p. 104).

This democratic perspective reveals the heart of social work as a transformational discipline and practice. As such, transformation will occur not only at the level of content—whether between case worker and client, or between activist and policy—but the methods of social work themselves will transform over time as well. Social work must therefore remain flexible and adaptive to the needs and values of a changing, developing, transforming society. Democracy comes into play as primary both in the *work* of social work, as well as in the process of discerning what social work is, what its methods and values will be, both of which are assumed to be ongoing. In his later work, for instance, Bisno applies his understanding of the democratic

nature of relationships to issues of managing conflict in human service organizations (Bisno, 1988). Here democracy comes into play as an element in the client-practitioner relationship as he discusses issues such as power, control, dependency and motivation.

Values. The values Bisno adopts for social work are, as Clark Chambers stated in the preface, the values of scientific humanism (Bisno, 1952). As such, social work on Bisno's account may be considered as the action arm of scientific humanism, reflecting its values in what it does. These values are lined up in Bisno's work in contrast to the values of Roman Catholic social work. Bisno's values for social work are evident in many different areas of his writing, but center, as with his purpose and methods, on both the individual and the society as a whole. Four primary values will be discussed here.

In perhaps its simplest statement, Bisno's value for individual level social work is the intrinsic worth of the human being. "This, the most fundamental premise of all, permeates social work" (1952, p. 5). It implies that life itself is socially desirable and should therefore be preserved, promoted and supported by a variety of means. For Bisno this means generating and maintaining social policies and institutions that run counter to any competition-focused ideology consistent with "survival of the fittest." Instead, Bisno's social work will act to take care of the least fit, and to set conditions for equality of opportunity. The value of human life implies also that human suffering should be prevented and alleviated as is possible.

A second value, following from the intrinsic worth of the individual, is the development of individuals to their full potential as human beings. The social work role is the facilitation of this process via case work or some other one-on-one (or perhaps small group) work. Even the nuclear family unit, on Bisno's account, is meant for this purpose. "In the main, social workers

support the companionship...family, the ideal of which is a harmonious democratic companionship which will allow for each member of the unit the fullest possible realization of his [sic] potentialities” (1952, p. 22). Bisno highly values the rights of individuals, and elevates this developmental piece as a right as well.

The advocacy of the principle of “socialized individualism” commits the social worker to support the right of every individual to attain the fullest (personally and socially constructive) development of which he is capable, the full realization of such potentialities being achieved through a planned social organization that is dedicated and conducive to that end (1952, p. 33).

With this statement Bisno states his primary value in such a way as to capture both the individual and societal focus. This statement also mentions “socialized individualism” which is another of Bisno’s primary values. The individual is not a “rugged individual” who survives alone and only by his or her rationality and wits, but as an interdependent individual who needs others, who has emotions, and who still has something to offer the larger group. This is Bisno’s denial of ‘homo economicus,’ the supposed rational self-interested individual (in the Hobbesian sense), in favor of a more holistic conception of the human person.

A third value, also consistent with the value of the individual, is that each person should have a right to self-determination. This applies specifically to the worker-client relationship in professional social work practice, and also to more generally to include non-coercive parenting and the right of welfare recipients to receive cash payments to spend as they choose. This relates directly to a fourth value, that of diversity. In this regard Bisno thinks beyond mere tolerance of one group for another, and hopes for real social integration. Prejudice and discrimination should

be eliminated and replaced with a “two way” process whereby one (minority) culture is not eliminated and assimilated, but where real (democratic) dialogue and mutual understanding and fellowship take place. For all of these values Bisno identifies roles for both individuals and society. For example, he believes that society has an obligation to provide for its citizens who are experiencing oppression, exploitation or economic hardship. He also sees a consistent and complementary role for individuals as social workers and citizens. Each person should be able (and enabled) to work out solutions to his or her own problems. But each person should also have the right to accessible, high quality services as needed.

Knowledge. The primary source of knowledge for social work is social science. “The scientific method is considered to be the essential instrument for the study of human behavior” (Bisno, 1952, p. 91). Bisno understands his social work philosophy as leaving both religion and magic behind in favor of a rational, scientific base. This is a naturalized approach to knowledge, as opposed to a supernatural one. The social science base that Bisno has in mind should be relativized to the circumstances and mores of different cultures and subcultures so as to avoid ethnocentrism in its methods (as he understands Catholic social work to be guilty of). Science, like social work philosophy and practice methods should be democratic in nature. He desires to avoid dogmatism even in science so that ‘truth’ may continue to emerge as a product of ongoing critical examination. There is not much extended discussion on this subject as he is convinced that contemporary social work theorists and practitioners are well convinced of the absolute need for social work to be dependent upon social science. He indicates as much by regularly citing various social science studies conducted at the time in order to support many of his points.

Sanction. Bisno does not provide a pointed or extended discussion about the sanctioning bodies for social work. He does understand, of course, that social work cannot exist without

them. Previous discussion about the conflicts arising in social work between social work practitioners and leaders, and the various supporters and funders of social work services is one indication of this awareness. Implicit in his writing about social work philosophy is the understanding that a number of individuals, groups and institutions will of necessity be involved with social work as sanctioning bodies. These include (but are not limited to) schools or other educational institutions; government, whether federal, state or local; business and industry; various civic and political groups; churches and other spiritual organizations; and individual citizens.

Pragmatist themes. Bisno's philosophy of social work is so consistent with Deweyan pragmatism that it is surprising it is not labeled as such. Bisno himself states "[s]ocial work is not only empirical in its outlook, but almost by definition thoroughly pragmatic..." (1952, p. 91). His philosophy of social work is consistent with each of the identified Deweyan themes. These will be discussed briefly here and returned to in the conclusion.

Bisno's primary value appears to be the creation of social conditions such that individuals, families and groups can develop and flourish according to their own, self-directed goals and life plans. Secular, scientific, liberal humanist values such as these (generally speaking) are a direct reflection of Dewey's ideas and generally reflect this broad historical trend in American history. The overlap with Deweyan pragmatism of Bisno's ideas in this regard can nearly be called a complete identity. Bisno is like an arm of Deweyan philosophy reaching out as social work. For instance, Bisno's ideas about transformation (see above in methods), such as should take place in an evolutionary and democratic way, are directly and explicitly Deweyan in nature.

There is also clear evidence in Bisno's work that his thinking is consistent with the pragmatist understanding of the individual as an organism in an environment. "The social worker acts upon the proposition that the human being is a biosocial organism whose behavior results from the interaction of original nature, unique experiences, and the culture" (Bisno, 1952, p. 6). Dewey (or perhaps Darwin) could hardly have summarized this idea better himself. Bisno continues by explicitly rejecting mind-body dualism in favor of a naturalistic understanding of the human person. A very 'this worldly' perspective on social work leads Bisno to reject theories that in his estimation overly spiritualize (e.g. Roman Catholic) or psychologize (e.g. psychodynamic) human behavior, and overly restrict it to the individual as opposed to the societal whole. He further pronounces his pragmatism (though still implicitly) by stating that the behaviors that can be scientifically studied and addressed by social work are not merely reflexive or programmatic, but are most often the results of pre-reflective intelligence (reminiscent of Dewey's 'Reflex Arc' concept). Bisno goes on to draw a significant implication of this perspective for social work, namely that it permits social workers to address clients' needs with regard to both personal responsibility and the influence of social structures and mores that are beyond the client's control.

Bisno states in the first paragraph of *The Philosophy of Social Work* that he has "...developed a "working definition" which, while unsatisfactory in certain respects, may be useful for the present purpose" (Bisno, 1952, p. 1). By this, he indicates both the fallibility of his current definition, as well as his understanding that the task of forming definitions of social work (and presumably other things) is a process that will be an ongoing development, as opposed to a procedure for exacting a once-for-all denotation. He makes no conveyance such that *any*

definition of social work (or anything else) is as good as any other, or that defining social work itself is a trivial task.

Further evidence of a process orientation, or process metaphysic, can be discerned from Bisno's statements regarding the differences between his perspective (or his ideas about what social work is in general) as compared to how he understands Catholic social work (that is social work construed and conducted explicitly under the auspices of the Roman Catholic church). In this discussion he states that the primary difference is that the Catholic school of thought maintains fixed, unchanging moral principles upon which human conduct must be patterned, whereas non-Catholic social work has largely rejected this idea. He implies here that the values and ideas used for social work are not set and fixed, but are variable and change to reflect the needs and values of the culture that sanctions the social work that is to be done.

Another pragmatist theme, this time related to his values, is evident in Bisno's work. Like Dewey, Bisno does not spill much ink offering lengthy justifications for the values he presents. He simply presents them. They are not stated arbitrarily, but if he is consistent with his stated criteria for something to be included in his philosophy of social work—namely, that it be an element raised by consensus—then we can assume that his values enter this way. There is a nested democratic element here: social work values (or any other element of social work) do not arrive a priori, nor are they deduced from first principles or discovered under a rock. Social work values are discerned from the culture, and more specifically, from the democratic deliberations of social workers over time. And as such, he looks to the ongoing discussions in social work to find his values and states them not as timeless truths, but instead holds them up for all to see. In this way he seems to be much less concerned with convincing everyone that they must be this or

that, and much more interested in inviting further discussion and deliberation about his observations. This is an example of pragmatist democratic process.

Discussion of the clinical vs. social reform debate. One major warrant offered for his own efforts in attempting to define social work is that social work, according to Bisno, did not have a clearly articulated philosophical perspective for itself. He also offers three keen insights into why that was the case. First, social work is a nascent profession and, as with any other new profession “action precedes reflection,” so a developmental process is to be expected. Second, the nature of the client-worker relationship in social work itself requires a certain inarticulateness in any attempt to precisely capture its nature. In other words, the complexities of human relationships and the means by which people grow, heal, problem solve, and interact are quite difficult to understand, and even more difficult to operationalize. And finally, social work must have sanctioning bodies, and often times there are discrepancies in social, political and philosophical orientations and ideologies between the social work entities and those who sanction them. This also leads to discrepancies and conflicts not only between sanctioned and sanctioner, but it raises multiple issues within the field itself. These, as has been stated in the introductory chapters of the present work, tend to center upon the clinical vs. social reform debate, and their opposing viewpoints.

Bisno also offers several important insights into the conflict and confusion that arises as part of the clinical vs. social change debate. Conflict can arise when conservatives attempt to dominate various social service programs and agencies (often via financial support). This can be complicated because social workers, as individuals or as a profession, often desire to achieve a high social status for themselves, which can compromise their purposes. Social work also has limited power and is not always regarded highly by the public. But, since social work must be

sanctioned by the “dominant economic and/or social elements of our society,” this will likely always remain in tension (Bisno, 1952, p. 90). Further conflict can arise simply due to the fact that, according to Bisno, social work does not have an adequate theoretical base, and the theories and research methods of sociology and psychology (among others) are often incompatible.

Bisno’s primary contribution to the clinical vs. social reform debate is his clear and unquestioning presentation of both the clinical and social reform perspectives as constituting the essence of social work. He does this at the beginning of his work by including both in his definition of what social work is. Perhaps even more significant is his assertion that social work must not only be dualistic, but must also remain flexible and adaptable to the point that it changes its own methods over time to accommodate needs at both individual and societal levels. This statement seems to put social work into a novel and progressive category all its own regarding professional self-definition. See the conclusion for further discussion of this topic.

Chapter 7: Summary of Findings

Brief Summary of Conclusions

As stated in the methodology section, there are four primary tasks to be completed in this dissertation: (1) Generate a pragmatist framework using John Dewey’s philosophy, along with the selected social work theorists, in a dialectical fashion (note that these are the same theorists as mentioned in task 2 below). (2) Develop a richer, deeper understanding of social work as pertains to the clinical vs. social reform debate by analyzing nine major social work theorists of the early 20th century who were seminal in the development of social work philosophy (i.e. the purposes, methods, values, knowledge, and sanction of social work), as well as four major social work conferences. (3) Apply pragmatism to this new understanding of social work as a solution

to the clinical vs. reform debate. (4) Discuss conclusions and implications for social work: practice, policy, teaching, and research.

Given the starting point and assumptions that were present at the beginning of this dissertation—as represented in the introduction and methodology sections—the findings are rather unexpected. This dissertation started with three major assumptions based on the recent literature surveyed (see introduction). First, it was assumed that social work has an unresolved identity crisis that has existed since its inception in the early 20th century. Second, it was assumed that the primary and persistent problem with the social work identity is the clinical vs. social reform debate. And third, it was assumed that the philosophies of social work which would be surveyed in (2) were not already pragmatist and therefore that a pragmatist framework could be applied to them in order to remedy the supposed divide in social work. All three of these assumptions have been refuted, unexpectedly, by the analysis of social work philosophies according to task (2).

The findings are summarized below according to task (except for #4 since it is the next chapter). Task (1) involved the generation of a summary framework of Dewey's pragmatism which produced the following three themes: the revolution in philosophy; the organism-in-environment perspective; and instrumentalist epistemology, including the democratic approach to ethics and politics. It was anticipated that further elements of pragmatism might be generated from the social work theorists themselves, and put into conversation with Dewey's ideas. However, what was discovered is that pragmatist elements were present in all of the philosophies of social work already. Social work itself was either conceived of as an 'arm' of pragmatist thought (or, more generally, of progressivism, of which pragmatism is arguably the key philosophical paradigm), and/or key pragmatist themes were clearly discernible in the

philosophies of social work. Thus, no new framework was needed as this would be redundant—it would merely involve ‘reverse engineering’ of a pragmatist framework from philosophies of social work that are already inherently pragmatist.

Task (2), the analysis of nine social work theorists (and four major social work conferences), was completed in order to better understand the nature of the clinical vs. social reform debate. What is discernible from this analysis is perhaps the most striking conclusion of this dissertation: without exception, all of the social work theorists analyzed here are dual focused with regard to the clinical vs. social reform debate. In other words, every philosophy of social work represented here includes both the clinical and the social reform perspectives. Each thinker has his or her own contribution and emphasis—some offer ideas more specifically linked to the clinical side (e.g. Taft’s Rankian social casework), some leaning more toward the social reform side (e.g. Addams’ Hull House)—but all of them define social work as an institution, discipline and practice that includes both aspects. This renders task (3) somewhat null. It was assumed that the clinical vs. social reform divide needed a fix, and that pragmatism might provide the solution (i.e. as a ‘reorientation’). However, since all of the philosophies of social work are already pragmatist, and, more importantly, since they also represent a unified, dual focused approach, it would only be redundant to apply pragmatism as a solution, and it is unnecessary in the first place, since a clinical vs. social reform ‘identity crisis’ is not apparent in any of these perspectives.

The primary conclusion of this dissertation is, therefore, that the clinical vs. social reform “debate” was not indicative of an identity crisis, at least not in the first 60+ years of the development of the profession. To be sure, there can be tensions between clinical and social reform perspectives, and there were difficult questions that had to be addressed (e.g. at the

Milford conference regarding the unity of social work practice). But the conceptions of social work analyzed here indicate that these tensions need not be considered dividing lines of crisis proportions since every single thinker always included both. In other words, social work, from its inception (with Jane Addams and Mary Richmond), should be considered a profession with a burgeoning *unity*, though it was never a profession of *uniformity*. All of these thinkers recognize the unity of social work, including both clinical and social reform aspects, to be inclusive of casework, group work, and various forms of social reform work such as community organizing and political advocacy for policy change. In sum, social work does not need a new theory or philosophy in order to define itself, or to solve a putatively irreconcilable divide—it would perhaps do better to *remember what it has always been*, a unified, though not uniform, perpetually growing and developing discipline and profession.

Summary of Findings for Each Analytical Category

Purpose. The stated purposes of social work, according to the nine theorists analyzed, vary somewhat, but remain within a fairly well-defined purview. As stated, all theorists indicate that the purposes of social work are dual: the goal is to help individuals and to change the structures and institutions of society. Jesse Taft, for instance, states that the overall goal of social work is “to help,” and by this she means that social workers can operate within multiple agency-defined purviews in order to establish relationships with individuals and groups which will facilitate problem solving, growth and development (in sum, the Functional school). Arthur Todd focuses his purposes for social work on the idea of “social progress,” in which the biopsychological and socioeconomic realms must be addressed in order to promote equal opportunity, health, vitality and capacity for individuals and communities. These two theorists provide a rough exemplar of the range of thought about the question of the purposes of social

work: Taft's answer tends to focus more on individuals and social casework, while Todd's focuses more on social reform, though each acknowledges the need for the other.

Several themes are present in the stated purposes of social work. First, social justice and human rights are discussed regularly, particularly in Todd, Devine, Lindeman and Bisno, though the others have consistent ideas. Democracy and the preservation of democracy are also important aspects of the purposes of social work. Sometimes, as with Eduard Lindeman, democracy, as "democracy in action," becomes the method for social transformation in order to bring about amicable relationships among individuals as well as more favorable and just social conditions. Others, like Charlotte Towle discuss democracy as something to be created and maintained by social work at both the micro (relationship focused) and macro levels. All theorists also focus the purposes of social work toward helping people who are poor, oppressed, exploited, and/or vulnerable. This includes a wide variety of social issues such as physical and mental illness, homelessness, drug addiction, child welfare, immigration and sanitation. To be sure, each thinker offers something somewhat unique, yet consistent with a dual focus and an emphasis on social justice and human rights. For example, Taft differs from the Diagnostic school by challenging the Freud-influenced idea of diagnosis with a Rankian perspective that is much more client focused. But she does not suggest eliminating case work, gathering information about clients, or ignoring the plight of individuals.

As for the conferences, the purposes of social work vary a bit more according to this analysis. The Milford conference was focused on social case work and concluded that social case work was one unified entity, but did not have much to say for the social reform side of the equation (granted, it was the first social work conference!). By the time of the Hollis-Taylor report a clear dual focus (on economic insecurity as well as individual needs) was evident,

though they also called for social work to continue to think hard about its self definition. The Working Definition continued the dual focused trend, offering as the purposes of social work the equilibrium between individuals, groups (large and small) and their environments. The Madison meeting papers represented a less unified view. Minehan & Pincus, Dean, and Cooper can be said to have offered a traditional, dual focused approach to social work (even implied by Dean's thesis was that social work needed to re-balance itself more towards the social reform side), but Reid offered a rather positivistic statement that social work should be built up "brick by brick" from empirical evidence. On the other hand, Morris—also quite concerned about "effectiveness" of social work services—called for a social work that focused nearly exclusively on convalescent or palliative care of individuals. These latter two theorists seem aberrant relative to the other three participating in the Madison conference, as well as the nine included in this dissertation. Given this point, it raises a question as to whether a certain fragmentation began to occur in the late 1970's or early 1980's that challenged the relative unity and consistency in social work's self-defined purposes of the previous 70 years or so.

Methods. Looking over all nine theorists and four conferences at once it quickly becomes evident that generic social work practice which includes case work, group work, and community organizing are common to all. The Milford conference began the acknowledgment of generic case work as the primary vehicle of social work, which included social assessment, treatment and evaluation. Subsequent conferences broadened the idea of generic social work to be more inclusive of group work and community organizing. The Working Definition, for instance, states all three primary methods, with increased detail about the role of relationships and person-environment interaction. It also offers more detail on the process, to include observation, assessment, planning, action, and evaluation phases.

The theorists all include the three primary methods and each offers makes their own contribution to the ongoing conversation. The use of democracy is present in most of these, particularly Addams, Lindeman, and Bisno. Addams, for instance, understands democratic deliberation to be the primary method by which individuals come together to determine community needs, support each other, strategize, plan, and take action for social reform. All theorists also agree that social work, though generic, takes place in many different settings (e.g. hospitals, schools, neighborhoods) and will have various specialties for social workers. Despite recognizing the need for specialization, the focus, whether for Addams' more social reform oriented philosophy, or for Reynolds' more casework-focused philosophy, is upon relationships. Addams and Lindeman, for instance, tend to think more about the relationships among people in groups, whereas Towle and Taft tend to focus more about the relationship between clients and caseworkers. A final salient theme among these thinkers is the understanding that the methods for social work are, and must remain, adaptable, flexible and always in process. As Devine stated, methods should be relevant to the people served in their social context and related to the problems and issues being addressed—and these are always in flux. This means that social work cannot afford any attempt to overly specify its methods as particular techniques, skills or competencies. Reynolds called for generic social work as a stabilizing force for an ever-adapting profession. She understood social work as an art that cannot be standardized.

Values. Two primary themes emerge when considering the nine theorists and four conferences at once: values for individuals and values for society (and they are interrelated). Values for society include social justice and human rights. This means slightly different things according to each thinker. For instance, Jane Addams offers her 'new social ethic' as a response to the hyper-individualistic, personal ethic of her day—thinking anew about ethics, from a social

standpoint, means understanding how systemic influences shape social and economic conditions for individuals and groups. Lindeman and Towle have similar ideas with their understandings of “social regard” and “social conscience” (respectively). Writing later than Addams (and, no doubt, influenced by Addams), their ideas focus on the individual’s incipient understanding of the needs of other people and groups, and the ways that individuals are interdependent (the Working Definition also asserted the same). Societal values are centered upon social justice, which means fairness and opportunity for everyone such that all people have the opportunity for a meaningful life that includes not only work, proper nutrition and shelter, but also the opportunity for leisure and recreation, and social equality (e.g. for women). Todd, Devine and Towle in particular centered upon these areas.

The development of individual-centered values morphed somewhat over time as social work’s thinking moved from the Diagnostic school to the Functional school (though both persist, the Diagnostic school prevailed to account for the vast majority of social workers’ perspectives). The inherent dignity, worth and value of the individual appears to be constant throughout, as is the value of each individual to be able to develop to their full potential. What was added (at least in emphasis) was client self-determination, self-awareness—these reflect the client-centered approach of the Functional school. Reynolds, Towle and Taft highlight these values in their philosophies, though, as stated, all of the stated values are consistent with each thinker (with the possible exception, arguably, of client self-determination in the early Diagnostic school).

Knowledge. In sum, knowledge for social work should be drawn from broad sources, it should be integrated, applied, and serve the purposes of the field. The Working Definition suggests that schools of social work teach courses on psychology, relevant humanities, theology and other related disciplines. All of the theorists state that knowledge for social work should be

diverse and come from the humanities, social and physical sciences, common sense, and the particulars of the practice context. Two of our thinkers, Todd and Bisno, tend to be more focused on the use of science for social work (though they avoid outright scientism)—Todd, for instance, asserts that “scientific social work” includes both scientific *attitude*, meaning an openness to new ideas, possibilities and novel solutions to social problems, as well as scientific *technique*, which means the application of scientific methodologies to solving real-world problems. The rest of the thinkers embrace science and also emphasize other components of knowledge. Towle, for example, offers a three-part knowledge: knowledge of self, knowledge of client and client systems, and content knowledge. Social workers should have self-awareness in order to avoid undue bias toward clients, a thorough understanding of each client in their social environment, as well as specific content knowledge about the relevant issues and problems (e.g. knowledge of psychopathology in a mental health treatment setting).

Knowledge for social work also carries a social justice component. None of these theorists believes that science produces absolutely objective, timeless truths. Instead, science is, as Lindeman says, “functional,” meaning that it is value-laden, theory-laden, and must prove itself in action. Scientific information about group dynamics, for instance, is interesting to Lindeman to the extent that it is useful for goal-directed group functions. Jane Addams offers the signal union of science and social justice with her concept “sympathetic knowledge.” Sympathetic knowledge is knowledge tested by action, and it means that simple information about people is insufficient—real knowing implies an understanding of people with some depth, taking into account their perspectives, which opens up pathways to empathic caring. This form of knowledge cannot be divorced from the interests of the investigators, and takes into account a holistic understanding of people, including not only rationality, but also emotion and experience

(ideas later used by Standpoint feminists and Critical Race theorists). Overall, knowledge for social work must be broad, avoid an over focus on skills and techniques training, and include the study of philosophy, literature, history, theology, and art. The Hollis-Taylor report suggests coursework not only in social welfare, but also in the history and philosophy of social welfare, as essential for preparation for social work practice.

Sanction. Two sources of sanction stand out among our theorists and conferences: the government and the public. The Hollis-Taylor report, recognizing that society and culture are always changing, asserts that social work will change with its needs and values. Todd, Devine and Bisno also offer a general reference to the public and government as primary sanctioning sources for social work. Sanction occurs not only by public favor, but also by direct policy vote (or election), taxation (i.e. use of government), and various forms of endowments, gifts and contributions. Towle, for instance, understood social work as the “action arm” of the “social conscience” of the public. A shift occurred with Reynolds, Towle and Taft in that they all stated the client as a primary sanction for social work services, though this was present in a somewhat diminished form earlier with Richmond. Reynolds said that clients should be able to choose the quality and quantity of available services, and have a say in what services are available. Taft also added the sanction of the social work agency as a primary source, though this was also present earlier as part of the Milford Conference. Addams stands out in the sanction category because for her sanction comes from the neighborhood. Consistent with her settlement house philosophy, it is the democratic process itself, which leads people to develop their opinions, discover their needs, and choose appropriate actions in their community. In other words, the people themselves are both the “social workers” and the “clients,” so the sanction can only come from them.

Pragmatist themes. It is not difficult to find pragmatist themes in this analysis of thinkers and conferences. The most obviously pragmatist thinkers here are Addams, Lindeman and Bisno, who explicitly cite Dewey and otherwise present what can easily be considered pragmatist philosophies of social work. Addams worked closely with Dewey and is considered a pragmatist philosopher in her own right, in addition to being considered a progenitor of American social work. Her ideas such as “sympathetic knowledge” are clear exemplars of philosophical pragmatist themes such as democracy, and can be considered pragmatist themes themselves, as invented or developed by Addams herself. Lindeman’s ideas about group processes and group functions are clearly linked to pragmatist ideas about democratic processes as well. Even Taft’s ideas, though they focus more on the individual, reflect pragmatism in a variety of ways (e.g. her understanding of science as a fallible process of discovery to be used for social casework). The pragmatist influence on Taft is not hard to trace since she studied under Dewey and Mead at the University of Chicago.

Thematically speaking, all three of the primary pragmatist themes identified in this dissertation (i.e. the revolution in philosophy; the organism in environment perspective; instrumentalism and democratic ethics/politics) have been easily recognized in the social work philosophers and conferences. The Milford conference, for instance, as the first social work conference of its kind, prescribed ongoing, democratic discussion as the means by which social work would continue to define itself into the future (as opposed to asserting a once-for-all definition dogmatically). The conclusion of the Milford Conference also reflected pragmatism as it defined social casework as a genus with many species: one thing, but very diverse and malleable. The notion that the definition of social work must be a process, as opposed to a static event (a central pragmatist theme) is also evident in many of the theorists work. Reynolds, for

instance, states that social work must always continue the conversation about its self-definition in order to remain relevant to the culture and society that sanctions it, and whom it serves. The knowledge and practices of social work, according to all of the theorists, are to be considered ‘in process,’ often provisional, fallible, and always functional. Knowledge, according to Todd, for instance, must be tested not by comparing potential ‘truths’ with the ‘real’ world, but by discerning its function, or utility as what ‘works.’ In other words, knowledge should be considered a tool for use in solving human social problems. Its effectiveness in carrying out these tasks (according to the values of social justice, equal opportunity and the worth of individuals) is the ‘proof’ for knowledge.

The clinical vs. social reform debate. Both the clinical and the social reform perspectives are represented in every thinker and conference. The Milford report is one possible exception as it merely recognizes the existence of social reform work without actually engaging in much discussion about it. However, the Milford report does state that its goals are rather preliminary and that it is not attempting to define social work in general, but only to deal with social casework in an attempt to ‘start somewhere’ and get the conversation going at a formal, organizational level. The rest of the conferences are clearly dual focused. Bisno states that the “essence” of social work is its dual focus, along with its general adaptability and flexibility. Todd suggested that social work is a unified field, but with a great diversity of roles according to a necessary “division of labor.” This same thinking made sense to Reynolds who added that with the diversity of roles follows the diversity of needs, and there needs to be a proper matching of people and problems with the best interventions. One should not, for instance, offer psychotherapy to a person whose problem is hunger. This point highlights the need for both individual, clinical work *and* social reform work: one person may need access to food (and work

to supply the means for food), which requires both policy change to remedy the cause of the problem, as well as casework to connect the individual to immediate food relief resources. Lindeman's group focus attempted to integrate both the clinical and social reform perspectives in one: democratic groups provide for the individual by offering a sense of belonging and purpose, and benefit the community as the group works to make positive policy changes that benefit everyone. There is some range of emphasis between the thinkers analyzed here. Towle's ideas, for instance, focus on the client-practitioner relationship, leaning more toward the individual, clinical side. Dean (of the Madison conference) calls for a return to thinking about social reform, representing a move away from what he perceived as too much clinical work. But each thinker at least stated that social work is comprised of both clinical and social reform perspectives and none of them are hostile or divisive about the issue.

Chapter 8: Discussion

This dissertation began with references to a number of recent scholarly social work articles which pointed to the clinical vs. social reform debate as a major divide in the field, one which could be considered an ongoing identity crisis (see introduction). Another fairly recent, and representative, article of the same sort by Holosko (2003), sums this up by stating

It is indeed a rather curious and embarrassing irony that after being in existence for some 400 years, the profession of social work is still seeking to define itself. Some have concluded that this dilemma plagues the profession's ability to move forward with its purpose (p. 271).

Holosko believes that social work has thus far failed to sufficiently define itself and sides with the others who find this a serious barrier to the profession's ability to carry out its purposes.

Holosko's article consists primarily of a summary of major, definitive conferences (e.g. Flexner; Hollis-Taylor) in early social work history. His conclusion is that these merely reiterate the "...urgent need for a simple, clear, and meaningful definition that has application in today's ever-changing world" (p. 271).

It is precisely Holosko's type of perspective that this dissertation counters, and to which it offers a different interpretation, not only of the conferences, but also of social work's major theorists for the first 60+ years in the United States. The same conferences have not only been surveyed, as Holosko did, but also analyzed (according to the five-item framework) alongside the nine major theorists, and with reference to pragmatist philosophy. To be fair, there is at least one point of overlapping agreement between Holosko's perspective and the conclusions of this dissertation: it is agreed that social work (especially in the early years) did need to undergo a discernment and discovery process whereby it sought self-definition. This is, of course, true of any emerging profession, and social work is no exception. The Milford conference, for instance, was an early setting for social work scholars to determine whether social case work was comprised of just one practice enterprise that could be captured under the umbrella term "social case work," or whether there were multiple practices that existed as separate professions. But where Holosko only sees social work as "embarrassingly" undefined, the findings of this dissertation show that social work, despite its internal diversity and multiple practice emphases, has salient defining features that can be easily understood via careful analysis of its major thinkers. Holosko's desire for a "simple, clear" definition overlooks the fact that the history of social work philosophy does offer a relatively clear (if not simplistic) definition, and it fails to grasp the nature of what social work has been (and still is) as well as its underlying philosophy (pragmatism).

The most recent definition of social work, offered by the NASW (2012, in the preamble to the Code of Ethics) clearly states that social work is a dual focused profession—thus centering on both the clinical and social reform perspectives—and is rooted in social justice and human rights traditions. What Holosko and others fail to realize is that this is largely what social work has been for over 100 years, at least in the United States. The desire for social work to create some other type of definition for itself—one supposedly more clear and simple—is perhaps reflective of an underlying absolutist type of philosophy which seeks universal, timeless, immutable answers to questions, whether regarding broad epistemological, metaphysical or ethical issues more generally, or definitions of professions more specifically. However, given the pragmatist thought that is inherent to social work philosophy, it does not make sense to ask social work to re-define itself over 100 years after its inception, according to a philosophical school that is foreign to it.

There are other social work scholars such as Witkin (1998) and Netting (2005) who argue that social work's internal diversity (reflected in its self-definition) is actually a strength because it does not attempt to supply an overly narrow definition of itself. Doing so would exclude either clinical work, social reform work, or, in an ever-changing social and political culture, it would leave certain individuals and groups beyond the purview of social work. And if social work's mission is to focus on those who are oppressed, exploited, impoverished, etcetera (also stated in the current NASW definition), then social works' definition must remain broad and flexible (again reflecting its inherent pragmatism), not narrow and fixed.

The conclusions of this dissertation are consistent with the ideas proposed by thinkers such as Witkin and Netting, but offer something more: an understanding of what social work has been, a historical understanding of where we began and what the major thinkers understood

social work to be as it developed over the first 60+ years. It is granted that the definition of social work was not always obvious, nor is it today—this is simply an enduring aspect of social work. Dealing with ambiguity is something that must be adjusted to and no simplistic, once-for-all definition of social work practice can remedy this. The present work, in an attempt to solve the supposedly “embarrassing” crisis of social work’s lack of self-definition, has revealed that social work has, with some qualification and variation, always had the same broad self-definition. The salient features of social work are now (fortunately) reflected in the current NASW self-definition.

The present work began in agreement with thinkers such as Holosko, with determination to remedy this great definitional problem, particularly the clinical vs. social reform debate, which is usually offered as the primary concern when it comes to self-definition. It was hoped at the outset that offering pragmatism as a philosophical undergirding or orientation for the entire field of social work would help to ease the supposed great divide between those concerned with social work at the individual level and those who focus more at the societal level. Pragmatism, as a philosophical perspective which replaces absolutisms of various sorts with an understanding of and appreciation for diversity, ecological interdependence (physically and socially), and the always-in-process nature of all things in the world, including social work, seemed a good way to help ‘bridge the gap’ between disputing factions in the field. There was no intent to offer yet another simplified or clarified definition of social work, but to help make sense of the extant, dual focused understanding.

The surprising and unanticipated finding, based on the historical analysis of nine philosophies of social work is twofold. First, social work is *already* inherently pragmatist in its orientation. The purposes, methods, values, knowledge and sanctions for social work (e.g. its

self-definition) are largely pragmatist. This means that pragmatist themes are clearly and pervasively present in nearly all of the early conceptions of social work. Second, without exception, all of the social work philosophies are dual focused. The definitions of social work offered are all surprisingly uniform and are represented by the current NASW definition. In other words, none of the major social work scholars stated that there was an identity crisis or problem between the clinical and social reform perspectives. Each thinker contributed their own perspective, as expected, and each was somewhat more focused toward either the individual or the societal side, but they always acknowledged that the definition of social work must include *both*.

What this means is that the dissertation cannot be completed according to the assumptions under which it began. Pragmatism cannot be applied to social work as a solution to the clinical vs. social reform debate because it was found that social work has been pragmatist from the beginning. Moreover, the social reform debate cannot be ‘solved’ since it was found that it is not actually a problem for any of the scholars whose work was analyzed.

One significant feature of social work’s self-definition—one which can be taken from social work itself since most of the theorists and conferences state it at some point—is the idea that social work, in order to remain relevant and progressive, must always continue to evaluate and re-evaluate its identity (including all five of the analytical categories). This is pragmatist because it is always self-renewing, always in process, as opposed to becoming static and dogmatic. Bertha Reynolds, for instance, stated that social work must always adapt to the culture that it is growing alongside. In order to serve its purpose of serving marginalized populations, social work must change when the culture changes: a population at a given time may not be (or may not be considered to be) experiencing oppression or may not be vulnerable, yet at a

subsequent time the same population may be in need of services or policy advocacy (e.g. military veterans now returning from Afghanistan). This notion defies contemporary calls for a simpler, clearer, and presumably, more fixed and detailed definition of social work and its practice methods and techniques (e.g. as mentioned in the introduction). A fixed and discreet definition would also limit the purview of social work services which, at least according to the philosophies of social work analyzed for this report, would defy the historical understanding of social work. In addition, a more discreet and fixed definition would run counter to the prevailing pragmatism inherent in the identity and definition of social work as represented by the historical perspective of social work in this dissertation. The reason for this is that a simple and fixed definition—especially for social work—would be inconsistent with the pragmatist understanding of ideas and concepts as tools that should be used in an ongoing and experimental (loosely speaking) process aimed at ends consistent with social justice and human flourishing. Pragmatists, including the social work scholars, did not consider themselves, even when attempting to *define* social work (or other phenomena), as offering something that would not change. But they did recognize the need to offer *something*—social work, as with many other things, requires an operational, working definition, and this is what has been found in the present historical investigation, and is (again) now reflected in the current NASW definition.

There are benefits from maintaining an ongoing dialogue about the social work identity. For example, over time there has been a (modest) change in theories of social casework from the diagnostic school to the functional school. The former is more concerned the role of the worker in ‘treating’ the client, whereas the latter is more concerned with the client’s perspective and goals, with an emphasis on client responsibility for transformative action. This has benefitted social work and its clients, not only by offering a more developed perspective over time, but also

by adding the client to the list of those who sanction social work. Though both schools of thought are still present today, progress has been made by continuing the discussion and by integrating new theoretical ideas into social work practice theory—in this case moving from Freud to Rank. This benefit in the development of the idea of social casework is consistent with what a pragmatist would expect and hope for. The pragmatist understanding of values is that they too are not timeless or universal. In social casework the value of self-determination is what came out of years of development in the ongoing conversation—the “process,” to use the pragmatist term—regarding ethics and the relationship between clients and practitioners. If the values portion of the social work definition had been set—simply, specifically and once-for-all, say at the Milford conference—then any suggestion to the contrary would have been considered heretical and, presumably, rejected. This is not to say that every non-pragmatist-based conception of a profession (or anything else) will require absolute, dogmatic adherence to an agreed upon set of principles or self-defining features, but the tendency for any group who has their self-definition simply and clearly ‘set in stone’ would likely be much more totalitarian than would the pragmatist social workers who expect change and who already embrace democracy as essential to both the *content* of their self-definition, as well as the ongoing *process* of it. It is noteworthy here as well that even in Reynolds’ discussion of the value of client self-determination, she does not expect that it will be applied universally. There are times, or so she states, when a client needs reprieve, in which case the caseworker should take a more directive stance. The pragmatist is primarily interested in what ‘works’—that is, what is useful, functional, serves positive ends, in a particular context—and not in merely applying an easy, simple principle such as client self-determination, in a robotic fashion. In this case, it seems that Reynolds shows her pragmatic spirit in her flexibility—in her understanding that the helping

relationship is complex and requires different techniques, interventions, problem-solving strategies, or even emotional responses, at different times with different people. The complexities of humans and their biological, social, economic, political, religious, and other ‘environments,’ and the myriad interactions and interdependencies that occur within them are simply too diverse and broad for simple definitions. The pragmatist style definition of social work as dual focused, democratic, social justice-oriented, etcetera, may not satisfy the absolutist, but it is at least parsimonious in its breadth.

Who We Have Been: Social Work as a Pragmatist Discipline and Profession

The refutation of the three primary assumptions that were present at the start of this dissertation leads to a new (old) perspective on what social work is, based on what it has been. What has been discovered here is not that all of the social work philosophers have stated exactly the same thing, or that social work has not had any difficulties in determining its own identity over time. To be sure, there is variation among the nine theorists and four conferences, and in fact, the conferences usually speak of the need for continued deliberation about what social work is and what its methods are (among other things, such as what social work education should include). In a sense, there is some overlap, and some room for agreement with scholars like Holosko who state that social work has deliberated for many years and yet continually fails to invent a satisfactory self-definition. To be honest, based on the literature review, I expected to discover that the history of social work philosophy would be consistent with the more negative view of social work as a field without an identity. I assumed that the analysis of social work theories would reveal a constant fluctuation in identity as each thinker contrasted with the others—some clinically oriented, others social reform oriented, and all of them offering rather disparate models and ideologies to undergird their practice and research perspectives. My own

experience as a student in social work departments also precipitated this response as I have observed the ‘wars’ of ideology and somewhat tribalistic divisions among faculty, and even students, as they line up as either clinical or social reform oriented, or as qualitative or quantitative researchers.

What is very different from that view of social work as “embarrassingly” negligent because it does not have a clear and simple enough self-definition, is the actual perspective that emerged from the analysis of the historical social work philosophies. One may maintain the view that social work is (and has been) too fragmented because it lacks an absolute, once-for-all definition that captures all of the diverse social work roles, methods, values, purposes, etcetera. On the other hand, what seems wiser, and more consistent with the historical social work scholars, is to gain an understanding of social work according to *who we have been*. Neglecting the historical perspective leaves one with only their own frame of reference (temporally, theoretically and otherwise) to answer important questions about what social work should be. Looking historically not only allows one contact with the content of social work theory (e.g. according to the five analytical categories), but also permits one to discover the inherent philosophical features of social work as it developed. It almost goes without saying that looking retrospectively also permits a glance at social work all at once—a ‘snapshot’ if you will, of what social work was for the first roughly one-half of its existence as part of US culture. In other words, we are able to consider not just each social work scholar, according to each analytical category, individually, but we are also able to consider them all, lined up side by side, in order to develop a portrait of what social work was (and still is). It is this perspective, or standpoint, that makes the present work significant. And what can be seen—or, what *I* see—is a philosophy of

social work—a self-definition that, while not always ‘clean cut,’ pretty, and colorfully packaged as if for market, is present.

Instead of finding the anticipated disparate and possibly incoherent concatenation of perspectives on social work, this analysis has found a nearly redundant series of perspectives that actually seem to ‘hang together’ quite well. I do not wish to diminish the unique and valuable contributions of each thinker. However, the overlapping similarities are striking. Not only are they striking in their portrait of a coherent discipline and profession of social work, but the similarities are also striking when it comes to the representation of pragmatism as an inherent philosophical perspective. Perhaps most significant, given the tasks set out for this work, is the realization that there was no great crisis or divide along the lines of the clinical vs. social reform debate. To be sure, there is room for democratic discussion (as commended by all of the theorists) around this issue, but it is never presented as a dividing line. In fact, most theorists were seeking better ways to integrate both, and they all at least recognized that each aspect was essential to the definition of social work.

The understanding of social work that emerges from this analysis is robust, and its content reflects its underlying philosophy. More specifically stated, its dual focused identity reflects its pragmatism. In addition, not only does the content of the social work theory reflect its inherent pragmatism, the process evident in the scholars and conferences (even up to the present) also reflects a pragmatist philosophy. It does so according to the three main features of Dewey’s philosophy: the revolution in philosophy, the organism-in-environment perspective, and instrumentalist epistemology (including democratic ethics). To conclude the discussion I’ll revisit each of these in order to spell out in one place how I understand social work to be pragmatist based on this analysis of social work history and Deweyan pragmatism.

In order to better understand social work as a discipline that is rooted in pragmatist philosophy let's first return to the current NASW definition of social work (2012). This definition is quite inclusive and defines social work as a profession that serves both individuals (capturing the clinical side) and groups (small or large, capturing the social reform side), and does so according to a variety of methods in multiple settings. For instance, the preamble to the Code of Ethics states "[a] historic and defining feature of social work is the profession's focus on individual wellbeing in a social context and the wellbeing of society. Fundamental to social work is attention to the environmental forces that create, contribute to, and address problems in living" (NASW 2012). It states further, in the next paragraph, that "[s]ocial workers promote social justice and social change with and on behalf of clients. "Clients" is used inclusively to refer to individuals, families, groups, and communities" (2012). And one line later adds "[t]hese activities may be in the form of direct practice, community organizing, supervision, consultation administration, advocacy, social and political action, policy development and implementation, education, and research and evaluation" (2012). This long list of social work "activities," along with the broad list of "clients," which includes individuals as well as communities, paints a very comprehensive range of interest and practice. The preamble also states that this wide range should focus in vulnerable and exploited populations according to the interest in social justice. The question for us here is the relationship between the current definition and the understanding now gained from the historical research in this dissertation. As stated previously, the current definition is quite consistent with the 'snapshot' of the social work identity discussed in the previous chapter. Though there is some variability in the definitions of social work found here (e.g. that the Milford conference tends to focus more on the clinical side, whereas the Working Definition is more inclusive), the current definition makes room for everyone from Mary

Richmond to Herbert Bisno (and, of course, this is no accident, as the definition is surely drawn from a historical perspective, as indicated in the first quoted line, which states that it is offering a “historic” perspective). So does the current work simply offer a supporting ‘hurrah’ for the most recent NASW definition of social work, or is there something more to be gained from this dissertation?

While the conclusions of this dissertation are supportive of the current NASW definition of social work, they also offer something more. It is one thing to merely point to a brief definition of social work (or anything else) and believe that by accepting it that one has gained a meaningful understanding of what it means—it is quite another thing to begin to take hold of the rich and deep historical and philosophical context that has shaped and formed the current definition. An investment in the latter begins to yield insights into not just what social work has been, but *why* social work has been what it has been. And this perspective, in conversation with our current trends in social mores, politics, economics, and, as always, the needs of individuals and groups who are vulnerable, will hopefully lead to wisdom about what social work should be now and into the future. But before I get to implications (next chapter) let me say more about the ‘why’ questions that pragmatism helps answer for social work. I’ll do this using the three main themes already identified in Deweyan pragmatism. The main point in what follows is to better understand what social work is, as a pragmatist undertaking. All statements contain some sort of theoretical underpinning (or so a pragmatist will assert), whether obvious or hidden. Examining these philosophical roots often provides answers to questions about why something is what it is, and social work in particular is no exception. So if we ask ‘why’ questions about social work—now that we have good reasons from the historical investigation (above) to believe that social work is pragmatist—we should be able to gain a better understanding by considering

pragmatism. In other words, we can think about social work, not as if it were some atheoretical entity, or a mysterious phenomenon that has taken place, but as something that has been grounded in the most significant contribution made to the world of philosophy by thinkers in the United States, pragmatism.

First question, “why does social work have such a broad and general definition, and why is this acceptable?” Recall the first Deweyan theme, “the revolution in philosophy.” This represents a great shift from pre-Darwinian thinking in which thinkers such as Descartes separated minds and bodies and sought absolute, universal, timeless and indubitable truths by way of rational or empirical proofs. The change was toward a perspectival and process oriented perspective instead. This means that instead of seeking truth in the form just mentioned, pragmatists understood that the ‘truth’ about something tended to be based on the perspective of the viewer, experiencer, thinker, and the understanding of those ‘truths’ (plural) tended to be a process (involving context and dialogue, hopefully democratic in nature) instead of an event. What we have seen in the social work thinkers is this same understanding. Bisno, for example, when he offers his definition of social work, does not state that he is offering a once-for-all definition. He offers his ideas—his “philosophy of social work”—as a contribution to the ongoing conversation—to the *process* of defining social work. The other social work scholars shared the same attitude toward their contribution. It would seem quite foreign to any of them to be doing something different, especially since they all also offered broad definitions, inclusive of both clinical and social reform perspectives. Social work has thus been defined broadly and intentionally inclusive of a wide range of perspectives. There seems to be an understanding that the diversity and complexity of human beings requires room for many perspectives. In sum, pragmatism offers somewhat of a justification for the social work definition being what it is: the

definition must be broad, inclusive and in process to be true to what social work is in the first place.

It was assumed at the outset of this dissertation that pragmatism was not already a key aspect of social work, and it was therefore proposed that pragmatism should be applied to the clinical vs. social reform debate as a solution. As stated earlier, it was surprising to find that in fact social work is already pragmatist and that the ‘debate’ does not exist as a divisive issue in the thinkers considered. The application of pragmatism to social work was intended to reorient (similar to the revolution in philosophy) the social work scholar by changing the nature of the questions being asked. What I mean is that at least part of the problem with those who are still seeking ‘the’ clear, simple definition of social work is that they are asking the question in a way that is inconsistent with the pragmatist philosophy of social work. Posing questions about the social work identity which indicate that it should be a simple, single, timeless (i.e. unchanging), universal thing, presume that social work itself is somehow conducive to an absolutist type of philosophy. These types of questions are exactly the ones that pragmatism rejected in philosophical discussions about epistemology, metaphysics and ethics. Pragmatism does not offer new answers to these ‘old’ questions—it offers a new way of thinking that ignores those questions. A reorientation occurs, not in the types of answers given (as if a ‘new’ answer were going to finally produce a final answer on the ‘truth’ we were looking for), but in the person asking the questions. The pragmatist, understanding that humans are animals that evolved in biopsychosocial environments, does not make such presumptions, but instead embraces provisional, functional knowledge, and as such and asks questions from that perspective. A social work scholar may still ask “what *is* social work,” but, as we have seen in the historical section here, they do not mean this in the timeless, universal, once-for-all sense. The

pragmatist—the social worker—is asking what social work is, what it has been, and offering a contribution to the ongoing, democratic dialogue, which is always provisional, or in process.

Second question, “why should social work include both the clinical and the social reform perspectives?” The answer to this question is tied to the second Deweyan theme: “the organism in environment perspective.” Dewey and all of the social work thinkers analyzed in this dissertation understand that human beings are animals who exist in physical and social environments (i.e. a post-Darwinian perspective), and that the relationship between an individual (or group) and its environment is one of interdependence and bi-directionality (with regard to cause and effect). Since social work is intentional about solving problems among humans according to social justice standards and the value and dignity of individuals’ quality of life, it only makes sense to include both the person and the environment as foci. In other words, the interventions or solutions to problems should reflect the inherent anthropology. If humans were considered simply ‘brains in vats’ (i.e. if the body did not matter), or if humans were not influenced significantly by their social, political, economic, religious, or other circumstances, then it would only make sense to focus attention only on serving the individual. Or, on the other hand, if humans had no will, personal responsibility, adaptability, or capacity as individuals to grow, develop, change themselves and their environments, it would not make any sense to bother with interventions that facilitated such things, and in this case only interventions at the environmental level would be sought. But since pragmatist social work understands people to be organisms in environments, only a both/and orientation will do when it comes to the clinical vs. social reform debate.

Third question, “why should social work have such a broad knowledge base?” One key piece to the reorientation that takes place with pragmatist thinking (see first question above), is

the shift to understanding epistemology as a method, not a truth-producing function of some sort. The method for gaining valuable information in the world is called instrumentalism. As organisms in environments humans use intelligent inquiry to better understand their world and to ‘co-evolve’ with it. This means that knowledge is understood in a ‘tool-like’ fashion, not just as supposed timeless ‘facts’ about the world, but as ‘know how.’ Pragmatists are not anxious about producing the ‘real’ truth about things so much as they are interested in developing knowledge useful to their desired ends. And this knowledge, though it may contain propositions, is more concerned with knowing how to do something, hence ‘instrumentalism.’ Pragmatist knowledge is a knowledge concerned with ‘what works.’ It is a knowledge that is always connected to action, and always keeps a dialectical process alive between knowledge and action, or between ‘theory’ and ‘practice.’ This is an age-old issue of course, and pragmatism handles it by avoiding getting stuck too far on either side: theory, or knowledge, or cognition, must always inform practice, or action, and vice versa. This type of knowledge will involve many different forms. Dewey was a proponent of science, for instance, though he opposed becoming ‘scientific’ (i.e. overly focused on science to the exclusion of any other way of ‘knowing’). Dewey thought farmers, for instance, knew plants and soil as well as botanists, and that poets knew landscapes as well as geologists.

Social work is also concerned not just with knowledge *that*, but also with knowledge *how*. And it comes in many forms. All of the social work thinkers analyzed here valued science, and nearly all of them (Todd being the only possible exception) also explicitly valued non-scientific ways of knowing. Knowledge for social work should come from philosophy, literature, the arts, theology, history, as well as from science. The reason social work should have a broad knowledge base is because it fits its pragmatist self-understanding. Social work itself is not just

something known, or a knowledge-producing endeavor, it is a practice, and as a practice it must be informed by various knowledges. Since the value for social work includes ends such as communities that are more just and equal, or people who are more mentally healthy, the knowledge may come from various sources. The concern for social work is not in discovering the one true knowledge, or using just one type of knowledge-producing instrument, but in finding what works to assist people in various ways to solve problems and to create better opportunities for living for everyone.

Fourth question, “why is social work concerned with social justice and human rights?” Simply put, the goals of social work are the goals of pragmatism. Pragmatism, like with its metaphysics and epistemology, does not have a new ‘theory’ or truth about its ethics. Others have proposed ideas such as virtue ethics (Aristotle) or utilitarian ethics (J.S. Mill), all with their own arguments and flaws, but pragmatists do not offer yet another theory. Instead, pragmatist ethics offer what is valued already by our society (understanding that this does reflect “our” perspective, and not necessarily the perspective of other cultures), and, again, the method of democratic deliberation. The hope is that a broad and diverse community can continue to generate ethics that will better support the interests of all, especially those most vulnerable. As such, ideals of democracy such as the value, dignity of the individual, human rights, and social justice come to the fore. Those seeking proofs and absolutes will again likely be unsatisfied with the pragmatist approach. Ethics is understood as an ongoing conversation as well as an ongoing practice.

Whether because of its means of self-understanding, its methods, or its values, in a very real sense, social work *is* pragmatism. Not only did social workers such as Jane Addams work alongside Dewey (and others) in developing pragmatism, but social work and pragmatism are

like two sides of the same coin. Pragmatism, as a philosophical school, is the more intellectual or cognitive side, and social work is the more action-oriented side. They mutually inform one another and neither is complete without the other. Philosophical pragmatism is toothless and hypocritical if it does not *do* anything in the world. “Ivory tower” pragmatism is a self-contradiction. Likewise, social work without pragmatism is directionless action. What good is social work if it loses sight of its underlying philosophy which provides its ethical foundation, its ideas about research, its broad approach to practice? In fact, it seems to be the ‘always in process’ nature of social work that saves itself from straying too far from its original purposes and methods. When, for instance, it gets overly focused on clinical work for individuals, social work scholars (e.g. Dean in the 1970’s; Courtney & Specht in the 1990’s) will speak up and attempt to steer a course back to a more balanced perspective.

Chapter 9: Back to Addams and Richmond: Was Social Work *Really* Unified in the Beginning?

The thesis of this dissertation—that social work has been a unified and dual focused profession from the beginning—may be countered by referencing the supposedly irreconcilable and divergent perspectives of Mary Richmond and Jane Addams. In fact, there seems to be a belief in the recent social work literature (a false one, or so I shall assert in the next section) that these two progenitors of social work were completely hostile toward each other’s perspectives, thus prefacing the supposedly irreconcilable divide between the clinical and social reform camps that has continued to plague social work all the way up to present times. Mary Richmond and Jane Addams did have divergent and often competing views of the purposes and methods of social work. In this section I will provide a basic sketch of each thinker by way of examining several key differences between them as reported in the professional literature. It actually seems

a rather uncontroversial point to suggest that Mary Richmond and Jane Addams had different perspectives about what social work should be, and this divergence is well documented. The following examples should suffice to make this point. However, the following section will argue that though their views were different, they were also complementary and interdependent, indicating that social work has been a unified, though not uniform, discipline and profession from the beginning, which is consistent with the findings of this dissertation.

The Divide Between Addams & Richmond

In her discussion of social work and progressivism, Allison Murdach (2010) asserts that significant differences exist at the inception of social work in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. She identifies “progressive” social workers as those found in the social settlement, community organization, and social reform segments. These segments are linked to Jane Addams. On the other hand, Mary Richmond is identified with classical liberal economics and social casework, both of which contrast to the social reform ideologies of the progressives. Instead, Richmond and her ilk are stated to believe that humanitarian concerns should be carried out on a one-to-one basis (social casework) instead of using government mobilization for mass betterment of populations. Richmond feared that too much government intervention would diminish interest in private charity by various potential benefactors. Murdach highlights the divide between social reformers and caseworkers by citing differences in policy advocacy between the two groups. For instance, Richmond opposed early efforts to use government to provide a social safety net via mother’s pensions, while Addams and the progressives supported mother’s pensions. Murdach does at least ‘tip her hat’ toward potential reconciliation of social reform and social casework with her mention that by the time of the Great Depression “...such divisions within social work were largely patched up as the field swung into gear to help fight

unprecedented economic and social catastrophe...” (Murdach, 2010, p. 84). Otherwise, this article represents social work as a profession divided.

Carel Germain and Ann Hartman (1980), in their article on ideas in the history of social work, state of Jane Addams and Mary Richmond that “[t]he approaches of the two movements and of the two women to the social problems of their era were strikingly different.” (p. 326) While Addams and other “settlers” sought to bring their education and good will to the poor by moving into poor neighborhoods and living among the poor, Richmond and the caseworkers instead sought to reform the poor themselves. The authors state that Richmond held the poor personally responsible for their own poverty—that they were poor was their own fault. Moreover, they state that Richmond believed that social reform was irrelevant to social problems such as sickness and pauperism, and therefore “...deplored the methods and ideas of the settlers...” (p. 326) On the other side was Addams, who “...abhorred anything that smacked of charity...” (p. 326), and instead sought only environmental reform. The authors state that these “ladies” tended to “tear one another’s positions to shreds” (p. 326), albeit politely, since “...neither could abide the work of the other...” (p. 326). The authors back up their assertions with references to the proceedings of the National Conference on Charities and Corrections (later the National Conference on Social Work). In the proceedings Addams is said to have belittled the charity visitors, who were accused of stereotyping and moralizing. Richmond countered by stating that settlements were old fashioned and unscientific, despite pretenses to the contrary. Further examples are brought to support the authors’ statements that Addams and Richmond had “profound differences” that took on the character of a personal rivalry. They suggest that Addams’ college education and high class upbringing, as contrasted with Richmond’s lack of both of these, may be at the root of their disparities, though both women were highly intelligent

and wrote voluminously. The divide between social reformers and caseworkers is summed up by asserting philosophical differences: Addams was pragmatic and sought environmental change, whereas Richmond was an old-school religious and moral dogmatist who sought to change the people themselves.

A third article that highlights the differences in social work with regard to the social reform vs. clinical or casework debate can be found in Ann McLaughlin's article on the same topic (2002). McLaughlin represents Mary Richmond as one who developed social casework—the “study-diagnosis-treatment” approach—utilizing the medical model. According to the medical model, if the cause of a problem (in this case a social problem) can be discerned, then this will uncover the cure as well. Like Germain and Hartman, McLaughlin states that Richmond focuses on the betterment of the family, particularly the reform of each individual, one at a time. The perspective of Jane Addams is said to be “fundamentally divergent” from that of Richmond, instead focusing on social work via community action paradigm (p. 189). As such, Addams sought broad change at the community or society level, not that of the individual. McLaughlin does state that Richmond acknowledged the need for social reform, but believed it would happen as a result of improving life for individual people. It is perhaps because of this statement that McLaughlin offers a slight qualification to her own statement that Richmond and Addams were “fundamentally opposed,” by also asserting that they were “in many ways at odds” (p. 189). To be sure, McLaughlin's own conclusion for social work is conciliatory between the two positions, but her representation of early social work is also as a profession divided.

A fourth article, by Donna Franklin (1986), addresses the Richmond v. Addams divide directly, and includes John Dewey's pragmatism. Calling them the “two most influential women in the history of the profession,” Franklin recognizes Addams as the chief architect of the

settlement house movement, and Richmond as the matriarch of the Charity Organization Society (COS) philosophy. She then links each movement to a philosophical trajectory: settlements with Deweyan pragmatism (see later section in this paper), and COSs with Spencerian liberalism (i.e. social Darwinism plus laissez-faire economics). As such, and consistent with the previously mentioned authors, Franklin ascribes personal rehabilitation of the poor and the development of personal character and responsibility, to Richmond and COSs. Likewise, she ascribes environmentally-defined problems and broad social melioration to Addams and the settlement houses. Addams is also linked to Dewey's pragmatist philosophy because of the experimental nature of her methods: perform an action, observe effects, modify and proceed. As with Germain and Hartman's article, Franklin notes the 1897 conference of the National Council on Charities and Corrections (NCCC) meeting where Addams putatively belittles Richmond. Richmond quotes the conference proceedings where Addams states

“[the visitors] are bound to tell a man he must be thrifty in order to keep his family... You must tell him that he is righteous and a good citizen when he is self supporting, that he is unrighteous and not a good citizen when he receives aid ... settlements see that a man may perhaps be a bit lazy and be a good man and an interesting person .. it does not lay so much stress on one set of virtues, but views the man in his social aspects (Franklin, 1986, p. 510).

After Addams' address, Franklin notes that Richmond then countered with a statement that settlement houses are “like old-fashioned missions, doing harm by their cheap, sprinkling sort of charity” (Franklin, 1986, p. 510). The debate then escalated when Richmond further stated that “[the settlement] can pretend to be scientific when it is nothing of the kind” (p. 510). Franklin's assessment of Richmond, based on her comment, is that she either does not understand science,

or that she devalues science that falls beyond the purview of biology. This, it is suggested, is likely due to her medical perspective and Spencerian understanding of Darwinism.

Franklin also corroborates Germain and Hartman's suggestion that a significant source of the rivalry between Richmond and Addams is due to their different social upbringings.

Richmond, an orphan, was raised by her grandmother and aunt, who were quite poor, whereas Addams enjoyed a family with wealth and influence, as her father was an Illinois state senator. Addams was able to travel throughout Europe and Russia, and even had the opportunity to get to know Tolstoy. Richmond graduated high school, but then had to work her way up in the COS, starting as a clerk, she later had her abilities recognized which led to promotion to the highest position, that of general secretary. Both women can be considered "misfits" of their time since they did not take on the roles of mother and wife, but instead sought leadership careers as single, independent women (Franklin, 1986, p. 511). These different courses of development, Franklin suggests, are what led to Addams' and Richmond's ideological differences, which in turn led to the differences in their philosophies of social work and social policy: Addams advocated for the admixture of social work (settlements) with academia for research purposes, while Richmond rejected any suggestion of the kind (though she did strongly support formal university education for social workers); Addams favored social policies such as the six-day work week, the eight-hour work day, the abolition of tenement manufacture, improved housing conditions and employment for women, while Richmond did not; Addams, a pacifist, opposed the entry of the US into World War I, while Richmond favored the war, hoping social casework would come to play a significant role alongside psychiatry in treating soldiers and families in need; Addams rejected the professionalization of social work, while Richmond clearly favored it and worked

tirelessly to see social casework become its own new profession that could address the problems of a newly industrialized world.

To sum up, Franklin concludes on a positive note with hope that social work in the future can collectively address social issues in an effective way. Her primary thesis, however, is to note these different camps in contemporary social work, adding insight by way of investigating their social and philosophical underpinnings.

One additional article also emphasizes the differences between Richmond and Addams. Brieland (1990) makes a modest case for the idea that the settlement tradition, with its emphasis on being neighbors as well as professionals and offering education for fulfillment as well as just treating pathology, has much to offer contemporary social work. He distinguishes Richmond and the COSs as “welfare gatekeepers” whose job it is to distinguish the deserving vs. the undeserving poor (Brieland, 1990, p. 135). “The visitor’s charge was to reject the sturdy beggar who was too lazy to work, as well as the drunk, the womanizer, and the prostitute” (p. 135). This amounts to a moral means test whereby a well-off visitor condescends to the poor via the charitable organization. Addams and the settlement tradition are favorably cast as offering direct service, urban education and recreation, and social reform, all without any moral means test or judgmentalism. Brieland states that the Hull-House tradition was comprised of “settling, beauty, and personal acquaintance,” whereas the typical social service agency today is “hardly homelike” (p. 135). The latter poor service conditions are attributed to the legacy of COSs and Richmond. Brieland’s criticism is subtle but clear, and highlights the distinctions between Addams and Richmond while pointing the reader to the former as exemplar of the future of social work.

Finally, two further articles are worth mentioning for their brief discussion of Addams' and Richmond's mutual recognition (Lundblad, 1995; Haynes & White, 1999). Both articles make the usual distinctions between Richmond and Addams, the COSs and the settlements. However, they both add further details about Richmond and Addams that begin to show a less simplified and caricatured version of each.

Lundblad, in her article on Jane Addams and social reform, after stating the aforementioned differences between Addams and Richmond, goes on to discuss Addams' speech in 1910 when she was elected president of the NCCC. In this speech Addams spoke about both the COSs and the settlements, and recognized their differences, but she also recognized the need for both: "that these two movements could share a broader perspective" (Lundblad, 1995, p. 667). Lundblad also briefly states that Richmond believed the division between social reform and social casework to be false. "In Richmond's thinking individual treatment would always be needed, but social reform was also legitimate and necessary" (p. 667). She concludes with a bland recommendation that social work should recognize both perspectives in order to affect change.

The article by Haynes and White (1999) is perhaps the most conciliatory of those discovered in the social work literature on this topic. It is also explicitly geared toward professional unity (i.e. the thesis of the article is that social workers should find common ground and unite). As such, it makes sense that the authors would seek to present material from Richmond and/or Addams that moves beyond their usual dichotomization. They do, like the others, recognize the differences between Richmond and Addams. Their version of it emphasizes Richmond and the COSs as being grounded in altruism and charity, and Addams and the settlements as being grounded in social justice. They quickly move on to state, however, that

“[t]hese ideological concepts have been set artificially at odds from the beginning of the profession ... a continued focus on one set of principles over the other will continue to divide the profession” (Haynes & White, 1999, p. 385). Their vision for social work is instead of a profession that is comprised of the *merger* of the COS and Settlement House movements: they believe that COS’s voluntary method (i.e. not governmental) that emphasizes philanthropy and personal responsibility is valuable, and so is the Settlement movement’s emphasis on social responsibility and societal reform. The authors’ thesis is that “[t]he ‘real’ social work is all of social work, in all of its diversity. It was the coming together of opposing principles and visions from which social work as a profession was born” (Haynes & White, 1999, p. 387).

To establish this conciliatory historical origin they quote Jane Addams from 1910 (NCCC proceedings) when she stated that social work meant the coming together of the “charitable” and the “radical” (p. 387). They also quote Richmond from an 1899 speech in which she declared that the problems of poverty must be approached from both sides—that the charity worker and the settlement worker need each other. The authors conclude that professional unity would be served well if individuals identified themselves first as social workers, only identifying their particular area of expertise afterward. Their hope is that social workers in the 21st century will not continue bickering about which one is the “real” social work, but instead that professionals will unite, recognize the value of each others’ contributions, and take concerted action to serve those most in need.

Rethinking the Divide: Unity, Complementarity and interdependence According to Addams and Richmond

There is an apparent disparity in the literature on Jane Addams and Mary Richmond: while all authors surveyed recognize the ideological and methodological differences between

them, only two make significant reference to any sympathetic language from either side. Have these two authors taken a brief, insignificant reference and exaggerated its impact to serve their intentions regarding professional unification in social work? Or maybe the majority of the authors on this topic have simply overlooked the extant similarities and mutual recognition in these two mothers of social work. Perhaps this topic itself serves as a sort of Rorschach test, indicating not much more than the author's present ideological positioning. The aim of this section is to provide sufficient information to address this issue. My point here, based on a more comprehensive reading of what Richmond and Addams actually said and wrote, is that they did recognize their mutual need. To be sure, they do have different perspectives on how to address issues in social welfare—I do not dispute this point. However, each respectfully recognizes the need for the other perspective. Therefore, I stand with Haynes and White (1999) and support professional unity based on the idea that it was clearly present in social work from the outset. Their brief article did not apparently permit space for a more detailed exploration of the peacable speeches and writings of Addams and Richmond. I will provide an account of this in what follows.

In order to establish the ideological compatibility and amiability between Richmond and Addams, I'll begin with several relevant statements by Addams, followed by similar statements by Richmond. In her speech entitled "Social Settlements" (1897), delivered to the National Conference on Charities and Corrections (NCCC, later the National Council on Social Work), Jane Addams began on a rueful, yet defiant note with her opening statement

I feel a little apologetic at being here at all. The settlements are accused of doing their charity work very badly. They pretend not to do it at all; and then they become overwhelmed with the poor, and the needy, and they do it, not as trained people should

do it, but as neighbors do it for one another, which is not scientifically. In spite of that, however, settlements are, I believe, valuable to charities. (Addams, 1897)

This opening points already to the competition between charities (COSs) and settlement houses such as Hull House, and their different ideologies and methods. That this state of difference existed is a point I have already conceded. What is interesting here is that even in her indication of the division between charities and settlements, Addams already reveals her belief that both are necessary by stating that settlements are valuable to charities. She then proceeds to deepen the rift by citing an example of a “famous” COS representative who, upon encountering an impoverished man, wished to get him on his feet, have him join a friendly society and a trades union, and hopefully never see him again, as there would be no further need. Addams was critical of this orientation to the poor because she hoped to build enduring community between the classes. As her speech proceeds, Addams discusses further differences between her own perspective and that of the charity movement.

It does not take long, however, for Addams to show her respect for charity workers. After stating her thesis that what is most important is that the recipients of charity are understood from their own point of view (a message for both charity and settlement workers), she states

I do not wish to underestimate the friendly visitor. I often say that the people who constantly visit the poor often know more about them than the people who should be content to live in settlements and should not visit them. It is nonsense to say that one cannot know the poor who does not live with them. You know the poor if you take pains to know them (Addams, 1897, p. 344).

This point would seem to clear up any question as to whether Addams believed that COS visitors—generally upper class women (as were the settlers)—were capable of truly understanding the contexts and problems facing oppressed and impoverished people. She does not go so far as to offer methodological agreement regarding the actions to be taken on behalf of, or with, the poor, but she does not denigrate the ability of COS workers to know the poor on their own terms, which is prerequisite to any helpful intervention, whatever that may be.

Having conceded that charity workers can know the poor just as well as settlement workers, Addams goes on to say that “...after the settlements have given this attention [to the poor], they would indeed be very stupid to minimize the people who are engaged in charitable and correctional work. *We need them at every possible point*” [my ital.] (Addams, 1897, p. 345). This surprising statement is followed by several examples. For instance, Addams suggests that she would prefer that another group (presumably a COS) provide nursery and probation services so that her own resources could be used otherwise. Hull House apparently did provide those and other related services “...not because we want to do that, but because we have no children’s court and no probation officer. We have no feeling with regard to the charities but one of hearty good fellowship” (p. 345). She follows this up with a genuine invitation for “real fellowship” between the COSs and the settlements such that they might work together, albeit with different emphases, to improve the lives of the very poorest people.

A second, and powerful, example of Addams’ understanding of, and call for, a unified social work, comes from her presidential address to the NCCC in 1910 (Addams, 1910).

In an attempt to review the recent trend in the development of charity, that which has appeared most strikingly to your president is a gradual coming together of two groups of

people, who have too often been given to a suspicion of each other and sometimes to actual vituperation. One group who have been traditionally moved to action by “pity for the poor” we call the Charitable; the other, larger or smaller in each generation, but always fired by a “hatred of injustice,” we designate the radicals.

These two groups, as a result of a growing awareness of distress and of a slowly deepening perception of its causes, are at last uniting in an effective demand for juster social conditions. The charitable have been brought to this combination through the conviction that the poverty and crime with which they deal are often the result of untoward industrial conditions, while the radicals have slowly been forced to the conclusion that if they would make an effective appeal to public opinion they must appeal to carefully collected data as to the conditions of the poor and criminal. It is as if the charitable had been brought, through the care of an individual, to a contemplation of social causes, and as if the radical had been forced to test his social doctrine by a sympathetic observation of actual people (Addams, 1910, p. 1).

Addams continues by commending the charities for becoming, over time, less dogmatic, more democratic and more flexible. This is a rather clear and bold statement of Addams’ peaceable stance toward the COSs and the charity workers. To be sure, she does not mention Mary Richmond specifically in this speech, but the connection between Richmond and the charity movement is well documented (e.g. see previous section). Addams’ statement is also addressed to the NCCC, which meant that it was to be heard by all sides in the developing field of social work. Her vision for social work is practically a ‘yin-yang,’ where the ideology of one group must be integral to the other: the charity ideology, in its individualistic focus, cannot help but develop an understanding that social and industrial conditions play a significant role in shaping

the plight of each woman, child or family. On the other hand, the settlement philosophy, aimed at ameliorating unjust social and industrial conditions, cannot elide individuals or individual families and their particular circumstances when advocating policy decisions for entire populations. Addams apparently envisions a future for social work that includes social work interventions at both the individual and broader societal levels. This would necessarily involve social workers in various systems such as child welfare and criminal justice, but also would require workers in positions of administration, social organizing and legislative advocacy.

Another conceptualization of this unified view of social work is that the charity organizations and the settlements share a common vision. Addams states this explicitly in her 1920 speech to the NCCC (Addams, 1920): reflecting on her recent visitation to social work sites in Europe, Addams states

It seems to me that there is for us from over there a direct message in regard to the spirit of social service. . . . what is the spirit of social work? It was founded upon genuine human pity, upon the desire to relieve suffering, to give food to the hungry and shelter to the homeless; unless we can get back to that, underlying as it does, all the subdivisions and subtleties into which we have developed our activities, and take hold of this great world-situation, we will fail in an essential obligation, in a sense we will be traitors to our original purpose (Addams, 1920, p. 41-42).

Her speech proceeds to tell of wretched conditions that children find themselves in in various European cities, her point with this quote being that social work must wholeheartedly take action, as a diverse profession with many “subdivisions and subtleties,” otherwise we are not “worth our salt” (p. 42). The “spirit” of social work then is one that does not forget its original

mission: its calling to relieve suffering, feed the hungry, shelter the homeless. And this spirit is for an inclusive, unified understanding that social work has strength in its internal diversity. If each subdivision of social work will remember its mission and take action, then real social transformation may be possible.

These excerpts should suffice to introduce a more holistic view of Jane Addams. Though her specific social work tasks differ (and overlap) from those of the COSs, she clearly promotes only a unified vision for social work. But what about Mary Richmond? What sort of vision did she have for social work as an emerging profession?

Richmond's perspective also can be discerned from her speech, following Addams', entitled "The Art of Beginning in Social Work," at the 1911 NCCC meeting (Richmond, 1911). She starts by saying

There is an art of beginning, whether we are considering our first steps in trying to find out what to do for an orphaned and destitute little child, or our method of procedure in the larger but related undertaking of trying to reduce the number of destitute orphans in the United States. Both of these social tasks demand a social investigation, though the investigation that is peculiarly my theme is that one which proceeds from some form of social treatment not for a large group but for an individual (Richmond, 1911, p. 373).

Richmond shows ownership of her own individual-centered role and function within social work, but does so without any hint of displeasure at the fact that others will do related but different tasks. In her speech she defines her own purview as "clinical," or focused on the person, contrasting with an alternative focus on the problem. Referring to the distinctions between different aspects of social work, Richmond says

But the methods of the workshop [settlement] and the bedside [COS] are always shading into one another, and the pendulum is always swinging now toward one, now toward the other; in social work it seems to be swinging almost violently of late. I make no attempt to settle the question of which one of these two methods of social service has contributed or will contribute more to human welfare. I do not know and probably no one knows. Probably both supply indispensable data of co-ordinate importance ... few forms of social betterment have always and under all circumstances been able to utilize only one of these two methods. (Richmond, 1911, p. 373).

The speech continues with Richmond elaborating on the similarities and differences between what she terms the “personal” and “wholesale” methods of social work. The latter setting policies for groups based on a broad understanding of the needs of groups, and the former attending to the need for individual tailoring of various policies and procedures. Similar to Addams’ understanding of the “spirit” of social work, Richmond is not interested in quibbling over which social work is the one authentic or true social work, but instead desires for needs to be addressed and problems solved using a plurality of investigations and interventions at different levels.

Further evidence of Richmond’s favorable opinion of Addams and the settlements can be found in her well-known book *Social Diagnosis* (Richmond, 1917). The book starts out by offering formal social case work as an alternative, not to settlements, but to merely “doing good” without any sense of standards or accountability (p. 25). The newly emerging profession of “social service” or “social work” is only worthwhile to the extent that “society is really served” (p. 25). To this end, social workers engage largely in case work for the betterment of individuals and families. Other social workers are distinguished by their focus on the betterment of

individuals and families “in the mass” (p. 25). “Mass betterment and individual betterment are interdependent, however, social reform and social case work of necessity progressing together. This fundamental truth will appear repeatedly as the present discussion of social diagnosis advances” (p. 25). Richmond’s conception of social work as necessarily being comprised of both individual and mass intervention is a rather strong statement of reconciliation. The fact that she calls it a “fundamental truth” should leave no doubt about her positive opinion regarding her putative opponents (i.e. Addams). It would seem that a bolder statement on the matter would be difficult to make. Of course, high regard for one’s comrades in any endeavor does not eliminate healthy competition in the development and implementation of various approaches.

Richmond revisits the topic of internal diversity in social work in chapter nineteen of *Social Diagnosis*, entitled “The Underlying Philosophy” (Richmond, 1917) She reiterates her central philosophy of social work, that “...social reform and social case work must of necessity progress together” (p. 365) Richmond’s, like Addams’, is a yin-yan-like orientation: she describes social work as an undertaking that requires social reforms and social diagnosis and treatment.

When, for example, the restriction of child labor was made possible, several new kinds of case work became necessary, one of them involving greater skill in sifting the various evidences of age, one involving the development of other family plans to take the place of children’s earnings, etc.” (P. 365)

Richmond demonstrates the interrelationship of social case work and social reform with this example: new policy, in this case child welfare, results in the need for new forms of case work in order to implement and evaluate the policy change. Alternatively, information from case work

with individuals may provide essential information for social reformers, who may then advocate for relevant legislation. This relationship involves the need for policies to be modified and adapted to accommodate individuals. "...resemblances have made mass betterment possible, while individuality has made adaptation a necessity" (p. 367).

If successful, this section has provided a more robust understanding of Richmond and Addams and their views on social work. These examples are a far cry from many of the claims in the literature that posit only hostility and vitriol between these two early leaders in the field. Statements such that Richmond and Addams "abhorred" or "deplored" each other's work and perspectives (Germain and Hartman, 1980), or that they are "fundamentally opposed" (McLaughlin, 2002), exaggerate the differences between them and fail to recognize the neighborly attitudes of each, and their mutual recognition, as presented in this section.

Chapter 10: Implications and Next Steps

If Social work does have a sound, historically traceable identity, rooted firmly in philosophical pragmatism, and therefore understandably dual focused, always 'in process,' and aimed at serving the ends of social justice and human rights, then this will have certain implications for how we understand, teach, research and practice social work today. Understanding the social work field through study of our own history and philosophy provides a robust sense of grounding and stability. It seems almost too obvious that having a solid identity implies understanding one's history. Sometimes it almost seems as if social work, by de-emphasizing its own history and philosophy (e.g. by canceling courses on the topic), has developed a sort of academic 'anterograde amnesia,' as we constantly 'wake up' to thinking we need to discover (again) who we are and what social work is supposed to be about. The present

historical perspective does call for social work to remain in conversation about its identity, but it also provides a grounded perspective on what social work is and has been, which is essential for wise navigation of the profession now and for the future. One positive feature is the understanding that the current NASW definition is quite consistent with this historical understanding. But, as stated, a definition alone cannot provide a stable sense of identity the way actually understanding one's history can. Social work has great historical traditions that provide a sense of identity, meaning and purpose for the field as a whole and for individual practitioners. A historical perspective offers this more robust, stable sense of identity by connecting current knowledge and practices to the enduring intellectual traditions and action orientation of social work. Hopefully a broader, historical perspective can provide for a more cooperative, shared vision for social work in the present and for the future, based on a richer understanding of who we have been in the past. Several implications of this perspective will be discussed in the following sections.

For Practice and the Social Work Identity

Recent historical perspectives. One next step, for practice in particular, would be to analyze more contemporary theorists (i.e. after the time of those who were analyzed for this dissertation) to determine whether there was in fact a growing divide in the field that may have started (either literally or representatively) with the Madison Conference. The tone of these authors is different from the previous scholars—frankly, they seem indulgently self-pitying, lamenting social work itself as a vague and aimless pseudo-profession that is in desperate need of re-definition. The attitude of these papers toward social work, despite the rather unusual and divergent suggestions for next steps, is one of malaise. Given that social work was largely pragmatist in orientation from Jane Addams until Madison, did the Reid paper (or others)

represent a new positivist split in the field? And either way, given the more recent literature (reviewed in the introduction) that describes the clinical vs. social reform debate as a divisive and crisis-like identity problem, is this linked to a positivistic strand in the field? If so, it would seem that social work does not have an identity crisis (since it has always been dual focused and pragmatist), so much as it has a certain sub-group within the profession with a philosophical disagreement about what social work is and should be. It should be noted here, of course, that pragmatism itself is quite scientifically oriented, though not “scientific,” as Dewey would label a more dogmatic and rigid approach to the use of science. The difference seems to be that a pragmatist perspective values science as a significant facet of knowledge generation without losing sight of the importance of values, practitioner and administrator experience, and wisdom from the humanities and theological/spiritual traditions. Perhaps there is even a sense of illegitimacy in some of the positivistic/scientistic strand who cannot accept the often unquantifiable aspects of social work practice. Retaining a pragmatist perspective should aid in relieving any anxieties associated with ‘physics envy,’ and permit social work to continue to develop scientific research while remaining within its historical integrative tradition.

Pragmatism. The present analysis of social work has found that social work is a highly pragmatist endeavor in many ways. However, the analysis of pragmatism and social work in this dissertation should be considered a starting point. Given the other tasks to be completed, the analysis of pragmatism and social work, was relatively brief. A more detailed examination of social work philosophies past and present may reveal further insights into social work’s self-definition as a pragmatist discipline and profession. Further analysis may also lead to important insights into ways in which present social work practice may develop more fully in addressing both the individual and societal aspects in novel and creative ways. Further analysis may permit

current scholars and practitioners to trace the roots of contemporary mid-level theories (e.g. the strengths perspective, empowerment theory) to their sources in thinkers such as Reynolds, Taft, Richmond or Towle. Doing so offers the possibility of deeper understanding, but also the possibility of discovering, via historical ‘mining,’ ideas that may have been forgotten or neglected but which also could be of great use to inform current theory and practice. For example, in discussions about practice ethics, pragmatism may offer reasonable and balanced perspective regarding the debate between situational ethics and rule/principle-based approaches. A more detailed examination may also reveal non-pragmatist trends in social work history that may help explain more recent divisiveness and anxiety about certain key aspects of social work such as the clinical vs. reform debate or the selection of research paradigms.

Race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation. It should be noted that there is little (if any) mention of race, ethnicity or sexual orientation in the theorists and conferences analyzed. Todd, for instance, discusses the value of equality, alongside many social justice and human rights-based freedoms that should be enjoyed by all people, such as the opportunity for leisure time and recreation, adequate food and shelter, and health. Yet he does not directly address these issues as problems in the United States at the time (c. 1911). He states that women should have equality in all social realms, but does not mention race, ethnicity or sexual orientation. Pragmatism itself has been criticized for not adequately addressing these issues. Social work in its early years (e.g. case work; settlement houses) has been similarly criticized for failing to address issues and problems relating to white supremacy. Eddie Glaude, for instance, states that “[p]ragmatism is as native to American soil as sagebrush and buffalo grass. So is white supremacy. But classical pragmatists like Charles S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey rarely took up the question of white supremacy...” (2007, p. 1). So while pragmatism (which Glaude has selected as the theory to use

to rethink the problems of racism) contains the hope and ideals of democracy, it also carries with it the limitations—America’s often undemocratic *practices*. To be fair, Glaude does acknowledge Dewey’s participation in the formation of the NAACP and an essay Dewey wrote on racial prejudice. However, given Dewey’s long life and thousands of pages of scholarly writings, this does not amount to much.

Next steps in this regard include the need for further historical and philosophical analysis of white supremacy and heterosexism in social work. The lack of serious attention to these extremely important and highly complex issues raises difficult questions about early social work. However, this is yet another area where the ongoing conversation about the definition of social work—with particular concern for social justice and human rights—may offer some hope because social work is not rigidly committed to past failings. Instead there is an opportunity to rethink these issues, expand and revise social work’s purview and foci for research, pedagogy, policy and practice. Research of this sort should include not only historical and philosophical writings of African American, gay, lesbian, transgendered, bisexual (and further non-white, non-heterosexual people), but also models and interventions developed by individuals and groups who belong to diverse communities.

Interdisciplinary scholarship: capability theory and social work. We have seen in the findings of this dissertation that social work is pragmatist. Another ‘strand’ of pragmatist thought, following Dewey (et al.), is the social justice tradition which includes John Rawls, who in the 1970’s wrote the famous book *A Theory of Justice*. More recently arriving on this philosophical scene, and also pragmatist, is the ‘capability theory’ of social justice (also called the ‘capabilities theory’). Martha Nussbaum is an American philosopher who, along with Amartya Sen (an Indian economist), developed this line of thinking (Nussbaum, 2000). The basic

idea of capability theory is that there should be an identifiable set of standards by which we determine whether social justice is actually taking place in a given group or society. Her own extensive research in India, for example, concluded that though India has one of the most progressive constitutions in the world (e.g. regarding women's rights), it did not serve as a valid measure or standard by which social justice could be assessed because women, despite what was written on paper, did not have the actual ability to "do and to be" what they choose. Other contrasting measures of social justice include gross domestic product (GDP) and average income—but these too are insufficient since it is possible to have a high GDP and/or average income, yet still have individuals and groups within a given society who are not able to grow, develop and have freedoms associated with social justice.

Nussbaum's solution—her version of the capabilities theory—is to offer a ten-item list that sets the standard for social justice (2000). I won't repeat it in its entirety, but the list includes such things as adequate nutrition and housing, freedom to pursue work, sexual freedom and freedom from harm and violence, the opportunities for education, recreation, leisure time and travel, and the ability to express oneself creatively in a variety of ways. The point I wish to make here is that her list (and general conception of social justice), though longer and more developed, is consistent with, and overlaps with, the social justice ideas of several of the social work scholars analyzed here—only the social workers wrote approximately 90 years before the capabilities theory came out as a 'new' idea on the philosophical and economic scene. So what was apparently a new idea in philosophy has been a common idea to the philosophy of social work for nearly a century. Todd, Devine, Addams and Lindeman in particular all wrote about standards of social justice. They also pointed out various specifics, such as adequate housing, nutrition, access to health care, education, jobs and even recreation.

My main suggestion here is that steps should be taken to make more linkages between pragmatism, philosophy in general, and social work scholarship. There are gaps that need to be filled both historically and philosophically in order to trace these ideas and better understand the relationships. Is it the case that social work scholarship was not being read by philosophers? Is it being ignored by modern social work scholars as well? Capability theory is now being integrated (re-integrated?) as a social justice theory for social work practice (Saleeby, 2007). It seems strange and unnecessary for present-day social work scholars to borrow ideas from recent philosophers when the same ideas were present in social work scholarship approximately 100 years ago. The recent philosophical work by Nussbaum and Sen is very good, but I wonder what kind of perspective might be gained by looking at what social workers were doing with the ideas in the past as well. Perhaps social work would need to do less borrowing in general if it were to utilize its own historical scholarship more fully (or at all). Based on what I've seen in this historical research, it seems that social work scholarship has something significant to contribute to the academic community, not only for its own present research and practice, but to offer other fields of study such as philosophy.

The client-practitioner relationship. Pragmatist social work at the individual level is consistent with the relationship focus of Towle, Taft and Reynolds, and is supported by recent empirical evidence (e.g. Duncan, Miller & Sparks, 2000). The later thinkers in this investigation (Towle, Taft and Reynolds) focused their efforts on generic social casework with the emphasis on the relationship between the client and the worker. This raises interesting research questions about the nature of this relationship. Perhaps social work research should focus more of its research efforts in this direction. For example, Jesse Taft stated that social casework should focus on a certain range of social problems within the purview of the agency, and that the worker-

client relationship provides a special setting for the client to explore issues and move toward change. One particular feature of the worker-client relationship that can be helpful (according to Taft) is when the client is able to feel safe (i.e. not judged) in the relationship and is therefore enabled to discover hidden motivations, solutions to problems, or previously unknown resources. Theoretical statements such as this may be formed into researchable questions for social work scholarship. For example, one may inquire as to what exactly are the practitioner attributes, behaviors, or methods that facilitate a “safe” or “non-judgmental” perception in the client? In addition, since social work is always concerned with the individual *and* the environment, scholarship such as this could also query into the ways that individual growth and development may influence subsequent behavior that leads to social change. For instance, to use Taft again, she asserted that when a client experiences a non-judgmental stance from the caseworker, then this same non-judgmental stance may offered by the client to another person or group. Similarly, social work research may inquire more intentionally into the nature of the relationship between a client’s participation in environment-altering activities (e.g. group work) and outcomes related to individual level symptoms, goals or maturation (as Lindeman suggested).

There are, of course, many researchers who are investigating client-practitioner relationships. Of particular significance is the connection between the relationship focus of the social work theorists (as opposed to practitioner-focused interventions that emphasize a treatment of some kind that a practitioner *does* to the client) and recent research by Duncan, Miller & Sparks (2000). Their research on psychotherapy shows that what is significant to producing positive outcomes is not so much the ‘therapy’ or theoretical orientation used by the practitioner, but the nature of the relationship between practitioner and client, and the client’s context. Only approximately 15% of the variance in outcomes is attributable to the

orientation/techniques of the practitioner (e.g. psychodynamic, humanistic, cognitive-behavioral, etc.), while the successful establishment of a therapeutic relationship accounted for approximately 30%. So it would seem that there is good empirical evidence in support of the broad, pragmatist social work perspective which focuses on the relationship with clients, whether practicing psychotherapy (which is mostly conducted by social workers in the US), case management or some other form of service. Not only this, but the social work perspective always considers the social context, or environment, of the client. Social work interventions are designed to facilitate change not just for clients as individuals, but also in consideration of their families, schools, neighborhoods, workplaces, housing situations and other relevant factors. And as Duncan, Miller & Sparks show, the environment has considerable influence on therapeutic outcomes as well (another ~40%). What this means is that case management and counseling/psychotherapy offered by social workers has strong scientific validation, and this validation has to do with the understanding of social work from this broad historical and pragmatist perspective. Duncan, Miller and Sparks' "client directed, outcome-informed" perspective suggests that social work should continue to be what it has always been.

The evidence-based practice debate. Understanding social work as pragmatist has implications for the evidence-based practice debate. A detailed discussion of this complex issue is beyond the scope of this paper, but suffice it to say that there is an array of perspectives about just what evidence-based practice is supposed to mean. These tend to range from the very narrowly conceived, positivistic side (e.g. Gambrill, 2003), to the more broad and constructivist side (e.g. Petr, 2009). A pragmatist social work perspective is most consistent with, and supportive of, the broader understanding of evidence-based practices (EBPs) such as that offered by Chris Petr (2009). Petr's perspective, called "multidimensional evidence-based practice"

(MEBP) states that evidence for EBPs should be gleaned from multiple “dimensions” in order to best inform social work practice. This contrasts with Gambrill’s perspective, which states that the ‘evidence’ generated for practice should come primarily, if not solely, from quantitative scientific research. Petr’s perspective states that best practices inquiries are improved when knowledge from multiple sources is integrated. The sources of information should be broadened to include not only quantitative and qualitative scientific research, but also the experiences and preferences of consumers, the wisdom of practitioners in a given area of social work practice, and the values inherent to the interventions themselves. Petr’s understanding of EBPs reflects the pragmatist understanding of knowledge: it should be generated from multiple sources; it is inherently value-laden; and it should consider social justice and humanistic concerns as it is always connected with practice, or actions of some sort. The understanding of social work as pragmatist can be used to make a strong case for EBPs in social work to utilize something more like Petr’s method. A historical social work perspective is only supportive of a broad approach such as this, which is also consistent with the current Council on Social Work Education policy 2.1.3. on critical thinking which states that social workers must be able to “distinguish, appraise, and integrate multiple sources of knowledge, including research-based knowledge, and practice wisdom” (CSWE, 2012).

For Research

Pragmatist social work suggests a reasonable and balanced approach to selecting methods for research. In the ‘paradigm wars’ over research ideologies, this historical and pragmatist perspective suggests that any fixed and dogmatic approach to research in social work would run counter to the nature of social work itself. All nine scholars considered in this dissertation call for a broad understanding of knowledge for social work practice. Pragmatism itself, as an

overarching philosophical perspective, fits nicely between positivism on the one hand, and constructivism (especially the more relativistic understandings) on the other. Pragmatism holds the best elements of both: it promotes the use of scientific methods, but does not become overly obsessed or dogmatic about specific methods, nor does it retain pretences about the results of the research—namely, that they produce timeless, absolute, universal truths. The instrumentalist perspective understands that scientific research must be an ongoing, fallibilistic endeavor, which, when used properly, produces results that are *useful* for making the world a more just and democratic place so that all people can flourish. And while pragmatism is pro-science, it is also favorable to many other forms of research and scholarship. As Dewey states, the poet or the actor may know human nature as well as the psychologist; the farmer knows crops and soils as well as the botanist. This does not mean, of course, that all knowledge, or all ways and means of knowing, are equally valid at all times and for all purposes. It simply means that we should recognize that ‘knowing’ a thing well requires us to understand it from many different perspectives. If we only use science, or only poetry, or only philosophical analysis, we will surely miss much that may be understood otherwise. So pragmatism, at the heart of social work, offers a broad and balanced perspective on knowledge that should help us avoid divisive ‘wars’ over research methods and ideologies. I’m hopeful that if social work would turn to its roots and history in order to gain more perspective on what it has been, then perhaps these often bitter and ugly disputes could turn into more productive, democratic discussions. Even with a pragmatist perspective there is still much to consider, and even debate over, such as which methods are the most suitable for a particular area of investigation, but these conversations would hopefully take on a different tone if everyone understood that social work knowledge has, since the beginning, included diverse forms.

Pragmatist social work research should therefore be conducted using a wide variety of research paradigms including (but not limited to) quantitative, qualitative, historical, conceptual/philosophical. The breadth of research itself adds strength because it brings forth a variety of information, insight and perspectives that can be used to address various social issues. Avoiding becoming overly focused on just scientific methods also helps to keep social work scholarship in conversation with its own history, the history and development of other disciplines such as psychology, and generally helps build bridges between disciplines. Interdisciplinary scholarship and practice has been a central feature of social work from the start (e.g. connections between social work and Freudian thought, Christian theology, or progressive politics). Though social work now generates more of its own scientific research, the continuing conversation between disciplines will hopefully continue to provide a rich source of research, practice theory and interventions at multiple levels.

Another significant implication of interdisciplinary and broad research is the consideration of the perspectives of various populations of interest to social work. All people who decide to participate in scientific (or other) research should be regarded as full human beings and not just ‘research subjects’ for Western science (Smith, 1999). Too much quantitative science in particular may lead to the exclusion of the voices and world views of non-science-based, Western, technological societies. Qualitative research (e.g. participatory action research) in particular can be designed to be intentionally inclusive of the perspectives of exploited, oppressed or otherwise vulnerable groups.

Pragmatist social work is also suggestive of mixed methods research (Cresswell, 2003). This is due (again) to the fact that pragmatism is not committed to any one systematic approach to philosophy or reality—researchers are free to choose the methods, techniques and procedures

that best meet their needs. Mixed methods research also permits the incorporation of information from multiple sources such as history, philosophy, and, as stated above, diverse people and cultures themselves. Mixed methods permits the researcher to do ‘science’ in a way that is reflexive of social justice and sociopolitical contexts.

For Teaching

Increasing students’ knowledge and understanding of the history and philosophy of social work can lead to a number of benefits for them as developing professionals, as well as for their clients and client systems, and for the profession as a whole. Benefits to understanding one’s history and philosophy include finding a solid foundation upon which to build a professional *social work* identity; providing the historical context often needed to make innovations in theory and practice, and to take next steps to lead the profession into the future; understanding the history of ideas helps prevent people from becoming polarized around key issues (such as the clinical vs. social reform debate) and helps them avoid fads.

Teaching the history and philosophy of social work is required by the Council on Social Work Education (CSWE, 2012) according to Educational Policy 2.1.1, which states that social workers should develop a professional identity rooted in the history of social work. The policy states that social workers should “identify as a professional social worker and conduct oneself accordingly.” Presumably, this implies (at least to the CSWE) that one must know one’s history in order to develop a sufficiently robust identity. The policy continues by stating that “social workers serve as representatives of the profession, its mission, and its core values. *They know the profession’s history* (my ital.)” (NASW, 2012). Earlier I stated that there is a great difference between understanding one’s history and simply memorizing a few lines from the NASW code

of ethics (preamble) which summarize the definition of social work. It would seem that the CSWE is in agreement with this line of thinking. Though the NASW definition is rooted in history, it cannot, in a few lines, offer students a history—it can only point to it. This raises questions about what a sufficient curriculum must be to achieve competency such that the above statement that “they know the profession’s history” is true. Does this mean we can insert historical tidbits into curriculum that is otherwise not focused on social work history? Do faculty in social work schools themselves possess sufficient knowledge of social work history? Should formal coursework at the undergraduate and graduate level be offered in the history and philosophy of social work? If we take this educational policy seriously and straightforwardly it would seem that at least some coursework at both the undergraduate and graduate levels should be solely dedicated to social work history.

Understanding social work history can lead practitioners to take ‘next steps’ in the profession, as has been done historically. One development in social work over time is the idea of the relationship as the focus of individual practice. In a sense, relationships were always the focus (e.g. in Richmond and Addams), but over time new ideas were brought to the ongoing conversation. Taft’s contribution to the field of social casework is one example. She took the existing understanding of casework, developed by Richmond initially, and moved it forward with her Functionalist perspective (i.e. including Rankian psychology and agency focus).

Generalizing the point—if social work is going to continue to be relevant and to grow and develop alongside not only the society it serves, but also the overlapping disciplines such as psychology (from which ideas from Freud and Rank were borrowed), then present day social workers, and social work scholars in particular, must know their history. In other words, one cannot take a ‘next step’ if one does not know where they are standing presently. Or if a next

step is taken, it may not be in line with the historical trajectory of the values and methods of social work, which are key aspects of ‘critical thinking’ for social workers (CSWE educational policy 2.1.3). Historical ignorance may also lead to redundancies, such as quarreling over issues that have either been resolved already, or that are not in fact problematic (such as the clinical vs. social reform debate). Practitioners too who do not know the history may also be at a disadvantage as they attempt to adapt to changing client needs and develop novel problem solving strategies and practice techniques. Moreover, if students do not understand the pragmatist nature of social work, namely that it is always growing and developing, and that its identity is a conversation in process, then they may not even think to make a change in the first place—this would be a great irony for social work. And as Bertha Reynolds suggested, a solid foundation in generic social work methods (for casework, group work and community organizing) can help students and practitioners avoid getting caught up in fads as they come and go.

Students, therefore, should not only be taught the history of social work, but the philosophy of social work. Most of the theorists analyzed in this dissertation stated that social work education should not become overly concerned with techniques and methods, but should seek to provide a broad curriculum including relevant sciences (e.g. psychology, economics), humanities (e.g. philosophy), and the history and philosophy of social work and social welfare.

Lindeman’s great contribution was to point out the need for consciously learning and thinking through philosophical concepts. Without more seminars in philosophy (which must be in the form of inquiries, not dogmatic teaching), social work will continue its unstable swing from one extreme to another and its tendency to indoctrination (Konopka, 1958, p. 201-202).

In many ways what this amounts to is empowering social work students with what Gadamer described as the “hermeneutical circle” and “fusion of horizons” (1975). The hermeneutical circle refers to the interpretation of a thing by putting its parts in conversation with the thing as a whole. Gaining a solid understanding of social work, and developing a professional identity as such, involves putting the ‘parts’ of social work, such as the relationship focus of social casework, into conversation with the ‘whole,’ such as the broad ‘snapshot’ offered by this dissertation. One may ask, for example, what active listening, as an aspect of social casework, has to do with social justice. The fusion of horizons concept may also help students gain a better understanding of their profession by putting themselves and their present social, economic, political, religious and other contexts into conversation with the people and contexts of the past, hence ‘fusing’ the two temporal and cultural horizons. When a student reads a line in the current NASW code, for instance, that describes social work as a dual focused profession, the interpretation of this will be better and more meaningful if the student can consider not only what that might mean for his or her own work (say, at their present practicum site), but also if the student can consider what that line might have meant to Jane Addams, Edward Devine or Bertha Reynolds. In order to interpret concepts like the dual focus, or social justice (CSWE educational policy 2.1.5), students should also have the opportunity to consider the context of the times in which historical (and present) documents were written. For instance, they may be challenged to consider social justice according to Addams’ perspective given the roles of women and other minority populations at that time, as compared to the same roles and issues today. They may also compare various conceptions of social justice and how they impacted the social work being done in either case. This is a process of inquiry and development that will lead students to gain a much better understanding of what it means to be a social worker. This in turn should strengthen them

against the ongoing stigma that is present against people who care about the poor and oppressed people in the population. A more developed professional identity should also enhance the worker's competence, one of the NASW ethics. In sum, developing a professional identity by gaining a rich understanding of social work history and philosophy can provide the stability and sense of direction and purpose that is needed in the complex situations social workers find themselves in today.

For Policy

Pragmatist social work is consistent with multiple methods of intervention related to social policy, such as group work, community organizing and direct legislative advocacy. As with the other aspects of social work (e.g. research and practice), pragmatism offers a broad, but grounded orientation that retains an ethical foundation while remaining flexible in its approach to analysis and action. The instrumentalist understanding of applied human intelligence is consistent with many forms of procedural policy analysis (e.g. Karger & Stoesz, 2002) as it prescribes a similar, though less specific, form of inquiry that includes forming researchable questions, gathering relevant information, applying solutions, evaluation, etc. Despite the particular procedure for analysis, or the method used for policy practice, the pragmatist grounding in human rights and social justice offer unity and stability for policy interpretation. The historical orientation offers perspective for insight as well. Any strong policy analysis will include the history of the particular policy being considered, but an understanding of the history and philosophy of social work adds information and perspective about how social work in particular has encountered various policy issues and dealt with them in the past. Moreover, with the philosophical grounding, it offers not just information about what the social work perspectives were and what kinds of actions were taken on behalf of the poor or oppressed, it

also offers an understanding of *why* the perspectives are what they are, and why certain actions tend to be taken (e.g. as stated in the previous chapter). It is not enough to merely refer to a brief code of ethics—even the NASW code—and consider this sufficient grounding for professional policy advocacy. The code is a summary of ethics that are rooted in the history of social work as a pragmatist undertaking. If we expect students and practitioners to retain a solid sense of identity and purpose when conducting complex analyses with often confusing ideological variations and a variety of interests represented, we should prepare them with a solid understanding of what social work is and has been, and why this is so. This may help them to avoid pitfalls such as merely seeking individual private practice that fails to consider social issues such as racism, poverty or sexual exploitation, or possibly becoming sidetracked by some other type of philosophy or ideology which does not actually serve the best interests of the poor and marginalized among us.

One practice example is the use of group work. While I would not say there is *never* a situation where psychotherapy alone is acceptable as a group focus, a social work perspective, grounded in its own history and pragmatism, will tend to understand group work as something that serves both individuals in the group in a psychotherapeutic way *and* the larger community. There is a connection therefore even between psychotherapy groups and policy practice. Lindeman in particular wrote extensively about this. Modern ideas about psychotherapy need not be separated from the power that groups may have not only to ‘heal’ each other internally or psychologically, but also to take action externally, socially, in making some sort of positive change in their communities—likely change that has something to do with the reason for joining the group in the first place, such as being abused as a child, or experiencing job loss and the subsequent inability to find work with a sustainable wage. Of course, it seems that the individual

level, or clinical, practitioners (whether group psychotherapists or otherwise) tend to receive most of the criticism for not considering the other end of the dual focus, namely the policy and social change end. This is likely because the individual level practitioners make up the majority of social workers at present. However, the same challenge applies to policy practitioners—they should be seeking ways to connect their policy-level efforts to individuals. Of course, a focus of effort on either the clinical or social reform side will likely remain, but there are many creative ways to retain the pragmatist social work perspective by always keeping the interconnections of both in mind.

Conclusion

It is difficult to underestimate the importance of a strong sense of identity, whether personal or professional. What I hope this dissertation has successfully contributed is at least a partial restoration of a strong, historical and pragmatist identity for social work, as well as a new orientation to the (alleged) clinical vs. social reform debate. There is, of course, always room for continued discussion about the philosophy of social work and what it means at each point in history. However, with a proper historical grounding in its own history and philosophy, social work need not wallow in a crisis of identity, whether it is about the clinical vs. social reform debate or some other issue—it is simply unnecessary to indulge the self-pity and malaise encountered, for example, in the Madison conference reports. It seems the real problem is not that social work is broad and multifaceted, but that its own scholars tend to forget what social work has been, and thus forget who they are and how they should be relating to society, other professions, and current challenges. This need not be the case. Social work has a rich intellectual and action-oriented history which offers practitioners and scholars a strong lineage to draw upon. The sense of identity that can be gained from a firm grounding in the history and philosophy of

social work also carries with it a freedom from the anxieties about how one may grow and develop as a practitioner and/or scholar. Drawing on a distinctive and historical social work perspective provides certain directives, but it also permits a lot of freedom. It is, like its inherent pragmatism, a middle way between the polar extremes that seem so alluring in American culture and politics. Pragmatist social work can maintain unity with a shared vision as it seeks social justice using multiple practice methods, including both clinical and social reform perspectives, incorporating knowledge from diverse resources.

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