

**COLLATERAL DAMAGE IN IRAQ AND CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN THE U.S.: HOW THE PUBLIC MAKES
SENSE OF EXTREME VIOLENCE AND DEATH**

BY

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COLLATERAL DAMAGE IN IRAQ AND CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN THE U.S.: HOW THE PUBLIC MAKES
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DEDICATION

To die is poignantly bitter, but the idea of having to die without having lived is unbearable.

Erich Fromm

This dissertation is dedicated to the hundreds, thousands, and perhaps millions of innocent civilians who have been victimized in the worst way possible by losing their lives in the theater of war or the American criminal justice system. The numbers are truly staggering—estimates as high as one million civilian lives lost in the Iraq war, thousands in the Afghan conflict, and hundreds killed who were wrongly convicted and sentenced to death for crimes they did not commit in the U.S. Some in our society carelessly and cruelly refer to these deaths as *collateral damage*. I sincerely hope this project can serve as a small wake-up call for the majority of people who share the compassion and trepidation I have for any loss of life in war and in the system of American justice. Innocent loss of life is *never* justified and my hope is this research can shed a light on the true costs of war and a broken capital punishment system. We must fight to remind people in the United States and around the world that *all* life is precious and no one is expendable because of crass politics, greed, egoism, racism, classism, sexism, or necrophilia. It is also important to acknowledge the effects these losses have on the family and friends of the deceased and the fact that their lives will never fully heal from the horrors these tragic situations wreak. A shift needs to occur in our society toward *love of life*—and not just for the privileged but the loving of *all* lives equally. And finally, we need to reformulate what it means to truly *live* a fruitful, balanced, healthy, soulful existence. Only then will Americans reconstitute their true sense of morality and be able to identify with the plights of others *and* be motivated to fight for the disadvantaged and forgotten of our society.

ABSTRACT

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Collateral Damage in Iraq and Capital Punishment in the U.S.: How the Public Makes Sense of Extreme Violence and Death

This dissertation investigates the tendencies, attitudes, beliefs, ideologies, and narratives that citizens in the Pacific Northwest have in regard to innocent loss of life in war and in the American criminal justice system. The project serves as a frontal analysis of recent scholarship regarding attitudes toward casualty tolerance by political scientists Peter Feaver, Chris Gelpi, and Jason Reifler (FGR). FGR focus on debunking the ‘myth’ that the American public is ‘casualty phobic’ and suffers from the ‘Vietnam syndrome.’ FGR’s research focuses heavily on American soldier casualties, whereas my project shines a light on gauging public opinion on the deaths of innocent civilians in wars. I argue that their model of predicting casualty tolerance—based solely on the use of survey data—is woefully inept and lacks important contributions from social psychology, sociology and personality theories in fostering a deeper understanding of explaining varying levels of casualty tolerance by individuals who are attitudinally ambivalent. I also extend the definition of collateral damage to include innocent loss of life in the criminal justice system by individuals put to death for crimes not committed. The study implores two methods, surveys and in-depth interviews, in order to better understand attitudes toward ‘collateral damage’ or innocent loss of life. Three new survey scales are introduced: a 14-item ‘Collateral Damage Tolerance Scale for War’ (CDTSW), a 10-item ‘Collateral Damage Tolerance Scale for Death Penalty’ (CDTSDP), and a 15-item Islamophobia Scale. In contemporary American politics the importance of the swing voter cannot be overstated. This study gives primacy to understanding in a more direct way what middle-scores think about innocent loss of life in war and in the criminal justice system. The foundation of the study is a Frankfurt School approach that highlights the following: individual differences are real and far-reaching, that personality has psychodynamic roots, and that variations in psycho-cultural experience (in early childhood, in the family, in the workplace) produce major variations in attitudes and character structure. The survey results indicate the power of authoritarianism (RWA), social dominance orientation (SDO), incidences of corporal punishment, and Islamophobia as strong predictors of more or less tolerance of innocent loss of life in war. In regard to collateral damage in the use of the death penalty four variables proved to be central: RWA, SDO, views toward the nature of God, and approval/disapproval of capital punishment. The interview data confirm predicted responses from high and low scoring individuals toward more or less tolerance of collateral damage. As for middle scorers the following themes emerged as contributors to more or less tolerance: perceived threat of terrorism, being informed or

uninformed about current events like war and the criminal justice system, the degree to which middle scorers buy in to the *master narratives* or national stories regarding justifications for collateral damage, and ability of middles to formulate and articulate counter narratives. The continued relevancy of Erich Fromm is discussed as well as a pitch for a renaissance of his social-psychological analytical approach to studies of casualty tolerance.

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Collateral Damage in Iraq and Capital Punishment in the U.S.: How the Public Makes Sense of Extreme Violence and Death

Chapter 1: Introduction

We were approaching this one house, and this farming area, they're built up into little courtyards. So they have the main house, common area. They have a kitchen and a storage shed-type deal. We were approaching, and they had a family dog. And it was barking ferociously, because it was doing its job. And my squad leader, out of nowhere, just shoots it. And he shot it and it went in the jaw and exited out. So I see this dog—and I'm a huge animal lover. I love animals—and this dog has like these eyes on it and he's running around spraying blood all over the place. And the family is sitting right there with three little children and a mom and a dad horrified. And I'm at a loss for words. And so, I yell at him. I'm like what are you doing? The dog's yelping. It's crying out without a jaw. And I'm looking at the family, they're just scared. I told him to shoot it, you know. At least kill it, because that can't be fixed. It's suffering. And I actually get tears from just saying this right now, but—and I had tears then, too—and I'm looking at the kids and they are so scared. So I got the interpreter over with me and I get my wallet out and I gave them twenty bucks, because that's what I had. I had him give it to them and told them that I'm so sorry that asshole did that (Hedges and Al-Arian 2008: xxvii-xxviii).

Brief Introduction – Why Study Attitudes Toward Innocent Loss of Life?

March 19th, 2010 marked the seventh anniversary of the U.S.'s invasion of Iraq. The human and financial costs of the Iraq war have been immense with estimates of over \$740 billion being spent and some 4,412 American troops having lost their lives. Another 31,874 military personnel have been injured in the Iraq war. Furthermore, allied fatalities from Britain and seventeen other participating nations presently stands at 309 dead. U.S. civilians (private contractors) killed in Iraq number 184 deaths. Gauging loss of life for civilians in Iraq can be difficult, but estimates range from 34,000 to over 1,000,000 human lives lost, depending on what source one trusts – either governmental or nongovernmental data (Burnham et al. 2006a, 2006b, 2004; Fischer 2010, 2008). In October of 2009, as reported by Fischer (2010), *The Iraq Ministry of Human Rights* published a report with a tally of 51,675 'martyred

victims' (civilians) who had died and been identified, and 34,019 'bodies found' (civilians who have died but who were not identified) for a total of 85,694 civilian deaths from 2004 through 2008 (Fischer 2010:1). In terms of nongovernmental sources there are several which report civilian deaths, often covering a wide range. Fischer lists the following agencies and their estimates: *Iraq Body Count*, 95,428 – 104,119; *Iraq Coalition Casualty Count*, 47,124; *Associated Press*, 39,036; *Brookings Iraq Index*, 111,437; *Opinion Business Research*, 1,000,000+; *Iraq Family Health Survey* 151,000 (may include police and/or security); and *The Lancet* 426,369 – 793,663 (Fischer 2010:8-9).

Not only has the Iraq war seemed never ending, but with the election of Barack Obama we have witnessed a doubling down in Afghanistan – a major escalation of the Afghan conflict. On December 1, 2009 President Obama addressed West Point cadets making his formal announcement to accelerate the war in Afghanistan with a troop surge of 30,000.¹ The financial costs of the Afghan war, since 2001, have been \$280 billion. 1,135 U.S. troops have lost their lives fighting in Afghanistan and another 6,141 have been severely injured. Allied fatalities in Afghanistan as reported by Britain, Canada and twenty other nations stand at 674 lives lost. Estimates are at least 8,309 civilians have perished in the Afghan war – many more since Obama's troop increase.² Many military experts and political pundits speculate that the bloodiest days of the Afghan war have yet to occur and, therefore, like the Bush administration the Obama administration will be in the business of selling the American public that the loss of life and limb in Afghanistan is worth the sacrifice. The primary narrative thread for Obama's war is that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are terrorist organizations that are a significant threat to U.S. national security and the 'just war' is to alleviate or neutralize them in Afghanistan. Of course one other significant storyline is Osama bin Laden is still a fugitive at large and needs to be brought to justice—and the place to find him is in Afghanistan (even though many experts believe he is in Pakistan). Another interesting debate has emerged in recent months regarding limiting the use of

¹ This may have come as a bit of a surprise to many progressives as they figured his tough talk on Afghanistan was a bit of a ploy to get elected (to appease Independent voters who often demand their leaders be hawks on military matters) and he wouldn't follow through with his campaign suggestions.

² Data compiled by an article in the New York Times: Grim Milestone: 1,000 Americans Dead (Dao and Lehren 2010).

aerial bombing in Afghanistan, due to the likelihood of innocent civilians being killed by these attacks (Benjamin 2007; Chivers and Nordland 2010; Cooper 2010; Meehan 2010; Oppel and Nordland 2010). Some have argued the pull back of use of aerial attacks will compromise our efforts in Afghanistan and put our troops in peril, while others have argued we need to cut innocent loss of life in order to continue to win ‘hearts and minds.’³ Clearly this question and many others about collateral damage in war are topics that are unfortunately not going away any time soon.⁴ Much to the chagrin of the anti-war Left in America, Obama is waging his own war (similar in many ways to George W. Bush’s war) and there is absolutely zero chance this war—in Afghanistan—will be quick or lacking in human and financial damage. According to the Obama administration, there is to be a major troop withdrawal from Iraq with a target date of August 2010 as the date by which to have a majority of troops out of the region. In regard to Afghanistan the length of the war is open-ended and many experts predict the U.S. could have troops in the region for at least a decade (Pincus 2009). Therefore, the primary research questions posed in this project are extremely relevant to current American politics and will remain so for the foreseeable future.⁵ Moreover, the wars being fought in the Middle East by America need to be understood in the context of a worldwide economic meltdown. Untangling public opinion about war and the criminal justice system is complex and needs to go far beyond polling. This project serves to move in that direction by attacking the problem with survey data and in-depth interviewing (primarily of individuals who are deemed attitudinally ambivalent).

In most cases public opinion is measured by polls about these matters and the focus is almost exclusively on loss of life of ‘American’ or ‘Allied’ forces. There is often very little discussion or polling about what American’s think of the loss of life

³ It is probably worth noting that in the previous administration many insiders have admitted that having a discussion regarding civilian loss of life probably wouldn’t have even been a discussion topic – just a part of war.

⁴ While my study focuses on the events in Iraq the goal is to try to cull together attitudinal tendencies and/or underlying character traits that could easily be transferred to understanding the public’s views of the Afghan conflict as well as the continuing war in Iraq.

⁵ At the present moment Americans are focused on unemployment and health care reform along with wars in two countries. Given the plethora of problems it is interesting to understand how often and to what degree citizens are paying attention to loss of life in war when so much is in flux and/or chaos.

and limb of innocent civilians in war. Further, in my view polls are limiting and sorely inadequate for understanding more deeply how citizens make sense of extreme violence and death in contemporary war zones. Another, moral theater that has to do with innocent people losing their lives is the U.S. criminal justice system and its use of the death penalty (currently 37 states have laws on the books authorizing the state to impose the death sentences in cases of convictions for 1st degree murder) . Since the mid-1990s there have been 255 individuals exonerated from prison and/or death row for crimes not committed. What is more, since 1973, 139 people in 26 states have been released from death row with evidence of their innocence.

Both of these ‘moral theaters’ involve innocent loss of life and could fit the euphemism of ‘collateral damage.’ Collateral damage has been defined by the U.S. military as “damage and destruction of targets or personnel not considered as lawful military targets” (USAF Intelligence Targeting Guide, 1998). As war journalists Chris Hedges and Laila Al-Arian chronicle in their pivotal book *Collateral Damage: America’s War Against Iraqi Civilians*, there is no question the war in Iraq has included thousands of instances of innocent loss of life.⁶ The primary purpose of this project is to delve deeply into what citizens in the Pacific Northwest think about instances of collateral damage in war and in the criminal justice system. The project will go far beyond poll numbers and anecdotes about war and the use of the death penalty in cases where the accused and convicted is truly innocent. Likewise, I do not contend that everyone will understand what ‘collateral damage’ means or agree on a common definition. Collateral damage is clearly a social construction and part of this project is to probe how individuals contextualize and make sense of collateral damage—innocent loss of life in war and the criminal justice system.⁷ As previously mentioned collateral damage has traditionally been used by the U.S. military (specifically the Air Force) as a way to describe unintended damage to human life and property during a military operation. The term was first introduced as a euphemism

⁶ The Haditha Massacre is a prime example of collateral damage as served as a template for one of the vignettes put together for the interview portion of this dissertation. U.S. marines killed 24 unarmed civilians on November 19th, 2005 in response to an IED that killed a marine (Langewiesche 2006). All marines involved in the mass killing were acquitted of all murder charges by U.S. military courts.

⁷ One of the primary reasons for performing in-depth interviews is to tap into the various story lines individuals impart when thinking about innocent loss of life in war and the criminal justice system.

during the Vietnam War, and referred to friendly fire or the destruction of civilians and their property (USAF Intelligence Targeting Guide, 1998; Reynolds 2005). It has been noted that the term collateral damage came into public consciousness, in earnest, during the Persian Gulf War, of 1991, from televised military briefings, and was used to describe civilian victims of bombing of Iraq. My use of the term will embody the same meaning as the U.S. Air Force Guide, but will also extend to include individuals wrongly convicted of crimes and, subsequently, exonerated from death row—‘unintended damage, destruction of civilians (including innocent people on death row) and their property.’ Just as innocent civilians can be killed or have their property destroyed in military conflicts, innocent civilians—255 we know of for certain—have had their lives *damaged* significantly for crimes of which they were completely innocent. Of course, scholars and advocates have speculated for years that it is highly likely that the U.S. criminal justice system has put to death individuals who were innocent—the ultimate form of criminal justice collateral damage (CJCD).

Two other important developments in the American arena of politics over the past few decades inform the research questions posed: one being the increasing importance of swing voters or the independent-minded electorate that often are the key for swaying elections toward Democrats or Republicans and, at the same time, the deeply divided nature of partisan politics—where ideologically a certain percentage of voters are locked down solidly to their positions on social issues. Over the years there have been a few scholars who have attempted to study, or indicated the need to study, attitudinal ambivalence (i.e., swing voters) (Adorno et al. 1950; Alvarez and Brehm 1997; Campbell 2007; Cantril and Cantril 1999; Capps 2001; Greenberg 2004; Greenberg and Greenberg 2004; Manza et al. 2002; McGraw et al. 2003; Smith and Hanley 2007). In 2004 Greenberg was able to show, for example, that approximately 37% of the country was ardently pro or anti-President Bush (37% favored Bush and 37% did not favor Bush). However, more importantly more than a quarter (26% to be exact) of the electorate remained somewhat ambivalent—with 9% mildly favoring Bush, 9% doubting Bush and 8% on the fence (Greenberg 2005). Interestingly, even though a few researchers have taken up the study of ambivalence it is still an area that needs to be explored in much more depth in order to solidify and understand more

completely the concept. Smith and Hanley (2007) make a strong case for studying ambivalence by noting, “The best research reveals that, despite the polarization of the U.S. electorate, there is still a substantial middle group of voters, who (to the perplexity of partisans) equivocate between liberal and conservative policies for largely non-ideological reasons” (Smith and Hanley 2007).⁸ In regard to the political divide in America between the Red states the Blue states and the so-called ‘Culture Wars’ a plethora of research has been conducted showing that the country is divided over many social and cultural issues (Abramowitz and Saunders 2005; Broder 2000; Brooks 2001; Davis and Robinson 1997; DiMaggio et al. 1996; Dionne 1991, 2000, 2003; Evans 2003; Evans et al. 2001; Fiorina 2005; Frank 2004; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Hunter 1991; Jacobson 2005, 2007; Kuklinski 2001; Williams 1997). My main question is, is the country also divided regarding tolerance of collateral damage? The 2000 and 2004 U.S. Presidential elections were extremely tight with Bush *winning* in 2000 by a 271-266 margin and in 2004 winning by a 286-251 gap.⁹ It is my contention that swing voters are often ambivalent personality-wise and this project will give these individuals a voice in order to understand their views on collateral damage in war and the criminal justice system.¹⁰

This study will also serve to empirically test the main theses of political scientists Peter Feaver, Christopher Gelpi and Jason Reifler who are the pre-eminent scholars in research on tracking public opinion about casualty tolerance for war deaths (Aldrich et al. 2006; Feaver 2001; Feaver and Gelpi 2004; Feaver and Gelpi 1999; Feaver and Kohn 2001; Feaver and Kohn 2000; Gelpi and Feaver 2002; Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler 2005; Gelpi and Mueller 2006; Gelpi, Reifler, and Feaver 2007; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2009; Gelpi 2009a, 2009b). In Chapter 2, I reveal serious reservations with many of the assumptions their research entails and argue for a social-

⁸ Smith and Hanley also say, “...no one yet has systematically compared or integrated findings of the type reported by Greenberg with psychological discoveries in the realm of RWA and SDO research. Nor has anyone carefully studied ‘middle’ RWA and SDO scorers—though, plainly, that is where we should look if we hope to explain swing voting” (Smith and Hanley 2007).

⁹ Of course many will never believe that Bush won the 2000 election fair and square because the Supreme Court ended the counting of votes prematurely. An event like this usually adds fuel to the fire of a bitterly divided population in regard to politics.

¹⁰ I will also inquire as to the possibility that there are underlying character traits that need to be investigated to acquire a more accurate picture of attitudinal ambivalence and attitudes toward collateral damage.

psychological model as the way forward for truly understanding political opinion regarding tolerance of war deaths and deaths by the U.S. criminal justice system.

Moral Theater of War and Capital Punishment as a Window into Ambivalence

Therefore the following are the key themes of this dissertation: (1) a focus on innocent loss of life as a window into attitudinal ambivalence, (2) a way to engage in a social-psychological manner the theories and research of political scientists who have been engaged in research on casualty tolerance – with a keen focus on, not only U.S./Allied military deaths, but also civilian deaths, (3) the production of a more nuanced – social psychological – approach to predicting variance in casualty tolerance (via wars and the U.S. criminal justice system), (4) a test of the Frankfurt School model (a combination of Freudian and Marxian theoretical contributions) that argues social class, childhood experiences with corporal punishment, and several other variables related to authoritarian personality tendencies have an impact on more or less tolerance for collateral damage, (5) the introduction of a more accurate measure of collateral damage tolerance and Islamophobia (via newly constructed Likert scales), (6) a focus on how ‘middle-scorers’ interpret, process, trivialize and otherwise make sense of collateral damage in war the criminal justice system – in other words what are the most important tipping points for the ambivalent for more or less tolerance of innocent loss of life and finally (7) the application of Frommian analytic social psychology as a contribution to the legacy of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory.

Polls and More Polls about Iraq, Afghanistan and Use of Death Sentence

America is a country obsessed with polls. There is hardly a day that goes by in the U.S. where political pundits are not talking about the latest poll numbers of the president or what a representative sample of Americans think about a whole host of hot-button political issues. The primary problem with polling is it is episodic and only goes so far in helping social scientists understand the ‘why’ behind the numbers. Or, even more specifically, poll numbers may go up and down (approval or disapproval of certain policies or initiatives), but the most important question is why do the poll

numbers wax and wane—what factors are likely contributing to the changes in public opinion?¹¹ Having said that, I will briefly outline the most up-to date polling data on the topics that are at the center of my inquiry (as a jumping off point to ignite and inspire my research questions): the war in Iraq, the war in Afghanistan and current attitudes toward the use of the death penalty.

Afghanistan

A CNN/Opinion Research Corporation Poll of 1,030 adults nationwide, in mid-March of 2010, asked the following question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Barack Obama is handling the situation in Afghanistan? 55% of the sample approved, while 42% disapproved (3% were unsure). In the same poll Americans were asked if they favored or opposed the U.S. war in Afghanistan and 48% were in favor while 49% opposed (3% unsure again). As previously stated there are limitations to polling data, however these numbers clearly show a nation divided on the war and whether or not we should be engaging in it. When asked “Regardless of how you feel about the war in general, do you favor or oppose President Obama’s plan to send about 30,000 more U.S. troops to Afghanistan in an attempt to stabilize the situation there” in January of 2010 61% favored the decision and 38% opposed (with 1% saying they were unsure). In December of 2009 a ABC News/Washington Post Poll asked an interesting question to 1,003 adults: All in all, considering the costs to the United States versus the benefits to the United States, do you think the war in Afghanistan has been worth fighting, or not? 52% indicated the war was worth fighting and 44% said the war was not worth fighting (4% were unsure). An even more inquisitive poll was taken by the Pew Research Center in October of 2009 regarding if Americans have ample information or background on the Afghan war. 53% said they do not always have enough background information to follow the news about Afghanistan and 26% said the news about war is so depressing they would prefer not to follow it. Only 20% said they felt guilty about not following news from the war more closely. Interestingly, personal views of Obama tend to lean more

¹¹ Or if public approval of a war goes up or down what significant variables are likely causing the changes in public opinion.

positive, but when individuals are asked to assess specifically his policies the numbers tend to go down precipitously. What is more, when asked if they knew how many troops had been killed in Afghanistan only 25% correctly estimated 900 as the correct fatality count. Most (52%) overestimated the number of U.S. fatalities: 25% said around 1,500 had been killed, while 27% estimated the military death toll at around 2,500. By contrast, a plurality in this poll (42%) correctly estimated U.S. troop deaths in Iraq at about 4,300 (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, October 16-19, 2009). As will be noted in subsequent chapters the percentage of Americans who can correctly identify the number of dead soldiers in the wars is not necessarily stable. For instance, in March of 2008 just 28% of those surveyed by the Pew Research Center could correctly identify U.S. troop deaths in Iraq at around 4,000. By way of contrast, in February of 2007, 55% identified number dead correctly (at 3,000). Polling data on the Afghan war are contradictory at best and, therefore, need to be unpacked and understood more deeply by social scientists.

Iraq

A CNN/Opinion Research Corporation Poll of 1,009 adults nationwide in late January of 2010 asked: Do you favor or oppose the U.S. war in Iraq? 39% favored, while 60% opposed (1% unsure). As might be expected this question has been asked often and since June of 2006 favorability has hit a low of 30% (in June of 2008) to a high of 40% (in September of 2006). When asked if they generally approve or disapprove of President Obama's plan to pull most American troops out of Iraq by the end of 2011 70% approved, while 23% disapproved in December of 2009 (according to an NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll). A CBS/New York Times Poll in September of 2009 asked: Do you think the result of the war with Iraq was worth the loss of American life and other costs of attacking Iraq, or not? 24% indicated it was worth it, 67% said not worth it, and 9% interestingly were unsure. Quinnipiac University conducted a poll of 2,210 registered voters, in November of 2008, asking if going to war with Iraq was the right thing for the U.S. to do or the wrong thing. 36% indicated it was the right course of action, while 58% said wrong thing to do – again, interestingly 6% were unsure. What is perhaps most important about looking at public

polling, about Iraq, is to understand the context for when the poll was taken and what the public's perception of the war might be (at that time). Therefore, in subsequent chapters political scientists Feaver, Gelpi and Reifler will make their case that it is possible to maintain adequate or acceptable levels of approval for a war like Iraq even if a solid majority sour on the initial rationale for getting into the conflict, but believe that a move like a troop surge is a prudent move. So, there could be 58% of the population that thinks the invasion of Iraq was a mistake (like was reported by the Quinnipiac poll discussed earlier), but also have 56% of the public, in November of 2009, indicate that the surge of 20,000 combat troops in 2007 was a success (CNN/Opinion Research Corporation Poll, 2009).

Akin to public opinion regarding the Afghan war it is easy to see that polling provides some important data, but provide more of a jumping off point as opposed to the final answer. Incidentally, one of the most intriguing items asked by the Pew Research Center from 1987-2003 was the following item: American lives are worth more than the lives of people in other countries. In August of 2003 9% of the sample completely agreed with this statement, 14% mostly agreed, 44% completely disagreed with the statement, 29% mostly disagreed with the statement, and 4% answered 'don't know.' (Pew Research Center: Trends in Political Values and Core Attitudes: 1987-2007). This is truly a fascinating question and one I ended up asking my interview subjects to comment on more deeply. The responses are interesting.

Capital Punishment in the United States

In October of 2007 Gallup asked 1,010 adults if they were in favor of the death penalty for persons convicted of murder. 69% were in favor, 27% against and 4% had no opinion (Gallup). Public opinion about use of the death sentence, for people convicted of 1st degree murder, has waxed and waned over the past several decades from a high of 80% approval in September of 1994 to a low of 47% approval in August of 1957 (Gallup). In October of 2009, Gallup's annual Crime Survey found that 65% of Americans continue to support the use of the death penalty, while 31% oppose it. Also, when asked if capital punishment is imposed *too often, about the right amount, or not often enough* 49% said not enough, 24% said about the right

amount, and 20% said too often. When asked if the death penalty is applied fairly or unfairly 57% said fairly while 34% said unfairly. For the purposes of my dissertation project—focusing on innocent loss of life via the death sentence—the following responses are the most interesting. The question was posed: How often do you think that a person has been executed under the death penalty who was, in fact, innocent of the crime he or she was charged with—do you think this has happened in the past five years, or not? 59% indicated that yes it had happened within the past five years, while 31% said no. Furthermore, the Gallup poll indicates that for many Americans agreement with the assertion that innocent people have been put to death does *not* preclude simultaneous endorsement of the death penalty. A third of all Americans, 34%, believe an innocent person has been executed and at the same time support the death penalty (Gallup, 2009). This is higher than the 23% who believe an innocent person has been executed and simultaneously oppose the death penalty.¹² What is more, 81% of Republicans and 67% of Independents support the use of capital punishment, while Democrats are divided 48% (support) and 47% (non-support). Again, the numbers are interesting but need to be investigated far deeper to understand more accurately what American's think about the death penalty—and especially what how they conceptualize and rationalize a criminal justice system that is clearly making many mistakes as the excellent work of the Innocence Project out of New York has shown over the past couple of decades. Incidentally, the only research I am aware of that probes the question of whether or not the probability that executing innocent people could have an impact on public opinion, regarding the use of the death sentence, is by British criminologist Andrew Stinchcombe (1994). Using public opinion research Stinchcombe concludes, "...most supporters of the death penalty accept to some extent at least the possibility of the risk of error. Only 10% of the population were found to both support execution and also to deny the possibility of error occurring. The majority of the supporters acknowledged that miscarriages of

¹² This is clearly where interviewing can help to unpack what is behind what some might think is a seemingly contradictory set of polling data. In my interviews I posed the question of if you support the death penalty would you continue to support it if you knew that 10%, 25%, or 50% of the individuals on death row were innocent.

justice could arise, yet still were in favour of the ultimate penalty” (Stinchcombe 1994:315).

Quick Preview of Chapters 2-7 of the Project


In chapter 2 I map out the specific literatures from which my research questions have arisen with a particular focus on anchoring the study in the important work of the Frankfurt School of Social Research, recent research on authoritarianism and its antecedent personality types, and a frontal analysis of research on casualty tolerance by Feather, Gelpi, and Reifler (and several other scholars). In chapter 3, I discuss the research methods employed with a focus on the need to do a more thorough accounting of survey research (thus the implementation of collateral damage tolerance scales and the introduction of an Islamophobia scale) and the need to follow up survey research with in-depth interviews to gauge more accurately what drives the answers to surveys or public opinion polls. Also, in the third chapter I outline the demographics of my sample and explain a bit about the process of attempting to go beyond student samples and do a more representative sample of Americans. In chapter 4 the results of the survey data are revealed with an emphasis on testing the hypotheses posed in the dissertation. It is concluded that the measures employed were statistically significant in many instances and, therefore, the methods could prove noteworthy in future studies with higher numbers of respondents. In chapter 5 I converse about the use of vignettes for studying attitudes toward collateral damage in war and the criminal justice system—with a primary focus on the responses from the nine middle-scorers (attitudinally ambivalent). Narratives of what interviewees tell themselves about collateral damage in war and the criminal justice system are investigated to glean what patterns emerge and, therefore, what possible hypotheses could be tested in future research. In chapter 6 I interpret the findings from both the surveys and interviews by way of a Frommian approach to social psychology. And, finally, in chapter 7 I look forward to the future of studies of collateral damage and lay out briefly the prospects of a more nuanced and interesting research agenda for understanding how the public makes sense of extreme violence and death.

Quantitative Hypotheses of CD Tolerance

The primary quantitative hypotheses are as follows:


- ❖ Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation are strong predictors of high tolerance levels of innocent loss of civilian lives in war and in the criminal justice system.
- ❖ Independent variables including religion, authoritarian family values, religiosity, attitudes toward the nature of God, incidences of corporal punishment in childhood, and racism (either symbolic racism or Islamophobia) can explain variance in tolerance for collateral damage in war and the criminal justice system.
- ❖ Feaver, Gelpi and Reifler's concept of tolerance for collateral damage in war is a statistically significant variable for predicting variance in Capps' concept of collateral damage in war.
- ❖ Social class position is an important variable for predicting a person's level of tolerance for innocent loss of life in war and the criminal justice system.
- ❖ Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation, incidences of corporal punishment, and religiosity can explain variance in tolerance for innocent people to be killed by erroneous convictions in the U.S. criminal justice system.
- ❖ There is a commonality between the moral theater of war and the moral theater of the criminal justice system.

Figure 1: Capps Theoretical Model of Collateral Damage Tolerance for Iraq War Deaths¹³



¹³ ** Indicates a level of significance of .01 (2-tailed). * Indicates a level of significance of .05 (2-tailed).

Figure 2: Capps Theoretical Model of CD Tolerance for Innocent Killed by U.S. Death Penalty¹⁴



¹⁴ ** Indicates a level of significance of .01 (2-tailed). * Indicates a level of significance of .05 (2-tailed).

Chapter 2 – Literature Review – Casualty Tolerance

Brief Outline of the Chapter

There are several broad literatures that have influenced the current project—understanding how the public—especially consistently middle scorers—understand, think about, and conceptualize collateral damage in war and the criminal justice system. First, I explain the most important concepts, theories, and research methodologies from the Frankfurt School of Research—and how they inform and influence my inquiries. The study of ambivalence and authority can be traced to the Frankfurt School and the pivotal scholarship of Erich Fromm. I map socio-historically the trajectory of Fromm’s scholarship from his fundamental research project that occurred between 1929-31 through his research in the 1950s and beyond on character development and ambivalence. In many ways I wish to pattern my research after the excellent example put forth by members of the Frankfurt School and Berkeley Team. Second, I discuss the highlights of the most important contemporary research by Bob Altemeyer, Felicia Pratto, Jim Sadanius, and others regarding authoritarianism and social dominance orientation in social psychology. Third, I provide a synopsis of research conducted by public opinion and casualty tolerance experts (political scientists) Peter Feaver, Christopher Gelpi, and Jason Reifler (Gelpi and Mueller 2006; Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler 2005; Feaver and Gelpi 2004; Feaver and Kohn 2001, 2000; Feaver and Gelpi 1999). Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler armed with a plethora of survey data, argue that the conventional wisdom that the public is highly ‘casualty phobic’ (and may suffer from the ‘Vietnam Syndrome’) is misguided. In their view, according to data they have compiled, the public is ‘defeat phobic’ not ‘death phobic’ and, therefore, are willing to tolerate more casualties if they have faith that the mission will ultimately be successful. A portion of this study implements and tests a couple of Feaver, Gelpi, and Reifler’s recent findings (constructs of casualty tolerance) in my sample of Seattle residents. Fourth, I point to a few other important pieces of scholarship on casualty tolerance, presidential politics, and public opinion in political science and social psychology—highlighting the most recent and relevant contributions. Fifth, I will comment briefly on the possibilities of a more nuanced social psychological approach toward collateral damage/casualty tolerance research—

focusing squarely on underlying character structures that could be influencing how people make sense of death in war and the criminal justice system. Research by Social Psychologists McFarland, Pratto and Glasford are highlighted. My contention is an attempt needs to be made to go beyond merely rational choice approaches to these complex attitudinal tendencies.

Frankfurt School and Authoritarianism Research 1929-Present

In what follows, I briefly discuss the most important themes and findings of the Frankfurt School circa 1929—1950 given the focus and related concepts of my project. Between 1929-31 Erich Fromm conducted research on authoritarian and anti-authoritarian tendencies in a major research project surveying over one thousand individuals who were part of the Weimar proletariat.¹⁵ Given the First World War, the Russian Revolution, the failure of the German Revolution of 1918, the world Depression of 1929, and the rise of Fascism these events all pointed to severe limitations of Marxist theory and a weakening of European working class movements. It was the events of the time that prompted a re-thinking of the social and psychological. Gabardi sums up by saying, “This required a radical rethinking of the relationship between social structure and character structure, political-economic forces and social-psychological syndromes, the material and the mental. What especially needed re-examination was the exact relation between the structures and dynamics of socialization (self, family, education, and workplace) and the economy and state (Gabardi 1987:167). This kind of analysis was a natural fit for Fromm, a trained psychoanalyst and someone highly interested in the social as well (the social-psychological approach).

The Frankfurt Labor Study of 1929, is viewed by many as critical because it offered a rare insight into, “the subjective character structure of the German working class during the late Weimar Republic in relation to its objective situation and

¹⁵ It should be pointed out that Max Horkheimer was working toward understanding the working classes in Germany as well. From 1926-1931 Horkheimer wrote a series of essays under the pseudonym “Heinrich Regius” pointing out his vision for a social theory that moved far beyond a reductionist Marxist approach. Smith summarizes, “Although faithful to Marx’s view of capitalism, Horkheimer believed that Marx’s labor theory of value can provide only the foundation of a social theory. Without a critique of political psychology the critique of political economy is unable to account for the most essential facts of politics: above all, the fact that the proletariat is *divided* (Smith 1998:60).

conscious political outlook” (Gabardi 1987:166). The survey was distributed between 1929-1931 in west and central Germany to approximately 3,300 workers (Smith 1998:65). Fromm’s study sought to look simultaneously at data concerning group specific attitudes and personality structure of individuals (Fromm [1939] 1984:41). The study sampled manual and white collar workers (collecting about eleven hundred completed surveys) and included 271 items—some objective and some open-ended questions requiring psychoanalytic interpretation.¹⁶ Fromm was brought to the Institute, in 1927, to reconcile Freud and Marx and develop an analytic social psychology that would seek to “understand unconsciously motivated behavior in terms of the effect of the socio-economic substructure on basic psychic drives” (Jay 1973:92). In other words, Fromm initiated the Frankfurt School’s revival of empirical social psychology. The two most important concepts probed were the working class and authority. Fromm came to the Frankfurt School from the Psychoanalytic Institute in Berlin and, thus, urged “the construction of a unified social theory on the dual basis of Marxist sociology and psychoanalysis” (Smith 1998:63). The primary findings from this early study was the assumption that working class individuals were uniformly anti-authoritarian and antithetical to authority was demonstrably false. As Smith (1998) points out:

The overall results were disturbing. On the one hand, for a fair number of left-wing respondents, there was a ‘far-reaching accord between personality and party program. These people wanted freedom, equality, and happiness for all: they hated war and sympathized with the oppressed. Their convictions and commitment were passionate and strong.’ This was Fromm’s *Revolutionärer* group. Others, however, were *Ambivalenter*—and still others were largely authoritarian.

Therefore, from the beginning of Fromm’s tenure at the Frankfurt School he was aware of the fact that authoritarian tendencies occurred on a continuum and, in fact, many individuals were ambivalent to authority and were vulnerable to swing one way or another—toward more or less authoritarian tendencies. These studies were a

¹⁶ The final number of participants was 584. Several hundred questionnaires were lost due to Fromm’s forced emigration of the Institute to the United States in 1933 (Fromm [1929] 1984:2). For the time the study can be viewed as a rare attempt at the synthesis of qualitative and quantitative techniques of research as well as macro-level and micro-level modes of analysis.

precursor to Fromm et al.'s pivotal study, in 1936, *Studien über Autorität und Familie*, his 1941 book *Escape from Freedom*, as well as the 1950 collaboration *The Authoritarian Personality* (with contributions from Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson and Sanford). A bit more discussion of each of these research projects is warranted.

In 1936 a two-volume research report was published by Horkheimer, Fromm and Marcuse titled *Studien über Autorität und Familie*. In a theoretical essay Fromm wrote for the investigation he attempts to provide conceptual tools to analyze relations between authority and family; he sought to identify, “the psychological impulses which cause people to submit to authority, and which make this submission pleasurable without regard to the nature of the commands” (as cited by Kellner 1991; Fromm 1936:908). At this point in the thinking of Fromm he followed the theoretical underpinnings of Freud and focused on development of the super-ego as the “internalization of social authority” (Kellner 1991). Fromm goes on to describe the family as a key cog in the production of a strong super-ego that can then facilitate the repression of rebellious impulses—in this case rebelling against authoritarian political structures. If individuals have weak super-egos they are more likely to develop a ‘masochistic character’ (resulting from repression and sublimation of instinctual drives, reaction formations, and socialization processes), which is bound up with sadism (Kellner 1991). Therefore, Fromm is arguing that in authoritarian societies the sado-masochistic character structure reigns supreme and can lead to disastrous consequences. Kellner further summarizes Fromm’s findings, “The masochistic character derives pleasure both from submission to higher authorities and from imposing authority on lower strata. This character type thus helps reproduce authority and contributes to an increase in social domination and aggression” (Kellner 1991).¹⁷ Fromm pinpoints the starting point for the production of weak super-egos with ‘authority of the father in the family,’ but also says when economic conditions worsen and social anxiety grew the power of social authorities often become more prominent submitting individuals to more direct domination in society (Kellner 1991). Fromm,

¹⁷ Interestingly, the dual presence of submission to authority and aggression toward out-groups will spring forth as pivotal in the work of Bob Altemeyer’s survey research of Right-Wing Authoritarianism.

therefore, calls for a rebellion against irrational authority and the development of a strong ego which does not garner pleasure from either subordination or domination. Fromm's work in 1936 provided the impetus for an even larger study in 1939 of the Weimar proletariat, which is discussed next.

In Fromm's Weimar Study he maps out a, "Social-psychological field research project on the unconscious attitudes of working people professing to be politically leftist" (Funk 2007:2; Fromm 1980a). Fromm reported the breakdown of his respondents by political party as the following: 82% belonged to the Social Democratic and Communist parties, 53% were Social Democrats, and 29% were Communists. Nazis made up an "insignificantly small" percentage of the total sample ([1939] 1984:48). Given the fracturing of the 'Social Democrats' the Institute sought to understand if they would successfully unite and fight totalitarianism or fold under the pressure. On the surface it might seem as if these factions would surely resist Fascism, but Fromm wanted to understand more deeply not just what someone said, but *why* he said it. Therefore, the Institute wanted to discover not only the structure of the workers' worldview, but also, their *character structure* (Smith 1998:67). As Smith points out, "Underlying an 'official' viewpoint there may be a mixed motive, or a contrary impulse" (Smith 1998:68). Also, Fromm's Weimar Study sought to construct 'syndromes' based on the conflation of attitudes revealed in the responses to the survey items. Fromm notes, "In order to gain a picture of the various aspects of the respective personalities, a technique was developed which enabled us to construct a 'syndrome' of the attitudes of each respondent...we were chiefly interested to study the relationship between party membership and character structure in order that we might form a picture of the depth and consistency of the individual's political opinions" (Fromm [1939] 1984:61). This is precisely where my research fits in with the spirit of the Frankfurt School researchers. It could very well be the case that to suggest some individuals in American society (or any society for that matter) are pro-death and destruction would seem outlandish given their responses to superficially worded polls. However, upon closer inspection (via in-depth interviews imparting vignette-style methodologies) it could be deduced that indeed there are certain character structural factors that encourage necrophilia (love of death) over biophilia

(love of life). Nevertheless, Fromm's Weimar study was clearly a springboard to his 1941 classic *Escape from Freedom*. The main findings from that work are summarized next.

In 1941 Fromm produced the book *Escape from Freedom* which gave many of the ideas in Fromm's previous work wide popularity. This work offered the sado-masochistic character as the core of the authoritarian personality. Unlike in 1936 where he posited the sado-masochistic personality to be rooted in sexuality, in "Escape from Freedom" he argued it was based on, "the 'existentialist' categories of alienation and symbiotic relatedness" (Jay 1973:128). Fromm outlines three mechanisms or directions individuals go in order to disconnect (or escape) from freedom: authoritarianism, destructiveness, and automaton conformity (Fromm 1941a). Authoritarianism in this context refers to the co-mingling of submission and domination in individual personalities. Individuals tending toward authoritarianism allow others to dominate them in certain circumstances (masochism) and by the same token try to dominate and control the behavior of others beneath them (sadism). For Fromm the authoritarian submits to those who are higher up than them and simultaneously steps on those who are below. Additionally, destructiveness is rooted in the "unbearableness of individual powerlessness in comparison with the world outside of myself by destroying it" (Fromm 1941a:177). Further, Fromm points to the sheer amount of destructiveness in society (war, death, destruction and so on) and believes it has to do with individuals, "react[ing] to attacks which result from a specific situation; as reaction to attacks on one's own or others' life and integrity, or on ideas which one is identified with. This kind of destructiveness is the natural and necessary concomitant of one's affirmation of life" (1941a:178). Fromm points to love, duty, conscience, and patriotism as often being used to disguise the destructiveness of others or oneself. It is also in this book that Fromm discusses the tendency for individuals to trend toward loving life or death to varying degrees. Fromm summarizes, "...the drive for life and the drive for destruction are not mutually independent factors but are in a reversed interdependence. The more the drive toward life is thwarted, the stronger is the drive toward destruction; the more life is realized, the less is the strength of destructiveness. *Destructiveness is the outcome*

of unlived life [emphasis Fromm] (Fromm 1941a:182). Therefore, Fromm was arguing that if the dynamic of destructiveness was prescient in a society (perhaps in the form of the destruction of the middle and working classes or the obsession with asceticism in Protestantism) it only made sense that some individuals would trend toward isolation and “suppression of individual expansiveness” (1941a:183). Automaton conformity had to do with the idea that sometimes in societies individuals cease to be their true selves and opt for adoption of the type of personality proffered by their culture. Another major concept that was discussed at length in “Escape from Freedom” was social character. A brief summation of how Fromm conceptualizes social character is next.

Fromm defines social character as, “...the essential nucleus of the character structure of most members of a group which has developed as the result of the basic experiences and mode of life common to that group” (1941a:276). Also, Fromm believed changing one’s character was difficult, but possible. Character was developed early in life by family, community, society, cultural factors, and genetics. Toward the end of EFF Fromm summarizes his approach to social psychology and social character:

We believe that man is primarily a social being, and not, as Freud assumes, primarily self-sufficient and only secondarily in need of others in order to satisfy his instinctual needs. In this sense, we believe that individual psychology is fundamentally social psychology or, in Sullivan’s terms, the psychology of interpersonal relationships; the key problem of psychology is that of the particular kind of relatedness of the individual toward the world, not that of satisfaction or frustration of single instinctual desires (1941a:290).¹⁸

Research conducted by Fromm in the 1930s and 40s became a precursor to studies of authoritarianism, Fascism, and anti-democratic trends in the 1950 classic *The Authoritarian Personality*. This essential piece of scholarship is outlined next.

On the verge of the horrific events of the Holocaust and World War II, the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research (1923-1950)— including German and American scholars—forged a new path of social theory that changed

¹⁸ I will return to, and expand upon, Fromm’s conception of social character in chapter 6.

profoundly studies of social psychology then and now. Early Frankfurt School theorists including Walter Benjamin, Max Horkheimer, Theodore Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswick, Daniel Levinson, Newitt Sanford, Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse and more recently Jürgen Habermas sought to move beyond the tired mantra of traditional theory: crisis breeds revolt, and take seriously the convergence of Marxism, Weber's sociology, and Freud's psychoanalysis. Frankfurt School scholarship is often believed to have been instituted in three phases. The bulk of my interest in Frankfurt School theory and empirical research was from the first phase—in which the focus was on personality, family and authority structures as well as the realm of aesthetics and mass culture. Instead of taking for granted the fact that individuals in the German working class were prone to anti-authoritarianism the Frankfurt School theorists argued these individuals were complex, divided and often fraught with contradictions—including a proclivity toward *ambivalence* (Smith 1998:35).

Therefore, the Frankfurt scholars linked political attitudes to personality and class. *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950) laid the groundwork for studies of authoritarianism, ethnocentrism, anti-democratic tendencies, and dogmatic attitudes. Adorno, specifically studied pre-fascist personality tendencies viewing authoritarianism as a continuous variable (never just a detached distinction between fascists and non-fascists). The important continuum for Adorno was the continuum that runs from antidemocratic to democratic. It was never expected that such a huge number of people would support an authoritarian regime, such as Nazism, which ultimately killed millions of individuals. The seemingly blind following of the horrors of Nazi Germany led these researchers to delve deeply into Freud, Marx, Weber and other classical theorists for inspiration (or a way to understand the potential causes of the Third Reich crisis). One general proposition, in this early work regarding overall prejudice, can be summarized in the following excerpt, “Political, economic, and social convictions of an individual often formed a broad and coherent pattern, as if bound together by ‘mentality’ or ‘spirit,’ and this pattern is an expression of deep lying trends in his [her] personality” (Adorno et al. 1950:1). Moreover, members of the Frankfurt School believed that individual differences were real and far-reaching, that personality had psychodynamic roots, and that variations in psychocultural

experience (in early childhood, in the family, in the workplace) produced major variations in attitudes and character structure. The work of the Frankfurt School scholars took a stark departure from behaviorist and sociobiology theories that were prevalent at the time and still are evident in many theoretical perspectives today (Fromm 1973).

Also affiliated with authoritarianism was the concept of ethnocentrism. Ethnocentrism was essentially the starting point for the researcher's inquiry into anti-democratic/authoritarian tendencies. D. Levinson, a member of the research team notes, "Ethnocentrism refers to group relations generally; it has to do not only with numerous groups toward which the individual has hostile opinions and attitudes, but, equally important, with groups toward which he [she] is positively disposed" (Adorno et al. 1950:102). Adorno et al. found that authoritarian attitudes were deeply woven into one's personality and not based on rational thought processes. They asserted that: "Evidence from the present study confirms...that a man who is hostile toward one minority group is very likely to be hostile against a wide variety of others. There is no conceivable rational basis for such generalization; and, what is more striking, prejudice against, or totally uncritical acceptance of, a particular group often exists in the absence of any experience with members of that group" (Adorno et al. 1950:9). Another crucial concept the "Berkeley Team" gained a better understanding of, were so-called "out-groups" and "in-groups." Levinson points out, "Ethnocentrism is conceived as an ideological system pertaining to groups and group relations. A distinction is made between *in-groups* (those groups with which the individual identifies himself) and *out-groups* (with which he does not have a sense of belonging and which are regarded as antithetical to the in-groups) (1950:104).¹⁹ The concept of ethnocentrism is clearly still relevant as Kinder and Kam (2009) recently published *Us Against Them: Ethnocentric Foundations of American Opinion*. The book documents the connection of ethnocentrism and several contemporary issues: enemies abroad, America first attitude, Strangers in the Land (immigration), Straight versus Gay

¹⁹ Kinder and Kam (2009) have continued to pursue research on ethnocentrism in a book titled, *Us Against Them: Ethnocentric Foundations of American Opinion*. One of the chapters is devoted to a discussion of how ethnocentric attitudes are connected to public sentiments regarding wars abroad (the title of the chapter is "Enemies Abroad").

(homosexuality), Women's place (gender roles in America), Us versus Them in the American Welfare State (hatred of downtrodden in society), and Ethnocentrism in Black and White (racial tensions in U.S.). Nevertheless, the Frankfurt scholars concluded that authoritarianism consisted of nine traits: conventionalism, authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, anti-intraception, superstition and stereotypy, power and "toughness," destructiveness and cynicism, projectivity, and finally an exaggerated concern with sexual affairs of other individuals in the society. In the past several decades psychologist Bob Altemeyer has studied Right-Wing Authoritarianism extensively and reduced authoritarianism into three basic tendencies: conventionalism, submissiveness and aggressiveness (Altemeyer 1981, 1988, 1996, 1998a, 1998b, 1999, 2004, 2007; Altemeyer and Hunsberger 2004). In my research I have implemented a 10-item version of Altemeyer's Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale as one tool for understanding an individual's tendency for democracy or authoritarianism. It should also be noted that at the end of the introduction to *The Authoritarian Personality*, the researchers state, "The intensive study of representative middle scorers should form a central part of any future research along the lines of the present study" (Adorno et al. 1950:27). After having worked in this area for some years now it is still quite obvious that most researchers, since 1950, have overlooked this important group. With the increasingly 'divided' political scene in American politics (and the race by politicians to move toward the center to gain favor with swing voters and those who are 'ambivalent') it seems highly relevant to highlight the views of the middle-scorers (which is highlighted in depth in chapter 5).

Erich Fromm's pre-1950 work has already been mentioned, but his work on necrophilia and biophilia should be highlighted as well along-side his contributions to social psychology, social character, and authoritarianism. Fromm's discussion of necrophilia (love of death) and biophilia (love of life) are particularly relevant to my project (Fromm 1973:367-481, 1964a, 1964c). In an essay 'Creators and Destroyers' and in his book *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness* (1973) Fromm says, "The necrophilous person is driven by the desire to transform the organic into the inorganic, to approach life mechanically, as if all living persons were things. All living processes, feelings, and thoughts are transformed into things. To the necrophilous

person justice means correct division, and they are willing to kill or die for the sake of what they call, justice. Law and order for them are idols, and everything that threatens law and order is felt as a satanic attack against their supreme values” (Fromm 1964:23). This rather pessimistic essay regarding the prospects of a peaceful humane world was no doubt influence by the nuclear war threat at the time. Given the current quagmires in Iraq and Afghanistan a fairly easy parallel could be drawn given the death and destruction that occurs every single day in the Middle East. Fromm questioned the notion that there is a universal ‘love of life’ and argued that perhaps there are segments of the populace who do not love life but tend toward death, corpses, decay, feces and dirt. Necrophilia’s are those people who love to talk about sickness, burials, and death. In terms of understanding what the potential causes are of necrophilia Fromm argues that is not a ‘normal biological tendency’ but a pathological phenomenon and underneath our ‘spiritual traditions’ (which he believes advocates love of life) there lies an ‘indifference’ to life and/or an attraction to death (1964:24-25). His use of the word *indifference* is particularly interesting in the context of my research questions for this project. It is also worth mentioning that Fromm theorized that the tendency toward necrophilia could be attributed to the “nature of our bureaucratized, industrial, mass civilization. Our approach to life becomes increasingly mechanical” (1964:25). Fromm’s exit question is, “How is it possible to create a humanist industrialism as against the bureaucratic mass industrialism that rules our lives today?” (1964:25). Again this discussion shows clearly his Freudian Marxist approach as well.²⁰

The Pivotal Research of Altemeyer et al. for Contemporary Studies of Authoritarianism

Political psychologists Bob Altemeyer, Sam McFarland, Gerda Lederer and Jos Melen are key researchers in the empirical study of antidemocratic, authoritarian, ethnocentric, anti-Semitic and political-economic conservative attitudes and beliefs. Altemeyer, since 1970, has been involved in an ongoing project to understand and test ‘Right-Wing Authoritarianism’ which is exceedingly close in definition to the original

²⁰ However it should also be noted that he is not a strict Freudian, but rather uses Freud as an inspiration for his theories. Social structure clearly matters to Fromm and should be combined with psychoanalysis.

‘Fascism’ personality type (Altemeyer 1981, 1988, 1996, 1998a, 1998b, 1999, 2004; 2007; Altemeyer and Hunsberger 2004). Altemeyer has given the RWA (and many others as well) scale to thousands of students and their parents from the University of Manitoba, Canada. The reliability and validity of his scale has remained high—with alpha’s (i.e., inter-item reliabilities) .85 and above. Altemeyer, McFarland, Lederer, and Meloen approach the study of authoritarianism from a positivistic angle focusing heavily on testing and re-testing various Likert-type scales (the most important being the RWA scale). As a result of the horrific events of the Second World War and the Holocaust scholars in Germany wanted to understand why so many people would be willing to go along with the Nazi regime and not question the barbaric actions that were taking place. As previously mentioned, *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950) brought together several of the key Frankfurt School researchers and showed that tendencies toward authoritarianism were part of a person’s personality structure and the following attributes were consistently found in people who tended toward being *authoritarian/antidemocratic*: conventionalism, submissiveness, aggression, anti-intraception, superstition and stereotypy, power and toughness, preoccupation with sex, and projectivity/cynicism/destructiveness. Altemeyer simplifies the definition a bit by listing the three crucial characteristics: conventionalism, submission, and aggression.²¹ In general individuals who are ‘authoritarian’ are submissive to authority figures that the individual deems as worthy, aggressive toward various ‘out-groups’ and conventional in their view of ‘traditional’ values and beliefs that the ‘way things used to be’ are much better for society. In other words, conventionality refers to getting back to, ‘a high degree of adherence to the social conventions that are perceived to be endorsed by society and its established authorities’ (Altemeyer 1996:6). Central to the study of right-wing authoritarianism is the tendency for individuals to hold many prejudices in reference to a diverse range of ‘out-groups.’

Perhaps the most important empirical finding in the past several years has been the predictive power of right-wing authoritarianism and Sidanius and Pratto’s social dominance orientation (Sidanius and Pratto 1999; Sidanius, Pratto, Van Laar, and

²¹ The categories of aggression and submission also go back to Fromm’s contribution to studies of authoritarianism where he labeled it sadism and masochism.

Levin 2004; Van Hiel and Mervielde 2005). Three proximal processes, according to SDT theory, drive group-based social hierarchy: aggregated individual discrimination, aggregated institutional discrimination, and behavioral asymmetry (1999:39). The authors go on to summarize, “These proximal processes are regulated, in part, by legitimizing myths. The extent to which an individual endorses legitimizing myths depends on whether he or she generally endorses, desires, and supports a system of group-based social hierarchy or not” (1999:39). Moreover, the ‘legitimizing myths’ include ideas like: racism, sexism, classism, nationalism, the Monroe Doctrine, Divine Right of Kings, protestant work ethic, negative stereotypes, universal rights of man, universalism, multiculturalism, socialism, and Christian brotherhood. Unlike the other social structural theories it regards individual differences in personality within these groups as crucial elements in maintaining the hierarchical system. The heart of social dominance theory concerns itself with identifying the psychological, ideological, and institutional mechanisms that produce and sustain these groups-based social hierarchies.²² Within social dominance theory, then, ‘the American dilemma’ is a special case of more general forces that tend to maintain the relative hegemony of some social groups over others (Sears et al. 2000:26-27). Sidanius et al. (2004) reiterate the goal of social dominance theory by noting, “The theory views all of the familiar forms of group-based oppression (e.g., group based discrimination, racism, ethnocentrism, classism, sexism) as special cases of a more general tendency for humans to form and maintain group-based hierarchy...Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) asks why human societies tend to be organized as group-based hierarchies...[focuses on] the universal and exquisitely subtle forms of discrimination and oppression that large numbers of people face in their everyday lives all over the planet” (Sidanius et al. 2004:846-847).

Altemeyer differentiates RWAs from SDOs by stating that RWAs are often fearful, self-righteous, fundamentalist, conforming, badly need structure, basically kind, hostile to sexual non-conformists, justify punishment and believe that life is a cosmic game of good v. evil. SDOs, on the other hand, tend to be self-confident, a-

²² SDT has often been misconstrued as being psychologically reductionist, conceptually redundant, biologically reductionist, and justifying hierarchy. In a 2004 essay in *Political Psychology* Sidanius et al. refute these claims reverently (Sidanius, Pratto, van Laar, and Levin 2004).

moral, not as interested in religion, scornful of conformity, rather cruel than kind, indifferent to sexual non-conformists, enjoy punishment—even if no real cause and punishment is not justifiable, and believed that the world is dominated largely by the ‘survival of the fittest’ mentality. Much of Altemeyer's research and many others have shown that indeed RWA and SDO are distinct personality types (shown in a pitting experiment by McFarland and Adelson to correlate only modestly), but when paired together are strong measures for predicting a whole host of disdainful attitudes and beliefs (McFarland and Adelson 1996; Henry, Sidanius, Levin and Pratto 2005). McFarland and Adelson were also able to show that RWA and SDO each contributed independently to variance in ethnocentrism. Altemeyer's (1998a) essay titled “The Other ‘Authoritarian Personality’” provides a plethora of evidence that RWA and SDO together can have significant predictive power—what he terms a ‘lethal union’ (Altemeyer 1998). Additionally, McFarland and Adelson's essay “An Omnibus Study of Personality and Prejudice” (1996) made a rather astonishing discovery—which has been replicated many times—that together SDO and RWA scores can account for *most* of the variance in prejudice scores (including several different forms of prejudice). Moreover, when RWA/SDO are coupled together a scattering of studies has shown power to predict racist, homophobic, ethnocentric and punitive attitudes (Van Hiel and Mervielde 2005; Capps 2002). Altemeyer's essay—“Highly Dominating, Highly Authoritarian Personalities”—also charted individuals who scored highly on both the RWA and SDO (Altemeyer 2004). These individuals (he surveyed nearly 4,000 Canadian students and 2,600 of their parents) showed that ‘dominating authoritarians’ are among the most prejudiced persons in society and bring about the worst elements of each kind of personality. Namely, these individuals tend to be, “...power hungry, unsupportive of equality, manipulative, amoral...while also being religiously ethnocentric and dogmatic” (Altemeyer 2004:421). Altemeyer argues that the good news is these folks tend to be a very small percentage of the population, but on the other hand, often “..can have considerable impact on society because they are well positioned to become the leaders of prejudiced right-wing political movements” (2004:421). Finally, in 2003 Altemeyer was involved in an interesting experiment/simulation with several nineteen-year-old students called the

Global Change Game. On the first night of the simulation he got together ‘right-wing authoritarian followers’ and on the second night added a small number of ‘dominating authoritarians’ (high RWAs and SDOs) and wanted to see what the world would look like if these two groups inhabited the planet and were the sole individuals making policy (Altemeyer 2003). The conclusions were predictable with RWAs and high RWA/SDOs leading the world into famines, wars, violence, destruction, incredible inequality, and so on. The impact of ‘double highs’ was downright scary. More specifically, Altemeyer concludes, “...high RWAs are not likely to come up with the answers to our global problems. They are far too ethnocentric. Perhaps the most striking aspect of the simulation was how automatically RWAs, placed in a room filled with *people rather like themselves*, still divided the world into small enclaves of ‘Us’ versus the global ‘Them’” (2003:168). Also, “...high RWAs create—by their submissive tendencies—an easy opportunity for social dominators to attain power. And social dominators who are *also* right-wing authoritarians will be more acceptable to rank-and-file authoritarians than will social dominators who are not. So Double Highs have a built-in advantage over others in the game of Reach for the Top, as they have a ready cadre of people with similar economic and political leanings, steeped in the same prejudices and looking for just the kind of leadership they intend to provide” (2003:169). Finally, McFarland (2005) conducted a study of Western Kentucky students focusing on RWAs and SDOs and their support or non-support of the 2003 invasion of Iraq—the two main reasons being WMDs and the connection of Hussein with al-Qaeda. Predictably individuals who scored high on RWA and SDO were more likely to favor the invasion, more likely to believe Iraq was a real threat, and possess a ‘blind patriotism’ that supported Bush’s policies with absolute faith in his authority. Also, SDOs were likely to not take into account (or care about) the potential ‘human costs’ (namely loss of innocent life) that the invasion would inevitably cause (2005:360-363).

Critics of Altemeyer often point out that his samples are not representative of the entire population, and therefore less credible given the fact that students and their parents are most often the groups surveyed. However, in *The Authoritarian Specter* (1996), there are some thirty-one studies cited (some tapping students and some

testing a more ‘representative’ sample) and his scale(s) consistently stood up to the challenge. Further, other researchers working on authoritarianism have used Altemeyer’s scale and gotten similar results (McFarland, and Adelson 1996; McFarland et al. 1993; Meloen 1999, 1998, 1994, 1991; Meloen, Van der Linden and Hand de Witte 1996; Stone, Lederer, and Christie 1992; Capps 2002; Van Hiel and Mervielde 2005). It is quite impressive also that these attitudinal scales have been tested in so many different populations (not just in North America but in many countries around the globe). The concept of authoritarianism and its derivatives now has a fairly long history of being tested and solidified as a more than viable variable in describing politics on the Right and a whole host of other attitudes (McFarland and Adelson 1996; Meloen 1999, 1998, 1994, 1991, Meloen, Van der Linden and Hand de Witte 1996; Stone et al. 1992). Even more recently there has been a renaissance of research on authoritarianism by a more broad group of scholars, pundits, and satirists (likely due to many of the ‘extreme’ policies of the Bush administration and the social, political, and cultural implications of living in a post-9/11 era) (Dean 2006; Frank 2004; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Smith and Hanley 2007; Smolik 2008; Stenner 2005).

Two other key constructs have guided my research project—most notably items from the 2005 Baylor study (that directly address authoritarian tendencies of fundamentalist Christian church attendees) and David Sears’ ‘Symbolic Racism’ items (items that focus on modern forms of racism). Altemeyer clearly shows significant links of RWA to religious fundamentalism (Altemeyer and Hunsberger constructed a ‘Religious Fundamentalism Scale’ in 1990). In one 1991 parent sample Altemeyer (1996) reported a .68 positive correlation between RWA and religious fundamentalism (Altemeyer 1996:159). Bader et al.’s 2005 study implemented items similar to the religious fundamentalism scale focusing even more specifically on individual attitudes toward the nature of God and views toward the meaning of the Bible (word of God/taken literally or book of interesting stories). Sears’s ‘Symbolic Racism’ scale has been in use since 2000 and asks respondents to assess the current status of blacks and whites and whether or not affirmative action is still necessary. Dunbar and Simonova (2003) were able to show a positive correlation between RWA and Sears’

Symbolic Racism measure in samples in the United States and Czech Republic (Dunbar and Simonava 2003). Ekehammar et al. (2004) also corroborate the connection between RWA and ‘generalized prejudice’ (measured partially by Sears’ measure) (Ekehammar et. al. 2004:463). A few of the Bader et al.’s items and Sears’ racism scale were included in the present study to find out if they have predictive power for collateral damage in Iraq and/or the criminal justice system.

Political Scientists Feaver, Gelpi, & Reifler’s Research on Casualty Tolerance




Figure 3: Feaver, Gelpi and Reifler Model of Tolerance for Casualties in War.

In recent years Political scientists Peter Feaver, Christopher Gelpi, and Jason Reifler are considered, by many, to be key players in research on public opinion and casualty tolerance in war (Feaver 2001; Feaver and Gelpi 2004, 1999; Feaver and Kohn 2001, 2000; Gelpi and Feaver 2002; Gelpi and Mueller 2006; Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler 2009, 2007, 2005/2006; Gelpi 2009a, 2009b).²³ Given the sheer volume and

²³ It is also worth noting that from 2004—2007 Peter Feaver worked for President Bush as the ‘Special Advisor for Strategic Planning and Institutional Reform on the National Security Council Staff’ at the White House. It is widely speculated (and been confirmed by several sources) that Feaver was a speech writer and key advisor in pushing forward the ‘stay the course’ philosophy in Iraq that Bush advocated in his second term. Feaver relies heavily on his research from public surveys to argue that the public is not as ‘casualty phobic’ as many think and if victory can be envisioned public support for a war like Iraq will be sustained. It can be speculated that the research of Feaver et al. helped convince the Bush

empirically grounded nature of Gelpi and Feaver's scholarship they are the leading voice in research on public views of death in war (American soldier casualties especially). In their book *Choosing Your Battles* (2004) they rely on survey data collected by the Triangle Institute for Security, 1998-1999 and attempt to query whether the public will support wars even when the costs (read U.S. military casualties are high). The dates are relevant as the data gathered was pre 9/11. The three main conclusions from their 2004 book *Choosing Your Battles* were: (1) civilians without military experience are more willing than soldiers to favor the use of force—the so called 'chicken hawks' (this is especially the case when the intervention is not directly related to procuring 'vital national interests,' (2) veteran opinion corresponds with military opinion or veterans in the civilian elite give responses that track more closely with active duty military officers than with non-veterans in the civilian elite and most importantly (3) the idea that the American public is 'casualty phobic' is a myth—if the public believes in the mission and is convinced that 'victory is achievable' they will be open to a significant number of casualties. Therefore, Gelpi and Feaver note, "The public is *defeat* phobic, not *casualty* phobic" (Gelpi and Feaver 2004:97). Their arguments are framed and argued using rational choice theory—in this case the question for FGR is whether the public is too sensitive to wartime casualties to see a war like Iraq through to the bitter end. The researchers compare the Iraq invasion and war with dwindling support for wars in Korea and Vietnam (and the small campaign in Somalia in 1992 and 1993).

In the subsequent years after publishing their 2004 manuscript they have remained relevant in proposing the idea that under certain circumstances the public will endure significant numbers of casualties in war—if the potential benefits outweigh the costs (Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler 2005/2006; Gelpi and Mueller 2006; Gelpi, Reifler, and Feaver 2007; Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler 2009; Gelpi 2009a). The FGR team categorizes the American public in four groups (in regard to support for Iraq invasion and subsequent occupation). According to FGR, on the extreme edges of the political spectrum are the 'die-hard hawks' (who will support any intervention

administration that a 'surge' of troops in Iraq *could* be spun to be a popular policy for dealing with the quagmire in Iraq (Barrett 2005). Further, their rationalist approach springs from research by Jentleson (1992) and Larson (1996).

and will stick with the president and the troops through thick and thin) and the ‘die-hard doves’ (who will not support any intervention under any circumstances). FGR believe that Solid Hawks are 30-35% of the public and Solid Doves are 10-30% of the populace. Neither of the ‘extreme’ groups constitutes a majority and so those ‘in the middle’ or ‘ambivalent’ should theoretically, at least, drive public opinion and public policy. Therefore, according to Gelpi and Feaver the two most important groups for maintaining solid public support for interventionist policies—‘Defeat Phobics’ and ‘Casualty Phobics.’ Casualty Phobics are estimated to be 15-20% of the total and may be willing to support intervention, but only so long as it remains essentially free of casualties and costs. The remaining 15-40% (pretty big gap here) consists of ‘Defeat Phobics’ who are less inclined to give up hope if there are significant casualties, but quick to do so if they begin to sense that the final outcome will fall short of victory (Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler 2006).²⁴ To sum up, therefore, FGR’s main thesis is, “When the public appears to be confident of a U.S. victory, casualties have little effect on popular support. [Only] if the public’s confidence is shaken [do] casualties erode support (2005/2006:23). I would like to attempt to tease out the nuances of the two groups ‘in the middle’ and understand in a more direct way the variables that could be pushing people to support or not support of interventionist wars and the subsequent loss of life that accompanies these wars and use of the death penalty for the wrongly convicted.

Much of Feaver and Gelpi’s work is a reaction to, and split from, the scholarship of John Mueller (1973) who argued that public opinion (support) concerning the Korean and Vietnam wars relied heavily on the number of American casualties. More specifically, Mueller contended that ‘sensitivity to casualties declines as the number of war deaths increases’ and so the American public is essentially casualty phobic (Mueller 1973). Many are critical of Mueller’s hypothesis (Burk 1999, Jentleson 1992, Larson 1996, Gartner, Segura and Wilkening 1997, Kull

²⁴ FGR, in prior research, has termed these four groups as ‘Bush Base’ (49%), ‘Noble Failure’ (meaning these folks believe it was the right decision to attack Iraq, but we will ultimately be unsuccessful in the mission) (8%), ‘Pottery Barn’ (meaning these folks didn’t agree with the initial invasion, but believe in victory and finishing the job—it you broke it, fix it” (15%), and ‘Vietnam Syndrome’ (meaning folks who didn’t favor going in and advocate for immediate withdrawal) (29%) (Gelpi, Reifler, and Feaver 2005/2006).

and Destler 1999, and Berinsky 2006), but Feaver and Gelpi have been perhaps the most forthright in proposing an alternative hypothesis to Mueller. The main thesis of Feaver and Gelpi (and also Jason Reifler and Richard Kohn) has been that support for the war hinges on initial support for military action and the belief in the success of the war—their research has been conducted since the 2003 invasion and includes the use of primarily survey research. Therefore, the dependent variable in their research is *individual casualty tolerance* and their main independent variables are *initial support for the war* and *evaluation of war success* (Feaver and Gelpi 2004).²⁵ To put it yet another way, Feaver, Gelpi and Reifler (FGR) claim that the “public’s tolerance for the human costs of war is primarily shaped by the intersection of two crucial attitudes: beliefs about the rightness or wrongness of the war and beliefs about a war’s likely success...[with the] likelihood of success matter[ing] most” (Gelpi et al 2005:8).²⁶ FGRs approach is to measure war support with one dependent variable (individual casualty tolerance) and they advocate a ‘causal relationship’ between these variables (when the 2 independent variables may be mere *indicators* of support for the war, not main *causes* for support). Incidentally, a few scholars have criticized their research for this fact (Berinsky 2007; Mueller 2005). As Smith (2007) points out the research of FGR is essentially a theory of swing voting and shifting public opinion because, “Hawks and Doves are unalterably pro-or anti-war; but the middle quartile (23%) can change its mind. FGR say that nearly two thirds of these potential changelings (15% and 8%) are inclined to stay or swing right if they believe that the war will succeed” (Smith 2007). This is precisely where my research fills a gap—by attempting to understand much more clearly these folks in the middle.

Critique’s of FGR From A Social-Psychological Point of View

From a social-psychological point of view there are several major problems with the scholarship and approach of Feaver, Gelpi and Reifler. First, FGR adhere to

²⁵ It is worth noting that FGR contend that success per se isn’t the key factor but if the public ‘expects success’ or whether they ‘count on success.’

²⁶ One key question posed by Berinsky (2007) is ‘how exactly should support for war be measured?’ (2007:4). It is clear that methodologically this question is not easily answered and Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler’s thesis assumes a ‘causal relationship’ that may be highly suspect—especially given the fact that the way they are measuring ‘support’ is incredibly narrow. My question, of course, is what about collateral damage? What role do the public’s views on CD have on the questions raised by Gelpi et al.?

a rational choice theory where the public is believed to make decisions about loss of lives in war using a rather simple ‘cost-benefit calculation’ (Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler 2005/2006:12). In other words, they try to impart a ‘pseudo-economic rationality’ and argue that under certain circumstances the public will agree to “pay the human costs of war.” However, the public isn’t personally paying the costs of war with their blood and so as Smith (2007) aptly points out, “Hence, for the non-combatant, the cost of war, if any is a imagined psychic loss, which would seem to reflect a psychological bond between the soldier and the citizen. Realizing a personal benefit (e.g., security) by ‘paying’ a cost borne by others is a pseudo-economic rationality. The purchaser is buying an outcome at someone else’s expense” (Smith 2007).²⁷ Second, they do not explore in any depth individual or group differences—asking pointedly *why* people differ in their value estimates, elasticities, and sensitivities (Smith 2007). Third, FGR adhere to a presumption of group narcissism in their research. They only focus on how Americans feel toward the loss of *American* deaths—what about the question of Iraqi deaths? Apparently to FGR the ‘rational value estimates approach’ only applies if we are discussing U.S. soldier deaths in war. When Americans think about the costs of wars do the losses of lives—especially civilian, non-combatant lives—have any bearing on the calculus of ‘Right to Invade’ and ‘Success will be achieved’? Fourth, FGR presume that everyone is anti-death: “The public would always like to assume less of this cost...” (2005/2006:10). It could be the fact (especially given many of the questions I pose in Capps’ CDT Iraq survey and many of the follow up interview items posed to individuals who were interviewed) that there are some individuals who have an appetite for death and destruction and, therefore, would not fit neatly into their categories.²⁸

²⁷ Smith asks the pertinent question: How much does the public empathetically suffer the loss of soldiers who are, in most instances, personally unknown to them? Does this vary individually, regionally, or religiously, by class or ethnicity, by age or gender?” (Smith 2007).

²⁸ As will be shown in chapter 5, I found a few individuals who had no trouble contemplating the death toll in Iraq (for both soldiers and Iraqi civilians) to be much higher than current estimates—insinuating a clear ‘appetite for death and destruction.’

Related Contemporary Research on Attitudes Toward Tolerance for Casualties in War

As might be expected there are several scholars who have critiqued, questioned, and otherwise attempted to build on the findings of FGR and a few of the most important studies will be briefly highlighted. MIT professor Adam Berinsky contends that the cost/benefit calculations of the citizenry are flawed and, instead, what matters are patterns of elite conflict and how they shape opinion concerning war (Berinsky 2001, 2007, 2009; Berinsky and Druckman 2007). Put more simply, “When political elites disagree as to the wisdom of intervention, the public divides as well. But when elites come to a common interpretation of a political reality, the public gives them great latitude to wage war” (Berinsky 2007:975). Eichenberg, Stoll and Lebo (2006) carefully study the approval ratings of George W. Bush between 2001-2006 and conclude that ‘rally events’ can have the effect of boosting approval ratings; however if casualties continue to mount and if citizens believe that civil war is likely (in Iraq for instance), then approval ratings will continue to slip.²⁹ Their findings suggest that understanding approval of the president isn’t solely based on a ‘rational’ public, but citizens’ perceptions of success and failure are most important and, therefore, “...the military strategy itself has to work” (2006:802). Karol and Miguel (2007), in an essay titled, “The Electoral Cost of War: Iraq Casualties and the 2004 U.S. Presidential Election” contend that war casualties were *the* significant factor in making the 2004 election much closer than it otherwise would have been. Specifically, they say, “We infer that were it not for the approximately 10,000 U.S. dead and wounded by election day, Bush would have won nearly 2% more of the national popular vote, carrying several additional states and winning decisively” (2007:633). By contrast, Norpoth and Sidman (2007) argue that the war helped Bush get re-elected because Bush benefited from the ‘rally’ effects (in a post 9/11 world) by keeping the topic of terrorism salient. Further, casualties from the war were trumped by most of the public having faith in the war being the right course of action. The

²⁹ Eichenberg, Stoll and Lebo conceptualize ‘rally events’ as 24 events covered intently by the mass media—things such as ‘attacks on the WTC and the Pentagon—2001,’ ‘initial air attacks in Afghanistan—2001,’ ‘Congressional approval of use of force against Iraq—2002,’ ‘War against Iraq begins with air strikes—2003,’ ‘Bush ‘Mission Accomplished’ speech—2003,’ ‘Saddam Hussein captured—2003,’ ‘Iraqi prisoner pictures (Abu Ghraib)—2004,’ ‘Bush reelection—2004,’ and ‘Iraq election—2005’ (2006:792).

researchers sum up by stating, “On election day, American voters cut through the fog of ambivalence about the war by giving the nod to the Commander-in-Chief rather than the challenger. Bush won the 2004 election because, not in spite, of the war in Iraq.” (2007:194). Boettcher and Cobb (2006) attempt to bridge the two camps—rationalist and elite driven—to argue that despite the fact that these two models could be helpful it is also important to understand the framing of the war (from both elite and media) and the role that partisanship/ideology has for driving misperceptions about the Iraq war. If the public is largely uninformed about the true costs of the war then using univariate, aggregate-level, cumulative and monotonic explanations may prove inadequate for understanding public sentiment on a deeper level. They attempt to expose the subjective rationality behind attitudes about the Iraq war but also demonstrate the marked disconnect between the objective reality of U.S. wartime casualties and how participants (mis)perceive that reality. More specifically, they find, “Actual estimates by the mass public of U.S. casualties in Iraq are widely divergent and inaccurate and do not seem to be associated with attitudes about war” (Boettcher and Cobb 2006:849). Further, they conclude: “More research is needed to penetrate the ‘black box’ that produces the perception that a tipping or breaking point has been reached and that casualties are no longer acceptable” (2006:850).

A More Nuanced Social-Psychological Approach to Casualty Tolerance – The Way Forward

As the previous discussion has shown most of the scholarship on understanding casualty tolerance for collateral damage in war has been conducted by political scientists and, therefore, little if any focus has been on underlying social-psychological attitudes or tendencies for acceptance of more or less death and destruction. There are, however, a couple of key social-psychologists who have dabbled in this realm and their contributions will now be highlighted by paying particular attention to a 2005 study by Sam McFarland and a 2008 study by Felicia Pratto and Demis Glasford. McFarland (2005b) conducted an interesting study whereby he wanted to find out the effect of authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and blind patriotism for support for the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

McFarland's findings can be summarized in the following manner: (1) both RWA and SDO correlated highly with support for the invasion, (2) RWA, but not SDO, intensified the belief that Iraq posed a threat to the U.S. by having WMDs, (3) SDO, but not RWA, intensified support for the attack by reducing concern for the likely human costs—the loss of innocent lives—that the war seemed certain to produce (McFarland 2005b:365). Further, RWA and SDO were shown to increase both nationalism and blind patriotism, but for different reasons. McFarland states, “Authoritarianism intensifies a perception of external threat and a fear of in-group disunity, and this perception and fear induce blind patriotism. Social dominance however strengthens concern for sheer superiority and unqualified identification with a powerful group.” (2005b:365-366). As in past research by Altemeyer, the combination of RWA and SDO proved highly correlated with support for the attack on Iraq (.51).

In a much more complicated project titled, “Ethnocentrism and the Value of Human Life” Pratto and Glasford (2008) probe what factors could be connected to valuing how much a human life is worth.³⁰ More specifically, the researchers hypothesized that, “...people might generally value the lives of in-group members more than those of out-group members, especially if group outcomes were said to be in competition...we [also] expected individual-difference measures that correspond with prejudice would correspond with ethnocentric valuation.” (2008:1424). Both of these hypotheses were confirmed by the findings. Pratto and Glasford summarize by saying, “Those who supported the impending war in Iraq and held more negative beliefs about Arabs, who endorsed illegal anti-humanitarian war tactics (e.g., torture), who were higher in support of group dominance, who were more identified with their nation, and who were low on empathy were especially likely to value in-group lives over out-group lives in their decisions. Thus, we found a variety of measures shown to be associated with group prejudice were able to play a predictable and significant role in the ethnocentric valuation of life” (2008:1425). As will be shown in chapter 4, my findings are similar to this study and attempt to introduce even more independent

³⁰ An important part of this study was the introduction of an Anti-Arab scale of eleven Likert-type items. When I constructed by ‘Islamophobia’ measure I implemented some of these items into my 15-item scale.

variables for understanding what factors are most salient for predicting tolerance of collateral damage in war.

Chapter 3 – Methodology/Conducting Survey Research and In-Depth Interviews

Setting and Participants

Psychologists and social psychologists for decades have surveyed, interviewed, and harassed college students to be research subjects for their studies. In sociology, however, we strive for more representative samples and so that is the reason why I chose to try and tap into the general population of the Puget Sound region and not just exclusively target college students. My initial goal was to get 600 people to take the survey. I was able to get 210 to participate – only about a third of my goal – but what I have given up in *quantity* I have gained in the quality of the responses and the overall sample is more representative of American society (the Puget Sound region more specifically) than if I had focused on a large student sample.³¹ In addition to the surveys, I also conducted fifteen in-depth interviews—nine of which were with middle-scorers—in order to add depth and nuance to the critical question of *why* individuals who took the survey think the way they do about innocent loss of life in war and the criminal justice system. The survey included several items that helped to identify people who tended toward ambiguity or ambivalence. Also, I discuss in more depth in Chapter 5, how I selected middle-scorers to interview based on if they scored ambivalently on the important psychological measures—the independent and dependent variables.

Demographically the city of Seattle has an estimated population of 578,700 and a metropolitan population of approximately 4 million (often referred to as the Puget Sound). Seattle is often regarded as the birthplace of grunge music and has a reputation for heavy coffee consumption. Beginning in the mid-1990s Seattle was one of the hubs of the dot-com bubble centered around the development of software technology. Of course, Seattle is also home to Microsoft and many other companies involved with internet development and telecommunications (Amazon.com,

³¹ One very obvious way that the sample is more diverse than student samples is the fact that 34% of were 51 years old or older.

RealNetworks, and T-Mobile to name a few). When the 'new economy' was 'booming,' in the mid-late 1990s, the success brought an influx of new citizens and saw Seattle's real estate become some of the most expensive in the country. Boeing Corporation has also been a major employer in Seattle, but in 2001 moved their corporate headquarters to Chicago. The Seattle area is still, however, home to Boeing's narrow-body plant (in Renton) and Boeing's wide-body plant (in Everett). The dot-com crash of 2001 clearly hit the Puget Sound region particularly hard, but despite this setback it still has one of the highest per capita average incomes in the U.S. Washington is the twelfth richest state in the U.S. with a per capita income of \$22,973 (2000) and a personal per capita income of \$33,332 (2003). Seattle was also the site of the 1999 meeting of the WTO, and the attendant demonstrations by anti-globalization activists. Seattle has a history and reputation as left-leaning and, in 2005, researchers at Central Connecticut State University ranked it the most literate city in America. Moreover, Census Bureau data shows that Seattle has the highest percentage of college graduates of any major U.S. city.

Politically, the Puget Sound region and state of Washington, went through a very bitterly divided governor's race in 2004 with Democrat Christine Gregoire eventually prevailing after the third official count by a mere 129 votes over GOP candidate Dino Rossi. The 129 votes (or 0.0045%) margin of victory is notable for being among the closest races in U.S. history. Interestingly, to my knowledge, I do not know of a comprehensive study regarding the factors that contributed to the close election in 2004 in Washington state. Nevertheless, both U.S. Senators are Democrats and women—Patty Murray and Maria Cantwell. Of the nine representatives in the U.S. House seven from Washington state are Democrats, two Republicans. Even though most might assume that Seattle and the state of Washington is a bastion of 'liberalism' or Democratic control, in reality the state is divided in much the same way as the rest of the country (if one is persuaded by the Red state/Blue state/cultural war divide thesis). The city of Seattle has trended toward Democrats for the past several decades and the state generally goes 'blue' in Presidential elections, however there are still pockets of the state that are 'red' and, therefore, it would be a misnomer to say that the region is a bastion of 'Liberalism' (it is more likely a purple state). As

Linneman (2003) eloquently shows in his book on Christian Conservatives and Gay and Lesbian Rights organizations, in Washington state, there are strong pockets of Democrats near the Puget Sound region and, likewise, a very strong Republican contingent ‘east of the mountains’ as many Washingtonians often say. Therefore, the stereotype that Washington and, specifically Seattle, are entirely or mostly Democratic/Liberal is simply not the case.

One of the main groups targeted for the study were members of ‘progressive’ churches in Seattle. Having lived in Seattle for several years it became obvious that this region, though in many cases a bastion for the un-churched, is also known for the number of progressive/liberal churches (liberal in regard to theology and a turn away from fundamentalist dogma). Given the way that the media often paint individuals of faith in America with one broad brush (as being fundamentalist and the always believing the Bible to be the word of God, and so on) I thought it would be a good idea to try and survey progressive church groups to get their take on my issues. I thought this would also be a clever way to tap into a more representative sample of American’s who might not often have their voices heard. As will be shown my efforts to recruit these individuals to take the survey had mixed results at best, but in the future I would like to cultivate these relationships better in the hopes of getting more robust participation from progressive church members.³² Nevertheless, in targeting certain groups to take the survey I focused on the following groups: progressive church goers, master’s degree students at a local independent private university, employees of a local government organization, members of two officiating organizations (football and basketball), and members of two Muslim/Persian student groups on the same campus as the graduate students.³³ The initial plan was to physically go to the groups—during one of their pre-planned events—and give out the

³² My target was clearly on progressive churches, but there were also a few more ‘mainstream’ church groups contacted as well. Participation from these groups was low. I did, however, have people take the survey through other connections (not their churches) that indicated they were members or attendees of liberal and conservative churches in the region. I would also contend that there were some churches mentioned on the survey that I would not be qualified to categorize as liberal or conservative.

³³ Two of the biggest groups represented in the survey were from individuals who worked in a governmental capacity for Seattle and people who are local football and basketball officials with two officiating organizations also in Seattle. It should also be noted that I am a part of the two officiating associations that were targeted and my wife happens to work at the government agency where several people took the survey.

survey. Seattle, however, is a city with an interesting social milieu that discourages social interaction, in the traditional sense, and so it became obvious after repeated attempts that handing out the survey to be taken with pen and paper was not going to garner the number of responses I desired—so I opted for the next best option—have people take the survey online. I set up a website, put the survey on Survey Monkey and provided groups with a link that would take them directly to the online version of the survey. In the spring of 2008 the survey was available on-line for a three month period.³⁴

In addition to the website I made arrangements to meet with one of the local church pastors of a progressive church in the heart of downtown Seattle. This particular pastor was very open to helping me garner responses to the survey and suggested I put a blurb in their church bulletin about the website and the purpose of the survey. The blurb did appear in the bulletin (and in the online version as well), but given the demographics of the church—over 80% were over the age of 55—it was nearly impossible to coordinate a large number of these folks to take the survey. In conjunction with the university I was working for, while trying to solicit responses to the survey, I was able to get several contacts with potential church leaders who might be interested enough in the topic to help me elicit responses. What is more, I had several contacts with other groups in the Seattle area and, therefore, I encouraged those leaders of the organizations to help me get responses. I also put together a flyer marketing the survey and a blurb for the Muslim, Arab, and Persian groups that were part of the surrounding area (and in some cases part of the university I worked for) hoping it would help get responses. Clearly individuals in these groups are usually not targeted to participate in social research, but their voices need to be heard nonetheless.

As can be seen on the actual survey I targeted several groups to take the survey. The largest response came from members of the two officiating groups I am a part of (45% of the respondents were members of these groups). These organizations are overwhelmingly men and so that explains why men took the survey at nearly a 2 to 1 ratio as compared to women. Another 20% of the sample consisted of graduate

³⁴ For a more detailed look at how I attempted to market the survey please refer to the appendix in chapter 8.

students at the university where I taught classes. An additional 19% of the sample consisted of employees of a local city organization. The remaining 16% were from various churches and other groups targeted. It should not go unnoticed that my attempts at trying to recruit progressive church-goers to take the survey was not all for naught. Eighty one participants indicated an affiliation with a religious organization. In some cases these folks were people that learned about the survey through contacts I made, and in other cases individuals happened on the survey via friends, colleagues, or other acquaintances.

Some of the most important basic demographic results were the following: 38% or 77 of the participants were female and 62% or 128 were male (8 didn't answer the question); 88% of the sample were White, 5% Black, 3% Hispanic, 2% Asian, 2% Persian, and .5% American Indian (92% disclosed their race/ethnicity on the survey). The overall racial/ethnic breakdown of Seattle (drawing on data from 2004) was 67.1% White, 16.6% Asian, 10% Black, 6.3% Hispanic or Latino, 1% Native American, .9% Pacific Islander, 2.3% from other races, and 3.4% two or more races.³⁵ Further, the age breakdown was the following: .5% were 18 or younger, 1% 19-21, 10% 22-25, 16%, 26-32, 16% 33-40, 23% 34-50, 29% 51-65, and 5% 66-80. My goal was to get a sample more representative than only college-aged adults, and clearly I was able to accomplish this. Ninety-five percent of the sample were natural born citizens. 1.5% were permanent residents-via a green card. The remaining percent did not disclose their citizenship status. The religious affiliation breakdown was the following: Protestant-41%, Catholic-32%, Jewish-1%, Muslim-1.5%, No Religious Affiliation-12% and Other-13.6%. In the 'other' category were many variations of Protestant sects. When asked about their religious views as being more liberal or conservative the breakdown went as follows: Very Liberal-18.5%, Somewhat Liberal 27%, Moderate/Middle of the Road-28%, Somewhat Conservative-19%, and Very Conservative 7%. Political party preference was fairly evenly divided among the nine choices: Far Left-2.5%, Strong Democrat-17.8%, Moderate Democrat-22%,

³⁵ Clearly my sample is not balanced racially/ethnically with 88% of the survey takers being white. This is yet another reason why getting my measures in the American National Election Survey (ANES) (or another survey with ANES's representativeness) would be ideal for the purposes of generalizing the findings to the broader U.S. public.

Independent Democrat-16%, Independent-10%, Independent Republican-9%, Moderate Republican-16%, Strong Republican-4.5%, and Far Right-2.5%.

In order to gauge the class position of the respondents I asked a variety of questions that went beyond just income and work status. In all I asked eleven questions regarding socio-economic status or class position. A few of the items included work status (full-time, part-time, not working), total household income before taxes, level of education of survey taker and his/her parents, whether parents were wage earners (and type of work performed), self-employed, or supervisors (and how many people they supervised). Given the relatively small sample size of 213 and the fact that 78% of the respondents worked full-time and 74.9% of the sample has household earnings of \$50,000 and above it is easy to see that the sample was mostly middle to middle-upper class. As will be shown in chapter 4, I was unable to see a significant amount of differentiation (on the scales tested) based on social class. Clearly this is an area that should be improved for future research.

Attitude Scales

Members of the Puget Sound community completed several scales on the survey. The primary scales used for interpretation for understanding the relationships between variables included: Altemeyer's Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale (1998) (RWA); Altemeyer's Attitudes toward Authority in the Family Scale; Pratto and Sidanius' Social Dominance Orientation Scale (1998); Sears' Symbolic Racism Scale; Milburn's Corporal Punishment Scale; Wright's Social Class Scale; Kury's Capital Punishment Favorability Scale; Bader et al.'s Attitudes Toward Nature of God Scale; Capps' Religiosity Scale; Smith's Tendency Toward Ambivalence Scale; Feaver et al.'s Casualty Tolerance Scale; Capps and Harb's Islamophobia Scale; and Capps' Collateral Damage Tolerance Scale (14-items on Iraq war and 10-items on Capital Punishment).³⁶ The survey items (testing psychological tendencies) had five possible

³⁶ More specifically, Capps and Harb's Islamophobia Scale (2009) consisted of 15-items focusing mainly on the following themes: the nature of Islamic religion—tending toward peace, love and democracy or violence and extremism in the political and religious sense, the value of Islamic/Arab culture for the world, and what should be done to halt violent Arabs. Pro-trait items included: (1) Recent world events have shown that most Muslims are violent fundamentalists, (2) Arabs in general

response categories – strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, and strongly disagree. Further, the scales are written in such a way that they have pro-traits and con-traits in order to keep people on their toes (forcing them to read each item closely). As can be noted in the tables the overall number of survey takers was 213, but in many instances not everyone answered all the items and so the more reliable number of respondents is 190 or so. Table 3.1 provides the basic descriptive statistics of the attitude scales employed in the study.

have little appreciation for democratic values, and (3) There is something sick at the root of Arab culture. Con-traits included: (1) The overwhelming majority of Muslims are peaceful and share many commonalities with Americans, (2) There is nothing inherently violent in the teachings of Islam and the Qur'an, and (3) The religion of Islam has truths to offer. When constructing the items inspiration was drawn from a research piece by Pratto and Glasford (2008) whereby they introduced an 'Anti-Arab' scale (Alpha = .83) consisting of 11 items. Eight of Capps and Harb's items were borrowed from Pratto and Glasford (with minor grammatical editing). Incidentally, Lee et al. (2009) have also introduced a 16-item 'Islamophobia Scale' (Alpha=.92) (2009:105). Lee et al.'s scale has similar items to Pratto and Glasford (2008) and Capps and Harb (2009).

Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics of Attitude Scales

<u>Attitude Scales</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Standard Deviation</u>	<u>Min.-Max.</u>	<u>N</u>
CDT IRAQ	21.44	13.9	0-51	194
CDT DEATH PENALTY	14.7	7.4	0-33	194
CDT IRAQI CIVILIANS	7.3	4.6	0-16	190
CORPORAL PUNISH	18.4	4.8	3-28	193
RWA	13.6	8.4	0-39	193
SDO	11	6.6	0-36	205
SYMBOLIC RACISM	8.6	3.7	0-21	210
ISLAMOPHOBIA	16.3	10.6	0-52	194
SOCIAL CLASS (SES)	13.1	2.4	6-19	203
AUTHORITY & FAMILY	1.8	.89	0-4	196
KURY DEATH PENALTY	6.2	3.7	0-14	210
FGR TOLERANCE CD	8.2	5.2	0-24	190
BAYLOR GOD	21.6	4.7	8-36	188
RELIGIOSITY	43.2	7.2	23-64	175
AMBIVALENCE	7.4	4.3	0-20	194

Note: CDT IRAQ=Scale from 0-56; CDT DEATH PENALTY=Scale from 0-40; CDT IRAQI CIVILIANS=Scale from 0-16; CORPORAL PUNISH=Scale from 0-32; RWA=Scale from 0-40; SDO=Scale from 0-40; SYMBOLIC RACISM=Scale from 0-28; ISLAMOPHOBIA=Scale from 0-60; SOCIAL CLASS=Scale from 0-26; AUTHORITY & FAMILY=Scale from 0-4; KURY DEATH PENALTY=Scale from 0-16; FGR TOLERANCE CD=Scale from 0-24; BAYLOR GOD=Scale from 0-52; RELIGIOSITY=Scale from 0-68; AMBIVALENCE=Scale from 0-21.

As Table 3.2 shows (below) all scales used in the analysis (save for the Sears Symbolic Racism measure) registered Alpha scores of .70 and above.³⁷ Of particular note are the new scales that were in use for the first time, namely Capps' CDT Iraq, CDT Death Penalty, CDT Iraqi Civilians and Capps' Islamophobia scale which came in at .94, .80, .83, and .92 respectively. When a factor analysis was performed on CDT Iraq, using the rotated varimax format, it was determined that the scale had two strong eigenvalues, namely a 7.83 and 1.35 accounting for 56% and 65.6% of the cumulative variance.³⁸ Furthermore, when factor analysis was calculated for CDT Death Penalty it was determined that the scale had three strong eigenvalues—a 3.78, 1.72, and 1.01 accounting for 37.8%, 55%, and 65.1% of cumulative variance. In regard to CDT Iraqi Civilians only one eigenvalue of 1.0 or more was produced—a 2.7 that accounts for 66% of cumulative variance. Finally, the Islamophobia measure had two strong eigenvalues of 6.80 and 1.00 accounting for 52.3% and 60% of cumulative variance. Given that these scales were 'first-runs' their overall reliability and validity was fairly solid and, clearly, could be the basis for more robust scales in the future when tested again. What follows is a discussion of the quantitative findings focusing on the following: mean score differences by sex, age, socio-economic status, community size, religiosity, and political party preference, a re-testing of important FGR variables, and several regression tests to understand which independent variables are the most powerful for predicting more or less tolerance for collateral damage in war and the criminal justice system.

Independent Variables Tested and Rationales for Their Inclusion

As summarized in Chapter 2, the foundations for this project are rooted in past studies of authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. Therefore, the decision to include 10-item measures of RWA and SDO was a no-brainer (Altemeyer 2007; Heaven and Connors 2001; Heaven et al. 2005; Pratto and Sidanius 1999; McFarland

³⁷ Cronbach's Alphas were computed for all of the scales followed by reliability analyses that were intended to delve even more deeply into the reliability and validity of the measures used in the study.

³⁸ An eigenvalue is, "A statistic used in factor analysis to indicate how much of the variation in the original group of variables is accounted for by a particular factor. It is the sum of the squared factor loadings of a factor. Eigenvalues of less than 1.0 are usually not considered significant" (Vogt 1999:95). Basically, if there are more than 4-5 eigenvalues of 1.0 one can rest assured that the scale being used is tapping many more constructs than the intended initial construct.

2005b). In 2005, McFarland paired down Altemeyer's original 32-item scale to 10-items and was able to show that the 10-item scale captured 90% of the variance of the original RWA scale (McFarland 2005b:363). I also implemented four time-tested items related to authoritarian or disciplinarian attitudes toward childrearing (Soss, Langbein and Metelko 2003).³⁹ Incidences of corporal punishment items were derived from research by Michael Milburn (Milburn and Conrad 1996; Milburn et al. 1995). I also implemented key measures from the work of Feaver, Gelpi and Reifler's essay "Iraq the Vote" (2007). Attitudes toward capital punishment were taken from Kury and Ferdinand (1999). Social class position items were drawn from past research by Erik O. Wright (1985, 1987, 2003). Also, the attitudes toward the nature of God items were taken from Bader et al.'s extensive research on religious beliefs (2006).

³⁹ Since 1992, the American National Election Survey (ANES) has included these four childrearing items as their test of authoritarianism. Subsequent researchers have shown the ANES childrearing scale has explanatory power for predicting anti-black prejudice, white support for the death penalty, and a variety of other social and political attitudes (Soss et al. 2003; Barker and Tinnick 2006; Hetherington and Weiler 2005).

Table 3.2 Internal Consistency and Psychometric Properties of Scales

<u>Attitude Scale</u>	<u>Mean-Inter Item <i>r</i></u>	<u>Alpha</u>	<u>N</u>
CDT IRAQ	.51	.94	194
CDT DEATH PENALTY	.27	.80	194
CDT IRAQI CIVILIANS	.55	.83	190
CORPORAL PUNISH	.26	.74	193
RWA	.40	.87	193
SDO	.44	.87	205
SYMBOLIC RACISM	.13	.40	210
ISLAMOPHOBIA	.48	.92	194
KURY DEATH PENALTY	.60	.86	210
FGR TOLERANCE CD	.40	.83	190
AMBIVALENCE	.25	.70	194

Note: CDT IRAQ=Scale from 0-56; CDT DEATH PENALTY=Scale from 0-40; CDT IRAQI CIVILIANS=Scale from 0-16; CORPORAL PUNISH=Scale from 0-32; RWA=Scale from 0-40; SDO=Scale from 0-40; SYMBOLIC RACISM=Scale from 0-28; ISLAMOPHOBIA=Scale from 0-60; KURY DEATH PENALTY=Scale from 0-16; FGR TOLERANCE CD=Scale from 0-24; AMBIVALENCE=Scale from 0-21.

Chapter 4 – Explaining Tolerance for Innocent Loss of Life in War and U.S. Criminal Justice System – The Surveys

The main conclusions in this section regarding the quantitative data analysis are the following:

- ❖ Validation of significant differences in mean scores of CDT Iraqi Civilians, CDT Iraq, CDT Death Penalty and Islamophobia based on the following demographic variables: gender, age, community size (for all dependent variables), religiosity (for all dependent variables), attitudes toward the nature of God, and political party preference. (Tables 4.1 – 4.7)
- ❖ Invalidation of significant differences in mean scores of CDT Iraqi Civilians, CDT Iraq, CDT Death Penalty and Islamophobia based on marital status and social class position.
- ❖ Validation of the Internal Consistency of Capps' CD Tolerance Scales (Iraq Full, Iraqi Civilian & Death Penalty) and Islamophobia Scale (as shown in chapter three). (Table 3.1)
- ❖ Validation of Significant Positive and Negative Correlations of all Variables in the Models. (Table 4.8)
- ❖ Validation of Significant Correlation of Important Independent Variables and Dependent Variables with Favorability/Un-Favorability Toward Abortion. (Table 4.9)
- ❖ Validation of FGR Measures with Capps' CD Tolerance Iraq – Correlation Matrix. (Table 4.13)
- ❖ Validation of the Power of Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation, Instances of Corporal Punishment, and Islamophobia as Statistically Significant Independent Variables for Explaining Variance on CD Tolerance of Iraqi Civilian Deaths. (Table 4.14)
- ❖ Validation of the Power of FGR's Measures for Explaining Variance on Capps' CD Tolerance Iraq Scale. (Tables 4.15 & 4.16)
- ❖ The Emergence of Instances of Corporal Punishment, Symbolic Racism, and Islamophobia as Independent Variables that can Explain Variance on CD Tolerance in Iraq. (Table 4.17)
- ❖ Validation that there is a connection and commonality between the moral theater of war and the moral theater of the criminal justice system when it comes to innocent loss of life. (Table 4.18)

- ❖ Validation of Power of Capps' CD Iraq, Social Dominance Orientation, and Attitudes toward Nature of God for Explaining Variance on Tolerance of Innocent Deaths in U.S. Death Penalty. (Table 4.18)
- ❖ Validation of the Power of Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation, and Approval of Death Penalty for Explaining Variance on Tolerance of Innocent Deaths in U.S. Death Penalty. (Table 4.19)

Before discussing the correlations between all of the important variables in the models, and the subsequent regression analyses, I first investigate mean score differences on three dependent variables (CDT Iraqi Civilians, CDT Iraq, and CDT Death Penalty) and one independent variable (Islamophobia) by sex, age, socio-economic status, community size, religiosity, and political party preference.⁴⁰ Given that the collateral damage tolerance scales are being tested for the first time (as well as the Islamophobia scale) it is important to find out in a precursory way (given the relatively small sample size) if there are statistically significant differences by sex, age, SES, community size, religiosity, and political party preference. I also ran means tests on marital status, but the findings were insignificant. It is also worth pointing out that in FGR's pivotal 2005/2006 essay "Iraq the Vote" they note that there is significant variation with respect to the willingness to tolerate at least 1,500 casualties based on the following variables: Age—People who are 60 years or older are 13% more likely to accept 1,500 deaths than respondents under 30; Gender—Men are 6% likelier than women; Ethnicity—White respondents are 15% likelier than minorities; Education—the college educated are 20% likelier than those with less than a high school education (Feaver, Gelpi, and Reifler 2005/2006:38).

Gender Differences

Significant differences in means scores were found for CDT Civilians, CDT Iraq Full, CDT Death Penalty, and Islamophobia. As shown in Table 4.1, in all cases women were less tolerant of collateral damage and less Islamophobic. What is particularly telling was the mean score difference in the full CDT Iraq scale – where

⁴⁰ In order to run these tests I implored three different statistical maneuvers (depending on what unit of analysis each independent and dependent variable was in): Independent-Samples T Test; One-way Analysis of Variance and a Bivariate Pearson R Test – which produces a Pearson correlation coefficient .

the mean score for men was 24.81 and for women was 15.76. This finding seems to contradict much of the work by Bob Altemeyer, who often argues that there are little to no significant differences based on sex/gender in authoritarianism, but also confirm research by FGR that shows significant differences for casualty tolerance with men, generally, being more tolerant.

Table 4.1 Mean Score Differences on Primary Dependent Variables & I.V. Islamophobia by Sex

	<u>Mean</u>	<u>SD</u>	<u>t</u>	<u>p-value</u>
<u>CDT Civilians</u>				
Male	8.7	4.15	-5.527	.000***
Female	5.1	4.44		
<u>CDT Iraq</u>				
Male	24.81	13.95	-4.565	.000***
Female	15.76	12.04		
<u>CDT Death Penalty</u>				
Male	16.3	16.3	-4.188	.000***
Female	11.87	11.9		
<u>Islamophobia</u>				
Male	18.56	10.47	-4.04	.000***
Female	12.41	9.71		

Note: The total number of respondents is 187, meaning 23 individuals did not reveal their sex on the survey 1=Female, 2=Male. ***=p<.001; **=p<.01; *=p<.05. An independent samples t-test was performed.

Age Differences

The survey allowed for respondents to indicate their age in one of nine categories from 18 or younger up to 80 years old and up. As noted in the previous chapter even with the small sample size the ages' represented were widely distributed. Overall the results show—in Table 4.2—that there were significant differences based on age for the four variables tested, however the significance was at the .05 level only (with CDT Civilians being a .024, CDT Iraq being a .035, CDT Death Penalty a .046, and Islamophobia a .06—not even significant at the .05 level). It is interesting to note that the age group with the highest mean scores for CDT Civilians and CDT Iraq were individuals in the 19-21 age range. On CDT Civilians the mean average was 12.0 (as compared to individuals in the 66-80 age range that scored a 3.4). Further, when looking at the CDT Iraq (full version) the average mean score of the 19-21 range was a 38.50 as compared to people in the 66-80 range that scored a 10.7. In terms of CDT Death Penalty, again the mean differences by age were significant. The highest scoring group was in the 33-40 group, which averaged a 16.9, while the oldest group scored lowest (66-80) with a 9.1. Finally, when investigating mean score differences for independent variable Islamophobia, the differences were not statistically significant. However, it is worth mentioning that the most Islamophobic group in the sample were the 19-21 year olds and the least anti-Arab individuals where the oldest group.

Table 4.2 Analysis of Variance on Primary Dependent Variables & I.V. Islamophobia by Age

<u>Source</u>	<u>Sum of Squares</u>	<u>df</u>	<u>Mean Square</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>p-value</u>
<u>CDT Civilians</u>					
Age	343.702	7	49.1	2.376	.024*
<u>CDT Iraq</u>					
Age	2896.911	7	413.844	2.217	.035*
<u>CDT Death Penalty</u>					
Age	765.147	7	109.307	2.097	.046*
<u>Islamophobia</u>					
Age	1500.489	7	214.356	1.978	0.06

Note: The total number of respondents is 202, meaning 8 individuals did not reveal their age on the survey. The categories for measuring age were 1=18 or younger, 2=19-21, 3=22-25, 4=26-32, 5=33-40, 6=34-50, 7=51-65, 8=66-80 and 9=80 or older. ***=p<.001; **=p<.01; *=p<.05. A one-way ANOVA was performed.

Socio-Economic Status or Social Class Position

Socio-economic status or social class position was measured using eleven items—that go far beyond just how much income the individual brings into their family.⁴¹ One of my hypotheses stated in the introduction was to investigate whether or not social class position is an important variable for predicting a person’s level of tolerance for innocent loss of life in war and the criminal justice system. Social psychological research has shown evidence that working class individuals are capable of leaning more toward authoritarianism and vice versa that authoritarian tendencies are more likely found in the middle to middle-upper class rank and file. For instance, Frankfurt School scholar Erich Fromm was one of the initial researchers to empirically show that working class members could be just as authoritarian and ethnocentric as members of other social classes (Fromm [1932] 1980; Gabardi 1987). Likewise, in 1959 Seymour Lipset was also able to show that working class workers were susceptible to authoritarian tendencies –and this was confirmed by other researchers as well (Lipset 1959; Kohn and Schooler 1983). While Fromm was trying to understand working class attitudes toward authority, other empirical evidence exists showing that it is members of the upper-class (or individuals in managerial positions) who are more likely to tend toward authoritarianism (Smith and Gunn 1999). As for my research, as Table 4.3 clearly shows, there were no significant mean score differences based on SES for the four variables chosen to test. Given that one of my hypotheses was to test the Frankfurt School notion that social class position matters for predicting the kind of attitudes probed in this project, a bit of discussion is needed in order to more fully understand why—in my sample—social class seems to be insignificant. By doing a careful analysis of the trends in the sample it seems plausible that most of the people who took my survey were middle class and above. Of course there are many ways to

⁴¹ Social class position was measured asking questions about the following: work status of survey taker, household income before taxes, father and mother’s highest level of education, what type of work did mother and father do—were they self-employed or not, and father and mother’s highest level of education. These items were inspired by the time tested survey items constructed by Erik Olin Wright over the past few decades (Wright 1985, 1997). This allowed me to compute a composite score for each individual—an SES score as it were. These scores would prove useful for parceling out differences in collateral damage tolerance based on social class position. Unfortunately, there was not a wide distribution of class positions represented in my sample and, therefore, it is difficult to make broad claims.

judge social class and several categories that could be constructed, but here are a few basics in regard to who took my survey. My scale went from 0-26 (with a high score meaning the person is higher in social class status). Two-hundred and three people filled out the necessary items to be counted for social class position and the minimum score was a 6.00 the maximum a 19.00, with a mean of 13.11 (right in the middle). Even more specifically, 78% of the sample worked full time and another 10% worked part-time. 43% of the sample had a pre-tax income of more than \$50,000/year. 21% of the sample had incomes of \$100,000-\$150,000, while another 11% had incomes of over \$150,000/year. Only 10.9% of the sample had incomes of \$35,000 or less. Therefore, in this particular sample I was not able to tease out significant differences in mean scores on four of the most important variables, however I do not think that is necessarily evidence that there are no significant differences by class position. Rather, I think it is a function of a biased sample that tended to lean middle-class and above.⁴²

⁴² Incidentally, I did run a quick Bivariate Pearson correlation on one important aspect of SES , namely income, in order to see if there were significant differences in income on collateral damage tolerance for civilian deaths and the results were not significant. The two were correlated at a -.002 with a .982 level of significance. Likewise I ran the test using income and collateral damage tolerance Iraq (full) and the results were again not significant: .041 correlation with a significance of .575.

Table 4.3 Analysis of Variance on Primary Dependent Variables & I.V. Islamophobia by Socio-Economic Status

	<u>Mean</u>	<u>SD</u>	<u>Pearson Correlation</u>	<u>Sig. (2-tailed)</u>
<u>CDT Civilians</u>	7.34	4.65	-.034	.642
SES	13.11	2.4		
<u>CDT Iraq</u>	21.44	13.93	.005	.945
SES	13.11	2.4		
<u>CDT Death Penalty</u>	14.69	7.37	-.088	.222
SES	13.11	13.11		
<u>Islamophobia</u>	16.29	10.57	-.054	.454
SES	13.11	13.11		

Note: The total number of respondents is 203, meaning 7 individuals did not answer all the items measuring SES on the survey. SES was measured by asking a series of questions including: household income, survey takers education, parents' education level, employment status of father and mother, what type of work father and mother did when survey taker was 14 (supervisory or non-supervisory). ***=p<.001; **=p<.01; *=p<.05. A Pearson Correlation Coefficient was tabulated.

Community Size

Subjects were asked to indicate the size of the community in which they reside and the mean score differences for CDT Civilians, CDT Iraq, and CDT Death Penalty were statistically significant at the .05 level. The mean differences for Islamophobia were not statistically significant. The basic trend was people who resided in smaller communities tended toward *more* tolerance of death in war and the death penalty, while individuals who lived in bigger cities (areas) were *less* tolerant of death in the two theaters highlighted. In the same manner that the sample had a wide range of ages represented, individuals who took the survey resided in a plethora of different community sizes. The largest group represented were individuals living in a major metropolis of a million or more (30.6%) followed by people living in a very large city of 500,000 or more (16.5%). In terms of mean scores for CDT Civilians the lowest mean scores came from people living in the ‘very large city category’ – 4.35, while the highest mean scores resided in the rural category—11.50. The basic trend for CDT Civilians scores were the larger the community the smaller mean score (meaning less tolerance for civilian deaths in war). When looking at CDT Iraq, again the mean scores were statistically significantly different with individuals in the rural category scoring the highest (33.0) and individuals in the very large city category scoring the lowest (12.6). The pattern for CDT Death Penalty was very similar to the previous patterns, with more tolerance coming from individuals who reside in rural areas or small towns as opposed to less tolerance from people living in larger cities. Independent variable Islamophobia, in this sample, did not vary statistically by community size. Though it is noteworthy to mention that the lowest scoring members came from the very large city group (12.93) and the highest scoring members came from rural communities (25.00). All statistics are shown in Table 4.4.

Table 4.4 Analysis of Variance on Primary Dependent Variables & I.V. Islamophobia by Community Size

	<u>Sum of Squares</u>	<u>df</u>	<u>Mean Square</u>	<u>p-value</u>
<u>CDT Civilians</u> Community Size	489.816	8	61.227	.003*
<u>CDT Iraq</u> Community Size	4568.738	8	571.092	.002*
<u>CDT Death Penalty</u> Community Size	1248.255	8	156.032	.002*
<u>Islamophobia</u> Community Size	1005.185	8	125.648	.344

Note: The total number of respondents is 210. The categories for measuring community size were 1=a major metropolis (a million people or more), 2=a very large city (500,000 people or more), 3=a large city (250,000 or more), 4=a medium-sized city (over 100,000 people but under 250,000), 5=A suburb or small city (over 50,000 people but under 100,000), 6=a small suburb or medium-sized town (over 10,000 people but under 50,000), 7=a town (over 2,500 people but under 10,000), 8=A small town (over 500 people but under 2,500), 9=a rural area. ***=p<.001; **=p<.01; *=p<.05. A one-way ANOVA was performed.

Religiosity

In order to assess the impact of religion on collateral damage tolerance and Islamophobia I included essentially three primary measures: (1) one basic question regarding what the person's religious affiliation was, (2) 4-items measuring religiosity—or how fundamentalist their beliefs are, and (3) respondents' views toward the nature of God (regardless of whether or not they were a believer or not). The religiosity scale used in this study was influenced by Bader et al.'s study in 1995. I took four of their items and summed the scores to understand an individual's religiosity. Essentially I wanted to know how often they attended religious services, their feelings on the meaning of the Bible/Qur'an (actual word of God to be taken literally, word of God but not everything should be taken literally, or book written by people and not the word of God), a self-assessment of how strict they were about right and wrong compared to others their age, and whether or not they considered themselves religiously 'liberal' or 'conservative.' I also drew from Bader et al. when I asked how individuals viewed the nature of God (regardless of whether or not they believe in God). The overall findings suggest that knowing one's religiosity is important for predicting more or less tolerance of collateral damage in war and the criminal justice system. The more religious a person is the higher likelihood they are willing to tolerate more innocent loss of life in war zones and the criminal justice system via execution of the innocent. A more in-depth look at the statistics follows.

Respondents were asked a question regarding what religion, if any, they grew up with (categories included Catholic, Jewish, Muslim, Protestant, None, or Other).⁴³ There were no mean score statistically significant differences based on type of religion an individual chose from the above list in regard to CDT Civilians, CDT Iraq, CDT Death Penalty and Islamophobia. For example, when focusing on CDT Civilians the sum of squares between groups was 234.470, df was 5, F was 2.241 with a significance of .052 (almost significant, but not quite). Mean scores for CDT Civilians by religious orientation were the following: Catholic—7.84, Jewish—11.0, Muslim—.50, Protestant—7.26, None—5.48, and Other—8.44. Asking folks what

⁴³ For individuals who selected "Other" a high percentage of them listed Protestant sects as their religious orientation. Therefore they could easily be lumped in with Protestants.

religious orientation they belong to is quite limiting for obvious reasons, and so I also inquired further about their religiosity by probing how often they attended religious services, their view of the fallibility of the Bible and Qur'an, their strictness on knowing right from wrong, and if they identified themselves as religiously 'liberal' or 'conservative.' Scores on religiosity ranged from a minimum of 23.00 to a maximum of 64.00 with a mean of 43.16. Upon investigating mean score difference by way of religiosity I was able to find statistically significant differences for the three primary dependent variables as Table 4.5 indicates. Basically, the higher one scored on religiosity (which could easily be read as being more fundamentalist in practice) the more tolerant of collateral damage in war and the criminal justice system. This finding would certainly be on par with the findings of Altemeyer et al. over the past several decades.

What is more, when I ran the ANOVA by attitudes toward the nature of God the mean score differences were significant on all four variables—as is depicted in Table 4.6. Researchers at Baylor came up with this typology of religiosity to test fundamentalist orthodoxies versus non-fundamentalist orthodoxies and my findings suggest that how one views the nature of God is an important variable for predicting differences in mean scores on collateral damage tolerance. Namely, the more fundamentalist one is—meaning the more likely they are to believe that God is a punishing, wrathful, or for lack of a better term 'mean' the more tolerant of collateral damage. Also, if people believe they have a personal relationship to God (as opposed to believing that God is distant and not interested in the day to day operations of individuals' lives) the more likely to tolerate collateral damage.

Table 4.5 Analysis of Variance on Primary Dependent Variables & I.V. Islamophobia by Religiosity

	<u>Mean</u>	<u>SD</u>	<u>Pearson Correlation</u>	<u>Sig. (2-tailed)</u>
<u>CDT Civilians</u>	7.34	4.65	.206	.008**
Religiosity	43.16	7.18		
<u>CDT Iraq</u>	21.44	13.93	.223	.004**
Religiosity	43.16	7.18		
<u>CDT Death Penalty</u>	14.69	7.37	.206	.007**
Religiosity	43.16	7.18		
<u>Islamophobia</u>	16.29	10.57	.136	.079
Religiosity	43.16	7.18		

Note: The total number of respondents is 175, meaning 35 individuals did not answer all items measuring religiosity on the survey. Religiosity was measured by the following: (1) How often do you attend religious services, (2) Bible/Qur'an literal interpretation, (3) strictness of right and wrong as compared to others your age and (4) religiously liberal or conservative. ***=p<.001; **=p<.01; *=p<.05. Pearson Correlation Coefficient was tabulated.

Table 4.6 Analysis of Variance on Primary Dependent Variables & I.V. Islamophobia by Attitudes Toward God

	<u>Mean</u>	<u>SD</u>	<u>Pearson Correlation</u>	<u>Sig. (2-tailed)</u>
<u>CDT Civilians</u>	7.34	4.65	.281	.000**
Views of God	21.63	4.69		
<u>CDT Iraq</u>	21.44	13.93	.256	.001**
Views of God	21.63	4.69		
<u>CDT Death Penalty</u>	14.69	7.37	.265	.000***
Views of God	21.63	4.69		
<u>Islamophobia</u>	16.29	10.57	.187	.012*
Views of God	21.63	4.69		

Note: The total number of respondents is 188, meaning 22 individuals did not answer all the items measuring attitudes toward God on the survey. Attitudes toward God was a question that asked what the respondent thought God was like (regardless of whether or not they believe in God). The categories included: distant, ever-present, directly involved in my affairs, directly involved in worldly affairs, removed from my affairs, concerned with the well-being of the world, concerned with my personal well-being, wrathful, angered by human sins, angered by my sins, punishing, severe, and critical. ***=p<.001; **=p<.01; *=p<.05. Pearson Correlation Coefficient was tabulated.

Party Preference

The final demographic variable that turned out to be statistically significant for differences in mean scores was political party preference. Two-hundred ten individuals indicated their political party preference with the following frequencies: Far Left (neither Democrat or Republican)—2.5%, Strong Democrat—17.8%, Moderate Democrat—22%, Independent (but slightly Democratic)—15.8%, Independent—10%, Independent (but slightly Republican)—8.6%, Moderate Republican—15.8%, Strong Republican—4.5%, and Far Right (neither Democrat or Republican)—2.5%. As Table 4.7 shows, mean score differences for CDT Civilians, CDT Iraq, CDT Death Penalty, and Islamophobia were statistically significant in regard to political party preference at the $< .001$ level. Generally, the trend was the more conservative respondents were politically, the more likely they were to tolerate collateral damage in war and the more likely to trend toward Islamophobia. However, there were interesting surprises in the data and, therefore, more in-depth explanation is necessary.⁴⁴

In regard to CDT Civilians the highest mean scores were registered by Moderate Republicans with an 11.79. The lowest scores were from individuals who identified themselves as Far Left with mean scores of 2.75. What is more interesting is that the pattern did not always trend in the direction many would assume. For instance, Strong Democrats (N=4) registered a rather high average score of 11.5 and Strong Republicans (N=34) notched a 3.10. This is the opposite of what most sociologists and political scientists would predict. Also, in regard to CDT Iraq, the highest mean scores were registered by individuals in the Far Right category (37.11), while the lowest mean scores were compiled by people who were Far Left (6.00). No surprise here. However, similar to CDT Civilians, Strong Democrats scored high with an average of 32.50 and Strong Republicans had an average of 8.38. Most might assume these scores would be flipped the other way. One other finding that is worth

⁴⁴ Given these findings it may be the case that people misidentified their political party preference. It is difficult to tell. Only four people indicated their political party preference as ‘Strong Democrat.’ It could be they meant to put ‘Strong Republican.’

mentioning is the fact that Independents scored highly with an average of 30.28.⁴⁵ Mean differences on CD Death Penalty by way of political party was also statistically significant. Not surprisingly the highest scores were individuals in the Far Right political category (19.63). The lowest scores were registered by Strong Republicans (6.76) followed by Far Left (10.25). Again this result is a bit puzzling. And finally, Islamophobia also saw mean score difference—based on political party—as significant. As might be expected individuals who were more on the Democratic side of the ledger tended to be less Islamophobic, while individuals on the Republican side were more likely to be Islamophobic. Once again, there were some people who scored in ways that might be intuitively surprising. Strong Democrats once again registered high mean scores (34.75)—in fact the highest average of the entire group, while Strong Republicans had relatively low mean scores of 8.27. These are all interesting findings and would need to be replicated in subsequent studies in order to establish more robust trends. Next, I will present the primary correlation table of all variables in the model with a bit of commentary and analysis.

⁴⁵ Given that the bulk of the interviews were conducted with middle-scorers (likely Independents) it could prove fruitful to find out if there is corroboration between survey data and interview data. In other words, do the middle-scorers tend toward more tolerance toward collateral damage when presented a vignette to respond to?

Table 4.7 Analysis of Variance on Primary Dependent Variables & I.V. Islamophobia by Political Party Preference

	<u>Sum of Squares</u>	<u>df</u>	<u>Mean Square</u>	<u>p-value</u>
<u>CDT Civilians</u> Political Party	1760.691	8	220.086	.000***
<u>CDT Iraq</u> Political Party	19221.826	8	2402.728	.000***
<u>CDT Death Penalty</u> Political Party	3955.026	8	494.378	.000***
<u>Islamophobia</u> Political Party	6264.963	8	783.12	.000***

Note: The total number of respondents is 199, meaning 11 individuals did not reveal political party preference on the survey. The categories for measuring political party preference were: 1=Far Left (neither Democrat or Republican), 2=Strong Democrat, 3=Moderate Democrat, 4=Independent (but slightly Democratic), 5=Independent, 6=Independent (but slightly Republican), 7=Moderate Republican, 8=Strong Republican, 9=Far Right (neither Democrat or Republican). ***=p<.001; **=p<.01; *=p<.05. A one-way ANOVA was performed.

Correlation Matrix of Variables in the Model

Table 4.8 provides the correlation matrix of all of the important variables in both the CDT Iraq model and the CDT Death Penalty model. Many of the items are positively correlated and in most cases at the .01 or .05 levels. A few of the positive and negative linear correlations are worth commenting on a bit further. First, RWA and SDO were correlated at a .48. In my MA thesis project I found a correlation of .36 between these two variables (Capps 2001, 2002). Right-Wing Authoritarianism continues to be a solid predictor for several other variables in the model. The most important linear relationships include positive correlations with the following other variables: Symbolic Racism (.27), CDT Death Penalty (.48), Islamophobia (.60), FGR's measures of collateral damage tolerance (.47), and most importantly my primary measure of CDT Iraq (.65). Like many other studies, SDO is also an important cog in trying to predict many attitudes, and in this case there were solid positive correlations with the following independent and dependent variables: Symbolic Racism (.35), CDT Death Penalty (.48), Islamophobia (.59), and FGR's items (.43). Further, it is also worth mentioning that social class was negatively correlated with several variables including RWA, SDO, Incidence of Corporal Punishment, Symbolic Racism, CDT Death Penalty, Islamophobia, Favorability toward the Death Penalty, and Attitudes toward the Nature of God. This would indicate that the lower the social class the higher the change of scoring highly on all of the scales previously listed. Correlations can be limiting and that is why it is important to spend the bulk of the discussion on the regression analysis, which will be discussed shortly. Before delving into the regressions, I want to take a small detour and discuss the correlations that were derived when I pulled out one particular question about abortion favorability and did the procedure to find out if abortion attitudes might be linked to a few of my main variables.

Table 4.8 Correlation Matrix of Variables in Model (N=193)

	CD	IRAQ	RWA	SDO	CORP	SR	CDDP	ISLAM	SES	FAM	DP	FGR	GOD	REL
CD														
IRAQ	-----													
RWA	.650**	-----												
SDO	.566**	.484*	----											
CORP	.259**	.195*	*	----										
SR	.129	.270*	*	.351**	.020	----								
CDDP	.689**	.482*	*	.482**	.171*	.178*	----							
ISLAM	.565**	.602*	*	.585**	.176*	.308*	*	----						
SES	.005	-.117	-.008	-.098	-.106	-.088	-.054	----						
FAM	.201**	.187*	.119	.126	.019	.170*	.167*	.033	----					
DP	.465**	.431*	*	.422**	.142*	.209*	.605*	.182*	.170	----				
FGR	.688**	.466*	*	.427**	.088	.207*	.688*	.380**	.122	.138	**	.261	-----	
BAY	.265**	.410*	*	.083	.079	-.066	.265*	.187*	.012	.108	**	.252	.184*	----
REL	.223**	.407*	*	.063	.006	.003	.223*	.136	.020	.077	**	.202	.227	.813*
SEX	.314**	.242*	*	.310**	.128	.137	.314*	.281**	.052	.087	**	.262	.254	.165
											**	**	*	.028

Note: CDIRAQ=Collateral Damage Tolerance Orientation-Iraq (14 Items); RWA=Right Wing Authoritarianism (10 Items); SDO=Social Dominance Orientation (10 Items); CORP=Level of Corporal Punishment (8 Items); SR=Sears' Symbolic Racism Scale (7 Items); CDDP=Capps Collateral Damage Tolerance Orientation Death Penalty (10 Items); ISLAM=Capps' Islamophobia – Anti-Arab Orientation (15 Items); SES=Capps' Measure of Social Class (10 Items); FAMILY=Altemeyer's Scale of Authoritarianism in the Family (4 Items); DP=Capps' Measure of Attitudes Toward Use of Death Penalty (4 Items); FGR=Feaver, Gelpi, and Reifler's Measure of Collateral Damage Tolerance (7 Items); BAYGOD=Bader & Froese Scale on Nature of God (13 Items); RELIGION=Capps' Measure of Religiosity (4 Items); SEX=Gender (1 Item).

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Correlation Matrix of Key Variables in Model with Favorability Toward Abortion

Several scholars, perhaps Altemeyer most prominently, argue that there is a distinct connection between RWA and SDO with favorability and un-favorability toward abortion (Altemeyer 1996; 1998a; 2004). The higher an individual scores on RWA or SDO the more likely they are to be anti-abortion. In 1990, Altemeyer surveyed students asking them how important the rights of the fetus, the mother, the father, and the rest of society were in cases of abortion. Highs favored the fetus ($r = .41$), while Lows favored the mother ($-.39$) (Altemeyer 1996:42). Also, Altemeyer cites a study by Moghaddam and Vuksanovic (1990) involving pro-life activists and found their mean scores on the RWA to be 220 (which he asserts is the highest mean score ever found). Therefore, it seems more than apropos to perform a precursory correlation analysis to find out if there are any significant linear relationships between abortion attitudes and collateral damage in war and the criminal justice system. As is depicted in Table 4.9 abortion favorability was negatively correlated with each of the variables ($-.375$ —CDT Iraq, $-.362$ —CDT Civilians, $-.268$ —CDT DP, $-.546$ —RWA) at the .001 level. SDO was also negatively correlated, but was not statistically significant. So, individuals who are less favorable of abortion are simultaneously likely to tolerate higher levels of death in war and the criminal justice system. Thus, parallel to many past studies, the paradox of understanding how people can be highly cognizant of, and bothered by, innocent loss of life of the unborn doesn't necessarily translate to being bothered by innocent loss of life in wars and the criminal justice system. This suggests the moral theaters of war and the criminal justice system are fundamentally different (in the minds of anti-abortionists anyway) than the moral theater of protecting the unborn.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Abortion will come up once again when the interview results are revealed. One of the warm-up questions asked in the interviews was 'what are the most important social issues of the day?' Interestingly, one of the individuals scoring high on several of the scales also indicated that one of this top three social issues was abortion rights.

Table 4.9 Correlation Matrix of Important Independent and Dependent Variables & Favorability Toward Abortion

	CDT Iraq	CDT Civilians	CDT DP	FGR CD Scale	RWA	SDO	Abortion Favorability
CDT Iraq - Full	-----						
CDT Civilians	.912**	-----					
CDT DP	.691**	.665**	-----				
FGR CD Scale	.674**	.601**	.451**	-----			
RWA	.650**	.645**	.483**	.450**	-----		
SDO	.566**	.583**	.500**	.417**	.484**	----	
Abortion Favorabi lity	-.375**	-.362**	.268**	-.204**	.546**	.114	-----

Note: The total number of respondents was 210 for the abortion favorability question. ***Correlation is significant at the .000 level (2-tailed); ** Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailed); and *Correlation is significant at the .005 level.

Testing FGR's Thesis in the Puget Sound Sample

Despite my criticisms of FGR's research methods, findings, and more generally their assumptions about the rationality of the public in Chapter 2, it is important to explore if my findings substantiate, or diverge sharply from, their primary empirical findings in recent years. One of the major thrusts of this project was to do a frontal analysis of the most cited and, perhaps, trusted sources on public opinion about casualty tolerance for wars. Therefore, on my survey I repeated items that had been asked by Feaver, Gelpi, and Reifler in their 2009 book. Three of the most important predictors (independent variables) for high or low tolerance of American soldier casualties according to FGR are opinions regarding whether President Bush did the right thing by invading Iraq in 2003, positive sentiments regarding the 2007 surge of more troops to Iraq (success), and opinions about the likelihood that when troops do withdraw from the region a bloody civil war is likely (failure). Their model is relatively simple and brings in independent variables education, party identification, age, gender, and race as key factors for predicting tolerance for casualties (that is U.S. military casualties) (Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2009). Table 4.10 shows the percentage of individuals in the Puget Sound Region sample who agreed, disagreed or were ambivalent to the items tested. As will be shown in several of the regression analyses to follow, although I have serious reservations for the FGR model of casualty tolerance I did, in fact, find that their two primary independent variables were significant predictors for my construction of Collateral Damage Tolerance in Iraq (full) and Collateral Damage Tolerance for Civilian Deaths. Where I have a particularly major problem with FGR's work is the fact that they don't engage in a deeper understanding of underlying character traits and how these traits could be influencing attitudes of more or less tolerance for innocent loss of life in war and for my purposes the criminal justice system as well.

Table 4.10 shows the raw numbers of Puget Sound residents who indicated whether or not they agreed that President Bush did the 'right thing' by invading Iraq, whether or not they believed the 2007 Surge was a success or not (and whether overall success was a real possibility). Finally, I asked folks if they believed that withdrawal

from Iraq might lead to a Civil war between the different religious/cultural factions—Sunni's, Shias, and Kurds. Interestingly, there was a noticeable polarization on the question of whether the right decision was made to invade Iraq with 34% strongly or somewhat agreeing, while 59% strongly or somewhat disagreed. Exactly zero individuals said they neither agreed nor disagreed. Also, it is interesting the variety of opinion on whether or not the 'Surge' has been successful. Contrary to the question of whether it was right to invade Iraq in the first place, a solid 19% of my sample indicated ambivalence regarding the success of the surge. Likewise, there was 29% of the sample that indicated ambivalence for the likelihood of Iraq deteriorating into Civil War upon the withdrawal of U.S. troops.

Table 4.10

Puget Sound Sample Results for Feaver/Gelpi Success, Surge, and Civil War Items, N=192

	Bush Did Right Thing Iraq	Surge Successful	Withdrawal Civil War
Strongly Agree	18%	16%	11%
Somewhat Agree	16%	21%	34%
Neither Agree nor Disagree	0%	19%	29%
Somewhat Disagree	15%	22%	16%
Strongly Disagree	44%	13%	3%

In a re-testing of FGR's main casualty tolerance measure I asked Puget Sound residents how many deaths they were willing to tolerate and still support U.S. military action in Iraq. The exact question was: *Would you support continued U.S. military action in Iraq until a new Iraqi government can take over if it resulted in (no additional U.S. military deaths, 5,000 additional U.S. military deaths, 10,000 additional U.S. military deaths, and 50,000 additional U.S. military deaths)?* As Table 4.11 shows, predictably, as the death toll increases support for the military effort declines. For my purposes, the 5-8% of the sample that indicated they 'neither agree nor disagree' is interesting (percent indicating ambivalence—8% no additional deaths, 6% 5,000 deaths, 7% 10,000 deaths, and 5% 50,000 deaths). Furthermore, Table 4.12 asked if the sample could correctly identify how many soldiers had died in the Iraq war (as of March 2008). The Pew Research Center originally asked this question (they have asked it multiple times since the invasion) and found varying levels of mindfulness from the public (from a high of 50% to a low of 28%). In March 2008, they reported their lowest level of public knowledge—at only 28% of their representative sample being able to identify 'Around 4,000' as the correct number of soldier deaths. In my sample, comparatively, 38.6% were able to correctly identify combat deaths as of March 2008. My guess is given the fact that most of my survey takers were older (35+) this lead to the fact that more of them were aware of the combat death toll in Iraq. When compared to the national random sample it is also noteworthy that Puget Sound residents were more likely to over-estimate the death toll than underestimated it (like in the Pew sample).

Table 4.11

**Puget Sound Tolerance for Casualties in Iraq War/Support for War,
N=192**

	No Additional Deaths	5,000 Deaths	10,000 Deaths	50,000 Deaths
Strongly Agree	27%	7%	5%	3%
Somewhat Agree	23%	12%	7%	4%
Neither Agree nor Disagree	8%	6%	7%	5%
Somewhat Disagree	18%	22%	16%	13%
Strongly Disagree	17%	43%	57%	66%

Table 4.12

Puget Sound Sample Results for Pew Research Item Asking Number of U.S. Military Deaths in Iraq, March 2008

Random Sample (N=1,003)	Puget Sound Sample (N=192)	National
Around 2,000	1.4%	11%
Around 3,000	12.9%	35%
Around 4,000	38.6%	28%
Around 5,000	30.5%	23%
Around 10,000	8%	3%

Table 4.13 is a correlation matrix, whereby I put my CDT Iraq scale in the mix with FGR's casualty tolerance measure, their 'Surge' item, their 'Civil War' item, and the pivotal FGR 'Bush Right' question. As can be seen there are clear statistically significant connections between these important constructs. Most notably, for sure, is the correlation of Capps' CDT Iraq scale to pro-surge attitudes (.625), Bush-right to invade Iraq (.775), and tolerance of 5,000 deaths in Iraq for time to help form an Iraqi government. The data presented in this table also indicates that there may be acceptance of up to 5,000 lives lost, but when the 10,000 and 50,000 number thresholds are reached, the correlations between the key independent variables tails off. Hence, for the 'BUSHRIGHT' item the correlations for deaths are the following: zero deaths (.576), 5,000 deaths (.634), 10,000 deaths (.544), and for 50,000 deaths (.416). This is the first indication that two of FGRs main independent variables for predicting tolerance for casualties could prove pivotal in my sample as well. Regression analysis results, provided late in this chapter, will confirm, clarify and corroborate their predictive power.

Table 4.13

Correlation Matrix of Feaver/Gelpi Items, N=192

	CDT IRAQ	+SURGE	CIVIL WAR	BUSH RIGHT	ZERO	5,000	10,000	50,000
CDT IRAQ	-----							
+SURGE	.625**	-----						
CIVIL WAR	-.133	-.072	-----					
BUSHRIGHT	.775**	.653**	-.081	-----				
ZERO	.544**	.482**	-.051	.576**	-----			
5,000	.685**	.482**	-.064	.634**	.607**	-----		
10,000	.579**	.178*	-.032	.544**	.469**	.882*	-----	
50,000	.478**	.529**	-.011	.416**	.342**	.713**	.863**	-----

Note: CDIRAQ=Capps' Full Collateral Damage Tolerance Orientation-Iraq (14 Items); +SURGE Feaver and Gelpi item: The Bush administration's recent 'surge' in the number of troops has significantly helped to stabilize the situation and reduce the overall level and threat of violence; CIVIL WAR Feaver and Gelpi item: When the U.S. ultimately withdraws most of its combat troops from Iraq, a bloody civil war between opposing Iraqi forces (Shi'ite, Sunni, and Kurd) will consume the lives of large numbers of Iraqi civilians; BUSH RIGHT Feaver and Gelpi item: I would like to know whether you think President Bush did the right thing by using military force against Iraq; ZERO, 5,000, 10,000 and 50,000 Feaver and Gelpi item: Would you support continued U.S. military action in Iraq until a new Iraqi government can take over if it resulted in no additional U.S. military deaths? (5,000, 10,000, or 50,000).

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Regression – Explaining Variance in Collateral Damage in War

The most important results, in terms of the quantitative data, have to do with putting the variables in a multiple regression in order to find out the percentage of variance that can be accounted for on the dependent variable(s).⁴⁷ In all of the statistical regression procedures, I worked with three dependent variables: Collateral Damage Tolerance of Iraqi Civilians (CDTIC), Collateral Damage Tolerance of Iraq Full (CDTIF) and Collateral Damage Tolerance of Death Penalty (CDTDP).⁴⁸ The following tables depict the explained variance in the dependent variables (or the proportion of sum of squares due to regression, R^2) given the most important independent variables: Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA), Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), Incidences of Corporal Punishment (CP), Islamophobia (ISLAM), Symbolic Racism (SR), Attitudes Toward Nature of God (ATNG), Favorability of Capital Punishment (CAP PUN), Religiosity (REL), Socio-Economic Status (SES), and Family Authority (FA).

Table 4.14 is a summary of the regression of CD Tolerance of Iraqi Civilian Deaths (a 4-item scale) with all of the selected independent variables. In this case the results suggest that when RWA is regressed on the CD Tolerance of Iraqi Civilian Deaths the unstandardized regression coefficient is .369 and is statistically significant at the .001 level. Technically, the regression coefficient means that for every change in one unit of RWA score, the CDTIC score changes by .369. More concretely, if we think about these statistics in terms of scores on the respective scales, then for every 10 point increase on the RWA scale there is a 3.69 point increase on the CDTIC scale, if these two variables are placed in the same linear regression equation. Further, the regression coefficient describes in very specific terms the relationship between the independent variable(s) and dependent variable. When RWA is the only variable in

⁴⁷ In each of the regression analyses conducted I entered the independent variables using three methods: enter, step-wise and backward.

⁴⁸ Collateral Damage Tolerance Iraqi Civilians was a 4-item measure that focused civilian deaths in Iraq. Collateral Damage Tolerance Iraq Full was a 14-item measure (including the 4 items from CDTIC) and included items about pre-emptive strikes, torture, and military action worth the costs. Collateral Damage Tolerance Death Penalty was a 10-item measure and focused on innocent people being put to death by the American system of capital punishment. Measures included reference to DNA testing in death penalty cases, compensation programs for exonerees, and likelihood that innocents have been killed in the U.S. due to mistakes.

the model it accounts for 41.9% of the overall variance in CDTIC. What is more, when SDO was added, together with RWA, the regression coefficient went to a .272 (.000) and then could explain 50.8% of the variance in CDTIC (an adjusted R² change of .091). Consequently, when Incidences of Corporal Punishment (CP) and Islamophobia (ISLAM) were added to the model, they too added to explaining variance on CDTIC (53.3% and 55.2% respectively). Also, it is worth noting that as independent variables were added (beyond RWA), the regression coefficient for RWA went down (.272, .250, and .200) but was nevertheless still statistically significant at less than the .001 level.⁴⁹ This analysis only confirms the power of RWA and SDO for yet again proving to be very important predictors of an important attitudinal measure—in this case tolerance of civilian casualties in war. As Altemeyer, Sidanius and Pratto, and McFarland (and others) have consistently shown, underlying authoritarian and social dominance tendencies are critical variables for predicting many other forms of racism, prejudice, homophobia and the like. The combination of Altemeyer's so-called 'Double-Highs' proves significantly important once again with the combination of RWA and SDO accounting for over 50% of the variance in more or less tolerance of innocent loss of life by Iraqi civilians in the Iraq war (50.8% to be exact). What is more, this also shows there may be two important variables not really tested in past research on casualty tolerance that can have predictive power: a personal history of corporal punishment in one's family background as well as propensity for Islamophobia or anti-Arab personality types.⁵⁰ Anti-Arab racism in post-9/11 America has been sorely under-researched and hopefully this data can lead the way forward for understanding it in a more nuanced and informed manner.

⁴⁹ All potentially relevant independent variables were put in this model and RWA, SDO, CORP PUNISH, and ISLAM came to the fore as the most relevant and statistically significant.

⁵⁰ Clearly, Milburn (1991), Milburn and Conrad (1996), Milburn et al. (1995), and Strauss (1994) have provided data showing incidences of corporal punishment matter for understanding a plethora of political attitude tendencies. My data adds tolerance of civilian casualties to the mix,

Table 4.14 Regression of CD Tolerance of Iraqi Civilian Deaths on Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Social Dominance, Corporal Punishment & Islamophobia (N=163).⁵¹

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Model 1</u>		<u>Model 2</u>		<u>Model 3</u>		<u>Model 4</u>	
	<u>b</u>	<u>SE</u>	<u>b</u>	<u>SE</u>	<u>b</u>	<u>SE</u>	<u>b</u>	<u>SE</u>
RWA	.369***	.033	.272***	.035	.250***	.035	.200***	.038
SDO			.243***	.043	.249***	.042	.197***	.045
CORP PUNISH					.163**	.052	.150**	.051
ISLAMOPHOBIA							.090*	.032
Adjusted R ²	.419		.508		.533		.552	
Adjusted R ² Change	.423		.091		.028		.021	

Note: ***=p<.001; **=p<.01; *=p<.05; b=unstandardized coefficient.

⁵¹ CD Tolerance of Iraqi Civilian Deaths is a 4-item scale (a part of the CD Iraq full scale) that consists of the following items (2 pro-traits/2con-traits). Pro-traits: (1) To safeguard America from terror, the U.S. must be prepared to take military action, even if this results in the deaths of innocent civilians, (2) The degree to which innocent civilians have been accidentally killed by U.S. troops in Iraq has been exaggerated by the media. Con-traits: (1) Is just one innocent civilian has died as a result of the U.S. occupation of Iraq, that is one death too many, (2) I am troubled that so many civilians, including women and children, have died as the result of U.S. military action in Iraq.

Next, I decided to put FGR's measure of casualty tolerance to the test (as an independent variable) with my measure of casualty tolerance for deaths in Iraq (CD Tolerance Iraq Full) along with the list of my aforementioned independent variables. Table 4.15 clearly shows that FGRs casualty tolerance 'scale' proved to be an important cog indeed by registering an unstandardized regression coefficient of 2.22 at the .000 level. When FGRs measure was the only independent variable in the model, it accounted for 45.8% of the variance in CDT Iraq Full. This does not come as a surprise, as FGR's measure of casualty tolerance and my measure clearly have similarities. The major difference, of course, is mine focuses on a more broadly defined set of items that includes concepts such as civilian lives lost, torture, military deaths, and the image of the U.S. in the world. FGR operationalizes casualty tolerance in a significantly more narrow way—focusing sharply on U.S. military deaths tolerated. Nevertheless, five other variables proved to be important predictors of overall tolerance of collateral damage in the Iraq war. When RWA was added, together with FGRs measure, the regression coefficient went to 1.55 (.000) and explained 60.5% of the variance (with an adjusted R^2 change of .144). Subsequently, when SDO was added the regression coefficient went to 1.34 (.000) and explained 63.4% of the variance (with an adjusted R^2 of .036). When incidences of corporal punishment was added the regression coefficient stayed at 1.34 (.000), but explained 65.2% of the variance (with an adjusted R^2 of .019). Symbolic Racism (Sears' measure of modern racism) made its first appearance as significantly contributing to predicting variance in tolerance of collateral damage in Iraq by posting a regression coefficient of 1.38 (.001) and, therefore, taking the explained variance to 66.4% (with an adjusted R^2 of .014). Finally, anti-Arab attitudes also made a contribution with a regression coefficient of 1.33 (.001) inching the explained variance upward a bit to 67.3% (with an adjusted R^2 of .011). Again, RWA and SDO proved to be pivotal predictors with RWA, perhaps, being the most important given the significant jump in explained variance of 14.7% when RWA was added to the model (with FGR's items). When SDO was added another 3% of the variance was accounted for.

Table 4.15 Regression of Capps' CD Tolerance in Iraq on Feaver, Gelpi & Reifler's Support for Military Deaths in Iraq, RWA, SDO, Corporal Punishment, Symbolic Racism, and Islamophobia (N=163).⁵²

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	<u>b</u> <u>SE</u>	<u>b</u> <u>SE</u>	<u>b</u> <u>SE</u>	<u>b</u> <u>SE</u>	<u>b</u> <u>SE</u>	<u>b</u> <u>SE</u>
FGR SUPPORT DEATHS	2.22*** .189	1.55*** .185	1.34*** .184	1.34*** .180	1.38** .177	1.33*** .176
RWA		.750*** .098	.605*** .101	.554*** .100	.576*** .098	.485*** .105
SDO			.489*** .123	.494*** .120	.562*** .120	.464*** .126
CORPORAL PUNISH				.439** .143	.387* .142	.350 .182
SYMBOLIC RACISM					-.485* .184	-.523* .182
ISLAMOPHOBIA					.193	.083
Adjusted R ²	.458	.605	.634	.652	.664	.673
Adjusted R ² Change	.461	.144	.036	.019	.014	.011

Note: ***=p<.001; **=p<.01; *=p<.05; b=unstandardized coefficient.

⁵² This regression uses Capps' 14-item Collateral Damage Tolerance in Iraq Scale as the dependent variable.

As yet one other way to test the power of FGR's main independent variables for predicting casualty tolerance I decided to put 'Bush right to invade' and the FGR casualty tolerance measure in a regression with Capps' CDT Iraq full. The results are shown in Table 4.16. The regression coefficient for 'Bush right to invade' was a 11.64 (.000), accounting for 59.8% of the variance. When FGR's items were added the regression coefficient dropped to 6.83, accounting for 64.8% of the variance (a modest 5% increase in explained variance). This clearly shows that FGR are asking *very* relevant questions in regard to casualty tolerance—especially the question of whether or not people believe the initial invasion was a right or wrong decision. The potential problem with the question is one's opinion is likely to change over time given circumstances on the ground in the conflict or other significant occurrences--the establishment of a stable government, democratic leanings/voting, and so on. My model identifies more specifically the underlying attitudinal factors (or parts of one's social character) that impact attitudes toward collateral damage in war. The FGR model seems completely oblivious to social-psychological factors that could prove predictive.

Table 4.16 Regression of Capps' CD Tolerance in Iraq Full on Feaver, Gelpi & Reifler's Bush Right to Invade & Support for Military Deaths in Iraq (N=194).

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Model 1</u>		<u>Model 2</u>	
	<u>b</u>	<u>SE</u>	<u>b</u>	<u>SE</u>
Bush Right to Invade	11.64***	.857	6.83***	.582
FGR Support Deaths			.967***	.182
Adjusted R ²	.598		.648	
Adjusted R ² Change	.600		.051	

Note: ***=p<.001; **=p<.01; *=p<.05; b=unstandardized coefficient.

Table 4.17 shows the five most important independent variables for predicting casualty tolerance in Iraq given my conceptualization of collateral damage tolerance in war (and not including FGR's casualty tolerance measure). Not surprisingly, given what has been discussed so far, RWA and SDO proved to be crucial followed by Islamophobia, Symbolic Racism, and incidences of Corporal Punishment. With all five independent variables in the model, the overall variance explained was 57.2%. The specifics are the following. When RWA is the only variable in the model, it accounts for 42.8% of overall variance in CDT Iraq, with a regression coefficient of 1.14 (at the .000 significance level). Adding SDO, the regression coefficient went to .848 (.000 level), accounting for 51.2% of variance (with an adjusted R² change of .087). Islamophobia took the regression coefficient to .692 (still at the .000 level), accounting for 53.6% of the variance (with an adjusted R² change of a modest .026). Symbolic Racism moved the regression coefficient slightly upward to .703 (at the .000 level) accounting for 54.9% of variance (with an adjusted R² change of .015). Finally, when incidences of corporal punishment was added, the regression coefficient settled to a .677 (.001 level), accounting for 57.2% of variance (with an adjusted R² change of .012). Given the high levels of statistical significance—given my sample in the Puget Sound—several independent variables seem to be connected intimately to tolerance of collateral damage in war. In order to corroborate these findings my collateral damage scales, along with the independent variables, need to be tested in far more populations (especially ones in which a more representative sample is employed).⁵³ But as a first-run they seem more than promising for adding a social-psychological angle to the overwhelming political science voices that currently dominate discussions of public opinion about casualty tolerance in war.

⁵³ Sociologists Smith, Hanley, and Milburn have been trying to get several of these attitude scales included in the ANES surveys distributed to a representative sample of the U.S. populace. Clearly the Capps CD tolerance scale needs to be included as well—as initial results show promise for understanding the phenomenon.

Table 4.17 Regression of Capps' CD Tolerance in Iraq Full on RWA, SDO, Islamophobia, Symbolic Racism, Corporal Punishment (N=194).

Independent Variables	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
RWA	1.14***	.101	.848***	.107	.692***	.117	.703***	.115	.677**	.114
SDO			.724***	.133	.558***	.141	.629***	.142	.635***	.141
ISLAMOPHOBIA					.288**	.094	.306***	.093	.282***	.093
SYMBOLIC RACISM							-.489*	.208	-.440*	.207
CORP PUNISHMENT									.342*	.161
Adjusted R ²	.428		.512		.536		.549		.572	
Adjusted R ² Change	.431		.087		.026		.015		.012	

Note: ***=p<.001; **=p<.01; *=p<.05; b=unstandardized coefficient.

Regression – Explaining Variance in Collateral Damage in Death Sentence

The final regression analyses were performed putting Capps' CD tolerance for killing innocent individuals via the death penalty as the dependent variable with selected independent variables (results are depicted in Table 4.18). CDT Death Penalty was comprised of a 10-item scale (with pro-traits and con-traits) focusing on items like: incidences of actual innocence, use of DNA evidence, the possibility that the U.S. justice system has killed innocent individuals, and compensation programs for those wrongly convicted. The first test was done putting all relevant independent variables into the model (including the 14-item CDT Iraq full measure) and three variables emerged showing significant amounts of variance on the dependent variable. CDT Iraq had a regression coefficient of 6.86 (.000) and explained 47.8% of the variance in CDT Death Penalty. When SDO was added, the regression coefficient moved to 5.85 (.000) and explained 49% of the variance (an adjusted R² change of 1.5%). The other variable that proved an important predictor was the attitude toward the nature of God measure (Baylor God). When 'Baylor God' was added, the regression coefficient went to 2.03 (.000) and explained 49.9% of the variance (an adjusted R² change of 1.3%). I had a hunch that the moral theaters of war and the criminal justice system might be easily connected and this initial finding seems to point in that direction, with CDT Iraq proving to be a significant predictor of CDT for the death of innocents via a faulty criminal justice system.

Additionally, when I put all the independent variables in the model including a basic measure of approval or disapproval of the death penalty generally there were three main variables that proved to be the most vital (Kury's approval of death penalty, SDO and RWA). Table 4.19 shows that Kury's 4-item scale measuring approval/disapproval of the death penalty registered as the most important variable for explaining variance collateral damage tolerance for innocent people to die via the U.S.'s death penalty. The regression coefficient of 'Kury Cap Punish' was a 1.22 (.000) and explained 37% of the variance. When SDO was added the coefficient went to .949 (.000) and 45.5% of the variance was then explained (with an adjusted R² change of .081 or 8%). RWA came in third and had a regression coefficient of .848

(.000) and explained 48.1% of the variance (with and adjusted R² change of .026 or 2.6%).

Finally, when putting all relevant variables into the mix for explaining variance on tolerance of death in use of the death penalty – three emerged as being the most important: SDO, RWA, and Family Authority.⁵⁴ The specifics include a regression coefficient of 7.88 for SDO (.000) with an explained variance of 26.6%. When RWA was added, the regression coefficient went to 6.02 (.000) with an explained variance of 33.7% (an adjusted R² change of .074 – or 7.4%). When Family Authority (Authoritarian leanings in parenting styles) was added, the coefficient went to 4.15 (.001) with an explained variance of 35.2% (an adjusted R² change of .019 – or 1.9%). The common thread with all three of these regression runs is the overwhelming presence of Social Dominance as an important predictor (even more so than RWA) for predicting tolerance of death by the wrongfully convicted in the U.S.

⁵⁴ Variables put in the model included: Religiosity, Attitudes toward the nature of God, Incidences of Corporal Punishment, Symbolic Racism, Family Authority, RWA, and SDO.

Table 4.18 Regression of Capps' CD Tolerance for Death Penalty on CD Tolerance Iraq, Social Dominance Orientation & Attitudes Toward God (N=194).

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Model 1</u>		<u>Model 2</u>		<u>Model 3</u>	
	<u>b</u>	<u>SE</u>	<u>b</u>	<u>SE</u>	<u>b</u>	<u>SE</u>
CD IRAQ	6.86***	.794	5.85***	.038	2.03***	.039
SDO			.185*	.085	.201*	.084
BAYLOR GOD					.190*	.095
Adjusted R ²	.478		.490		.499	
Adjusted R ² Change	.481		.015		.013	

Note: ***=p<.001; **=p<.01; *=p<.05; b=unstandardized coefficient.

Table 4.19 Regression of Capps' CD Tolerance for Death Penalty on Kury's Capital Punishment Favorability, Social Dominance Orientation & Right-Wing Authoritarianism (N=194).

<u>Independent Variables</u>	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	<u>b</u>	<u>SE</u>	<u>b</u>	<u>SE</u>	<u>b</u>	<u>SE</u>
KURY CAP PUNISH	1.22***	.126	.949***	.130	.848***	.133
SDO			.373***	.077	.285**	.082
RWA					.180*	.064
Adjusted R ²	.370		.454		.481	
Adjusted R ² Change	.374		.081		.026	

Note: ***=p<.001; **=p<.01; *=p<.05; b=unstandardized coefficient.

Table 4.20 Regression of Capps' CD Tolerance for Death Penalty on Social Dominance Orientation, Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Family Authoritarianism (N=190).

Independent Variables	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
SDO	7.88***	1.05	6.02***	1.01	4.15**	1.39
RWA			.291***	.069	.281***	.082
FAMILY AUTHORITY					1.19*	.552
Adjusted R ²		.266		.337		.352
Adjusted R ² Change		.271		.074		.019

Chapter 5 – Explaining Collateral Damage Tolerance – The Interviews

What happens is there are dollar values put on lives that are lost. If an Iraqi family loses a member of their family due to actions by the U.S. we pay that family for that loss. That range can be anywhere from I would say roughly \$2,500 to maybe \$5,000, depending on what exactly happened...If a soldier loses his life in theater his insurance payment to the family is \$400,000 or \$500,000. Sean Lawson – Iraq War Veteran

Interviewer: Estimates are 41,000 – 800,000 Iraqi civilians have been killed since America's 2003 invasion, in your view is it closer to 41 or 800?

Joe Stewart: I have no idea, just the amount of shit we blow up. I mean, we blow up a lot of...I mean, we've been blowing stuff us since I was in the seventh grade. I remember listening to the radio in the first Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and listening us to blow...listening to us blow stuff up. So I guess I just assumed a lot of casualties on both sides occur.

Logistics, Rationale, and General Information on the Interviews

As has been pointed out in previous sections, one of the primary reasons I embarked on this set of research questions was to add significant depth to understanding *why* middle-scorers feel the way they do in regard to more or less tolerance of innocent loss of life in war and the criminal justice system. In chapter 2 I critiqued leading casualty tolerance scholars Peter Feaver, Chris Gelpi and Jason Reilfer's research methods on the grounds of, grave assumptions and oversights I argued they have made, in their studies of public opinion on collateral damage. By way of reminder, my criticisms of FGR's work includes the following: (1) FGR strictly adhere to a rational choice theoretical foundation, whereby individuals view death and destruction in a strict 'cost benefit analysis' approach, (2) FGR's work is entirely quantitative and they never probe deeper to find out *why* the public is willing to tolerate more or less innocent loss of life, (3) FGR's research is ethnocentric in the fact that only American soldier lives are worthy to be queried in regard to tolerance levels of death—civilian lost lives are completely ignored—and (4) FGR assume that everyone is inherently anti-death and would prefer fewer deaths as a result of war. Therefore, at the heart of my qualitative research is a direct rebuttal to, and extension of, the research I believe should have been done to compliment the quantitative

findings compiled by FGR over the past several years. In this section I point out instances where a qualitative angle for studying casualty tolerance is clearly warranted and needed to enhance our understanding of public sentiments. My data are suggestive and complementary—not exhaustive or confirmatory—given the relatively small sample of survey takers I was able to interview (fifteen out of a possible two-hundred ten). However, I think the interview data I analyze in this section can provide a springboard for future studies where qualitative hypotheses could be formulated and tested in a thorough manner. Incidentally, at the end of this chapter I lay out a few hypotheses that could prove fruitful and insightful. Next I discuss the mechanics of the interviews and the theoretical influences that helped formulate the questions asked.

First, the interview schedule was influenced by research by Rossi and Berk (1997) and Capps (2001) that showed promise for the use of vignettes for tapping into underlying personality tendencies and thought processes for detecting the substance underneath responses to polls or survey questions. My goal was to provide them with scenarios that *could* occur and let them tell me what they thought of them if they were to occur.⁵⁵ The goal was to get the interviewees to tell me the stories they tell themselves about the situations presented—I was looking to prod them for ‘thick description’ of the narratives they use to make sense of collateral damage. Secondly, the interview schedule was influenced by philosopher Michel Foucault’s concept of the ‘master narrative’ and Herman and Chomsky’s research on the ‘Propaganda Model’ (Foucault 1972; Herman and Chomsky 2002). These two genres of thought regarding how individuals come to ‘know what they know’ are very different, but equally important, in my view, for helping us understand the back stories of how citizens come to know what they know about knowledge of current events, politics, ideology, and so forth. In the case of my project I am interested in focusing on understanding more clearly how interviewees arrive at the opinions they have about innocent loss of life and limb in war and the criminal justice system.

It is difficult to summarize easily (or quickly for that matter) Foucault’s contributions to knowledge building; however, one of his most basic points was that

⁵⁵ It should be noted, however, that all of the vignettes were based in actual instances of ‘collateral damage’ in war and the criminal justice system. So, these scenarios were not completely foreign to the interviewees.

individuals in societies often actively produce and re-produce knowledge and power. Truth is a social construction and mediated via discourse—the focus for Foucault is on understanding ‘how we know what we know’ (Foucault 1972). Therefore, ‘master narratives’ or ‘regimes of truth’ serve as national stories that often serve as convenient ends for government, politicians, and others in positions of power and authority. Foucault elaborates by saying,

...truth isn't outside power, or lacking in power: contrary to a myth whose history and functions would repay further study... Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it indulges regular effects of power. Each society has its régime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true (Foucault 1980:131).

Also, it is important to recognize ‘counter narratives’ or instances in which individuals do not accept the master narratives provided by those in authority. The critical question then is what types of modes of thought distinguish individuals that are repeating master narratives with people who are directly challenging master narratives and constructing cogent counter narratives (or perhaps just rigorously challenging the master narrative with critical questioning).⁵⁶ In asking interviewees broad open-ended questions like what they thought about the war in Iraq and what the end-game might be, I was attempting to get a feel for the narrative(s) they were relying on to construct their ‘truth(s)’ (Ayers 2003; Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983; Fox 1998; McHoul & Grace 1993; O’Brien 2006 and Schoenberg & Ravdal 2000). By way of contrast, Herman and Chomsky (2002) argue that mainstream media is filtered through a system of checks and balances to ensure the country is only partially informed on most of the important issues of the day via their ‘propoganda model’ methodology. Their

⁵⁶ In American politics we often hear these days about political ‘talking points.’ These are essentially master narratives that pundits and political operatives produce that ‘tell a story’ about the issue or topic and are supposed to provide citizens with a particular lens by which to think about and conceptualize social issues. Essentially, the qualitative data discussed in this section is an attempt to listen carefully to what the interviewees say and document how or if they are retelling or recapitulating master narratives or actively talking back to the M.N.’s in the form of counter narratives.

approach is that information flows from the top down and the reason the public may be so mis-informed on the key issues is because the information the mainstream media is feeding them is filtered and littered with lies and distortions. The propoganda model includes the following filters: ownership of the medium, medium's funding sources, sourcing, flak, and anti-communist ideology (Herman and Chomsky 2002). I believe there is clearly merit in the 'propoganda model' approach. As a result, part of my interview schedule focused on asking questions about 'media framing' of collateral damage in war and the criminal justice system as well as probing the question of whether or not the interviewees felt they were adequately informed on matters of war and the workings of the criminal justice system. Further, I asked if the respondents thought the media could significantly shift public opinion one way or another.

Logistically, after the survey data was compiled and I had a chance to comb through it, I put together a list of potential individuals to interview. The interviews were conducted in February and March of 2009. Half of the interviews were conducted in a conference room near my office at the university for which I was teaching at the time and half were conducted in the offices of the interviewees. As can be quickly deciphered by reading over the interview schedule certain questions were asked that had to do with understanding what the interviewees thought of certain things going on at that particular moment in time. For instance, questions pertaining to the success or failure of President Bush's 'Surge' in Iraq or media 'fairness' in coverage of the war. Other items (the bulk of the questions) were more general and asked interviewees to respond to three particular scenarios (vignettes) of situations that 'could' occur in war and the criminal justice system. The findings presented in this section are interpretive and suggestive, not confirmatory of direct causal links between variables (like in the quantitative section). Hence, my goal is to bring out the most salient findings from the interviews and use them as a supplement to the survey data.⁵⁷

As Table 5.1 shows my goal was to target middle-scorers, but also to interview high and low scorers as well for comparison purposes. In order to figure out which

⁵⁷ I will comment at the end of this section on potential hypotheses that could be tested as a result of my findings. The data I have collected and analyzed for this project could prove to be very fruitful for further research on casualty tolerance from a qualitative methodological angle.

individuals would be considered ‘ambivalent,’ I studied their scores on the main psychological measures and I computed an ‘ambivalence score’ (ambivalence index) based on responses to the following question: Please indicate whether and to what extent you feel conflicted about the following issues (very much, somewhat, not very much, not at all): Abortion, Death Penalty, Euthanasia (physician assisted suicide), Bombing Iran, Affirmative action for minorities, and Pre-emptive military strikes by the U.S. Scores on my Ambivalence Index (AI) ranged from 0-21 (with a higher score indicated a tendency toward more ambivalence). High scorers averaged a 6.7 on the AI, low scorers came in at 7.3, while middle scorers averaged a 7.9 on the AI. Table 5.1 provides a summary of all relevant scale scores as well as basic demographic information for each interviewee.⁵⁸

A semi-structured interview style was implemented, whereby I conducted the interviews in three stages: warm-up questions, response to three vignettes, and finally exit questions. The interviews all lasted at least one hour and in a few cases lasted 1 ½ hours. The warm-up questions included the following: hometown, how where they were from compared to living in Seattle/Puget Sound, how closely they followed American politics (very closely, somewhat closely, no closely, not closely at all), what were their main sources of information about politics, opinions on the effectiveness of the criminal justice system, and I asked interviewees to rank order what they thought the most important social issues were.⁵⁹ Next, I asked individuals if they had family or friends who had served in Iraq since 2003 (military and/or private security). I also asked if they had ever had a family member or friend that they knew was wrongly convicted of a crime. Further, I asked about if they (or anyone close to them) had ever been a victim of a violent crime. I also asked them to jot down the emotions they felt when thinking about deaths in the Iraq war. And finally, I asked them to jot down how they visualized war-related deaths among U.S. soldiers and civilians in Iraq and

⁵⁸ All names of the individuals have been changed to ensure anonymity of the interviewees.

⁵⁹ The list of issues were: Health Care Costs, Poverty, Personal Indebtedness, Economic Woes of the U.S. Stock Market, HIV/AIDS, Social Security, Abortion, War in Iraq, War in Afghanistan, Potential War with Iran, Illegal Immigration, Crime and Deviance in Society, Global Warming, Gay and Lesbian Lifestyles, and Content of TV and Movies. Upon rank ordering them I then asked them to explain the ordering in more detail.

their vision of the common characteristics and typical scenario of individuals involved in recent exonerations from U.S. prisons (due to DNA evidence proving innocence).⁶⁰

General Comments on the 15 Interviewees – Summation of Attributes

In Tables 5.1 and 5.2 it is noted that fifteen individuals were interviewed for the study – six women and nine men. This is proportional to the number of men and women who took the survey (38% female and 62% male). Given my emphasis on middle-scorers, I purposely targeted ambivalent-minded individuals as a higher proportion of the interviewees. A few more specific notes about the sample of interviewees is in order. First, it is important to note that thirteen out of fifteen were white with one identifying as African American and one person as Asian American. Thus, this is not a terribly diverse sample in regard to race/ethnicity. Also, ten out of the fifteen had hometowns that were not in the Seattle/Puget Sound region. This is consistent with the transplant nature of Seattle—where more than half of the residents have migrated in from different parts of the country and/or world. Second, it is noteworthy to point out how the interviewees were selected. I investigated how individuals scored on the survey items and then rank ordered folks from being generally low to middle to high scorers on the most critical psychological tests. As can easily be seen in tables 5.1 and 5.2 there are instances where individuals did not always ‘fit’ neatly in the three general categories. For instance, high scorer Ashley Simon is a prime example. Simon scored relatively moderately on RWA, SDO, BAYLOR and ISLAM, but scored significantly higher on CD IRAQ and CD DP. In this case her scores on collateral damage in war and the criminal justice system were deemed ‘enough’ to place her in the ‘high scorer’ category. Clearly this is not an exact science. Third, in choosing the ‘middle-scorers’ I was careful to try and target individuals who had indicated at least some level of ambivalence on the survey items asking directly about whether or not they felt ambivalent about a few current social issues in America. I also wanted to try and find individuals, obviously, who scored in

⁶⁰ The inspiration for the vignettes came from typical scenarios of innocent loss of life and limb in war (the Haditha Massacre in Iraq and suspected torturing of innocent individuals at Guantanamo) and recent incidents of innocent individuals being exonerated from American prisons.

the middle on all or most of the important psychological tests on the survey. For the most part this was achieved, but again, there were exceptions. Joe Stewart was a middle-scorer who scored a 0.00 on ambivalence despite being in the middle on most of the psychological measures. It could be the issues I chose to inquire about—regarding one’s ambiguity—may have been more applicable to some of the interviewees and not so important to others.

It is interesting to note that almost all of the interviewees indicated they ‘follow politics’ at least somewhat closely (only two said ‘not closely’). There were a plethora of media outlets mentioned as their primary sources of information. *Fox News* was mentioned only twice and both times by high scoring individuals. Moreover, when asked about the top three most important issues of the day the economy/poverty was mentioned that most often as the number one social problem (five indicated economy along with another four saying poverty).⁶¹ This is not a major surprise as the recession/depression of 2008 was (and still is) in full swing and affecting millions across the United States. The war in Iraq and Afghanistan made a few of the interviewees’ top three—five to be exact. Other common answers were health care, global warming, and personal debt. Only one interviewee indicated abortion as a top three issue—not surprisingly he was a high scorer. Twelve of the interviewees were gainfully employed at the time of the interview. One individual had been recently laid off from a job with the city of Seattle and one person was a full-time student. One interviewee had served time in the Air Force and one individual was an active soldier in the military (the rest did not have any military service). Nine of the fifteen had family or friends who had or were serving in the military. Likewise, one person of the group had a family or friend be the victim of an erroneous conviction of a crime, while six had been a personal victim of a violent crime.

⁶¹ I instigated the list of the top social issues of the day (health care costs, poverty, personal indebtedness, economic woes of the U.S. stock market, HIV/AIDS, Social Security, abortion, war in Iraq, war in Afghanistan, potential war with Iran, illegal immigration, crime and deviance in society, global warming, gay and lesbian lifestyles, and content of TV and movies) and asked individuals to rank order the issues from most to least important.

Table 5.1 Vital Scale Scores and Important Attributes of 16 Puget Sound Residents Interviewed⁶²

Interview Name	PARTY	ETHNICITY	RELIGION	AGE	BAYLOR	RELIGIOSITY	RWA	SDO	ISLAM
<i>Mean Scores</i>					21.60	43.20	13.6	11	16.2
<i>Range of Scores</i>					0-52	0-68	0-40	0-40	0-60
<i>Highs</i>									
Simon, Ashley	Mod Rep	White	Protestant	26-32	20.00	46.00	9.00	10.00	15.00
Ferguson, Scott	Strong Rep	White	Protestant	26-32	36.00	64.00	30.00	36.00	12.00
Johnson, Kate	Strong Rep	White	Protestant	34-50	N.A.	N.A.	34.00	12.00	13.00
<i>Lows</i>									
Cloud, Matt	Independent	White	Catholic	34-50	17.00	30.00	1.00	4.00	13.00
Smith, Samantha	Strong Dem	White	Protestant	51-65	15.00	45.00	3.00	4.00	1.00
Gillette, Amy	Far Left	White	Protestant	51-65	20.00	28.00	2.00	4.00	0.00
<i>Middles</i>									
Hamilton, Justin	Mod Dem	White	None	33-40	19.00	37.00	20.00	10.00	19.00
Lawson, Sean	Mod Dem	African Am	Protestant	34-50	27.00	51.00	26.00	7.00	14.00
Scheib, Nick	Indep/Rep	White	Protestant	26-32	23.00	42.00	16.00	7.00	11.00
Sloan, Michelle	Mod Dem	White	None	22-25	12.00	32.00	7.00	5.00	22.00
Stewart, Joe	Mod Rep	White	Catholic	26-32	27.00	50.00	20.00	25.00	16.00
Kodama, Ryan	Strong Dem	Asian Am	Catholic	26-32	24.00	N.A.	12.00	13.00	26.00
Matthews, Tony	Mod Dem	White	Protestant	33-40	21.00	43.00	18.00	9.00	28.00
Peterson, Tim	Independent	White	None	51-65	15.00	35.00	11.00	17.00	9.00
Lawrence, Jessie	Mod Rep	White	Other	22-25	19.00	42.00	18.00	17.00	27.00

⁶² PARTY refers to the interviewees political party preference; ETHNICITY refers to their race/ethnicity; RELIGION refers to religion they identified most with; BAYLOR refers to responses to what they think the nature of God is, RELGIOSITY refers to their composite score on ‘tendency toward fundamentalism,’ RWA – Right-Wing Authoritarianism score, SDO – Social Dominance Orientation score, and ISLAM refers to score on Capps’ Islamophobia scale.

Interview Name ⁶³	CD IRAQ	CD DP	RACISM	CORP PUN	AMBIV	SES	FAM/AU	KURY - DP	PEW	FEAVER
<i>Mean Scores</i>	21	14.7	8.6	18.4	7.4	13.1	1.8	6.2		8.2
<i>Range of Scores</i>	0-56	0-40	0-28	0-32	0-21	0-26	0-4	0-16	2K-10K	0-24
Highs										
Simon, Ashley	37.00	24.00	11.00	17.00	9.00	14.00	2.00	10.00	10000.00	15.00
Ferguson, Scott	45.00	18.00	6.00	11.00	11.00	14.00	3.00	6.00	3000.00	19.00
Johnson, Kate	46.00	20.00	12.00	27.00	0.00	14.00	2.00	5.00	4000.00	16.00
Lows										
Cloud, Matt	7.00	21.00	9.00	17.00	12.00	12.00	2.00	6.00	4000.00	10.00
Smith, Samantha	1.00	0.00	8.00	7.00	2.00	17.00	1.00	0.00	4000.00	4.00
Gillette, Amy	2.00	9.00	7.00	27.00	8.00	19.00	1.00	0.00	4000.00	3.00
Middles										
Hamilton, Justin	32.00	4.00	19.00	23.00	11.00	11.00	2.00	3.00	5000.00	10.00
Lawson, Sean	24.00	6.00	7.00	23.00	7.00	10.00	2.00	8.00	5000.00	5.00
Scheib, Nick	22.00	18.00	10.00	11.00	14.00	13.00	1.00	7.00	4000.00	11.00
Sloan, Michelle	37.00	23.00	5.00	15.00	5.00	14.00	3.00	7.00	5000.00	8.00
Stewart, Joe	25.00	19.00	11.00	18.00	0.00	14.00	1.00	5.00	4000.00	14.00
Kodama, Ryan	16.00	5.00	1.00	19.00	2.00	15.00	3.00	7.00	10000.00	3.00
Matthews, Tony	33.00	25.00	3.00	19.00	8.00	16.00	0.00	6.00	4000.00	10.00
Peterson, Tim	13.00	21.00	11.00	17.00	8.00	14.00	1.00	8.00	4000.00	6.00
Lawrence, Jessie	37.00	23.00	10.00	16.00	10.00	13.00	2.00	12.00	5000.00	15.00

⁶³ CD IRAQ refers to Capps' 14-item scale of tolerance for collateral damage in war; CD DP refers to Capps' 10-item scale of tolerance for collateral damage in use of death sentence for wrongly convicted; RACISM refers to Sears' 7-item Symbolic Racism scale; CORP PUN refers to Milburn's measure of corporal punishment; SES refers to Wright's measure of social class position; FAM/AU refers to Altemeyer's 4-item authoritarianism and family scale; KURY DP refers to Kury's measure of favorability toward the death penalty; PEW refers to the interviewees response to how many U.S. military personnel had been killed as of March 2003 (the correct answer was 4,000), and FEAVER refers to scale scores on FGR's primary measure of casualty tolerance.

Table 5.2 Interviewee Demographic/Background Information

Interview Name	Hometown	Follow Politics	Main Sources of Info	CJS Effect	Top 3 Issues		
<i>Higs</i>							
Simon, Ashley	Bay Area, CA	Somewhat closely	CNN/ NBC Nightly News	Fair	1. Economy	2. War in Iraq	3. Mental Illness
Ferguson, Scott	Seattle, WA	Somewhat closely	Newspapers/ Fox News	Good	1. Economy	2. Personal Debt	3. Abortion
Johnson, Kate	Walnut Creek, CA	Somewhat closely	Fox News/ Newspaper/ CNN	Good	1. Health Care	2. Personal Debt	3. Poverty
<i>Lows</i>							
Cloud, Matt	Eugene, OR	Somewhat closely	NY Times/ Salon.com/ Daily Kos	Fair	1. Health Care	2. Social Security	3. Global Warming
Smith, Samantha	Scarsdale, NY	Very closely	Seattle Times/ Internet	Poor	1. Poverty	2. Global Warming	3. Nuclear Weapons
Gillette, Amy	Rhode Island	Very closely	NY Times/ Seattle Times /NPR	Poor	1. Poverty	2. M.E. Wars	3. Health Care
<i>Middles</i>							
Hamilton, Justin	Port Orchard, WA	Not closely	Newspapers	Poor	1. Energy Depen.	2. Health Care	3. Personal Debt
Lawson, Sean	Milwaukee, WI	Somewhat closely	CNN/MSNBC	Fair	1. Poverty	2. Health Care	3. Social Security
Scheib, Nick	Burien, WA	Somewhat closely	MSNBC/ CNN/Blogs	Fair	1. Poverty	2. Immigration	3. Crime
Sloan, Michelle	Vancouver, WA	Somewhat closely	Local News/ John Stewart	Good	1. Economy	2. Social Security	3. Health Care
Stewart, Joe	Bothell, WA	Somewhat closely	CNN/ USA Today /Internet	Fair	1. Health Care	2. Poverty	3. Social Security
Kodama, Ryan	Hong Kong/ Chicago	Not closely	CNN/ Newsweek	Fair	1. Global Warming	2. Health Care	3. Poverty
Matthews, Tony	Lynwood, WA	Somewhat closely	Seattle Times/ Local News	Good	1. Personal Debt	2. Health Care	3. Crime
Peterson, Tim	Wisconsin	Somewhat closely	Seattle Times/ Magazines/ Internet	Fair	1. Economy	2. War in Iraq	3. Afghan War
Lawrence, Jessie	Federal Way, WA	Somewhat closely	Newspapers/ Local News	Good	1. Economy	2. Health Care	3. War with Iran

Interview Name	Job/Status	Military Service	Family/Friends Military	Family/Friend Wrongly Convicted	Victim of Violent Crime
<i>Highs</i>					
Simon, Ashley	Sports Marketing	No	Yes	No	No
Ferguson, Scott	City Planner	No	No	No	Yes
Johnson, Kate	WA State Activities	No	Yes	No	No
<i>Lows</i>					
Cloud, Matt	City Planner	No	Yes	No	No
Smith, Samantha	Pastor	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Gillette, Amy	Health Care	No	Yes	No	Yes
<i>Middles</i>					
Hamilton, Justin	City Planner/Laid Off	Yes - Air Force	Yes	No	No
Lawson, Sean	Military-Army	Yes - Army	Yes	No	Yes
Scheib, Nick	Pastor/Student	No	No	No	No
Sloan, Michelle	Parks and Rec	No	Yes	No	No
Stewart, Joe	Police Officer	No	Yes	No	Yes
Kodama, Ryan	City Planner	No	No	No	No
Matthews, Tony	Banking/Finance	No	No	No	No
Peterson, Tim	Engineer	No	No	No	No
Lawrence, Jessie	Full-Time Student	No	No	No	Yes

Master Narratives of War in Iraq

Before discussing the vignettes employed in the qualitative data analysis, I want to report on the most common themes or ‘stories’ the interviewees were telling themselves about the war in Iraq, how it was going, what the likely outcome might be and if they thought they were adequately informed on the basics of the mission, goals, and so on.⁶⁴ This way of understanding an individual person’s epistemology was advocated, as previously mentioned, by French post-structuralist Michel Foucault (1972). In asking interviewees broad open-ended questions like what they thought about the war in Iraq and what the end-game might be I was attempting to get a feel for the narrative(s) they were relying on to construct their ‘truth(s).’ Clearly there were differences in what Highs, Lows, and Middles think about the Iraq war. High scorers indicated the following themes in response to how the war was going in general and what the ultimate end game might be: the surge worked and helped to stabilize the violence and chaos in Iraq, U.S. military was working to help Iraq have a non-corrupt democratic form of government, transitions were occurring whereby Iraqi soldiers would take over the duties of protecting the Iraqi people from insurgents (as opposed to American/Ally forces having to do so), and leaving abruptly could cause even bigger problems. Higher scorer Ferguson said the following, “Um, from what I hear and I...I mean, I don’t pay a ton of attention to it, I think things are going smoothly.” In terms of what the end result might be of the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq, High scorers predicted that U.S. soldiers (some level of presence) would be in Iraq for decades, but hopefully the majority of the troops could leave Iraq in the coming months and years. Overall, High scorers were somewhat upbeat and hopeful of the situation in Iraq. Low scorers, on the other hand, were not quite as optimistic and provided a much more informed, thoughtful analysis of the situation. For instance, Amy Gillett responded in the following way:

⁶⁴ More specifically the questions I posed were the following: How would you describe the war in Iraq? In your own terms, what is happening, what will come of it, and what should happen ultimately? Also, do you think you are adequately informed on matters pertaining to the Iraq war? If you feel uninformed what would you like to know more about?

Well, my guess is there will be a series of civil wars. I think that the kind of democracy that...that we say we are trying to create over there is insane given the tribal nature of that part of the world. It is not what works...[Iraqis] should be allowed to choose their own governing...their own way of governing themselves...I do not see anything good coming out of it.

Both of the other Lows indicated the distinct possibility of an even more wide spread civil war (than what was already occurring between the Shi'a, Sunnis and Kurds). Further, Low scorers indicated they didn't completely buy the idea that if the U.S. and Allied forces left Iraq quickly the situation would be worse—in terms of loss of human life. Given the widespread popularity (by Republicans and Democrats) that a quick withdrawal would be a disaster these sentiments could be viewed as comprising a 'counter narrative' of sorts. When Middle scorers were asked about their general feelings about the war they indicated the following themes: a move toward a more democratic form of government, the U.S. was shortsighted in believing the war would be easily won, the war has been unnecessarily bloody and violent (and far too long), and the U.S. should not make it an accepted policy that we have the burden of 'policing the world.' Middles were essentially split in regard to what the ultimate outcome of the invasion would be. Some argued the country and the Iraqi people would forever be bitter at the U.S. for what it had done, while others had a more upbeat tone and indicated that our efforts could prove positive in the end (or in one or two decades) by helping Iraq form into a democracy that wasn't a threat to its neighbors. Moreover, in terms of the consequences of U.S. forces pulling out of Iraq in a 'quick manner' all Middles that commented on the possibility indicated they had grave concerns—thus essentially buying into the talking point that is so often repeated in discussions of the Iraq war (pulling out quickly would be disastrous). Tony Matthews commented, "...We are too far into it right now, as much as I hate to say it, we are far into it to just completely pull out." Another key example of a Middle scorer 'buying' one of the primary master narratives justifying our presence in Iraq were the comments of Joe Stewart on the question of if Iraq had anything to do with 9/11. The discussion between Stewart and I went as follows:

Capps: Do you think that Iraq had anything to do with 9/11?

Stewart: Yes.

Capps: You do. How?

Stewart: I think that all countries that have harbored terrorists or allowed camps to exist or allowed training to occur somehow helped. But...

Capps: Why don't we invade them all then?

Stewart: Because there was oil in Iraq. We wanted to secure our oil.

This exchange is interesting for at least two reasons. One, Stewart clearly buys in to the master narrative that Iraq was a 'breeding ground for terrorists' (perhaps the terrorists in Al Qaeda who might wish harm on the U.S.). Two, Stewart says that we chose to invade and occupy Iraq because they have oil, *our* oil. This is fascinating that Middle scorer Stewart would say that Iraq's oil is ours not theirs. Again, this is further evidence that Middle scorers are much more likely to buy into the 'official story' or 'regime(s) of truth' set forth by national leaders or media pundits as opposed to Low scorers who were more skeptical. One question I posed in which there was some level of universal agreement was if interviewees felt they were significantly informed on all matters pertaining to the Iraq war. Almost unanimously all those interviewed said they did not feel they knew everything they needed to know. Virtually all respondents were skeptical of the media, but for different reasons. Highs tended to talk about the fact that the media had a 'Liberal' bias and, would therefore, tend to focus on the negative aspects of the war and deemphasize the positives. Lows were also critical of the media, however their problem was the media didn't give enough coverage of what was actually happening in Iraq to the Iraqi citizens (insurgents and non-insurgents). Middle scorers often combined the concerns of Highs and Lows. In a general sense Lows were the most informed and desperately wanted to know more and more because (in their minds) it would likely reaffirm their disdain for the war and its dire consequences for all involved. Highs tended to repeat talking points they had likely heard from politicians and military leaders via the media—what might be termed an *uninformed apathy*—toward the war. Middles, by contrast were, by and large, a bit

more informed than Highs, but nevertheless somewhat apathetic to the war and its consequences—perhaps more of an *informed apathy*.⁶⁵ I followed up the question by asking them to talk about what they would like to know more about. In response to this question there were a few differences and those are briefly discussed next.

Low scorers focused heavily on wanting to know more about what the Iraqis think of the war and the U.S.'s continued presence and occupation of their country. One Low scorer also wanted to understand better why the insurgents are doing what they are doing. Samantha Smith said:

We need to know more about everything. We need to know more about what's happening to our people, and know more about what's happening to the Iraqi people, and we need a better understanding of the political situation there. We need a much better understanding of the insurgents there, and how they feel about what's going on and why they are doing what they are doing.

By contrast, High scorers did not indicate they wanted to know more about the impact of the war on the citizens and especially not what the insurgents were thinking of the U.S., our policies, or U.S. service men and women. I mentioned that almost all the respondents indicated there was more they would like to learn about the Iraq war. One person that did not want nor require more coverage by the media was Scott Ferguson. Ferguson said he didn't want to know anything more than he presently did about the war and, "I mean, I'd rather spend time with my own family or...you know, something that does make me happy..." Further, Ferguson mentioned more than once during the interview that the media is biased toward 'Liberals' and so he is quite choosy in terms of who he trusts to deliver 'the truth' about current events. Another theme that emerged from the High scorers was the sense that there needed to be more positive stories told by the media to the American public about the war. Ashley Simon said she knew of a positive story (through a friend) of Ft. Lewis soldiers taking soccer balls to kids in Iraq. She indicated that story would likely never make the news—but nevertheless be a true sign of progress and positivity in the Iraq conflict.

⁶⁵ The concepts of *uniformed* and *informed apathy* are constructs that emerged from the interview data of the Middle scorers. There seemed to be a clear distinction between individuals who knew the basics about the war in Iraq (why we invaded, why we were still there, exit strategies, success or non-success of the surge and so on) and those that had seemingly tuned out the war.

And finally, Middle scorers communicated, in general, the following list of items they would like to know more about: the geography of Iraq, strategies from U.S. military top brass about the mission and goals of the war, what will happen when we leave Iraq some day, the possibility of Iraq standing on its own and being a real democracy, civilian casualties and injuries, the state of Iraq's economy pre and post U.S. invasion and occupation, and why do so many Islamic individuals 'hate' Americans. Clearly there was a sense by almost all of the interviewees that the media is not doing their job—of informing the American public about the basics of the Iraq war and why it is so essential that America keep the occupation in place for an untold number of months and/or years to come. Next I discuss the game changing interview I had with an Army veteran stationed in the Pacific Northwest that had served multiple tours in Iraq.

Iraq War Veteran-Infantry Soldier Interviewee #8

My mother always told me that the road to hell is paved in gold. So for all the good we could be doing I think we are causing more harm by being there (Sean Lawson – Iraq war veteran).

About half-way through the process of interviewing individuals I had the opportunity to interview an Army war veteran (and incidentally a middle-scorer) who had done multiple tours in Iraq and was currently stationed at Ft. Lewis in Tacoma, Washington. This turned out to be a fortuitous and pivotal moment in the study and allowed me to become more informed on *exactly* how innocent loss of life in war zones is dealt with in contemporary situations by the U.S. military.⁶⁶ Not only did I probe infantry soldier Sean Lawson about his experiences in war, but was also able to parlay my new found knowledge into the interview schedule and ask interviewees nine through fifteen to comment on what I had learned from a real life soldier who had served multiple tours of duty in Iraq. My interview with Mr. Lawson lasted almost a full two hours and will now be discussed in a bit more detail as a lead-in to the main findings from responses to my warm-up questions and the vignettes.

As part of the interview schedule I asked respondents to indicate what they thought of when they visualized loss of life in Iraq. Lawson said, “Um, I actually feel

⁶⁶ I'm still not entirely sure how Mr. Lawson happened upon my survey. My hunch is someone from his church (one of the many churches I targeted) must have forwarded him the link to the online survey.

sad. The reason being...because not only just concentrating on the lives of the Americans that I've lost but also on the Iraqis, who are collateral damage.” Lawson went on to talk about three scenarios of collateral damage in Iraq that he personally witnessed happening multiple times. Clearly it is his belief that the negative incidents could be significantly hurting the ‘winning the hearts and minds’ mission of U.S. soldiers in Iraq. A more lengthy excerpt from his comments is warranted:

A prime example is, you go into an Iraqi neighborhood, they haven't had power for months. They finally get their power turned on. They've had it for a couple of days now, everything is looking pretty good for them. But now you have the U.S. military coming down the streets of Iraq in their strikers. And you have these power lines that are hanging down. And because of what has happened to us from IED's and EFP's, and things like that we are ordered to cut these wires, especially if they are lying on the ground. So a family who has not had power for a while, now has power. Now they don't have power anymore. So are we making a difference or are we causing a problem?

We are going on what we call ‘door knocking’ house to house, looking for weapons, looking for high-valued targets. And we are waking people up at 3:00am and yelling, ‘If you don't open this door in ten seconds we are kicking it in.’ Right before this guy can get down with his family there we are kicking in his door.

And [another] scenario, there are Iraqi kids playing out in the street, you have insurgents in the area, a fire fight breaks out. We are very noticeable in our uniforms. The insurgents are not noticeable. They are blended in with the populace there. A young boy get shot by a 7.62 round that comes from an American weapon. So are we actually doing good or are we causing a problem?

Lawson's basic point was all in all we were doing more harm than good in Iraq. He noted, “My mother always told me that the road to hell is paved in gold. So for all the good we could be doing I think we are causing more harm by being there.”⁶⁷ Later in the interview, when we discussed my first vignette regarding innocent loss of Iraqi lives in the war, Lawson provided invaluable information regarding the actual process—given his experiences—by which Iraqi citizens were ‘compensated’ for loss

⁶⁷ I will have much more to say about Lawson's responses to other relevant warm up questions later in this section (when I compare what he said to other middle-scorers).

of property and human life. I asked him what the proper compensation is for surviving members of Iraqi families when their non-insurgent family members were killed in the theater of war. Lawson said, "You want the real answer?" I said "Sure."

The exchange went as follows:

Lawson: All right. This is...this is something that...I guess it is public knowledge to an extent. What happens is, there are dollar values put on the lives that are lost. If a Iraqi family loses a member of their family due to actions by the U.S. we pay that family for that loss.

Capps: Um-hum.

Lawson: That range can be anywhere from I would say roughly \$2,500 to maybe \$5,000, depending on what exactly happened. And we do compensate. We compensate for...everything that we do or destroy in theater. If I kick your door in, off the hinges, regardless of if we find weapons or whatever...

Capps: Right.

Lawson: ...the family that is living in...a lot of times what happens is insurgents have moved into a home that is occupied by a family and they are using that as a front. So we are searching that home, we kick in the door, we pay for that door.

Capps: Right.

Lawson: We may pay on the spot \$500 for the door. We break a window; it may cost us \$300. We tear up things inside the home, so we pay them on the spot. We have a person, military person that travels with us, that has a briefcase full of money to pay for the incidents.

Capps: That seems interesting.

Lawson: Yeah. You would be surprised.

Capps: So, in that case, I mean, the military has calculated what a life is worth.

Lawson: Yes...we are putting a price on...an Iraqi life is worth \$2,500.

Shortly after this discussion Lawson and I talked about what the average compensation is for U.S. soldiers killed in the war. He indicated that the ‘payout’ would be much higher for the soldier’s family, “...for the most part, if a soldier loses his life in theater his insurance payment to the family is \$400,000 or \$500,000. Not to include...they get...you get right up front \$100,000. Not to include that, the government also pays for your funeral and anything that has to go with that.” This seemed to add much appreciated depth to the poll numbers I had mentioned to the interviewees where 23% of Americans indicated that American lives were worth more than the lives of people in other countries. This is the literal embodiment of the somewhat abstract poll question. Before interviewing Mr. Lawson I was unaware of *exactly* how instances of collateral damage were handled in the war zones. After talking to this soldier I was armed with ‘insider information’ and a more nuanced way in which to pose the question of whether or not American lives are worth more than the lives of Iraqi civilians. For each interview after my interview with Mr. Lawson I included a question about the stark difference in compensation for American soldiers and Iraqi civilians killed in the war zone.

Warm-Up Inquiries – Highs & Lows

As a way of introducing what the interview was about I asked the interviewees three primary questions: (1) Please describe the emotions you feel when you think of deaths in the Iraq war, (2) In your view have the 4,245 American women and men serving in Iraq who have lost their lives been worth it? and (3) Define the phrase ‘collateral damage’ in your own words.⁶⁸ In response to my first inquiry regarding the emotions felt when the respondents thought about death in the Iraq war I noted a fairly stark difference in tone from the Highs and Lows. High scorers tended to focus on the fact that the sacrifice was unfortunate but was ‘what they signed up for,’ while Low

⁶⁸ My intention is to discuss high and low scorers together and then talk in more depth about middle scorers in more depth. I will also focus more on the first two inquiries and say less about responses to the third question.

scorers talked about feeling ‘devastated’ and ‘angry.’⁶⁹ High scorer Scott Ferguson noted:

Um, I think it is an unfortunate part of war, if we are talking about Iraqis and also American soldiers or civilians that are working over there that are killed...it is part of what they unfortunately signed up for...is taking the chance.

Samantha Smith (Low scorer) asserted the following:

I...I feel devastated by the thought of all the people who have died there, both our soldiers and people who live there. I’m horrified and saddened. I think it’s terrible.

The obvious follow-up question to how folks felt about deaths in war was the second item: has the loss of life and limb been worth it? Again it was easy to pick out substantial differences in the way Highs and Lows contemplated the loss of life as being worth it or not. Two High scorers said unequivocally ‘Yes,’ the loss of life was worth it, and one High scorer hedged a bit but ended up saying it would eventually be worth it in the future; all three Low scorers, however, were adamant that the losses were absolutely not worth the price. The High’s main justifications included comments about the transfer of power to the Iraqis, Iraqis would be forming a democratic government soon, progress was being made, we had gained a ‘strategic advantage’ by having a strong presence in the Middle East, and that the number of soldiers killed was relatively low considering how long we had been fighting. On the other hand, Low scorers were defiantly positive that the loss of life was not worth it and diplomacy should have been continued before jumping into a pre-emptive war. Samantha Smith remarked, “We could have used diplomacy, we could have helped people there. We could have...I mean, we could have, you know, talked with allies in nearby countries.” Low scorers also mentioned that the war was really about oil, President Bush getting revenge against Hussein for ills against Bush Sr., and Dick Cheney’s wish to improve his financial standing by instigating war in the Middle East. Moreover, when I asked High and Low scorers to disclose how they would define the term ‘collateral damage,’ both groups mentioned civilian casualties as likely a part of

⁶⁹ High scorers also mentioned heroism a couple of times—saying they looked up to the soldiers for how brave they were and the sacrifices they were willing to make for their country.

the definition of collateral damage that would be tied to wars. The Low scorers were more nuanced in their responses and provided more detail in regard to what collateral damage could entail. For instance High scorer Scott Ferguson noted, “Ah, I think it could be expected or unexpected results from inaction. Fortunate or unfortunate...it’s you know, whatever the result is from...from an event.” Seems like a fairly ‘clinical’ definition. By way of contrast, Low scorer Amy Gillett responded by saying:

I think the only damage that is generally cited in a war is the deaths of soldiers, so collateral damage, which is just a euphemism for the rest of the damage that isn’t getting reported, you know...the tremendous loss of Iraqi life, the loss of what infrastructure there was which, granted wasn’t much, but even that, you know, people...people’s loss...displacement of people, the complete disruption of a culture, of several cultures.

Further, Low scorer Matt Cloud chimed in, “...it’s the innocent lives that are lost, you know, the citizens that happen to be in the way of the action...that happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time.”

Warm-Up Inquiries – Middles

When asked about the emotions they felt regarding deaths in the Iraq war Middle scorers were in two camps: feelings of sadness, anger, and being upset by the goings on *or* having little to no emotion about the deaths. Seven felt sad and angry while two had little to no emotional reaction. Tony Matthews asserted, “I mean I think any loss of life is a tragic thing, and there is a, you know, a large level of heartache that comes no matter who it is...I’m not a big fan of war, so you know, every single loss of life is a tragic loss of life.” Two Middle scorers indicated having little feelings one way or the other. Justin Hamilton, who served in the military right out of high school (doesn’t serve currently) said, “I would say no emotions come to mind, because I don’t think we really hear too much about it. I think for a while on nightly news they were doing a body count, but I haven’t heard that for months or too

long to even remember...”⁷⁰ What is more, when I inquired about the 4,245 lives being worth it or not six indicated the sacrifice was not worth it, while two said it was a ‘mixed bag’ and with time the loss of life could prove worth the cost. Justin Hamilton said, “No...because it has created a bigger mess than was there before...when Saddam Hussein was in power he had every...it wasn’t an ideal system, but he controlled the power in the country and everything was in check.” Nick Scheib of the ‘mixed bag’ approach argued:

I don’t know if we can say yet. I mean, I think it is something where fifteen, twenty years down the road when things have evolved from the efforts going on right now, maybe we can look back and say yes or no.

Given the semi-structured nature of the interviews I was able to interject questions off the script at times and one Middle scorer provided an interesting example of being a bit confused on the master narrative of why we invaded Iraq in the first place. Michelle Sloan offered an interesting take on whether or not Iraq had anything to do with 9/11 by saying the following in the back and forth:

Capps: Do you think Iraq, I mean, were they principally responsible for 9/11, do you think?

Sloan: Hm...for 9/11? I don’t...isn’t that why we went over there?
[laughs]

Capps: Well, that is what we were told.

Sloan: Yeah [laughs]...Um...I don’t know. I don’t really...it is still not...it is unclear to me.

This theme, of Middle scorers often struggling to figure out what the ‘facts’ are, will be seen as an emerging pattern in the responses to the vignettes. And finally, in terms of defining collateral damage the Middle scorers were not unlike Highs and Lows in this regard. Interviewees mentioned loss of U.S. soldier lives, soldiers being disabled because of the war, Iraqi innocent civilian loss of life, the financial costs of the war, and the families of wounded soldiers who are burdened with taking care of

⁷⁰ This is yet more evidence of the apathy mentioned earlier in this section. By my estimation both of these Middle scorers, who communicated apathy toward what they thought about deaths in the war, seemed to be fairly well informed—therefore would likely fit into the ‘informed apathy’ category.

them upon their return to civilian life. After asking interviewees these warm-up questions we then proceeded on to the main event—the three vignettes. The results are presented next.

Vignette #1 – Killing of Innocent Civilians in Village – Highs & Lows

The first vignette presented to the subjects highlighted a proposed scenario whereby U.S. soldiers were involved in the killing of innocent civilians, including women and children, after one of their comrades had been killed via a roadside bomb. There were several questions probed after the interviewees read the vignette. The present discussion will focus on five of the most pertinent questions posed: (1) Should the Marines be charged with pre-meditated murder for the killings?, (2) Is there a difference between the women and children that were killed vs. the men (i.e., is it more justified to kill the men as opposed to the women and children)?, (3) What do you make of polling that suggests 23% of Americans view American lives as worth more than the lives of others?, (4) What are your thoughts regarding surviving family members of Iraqis being paid \$2,500 for loss of life vs. U.S. soldier families being paid \$400,000?, and (5) In your estimation what is the Iraqi civilian death toll in the Iraq war—40,000 or 800,000—and would this number influence your support of the war effort?⁷¹ The actual vignette is posted below.

Imagine you're on a military jury evaluating the following events:

In 2005, the third year of the Iraq war, U.S. marines set out to secure a small town just outside Baghdad. On the way, a roadside bomb destroyed a Humvee and took the life of a popular and decorated soldier.

Minutes later the marines saw five men in a taxi near the bomb site. They shot and killed these men as suspected insurgents and then entered a nearby village, suspecting that the villagers were shielding others. Chaos ensued and the marines ultimately killed people in three homes with guns and grenades. At first it was thought that all of those who died were Al Qaeda insurgents. But 24 were actually unarmed civilians ranging in age from 1 to 76, of whom eight were women or children. The five men in the taxi were unarmed students. Many Iraqis and some in the U.S. media later

⁷¹ The item regarding the actual payment of Iraqis and U.S. soldier families was asked of the final seven interviewees only.

charged that these two dozen Iraqi civilians were the victims of a murderous rage sparked by the bombing just minutes earlier. Others said that, on the heels of an unprovoked attack and in the heat of battle, the marines were justified in their actions, even if civilians were hurt as a result.

In response to whether or not the soldiers should be charged with pre-mediated murder for the killings all three High scorers, as well as all three Low scorers said no. The general consensus amongst both groups was the killings were spur of the moment and did not merit a ‘pre-meditated’ act—whereby the soldiers thought out the killing of the civilians before the incident happened. The killings were surmised to be indeed a reaction to fallen soldier, but not 1st degree murder. Next, I asked if there was a difference in the minds of the interviewees between the men being killed vs. the women and children. This question tried to probe the idea that it might be more acceptable to kill innocent civilian men because they could more easily fit the profile of an insurgent, while women and children—in most cases—would not fit the profile. Interestingly, both groups had general agreement that there was little to no difference in who was killed (i.e., it was unfortunate and/or tragic in both situations). Both the women and children and the college aged men in the car could be viewed as equal threats and both being killed was equally troublesome. High scorer Ashley Simon said, “...a lot of women are involved [as insurgents]. And I really think it is one of those things where you can’t trust anybody...” Low scorer Amy Gillette noted, “Well, my heart goes out to the women and children, but I think my heart should also go out to innocent men who are just grown up children....They are children of God as well. So no, I don’t think there is a difference.” When I asked about what the High and Low scorers thought of a poll indicating that 23% of American value American lives more than others, both groups tended toward arguing that the finding was unfortunate, but not terribly surprising. Low scorer Gillette quipped, “...I really think that every time we salute the flag, that we are saying our country is better than other countries...so I’m not surprised, but I’m horrified that we’ve taught our people to feel that way.” High scorer Johnson said, “That’s a pretty arrogant viewpoint.” Further, High Scorer Ferguson added a bit of twist by saying, “...sounds kind of surprising, but I mean, I guess it depends on which American lives. I mean, certainly I value my life

more than other people's...but that seems pretty ethnocentric I guess [laughs]." The next item asked had to do with the total Iraqi civilian death toll from the Iraq war.

I asked the interviewees to speculate on the number of innocent civilians who had perished in the Iraq war conflict—noting that estimates range from 40,000 to close to a 1,000,000. In response to this question there were significant differences between the High and Low scorers and a particularly chilling response from one of the High scorers. For starters, two High scorers indicated they believed the number dead to be closer to 800,000, while the other indicated he had no idea what the number might be. Mr. Ferguson (who said he did not know the number dead) also noted he did not trust the media to provide an accurate count so it was virtually impossible to know how many civilians had died. This pattern, of multiple and varied responses, was also present in Middle scores as Table 5.3 clearly shows.⁷² When I probed a bit further into the thinking of Mr. Ferguson he said the following in response to the question of whether or not he ever thinks about innocent civilians being killed in Iraq:

Yeah...certainly. I mean, it...it certainly sucks to be the random person that is in a building that has a bomb dropped on 'em. But it also sucks to be the person that in a building that has an airplane run into it.

Clearly this is an example of Ferguson reaffirming his acceptance of the master narrative that Iraq somehow had something to do with 9/11. It seems he is also justifying the death of Iraq citizens because *someone* has to pay for American lives being lost in the terrorist attacks on 9/11, and for Ferguson, Iraqi civilians will do. Furthermore, when I asked Ferguson if there was a number of dead U.S. soldiers and/or dead Iraqi civilians that could cause him to lose support for the invasion (he has always been supportive of the mission) his answer was right in line with his CD IRAQ score (he scored a 45 out of possible 56 on my survey measure)—no backing down in the least. The conversation went as follows:

Capps: Is there any number of losses of life [Iraqi civilian lives] where you would go, "Wow, maybe this wasn't a good idea?"

⁷²Additionally, I asked the interviewees to comment on whether or not the number of Iraqi civilian deaths would or could alter their support of the war and as Table 5.3 notes there were several varied answers given (more to come on this point later in this section).

Ferguson: No, I don't think...think you can necessarily base, you know, a war on some number of expected deaths. I mean it is...the war is either a good idea or not a good idea. If it is a good idea, then...you have to go with it.

Capps: Focusing more on U.S. soldier deaths...if someone in politics had said, "We are going to Iraq and it's going to cost 10,000 lives or 50,000 lives..." Is there a number here that would give you pause?

Ferguson: Hm. I don't think so. No, I mean, it's kind of...at full expense, I suppose...I mean, yeah because we can only speculate on the amount of lives that are lost if we didn't go to war.⁷³

By way of contrast Kate Johnson, who scored a 46 on the CD IRAQ scale toned down her tolerance of innocent loss of life by saying that as the death toll went up that could eventually cause her to lose support for the effort. She didn't put a specific number on it, but did indicate that if she had a personal connection to a loss that would likely be more impactful, "I mean it's harder for me to say because like I haven't...had anybody personally that has been, you know a casualty or anything. If that was the case, then I'm sure my view would be much different." This type of thinking is likely very common—a sense of apathy for the deaths in a war *until* and *unless* those deaths personally affect the individual in question. In other words, the deaths are 'out of sight out of mind' until a friend, loved one, or even a distant relative is injured or killed.⁷⁴ As for the Low scorers, two believed the number dead to be in the 800,000 range and one said in the middle. All three of the Low scorers were against the invasion from day one and so the more deaths that piled up just tended to make them more and more bitter and saddened by the efforts of the U.S. military. All three said they had thought quite often about the loss of U.S. soldier lives *and* innocent civilians being killed in Iraq. It is also worthy to note that all three Low scorers were able to correctly identify the number of dead U.S. soldiers on the survey (approximately 4,000 at the time of the interviewing). The three Low scorers interviewed for the study were incredibly well-informed and the exact opposite of apathetic toward collateral damage

⁷³ I will have more to say about the sentiments of Mr. Ferguson in the next chapter. He just might be the epitome of Erich Fromm's characterization of an individual who trends toward necrophilia, rather than biophilia (love of death over love of life).

⁷⁴ This would clearly make sense given the plethora of recent research on 'Gen Me' and the fact that so many young adults are becoming increasingly self-centered and narcissistic.

in war. By well-informed I mean that the Lows were able to articulate in fairly lengthy responses their views of the war and the intended and unintended consequences of America's continued occupation.

Vignette #1 – Killing of Innocent Civilians in Village – Middles

Iraqi Civilians are Just What Gets 'in the' Way for us to Be Safe

What about Middle scorers? Not surprisingly they were all over the map in regard to speculation on the number of Iraqi civilian deaths with one saying 'no idea,' 2 saying 40,000 deaths, 2 saying 800,000 deaths, and 4 believing the number to be in the middle. Most of the Middle scorers indicated that they *wished* the number of innocent civilians was less, but when it came down to it they really had no idea what the 'true' number of dead was and were highly skeptical of the number being skewed by any group(s) or political agenda that could be served by deflating or exaggerating the loss of lives. When I asked Joe Stewart (scored a 25 on CD IRAQ—solidly in the middle) his estimation of the number of innocent Iraqis killed in the war he responded by conjecturing:

Stewart: High-middle for me on those numbers...closer to like half a million.

Capps: What would you base [this] on?

Stewart: I have no idea, just the amount of shit we blow up. I mean, we blow up a lot of...I mean, we've been blowing stuff up since I was in the seventh grade...So I guess I just assumed a lot of casualties on both sides occur.

In talking more to Stewart we discussed if loss of innocent lives by Iraqis would likely alter his opinion of the war (he has neither for or against the initial invasion) he said:

Stewart: I...I think I'm a totality of circumstance, collateral damage type guy. I don't know if I'm emotionally detached or what, but if we have goals and things to accomplish...to rid the world of terrorists and gain access to oil...

Capps: But, I mean, innocent civilians, they are not...terrorists.

Stewart: But they [innocent Iraqi citizens] are just part of what gets in the way for us to be safe.

This final statement by Stewart pretty much sums up many of the sentiments of the Middle scorers. He was able to crystallize it in a more succinct manner, but many people indicated that this reflected their feelings on the matter. While unfortunate the loss of innocent civilian lives in Iraq was worth it so that Americans could be spared from losing lives in a repeat of 9/11 or worse.⁷⁵ Jessie Lawrence chimed in by saying, “I think our society has been brought up to think that when you’re at war with somebody, the other group is the enemy and so those casualties...don’t matter.” Upon pressing Ms. Lawrence in regard to if she thought the number of civilian and U.S. soldier casualties could alter public opinion she said:

...I don’t think it’s a tangible thing to people. It’s halfway across the world. It doesn’t affect us as a majority of people. I mean, obviously friends and family of people...but a large majority of our society is really unaffected by it. It’s ‘over there’ and our daily activities are not influenced at all by what’s going on there...

Yet another interesting rationalization of the killing of innocent civilians occurred when Middle scorer Nick Scheib noted that it was likely that U.S. soldiers tried harder not to kill innocent civilians when compared to insurgents. Scheib said, “...I would imagine that the U.S. soldiers are more particular about who they are killing than insurgents. I mean there are situations where they are [U.S. soldiers] not thinking and not trying, but I think for the most part, they are trying to pick out the right people to be shooting.” As Table 5.3 shows, in response to the question of whether there might be a threshold of Iraqi deaths that could alter public opinion about the war, many Middle scorers opted for arguing that numbers were so varied that most Americans would likely dismiss the estimates. Further, several indicated that the war had drug on so long and was physically ‘out of sight and mind’ and so most Americans would likely rarely think about the costs of the war—in terms of loss of innocent lives of Iraqis. Finally, throughout the interviews I asked respondents to comment on the role

⁷⁵ Never mind, of course, that Iraq had no direct link to 9/11, no WMDs, and so on. Clearly there is a convenient confluence of the notion that Islamic people are generally more prone to violence and destruction and in order to keep up safe they should be willing to sacrifice innocent civilians. In essence citizens in the Middle East must pay for the small minority of people who do wish harm and destruction on the West.

of the media in regard to accurately portraying the true costs of the war and Iraq war veteran Lawson had an interesting take:

...when you see figures or you hear the figures it's still hard to grasp. But if they could see pictures...you know. If they could see pictures of thousands of Iraqi families and children I think that would bring up a red flag and they would be like, "Whoa, we really need to re-think this." This is not what we bought in to. We thought we were going to go in and this was going to be another...thousand day war.

\$2,500 for Iraqi Civilians and \$400,000 for American Soldiers Killed – Justified?

One Low and one High scorer, as well as four Middle scorers, were able to respond to my question about the differences being paid to individuals losing their lives in the Iraq war (Iraqi civilians vs. U.S. soldiers). While the sample size is obviously small (at two), the differences between the responses of Simon (High scorer) and Cloud (Low scorer) could not be more divergent. When I posed the scenario to Simon this was the exchange:

Simon: I [would] look at that...is the kind of the state of the different economies...I don't know, maybe it is me just rationalizing it but...um...

Capps: In other words, \$2,500 means a lot more in their culture.

Simon: Exactly. If \$2,500 there [in Iraq] will pay for the whole funeral, you know, all those things. \$2,500 here, um, you might as well just burn them yourself in your own backyard or bury them yourself [giggles]...

Capps: Okay. But I mean, if that compensation was more than just the funeral, if it was being paid for the loss of life...for as long as they could live or whatever their job was would you think it might need to be more equal?

Simon: I wish I could say yes but one of my top priorities, with the economy and things like that...at least we are holding some accountability, that it was an accident, and we are trying with our best efforts to help people get through it or figure out what to do...If our country had more money and we could afford it, I think yeah that would be great [to give the surviving families more compensation].

The fact that Simon giggles halfway through her answer to the question could indicate her callousness or uncomfortableness with the inquiry. Either way it is a fairly odd way to respond to such a serious item—how families are compensated for family members killed when they should not have perished at the hands of U.S. or Allied forces. Also, the justification of the discrepancy between ‘payouts’ because of a struggling economy seems a rather clever attempt to mask her insensitivity toward the Iraqi citizens killed in the Iraq war. This could also be viewed as a strategy for trivializing the innocent loss of lives by Iraqi civilians. If citizens are trying to ‘do the math,’ to figure out what \$2,500 means in Iraqi culture, that is mental energy wasted and not spent thinking deeply about the true costs of wars. On the other hand, Cloud was clearly offended and saddened that this might be common practice in the Iraq war:

Capps: What should be done in these cases?

Cloud: I remember I visited some friends who were living in South Korea back in the 70’s and them telling me that they weren’t driving because...if you hit somebody with your automobile that you’re responsible for that person and their family for the rest of their life.

Capps: Yeah. So, I mean, a lot more than, “Here’s \$2,500. We are sorry.”

Cloud: Follow them. You know...take care of them for seven generations, see how many wars we stay in. To me that is just utterly ridiculous...there is no value that you can put on it.

Four Middle scorers were asked the same question. Three out of four indicated the payment of \$2,500 to the Iraqi surviving family members was not enough and essentially an insult. Two also mentioned that \$400,000 did not necessarily seem like a fair payment for a U.S. soldier losing his/her life. One Middle scorer, Joe Stewart indicated that he was indifferent to the disparity of money given to each group:

I guess I’m indifferent. It doesn’t make me uncomfortable. It doesn’t surprise me that..I had never heard of that until you told me, but it doesn’t surprise me that that happens. You have to realize the economics of it too. I mean, that might be a lot of money to some.

Again the response of Stewart shows a real twist of apathy toward the deaths of the Iraqis due to America's invasion and occupation of their country. I think it is also safe to say that all nine of the interviewees were unaware of the process and likely had never thought about payments being given to anyone who loses their life in a conflict like the Iraq war.

Table 5.3 - INTERVIEWEE ESTIMATES OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN IRAQ

	<u>NO IDEA</u>	<u>CLOSER TO 40,000</u>	<u>CLOSER TO 800,000</u>	<u>SOMEWHERE IN THE MIDDLE</u>	<u>NUMBER OF DEATHS ALTERING VIEW OF WAR*</u>
<i>Highs</i>					
Simon, Ashley			X		Too Early to Tell
Ferguson, Scott	X				No Limit
Johnson, Kate			X		Yes - Number Unknown
<i>Lows</i>					
Cloud, Matt				X	N.A.
Smith, Samantha			X		1 Death Too Many
Gillett, Amy			X		1 Death Too Many
<i>Middles</i>					
Hamilton, Justin	X				No Number-Focus on Soldiers
Lawson, Sean				X	Numbers Are Not Effective
Scheib, Nick				X	Number of Deaths if we Leave
Sloan, Michelle				X	Numbers Are Not Effective
Stewart, Joe			X		N.A.
Kodama, Ryan			X		No Number-Public Tuned Out
Matthews, Tony		X			Number Are Not Effective
Peterson, Tim				X	Number Are Not Effective
Lawrence, Jessie		X			No Number-Public Tuned Out

* *Number of Deaths Altering View of War* - Question probed whether or not there was a threshold, in terms of number of Iraqi civilian deaths, that would or could alter support of the war effort in Iraq or society's support in general.

Vignette # 2 – Torture of ‘Enemy Combatants’ at Guantánamo – Highs & Lows

Not only is loss of life by soldiers and Iraqi citizen’s part of collateral damage, but torture of so-called ‘enemy combatants’ is also considered a form of collateral damage for the present study and in the post 9/11 world America has been (and still is by all accounts) in the business of breaking the Geneva Convention rules of engagement and engaging in various torture techniques at Guantánamo Bay military prison and other prisons in various war zones across the globe. There has also been evidence that hundreds (perhaps thousands) of people who did not have ties to terrorist organizations in any way have been tortured. Clearly this could be viewed as another form of ‘collateral damage’ in a post-9/11 world. Therefore, it only seems logical to understand in more depth the interviewees’ thoughts in regard to the use of torture. I asked six questions in response to the second vignette. The four most important items I will analyze for this discussion are the following: (1) What are your general thoughts about America’s use of ‘torture’ as a way to garner information from our enemies? Should we be torturing or not torturing? (2) Does the so-called ‘ticking time bomb’ scenario alter your view of the use of torture? (3) Do you believe that, while unfortunate, the torturing of some innocent individuals at Guantánamo Bay has aided, in at least some way, for disallowing another major terrorist strike on U.S. soil? Why or why not? (4) In your view should President Obama retain the policies of the Bush administration and continue to use torture where necessary to try and get information and, perhaps, thwart a terrorist attack or are these practices immoral and a black eye for America in the eyes of the world and, therefore, unacceptable—to be abolished immediately. The actual vignette is posted below.

Suppose you read the following news report in your local newspaper about the Detention Facility at Guantánamo Bay.

Report: Study Shows over 75% of Prisoners at Guantánamo Bay Were Innocent—Not ‘Enemy Combatants’ Yet Still Victims of Torture Techniques

A newly released report by U.S. government officials and researchers at Harvard University has concluded that over 75% of the detainees at the infamous Guantánamo Bay Detention Facility in Cuba were not ‘enemy combatants’ and completely innocent

of any wrongdoing, violence, or proposed violence (or terrorist attacks) against America and American allies. Many of the detainees—now deemed in the wrong place at the wrong time at the time of their capture—were not formally charged of crimes and were held for more than 5 years with no legal representation. The study also details the types of torture techniques used to try and pry information from them. The list includes: water-boarding, extended sleep deprivation, extended solitary confinement, partial or total sensory deprivation, threat of permanent or severe disfigurement, and sexual assault.

A brief counting of the responses in simple categories of agreement and disagreement is warranted here, followed by a more in depth analysis of differences in opinion among the three groups and their rationalization processes. In reaction to the first question regarding overall approval of torture as a way of garnering information from our ‘enemies’ all three High scorers indicated agreement with the policy while all three Low scorers said they were against the use of torture. This is not surprising given the fact that Highs and Lows are likely locked into their positions on torture, regardless of potential incidences of injustice. As for the Middle scorers two were in favor of torture, six were against, and one was a ‘maybe’ and essentially of mixed opinion regarding the use of torture techniques to glean live-saving information from terrorists. Upon inquiring about the so-called ‘ticking time bomb scenario’ fancied by Alan Dershowitz and others in the political sphere as ‘the’ scenario where torturing someone with information could save the lives of those targeted for terrorist attacks, the Highs and Lows remained loyal to their positions—and therefore were not swayed (Dershowitz 2006, 2002). Three Middle scorers, however, were persuaded. One went from not supporting to support, and two other non-supporters went over to the ‘maybe’ side. What is more, when I asked the question inquiring if the respondents thought the use of torture by America had contributed to disallowing another ‘major terrorist attack’ the results were the following: two Highs said yes torture was effective, one said no; all three Lows said it was ineffective; one Middle said torture was effective, four indicated it was not effective, four said maybe effective. And finally, when asked if President Obama should discontinue the torture techniques that were implemented in the previous administration, all three Highs said no (keep torture option open for use), all three Lows said chuck it, while four Middles said get rid of it, two said the techniques might need to be discussed or altered but were not in favor of

totally taking it off the table as a way to garner information from our enemies, and three did not answer the question.⁷⁶ Two High scorers indicated they just assumed torture worked and so was a ‘necessary evil’ to keep Americans safe. The other High scorer initially said it was a bit of a tough call, but then proceeded to compare the torturing of ‘enemy combatants’ with her siblings harassing her for information growing up. The exchange with Simon went as follows:

Simon: Do you have any siblings?

Capps: Yeah.

Simon: Have you ever been in a situation where, you know, your siblings are trying to get something out of you and they sit on you or [giggles] do something and eventually you talk?

Capps: Yeah, probably.

Simon: As a younger sibling...I’m a middle child but my older sister used to...could torture the crap out of me and I would give up any information she wanted...I do think there are certain things you can do to people, uncomfortableness, fear that will get people to talk and give up information...I don’t know if these particular things are right or not...I don’t think it is bad to make somebody, you know, sleep deprived if it makes them eventually talk, or things that aren’t going to impair them for...or have a permanent effect on them.

By way of contrast, all Low scorers said unequivocally that torture was always wrong and in some cases reminded them of dark periods in human history. When asked to elaborate on the lack of public outcry in America regarding instituting torture techniques Gillett sums up by saying, “I found it very frightening...you know it gave me a great deal of empathy for people living in Germany at the rise of the Nazi regime, because things can topple so fast.” The ticking time bomb scenario for Highs just reinforced the importance of the military, the CIA, FBI, and so on having access to torture tools to thwart evil, death and destruction. Highs also accepted the likelihood of the ticking time bomb scenario as likely to have happened and possible

⁷⁶ In this case these respondent were not asked this particular question by way of interviewee oversight—therefore missing data.

in the future.⁷⁷ Interestingly, Lows did just the opposite and pontificated about the validity (and likelihood) that the ticking time bomb scenario would ever occur in the *real* world. Also, Lows pointed out that they had not been shown evidence that torture was actually effective in garnering information. Samantha Smith notes, “I don’t know how you could depend on anything you got out of someone with torture techniques...Yea someone will say whatever they think you want them to say to stop it.” Finally, in regard to Highs and Lows and the question of if torture is worth it compared to the harm done to innocent individuals, the following is a brief summary. Highs and Lows were in very different camps. Highs focused on the number of lives that could be saved and in the end it was worth it, while Lows said it likely produced more hate against America—and therefore more terrorists that would likely wish ill will on Americans. Next I will summarize the comments by the Middle scorers.

Vignette #2 – Torture of ‘Enemy Combatants’ at Guantánamo – Middles

In terms of the Middle scorers they tended to shake out in one of three camps in regard to torture in both common situations where information is needed and also the use of torture in ‘extreme circumstances.’ The basic responses of the Middle scorers fell into the following broad categories: (1) Torture is justified and should be continued, (2) Torture is never justified (not even in cases of the ticking time bomb) and (3) If the ticking time bomb scenario presents itself torture should be on the table – two said maybe, one said yes. The demarcations between the three points of view are quite fascinating and, therefore, require a more substantive discussion and description.

Do What you Need to do to Ensure my Safety

Two of the Middles indicated they were in favor of torture if the ticking time bomb scenario was in play *and* more generally as a way of keeping Americans safe from terrorists. One of these individuals was Matt Cloud (the Iraq war veteran) and he said he had ‘mixed’ feelings about the use of torture, but in the final analysis would

⁷⁷ Two of the Highs actually mentioned the Fox TV show *24* as evidence of the type of scenario that would justify torture.

tend to favor it as being one tool the Pentagon could use to force information out of people. Cloud said:

...Are there some things that are probably over the top with torture trying to extract information? I think so. But still...it still comes to my mind that, if another country's able to do it, that we should be able to do it, if that is going to benefit us and we're actually going to get information.

While saying he generally favored torture, Cloud also stated that there had been clear cases where some of the techniques had crossed the line – such as solitary confinement, disfigurement, and the situation with Abu Ghraib (sexual assault). Jessie Lawrence also indicated she came down on the side of believing torture was a necessary part of keeping America safe in a post 9/11 world. She summed up by stating, "...you know you almost like just turn your head and say, 'Do what you need to do to ensure my safety'...I know that is an awful thing to say but..." Not surprisingly in cases where the threat of a terrorist attack was imminent (and time was critical) Cloud and Lawrence, again somewhat reluctantly, indicated they would support such measures.

If it is Wrong it is Wrong / Slippery Slope

Four of the Middles said that in both cases torture was wrong and should be off the table as a way to garner information from suspected terrorists. The consensus from this group was torture was wrong for moral and ethical reasons, going against the Geneva Conventions was unacceptable, and there were too many chances where innocent people could be the victims of torture. Also, interviews said that America should be above acting in ways similar to what some terrorists might do to our soldiers. Further, when pressed on the 'ticking time bomb' scenario this group said that torture techniques should not be conditional. In other words, if it is wrong it is wrong, period. Joe Stewart indicated that torture might be effective (he wasn't sure), but was still wrong, "I'm completely against the torture idea...even if we [Americans] could have tortured someone and prevented 9/11 I just don't think it worth it...how many people do we torture [who] have nothing to give us?"

One of the more interesting revelations from this group came from Stewart who had indicated in the first vignette that, "...they [innocent Iraqi citizens] are just part of what gets in the way for us to be safe." One might then predict that Stewart would also be at least somewhat sympathetic to uses of torture to 'keep us safe.' This was not the case however. Stewart said:

Well, it's tough because, on the one hand I say I don't care that half a million people are killed that are innocent, but then I'm saying, 'Well, these select few shouldn't be tortured if we do capture them.' I just think it kind of puts us on the bottom end of the spectrum as trying to do the best we can at our goals in the war.

Stewart was also concerned that the torture was often being conducted by private contractors, not by U.S. military personnel. The implication was that private contractors would have much more leeway and not be held to standards of conduct like military service women and men.

Extreme Measures call for...

Three interviewees fell into the category of supporting torture only in situations in which time was of the essence and the threat warranted the use of torture. Two of the respondents (Nick Scheib and Tim Peterson) hedged a bit and stated they 'might' be in favor if the ticking time bomb were in play, while one individual (Michelle Sloan) indicated she would favor torture given these 'extreme' circumstances. I asked if they could trust the governmental authorities stating that there was indeed a threat that merited torturing 'enemy combatants' and they all three stated that this could likely prove to be a problem—that they could see where politicians or governmental authorities could be tempted to manipulate the public with exaggerations about the threats. Scheib noted, "No one ever says, you know, 'We tortured this many people, here's what we did to them and we got good information this percentage of the time...if you tortured five people and got five people to give up information that saved the lives of millions of people, then...I mean, I guess it's worth it.'"

In reaction to the question of whether torture should be abolished for 'enemy combatants' under Obama's administration most of the Middles (8) said that all in all

torture had been a black eye for America and the its use should be disbanded. Two in this train of thought also said that the concept of ‘enemy combatant’ was a problem and that suspected terrorists should have legal representation and proceed through the U.S. criminal justice system (not the military tribunal process). Mr. Lawson (war veteran) said it should not be shut down but that, “...our method of extracting information or our method of dealing with the detainees has to be different.” Lawson didn’t go into any more detail regarding exactly *how* he would change things. The final vignette has to do with the use of the death penalty, DNA evidence, and the possibility of executing innocent people in the United States.

Vignette #3 – DNA Exonerations and Death Row –Highs & Lows

Vignette three is listed below and presents a case regarding a DNA exoneration of in individual on death row in America. As was shown previously in this dissertation there have been over 250 exonerations since the mid-1990s, many with ‘inmates’ convicted of violent crimes and having served time on death row. I asked nine questions after interviewees read the vignette. I will comment in more depth on responses to seven of these questions: (1) Why do you think this happened to the young man? In your view is it just to imprison people who might be innocent in order to ensure that the true culprit(s) doesn’t escape and to provide ‘justice’ and peace to the victims? (2) Would it surprise you to know that 232 people in America have been exonerated through DNA evidence, proving their innocence, since 1989? Why or why not? (3) Could the fact that seventeen exonerees (of the 232) have served time on death row alter your support or non-support of the death penalty in the U.S. criminal justice system? (4) Do you believe these cases are rare in occurrence and, therefore, an acceptable form of ‘collateral damage’ in order to keep the streets as safe as possible from potential predators? (5) Of the 232 exonerees the following racial/ethnic groups are represented: African Americans, Caucasians, Latinos, and Asian Americans. What percentage would you guess are represented by each category? (6) Since 1976 when the death penalty was re-instated in the U.S. 1,107 individuals have been executed. Would you continue to support the death penalty if you knew 5% (or 55) of these folks were innocent, and therefore executed for crimes

not committed? What about 10% or 111 were innocent? and (7) There are currently 3,263 people on death row. Are you comfortable in supporting the death penalty knowing that perhaps 10% or 326 of these folks set to be executed are innocent? The actual vignette is below.

Suppose you read the following news report in your local newspaper about an individual exonerated from a U.S. prison due to evidence proving their innocence.

A young man was convicted of the brutal rape and murder of a young mother. Before the woman died, she was able to tell the police that a lone man was responsible for her demise. During questioning after an arrest for a drunken assault of his neighbor, the young man confessed to four different crimes, including the murder of the young mother. Three of the four confessions were dismissed but there was no victim to clear the man of the murder of the young woman. As a result, even though the man did not know the race of the victim, how many times he supposedly stabbed her, where she lived, or if she was alone when the crime was committed, he was convicted of the young woman's murder. Genetic evidence found at the crime scene did not match the young man's genetic type but the young man's trial lawyer failed to notice or concern himself with this. Despite psychological analysis that the young man had an IQ of 69 and would defer to any authority figure in the confession process, he was convicted and sentenced to death. The young man was granted an absolute pardon after he had served 17 years of his death sentence after much work by lawyers to clear him based on DNA evidence which excluded him from even being a possible suspect in the crime.

Table 5.4 shows a few of the most pertinent results from responses to the vignette about use of the death penalty in the post-DNA era where dozens of individuals have been exonerated for crimes not committed (232 at the time of the interviews) with 17 having served time on death row. I will first discuss briefly the master narrative(s) of the interviewees in reaction to the question of *why* this injustice occurred, and then I will highlight the most important responses from High and Low scorers and then summarize the Middles. Interviewees varied considerably in response to why this happened to the young man in the vignette. Subjects pointed to the man's low IQ, shoddy lawyer, the fact that he was tortured into a confession, a corrupt prosecuting attorney, pressure from the community to solve the case, laziness of the police department, race-related, a flawed justice system, and social inequality in the criminal justice process. Joe Stewart commented, "...He may not have been demanding of the system or his lawyers. It has always frustrated me that sometimes

the criminal justice system appoints someone a real shitty lawyer, but then other high profile cases get two or three million dollar retainer lawyers.”

As can be quickly discerned from the table High scorers were unanimously in favor of the death penalty to begin with and were not swayed at all by the fact that the criminal justice system makes mistakes and likely has executed innocent individuals. Further, High scorers had no qualms continuing to support capital punishment even if 5% or 10% of those executed since 1976 were innocent. In response to why this happened to the young man in the vignette, one High scorer indicated that even though innocent of the first degree murder, the young man must of done something to land on death row. This was a pattern in responses from the three High scorers. High scorer Simon notes, “Did this guy deserve the death sentence and to be in prison for seventeen years? Maybe not, but I mean, he obviously was doing something wrong in the first place getting there. So we can’t say he is a good guy.” I pressed Simon on the question of if the suspect in the scenario was indeed guilty of ‘drunken assault,’ was a death sentence the proper punishment for the crime. Simon opined:

No. But he wasn’t killed...if he had gone through and didn’t get pardoned and all that stuff it would be the worst kind of collateral damage. I don’t think he would [have] deserved that at all. But at the same time I think it is...we have to take some sort of risk...I think it is better to have a few that might not deserve to be there then have, you know, everyone else’s life in danger.

Also, none of the Highs were shocked that over 230 people had been exonerated since 1989, and, in fact, said they suspected that number was much higher. In response to the question about the seventeen exonerees who have been released from death row (were scheduled to be killed by the state for crimes not committed) this did not give the Highs I interviewed pause in the least in their support for use of the death penalty. Kate Johnson said, “...unfortunately mistakes happen...that doesn’t mean that you throw away the whole process because there were a couple of mistakes, if you take a life, yours should be taken.” Simon added, “People die all the time that shouldn’t...just like we were talking about the war earlier...people make mistakes, that is part of life.” When asked about the racial breakdown of the exonerees all High scorers indicated that it *should* track closely to the numbers of racial and ethnic group

percentages in America, but that African-Americans were likely more high represented given their disproportional numbers in the prison population. When I asked about the fact that currently there are 3,263 on death row and if 10% were innocent would you still support the death penalty, the exchange I had with Scott Ferguson is far too important not to be mentioned in some detail. We were talking hypothetically about percentages of people who could be executed for crimes they did not commit and I propositioned the scenario by which 50% of those killed were innocent—would this alter his support of the death penalty. The exchange went as follows:

Capps: So one could argue that you could in principle say, “I think the death penalty a great idea, but the way we do it is so screwed up, I am not in favor of that.” So...so is that a distinction, or...or would you say “I would favor it, even if 50% of them were innocent?”

Ferguson: It’s probably even more a deterrent for people committing a crime [laughs]...

Capps: So there is literally, I could say there were 1,107 executed and half of them were innocent, you would still support that.

Ferguson: I’ll blow your mind Jason! Yeah, I might. My support is not based on a percentage. I believe that...that somebody that kills another person or...yeah, that...

Capps: But what if those...half of those people didn’t do it?

Ferguson: See, the problem there is that they were convicted of a crime they didn’t do.

Capps: Right...I mean, the argument would be, if you don’t have the death penalty, yes, you may convict people that are innocent...but if they are in prison they can get out. Whereas if you kill them, and they didn’t do it, you’re done. You have done a huge injustice to them and their families, and now you can’t go back on that.

Ferguson: Yeah, I mean anybody, whether they are going to be on death row or not is...is has an injustice against them if they are...innocent.

Capps: So, really for you, if they die or not isn’t really that big of a factor.

Ferguson: Um...no, it's collateral damage and worth it.

By way of contrast Kate Johnson, while a fellow High scorer, indicated that if the criminal justice system was executing innocent people at a 50% clip, that would be too many for her and she would deem the system broken and in need of at least a temporary moratorium. Ashley Simon also had a similar reaction to the 50% number as Johnson, saying that 50% is an unacceptable rate of error but that should not signal the death knell of capital punishment—just a cleaning up of the system in order to improve the odds that the state and federal government are convicting guilty people.

The Low scorers in the interview phase were not all in agreement in their opposition to the death penalty—and, in fact, one said he generally favored it. When asked about if he would continue to favor it knowing the error rate in the criminal justice system, he backed off his support and stated, “You know, I’ve struggled about this, you know, because I know we have killed innocent people over time. I mean it’s the typical lynch mob mentality, you know...in a perfect world DNA evidence would lend us the ability to make sure we know, scientifically this person did it, in every case.” In regard to the question of the racial makeup of the exonerees, all of the Low scorers were very close to correct in their estimations that African Americans were much more likely to be wrongly convicted and sentenced to death.

Table 5.4 – SUPPORT FOR DEATH PENALTY IN WAKE OF DNA EVIDENCE EXONERATIONS

	<u>IN FAVOR OF DEATH PENALTY?</u>		<u>17 EXONEREES ON DEATH ROW INFLUENCE VIEW OF D.P.?</u>		<u>1,107 EXECUTIONS SINCE 1976 - 5% INNOCENT</u>		<u>1,107 EXECUTIONS SINCE 1976 - 10% INNOCENT</u>	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
<i>Highs</i>								
Simon, A.	X			X		X		X
Ferguson, S.	X			X		X		X
Johnson, K.	X			X		X		X
<i>Lows</i>								
Cloud, M.	X		X		X		X	
Smith, S.		X		----		----		----
Gillett, A.		X		----		----		----
<i>Middles</i>								
Hamilton, J.		X		----		----		----
Lawson, S.		X		----		----		----
Scheib, N.		X		----		----		----
Sloan, M.	X		X		Middle		X	
Stewart, J.		X						
Kodama, R.		X						
Matthews, T.	X			X		X		X
Peterson, T.	X			X		X		X
Lawrence, J.	X			X		X		X

Vignette #3 – DNA Exonerations and Death Row –Middles

What about the Middle scorers? As Table 5.4 reveals the Middle scorers were fairly split on support of capital punishment—four in favor, five not in favor.⁷⁸ In terms of the four who stated they were initially in support, it is interesting to note that only one of the four indicated that evidence that the criminal justice system was making grave mistakes and killing the innocent would, in fact, cause them concern and potentially diminish their support of capital punishment. And even in this situation, as I will outline shortly, Michelle Sloan was not terribly convinced that her support would be altered due to a “few mistakes.” The three other Middle scorers were not swayed by statistics showing the fallibility of the system and the likelihood that innocent people had been killed by the State or the potentiality of the situation. Jessie Lawrence made a rather interesting statement about why she favored the death penalty—especially given the hard economic times we are current going through. She said, “...I was an economics major, on a more practical term, you know, it is...[giggles] it sounds bad but it is cheaper to kill this person than to keep him in prison for the next fifty years...that is not my main reason for being a proponent of it, but it is something to think about.”

Not Swayed by Executing the Innocent

More specifically in response to the fact that 17 out of 232 of the recent exonerees had served time on death row, I asked the Middles if this could sway their support of the death penalty. In the end, three of the interviewees said it would *not* cause them to change their views. The reasons given can be summed in the following manner: (1) mistakes were made in the past and today errors are much less likely, (2) eye for an eye mentality overrides few that could be innocent and executed, and (3) there is no evidence that anyone has been executed and it is a good thing these seventeen were spared—this is proof the system is working properly. Further, Middles all indicated their faith in the criminal justice system to get it right ‘most of

⁷⁸ For those who said they were not in favor of the death penalty I asked them to comment on the American population (of which 75% or more favor capital punishment). In other words, I would say, “Do you think information regarding the number of innocent people exonerated from death row would give most Americans pause in their adamant support of the death penalty?”

the time' and so, therefore, it could easily be justified that the innocent individuals killed were just unlucky. Jessie Lawrence summarizes, "...with technology we have, some of the advances we've made in criminal investigations, things like that, that maybe we are doing a better job of getting the bad guy...and that maybe we are not making as many mistakes as in the past..."

Could be Swayed by Possibility of Executing the Innocent

Middle scorer Michelle Sloan indicated that given this information her opinion about capital punishment could change. She commented, "...I mean I don't want to put innocent people to death, just because, say, their lawyer was incompetent, or you know, like this gentleman, whatever, his IQ was low and he didn't know what was right, you know, what to say." Also, when I asked Sloan if she could continue to support the death sentence if she knew 5% of those killed since 1976 were demonstrably innocent the exchange went as follows:

Sloan: I would...kind of [be]in the middle of it, because I still think that some people don't deserve to live anymore...But at the same time, you don't want to kill those innocent people either...maybe only...only cases that are death penalty, or if you have DNA evidence that you absolutely know beyond a shadow of a doubt they did it.

Capps: So maybe if the case was based on eye-witness testimony, you would say, you know what? Life in prison would be enough.

Sloan: Yeah. Yeah.

When asked about the 10% threshold Sloan quickly said that was too many and knowing this would definitely affect her continued support of capital punishment.

As for the Middles who did not support the death penalty but, nevertheless, speculated as to whether or not the facts presented could sway supporters of the death penalty, the consensus was the numbers would not matter for most. In fact, two interviewees commented that some people in America would revel in the killing of others. Joe Stewart (police officer) stated, "I don't know if those people would shift. Because I think some people just glory in the excitement of seeing someone else die...some might say, 'Hey, cool, we killed someone, that will teach other people to

straighten out.” Nick Scheib also pointed out a similar theme and discussed the important of race in America by saying:

This is going to sound horrible, but I think most of the people that are...and many of these numbers have changed since this last election because of Obama, but I mean most of the people that vote are politically active in our country...tend to be rich White people, and I don't think that I would imagine that most of these people that are on death row are probably young Black men that are lower income.

It was fairly clear from the interview data on the third vignette that, for the most part, the likelihood that people who are innocent have been executed (or minimally served time on death row for crimes not committed) did not (and would not) sway most people to change their views of capital punishment. Those who oppose it tend to have their views substantiated by information pointing to the killing of innocent people due to wrongful convictions. Likewise, those who are in strong support of the death penalty are not swayed—in many cases—by the chance that some people who did not do the crime, but were convicted might be executed. And finally, the interviewees mentioned that some in society revel in the death and destruction of others and trend toward necrophilia.

Putting it All Together

In what follows I briefly summarize and comment on the findings of the qualitative interviews. Additionally, I preview the impact of my findings on the potentiality for future research (perhaps hypothesis testing) on public attitudes toward innocent loss of life in war and the criminal justice system. My goal in conducting the interviews was to gain more in-depth information regarding how people rationalize, trivialize, and otherwise make sense of collateral damage in war and the U.S. criminal justice system and indeed I think several interesting themes emerged, mission accomplished.

First, I want to comment on the High scorers. Intuitively, given previous research I have done on authoritarianism, social dominance orientation and punitivity I expected these individuals to be measurably more tolerant of collateral damage when compared with their Middle and Low scoring counterparts. However, I was taken

aback several times by the utter indifference, and in some cases, sick fascination with death displayed by the High scorers in response to my inquiries. These findings, although suggestive, strike a considerable blow to FGR's assumption that the public is anti-death. I will talk more extensively about this in chapter 6, as well in conjunction with the theoretical work of Erich Fromm on necrophilia and biophilia. Second, as disturbing as some of the responses were from the Highs, the Low scorers offered a glimmer of hope that there are still some (the question is how many) in American society who are locked in to issues, of life and death like the war and the criminal justice system, and are motivated to educate themselves as much as possible on the costs of our actions. What is more, two of the Low scorers I interviewed indicated they were religious (one was a Lutheran pastor and the other attended a Baptist church regularly) and contrary to what many might predict, these religious-minded individuals were adamant in their intolerance of collateral damage in war and the criminal justice system. Again, this is suggestive but a sign that the stereotypes often attributed to individuals who are highly religious needs to be revisited. Third, in regard to the Middle scorers, there are several interesting themes that come to light from the data. Clearly the idea of *apathy* can be sensed by many of the ambivalently-leaning folks. I was able to further distinguish the Middle scorers between the *informed apathetic* and *uninformed apathetic*. This is critical because when 'push comes to shove' on issues of life and death it would seem the more informed will have a much higher likelihood of resisting the tendency to buy in to the 'official stories' being told by those in power (namely politicians). Additionally, it was fascinating to tease out the ways in which Middle scorers rationalized collateral damage in the three scenarios posed. Often Middles would point out their own inconsistencies or contradictory stances. For instance, one Middle scorer pointed out that it was weird how he could have no problem with hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians being killed in war, but was starkly against the torturing of everyone to get information—no matter the circumstance. This same individual was also against the death penalty. Another important theme I found was in relation to the money paid to Iraqi families versus American families for lives lost, Iraqi civilians and U.S. soldiers respectively. Two of the Middle scorers were completely indifferent to the discrepancy. In other

words, they were not offended or bothered by the difference in the *value* of the respective lives. This sentiment reminds me of a saying by former British statesman and philosopher (1729-1797) Edmund Burke who said, “All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing.” The Highs and Lows are polarized in one direction and unlikely to budge from their positions. Middles are more malleable and are apt for change, but if a certain percentage of the ambivalently-minded are apathetic or indifferent to the horrors of collateral damage they might as well be put in the High scorer category. More work is needed to tease out the defining characteristics amongst Middle scorers—those factors that push them in the direction of being more or less tolerant of innocent loss of life in war and the criminal justice system. Given my current findings I would argue a few key variables to be prescient: perceived threat level by Middles from bona fide terrorist organizations, the degree to which Middles pay attention to current events (informed/uninformed), the degree to which Middles buy in to the ‘master narratives’ being sold by politicians in power, and the ability of Middles to formulate, articulate, and believe in alternative ‘regimes of truth’ (or counter narratives) regarding the important social issues of the day. What is more the following list of potential hypotheses could prove fruitful in future research on perceptions about innocent loss of life, if a bigger sample size was secured:

- ❖ High and low scorers will respond in a predictive manner to vignettes regarding incidences of innocent loss of life in war and the criminal justice system – either more or less tolerant.
- ❖ High scorers will have no problems accepting increasingly high levels of collateral damage in war and in the criminal justice system.
- ❖ High scorers may have a tendency to ‘talk tough’ when filling out survey items, but will likely tamper down their hostilities when confronted with complex - somewhat ambiguous – vignettes.
- ❖ Low scorers will *not* accept increasingly high levels of collateral damage in war and in the criminal justice system.
- ❖ Middle scorers will be highly conflicted when interpreting complex scenarios of collateral damage in war and the criminal justice system.
- ❖ Middle scorers will construct elaborate ways to come to peace with incidences of collateral damage and particular breaking points (pivotal points where they favor

more or less tolerance of collateral damage in war and the criminal justice system) will be able to be identified.

- ❖ Middle scorers will tend to be more sympathetic to innocent individuals (i.e., the wrongly convicted) being executed than to innocent civilians being killed or tortured in war zones due to the perceived ‘distance’ of the wars.
- ❖ Middle scorers will differ in their abilities and/or willingness to accept ‘master narratives’ or ‘official stories’ regarding collateral damage in wars and the criminal justice system.
- ❖ A certain proportion of middle scorers will have the ability to construct counter narratives to *official storylines* and, therefore, come down on the side of being pro-life as opposed to pro-death.
- ❖ A certain proportion of middle scorers will buckle under the weight of certain variables (perhaps terrorist threats, personal experiences with violence or physical harm, mainstream media scare tactics, and so on) and break toward more tolerance of collateral damage in war and the criminal justice system.

In many ways this analysis, of my fifteen interviews, is only opening the door to a more nuanced and thought-provoking line of attack to studying attitudes toward casualty tolerance. I believe it is a welcome change from the inadequacies of the rational choice theories of political scientists Feaver, Gelpi, and Reifler. In chapter six I outline briefly my vision for a social-psychological (Frommian analytic social psychological angle perhaps) approach to the subject at hand.

Chapter 6 – Frankfurt School – Erich Fromm & Critical Theory Applied to Collateral Damage Tolerance

“Destructiveness is the outcome of un-lived life” (Fromm 1941a:182)

An Analytic Social Psychology Approach to Collateral Damage Tolerance

In the broad sense the foundation of this dissertation was built on research conducted by Frankfurt School/Critical Theorists in their second phase (1931-1950). Critical theorists in the 1930s sought to build on Classical sociological theories by focusing on the intersection of Marx, Weber, and Freud with a sensibility and deep moral concern about social problems plaguing society such as alienation and exploitation. Critical theorists had grave doubts that Marx’s predictions about working class consciousness and social action would come to fruition (they were on target in this regard) and, therefore, their goal was to push social theory beyond the mantra ‘crisis equals revolt’ and delve deeper into the contributions of Weber and Freud (as well as Marx) for understanding the intersection of the individual with society. The foci of the critical theorists were also in line with what was happening in the societies in which they lived at the time. Generally, the 1920s through the 1950s was a time of severe economic collapses (one on top of another) and a series of wars, genocide, death and destruction.⁷⁹ Critical theorists were looking for ways to put civilization back on the path toward freedom and power for the public. Scholars who were part of the Critical theory consortium were anti-reductionist and refused to take for granted that the public would trend toward democracy, self-determination, and self-emancipation. On the contrary, the Critical theory approach viewed individuals as highly complex—at times ambivalent—beings that, given the right circumstances, could fall into fetishizing authority figures, capital and/or commodities. They further argued that if working class consciousness was in any way ambivalent toward authority or capital this could easily jeopardize social change—for a more just and progressive society. Therefore, at the heart of Critical theory is the question of why working people could be ambivalent toward capital (economy/bosses) and the state

⁷⁹ Unfortunately, not much has changed in 2010 if compared to the 1920s-1950s. We are currently in a major global recession/depression and the U.S. is entangled in two wars.

(nationalism/rulers). The findings from my current project directly point to a plethora of ambivalence toward the innocent loss of life in war and the criminal justice system. As the interview data show Middle scorers, especially, are often unsure of (and perhaps easily swayed) in regard to their views on tough social issues in contemporary society—such as pre-emptive war(s), the use of torture to garner information, or the continued use of the death penalty in the face of the high likelihood that innocent people have been executed for crimes they did not commit.

Moreover, Critical theorists were radically non-reductionist in approach, and by contrast, were striving to bring together the best social and/or psychological theories into a coherent way of thinking and analyzing social ills. Given the data presented in my study there is little question that at least two of the three main threads of the Frankfurt School is highly relevant for understanding public attitudes toward death and destruction. The main tenets of the Frankfurt School were the following: (1) *individual differences are real and far-reaching*, (2) *that personality has psychodynamic roots*, (3) *and that variations in psycho-cultural experience (in early childhood, in the family, in the workplace) produce major variations in attitudes and character structure*. There is no question the findings from this study show clearly that individuals differ (often to extreme degrees) in their views of innocent loss of life in war and the criminal justice system. In regard to the idea that ‘personality has psychodynamic roots’ (meaning the existence and importance of the unconscious and significance of childhood relationships and experiences as being key in shaping one’s personality), the data was not as conclusive. However, there were instances (especially in the interview phase of the project) where individuals did reflect on childhood experiences as a way to make sense of the vignettes I asked them to respond to.⁸⁰ Also, if a more psychoanalytic approach was taken in the interviews I may have been more likely to find out the connection of the unconscious to tendencies toward more or less tolerance of collateral damage. And finally, in the survey data I collected early experiences with spanking or corporal punishment did emerge as being a pivotal variable in predicting tolerance for collateral damage (thus variations in psycho-

⁸⁰ I can think of one interview in particular where an interviewee was comparing siblings taunting each other to how the use of torture could be seen as an effective tool for garnering information.

cultural experiences). The higher number of incidences of corporal punishment in a person's childhood the more likely they are to tolerate higher levels of innocent loss of life in wars and the criminal justice system. More specifically, I was able to isolate four attitudinal tendencies as predictors of more or less tolerance of civilian loss of life in the Iraq war: Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation, Incidences of Corporal Punishment as a Child, and the extent of Islamophobia. Furthermore, in regard to the full measure of 'Collateral Damage Tolerance of War' I was able to pull out incidences of corporal punishment, symbolic racism, and Islamophobia as key predictors. When I focused on tolerance of innocent loss of life via the death penalty there were a few key variables showing significant predictive power: Collateral Damage Tolerance in War, Social Dominance Orientation, Views regarding the Nature of God, Authoritarianism, and one's initial approval/disapproval of the death penalty.⁸¹ Also, in the interviews I was able to highlight the importance of all forms of media for helping to shape public opinion, personal narratives, personality, and character development in regard to perceptions about wars and the criminal justice system. In future studies it would be important to also target other social experiences such as the workplace, family dynamics, interaction with media, rural versus urban living situations, and so forth. Having discussed briefly the big picture perspective of the obvious relevance of the Frankfurt School theorists to my work I now hone in specifically on the contributions of Erich Fromm.

The following discussion sketches what a Fromm-based framework for a *social-psychological analytic* approach might look like, based on the information presented in this dissertation. Fromm's main project was to investigate the "active and passive adaptation of the biological apparatus, the instincts, to social reality" (Fromm 1941b:139). Additionally, Fromm wanted to point out the hidden sources of irrational behavior patterns in important aspects of society such as, religion, politics, education and the military. Yet another way to characterize the approach of Fromm is to point to an essay he wrote in 1937 on the importance of a social psychological approach:

⁸¹ It is also noteworthy to add that in reference to tolerance for innocent lives lost via the death penalty the variable 'Family Authority' was shown to have predictive power (Table 4.20). Family authority was a measure testing how individuals view authority and family—namely leaning toward patriarchy or non-patriarchy. This concept was very important for Fromm and other Critical theorists.

Social psychology must describe the socially typical character, analyse it on the strength of fundamental unconscious impulses, fears and attitudes present in it, it must show to what extent the socially typical character is a product of the manner of life and production in society and the ideological influences on the individual that takes place in it, and finally it must show how psychic energies, expressed and formed in character traits enter into the social process as productive forces (Fromm [1937] 1992:33).

Fromm's strategy for understanding the often hidden causes of irrational behavior was to combine two heavy weights for understanding human behavior: Sigmund Freud and Karl Marx. The combination of Freud and Marx meant Fromm was beholden to the idea, "that an analytical social psychology can study the ways that socio-economic structure influences and shapes the instinctual apparatus of both individuals and groups" (Kellner 1990). Fromm's theoretical contributions could prove highly fruitful—namely in regard to how some interviewees were stuck on the 'math' of what innocent Iraqi citizens were paid versus U.S. soldiers instead of taking a step back and viewing the incongruities from a social humanist standpoint (valuing the loss of any human life as tragic). This is an example in which the capitalistic system is creeping into virtually all aspects of our lives—including how we surmise and contemplate innocent loss of life in war and the criminal justice system.⁸²

It is prudent to juxtapose the theoretical approach chosen for this project (an approach with sensibilities to Fromm) with theories propagated by leading researchers in casualty tolerance, authoritarianism, and social dominance orientations. As previously mentioned the leading voices on casualty tolerance—political scientists Feaver, Gelpi and Reifler—essentially adhere to a rational choice model. Psychologist Bob Altemeyer makes no bones about the fact that his specialty is not in the production of theory or adding depth to the *why* question in regard to personality tendencies tracking toward RWA, SDO, ethnocentrism, and so on. For FGR they assume that individuals are 'cost-benefit' analysis types that weigh situations in their minds and then make 'rational decisions.' For Altemeyer, his only intended

⁸² The theoretical contributions of Fromm seem even more relevant given the current state of things in America due to the sustained economic downturn that had plagued the American public. Millions are suffering incessantly due to the continued injustices of capitalism and clearly this is impacting other social problems in our society—in this case war and the criminal justice system.

contribution to social theory is to note briefly his thesis of authoritarian tendencies being 30% genetics and 70% experience. As a critical social psychologist and political sociologist my aim is to add significant specificity to these half-hearted attempts to describe the underlying causes of potentially harmful attitudinal tendencies. The findings from my collateral damage tolerance study clearly point in the direction of the need for a re-birth of Frankfurt-style critical analysis. Along with discussing my vision of an analytic social psychology for the study of collateral damage, I will also point out instances where concepts developed by critical theorist Erich Fromm are given credence due to the data collected for this dissertation. The implications are suggestive at this point, but with further research, and the application of the methods employed in the present study, could be afforded an even more solid platform in the future. For research on casualty tolerance the tireless efforts of Erich Fromm are perhaps the most resonate.

My suggestions and comments interact directly with the vital work of Erich Fromm because he is a key guidepost that should be remembered for his excellent scholarship in the direction of the analytical social psychological approach. I would also argue that contributions from Max Weber on authority and Karl Marx on capital are very important to mention briefly in the context of formulating an analytic social psychology similar to what was attempted in the 1930s to 1950s by Critical Theorists in Europe and America. Fromm (1900—1980) was a highly relevant and active ‘individual of the 20th century’ he lived professionally as a psychologist-psychoanalyst-social activist from the WWI and Weimar Republic years in Frankfurt, Heidelberg, and Berlin, Germany; through the WWII and early Cold-War-Communist witch-hunt years in New York City; through the 1960s in Mexico City as Director of the Department of Psychoanalysis at the U. of Mexico School of Medicine; and the last decade of his life in Switzerland where he taught visiting psychoanalysts and thoughtfully spoke to the freedom of the West German peoples (Ortmeyer 1998:25). Fromm’s thinking went through several changes throughout his productive tenure, but a few common themes are worth mentioning. Fromm was a socialist humanist and attempted to combine elements of Marx and Freud and understand pathological problems of social character and the ‘pathology of normalcy.’ Fromm advocated an

analytical social psychology that combined a 'historical materialism' that assumed the primacy of economic forces and interests in individual and social life with a focus on psychoanalytic, instinctual and psychological forces. Fromm paid particular attention to the pivotal role of the family as an essential medium through which the economic situation exerts its formative influence on an individual's psyche. A couple of his books describe in detail two of his empirical research projects, both of which concerned the impact of culture, social class and work on psychological adaptation and psychopathology. Fromm also directed a study of the character and attitudes of German blue-collar workers in the Weimar Republic of 1929-1930. Their data indicated that the German working man's character was not well-defined. The lower middle-class Germans, in the 1920s, suffered from a sense of being powerless and meaningless. The lack of a well-defined character, neither authoritarian nor democratic, left the worker vulnerable to current and future social-political conditions. Also, Fromm attempted to take the best aspects of Marx and Freud and combine them into a particularly fruitful social theory. Fromm believed the reductionist approach of Freud's instinct theory was problematic and, therefore, needed to be combined with insights into the role that social processes play in the development of the unconscious. He notes:

...the phenomena of social psychology are to be understood as processes involving the active and passive adaptation of the instinctual apparatus to the socio-economic situation. In certain fundamental respects, the instinctual apparatus itself is a biological given; but it is highly modifiable. The role of primary formative factors goes to the economic conditions. The family is the essential medium through which the economic situation exerts its formative influence on the individual's psyche. The task of social psychology is to explain the shared, socially relevant, psychic attitudes and ideologies—and their unconscious roots in particular—in terms of the influence of economic conditions on libido strivings (Fromm 1970a [1932]:121).

Clearly, this dissertation project did not focus heavily on economic indices of individual character or personality development. However, the study is set in the context of a time period in which unemployment is a robust ten percent (and much higher if individuals who stop looking for work are added to the statistics) and the

state of the overall economy is very dreary, depressing, and devastating for millions of people in the United States. Also, when I asked the fifteen interviewees to pick out the to pick out their top three social issues many put economics or personal finances near the top of the list. Moreover, from a Frommian perspective it is not a major surprise that I would find a certain proportion of the population that is overtly pro-death and another set of people who are apathetic toward death and destruction in war. Fromm would likely argue that when the economy is in the tank people need to unload their frustrations on something, or more likely, someone and so if an enemy can be identified (in the case of my research Iraqi ‘insurgents,’ innocent civilians, or the wrongly convicted) they are likely to be the target of a certain portion of the populace. In other words, repressed displeasure with one’s economic situation can be transferred onto ‘others.’ As mentioned previously, I was unable to survey a representative sample of people from all parts of the economic stratum and in future work that would be the goal. It might also be helpful to target working class/middle class individuals and learn more about how their attitudes about the economy could be linked to personality tendencies such as RWA, SDO, Punitivity, or Collateral Damage Tolerance in the criminal justice system and war. Again, Fromm is sympathetic to many of the insights of Freud, but also believes the social is vitally important as well. Funk sums by stating, “His analysis of the modern capitalist and bureaucratic social structure lays bare the universal phenomenon of alienation that can be overcome only if economic, political, and cultural conditions are fundamentally changed in the direction of a democratic and humanist socialism” (Anderson 1998:15). Next I delve a bit deeper into Fromm’s research on love of death and love of life.

Fromm on Necrophilia and Biophilia

The drive for life and the drive for destruction are not mutually independent factors but are in a reversed interdependence. The more the drive toward life is thwarted, the stronger the drive toward destruction; the more life is realized, the less is the strength of destructiveness. Destructiveness is the *outcome of unlived life*. Those individual and social conditions that make for suppression of life produce the passion for destruction that forms, so to speak,

the reservoir from which the particular hostile tendencies—either against others or against oneself—are nourished (Fromm [1941] 1994a:182).

The above quote was taken from Fromm's classic *Escape from Freedom* (1941). Fromm's conjecture was if an individual was not living their lives to the fullest and truly engaged in 'positive freedom' they might turn toward destructiveness or ambivalence toward death and destruction. Fromm defines the 'freedom to' as the use of freedom to behave in ways which are constructive and respond to the genuine needs and wishes of the free individual/society by creating a more just social order (1994 [1941]). By virtually any measure one might employ, social inequality is getting worse and worse and millions are struggling to meet their basic needs (and are unnecessarily suffering) in contemporary society. Therefore, it would make sense to argue that millions in America are living 'unlived lives' and so, for some, a life of destruction or favoring destruction seems plausible—according to the approach of Fromm. With Marx in mind, a Frommian approach to decreasing casualty tolerance would mean a move toward a more equal socialist-minded society where the discrepancies between rich and poor were decreased. Of course, the trends in America over the past forty years are exactly the opposite, we've seen the rich become much more rich and the poor a lot more poor—and the middle class shrink and continue to move down the social class ladder. This line of thinking portends Fromm's comments on necrophilia discussed next.

In the 1960s Fromm discovered a new orientation of social character: necrophilia. Necrophilia was defined simply as the passion to be attracted by all that is dead and without life. People who tended toward necrophilia were believed to champion the notion "Long Live Death" according to Fromm. Not only did Fromm believe there could be individuals who favored death over life, but many other who were *indifferent* to life. Given my focus on ambivalent-leaning personality types this is precisely where I see Fromm's work being highly relevant to studies of casualty tolerance. More specifically, Fromm defines necrophilia a bit more specifically as:

He is one who is attracted to and fascinated by all that is not alive, to all that is dead; to corpses, to decay, to feces, to dirt. Necrophiles are those people who love to talk about sickness,

burials, death. They come to life precisely when they can talk about death (Fromm 1964c:1).

Fromm juxtaposes necrophilia (love of death) with biophilia (love of life) in his 1964 essay “Creators and Destroyers.”⁸³ Fromm doesn’t believe individuals either love life or love death but the orientations exist on a continuum. Also, a person that favors necrophilia may not possess all of the characteristics of necrophilia. On the contrary, he argues that people can have *tendencies* for death and life. In his essay *War Within Man* Fromm makes the case:

There are, perhaps, a few who are totally devoted to death and those who are, are insane. There are not so many who are entirely devoted to life, and those who strike us as having accomplished the highest aim man is capable of. In most of us both the biophilous and the necrophilous trends are present, but in different blends. What matters, here as always in living phenomena, is which trend is stronger, so that it determines man’s behavior, not the complete absence or presence of one of the two orientations (Fromm 1963:3).

This theory of orientations favoring life or death originated in Freud’s theory of the life and death instincts. Fromm’s theory focuses more on the social factors that could be influencing these two extremes on a continuum. Given the subject matter of my work this contribution by Fromm is very relevant and enlightening. Particularly in the interview phase of the research I was able to show an individual that clearly seemed to be leaning toward necrophilia rather than biophilia. There was no ceiling on the number of dead Iraqi civilians for this person (a number dead that might make him re-think our Iraq war policy). Fromm also points out how his theory of necrophilia/biophilia differs from Freud’s ‘life and death instinct’ given the biological inherency Freud attributes to love of life and love of death. Fromm, on the other hand, does not believe necrophilia is a normal biological tendency, but rather a ‘pathological phenomenon’ (1964c:4). Fromm points to the nature of our bureaucratized, industrial,

⁸³ Fromm also discusses these ideas in an essay titled, “War Within Man” and in his chapter on “Love of Death and Love of Life’ in *The Heart of Man* (Fromm 1963; 1964a). Subsequently, war correspondents’ Chris Hedges has recently published a very interesting book titled, *War is a Force that Gives Us Meaning* (2002). Having served in multiple war zones and other situations where collateral damage is rampant, Hedges offers a Frommian-type argument to the fact that perhaps there are some in our society that tend toward necrophilia (and it is not just present with the soldiers but wider public as well).

mass civilization as at least partially responsible for promoting necrophilia. Additionally, Fromm argues mass society is addicted to gadgets, “People love mechanical gadgets more than living beings” (1964c:4). The primary question Fromm poses is: How is it possible to create a humanist industrialism as against the bureaucratic mass industrialism that rules our lives today? (1964c:6). Related to this question is the critical question Fromm poses in regard to what factors could be contributing to a society that is trending toward the development of necrophilous orientations (or character structures)? Fromm notes, “...which factors make for the development of the necrophilous orientation, in general, and more specifically, for the greater or lesser intensity of the death-loving orientation in a given individual or group” (Fromm 1963:9)? In “War Within Man” Fromm says he does not have a satisfactory answer for this question but notes that love of life and love of death are contagious and so childhood experiences are very important. Additionally, Fromm returns to his theme of “freedom” and states that love of life can be stunted if man’s energy is taken up by items such as defending against attacks, fighting injustices, or warding off starvation/poverty (1963:10). In other words, for a society to truly promote biophilia the following basic things need to be developed, “...love for life will develop most in a society in which there is *security* in the sense that the basic conditions for a dignified life are not threatened; *justice* in the sense that nobody can be an end for the purpose of another, and *freedom*, in the sense that each man has the possibility to be an active and responsible member of society (1963:10).

It should also be noted that in conjunction with Maccoby (1972) Fromm tested the psychological polarity of biophilia and necrophilia by surveying Americans in 1966 and beyond. The main point of the Maccoby/Fromm study was to see if biophilia and necrophilia (characterized as emotional attitudes) were connected to political choices. The findings suggest that indeed attitudes toward life and death can impact political behavior and/or choices. Clearly, the insights of Fromm are abundant and his combination of Freud and Marx is intriguing and should not be forgotten or discounted. In direct relation to the findings of my dissertation it is obvious the significant impact that Frommian theory could have for helping to sort out why individuals lean toward more or less tolerance of death. In so many ways our society

is going in the exact wrong direction on all three of the items Fromm notes—security, justice and freedom. As society goes deeper in the direction of less security, less justice and less freedom we can expect more and more people to turn toward necrophilia rather than biophilia.

Fromm's Concept of 'Social Character' - Influence of Corporal Punishment

“...we have assumed that ideologies and culture in general are rooted in the social character; that the social character itself is molded by the mode of existence of a given society; and that in their turn the dominant character traits become productive forces shaping the social process” (Fromm [1941] 1994a:294).

Yet another important concept that Fromm brings to light in his work is the idea of ‘social character’ and how it is developed in societies. Fromm first discusses this idea in the appendix of *Escape from Freedom*, though he had been thinking about it for some time before 1941. Social character is developed, for Fromm, in the family and is connected to the dominant mode of production in societies. Therefore, the concept integrates Marx’s theory concerning how the mode of production determines ideology with Freud’s concept of character. Social character describes the emotional attitudes common to individuals in a social class or society. Part of how social character is developed has to do with the use of corporal punishment by parents in families. Fromm notes the family as the essential medium through which the economic situation exerts its formative influence on the individual’s psyche. In the present study I show that if a person is a victim of corporal punishment they were more likely to be more tolerant of collateral damage in war and in the use of the death penalty. Clearly, more development is needed on this point, however this is further evidence of the salience of Fromm’s theoretical contributions to studies of casualty tolerance.

Fromm’s theoretical contributions should not be underestimated or forgotten. Combining Freud and Marx is a creative and productive way to understand individual tendencies toward casualty tolerance. Especially given the current crisis of capitalism, in America and globally, Marx must not be forgotten. There is no doubt or debate regarding the devastating consequences the free market has wrought on the lives of a

vast majority of individuals. As more and more people are damaged by the ills of capitalism the effects on other aspects of our lives (perhaps one's attitude toward collateral damage in war and the criminal justice system) will be impacted. This is precisely where Fromm's work can provide keen insight.

Chapter 7 – Quick Summation & Future Studies on Collateral Damage Tolerance in War and the Criminal Justice System

“All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing” (Edmund Burke, British Statesman and Philosopher, 1729-1797)

When I embarked on this project several years ago I remember being struck by what I perceived as the highly problematic research being churned out by Duke University political scientists Feaver, Gelpi and Reifler. I was intrigued by the questions they were asking and the results—but knew there were serious holes in their methodology and, more importantly, the boldness of their conclusions. Therefore, I decided to approach the topic of how the public felt about innocent loss of life in wars and the criminal justice system from a different point of view: a critical social psychological standpoint. The goal was to approach the subject with the spirit of the Frankfurt School scholarship as the backbone of the inquiry. Along with being terribly troubled by the human costs of the Middle Eastern wars I was also struck by stories of innocent people being let out of prison and/or death row for crimes of which they were innocent.⁸⁴ The intriguing question always remained: how often does the system make mistakes and how many people has the state killed that were not guilty? I also remember when I was about ten years old my father and I visited a friend he had worked with who had been convicted of a 1st degree murder, but swore he was innocent. The gentleman had been a police officer before working with my father at UPS and so they shipped him to Colorado to serve out his 25 year plus sentence (he was originally from Kansas City). This was my first experience being in a maximum security prison and I remember that the guards made me change my clothing three times in order to meet their standards and make sure I wasn't providing the inmates with 'tools' to use to break out of the hell hole. My dad instructed me not dare mention the case or ask whether or not he was guilty—our job was to support him and just provide company. Much to the chagrin of my father, in the first ten minutes of the encounter my dad's pal started laying out the case for why he was innocent. He also outlined, specifically, how the system had failed him in a multitude of ways. This

⁸⁴Therefore, I often wondered if the public ever gave a second thought about the innocent losses of life inherent in wars and in the U.S. criminal justice system.

individual ended up serving twenty five years and was a model prisoner. Upon his release he quickly developed cancer and died shortly thereafter. I remember walking away from that maximum security prison on that warm summer day, in Colorado, and asking myself: How in the world would a person cope with the horrors of prison if they were innocent? This childhood memory has stuck with me and it is fulfilling to have conducted meaningful research on the topic all these years later. Indeed the moral theaters of war and the criminal justice system make are fruitful for understanding opinions and underlying character structures associated with ‘collateral damage.’

Innocent loss of life in war and in the American criminal justice system is unfortunately an issue that is not going away anytime soon. The Iraq war rages on and since Obama has come into office the death and destruction in Afghanistan has grown exponentially. As of June 2010 the U.S. military death toll went over 1,000 lives lost. The war seemingly has no end in sight and this is, of course, happening at the same time the U.S. and global economy is in free fall and virtually all social institutions (schools, hospitals, mental facilities, and every other social safety net in sight) are drastically cutting budgets and causing enormous unnecessary suffering for millions. Very recently General Stanley McChrystal (general in charge in Afghanistan) was fired by Obama and replaced by General David Petraeus. Apparently one of the issues that was causing a major rift between the soldiers on the ground and McChrystal was the counter-insurgency strategy that sought (among other things) to intentionally avoid civilian casualties if at all possible. In Michael Hastings’ June 2010 article in *Rolling Stone* he documented how unpopular this shift in strategy was with a large majority of the soldiers. Most felt like it put them in more danger—more likely to be killed. One soldier quipped, “I would love to kick McChrystal in the nuts. His rules of engagement put soldiers’ lives in even greater danger. Every soldier will tell you the same thing.” Yet another dissatisfied soldier was a bit more forceful in his displeasure that he and others had to adhere to new rules and said, “We should just drop a fucking bomb on this place. You sit and ask yourself: What are we doing here?” (Hastings 2010). My immediate thought is how many Americans agree with the sentiments of this soldier who is advocating the complete genocide of everyone in Afghanistan (both

“insurgents” and innocent civilians)? These are precisely the types of issues that interest me and given the power of the military industrial complex and the trends toward more and more privatization of the military the well for study of collateral damage will not dry up any time soon (Scahill 2007). Likewise, even though over 250 individuals have been exonerated from U.S. prisons in recent years, due to DNA evidence proving their innocence, the use of the death penalty persists in a majority of states in America. The message being sent by America’s continued use of capital punishment (in the face of incidences of grave injustices) and never ending wars is the tendency to favor death over life. Research needs to continue to show the effects these policies have on individuals—their politics and psyches. In what follows my goal is to sum up the most salient findings from this research, discuss lessons learned about methodology, and finally, talk about the next steps that need to be taken to move this work forward.

Strengths/Major Findings

Given that brief introduction, now I comment on the strengths of the project. One of the primary goals was to add nuance to the survey research conducted by political scientists Feaver, Gelpi and Reifler. This was indeed accomplished. FGR focus solely on U.S. soldier lives lost and completely ignore Iraqi civilians killed in the ongoing war. This project places the innocent loss of Iraqi citizens at the heart of the matter.⁸⁵ I am of the opinion as well that expanding ‘collateral damage tolerance’ to the issue of torture is important and a step in the right direction. In other words, collateral damage doesn’t always come in the form of death—torturing almost to death can be viewed in the same vain as loss of life. Also, the triangulated method employed and the frontal analysis of putting ‘meat on the bones’ as it were to FGR’s findings proved very interesting. Although the number of interviews was rather small, the questions I asked and the responses were telling. Next, in this project I had the goal of producing a more robust survey measure for ‘collateral damage’ tolerance in war and the criminal justice system. I ended up coming up with four scales (CDT Iraq

⁸⁵ I would also further comment that the focus on DNA exonerations and showcasing the distinct possibility that the U.S. has killed individuals who did not do the crimes is important for helping to add empirical data to the ongoing debate about the credence and morality of the death penalty in America.

full, CDT Iraq civilians, CDT Death Penalty, and Islamophobia). Again, FGR's questions seemed to simple and, therefore, not a sophisticated way to really dig in to what people think about innocent loss of life. I also was able to introduce an "Islamophobia" scale that would provide a better measure of one's disdain, distrust, and/or outright hatred for Islamic people, Muslims and the Islamic faith more generally. All four of these new scales proved to have high internal validities (CDT Iraq full, .94; CDT civilians .83; CDT death penalty .80; and Islamophobia .92). Third, my goal was to test the critically important RWA and SDO scales for predicting levels of casualty tolerance in war and the criminal justice system. As the regression tables in chapter 5 show RWA and SDO were indeed major factors in predicting more or less tolerance of collateral damage. What is more, I was able to document significant differences in tolerance between groups, namely: gender, age, community size, religiosity, attitudes toward the nature of God/Allah and political party affiliation. In regard to predicting tolerance of Iraqi civilian deaths I was able to establish the significance of RWA, SDO, incidences of corporal punishment, and Islamophobia as the four most productive variables. Not surprisingly, I was also able to further establish the validity of FGR's collateral damage tolerance measure for predicting Capps' version of tolerance of innocent loss of life in war. Furthermore, FGR's primary independent variables ('Bush Right to Invade' and 'Willingness to Support More Deaths if Mission is Sound') were shown to be solid variables in the collateral damage tolerance model. In terms of predicting tolerance for innocent loss of life via the death sentence I was able to report that three independent variables matter most: Support for the Death Penalty, SDO, and RWA. On a more practical level my findings indicate that the use of corporal punishment can be linked to attitudes and beliefs as an adult that are pro-death as opposed to pro-life. This finding has been found in other studies, most notably the work of Milburn, Conrad, Sala and Carberry in regard to attitudes toward abortion, aid to the poor, and euthanasia (Milburn et al. 1995). It is interesting to note that incidences of corporal punishment could also be connected with more or less tolerance of collateral damage.

As for the qualitative interview aspect of the dissertation the findings, while clearly suggestive and not conclusive, were enlightening and the vignette method

proved to be a successful strategy for getting people to open up about the topic at hand. Instead of arguing about the ‘facts’ of cases of collateral damage the vignette methodology allowed for that question to be put aside and the bulk of the interview to focus on the question of ‘what if’ these incidences were happening what would your thoughts be? I also believe the way in which the interviewees were chosen tending toward “Highs,” “Lows,” or “Middles” proved an effective method for confirming or not confirming their sentiments on the survey. Also, the focus on middle scorers was sound, given the enormous importance that swing voters (ambivalently leaning individuals) have had in recent elections and the political sphere. In interpreting the interview data it also became evident that in order to understand tendencies toward more or less tolerance of collateral damage the construction of master and counter narratives (via a Foucaudian approach) was insightful. I wanted to glean information as to the stories the interviewees tell themselves about the issues at hand. As for major findings from the qualitative data I was able to achieve the following: suggest instances where necrophilia was alive and well I the comments/personalities of the interviewees—especially the High scorers, suggest how Low scorers responded drastically differently than Highs, suggest that Middles are indeed often ambivalent and struggle to come up with sound or coherent reasoning for favoring more or less tolerance for CD, suggest that a distinction between ‘informed’ and ‘uninformed’ Middles might help to understand and predict levels of tolerance, suggest that if Middles were uninformed it is much more likely they will revert back to dominant ‘master narratives’ as told by media personnel or politicians rather than actively construct sound ‘counter narratives,’ suggest that Middles will tend to have more of a problem with the U.S. criminal justice system killing innocent people than Iraqi civilians—given the vast distance of Middle Eastern wars, and finally, suggest that stereotypes about highly religious individuals need to be unpacked and debunked (two of my Low scorers were very religious *and* the least tolerant, by far, of collateral damage in war and the death penalty).

Weaknesses

There are several weaknesses or shortcomings in this project and a few deserve to be expanded upon. First, the sample size for the survey portion of the project was quite low (N=210). The goal was to tap into a more representative sample than what is generally used for these types of studies—college students. So, I attempted to invite various groups (including several churches in the Puget Sound Region) and for a whole host of reasons it was difficult to get a plethora of responses (my goal had been 600 or more). The sample was indeed more representative than a college sample, but suffered methodologically by having fewer responses. I did learn, however, that putting the survey online is likely *the* primary way survey research will be conducted in the future. These days many people are used to taking surveys online for all kinds of purposes, and so for the people who did take the survey, doing it online was convenient and worked well. I wasted a ton of time relentlessly trying to get church groups and other social organizations in Seattle to let me give my survey at a time they were already meeting. It did not happen. I would also note, however, that one of the reasons I think it was difficult to get more responses was the length. For most people it took about fifty minutes or more. It is really hard to get fifty minutes of a person's time in the busy world we live in. Second, in order to have more conclusive findings in regard to the qualitative data I would have needed to conduct more interviews. As it were my findings were suggestive and interesting, but not as conclusive as if I could have interviewed thirty or forty instead of fifteen. Third, it would have behooved me to delve deeper into the methodology of 'grounded theory' research and perhaps used the findings from the interviews to go back to the survey aspect of the study to help formulate even more effective survey measures of collateral damage tolerance. Fourth, I wish there would have been more diversity in terms of social class in the respondents. It was difficult to truly test many of the hypotheses that Fromm and other Frankfurt School theorists postulated (and tested in some cases) in the 1930s-1950s because most of my survey takers were solidly middle class or above. Fifth, one of my goals was to try and get responses from Muslim, Islamic, and Persian individuals living in the U.S. By and large this proved a difficult task (given the language barrier and the fact that some may have been suspicious of my motives and

survey questions).⁸⁶ Sociological research focuses very little on the attitudes, beliefs, character structures, and so on of Islamic, Muslim and Persian Americans. Clearly, more research is needed to hear the narratives of those who bear the brunt of Islamophobia. Finally, I would argue that my use of an analytic Frommian social psychology was not quite as sharp as it could have been. In other words, I did not focus enough on the Marxian side of the Frommian model in understanding character development and the pivotal role that social class position plays. I am very interested in Marxian interpretations of capitalism and in future work would like to make these concepts a more central aspect of my scholarship. I would further comment that one specific goal I have for pushing this scholarship forward is to persuade the American National Election Survey (ANES) to include the collateral damage tolerance items, constructed in this dissertation, in their national representative sampling of Americans.⁸⁷ This would obviously test the measures for their reliability and validity, as well as, make the results more generalizable to the wider public.

The Road Ahead

As for what needs to be done in the future. Political sociologists and social psychologists are going to have plenty of work to do on these issues as long as the U.S. continues to be involved in Middle Eastern wars and kill innocent ‘convicted felons’ via a flawed death penalty system. Also, with the advent of the Obama administration we are seeing several interesting trends in politics that demand for sociologists to use their skills for understanding the deeper causes of a whole host of attitudes, behaviors, and trends. A few to mention briefly might be: the rise of the Tea Party movement in America (Bob Altemeyer has commented on the fact that they likely tend toward RWA, SDO, or both—Double Highs), the rise of Libertarian philosophies for how the government should work, and the continued importance of swing voters (or the ambivalent minded) in determining which political party is in charge. There is little doubt that swing voters will be pivotal in elections for the

⁸⁶ Mr. Nazir Harb (a former student in one of my ‘Politics and Society’ courses) was very helpful in trying to get groups he was affiliated with in the Muslim, Persian, and Islamic community to take the survey, but in the end only a handful were able to get it done.

⁸⁷ There are other scales employed in this study that would be important to pitch to the ANES as well including the Islamophobia scale, RWA, SDO, and the Corporal Punishment items.

foreseeable future. A new ‘theory of attitudinal ambivalence’ could prove to be very important for understanding American politics in the coming decades. Further, understanding the motivations of independent/ambivalent voters, in more nuanced ways, could help predict if the patterns of widespread tolerance of collateral damage in war and the criminal justice system will be stymied or continue at their current pace. Just as important as understanding what factors push individuals toward love of death, we also need to learn about what needs to happen to encourage love of life. Also, researchers need to continue to focus on how individuals interact with master and counter narratives the media is constantly constructing about war and the criminal justice system. The media play a critical role in presenting ‘national story lines’ for the public to consume in order to help shape their views. The true extent to which the media affects opinions, underlying personalities, and psyches is not yet known. Moreover, the role that ‘apathy’ plays in the swing voter needs to be explored in much greater depth. When push comes to shove it is critical that, as a society, we are fully aware of the likelihood the ambivalent will turn toward defending life or accepting death. We also need to investigate what factors are critical for predicting why the American public is likely to go one way or the other or remain apathetic—which, by default, means they are trending toward tolerance of death and destruction. Clearly, and unfortunately so, there will be ample opportunities to study casualty tolerance for many decades in the foreseeable future.

Chapter 8 – Appendix – Survey Components

2008 Puget Sound Social Survey

Confidentiality Agreement/Contact Information

INTRODUCTION

The Department of Sociology, at the University of Kansas, supports the practice of protection for human subjects participating in research. Participation in such research is entirely voluntary and anonymous. The following information is provided for you to decide whether you wish to participate in the present study. You may refuse to sign this form and not participate in this study. You should be aware that even if you agree to participate, you are free to withdrawal at any time. If you do withdrawal from this study, it will not affect your relationship with this unit, the services it may provide you, or the University of Kansas.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of this study is to survey public opinion about a variety of social issues that are pertinent in American politics.

PROCEDURES

This survey will require 30-45 minutes of your time. To participate in the study every participant must sign a consent form. After careful review of the survey data the second phase of the study will involve the researchers interviewing 20-30 individuals who have taken the survey. If you would be willing to be contacted for an interview please fill out the survey contact information accordingly.

RISKS

This study requires participants to take a survey and perhaps be interviewed on relevant political issues that are affecting America. There is no risk to participants and participants can disband their participation at any time.

BENEFITS

The benefits of your participation to this study will be to help researchers understand the phenomena of ambivalence and swing voters' preferences in American politics.

PAYMENT TO PARTICIPANTS

Participants will not be paid—their participation is entirely voluntary.

PARTICIPANT CONFIDENTIALITY

Your name will not be associated in any way with the information collected about you or with the research findings from this study. The researcher(s) will use a study number or pseudonym instead of your name. The researchers will not share information about you unless required by law or unless you give written permission. Permission granted on this date to use and disclose your information remains in effect indefinitely. By signing this form you give permission for the use and disclosure of your information for purposes of this study at any time in the future.

REFUSAL TO SIGN CONSENT AND AUTHORIZATION

You are not required to sign this Consent and Authorization form and you may refuse to do so without affecting your right to any services you are receiving or may receive from the University of Kansas or to participate in any programs or events of the University of Kansas. However, if you refuse to sign, you cannot participate in this study.

CANCELLING THIS CONSENT AND AUTHORIZATION

You may withdraw your consent to participate in this study at any time. You also have the right to cancel your permission to use and disclose information collected about you, in writing, at any time, by sending your written request to: Jason S. Capps, Seattle University, 901 12th Ave., P.O. Box 222000, Casey 300 (Anthropology, Sociology and Social Work), Seattle, WA 98122-1090. If you cancel permission to use your information, the researchers will stop collecting additional information about you. However, the research team may use and disclose information that was gathered before they received your cancellation, as described above.

QUESTIONS ABOUT PARTICIPATION

Questions about procedures should be directed to the researcher(s) listed at the end of this consent form.

Jason S. Capps, Ph.D. Candidate
Principal Investigator
Sociology Department at Kansas
Adjunct Professor, Seattle University
901 12th Ave.
P.O. Box 222000
Seattle, WA 98122-1090
(206) 296-5906

PARTICIPANT CERTIFICATION

Participant Name: _____

Signature: _____

Date: _____

4 Digit Code you will remember in 2-5 weeks:

First Name Only:

E-mail address that I can use to contact you for brokering a meeting in which to conduct the interview:

Phone number I can use to contact you for brokering a meeting in which to conduct the interview:

Please indicate which group(s) you are affiliated with from the list below:

Member of University Lutheran, Seattle

Member of Plymouth Congregational, Seattle

Graduate Student at Seattle University

Member of Football or Basketball Officiating Association, Seattle

Member of Seattle First Baptist, Seattle

Member of University Baptist, Seattle

Member of Mars Hill Church, Seattle

Member of City Church, Seattle

Member of Saudi Student Club, Seattle

Member of Islamic Educational Center, Seattle

Member of City of Seattle Employees, Seattle

Member of St. Therese Parish, Seattle

Member of St. Joseph Parish, Seattle

Member of St. James Cathedral, Seattle

Member of Seattle First United Methodist, Seattle

Member of Gethsemane Lutheran, Seattle

Member of Temple Beth Am, Seattle

Member of Temple De Hirsch Sinai, Seattle

Other Church Affiliation (please specify)

What is your sex?

Female

Male

What is your age?

18 or younger

19-21

22-25

26-32

33-40

34-50

51-65

66-80

80 or older

What is your current status in the United States?

Natural born citizen

Permanent resident (green card)

Visitor to U.S. via Visa Grant

Other (please specify)

Last week, did you work full-time, part-time, or not at all?

Full-time

Part-time

Not at all

By your best estimate, what was your total household income last year, before taxes?

\$10,000 or less

\$10,001--\$20,000

\$20,001--\$35,000

\$35,001--\$50,000

\$50,001--\$100,000

\$100,001--\$150,000

\$150,000 or more

What is your marital status?

Never married
Married
Living as married
Separated
Divorced
Widowed

Describe the community where you lived the longest.

A major metropolis (a million people or more)
A very large city (500,000 people or more)
A large city (250,000 people or more)
A medium-sized city (over 100,000 people but under 250,000)
A suburb or small city (over 50,000 people but under 100,000)
A small suburb or medium-sized town (over 10,000 people but under 50,000)
A town (over 2,500 people but under 10,000)
A small town (over 500 people but under 2,500)
A rural area

When you were 14, with whom did you live primarily?

With my mother and father
With my father and step-mother
With my mother and step-father
With both divorced parents in joint custody
With my father only
With my mother only
With other relative(s)
With a foster family
Other

What's your father's highest level of education?

Elementary school
Some high school
High school graduate
Some college
Two year college degree
Four year college degree
Master's degree

Doctoral degree

What was your father doing when you were 14 years old?

Working—Go to next question

Staying at home caring for children

Looking for a job (he was unemployed)

Attending school

Staying at home because he was retired

Staying at home because he was disabled

Serving in the military

Serving time in prison

Other

Was your father self-employed when you were 14 years old?

Yes

No

Did you father (or step-father) supervise anyone at work when you were 14 years old?

Yes, he supervised 10 or more people.

Yes, he supervised 1 person to 9 people.

No, he did not supervise anyone at work.

What kind of work did your father (or step-father) do when you were 14 years old? (If your father or step-father was a supervisor or manager, please select the type of work done by the people he supervised).

Elementary occupation (janitors, domestic helpers, agricultural laborers, construction laborers, etc.)

Machine operator or assembler (drivers, plant operators, assembly worker, etc.)

Service worker (shop salespersons, police officers, prison guards, cooks, waiters, hairdressers, child-care and personal care workers, etc.)

Clerical worker (cashiers, tellers, mail carriers, secretaries, receptionists, data entry operators, etc.)

Middle professional (teachers, nurses, medical and dental assistants, bookkeepers, sales representatives, real estate agents, social workers, government officials, etc.)

Upper professional (scientists, doctors, dentists, pharmacists, college professors, accountants, lawyers, psychologists, etc.)

What's your mother's highest level of education?

Elementary school

Some high school

High school graduate

Some college

Two year college degree

Four year college degree

Master's degree

Doctoral degree

What was your mother (or step-mother) doing when you were 14 years old?

Working—Go to next question

Staying at home caring for children

Looking for a job (he was unemployed)

Attending school

Staying at home because he was retired

Staying at home because he was disabled

Serving in the military

Serving time in prison

Other

Was your mother self-employed when you were 14 years old?

Yes

No

Did your mother supervise anyone at work when you were 14 years old?

Yes, she supervised 10 or more people.

Yes, she supervised 1 person to 9 people.

No, she did not supervise anyone at work.

What's your ethnicity?

White
Black or African-American
Hispanic
American Indian
Asian or Pacific Islander
Persian
Arab
Other (please specify)

What's your family's religious background?

Protestant
Catholic
Jewish
Muslim
Hindu
Buddhist
New Age
None
Other (please specify)

How often do you attend religious services?

Never
Less than once a year
Once or twice a year
Several times a year

Once a month
Several times a month
About weekly
Weekly
Several times a week

Which of these statements comes closest to describing your feelings about the Bible?

The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word.
The Bible is the word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word.
The Bible is a book written by people and is not the word of God.

Which of these statements comes closest to describing your feelings about the Qur'an?

The Qur'an is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word.

The Qur'an is the word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word.

The Qur'an is a book written by people and is not the word of God.

Even if you might not believe in God, based on your personal understanding, what do you think God is like? (Strongly Agree, Agree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree)

Distant

Ever-Present

Directly involved in my affairs

Directly involved in worldly affairs

Removed from my affairs

Concerned with the well-being of the world

Concerned with my personal well-being

Wrathful

Angered by human sins

Angered by my sins

Punishing

Severe

Critical

How strict are you about right and wrong, how moral are you compared to others your age?

Very Strict

Somewhat Strict

Neither Strict nor Lax

Somewhat Lax

Very Lax

Please indicate which item in each pair YOU think is more important for a child to have:

Being Considerate

Well-Behaved

Please indicate which item in each pair YOU think is more important for a child to have:

Independence
Respect for Elders

Please indicate which item in each pair YOU think is more important for a child to have:

Curiosity
Good Manners

Please indicate which item in each pair YOU think is more important for a child to have:

Obedience
Self-Reliance

Do you see yourself as more liberal or conservative?

Very liberal
Somewhat liberal
Moderate, middle of the road
Somewhat conservative
Very conservative

Do you see yourself as more religiously liberal or conservative?

Very liberal
Somewhat liberal
Moderate, middle of the road
Somewhat conservative
Very conservative

What is your party preference?

Far Left (neither Democrat or Republican)
Strong Democrat
Moderate Democrat
Independent (but slightly Democratic)

Independent
Independent (but slightly Republican)
Moderate Republican
Strong Republican
Far Right (neither Democrat or Republican)

How certain do you feel about your party preference?

Very Certain
Somewhat Certain
Unsure
Not Very Certain
Not at all Certain

What is your father's party preference?

Far Left (neither Democrat or Republican)
Strong Democrat
Moderate Democrat
Independent (but slightly Democratic)
Independent
Independent (but slightly Republican)
Moderate Republican
Strong Republican
Far Right (neither Democrat or Republican)

What is your mother's party preference?

Far Left (neither Democrat or Republican)
Strong Democrat
Moderate Democrat
Independent (but slightly Democratic)
Independent
Independent (but slightly Republican)
Moderate Republican
Strong Republican
Far Right (neither Democrat or Republican)

Please indicate whether and to what extent you feel conflicted about the following issues: (Very much, Somewhat, Not very much, Not at all)

Abortion
Death Penalty
Euthanasia (physician assisted suicide)
Letting gay couples adopt children
Bombing Iran
Affirmative action for minorities
Pre-emptive military strikes by the U.S.

Please ignore for a moment any negative feelings you might have and consider only your positive feelings. How favorable do you feel towards... (Highly favorable, Somewhat favorable, Slightly favorable, Not favorable)

The death penalty?
Legalized abortion?
Euthanasia?
Donating blood?

Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statement: (Strongly agree, Somewhat agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Strongly disagree)

Iraq

To safeguard America from terror, the U.S. must be prepared to take military action, even if this results in the deaths of innocent civilians.

To keep the homeland safe, the president should have the authority to initiate military action against any country that appears to pose a threat.

If just one innocent civilian has died as a result of the U.S. occupation in Iraq, that is one death too many.

The degree to which innocent civilians have been accidentally killed by U.S. troops in Iraq has been exaggerated by the media.

Post-9/11, the U.S. must use whatever interrogation methods are best suited to prevent another terror attack, including water-boarding and other so-called forms of torture.

The loss of life by U.S. soldiers in Iraq is tragic but necessary if we hope to keep America strong and safe.

Unacceptably large numbers of American soldiers have been killed or injured in Iraq.

The costs of the Iraq war (in casualties and money) far outweigh the benefits.

The media doesn't pay enough attention to the suffering of soldiers and their families.

Water-boarding is torture and the U.S. government should never permit its use.

If torture is the only way to get the facts needed to stop an imminent terror attack—one that is just hours away—then, in that case, torture is necessary and acceptable.

Getting information by torture is not worth the loss of U.S. moral standing on the world stage.

I am troubled that so many civilians, including women and children, have died as the result of U.S. military action in Iraq.

Even if the U.S. has to stay in Iraq for 50 years and incur significant military losses, the effort will have been worth the cost if there are no further terrorist attacks on U.S. soil.

Death Penalty

The death penalty is necessary even if, in some cases, innocent people are put to death.

The death penalty should be abolished since we now know that many people have been sentenced to death even though they were later definitely proven to be innocent.

It is unfortunate but inevitable that the criminal justice system will occasionally make mistakes and convict innocent people.

To prevent innocent people from being sentenced to death, our elected leaders should abolish capital punishment.

It is impossible to provide ample compensation to wrongly convicted individuals who have spent time on death row.

The use of DNA evidence should be a basic right for people accused of murder or rape.

There is a very good chance that Americans have been executed for crimes they did not commit.

Since no one can be right 100% of the time, it is excessive to abolish the death penalty just because a few people are wrongly convicted of capital crimes.

People who spend time on death row for crimes they did not commit should be amply compensated by the government.

The federal or state government is under no obligation to provide compensation to the wrongly convicted; it is just a matter of bad luck.

**Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:
(Strongly agree, Somewhat agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat disagree, Strongly disagree)**

The Bush administration's recent 'surge' in the number of troops in Iraq has significantly helped to stabilize the situation and reduce the overall level and threat of violence.

When the U.S. ultimately withdraws most of its combat troops from Iraq, a bloody civil war between opposing Iraqi forces (Shi'ite, Sunni and Kurd) will consume the lives of large numbers of Iraqi civilians.

**Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:
(Strongly agree, Somewhat agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat disagree, Strongly disagree)**

Would you support continued U.S. military action in Iraq until a new Iraqi government can take over if it resulted in no additional U.S. military deaths?

Would you support continued U.S. military action in Iraq until a new Iraqi government can take over if it resulted in up to 5,000 additional U.S. military deaths?

Would you support continued U.S. military action in Iraq until a new Iraqi government can take over if it resulted in up to 10,000 additional U.S. military deaths?

Would you support continued U.S. military action in Iraq until a new Iraqi government can take over if it resulted in up to 50,000 additional U.S. military deaths?

I would like to know whether you think President Bush did the right thing by using military force against Iraq.

Strongly Agree
Somewhat Agree
Somewhat Disagree
Strongly Disagree

Since the start of the military action in Iraq, about how many U.S. military personnel have been killed there?

Around 2,000
Around 3,000
Around 4,000
Around 5,000
Around 10,000

The following questions concern how your father and/or mother would have typically punished you in various situations. When you were young, say 7 to 9 years old, how angry would your father or mother have gotten if they found out you had done the following: (Spanked you, Taken away your privileges, Scolded you, Expressed disappointment, Not punished you)

Stole a dollar from his wallet.

Got the house dirty by tracking in mud.

Hit a younger brother or sister or a younger neighbor kid during an argument.

Lied to your father or mother about breaking something like a vase or a window.

Disobeyed him or her in a manner like coming straight home from school or cleaning up your room.

Disobeyed him or her in something important, like going somewhere you were forbidden to go.

Talked back to an adult or showed disrespect in some other way.

Yelled abusive or angry things at your father or mother.

**Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:
Capital Punishment...**

(Strongly agree, Somewhat agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat disagree, Strongly disagree)

Is often just and necessary

Is absolutely never justified

May be wrong, but is the best way to prevent crime

Is not a rational healthy way to deal with crime

**Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:
(Strongly agree, Somewhat agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat disagree, Strongly disagree)**

It's not really a problem if racial minority groups experience unfair treatment and need help.

Many people say the Irish, Italians and other ethnic groups overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Minorities today should do the same without any special favors.

More good jobs for African-Americans means fewer good jobs for others.

More good jobs for Hispanics means fewer good jobs for others.

Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for African Americans to work their way out of the lower class.

Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.

Over the past few years, black have gotten more economically than they deserve.

**Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:
(Strongly agree, Somewhat agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat disagree, Strongly disagree)**

Recent world events have shown that most Muslims are violent fundamentalists.

The only real way to stop violent extremists in the Islamic world is to kill as many as possible.

The overwhelming majority of Muslims are peaceful and share many commonalities with Americans.

There is nothing inherently violent in the teachings of Islam and the Qur'an.

Arabs should embrace Western values and habits (instead of resenting and attacking them).

People of Middle Eastern descent should have to carry special identification.

Most of the terrorists in the world today are Arabs.

Historically, Arabs have made important contributions to world culture.

Arabs in general have little appreciation for democratic values.

Arab societies have good reason to be proud.

Contemporary Western culture dominates in the world because it has more to offer than contemporary Muslim culture.

Muslims value peace and love.

The religion of Islam has truths to offer.

Adherents of the religion of Islam tend to be fanatical.

There is something sick at the root of Arab culture.

**Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:
(Strongly agree, Somewhat agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat disagree, Strongly disagree)**

There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to ruin it for their own godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action.

There is no 'ONE right way' to live life; everybody has to create their own way.

Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs.

Homosexuals and feminists should be praised for being brave enough to defy 'traditional family values.'

Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, even if it makes them different from everyone else.

The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our traditional values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad ideas.

Our country needs free thinkers who will have the courage to defy traditional ways, even if it upsets many people.

What our country needs, instead of more 'civil rights,' is a good stiff dose of law and order.

There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse.

Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.

**Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:
(Strongly agree, Somewhat agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat disagree, Strongly disagree)**

Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.

In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups.

If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.

It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.

Inferior groups should stay in their place.

It would be good if groups could be equal.

Group equality should be our idea.

All groups should be given an equal chance in life.

We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.

I support increased social inequality.

Collateral Damage Tolerance Scale Full (Capps, 2009)

1. To safeguard America from terror, the U.S. must be prepared to take military action, even if this results in the deaths of innocent civilians.
2. To keep the homeland safe, the president should have the authority to initiate military action against any country that appears to pose a threat.
3. If just one innocent civilian has died as a result of the US occupation of Iraq, that is one death too many.*
4. The degree to which innocent civilians have been accidentally killed by U.S. troops in Iraq has been exaggerated by the media.
5. Post-9/11, the U.S. must use whatever interrogation methods are best suited to prevent another terror attack, including waterboarding and other so-called forms of torture.
6. The loss of life by U.S. soldiers in Iraq (nearly 4,000 at last count) is tragic but necessary if we hope to keep America strong and safe.
7. Unacceptably large numbers of American soldiers have been killed or injured in Iraq.*
8. The costs of the Iraq war (in casualties and money) far outweigh the benefits.*
9. The media doesn't pay enough attention to the suffering of soldiers and their families.*
10. Waterboarding is torture and the U.S. government should never permit its use.*

11. If torture is the only way to get the facts needed to stop an imminent terror attack – one that is just hours or minutes away – then, in that case, torture is necessary and acceptable.
12. Getting information by torture is not worth the loss of U.S. moral standing on the world stage.*
13. I am troubled that so many civilians, including women and children, have died as the result of U.S. military action in Iraq.*
14. Even if the U.S. has to stay in Iraq for 50 years and incur significant military losses, the effort will have been worth the cost if there are no further terrorist attacks on U.S. soil.
15. The death penalty is necessary even if, in some cases, innocent people are put to death.
16. The death penalty should be abolished since we now know that many people have been sentenced to death even though they were later definitely proven to be innocent.*
17. It is unfortunate but inevitable that the criminal justice system will occasionally make mistakes and convict innocent people.
18. To prevent innocent people from being sentenced to death, our elected leaders should abolish capital punishment.*
19. It is impossible to provide ample compensation to wrongly convicted individuals who have spent time on death row.*
20. The use of DNA evidence should be a basic right for people accused of murder or rape.*
21. There is a very good chance that Americans have been executed for crimes they did not commit.*
22. Since no one can be right 100% of the time, it is excessive to abolish the death penalty just because a few people are wrongly convicted of capital crimes.
23. People who spend time on death row for crimes they did not commit should be amply compensated by the government.*

24. The federal or state government is under no obligation to provide compensation to the wrongly convicted; it is just a matter of bad luck.

*Con-trait item, for which the -4 to +4 scoring key is reversed.

Collateral Damage Tolerance Scale Iraqi Civilian Casualties (Capps, 2009)

To safeguard America from terror, the U.S. must be prepared to take military action, even if this results in the deaths of innocent civilians.

If just one innocent civilian has died as a result of the US occupation of Iraq, that is one death too many.*

The degree to which innocent civilians have been accidentally killed by U.S. troops in Iraq has been exaggerated by the media.

I am troubled that so many civilians, including women and children, have died as the result of U.S. military action in Iraq.*

*Con-trait item, for which the -4 to +4 scoring key is reversed.

Collateral Damage Tolerance Scale Iraq (Capps, 2009)

1. To safeguard America from terror, the U.S. must be prepared to take military action, even if this results in the deaths of innocent civilians.

2. To keep the homeland safe, the president should have the authority to initiate military action against any country that appears to pose a threat.

3. If just one innocent civilian has died as a result of the US occupation of Iraq, that is one death too many.*

4. The degree to which innocent civilians have been accidentally killed by U.S. troops in Iraq has been exaggerated by the media.

5. Post-9/11, the U.S. must use whatever interrogation methods are best suited to prevent another terror attack, including waterboarding and other so-called forms of torture.

6. The loss of life by U.S. soldiers in Iraq (nearly 4,000 at last count) is tragic but necessary if we hope to keep America strong and safe.
7. Unacceptably large numbers of American soldiers have been killed or injured in Iraq.*
8. The costs of the Iraq war (in casualties and money) far outweigh the benefits.*
9. The media doesn't pay enough attention to the suffering of soldiers and their families.*
10. Waterboarding is torture and the U.S. government should never permit its use.*
11. If torture is the only way to get the facts needed to stop an imminent terror attack – one that is just hours or minutes away – then, in that case, torture is necessary and acceptable.
12. Getting information by torture is not worth the loss of U.S. moral standing on the world stage.*
13. I am troubled that so many civilians, including women and children, have died as the result of U.S. military action in Iraq.*
14. Even if the U.S. has to stay in Iraq for 50 years and incur significant military losses, the effort will have been worth the cost if there are no further terrorist attacks on U.S. soil.

*Con-trait item, for which the -4 to +4 scoring key is reversed.

**Collateral Damage Tolerance Scale Innocent Killed by U.S. Death Penalty
(Capps, 2009)**

The death penalty is necessary even if, in some cases, innocent people are put to death.

The death penalty should be abolished since we now know that many people have been sentenced to death even though they were later definitely proven to be innocent.*

It is unfortunate but inevitable that the criminal justice system will occasionally make mistakes and convict innocent people.

To prevent innocent people from being sentenced to death, our elected leaders should abolish capital punishment.*

It is impossible to provide ample compensation to wrongly convicted individuals who have spent time on death row.*

The use of DNA evidence should be a basic right for people accused of murder or rape.*

There is a very good chance that Americans have been executed for crimes they did not commit.*

Since no one can be right 100% of the time, it is excessive to abolish the death penalty just because a few people are wrongly convicted of capital crimes.

People who spend time on death row for crimes they did not commit should be amply compensated by the government.*

The federal or state government is under no obligation to provide compensation to the wrongly convicted; it is just a matter of bad luck.

*Con-trait item, for which the -4 to +4 scoring key is reversed.

Islamophobia – Anti-Arab Scale (Capps & Harb, 2009)

1. Recent world events have shown that most Muslims are violent fundamentalists.
2. The only real way to stop violent extremists in the Islamic world is to kill as many as possible.
3. The overwhelming majority of Muslims are peaceful and share many commonalities with Americans.*
4. There is nothing inherently violent in the teachings of Islam and the Qur'an.*
5. Arabs should embrace Western values and habits (instead of resenting and attacking them).
6. People of Middle Eastern descent should have to carry special identification.
7. Most of the terrorists in the world today are Arabs.

8. Historically, Arabs have made important contributions to world culture.*
9. Arabs in general have little appreciation for democratic values.
10. Arab societies have good reason to be proud.*
11. Contemporary Western culture dominates in the world because it has more to offer than contemporary Muslim culture.
12. Muslims value peace and love.*
13. The religion of Islam has truths to offer.*
14. Adherents of the religion of Islam tend to be fanatical.
15. There is something sick at the root of Arab culture.

*Con-trait item, for which the -4 to +4 scoring key is reversed.

Dissertation Survey Flyer

The 2008 US Presidential Election is Shaping Up to Be One of the Most Intriguing in Recent Memory.



Make Your Voice Heard on Several of the Primary Social and Political Issues Being Debated by Participating in an Online Survey Conducted by Seattle University Professor Jason Capps!

The 2008 Puget Sound Social Survey May be Accessed by Going to the Following Website: <http://fac-staff.seattleu.edu/cappsj/web/>

For Every Survey Completed \$1 Will Be Donated to the Charity of the Group's Choice.

Thanks for your Participation!

Survey Blurb for Church Bulletins

Please participate in Seattle U. sociologist Jason Capps' survey on several relevant social and political issues for progressive churches. The survey can be taken online at the following web address <http://fac-staff.seattleu.edu/cappsj/web/>. For every member of our church that fills out the survey professor Capps will donate \$1 to the charity of our choice. If you have further questions please contact Jason at cappsj@seattleu.edu. Thanks for your support!

Capps Dissertation Blurb for National Muslim Student Association (Pacific Northwest)

Two of the many troubling issues in our society today are the loss of life and limb in the Iraq war (both U.S./ally soldiers and Iraqi citizens) and the reality that innocent persons may have been executed before adequate research has been able to exonerate them. Over 220 individuals have been freed due to DNA evidence, and many of them were on death row. Jason Capps, a candidate for PhD in Sociology from the University of Kansas and adjunct faculty member at Seattle University, is conducting a large scale survey focused on these two issues and what folks think of ‘innocent loss of life’ in the theater of war and the American criminal justice system. Moreover, there is scant research targeting the opinions of Muslim, Persian, and/or Arab groups in the U.S. It would be very exciting to get a sampling of the attitudes of the MSA Northwest and MSA National networks. The research will also be augmented by 20-25 follow up interviews with those who have taken the survey.” The survey takes 25-30 minutes to complete.

All you have to do is access the website <http://fac-staff.seattleu/cappsj/web/>, download and print the survey, then return it to me. Or access the website and take the survey on line (preferred option). As an incentive, Jason is offering a donation of \$1 per completed survey to the charity of our choice. Please go ahead and check this out on his website.

Capps Website for Dissertation Survey Research

<http://fac-staff.seattleu.edu/cappsj/web/>

Welcome to Sociologist Jason Capps' Public Attitudes Research Website!



2008 Puget Sound Social Survey

The 2008 United States Presidential Election is shaping up to be one of the most interesting and, perhaps, important in quite some time. There are several very important social issues the country is focused on and I want to know what you think of some of those key issues. I am currently in the final stages of completing my doctorate, from the University of Kansas, and serve as an adjunct professor of sociology, at Seattle University. This project is **not** funded by any outside sources.

As part of my final dissertation project my goal is have 800+ Puget Sound residents complete my survey, which asks questions on a variety of social and political attitudes. I am targeting several different religious and civic-minded groups to take this survey. My mission is to give citizens, in the Puget Sound area, the chance to voice their views on a few of the most important political issues being debated around the country.

As a follow-up to the survey I will also be conducting 20-25 interviews with folks who took the survey.

There are **3** ways to take the survey:

1. Online via [Survey Monkey](#)
2. By printing out a [copy of the survey](#) and sending it to me at the address provided

Complete and send to:

Jason S. Capps
Sociology, Anthropology & Social Work
901 12th Ave., P.O. Box 222000
Seattle, WA 98122-1090

OR

3. I can come to your group and personally administer the survey (please e-mail me your request: jasonscapps@hotmail.com).

As an additional incentive to encourage participation, I am offering the following to churches, civic groups, and other organizations that help get their constituencies to participate:

- \$1 will be donated per completed survey to the charity of the organization's choice
- Upon completion of the research (both survey and interviews) I will be available to give talks revealing the results of the study
- Survey takers will be invited to see me give a talk on the findings at Seattle University in the Spring of 2009

Many Thanks for Taking Part in My Survey and Helping Me Finish My Dissertation!

This is a personal WEB site developed and maintained by an individual and not by Seattle University. The content and link(s) provided on this site do not represent or reflect the view(s) of Seattle University. The individual who authored this site is solely responsible for the site's content. This site and its author are subject to applicable University policies including the Computer Acceptable Use Policy (www.seattleu.edu/policies).

Chapter 8 - Appendix – Interview Components

Capps Dissertation Interview Vignettes and Open-Ended Questions

Spring 2009

Open-Ended Questions

Date:

Name:

Where are you from originally?

How does the Seattle/Puget Sound region compare to your home town?

How closely do you follow American politics? (Very closely, somewhat closely, not closely, not closely at all).

What are your main sources of information about politics? (newspapers, magazines/other print media—what specifically do you read or watch?, TV/news shows—networks, show preference, radio—satellite, terrestrial/what specific commentators do you listen to often? websites, Blogs, other forms of media?).

Do you think the American criminal justice system does a good, fair, or poor job of keeping our streets safe and putting away criminals that deserve punishment? Why?

Of the most common social issues often discussed in political circles (especially in relation to the 2008 election process) what are the most important issues the country faces in your view? (Please Rank Order 1-15—1 being the most important 15 being the least important).

- Health Care Costs
- Poverty
- Personal Indebtedness
- Economic Woes of U.S. Stock Market
- HIV/AIDS
- Social Security
- Abortion
- War in Iraq
- War in Afghanistan
- Potential War with Iran
- Illegal Immigration
- Crime and Deviance in Society
- Global Warming
- Gay and Lesbian Lifestyles
- Content of TV and Movies

Discuss in a bit more detail your top 3 social issues (concerns). Why are these the most troublesome in your view? In your estimation what should be done to help fix the most important social issues that are plaguing American society?

- Do you have family or friends who have served in Iraq since 2003? Military? Private Security/Corporation?
- Have you ever known a family member or friend that was wrongly convicted of a crime?
- Have you or someone close to you been a victim of a violent crime?
- Please describe the emotions you feel when you think about deaths in the Iraq war.
- Jot down, as specifically as you can, the ways in which you visualize war-related deaths occurring among U.S. soldiers, and civilians in Iraq.
- In your view have the 4,245 American women and men serving in Iraq who have lost their lives been worth it? Why or why not?
- For the 31,004 service women and men who have returned from Iraq, without arms, legs or severely injured in other ways, what is the responsibility of the federal government for ensuring they get the proper health care? Should the military ensure they are employable before discharging them?

- Define the phrase ‘collateral damage’ in your own words.
- If someone was to associate the phrase ‘collateral damage’ with the Iraq war and the U.S criminal justice system how would you define CD in these two situations?
- Jot down, as specifically as you can, your vision of the characteristics (race/ethnicity, class position, age, gender, etc.) and typical scenario involving individuals who have recently been exonerated from U.S. prisons due to DNA evidence proving their innocence.

3 Vignettes for Analysis

Vignette #1: Loss of Life in Iraq (Collateral Damage in loss of Iraqi civilian life)

Imagine you’re on a military jury evaluating the following events:

In 2005, the third year of the Iraq war, U.S. marines set out to secure a small town just outside Baghdad. On the way, a roadside bomb destroyed a Humvee and took the life of a popular and decorated soldier.

Minutes later the marines saw five men in a taxi near the bomb site. They shot and killed these men as suspected insurgents and then entered a nearby village, suspecting that the villagers were shielding others. Chaos ensued and the marines ultimately killed people in three homes with guns and grenades. At first it was thought that all of those who died were Al Qaeda insurgents. But 24 were actually unarmed civilians ranging in age from 1 to 76, of whom eight were women or children. The five men in the taxi were unarmed students. Many Iraqis and some in the U.S. media later charged that these two dozen Iraqi civilians were the victims of a murderous rage sparked by the bombing just minutes earlier. Others said that, on the heels of an unprovoked attack and in the heat of battle, the marines were justified in their actions, even if civilians were hurt as a result.

In your view...

1. Should the Marines who pulled the triggers and threw the grenades into the dwellings, killing the unarmed civilians, be charged with pre-meditated murder? Why or why not?
2. Is there a difference, in your mind, between the Iraqi women and children being killed and the Iraqi unarmed (non-insurgent) men being killed? Is it more justified to accidentally kill men as opposed to other groups—women and children in a war like the Iraq war?
3. What is the proper punishment for the Marines involved in this event? (Those directly involved as ‘shooters,’ the commanding officers who gave the order, or officers higher up the food chain).
4. A recent poll indicated that 23% of Americans say that American lives are worth more than the lives of people in other countries. What do you make of this poll?
5. What, if any, compensation should be paid (or given) to the surviving members of the families that lose loved ones in this manner?
6. How would you describe the ‘war in Iraq’? In your own terms, what is happening, what will come of it, and what should happen ultimately?
7. Do you think you are adequately informed on matters pertaining to the Iraq war? If you feel unformed what would you like to know more about?
8. Given this kind of brutality in the Iraq war, why do you suspect, in the last election, the public decided to run a Republican candidate for the Presidency who was one of the most advent supporters of the war and, especially, the ‘Surge’ (or escalation of the conflict)?
9. Does the mainstream media do an adequate job of reporting accurately these types of incidents? If there was more coverage of these incidents do you think it would result in more disapproval of the war? Why or why not?
10. Do you think the media could or has changed U.S. public opinion about the occupation of Iraq? To what extent?
11. There are several conflicting reports by governmental and non-governmental sources regarding the number of non-insurgent innocent Iraqi citizens who have died as a result of the 2003 invasion. From the initial invasion (in 2003) until now estimates range from 41,000 to 790,000 dead Iraqi civilians. Do you think the number dead is closer to 40,000 or 800,000? What would you base this on? Have you ever stopped to think about the impact of the war on innocent citizens in Iraq? How many dead civilians would likely alter your opinion of the war significantly? In other words, is there a particular number that would significantly alter your views/support for the war?
12. Is there such a thing as compensation for the lost lives of unarmed civilians? For the price of war? If so, what is that compensation?
13. Do you believe the ‘Surge’ has worked—politically/militarily? Why or why not?

Vignette #2: Torture of ‘Enemy Combatants’ at Guantanamo (Collateral Damage as torture of innocent ‘enemy combatants’)

Suppose you read the following news report in your local newspaper about the Detention Facility at Guantánamo Bay.

Report: Study Shows over 75% of Prisoners at Guantánamo Bay Were Innocent—Not ‘Enemy Combatants’ Yet Still Victims of Torture Techniques

A newly released report by U.S. government officials and researchers at Harvard University has concluded that over 75% of the detainees at the infamous Guantánamo Bay Detention Facility in Cuba were not ‘enemy combatants’ and completely innocent of any wrongdoing, violence, or proposed violence (or terrorist attacks) against America and American allies. Many of the detainees—now deemed in the wrong place at the wrong time at the time of their capture—were not formally charged of crimes and were held for more than 5 years with no legal representation. The study also details the types of torture techniques used to try and pry information from them. The list includes: waterboarding, extended sleep deprivation, extended solitary confinement, partial or total sensory deprivation, threat of permanent or severe disfigurement, and sexual assault.

1. What are your general thoughts about America’s use of ‘torture’ as a way to garner information from our enemies? Should we be torturing or not torturing?
2. Does the so-called ‘ticking time bomb’ scenario alter your view of the use of torture? (A person has pertinent information that could head off a violent terrorist attack and torture *may* be the proposed only way to get the information from the person).
3. Do you believe that while unfortunate the torturing of some innocent individuals at Guantánamo Bay has aided, in at least some way, for disallowing another major terrorist strike on U.S. soil? Why or why not?
4. Does allowing torture make America more or less safe in the long run?
5. Lately there has been substantial discussion of America’s use of ‘torture’ for so-called ‘enemy combatants.’ In your view should President Obama retain the policies of the

Bush administration and continue to use torture where necessary to try and get information and, perhaps, thwart a terrorist attack OR are these practices immoral and a black eye for America in the eyes of the world and, therefore, unacceptable—to be abolished immediately.

6. President Obama has recently indicated he wishes to shut down the now infamous Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility. What should be done with the 270 individuals that have been deemed ‘enemy combatants’ but have not been channeled through the normal workings of the American criminal justice system? (rights awarded to the accused via the Bill of Rights).

Vignette #3: DNA & Death Row (Collateral Damage as innocent people convicted of violent crimes/Prison Time/Death Row)

A young man was convicted of the brutal rape and murder of a young mother. Before the woman died, she was able to tell the police that a lone man was responsible for her demise. During questioning after an arrest for a drunken assault of his neighbor, the young man confessed to four different crimes, including the murder of the young mother. Three of the four confessions were dismissed but there was no victim to clear the man of the murder of the young woman. As a result, even though the man did not know the race of the victim, how many times he supposedly stabbed her, where she lived, or if she was alone when the crime was committed, he was convicted of the young woman’s murder. Genetic evidence found at the crime scene did not match the young man’s genetic type but the young man’s trial lawyer failed to notice or concern himself with this. Despite psychological analysis that the young man had an IQ of 69 and would defer to any authority figure in the confession process, he was convicted and sentenced to death. The young man was granted an absolute pardon after he had served 17 years of his death sentence after much work by lawyers to clear him based on DNA evidence which excluded him from even being a possible suspect in the crime.

1. Why do you think this happened to the young man? In your view is it just to imprison people who might be innocent in order to ensure that the true culprit(s) doesn’t escape and to provide ‘justice’ and peace to the victims?
2. Would it surprise you to know that 232 people in America have been exonerated through DNA evidence, proving their innocence, since 1989? Why or why not?
3. Further, 17 of the 232 have served time on death row. Average time served: 12 years. Total number of years served for crime not committed: 2,892 years. Could this information potentially alter your support or non-support of the death penalty in the U.S. criminal justice system?

4. Do you believe these cases are rare in occurrence and, therefore, an acceptable form of ‘collateral damage’ in order to keep the streets as safe as possible from potential predators? Why or why not?
5. What do you suppose are the main reasons why innocent people have been convicted in the U.S.? (incompetent lawyers, faulty eye-witness testimony, no access to DNA evidence, shoddy police work, etc.)
6. Of the 232 exonerees the following racial/ethnic groups are represented: African Americans, Caucasians, Latinos, and Asian Americans. What percentage would you guess are represented by each category?
7. Since 1976 when the death penalty was re-instated in the U.S. 1,107 individuals have been executed. Would you continue to support the death penalty if you knew 5% (or 55) of these folks were innocent, and therefore executed for crimes *not* committed? What about 10% or 111 were innocent? Why or why not?
8. There are currently 3,263 people on death row. Are you comfortable in supporting the death penalty knowing that perhaps 10%, or 326 of these folks set to be executed are innocent?
9. About half of the people exonerated since 1989 have been financially compensated. Should people be financially compensated, by the state, if wrongly convicted (and they spend time in prison)? Is there any way, in your mind, to ‘truly’ compensate innocent people who have served time in prison and/or on death row for crimes they did not do?

Exit Questions:

- Given the three vignettes provided in this interview which of the three is the most upsetting? Why?
- In your view is there a distinct difference between the *moral theater of war* and the *moral theater of criminal justice system*? Why or why not?
- Are you likely to be more or less accepting of innocent loss of life in **war** or the **criminal justice system** or are they both similar moral theaters and, therefore, equally disturbing? In other words, is it possible that one venue (war or CJS) hits closer to home than the other?
- Would you describe these forms of ‘innocent loss of life’ as collateral damage? Does the analogy/euphemism work for you? Why or why not?

Capps Dissertation Interview, 2009

Name: _____

Date: _____

Of the most common social issues often discussed in political circles (especially in relation to the 2008 election process) what are the most important issues the country faces in your view? (Please Rank Order 1-15—1 being the most important 15 being the least important).

- Health Care Costs
- Poverty
- Personal Indebtedness
- Economic Woes of U.S. Stock Market
- HIV/AIDS
- Social Security
- Abortion
- War in Iraq
- War in Afghanistan
- Potential War with Iran
- Illegal Immigration
- Crime and Deviance in Society
- Global Warming
- Gay and Lesbian Lifestyles
- Content of TV and Movies

Jot down, as specifically as you can, the ways in which you visualize war-related deaths occurring among U.S. soldiers, and civilians in Iraq.

Jot down, as specifically as you can, your vision of the characteristics (race/ethnicity, class position, age, gender, etc.) and typical scenario involving individuals who have recently been exonerated from U.S. prisons due to DNA evidence proving their innocence.

Vignette #1

Imagine you're on a military jury evaluating the following events:

In 2005, the third year of the Iraq war, U.S. marines set out to secure a small town just outside Baghdad. On the way, a roadside bomb destroyed a Humvee and took the life of a popular and decorated soldier.

Minutes later the marines saw five men in a taxi near the bomb site. They shot and killed these men as suspected insurgents and then entered a nearby village, suspecting that the villagers were shielding others. Chaos ensued and the marines ultimately killed people in three homes with guns and grenades. At first it was thought that all of those who died were Al Qaeda insurgents. But 24 were actually unarmed civilians ranging in age from 1 to 76, of whom eight were women or children. The five men in the taxi were unarmed students. Many Iraqis and some in the U.S. media later charged that these two dozen Iraqi civilians were the victims of a murderous rage sparked by the bombing just minutes earlier. Others said that, on the heels of an unprovoked attack and in the heat of battle, the marines were justified in their actions, even if civilians were hurt as a result.

Vignette #2

Suppose you read the following news report in your local newspaper about the Detention Facility at Guantánamo Bay.

Report: Study Shows over 75% of Prisoners at Guantánamo Bay Were Innocent—Not ‘Enemy Combatants’ Yet Still Victims of Torture Techniques

A newly released report by U.S. government officials and researchers at Harvard University has concluded that over 75% of the detainees at the infamous Guantánamo Bay Detention Facility in Cuba were not ‘enemy combatants’ and completely innocent of any wrongdoing, violence, or proposed violence (or terrorist attacks) against America and American allies. Many of the detainees—now deemed in the wrong place at the wrong time at the time of their capture—were not formally charged of crimes and were held for more than 5 years with no legal representation. The study also details the types of torture techniques used to try and pry information from them. The list includes: water-boarding, extended sleep deprivation, extended solitary confinement, partial or total sensory deprivation, threat of permanent or severe disfigurement, and sexual assault.

Vignette #3

Suppose you read the following news report in your local newspaper about an individual exonerated from a U.S. prison due to evidence proving their innocence.

A young man was convicted of the brutal rape and murder of a young mother. Before the woman died, she was able to tell the police that a lone man was responsible for her demise. During questioning after an arrest for a drunken assault of his neighbor, the young man confessed to four different crimes, including the murder of the young mother. Three of the four confessions were dismissed but there was no victim to clear the man of the murder of the young woman. As a result, even though the man did not know the race of the victim, how many times he supposedly stabbed her, where she lived, or if she was alone when the crime was committed, he was convicted of the young woman's murder. Genetic evidence found at the crime scene did not match the young man's genetic type but the young man's trial lawyer failed to notice or concern himself with this. Despite psychological analysis that the young man had an IQ of 69 and would defer to any authority figure in the confession process, he was convicted and sentenced to death. The young man was granted an absolute pardon after he had served 17 years of his death sentence after much work by lawyers to clear him based on DNA evidence which excluded him from even being a possible suspect in the crime.

Collateral Damage in Iraq & Capital Punishment in the United States: How the Public Makes Sense of Extreme Violence and Death. (Interview Participants)

INTRODUCTION

The Department of Sociology, at the University of Kansas, supports the practice of protection for human subjects participating in research. The following information is provided for you to decide whether you wish to participate in the present study. You may refuse to sign this form and not participate in this study. You should be aware that even if you agree to participate, you are free to withdraw at any time. If you do withdraw from this study, it will not affect your relationship with this unit, the services it may provide to you, or the University of Kansas.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of this study is to interview Seattle citizens about key social issues that are pertinent in American politics with a specific focus on war and the U.S. practice of capital punishment.

PROCEDURES

This interview will require 45-60 minutes of your time. The researcher will provide open-ended interview questions and solicit responses to 4 vignettes. The session will be taped with a mini voice recorder. Upon the conclusion of the study (when the interview data has been compiled and analyzed) the tapes will be stored in a lock box for protection. To participate in the study every participant must sign a consent form.

RISKS

This study requires participants to answer questions about the Iraq war and the U.S. death penalty. Participants can disband their participation at any time.

BENEFITS

The benefits of your participation to this study will be to help researchers understand the phenomena of ambivalence and swing voters in America.

PAYMENT TO PARTICIPANTS

Participants will not be paid—their participation is entirely voluntary.

PARTICIPANT CONFIDENTIALITY

Your name will not be associated in any way with the information collected about you or with the research findings from this study. The researcher(s) will use a study number or a pseudonym instead of your name. The researchers will not share information about you unless required by law or unless you give written permission. Permission granted on this date to use and disclose your information remains in effect indefinitely. By signing this form you give permission for the use and disclosure of your information for purposes of this study at any time in the future.

REFUSAL TO SIGN CONSENT AND AUTHORIZATION

You are not required to sign this Consent and Authorization form and you may refuse to do so without affecting your right to any services you are receiving or may receive from the University of Kansas or to participate in any programs or events of the University of Kansas. However, if you refuse to sign, you cannot participate in this study.

CANCELLING THIS CONSENT AND AUTHORIZATION

*You may withdraw your consent to participate in this study at any time. You also have the right to cancel your permission to use and disclose information collected about you, in writing, at any time, by sending your written request to: **Jason S. Capps, Seattle University, 901 12th Ave., P.O. Box 222000, Casey 300 (Anthropology, Sociology and Social Work), Seattle, WA 98122-1090.** If you cancel permission to use your information, the researchers will stop collecting additional information about you. However, the research team may use and disclose information that was gathered before they received your cancellation, as described above.*

QUESTIONS ABOUT PARTICIPATION

Questions about procedures should be directed to the researcher(s) listed at the end of this consent form.

PARTICIPANT CERTIFICATION:

I have read this Consent and Authorization form. I have had the opportunity to ask, and I have received answers to, any questions I had regarding the study. I understand that if I have any additional questions about my rights as a research participant, I may call (785) 864-7429 or (785) 864-7385 or write the Human Subjects Committee Lawrence Campus (HSCL), University of Kansas, 2385 Irving Hill Road, Lawrence, Kansas 66045-7563, email dhann@ku.edu or mdenning@ku.edu.

I agree to take part in this study as a research participant. By my signature I affirm that I am at least 18 years old and that I have received a copy of this Consent and Authorization form.

Type/Print Participant's Name	Date

Participant's Signature

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