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Abstract: Can style or presentational devices reasonably compel us to believe, agree, act? I submit that they can, and that the normative pragmatic project explains how. After describing a normative pragmatic approach to presentational force, I analyze and evaluate presentational force in Susan B. Anthony's "Is it a Crime for a U. S. Citizen to Vote" as it apparently proceeds from logic, emotion, and style. I conclude with reflections on the compatibility of the normative pragmatic approach with the recently-developed pragma-dialectical treatment of presentational devices.

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NORMS OF PRESENTATIONAL FORCE

Someone's style of argumentation sometimes seems to force us to believe or do something. We may feel compelled by a case presented seductively. A vivid description of potential harmful consequences of a policy may pressure us to abandon our support for it. A child may speak with such sweetness and naiveté that we can't refuse to buy a dozen boxes of candy to support her club's trip. In these cases we may say that the presentational style was effective since it persuaded us. But would we say that we were rationally persuaded? Can style or presentational devices as such reasonably compel us to believe, agree, act? I submit that they can, and that the normative pragmatic project explains how.

"Presentational force" is the force of style as argument. Although it is possible to abstract an argument from a discourse--when someone asks us what argument an author made in an essay, we do not read the essay to her--presentational devices constitute the argument as designed and presented.¹ Presentational devices include but are not limited to language uses such as word choice, syntax, figures and tropes, and broader units of composition. Although some presentational devices in argumentation may be viewed as outside the scope of argument proper (see for example Jacobs 267, 270, 272), presentational devices constitute argumentation (Jacobs 265; see also Conley 273-74; Manolescu, "Style" 64). Therefore at least some presentational devices are inseparable from argumentation itself and must be investigated as sources of force.

By "presentational force" I mean something other than a "forceful style" where "forceful" may refer to the strength, intensity, or impact of presentational devices. Instead, I use "force" in the sense of "pressure" or "compel." Some students of rhetoric and argumentation may object to the idea that arguments are compelling, that a forceful argument may pressure someone to believe or act. They may be in the good company of those who have understood rhetoric and argumentation as alternatives to

physical force.² Still, it is commonplace to speak of arguments forcing responses, and this is not necessarily objectionable. It is good that arguments force politicians to make health care an issue in a political campaign, or force jurors to acknowledge evidence in a trial.

In what follows I aim to show how presentational devices may serve as sources of force and that they may be analyzed and evaluated from the perspective of normative pragmatics. After explaining the normative pragmatic project, I analyze and evaluate select presentational forces in Susan B. Anthony's "Is it a Crime for a U. S. Citizen to Vote" and conclude with reflections on the compatibility of the normative pragmatic approach with the recently-developed pragma-dialectical treatment of presentational devices.

NORMATIVE PRAGMATICS AND PRESENTATIONAL FORCE

Researchers past and present, approaching argumentation from a variety of perspectives, have referred to "force" in their theories of argumentation (see for example Apostel 101; van Eemeren and Grootendorst, *Systematic* 12; Johnson 334; Whately). There are at least three ways of theorizing force, where "theorizing" means explaining: intellectual, social, and pragmatic. Although these ways of explaining force are not mutually exclusive, they involve different emphases. In what follows I overview these ways with reference to how argumentation may pressure addressees to accept an argument's conclusion. Accepting a conclusion is not the only thing an argument may force addressees to do. Argumentation may aim to force addressees to accept a premise or burden of proof, for example. Still, forcing acceptance of a conclusion is a straightforward kind of case so a good way to introduce different ways of theorizing the force of argumentation.

First, an explanation for why argumentation may pressure, compel, force an addressee to accept a conclusion may be primarily intellectual. Intellectual accounts of force inform basic kinds of critical questions for different kinds of arguments. To ask of an argument from analogy if the relationships

compared are sufficiently similar, to ask of a causal generalization if causation and not just correlation is present, to ask of a hypothetical syllogism if the antecedent is denied or the consequent affirmed is to ask about the intellectual force of these kinds of arguments. In all cases, we assess their force apart from audience and context and based on what may be taken as objective, impersonal standards of rationality. From this perspective, we may say that argumentation pressures a physician to accept the conclusion that a drug treatment is effective because the conclusion is based on a sample of sufficient size, spread, and randomness and meets all other relevant criteria for a rational argument.³

Second, an explanation for why argumentation may force an addressee to accept a conclusion may be primarily social. From this perspective, we may explain the compelling nature of arguments from analogy that meet traditional standards of rational argument by saying that such reasoning patterns are sanctioned by society. Or we may say that the physician is compelled to accept that a drug treatment is effective, because the argumentation meets standards set by a society of professionals. In these cases, force is explained not by impersonal standards of rationality but by agreements among people about what counts as a valid, strong, appropriate argument.⁴ This perspective grounds the force primarily in intersubjective agreement.

If force pressures or compels to some degree, then social explanations are preferable to intellectual. The categories are not mutually exclusive, but emphasizing the social enables the theory to cover cases of non-cooperative, adversarial argumentation. But social explanations are unsatisfactory since a theory of argumentation aims to explain the practice of argumentation rather than social norms, so an explanation in terms of the practice of argumentation is preferable. Again, the categories are not mutually exclusive, but emphasizing the practice takes us more deeply into argumentation whereas emphasizing the social directs us more toward the context. Context is essential but the practice of argumentation ought to be the focus of the inquiry.

A normative pragmatic approach to force addresses these considerations. It is a third kind of explanation for why an argument may compel addressees to accept a conclusion. From this perspective the force of argumentation is explained by normative pragmatic reasons. From this perspective, we may say that the physician is compelled to accept that the drug treatment is effective, because the argument is presented in such a way that to do otherwise would lead to negative consequences: he would look irrational or unprofessional. Accepting the conclusion appears to be the rational, professional choice, so the presentational design itself offers positive inducements for accepting the conclusion. Clearly intellectual and social dimensions--and other kinds of dimensions such as political--may be involved in a normative pragmatic explanation of force. But the normative pragmatic perspective (1) emphasizes the presentational design of the argumentation as the source of force, (2) explains how the design features themselves may serve as reasons (or not) for accepting a conclusion, and (3) evaluates the argumentation based on its reasonability under the circumstances.

A normative pragmatic approach to argumentation was first systematically outlined by the pragma-dialecticians. In their view, argumentation theory is a branch of what they have termed "normative pragmatics"--an approach to argumentation that attempts "to transcend the limitations of a purely normative or a purely descriptive approach to argumentation" (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, *Systematic* 10). A purely normative approach would propose an ideal model of argumentation without reference to the actual practice of argumentation; a purely descriptive approach would simply describe the properties of argumentation. A pragma-dialectical perspective transcends these approaches by studying actual argumentation, reconstructing it using a series of transformations (addition, deletion, substitution, permutation) to produce an analytic overview, and evaluating it according to the rules for a critical discussion. The pragma-dialecticians' attempt to merge the ideal and the real is a significant contribution to argumentation theory (see van Eemeren, "Argumentation" 9 and "Study" 40; van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson, and Jacobs, ch. 1; van Eemeren and Grootendorst, *Systematic* ch. 2).

Working from a rhetorical perspective, a number of scholars have recently developed a normative pragmatic approach to force that preserves the central insight of the need to merge the ideal and the real. This project involves a number of assumptions, some of which are shared by the pragma-dialectical perspective. First, the force of arguments is derived from discourse strategies--from what arguers actually do. Second, these strategies or design features serve as reasons created by the argumentation.

These two assumptions may be illustrated by the following example. Arguers may design their argumentation in a way that pressures reluctant addressees to consider matters which they otherwise might disregard (Kauffeld, "Persuasive" 86). Qualities of argumentation that seem to compel consideration of a proposal may include that the argument is apparently well thought out and takes into account the addressees' interests; if argumentation manifests these qualities, addressees may be "vulnerable to criticism should they fail to contend with the speaker's argument" (Kauffeld, "Persuasive" 82). If the argument is not taken into consideration, addressees may not appear prudent or self-reliant; in this way the argument pressures or compels consideration (see also Kauffeld, "Presumptions"). Analysts focus not on the argument that is "in" the discourse and abstracted from the design elements, but on the design elements themselves and the reasons for persuasion created by these elements (see also Jacobs; Leff, "Rhetoric").

Since the normative pragmatic perspective views force as derived from discourse strategies which create reasons, it does not view force as compulsion. This is a third key assumption. As we may evade or overcome physical forces--we may evade the force of the wind by stepping into a shelter, or overcome the force of gravity by jumping--so we may evade or overcome the force of argumentation (see also Goodwin, "Manifestly" 3-4). Analysts working from a normative pragmatic perspective view addressees as autonomous agents who are free to choose to meet, ignore, evade the forces--to confront negative consequences or forgo positive consequences. The prospect of publicly taking responsibility

for one's decision at a later date, for example, may pressure someone to make something an issue in a policy debate (Goodwin, "Designing" 93); but the legislator may still choose to take her chances and ignore the issue. Or, in a trial, "[t]he strategy of evidence works because no one can deny having seen or heard the items ostended. Why not? Since everyone saw each other seeing the evidence, to deny having seen it would either be to lie (bad) or to admit to having been inattentive at trial (also bad)" (Goodwin, "Manifestly" 6). But the juror may choose to accept these consequences. Or an argument from authority may pressure addressees to assent in part because refusal to assent may lead to public disapproval of impudent conduct (Goodwin, "Cicero's" 43); but addressees may decide these consequences are tolerable. Inducements created by discourse strategies may be positive or negative; or, as Goodwin has put it, carrots or sticks ("Designing" 88).

A final assumption of the normative pragmatic project is that analysts evaluate the force of argumentation based on its reasonability under the circumstances. It is possible to say that a sign of an argument's force is its effectiveness: if someone in fact changes her mind or acts as a result of an argument, then it must have force. But this is not the normative pragmatic view. The normative pragmatic view aims to transcend so-called rhetorical and dialectical conceptions of argument, where rhetoric is equated with effectiveness and dialectic with procedural issues; as Jacobs has put it: "The dark side of rhetoric lies in its power over people; the dark side of dialectic lies in its lack of it" (262).⁵ A normative pragmatic perspective locates force in the reasons created by discourse strategies, and the reasons created by the discourse--reasons that are compelling to varying degrees--compel because they invoke norms about how people should act. Therefore, what is forceful is normative.

This is not an entirely relativistic notion of reasonableness but rather something like the pragma-dialecticians' account of problem validity and intersubjective validity. "Problem validity" refers to the validity of procedural rules--discussants cannot prevent each other from calling standpoints into

question, for example--that enable participants in a critical discussion to resolve a difference of opinion. "Intersubjective validity" recognizes that what counts as reasonable is a product of situated human judgment; reasonableness is a "gradual" concept (van Eemeren, "Argumentation" 12; van Eemeren and Grootendorst, *Systematic* 16). A normative pragmatic perspective expands the notion of problem validity to include the functions argumentation serves in addition to or instead of resolving a difference of opinion. And it considers context--audience, time constraints, and so on--in the assessment.

In short, I submit that presentational force ought to be analyzed and evaluated from the perspective of normative pragmatics. Analysts ought to identify presentational devices that are apparent sources of force and explain why they are or are not reasonable under the circumstances.⁶ Put simply, we may ask: what reasons or manifest rationales for persuasion do presentational devices create, and why may they be expected to work (see also Jacobs 264-65; Goodwin, "Comments" 288 and "Cicero's" 39)?

In the following analysis I locate force in part by using Kenneth Burke's conception of form as the creation and fulfillment of expectations by a discourse.⁷ Briefly, Burke identified five aspects of form: syllogistic, where premises lead auditors to expect or see the propriety of a conclusion; qualitative, where some tone or emotions lead auditors to expect or see the propriety of other tones or emotions, or recognize in retrospect a fit among qualities analogous to a fit among premises; repetitive, where the repetition of the same principle in different guises leads auditors to expect or see the propriety of presenting the principle in other guises; conventional, where a specific kind of situation leads auditors to expect or see the propriety of generic features of texts; and minor, where auditors are engaged by figures such as metaphor or personification, or syntactical arrangements such as when-then, if-then, not-but. These different aspects of form are illustrated in the analysis.

NORMS OF PRESENTATIONAL FORCE IN "IS IT A CRIME FOR A U. S. CITIZEN TO VOTE"

To show how norms of presentational force may be analyzed and evaluated from a normative pragmatic perspective, I analyze and evaluate select passages of Anthony's speech "Is it a Crime for a U. S. Citizen to Vote" (1872-73). It is a clear case of argumentation: she was indicted for voting and delivered the speech defending her right to vote in every postal district of Monroe county and then Ontario county in New York.⁸ As she puts it in the second sentence of the speech: "It shall be my work this evening to prove to you that in thus voting, I not only committed no crime, but, instead, simply exercised my *citizen's right*, guaranteed to me and all United States citizens by the National Constitution, beyond the power of any State to deny" (280). The speech consists of six main lines of argument. First, suffrage is a natural right, protected by government rather than bestowed by it (280-86). Second, states cannot limit the franchise (286-91). Third, there are harmful consequences of interpreting the pronouns in law literally (291-95). Fourth, the fourteenth amendment gives women the right to vote (295-304). Fifth, the fifteenth amendment gives women the right to vote (304-13). Sixth, the national government protects the franchise against the interference of states (313-15). The peroration consists of a series of calls to action (315-16).

The force of this speech for its contemporary audience is apparent based on comments about the speech and its results. Contemporary accounts report that Anthony "converted" almost all who listened to her (Harper 993). Presumably she was not speaking to the converted, or at least some notable number of her auditors was not converted to the cause of woman suffrage prior to hearing her speech. Second, these accounts have perhaps confirmed for scholars that one effect of the speech was that the trial venue was changed because the arrest was notorious, the Grant administration wanted a guilty verdict and, after Anthony's speech, it would be difficult--perhaps impossible--to select a jury that would deliver a verdict of "guilty" (Campbell, "Seeking" 116 and "Contemporary" 129; Dorr 255). These

facts point to the forcibleness of the speech.

Its force has transcended the immediate occasion. It is anthologized in an important collection of woman's rights speeches, Campbell's *Man Cannot Speak for Her*, and a leading scholar of American public address has called for critical attention to the speech (Lucas 247). Another has said about the speech: "Probably nowhere else did Anthony argue woman's suffrage more forcefully" (Merriam 30). Because its force does not seem to be wholly a function of the immediate situation but lay also in its status as an exemplar of the art of rhetoric and argumentation, it is an appropriate source for inquiring into norms of presentational force.

The force of argumentation may be attributed to different features of presentation such as logic, emotion, style. These are not the only design features that may lend force to argumentation; absent, for example, is character. Nor are they mutually exclusive; an appeal to fear may be logical as it is presented in the form of a hypothetical syllogism that appeals to harmful consequences and involves language strategies such as repetition. Still, it is commonplace to distinguish such features, so they serve well as an initial foray into norms of presentational force.

Logic and Presentational Force

The points I hope to illustrate with analysis of the following passage are that an account of the logical force of argumentation must take into account presentational devices, and that the devices are not "merely" presentational. Anthony uses syllogistic forms throughout the speech, but one renowned example is the following. The fourteenth amendment (1) defines all persons born or naturalized in the United States as citizens and (2) forbids states to make or enforce laws that abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens; women are persons; therefore no state can legally abridge their privileges or immunities. But this is not really the argument that Anthony made.⁹ This is:

But whatever room there was for a doubt, under the old regime, the adoption of the fourteenth amendment settled that question forever, in its first sentence: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside."

And the second settles the equal status of all persons--all citizens: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

The only question left to be settled, now, is: "Are women persons?" And I hardly believe any of our opponents will have the hardihood to say they are not. Being persons, then, women are citizens, and no State has a right to make any new law, or to enforce any old law, that shall abridge their privileges or immunities. Hence, every discrimination against women in the constitutions and laws of the several States, is to-day null and void, precisely as is every one against negroes. (296)

The premises apparently force the conclusion: they create an expectation for the conclusion, and the conclusion fits the premises, so the syllogistic form has propriety. Assuming that Anthony chose the manner of presentation to provide addressees with reasons to respond favorably to her case, we may ask (1) what presentational strategies did she use and (2) how would these strategies create a reason or manifest rationale for addressees to respond favorably to her case. The reason or rationale is the source of force; it compels to some degree the response Anthony seeks and is grounded in part in norms of the practice of argumentation.

One presentational strategy is direct quotation of sections of the fourteenth amendment. The work of Kauffeld and Goodwin helps to explain the force of this presentational strategy. First, it

contributes to the forces that compel addressees to attend to her case. In this passage direct quotation serves as an inducement in part because the quotations, combined with many other quotations of legal documents and authorities throughout the speech, are a fallible sign that the position is well thought out. Direct quotation here provides even reluctant addressees with a reason for attending to the position, because to ignore a well thought out position seems to be uncharacteristic of a prudent person (Kauffeld, "Persuasive" 85, "Presumptions" 250-52) and, under the circumstances, uncharacteristic of a responsible citizen. The risk is serious given that citizenship is a key term and issue of the speech. Second, it contributes to the forces that compel addressees to recognize the adequacy of the premises. Direct quotation involving an issue of the letter of the law is analogous to a presentation of evidence. This style creates a manifest rationale for persuasion because addressees know that they can be held accountable for direct knowledge of it (Goodwin, "Manifestly" 4-5); pleading ignorance would mean that addressees are lying or were not attentive.

A second presentational strategy is contrasting past and present. Immediately before the passage quoted above, Anthony acknowledges that "there was always a conflict of opinion, prior to the war" (296) as to whether words such as "person" and "citizen" are synonymous, and she quotes examples. These quotations create reasons to grant Anthony's proposal at least tentative consideration not only because they again indicate that the position is well thought out. They also create tentative grounds for believing that potential adversaries' positions have been taken into account and, because quoted, considered carefully and fairly. The presentation is forcible, because ignoring an argument that takes into account one's position would not seem to characterize a person who has responsibly formed a commitment (Kauffeld, "Persuasive" 85) and, under the circumstances, such a person runs the serious risk of appearing to be unworthy of the name "citizen."

Anthony sets up an expectation for a contrast with this opposing position in the beginning of the

first sentence quoted above: "But, whatever room there was for a doubt, under the old regime." The contrast is not between an incorrect and correct interpretation or between a harmful and beneficial state of affairs; not just any contrast would work. Anthony contrasts past and present, amplified by the phrases "prior to the war" and "old regime." The presentation is forcible, because it amplifies an indisputable truth: from a legal perspective, the antebellum and Reconstruction periods are fundamentally different times due to the ratification of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments to the Constitution. Thus the contrast highlights the manifest adequacy of the premise; it compels assent to some degree because to do otherwise would involve denying an historical fact. Addressees who do not recognize premise adequacy would be subject to criticism for their ignorance.

A third presentational strategy is repetition of the principle of settled issues, and in particular the idea that the fourteenth amendment has "settled" the questions of the past and that "[t]he only question left to be settled, now, is: Are women persons?" To complete the syllogistic form, it would have been sufficient for Anthony to begin with the statement: "Being persons, then, women are citizens, and no State has a right to make any new law, or to enforce any old law, that shall abridge their privileges or immunities." The strategies of asking whether women are persons, describing it as "[t]he only question left to be settled," and noting that she could "hardly believe any of our opponents will have the hardihood to say they are not" compel assent to some degree. The question of whether women are persons is not really an issue; the definition of citizenship is. However, Anthony is not setting up a straw man since, following this argument, she argues that one of the privileges of citizens is the elective franchise. Instead, she is creating reasons for persuasion. First, nodding to opponents helps to compel attention to her proposal even by opponents, because ignoring an argument that manifests consideration of one's own position, particularly in combination with other forcible qualities such as signs of being apparently well thought out, seems uncharacteristic of a prudent citizen with responsibly-formed commitments. Anthony's presentation of opponents does not give them much credit as she

only observes that they will not "have the hardihood" to say women are not persons, but it does offer to take them seriously rather than ridicule them or exaggerate their positions. Second, the manner of presentation manifests an opportunity for addressees to make a judgment; difficult questions have been settled by the text of the fourteenth amendment, but now addressees must settle a question. It may not be appropriate to call this a judgment since the question of whether women are persons is not really an issue here; but the apparent nod to judgment forces consideration to some degree because the argumentation to this point has manifested signs that it deserves consideration and because these qualities to some degree compel an act of judgment when such an act is called for. Again, to not act thus may, under the circumstances, subject addressees to criticism for lack of prudent citizenship.

The forces constituted by presentational devices here work not in isolation but in combination with each other and with others throughout the speech. The point is not to view them as stimuli that compel responses but as manifest rationales for persuasion submitted to autonomous agents who may choose to ignore, evade, attempt to overcome the forces. The brief analysis here has shown where forces are and offered a normative pragmatic explanation of why they may be expected to work. In doing so, I have judged that they are forcible because under the circumstances they are reasonable; the presentational devices create good reasons for adherence, and attempts to evade the forces may subject addressees to criticism for ignorance or poor citizenship.

Emotion and Presentational Force

The second apparent source of force I analyze is emotional. The points I hope to illustrate are that emotional appeals need not nor ought not to be abstracted from argumentation because they may constitute the argumentation; and that the reasonability of emotional appeals may become more apparent by considering the presentational strategies that constitute them. In the following passage, Anthony apparently appeals to anger and indignation. By making a case for why the appeal lacks force, I

hope to illustrate the close connection between emotional appeal and premise adequacy.

After arguing that the Declaration of Independence and Constitution secure rather than bestow rights, Anthony argues that state constitutions cannot disfranchise any class of citizens as follows:

For any State to make sex a qualification that must ever result in the disfranchisement of one entire half of the people, is to pass a bill of attainder, or an *ex post facto* law, and is therefore a violation of the supreme law of the land. By it, the blessings of liberty are forever withheld from women and their female posterity. To them, this government has no just powers derived from the consent of the governed. To them this government is not a democracy. It is not a republic. It is an odious aristocracy; a hateful oligarchy of sex. The most hateful aristocracy ever established on the face of the globe. An oligarchy of wealth, where the rich govern the poor; an oligarchy of learning, where the educated govern the ignorant; or even an oligarchy of race, where the Saxon rules the African, might be endured; but this oligarchy of sex, which makes rather, brothers, husband, sons, the oligarchs over the mother and sisters, the wife and daughters of every household; which ordains all men sovereigns, all women subjects, carries dissension, discord and rebellion into every home of the nation. (290)

As the first sentence indicates, part of Anthony's aim is to amplify the point that voting qualifications such as sex cannot be permanent and insurmountable. Anger and indignation are apparent.

One presentational device that Anthony employs in this emotional appeal is allusion. She alludes to the U. S. Constitution and Declaration of Independence: "the blessings of liberty" are not secured to their "posterity"; the "just powers" are not "derived from the consent of the governed." Such allusions force recognition of premise adequacy in part by making use of the language of founding documents that are indisputably fundamental principles of a republican form of government. To deny these premises would, under the circumstances, be unreasonable and subject addressees to criticism for

ignorance, particularly since this basic knowledge ought to be part of a citizen's equipment. The allusions as well as the epithets "odious" and "hateful," and the repetition of what the government is not also amplify the contrast between the nation's founding principles and aristocracy and oligarchy. Not recognizing the contrast would render one unfit to be called a citizen and not worth arguing to about this issue, so the argumentation creates compelling reason for accepting the premise.

Although there may be premise adequacy in this part of the passage, I submit that the manifest rationale that Anthony creates for applying it to her situation lacks force. The manifest rationale is created in part by parallel construction that links the "oligarchy of sex" with different kinds of oligarchies that "might be endured": oligarchies of wealth, learning, or "even" race. Anthony follows this appeal with a scene of discord that ends the parallelism and alludes to the Revolution and the rebellion that resulted from colonists being subjects, as well as to the argument that giving women the right to vote would cause discord in homes if women voted differently from the male members of their households (see also 294). The break in the parallelism manifests a purported difference between oligarchies of learning, wealth, and race and an oligarchy of sex; but is insufficient for amplifying the difference between potentially enduring and unacceptable kinds of oligarchies. If elitism and racism are presented as acceptable on some level, there is no compelling manifest rationale for not adding sexism. First, the rationale presented violates the repetitive form that amplifies the call for universal suffrage. Second, it violates syllogistic form since the premises are unacceptable given the use of contradictory premises in other parts of the speech; and since the premise that the oligarchy of sex will carry dissension, discord, and rebellion into every home is not manifestly adequate given the apparent lack of such dissension, discord, and rebellion in almost one hundred years since the start of the American Revolution. Third, it violates qualitative form because anger and indignation regarding exclusion based on permanent and insurmountable qualifications such as sex do not with propriety lead to potential endurance of exclusion based on the permanent and insurmountable qualification of race and back to

anger and indignation regarding sex. In this case presentational devices do not create compelling rationales for persuasion; on the contrary, they create reasons for rejecting the argument.

Analysis of this passage shows that the emotional appeal here is an argument. The presentational devices that constitute the emotional qualities of the argumentation are inseparable from issues related to premise adequacy. Certainly Anthony expected this argument to have some impact as she no doubt accurately gauged some level of elitism and racism in addressees. I submit that it does not to have force given the preponderance of inconsistencies with other parts of the argumentation. Again, the ideal against which presentational force is evaluated is not effectiveness but reasonability under the circumstances; and, under the circumstances constituted by the argumentation itself, this argument lacks force.

Style and Presentational Force

The last passage I analyze involves force apparently based on style. Although the previous analyses of presentational devices at work in logically and emotionally forcible argumentation may have made this clear, I hope to further highlight the inextricable link between style and argument: the style is the argument and must be taken into account when discussing force, and style may be evaluated according to a standard of reasonability under the circumstances.

Something like vivid description apparently contributes to the force of the following passage as Anthony considers the objection that "the use of the masculine pronouns *he, his, him*, in all the constitutions and laws, is proof that only men were meant to be included in their provisions" (291). One of her answers involves an appeal to harmful consequences: if male pronouns prove that only men are to be included, then women should not have to pay taxes or be charged with crimes. One of the rare instances when Anthony refers explicitly to her own cause occurs at this point.

The same with the law of May 31st, 1870, the 19th section of which I am charged with having violated; not only are all the pronouns in it masculine, but everybody knows that that particular section was intended expressly to hinder the rebels from voting. It reads: "If any person shall knowingly vote without *his* having a lawful right," &c. Precisely so with all the papers served on me--the U. S. Marshal's warrant, the bail-bond, the petition for habeas corpus, the bill of indictment--not one of them had a feminine pronoun printed in it; but, to make them applicable to me, the Clerk of Court made a little carat [*sic*] at the left of "he" and placed an "s" over it, thus making *she* out of *he*. Then the letters "is" were scratched out, the little carat under an "er" over, to make *her* out of *his*, and I insist if government officials may thus manipulate the pronouns to tax, fine, imprison and hang women, women may take the same liberty with them to secure to themselves their right to a voice in the government. (293)

Anthony does not simply say the clerk altered the pronouns of the documents, but details the minutiae of the changes. Moreover, she caps the appeal with chiasmus (A-B-B-A arrangement).

How do these presentational strategies create reasons for addressees to assent to Anthony's position--reasons created by the discourse that supplement those presented in the discourse? First, the use of detail amplifies the ease with which the laws were altered: scratching out a couple of letters, inserting a couple. This makes it difficult to deny that the gender of pronouns is either arbitrary or easy to change. Second, first-person references, the fact that such references are rare in the argument, vivid description, and chiasmus bring her to the fore as a character who may be contrasted with the clerk. The little carets inserted and the pairs of letters scratched out suggest a clerk hunched over pieces of paper; in any case, the clerk was not speaking wisdom copiously as Anthony was while delivering this speech. In contrast to the clerk and his scratchings, Anthony performs the "work . . . to prove to you that in thus voting" (280) she committed no crime, as she promised in the opening sentences of the

speech. Again, the signs of her efforts, especially in comparison to those of the clerk, create a manifest rationale for persuasion. Campbell has argued that Anthony enacts her position--that her delivery of this speech serves as evidence that she ought to have the right to vote ("Contemporary" 128). It would not seem to be characteristic of a prudent citizen to prefer the clerk's scratchings to Anthony's reasoning--to prefer the clerk's way of addressing the problem to the work Anthony performs in arguing. To prefer the clerk would be to deny or to admit ignorance of basic civic values and knowledge, both of which are particularly unreasonable under the circumstances of attending an argument regarding citizens' rights. Thus the presentation creates forcible argumentation. The chiasmus also amplifies an application of the rule of justice which, in turn, serves as the opening instance of repetitive form as Anthony describes cases where black men and ministers are exempt from paying taxes, but their widows have to pay taxes. By establishing the manifest adequacy of the premise of the rule of justice, her subsequent arguments are forcible.

CONCLUSION

Because these analyses show how presentational devices may create compelling reasons to accept a conclusion, accept a premise, and so on, they may help advance understanding of the role of presentational devices or style in argumentation. I have argued that attention to presentational devices is necessary to explain the force of argumentation, whether the force seems to derive from logic, emotion, or style. Perhaps the third passage analyzed, where Anthony features herself as a character, offers sufficient hints for how the presentation of character in argumentation may create force.¹⁰ In any case, presentational force is not "merely" presentational; it is inseparable from issues such as presumption and burden of proof and premise adequacy.

The normative pragmatic approach complements the recent attempt by pragma-dialecticians to incorporate presentational devices into their theory of argumentation. First, both perspectives

recognize that presentational devices are at least to some extent inseparable from the argumentation itself. Pragma-dialecticians have identified presentational devices, along with topic selection and adaptation to audience demand, as the rhetorical dimensions that analysts should describe for each stage of the argumentation; they are part of strategic maneuvering. The convergence of these elements constitutes a "fully fledged 'rhetorical strategy'" (van Eemeren and Houtlosser, "Discourse" 485, "Rhetorical Analysis" 299, "Rhetorical Rationales" 54) that works best when the elements do in fact converge (Houtlosser and van Eemeren 62; van Eemeren and Houtlosser, "Managing" 157; "Rhetorical Rationales" 54). It is possible to separate these elements analytically but in fact they usually work together (van Eemeren and Houtlosser, "Burden" 16).

As the analysis here has shown, the normative pragmatic approach to presentational force also recognizes the inseparability of style, content, and context. Since the manifest design of argumentation is central to the normative pragmatic perspective, the design of the argumentation is preserved in the analysis. The argumentation is not reconstructed in order to prepare it for evaluation; it is not rewritten to fit a Toulmin diagram or transformed through addition, deletion and so on. Such analytical approaches seem necessary in at least some cases of everyday conversation.¹¹ But there are cases of public argumentation, prepared in advance and stylized, that cannot be fully understood without considering elements of their presentational design.

Second, both perspectives are based on the insight that studies of argumentation must integrate descriptive and normative approaches (van Eemeren, "Study" 40; van Eemeren et al. 1-2). Pragma-dialecticians view presentational devices in terms of arguers getting their own way or effectiveness (see for example van Eemeren and Houtlosser, "Delicate" 138, 140), but they evaluate strategic maneuvering according to the pragma-dialectical rules for a critical discussion (van Eemeren and Houtlosser, "Burden" 16). The normative pragmatic perspective also describes the argumentation

as presented. Since it identifies norms created by the design elements, the description also involves an account of the normative. The perspective offers the possibility of viewing rogue elements of argumentation such as style and emotion as reasonable rather than as elements to be abstracted out of a reconstruction or simply tolerated.¹² Normative pragmatic assessment extends beyond the rules for a critical discussion since the argumentation is not reconstructed as a critical discussion.

Norms of presentational force may still seem insufficiently precise. After all, a complete inventory of presentational devices, their functions, and their degrees of force may not be possible given the range of situations in which such devices might be used. But attempts at an inventory may not be desirable. This may move us in the direction of theoretical elegance but would take us away from attention to exemplars of argumentation that serve not only as sources of theory but also as models for imitation. Continued research in this area may confirm its pedagogical value.

ENDNOTES

¹ On the "design" metaphor, see Goodwin, "Designing" 86-87.

² See for example Cicero I.ii.2 and Perelman 11.

³ Accounts of force that involve primarily an intellectual perspective include Jasinski 58, 59; and Johnson 334.

⁴ Accounts of force that involve primarily a social perspective include Gronbeck 98 and van Eemeren and Grootendorst, *Systematic* 148-50. Although the latter would describe their perspective as "normative pragmatic," I classify it as social because the rules for a critical discussion call for intersubjective agreements on logical validity or the admissibility and applicability of argumentation schemes.

⁵ Scholars who have noted that rhetoric itself involves norms other than effectiveness include Wenzel 12, 14, 24; Tindale; Goodwin, "Comments" 289; Leff, "Relation" 55; and Manolescu, "Formal."

⁶ For a discussion of "apparent" as a descriptor of argumentation, see Kauffeld, "Persuasive" 79.

⁷ He introduces this notion of form in *Counter-Statement*. For a fuller account of form in argumentation, see Manolescu, "Formal."

⁸ For rhetorical critiques of the speech with background information, see Campbell, "Seeking" 106-08 and "Contemporary" 123. For historical background, see volume 2 of Stanton, Anthony, and Gage, particularly 627-47 on Anthony; Dubois; Flexner and Fitzpatrick, chs. 10 and 12; Harper 1: 424-29, 435-36; Hoff, chs. 4 and 5; Lucie; Lutz, ch. 16; Marilley, ch. 3.

⁹ Or, following O'Keefe, I report Anthony's argument₁-making rather than her argument₁.

¹⁰ Campbell describes the passage as a case where Anthony "synthesizes the modes of proof in a particularly vivid and effective way" ("Contemporary" 128).

¹¹ The custody case in chapter 4 of van Eemeren et al., *Reconstructing*, for example, offers a good reason for reconstruction.

¹² Other calls for attention to emotion and style in argumentation include Leff, "Relation" 57 and Zulick

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