FROM THE PREAMBLE TO THE FOXHOLE

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SEARCH TOPICS

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ABSTRACT

Defense policy formulation has evolved significantly since 1940, yet these processes have a constitutional foundation.   This study described the process that the U.S. government uses to meet its security challenges.   This study examined the interdependent relationships between the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and the Army Force Management System (AFMS); it analyzed the process the Army uses to determine the forces and equipment needed to meet the civilian leadership's guidance for national security. It explored this process "From the Preamble to the Foxhole". This study chronicled how Lieutenant General Richard G. Trefry (retired) was instrumental in the development of a systematic approach to managing change across the Army in the 1980s. The histories of many independent projects are portrayed in this study which comprised this effort. Chief among these were the development of: the Army Force Management System (AFMS), the U.S. Army Force Management School (USAFMS), the Mother of All Charts (MOAC), and the role of the Inspector General of the Army.   This study demonstrated how civil-military relations are critical to defense policy determination. Lastly, it provided some future policy considerations that demonstrate the interrelationships between force management and national security policy development.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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ABBREVIATIONS

(AFMS)	Army Force Management System
(AOLCM)	Army Organizational Life Cycle Model
(AOR)	Area of Responsibility
(BES)	Budget Estimate Submission
(CGA)	Capabilities Gap Assessment
(CGSC)	The Army Command and General Staff College
(CJA)	Comprehensive Joint Assessment
(CJCS)	The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(CJCSI)	Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
(CONPLAN)	Contingency Plan
(CPA)	Chairman's Program Assessment
(CPG)	Chairman's Planning Guidance
(CPR)	Chairman's Program Recommendation
(CRA)	Chairman's Risk Assessment
(CSA)	Chief of Staff of the Army
(DIME)	Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic
(DoD)	Department of Defense
(DPG)	Defense Planning Guidance
(DSCA)	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
(FLCM)	Functional Life Cycle Model of the Army
(FM)	Field Manual
(FYDP)	Future Years Defense Plan/Program
(GCC)	Geographic Combatant Commander
(GDF)	Guidance for the Development of the Force
(GEF)	Guidance for the Employment of the Force
(IPL)	Integrated Priority List
(JCCA)	Joint Combat Capability Assessment
(JOPES)	Joint Operations Planning and Execution System

(JPD)	Joint Planning Document
(JPG)	Joint Programming Guidance
(JROC)	Joint Requirements Oversight Council
(JSCP)	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
(JSPS)	Joint Strategic Planning System
(JSR)	Joint Strategy Review
(JSRWG)	Joint Strategy Review Working Group
(JWCA)	Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment
(MOAC)	Mother of all Charts
(NCA)	National Command Authority
(NDS)	National Defense Strategy
(NMS)	National Military Strategy
(NSC)	National Security Council
(NSPD)	National Security Presidential Directive
(NSS)	National Security Strategy
(OPLAN)	Operations Plan
(PDM)	Program Decision Memorandum
(POM)	Program Objective Memorandum
(PPBES)	Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System
(QDR)	Quadrennial Defense Review
(SCG)	Security Cooperation Guidance
(SecDef)	Secretary of Defense
(SPG)	Strategic Planning Guidance
(TAA)	Total Army Analysis
(TAFMS)	The Army Force Management School
(TEP)	Theater Engagement Plan
(TOE)	Table of Organization and Equipment
(TOR)	Terms of Reference
(U.S.)	United States
(USAFMS)	United States Army Force Management School
(UCP)	Unified Command Plan

(UPL)   Unfunded Priority List

(WMD)   Weapons of Mass Destruction

Chapter One

Introduction

The end of the Cold War challenged traditional security relationships worldwide. Many historians claimed that the United States won the Cold War. However, it is not yet clear what victory will mean for the United States. Globalization has increased economic interdependence and created new forms of competition and risks. The relative power of the United States is declining. American sources of this power (diplomatic, information, military, and economic [DIME]) are increasingly threatened around the world. The United States has become emblematic of the good and bad of capitalism and a target for the disenfranchised seeking revenge. The attacks of September 11, 2001 demonstrated the depth of enmity that extremists hold towards the United States.

Military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have mobilized a diverse group of enemies against the United States. Belligerent actions have further reduced the relative diplomatic, military, and economic power of the United States. The U.S. "war on terrorism" or "war on terror" has become the "long war" and more recently "overseas contingency operations".[1] Despite these name changes, the United States

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[1]Scott Wilson and Al Kamen, "Global War on Terror is Given New Name," *Washington Post*, March 25, 2009. http://ebird.osd.mil/cgi-bin/ebird/displaydata.pl?Requested=/ebfiles/e 200903256 65616. html (accessed April 3, 2009).

has not mobilized as a nation for war.[2]   The U.S. military has been at war in Iraq and

Afghanistan for a longer sustained period than ever before in U.S. history. The

United States has mobilized for war with conscription and industrial reorganization in

the past. Conversely, the U.S. military forces fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan are

part of an all volunteer force, or professional standing army.   Additionally, the nation

has not mobilized its economic or industrial base to support the war effort.   In effect,

the government has initiated and conducted a largely unpopular war without

impacting the daily lives of the majority of its citizens. A generation of the nation's

youth has not been conscripted or sent off to war involuntarily, and factory workers

have not been retrained to produce materials required for war. The combination of

these two unprecedented events - longest sustained conflict and lack of full war

mobilization - provides an opportunity to examine a timely issue in strategic security

studies.

Coordinated government efforts, whether a comprehensive approach or a

whole-of-government approach, are required to reverse the declining power trends

and prepare the nation to overcome emerging threats.[3] While many journalists,

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[2]In accordance with Kate Turabian's *A Manual for Writers of Research Papers, Theses, and Dissertations 7th Edition*, the United States can be abbreviated U.S. when used as an adjective or spelled out(for a more formal tone), page 337. It must be spelled out when used as a noun. Example: the U.S. Army defends the United States. This convention will be used in this study.

[3]The two terms "whole of government" and "comprehensive approach" have different implications. A comprehensive approach is considered broader than a whole of government approach. George W. Bush on December 7, 2005, National Security Presidential Directive- 44 (NSPD 44) designated the Secretary of State as lead for reconstruction and stability operations and established the "whole of government" planning initiative. Available at ftp.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/index.html; (accessed 6 OCT 2009). Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations* dated 6 October 2008, page 1-5 established that a "*comprehensive approach* is an approach that integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental

scholars, and members of society at large may agree that something should be done to counter emerging global threats, what to do or how to accomplish this is less clear. Strong opinions support recommendations for change on nearly every issue. Providing "security" to national citizens becomes an essentially contested concept at nearly every level.[4]

Power within the government is intentionally diffused - making significant change very difficult without broad popular support. Both the legislative and executive branches of government share responsibility for developing national security policy. Collectively, the colossal government bureaucracy and its complex procedures for effecting change are formidable. However difficult it may be to develop a comprehensive security strategy, maintaining national security should be a principal public interest and is of grave public importance. Therefore, understanding the process used to identify and mitigate national security challenges should also be of critical interest.

This study describes and assesses the process that the U.S. government uses to meet its current security challenges. Since 1986, the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) codified how national priorities are communicated to the Department of Defense (DoD) and translated into military requirements. The JSPS is the formal

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organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal."

[4]Fierke, K. M., *Critical Approaches to International Security* (Mauldin, MA: Polity Press, 2007), 99; and, David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, Revised Edition (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1992, 1998), 3, 227. Both provide greater treatment of the contested nature of determining and providing national security.

process the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) utilizes to meet his statutory requirements for defense planning.[5]   This study concentrates on the interdependent relationships between the JSPS and the Army Force Management System (AFMS) to analyze the process the Army uses to determine the forces and equipment needed to meet security challenges.

The Army has been transforming or modernizing continually since its founding 14 June 1775.   The historiography on U.S. military history is rich with comprehensive accounts of Army battles and campaigns, technological changes in weaponry, and doctrinal advances.   Two related works by Edward Coffman are particularly noteworthy for their insights into changes in the Army; *The Old Army* and *The Regulars* detailed the evolution of the professional Army from 1784 to 1941.[6]   His analysis is augmented with reminiscences from soldiers of all ranks, and their family members, which provide valuable firsthand accounts of what life was like within the Army.   He argued that throughout the 19th century "intervals of peace took up a far greater number of years than did war."[7]   Further, the nation has relied on a small peacetime Army which has been augmented by volunteers in time of war.   He

[5]Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3100.01B, dated 12 December 2008. "The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is the primary means by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) carries out statutory responsibilities assigned in titles 6, 10, 22 and 50 of the United States Code (USC)."A-1, http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3100_01.pdf (accessed February 15, 2009).

[6]Edward M. Coffman, *The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784-1898* (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); and, Edward M. Coffman, *The Regulars: The American Army 1898-1941* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004).

[7]Edward M. Coffman, *The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784-1898* (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), vii.

described the first half of the century as "the days of small things - less money, fewer people, more inconveniences, and downright hardship."[8] He traced the beginnings of the professional Army to the founding of West Point in 1802. West Point provided technical engineering training that facilitated civil works projects, mapping and exploration, artillery employment, and the construction, attack, and defense of fortifications.[9] In the War of 1812, the nation again relied on volunteers lead by Winfield Scott against the British in Niagara and Andrew Jackson in New Orleans.[10] Subsequent generations of soldiers defended frontier outposts as the nation expanded west in pursuit of Manifest Destiny. In 1846, volunteers under Winfield Scott successfully executed a complex expeditionary campaign into Mexico.[11] The Civil War, during the 1860s, marked a dramatic shift in military capabilities and tactics. On both sides of the conflict mobilization efforts - and the Army size - far exceeded previous levels.   Railroads made possible the rapid movement of supplies and troops across previously unimaginable distances. The lethality of weapons also increased – which led to new tactics. Together these changes required unprecedented

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[8]Edward M. Coffman, *The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784-1898* (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), vi.

[9]Edward M. Coffman, *The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784-1898* (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 11; Also, West Point was the only engineering school in the nation until 1824. Available from: http://www.usma.edu/bicentennial /history/history_impact.asp; (accessed 18 February 2010).

[10]See also: Harry Cole, *The War of 1812* (Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 1965); Donald Hickey, *The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict* (Champaign, Illinois: The University of Illinois Press, 1990), 86, 203; and, Robert Remini, *The Battle of New Orleans: Andrew Jackson and America's First Military Victory* (New York, New York: Penguin Books, 1999), 111, 116.

[11]See also John S.D. Eisenhower, *So Far From God: The U.S. War with Mexico1846-1848* (New York, New York: Random House Publishing, 1989 and 2000), 216.

management efforts.[12]   During the period of reconstruction following the war the

Army returned to pre-conflict strength levels.   In 1898, the Army again relied on

volunteers to fight in Cuba and the Philippines in the Spanish-American War.[13]   In

1917, when the United States declared War with Germany, advances in artillery and

machine guns increased lethality on the battlefield. The Army Pershing led across

Europe did not remotely resemble the militiamen Washington led against the

British.[14]

Walter Kretchik in his 2001 dissertation entitled, *Peering Through the Mist:*

Doctrine as a Guide for U.S. Army Operations, 1775-2000, also provided a detailed

review of Army doctrinal changes since the founding of the Continental Army. His

work documented the changes in technology, societal values, and the external

environment that influenced change in the Army throughout 19th and 20th Centuries.

Collectively, these factors influenced the development of Army doctrine. He argued

that American culture evolved from a diverse society that differed greatly from the

European origins of its members. Their experiences in America shaped their beliefs

that had lasting impact upon the limitations on the Army in the Constitution. British

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[12]In 1801, the Army Strength was no more than 2579. By 1865 more than a million soldiers were in the Union Army alone. By 1875, strength again was reduced to 25,000. Edward M. Coffman, *The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784-1898* (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 12, 215.

[13]Edward M. Coffman, *The Regulars: The American Army 1898-1941* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 26. "The Old Army was gone...The Spanish-American War had destroyed forever the quiet home life and projected us into the role of a world power which has developed into the tragic responsibilities with which we are laden today."

[14]Edward M. Coffman, *The Regulars: The American Army 1898-1941* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 2, 142. Coffman devotes a chapter to the changes in the early 20th century promoted by Elihu Root, Arthur Conger, and Douglas MacArthur.

soldiers' harsh treatment of the colonials left a lasting distrust of large standing armies.[15] His analysis of the roles of the Army in the 19th Century American society corresponds with Coffman's earlier analysis. However, Kretchik placed a much greater emphasis on the role of culture in determining doctrine. After defining the doctrine and its evolution, he then analyzed the appropriateness of the doctrine to the major Army operations' success.

Despite the volumes of work that chronicle these changes - technological changes in weaponry, doctrinal advances, and force structure- little documentation exists to explain the comprehensive management of change within the Army. This study reveals how in the 1970s and 1980s the Army developed a system to manage change. It includes an examination of the contemporary management philosophies that influenced organizational behavior in force management and defense strategic planning. While the topics of management and defense planning are larger than can be addressed in one study, this study provides a basis for further analysis of national security objectives, policies, and issues.

As part of the analysis of the AFMS, this study details the events that led to the creation of the U.S. Army Force Management School (USAFMS) at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Force management is the capstone process to establish and field mission-ready Army organizations. The School was established as the Army's central educational institution for preparing senior analysts and leaders for assignment in the

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[15]Walter Kretchik, *Peering Through the Mist: Doctrine as a Guide for U.S. Army Operations, 1775-2000* (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas, 2001), 22, 35. Available through ProQuest, UMI, Ann Arbor, Michigan, UMI Number 3018507.

force management community worldwide.   USAFMS trains the specialists that manage the Army bureaucracy to provide the resources needed to meet our national threats. Many defense department primers and reference books describe these detailed processes. One of the most comprehensive is *How the Army Runs: a Senior Leader Reference Book*, written by the USAFMS.[16]   Lieutenant General (retired) Richard G. Trefry is the Program Manager of this school.

Trefry also developed a series of charts somewhat whimsically entitled "The Mother of All Charts" (MOAC) that traces several Army force management themes since 1940. These charts consolidate a diverse collection of information that provides insight into Army force management. Collectively, these charts reveal trends and some of the unintended consequences of defense policy changes. The MOAC currently contains twenty seven themes and numbers over 100 separate charts. Strategic leaders, both military and civilian, utilize this robust display for reference during conferences and planning sessions. Together, these charts represent an impressive amount of information. These charts are supported by a database that has been digitized and contains a wealth of documents relating to Army force management since 1940. This study also provides the first documentation of the development of these charts and the creation of the USAFMS. Together, these histories provide a starting point to examine the rationale behind the broader topics of Army force management and formulation of national security policy.

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[16]*How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Handbook* (Government Printing Office, 2007): Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, U.S. Army War College, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/dclm/Htar2007.html; (accessed February 17, 2009).

Analysts must understand the JSPS and AFMS before they consider the impacts of current military operations on equipment, personnel, organizations, and strategy. This study examines the civil–military relations that are embedded in both of these systems. Civilian policy decisions, and the resources available to implement them, have serious implications for future U.S. national security. While there is an impressive body of literature concerning future threats and likely challenges for U.S. national security, the interrelationships between force management and the JSPS provides a new heuristic for examining the implications of current military operations upon national security policy.

Chapter Two explicates the JSPS. Chapter Three builds on this understanding and examines the AFMS. This examination of the AFMS documents the development of the Army Organizational Life Cycle Model (AOLCM), or functional life cycle model (FLCM) of the Army during the 1970s and 1980s. This examination considers some of the broader influences of change during this period: the global security environment, Army equipment, Army doctrine, and management theories. Chapter Four describes the establishment of the US Army Force Management School (USAFMS) and the development of the Mother of All Charts (MOAC). Chapter Five considers civil-military relations as they relate to the JSPS and the AFMS. Chapter Six considers the implications of current military operations on future national security policy.

Relevance of Study

Collectively this study offers a current perspective on the following contributors to the nation's security. These areas - or categories - are interrelated, not discrete. They provide a background for focused analysis and further consideration. They are: 1) JSPS, 2) AFMS, 3) MOAC, 4) Management theory, and 5) Contemporary security studies.

1. *The Joint Strategic Planning System* (JSPS): Formulation of foreign policy and presidential decision-making has been analyzed in a variety of secondary sources. Initial review does not reveal any efforts to describe the combination of policy development and force structure developments. Policy analysts can benefit from knowledge of the process of how and why the Army is organized and equipped. An increased reliance on National Guard and Reserve soldiers for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has increased the percent of the population that personally knows a soldier who has deployed in support of combat operations overseas. During the 2008 presidential election, this increased personal awareness of the employment of military members attracted interest in why the Army is organized as it is, and how it should be changed to conduct combat operations in the Middle East.[17] The threat of terrorism has also raised public concern over national security and homeland defense. This increased public interest in security begs the question of how our leaders determine what force structure is required to meet our security challenges. Operations in Iraq

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[17]Nancy Youssef, "McCain, Obama differ on military's role -- but not its structure," *Sacramento Bee*, October 23, 2008. Available from http://www.sacbee.com/racefor08/ story/1335956 html; (accessed 3 October 2009).

and Afghanistan have further increased interest in how the Army works at the strategic level. Many recent policy decisions to deploy soldiers, extend rotations, and increase force structure have been scrutinized by the press and Congress.[18] Civil-military relations are at the heart of the JSPS and force management. Current interest in these issues of national security warrants thorough examination of these planning processes.

2. *Army Force Management System* (AFMS): Only a select group of specialists really understand this process. Historically, the Army has continuously changed, yet the current process used to manage change is a fairly modern development that is still evolving. Defense management can be traced back through time to various defense initiatives, but there is little available explanation of the current process and system. This study contributes to the existing literature that is largely addressed to discrete communities of practice within the DoD. Additionally, this study increases visibility and awareness of strategic defense management issues.

3. *The Mother of All Charts* (MOAC): This study may become the seminal study for further research on the current twenty-seven different chart themes. It may promote new research based on increased awareness of the charts. Current source material for the MOAC is located at USAFMS Archives at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The depth and scope of these archives is undetermined because they have not yet been completely cataloged. Further organization and cataloging of the Fort Belvoir archives may

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[18]Numerous articles appeared between 2004 and 2009 as unit rotations were adjusted to meet operational requirements in Afghanistan and Iraq. An Associated Press example from April 15, 2004 entitled, "20,000 troops see Iraq duty extended 90 days- Move breaks earlier pledge to soldiers of one-year tour." Available from http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4739978; (accessed 3 October 2009).

reveal information that will result in new themes being developed or modifications to the existing charts. Other related archives may similarly lead to modifying these charts. This study provides a history of the USAFMS, the MOAC, and the functional Life cycle model of the Army.

4. *Management theory:* The DoD is one of the largest bureaucracies in the world. Management practices within DoD may be applicable to other bureaucracies. Many effective organizations manage change and deal with resource constraints. This study provides insights that may encourage additional research within this broad domain.

5. *Contemporary security studies*: Academics have become increasingly interested in understanding contemporary strategic issues and their implications for U.S. national security. Scholars of national security and international relations can benefit greatly from understanding the interrelationships and implications that current operations, management systems, and processes have in determining defense policy and military readiness. Although, current events are extensively covered by journalists, there is little evidence of their understanding of the interrelationships between policy formulation and force management. While journalists and scholars serve many roles and purposes, there are innumerable consequences to explore with regard to each national security policy decision. This study serves as a starting point for better understanding of such issues. Greater public awareness of these issues can strengthen the national will to maintain a military that is appropriately structured to meet the challenges set forth in our national security policy.

Chapter Two

The Joint Strategic Planning System

> I do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God.
>
> - Oath of Enlistment, United States Army[19]

This Oath of Enlistment in the U.S. Army represents the long standing commitment of every U.S. Soldier to support and defend the Constitution. The Army in this sense exists to support and defend the Constitution. The framers of the Constitution designated the government's mission in the Preamble to "provide for the common defense."[20] In order to meet this requirement, Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power "to raise and support Armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for more than two years."[21] It provided the Congress the authority to raise and support the Army in order to provide for the

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[19]United States Code, Title 10, Oath of Enlistment; Act of 5 May 1960 replacing the wording first adopted in 1789, with amendment effective 5 October 1962). Available from http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/faq/oaths.html, (accessed 10 December 2007).

[20]United States Constitution, Preamble. "We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

[21]United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8, paragraph (12).

common defense, but limited their authority over a given incident to a two year period. Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution established a balancing role for the Executive Branch in providing for the common defense: "The President shall be the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States."[22] This further subordinated all military officers to the President and purposefully established civilian control of the military. The Constitution is very specific in these respects, yet it does not provide much further guidance on how to provide for the common defense. This raises a critical question: How do the President and the Congress lead the DoD to provide for the common defense? Through what process do they analyze the international environment and determine national objectives, identify threats, and formulate policy? How is the Army designed to support national strategy and defend the Constitution from all enemies, foreign and domestic?

This chapter explores these questions by identifying the key actors and analyzing their responsibilities to meet the Constitutional requirements to provide for the common defense. The Constitution, amplified by United States Code, provides the legal basis for this analysis. Starting with a review of established law, this analysis examines the roles of the President and Congress, the DoD, and then the Armed Services to provide national security. This analysis of the bureaucratic system

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[22]United States Constitution, Article II, Section 2, (1). Section 2. (1) the President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States;

in use in 2009 begins with the National Security Act of 1947.[23]   It describes the

bureaucracy that interprets the strategic guidance and executes the policy decisions to

ensure that the DoD is prepared to accomplish all assigned missions. This chapter

provides the background necessary to appreciate the relationships between the Army

Force Management System (AFMS) and the Joints Strategic Planning System (JSPS).

While it is obvious that the Constitution established the President as the Commander

in Chief, the ways and means to provide for the national defense are intentionally

diffused throughout the government.

U.S. Code specifies the authorities and responsibilities within the DoD to

provide for the common defense. Within the Army, U.S. Code provides the legal

basis for the establishment of the Army, the Army Staff, the Chief of Staff of the

Army (CSA), and the Secretary of the Army.[24] While the National Security Act of

1947 established the Department of Defense, Titles 10 and 32 of U.S. Code were not

established until 1956 when sufficient expertise enabled their transcription from

approved legislation. Further, the 1947 Act establishes the responsibilities and

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[23]National Security Act of 1947 available from: http://www.archives.gov/legislative/finding-aids/reference/senate/armed-services/1947-1954.html; (accessed 20 February 2010); More that 50 changes have occurred to this system based on leadership changes. See Current system based on CJCSI 3100.01B, Dated 12 December 2008 - Joint Strategic Planning System (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), Available from http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit /3100_01.pdf; (accessed 8 November 2009).

[24]United States Code, Title 10, Sections 3062, 3032 and 3013. Section 3062. (a) It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable…; Section 3032. The Army Staff: general duties: (a) The Army Staff shall furnish professional assistance to the Secretary, the Under Secretary, and the Assistant Secretaries of the Army and to the Chief of Staff of the Army. Section 3013. Secretary of the Army (a), Available from http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/ uscode10/usc_sec _10_00003013----000-.html; (accessed 10 December 2007).

qualifications for the Secretary and CSA.[25] Specifically, it requires the Secretary of

the Army to be a civilian who has not held a commission in any of the Armed Forces

within the past five years. This requirement supports the importance of civilian

control of the military.[26] The Secretary is responsible for all of the functions essential

to raise and maintain an Army: recruiting; organizing; supplying; equipping; training;

servicing; mobilizing; demobilizing; administering; maintaining; and, the

construction, maintenance and repair of equipment, buildings, and real property.[27]

The Service Secretaries serve under the authority of the Secretary of Defense.

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[25] "As expertise became available from various executive departments, other titles were enacted including titles 14 (1949), 35 (1952), 13 (1954), 10 & 32 (1956), 23 (1958), 38 (1958), 39 (1960& 1970), 37 (1962), 5 (1966), 44 (1968), 17 (1976 rev.), 11 (1978), 49 Subtitle IV (1978), 31(1982), 49 Subtitle I (1983), 46 (1983 in part, also 1986 & 1988), and 49 Subtitles II, III, V-X (1994)." Richard J. McKinney, *United States Code: Historical Outline and Explanatory Notes.* Available from: http://www.llsdc.org/attachments/wysiwyg/544/us-code-outline.pdf; (accessed 26 February 2010), 2.

[26] United States Code, Title 10, Section 3013. Secretary of the Army (a) (1) there is a Secretary of the Army, appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Secretary is the head of the Department of the Army. (2) A person may not be appointed as Secretary of the Army within five years after relief from active duty as a commissioned officer of a regular component of an armed force. Available from http: //www. law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/ uscode10/usc_sec _10_00003013----000-.html;(accessed 10 December 2007).

[27] United States Code, Title 10, Section 3013. Secretary of the Army (a) (2) (b) Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and subject to the provisions of chapter 6 of this title, the Secretary of the Army is responsible for, and has the authority necessary to conduct, all affairs of the Department of the Army, including the following functions: (1) Recruiting. (2) Organizing. (3) Supplying. (4) Equipping (including research and development). (5) Training. (6) Servicing. (7) Mobilizing. (8) Demobilizing. (9) Administering (including the morale and welfare of personnel). (10) Maintaining. (11) The construction, outfitting, and repair of military equipment. (12) The construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings, structures, and utilities and the acquisition of real property and interests in real property necessary to carry out the responsibilities specified in this section. Available from http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/ uscode10/usc_sec _10_00003013----000-.html; (accessed 10 December 2007).

Additionally, U.S. Code establishes the National Guard as a force that can be called

to active duty for as long as it is needed.[28]

The National Military Establishment has evolved considerably since its

creation in 1947. An ample body of literature documents the history of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense. In short, the scale and complexity of

operations in World War II demonstrated the need for change within the military

establishment that can be traced back to the ARCADIA Conference of 1941.   The

American senior military staff structure did not provide a single Service point of

contact to coordinate war efforts with the British. The Combined Chiefs of Staff was

established with an equal number of British and U.S. Service Chiefs.[29] By 1942,

"The U.S. representatives became known as the Joint Chiefs of Staff and absorbed the

duties of the Joint Board."[30] In 1943, the Casablanca Conference demonstrated the

inadequacy of the American supporting staff when compared to the more mature

British staff system. Sweeping reforms provided a dedicated staff to support

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[28]United States Code, Title 32, Section 102. General Policy, In accordance with the traditional military policy of the United States, it is essential that the strength and organization of the   Army National Guard and the Air National Guard as an integral part of the first line defenses of the United States be maintained and assured at all times. Whenever Congress determines that more units and organizations are needed for the national security than are in the regular components of the ground and air forces, the Army National Guard of the United States and the Air National Guard of the United States, or such parts of them as are needed, together with such units of other reserve components as are necessary for a balanced force, shall be ordered to active Federal duty and retained as long as so needed. Available from: http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com /scripts/ts_search.pl?title =32&sec= 102 ; (accessed 10 December 2007).

[29]Michael McAleer, Historical Division, Joint Secretariat Joint Chiefs of Staff, The *Organizational Development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1942-1989*, (Washington, D.C.: Joint Historical Office, 1989), 3.

[30]Ibid., 3.

American war planning by the Chiefs. By the end of the war compartmentalized

planning systems evolved that facilitated victory in Europe and the Pacific. However,

these systems needed to be examined and codified to ensure future defense readiness.

Several Army, Navy, and Congressional committees were established to analyze the

military establishment and make reform recommendations. The National Security

Act of 1947 is the result of these efforts.[31] Several more detailed official histories

have been produced by the Joint History Office within the Office of the Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), as well as by other authors, that detail the evolution

of the DoD and the Chairman's role. Three books are worth mentioning: *The*

Organizational Development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1942-1989, published in

1989; *The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,* published in 1995; and Richard

Meinhart's, *Strategic Planning by the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1990-2005.*[32]

Together they provide the required historical context to appreciate the numerous

changes in the role of the JCS which manifests itself in the JSPS- the system the

chairman uses to meet his statutory responsibilities.

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[31]Ibid., 11. See also: James Schnabel, History *of The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, 1986); Willard J Webb and Ronald Cole, *The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,* (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, 1995); and Richard Meinhart, *Strategic Planning by the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1990-2005,* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005).

[32]Michael McAleer, Historical Division, Joint Secretariat Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The Organizational Development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1942-1989*, (Washington, D.C.: Joint Historical Office, 1989); Ronald Cole, et al, Willard J Webb and Ronald Cole, *The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,* (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, 1995); Richard Meinhart, *Strategic Planning by the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1990-2005,* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005);   and Richard Meinhart, *Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff's Leadership Using the Joint Strategic Planning System in the 1990s: Recommendations for Strategic Leaders,* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003).

The President and Congress

The Founding Fathers established a constitutional balance of power between the Executive and Legislative Branches. The President and Congress use a variety of means to determine our national interests, or objectives, and to identify their corresponding threats. The two branches share leadership of the Department of Defense to provide for the common defense. Congress relies on a variety of committees to provide leadership and oversight on defense issues.[33] Congress further shapes national defense through their Constitutional authority to approve appropriations and confirm the appointment of Officers and Ambassadors of the United States.

However, the President develops a strategy to prioritize allocation of resources and to achieve these objectives within an acceptable level of risk. He has significant latitude in determining how to develop and execute foreign policy. Congress established The National Security Council (NSC) in the Executive Office of the President through the passage of the National Security Act of 1947.[34] The President relies on the NSC to provide security recommendations, to develop a

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[33]The Senate and House Armed Services, Intelligence and Appropriations committees, among others, keep the Congress aware of the threats and interests and provide an opportunity to prioritize defense resources. Control of appropriations is an obvious means to influence defense posture. Power to confirm appointments of officers, and ratify treaties extends form Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution.

[34]National Security Act of 1947, Act of July 26, 1947 (As Amended). The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security. Available from http://www. Intelligence.gov/0-natsecact_1947.shtml#s101; (accessed 10 December 2007).

coordinated strategy, and to assist him in executing this strategy. The NSC is

composed of: (1) the President; (2) the Vice President; (3) the Secretary of State; (4)

the Secretary of Defense; (5) the Director for Mutual Security; (6) the Chairman of

the National Security Resources Board; and (7) the Secretaries and Under Secretaries

of other executive departments and the military departments, the Chairman of the

Munitions Board, and the Chairman of the Research and Development Board. These

NSC members are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the

Senate, to serve at his pleasure.[35]   John Prados in his book, *The Keepers of the Keys,*

examined the President's and their National Security Advisors from Truman to

Bush.[36] The composition of the NSC establishes a basis for civil-military relations

that will be examined further in Chapter Five.

The President can further organize his cabinet to accomplish his agenda. The

President issues Presidential Directives to establish the structure and authorities

needed to enact his priorities.[37] President George W. Bush established his National

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[35] National Security Act of 1947, Act of July 26, 1947 (As Amended). The positions of Director for Mutual Security, Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, Chairman of the Munitions Board, and Chairman of the Research and Development Board have been abolished by various Reorganization Plans. The statutory members of the National Security Council are the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense. Available from http://www. Intelligence.gov/0-natsecact_1947.shtml#s101; (accessed 10 December 2007).

[36] John Prados, *The Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush* (New York, NY: William Morrow and Company, 1991).

[37] George Caldwell, "Presidential Directives and Where to Find Them," Library of Congress Researchers, News and current periodical reading room, serial and government publications division. Contains a detailed listing of books and primary source locations for Presidential directives. They have been given different names by different Presidential administrations: 1) National Security Action Memoranda (NSAMs) - Kennedy & Johnson; 2) National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs) - Nixon and Ford; 3) Presidential Directives (PDs) – Carter; 4) National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs) – Reagan; 5) National Security Directives (NSDs) – Bush; 6) Presidential Decision

Security Presidential Directives (NSPD) to enact his priorities.[38] National Security

Presidential Directive-1 (NSPD-1) established the Bush administration's cabinet

organization for national security. President Barrack Obama similarly proclaimed his

cabinet organization for security in Presidential Policy Directive-1 (PPD-1), on 13

February 2009.[39] Later that month, he issued a Presidential Study Directive to

review ways the White House organization can "strengthen the government's ability

to craft and implement sound policies designed to keep our country secure and our

citizens safe."[40] Presidents disseminate their national security policy through the

National Security Strategy (NSS). The current NSS was distributed in March 2006.

It specifies broad goals that are the declared national objectives. These objectives

provide a general direction for other government departments and agencies. For

example, the 2006 NSS contained two key pillars: the first, to promote freedom,

justice, and human dignity; the second, to confront the challenges of our time by

leading a growing community of democracies. However, achieving these goals is

acknowledged as the work of generations.   These objectives reflect a broad vision to

facilitate a myriad of subordinate activities working toward the common goal of

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Directives (PDDs) – Clinton; and, 7) National Security Presidential Directives (NSPDs) - GW Bush.
Available from h ttp://www.loc.gov/rr/news/directives.html; (accessed 3 October 2009).

[38]George W. Bush, National Security Presidential Directive-1 (NSPD-1), the White House,
Washington, D.C., 13 February 2001. Michael Donley, "Rethinking the Interagency System" March
2005; available from http://www.hicksandassociates.com/reports/HAI-occasional-paper.pdf; (accessed
21 January 2007).

[39] Barrack Obama, Presidential Policy Directive-1, Available from http://www.fas.org/irp/off
docs /ppd/ppd-1.pdf; (accessed 3 October 2009).

[40]Ibid.

promoting freedom and leading a growing community of democracies. The Obama

Administration is expected to publish a new National Security Strategy in 2010.

Presidents further define the role of the Armed Forces in providing for the

common defense by establishing the Unified Command Plan (UCP). This document

sets forth basic guidance to all Combatant Commanders. *The History of the Unified*

Command Plan 1946-1993, detailed the evolution of this command structure and

provided significant historical context to each of the changes that have occurred to

this document since World War II. The official history of the UCP, maintained by

the Joint History Office, itemized the UCP changes since its creation in 1946 as an

organizational directive known as the "Outline Command Plan."[41] The UCP provides

the President's senior command arrangements for management on a global basis; "Its

structure and the organizational philosophies that it represents have had a major

impact on U.S. military operations in the post World War II era. Thus, the history of

the UCP is a useful guide for those involved in the development of policy as well as

an important reference of strategy and policy of the Cold War."[42]   The National

Security Act of 1947 established Combatant Commands.[43] Combatant Commands

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[41]Ronald Cole, Walter Poole, James Schnabel, Robert Watson, and Willard Webb, *The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1993*, Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, 1995), 11.

[42]Ibid., 1.

[43]National Security Act of 1947, Act of July 26, 1947 (As Amended). An Act to promote the national security by providing for a Secretary of Defense; for a National Military Establishment; for a Department of the Army, a Department of the Navy, and a Department of the Air Force; and for the coordination of the activities of the National Military Establishment with other departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security. Available from http://www. globalsecurity. org/military/agency/dod/unified-com.htm; (accessed 10 December 2007).

are military commands with broad, continuing missions assigned to forces from two

or more military departments.   In brief, the Combatant Commanders are responsible

for coordinating all military activities within a specific part of the world. These areas

are designated areas of responsibility (AOR). There are currently six geographical

combatant commands.[44] The UCP establishes combatant command missions,

responsibilities, and force structure; further, it delineates areas of responsibility for

Geographic and Functional Combatant Commanders. Title 10 of the U.S. Code

requires the CJCS to review the UCP every two years and recommend changes to the

President, as appropriate.[45] As the name implies, functional combatant commands

focus on a function rather than a geographic area. United States Transportation

Command (TRANSCOM) is a functional command that commands all strategic level

transportation assets across all services. The UCP outlines the distinction between

geographic responsibilities and the functional Service responsibilities. These two

concepts are associated with the centralized management of the DoD at the expense

of Service independence. Operations in World War II identified the need for joint

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[44]The Five Combatant Commands are EUCOM, PACOM, CENTCOM, NORTHCOM, and SOUTHCOM. Available from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/unified-com.htm; Internet; accessed 10 December 2007. On October 1, 2007, U.S. Africa Command was established as a sub-unified command, subordinate to U.S. European Command. As a sub-unified command, U.S. Africa Command continues to report to European Command. President Bush has authorized and directed the establishment of AFRICOM as a separate unified Africa Command no later than the end of Fiscal Year 2008, which ends September 30, 2008. Available from http://www.africom.mil/About AFRICOM.asp; (accessed 10 December 2007). On OCT 1, 2008 AFRICOM became the sixth Geographic Combatant Command. Available from http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx ?releaseid=12408; (accessed 3 October 2009).

[45]United States Code, Title 32, Section 161. Responsibilities of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Available from: http://www.house.gov/hasc/comdocs/reports/Title10UnitedStatesCode.pdf; (accessed 10 December 2007).

cooperation; however, strong resistance still remains to infringements of Service autonomy.[46]

The President also provides leadership in national security by submitting his budget recommendations to the Congress. Defense funding provides the means for the President and Congress to decide how much money to spend, what to spend it on, and how to raise the money they have decided to spend. The President relies on the Office of Management and Budget to assist him in preparing the Budget. The Congress similarly relies on the Congressional Budget Office.[47] The separation of powers between the two branches of government warrants maintaining both agencies with a common function. Simultaneous efforts in each budget office often complicate sharing of information and often lead to disparities in interpretation of the data as well as the data itself.[48] Meeting our national security objectives requires allocation of resources within the government as well as within the private sector. Many budget decisions affect foreign aid and have global implications. Budgetary decisions directly determine the strength of the nation and affect its ability to provide for the common defense.

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[46]Ronald Cole, Walter Poole, James Schnabel, Robert Watson, and Willard Webb, *The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1993*, Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, 1995), 2.

[47]Office of Management and Budget: Budget System and Concepts. Available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/pdf/concepts.pdf; (accessed 9 December 2005).

[48] Ezra Klien, "The Congressional Budget Office VS. The White House," *The Washington Post*, July 25, 2009. "As a former CBO director, I can attest that CBO is sometimes accused of a bias toward exaggerating costs and underestimating savings." Peter Orszag, the former director of the Congressional Budget Office and the current director of the Office of Management and Budget, Available from http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2009/07/the_congressional _budget_ offic_2.html; (accessed 3 October 2009).

The Secretary of Defense

The National Security Act of 1947 also established the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) as a member of the President's Cabinet.[49] Again, Congress has codified the duties and responsibilities of this office in Title 10 of U.S. Code.[50] Title 10 empowers the SecDef to maintain efficient administration of the DoD. It directs the Secretary to provide a variety of reports to Congressional oversight committees for intelligence, budget, and the Armed Services. The SecDef is a member of the NSC and the senior member of the DoD. He provides strategic direction through a variety of means, one of which is the National Defense Strategy (NDS).   This strategy seeks to create the conditions to support the President's National Security Strategy (NSS). It establishes DoD's strategic objectives to support the President's strategy. The NDS identifies anticipated challenges to the nation and provides a means to address these challenges. The first NDS, issued by Secretary Rumsfeld in March 2005, contained the following objectives: 1) secure the United States from direct attack; 2) secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action; 3) strengthen alliances and

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[49]National Security Act of 1947, Act of July 26, 1947 (As Amended). AN ACT To promote the national security by providing for a Secretary of Defense; for a National Military Establishment; for a Department of the Army, a Department of the Navy, and a Department of the Air Force; and for the coordination of the activities of the National Military Establishment with other departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security. Available from http://www. Intelligence gov/0-natsecact_1947.shtml#s101; (accessed 10 December 2007).

[50]United States Code, Title 10, Sections, 113, and 131. Office of the Secretary of Defense (a) There is in the Department of Defense an Office of the Secretary of Defense. The function of the Office is to assist the Secretary of Defense in carrying out his duties and responsibilities and to carry out such other duties as may be prescribed by law. Available from: http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com; (accessed 10 December 2007).

partnerships; and 4) establish favorable security conditions.[51]   The latest NDS was

issued by Secretary of Defense Gates in June 2008. Similarly, it contained the

following five objectives: 1) defend the homeland; 2) win the long war; 3) promote

security; 4) deter conflict; and, 5) win our nation's wars.[52]

The SecDef provides more specific classified guidance in the Strategic

Planning Guidance (SPG). This single fiscally informed document replaced the

policy/strategy sections of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) in 2003. The draft

is issued early in the planning process to provide overall guidance for policy and

strategy development and their associated supporting defense programs. The SPG

provides the DoD components with direction on defense policy, strategy, force and

resource planning, and related fiscal matters.[53]   The President issues fiscal policy

guidance to the DoD, then the Secretary must manage DoD in compliance with this

guidance. The Joint Programming Guidance (JPG) complements the SPG by

providing final programmatic guidance and performance measures for planning. The

JPG is usually issued in even-numbered years. Together, the SPG and the JPG have

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[51]Donald Rumsfeld, *National Defense Strategy 2005*. Available from http://www. defenselink.Mil/news/ Apr2005 /d20050408strategy.pdf; (accessed 11 December 2007).

[52]Robert M. Gates, *National Defense Strategy, June 2008*, 6. Available from http://www. defenselink.mil/news/2008%20National%20Defense%20Strategy.pdf; (accessed 3October 2009).

[53]Strategic Planning Guidance unclassified description available from http://www.defenselink .mil/ comptroller/icenter/budget/planningphase.Html; (accessed 11 December 2007).

replaced the DPG for use in developing DoD components' Program Objective

Memorandums (POMs) and Budget Estimate Submissions (BESs).[54]

In June 2008, Secretary Gates further modified the strategic planning

guidance with release of a new document called Guidance for Employment of the

Force (GEF). This classified document consolidated the Contingency Planning

Guidance (CPG), Global Force Management (GFM), and Security Cooperation

Guidance (SCG) into one document to facilitate near-term planning. Through this

consolidated document, the SecDef sought to simplify guidance to the combatant

commands for establishing priorities for contingencies and steady- state planning. [55]

There is a conceptual link between the contingencies that a combatant commander

may have to execute and the security cooperation engagement plans that he executes

to build partner capacity, establish habitual relationships, mitigate risks, and

potentially prevent the need for armed confrontations. So, consolidating the guidance

for each region may reduce contradictions and could be considered appropriate. The

GEF and the Chairman's Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) will become the two

primary planning documents for the combatant commands. [56] Brigadier General Gary

Patton testified on their utility before the House Armed Services Committee: "The

GEF and JSCP inform the Department of Defense how to employ, and in part

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[54]Joint Programming Guidance description available from http://www.defenselink.mil /comptroller/icenter/budget/ planning phase.html; (accessed 11 December 2007).

[55]Inside The Pentagon, May 15, 2008 available from http://www.military-quotes.com/forum/ gates-signs-planning-documents-guide-t62194.html; (accessed 3 October 2009).

[56]Tim Hoffman, Joint Staff J-7 Planning Document, April 14, 2009. 48. Also available from http://www.Dtic.mil/ doctrine/training/wjtsc07_2feg_brief.ppt#1; (accessed 3 October 2009).

manage, the force in the near term (2008-2010). The GEF provides strategic planning guidance and identifies security cooperation focus areas for campaign planning."[57]

Secretary Gates also consolidated budget and programming guidance in June 2008 in his new document, Guidance for Development of the Force (GDF). The GDF replaced documents previously issued every two years- such as the SPG, the Transformation Planning Guidance, the Global Posture Guidance, the Science and Technology Strategic Guidance, the Joint Concepts and Experimentation Guidance, and the Analytic Agenda Guidance. The GDF, similar to the previously mentioned SPG, projects a 20-year view of the security environment to inform the Pentagon's development of relevant capabilities. This classified document is distributed internally within DoD. However, unclassified references to it confirm that it provides greater attention on joint capabilities than the preceding documents' service-centric program solutions.[58]

The SecDef also provides guidance in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). This document builds upon the guidance provided in the NDS and meets the Congressional requirement mandated in Title 10 of U.S. Code. In broad terms, the QDR assists the Congress in shaping the DoD to provide for the common defense. Specifically, by statute, the QDR's purpose is to specify: sufficient force structure;

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[57]BG Gary S. Patton USA, Director, Manpower and Personnel, Testimony before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on Foreign Language and Cultural Awareness Transformation on September 2008. Available from http://ww w.dod.mil/dodgc/ olc/docs/testPatton080910.pdf; (accessed 4 October 2009).

[58]Inside The Pentagon, May 15, 2008 available from http://www.military-quotes.com/forum/ gates-signs-planning-documents-guide-t62194.html; (accessed 3 OCT 09).

force modernization plans; DoD infrastructure; budget plans; and, other elements of the nation's defense program associated with the NDS that would be required to successfully execute the full range of missions called for in that NDS at a low-to-moderate level of risk.[59] The 2006 QDR provided four specific priorities: 1) defeating terrorist networks; 2) defending the homeland in depth; 3) shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads; and, 4) preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Terms of Reference (TOR) were announced in April 2009. The TOR identified the following key security trends and associated challenges: 1) violent extremist movements; 2) spread of weapons of mass destruction; 3) rising powers with sophisticated weapons; 4) failed or failing states; and 5) increasing encroachment across the global commons (air, sea, space, and cyberspace). Additionally, national security is affected by issues associated with climate change, cultural and demographic shifts, increasing scarcity of resources, and the spread of destabilizing technologies. Noting these trends, the following areas of emphasis were identified for further analysis in the 2010 QDR:

> 1) Further institutionalizing irregular warfare and civil support abroad capabilities and capacities, to include building partnership capacity; 2)

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[59]United States Code, Title 10, Section 118. To define sufficient force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program of the United States associated with that national defense strategy that would be required to execute successfully the full range of missions called for in that national defense strategy; and (3) to identify (A) the budget plan that would be required to provide sufficient resources to execute successfully the full range of missions called for in that national defense strategy at a low-to-moderate level of risk, and (B) any additional resources (beyond those programmed in the current future-years defense program) required to achieve such a level of risk. Available from: http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com; (accessed 10 December 2007).

Addressing threats posed from the use of advanced technology and WMD; 3) Global Force Posture; 4) Strengthening DoD support to civilian-led operations and activities; and 5) Managing the Department's internal business processes to improve efficiency and effectiveness.[60]

The 2010 QDR was released in February 2010. Each QDR addresses contemporary security concerns identified within of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Hence, each QDR is different from the last. In 2009, The Deputy Undersecretary for Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense, established a QDR Analysis and Integration Cell to coordinate the issues for consideration by the senior members of the DoD. Five issue teams were established, corresponding to the previously cited five areas of emphasis. The teams are lead by a representative of the Joint staff and a member of the Office of the Secretary of Defense; they report to Dave Ochmanek, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Development.[61]

The SecDef issues additional guidance for planning within the Department through the Security Cooperation Guidance (SCG). This document establishes planning objectives for Combatant Commanders within their geographic areas of responsibility. The Secretary has designated the DoD's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) to lead, direct, and manage security cooperation programs and resources to support national security objectives that: 1) build relationships that promote U.S. interests; 2) build allied and partner capacities for

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[60]United States Department of Defense, Office of Public Affairs, "2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, Unclassified Terms of Reference Fact Sheet," April 27, 2009. Available from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/d20090429qdr.pdf; (accessed 4 October 2009).

[61]"Scenarios Selected for Quadrennial Defense Review; Team Leaders Named," InsideDefense News Stand. Detailed listing of the scenarios to be considered and the leads for each committee for the five areas of emphasis. Available from http://www.itaa.org/upload/es/docs/QDR%20Article.pdf; (accessed 4 October 2009).

self-defense and coalition operations in the global war on terrorism; and 3) promote

peacetime and contingency access for U.S. forces.[62] These objectives align with the

guidance in the 2006 and 2010 QDRs and serve to foster planning efficiency.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is the senior uniformed

military member in the DoD. This position was established by the National Security

Reorganization Act of 1947 and the subsequent amendments of 1949.[63] The Joint

History Office has detailed the historical context and contributions of each of the

CJCS from Omar Bradley in 1949 to Colin Powell in 1993.[64] Richard Meinhart

continued the historical analysis of each of the CJCS, the challenges they faced, and

the evolution of the chairman's role, in his work *Strategic Planning by the Chairmen,*

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1990-2005. Title 10 of U.S. Code contains the current specific

authority and responsibilities of the CJCS, whose functions include six broad areas:

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[62]Defense Security Strategic Plan, Lieutenant General Jeffery B. Kohler, USAF, 13 February 2006. 2.

[63]Available from http://www.ndu.edu/library/goldnich/goldnich.html; (accessed 10 December 2007). Also, U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 151 (1). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. (2) The other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense as specified in subsections (d) and (e).Also see section 153. Available from: http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com; (accessed 10 December 2007).

[64]Michael McAleer, Historical Division, Joint Secretariat Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The Organizational Development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1942-1989*, (Washington, D.C.: Joint Historical Office, 1989), 11; Meinhart continues the history from 1990 till 2005 in: Richard Meinhart, *Strategic Planning by the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1990-2005,* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005);   and *Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff's Leadership Using the Joint Strategic Planning System in the 1990s: Recommendations for Strategic Leaders,* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003).

1) strategic direction; 2) strategic planning; 3) contingency planning- preparedness; 4) advice on requirements, programs, and budget; 5) doctrine, training, and education; and 6) other matters. [65]

The Chairman developed the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) to assist him in meeting these Title 10 responsibilities.   This system provides a formal means to analyze the broad guidance provided by the President and the SecDef and develop detailed plans, strategies, and assessments to accomplish the desired objectives. The JSPS also interacts with the other DoD systems by providing military advice to: the Acquisition Systems; the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBE); and, the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES). The strategic documents that the Chairman must produce to provide his strategic direction within the DoD include: the National Military Strategy (NMS); the Chairman's Planning Guidance (CPG); the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP); the Joint Planning Document (JPD); the Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR); the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA); and, the Joint Strategy Review (JSR). This study will examine each of these documents to demonstrate how they enable the

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[65]Also see previous discussion of the History of title 10 USC is traced back to 1956. Specific responsibilities from current code: United States Code, Title 10, Section 153. Chairman: Functions (a) PLANNING; ADVICE; POLICY FORMULATION.—Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be responsible for the following: (1) STRATEGIC DIRECTION… (2) STRATEGIC PLANNING… (3) CONTINGENCY PLANNING; PREPAREDNESS... (4) ADVICE ON REQUIREMENTS, PROGRAMS, AND BUDGET… (5) DOCTRINE, TRAINING, AND EDUCATION… (6) OTHER MATTERS… Available from: http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com; (accessed 10 December 2007).

Chairman to efficiently distribute limited resources to achieve the military objectives that support the National Military Strategy (NMS).[66]

The NMS defines the nation's military objectives, establishes the strategy to accomplish these objectives, and specifies the military capabilities required to execute the strategy. The Chairman develops the NMS by analyzing the security policy guidance contained in the President's National Security Strategy (NSS) and the SecDef's NDS in consultation with the other Service Chiefs and Combatant Commanders. The NMS describes the strategic environment and includes a discussion of potential threats and risks. It also provides strategic direction for the development of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and the Joint Planning Document (JPD).[67] The CJCS submits the NMS to the SecDef by 1 January of every odd numbered year.[68] The NMS provides the Chairman's assessment of the nature and magnitude of risk associated with executing the current NMS. The SecDef forwards these comments to the Congress with the next budget submission. If any risk is considered significant, the SecDef must submit a plan for risk mitigation with the strategy. The Chairman also submits the NMS to Congress by 15 February of every even numbered year. This document contains the Service Chiefs and the

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[66]Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3100.01A - Joint Strategic Planning System (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, dated 1 September 1999, current as of 12 September 2003), 25.

[67]Ibid., Enclosure B.

[68]U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 153. Available from: http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com; (accessed 10 December 2007).

Combatant Commanders' assessments of risk associated with executing the NMS within their respective areas.[69]

The latest NMS was provided in 2004. This strategy conveyed The Chairman's message to the Joint Force on the strategic direction the Armed Forces should follow to support the NSS and NDS in this time of war. This document described the ways and means necessary to protect the United States; to prevent conflict and surprise attack; and to prevail against adversaries who threaten our homeland, deployed forces, allies, and friends. Success rests on three priorities: first, while protecting the United States we must win the War on Terrorism; second, we will enhance our ability to fight as a joint force; third, we will transform the Armed Forces "in stride" by fielding new capabilities and adopting new operational concepts while actively taking the fight to terrorists.[70]

The Chairman's Guidance or Chairman's Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) is issued as a separate classified document that provides deliberate guidance. The Chairman may also provide continual assessments of the security environment and may provide contingency planning guidance to the combatant commanders based on analysis from other planning efforts within the JSPS or changing world events which is not published in the CPG. However, the CPG establishes a common set of assumptions, priorities, intent, and planning factors to facilitate planning and

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[69]U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 153, (2), (d). Available from: http://caselaw.lp.find law .com; (accessed 10 December 2007).

[70]General Richard B. Meyers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, paraphrase from the chairman's letter in the 2004 National Military Strategy (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, Jan 2004), 1.

development of strategy. The analysis that occurs in developing the National Military

Strategy (NMS) often surfaces as the Chairman's Guidance upon approval of the

strategy.[71] In December 2008 a new CJCS Instruction 3100 .01B incorporated the

CPG into the new document, Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF).

Figure 1 below graphically portrays this new relationship.

Strategic Planning Process & Documents

- National Security Strategy (NSS)
- National Defense Strategy (NDS)
- National Military Strategy (NMS)

Employ the Force
- Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF)
- Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)
  - Contingency Planning Guidance
  - Security Cooperation Guidance
  - Global Force Mgmt Guidance

Manage the Force
  - Global Posture Guidance
  - Nuclear Weapons Planning Guidance

Develop the Force
- Guidance for Development of the Force (GDF)
  - Strategic Planning Guidance
  - Transformation Planning Guidance
  - Global Posture Guidance
  - Human Capital Strategy
  - Analytic Agenda Guidance
  - Joint Concepts & Experiment. Guidance
  - Science & Technology Guidance

- Unified Command Plan
- Global Force Mgmt (GFM) Implementation Guidance
- CJCS Risk Assessment

Figure 1.   Consolidation of Strategic Documents by CJCSI 3100.01B.[72]

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[71]CJCSI 3100.01A was replaced by CJCSI 3100.01B, Dated 12 December 2008 - Joint Strategic Planning System (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office) Available from http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3100_01.pdf; (accessed 8 November 2009).

[72]CJCSI 3100.01B, Dated 12 December 2008 - Joint Strategic Planning System (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office) Available from http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata /unlimit /3100_01.pdf; (accessed 8 November 2009). Enclosure A-10.

CJCS Instruction 3100 .01B established three major components of the JSPS to address the Chairman's statutory responsibilities: assessments, advice, and direction.[73] New assessment documents include: the Comprehensive Joint Assessment (CJA), the Joint Combat Capability Assessment (JCCA), the Joint Strategy Review (JSR) process, the Chairman's Risk Assessment (CRA), the Capabilities Gap Assessment (CGA), the Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR), and the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA).[74] While many of these documents are still evolving, collectively they will provide the CJCS with an annual review of the strategic environment.[75] These documents also provide the Chairman's advice to the President, SecDef, National Security Council (NSC), and Congress. Both the CRA and the CPA have components of assessment and advice that represents the overlap between the corresponding statutory roles of the CJCS. The NMS is the base document that accompanies the CRA. The NMS delivers the Chairman's advice and direction on behalf of the President and SecDef, based on near-term military capabilities, to the military departments and combatant commands. The NMS and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) meet the CJCS

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[73]CJCSI 3100.01B, Dated 12 December 2008 - Joint Strategic Planning System (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office) Available from http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata /unlimit /3100_01.pdf; (accessed 8 November 2009), A-6.

[74]Each document is addressed in greater detail in this chapter with the exception of the new assessment documents that are not yet available for review: specifically, the CJA, JCCA, and CGA. Their purpose is to identify capability gaps as part of the CJCS assessment process. Appendix C and F of CJCSI 3100.01B contain detailed coverage.

[75]CJCSI 3100.01B, Dated 12 December 2008 - Joint Strategic Planning System (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office) Available from http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata /unlimit /3100_01.pdf; (accessed 8 November 2009), A-7.

responsibilities to direct in Title 10 of U.S. Code.[76] Figure 1 below depicts the

consolidation of documents into the GDF and GEF by CJCSI 3100.01B.

CJCS Instruction 3100 .01B also directs a timeline for the completion of these

strategic documents. The cycle begins when the President publishes the NSS and the

SecDef, supported by the CJCS, completes the QDR. During the first year and third

year, or as required, the CJCS completes the JSR. During the second and fourth year,

the majority of the other documents are produced, to include: the Unified Command

Plan (UCP) from the President; the National Defense Strategy (NDS), the Guidance

for the Development of the Force (GDF), and the GEF from the SecDef; and the

NMS and JSCP from the CJCS. The JSPS cycle is repeated annually starting with

input from the combatant commanders and Services and ending when the JSR is

published at the end of every odd numbered year, or as required.[77] Figure 2 below

graphically portrays this timeline.

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[76]Ibid., A-8. "The Chairman to produce strategic plans and provides assistance to President and the SecDef in military direction to the Armed Forces. The JSCP directs campaign, campaign support, contingency, and posture planning."

[77]Ibid., A-9.

Figure 2.   Joint Strategic Planning System Timeline.[78]

The Chairman develops the JSCP to provide guidance for strategic planning to

the Combatant Commanders based on their specific theater requirements. It assigns

tasks and missions in support of the NMS, NDS, and NSS. This enables the

Combatant Commander's to develop their detailed operations plans (OPLANs) and

contingency plans (CONPLANs) and prioritize resources within their area of

responsibility.   Additionally, the Combatant Commanders develop Theater

Engagement Plans (TEPs) to conduct their peacetime engagement missions in support

of the objectives and missions identified in the NMS. These TEPs include the

Combatant Commander's intent, priorities, tasks, and resources required to achieve

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[78] Ibid., A-8.

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the shaping objectives in areas that are not involved in combat. They are similar to

the Theater Security Cooperation Plans that also support NSS and the SecDef's

Security Cooperation Guidance (SCG). The SCG has now been incorporated in the

classified GEF. The JSCP and GEF are the new companion documents for

implementation planning.[79]

The development of the NMS also provides a basis for development of the

Joint Planning Document (JPD).   The JPD sets the initial, CJCS planning and

programming priorities and advices the SecDef in his preparations of the draft

Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). SecDef, Donald Rumsfeld, replaced the DPG

with the Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) and Joint Programming Guidance

(JPG).[80]   So, the JPD now informs the preparation of the SPG and JPG. Further, the

JPD identifies the critical capabilities and shortfalls in the current NMS.

Identification of these shortfalls provides clear and concise terms that focus the

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[79]CJCSI 3100.01A, - Joint Strategic Planning System (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, dated 1 September 1999, current as of 12 September 2003), Enclosure C; Also CJCSI
3100.01B, Dated 12 December 2008 - Joint Strategic Planning System (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office) Available from http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit
/3100_01.pdf; (accessed 8 November 2009). D-4.

[80]U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 113, (g) (1). Replacing the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)
with the Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG). The SPG is not specifically cited in Title 10; however,
the DPG is cited. The Specific requirements for formal guidance are reflected below. Theoretically,
the SPG and JPG meet these requirements. Title 10 however has not been modified. Future
Secretaries may reinstate the DPG. (g)(1) The Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall provide annually to the heads of Department of Defense
components written policy guidance for the preparation and review of the program recommendations
and budget proposals of their respective components. Such guidance shall include guidance on—(A)
national security objectives and policies; (B) the priorities of military missions; and (C) the resource
levels projected to be available for the period of time for which such recommendations and proposals
are to be effective.

efforts to formulate the DPG or SPG.[81] The JPD was prepared and submitted

approximately six months in advance of the scheduled publication of the DPG.

The Joint Staff J- 5 Director, coordinating with the Joint Staff J-8 Director,

prepares a cover letter for the JPD that summarizes the Chairman's advice on

planning and programs. The JPD is forwarded to the SecDef after the CJCS has

approved it. At a minimum, the JPD is required to address the following areas: 1)

planning guidance; 2) challenges; 3) required capabilities; 4) priorities; and, 5)

combatant commander and Service programming initiatives.[82] The new CJCSI

3000.01B directs that the JPD will no longer be published and the SPG will be

incorporated into the GDF. Therefore, the GDF will provide the programming and

planning guidance once found in the JPD.[83]

The Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR) further analyzes the

capabilities and shortfalls of the NMS and the JPD through the Joint Requirements

Oversight Council (JROC) process. The process of determining capabilities provides

specific recommendations to address Joint capability shortfalls, to improve Joint

training, or to meet warfighting requirements. These recommendations then become

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[81]CJCSI 3100.01A, - Joint Strategic Planning System (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, dated 1 September 1999, current as of 12 September 2003), Enclosure D.

[82]Ibid.

[83]CJCSI 3100.01B, Dated 12 December 2008 - Joint Strategic Planning System (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office) Available from http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata /unlimit /3100_01.pdf; (accessed 8 November 2009), Enclosure E and F. However, conflicting guidance on page GL-17 states: "The CPR provides the Chairman's personal recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for the programming and budgeting process before publishing the Joint Planning Guidance, in accordance with Title 10, United States Code."

inputs into the JROC process for further consideration.[84] Accordingly, each issue is

vetted through the Services and Combatant Commanders. The CPR consolidates the

issues that support his priorities. The draft CPR is vetted again through the Services

and Combatant Commanders. The Chairman then forwards the document to the

Secretary of Defense for his consideration in developing the DPG, SPG, or now the

new GDF.[85] The Services use this guidance in the development of their Program

Objective Memorandums (POMs) and Budget Estimate Submissions (BESs).

The Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) provides the SecDef with the

Chairman's personal assessment of the Service's conformance with the priorities

established in the strategic guidance. This guidance includes: the DPG; the SPG; the

GDF; the JPG; the JSCP; and, indirectly, the CPR.[86] The Secretary considers the

Chairman's assessment when he develops his Program Decision Memorandums

(PDMs) and develops his budget proposal. The PDMs reflect the Secretary's

priorities for allocations of resources. PDMs are issued by the SecDef or Deputy

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[84]Ibid., Enclosure C, E, and F.

[85]CJCSI 3100.01A, - Joint Strategic Planning System (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, dated 1 September 1999, current as of 12 September 2003), Enclosure D. See also CJCSI 3100.01B; "The CPR provides the Chairman's formal input to the Secretary of Defense with regard to the Department's resource priorities and is the Chairman's personal advice for capabilities and budgeting consideration to the Secretary of Defense." See also Enclosures C and F.

[86]Ibid. The CJCSCI 3100.01A states personal assessment of the POMs to the priorities established in the DPG, Strategic Plans, and CINC requirements. The SPG and JPG serve the role of the DPG and the JSCP and NMS provide the priorities for strategic plans. The CINC requirements should also be addressed in the CPR through the JROC-JWCA analysis of capability shortfalls. See also: CJCSI 3000.01B, Enclosure C-3.

SecDef; they report final decisions on Program Objective Memorandum (POM) proposals as modified by these decisions.[87]

Title 10 of U.S. Code requires the Chairman to provide strategic assessments and advice to the National Command Authority (NCA).[88] The Joint strategy review process, or joint strategic review, provides continuous analysis to support the CJCS's strategic assessments.[89] The Joint strategic review is the Chairman's primary means for monitoring the strategic environment to identify conditions that may require changes to the strategic guidance. The Joint Strategy Review Working Group (JSRWG) conducts this review; it is composed of representatives from the Joint Staff, the Services, and the Combatant Commands and is supported by various agencies.[90] The representatives study the strategic environment and develop a common planning horizon. One of the reasons that this analysis is accepted across the DoD is that all the representatives provide input. Under the direction of the Joint Staff J-5, they meet regularly, to coordinate recommendations, resolve incongruities, or address

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[87]Definition of Program Decision Memorandums. Program Decision Memorandum (PDM): A document which records Secretary of Defense or Deputy Secretary of Defense final decisions on Program Objective Memorandum (POM) proposals and approves Department of Defense component POMs, as modified by these decisions. Available from https //akss.dau.mil/askaprof-akss/qdetail2. aspx?cgiSubjectAreaID=14&cgiQuestionID=2809; (accessed 12 December 2007).

[88]United States Code, Title 10, Section 151. Available from: http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com; (accessed 10 December 2007).

[89]The Joint Strategy Review process was referred to as the Joint Strategic Review to avoid confusion between references to the document and the process between 2002 and 2006 by the Joint staff J-5 planners.

[90]The Joint Strategy Review Working Group (JSRWG) was referred to as the Joint Strategy Working Group (JSWG) that performed these functions from 2002-2006. This differs from the CJCSI reference but is the same group of planners that are addressed here. I was a member of this body and worked with the Joint Staff J-5 in this process during this time.

areas of critical concern to the Chairman or National Command Authority. Their

analysis specifies a common set of assumptions that facilitates further defense

planning. There are two main products of the Joint strategy review process: the JSR

Annual Report; and, the JSR Issue Papers.[91]

The JSR Annual Report, or now the Comprehensive Joint Assessment (CJA),

fundamentally supports the JSPS and JSR process.[92]   It examines the future security

environment in the short- (0-2 years), mid- (2-10 years), and long-term periods (10-20

years), to determine likely threats and capabilities required to counter the threats.[93]

Although the process is continual, the JSR assesses the global strategic setting for

issues affecting the current: NMS; Presidential policy guidance; DPG, SPG or GDF;

and, the CPA. JSR Issue Papers, now called the CJA or annual CJA, identify changes

in the security environment and estimate how they may impact the current strategy.

The JSR produces a long-range vision paper addressing plausible strategic settings

10-20 years into the future. When they are approved by the Chairman they provide a

common framework for planning and further analysis. These products become inputs

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[91]CJCSI 3100.01A, - Joint Strategic Planning System (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, dated 1 September 1999, current as of 12 September 2003), Enclosure E.

[92]CJCSI 3000.01B, States: "The CJA is a formal holistic strategic assessment process that provides a common informational baseline and strategic picture. The CJA provides a central unified mechanism for combatant commands and Services to describe the strategic environment, their opportunities, challenges, state of their organization, and overarching requirements. The CJA uses an annual survey and compilation of other assessments to enable integrated analysis to begin on 1 October each year." Enclosure A-5. See also Enclosures B and F.

[93]CJCSI 3100.01A, - Joint Strategic Planning System (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, dated 1 September 1999, current as of 12 September 2003), Enclosure E. also Defense Policy search, Available from http://www.global security .org /military/library/policy/intro.htm; (accessed 12 December 2007); and CJCSI 3000.01B, Enclosure B-5.

to the JROC process; and they provide a complementary means for evaluating programs and plans, threats, strategic assumptions, opportunities, technologies, organizations, doctrinal concepts, force structures, and military missions. Each paper provides the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff and Combatant Commanders with a summary of issues; significant changes in the strategic environment; and their projected impact on the NMS.[94]

Considering the Chairman's documents collectively, the JSR process provides a continual analysis that informs strategists about changes and trends that may affect their analysis and guidance. The Combatant Commander's representatives provide a geographical or functionally specific perspective that indicates their challenges and concerns. The Joint Staff Directorates and Services similarly identify their concerns and trends, which are evaluated collectively for impacts on the NMS. Figure 3 below illustrates this complex process.

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[94]CJCSI 3100.01A, Enclosure A; Also see CJCSI 3100.01B, Enclosure B-3.

Joint Strategic Planning System

Figure 3. Joint Strategic Planning System.[95]

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[95] Figure 2 created by the author for this study as a Microsoft PowerPoint chart. Description: The NMS and the Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR) serve to provide the SecDef the Chairman's military advice for supporting the NSS and NDS. The Secretary uses this input to draft his DPG, SPG, GDF, and JPG. The Chairman further assists the Secretary with military planning by issuing the JSCP that provides detailed planning requirements for each of the Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC). The Services then develop their Program Objective Memorandums (POMs) that support the strategic guidance provided by the Chairman and the Secretary. The Chairman then evaluates the Service POMs and provides the Secretary with his assessment and recommendations for changes in the CPA. The Secretary then considers this advice and issues the Program Decision Memorandums (PDMs) that may alter, but approves, the Service POM submissions. Every two years NMS is updated and reviewed by Congress. Every year the Secretary provides an annual report to Congress to account for the status of equipment and resources for the prior year. Every four years the Secretary, supported by the Chairman, conducts a QDR to provide Congress with an evaluation of the strategic resources and future challenges anticipated in the global security environment. Collectively, this system provides a common strategic direction for the Department of Defense to efficiently utilize its resources.

Combatant Commanders and Services

The Combatant Commanders' role as geographic or functional military representatives has already been examined.[96] The Combatant Commands play a key role in providing for the common defense. Their origin and authorities for developing and executing plans have also been discussed. The first Combatant Commands emerged after World War II to define responsibilities in the Pacific for future operational planning.[97] Command representatives provide key regional or functional insight and participate in: the JSPS; the Joint Strategy Review Working Group (JSRWG); and the JROC process. Moreover, they also play a key role in programming resources to accomplish the strategy. Combatant Commanders submit budget proposals to the Secretary of Defense for consideration and possible inclusion in his budget.[98] Combatant Commanders have two additional means of influencing

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[96]U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 164, (b) RESPONSIBILITIES OF COMBATANT COMMANDERS.—(1) The commander of a combatant command is responsible to the President and to the Secretary of Defense for the performance of missions assigned to that command by the President or by the Secretary with the approval of the President. Available from: http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com; (accessed 10 December 2007).

[97]See Ronald Cole, Walter Poole, James Schnabel, Robert Watson, and Willard Webb, *The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1993*, Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, 1995) for greater description of the historical context and history of each UCP defining the Combatant commands.

[98]U.S. Code, Title 10 Section 166. Combatant commands: budget proposals (a) COMBATANT COMMAND BUDGETS.—The Secretary of Defense shall include in the annual budget of the Department of Defense submitted to Congress a separate budget proposal for such activities of each of the unified and specified combatant commands as may be determined under subsection (b). (b) CONTENT OF PROPOSALS.—A budget proposal under subsection (a) for funding of activities of a combatant command shall include funding proposals for such activities of the combatant command as the Secretary (after consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) determines to be appropriate for inclusion. Activities of a combatant command for which funding may be requested in such a proposal include the following: (1) Joint exercises. (2) Force

programming and prioritization of resources: the Integrated Priority List (IPL) and the Chairman's Risk Assessment (CRA).

The Combatant Commanders develop their plans and budgets in accordance with the strategic guidance from the President, the Chairman, and the SecDef to accomplish all assigned operational and engagement missions. Changes in the strategic environment or conflicting requirements can create gaps between missions and resources. Combatant Commanders identify and then prioritize these capability or resource shortfalls in a document called the IPL.[99] This list is then provided to the Chairman and the SecDef for consideration in the development of the CPA and the Secretary's PDMs. Similarly, in a resource-constrained environment, Services submit an Unfunded Priority List (UPL) for their unfunded requirements to their Service Chiefs based on perceived disparities between missions and resources.

Combatant Commanders continually update their plans and analyze the security environment to assess their ability to perform all of their missions in support of the NMS. They develop a Commander's risk Assessment that is submitted to the Chairman and the Secretary which reports their personal assessment of risks in executing their assigned missions. These assessments are then consolidated in the

training. (3) Contingencies. (4) Selected operations. Available from: http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com; (accessed 10 December 2007).

[99]Integrated Priority List Definition: (DOD) A list of a combatant commander's highest priority requirements, prioritized across Service and functional lines, defining shortfalls in key programs the judgment of the combatant commander, adversely affect the capability of the combatant commander's forces to accomplish their assigned mission. The integrated priority list provides the combatant commander's recommendations for programming funds in the planning, programming, and budgeting system process. Also called IPL. Available from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/ doddict/data/i/02725.html; (accessed 12 December 2007).

Chairman's Risk Assessment (CRA). The CRA then informs the Chairman, the

Secretary, the President, and Congress of the status of the Armed Forces and the

programming requirements to provide for the common defense.

The POM is the Services' primary document for submitting programming

proposals. The POM includes an analysis of missions, objectives, alternative

methods to accomplish objectives, and allocation of resources.[100] The Services have

detailed procedures for developing these proposals. The Army uses the Total Army

Analysis (TAA). In brief, this process builds on the strategic guidance that has been

provided through the JSPS. The Services analyze their missions and propose a force

structure and list of equipment needed to accomplish these missions.   These

proposals are submitted through the Chairman to the Secretary and the President for

inclusion in the budget that the President submits to Congress.

Conclusion

The JSPS enables the Chairman to meet his responsibilities to advise the

President and the Secretary on military matters. It assists him in organizing planning

efforts and resources within the DoD to support the NSS and NDS. The CJCS thus

has a flexible means to analyze the current security environment in order to determine

whether our military capabilities are adequate to secure the nation and to assess real

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[100]The program provides for four years beyond the budget year for cost and manpower, and seven years beyond the budget year for forces. For example, FY06 Program Objective Memorandum will contain FY06, FY07, FY08, FY09, FY10, and FY11 for cost and manpower; and FY06, FY07, FY08, FY09, FY10, FY11, and FY12, FY13, and FY14 for forces. Available from http://www. defenselink.mil/ comptroller/icenter/budget/progphase.html; (accessed 12 December 2007).

time risks to the nation's security. These assessments then inform the programming

process in the Planning Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES),

which determines resource allocations in support of the NMS. The JSPS thus aids in

quantifying how to best utilize many kinds of resources in order to provide for the

common defense.

World War II demonstrated that the Services could no longer operate

independently on a global scale. Coordination was required with a joint perspective

that could integrate all the capabilities into a campaign across theatres. The role of

the CJCS grew to provide better informed advice to the President. Congressional

reforms increased the Chairman's authority significantly in 1986, at the expense of the

services, to provide a vehicle for comprehensive joint reform. Colin Powell used this

authority to establish joint functional commands that could better manage DoD assets

across the services.[101] The Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 strengthened the

roles of the civilian Service secretaries and reduced the roles of each of the Service

chiefs, thereby increasing civilian control of the military.[102] The aforementioned

relationships between the key actors in formulating defense policy provide a critical

[101]Ronald Cole, Walter Poole, James Schnabel, Robert Watson, and Willard Webb, *The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1993*, Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, 1995), 4, 101.

[102]Richard Meinhart, *Strategic Planning by the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1990-2005,* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005); and Ronald Cole, Walter Poole, James Schnabel, Robert Watson, and Willard Webb, *The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1993*, Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, 1995), 11.

background for the examination of force management and the role of civil military

relations.

Chapter Three

Findings: The History of the Army Force Management System

The previous chapter explored the changes in the DoD as a consequence of advancing technologies and World War II; however, the 1970s and 1980s were also periods of significant innovation and modernization. Many weapon systems in use during the decade were developed and fielded with 1950s technology. Complex acquisition regulations require milestones and review gates during each phase of the system development. New capabilities must advance through each phase of a regulated system including concept development, research and development, testing, and fielding, to become a material solution. Collectively, the DoD 5000 series of regulations defines this process as the Acquisition system. [103] In short, the development of a defense system typically takes fifteen to twenty years from conception to fielding. Therefore, it was common practice to field systems with proven technology, that existed when the concept was approved, rather than with emerging technology.[104] In 1980, The Packard Commission was established by President Reagan to evaluate defense reorganization. The interim report identified:

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[103]Paul Wolfowitz, DoD Directive 5000.01, Dated 12 May 2003, Subject: The Defense Acquisition System, (verified current). DoD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, establishes the management framework that implements these policies and principles. The Defense Acquisition University maintains an Acquisition guidebook and website that explicates the detailed requirements of the acquisition system. Available from: https://dap.dau.mil/ policy/Pages/ overview.aspx; (accessed 28 February 2010).

[104]The Acquisition system has been revised fourteen times since it was developed in 1971; it still is criticized for being too slow and unresponsive to the needs of the warfighter. Much has been

With notable exceptions, weapon systems take too long and cost too much to produce. Too often, they do not perform as promised or expected. The reasons are numerous. ..Federal law governing procurement has become overwhelmingly complex. Each new statute adopted by Congress has spawned more administrative regulation. As law and regulation have proliferated, defense acquisition has become ever more bureaucratic and encumbered by unproductive layers of management and overstaffing.[105]

However, developing new defense systems became even more challenging in the 1980s when the rate of technological change rapidly increased. The Army fielded new systems with technology that was not only dated but also obsolete. Development of new systems was also complicated because projected Congressional funding authorizations differed from the actual appropriation of resources.[106]

During the 1970s, Congress reduced defense spending – in percentage of the budget and in real dollars - as American forces were removed from Vietnam.[107] At the same time, other countries were developing defense systems that capitalized on

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written about the likely causes of this problem and many suggestions continue to be made on ways to improve business practices within DOD. This was a major area of study in the 2006 and 2010 QDRs. See the Center for Strategic and International Studies recommendations: *Transitioning Defense Organizational Initiatives: An Assessment of Key 2001-2008 Defense Reforms* (Washington, D. C.: The CSIS Press, 2008), 57. The Defense Acquisition University also maintains an Acquisition guidebook and website that explicates the detailed requirements of the acquisition system. They outline typical timelines for each phase of capability development and program development management. Available from: https://dap.dau.mil/ policy/Pages/ overview.aspx; (accessed 28 February 2010).

[105]David Packard, *An Interim Report to the President by the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management,* (Washington, D.C.: February 28, 1986), 13; Available from: http://www.ndu.edu/library/pbrc/36In8.pdf; (accessed 28 February 2010).

[106]Ibid. See also the Defense Acquisition University's *Acquisition Guidebook* and website that explicates the detailed requirements of the acquisition system. Available from: https://dap.dau.mil/ policy/Pages/ overview.aspx; (accessed 28 February 2010).

[107]John L. Romjue, TRADOC Historical Monograph Series – A History of Army 86, Volume II, The Development of The Light Division, The Corps, and Echelons Above Corps November 1979 – December 1980 (Fort Monroe, Virginia: Historical Office United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1982), v.

recent technological advances in computerization, communications, and miniaturization. President Richard Nixon's comment to the NATO Supreme Council in 1969 illustrates the challenges faced in the early 1970s: "Let's put it in plain words, the West does not have the massive nuclear preponderance that it once had, and any sort of broad based arms agreement with the Soviets would codify the present balance."[108] Similarly, President Ronald Reagan's speech twelve years later in 1982 reflects the same concern: "The combination of the Soviets spending more and the United States spending proportionally less changed the military balance of power and weakened our deterrence; in virtually every measure of military power the Soviet Union enjoys a decided advantage."[109] The Soviet military buildup of the 1970s consisted of more than an increase in numbers of systems. The Soviets also forged ahead of American military technology in one area after another.[110] In business terminology, the chief executive officer of the organization, the president, believed that the United States comparative advantage in defense systems was threatened.

The Department of Defense (DoD) responded to these challenges by developing significant modernization programs for all Services. Within the Army, five major combat systems were introduced to modernize the force structure. These

[108]Thomas McCormick, *America's Half Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War and After* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 170.

[109]Ronald Reagan, Speech 23 November 1982; available from http://www.nuclearfiles. org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/history/cold-war/strategy/index.htm; (accessed 5 April 2008).

[110]Romjue, *History of Army 86, Volume II,* v. This view is more fully described by Thomas McCormick in *America's Half Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War and After* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 204, 214, 229.

systems, known as "the Big Five", included a new tank, attack and assault

helicopters, an infantry fighting vehicle, and an artillery system. "Few outside of the

Army were aware either of the massiveness and complexity of the modernization

events under way in the 1980's or under the limitations under which they

proceeded."[111] Thirty- five percent of the 7,500 M-1 Tanks, seventeen percent of the

Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles, forty percent of the UH-60 Black Hawk

Helicopters, eleven percent of the Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, and over 3,500

trucks had been delivered to units within the active and reserve components of the

Army by 1984.[112]

Although these figures affirm fielding an impressive number of new systems,

change in the Army, as in any large organization, requires much more than new

equipment. These systems provided new capabilities and prompted a reexamination

of the fundamental Army business practices (tactics and doctrine) as well as its

management theories (headquarters administration) and organizational structure

(Table of Organization and Equipment [TOE]). The Army's change may be viewed

from two perspectives: First, this change refers to a comparison of the Army at two

points in time- the Army before and after the 1980s. Second, this change refers to the

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[111]Speech by Major General (MG) Louis Wagner, Jr. (17 July 1984). Referenced in Romjue, John L. *TRADOC Historical Monograph Series - The Army of Excellence: the Development of the 1980s Army* (Fort Monroe, Virginia: Historical Office United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1982), 100. Specifically, the big five weapon systems are: the M-1 tank; The M2/3 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle; The AH-64 Apache attack helicopter, the UH-60 Black Hawk utility helicopter; and, the Patriot missile system.

[112]John L. Romjue, *TRADOC Historical Monograph Series - The Army of Excellence: the Development of the 1980s Army* (Fort Monroe, Virginia: Historical Office United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1982), 100.

process of how it occurred in the Army. The simultaneous fielding of these new systems revealed the need for an integrated system to manage how change takes place in the Army.

The Army commissioned the Division 86 Study to develop a recommendation for the integration of these new systems and capabilities into the Army in the 1980s. General Donn A. Starry, who was one of the key leaders of the Division 86 Study, met with the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Edward C. Meyer, on 20 December 1980 to discuss this issue.[113] Starry recommended an Army reorganization to maximize the potential capabilities of these new weapon systems. John Romjue, who became the TRADOC Historian, produced a comprehensive historical account of the proposed doctrinal changes that Starry developed. Starry also proposed changing the Army personnel management system from one that managed individuals to one that managed whole units. Starry's proposal was called the regimental system because it was similar to the British regimental personnel system, which assigned soldiers to one unit (a regiment) for their entire career.

The idea for a regimental system centered on a belief that unit cohesion would be improved - and hence readiness - if soldiers were assigned to the same unit for their entire career. The resulting habitual relationships and familiarity might result in improved unit performance. In Vietnam, the personnel replacement system was

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[113]The Division 86 Study focused on developing a new Army organization to capitalize on the projected capabilities of the new weapon systems that were fielded in the Army in the 1980s. There were recommendations for the armored divisions, the motorized infantry, and the light infantry. Also see Oral History Interview with General Donn A. Starry, Fairfax Station, VA, March 19, 1993 by John L. Romjue for a more detailed discussion of the Division 86 Study.

based on individual replacements and was criticized for the turmoil that high rates of turnover provided in units.[114] Individual replacements were not familiar with the procedures and practices of their new units and needed additional training to become integrated into the unit. The Army Lineage Series portrayed some of the challenging conditions that lead to the consideration of new manning policies:

> The early 1970s saw the U.S. Army in decline. The decision to stage a phased withdrawal from Vietnam led to a drastic cut in troop strength, and between 1969 and 1973 the Army shrank in size by almost half, from a force of 1.5 million to one of 800,000. More important, its ranks were plagued with incidents of drug abuse, racial turmoil, and lack of discipline. The final elimination of the draft in 1973 deprived the Army of its reservoir of college-trained enlisted men and confronted it with daunting recruitment problems.[115]

If whole units were managed and replaced, rather than individuals, readiness and morale might be improved. The Army Center for Military History also expressed this belief in the importance of unit histories: "Experience has shown that members of a military community are more effective when they understand and take pride in military traditions. By making soldiers feel that they are part of a unit, they can draw strength from the individuals who served before them. This phenomenon is esprit de

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[114]The Army was engaged in fighting a large-scale war in Southeast Asia for which the country had never been properly mobilized. The short tours of duty in Vietnam caused constant personnel turbulence. The demands of the war gutted units outside the combat zone of equipment as well as people. Available from Army Heritage and Education Center, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc? AD=ADA195746&Location= U2&doc= GetTRDoc.pdf; (accessed 4 March 2010).

[115]John Patrick Finnegan, Army Lineage Series, Military *Intelligence,* (Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D. C., 1998), 158. Available from http://www.history .army.mil/search.html; (accessed 3 March 2010).

corps."[116] In an attempt to maintain unit esprit and morale the Army developed the Combat Arms Regimental System (CARS) which maintained the designation of units with established histories as the size of the Army was reduced after Vietnam.[117] This program maintained unit designations and was not a personnel management policy or system like the British regimental system Starry mentioned.

Lieutenant General Richard G. Trefry, who was the Army Inspector General, was informed that General Meyer wanted to see him. General Trefry had a unique background. He was the Inspector General for the Army from 1977 to 1983. Born in Newburyport, Massachusetts, on 6 August 1924, he joined the Army in World War II as a trained meteorologist. After the war he briefly attended Dartmouth College before he attended the United State Military Academy, graduating with the Class of 1950.[118] He was commissioned as a Field Artillery Officer and successfully commanded units at various levels in Germany, Oklahoma, Korea, Vietnam, and Laos. He was an instructor at the U.S. Army Field Artillery and U.S. Army Engineer Schools between 1953 and 1958, then a Tactical Officer at the United States Military Academy between 1959 and 1962. He served in many command and staff positions

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[116]The Army regimental personnel replacement system is different than the Combat Arms Regimental System that was devised to retain unit histories and lineage, rather than as a personnel management system. "Experience has shown that members of a military community are more effective when they understand and take pride in military traditions. By making soldiers feel that they are part of a unit, they can draw strength from the individuals who served before them. This phenomenon is esprit de corps." See Regimental Organizational History Branch, US Army Center of Military History. Available from http://www. history.army.mil/html/forcestruc/ohpam.html; (accessed 3 March 2010).

[117]Ibid.

[118]Richard G. Trefry, Interview with Colonel William A. Hall and Colonel Robert J. Michela, United States Army War College Oral History Program, Clifton, VA, 25 January 1985. (Tape T-69, Side 1). Transcript contains 1274 pages interspersed with biographical data.

before his promotion to brigadier general in 1973. As a general officer he served as

the Defense Attaché to Laos; on the Army staff as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff

for Personnel, the Director of Human Resources, the Director of Management, and

the Inspector General of the Army (IG). After retirement from the Army in 1983, he

continued to serve as an independent defense consultant. In 1990, he became the

Military Assistant to President George H. W. Bush and the Director of the White

House Military Office until 1992. He then became the Program Manager for the

Army Force Management School, which he continued to direct in 2010.[119]

The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General John Vessey saw Trefry in the

Pentagon Hallway on 20 December 1980 and asked him if he had seen the Chief yet.

Trefry replied "No" then Vessey informed Trefry, "Well, he wants to give you a new

job."[120] When Trefry met with the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), General Meyer,

requested Trefry to determine the feasibility of adopting a regimental system of

personnel management.[121] Meyer added "I want you to have an answer to me by the

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[119]Richard G. Trefry, interview with author, Fort Belvoir, VA, December 18, 2007. Interview recordings have not been transcribed. Interviews conducted 16 - 18 December 2007. Resume, personnel files, and other biographical records provided during the interview.

[120]Richard Trefry, interview with COL Whitehorne, United States Army War College Oral History Program, Clifton, VA, 25 January 1985. Transcript contains 1274 pages interspersed with biographical data.

[121]Ibid. A regimental system assigns personnel to a specific unit (or regiment) similar to the system used by the British Army. This personnel system is based on individuals remaining members of a specific unit (regiment) for their entire careers. Personnel are then stationed at locations to meet the regiment's mission. In contrast, the U.S. Army personnel system is based on individual assignments and replacements. Units receive missions and responsibilities, but the personnel in that unit change almost constantly. In the regimental system, the missions could change but the personnel assigned to the units would not. Proponents of the regimental system suggest that valuable benefits can be gained in unit cohesion by maintaining personnel in the same unit for an entire career. Opponents to the system suggest that it is unsupportable because each regiment will need replacements

first of April."[122] As the Army IG it was appropriate for Trefry to conduct studies

and provide recommendations to the CSA on a variety of issues. Trefry was also

uniquely qualified to address this question based on his prior experience working in

the Army Staff personnel office. Confronted with this challenge, Trefry went back to

his office and thought, "If I were going to start an Army tomorrow, how would I do

it?"[123]

In response to this challenge, Trefry drafted the functional life cycle model of

the Army.[124] He quickly drew it out on a piece of paper that evening as he thought

about the functions of managing the Army. Although the United States already had

an Army, his approach to the problem was radically holistic. He chose the term life

cycle symbolically because it implied everything in the Army had a birth, matured,

and had an end to its useful life. His response below summarized his

conceptualization of the model:

> Think about it: First off you have to have a reason to have an Army, so you
> have to understand the threat. You need authorizations from Congress and the
> President to raise an Army. So the President has got to perceive that there is a
> threat and this has to be tied in with Congress. Once that is understood, then
> there must be a force structure or organizations that are capable of
> accomplishing the mission. Since they are new, they will need to be recruited,
> trained, distributed, sustained, and developed. Since they may be required to
> fight overseas, they will need to be able to be deployed. They will require

for combat casualties. These replacements will have to come from the other regiments. Therefore, it
would be impossible to consolidate and reorganize units strictly managed within regiments.

[122]Richard Trefry, interview with Whitehorne, (Tape T-127, Side 1).

[123]Ibid.

[124]Trefry, interview with author, December 18, 2007.

equipment to accomplish their mission that will have to be acquired and maintained. They will need training on the new equipment and have to be developed professionally. At some point we will no longer need the equipment and, as this is young man's game, some soldiers will get too old. So, we will need a means of disposing of the property and separating the personnel. All of these functions must be coordinated by command, management, and leadership and require the resources of time, people, money, things, and information.[125]

Trefry's description of what is required to build an Army amounts to a model. The functions he described (force development, acquisition, training, distribution, deployment, sustainment, development, and separation) are represented in the Army functional life cycle model. These functions require leadership to manage the integration of resources, which he designated as time, people, money, and information. His feasibility study was initiated because of problems in the personnel system, but he understood the interrelationships of other systems to personnel system changes. When asked if any current corporate management theories influenced his thinking, he replied "No."[126]

Trefry developed a team of twenty-five personnel from the Army staff and the U.S. Army War College students to conduct an independent assessment of the feasibility of incorporating a regimental system in the Army. This group recommended that a regimental system was feasible for the infantry, armor and possibly artillery branches, but implementation should be restricted to the company

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[125]Trefry, interview with Whitehorne, (Tape T-125, Side 2). Summary of original comments.

[126]Trefry, interview with author, December 18, 2007, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

level.[127]   Before this recommendation was made to the Chief of Staff of the Army, it

was presented to the Army Staff.   Trefry recounts:

> Major General Clay Buckingham, who was the Director of Information
> Management at the time, stopped and said to me: "That model is fascinating, I
> had never seen the Army depicted that way. You know it not only works for
> people, but this is the way we buy computers." I replied, "Well, I remember
> when I was drawing the thing on butcher paper down in my office: I had
> thought maybe this could be used for other things." That [the discussion with
> Buckingham] was the first cognitive realization I had that I had something that
> I could use across the Army.[128]

Buckingham's application of the model to purchase computers enabled Trefry

to realize his recommendation had greater significance to the Army. Trefry

envisioned applications of the model as a tool for analysis beyond the personnel

system. It could be used to manage change in other Army systems. The model

demonstrated that change made to any one function affected other functions. All

eight functions were interdependent. The model in the chart was metaphorically

referred to as a "spider web".   One strand of the web could not be touched without

affecting the other strands (or functions) on the web.   In this depiction, the web was

the Army and each of the strands served as functional entry points into the web.

Buckingham used the model to graphically depict the life cycle of computers in the

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[127]Trefry, interview with Whitehorne, (Tape T-125, Side 2). Trefry initially recommended
company level, armor, infantry and artillery units be converted to the regimental system only because
it was easier to manage a smaller number of personnel. The Army could expand implementation of the
system later if desired. This made his recommendation similar to a test, rather than a change across the
entire Army.   After this recommendation, in later months, many British Officers told Trefry that the
regimental system had been very difficult to manage in World War II due to soldiers refusing to leave
their regiments to replace combat casualties in other regiments.

[128]Trefry, interview with Whitehorne, (Tape T-127, Side 2). Similar statements provided to
author in interview with General Trefry at Fort Belvoir, VA, 18 December 2007.

Army. The following explanation illustrates the interrelationships within the model in greater detail.

The Functional Life Cycle Model of the Army

Develop a capable combat force within constrained resources.

Release or remove people and equipment from military control; dispose of facilities or real

Obtain people, equipment, money, and facilities.

Force Development 1

Separation 8

Acquisition 2

Increase force capabilities Bring people and/or equipment to a more advanced state.

Impart and instill that discipline, instruction, drill, and practice designed to create military efficiency or

Development 7

Title 10 USC

Training 3

Provide for people, organizations, and equipment by furnishing means or funds.

Sustainment 6

Distribution 4

Allot people and/or equipment to claimant organizations according to priorities.

Command, Leadership, & Management

Deployment 5

Resources

Structuring, equipping, training, manning, sustaining, deploying, stationing, funding, readiness

Project a combat force rapidly to any place in the world to satisfy a national requirement.

People, things, time, money, information, technology

Figure 4.   The Functional Life Cycle Model of the Army, 2001.[129]

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[129]C-400, How the Army Runs, Instructor Notes, AY 2001, United States Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Functional Lifecycle Model Slide is also from C-400 Instructor Notes, Slide 1-1-36. (This is the updated Functional Life Cycle chart that varies slightly

This chart depicts eight functions with a brief description of each. Force

development is positioned at the top of the chart, indicating its fundamental

relationship with the other seven numbered functions. Trefry coined the term "force

development" to describe the process of leading and managing resources (the people,

things, time, money, information and technology) through their life cycle.

Essentially, force development involves identifying a needed Army capability;

determining how to achieve that capability; designing units and a force structure

capable of accomplishing the national military objectives; determining the personnel

and materiel requirements necessary for robust, efficient organizations; and then

allocating capabilities within the available constrained resources.[130] Needed

capabilities can be identified at any level of the Army and evaluated through this

process of force development. At the center of the model is Title 10 of U.S. Code. It

provides the statutory authorization for the Army. The bottom of the model depicts

the Army's most important output, or product: Combat-ready units - a combination of

soldiers and equipment organized in units with appropriate doctrine and training to

accomplish their mission. Further, this product realizes the core objective of the

organization. Each resource required by an organization is represented somewhere on

a life-cycle continuum within the model. The dynamic nature of the model is

depicted in the bottom left corner of the chart as command, leadership, and

from the original chart developed by LTG Trefry in 1980 and published in 1983. The function
Acquire on the original chart has changed to acquisition; Train to training…. The original chart was
drawn by hand in the March 1983 and is contained in the original Inspector General Report. Numbers
have also been added to identify the eight functions to aid the explanation in this study.

    [130]Ibid.

management; these vital components must synchronize the efforts of all of these

functions simultaneously.[131] **"These functions, while they do stand alone, do not

represent a system;"** advised Trefry. "However, when we apply feedback loops

between all of these functions and provide the necessary resources to enable

leadership, command and management to do its job, we then have a functioning

Army at any level of organization."[132] These eight functions of the functional life

cycle model became a heuristic for Trefry. As the Inspector General of the Army, he

used them to manage change in the Army during this period.

The Inspector General (IG) has a critical role in the Army's senior

management. The IG leads a fact-finding organization that conducts inspections of

Army units. The IG's background reports provide the Chief of Staff of the Army

with advice on a variety of subjects.[133] Before the 1980s, the Inspector General

Agency focused on inspecting Army commands for compliance with Army standards.

Many units considered these inspections the single most important event of the year.

The inspection teams focused on identifying a unit's non-compliance with regulations

rather than on identifying the rationale for their non-compliance. However, unit-

[131]Ibid.

[132]Inspector General, United States Army, *Functional Lifecycle Model of the Army: Introduction* (Washington, D.C.: Inspector General of the Army, 1983), 70.5. The Inspector General Inspection Report dated 1 March 1983.

[133]Department of the Army, *Army Regulation 20-1, Inspector General Activities and Procedures* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007), Paragraph 1-4. a. "The Inspector General inquires into the discipline, morale, training, property and money accounting, record keeping, and all other matters that affect the efficiency or economy of an organization; and, makes recommendations, as appropriate, to the commander."

oriented inspections often uncovered deficiencies that were beyond the unit's ability to correct.[134] Trefry reflected upon this issue when he described an inspection conducted in 1978: "It's terrible; all you know is that some platoon sergeant did not come down and check that all the toothbrushes were in the same direction. You're not solving anything. I don't know what shape the unit is in; I don't know how much of this stuff is borrowed."[135] This observation is significant because it reveals Trefry's holistic concern for the inspection process. Units may have presented equipment borrowed from other units as their own in order to pass their inspection. Thus, the results of the inspection could be an unreliable indicator of the unit's status or readiness to perform its mission. His observation further implies that there may have been systemic issues- indeed issues of integrity- in the 1970s Army. The inspections also provided a report that was considered almost like a report card on the command. This led to units spending a great deal of time preparing for the inspection, rather than training or doing other important tasks because no one wanted to risk a report card documenting any deficiencies. This culture surrounding the inspections was perhaps the greatest obstacle to overcome when changing the role of the inspector general. IG inspections meant weeks of preparation for compliance with established standards.[136] Lastly, the inspections provided only a snapshot in time; the IG had no systemic means of ensuring corrective action was ever taken on

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[134]Trefry, interview with Whitehorne, (Tape T-126, Side 1).

[135]Ibid.

[136]Trefry, Interview with author, 18 December 2007, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

any of the identified deficiencies.[137] Trefry began to change inspection policy and

doctrine to correct these three major problems: 1) undue reliance on the inspections;

2) ineffectiveness of inspections; and, 3) lack of follow up on inspection findings.[138]

In 1981, Trefry decided to use the functional life cycle model as an inspection

methodology to correct these problems. The first experimental inspection was

conducted in July 1981 on the Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN).[139] Trefry

changed the focus of the inspection from compliance with Army standards to

something called a "compliance-systemic inspection". This new focus identified the

systemic flaws in Army systems that created the underlying conditions that accounted

for non-compliance with established Army standards.[140] Prior to 1981, for example, a

unit inspection could verify that tools were missing from a tool set, but it would not

identify the reason that the tools were missing. Perhaps the unit lacked secure storage

areas. Or soldiers may have broken the missing tools and thrown them away without

understanding or observing the procedures to replace or account for damaged tools.

[137]Ibid. See also James Heil, Command Inspections: A Self-Evaluation Approach (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1988), 4. Available from Army Heritage and Education Center, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc? AD=ADA195746&Location= U2&doc= GetTRDoc.pdf; (accessed 4 March 2010).

[138]James Heil, Command Inspections: A Self-Evaluation Approach (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1988), 4. Available from Army Heritage and Education Center, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc? AD=ADA195746&Location= U2&doc= GetTRDoc.pdf; (accessed 4 March 2010). See also Department of the Army Inspector General Agency, The Inspections Guide (Fort Belvoir, VA: United States Army Inspectors General School, 2008), 1-3-1.

[139]Trefry, interview with Whitehorne, (Tape T-126, Side 1).

[140]Ibid. See also James Heil, Command Inspections: A Self-Evaluation Approach (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1988), 8. Available from Army Heritage and Education Center, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc? AD=ADA195746&Location= U2&doc=

Trefry's new focus on systemic problems represented a dramatic shift in perspective for everyone involved in the inspection. Subsequently, the new inspection technique was heralded as an overwhelming success. The Inspector General Inspection Team conducted several other inspections throughout 1981, utilizing and refining the new "compliance-systemic inspection" methodology based on the functional life cycle model.[141]

In 1982, IG inspection teams cataloged over eight hundred and fifty systemic findings from the previous year's inspections. Each of these findings identified a significant problem area within the Army. For example, the inspectors observed a soldier inspecting his vehicle in order to evaluate the unit's maintenance procedures. Trefry explained, "The mechanics used to spend months inspecting and fixing vehicles and would then put them behind barbed wire until it was time for the inspectors to come down and look for drips from the oil pans."[142] This new method revealed a systemic problem: that many soldiers did not know the proper procedures for inspecting and servicing their vehicles. These soldiers' lack of knowledge of

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[141]Ibid. "The new emphasis for IGs was on a compliance-systemic inspection methodology. This focused attention on causes rather than symptoms, allowed policy errors or omissions to be addressed for resolution, traced unit problems to Army problems, emphasized correction at the proper level, and minimized the need for onetime unit inspection preparation. Follow-up inspections were also stressed, primarily to verify that corrective action was carried out and to ensure the corrections truly solved the problems." Available from http://www.usma.edu/ig/history/default.htm; (accessed 6 March 2010).

[142]Trefry, interview with Whitehorne, (Tape T-127, Side 2).

proper preventative maintenance led to increased maintenance costs and reduced vehicle availability.[143]

Trefry's inspection team discovered that they lacked an easily understandable method of organizing their findings to facilitate corrective action. Two members of the Inspector General Force Modernization Cell, Billy Gavin and Tom Fintel, decided to sort their findings in accord with the eight functions of the functional life cycle model, which was already used in the inspections. They demonstrated that some of the findings in one area reappeared in later inspection findings in other areas, which clearly identified systemic problems. This application of the model validated the inspection methodology and its holistic approach. Trefry recalled, "What these guys had done was truly amazing. Well, I said, we've got a winner, we've got a winner."[144]

The Inspector General Agency spent most of August 1982 refining their analysis. They then explicated their model, inspection methodology, and findings to the Army Chief of Staff Meyer. Meyer was impressed with the model and discussed it at length with Trefry.[145] Meyer also directed that the new Vice Chief of Staff of the

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[143]"All I G inspection findings are the property of the Secretary of the Army and only releasable by the Inspector General of the Army." However, several separate inspector general histories document a similar condition and the change to a compliance based system in their state inspector general histories. The account portrayed by Trefry seems plausible as an example. Source of release authority policy, AR 20-1, Chapter 3. Available from http://wwwpublic.ignet .army. mil/Pdf/AR%2020-1_Chapter%203.pdf; (accessed 6 March 2010).

[144]Trefry, interview with Whitehorne, (Tape T-127, Side 1).

[145]Ibid., (Tape T-127, Side 2).

Army, General John A. Wickham, should study Trefry's expanded presentation in greater detail and then lead the Army staff effort to promulgate this holistic perspective throughout the Army.

Trefry's staff prepared a twenty-five hour briefing to introduce Wickham to the complexity and scope of Trefry's winning model. This comprehensive briefing explained all the Army systems affected by the modernization efforts and their interrelationships. Wickham received the first of these presentations at 0800 on the Saturday of Labor Day weekend. He initially allocated thirty minutes for the briefing, but consented to allocate four hours upon Trefry's request. At the start of the briefing, he declared "He was going to be hard to convince that he would need twenty-five hours of briefings."[146] After the first four hours dealing with force development, Wickham agreed that he would need the entire twenty-five hours. In the end, he stated that "the information was a great education."[147] Wickham directed Trefry to present the same information to the Command and General Staff College, The Army War College, and all the major Army commands.[148]

The IG also serves the Army as a teacher and advisor. Hence, it was quite appropriate for Trefry to travel to the Army schools to present this model. On the return flight from one of these briefings at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Trefry decided to establish a school to teach all of the Army IGs this new methodology. His

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[146]Ibid.

[147]Ibid.

[148]Ibid.

rationale was exquisitely simple: "How can you inspect the Army when you don't understand how it runs?"[149] He received authorization from the Chief of Staff of the Army General Meyer to cancel all the IG inspections for the next year, thereby freeing the IGs to attend training. Trefry recalled, "I went down to Fort Belvoir and borrowed a classroom from the Engineer School because they were getting ready to move to Fort Leonard Wood and had some small classes and space available. So they gave me this classroom over here that we still use today."[150] He brought all the IGs to Fort Belvoir, Virginia, for a six-week course on the new methodology based on the functional life cycle model. (IGs are also usually assigned at the rank of lieutenant colonel for every major command (or installation) in the Army to provide local assistance to assigned personnel and commanders). Trefry recollected, "Let me tell you - at first all of them groaned. But at the end of the first week, we had a four-week school then, but at the end of the first week everyone was saying holy cow there is really something to this stuff."[151] The goal of this effort was to increase awareness and establish a holistic approach to problem-solving throughout the Army. This inspection methodology changed inspections from looking at the current condition of things, like vehicle oil leaks, to looking at the systemic problems, like do soldiers know how to inspect and service their vehicles.

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[149]Trefry, Interview with author, 18 DEC 2007, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Tape 1.

[150]Ibid.

[151]Ibid.

Trefry had the first class of Inspectors General conduct an inspection at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to apply their new understanding. This inspection reinforced the new methodology that was taught in the classroom by requiring an application of the knowledge acquired in the classroom. He recalled the importance of this event: "And let me tell you, if I ever had to do it again that would be the first thing I would do. Because you see, it is one thing to go to school and sit in class, then to go out and say okay, show me what you've learned by writing up these findings."[152] This first class graduated on December 17, 1982. Trefry then focused the entire agency on refining the coursework and inspection methodology; he published a thirteen volume report on the functional life cycle model of the Army in March 1983.[153] This effort was completed in only six weeks. These initial volumes presented the revised course material that was utilized in the initial course taught to the IG. This material became the basis for a new IG course.[154]

Trefry's new organizational objectives and inspection methodology was now firmly established with the IGs in the Inspector General Agency. However, this new approach prompted a reorganization of the agency. Trefry recounted that he asked his key staff members: "Is anybody going home tonight? Anybody have anything

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[152]Ibid.

[153]Ibid. The Inspector General published the thirteen volumes. Each volume explained one of the functions of the lifecycle model and the functions of "command and management" and "resources." The other volumes provided "an introduction to force management" and the "inspection methodology". I reviewed copies of the original reports that are available in the archives at the USAFMS at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

[154]David M. Foye, "Army Inspector General Inspection Methodology" (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1984), 1.

going on tonight? They said no. So I said, Okay, call your wives and tell them we're

going to be late. I'll tell you what we're going to do. We're going to reorganize the

agency."[155]   This small team worked until midnight: then the next morning Trefry

had all the members of the Inspector General Agency assemble for a briefing. He

startled his audience by beginning his presentation with: "While you were home and

sleeping last night, the staff and I changed things, and you are no longer working

where you think you are."[156] The group that formerly followed- up on the inspection

findings was moved under the inspection group: They were now required to travel

with the inspection teams.   This significantly changed their way of doing business.

However, requiring this follow-up team to travel made them more familiar with the

inspection methodology and provided valuable context to the findings that they

managed. This policy increased the team's awareness of the interrelationships among

systemic findings as they conducted more inspections and gained experience.[157] This

increased awareness then led to better informed recommendations to systemic

problems in the inspection findings and follow-up advice.   Trefry was now

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[155]Trefry, interview with Whitehorne, (Tape T-127, Side 2).

[156]Ibid.

[157]Trefry commented that the inspection follow-up consisted of little more than a phone call and a checklist. The exchange would be something like, what is the status of finding number 136? The reply was "we are working on it." The follow up team would put a check in the block and annotate the date that they had called. The group managed lists with limited awareness of the problem they were inquiring about or ability to provide assistance. Trefry, interview with author, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 18 December 2007.

convinced that the Agency was prepared to run a school to better assist the Army as it modernized throughout the 1980s.[158]

Modernization that alters the core values or culture of the organization can be very complicated. Many prominent business and management scholars - like Henry Mintzberg, Peter Drucker, Knoll Tichy, and Alfred Chandler, among others explored in this study - have written many books explicating the challenges involved in managing change in large organizations. Strategic change in an organization like the Army is not dependant solely on restructuring the organization or on technological change. Summarizing many analysts' observations, changes in the 1980s strategic environment prompted change in large corporations as well as the Army. The nature of this change was ultimately the responsibility of the senior leadership of these organizations. A change in management or senior executives often brings new strategic vision to an organization. This new vision often alters the key strategic objectives and essential core missions of the organization. This new vision also challenges the established doctrine and values of the organization and often leads to unintended changes. Accordingly, the initial scenario that led Trefry to develop the functional life cycle model was the regimental feasibility study that was part of the larger issue under consideration from General Meyer and General Starry; how should the Army prepare to accomplish its assigned missions. Doctrine is the broad

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[158]Trefry, Interview with author, 18 DEC 2007, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Tape 1. This change in organizational responsibilities was not embraced by all the civil servants that worked at the IG School. Many of them found different jobs in other organizations because they preferred a job that did not require travel.

guidance showing how the Army should accomplish its assigned missions.[159]

Doctrinal changes also influenced change in the Army during this period.

Doctrine

In the 1970s, the Army developed new doctrine based on the assumption that

it would be required to fight the Soviet Union outnumbered and win on the plains of

Europe. This differed from the previous doctrinal reliance upon nuclear weapons to

deter Soviet aggression.[160] Walter Kretchik detailed the historical context and

application of the keystone Army doctrinal manuals since the Continental Army in his

dissertation, *Peering Through the Mist: Doctrine as a Guide for U.S. Army*

Operations, 1775 -2000.[161] He further analyzed how appropriate the doctrine was in

its wartime application. He proposed that doctrine was only appropriate for the

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[159]Henry H. Shelton, *Joint Publication 1: Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, November 2000), 2. (For a more detailed definition of doctrine: "Military doctrine presents fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces. Joint doctrine provides authoritative guidance, based upon extant capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States. It incorporates time-tested principles for successful military action as well as contemporary lessons which together guide aggressive exploitation of US advantages against adversary vulnerabilities. Doctrine shapes the way the Armed Forces think about the use of the military instrument of national power".) Joint Publication 1-02 updated 17 OCT 2008 defines doctrine as — "Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application." Available from http://www.dtic.mil /doctrine/jel/newpubs/jp1_02.pdf; (accessed 18 February 2009).

[160]For a general explanation of détente see Gaddis; See McCormick for a more detailed treatment of détente and the Cold War. John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: a New History* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2005), 184; and, Thomas McCormick, *America's Half Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War and After* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 180 and 242.

[161]Walter Kretchik, *Peering Through the Mist: Doctrine as a Guide for U.S. Army Operations, 1775-2000* (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas, 2001), 22, 35. Available through ProQuest, UMI, Ann Arbor, Michigan, UMI Number 3018507.

strategic environment approximately half the time. Considered differently, doctrine

was not appropriate approximately half the time. However, his analysis demonstrated

that doctrinal failures were most apparent after they were applied in combat rather

than prior to application. Therefore, it was remarkable that the new doctrine outlined

in *Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations*, developed by General William DePuy -

then the Commander of the Army Training and Doctrine Command - was developed

in peacetime. This manual signaled a profound shift in guidance from the Army's

senior leadership that responded to an acknowledgement that the Soviet Union

enjoyed a superiority of conventional forces, both in their numbers and in the lethality

of their modern weapons systems.

    The U. S. Army tactics and doctrine for employing force during this decade

largely resembled the tactics derived from operations in World War II. Some argued

that if war was to be fought over the same ground as World War II, the maneuver

tactics that won the war would still be valid. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War also

demonstrated the strength of the defense to defeat a numerically superior force.[162]

Further, the tactical experiences gained in Vietnam were considered limited to a

counter-insurgency effort or only appropriate to a jungle environment. Doctrine had

not yet advanced for armored maneuver that could be expected in a European

environment. Modern weapons systems with increased capabilities were still under

development and their capabilities still unknown. This uncertainty created conditions

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[162]Ibid., 188. See also Robert A. Doughty, *Leavenworth Papers - The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-1976* (Washington, D.C.: Combat Studies Institute, Center of Military History, Government Printing Office, 1979 and 2001), 43. This publication contains an in depth analysis of the rationale and development of Army doctrine during this period.

that made *FM 100-5, Operations* one of the most controversial field manuals ever published.[163] The new doctrine stressed increased mobility- based on lessons learned from helicopter operations in Vietnam. None the less, it continued to emphasize defensive operations.[164] This new doctrinal focus on the defense of Europe with a numerically inferior force prompted a heated debate. A defensive strategy implied that Western Europe would have to endure another invasion and potential occupation. Many believed that an offensive strategy was a better means to achieve victory in Europe than a defensive strategy. An offensive strategy, however, did not imply that the United States military would invade the Soviet Union. An offensive strategy was limited to counterattacks designed to restore the West German borders.   However, the anticipated shortage of military resources precluded realistic consideration of a strategic level offensive strategy with limited conventional forces.[165]

This doctrinal shift challenged existing core missions and procedures at all levels of the Army. This dramatic shift in strategy - from an offensive focus to a defensive focus - shook the cultural foundations of the Army.[166] It required a

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[163]Robert A. Doughty, *Leavenworth Papers - The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-1976* (Washington, D.C.: Combat Studies Institute, Center of Military History, Government Printing Office, 1979 and 2001), 43. This publication contains an in depth analysis of the rationale and development of Army doctrine during this period.

[164]*Field Manual 100-5, Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of The Army, 1976), 2-30.

[165]Doughty, *Leavenworth Papers - The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-1976*, 45. Western European Allies also were very concerned that the United States plans now called for a defensive strategy of trading space for time in Europe. This space meant that Germany and France would potentially be overrun in a delaying action until additional troops or nuclear weapons were made available.

[166]Ibid.

reassessment of all of the functions of the functional life cycle model. As Trefry

noted, "The Army's most important output, or product, is combat-ready units - a

combination of soldiers and equipment organized in units with appropriate doctrine

and trained to accomplish their mission."[167] As this doctrinal shift began to permeate

the force, the Army's organizational structure began to change accordingly.

The senior leadership of a large corporation or of the Army is required to

provide the long-range vision of change to ensure proper allocation of resources.

Similarly, in the 1970s the Army senior leadership of Generals Meyer and Starry

provided the guidance for reorganizing the Army based on the operational concepts

that shaped the new doctrine. This Army wide effort was collectively referred to as

the "Army of Excellence". The organizational design structure was referred to as

"Army 86" or "Division 86".[168] The Army of Excellence organizationally reflected

the doctrine proposed in *FM 100-5, Operations*.

The Army Training and Doctrine Command conducted a series of studies

and simulations under Starry's leadership between 1977 and 1981 to determine the

operational concepts required to optimize the capabilities of the modernized weapon

systems.[169] These concepts (doctrine) then provided guidance for planners to develop

an appropriate organizational structure. This approach is a significant example of

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[167]Trefry, interview with Whitehorne, (Tape T-127, Side 2).

[168]Division 86 was the organization that resulted from the aforementioned Division 86 study. See Oral History Interview with General Donn A. Starry, Fairfax Station, VA, March 19, 1993 by John L. Romjue for a more detailed discussion of the Division 86 study.

[169]Donn A. Starry, General (retired), interview with Lieutenant John L. Romjue, Fairfax Station, VA, March 19, 1993. 14.

how senior leaders' ideas drive organizational change, rather than the organizational change driving the concepts. Further, it produced an optimal organization to accomplish a desired capability, rather than the organizational design limiting the operational abilities of the organization.[170] This change in Army organization also demonstrated the interdependent relationships described by Trefry in the functional life cycle model. Collectively, these altered assessments of the Soviet military threat and corresponding change in U. S. Army doctrine, equipment, and organizational structures, are nothing less than monumental.

In the 1980s the Army faced a series of significant challenges. Globalization, modernization, economic crisis, political uncertainty, and the changing competitive environment collectively required an evaluation of how to accomplish the core mission of the Army.   Senior Army executives looked for the best method to manage change. They considered the importance of organizational design, well-defined objectives, and horizontal integration. The Army then changed its mission, its doctrine, its organizational structure, and much of its equipment. These significant changes wreaked havoc at the highest levels of management. However, Trefry's approach to these challenges was holistic, and his understanding of the

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[170]A detailed analysis of the development of these operational concepts and associated organizational designs has been developed by the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command Historian John L. Romjue and is presented in his 1982 works, *A History of Army 86, Volumes I and II*. John L. Romjue, *TRADOC Historical Monograph Series – A History of Army 86, Volume II, The Development of The Light Division, The Corps, and Echelons Above Corps November 1979 – December 1980* (Fort Monroe, Virginia: Historical Office United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1982); and Romjue, John L. *TRADOC Historical Monograph Series - A History of Army 86: Volume I, Division 86: The Development of the Heavy Division September 1978 -- October 1979.* Fort Monroe, Virginia: Historical Office United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1982.

interrelationships among Army systems was singular. He incorporated his functional life cycle model into the Army to manage some very turbulent changes.

His model could be applied to any large organization. It provides a holistic approach to managing change of an organization.   It addresses the importance of defining objectives and identifying systemic causes of problems before making any recommendations for change. This model is still in use in the Army today, which testifies to its value. Trefry's leadership was critical to the development of this model. His performance in the 1980s demonstrates the positive impact that a strategic leader can have on an organization in a changing environment.

Management Theories

Although Trefry did not have any specific business theorist in mind when he developed the organizational life cycle model, many organizational theorists have shown that change dramatically affected business in the 1980s. It is likely that Trefry was aware of some of the business reforms of the time. In any case, Army leaders and business managers encountered similar problems and arrived at a similar set of solutions to manage change. Trefry's following remarks affirm his awareness of contemporary business managerial concepts:

> Now, there's a hell of a lot written about management, and I get a big kick out of the reformers talking about how we don't train leaders anymore, we train managers. As a matter of fact, any study of the programs of instruction in the school system will show you it's just the other way around. We train very few people in what you would call management. Most of the school programs of instruction are built around warfighting, command and leadership, but

management to me, is nothing more than understanding of the processes by which you are able to command and lead. That's where we get in trouble.[171]

Exploration of some of the dominant business management theories reveals similarities between the corporate management concepts and Army management concepts embedded in the Army functional life cycle model. First of all, senior executives of business, the Secretary of Defense, and all the Service Secretaries are civilian appointees. Many of them were former leaders of industry. The civilian leadership of the DoD has great authority and the ability to make lasting changes in the management processes of the organization. For example, Robert McNamara, who was the Secretary of Defense from 1961 until 1968, designed and implemented the planning, programming, and budgeting system that is still used by the DoD. The military is not completely isolated from business practices or from society as a whole. From a practical standpoint, military leaders must understand civilian management theories in order to communicate with their civilian leaders. The role of the senior leadership in leading change in an organization cannot be overstated. Accordingly, Trefry's recommended model inevitably incorporated the dominant business practices in order for it to be approved by the Army's civilian leadership.   Some of these practices included the importance of organizational design, well-defined objectives, and horizontal integration.

Peter Drucker, a noted business consultant and professor of the period, provided a corporate example of strategic change in an organization, including

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[171]Trefry, interview with Whitehorne, (Tape T-127, Side 2).

unintended consequences. He cited the case of a corporation that decided to stop making a measurement instrument that had decreasing sales. The company informed its customers of its intention to stop production completely in three years, and then sales increased as past customers "stocked up" on the familiar product. The purchasing department, however, was unaware of the decision to discontinue production and continued to buy assembly parts to make new instruments. Company policy required acquisition of assembly parts based directly on the number of units sold. Hence, when production stopped, the company suffered a significant loss due to the accumulated inventory of approximately ten years of assembly parts.[172] This example demonstrated that executive's strategic decisions have tactical consequences. Further, it illustrated the challenge of managing information within a large corporation.

Within the Army functional life cycle model the importance of sharing information and synchronizing actions is graphically illustrated by the interdependence of functions woven into the "spider web". There were countless examples of unintended consequences of strategic decisions, or the lack of information sharing within the military. Trefry recalled the modernization experience of the 256th Infantry Brigade, Louisiana National Guard, to illustrate the impacts of lack of coordination. He produced a thirty-four page summary that detailed the

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[172]Peter Drucker, *Peter Drucker on the Profession of Management* (Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Book Series, 1998), 28. This chapter is based on an article originally presented in 1965; "The Effective Decision", *Harvard Business Review*, 45, no. 1 (1965). Drucker was widely regarded as one of the most sought after corporate management consultants and business professors of the late 20th century. He was a consultant for more than forty five years to many government, non-profit, university, and corporate organizations in the United States, Europe, and Japan.

shortcomings identified by the 1982 Army modernization inspection. He organized

the report findings along the functions of the life cycle model. For instance, one of

the findings under the distribution function was that a fifty million dollar funding

shortfall was identified due to a lack of information sharing between management

systems.[173] The 256th Infantry Brigade was being converted from a light infantry to a

mechanized infantry structure. This conversion involved many activities within the

functions of Trefry's model. For the most part, the unit was changing from carrying

everything they needed on their backs to riding in armored personnel carriers and

tanks. Trefry recalled that,

> They received a tank with no keys, or anything else. They had to use a winch
> to get it on a tractor trailer sideways and then they had the state police escort
> them twenty miles to the armory. They had to get guys from Fort Polk,
> Louisiana to come down and show them how to start it and that sort of
> thing.[174]

The inspection culminated with a briefing to the Adjutant General of the State

of Louisiana and the Brigade Commander. Trefry sat them both down on swivel

chairs in the middle of the room surrounded by a chart that went around the four

walls. The chart showed the functions of the model and the impacts of what the

inspectors found that the Army did, or failed to do. Trefry recalled, "You should

have seen those guys. They sat there and said, 'Gee Whiz', and 'that's right'. So I

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[173]*256th Infantry Brigade Conversion to Mechanized Infantry Report* (Fort Belvoir, Virginia:
Office of the Inspector General, 1982), 19. Available from Fort Belvoir archives.

[174]Trefry, interview with Whitehorne, (Tape T-127, Side 1).

asked them if I could take the information back to show the folks at Washington."[175]

He did not seek to embarrass the Louisiana National Guard; they had done well in

spite of the Army's bureaucratic failures. He wanted to demonstrate that the lack of

communication and coordination by the Army staff has some very serious

consequences. This example highlights the importance of senior executives'

responsibility to effectively manage change and define organizational objectives.

Another of Drucker's management theories related to the foregoing example

is called management by objectives. This concept validates the necessity of all

workers to understand how they contribute to achieving an organization's

objectives.[176] This theory has been embraced and adapted to many organizations. It

is similar to the concept of mission in a military organization. All soldiers are

expected to know what their unit's mission is so that they can ensure that all their

actions contribute to accomplishing this organizational mission. Communication is

vital for management by objectives. It is not a means of organization, but a mode of

organization.[177] The design of the organization dramatically affects the flow of

information; design is critical to both military and civilian organizations. As Trefry

commented, "Look at the model, if the force structure isn't right, everything else is

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[175]Ibid.

[176]Peter Drucker, *The Essential Drucker* (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 2001), 112. This chapter is based on the chapter in his book originally presented in 1954; "Management by Objective and Self-Control" in *The Practice of Management* (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1954).

[177]Drucker, *The Essential Drucker*, 267. This chapter is based on the chapter in his book originally presented in 1974; "Functioning Communication" in *Management Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices* (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1974).

wrong."[178]   Horizontal organization was also a dominant managerial redesign
concept of the 1980s.

The functional life cycle model incorporates the concept of horizontal
integration in its representation of the lines that make up the "spider web". The Army
was both a vertical organization, with specialists in many areas, as well as a
horizontal organization, with commanders empowered to commit resources across
organizational boundaries.   The model reinforced the importance of sharing
information and synchronizing actions across organizational boundaries in order to
implement effective change.

Many large organizations are integrated vertically along functional lines, but
they are integrated horizontally only at the highest levels of management. However,
horizontal integration is essential for the efficient and effective management of any
large organization. This horizontal integration is often referred to as the strategic or
macro level of management. Decision-making about organizational priorities and
corresponding allocation of resources within an organization are made only at the
highest levels of authority within an organization. While the day-to-day decisions of
a large organization are essential to its well-being, senior executives of an
organization should not focus on its routine activities. The problems of
communication within a vertically structured organization were not new to the 1980s;
however, Drucker stressed the importance of sharing information: "In no other area

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[178]Trefry, interview with Whitehorne, (Tape T-127, Side 1).

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have intelligent men and woman worked harder or with greater dedication than they have worked on improving communications in our major institutions."[179]

John Byrne also wrote about the problems of horizontal integration and the emergence of "the horizontal corporation" in American business.[180] He built on Alfred Chandler's 1977 work, *The Visible Hand: the Managerial Revolution in American Business*. Chandler identified horizontal integration as a concept that originated with the consolidation of the American cigarette industry in the 1890's.[181] Byrne advanced this theory with modern examples from the 1980s and analyzed the restructuring initiatives of Eastman Kodak, DuPont, American Telephone and Telegraph, and Motorola to become more horizontal. He stressed that "to produce significant increases in productivity, firms must concentrate on managing across the organization as opposed to up and down."[182] He credited the term "horizontal organization" to Frank Ostroff of McKinsey & Company Consultants, who produced, *In Search of Excellence: Lessons from America's Best-Run Companies* in 1982.[183]

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[179]Drucker, *The Essential Drucker*, 260. This chapter is based on the chapter in his book originally presented in 1974; "Functioning Communication" in *Management Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices* (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1974).

[180]John A. Byrne, "The Horizontal Corporation", *Business Week*, December 20, 1993 in *Readings in Strategic Management* edited by Arthur A. Thompson, Jr., A.J. Strickland III, and Tracy Robertson Kramer (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill, 1998), 339.

[181]Alfred D. Chandler Jr., *The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 316.

[182]Byrne, "The Horizontal Corporation", 339.

[183]Thomas J. Peterman and Robert H. Waterman, Jr., *In Search of Excellence: Lessons from America's Best-Run Companies* (New York, NY: Harper Collins Publishers, 1982), 9. (See for more detailed analysis of their 1977 study of the challenges and trends in business; and contributions of McKinsey and Company, Taylor, Chandler, Weber, March, and Mintzberg. 360 pages.)

Ostroff expanded the theory that centered on organizational design that was based on processes that empowered employees to make decisions that traditionally were made by senior department managers. In theory, a horizontal organization needs fewer personnel than a vertical organization because the horizontal organizations create overlapping managerial positions. Byrne also elaborated that the potential to reduce manpower costs increased the appeal of horizontal integration during the growing global competition of the 1980s.[184] Byrne acknowledged that there are many challenges in restructuring an organization. He analyzed the DuPont Chemical Corporation's challenges in creating a horizontal organization. He concluded that, "Personnel must abandon the business practices that have made them successful in the past and look at process more broadly. That is the hardest damn thing to do."[185]

Henry Mintzberg, another influential strategic business consultant and professor, cautioned that horizontal organizations did not work in all applications. "Some mass-production industries," he warned, "are better suited to streamlined vertical structures."[186] In fact, vertical organizations encourage specialization and take advantage of technical expertise. The predecessor of the horizontal organization was the team concept that cut across departments for temporary projects but left the organizational structure and authorities intact. This practice dated back to the

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[184]Byrne, "The Horizontal Corporation", 342. Ostroff offers an eleven step plan to create a horizontal organization in this chapter.

[185]Byrne, "The Horizontal Corporation", 343.

[186]Ibid.

1960s.[187] In, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning*, Mintzberg cites many of the

fallacies of strategy development and planning.[188] Additionally, he provides

guidelines for implementing change and analyzes why many corporate strategies

fail.[189] However, Byrne, Ostroff, and Mintzberg all agreed that correctly determining

an organization's key strategic objectives and identifying its essential core processes

are prerequisites for considering any organizational changes.

Much was being written in the 1980s about how to manage change in large

corporations. Executives share a common ambition: they want to change their

organization for the better. Some claimed the only real constant in an organization is

change. Many management theories of the period professed that dramatic change is

very difficult in a large organization. The very strengths that make an organization

successful also serve as impediments to change. Comfortable hierarchal relationships

are threatened by organizational restructuring. Turf wars can impede the overall goal

of improving the efficiency of the company. The pre-existing organizational

structure, procedures, and personnel may be incapable of formulating or executing

dramatic organizational change. For this reason, many theories proposed a new

'change' organization or cell be created to dramatically change a large organization.

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[187]Byrne, "The Horizontal Corporation", 345.

[188]Henry Mintzberg, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning* (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1994), 221.

[189]Mintzberg, The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning, 24.

Several dominant theories of change in corporations and the Army emerged in the 1980s.

In his 1983 work, *Managing Strategic Change: Technical, Political, and Cultural Dynamics*, Knoll Tichy proposed a model for managing organizational change. His experience as a consultant convinced him that organizational change must be managed across three areas: 1) Technical, 2) Power or political and 3) Cultural or organizational values.[190] He argued that many executives or management consultants focused their analysis and subsequent recommendations upon only one of these areas; their narrow focus then contributed to the failure of an organization to successfully adapt to change.[191] In other words, a holistic approach provides a more effective means of changing an organization. Both horizontal integration and a holistic approach facilitate positive change in a large organization.

Trefry similarly identified the need for a holistic approach when he was developing the functional life cycle model: "There is no system; there is a series of processes."[192] The Army is organized into many vertical organizations that manage functions like acquisition, training, doctrine development, and operational warfighting. Like Tichy, there are experts and consultants in all of these fields in the Army, but few of these experts can provide solutions to more than one function.

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[190] Knoll M. Tichy, Managing Strategic Change: Technical, Political, and Cultural Dynamics (New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, 1983), x.

[191] Tichy, Managing Strategic Change, 7.

[192] Trefry, interview with Whitehorne, (Tape T-127, Side 1).

Trefry offered a model to determine the systemic causes to problems within the Army. "You're a lot better off using something like a model," he explained, "because you're dealing with force structure, material, training, how you deploy, sustain, develop and get rid of things."[193] For example, among detailed histories of organizational change, doctrine development, and material changes, we find no detailed histories of modernization in the Army that focus on the relationships among these separate functions. Management of change was very difficult: Only innovative professional managers successfully change their large organizations.   They constitute a professional class of managers.

The previous discussion emphasized the importance of strategic leaders in the management of large organizations; their roles were extolled by the dominant business theorists of the 1980s.   The American business and the professional management class also have rich histories. The business activities of production and distribution required managerial expertise from the establishment of the first trading company. Adam Smith and other economic theorists laid a rich foundation in their descriptions of market forces and capitalist theories of supply and demand.   In his 1977 work, *The Visible Hand: the Managerial Revolution in American Business*, Alfred Chandler expounded on these theories in his detailed explanation of the evolution of the modern American multinational corporation. He diverged significantly from the current business analysis by challenging a basic premise of economic theory: management, he argued, not "the invisible hand of market forces,"

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[193]Trefry, interview with Whitehorne, (Tape T-120, Side 1).

controlled economic production and distribution.[194] His analysis focused on U. S.

businesses between 1790 and 1960.

In the 1980s, leaders of both the military and U. S. corporations were civilian

senior executives. The history of the professional management class underscores the

role of senior executives. Chandler discussed the emergence of this professional class

of managers in American business. As late as 1840, he stated, "nearly all top

managers were owners; they were either partners or major stockholders in the

enterprises that they managed."[195] These managers controlled specific product lines

or oversaw business sites. Corporations eventually began to utilize a new class of

professional managers who established hierarchical organizations and managed the

activities of many elements of the corporation from distant locations.[196] Chandler

cited the railroad and telegraph industries as the first modern enterprises that

employed the new managerial class. This new professional managerial class

established techniques that still contribute to modern corporate management. "As

technologies became more complex, and markets continued to expand, these

managers assumed command in central sectors of the American economy."[197]

Chandler claimed that "professional managers replaced owners and financers by 1960

to the point that no family or financiers were majority owners of the largest 200

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[194]Alfred D. Chandler Jr., *The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business.* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1977), 490.

[195] Ibid., 3.

[196]Ibid., 4.

[197]Ibid., 484.

companies in American business."[198]   This brief history of business executives

traces increasing reliance on professional managers by the 1980s.

Military Project Management

Management of production and distribution in the military by a professional

class of managers has a long history. Paul Koistinen has produced a series of works

that outline the process the U.S. Government used to mobilize the nation's industrial

base for war. In his first book, he outlined his model for a series of five books. To

date, he has completed four volumes that provide a thorough analysis of "the political

economy of warfare in America" from 1606 through 1945. He stated, "The political

economy of warfare involves the interrelationships of the political, economic, and

military institutions in devising the means to mobilize resources for defense and to

conduct war."[199] He established three major stages and periods of economic

mobilization in U.S. history; first, the preindustrial stage associated with the

Revolutionary War; second, the transition stage associated with the Civil War; and

third, the industrial stage associated with twentieth-century warfare.[200] He argued,

due to a lack of established governmental functions and relatively little military

specific technology during the first stage, "economic mobilization involved

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[198]Chandler, *The Visible Hand*, 493.

[199]Paul Koistinen, *Beating Plowshares into Swords: the Political Economy of American Warfare*, (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1996), 1.

[200]Ibid., 2.

increasing civilian output and diverting products from civilian to military in order to

supply the armed forces without converting the economy."[201] There was not an

established group of managers for war supplies during this stage. He stated,

"Merchants simultaneously served as public officials and military officers while they

continued to conduct their private affairs."[202]

In the second stage, he argued the Union military and government best

represented the economic mobilization pattern of the second period. "Operating

under the President, the War, Navy, and Treasury departments acted as the principal

mobilization agencies. They relied on market forces rather than elaborate

regulations…to meet the enormous demands of war. The only exception involved the

railroads…followed by the telegraph."[203] He accounted for these exceptions because

the railroads and telegraph systems had been established before the war and were not

considered a result of the wartime economic mobilization.   In fact, several prominent

civilian railroad managers brought their experience and expertise to the Union Army.

They became generals in the United States Military Rail Roads (USMRR) agency and

managed complex strategic rail movements that provided logistical support for the

Union Army. Christopher Gabel portrayed the role of "Railroad Generals" of the

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[201]Ibid.

[202]Ibid., 133. He also devotes much of his work to examining the Confederate economic mobilization process but does not believe that it was effectively exercised or representative of the economic trends of the interwar years following the Civil War.

[203]Ibid., 3.

Civil War in his book *Railroad Generalship: Foundations of Civil War Strategy.* [204]

"Railroad generals" of the Civil War managed complex production and distribution

systems that required dedicated staffs and management techniques similar to those

utilized by the corporate enterprise.[205] Koistinen's analysis corresponds to Chandler

and Gabel's argument that the first American class of managers emerged in the

railroad and telegraph industries.

In the third stage, industrialization, Koistinen detailed the growth of large

corporations and the government bureaucracy. He argued, "The growth of huge

bureaucracies in corporate and governmental spheres began to blur the institutional

lines between both."[206] He noted similarity between the interdependent relationships

in stages one and three: "Businessmen often staffed the government's regulatory

agencies, and…the affairs of government and business touched or merged at many

points."[207] By the eve of World War I complex bureaucracies existed in both

business and government. However, national security concerns required government

control of economic mobilization due to the risk of dire consequences to the nation if

market forces could not meet demand for war materials. Koistinen argued the War

Industries Board (WIB) was the most important board during the War. It determined

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[204]Christopher Gabel, *Railroad Generalship: Foundations of Civil War Strategy* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Combat Studies Institute, 1997), 12, 13.

[205]Ibid.

[206]Ibid., 4.

[207]Ibid.

the conversion of businesses to produce military hardware, as well as the priority,

allocation, and price of wartime materials.[208] He maintained that this model of

government - working interpedently with business and the military communities -

provided the precedent for military economic planning during the interwar years and

World War II.[209] Again, Koistinen's analysis conforms to Chandler and Gabel's

assessment that a professional class of managers emerged in the industrial era in

response to the increased technological advances.

In his latest book, *Arsenal of World War II: The Political Economy of*

American Warfare, 1940-1945, Koistinen detailed the complex set of boards and

offices that were established for managing the political economy for World War II.

In short, this history demonstrated the political struggle between the various interest

groups over how to best coordinate or control the means of war production for the

nation. One the one hand, the military and business had continued defense

coordination in the interwar years though several coordination boards. Some of these

included the War Resources Board (WRB) and supported the guidance of the

Industrial Mobilization Plan.[210] On the other hand, President Roosevelt deeply

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[208]Ibid., 5, 137, 188.

[209]Although Koistinen outlines his framework in his first book, his other books provide a more detailed analysis of the subsequent periods. *Mobilizing for Modern War: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1865-1919* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1997); *Planning War, Pursuing Peace: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1920-1939*(Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1998); and *Arsenal of World War II: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1940-1945*(Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2004).

[210]Paul Koistinen, *Arsenal of World War II: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1940-1945*(Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 17. There were at least 18 Commissions, Bureaus, Boards, or divisions within the Office of the Executive alone. Koistinen describes the history and purpose of them all in this book. He has a summary organizational chart that

wanted to oversee control of the means of war production. The Reorganization Act of 1939 provided the authority for Roosevelt to establish the Executive Office of the President. Within the executive office, he established the National Resources Planning Board and the Office for Emergency Management (OEM). Roosevelt envisioned all other boards and commissions working under the authority OEM and therefore under his supervision of the executive branch.[211] In 1940, Roosevelt reestablished the National Defense Advisory Commission (NDAC) that had been utilized in World War I. The composition of the board brings the discussion back to the role of managers and elites in the organization. Roosevelt selected several leaders of industry; the heads of: U.S. Steel, General Motors, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, Association of American Railroads, and a professor from the University of North Carolina.[212] The nation's reliance on the best and the brightest from industry - or as Koistinen states "the elite class"- in times of national emergency supports his argument that a professional class of managers was needed for political economic mobilization of the nation for war.

Since the 1940s, the military has adopted contemporary business management practices to manage the production and distribution of weapons systems. On a

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displays the structure of the major boards on page 19. There were other boards, like the Army Navy Munitions Board (ANMB) that are not represented as part of the Executive Office.

[211]Paul Koistinen, *Arsenal of World War II: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1940-1945*(Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 15.

[212]Ibid., 18. See also John Whiteclay Chambers's book, *To Raise and Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America (*New York, NY: The Free Press, 1987), Which outlines the political conditions and steps taken by leaders of industry to prepare and mobilize the nation for war.

broader scale, the Department of Defense, Congress, and the President provide strategic guidance and may have divergent interests; Similarly Koistinen argued bitter disputes existed between Roosevelt and Secretary of War Stinson over control of war mobilization.[213] Herbert Leventhal, the historian of the Army Material Command, detailed the role of project managers in the military in his work, *U.S. Army Material Command: Project Management in the Army Material Command, 1962-1987*. Project managers provided an organizational solution for achieving the objectives of specific programs. Project managers were granted the sole authority and responsibility for managing a project to produce a final product, without any separate functional interests in another Army headquarters command.   He contended that the first modern example of this type of organization "occurred in the 1940s and was called the Manhattan Project, which developed the Atomic Bomb."[214]   Later in 1955, he noted, the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) was formed to oversee the Jupiter Missile Program. In 1962, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara established the Army Material Command to oversee the production and distribution of Army systems.   Leventhal contends that McNamara's initiative expanded the project manager's role. He reports that this role includes "all phases of development, procurement, production, distribution, and support of a balanced program to ensure

[213]Paul Koistinen, *Arsenal of World War II: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1940-1945*(Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 15.

[214]Herbert A. Leventhal, *U. S. Army Material Command: Project Management in the Army Material Command, 1962-1987* (Alexandria, Virginia: Historical Office U.S. Army Material Command, 1992), 4. This was not solely an Army project, yet it provides an example of an early War department defense effort.

that all employment schedules were met."[215] This short history of military project

management and political and economic mobilization provides a foundation for

further analysis of the doctrinal and organizational changes that occurred in the

Army.[216]

Conclusion

The Army Functional Life Cycle Model similarly incorporated the concept of

the project manager using a team approach to coordinate the management of change

or modernization. Teams were established to coordinate projects; they included

representatives from the different organizations that are responsible for the eight

functions of the model. Trefry provided management of Army programs with a

codified inspection methodology that identified systemic faults and provided a means

to correct them. He developed a trained set of inspectors and founded a school to

implement these changes at every level of the Army. Further, he developed a model

that served as a management tool to ensure a holistic approach to managing change of

complex interdependent systems. Trefry's approach to change resembles many of the

change initiatives of managers of large corporations in the 1970s and 1980s.

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[215]Leventhal, U. S. Army Material Command, 4, 5, 6.

[216]Ibid.

Chapter Four

Findings: The History of the Army Force Management School

The history of the U. S. Army Force Management School (USAFMS) provides further insight into the management of change in the Army. As the previous chapters have established, the Army continually adapts to changes in the global security environment, national policy, technology, doctrine, and resource availability. Chapter Three addressed the role of the Army inspectors general in developing and establishing the Army Organizational Life Cycle Model as a tool to manage change within the Army. However, oversight of the daily activities required to manage change within the Army is not the main focus of the inspectors general. Lieutenant General Trefry recognized that the scope and complexity of managing change throughout the Army in the 1970s and 1980s required a trained group of professionals. These professionals needed a holistic view of the Army bureaucracy in order to increase efficiency in a resource constrained environment. In response to this challenge, the Army established a specialized school which raised senior officials' awareness of the holistic perspective required to manage change within the Army. Trefry, once again, played an essential role in the establishment of this school - the U.S. Army Force Management School (USAFMS). This chapter explores the development of the USAFMS as well as the creation of a series of charts that document many of the force management initiatives that have occurred within the

Army since 1940.[217]   These charts are referred to as the Mother of All Charts (MOAC).

Trefry recalled that in 1993, after he had left White House as the Military Assistant to President George H. W. Bush and the Director of the White House Military Office, he met with Vice Chief of Staff of the Army General Dennis Reimer and Army Operations Officer Army General Binford Peay. Reimer and Peay mentioned that they had just received a functional area assessment report on modernization that was discouraging. They were both familiar with Trefry's work on force management as The Inspector General of the Army in the 1980s. They asked Trefry to assemble a team to investigate the status of force management in the Army. Trefry was obviously interested in what had happened to the force management initiatives began in the 1980s. Trefry recalled, "So we went around the Army (in 1993) and found that all the schools had evaporated."[218]

Force Management Training since the 1980s

Chapter Three identified the origins of Army force management and the role of the inspector general in developing a program of instruction for force management in the 1980s. The Inspector General School incorporated the functional life cycle model of the Army (FLCM) into the inspection training program. This training provided the inspectors with a holistic understanding of the systemic causes of the

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[217]Charts available online at the U.S. Army Force Management School, http://160.147.135.6 /afms /introduction.po; (accessed 22 February 2009).

[218]Richard Trefry, Interview with author, 18 December 2007, tape 1.

inspection deficiencies they encountered in the Army.   However, Trefry's 1993 investigation revealed that although the Army recognized the importance of an integrated force management training program in the 1980s, no organizational structure was created to ensure the continuation of the educational initiatives he championed while on active duty. When he retired in 1983, four courses were envisioned - 1) force developers, 2) training developers, 3) personnel specialists, and 4) logisticians - to train a cadre of force management specialists.

First, a force developer's school offered a four week long course at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. "Believe it or not, the Force Development School lasted nine years and was run by contractors from the Allen Corporation between 1982 through 1991."[219] "However", he stated, "By 1988, the contract was down to just one instructor, who had been a program manager in the signal field. The course began to closely resemble the Program Manager's Course at Fort Belvoir."[220] By 1991, "General Mike Steele was the Commandant at Fort Leavenworth and he told me that they could no longer support the contract and had to eliminate the course."[221] This was largely due to a reduction in budget resources.[222]

A second school was also located at Fort Leavenworth.   Trefry stated, "A training developer's course was established at Fort Leavenworth in 1983. It only

[219]Ibid.

[220]Ibid.

[221]Ibid.

[222]Gregory Beck, CGSC Force Management Course Director, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Interview with author, 19 November 2009.

lasted six months and graduated two classes."[223]   The third school was located at Fort

Benjamin Harrison, Indiana to train personnel specialists. Trefry recalled that he

spoke to every class at this school. It was a four week course and was also eliminated

by 1990. He remembered, "Bill Richardson and Carl Vouno were the Commandants.

They were very supportive. But in the mid 1980s, the Army began to look at the

school at Leavenworth as a senior Captain's course and they really believed that force

management didn't have a place in this (instruction)."[224]

This lack of understanding of the importance of force management to the

Army school system speaks volumes on the divide between training the institutional

army for success and training the operational Army for success. Although there is

only one U.S. Army there are many specialties or tribes within the Army. Within the

Operational Army there are combat arms, combat support, and combat service

support elements that all have their own heritage, culture, and community of

significant others. In a sense, these tribes all cooperate to support the overall mission

of the nation, but they have different internal parochial priorities. The operational

Army consists of numbered armies, corps, divisions, brigades, and battalions that

conduct full spectrum operations around the world.[225] The Institutional Army

supports the operational Army and provides the infrastructure necessary to raise,

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[223]Richard Trefry, Interview with author, 18 December 2007, tape 1.

[224]Ibid. (The Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CASSS)) was the Captain's Career Course referenced by LTG Trefry).

[225]Available from: http://www.army.mil/info/organization; (accessed 16 March 2010).

train, equip, deploy, and provide the readiness of all Army forces.[226] Much of the instruction at the institutional school system is focused on training the operational forces for combat. Many staff officers are required to complete the missions of the institutional Army and have to learn their staff skills and responsibility through on the job training. There are many reasons for this phenomenon, but the lack of institutional foresight to train should not be one of them.[227]

Lastly, a fourth course was envisioned at Fort Lee, Virginia for logisticians. Trefry stated, "The logistician's course never got off the ground because there were no resources to support it."[228] Collectively, including the Inspectors General School, these five courses lasted many years and had a great impact on raising awareness of a holistic approach to force management in the Army. The establishment of these schools indicated that force management was recognized as an important concept in the Army in the 1980s. However, adequate resources were not dedicated to maintain these initiatives into the 1990s. Since resources were not allocated to sustain these initial initiatives, the relative importance of force management to the Army can be doubted. In a large bureaucracy like the Army, however, the lack of resources for

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[226]Ibid.

[227]Gregory Beck, CGSC Force Management Course Director, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Interview with author, 19 November 2009.

[228]Richard Trefry, Interview with author, 18 December 2007, tape 1.

force management training can be attributed to a number of factors other than "lack of relative importance of the concept."[229]

The importance of force management to the Army can also be measured by the importance placed on the selection of Army Inspectors General because they were the first officers trained in force management. Trefry recalled, "When Bernie Rogers was the Chief of Staff of the Army in 1976 he gave me top priority to select the Inspectors General."[230] Rogers said, "If you really want to understand the Army you have got to get out and see it and you've got these schools going and they are just making a hell of a difference, and they did."[231] Trefry added, "By 1983, when I retired, the Inspector General School was firmly established. Nearly half of the general officers selected in 1984 had been former inspectors general. No longer was an inspector general position seen as a career ending position."[232] The high rate of selection to general officer implies that at the senior Army levels force management experience was still considered valuable in the 1980s.

The National Guard and reserve components also benefited from the Inspectors General School. Trefry reminisced, "One morning I was having breakfast

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[229]For a detailed history of Force management instruction at Fort Leavenworth, See also: Eric Hollister, "A History of Force Management Instruction at the Command and General Staff College", U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Department of Logistics and Resource Operations. January 2009; and Nicholas Cherchio, "The Evolution of Force Management," A Force Management Update: AFMS Quarterly Newsletter, April 2006, 9. Available from http://www.afms1.belvoir army .mil; (accessed 14 January 2010).

[230]Richard Trefry, Interview with author, 18 December 2007, tape 1.

[231]Ibid.

[232]Ibid.

with the Secretary of Defense, the Chief of the Guard Bureau, and the Chief of the

Army Reserve. I asked the Chiefs what they would think if I offered them an active

duty Army Colonel to be their Inspector General. Well, the National Guard thought it

would be a hell of a good idea."[233] The Reserve declined the offer because they

preferred to have a reservist trained for the position at the Inspector General School.

Trefry explained,

> We thought we'd start out small and he picked about six states: New Jersey, Tennessee, California, and Oklahoma were among the first. I got a phone call a little later about how this program just turned into a howling success. One of the state Adjutant Generals (Karl Wallace from Tennessee) called me and said, "I nodded and really didn't know what I was getting into when I agreed to this program." But he then said, "This has turned out to be one of the best decisions I ever made. I tell the other Adjutant Generals the best thing they can do is to get an active duty Colonel as their Inspector General." So that's the way it grew.[234]

As the previous chapter discussed, the Inspector General School provided the

initial force management training in the Army and became the basis of the USAFMS.

The history of the USAFMS therefore builds on the history of the Inspector General

School. Trefry recounted how the USAFMS was founded at Fort Belvoir. "Right

before I retired, I went down to see the Chief of Engineers at Fort Belvoir, Virginia

and asked him for a building where we could permanently run the Inspector General

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[233]Ibid.

[234]Ibid.

School. He provided the building (Humphrey Hall) that we still use today for the Inspector General School."[235]

Force management training was also included in the curriculum for all officers attending the Command and General Staff College and the Army War. Major Eric Hollister completed a review of the existing course catalogs for the Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSC) conducted at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas in a 2009 monograph examining the "History of Force Management Education at the Command and General Staff College." He argued that some aspects of force management training have been present in the college curriculum since 1933. He considered force management as any instruction related to nine basic fields: "General Force Management; Force Development (FD); Material Development; Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE); Force Generation; Manning; Total Army Analysis (TAA); Force Integration; and Case Study".[236] He argued that the number of hours associated with a block of instruction was an indication of the amount of relative emphasis placed upon force management. His analysis established

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[235]Army Force Management School Administrative Policy and Procedures Guide, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 15 February 1995: Humphrey's Hall, Building 247 is the building that was allocated for the school. Comments see: Trefry, Interview with author, 18 December 2007, tape 1.

[236]Eric Hollister, "A History of Force Management Instruction at the Command and General Staff College", U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Department of Logistics and Resource Operations. January 2009. 2. However, he does not provide any definitions of these terms or detailed explanation of the course material to substantiate his characterization of a course of instruction as a force management course. While these generalizations may be supported by the evidence, his analysis is not thoroughly explained and therefore his conclusions are severely weakened. An overly broad definition of force management could imply that nearly anything that involved the administration or sustainment of the Army could be categorized as force management related instruction. Notwithstanding these issues, His analysis still supports the trend that hours of instruction declined from 1985 to 1993.

that the number of hours associated with "force management" instruction at CGSC

has varied dramatically since the 1930s. His charts demonstrate that between 1985

and 1993, force management instruction hours declined dramatically.[237] Trefry also

identified a similar trend of reduction in other force management courses in his

investigation.

In June 1993, Trefry's investigation team published their findings entitled the

Final Report- U.S. Army Force Management.[238] The report identified nine "key

issues" from the detailed findings addressed in the final report. It also contained

fifteen recommendations; nine of which addressed the nine key issues. The nine key

recommendations were approved by Reimer for immediate action. Based on the

experience of the loss of resources for force management training at the service

schools, Trefry believed that a force management school should be established in the

National Capital Region under the oversight of the Army Staff. This location would

facilitate the training of specialists in force management, as well as senior members

of the Army staff, with a minimum of expense or disruption because most of the

Army Staff is assigned to the National Capital Region. The location would also

facilitate the Chief of Staff of the Army's visibility over force management training.

Many force management initiatives are managed by the Army staff. The location also

supports the integration of force management issues being coordinated by the Army

[237]Eric Hollister, "A History of Force Management Instruction at the Command and General Staff College", U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Department of Logistics and Resource Operations. January 2009. Chart One.

[238]United States Department of the Army. Office of the Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. *Final Report - U.S. Army Force Management Study* (30 June 1993), 22.

staff into the curriculum. Further, Trefry recommended that the school be organized

under the G-3 of the Army rather than under TRADOC to prevent another dilution of

resources over time. The Inspector General School at Fort Belvoir, Virginia already

provided some force management training so it was a likely location for a force

management specialty school. Accordingly, one of the final report recommendations,

adopted by Reimer, directed the establishment of a force management training site in

the National Capital Region.[239]

Reimer asked Trefry if he would like to run the school based on his

experience with the Inspector General School. He told Reimer, "I would love too but

I'm not sure that it is legal, (for) I'm the one who came up with this stuff."[240] The

Adjutant General of the Army, at Reimer's request, determined that Trefry could

compete for the position as long as an open competition was allowed. There were

three competitors for the contract, but Military Professional Resources Incorporated

(MPRI) received the contract to establish the USAFMS on 24 June 1994. The first

test course started 1 October of that year as a three week class and contained fifty

students. The class has been offered six times each year since then.[241] USAFMS

serves the Army as an educational institution for preparing senior leaders, both

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[239]Ibid.

[240]Richard Trefry, Interview with author 18 December 2007, Fort Belvoir, VA; Track A0023, (1:11:26).

[241]Trefry interview with author 18 December 2007, Fort Belvoir, VA; Track A0023, (1:11:46). See also Nicholas Cherchio, "The Evolution of Force Management," A Force Management Update: AFMS Quarterly Newsletter, April 2006, 9. Available from http://www.afms1.belvoir army .mil; (accessed 14 January 2010).

military and civilian, entering the force management worldwide community. The

contract has been competed several times since then but no competitor has shown

interest in running the school. MPRI has been running the school continuously under

the G3 since 1994.   "Since contract inception the USAFMS has provided in excess of

20,000 graduates, and averages 3,500 students per year. The USAFMS provides the

only means to teach the Army how the Army runs versus the TRADOC School

System, which teaches how the Army fights."[242] Many of the instructors at the

Inspector General School were the Army force management subject matter experts.

The existing school contract expires in 2010.   The Department of the Army,

Defense Contracting Command-Washington, Contracting Center of Excellence has

solicited inquiries for this opportunity. A brief excerpt from the solicitation provides

additional insight to the purpose and scope of work performed at the USAFMS. It

demonstrates the technical expertise required to understand the complex relationships

between Army systems that constitute force management:

> To procure a contractor(s) who shall provide overall operational and
> programmatic support to the Force Management School: to provide in-depth
> education and training to both military and civilian personnel in the entire
> spectrum of Force Management, Force Development, and Force Integration to
> include the why and how to of determining force requirements and alternative
> means of resourcing. The contract will provide for the focusing of force
> capabilities centered upon the processes, system of systems and regulatory
> basis of force management and the capabilities that must be sustained through
> management of doctrinal, organizational and materiel change. The Army
> Force Management School is a government owned contract operated school

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[242]Toye Latimore, Contracting Officer, Department of the Army, Defense Contracting
Command-Washington, Contracting Center of Excellence, Army Contracting Agency (ACA),
Contracting Center of Excellence, Army Contracting Agency (ACA), Policy and Compliance, 5200
Army Pentagon, Room 1D245, Washington, DC 20310-5200 FBO# 2678. Available from: http://
www. fbodaily.com/archive/2009/03-March/27-Mar-2009/FBO-01778055.htm; (accessed 20 January
2010).

which provides consolidated and cost effective Force Management education and training to both Military and Civilian force Management Analyst, and to provide the means of maintaining currency of specified Army Force Management publications, regulations, manuals, pamphlets, circulars and associated documents, providing review, updating, and publication of force management related publications. Businesses are to outline their experiences in the following areas: 1) Organization Design and Analysis 2) Force Development 3) Capabilities Based Requirements Generation 4) The Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS 5) Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS 6) Force Management Education and Training and lastly 7) Doctrine.[243]

Reimer became the Chief of Staff of the Army 20 June 1995. He was interested in how force modernization training was progressing in the Army and at the USAFMS. He made a visit to the school in January 1996. Trefry recalled, "I had a blackboard with me and basically, I described the two (Army) missions. There is an organization mission, and there is a fighting mission, and Reimer said "what's this?" I said this is Army force management. He said "take me through it," so I did."[244] Reimer was very interested in the information and embraced the program. Reimer said:

> Okay, I want every officer in the Army to hear this. I want you (Trefry) to go out to charm school (Army 'Capstone' initial general officer development program) and give this same briefing. I want thirty two hours of curriculum instruction-mandatory for the Army War College and Leavenworth as a core course, and I want a thirty two hour elective course at Leavenworth (CGSC) and the War College.[245]

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[243]Ibid.

[244]Richard Trefry, Interview with author 18 December 2007, Fort Belvoir, VA; Track A0023, (00:53:00).

[245]Ibid., Track A0023, (00:54:00). Also see: Directive confirmed at the War College and the Command and General Staff College; Dave Drummond "CGSC Resource Management Division Memorandum, Subject: Change to C430 Course, Memorandum, 1996.

Trefry continued, "You can imagine what a response this got. Everybody screamed like hell at TRADOC. They didn't have to furnish anything but it was the idea of taking people away from the tactical focus. People would come to class kicking and screaming. After they had been here about a week they said, "Jeez what else do you teach?"[246]

Reimer mandated instruction at the two Army schools, The Army War College and CGSC, institutionally responsible to develop the future senior leaders of the Army. Force management instruction has remained a part of the core curriculum at the Army War College through 2010. However, in 2003, the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) instruction once again has been reduced to facilitate the transition to universal Intermediate Level Education (ILE). The ILE transition involved providing resident education opportunities to all eligible Army officers, rather than the prior system that provided instruction to approximately half of all officers. This transition reduced the contact hours available as the core course was shortened from ten months to approximately three months for required core instruction. In 2003, the course was reduced from thirty-four hours by ten hours and the information was provided on a computer disk for self study. After two years, the self study requirement was also dropped and the course was left at twenty-four hours. In 2006, the CGSC Commandant, Brigadier General Volney Warner reduced the force management instruction to sixteen hours per year in order to incorporate Middle

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[246]Ibid. See also: Dave Drummond, "CGSC Resource Management Division Memorandum Addressing Directed Change to C430 Course", 1996; This memo substantiates the comments Trefry recalled from Reimer. Also confirmed with Gregory Beck, the Force Management Course Director at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas during this period.

East regional studies instruction.[247] Gregory Beck, the course director recalled, "He directed that CGSC majors didn't need 'strategic' level force management stuff -like planning, programming, budgeting, and execution, or material acquisition. The course needed to address 'current' stuff - that operations officers and executive officers needed - that the army was dealing with at the tactical level."[248] Although the course director disagreed with the rationale, the hierarchal nature of the organization ensured that the decision would be carried out enthusiastically. Two additional hours were recently added back to the course to address contracting. A force management elective is also offered at CGSC and taken by approximately sixteen officers per year.[249]

The reduction of training in force management at the major level has a greater impact than it may appear. Senior level commanders must understand force management and the relationships between systems in the Army. The problem becomes balancing training requirements with utilization assignments. Many positions are not coded for a force management specialist because of the limitations on manpower and associated structure.[250] Yet understanding the relationship between

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[247]Gregory Beck, CGSC Force Management Course Director, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Interview with author, 19 November 2009.

[248]Ibid.

[249]Ibid. Greg Beck implied that he feared losing his job based on his strong opposition to the changes he was required to make.

[250]Requirements are provided for organizations through tables of organizations and equipment (TOE) for combat units, and tables of distribution and allowances (TDA) for non-doctrinally based units which a TOE does not exist. Requirements may exist but manpower limitations may not support

systems is critical to the efficient operations of the Army.   If an officer is not going

to be assigned to a force management coded position, it is unlikely that they will

attend the USAFMS. Personnel in many other positions - than the few specialty

coded positions - require an understanding of force management to effectively

manage the Army. Yet, as discussed, they only receive limited instruction at the

CGSC before they are assigned to positions that would benefit from their increased

awareness. It is difficult to quantify the impact of additional force management

training, yet it is likely that there would be benefits. Trefry understood this dilemma

and stated: "There is not a day that goes by that the Army is not in need of Force

Management. People forget that the mission of the Secretary of the Army is very

simple, he raises, provisions, and resources the Army. He does not fight. The people

who fight are the Combatant Commanders, not the Chiefs either; the chiefs assist the

Secretaries."[251] Trefry's comment reflects the difference between the operational and

institutional Army and are founded in Title 10 of the U.S. Code and the UCP.[252]

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all the requirements so prioritization of authorizations and hence requirements coding exist. Available
from: http://www.history.army.mil/ht ml/forcestruc/tda-ip.html; (accessed 17 March 2010).

[251]Trefry, Interview with author 18 December 2007, Fort Belvoir, VA; Track A0033,
(0:33:18).

[252]United States Code, Title 32, Section 161. Responsibilities of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff. Available from: http://www.house.gov/hasc/comdocs/reports/Title10UnitedStatesCode.pdf;
(accessed 10 December 2007); See also Center for Military History discussion of the origins of
differences between line and staff units: "During the nineteenth century the Army called these
categories staff and line. The staff consisted of various departments and corps, including The Adjutant
General's Department, Quartermaster Department, Medical Department, Corps of Engineers, Ordnance
Department, and Signal Corps. The line consisted of cavalry, artillery, and infantry regiments. The
former may be considered the predecessors of today's TDA units, while the latter may be thought of as
today's table of organization and equipment (TOE) units" Available from: http://www.history.army.
mil/html/forcestruc/tda-ip.html; (accessed 17 March 2010).

There are two main parts to the Army, figuratively referred to as the tip of the spear and the shaft. The tip of the spear represents the fighting forces and the shaft represents the forces that support the fighting forces, just as the shaft supports or enables the tip of a spear. The supporting forces must understand how to manage the resources to ensure the tip of the spear – the fighting forces - have their combat capabilities when they are required. Majors and lieutenant colonels serve in key staff positions at every level of the Army. Many do so after completing CGSC but before attending the Army War College. Universal attendance at the CGSC level provides an opportunity to influence every future senior leader of the Army at approximately their thirteenth year of their career - before critical staff utilization assignments. Attendance at the Army War College is based on a centralized selection board that typically selects six percent of the eligible population at an average of twenty-three years of service. Many of the majors and lieutenant colonels retire when they reach twenty years of service and are never considered for attendance. Therefore, foregoing the opportunity to teach the majors at CGSC has a much greater impact on the education of the Army than it may initially appear. Much of the eligible population is missed by the current instruction methodology because it is projected too late in the officer's career- either after retirement or after staff assignment.[253] Ironically, the current reduction in force management training in the Army is exactly the condition

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[253]As one of eight CGSC force management instructors, I taught one eighth of the students in each year during 2001and 2002. I received approximately twelve emails or calls a year from former students thanking me for the instruction and explaining how critical it was to their understanding and ability to perform in their follow-on assignment after CGSC. Many of the other instructors had similar experiences. These unsolicited comments endorse the importance of teaching the Army officers while majors, rather than the current system which waits until they attend the Army War College.

Trefry reported in the 1993 *Final Report* that led Reimer to mandate instruction at CGSC and the Army War College.

All force management instructors at CGSC attend the Advanced Force Management Course at the USAFMS located at Fort Belvoir, Virginia as part of their instructor qualification training.[254] The course consists of four weeks of comprehensive instruction that explicates the Army Flow Model. Chapter Two detailed how the Army determines the national military objectives utilizing the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS).[255] At the USAFMS a series of charts are mounted to the walls on the second floor of the building (Humphrey Hall). These charts provide a graphic representation of many events that have shaped the Army since 1940. Collectively, the charts are known as the Mother of all Charts (MOAC).

Findings: The History of the Mother of All Charts

The Mother of All Charts (MOAC) currently traces twenty-seven themes and consists of over one hundred separate charts. Each chart is approximately three feet by six feet. Senior executives, of both military and civilian organizations, have displayed these charts during numerous conferences and planning sessions.

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[254]Gregory Beck, CGSC Force Management Course Director, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Interview with author, 19 November 2009.

[255]The Army Flow Model is also known as the Army Force Management Model by the AFMS. It graphically depicts the interrelations between: the Joint Strategic Planning System, The Capabilities Integration and Development System, The Total Army Analysis, The Defense Acquisition Management System, The Planning Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System, and the Personnel and Material Acquisition, Training and Distribution Systems. Collectively, they determine establish the requirements and authorizations to field combat ready troops. Available from: http://www .afms1.belvoir.army.mil/model placemat; (accessed 18 March 2010).

Collectively, these charts represent an impressive amount of information. They provide an eclectic display of historical data and trends spanning from 1940 to the present. They represent the history of the Army and the nation. Coupled with the history of the USAFMS, these charts provide a foundation to consider the broader topics of Army force management and national security policy formulation. The USAFMS maintains the charts with inputs from a variety of sources. They have also digitized the charts and made them available online linked to a detailed Oracle database. The school acknowledges that the charts will never be complete because, similar to history, new information is always being uncovered that must be added to the data base.

In 1999, Scott Wilson joined MPRI and began work on the MOAC and has maintained the data base that supports the charts ever since.[256] Lieutenant Colonel Scott Wilson worked on the Army Staff in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Force Development, Force Management and Integration Division from 1987 until he retired in 1993. Wilson was an Air Defense Artillery officer with experience in numerous command and staff positions throughout his career of over twenty years. He worked in the Department of the Army Office of the Inspector General between 1980 and 1981 when many of the changes to the inspection methodology, which were discussed in Chapter Three, occurred. He described the charts:

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[256]Scott Wilson, Interview with author, Fort Belvoir, VA, 17 January 2008.

The charts are comparatively easy to read. The left-hand margin displays the category of information with the years depicted horizontally across charts for the 1940 to 2000 time period. Ideally, the charts would be stacked one upon the other in one column and you could then scan up and down to see the relationships of events and people and the following effects: Actions and reactions; intended an unintended consequences; initiatives and competence; doctrine leading technology or technology leading doctrine; and, sequential but simultaneous accomplishment of events.[257]

The creation of the MOAC can be traced back to Lieutenant General Trefry. He needed a teaching tool, or training aide, that visually expressed the complex force development relationships. He wanted to use historical examples to demonstrate how the Army functional life cycle model (FLCM), and force development provide a comprehensive understanding of change in the Army. Curiously, the MOAC mirrored Trefry's own career that began before the start of World War II and still continues today as the program manager of the AFMS. Trefry recalled that he had dealt with modernization and changes to Army units throughout his career and found it fascinating.[258] He described the purpose of the FLCM model in a 1982 Army magazine article entitled, "The IG: Inspector but a Teacher, Too":

> To meet the dynamics of force modernization and to develop a means for Army personnel at all levels to better understand how the Army runs….Using the model, inspectors, commanders and managers are better able to evaluate the entire spectrum of Army operations, to describe them in proper perspective, and relate them in a context that is illustrative, meaningful, and comprehensible.[259]

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[257]Scott Wilson, USAFMS MOAC, "What is the MOAC?" Available from http://www afms1 .belvoir.army.mil; (accessed 14 January 2010).

[258]Trefry, Interview with author 18 December 2007, Fort Belvoir, VA; Track A0033, (0:33:18).

[259]Richard G. Trefry, "The IG: Inspector But a Teacher, Too," *ARMY Managing Modernization Green Book 1982-1983*, (October 1982): 132.

The Army FLCM had been utilized as the basis of an inspection methodology since 1982. By 1996, when Trefry developed the MOAC, he had over fourteen years of experience working with the FLCM. This familiarity provided the background to view the interrelationships between historical events and their consequences in different systems throughout the Army. He came back to his office one night in 1996 and drafted the first chart on a piece of butcher paper. These butcher paper charts are still displayed above his bookshelves on his office walls in Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The first charts portrayed the linkage from the National Security Strategy to the National Military Strategy and down through the Army systems. Each chart was connected to the adjoining charts by inputs and outputs from the force development functions. He described what the first charts looked like:

> Those are the originals. The purple lines that you see, you have to start on that chart up there and come down and then to the top of the next one and come down and over. There are the events leading to the people. It starts with the President and it finishes up with the Secretary of Defense. It comes down through the National Security Strategy and then the National Military Strategy. Then you go back up here to organizational change and all those things in red up at the top here… and that is it. Those are the divisions in red, World War I, World War II, and Korea. Then you get into development, and culture, and personnel, and I tracked those things up until about the end of 1996; I think was the last one. The green lines are reorganizations.[260]

Trefry recalled, "The Army is a system of systems how I can get that across? I mentioned that the people determine the national security (through voting), and then

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[260]Trefry, Interview with author, 18 December 2007, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Tape Track 25, page 18.

we get the national military stuff, and then we go into the domains."[261] He started his

charts with the domains of acquisition, training, distribution, deployment,

sustainment, development, and separation that are referred to as the functions in the

Army functional life cycle model (FLCM).[262]

These domains can be traced to a term that is more familiar to many in the

Army today: DOTLMS, or doctrine, organizations, training, leader development,

material, and soldiers.[263] Similarly, DOTLMS served as a model to analyze major

areas of change within the Army. General Vouno adopted these six functions and

first published them in the 1986 Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)

commander's annual update in *Army* magazine. TRADOC historian John Romjue

chronicled much of the doctrinal changes in the Army in a series of TRADOC

historical monographs; however, he does not examine the origin of the term

DOTLMS before 1986.[264] When Trefry discussed the development of the first

MOAC chart, he recalled the term DOTLMS actually originated in 1984: "General

Thurman was a great man on principles and one morning we met for breakfast and he

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[261]Ibid., 19.

[262]See Chapter Three for a more complete discussion of the development of the functional life cycle model of the Army and the role of the inspectors general.

[263]Doughty, *The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946 -- 1976.* These domains are often referred to by the acronym DOTLMS and can be traced back to the Army Green Book, OCT 1987. These have been expanded now to include DOTLMSPF– Added PF for personnel and facilities. Available from http://www.tradoc.army.mil/historian/faqs.htm; (accessed 24 November, 2009).

[264]Romjue, see his series of works as the TRADOC Historian listed in bibliography including. *TRADOC Historical Monograph Series - The Army of Excellence: the Development of the 1980s Army.* Fort Monroe, Virginia: Historical Office United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1982.

said, 'What are the principles of force management.' I said, I don't know, let's make something up. I've still got the napkin they were written on. …This was in April 1984. He was the Vice (CSA); Yeah 1984, they have stood the test of time."[265]

General Maxwell Thurman was an ordnance officer that served in a variety of command and staff positions culminating as Commander, U.S. Southern Command Overseeing the invasion of Panama to capture General Noriega.   He also served as an artillery battalion commander during the Tet offensive in Vietnam; the Commander, Army Training and Doctrine Command; and the Commander, Army Recruiting Command when the slogan "Be all that you can be" was adopted. Similar to Trefry, he was a bachelor and a tireless leader who would spend many hours at the office.[266]

Over time many other chart themes emerged.   DOTLMS is now divided into several different charts chronicled on the MOAC. As of January 2010, the MOAC had evolved into an electronic database. The hard copy charts still exists.   Mr. Scott Wilson has been steadily converting the existing documents in the archive into electronic formats.   New material continues to be cataloged and stored electronically. Trefry determines which of the documents he believes are of sufficient historical significance for Wilson to archive from his daily correspondence. Much of the cultural or social events have been subjectively added to the charts based on Trefry's judgment. The abundant data points on the chart can now be expanded through the

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[265]Trefry, Richard, Interview with Author 18 December 2007, Fort Belvoir, VA; Track A0031: (00:04:18).

[266]Arlington National Cemetery Website, available from: http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/mthur man.htm; (accessed 19 March 2010).

"Microsoft Visio" program to reveal a greater level of detail. They are also cataloged in a searchable Oracle database. For example, the Threat theme chart is one of eighty-eight digitized charts that have many subcategories depicted on them. Trefry described some of them, "Threats can be personalities, they can be economic, they can be political, they can be regicide, they can be assassinations, and they can be holocausts."[267] The data base contains more items than can be represented by each data point on the chart. Trefry explained, "The State Department puts out a publication that lists the threats since World War II. They have identified over seven thousand of them. I haven't even seen some of them. We picked some of the major ones to put on the chart."[268] Clicking on the bottom of each of these points opens a new set of data points. Some of these similarly open another supporting level of detail. It is similar to a wiring diagram that has branches extending from each subsequent level of the chart. An example of the Geopolitical chart is provided below.

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[267]Ibid., (00:04:47).

[268]Ibid., (00:04:50).

Figure 5.   The Mother of All Charts Electronic Database.[269]

Figure Five provides an example of the capabilities of the electronic database.

A "tree search" provides an outline view of the data represented on the chart. The

Geopolitical chart expands to the subcategories of "people, nuclear weapons, School

of the Americas, conferences & conventions, incidents, conflicts, boards, studies,

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[269]U.S. Army Force Management School Website, Mother of All Charts, Tree Search, Geopolitical. Available from: http://160.147.135.6/afms/charts.po; (accessed 21 January 2010).

publications, and legislation."[270] Selecting the category people returns forty-five

records. Selecting the dates listed in the third row, 1 March 1941- 3 August 1944,

displayed a box with the summary "Truman Committee: Senate Committee to

Investigate the National Defense Program formed on 1 Mar 1941; Truman appointed

chairman on 8 Mar 1941; Truman nominated for Vice President in July 1944;

resigned chairmanship of committee on 3 Aug 1944."[271] The database further

provided a link to the United States Senate site with an historical essay detailing the

Truman Committee. The Senate link also contained additional historical links for

further research.[272] Many pictures were also represented by the data points on the

charts. The archive collection of photographs was also impressive. The current

charts and databases are listed below:

- Events [Geopolitical, Threat, Mobilization, Military Actions, Joint & Combined Military Endeavors, Military Campaigns, Science & Technology, Army Culture, Army Reorganizations, Selective Service, Military Exercises, Installations (BRAC), and Security Assistance Programs]

- People [Presidents, Key Advisors, Joint Chiefs of Staff, OSD, Key Congressional Leaders, Army Secretariat and Army Staff, CINC's, Major Army Commanders]

- National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy

- Resources [Manpower, Dollars]

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[270]Ibid.

[271]Ibid.

[272]United States Senate, Historical Minute essays, The Truman Committee, 1941-1963. Available from http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/The_Truman_Committee.htm; (accessed 21 January 2010).

- DTLOMS [Doctrine Development, Training Development, Leader Development, Organization Development, Materiel Development, Soldier Support Systems]

- Information Systems

- Army Analysis Programs

- Major Combat Divisions [Regular Army, Army of the United States, Army National Guard, Army Reserve]

- Major Combat Brigades/Armored Cavalry Regiments [Regular Army, Army National Guard, Army Reserve]

- Branches of the Army [Coast Artillery, Air Defense, Field Artillery, Aviation, Armor, Engineers, Infantry, Signal, Military Intelligence, AG, Finance, Chaplain, Military History, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Transportation, etc.][273]

These chart themes have largely evolved from Trefry's imagination, although some have been "inspired by some of the subject matter experts working at USAFMS like Jim Camp, John Walsh, and John Albertson."[274] These subject matter experts are MPRI contractors on the faculty of the AFMS. Each is responsible for a specific area of instruction based on their experiences as career Army officers and continued work with the Army staff. Jim Camp is the Director of Instruction, John Walsh is a budget specialist, and John Albert is a logistics specialist.[275]

The branches of the Army MOAC charts are particularly interesting. There are twenty-four branches in the Army. Each has a unique culture based on a rich

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[273]Wilson, Scott, USAFMS "What is the Mother of All Charts?" Available from http://www .afms.belvoirarmy.mil; (accessed 14 January 2010).

[274]Trefry, Richard, Interview with author 19 December 2007, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Track 31, (00:04:18).

[275]Faculty biographies, the Army Force Management School, Available from http://www. afms1.belvoir.army.mil; (accessed 19 March 2010).

history of changing organizational structures, equipment fieldings, evolving missions, and distinguished leadership. These cultural components lie at the heart of force management. Trefry described his experience in the military as a field artillery officer since 1950. He started as a battery level officer dealing with the transition from one type artillery system to another. He managed his unit transition from eight inch artillery tubes to Honest John missiles. Later his unit transitioned to nuclear capable missiles. As a new general officer, in January 1971, he deployed to Thailand and oversaw the augmentation of the Laotian military. He summarized,

> You see now all of these things, every one of them is a force
> management competition and a lot of people don't know that. They
> think that force management is just about tactical troops. That's the
> easy stuff. It's the other issues that are more complicated. That you
> really have to sit down and think about this and ask, what do we want
> to do with this? Why do we need this? You have to keep a very close
> eye on technology… because when you bring a new piece of gear on,
> it probably means a change of MOS or two, or three… which also
> means a new school. …It's not all in the equipment. It just requires a
> complete a change all the way around.[276]

Scott Wilson was an Air Defense officer so he started with a MOAC Air Defense branch chart. He then developed one for the engineers. Some of the other MPRI instructors started charts for branches they were affiliated with. The branch schools periodically request copies of their charts.   As an example of some of the information maintained on the chart, Trefry recalled a trip to dedicate a building at the Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.   When he got there they unveiled the mission of the artillery branch and he was surprised that it was not the same one that

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[276]Trefry, Richard, Interview with author 18 December 2007, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Track 25, (00:39:58).

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he had remembered. That inspired him to research the missions of the Artillery branch. He discovered that the mission has been changed nine times by different branch chiefs. These changes are now incorporated on the Artillery Branch chart. Similarly equipment, organizations, and leadership changes are also captured.

Conclusion

The U.S. Army Inspector General School began force management instruction in 1980. The inspectors general were the first to receive force management instruction in the Army. The Army envisioned four other special courses to integrate force management into the Army during the 1980s. Although these courses were deemed important, they were not adequately resourced for sustained operations. VCSA Reimer asked Trefry to conduct and inspection of the force management training in the Army in 1993. Trefry's inspection team found that much of the force management instruction in the Army had been eliminated.   Ironically, the trend at the CGSC to reduce force management instruction in favor of more tactically focused topics has recently repeated itself in 2006.   The 1993 *Final Report – U.S. Army Force Management Study* recommended the establishment of a school in the National Capital Region to teach force management under the control of the Army G-3.   The recommendation was adopted by Reimer and the U.S. Army Force Management School was founded. The courses at this school provide a holistic appreciation of the relationships between systems in the Army that generate combat ready organizations. This comprehensive training is based on the functional life cycle model of the Army

(FLCM) taught at the U.S. Army Inspector General School.   Trefry created the

FLCM as well as the Mother of All Charts (MOAC).   The MOAC was created in

1996 to provide a visual representation of the complex relationships between systems

in the Army.   This analysis described how the MOAC was developed as a training

aid to demonstrate the complexities involved in modernization and managing change

in the Army. However, while the charts do not provide an in depth analysis of the

history surrounding each of the data points they represent, they display an impressive

collection of information for additional research. The MOAC has developed from a

butcher paper chart into an extensive electronic database that demonstrates the

linkages between historical events and the systems that constitute Army force

management.   Force management was still taught at both the Inspector General

School and the USAFMS in 2010.

Chapter Five

Civil-Military Relations

Discussion of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and The Army Organizational Life Cycle Model (AOLCM) provides valuable insight to the mechanics of defense planning. However, a broader question concerns the role of the military in providing leadership or executing the policy decisions of the civilian leadership in defense related matters. Chapter Two explored the constitutional basis for military subordination of the military to the Congress and executive branches of government. This chapter explores some of the dominant literature pertaining to civil-military relations to investigate the complex interrelationships that determine defense policy and execution.

On 8 December 2004, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld conducted a town hall style meeting with soldiers in Kuwait that was intended to boost the morale of the troops fighting in the Iraq War. Army Specialist Timothy Wilson asked, "Now, why do we soldiers have to dig through local landfills for pieces of scrap metal and compromised ballistic glass to up armor our vehicles and why don't we have those resources readily available to us?"[277] Wilson's comment represented the strained relationship between the military, which develop and execute a strategy to

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[277]Donald Rumsfeld, Response at a town hall meeting with soldiers at Camp Buehring in Kuwait, December 8, 2004. SPC Thomas Wilson's question: "Now, why do we soldiers have to dig through local landfills for pieces of scrap metal and compromised ballistic glass to up armor our vehicles and why don't we have those resources readily available to us?" http://www.accessmylibrary.com/ coms2/summary_0286-5379708 _ITM; (accessed 19 July 2008).

support policy, and the civilian administration, that determines policy and resources. Rumsfeld replied, "You go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time."[278] Although many have criticized Rumsfeld for a lack of imagination, stubbornness, and a failure to plan for likely consequences of many policy decisions surrounding the war, his response characterized the inherent complexity in developing and executing national security policy.[279] Perhaps a better example of inappropriate equipment for the realities of war occurred in World War II when the Army failed to anticipate the complexities of armored warfare and had a shortage of M3, 37 mm anti-tank guns. The guns that were on hand quickly became ineffective against German armored vehicles as armored technology improved.[280] Similarly, after defeating the Germans in Europe in World War II the U.S. Army was fatigued and faced serious resource shortages. Yet, the Army still had to prepare to defeat the Japanese in the Pacific.[281] In March 1946, General George C. Marshall commented to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Making war in a democracy is not a

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[278]Ibid.

[279]Michael Gordon, *Cobra II: the Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*, (New York, New York: Vintage Books, 2007), 555. This book highlights many of the planning problems and resulting hardships stemming from policy decisions.

[280]Example suggested by Theodore Wilson. The M3, 37 millimeter guns, quickly became ineffective in Europe as German armor improved. They were replaced by 57 millimeter guns in 1944. The Marines continued to use the M3 in the Pacific throughout the war. See Richard Anderson, "U.S. Army in World War II." Available from http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/usarmy/cavalry .aspx; (accessed 19 March 2010).

[281]Michael Pearlman, Warmaking and American Democracy: The Struggle over American Strategy, 1700 to the Present (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1999), 276.

bed of roses."[282]   His comment denoted the challenge and frustration that the military

faced when tasked with developing a strategy to achieve the civilian policy goal of

unconditional surrender from Japan.[283]   Strategy and policy are inextricably linked in

a democracy, with strategy subordinate and dependent upon policy. Policy goals

become the basis for the development of military objectives, regardless of military

readiness. As Wilson's and Marshall's comments represented the military and

Rumsfeld's comments represented the civilian perspectives. Neither comments

encompass all the motives and concerns at work behind the development of strategy

or policy, yet together they illustrate the complex challenges faced by both civilian

and military leaders in developing and executing national security policy in a

democracy.

In the United States, policy determination is ultimately the responsibility of

the President; however, the constitutional system of checks and balances provided

numerous opportunities for other actors to influence policy development and

execution. Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution established, "The President shall

be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States," which placed

civilian authority over the military.[284]   The military is required to execute policy

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[282]Ibid.

[283]Ibid.

[284]For further discussion of the court's interpretation of the constitutional basis of civilian
primacy see Find Law for Legal Professionals. "The President receives his compensation for his
services, rendered as Chief Executive of the Nation, not for the individual parts of his duties. No part
of his compensation is paid from sums appropriated for the military or naval forces; and it is equally
clear under the Constitution that the President's duties as Commander in Chief represents only a part of
duties ex officio as Chief Executive [Article II, sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution] and that the latter's

approved by civilian authorities even when it conflicts with their recommendations and may lead to failure. This inherent struggle has made civil-military relations in a democracy a recurrent topic of debate. Samuel Huntington summarized these relations in his book, *The Soldier and the State*; "Any system of civil-military relations thus involves complex equilibrium between the authority, influence, and ideology of the military, on the one hand, and the authority, influence in ideology of nonmilitary groups on the other."[285]

Historians, philosophers, social scientists, military professionals, lawyers, and scholars from other disciplines have created a large body of complex works that advance this debate. Many of these works focus upon the United States as a model for analysis. Five noted authors, Samuel P. Huntington, Morris Janowitz, John Prados, Michael Pearlman, and Phillip Bobbitt offered differing perspectives on some key civil-military relations issues. These works will be analyzed separately, in the order in which they were written to provide a foundation for further discussion. Considered holistically, three themes emerge that present a model for examining civil-military relations and policy development in America. They are: 1) an understanding of civil-military relations theory; 2) an understanding of civil-military relations in practice; and 3) a theoretical and practical understanding of the role of international relations in civil-military relations and policy development. The first

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office is a civil office. [Article II, section 1 of the Constitution; vol. 91, Cong. Rec. 4910-4916; Beard, The Republic (1943) pp. 100-103.] http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com; (accessed July 19, 2008).

[285]Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957, and 1985), VIII.

theme provided a theoretical understanding of the legal and philosophical basis of civil-military relations in a democracy. This included a sociological analysis of the military profession and a study of the National Security Council. The second theme provided historical case studies that depict the actual practice of determining national security policy. These studies examined national security crises and policy determination as a component of civil-military relations. These case studies vary in complexity from a relatively focused view to a comprehensive multi-actor analysis of policy development. Many of the crises studied involved international conflicts, which increases the complexity of the study. International actors and organizations must also be considered because they impact policy development. The third theme embraced this complexity and examined how international relations influence policy development.

Together, these works establish a foundation for understanding civil-military relations within a democracy, as well as international relations between states. Each author makes a specific contribution that furthers this discussion. Huntington's work *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, published in 1957, sought to create a theoretical basis for civil-military relations in the United States. He focused on the broad national security implications of civil-military relations at the start of the Cold War. Second, Janowitz building on this theoretical basis, wrote *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* in 1960, which presented a sociological analysis of the professional United States soldier from 1900 to 1950. His revised edition in 1971 added relevant national

security considerations of transitioning to an all volunteer force. Third, John Prados, in his 1991 work, *The Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush,* examined the differing methods of national security policy development.[286] This included a theoretical basis as well as case studies of actual policy development. Fourth, Michael D. Pearlman's 1999 work, *Warmaking and American Democracy: The Struggle over American Strategy, 1700 to the Present,* supplied a synthesis of the struggle over developing military strategy in "America" since 1700. His detailed analysis of historical examples from the Revolutionary War, to the War in Bosnia, exposed the role of politics in determining American military strategy. Finally, Philip Bobbitt, in his 2002 work, *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History*, combined two books that studied western civilization and the evolution of states. His work examined the impact of international relations on policy development in America. First, he presented a theoretical scheme: a new model and periodization for the study of the evolution of international relations. Second, he offered historical analysis in which he argued that international treaties, following wars, set the conditions for future wars.

Huntington's work, *The Soldier and the State,* supports the first theme and has had exceptional influence. It has remained relevant for over fifty years as the seminal explanation of civil-military relations theory in the United States. Huntington examined the relationship of the professional military officer corps to the state from

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[286]John Prados, The Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush (New York, NY: William Morrow and Company, 1991), 632.

the Civil War to the Cold War. His book was published as the nation reevaluated the

national security requirements emerging from the Cold War and the Korean War. He

proposed that the United States historical tendency to retain only a small professional

standing Army in peacetime was incompatible with the changed security

environment. Specifically, "changes in technology and the international environment

made a large professional military a requirement for national security".[287]   He argued

that the professional officer is motivated to serve the state, subordinate to civil

authority, as an essential part of this professionalism.[288]

Huntington proposed that civil-military relations are characterized by

equilibrium between the military requirement to provide advice to the Congress, the

President, and the Service Secretaries. This invariably created tensions that elected

officials have often exploited for political gain through the media.   He also argued

that Congress exercised civilian control of the military primarily through military

appropriations. The House provided the majority of the fiscal oversight, and the

Senate provided the majority of the policy oversight. Although he examined

Truman's relief of MacArthur, he argued that in most cases the United States military

supported the decisions of the civilian authorities after their military advice was

considered.[289]

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[287]Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957, and 1985), 3.

[288]Ibid., 79.

[289]Ibid, 410; Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1971), 349.

Huntington's analysis of the American military officer as a profession has also

remained relevant. He proposed that "the distinguishing characteristics of a

profession as a special type of vocation are its expertise, responsibility, and

corporateness."[290] He argued that the military officer ideal meets all these

requirements when considering his role in the "management of violence" for the

state.[291] He examined the evolution of five key institutions of the military vocation

that developed the professional ethic and provided the intellectual rationale for the

profession. They are: "(1) the requirements for entry into the officer corps; (2) the

means of advancement within the officer corps; (3) the character of the military

education system; (4) the nature of the military staff system; and, (5) the general

esprit and competence of the officer corps."[292] He concluded that the officer corps

became professional during the 18th-century. Based on this understanding of the

profession, he argued that the military must always be subordinate to civilian

authority. His detailed analysis developed a model that encouraged other sociological

studies of military officers as a group.

Morris Janowitz, who was one of the final reviewers of Huntington's work,

offered a sociological examination of professional military officers. His study, *The

Professional Soldier*, offered valuable insight into the military profession that

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[290]Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957, and 1985), 8. Huntington refers to several earlier sources in his notes that define a profession and apply the standard to British officers. This is the first example applied to the American military.

[291]Ibid., 11.

[292]Ibid., 20.

complimented Huntington's theoretical work. He analyzed the professional life,

organizational setting, and leadership of the American military profession during the

first half of the 20th century.[293] His work expressed many of the same opinions that

Huntington proposed about the professionalism and motivation of the military officer

corps. Janowitz maintained that the military profession was not a monolithic power

group; but a diverse group with many interests, that accepted civilian control of

military affairs. Similarly he argued, "Any imbalance in military contributions to

political-military affairs - domestic or international - is therefore often the result of

default by civilian political leaders."[294] This hypothesis further advanced the

theoretical belief from American Liberal traditions of civilian control of the military.

Janowitz, however, identified several additional motivating factors that made

the military professional serve his country. This motivation is relevant to

understanding civil-military relations. His argument was based on the belief that the

professional soldier is motivated to fight by professional ethics alone. He devoted a

chapter to professional motivation. The central thesis was as follows: "Civilian

society permits the professional soldier to maintain his code of honor and encourages

him to develop his professional skill. He is amiable to civilian political control

because he recognizes that civilians appreciate and understand the tasks and

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[293]Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1971), lvi.

[294]Ibid., lvii.

responsibilities of the constabulary force."[295] His discussion of the constabulary

force, like Huntington, is based on the belief that a large standing peacetime Army is

required to meet the nation's security challenges. He argued that the military should

establish a "constabulary force, which is prepared for war, committed to the minimal

use of force, and seeks viable international relations rather than victory."[296]

Constabulary forces are prepared for major conflict, but also are required to perform

across the spectrum of operations. Constabulary forces would perform activities like

humanitarian assistance, police action, limited war, and even domestic assistance to

further policy goals. Janowitz, like Huntington, recognized the role of the military

professional in developing and executing policy as another important issue in civil-

military relations.

Janowitz asserted that five changes have occurred in the military profession

that affected civil-military relations since 1900. First, organizational authority has

shifted from authoritarian rule to a greater reliance on manipulation, persuasion, and

group consensus.[297] Second, skills have narrowed between the military and the

civilian elites. This has required military professionals to gain more managerial skills

as well as technical training to perform skills that now have a civilian equivalent.[298]

Third, officer recruitment has shifted from a high social status group to a broader

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[295]Ibid., 440.

[296]Ibid., 418.

[297]Ibid., 8.

[298]Ibid., 9.

representation of society.[299] Fourth, there is a prescribed career pattern that if

performed with great competence will lead to membership in the professional military

elite.[300] Finally, the military profession developed an increased political role at the

strategic level of the organization that required more than just military technical

skills.[301] The cumulative effect of these changes is that the military, at the strategic

level, resembles a civilian organization and can be viewed in competition with the

civilian authorities.

Janowitz believed that the future professional soldier must also be better

educated in international relations and politics if he is to be effective.[302] Huntington

and Janowitz proposed that civilian influence is greatest in budget oversight and

development, rather than issues of policy and military operations. They argued that

the complexity of developing a force structure to meet policy objectives provides

ample room for vastly different conclusions. This led to divisions between the

Services and their separate constituencies in Congress regarding conflicting solutions

similar to those addressed in Chapter Two of this study. The Department of Defense

submits a consolidated budget proposal, but each Service develops their budget

separately. Great divisions remain within each of the Services about the appropriate

mix of personnel and equipment. Inter-service rivalries further complicate budget

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[299]Ibid., 10.

[300]Ibid., 11.

[301]Ibid., 13.

[302]Ibid., 165, 434.

allocations. Due to this complexity, Janowitz claims, the civilian leadership often

yields to the military's requests based on deference to military professionalism and

expertise.[303] Simultaneously, however, Congress has been increasingly suspicious of

military budgets and focused on the elimination of waste, rather than on military

performance.[304] Therefore, the military is faced with a dilemma; it requires political

awareness to ensure that it can gain support for the resources required to provide

national security, yet it must remain subordinate to the disparate interests of

numerous civilian authorities. The annual political nature of the budget battles for

limited defense resources suggest that these divisions still exists today. Many of

their observations about Congress, politics, and resource allocation are at the center of

contemporary debates about civil-military relations and the role of the military.

Fifty years after release of Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* Don Snider

and Suzanne Nielson organized a conference at West Point to review the relevancy of

Huntington's model to modern civil-military relations. The group prepared and

reviewed over thirteen papers that were subsequently published as *American Civil-

Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era*.[305] This work is divided

into four sections that all conclude that Huntington's work is still of great value today.

Section one provides contrasting perspectives of American civil-military relations

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[303] Ibid., 364.

[304] Ibid., 354.

[305]Suzanne Nielsen and Don Snider, editors, *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era*, (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).

since Huntington's work. Of note, Chapter Three examined the friction between General Eric Shinseki and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. The chapter's author, Mathew Moten argued that Shinseki provided his professional opinion to the Congress and the President and obediently carried out their decisions even when they conflicted with his personal opinions. Moten contended that Shinseki's behavior was in keeping with Huntington's patterns of civilian control of the military and the officer corps as a profession.[306] Section two examined Huntington's societal and functional imperatives. The authors conclude that the management of violence may be too narrow a definition of the functional imperative when applied to the expanded group of tasks required of the military in a counter-insurgency environment.[307] Section three explored issues associated with loyalty and obedience of the military profession. Further, it explored the conservative nature of the military society and expands Janowitz's treatment of the military as representatives of the broader society.[308] The final section addressed the role of interpersonal relations in civil-military relations and suggests norms and practices to guide the military in politics, and working with Congress and the President. Richard Kohn concludes this section with some suggested norms for improving civil-military relations.

The concluding chapter offers nine conclusions that reinforce the lasting value of Huntington's work. Snider and Nielson assert: "Five decades after its creation, the

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[306]Ibid., 60.

[307]Ibid., 8, 113.

[308]Ibid., 9, 195.

contributions of Huntington's objective control model continue to outweigh its shortcomings. The most significant shortcoming of his model was its failure to recognize that a separation between political and military affairs is not possible - particularly at the highest levels of policymaking."[309] The book provides many examples from the Iraq War to illustrate the current relevance of Huntington's framework for the further study of civil-military relations. Each chapter provides a detailed analysis and is worthy of repeated study.

In contrast to Janowitz's military perspective, John Prados offered a detailed analysis of the civilian role in national security policy development. His work, *Keepers of the Keys*, examined the prominent actors in the National Security Council since its establishment under President Truman in 1947. Prados's detailed narrative description of the personalities of the Presidents and their National Security Advisors provided valuable insight into the civilian statutory roles of civil-military relations. Prados argued that the council's influence increased to the point of near independent action in the Iran-Contra scandal of the Reagan Presidency. His work contributes to understanding both the theoretical and actual practice of civil-military relations in policy development.

The National Security Act of 1947 established the National Security Council as a part of the executive branch. Hence, each President has great flexibility in determining its composition and authority. Prados concentrated on the relationships between the standing members of the National Security Council in developing policy

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[309]Ibid., 291.

for each administration; the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. Prados did an excellent job of demonstrating the conflicting interests and objectives of the people and institutions that develop national security policy for the President. His work highlights the volume of Presidential decisions that must be made with imperfect information - and it is sobering. Prados demonstrated that The President's ability to make good decisions is dependent upon the advice he receives from his cabinet members and personal staff. While each President can select "the best and the brightest" people to support his decision making, he is ultimately at their mercy.[310]

His book highlighted the Eisenhower administration as a model for policy development. Prados credits President Eisenhower's management and intellectual ability for his administration's policy successes.[311] In comparison, Prados condemns Presidents Johnson and Nixon for their character flaws and resulting policy missteps. Despite his pattern of assigning responsibility with the chief executive, Prados's evaluation of President Reagan and the Iran-Contra scandal placed most of the blame with the President's Cabinet rather than the President. His criticism seems sharpest when the positions of trust have been violated. He cited examples of these betrayals of trust as: leaks to the media, commission or omission of obvious responsibilities to inform the President, and misrepresentation of the facts to the President, Congress, or

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[310]John Prados, *The Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush* (New York, NY: William Morrow and Company, 1991), 563.

[311]Ibid., 85.

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the media. The book's narrative convincingly highlighted these violations of trust regarding Vietnam, Iran-Contra, and Watergate.[312]

Prados also identified the challenges of policy implementation throughout the government. The National Security Council is largely responsible for the coordination of the government bureaucracy; Prados provided valuable insight and numerous examples of how difficult a task this has been. Again, President Eisenhower is applauded for his understanding of the requirement to manage the implementation of policy decisions through the executive branch.   In true military style, planning and implementation were treated as equally important functions.[313] Prados criticized Johnson and all subsequent Presidents for their lack of oversight and coordination of policy implementation. While all global national security scenarios cannot be anticipated, Prados argued that many Presidential decisions were made without complete analysis or the development of a synchronized government policy. The escalations of military involvement in Vietnam, and the United States Middle East policy since Nixon, demonstrate how the various elements of government were not coordinated toward common goals.[314]

Prados concluded his analysis with two themes. First, the National Security Council Staff became "the keepers of the keys" by: establishing policy and actions in the name of the President; and acting in the place of existing government institutions

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[312]Ibid., 223.

[313]Ibid., 149.

[314]Ibid., 201.

through secrecy.[315] Second, the National Security Council has grown considerably

stronger since its creation in 1947 and has become unaccountable in its present form.

He argued that legislation is required to limit its power and increase Congressional

oversight of the National Security Advisor.[316]

Prados provided a great amount of detail on the actors within the executive

branch that influence national security policy, however; he placed little emphasis on

political influences from sources outside the executive branch. This focused analysis

limits the scope of the discussion but it does not provide a comprehensive

appreciation of the factors influencing policy development. For example, the political

influence of Congress and the public is mentioned as a concern to the Johnson

administration, but, Prados does not provide an analysis of what this means. The

focus of his work is the National Security Council, however, political considerations

beyond those mentioned in this work shape policy determination.

In contrast, Pearlman analyzed a broader base of actors involved in national

security policy development than Prados. He examined the interactions within and

between the military, the Congress, the executive branch, domestic public opinion,

international leaders, world opinion, and economics. The interactions between these

forces demonstrate the challenges in developing a strategy in America. He provided a

comprehensive study of American historical examples of civil-military relations in his

work, *Warmaking and American Democracy*. He focused on these complex

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[315]Ibid., 26.

[316]Ibid., 566.

relationships, which are collectively referred to as high and low politics.   His

analysis also included the influence of international relations and actors in

determining policy and their effect on civil-military relations. Each of his chapters is

focused on a specific period of conflict in American history and provided a narrative

account of how policy was developed. Pearlman cited many prominent actors,

granting valuable insight into policy development and offered a more comprehensive

analysis.

His premise is based on historical analysis and concludes that the problems of

strategy development in a democracy are traditional. Policy and strategy

development must balance the democratic principles of pluralism and individual

liberties with the military necessity for discipline and hierarchal authority. The

military requires clear objectives and guidance to ensure efficient utilization of

resources and successful establishment of appropriate post hostility conditions.

Political considerations, however, frequently preclude the clear declaration of

objectives. The military is regularly faced with policies that have multiple

interpretations and unclear objectives. This ambiguity leads to diffused allocation of

resources and personnel. Although this appears similar to Huntington's argument,

Pearlman's specific examples of ambiguous policies support his argument throughout

American history.[317]

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[317]Michael Pearlman, *Warmaking and American Democracy* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1999), 5.

Pearlman began his argument with General Washington's predicament resulting from conflicting policies during the Revolutionary War. On the one hand, the colonials needed an Army to defeat the British Army and occupy their forts to establish legitimacy as a nation. On the other hand, they were opposed to establishing a professional army and preferred militia troops with local allegiance to the defense of their village. As a rule, local militias were not willing to fight in distant areas against British regular units. Militiamen were also unaccustomed to the discipline and tactics required by the Continental Army. Pearlman argued that in order to gain foreign support for American independence, a standing Colonial Army needed to achieve a military victory against the British Army. Then again, Washington also needed to maintain popular support for the war by accepting the militia's role in providing local security. This requirement conflicted with his need to conscript large numbers of personnel, which were also militiamen, for the Army without jeopardizing popular support and security. Advocates of the militia favored a protracted harassment campaign to defeat the British without a standing army. The lack of an established government further added to the ambiguity of developing a comprehensive strategy. These challenges demonstrate that the problems of war making in a democracy predated the establishment of the nation itself.[318]

Pearlman analyzed similar examples from the Civil War, World Wars I and II, Korea, Vietnam, and Bosnia that indicate the challenges that Washington faced were not unique. Grant, Pershing, Marshall, and Eisenhower all commented on the

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[318]Ibid, 53.

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difficulties of rapidly transforming recruits into disciplined fighting forces to achieve policy goals that were beyond the capabilities of the standing army. Consider the similarity to this comment and Rumsfeld's opening remarks about going to war with the Army you have rather than the Army you need. All of these military leaders adopted tactics and strategies to compensate for these factors, just as General Washington utilized the militia in a limited role against the British.[319]

Pearlman's chapter on World War II was particularly noteworthy. Pearlman clearly portrayed a number of individual actors that influenced policy and strategy development. A few of the prominent actors that emerged are: Admiral King, Churchill, Roosevelt, Marshall, Eisenhower, Patton, LeMay, Stinson, and Vinson.[320] The complexity, scope, and sheer number of actors involved in his analysis was impressive. It provided a synthetic view of the debates surrounding the major issues in both theaters of the War. Consequently, his treatment is lengthy, detailed, and warrants close study. However, as this study focuses on the management of change in the Army over time, Pearlman has failed to include logisticians and key managers of support in his analysis.[321]

Pearlman's treatment of Truman's decision to drop the atomic bomb on Japan is an especially comprehensive analysis of a complex issue of debate involving civil-

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[319]Ibid., 5.

[320]Ibid., 221.

[321]Idea provoked by Theodore Wilson. The central theme of managing change in the Army is not reflected in the key leaders selected by Pearlman for his analysis.

military relations. Specifically, he identifies five often overlooked factors.[322] First,

the combat readiness of the United States Army and Marine Corps after achieving

victory in Europe was declining rapidly. Pearlman argued that 450,000 veterans were

released from active duty, and more were becoming eligible for release.[323] The

readiness of the armed forces decreased as the combat experienced veterans left the

service. Second, he cited Eisenhower's estimate, after Victory in Europe, it would

take approximately eighteen months to prepare European Forces for an invasion of

Japan.[324] Third, he argued that as the veterans returned home national resolve to

endure continued sacrifice in order to defeat Japan would decrease.   The veterans

return psychologically affected communities as an indication of a return to prewar

normalcy. He argued that this affected public opinion and would curtail a protracted

operation against Japan.[325] Fourth, Congress legislated that all eighteen year old

draftees required a minimum of six months training before they could be sent to a

combat zone. Conscription of new personnel, therefore, could not numerically

compensate for the number of released veterans.[326] Fifth, he cited Marshall's

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[322]These factors were not identified in two books focused on the use of the atomic bomb: Samuel Walker's, *Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the use of Atomic Bombs against Japan* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997, 2004), and Michael Hogan's, *Hiroshima in History and Memory* (New York, NY: The Cambridge University Press, 1996) both well respected authors and works.

[323]Michael Pearlman, *Warmaking and American Democracy* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1999), 274.

[324]Ibid., 275.

[325]Ibid.

[326]Ibid., 276.

opinion: "Don't ask me the question of whether to drop the bomb; it is not a military

question" in order to demonstrate that the military believed dropping the bomb was a

political issue.[327] When these factors are considered together, the use of the atomic

bomb becomes more of a necessity - to defeat the Japanese quickly - than an

alternative to an armed invasion. Further, this analysis highlights the complex

interdependence between military and civilian information sharing involved in

determining defense related policy.

Bobbitt rounds out this analysis with a focus on the role of international

relations in developing national security policy. His work, *The Shield of Achilles*, is

organized into two books. Book I focused on the evolution of the individual state and

provided a new model to analyze international relations. His model is organized into

six periods: princely, kingly, territorial, state-nation, nation-state, and the Market-

State. Bobbitt argued that the origins of the modern state can be traced back to Italy

in the 15th-century. Specifically, the princely, kingly, territorial, and state-nation

periods occurred between 1494 and 1914. He defined the period of the nation-state

and the long war from the start of World War I to the end of the Cold War, or 1914-

1990. He stated, the long war "was fought to determine which of the three

alternatives - communism, fascism, or parliamentarianism - would replace the

Imperial constitutional orders of the 19th century."[328] His last period, the Market-

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[327]Ibid., 269.

[328]Philip Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles: War Peace and the Course of History* (New York, NY: Anchor Books, 2002), xxviii.

State is defined as beginning in 1990, with end of the Cold War, and continuing through the present as the new form of state in the system of states.[329]

Thomas Friedman has written one of the many contemporary books that address the possible implications of an increasingly interconnected world in his 1999 book, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization*. Friedman contends that "Globalization has replaced the former Cold War system...and has its own rules and logic that today directly or indirectly influence the politics, environment, geopolitics, and economics of virtually every country in the world."[330] Although this work precedes Bobbitt's, Friedman explores the potential declining influence of the state-centric system as transnational issues - such as religion - gain influence in guiding the behavior of populations. Potentially, this creates a more dangerous world that empowers individuals with their ideas, for good or evil, to have dramatic and almost instant global effects. These actions and the corresponding consequences cannot be controlled by the state system.[331]

In Book II, Bobbitt maintained the same periodization but changed his focus to the treaties that established the state's legitimacy and role in international matters as part of the society of states.[332] He believed his thesis is different from the existing

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[329]Ibid., xxvii.

[330]Thomas Freidman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization* (New York, New York: Anchor Books, 1999), ix. See also, Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New York, New York: Touchstone, Simon and Shuster, 1997).

[331]Friedman, xxii, 328, 436.

[332]Philip Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles: War Peace and the Course of History* (New York, NY: Anchor Books, 2002), 827.

literature "because it derives from the general conclusion that the dying and regeneration of constitutional orders are a periodic part of the history of the modern state."[333] In other words, treaties establish the periodization for new state systems.

Bobbitt provided a new paradigm for examining the impact of war on the international environment. His paradigm adds another dimension to the discussion of civil-military relations because he depends upon the impact of wars as a central component of his model. First, he proposed that the international order of states is the result of wars and the treaties. Wars led to treaties which ended an epoch. The epochal change created disenfranchisement and a new set of problems, which led to another war and began the cycle anew. Second, he proposed that the Cold War led to the creation of a new state system termed the Market-State. He claimed, "The Market-State promises to maximize the opportunity of the people (rather than the state) and thus privatize many state activities and make voting and representative government less influential and more responsive to the market."[334] Third, he argued that the current global conditions present a new set of challenges that make the global security environment less stable than it was during the twentieth century.[335]

Bobbitt's book was written before the attacks of September 11, 2001, although it was released in 2002. His last point, that the new epoch of the Market-State will be less stable than the long periods of "peace" in the 20th-century, seems

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[333]Ibid., xxx.

[334]Ibid., 211.

[335]Ibid., 211.

prophetic. His argument for the Market-State is most compelling at the strategic

level. Treaties shape future competition between states. He asserted, "War is a

natural condition of the state, which was organized in order to be an effective

instrument of violence on behalf of society."[336] He argued that Market-States will

take various forms around the world and this competition will inevitably lead to

conflict. Market forces will not prevent the disenfranchised from taking warlike

actions against those they believe responsible for their plight. These words seem

even more accurate today when considering the current security environment in the

Middle East. Bobbitt maintained that the nation-state is dead "due to revolutions in

computations, communications, and weapons of mass destruction."[337] A contrary

view may be that these "revolutions" offer increased opportunities for cooperation in

an increasingly interdependent global environment.

His identification of numerous threats that challenge the state and the

constitutional system of states is enlightening. He made a strong argument that

international cooperation is needed to effectively combat these new threats with much

more than just military power. Untraceable enemies with global connections require

a new approach to a state's defense; or society will need to lower their expectations of

a successful defense against these threats.   Bobbitt suggested that the current set of

constitutions and international treaties are inadequate to address these challenges. He

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[336]Ibid., 819.

[337]Ibid., 225.

argued "that the world community faces its own historic challenge in creating a constitution for the international order that will emerge from this war."[338]

Bobbitt's work is thought provoking and well researched. It is most relevant to those interested in international relations, law, history, and national security affairs. The work's presentation of the interdependence between law, history, and strategy is one its major strengths. His periodization offers a fresh approach to reconsider existing historical accounts. His Market-State model can be applied to current events to consider their strategic implications. The breadth of the issues contained in this book makes it one that can be studied repeatedly; each time from a different perspective offering new insights. Book II, Part II, *A Brief History of the Society of States and the International Order,* provided a comprehensive understanding of the treaties that established the nation-state system. It presented the evolution of international relations of states from the Treaty of Augsburg through the Peace of Paris.[339]

Bobbitt's paradigm for considering the international order of states is based on a Eurocentric view. A weakness is that he does not address trends in Asia or elsewhere in his analysis. He briefly acknowledged this shortcoming in his appendices, "The reason (that I have focused on a Eurocentric view) is that the state is a European political idea."[340] In his defense, the global international state system

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[338]Ibid., 821.

[339]Ibid., 482.

[340]Ibid., 825.

evolved from European treaties. Specifically, the development of the United Nations, World Court, and World Bank can be traced back to Western initiatives. However, without further analysis one can only speculate about any similarities in his analysis of epochal changes in the international order from an Asian perspective.

Lastly, Bobbitt proposed that the United States is at a crossroad based on the strategic decisions it must make to develop a national strategy to ensure its national security in the Market-State.[341] He suggested that the United States lacks a consistent paradigm, "a worldview that members of a political community share; a policy is what some portion of them put in place in pursuit of the goals of the paradigm."[342] He argued that "without a shared paradigm, the United States is condemned to adopt the most seductive of strategies, the case by case approach."[343] As long as the United States retains a powerful position in the world community, this approach will appear as a self fulfilling prophecy of success. However, he argued, it avoids facing the strategic choices that could enable the United States to shape the world of the future into a more advantageous scenario.[344] These strategic level decisions lie at the heart of national security and civil-military relations. They involve much more than just military considerations of security. They demonstrate that the economic, information, and diplomatic elements of national power further complicate development of a

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[341]Ibid., 246.

[342]Ibid., 275.

[343]Ibid.

[344]Ibid.

comprehensive national security policy or strategy. Bobbitt's examination of future worlds and possible scenarios illustrates the degree of complexity that the international environment brings to the civilian side of civil-military relations. That said, the military is increasingly asked to perform roles that have been traditionally performed by civilians as the nation continues to engage in nation building on a global scale.

Conclusion

Civil-military relations remain a critical topic of study in America. The three themes of theory, practice, and international relations demonstrated the complexity involved in developing national security policy in a democracy. The fact that Huntington's and Janowitz's works are still analyzed reflects their importance to the field. They wrote as major changes in the security environment brought fundamental issues of national security into question. Both authors established a theoretical basis for evaluating civil-military relations. The Cold War and the Vietnam War inspired dramatic changes within the military, such as a large peacetime force and an all volunteer force. Recent changes in the security environment since the end of the Cold War have resurfaced similar concerns over national security and civil-military relations in a democracy. Prados provided valuable insight into how Presidents make national security decisions. He also raised serious concerns over the autonomy and secrecy that exists within the National Security Council and the "keepers of the keys." Current concerns over the buildup for the invasion of Iraq have raised similar

concerns about the appropriateness of the executive branch taking the nation to war on questionable precepts. Andrew Bacevich has written two recent books on this topic which are worthy of additional study.[345] Pearlman addressed the complexity of national security policy development in an international environment. He clearly portrayed the complexity involved in developing and executing policy with imperfect information. His comprehensive analysis of World War II is even more impressive when considering his scope. He covered both events in the Pacific and Europe, international leaders influence on American policy determination, and the administrations of Roosevelt and Truman. He identified numerous examples of problems with civil-military relations in policy making in World War II. Many of these problems occurred due to a lack of resources available to execute a policy decision from a civilian executive. In the same way, military forces today are challenged to balance resources with deployment policies. Bobbitt's focus on international relations and the interrelationship between war, treaties, and civil-military relations, added another dimension to the complexity of determining national security policy in America. He proposed that the existing order of states has been replaced by a new order, with new threats and challenges for policy makers.

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[345]Andrew Bacevich, *The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism* (New York, New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2009). Bacevich is critical of the Bush Administration, Rumsfeld, and the reasoning for waging war in Iraq and Afghanistan. *The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War* (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) provides a balanced analysis of the neoconservative and neorealist perspectives. The last chapter however, is very critical of American involvement in - and the 'road to war" for - Afghanistan and Iraq. Bacevich is a West Point Graduate and professor at Boston University whose son died serving in the Army in Iraq. Both books are well written and compelling.

Regardless of these new challenges, the military remains in a subordinate role and carries out the civilian policy decisions.

Collectively, these works provided a valuable foundation to the study of civil-military relations in America and insight into the broader fields of historical case studies and biographies that focus on major policy dilemmas and senior government officials. H.R. McMaster's *Dereliction of Duty* is a recent example of this body of literature. He provided keen insight to both military and civilian leadership decisions surrounding the Vietnam War. His illustrations highlight some of the problems with civil-military relations that lead to the development of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the formation of the Joint Strategic Planning System.[346]

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[346]H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam* (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 1997), 446.

Chapter Six

Implications of What Had Gone Before for Today

<u>Stress on the Force</u>

Ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq provide an opportunity for additional exploration of the topics presented in the previous chapters. Specifically, the discussion of the mechanics of defense planning contained in the Joint Strategic Planning System, the importance of force management, and the roles of civil and military leaders in policy formulation. The United States has been conducting military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for over nine years. Considered collectively as the war against violent extremists, or overseas contingency operations, they are the longest sustained combat operations conducted in the nation's history. However, they are not the nation's first use of an expeditionary force and they have produced relatively few military casualties when compared to WWI, WWII, Korea, or Vietnam. The war has not directly impacted many Americans daily routines. However, for the soldiers and families of those who have served in support of these operations, their lives may never be the same. Politicians, military leaders, scholars, and many journalists have expressed concern over the "stress on the force" derived from the prolonged deployments in support of our national policies. The

principles of force management and the Army functional life cycle model provide a

holistic archetype to consider the implications of stress on the force. This chapter

will consider some of the policy implications arising from these security challenges.

The functional life cycle model of the Army provided a heuristic to examine

the interrelationships between the components of stress on the force.   In review, the

eight aforementioned functions of the model are: force development, acquisition,

training, distribution, deployment, sustainment, development, and separation.

Resources, command, leadership, and management impact each of them.   The goal of

force development is to create a combat capable force within constrained resources.

This last statement acknowledges the reality that there are never enough resources to

meet requirements. There is never enough time, personnel, money, equipment, fuel,

ammunition, training space, bandwidth, or maneuver area to meet all the requirements

placed on the force. Leadership allocates finite resources and assumes risk in

shortage areas.   Contemporary examples of resource shortages abound in the press.

These shortages not only increase strategic risk to the nation, but also increase the

stress on the forces responsible to execute the policies and accomplish the missions.

Secretary of Defense Gates identified three main components of stress on the

force. The first is associated with the negative ramifications on the military force due

to operational commitments that require repeated and prolonged absences from home.

The second element is often associated with the cause for prolonged absences. It is

the stress derived from participation in, or proximity to, combat operations. The third

element of the term stress on the force applies to the equipment destroyed or worn out

because of demands the force.[347] In short, stress on the force is a visible consequence of executing the national security strategy with limited resources. Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter Chiarelli also expressed his concern about stress on the force after a United States Army soldier at Camp Liberty, Iraq shot five of his fellow soldiers in May 2009. Chiarelli stated: "As long as the demand on forces stays what it is right now and the supply of forces remains the same, it will be very difficult for us to do anything with that stress…"[348] Specifically, this concern addresses the first two components of stress on the force concerning the requirement for repeated deployments to a combat environment. This requirement exists due to an insufficient supply of troops to meet the operational demand. This imbalance raises the larger question of whether the Army, or in a broader sense, the military, should be developed and funded based on the threat requirements or the resources available. While components of both requirements and resources must be considered, Chiarelli correctly identified the heart of the problem of stress on the force as the imbalance between operational requirements and force capabilities.

Chapter One reasoned that the military should be structured in order to meet national objectives.   The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review has sparked much debate about the need to determine a national strategy before a military strategy can

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[347]Defense Secretary Robert Gates, press conference statement 10 February 2009. Also addressed tour lengths, divorce rates, suicide rates, multiple deployments, post traumatic stress disorder, and extended tours as manifestations of the stress on the force. Available from http://www. dodvclips.mil/?fr_story=FRdamp340481&rf=sitemap; (accessed 12 November 2009).

[348]General Peter Chiarelli, Statement 11 May 2009, Available from http://www.dodvclips.mil/ ?fr_story=FRdamp355399&rf=sitemap; (accessed 10 October 2009).

be developed to achieve national objectives. This line of reasoning suggests that without a clear articulation of these national objectives, many force structures can be considered appropriate. Imprecise objectives and a vague threat can have many appropriate force structure solutions. Similarly, one could consider any answer a good one, if the question remains unknown. Equally, any answer could also be considered extremely bad or incorrect. Otherwise stated as John Collin's Law "If you don't know what you want to do, you can't plan how to do it."[349] Unfocused guidance provides proponents on all sides of the force structure debates considerable room to maneuver for their causes. This question directly relates back to the discussion of the proper roles and responsibilities in civil-military relations. How should the military gain focused guidance?

This argument does not suggest that specific national security objectives require only one specific military force structure solution. The solution set that meets all national security objectives contains nearly an infinite number of combinations. The flexibility inherent in the military to adapt to changing battlefield and security requirements precludes an exclusive solution. Redundancies in capabilities compensate for periods of equipment non-availability due to battlefield loss or required maintenance. Advocates of the different services, and of branches within the services, disagree about the specific force structure required to best achieve national objectives. This debate can be easily exploited, or misinterpreted, by

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[349]John Collins, *U.S. Defense Planning: a Critique* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), 6.

journalists, congressmen, or proponents to support their exclusive agendas.

However, the presence of stress on the force implies that the force structure solution

set has a minimal level, or baseline, that must be considered adequate to meet national

objectives. Failure to resource this minimal level increases the risk that the military

may be unable to achieve the nation's military objectives.

Force Structure Considerations

Force structure considerations are further complicated by time constraints.

Two components of time constraints must be considered: the speed to respond, as

well as, the anticipated length or duration of the conflict. Timing guidance must

precede force structure requirements. Historical examples demonstrate the

importance of timing considerations to defense policy formulation. First, consider

timing in the deployment of forces to Europe during World War II (WWII). Once

war was declared, the national military policy was clear; immediate wartime

mobilization and conscription provided the force structure and equipment to meet the

military requirements of a nation at war.[350] However, the national policy and related

force structure at the onset of the war did not anticipate military commitments that

would endure for more than sixty years. Until this time, national security and military

policy were based on the belief that the geographic separation from Europe would

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[350]Detailed discussion of the details of mobilization and conscription for WWII can be found in Edward Coffman's, *The Regulars: The American Army* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004). See John Chambers' detailed treatment of modern conscription in America starting in WWI in his work, *To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America* (New York, NY, The Free Press, 1987). Much has also been written about the relative speed that the United States mobilized and provided trained and ready forces for World War II. From a European or Russian perspective the troops were not provided fast enough.

allow time to augment a small standing army to defend the nation in time of war. Warfare was expected to be conducted by an expeditionary armed force that - following an extended period for mobilization and training - would deploy and rapidly achieve a decisive victory. Therefore, a small standing army could support the national strategy before the war. The duration of an anticipated war could not be determined, but the speed to respond was susceptible to careful planning. Along these lines, as the likelihood of war in Europe grew, conscription was authorized for a period of one year. However, Congress restricted conscripted soldiers from serving overseas in order to limit the President's ability to enter the war in Europe without further Congressional consultation.[351] The attack on Pearl Harbor challenged this strategic situation. Geographic separation no longer ensured the United States protection from the threat of attack or afforded time for full mobilization.

Upon the conclusion of WWII, timing considerations changed. Cold War policies led to the development of a force structure to deter, and if needed fight, a land war in Europe.[352] Cold War forces were expected to respond quickly to any Soviet aggression. Forces were stationed in Europe to provide credibility to the

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[351]Kretchik argued that conscription was set to one year to limit the president's ability to involve the United States in Europe's land war against Germany. Walter Kretchik, *Peering Through the Mist: Doctrine as a Guide for U.S. Army Operations, 1775-2000* (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas, 2001), 22, 35. Available through ProQuest, UMI, Ann Arbor, Michigan, UMI Number 3018507.

[352]Cold War policy was based on the premise that it was a vital U.S. national interest to prevent European occupation by a hostile power or powers. For further discussion of the definitions of national interests see: *America's National Interests: a Report from the Commission on America's National Interests* by Graham T. Allison and Robert Blackwill; Internet: www.nixoncenter.org /publications /monographs/national interests; (accessed 13 December 2009).

national security policies and treaty obligations to defend member nations of the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).[353] In case of hostilities, time available

to raise and train an army would be dramatically less than was available at the onset

of WWII. This policy created basing requirements for a large standing force in

Europe. The military was required to build an expeditionary force structure to

support these bases and permit defense of vital national interests in Europe and

outside of the United States. The United States has a history of expeditionary forces

that precedes WWII; In World War I (WWI) the American Expeditionary Forces

(AEF) deployed to Europe in support of the French. However, the force structure and

bases were not maintained in Europe after the WWI.   After WWII the strategic

situation developing with the start of the Cold War required a larger standing force

structure to maintain a credible presence in Europe. More recently, basing

requirements on the Korean peninsula have contributed to the force structure

requirements.[354]

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[353]The Cold War basing policy was not a direct result of World War II. John Lewis Gaddis described the Cold War as beginning with deteriorating United States-Soviet relation that compounded with one event after another. He argued Keenan's long telegram as one of the key indicators of the deteriorating relations in 1946. He also sights Soviet refusal to remove occupied troops in Eastern Europe and opposition to the Marshall Plan in 1947. By May 1949, the Berlin Blockade had been lifted, The Federal Republic of Germany established, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) formed. NATO committed the United States to the peacetime defense of Western Europe. John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: a New History* (New York, New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 34.

[354]Ibid. The strategic reliance upon nuclear weapons under the Eisenhower administration informed the creation of doctrine for fighting on the plains of Europe. Military bases in Europe and Korea became a show of American political resolve because American Soldiers shared the European risk of combat casualties: It follows that American military resources would be more readily available if U.S. lives were also at stake. See also Walter Kretchik, *Peering Through the Mist: Doctrine as a Guide for U.S. Army Operations, 1775-2000* (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas, 2001), 35, 142. Available through ProQuest, UMI, Ann Arbor, Michigan, UMI Number 3018507.

Basing

Basing requirements and rotation policies are intertwined considerations influencing force structure requirements. The time required to accomplish the national military objectives often necessitates the establishment of permanent bases and force rotation policies. During WWII, conscriptions were for the duration of the conflict. However, maintaining a presence overseas for an indefinite period required consideration of a different policy. Costs, as well as many cultural factors, prohibited maintaining the large active forces raised for World War II, or Korea, for the duration of the Cold War. Further, the shift from a conscripted Army to an all volunteer force in the 1970s warranted reconsideration of the existing force rotation policies. Rotations to Korea were generally established for one year and three years for Germany.[355] Planning models suggest that three soldiers are required in the active force structure for every one soldier required in Korea or Germany: one is currently serving overseas, one has just returned, and one is getting ready to deploy. Returning to the current discussion of stress on the force, the force structure during the Cold War provided a rotation base far greater than three times the number of troops assigned in Korea and Germany. If a one year rotation policy had been utilized in World War II or the Korean War, force structure requirements - specifically the number of troops required - clearly would have increased dramatically.

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[355]Command assignments in Korea and select accompanied billets were normally for two years. However, most assignments to Korea were unaccompanied and for only one year. Rotations to Germany were usually for three years. Hence, the rotation policies required an active duty force structure at least three times the size of the number of deployed soldiers. Other force requirement planning considerations, like the unavailability of some soldiers due to schooling or medical factors, actually suggests that the force structure rotation base be much larger than three times the overseas requirement.

Debate continues around the rotation policies for each of the nation's conflicts.

In addition to tour length considerations, the manner of replacements is also

considered. On one end of the spectrum, World War II conscripts and mobilized

guard and reserve units generally trained together as a unit before being deployed in

combat. Units were formed and largely remained together for the duration of the war,

although some units were disbanded early in their training to serve as replacements

for war casualties in existing divisions.[356] At the other end of the spectrum, Vietnam

War units lacked of unit cohesion because of an individual replacement policy. In

1965, during the Vietnam War, "The Secretary of the Army, Stanley Resor, asked the

Chief of Staff to consider extending the average soldier's tour length in Vietnam to 15

months. That adjustment would reduce replacements needed by 20 percent for

Vietnam and 12 percent for Korea, while increasing unit effectiveness,"[357] This

proposal was rejected by President Johnson in October 1966 because he believed that

an extension of tour lengths would spark an unwanted congressional debate over the

conduct of the war that would threaten his domestic agenda.[358] General

Westmoreland, the Commander in Vietnam also argued, "The harsh conditions

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[356]Russell F. Weigley, *History of the United States Army: Enlarged Edition* (Bloomington, Indiana: first Midland Book Edition by the Indiana University Press, 1984), 437.

[357]Mark DePu, "Vietnam War: The Individual Rotation Policy" *Vietnam* Magazine, December 2006, Available from http://www.historynet.com/vietnam-war-the-individual-rotation-policy.htm/1; (accessed 27 March 2010). See also Andrew F. Krepinevich, JR. *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 206.

[358]Ibid., "Ultimately, President Johnson elected not to mobilize the Reserve and National Guard. To do otherwise, he feared, would only lead to a fierce debate in Congress about the merits of the war, a debate he very much wanted to avoid for fear it would derail his domestic agenda, especially the war on poverty. "

provided one of the strongest arguments for a one-year tour of duty."[359] Soldiers

rotated into units for twelve months rather than collectively training as a unit

replacement. Combat command tours were also limited to six months in Vietnam.[360]

Dr. Andrew Krepinevich in his book, *The Army and Vietnam*, argued, "General

Westmoreland did not believe that it (the Vietnam War) was going to be a long war.

If he had he there would have been no reason to rotate command so frequently."[361]

Hence, force structure requirements are tied to the deployment policies, based on the

projected conflict duration and time available prior to war. Premonition is not

required of national leaders before they can respond to a conflict.   However, the

military and security strategies must inform subsequent force structure deliberations.

Dr. Tim Kane has consolidated U.S. troop deployment statistics into a single

data base which demonstrates the force structure basing and rotation considerations.

His study identified fifty-four nations that have had over one thousand U.S. troops

deployed. On average, he demonstrated, between 1950 and 2003 nearly forty-five

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[359]Ibid. Westmoreland "later explained in his autobiography, *A Soldier Reports*. 'The one-year tour gave a man a goal. That was good for morale.' The 12-month policy was retained. Meanwhile, the tour for 130 senior officers was extended to 19 months, this exception applying only to general officers and other selected officers in senior staff positions." Westmorland's comment demonstrated that morale and health also played a role in determining the military efficiency of the policy decisions to determine tour lengths. Fewer soldiers may be forecast when longer rotations are planned, but combat losses and the need for replacements are also factors to consider when determining a rotation policy.

[360]Andrew F. Krepinevich, JR. *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 157, 207. Initially divisions were deployed to Vietnam, however, the nature of counterinsurgency operations relied upon maneuver battalions rather than division operations. Further the rotation policy for deployed units restricted a tour of duty to twelve months and six months of combat command time. General officers and key staff positions were authorized an extended tour of nineteen months.

[361]Ibid., 206.

thousand soldiers have remained stationed in Korea on active duty at any one time.[362]

However, the largest numbers of U.S. troops deployed overseas, nearly two hundred-fifty thousand during this period, were stationed in Germany. He concluded that during this period, the total number of U.S. troops deployed on foreign soil averaged over twenty-two percent of the total force.[363] This demonstrated that Cold War force structure requirements were resourced sufficiently to support the rotation policies without significant stress on the force. In reality, during the Cold War, most active duty soldiers expected only one assignment to Korea or Germany during an average twenty year career. In contrast, with no end in sight to the "overseas contingency operations" or combat operations in the Middle East, many soldiers today have served in an Army at war for over ten years of their projected twenty year career.[364]

Recent deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq have brought more attention to the percentage of the total force deployed overseas. Reductions in force structure in Germany and Korea are being considered in order to meet the growing troop demands in the Middle East. Similar to the Korea and Germany rotation examples, for every

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[362]Tim Kane, Ph.D., *Troop Deployment Dataset, 1950–2003*, The Heritage Foundation, Center for Data Analysis, October 2004; Internet: www.heritage.org/Research/National Security /troopsdb.cfm; (accessed 4 December 2009).

[363]Ibid., the total troops available includes all services and components. Percentage of active duty forces assigned overseas would be much higher than 23% of the total force. Regardless the study supports the concept that more than three soldiers were in the active force than the overseas basing requirement.

[364]Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have been ongoing since 1991 and 1993 respectively. Although there have been withdrawals of many of the forces in Iraq, the current surge in Afghanistan will continue for at least another year. Forces in Iraq are planned to remain at reduced levels for many years to come. Soldiers can retire after serving 20 years active duty in the Army. Hence, in 2011, all soldiers with at least ten years of service will have served in the Army at war at least half of the last twenty years. This number will increase if the Army remains at war past 2011.

soldier required in the force structure in Iraq and Afghanistan, one soldier has just left the theater and another is getting ready to deploy. Dissimilarly however, different Army rotation policies limit deployment frequency to 1:2 for the active force, and 1:4 for the reserve force. This implies that for every one year "boots on the ground" time (BOG) - time that a soldier spends deployed overseas to the Middle East- he will maintain two years out of theater (dwell time between deployments) - or four years out of theater for a reserve component soldier. This policy is a goal and not a law, so it does not prohibit earlier reassignment of forces back to the theater. However, the Army tracks each individual soldiers dwell time in an effort to achieve this goal. In order to achieve this policy goal with the current operational demand, a much larger force structure is required than the current active duty force. In practice, soldiers are typically spending one year in theatre and are returning within a year for another combat assignment in Afghanistan or Iraq. Secretary Gates recently expressed his concern for dwell times,

> My hope is that we will begin to see a lengthening of the dwell times to beyond a year, perhaps before the later part of this year (2009), and I think it will incrementally lengthen over time. We won't go from one year deployed to two years at home. We will more likely go from one year deployed to fifteen months, to eighteen months and so on.[365]

As the operational demands are increased in Afghanistan, increases in the force levels are needed to account for normal attrition, injuries, and schooling requirements in order to effectively lengthen dwell times.

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[365]Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, comments also stated dwell time was dependent upon the drawdown schedule execution for troops in Iraq. Available from: http://www.dodvclips.mil /? 11February 2009; (accessed 28 December 2009).

Dwell time is important because it allows soldiers time to recover from the stress of deployment. During dwell time soldiers have the opportunity to reunite with families, physically recuperate, train on required specialty skills, and complete professional development courses or schools. Many of these tasks are essential to the long term resiliency and readiness of an all volunteer Army. Failure to provide adequate dwell time threatens the long term health of the military. Obviously, the military has the ability to surge to meet the national requirements and has demonstrated extraordinary resiliency already throughout the last nine years. Failure to consider the long term effects of these operational commitments is the metaphorical equivalent of eating the seed corn. The immediate dilemma requires attention, yet the long term impacts - although uncertain - are significant. Eating the seed corn may satisfy an immediate need for nourishment, which must be met in order to survive, yet it limits the ability to plant a new crop in the coming year. Similarly, the Army must address current combat requirements, yet future readiness cannot be ignored. Force management provides a lens to quantify these requirements and their costs. Consequently, the force structure should be increased in the absence of policy guidance in order to meet the military requirements of the nation. Failure to increase the force structure increases the strategic risk to respond to existential threats. The debate between military effectiveness and national objectives lies at the heart of civil-military relations. Military leaders must clearly articulate their best military advice to civilian policy makers to ensure that the likely consequences of

current operations are understood.   Strategic flexibility further considers the policy implications arising from current operations.

Strategic Flexibility

 In December 2009, President Obama announced plans to increase the operational force structure requirements - the troop levels - in Afghanistan by thirty thousand soldiers.[366] This increased the troop requirements - and hence the stress on the force - for many elements of the Army that are already pressured. This does not increase the overall force structure, or size of the Army to meet this increase in operational demand. The specialties required in Afghanistan are similar to those required in Iraq. The total number of troops available to meet the surge requirement is much smaller than the total number of U.S. troops serving in all the Services within DoD. The pool of troops available to deploy to Afghanistan is the same pool of troops that have already deployed on recent tours to Iraq or Afghanistan. The earlier discussion of rotation policies argued that increasing the demand for one soldier overseas creates a force structure requirement for three soldiers. Logically, the force structure requirements generated from this thirty thousand soldier increase would therefore impact approximately ninety thousand soldiers.

Too, a multiple of combat enablers, or support personnel, is required to facilitate an increase in combat strength. Much has been written debating the

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[366]Available from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/02/world/asia/02prexy.text.html; (accessed 4 December 2009).

appropriate "tooth to tail" ratio of combat troops to combat enablers.[367] For example,

World War I marked a high point in percentage of combat forces to support forces in

1918 at nearly fifty percent and a low of nearly twenty-percent in World War II.

"The Korean War approached thirty-three percent combat forces, Vietnam thirty-five

percent, and twenty-seven percent in Cold War Germany. Congress intervened to

enforce economy and mandate a minimum level of combat elements of twenty-nine to

thirty-four percent."[368] Regardless of what one considers the appropriate ratio, the

fact remains that the Army requires a significant number of combat support enablers

for each combat brigade deployed. Ironically, efforts to reduce the tooth to tail ratio

have reduced the number of enablers in the force structure. This has resulted in many

capability gaps within the Services. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)

identified many of these gaps and directed the restructuring of many specialties

within the force structure to address some of these gaps.[369] Congress limits the size

of the force structure, largely through budget appropriations, so recruiting sufficient

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[367]Many monographs and reports have been written on tooth to tail ratio or (T3R). Some of note are available on the internet; "The Tooth to Tail Ratio: Considerations for Future Army Force Structure" http://www.stormingmedia.us/81/8136/A813623.html; "An Analysis of the Tail to Tooth Ratio as a Measure of Operational Readiness and Military Expenditure Efficiency" http://oai.dtic. mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA411171; John McGrath, *The Other End of the Spear: The Tooth-to-Tail Ratio (T3R) in Modern Military Operations*, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2007). Available from http://www. Storming media .us /76/7642/A764274.html; (accessed 13December 2009).

[368]John McGrath, *The Other End of the Spear: The Tooth-to-Tail Ratio (T3R) in Modern Military Operations*, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2007). Available from http://www. Stormingmedia.us /76/7642/A764274.html; (accessed 13December 2009), 65. McGrath also argued, During the Iraq War in 1995 the tooth to tail ratio was below the mandated twenty-nine percent if contractors were considered in the ratio as part of the support personnel.

[369]Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2006 Available http://www.defense.gov/qdr/archive /20060206qdr1.html; (accessed 13 December 2009).

personnel to fill these gaps is not possible.[370] Consequently, many civilian

contractors have been hired to meet these capability gaps and provide essential

support to combat operations. Hiring civilian contractors has created additional

security and support concerns that must be addressed for their welfare.   Additionally,

the nature of counterinsurgency, stability support, and security operations places a

greater emphasis upon non kinetic means, which are increasingly dependent upon

combat enablers such as intelligence analysts. These specialties have been considered

high demand, low density specialties or HD/LD.   These HD/LD specialties are not

limited to combat enablers.   Demand for military police, infantry, military

intelligence, linguists, veterinarians, as well as other specialties, exceeds the supply

available. Personnel within these specialties cannot expect to meet the rotation policy

goals of 1:2 or 1:4 until the operational demand is decreased - mission requirements

are reduced.[371]

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[370]The size of the military is determined through a detailed Joint Strategic Planning System that was explicated in Chapter Two. Each of the Services further have their own method of determining their force structure recommendation to the Secretary of Defense which is then modified and submitted to the President as part of his budget which is sent to Congress. The Congress then deliberates and modifies the President's Budget based on their varied considerations. The President ultimately receives the budget and has the ability to approve or veto the budget similar to other legislative proposals. Ultimately, however, the authorizations and appropriations in the budget determine the size of the force structure.

[371]While it may appear obvious that more personnel should be converted to specialties that are in high demand from those that are in lesser demand, the solution is more complex than simply retraining existing personnel. Veterinarians, Linguists, Special Forces troops, and many other specialties require capabilities and aptitudes that may not exist in the available personnel in low demand specialties available for retraining. Some of these specialties must be recruited from the population outside the military and undergo training that takes years before they are ready for assignment in the operational Army.

Rotation policies have broader security implications beyond the determination of force structure requirements. Much has been written in the media about a concern that the military has become overcommitted and lost the ability to respond to additional security challenges.[372]   As early as August 2004, Dr. Andrew Krepinevich, and many military officials, openly questioned how long the Army could conduct sustained operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Krepinevich coined the phrase "the thin green line" to represent how the Army was overstretched by operational requirements.[373]   In January 2006, he conducted a Pentagon sponsored study to determine how well the Army was doing in Iraq. He further reported that the "Army is dangerously overtaxed in Iraq" and the strategy should change "before the Army is broken."[374] More recently in 2009, *U.S. News and World Report* published an article that is representative of many similar arguments. It stated:

> With progress in Iraq still precarious and the war in Afghanistan growing ever more violent, the American military remains overburdened and, U.S. officials repeatedly point out, dangerously overstretched. Troops are also exhausted,

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[372]The loss of strategic flexibility is mentioned as a concern in the 2009 DoD budget. Having a large pool of trained and ready forces available provides military options that can be tailored to mission requirements. As the pool of available forces is reduced by military commitments and reduced equipment readiness, the options available to respond to a crisis become limited and strategic flexibility is reduced. Available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/rewrite/budget /fy2009 defense.html; (accessed 13 December 2009).

[373]Andrew Krepinevich, *The Thin Green Line: Backgrounder.* Available from http://www.c sbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/B.20040814.GrnLne/B.20040814.GrnLne.php; (accessed 4 November 2009).

[374]Associated Press, "Study: Army Stretched to Breaking Point." *USA Today*, 24 January 2006. Available from http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-01-24-army-study_x.htm (accessed 4 November 2009).

after back-to-back tours that are leaving a growing number of military
families in shambles.[375]

America's adversaries can read these reports and may infer that the degraded military

capacity provides them with a strategic opportunity. They may believe the United

States has lost the capacity or willingness to engage in any additional military

operations. Further, they may conclude that they can pursue their own national

interests - which may challenge U.S. security interests - without fear of a

conventional military response.[376]

This belief is founded on the rationale that major or peripheral U.S. national

interests are less likely to be defended with military force when higher priority

interests are consuming a large share of the national elements of power: (political,

informational, military, and economic power). Survival and vital interests are

unlikely to be directly challenged by state actors because the risk to the United States

would still require a military response to ensure national existence. The threat and

the risk associated with major or peripheral interests are subject to much greater

interpretation because they do not directly threaten the existence of the nation and

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[375]Anna Mulrine, "Obama to Confront Limits of America's Overstretched Military: After
years of tough deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the military is struggling to retain soldiers," *U.S.
News and World Report,* 16 January 2009, Available from http://www.usnews.com articles/news/
world/ 2009/ 01/16/obama-to-confront-limits-of-americas-overstretched-military.html?PageNr=1;
(accessed 4 November 2009).

[376]Such an existential threat could require full mobilization of society for resolution. The
earlier discussion of time available for mobilization remains a critical consideration in response to an
existential threat. Many strategists would argue that it would be very unwise for a potential adversary
to allow the United States the strategic warning r time to permit a full mobilization or deployment of
troops prior to a conflict. One could suggest that the mature logistical support and established theatre
enjoyed in Afghanistan and Iraq will not be available in future conflicts.

offer a greater range of appropriate responses.   What is considered appropriate is itself a topic for extended debate.

Resources for defense compete with other domestic budgetary items. The President's budget submission includes both defense and domestic spending programs. Increased concern over deficit spending and the loss of U.S. economic power in the global economy has reduced popular support for the current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. As domestic economic concerns increase, risk tolerance increases for major and peripheral interests. Congress, as an expression of popular support, is unlikely to support military involvement in peripheral or major U.S. interests until economic recovery occurs. Congress reflects the societal isolationist tendencies that favor addressing concrete domestic economic threats over less visible, indirect threats overseas. The complex nature of the overseas security threats often makes it difficult for defense advocates to demonstrate the direct threat to rural neighborhoods in the continental United States.   The impacts of economic recession are much more visible to the American population than these complex foreign threats. Without a clear depiction of the threat to security, domestic concerns often take priority over major or peripheral national interests.

Krepinevich's theory of 'a thin green line' can be applied to Iranian efforts to develop nuclear weapons. The nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is at least a major U.S. security concern.[377] However, current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have

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[377]Debate remains that preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons is a vital U.S. interest. More directly Israel has declared that they will not permit Iran to gain a nuclear capability which may imply that they would use military means to prevent Iran. Israeli military action could lead to a larger Middle-Eastern conflict that could involve the United States if it were to commit forces in defense of

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limited the United State's ability to respond militarily with conventional ground forces. Ironically, U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have strengthened Iran's relative military power in the region. Iran now has the largest military force in the region.[378] Iran may believe that they have a strategic opportunity to develop nuclear weapons without fear of foreign intervention as long as the U.S. military is engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan. On 25 April 2008, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen stated, "A war against Iran would extremely stress forces already stretched thin by the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan… However, I have reserve capability in particularly our Navy and our Air Force…available globally…but it would be a mistake to think that we are out of combat capability."[379] His statement reflected concern for the ability of the ground forces to respond to another conflict. It also provided warning that other military capabilities may still be employed if U.S. vital interests are sufficiently threatened.

Israel. Iran's declaration that it" would eliminate Israel" is cited by those who believe that Iran should not be a nuclear power. Concern also exists that a nuclear capable Iran might share technology or capabilities with non state actors or other states that would threaten the United States and hence makes it a U.S. vital interest to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Further, if Iran maintained nuclear weapons would the balance of power in the region be threatened to the point that other Middle-Eastern states would feel compelled to also develop a nuclear capability? The comparable wealth within the region makes it likely that resources exist for states to acquire nuclear weapons if their leaders are determined to do so.

[378]This does not include Egypt which has a larger conventional army. Military capabilities vary within the region and size of the force is only one component of military power. For more details about the Egyptian military see Global Security.org, Egyptian military guide. Available from: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military /world/egypt/army.htm; (accessed 28 December 2009).

[379]Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen. Available from: http://www.dod vclips.mil/? 25 April 2008; (accessed 28 December 2009).

President Carter declared in his State of the Union Address 23 November 1980: "Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."[380] This statement became known as the Carter Doctrine and was a direct response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution. United States economic dependence on Middle East oil has led to continuous naval operations in the Persian Gulf to ensure freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.

Public approval for military action against Iran in response to their nuclear program may be difficult to achieve. Americans understand that their dependence on foreign oil validates the vital interest in securing the Strait of Hormuz. It is less clear, however, that a nuclear capable Iran directly threatens the flow of oil through the region. Articulation of this threat is further confused by the lack of information about Iran's nuclear capabilities or intentions. The indirect and uncertain future Iranian threat of proliferation of technology or weapons to other actors and nations is a serious concern, but future intentions are difficult to prove without corresponding actions. Without a clear understanding or articulation of the facts, it is difficult to determine exactly which military option would be the most appropriate - or effective - response to this Iranian threat. Additionally, public skepticism following the failure

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[380]President Jimmy Carter, State of the Union Address: January 23, 1980. Available from http://www.jimmycarter library.org/documents/speeches/su80jec.phtml; (accessed 13 December 2009).

to locate nuclear weapons in Iraq is high. The standards of proof required to gain

popular support for military action should be expected to be high. Hence, the

combination of these factors makes popular support for U.S. military action in Iran

logically unlikely. However, the President as the Commander in Chief has the ability

to direct military action against Iran without the prior approval of Congress or the

American people. Returning to the discussion of stress on the force, conventional

military operations against Iran would increase the stress on the force considerably.

The defense of Taiwan is another declared U.S. national interest that may lack

popular support for direct U.S. military intervention.[381] Similarly, it is difficult to

articulate how China's actions in Taiwan directly threaten the security of rural

America. Conceivably, China could gradually escalate pressure against Taiwan,

short of military action, with a variety of peaceful actions within their border meant to

pressure Taiwan to closer unification. From this perspective, U.S. military

operations against China are not likely to gain U.S. popular support. The special

relation with Taiwan may be difficult to define for the Chinese as well as the

American public. Similarly, Russian operations within their borders in Chechnya did

not receive U.S. popular support for U.S. military intervention despite concern over

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[381]The stated policy is regarded as the Taiwan Relations Act signed by President Carter 10 April 1979. In short, it calls for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan –China issue, the sale of Arms to Taiwan, and the statement that "any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means would be of grave concern to the United States". For a more complete treatment of the history and current U.S. China policy see James Chang, *U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan*, Harvard's Waterhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, June 2001. Available from: http://www.wcfia. Harvard.edu /fellows/papers /2000-01/chang.pdf; (accessed 28 December 2009).

the rights of the Chechens to declare themselves an independent republic.[382]

Operations against Iran, Russia, or China while we are still deployed in Afghanistan

and Iraq, would challenge national economic and military resources. In the same

way, one could argue that operations against China would be even more challenging

than the other two nations due to China's relative enormity and large population.

China may perceive that they have an opportunity to pursue their interests without

fear of a U.S. military response.

Analysts have explored some of the possible scenarios for military actions

between Taiwan and China. Chinese intentions for offensive military operations

against Taiwan remain unclear.[383] China's stated policy was reaffirmed in 2005. The

Chinese parliament passed a resolution that threatened to use force if Taiwan

attempted to secede from China. Specifically, party members reaffirmed, "(to take)

non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and

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[382]See Council on Foreign Relations website for more information about the history and current challenges facing Chechnya. Available at: http://www.cfr.org/ publication /91 81; (accessed 28 December 2009). While many differences exist between Chechnya and Taiwan, the example serves to illustrate that states are reluctant to interfere militarily in the internal affairs of other large nation states. There is no declared policy to specifically defend Chechnya. China, The United States, and Russia are large powers that would most likely be unwilling to accept foreign military intervention in internal security matters without consent. Deployment of U.S. Troops into a foreign nation without a request for assistance or UN mandate would be the equivalent of an act of war. It is unlikely that popular support exists for military operations on this scale while engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even if popular support is established the capability of conventional (army) forces is limited by current operations that shape the military options available for consideration. See also CJCS statement: Pentagon press conference, 25 April 2008.

[383]David Lague "China Confronts U.S. Defense of Taiwan" *The New York Times* June 10, 2007. Available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/10/world/asia/10iht-defense.4.6078917.html? _ r=1&pagewanted=2; (accessed 15 December 2009).

territorial integrity."[384] There is much room for debate over the likely consequences and outcomes of future military actions however; the arguments can be simplified into two scenarios: China wins in one, and Taiwan wins in the other.   In the first, China has a significant numerical military advantage over Taiwan and would prevail in a conflict. In the second, others believe that Taiwan has a qualitative military advantage because their western military equipment is considered more advanced than most of the Chinese equipment.[385]

These scenarios include a varying role for the U.S. military in the defense of Taiwan.   If the U. S. military were asked to defend Taiwan against a Chinese attack, conceivably, they would utilize the most advanced weapons systems available to compensate for a smaller military force.   David Lague reported that China has taken significant steps to counter U.S. military advantages in advanced weapon systems that rely on satellites, computers, and radio transmissions.   He described their actions in 2007, "analysts say, measures like these combined with jamming of radars and communications along with attacks on computer networks could force the U.S. military to fight an old-fashioned war"[386] The military options available to consider

[384]"Beijing Warns of Invasion if Taiwan Dares to Declare its Independence", *Times Online* 9 March 2005. Available from http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article422413.ece; (accessed 15 December 2009).

[385]Piers M. Wood and Charles D. Ferguson "How China might invade Taiwan", *Naval War College Review*, Autumn 2001. Available from http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi _m0JIW/I s_4_54/ ai_8329 51 22/; (accessed 15 December 2009).

[386]David Lague "China Confronts U.S. Defense of Taiwan" *The New York Times* June 10, 2007. Available from http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/10/world/asia/10iht-defense.4.6078917 .html? _r=1&pagewanted=2; (accessed 15 December 2009).

for a defense of Taiwan are further reduced by the lack of available conventional troops due to operational commitments in the Middle East. If the only options available involve "advanced weapon systems", mentioned by Lague, than the possibility of escalation to a total war with China must be considered before military actions are initiated.   Equally, one must consider what level of national commitment is necessary to achieve the political and military objectives? What vital interests are at stake that threatens the existence of the United States and should they be defended at all costs? If these questions cannot be answered precisely before the engagement of forces, then military failure is likely against a powerful nation like China. One should anticipate that national leaders would not initiate military action in such a case without careful consideration of the long term costs and benefits of such actions. Notional scenarios are often examined to build a knowledge base to ponder these difficult questions before a crisis emerges. Such complex analysis and subsequent understanding cannot be achieved rapidly during a crisis without prior awareness.

There are clear linkages between the aforementioned three components of stress on the force and rotation policies. Rotation policies are commonly associated with the Army; but the Air Force, Navy, and Marines also faced challenges associated with rotations. Specialties exist in each of the services that are taxed by the continued operational requirements in the Middle East. Some shortages within the Army have been filled by over fourteen thousand sailors serving on the ground with the Army.[387]

[387]Chief of Naval Operations Admiral David Roughead comments to the Philadelphia Council of the Navy League Annual Dinner 24 June 2009. Available from: http://www.navy.mil/navydata /people/c no/ Roughead /Speech/6.24.09_Philadelphia%20Navy% 20League%20Dinner %20FINAL .doc; (accessed 28 December 2009).

The Department of the Navy is also concerned that many marines have never served on an amphibious rotation due to the force structure requirements for ground operations in Iraq over the last seven years. Andrew Tilghman recently reported, "Years ago, half the marines in a marine expeditionary unit (MEU) had amphibious experience. Now roughly three quarters of them are going to sea for the first time."[388] Concern exists that the Marines are losing their amphibious experience as well as sailors losing their experience working with marines afloat. Both experiences are associated with the corps competencies of each of these services to conduct amphibious operations. Stress is also affecting the Air Force. Combat related stress has been attributed to roughly four percent of the deaths in theater over the last six years. "Over one hundred seventy- two airmen have committed suicide since the start of the war…That's roughly eighteen percent of all non-hostile related deaths."[389] Complex challenges confront the leaders responsible for restoring a sense of balance between operational demand and resources available in all services. Stress on the force will likely remain an issue for many years to come.

Equipment

Returning to the third component of stress on the force identified by Secretary Gates, the military equipment required to meet the national policy objectives also

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[388]Andrew Tilghman, "More 'green' Marines aboard ships", *Navy Times*, Thursday February 19, 2009. Available from: http://www.navytimes.com /news/2009/02/navy_bluegreen_021809w/ (accessed 28 December 2009).

[389]"Editorial: Combat Stress Kills," Available from: http://www.airforcetimes.com /community/opinion/airforce_editorial_stress _060908; (accessed 10 October 2009).

requires actions to reduce stress on the force.[390] While many troops have been

removed from Iraq, much of the equipment remains in Iraq to equip the Iraqi Army.

This equipment must be replaced in order to maintain military capabilities and

strategic flexibility.   Michelle Flournoy, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy,

addressed this policy goal, "Iraqi forces must be able to provide security for Iraq's

population and to conduct internal defense and basic external defenses to maintain

stability there;" she explained, "Congress recently granted the Defense Department

authority to provide "excess material" and some "non-excess material" to help the

Iraqis meet that goal."[391]   Although the reduction of U.S. forces in Iraq continues

there is a large amount of equipment that must be transported to the United States for

reconditioning or reset. Much of this equipment has been utilized at a rate much

higher than it was initially designed. Many of these systems are the same ones that

were developed in the 1980s and require 'deep maintenance'. This deep maintenance

is referred to as part of the process to reset the force in preparation for future

operations and effects Bradley fighting vehicles, M-1 Abrams tanks, High Mobility

Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HUMWV's), and the fleet of helicopters.[392] "The

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[390]Defense Secretary Robert Gates, Statement 10 February 2009, Available from: http://www.dodvclips.mil/?fr_story=FRdamp340481&rf=sitemap; (accessed 12 November 2009).

[391]Michelle Flournoy, statement to Congress 21 October 2009. Available from: http://www.usembassy.org.uk/iraq015.html; (accessed 28 December 2009).

[392]"Reset of U.S. Army Vehicle Fleet Continues", Defense Industry Daily, 4 October 2009. Available from:http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/reset-of-the-us-armys-vehicle-fleet-continues-02493/# overhangs; (accessed 29 December 2009). Detailed schedules of reset objectives for each platform are outlined. See also "In FY-10 Budget, Army Begins To Replace Kiowa Warriors Lost In Battle", *Inside the Army* - December 28, 2009. Available from http: // www. insidedefense.com .ezp roxy.usawcpubs.org/secure/display.asp?docnum=ARMY-21-51-9&f= defense _ 2002.ask; (accessed 28 March 2010).

reset process takes used vehicles apart, inspects the parts, then replaces any defective

parts and refurbishes the equipment to like-new condition, often installing available

upgrades."[393] The scope of the problem was expressed to Congress by Michelle

Flournoy. "About 3.3 million pieces of U.S. equipment are in Iraq now, and although

some will transfer to Iraq and eventually to Afghanistan, the majority will stay with

U.S. forces." [394] Other policy initiatives propose transferring equipment to Pakistan

to increase Pakistani capacity to fight the Taliban in Pakistan.[395] Alan Estavez, acting

Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness added,

"Military logisticians are also determining what to do with 49,000 sea-land

containers, 34,000 tons of ammunition, and 21,000 tons of supplies."[396]

Supplemental funding has financed the operating costs in Iraq; however, most

personnel are scheduled to be withdrawn from Iraq by 2011. It remains uncertain

how much budget support will exist for refitting and reconditioning military

equipment after the operational demand has been reduced in the Middle East.

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[393]"Reset of U.S. Army Vehicle Fleet Continues", *Defense Industry Daily*, 4 October 2009. Available from:http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/reset-of-the-us-armys-vehicle-fleet-continues-02493/#overhangs; (accessed 29 December 2009).

[394]Michelle Flournoy statement to Congress 21 October 2009. Available from: http://www. usembassy.org.uk/iraq015.html; (accessed 28 December 2009).

[395]"U.S. Eyes Military Equipment in Iraq for Pakistan" *Reuters*, 10 September 2009. Available from: http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5890IR20090910; (accessed 28 December 2009).

[396]William H. McMichael, "Guard to Bring Gear Back from Iraq," Air Force Times, Oct 21, 2009. Congressman Gene Taylor's announcement. Available from: http://www.taylor.house.gov /index.php? option=com _content &task=view&id=1298&Itemid=89; (accessed 28 December 2009).

Much has been written over the past nine years on the lack of capacity within the industrial base to provide the materials needed to support military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Small arms ammunition is one of the basic requirements for an Army at war and also serves to demonstrate the lack of production capacity in the industrial base.

> A weapon without ammunition is useless, which is why ammunition is almost always a strategic national capability whose production must remain in-country. On the other hand, government demand has a tendency to swing up and down within narrow limits, and the demands of efficiency usually lead to a single supplier situation – often using equipment that dates back to World War II.[397]

Since 2004, ammunition shortages have existed for a variety of small arms calibers including precision guided missiles. The military has steadily expended ammunition beyond the production capacity to replace it.[398] War time stocks were reduced below acceptable levels and strategic flexibility again was reduced.

Great Britain and Australia also depleted their reserves and were forced to reexamine their ammunition acquisition and stockpiling policies.[399] In an effort to maximize efficiency and minimize costs these nations had relied upon single source

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[397]"Mass for Effect: The UK's Long-Term Ammo Contract", *Defense Industry Daily*, 1 October 2009. Available from http://w ww.defenseindustrydaily.com/?s=ammunition+shortage; (accessed 29 December 2009).

[398]"Pass The Ammunition: Army Taking Action on Small-Cal Shortages", *Defense Industry Daily,* 14 July 2005. Available from: http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/pass-the-ammunition-army-taking-action-on-smallcal-shortages-0859/; (accessed 29 December 2009).

[399]See *Defense Industry Daily* archives for several articles concerning military ammunition shortages. Some of note: "$298M to AEY for Ammo in Afghanistan", 21 March 2007; "Ammo Imperative: Australia Modernizes Mulwala Facility", 13 June 2007; "$52.2M to Finance Ongoing Lake City Ammo Modernization", 24 January 2008; "$102.2M for 380.6M small-cal rounds", 4 March 2008; "MASS for Effect: The UK's Long-Term Ammo Contract", 1 October 2009; Available from: http://w ww.defenseindustrydaily.com/?s=ammunition+shortage; (accessed 29 December 2009).

providers, rather than maintaining numerous providers that could supply a greater surge capacity as wartime needs increased.[400] Great Britain in 2008 addressed the problem, of having a single supplier whose production could not meet the operational demands, by contracting with a German company to produce conventional munitions.

Similarly, the U.S. Army Sustainment Command in Rock Island, Illinois has sought to expand from its single production facility, Lake City Army Ammunition Plant (LCAAP) in Independence, Missouri. The United States also preferred to outsource ammunition development rather than build a government owned and managed production facility. General Dynamics was named the secondary supplier of small arms ammunition. Additionally, ten other manufacturers across the United States were also awarded contracts to alleviate the shortage of small arms ammunition.[401]

The shortage of war stocks is not a new phenomenon springing from recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Stuart Brandes in his book, *WarHogs: a History of War Profits in America*, argued that American production capacity has never been prepared for the start of a war. His analysis examined U. S. materiel production from Colonial times to World War II. He stated, "When World War II opened, the United States leadership was shocked to find that the American capacity to produce war

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[400]Greater treatment of American mobilization of economic resources and the ethical questions of wartime profiteering, from Colonial times through World War II, can be found in Stuart Brandes's Work: *Warhogs: A History of War Profits in America*, (Lexington, Kentucky: The University of Press of Kentucky, 1997), 258.

[401]"Up to $2B for U.S. Army Munitions Orders to Alliant Techsystems", *Defense Industry Daily,* 17 June 2009. Available from http://w ww.defenseindustrydaily.com/?s=ammunition+shortage; (accessed 29 December 2009).

materiel was woefully inadequate. In 1940, the entire stockpile of gunpowder was too small to meet the needs of a single day of battle at 1943 levels."[402] The United States historically has increased civilian production facilities to meet operational requirements. During World War II a centralized government approach resulted in the government owning nearly sixteen percent of the nation's industrial capacity. However, after World War II, much of the defense production facilities were quickly sold off at a fraction of their cost to the government in an attempt to quickly return to private enterprise.[403]

The previous analysis implies that recent operational demand must inform policy formulation. As foretold by the ancient rhyme "…for want of a nail…the kingdom was lost", emphasized the point that policy decisions have weighty consequences related to war preparations.[404] When ammunition utilization rates decrease with the anticipated troop withdrawals from the Middle East, policies must remain in place to ensure sufficient war reserves and production capacity to maintain

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[402]Stuart Brandes, *Warhogs: A History of War Profits in America* (Lexington, Kentucky: The University of Press of Kentucky, 1997), 259.

[403]Ibid., 260.

[404]Complete rhyme, "For want of a nail the shoe was lost. For want of a shoe the horse was lost. For want of a horse the rider was lost. For want of a rider the battle was lost. For want of a battle the kingdom was lost. And all for the want of a horseshoe nail." Original British rhyme popularized by Benjamin Franklin in *Poor Richard's Almanac, 1758*. Intended to show that little actions can have significant consequences and promote virtuous behavior. Available from: http://www.rhymes .org.uk /for_ want _of_a_nail.htm; (accessed 31 December 2009). *Poor Richard's Almanac* selected copies available from: http://public.gettysburg.edu /~ tshannon /his 341/colonia lam er.htm; (accessed 31 December 2009).

strategic flexibility.[405] War stockpiles and production capacity should be

reconsidered. Analysis must expand beyond ammunition shortages to other wartime

consumable goods and major end items. Just as ship building traditionally has

required forethought to ensure the Navy is able to defend the sea lines of

communications, the armed forces of today must be adequately resourced to execute

the national strategy. Tanks, helicopters, armored vehicles, and planes have suffered

from shortages of spare parts from years of operational demand and maintenance

requirements exceeding the production capacity.[406] Budget competition between

defense programs to 'reset' the force and domestic programs will likely increase from

an implied 'peace dividend' as troops are withdrawn from overseas areas. The policy

challenge remains to provide for the national defense at an acceptable level of risk.

The current indicators of stress on the force may demonstrate that the level of risk

assumed in the past is not appropriate for the emerging security environment.

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[405]For more information on the ammunition shortages and the actions taken to expand the industrial base also see: Daniel Goure, "In the End, It's all About Ammunition", Army, September 2005. Available from: http://www3.ausa.org/pdfdocs/armymag/ammo.pdf; (accessed 29 December 2009) and "Pass the Ammunition: Army Taking Action on Small-Cal Shortages", *Defense Industry Daily,* 14 July 2005. Available from: http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/pass-the-ammunition-army-taking-action-on-smallcal-shortages-0859/; (accessed 29 December 2009).

[406]Many articles have been written highlighting the shortages of parts for Up-armored HUMWVs, UH-60 helicopters, M-1 tanks, and C-130 aircraft. See Thomas Ricks, "General Reported Shortages in Iraq: Situation Is Improved, Top Army Officials Say", *The Washington Post*, 18 October 2004. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com /wp-dyn/articles/A40321-2004Oct17.html; (accessed 31 December 2009).

Conclusion

Secretary Gates identified three components of stress on the force - repeated and prolonged absences from home, exposure to combat operations, and equipment fatigue. They all reveal visible consequences of executing the national security strategy with limited resources.[407] The goal of force development is to create combat capable forces within constrained resources. All DoD efforts associated with acquisition, training, distribution, deployment, sustainment, development, and separation are impacted by resources, command, leadership, and management. The functional life cycle model of the Army addressed these interrelationships within the Army. General Trefry commented on the importance of being able to understand and apply these relationships to the challenges facing the Army for the future:

> Well I think the Army faces some severe problems. There are so very few people who know all this stuff. The experts are in force management...until we can get some people who can articulate Army positions it is going to be tough as hell. The Army is not going to get what the hell its wants. …To be able to do that, I don't see how you can do it any other way than force management.[408]

The fundamental strategic questions raised in this chapter remain; 1) can all the national security objectives be achieved with limited resources? And, 2) what is the proper prioritization of objectives and resources to maintain combat capable forces?

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[407]Defense Secretary Robert Gates, press conference statement 10 February 2009. Also addressed tour lengths, divorce rates, suicide rates, multiple deployments, post traumatic stress disorder, and extended tours as manifestations of the stress on the force. Available from http:// www. dodvclips.mil/?fr_story=FRdamp340481&rf=sitemap; (accessed 12 November 2009).

[408]Richard Trefry, Interview with author, 19 December 2007, track 25 (00:36:14).

President Obama's speech at West Point 1 December 2009 reflected many of

the concerns surrounding these questions related to operations in Afghanistan and

Iraq. He announced his decision to increase the number of troops in Afghanistan by

thirty thousand and established a timeline to begin the withdrawal of these troops by

July 2011.[409] Much of the public debate has polarized around the issue of how many

troops should be deployed to Afghanistan and for how long. However, very little

public debate surrounded his declared objectives:

> We will pursue the following objectives within Afghanistan. We must deny
> al-Qaeda a safe haven. We must reverse the Taliban's momentum and deny it
> the ability to overthrow the government. And we must strengthen the capacity
> of Afghanistan's security forces and government, so that they can take lead
> responsibility for Afghanistan's future.[410]

The *Washington Post* headline 2 December 2009 reflected this polarization; it

read: "Obama: U.S. security is still at stake AFGHAN WAR TO ESCALATE, 30,000

more troops; pullout begins mid-2011."[411] Obama also recognized that defense

requirements must be balanced against domestic economic concerns in his statement,

"…having just experienced the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, the

American people are understandably focused on rebuilding our economy and putting

[409]President Barrack Obama, Transcript of Speech delivered at West Point, 1 December 2009. Available from: http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2009/12/obamas-afghan-policy-speech-at.html; (accessed 2 January 2010).

[410]President Barrack Obama, Transcript of Speech delivered at West Point, 1 December 2009. Available from: http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2009/12/obamas-afghan-policy-speech-at.html; (accessed 2 January 2010).

[411]Scott Wilson, "Obama: U.S. security is still at stake AFGHAN WAR TO ESCALATE, 30,000 more troops; pullout begins mid-2011", *The Washington Post*, 2 December 2009. Available from: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/01/ AR20091 20101231.html ?sid =ST2009120100456; (accessed 2 January 2010).

people to work here at home."[412] Further, he acknowledged a conflict between

potential mission accomplishment and cost by limiting the scope of our commitment.

He declared "it is in our vital national interest" to send more troops and it is "not

simply a test of NATO's credibility," indicating his viewed importance of success in

Afghanistan. [413] But he also rejected an absolute commitment of U.S. resources to the

mission. "Some call for a more dramatic and open-ended escalation of our war effort,

one that would commit us to a nation-building project of up to a decade. I reject this

course because it sets goals that are beyond what can be achieved at a reasonable cost

and what we need to achieve to secure our interests."[414] Challenges must be

reassessed regularly in order to ensure that the appropriate amounts of resources are

dedicated to achieve our national objectives. The underlying national objectives must

also be reassessed to ensure that they still warrant prioritization of scarce resources

with the government and the DoD.

[412]President Barrack Obama, Transcript of Speech delivered at West Point, 1 December 2009. Available from: http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2009/12/obamas-afghan-policy-speech-at.html; (accessed 2 January 2010).

[413]President Barrack Obama, Transcript of Speech delivered at West Point, 1 December 2009. Available from: http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2009/12/obamas-afghan-policy-speech-at.html; (accessed 2 January 2010).

[414]President Barrack Obama, Transcript of Speech delivered at West Point, 1 December 2009. Available from: http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2009/12/obamas-afghan-policy-speech-at.html; (accessed 2 January 2010).

Chapter Seven

Conclusions

The idea for this research began in 2007 at a celebration in honor of George Washington's 275th birthday at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. General Richard Trefry proposed the idea of celebrating this occasion with the military community at the U.S. Army War College. Organizers displayed several three by six foot charts on easels in a large ballroom in the Letort Creek Community Club. These charts were known as the Mother of all Charts. They attracted much attention from many of the attending War College faculty and students, who were fascinated with this diverse collection of detailed information associated with Army force management. As they gazed at this display, they discussed the various events and issues portrayed ranging from the Army's policy development, doctrine development, organizational structure, civilian leadership, military equipment, and the associated periods of declared conflicts. Many of the older participants reminisced about their personal experiences during their active military service.

These charts were not new, but the reaction that they received inspired new questions: What was the story behind their creation? For what purpose was this information recorded and archived? Who decided to present this information visually as a series of charts? Why had the Army's organization and equipment changed so much over the past seventy years? How was a complex organization able to manage such dramatic changes? From a historical perspective alone, the information on these

charts provided a rich database documenting over twenty-seven themes of change in the Department of Defense (DoD). Collectively, they told the story of how the Army has been organized, trained, and equipped since 1940. These changes were driven by changes in policies and missions determined by the civilian leadership. However, analyzing this data required an understanding of the processes used to determine defense policy.

Defense policy formulation has evolved significantly since 1940, yet these processes are securely grounded on a constitutional foundation. The constitutional separation of powers is represented on the charts under the headings of "President's, key advisors, key Congressional leaders, and Joint Chiefs of Staff."[415] The interactions among these groups are depicted in the military budget and policy decisions portrayed on the charts. Civil-military relations lie at the heart of these interactions. This study has examined some of the many of these leader's management techniques and styles. These styles can be reduced to two groups: those favoring either objective or subjective control of the military. Historical examples support both the supporters of objective and subjective control of management of the military to ensure national security.

This study provided new analysis of management of complex DoD systems. The inherent challenge of managing a complex organization like the DoD invites comparisons between military and corporate management techniques. Accordingly,

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[415]U. S. Army Force Management School, Mother of All Charts. Available from: http:// 160 .147. 135.6 /afms/afmsMain.po; (accessed 26 January 2010).

this study examined the dominant civilian management theories of the 1980s.

Corporate America and the military can learn from each other about the management

of large organizations. Best practices have migrated in both directions between

them. Both military and civilian organizations rely on systems that are vertically

separated and exist within their own management communities, such as acquisition or

training systems. Force management provides a holistic approach that crosses

vertical barriers to improve effectiveness, efficiency, and management of change.

Many of these principles of management are common within large organizations,

both corporate and military.

This research revealed the evolution of the process of force management in

the 1980s - from policy formulation to combat ready organizations in a resource-

constrained environment. In other words, force management led change in the

Army.[416] Lieutenant General (retired) Richard G. Trefry has remained at the center

of Army force management. The Secretary of the Army awarded Trefry the first

"LTG Richard G. Trefry Lifetime Service Award" for over sixty-five years of service

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[416]*2008 Primer Army Force Management*, U.S. Army Force Management School, Fort Belvoir, VA, 9. Available from: http://www.afms1.belvoir.army.mil; (accessed 23 January 2010). "Force Management is the capstone process to establish and field mission-ready Army organizations. The process involves organization, integration, decision making, and execution of the spectrum of activities encompassing requirements definition, force development, force integration, force structuring, capabilities developments, materiel developments, training developments, resourcing and all elements of the AOLCM. Force management is a very complicated business. It includes force development, force integration, force modernization, capabilities development, doctrine development, training development, organizational development, materiel development, force structuring, organizational integration, system integration, resourcing integration, and document integration. Force management also includes the functions of manning, equipping, readiness, TOEs, MTOEs, TDAs, JTAs, and all categories of personnel."

to the Army on 20 March 2009.[417]   The life and times of LTG Trefry warrant separate

treatment.   His experiences over his years of service chronicle many noteworthy

accomplishments. They also offer many valuable insights to the challenges that faced

the nation.   He was instrumental in the advancement of a systematic approach to

managing change across the Army, which involved many independent projects.

Chief among these was the development of the Army Force Management System

(AFMS), the U.S. Army Force Management School (USAFMS), the Mother of All

Charts (MOAC), as well as the role of the Inspector General of the Army. This study

offers historical background on Trefry's labors to improve Army force management.

This study has described the process that the U.S. government has used to

meet its security challenges since the 1980s. The Joint Strategic Planning System

(JSPS) codified national priorities and enabled the Department of Defense (DoD) to

translate them into military requirements. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(CJCS) utilizes the JSPS to meet his statutory requirements for defense planning.[418]

This study examined the interdependent relationships between the JSPS and the Army

Force Management System (AFMS); it analyzed the Army process to determine the

forces and equipment needed to meet the civilian leadership's guidance for national

security.

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[417]"Former Inspector General honored for Lifetime Service," Army News Service, 20 March
2009. Available from http://www.army.mil/-news/2009/03/20/18528; (accessed 23 January 2010).

[418]Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3100.01B, dated 12 December
2008. "The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is the primary means by which the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) carries out statutory responsibilities assigned in titles 6, 10, 22 and 50
of the United States Code (USC)."A-1, http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3100_01.pdf
(accessed February 15, 2009).

Chapter Three traced the history of the Army Force Management System (AFMS) during the 1970s and 1980s. It explained how in the 1970s and 1980s Trefry developed a system to manage change in the Army. This analysis included the development of the Army Organizational Life Cycle Model (AOLCM), or Functional Life Cycle Model of the Army (FLCM). This model was designed to manage change in the Army during the 1980s. This chapter illustrated how the contemporary management philosophies of Peter Drucker, Henry Mintzberg and others, influenced organizational behavior in force management and defense strategic planning. This chapter then provided a basis for further analysis of national security objectives, policies, and issues. It stressed the need for a holistic approach to manage the complex systems that direct change across the DoD. Understanding these systems and their interrelationships is essential for ensuring combat-ready units have the requisite structure, equipment, and training to accomplish national security objectives. As the Inspector General of the Army, Trefry understood and articulated these systems.

Continuing the analysis of the AFMS, Chapter Four examined the history of the U.S. Army Force Management School (USAFMS) at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. It explains how the Army incorporated Trefry's holistic vision of management. Despite early efforts in the 1980s to establish force management training in the Army, by 1993 most force management training initiatives had been eliminated. In 1993, Trefry led the Army investigation that detailed the state of Army force management training since 1980s. This chapter described the events that led to the creation of the

USAFMS as the Army's central educational institution for preparing senior analysts and leaders for assignment in the global force management community. USAFMS has produced many DoD primers and reference books. One of the most comprehensive is *How the Army Runs: a Senior Leader Reference Book*, written by the USAFMS.[419] In 1994, Trefry became the Program Manager of the school; he still serves in 2010. Sadly, few senior military officers have the background or have expressed the inclination to succeed Trefry in this position.

Chapter Four also chronicled the history of the Mother of All Charts (MOAC). In 1996, Trefry developed these charts as a training aid to visually depict the interrelationships among the AFMS's many domains. These charts are managed by Scott Wilson at the USAFMS and detail several themes affecting the Army since 1940. Collectively, these charts display trends and portray some of the unintended consequences of defense policy changes over time. The MOAC currently exhibits twenty-seven themes in over 100 separate charts. This study provided the first documentation of the development of these charts and the electronic database that supports them. The archives at the USAFMS have yet to be fully cataloged or analyzed. The U.S. Military Academy at West Point has expressed interest in acquiring and cataloging many of these records, however, the Army Heritage and Education Center has also expressed an interest. These archives deserve additional examination as they mature.

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[419]*How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Handbook* (Government Printing Office, 2007): Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, U.S. Army War College, http://www.carlisle .army.mil/ usawc/dclm/Htar2007.html; (accessed February 17, 2009).

Chapter Five explored civil-military relations. These relations, or interactions, develop the objectives that drive change in the DoD. This chapter elaborated on the role of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) described in Chapter Two. Analysts must be familiar with the JSPS and AFMS before they consider the impacts of current military operations on equipment, personnel, organizations, and strategy. Civilian policy decisions, and the resources allocated to implement them, have serious implications for future U.S. national security. The interrelationships among force management and the JSPS provide a new heuristic for examining the implications of current military operations upon national security policy. Few analysts seem to be aware of the implications of policy decisions on Army force management. Senior military leaders have a professional responsibility to inform their civilian leaders of the likely implications of defense related policy decisions.

The attacks of September 11, 2001 demonstrated that the United States homeland is vulnerable to attacks from violent extremists. This spectacular attack changed many Americans' view of our national security within the new global security environment. The coordinated efforts of a few extremists irrevocably changed Americans' view of national security requirements. This vulnerability created a sense of urgency, which prompted examination of U.S. defense measures on a global scale. Within the United States, homeland defense was elevated to a cabinet-level position as public and private organizations increased security awareness and defense measures. This dissertation provided a history of the management systems

critical to ensuring the Army and the nation are capable of developing a viable national security strategy.

Chapter Six presented some policy considerations that affect interactions among policy, the JSPS, and force management. Journalists, politicians, scholars, and various defense analysts have added to this emerging body of literature concerning future threats and likely U.S. national security challenges. This dissertation showed how the JSPS system produces divergent views of the security environment, leading to divergent DoD policy recommendations. Civilian leaders also have access to a wealth of knowledge that can inform their policy recommendations. The military must remain actively involved in deliberations of policy to ensure that informed decisions are reached. However, the civilian leadership is ultimately responsible for determining national security objectives and the organization of the military.

Recent operations in the Middle East have stressed the force to the point that it will take many years to replace equipment and train personnel to conduct operations on a scale equivalent to what is required for major combat operations. Many believe that the probability of fighting a near-peer competitor is too low to justify the expense of refitting the Army. Some place their confidence in the nuclear arsenal to mitigate or deter any future near peer military threat. Others believe the future Army should be organized to conduct counterinsurgency operations similar to the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Proposals for future military structures are based on differing views of the global security environment. Yet all future threat

assessments are fraught with ambiguity. Warfare is inherently asymmetric; there would be no armed conflict if all adversaries were transparently symmetrical. Adversaries always adapt to new technology, tactics, and procedures; they find ways to compensate for their comparative weaknesses. However, time is not always available to mitigate vulnerabilities and thus to prevent devastating consequences. Risk must be assumed as current needs are balanced against future requirements. Competition for scarce resources makes prioritization of resources even more difficult.

In a democracy, defense spending will continue to compete with other domestic programs for limited resources. Right minded leaders will continue to disagree over the composition of the military needed to accomplish the national security objectives. This debate must include an open discussion of all parties' assumptions and expectations. Allocation of resources may be based on deep-seated values and beliefs that may never be altered by reason. Risk will be assumed across all elements of national power. The military provides just one of the means that can be used to achieve national security objectives. Policy makers must determine and prioritize national objectives as they allocate resources. Failure to do so jeopardizes accomplishment of domestic agendas as well as national security objectives.

Public opinion also plays a large role in determining how much national treasure will be expended for defense. Many Americans believe the most immediate threat to the nation is economic. Most also acknowledge that terrorist extremist groups threaten global security. Incessant news broadcasts reinforce the impression –

even the fear- that Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups are actively working to attack the United States.   However, the role of the military in addressing this threat is less clear. The Federal Aviation Administration has played a significant role in establishing practices to combat terrorism on flights.   Increased security procedures at airports are the most visible evidence of these changes. Similarly, piracy threatens free commerce on a global scale, yet the role of the military to combat piracy is also limited. The business community has independently adopted several security measures to protect themselves in overseas operations. Improved security procedures have also reduced pirates' abilities to seize merchant ships. All elements of power must be coordinated to effectively deal with these varied threats. National security can be improved in many ways without increasing the defense budget.

This dissertation focused on the military's national security processes to explicate the role of force management in coordinating resources to field combat ready units. However, it does not advocate that the DoD is the only element of power that should be considered in developing the national security strategy. A comprehensive, or whole-of-government, approach should be developed to mitigate risks to vital national security interests. Other elements of national power can effectively achieve national objectives. But just like the military, they have their own limitations. Effective force management satisfies realistic expectations when the military is called to respond to respond to a crisis. The Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen of the nation have always acted valorously in response to our national emergencies. Our national policy makers do not need 20/20 future vision to assure

the nation's security. Plans for the future force structure must be realistically based on the intended military mission. As these requirements change, so must the force structure to accomplish these missions. Strategy development requires national leaders to make hard decisions and set priorities to guide the development of a force structure. Changes in force structure take years to implement; they must be anticipated in order to succeed. Understanding force management provides insight into a process that analyzes the threat and produces trained and ready combat organizations to maintain national defense.   Defense professionals and scholars of national security should understand the history of this system in order to inform their decisions as they lead change to provide for our nation's security.

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Appendix 1

The Mother of All Charts

Figure 6. **The Mother of All Charts Threat "Theme" Chart (Left).**[420]

[420]U.S. Army Force Management School, Mother of All Charts. Available from: http://160.147.135.6/afms/charts; (accessed 21 January 2010). Picture of charts converted by U.S. Army War College Photo Lab, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 23 January 2010.

Figure 7. The Mother of All Charts "Threat" Theme Chart (Right).[421]

Figure 8. **The Mother of All Charts "Army Secretariat" Theme Chart (Left).**[422]

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[422]Ibid.

Figure 9. **The Mother of All Charts "Army Secretariat" Theme Chart (Right).**[423]

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
[423]Ibid.

Figure 10. **The Mother of All Charts "Heads of State Visits Outside of U.S."
Theme Chart (Left).**[424]

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[424]Ibid.

Figure 11. **The Mother of All Charts "Heads of State Visits Outside of U.S."**
Theme Chart (Right).[425]

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[425]Ibid.

Figure 12. The Mother of All Charts "Heads of State Visits to U.S. 1940-1975" Theme Chart (Left).[426]

Ibid.

Figure 13. The Mother of All Charts "Heads of State Visits to U.S. 1940 – 1975" Theme Chart (Right).[427]

[427]Ibid.

Figure 14. The Mother of All Charts "Heads of State Visits to U. S. 1975 - 1990" Theme Chart (Left).[428]

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[428]Ibid.

Figure 15. The Mother of All Charts "Heads of State Visits to U. S. 1975 - 1990" Theme Chart (Right).[429]

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[429]Ibid.

Figure 16.   The Mother of All Charts "Key Leadership" Theme Chart (Left).[430]

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[430]Ibid.

Figure 17. **The Mother of All Charts "Key Leadership" Theme Chart (Right).**[431]

[431]Ibid.

Figure 18.   The Mother of All Charts "Organizations" Theme Chart (Left).[432]

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[432]Ibid.

Figure 19.   The Mother of All Charts "Organizations" Theme Chart (Right).[433]

[433]Ibid.

Appendix 2

Interview Questions for Lieutenant General Richard Trefry

**(Interviewed by Colonel Gregory L. Cantwell 18, 19, 20 December 2007
at the U.S. Army Force Management School, Fort Belvoir, Virginia)**

1. History of the US Army Force Management School? (What is the story behind

   establishing the Force Management School (AFMS)?)

   a. Why did the Army establish the Army Force Management School?

   b. When did The Army establish the Army Force Management School?

   c. How long did it take from conceptualization to activation?

      i. Who were the key players involved: supporters and opponents?

         1. In Congress?

         2. In DA?

         3. In MPRI?

   d. How did the curriculum evolve?

      i. What were the first courses offered? Why?

      ii. What courses don't you offer that you believe should be

         offered? Why?

   e. What is the funding source for the AFMS?

      i. Is it subject to change annually?

      ii. I understand that many of the officers newly assigned to the

         pentagon attend your orientation courses.

1. What are the selection criteria for attendance? Is it required? Is there a goal? Are records kept to show the percentage of personnel that have attended the staff orientation courses?

2. Who funds their attendance?

3. What courses do they attend? Staff Officers? General Officers?

4. What are the objectives of these courses?

5. Who develops the curriculum and courseware? What is the approval process for the courseware?

f. Based on the importance of the school- I understand that the school is a US Army field agency in support of the army G-3.

   i.   Is this a permanent association? Can the G-3 alter this relationship? Is it codified?

   ii. Are the instructors DOD civilians?

   iii. Can the AFMS be closed? If so, what authority could do so?

   iv. What do you see as the future for the school?

   v.   What challenges do you see to this future for the school?

g. Is there anything else that you would like to add about the Force Management School or its founding? Is there anyone else that you recommend I speak with or questions that I should ask?

2. History of Mother of all Charts (MOAC) (What is the Story behind the Mother of All Charts?)

   a. What is the purpose of the MOAC?

   b. Why did you establish the Mother of All Charts (MOAC)?

   c. What did the first chart cover?

   d. How did you determine what information should be captured? What were the criteria?

   e. Management of Charts:

      i. Who manages the charts? Scott Wilson? What is his background? How did you select him for the job?

      ii. How are the charts managed?

   f. What are the charts used for? Who uses them? Where are they displayed permanently, and temporarily?

   g. How does information get added to the chart?

   h. I understand that you currently have 27 different themes. How many charts cover are there in total?

   i. Are there additional charts you would like to see?

   j. What do you see as the future of the MOAC?

   k. Is there anything else that you would like to add about the Mother of All Charts? Is there anyone else that you recommend I speak with or questions that I should ask?

3. I understand that you have an extensive archive collection. Can you tell me more about what kind of information is contained in these archives?

   a. Where are they located?

   b. Is there a custodian? How can they be accessed?

   c. How does the information get into the archives?

   d. Where does it come from? Are parts of it classified?

   e. Has it been digitally preserved?

   f. I understand that you have arranged for West Point to accept the archives. Can you tell me more about this? (degree of scope, quantity, timetable for transfer)

      i. How are they organized?

      ii. Are these personal archives or government property?

      iii. Who is the point of contact at West Point?

      iv. What do you believe is the greatest value of the archive?

      v. What do you believe is the most valuable information contained in them?

      vi. What is the most interesting information?

   g. Is there anything else that you would like to add about the archives or their establishment? Is there anyone else that you recommend I speak with or questions that I should ask?

4. History of "How the Army Runs" (HTAR). I understand that this is a War College Textbook that was written by the AFMS at one time. What is the History of the development of HTAR?

   a. Who were the key players involved:

      i. In Congress?

      ii. In DA?

      iii. At Carlisle?

      iv. In MPRI?

   b. When was it created?

   c. Why is it now managed at the War College?

   d. Who is the primary audience?

   e. What changes would you suggest to it?

   f. The book "How the Army Runs" covers many of the systems that you mention in your presentation. Some of this is by necessity. What is the relationship between the presentation and the Book? Is there a chicken and an egg?

   g. What components do you believe needs modification in the force management process? Why?

   h. Is there anything else that you would like to add about "How the Army Runs" or its establishment? Is there anyone else that you recommend I speak with or questions that I should ask?

5. I have been one of your trained force management instructors at the Command and General Staff College (2000-2003) and have great appreciation for what you do personally and with the Army Force Management School. I have observed your 'Preamble to the Foxhole' presentation given to the Majors at the resident course several times. I have received many emails and phone calls from students thanking me for the instruction and assistance in understanding the Army Bureaucracy. Others have told me they wished they had paid more attention in class, but still appreciated the instruction. In all cases they had an increased appreciation for the importance of the subject matter a very short time after their new assignment in the Pentagon or a staff position.

   a. What led you to develop that presentation?

   b. What is the objective of the presentation? What is its importance to you?

   c. Where has it been given? Where do you still present this briefing?

   d. Is there anything else that you would like to add about "Preamble to the Foxhole" or its establishment? Is there anyone else that you recommend I speak with or questions that I should ask?

6. General questions:

   a. What is your top concern in the Army right now?

   b. What other areas do you want to see better addressed by the Army leadership?

c. What other areas do you think that "somebody" needs to take a closer look at in the Army?

d. What would you change today if you had the resources and ability? Process? Structure?

e. H.R. Mc Master's "Dereliction of duty" made a lot of accusations about senior military leaders' lack of fortitude to resist civilian authority in the employment of troops in the Vietnam War. More recently, many journalists are criticizing the role of the senior military leaders in Iraq.

    i. What do you believe is the appropriate approach for a senior military leader to express disagreement with national policies and military employment?

    ii. How do you effect change when the underlying principle is civilian control of the military?

    iii. How should the military interact with Congress in this regard?

    iv. What do you believe is the proper role for a retired general officer in the press, media, and politics?

7. There has been a debate for decades over the size of the military. The short and long of it is that the missions and resources, ((DOTMLPF) people, organizations, equipment, training, funding) must balance or national security risk is assumed. Many claim that there is a current imbalance between the two and that the force structure should be increased to enable the Army to

better meet its obligations. This assumes that the current operational requirements are representative of future requirements. No one has a crystal ball, but what trends do you see that support an increase or decrease in force structure?

8. Many Reservists are now serving in the Middle East or are scheduled for service in the Middle-East. This has many journalists calling for a reevaluation of the role of the reserves. A reevaluation on this scale has many force Management implications. You have seen many changes in the role of the reserve since WWII.

   a. What do you believe should happen?

   b. What will happen?

   c. Andrew Bacevich in his book 'The New American Militarism' claims that the military has become too separated from society, and in effect, the all volunteer force has become a elite mercenary force. Society no longer embraces citizenship with a sense of obligation for military service. Currently, less than 1% of the population serves in the military.

      i. What are the implications or historical trends you anticipate by maintaining the all volunteer force.

      ii. Do you believe that a change is needed?

      iii. Do you believe that the United States could go back to a draft? Under what circumstances?

Appendix 3

Selected Annotated Bibliography

The research identified in this review was the first step on the journey towards completing this dissertation. Each of these references led to additional sources and raised new questions that warranted deeper investigation. The following documents highlight the existing literature applicable to this study. This brief synopsis is separated into two categories: primary and secondary sources. Some sources could be considered in either categories depending upon the context in which they are viewed. Each section is arranged alphabetically by title.

The secondary sources contain a brief summary of the author's thesis or main points- often in their own words- and their respective value to this study. Several books provide an analysis of the emerging international security environment. Many others present alternate models for restructuring the DoD or deal with the broader topic of managing organizational change. These fields were explored in greater depth in the course of my research and are rich with published and unpublished works and studies. The United States Army War College librarians compiled a thirty one page bibliography focused on doctrine and organizational change that provided valuable starting points for this research. Additionally, they have compilations on a variety of related topics: transformation, leadership, and management, which are recommended for additional research. The Combined Arms Research Library Research Librarians

at Fort Leavenworth also compiled larger bibliographies on force management and related defense issues. Similarly, the Force Management School archive at Fort Belvoir contains a wealth of information on force management and the Army inspector general inspections.   The following summary does not address the entirety of the research effort or attempt to evaluate all of these sources, yet it is provided to assist in additional research.

The richest primary source should come as no surprise, the Oral History Interviews with LTG Richard Trefry. The first 1276 pages of the transcript provided information documenting other portions of his military career. These documents could serve as a starting point for a separate work on the life and times of Trefry. The interviews conducted 18 -20 December 2007 focused specifically on the force management research questions in this dissertation. Neither of these sources have been released or reviewed prior to this research effort. The manuscripts of these interviews will be maintained at the Army War College library archives.

The information synthesized in *How the Army Runs* outlines the Joint Strategic Planning System and the Army Force Management System. Outlining these bureaucratic systems is not new ground. However, the new regulation CJCSI 3100.01B changed the system dramatically. The new version of *How the Army Runs* was not available in time to inform this dissertation. Force Management instruction however, has been part of the institutional training school houses for many years. Unfortunately, interest in the subject is nominal in all but the practitioners of the

system. Many developing leaders do not *understand* that they have a need to understand the system until they are placed in a leadership position within the system. Their wakeup call comes in the form of assignment orders to a position on a Divisions, Corps, or Army Staff. One goal of this research was to develop a narrative description that explains the interrelationships between these systems that can be easily understood.

LTG Trefry established the Force Management School and is still the director. He is also the creator of the 'Mother of All Charts' and oversees revisions to *How the Army Runs*.   This study of the force management systems and products all relate back to Fort Belvoir, MPRI, and its founder, LTG Trefry.

Primary Sources

1. **Chairman Joint Chief's of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3100.01A Joint Strategic Planning System:** (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Dated 1 September 1999, current as of 12 September 2003) 25 pages.

   Summary: This instruction provides joint policy and guidance on, and describes the responsibilities and functions of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS).

   Contents: A) Introduction. B) Strategic direction. Purpose, Scope, Components. C) Strategic Plans. Purpose, Scope, Components and Guidance. D) Programming Advice. Purpose, Scope, Linking Programs and Strategy, Sources and Programmatic Advice, Synchronization, Planning and Programming. E) Strategic Assessments, Purpose, Scope. F) References.

   Value: This document outlines the strategic documents that provide the strategic direction of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). This includes the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Military Strategy (NMS), the Chairman's Guidance, Joint Vision (JV), the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), Operation Plans (OPLAN), Contingency Plans (CONPLAN), Functional Plans (FUNCPLAN), Theater Engagement Plans (TEP), Joint Planning Document (JPD), Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR), Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA), and Defense Planning Guidance (DPG).

2. **Chairman's Program Assessment**

   (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office) CJCS.

Summary: The Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) provides the Chairman's personal assessment of the conformance of Service and Agencies Program Objective Memorandums (POMs) to the priorities established in the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), strategic plans, and Combatant Commander's requirements. Main Points: 1) The Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff's personal advice to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman's Program Assessment are submitted to impact the Program Decision Memorandums (PDM) in the budget review. 2) The Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) is prepared in accordance with Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3137.01A Series, and developed through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) -- the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) process, now called the Functional Capabilities Board Process (FCB).[434]   Using a process similar to the production of the draft Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR), most Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) issues are derived from the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) findings and recommendations that have been vetted through the Joint Requirements Board (JRB) and approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).   3) The JROC approved draft Chairman's Program Assessment is vetted: through each Combatant Commander, Service Chief, and Joint Staff Director. The Chairman considers the comments

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[434] CJCSI 31 37.01C Functional Capabilities Board Process (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, dated 12 November 2004), "CJCSI 3137.01B, 15 April 2002, "The Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment Process (JWCA)" is canceled.1.

from these senior leaders as he personally finalizes this memorandum. (From CJCSI 3100.01A).

Value: This document is one of the many documents that the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff uses to meet his Title 10 responsibilities and provide his best military advice to the President. This document demonstrates how the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides his assessment, within the Joint Strategic Planning System, of how well the Services are prepared to accomplish their mission requirements.

3. **Chairman's Program Recommendation**

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office) CJCS.

Summary: The Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR) is developed in accordance with the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3137.01A Series, The Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) Process. The Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR) provides the Chairman's personal programmatic advice to the Secretary of Defense. This memorandum is provided prior to the publication of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) (This has since been replaced (as of 2006) by the Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) and the Joint Planning Guidance (JPG) that are produced separately. However, the CJCSI (regulation) changed in December 2008). The Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR) emphasizes specific recommendations, within Department of Defense resource constraints and within an acceptable risk level,

that will - enhance joint readiness; promote joint doctrine and training; and, better satisfy joint warfighting requirements. The Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR) is developed through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) process. Most Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR) issues are derived from the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments (JWCAs) findings and recommendations that have been vetted through the Joint Requirements Board (JRB) and approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). The JROC approved Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR) draft is sent personally through each Combatant Commander, Service Chief, and Joint Staff J-Director. The Chairman considers the comments from the senior leader as he personally finalizes his memorandum. (From CJCSI 3100.01A)

Value: This document is one of the many documents that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff uses to meet his Title 10 responsibilities and provide planning and programmatic guidance to the Services. It provided the statutory basis for the CJCS requirements as component of the Joint Strategic Planning System analyzed in my research. (Document superseded in Dec 2008 by CJCSI 3100.01B)

4. **Interview from LTG (RET) Richard Trefry with Gregory L. Cantwell**

Summary: Interviews conducted by author with Lieutenant General Trefry at Fort Belvoir, Virginia: 18-20 December 2007. Trefry was born 6 August 1924.

His career of service spans from WWII to the present at time of this writing. He is currently the Program Manager at the U.S. Army Force Management School at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. He was commissioned in 1950 from West Point and retired from active duty in 1983. The interview questions are included in Appendix 2. Discussions cover: 1) The founding of the Army Force Management School; 2) The development of the Functional Life Cycle Model of the Army; 3) The history of the "Mother of All Charts"; 4) The history of "*How the Army Runs*"; and, 5) The history of "Preamble to the Foxhole". Additional discussion addressed the implications of current operations on national security from a force management perspective. Topics deal with civil-military relations, the challenges of an all volunteer Army, and the role of the National Guard and Reserve in defense planning.

Value: These interviews provided detailed personal accounts of events spanning throughout General Trefry's career. His ability to recall names, places and dates is noteworthy. His personal insights have provided opportunities for further study. Without exception, his accounts of events have been substantiated by additional research. His experience as the Army Inspector General provided him with invaluable insights to the changes which occurred in the Army in the 1970s and early 1980s.   This information provided many avenues for further exploration and research beyond the scope of this study.

5. **Joint Planning Document**

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office) CJCS.

Summary: The Joint Planning Document (JPD) consists, as a minimum, of a cover letter and several chapters with specific planning and broad programming recommendations for topics approved by the CJCS. Program recommendations address capabilities warranting further programmatic assessments or emphasis. The Joint Staff J- 5 Director, in consultation with the Joint Staff J-8 Director, prepares cover letters to: direct the planning, provide programmatic advice, and set priorities for the development of the DPG. The JPD is forwarded to the CJCS for approval. Upon approval, the JPD is forwarded to the SecDef under the CJCS's signature. The JPD provides the initial, timely, authoritative CJCS planning and programming advice to the SecDef for initial preparations of the draft DPG. It contains the CJCS's planning and programming priorities. Specifically, the JPD 1) Reflects the Chairman's planning guidance based on the National Military Strategy (NMS), Joint Strategy Review (JSR), Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and Joint Vision (JV). 2) Strives to identify critical capabilities and shortfalls in meeting the National Military Strategy (NMS). These capability shortfall findings provide clear and concise terms to focus the efforts of the Defense Planning Guidance writers. 3) Emphasizes the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff's priorities. The JPD is prepared and submitted approximately six months before the scheduled publication of the DPG. The format for the JPD chapters is developed annually by the Joint Staff J-5 Director, each chapter addresses the following areas: 1) Planning Guidance; 2) Challenges;

3) Required Capabilities; 4) Priorities; and, 5) Commander in Chief and Service Programming Initiatives. (From CJCSI 3100.01A).

Value: This document is one of the many documents that the CJCS uses to meet his Title 10 responsibilities and provide planning and programmatic guidance to the Services. It examines a component of the Joint Strategic Planning System covered in this dissertation.

6. **The Joint Strategy Review**

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office) Chairman Joint Chief of Staff (CJCS).

Summary: The Joint Strategy Review (JSR) is a continuous process used to develop strategic military planning advice and assessments. The Joint Strategy Review Working Groups (JSRWG), composed of representatives from the Joint Staff, Services, Combatant Commands, and supported by the defense agencies, study the strategic environment to develop a common planning horizon for specific areas of concern identified by the Chairman. This analysis provides a basis for changes to the Joint Vision (JV) and the National Military Strategy (NMS). The JSR provides a strategic framework for Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff advice to the National Command Authority (NCA) on critical defense issues. The Joint Strategy Review validates a common set of planning assumptions and provides a common reference point to be used by the other joint staff processes; Such as the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee (JROC) and Functional Capabilities Boards (FCB). The assumptions developed in the JSR

provide a common thread for the development of future plans and programs. The JSR scrutinizes current strategy, forces, and national policy objectives to assess - near, - mid, and - long, term United States requirements and objectives. The JSR provides the primary means for the Chairman, in consultation with the Combatant Commanders, Services, and defense agencies, to analyze strategic concepts and issues relevant to strategy formulation. The JSR process continuously gathers information through an examination of the current, emerging, and future issues: related to threats, strategic assumptions, opportunities, technologies, organizations, doctrinal concepts, force structures, and military missions. Although it is not the subject of a JSR, the current strategic picture may serve as a useful reference point for other analysis. The Joint Strategy Review process produces the: Joint Strategy Review Annual Report, and Joint Strategy Review Issue Papers.

7. **Joint Strategy Review Annual Report**

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office) Chairman Joint Chief of Staff (CJCS).

Summary: A key annual report that provides a framework for the CJCS's strategic military advice. It includes an assessment of the strategic environment, national security objectives, and strategic priorities covering a designated - midterm or long term - timeframe. It reports anticipated changes in the strategic environment, significant enough to warrant senior leader attention. The report highlights the threat assessment and issues contained in the JSR. It contains issue

papers on topics that affect the NMS. These papers provide the Chairman with findings, options, and recommendations. The CJCS's endorsement of a specific issue constitutes guidance to update, rewrite, or retain the current NMS. Alternately, this report may focus on a strategic topic of separate importance to the Chairman. (From CJCSI 3100.01A).

8. **<u>Joint Strategy Review Issue Papers.</u>**

<u>Summary</u>: When significant changes or factors in the strategic environment occur or apply, papers may be presented to the Chairman, Service Chiefs, and Combatant Commanders. These papers address changes to the Joint Vision, NMS, JPD, and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). Each paper provides the CJCS and Combatant Commanders with an issue summary, significant change in the strategic environment, and the impact on the NMS. Issues selected for review will be based on a continuous analysis and assessment of National Command Authority policy guidance, NMS, DPG, Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA), strategic environment, and other sources. (from CJCSI 3100.01A)

<u>Value</u>: This document is one of the main documents produced by the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet his Title 10 responsibilities and provide planning and programmatic guidance to the Services. It serves as a component of the Joint Strategic Planning System analyzed in this study.

9. **National Military Strategy of the United States 1992 -- 1997.**

Summary: The versions from 1992 to 1997 are available digitally. The current (2004) version is summarized below. This document has been under revision for the last year and a new version is overdue. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) has changed the strategic guidance and established a new force sizing construct that supersedes the guidance in the 2004 National Military Strategy (NMS). The Classified appendices to the NMS are not included in the reviewed version of the NMS.

The NMS conveys the CJCS message to the joint force of the strategic direction the Armed Forces of the United States should follow to support the NSS and NDS in this time of war. This document describes the ways and means to protect the United States, prevent conflict and surprise attack and prevail against adversaries who threaten our homeland, deployed forces, allies and friends. Success rests on three priorities: first, while protecting the United States we must win the war on terrorism. Second, we will enhance our ability to fight as a joint force. Third, we will transform the Armed Forces in stride - fielding new capabilities and adopting new operational concepts while actively taking the fight to the terrorists. The NMS serves to focus the Armed Forces on maintaining United States leadership in a global community that is challenged on many fronts. In this environment, United States presence and commitment to partners are essential. Our dedication to security and stability ensures that the United States is

viewed as an indispensable partner, encouraging other nations to join us in helping make the world not just safer, but better. (Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).

Content: I. Introduction, Strategic Guidance, the Role of the National Military Strategy, Key Aspects of the Security Environment, Strategic Principles. II. National Military Objectives. III. Joint Force Mission Success, Desired Attributes Functions and Capabilities. IV. Force Design and Size. V. Joint Vision for Future Warfighting.

Value: This document is one of the main documents produced by the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet his Title 10 responsibilities and provide planning and programmatic guidance to the Services. It will serve as a component of the Joint Strategic Planning System Analyzed in this study.

10. **National Security Strategy of the United States 1987 -- 2002.**

Summary: The versions from 1987 to 2002 are available digitally. The current version (March 2006) is summarized below. The 2002 version may be more noteworthy because it established the declared policy of preventative war. This policy differs from the policy of preemptive strike, which remains an internationally justifiable cause for war. This document is produced by the President and establishes the NSS. The NSS is founded upon two pillars: the first pillar is promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity -- working to end tyranny,

to promote effective democracies, and to extend prosperity through free and fair trade and the wise development policies. The second pillar of the strategy is confronting the challenges of our time by leading a growing community of democracies. Achieving the goals of this strategy is acknowledged as a work of generations. The United States is in the early years of a long struggle, similar to what our country faced in the early years of the Cold War. A new totalitarian ideology now threatens us, and ideology grounded not in secular philosophy, but in perversion of a proud religion. The content may be different from the ideologies of last century, but its means are similar: intolerance, murder, terror, enslavement, and repression. The United States must: - champion aspirations for human dignity; - strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends; - work with others to defuse regional conflicts; - prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD); - ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade; - expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy; - develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power; - transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century; and - engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization.

Content: I. Overview of America's National Security Strategy. II. Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity. III. Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global

Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against us and our Friends. IV. Work with Others to Defuse Regional Conflicts. V. Prevent our Enemies from Threatening Us, our Allies, and our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). VI. Ignite a New Era of Global Economic Growth Through Free Markets and Free Trade. VII. Expand the Circle of Development by Opening Societies and Building the Infrastructure of Democracy. VIII. Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers of Global Power. IX. Transform America's National Security Institutions to Meet the Challenges and Opportunities of the 21st Century. X. Engage the Opportunities and Confront the Challenges of Globalization. XI. Conclusion.

Value: This document provides a broad overarching guidance that establishes priorities for the DoD and other agencies to meet our national security objectives. This is the top document in the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) hierarchy analyzed in this study. All of our military objectives should support the objectives of the NSS.

11. **Oral History Interview from LTG (RET) Trefry: Whitehorne**

United States Army War College / United States Army Military History Institute (USAWC/USAMHI) Senior Officer Oral History Program, Project: 85-6, Interviewers: Colonel William A. Hall, III, Colonel Robert J. Michela; Interviewee: Lieutenant General Richard G. Trefry, USA Retired; Interview Number 1: 25 January 1985. Session number five with Lieutenant General

Trefry, USA Retired, 19 April 1985 (page 557). Interviewer Number 3: Joseph

Whitehorne, Session Five, Clifton, Virginia, 27 November 1987 (Page 1168).

Tapes reviewed 69-97, 113, 118-120, 124-134 (30 tapes, 1 hour each).

Summary: 1276 pages. Many interview sessions of spread out from 1985 -

1987. They have been consolidated into a single transcript. The first three

hundred pages (double spaced) of this interview, deal with the personal history of

Richard G. Trefry. He was born and raised in Massachusetts. He remembers his

elementary school teachers, all by name, and describes his upbringing, times at

Dartmouth and West Point, and traces his early Army career from graduation

forward. There are a series of fascinating monograph length discussions on some

of the significant projects Trefry worked on, similar to those contained in Edward

M. Coffman, *the Old Army*. For example, He was the LTC in charge of morale

welfare and services at Fort De Russey, Hawaii (1965) (pages 400-550); Hamsters

at West Point (as a Cadet), West Point and the honor code (with the Bormann

Commission); Saving Fort De Russey from the General Accounting Office;

Mortar employment and reorganization in the Artillery in Vietnam, 180 MPH

winds on Mount McKinley (as a meteorologist); Establishing skiing in the New

Hampshire (working at Mt. McKinley)….These tapes have not be previously

released or analyzed. I found breaks in the discussion (after page 800). Several

pieces may have been omitted due to their sensitive nature. Specifically, names in

the Inspector General portion are removed from much of the discussion.

However, their absence is more noticeable because of his tremendous recall of all

acquaintances in the rest of the discussions. It appears that over thirty tapes were used on this project.

Value: There is much rich discussion in these interviews that provide endless vignettes and insights into the life of Richard Trefry and the Army of from 1948 forward.   There is a wealth of opportunities here. Dr. Jacob Kipp suggested that the story of Richard Trefry may be worthy of a separate effort altogether. The narratives contained in these interviews are fascinating. However, to tell the larger narrative for all the events that he describes would be a monumental task. Research may be able to substantiate his narrative, but the scope of information required would be daunting. This transcript can be reviewed in greater detail for many tangential efforts. Several chapters could be written on the life and times of Richard Trefry alone. Some of the topics contained are: His childhood and college days / WWII / West Point days / Germany / Korea / Hawaii / Armed Forces Staff College / Vietnam / West Point Cheating Scandal Investigation / Department of the Army Chief of Staff Personnel /and, Department of the Army Inspector General. Trefry also provided the author an interview, addressed separately, 18-20 December 2007 at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Appendix two of this dissertation contains the questions discussed with Trefry. These questions directly relate to this dissertation. Trefry's responses have provided many avenues for additional research.

12. **Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress.**

Summary: 1990 through 1999. Call number 353.60973 U565 RS for hard copy at Combined Arms Research Library. (Washington, DC: Department of Defense: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990 – annual). Past editions (1995-2005) available at (http://www.dod.mil/execsec/adr_intro.html. Current edition available online at http://www.dod.mil/execsec/adr2005.pdf. The *Annual Report to the President and the Congress* commonly referred to as the *Annual Defense Report*, details how the DoD built its capabilities and is working to maintain them for the future. In addition to fulfilling a statutory requirement, specifically, Title 10 of U.S. Code, the SecDef's *Annual Defense Report* is widely distributed and serves as a basic reference document for those interested in national defense issues and programs. This report is unclassified so that it may be presented in an open forum.

Content: I. Summary of the National Defense Strategy. II. Annual Report to the President and the Congress. III. Force Management Challenges. IV. Operational Challenges. V. Institutional Challenges. VI. Future Challenges. VII. Reports from the Secretaries of the Military Departments. VIII. Report of the Secretary of the Army. IX. Report of the Secretary of the Navy. X. Report of the Secretary of the Air Force. XI. Appendices, A: Budget Tables; B: Personnel Tempo; C: Resources Allocated to Mission and Support Activities; D: Goldwater-Nichols Act Implementation Report.

Value: This report provides a formal record of the status of the armed forces as viewed by the SecDef.   Although it is not formally part of the JSPS, this report addresses many of the same central defense issues.

13. **Title 10 U.S. Code, Section 3062, 3032, 3013; Title 32 Section 102**

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office)

Summary: U.S. Code provides the legal basis for the establishment of the Army, and the position of the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA). Further, it establishes the responsibilities of the senior leadership within the Army. The following excerpts reflect these relationships.   **Section 3062**. (a) It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable…; **Section 3032**. The Army Staff: general duties: (a) The Army Staff shall furnish professional assistance to the Secretary, the Under Secretary, and the Assistant Secretaries of the Army and to the Chief of Staff of the Army. **Section 3013**. Secretary of the Army (a) (1) there is a Secretary of the Army, appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Secretary is the head of the Department of the Army. (2) A person may not be appointed as Secretary of the Army within five years after relief from active duty as a commissioned officer of a regular component of an armed force. (b) Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and subject to the provisions of chapter 6 of this title, the Secretary of the Army is responsible for, and has the authority necessary to conduct, all affairs of the Department of the Army, including the following functions: (1) Recruiting. (2) Organizing. (3) Supplying. (4) Equipping (including

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research and development). (5) Training. (6) Servicing. (7) Mobilizing. (8)
Demobilizing. (9) Administering (including the morale and welfare of personnel).
(10) Maintaining. (11) The construction, outfitting, and repair of military
equipment. (12) The construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings,
structures, and utilities and the acquisition of real property and interests in real
property necessary to carry out the responsibilities specified in this section.
United States Code, **Title 32**, National Guard, Chapter 1, Organization, **Section
102**. General policy: In accordance with the traditional military policy of the
United States, it is essential that the strength and organization of the Army
National Guard and the Air National Guard as an integral part of the first line
defenses of the United States be maintained and assured at all times.

Value: These codes provide the legal basis for the responsibilities of the
leadership of the Army. They serve to demonstrate the origin and source of
responsibilities and authority. The entire code is available in a PDF file and
further delineates responsibilities within the Department of Defense.
Understanding the legal basis is essential to the analysis contained in this
dissertation.

14. **Quadrennial Defense Review Report** by Donald Rumsfeld (Washington, DC:
Department of Defense, 6 February 2006), 92 pages.

Summary: The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is required by Congress
every four years. The Department of Defense provides a review of its forces,
resources, and programs and presents the findings in a report to the President and

Congress. The report provides a basic strategy for addressing critical defense issues concerning acquisition priorities, emerging threats, and defense capabilities for the next 20 years.

Contents: The report is organized into eight sections. I. Introduction. II. Fighting the Long War. III. Operationalizing the Strategy. IV. Reorienting Capabilities and Forces. V. Reshaping the Defense Enterprise. VI. Developing a 21st-Century Total Force. VII. Achieving Unity of Effort. VIII. Chairman's Assessment of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review.

Value: This report provides the SecDef's analysis of the current capabilities of the DoD, and the future capabilities required for the next 20 years. It further provides guidance and establishes priorities for the development of future forces. Many of the issues contained within the report have force management implications. This is one of the primary documents provided by the SecDef in the JSPS. It establishes the force sizing construct which guides the development of organizations and prioritization of resources within the DoD.

Secondary Sources

Books

1. ***American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process*** by Charles W. Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 658 pages.

   Summary: This book is organized with an analytical framework that maintains: five sources of power -- international, societal, governmental, role, and individual -- collectively influence decisions about foreign policy goals and the means chosen to realize them. Kegley examined the questions: 1) Does the Cold War legacy continue to inform the making of American policymakers? 2) What challenges and opportunities to changes in the post-Cold War political and economic system structures pose for the United States? 3) Have the American people tired of the burdens of leadership and prefer to return to a pattern of isolation from world affairs? 4) Will the President remain a preeminent player in the foreign policy development in defining the nation's role in war and peace in setting priorities that other nation should follow? 5) Will Congress now asserts its prerogatives constraining the president for policy flexibility shifting resources away from long-standing policy instruments? 6) What impact will the downsizing of the defense establishment exert on the Pentagon's ability to project power and protect the nation's interests and those of its allies? 7) Will the generation of policymakers on the horizon who are unschooled in the thinking of

the 1930s and 1940s, opt for a radically new approach to the challenge the nation will face in the new millennium?

Value: This book is a valuable reference for understanding the organizations and processes that are involved in defense policy formulation. The multilayered approach provides a framework for analysis of the Mother of All Charts (MOAC). Analysis of the data points on the MOAC is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but this study could provide valuable context about policy formulation outside of the Department of Defense. Understanding the policy formulation system outside the department of defense is at least as daunting a task as understanding the military components of the system. This book also explores how civilian control of the military is exercised in foreign policy formulation.

2. ***Attitudes and Latitudes: Exploring the World after September 11*** by Thomas L. Friedman (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002), 383 pages.

   Summary: This book has two parts. The first part contains the newspaper columns Thomas Friedman published in the New York Times about September 11. The second part contains a diary of his private experiences and reflections reporting on the post-September 11 world. It covers his travels to Afghanistan, Israel, Europe, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia. Friedman had two driving motivations for this book. The first: to understand who the hijackers were. The second: to better understand and express who Americans are. Collectively, this book constitutes a word album for the September 11 experience. His columns attempt to capture and preserve in words, rather than pictures, some of the

emotions to remind ourselves and our grandchildren what it was like to experience 9/11. Each of his columns is limited to 740 words and presents a concise argument.

Value: Thomas Friedman is a Pulitzer Prize-winning - New York Times journalist. This book is not a historical analysis. However, he does provide valuable insight into the contemporary understanding of the events of 9/11. Many current analysts use 20/20 hindsight to criticize the current military policy or strategy. This book serves to capture the perceptions and understandings that existed in September 2001. This book may become a valuable reference for placing other strategic documents in the context of the times. Specifically, the National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002 and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2001 were released a few months after September 2001.

3. ***Breaking the Phalanx: a New Design for Landpower in 21st Century*** by Douglas A. Macgregor (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1997), 283 pages. Index and bibliography.

Summary: Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Macgregor's study economically and convincingly makes a case for the importance of land forces in wars of the future and, no less important, deterrence of war. He uses the victory of the Roman legion over less flexible Greek hoplite phalanx as an illuminating analogy to his own proposal for a new military. His study shows a deep knowledge and appreciation of the value of the other Services, and fairly evaluates their strengths and weaknesses. He is focused on ground forces. Having demonstrated the

continual essential role of ground forces, he recommends a new organization for ground combat power, more flexible, mobile and self-sufficient, versatile and powerful, structured to operate as part of a Joint Task Force. Its purpose is not only to make best use of the new technology, but also to unleash the potentialities of human beings to use them. McGregor argues that there is no going back to the assumption on which the traditional American nation-state was founded: that a small Army, augmented by large numbers of reservists, is all that is needed to hold the enemy at bay while civilian economy is converted to wartime production. In practical terms, this involves replacing old military structures and concepts - the contemporary equivalent of the phalanx - with new structures: a modern army military equivalent of the Roman legion. This book seeks to answer the questions which confront the United States Army today: 1) is land power essential to American strategic dominance? 2) Can the Army's elected and appointed leaders shape warfighting organizations so that they are skilled enough, smart enough, and enduring enough to maneuver within a joint framework through the treacherous environments of contemporary and future conflict? 3) How do political and military leaders ensure execution of complex operations in winning performance in battle without restricting human potential and suffocating the American soldiers' individual brains and initiative? Answers to these questions must be found before key choices are made by defense planners. Macgregor contended Landpower will be an essential feature of statecraft and deterrence in the future. What is needed today is a vision for the role the Army will play in the

NMS, and a description of how the Army will achieve that role. This works suggests reorganizing the Army into mobile combat groups positioned on the frontiers of American security, ready to act quickly and decisively, primed to move with a minimum of preparation. However, what is certain is that organizational change in armies can produce revolutionary changes in warfare.

Contents: This book is organized into eight chapters. I. Introduction. II. Landpower and Strategic Dominance. III. Meeting the Demands of Revolutionary Change in Warfare. IV. Organizing within the RMA Trend Line. V. Fighting with the Information-Age Army in the year 2003. VI. Shaping Landpower for Strategic Dominance. VII. Streamlining Defense to Pay for Strategic Dominance. VIII. Final Thoughts and Future Prospects.

Value: This book suggests an alternative organizational design and basing structure to meet the United States future defense requirements. Conceptually, this model Army should be organized to operate as part of a Joint Task Force. This analysis takes a broad look at organizational change but gets detailed about the specifics of each organization. There is little mention of the mechanics or processes that are needed to execute this change. This book is relevant because the arguments for change are central to policy determination and this dissertation.

4. ***Bureaucratic Power in National Politics*** by Francis E. Rourke (Boston, MA: Little Brown and Company, 1978, 3rd edition), 478 pages.

Summary: This book contains a collection of 29 essays from notable authors in the field of political science and policy formulation, to include: James Q. Wilson, Max Weber, Morton Halperin, Graham Allison, Arthur's Schlesinger Jr., and Carl Friedrich, et al. The author argues that the American executive has increased in power and with it the bureaucracy has grown dramatically. The foreign policy and national defense policy organizations specifically demonstrate this trend. Both organizations are more bureaucratic in nature than electoral. This book illuminates how bureaucratic organizations influence public policy. These readings show the leading role that the executive organizations play as instruments of government. In the policy arena, power is not just located in the executive agency. Governmental and nongovernmental pressure groups, legislative committees, and other executive institutions all influence policy development. Much of the discussion centers on reforming executive agencies to make them more effective in achieving the goals for which they were created and more serviceable for the people who depend on them.

Contents: Chapters: 1) Administrative Agencies and their Constituencies; 2) The Power of Bureaucratic Expertise; 3) Bureaucratic Politics: the Struggle for Power; 4) Bureaucratic and other Elites; 5) Bureaucratic Politics and Administrative Reform; 6) Public Control over Bureaucratic Power.

Value: The military is clearly a bureaucratic organization. Examining the principles of bureaucratic organizations is central to understanding how and why

policy decisions are reached. Although this source predates Goldwater-Nichols 1986, it serves as a valuable reference to bureaucratic theory and terminology. Many of the issues of bureaucratic reform and control reappear over time. Many of the essays argue that bureaucracies continually grow as they strive for greater control or power.

5. ***Cases in Joint Force Development*** by Wade Hinkle; Edward Smith; Joel Christiansen; Lawrence Morton. (Institute for Defense Analysis: Alexandria, Virginia.) Report date October 2001. 73 pages.

Summary: This report contains the teaching syllabus and lesson plans for the joint force development course developed by the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) at the request of the Dean of the Air War College. This elective course increased curriculum emphasis on joint matters. It was designed to give students both an overview of service force development processes, and the opportunity to discuss trends that may portend changes to these processes in the future. This course consists of three parts, presented in 15 instructional periods (IPS). Part one defines and delineates force development. Part two contains a series of case studies (Army Force XXI; Marine Corps Urban Warfare; Naval Mine Warfare; Air Force Composite Wing; TRANSCOM Strategic Airlift). Each case study is followed by a lesson dedicated to the official policies and regulations that guide each of the player's actions and decisions in the force development process. In part three the students take an in-depth look at a number of current and prospective issues that may impact the manner in which the Department of Defense develops forces in the future. (Accession number: ADA 397010).

Value: This course provides the Air War College students an opportunity to develop a common level of understanding and exposure to force management. It was designed as a senior leader overview and the Air College equivalent to what is taught by the Department of Leadership at the Army War College. This course material provides an alternative model for the study of *How the Army Runs* at the Army War College. Both present the details of Joint Force development which is central to this dissertation.

6. ***Classical Readings of International Relations*** by Phil Williams, Donald M. Goldstein, and Jay M. Shafritz (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1994), 498 pages.

Summary: This book provides an appreciation of the diversity of approaches involved in the study of international relations and an understanding of the key concepts and frameworks. This volume identifies the themes and issues of enduring importance in international relations. Williams argues, there are several reasons for this current relevance. First, this book identifies some of the ways in which analysts and scholars have understood and explained relations among states. Second, considerations of actors in international relations has never been more pertinent than today. When the states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have reasserted their sovereignty and independence and are attempting to make a transition to democracies and market economies; and, when the states of the Third World are seeking a greater sense of identity and a more equitable distribution of global resources. Third, the end of the Cold War has had little impact on the issues of Third World development. The problems of

economic inequality remain acute. Fourth, the book contains several selections which focus on the distribution of power in the international system. The proponents of interdependence and integration are represented here, but so too are those who believe that interdependence does not guarantee harmony. The selections in this book provide a classical analysis, basic themes, and enduring problems of international relations. The concepts and ideas and analysis can be used as a model to provide meaning, order, and interpretation to current events facing the DoD.

 Contents: The book is organized into seven sections: I. Theories and Traditions; II. The Structure of the International System; III. The Actors in International Politics; IV. Anarchy and Society in the International System; V. Deterrence, Crisis, and War; VI. The Cold War International System; and, VII. International Relations after the Cold War. Noted authors are: Hugo Grotius, Woodrow Wilson, Hedley Bull, Niccolo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, Thucydides, Bernard Brodie, Albert Wohlstetter, Thomas Schelling, John Mearsheimer, George Kennan, et al…

Value: This book is a valuable reference for understanding the divergent approaches and schools of thought with which inform the discussion of defense policy formulation. This book specifically relates to this dissertation concerning diplomatic relations and foreign policy. It is important to understand the theories

of international relations prior to analyzing strategy or policy. Understanding and applying these theories adds scholarly depth to this study.

7. ***Department of the Army Historical Summaries (DAHSUMs) 1969-1990***
(Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, Government Printing Office).

Summary: Since 1969 the U.S. Army Center of Military History has produced the Department of the Army Historical Summary (DAHSUM) as an annual publication. It provides an overview of the successes and problems of major Army programs during the given fiscal year. The DAHSUMs seek to provide a record similar to, but more concise then, that published in the Annual Reports of the Secretary of War from 1822 to World War II, and in the Army's portion of the Semiannual Report of the SecDef from 1949 through 1968.

Value: This report provides a formal record of the status of the Armed forces as viewed by the SecDef at any period of time. These reports may inform further research of the specific programs or events represented on the MOAC discussed in this study.

8. ***Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3-50 – Force Development***
(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1 August 1987)

Summary: By definition, the force development functional area includes staff positions from the Department of the Army to division level. Force development officers focus on the management of resources for changing the Army's organizational structure, to provide for the associated manpower and equipment needs of active and reserve component forces. This staff work determines force

levels capable of implementing the Army's role in national security within established resource levels. Force management involves the integration of force structuring, resourcing, documentation, manning, and equipping to reach these goals.

Contents: 1) Force Development Functional Area. 2) Role of the Force Development Officer. 3) Education. 4) Duties and Positions. 5) Selection and Professional Development.

Value: This pamphlet is a valuable reference for reviewing the roles of force development officer. This Department of the Army Pamphlet describes the role of a force development officer and the training required for him to meet his duties and responsibilities throughout his career. These officers are the specialists in the Army that work within the bureaucracy to manages the endless changes that occur with modernization and reorganization.

9. ***Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century*** by Henry Kissinger (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), 318 pages.

Summary: Kissinger argued, at the apex of its power, the United States finds itself in an ironic position. In the face of perhaps the most profound and widespread upheavals the world has ever seen, it is failed to develop concepts relevant to the emerging realities. Victory in the Cold War temps smugness; satisfaction with the status quo causes policy to be viewed as a projection of the familiar into the future; astonishing economic performance forces policymakers to

confuse strategy with economics and makes them less sensitive to the political, cultural, and spiritual impact of the vast transformation brought about by an American technology. The debate focuses on an abstract issue: whether values or interest, idealism or realism, should guide American foreign policy. The real challenge is to merge the two; the serious American maker of foreign policy cannot be oblivious to the traditions of exceptionalism by which American democracy has defined itself. **Contents:** 1) America at the apex: Empire Earth leader? 2) America and Europe: the World of Democracies I. 3) The Western Hemisphere: the World of Democracies II. 4) Asia: World of Equilibrium. 5) The Middle East and Africa: Worlds in Transition. 6) The Politics of Globalization. 7) Peace and Justice.

Value: This book is a valuable reference for understanding many of the challenges facing the United States. Although Kissinger's use of notes and references is sparse, his arguments are clearly presented in an unclassified forum. Dr. Kissinger is now head of the Kissinger consulting group. This book addresses some of the same issues outlined in the National Security Strategy and provides needed context for the events portrayed on the MOAC. Although this book is six years old, it is still relevant to this study because policy formulation issues still exist today.

10. ***F100: Changing the Army, Selected Readings and References (AY06-07)*** (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, August 2006) 350 pages.

Summary: This is the Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) course materials for presenting "Force Management" as part of the "Changing the Army Course". The book contains the advance sheets, selected readings, references, and extracts required for the course. This is the broad overview course that is provided to all the students attending the resident Command and General Staff College. An elective is offered, A499, Force Management that provides greater detail into the processes of force management. Traditionally, this elective-A499- is only selected by 6-9 students a year, who are already force development specialists.

Contents: Strategic Change; Army Campaign Plan and Modularity; Combat and Force Development; ARFORGEN; Material Development and Rapid Fielding; Organization and FMS Web; Force Management Practical Exercise.

Value: This course is taught to all the majors attending CGSC. For many this is the only exposure to force management or force development that they will ever receive. (Because many of them will never attend the Army War College; only two to four percent of each year group of officers attends the Army War College in residence. The nonresident course is voluntary.) The low number of CGSC students that take the elective course is representative of the other indicators that force management is not studied or understood by the majority of the army. This is one of the central points that reinforce the importance of this dissertation.

These course materials provide another perspective of how to communicate an understanding of the force development process.

11. ***F100: Changing the Army, Selected Readings and References (AY07-08)*** (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, August 2006) 350 pages.

Summary: Like the F100 entry above, this is the CGSC course materials for presenting "Force Management" as part of the "Changing the Army Course" for AY 2007-2008. Changes reflected in this version are: Army Campaign Plan and Modularity have been dropped from last year's course and Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE), Total Army Analysis (TAA), and Ethics and Military Contracting have been added.

Contents: Strategic Change; Combat and Force Development; Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) and Total Army Analysis (TAA); Material Development and FCS Case Study; Organization and FMS Web; Ethics and Military Contracting; ARFORGEN; Rapid Fielding and Equipping.

Value: Same value as F100 above. The course no longer teaches the Joint Strategic Planning System. The course has been reduced from forty contact hours to twelve. This reflects a diminished emphasis on understanding force management and development in the Army school system.

12. ***Games Nations Play: The Three Levels of Analysis: A Framework for the Study of International Politics*** by John Spanier and Robert Wendzel (CQ Press, 1996) reproduced in *Theory of War and Strategy, AY 2007* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Department of National Security and Strategy, 2007). 204 pages.

Summary: This work provides three models used to study international relations. They are: the international system level, the actor level, and the decision making level.

Value: These models could be applied to the historical events depicted on the MOAC. Much of the history depicted on the MOAC originated with an international dispute. Application of the concepts from this book informs analysis of the key events that have occurred since 1940. The original book should also be considered for additional background on international relations theory.

13. ***How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 2005 – 2006*** (Carlisle Barracks, PA: The Army War College, 2005), 553 pages.

Summary: This book is a synthesis and interpretation of existing and developing Army and Joint systems, processes and procedures as currently practiced.

Content: The book is organized into 23 chapters. Chapter 1) Introduction. Chapter 2) The Army Organizational Life Cycle. Chapter 3) The Army Organizational Structure. Chapter 4) The Relationship of Joint and Army Force Planning. Chapter 5) Army Force Development. Chapter 6) Planning for Mobilization and Deployment. Chapter 7) Reserve Components. Chapter 8) Force Readiness. Chapter 9) Army Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Process. Chapter 10) Resource Management. Chapter 11) Material

System Research, and Development, and Acquisition Management. Chapter 12)

Logistics. Chapter 13) Military Human Resource Management. Chapter 14)

Civilian Personnel Management. Chapter 15) Army Training. Chapter 16) Army

Knowledge Management. Chapter 17) Installation Command and Management.

Chapter 18) Intelligence. Chapter 19) The Army Health Services Support

System. Chapter 20) Management of Legal Affairs. Chapter 21) Civil Functions

of the Department of the Army. Chapter 22) Public Affairs. Chapter 23) Defense

Support of Civilian Authorities.

Value: This book is a senior leader reference book that describes two of the

systems researched in detail in this dissertation: The Joint Strategic Planning

System (JSPS), and the Army Force Management System (AFMS). It is produced

by the Army Force Management School but has 'chapter authors', Army War

College Professors, which serve as points of contact for updating each volume.

This book is a 'one source reference' for information concerning how the Army

bureaucracy functions. One of the findings of the dissertation details the origins

of this document.

14. ***International Law Cases and Materials: Third Edition*** by Louis Hankin,
Richard Crawford Pugh, Oscar Schachter, and, Hans Smit (St. Paul, MN: West
Publishing Co., 1993), 1596 pages.

Summary: This book is a casebook of international law. It is a reference book

with an encyclopedic index. It has many cases that present the history and

justification for the corresponding international laws. It also contains a

historiography of the evolution of international law. The book is organized into nineteen chapters and covers most aspects of international law.

Value: Understanding international law has become increasingly important with the changes in the international community brought about by the fall of the Soviet Union, emerging democracies, non-state actors, and increased globalization. The Bush Doctrine of preventative employment of combat forces, and the prolonged custody of detainees, raises legal questions that are important for policy makers to understand. This book provides a reference for understanding the international legal implications and historical precedence of established international norms. This book provides a valuable reference for considering the products of the JSPS and the emerging issues in international law.

15. ***Modern Strategy*** by Colin Gray (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 412 pages.

Summary: This book is Gray's effort to share an understanding of his chosen field of scholarly interest at the 30 year point in his career. The master theme of the book - the claim that there is unity of all strategic experiences: nothing essentially changes in the nature and functions (or purpose) -- in sharp contrast to the character -- of strategy and war (In other words, strategy eternal). "There is an essential unity to all strategic experiences in all periods of history because nothing vital to the nature and functions of war and strategy changes." In support of this master theme, six major questions shaped the design of the book. 1) How

does the theory and practice of strategy interact? 2) What has the growing

complexity of defense preparation and war meant for strategy? 3) Why is strategy

so difficult? 4) Since strategy and war have many dimensions, is it probable that

superiority in only one or even several such dimensions can deliver victory? 5)

What has changed for strategy in the 20th century and what has not? 6) What

does the strategic experience of the 20th century tell us about what is probably to

come in the 21st century? This book is about modern strategy: the use or threat of

military power for political purposes.

Value: Colin Gray has been a leading defense strategist and strategic thinker for

the last 30 years. His mission here is to help improve understanding of modern

strategy. He does not see important differences among ancient, medieval and

modern strategy. This book is a valuable reference for considering the strategic

challenges of modern warfare. The extensive list of references is also useful for

further research on many of the themes on the MOAC. This book provides

background for consideration of many of other books written about modern or

future warfare.

16. ***The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*** by Samuel P.
Huntington (New York, New York: Touchstone, Simon & Schuster Inc., 1997),
367 pages.

Summary: This book is based on a concept proposed in the 1993 *Foreign Affairs*

article entitled the Clash of Civilizations? Huntington explores the concept of

civilizations; the question of the universal civilization; the relation between power

and culture; the shifting balance of power among civilizations; cultural

indigenization in non-Western societies; the political structure of civilizations;

conflicts generated by Western universalism, Muslim militancy, and Chinese

assertion; balancing and bandwagoning responses to the rise of Chinese power;

the causes and dynamics of fault line wars; and the futures of the West and of a

world of civilizations. Additionally, he proposes: 1) Clashes of civilizations are

the greatest threat to world peace, and, 2) An international order based on

civilizations is the surest safeguard against a world war.

Contents: This book is organized into five sections. I. A World of Civilizations.
II. The Shifting Balance of Civilizations. III. The Emerging Order of
Civilizations. IV. Clashes of Civilizations. V. The Future of Civilizations.

Value: This book presents a paradigm for viewing global politics that will be

meaningful to scholars and useful to policymakers. He presents a useful lens to

view international developments of the early 21st century. Samuel Huntington

stated that *Foreign Affairs* editors received more discussion on this article in 1993

than they had on any article published since 1940. As such, it is worth

considering the themes, and understanding the arguments, presented as threats to

the future of world peace. If one accepts Huntington's arguments, then there are

direct implications that should be addressed in the JSPS documents and

considered in force development. Both the JSPS and force development are

central to this dissertation.

17. ***The Downsized Warrior: America's Army in Transition*** by David McCormick (New York, New York: New York University Press, 1998), 266 pages. Notes and bibliography.

Summary: This book examines: between 1989 and 1996, the active-duty Army was cut back by more than a third, from 770,000 soldiers to fewer than half a million. How has the Army implemented this mandate to downsize? What common threads exist between past postwar cutbacks and today's redistribution of the peace dividend? How has downsizing affected morale, devotion, and disposition of the Army's officers, whose commitment to the institution profoundly determines its effectiveness? Crucially, is it truly possible to institute the radical transformation that downsizing requires without affecting the Army's ability to fight and win the future wars? The Army's downsizing is the story of both failure and success. Unable to make a persuasive case for larger force, the Army's leaders energetically implemented dramatic reductions, particularly among the officer corps. Downsizing of the Army is unique in that it was externally mandated. Its experiences are enormously instructive for all organizations -- government, corporate, and nonprofit alike -- faced with the need to streamline their operations. McCormick proposes a reform agenda for addressing the effects of downsizing and preparing the Army for the 21st century. His work is based on hundreds of in-depth interviews with officers across all ranks, senior civilians and military leaders. He provides a definitive portrait of today's U.S. Army in transition, one that will transform our thinking about both downsizing and the military.

Contents: This book has five chapters. 1) Introduction: The Legacy of Downsizing. 2) The Politics of Downsizing: the Dark Side of Defense Policy Making. 3) Reducing the Ranks: Anatomy of the Decision-Making Process. 4) Lean and Mean: Changing Attitudes and Behaviors in the Muddy Boots Army. 5) An Agenda for Reform: An Officer Corps for the 21st Century. Epilogue: the Army's Future Course.

Value: This book has a 20 page bibliography with many relevant sources. This is the first book by David McCormick based on his studies at Princeton. His dissertation advisor was Aaron Friedberg, who wrote *In the Shadow of the Garrison State,* which is a study of the interior dimension of American grand strategy during the Cold War. McCormick's focus on downsizing and the active Army between 1989 and 1996 is clearly related to force management. His thesis supports many of the themes in this dissertation:"that the dramatic downsizing has compromised the Army's institutional health in ways not studied or completely understood. Qualitative reform measures are needed to restore the Army's vitality." Or that few understand or want to comprehend the complexity involved in force management. This book illustrates the complexity and the consequences of force management policy decisions. It is particularly relevant because it looks at dramatic cuts in an all volunteer force, as compared to dramatic cuts after periods of conscription. This makes his analysis more current and a source for greater analysis to determine applicability to current challenges. He further

supports the emphasis in this dissertation that the civilian leadership of the military is at the center of policy decisions.

18. ***The Future of the Army Profession*** by Don M. Snider (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill Custom Publishing, 2002 and 2005), 762 pages.

Summary: This book is a collection of 33 essays based on the research of each of the authors within their fields. The essays address the majority of the contemporary issues that challenge the nation's military. This book was developed by the faculty at West Point. It contends: Professor Andrew Abbott in his prize-winning book, *The System of Professions*, established the methodological framework for both the first and second research projects with his descriptive and analytical schema on how all professions, and would be professions - including the Army and other military professions, struggle within an ecology of competitor professions for legitimacy in doing the expert work associated with their chosen jurisdiction. This framework has become the only functional and realistic means for the next generation of Army officers to understand the dynamics of their professional evolution within a larger context of all professional work and aspiration. This new edition amplifies the major findings of the first edition of 2002.

Contents: This book is organized into seven parts. Part One) the Study of Military Professions. Part Two) Officership in the Army Profession. Part Three) the Expert Knowledge of the Army Profession. Part Four) the Army's Military Technical Expertise. Part Five) the Army Profession and the Army Ethos. Part

Six) the Premier Expertise – Human / Leader Development. Part Seven) the Army Profession and its Political - Culture Expertise.

Value: This book has renewed the formal study of the Army as a vocational profession rather than simply as a uniformed bureaucracy after a thirty year hiatus. It is a valuable reference for understanding the current challenges to the military profession. It also provides a basis for understanding many of the issues involving policy analysis and civil-military relations covered in this dissertation.

19. ***The Lexus and the Olive Tree*** by Thomas Friedman (New York, New York: Anchor Books, a Division of Random House, Inc., 2000), 490 pages.

Summary: Thomas Friedman examined the international system that is transforming world affairs. He argued: globalization has replaced the Cold War system with integration of capital, technology, and information across national borders - a single global village. Friedman explained the new electronic global economy and what it takes to live within it. The Lexus and the olive tree symbolize the tension between globalization and the ancient forces of culture, geography, tradition, and community. He also detailed the animosity that globalization produces among those who feel brutalized by it, and proposes what should be done to maintain a peaceful world balance. Friedman stated that globalization is not simply a trend or a fad but is, rather an international system. It is the system that has now replaced the old Cold War system and has its own rules and logic that directly influence the politics, environment, geopolitics and economics of virtually every country in the world.

Contents: This book is organized into four parts. Part One: Seeing the System. Part Two: Plugging into the System. Part Three: The Backlash against the System. Part Four: America and the System.

Value: This book provides an alternate model for analyzing international relations and politics. Friedman provides much quantitative data that identified global trends in 2000. As such, it is a valuable reference book for the period and provides valuable context for discussion of other policy issues. His thesis proposed that increased interdependence provides stability in the international state system. This concept has national security and policy development implications that are central themes of this dissertation.

20. ***The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century*** by Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, USMC (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2006), 321 pages.

Summary: Hammes stated: David's sling and stone fight against Goliath isn't that far from Iraqi insurgents fighting against coalition forces. While the DoD continues to build a high-tech American military to win wars against others, albeit second-tier, Goliaths, insurgents have adopted and are practicing sling and stone, low-tech, fourth generation warfare. These fourth generation warfare warriors rely on networks of people versus Americas networks of state-of-the-art high-tech weapons. Just as the world has evolved from an industrial society to an information-based society, so has warfare. Information collection against today's threats requires a greater investment in human skills. Technology by itself is not the answer. The United States defense establishment's failure to address the

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importance of human knowledge over that of technology leaves us as unprepared

to deal with the kinds of wars we are fighting today and those we are most likely

to face in the future -- fourth-generation wars. Fourth generation war is the only

kind of war America has ever lost, we've done so three times: Vietnam, Lebanon,

and Somalia. It has also defeated the Soviet Union, in Chechnya, and the French,

in Indochina and Algeria. Arguably fourth-generation war has been the most

successful form of war, for our adversaries, for last 50 years.

Value: This book provides a plausible model for future warfare that has

historical precedent. Additionally, as fourth-generation warfare, as it is described,

exploits the superpowers' military vulnerabilities.   Understanding this model is

essential to determining future force capability requirements. This book provides

an unclassified model of potential future threats that the Department of Defense

may have to face. There are obvious force structure implications if one accepts

his arguments. Further, the model for fourth-generation warfare has been

accepted by many senior leaders within the DoD

21. ***United States Diplomatic History: the Age of Ascendancy Volume 2, Since 1900***
by Gerard Clarfield (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1992), 772
pages.

Summary: This book is a synthesis based on extensive readings. This book has

20 chapters that cover the period 1899 to 1992. It provides a chronological

assessment of 20th century U.S. diplomatic history.

Value: This book is a valuable reference for understanding the broad historical

trends that made up the 20th century. The supplementary readings provide a

broad historiography of diplomatic history writings for each 20th century

chronological theme.   The Themes identified are: The Age of Empire, 1899 --

1917; World War I and its Aftermath; Between the Wars 1921 to 1939; World

War II; the Cold War 1945 -- 1961; to the Present: Carter and Reagan.

22. ***The Visible Hand: the Managerial Revolution in American Business*** by Alfred
D. Chandler, Jr. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1977).

Summary: Chandler states: the purpose of this book is to examine the changing

processes of production and distribution in the United States and the ways in

which they have been managed.   The large enterprises administered by salaried

managers replaced the small traditional family firm as the primary instrument for

management, production, and distribution. This book concentrates specifically on

the rise of the modern business enterprise and its managers. It is a history of

business institutions and a business class. (1) In many sectors of the economy the

'visible hand of management' replaced what Adam Smith referred to as the

'invisible hand of market forces'. The market remained a generator of demand

for goods and services, but modern business enterprise took over the functions of

coordinating flows of goods through existing processes of production and

distribution, and of allocating funds and personnel for future production and

distribution. As a result, modern business enterprise became the most powerful

institution in the American economy and its manager's the most influential group

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of economic decision-makers. The rise of modern business enterprise in the United States brought with it "managerial capitalism". This study is an attempt to fill a void by concentrating on a specific time and a specific set of concerns. It centers on the years 1840 to 1920s -- when the agrarian, rural economy of the United States became industrial and urban. These decades witnessed revolutionary changes in the processes and production and distribution in the United States. It also examines the ways in which the unit carrying out these changing processes of production and distribution -- including transportation, communication, and finance -- were administered and coordinated.

Value: This book is considered the seminal work on the emergence of the professional managerial class in American business. This book provides valuable historical information about American business.   The professionalization of management, the development of hierarchical organizations, and the influence of government in regulating modern business, as described in this book, are all associated with the early 1950s. However, understanding the origins of these broad trends in business development adds depth to my analysis of business in the 1970s and 1980s. Specific management techniques or philosophies are not covered in this work. This work is a synthesis of the economic impacts of private business in the period between the Civil War and the Korean War. It Most closely informs Chapter Three of this dissertation.

23. *The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946 – 1976* by Robert A. Doughty. (Washington, D. C.: Combat Studies Institute, United States Army

Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and The Center of Military History, 1979 and 2001.

Summary: United States Army's tactical doctrine in the generation following the Second World War owed its character to the influence of a number of factors. Doughty proposed: among these factors, national security policy, new technology, service branch parochialism, and actual battlefield experience, became the arbitrators of what Army doctrine would be. As the Army attempted to respond to the shift in mission required by policy, Army doctrine writers capitalized upon the technological advances that spurred new potentials for firepower and mobility. Europe remained the focus of national defense policy concerns. Virtual revolutions in tactical doctrine occurred in the late 1950s, early 1960s, and early 1970s, as the Army shifted the focus of its doctrine from conventional to nuclear, to counterinsurgency, to conventional operations. The combination of these changes has contributed to the modern Army tactical doctrine, now more complex than at any other time in American history. The purpose of this study is to describe and analyze major trends in Army doctrine since World War II. "In short, intellectual changes can sometimes be more difficult to achieve than material changes. One of the purposes of doctrine is to ensure common thinking, but when changes are necessary, that common thinking can become an obstacle to needed modification or improvements." (page 47).

Value: This book provides a detailed analysis of the actual changes in major policy trends from World War II to the present. It details the considerations that

led to organizational and weaponry changes during the same period. His

investigation provides a vertical analysis of change within the Army specifically

focused upon doctrine. It supports the dissertation's claim that a horizontal (or

holistic) approach to managing change in the Army was lacking prior to 1983

Inspector General Report. This book specifically informs the development of

Chapter Three.

24. ***The Essential Drucker*** by Peter Drucker (New York, NY: HarperCollins
Publishers, 2001).

Summary: Drucker states: this book contains twenty six selections on

management in organizations, management and the individual, and management

and society. It is a collection from sixty years of his writings on management.

(page VIII).

Value: Drucker's articles on management that deal with organizational design

are especially relevant to the dissertation focus on the study of large organizations

in the 1980s. His numerous articles on senior executive leadership provide

credible examples for comparison with the Army leadership of the 1980s. He has

several articles that deal with the structure of an organization and the importance

of information flow - form follows function - that express the concept of

horizontal integration and the need for a holistic approach to managing change.

Further, his article on social transformation and changes in society provide

valuable context on the challenges to business in the 1970s and 1980s addressed

in the dissertation.

25. ***Peter Drucker on the Profession of Management*** by Peter Drucker (Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business Review Books, 1998).

Summary: Drucker claimed: management has become a well-established discipline; and the book that helped launch this discipline was *The Concept of the Corporation*, published from Drucker's study of General Motors. Drucker concluded that large business enterprise had become the most important institution in an industrialized society, and he wanted to understand how it worked. The 13 chapters of his book are divided into two distinct sections. The first, called the managers responsibilities, devotes itself to the fundamental work of management. Other recurring topics in this section involve effective decision-making, the systematic practice of innovation, and the responsible management of people. The second section, the executive's world, addresses the particular challenges of management in a knowledge economy. Peter Drucker was among the first to observe the transformation of industrial economies into knowledge economies and to explore the implications of this change for the world of management.   The chapters in this book were originally published separately in the Harvard Business Review. (page xiv).

Value: Peter Drucker is one of the most respected professors and consultants on business management. His writing spans from the 1950s to present day. This book provides a good basis of understanding the dominant management theories associated with the manager's responsibilities in the business world. Numerous theories of management are explained in these chapters. References are made to

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case studies and consulting work that Drucker has accomplished over the last 45 years. These concrete examples provide useful illustrations for comparison between the military and the corporate world. His discussion of vertical and horizontal organizations and the management of knowledge based organizations was particularly useful for analysis of the Army organizations of the 1980s in this dissertation.

26. ***Army Inspector General Inspection Methodology*** by David M. Foye (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: United States Army War College, 1984).

Summary: This essay analyzes the Army Inspector General Inspection Methodology. It highlights three major events leading to adoption of a new methodology - the Inspector General Act of 1978, the finding from a Force Modernization Special Inspection conducted by the Department of the Army Inspector General Office in 1983, and a need for Inspector General follow-up to ensure proper resolution of inspection findings. These events led the Army's leadership to adopt its current Inspector General Inspection Methodology. This methodology is formally known as: the compliance/systemically inspection approach using the functional life cycle model of the Army. Lastly, the study outlines the major steps of the newly adopted Inspector General Inspection Methodology and compares these steps to the previous inspection methodology used by Army Inspectors General. (Abstract)

Value: This monograph provides a detailed narrative account of the Inspector General Inspection Methodology before 1978; and, after 1983 when General

Trefry initiated the functional life cycle model training program for the Inspectors

General of the Army. This model provided a horizontal integration system and

emphasized a greater awareness of the systemic interrelationships between

various functions of the Army. This methodology served to examine the broader

root causes, or systemic causes, of problems. Previous inspections documented

noncompliance with standards and ignored the reasons for non-compliance. This

monograph also credits General Trefry with developing the functional life cycle

model and points to another article in the Army Green Book written by General

Trefry. This horizontal integration of an organization is compared -between

business and the Army -in the 1980s in Chapter Three of this dissertation.

Detailed descriptions of the Inspector General Inspection Methodology also aided

comparison of how to manage change in an organization discussed in the other

works by Drucker, Gilmore, and others.

27. ***Making a Leadership Change: How Organizations and Leaders Can Handle Leadership Transition Successfully*** by Thomas North Gilmore, (San Francisco, California: Jossey - Bass Publishers, 1989).

Summary: This book offers advice for executives and managers assuming new

positions, and for organizations undergoing changes in leadership. Drawing on

his experience as consultant to top corporations and political leaders, Thomas

North Gilmore gives practical tips on how executives in new positions can

quickly take charge and set the stage for long-term success.   Thomas North

Gilmore is Vice President of the Wharton Center for Applied Research, a private

consulting firm that operates with the Wharton School of the University of

Pennsylvania. He has worked with many large industrial enterprises and small nonprofit organizations. He has also worked extensively in government on the transitions of Governors and other senior executives.

Value: This is a 'how to' book of management. As such, the book provides practical information and advice about determining the strategic objectives of a corporation, and developing the means to reorganize and modify an existing organization. The focus of the book is on new leadership and management of an organization. Within this discussion many techniques for managing change are proposed. Gilmore addressed some of the challenges to organizational change as well as proposed some solutions. Again, this book provides a foundation for discussion of comparison between management of change in large organizations, corporate or military. Specifically, Chapter 12 'handling the inevitable reorganization effectively' explores the reasons for reorganization and proposes a theoretical three phase plan for designing organizations. Many of the reasons for reorganization correspond to the series addressed by Peter Drucker and others in their books. These models could also be applied to analyze the causes for Army reorganization in the 1980s.

28. ***Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff's Leadership Using the Joint Strategic Planning System in the 1990s: Recommendations for Strategic Leaders*** by Richard M. Meinhart (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, June 2003), 54 pages.

Summary: The JSPS is considered the primary formal means by which the CJCS executes his statutory responsibilities specified by Congress in Title 10, U.S.

Code. Yet, little has been written about the strategic planning system itself. Some of its products: such as the NMS, and Joint Visions (JV) have been thoroughly reviewed. Meinhart contends: one can gain great insight into the Chairman's formal leadership since the 1986 Goldwater - Nichols Act by understanding how the JSPS evolved, reviewing its process, and examining all of its products. Meinhart examines how three Chairmen - Generals Powell, Shalikashvili, and Shelton - adapted and used strategic planning to provide direction and shape the military in the strategic environment of the 1990s.

The author examined four major revisions in this strategic planning system, as it changes from being rigid and focused on the Cold War to be more flexible, vision oriented, and resource focused by the decade's end. The major strategic planning products are analyzed from both the content and process perspective to identify the formal role of the Chairman's leadership in developing them. Meinhart proposed five broad recommendations for future senior leaders to enable them to better use the strategic planning system and transform their organizations. They are: (1) use of the strategic planning system for revolutionary change; (2) use of strategic planning system for evolutionary change; (3) need for senior leaders vision to lead organizations; (4) need for flexibility and bureaucracy balance for success in strategic planning; and, (5) need for senior leaders energy and moral courage to execute fundamental change.

Value: This monograph has useful background information about the origins of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. The endnotes provided useful references to primary documents that were examined to better understand the discussion surrounding the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This work also referenced several books that dealt with: 1) Congress and the politics of defense reform, and, 2) Strategic defense planning. The author conducted interviews with the three former Chairmen while researching this effort. This study provided valuable research material and insight about the JSPS system that emerged in the 1980s that is central to my research.

29. ***Strategic Planning by the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1990 to 2005*** by Richard M. Meinhart (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, April 2006), 35 pages.

Summary: This is an update of the previous published monograph, *Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff's Leadership Using the Joint Strategic Planning System in the 1990s: Recommendations for Strategic Leaders,* By Dr. Meinhart. This monograph includes information about Gen Shelton and the changes to the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) since 2000. It does not cover the recent changes of CJCSI 3100.01B to the JSPS.

Value: This monograph has useful background information about the origins of the JSPS System and the changes that have occurred since 2000. Again, the fifty seven endnotes provided useful references to primary documents that were examined to better appreciate the JSPS.

30. ***Inspector General Inspection Report dated 1 March 1983 - Functional Life Cycle Model of the Army: Introduction.*** (*Washington*, D.C.: Inspector General of the Army, 1983).

Summary: This book explains the Functional Life Cycle Model of the Army that was developed by the Inspector General Agency in March of 1983. It is the result of: an Army Inspector General Modernization Inspection; and, the new inspector general inspection methodology. It presents a model to determine the systemic causes of noncompliance with Army standards and regulations. It is arranged as an instructor guide for a program of instruction consisting of twelve major sections of the functional life cycle model of the Army. As stated: "the purpose of this book is to provide the required foundation of knowledge of the functions and operations of the Army in order to ensure a more cohesive and disciplined approach to the assessment of organizational needs." (page 27).

Value: The development of the functional Life Cycle model of the Army tells the story of how the Army in the 1980s designed a systemic means to manage modernization. The Army Inspector General Agency was at the center of this initiative. This report provided a detailed explanation of this model and how to apply it within the Army to identify systemic problems or opportunities for greater efficiencies. Understanding this model is a prerequisite for further comparison to the dominant corporate management theories of the 1980s. Central to this model is an understanding of the interrelationships between actions and processes within the Army. These concepts are similar to a holistic view required of senior organizational executives. This model is similar to the business concept

of horizontal integration. This model was adopted by the senior leadership of the Army to manage modernization in the 1980s and is still in use today. LTG Trefry's involvement in the development of this model is a major finding of this dissertation.

31. ***US Army Material Command: Project Management in the Army Material Command, 1962 – 1987*** by Herbert A. Leventhal (Virginia: United States Army Material Command, 1992).

Summary: This book provides a history of the Army Material Command (AMC) and the evolution of Project Managers in the Army. In short Leventhal stated: AMC had been the primary user of project managers within the Army from early 1960s to the late 1980s. Prior to the 1962 establishment of AMC, project management had been used by industry, by the Navy to develop the Polaris missile, by the Air Force to manage a variety of systems, and, by the Army to construct the Jupiter missile. It was introduced to AMC by its first commander General Frank Besson who drew especially on the example of the Air Force Special Projects Office in which individuals were given substantial amount of authority over specific items of equipment. Subsequent commanders were concerned about the need to limit the use of project manager programs and integrated them into normal command channels. In addition to efforts to reduce the number of programs, there were also strong efforts to reduce their autonomy. (page X)   This trend was abruptly reversed by the implementation of the Packard Commission Report of 1986. Most project management programs moved completely out of AMC and into the Army Secretariat for management. Another

major trend throughout the history of the project manager program was the effort

to normalize the selection of the project managers.

Value: The history of project management and the Army Material Command

provides valuable background information about the vertical orientation of project

management within the Army between 1962 and 1987. Their examples of project

management are valuable illustrations that this dissertation compared and

contrasted with the corporate management techniques contained in the other

readings. In 1987 the Packard Commission results were implemented. They

established an under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Program Executive

Offices within each of the Service and DOD Secretariats. This simplified the

chain of command for all project managers. Although the structure was

simplified, it nevertheless was still a vertical organization. This study adds to the

knowledge of military material management and supports this dissertation finding

that management of change within the Army occurred along vertical lines.

32. ***TRADOC Historical Monograph Series - The Army of Excellence: the Development of the 1980s Army* by John L. Romjue** (Fort Monroe, Virginia: Historical Office United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1982).

Summary: The Office of the Command Historian prepared the Training and

Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Historical Monograph to provide planners, action

officers, and researchers in the Army with a critical, documented evaluation of the

design and development of the 1980s Army. Romjue Summarized: this volume

addressed the completed Army 86 design work and examined the origins and the

development of the Army of Excellence during 1983, including the conceptual formulation of the Infantry division. The originator and dominating influence upon the Army of Excellence was General John A. Wickham Jr., Chief of Staff of the Army from 1983 to 1987, whose difficult decisions affecting the light and heavy divisions - while controversial at different levels - met the Army's twin strategic challenges of the early 1980s: the defense of NATO Europe, and the provision of rapidly deployable light infantry force package to defend United States interests worldwide. It was the achievement of the Army of Excellence that provided a balanced force at an acceptable level of risk within limited resource constraints. This study attempts to present for future Army planners a record of the significant contribution to the security of the nation and to the ending of the Cold War. (Foreword).

Value: This study contains detailed information about the changes in doctrine, organizations, and material developed between the 1970s and 1980s. Detailed studies are referenced that document the history of these three themes. This study provides valuable background information and supports this dissertation assertion that no consolidated "macro" level study has been conducted that includes the Army Functional Life Cycle Model. This historical monograph portrays the needs for the Army to modernize prior to 1980 and documents the doctrinal development of the organizations required to support the Army of Excellence. There is no mention in Romjue's study about the Inspector General's Report or its potential impacts. this study contains substantial background information on the

fielding of the big five and potential influence the fielding had on the Chief of Staff's of the Army. (Chief of Staff of the Army General Edward C. Meyer (1979 -- 1983); General John A. Wickham Jr. (1983 -- 1987); and, General Carl E. Vouno 1989).

33. ***Readings in Strategic Management*** by Thompson, Arthur A. Jr., A.J. Strickland III, and Tracy Robertson Kramer (Boston, Massachusetts: McGraw Hill, 1998).

<u>Summary:</u> The whole strategic management cycle - from defining the business, to crafting a strategy, to implementation and execution, to evaluation of results, to reformulation and fine-tuning the game plan - is being intensively scrutinized by practitioners, consultants, and business school academics. *Readings in Strategic Management* provides a blend of contemporary and landmark oracles of the theory and practice of strategic management. This edition contains forty three articles. The readings are of two types. One type consists of a standard length article from first-tier journals, and provides in-depth treatment of important topics covered in most business policy strategy text. The second type includes shorter goals drawn from practitioners that emphasize how strategic management concepts and tools were applied to actual practice. Together the two types of readings provide an effective and efficient vehicle for reinforcing and expanding case study treatments to include a flavor of both current literature and management applications. The forty three readings are grouped into five sections -- each of which represents one of the major building blocks of strategic management. At the beginning of these grouping is a brief overview of the topics covered and how each article fits into the scheme and structure of strategy

management. The topic areas covered include: creating and sustaining corporate

vision; mission strategic content; and, business definitions and strategic planning.

The second group of eleven articles deals with analyzing and crafting business

strategy. The third section is concerned with strategic analysis and diversified

companies in the formation and management of strategic alliances. The fourth

group of articles surveys the ins and outs of effective strategy implementation and

execution. The final section concerns business ethics and social responsibility.

(iv).

Value: Each of the five sections of the book contains valuable information about

corporate strategy development. Specifically, the articles on strategy formulation

and the difficulties in managing change are applicable to this dissertation's

comparison of how change is conducted within the military and the corporate

world. Although many of these articles were written in the 1990s, they deal with

the decades of the 1970s and the 1980s and provide background and context about

the dominant changes in management theory during this period.   Chapter four on

managing strategy and implementation is the most applicable to this dissertation.

34. ***Managing Strategic Change: Technical, Political, and Cultural Dynamics*** by
Knoll M. Tichy (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1983). (The senior editors are
Edward Lawler and Stanley Seashore.)

Summary: This series on organizational assessment and change is concerned

with all aspects of the debate on how an organization should be managed,

changed, and controlled. This volume addresses issues of organizational

assessment and change at a very broad level. It focuses upon organizational

response to change in the environment or in managerial priorities that require

changes of the organizational design - changes that are substantial and the affects

are often irreversible. The author proposed a model of organizational functioning

that incorporates factors commonly overlooked, or undervalued by managers

under the stress of approaching critical organizational designs. This analysis

includes case studies. It is a 'how-to book' as well as one that offers a broad

theoretical framework and orientation. It is an invitation to scholars to rethink

their ways of studying the processes of organizational transformation. (Preface)

Three major foci with regard to change management: (1) technical aspects of

work, (2) power, and (3) values. These correspond to the three strands --

technical, political, and cultural -- of the strategic model presented in Chapter 1.

(X). Tichy further argued: contemporary change management practice is limited

because managers and consultants tend to focus attention on a restricted set of

organizational change levers. Some always restructure the organization. Others

always try to improve communication. Others always replace people. Others

always alter production and control systems. Some see change solely as a

technical problem, others see it as a political problem, and still others see it as a

cultural problem. By limiting their viewpoint, they limit their use of different

change levers. All three sets of problems require management. In order to

strategically manage change, dependence upon nine change levers must be

equally available for use. Very few managers and consultants are trained to work with all levers. This book attempts to help managers acquire that training. (7).

Value: This book provides a holistic approach to managing strategic change. It provides an alternative model to compare and contrast with the Army Functional Life Cycle Model. Noel Tichy worked on this book for ten years. He stressed the importance of horizontal integration to affecting change within an organization. He modified his approach dramatically after hands-on experience working with hospital organizations in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. He stressed the importance of including all aspects of technical, political, and cultural dynamics in developing strategic level change. He asserted, change consultants previously focused on the technical, the political, or the cultural dynamics of an organization, but none focused on incorporating all three aspects. Further, he claimed, few consultants or scholars understand the comprehensive nature of all three of these elements. He argued, technical management expertise is needed for specific change to be effective. This expertise is only gained by attending specialized training. Similarly, the Army developed a Force Management School and the Force Management specialty branch. This book was published in 1983. This book came from the U.S. Army Organizational Effectiveness Training Center. Further research of this center has not revealed any other sources pertinent to this study. However, future research in management may find this resource valuable. This book is part of a series on organizational assessment and

change. It is a valuable intellectual history of the management of organizational

change in the 1970s and 1980s.

Articles

"The Army Force Management Update," *Quarterly Newsletter of the*

Army Force Management School, July 2007. Fort Belvoir, VA.

Summary: This newsletter provides an update of the current changes in the field

of force management. Project officers provide summaries of new developments

within their fields. For example, Mr. John Walsh described the changes to repeal

the requirement for a two-year budget cycle for the Department of Defense from

the National Defense Authorization Act FY 1986. [435]

Value: This newsletter tracks current developments that affect the field of force

management. Specifically, the referenced change to the repeal of a biennial

budget submission should have lasting impacts on the current force development

process. In 2007, Chief of Staff of the Army GEN Schoomaker for the first time

did not submit a Program Objective Memorandum (POM) 'Army budget

proposal' because he believed he could not comply with the resource constraints

imposed by the Department of Defense. He demonstrated that the Army needed

much more money in the base budget, rather than supplemental budgets, for the

war. He presented the Army requirements to the President and the Congress

without a POM submission. This was an unprecedented act and provides valuable

insight to the force management process addressed in this dissertation.

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[435] See the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate Report 110-77, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, "Repeal of requirement for two-year budget cycle for the Department of Defense", p. 388, June 5, 2007.

"The Defense Readiness Reporting System: a New Tool for Force Management" by Laura Junor. *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 44, first quarter 2007. Page 30-33.

Summary: How does DoD measure the ability of the Armed Forces to execute a broad range of missions? The sustained demand for forces in Iraq and Afghanistan make it challenging to find units that are both suitable and available for deployment. It also underscores the importance of understanding residual force capability should another crisis occur. In the spring of 2000 to the Office of Secretary of Defense formally announced plans to create the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) to promote real change in how the Department of Defense thinks about, plans for, and assesses, the ability of the Armed Forces to conduct operations. When complete, the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) will be a network of applications that provides force managers at all levels the tools and information to respond to emerging crisis, and the ability to assess the risks of conducting such operations.[436] The Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) is a major transformation, moving the focus of force managers from reporting unit readiness to managing force capabilities. Specifically, it represents a shift from resources to capabilities, deficiencies to their implications, units to combined forces, and front-line units to all units contributing to combat operations. Force managers must be able to define capabilities and understand implications. Defense Readiness Reporting System

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[436] The Defense Readiness Reporting System: a New Tool for Force Management" by Laura Junor. *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 44, first quarter 2007. 31.

(DRRS) using ESORTS (secure electronic reporting of unit capabilities and status) will provide much needed visibility to enable deployment management and force management. Bottom line: this system will provide readiness visibility at all levels to inform planners at all levels of the availability of forces for operations.

Value: This article highlights the challenges facing force providers to understand unit capabilities and readiness. This system (DEERS) is an attempt to improve visibility of readiness through all components to enable efficient employment of resources to meet mission requirements. Improved visibility and reporting efficiency effects force management by enabling consideration of smaller or fewer organizations to accomplish defense missions. Rather than tasking a larger unit, specific elements can be mobilized for a mission. A point still remains where mission requirements can exceed capabilities but, increased efficiency is desirable. Visibility to enable smaller unit tasking however, may create new leadership or support challenges. Increased visibility may lead to changes in the force sizing construct or assignment policies that should be a topic of future research.

"The Successes of Global Force Management in Joint Force Providing", by Michael Ferriter and Jay Burdon, *Joint Forces Quarterly,* Issue 44, first quarter 2007. Page 44-46.

Summary: Implementation of the Global Force Management (GFM) construct and associated joint force provider (JFP) has changed the assignment, allocation, and apportionment of forces into a predictive, streamlined, and integrated process.

United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), Service components, Service headquarters, and Combatant Commands, now can bring the Secretary of Defense sourcing recommendations from the global pool of available resources and augment those recommendations with assessments of current and future readiness. This enables the Secretary to make proactive, risk informed force management decisions - by integrating the three processes to facilitate alignment of operational forces against known allocation and apportionment requirements - in advance of planning and deployment timelines.

Value: This article explains the joint force provider process and the problems that it was established to resolve. This is the evolving system that the Joint force has used to provide the SecDef risk informed sourcing solutions to meet our near-term military requirements.

"What the Past Teaches about the Future" by Max Boot, *Joint Forces Quarterly,* Issue 44, First Quarter 2007. Page 109 - 116.

Summary: While the United States has been dominant so far in the information age, there is no guarantee that this streak will continue. A challenger, whether rival states such as China or even Nonstate groups such as Al Qaeda, could use new ways of war to alter the balance of power. Cheap to produce and easy to disseminate - germs, chemicals, cyber viruses - are particularly well-suited for the weak to use against the strong. History is full of super powers failing to take advantage of important revolutions in military affairs (RMAs). Max Boot warned against complacency because historically, dominant powers are eventually

toppled. He further warned that too much change creates a similar phenomenon that can lead to a great power's downfall. He claimed that the possibility of conventional interstate war is lower today than at any other time in the past 500 years, but it has not disappeared altogether. The boundaries are blurring between conventional and unconventional war, regular and irregular war. Nonstate groups are increasingly gaining access to the kinds of weapons that were once the exclusive preserve of states. He argued that future wars may resemble a series of terrorist attacks or hit-and-run raids rather than, traditional force on force armored, aerial, or naval engagements.

Value: This article gets to the root of question related to the force management issues in this dissertation; what are the military capabilities required for future war? Many other works provide conflicting concepts of how nations will fight wars in the future. Correspondingly, there are conflicting visions of future military capabilities required. *The Sling and the Stone* (T.X. Hammes) is mentioned as a similar book to examine. Future warfare is a broad field that has force management and policy implications. Assumptions about the nature of warfare, the threats, and the employment of forces should drive the future military capabilities required.

Monographs

An Analysis of the Department of Defense Strategic Management Process by Lieutenant Colonel Gary P. Graves, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013. 7 June 1976. 115 pages.

Abstract: This study examined the factors which impact the top-level management processes within the DoD. It is based on readings, studies, interviews, questionnaires, and lectures. The body of this paper contains a review of the relevant management theory, an outline of the formal defense management process, and an analysis of data collected. Due to the broad scope of the subject, the conclusions take the form of a working hypothesis; the study then recommends specific areas for further study. Among the primary hypothesis are a lack of effective long range and contingency planning, and absence of an articulated and perceived code of values, and an adversarial relationship between key participants in the Department of Defense short-circuits rational decision making. Recommendations for further study include: creating a specific functional area for planning; eliminating the Service Secretaries; revising the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS); an immediate goal to streamline and sanitize the organization; and, the establishment of a firm set of values.

Content: Chapter 1) Introduction; Chapter 2) Theoretical Considerations; Chapter 3) The Department of Defense Management Design; Chapter 4) Interpretation, Analysis and Presentation of Data; Chapter 5) Hypothesis and Recommendations; Footnotes. Bibliography.

Value: This paper predates the Goldwater-Nichols act of 1986. Joint processes have evolved significantly since 1976. Graves examined managerial theory (management by objectives, Mintzberg's theories, Maslow's theory, Galbrieths's complex organizations, and Rosenzweig's systems approach). This discussion and related bibliography depicts the literature available in the seventies. Some significant timeless concepts appear in this study: 1) a steep learning curve is required for action officer's to learn about the PPBES (page 47); 2) There is an inherent friction noted between Service budgets and Combatant Command requirements; 3) The time compressed budget process hampers optimal decision making. This study includes an obvious pessimistic bias about budget specialists and the budget process. The target group of 19 officers included then COL Peter Dawkins. The survey used to gather the group responses is included in the monograph, but the responses are not.

JCS Planning: Assessment and Recommendations by Lieutenant Commander Rocky D. Kropp., September 1989. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, the Co-advisors Nancy C. Roberts and James J. Tritten. (Master's thesis.)

Abstract: Strategic planning by the JCS has been a source of criticism about the lack of quality and timely military advice provided to the National Command Authorities (NCA). The 1986 Goldwater - Nichols Act made organizational changes to help solve joint planning problems, but failed to address other functional problems such as: 1) the lack of Presidential participation in planning; 2) the lack of recognition of strategic role of today's information technology in

joint strategic planning; and, 3) the lack of training and experienced planning officers. This thesis provides a high-level overview of both the JSPS, currently being revised, and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) designed to improve deliberate planning for unified and specified commanders. Conclusions and recommendations are given to address the DoD's decentralized and incompatible planning systems currently in use, and to improve the flow of information from the CJCS to the President.

Content: 1) Introduction. Research questions, problems, changes, analysis. Structure of thesis, methodology. 2) Description of JCS planning process. A) DOD planning officials. B) JCS planning process. C) Deliberate planning. 3) Problems with JCS planning process. A) Structural and procedural causes. B) Information technology causes. 4) Planning process changes. A) DOD planning officials. B) Midrange planning. C) Deliberate planning. 5) Analysis and discussion of military planning. A) Anticipated improvements. B) Remaining problem. 6) Conclusions and Recommendations. A) Research questions. B) Thesis findings. C) Recommendations.

Value: This report provides the background behind the Goldwater Nichols 1986 Defense Reorganization Act. It also referenced the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report that stressed the necessity for change in defense reorganization. Much of the information gathered for this report came from a JOPES conference held at the Armed Forces Staff College 15 through 19

July 1989. In constructing this report, only one participant from the Joint Staff was able to communicate via the defense data net (DDN) which was the forerunner of the Internet. (Page 9). The Joint Staff Officers Guide is referenced for background information and definitions. Structural and procedural causes of problems identified are: 1) lack of policy direction from the president; 2) overemphasis on budgeting; 3) decentralized structure; 4) functional organizational structure; 5) lack of integration; 6) bypassing formal process; (Page 39 contains a summary of the changes proposed by Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986). This report focuses on the information technology solutions that can help improve joint cooperation in planning for the DoD. Each of the Goldwater - Nichols proposals is evaluated to demonstrate how to correct a deficiency identified in this report. Note: <u>References to review for further study:</u> Joint Planning (National Defense University in the Armed Forces Staff College); <u>the</u> *Joint Staff Officers Guide 1988* (Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1988); Report to the Committee of Armed Services, United States Senate; *Defense Organization: the Need for Change* Gardner, J.R., Rachlin, R., Sweeney, H.WA. (Editors) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 16 October 1985); *Handbook of Strategic Planning* (John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1986).