the spirit of capitalism. If, however, it is maintained that the Calvinist configuration did occur as claimed, then nonreligious factors would have to be introduced to account for this conjunction of elements. Recourse to a nonreligious explanation is mandatory, for there is no logical, meaningful relationship between these elements in the purely religious sphere. These nonreligious factors may be idealistic as well as materialistic. The point simply is that they must be used and they are not. Thus, it appears that disparate elements are taken from various points in time and blended together to form a static picture. This picture appears to form a Protestant ethos that is related to a spirit of capitalism only if the historical dimension with its implicit interaction between elements and forces is ignored.

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# INTERDISCIPLINARY VARIATIONS IN THE PERCEPTION OF POWER: A STUDY IN IDEOLOGY

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*There have been marked disagreements in the literature on the structure of power in American society. The authors suggest that this controversy is an artifact of ideological differences between sociologists and political scientists. This hypothesis is tested through the use of a pluralism-elitism scale. Political scientists are found to score toward the pluralistic end of the spectrum, while sociologists are concentrated toward the elitist end, thus providing preliminary support for the hypothesis.*

The structure of power in American society constitutes an unresolved problem among social scientists (Ricci, 1971). While research into the structure of community power has moved beyond the ideologically based clashes of Hunter (1953) and Dahl (1961) so that today the question is no longer "who governs" but rather "who governs under what conditions, where, and when," still the ideological components of the issue remain to whet the curiosity of the researcher. Why is it that when sociologists investigate the structure of power they tend to discover a "power elite" (a small integrated group of power holders who rather undemocratically dominate decision making), but when political scientists investigate the structure of power they tend to discover that power is dispersed among many groups in a rather democratic way (in essence, a "pluralist" structure)? Moreover, why is it that sociologists are strongly inclined to employ a "positional" or "reputational" approach in locating power holders while political scientists are more inclined to employ a "decisional" approach?

While research has moved beyond the ideological stage of "power elite" vs. "pluralist" orientations so that Clark (1968) can

formulate a number of propositions about how power structure correlates with community size, degree of urbanization and industrialization, type of city government, socioeconomic characteristics, etc., there is still a legitimate problem dealing with the general orientation of various disciplines toward the phenomenon and structure of power in society. This paper attempts to explore the problem of the ideological base from which the phenomenon of power is viewed by various academic disciplines. Are sociologists relatively homogeneous in their perspective on how power is structured in society? More particularly, are they inclined to see "power elites" operating? Are political scientists more inclined to view power in a "pluralist," dispersed fashion, thereby carrying a less critical view of the allocative processes of the social order? If there are genuine differences in ideological perspectives, are they a product of the discipline and its socializing process? Such questions constitute an ambitious undertaking, but they are questions which deserve exploration. It will not be the intent of this paper to give a definitive answer to any of these questions. Rather it will be an attempt to probe and explore and create the basis upon which more specific empirical propositions can be formulated.

## REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

With the publication in 1953 of Floyd Hunter's *Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers*, a long and acrimonious debate has ensued over how power is distributed and exercised in local communities and in American society as a whole. Hunter's findings tend to suggest that power is exercised in communities by a rather tightly knit structure of leadership, a sort of ruling stratum. Subsequent studies by other scholars have supported his contention that power is exercised by an "elite" group (Mills, 1959; Domhoff, 1967).

On the other hand, in 1961, Robert Dahl published the results of his study of the community of New Haven, Connecticut (*Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City*) which reached precisely opposite conclusions. Dahl found that power is dispersed among competing centers of interest at the local level.

His findings suggesting that power is exercised in a pluralistic, democratic fashion have been duplicated by other researchers (Polsby, 1963).

At present, a "scholarly impasse" exists. One group of scholars tends consistently to find at least several competing centers of local or national power. They are called "pluralists" (Keynes & Ricci, 1971). Other scholars tend to find a tightly knit structure of leadership, a ruling elite or ruling stratum. They are called "stratification" theorists (Keynes & Ricci, 1971). As the debate between the positions has gone forward, the intensity of feeling among the disputants has increased. Criticism of the rival views has become polemic and frequently uncharitable. As a case in point, when G. William Domhoff produced an updated study of national power in 1967 (*Who Rules America?*) based on C. Wright Mills' positional theory of elitism, pluralist critic Nelson Polsby promptly called it "amateur sociology" shedding "no light whatever on how anything works" (Polsby, 1968).

Obviously the whole question of who governs carries considerable ideological implications. What is at stake is either a portrait of democracy which roughly corresponds with liberal expectations or a portrait of power which is essentially undemocratic. As Richard Gillam (1971) describes the crisis,

> The bedeviling doubts planted in academic and popular minds by the discovery of power elites and ruling classes denote, among other things, a potential crisis in liberal ideology. Clearly, liberal pluralism still commands vast amounts of disputed intellectual territory, yet the ranks of orthodoxy have thinned, and today its triumph may not be so inevitable as it once seemed.

The dispute between the "pluralists" and the "stratificationists" appears to be cast in a normative context. At issue is the "process theory of democracy" (Truman, 1951). The so-called "pluralists" rely on group theory to describe the political system as a flourishing democracy with power being widely dispersed. On the other hand the "stratificationists" tend to reject group theory and hold to reputational and positional theories of elitism and conclude by insisting that something is seriously wrong with the American political process, "that we deceive ourselves

into unwarranted complacency if we label our politics as substantially democratic" (Ricci, 1971). Thus normative commitments relating to the evaluation of the American political system seem to undergird the debate.

The controversy has increasingly focused on research methodology since it appears that research findings in power studies appear to be "an artifact of method" (Walton, 1966). The old adage that the questions men ask determine the answers they obtain seems applicable. The methodological issue can be reduced to two matters—the proper *methods* for locating power and the proper *definition* of key concepts in that search (Keynes & Ricci, 1970). It appears that regardless of the actual configuration of power in a particular community, the method an investigator uses to locate it will probably reveal an apparent power pattern which is linked to that method. If one pursues the location of power by reputational techniques a clique or elite of power usually emerges. If another pursues the location of power by asking who makes the crucial decisions, a dispersed or pluralistic image of power emerges (Walton, 1966).

The issue of definitions of terms is also highly correlated with outcomes. The term "power" itself is problematic. As Kaufman and Jones describe it,

> There is an elusiveness about power that endows it with almost a ghostly quality. We 'know' what it is, yet we encounter endless difficulties in trying to define it. We can 'tell' one group or person is more powerful than another, yet we cannot measure power. It's as abstract as time, yet as real as the firing squad.

Scholars in the tradition of Max Weber have defined power as *potential*, as "the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action" (Weber, 1946). Such a notion of power is inclusive, but vague, and has led analysts to use indirect measures of power such as "reputation" and "position."

Other scholars such as Robert Dahl have conceived power as *actual*. In the words of Dahl, "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something B would not otherwise do"

(Dahl, 1957). This more restricted definition has enabled those who used it to focus on a narrower range of phenomena in studying power, namely, political processes. Thus the definition given to power suggests a method to study it and seems to prophesy an outcome.

As a rule, "pluralist" scholars tend to define power as *actual* and thus stress a decisional methodology and produce findings that show power to be democratically dispersed. "Stratification" scholars on the other hand tend to define power as *potential* and thus stress reputational and positional methodologies and produce findings that show power concentrated in an elite stratum inimical to democracy.

### THE DISCIPLINARY COMPONENT

Those studies which have reported elitist or pyramidal power structures have been done largely by sociologists; those studies which have concluded that power is pluralistically distributed have largely been done by political scientists (Aiken, 1971). Yet there are enough exceptions to wonder if indeed the issue is essentially an interdisciplinary issue. Hunter's and Mills's sociological colleagues David Riesmann, Talcott Parsons, William Kornhauser, Daniel Bell, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Arnold Rose tend to lean toward the "pluralist" conclusion. Nevertheless many scholars have observed that discipline is related to method, and method is related to findings of power studies (Walton, 1966). Aiken (1970) analyzed fifty-seven studies of community power by sociologists and political scientists and discovered a strong inclination for sociologists to use only the reputational approach (r=.77). The correlation between using only the reputational technique and finding of pyramidal power structure in these studies was (r=.38). Similar findings are found by Claire Gilbert (1968). There is a dissenting view, however, which says discipline and method are not related to the findings of power studies (Clark, 1968a).

That disciplinary lines do tend to affect definitions and thus methodologies is seen in the fact that divisions over the meaning of power frequently coincide with disciplinary lines. Most sociologists accept notions of potential power while political

scientists usually view power as actual (Kaufman & Jones, 1954). Sociologists tend to begin with society and ask how it affects the state and thus are naturally inclined to search for power elites and ruling classes. Political scientists on the other hand tend to begin with the state and ask how it affects society and in the process tend to find pluralistic distributions of power. Petras (1965) suggests that "the values of political scientists are derived from the functioning of contemporary institutions, which infers a predeliction on the part of political scientists to see political machinery functioning as it is intended to function."

Beyond this, however, sociologists tend to view any community as an enduring phenomenon, an aggregation of human institutions that is greater and more permanent than the sum of its parts. The durablity of the community leads the sociologist to presume some structure of power, some network of stable relationships which maintain it. The community's lasting parts *must* collectively have this power, else they could not last. Robert Lynd (1957), a sociologist, asserts

> Organized power exists—always and everywhere, in societies large or small, primitive or modern—because it performs the necessary function of establishing and maintaining the version of order by which a given society in a given time and place lives.

It follows from this assumption that sociologists will expect that particular men at specific times will wield great power, but only insofar as they are in control of the community's enduring constituent parts. Hunter (1953) in studying Atlanta affirmed that "power of the individual must be structured into associational, clique, or institutional patterns to be effective."

Political scientists on the other hand tend to impute less significance to society as an enduring phenomenon. Rather society is a "fluid, ever changing interplay of influence relationships between men who seek and wield a somewhat free floating substance of power" (Ricci, 1971).

In contrasting the perspectives of the sociologist and the political scientists, Petras (1965) observes,

> It would seem that the closer one is to "society" and the further one is from political institutions the greater the emphasis upon conflict and group disharmony. To the extent that social conflict and group disharmony are filtered through the political process somehow the analysis and/or the political sphere "loses" these elements. This would seem to lead to the idea that the political is not completely "congruent" with society at large since by focusing on one or the other, one derives a different view of how "politics" function.

Kaufman (1954) further points out that some scholars accept a "scarcity" or "zero-sum" model of power. There is by this reckoning only a certain amount of power in any political system. Increase in the power of one can only result in decrease in others. By this interpretation, conflict, coercion, or domination follows from inequalities of power. This perspective is more typical of "stratificationists."

Other scholars, Kaufman (1958) argues, use a "resource" model of power stressing consensus and the part necessarily played by power in any successful achievement of common social goals. "Pluralists" see power in this way and tend to emphasize its benevolence. The *resource* model tends to be used to defend existing arrangements while the *scarcity* model is used to attack them.

Thus it would appear that the enduring warfare between "stratificationist" and "pluralist" scholars is in large part an ideological conflict, and perhaps is associated with the struggle for power itself. In any event, by the Dolbeares' (1971) definition

> anyone who holds an ideology has, in effect, a series of expectations or a map in his mind, orienting him and telling him how things work. Thus he knows where to fit the facts that he perceives and how to understand their significance.

"Pluralists" and "stratificationists" both seem to have clear maps in their minds, orienting them to how things work, and it may conceivably be true that those ideological maps are a function of disciplinary background. Ricci (Keynes & Ricci, 1970) says it even more directly:

We can infer, then, that the academic disciplines of sociology and anthropology and political science are staffed by men of conflicting outlook and social persuasion. These ingrained differences predispose them to be satisfied or dissatisfied with society and, thereby, determine the shape of their inquiries. If, as researchers, they seek an unfavorable portrait of politics, they will opt for the [reputational or positional] methods; if they seek to defend politics, they will choose [the decisional method].

While Ricci states such a proposition as a fact, the issue he focuses on will be considered a hypothesis to be tested in this paper. Whether or not sociologists generally differ from political scientists in ideological orientation will be empirically examined.

What actually is known at this point is that, as a rule, those political scientists that have studied community and national power have generally employed a decisional model and arrived at pluralistic conclusions. Those sociologists who have studied the same phenomena (though with some notable exceptions) tend to employ positional or reputational models and arrive at "elite" or "stratification" conclusions. What we do *not* know is whether sociologists *in general* are inclined to view power as potential, ascertainable by reputational or positional methodologies and thus inclined to see power as concentrated in a strata which is inimical to democracy. Neither do we know if political scientists *in general* are inclined to view power as actual, ascertainable by decisional methodologies and thus inclined to see power as dispersed in ways congenial to liberal democratic thought.

The problem which shall be investigated, then, is whether or not discipline background is highly associated with views of power. Additional variables will be tested as well, such as socioeconomic background, age, sex, educational background, and vocational history.

SOURCE OF BASIC CONSTRUCTS: THE "PLURALIST" ASSUMPTIONS

In order to determine whether or not sociologists generally subscribe to the "stratification" ideology and political scientists embrace the "pluralist" ideology, it is necessary to more

thoroughly define the concepts and ascertain what general assumptions underlie each perspective.

The "pluralist" perspective substitutes the group for the free individual in classic liberalism. According to pluralist theory

politics is a contest among social groups. Each group is motivated by some interest or cluster of interests and seeks to sway government its direction. Thus the typical social problem is some instance of distributive injustice. One group is getting too much, another too little. Solution is rough parity among competing groups. New proposals originate with group feeling slighted and the legislative outcome is a measure which corrects the imbalance to the degree commensurate with the size and political power of the initiating group. (Wolff, 1965)

Such a group orientation tends to assume that society itself is but an aggregate of human communities rather than itself a community. It is more inclined to recognize the validity of the concept "group" than it is the concept "society." In fact Petras (1965) argues that

society is conceived of (by the 'pluralists') simply as a plurality of groups interacting with each other and that the political process is essentially a process of group competition for power over the allocation of resources.

Associated with the group theory of the "pluralists" is the assumption that the major groups in society compete through the electoral process for control over the actions of government (Wolff, 1965). Politicians are forced to accommodate themselves to a number of opposed interests and in so doing achieve a rough distribution of justice. Pluralists concede that there are power elites, but such elites are diversified and represent the primary interests of society. In this way, while they are elites, they are *representative* elites (Petras, 1965).

"Pluralists" tend to assume that power is not intrinsically malign. Power, rather, is seen as a positive resource of great potential benefit to society as a whole. Thus concentrated power tends to be inevitable and desirable. However, power concentrations are always seen as dispersed. In fact "pluralists"

such as John Kenneth Galbraith assume that as concentrations of power build up there is a more or less automatic emergence of countervailing power which serves to restrain. Big unions and big government restrain big corporations. Large retailers check the power of large producers (Galbraith, 1952). In fact, "pluralists" are inclined to see the emergence of "corporate consciences" which result in businesses being run with an eye to the general welfare (Berle & Means, 1932).

The essential position of the "pluralists" is not to deny the existence of elites of power, for they accept the fact that small numbers of men must inevitably wield disproportionate power in any modern society. But democracy is preserved by the *competition* between different elites with differing interests and by the accountability of the representative elites to the body politic. In relation to the competition between interest group elites, the "pluralists" conceive of government as serving a referee function (Wolff, 1965).

Because of the "pluralists'" confidence in the efficacy of groups, they assume that any interests which are not adequately served in a political system can organize and have an impact on the system. With that assumption as background, Dahl, for example in his study of New Haven, tended to interpret voter apathy as indicative of contentment with the political system and its allocations (Dahl, 1961). In fact, Petras (1965) claims that "pluralists" tend to see apathy as a buffer against mass movements and uninstitutionalized social forces. Political stability is seen as enhanced by apathy.

"Pluralists" tend to adopt the behaviorist perspective which affirms that the only proper objects of study are observable, overt behavior. Thus power is necessarily defined in its overt, decisional manifestations. The idea of potential power which constrains behavior without having to be overtly exercised is ignored in favor of the more observable, measurable decisions. Thus "pluralists" focus on actual power in contrast to potential power, arguing that potential power may or may not be used. The only significant power is *exercised* power, which takes the form of decisions (Dahl, 1963).

"Pluralists," because of their more fluid conception of society, do not see power as an enduring phenomenon, structured in the social system. Polsby (1963) asserts plainly that no presumptions about the structure of power can justifiably be made at all.

Because of their disinclination to see power embedded in economic and status differences, "pluralists" tend to define community power with reference to political conduct,

> since the political arena is the sector of community life in which large groups in the community make demands upon one another and collectively determine policy outcomes. (Dahl, 1963)

Thus for Dahl, the major question is who dominates public governments rather than private hierarchies.

Dahl (1961a) who is perhaps the most eloquent spokesman for the "pluralists" summarizes the perspective by observing that

- inequities are dispersed rather than cumulated throughout the social order, thus inhibiting the growth of oligarchic domination

- power structures are not present in communities, only groups competing

- political power is more significant for study than social or economic power

- "elites" do exist, but they are competitive and thus prevent oligarchic domination by a minority

- one power resource (such as wealth) is not consistently dominant over other resources such as status, skill, knowledge, etc.

- groups disadvantaged in their access to resources can sometimes compensate by using what resources they have at a relatively high level

- groups disadvantaged in resources may compensate by developing high level skill such as in electioneering and party politics

- competitive elections assure that office holders will execute policies benefiting the majority in order to get reelected

In general, pluralist theory seeks to account for both elites and groups in such a way as to divest elites of the undemocratic quality attributed to them by "stratificationists."

### THE "STRATIFICATIONIST ASSUMPTIONS"

The guiding ideas in the "stratificationist" perspective stand in contrast to the "pluralist." Floyd Hunter and C. Wright Mills are most explicit in the assumptions which guided their work and thus we shall take them as representative of the "stratificationist" perspective.

Mills and Hunter both worked from a perspective that inclined them to see society as a reasonably stable phenomenon which outlives the individuals which make it up. The very fact of its perceived durablity made it sensible to assume that it was held together by a structure of power. Hunter postulated that a power structure exists by necessity in all communities. Power is basically a social phenomenon involving relationships between individuals and groups, and to be effective, it always assumes associational, clique, or institutional patterns (Hunter, 1953). Mills (1959), following the sociological tradition of assuming that power is entrenched in a society's continuing institutions, argued that

> power is not of man. . . . To be celebrated, to be wealthy, to have power requires access to major institutions, for the institutional positions men occupy determine in large part their chances to have and to hold those valued experiences.

Mills and Hunter both postulate levels of power. The elite level of power is made up of people who make crucial decisions. For Mills it is the people who make decisions in times of crisis and

people whose decisions have enormous scope. For Hunter, the elite level consists of people who make crucial policy decisions which are associated with change. Decisions regarding day-to-day continuity for both Hunter and Mills are made by people occupying a subordinate stratum composed of more or less pluralistic groups and interests (Ricci, 1971).

Mills and Hunter also assumed that the economic and political systems are virtually inseparable. The resulting intertwining tends to overshadow the nominal political equality of all citizens since there is the ever present differential in terms of their access to economic resources. Ricci (1971) states the case:

> in a society pervaded by the ethics of capitalism which sees itself engaged in a world-wide struggle against the ethics of collectivism, no one expects economic hierarchy and inequality to vanish. Indeed, according to our commonly accepted principles of practical virtue—material incentives, business competition, entrepreneurial imagination and hard work—enormous disparities of income and economic power are held to be legitimate, even necessary. The inevitable result, in Hunter's theory of elitism, is a polity dominated by economic elites . . .

Thus Hunter (1953) postulates that "power is structured socially in the United States, in a dual relationship between governmental and economic authorities. Both types of authorities may have functional, social and institutional power units subsidiary to them."

Also, whereas the "pluralists" conceive power as operating only in the context of decision making, Hunter (1953) conceives of power as a relatively constant factor in social relationships with policies as variables. Wealth, social status, and prestige are factors in the "power constant."

The foregoing assumptions constitute the core of the "stratification" orientation which, from Hunter's (1953) point of view, are "self-evident propositions." He affirms that they constituted "a mental backdrop, an abstract frame of reference" during his field investigation (Hunter, 1953).

## HYPOTHESES

Our assumption is that from the foregoing summary of "pluralist" and "stratificationist" postulates, one can devise a research instrument which will measure the extent to which an individual has ideological kinship with either of the points of view. While it has been documented that disciplinary background does tend to make a difference in methodologies adopted for the study of the structure of power, and that results of power studies tend to be an artifact of the method, it does not appear that there has been any systematic exploration of the hypothesis that, in academic disciplines, ideological differences exist which predispose researchers to choose the methods they choose and thus arrive at concomitant conclusions. The present research is an exploratory probe into the ideological differences characterizing academic disciplines. More specifically, we hypothesize that:

1. Intradisciplinary homogeneity exists among the social sciences in the form of ideologies concerning the structure of power.
2. Sociologists tend to hold a stratificationist view concerning the structure of power.
3. Political scientists tend to hold a pluralist view concerning the structure of power.

## CONSTRUCTION OF THE INSTRUMENT

This research project involved a study of attitudes; thus, we needed to choose among several major attitude scaling techniques. Likert scaling was chosen because of its relative ease of construction. Also, the ordinal-level data it yields was deemed adequate for the exploratory purposes of the study (Edwards, 1957). The Likert statements used in the instrument were constructed by our research group. A pool of statements were especially designed for this instrument in an attempt to measure a pluralist-elitist attitudinal dimension as reflected in the literature reviewed earlier. The pool of statements were narrowed to the sixteen that were included in the questionnaire on the basis of face validity.

The use of Likert scale-type items presupposes that the statements are representative of a psychological continuum on which one may place scale values. For any given statement, we have available the proportion of respondents giving each of the five categories of responses: strongly agree, agree, uncertain, disagree, and strongly disagree. The categories were weighted in such a way that the person with the most favorable response was most favorable to pluralism and thus had the lowest score. The weighting for the response categories ranged from one to five, and was reversed if the statement was written in such a way that agreement would be a favorable response to elitism.

In addition to the sixteen Likert statements, there were nine questions dealing with background aspects of the respondent's personal history. These questions were included to identify possible confounding variables that Kish discusses (Kish, 1959:328-38). The questions provided the following information on each respondent: 1) current discipline; 2) years of teaching experience at the college level; 3) size of community in which respondent spent his or her childhood; 4) discipline in which respondent received undergraduate and graduate degrees; and 5) occupation of respondent's mother and father. These questions obviously do not cover all the possible confounding variables, but were included so that we might look at some of the variables that might inflate or depress a relationship between pluralism-elitism and discipline.

## SAMPLE SELECTION

The population studied were the professionals in the departments of sociology and political science at the University of Kansas. In addition we included the departments of philosophy and economics in order to see if ideological influences might also be present in other disciplines. It was decided to use both the graduate students and faculty members of each department in order to examine some of the effects that the discipline might have on one's perspective on power.

The sample of respondents was restricted to the above-mentioned categories in order to facilitate data collection

within a very brief time span. Questionnaires were placed in the mail boxes of those individuals who had mail boxes on the campus with the request that those respondents return the questionnaires by campus mail. In this way, all of the faculty members in each of the four departments and 40 graduate students received the questionnaire. Twenty-nine additional graduate students received questionnaires by distribution through graduate seminars, while 22 others were personally given copies of the instrument. Finally, 20 questionnaires were mailed to the homes of those graduate students we were unable to locate otherwise. Thus, the total number of questionnaires distributed was 184; 73 to the faculty members, and 111 to the graduate students. Of the total number distributed 104 were returned, or 57 percent.

| | Sociology | | Political Science | | Philosophy | | Economics | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | sent | ret'd | sent | ret'd | sent | ret'd | sent | ret'd |
| Faculty | 18 | 16 | 25 | 15 | 14 | 6 | 16 | 8 |
| Graduate Students | 22 | 19 | 37 | 12 | 32 | 13 | 20 | 16 |

It should be emphasized here that the process used to attain responses to the questionnaire did not provide a random sample. Thus, there is no justification for making inferences to a larger population. However, the intent of the study was exploratory, so this was not seen to be a major limitation.

*Data Analysis*

After the coding and key punching were completed, the data was analyzed on a Honeywell 635 computer at the University of Kansas, using the SPSS library programs. The data was factor analyzed with principal components, providing a conservative indication of the presence of a pluralism-elitism dimension. The procedure is conservative in that it factors the variance into maximally distinct clusters, rather than attempting to maximize

the loadings on just the one component factor, pluralism-elitism. A second step in the data analysis was the performance of the traditional Likert summated rating for individual respondents. The respondents were given scores by adding the number assigned to their position on the sixteen items. This was an easy way to have a score for each individual provided they responded to all the items. However, some respondents did not answer certain items, which presented the problem of how to give a score for missing data. It was decided that the best way for handling missing data was to give such persons a neutral or uncertain scale value, namely, a three. This procedure has the effect of keeping the total number of subjects intact and also has the tendency to bring the scores of the more extreme cases more toward a central position in the summated scores. This procedure logically represents the person's uncertainty on that item, and thus is probably not a distortion of that person's position.

After the summated scores had been calculated for each individual, the scores were rank-ordered by total score and discipline so that an examination could be made of the distribution of scores of the individuals. This rank-ordering was then divided into quartiles to allow for an item analysis. Item analysis was performed by using the t-test to see if the items differentiated in contributing to the summated scores of the individuals in the high and low quartiles. The results of the t-test indicated that all sixteen items did contribute significantly to the differentiation of the high and low scoring groups.

FINDINGS

The results of factor analysis of the Likert statements are given in tables I and II. In view of the high loadings on the first factor and its explanation of approximately three-fourths of the total variance, shown in table I, there is some justification for viewing the data as unidimensional. We do not argue that our data are clearly unidimensional, yet the presence of a dominant factor indicates the validity of the instrument in tapping a dimension which we call pluralism-elitism. The results of the item analysis, as

previously noted, further demonstrates the validity and the reliability of the instrument.

### Table I
### Unrotated Factor Matrix Using Principal Factor

| Item | Factor 1 | Factor 2 | Factor 3 | Factor 4 |
|------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 1.   | -0.57560 | 0.24953  | 0.40115  | -0.04891 |
| 2.   | -0.42621 | 0.44101  | 0.08222  | 0.37698  |
| 3.   | -0.26846 | -0.27503 | -0.27503 | -0.16420 |
| 4.   | -0.23347 | 0.30152  | -0.06794 | 0.16240  |
| 5.   | -0.68587 | 0.30310  | -0.04814 | -0.08962 |
| 6.   | -0.53584 | -0.07053 | -0.19332 | -0.06014 |
| 7.   | -0.59024 | 0.37539  | -0.03637 | -0.19050 |
| 8.   | -0.56371 | 0.30239  | -0.44563 | 0.05411  |
| 9.   | -0.47867 | -0.10660 | -0.02059 | 0.04685  |
| 10.  | -0.84135 | 0.10321  | 0.20534  | -0.41575 |
| 11.  | -0.67106 | -0.28457 | 0.16982  | -0.03663 |
| 12.  | -0.83889 | -0.22209 | -0.22910 | 0.09778  |
| 13.  | -0.71709 | -0.34979 | -0.01940 | 0.11365  |
| 14.  | -0.49287 | -0.33033 | -0.04147 | -0.07954 |
| 15.  | -0.72319 | -0.19621 | -0.19463 | 0.33978  |
| 16.  | -0.61236 | -0.06264 | 0.06817  | 0.05091  |

| Factor | Eigenvalue | Percent of Variance |
|--------|-----------|---------------------|
| 1 | 5.80944 | 71.3 |
| 2 | 1.11455 | 13.7 |
| 3 | 0.65580 | 8.0 |
| 4 | 0.57194 | 7.0 |

### Table II
### Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix

| Item | Factor 1 | Factor 2 | Factor 3 | Factor 4 |
|------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 1.   | 0.31014  | 0.30712  | 0.59380  | 0.       |
| 2.   | 0.       | 0.68021  | 0.       | 0.       |
| 3.   | 0.       | 0.       | 0.       | 0.       |
| 4.   | 0.       | 0.40479  | 0.       | 0.       |
| 5.   | 0.27033  | 0.42611  | 0.46778  | 0.       |
| 6.   | 0.37550  | 0.       | 0.       | 0.37796  |
| 7.   | 0.       | 0.37984  | 0.51870  | 0.       |
| 8.   | 0.       | 0.52007  | 0.       | 0.54647  |
| 9.   | 0.41763  | 0.       | 0.       | 0.       |
| 10.  | 0.44438  | 0.       | 0.79735  | 0.       |
| 11.  | 0.66876  | 0.       | 0.       | 0.       |
| 12.  | 0.72656  | 0.25089  | 0.       | 0.45320  |
| 13.  | 0.75635  | 0.       | 0.       | 0.       |
| 14.  | 0.52157  | 0.       | 0.       | 0.       |
| 15.  | 0.77170  | 0.30738  | 0.       | 0.       |
| 16.  | 0.50217  | 0.       | 0.       | 0.       |

Zero-Loading Factor = 0.25000

The summated rating score of an individual respondent refers to his score on the pluralism-elitism scale. Referring to table III, quartile I represents individuals with highly pluralistic attitudes and quartile IV represents those with highly elitist attitudes. The data in table IV constitute a summary of the test of our major hypotheses. As the table indicates, the summated rating scores of political scientists tend to fall in the more pluralistic (lower) quartiles, while sociologists' scores are concentrated in the elitist (higher) quartiles. Economists and philosophers in our sample are

## Table III
### Raw Summated Rating Scores by Discipline

| | | Sociology | Political Science | Philosophy | Economics |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| First quartile | 31. | | 1 | | |
| | 35. | | | 1 | |
| | 36. | | 4 | | |
| | 37. | | 2 | | |
| | 38. | 3 | | | |
| | 40. | | 2 | | |
| | 41. | | | | 3 |
| | 42. | | 2 | | |
| | 43. | | 1 | | |
| | 44. | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| | 45. | 1 | 1 | | 1 |
| Second quartile | 46. | 1 | 1 | | 1 |
| | 47. | | 1 | 1 | |
| | 48. | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| | 49. | | | | 1 |
| | 50. | | 1 | | |
| | 51. | | 1 | | 1 |
| | 52. | | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| | 53. | 3 | 1 | 2 | |
| Third quartile | 54. | 3 | | | 3 |
| | 55. | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| | 56. | 2 | 2 | | |
| | 57. | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| | 59. | | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Fourth quartile | 60. | 1 | | | |
| | 61. | 1 | | 3 | |
| | 62. | 2 | | | |
| | 63. | 1 | | | |
| | 64. | 2 | | | |
| | 65. | 1 | | | |
| | 66. | | 1 | | |
| | 67. | 2 | | 1 | |
| | 68. | 2 | | 1 | 1 |
| | 69. | 1 | | | 1 |
| | 71. | 1 | 1 | | |
| | 75. | | | | 1 |
| | 76. | | | 1 | |
| | 78. | | | | 1 |

## Table IV
### Pluralism-Elitism by Discipline

| | | Sociology | Political Science | Philosophy | Economics | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pluralist Quartile | 1 | 5 | 15 | 2 | 5 | 27 |
| | 2 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 26 |
| | 3 | 10 | 3 | 4 | 9 | 26 |
| Elitist Quartile | 4 | 15 | 2 | 6 | 3 | 26 |
| | | 36 | 27 | 19 | 23 | 105 |

Chi Square: p < 0.0008          $\lambda = .244$

not concentrated in any particular quartiles, with about half being in the upper quartiles, as can be seen by separating the sociologists and political scientists from the economists and philosophers (tables V and VI). These tables offer strong support for our major hypotheses.

Given this apparently strong relationship between discipline and scale score, several background characteristics of the respondents were examined as possible confounding variables. Unfortunately, due to the relatively small number of respondents, no elaborations were possible. The background variables were checked by the use of contingency tables containing only two variables. Table VII represents the examination of one possible confounding variable, namely the academic rank of the respondent. Presumably, academic rank, as a characteristic of the respondent's position in the social world of his or her discipline might affect scale score. Table VII shows that this relationship is not strong, and is not statistically significant ($X^2$ p=.096, $\lambda$=.218). Furthermore, there does not appear to be any systematic trend in the data. There is an unusual concentration of full professors in

### Table V
### Pluralism-Elitism by Discipline (homogeneous)

|  | Sociology | Political Science |  |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pluralist (1-2) | 11 | 22 | 33 |
| Elitist (3-4) | 25 | 5 | 30 |
|  | 36 | 27 | 63 |

$X^2$: p < .001        λ = .467

### Table VI
### Pluralism-Elitism by Discipline (heterogeneous)

|  | Philosophy | Economics |  |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pluralist (1-2) | 9 | 11 | 20 |
| Elitist (3-4) | 10 | 12 | 22 |
|  | 19 | 23 | 42 |

$X^2$: n.s.        $\phi$ = 0.005

### Table VII
### Pluralism-Elitism by Rank

|  |  | M.A. Aspirant | Ph.D. Aspirant | Lecturer | Asst. Prof. | Assoc. Prof. | Full Prof. |  |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pluralist Quartile | 1 | 6 | 8 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 10 | 27 |
|  | 2 | 4 | 10 | 1 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 26 |
|  | 3 | 12 | 6 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 25 |
| Elitist Quartile | 4 | 6 | 7 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 4 | 26 |
|  |  | 28 | 31 | 4 | 17 | 6 | 18 | 104 |

Chi Square: p = 0.096        λ = .218

the lowest quartile, with more than half of the full professors in our sample being found in the most pluralistic quartile. There also seems to be a slight concentration of graduate students in the third quartile. Approximately half of the graduate students were in the lower two quartiles, and half were in the upper two quartiles; this was also true for faculty members. However, generally, no particular trend is apparent in this table.

The occupational statuses of the respondent's mother and father were examined as possible confounding variables. Insofar as these background characteristics of the respondent might be a factor in influencing his world view, they could affect his view on power and consequently his scale score. However, according to our findings, shown in tables VIII and IX, this is not the case. No relationship was found between the occupational variables and scale score. The size of the city in which the respondent spent most of his or her childhood was also checked as a confounding variable. Table X indicates that respondents from different size cities are not concentrated in particular scale score quartiles; hence, no support was found for the supposition that city size background effects scale more.

## Table VIII
### Pluralism-Elitism by Father's Occupation

| | | Father's Occupation | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | |
| Pluralist | 1 | 6 | 8 | 3 | 8 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 27 |
| | 2 | 6 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 7 | 0 | 2 | 26 |
| Scale Score | 3 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 25 |
| Elistist | 4 | 7 | 3 | 5 | 6 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 26 |
| | | 24 | 18 | 17 | 24 | 13 | 2 | 6 | 104 |

Chi Square: p = 0.293          $\lambda = .167$

## Table IX
### Pluralism-Elitism by Mother's Occupation

| | | Mother's Occupation | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | |
| Pluralist | 1 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 17 | 27 |
| | 2 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 25 |
| Scale Score | 3 | 2 | 7 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 26 |
| Elitist | 4 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 17 | 26 |
| | | 2 | 17 | 6 | 18 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 57 | 103 |

Chi Square: p = .478          $\lambda = .128$

## Table X
### Pluralism-Elitism by City Size

| | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pluralist Quartile | 1 | 5 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 8 | 27 |
| | 2 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 14 | 26 |
| Scale Score | 3 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 26 |
| Elitist Quartile | 4 | 5 | 3 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 25 |
| | | 17 | 17 | 18 | 8 | 7 | 37 | 104 |

Chi Square: p = 0.5424          $\lambda = .154$

| City Size |
|---|
| 1 = 0-2,500 |
| 2 = 2,501-10,000 |
| 3 = 10,001-50,000 |
| 4 = 50,001-100,000 |
| 5 = 100,001-250,000 |
| 6 = 250,001 or more |

### CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of the data generated by this study, the following conclusions are drawn:

1. Our first hypothesis concerning intradisciplinary homogeneity of perspective on power is partially sustained. Sociologists and political scientists represented the greatest homogeneity while economists and philosophers were less homogeneous. This is not surprising since both sociologists and political scientists are more directly concerned with the phenomenon of power than economists or philosophers and thus are likely to have a more highly developed sensitivity to the issue.

2. Our second and third hypotheses are supported by the data. Political scientists tended to reflect a pluralist orientation while sociologists tend to reflect an elitist orientation. Cross tabulating to discover the possible effects of extraneous background variables did not disclose any grounds to suspect that such variables confounded the relationships.

Since this study focused on sociologists and political scientists in an academic setting, future research could include political scientists and sociologists in nonacademic settings. Moreover, general characteristics of the university itself such as size, location, and whether it is public or private should be considered in sample selection in future research, since the data in this study was obtained from only one large, midwestern, public university.

Limitations intrinsic to the study preclude making inferences to a larger population of sociologists or political scientists. However, on the strength of this exploratory study it appears warranted to further test the hypotheses on a more adequate sample from which inferences could be drawn. Future research, in addition to testing the hypothesis of interdisciplinary ideological differences between sociologists and political scientists, might also focus more specifically on the problem of the socialization process within the discipline, since our findings indicate that discipline itself and not background characteristics provide the most adequate predictor of sociologists' and political scientists' ideological position. Thus it appears useful to more rigorously test the proposition that the salient reference group is the discipline. Longitudinal studies of the development of students' attitudes toward the power structure could provide valuable insight into the process by which students assume the ideological positions of their respective disciplines.

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